4 20 90 https://www.antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/48e20123bb1a0afc4c75d56b9df2ed2b.pdf 3a5b14ed1024ae543ea015e4c65d7a7e PDF Text Text (SECTIC;. i'v'j 174 /al Plumwood 1 and Richard Rout ley Peter like Singer, so-e basic wish Philosophic to question, assumptions underpinning estern can's attitudes loaros nis role in the moral universe ana his relationship to nonhunan animals. 1 *vai •Plumwood has done most of ner work under ner married name: • v a 1 “Routley. *ln deference, however, to her wish tc establish herself under •Plur »ooi that name ■ill oe used throughout this work. In a passage reiininscent of Singer's call for examination of unguestioneo assumptions, they state: ..nodern moral philosophers -- fulfilling tneir now established function of providing a theoretical superstructure to explain and justify contemporary rather than .oral sensibilities questioning fundamental asumptions -- tend to argue tnat tne bias toward human interests, which is an integral part of going ethical theories, is not just hich is both possible and aesiraole tc eliminate, out another form of class cnauvinism is ratner a restriction nctated by tne logic of evaluative an- .oral concepts, ana tnat the �Page 2 coherent, possible, or viable alternative to the "human chauvinism" of. standard etnical theories. 2 there is no “Richard “Routley “sand\& “Vai “Routley. '‘Against the “inevitability of “Human 2 “Cnauvinisr . “>ln\a “Goodpaster, “r.,“E. "&ar At *K.“ . “Sayre, "o.eds\&. “ttric s ano “Problems of tne 21st “Century. “ one “Lame, “.-Diversity of "-otre “Dame “t ress, If class cnauvinism Jo-7. differential, "is discriminatory and inferior treatnent (oy sufficiently many members of the class) for items outside the class, for which there is not suiXiciect chauvinism is tne form of justification"3, class chauvinism in then which human the species, uaao Sapleur., substantially morally discriminates against everything nonhuman by an insufficiently justified assumption of human rnoral uniqueness. “R, “Routley “4<and\i. *v, “Routley, “Hunan "Chauvinisi? and “Environmental “Ethics. “kln\& “ annison, “D.“S., c“Ror>bie, “m.“A., “aand\& “R. “Routley, “Environmental “Philosophy. “Canberra, “A“ "u, 1980; 96. *&eds\&. The contention that man is tne sole subject of value and �Page J morality fallacy. by definition This runs contention aground takes the the seif-validating ana unchallengeable; consideration oeing exclusive to on a definitional definition ot moral human realm to be The fallacy of the definitional move is that of believing that by converting the substantive evaluative theses of nu<an chauvinism to matters of definition they become somehow exempt from challenge or need for justification, iris is comparable to justifying discriminatory menbership for a club by referring to the rules, similarly conceived as self-validating and exempt from question or need of justification. 4 v v r'r sr °Ut3sy "&andX& "v • *Routiey. 'Against the 'Inevitability of 'Human In this case the club rules define the Moral Club. These definitions can upon either Physical characteristics or a set of properties that are logically connected with qualification for moral consideration, it is onvious that the physical characteristics are not morally relevant: * x It is impossible to restrict moral terms to particular species, when species distinctions are defined in terms of physical characteristics which are not morally relevant, •ore generally, an attempt to derive a logically necessary connection net eet humanity itself and the applicability of morality is bound to fail, for creatures anatomically ana zoologically aistinct fro hurans >hicii arc identical with humans in terms ot morally relevant features arc logically possible, upsetting any logical linkage. 5 5• and Houtley. W Koutley ■■ Against the inevitability of Human Chauvinism; 39. X rnerefore , the characteristics neeoed to support the defintional move have to be other than physical characteristics. However, if properties logically tiea „itn moral considerations are examined closely, it is fauna that they do not support the exclusive eligibility of hur ans to tne Moral Clue. Three conditions or adequacy ore set down for making tne Clue exclusive to humans: �Page 4 1. The set of characteristics must he possessed oy at least all properly functioning humans, since tc omit any si unit leant aroup usually considered subject to iroral consiceratin, suer as infants, young children, prinitive tribesmen, etc., ano to allow that it was ierrissiole to treat these groups in the ay it is considered permissible to treat non-humans, that is, as mere instruments, would certainly lc repugnant to modern moral sensibilities and would offend common intuitions as to the orotherhood of mar., the vie- that all humans are possessors of inalienable rights, Thus human chauvinism , if it is to produce a coherent theory which does not unacceptably rule out some groups of humans, must find so e set cf features cc on to the rust diverse ' en ters of hu" anKiriu.... (luu loiax Auclusloa 2. in order tor nu an chauvinis; to be justified, this sec ot characteristics ust not be possessed by any non-nuran. Uiie ioXai i-xclusiau 3. The set of characteristics must oe not merely norally relevant but sufficient to justify, in a ncn-circuiar way, the cut-oil of moral consideration at exactly tne right point. If human chauvinism is to avoio the charge of arbitrariness and unjustifiability and to demonstrate its inevitability ana tne impossibility of alternatives, it rust erneroe from tne characteristics why items not having tne f ay oe used as i: ere instruments to serve tne interests of those which do possess tne . b (lac Xb^Xxxi&euXai Ju&xxxXcaXXQa liS&UuaXlbU ) b “Routley and "Routley. 39-40. "Against tne "Inevitability of "Human "Chauvinism J But tne properties usually assumed to give humans exclusive entry into tne moral Cluo when tested against these conditions of adequacy either admit nonhumans or exclude humans. Thirty-two such properties are tested oy Plumwood and Routely XuXb£ alia, using tools, using language, self-awareness, ceing a■are of the Inevitability ot one s own death, being aoie to answer questions about moral issues sucn as human chauvinism, having interests, having projects, belonging to a social community, being morally responsible tor one's actions, etc., and all are found anting on at least one count. �Page 5 However, the conditions of adequacy night oe challenged as too stmgent. Yet, if tne '<oral Club is to be exclusive to humans and neither arbitrary nor unjustified, then condition 1 - tnat all functioning humans possess the property - must apply, etherise tne requirerents for Club member snip are drawn too narrowly and some humans are excludes. against this condition it might be argued tnat numan is too __ _____ _ _ and it is only persons (where oread________ in scope , . re j_eVdnt_ "para parametre) person is defined by some morally relevant e’tre) who should De considered, this would mean that those humans buran , ,---- -— -no did not qualify as persons aouIo net oe eligible for treatment as oncers of tne oral Clue or if they tie treated as members that eligibiility was arbitrary and unjust. it it is the case that’all humans (persons) must possess this property, then it must also be the case tnat no nonhuman possesses it, otherwise an Argument From Analogy and Anoiiioiy applies. if some nonhumans possess the property or properties then the requirements for Club membership are ara^n too broadly ana some nonnumans are eligible _J. Finally, it is not enough to separate the eligible - ’ J ~ ' •- from the ineligible (or pernaps the edible from tne inediblej, it must oe snown why the ineiigiole are not only ineligible for membership, but why tney cannot even oe consldereo for membership, otherwise tne difference in treatment is not justified. To carry tne Club metaphor .. a little farther, pernaps too far, while remoers n.a, ay h-.nave certain privileges, this aoes not necessarily mean tnat that in addition to not enjoying these special privileges, nonrnembers can also oe un*arrantly deprived of benefits common to memoers and non-memoers. why should membership devalue nonmenoers ano put tneTi at the disposal of members? it is o y this condition that human chauvinism must show why humans are the exclusive subjects of intrinsic value and the value of nonhumans can be handled in terms of instrun.enr.al value to humans. If these conditions of adequacy stand, then tne definitional necessity of exclusiveness fails. Yet another approach at making the realms of value ano morality exclusive to humans is to examine no.< values are thougnt to operate. . prototype argument tor this is laio out as follows: A. values are determined through tne preference rankings of valuers (tne aa dfixacuafiie Karnes , Valuers' preference rankings are determined through valuer s interests (tne preXcifiace £aauci.ioa thesis). C. valuers are humans (persons) (tne saecsas assaaplioa). I. Therefore, values are determines tnrouqn human interests (tnrough tne interests ot persons). 8 Routley and Routley. Against the Inevitability of human Chauvinism: The use of persons in this quotation is a reference to agru.rents aimed at �Page 6 saving tne exclusiveness of the doral Club by limiting membership to humans with some given capacity, characteristic or excellence or combination of these. while this argument may succeed in preventing non- u.ans tror consideration, it is at the cost of non-paradigr atic i,.<ins. From this argument It is sometimes concluded that "not only is it perfectly accceptatie for humans to reduce matters of value and morality to natters of human interest, but oreover there is no rational or possible alternative to going so; any alternative is simply incoherent." 9 ithever, it this argument is disrantled it is snown to rest on a set of false assumptions that even Charitable tanipulation cannot save. 9 43. Routley and Routley. Against me Inevitability of Human Chauvinism; an ambiguity resides in the use of 'determined through' in precise I, if 'determined through' means 'have to ce determined*, men Plumwood and Routley feel, mat it is ’Odaliy upgraded "to reveal the sneer necessity of conclusion J." 10 10 “Routley and “Routley. Against the inevitability of Human Chauvinism: no-ever, this involves a similar modificiition of p r e tn i s e C or eise a nodal fallacy is involved. The C._ stronger ci­ necessary sense is preferable in forcing tne conclusion, J -- as shall be seen snortly when premise C is considered, but tne more cnaritaoie move for tne argument is to weaken the use of 'determined mrougn' to something like 'reflect ' or 'are a ratter of'. Despite either modification to resolve the ambiguity of 'determined through' premise A is still susceptide to the charge: value rankings cannot however ce cashed in for preference rankings since, as 1 s well-known, preference rankings and value rankings car diverge; a valuer can prefer wnat has less value and can value what is not , referred. 11 Premise a is , therefore ( modified to read: Al Values are determined through the value rankings of (appropriate) valuers, 12 11 "Routley and “Routley. Against the Inevitability of Human Chauvinism 44. 12 Ro tley and Routley, Against me inevitability of num Chauvinism: 44. Bypassing premise B for a moment, premise C, the St-ficieb aSiuuiptAob, can be seen as a "circular way of reintroducing tne logical version of human chauvinism by restricting tne class of valuers a priori to humans" and at �Page 7 Snr1 ^'?2Hy2enriy*-^rae' 13 11 is essential to the argument lse1 c to oe a necessary condition that humans are the only valuers. ithout that the argument ooes not human chauvinsitic conclusion. if persons is usea instead of humans, tnen it becomes -ore defensible, since not all humans are valuers, but not all valuers are human, if not all valuers are numar' or persons, tnen to sustain the human chauvinistic conclusion it becomes necessary either to reject ail non-human (person) values or i? i‘,’o e«- a "'ove m premise a such that 'interests' are United to human (person) interests. 43-4. Routley and Houtley. Against the Inevitability of Human Chauvinism! , „ It is just such a move at premise B , that ma k e s it, tor them, tne most objectionable of the premises, Premise 6 is a group selfisnness To eirrsnness argument. io show tn at the that conclusion and particularly premise ‘ pre ise “B is little more than an argument for group oup egoism in an environmental setting, they oisplay it against ainst an argument baldly for egoism. if pre ise A is recast replacing 'preferences' ith 'values' as ov°'v-i^2'preTn!ern ?rS0 0ds.to have 'preferences' replaced attention in is no- shifted to interests . interests can oe usea either in a weax and - , -se so tnat anything tne valuer values is in tne Ya|uer s interest ,ln stronger, but false sense tnat is intended to support interests as ceing in the valuer's advantage: to sum. up tne dilemma for the argument then: when. "interests" is usea in its weaker sense premise u may be accepted out tne argument does not establish its inter, oea conclusion or in any way sucpoert human chauvinism. For tne intended effect of the argument in the cruae form is this; in determining values it is enough to look at human advantage; nothing else counts. If tne argument -ere correct, tnen one could assess values bv cneckmq out tne local (selfish) advantage of hu ans, or, more generally, tne aavanta ,e of tne case class someho* assembled. it, on thP otner hano, "interests": is usea in its strong sense, tne conclusion would license a form of human crauvinis , but premise no, false. 14 Rout ley ano Routley. “Against the “Inevitability of “Human "Chauvinism: �Page 8 This argument has a second , aspect to it which they explore. if tne argument is not acceptable as it stands, then supposelv, neither is tne alternative of rejecting its conclusion. Precise A is opposed to the conclusion D (~a or D / D-> A) to shod either one accepts the conclusion, ith its consequent instru entalist account of value, or one is committed to an intrinsic or cetacned value theory wnich takes values to oe completely independent of valuers, no ------------ , ano and r.c ay determined oy tneit, out, it is assumed, the latter theory is a ell Known as untenable, and rr.ay even _. ____ as involving mysticism be seen or as oeing irrational inus, it may te conduced, there is no real alternative to hu-an chauvinism. lb #15 Routley and Routley. Against tne inevitability of Human Chauvinism; but this choice is rejectee « as a x false «js>c one: u < < c. To reject the instrumentalist conclusion D is bv no means to be commited tc a, or to the view that tne valuers . _____ __ ,____ and their preference rankings play no role in determining values and tnat values are a_ further 'set„ o — __ ___ . of items mysterious independent iters in the world somehow perceived by valuers through a special (even mystical and nonr ational) moral sense. 16 Against, the Inevitability of Human Chauvinism: Parallel to this dichotomy between A and u is the dichotomy Detween instrumental and intrinsic values so central in tne division and treatment of members from nonmembers in tne hor a1 Club; Tne dicnotomy frequently presentea between instrumentalist accounts of. value, on tie one hand, ana detached tneories (or what die mistakenly taken to 0e the same, intrinsic tneories) is, for the same reason, a false one. Instrumental theories ore those men attempt to reduce value to what is instrumental to or contributes to a stated goal. Typically such theories taxe tne goal to oe tne furtherance of the interest of a privileged class; tor example, tne goal may oe taken to be determined in terms of the interests, concerns, advantage, or welfare of tne .class of humans, or of persons, or of sentient creatures, cej ending on t>e type of cnauvinism. In particular, human chauvinist tneories are, characteristically, instrumentalist theories. in contrast, an item is valued intrinsically where it is 16 Routley and Routley. 47. 47. �Page 9 valued for its own sake, and not merely as a means to something further; and an intrinsic-value theory allo is that some items are intrinsically valuable. valuable, . intrinsic theories tnen, then, contrast with - it n ___ instr urn on cal theories,, and *hat vhat "intrinsic" tells us is no more tnan that tne the iter taken as intrinsically valuable is not valued merely as a means tc some goal, i.e., is, not merely - - is instrumentally valued. Accordingly - 117 detached value theories, since < disjoint 1 from instrumental theories, are a suo-ciass of intrinsic value theories; and they are a proper suoclass since intrinsic values need not be detached, lSomething may __ ______ _ be valuaole in itself without its ceing detached frott all valuing experience. 17 17 Routley and Routley. Against tne inevitability 01 ■ uman •Chauvinism Because detacned value theories are only a subclass of intrinsic value theories the dichotomies bet een A and b and between instrumental and instrinsic theories are false. Since detached theories cannot be maintained and totally instrumental value theories leao to an infinite regress, which is manifest if, consistent witn tne theory, the goals of a valuer are taken as instrumental, then neither of tnese extremes is acceptable, but values do exist, so some other vie-, besides those offered in the dichotomy must be advanced, Plumwood ana Routley advance one vie* tnat denies the dichotomy, yet does not limit valuers to humans and does not li it tne value of objects to human instrumental values; A person is the source of value-judgments and values .in one sense, i.e. s/he is tne valuer; out not in another, namely s/ne is not responsible for a valued item having its valued properties. or is there any licence for reducing tne values assignee to those tnat serve tne interests of tne valuer. 18 18 Routley and Routley. Hunan chauvinism and Environmental Ethics: This solution seems to do little more than shift the detached value argument back one step. -hy snould tne qualities of an item be valued except that a valuer places some value on them? Tnat is to say, all items (objects of moral concern) have qualities, out tnat some of these Qualities are valued ana some are not inaicates tne (instrumental) choices of a valuer (unless a theory of detacher values, *hich has just teen rejected, is adopted.) me intent behind this value theory is to avoid positing detacned values, yet to maintain sone basis for intrinsic values tnat cannot be cashed in tor instrumental values. io 158 47’8. �Page 10 do this requires that the intrinsic value of the qualities not be seen also as instrumental values. it is not, tneretorej a natter of assigning intrinsic values to tne goals of instrumental value tneories, it is a matter of finding a way in which a particular goal or item or being is capable of possessing value that is neither detached from, the notion of a valuer nor , if connected in some manner to a valuer, merely a means to another end. Asserting the valued qualities are resident in the iter; is intended to separate it from the valuer's evaluation and denying the reauction of values to the interests of tne valuer is intended to provide for an intrinsic worth in items and separate intrinsic values from purely instrumental values, if tne intrinsic value of an object is conceptually different from its instrumental value, then tne intrinsic value must be taken into consideration separate from its instrumental uses and instrumental judgments about the item. Therefore, the item (object of moral concern) is granted respect in, of ana tor itself and this is the ultimate goal of the P1U' .-ood/Koutley position. An item can have an Intrinsic and an instrumental worth, but this does not in and of itself remove the humans bias to arcs intrunentai values or towards the properties valued. For this the aerial that humans (persons) are tne only valuers is needed: It is simply a (common) mistake to think mat values and rights do not have a meaning, or an application, outsice tne human context or situation: to establish tnis point (on which i-oore rightly insisted) it is enough to point out again that (hypothetical) valuers, not necessarily nun an or persons, can assign values with respect to situations and worlds devoid of hunans ano of persons altogether. 19 houtley ano "Routley. “Human Chauvinisr and “Environmental “mthics: 19 it can now be asserted tnat items in the environment have a value beyond those assignee to then by humans (persons)) ana that ceings other than humans can be valuers,, but what is left to do is to establish tne relative ranks or 'pecking In this regari tne greater value order' of valuers. things may nave assumption "that ever, trough other instrinsic value, people <or humans are more valuable than anything else, and rank more highlyi (no matter how large their numoer) ' must be denied. 20 Houtley and Pout ley. Human Chauvinism and Environmental Ethics: The greater value assumption, a weaker form, ot human chauvinism, is open to most of objections made against numao chauvinisr. and to examples contrasting morally repugnant humans ith norally non-repugnant nonhumans illustrating t.ne 171. 157-b. �Page 11 • • unacceptable outcomes of this assumption, such as: if tnere is only roc in one's life boat for one ano one fust cnccse oet-.een saving Adolf Hitler and a combat ^hicn nas lived a decent life and never narirea a living creature, one is morally obliged to choose the former. 21 21 Routley and Routley. Against tne Inevitability of Human Chauvinism: 5 7. Having set aside tne arguments for value being exclusive to humans tney no focus on arguments for morality being exclusive to humans. One such argument is tne contractual argument: J. K. L. M. N. 22 fne only justification of moral principles (only X) is a contractual one, i.e., the entry into contracts of agents (Zry). Agents only enter into contracts (only Z) it it serves tneir. o*n interests. (The Ciaisl. ifiii J Humans (persons) are the only agents that enter into contracts (tout Zj, therefore, oy K ano i; Humans (persons) only enter into contracts (only Z) if it serves tneir own interests. Tnerefore, from J and : Tne only justification for moral principles (only X) is the (selfisn) interests of humans (persons). 22 "Routley ano "Routley. "Against the Inevitability of Human Chauvinisms This entire contract argument can oe faulted as a strawman, out tne general effect of the argument ano tne conclusion still carry tne intention of human chauvinistic arguments oased on the exclusiveness of morality to numans. Thus tnis prototype is illustrative ana descriptive of the sorts of conclusions in force and the sorts of premises usea to support then. Therefore, the counterarguments usea against trie contractual argument and its close relatives oesignate the sorts of attacxs that can be launched against arguments for human cnauvlnis ano moral exclusiveness. It is assumed tnat conditions other tnan contractual ones , e.g. community based, can be substituted into pre ■ ise J and with appropriate modifications to the rest of tne argu ent tne same conclusion can be reached. Premise d proports to set tne parameters of tne argument oy selecting an activity with moral relevance that does not violate tne second condition of adequacy previously set down. In an 52. �Page 12 attempt to describe an exclusively hui<<an i oral context, premise J's use o£ the ^oro 'only' to support entry into contracts, a purely hu.an (person's) endeavour, makes it obviously raise. turtnernore, in supporting the contract -hdicinq as a purely human (person s) endeavour, however, "premise J imports the very chauvinism that is at issue in tne conclusion." 2J 23 “Routley ana “Routley. Against tne inevitability of Human “Chauvinism: 53. premise J is found to be faulty on several points. If moral obligation is tasen to ce a moral principle then premise J is not sufficient to include all moral obligations. "There is no actual contract underlying tne principle that one ought not to be cruel to animals, children, and otners not in a position to contract." 24 Ii this too narrow scope »ere not enough to condemn tne theory, then; The social contract account of moral obligation is defective because it implies tnat moral obligations can really only hold between responsible moral agents and attempts to account for all. moral ooliqation as based on contract. but of course tne account is correct as an account of the origin of some tyr.es of moral ooligatlon; there are moral ooli ,ations of type that can only hold oetween free and responsible agents and others which only apply within a social and political context. let other types of ooligatlon, such as the obligation not to cause suffering, can arise only with respect to sentient or prefercnce-naving creatures -.•no are not necessarily morally responsible -- ana could not significantly arise itn res.ect to a nonsentient such as a tree or a rock. 25 Routley and Routley. Against the Inevitability of Human Chauvinism: Routley ano Routley. Against tne Ir.evitablility of human Chauvinism: 24 25 A moral agent could have a moral obligation to a being incapable of being or becoming a moral agent. Even when precise J is amended to something besiaes a contractual, foundation, it still comes to grief on tne sticking point of obiigations. Premise K, the egoist assumption; is faulted on the same grounds as egoism itself. For agents sometimes enter into contacts that are not in their awn interests but are in tne interests of other persons or 54. 5b. �Page 13 creatures, or are undertaken on behalf of, tor instance to protect, other items tr at do not nave interests at all, e.g., rivers, ouildings, forests. Against the Inevitability of u an Chauvinism: what is not pellucid nere, is that entering into a contract on oenalf of another is not, or cannot, be in the interests of the contracting agentand therefore a denial of premise K, Entering into acontract that protects something that is itself incapable of interests nay indirectly oe in the interests of tne contracting agent even though tne agent's interests are not directly recognized by tne contract. by example, an agent may enter into a contact that proctects a virgin forest and the river that flos through it, in order to protect the agent's access to water downstream of tne forest. Or pernaps even more indirectly, an agent ray sign over his land as a wildflower sanctuary because his neighbour, *no he nates, is allergic to wildflowers. It would seer that wnat has to oe snown is that an agent would enter a contract on behalf gf anotner -nen tne interests of the other are directly opposed to tne interests of tne conrtracting agent, Opposition to tne contracting agent's interests may oe, however, too strinqent a condition. If breaking the premise rests in showing tnat an agent will act outside nis selfish interests, tnen it is only necessary to snow tnat an agent vould enter into a contract when his selfish interests -ere not involved. In sucn a case, entering a contract tc protect a river, building, or forest could ce sufficlent. 26 -^outley and Routiey. 53. Premise K can be amended to reflect the ability to enter into contracts for beings or things other tnan tne contracting agent: 27 However even if premise . K were amended to ad-iiit that agents may enter into contracts on oenalt of nonhuman items, it would still result in a form of numan chauvinis given familiar -assumptions, since nonhun-an items will still ce unable to create moral obligaions except through a human sponsor or patron, who will presumably aole to choose -hetner or not to protect them. 27 "Routley and "Routiey. "Against the "Inevitability of "Human "Chauvinism: but if tnis modification is made and nonhuman items are unable to create a moral, obligation on the agents (agents ceing under moral obligations only where they cnoose to De), then tnis premise assumes tne conclusion ■. It is only the interests of the humans Involved tnat justify the moral obligation imposed by tne contract. 53. �Page 14 Premise L is strengthened by trie use of person* "tor otherwise premises suer, as e and its variations are suspect, since tnere is nothing, legally or morally, to prevent consortia, organizations, and other nonhumans from entering into contracts (and tnese items are appropriately counted as persons in the larger ieg.,1 sense)." 2t 28 -? 3 • Routley and Routley. Against the Inevitability of Hunan Chauvinism: ■<hile premise L may be the better by this move premises j and k are both tne worse. J remains false and K is either false or assumes the conclusion if modified to allow for conditions tnat would save tne human chauvinistic elements of it. thus contractual arguments land alter natives of the same form as this prototype) for the substantiation of a human cnauvinistic-oased environmental ethics are lost. ine assumptions underlying tne premises are simply not. equal to the task of supporting the conclusion. Further modification of the premises is at the expense oi violating the conditions of adequacy for exclusive human membership in the .'oral Clue. if the restrictions (such as 'only') on oremdses ltxe J (or variations of it) are removed, then leeway is left for including soie npnhumans oi excluding some humans. Cn the other hand, restrictions may oe retained and tne contractual portion is modified put the result is tne sane. ire -ore vital premise for establishing tne human cnauvinistic conelusion, premises like K tnat 1ink t?e exclusive numan justification ot moral actions to human interests, either assume the conclusion or may re countered by examples that snow them to be false. Plum-ood and Routley conclude; it is not possible to provide criteria hich would jusill* distinguishing, lr the sharp way standard western ethics do, between numans and certain nonhuman creatures, and particularily those creatures which have preferences or ^referred states. For sucn criteria appear to depend upon tne mistaken assumption that moral respect for other creatures is due only when they can be shown to measure up to some ratner axaltbai.ll4=u£.t.££aifi£d and JLaauea tests for membership of a privileged class (essentially an elitist view), instead of upon, say, respect for tne preferences of other creatures. Accordingly tne sharp moral distinction, commonly accepted in ethics bv philosophers and ethers alike, all bureaus aea all olb££ aniial ^pbclax*. lac&£ a Sall^laClQty; Cobfitbul 29 �Page 15 29 103. “Koutley ana “Routley. “Chauvinisi ar.) “•.nviron : ental “£tnicss Having broken the exclusiveness of value and morality to humans and naving disconnected the link of values and morals to solely human interests, ■ nat alternatives are there to human chauvinistic systens? Given tne analysis just made of value and morality, Plumwood ano Routley maintain: what emerges ____ __ _ is ________ ____ of __ types of __ ____ a picture oral obligation as associated with a nest of rings or annular bounaary classes, with the innermost class, consisting of highly _ creatures, intelligent, social, sentient having tne full range of moral obligations applicable to them, ana outer classes of sucn nonsentient items as trees and rocks having only a much more restricted range of moral obligations significantly applicable to them, In in some cases there is no sharp division between tne rings, 'but there is no single uniform privileged class of items, no one base class, to which all ano only moral principles directly apply, and moreover the zoological ■class of humans is not one or tne really significant boundary classes. Tne recognition tnat sone types of moral ooiiqation only apply -<ithin tne context of a particular sort of society, or through contract, does nothing to support the case of human cnauvinlsfi . 3 30 55. Routley and “Routley. -gainst tne inevitability of human Chauvinism This notion of nested zones or an annular classes ; ay be diagramed as in Diagram i. 31 picture of �Page lb 31 "Routley, "Richard. "Canberra, 1981: 2. "In "defense of "Cannibalise, "Unpublished paper. The laoels for the rings or zones represent; 32 respectively different soils of objects such as, objects of moral concern, /.elf are-having objects, preference-havers (and cnoice-na<ers), right-nolders, obligation-holders and responsibilitybearers, trose contractually- co<ni!'ittea- and tne different sorts of obligations that can significantly apply to such objects. ot all the tyoes of objects indicated are distinct, nor is the listing intended to be exhaustive but rather illustrative. for strictly the laoels given should oe expanded, as the distinctions are categorical ones, so tnat what matters is net whether an object is, tor instance, contractually committed in sore fasnion out whether it is tne sort of thing that can be, whether it can significantly enter into or be committed by arrangements of a contractual xina, 32 Routley and Routley. human Cnauvinlsin and Environmental Ethics: oreover, tne categorical distinctions that demarcate the various rings or zones are morally relevent categories. ine annular picture does not. reject traditional ethical categories, tut does reject the limitation of categories to one snecies or case class. .Also it rejects unjustified distinctions tnat are not "...categorical distinctions .hich tie analytically -itn ethical notions...." 33 107-8. �Page 17 Routley ana "Routley. "Human "cnauvinis and "Environmental "Ethics: inis celng tne case: it is certainly in no «ay species chauvinist or nuian chauvinist. For none of tne zones of tne annular picture couprises the class o£ humans (or its jincr variant tne class of persons); for tnis class is not of moral relevance. 34 _Routley and Routley. Human Chauvinism ana Environmental Ethics: Returning again to tne metaphor of tne oral Club, under tr.e annular ring picture membership in tne Club is automatic to all objects of moral concern, out tne privileges within tne Club are limited by moral capacities to use the facilities ot me Club. Tne obligations and the extent of those ooligations of human members to nonhuman members rest upon tne type of moral object . tne nonhuman is and on its capacities (illustrated by its overlay on the annular rings) not upon a comparison of tne nonhuman to tne human. For example a being capaole of contractual obligation could justifiaoly discriminate against a being unaole to make contracts with reference to contractual ooligations, regardless of the species of tne t/o beings. dy tie same token, it would be unjust of a preference-haver to discriminate against another preference-haver solely because tne two preference-havers were of uifferent species. loo it snould be notes tnat Diagram 1 illustrates tne position of humans as a species ano not tnat ot a particular human. Any given nuran, as ith any given object of noral concern plotted on tne annular rings, .»ould not necessarily mater? in each detail the plot of tne species to «nicn it oelonjs: Just as tnere are relevant divisions beyond tne class of perference-havers , so tnere are ithir. the class. Tnus tne suggestion tnat tne class to.-a rds which noral obligations (ano a corresponding Sait ot moral concern which ta<es account ot creatures* states) ay oe neld is bounded by tne class of preference-havers, does not ot course imply tnat oo disxiUGXicas can be nade -iiwl- the class of preference-navers with respect to tne kind of behaviour appropriate to them. For example, contractual obligations -- wnicn Dy no means exnaust obligation -- can only be nela directly (as distinct from by way of representative) with respect to a n.ucn narrower class of creatures, from which many • 108. �P a g e 1« humans are excluded. 35 10 7. 3b “Routley and “Routley. “Human “Chauvinis and “Environmental “Ethics; The shift from determining moral regard by a comparison o£ nonnumans to humans to a determination oy an examination ot categorical distinctions expands tf.e range of nonhuman objects of moral concern. ay rejecting tne base class assumption, value as determined oy use or production by the base class is also rejected. inis does not mean tnat human values *111 be rejected, but tnat values will no longer oe judged solely in human terms and that human values -ill no longer automatically taxe precedent over all other values, inus a particular ecosystem, e.g. a swamp, is recognized a., having value other tnan the possible location of an oil­ bearing geosyncline or a salt dome. It is seen to nave value as the home of a number of various flora and fauna species with a complex set of inter-relationships and as a system in itself that is not reducible to the interests of one species or even group of species within it. Inis last point tnat the value of an ecosystem, or any similar complex of values, interests, preferences, etc,, is not reducible to the values, interests, or preferences of either the individual components or toe whole, ignoring tne individual components, is called by them tne "no-reduction position". Inis position permits a middle ground between tne extremes of particularistic and holistic views and thereby provides a loc is for what they term "the ecological outlook": in a closely related -ay, the no-reduction position can provide a suitable metaphysical base for an ecological outloox vor* i ax vuuxuurs worldview, in which man is seen : as .part _ of a natural community, part of natural systems seen as integrated wholes and with .welfare and interests bound whole, ...... ano not __________ ____ __ up with the ..................... as, in tne typical .estern view, a separate, self-contained actor standing outsue tne syster and manipulating it in the pursuit of self-contained interests, 36 36 Routley, Vai and Richard Routley. Social rneories, oelf management, and Environmental Problems. “&“ln\s annison, .s., iCRobbie, .a. “ .anoX* R. Routley, “&edsX&. Environmental Philosophy. Canberra, am), I960: 319. One of the offsooots ot this no-reductior position is a policy of respect for the systei , its parts, and for the inter-relationships between parts and the parts and the h ole; �Page 19 Tne no-reduction position can thus provide a natural foundation for a genuinely environmental ethic, one *nicn allows human actions to be guided oy respect, cure and concern for the natural world and rejects tne "human Egoist" tnesis that tne only constraints on nunan action concerning nature arise from tne interests of other numans. For sucn relations of interdependence between man and nature must give rise to constraints on numan action in the same *ay tnat appropriate relations of. interdependence between en do, so tne thesis that action can and must oe unconstrained by any concerns other than human ones fails, as does tne thesis tnat nature is no more than a means to hu an ends, a mere tool. 37 37 Routley and Routley. Social theories, Self management, and Environmentaifroblems: Tne respect position .is cased on one or general ooligation principles: 1. ore of three Ine general principle cf respect . .. .. _ _ i for preference-navers (.formerly applied only to human preferences) is transferred to the larger arena of all oeinys or items that can be placed in a disprefer red state> • ..the requisite, important and non-ar.itrary distinction is to ce ora*n which narKS out the class of creatures to.-,arcs -hicn obligations may ce held; tnat is, the usually recognisec principles oi consideration towards others (of tne privileged class) properly extend or should be generalized to consideration for other creatures having preferences, and xgg geaaxal aeXeriSiCle GGliGaiiaa -iu.cci„14i is fiat Lii put aXfaets XoXuui PitfiXetfiaGfisfiaAzexsl iuia a dis^raXaxxfia state 1CC GQ GQGU reuses, 38 Routley and Routley, 2. 39 Hunan Chauvinism and Environmental Ethics: Preferences alone, ho-.ever, are still too narro to develop an environmental ethic or ecological outlooK. So tne second principle applies to beings or iters <itn an interest' or 'welfare', v-nere rf...an 'interest' or welfare in tne broaa sense is a Xclus or life-goal, as possessed by living things, or an equilibrium or system goal, as possessed oy living ecosystems." 39 Routley and Routley, 104. ' Human Chauvinism and Environmental Ethics: 106, 319. �Page 20 iherefore, tne second principle is: that the -altaic or of animate objects and also such biological items as ecosystems can ce affected in one way oi another, e.g. increased, decreased, upset. Foi instance, the wellbeing of a coastal community and of the individual trees in it can ce reduced to zero oy sandmining, and it can be seriously threatened by pumping vaste detergent into trie nearoy ocean. Tnere is a general ocligaiton principle corresponding likewise to tnis more comprehensive class of ,»elf are-bearers, namely, dpX to jaopafoxse ttfi ..ulijeiiju ui aaiuxai oPJecxs uc -J.4--UU1 JiCu ±£aiGU. 4<) 40 3. Routiey and Routiey. Human Chauvinism and Environmental Ethics; lOu- /. Beyond preference-havers and beings or systems ith interests or welfares, the environment contains items, sucn as rocKS, soils and «:ater*ays tnat nave value, out no preferences or interests; unlike higher animals sucn items cannot literally be put into dispreferred states (and In obvious sense, as opposed to the ider sense of 'interests' tied to welfare, they have no interests), out they can be damaged or destroyeo or nave their Maiue eroded or impaired. 41 41 Routiey ana Routiey. Human Chauvinism and Environmental Ethics; Tne three generalizable obligation principles are parallel in their structure and application and vary omv in /.hat rings of the annular Picture that they cover. Exclusiveness of the principles to a particuair ring, however, snould not ce assumed. ine principle of not damaging or destroying the value of an object of in oral concern could extend across the entire annular picture. Thus tne overlay of a ^articular ouject of moral concern will indicate which principle(s) of obligation may be applied to a particular case. An object of moral concern, e.g. a wornoat, may very veil be capdole of being placed in a dispreferred state, its wellbeing or interests jeopardizej, or devalued at one ana tne same time. in tne other hand, another object of moral concern, e.g. Ayers Rock, may, perhaps, only be disvalued. 109. �Page 21 Further tne respect position not only gives generalized principi.es of od! igat ion , but it also reverses tne common notion of when tnese principles are applied: Cn tne alternative thoroughgoing respect vie.'., whi.cn is illustrated o y various nonexploitive non- estern ethics, one starts from a restricted position, a position of no interference and no exploitation, a position at peace witn tne natural world so to say, and allots interference -- not as on ■estern tninxlng, restricts i terference -- for aooa reasons. ine onus of ,-roof is tnus entirely inverted: good reasons are required lax interference, not xa siax interference. 42 _____ Routley and Routley. nunan Chauvinism and Environmental Ethics: 174. <*?verLi? ’ onus 01 proof leads to shifts and inversions in otner areas as well. Requiring good reasons for interfering crings about a shift in tne notion of property ownership. Operating under a respect position, it can no longer oe assumed that tne environment or pieces of lii?an QofSrivate Property t0 De done with or disposed of at ■'•ill. Before a s-amp can ce drained, or a forest" cut, or a steam polluted seme jooa reason must be given, Human convenience and economic gain would not count as good Respect does not preclude use, nut it does preclude certain sorts of use. it is inco catioie aoove all -itn property vie ano >.itn regarding something as no lore than a eans to tne user's eras. 43 Routley* Social theories, Self management, and Environmental Problems: The respect position is not only incompatible witn the property view, it is also incompatible 1th tne strong dichotomy between use and nonuse: me conventional wisdom of western Society tends to offer a false dichotomy of use versus respectful nonuse - a false choice wnicn cones out especially clearly again in tne treat ent of animals. Here the choice presented in -estern thought is typically one of exxoex use without respect or serious constraint, of using animals for example in the ways cnaracteristic of largescare mass-production farming and a market economic systep wnich are inconpatiole with respect, ox on the otner nand of not making any use of animals at all, for e x ampie, never making use 322 . �Page 22 of animals for food or for farming purposes, •hat is left out in unis choice is trie alternative tne Indians and other non--.estern teople have recognizee, the alternative oi li 'ited and respectful use, which enaoles use to be made of animals, but does not allow animals to oe used in an unconstrained way or merely as means tc human ends. 44 44 Routley and Routley, human Chauvinism aid Environmental Ethics: 179. bt^taKerVup tr^a^a ter °cn^t er*™ pe0fie' sever’di groups of Australian Aborigines, will ^either, then, is tne respect position a reverence position tnat also arises from the use/nonuse oicnotoi y. the lives, preferences, choices, and considerations of otner species or objects of oral concern are not to be taken as sacred and inviolable. out as has been pointed out before a good reason must be given before interference can oe orooKe . interference is acceptable, as in tne case of ’essential predation... nlch is essential to the normal livelihood of the predator, and where tne predator takes tor itself no more than it requires for its livelihood," 45 Routley, Richard. in Defense of Cannibalism•; 32. thus an alternative to tne western dichotomy of use versus nonuse is to mitigate, if possible, tne user's considerations with the considerations of the item: io so ise somethin i itnout treating it as available for unlimited or unconstrained use tor numan ends is characteristic of x;esfcicci.XuX use. In contrast non-respectful use treats the use of the Iten as constrained by no considerations arising from the item itself and tne user's relationship to it, but as constrained only in a derivative way, by considerations of the convenience, welfare ano so forth of otner humans. 4b Routley and Routley. Human Chauvinism and Environmental Ethics: For there to be a respectful position that denies tne dichotomy of unconstrained use versus respectful nonuse and tnat allows tor the relationsnip Detween tne user and tne item and the considerations of the item to be taken into account, one fundamental change in tne present relationship between humans and tne environment tnat must eventuate is for individual users to take direct responsibility for their impact: Respect positions can only be generally 179. �Page 23 realized in a society in whicn tne basic social structure and economy enables people to take direct responsibility for tne impact on tne natural world their needs and tneir statisfaction create , such as in tne economy of cooperative, involvement, 47 Routley and Routley. Social theories, Self "anagement, and Environmental Problems: Human users taking direct responsibility tor tneir impact snould lover tneir impact. If users bear tne responsibility tor producing and managing what they need, then they should produce, in a manner like unto tne 'taking' of essential oreaation only wnat they neeo and should 'qo lighter' on tne world: 323 . ..self-management can offer the alternative of a social^ in wnich nothing is produced wnich uoes not correspond to genuine needs an .i in which production is designed to satisfy tnose needs «itn a minimum of aste. Tne possiclity of production of material *nicn does not correspono to genuine neeos is eliminated oy two factores in the ecomony of cooperative exchange ano involvement; first, a direct relationsnip between tne possiblity of use of an iter and direct expenditure of labour on tne part of tne user, and second, direct cooperative involvment bet een producers and users. 48 48 Routley and Routley. social Theories, Self anagement, and Environmental Problems: Tne respect position, tnerefore, is intended to lower the impact of human users on the entire environment, -nile extending tne position's own impact goes far beyond tne interrelations of human and other species. It is intended, when applied to «estern cultures, to face among other issues tne econonic/etnicai conflicts tnat nave been at tne core of many of tne practical ethical problems concerning humans ana nonhumans and that nave given rise to much of tne current debate over inter-specific ethics. ine respect position is a strong repalcement to the Dominion Thesis that has been tne ruleing and guiding principle of western though on etnical relationsnips between numans and nonhumans. bike the Dominion Thesis, tne respect position is a oasic set of principles from whicn a wnoie range of problems, situations, ' and questions can oe approached. Tne alterations to the cut of -estern societies tnat would result from its adoption as tne pattern of etmcal progress would oe more drastic tnan that of either a Stewardship Principle (or some other weakened form of the Dominion Thesis) or an extension principle, sucn as the Utilitarian extension proposed by Singer. fet these seeniniy drastic alterations, or some 313. �Page 24 otnef equally drastic set, r^ay be no more tnan *nat is ■■eeje.; to restyle current practices as a more just ano less ar o i t rary . � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Draft Papers Description An account of the resource Sylvan's literary executor encountered an archive in which “all his projects were current", since manuscripts were undated and unattributed. Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document (SECTIC;. i'v'j 174 /al Plumwood 1 and Richard Rout ley Peter like Singer, so-e basic wish Philosophic to question, assumptions underpinning estern can's attitudes loaros nis role in the moral universe ana his relationship to nonhunan animals. 1 *vai •Plumwood has done most of ner work under ner married name: • v a 1 “Routley. *ln deference, however, to her wish tc establish herself under •Plur »ooi that name ■ill oe used throughout this work. In a passage reiininscent of Singer's call for examination of unguestioneo assumptions, they state: ..nodern moral philosophers -- fulfilling tneir now established function of providing a theoretical superstructure to explain and justify contemporary rather than .oral sensibilities questioning fundamental asumptions -- tend to argue tnat tne bias toward human interests, which is an integral part of going ethical theories, is not just hich is both possible and aesiraole tc eliminate, out another form of class cnauvinism is ratner a restriction nctated by tne logic of evaluative an- .oral concepts, ana tnat the Page 2 coherent, possible, or viable alternative to the "human chauvinism" of. standard etnical theories. 2 there is no “Richard “Routley “sand\& “Vai “Routley. '‘Against the “inevitability of “Human 2 “Cnauvinisr . “>ln\a “Goodpaster, “r.,“E. "&ar At *K.“ . “Sayre, "o.eds\&. “ttric s ano “Problems of tne 21st “Century. “ one “Lame, “.-Diversity of "-otre “Dame “t ress, If class cnauvinism Jo-7. differential, "is discriminatory and inferior treatnent (oy sufficiently many members of the class) for items outside the class, for which there is not suiXiciect chauvinism is tne form of justification"3, class chauvinism in then which human the species, uaao Sapleur., substantially morally discriminates against everything nonhuman by an insufficiently justified assumption of human rnoral uniqueness. “R, “Routley “4<and\i. *v, “Routley, “Hunan "Chauvinisi? and “Environmental “Ethics. “kln\& “ annison, “D.“S., c“Ror>bie, “m.“A., “aand\& “R. “Routley, “Environmental “Philosophy. “Canberra, “A“ "u, 1980; 96. *&eds\&. The contention that man is tne sole subject of value and Page J morality fallacy. by definition This runs contention aground takes the the seif-validating ana unchallengeable; consideration oeing exclusive to on a definitional definition ot moral human realm to be The fallacy of the definitional move is that of believing that by converting the substantive evaluative theses of nu<an chauvinism to matters of definition they become somehow exempt from challenge or need for justification, iris is comparable to justifying discriminatory menbership for a club by referring to the rules, similarly conceived as self-validating and exempt from question or need of justification. 4 v v r'r sr °Ut3sy "&andX& "v • *Routiey. 'Against the 'Inevitability of 'Human In this case the club rules define the Moral Club. These definitions can upon either Physical characteristics or a set of properties that are logically connected with qualification for moral consideration, it is onvious that the physical characteristics are not morally relevant: * x It is impossible to restrict moral terms to particular species, when species distinctions are defined in terms of physical characteristics which are not morally relevant, •ore generally, an attempt to derive a logically necessary connection net eet humanity itself and the applicability of morality is bound to fail, for creatures anatomically ana zoologically aistinct fro hurans >hicii arc identical with humans in terms ot morally relevant features arc logically possible, upsetting any logical linkage. 5 5• and Houtley. W Koutley ■■ Against the inevitability of Human Chauvinism; 39. X rnerefore , the characteristics neeoed to support the defintional move have to be other than physical characteristics. However, if properties logically tiea „itn moral considerations are examined closely, it is fauna that they do not support the exclusive eligibility of hur ans to tne Moral Clue. Three conditions or adequacy ore set down for making tne Clue exclusive to humans: Page 4 1. The set of characteristics must he possessed oy at least all properly functioning humans, since tc omit any si unit leant aroup usually considered subject to iroral consiceratin, suer as infants, young children, prinitive tribesmen, etc., ano to allow that it was ierrissiole to treat these groups in the ay it is considered permissible to treat non-humans, that is, as mere instruments, would certainly lc repugnant to modern moral sensibilities and would offend common intuitions as to the orotherhood of mar., the vie- that all humans are possessors of inalienable rights, Thus human chauvinism , if it is to produce a coherent theory which does not unacceptably rule out some groups of humans, must find so e set cf features cc on to the rust diverse ' en ters of hu" anKiriu.... (luu loiax Auclusloa 2. in order tor nu an chauvinis; to be justified, this sec ot characteristics ust not be possessed by any non-nuran. Uiie ioXai i-xclusiau 3. The set of characteristics must oe not merely norally relevant but sufficient to justify, in a ncn-circuiar way, the cut-oil of moral consideration at exactly tne right point. If human chauvinism is to avoio the charge of arbitrariness and unjustifiability and to demonstrate its inevitability ana tne impossibility of alternatives, it rust erneroe from tne characteristics why items not having tne f ay oe used as i: ere instruments to serve tne interests of those which do possess tne . b (lac Xb^Xxxi&euXai Ju&xxxXcaXXQa liS&UuaXlbU ) b “Routley and "Routley. 39-40. "Against tne "Inevitability of "Human "Chauvinism J But tne properties usually assumed to give humans exclusive entry into tne moral Cluo when tested against these conditions of adequacy either admit nonhumans or exclude humans. Thirty-two such properties are tested oy Plumwood and Routely XuXb£ alia, using tools, using language, self-awareness, ceing a■are of the Inevitability ot one s own death, being aoie to answer questions about moral issues sucn as human chauvinism, having interests, having projects, belonging to a social community, being morally responsible tor one's actions, etc., and all are found anting on at least one count. Page 5 However, the conditions of adequacy night oe challenged as too stmgent. Yet, if tne '<oral Club is to be exclusive to humans and neither arbitrary nor unjustified, then condition 1 - tnat all functioning humans possess the property - must apply, etherise tne requirerents for Club member snip are drawn too narrowly and some humans are excludes. against this condition it might be argued tnat numan is too __ _____ _ _ and it is only persons (where oread________ in scope , . re j_eVdnt_ "para parametre) person is defined by some morally relevant e’tre) who should De considered, this would mean that those humans buran , ,---- -— -no did not qualify as persons aouIo net oe eligible for treatment as oncers of tne oral Clue or if they tie treated as members that eligibiility was arbitrary and unjust. it it is the case that’all humans (persons) must possess this property, then it must also be the case tnat no nonhuman possesses it, otherwise an Argument From Analogy and Anoiiioiy applies. if some nonhumans possess the property or properties then the requirements for Club membership are ara^n too broadly ana some nonnumans are eligible _J. Finally, it is not enough to separate the eligible - ’ J ~ ' •- from the ineligible (or pernaps the edible from tne inediblej, it must oe snown why the ineiigiole are not only ineligible for membership, but why tney cannot even oe consldereo for membership, otherwise tne difference in treatment is not justified. To carry tne Club metaphor .. a little farther, pernaps too far, while remoers n.a, ay h-.nave certain privileges, this aoes not necessarily mean tnat that in addition to not enjoying these special privileges, nonrnembers can also oe un*arrantly deprived of benefits common to memoers and non-memoers. why should membership devalue nonmenoers ano put tneTi at the disposal of members? it is o y this condition that human chauvinism must show why humans are the exclusive subjects of intrinsic value and the value of nonhumans can be handled in terms of instrun.enr.al value to humans. If these conditions of adequacy stand, then tne definitional necessity of exclusiveness fails. Yet another approach at making the realms of value ano morality exclusive to humans is to examine no.< values are thougnt to operate. . prototype argument tor this is laio out as follows: A. values are determined through tne preference rankings of valuers (tne aa dfixacuafiie Karnes , Valuers' preference rankings are determined through valuer s interests (tne preXcifiace £aauci.ioa thesis). C. valuers are humans (persons) (tne saecsas assaaplioa). I. Therefore, values are determines tnrouqn human interests (tnrough tne interests ot persons). 8 Routley and Routley. Against the Inevitability of human Chauvinism: The use of persons in this quotation is a reference to agru.rents aimed at Page 6 saving tne exclusiveness of the doral Club by limiting membership to humans with some given capacity, characteristic or excellence or combination of these. while this argument may succeed in preventing non- u.ans tror consideration, it is at the cost of non-paradigr atic i,.<ins. From this argument It is sometimes concluded that "not only is it perfectly accceptatie for humans to reduce matters of value and morality to natters of human interest, but oreover there is no rational or possible alternative to going so; any alternative is simply incoherent." 9 ithever, it this argument is disrantled it is snown to rest on a set of false assumptions that even Charitable tanipulation cannot save. 9 43. Routley and Routley. Against me Inevitability of Human Chauvinism; an ambiguity resides in the use of 'determined through' in precise I, if 'determined through' means 'have to ce determined*, men Plumwood and Routley feel, mat it is ’Odaliy upgraded "to reveal the sneer necessity of conclusion J." 10 10 “Routley and “Routley. Against the inevitability of Human Chauvinism: no-ever, this involves a similar modificiition of p r e tn i s e C or eise a nodal fallacy is involved. The C._ stronger ci­ necessary sense is preferable in forcing tne conclusion, J -- as shall be seen snortly when premise C is considered, but tne more cnaritaoie move for tne argument is to weaken the use of 'determined mrougn' to something like 'reflect ' or 'are a ratter of'. Despite either modification to resolve the ambiguity of 'determined through' premise A is still susceptide to the charge: value rankings cannot however ce cashed in for preference rankings since, as 1 s well-known, preference rankings and value rankings car diverge; a valuer can prefer wnat has less value and can value what is not , referred. 11 Premise a is , therefore ( modified to read: Al Values are determined through the value rankings of (appropriate) valuers, 12 11 "Routley and “Routley. Against the Inevitability of Human Chauvinism 44. 12 Ro tley and Routley, Against me inevitability of num Chauvinism: 44. Bypassing premise B for a moment, premise C, the St-ficieb aSiuuiptAob, can be seen as a "circular way of reintroducing tne logical version of human chauvinism by restricting tne class of valuers a priori to humans" and at Page 7 Snr1 ^'?2Hy2enriy*-^rae' 13 11 is essential to the argument lse1 c to oe a necessary condition that humans are the only valuers. ithout that the argument ooes not human chauvinsitic conclusion. if persons is usea instead of humans, tnen it becomes -ore defensible, since not all humans are valuers, but not all valuers are human, if not all valuers are numar' or persons, tnen to sustain the human chauvinistic conclusion it becomes necessary either to reject ail non-human (person) values or i? i‘,’o e«- a "'ove m premise a such that 'interests' are United to human (person) interests. 43-4. Routley and Houtley. Against the Inevitability of Human Chauvinism! , „ It is just such a move at premise B , that ma k e s it, tor them, tne most objectionable of the premises, Premise 6 is a group selfisnness To eirrsnness argument. io show tn at the that conclusion and particularly premise ‘ pre ise “B is little more than an argument for group oup egoism in an environmental setting, they oisplay it against ainst an argument baldly for egoism. if pre ise A is recast replacing 'preferences' ith 'values' as ov°'v-i^2'preTn!ern ?rS0 0ds.to have 'preferences' replaced attention in is no- shifted to interests . interests can oe usea either in a weax and - , -se so tnat anything tne valuer values is in tne Ya|uer s interest ,ln stronger, but false sense tnat is intended to support interests as ceing in the valuer's advantage: to sum. up tne dilemma for the argument then: when. "interests" is usea in its weaker sense premise u may be accepted out tne argument does not establish its inter, oea conclusion or in any way sucpoert human chauvinism. For tne intended effect of the argument in the cruae form is this; in determining values it is enough to look at human advantage; nothing else counts. If tne argument -ere correct, tnen one could assess values bv cneckmq out tne local (selfish) advantage of hu ans, or, more generally, tne aavanta ,e of tne case class someho* assembled. it, on thP otner hano, "interests": is usea in its strong sense, tne conclusion would license a form of human crauvinis , but premise no, false. 14 Rout ley ano Routley. “Against the “Inevitability of “Human "Chauvinism: Page 8 This argument has a second , aspect to it which they explore. if tne argument is not acceptable as it stands, then supposelv, neither is tne alternative of rejecting its conclusion. Precise A is opposed to the conclusion D (~a or D / D-> A) to shod either one accepts the conclusion, ith its consequent instru entalist account of value, or one is committed to an intrinsic or cetacned value theory wnich takes values to oe completely independent of valuers, no ------------ , ano and r.c ay determined oy tneit, out, it is assumed, the latter theory is a ell Known as untenable, and rr.ay even _. ____ as involving mysticism be seen or as oeing irrational inus, it may te conduced, there is no real alternative to hu-an chauvinism. lb #15 Routley and Routley. Against tne inevitability of Human Chauvinism; but this choice is rejectee « as a x false «js>c one: u < < c. To reject the instrumentalist conclusion D is bv no means to be commited tc a, or to the view that tne valuers . _____ __ ,____ and their preference rankings play no role in determining values and tnat values are a_ further 'set„ o — __ ___ . of items mysterious independent iters in the world somehow perceived by valuers through a special (even mystical and nonr ational) moral sense. 16 Against, the Inevitability of Human Chauvinism: Parallel to this dichotomy between A and u is the dichotomy Detween instrumental and intrinsic values so central in tne division and treatment of members from nonmembers in tne hor a1 Club; Tne dicnotomy frequently presentea between instrumentalist accounts of. value, on tie one hand, ana detached tneories (or what die mistakenly taken to 0e the same, intrinsic tneories) is, for the same reason, a false one. Instrumental theories ore those men attempt to reduce value to what is instrumental to or contributes to a stated goal. Typically such theories taxe tne goal to oe tne furtherance of the interest of a privileged class; tor example, tne goal may oe taken to be determined in terms of the interests, concerns, advantage, or welfare of tne .class of humans, or of persons, or of sentient creatures, cej ending on t>e type of cnauvinism. In particular, human chauvinist tneories are, characteristically, instrumentalist theories. in contrast, an item is valued intrinsically where it is 16 Routley and Routley. 47. 47. Page 9 valued for its own sake, and not merely as a means to something further; and an intrinsic-value theory allo is that some items are intrinsically valuable. valuable, . intrinsic theories tnen, then, contrast with - it n ___ instr urn on cal theories,, and *hat vhat "intrinsic" tells us is no more tnan that tne the iter taken as intrinsically valuable is not valued merely as a means tc some goal, i.e., is, not merely - - is instrumentally valued. Accordingly - 117 detached value theories, since < disjoint 1 from instrumental theories, are a suo-ciass of intrinsic value theories; and they are a proper suoclass since intrinsic values need not be detached, lSomething may __ ______ _ be valuaole in itself without its ceing detached frott all valuing experience. 17 17 Routley and Routley. Against tne inevitability 01 ■ uman •Chauvinism Because detacned value theories are only a subclass of intrinsic value theories the dichotomies bet een A and b and between instrumental and instrinsic theories are false. Since detached theories cannot be maintained and totally instrumental value theories leao to an infinite regress, which is manifest if, consistent witn tne theory, the goals of a valuer are taken as instrumental, then neither of tnese extremes is acceptable, but values do exist, so some other vie-, besides those offered in the dichotomy must be advanced, Plumwood ana Routley advance one vie* tnat denies the dichotomy, yet does not limit valuers to humans and does not li it tne value of objects to human instrumental values; A person is the source of value-judgments and values .in one sense, i.e. s/he is tne valuer; out not in another, namely s/ne is not responsible for a valued item having its valued properties. or is there any licence for reducing tne values assignee to those tnat serve tne interests of tne valuer. 18 18 Routley and Routley. Hunan chauvinism and Environmental Ethics: This solution seems to do little more than shift the detached value argument back one step. -hy snould tne qualities of an item be valued except that a valuer places some value on them? Tnat is to say, all items (objects of moral concern) have qualities, out tnat some of these Qualities are valued ana some are not inaicates tne (instrumental) choices of a valuer (unless a theory of detacher values, *hich has just teen rejected, is adopted.) me intent behind this value theory is to avoid positing detacned values, yet to maintain sone basis for intrinsic values tnat cannot be cashed in tor instrumental values. io 158 47’8. Page 10 do this requires that the intrinsic value of the qualities not be seen also as instrumental values. it is not, tneretorej a natter of assigning intrinsic values to tne goals of instrumental value tneories, it is a matter of finding a way in which a particular goal or item or being is capable of possessing value that is neither detached from, the notion of a valuer nor , if connected in some manner to a valuer, merely a means to another end. Asserting the valued qualities are resident in the iter; is intended to separate it from the valuer's evaluation and denying the reauction of values to the interests of tne valuer is intended to provide for an intrinsic worth in items and separate intrinsic values from purely instrumental values, if tne intrinsic value of an object is conceptually different from its instrumental value, then tne intrinsic value must be taken into consideration separate from its instrumental uses and instrumental judgments about the item. Therefore, the item (object of moral concern) is granted respect in, of ana tor itself and this is the ultimate goal of the P1U' .-ood/Koutley position. An item can have an Intrinsic and an instrumental worth, but this does not in and of itself remove the humans bias to arcs intrunentai values or towards the properties valued. For this the aerial that humans (persons) are tne only valuers is needed: It is simply a (common) mistake to think mat values and rights do not have a meaning, or an application, outsice tne human context or situation: to establish tnis point (on which i-oore rightly insisted) it is enough to point out again that (hypothetical) valuers, not necessarily nun an or persons, can assign values with respect to situations and worlds devoid of hunans ano of persons altogether. 19 houtley ano "Routley. “Human Chauvinisr and “Environmental “mthics: 19 it can now be asserted tnat items in the environment have a value beyond those assignee to then by humans (persons)) ana that ceings other than humans can be valuers,, but what is left to do is to establish tne relative ranks or 'pecking In this regari tne greater value order' of valuers. things may nave assumption "that ever, trough other instrinsic value, people <or humans are more valuable than anything else, and rank more highlyi (no matter how large their numoer) ' must be denied. 20 Houtley and Pout ley. Human Chauvinism and Environmental Ethics: The greater value assumption, a weaker form, ot human chauvinism, is open to most of objections made against numao chauvinisr. and to examples contrasting morally repugnant humans ith norally non-repugnant nonhumans illustrating t.ne 171. 157-b. Page 11 • • unacceptable outcomes of this assumption, such as: if tnere is only roc in one's life boat for one ano one fust cnccse oet-.een saving Adolf Hitler and a combat ^hicn nas lived a decent life and never narirea a living creature, one is morally obliged to choose the former. 21 21 Routley and Routley. Against tne Inevitability of Human Chauvinism: 5 7. Having set aside tne arguments for value being exclusive to humans tney no focus on arguments for morality being exclusive to humans. One such argument is tne contractual argument: J. K. L. M. N. 22 fne only justification of moral principles (only X) is a contractual one, i.e., the entry into contracts of agents (Zry). Agents only enter into contracts (only Z) it it serves tneir. o*n interests. (The Ciaisl. ifiii J Humans (persons) are the only agents that enter into contracts (tout Zj, therefore, oy K ano i; Humans (persons) only enter into contracts (only Z) if it serves tneir own interests. Tnerefore, from J and : Tne only justification for moral principles (only X) is the (selfisn) interests of humans (persons). 22 "Routley ano "Routley. "Against the Inevitability of Human Chauvinisms This entire contract argument can oe faulted as a strawman, out tne general effect of the argument ano tne conclusion still carry tne intention of human chauvinistic arguments oased on the exclusiveness of morality to numans. Thus tnis prototype is illustrative ana descriptive of the sorts of conclusions in force and the sorts of premises usea to support then. Therefore, the counterarguments usea against trie contractual argument and its close relatives oesignate the sorts of attacxs that can be launched against arguments for human cnauvlnis ano moral exclusiveness. It is assumed tnat conditions other tnan contractual ones , e.g. community based, can be substituted into pre ■ ise J and with appropriate modifications to the rest of tne argu ent tne same conclusion can be reached. Premise d proports to set tne parameters of tne argument oy selecting an activity with moral relevance that does not violate tne second condition of adequacy previously set down. In an 52. Page 12 attempt to describe an exclusively hui<<an i oral context, premise J's use o£ the ^oro 'only' to support entry into contracts, a purely hu.an (person's) endeavour, makes it obviously raise. turtnernore, in supporting the contract -hdicinq as a purely human (person s) endeavour, however, "premise J imports the very chauvinism that is at issue in tne conclusion." 2J 23 “Routley ana “Routley. Against tne inevitability of Human “Chauvinism: 53. premise J is found to be faulty on several points. If moral obligation is tasen to ce a moral principle then premise J is not sufficient to include all moral obligations. "There is no actual contract underlying tne principle that one ought not to be cruel to animals, children, and otners not in a position to contract." 24 Ii this too narrow scope »ere not enough to condemn tne theory, then; The social contract account of moral obligation is defective because it implies tnat moral obligations can really only hold between responsible moral agents and attempts to account for all. moral ooliqation as based on contract. but of course tne account is correct as an account of the origin of some tyr.es of moral ooligatlon; there are moral ooli ,ations of type that can only hold oetween free and responsible agents and others which only apply within a social and political context. let other types of ooligatlon, such as the obligation not to cause suffering, can arise only with respect to sentient or prefercnce-naving creatures -.•no are not necessarily morally responsible -- ana could not significantly arise itn res.ect to a nonsentient such as a tree or a rock. 25 Routley and Routley. Against the Inevitability of Human Chauvinism: Routley ano Routley. Against tne Ir.evitablility of human Chauvinism: 24 25 A moral agent could have a moral obligation to a being incapable of being or becoming a moral agent. Even when precise J is amended to something besiaes a contractual, foundation, it still comes to grief on tne sticking point of obiigations. Premise K, the egoist assumption; is faulted on the same grounds as egoism itself. For agents sometimes enter into contacts that are not in their awn interests but are in tne interests of other persons or 54. 5b. Page 13 creatures, or are undertaken on behalf of, tor instance to protect, other items tr at do not nave interests at all, e.g., rivers, ouildings, forests. Against the Inevitability of u an Chauvinism: what is not pellucid nere, is that entering into a contract on oenalf of another is not, or cannot, be in the interests of the contracting agentand therefore a denial of premise K, Entering into acontract that protects something that is itself incapable of interests nay indirectly oe in the interests of tne contracting agent even though tne agent's interests are not directly recognized by tne contract. by example, an agent may enter into a contact that proctects a virgin forest and the river that flos through it, in order to protect the agent's access to water downstream of tne forest. Or pernaps even more indirectly, an agent ray sign over his land as a wildflower sanctuary because his neighbour, *no he nates, is allergic to wildflowers. It would seer that wnat has to oe snown is that an agent would enter a contract on behalf gf anotner -nen tne interests of the other are directly opposed to tne interests of tne conrtracting agent, Opposition to tne contracting agent's interests may oe, however, too strinqent a condition. If breaking the premise rests in showing tnat an agent will act outside nis selfish interests, tnen it is only necessary to snow tnat an agent vould enter into a contract when his selfish interests -ere not involved. In sucn a case, entering a contract tc protect a river, building, or forest could ce sufficlent. 26 -^outley and Routiey. 53. Premise K can be amended to reflect the ability to enter into contracts for beings or things other tnan tne contracting agent: 27 However even if premise . K were amended to ad-iiit that agents may enter into contracts on oenalt of nonhuman items, it would still result in a form of numan chauvinis given familiar -assumptions, since nonhun-an items will still ce unable to create moral obligaions except through a human sponsor or patron, who will presumably aole to choose -hetner or not to protect them. 27 "Routley and "Routiey. "Against the "Inevitability of "Human "Chauvinism: but if tnis modification is made and nonhuman items are unable to create a moral, obligation on the agents (agents ceing under moral obligations only where they cnoose to De), then tnis premise assumes tne conclusion ■. It is only the interests of the humans Involved tnat justify the moral obligation imposed by tne contract. 53. Page 14 Premise L is strengthened by trie use of person* "tor otherwise premises suer, as e and its variations are suspect, since tnere is nothing, legally or morally, to prevent consortia, organizations, and other nonhumans from entering into contracts (and tnese items are appropriately counted as persons in the larger ieg.,1 sense)." 2t 28 -? 3 • Routley and Routley. Against the Inevitability of Hunan Chauvinism: ■<hile premise L may be the better by this move premises j and k are both tne worse. J remains false and K is either false or assumes the conclusion if modified to allow for conditions tnat would save tne human chauvinistic elements of it. thus contractual arguments land alter natives of the same form as this prototype) for the substantiation of a human cnauvinistic-oased environmental ethics are lost. ine assumptions underlying tne premises are simply not. equal to the task of supporting the conclusion. Further modification of the premises is at the expense oi violating the conditions of adequacy for exclusive human membership in the .'oral Clue. if the restrictions (such as 'only') on oremdses ltxe J (or variations of it) are removed, then leeway is left for including soie npnhumans oi excluding some humans. Cn the other hand, restrictions may oe retained and tne contractual portion is modified put the result is tne sane. ire -ore vital premise for establishing tne human cnauvinistic conelusion, premises like K tnat 1ink t?e exclusive numan justification ot moral actions to human interests, either assume the conclusion or may re countered by examples that snow them to be false. Plum-ood and Routley conclude; it is not possible to provide criteria hich would jusill* distinguishing, lr the sharp way standard western ethics do, between numans and certain nonhuman creatures, and particularily those creatures which have preferences or ^referred states. For sucn criteria appear to depend upon tne mistaken assumption that moral respect for other creatures is due only when they can be shown to measure up to some ratner axaltbai.ll4=u£.t.££aifi£d and JLaauea tests for membership of a privileged class (essentially an elitist view), instead of upon, say, respect for tne preferences of other creatures. Accordingly tne sharp moral distinction, commonly accepted in ethics bv philosophers and ethers alike, all bureaus aea all olb££ aniial ^pbclax*. lac&£ a Sall^laClQty; Cobfitbul 29 Page 15 29 103. “Koutley ana “Routley. “Chauvinisi ar.) “•.nviron : ental “£tnicss Having broken the exclusiveness of value and morality to humans and naving disconnected the link of values and morals to solely human interests, ■ nat alternatives are there to human chauvinistic systens? Given tne analysis just made of value and morality, Plumwood ano Routley maintain: what emerges ____ __ _ is ________ ____ of __ types of __ ____ a picture oral obligation as associated with a nest of rings or annular bounaary classes, with the innermost class, consisting of highly _ creatures, intelligent, social, sentient having tne full range of moral obligations applicable to them, ana outer classes of sucn nonsentient items as trees and rocks having only a much more restricted range of moral obligations significantly applicable to them, In in some cases there is no sharp division between tne rings, 'but there is no single uniform privileged class of items, no one base class, to which all ano only moral principles directly apply, and moreover the zoological ■class of humans is not one or tne really significant boundary classes. Tne recognition tnat sone types of moral ooiiqation only apply -<ithin tne context of a particular sort of society, or through contract, does nothing to support the case of human cnauvinlsfi . 3 30 55. Routley and “Routley. -gainst tne inevitability of human Chauvinism This notion of nested zones or an annular classes ; ay be diagramed as in Diagram i. 31 picture of Page lb 31 "Routley, "Richard. "Canberra, 1981: 2. "In "defense of "Cannibalise, "Unpublished paper. The laoels for the rings or zones represent; 32 respectively different soils of objects such as, objects of moral concern, /.elf are-having objects, preference-havers (and cnoice-na<ers), right-nolders, obligation-holders and responsibilitybearers, trose contractually- co<ni!'ittea- and tne different sorts of obligations that can significantly apply to such objects. ot all the tyoes of objects indicated are distinct, nor is the listing intended to be exhaustive but rather illustrative. for strictly the laoels given should oe expanded, as the distinctions are categorical ones, so tnat what matters is net whether an object is, tor instance, contractually committed in sore fasnion out whether it is tne sort of thing that can be, whether it can significantly enter into or be committed by arrangements of a contractual xina, 32 Routley and Routley. human Cnauvinlsin and Environmental Ethics: oreover, tne categorical distinctions that demarcate the various rings or zones are morally relevent categories. ine annular picture does not. reject traditional ethical categories, tut does reject the limitation of categories to one snecies or case class. .Also it rejects unjustified distinctions tnat are not "...categorical distinctions .hich tie analytically -itn ethical notions...." 33 107-8. Page 17 Routley ana "Routley. "Human "cnauvinis and "Environmental "Ethics: inis celng tne case: it is certainly in no «ay species chauvinist or nuian chauvinist. For none of tne zones of tne annular picture couprises the class o£ humans (or its jincr variant tne class of persons); for tnis class is not of moral relevance. 34 _Routley and Routley. Human Chauvinism ana Environmental Ethics: Returning again to tne metaphor of tne oral Club, under tr.e annular ring picture membership in tne Club is automatic to all objects of moral concern, out tne privileges within tne Club are limited by moral capacities to use the facilities ot me Club. Tne obligations and the extent of those ooligations of human members to nonhuman members rest upon tne type of moral object . tne nonhuman is and on its capacities (illustrated by its overlay on the annular rings) not upon a comparison of tne nonhuman to tne human. For example a being capaole of contractual obligation could justifiaoly discriminate against a being unaole to make contracts with reference to contractual ooligations, regardless of the species of tne t/o beings. dy tie same token, it would be unjust of a preference-haver to discriminate against another preference-haver solely because tne two preference-havers were of uifferent species. loo it snould be notes tnat Diagram 1 illustrates tne position of humans as a species ano not tnat ot a particular human. Any given nuran, as ith any given object of noral concern plotted on tne annular rings, .»ould not necessarily mater? in each detail the plot of tne species to «nicn it oelonjs: Just as tnere are relevant divisions beyond tne class of perference-havers , so tnere are ithir. the class. Tnus tne suggestion tnat tne class to.-a rds which noral obligations (ano a corresponding Sait ot moral concern which ta<es account ot creatures* states) ay oe neld is bounded by tne class of preference-havers, does not ot course imply tnat oo disxiUGXicas can be nade -iiwl- the class of preference-navers with respect to tne kind of behaviour appropriate to them. For example, contractual obligations -- wnicn Dy no means exnaust obligation -- can only be nela directly (as distinct from by way of representative) with respect to a n.ucn narrower class of creatures, from which many • 108. P a g e 1« humans are excluded. 35 10 7. 3b “Routley and “Routley. “Human “Chauvinis and “Environmental “Ethics; The shift from determining moral regard by a comparison o£ nonnumans to humans to a determination oy an examination ot categorical distinctions expands tf.e range of nonhuman objects of moral concern. ay rejecting tne base class assumption, value as determined oy use or production by the base class is also rejected. inis does not mean tnat human values *111 be rejected, but tnat values will no longer oe judged solely in human terms and that human values -ill no longer automatically taxe precedent over all other values, inus a particular ecosystem, e.g. a swamp, is recognized a., having value other tnan the possible location of an oil­ bearing geosyncline or a salt dome. It is seen to nave value as the home of a number of various flora and fauna species with a complex set of inter-relationships and as a system in itself that is not reducible to the interests of one species or even group of species within it. Inis last point tnat the value of an ecosystem, or any similar complex of values, interests, preferences, etc,, is not reducible to the values, interests, or preferences of either the individual components or toe whole, ignoring tne individual components, is called by them tne "no-reduction position". Inis position permits a middle ground between tne extremes of particularistic and holistic views and thereby provides a loc is for what they term "the ecological outlook": in a closely related -ay, the no-reduction position can provide a suitable metaphysical base for an ecological outloox vor* i ax vuuxuurs worldview, in which man is seen : as .part _ of a natural community, part of natural systems seen as integrated wholes and with .welfare and interests bound whole, ...... ano not __________ ____ __ up with the ..................... as, in tne typical .estern view, a separate, self-contained actor standing outsue tne syster and manipulating it in the pursuit of self-contained interests, 36 36 Routley, Vai and Richard Routley. Social rneories, oelf management, and Environmental Problems. “&“ln\s annison, .s., iCRobbie, .a. “ .anoX* R. Routley, “&edsX&. Environmental Philosophy. Canberra, am), I960: 319. One of the offsooots ot this no-reductior position is a policy of respect for the systei , its parts, and for the inter-relationships between parts and the parts and the h ole; Page 19 Tne no-reduction position can thus provide a natural foundation for a genuinely environmental ethic, one *nicn allows human actions to be guided oy respect, cure and concern for the natural world and rejects tne "human Egoist" tnesis that tne only constraints on nunan action concerning nature arise from tne interests of other numans. For sucn relations of interdependence between man and nature must give rise to constraints on numan action in the same *ay tnat appropriate relations of. interdependence between en do, so tne thesis that action can and must oe unconstrained by any concerns other than human ones fails, as does tne thesis tnat nature is no more than a means to hu an ends, a mere tool. 37 37 Routley and Routley. Social theories, Self management, and Environmentaifroblems: Tne respect position .is cased on one or general ooligation principles: 1. ore of three Ine general principle cf respect . .. .. _ _ i for preference-navers (.formerly applied only to human preferences) is transferred to the larger arena of all oeinys or items that can be placed in a disprefer red state> • ..the requisite, important and non-ar.itrary distinction is to ce ora*n which narKS out the class of creatures to.-,arcs -hicn obligations may ce held; tnat is, the usually recognisec principles oi consideration towards others (of tne privileged class) properly extend or should be generalized to consideration for other creatures having preferences, and xgg geaaxal aeXeriSiCle GGliGaiiaa -iu.cci„14i is fiat Lii put aXfaets XoXuui PitfiXetfiaGfisfiaAzexsl iuia a dis^raXaxxfia state 1CC GQ GQGU reuses, 38 Routley and Routley, 2. 39 Hunan Chauvinism and Environmental Ethics: Preferences alone, ho-.ever, are still too narro to develop an environmental ethic or ecological outlooK. So tne second principle applies to beings or iters <itn an interest' or 'welfare', v-nere rf...an 'interest' or welfare in tne broaa sense is a Xclus or life-goal, as possessed by living things, or an equilibrium or system goal, as possessed oy living ecosystems." 39 Routley and Routley, 104. ' Human Chauvinism and Environmental Ethics: 106, 319. Page 20 iherefore, tne second principle is: that the -altaic or of animate objects and also such biological items as ecosystems can ce affected in one way oi another, e.g. increased, decreased, upset. Foi instance, the wellbeing of a coastal community and of the individual trees in it can ce reduced to zero oy sandmining, and it can be seriously threatened by pumping vaste detergent into trie nearoy ocean. Tnere is a general ocligaiton principle corresponding likewise to tnis more comprehensive class of ,»elf are-bearers, namely, dpX to jaopafoxse ttfi ..ulijeiiju ui aaiuxai oPJecxs uc -J.4--UU1 JiCu ±£aiGU. 4<) 40 3. Routiey and Routiey. Human Chauvinism and Environmental Ethics; lOu- /. Beyond preference-havers and beings or systems ith interests or welfares, the environment contains items, sucn as rocKS, soils and «:ater*ays tnat nave value, out no preferences or interests; unlike higher animals sucn items cannot literally be put into dispreferred states (and In obvious sense, as opposed to the ider sense of 'interests' tied to welfare, they have no interests), out they can be damaged or destroyeo or nave their Maiue eroded or impaired. 41 41 Routiey ana Routiey. Human Chauvinism and Environmental Ethics; Tne three generalizable obligation principles are parallel in their structure and application and vary omv in /.hat rings of the annular Picture that they cover. Exclusiveness of the principles to a particuair ring, however, snould not ce assumed. ine principle of not damaging or destroying the value of an object of in oral concern could extend across the entire annular picture. Thus tne overlay of a ^articular ouject of moral concern will indicate which principle(s) of obligation may be applied to a particular case. An object of moral concern, e.g. a wornoat, may very veil be capdole of being placed in a dispreferred state, its wellbeing or interests jeopardizej, or devalued at one ana tne same time. in tne other hand, another object of moral concern, e.g. Ayers Rock, may, perhaps, only be disvalued. 109. Page 21 Further tne respect position not only gives generalized principi.es of od! igat ion , but it also reverses tne common notion of when tnese principles are applied: Cn tne alternative thoroughgoing respect vie.'., whi.cn is illustrated o y various nonexploitive non- estern ethics, one starts from a restricted position, a position of no interference and no exploitation, a position at peace witn tne natural world so to say, and allots interference -- not as on ■estern tninxlng, restricts i terference -- for aooa reasons. ine onus of ,-roof is tnus entirely inverted: good reasons are required lax interference, not xa siax interference. 42 _____ Routley and Routley. nunan Chauvinism and Environmental Ethics: 174. <*?verLi? ’ onus 01 proof leads to shifts and inversions in otner areas as well. Requiring good reasons for interfering crings about a shift in tne notion of property ownership. Operating under a respect position, it can no longer oe assumed that tne environment or pieces of lii?an QofSrivate Property t0 De done with or disposed of at ■'•ill. Before a s-amp can ce drained, or a forest" cut, or a steam polluted seme jooa reason must be given, Human convenience and economic gain would not count as good Respect does not preclude use, nut it does preclude certain sorts of use. it is inco catioie aoove all -itn property vie ano >.itn regarding something as no lore than a eans to tne user's eras. 43 Routley* Social theories, Self management, and Environmental Problems: The respect position is not only incompatible witn the property view, it is also incompatible 1th tne strong dichotomy between use and nonuse: me conventional wisdom of western Society tends to offer a false dichotomy of use versus respectful nonuse - a false choice wnicn cones out especially clearly again in tne treat ent of animals. Here the choice presented in -estern thought is typically one of exxoex use without respect or serious constraint, of using animals for example in the ways cnaracteristic of largescare mass-production farming and a market economic systep wnich are inconpatiole with respect, ox on the otner nand of not making any use of animals at all, for e x ampie, never making use 322 . Page 22 of animals for food or for farming purposes, •hat is left out in unis choice is trie alternative tne Indians and other non--.estern teople have recognizee, the alternative oi li 'ited and respectful use, which enaoles use to be made of animals, but does not allow animals to oe used in an unconstrained way or merely as means tc human ends. 44 44 Routley and Routley, human Chauvinism aid Environmental Ethics: 179. bt^taKerVup tr^a^a ter °cn^t er*™ pe0fie' sever’di groups of Australian Aborigines, will ^either, then, is tne respect position a reverence position tnat also arises from the use/nonuse oicnotoi y. the lives, preferences, choices, and considerations of otner species or objects of oral concern are not to be taken as sacred and inviolable. out as has been pointed out before a good reason must be given before interference can oe orooKe . interference is acceptable, as in tne case of ’essential predation... nlch is essential to the normal livelihood of the predator, and where tne predator takes tor itself no more than it requires for its livelihood," 45 Routley, Richard. in Defense of Cannibalism•; 32. thus an alternative to tne western dichotomy of use versus nonuse is to mitigate, if possible, tne user's considerations with the considerations of the item: io so ise somethin i itnout treating it as available for unlimited or unconstrained use tor numan ends is characteristic of x;esfcicci.XuX use. In contrast non-respectful use treats the use of the Iten as constrained by no considerations arising from the item itself and tne user's relationship to it, but as constrained only in a derivative way, by considerations of the convenience, welfare ano so forth of otner humans. 4b Routley and Routley. Human Chauvinism and Environmental Ethics: For there to be a respectful position that denies tne dichotomy of unconstrained use versus respectful nonuse and tnat allows tor the relationsnip Detween tne user and tne item and the considerations of the item to be taken into account, one fundamental change in tne present relationship between humans and tne environment tnat must eventuate is for individual users to take direct responsibility for their impact: Respect positions can only be generally 179. Page 23 realized in a society in whicn tne basic social structure and economy enables people to take direct responsibility for tne impact on tne natural world their needs and tneir statisfaction create , such as in tne economy of cooperative, involvement, 47 Routley and Routley. Social theories, Self "anagement, and Environmental Problems: Human users taking direct responsibility tor tneir impact snould lover tneir impact. If users bear tne responsibility tor producing and managing what they need, then they should produce, in a manner like unto tne 'taking' of essential oreaation only wnat they neeo and should 'qo lighter' on tne world: 323 . ..self-management can offer the alternative of a social^ in wnich nothing is produced wnich uoes not correspond to genuine needs an .i in which production is designed to satisfy tnose needs «itn a minimum of aste. Tne possiclity of production of material *nicn does not correspono to genuine neeos is eliminated oy two factores in the ecomony of cooperative exchange ano involvement; first, a direct relationsnip between tne possiblity of use of an iter and direct expenditure of labour on tne part of tne user, and second, direct cooperative involvment bet een producers and users. 48 48 Routley and Routley. social Theories, Self anagement, and Environmental Problems: Tne respect position, tnerefore, is intended to lower the impact of human users on the entire environment, -nile extending tne position's own impact goes far beyond tne interrelations of human and other species. It is intended, when applied to «estern cultures, to face among other issues tne econonic/etnicai conflicts tnat nave been at tne core of many of tne practical ethical problems concerning humans ana nonhumans and that nave given rise to much of tne current debate over inter-specific ethics. ine respect position is a strong repalcement to the Dominion Thesis that has been tne ruleing and guiding principle of western though on etnical relationsnips between numans and nonhumans. bike the Dominion Thesis, tne respect position is a oasic set of principles from whicn a wnoie range of problems, situations, ' and questions can oe approached. Tne alterations to the cut of -estern societies tnat would result from its adoption as tne pattern of etmcal progress would oe more drastic tnan that of either a Stewardship Principle (or some other weakened form of the Dominion Thesis) or an extension principle, sucn as the Utilitarian extension proposed by Singer. fet these seeniniy drastic alterations, or some 313. Page 24 otnef equally drastic set, r^ay be no more tnan *nat is ■■eeje.; to restyle current practices as a more just ano less ar o i t rary .  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Box 3, Item 1744: (Section IV) Subject The topic of the resource Computer print out on Val Plumwood (Val Routley) and Richard Routley's (Richard Sylvan) environmental philosophy, includes 48 literature summaries of their works. Author not identified. Description An account of the resource Title in collection finding aid: ?: computer print out on Routleys’ environmental phil. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/browse?search=Val+Plumwood&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bjoiner%5D=and&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=&amp;range=&amp;collection=&amp;type=&amp;user=&amp;tags=&amp;public=&amp;featured=&amp;exhibit=&amp;geolocation-mapped=&amp;geolocation-address=&amp;geolocation-latitude=&amp;geolocation-longitude=&amp;geolocation-radius=10&amp;submit_search=Search+for+items">Val Plumwood</a> <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/browse?search=Richard+Sylvan&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bjoiner%5D=and&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=&amp;range=&amp;collection=&amp;type=&amp;user=&amp;tags=&amp;public=&amp;featured=&amp;exhibit=&amp;geolocation-mapped=&amp;geolocation-address=&amp;geolocation-latitude=&amp;geolocation-longitude=&amp;geolocation-radius=10&amp;submit_search=Search+for+items">Richard Sylvan</a> Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived <span class="MuiTypography-root-125 MuiTypography-body2-126">The University of Queensland's <a data-testid="rek-series" href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/records/search?page=1&amp;pageSize=20&amp;sortBy=score&amp;sortDirection=Desc&amp;searchQueryParams%5Brek_series%5D%5Bvalue%5D=Richard+Sylvan+Papers%2C+UQFL291&amp;searchMode=advanced">Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291</a></span>, Box 3, Item 1744 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org">Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy</a> Contributor An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource <span>This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, </span><a href="https://najtaylor.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Dr. N.A.J. Taylor</a><span>.</span> Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library. Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource [24] leaves. 19.2 MB. Type The nature or genre of the resource Manuscript Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context <a href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:4f13573">https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:4f13573</a> Coverage The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant Australian National University - Second Bookcase - Fourth Shelf - Pile 2 Australian National University Office Australian National University Office > Second Bookcase > Fourth Shelf > Pile 2 Box 3: Environmental Ethics https://www.antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/997fd85057676508d18a88b1e6bf281d.pdf 516f4fd88e81218b85118182cadc8850 PDF Text Text GAEAN GREENHOUSE, NUCLEAR WINTER, AND ANTHROPIC DOOMSDAY? ... climate change, like no other issue, calls the whole notion of human progress into question. The [ever promised] benefits of newer technologies, more efficient economics, and improved political systems could be overwhelmed by uncontrolled global warming. ... the pace of climate change will soon overwhelm natural variability in the earth's climate. Indeed, it can be compared with nuclear war for its potential to disrupt a wide range of human and natural systems, [severely] complicating the task of managing economies and coping with other problems. Irrigation works, settlement patterns, and food production [among others] would be tragically disrupted ... (Worldwatch 89, p.ll, p.10) There are many approaches to the the cluster of problems upon which this philosophical investigation focuses. These approaches range from playing the issue down entirely, dismissing it as not a problem, not something anyone should worry about, at the one end of the range, to playing it up at the other. Those who play it up may even foresee the demise of the human race, unless substantially new socio-economic arrangements - with restructured cities, revitalized lands, rejuvenated oceans - soon eventuate. There is certainly plenty of room for different approaches (see Diagram 1), and for some eclecticism. For what is being relied upon, in every case, comprises shaky and contestable arguments, from flimsy forecasting models lacking many apparently relevant details. No one of sound judgment, aware that weather reports for twelve hours ahead can be wildly astray, would place a very high level of confidence on climatic forecasts for fifty years ahead down a very hazardous track. Nonetheless there is enough information to act; and there is information rationally requiring action. For things in the future are not going to be the same. It is very doubtful that they are going to be any better (though much important economic theorizing presupposes as much, such as the monetary discounting of the future). They are not going to be similar even, because so many parameters important to life are changing, several at exponential rates. Significant in these changes are likely climatic changes. The Greenhouse effect is among these, a result of the increases of "greenhouse" gases, especially carbon dioxide and methane, in the Earth's atmosphere, which have followed exponential paths since the highenergy phase of industrial culture (see Diagram 7). The growth in gas concentration produces, what it is lagged by, but is now apparent, a significant increase in mean global temperatures. This has major implications for much of life on Earth. �Course of action Reasons offered Short response No problem Refutable No certainty Irrational Adaptive capacity Exaggerated High-tech resolution Wishful thinking Severe dislocation otherwise Utopian Individual survival Pointless No action^ Moderate action Considerable action These very condensed responses will be expanded and explained as we proceed. In accord with an esteemed philosophical tradition, a medical analogy is first deployed; it serves to throw main points into high relief. Consider the possible illness of the Earth, for instance as a result of brutalisation and poisoning. Look on the Earth then as a patient^, who exhibits some symptoms of a possibly disabling illness; for instance the patient's system is overloaded with troublesome trace elements and her temperature appears to be rising. Compare rational medical practice where a human patient gives indications of possibly disabling illness, for instance the patient shows signs of hypertension. Now consider some of the spectrum of approaches. Suppose the advice is to take no action, to do nothing but monitor the situation until further information comes in, until even (to take a worst case) it becomes evident that the patient indeed has hypertension and suffers a severe consequence. That would be regarded as irresponsible practice. To say that there is no problem when symptoms are there, would be regarded as utterly irresponsible, and medically refutable. To say that no action should be taken until certainty as to the complaint is established would be seen as incompetent medical practice. Taoist no-action would be different. It would not have undertaken excessive industrial action in the first place. This is precisely not the way less modest Gaean hypotheses regard the Earth. For there the Earth is active, actively participating in co-evolutionary developments. But the health analogy does of course go right back to ancient chthonic view, systematically presented in Plato, according to which The Earth is a living being of whom humans are only a part. Right relationship with the Earth means that the total organism is in good health; so environmental problems are seen as illness, as a failure of one part of the organism to interact supportivcly with others' (Hughes, p.60). For Gaean themes in other ancient philosophies, both before and after Plato, see Hughes p.57. �a ? 3 A responsible practitioner begins recommending some remedial action straight away. Naturally there are various options open as to what may be prescribed. These include, at the one end, high-tech procedures, such as, what would be ridiculous simply for hypertension, full medical engine-and-gearbox replacement (heart and kidney transplant), or, a little less ludicrous but ridiculously commonplace, a whole-remaining-life course of pharmaceutical products, e.g. tablets. At the other end, lifestyle changes are proposed, such as more exercise, weight loss, stress reduction, and an improved diet with less sodium input. Reasonable advice would not include pure adaptation, that the patient went on living as before in the expectation that her system would adapt to the situation. Nor would it be reasonably suggested, except in somewhat unusual circumstances, that the patient entirely change her lifestyle, abandon her work, house and so on, and live somewhere else. Even so unusual circumstances, which might include residence in a very polluted environment or work in a nuclear plant, are no doubt on the increase. Like all analogies, the medical analogy has limitations. One feature it does not capture concerns the holistic aspects of the Earth's sickness, and why accordingly an individualistic survival approach, egotistically rational enough for hypertension and perhaps even for a localised nuclear war, cannot succeed. The reason is, of course, that holistic problems are too extensive for individuals, or even small collectives, acting on their own to be effective or to make much difference. Some are too big even for large collectives or states, but would require whole regions of the Earth acting in concert. But of course some state players, such as the superpowers as regards nuclear winter, can make a substantial difference, or even all the difference. The medical analogy also indicates the outcome of further investigation of approaches. Briefly, as with a chronic illness, the conclusion is that there is no very easy path; future humans should expect a hard landing. 1. Investigative philosophy, argument and rational decision as applied to climatic probiematiques. The role of philosophy in such a complex problematique as that of Greenhouse effects is not difficult to state briefly. Philosophy, Anglo-American philosophy especially, is concerned above all with Investigative philosophy resembles philosophy, except that it may upset the philosophy it applies; it investigates arguments, their features - assumptions, reliability, etc. - and their generalisation to rational processes and methods, but normal philosophical topics. The generalisation to rational processes comprehends a wider range of philosophical throughput than the orthodox narrow range of argument typically addressed in logic courses; to probabilistic and plausibilistic reasoning, to decision processing and making. �4 A main objective in this piece of investigative philosophy is to consider certain argumcmj pointing to probabilities of severe dislocation as a result of Greenhouse effects, and the resulting impact on rariana/ formation and action. There are certain arguments of particular interest for radical decision and action: various neo-Malthusian arguments, catastrophe arguments, and doomsday arguments. A main run of arguments to considerable action are limitative in character. Such ZimifafMm arguments are sometimes alternatively called *neo Malthusian', since Malthus presented a very elementary, very controversial, argument of this general type. But such is the hostility, especially in Marxist-influenced quarters, to Malthus's associated themes (some of them admittedly repulsive) that merely to associate an argument terminologically with Malthus is thereby likely to condemn it. To avoid such fallacious condemnation-byassociation, the graphic term 'neo-Malthusian' is largely avoided in what follows. The general form of these limitation arguments is simply this: growth in some parameter over time encounters limits, typically with severe, even catastrophic, effects; for seldom is the transition to severely constrained behaviour smooth. A characteristic graphic representation is as follows: Diagram 2. GrowfA ZimiM growth parameter exponential growth pattern encountering limits subsequent varying behaviour The limits are often imposed just by finitude, for instance finiteness of a resource or a sink. But other limits can be important, for instance where new phenomena or thresholds come into play. General limitation arguments loom in the background in what follows, where we shall be arguing on a double front: �* * 5 A. Significant disequilibrium of the Earth's systems is a real possibility, and accordingly must be reckoned with in decision procedures. Though the probability of such an outcome may only be modest, the case has to be taken seriously because the result (arrived at by a limitation argument typically) is so bad. Suppose, for instance, the outcome is that the Earth ceases to be habitable in present terms, to be able to carry its present demanding load. Such an outcome would have an extremely high negative value, so it would tend to dominate other alternatives. (But it need not be an entirely worst case, where perhaps the dominant terrestrial species becomes extinct, or the Earth becomes devoid of "higher" life. Under the bad result contemplated some better-off humans in special circumstance may subsist for a while.) Such sufficiently bad cases be taken account of in decision making; they have to be taken account of in rgrz'o/ia/ decision procedures. A*. Significant disequilibrium not only has a non-negligible probability, but set in the proper content has a sizeable probability; so it cannot be ignored or discounted as too low to bother about. For such an argument has to be established at the outset than for a rational decision theory argument. Such a different argument, of especial concern as regard climatic changes, is the following argument:- * There is some probability that the Gaean "greenhouse effect", generated by human activity, will get out of control, that Gaean control mechanisms will fail, and that the Earth will, for example, overheat (Runaway Greenhouse, or premiss). * That result would be disastrous for human activities, and indeed for humans Pr<9.sp(?cf). * Because of the unusual, and unusually precarious, position of humans (of certain critical anthropic parameters), such a probability of disaster is not in fact small but decidedly large. As a consequence then, the human species will probably sharply decline, and even become extinct (C^^^p/26 That is, by a rectified version of Murphy's law - that if something can go wrong then in appropriate unusual conditions, it very probably will - an incrementally small probability is inflated into a very large probability. It would be a mistake to conclude that because the argument itself looks an unlikely one, everyone can stop worrying. The argument is but ong of a substantial raft of arguments, suggesting that we are already in deep trouble, that 5/23^ have everyone worried; it is but a final intellectual sting, so to say, from the previously inconspicuous cosmological tail. �6 Such a doomsday argument no doubt puts together, in one more exact form, some of the sorts of considerations that are troubling many people, especially concerned youth, about the Greenhouse business: that humans (including themselves) are on a decline or extinction path. It is no doubt not the only consideration that should be troubling them or us. For whether or not doomsday warnings are warranted, there are other matters that should be sufficiently worrisome, to anyone of moral integrity:* Future times are likely to be exceedingly uncomfortable for very many creatures, as habitats are destroyed, food producing regions are eliminated, and environments seriously impoverished. (Many of these creatures are nonexistents, mere future existents, i.e. creatures that do not yet exist or participate in market or voting rituals, but nonetheless they wzZ/ exist and may participate. But, despite their presently unfavourable ontological status, they are entitled to fair and decent treatment.) * Given such future prospects, present practices which do nothing or vanishingly little to ameliorate these prospects, are decidedly irrational. Indeed a main message that will emerge from the present exercise is the mora/ Zrrtmpna/f/y of critical large-scale human practices. The irrationality, morally-weighed-down irrationality, of present large-scale human practices is already conspicuous from the wintry downside of climatic prospects of which Greenhouse warming is the upside. �7 Diagram 3. Macro-c/wKmc jarring am?Observed global average temperatures, 1880-1987, with forward projections (historic data from Worldwatch p.10). mean global temperature (degrees C) The apparatus for conducting a world-wide nuclear war is entirely in place and indeed on alert The probability of such a war, even if small, is not zero. Among the many awful effects of a large nuclear war is that of nuclear winter, which would probably bring about the demise of present human civilisation, and would at the very least mean enormous dislocation for most surviving humans and other creatures. A sufficiently diabolical chemico-nuclear war, reaching into all inhabited parts of the globe, could indeed drive the human species close to extinction. The decidedly dubious rationality and morality of these general nuclear arrangements both through what they are in themselves for what purposes, and through their moral �8 opportunity costs - are widely appreciated. The thesis that the arrangements and practices are immoral, irradonal, and ought to be dismantled - already much argued, and also contested^ - is not the present concern. The thermonuclear downside is, by comparison, a very easy case to examine philosophically, and argue, as compared with the greenhouse upside.4 For there is, for instance, a case of sorts for much increased use of greenhouse gases, such as CFCs in refrigerators, a case that hardly extends very plausibly to nuclear weapons. It is a case heavily pressed by some "developing" nations, for polluting devices already in widespread use in more affluent places, as necessary for local standards of living. These nations want, or are heavily encouraged, to extend the war against Nature through the habitats they have gained control over, in the name of economic progress. War also joins Greenhouse summer and nuclear winter. For the barely-analogical rapacious war against Nature is a major contributor to Greenhouse gas emissions, for instance, in the domestication of wetlands for rice paddies, through the heavy pillaging of forests, and the like, typically carried on with swords and bayonets reforged to jump ploughs, chemical weapons turned to herbicide guns, and tanks converted to bulldozers. The protracted war against Nature^, carried, it had been supposed, to a victorious conclusion with the rise of science and technology and the ubiquitous advance of industralisation, seems however to have backfired. For it is turning the Earth, Gaea herself, into a patient, with crippled life support systems, thereby endangering the sustained future even of the victorious. Yet another Pyrrhic victory. Greenhouse and nuclear winter are more intricately connected than through war and as the upside and downside of meteorological phenomena. One of the high-tech solutions suggested for atmospheric overheating, involves the generation of wintering effects - to cool things down - by flinging enough dust up into the atmosphere, a trick no doubt most easily achieved on the requisite scale by nuclear explosives. Needless to say, like backbuming against out-of-control fires, artificial winter would be a pretty desperate and, given present expertise, dangerous expedient. 2. The Greenhouse debate, main policy responses, and irrational decision. The Greenhouse debate, as to what to do, if anything, about forecast Greenhouse effects on Earth, is intellectually disturbing. For it has revealed, as we shall soon see, that many of those who have spoken, worse that /pta/ry q/ r/io-yg wAo who have some role For my very small contribution to this, see the War and Peace scries in Papery E/iwv/wig/mxZ RSSS, Australian National University. Global warming, by no means entirely certain, is assumed to be the outcome of increasing greenhouse gas build up. Of course though some mean temperatures will rise, cooling will probably occur also in some localized regions. A war incited and applauded by illustrious philosophical forebears. �* & 9 in decision making (including both experts and politicians), mah'ng in con^'n'on^ p/nncorrainiy or possible riskA a J7rm gra.%? on The main canvassed policy approaches to the Greenhouse problematique lie firmly within the dominant social outlook, the high-tech growth and development ideology. Diagram 4 E?r<9<26? po/z'cy fa rA^ Gr^g/i/z<9^^ /?ra^/^marz^a^. Dominant paradigm options Alternative ecological outlook Procrastination (wait-and-see) Soft energy paths and alternative regulation Adaptation (sink-or-swim) Socio-economic transformation Regulation Intervention (star wars) We will briefly outline, and find wanting, a// the dominant approaches. * Procra^rznaaon, the prevailing response. In fact the main governmental and conservative response thus far has been procrastination, or "wait-and-see" as it is more benignly known.*? The approach makes much of the uncertainties, of the shortcomings, in even the most elaborate general circulation models for future climatic change, of the high noise-to-signal levels. On such bases it contends that it is too early to do anything, except staging some meetings, organising some review committees, undertaking some monitoring, and funding a little more "research". It obviously does nothing to rock the growth ideology boat. Certainly a few scientists, outside main policy making reaches, do have a sound intuitive appreciation of these problems, and of the deficiencies of prevailing practices, e.g. Pittock 87. There is little excuse for prevailing ignorance of or ignoring of decision theory: for the elements of the standard theory are readily accessible and very elementary. In the present essay a modification of standard decision theory (as expounded e.g. in Jeffrey) is assumed as background; for details see Sylvan. Following Knight, many economists (try to) distinguish between uncertainty and risk. Risk is said to obtain when some more or less objective numerical probabilities can be assigned to outcomes, a situation not obtaining as regards global greenhouse effects. Bayesians, who can always assign subjective probabilities tend to eschew the distinction, e.g. Cyert and DeGroot, who say that 'decision making under uncertainty refers to situations in which the outcome of the decision is not precisely predictable'(p.3). Either way, Greenhouse involves uncertainty - to which rational procedures should be applied. There is significant rhetorical art in the choice of classificatory labels, a rather philosophically neglected art. A PR person must have been hired to produce the Greenhouse adaptation of 'adaptation*. �10 There is the pretence that we do not know enough to act.s But it is known that carbon dioxide, methane and other greenhouse gases are fast increasing. The main causes and enough likely enough consequences are also known. Theoretical considerations have already been partially confirmed by rising temperatures in the eighties. Outcomes of rising temperatures are also known in broad outline: rising sea levels, and so forth. In addition, there are partial small-scale models of Greenhouse effects in action. For example, a city such as Mexico City, which is situated in the bowl-like valley, is placed in an environment which traps heat as well as polludon. The ecological effects, like the human effects, are pretty dramatic even at this small level, and hardly to be sought, or emulated elsewhere. There is a pretence, fostered also by many sciendsts, that Greenhouse difficuldes have only just been discovered; a date commonly set for that watershed event is the Villiers conference and statement of 1985 (e.g. Pittock 87 pp.2-3). Actually there have been Greenhouse warnings for more than a decade, and there has been a corresponding decade of inacdon. Nor is any acdon of much significance presently seriously contemplated. Back in 1979 Bernard wrote at length about and reported the substantial concern of climatologists about Greenhouse effects. Even the magazine not then noted for its green sympathies, recorded that The release of carbon dioxide to the atmosphere by the burning of fossil fuels is, conceivably, the most important environmental issue in the world today" (May 3 1979). Bernard quotes many other concerned scientists, several asserdng that 'the government must start dealing with this problem now". They meant the United States government. "The"" government didn't take the hint. For more than a decade then, sciendsts have been emphasizing that the Greenhouse threat is a major environmental problem, and that action should be taken immediately. Over 10 years nothing of real significance to counter the effects has happened. There has been more than a q/TKacdo/t, during which matters have got worse, and the time frame for evasive acdon disturbingly shorter. It is already evident that requisite decision making under uncertainty is not taking place. On straight inductive grounds, it would be reasonable to expect nothing will be done. While there are theoretical grounds to back up such an assessment, still it is only just beginning to get through to a much wider public (which can exercise a marginal influence on what politicians say) that there is - or T/zay be, as some more reactionary modal-mongering academics would have - a problem or two. Part of the problem is that scientists have been caught out (e.g. crying wolf) and have become ultra-cautious. With the advent of thermodymamics, for instance, scientists began 'threatening mankind with a rather swift "heat death"' as the universe ran down. Thus M. Alier, on 'blatant ideological use of science even by scientists themselves' (see Bernard p.9). More recently, many rang alarm bells prematurely concerning an impending mini-ice-age. The past predictive failures of scientists have been used as evidence for scepticism concerning greenhouse effects; see Me Kibben p.8. It is an unsatisfactorily selective argument; interestingly it is not used in a similar way against economists, whose predictive record is significantly worse. �11 Many scientists have joined the wait-and-see queue, with their begging bowls, hoping for more hand-outs for research. They assume, rightly enough, that more information would assist with rational decision-making, and also, quite wrongly, that "scientific certainty" is required for action to be taken. Physical scientists are not alone in their misapprehension of rational decision methods. Although there is a good deal of practical experience available of statistical-type decision making under uncertainty, for instance as regards insurance coverage and engineering projects, decision theory, especially as regards unrepeatable situations, has not penetrated very far into standard scientific methodology or much into mainstream parts of social sciences. 'Economists in particular have shown a talent for bringing every problem back to a world of certainty where all solutions are known or can be easily found/ Natural scientists including climatologists are, for the most part, on the same erroneous reducdon-tounattainable-certainty trip. 'This is not to say that economists have not worked on uncertainty. ... however ... uncertainty is introduced and then taken out by assumption' (Cyert and DeGroot, continuing, p.l). But there are several classes of problemadc situations, where decision and action may be required, where uncertainty be removed or discarded by fiat, reducdon stratagems or otherwise, notably:* inherently probabilistic situations, such as those of indeterminacy in quantum theory; * essentially unpredictable situadons (which may be determinisdc) such as those now under invesdgadon in chaos theory; * presently uncertain situations and outcomes, which may eventually resolve into certain cases, or may tum into some of the above classes, where there is not time to wait for resolution. The Greenhouse problem is regularly put into the latter class, a standard assumpdon being that with enough money and research effort thrown at it, it will resolve to decent certainty. But it may well not. Climate is now a prime arena for applications of chaos theory (in any case inidal conditions for application of meteorological equadons are seldom very accurate and are now shifting with the accumulation of Greenhouse gases). There are grounds for supposing that critical parts of climatology will fall into the essentially unpredictable class, that the sought certainly is unattainable. If so the standard begging-bowl posture of too many research scientists: Supply more funding so we can go on researching undl we obtain certainty, is misguided.^ Or, less charitably, downright dishonest. Nor does it seem to have occurred to most research scientists demanding more money that an important reason why they are not obtaining the funding they expect, or even enough to run complex modellings on expensive computers, is because their research results could, if unfavourable, act as a serious drag on the industrial establishment. 77zey are Aar<^/y go//7g to /?e we// jrt/tt/et/ to ^e/eg/twuze woder/i /a^artr/a/ society. �12 There are thus some severe problems with this prevailing response. Firstly, it is irrational. Certainty, achieved, may be achieved too late. What was required for rationality was decision making in advance of certainty. Secondly, certainty may be unobtainable. The meteorological equations may be non-linear (nonadditive) and so incapable of delivering firm results given slightly fluctuating initial data. Not only are many experts and decision makers only comfortable about acting in circumstances of relative certainty; almost as bad, where some uncertainty is involved, only what is considered Zz^/y gets genuine consideration. Rational decision making has however to take account of what may not be very likely at all, but may be quite disastrous should it occur (e.g. a nuclear accident with full meltdown). In this respect too, the standard response is methodologically unsound. * AzZapzarz^n, learning to live with and love the Greenhouse. The policy That tends to be favoured by most economists' is an adaptive strategy: '"Let society adjust to environmental changes without attempting to mitigate or prevent the changes in advance". We could adapt to climate change for example, by planting alternative crop strains [themselves] ... more widely adapted... ' (Schneider p.8). Observe, however, that it is a decidedly rayzrzcf&% "adaptation" that is being proposed, that humans adjust to the results of present economic and industrial practices, rather than adjusting fAem. It is zz^^zz/?z^6Z that economic growth comes first, that we do not change (e.g. through decent regulation) high energy industrial practices. A fuller and smarter adaptation would adapt r/z&yg practices. The policy is like a pernicious agriculture policy that says, "Let farmers adjust to the results of soil erosion, salination and so on, without attempting to mitigate or prevent these deleterious changes in advance." Such "adaptadve agriculture", the present predominant practice in advanced agriculture, is anti-environmental, but is given a spurious air of evolutionary inevitability and evolutionary redistributive justice; you can't buck natural evolution, which is entirely natural, can you? Let us condense such far-from-inevitable and highly artificial mal-adaptation in the neologism Greenhouse adaptation, like nuclear adaptation, is badaptation (some, less kind, would say wa^aptation). There is a pragmatic, if cynical, political argument for badaptation, namely, that zznzZat^raZ action to prevent a warming is unfeasible and requisite international cooperation is unattainable. Both contentions are open to doubt. Unilateral action by the USA, by far the Earth's heaviest resource and energy consumer (per capita and on several other relevant dimensions), could make a major difference, especially when backed up by pressure (familiar from other settings, such as the narcotics war) on other nations and through the United Nations. Unfortunately the USA is also the world's largest supplier of influential growth economists. In any case, international agreements such as those on whaling and �13 concerning Antarctica, are attainable, and sometimes effective. The ozone protocols, limiting production of CFCs, show that results can be achieved to limit trace gas emissions. The adaptadon proposal is presently compatible with wait-and-see; both mean little or no hauling back on trace gas production. Indeed procrastination will force sociedes towards badaptation. Typical of adaptation, like procrastination, is an (over-)emphasis on the uncertainties of Greenhouse forecasts, and on the decision-theoretic paralysis such uncertaindes are alleged to produce. Characterisdc of adaptadon too is a minimisadon of the of Greenhouse modification. No doubt the impression that things won't be so very different, or far removed from what has already been experienced, is important in getting adaptationism more readily accepted, as a radonal course of acdon (instead of the seemingly irradonal course it is). Thus badaptation tends to play with figures at the low end of projected ranges of temperature increase, such as 1.5°C for 2050, when in fact present data indicates something rather in the vicinity of 4° C - in a setting, furthermore, where fracdons of a degree centigrade may well be linked to macro-physical and macro-biological change. Recent modellings deliver, on average, an increase in 2°C attributable to carbon dioxide, and it is widely thought that other trace gases will double the CO2 effect^, thus yielding a 4°C temperature increase around 2050. The colossal extent of future human dislocation has correspondingly been deliberately underemphasized. The adaptive capacides of human arrangements, when humans are living at the margin, to massive natural shifts, has been grossly exaggerated. Consider agriculture alone - set aside flooded cides, sunken atoll islands, and all the rest. Some of the Earth's major grain producing regions - upon which famine relief projects depend - could be pushed substantially out of business. The conditions which prevailed during the American dust­ bowl experience of the nineteen-thirties were benign indeed compared with those which threaten with mid twenty-first century Greenhouse condidons. The mid-continental summer temperatures were only 1-2° C warmer than the present average; under greenhouse conditions they could well be more than 3-4° C warmer. In the dust-bowl rainfall only slipped at critical growing times (e.g. July for northern corn) to 80% of the contemporary norm; but under Greenhouse conditions it could be significantly less again (only winter precipitation increasing). A super dust-bowl is not improbable (for much more detail, see Bernard). Similarly for other similar latitude Northern grain producing regions. But the high-energy industrial superstructure is crucially based upon sufficient cheap food (bread) for the urban masses. 10 See e.g. Pearman p.18. Note that methane is beginning to rival carbon dioxide as a gas whose atmospheric propordons really matter and whose present exponential increase is excessive. �14 * Tnfgrvenn'o?!, high-tech Earth engineering. Interventionist proposals so far floated include (D New oceans in parts of the Earth's land surface lying below, at, or near sea level. These projects would make the mega-dams of recent times look like children's play. @ Wintering effects. Production of sufficient dust in the atmosphere, achieved for instance by nuclear detonations, to mitigate heating effects. Such enterprise would make modification of the weather by cloud seeding look like childs' play. Fortunately these and other expensive and grandiose proposals, which would call for considerable international cooperation, far down the planning track; with these schemes procrastination is rational. * controlling free(-wheeling) enterprise. Regulation itself is of course transparadigmatic; where it belongs depend on what measures (what sorts of constraints, rights, etc.) are proposed and how they are imposed or enforced. If it is, for example, some industrial law-and-order, smokestack scrubbing regulations or Greenhouse polluting rights, within the status quo, that is one thing, but if a minimally- constrained growth paradigm is questioned and alternative socio-economic arrangements advocated, that is quite another, and falls outside the dominant paradigm. Such policies involving regulations controlling fossil fuel emissions especially, are negatively labelled in the predominantly American policy literature, though there is now no preventing some Greenhouse effects; but the worse to follow could still be prevented. What is usually covered under the label is however some regulation within prevailing political arrangements. So energy efficiencies and savings for investment in growth elsewhere is comprehensible, straight growth-curtailing non-consumption is not contemplated. But the latter is just what alternatives do contemplate. Democratic political arrangements do not exclude such alternatives; both the power bases of political leaders and economic prescriptions do. Adequate regulation within prevailing socio-economic arrangements is going to prove impossible, without adjustment of power structures and economic imperatives - in effect without far-reaching systemic and ideological adjustment. While such adjustment appears rational, it seems unlikely (see further section 5). Power holders and the power structures into which they slot have too much to lose. So it is hardly remarkable that regulation itself is not so bureaucratically popular (at least under that mode of presentation) in these latter days of economic irrationalism, and is strongly resented and resisted. Some of the U.S. bureaucratic reaction to the Antarctic ozone hole, now regularly attributed to extensive CFC usage, is instructive. A top Reagan official 'said that since CFO's were useful to industry, people should use sunglasses and baseball caps as protection against retina damage and skin cancer' - individualisdcally distributed adaptationism, terrific �€? & 15 for creatures outside "sunglasses and baseball caps" economies. Other Reagan administrators spoke for procrastination, one academic-turned-bureaucrat observing that 'so far the ozone hole has had little effect on skin cancer rates in the United States'. The prevailing bureaucratic procrastination stance that was applied to the much easier ozone problem (which has belated obtained weak international responses), is now extended to Greenhouse effects. It is typically, typically irrationally, stated by high administrators that 'significant gaps exist in our knowledge .... These scientific uncertainties must be reduced before we commit the economic future to drastic and potentially misplaced policy responses' (preceding quotations from McKibben p.10, p.ll, italics added). and the of the Greenhouse business is thereby also revealed. Like heart disease and cancer, Greenhouse effects are gaining much discussion and some funding because they just may severely effect the affluent, affluent humans and affluent nations, that have a good deal to lose, in United States especially. The impact will, however, be at least as severe in some third world nations, whose lands or much of them will be flooded, countries which cannot afford extensive The extensive expensive dyking (or where such effort would be in the longer term, as seas rise, be pointless), countries such as Pacific coral atoll nations and delta states like Bangladesh. But the really serious losers will no doubt be, not humans , rich or poor, but nonhumans. Biological diversity, already being reduced by various human activities, may be one of the chief casualties of global warming. Massive destruction of forests, wetlands, and even the polar tundra could irrevocably destroy complex eco­ systems that have existed for millennia. Indeed, various biological reserves created in the past decade to protect species diversity could become virtual death traps as wildlife attempt to survive in conditions for which they are poorly suited. Accelerated species extinction is an inevitable consequence of a rapid warming (Worldwatch p.10). 3. Arguments to dislocation and for a Lesser Venus Prospect. There is at least a small probability that predicted increases in mean atmospheric temperatures will seriously interfere with most remaining natural habitats and result in the degeneration or destruction of many of them, especially forests, wetlands, and marine environments. For example, most wetlands will either be flooded or else evaporate under increasing temperatures. Again, the prospect is for the boreal forest to shrink from about 23% of the world's forest to something like 1% of a much diminished forest covering. Nor will adaptationism help here; for natural evolution is much too slow for adaptationism to succeed n. 11 Cf. Keeton pp.763-4, '... typical migration rates for forest boundaries are of the order of 502000m per annum ... [A requisite] shift of 500-1000km would, however, take hundreds of years. ... Pollen evidence... suggests that large changes occurred in forest composition during the Holocene period some 8000-10000 years ago, even though the climate changes then were less �16 Natural ecosystems will not adapt effectively to rapid climatic change.... With regard to forests, habitats for plants and animals cannot be re-created or transplanted rapidly. Continuing climatic changes would strain the capabilities of management practices even in commercial tree plantations (Beijer Institute Report pp.21-3). The decline or demise of these systems, vast reservoirs for greenhouse gases, will accelerate the warming, and accordingly make matters substantially worse: Trees are adapted to a narrow range of temperature and moisture levels, and cannot cope with rapid climate change. A temperature increase of 1 degree Celsius per decade in mid- to upper latitudes translates into a shift in vegetation zones of 60-100 miles northward. Terrestrial ecosystems cannot migrate that fast. Vast numbers of trees are likely to die, and new trees adapted to warmer temperatures are unlikely to be able to replace them rapidly. During such a disruption, huge areas of forest could die and, as they decay or bum, send large quantities of additional CO2 into the atmosphere, accelerating the warming (Worldwatch p.10). Of course the immediate climatic patterns would be somewhat more complex. If enough soot and ash from fires were flung into the atmosphere there would be a cooling effect, like that of a small nuclear winter, before heating accelerated. The present pattern of ecosystemic loss would also be sharply accelerated. For when natural ecosystems get reduced to about 30% of their initial size, they tend to collapse of themselves. Moreover, there would be other significant positive feedback from ecosystems other than the terrestrial forests, from the oceans especially. As the oceans warm, they lose their capacity to serve as carbon dioxide reservoirs. So they too release additional gases, including previously absorbed CO2, back into the atmosphere, further accelerating the warming. A critical question arises as to how much danger such positive feedback poses? As so often, informed opinions, and so probability estimates differ. However 'several scientists working in the area consider that positive feedback effects will force a very bleak picture to be drawn" (Worldwatch p.19).^ Unlike the interim effect of a small nuclear winter, where after a few years at most, climatic behaviour (as distinct from radioactivity levels and, differently, from ecological communities) would presumably return towards the previous norm, there will be /7<9 similar under greenhouse impact. Technically then, stability would be lost under the than those expected by 2030 [and forests were more extensive and less interfered with]' (Pittock 87a p.209, rearranged). Second order probabilities, probabilities and uncertainties in the light of first order subjective probabilities, enter importantly. �17 impact,^ disequilibrium induced. An eventual long-term return to some different but sufficiently congenial equilibrium could well be excluded. Under new climatic regimes plants themselves may be able to do little more than hang on for part of their own lives. In many places conditions would be too severe for much of the "year" to permit normal plant functioning, including what is crucial for Greenhouse amelioration, photosynthesis. In most plants, photosynthesis only occurs across a narrow band of temperatures (e.g. 6 - 34°C); outside that range the plants shut down operations.^ Even more important, many plants would leave few or no successful successors. Even where plants set seed, seedlings would not survive under the severe conditions expected; for instance, they would be killed by hot dry summer conditions, or in other places by frosts to which they are not adapted, both phenomena already familiar after clearfelling of forests. The situation at a famous place in southern Sahara, where there is but one ancient tree hanging on in thousands of square kilometres of desert, a tree with viable seeds which sets no seedlings, could be more or less replicated in many other places where forests or woody plants once grew. In fact we are already witnessing the demise of the trees in much of Australia. Already dead and dying trees form a predominant feature of the Australian rural landscape. Virtually whichever way ecologists travel in Australia where trees remain, they are confronted with dead and dying trees The reasons for the present decline of trees in rural Australia is, for the most part, not to be attributed to early Greenhouse or even pollution effects. "6 It is thought to be due to a complex of factors, including a range of insect predators whose efforts are concentrated on isolated trees left after an excessive zeal for clearing (i.e. holistic effects enter as regards healthy persistence of trees). Excessive disturbance of ecological systems, though overclearing of trees, has seriously upset the systems. Types of systemic stress and disturbance are likely to be much accelerated given the additional impact of Greenhouse warming on plant functioning and reproduction. f<9 some q/ worth disentangling. Firstly, a system may be disturbed by interfering with critical components There are several within the system structure, processing parts, such as botanical systems or their interconnections. As with a computer, if a cridcal component is broken or a circuit cut, the probability of serious malfunction increases. Secondly, a system normally operates within a Stability is defined in physics in terms of immediate return to an initial (inertial) position after small disturbance. The upper bound may be difficult to appreciate in most of Aotearoa. But in much of Australia, during the summer, many plants close down their operations for much of the day. Other effects of increased heat on major food plants matter for human affairs. Severe heat interferes with fertilization and reproduction in com, and apparently affects the ability of rice in Asia to reproduce; so considerably reduced yields of staple foods may be anticipated. Reported by Recher on EarfAworw. Thus coastline vegctational destruction through detergents in sewerage waters. �18 certain range of condition. Take it outside these conditions or push it towards limits (let the computer get too hot or too cold), and probability of breakdown is much increased. Feedback loops, which are an important feature of cybernetic systems are particularly vulnerable to normality disturbance. Cybernetic systems afford one example of more holistic behaviour; dissipative systems, where perhaps strange new features may enter as systemic loading is increased, another. Such new features may not be at all congenial to dominant forms, or to maintenance of life support arrangements. It should be evident from details already assembled that there is some probability the Greenhouse efforts could seriously disturb the crucial carbon cycle. The carbon cycle loops, in major fashion, through both the higher plant complexes and the oceans, both major carbon dioxide reservoirs - but just how critically through them is uncertain. However, with the serious disturbance of main components in the cycle, the real possibility of cycle malfunction can hardly be excluded. Much the same holds with other crucial chemical cycles, such as the sulphur cycle (though woody plants are perhaps less important here, the oceans are highly significant, the oceans Costeau has already pronounced moribund). To a lesser extent, several of the other well-known bio-chemical cycles, such as those for nitrogen, sodium, and so forth, depend for their stability and maintenance on the adequate operation of active ecological structures. Plainly if a cycle loops through a component, such as a tropical forest, which is severely disturbed then the crucial cycle itself could be locally disrupted. There is some probability, furthermore, that the changes will disturb other physical cycles crucial to the stability of systems. For some of the Earth's feedback systems are in fact maintained in equilibrium through natural ecosystems. A striking example appears to be the regulating of the Earth's temperature itself. Lovelock and collaborators have devised an elementary daiyy wor/d m(9dg/ which reveals how a feedback system with two types of daisies can, within limits, stabilize temperatures despite increasing solar energy input (see the next diagram). The limits are important, for as these limits are approached the maintenance systems break down. Thus again, instability could ensue under disturbance. �19 Diagram 5.77z^rm<9.s7anc r^ga/aizoa a/*rA^ Earr/z j ^zayac^ i^mp^ramrf rAraag/z p/a/zM (a much simplified picture from Lovelock 88 p.58). !n the "Datsyworid" mode), tife adjusts the pfanefs temperature to suit ttseif. A basic assumption is that on Daisyworid, as on Earth, the sun is getting progressive^ hotter. Biack daisies grow best when the surface temperature is tow, because their petals absorb radiation. As the sun's heat increases, the white daisies begin to nourish. Their petais reflect radiation, thus heipingto iower surface temperature. Between the time the seeds first germinate and when the sun gets too hot, the piants maintain a steady surface temperature by adjusting the pfanefs aibedo. Without doubt these matters are bad enough. Demise of most of the Earth's richness^ is not a minor matter. Worse could follow. Apart from direct ecological breakdown, there are several other major ways through which the maintenance structures of the Earth can be not merely awkwardly disturbed, but thrown right out of kilter - perhaps, given the d^/zcacy of several critical matters, never to return present norms. Most obvious and immediately threatening is * nuclear warfare, and therewith nuclear winter. But there are of course other severe shocks that the planet could suffer than those chemonuclear warfare, some human induced, some a "chance" matter of the planets' posidon in space; namely * a mini Big Bang, or an undermining of metastability, brought about through very high energy experimentadon (see Leslie); * a collision with a large meteorite or asteroid. Such uncertaindes, not germane to the main climatic arguments, are listed, not to achieve a bogus completeness, but to emphasize that complete certainty is not to expected, not radonally. Should we obtain it, should we obtain easy relatively unproblemadc lives, then we have, by world standards, been rather lucky. Moreover, these latter uncertaindes do so 17 Natural richness is its main richness, much exceeding human arufice. �20 far appear negligible compared with those bound up with climate.is The Greenhouse problemadque differs (as do nuclear winter and also high energy experimentation) from such possibilities as destruction of the Earth's favourable climate or life-supports by collision with an asteroid in two crucial respects: the poor prognoses are largely a matter of human making (meaning the making of certain among humans) and the damaging situations could be substantially averted by positive or concerted human activity. According analogies with remote phenomena such as decline of the sun, asteroid collisions, etc., sometimes applied to dismiss concerns with global environmental problems, do not hold up, and should be resisted. The human-induced climatic problems are primarily ascribable to: * excess economic development. The practices involve a complex and sustained assault on most of the Earth's major ecosystems, forests, seas, and so on, along with the alteration of atmospheric composition by greenhouse gases. For example, the forests are cut down, burnt, poisoned by herbicides and acid rain, or otherwise removed or destroyed. (Therewith too a great deal more carbon dioxide is released into the atmosphere and major sinks of carbon dioxide are removed.) As a result of these concerted growth-and-development activities such systems are driven to limits, and breakdown occurs. Once it occurs at some weak point it can escalate elsewhere, like a conflagradon; thus again ecosystemic collapse for example. Quite apart from breakdown at or approaching limits, for instance because of systemic overload, remarkable changes can occur in dissipative systems under stress or strain. * excess energy or chemical loading. Though such striking examples as the chemical clock, it has been demonstrated that dissipative systems can suddenly, and often rather unpredictably, undergo extraordinary changes, as for instance energy flux is increased (Prigogine and others). Such non-additive or nonlinear effects, characteristic of more holistic dissipative systems, seem bound to occur within the Earth's atmosphere and oceans as they undergo compositional changes. Carbon dioxide itself provides a good example: None of these assessments are strikingly objective, but are a matter of appearance. The risk of catastrophic destruction of Earth civilization by an asteroid or comet is discussed, and compared with either less exotic risks, in Chapman and Morrison, chapter 19. It has been guesstimated at a 1 in 300,000 chance per year, a much smaller probability than that serious Greenhouse effect will eventuate (often put at about 85%), but comparable with some rather more mundane risks (see p.283). The risks from very high energy experimentation will no doubt rise sharply as orders of attainable energy increase. �21 With small quantities its effect on the temperature of the air is proportional to the amount added; there is a linear effect. However once the carbon dioxide concentration in the air approaches 1%, new nonlinear effects come into play and heating greatly increases. In the absence of a biosphere to fix carbon dioxide, its concentration in the atmosphere would probably exceed the critical figure of 1%. The Earth would then heat up rapidly to a temperature near to that of boiling water. Increasing temperatures would speed up chemical reacdons and accelerate their progress towards chemical equilibrium. ... eventually ... the Earth would become permanently cocooned in a brilliant white cloud - a second Venus, although not quite as hot (Lovelock pp.45-6). Fortunately for Gaean prospects, the percentage of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere is now nowhere near 1% nor likely to be pushed near 1% by projected increases in carbon dioxide levels under economic activity over the next 50 years^. However eventual exponential growth will lead towards accentuated levels, and the side effect of such growth, the release of carbon dioxide from forests and oceans and the considerable reduction in fixadon of carbon dioxide with the decline of forests, will lead in that disastrous direction rather more rapidly. The 1% bound constitutes just one of the many serious limits (fortunately a fairly remote one) to condnuation of present developmental pracdces. Now there can be no radonal confidence with respect to complex dissipadve systems about the behaviour of which we presendy know comparadvely little - that other nonaddidve effects will not be encountered at a much earlier stage. After all, the Gaean system, its atmosphere, oceans and ecosystems, will be pushed into essendally unexperienced and substandally unknown reaches. There is, for example, no experience from comparable past times of such elevated temperatures as Greenhouse effects will lead to, to draw upon. 'There is no evidence that the land-bound glaciers in Greenland and Antarctica have ever completely melted in the last two million years'. There is experience of much colder periods. 'During ice ages, the earth's average temperature has been about 5°C colder than at present, with glaciers covering major portions of continents' (Barth p.7). But there is no similar experience of temperatures 4-5° C warmer than at present (in any warm interglacial period), 'a global increase of more than 2°C above present is unprecedented in the era of human civilization' (Schneider p.6). It would accordingly be decidedly rash, rash decision making, to assign a zero or negligible probability to the emergence of new or unknown effects of relevance, to assume all will go smoothly and well. That would presuppose, in any event, a completeness in present scientific knowledge, contrary to the information we actually have that present investigation of holistic systems, among much else, is still in its infancy. The probability of 19 In the atmosphere of the very early Earth, CO? exceeded the critical 1% figure; but solar luminosity was about 25% less than now. With increasing solar flux the Earth would have overheated had the proportion of CO2 not been much reduced (e.g. see Lovelock 88 p.56). �22 something critical (e.g. perhaps radicals like hydroxyl) having been left out of estimations, of room accordingly for something unexpected or for something to go wrong, may be small (though experience implies it is not always so), but it certainly appears to be non-zero. For the overconfident, with excess faith in the flimsy scientific edifice, there is a salutary lesson to be drawn from the erratic and stumbling path of the main proponent of Gaia hypotheses, Lovelock. Lovelock, coming from a working life as an industrial chemist, part of that time for a giant chemical transnational, had, and retained for a considerable time after he began his holistic hypothesizing, a strong antipathy for environmentalists.^ Even Gaia was for industry and against the environmentalists; she was going to laughingly soak up all the pollution, courtesy of the chemical companies especially, that we humans could throw at her. In particular, we did not really need to worry much about ozone depletion or greenhouse gas escalations^ 'Contrary to the forebodings of many environmentalists, finding a suitable" destructive agent to bring about a 'doom scenario" 'turns out to be an almost insoluble problem" (79 p.40). Lovelock makes it easier for himself by helping himself to the assumption that a doomsday scenario involves the destruction of all "life"', 'down to the last spore of some deep-buried anaerobic bacteria" (p.40). But even for the least chauvinistic of environmentalists, destruction of all humans but the select elect would be quite enough for a decent doomsday. Lovelock's high redefinition of a environmental 'doomsday scenario" is unacceptable. Lovelock does not however stay within the bound of his redefinition. He proceeds to pooh-pooh the idea that anything much that we humans could accomplish would make any difference to Gaia (p.41) or even to most humans, including use of nuclear devices. Unfortunately for Lovelock's credibility, he was writing three years before the seemingly obvious wintering effects of a major nuclear war were realised by the accredited scientific community. Appealing in a common scienufic fashion to scientific authority, he proceeds to minimalize the human and ecological effects of a major war. The report he relies upon as authoritative was a 1975 (unreferenced) one of 'the US Nadonal Academy of Sciences ... prepared by an eight-man committee of their own assisted by forty-eight other explosions and a// chosen from those members, in the effects of nuclear to them" (p.41, italics added). Lovelock draws from the disdnguished expert report the findings that Coupled with this, there was a certain schizophrenia in Lovelock's attitude to the natural environment. There was also a matching schizophrenia as to the fragility of life on Earth. On the one side, it required very delicate settings and fine tuning to arise; this is part of the argument for a Gaia hypothesis. On the other side, life is 'tough, robust, and [highly] adaptable', virtually indestructible (79 p.90). But though a flawed hero, Lovelock is a hero nonetheless. See e.g. Lovelock 79, p.40ff; and also, on ozone, 88 p.63. �23 ... if half of all the nuclear weapons in the world's arsenals, about 10,000 megatons, were used in a nuclear war the effects on most of the human and man-made ecosystems of the world would be small at first and would become negligible within thirty years. Both aggressor and victim nations would of course suffer catastrophic local devastation, but areas remote from the battle and, especially important in the biosphere, marine and coastal ecosystems would be minimally disturbed (p.41). Three years later Turco and others proceeded to detail a very different scenario, that of widespread and ecologically damaging nuclear winter. Not for the only time, Lovelock had been caught out badly. As with pollution, Lovelock has more recently shifted ground,^ considerably, on the vulnerability of the Earth to human-induced disturbance. When a system such as Gaea in homeostatis is stressed to near the limits of regulation even a small disturbance may cause it to jump to a new stable state or even fail entirely.... It could be that the regulation of the Earth's climate is not far from one of these limits. Thus if some part of climate regulation is connected with the natural level of CO2 then clearly we are close to the limits of its regulation. This is because CO2 cannot be reduced much below the level observed for the last glaciation, about 180 ppm, without seriously limiting the rate of growth of the more abundant C3 type plants. If we perturb the Earth's radiation balance by adding more CO2 and other greenhouse gases to the atmosphere or reduce its capacity to regulate by decreasing the area of forests or both of these together then we could be surprised by a sudden jump of both CO2 and temperature to a new and much warmer steady state; or by the initiation of periodic fluctuations between that state and our present climate. The anomalously low abundance of CO2 on Earth when compared with the other terrestrial planets and especially the fact that the mean temperature of the Earth is on the cool side of the optimum for regulation, suggests strongly that the biota is regulating the climate by pumping CO2 from the air. The common feature of most of our pollutions and of our exploitation of the land surface seems to be unintentionally to thwart this natural process (Lovelock 85 pp.5354). The argument to the lesser par/i, to significant disequilibrium with the Earth's ecological support system destabilized, takes the following lines. The Earth appears to be a dissipative (far-from-equilibrium) system held at its present by a combinadon of an (increasing) solar flux - a main energy input into the system - and its major ecological arrangements, especially vegetational complexes and live oceans. The sheer extent to which the resulting system differs from the stable dead system it could otherwise be is shown by the following table for atmospheric and oceanic composidon. Shifdng ground may be fine, especially when it is to an improved position. But it should be done honesdy and openly, not stealthily or shiftily. Lovelock proceeds to attribute a cancature of his <9WH previous position to cdtics of the Gaia hypothesis (as a clever Tabneation', which also it was not): that it is 'an argument developed to allow industry to pollute at will, since mother Gaia will clean up the mess '(85 p.53). �24 TABLE 1. Substance Funerary Equilibrium (principal components per cent). Venus Earth Carbon dioxide A Nitrogen 1 R Oxygen Argon 0 C E A N S Water Lifeless Mars Earth 99 0 98 1.9 98 1.9 0 trace trace 1 0.1 0.1 Earth 95 2.7 0.13 2 63 Salt 3.5 Sodium nitrate 1.7 Present 0.03 79 21 1 96 n.a. n.a. 3.5 traces Surface temperatures (°C) n.a 477 Total pressure (bars) n.a. 90 290+50 60 -53 13 0064 1 The table is based upon tables 1 and 2 of Lovelock 79, p.37 and p.39. The whole Earth system is accordingly far from equilibrium. Unpredictable behaviour as loads increase is therefore almost to be expected. A likely moral is presumably: stress the system, or destabilize ecosystem controls sufficiently, and the system may be in deep trouble. It is relevant to inquire briefly into what evidence we so far have on this score. To do so let us reconsider some of the array of arguments there are from some sort of holistic organisation of the Earth (for a modest Gaea hypothesis, to the effect that the (outer) Earth is a naturally regulated nonadditive cybernetic system, important attributes of which are regulated by the biota). /or the participation of the Earth's ecological support systems, plant complexes especially, the Earth would not be blessed with its present life- benign physical characteristics. The oceans would be much saltier and too salty for most life, the air would not contain the present rich mixture of oxygen and carbon dioxide so important for terrestrial life, and so on; perhaps most important the Earth would be significantly hotter and too hot for most life, for most of what does the regulating and stabilizing of present conditions. For the solar flux has increased in intensity about 30% since life appeared on Earth, whereas the mean global temperatures have exhibited no �25 corresponding increase, but have remained relatively constant. Such an expected constancy in the face of disturbing inputs is ascribed, under holistic approaches that do something to explain it, to the concerted activity of plant life, as already indicated. The general tenor of the argument is so far this:- By arguments from physical and other models, and because of uncertainties, the probability that something could go badly wrong is not merely nonzero^ but indeed far from negligible. Part of the argument can be put as follows:- There is a decent probability that a modest Gaea hypothesis holds. But then, there is a considerable probability that excessive Greenhouse build-up will lead to damaging system destabilization. So combining probabilities, there at least a nonnegligible probability of such destabilization. An analogy should now emphasize both the dubiousness of what is being proposed under adaptationism and the precariousness of the human predicament. The proposal is to take this ancient craft, now overloaded with human passengers and their heavy baggage, a cargo it was never organised to carry, out on new routes and run it faster and higher than it has ever travelled before. Even for an experimental prototype, a now very fast (air-)bus say, with a select test crew, such a procedure, of running over new uncharted routes at speeds and heights never attained before, would be risky enterprise. With an ancient craft, with a heavy non-elite cargo of baggage and passengers (some whom try to interfere with the controls), the proposal is extremely rash. For the chances that the craft will break/down and perhaps crash, with serious consequences to passengers and for the baggage, are greatly elevated over the risks of proceeding as usual much more slowly. With the costs of crashing so severe, rational operators and sensible pilots would not take them.^ Unfortunately the analogy is not at all far-fetched, but resembles what is in store for spaceship Earth, already under significant stress with its excessive human passenger load and their heavy ecological practices. Not only is the future itself pretty new territory, but it is a future at terrestrial temperatures never before attained. As a result too of these enhanced temperatures, important processes will proceed faster than ever before, in particular all chemical processes. Simply to take the craft up there, as do-nothing and adaptation approaches would have is to emulate the risks and hubris of Daedelus; such approaches are From logical theories of probability such as Camap's non-zero probabilities are rather easily reached (perhaps too easily, with the converse feature that natural laws never obtain high probabilities. The difficulty can be averted, to some extent, by restriction to physical models.) The analogy is an old one, which we exploited before in the nuclear case; for the "bus analogy", see Routley and Routley. The analogy admits of much graphic variation. Instead of running the craft at excess speed, an alternative or additional image is that of destroying the controls of the craft. Lovelock deploys this apposite image (88 p.63), which corresponds to the demolition of Gaean control systems. Others speak of a colossal experiment with the Earth; but strictly the conditions for a controlled experiment are not met. �26 aptly named D<2^Zfa?i. Given anthropic terrestrial practices, a Daedelian future and fate should not be excluded. 4. A Sting in the Cosmic Tail: the mini-Furphy theorem and on the iikeiy decline of Homo sapiens spp. economicus. The anthropic doomsday argument developed relies upon a modified Murphy's law. The trouble with the initial formulation of Murphy's law: ^anyf/ung can go wrong, if wii/, was that it was insufficiently qualified, much too absolutist, and apparently self-refuting.^ Certain crucial qualifications are required:* Replacement of the too certain conclusion by a somewhat weaker probabilistic one: for instance, it pro&a&/y will. * Correlative to weakening the conclusion, strengthening the premiss, by rendering it more specific; namely, in place of "anything" or "something" put "some thing ... given a chancy situation". The modified formulation is accordingly the following mini-Furphy proposition^ r/HKg can ge/iMZMe/y go wrong, given o re/onvefy cAoncy Mfi/ohon, zf pro/MZ&iy wi/i. Here "chancy" means more or less what it means according to the dictionaries: doubtful, decidedly risky, or as we shall construe it, having a comparadvely low probability vis-a-vis its altemadves. The precise extent of relative chanciness will be explained as we go. The proposidon is itself a corollary of a more general result, an ancient principle. The generalisadon replaces "go wrong" by "happen'; the ancient principle is that of jy/^ndfM^, sometimes stated, with quite insufficient reservations, as that all places are full, or ony ggnfdn^/y ^fofg &onn<% fo rgo/fy^Z (when genuinely possible states are compadble with all that is already transpiring). The principle, whose distinguished history is traced in Lovejoy, has emerged in contemporary particle physics, in such forms as the For this and other formulations of Murphy's law, and many loosely associated humorous maxims with grains of truth encapsulated, see Block. As to the history of the "law", which originated with J.M. Chase, editor of Aw'adPH see the A/nerzcgmi; Chase's inidal formulation in a 1955 issue read 'If an aircraft part can be installed incorrectly, someone will install it that way". Silberman's paradox, that if Murphy's Law can go wrong, it will, is not a genuine paradox. For it can simply be asserted that where Murphy's Law is a real law it will not go wrong. The connection of Murphy's Law with the pnnciple of plendtude appears to have escaped much notice. This little theorem was originally titled the Murphy-Leslie theorem. It is an adaptation, suggested by Leslie's work, of Murphy's Law. While this secuon is overwhelmingly indebted to Leslie, the arguments developed from those Leslie advances. For Leslie's arguments and also his debts, and so the transitive debts of this section, see Leslie himself, who deserves to be read in defence his own legidmate doomsday apprehensions. The Appendix indicates the very limited extent to which Leslie's arguments arc here endorsed. �27 following: if a thing (e.g. an elementary particle) is not forbidden, excluded by quantum rules, then it is bound to occur (or be realised), even is "compulsory". For things and events generally, such completeness (all nonexcluded particle niches are occupied) cannot reasonably be expected.^ The main mini-plentitude proposition has, like its mini-Furphy specialization to bad outcomes, to take the much more hedged form: if something can genuinely happen, given a relatively chancy situation, it probably will. To prove this proposition, let us first recast it in appropriate symbolic form. Let D be some arbitrary (bad) situation, a suitable disaster in the intended application. Let the possibility of D's happening - such as something's going wrong - be represented by a non­ zero probability, and genuineness by non-negligible probability. It can be assumed that that probability, P(D), is small; if it were large enough the requisite conclusion would follow in any case. Let C represent the relativizing features, what is given that renders the situation chancy. Then what we aim to show is that where P(D) is small positive, P(D { C) is probable. The proof applies a special case of Bayes' theorem, which takes the following form where there are n alternative hvpotheses hi,...,hn including h: P(h { i) = " * Pd 1 M I P(hr) X P(i { hr) r = 1 Here h is the hypothesis, which in our application is D, i is the additional information (or, as in Carnap, a new observation), which in our case is C.28 P(h j i) is the probability of h given i, or of h on condition i (the backward arrow notation, { , symbolises the condition There is a marvellous Greek term, which could serve to cover items where the particle physics "principle" is satisfied. 'We may call an event agathonic to convey that, though in itself it was highly unlikely, we might have known that something of that sort was bound to happen. ... from the name of the tragic poet to whom Aristotle attributes the view that it is very probable that the improbable should happen. (Kaplan p.9 rearranged). Is the chronic chthonic Greenhouse escalation agathonic? The formulation is a special case of that proved in Carnap, p.331; namely that (absolute) case where the evidence e is elided, or e set = 1. A similar result follows, subject to slightly more rigorous conditions, in relevant probability theory; see Routley 79 p.954. In effect we shall look at the form P(h ) ,) = --------------- * PC < D ' P(h) X P(i { h) + XP(hr) X P(i { hr) n with the sum excluding the product for h. Though demonstrable given satisfiable exclusion and exhaustion conditions, Bayes' theorem is not lacking critics, in part because of the surprises this bit of logic can deliver. Carnap meets the objection that Bayes' theorem has sometimes 'been applied to cases where it led to strange or even absurd results' thus: 'This was mostly due to an uncritical use of the principle of indifference :... [The] theorem is provable ... on the basis of those weak assumptions which practically all theories of probability seem to have in common' (p.331, sub 1 elided). Of course the present applications could (just) be objected to on the grounds that the logical conditions for the theorem to apply are not fully satisfied. �28 involved and shows its direction). For simplicity we shall suppose that all the alternatives to D are concentrated (as far as symbolic exposure goes) in one, namely D*. Then the form we seek to apply is simply: P(D { C) = __________ { D)_______________ _ ' P(D) x P(C { D) + P(D*) x P(C { D*) The arithmetic details needed can be tabulated in a revealing form as follows: C<2.$ay D D* Initial (or prior) probability d 1-d m, say 1/d m/L,say 1/d! of outcome relative chance that C As it is the chance of C that matters, we can rescale to set m = 1/d. To make C relatively chancy, L has some modest size; specifically let L exceed 1-d/d. Then the probability to be estimated, P(D { C), is d x 1/d dxl/d + (l-d)/dL _ " __ 1 1+^ where k - - That is, P(D { C) = y where k = 1, andP(D { C)> when -when L > . Thus D is probable, at least in being more probable than not, given C, when L is of at least modest size, i.e. given C is relatively chancy. In a merely apparently more general form of the estimation, where we do not align m to d, P(D { C) ______ d x m______ d x m + (1-d) x m/1 1 1 1 + k' as before. That is, m drops out, only the relative chanciness really matters. The little plendtude theorem follows as before. Now to put some relevant flesh on these abstract statements and figures. Let D be some future disaster such as the catastrophic decline, for instance, through summer or winter phenomena, of the human species, from which the enormous present population never recovers. At worst (from a chauvinistic angle) the population, like many catastrophically effected by human activities, goes extinct. Suppose, for a bifurcating outcome, there is a �29 catastrophe stage, before halfway through next century, 2050. If humans do not get their act together before then, they go into catastrophic decline, as already indicated. If however they do get their ecopolitical act together then humans, while they hardly live happily ever after (poverty, inequality, domination, and other evils not being removed), continue to persist or even grow in numbers, perhaps fanning out through the solar system (in the way envisaged by too many physicists). Suppose further we are optimists, imagining that the prior probability of D, ecodisaster and human decline, is small, say 1%. That is d = .01, and the inidal probability of D*, human "success", is .99. The figures are pretty notional. Supreme optimists would want to set d much smaller, pessimists rather at a higher probability. Table 2. D human decline D* human success Initial probabilities 1%, i.e. .01 99%, i.e. .99 Relative chanciness, 1/100, i.e. .01 1/100 x 1/1 ofC Then the probability of human decline given C, .01 X .01 P(D { C) .01 x .01 + .99 x .01/1 1/2 , when 1 > 99. For example, when 1 is set, conservatively, at 1,000, then the probability of human decline given present chanciness is approximately 90%. It remains to fill out C, thereby showing that 1 is very likely much much larger than 99, and correspondingly human decline so much the more probable in the light of additional information, i.e. 6! usual jargon. probable in the There are several high risk factors, acting in a certain concert, factors emphasized more than a decade ago in world systems modellings (such as, most famously, that of the Club of Rome), Malthusian factors such as human population, economic product, pollution, energy consumption, ... . (The list rolls on.) It is appropriate to estimate posterior probability relative to any one of these, any of which can serve as C, in order to expose the riskiness of present gross human practices. In brief, because there are several high risk factors, so there are several appropriate relative or reference classes. Thus the posterior probability is assessed relative to such matters as humans now being thus and so, our or my being alive �30 now (Leslie's first-person reference class), this being present energy use, present waste output, present forest destruction and so forth. The upshot is not the triviality that probability can be jacked up by placement in a suitably restricted context, though that analyticity is established.^ The point is that, environmentally, more affluent humans have fdgmjg/vgj produced such adverse circumstances, which are upon us, the very circumstances typically productive of limitadon results. In sum, the aadirapfc argument considers the environmentally invidious situadon of present humans on the Earth. The argument can be carried through either in terms of sheer population, gross numbers, or in terms of human resource grabbing, as esdmated for instance through energy consumption. In fact all the other factors are anthropically tied, to gross human numbers, via the environmental impact equation and because the levels are human-use numbers. Let us consider the prospects given addidonal information as to the present phase of gross human population. C will be some such proposition as: the proportional preponderance of humans who have ever lived alive now, or to personalize it: the chance that you or your family, are alive now. Diagram 6: (?ar praf^nf popidadon pred/camg/zf <?n die /wo jce/iarioj. Humans have got themselves - to some extent pat themselves, though much may be the result of muddling through - into an extremely dubious, environmentally insidious, and One of the weaknesses in the argument may appear to be its dependence on an appropnate choice of relative class. For, the high relative probabilities can fall away if different reference classes, not exhibiting such growth patterns are taken, c.g. present wattle distribution, birds being thus and so. On the other hand, probabilities can be elevated even more by selection of more unusual reference classes, such as our being scientists, or being computer programmers, etc.. It is not so remarkable that probabilities can be wound up - or down - perhaps quite dramatically, by appropriate relativisation, by appropriate selection of a reference class. �31 unsustainable position, on a range of critical parameters. Their numbers are excessive, their high energy use is excessive, their waste and their polludon are both excessive - and all these and other excesses are at the steep end of upward exponendal curves. Several relevant graphs are distressingly exponendal, with the present in the near verdeal growth phase: Digram 7 : GrowrA in are drawn from Boyden). envzronm^nfgZZy r^Z^vanr parg/neter-P (all graphs exhibited �32 Many other similarly shaped graphs could be added, for instance for growth of pollution, of waste products, of weapons (in terms of tonnes of explosive power), of other greenhouse gases such as the chlorofluorocarbons (which accelerated from zero in the nineteen thirties), and so on. The display typifies the accelerating human roller coaster (or air bus). Those curves are dghtly interconnected, in criss-crossing fashion. For example, the productivity of contemporary agriculture which enables the feeding of huge urbanised human populations depends on a very high energy use (in term of energy efficiency, contemporary high-tech agriculture falls below that of much traditional agriculture). The maintenance of high populations with supplies of cheap food depends in tum on fossil fuel agriculture. Because of the intertwining of these phenomena, there is no easy way of getting off the accelerating roller-coaster. Nor, as observed, is there much real effort devoted to slowing the coaster. For politicians it would be politically risky and inexpedient to try (for them the rhetoric about an ecologically sustainable future must remain just that, more rhetoric). For many other power holders and brokers such ideas are ideologically excluded: growth remains the gospel. So a precarious position becomes ever more precarious. Humans are in a decidedly chancy position, because of their population situation and other limitative factors; they are becoming very disaster-prone. If humans want an acceptable future for themselves - they have virtually ruled out an acceptable future for many other creatures, through their predominantly selfish thoughtless greedy practices - then they will probably have to mend their collective ways, very considerably and very soon. But, given the nature of the beast, that itself seems improbable. Humans, if they seek a more assured future, should make a concerted effort to put themselves into a less precarious position. That could be achieved by proceeding to reduce relative risks. These relative risks, sharply reducing prospects for a reliable future, fall into two classes:- * Manufactured risk factors, including weaponry such as mega-nuclear devices and elements of biochemical warfare, and experimental equipment such as very high energy particle accelerators (which could perhaps tunnel under a metastable state or induce a miniBig-Bang; see again Leslie). * Accumulated risk factors, such as the huge relative size of human population, energy consumption, greenhouse gas production, etc.30 30 As before, there are various different reasons why these induce risk, limitative and probabilistic in particular. �33 Despite the ideological obstacles - enormous political, religious and economic obstacles blocking the way of requisite change - major efforts should be put into reducing these types of risks. Philosophers, beyond other intellectuals, cozdd have a significant role in breaking down the ideological barriers and in clarifying and developing the arguments involved. Given the track-record of professional philosophers, don't expect very much.31 5. Further notes on human prospects and improved practices: What in generai ought to be done about the Greenhouse problematique? The general result already reached, that humans collectively should substantially reduce their risk taking, and in particular reduce their gross numbers, extends to radonal Greenhouse decision and action theory. But that large and difficult challenge - with all that it entails by way of radical change upon present arrangements - is not all that there is to try, all that should radonally be attempted. While some increase in mean global temperatures, and what that implies, can no longer be averted, the potentially most damaging effects can be: namely, by curtailing humaninduced output of Greenhouse gases. Moreover, there is an approximate upper bound of importance, upon temperature, which can serve to supply a significant limit on output. That bound - which conrrnns rfyZr raZd/zg by confining encountered situadons a? those where there is some ba-sds* - is given by esdmated temperatures during Aldthermal and Eemian eras. Those temperatures are estimated to have been between about 1/2 a degree and 1 degree Centigrade above contemporary (pre-1980) temperatures; so the upper bound is about PC. 31 There is much else for philosophers to contribute in these fields, especially on the expanding issues of future redistributive justice, ecological equity, genuinely pluralistic arrangements, etc. �34 gZo^zzZ zznd^r Z&ree zn/^rcy/zzzg sc^zzzzrzoy. AT (°C ) Dnzgram # : B^zckgroz/nd in/orw^hozz: 'Annual mean global surface air temperature computed for trace gas scenarios A, B, and C .... Scenario A assumes continued growth rates of greenhouse gas emissions typical of the past 20 years, i.e., about 1.5% per year emission growth; scenario B has emission rates approximately fixed at current rates; scenario C drastically reduces trace gas emissions between 1990 and 2000.... The shaded range is an estimate of global temperature during the peak of the current and previous interglacial periods, about 6,000 and 120,000 years before present, respectively. The zero point fbr observation is the 1951-1980 mean; the zero point for the model is the control run mean' (Walsh p.14, from whom the diagram is drawn). Not only will a continuation of current emission trends take global temperatures clean through and way beyond that bound, so also will an alternative set-up where emission rates are fixed more or less at current rates. The only apparent way to remain rationally within an experiential domain is to curtail sharply trace gas emissions, beginning early in the 1990s. That means shifting from the dominant growth ideology; it means expensive re- and de­ industrialisation. Short of catastrophic nuclear war it seems unlikely. �35 There are several reasons why requisite change looks unlikely. Firstly, requisite changes are generally difficult, ideologically unwelcome, extensive and expensive. Politicians will accordingly be extremely loath to undertake them, to offer more than tokenism. Moreover, those states and corporations that avoid making hard changes will, like free riders, be at a comparadve advantage in the short term as regards both profits and power. Secondly, then, there are Tragedy-of-Commons reasons, i.e. those deriving from general Prisoners' Dilemma situations. However the troughs induced by such dilemmas could be climbed out of; they can be transcended given, for instance, some resolute players committed to major change, despite heavy commercial and political disadvantages, and prepared to pursue judicious tit-for-tat strategies. Thirdly, because main Greenhouse effects are gradual, long-term by polidcal standards, and uncertain, the main pohdcal temptation will undoubtedly again be to avoid the problems - to muddle incrementally along, and hope that the problems will dissolve or that something (some magical technology perhaps) will turn up or that adaptadon will occur or, at worst, that the problems will fall to some successors. Meanwhile the problems will continue to be dismissed as "too hard", "too uncertain", and their costs, polidcal and economic and ideological, as "too great". We have already accumulated substantial experience of these inadequate evasive, dismissive and postponement procedures. What should of course be attempted involves extensive changes and restructuring across virtually the entire face of industrialisation and urbanisation, and therewith extensive alterations in the demands they impose upon new urban environments. The ultimate objective as regards the Greenhouse problems - a reduction in the rate of increase of, and then in the gross levels of, emissions of Greenhouse gases - direcdy implies, above all, constraints on the combustion of fossil fuels, both decelerating use and improved use, but also much better regulation, in one way or another, of production of other Greenhouse gases and of interference with ecosystems storing or absorbing Greenhouse gases. The main burden as regards requisite changes falls on the main users of fossil fuels and main consumers of Greenhouse relevant products, namely the Earth's most affluent centres: North America, Japan and Europe. In these centres especially, the work should be started on reducing consumption of fossil fuel involved goods and services. (In a thoroughly methodical approach a GG, Greenhouse gas, rating would be assigned to each sort of good and service, the objective being to reduce these ratings, an effort that would no doubt concentrate upon highly rated and easily altered items.) The general types of changes needed or desirable are well enough known to environmental planners, and include: restructuring of cides into network systems, so that reliance upon automobile commudng and truck transport of goods is much reduced, improved building practices for energy efficiency cogeneration and related technologies, increased reliance on solar energy technologies, and so on. �36 Venturing much further into unknown territory are the types of political and economic alterations required to implement the planning changes. It has already been insinuated that conventional governmental and public policy practices, analyses and procedures are inadequate to the tasks ahead. For these presuppose, for example, reladvely short-term and quite bounded settings, in which most information (as to costs, benefits, beneficiaries, etc.) is more or less certain, and where an ethical/ideological framework is taken for granted. Indeed most of the favoured procedures - such as reliance on standard cost-benefit analyses, on markets of orthodox economics, on muddling through, etc - not only depend on certainty and are unfitted for situations of uncertainty, and assume at best a decidedly shallow approach to environmental matters; but further they tend to exhibit, what is quite compatible with short-term rationality, long-term irrationality. Much intellectual effort should be invested, straightaway, in designing and developing improved political structures and matching decision-making procedures. Such structures deserve to be better articulated and understood - a large task - before the struggle is begun in earnest - perhaps in East European style - to put some of them into place. From the angle of radical change, then, impact of the Greenhouse problematique is far from entirely negative. For it may encourage or even force many more of us into thinking about and doing what should be done from a deep perspective anyway, such as rectifying recent heavy human impact upon environments, and beginning at once to put in place more environment-friendly arrangements and structures'^ Richard Sylvan APPENDIX: As to the Doomsday Argument circulated by Leslie. The anthropic argument of the penultimate section applies limitation results to escalate probabilities. By contrast, the argument deployed by Leslie has comparatively little to do with limitation features or the special risks of the present times (it does depend upon some features of the temporal distribution of the total human population). As a consequence also, 32 This more positive conclusion contrasts with final pessimistic corollary which ended the previous interim version of this essay. The corollary, which followed the gloomy (but warranted) claim that requisite restructuring change seems unlikely, and was intended to underpin it, was simply this: Humans collectively are not (particularly) rational. But we had already been told as much by philosophers like Russell and surmised as much from the latest perambulations in the long history of human wars. Finally, a significant debt should be recorded at least to all the following: to John Leslie for leading ideas and for comments, to David Bennett for comments and for research and production assistance, to Pat Troy for an opportunity to read his unpublished paper on the topic, to Malcolm Slade and Joseph Wayne Smith for encouragement to write on the topic, and to several members of the audience at the Australasian Association of Philosophy Conference, held in Christchurch, New Zealand, during August 1989, where parts of the essay were fruitfully discussed and several worthwhile suggestions or objections made. �37 it has no direct application to the special environmental problems of the present. It yields at best a general admonition against human risk taking - and even the inference to that is shaky the argument itself is unavoidable. The central claim of Leslie's argument comes to this: unless the human race ends soon, then any one of us present humans is not an ordinary one at all, but an exceptionally early one. (Such statistical ordinariness is presumably supposed analytic upon total human populadon distributions.) Thus (contraposing and distributing a reasonable expectation functor), since it is reasonable to expect that such humans are ordinary (minor premiss), it is reasonable to expect the human race will soon die out of the weaknesses of Leslie's Doomsday Argument, especially in its quasiinductive guise (e.g. PQ p.2), is its background reliance upon an indifference principle assumpdon, much as in faulty applicadons of Bayes' theorem, already noted. (The principle is used in Leslie's um argument; see p.12.) The problemadc assumption shows up in c^rz.y clauses in Leslie's deontic probability (typicality) principle, what he describes as "the Argument's underlying principle' (in fact a minor premiss): one should. %ZZ eZ^ &^Zng take one's position to be fairly typical rather than very untypical, or in different formulation: whenever Zach'/zg gvz'^nce to r/zg ccnfra/y, one should prefer to think of one's own position as fairly typical rather than highly untypical (both principles are stated, though with different emphases in PQ p.2). Much the same principle, but in stronger form, operates in what he calls 'the crux of the argument': dmZ^yj you /zav^ specially jfrong to believe that you are a very untypically early human, you ought not to believe it' (p.10, rearranged, different emphasis). Unfortunately for the Argument's principle, matters are not so indifferent, things are not so equal, some sciendsts have reasons which they think are cogent, for believing that present humans are fairly early members of the species. Consider Lovelock, whom, as we have seen, used to think that the Earth and its life systems were virtually indestructible; it is only necessary to add the familiar belief that humans themselves (like rats) are very resourceful beings, virtually impossible to exterminate, to arrive at the result that there is reason to believe that the human race is bound to persist for many more generations. That is, of course, both the informed and not unreasoned popular view, guiding much practice. As a result the principle is, at the very least, in doubt. Accordingly what Leslie presents as the crux of the argument is not endorsed here. The Argument is vulnerable in other ways as well. For one, the main premiss is, in duly contraposed form, not quite so evident, as for instance the human race could just tail off at low population levels on Earth. For another, the distribution of the functor 'it is reasonable to expect that' across the conditional involved is not unproblematic: the �38 distribution principle itself is contested in the literature, and here the result it is supposed to yield looks unreasonable! References H. W. Bernard, T/za GraaK/zazz^a E)/acr, Ballinger, Cambridge Mass., 1980. A. Block, Mzap/zy'.? Law. Boo/: Two, Magnum, Methuen Paperbacks, London, 1980. S. Boyden, WasfarK Czvz'ZzzarzaK zn EzaZagzcaZ Parspacrzva, Clarendon, Oxford, 1987. L.R. Brown and others, ^rara a/r/za WarZzZ 79^9, Norton/Worldwatch, New York, 1989; referred to as Worldwatch. R. Carnap, Eagz'caZ FazzK<7a?zaK.s' a/ PraZ?a/?zZzzy, Second edition, University of Chicago Press, 1962. C.R. Chapman and D. Morrison, Ca^mzc Cara^rrap/za^, Plenum, New York, 1989. R.M. Cyert and M.H. DeGroot, 7?ayasz'aK AKaZy^z^ aK<7 (/zzcortoz/zzy ZK EcaKaKzzc T/zaary, Rowman & LittEeld, New Jersey, 1987. 'Developing policies for responding to climatic change", Report of the Beijer Institute, February 1988. W.T. Keeton, BzaZagzcaZ -SczaKca, Third edition, Norton, New York, 1980. I. Prigogine, Or^ar azTra/C/zaag , Batam, Toronto, 1984. J. D. Hughes, 'Gaia: an ancient view of our planet", T/za EcaZagz^r 13(1983) 54-60. R. Jeffrey, T/za Eagzc p/Dacz\YzaK 2ed., University Chicago Press, 1983. A. Kaplan, 7K Pz/r^zzz'r p/Wz'-y&wz, Glencoe, Beverly Hills Ca., 1977. J. Leslie, 'Risking and World's End", EzzZZazzK a/ r/za C<2K<2<7Z<2K Azzc/aar 5aczary 10(3) (1989) 10-15; all references to Leslie are to this article unless otherwise indicated. J. Leslie, 'Is the end of the world nigh?", T/za E/zzZa^ap/zzcaZ Czzarrar/y, to appear; referred to as PQ. J.E. Lovelock, Gaza. A Kaw Zaa/z ar Zz/a <9K Earr/z, Oxford University Press, 1979. J. Lovelock, 'Are we destabilising world climate?", T/za Eaa/agz^r 15(1985) 52-55. J.Lovelock, 'Man and Gaia", T/za Earr/z E apart. MaKz'zarzKg z/za Eazz/a/ar Czzr EKVz'raKKzaKZ (ed. E. Goldsmith and N. Hilyard), Mitchell Beazley, London, 1988, 51-64. A. Lovejoy, T/za Graaf C/zaz'K p/EazKg, Harvard University Press, Massuchusetts, 1950. B. McKibben, 'Is the world getting hotter?" T/za Aaw Yar% Eavz'aw, 8 December 1988, 711. G.I. Pearman (ed.), GraaK/zazz^a. P/aKKZKg /ar c/zKzaza c/zaKga, Division of Atmospheric Research,CSIRO, 1988. �39 B. Pittock, 'Climatic catastrophes: The international implications of the greenhouse effect and nuclear winter', Peace Research Centre, Working Paper No. 20, RSPacS, Australian National University, 1987. B. Pittock, 'Forests beyond 2000 - effect of atmospheric change', AM.yfra/i(2M For^rry 50(1987a) 205-215. R. and V. Routley, 'Nuclear energy and obligations to the future', 7E%zEry 21(1978) 133179. R. Routley, 'Ultralogic as universal?' reprinted as an Appendix in Expiring Jzz/tgZ^ RM^E^yafxZ, RSSS, Australian National University, 1979. S. Schneider, 'Not to decide is to decide', in '88: P/anm/ig/br OZ/ware C/zange (ed. T. Dendy), Department of Environment and Planning, Adelaide, 1989, 5-10. R. Sylvan, 'Modern myths concerning rationality: the imperatives of consistency and (constrained) maximality', 1988, Rarzona/zzy antZ ZrrazfpfzaZzzy.* E^r <2HtZ (ed. S. Bidermann and B. Scharfstein), Brill, 1989. R.P. Turco and others, 'Nuclear winter: Global consequences of multiple nuclear explosions', 5cz^nce 222 (1983) 1283-1292. K. Walsh, 'Greenhouse-induced climatic change in Australia' in Urgex/zazAfe '88., op.czf., 10-19. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Draft Papers Description An account of the resource Sylvan's literary executor encountered an archive in which “all his projects were current", since manuscripts were undated and unattributed. Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document GAEAN GREENHOUSE, NUCLEAR WINTER, AND ANTHROPIC DOOMSDAY? ... climate change, like no other issue, calls the whole notion of human progress into question. The [ever promised] benefits of newer technologies, more efficient economics, and improved political systems could be overwhelmed by uncontrolled global warming. ... the pace of climate change will soon overwhelm natural variability in the earth's climate. Indeed, it can be compared with nuclear war for its potential to disrupt a wide range of human and natural systems, [severely] complicating the task of managing economies and coping with other problems. Irrigation works, settlement patterns, and food production [among others] would be tragically disrupted ... (Worldwatch 89, p.ll, p.10) There are many approaches to the the cluster of problems upon which this philosophical investigation focuses. These approaches range from playing the issue down entirely, dismissing it as not a problem, not something anyone should worry about, at the one end of the range, to playing it up at the other. Those who play it up may even foresee the demise of the human race, unless substantially new socio-economic arrangements - with restructured cities, revitalized lands, rejuvenated oceans - soon eventuate. There is certainly plenty of room for different approaches (see Diagram 1), and for some eclecticism. For what is being relied upon, in every case, comprises shaky and contestable arguments, from flimsy forecasting models lacking many apparently relevant details. No one of sound judgment, aware that weather reports for twelve hours ahead can be wildly astray, would place a very high level of confidence on climatic forecasts for fifty years ahead down a very hazardous track. Nonetheless there is enough information to act; and there is information rationally requiring action. For things in the future are not going to be the same. It is very doubtful that they are going to be any better (though much important economic theorizing presupposes as much, such as the monetary discounting of the future). They are not going to be similar even, because so many parameters important to life are changing, several at exponential rates. Significant in these changes are likely climatic changes. The Greenhouse effect is among these, a result of the increases of "greenhouse" gases, especially carbon dioxide and methane, in the Earth's atmosphere, which have followed exponential paths since the highenergy phase of industrial culture (see Diagram 7). The growth in gas concentration produces, what it is lagged by, but is now apparent, a significant increase in mean global temperatures. This has major implications for much of life on Earth. Course of action Reasons offered Short response No problem Refutable No certainty Irrational Adaptive capacity Exaggerated High-tech resolution Wishful thinking Severe dislocation otherwise Utopian Individual survival Pointless No action^ Moderate action Considerable action These very condensed responses will be expanded and explained as we proceed. In accord with an esteemed philosophical tradition, a medical analogy is first deployed; it serves to throw main points into high relief. Consider the possible illness of the Earth, for instance as a result of brutalisation and poisoning. Look on the Earth then as a patient^, who exhibits some symptoms of a possibly disabling illness; for instance the patient's system is overloaded with troublesome trace elements and her temperature appears to be rising. Compare rational medical practice where a human patient gives indications of possibly disabling illness, for instance the patient shows signs of hypertension. Now consider some of the spectrum of approaches. Suppose the advice is to take no action, to do nothing but monitor the situation until further information comes in, until even (to take a worst case) it becomes evident that the patient indeed has hypertension and suffers a severe consequence. That would be regarded as irresponsible practice. To say that there is no problem when symptoms are there, would be regarded as utterly irresponsible, and medically refutable. To say that no action should be taken until certainty as to the complaint is established would be seen as incompetent medical practice. Taoist no-action would be different. It would not have undertaken excessive industrial action in the first place. This is precisely not the way less modest Gaean hypotheses regard the Earth. For there the Earth is active, actively participating in co-evolutionary developments. But the health analogy does of course go right back to ancient chthonic view, systematically presented in Plato, according to which The Earth is a living being of whom humans are only a part. Right relationship with the Earth means that the total organism is in good health; so environmental problems are seen as illness, as a failure of one part of the organism to interact supportivcly with others' (Hughes, p.60). For Gaean themes in other ancient philosophies, both before and after Plato, see Hughes p.57. a ? 3 A responsible practitioner begins recommending some remedial action straight away. Naturally there are various options open as to what may be prescribed. These include, at the one end, high-tech procedures, such as, what would be ridiculous simply for hypertension, full medical engine-and-gearbox replacement (heart and kidney transplant), or, a little less ludicrous but ridiculously commonplace, a whole-remaining-life course of pharmaceutical products, e.g. tablets. At the other end, lifestyle changes are proposed, such as more exercise, weight loss, stress reduction, and an improved diet with less sodium input. Reasonable advice would not include pure adaptation, that the patient went on living as before in the expectation that her system would adapt to the situation. Nor would it be reasonably suggested, except in somewhat unusual circumstances, that the patient entirely change her lifestyle, abandon her work, house and so on, and live somewhere else. Even so unusual circumstances, which might include residence in a very polluted environment or work in a nuclear plant, are no doubt on the increase. Like all analogies, the medical analogy has limitations. One feature it does not capture concerns the holistic aspects of the Earth's sickness, and why accordingly an individualistic survival approach, egotistically rational enough for hypertension and perhaps even for a localised nuclear war, cannot succeed. The reason is, of course, that holistic problems are too extensive for individuals, or even small collectives, acting on their own to be effective or to make much difference. Some are too big even for large collectives or states, but would require whole regions of the Earth acting in concert. But of course some state players, such as the superpowers as regards nuclear winter, can make a substantial difference, or even all the difference. The medical analogy also indicates the outcome of further investigation of approaches. Briefly, as with a chronic illness, the conclusion is that there is no very easy path; future humans should expect a hard landing. 1. Investigative philosophy, argument and rational decision as applied to climatic probiematiques. The role of philosophy in such a complex problematique as that of Greenhouse effects is not difficult to state briefly. Philosophy, Anglo-American philosophy especially, is concerned above all with Investigative philosophy resembles philosophy, except that it may upset the philosophy it applies; it investigates arguments, their features - assumptions, reliability, etc. - and their generalisation to rational processes and methods, but normal philosophical topics. The generalisation to rational processes comprehends a wider range of philosophical throughput than the orthodox narrow range of argument typically addressed in logic courses; to probabilistic and plausibilistic reasoning, to decision processing and making. 4 A main objective in this piece of investigative philosophy is to consider certain argumcmj pointing to probabilities of severe dislocation as a result of Greenhouse effects, and the resulting impact on rariana/ formation and action. There are certain arguments of particular interest for radical decision and action: various neo-Malthusian arguments, catastrophe arguments, and doomsday arguments. A main run of arguments to considerable action are limitative in character. Such ZimifafMm arguments are sometimes alternatively called *neo Malthusian', since Malthus presented a very elementary, very controversial, argument of this general type. But such is the hostility, especially in Marxist-influenced quarters, to Malthus's associated themes (some of them admittedly repulsive) that merely to associate an argument terminologically with Malthus is thereby likely to condemn it. To avoid such fallacious condemnation-byassociation, the graphic term 'neo-Malthusian' is largely avoided in what follows. The general form of these limitation arguments is simply this: growth in some parameter over time encounters limits, typically with severe, even catastrophic, effects; for seldom is the transition to severely constrained behaviour smooth. A characteristic graphic representation is as follows: Diagram 2. GrowfA ZimiM growth parameter exponential growth pattern encountering limits subsequent varying behaviour The limits are often imposed just by finitude, for instance finiteness of a resource or a sink. But other limits can be important, for instance where new phenomena or thresholds come into play. General limitation arguments loom in the background in what follows, where we shall be arguing on a double front: * * 5 A. Significant disequilibrium of the Earth's systems is a real possibility, and accordingly must be reckoned with in decision procedures. Though the probability of such an outcome may only be modest, the case has to be taken seriously because the result (arrived at by a limitation argument typically) is so bad. Suppose, for instance, the outcome is that the Earth ceases to be habitable in present terms, to be able to carry its present demanding load. Such an outcome would have an extremely high negative value, so it would tend to dominate other alternatives. (But it need not be an entirely worst case, where perhaps the dominant terrestrial species becomes extinct, or the Earth becomes devoid of "higher" life. Under the bad result contemplated some better-off humans in special circumstance may subsist for a while.) Such sufficiently bad cases be taken account of in decision making; they have to be taken account of in rgrz'o/ia/ decision procedures. A*. Significant disequilibrium not only has a non-negligible probability, but set in the proper content has a sizeable probability; so it cannot be ignored or discounted as too low to bother about. For such an argument has to be established at the outset than for a rational decision theory argument. Such a different argument, of especial concern as regard climatic changes, is the following argument:- * There is some probability that the Gaean "greenhouse effect", generated by human activity, will get out of control, that Gaean control mechanisms will fail, and that the Earth will, for example, overheat (Runaway Greenhouse, or premiss). * That result would be disastrous for human activities, and indeed for humans Pr<9.sp(?cf). * Because of the unusual, and unusually precarious, position of humans (of certain critical anthropic parameters), such a probability of disaster is not in fact small but decidedly large. As a consequence then, the human species will probably sharply decline, and even become extinct (C^^^p/26 That is, by a rectified version of Murphy's law - that if something can go wrong then in appropriate unusual conditions, it very probably will - an incrementally small probability is inflated into a very large probability. It would be a mistake to conclude that because the argument itself looks an unlikely one, everyone can stop worrying. The argument is but ong of a substantial raft of arguments, suggesting that we are already in deep trouble, that 5/23^ have everyone worried; it is but a final intellectual sting, so to say, from the previously inconspicuous cosmological tail. 6 Such a doomsday argument no doubt puts together, in one more exact form, some of the sorts of considerations that are troubling many people, especially concerned youth, about the Greenhouse business: that humans (including themselves) are on a decline or extinction path. It is no doubt not the only consideration that should be troubling them or us. For whether or not doomsday warnings are warranted, there are other matters that should be sufficiently worrisome, to anyone of moral integrity:* Future times are likely to be exceedingly uncomfortable for very many creatures, as habitats are destroyed, food producing regions are eliminated, and environments seriously impoverished. (Many of these creatures are nonexistents, mere future existents, i.e. creatures that do not yet exist or participate in market or voting rituals, but nonetheless they wzZ/ exist and may participate. But, despite their presently unfavourable ontological status, they are entitled to fair and decent treatment.) * Given such future prospects, present practices which do nothing or vanishingly little to ameliorate these prospects, are decidedly irrational. Indeed a main message that will emerge from the present exercise is the mora/ Zrrtmpna/f/y of critical large-scale human practices. The irrationality, morally-weighed-down irrationality, of present large-scale human practices is already conspicuous from the wintry downside of climatic prospects of which Greenhouse warming is the upside. 7 Diagram 3. Macro-c/wKmc jarring am?Observed global average temperatures, 1880-1987, with forward projections (historic data from Worldwatch p.10). mean global temperature (degrees C) The apparatus for conducting a world-wide nuclear war is entirely in place and indeed on alert The probability of such a war, even if small, is not zero. Among the many awful effects of a large nuclear war is that of nuclear winter, which would probably bring about the demise of present human civilisation, and would at the very least mean enormous dislocation for most surviving humans and other creatures. A sufficiently diabolical chemico-nuclear war, reaching into all inhabited parts of the globe, could indeed drive the human species close to extinction. The decidedly dubious rationality and morality of these general nuclear arrangements both through what they are in themselves for what purposes, and through their moral 8 opportunity costs - are widely appreciated. The thesis that the arrangements and practices are immoral, irradonal, and ought to be dismantled - already much argued, and also contested^ - is not the present concern. The thermonuclear downside is, by comparison, a very easy case to examine philosophically, and argue, as compared with the greenhouse upside.4 For there is, for instance, a case of sorts for much increased use of greenhouse gases, such as CFCs in refrigerators, a case that hardly extends very plausibly to nuclear weapons. It is a case heavily pressed by some "developing" nations, for polluting devices already in widespread use in more affluent places, as necessary for local standards of living. These nations want, or are heavily encouraged, to extend the war against Nature through the habitats they have gained control over, in the name of economic progress. War also joins Greenhouse summer and nuclear winter. For the barely-analogical rapacious war against Nature is a major contributor to Greenhouse gas emissions, for instance, in the domestication of wetlands for rice paddies, through the heavy pillaging of forests, and the like, typically carried on with swords and bayonets reforged to jump ploughs, chemical weapons turned to herbicide guns, and tanks converted to bulldozers. The protracted war against Nature^, carried, it had been supposed, to a victorious conclusion with the rise of science and technology and the ubiquitous advance of industralisation, seems however to have backfired. For it is turning the Earth, Gaea herself, into a patient, with crippled life support systems, thereby endangering the sustained future even of the victorious. Yet another Pyrrhic victory. Greenhouse and nuclear winter are more intricately connected than through war and as the upside and downside of meteorological phenomena. One of the high-tech solutions suggested for atmospheric overheating, involves the generation of wintering effects - to cool things down - by flinging enough dust up into the atmosphere, a trick no doubt most easily achieved on the requisite scale by nuclear explosives. Needless to say, like backbuming against out-of-control fires, artificial winter would be a pretty desperate and, given present expertise, dangerous expedient. 2. The Greenhouse debate, main policy responses, and irrational decision. The Greenhouse debate, as to what to do, if anything, about forecast Greenhouse effects on Earth, is intellectually disturbing. For it has revealed, as we shall soon see, that many of those who have spoken, worse that /pta/ry q/ r/io-yg wAo who have some role For my very small contribution to this, see the War and Peace scries in Papery E/iwv/wig/mxZ RSSS, Australian National University. Global warming, by no means entirely certain, is assumed to be the outcome of increasing greenhouse gas build up. Of course though some mean temperatures will rise, cooling will probably occur also in some localized regions. A war incited and applauded by illustrious philosophical forebears. * & 9 in decision making (including both experts and politicians), mah'ng in con^'n'on^ p/nncorrainiy or possible riskA a J7rm gra.%? on The main canvassed policy approaches to the Greenhouse problematique lie firmly within the dominant social outlook, the high-tech growth and development ideology. Diagram 4 E?r<9<26? po/z'cy fa rA^ Gr^g/i/z<9^^ /?ra^/^marz^a^. Dominant paradigm options Alternative ecological outlook Procrastination (wait-and-see) Soft energy paths and alternative regulation Adaptation (sink-or-swim) Socio-economic transformation Regulation Intervention (star wars) We will briefly outline, and find wanting, a// the dominant approaches. * Procra^rznaaon, the prevailing response. In fact the main governmental and conservative response thus far has been procrastination, or "wait-and-see" as it is more benignly known.*? The approach makes much of the uncertainties, of the shortcomings, in even the most elaborate general circulation models for future climatic change, of the high noise-to-signal levels. On such bases it contends that it is too early to do anything, except staging some meetings, organising some review committees, undertaking some monitoring, and funding a little more "research". It obviously does nothing to rock the growth ideology boat. Certainly a few scientists, outside main policy making reaches, do have a sound intuitive appreciation of these problems, and of the deficiencies of prevailing practices, e.g. Pittock 87. There is little excuse for prevailing ignorance of or ignoring of decision theory: for the elements of the standard theory are readily accessible and very elementary. In the present essay a modification of standard decision theory (as expounded e.g. in Jeffrey) is assumed as background; for details see Sylvan. Following Knight, many economists (try to) distinguish between uncertainty and risk. Risk is said to obtain when some more or less objective numerical probabilities can be assigned to outcomes, a situation not obtaining as regards global greenhouse effects. Bayesians, who can always assign subjective probabilities tend to eschew the distinction, e.g. Cyert and DeGroot, who say that 'decision making under uncertainty refers to situations in which the outcome of the decision is not precisely predictable'(p.3). Either way, Greenhouse involves uncertainty - to which rational procedures should be applied. There is significant rhetorical art in the choice of classificatory labels, a rather philosophically neglected art. A PR person must have been hired to produce the Greenhouse adaptation of 'adaptation*. 10 There is the pretence that we do not know enough to act.s But it is known that carbon dioxide, methane and other greenhouse gases are fast increasing. The main causes and enough likely enough consequences are also known. Theoretical considerations have already been partially confirmed by rising temperatures in the eighties. Outcomes of rising temperatures are also known in broad outline: rising sea levels, and so forth. In addition, there are partial small-scale models of Greenhouse effects in action. For example, a city such as Mexico City, which is situated in the bowl-like valley, is placed in an environment which traps heat as well as polludon. The ecological effects, like the human effects, are pretty dramatic even at this small level, and hardly to be sought, or emulated elsewhere. There is a pretence, fostered also by many sciendsts, that Greenhouse difficuldes have only just been discovered; a date commonly set for that watershed event is the Villiers conference and statement of 1985 (e.g. Pittock 87 pp.2-3). Actually there have been Greenhouse warnings for more than a decade, and there has been a corresponding decade of inacdon. Nor is any acdon of much significance presently seriously contemplated. Back in 1979 Bernard wrote at length about and reported the substantial concern of climatologists about Greenhouse effects. Even the magazine not then noted for its green sympathies, recorded that The release of carbon dioxide to the atmosphere by the burning of fossil fuels is, conceivably, the most important environmental issue in the world today" (May 3 1979). Bernard quotes many other concerned scientists, several asserdng that 'the government must start dealing with this problem now". They meant the United States government. "The"" government didn't take the hint. For more than a decade then, sciendsts have been emphasizing that the Greenhouse threat is a major environmental problem, and that action should be taken immediately. Over 10 years nothing of real significance to counter the effects has happened. There has been more than a q/TKacdo/t, during which matters have got worse, and the time frame for evasive acdon disturbingly shorter. It is already evident that requisite decision making under uncertainty is not taking place. On straight inductive grounds, it would be reasonable to expect nothing will be done. While there are theoretical grounds to back up such an assessment, still it is only just beginning to get through to a much wider public (which can exercise a marginal influence on what politicians say) that there is - or T/zay be, as some more reactionary modal-mongering academics would have - a problem or two. Part of the problem is that scientists have been caught out (e.g. crying wolf) and have become ultra-cautious. With the advent of thermodymamics, for instance, scientists began 'threatening mankind with a rather swift "heat death"' as the universe ran down. Thus M. Alier, on 'blatant ideological use of science even by scientists themselves' (see Bernard p.9). More recently, many rang alarm bells prematurely concerning an impending mini-ice-age. The past predictive failures of scientists have been used as evidence for scepticism concerning greenhouse effects; see Me Kibben p.8. It is an unsatisfactorily selective argument; interestingly it is not used in a similar way against economists, whose predictive record is significantly worse. 11 Many scientists have joined the wait-and-see queue, with their begging bowls, hoping for more hand-outs for research. They assume, rightly enough, that more information would assist with rational decision-making, and also, quite wrongly, that "scientific certainty" is required for action to be taken. Physical scientists are not alone in their misapprehension of rational decision methods. Although there is a good deal of practical experience available of statistical-type decision making under uncertainty, for instance as regards insurance coverage and engineering projects, decision theory, especially as regards unrepeatable situations, has not penetrated very far into standard scientific methodology or much into mainstream parts of social sciences. 'Economists in particular have shown a talent for bringing every problem back to a world of certainty where all solutions are known or can be easily found/ Natural scientists including climatologists are, for the most part, on the same erroneous reducdon-tounattainable-certainty trip. 'This is not to say that economists have not worked on uncertainty. ... however ... uncertainty is introduced and then taken out by assumption' (Cyert and DeGroot, continuing, p.l). But there are several classes of problemadc situations, where decision and action may be required, where uncertainty be removed or discarded by fiat, reducdon stratagems or otherwise, notably:* inherently probabilistic situations, such as those of indeterminacy in quantum theory; * essentially unpredictable situadons (which may be determinisdc) such as those now under invesdgadon in chaos theory; * presently uncertain situations and outcomes, which may eventually resolve into certain cases, or may tum into some of the above classes, where there is not time to wait for resolution. The Greenhouse problem is regularly put into the latter class, a standard assumpdon being that with enough money and research effort thrown at it, it will resolve to decent certainty. But it may well not. Climate is now a prime arena for applications of chaos theory (in any case inidal conditions for application of meteorological equadons are seldom very accurate and are now shifting with the accumulation of Greenhouse gases). There are grounds for supposing that critical parts of climatology will fall into the essentially unpredictable class, that the sought certainly is unattainable. If so the standard begging-bowl posture of too many research scientists: Supply more funding so we can go on researching undl we obtain certainty, is misguided.^ Or, less charitably, downright dishonest. Nor does it seem to have occurred to most research scientists demanding more money that an important reason why they are not obtaining the funding they expect, or even enough to run complex modellings on expensive computers, is because their research results could, if unfavourable, act as a serious drag on the industrial establishment. 77zey are Aar<^/y go//7g to /?e we// jrt/tt/et/ to ^e/eg/twuze woder/i /a^artr/a/ society. 12 There are thus some severe problems with this prevailing response. Firstly, it is irrational. Certainty, achieved, may be achieved too late. What was required for rationality was decision making in advance of certainty. Secondly, certainty may be unobtainable. The meteorological equations may be non-linear (nonadditive) and so incapable of delivering firm results given slightly fluctuating initial data. Not only are many experts and decision makers only comfortable about acting in circumstances of relative certainty; almost as bad, where some uncertainty is involved, only what is considered Zz^/y gets genuine consideration. Rational decision making has however to take account of what may not be very likely at all, but may be quite disastrous should it occur (e.g. a nuclear accident with full meltdown). In this respect too, the standard response is methodologically unsound. * AzZapzarz^n, learning to live with and love the Greenhouse. The policy That tends to be favoured by most economists' is an adaptive strategy: '"Let society adjust to environmental changes without attempting to mitigate or prevent the changes in advance". We could adapt to climate change for example, by planting alternative crop strains [themselves] ... more widely adapted... ' (Schneider p.8). Observe, however, that it is a decidedly rayzrzcf&% "adaptation" that is being proposed, that humans adjust to the results of present economic and industrial practices, rather than adjusting fAem. It is zz^^zz/?z^6Z that economic growth comes first, that we do not change (e.g. through decent regulation) high energy industrial practices. A fuller and smarter adaptation would adapt r/z&yg practices. The policy is like a pernicious agriculture policy that says, "Let farmers adjust to the results of soil erosion, salination and so on, without attempting to mitigate or prevent these deleterious changes in advance." Such "adaptadve agriculture", the present predominant practice in advanced agriculture, is anti-environmental, but is given a spurious air of evolutionary inevitability and evolutionary redistributive justice; you can't buck natural evolution, which is entirely natural, can you? Let us condense such far-from-inevitable and highly artificial mal-adaptation in the neologism Greenhouse adaptation, like nuclear adaptation, is badaptation (some, less kind, would say wa^aptation). There is a pragmatic, if cynical, political argument for badaptation, namely, that zznzZat^raZ action to prevent a warming is unfeasible and requisite international cooperation is unattainable. Both contentions are open to doubt. Unilateral action by the USA, by far the Earth's heaviest resource and energy consumer (per capita and on several other relevant dimensions), could make a major difference, especially when backed up by pressure (familiar from other settings, such as the narcotics war) on other nations and through the United Nations. Unfortunately the USA is also the world's largest supplier of influential growth economists. In any case, international agreements such as those on whaling and 13 concerning Antarctica, are attainable, and sometimes effective. The ozone protocols, limiting production of CFCs, show that results can be achieved to limit trace gas emissions. The adaptadon proposal is presently compatible with wait-and-see; both mean little or no hauling back on trace gas production. Indeed procrastination will force sociedes towards badaptation. Typical of adaptation, like procrastination, is an (over-)emphasis on the uncertainties of Greenhouse forecasts, and on the decision-theoretic paralysis such uncertaindes are alleged to produce. Characterisdc of adaptadon too is a minimisadon of the of Greenhouse modification. No doubt the impression that things won't be so very different, or far removed from what has already been experienced, is important in getting adaptationism more readily accepted, as a radonal course of acdon (instead of the seemingly irradonal course it is). Thus badaptation tends to play with figures at the low end of projected ranges of temperature increase, such as 1.5°C for 2050, when in fact present data indicates something rather in the vicinity of 4° C - in a setting, furthermore, where fracdons of a degree centigrade may well be linked to macro-physical and macro-biological change. Recent modellings deliver, on average, an increase in 2°C attributable to carbon dioxide, and it is widely thought that other trace gases will double the CO2 effect^, thus yielding a 4°C temperature increase around 2050. The colossal extent of future human dislocation has correspondingly been deliberately underemphasized. The adaptive capacides of human arrangements, when humans are living at the margin, to massive natural shifts, has been grossly exaggerated. Consider agriculture alone - set aside flooded cides, sunken atoll islands, and all the rest. Some of the Earth's major grain producing regions - upon which famine relief projects depend - could be pushed substantially out of business. The conditions which prevailed during the American dust­ bowl experience of the nineteen-thirties were benign indeed compared with those which threaten with mid twenty-first century Greenhouse condidons. The mid-continental summer temperatures were only 1-2° C warmer than the present average; under greenhouse conditions they could well be more than 3-4° C warmer. In the dust-bowl rainfall only slipped at critical growing times (e.g. July for northern corn) to 80% of the contemporary norm; but under Greenhouse conditions it could be significantly less again (only winter precipitation increasing). A super dust-bowl is not improbable (for much more detail, see Bernard). Similarly for other similar latitude Northern grain producing regions. But the high-energy industrial superstructure is crucially based upon sufficient cheap food (bread) for the urban masses. 10 See e.g. Pearman p.18. Note that methane is beginning to rival carbon dioxide as a gas whose atmospheric propordons really matter and whose present exponential increase is excessive. 14 * Tnfgrvenn'o?!, high-tech Earth engineering. Interventionist proposals so far floated include (D New oceans in parts of the Earth's land surface lying below, at, or near sea level. These projects would make the mega-dams of recent times look like children's play. @ Wintering effects. Production of sufficient dust in the atmosphere, achieved for instance by nuclear detonations, to mitigate heating effects. Such enterprise would make modification of the weather by cloud seeding look like childs' play. Fortunately these and other expensive and grandiose proposals, which would call for considerable international cooperation, far down the planning track; with these schemes procrastination is rational. * controlling free(-wheeling) enterprise. Regulation itself is of course transparadigmatic; where it belongs depend on what measures (what sorts of constraints, rights, etc.) are proposed and how they are imposed or enforced. If it is, for example, some industrial law-and-order, smokestack scrubbing regulations or Greenhouse polluting rights, within the status quo, that is one thing, but if a minimally- constrained growth paradigm is questioned and alternative socio-economic arrangements advocated, that is quite another, and falls outside the dominant paradigm. Such policies involving regulations controlling fossil fuel emissions especially, are negatively labelled in the predominantly American policy literature, though there is now no preventing some Greenhouse effects; but the worse to follow could still be prevented. What is usually covered under the label is however some regulation within prevailing political arrangements. So energy efficiencies and savings for investment in growth elsewhere is comprehensible, straight growth-curtailing non-consumption is not contemplated. But the latter is just what alternatives do contemplate. Democratic political arrangements do not exclude such alternatives; both the power bases of political leaders and economic prescriptions do. Adequate regulation within prevailing socio-economic arrangements is going to prove impossible, without adjustment of power structures and economic imperatives - in effect without far-reaching systemic and ideological adjustment. While such adjustment appears rational, it seems unlikely (see further section 5). Power holders and the power structures into which they slot have too much to lose. So it is hardly remarkable that regulation itself is not so bureaucratically popular (at least under that mode of presentation) in these latter days of economic irrationalism, and is strongly resented and resisted. Some of the U.S. bureaucratic reaction to the Antarctic ozone hole, now regularly attributed to extensive CFC usage, is instructive. A top Reagan official 'said that since CFO's were useful to industry, people should use sunglasses and baseball caps as protection against retina damage and skin cancer' - individualisdcally distributed adaptationism, terrific €? & 15 for creatures outside "sunglasses and baseball caps" economies. Other Reagan administrators spoke for procrastination, one academic-turned-bureaucrat observing that 'so far the ozone hole has had little effect on skin cancer rates in the United States'. The prevailing bureaucratic procrastination stance that was applied to the much easier ozone problem (which has belated obtained weak international responses), is now extended to Greenhouse effects. It is typically, typically irrationally, stated by high administrators that 'significant gaps exist in our knowledge .... These scientific uncertainties must be reduced before we commit the economic future to drastic and potentially misplaced policy responses' (preceding quotations from McKibben p.10, p.ll, italics added). and the of the Greenhouse business is thereby also revealed. Like heart disease and cancer, Greenhouse effects are gaining much discussion and some funding because they just may severely effect the affluent, affluent humans and affluent nations, that have a good deal to lose, in United States especially. The impact will, however, be at least as severe in some third world nations, whose lands or much of them will be flooded, countries which cannot afford extensive The extensive expensive dyking (or where such effort would be in the longer term, as seas rise, be pointless), countries such as Pacific coral atoll nations and delta states like Bangladesh. But the really serious losers will no doubt be, not humans , rich or poor, but nonhumans. Biological diversity, already being reduced by various human activities, may be one of the chief casualties of global warming. Massive destruction of forests, wetlands, and even the polar tundra could irrevocably destroy complex eco­ systems that have existed for millennia. Indeed, various biological reserves created in the past decade to protect species diversity could become virtual death traps as wildlife attempt to survive in conditions for which they are poorly suited. Accelerated species extinction is an inevitable consequence of a rapid warming (Worldwatch p.10). 3. Arguments to dislocation and for a Lesser Venus Prospect. There is at least a small probability that predicted increases in mean atmospheric temperatures will seriously interfere with most remaining natural habitats and result in the degeneration or destruction of many of them, especially forests, wetlands, and marine environments. For example, most wetlands will either be flooded or else evaporate under increasing temperatures. Again, the prospect is for the boreal forest to shrink from about 23% of the world's forest to something like 1% of a much diminished forest covering. Nor will adaptationism help here; for natural evolution is much too slow for adaptationism to succeed n. 11 Cf. Keeton pp.763-4, '... typical migration rates for forest boundaries are of the order of 502000m per annum ... [A requisite] shift of 500-1000km would, however, take hundreds of years. ... Pollen evidence... suggests that large changes occurred in forest composition during the Holocene period some 8000-10000 years ago, even though the climate changes then were less 16 Natural ecosystems will not adapt effectively to rapid climatic change.... With regard to forests, habitats for plants and animals cannot be re-created or transplanted rapidly. Continuing climatic changes would strain the capabilities of management practices even in commercial tree plantations (Beijer Institute Report pp.21-3). The decline or demise of these systems, vast reservoirs for greenhouse gases, will accelerate the warming, and accordingly make matters substantially worse: Trees are adapted to a narrow range of temperature and moisture levels, and cannot cope with rapid climate change. A temperature increase of 1 degree Celsius per decade in mid- to upper latitudes translates into a shift in vegetation zones of 60-100 miles northward. Terrestrial ecosystems cannot migrate that fast. Vast numbers of trees are likely to die, and new trees adapted to warmer temperatures are unlikely to be able to replace them rapidly. During such a disruption, huge areas of forest could die and, as they decay or bum, send large quantities of additional CO2 into the atmosphere, accelerating the warming (Worldwatch p.10). Of course the immediate climatic patterns would be somewhat more complex. If enough soot and ash from fires were flung into the atmosphere there would be a cooling effect, like that of a small nuclear winter, before heating accelerated. The present pattern of ecosystemic loss would also be sharply accelerated. For when natural ecosystems get reduced to about 30% of their initial size, they tend to collapse of themselves. Moreover, there would be other significant positive feedback from ecosystems other than the terrestrial forests, from the oceans especially. As the oceans warm, they lose their capacity to serve as carbon dioxide reservoirs. So they too release additional gases, including previously absorbed CO2, back into the atmosphere, further accelerating the warming. A critical question arises as to how much danger such positive feedback poses? As so often, informed opinions, and so probability estimates differ. However 'several scientists working in the area consider that positive feedback effects will force a very bleak picture to be drawn" (Worldwatch p.19).^ Unlike the interim effect of a small nuclear winter, where after a few years at most, climatic behaviour (as distinct from radioactivity levels and, differently, from ecological communities) would presumably return towards the previous norm, there will be /7<9 similar under greenhouse impact. Technically then, stability would be lost under the than those expected by 2030 [and forests were more extensive and less interfered with]' (Pittock 87a p.209, rearranged). Second order probabilities, probabilities and uncertainties in the light of first order subjective probabilities, enter importantly. 17 impact,^ disequilibrium induced. An eventual long-term return to some different but sufficiently congenial equilibrium could well be excluded. Under new climatic regimes plants themselves may be able to do little more than hang on for part of their own lives. In many places conditions would be too severe for much of the "year" to permit normal plant functioning, including what is crucial for Greenhouse amelioration, photosynthesis. In most plants, photosynthesis only occurs across a narrow band of temperatures (e.g. 6 - 34°C); outside that range the plants shut down operations.^ Even more important, many plants would leave few or no successful successors. Even where plants set seed, seedlings would not survive under the severe conditions expected; for instance, they would be killed by hot dry summer conditions, or in other places by frosts to which they are not adapted, both phenomena already familiar after clearfelling of forests. The situation at a famous place in southern Sahara, where there is but one ancient tree hanging on in thousands of square kilometres of desert, a tree with viable seeds which sets no seedlings, could be more or less replicated in many other places where forests or woody plants once grew. In fact we are already witnessing the demise of the trees in much of Australia. Already dead and dying trees form a predominant feature of the Australian rural landscape. Virtually whichever way ecologists travel in Australia where trees remain, they are confronted with dead and dying trees The reasons for the present decline of trees in rural Australia is, for the most part, not to be attributed to early Greenhouse or even pollution effects. "6 It is thought to be due to a complex of factors, including a range of insect predators whose efforts are concentrated on isolated trees left after an excessive zeal for clearing (i.e. holistic effects enter as regards healthy persistence of trees). Excessive disturbance of ecological systems, though overclearing of trees, has seriously upset the systems. Types of systemic stress and disturbance are likely to be much accelerated given the additional impact of Greenhouse warming on plant functioning and reproduction. f<9 some q/ worth disentangling. Firstly, a system may be disturbed by interfering with critical components There are several within the system structure, processing parts, such as botanical systems or their interconnections. As with a computer, if a cridcal component is broken or a circuit cut, the probability of serious malfunction increases. Secondly, a system normally operates within a Stability is defined in physics in terms of immediate return to an initial (inertial) position after small disturbance. The upper bound may be difficult to appreciate in most of Aotearoa. But in much of Australia, during the summer, many plants close down their operations for much of the day. Other effects of increased heat on major food plants matter for human affairs. Severe heat interferes with fertilization and reproduction in com, and apparently affects the ability of rice in Asia to reproduce; so considerably reduced yields of staple foods may be anticipated. Reported by Recher on EarfAworw. Thus coastline vegctational destruction through detergents in sewerage waters. 18 certain range of condition. Take it outside these conditions or push it towards limits (let the computer get too hot or too cold), and probability of breakdown is much increased. Feedback loops, which are an important feature of cybernetic systems are particularly vulnerable to normality disturbance. Cybernetic systems afford one example of more holistic behaviour; dissipative systems, where perhaps strange new features may enter as systemic loading is increased, another. Such new features may not be at all congenial to dominant forms, or to maintenance of life support arrangements. It should be evident from details already assembled that there is some probability the Greenhouse efforts could seriously disturb the crucial carbon cycle. The carbon cycle loops, in major fashion, through both the higher plant complexes and the oceans, both major carbon dioxide reservoirs - but just how critically through them is uncertain. However, with the serious disturbance of main components in the cycle, the real possibility of cycle malfunction can hardly be excluded. Much the same holds with other crucial chemical cycles, such as the sulphur cycle (though woody plants are perhaps less important here, the oceans are highly significant, the oceans Costeau has already pronounced moribund). To a lesser extent, several of the other well-known bio-chemical cycles, such as those for nitrogen, sodium, and so forth, depend for their stability and maintenance on the adequate operation of active ecological structures. Plainly if a cycle loops through a component, such as a tropical forest, which is severely disturbed then the crucial cycle itself could be locally disrupted. There is some probability, furthermore, that the changes will disturb other physical cycles crucial to the stability of systems. For some of the Earth's feedback systems are in fact maintained in equilibrium through natural ecosystems. A striking example appears to be the regulating of the Earth's temperature itself. Lovelock and collaborators have devised an elementary daiyy wor/d m(9dg/ which reveals how a feedback system with two types of daisies can, within limits, stabilize temperatures despite increasing solar energy input (see the next diagram). The limits are important, for as these limits are approached the maintenance systems break down. Thus again, instability could ensue under disturbance. 19 Diagram 5.77z^rm<9.s7anc r^ga/aizoa a/*rA^ Earr/z j ^zayac^ i^mp^ramrf rAraag/z p/a/zM (a much simplified picture from Lovelock 88 p.58). !n the "Datsyworid" mode), tife adjusts the pfanefs temperature to suit ttseif. A basic assumption is that on Daisyworid, as on Earth, the sun is getting progressive^ hotter. Biack daisies grow best when the surface temperature is tow, because their petals absorb radiation. As the sun's heat increases, the white daisies begin to nourish. Their petais reflect radiation, thus heipingto iower surface temperature. Between the time the seeds first germinate and when the sun gets too hot, the piants maintain a steady surface temperature by adjusting the pfanefs aibedo. Without doubt these matters are bad enough. Demise of most of the Earth's richness^ is not a minor matter. Worse could follow. Apart from direct ecological breakdown, there are several other major ways through which the maintenance structures of the Earth can be not merely awkwardly disturbed, but thrown right out of kilter - perhaps, given the d^/zcacy of several critical matters, never to return present norms. Most obvious and immediately threatening is * nuclear warfare, and therewith nuclear winter. But there are of course other severe shocks that the planet could suffer than those chemonuclear warfare, some human induced, some a "chance" matter of the planets' posidon in space; namely * a mini Big Bang, or an undermining of metastability, brought about through very high energy experimentadon (see Leslie); * a collision with a large meteorite or asteroid. Such uncertaindes, not germane to the main climatic arguments, are listed, not to achieve a bogus completeness, but to emphasize that complete certainty is not to expected, not radonally. Should we obtain it, should we obtain easy relatively unproblemadc lives, then we have, by world standards, been rather lucky. Moreover, these latter uncertaindes do so 17 Natural richness is its main richness, much exceeding human arufice. 20 far appear negligible compared with those bound up with climate.is The Greenhouse problemadque differs (as do nuclear winter and also high energy experimentation) from such possibilities as destruction of the Earth's favourable climate or life-supports by collision with an asteroid in two crucial respects: the poor prognoses are largely a matter of human making (meaning the making of certain among humans) and the damaging situations could be substantially averted by positive or concerted human activity. According analogies with remote phenomena such as decline of the sun, asteroid collisions, etc., sometimes applied to dismiss concerns with global environmental problems, do not hold up, and should be resisted. The human-induced climatic problems are primarily ascribable to: * excess economic development. The practices involve a complex and sustained assault on most of the Earth's major ecosystems, forests, seas, and so on, along with the alteration of atmospheric composition by greenhouse gases. For example, the forests are cut down, burnt, poisoned by herbicides and acid rain, or otherwise removed or destroyed. (Therewith too a great deal more carbon dioxide is released into the atmosphere and major sinks of carbon dioxide are removed.) As a result of these concerted growth-and-development activities such systems are driven to limits, and breakdown occurs. Once it occurs at some weak point it can escalate elsewhere, like a conflagradon; thus again ecosystemic collapse for example. Quite apart from breakdown at or approaching limits, for instance because of systemic overload, remarkable changes can occur in dissipative systems under stress or strain. * excess energy or chemical loading. Though such striking examples as the chemical clock, it has been demonstrated that dissipative systems can suddenly, and often rather unpredictably, undergo extraordinary changes, as for instance energy flux is increased (Prigogine and others). Such non-additive or nonlinear effects, characteristic of more holistic dissipative systems, seem bound to occur within the Earth's atmosphere and oceans as they undergo compositional changes. Carbon dioxide itself provides a good example: None of these assessments are strikingly objective, but are a matter of appearance. The risk of catastrophic destruction of Earth civilization by an asteroid or comet is discussed, and compared with either less exotic risks, in Chapman and Morrison, chapter 19. It has been guesstimated at a 1 in 300,000 chance per year, a much smaller probability than that serious Greenhouse effect will eventuate (often put at about 85%), but comparable with some rather more mundane risks (see p.283). The risks from very high energy experimentation will no doubt rise sharply as orders of attainable energy increase. 21 With small quantities its effect on the temperature of the air is proportional to the amount added; there is a linear effect. However once the carbon dioxide concentration in the air approaches 1%, new nonlinear effects come into play and heating greatly increases. In the absence of a biosphere to fix carbon dioxide, its concentration in the atmosphere would probably exceed the critical figure of 1%. The Earth would then heat up rapidly to a temperature near to that of boiling water. Increasing temperatures would speed up chemical reacdons and accelerate their progress towards chemical equilibrium. ... eventually ... the Earth would become permanently cocooned in a brilliant white cloud - a second Venus, although not quite as hot (Lovelock pp.45-6). Fortunately for Gaean prospects, the percentage of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere is now nowhere near 1% nor likely to be pushed near 1% by projected increases in carbon dioxide levels under economic activity over the next 50 years^. However eventual exponential growth will lead towards accentuated levels, and the side effect of such growth, the release of carbon dioxide from forests and oceans and the considerable reduction in fixadon of carbon dioxide with the decline of forests, will lead in that disastrous direction rather more rapidly. The 1% bound constitutes just one of the many serious limits (fortunately a fairly remote one) to condnuation of present developmental pracdces. Now there can be no radonal confidence with respect to complex dissipadve systems about the behaviour of which we presendy know comparadvely little - that other nonaddidve effects will not be encountered at a much earlier stage. After all, the Gaean system, its atmosphere, oceans and ecosystems, will be pushed into essendally unexperienced and substandally unknown reaches. There is, for example, no experience from comparable past times of such elevated temperatures as Greenhouse effects will lead to, to draw upon. 'There is no evidence that the land-bound glaciers in Greenland and Antarctica have ever completely melted in the last two million years'. There is experience of much colder periods. 'During ice ages, the earth's average temperature has been about 5°C colder than at present, with glaciers covering major portions of continents' (Barth p.7). But there is no similar experience of temperatures 4-5° C warmer than at present (in any warm interglacial period), 'a global increase of more than 2°C above present is unprecedented in the era of human civilization' (Schneider p.6). It would accordingly be decidedly rash, rash decision making, to assign a zero or negligible probability to the emergence of new or unknown effects of relevance, to assume all will go smoothly and well. That would presuppose, in any event, a completeness in present scientific knowledge, contrary to the information we actually have that present investigation of holistic systems, among much else, is still in its infancy. The probability of 19 In the atmosphere of the very early Earth, CO? exceeded the critical 1% figure; but solar luminosity was about 25% less than now. With increasing solar flux the Earth would have overheated had the proportion of CO2 not been much reduced (e.g. see Lovelock 88 p.56). 22 something critical (e.g. perhaps radicals like hydroxyl) having been left out of estimations, of room accordingly for something unexpected or for something to go wrong, may be small (though experience implies it is not always so), but it certainly appears to be non-zero. For the overconfident, with excess faith in the flimsy scientific edifice, there is a salutary lesson to be drawn from the erratic and stumbling path of the main proponent of Gaia hypotheses, Lovelock. Lovelock, coming from a working life as an industrial chemist, part of that time for a giant chemical transnational, had, and retained for a considerable time after he began his holistic hypothesizing, a strong antipathy for environmentalists.^ Even Gaia was for industry and against the environmentalists; she was going to laughingly soak up all the pollution, courtesy of the chemical companies especially, that we humans could throw at her. In particular, we did not really need to worry much about ozone depletion or greenhouse gas escalations^ 'Contrary to the forebodings of many environmentalists, finding a suitable" destructive agent to bring about a 'doom scenario" 'turns out to be an almost insoluble problem" (79 p.40). Lovelock makes it easier for himself by helping himself to the assumption that a doomsday scenario involves the destruction of all "life"', 'down to the last spore of some deep-buried anaerobic bacteria" (p.40). But even for the least chauvinistic of environmentalists, destruction of all humans but the select elect would be quite enough for a decent doomsday. Lovelock's high redefinition of a environmental 'doomsday scenario" is unacceptable. Lovelock does not however stay within the bound of his redefinition. He proceeds to pooh-pooh the idea that anything much that we humans could accomplish would make any difference to Gaia (p.41) or even to most humans, including use of nuclear devices. Unfortunately for Lovelock's credibility, he was writing three years before the seemingly obvious wintering effects of a major nuclear war were realised by the accredited scientific community. Appealing in a common scienufic fashion to scientific authority, he proceeds to minimalize the human and ecological effects of a major war. The report he relies upon as authoritative was a 1975 (unreferenced) one of 'the US Nadonal Academy of Sciences ... prepared by an eight-man committee of their own assisted by forty-eight other explosions and a// chosen from those members, in the effects of nuclear to them" (p.41, italics added). Lovelock draws from the disdnguished expert report the findings that Coupled with this, there was a certain schizophrenia in Lovelock's attitude to the natural environment. There was also a matching schizophrenia as to the fragility of life on Earth. On the one side, it required very delicate settings and fine tuning to arise; this is part of the argument for a Gaia hypothesis. On the other side, life is 'tough, robust, and [highly] adaptable', virtually indestructible (79 p.90). But though a flawed hero, Lovelock is a hero nonetheless. See e.g. Lovelock 79, p.40ff; and also, on ozone, 88 p.63. 23 ... if half of all the nuclear weapons in the world's arsenals, about 10,000 megatons, were used in a nuclear war the effects on most of the human and man-made ecosystems of the world would be small at first and would become negligible within thirty years. Both aggressor and victim nations would of course suffer catastrophic local devastation, but areas remote from the battle and, especially important in the biosphere, marine and coastal ecosystems would be minimally disturbed (p.41). Three years later Turco and others proceeded to detail a very different scenario, that of widespread and ecologically damaging nuclear winter. Not for the only time, Lovelock had been caught out badly. As with pollution, Lovelock has more recently shifted ground,^ considerably, on the vulnerability of the Earth to human-induced disturbance. When a system such as Gaea in homeostatis is stressed to near the limits of regulation even a small disturbance may cause it to jump to a new stable state or even fail entirely.... It could be that the regulation of the Earth's climate is not far from one of these limits. Thus if some part of climate regulation is connected with the natural level of CO2 then clearly we are close to the limits of its regulation. This is because CO2 cannot be reduced much below the level observed for the last glaciation, about 180 ppm, without seriously limiting the rate of growth of the more abundant C3 type plants. If we perturb the Earth's radiation balance by adding more CO2 and other greenhouse gases to the atmosphere or reduce its capacity to regulate by decreasing the area of forests or both of these together then we could be surprised by a sudden jump of both CO2 and temperature to a new and much warmer steady state; or by the initiation of periodic fluctuations between that state and our present climate. The anomalously low abundance of CO2 on Earth when compared with the other terrestrial planets and especially the fact that the mean temperature of the Earth is on the cool side of the optimum for regulation, suggests strongly that the biota is regulating the climate by pumping CO2 from the air. The common feature of most of our pollutions and of our exploitation of the land surface seems to be unintentionally to thwart this natural process (Lovelock 85 pp.5354). The argument to the lesser par/i, to significant disequilibrium with the Earth's ecological support system destabilized, takes the following lines. The Earth appears to be a dissipative (far-from-equilibrium) system held at its present by a combinadon of an (increasing) solar flux - a main energy input into the system - and its major ecological arrangements, especially vegetational complexes and live oceans. The sheer extent to which the resulting system differs from the stable dead system it could otherwise be is shown by the following table for atmospheric and oceanic composidon. Shifdng ground may be fine, especially when it is to an improved position. But it should be done honesdy and openly, not stealthily or shiftily. Lovelock proceeds to attribute a cancature of his <9WH previous position to cdtics of the Gaia hypothesis (as a clever Tabneation', which also it was not): that it is 'an argument developed to allow industry to pollute at will, since mother Gaia will clean up the mess '(85 p.53). 24 TABLE 1. Substance Funerary Equilibrium (principal components per cent). Venus Earth Carbon dioxide A Nitrogen 1 R Oxygen Argon 0 C E A N S Water Lifeless Mars Earth 99 0 98 1.9 98 1.9 0 trace trace 1 0.1 0.1 Earth 95 2.7 0.13 2 63 Salt 3.5 Sodium nitrate 1.7 Present 0.03 79 21 1 96 n.a. n.a. 3.5 traces Surface temperatures (°C) n.a 477 Total pressure (bars) n.a. 90 290+50 60 -53 13 0064 1 The table is based upon tables 1 and 2 of Lovelock 79, p.37 and p.39. The whole Earth system is accordingly far from equilibrium. Unpredictable behaviour as loads increase is therefore almost to be expected. A likely moral is presumably: stress the system, or destabilize ecosystem controls sufficiently, and the system may be in deep trouble. It is relevant to inquire briefly into what evidence we so far have on this score. To do so let us reconsider some of the array of arguments there are from some sort of holistic organisation of the Earth (for a modest Gaea hypothesis, to the effect that the (outer) Earth is a naturally regulated nonadditive cybernetic system, important attributes of which are regulated by the biota). /or the participation of the Earth's ecological support systems, plant complexes especially, the Earth would not be blessed with its present life- benign physical characteristics. The oceans would be much saltier and too salty for most life, the air would not contain the present rich mixture of oxygen and carbon dioxide so important for terrestrial life, and so on; perhaps most important the Earth would be significantly hotter and too hot for most life, for most of what does the regulating and stabilizing of present conditions. For the solar flux has increased in intensity about 30% since life appeared on Earth, whereas the mean global temperatures have exhibited no 25 corresponding increase, but have remained relatively constant. Such an expected constancy in the face of disturbing inputs is ascribed, under holistic approaches that do something to explain it, to the concerted activity of plant life, as already indicated. The general tenor of the argument is so far this:- By arguments from physical and other models, and because of uncertainties, the probability that something could go badly wrong is not merely nonzero^ but indeed far from negligible. Part of the argument can be put as follows:- There is a decent probability that a modest Gaea hypothesis holds. But then, there is a considerable probability that excessive Greenhouse build-up will lead to damaging system destabilization. So combining probabilities, there at least a nonnegligible probability of such destabilization. An analogy should now emphasize both the dubiousness of what is being proposed under adaptationism and the precariousness of the human predicament. The proposal is to take this ancient craft, now overloaded with human passengers and their heavy baggage, a cargo it was never organised to carry, out on new routes and run it faster and higher than it has ever travelled before. Even for an experimental prototype, a now very fast (air-)bus say, with a select test crew, such a procedure, of running over new uncharted routes at speeds and heights never attained before, would be risky enterprise. With an ancient craft, with a heavy non-elite cargo of baggage and passengers (some whom try to interfere with the controls), the proposal is extremely rash. For the chances that the craft will break/down and perhaps crash, with serious consequences to passengers and for the baggage, are greatly elevated over the risks of proceeding as usual much more slowly. With the costs of crashing so severe, rational operators and sensible pilots would not take them.^ Unfortunately the analogy is not at all far-fetched, but resembles what is in store for spaceship Earth, already under significant stress with its excessive human passenger load and their heavy ecological practices. Not only is the future itself pretty new territory, but it is a future at terrestrial temperatures never before attained. As a result too of these enhanced temperatures, important processes will proceed faster than ever before, in particular all chemical processes. Simply to take the craft up there, as do-nothing and adaptation approaches would have is to emulate the risks and hubris of Daedelus; such approaches are From logical theories of probability such as Camap's non-zero probabilities are rather easily reached (perhaps too easily, with the converse feature that natural laws never obtain high probabilities. The difficulty can be averted, to some extent, by restriction to physical models.) The analogy is an old one, which we exploited before in the nuclear case; for the "bus analogy", see Routley and Routley. The analogy admits of much graphic variation. Instead of running the craft at excess speed, an alternative or additional image is that of destroying the controls of the craft. Lovelock deploys this apposite image (88 p.63), which corresponds to the demolition of Gaean control systems. Others speak of a colossal experiment with the Earth; but strictly the conditions for a controlled experiment are not met. 26 aptly named D<2^Zfa?i. Given anthropic terrestrial practices, a Daedelian future and fate should not be excluded. 4. A Sting in the Cosmic Tail: the mini-Furphy theorem and on the iikeiy decline of Homo sapiens spp. economicus. The anthropic doomsday argument developed relies upon a modified Murphy's law. The trouble with the initial formulation of Murphy's law: ^anyf/ung can go wrong, if wii/, was that it was insufficiently qualified, much too absolutist, and apparently self-refuting.^ Certain crucial qualifications are required:* Replacement of the too certain conclusion by a somewhat weaker probabilistic one: for instance, it pro&a&/y will. * Correlative to weakening the conclusion, strengthening the premiss, by rendering it more specific; namely, in place of "anything" or "something" put "some thing ... given a chancy situation". The modified formulation is accordingly the following mini-Furphy proposition^ r/HKg can ge/iMZMe/y go wrong, given o re/onvefy cAoncy Mfi/ohon, zf pro/MZ&iy wi/i. Here "chancy" means more or less what it means according to the dictionaries: doubtful, decidedly risky, or as we shall construe it, having a comparadvely low probability vis-a-vis its altemadves. The precise extent of relative chanciness will be explained as we go. The proposidon is itself a corollary of a more general result, an ancient principle. The generalisadon replaces "go wrong" by "happen'; the ancient principle is that of jy/^ndfM^, sometimes stated, with quite insufficient reservations, as that all places are full, or ony ggnfdn^/y ^fofg &onn<% fo rgo/fy^Z (when genuinely possible states are compadble with all that is already transpiring). The principle, whose distinguished history is traced in Lovejoy, has emerged in contemporary particle physics, in such forms as the For this and other formulations of Murphy's law, and many loosely associated humorous maxims with grains of truth encapsulated, see Block. As to the history of the "law", which originated with J.M. Chase, editor of Aw'adPH see the A/nerzcgmi; Chase's inidal formulation in a 1955 issue read 'If an aircraft part can be installed incorrectly, someone will install it that way". Silberman's paradox, that if Murphy's Law can go wrong, it will, is not a genuine paradox. For it can simply be asserted that where Murphy's Law is a real law it will not go wrong. The connection of Murphy's Law with the pnnciple of plendtude appears to have escaped much notice. This little theorem was originally titled the Murphy-Leslie theorem. It is an adaptation, suggested by Leslie's work, of Murphy's Law. While this secuon is overwhelmingly indebted to Leslie, the arguments developed from those Leslie advances. For Leslie's arguments and also his debts, and so the transitive debts of this section, see Leslie himself, who deserves to be read in defence his own legidmate doomsday apprehensions. The Appendix indicates the very limited extent to which Leslie's arguments arc here endorsed. 27 following: if a thing (e.g. an elementary particle) is not forbidden, excluded by quantum rules, then it is bound to occur (or be realised), even is "compulsory". For things and events generally, such completeness (all nonexcluded particle niches are occupied) cannot reasonably be expected.^ The main mini-plentitude proposition has, like its mini-Furphy specialization to bad outcomes, to take the much more hedged form: if something can genuinely happen, given a relatively chancy situation, it probably will. To prove this proposition, let us first recast it in appropriate symbolic form. Let D be some arbitrary (bad) situation, a suitable disaster in the intended application. Let the possibility of D's happening - such as something's going wrong - be represented by a non­ zero probability, and genuineness by non-negligible probability. It can be assumed that that probability, P(D), is small; if it were large enough the requisite conclusion would follow in any case. Let C represent the relativizing features, what is given that renders the situation chancy. Then what we aim to show is that where P(D) is small positive, P(D { C) is probable. The proof applies a special case of Bayes' theorem, which takes the following form where there are n alternative hvpotheses hi,...,hn including h: P(h { i) = " * Pd 1 M I P(hr) X P(i { hr) r = 1 Here h is the hypothesis, which in our application is D, i is the additional information (or, as in Carnap, a new observation), which in our case is C.28 P(h j i) is the probability of h given i, or of h on condition i (the backward arrow notation, { , symbolises the condition There is a marvellous Greek term, which could serve to cover items where the particle physics "principle" is satisfied. 'We may call an event agathonic to convey that, though in itself it was highly unlikely, we might have known that something of that sort was bound to happen. ... from the name of the tragic poet to whom Aristotle attributes the view that it is very probable that the improbable should happen. (Kaplan p.9 rearranged). Is the chronic chthonic Greenhouse escalation agathonic? The formulation is a special case of that proved in Carnap, p.331; namely that (absolute) case where the evidence e is elided, or e set = 1. A similar result follows, subject to slightly more rigorous conditions, in relevant probability theory; see Routley 79 p.954. In effect we shall look at the form P(h ) ,) = --------------- * PC < D ' P(h) X P(i { h) + XP(hr) X P(i { hr) n with the sum excluding the product for h. Though demonstrable given satisfiable exclusion and exhaustion conditions, Bayes' theorem is not lacking critics, in part because of the surprises this bit of logic can deliver. Carnap meets the objection that Bayes' theorem has sometimes 'been applied to cases where it led to strange or even absurd results' thus: 'This was mostly due to an uncritical use of the principle of indifference :... [The] theorem is provable ... on the basis of those weak assumptions which practically all theories of probability seem to have in common' (p.331, sub 1 elided). Of course the present applications could (just) be objected to on the grounds that the logical conditions for the theorem to apply are not fully satisfied. 28 involved and shows its direction). For simplicity we shall suppose that all the alternatives to D are concentrated (as far as symbolic exposure goes) in one, namely D*. Then the form we seek to apply is simply: P(D { C) = __________ { D)_______________ _ ' P(D) x P(C { D) + P(D*) x P(C { D*) The arithmetic details needed can be tabulated in a revealing form as follows: C<2.$ay D D* Initial (or prior) probability d 1-d m, say 1/d m/L,say 1/d! of outcome relative chance that C As it is the chance of C that matters, we can rescale to set m = 1/d. To make C relatively chancy, L has some modest size; specifically let L exceed 1-d/d. Then the probability to be estimated, P(D { C), is d x 1/d dxl/d + (l-d)/dL _ " __ 1 1+^ where k - - That is, P(D { C) = y where k = 1, andP(D { C)> when -when L > . Thus D is probable, at least in being more probable than not, given C, when L is of at least modest size, i.e. given C is relatively chancy. In a merely apparently more general form of the estimation, where we do not align m to d, P(D { C) ______ d x m______ d x m + (1-d) x m/1 1 1 1 + k' as before. That is, m drops out, only the relative chanciness really matters. The little plendtude theorem follows as before. Now to put some relevant flesh on these abstract statements and figures. Let D be some future disaster such as the catastrophic decline, for instance, through summer or winter phenomena, of the human species, from which the enormous present population never recovers. At worst (from a chauvinistic angle) the population, like many catastrophically effected by human activities, goes extinct. Suppose, for a bifurcating outcome, there is a 29 catastrophe stage, before halfway through next century, 2050. If humans do not get their act together before then, they go into catastrophic decline, as already indicated. If however they do get their ecopolitical act together then humans, while they hardly live happily ever after (poverty, inequality, domination, and other evils not being removed), continue to persist or even grow in numbers, perhaps fanning out through the solar system (in the way envisaged by too many physicists). Suppose further we are optimists, imagining that the prior probability of D, ecodisaster and human decline, is small, say 1%. That is d = .01, and the inidal probability of D*, human "success", is .99. The figures are pretty notional. Supreme optimists would want to set d much smaller, pessimists rather at a higher probability. Table 2. D human decline D* human success Initial probabilities 1%, i.e. .01 99%, i.e. .99 Relative chanciness, 1/100, i.e. .01 1/100 x 1/1 ofC Then the probability of human decline given C, .01 X .01 P(D { C) .01 x .01 + .99 x .01/1 1/2 , when 1 > 99. For example, when 1 is set, conservatively, at 1,000, then the probability of human decline given present chanciness is approximately 90%. It remains to fill out C, thereby showing that 1 is very likely much much larger than 99, and correspondingly human decline so much the more probable in the light of additional information, i.e. 6! usual jargon. probable in the There are several high risk factors, acting in a certain concert, factors emphasized more than a decade ago in world systems modellings (such as, most famously, that of the Club of Rome), Malthusian factors such as human population, economic product, pollution, energy consumption, ... . (The list rolls on.) It is appropriate to estimate posterior probability relative to any one of these, any of which can serve as C, in order to expose the riskiness of present gross human practices. In brief, because there are several high risk factors, so there are several appropriate relative or reference classes. Thus the posterior probability is assessed relative to such matters as humans now being thus and so, our or my being alive 30 now (Leslie's first-person reference class), this being present energy use, present waste output, present forest destruction and so forth. The upshot is not the triviality that probability can be jacked up by placement in a suitably restricted context, though that analyticity is established.^ The point is that, environmentally, more affluent humans have fdgmjg/vgj produced such adverse circumstances, which are upon us, the very circumstances typically productive of limitadon results. In sum, the aadirapfc argument considers the environmentally invidious situadon of present humans on the Earth. The argument can be carried through either in terms of sheer population, gross numbers, or in terms of human resource grabbing, as esdmated for instance through energy consumption. In fact all the other factors are anthropically tied, to gross human numbers, via the environmental impact equation and because the levels are human-use numbers. Let us consider the prospects given addidonal information as to the present phase of gross human population. C will be some such proposition as: the proportional preponderance of humans who have ever lived alive now, or to personalize it: the chance that you or your family, are alive now. Diagram 6: (?ar praf^nf popidadon pred/camg/zf <?n die /wo jce/iarioj. Humans have got themselves - to some extent pat themselves, though much may be the result of muddling through - into an extremely dubious, environmentally insidious, and One of the weaknesses in the argument may appear to be its dependence on an appropnate choice of relative class. For, the high relative probabilities can fall away if different reference classes, not exhibiting such growth patterns are taken, c.g. present wattle distribution, birds being thus and so. On the other hand, probabilities can be elevated even more by selection of more unusual reference classes, such as our being scientists, or being computer programmers, etc.. It is not so remarkable that probabilities can be wound up - or down - perhaps quite dramatically, by appropriate relativisation, by appropriate selection of a reference class. 31 unsustainable position, on a range of critical parameters. Their numbers are excessive, their high energy use is excessive, their waste and their polludon are both excessive - and all these and other excesses are at the steep end of upward exponendal curves. Several relevant graphs are distressingly exponendal, with the present in the near verdeal growth phase: Digram 7 : GrowrA in are drawn from Boyden). envzronm^nfgZZy r^Z^vanr parg/neter-P (all graphs exhibited 32 Many other similarly shaped graphs could be added, for instance for growth of pollution, of waste products, of weapons (in terms of tonnes of explosive power), of other greenhouse gases such as the chlorofluorocarbons (which accelerated from zero in the nineteen thirties), and so on. The display typifies the accelerating human roller coaster (or air bus). Those curves are dghtly interconnected, in criss-crossing fashion. For example, the productivity of contemporary agriculture which enables the feeding of huge urbanised human populations depends on a very high energy use (in term of energy efficiency, contemporary high-tech agriculture falls below that of much traditional agriculture). The maintenance of high populations with supplies of cheap food depends in tum on fossil fuel agriculture. Because of the intertwining of these phenomena, there is no easy way of getting off the accelerating roller-coaster. Nor, as observed, is there much real effort devoted to slowing the coaster. For politicians it would be politically risky and inexpedient to try (for them the rhetoric about an ecologically sustainable future must remain just that, more rhetoric). For many other power holders and brokers such ideas are ideologically excluded: growth remains the gospel. So a precarious position becomes ever more precarious. Humans are in a decidedly chancy position, because of their population situation and other limitative factors; they are becoming very disaster-prone. If humans want an acceptable future for themselves - they have virtually ruled out an acceptable future for many other creatures, through their predominantly selfish thoughtless greedy practices - then they will probably have to mend their collective ways, very considerably and very soon. But, given the nature of the beast, that itself seems improbable. Humans, if they seek a more assured future, should make a concerted effort to put themselves into a less precarious position. That could be achieved by proceeding to reduce relative risks. These relative risks, sharply reducing prospects for a reliable future, fall into two classes:- * Manufactured risk factors, including weaponry such as mega-nuclear devices and elements of biochemical warfare, and experimental equipment such as very high energy particle accelerators (which could perhaps tunnel under a metastable state or induce a miniBig-Bang; see again Leslie). * Accumulated risk factors, such as the huge relative size of human population, energy consumption, greenhouse gas production, etc.30 30 As before, there are various different reasons why these induce risk, limitative and probabilistic in particular. 33 Despite the ideological obstacles - enormous political, religious and economic obstacles blocking the way of requisite change - major efforts should be put into reducing these types of risks. Philosophers, beyond other intellectuals, cozdd have a significant role in breaking down the ideological barriers and in clarifying and developing the arguments involved. Given the track-record of professional philosophers, don't expect very much.31 5. Further notes on human prospects and improved practices: What in generai ought to be done about the Greenhouse problematique? The general result already reached, that humans collectively should substantially reduce their risk taking, and in particular reduce their gross numbers, extends to radonal Greenhouse decision and action theory. But that large and difficult challenge - with all that it entails by way of radical change upon present arrangements - is not all that there is to try, all that should radonally be attempted. While some increase in mean global temperatures, and what that implies, can no longer be averted, the potentially most damaging effects can be: namely, by curtailing humaninduced output of Greenhouse gases. Moreover, there is an approximate upper bound of importance, upon temperature, which can serve to supply a significant limit on output. That bound - which conrrnns rfyZr raZd/zg by confining encountered situadons a? those where there is some ba-sds* - is given by esdmated temperatures during Aldthermal and Eemian eras. Those temperatures are estimated to have been between about 1/2 a degree and 1 degree Centigrade above contemporary (pre-1980) temperatures; so the upper bound is about PC. 31 There is much else for philosophers to contribute in these fields, especially on the expanding issues of future redistributive justice, ecological equity, genuinely pluralistic arrangements, etc. 34 gZo^zzZ zznd^r Z&ree zn/^rcy/zzzg sc^zzzzrzoy. AT (°C ) Dnzgram # : B^zckgroz/nd in/orw^hozz: 'Annual mean global surface air temperature computed for trace gas scenarios A, B, and C .... Scenario A assumes continued growth rates of greenhouse gas emissions typical of the past 20 years, i.e., about 1.5% per year emission growth; scenario B has emission rates approximately fixed at current rates; scenario C drastically reduces trace gas emissions between 1990 and 2000.... The shaded range is an estimate of global temperature during the peak of the current and previous interglacial periods, about 6,000 and 120,000 years before present, respectively. The zero point fbr observation is the 1951-1980 mean; the zero point for the model is the control run mean' (Walsh p.14, from whom the diagram is drawn). Not only will a continuation of current emission trends take global temperatures clean through and way beyond that bound, so also will an alternative set-up where emission rates are fixed more or less at current rates. The only apparent way to remain rationally within an experiential domain is to curtail sharply trace gas emissions, beginning early in the 1990s. That means shifting from the dominant growth ideology; it means expensive re- and de­ industrialisation. Short of catastrophic nuclear war it seems unlikely. 35 There are several reasons why requisite change looks unlikely. Firstly, requisite changes are generally difficult, ideologically unwelcome, extensive and expensive. Politicians will accordingly be extremely loath to undertake them, to offer more than tokenism. Moreover, those states and corporations that avoid making hard changes will, like free riders, be at a comparadve advantage in the short term as regards both profits and power. Secondly, then, there are Tragedy-of-Commons reasons, i.e. those deriving from general Prisoners' Dilemma situations. However the troughs induced by such dilemmas could be climbed out of; they can be transcended given, for instance, some resolute players committed to major change, despite heavy commercial and political disadvantages, and prepared to pursue judicious tit-for-tat strategies. Thirdly, because main Greenhouse effects are gradual, long-term by polidcal standards, and uncertain, the main pohdcal temptation will undoubtedly again be to avoid the problems - to muddle incrementally along, and hope that the problems will dissolve or that something (some magical technology perhaps) will turn up or that adaptadon will occur or, at worst, that the problems will fall to some successors. Meanwhile the problems will continue to be dismissed as "too hard", "too uncertain", and their costs, polidcal and economic and ideological, as "too great". We have already accumulated substantial experience of these inadequate evasive, dismissive and postponement procedures. What should of course be attempted involves extensive changes and restructuring across virtually the entire face of industrialisation and urbanisation, and therewith extensive alterations in the demands they impose upon new urban environments. The ultimate objective as regards the Greenhouse problems - a reduction in the rate of increase of, and then in the gross levels of, emissions of Greenhouse gases - direcdy implies, above all, constraints on the combustion of fossil fuels, both decelerating use and improved use, but also much better regulation, in one way or another, of production of other Greenhouse gases and of interference with ecosystems storing or absorbing Greenhouse gases. The main burden as regards requisite changes falls on the main users of fossil fuels and main consumers of Greenhouse relevant products, namely the Earth's most affluent centres: North America, Japan and Europe. In these centres especially, the work should be started on reducing consumption of fossil fuel involved goods and services. (In a thoroughly methodical approach a GG, Greenhouse gas, rating would be assigned to each sort of good and service, the objective being to reduce these ratings, an effort that would no doubt concentrate upon highly rated and easily altered items.) The general types of changes needed or desirable are well enough known to environmental planners, and include: restructuring of cides into network systems, so that reliance upon automobile commudng and truck transport of goods is much reduced, improved building practices for energy efficiency cogeneration and related technologies, increased reliance on solar energy technologies, and so on. 36 Venturing much further into unknown territory are the types of political and economic alterations required to implement the planning changes. It has already been insinuated that conventional governmental and public policy practices, analyses and procedures are inadequate to the tasks ahead. For these presuppose, for example, reladvely short-term and quite bounded settings, in which most information (as to costs, benefits, beneficiaries, etc.) is more or less certain, and where an ethical/ideological framework is taken for granted. Indeed most of the favoured procedures - such as reliance on standard cost-benefit analyses, on markets of orthodox economics, on muddling through, etc - not only depend on certainty and are unfitted for situations of uncertainty, and assume at best a decidedly shallow approach to environmental matters; but further they tend to exhibit, what is quite compatible with short-term rationality, long-term irrationality. Much intellectual effort should be invested, straightaway, in designing and developing improved political structures and matching decision-making procedures. Such structures deserve to be better articulated and understood - a large task - before the struggle is begun in earnest - perhaps in East European style - to put some of them into place. From the angle of radical change, then, impact of the Greenhouse problematique is far from entirely negative. For it may encourage or even force many more of us into thinking about and doing what should be done from a deep perspective anyway, such as rectifying recent heavy human impact upon environments, and beginning at once to put in place more environment-friendly arrangements and structures'^ Richard Sylvan APPENDIX: As to the Doomsday Argument circulated by Leslie. The anthropic argument of the penultimate section applies limitation results to escalate probabilities. By contrast, the argument deployed by Leslie has comparatively little to do with limitation features or the special risks of the present times (it does depend upon some features of the temporal distribution of the total human population). As a consequence also, 32 This more positive conclusion contrasts with final pessimistic corollary which ended the previous interim version of this essay. The corollary, which followed the gloomy (but warranted) claim that requisite restructuring change seems unlikely, and was intended to underpin it, was simply this: Humans collectively are not (particularly) rational. But we had already been told as much by philosophers like Russell and surmised as much from the latest perambulations in the long history of human wars. Finally, a significant debt should be recorded at least to all the following: to John Leslie for leading ideas and for comments, to David Bennett for comments and for research and production assistance, to Pat Troy for an opportunity to read his unpublished paper on the topic, to Malcolm Slade and Joseph Wayne Smith for encouragement to write on the topic, and to several members of the audience at the Australasian Association of Philosophy Conference, held in Christchurch, New Zealand, during August 1989, where parts of the essay were fruitfully discussed and several worthwhile suggestions or objections made. 37 it has no direct application to the special environmental problems of the present. It yields at best a general admonition against human risk taking - and even the inference to that is shaky the argument itself is unavoidable. The central claim of Leslie's argument comes to this: unless the human race ends soon, then any one of us present humans is not an ordinary one at all, but an exceptionally early one. (Such statistical ordinariness is presumably supposed analytic upon total human populadon distributions.) Thus (contraposing and distributing a reasonable expectation functor), since it is reasonable to expect that such humans are ordinary (minor premiss), it is reasonable to expect the human race will soon die out of the weaknesses of Leslie's Doomsday Argument, especially in its quasiinductive guise (e.g. PQ p.2), is its background reliance upon an indifference principle assumpdon, much as in faulty applicadons of Bayes' theorem, already noted. (The principle is used in Leslie's um argument; see p.12.) The problemadc assumption shows up in c^rz.y clauses in Leslie's deontic probability (typicality) principle, what he describes as "the Argument's underlying principle' (in fact a minor premiss): one should. %ZZ eZ^ &^Zng take one's position to be fairly typical rather than very untypical, or in different formulation: whenever Zach'/zg gvz'^nce to r/zg ccnfra/y, one should prefer to think of one's own position as fairly typical rather than highly untypical (both principles are stated, though with different emphases in PQ p.2). Much the same principle, but in stronger form, operates in what he calls 'the crux of the argument': dmZ^yj you /zav^ specially jfrong to believe that you are a very untypically early human, you ought not to believe it' (p.10, rearranged, different emphasis). Unfortunately for the Argument's principle, matters are not so indifferent, things are not so equal, some sciendsts have reasons which they think are cogent, for believing that present humans are fairly early members of the species. Consider Lovelock, whom, as we have seen, used to think that the Earth and its life systems were virtually indestructible; it is only necessary to add the familiar belief that humans themselves (like rats) are very resourceful beings, virtually impossible to exterminate, to arrive at the result that there is reason to believe that the human race is bound to persist for many more generations. That is, of course, both the informed and not unreasoned popular view, guiding much practice. As a result the principle is, at the very least, in doubt. Accordingly what Leslie presents as the crux of the argument is not endorsed here. The Argument is vulnerable in other ways as well. For one, the main premiss is, in duly contraposed form, not quite so evident, as for instance the human race could just tail off at low population levels on Earth. For another, the distribution of the functor 'it is reasonable to expect that' across the conditional involved is not unproblematic: the 38 distribution principle itself is contested in the literature, and here the result it is supposed to yield looks unreasonable! References H. W. Bernard, T/za GraaK/zazz^a E)/acr, Ballinger, Cambridge Mass., 1980. A. Block, Mzap/zy'.? Law. Boo/: Two, Magnum, Methuen Paperbacks, London, 1980. S. Boyden, WasfarK Czvz'ZzzarzaK zn EzaZagzcaZ Parspacrzva, Clarendon, Oxford, 1987. L.R. Brown and others, ^rara a/r/za WarZzZ 79^9, Norton/Worldwatch, New York, 1989; referred to as Worldwatch. R. Carnap, Eagz'caZ FazzK<7a?zaK.s' a/ PraZ?a/?zZzzy, Second edition, University of Chicago Press, 1962. C.R. Chapman and D. Morrison, Ca^mzc Cara^rrap/za^, Plenum, New York, 1989. R.M. Cyert and M.H. DeGroot, 7?ayasz'aK AKaZy^z^ aK<7 (/zzcortoz/zzy ZK EcaKaKzzc T/zaary, Rowman & LittEeld, New Jersey, 1987. 'Developing policies for responding to climatic change", Report of the Beijer Institute, February 1988. W.T. Keeton, BzaZagzcaZ -SczaKca, Third edition, Norton, New York, 1980. I. Prigogine, Or^ar azTra/C/zaag , Batam, Toronto, 1984. J. D. Hughes, 'Gaia: an ancient view of our planet", T/za EcaZagz^r 13(1983) 54-60. R. Jeffrey, T/za Eagzc p/Dacz\YzaK 2ed., University Chicago Press, 1983. A. Kaplan, 7K Pz/r^zzz'r p/Wz'-y&wz, Glencoe, Beverly Hills Ca., 1977. J. Leslie, 'Risking and World's End", EzzZZazzK a/ r/za C<2K<2<7Z<2K Azzc/aar 5aczary 10(3) (1989) 10-15; all references to Leslie are to this article unless otherwise indicated. J. Leslie, 'Is the end of the world nigh?", T/za E/zzZa^ap/zzcaZ Czzarrar/y, to appear; referred to as PQ. J.E. Lovelock, Gaza. A Kaw Zaa/z ar Zz/a <9K Earr/z, Oxford University Press, 1979. J. Lovelock, 'Are we destabilising world climate?", T/za Eaa/agz^r 15(1985) 52-55. J.Lovelock, 'Man and Gaia", T/za Earr/z E apart. MaKz'zarzKg z/za Eazz/a/ar Czzr EKVz'raKKzaKZ (ed. E. Goldsmith and N. Hilyard), Mitchell Beazley, London, 1988, 51-64. A. Lovejoy, T/za Graaf C/zaz'K p/EazKg, Harvard University Press, Massuchusetts, 1950. B. McKibben, 'Is the world getting hotter?" T/za Aaw Yar% Eavz'aw, 8 December 1988, 711. G.I. Pearman (ed.), GraaK/zazz^a. P/aKKZKg /ar c/zKzaza c/zaKga, Division of Atmospheric Research,CSIRO, 1988. 39 B. Pittock, 'Climatic catastrophes: The international implications of the greenhouse effect and nuclear winter', Peace Research Centre, Working Paper No. 20, RSPacS, Australian National University, 1987. B. Pittock, 'Forests beyond 2000 - effect of atmospheric change', AM.yfra/i(2M For^rry 50(1987a) 205-215. R. and V. Routley, 'Nuclear energy and obligations to the future', 7E%zEry 21(1978) 133179. R. Routley, 'Ultralogic as universal?' reprinted as an Appendix in Expiring Jzz/tgZ^ RM^E^yafxZ, RSSS, Australian National University, 1979. S. Schneider, 'Not to decide is to decide', in '88: P/anm/ig/br OZ/ware C/zange (ed. T. Dendy), Department of Environment and Planning, Adelaide, 1989, 5-10. R. Sylvan, 'Modern myths concerning rationality: the imperatives of consistency and (constrained) maximality', 1988, Rarzona/zzy antZ ZrrazfpfzaZzzy.* E^r <2HtZ (ed. S. Bidermann and B. Scharfstein), Brill, 1989. R.P. Turco and others, 'Nuclear winter: Global consequences of multiple nuclear explosions', 5cz^nce 222 (1983) 1283-1292. K. Walsh, 'Greenhouse-induced climatic change in Australia' in Urgex/zazAfe '88., op.czf., 10-19.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Box 148, Item 1: Draft of Gaean greenhouse, nuclear winter and anthropic doomsday? Subject The topic of the resource Typescript draft of paper published, Sylvan R (1990), 'Gaean greenhouse, nuclear winter, and anthropic doomsday', Research Series in Unfashionable Philosophy, 4. , Division of Philosophy and Law, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University. Description An account of the resource Unnumbered paper from collection, item number assigned by library staff. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/browse?search=Richard+Sylvan&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bjoiner%5D=and&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=&amp;range=&amp;collection=&amp;type=&amp;user=&amp;tags=&amp;public=&amp;featured=&amp;exhibit=&amp;geolocation-mapped=&amp;geolocation-address=&amp;geolocation-latitude=&amp;geolocation-longitude=&amp;geolocation-radius=10&amp;submit_search=Search+for+items">Richard Sylvan</a> Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived <span class="MuiTypography-root-125 MuiTypography-body2-126">The University of Queensland's <a data-testid="rek-series" href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/records/search?page=1&amp;pageSize=20&amp;sortBy=score&amp;sortDirection=Desc&amp;searchQueryParams%5Brek_series%5D%5Bvalue%5D=Richard+Sylvan+Papers%2C+UQFL291&amp;searchMode=advanced">Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291</a></span>, Box 148, Item 1 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org">Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy</a> Contributor An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource <span>This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, </span><a href="https://najtaylor.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Dr. N.A.J. Taylor</a><span>.</span> Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library. Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource [39] leaves. 42.24 MB. Type The nature or genre of the resource Manuscript Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context <a href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:00341fd">https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:00341fd</a> Box 148: Offprints of Publications (to Como) https://www.antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/6b77012c0a66d38b0416c8154df0b2c9.pdf 76b38d3523658bc16adbace6e129781e PDF Text Text <* Nuclear waste, obligations to the future, and social choice. The bus example. very long journey. Suppose we consider a bus which, hopefully, is to make a Early in the journey of the bus someone consigns on it, to a far distant destination, a package which contains a highly toxic and explo­ sive gas. This is packaged in a thin container, which as the consigner well knows may well not contain the gas for the full distance for which it is con­ signed, and certainly will not do so if the bus should strike any trouble, for example if there is a breakdown and the interior of the bus becomes very hot, if the bus should strike a very large bump or pothole of the sort commonly found on some of the bad roads it has to traverse, or if some passenger should interfere deliberately or inadvertently with the cargo or perhaps try to steal some of the freight. If the container should break the resulting disaster would probably kill at least some of the people on the bus, while others could be maimed or contract serious diseases. Most of us would condemn such an action. parcel say to try to justify it? What might the consigner of the He might say that it is not certain that the gas will escape and that it is mere speculation to suppose it will, that the world needs his product and it is his duty to supply it, and that in any case he is not responsible for the bus or the people on it. These sorts of excuses however would normally be seen as ludicrous. Suppose he says that it is his own pressing needs which justify his action. The firm he owns, which produces the material as a by-product, is in bad financial straits, and couldn't afford to produce a better container (even if it knew how to make one). If the firm goes broke, he and his family will suffer, his employees will lose their jobs and have to look for others, and the whole village, through loss of spending and the cancellation of the Multiplier Effect, will be worse off. The poor of the village whom he would otherwise have been able to help, will suffer especially. Few people would accept this story,even if correct, as justification. Even where there are serious risks and costs to oneself or some group for whom one is concerned^one is usually thought not to be entitled to simply transfer the burden of those risks and costs onto other uninvolved parties, especially where they arise from one's own chosen life style and the transfer of costs creates a risk of serious harm to others (the transfer principle). �Tbe nuclear comparison. One of the major problems arising from the use of nuclear power is the disposal of highly radioactive wastes which must be segregated from the biosphere for periods on the order of a million years (Ringwood 78, p.l). The wastes are highly toxic and will be spread around the world if large-scale nuclear development goes ahead as planned. Yet there is no method of packaging them whose safety has been demonstrated beyond reasonable doubt and which we can be confident will be generally used. Despite recent 'new strategies for safe disposal of nuclear waste', it remains true that there is at present no generally accepted means by which high level waste can be permanently isolated from the environment and remain safe for very long periods. (Fox Report, p.110). It was presumably largely for this sort of reason that the Fox Report endorsed the conclusion of the British (Flowers) Report 'with respect to nuclear waste' namely:- There should be no commitment to a large programme of nuclear fission power until it has been demonstrated beyond reasonable doubt that a method exists to ensure the safe containment of long-lived radioactive waste for the indefinite future (Fox Report, p.189; our italics). - a reliable method, the Report should have added, whose commercial viability and use is assured. example. The need for these further conditions can be seen from the bus The consigner can hardly justify his action as regards the people on the bus, the people of the future, by saying that a better container is too expensive, or that he does have a strategy for producing or theory which will enable him to produce a superior container,if he has failed to use the method. It is thus a non sequitur to argue as Ringwood does on the basis of his proposed strategy for the safe disposal of radwastes (i.e. high-level nuclear wastes) that the radwaste problem is no reasonable ground upon which to curtail use of nuclear power: The principle conclusion of this book is that the problem of isolating high level nuclear wastes from the biosphere can be solved. Although there may be other objections to the use of nuclear power, the radwaste problem cannot reasonably be cited in justification of policies to abandon its use (78, Ringwood's italics). Even if the premiss that the problem can be solved had been established - it 2 hasn't at all - the no-abandonment-of-nuclear-power conclusion in no way fellows. There is a large gap between the theoretical possibility of a method of safe storage (hardly an important issue in the nuclear debate) and the availability of a commercial containment method whose reliability has been demonstrated beyond �3. reasonable doubt and whose general use can be reasonably assumed. It is the latter that is required for Ringwood's no-abandonment-of-nuclear-power conclusion; but of the latter Ringwood's strategy gives no assurance.^ There is in fact little reason to believe that nuclear pollution will be treated in a different fashion from other forms of pollution, where the availability of more satisfactory methods of control is by no means sufficient to guarantee their effective employ­ ment, especially if they are expensive. It is methodologically unsound to ignore social, ethical and political factors and to regard the radwaste problem as a purely technological one which can be classed as solved should a theoretical solution with practical application possibilities be reached. The practical likelihood, even given (what we lack) a disposal method proven safe beyond reasonable doubt, remains - that nuclear wastes will not be adequately contained, with the result that nuclear power will impose serious costs and risks on future people who do not benefit. Por nuclear fission generates wastes which may remain toxic for a million years, but even with the breeder reactor it could be an energy source for perhaps only 150 years. Thus 30,000 generations of future people could be forced to bear significant risks,without any corresponding benefits, resulting from the provision ot the extravagant energy use of only 5 generations or so. Like the consigner in the bus example, contemporary industrial society proposes, in extricating itself ^rom a mess arising from its own life style - the creation of economies dependent on an abundance of non-renewable energy which is limited in physical supply - to pass on costs and risks of serious harm to others who will obtain no corresponding energy benefits. The solution may enable the avoidance of some uncomfortable changes in the lifetime of those now living and their immediate descendants, just as the consigner's action avoids uncomfortable changes for him and his immediate surroundings, but at the expense of passing heavy burdens to other uninvolved parties. For these reasons the nuclear energy option is, like the consigner's What makes matters worse is that present industrial action morally unacceptable. society has clear alternatives to its nuclear choice, which is made essentially to avoid changing wasteful patterns of consumption and to protect the interests of those who profit from them. Obligations to the future. One way of trying to escape the conclusion that present large-scale nuclear development involves serious injustice with respect to people of the distant future is to deny, as the occasional philosopher has, that there are moral obligations to remotely future people. But the view that there are no such obligations, that we are free to do as we like with respect to future people, is a very difficult one to sustain. Would scientists, for example, in the course of conducting an experiment, be entitled to do something, say release a disease-carrying organism with a very long incubation period, which �4. while not affecting the present, could cause death and disease for many future people, for example? Most people would say they certainly are not. Nevertheless 'The future can take case of itself; why should we worry about it, we have enough problems' is also a common attitude. But it is not as if in the nuclear case we are simply leaving the future alone to take care of itself. We are causally influencing it and in doing so acquire moral responsibilities with respect to future people, namely the obligation to take account of people affected and their interests in what we do, to be careful in our actions, to take account of the probability of our actions causing harm, and to see that we do not act so as to rob future people of the chance of a good life - and a satisfactory environment. That there are obligations to the distant future^-which follows logically from examples, such as that of scientists who act wrongly in deliberately or carelessly damaging people displaced in timej-may be argued, more generally, on the basis of the spatial analogy (that the temporal dimension is like spatial dimensions and remoteness in space does not eliminate, or substantially diminish, obligation), or on the basis of ethical theories, and general principles common to such theories. ^The main modern theories of obligation^ e.g. utilitarian, contractual, intuitionisti when properly applied, converge to show that there are moral obligations to people in the distant future of the same sort that there are to present people. (Thus the rejection of nuclear development as morally unacceptable does not depend on a particular ethical theory, but uses only ground common to the main theories.) The convergence of theories may be accounted for in terms of conditions of adequacy an ethical theory should meet. The principles of obligation of such a theory should be universalisable or lawlike in that they do not make exceptions for particular times or places or peoples (such as those of contemporary industrial society): to make exceptions would be to accept unfairness, and so injustice. Thus the temporal position of a person cannot affect that person's entitlement to just and fair treatment; are the same sorts of general obligations to future people as to present. Engineering and economic comparisons and assessments of different energy options are usually inadequate because they neglect these general features of obligation. Just as the fact that the consigner and his immediate environment will benefit from sending the parcel does not show it is morally acceptable, so arguments for nuclear power based on alleged economic benefits for the present, or a favourable benefit-risk analysis, do not even begin to show that it is morally acceptable. Economics and engineering must (like law) operate within the framework of moral constraints, not determine those constraints. �5. Uncertainty arguments. Elements of uncertainty or indeterminacy in a situation (especially in our knowledge of the situation) provide no exemptions from general obligations, any more than they upset or modify the operation of general physical laws. It is commonly argued, however that we cannot really be expected to take account of the interests of future people, because the damage to the future from nuclear waste is by no means certain, we cannot be sure that future people will not develop a way of coping with the problem or will care about the risk anyway. Aren't we being asked to forego tangible benefits for the present for the sake of avoiding a merely speculative risk of harm to people we do not even know will exist? This sort of argument may seem initially plausible, but a little reflection on examples, such as the bus example, shows that it is mistaken. It is like the consigner saying that there is nothing wrong in his sending his parcel, since it is not certain the gas will escape, or that there will be anybody on the bus when it does, or that the people on the bus may think of a way of coping with the problem, or may not care anyway. Can he really be expected to forego tangible benefits for himself and his family just to avoid speculative harm to the possibly non-existent passengers? The answer of course is yes. The damage to the passengers does not have to be certain or even probable - it is enough that a significant risk of serious harm is imposed on the unconsenting and uninvolved passengers. In the nuclear case it is clear that a significant risk will be imposed on the future. The circumstances in which nuclear waste disposal could be improper or ineffective are only too easy to envisage, and must be considered real risks with a real evidential basis, not merely idle speculation or science-fiction possibility. And uncertainty about the future is not so great as this line of argument likes to make out - there is uncertainty about many details of little moral consequence concerning the future, such as which girls' names will be used commonly in 100 years, but we do have good reason to believe, especially if we consider 3000 years of history, that future people will have basic needs and desires rather like our own, that they will need a healthy biosphere for a good life, and that their lives will not be improved by an increased incidence of disease and cancer from increased radiation. written off in this way: Moral conflict arguments. The legitimate interests of future people cannot be These uncertainty arguments are moral cop-outs. The alternative to disputing obligations to the future is to appeal to overriding obligations involving the present (which induce situations where obligations conflict). According to moral conflict arguments, nuclear development does have its morally undesirable aspects, but the only practical alternatives to nuclear development are morally even worse. ^Observe that such arguments are only satisfactory provided the options presented are �6. genuine and exhaustive, all practicable alternatives being considered and shown to be worse than the option under consideration: in the nuclear development case this necessary condition is not satisfied.14oral conflict arguments are commonly advanced in favour of nuclear development, some alleging competing and overriding duties to future people, and some analogous duties to present people. The main (and representative) argument of the last class, laying stress on duties to present people, is the Poverty Argument, according to which there is an overriding obligation to the poor, both of the third world and the industrialized countries who, according to the argument, will suffer or be denied the opportunity to reach affluence if nuclear development does not proceed. In neither case does the argument stand up to examination. There is good evidence that large-scale nuclear energy will help to increase unemployment and poverty in the industrial world, through the diversion of very much available capital into an industry which is not only an exceptionally poor provider of direct employment, but also helps to reduce available jobs through encouraging substitution of energy use for labour use. The argument that nuclear energy is needed for the third world is even less convincing. Nuclear energy is both politically and economically inappropriate for the third world, since it requires massive amounts of capital, requires numbers of imported scientists and engineers, and creates negligible employment. Politically it increases foreign dependence, adds to centralised entrenched power and reduces the chance for change in the oppressive political structures which are a large part of the problem something which may help explain why it is attractive to many of the military governing elites of these countries. The poverty argument then - like many modern economic arguments for development which appeal to the way in which development will, allegedly, assist the poor - is a fraud. Nuclear energy will not be used, except incidentally, to help the poor. Both for the third world and for the industrialised countries there are well-known energy conserving alternatives and the practical option of developing other energy sources, alternatives which are morally acceptable and socially preferable to nuclear development, and which have far better prospects for helping the poor. The other, major, moral conflict argument appeals to a set of supposedly overriding and competing obligations to present and future people. We have, it is said, a duty to pass on the immensely valuable things and institutions which our culture has developed. The argument is essentially that without nuclear power, without the continued level of material wealth it alone is assumed to make possible, the lights of our civilization will go out, our valuable institutions and traditions will fall into decay or be swept away. Future people also will be the losers. �7. The assumptions upon which this Lights-going-out Argument is based are untenable. It appears to assume that existing high-energy consumption society is uniformly and uniquely valuable and that it cannot be directed towards energy conservation or alternative energy sources without utter collapse. But no enormous reduction in energy use, and perhaps little in real welfare, is needed to obviate the need for nuclear power in the shorter term, and alternative energy strategies to nuclear will have, in any case, to be adopted for the longer term anyway. High rates of energy use may be necessary to maintain the political and economic status quo, but they are scarcely necessary to maintain what is really valuable in our society, much of which we inherited from a past with a vastly lower energy con­ sumption, and much of which might well be better fostered in lower (energy) con­ sumption society with less concentration of political and economic power. Not only are the extravagant levels of energy consumption upon which the ''need" for nuclear power is premissed unnecessary to maintain what is valuable, but there is some reason to believe they are positively inimical to doing so. Nuclear develop­ ment may help in passing on to future generations some of the worse aspects of our society, the consumerism, alienation, destruction of nature and latent authori­ tarianism, while many valuable aspects, such as the degree of political freedom and those opportunities for personal and collective autonomy which exist, would be lost or diminished. But it is not the status quo, but what is valuable in our society, presumably, that we have an obligation to pass on to the future, and if possible enhance. Both moral conflict escape routes are closed then, because the arguments depend on false contrasts, ignore practicable alternatives which are not morally worse than nuclear power, and in painting their picture of inevitability, vastly understate the extent of available social choice. It is like the consigner of the parcel arguing that if he does not send his parcel his family and the village will starve, when in fact there appear to be viable, but perhaps less profitable, alternatives he has not troubled to consider or investigate seriously. Alternative energy options. The future energy option that is most frequently contrasted with nuclear, that based on coal, is not without ethical problems. Certainly there is no radioactive waste disposal problem, and other important grounds for moral and political concern over extensive reliance on nuclear energy are removed, namely problems arising from the real possibilities of proliferation of nuclear weapons, of deliberate release or threat of release of radioactive materials as a measure of terrorism or of extortion, and of catastrophic releases of radiation or of radioactive fuel or waste into the environment following an �8. accident such as reactor melt-down, and from security measures adopted to reduce such eventualities. But the coal-based option carries nonetheless serious costs and risks both to the environment and to health - because of the likelihood of severe pollution and associated damaging phenomena such as acid rain and atmospheric heating, not to mention the despoliation caused by extensive strip mining, all of which will result from use of coal in meeting very high projected Such an option would also fail, it seems, to satisfy the consumption figures. transfer principle, because it would impose widespread costs on nonbeneficiaries for some concentrated benefits to some profit takers and to some contemporary users who do not pay the full costs of production and replacement. These are the conventional options and a third is often added which emphasizes soft or benign technologies, such as those of solar energy. However the fundamental choice, such options usually neglect, is not technological but social, and involves both the restructuring of production, and change of consumption, away from energy intensive uses: at a more basic level there is a choice between consumeristic and nonconsumeristic futures.^ It is not just a matter of deciding in which way to meet unexamined goals but also a matter of examining the goals and underlying values. That is, we are not just faced with the question of comparing different technologies or substitute ways of meeting some fixed or given demand or level of consumption, and of trying to see whether we can meet this with soft rather than hard technologies; we are also faced, and primarily, with the matter of examining those alleged needs and the cost of society that creates them. It is not just a question of devising less damaging ways to meet these alleged needs conceived of us inevitable and unchangeable. There are solar ways of producing unnecessary trivia no one really wants and of squandering energy, as well as nuclear ways. This is not to deny that softer options may be superior to the ethically unacceptable features of the others. But it is doubtful that any technology however benign in principle will be likely to leave a tolerable world for future people if it is expected to meet limitless and uncontrolled energy consumption and demands. Even the more benign technologies such as solar technology may well be used in ways which create costs for future people and are likely to result in a deteriorated world being transmitted to them. Consider, to take one important example, the effect on the world's forests, which are commonly counted as a solar resource, of use for production of methonal or of electricity by woodchipping, as already planned by forest authorities in California and contemplated by many other energy organisations. Few would object to the use of genuine waste material for energy production, but the un­ restricted exploitation of forests - whether it goes under the name of solar energy" or not - to meet ever increasing energy demands would have a very damaging effect on the world's already hard pressed natural forests.5 Some of us do not �9. want to pass on - we are not entitled to pass on - to the future a world largely devoid of natural forests and accordingly much impoverished in fauna and flora, any more than we want to pass on one poisoned by nuclear products or polluted by coal products. In short, a mere switch to a more benign technology - important though this is - without any more basic structural and social changes is inadequate. Social options. The deeper social options involve challenging and trying to change a social structure which promotes consumerism and an economic structure which encourages the use of highly energy-intensive modes of production. This involves, for instance, trying to change a social structure in which those who are fortunate enough to make it into the work force are cogs in a production machine over which they have very little real control and in which most people do unpleasant or boring work from which they derive very little real satisfaction in order to obtain the reward of consumer goods and services. A society in which social rewards are obtained primarily from products rather than processes, from consumption, rather than from satisfaction in work and in social relations and other activities, is bound to be one which generates a vast amount of unnecessary consumption. (A production system that produces goods not to meet genuine needs but for created and nongenuine needs is virtually bound to overproduce.) Consumption frequently becomes a substitute for satisfaction in other areas. The social change option is a hard option, but it seems the only way to avoid passing on serious costs and risks to the future; and there are not only ethical grounds, but ecological reasons for choosing it. Conventional technology-oriented discussions of energy options and of how to meet future energy "needs" obscures the social change option, in part because the option questions values underlying current social arrangements. The conventional discussion proceeds by taking y alleged demand (often restated as wants or needs) as unchallengeable,' and the issue to be one which technology can be most profitably employed to meet them. This effectively presents a false choice, and is the result of taking needs and demand as lacking a social context so that the social structure which produces the needs is similarly taken as unchallengable and unchangeable. The social changes that the option requires will be strongly resisted because they mean changes in current social organisation and power structure, and to the extent that the option represents some kind of threat to parts of present political and economic arrangements it is not surprising that official energy option discussion proceeds g by misrepresenting and often obscuring it. �FOOTNOTES 1. Some leading proponents of nuclear development admit the absence of satisfactory storage and disposal methods; others do not. Some of the newer strategies for waste disposal, e.g. that promoted by Cohen 77 fail, conspicuously, to meet conditions of adequacy on disposal (see Routley and Routley 78, footnote 1). Ringwood's new strategy, in 78, was immediately rejected by some of the pronuclear establishment both as too expensive (even allowing Ringwood's optimistic costguestimates) and as unnecessary, which does not augur well for its use. Yet Ringwood cast serious doubt on the adequacy of alternative disposal strategies, notably immobilisation of wastes in glass and in supercalcine. All Ringwood has shown conclusively is that he can create an artificial equivalent of a uranium one-bodv (Hallam 79) What Ringwood's 'strategy for radwaste disposal' amounts to is a further possible method of treating radwaste, with significant gaps in the argument, a considerable lack of experimental and practical support, no commercial feasibility studies, etc: see Martin 78 and Hallam 79. -1* It depends on several processes whose large-scale commercial viability has very definitely not been shown beyond reasonable doubt, including reprocessing (Fox Report, p.29). It appears to be far too expensive for the nuclear industry, and certainly for poorer nations that have embarked on nuclear power projects. There are moreover reasons for thinking that governments may not want or favour permanent irretrievable disposal methods; they may want to keep open their options for employing waste components either for military purposes or for use in breeder reactors or elsewhere. 4. On alternative technology and softer energy options, see especially Lovins 77; also Lovins 76. For criticism of Lovins' comparative neglect of social alternatives, see Martin 77 (and Lovins' reply thereto). 5. The already very serious situation of the world's forests, especially the wet tropical forests, is not sufficiently widely appreciated. Et is a commonplace reflection, however, among rainforest botanists and ecologists that nearly all tropical lowland rainforest and much highlevel rainforest will have been cut over by about the year 2000. Moreover such forests cannot at present be utilised on a sustained yield basis or as a renewable resource (see, e.g. p.219 of Prance and Elias 77). Worse, there are now few forestry operations anywhere in the world where the forests are treated as completely renewable in the sense of the renewal of all their values. In many temperate regions too the rate of exploitation which would enable renewal has already been exceeded. The addition of a major further demand source - that for energy, whether advertised as part of a "soft" energy path or otherwise and especially one which shows every sign of being not readily limitable, on top of the present sources is a development which anyone with a realistic appreciation of the conduct of forestry operations, who is also properly concerned about the longterm integrity of the forests and remaining natural communities, must regard with considerable alarm. �6. The transmission principle, that one should not hand the world on to our successors in substantially worse shape than we received it, is a corollary of the transfer principle - applied in the bus example and suggested as a necessary condition on energy options - that to be morally acceptable a course of action should not involve the transfer of significant cost and risks onto uninvolved parties who are not beneficiaries. For if we violated the transmission principle, there would be a significant transfer of costs, contradicting the transfer principle. The transmission principle can be independently argued for, e.g. on the basis of contract (and other) theories of obligation. 7. Thus it is argued by representatives of such industries as transportation and petroleum, as for example by McGrowth of the XS Consumption Co., that people want deep freezers, air conditioners, power boats, ... and that it would be authoritarian to stop them satisfying these wants. The argument conveniently ignores the social framework in which such needs and wants arise or are produced. To point to the determination of many such wants at the framework level is not however to accept a Marxist approach according to which they are entirely determined at the framework level (e.g. by industrial organisation) and there is no such thing as individual choice or determination at all. It is to see the social framework as a major factor in determining certain kinds of choices and to see apparently individual choices made in such matters as being channelled and directed by a social framework determined largely in the interests of commercial and political advantage. 8. This paper draws on material from Routley and Routley 78 and 79 where fuller discussion of many of the topics covered, especially the question of obligations to the future and uncertainty arguments, may be found. �w REFERENCES B.L. Cohen, 'The disposal of radioactive wastes from fission reactors', Sg-Zg^tf^a Amgr-faa^ 236 (June 1977) 22-31. Flowers Report: Fz^aZgar Pazjgr a?zJ ^Fg FwPra^g??^. Sixth Report of the British Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution, London, 1976. Fox Report.: Fa??pgr Pra??7'zw Pw-Zra?w?g7ztaZ F-frst Report, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 19/7. J.R. Hallam, 'Synroc or C#nroc?', F/za*Z?n Pgaat^azz 4 (2-3) (1979) 4-5. A. Lovins, 'Energy strategy: the road not taken:', Forgan Aj^a-frs 55 (1) (October 1976) 65-96. A. Lovins, Soft F%grgrp Pa^As, Friends of the Earth, San Francisco, 1977 B. Martin, 'Is alternative technology enough?', 6%a-f% Pgaat-Zaz? 3 (2) (1977) 17-21. B. Martin, 'Call for research into Synroc', 7%g Fan&grua Tvxgs, December 6, 1978, p.15. G.T. Prance and T.S. Elias (editors), Botanic Garden, 1977. -fs Fcrgpgr, New York A.E. Ringwood, Safa PZspasaZ a/ Pgz?gZ F^aZgar Fgaa^a?^ fVasZgs.* 4 Fgzj s^ratgpp, ANU Press, Canberra, 1978. R. and V. Routley, 'Nuclear energy and obligations to the future', 21 (1978) 133-179. R. and V. Routley, 'Some ethical aspects of energy options', in Fzzgrpz/ a?%f PggpZg; Saa-ZaZ JmpZtaat'Za^s <pf P-Z/ygrgn^ F?zgrpz/ FM^z^rgs, edited by M. Diesendorf, Society for Social Responsibility in Science (A.C.T.), Canberra, 1979. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Draft Papers Description An account of the resource Sylvan's literary executor encountered an archive in which “all his projects were current", since manuscripts were undated and unattributed. Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document <* Nuclear waste, obligations to the future, and social choice. The bus example. very long journey. Suppose we consider a bus which, hopefully, is to make a Early in the journey of the bus someone consigns on it, to a far distant destination, a package which contains a highly toxic and explo­ sive gas. This is packaged in a thin container, which as the consigner well knows may well not contain the gas for the full distance for which it is con­ signed, and certainly will not do so if the bus should strike any trouble, for example if there is a breakdown and the interior of the bus becomes very hot, if the bus should strike a very large bump or pothole of the sort commonly found on some of the bad roads it has to traverse, or if some passenger should interfere deliberately or inadvertently with the cargo or perhaps try to steal some of the freight. If the container should break the resulting disaster would probably kill at least some of the people on the bus, while others could be maimed or contract serious diseases. Most of us would condemn such an action. parcel say to try to justify it? What might the consigner of the He might say that it is not certain that the gas will escape and that it is mere speculation to suppose it will, that the world needs his product and it is his duty to supply it, and that in any case he is not responsible for the bus or the people on it. These sorts of excuses however would normally be seen as ludicrous. Suppose he says that it is his own pressing needs which justify his action. The firm he owns, which produces the material as a by-product, is in bad financial straits, and couldn't afford to produce a better container (even if it knew how to make one). If the firm goes broke, he and his family will suffer, his employees will lose their jobs and have to look for others, and the whole village, through loss of spending and the cancellation of the Multiplier Effect, will be worse off. The poor of the village whom he would otherwise have been able to help, will suffer especially. Few people would accept this story,even if correct, as justification. Even where there are serious risks and costs to oneself or some group for whom one is concerned^one is usually thought not to be entitled to simply transfer the burden of those risks and costs onto other uninvolved parties, especially where they arise from one's own chosen life style and the transfer of costs creates a risk of serious harm to others (the transfer principle). Tbe nuclear comparison. One of the major problems arising from the use of nuclear power is the disposal of highly radioactive wastes which must be segregated from the biosphere for periods on the order of a million years (Ringwood 78, p.l). The wastes are highly toxic and will be spread around the world if large-scale nuclear development goes ahead as planned. Yet there is no method of packaging them whose safety has been demonstrated beyond reasonable doubt and which we can be confident will be generally used. Despite recent 'new strategies for safe disposal of nuclear waste', it remains true that there is at present no generally accepted means by which high level waste can be permanently isolated from the environment and remain safe for very long periods. (Fox Report, p.110). It was presumably largely for this sort of reason that the Fox Report endorsed the conclusion of the British (Flowers) Report 'with respect to nuclear waste' namely:- There should be no commitment to a large programme of nuclear fission power until it has been demonstrated beyond reasonable doubt that a method exists to ensure the safe containment of long-lived radioactive waste for the indefinite future (Fox Report, p.189; our italics). - a reliable method, the Report should have added, whose commercial viability and use is assured. example. The need for these further conditions can be seen from the bus The consigner can hardly justify his action as regards the people on the bus, the people of the future, by saying that a better container is too expensive, or that he does have a strategy for producing or theory which will enable him to produce a superior container,if he has failed to use the method. It is thus a non sequitur to argue as Ringwood does on the basis of his proposed strategy for the safe disposal of radwastes (i.e. high-level nuclear wastes) that the radwaste problem is no reasonable ground upon which to curtail use of nuclear power: The principle conclusion of this book is that the problem of isolating high level nuclear wastes from the biosphere can be solved. Although there may be other objections to the use of nuclear power, the radwaste problem cannot reasonably be cited in justification of policies to abandon its use (78, Ringwood's italics). Even if the premiss that the problem can be solved had been established - it 2 hasn't at all - the no-abandonment-of-nuclear-power conclusion in no way fellows. There is a large gap between the theoretical possibility of a method of safe storage (hardly an important issue in the nuclear debate) and the availability of a commercial containment method whose reliability has been demonstrated beyond 3. reasonable doubt and whose general use can be reasonably assumed. It is the latter that is required for Ringwood's no-abandonment-of-nuclear-power conclusion; but of the latter Ringwood's strategy gives no assurance.^ There is in fact little reason to believe that nuclear pollution will be treated in a different fashion from other forms of pollution, where the availability of more satisfactory methods of control is by no means sufficient to guarantee their effective employ­ ment, especially if they are expensive. It is methodologically unsound to ignore social, ethical and political factors and to regard the radwaste problem as a purely technological one which can be classed as solved should a theoretical solution with practical application possibilities be reached. The practical likelihood, even given (what we lack) a disposal method proven safe beyond reasonable doubt, remains - that nuclear wastes will not be adequately contained, with the result that nuclear power will impose serious costs and risks on future people who do not benefit. Por nuclear fission generates wastes which may remain toxic for a million years, but even with the breeder reactor it could be an energy source for perhaps only 150 years. Thus 30,000 generations of future people could be forced to bear significant risks,without any corresponding benefits, resulting from the provision ot the extravagant energy use of only 5 generations or so. Like the consigner in the bus example, contemporary industrial society proposes, in extricating itself ^rom a mess arising from its own life style - the creation of economies dependent on an abundance of non-renewable energy which is limited in physical supply - to pass on costs and risks of serious harm to others who will obtain no corresponding energy benefits. The solution may enable the avoidance of some uncomfortable changes in the lifetime of those now living and their immediate descendants, just as the consigner's action avoids uncomfortable changes for him and his immediate surroundings, but at the expense of passing heavy burdens to other uninvolved parties. For these reasons the nuclear energy option is, like the consigner's What makes matters worse is that present industrial action morally unacceptable. society has clear alternatives to its nuclear choice, which is made essentially to avoid changing wasteful patterns of consumption and to protect the interests of those who profit from them. Obligations to the future. One way of trying to escape the conclusion that present large-scale nuclear development involves serious injustice with respect to people of the distant future is to deny, as the occasional philosopher has, that there are moral obligations to remotely future people. But the view that there are no such obligations, that we are free to do as we like with respect to future people, is a very difficult one to sustain. Would scientists, for example, in the course of conducting an experiment, be entitled to do something, say release a disease-carrying organism with a very long incubation period, which 4. while not affecting the present, could cause death and disease for many future people, for example? Most people would say they certainly are not. Nevertheless 'The future can take case of itself; why should we worry about it, we have enough problems' is also a common attitude. But it is not as if in the nuclear case we are simply leaving the future alone to take care of itself. We are causally influencing it and in doing so acquire moral responsibilities with respect to future people, namely the obligation to take account of people affected and their interests in what we do, to be careful in our actions, to take account of the probability of our actions causing harm, and to see that we do not act so as to rob future people of the chance of a good life - and a satisfactory environment. That there are obligations to the distant future^-which follows logically from examples, such as that of scientists who act wrongly in deliberately or carelessly damaging people displaced in timej-may be argued, more generally, on the basis of the spatial analogy (that the temporal dimension is like spatial dimensions and remoteness in space does not eliminate, or substantially diminish, obligation), or on the basis of ethical theories, and general principles common to such theories. ^The main modern theories of obligation^ e.g. utilitarian, contractual, intuitionisti when properly applied, converge to show that there are moral obligations to people in the distant future of the same sort that there are to present people. (Thus the rejection of nuclear development as morally unacceptable does not depend on a particular ethical theory, but uses only ground common to the main theories.) The convergence of theories may be accounted for in terms of conditions of adequacy an ethical theory should meet. The principles of obligation of such a theory should be universalisable or lawlike in that they do not make exceptions for particular times or places or peoples (such as those of contemporary industrial society): to make exceptions would be to accept unfairness, and so injustice. Thus the temporal position of a person cannot affect that person's entitlement to just and fair treatment; are the same sorts of general obligations to future people as to present. Engineering and economic comparisons and assessments of different energy options are usually inadequate because they neglect these general features of obligation. Just as the fact that the consigner and his immediate environment will benefit from sending the parcel does not show it is morally acceptable, so arguments for nuclear power based on alleged economic benefits for the present, or a favourable benefit-risk analysis, do not even begin to show that it is morally acceptable. Economics and engineering must (like law) operate within the framework of moral constraints, not determine those constraints. 5. Uncertainty arguments. Elements of uncertainty or indeterminacy in a situation (especially in our knowledge of the situation) provide no exemptions from general obligations, any more than they upset or modify the operation of general physical laws. It is commonly argued, however that we cannot really be expected to take account of the interests of future people, because the damage to the future from nuclear waste is by no means certain, we cannot be sure that future people will not develop a way of coping with the problem or will care about the risk anyway. Aren't we being asked to forego tangible benefits for the present for the sake of avoiding a merely speculative risk of harm to people we do not even know will exist? This sort of argument may seem initially plausible, but a little reflection on examples, such as the bus example, shows that it is mistaken. It is like the consigner saying that there is nothing wrong in his sending his parcel, since it is not certain the gas will escape, or that there will be anybody on the bus when it does, or that the people on the bus may think of a way of coping with the problem, or may not care anyway. Can he really be expected to forego tangible benefits for himself and his family just to avoid speculative harm to the possibly non-existent passengers? The answer of course is yes. The damage to the passengers does not have to be certain or even probable - it is enough that a significant risk of serious harm is imposed on the unconsenting and uninvolved passengers. In the nuclear case it is clear that a significant risk will be imposed on the future. The circumstances in which nuclear waste disposal could be improper or ineffective are only too easy to envisage, and must be considered real risks with a real evidential basis, not merely idle speculation or science-fiction possibility. And uncertainty about the future is not so great as this line of argument likes to make out - there is uncertainty about many details of little moral consequence concerning the future, such as which girls' names will be used commonly in 100 years, but we do have good reason to believe, especially if we consider 3000 years of history, that future people will have basic needs and desires rather like our own, that they will need a healthy biosphere for a good life, and that their lives will not be improved by an increased incidence of disease and cancer from increased radiation. written off in this way: Moral conflict arguments. The legitimate interests of future people cannot be These uncertainty arguments are moral cop-outs. The alternative to disputing obligations to the future is to appeal to overriding obligations involving the present (which induce situations where obligations conflict). According to moral conflict arguments, nuclear development does have its morally undesirable aspects, but the only practical alternatives to nuclear development are morally even worse. ^Observe that such arguments are only satisfactory provided the options presented are 6. genuine and exhaustive, all practicable alternatives being considered and shown to be worse than the option under consideration: in the nuclear development case this necessary condition is not satisfied.14oral conflict arguments are commonly advanced in favour of nuclear development, some alleging competing and overriding duties to future people, and some analogous duties to present people. The main (and representative) argument of the last class, laying stress on duties to present people, is the Poverty Argument, according to which there is an overriding obligation to the poor, both of the third world and the industrialized countries who, according to the argument, will suffer or be denied the opportunity to reach affluence if nuclear development does not proceed. In neither case does the argument stand up to examination. There is good evidence that large-scale nuclear energy will help to increase unemployment and poverty in the industrial world, through the diversion of very much available capital into an industry which is not only an exceptionally poor provider of direct employment, but also helps to reduce available jobs through encouraging substitution of energy use for labour use. The argument that nuclear energy is needed for the third world is even less convincing. Nuclear energy is both politically and economically inappropriate for the third world, since it requires massive amounts of capital, requires numbers of imported scientists and engineers, and creates negligible employment. Politically it increases foreign dependence, adds to centralised entrenched power and reduces the chance for change in the oppressive political structures which are a large part of the problem something which may help explain why it is attractive to many of the military governing elites of these countries. The poverty argument then - like many modern economic arguments for development which appeal to the way in which development will, allegedly, assist the poor - is a fraud. Nuclear energy will not be used, except incidentally, to help the poor. Both for the third world and for the industrialised countries there are well-known energy conserving alternatives and the practical option of developing other energy sources, alternatives which are morally acceptable and socially preferable to nuclear development, and which have far better prospects for helping the poor. The other, major, moral conflict argument appeals to a set of supposedly overriding and competing obligations to present and future people. We have, it is said, a duty to pass on the immensely valuable things and institutions which our culture has developed. The argument is essentially that without nuclear power, without the continued level of material wealth it alone is assumed to make possible, the lights of our civilization will go out, our valuable institutions and traditions will fall into decay or be swept away. Future people also will be the losers. 7. The assumptions upon which this Lights-going-out Argument is based are untenable. It appears to assume that existing high-energy consumption society is uniformly and uniquely valuable and that it cannot be directed towards energy conservation or alternative energy sources without utter collapse. But no enormous reduction in energy use, and perhaps little in real welfare, is needed to obviate the need for nuclear power in the shorter term, and alternative energy strategies to nuclear will have, in any case, to be adopted for the longer term anyway. High rates of energy use may be necessary to maintain the political and economic status quo, but they are scarcely necessary to maintain what is really valuable in our society, much of which we inherited from a past with a vastly lower energy con­ sumption, and much of which might well be better fostered in lower (energy) con­ sumption society with less concentration of political and economic power. Not only are the extravagant levels of energy consumption upon which the ''need" for nuclear power is premissed unnecessary to maintain what is valuable, but there is some reason to believe they are positively inimical to doing so. Nuclear develop­ ment may help in passing on to future generations some of the worse aspects of our society, the consumerism, alienation, destruction of nature and latent authori­ tarianism, while many valuable aspects, such as the degree of political freedom and those opportunities for personal and collective autonomy which exist, would be lost or diminished. But it is not the status quo, but what is valuable in our society, presumably, that we have an obligation to pass on to the future, and if possible enhance. Both moral conflict escape routes are closed then, because the arguments depend on false contrasts, ignore practicable alternatives which are not morally worse than nuclear power, and in painting their picture of inevitability, vastly understate the extent of available social choice. It is like the consigner of the parcel arguing that if he does not send his parcel his family and the village will starve, when in fact there appear to be viable, but perhaps less profitable, alternatives he has not troubled to consider or investigate seriously. Alternative energy options. The future energy option that is most frequently contrasted with nuclear, that based on coal, is not without ethical problems. Certainly there is no radioactive waste disposal problem, and other important grounds for moral and political concern over extensive reliance on nuclear energy are removed, namely problems arising from the real possibilities of proliferation of nuclear weapons, of deliberate release or threat of release of radioactive materials as a measure of terrorism or of extortion, and of catastrophic releases of radiation or of radioactive fuel or waste into the environment following an 8. accident such as reactor melt-down, and from security measures adopted to reduce such eventualities. But the coal-based option carries nonetheless serious costs and risks both to the environment and to health - because of the likelihood of severe pollution and associated damaging phenomena such as acid rain and atmospheric heating, not to mention the despoliation caused by extensive strip mining, all of which will result from use of coal in meeting very high projected Such an option would also fail, it seems, to satisfy the consumption figures. transfer principle, because it would impose widespread costs on nonbeneficiaries for some concentrated benefits to some profit takers and to some contemporary users who do not pay the full costs of production and replacement. These are the conventional options and a third is often added which emphasizes soft or benign technologies, such as those of solar energy. However the fundamental choice, such options usually neglect, is not technological but social, and involves both the restructuring of production, and change of consumption, away from energy intensive uses: at a more basic level there is a choice between consumeristic and nonconsumeristic futures.^ It is not just a matter of deciding in which way to meet unexamined goals but also a matter of examining the goals and underlying values. That is, we are not just faced with the question of comparing different technologies or substitute ways of meeting some fixed or given demand or level of consumption, and of trying to see whether we can meet this with soft rather than hard technologies; we are also faced, and primarily, with the matter of examining those alleged needs and the cost of society that creates them. It is not just a question of devising less damaging ways to meet these alleged needs conceived of us inevitable and unchangeable. There are solar ways of producing unnecessary trivia no one really wants and of squandering energy, as well as nuclear ways. This is not to deny that softer options may be superior to the ethically unacceptable features of the others. But it is doubtful that any technology however benign in principle will be likely to leave a tolerable world for future people if it is expected to meet limitless and uncontrolled energy consumption and demands. Even the more benign technologies such as solar technology may well be used in ways which create costs for future people and are likely to result in a deteriorated world being transmitted to them. Consider, to take one important example, the effect on the world's forests, which are commonly counted as a solar resource, of use for production of methonal or of electricity by woodchipping, as already planned by forest authorities in California and contemplated by many other energy organisations. Few would object to the use of genuine waste material for energy production, but the un­ restricted exploitation of forests - whether it goes under the name of solar energy" or not - to meet ever increasing energy demands would have a very damaging effect on the world's already hard pressed natural forests.5 Some of us do not 9. want to pass on - we are not entitled to pass on - to the future a world largely devoid of natural forests and accordingly much impoverished in fauna and flora, any more than we want to pass on one poisoned by nuclear products or polluted by coal products. In short, a mere switch to a more benign technology - important though this is - without any more basic structural and social changes is inadequate. Social options. The deeper social options involve challenging and trying to change a social structure which promotes consumerism and an economic structure which encourages the use of highly energy-intensive modes of production. This involves, for instance, trying to change a social structure in which those who are fortunate enough to make it into the work force are cogs in a production machine over which they have very little real control and in which most people do unpleasant or boring work from which they derive very little real satisfaction in order to obtain the reward of consumer goods and services. A society in which social rewards are obtained primarily from products rather than processes, from consumption, rather than from satisfaction in work and in social relations and other activities, is bound to be one which generates a vast amount of unnecessary consumption. (A production system that produces goods not to meet genuine needs but for created and nongenuine needs is virtually bound to overproduce.) Consumption frequently becomes a substitute for satisfaction in other areas. The social change option is a hard option, but it seems the only way to avoid passing on serious costs and risks to the future; and there are not only ethical grounds, but ecological reasons for choosing it. Conventional technology-oriented discussions of energy options and of how to meet future energy "needs" obscures the social change option, in part because the option questions values underlying current social arrangements. The conventional discussion proceeds by taking y alleged demand (often restated as wants or needs) as unchallengeable,' and the issue to be one which technology can be most profitably employed to meet them. This effectively presents a false choice, and is the result of taking needs and demand as lacking a social context so that the social structure which produces the needs is similarly taken as unchallengable and unchangeable. The social changes that the option requires will be strongly resisted because they mean changes in current social organisation and power structure, and to the extent that the option represents some kind of threat to parts of present political and economic arrangements it is not surprising that official energy option discussion proceeds g by misrepresenting and often obscuring it. FOOTNOTES 1. Some leading proponents of nuclear development admit the absence of satisfactory storage and disposal methods; others do not. Some of the newer strategies for waste disposal, e.g. that promoted by Cohen 77 fail, conspicuously, to meet conditions of adequacy on disposal (see Routley and Routley 78, footnote 1). Ringwood's new strategy, in 78, was immediately rejected by some of the pronuclear establishment both as too expensive (even allowing Ringwood's optimistic costguestimates) and as unnecessary, which does not augur well for its use. Yet Ringwood cast serious doubt on the adequacy of alternative disposal strategies, notably immobilisation of wastes in glass and in supercalcine. All Ringwood has shown conclusively is that he can create an artificial equivalent of a uranium one-bodv (Hallam 79) What Ringwood's 'strategy for radwaste disposal' amounts to is a further possible method of treating radwaste, with significant gaps in the argument, a considerable lack of experimental and practical support, no commercial feasibility studies, etc: see Martin 78 and Hallam 79. -1* It depends on several processes whose large-scale commercial viability has very definitely not been shown beyond reasonable doubt, including reprocessing (Fox Report, p.29). It appears to be far too expensive for the nuclear industry, and certainly for poorer nations that have embarked on nuclear power projects. There are moreover reasons for thinking that governments may not want or favour permanent irretrievable disposal methods; they may want to keep open their options for employing waste components either for military purposes or for use in breeder reactors or elsewhere. 4. On alternative technology and softer energy options, see especially Lovins 77; also Lovins 76. For criticism of Lovins' comparative neglect of social alternatives, see Martin 77 (and Lovins' reply thereto). 5. The already very serious situation of the world's forests, especially the wet tropical forests, is not sufficiently widely appreciated. Et is a commonplace reflection, however, among rainforest botanists and ecologists that nearly all tropical lowland rainforest and much highlevel rainforest will have been cut over by about the year 2000. Moreover such forests cannot at present be utilised on a sustained yield basis or as a renewable resource (see, e.g. p.219 of Prance and Elias 77). Worse, there are now few forestry operations anywhere in the world where the forests are treated as completely renewable in the sense of the renewal of all their values. In many temperate regions too the rate of exploitation which would enable renewal has already been exceeded. The addition of a major further demand source - that for energy, whether advertised as part of a "soft" energy path or otherwise and especially one which shows every sign of being not readily limitable, on top of the present sources is a development which anyone with a realistic appreciation of the conduct of forestry operations, who is also properly concerned about the longterm integrity of the forests and remaining natural communities, must regard with considerable alarm. 6. The transmission principle, that one should not hand the world on to our successors in substantially worse shape than we received it, is a corollary of the transfer principle - applied in the bus example and suggested as a necessary condition on energy options - that to be morally acceptable a course of action should not involve the transfer of significant cost and risks onto uninvolved parties who are not beneficiaries. For if we violated the transmission principle, there would be a significant transfer of costs, contradicting the transfer principle. The transmission principle can be independently argued for, e.g. on the basis of contract (and other) theories of obligation. 7. Thus it is argued by representatives of such industries as transportation and petroleum, as for example by McGrowth of the XS Consumption Co., that people want deep freezers, air conditioners, power boats, ... and that it would be authoritarian to stop them satisfying these wants. The argument conveniently ignores the social framework in which such needs and wants arise or are produced. To point to the determination of many such wants at the framework level is not however to accept a Marxist approach according to which they are entirely determined at the framework level (e.g. by industrial organisation) and there is no such thing as individual choice or determination at all. It is to see the social framework as a major factor in determining certain kinds of choices and to see apparently individual choices made in such matters as being channelled and directed by a social framework determined largely in the interests of commercial and political advantage. 8. This paper draws on material from Routley and Routley 78 and 79 where fuller discussion of many of the topics covered, especially the question of obligations to the future and uncertainty arguments, may be found. w REFERENCES B.L. Cohen, 'The disposal of radioactive wastes from fission reactors', Sg-Zg^tf^a Amgr-faa^ 236 (June 1977) 22-31. Flowers Report: Fz^aZgar Pazjgr a?zJ ^Fg FwPra^g??^. Sixth Report of the British Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution, London, 1976. Fox Report.: Fa??pgr Pra??7'zw Pw-Zra?w?g7ztaZ F-frst Report, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 19/7. J.R. Hallam, 'Synroc or C#nroc?', F/za*Z?n Pgaat^azz 4 (2-3) (1979) 4-5. A. Lovins, 'Energy strategy: the road not taken:', Forgan Aj^a-frs 55 (1) (October 1976) 65-96. A. Lovins, Soft F%grgrp Pa^As, Friends of the Earth, San Francisco, 1977 B. Martin, 'Is alternative technology enough?', 6%a-f% Pgaat-Zaz? 3 (2) (1977) 17-21. B. Martin, 'Call for research into Synroc', 7%g Fan&grua Tvxgs, December 6, 1978, p.15. G.T. Prance and T.S. Elias (editors), Botanic Garden, 1977. -fs Fcrgpgr, New York A.E. Ringwood, Safa PZspasaZ a/ Pgz?gZ F^aZgar Fgaa^a?^ fVasZgs.* 4 Fgzj s^ratgpp, ANU Press, Canberra, 1978. R. and V. Routley, 'Nuclear energy and obligations to the future', 21 (1978) 133-179. R. and V. Routley, 'Some ethical aspects of energy options', in Fzzgrpz/ a?%f PggpZg; Saa-ZaZ JmpZtaat'Za^s <pf P-Z/ygrgn^ F?zgrpz/ FM^z^rgs, edited by M. Diesendorf, Society for Social Responsibility in Science (A.C.T.), Canberra, 1979.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Box 142, Item 1931: Draft of Nuclear waste, obligations to the future, and social choice Subject The topic of the resource Typescript draft, with handwritten emendations. Handwritten on first leaf: Penguin paper 1974 unpublished? Description An account of the resource Note, one paper digitised from item 1931. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/browse?search=Richard+Sylvan&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bjoiner%5D=and&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=&amp;range=&amp;collection=&amp;type=&amp;user=&amp;tags=&amp;public=&amp;featured=&amp;exhibit=&amp;geolocation-mapped=&amp;geolocation-address=&amp;geolocation-latitude=&amp;geolocation-longitude=&amp;geolocation-radius=10&amp;submit_search=Search+for+items">Richard Sylvan</a> Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived <span class="MuiTypography-root-125 MuiTypography-body2-126">The University of Queensland's <a data-testid="rek-series" href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/records/search?page=1&amp;pageSize=20&amp;sortBy=score&amp;sortDirection=Desc&amp;searchQueryParams%5Brek_series%5D%5Bvalue%5D=Richard+Sylvan+Papers%2C+UQFL291&amp;searchMode=advanced">Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291</a></span>, Box 142, Item 1931 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org">Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy</a> Contributor An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource <span>This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, </span><a href="https://najtaylor.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Dr. N.A.J. Taylor</a><span>.</span> Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library. Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource [12] leaves. 31.86 MB. Type The nature or genre of the resource Manuscript Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context <a href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:287059e">https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:287059e</a> Australian National University Office Australian National University Office > Far Bookshelf > Second Bay > Fourth Shelf -> Pile 2 Box 142: File Cabinet 2 Draw 1 https://www.antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/9fad10700c696fd3710e7ebe33ec9966.pdf 9845ac7fc4def38451cd2fcd089001b1 PDF Text Text R TREATISE ON POLITICAL THEORY OTHER HQJOR TOPICS (UNOROERED):- 1. PturatisM and pturatisMS: the otd (and Marxist) fallacy of one form. 2. Power, hierarchies, Constitutions, corporations, states and transnationats Authoritarian rotations; organisations. 3. Undertying Metaphysics. (not independent things). Stytes of denocracy, and inproving denocracy. 6. A Major source of power: property. Land rights. ��INTRODUCTION Present poLet Leet arrangements are hardig satisfactorg, angMhere. Theg not de Livering adequate shoutd at Least assist Ln environment, Meifare, of mang of* the things that such arrangements Levels^ productLon the are or education^ LiveLihood, of, attainment ... e.g. securLtg, . Thus if better Mags to do these things can be found, theg shouLd be sought, and tried. Perhaps surprisingLg, there has been remarkabLg Lit tie effort expended upon surveuing the range of poLLticaL atternatives (as compared, e.g., Mith the effort put into defending the status quo), or to Mork out, so far as can or need be done, areas, detaiLs Mhere of the more promising options. entrenched positions Indeed, as Mith so mang other dominate^ there been has cons iderabLe discouraoement of such important investigation. R s ign if ican t r ange of a L te ma t i ves, sea roe Lg g i ven a triaL in modern historg, are these arrangements Mhich reduce domination and the exercise of poMer and increase freedom. The present studg concentrates on these sorts arrangements, not in totaLitarian of or fascist or imperiaiist structures Mhich have more than sufficient exempiification in recent times, despite their Lack of justification and base in raM poMer and brute force. 10. POLITICS WITHOUT DONINRTION: Rnakgr ie means varietg of RNRKYRIE RND RNRRCHISM Mi thout domination. domination. For domination That incLudes comes in the Mhoie range mang forms: of citizens bg states, civiLians bg miLitarg, poor bg rich, bLacks bg Mhites, thirdMoriders -1- and bg �HMerLeans ) Russ Lans. MOMen bu nan. young by otder, anLMaLs by huMans, nature '. \ . RnaRyrLsM consLsts Ln socLaL arrangeMents desLgned to avoLd aLL e<.c*i v.*? , ^etA/'o , py<-. 'fiohcoAc^ forMs of doMLnatLon-^ [There Ls nothLng Ln the account so far g^v^n whLch bu Men? such orr ... <3/* LMpLLes that Lt Must taRe a gLven shape, that Lt Ls unLquety deterMLned.] RnarchLsM dLrectLy Ls MLth concerned onLy one part of Mhat anahyrLe Ls about: doMLnatLon by peopte by states (Mhether theLr OMn or that of others), and rewovaL of thLs doMLnatLon by aboLLtLon of the state. But there are forMs other not essenttaLLy bound up MLth thLs forM, and aboLLtcon of doMLnatLon of Many the state Ls but oney rather drasttcyMay of reMovtng state doMLnatLon. RnarchLsM has been extended, for Lnstance to eco-anarchLsM (as feMLnLsM has been broadened to eco-feMLnLsM), Ln an effort to overcoMe a conspLcuous part of c/ n/ttj 19th C anarchLsM tended to accept the saMe doMLnatLon of the probteM, that nature by Lndeed and huMans, the saMe sort of scLentLfLo reductLonLstLc MaterLaL',SM, as Lts doMLnant rLvats, capLtaLLsM and (MarxLst) socLaLLsM. But the broadenLng caLLs for atso further expLanatLon, to LncLude other types of doMLnatLony^id strLctLy,such a recr^antatLon as to LnvoLve a change Ln MeanLng, A Ln Mhat Mas Meant by anarchLsM . In these cLrcuMstances, Lt Ls More forMard and Less MLsLeadLng sLMpLy to Lntroduce neM terMLnoLogy. Rtw straLghtthere are , good reasons for seeRLng neM terMLnoLogy. In More than a century of use anarchy and Lts derLvatLves have becoMe thoroughLy oenve-p-tied- MLth undesLrabte and LnapproprLate assoc LatLons, to such an extent that soMe of these, such as chaos and dLsorder, are no&'saLd to gLve part / of the MeanLng of anarchy'. �3. �r / ���7. �Z7^ /^y- /' ^^^7T/Fv^) 4^7^7 - -—-V /FLy X' y y -^=y 1 ^/rc-^A^-g' ' t7 LA^ct^ <\_^ Ar^ / -tAjL ^tL_\ _ ^-e>^ /%y 4Z—f Z^4-^c—1<^^7- <K^- ' , /<7 ,/' 1 ^XTg^bTyZr* -(Zc6tA.________ __________ ^BLUy^Aya&LA^^ -------- ________________________________________________________________________________________________________ c^Lct^A^!L4/7A^^^ cAy*t^i^c^u^uLil_ Z ' 1^9-^^\Acc\_. c\ rr^, ^-y " ^7 �A ^3^ LA.A.itfA.'t t?L-'Se. ^Z (loA CAAA.. t4^Zt^- ^STc^r- . A <c t/coZwA g AA-^ tA'LCi^^A (^C 6t/Z^cAy (/^cA tAAAAAAA^LA^^ ( Q#-A- C>Lu^t4^ /A cA^_ y4 AZ^^ / <^r-V ^// ^cyc ^,V . v Aa^A —"------------<-A G^<Ar, //-^; tA L^Jb^y^GA^ZjA^c^ ^pA-4_/ tA lA^CCCCJ!— Qt&^> A. _____ u?^jtjt^- (A-S^ L^<%^ tAj^r 'iC^ZA sA^PAAL ^-A^. (JS- tUlL ^eACL& C^A jAMAAtAA- CC^s L&^ULC^ tX-AA*^ Ct <^A> (Av^ zA ^^AjL CA/^2^ tA, t<A, c/ ^X/>AL, (AA/^^xA^- CA^JAA^ ��BOCK NUMBER A Aw/ AUTHOR (BLOCK LETTERS) ------------------------------------------------------- DATE DUE <V HILE NAME & cheer? I?U(/ tLE;^ / KQ-Cc DEPT. (BLOCK LETTERS) PHONE NUMBER IF YOU WISH DETAILS OF THIS LOAN TO REMAIN CONFIDENTIAL. PLEASE INITIAL SPACE BELOW CP-228-81 GTO DATE TVB./gTT SIGNATURE Cl �1 �-y-"^5- J / . lx? /' ��138 139 genuine solution' since it combines both autonomy and authority; the difficulty i* 3 that it is empirically unrealistic? I shall return to WolfFs reasons for hesitating to 3 accept his own philosophical anarchist conclusions in a moment. Godwin, in his F/M/mry Concerning Po/Mcu/ Justice, was not so timid. Godwin's theory is extremely interesting for any discussion of political obligation because, like Hobbes' theory, it 3 shows the full implications of one form of adherence to radical, abstract individualism. B Godwin's theory is a mirror image of Hobbes'. He ends where Hobbes begins^ with a collection of individuals who each view the world through their own, subjective viewpoint. For Hobbes, the absolute freedom of individual private judgement leads to complete insecurity and arbitrariness; for Godwin, the unspeakably beautiful' practice of absolutely free exercise of individual private judgement is the only way to peace (p. 208).*" Hobbes creates an artificial social union held together by the Sword and reduces obligation' to enforced submission and obedience. Godwin relies on reified Reason that speaks identically to individual and he completely eliminates obligation' along with all other social relationships. Social institutions and social relationships, Godwin argues, merely stand in the way of individual judgement by preventing individuals seeing things as they really are." Unhindered by governments, and other social institutions such as promising, each individual will be able to decide for herself what ought to be done and individuals' judgements will coincide. Reason will speak to all in a single voice because, in the absence of social institutions, reality will stand revealed in all its transparency. Godwin's objections to the practice of promising are similar to his objections to political institutions. Promising is absolutely considered, an evil' (p. 218). It may occasionally be necessary to make a promise in order not to mislead other people about one's intentions, but a defence of necessity in specific cases does not detract from the essential evil of the practice itself. The evils of promising are twofold: first, promising binds future conduct and thus rules out further individual judgement as information and circumstances change. Secondly, promising encourages individuals to act from 'a precarious and temporary motive' (p. 219). It distracts attention front the consequences of particular actions, and hence obscures their intrinsic merits. If the individual judges that an action ought to be performed (and Godwin saw this judgement as a utilitarian calculation) then a promise adds nothing; it merely clouds the moral worth, or otherwise, of the judgement itself. Political institutions function in the same way to prevent individuals seeing things as they really are. For example; they give an appearance of permanence to opinions that prevail at their inception and thus cause the stagnation of judgement. Laws, like obligations, bind future conduct and, being general in form, can take no account of the fact that each case is unique and should be judged, according to Reason, on its own merits. Moreover, political assemblies impose a factitious unanimity' on their members. Decisions have to bn reached in which all the members must acquiesce, thus pretending that they am something more than a collection of individuals, each with their own opinions; Deliberation has to be cut short ly a vote and everyone, if their efforts are not to be for nothing, has to see themselves as obliged' to carry out the decision: 'Nothing can '3 ? 3: ? 3; ' y more directly contribute to the depravation of the human understanding and character' (p. 547). Properly, according to Godwin, there are no obligations, only actions that ought to be performed, or refrained from; nor is there any political authority, only a coincidence of individual judgements that certain things ought to be done. Godwin's individuals, unlike those who enter a social contract, are bound to nothing'. If an individual joins in a 'common deliberation', he is, 'when the deliberation is over,... as much disengaged as ever' (p. 234). This is not to say that he will never act with his fellows; they may independently have arrived at the same judgement as to the right course of action. Godwin also allows that individuals may sometimes defer to the judgements of an authority on a particular matter; this he calls authority' that depends upon the conhdence of him with whom it prevails' (p. 242). This deference should, however, be rarely given, or it may tip over into a misplaced 'conhdence' in alleged superiors who make judgements for others, and so inculcate those slavish feelings that shrink up the soul' (p. 232). This form of obedience is a greater source of degradation and depravity' than if the individual bows to political authority out of fear of the sanctions for disobedience. Here Godwin anticipates Wolffs denial' of the authority of the state. Wolff recognizes that there are many reasons for compliance, but these are irrelevant providing that the claims of the state are subjectively denied a binding moral force'." Similarly, Godwin argued almost two hundred years ago that the individual who obeys solely to avoid punishment, may reserve, in its most essential sense, his independence. He may be informed in judgement,... and suffer his understanding neither to be seduced nor confounded' (p. 141). Godwin was confident that the philosophical anarchist denial' of authority and obligation could be put into practice. Through discussion and education, and the example of sincerity and frankness, individuals will become enlightened and develop an appreciation of the evils of social institutions and social cooperation. Godwin ruled out a sudden revolutionary change as this would not be based on the necessary development of individual understanding. As a transitional measure he advocated a system of 'juries', within small political communities or parishes', the juries dating with individual offenders and disputes over property. He expected that disputes between parishes would be rare and that the obvious principles of convenience' would soon suggest a settlement (p. 546). A national assembly' might occasionally be necessary to adjudicate in such matters, but it would not be a permanent body. At first, all these institutions would exercise political 'authority' but, in time, Godwin expected that they would merely issue invitations' to ^individuals to cooperate in executing their verdicts, and, eventually, ail political institutions and cooperation would wither away. Abstract individualism rests on heroic assumptions. In Godwin 's case he assumes that individual moral judgement can be exercised in complete absence of intersubjective theoretical categories and communal relationships. The argument of the &!<7uiry implies that that which can be thought can be put into practice. Because it is Possible to imagine an individual abstracted from social life, yet endowed with Reason and a capacity for moral judgement, Godwin also assumes that, given a �140 sufficient period of education and social and political change, those individuals could actually exist, with their social past 'stored', as it were, within the consciousness of each one. They would exist largely in isolation and yet, on occasions, emerge, inspect reality and make an individual judgement that would coincide with judgements and Reason of others. Godwin's theory has some extremely charming aspects, but they cannot hide the philosophically and sociologically bizarre consequences of radical individualism taken to one of its extremes. Everything, except their own judgements, and actions that flow immediately and unhindered from them, is foreign to one of Godwin's individuals. Even the individual's own physical needs or freely created relationships appear as impediments. A solitary individual, Godwin writes, is prevented from executing his judgements 'in compliance with his necessities, or his frailties' (p. 758). The evils of social cooperation are much worse, but technological progress will enable individuals to do many things for themselves in the future that now require the help of others. Godwin expects that concerts and plays will cease to be performed; what enlightened individual would want to mouth the words or play the compositions of another ? Eventually, the individual will come to see society as 'not a necessary of life, but a luxury, innocent and enviable, in which he joyfully indulges' (p. 761). At this point, however, there is no 'society' for them to indulge in. Godwin relies on a reified Reason to link his individuals together but this cannot take the place of the social relationships he has wished away. Once again, the impossibility of distinguishing between institutions in various dimensions of social life from within an abstractly individualist perspective is demonstrated. Godwin treats promising as just as much a constraint and impediment, and just as mystifying, as the laws of the state. It is worth emphasizing that Godwin ends by depriving his individuals of the means of transcending their own subjectivity. They have no social means of acting on their judgements and thus must remain totally immersed in their own assessments of what 'ought' to be done. The creative moral and social capacities of individuals are meaningless treated in the abstract; they presuppose, and, in practice, can only be exercised and developed as a part of social relationships including relationships of obligation. A tacit realization of the peculiar conclusion of philosophical anarchism seems to underlie Wolfs equivocations about the 'just state'. In the last part of /n Defence of ,4norchism, Wolff offers some 'deeper philosophical reasons' why he is unwilling to accept the 'negative results' of his argument; the social world, unlike the natural world, is not 'irreducibly other'. Wolff is thus implicitly arguing against Godwin when he says that the state is 'no more than the totality of the beliefs, expectations, habits, and interacting roles of its members and subjects.... The state,... cannot be ineradicably other'." In other words, instead of arguing that all authority is illegitimate, Wolff is now moving to the opposite theoretical extreme and putting forward a version of the conceptual argument; the state is no more than the association of its members and so necessary to them, so there is no problem about its authority. Wolff also suggests that there might be a practical solution to the problem of authority; political institutions must be decentralized and based on 'voluntary compliance' (although he may be arguing that a system based on 'voluntary 141 compliance' does not involve authority at all). Curiously, Wolff does not appear to see anything odd in an 'anarchism' that proclaims the necessity of the state. The -central argument of anarchism is precisely that the state, including the liberal democratic state, is inherently 'other', and so its claim to authority can never be justified. Anarchists, philosophical or otherwise, it will be objected at this point, make a much larger claim than this. Like Wolff, they argue that all political authority, not just that of the state, is illegitimate. It is true that anarchist writings are full of statements to this effect. Kropotkin, for example, writes that 'anarchism... works to destroy authority in all its aspects'." Such statements are usually taken at face value. Flathman, for instance, criticizing Pitkin's comments on 'authority', argues that the state of nature in Hobbes' and Locke's theories provides an example of individuals living together without authority, and he asks what else have anarchists been putting forward as an ideal?'." But, as I have shown, any social relationships existing in Hobbes' radically individualist natural condition are likely to be based on force and power, not authority, and Locke's state of nature, with its father-rulers and capitalist economy, would certainly not And favour with anarchists. Nor is it self-evident that the anarchist ideal does involve an absence of authority; not, that is, if anarchism is seen as a political theory and not merely as a variety of philosophical scepticism. The political theory of anarchism is not a theory of the chaos with which 'anarchy' is popularly equated, but a theory of a specihc form of socio-political organization that is, as it must be, ordered and rule-governed. Anarchists have usually been political activists and popular pamphleteers and not concerned with precise conceptual distinctions. They have tended to treat authority' as a synonym for 'authoritarian', and so have identified authority' with hierarchical power structures, especially those of the state. Nevertheless, their practical proposals and some of their theoretical discussions present a different picture. Kropotkin calls anarchism the 'no-govemment system of socialism'," but on one occasion he also distinguishes 'government' and the 'state'. He writes that 'it seems to me that in State and government we have two concepts of a different order'." Unfortunately, Kropotkin does not pursue this distinction, but it suggests that one anarchist, at least, did not totally reject political authority. This conclusion is also suggested by the social and political changes advocated by Kropotkin. He argued that abolition of the political institutions of the state would allow 'mutual aid' to become the ordering principle of socio-political life. His discussion of this principle presents similar dif&culties to the recent philosophically sophisticated discussions of cooperation, reciprocity and obligation. In part, Kropotkin 's claim can be seen as a version of the conceptual argument: 'the practice of mutual aid... [has] created the very conditions of society ...'.** He also used mutual aid to refer to actual historical examples of cooperative institutions based on the voluntary agreement of the members, and it is the principle of free agreement that will govern an anarchist socio-political order. However, as I have argued, in political life self-assumed obligation and authority presuppose such 'free agreement'. Kropotkin's sketch of the internal organization of the communes that will replace the state is significant here. Kropotkin envisages ���ct^— C ^u^n. ^41 7 ? <*W ��THE SERRCH FOR RNRRCHISil - RND FOR RN RPPROPRIRTE NE!*f TITLE FOR IT. IB. term The anarchism has acquired such an encrustation of unfortunate and undesirabLe associations that it is time for a ciear neM term to rep Lace Lt. But that is not so easg, one reason being that it is not at aLL easg to sag Mhat the [neM] position the term is to ref Leet is Like, even in rough outLine, or hoM that position (that nonstate state) might come about. [RepLace B approach Mith R approach.] It easier is to be negative than positive, to sag (as LtseLf anarchism does) Mhat anarchism, or the repLacement $-ism (sag) is not, rather than Mhat it is. LJhat the position is not is, firstig^a state of chaos. R state not one of disorder; on contrarg^ ^-istic the arrangements definiteLg be sociai and poLiticaL arrangements - MiLL be coroLLarg - since (thermodgnamicaLLg) energg for its production extremeLg untikeLg and - $-g is there MiLL organLsed. R organised sgstem or state requires an maintenance highLg of - is that a t^-istic sgstem is to arise spontaneousig. Directed urganisationaL energg must be put into the attainment of a ^-istic endstate. Sought d)-istic sgstems MiLL ' ) simpig not emerge spontaneousLg, even Mhen energg LeveLs have been raised and states excited, as in vigorous demonstrations or in revoLutionarg activities. Furthermore, t^-ism does not inciude^ ang more than anarchism need invoLve vioLet=tee: Nur need a ^-istic sgstem emerge in a vioient Mag. Even if it arises in a revoiutionarg Mag, there is no need for the route to incLude substantiaL, or even perhaps ang vioience. The notion of a nonvioient contradictorg revoLution is not a one. Nor are rapid nonvioLentig induced changes begond the bounds of reaL posstbeietg Ln severaL parts of the Morid. -3- . �Rn additionat anarchLsM set froM derives EngeLs-LenLn anarchLsM, Mounted as negative of the assoc tat Lons pretty a pubLLeatLon the for reasons scurrLLous, against and Rnarcho- reveaLs. R Main reason for the Marxist reject Lon of synd Lea L Lsw term caMpaign RnarchLSM LenLn. EngeLs Marx the grafted on to Lt by Marxists. Marx- and reguLar, MLth dispensing anarch LSM Mas that Lt Mas assuMed to LnvoLve LMMed Late transact Lon to state Less socLety. Uhat aLL anarchist trends have Ln coMMon Ls a utop Lan vLsLon of settLng up a socLety ML thout state and expLotttng cLasses through a spontaneous rebeLLLon by the Masses and instant abotition of state poMer and aLL Lts LnstLtut Lons, instead of through potiticat struggLe bu the working cLass, socLaLLst revoLutLon, and estabtishMent of a proietarian dictatorship (p.9). ThLs Last LnvoLves a faLse dLchotoMy. SiMitarLy there Ls heavy crLtLcLsM of anarehLst dogwas about revoLutLon (p.I7). The transition aboiishing opposLng the as state" the idea Mas that of the fLrst as state step Ln affording the a period". But reaLLy there Ls no opposLtLon: both are coMpatLbLe with anarchLsM: there Ls /yio^d than one May of deaiing MLth a scoundreL. The qeneraL shape of poLLtLcaL transfurMation, both Ln cLassicat MarxisM and Ln anarchLsM, Ls a MuLti-stage transforMation MLth 1) transLtLon states, Mhere the state Ls retaLned, 2) an end state, Mhere the state Ls reMoved. But the suggestion, especiaLLy LenLn, Ln that even Ln the end state of Ls cuMHUH LSM, the s ta te M L L L surv eve: criticai Marx Lsts anarchist of proposeLs for the destruction of authority of every k end, and the introduction of totaL decentrat­ er L tic LsM ts decentraLisation^; but it difference (which ref Leet unfairLg never the Less deeper with Loaded, r*. MBf^S out differences Ln every kind and totaL Lts tMO areas MorLd of substantLaL vieM). For exaMpLe, Leadership need not be excLuded, Mhere roLe to direct is freeLy granted and does -4- �not devoive into 3 fixed or imposed power relationship? and influence mag be exercised from federai to Locai LeveL as we Li as from LocaL to federai. There are batch a sort of theorg to anarchism. Like of iesser associations aiso removed bg distancing the be outiined from its dominant rivaL, accepted too much Eniightenment doctrine, anarchism. For (e.g. the essentiai goodness of man, the unaiieged instance, benigness centurg 19th science, of and worthwhiLeness of dominant economic goats. Not ontg was it too much a product of thinking: Eniightenment it shared with Marxist unecoLogicaL assumptions about the eiimination of scarcitg, and with capitalism assumption an reduction (at Least in most of its individuai of being an exception). If we trg to reach behind the contrasts, of 19th centurg poLiticaL thought. both orthodox and at ternatives"'. do we reduct ion ism, . science individuai especiaLLg what find? and Not reduct ion ism, ontg worship, techno Logg and maximisation, but mang other doctrines from its mgre orthodox, powerfut and yei/cvc-Z successfui rivais, incLuding domination, ^forms of domination. It is the removai of a wide varietg of forms of domination, of a ims at (Martin's power getting rid of)^ the structures, that negative side of anakgrie. rTn-srchg, w t th the remove L of state, ts ontg part of that: tt aLsc remova L anakgrie concerns the of domination of nature (bg humans), countrgside (bg cities), women (bg men), b Lacks (bg whites), etc. Rs the removai of weeds makes wag for new growth, so the removaL of domination makes wag respects too reiations anakgrie forms for new relations. The primitive side of anakgrie is concerned, among other things with such retations, especiaiig seLf-reguLating of of reaches this far with stabie sort, and wags of achieving them. begond what anarch ism. 5- and In these was normaLLg encompassed bg j �was selected RnakgrLe tupographLc to resembLance resembLance, and e^c4mf"Cttics4T.3 get It - Ln tern the was It of* because Lts and phonetcc cLose enough to benefit bg the Ls hopefuLLg, to shed the bed /A <%<2 the fLrst term arrLved at, bg eng weans, get Lt not removed, means rough Lu the same as the fLrst. resuLt however anarkLe . enough farMas part SRNOOillNISfl, In the search terms new for f'crst the L.e. sandomLn (wtthout waster or authorLtg) But atthough domLnatLon cs one of the ma tn thcngs to be removed tn served for aLternatLve arrangements, especLaLLg) Ls onLg Ln domLnatLon part range pLcture. the of a of forms (envLronmentaL DLth domLnatLon Ls assumed to go subject Lon and expLoLtatLon of what Ls domLnated. LIL th domLnatLon a Lso tends go Yet expans ton. there are other thtngs. [Expand, when Look at domLnatLon Later.J Finother word Looked at that has some currencg state Less roughLg LLteraLLg Lt means to acephaLous Ls wLthout a head head Less . meaning It Ls not a part Lou LarLg good term for present purposes. state The operates wLth,ratLfLes, SLnce both AnakgrLe domLnatLon. the same road for a Long part of ensure, and reLg upon, and LegLtLmLzes forms of and anarchg aLm to eLLmLnate these, theg traveL thejourneg. Find forms of domLnatLon - Lf the rLde together; and state Ls as mang crLtLcs, anarchLsts, have argued - then anakgrLe LncLudes anarchg. of the LnLtLaL argument, theg mang some In ang case bound to not reaLLg for sssLmLLatLon^ Ln much the interests of brevLtgwLLL not be too mLsLeadLng. S great Ls proper - Ls advantage of anakgrLe, however - and one reason whg the LncLusLon thLsj- The rewovaL of domLnatLon gLves actLvLsts something LmmedLate to work for, and Ln an ef'fectLve wag — 3gaLn bg contrast wLth anarchg, whLch mau be a Long-term project, or aLmost a do-nothLng one Ln some advanced capLtaLLst states. -6- �FOOTNOTES The probiem is frequentiy not one of suppiy, but rather of 1. distribution stiii -3 matter of poiitico-economic arrangements. 2. Negativety remains a prob Lem. It is considered beioM. 3. foLLoM Preface iJhat are from the by N.Y. KeLpinsky, to thLs work. couLd be argued is that the idea of immediate modern states is rather naive. ) A <3' /ZuA <5^ /7^ c y*&"- -7- 7 �21/3/84 - I. ANARCHISM : %ea</oc/ s The multiple aims of Often theory. political an aim,^ is takq^ to (model) of the good society, or even more strongly (and less likely) of a or perfect, society. But, to put it in an old-fashioned way, there is no "X such thing as the good society, any more than there is such a thing as the good life. In at principle least, are there variety a of good and societies, even pluralistically there are different mixes (or pluralities) of good societies. ft -Ritter's Rosseau, (p.135) problem A with of ' Marx, equality, vs. with models material of the good de^dgnce^ vs society (e-g- Prato, with The^ can be combined in a pluralistic framework of intellectual virtues)^ vanishes, many good societies. competing Likewise the problem of conflicting values is much reduced, 4 and indeed given sufficient tolerance of other arrangements largely vanishes. Ritter, Equality. 'The real p.137: /?* diversity that matlcs anarchist society is supposed to be accompanied by equality of staffs'. But this is not required. even is equality of power, but rather removal of social power. Nor This leads Ritter on to the alleged conflict of community, which is 'repressive', and individuality. But some conflict Ae. ^following is alright^ as Ritter admits later (pp.138-9), where he gives conflict: pairs? generating diversity/equality, r?J censure/^o^^^ individuality/community. Consistency requirements. required to demonstrate Ritter^ at^mp^yes these everywhere; e.g. the of public censure. , from partial models, argues of a state-less issue f ____ of.consistency of freedom with use But see also(p.l, p.9^ Ritter harmoniousness) *i ^3- / condition, p.138. (also consistency anarchists are to consistency, and permissibility of some limited communities and arrangements of anarchistic (primarily those given by Krop^t^ut)^ �1. Criticisms^ 'Individualism gone wild' destructive 'socially (Hyndman), This confuses pluralistic/socialistic anarchism with right- selfishness (Rp.140). And as R's model one has 'communal individuality'. leaning^ 2. Social oppressiveness gang' 'adolescent picture^ Thus But, e.g. on suffocating contrary group peer considerable very permit^ pressures; individualism and choice. Insufficient 'provision for privacy, for external self-expression and for 3. meeting claims in problems of distributive some anarchist justice' communities, While (Rp.140). things these 'Godwin's conversational e.g. may be anarchy', they are not problems in pluralistic arrangements. Ritter argues however that in the anarchistic society the needs for privacy vanishes - both as refuge from considerable intrusions and as a place of seclusion A for inner growth or restoration. But these things depend on much^improved other people. 3.2 Of course nothing excludes solitude. 4 The issue of older character of such behaviour by reasoned ties up with the the expression of emotions anarchism, argument. the settling ig&aanarchisms of reject disputes rationalistic and reliance the controlling on reason, because reason has too often been used for evil ends, etc., and because emotional attributes are considered to be more central MiilLLiinally-oriented anarchism, to Ritter draws on the In rejecting more person. the reason/formation * dichotomy. * t i ' vp-v {y But emotion does not exclude or block out reason indefinitely. emotion does not interfere with freedom: So too it is false that 'the extensive freedom /! of classical anarchy is simply unattainable without the limits on emotional self­ expression that non-rational anarchists reject' (Rp.143). �3.3 special failure The of bestow to on benefits from a one-track view, This again comes talents. society anarchistic those with from pure communistic anarchism alone. Ritter argues [or understanding', people will not receive is better It 'desire , efficient production incentives' (p.143). He argues to develop ... native talents', 'satisfaction 'polytechnical education' that people not of to argue 'just de^ejfft'^ re&SM^@d] A usual varied work', voluntary, etc. these without 'mutual ... some in terms of what they put in, still ' v'tewetf occurs though that (of English from in character!), this sort will choose different life-styles, in different communities. The 4. political 'unanimous 'repudiation of (Rp.144). direct democracy'. individuality between This theory' citizenship is and which active citizenship' to has argued Rosseau (see citizenship correlative to a state, do with 'is a anarchistic there that recurrent theme Rp.145): was a criticism of contradiction itself. dubious in But . . . , , so^not too surprising that it is damaged. Anarchism gives much greater scope for the do-nothing or do—it-when-you-feel-like- it life. No filling-in blw form; at this cn. times, voting^ those Ejeg^ixicLal days, etc. demoded, time, registrations at those , That is, it offers a range of freedoms the citizen does not get. Presumably also then the Kantian idea of man as a self-governing citizen also gets ditched. public But the alleged accompanying virtues - such as being self-directred, spirited, controlling die t ing - are not lost, but enhanced. For communities replace the state as the place where they are manifested. 5. 1 Argument making. roblem from the strange character of anarchist arises because it (p.148), provided Wational procedural permits bad freedom and decision- decision-making, rules are met. so R claims This is very curious. But �4 cjoc4 the problem of appeals to rationality-justified freely-chosen exploitation ^arise^ here. constraints - which from a consistency viewpoint limits freedom. R The constraints are internalisation, positional authority, censorial rebuke. Anarchist arrangements are better superior to feasible alternatives, than where we are. Since they are also that is enough for movement in that direction. No requirement of best need be met. 5. dm rd al Anarchism is a dangerous ideal, because it helps undermine the established 4 social order. But it is pernicious because that ideal is unattainable. ) 6. no place Objection to anarchist methods. in them. example' (p.152). According to R But aversion and fraud are said to have the main methods are 'fr#ecof argument and But this ^gnves out a range of i-ndi-catrrves and strategies. ��s THE^ARCUhEETS HJR THE STATE. There are a variety of arguments^*which will be ass^^bled at first a jumbled order. Other arguments are: in from organisational demands, from law and order, from provision of public goods generally, from maximization (ana prisoners' dilemma, etc.) (e.g.A A. surprising Argument for the State is given by economists Atkinson and Lectures Stieglit^, in Economics). Public required to regulate market(s) and ensure that theorems of The state is welfare even ground that it apply, Is that .case? .the market is invariably recommended ------- /) is self-regulating, and can dispense with government. Argument for^ state appalling^from ideal). that overcoming CrSiK angle^ angle deficiencies really of ^market For it means that the market is assumed (as All.argument shows ^is that market isn't means of regulation^ that should adopts^ In a way it is a reductio of ^market. It may be claimed that it is analytically that true any society involves a state. This is false. Social arrangements without state powers A)ct 5M! L' / J -- CT are perfectly possible. ^&onstruct small social moael^,, The argument that no society &ommon4ry-1 s anthropologists iI^ defence of the claim that 71c internal by some primitive society is anarchic - depends on an A-conversion. ^rgument^^j QJ (a) every society has exhibits (some) used stateless order , fJ"— (otherwise it would not be a society) (b) the basic proper^function of order, i .e. (c) the fA/e is to ensure internal state^(ought to% impl^) order. there is internal order.there must be some sort of state. ��7 ^77777^77- /71 <?/= ^7757777; - /<F^ / �3? ARGUMENTS AGAINST STATES AND THEIR POKERS Nation-state arrangements, which based on assumptions of are fairly recent phenomena, are a cert^jn amount of independence and isolation. The rise of technology, including communication, have put these assumptions in doubt, as has.war. 1 'The presumption of the nation-state system, that sovereignty implied an ability to protect a nation's territory and population, is precisely the presumption denied by the nuclear, capacities 313). This was already put in doubt by of both other superpowers' things: (PL, now also by Consider again also Argument A. 1) Kars are the rights of states only.3 'x may [wagej war upon y only if x is a sovereign state; has legal means (Barnes, p.776). declaration of by which it may 3. not of authority, requires 'just authority' to do so, thus: authority of a prince, at whose command the war is to does otherwise x and must settle the claim against y' Thus Aquinas explains the condition war for be that 'first the waged; for it belong to a private person to start a war since he can prosecute Naturally one has to worry about private armies and so forth, as well. But undoubtedly the overwhelming problem in the case of 4cyp*=. LN wars with the superstate. his rights in the court of a superior' (Aquinas, quoted in Barnes, In tact however an alternative factual premiss will serve as well: (a) only (super)states are capable of waging LN wars. p.776). �PATHS TO ANARCHISTIC END-STATE Pasture of stages ( o ) and transitions (o ** o) finish start Golden future age Present Past Intermediate states '? Pluralist anarchism Communist anarchism Kingdom of God Corporate capitalism State socialism Democratic socialism Totalitarianism A useful model for the process is that of punctuated equilibrium, drawn from recently reformulated evolutionary theory. Another useful model is Kuhn's picture of the growth of science, which is also one of punctuated equilibrium, the equilibrium dominates, There is states or stages being those where a scientific paradigm the transitions between stages being rapid and even revolutionary. presumably a general model of this type within the framework of systems theory, which brings models of this type together [verify *1]. The classical anarchist assumption is that no intermediate stages need be involved, we can transit directly (in a single revolutionary upheaval) into an anarchistic end-state - a pretty unplanned and unprepared for end-state. the fast increasing size of the world's With human population and complexity of modern organisation - both further locking things into statist frames - that assumption looks increasingly untenable. reasons for supposing necessary. There are also, and always were, that intermediate preparation and planning stages are For what have to be altered, in particular, are human attitudes, �2 expectations, etc. - malleable parts of human "nature" that can be altered by reeducation, reflection and immersion in alternative conditions. What has to be changed? Much. The modern encouragement of greed - in such forms as maximum consumption, maximum production, etc. of gross inequality. economic bottom up, The is reversal to be achieved in affluent and by redirecting military and industrial What still has some appeal is reorganising. The entrenchment the idea, spending into social suggested by Marx's work, of initial transition into a state governed from the bottom (certainly no longer workers) instead of from the top: this pending of states' structure could but the intended good effects of be rather quickly lost (like the Aid­ effects of shallowly^/cultural revolutions). A critical question is what produces the direction and so on are desirable. decidedly undesirable, e.g. nuclear war. But one state to some causes of^ transition are There are other ways as the models natural cataclysm, economic instability The anarchistic which - from For if we can find out perhaps we can hasten the process - assuming another? reveal, transition route is a branch on the 1 accumulation o^f anomalies. 2 tree of future political options, blown over and assuming a single starting point (that of Australia say) - schematically looks like this? ^E.g. the present loans and deficit situation, especially in third world countries. 2 Including undermining of state economies by al ternative economies (examples from places like Peru). �3 Anarchistic branches It is crucial to avoid many of the alternative futures possible from where we are, e.g. transitions to the increasing state-corporate control of life. The Kingdom of God can^ be comjhpared with the marxist findj state? The Kingdom of God is pacifist (state). Peace is fully realised, and justice i^foundation of it (yet there are tensions between them sometimes?) J/ �/ _---- .-------------- seek 3 newer world. 'Its % <7^t/ 1 ?V^^/ 4^7 1 state has destroyed so Much of coMMunity arrangeMents that road anarchism wiii have to Make use of the state. 11 Ls L ike 3 weed such as lantana, It has suppressed growth of the new forest, But simply sorting it out will expose the ground to forces fertile to the new forest aiso (moisture stress, erosion, etc.), bo the state Must be pruned awasy, substituted for, and Jttirpated bit by bit. &. There is now so Much governMent - the governMent effectively in Many so areas of IsoMMunal structures - that simply/ social life, Ibreaking down and displacing dispensing with governMent, an immediate to coMMunal arrangeMents, could not be accomplished without Massive dislocation. Short of a Massive disaster, disabling governmental s^^ructure, return instant anarchisM is not feasible. Since such a disaster is not improbable, instant anarchism should not however be excluded, but, -^pnte.s states, allowed and planned for. Otherwise, the like route more evolutionary is by replacement, ching us or substituting for the displaced coMMunity structures broken down state ac t iv i ty. Removal of government - not from where controls are required ac^trarl rep lacements^e.g. transitional penetration, big business,(are developed^ - from exploitative areas, e.g. gambling, drugs, prostitution, etc. 5et up instead nets to gatch people/victijhs of these things. �voluntarg arrangement freelg unLirtt/ted to, then contributions to state coffer^ should also be votuntarg, likewise involving free assent, not If ^the state compulsorg as theg are. But then free-rider problems, etc. No, onlg showing there wasn t consent, bg mang exodus from fragments. If there were onlg a few free-riders^ these people who didn't have a state constribution and would get state carried, such as police - as simple as RR You bug state protection, whatever, just Ibke state insurance. / . E Is ter Sour Gr apes p. 37_bqttow (a Iso surrounding section)) ....... ...... —' ------------- ------------------------ ueMucracg anc^- o the r po1i t ica1 :sustems advanted bu various authors for their side effects Z! o which obtainable better in other wags. Lare for anarchism here. Patemen good A ____ J* j �On Tr.3nsn.3t Lona Ls The sources of -3re power of one sort or another. SocLaL arrangements wLthout ^%?-W^-b^-h'A^^>wLLL be designed so far as possLbLe to LLmLt such power and prevent Lts accumutatLon. Prevent,^ gLobaL corp^arrangements/ LnternatLonaLLsm^ aLready over hLLL. Rnd good twenty years our of date. //GLobaL (^each p.368.. Rehun^ the prob Lem — passed by the gLobaL corporatLon ... ---------------------/) ms Ls excessLve power, and the seLf-Lmpatred LLmLtatLon on power cs not characterr Jsttc of human LnstLtutLons',^ rearranged?. Remedies. 1. at InformatLon and end to secrecy, as a way to socLaL responses.^ books as pubLLc documents etc., p.369. 2. TndLspensLbLe data for natLonaL program of natLonaL and Lnternat- LonaL reguLatLon, 370. Sc<%/<)<2 , Standsrd Last Lon of accountLng -r-------- and practLces. p.3*^/ Breakdown of pubLLc/prLvate dLstLnctLon and dLsappearance of free market? 'L--------- . GLobaL co rpo rat Lons buLLt on socLaL cap^taL consp ucuous L^* p.376 RLternatLon of t3X Laws to remove credLts and Tax bLas Ln favour of transnatLonaLs. counterrLdLng power / be^^re strateggt^ , pubLLc dLrectors , better uaadetermLnatLon , pre^Ldents runnLng for c?r companys at Least eLectLonjfor candLdates of reguLati)$y comm css conf GeneraLLyatter tax Laws, remove subsLdLes whLch 4ncouraaa the accumutatLon of . ,7 prLvate weaLth, and power, us Lng pubLLc/socLat and bLoLogLcaL capLtaL. ^7^ /j /y CCyTY ^g -y power. fAc State underpinning of multinationals. Multinationals would not have arisen to their present position of eminence without state assistance - and infrastructure, education, security, etc. N^d detailed evidence of this. Then can argue that problem of multinationals can be resolved, more or -3 p less automatically, with problem of state. �/^* /? -e^— �7 0 ,%?. rofit system^never satisfactory,^now extremely dama^gmg. Compare^ damag fetnoTie. , / i be profits - and look at the way these ^to worlds by destruction for profits are spent. Profit system compare with (ccyM?) sovereignty systems. �an anarchist.theory. LAW . jLaw is incompatible with anarchist utopianism. Anarchism can retain a framework of rules. are backed up, and enforced. where this involves violence. pre^$e, etc. consider, This is false. The key issue is how these rules What anarchism excludes is coercive backing Opposition usually involves sliding on coergion, So it looks as if there are several different theses to depending on how enforcement, rules, etc. are expanded. Kam argued that anarchism could not handle law on basis of A i. A level of detail of law. ii. amount of procedural detail. But there are no barrier at all. be refuted by a countermodel. Complexity is no bar. The claims can One such is the model Chom^siey appeals to, that of rules of language, which are complex and intricate enough, and nvj backed by force (Passmore wanted to suggest they were! But it is obvious that they need not be, whatever lapses occurred in the 16th century.) As a matter of history, several anarchist thinkers were not opposed to operation of law, but included it in their framework. Proudhon. Others? One example is �/^ <2 ��MY ENGAGEMENT WITH SOCIAL AND POLITICAL THEORY Over the past decadeI have found myself increasingly concerned with social and political problems and more and more immersed in the theoretical issues raised thereby. In large part this has arisen from environmental involvement, especially on forestry and nuclear matters, and the realisation that the basic problems mostly lay with social and political arrangements. It thus became important to try to determine what those really were, and how they might be changed, what the alternatives weie. But in part also my legitimate intellectual movement from logic and meta­ physics^ to a wider perspective which includes social and political philosophy as major area of concern has come about as a result of reflection on the unsatisfactory and fragmented state of philosophy and its surrounds. It became increasingly hard (in particular for someone trained in analytic philosophy with a heavy Oxbridge orientation) to avoid noting, especially when confronted with wider philosophical and social issues, that one's philosophical education and ifn 1972 I presented and circulated a paper, 'Is there a need for a new, and environmental ethic?' which played an influential part in the rapid growth of environmental philosophy in New Zealand and Australia (on the latter see D. Mannison and M. McRobbie in Environmental Philosophy). Such an excursion into ethics was not without precedent. My research work in fact began in ethical theory, with a thesis on moral scepticism, and I thought about and wrote on deontic problems in the sixties. ^The point is explained in detail in work cited in the accompanying curriculum vitae (where all otherwise unreferenced work is listed). In the case of forestry see for example 'Destructive forestry in Australia and Melanesia' and 'World rainforest destruction - the social factors'; as to nuclear see 'Nuclear power - some ethical and social dimensions' and 'The ethics of nuclear war, and political fall-out'; and for the general argument see 'Social theories, self management and environmental problems'. ^This does not mean that I have entirely abandoned these areas. Logic is, I believe (with Anderson, and so with the mainstream of Australia's most significant philosophical movement), the central part of philosophy, and many conceptual problems in applied philosophy will continue to require return to logical ground in order to find satsifactory solutions. A sound training in logical theory is essential for deeper solutions for some of these problems. I should add that I never have been a very pure logician. I moved into logic in order to try to solve severe conceptual problems first in the philosophy of science and then in metaphysics. Now that these problems are largely solved (to my satisfaction at any rate) I can presumably move on to other things. �2. practice offered only a somewhat limited set of tools and techniques for tackling wider philosophical concerns and, worse, but few instruction as to how to apply these analytic techniques more widely. Nor had the inadequacy of such an education and the sort of philosophy to which it led gone unremarked. It was charged that philosophy had abdicated several of its proper respons­ ibilities - for example, to organise knowledge into some more coherent whole or world-view, to elaborate a social theory and influence social criticism, even to afford intellectual leadership - and had become excessively analytic and specialised, and therewith narrow and sterile (concerned, e.g., merely with linguistic niceties, conservative commonsense and/or scholastic logic-chopping). It was charged that academic philosophy not only had become excessively timid and accordingly lost intellectual excitement and appeal, but also had lost relevance to and touch with the important intellectual issues of the times and had failed in the business of addressing a larger audience with philosophical interests. These charges, which have a solid foundation, did not come from within academic philosophy but were most evocatively made by people outside philosophy (though with some knowledge of it) or by those in the margins of academic, professional­ ised^ philosophy. Thus Durrant, an outsider, has powerfully expressed a part of the charges: ... philosophy itself, which had once summoned all sciences to its aid in making a coherent image of the world and an alluring picture of the good, found its task of inordination too stupendous for its usage, ran away from ... .'LtheJ battlefronts of truth, and hid itself in recondite and narrow lanes, timidly secure from the issues and responsibilities of life.* Philosophy began to change in the Seventies, some philosophers naturally changing with it. We aimed to address a wider range of socially relevant topics - and also sometimes a .wider audience - for example, to get beyond the ^W. Durrant, The Story of Philosophy, Second edition, Simon and Schuster, New York, 1926, p.v. Durrant though (or perhaps because) a leading populariser of philosophy in North America, is not usually at all well regarded by academic philosophers. �3. sterile examples of previous texts on moral philosophy to live issues, from minor cases of promising and truth-telling to abortion and euthanasia, genetic engineering and the treatment of animals, violence and nuclear war. But the analytical methods used for the most part did not change, the widening of horizons in applied philosophy proceeded from a narrow and inadequate logical (argumentive) and metaphysical base. stagnation: The applied expansion went with theoretical mainstream theoretical philosophy sat in the doldrums. Nor has the applied transformation gone far enough. Significant issues have been left to theologians and journalists.And there has been insufficient effort by philosophers (even those addressing relevant issues) to integrate their work with that of other (social) sciences that shed light on the issues, to overcome discipline fragmentation by synthesis. For it was not merely that philosophy itself was fragmented and often irrelevant, it had also become largley isolated from other disciplines and had ceased to be properly informed by them - or to inform them. This unsplendid isolation is particularly conspicuous in the case of political philosophy, which often proceeds in much the way it did in the 17th century, with little of the import it should be receiving from recent advances in social psychology and well-founded) sociobiology. ethology and (to the extent that it is More generally, the way in which areas have been isolated from one another, and ceased communicating, to the disadvantage to all, is a matter for serious concern. It is not merely that philosophy, for example, can be enriched by taking due account of the social sciences. The ^This description derives from Passmore. ^Philosophers and other academics should not be led in these areas, but do the leading. One of the roles of the academic community - a role in which philosophy in Australia (much, degenerated by too long an incestuous history) mostly fails - is to address a wider public than part of itself. Philosophers may justly complain that there is little competent public discussion of these issues where applied philosophy matters and no reputable intellectua ea er ship in Australia at present, but they have by and large done little to rectify the matter. �4. social sciences also can be improved, and much rubbish removed, by taking account of philosophical criticism.Each impacts on the others, in ways that should be taken into account. Moreover the interplay of different parts is fruitful.2 There is a richness to be generated if the interaction works well. And such interaction is required to pull much material into a more coherent whole. Such sentiments on integrating areas and rendering work more informed and holistic have been expressed before. another putting them into effect. It is one thing expressing them, and The tasks involved are difficult. And putting them into effect is not of course a task for just one person, but for several. A start can however be made with interdisciplinary people who willingly cross discipline boundaries, because they need to, and see the need to; by people who are able to adopt the often special methods and procedures of other disciplines and combine them with those of their own. But a start can not in general be satisfactorily initiated just by administrative fiat. A good deal of evidence has now accumulated to show that an administrator cannot simply pull together a successful interdisciplinary research group by hiring people skilled in the different disciplines concerned and putting them in a common setting. Such, groups can evolve however by individuals with wide-ranging concerns interesting other researchers or like-inclined people from other disciplines in overlapping or joint problems. And in setting up the conditions for such collaborative research to evolve, administrative inputs are important. It is, for example, an astute move to have a position linking several different departments 3 attached to none of them but to a section that sits so-to-speak above them; for in this way the researcher has access to all the departments concerned but is confined to none. *New philosophies of nature call for much more than this, indeed for major theor­ etical reorientation of some social sciences. The point is elaborated in the concluding part of 'Human chauvinism and environmental ethics'. 2Nor will unified or coherent social sciences be arrived at without substantial philosophical imports. 3 As the present post does. influenced the move. No doubt other political considerations have also �5. I think I can justifiably account myself an interdisciplinary person. Firstly, I have considerable experience in collaborative work, an advantage that philosophers, in contrast to experimental scientists, seldom enjoy. claim is supported by my publication record. The While that indicates the extent of my joint activity in research, it does not fully record cooperative activity in organising conferences and workshops, both in logic and in environmental philosophy, in helping found or reestablish organisations (the Australasian Association of Logic is the main example, but the local AAP is another), in establishing publications (e.g. the Environmental Philosophy Discussion Papers serve both Philosophy Departments) and so on. More significantly, I can also fairly claim substantial experience in interdisciplinary work, as well as in other fields of philosophy. For example, I have worked not only in philosophy departments but in mathematics and in environmental studies programs.i Furthermore, my work in forestry, which is continuing, brought me into close touch with people from a broad spectrum of fields, not only forestry, but also economics, geography, demography, botany and zoology. The work, which is well-known locally and referred to in inter­ national textbooks, has for the most part been well received by people in those area, except forestry, and has been taken seriously .by those who disagree with the often controversial positions developed. My more recent work on environmental problems has led me to communicate and interchange material with sociologists and political Scientists in North American and England, and also with people in a variety of fields in Australian Colleges of Advanced Education. Naturally then, much of the resulting work reaches people in a range of fields. My work on environmental problems has also resulted in invitations to participate in conferences in a wide range of areas, on forestry (in several Australian ^1 declined invitations to work in interdisciplinary research groups in Washington and The Hague primarily because they would have kept me away from Australia too long and obliged me to endure northern winters. �6. states), on energy, on the environment (in New Guinea and USA). I have twice been invited to present papers at Australian Sociology conferences, but been unable to do so because of commitments abroad. The basic forestry book The Fight for the Forests, and subsequent forestry and environmental papers, already included much that bears upon and is informed by social and political theory. A new book, tentatively entitled Forestry in Australia, now in preparation by a team of people drawn from a wide range of disciplines - which is intended to replace The Fight for the Forests, long out of print - will be even more closely involved with social and political theory. It includes much fuller analysis of social classes and power structures (and models of these) as well as, like earlier work, examination of elites, and types of inequality. This should also begin to reveal how my work on apparently diverse areas is interrelated, and not a result of compartmentalisation. Most obviously, my work on forestry, which directly involves a range of environmental problems, in a very practical way, leads directly into areas of social and political theory. It is less obvious, but nonetheless a fact, that work on environmental problems, value theory and logic, is not disconnected, but joined by several connecting ways. For example, relevant deontic logic has shown how the key moral matter of moral dilemmas and conflicts of value can be treated. The logic of obligation is important in rejecting arguments that there is a significant separate "morality" for nation states or for public representatives of these which exonerates them from normal responsibility. Differently, logic provides the basis of decision theory, which is important in structuring environmental problems. And so on, to look at some of the more straightforward connections. There are larger connections. Social and political theory necessarily presupposes ^Explanations of these connections are much expanded in "The logical basis of the social sciences'. �7. a metaphysics, and this in turn a logical theory X Philosophers of very different persuasions, for instance Hegel and Mill, have agreed about this. Of course work in logic, such as that in probability theory and on statistical inference, sometimes speaks directly to other areas in the social sciences. My own work on universal semantics is of interest to linguists, and 'Universal semantics?' was abstracted in Sociological Abstracts, as have been several of my philosophical papers, on for example metaphysics, limits to Work on the recent history of logic and knowledge and animal intentionality. of philosophy of science in Australasia has led me into some sociological as well as historical investigations. political science and economics. Logical pursuits have also lead me into Because of my interest in applied logic I came to take over supervision of B. Embury's doctoral dissertation on voting theory, a thesis in the Department of Political Science. in work with a post-doctoral social choice theory. My interests also involved me fellow on preference and decision theory and Regretably no joint work issued from this enterprise, but I did publish some papers in the area, and emerged with further ideas for research jotted down: these ideas, mainly for further impossibility and limitative results in social theory, have yet to be followed through. My present research in social and political theory has (like a conic section) double foci. One focus (Fl) is a book tentatively entitled The Philosophic Reach of Environmental Problems and intended to supersede Environmental Philosophy in main respects, on the ethical, social and political dimensions of environmental problems.2 familiar list: The central problems yield a now rather for instance, those of human and animal populations, disappearing species, vanishing rainforests and other habitats and ecosystems, treatment (and rights) of indigenous peoples, of animals and of plants, cities and substantial start in explaining these deeper connections is made in 'Social theories, self management and environment problems' and in Exploring Meinong's Jungle and Beyond, chapter 9, ^12. ^Here environmental is used in the wide sense, of which the ecological is only a quite proper part. �8. neighbourhoods, landscape transformation or destruction, mining, pollution, nuclear and energy issues, and so on. The underlying problems have significant features in common and common social and political sources. Before the integrative task is tackled in detail however, an analytical approximative approach is being followed. Discussion papers on several of the topics listed are being researched or written, and discussion papers on others will follow, before the whole thing is pulled together. The other focus (F2) is a book on what might be called New Age Social Organisation, investigating alternatives to prevailing social, economical and political arrangements. Major alternatives considered in detail include left­ leaning and right-leaning anarchisms, which will involve a careful examination of the extent to which social arrangements and political organisations can be self-managed and self-regulating. While it is ambitiously hoped that the investigation will not only result (ideally) in a more philosophically-adequate left-leaning anarchist theory than has so far been produced, that is only part of its purpose. Another very important part of the enterprise is to give some better understanding of the range of alternatives to present (monopolistic capitalist and state socialist) arrangements that there are and that could be tried. A further part is, by considering alternatives, to shed light on the prevailing systems (their structures, institutions, etc.), in particular to bring out more clearly their underlying assumptions,the extent of their necessity, to give a better idea ^In several respects the term 'anarchism' is unsatisfactory and will have event­ ually to be replaced, perhaps by a neologism, since no available term delineates the types of socio-political arrangements envisaged. It should perhaps be remarked, in case it is thought that I have no academic background in political theory, that my university education did include courses and seminars in the area. Furthermore I have more recently acquired a good working knowledge of the anarchist literature, and am well advanced in the process of obtaining a grasp of organisation theory and the necessary parts of social psychology. Some of these assumptions are rejected or varied in an assessment of alternatives. Thus, as a much better idea of euclidean geometry was obtained with the elaboration of hyperbolic and Riemannian geometry, and similarly of arithmetic with the formulation of nonstandard arithmetics, so also a much better appreciation of mainstream social theory should be achieved by investigating nonstandard social theories and assumptions. This method of variation of assumptions is a fruitful one as regards many scientific,theories. �of the values they write in, of their desirability or undesirability, and so on. Although my enagement has two main foci, naturally there are also other and smaller endeavours under way: of these - but only some. the attached curriculum vitae gives some indication For example, the trilogy of papers on the meaning of life, nihilism, and the ultimate existence question is to be arranged into a book which will probably also address such related issues as the quality of life. Richard Routlev �zi___ A_ ��^L</^—*^/y /J &4n^-*- "" J^TL^ r/7v—, 7/ /<?\A<?/ Ay 3 ��ANAKYRIE. In Chapter 1 The multiple and inconsistent axioms of political theory : pluralism, morality, ... The differences in theory begin at the beginning, in what political arrangements are for, what they are about, whom they are for, how they apply. There are important differences in the extent to which peoples' and other creatures' activities and lives can be controlled and regulated. More authoritarian or paternalistic political arrangements impose much more in the way of regulations than more liberal arrangements which in theJlimit reduce regulation or setting for pursuit of satisfactory lives. to some minimum, to some So far as political relations are concerned, the world (Terr& is a closed system. Political influence is not exercised from outside that system, nor f!'o political influences of significance so far flow from Terra elsewhere. (All that may of course change, in which case the problem is reset in terms of some larger system, the Universe providing an upper limit - unless some extraspb tial gods are invoked.) With the advance of industrialisation, communications and spill-over technology, few communities smaller than the world system are any longer effectively closed. The general political problem is unsolvable. The argument for this theme is that the problem is only solvable for small relatively uniform But we no longer have such, given modern interference com-unities (Taylor). effects. The basic picture is of a network of goal-directed Defining the^problem: creatures and systems. The aim (political goal) is to ensure that these creatures are able to pursue goals so far as these are satisfactory. A major value judgment is inserted here : what of wiping out lives, of war, etc., those that interfere seriously with others? A liberal setting such as Redman sketched is operating in the background here. Present political arrangements anachronistic : they were introduced at a time when much less interference was technically possible. longer appropriate. The They are no of empires now affects everyone s lives, so on democratic grounds all should have say (or vote). But they don t : democracy stops at national borders (even in those borders where it kmd-of operates). �2 Present political arrangements, by increasing population, etc. for what sort of consumption high can be obtained by present people are making things much worse. For the benefit of present power-holders, their maintenance of power and privilege, short-term drr the inadequacies of %^ts - of present economics within political frameworks. On the End State: According to Kamenka a central deficiency of a M^up-ist account is its pre­ industrial character, also its romantic character, and its view of creative labour. These are a result in part of looking for utopia in the past, the sources of which according to Kumenka are: (i) a mistaken view of the happy (noble) savage; (ii) the abundance of industry; (iii) the rationality of industry (presumably its increasingly automatic and self-regularity character?). This is confused. Sources (ii) and (iii) are the basis of the past industrial character of the end state (where the machines are really whirring along). The main source of the search in the past is quite different, namely the search for historical models, however partial, of the good or better life. The reason is that (iv) there is something drastically wrong with present arrangements which not rectified by minor adjustments. The end state, so far as it is described, is certainly a curious mixture of A' pre- and past-industrial elements. The end state is not a static state, but a stable, climax state. analogy is again useful here. The ecological Capitalism is like a pioneering stage. Stable states may have been achieved in the past, to be disturbed in one way or another. That is one reason why it is important to look in the past - for fc^r^r of past stable states. Political theory (note A *) As a result of the way 'political system' is commonly defined, anarchy is not a political system. The reason is that 'most authors consider the modern political system to be that system which controls the use of power or force in society' (Kaplan, p.22). therewith that system. Anarchy aims to remove use of power and force, and The exclusion could of course be taken to be a (further) inadequacy in the definition, a mere technicality almost, got around by expanding 'controls' disjunctively to 'controls or removes'. �3 For whether or not anarchy is a political system, it is certainly an organisational system or structure. POLITICAL THEORY AND MORALITY 1. On the one hand, it is claimed that 'any acceptable form of social order...must rest on moral foundations, which are in principle ascertainable at any period, and permanently valid'.'*' (Donegan, p.xiv) On the other, and more common view, politics simply tramples over morality when it suits it. However that is a matter of one morality, e.g. of a Christian established form, being overwhelmed by another Mafia-style morality not the absence of a value position. theory. 2. Any political theory rests on a value That is the point. There is the problem of evil, powerful people, often unintentionally evil people such as Reagan, Thatcher, ... Hitler flourished most of his life; he led an active (etc.) life ... 3. Anarchism does not require especially good people. But political life would run much more easily without a certain range of people. (Of course, states think this, and totalitarian states try to realise theit aim). 4. On Political Obligation obligation. There is no good ground as basis of political All arguments designed to establish obligation to a state - of people living in it ('its territory') especially - are wanting. (Argument for this there). Scepticism about political obligation does not imply scepticism about obligation. So moral scepticism is not implied. And on the contrary, most requirements are of the first importance in outlining alternatives to the state. Hobbes problem was that of political obligation - 'reasonswhy we ought to change the state' (R p.61). Hobbes finds three causes of disorder (competition - reflecting self interest drives; distrust; argued for on ground that enjoyment of power ('glory') [Self-interest is motive is self-preservation.] To these he opposes inter - from desire for security. 1. This involves a very dubious objectivity. �4 On Marx-Engels way Although Marx and Engels say comparatively little about their projected end state, they say a great deal about the route through the new state - to that end, and about the means to be used along that route. By contrast with means, they are far too restrictive about routes, ruling out many plausible roads to change (including peasant revolutions, etc.) Engels' proposed route is through 'a new social order' where production and industry run on behalf of society, according to a social plan. The main features are addition of private property (vol.l, p.88) and of private means of communication (p.92). Note that it is unclear whether this social order is an immediate or end state, but those features are common to both. There is massive industrial and agricultural production (though not over­ production) by (rationalised) planned economy without ( ) private property (I,p.92). Hence, division into antagonistic clauses becomes superfluous. There are new all-round people (p.93), a disappearance of division of labour, for flexible labour. There is association instead of competition. Fusion of town and country (p.94). According to Marx-Engels (I,p.l83) the route is through the central state. 'The workers must not only strive [against democrats] for a single and indivisible...republic, but also within this republic for the most determined centralisation of power in the hands of the state authority. They must not allow themselves to be misguided by the democratic talk of freedom for the communities, of self-government, etc.' No communal property 'Concentrate productive to remain : etc... in means of of state'. This account is extremely top-down. As to means, it looks as if Marx and Engels are prepared to adopt any means, likely or not. For Marx, the main means are by violent revolution (last page Poverty of Philosophy). of classes. Revolution is the outcome of the contradiction By contrast, Engels prefers peaceful means (in 1847 i.e. vol 1, p.89); but he won't at all rule out revolution. But together Marx and Engels emphasise violent means, and encourage excuses on occasions ( p.180). �5 Under the pretext that the petty bourgeous democrats will betray the workers, the subversion (destabilization) of their government is planned (Vol 1. address of CC to League, pp.180-1) Unlike Bak Marx and Engels.advocate fostering massacres etc. stuff mean?), and a regime of terror. (for what else can this Bak thinks that in a revolutionary situation such things may occur but should be immunized (I can easily check the reference in Bak if necessary (p.180). For the most part, Engels was much more inclined to peaceful and established means to change, even to change by way of ballot box and universal suffrage; the Democratic route to state transformation (1, p.195, also 1, p.202). Note Engels' introduction to Class Struggles in France written in 1895 (p.195), e. i. later than the more bellicose texts Lenin is relying on - and as the fruit of a riper experience of politics. He says that by party action universal suffrage 'transforme de mayer de dupere qu'il a ete jusqui' en instrument d'emarcqation'and this as footnote shows is a quote from Marx. This suggests that it can be used to gain control of and subsequently transform state app In 1895 (pp.199-200) Engels suggests a revision of . Now show means, propaganda etc., to win over the mass of people [different from technological determination!] No doubt because of technological determination, there is no need to be too specific about means; for it is not as if activity is shaping the course of things, only speeding up the (in ) process. Reasons for the lack of detailed description of the end state in Marx-Engels: 1. This would be to try to set the future, which is reactionary (Why? Because of historical determination?), and unnecessary, because future people will be wiser than us. 2. Standard explanation, suggested by Marx: 'scientific socialism cannot describe in any detail the society that will replace capitalism. Utopians speculate about the socialist future : Marxists analyse the capitalist present' (Moore, p.76). Moore argues the standard explanation is implausible. �6 Principles of Individualism [ ?] 1. Government based on individually-given consent of citizens - 'its authority or legitimacy deriving from that consent' (Lubes, p.ll) Consent-answering back requirement 2. Political representation as representing individual interests, not classes, estates, etc. 3. That's all. interests. Government confined to enabling satisfaction of individual Hence towards laissez-faire, against paternalism, influencing or interpreting individual wants. (79). � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Draft Papers Description An account of the resource Sylvan's literary executor encountered an archive in which “all his projects were current", since manuscripts were undated and unattributed. Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document R TREATISE ON POLITICAL THEORY OTHER HQJOR TOPICS (UNOROERED):- 1. PturatisM and pturatisMS: the otd (and Marxist) fallacy of one form. 2. Power, hierarchies, Constitutions, corporations, states and transnationats Authoritarian rotations; organisations. 3. Undertying Metaphysics. (not independent things). Stytes of denocracy, and inproving denocracy. 6. A Major source of power: property. Land rights. INTRODUCTION Present poLet Leet arrangements are hardig satisfactorg, angMhere. Theg not de Livering adequate shoutd at Least assist Ln environment, Meifare, of mang of* the things that such arrangements Levels^ productLon the are or education^ LiveLihood, of, attainment ... e.g. securLtg, . Thus if better Mags to do these things can be found, theg shouLd be sought, and tried. Perhaps surprisingLg, there has been remarkabLg Lit tie effort expended upon surveuing the range of poLLticaL atternatives (as compared, e.g., Mith the effort put into defending the status quo), or to Mork out, so far as can or need be done, areas, detaiLs Mhere of the more promising options. entrenched positions Indeed, as Mith so mang other dominate^ there been has cons iderabLe discouraoement of such important investigation. R s ign if ican t r ange of a L te ma t i ves, sea roe Lg g i ven a triaL in modern historg, are these arrangements Mhich reduce domination and the exercise of poMer and increase freedom. The present studg concentrates on these sorts arrangements, not in totaLitarian of or fascist or imperiaiist structures Mhich have more than sufficient exempiification in recent times, despite their Lack of justification and base in raM poMer and brute force. 10. POLITICS WITHOUT DONINRTION: Rnakgr ie means varietg of RNRKYRIE RND RNRRCHISM Mi thout domination. domination. For domination That incLudes comes in the Mhoie range mang forms: of citizens bg states, civiLians bg miLitarg, poor bg rich, bLacks bg Mhites, thirdMoriders -1- and bg HMerLeans ) Russ Lans. MOMen bu nan. young by otder, anLMaLs by huMans, nature '. \ . RnaRyrLsM consLsts Ln socLaL arrangeMents desLgned to avoLd aLL e<.c*i v.*? , ^etA/'o , py<-. 'fiohcoAc^ forMs of doMLnatLon-^ [There Ls nothLng Ln the account so far g^v^n whLch bu Men? such orr ... <3/* LMpLLes that Lt Must taRe a gLven shape, that Lt Ls unLquety deterMLned.] RnarchLsM dLrectLy Ls MLth concerned onLy one part of Mhat anahyrLe Ls about: doMLnatLon by peopte by states (Mhether theLr OMn or that of others), and rewovaL of thLs doMLnatLon by aboLLtLon of the state. But there are forMs other not essenttaLLy bound up MLth thLs forM, and aboLLtcon of doMLnatLon of Many the state Ls but oney rather drasttcyMay of reMovtng state doMLnatLon. RnarchLsM has been extended, for Lnstance to eco-anarchLsM (as feMLnLsM has been broadened to eco-feMLnLsM), Ln an effort to overcoMe a conspLcuous part of c/ n/ttj 19th C anarchLsM tended to accept the saMe doMLnatLon of the probteM, that nature by Lndeed and huMans, the saMe sort of scLentLfLo reductLonLstLc MaterLaL',SM, as Lts doMLnant rLvats, capLtaLLsM and (MarxLst) socLaLLsM. But the broadenLng caLLs for atso further expLanatLon, to LncLude other types of doMLnatLony^id strLctLy,such a recr^antatLon as to LnvoLve a change Ln MeanLng, A Ln Mhat Mas Meant by anarchLsM . In these cLrcuMstances, Lt Ls More forMard and Less MLsLeadLng sLMpLy to Lntroduce neM terMLnoLogy. Rtw straLghtthere are , good reasons for seeRLng neM terMLnoLogy. In More than a century of use anarchy and Lts derLvatLves have becoMe thoroughLy oenve-p-tied- MLth undesLrabte and LnapproprLate assoc LatLons, to such an extent that soMe of these, such as chaos and dLsorder, are no&'saLd to gLve part / of the MeanLng of anarchy'. 3. r / 7. Z7^ /^y- /' ^^^7T/Fv^) 4^7^7 - -—-V /FLy X' y y -^=y 1 ^/rc-^A^-g' ' t7 LA^ct^ <\_^ Ar^ / -tAjL ^tL_\ _ ^-e>^ /%y 4Z—f Z^4-^c—1<^^7- <K^- ' , /<7 ,/' 1 ^XTg^bTyZr* -(Zc6tA.________ __________ ^BLUy^Aya&LA^^ -------- ________________________________________________________________________________________________________ c^Lct^A^!L4/7A^^^ cAy*t^i^c^u^uLil_ Z ' 1^9-^^\Acc\_. c\ rr^, ^-y " ^7 A ^3^ LA.A.itfA.'t t?L-'Se. ^Z (loA CAAA.. t4^Zt^- ^STc^r- . A <c t/coZwA g AA-^ tA'LCi^^A (^C 6t/Z^cAy (/^cA tAAAAAAA^LA^^ ( Q#-A- C>Lu^t4^ /A cA^_ y4 AZ^^ / <^r-V ^// ^cyc ^,V . v Aa^A —"------------<-A G^<Ar, //-^; tA L^Jb^y^GA^ZjA^c^ ^pA-4_/ tA lA^CCCCJ!— Qt&^> A. _____ u?^jtjt^- (A-S^ L^<%^ tAj^r 'iC^ZA sA^PAAL ^-A^. (JS- tUlL ^eACL& C^A jAMAAtAA- CC^s L&^ULC^ tX-AA*^ Ct <^A> (Av^ zA ^^AjL CA/^2^ tA, t<A, c/ ^X/>AL, (AA/^^xA^- CA^JAA^ BOCK NUMBER A Aw/ AUTHOR (BLOCK LETTERS) ------------------------------------------------------- DATE DUE <V HILE NAME & cheer? I?U(/ tLE;^ / KQ-Cc DEPT. (BLOCK LETTERS) PHONE NUMBER IF YOU WISH DETAILS OF THIS LOAN TO REMAIN CONFIDENTIAL. PLEASE INITIAL SPACE BELOW CP-228-81 GTO DATE TVB./gTT SIGNATURE Cl 1 -y-"^5- J / . lx? /' 138 139 genuine solution' since it combines both autonomy and authority; the difficulty i* 3 that it is empirically unrealistic? I shall return to WolfFs reasons for hesitating to 3 accept his own philosophical anarchist conclusions in a moment. Godwin, in his F/M/mry Concerning Po/Mcu/ Justice, was not so timid. Godwin's theory is extremely interesting for any discussion of political obligation because, like Hobbes' theory, it 3 shows the full implications of one form of adherence to radical, abstract individualism. B Godwin's theory is a mirror image of Hobbes'. He ends where Hobbes begins^ with a collection of individuals who each view the world through their own, subjective viewpoint. For Hobbes, the absolute freedom of individual private judgement leads to complete insecurity and arbitrariness; for Godwin, the unspeakably beautiful' practice of absolutely free exercise of individual private judgement is the only way to peace (p. 208).*" Hobbes creates an artificial social union held together by the Sword and reduces obligation' to enforced submission and obedience. Godwin relies on reified Reason that speaks identically to individual and he completely eliminates obligation' along with all other social relationships. Social institutions and social relationships, Godwin argues, merely stand in the way of individual judgement by preventing individuals seeing things as they really are." Unhindered by governments, and other social institutions such as promising, each individual will be able to decide for herself what ought to be done and individuals' judgements will coincide. Reason will speak to all in a single voice because, in the absence of social institutions, reality will stand revealed in all its transparency. Godwin's objections to the practice of promising are similar to his objections to political institutions. Promising is absolutely considered, an evil' (p. 218). It may occasionally be necessary to make a promise in order not to mislead other people about one's intentions, but a defence of necessity in specific cases does not detract from the essential evil of the practice itself. The evils of promising are twofold: first, promising binds future conduct and thus rules out further individual judgement as information and circumstances change. Secondly, promising encourages individuals to act from 'a precarious and temporary motive' (p. 219). It distracts attention front the consequences of particular actions, and hence obscures their intrinsic merits. If the individual judges that an action ought to be performed (and Godwin saw this judgement as a utilitarian calculation) then a promise adds nothing; it merely clouds the moral worth, or otherwise, of the judgement itself. Political institutions function in the same way to prevent individuals seeing things as they really are. For example; they give an appearance of permanence to opinions that prevail at their inception and thus cause the stagnation of judgement. Laws, like obligations, bind future conduct and, being general in form, can take no account of the fact that each case is unique and should be judged, according to Reason, on its own merits. Moreover, political assemblies impose a factitious unanimity' on their members. Decisions have to bn reached in which all the members must acquiesce, thus pretending that they am something more than a collection of individuals, each with their own opinions; Deliberation has to be cut short ly a vote and everyone, if their efforts are not to be for nothing, has to see themselves as obliged' to carry out the decision: 'Nothing can '3 ? 3: ? 3; ' y more directly contribute to the depravation of the human understanding and character' (p. 547). Properly, according to Godwin, there are no obligations, only actions that ought to be performed, or refrained from; nor is there any political authority, only a coincidence of individual judgements that certain things ought to be done. Godwin's individuals, unlike those who enter a social contract, are bound to nothing'. If an individual joins in a 'common deliberation', he is, 'when the deliberation is over,... as much disengaged as ever' (p. 234). This is not to say that he will never act with his fellows; they may independently have arrived at the same judgement as to the right course of action. Godwin also allows that individuals may sometimes defer to the judgements of an authority on a particular matter; this he calls authority' that depends upon the conhdence of him with whom it prevails' (p. 242). This deference should, however, be rarely given, or it may tip over into a misplaced 'conhdence' in alleged superiors who make judgements for others, and so inculcate those slavish feelings that shrink up the soul' (p. 232). This form of obedience is a greater source of degradation and depravity' than if the individual bows to political authority out of fear of the sanctions for disobedience. Here Godwin anticipates Wolffs denial' of the authority of the state. Wolff recognizes that there are many reasons for compliance, but these are irrelevant providing that the claims of the state are subjectively denied a binding moral force'." Similarly, Godwin argued almost two hundred years ago that the individual who obeys solely to avoid punishment, may reserve, in its most essential sense, his independence. He may be informed in judgement,... and suffer his understanding neither to be seduced nor confounded' (p. 141). Godwin was confident that the philosophical anarchist denial' of authority and obligation could be put into practice. Through discussion and education, and the example of sincerity and frankness, individuals will become enlightened and develop an appreciation of the evils of social institutions and social cooperation. Godwin ruled out a sudden revolutionary change as this would not be based on the necessary development of individual understanding. As a transitional measure he advocated a system of 'juries', within small political communities or parishes', the juries dating with individual offenders and disputes over property. He expected that disputes between parishes would be rare and that the obvious principles of convenience' would soon suggest a settlement (p. 546). A national assembly' might occasionally be necessary to adjudicate in such matters, but it would not be a permanent body. At first, all these institutions would exercise political 'authority' but, in time, Godwin expected that they would merely issue invitations' to ^individuals to cooperate in executing their verdicts, and, eventually, ail political institutions and cooperation would wither away. Abstract individualism rests on heroic assumptions. In Godwin 's case he assumes that individual moral judgement can be exercised in complete absence of intersubjective theoretical categories and communal relationships. The argument of the &!<7uiry implies that that which can be thought can be put into practice. Because it is Possible to imagine an individual abstracted from social life, yet endowed with Reason and a capacity for moral judgement, Godwin also assumes that, given a 140 sufficient period of education and social and political change, those individuals could actually exist, with their social past 'stored', as it were, within the consciousness of each one. They would exist largely in isolation and yet, on occasions, emerge, inspect reality and make an individual judgement that would coincide with judgements and Reason of others. Godwin's theory has some extremely charming aspects, but they cannot hide the philosophically and sociologically bizarre consequences of radical individualism taken to one of its extremes. Everything, except their own judgements, and actions that flow immediately and unhindered from them, is foreign to one of Godwin's individuals. Even the individual's own physical needs or freely created relationships appear as impediments. A solitary individual, Godwin writes, is prevented from executing his judgements 'in compliance with his necessities, or his frailties' (p. 758). The evils of social cooperation are much worse, but technological progress will enable individuals to do many things for themselves in the future that now require the help of others. Godwin expects that concerts and plays will cease to be performed; what enlightened individual would want to mouth the words or play the compositions of another ? Eventually, the individual will come to see society as 'not a necessary of life, but a luxury, innocent and enviable, in which he joyfully indulges' (p. 761). At this point, however, there is no 'society' for them to indulge in. Godwin relies on a reified Reason to link his individuals together but this cannot take the place of the social relationships he has wished away. Once again, the impossibility of distinguishing between institutions in various dimensions of social life from within an abstractly individualist perspective is demonstrated. Godwin treats promising as just as much a constraint and impediment, and just as mystifying, as the laws of the state. It is worth emphasizing that Godwin ends by depriving his individuals of the means of transcending their own subjectivity. They have no social means of acting on their judgements and thus must remain totally immersed in their own assessments of what 'ought' to be done. The creative moral and social capacities of individuals are meaningless treated in the abstract; they presuppose, and, in practice, can only be exercised and developed as a part of social relationships including relationships of obligation. A tacit realization of the peculiar conclusion of philosophical anarchism seems to underlie Wolfs equivocations about the 'just state'. In the last part of /n Defence of ,4norchism, Wolff offers some 'deeper philosophical reasons' why he is unwilling to accept the 'negative results' of his argument; the social world, unlike the natural world, is not 'irreducibly other'. Wolff is thus implicitly arguing against Godwin when he says that the state is 'no more than the totality of the beliefs, expectations, habits, and interacting roles of its members and subjects.... The state,... cannot be ineradicably other'." In other words, instead of arguing that all authority is illegitimate, Wolff is now moving to the opposite theoretical extreme and putting forward a version of the conceptual argument; the state is no more than the association of its members and so necessary to them, so there is no problem about its authority. Wolff also suggests that there might be a practical solution to the problem of authority; political institutions must be decentralized and based on 'voluntary compliance' (although he may be arguing that a system based on 'voluntary 141 compliance' does not involve authority at all). Curiously, Wolff does not appear to see anything odd in an 'anarchism' that proclaims the necessity of the state. The -central argument of anarchism is precisely that the state, including the liberal democratic state, is inherently 'other', and so its claim to authority can never be justified. Anarchists, philosophical or otherwise, it will be objected at this point, make a much larger claim than this. Like Wolff, they argue that all political authority, not just that of the state, is illegitimate. It is true that anarchist writings are full of statements to this effect. Kropotkin, for example, writes that 'anarchism... works to destroy authority in all its aspects'." Such statements are usually taken at face value. Flathman, for instance, criticizing Pitkin's comments on 'authority', argues that the state of nature in Hobbes' and Locke's theories provides an example of individuals living together without authority, and he asks what else have anarchists been putting forward as an ideal?'." But, as I have shown, any social relationships existing in Hobbes' radically individualist natural condition are likely to be based on force and power, not authority, and Locke's state of nature, with its father-rulers and capitalist economy, would certainly not And favour with anarchists. Nor is it self-evident that the anarchist ideal does involve an absence of authority; not, that is, if anarchism is seen as a political theory and not merely as a variety of philosophical scepticism. The political theory of anarchism is not a theory of the chaos with which 'anarchy' is popularly equated, but a theory of a specihc form of socio-political organization that is, as it must be, ordered and rule-governed. Anarchists have usually been political activists and popular pamphleteers and not concerned with precise conceptual distinctions. They have tended to treat authority' as a synonym for 'authoritarian', and so have identified authority' with hierarchical power structures, especially those of the state. Nevertheless, their practical proposals and some of their theoretical discussions present a different picture. Kropotkin calls anarchism the 'no-govemment system of socialism'," but on one occasion he also distinguishes 'government' and the 'state'. He writes that 'it seems to me that in State and government we have two concepts of a different order'." Unfortunately, Kropotkin does not pursue this distinction, but it suggests that one anarchist, at least, did not totally reject political authority. This conclusion is also suggested by the social and political changes advocated by Kropotkin. He argued that abolition of the political institutions of the state would allow 'mutual aid' to become the ordering principle of socio-political life. His discussion of this principle presents similar dif&culties to the recent philosophically sophisticated discussions of cooperation, reciprocity and obligation. In part, Kropotkin 's claim can be seen as a version of the conceptual argument: 'the practice of mutual aid... [has] created the very conditions of society ...'.** He also used mutual aid to refer to actual historical examples of cooperative institutions based on the voluntary agreement of the members, and it is the principle of free agreement that will govern an anarchist socio-political order. However, as I have argued, in political life self-assumed obligation and authority presuppose such 'free agreement'. Kropotkin's sketch of the internal organization of the communes that will replace the state is significant here. Kropotkin envisages ct^— C ^u^n. ^41 7 ? <*W THE SERRCH FOR RNRRCHISil - RND FOR RN RPPROPRIRTE NE!*f TITLE FOR IT. IB. term The anarchism has acquired such an encrustation of unfortunate and undesirabLe associations that it is time for a ciear neM term to rep Lace Lt. But that is not so easg, one reason being that it is not at aLL easg to sag Mhat the [neM] position the term is to ref Leet is Like, even in rough outLine, or hoM that position (that nonstate state) might come about. [RepLace B approach Mith R approach.] It easier is to be negative than positive, to sag (as LtseLf anarchism does) Mhat anarchism, or the repLacement $-ism (sag) is not, rather than Mhat it is. LJhat the position is not is, firstig^a state of chaos. R state not one of disorder; on contrarg^ ^-istic the arrangements definiteLg be sociai and poLiticaL arrangements - MiLL be coroLLarg - since (thermodgnamicaLLg) energg for its production extremeLg untikeLg and - $-g is there MiLL organLsed. R organised sgstem or state requires an maintenance highLg of - is that a t^-istic sgstem is to arise spontaneousig. Directed urganisationaL energg must be put into the attainment of a ^-istic endstate. Sought d)-istic sgstems MiLL ' ) simpig not emerge spontaneousLg, even Mhen energg LeveLs have been raised and states excited, as in vigorous demonstrations or in revoLutionarg activities. Furthermore, t^-ism does not inciude^ ang more than anarchism need invoLve vioLet=tee: Nur need a ^-istic sgstem emerge in a vioient Mag. Even if it arises in a revoiutionarg Mag, there is no need for the route to incLude substantiaL, or even perhaps ang vioience. The notion of a nonvioient contradictorg revoLution is not a one. Nor are rapid nonvioLentig induced changes begond the bounds of reaL posstbeietg Ln severaL parts of the Morid. -3- . Rn additionat anarchLsM set froM derives EngeLs-LenLn anarchLsM, Mounted as negative of the assoc tat Lons pretty a pubLLeatLon the for reasons scurrLLous, against and Rnarcho- reveaLs. R Main reason for the Marxist reject Lon of synd Lea L Lsw term caMpaign RnarchLSM LenLn. EngeLs Marx the grafted on to Lt by Marxists. Marx- and reguLar, MLth dispensing anarch LSM Mas that Lt Mas assuMed to LnvoLve LMMed Late transact Lon to state Less socLety. Uhat aLL anarchist trends have Ln coMMon Ls a utop Lan vLsLon of settLng up a socLety ML thout state and expLotttng cLasses through a spontaneous rebeLLLon by the Masses and instant abotition of state poMer and aLL Lts LnstLtut Lons, instead of through potiticat struggLe bu the working cLass, socLaLLst revoLutLon, and estabtishMent of a proietarian dictatorship (p.9). ThLs Last LnvoLves a faLse dLchotoMy. SiMitarLy there Ls heavy crLtLcLsM of anarehLst dogwas about revoLutLon (p.I7). The transition aboiishing opposLng the as state" the idea Mas that of the fLrst as state step Ln affording the a period". But reaLLy there Ls no opposLtLon: both are coMpatLbLe with anarchLsM: there Ls /yio^d than one May of deaiing MLth a scoundreL. The qeneraL shape of poLLtLcaL transfurMation, both Ln cLassicat MarxisM and Ln anarchLsM, Ls a MuLti-stage transforMation MLth 1) transLtLon states, Mhere the state Ls retaLned, 2) an end state, Mhere the state Ls reMoved. But the suggestion, especiaLLy LenLn, Ln that even Ln the end state of Ls cuMHUH LSM, the s ta te M L L L surv eve: criticai Marx Lsts anarchist of proposeLs for the destruction of authority of every k end, and the introduction of totaL decentrat­ er L tic LsM ts decentraLisation^; but it difference (which ref Leet unfairLg never the Less deeper with Loaded, r*. MBf^S out differences Ln every kind and totaL Lts tMO areas MorLd of substantLaL vieM). For exaMpLe, Leadership need not be excLuded, Mhere roLe to direct is freeLy granted and does -4- not devoive into 3 fixed or imposed power relationship? and influence mag be exercised from federai to Locai LeveL as we Li as from LocaL to federai. There are batch a sort of theorg to anarchism. Like of iesser associations aiso removed bg distancing the be outiined from its dominant rivaL, accepted too much Eniightenment doctrine, anarchism. For (e.g. the essentiai goodness of man, the unaiieged instance, benigness centurg 19th science, of and worthwhiLeness of dominant economic goats. Not ontg was it too much a product of thinking: Eniightenment it shared with Marxist unecoLogicaL assumptions about the eiimination of scarcitg, and with capitalism assumption an reduction (at Least in most of its individuai of being an exception). If we trg to reach behind the contrasts, of 19th centurg poLiticaL thought. both orthodox and at ternatives"'. do we reduct ion ism, . science individuai especiaLLg what find? and Not reduct ion ism, ontg worship, techno Logg and maximisation, but mang other doctrines from its mgre orthodox, powerfut and yei/cvc-Z successfui rivais, incLuding domination, ^forms of domination. It is the removai of a wide varietg of forms of domination, of a ims at (Martin's power getting rid of)^ the structures, that negative side of anakgrie. rTn-srchg, w t th the remove L of state, ts ontg part of that: tt aLsc remova L anakgrie concerns the of domination of nature (bg humans), countrgside (bg cities), women (bg men), b Lacks (bg whites), etc. Rs the removai of weeds makes wag for new growth, so the removaL of domination makes wag respects too reiations anakgrie forms for new relations. The primitive side of anakgrie is concerned, among other things with such retations, especiaiig seLf-reguLating of of reaches this far with stabie sort, and wags of achieving them. begond what anarch ism. 5- and In these was normaLLg encompassed bg j was selected RnakgrLe tupographLc to resembLance resembLance, and e^c4mf"Cttics4T.3 get It - Ln tern the was It of* because Lts and phonetcc cLose enough to benefit bg the Ls hopefuLLg, to shed the bed /A <%<2 the fLrst term arrLved at, bg eng weans, get Lt not removed, means rough Lu the same as the fLrst. resuLt however anarkLe . enough farMas part SRNOOillNISfl, In the search terms new for f'crst the L.e. sandomLn (wtthout waster or authorLtg) But atthough domLnatLon cs one of the ma tn thcngs to be removed tn served for aLternatLve arrangements, especLaLLg) Ls onLg Ln domLnatLon part range pLcture. the of a of forms (envLronmentaL DLth domLnatLon Ls assumed to go subject Lon and expLoLtatLon of what Ls domLnated. LIL th domLnatLon a Lso tends go Yet expans ton. there are other thtngs. [Expand, when Look at domLnatLon Later.J Finother word Looked at that has some currencg state Less roughLg LLteraLLg Lt means to acephaLous Ls wLthout a head head Less . meaning It Ls not a part Lou LarLg good term for present purposes. state The operates wLth,ratLfLes, SLnce both AnakgrLe domLnatLon. the same road for a Long part of ensure, and reLg upon, and LegLtLmLzes forms of and anarchg aLm to eLLmLnate these, theg traveL thejourneg. Find forms of domLnatLon - Lf the rLde together; and state Ls as mang crLtLcs, anarchLsts, have argued - then anakgrLe LncLudes anarchg. of the LnLtLaL argument, theg mang some In ang case bound to not reaLLg for sssLmLLatLon^ Ln much the interests of brevLtgwLLL not be too mLsLeadLng. S great Ls proper - Ls advantage of anakgrLe, however - and one reason whg the LncLusLon thLsj- The rewovaL of domLnatLon gLves actLvLsts something LmmedLate to work for, and Ln an ef'fectLve wag — 3gaLn bg contrast wLth anarchg, whLch mau be a Long-term project, or aLmost a do-nothLng one Ln some advanced capLtaLLst states. -6- FOOTNOTES The probiem is frequentiy not one of suppiy, but rather of 1. distribution stiii -3 matter of poiitico-economic arrangements. 2. Negativety remains a prob Lem. It is considered beioM. 3. foLLoM Preface iJhat are from the by N.Y. KeLpinsky, to thLs work. couLd be argued is that the idea of immediate modern states is rather naive. ) A <3' /ZuA <5^ /7^ c y*&"- -7- 7 21/3/84 - I. ANARCHISM : %ea</oc/ s The multiple aims of Often theory. political an aim,^ is takq^ to (model) of the good society, or even more strongly (and less likely) of a or perfect, society. But, to put it in an old-fashioned way, there is no "X such thing as the good society, any more than there is such a thing as the good life. In at principle least, are there variety a of good and societies, even pluralistically there are different mixes (or pluralities) of good societies. ft -Ritter's Rosseau, (p.135) problem A with of ' Marx, equality, vs. with models material of the good de^dgnce^ vs society (e-g- Prato, with The^ can be combined in a pluralistic framework of intellectual virtues)^ vanishes, many good societies. competing Likewise the problem of conflicting values is much reduced, 4 and indeed given sufficient tolerance of other arrangements largely vanishes. Ritter, Equality. 'The real p.137: /?* diversity that matlcs anarchist society is supposed to be accompanied by equality of staffs'. But this is not required. even is equality of power, but rather removal of social power. Nor This leads Ritter on to the alleged conflict of community, which is 'repressive', and individuality. But some conflict Ae. ^following is alright^ as Ritter admits later (pp.138-9), where he gives conflict: pairs? generating diversity/equality, r?J censure/^o^^^ individuality/community. Consistency requirements. required to demonstrate Ritter^ at^mp^yes these everywhere; e.g. the of public censure. , from partial models, argues of a state-less issue f ____ of.consistency of freedom with use But see also(p.l, p.9^ Ritter harmoniousness) *i ^3- / condition, p.138. (also consistency anarchists are to consistency, and permissibility of some limited communities and arrangements of anarchistic (primarily those given by Krop^t^ut)^ 1. Criticisms^ 'Individualism gone wild' destructive 'socially (Hyndman), This confuses pluralistic/socialistic anarchism with right- selfishness (Rp.140). And as R's model one has 'communal individuality'. leaning^ 2. Social oppressiveness gang' 'adolescent picture^ Thus But, e.g. on suffocating contrary group peer considerable very permit^ pressures; individualism and choice. Insufficient 'provision for privacy, for external self-expression and for 3. meeting claims in problems of distributive some anarchist justice' communities, While (Rp.140). things these 'Godwin's conversational e.g. may be anarchy', they are not problems in pluralistic arrangements. Ritter argues however that in the anarchistic society the needs for privacy vanishes - both as refuge from considerable intrusions and as a place of seclusion A for inner growth or restoration. But these things depend on much^improved other people. 3.2 Of course nothing excludes solitude. 4 The issue of older character of such behaviour by reasoned ties up with the the expression of emotions anarchism, argument. the settling ig&aanarchisms of reject disputes rationalistic and reliance the controlling on reason, because reason has too often been used for evil ends, etc., and because emotional attributes are considered to be more central MiilLLiinally-oriented anarchism, to Ritter draws on the In rejecting more person. the reason/formation * dichotomy. * t i ' vp-v {y But emotion does not exclude or block out reason indefinitely. emotion does not interfere with freedom: So too it is false that 'the extensive freedom /! of classical anarchy is simply unattainable without the limits on emotional self­ expression that non-rational anarchists reject' (Rp.143). 3.3 special failure The of bestow to on benefits from a one-track view, This again comes talents. society anarchistic those with from pure communistic anarchism alone. Ritter argues [or understanding', people will not receive is better It 'desire , efficient production incentives' (p.143). He argues to develop ... native talents', 'satisfaction 'polytechnical education' that people not of to argue 'just de^ejfft'^ re&SM^@d] A usual varied work', voluntary, etc. these without 'mutual ... some in terms of what they put in, still ' v'tewetf occurs though that (of English from in character!), this sort will choose different life-styles, in different communities. The 4. political 'unanimous 'repudiation of (Rp.144). direct democracy'. individuality between This theory' citizenship is and which active citizenship' to has argued Rosseau (see citizenship correlative to a state, do with 'is a anarchistic there that recurrent theme Rp.145): was a criticism of contradiction itself. dubious in But . . . , , so^not too surprising that it is damaged. Anarchism gives much greater scope for the do-nothing or do—it-when-you-feel-like- it life. No filling-in blw form; at this cn. times, voting^ those Ejeg^ixicLal days, etc. demoded, time, registrations at those , That is, it offers a range of freedoms the citizen does not get. Presumably also then the Kantian idea of man as a self-governing citizen also gets ditched. public But the alleged accompanying virtues - such as being self-directred, spirited, controlling die t ing - are not lost, but enhanced. For communities replace the state as the place where they are manifested. 5. 1 Argument making. roblem from the strange character of anarchist arises because it (p.148), provided Wational procedural permits bad freedom and decision- decision-making, rules are met. so R claims This is very curious. But 4 cjoc4 the problem of appeals to rationality-justified freely-chosen exploitation ^arise^ here. constraints - which from a consistency viewpoint limits freedom. R The constraints are internalisation, positional authority, censorial rebuke. Anarchist arrangements are better superior to feasible alternatives, than where we are. Since they are also that is enough for movement in that direction. No requirement of best need be met. 5. dm rd al Anarchism is a dangerous ideal, because it helps undermine the established 4 social order. But it is pernicious because that ideal is unattainable. ) 6. no place Objection to anarchist methods. in them. example' (p.152). According to R But aversion and fraud are said to have the main methods are 'fr#ecof argument and But this ^gnves out a range of i-ndi-catrrves and strategies. s THE^ARCUhEETS HJR THE STATE. There are a variety of arguments^*which will be ass^^bled at first a jumbled order. Other arguments are: in from organisational demands, from law and order, from provision of public goods generally, from maximization (ana prisoners' dilemma, etc.) (e.g.A A. surprising Argument for the State is given by economists Atkinson and Lectures Stieglit^, in Economics). Public required to regulate market(s) and ensure that theorems of The state is welfare even ground that it apply, Is that .case? .the market is invariably recommended ------- /) is self-regulating, and can dispense with government. Argument for^ state appalling^from ideal). that overcoming CrSiK angle^ angle deficiencies really of ^market For it means that the market is assumed (as All.argument shows ^is that market isn't means of regulation^ that should adopts^ In a way it is a reductio of ^market. It may be claimed that it is analytically that true any society involves a state. This is false. Social arrangements without state powers A)ct 5M! L' / J -- CT are perfectly possible. ^&onstruct small social moael^,, The argument that no society &ommon4ry-1 s anthropologists iI^ defence of the claim that 71c internal by some primitive society is anarchic - depends on an A-conversion. ^rgument^^j QJ (a) every society has exhibits (some) used stateless order , fJ"— (otherwise it would not be a society) (b) the basic proper^function of order, i .e. (c) the fA/e is to ensure internal state^(ought to% impl^) order. there is internal order.there must be some sort of state. 7 ^77777^77- /71 <?/= ^7757777; - /<F^ / 3? ARGUMENTS AGAINST STATES AND THEIR POKERS Nation-state arrangements, which based on assumptions of are fairly recent phenomena, are a cert^jn amount of independence and isolation. The rise of technology, including communication, have put these assumptions in doubt, as has.war. 1 'The presumption of the nation-state system, that sovereignty implied an ability to protect a nation's territory and population, is precisely the presumption denied by the nuclear, capacities 313). This was already put in doubt by of both other superpowers' things: (PL, now also by Consider again also Argument A. 1) Kars are the rights of states only.3 'x may [wagej war upon y only if x is a sovereign state; has legal means (Barnes, p.776). declaration of by which it may 3. not of authority, requires 'just authority' to do so, thus: authority of a prince, at whose command the war is to does otherwise x and must settle the claim against y' Thus Aquinas explains the condition war for be that 'first the waged; for it belong to a private person to start a war since he can prosecute Naturally one has to worry about private armies and so forth, as well. But undoubtedly the overwhelming problem in the case of 4cyp*=. LN wars with the superstate. his rights in the court of a superior' (Aquinas, quoted in Barnes, In tact however an alternative factual premiss will serve as well: (a) only (super)states are capable of waging LN wars. p.776). PATHS TO ANARCHISTIC END-STATE Pasture of stages ( o ) and transitions (o ** o) finish start Golden future age Present Past Intermediate states '? Pluralist anarchism Communist anarchism Kingdom of God Corporate capitalism State socialism Democratic socialism Totalitarianism A useful model for the process is that of punctuated equilibrium, drawn from recently reformulated evolutionary theory. Another useful model is Kuhn's picture of the growth of science, which is also one of punctuated equilibrium, the equilibrium dominates, There is states or stages being those where a scientific paradigm the transitions between stages being rapid and even revolutionary. presumably a general model of this type within the framework of systems theory, which brings models of this type together [verify *1]. The classical anarchist assumption is that no intermediate stages need be involved, we can transit directly (in a single revolutionary upheaval) into an anarchistic end-state - a pretty unplanned and unprepared for end-state. the fast increasing size of the world's With human population and complexity of modern organisation - both further locking things into statist frames - that assumption looks increasingly untenable. reasons for supposing necessary. There are also, and always were, that intermediate preparation and planning stages are For what have to be altered, in particular, are human attitudes, 2 expectations, etc. - malleable parts of human "nature" that can be altered by reeducation, reflection and immersion in alternative conditions. What has to be changed? Much. The modern encouragement of greed - in such forms as maximum consumption, maximum production, etc. of gross inequality. economic bottom up, The is reversal to be achieved in affluent and by redirecting military and industrial What still has some appeal is reorganising. The entrenchment the idea, spending into social suggested by Marx's work, of initial transition into a state governed from the bottom (certainly no longer workers) instead of from the top: this pending of states' structure could but the intended good effects of be rather quickly lost (like the Aid­ effects of shallowly^/cultural revolutions). A critical question is what produces the direction and so on are desirable. decidedly undesirable, e.g. nuclear war. But one state to some causes of^ transition are There are other ways as the models natural cataclysm, economic instability The anarchistic which - from For if we can find out perhaps we can hasten the process - assuming another? reveal, transition route is a branch on the 1 accumulation o^f anomalies. 2 tree of future political options, blown over and assuming a single starting point (that of Australia say) - schematically looks like this? ^E.g. the present loans and deficit situation, especially in third world countries. 2 Including undermining of state economies by al ternative economies (examples from places like Peru). 3 Anarchistic branches It is crucial to avoid many of the alternative futures possible from where we are, e.g. transitions to the increasing state-corporate control of life. The Kingdom of God can^ be comjhpared with the marxist findj state? The Kingdom of God is pacifist (state). Peace is fully realised, and justice i^foundation of it (yet there are tensions between them sometimes?) J/ / _---- .-------------- seek 3 newer world. 'Its % <7^t/ 1 ?V^^/ 4^7 1 state has destroyed so Much of coMMunity arrangeMents that road anarchism wiii have to Make use of the state. 11 Ls L ike 3 weed such as lantana, It has suppressed growth of the new forest, But simply sorting it out will expose the ground to forces fertile to the new forest aiso (moisture stress, erosion, etc.), bo the state Must be pruned awasy, substituted for, and Jttirpated bit by bit. &. There is now so Much governMent - the governMent effectively in Many so areas of IsoMMunal structures - that simply/ social life, Ibreaking down and displacing dispensing with governMent, an immediate to coMMunal arrangeMents, could not be accomplished without Massive dislocation. Short of a Massive disaster, disabling governmental s^^ructure, return instant anarchisM is not feasible. Since such a disaster is not improbable, instant anarchism should not however be excluded, but, -^pnte.s states, allowed and planned for. Otherwise, the like route more evolutionary is by replacement, ching us or substituting for the displaced coMMunity structures broken down state ac t iv i ty. Removal of government - not from where controls are required ac^trarl rep lacements^e.g. transitional penetration, big business,(are developed^ - from exploitative areas, e.g. gambling, drugs, prostitution, etc. 5et up instead nets to gatch people/victijhs of these things. voluntarg arrangement freelg unLirtt/ted to, then contributions to state coffer^ should also be votuntarg, likewise involving free assent, not If ^the state compulsorg as theg are. But then free-rider problems, etc. No, onlg showing there wasn t consent, bg mang exodus from fragments. If there were onlg a few free-riders^ these people who didn't have a state constribution and would get state carried, such as police - as simple as RR You bug state protection, whatever, just Ibke state insurance. / . E Is ter Sour Gr apes p. 37_bqttow (a Iso surrounding section)) ....... ...... —' ------------- ------------------------ ueMucracg anc^- o the r po1i t ica1 :sustems advanted bu various authors for their side effects Z! o which obtainable better in other wags. Lare for anarchism here. Patemen good A ____ J* j On Tr.3nsn.3t Lona Ls The sources of -3re power of one sort or another. SocLaL arrangements wLthout ^%?-W^-b^-h'A^^>wLLL be designed so far as possLbLe to LLmLt such power and prevent Lts accumutatLon. Prevent,^ gLobaL corp^arrangements/ LnternatLonaLLsm^ aLready over hLLL. Rnd good twenty years our of date. //GLobaL (^each p.368.. Rehun^ the prob Lem — passed by the gLobaL corporatLon ... ---------------------/) ms Ls excessLve power, and the seLf-Lmpatred LLmLtatLon on power cs not characterr Jsttc of human LnstLtutLons',^ rearranged?. Remedies. 1. at InformatLon and end to secrecy, as a way to socLaL responses.^ books as pubLLc documents etc., p.369. 2. TndLspensLbLe data for natLonaL program of natLonaL and Lnternat- LonaL reguLatLon, 370. Sc<%/<)<2 , Standsrd Last Lon of accountLng -r-------- and practLces. p.3*^/ Breakdown of pubLLc/prLvate dLstLnctLon and dLsappearance of free market? 'L--------- . GLobaL co rpo rat Lons buLLt on socLaL cap^taL consp ucuous L^* p.376 RLternatLon of t3X Laws to remove credLts and Tax bLas Ln favour of transnatLonaLs. counterrLdLng power / be^^re strateggt^ , pubLLc dLrectors , better uaadetermLnatLon , pre^Ldents runnLng for c?r companys at Least eLectLonjfor candLdates of reguLati)$y comm css conf GeneraLLyatter tax Laws, remove subsLdLes whLch 4ncouraaa the accumutatLon of . ,7 prLvate weaLth, and power, us Lng pubLLc/socLat and bLoLogLcaL capLtaL. ^7^ /j /y CCyTY ^g -y power. fAc State underpinning of multinationals. Multinationals would not have arisen to their present position of eminence without state assistance - and infrastructure, education, security, etc. N^d detailed evidence of this. Then can argue that problem of multinationals can be resolved, more or -3 p less automatically, with problem of state. /^* /? -e^— 7 0 ,%?. rofit system^never satisfactory,^now extremely dama^gmg. Compare^ damag fetnoTie. , / i be profits - and look at the way these ^to worlds by destruction for profits are spent. Profit system compare with (ccyM?) sovereignty systems. an anarchist.theory. LAW . jLaw is incompatible with anarchist utopianism. Anarchism can retain a framework of rules. are backed up, and enforced. where this involves violence. pre^$e, etc. consider, This is false. The key issue is how these rules What anarchism excludes is coercive backing Opposition usually involves sliding on coergion, So it looks as if there are several different theses to depending on how enforcement, rules, etc. are expanded. Kam argued that anarchism could not handle law on basis of A i. A level of detail of law. ii. amount of procedural detail. But there are no barrier at all. be refuted by a countermodel. Complexity is no bar. The claims can One such is the model Chom^siey appeals to, that of rules of language, which are complex and intricate enough, and nvj backed by force (Passmore wanted to suggest they were! But it is obvious that they need not be, whatever lapses occurred in the 16th century.) As a matter of history, several anarchist thinkers were not opposed to operation of law, but included it in their framework. Proudhon. Others? One example is /^ <2 MY ENGAGEMENT WITH SOCIAL AND POLITICAL THEORY Over the past decadeI have found myself increasingly concerned with social and political problems and more and more immersed in the theoretical issues raised thereby. In large part this has arisen from environmental involvement, especially on forestry and nuclear matters, and the realisation that the basic problems mostly lay with social and political arrangements. It thus became important to try to determine what those really were, and how they might be changed, what the alternatives weie. But in part also my legitimate intellectual movement from logic and meta­ physics^ to a wider perspective which includes social and political philosophy as major area of concern has come about as a result of reflection on the unsatisfactory and fragmented state of philosophy and its surrounds. It became increasingly hard (in particular for someone trained in analytic philosophy with a heavy Oxbridge orientation) to avoid noting, especially when confronted with wider philosophical and social issues, that one's philosophical education and ifn 1972 I presented and circulated a paper, 'Is there a need for a new, and environmental ethic?' which played an influential part in the rapid growth of environmental philosophy in New Zealand and Australia (on the latter see D. Mannison and M. McRobbie in Environmental Philosophy). Such an excursion into ethics was not without precedent. My research work in fact began in ethical theory, with a thesis on moral scepticism, and I thought about and wrote on deontic problems in the sixties. ^The point is explained in detail in work cited in the accompanying curriculum vitae (where all otherwise unreferenced work is listed). In the case of forestry see for example 'Destructive forestry in Australia and Melanesia' and 'World rainforest destruction - the social factors'; as to nuclear see 'Nuclear power - some ethical and social dimensions' and 'The ethics of nuclear war, and political fall-out'; and for the general argument see 'Social theories, self management and environmental problems'. ^This does not mean that I have entirely abandoned these areas. Logic is, I believe (with Anderson, and so with the mainstream of Australia's most significant philosophical movement), the central part of philosophy, and many conceptual problems in applied philosophy will continue to require return to logical ground in order to find satsifactory solutions. A sound training in logical theory is essential for deeper solutions for some of these problems. I should add that I never have been a very pure logician. I moved into logic in order to try to solve severe conceptual problems first in the philosophy of science and then in metaphysics. Now that these problems are largely solved (to my satisfaction at any rate) I can presumably move on to other things. 2. practice offered only a somewhat limited set of tools and techniques for tackling wider philosophical concerns and, worse, but few instruction as to how to apply these analytic techniques more widely. Nor had the inadequacy of such an education and the sort of philosophy to which it led gone unremarked. It was charged that philosophy had abdicated several of its proper respons­ ibilities - for example, to organise knowledge into some more coherent whole or world-view, to elaborate a social theory and influence social criticism, even to afford intellectual leadership - and had become excessively analytic and specialised, and therewith narrow and sterile (concerned, e.g., merely with linguistic niceties, conservative commonsense and/or scholastic logic-chopping). It was charged that academic philosophy not only had become excessively timid and accordingly lost intellectual excitement and appeal, but also had lost relevance to and touch with the important intellectual issues of the times and had failed in the business of addressing a larger audience with philosophical interests. These charges, which have a solid foundation, did not come from within academic philosophy but were most evocatively made by people outside philosophy (though with some knowledge of it) or by those in the margins of academic, professional­ ised^ philosophy. Thus Durrant, an outsider, has powerfully expressed a part of the charges: ... philosophy itself, which had once summoned all sciences to its aid in making a coherent image of the world and an alluring picture of the good, found its task of inordination too stupendous for its usage, ran away from ... .'LtheJ battlefronts of truth, and hid itself in recondite and narrow lanes, timidly secure from the issues and responsibilities of life.* Philosophy began to change in the Seventies, some philosophers naturally changing with it. We aimed to address a wider range of socially relevant topics - and also sometimes a .wider audience - for example, to get beyond the ^W. Durrant, The Story of Philosophy, Second edition, Simon and Schuster, New York, 1926, p.v. Durrant though (or perhaps because) a leading populariser of philosophy in North America, is not usually at all well regarded by academic philosophers. 3. sterile examples of previous texts on moral philosophy to live issues, from minor cases of promising and truth-telling to abortion and euthanasia, genetic engineering and the treatment of animals, violence and nuclear war. But the analytical methods used for the most part did not change, the widening of horizons in applied philosophy proceeded from a narrow and inadequate logical (argumentive) and metaphysical base. stagnation: The applied expansion went with theoretical mainstream theoretical philosophy sat in the doldrums. Nor has the applied transformation gone far enough. Significant issues have been left to theologians and journalists.And there has been insufficient effort by philosophers (even those addressing relevant issues) to integrate their work with that of other (social) sciences that shed light on the issues, to overcome discipline fragmentation by synthesis. For it was not merely that philosophy itself was fragmented and often irrelevant, it had also become largley isolated from other disciplines and had ceased to be properly informed by them - or to inform them. This unsplendid isolation is particularly conspicuous in the case of political philosophy, which often proceeds in much the way it did in the 17th century, with little of the import it should be receiving from recent advances in social psychology and well-founded) sociobiology. ethology and (to the extent that it is More generally, the way in which areas have been isolated from one another, and ceased communicating, to the disadvantage to all, is a matter for serious concern. It is not merely that philosophy, for example, can be enriched by taking due account of the social sciences. The ^This description derives from Passmore. ^Philosophers and other academics should not be led in these areas, but do the leading. One of the roles of the academic community - a role in which philosophy in Australia (much, degenerated by too long an incestuous history) mostly fails - is to address a wider public than part of itself. Philosophers may justly complain that there is little competent public discussion of these issues where applied philosophy matters and no reputable intellectua ea er ship in Australia at present, but they have by and large done little to rectify the matter. 4. social sciences also can be improved, and much rubbish removed, by taking account of philosophical criticism.Each impacts on the others, in ways that should be taken into account. Moreover the interplay of different parts is fruitful.2 There is a richness to be generated if the interaction works well. And such interaction is required to pull much material into a more coherent whole. Such sentiments on integrating areas and rendering work more informed and holistic have been expressed before. another putting them into effect. It is one thing expressing them, and The tasks involved are difficult. And putting them into effect is not of course a task for just one person, but for several. A start can however be made with interdisciplinary people who willingly cross discipline boundaries, because they need to, and see the need to; by people who are able to adopt the often special methods and procedures of other disciplines and combine them with those of their own. But a start can not in general be satisfactorily initiated just by administrative fiat. A good deal of evidence has now accumulated to show that an administrator cannot simply pull together a successful interdisciplinary research group by hiring people skilled in the different disciplines concerned and putting them in a common setting. Such, groups can evolve however by individuals with wide-ranging concerns interesting other researchers or like-inclined people from other disciplines in overlapping or joint problems. And in setting up the conditions for such collaborative research to evolve, administrative inputs are important. It is, for example, an astute move to have a position linking several different departments 3 attached to none of them but to a section that sits so-to-speak above them; for in this way the researcher has access to all the departments concerned but is confined to none. *New philosophies of nature call for much more than this, indeed for major theor­ etical reorientation of some social sciences. The point is elaborated in the concluding part of 'Human chauvinism and environmental ethics'. 2Nor will unified or coherent social sciences be arrived at without substantial philosophical imports. 3 As the present post does. influenced the move. No doubt other political considerations have also 5. I think I can justifiably account myself an interdisciplinary person. Firstly, I have considerable experience in collaborative work, an advantage that philosophers, in contrast to experimental scientists, seldom enjoy. claim is supported by my publication record. The While that indicates the extent of my joint activity in research, it does not fully record cooperative activity in organising conferences and workshops, both in logic and in environmental philosophy, in helping found or reestablish organisations (the Australasian Association of Logic is the main example, but the local AAP is another), in establishing publications (e.g. the Environmental Philosophy Discussion Papers serve both Philosophy Departments) and so on. More significantly, I can also fairly claim substantial experience in interdisciplinary work, as well as in other fields of philosophy. For example, I have worked not only in philosophy departments but in mathematics and in environmental studies programs.i Furthermore, my work in forestry, which is continuing, brought me into close touch with people from a broad spectrum of fields, not only forestry, but also economics, geography, demography, botany and zoology. The work, which is well-known locally and referred to in inter­ national textbooks, has for the most part been well received by people in those area, except forestry, and has been taken seriously .by those who disagree with the often controversial positions developed. My more recent work on environmental problems has led me to communicate and interchange material with sociologists and political Scientists in North American and England, and also with people in a variety of fields in Australian Colleges of Advanced Education. Naturally then, much of the resulting work reaches people in a range of fields. My work on environmental problems has also resulted in invitations to participate in conferences in a wide range of areas, on forestry (in several Australian ^1 declined invitations to work in interdisciplinary research groups in Washington and The Hague primarily because they would have kept me away from Australia too long and obliged me to endure northern winters. 6. states), on energy, on the environment (in New Guinea and USA). I have twice been invited to present papers at Australian Sociology conferences, but been unable to do so because of commitments abroad. The basic forestry book The Fight for the Forests, and subsequent forestry and environmental papers, already included much that bears upon and is informed by social and political theory. A new book, tentatively entitled Forestry in Australia, now in preparation by a team of people drawn from a wide range of disciplines - which is intended to replace The Fight for the Forests, long out of print - will be even more closely involved with social and political theory. It includes much fuller analysis of social classes and power structures (and models of these) as well as, like earlier work, examination of elites, and types of inequality. This should also begin to reveal how my work on apparently diverse areas is interrelated, and not a result of compartmentalisation. Most obviously, my work on forestry, which directly involves a range of environmental problems, in a very practical way, leads directly into areas of social and political theory. It is less obvious, but nonetheless a fact, that work on environmental problems, value theory and logic, is not disconnected, but joined by several connecting ways. For example, relevant deontic logic has shown how the key moral matter of moral dilemmas and conflicts of value can be treated. The logic of obligation is important in rejecting arguments that there is a significant separate "morality" for nation states or for public representatives of these which exonerates them from normal responsibility. Differently, logic provides the basis of decision theory, which is important in structuring environmental problems. And so on, to look at some of the more straightforward connections. There are larger connections. Social and political theory necessarily presupposes ^Explanations of these connections are much expanded in "The logical basis of the social sciences'. 7. a metaphysics, and this in turn a logical theory X Philosophers of very different persuasions, for instance Hegel and Mill, have agreed about this. Of course work in logic, such as that in probability theory and on statistical inference, sometimes speaks directly to other areas in the social sciences. My own work on universal semantics is of interest to linguists, and 'Universal semantics?' was abstracted in Sociological Abstracts, as have been several of my philosophical papers, on for example metaphysics, limits to Work on the recent history of logic and knowledge and animal intentionality. of philosophy of science in Australasia has led me into some sociological as well as historical investigations. political science and economics. Logical pursuits have also lead me into Because of my interest in applied logic I came to take over supervision of B. Embury's doctoral dissertation on voting theory, a thesis in the Department of Political Science. in work with a post-doctoral social choice theory. My interests also involved me fellow on preference and decision theory and Regretably no joint work issued from this enterprise, but I did publish some papers in the area, and emerged with further ideas for research jotted down: these ideas, mainly for further impossibility and limitative results in social theory, have yet to be followed through. My present research in social and political theory has (like a conic section) double foci. One focus (Fl) is a book tentatively entitled The Philosophic Reach of Environmental Problems and intended to supersede Environmental Philosophy in main respects, on the ethical, social and political dimensions of environmental problems.2 familiar list: The central problems yield a now rather for instance, those of human and animal populations, disappearing species, vanishing rainforests and other habitats and ecosystems, treatment (and rights) of indigenous peoples, of animals and of plants, cities and substantial start in explaining these deeper connections is made in 'Social theories, self management and environment problems' and in Exploring Meinong's Jungle and Beyond, chapter 9, ^12. ^Here environmental is used in the wide sense, of which the ecological is only a quite proper part. 8. neighbourhoods, landscape transformation or destruction, mining, pollution, nuclear and energy issues, and so on. The underlying problems have significant features in common and common social and political sources. Before the integrative task is tackled in detail however, an analytical approximative approach is being followed. Discussion papers on several of the topics listed are being researched or written, and discussion papers on others will follow, before the whole thing is pulled together. The other focus (F2) is a book on what might be called New Age Social Organisation, investigating alternatives to prevailing social, economical and political arrangements. Major alternatives considered in detail include left­ leaning and right-leaning anarchisms, which will involve a careful examination of the extent to which social arrangements and political organisations can be self-managed and self-regulating. While it is ambitiously hoped that the investigation will not only result (ideally) in a more philosophically-adequate left-leaning anarchist theory than has so far been produced, that is only part of its purpose. Another very important part of the enterprise is to give some better understanding of the range of alternatives to present (monopolistic capitalist and state socialist) arrangements that there are and that could be tried. A further part is, by considering alternatives, to shed light on the prevailing systems (their structures, institutions, etc.), in particular to bring out more clearly their underlying assumptions,the extent of their necessity, to give a better idea ^In several respects the term 'anarchism' is unsatisfactory and will have event­ ually to be replaced, perhaps by a neologism, since no available term delineates the types of socio-political arrangements envisaged. It should perhaps be remarked, in case it is thought that I have no academic background in political theory, that my university education did include courses and seminars in the area. Furthermore I have more recently acquired a good working knowledge of the anarchist literature, and am well advanced in the process of obtaining a grasp of organisation theory and the necessary parts of social psychology. Some of these assumptions are rejected or varied in an assessment of alternatives. Thus, as a much better idea of euclidean geometry was obtained with the elaboration of hyperbolic and Riemannian geometry, and similarly of arithmetic with the formulation of nonstandard arithmetics, so also a much better appreciation of mainstream social theory should be achieved by investigating nonstandard social theories and assumptions. This method of variation of assumptions is a fruitful one as regards many scientific,theories. of the values they write in, of their desirability or undesirability, and so on. Although my enagement has two main foci, naturally there are also other and smaller endeavours under way: of these - but only some. the attached curriculum vitae gives some indication For example, the trilogy of papers on the meaning of life, nihilism, and the ultimate existence question is to be arranged into a book which will probably also address such related issues as the quality of life. Richard Routlev zi___ A_ ^L</^—*^/y /J &4n^-*- "" J^TL^ r/7v—, 7/ /<?\A<?/ Ay 3 ANAKYRIE. In Chapter 1 The multiple and inconsistent axioms of political theory : pluralism, morality, ... The differences in theory begin at the beginning, in what political arrangements are for, what they are about, whom they are for, how they apply. There are important differences in the extent to which peoples' and other creatures' activities and lives can be controlled and regulated. More authoritarian or paternalistic political arrangements impose much more in the way of regulations than more liberal arrangements which in theJlimit reduce regulation or setting for pursuit of satisfactory lives. to some minimum, to some So far as political relations are concerned, the world (Terr& is a closed system. Political influence is not exercised from outside that system, nor f!'o political influences of significance so far flow from Terra elsewhere. (All that may of course change, in which case the problem is reset in terms of some larger system, the Universe providing an upper limit - unless some extraspb tial gods are invoked.) With the advance of industrialisation, communications and spill-over technology, few communities smaller than the world system are any longer effectively closed. The general political problem is unsolvable. The argument for this theme is that the problem is only solvable for small relatively uniform But we no longer have such, given modern interference com-unities (Taylor). effects. The basic picture is of a network of goal-directed Defining the^problem: creatures and systems. The aim (political goal) is to ensure that these creatures are able to pursue goals so far as these are satisfactory. A major value judgment is inserted here : what of wiping out lives, of war, etc., those that interfere seriously with others? A liberal setting such as Redman sketched is operating in the background here. Present political arrangements anachronistic : they were introduced at a time when much less interference was technically possible. longer appropriate. The They are no of empires now affects everyone s lives, so on democratic grounds all should have say (or vote). But they don t : democracy stops at national borders (even in those borders where it kmd-of operates). 2 Present political arrangements, by increasing population, etc. for what sort of consumption high can be obtained by present people are making things much worse. For the benefit of present power-holders, their maintenance of power and privilege, short-term drr the inadequacies of %^ts - of present economics within political frameworks. On the End State: According to Kamenka a central deficiency of a M^up-ist account is its pre­ industrial character, also its romantic character, and its view of creative labour. These are a result in part of looking for utopia in the past, the sources of which according to Kumenka are: (i) a mistaken view of the happy (noble) savage; (ii) the abundance of industry; (iii) the rationality of industry (presumably its increasingly automatic and self-regularity character?). This is confused. Sources (ii) and (iii) are the basis of the past industrial character of the end state (where the machines are really whirring along). The main source of the search in the past is quite different, namely the search for historical models, however partial, of the good or better life. The reason is that (iv) there is something drastically wrong with present arrangements which not rectified by minor adjustments. The end state, so far as it is described, is certainly a curious mixture of A' pre- and past-industrial elements. The end state is not a static state, but a stable, climax state. analogy is again useful here. The ecological Capitalism is like a pioneering stage. Stable states may have been achieved in the past, to be disturbed in one way or another. That is one reason why it is important to look in the past - for fc^r^r of past stable states. Political theory (note A *) As a result of the way 'political system' is commonly defined, anarchy is not a political system. The reason is that 'most authors consider the modern political system to be that system which controls the use of power or force in society' (Kaplan, p.22). therewith that system. Anarchy aims to remove use of power and force, and The exclusion could of course be taken to be a (further) inadequacy in the definition, a mere technicality almost, got around by expanding 'controls' disjunctively to 'controls or removes'. 3 For whether or not anarchy is a political system, it is certainly an organisational system or structure. POLITICAL THEORY AND MORALITY 1. On the one hand, it is claimed that 'any acceptable form of social order...must rest on moral foundations, which are in principle ascertainable at any period, and permanently valid'.'*' (Donegan, p.xiv) On the other, and more common view, politics simply tramples over morality when it suits it. However that is a matter of one morality, e.g. of a Christian established form, being overwhelmed by another Mafia-style morality not the absence of a value position. theory. 2. Any political theory rests on a value That is the point. There is the problem of evil, powerful people, often unintentionally evil people such as Reagan, Thatcher, ... Hitler flourished most of his life; he led an active (etc.) life ... 3. Anarchism does not require especially good people. But political life would run much more easily without a certain range of people. (Of course, states think this, and totalitarian states try to realise theit aim). 4. On Political Obligation obligation. There is no good ground as basis of political All arguments designed to establish obligation to a state - of people living in it ('its territory') especially - are wanting. (Argument for this there). Scepticism about political obligation does not imply scepticism about obligation. So moral scepticism is not implied. And on the contrary, most requirements are of the first importance in outlining alternatives to the state. Hobbes problem was that of political obligation - 'reasonswhy we ought to change the state' (R p.61). Hobbes finds three causes of disorder (competition - reflecting self interest drives; distrust; argued for on ground that enjoyment of power ('glory') [Self-interest is motive is self-preservation.] To these he opposes inter - from desire for security. 1. This involves a very dubious objectivity. 4 On Marx-Engels way Although Marx and Engels say comparatively little about their projected end state, they say a great deal about the route through the new state - to that end, and about the means to be used along that route. By contrast with means, they are far too restrictive about routes, ruling out many plausible roads to change (including peasant revolutions, etc.) Engels' proposed route is through 'a new social order' where production and industry run on behalf of society, according to a social plan. The main features are addition of private property (vol.l, p.88) and of private means of communication (p.92). Note that it is unclear whether this social order is an immediate or end state, but those features are common to both. There is massive industrial and agricultural production (though not over­ production) by (rationalised) planned economy without ( ) private property (I,p.92). Hence, division into antagonistic clauses becomes superfluous. There are new all-round people (p.93), a disappearance of division of labour, for flexible labour. There is association instead of competition. Fusion of town and country (p.94). According to Marx-Engels (I,p.l83) the route is through the central state. 'The workers must not only strive [against democrats] for a single and indivisible...republic, but also within this republic for the most determined centralisation of power in the hands of the state authority. They must not allow themselves to be misguided by the democratic talk of freedom for the communities, of self-government, etc.' No communal property 'Concentrate productive to remain : etc... in means of of state'. This account is extremely top-down. As to means, it looks as if Marx and Engels are prepared to adopt any means, likely or not. For Marx, the main means are by violent revolution (last page Poverty of Philosophy). of classes. Revolution is the outcome of the contradiction By contrast, Engels prefers peaceful means (in 1847 i.e. vol 1, p.89); but he won't at all rule out revolution. But together Marx and Engels emphasise violent means, and encourage excuses on occasions ( p.180). 5 Under the pretext that the petty bourgeous democrats will betray the workers, the subversion (destabilization) of their government is planned (Vol 1. address of CC to League, pp.180-1) Unlike Bak Marx and Engels.advocate fostering massacres etc. stuff mean?), and a regime of terror. (for what else can this Bak thinks that in a revolutionary situation such things may occur but should be immunized (I can easily check the reference in Bak if necessary (p.180). For the most part, Engels was much more inclined to peaceful and established means to change, even to change by way of ballot box and universal suffrage; the Democratic route to state transformation (1, p.195, also 1, p.202). Note Engels' introduction to Class Struggles in France written in 1895 (p.195), e. i. later than the more bellicose texts Lenin is relying on - and as the fruit of a riper experience of politics. He says that by party action universal suffrage 'transforme de mayer de dupere qu'il a ete jusqui' en instrument d'emarcqation'and this as footnote shows is a quote from Marx. This suggests that it can be used to gain control of and subsequently transform state app In 1895 (pp.199-200) Engels suggests a revision of . Now show means, propaganda etc., to win over the mass of people [different from technological determination!] No doubt because of technological determination, there is no need to be too specific about means; for it is not as if activity is shaping the course of things, only speeding up the (in ) process. Reasons for the lack of detailed description of the end state in Marx-Engels: 1. This would be to try to set the future, which is reactionary (Why? Because of historical determination?), and unnecessary, because future people will be wiser than us. 2. Standard explanation, suggested by Marx: 'scientific socialism cannot describe in any detail the society that will replace capitalism. Utopians speculate about the socialist future : Marxists analyse the capitalist present' (Moore, p.76). Moore argues the standard explanation is implausible. 6 Principles of Individualism [ ?] 1. Government based on individually-given consent of citizens - 'its authority or legitimacy deriving from that consent' (Lubes, p.ll) Consent-answering back requirement 2. Political representation as representing individual interests, not classes, estates, etc. 3. That's all. interests. Government confined to enabling satisfaction of individual Hence towards laissez-faire, against paternalism, influencing or interpreting individual wants. (79).  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. 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Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/browse?search=Richard+Sylvan&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bjoiner%5D=and&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=&amp;range=&amp;collection=&amp;type=&amp;user=&amp;tags=&amp;public=&amp;featured=&amp;exhibit=&amp;geolocation-mapped=&amp;geolocation-address=&amp;geolocation-latitude=&amp;geolocation-longitude=&amp;geolocation-radius=10&amp;submit_search=Search+for+items">Richard Sylvan</a> Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived <span class="MuiTypography-root-125 MuiTypography-body2-126">The University of Queensland's <a data-testid="rek-series" href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/records/search?page=1&amp;pageSize=20&amp;sortBy=score&amp;sortDirection=Desc&amp;searchQueryParams%5Brek_series%5D%5Bvalue%5D=Richard+Sylvan+Papers%2C+UQFL291&amp;searchMode=advanced">Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291</a></span>, Box 120, Item 102 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org">Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy</a> Contributor An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource <span>This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, </span><a href="https://najtaylor.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Dr. N.A.J. Taylor</a><span>.</span> Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library. Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource [66] leaves. 150.42 MB. Type The nature or genre of the resource Manuscript Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context <a href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:ab005a4">https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:ab005a4</a> Box 120: Philosophy Wisdom to Wowserism Como House Como House > Green Table > Pile 5 https://www.antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/1ef873397db9176610ec09df90503ccb.pdf 05d94d591b5ca14ea4549ac3c3755d09 PDF Text Text WORKING DRAFT ON THE ETHICS OF LARGE-SCALE NUCLEAR WAR AND WAR-DETERRENCE AND THE POLITICAL FALL-OUT Because of their projected effects - which are said to differ from those of the even largest difference in kind - generated, encounters. exchanges either at all wars nuclear large-scale World (the wars conventional Wars) raise to as and not or nearly so forcefully, by previous human military Certainly exchanges such as nuclear wars involve, such constitute a questions ethical deterrence nuclear investigation is and threatened presupposes, are neither envisaged nor fully accommodated by traditional theories of just wars. reflection as even required, if Much new philosohical well-tested and rather old-fashioned moral principles will serve as ethical base. Nuclear wars - though a fine class of nonexistent object, is existence whose however best confined to other (already uncomfortably neighbouring) possible worlds - have several distinctive properties and come in several varieties. particular, limited nuclear wars which (of tactical or strategic subvarieties) contrast with large-scale nuclear wars, LN-type-wars, large quantities of nuclear devices over a sizeable region; two main parameters: are need A large-scale nuclear war involves the explosion of however be unlimited not which In quantity it is a function of of explosive) and distribution. (megatonnage Such a war differs markedly from a limited (or tactical or strategic) nuclear war which is limited - by assumption, the chances of escalation are however very real 3 - to much smaller quantities of explosives characteristically circumscribed, installations in a given region. wars and their prevention, and where the targets are confined to military Though the focus in what follows is upon e.g. limited in nuclear principle LN wars are by no means a separate �Page 2 issue, since a nuclear arsenal is escalation of such are wars a and prerequisite, high probabilities of assumptions of reasonable usual (given the follow-up or second strike, etc.) §1. is What different old of appropriateness and models wars:____ the nuclear about theories resulting war. of limited model of war that A dominates much thinking, including [even] strategic thinking, is the two party 4 (or even two person) game or, a complication of that, the clan or tribe battle . A picture of war built up, especially as a result of medieval discussion of just war, which inapplicable. for such technological have advances The traditional theory, hardly surprisingly, phenomena Dresden and Tokyo. mass as bombing inappropriate rendered no made the and allowance large cities, such as occurred with of And nuclear bombing, with its many further crucial effects beyond mass bombing, adds further new dimensions. Yet it is Important, for the argument to anchors, historical linkages and to be aware of what counted as war (the semantics of the matter^), and of when, and why, wars and military actions Firstly, retain were accounted unjust war is essentially a matter of states and their control: or wrong. to elaborate the OED account, war is ’hostile contention by means of armed forces, carried on between nations, states, or rulers, or between parties in the same nation or state’ for control of the state : literal, but transferred, antagonists or players; other metaphoric, forces comprising senses of etc.? States armed the ’war’ noun not the protagonists, are soldiers are are the means of contention or combat, and combat or forceful (typically violent) exchange is the actual experience. function of remove states: Thus wars are external or internal (civil), states or their rule. but always, a An obvious way then to eliminate wars is to in short, wars are an outcome of political structure, and are �Page 3 altering the structure . by removed This is an initial reason why the radical argument against nuclear wars and deterrence devolves into an argument the (self-legitimised) war-declarers and war-makers, against states. the traditional theory, wars were restricted to external against In fact on which wars, were construed as the right of states or their rulers (princes) for certain political purposes, the argument being that private persons with grievences had access the while courts, did not states legitimate (wars were, so to speak, the international But this is itself a very analogue of the law courts). the 9 to statist conception of the semantics is not so restrictive and permits place of wars; internal wars, for example, to end wars. Let us however - to bring out what is different now - confine attention a basic and most familiar case, external wars between two states or set (axes) of states, two-player external wars. games competitive could be won. It was assumed be well no winning strategy. waste of the Northern huge surrounding areas of countryside. hemisphere and not like a draw, or like the strange out for the simultaneously knock each other element, emphasis the inevitable is disputes, removed: be pointfully fought. Certainly, elements of gamesmenship had a role count.) in for, deterrence, earlier wars, (So where two boxers situation on pure deterrence; that are most elaborately prepared for (exercised never the settled with main protagonists substantially obliterated^, and all is is there Thus too the point of main players very substantially worse off than at the outset of the "play". it like An LN war could involve destruction of all war as traditionally seen, to settle serious interstate nothing wars, that With LN wars it no longer holds; main Western metropolitan agglomerations in laying firstly That assumption still held good for massive armed exchanges such as the World Wars. may to Hence another newer the phenomenon of wars etc.), but which can bluff, and the other it was not but pure �Page 4 deterrence. to principle important, Most military next, traditional and targets military gross ways to uninvolved parties sacrifice effects nuclear of large nuclear wars cannot (presented horrifying in be confined in be could This exchanges. feature is for, as we shall see, wars that spill over in fundamental as regards just wars; special wars any The morality. to pretension explosives, especially in mass, mean however that legitimately detail in confined. popular These effects special sources such as Schell) include radioactivity, ozone destruction, shockwaves, fireball or firestorm devastation, etc., etc . . .. The moral situation, and the tendency of moral §2. entirely in the context of war. submerged case of war to maintain a firm grasp on the expediency. What is to considerations become It is particularly important in the distinction between morality done in war, especially for local or national advantage, may be very different from what ought morally to be done, whether the latter ought not to be done codes and conventions of war, or otherwise in war is done, despite modern . military conventions and the like, for one (alleged) advantage or another. live in a rather barbarous age: go unremarked, if so numbing, codes the history gets written (accurately) that is. tends 13 to induce a and Militarily we will the horrors of the twentieth century military thinking and strategic planning is A , Much that 12 the using determined and not Furthermore certain moral that a range of morally excluded actions, such as wiping our rural populations, become real ("moral’') possibilities, to be reckoned, for example, into consequentialist calculations of maximising expediency. The reason is that strategic planning is characteristically based on expediency (and extent displaces morality). so to that For each side in a military encounter determines its "strategy" by considering only its own advantages and disadvantages, its own gains and losses as a result of alternative possible moves, not, as it ought, �Page 5 those of the other side(s) as well. Indeed it has been contended that war should be planned and conducted way, no-holds-barred-combat fought to the maximal (local) advantage, without a limits, moral or other (except insofar as technology limits the means of etc., themselves). Such is the And Clausowicz tries to repeated. argue, through 14 an be broken by player each in from And the argument is inconclusive; c Thus too an It would follow for the players from the can choose 15 A state engaged in war - this will no doubt include nuclear nowadays war sees itself as entirely bound by constraints of morality: to be mere prudence on the part no-immoral-holds-barred of approach those they attacked to take - seldom it is taken account of the may well encounter, especially from the So each group potentially engaged in war forces other side. the question not as to what it ought to do in morally permissible situations, but also both what it ought really do and what it can do in the morally flawed finds enforced) escalate, and, for example, agree to abide by arranged practices, types to of weapons, etc. only The that the idea of a limited war is some sort of contradiction in terms. But it is not. not escalation externally for advantage. turn extraordinarily narrow motivational base is assumed. argument incremental ), that there can be no limit. assumption is that any merely selected (as distinct will force, so-called "classic" view of Clausowicz, oft argument (but really "the bald man" fallacy limit this itself in. But last the question does not then situations it reduce to one of expediency. There is expediency, involves. no question of morality giving or having to give way to for instance under extreme circumstances such as prospect of LN war For it is not as if shaky considerations of morality are bound to to �Page 6 give not only firm ground of expediency when the chips are down: the to way does this in fact often enough not happen in crises situations, but the fact that is both morality and expediency fall within the same, equally shaky or solid, Expediency does not (meticulously) deliver us from domain of value theory. fact, but simply takes narrowly-construed local advantage or power as to value what is valuable, as what matters; family, that urges values local - of self, region or nation - are what really count and override or class, clan, it are to be maximized at the expense of remote or considerations. foreign By morality requires, as a matter of its proper characterisation, a much contrast, more universal distribution of value thereby the through imposes, requirements general of universalizable intersubstitutivity resultant equillbity fairness, of the same results not holding when x and y are interchanged, under Not evaluations 16. certain principles, justice. and and principles, The deep expediency derives from the failure of interreplacement, of unsatisfactoriness so and only can expediency be given a deontic presentation, as expediency through such slogans as "might is right", but theories or utility do not have to be positions of expediency utilitarianism proper — morality, which if can utility meet not is locally intersubstltutivity Thus confined. requirements of unlike the war game theory, does not assign different weights which, to (say) the individual utility of Americans as opposed to Russians — is not to be dismissed as considering only expediency. There are however significant moral differences, between and utilitarians 17 deontologists especially, which serve to further complicate the moral picture Thus utilitarian approaches have seemed to justify ugly strategies and practices render as morally regards deontological principles would not permit (even with the convenient law of double effects). But this is permissible enemy best already or civilians, bending to of to that the effect some �Page 8 Characteristically, national interest is taken to differently, to override morality impose Irresistible ethical claims that dominate more ordinary ethical considerations (such as even the immorality of killing millions). as or, Schell puts it, Thus, ’What is being claimed is that one or two countries have the right to jeopardise all countries and their descendents in the name certain of beliefs’ (II, p.70). But morally national interest can do neither of those things. simply the The first is substitution of expediency for morality, which entirely lacks moral justification, while second, the the alleged moral dominance of national fails in important classes of cases, including, so the argument will Interests, go, the case of LN war. States may insist upon operating on a selfish national interest basis, let it not pretended be expediency (’’group governments. Morality it is a moral basis as distinct from one of There is no that egoism’’). works in the special dispensation moral For example, what ought be to as regards x semantically, what would happen as regards x in all ideal worlds; no difference x is an individual or States such as Israel (in its recent organisation. behaving whether just as immorally as brigands individual invasion or mass killers: difference. Certainly there are grounds on which states or claimed been conceded special moral dispensations; or for same way for groups as for individuals: there is no logical difference in the pattern of justification, or obligation. but are no more than that and do not stand up to criticism. of analysis is, analysed and it makes system, group or of are Lebanon) there is no moral their agents have but the excuses offered A satisfactory moral theory cannot furnish two (Incompatible) moralities, a state or public one and a private or individual citizen one - state expediency and individual morality - �Page 7 partisanship - since utilitarians would the reject description practices of permitted under their principles as ’ugly’ - and an objective in what follows is to avoid metaethlcal partisanship, to achieve metaethical, though of course moral, neutrality. argument can begin. several And morally there is a large area of consensus Virtually all positions cities major in agree that the 18 not from which obliteration of a LN war would be wrong - indeed morally outrageous. Where there is dissension, as there may be among nuclear strategists who seem to feel qualms no when it comes to trading loss of some American cities for some Russian ones, simply increase the costs involved, up to loss of whole nations if necessary, then try to work down again. until moral repugnance is encountered; The fact remains however that things have got substantially out of perspective, Strategic thinking, in particular, has tended to abandon, or suppress morally. moral considerations (as indeed many theories of the state also pretend to do). Naturally the fact of broad consensus as to the morality of the matter does not mean that there are none who would welcome such outrageous happenings, that total nuclear destruction of the North even, would be Consider the world empire. be realised. rising southern (hemisphere) no one’s While the superpowers of the north remain SS’s dream Thus his best strategy, exchange in the North. There advantage. strongman, SS, who has visions of will can be to a encourage point an all-out then in securing institutional arrangements so that potential SS’s do not accumulate much especially given the that is to anticipate: has its limitations, structural adjustments. hardly rid of southern waters of US having submarines and southern lands of US bases, is to try nuclear to power, apparent instability of crucial world arrangements. the present point is that (the fact of) moral and is an inadequate But consensus constraint without accompanying �Page 9 19 because this would lead to violations of substitutivity , neutrality, etc. instance, a state operative x could use state cover morally impermissible ways, ways ruled out (e.g. y are permuted. derivative A group or organisation or in consideration can but role, bound be by moral principles. special these are derivative principles, good for any such institution, which fit within and answer general in y by state interests) when x and person its of virtue citizen damage to For back to So it is also with a state which is an institutional arrangement justified (insofar as it is) by the way it answers back to some least) its of citizens: its (at charter does not legitimate emergent allegedly moral principles which conveniently coincide with those of state expediency. particular, In state is not (morally) entitled to risk the lives of many of its a own citizens and of other peoples and creatures for its own ends, even its for own survival. §3. Arguments to the Immorality of LN wars. can which set be since aside, the concede that war per se is not a crime. but pacifist positions immorality of LN wars follows at once - Not all wars are immoral, though states. aristocratic Among young men admissible wars are the external tournaments or of or warriors who volunteer as soldiers where the action does not spill over onto noncombatants, and some early and medieval wars, few even wars may be pointless or inferior ways of settling political issues inoffensive between All no combatants even were killed in war. where Since the establishment of such induction practices as conscription and recruitment of the near-destitute, have largely ceased to take these inoffensive forms: far removed from the ideal ecotopian literature war-tournament (where type, that its position is dubious). immoral, but few to such an extent as LN wars. wars modern massive wars are features now only in Most sorts of wars are �Page 10 argument The first key to (1KA) the of (and wars LN of immorality sufficiently large-scale wars generally) takes the following form: Pi. The deliberate killing in mass of noncombatants is wrong. Pli. LN wars involve the killing in mass of noncombatants. (KA) What involves what is wrong is wrong. Piii . LN wars are wrong. J Supplementary remarks are called for:- Firstly, the (1KA) is one just representative of a Characteristically, in Western culture, it is arguments of that thought argument given of type. mass this taken But the focus can be off the killing: destruction of a first variation on (KA) replaces ’killing the is basis of may each be attacked of its premisses. wrong is as There slack by a has in effect been Let us consider these in that what involves are, in particular, such those generated by Good Samaritan arguments, which purport to show that some proper obligations involve wrongdoing. too noncombatants’ wrong, often expanded to a "distribution of obligation over entailment" principle, has been challenged. problems (and The principle, Piii, used in the argument, reverse order. what of Other variations will emerge in the discussion. but The argument is valid, on mass Thus concerning ’huge destruction of lifestyle of uninvolved or not clause directly involved creatures’. attacked) in of lifestyle nonhumans and humans alike that an LN war will bring is sufficiently evil. suitable of killing about the worst thing that can happen (after the killing of police). is humans set particular a notion of involvement; linked to paradox-free entailment 20 But the problems derive from with a tighter Involvement connective, , the problems disappear, and Piii stands. �Page 11 As against Pii, it may be legitimately argued against directed nuclear that military targets. wars can encounters be But given the character of nuclear weapons, LN wars could in no way be confined to such targets. merely the likelihood that many missiles explode off target. not the other effects of large-scale nuclear bombings, for example down-wind fallout There is There are all the radioactive military targets, which in the case of US and European from targets especially will effect large concentrations of people, Including therein perhaps uninvolved countries such as Canada. There may be an attempt to avoid the problem of massive civilian casualties by appeal to such dubious principles as the doctrine of double effect (or side 21 effect) If missiles were characteristically was which intended only to destroy an reliably underground unmanned unfortunately went off course and destroyed a large city, it the that Such claims should be rejected: not wrongness lessened could make a difference; for firing the city. the and one missile silo could be claimed mass destruction is legitimised under the double effect (unintended) principle. target, on the action would be wrong, and by the given intention. the Nonetheless the circumstances for they may mitigate attitudes to those responsible missile, since it was not as if they had deliberately aimed at The double effect principle confuses [diminution of] the allocation of responsibility for an act with the [diminution of] wrongness of the act. As against Pi, and as regards the middle term of Pi argued that there is an important equivocation. the bracketed term, killing ’deliberate’. While it will and Pii, it may be The equivocation is induced by be that admitted deliberate of genuine innocents is impermissble , it will be contended firstly that they noncombatants, insofar as innocent, directly many being are distinguishable, involved in are by no means all military effort, whether just as �Page 12 taxpayers or as suppliers of goods farmers or services used innocent. second The point Because Pii so amended in less defensible, and/or other reasons, discussed. leave to out the "modifier" ’deliberate’. of the perpetrators. it What is important for the present purposes is the moral status of what is done, not that motives e.g. military, a much narrower - and less defensible - version of premiss Pll already concerns best the and secondly LN wars do not involve the or bootmakers or entertainers; deliberate killing of those properly excluded as is by mixed with the So ’deliberate’ is out, equivocation is avoided, 22 Pii stands, and so does Pl. For not does Pi ’deliberate’, or ’intentional’ or the like. require the qualification Admittedly also ’noncombatant’ is a fuzzy term, but none the worse for that, and there is no problem serious in marking out a class of clear noncombatants, people who are not directly involved in the command and action chains. practice, deriving from There is, moreover, Catholicism, of no need to the adopt stating an initial version of Pi in terms of innocents - at least as problematic a class as that of noncombatants to try to characterize - and then endeavouring to make the difficult transition to noncombatants. Not only can arguments against the premisses of the argument be met, art arguments for the premisses, though for the substantive moral premiss Pi they are of the characteristically nonconclusive moral sort vary somewhat with the underlying ethical theory. and will tend seriously understate the point) minimal respect owed to them as persons doing so 23 The argument from historical requirements on just wars from convergence. conclusion that fails to treat them with the §4. The to For example, one argument for Pi, and for objecting to the killing of noncombatants, is the Kantian one, (to there that and the argument LN wars cannot be justly waged - and �Page 13 accordingly are unjustified - is not merely something dreamed up by contemporary opponents The same conclusion falls out of various traditional requirements, worked etc). out America or of the capitalist State (and communistically inspired, of times mdeieval in just for variant on the key argument (1KA). was justly that not it be One of the requirements gives but a wars. For a necessary condition for fighting a war the that case noncombatants are bound to be killed (cf. numbers large [innocent] of Barnes, p.775). A just war requires just means, that the war should be fought morally by which implies in particular that there is no indiscriminate killing of noncombatants. The implied principle was escapsulated in a principle legitimate of means, (between combatants and others) which ’prohibits all actions discrimination directly Intended to take the lives of p.312) 24 civilians and of (PL, noncombatants’ LN wars, where not only military installations are targeted, violate . U. . 25 this requirement Overlapping the requirement of just means is that of proportion being that of net evil to net good): ’the damage to be inflicted and costs Incurred by the war must be proportionate to the good expected up arms’ (PL, p.312). disproportionate to moral goods proportionality requirement is criterion of by the which achieved in doctrine "improvement" through war : not are of that nationally way. confined, overall consequences of abstaining improvement "puts wrongs to rights": "ameliorative" conditions and war according to the first, justly the ’X wages war bad, from war’ (Barnes, p.72). ’A nation wages war are Entangled with the justly upon y if the overall consequences of war are better, or less the taking is not difficult to see that LN wars violate this It the damage and costs, requirement: (the proportionality only than Similarly if the for that nation or the wronged nation it is supporting have a decent �Page 14 chance of being better after the fighting ends’ (Wakin, p.20). way LN war can in no satisfy these conditions, as scenarios depicting the aftermath of such wars reveal. Some of the lesser requirements for a just war are infringed wars; LN It seems that there can for example, that of reasonable expectation of success. be no reasonable expectation of success in an LN by war, the whatever prospects of success with more limited nuclear exchanges. (limited) What is less clearcut is the question of whether LN wars conflict with the requirements of just cause or due fault and of right intention. For this depends on the sensitive issue of the weight assigned to what are seen as basic rights human and fundamental values, and the extent to which just wars can be ideologically justified. the mainstream justified position and wars definitively excluded however, in puzzling of medieval "humanitarian" by the over decisive against LN wars. theory wars (cf. traditional was opposed to While ideologically Barnes, p.778), these were not theory. There is merit, little dubiously effective requirements, when so many are Finally, these arguments from historical requirements do not violate prescriptive requirements: the argument is not a simple argument from historical authority, but also premisses uses requirements imposed (and used) were justified. the to effect that the As they are. In the Christian tradition there were two main strands of reflection on the moral rightness or justness of wars 9A , the just war theory and a rival pacificist strand, prominent in early Christianity, but submerged from Augustine on until contemporary times. Both exclude nuclear wars, one strand because they are inevitably unjust, the other because they are wars and This is the involve violence beginning of the convergence argument against nuclear wars: such wars are excluded from all ethical perspectives, once expediency is 27 that duly �Page 15 The detailed argument They are morally wrong however you look at it. removed. is an exhaustive case by case one, from each type of moral theory. can details For deontological and contractual theories lead back be shortcut. to requirements for a just war, violate. Fortunately which it has already shown, been In fact conditions for just wars were sometimes arrived at or defended through principles of such moral theories, so that a good deal of the work argumentative already has brand utilitarian of finally accomplished; for such and is adopted, not is far to have effect in shown pleasure, reason The wars Involves such massive that this dominates genuine alternative to LN war is better or 28 outlined against overwhelming moral case against such wars. wars LN do not exhaust the For there are other moral principles (derivative in some of the theories just considered) which the waging of war would violate. in are accomplished in utilitarian fashion, so that any they The arguments given LN that utility maximisation is however seek: infliction of pain and colossal removal of however others requisite latter point holds also as LN wars are excluded on utilitarian grounds. convergence assessments The done. been regards utilitarianism, where Lackey whatever wars LN an LN Among such principles are conservative ones, that we have an obligation to maintain the earth in proper shape and not degrade its systems, that we have a responsibility to future generations, to whom we are accountable, to "pass the world on" not in substantially worse condition it". Such conservative principles than we "received - however they are finally satisfactorily formulated - are bound to be violated in the event of an LN war. §5. The shift to nuclear lobby nuclear arguments deterrence: to its immorality. The has a way of halting, and if not defeating, certainly deflating, arguments against the immorality of LN wars, namely there is no actual �Page 16 such any In engagement wars. different from engagement in war: LN being done is, it is claimed, quite is What is deterrence indeed important most precisely in preventing such wars from ever occurring, as well as in maintaining (other) fundamental [Western] values. obtaining desiderata. both is deterrence pronouncements, claims The reasons:- A first reason is that Indeed it is the only there are is much for more than deterrence can account neither for strategy military Western disarmament to expected be On deterrence. 29 the despite For if it and sometimes even a drive for superiority. this, actual nuclear of In fact there has been a were "sufficiency" to deter would be an adequate goal. quest that, evidence the - the only - military goal. not way dubious, for several decidedly too practical nor weapons for Pure orthodox Nor has deterrence set in motion the process of . to armaments reduce "its" under contrary, to levels impulse there sufficient has for been almost unlimited acceleration in building arms (PL, p.318, quotes inserted). Another of deterrence reason for the type serious that is doubt being concerns other reasons also, connected with pure deterrence The reasons include the for nuclear war and with to For original (its threatening posture deterrence for, the propaganda that must be promulgated to maintain credibility with a population whose interests are being etc. conditions the "cold war", the probability of a LN war has increased considerably in the last 30 years. calls factor: to that extent, at least, enhanced its prospects of occurring. and setting) probability practised, which involves full-scale preparation for nuclear war, has prepared the occur, the The "sacrificed" for objectives, situation has now been reached where many theorists think there is a high probability at least of an LN war this century, i.e. certainly military be before 2000. It can argued - though there seems no way to make any such a probability argument at all tight, and it may be demonstrable that it cannot be made tight - �Page 17 that there is a non-negligible probability of an LN war before 2000. If it is wrong that X should occur, then it is also wrong that Cl. be But highly probably that should it X occur, and it is wrong to increase the probability that X occur. This is the first several of connecting doxastic mapping principles moral considerations against LN war into arguments against deterrence of LN war by the perverse practice of preparing for it and thereby helping "to the sense of raising the probability). (in it bring about" But like most principles in ethics, Cl requires complication to avoid defeat by counterexamples. The second part of Cl encounters apparent trouble where clash of principles occurs. Thus it may be argued that it is permissible to increase the probability that X occurs to avoid a greater Consider for example the pilot who increases the probability evil. that the passenger plane he is flying crashes in order to aircraft troubled does not make hit city apartment buildings 30 . sure Such a defeating condition does not apply in the case of nuclear deterrence where is there (though of principles) wrongness of a practice is not offset or removed by clash a the that its role in avoiding greater evil. It can be argued that it is; argument from the previous such is part of success of the deterrence. point of the popular This inductive argument deserves little more credence than the racing driver’s argument, perhaps from similar that because he hasn’t had a fatal crash yet (despite some base, time a close calls), he won’t. There are, furthermore, reasons for concluding continue to work. of will not One is the deterrence depends upon judgements regarding the other side, which may be mistaken: perception deterrence that what strategy ’each is is at rational", the mercy what kind the of of other’s damage is �Page 18 one "unacceptable", how "convincing" Not p.313). threat side’s other’ the (PL. as rational, regards limited but there must be severe doubts as to whether rational principles war, As to the last consider, for example, the are operating effectively. idea to is there evidence that one side (the USA) has misjudged the only other side’s (the USSR’s) perception of what is nuclear is (already erroneous to, as held in high places of power) that LN war can be alluded survived in rudimentary shelters, and also won. Deterrence consists in preventing something (often some wrong) by threats including 31 OED) . (cf. fright For most people without not Immoral destruction of New York.) deterrence, that is his graphic descriptions But though deterrence per deterrence from suchmeans is of course not immoral. publishing in them LN expense, trouble and wastage of preparing to enormous And deterrence by engage in them. was the all or scenarios vivid portraying the horror or LN wars would serve adequately to deter wars, fear by complete se is the of (Schell nuclear permissible, war preparation of the object to be prevented, is not, where this object Itself is not permissible. The argument for this is through the principle C2. If X is wrong then complete preparation of X is wrong. Hence since LN wars are wrong and war-deterrence implies of LN wars is wrong. war—deterrence X is just as bad as doing X: Y. preparation, It is not being claimed that preparing for Y and Z may both be wrong and Z (much) worse than , 32 What is wrong is by no means uniformly evil Principle C2 principles: a part is way succeeds or down the line in a series of connecting principle of the same sort that it higher in the series is that connecting X with attempted X: X complete not 33 . But if X is wrong then attempted X is wrong, whether the series ends; it cuts off well before mere �Page 19 intentionality, contrary to the claims example, it does various of religious For positions. not follow that if X is wrong then the contemplation of X is wrong or that mere non-action-oriented consideration of carrying out X is wrong. The applies point nightmares. or war, equally sexual fantasies, power fantasies, and nuclear to In particular there is nothing reflecting upon it, as we are: wrong nuclear nuclear wars, even if their horrors don't bear thinking on, are not unthinkable, and in thinkable. contemplating with some senses are all too Indeed one of the reasons why the connecting principles hold is that each involves decidedly increased probability of the evil outcome it connects Accompanying the increased probability are certain sets of reprehensible with. these are not those attitudes tied to the action the evil outcome involves; mere passive contemplation of 34 this War-deterrence involves not only war preparation, but announcement of accompanied by threats and a threatening posture. For some party, the potential enemy, has to be frightened, if deterrence is to succeed. This aspect of (war-) deterrence yields a further connecting principle, If X is wrong then threatening X is also wrong. C3. is wrong to do ... then the declared Intent put to that Intending to do wrong is wrong, and so also is favourable circumstances for one’s alternatively be argued semantically: (e.g. into Intending position committing 35 . rape) The is practice is also wrong. to prevail. if a world with X 'What Ramsey: is wrong to threaten ...’ (quoted in Walzer p.272) reason is that if putting something into practice wrong Thus too is do wrong The never unless point ideal can then neither is a world in which X is only conditionally blocked, in which X may well occur. �Page 20 By detachment from the connecting principles - one sound one would but logically, defensible three ones is good measure - nuclear deterrence by preparation for and threat of LN war is This wrong. also reveals suffice Deterrence wrong. of this type the suggestion that the morality of the whole why deterrence thing depended on war itself never occurring was so bizarre: connections between war and war-deterrence. the out is it left War-deterrence should not be practised any more than nuclear war itself should be engaged in - unless directions can be drastically changed (e.g. its at least limited, per impossible in the case of nuclear, to purely military targets). There are other concomitant reasons for the Firstly, with dissatisfaction deterrence. it has provided (nuclear peace, as there is no shortage of peace small-scale conventional wars) is at least a tenuous peace, which is not stable, liable but upset at any stage by a range of factors, including error (both to It does not offer genuine peace, of the sort required for human and technical). a international life, but only a fragile "peace of a sort" (PL, p.316). stable Secondly, there is enormous cost, the because on expenditure it moral excludes Bishops put their point in a surprising opportunity urgent other by Marxist cost of deterrence, The US moral priorities. way: in terms of ’the between what is spent for destructive capacity and what is needed contradiction for constructive development’ (PL, p.316). §6. The and super-states; arguments to persuasive prudential practical, the the resulting arguments (that have war persuaded justifiability of nuclear war preparation in basic argument is simply an elaboration, build-up nuclear situation. moral-fix nuclear of immorality to argument Not preparation; many the or theorists) present of the only are there there to are the circumstances. also moral The state-uplift, of that for the �Page 21 escalation of weapons at the local level, for acquiring a gun or for stocking-up the armoury [and every bit as doubtful as that argument]. neighbourhood that nuclear preparation, first danger: of nuclear destruction. blackmail, ’so we have been told, against guards all atomic blackmail and foreign domination; The two together, go since if did we double the and second of not the fear we might adopt a policy of appeasement or surrender and so avoid the destruction’ (Walzer, p.273). In fact it is supposed to guard against more than there is a crucial third element, namely, loss of basic rights (freedom, these; equality, etc.) and fundamental values (preservation of etc.) and ways of life integrated with these. truth, dignity, human This further set of elements is linked to the danger of foreign domination - which is really a separate from It is risk blackmail. of element Though foreign domination need not imply the loss of most basic values it does imply the loss of at least of one, self-determination, freedom to choose various national objectives; conversely loss or infringement of basic values can occur without foreign domination, e.g. of by internal change government or governmental approach, by the increased security and control a nuclear state demands, etc. values, through Nuclear destruction can also involve loss of destruction but the converse does not hold. basic of the material base of the cherished life-style; It should be observed that not all the values concerned are equally fundamental: one of the main values of deterrence theory, the resistance to and of containment "communism", is questionable this in regard. The theme is, in short, NA. Because of multiple (connected) states) which have nuclear dangers from another state (or other weapons, a state - any state that is too large to rely upon other states - is obliged to invest in [matching] nuclear weapons. �Page 22 Hence, by detachment, a nation-state, such as USA, ought to order the of nuclear armoury that it something have in has, or, weakening the theme to meet objections concerning excess, "overkill", capacity, at least a solid core of the nuclear devices it has. out whether the obligation is a moral one, Sorting because for instance of the character of the values supposedly being merely or one protected, of prudential reason - it is presumably somewhat more than mere expediency - can be set aside for the present. On the same basis it can be argued that unilateral disarmament against a dangerous nuclear opponent would be prudentially irrational. It can be freely admitted that what is prudentially required is, like the common strategies of the prisoners’ dilemma situation and of certain competitive games, a suboptimal strategy; sufficient trust, that a superior strategy for adversaries, if etc., could be achieved, would be a cooperative arrangement. Joint agreement would be better not merely in removing the moral dilemma, but in a range of other respects: it would be much less risky, expensive, draining of resources and destructive of the environment, etc. However for the present and the foreseeable future the prospects of cooperation appear, so we are repeatedly told, unfortunately rather remote: or the only sure insurance is nuclear if one is a smaller nation, a larger ally who has an arsenal. force (Here a level of trust is called for which is far from foolproof, and which contrasts strongly with the lack of trust displayed elsewhere.) The nuclear theme for a middling or lesser power is a bit different from NA and ends rather as follows: MA. Because ..., a state that cannot rely on obliged ally. its own nuclear resources is to accommodate the nuclear installations and facilities of a protecting �Page 23 Principle MA is not very plausible, nor are the for substitutes obvious Not only MA but also NA, is now coming under question by disarmament it ° . who groups, more challenge the basic assumptions of the underlying general retaliatory model that Safely lies in weapons, and 1) More weapons imply more security ii) 37 Certainly, for more isolated states, such as New Zealand, lies attack submarines). more of a in excluding nuclear facilities from safety nuclear (including visits from nuclear Europeans are arguing in a similar way, that the present system is risk [liability] than a protection (p.251, Thompson); nuclear installations, Europe cannot be the envisaged and without for theatre a limited nuclear war it is now seen as by US (but not Soviet) strategists. Once i) and ii) are questioned, other assumptions of the retaliatory model and its variants come up for examination, namely iii) iv) Whether the proper response to danger is armament, in particular Whether the proper response is through nuclear armament, as opposed to other military responses (such as conventional arms), and generalising on part of Hi), v) Whether military approaches/procedures (through armaments, etc.) the proper is method, or should be the method, of conflict resolution at the international level. It is plausibly argued against military procedures that at no ordinary level do we set about meeting danger or settling disputes by acquiring lethal weapons and threatening to use them - except perhaps warranted, frontier ethics. But on an out-dated, and never really this takes us into the issue of alternative defence systems, an important matter beginning to obtain the contemporary 38 explanation it deserves, but one that already anticipates subsequent questioning �Page 24 While the state system is intact, of the framework of nation-states. not and exceptional inevitable: according military to is are to be expected and are likely permanent place in the procedures ’force has [a] ... force nation-state system’ Ramsey (p.xv) who uses this as part of his case for a nuclear war doctrine. far Assembling the arguments so to as the nuclear fix:- referred hereafter developed engage to sections) it is and immoral, in war-deterrence, for prudential reasons (as argued using NA This dilemma is no idle construction and MA). dilemma, deontic States both ought not to engage in war-deterrence, because (as argued in previous ought the yields (concocted to demonstrate of paraconsistent logic), but a serious real-life dilemma, the outlines virtues of which are repeatedly encountered in texts on nuclear war and its aspects The nuclear fix is in part simply a more intense dilemma beyond produced purely by itself^, war military typically transport, (since targets rely on or version of deontic the civilian ones). e.g. arrangements, military rail The main dilemma arises from a War is required for defence of the state and values it upholds (or pretends to uphold); also involves immoral acts and evil consequences. also seen be ’some The doctrine "just of justifications of war evil alm are consequences to morally war’ (Walls, p.260). dilemmas, e.g. most difficult war" the aegis War and preparedness for war also generate subsidiary a severe tension between freedom and problems justified. show that actions deemed normally forbidden by moral mandates are now permissible when performed under of but war as attempting a reconciliation by trying to show that under certain circumstances these really Thus 39 at least war which spreads inevitably combination of the retaliatory model with the features of war. can the of war Involves authority: defending a ’one of the free society without �Page 25 destroying the values that give it meaning and validity’ (PL, p.324). The essential feature of a moral dilemma is that both A and the negation of A are well essential role of moral dilemmas is not widely or literature 41 The place and (or differently, obligatory), for some suitable A. wrong . positions Moreover understood utilitarianism like cannot ethical in at all easily accommodate moral dilemmas or the data which gives rise to them - but then such positions do not really offer reportive accounts of wrong and obligation anyway. Contrary to utilitarian perceptions a dilemma does not any have necessarily moral solution, though there may be better and worse ways out. Reactions and responses that are characteristic of the from nuclear moral dilemmas There is an unsteadiness, an uncertainty as to what to fix. do, which way to proceed, which principles in watered-down form to temporary Thus, crutch. for world’ best" 42 as a of way "morally never our exercising moral , that is in a morally-strapped world. ethical Bishops who the of ’strictly conditional’ moral fix. Deterrence has a strictly temporary role but can be responsibility a shift "morally in a fallen to a ’moral "second acceptability’ try to escape ’the paradox of deterrence’, i.e. while acceptability, good", A similar deterrence we as (as from good to acceptable) is made by the US Catholic functor speak grasp example, the Bishop of London contends that the possession of nuclear weapons ’while acceptable" emerge the object must and strictly be to move beyond deterrence, of from the conditional ’towards a world free of the threat of deterrence’ (PL, p.317), out of the nuclear fix. To make matters worse the nuclear fix is is, not furthermore, a fix of (more something they happened into, by affluent) states’ accident. The initial nuclear involvement was deliberately chosen, primarily by USA, and the own making. It escalation has by and large also been deliberately chosen, again �Page 26 In these respects the situation is like that often by the USA. who person deliberately lets perself to be involved in two incompatible relations, and that currency, of adoption nuclear is the that nuclear build-up. The recent (1980) programme is to be in addition to existing are (which Soviet USA Initiated nuclear armament, and has frequently led escalation, and apparently still does. resources some weaponry, and nuclear build-up, in North America occurred on a defensive basis in response to fact with It is a myth, though one builds up conflicting obligations thereby. The the of generally United strategic be already in excess of to agreed States’ Russia’s, and which always have been so) (Thompson, p.21). The present dilemma is then a direct outcome advanced of state policy, especially by capitalist nations, and not merely a response to the Soviets (or state socialism). There is a two-way connection between world political arrangements and nation-states the nuclear fix. On the one hand, situation increasingly is political arrangements / Q ; seen political these arrangements are an evident source of the dilemma with the result through that nuclear as indicating the inadequacy of present world on the other, the nuclear fix tends to lock political arrangements into the statist form (into statist arrangements of an increasingly centralist cast). peace The espoused purpose of nuclear weapons may be to keep the (!) and to defend national interests, but there are other reasons such as perpetuating the system of sovereign states and politically confrontation. The argument to the theme that advantageous the very nuclear situation arising from the statist arrangements and interrelationals (economic conflicting rivalries, ideologies, etc.) tends to, and is used to, lock the world into the present arrangements of sovereign states and zones of interest, is practical state one. Consider first, the matter from a piecemeal the Soviet side where the �Page 27 pattern of national control and military economic reorientation is clearer. The threat from the West, whether it exists or not (and in Soviet perception it certainly does), has become a necessary legitimation for the power of the ruling elites, an excuse for their many economic and social failures, and an argument to isolate and silence critics within their own borders. In the West we have controlled carefully ... and ... selective release of ’official information’ (Thompson, p.20). Secondly, there is evidence of entrenchment of the arrangements, by the SALT negotiations: of rules not regarded as threatening US in place by The Soviet invasion interests", and so the US is not "vital What was different, what particularly worried about Afghanistan and its people. it held penalty for breaking the rules is the threat of annihilation). (the Thirdly, there are cases, such as the Afghanistan example. is shown there are fixed superpowers and a (growing) nuclear club of nations all governed by a negotiated set deterrence as was worried about and made nuclear threats concerning, were adjacent Western these lay within the US zone of interest. oil supplies: 44 and complicates other dilemmas The nuclear fix enhances contemporary sovereign state, in particular the deep tensions between national security and the operation of liberal-democratic arrangements (e.g. liberty, popular control of institutions, etc). personal subsidiary dilemmas, as for example the obligations to a nuclear conflicting obligations the by induced as state, a or doctor It also spotlights other more extent role-induced or a individual nuclear of (political) one’s dilemmas armaments such as one’s processor or researcher (the question of political obligations is considered in Appendix 2). §7. Ways out of the moral dilemmas: [initial] political fall-out from the �Page 28 conclusions. ethical all the ways are ways of limitation, and they Virtually all Involve in one way or another limitations on nuclear arms or are limitations on the powers of states. and deployed the they way The limitations may be 45 reached by agreement and negotiation and more or less voluntarily agreed , to or they may be imposed, or worst of all, they may emerge from an initial war. As with other fixes produced by are there suggested structure there and relations power and extra—state approaches. "realistic", attempts All to cow, as unilateral disarmament. is it states the or alter the remove them altogether, allegedly familiar, the seriously do which and "practical" nuclear problem - e.g. disarmament by they do not tamper with that - are inter-state; But in fact there is nothing very sacred not even a very long-standing arrangement, nor, as a matter or empirical fact, is one. states, of and the same goes for less "realistic" proposals, such the state; nation-state; arrangements which ways are of resolve neutral arms limitations, etc. sacred structural out which do not interfere with these arrangements, ways inter-state approaches, the it form about the political of particularly a stable We are certainly free - in more liberal states, it should be everywhere - to theorise as to its demise and replacement by alternative arrangements. Extra-state approaches take one of two routes, the way up, to genuine 46 power, or the way down, through fractionation or deunionisation international of states. not to The ways up and down are by no means one and the same; necessarily world government Were law-courts. remedy, namely intra-state incompatible. the through to Some of the important machinery, for the way up operate, courts legal but they are is assigned action, already there sufficient that medieval the international authority and power, the in theorists saw to all disputes could be extended to interstate disputes, and the just war �Page 29 between states S and T superseded by the just case of S versus T. one statist, more legalistic of trying to get to grips with the nuclear way problem, and accordingly is often mentioned, though dismissed 47 in , orthodox The Way Up is mostly passing in strategic texts on thermonuclear war. It is however beginning to be much more sympathetically considered by those who take rather than strategic viewpoint. moral a There is a renewed emphasis on world order, in reaching ’towards a morally integrated international system’; element be to and ’the missing of world order today is the absence of a properly constituted political The Way Down - though, like The Way authority’ (PL, p.320). by Up, no means new, turning back to the anarchist positions of a century ago - is, by contrast, scarcely mentioned in the orthodox discussions, but is making an appearance (a which is comeback) in some more radical discussions. A main argument for The Way Up is to supposed underpin statist just arrangements a repetition in first the argument from (generous) variations upon the Prisoners’ that of place, namely the Dilemma, the as such Tragedy of the Commons, that authority and coercion - in the form of the state are requiried to ensure best solutions, ecological order. especially regards of part the sort of super-state. of the "tragedy" is destruction when to assume in fact assumptions 48 of a commons by nuclear war, the solution is now said to be some Of course, this begins to undermine an earlier application argument, since states will lose their sovereignty, and political obligation to states will be correspondingly weakened. is and order So with the "tragedy of nation-states", where the players are not herdsmen but nation-states, and one of the prospects good public But all this that these "tragedy" arguments are good ones in the first place, they are not but are only sound under quite restrictive �Page 30 There are many problems with the Way Up, both theoretical and practical.An theoretical hitch is that the Way Up merely repeats statist arrangments initial at a level up, by way contingency, of super-state It arrangements. only is through a of there being no rival Intelligent civilisations nearby, that the problems of interstate relations not are repeated level a The up. major practical hitch is that there is no prospect at all of getting such a "solution" to work in time to serve its intended interstate future the For purpose. ideological differences, including especially differences as to how political arrangements should be effected, exclude world operative hostilities. government of prospect any an or world legal system capable of resolving nuclear In some ways, perhaps, this is just World well. as government be extremely monolithic, would entrench bureaucracy with all its damaging would features, and could easily tend to totalitarianism. on nuclear foreseeable the It would impose certainly an exploitative economic system which would do immense damage to world many remaining natural systems. The Way Up thus presupposes an unlikely, undesirable, level ideological, indeed requisite unity of political paradigmatic, cannot be and and expected unity economic separation with some in of nuclear main crucial respects, Moreover, given the Northern cultures, deadlines. When not even nuclear weapons limitations can be worked out how much less likely much more sweeping sovereignty, could be agreements, negotiated? Involving genuine There an is is limitations almost endless that it of state series of blockages and deadlocks in the way of such state reconciliation. The nuclear fix emerging from nation-state arrangements - combined with the apparent impotence of interstate relations to alleviate the situation, indeed with the ability only to push the world further into the situation and nearer to �Page 31 nuclear now is - "brink" taken to indicate (from yet a further angle) the inadequacy of nation-state political arrangements, and has given new impetus resolutions. extra-state other of consideration to The thesis that the nuclear problem indicates the radical unsatisfactoriness of national sovereignty and the present system namely in Schell. ’full-scale nation states has even reached the best-seller book stands, of According to Schell the nuclear situation should they operate' ... which himself avoids these reality and in ’workfing] out the practical steps by which 'awesome (III, p.92). Schell However urgent tasks, which, imposed on us by history, constitute the political work of our age’^9, history consonant with the global can reorganise its political life’ mankind ... a of the foundations of political thought’ required to reexamination make ’the world’s political institutions ... in to lead So, not feeling the pressures of overimpressed by the realities of (unstable) nation-states, do most or political theorists. But, having rashly ventured this far, we can hardly avoid some of these tasks. The central argument arising from the nuclear fix, for questioning political arrangements and seriously current considering changing them (in theory at least), takes the following shape:- H1. Political arrangements should answer back to certain requirements and justified in terms of doing so. are These requirements include such things as enabling good and meaningful lives for those who operate under the arrangements, at least where (as certainly in the West) the basic material conditions for such lives are met. H2. these Because of the nuclear fix, nation-state arrangements have ceased to requirements. For guarantee the prospect of arrangements. nation-states, good and at meaningful meet least in the North can no longer lives to those under their A life's meaningfulness is certainly diminished if it ends before �Page 32 its prime in a nuclear disaster; yet there is a non-negligible probability that many such lives may terminate, less than fulfilled, in this way. Therefore, Nation-state arrangements have forfeited their justification, H3. should and be changed. There is enough evidence that power brokers who control states, both more powerful states and lesser states (sometimes with some claim to popular mandate, often without), have lost sight of - or worse don’t care about - the point of political arrangments, of what justifies or is supposed to justify their states. The situation has been reached where ’nuclear powers, or higher value This is already illustrated by states in nonnuclear military situations: have much forfeited of what claim Vietnam Israel, many and the principles of just warfare have been blatantly violated repeatedly, as have many states put statesmen, on national sovereignty than they do on human survival’ (Schell’s conclusion, p.76). other their they Such principles. other had to external respect or internal political obedience. It could just be, of course, that there are no alternatives, or no possibly better But alternatives. alternatives there are, as we have seen, though but little work has been expended on working out the range of alternatives or features (except perhaps for the option of world government). As to whether all such alternatives can be dismissed, for instance as lacking feasibility, difficult to be all sure without being dogmatic: operate, once adjusted, very far on organising is humans, for under substantially different arrangments. But, once again, nuclear deadlines do not appear proceed it alternatives have been given very little opportunity to work, and we know very little about how instance, their to give sufficient time to and trying out alternative arrangments, even those of the more accessible Way Down. Thus alternative political and social �Page 33 while theoretically feasible and certainly a longer-term goal, do arrangements, not presently offer a satisfactory practical response to the nuclear fix. There is no need to insist upon a dilemma to single-track the of out nuclear We can not only quite the contrary. exclusion of all others: the way afford to be fairly catholic about "second best" approaches pursued and whatever to be working or looks like helping, within reorganised ethical seems Indeed, (and other) constraints: situation, methods, should we as such urgency, the the of direness the and nondemocratlc very (and down certainly negotiations on arms limitations between main nuclear states. The direction of most hope is given be fairly catholic and not inflexibly commited to narrow bogged unrepresentative) direction embrace for especially new. not has progress however come into view; the The political means of the Way Out are what they have been on almost every larger liberal or that issue humanitarian has from outside state governmental apparatus by organised pressure from mattered; within or without upon it, characteristically Bottom-Up Such Top-Down. familiar and practically never considerations are but part of the more general, and very effective, case against reliance upon states for a range of things they are now supposed required, to more supply, effectively but can almost Invariably be obtained, where which and less expensively without (and them their monopolies). In the case of security it is states, with very few exceptions, that have imposed, or acquiesed in, military solutions involving nuclear installations and The nuclear weapons. frequently from across nations. installations opposition local and the to neighbourhood These groups have been and establishing, for escalating groups, successful the time nuclear fix has come some of them now federated in blocking being, some some nuclear nuclear-free �Page 34 The patchwork grass-roots movement against nuclear is strongest neighbourhoods. in which Europe, - as the movement realised, and what gave it impetus - a is leading theatre, on US American touching thinking, strategic American nuclear installations in Europe will make it a contrary it probable seems nuclear limited a war that Europe safer much become will place: safer on the if the anti-nuclear movements succeed in having these installations removed and rendered nuclear-free. not is extremely doubtful that increasing NATO and It shores. for Europe The chances of grossly immoral conduct will thereby also be considerably reduced. What the movements must press for is accordingly clear it is in broad outline: what they have been pushing for, nuclear reduction and disarmament. But the argument also makes it clearer how far this should go, namely all the way to nuclear unilateral disarmament if necessary, certainly to local disarmament across progressively larger parts of the planet’s surface. is its demoted, importance and the necessity of For once the state its maintenance properly downgraded and reliance on its decision-making diminished in favour of localised decision-making (say) - once all that happens or is allowed for, one major component in the nuclear fix is removed, namely the worry about sovereignty. the of that sovereignty has of been assigned a mistaken weakest links in the moral fix structure. In the weigh-up that should occur in charting a way out of moral dilemma, much more Important elements features state The state, and accompanying features such as misplaced nationalism, importance. are Maintenance loss than the state are those things the state is supposed to safeguard such of as individual and local welfare and autonomy, but they are better ensured by the removal of nuclear weapons. The nuclear circumstances threaten the loss of basic values, autonomy, for in particular, main reasons are familiar; such as welfare and many creatures and regions, and the potential loss is in general �Page 35 much greater than in a nuclear-free situation (even should party remain armed with nuclear weapons). for example, the production (because of nuclear another ideological There are also subsidiary reasons; weapons reduces local both welfare of the opportunity costs of weapons manufacture) and autonomy (because of the accompanying security measures). Thus the nuclear fix is resolved, theoretically at loss of the state. any rate, by risking But, although that is the best way out at least cost in the circumstances, it will be strongly resisted in practice, since those who hold power hold it, in one way or another, under the auspices of state. FOOTNOTES 1. The US Catholic Bishops make the point forcefully: ’Nuclear weapons ... and nuclear warfare ... are new moral issues ... There exists a capacity to do something no other age could imagine: we can threaten the created order ... We could destroy [God’s] work’ (PL, p.312). While the analysis offered in what follows has a great deal in common with the Bishop’s position, it differs significantly in removing the religious backdrop and associated features and, it is hoped, in bringing out the logical structure of the argument more clearly and sharply (the paper was Initially drafted independently of PL). To illustrate the differences that emerge with removal of the religious backdrop and its acoutrements, consider two examples from PL, p.323:- Firstly, peace is possible without religious enlightenment if it is possible with it: religious enlightenment is not an essential condition as there implied. Secondly, violence does not take all the forms the Bishops try to give it, e.g. sexual discrimination is hardly a form of violence, pornography can operate without it, etc. It is a serious mistake to try to heap so many diverse and independent issues together under the one head (forms of violence) as if they stood and fell together, e.g. abortion and nuclear war. 2. Another dimension of variation concerns the sequence of the war, especially the type of strike involved. Though the sequence is important for the moral assessment, for example of the main actors, it is in no way alters the immorality of LN wars, as will emerge. 3. ’The overwhelming probability [is] that a nuclear exchange would have no limits’, (PL, p.314). Hence a major argument against limited nuclear wars: that any such war risks, indeed renders highly probable, an unlimited war, and risk is far too large to take. The point in fact follows by straightforward application of decision theory, multiplying the massive undesirability (moral and otherwise) of an LN war by its probability given a �Page 36 limited nuclear war. Given the character of weapons development and present communication arrangements, the idea of a purely nuclear exchange between the superpowers, perhaps in the European "theatre", is really a myth. But limited wars are not the present focus. 4. There was a substantial element of sport (and connected features of prowess) in traditional wars that has been eroded in modern technological wars. Nuclear wars are not just unsporting, in that no notice is given, etc. They are unjust in a much deeper way. 5. There are interesting sidelights concerning even the etymology of the term ’war’, which was derived from a term meaning ’confusion’. In particular, ’it is a curious fact that no Germanic nation in early historic times had in living use any world properly meaning ’war’’. (OED) 6. But of course there can be something quite analogous to war between clans, multinational firms, even nature, etc. (To this extent, a strict definition of ’war’ is being insisted upon.) So the diffusion of power structures has to extend beyond just the break-down of states. 7. Thus the ubiquitous war against Nature of modern times, which features just as large in marxists as in capitalists. As could have been guessed, someone - it was James - suggested chanelling all war into "war" in the metaphorical sense against that unarmed and nonaggressive "opponent", Nature. James proposed as a substitute for war proper, conscription of the youth for a war against Nature (see Wasserstrom, p.12). What it boiled down to, however, was that youth was to be channelled into all the dirty work, in that way to acquire manly virtues military activities "rightly" instil, especially discipline, but also service, devotion, physical fitness, constructive exertion, responsibility, and order. Another less diabolical substitute for wars proper is through war games and other games of competitive cast. Again specious arguments enter for bringing out the "best" in human males. 8. War can be seen as a structural problem of state arrangments, to be removed along with these (otherwise defective) arrangements. Wars arise from political organisation of states - a situational fix. 9. Thus Aquinas and Grotius for example (see Barnes, p.776, top). The argument presupposes rather a lot, Including a neat public/private distinction. Put Aquinas’s way, it looks as if it could be readily transferred into an argument for international government, or at least effective law-courts. Yet all Christendom was supposed at that time to be one state! 10. There is however the degenerate idea of war as annihilation or extinction, and of winning a nuclear war as annihilation of the enemy while not being entirely annihilated oneself: the side that somehow "survives" is said to "win". But this is an extremely tenuous sense of winning. Moreover any such war is radically unjust, because of violation of the traditional requirement of proportionality, and for other reasons developed in the text. Recent talk about winning or even surviving a nuclear war must reflect a failure to appreciate a medical reality: Any nuclear war would inevitably cause death, disease and suffering of pandemonic proportions and without the possibility of effective medical intervention ... (PL, p.313). �Page 37 Unfortunately as documented in Scheer, significant officials who are responsible for the nuclear destiny of the U.S.A. - and so of the world think that the devastation of nuclear war can be survived and that a global nuclear war can actually be won! 11. In practice they often were not, they drained limited economies, they layed waste countryside (though to a minor extent by nuclear or chemical or modern mining standards), impoverishing Inhabitants, etc. 12. For as Nagel contents (early on), there are moral restrictions on the conduct of warfare which are not legalistic only and which are neither arbitrary not merely conventional nor a matter of usefulness. These themes run entirely counter to the classic theory of war of Clausowicz - a theory outlined in Walzer. 13. As Nagel remarks. 14. The progressive escalation argument is an incremental Sorites. This is part of the so-called "logic of war". 15. As Walzer argues, p.24. 16. The severe limitations of those also come from the failure person from inside the homeland which excessive applications of 17. Thus the differences between Nagel on the one side, and Brandt and the other, in Cohen et al. 18. The pattern of moral argument has much in common with procedure in anarchist political discussion. 19. There are other arguments against two (or Routley and Plumwood. 20. For details see Routley and Plumwood. 21. According to the doctrine, which is one concerning responsibility, we are responsible only for the intended effects or consequences of our freely-chosen actions, and not for other (side) effects or consequences, even if these are forseen and/or intimately tied to the intended consequences. The doctrine is pernicious allowing those who adjust their intention suitably to escape responsibility for evil they knowingly perpetrate. Thus, for instance, a Russian supreme command which intended only to take out US military targets would, under double effects, effects have no responsibility for the resultant effect on American and Canadian cities! 22. Despite Nagel’s suggestion (pp.158). 23. Of course there are counterarguments too, and not merely from military in the case of small numbers of obstructive noncombatants. One is a variation of the Bald Man: there is no clear line between combatants and noncombatants. However as Nagel argues (p.20) there are distinctions between them, firstly in terms of their roles, e.g. in carrying or using argument like the lesser virtues, nationalism and patriotimsm, of replacement - try for example swapping a by one from outside as regards treatment patriotism can engender. multiple) morality Hare lines: on see �Page 38 arms or directing those who do, and secondly in terms of their harmfulness, the threat they offer. See also PL, p.312, where a simple and effective paradigm case argument is applied. 24. The principle can be argued to in various ways. One (not entirely conclusive) way is Nagel’s way, from the requirements of directness and relevance in combat, the underlying principle being that, ’whatever one does to another person intentionally must be aimed at him as a subject, with the intention that he receive it as a subject’. (p.15) 25. The situation with limited nuclear wars where the targets are essentially military ones, and noncombatants are unaccountably killed "indirectly' is different. Such wars are not however excused by the pernicious doctrine of double effect. For such wars remain unjust on several counts, e.g. they inflict disproportionate damage, e.g. on life systems. As Zuckermann says, ’It is still inevitable that were military installations rather than cities to become the objectives of nuclear attack, millions, even tens of millions of civilians would be killed ...’ (quoted in Thompson and Smith, p.14 where the Italics are added). 26. Throughout the OED equations,reflecting common usage, of just with right or correct, and unjust with morally wrong, are adopted. 27. These alternatives are not as far removed practically as may appear. For the aim of just war theory is not ’to legitimize war but to prevent it. The presumption is against the use of force’ (PL, p.312). And most types of wars are ruled out by the theory. However not all wars or violent revolutions are excluded, and that is enough to guarantee the distinction between the alternatives. In particular, defensive wars are allowed - at least for the defending side, though from a wider viewpoint these too may be condemned - ’the classic case [of the just war] ... was the use of lethal force to prevent aggression against innocent victims’ (PL, p.311). Under Twentieth Century international law defence, narrowly construed, is the only legitimate basis for war; Roman law was only slightly more generous, in allowing for the restitution of goods (see Barnes, p.780). 28. An argument of this sort is developed in more detail, though not in complete generality, in Goodin. 29. As to the first point, there is not only overkill capacity and the drive for superiority (often represented via "negotiating" strength) but the matter of counterforce weapons which are offensive weapons. As regards the second point, US policy has been decidedly expansionist with regular intervention in other nations; there have been repeated US threats to use nuclear weapons, especially to deal with revolutionary activities in the third world, but also in Europe in "limited" nuclear war; and in official military strategy no sharpline has been drawn between conventional and nuclear weapons: on these and other related points see further Lackey 82, p.l91ff., and also Thompson and Smith. 30. The example was supplied by D. 31. Deterrence also commonly includes elements of mendacity, deception, misinformation. There is a grain of truth in the claim that ’deterrence is primarily about what the other side thinks, not what we think’ (Pym quoted morally Johnson. �Page 39 in Thompson, p.19). simply 32. Nor are degrees of wrongness required: ordered as regards worseness. 33. Can this be done semantically in terms of closeness/worseness The attempted X world is close to the X world? 34. There is a need for further clarification here. Passive spectatorship of evil events where one is in a position to make a difference is quite another thing, from contemplation of other worlds where evil occurs. 35. It is this principle especially that forces Ramsey, a Protestant theologian who is a nuclear hawk, into the tight position he ends in, which as Walzer explains, really leaves no room to move. For in virtue of C3 it must be allowed that the threatened wars are permissible to carry out. Ramsey tries to limit these to military exchanges. But to be effective as a deterrent, the exchange permitted must both threaten and also, in view of C3, not threaten nonmilitary targets, collateral non-combatant populations. It appears that Ramsey’s position, if worked out, would be inconsistent. wrongs can be partially of worlds? Principle C3 is also invoked by the US Catholic Bishops: see PL, p.316. They put the point both in terms of threat and of declared intent to use nuclear weapons, which they pronounce morally wrong. 36. As is widely known, inadmissible considerations of expediency frequently enter into reasons why states allow foreign nuclear facilities upon their territories, e.g. economic considerations such as trade or local revenue and jobs. 37. Cf. 38. It was considered long ago in China by the alternative systems, see especially Sharp. 39. Thus Green, along with many others, ’find[s] nuclear deterrence ... the best of practical policies available to us now ... given the realities of world politics’ but ’still demurfs] because of moral qualms’ (p.xil). Green also represents both Morgenthau and Halle as having ’rather agonisingly presented a ... case for a deterrence strategy, even while asserting that the strategy is morally indefensible according to the traditional ethical codes’ (p.252). Walzer ends in a similar dilemma (he is committed to a stronger and less qualified form of it than he sets down): ’... though it [deterrence] is a bad way, there may well be no other that is practical in a world of sovereign and suspicious states’ (p.274) (an indictment of the state system that Walzer does not pursue). the last article in Thompson. Mohists. For contemporary Similarly the Catholic Bishops present the situation in terms of a moral dilemma: they speak of ’the political paradox of deterrence ... the dilemma of how to prevent the use of nuclear weapons ... (PL, p.313). 40. Situations in war are also a major source of moral dilemmas. See Routley and Plumwood where several examples are given. A general logical account of and theory of moral dilemmas is elaborated therein. �Page 40 41. There are exceptions of course, e.g. Sartre; and Nagel’s final example is very instructive. For a full theory of moral dilemmas see however Routley and Plumwood. 42. Reported in The Economist; reprinted in The 1983, Weekend Magazine p.2. 43. This is no longer a radical theme but is widely promulgated. The source of the nuclear problem comes from state arrangements: it is ’... a world of sovereign states ... which brought the world to the present dangerous situation’. (PL, p.313) 44. It is not alone responsible for these other dilemmas. Large-scale nuclear power and other types of warfare and security arrangements also contribute. 45. In principle it would be relatively easy for states to agree to settlement of their disputes by less damaging and expensive contests than military ones, e.g. by contests of selected representatives, and not just through fighting in some form but by contests of footballers, singers, dancers, lawyers, or etc. In practice, however, such more civilized alternatives are never considered. Animals, by contrast, are smart enough to settle disputes by means much more like these. 46. Americans, for example, tend to forget that their State (like USSR) is a union, of fairly recent origin; and that a State of the Union message could consider the dissolution of the union. 47. Thus for example, Kahn, where such a "solution" is quickly dismissed as, impractical, etc. Hardly necessary to say the Way Up has won most favour with the legal fraternity, and from more authoritarian organisations. 48. See further Routley and especially Griffin. 49. Schell does not make it clear whether he is thinking of the Way Up or the Way Down, but some of the names he drops suggest the Way Up. So can some of what he says, e.g. ’Thus the peril of extinction is the price that the world pays not for "safety" or "survival" but for its [sic!] insistence on continuing to divide Itself up into sovereign nations’ (p.76, III), as if the natural or original state were an undivided one? Routley and Australian, material referred February to 12- therein, 13 and �Page 41 APPENDIX 1; Remarks on J. Schell’s THE FATE OF THE EARTH. Schell’s book is an important and influential document, which is significant having a and urgently needed effect in shifting attitudes towards nuclear. It is especially valuable for aftermath example defects. is Some exhibits, also it just nothing else that we undertake together can make any sense ...’ the of both for rubbish, a world-wide program of action for preserving the [human] ’without ... species ... moral scenarios horrifying Unfortunately severe philosophically and factually, and vivid attack. nuclear of its (p.104, Humans rearranged). however like rabbits in are Australia, virtually beyond human power to extirpate. or practical The claim presupposes two of the major defective assumptions of the book: 51. That nuclear war will eliminate life, human life, at least, on earth total extermination assumption); (the and 52. That very many notions, not only those of morality and value, but those of time and space, make no sense in the absence of humans, or, to put it into a more sympathetic philosophical form, in the absence of an actual context human (the anthropocentric assumption). The frequent applications of S2, which philosophical depth and induce give the book some of its apparent suitable puzzlement through their paradoxical without total extermination aspects, depend essentially on SI; there will be humans, about to make past and future, good and evil, go on making sense! Now although the factual assumption SI is possibility, unlikely. example, it appears in Schell’s argument on an unjustified no means ruled out as a light of present (inadequate) knowledge most the to by SI is extremely extrapolation from Hemisphere, but for the most part it does that very flimsy. It depends, for the Northern to the Southern North American thing, of �Page 42 the contracting North to world (All that matters, all worthwhile America. civilization, is in USA, or at least, to be more charitable, and Europe, also be wiped out, i.e. will which eliminated in the nuclear holocaust). the example out of date. America North its human population will be Some of the data Schell relies upon, for of nuclear explosions on the ozone layer, is significantly Other effects than ozone destruction transfer even less well South. to North effect in from A factually superior study of nuclear disaster that Schell’s, Preddy and others, indicates that parts of the Southern Hemisphere, New Zealand and Southern Africa and America could escape relatively unscathed even from most massive northern exchanges. The penetration of human chauvinism as in S2 is not something Schell but product a is of truths necessary mathematics of and in Wittgenstein ’s philosophy, where even the are a product of human conventions and would In Schell human chauvinism is dished up in a particularly vanish with humans!). powerful obnoxious Kantian Thoughts form. tenses, values and morality, all depend in the and propositions, time and presence life-giving of human - past or future or merely potential humans are not enough, persons that beings are not humans are certainly not enough. ’... e.g.): Thus according to (II, Schell p.74, the thought "Humanity is not extinct" is an impossible one for a rational person, because as soon as it is, we are not. In imagining any other we look ahead to a moment that is still within the stream of human time, event, ...’. right to philosophy especially, which is still European unfortunately alive and well (e.g. peculiar The thought is however perfectly possible for humans; now. Though we (p.74)l. ’... outside can have it no doubt have it falsely a later rational creature may well be able to have it truly. "later" we the Schell erroneously denies human tenses of past, that: there is no present, and future ...’ Human extinction eliminates ’the creature that divides time into past, �Page 43 present future’: and so annihilation cannot ’come to pass’ (p.77). simply false that the tenses are human: the tenses depend on But it is time local a (perceptible to many creatures other than humans, but not depending at ordering all on perceptibility for its viability) relating other times to the present, to now (also a human-independent location, evident to other creatures, and borne witness to by such sequences as the passing seasons). too easily come And annihilation may also to pass, for many humans in the North at least, as it came to pass in recent geological times that humans began to exist upon that there was a time before there were any human beings. earth. Before Here as elsewhere the human chauvinism is mixed with other distorting metaphysical assumptions of Western our heritage, verlficationism and Implicit ontic assumptions (to the effect that there are severe difficulties in talking about what does not exist). Thus, for example, Schell takes over dubious metaphysics from Freud, according to whom "it is indeed impossible to imagine our own death; do so, we (p.77/4?). In can perceive that we are in attempt and whenever we fact still present as spectators" The second clause goes a good distance towards refuting first. the fact there is no great problem in describing counterfactual situations which undermine both Freud’s claims. chauvinism into one of The same goes for Schell’s extensions human of its main traditional strongholds, value theory: the simple and basic fact [sic!] that before there can be good or evil, or to service harm, lamenting or rejoicing there must be life’, human life (p.103). are no facts, but entrenched philosophical assumptions which have been ’... These exposed 2 and criticised elsewhere . Another obnoxious theme, which Schell repeatedly infiltrates, is the Pogo theme, which S3. Distributes responsibility for the present really) onto everyone, every human in the world. nuclear situation (fiasco, An especially blatant example 3 �Page 44 the world’s political runs as follows: menace leaders ... though the earth with nuclear weapons, do so only with our permission, and even at our bidding. theme At least, this is true elsewhere elaborated is ’... for democracies’ pay 4 we are the authors of the destruction . while for the peoples of the non-nuclear-armed world it sense to an argument of all The moral cost of only true in the sensitivity nuclear of representative And again ’... we is it armaments that of us underwriters of the slaughter of hundreds of millions - ’. And again ’[as] perpetrators ... is not sacred but is worthless; be killed’ (p.88). vote the against of the populace they allegedly govern. many are potential mass—killers. makes is that they fail to try to do anything about the danger)’ (p.87). But this is more of government since extinction and support the governments that pose the threat of it, for negative The III). (p.106, (For the populations of the superpowers this is true in a positive sense, we now they we convey the steady messsage ... it ... that ... Little of this is true. that life is acceptable for everyone to Those who campaign against nuclear, against nuclear-committed parties so far as is possible, and the like, are certainly not the authors of potential destruction, and responsibility nuclear situation does not simply distribute onto them. - or the unlikely opinions as to worth Schell everyone - fall on those who have done less. for the Nor does responsibility illegitimately attributes to Responsibility for decisions taken in "liberal democracies" even by representatives (in the unlikely event of this happening in the case of anything as important as defence) cannot be traced back to those represented, since among many other things, a representative of a party is only which offers a complex and often ill-characterised package of policies, and a voter may vote for zero package. representative or more policies of this Only in the (unlikely) event of a clear single issue referendum, which is adopted, can responsibility, still of a qualified sort, be sheeted home, to �Page 45 those who voted for it, not every one in the community. When however the Pogo assumption is disentangled from the following theme what results is decidedly along the right lines: The controllers [not to be confused, in Schell’s fashion, with all of S4. have failed to change our pre-nuclear institutions. The sovereign system is out HI) (p.51, of step with nuclear age, the one-earth system, etc. earth us] (the whole Unfortunately Schell often loses sight of this important theme. theme). S4 forms part of Schell’s critique of the state which is, by an large, scattered and fragmentary. As we saw, in §7, Schell arrives at the conclusion that the nation-state has outlasted its usefulness, and that new institutions political more ’consonant the global reality’ are required as a matter of urgency. evades what he admits is the major task, making viable out But he alternatives. most he makes some passing suggestions, some of which point to the Way Up. he remains clear about are the serious defects of the state and the At What frequently immoral purposes for which the state is used. At one stage he contrasts what he calls Socratic-Christian ethics with that of state, where ’the end [state] justifies the means . .., the raison d’etre of government, is the basis on which themselves to commit crimes of governments, every in sort’. anything whatever in the name of [their] survival’. that all So times, licensed ’states may do virtually Schell then argues however, extinction nullifies end-means justification by destroying every end; that argument is far from sound, and depends again on extreme (S2) have combined with ontic assumptions. under system SI) ends could remain, e.g. human but chauvinism Even if all humans were extinguished (as for nonhumans (actual or not). �Page 46 As to the part of the state and (state) sovereignty in war, in us Schell leaves A sovereign state is virtually defined as one that enjoys the no doubt. right and power to go to war in defence or pursuit of its interests (III, p.51). War from how things are: arises jealous nation states (p.51). and sovereignty from the arrangement of political affairs via Indeed there is a two-way linkage between On the one side, sovereignty is, Schell capacity to wage war. contends, necessary for people to organise for war. is impossible to preserve sovereignty. it war transparently clear as they stand. having On the other side, without Neither of these contentions is Now that the state system in entrenched, it however easy for conservatives (in particular) to argue from the "realities" is of international life, which include self-interest, is It on basis this that peace arrangements aggression, readily are hatred. fear, dismissed as unrealistic, utopian, even (amusingly) as extremist. Schell’s further theme that nuclear "war" is not war threatens to undermine his case erroneous an sovereign characterisation nation to achieve an end’ (III, sufficient for p.52): war as ’a violent means employed by a of but neither considerations but not all wars or games are won). It they fail (even on one side being defeated on a But in nuclear "war" this doesn’t happen, ’no one’s strength But what these sorts contribute to showing is not that nuclear wars are not wars, but that they are not wars of certain sorts, e.g., not just wars because nor LN falls until both sides have been annihilated* (III, p.52). of necessary if is also claimed that war depends on weakness; by arms. is But nuclear attacks can certainly have ends cannot be won in the older sense: decision this It is then claimed that war requires an end which nuclear war. "war" does not have. wars state based, for example, on its nuclear war But the not-war theme needs much qualification, and starts out making capacity. from the against on such criteria as reasonable when LN wars prospect of success and �Page 47 improvement, not rational wars (in a good sense), and so on. wars nuclear weapons have also ruined "conventional" wars, and that demise the war of not just on his connected the mistaken has removed been proposition The (p.52). concerning the conventional war and the mistaken proposition that war of some sort the theme has left no means to finally settle disputes between nations, for the final court of appeal depends conventional nuclear times does damage to Schell’s argument that into persisted have That theme demise has to of be "court of appeal" between nations (for, as observed, there are other final types of contests that could serve, and there is also the cooperative behaviour, e.g. joint referenda); possibility of more it also imports the assumption of Clausowicz (criticised earlier) that war has to proceed to the technological limit - as if war and violence were thoroughly natural activities independent of recognised social settings (for winning, surrender, etc.) and ruleless. wars contrary, are parasitic on On the social organisations such as states and are They are a social governed by a range of understandings, conventions and rules. phenomenon, with a rule structure if not a logic. Much capital has been made from what is called "the and the "logic logic of deterrence" The message that is usually of nuclear (strategic) planning". supposed to come through is that the massive nuclear arraangements the world now entangled in are perfectly logical, sound, reasonable, rational. this represents little more than a cheap semantical the justifies reasonable. can be present arrangements, or trick. anything in strategic planning; values no in way in Jeffrey) which but is does not yield specific results without desirability measures being assigned to alternative without However like them, or renders them There is a logic of decision (as presented e.g. applied Logic is being pumped in, extralogically . outcomes, that is There are varaious ways these value assignments may be determined, to meet moral requirements or not; but in �Page 48 nuclear planning strategic (Selecting the usual expediency. automatically; is have invariably been settled on the basis of game theory setting based something cover strategy of’. term almost Thus too the presumption in Walzer, p.277, that the logic of on eye-for-eye and tooth-for-tooth assumptions.) ’logic of’ tends to be used very generously, as a word of general to this to sees for it is then assumed that each player plays to maximize his or her own advantage. deterrence they like In fact commendation, ’rational considerations entering into the policy or In these terms, Schell, who like others enjoys playing with the ’logic of’, should write of ’the illoglc of deterrence’, for he emphasizes (III, p.80) the disparity between the supposed rationality of threatening use of nuclear weapons and the irrationality (even from a national interest viewpoint) of actually using them should the threat fail: doctrine depends irrational use. deterrence (e.g. on credibility of the yet the threat of of success this deterrence unjustifiable and Indeed Schell wants to go further and locate a contradiction in HI, pp.67-8): but the argument depends on an interesting confusion of contradiction with cancellation, which deterrence is supposed to (etc.) is involve. FOOTNOTES 1. The appalling theme that humans create past, present and repeated, e.g. p.104 top. 2. See e.g. ’Human chauvinism and environmental ethics’ in Environmental Philosophy (editor Mannison and others), Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University, 1980. 3. Another example of spreading the responsibility runs as follows (Schell p.46, III): we plan to exterminate species in certain circumstance, though we don’t quite admit this to ourselves, as sane or sensible (or rational?). Further (p.55 III), ’the world ... chose the course of attempting to refashion the system of sovereignty to accommodate nuclear weapons’: the world? Connected with this is the argument from defence of fundamentals [ideology] - e.g. for liberty, the (USA) nation, and against socialism. In the course of this yet another fallacious assumption is rolled out: ’The means to the end are not limited, for the end itself sets the limits in each future �Page 49 case’ [?] 4. There is also, mixed in, a weaker more plausible claim that gives lie to the stronger one, namely that we have some responsibility (the Nazi situation is compared). 5. There is however a simple solution to Schell’s problem of the missing motive, namely an ideological one: remove the rival ideology from future dominance. �Page 50 APPENDIX 2: Strategies and the Matter of Collective and Individual Responsibility What one does depends, naturally, on where one lives and what sort of power it is. responsibility work to entirely to an In present circumstances states have and states, there ends: responsibilities these no individual, or (smaller scale) is collective responsibility to work out a policy or people on stance matters such as While such a non-responsibility nuclear and still less to act on such a stance. (or opt-out) theme no doubt suits many evident There are however some persuasive out their policies. arguments that this is where the responsibility accrue one means what as what strategy a state should adopt depends on where it is located much has, and — many for some, themselves, especially more authoritarian power-holders, for others - it does involve opting out of moral responsibilities, responsibilities acquired by virtue of being a person within the framework of certain social arrangments. Now there is no doubt that individuals and a group can out. They can neglect their moral responsibilities; in doing so. being this, do can opt but they are not justified Against this claim, which is based ultimately upon each person’s caught in a web of responsibility-inducing social relations, whether they like it or not, there are some neat arguments which appear to permit opting out. One goes as follows: 1. The (ordinary) individual, difference to what happens. 2. Such difference. 3. individuals, or or group, has no possibility of making a make a Therefore groups, have no obligation to try to Hence Such individuals, or groups, are not morally responsible, for instance when things go wrong. �Page 51 There are two main assumptions resisted; this in argument, both which of be firstly, a variant of the ought implies can theme , and secondly, the assumption that individuals can’t make a difference. cannot individuals competitive highly that true What an individuals do. full of hopeful free-riders, a person may communities, encouter a familiar impasse: is on their own, together they can. much accomplish it While individual can achieve depends on what sufficiently many other In should that he or she acts M-ly (e.g. against morally, nuclear arrangements, present destruction) at considerable personal cost with no Such an impasse no guarantee that others will also act M-ly. longer faces so many in the West at least as regards initial steps against nuclear arrangements. The individual can cooperate with others in ways that do make a difference. An individual is not exonerated from responsibility by the argument. While individuals can respond by joining organisations whose activities are at directed difference, many individuals also have the option of some making more individualistic action in such disobedience. important An forms as or deployment) Evidently, various or parts redirection however, work more effectively go slows, political form of individual resistance, already adopted in Canada and north-western USA is refusal to pay defence boycotts, thereof of such (e.g. taxes, income taxes nuclear for directed weapons Instance towards production to peace and funds. all these more individualistic forms of political activity if individuals integrate their activities since the impacts aggregate (and appear after a certain stage to exponentiate). There are arguments of some weight that individuals are under some sort moral obligation to take political action to disaffiliate themselves from what contributes to the prospects of nuclear depends on the of sort of state war. What type of action this is one resides in, e.g., whether it is a nuclear �Page 52 power, whether it provides nuclear issues complicating as or bases facilities, and such on kind of preventive action the state is likely to what One argument - it is one of a type take in return. etc., be can that varied from making nuclear weapons to, for example, providing facilities for them - proceeds from the wrongness of nuclear war to the position that it is making weapons the such for The war. argument here not applies principles (like that of §5), for instance that the manufacture of such weapoons increases the risk of such war. right and to connecting deployment But if it is not morally right to be making such weapons then those who live in a state that is doing so to disaffiliate themselves from such substantive without The argument is but the assumptions opt-outers and do-nothingers assumption, ought defence production, and disaffiliation 2 includes not paying for such production through defence taxes . not be morally appear reasonable and defensible. Such arguments not only insofar as they put to contribute national for those 3 take action, even limited action such as redirection of taxes . in some fashion to moral obligations; political obligations. And political limited, by moral constraints. are already answer for then moral obligations override obligations are already significantly The nuclear situation does not so much bring out new limits on political obligation, as emphasize the obligations who There is however no dilemma under any theory which takes political obligations to back spot the objectives, they also raise serious questions and perhaps dilemmas as regards political obligations would on limited, and respects in which those introduce further moral considerations against sponsorship of national defence arrangements. �Page 53 An obligation to try war does not commit one to more than this: for an to an obligation, for example, work to But alternative national defence policy which avoids nuclear elements. no doubt this would be a good thing to try to contribute to. one nuclear spending part of one’s working life contributing indirectly to it, not by to disaffiliate oneself from preparation for attempts depends commitments, and on forth. so where lives, one For not only the level are Once of again, one’s pacificist types different what policy of appropriate for different nations and regions, but there are more reorientation superficial and deeper reorientations that can be worked out and promoted, schemes that "conventional" leave e.g. warfare apparatus more or less Intact, and deeper (ecological) schemes that change that. The US Bishops, for example, present a shallower set of goals for such power as the USA, which includes such as preventing the objectives working development and deployment of destabilizing nuclear weapons systems and for better of already operational systems (see PL, p.317). control super a For those whose very limited political Influence is exerted in considerably lesser even the shallow goals may look quite different: there are no weapons (except perhaps those of another power planted on local territory) better control. The view from the very minor to in or redeploy to powers in the Antipodes is furthermore different from that of the medium powers in Europe. prospect powers is There some the Antipodes of avoiding the more immediate effects of an LN war, while there is little such prospect in Europe (cf. Preddy and others). There is accordingly some obligation - an obligation little considered and not grasped by the power holders - on those in the Antipodes to make some effort to preserve there elements of what is valuable in world civilization. Local and regional self-interest would also suggest steps towards self-preservation that been initiated. have not �Page 54 What is broadly required in the Andipodes is a work out once removal of American bases alliance, which is in any case of questionable merit; and withdrawal of American rightss for nuclear-carrying equipment to access ports, air bases and other facilities, so as to remove pursuit of more a evenhanded policy targets; nuclear is That much easy, in principle. difficult to ensure is that economic and cultural collapse does not follow an LN war in the North. independence Secondly then the building of Increased in the Antipodes is required. sustainable of life its exercise unless combined with and Preddey it others is own. ’the region must also other desirable objectives: unlikely - the structural readjustment aims of moving for example, in estimated that 25 per cent of GDP would have to be included Australia the costs would be less. desirable have For a small region that looks a very costly diverted to build up New Zealand’s economic independence. which socio-economic It is not enough to make the region a nuclear-free zone not worth targeting militarily: a local of nonalignment (something quite small powers elsewhere have managed to achieve). More to Firstly, withdrawal from the American goals are glimpsed. the matter straightforward the were For a larger region If, furthermore - what seems combined with the independently whole region towards a multicultural conserver society and diverting "defence" spending to connected self-management and civil be considerably lessened. They only appear great in the setting of an on-going consumer-defence socleity. In any case where life itself defence goals, would is concerned, the costs do not appear excessive. FOOTNOTES 1. Any satisfactory deontic theory which takes moral dilemmas with due seriousness is bound to reject this theme. There are also independent grounds for jettisoning this Kantian theme: see Routley and Plumwood. �Page 55 Seatie 2. An argument of this type was deployed by Bishop support of his refusal to pay defence taxes. 3. This dilemma and option is now removed for most wage earners by Pay As You Earn taxation schemes, schemes apparently introduced to give the state interest on gross earnings, but obviously very effective in removing taxation power from most workers, and so from individuals to the state. 4. Given the power of institutions and the state one may be able to do little more than try, without giving up one’s work and therby one’s ability to contribute to other deserving causes. For example, it may be virtually impossible for one to avoid contributing to a superannuation fund which is investing in projects which one opposes and/or ought to oppose. Hunthaassen of in �Page 56 REFERENCES Berg, Reinhabiting a Separate 1979. P. M. Cohen, Nagel, Scanlan Princeton, 1974. Country, (editors) Planet War and Drum, Moral San Francisco, Responsibility , R.E. Goodin, ’Disarming nuclear apologists’, typescript, 1982. R.E. Goodin, ’Disarmament as a moral certalnuity’, typescript, 1983. P(hilip) Green, Deadly Logic: The Theory of Nuclear Deterrence, Ohio State University Press, Columbus, 1966. N. Griffin, ’Lifeboat USA', typescript, 1982. Ground Zero Organisation, Nuclear War: New York, 1982. R. Jeffrey, The Logic of Decision H. Kahn, On Thermonuclear War. What’s In It For You? Pocket Book (editor D.P. Lackey, ’Ethics and nuclear deterrence*, in Moral James Rachels), Harper and Row, New York, 1979. D.P. Lackey, 'Missiles and morals: a utilitarian look at nuclear deterrence’ Philosophy and Public Affairs 11 (1982) pp.189-213. J.C. Problems Murray, Morality and Modern War, T. Nagel, ’War and Massacre' in Cohen et al, pp.3-24. J. Narvesen, 'Violence and War’ in Regan, pp.109-146. National Conference of Catholic Bishops, Committee on War and Peace, ’The challenge of peace: God’s promise and our response’, Origins 12 (20) (1982) pp.306-328 [hereafter referred to as PL, for ’New Draft of Pastoral Letter’]. G.F. Preddey and others, Future Contingencies 4. Nuclear Disasters, A Report to the Commision for the Future, Government Printer, Wellington, New Zealand, 1982. T. Regan (editor), Matters of Life and 1980. R. Routley and V. Routley, Alternatives, (1982). R. Routley and V. Plumwood, 'Moral dilemmas and (edit. notions’ in Paraconsistent Logic, Philosophla Verlag, 1983. 'The Death, Random irrefutability of the G. House, New anarchism’, York, Social logic of deontic Priest and others) �Page 57 R. Scheer, With Enough Shovels: House, New York, 1982. J. Schell, ’Reflections (Nuclear Arms - Parts I-III)’, The New Yorker, February 1, 8, and 15, 1982, pp.47-113, 48-109, and 45-107, respectively. This series subtitled The Fate of the Earth, has now appeared as a book with that title (Kopf, New York, 1982). References in the text are to the original articles. All references by parts labels ’I’-’III’ are to these articles. T.C . Reagan, Bush and Nuclear Sharp, Exploring Nonviolent Alternatives, Boston, 1971. T. Taylor, Nuremburg and Vietnam: R.W.. M.M.. M. R.A. S. Random Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, Harvard University Press, 1980. G. E.P.. War, Thompson and D. New York, 1981. An American Tragedy, Smith, Protest and Survive, Monthly Review Press, Tucker, The Just War, Wakin (editor), War, Morality and the Military Profession, Boulder, Colorado, 1979. Westview, Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, Basic Books, New York, 1977. Wasserstrom (editor) California, 1970. War and Morality, Wadsworth, Zuckerman, Nuclear Illusion and Reality, Collins, London, 1982. Belmont, � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Draft Papers Description An account of the resource Sylvan's literary executor encountered an archive in which “all his projects were current", since manuscripts were undated and unattributed. 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Text Any textual data included in the document WORKING DRAFT ON THE ETHICS OF LARGE-SCALE NUCLEAR WAR AND WAR-DETERRENCE AND THE POLITICAL FALL-OUT Because of their projected effects - which are said to differ from those of the even largest difference in kind - generated, encounters. exchanges either at all wars nuclear large-scale World (the wars conventional Wars) raise to as and not or nearly so forcefully, by previous human military Certainly exchanges such as nuclear wars involve, such constitute a questions ethical deterrence nuclear investigation is and threatened presupposes, are neither envisaged nor fully accommodated by traditional theories of just wars. reflection as even required, if Much new philosohical well-tested and rather old-fashioned moral principles will serve as ethical base. Nuclear wars - though a fine class of nonexistent object, is existence whose however best confined to other (already uncomfortably neighbouring) possible worlds - have several distinctive properties and come in several varieties. particular, limited nuclear wars which (of tactical or strategic subvarieties) contrast with large-scale nuclear wars, LN-type-wars, large quantities of nuclear devices over a sizeable region; two main parameters: are need A large-scale nuclear war involves the explosion of however be unlimited not which In quantity it is a function of of explosive) and distribution. (megatonnage Such a war differs markedly from a limited (or tactical or strategic) nuclear war which is limited - by assumption, the chances of escalation are however very real 3 - to much smaller quantities of explosives characteristically circumscribed, installations in a given region. wars and their prevention, and where the targets are confined to military Though the focus in what follows is upon e.g. limited in nuclear principle LN wars are by no means a separate Page 2 issue, since a nuclear arsenal is escalation of such are wars a and prerequisite, high probabilities of assumptions of reasonable usual (given the follow-up or second strike, etc.) §1. is What different old of appropriateness and models wars:____ the nuclear about theories resulting war. of limited model of war that A dominates much thinking, including [even] strategic thinking, is the two party 4 (or even two person) game or, a complication of that, the clan or tribe battle . A picture of war built up, especially as a result of medieval discussion of just war, which inapplicable. for such technological have advances The traditional theory, hardly surprisingly, phenomena Dresden and Tokyo. mass as bombing inappropriate rendered no made the and allowance large cities, such as occurred with of And nuclear bombing, with its many further crucial effects beyond mass bombing, adds further new dimensions. Yet it is Important, for the argument to anchors, historical linkages and to be aware of what counted as war (the semantics of the matter^), and of when, and why, wars and military actions Firstly, retain were accounted unjust war is essentially a matter of states and their control: or wrong. to elaborate the OED account, war is ’hostile contention by means of armed forces, carried on between nations, states, or rulers, or between parties in the same nation or state’ for control of the state : literal, but transferred, antagonists or players; other metaphoric, forces comprising senses of etc.? States armed the ’war’ noun not the protagonists, are soldiers are are the means of contention or combat, and combat or forceful (typically violent) exchange is the actual experience. function of remove states: Thus wars are external or internal (civil), states or their rule. but always, a An obvious way then to eliminate wars is to in short, wars are an outcome of political structure, and are Page 3 altering the structure . by removed This is an initial reason why the radical argument against nuclear wars and deterrence devolves into an argument the (self-legitimised) war-declarers and war-makers, against states. the traditional theory, wars were restricted to external against In fact on which wars, were construed as the right of states or their rulers (princes) for certain political purposes, the argument being that private persons with grievences had access the while courts, did not states legitimate (wars were, so to speak, the international But this is itself a very analogue of the law courts). the 9 to statist conception of the semantics is not so restrictive and permits place of wars; internal wars, for example, to end wars. Let us however - to bring out what is different now - confine attention a basic and most familiar case, external wars between two states or set (axes) of states, two-player external wars. games competitive could be won. It was assumed be well no winning strategy. waste of the Northern huge surrounding areas of countryside. hemisphere and not like a draw, or like the strange out for the simultaneously knock each other element, emphasis the inevitable is disputes, removed: be pointfully fought. Certainly, elements of gamesmenship had a role count.) in for, deterrence, earlier wars, (So where two boxers situation on pure deterrence; that are most elaborately prepared for (exercised never the settled with main protagonists substantially obliterated^, and all is is there Thus too the point of main players very substantially worse off than at the outset of the "play". it like An LN war could involve destruction of all war as traditionally seen, to settle serious interstate nothing wars, that With LN wars it no longer holds; main Western metropolitan agglomerations in laying firstly That assumption still held good for massive armed exchanges such as the World Wars. may to Hence another newer the phenomenon of wars etc.), but which can bluff, and the other it was not but pure Page 4 deterrence. to principle important, Most military next, traditional and targets military gross ways to uninvolved parties sacrifice effects nuclear of large nuclear wars cannot (presented horrifying in be confined in be could This exchanges. feature is for, as we shall see, wars that spill over in fundamental as regards just wars; special wars any The morality. to pretension explosives, especially in mass, mean however that legitimately detail in confined. popular These effects special sources such as Schell) include radioactivity, ozone destruction, shockwaves, fireball or firestorm devastation, etc., etc . . .. The moral situation, and the tendency of moral §2. entirely in the context of war. submerged case of war to maintain a firm grasp on the expediency. What is to considerations become It is particularly important in the distinction between morality done in war, especially for local or national advantage, may be very different from what ought morally to be done, whether the latter ought not to be done codes and conventions of war, or otherwise in war is done, despite modern . military conventions and the like, for one (alleged) advantage or another. live in a rather barbarous age: go unremarked, if so numbing, codes the history gets written (accurately) that is. tends 13 to induce a and Militarily we will the horrors of the twentieth century military thinking and strategic planning is A , Much that 12 the using determined and not Furthermore certain moral that a range of morally excluded actions, such as wiping our rural populations, become real ("moral’') possibilities, to be reckoned, for example, into consequentialist calculations of maximising expediency. The reason is that strategic planning is characteristically based on expediency (and extent displaces morality). so to that For each side in a military encounter determines its "strategy" by considering only its own advantages and disadvantages, its own gains and losses as a result of alternative possible moves, not, as it ought, Page 5 those of the other side(s) as well. Indeed it has been contended that war should be planned and conducted way, no-holds-barred-combat fought to the maximal (local) advantage, without a limits, moral or other (except insofar as technology limits the means of etc., themselves). Such is the And Clausowicz tries to repeated. argue, through 14 an be broken by player each in from And the argument is inconclusive; c Thus too an It would follow for the players from the can choose 15 A state engaged in war - this will no doubt include nuclear nowadays war sees itself as entirely bound by constraints of morality: to be mere prudence on the part no-immoral-holds-barred of approach those they attacked to take - seldom it is taken account of the may well encounter, especially from the So each group potentially engaged in war forces other side. the question not as to what it ought to do in morally permissible situations, but also both what it ought really do and what it can do in the morally flawed finds enforced) escalate, and, for example, agree to abide by arranged practices, types to of weapons, etc. only The that the idea of a limited war is some sort of contradiction in terms. But it is not. not escalation externally for advantage. turn extraordinarily narrow motivational base is assumed. argument incremental ), that there can be no limit. assumption is that any merely selected (as distinct will force, so-called "classic" view of Clausowicz, oft argument (but really "the bald man" fallacy limit this itself in. But last the question does not then situations it reduce to one of expediency. There is expediency, involves. no question of morality giving or having to give way to for instance under extreme circumstances such as prospect of LN war For it is not as if shaky considerations of morality are bound to to Page 6 give not only firm ground of expediency when the chips are down: the to way does this in fact often enough not happen in crises situations, but the fact that is both morality and expediency fall within the same, equally shaky or solid, Expediency does not (meticulously) deliver us from domain of value theory. fact, but simply takes narrowly-construed local advantage or power as to value what is valuable, as what matters; family, that urges values local - of self, region or nation - are what really count and override or class, clan, it are to be maximized at the expense of remote or considerations. foreign By morality requires, as a matter of its proper characterisation, a much contrast, more universal distribution of value thereby the through imposes, requirements general of universalizable intersubstitutivity resultant equillbity fairness, of the same results not holding when x and y are interchanged, under Not evaluations 16. certain principles, justice. and and principles, The deep expediency derives from the failure of interreplacement, of unsatisfactoriness so and only can expediency be given a deontic presentation, as expediency through such slogans as "might is right", but theories or utility do not have to be positions of expediency utilitarianism proper — morality, which if can utility meet not is locally intersubstltutivity Thus confined. requirements of unlike the war game theory, does not assign different weights which, to (say) the individual utility of Americans as opposed to Russians — is not to be dismissed as considering only expediency. There are however significant moral differences, between and utilitarians 17 deontologists especially, which serve to further complicate the moral picture Thus utilitarian approaches have seemed to justify ugly strategies and practices render as morally regards deontological principles would not permit (even with the convenient law of double effects). But this is permissible enemy best already or civilians, bending to of to that the effect some Page 8 Characteristically, national interest is taken to differently, to override morality impose Irresistible ethical claims that dominate more ordinary ethical considerations (such as even the immorality of killing millions). as or, Schell puts it, Thus, ’What is being claimed is that one or two countries have the right to jeopardise all countries and their descendents in the name certain of beliefs’ (II, p.70). But morally national interest can do neither of those things. simply the The first is substitution of expediency for morality, which entirely lacks moral justification, while second, the the alleged moral dominance of national fails in important classes of cases, including, so the argument will Interests, go, the case of LN war. States may insist upon operating on a selfish national interest basis, let it not pretended be expediency (’’group governments. Morality it is a moral basis as distinct from one of There is no that egoism’’). works in the special dispensation moral For example, what ought be to as regards x semantically, what would happen as regards x in all ideal worlds; no difference x is an individual or States such as Israel (in its recent organisation. behaving whether just as immorally as brigands individual invasion or mass killers: difference. Certainly there are grounds on which states or claimed been conceded special moral dispensations; or for same way for groups as for individuals: there is no logical difference in the pattern of justification, or obligation. but are no more than that and do not stand up to criticism. of analysis is, analysed and it makes system, group or of are Lebanon) there is no moral their agents have but the excuses offered A satisfactory moral theory cannot furnish two (Incompatible) moralities, a state or public one and a private or individual citizen one - state expediency and individual morality - Page 7 partisanship - since utilitarians would the reject description practices of permitted under their principles as ’ugly’ - and an objective in what follows is to avoid metaethlcal partisanship, to achieve metaethical, though of course moral, neutrality. argument can begin. several And morally there is a large area of consensus Virtually all positions cities major in agree that the 18 not from which obliteration of a LN war would be wrong - indeed morally outrageous. Where there is dissension, as there may be among nuclear strategists who seem to feel qualms no when it comes to trading loss of some American cities for some Russian ones, simply increase the costs involved, up to loss of whole nations if necessary, then try to work down again. until moral repugnance is encountered; The fact remains however that things have got substantially out of perspective, Strategic thinking, in particular, has tended to abandon, or suppress morally. moral considerations (as indeed many theories of the state also pretend to do). Naturally the fact of broad consensus as to the morality of the matter does not mean that there are none who would welcome such outrageous happenings, that total nuclear destruction of the North even, would be Consider the world empire. be realised. rising southern (hemisphere) no one’s While the superpowers of the north remain SS’s dream Thus his best strategy, exchange in the North. There advantage. strongman, SS, who has visions of will can be to a encourage point an all-out then in securing institutional arrangements so that potential SS’s do not accumulate much especially given the that is to anticipate: has its limitations, structural adjustments. hardly rid of southern waters of US having submarines and southern lands of US bases, is to try nuclear to power, apparent instability of crucial world arrangements. the present point is that (the fact of) moral and is an inadequate But consensus constraint without accompanying Page 9 19 because this would lead to violations of substitutivity , neutrality, etc. instance, a state operative x could use state cover morally impermissible ways, ways ruled out (e.g. y are permuted. derivative A group or organisation or in consideration can but role, bound be by moral principles. special these are derivative principles, good for any such institution, which fit within and answer general in y by state interests) when x and person its of virtue citizen damage to For back to So it is also with a state which is an institutional arrangement justified (insofar as it is) by the way it answers back to some least) its of citizens: its (at charter does not legitimate emergent allegedly moral principles which conveniently coincide with those of state expediency. particular, In state is not (morally) entitled to risk the lives of many of its a own citizens and of other peoples and creatures for its own ends, even its for own survival. §3. Arguments to the Immorality of LN wars. can which set be since aside, the concede that war per se is not a crime. but pacifist positions immorality of LN wars follows at once - Not all wars are immoral, though states. aristocratic Among young men admissible wars are the external tournaments or of or warriors who volunteer as soldiers where the action does not spill over onto noncombatants, and some early and medieval wars, few even wars may be pointless or inferior ways of settling political issues inoffensive between All no combatants even were killed in war. where Since the establishment of such induction practices as conscription and recruitment of the near-destitute, have largely ceased to take these inoffensive forms: far removed from the ideal ecotopian literature war-tournament (where type, that its position is dubious). immoral, but few to such an extent as LN wars. wars modern massive wars are features now only in Most sorts of wars are Page 10 argument The first key to (1KA) the of (and wars LN of immorality sufficiently large-scale wars generally) takes the following form: Pi. The deliberate killing in mass of noncombatants is wrong. Pli. LN wars involve the killing in mass of noncombatants. (KA) What involves what is wrong is wrong. Piii . LN wars are wrong. J Supplementary remarks are called for:- Firstly, the (1KA) is one just representative of a Characteristically, in Western culture, it is arguments of that thought argument given of type. mass this taken But the focus can be off the killing: destruction of a first variation on (KA) replaces ’killing the is basis of may each be attacked of its premisses. wrong is as There slack by a has in effect been Let us consider these in that what involves are, in particular, such those generated by Good Samaritan arguments, which purport to show that some proper obligations involve wrongdoing. too noncombatants’ wrong, often expanded to a "distribution of obligation over entailment" principle, has been challenged. problems (and The principle, Piii, used in the argument, reverse order. what of Other variations will emerge in the discussion. but The argument is valid, on mass Thus concerning ’huge destruction of lifestyle of uninvolved or not clause directly involved creatures’. attacked) in of lifestyle nonhumans and humans alike that an LN war will bring is sufficiently evil. suitable of killing about the worst thing that can happen (after the killing of police). is humans set particular a notion of involvement; linked to paradox-free entailment 20 But the problems derive from with a tighter Involvement connective, , the problems disappear, and Piii stands. Page 11 As against Pii, it may be legitimately argued against directed nuclear that military targets. wars can encounters be But given the character of nuclear weapons, LN wars could in no way be confined to such targets. merely the likelihood that many missiles explode off target. not the other effects of large-scale nuclear bombings, for example down-wind fallout There is There are all the radioactive military targets, which in the case of US and European from targets especially will effect large concentrations of people, Including therein perhaps uninvolved countries such as Canada. There may be an attempt to avoid the problem of massive civilian casualties by appeal to such dubious principles as the doctrine of double effect (or side 21 effect) If missiles were characteristically was which intended only to destroy an reliably underground unmanned unfortunately went off course and destroyed a large city, it the that Such claims should be rejected: not wrongness lessened could make a difference; for firing the city. the and one missile silo could be claimed mass destruction is legitimised under the double effect (unintended) principle. target, on the action would be wrong, and by the given intention. the Nonetheless the circumstances for they may mitigate attitudes to those responsible missile, since it was not as if they had deliberately aimed at The double effect principle confuses [diminution of] the allocation of responsibility for an act with the [diminution of] wrongness of the act. As against Pi, and as regards the middle term of Pi argued that there is an important equivocation. the bracketed term, killing ’deliberate’. While it will and Pii, it may be The equivocation is induced by be that admitted deliberate of genuine innocents is impermissble , it will be contended firstly that they noncombatants, insofar as innocent, directly many being are distinguishable, involved in are by no means all military effort, whether just as Page 12 taxpayers or as suppliers of goods farmers or services used innocent. second The point Because Pii so amended in less defensible, and/or other reasons, discussed. leave to out the "modifier" ’deliberate’. of the perpetrators. it What is important for the present purposes is the moral status of what is done, not that motives e.g. military, a much narrower - and less defensible - version of premiss Pll already concerns best the and secondly LN wars do not involve the or bootmakers or entertainers; deliberate killing of those properly excluded as is by mixed with the So ’deliberate’ is out, equivocation is avoided, 22 Pii stands, and so does Pl. For not does Pi ’deliberate’, or ’intentional’ or the like. require the qualification Admittedly also ’noncombatant’ is a fuzzy term, but none the worse for that, and there is no problem serious in marking out a class of clear noncombatants, people who are not directly involved in the command and action chains. practice, deriving from There is, moreover, Catholicism, of no need to the adopt stating an initial version of Pi in terms of innocents - at least as problematic a class as that of noncombatants to try to characterize - and then endeavouring to make the difficult transition to noncombatants. Not only can arguments against the premisses of the argument be met, art arguments for the premisses, though for the substantive moral premiss Pi they are of the characteristically nonconclusive moral sort vary somewhat with the underlying ethical theory. and will tend seriously understate the point) minimal respect owed to them as persons doing so 23 The argument from historical requirements on just wars from convergence. conclusion that fails to treat them with the §4. The to For example, one argument for Pi, and for objecting to the killing of noncombatants, is the Kantian one, (to there that and the argument LN wars cannot be justly waged - and Page 13 accordingly are unjustified - is not merely something dreamed up by contemporary opponents The same conclusion falls out of various traditional requirements, worked etc). out America or of the capitalist State (and communistically inspired, of times mdeieval in just for variant on the key argument (1KA). was justly that not it be One of the requirements gives but a wars. For a necessary condition for fighting a war the that case noncombatants are bound to be killed (cf. numbers large [innocent] of Barnes, p.775). A just war requires just means, that the war should be fought morally by which implies in particular that there is no indiscriminate killing of noncombatants. The implied principle was escapsulated in a principle legitimate of means, (between combatants and others) which ’prohibits all actions discrimination directly Intended to take the lives of p.312) 24 civilians and of (PL, noncombatants’ LN wars, where not only military installations are targeted, violate . U. . 25 this requirement Overlapping the requirement of just means is that of proportion being that of net evil to net good): ’the damage to be inflicted and costs Incurred by the war must be proportionate to the good expected up arms’ (PL, p.312). disproportionate to moral goods proportionality requirement is criterion of by the which achieved in doctrine "improvement" through war : not are of that nationally way. confined, overall consequences of abstaining improvement "puts wrongs to rights": "ameliorative" conditions and war according to the first, justly the ’X wages war bad, from war’ (Barnes, p.72). ’A nation wages war are Entangled with the justly upon y if the overall consequences of war are better, or less the taking is not difficult to see that LN wars violate this It the damage and costs, requirement: (the proportionality only than Similarly if the for that nation or the wronged nation it is supporting have a decent Page 14 chance of being better after the fighting ends’ (Wakin, p.20). way LN war can in no satisfy these conditions, as scenarios depicting the aftermath of such wars reveal. Some of the lesser requirements for a just war are infringed wars; LN It seems that there can for example, that of reasonable expectation of success. be no reasonable expectation of success in an LN by war, the whatever prospects of success with more limited nuclear exchanges. (limited) What is less clearcut is the question of whether LN wars conflict with the requirements of just cause or due fault and of right intention. For this depends on the sensitive issue of the weight assigned to what are seen as basic rights human and fundamental values, and the extent to which just wars can be ideologically justified. the mainstream justified position and wars definitively excluded however, in puzzling of medieval "humanitarian" by the over decisive against LN wars. theory wars (cf. traditional was opposed to While ideologically Barnes, p.778), these were not theory. There is merit, little dubiously effective requirements, when so many are Finally, these arguments from historical requirements do not violate prescriptive requirements: the argument is not a simple argument from historical authority, but also premisses uses requirements imposed (and used) were justified. the to effect that the As they are. In the Christian tradition there were two main strands of reflection on the moral rightness or justness of wars 9A , the just war theory and a rival pacificist strand, prominent in early Christianity, but submerged from Augustine on until contemporary times. Both exclude nuclear wars, one strand because they are inevitably unjust, the other because they are wars and This is the involve violence beginning of the convergence argument against nuclear wars: such wars are excluded from all ethical perspectives, once expediency is 27 that duly Page 15 The detailed argument They are morally wrong however you look at it. removed. is an exhaustive case by case one, from each type of moral theory. can details For deontological and contractual theories lead back be shortcut. to requirements for a just war, violate. Fortunately which it has already shown, been In fact conditions for just wars were sometimes arrived at or defended through principles of such moral theories, so that a good deal of the work argumentative already has brand utilitarian of finally accomplished; for such and is adopted, not is far to have effect in shown pleasure, reason The wars Involves such massive that this dominates genuine alternative to LN war is better or 28 outlined against overwhelming moral case against such wars. wars LN do not exhaust the For there are other moral principles (derivative in some of the theories just considered) which the waging of war would violate. in are accomplished in utilitarian fashion, so that any they The arguments given LN that utility maximisation is however seek: infliction of pain and colossal removal of however others requisite latter point holds also as LN wars are excluded on utilitarian grounds. convergence assessments The done. been regards utilitarianism, where Lackey whatever wars LN an LN Among such principles are conservative ones, that we have an obligation to maintain the earth in proper shape and not degrade its systems, that we have a responsibility to future generations, to whom we are accountable, to "pass the world on" not in substantially worse condition it". Such conservative principles than we "received - however they are finally satisfactorily formulated - are bound to be violated in the event of an LN war. §5. The shift to nuclear lobby nuclear arguments deterrence: to its immorality. The has a way of halting, and if not defeating, certainly deflating, arguments against the immorality of LN wars, namely there is no actual Page 16 such any In engagement wars. different from engagement in war: LN being done is, it is claimed, quite is What is deterrence indeed important most precisely in preventing such wars from ever occurring, as well as in maintaining (other) fundamental [Western] values. obtaining desiderata. both is deterrence pronouncements, claims The reasons:- A first reason is that Indeed it is the only there are is much for more than deterrence can account neither for strategy military Western disarmament to expected be On deterrence. 29 the despite For if it and sometimes even a drive for superiority. this, actual nuclear of In fact there has been a were "sufficiency" to deter would be an adequate goal. quest that, evidence the - the only - military goal. not way dubious, for several decidedly too practical nor weapons for Pure orthodox Nor has deterrence set in motion the process of . to armaments reduce "its" under contrary, to levels impulse there sufficient has for been almost unlimited acceleration in building arms (PL, p.318, quotes inserted). Another of deterrence reason for the type serious that is doubt being concerns other reasons also, connected with pure deterrence The reasons include the for nuclear war and with to For original (its threatening posture deterrence for, the propaganda that must be promulgated to maintain credibility with a population whose interests are being etc. conditions the "cold war", the probability of a LN war has increased considerably in the last 30 years. calls factor: to that extent, at least, enhanced its prospects of occurring. and setting) probability practised, which involves full-scale preparation for nuclear war, has prepared the occur, the The "sacrificed" for objectives, situation has now been reached where many theorists think there is a high probability at least of an LN war this century, i.e. certainly military be before 2000. It can argued - though there seems no way to make any such a probability argument at all tight, and it may be demonstrable that it cannot be made tight - Page 17 that there is a non-negligible probability of an LN war before 2000. If it is wrong that X should occur, then it is also wrong that Cl. be But highly probably that should it X occur, and it is wrong to increase the probability that X occur. This is the first several of connecting doxastic mapping principles moral considerations against LN war into arguments against deterrence of LN war by the perverse practice of preparing for it and thereby helping "to the sense of raising the probability). (in it bring about" But like most principles in ethics, Cl requires complication to avoid defeat by counterexamples. The second part of Cl encounters apparent trouble where clash of principles occurs. Thus it may be argued that it is permissible to increase the probability that X occurs to avoid a greater Consider for example the pilot who increases the probability evil. that the passenger plane he is flying crashes in order to aircraft troubled does not make hit city apartment buildings 30 . sure Such a defeating condition does not apply in the case of nuclear deterrence where is there (though of principles) wrongness of a practice is not offset or removed by clash a the that its role in avoiding greater evil. It can be argued that it is; argument from the previous such is part of success of the deterrence. point of the popular This inductive argument deserves little more credence than the racing driver’s argument, perhaps from similar that because he hasn’t had a fatal crash yet (despite some base, time a close calls), he won’t. There are, furthermore, reasons for concluding continue to work. of will not One is the deterrence depends upon judgements regarding the other side, which may be mistaken: perception deterrence that what strategy ’each is is at rational", the mercy what kind the of of other’s damage is Page 18 one "unacceptable", how "convincing" Not p.313). threat side’s other’ the (PL. as rational, regards limited but there must be severe doubts as to whether rational principles war, As to the last consider, for example, the are operating effectively. idea to is there evidence that one side (the USA) has misjudged the only other side’s (the USSR’s) perception of what is nuclear is (already erroneous to, as held in high places of power) that LN war can be alluded survived in rudimentary shelters, and also won. Deterrence consists in preventing something (often some wrong) by threats including 31 OED) . (cf. fright For most people without not Immoral destruction of New York.) deterrence, that is his graphic descriptions But though deterrence per deterrence from suchmeans is of course not immoral. publishing in them LN expense, trouble and wastage of preparing to enormous And deterrence by engage in them. was the all or scenarios vivid portraying the horror or LN wars would serve adequately to deter wars, fear by complete se is the of (Schell nuclear permissible, war preparation of the object to be prevented, is not, where this object Itself is not permissible. The argument for this is through the principle C2. If X is wrong then complete preparation of X is wrong. Hence since LN wars are wrong and war-deterrence implies of LN wars is wrong. war—deterrence X is just as bad as doing X: Y. preparation, It is not being claimed that preparing for Y and Z may both be wrong and Z (much) worse than , 32 What is wrong is by no means uniformly evil Principle C2 principles: a part is way succeeds or down the line in a series of connecting principle of the same sort that it higher in the series is that connecting X with attempted X: X complete not 33 . But if X is wrong then attempted X is wrong, whether the series ends; it cuts off well before mere Page 19 intentionality, contrary to the claims example, it does various of religious For positions. not follow that if X is wrong then the contemplation of X is wrong or that mere non-action-oriented consideration of carrying out X is wrong. The applies point nightmares. or war, equally sexual fantasies, power fantasies, and nuclear to In particular there is nothing reflecting upon it, as we are: wrong nuclear nuclear wars, even if their horrors don't bear thinking on, are not unthinkable, and in thinkable. contemplating with some senses are all too Indeed one of the reasons why the connecting principles hold is that each involves decidedly increased probability of the evil outcome it connects Accompanying the increased probability are certain sets of reprehensible with. these are not those attitudes tied to the action the evil outcome involves; mere passive contemplation of 34 this War-deterrence involves not only war preparation, but announcement of accompanied by threats and a threatening posture. For some party, the potential enemy, has to be frightened, if deterrence is to succeed. This aspect of (war-) deterrence yields a further connecting principle, If X is wrong then threatening X is also wrong. C3. is wrong to do ... then the declared Intent put to that Intending to do wrong is wrong, and so also is favourable circumstances for one’s alternatively be argued semantically: (e.g. into Intending position committing 35 . rape) The is practice is also wrong. to prevail. if a world with X 'What Ramsey: is wrong to threaten ...’ (quoted in Walzer p.272) reason is that if putting something into practice wrong Thus too is do wrong The never unless point ideal can then neither is a world in which X is only conditionally blocked, in which X may well occur. Page 20 By detachment from the connecting principles - one sound one would but logically, defensible three ones is good measure - nuclear deterrence by preparation for and threat of LN war is This wrong. also reveals suffice Deterrence wrong. of this type the suggestion that the morality of the whole why deterrence thing depended on war itself never occurring was so bizarre: connections between war and war-deterrence. the out is it left War-deterrence should not be practised any more than nuclear war itself should be engaged in - unless directions can be drastically changed (e.g. its at least limited, per impossible in the case of nuclear, to purely military targets). There are other concomitant reasons for the Firstly, with dissatisfaction deterrence. it has provided (nuclear peace, as there is no shortage of peace small-scale conventional wars) is at least a tenuous peace, which is not stable, liable but upset at any stage by a range of factors, including error (both to It does not offer genuine peace, of the sort required for human and technical). a international life, but only a fragile "peace of a sort" (PL, p.316). stable Secondly, there is enormous cost, the because on expenditure it moral excludes Bishops put their point in a surprising opportunity urgent other by Marxist cost of deterrence, The US moral priorities. way: in terms of ’the between what is spent for destructive capacity and what is needed contradiction for constructive development’ (PL, p.316). §6. The and super-states; arguments to persuasive prudential practical, the the resulting arguments (that have war persuaded justifiability of nuclear war preparation in basic argument is simply an elaboration, build-up nuclear situation. moral-fix nuclear of immorality to argument Not preparation; many the or theorists) present of the only are there there to are the circumstances. also moral The state-uplift, of that for the Page 21 escalation of weapons at the local level, for acquiring a gun or for stocking-up the armoury [and every bit as doubtful as that argument]. neighbourhood that nuclear preparation, first danger: of nuclear destruction. blackmail, ’so we have been told, against guards all atomic blackmail and foreign domination; The two together, go since if did we double the and second of not the fear we might adopt a policy of appeasement or surrender and so avoid the destruction’ (Walzer, p.273). In fact it is supposed to guard against more than there is a crucial third element, namely, loss of basic rights (freedom, these; equality, etc.) and fundamental values (preservation of etc.) and ways of life integrated with these. truth, dignity, human This further set of elements is linked to the danger of foreign domination - which is really a separate from It is risk blackmail. of element Though foreign domination need not imply the loss of most basic values it does imply the loss of at least of one, self-determination, freedom to choose various national objectives; conversely loss or infringement of basic values can occur without foreign domination, e.g. of by internal change government or governmental approach, by the increased security and control a nuclear state demands, etc. values, through Nuclear destruction can also involve loss of destruction but the converse does not hold. basic of the material base of the cherished life-style; It should be observed that not all the values concerned are equally fundamental: one of the main values of deterrence theory, the resistance to and of containment "communism", is questionable this in regard. The theme is, in short, NA. Because of multiple (connected) states) which have nuclear dangers from another state (or other weapons, a state - any state that is too large to rely upon other states - is obliged to invest in [matching] nuclear weapons. Page 22 Hence, by detachment, a nation-state, such as USA, ought to order the of nuclear armoury that it something have in has, or, weakening the theme to meet objections concerning excess, "overkill", capacity, at least a solid core of the nuclear devices it has. out whether the obligation is a moral one, Sorting because for instance of the character of the values supposedly being merely or one protected, of prudential reason - it is presumably somewhat more than mere expediency - can be set aside for the present. On the same basis it can be argued that unilateral disarmament against a dangerous nuclear opponent would be prudentially irrational. It can be freely admitted that what is prudentially required is, like the common strategies of the prisoners’ dilemma situation and of certain competitive games, a suboptimal strategy; sufficient trust, that a superior strategy for adversaries, if etc., could be achieved, would be a cooperative arrangement. Joint agreement would be better not merely in removing the moral dilemma, but in a range of other respects: it would be much less risky, expensive, draining of resources and destructive of the environment, etc. However for the present and the foreseeable future the prospects of cooperation appear, so we are repeatedly told, unfortunately rather remote: or the only sure insurance is nuclear if one is a smaller nation, a larger ally who has an arsenal. force (Here a level of trust is called for which is far from foolproof, and which contrasts strongly with the lack of trust displayed elsewhere.) The nuclear theme for a middling or lesser power is a bit different from NA and ends rather as follows: MA. Because ..., a state that cannot rely on obliged ally. its own nuclear resources is to accommodate the nuclear installations and facilities of a protecting Page 23 Principle MA is not very plausible, nor are the for substitutes obvious Not only MA but also NA, is now coming under question by disarmament it ° . who groups, more challenge the basic assumptions of the underlying general retaliatory model that Safely lies in weapons, and 1) More weapons imply more security ii) 37 Certainly, for more isolated states, such as New Zealand, lies attack submarines). more of a in excluding nuclear facilities from safety nuclear (including visits from nuclear Europeans are arguing in a similar way, that the present system is risk [liability] than a protection (p.251, Thompson); nuclear installations, Europe cannot be the envisaged and without for theatre a limited nuclear war it is now seen as by US (but not Soviet) strategists. Once i) and ii) are questioned, other assumptions of the retaliatory model and its variants come up for examination, namely iii) iv) Whether the proper response to danger is armament, in particular Whether the proper response is through nuclear armament, as opposed to other military responses (such as conventional arms), and generalising on part of Hi), v) Whether military approaches/procedures (through armaments, etc.) the proper is method, or should be the method, of conflict resolution at the international level. It is plausibly argued against military procedures that at no ordinary level do we set about meeting danger or settling disputes by acquiring lethal weapons and threatening to use them - except perhaps warranted, frontier ethics. But on an out-dated, and never really this takes us into the issue of alternative defence systems, an important matter beginning to obtain the contemporary 38 explanation it deserves, but one that already anticipates subsequent questioning Page 24 While the state system is intact, of the framework of nation-states. not and exceptional inevitable: according military to is are to be expected and are likely permanent place in the procedures ’force has [a] ... force nation-state system’ Ramsey (p.xv) who uses this as part of his case for a nuclear war doctrine. far Assembling the arguments so to as the nuclear fix:- referred hereafter developed engage to sections) it is and immoral, in war-deterrence, for prudential reasons (as argued using NA This dilemma is no idle construction and MA). dilemma, deontic States both ought not to engage in war-deterrence, because (as argued in previous ought the yields (concocted to demonstrate of paraconsistent logic), but a serious real-life dilemma, the outlines virtues of which are repeatedly encountered in texts on nuclear war and its aspects The nuclear fix is in part simply a more intense dilemma beyond produced purely by itself^, war military typically transport, (since targets rely on or version of deontic the civilian ones). e.g. arrangements, military rail The main dilemma arises from a War is required for defence of the state and values it upholds (or pretends to uphold); also involves immoral acts and evil consequences. also seen be ’some The doctrine "just of justifications of war evil alm are consequences to morally war’ (Walls, p.260). dilemmas, e.g. most difficult war" the aegis War and preparedness for war also generate subsidiary a severe tension between freedom and problems justified. show that actions deemed normally forbidden by moral mandates are now permissible when performed under of but war as attempting a reconciliation by trying to show that under certain circumstances these really Thus 39 at least war which spreads inevitably combination of the retaliatory model with the features of war. can the of war Involves authority: defending a ’one of the free society without Page 25 destroying the values that give it meaning and validity’ (PL, p.324). The essential feature of a moral dilemma is that both A and the negation of A are well essential role of moral dilemmas is not widely or literature 41 The place and (or differently, obligatory), for some suitable A. wrong . positions Moreover understood utilitarianism like cannot ethical in at all easily accommodate moral dilemmas or the data which gives rise to them - but then such positions do not really offer reportive accounts of wrong and obligation anyway. Contrary to utilitarian perceptions a dilemma does not any have necessarily moral solution, though there may be better and worse ways out. Reactions and responses that are characteristic of the from nuclear moral dilemmas There is an unsteadiness, an uncertainty as to what to fix. do, which way to proceed, which principles in watered-down form to temporary Thus, crutch. for world’ best" 42 as a of way "morally never our exercising moral , that is in a morally-strapped world. ethical Bishops who the of ’strictly conditional’ moral fix. Deterrence has a strictly temporary role but can be responsibility a shift "morally in a fallen to a ’moral "second acceptability’ try to escape ’the paradox of deterrence’, i.e. while acceptability, good", A similar deterrence we as (as from good to acceptable) is made by the US Catholic functor speak grasp example, the Bishop of London contends that the possession of nuclear weapons ’while acceptable" emerge the object must and strictly be to move beyond deterrence, of from the conditional ’towards a world free of the threat of deterrence’ (PL, p.317), out of the nuclear fix. To make matters worse the nuclear fix is is, not furthermore, a fix of (more something they happened into, by affluent) states’ accident. The initial nuclear involvement was deliberately chosen, primarily by USA, and the own making. It escalation has by and large also been deliberately chosen, again Page 26 In these respects the situation is like that often by the USA. who person deliberately lets perself to be involved in two incompatible relations, and that currency, of adoption nuclear is the that nuclear build-up. The recent (1980) programme is to be in addition to existing are (which Soviet USA Initiated nuclear armament, and has frequently led escalation, and apparently still does. resources some weaponry, and nuclear build-up, in North America occurred on a defensive basis in response to fact with It is a myth, though one builds up conflicting obligations thereby. The the of generally United strategic be already in excess of to agreed States’ Russia’s, and which always have been so) (Thompson, p.21). The present dilemma is then a direct outcome advanced of state policy, especially by capitalist nations, and not merely a response to the Soviets (or state socialism). There is a two-way connection between world political arrangements and nation-states the nuclear fix. On the one hand, situation increasingly is political arrangements / Q ; seen political these arrangements are an evident source of the dilemma with the result through that nuclear as indicating the inadequacy of present world on the other, the nuclear fix tends to lock political arrangements into the statist form (into statist arrangements of an increasingly centralist cast). peace The espoused purpose of nuclear weapons may be to keep the (!) and to defend national interests, but there are other reasons such as perpetuating the system of sovereign states and politically confrontation. The argument to the theme that advantageous the very nuclear situation arising from the statist arrangements and interrelationals (economic conflicting rivalries, ideologies, etc.) tends to, and is used to, lock the world into the present arrangements of sovereign states and zones of interest, is practical state one. Consider first, the matter from a piecemeal the Soviet side where the Page 27 pattern of national control and military economic reorientation is clearer. The threat from the West, whether it exists or not (and in Soviet perception it certainly does), has become a necessary legitimation for the power of the ruling elites, an excuse for their many economic and social failures, and an argument to isolate and silence critics within their own borders. In the West we have controlled carefully ... and ... selective release of ’official information’ (Thompson, p.20). Secondly, there is evidence of entrenchment of the arrangements, by the SALT negotiations: of rules not regarded as threatening US in place by The Soviet invasion interests", and so the US is not "vital What was different, what particularly worried about Afghanistan and its people. it held penalty for breaking the rules is the threat of annihilation). (the Thirdly, there are cases, such as the Afghanistan example. is shown there are fixed superpowers and a (growing) nuclear club of nations all governed by a negotiated set deterrence as was worried about and made nuclear threats concerning, were adjacent Western these lay within the US zone of interest. oil supplies: 44 and complicates other dilemmas The nuclear fix enhances contemporary sovereign state, in particular the deep tensions between national security and the operation of liberal-democratic arrangements (e.g. liberty, popular control of institutions, etc). personal subsidiary dilemmas, as for example the obligations to a nuclear conflicting obligations the by induced as state, a or doctor It also spotlights other more extent role-induced or a individual nuclear of (political) one’s dilemmas armaments such as one’s processor or researcher (the question of political obligations is considered in Appendix 2). §7. Ways out of the moral dilemmas: [initial] political fall-out from the Page 28 conclusions. ethical all the ways are ways of limitation, and they Virtually all Involve in one way or another limitations on nuclear arms or are limitations on the powers of states. and deployed the they way The limitations may be 45 reached by agreement and negotiation and more or less voluntarily agreed , to or they may be imposed, or worst of all, they may emerge from an initial war. As with other fixes produced by are there suggested structure there and relations power and extra—state approaches. "realistic", attempts All to cow, as unilateral disarmament. is it states the or alter the remove them altogether, allegedly familiar, the seriously do which and "practical" nuclear problem - e.g. disarmament by they do not tamper with that - are inter-state; But in fact there is nothing very sacred not even a very long-standing arrangement, nor, as a matter or empirical fact, is one. states, of and the same goes for less "realistic" proposals, such the state; nation-state; arrangements which ways are of resolve neutral arms limitations, etc. sacred structural out which do not interfere with these arrangements, ways inter-state approaches, the it form about the political of particularly a stable We are certainly free - in more liberal states, it should be everywhere - to theorise as to its demise and replacement by alternative arrangements. Extra-state approaches take one of two routes, the way up, to genuine 46 power, or the way down, through fractionation or deunionisation international of states. not to The ways up and down are by no means one and the same; necessarily world government Were law-courts. remedy, namely intra-state incompatible. the through to Some of the important machinery, for the way up operate, courts legal but they are is assigned action, already there sufficient that medieval the international authority and power, the in theorists saw to all disputes could be extended to interstate disputes, and the just war Page 29 between states S and T superseded by the just case of S versus T. one statist, more legalistic of trying to get to grips with the nuclear way problem, and accordingly is often mentioned, though dismissed 47 in , orthodox The Way Up is mostly passing in strategic texts on thermonuclear war. It is however beginning to be much more sympathetically considered by those who take rather than strategic viewpoint. moral a There is a renewed emphasis on world order, in reaching ’towards a morally integrated international system’; element be to and ’the missing of world order today is the absence of a properly constituted political The Way Down - though, like The Way authority’ (PL, p.320). by Up, no means new, turning back to the anarchist positions of a century ago - is, by contrast, scarcely mentioned in the orthodox discussions, but is making an appearance (a which is comeback) in some more radical discussions. A main argument for The Way Up is to supposed underpin statist just arrangements a repetition in first the argument from (generous) variations upon the Prisoners’ that of place, namely the Dilemma, the as such Tragedy of the Commons, that authority and coercion - in the form of the state are requiried to ensure best solutions, ecological order. especially regards of part the sort of super-state. of the "tragedy" is destruction when to assume in fact assumptions 48 of a commons by nuclear war, the solution is now said to be some Of course, this begins to undermine an earlier application argument, since states will lose their sovereignty, and political obligation to states will be correspondingly weakened. is and order So with the "tragedy of nation-states", where the players are not herdsmen but nation-states, and one of the prospects good public But all this that these "tragedy" arguments are good ones in the first place, they are not but are only sound under quite restrictive Page 30 There are many problems with the Way Up, both theoretical and practical.An theoretical hitch is that the Way Up merely repeats statist arrangments initial at a level up, by way contingency, of super-state It arrangements. only is through a of there being no rival Intelligent civilisations nearby, that the problems of interstate relations not are repeated level a The up. major practical hitch is that there is no prospect at all of getting such a "solution" to work in time to serve its intended interstate future the For purpose. ideological differences, including especially differences as to how political arrangements should be effected, exclude world operative hostilities. government of prospect any an or world legal system capable of resolving nuclear In some ways, perhaps, this is just World well. as government be extremely monolithic, would entrench bureaucracy with all its damaging would features, and could easily tend to totalitarianism. on nuclear foreseeable the It would impose certainly an exploitative economic system which would do immense damage to world many remaining natural systems. The Way Up thus presupposes an unlikely, undesirable, level ideological, indeed requisite unity of political paradigmatic, cannot be and and expected unity economic separation with some in of nuclear main crucial respects, Moreover, given the Northern cultures, deadlines. When not even nuclear weapons limitations can be worked out how much less likely much more sweeping sovereignty, could be agreements, negotiated? Involving genuine There an is is limitations almost endless that it of state series of blockages and deadlocks in the way of such state reconciliation. The nuclear fix emerging from nation-state arrangements - combined with the apparent impotence of interstate relations to alleviate the situation, indeed with the ability only to push the world further into the situation and nearer to Page 31 nuclear now is - "brink" taken to indicate (from yet a further angle) the inadequacy of nation-state political arrangements, and has given new impetus resolutions. extra-state other of consideration to The thesis that the nuclear problem indicates the radical unsatisfactoriness of national sovereignty and the present system namely in Schell. ’full-scale nation states has even reached the best-seller book stands, of According to Schell the nuclear situation should they operate' ... which himself avoids these reality and in ’workfing] out the practical steps by which 'awesome (III, p.92). Schell However urgent tasks, which, imposed on us by history, constitute the political work of our age’^9, history consonant with the global can reorganise its political life’ mankind ... a of the foundations of political thought’ required to reexamination make ’the world’s political institutions ... in to lead So, not feeling the pressures of overimpressed by the realities of (unstable) nation-states, do most or political theorists. But, having rashly ventured this far, we can hardly avoid some of these tasks. The central argument arising from the nuclear fix, for questioning political arrangements and seriously current considering changing them (in theory at least), takes the following shape:- H1. Political arrangements should answer back to certain requirements and justified in terms of doing so. are These requirements include such things as enabling good and meaningful lives for those who operate under the arrangements, at least where (as certainly in the West) the basic material conditions for such lives are met. H2. these Because of the nuclear fix, nation-state arrangements have ceased to requirements. For guarantee the prospect of arrangements. nation-states, good and at meaningful meet least in the North can no longer lives to those under their A life's meaningfulness is certainly diminished if it ends before Page 32 its prime in a nuclear disaster; yet there is a non-negligible probability that many such lives may terminate, less than fulfilled, in this way. Therefore, Nation-state arrangements have forfeited their justification, H3. should and be changed. There is enough evidence that power brokers who control states, both more powerful states and lesser states (sometimes with some claim to popular mandate, often without), have lost sight of - or worse don’t care about - the point of political arrangments, of what justifies or is supposed to justify their states. The situation has been reached where ’nuclear powers, or higher value This is already illustrated by states in nonnuclear military situations: have much forfeited of what claim Vietnam Israel, many and the principles of just warfare have been blatantly violated repeatedly, as have many states put statesmen, on national sovereignty than they do on human survival’ (Schell’s conclusion, p.76). other their they Such principles. other had to external respect or internal political obedience. It could just be, of course, that there are no alternatives, or no possibly better But alternatives. alternatives there are, as we have seen, though but little work has been expended on working out the range of alternatives or features (except perhaps for the option of world government). As to whether all such alternatives can be dismissed, for instance as lacking feasibility, difficult to be all sure without being dogmatic: operate, once adjusted, very far on organising is humans, for under substantially different arrangments. But, once again, nuclear deadlines do not appear proceed it alternatives have been given very little opportunity to work, and we know very little about how instance, their to give sufficient time to and trying out alternative arrangments, even those of the more accessible Way Down. Thus alternative political and social Page 33 while theoretically feasible and certainly a longer-term goal, do arrangements, not presently offer a satisfactory practical response to the nuclear fix. There is no need to insist upon a dilemma to single-track the of out nuclear We can not only quite the contrary. exclusion of all others: the way afford to be fairly catholic about "second best" approaches pursued and whatever to be working or looks like helping, within reorganised ethical seems Indeed, (and other) constraints: situation, methods, should we as such urgency, the the of direness the and nondemocratlc very (and down certainly negotiations on arms limitations between main nuclear states. The direction of most hope is given be fairly catholic and not inflexibly commited to narrow bogged unrepresentative) direction embrace for especially new. not has progress however come into view; the The political means of the Way Out are what they have been on almost every larger liberal or that issue humanitarian has from outside state governmental apparatus by organised pressure from mattered; within or without upon it, characteristically Bottom-Up Such Top-Down. familiar and practically never considerations are but part of the more general, and very effective, case against reliance upon states for a range of things they are now supposed required, to more supply, effectively but can almost Invariably be obtained, where which and less expensively without (and them their monopolies). In the case of security it is states, with very few exceptions, that have imposed, or acquiesed in, military solutions involving nuclear installations and The nuclear weapons. frequently from across nations. installations opposition local and the to neighbourhood These groups have been and establishing, for escalating groups, successful the time nuclear fix has come some of them now federated in blocking being, some some nuclear nuclear-free Page 34 The patchwork grass-roots movement against nuclear is strongest neighbourhoods. in which Europe, - as the movement realised, and what gave it impetus - a is leading theatre, on US American touching thinking, strategic American nuclear installations in Europe will make it a contrary it probable seems nuclear limited a war that Europe safer much become will place: safer on the if the anti-nuclear movements succeed in having these installations removed and rendered nuclear-free. not is extremely doubtful that increasing NATO and It shores. for Europe The chances of grossly immoral conduct will thereby also be considerably reduced. What the movements must press for is accordingly clear it is in broad outline: what they have been pushing for, nuclear reduction and disarmament. But the argument also makes it clearer how far this should go, namely all the way to nuclear unilateral disarmament if necessary, certainly to local disarmament across progressively larger parts of the planet’s surface. is its demoted, importance and the necessity of For once the state its maintenance properly downgraded and reliance on its decision-making diminished in favour of localised decision-making (say) - once all that happens or is allowed for, one major component in the nuclear fix is removed, namely the worry about sovereignty. the of that sovereignty has of been assigned a mistaken weakest links in the moral fix structure. In the weigh-up that should occur in charting a way out of moral dilemma, much more Important elements features state The state, and accompanying features such as misplaced nationalism, importance. are Maintenance loss than the state are those things the state is supposed to safeguard such of as individual and local welfare and autonomy, but they are better ensured by the removal of nuclear weapons. The nuclear circumstances threaten the loss of basic values, autonomy, for in particular, main reasons are familiar; such as welfare and many creatures and regions, and the potential loss is in general Page 35 much greater than in a nuclear-free situation (even should party remain armed with nuclear weapons). for example, the production (because of nuclear another ideological There are also subsidiary reasons; weapons reduces local both welfare of the opportunity costs of weapons manufacture) and autonomy (because of the accompanying security measures). Thus the nuclear fix is resolved, theoretically at loss of the state. any rate, by risking But, although that is the best way out at least cost in the circumstances, it will be strongly resisted in practice, since those who hold power hold it, in one way or another, under the auspices of state. FOOTNOTES 1. The US Catholic Bishops make the point forcefully: ’Nuclear weapons ... and nuclear warfare ... are new moral issues ... There exists a capacity to do something no other age could imagine: we can threaten the created order ... We could destroy [God’s] work’ (PL, p.312). While the analysis offered in what follows has a great deal in common with the Bishop’s position, it differs significantly in removing the religious backdrop and associated features and, it is hoped, in bringing out the logical structure of the argument more clearly and sharply (the paper was Initially drafted independently of PL). To illustrate the differences that emerge with removal of the religious backdrop and its acoutrements, consider two examples from PL, p.323:- Firstly, peace is possible without religious enlightenment if it is possible with it: religious enlightenment is not an essential condition as there implied. Secondly, violence does not take all the forms the Bishops try to give it, e.g. sexual discrimination is hardly a form of violence, pornography can operate without it, etc. It is a serious mistake to try to heap so many diverse and independent issues together under the one head (forms of violence) as if they stood and fell together, e.g. abortion and nuclear war. 2. Another dimension of variation concerns the sequence of the war, especially the type of strike involved. Though the sequence is important for the moral assessment, for example of the main actors, it is in no way alters the immorality of LN wars, as will emerge. 3. ’The overwhelming probability [is] that a nuclear exchange would have no limits’, (PL, p.314). Hence a major argument against limited nuclear wars: that any such war risks, indeed renders highly probable, an unlimited war, and risk is far too large to take. The point in fact follows by straightforward application of decision theory, multiplying the massive undesirability (moral and otherwise) of an LN war by its probability given a Page 36 limited nuclear war. Given the character of weapons development and present communication arrangements, the idea of a purely nuclear exchange between the superpowers, perhaps in the European "theatre", is really a myth. But limited wars are not the present focus. 4. There was a substantial element of sport (and connected features of prowess) in traditional wars that has been eroded in modern technological wars. Nuclear wars are not just unsporting, in that no notice is given, etc. They are unjust in a much deeper way. 5. There are interesting sidelights concerning even the etymology of the term ’war’, which was derived from a term meaning ’confusion’. In particular, ’it is a curious fact that no Germanic nation in early historic times had in living use any world properly meaning ’war’’. (OED) 6. But of course there can be something quite analogous to war between clans, multinational firms, even nature, etc. (To this extent, a strict definition of ’war’ is being insisted upon.) So the diffusion of power structures has to extend beyond just the break-down of states. 7. Thus the ubiquitous war against Nature of modern times, which features just as large in marxists as in capitalists. As could have been guessed, someone - it was James - suggested chanelling all war into "war" in the metaphorical sense against that unarmed and nonaggressive "opponent", Nature. James proposed as a substitute for war proper, conscription of the youth for a war against Nature (see Wasserstrom, p.12). What it boiled down to, however, was that youth was to be channelled into all the dirty work, in that way to acquire manly virtues military activities "rightly" instil, especially discipline, but also service, devotion, physical fitness, constructive exertion, responsibility, and order. Another less diabolical substitute for wars proper is through war games and other games of competitive cast. Again specious arguments enter for bringing out the "best" in human males. 8. War can be seen as a structural problem of state arrangments, to be removed along with these (otherwise defective) arrangements. Wars arise from political organisation of states - a situational fix. 9. Thus Aquinas and Grotius for example (see Barnes, p.776, top). The argument presupposes rather a lot, Including a neat public/private distinction. Put Aquinas’s way, it looks as if it could be readily transferred into an argument for international government, or at least effective law-courts. Yet all Christendom was supposed at that time to be one state! 10. There is however the degenerate idea of war as annihilation or extinction, and of winning a nuclear war as annihilation of the enemy while not being entirely annihilated oneself: the side that somehow "survives" is said to "win". But this is an extremely tenuous sense of winning. Moreover any such war is radically unjust, because of violation of the traditional requirement of proportionality, and for other reasons developed in the text. Recent talk about winning or even surviving a nuclear war must reflect a failure to appreciate a medical reality: Any nuclear war would inevitably cause death, disease and suffering of pandemonic proportions and without the possibility of effective medical intervention ... (PL, p.313). Page 37 Unfortunately as documented in Scheer, significant officials who are responsible for the nuclear destiny of the U.S.A. - and so of the world think that the devastation of nuclear war can be survived and that a global nuclear war can actually be won! 11. In practice they often were not, they drained limited economies, they layed waste countryside (though to a minor extent by nuclear or chemical or modern mining standards), impoverishing Inhabitants, etc. 12. For as Nagel contents (early on), there are moral restrictions on the conduct of warfare which are not legalistic only and which are neither arbitrary not merely conventional nor a matter of usefulness. These themes run entirely counter to the classic theory of war of Clausowicz - a theory outlined in Walzer. 13. As Nagel remarks. 14. The progressive escalation argument is an incremental Sorites. This is part of the so-called "logic of war". 15. As Walzer argues, p.24. 16. The severe limitations of those also come from the failure person from inside the homeland which excessive applications of 17. Thus the differences between Nagel on the one side, and Brandt and the other, in Cohen et al. 18. The pattern of moral argument has much in common with procedure in anarchist political discussion. 19. There are other arguments against two (or Routley and Plumwood. 20. For details see Routley and Plumwood. 21. According to the doctrine, which is one concerning responsibility, we are responsible only for the intended effects or consequences of our freely-chosen actions, and not for other (side) effects or consequences, even if these are forseen and/or intimately tied to the intended consequences. The doctrine is pernicious allowing those who adjust their intention suitably to escape responsibility for evil they knowingly perpetrate. Thus, for instance, a Russian supreme command which intended only to take out US military targets would, under double effects, effects have no responsibility for the resultant effect on American and Canadian cities! 22. Despite Nagel’s suggestion (pp.158). 23. Of course there are counterarguments too, and not merely from military in the case of small numbers of obstructive noncombatants. One is a variation of the Bald Man: there is no clear line between combatants and noncombatants. However as Nagel argues (p.20) there are distinctions between them, firstly in terms of their roles, e.g. in carrying or using argument like the lesser virtues, nationalism and patriotimsm, of replacement - try for example swapping a by one from outside as regards treatment patriotism can engender. multiple) morality Hare lines: on see Page 38 arms or directing those who do, and secondly in terms of their harmfulness, the threat they offer. See also PL, p.312, where a simple and effective paradigm case argument is applied. 24. The principle can be argued to in various ways. One (not entirely conclusive) way is Nagel’s way, from the requirements of directness and relevance in combat, the underlying principle being that, ’whatever one does to another person intentionally must be aimed at him as a subject, with the intention that he receive it as a subject’. (p.15) 25. The situation with limited nuclear wars where the targets are essentially military ones, and noncombatants are unaccountably killed "indirectly' is different. Such wars are not however excused by the pernicious doctrine of double effect. For such wars remain unjust on several counts, e.g. they inflict disproportionate damage, e.g. on life systems. As Zuckermann says, ’It is still inevitable that were military installations rather than cities to become the objectives of nuclear attack, millions, even tens of millions of civilians would be killed ...’ (quoted in Thompson and Smith, p.14 where the Italics are added). 26. Throughout the OED equations,reflecting common usage, of just with right or correct, and unjust with morally wrong, are adopted. 27. These alternatives are not as far removed practically as may appear. For the aim of just war theory is not ’to legitimize war but to prevent it. The presumption is against the use of force’ (PL, p.312). And most types of wars are ruled out by the theory. However not all wars or violent revolutions are excluded, and that is enough to guarantee the distinction between the alternatives. In particular, defensive wars are allowed - at least for the defending side, though from a wider viewpoint these too may be condemned - ’the classic case [of the just war] ... was the use of lethal force to prevent aggression against innocent victims’ (PL, p.311). Under Twentieth Century international law defence, narrowly construed, is the only legitimate basis for war; Roman law was only slightly more generous, in allowing for the restitution of goods (see Barnes, p.780). 28. An argument of this sort is developed in more detail, though not in complete generality, in Goodin. 29. As to the first point, there is not only overkill capacity and the drive for superiority (often represented via "negotiating" strength) but the matter of counterforce weapons which are offensive weapons. As regards the second point, US policy has been decidedly expansionist with regular intervention in other nations; there have been repeated US threats to use nuclear weapons, especially to deal with revolutionary activities in the third world, but also in Europe in "limited" nuclear war; and in official military strategy no sharpline has been drawn between conventional and nuclear weapons: on these and other related points see further Lackey 82, p.l91ff., and also Thompson and Smith. 30. The example was supplied by D. 31. Deterrence also commonly includes elements of mendacity, deception, misinformation. There is a grain of truth in the claim that ’deterrence is primarily about what the other side thinks, not what we think’ (Pym quoted morally Johnson. Page 39 in Thompson, p.19). simply 32. Nor are degrees of wrongness required: ordered as regards worseness. 33. Can this be done semantically in terms of closeness/worseness The attempted X world is close to the X world? 34. There is a need for further clarification here. Passive spectatorship of evil events where one is in a position to make a difference is quite another thing, from contemplation of other worlds where evil occurs. 35. It is this principle especially that forces Ramsey, a Protestant theologian who is a nuclear hawk, into the tight position he ends in, which as Walzer explains, really leaves no room to move. For in virtue of C3 it must be allowed that the threatened wars are permissible to carry out. Ramsey tries to limit these to military exchanges. But to be effective as a deterrent, the exchange permitted must both threaten and also, in view of C3, not threaten nonmilitary targets, collateral non-combatant populations. It appears that Ramsey’s position, if worked out, would be inconsistent. wrongs can be partially of worlds? Principle C3 is also invoked by the US Catholic Bishops: see PL, p.316. They put the point both in terms of threat and of declared intent to use nuclear weapons, which they pronounce morally wrong. 36. As is widely known, inadmissible considerations of expediency frequently enter into reasons why states allow foreign nuclear facilities upon their territories, e.g. economic considerations such as trade or local revenue and jobs. 37. Cf. 38. It was considered long ago in China by the alternative systems, see especially Sharp. 39. Thus Green, along with many others, ’find[s] nuclear deterrence ... the best of practical policies available to us now ... given the realities of world politics’ but ’still demurfs] because of moral qualms’ (p.xil). Green also represents both Morgenthau and Halle as having ’rather agonisingly presented a ... case for a deterrence strategy, even while asserting that the strategy is morally indefensible according to the traditional ethical codes’ (p.252). Walzer ends in a similar dilemma (he is committed to a stronger and less qualified form of it than he sets down): ’... though it [deterrence] is a bad way, there may well be no other that is practical in a world of sovereign and suspicious states’ (p.274) (an indictment of the state system that Walzer does not pursue). the last article in Thompson. Mohists. For contemporary Similarly the Catholic Bishops present the situation in terms of a moral dilemma: they speak of ’the political paradox of deterrence ... the dilemma of how to prevent the use of nuclear weapons ... (PL, p.313). 40. Situations in war are also a major source of moral dilemmas. See Routley and Plumwood where several examples are given. A general logical account of and theory of moral dilemmas is elaborated therein. Page 40 41. There are exceptions of course, e.g. Sartre; and Nagel’s final example is very instructive. For a full theory of moral dilemmas see however Routley and Plumwood. 42. Reported in The Economist; reprinted in The 1983, Weekend Magazine p.2. 43. This is no longer a radical theme but is widely promulgated. The source of the nuclear problem comes from state arrangements: it is ’... a world of sovereign states ... which brought the world to the present dangerous situation’. (PL, p.313) 44. It is not alone responsible for these other dilemmas. Large-scale nuclear power and other types of warfare and security arrangements also contribute. 45. In principle it would be relatively easy for states to agree to settlement of their disputes by less damaging and expensive contests than military ones, e.g. by contests of selected representatives, and not just through fighting in some form but by contests of footballers, singers, dancers, lawyers, or etc. In practice, however, such more civilized alternatives are never considered. Animals, by contrast, are smart enough to settle disputes by means much more like these. 46. Americans, for example, tend to forget that their State (like USSR) is a union, of fairly recent origin; and that a State of the Union message could consider the dissolution of the union. 47. Thus for example, Kahn, where such a "solution" is quickly dismissed as, impractical, etc. Hardly necessary to say the Way Up has won most favour with the legal fraternity, and from more authoritarian organisations. 48. See further Routley and especially Griffin. 49. Schell does not make it clear whether he is thinking of the Way Up or the Way Down, but some of the names he drops suggest the Way Up. So can some of what he says, e.g. ’Thus the peril of extinction is the price that the world pays not for "safety" or "survival" but for its [sic!] insistence on continuing to divide Itself up into sovereign nations’ (p.76, III), as if the natural or original state were an undivided one? Routley and Australian, material referred February to 12- therein, 13 and Page 41 APPENDIX 1; Remarks on J. Schell’s THE FATE OF THE EARTH. Schell’s book is an important and influential document, which is significant having a and urgently needed effect in shifting attitudes towards nuclear. It is especially valuable for aftermath example defects. is Some exhibits, also it just nothing else that we undertake together can make any sense ...’ the of both for rubbish, a world-wide program of action for preserving the [human] ’without ... species ... moral scenarios horrifying Unfortunately severe philosophically and factually, and vivid attack. nuclear of its (p.104, Humans rearranged). however like rabbits in are Australia, virtually beyond human power to extirpate. or practical The claim presupposes two of the major defective assumptions of the book: 51. That nuclear war will eliminate life, human life, at least, on earth total extermination assumption); (the and 52. That very many notions, not only those of morality and value, but those of time and space, make no sense in the absence of humans, or, to put it into a more sympathetic philosophical form, in the absence of an actual context human (the anthropocentric assumption). The frequent applications of S2, which philosophical depth and induce give the book some of its apparent suitable puzzlement through their paradoxical without total extermination aspects, depend essentially on SI; there will be humans, about to make past and future, good and evil, go on making sense! Now although the factual assumption SI is possibility, unlikely. example, it appears in Schell’s argument on an unjustified no means ruled out as a light of present (inadequate) knowledge most the to by SI is extremely extrapolation from Hemisphere, but for the most part it does that very flimsy. It depends, for the Northern to the Southern North American thing, of Page 42 the contracting North to world (All that matters, all worthwhile America. civilization, is in USA, or at least, to be more charitable, and Europe, also be wiped out, i.e. will which eliminated in the nuclear holocaust). the example out of date. America North its human population will be Some of the data Schell relies upon, for of nuclear explosions on the ozone layer, is significantly Other effects than ozone destruction transfer even less well South. to North effect in from A factually superior study of nuclear disaster that Schell’s, Preddy and others, indicates that parts of the Southern Hemisphere, New Zealand and Southern Africa and America could escape relatively unscathed even from most massive northern exchanges. The penetration of human chauvinism as in S2 is not something Schell but product a is of truths necessary mathematics of and in Wittgenstein ’s philosophy, where even the are a product of human conventions and would In Schell human chauvinism is dished up in a particularly vanish with humans!). powerful obnoxious Kantian Thoughts form. tenses, values and morality, all depend in the and propositions, time and presence life-giving of human - past or future or merely potential humans are not enough, persons that beings are not humans are certainly not enough. ’... e.g.): Thus according to (II, Schell p.74, the thought "Humanity is not extinct" is an impossible one for a rational person, because as soon as it is, we are not. In imagining any other we look ahead to a moment that is still within the stream of human time, event, ...’. right to philosophy especially, which is still European unfortunately alive and well (e.g. peculiar The thought is however perfectly possible for humans; now. Though we (p.74)l. ’... outside can have it no doubt have it falsely a later rational creature may well be able to have it truly. "later" we the Schell erroneously denies human tenses of past, that: there is no present, and future ...’ Human extinction eliminates ’the creature that divides time into past, Page 43 present future’: and so annihilation cannot ’come to pass’ (p.77). simply false that the tenses are human: the tenses depend on But it is time local a (perceptible to many creatures other than humans, but not depending at ordering all on perceptibility for its viability) relating other times to the present, to now (also a human-independent location, evident to other creatures, and borne witness to by such sequences as the passing seasons). too easily come And annihilation may also to pass, for many humans in the North at least, as it came to pass in recent geological times that humans began to exist upon that there was a time before there were any human beings. earth. Before Here as elsewhere the human chauvinism is mixed with other distorting metaphysical assumptions of Western our heritage, verlficationism and Implicit ontic assumptions (to the effect that there are severe difficulties in talking about what does not exist). Thus, for example, Schell takes over dubious metaphysics from Freud, according to whom "it is indeed impossible to imagine our own death; do so, we (p.77/4?). In can perceive that we are in attempt and whenever we fact still present as spectators" The second clause goes a good distance towards refuting first. the fact there is no great problem in describing counterfactual situations which undermine both Freud’s claims. chauvinism into one of The same goes for Schell’s extensions human of its main traditional strongholds, value theory: the simple and basic fact [sic!] that before there can be good or evil, or to service harm, lamenting or rejoicing there must be life’, human life (p.103). are no facts, but entrenched philosophical assumptions which have been ’... These exposed 2 and criticised elsewhere . Another obnoxious theme, which Schell repeatedly infiltrates, is the Pogo theme, which S3. Distributes responsibility for the present really) onto everyone, every human in the world. nuclear situation (fiasco, An especially blatant example 3 Page 44 the world’s political runs as follows: menace leaders ... though the earth with nuclear weapons, do so only with our permission, and even at our bidding. theme At least, this is true elsewhere elaborated is ’... for democracies’ pay 4 we are the authors of the destruction . while for the peoples of the non-nuclear-armed world it sense to an argument of all The moral cost of only true in the sensitivity nuclear of representative And again ’... we is it armaments that of us underwriters of the slaughter of hundreds of millions - ’. And again ’[as] perpetrators ... is not sacred but is worthless; be killed’ (p.88). vote the against of the populace they allegedly govern. many are potential mass—killers. makes is that they fail to try to do anything about the danger)’ (p.87). But this is more of government since extinction and support the governments that pose the threat of it, for negative The III). (p.106, (For the populations of the superpowers this is true in a positive sense, we now they we convey the steady messsage ... it ... that ... Little of this is true. that life is acceptable for everyone to Those who campaign against nuclear, against nuclear-committed parties so far as is possible, and the like, are certainly not the authors of potential destruction, and responsibility nuclear situation does not simply distribute onto them. - or the unlikely opinions as to worth Schell everyone - fall on those who have done less. for the Nor does responsibility illegitimately attributes to Responsibility for decisions taken in "liberal democracies" even by representatives (in the unlikely event of this happening in the case of anything as important as defence) cannot be traced back to those represented, since among many other things, a representative of a party is only which offers a complex and often ill-characterised package of policies, and a voter may vote for zero package. representative or more policies of this Only in the (unlikely) event of a clear single issue referendum, which is adopted, can responsibility, still of a qualified sort, be sheeted home, to Page 45 those who voted for it, not every one in the community. When however the Pogo assumption is disentangled from the following theme what results is decidedly along the right lines: The controllers [not to be confused, in Schell’s fashion, with all of S4. have failed to change our pre-nuclear institutions. The sovereign system is out HI) (p.51, of step with nuclear age, the one-earth system, etc. earth us] (the whole Unfortunately Schell often loses sight of this important theme. theme). S4 forms part of Schell’s critique of the state which is, by an large, scattered and fragmentary. As we saw, in §7, Schell arrives at the conclusion that the nation-state has outlasted its usefulness, and that new institutions political more ’consonant the global reality’ are required as a matter of urgency. evades what he admits is the major task, making viable out But he alternatives. most he makes some passing suggestions, some of which point to the Way Up. he remains clear about are the serious defects of the state and the At What frequently immoral purposes for which the state is used. At one stage he contrasts what he calls Socratic-Christian ethics with that of state, where ’the end [state] justifies the means . .., the raison d’etre of government, is the basis on which themselves to commit crimes of governments, every in sort’. anything whatever in the name of [their] survival’. that all So times, licensed ’states may do virtually Schell then argues however, extinction nullifies end-means justification by destroying every end; that argument is far from sound, and depends again on extreme (S2) have combined with ontic assumptions. under system SI) ends could remain, e.g. human but chauvinism Even if all humans were extinguished (as for nonhumans (actual or not). Page 46 As to the part of the state and (state) sovereignty in war, in us Schell leaves A sovereign state is virtually defined as one that enjoys the no doubt. right and power to go to war in defence or pursuit of its interests (III, p.51). War from how things are: arises jealous nation states (p.51). and sovereignty from the arrangement of political affairs via Indeed there is a two-way linkage between On the one side, sovereignty is, Schell capacity to wage war. contends, necessary for people to organise for war. is impossible to preserve sovereignty. it war transparently clear as they stand. having On the other side, without Neither of these contentions is Now that the state system in entrenched, it however easy for conservatives (in particular) to argue from the "realities" is of international life, which include self-interest, is It on basis this that peace arrangements aggression, readily are hatred. fear, dismissed as unrealistic, utopian, even (amusingly) as extremist. Schell’s further theme that nuclear "war" is not war threatens to undermine his case erroneous an sovereign characterisation nation to achieve an end’ (III, sufficient for p.52): war as ’a violent means employed by a of but neither considerations but not all wars or games are won). It they fail (even on one side being defeated on a But in nuclear "war" this doesn’t happen, ’no one’s strength But what these sorts contribute to showing is not that nuclear wars are not wars, but that they are not wars of certain sorts, e.g., not just wars because nor LN falls until both sides have been annihilated* (III, p.52). of necessary if is also claimed that war depends on weakness; by arms. is But nuclear attacks can certainly have ends cannot be won in the older sense: decision this It is then claimed that war requires an end which nuclear war. "war" does not have. wars state based, for example, on its nuclear war But the not-war theme needs much qualification, and starts out making capacity. from the against on such criteria as reasonable when LN wars prospect of success and Page 47 improvement, not rational wars (in a good sense), and so on. wars nuclear weapons have also ruined "conventional" wars, and that demise the war of not just on his connected the mistaken has removed been proposition The (p.52). concerning the conventional war and the mistaken proposition that war of some sort the theme has left no means to finally settle disputes between nations, for the final court of appeal depends conventional nuclear times does damage to Schell’s argument that into persisted have That theme demise has to of be "court of appeal" between nations (for, as observed, there are other final types of contests that could serve, and there is also the cooperative behaviour, e.g. joint referenda); possibility of more it also imports the assumption of Clausowicz (criticised earlier) that war has to proceed to the technological limit - as if war and violence were thoroughly natural activities independent of recognised social settings (for winning, surrender, etc.) and ruleless. wars contrary, are parasitic on On the social organisations such as states and are They are a social governed by a range of understandings, conventions and rules. phenomenon, with a rule structure if not a logic. Much capital has been made from what is called "the and the "logic logic of deterrence" The message that is usually of nuclear (strategic) planning". supposed to come through is that the massive nuclear arraangements the world now entangled in are perfectly logical, sound, reasonable, rational. this represents little more than a cheap semantical the justifies reasonable. can be present arrangements, or trick. anything in strategic planning; values no in way in Jeffrey) which but is does not yield specific results without desirability measures being assigned to alternative without However like them, or renders them There is a logic of decision (as presented e.g. applied Logic is being pumped in, extralogically . outcomes, that is There are varaious ways these value assignments may be determined, to meet moral requirements or not; but in Page 48 nuclear planning strategic (Selecting the usual expediency. automatically; is have invariably been settled on the basis of game theory setting based something cover strategy of’. term almost Thus too the presumption in Walzer, p.277, that the logic of on eye-for-eye and tooth-for-tooth assumptions.) ’logic of’ tends to be used very generously, as a word of general to this to sees for it is then assumed that each player plays to maximize his or her own advantage. deterrence they like In fact commendation, ’rational considerations entering into the policy or In these terms, Schell, who like others enjoys playing with the ’logic of’, should write of ’the illoglc of deterrence’, for he emphasizes (III, p.80) the disparity between the supposed rationality of threatening use of nuclear weapons and the irrationality (even from a national interest viewpoint) of actually using them should the threat fail: doctrine depends irrational use. deterrence (e.g. on credibility of the yet the threat of of success this deterrence unjustifiable and Indeed Schell wants to go further and locate a contradiction in HI, pp.67-8): but the argument depends on an interesting confusion of contradiction with cancellation, which deterrence is supposed to (etc.) is involve. FOOTNOTES 1. The appalling theme that humans create past, present and repeated, e.g. p.104 top. 2. See e.g. ’Human chauvinism and environmental ethics’ in Environmental Philosophy (editor Mannison and others), Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University, 1980. 3. Another example of spreading the responsibility runs as follows (Schell p.46, III): we plan to exterminate species in certain circumstance, though we don’t quite admit this to ourselves, as sane or sensible (or rational?). Further (p.55 III), ’the world ... chose the course of attempting to refashion the system of sovereignty to accommodate nuclear weapons’: the world? Connected with this is the argument from defence of fundamentals [ideology] - e.g. for liberty, the (USA) nation, and against socialism. In the course of this yet another fallacious assumption is rolled out: ’The means to the end are not limited, for the end itself sets the limits in each future Page 49 case’ [?] 4. There is also, mixed in, a weaker more plausible claim that gives lie to the stronger one, namely that we have some responsibility (the Nazi situation is compared). 5. There is however a simple solution to Schell’s problem of the missing motive, namely an ideological one: remove the rival ideology from future dominance. Page 50 APPENDIX 2: Strategies and the Matter of Collective and Individual Responsibility What one does depends, naturally, on where one lives and what sort of power it is. responsibility work to entirely to an In present circumstances states have and states, there ends: responsibilities these no individual, or (smaller scale) is collective responsibility to work out a policy or people on stance matters such as While such a non-responsibility nuclear and still less to act on such a stance. (or opt-out) theme no doubt suits many evident There are however some persuasive out their policies. arguments that this is where the responsibility accrue one means what as what strategy a state should adopt depends on where it is located much has, and — many for some, themselves, especially more authoritarian power-holders, for others - it does involve opting out of moral responsibilities, responsibilities acquired by virtue of being a person within the framework of certain social arrangments. Now there is no doubt that individuals and a group can out. They can neglect their moral responsibilities; in doing so. being this, do can opt but they are not justified Against this claim, which is based ultimately upon each person’s caught in a web of responsibility-inducing social relations, whether they like it or not, there are some neat arguments which appear to permit opting out. One goes as follows: 1. The (ordinary) individual, difference to what happens. 2. Such difference. 3. individuals, or or group, has no possibility of making a make a Therefore groups, have no obligation to try to Hence Such individuals, or groups, are not morally responsible, for instance when things go wrong. Page 51 There are two main assumptions resisted; this in argument, both which of be firstly, a variant of the ought implies can theme , and secondly, the assumption that individuals can’t make a difference. cannot individuals competitive highly that true What an individuals do. full of hopeful free-riders, a person may communities, encouter a familiar impasse: is on their own, together they can. much accomplish it While individual can achieve depends on what sufficiently many other In should that he or she acts M-ly (e.g. against morally, nuclear arrangements, present destruction) at considerable personal cost with no Such an impasse no guarantee that others will also act M-ly. longer faces so many in the West at least as regards initial steps against nuclear arrangements. The individual can cooperate with others in ways that do make a difference. An individual is not exonerated from responsibility by the argument. While individuals can respond by joining organisations whose activities are at directed difference, many individuals also have the option of some making more individualistic action in such disobedience. important An forms as or deployment) Evidently, various or parts redirection however, work more effectively go slows, political form of individual resistance, already adopted in Canada and north-western USA is refusal to pay defence boycotts, thereof of such (e.g. taxes, income taxes nuclear for directed weapons Instance towards production to peace and funds. all these more individualistic forms of political activity if individuals integrate their activities since the impacts aggregate (and appear after a certain stage to exponentiate). There are arguments of some weight that individuals are under some sort moral obligation to take political action to disaffiliate themselves from what contributes to the prospects of nuclear depends on the of sort of state war. What type of action this is one resides in, e.g., whether it is a nuclear Page 52 power, whether it provides nuclear issues complicating as or bases facilities, and such on kind of preventive action the state is likely to what One argument - it is one of a type take in return. etc., be can that varied from making nuclear weapons to, for example, providing facilities for them - proceeds from the wrongness of nuclear war to the position that it is making weapons the such for The war. argument here not applies principles (like that of §5), for instance that the manufacture of such weapoons increases the risk of such war. right and to connecting deployment But if it is not morally right to be making such weapons then those who live in a state that is doing so to disaffiliate themselves from such substantive without The argument is but the assumptions opt-outers and do-nothingers assumption, ought defence production, and disaffiliation 2 includes not paying for such production through defence taxes . not be morally appear reasonable and defensible. Such arguments not only insofar as they put to contribute national for those 3 take action, even limited action such as redirection of taxes . in some fashion to moral obligations; political obligations. And political limited, by moral constraints. are already answer for then moral obligations override obligations are already significantly The nuclear situation does not so much bring out new limits on political obligation, as emphasize the obligations who There is however no dilemma under any theory which takes political obligations to back spot the objectives, they also raise serious questions and perhaps dilemmas as regards political obligations would on limited, and respects in which those introduce further moral considerations against sponsorship of national defence arrangements. Page 53 An obligation to try war does not commit one to more than this: for an to an obligation, for example, work to But alternative national defence policy which avoids nuclear elements. no doubt this would be a good thing to try to contribute to. one nuclear spending part of one’s working life contributing indirectly to it, not by to disaffiliate oneself from preparation for attempts depends commitments, and on forth. so where lives, one For not only the level are Once of again, one’s pacificist types different what policy of appropriate for different nations and regions, but there are more reorientation superficial and deeper reorientations that can be worked out and promoted, schemes that "conventional" leave e.g. warfare apparatus more or less Intact, and deeper (ecological) schemes that change that. The US Bishops, for example, present a shallower set of goals for such power as the USA, which includes such as preventing the objectives working development and deployment of destabilizing nuclear weapons systems and for better of already operational systems (see PL, p.317). control super a For those whose very limited political Influence is exerted in considerably lesser even the shallow goals may look quite different: there are no weapons (except perhaps those of another power planted on local territory) better control. The view from the very minor to in or redeploy to powers in the Antipodes is furthermore different from that of the medium powers in Europe. prospect powers is There some the Antipodes of avoiding the more immediate effects of an LN war, while there is little such prospect in Europe (cf. Preddy and others). There is accordingly some obligation - an obligation little considered and not grasped by the power holders - on those in the Antipodes to make some effort to preserve there elements of what is valuable in world civilization. Local and regional self-interest would also suggest steps towards self-preservation that been initiated. have not Page 54 What is broadly required in the Andipodes is a work out once removal of American bases alliance, which is in any case of questionable merit; and withdrawal of American rightss for nuclear-carrying equipment to access ports, air bases and other facilities, so as to remove pursuit of more a evenhanded policy targets; nuclear is That much easy, in principle. difficult to ensure is that economic and cultural collapse does not follow an LN war in the North. independence Secondly then the building of Increased in the Antipodes is required. sustainable of life its exercise unless combined with and Preddey it others is own. ’the region must also other desirable objectives: unlikely - the structural readjustment aims of moving for example, in estimated that 25 per cent of GDP would have to be included Australia the costs would be less. desirable have For a small region that looks a very costly diverted to build up New Zealand’s economic independence. which socio-economic It is not enough to make the region a nuclear-free zone not worth targeting militarily: a local of nonalignment (something quite small powers elsewhere have managed to achieve). More to Firstly, withdrawal from the American goals are glimpsed. the matter straightforward the were For a larger region If, furthermore - what seems combined with the independently whole region towards a multicultural conserver society and diverting "defence" spending to connected self-management and civil be considerably lessened. They only appear great in the setting of an on-going consumer-defence socleity. In any case where life itself defence goals, would is concerned, the costs do not appear excessive. FOOTNOTES 1. Any satisfactory deontic theory which takes moral dilemmas with due seriousness is bound to reject this theme. There are also independent grounds for jettisoning this Kantian theme: see Routley and Plumwood. Page 55 Seatie 2. An argument of this type was deployed by Bishop support of his refusal to pay defence taxes. 3. This dilemma and option is now removed for most wage earners by Pay As You Earn taxation schemes, schemes apparently introduced to give the state interest on gross earnings, but obviously very effective in removing taxation power from most workers, and so from individuals to the state. 4. Given the power of institutions and the state one may be able to do little more than try, without giving up one’s work and therby one’s ability to contribute to other deserving causes. For example, it may be virtually impossible for one to avoid contributing to a superannuation fund which is investing in projects which one opposes and/or ought to oppose. Hunthaassen of in Page 56 REFERENCES Berg, Reinhabiting a Separate 1979. P. M. Cohen, Nagel, Scanlan Princeton, 1974. Country, (editors) Planet War and Drum, Moral San Francisco, Responsibility , R.E. Goodin, ’Disarming nuclear apologists’, typescript, 1982. R.E. Goodin, ’Disarmament as a moral certalnuity’, typescript, 1983. P(hilip) Green, Deadly Logic: The Theory of Nuclear Deterrence, Ohio State University Press, Columbus, 1966. N. Griffin, ’Lifeboat USA', typescript, 1982. Ground Zero Organisation, Nuclear War: New York, 1982. R. Jeffrey, The Logic of Decision H. Kahn, On Thermonuclear War. What’s In It For You? Pocket Book (editor D.P. Lackey, ’Ethics and nuclear deterrence*, in Moral James Rachels), Harper and Row, New York, 1979. D.P. Lackey, 'Missiles and morals: a utilitarian look at nuclear deterrence’ Philosophy and Public Affairs 11 (1982) pp.189-213. J.C. Problems Murray, Morality and Modern War, T. Nagel, ’War and Massacre' in Cohen et al, pp.3-24. J. Narvesen, 'Violence and War’ in Regan, pp.109-146. National Conference of Catholic Bishops, Committee on War and Peace, ’The challenge of peace: God’s promise and our response’, Origins 12 (20) (1982) pp.306-328 [hereafter referred to as PL, for ’New Draft of Pastoral Letter’]. G.F. Preddey and others, Future Contingencies 4. Nuclear Disasters, A Report to the Commision for the Future, Government Printer, Wellington, New Zealand, 1982. T. Regan (editor), Matters of Life and 1980. R. Routley and V. Routley, Alternatives, (1982). R. Routley and V. Plumwood, 'Moral dilemmas and (edit. notions’ in Paraconsistent Logic, Philosophla Verlag, 1983. 'The Death, Random irrefutability of the G. House, New anarchism’, York, Social logic of deontic Priest and others) Page 57 R. Scheer, With Enough Shovels: House, New York, 1982. J. Schell, ’Reflections (Nuclear Arms - Parts I-III)’, The New Yorker, February 1, 8, and 15, 1982, pp.47-113, 48-109, and 45-107, respectively. This series subtitled The Fate of the Earth, has now appeared as a book with that title (Kopf, New York, 1982). References in the text are to the original articles. All references by parts labels ’I’-’III’ are to these articles. T.C . Reagan, Bush and Nuclear Sharp, Exploring Nonviolent Alternatives, Boston, 1971. T. Taylor, Nuremburg and Vietnam: R.W.. M.M.. M. R.A. S. Random Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, Harvard University Press, 1980. G. E.P.. War, Thompson and D. New York, 1981. An American Tragedy, Smith, Protest and Survive, Monthly Review Press, Tucker, The Just War, Wakin (editor), War, Morality and the Military Profession, Boulder, Colorado, 1979. Westview, Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, Basic Books, New York, 1977. Wasserstrom (editor) California, 1970. War and Morality, Wadsworth, Zuckerman, Nuclear Illusion and Reality, Collins, London, 1982. Belmont,  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Box 97, Item 6: Working draft of On the ethics of large-scale nuclear war and war-deterrence and the political fall-out Subject The topic of the resource Typescript working draft. 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Type The nature or genre of the resource Manuscript Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context <a href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:f4d8642">https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:f4d8642</a> Coverage The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant n/a - not listed in manuscript finding aid Box 97: Paper - Extracts - Articles and Chapters by Richard Sylvan https://www.antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/4120878f06ef8ee9f658fcc5da962087.pdf ee2f993c5c9ca4bd98005f0f33595402 PDF Text Text PROSPECTS FOR REGIONAL PHILOSOPHIES IN AUSTRALASIA Philosophy, especially academic philosophy but also folk philosophy, like other intellectual and higher cultural activity In Australasia, has long been indeed dominated, Europe, the largely swamped, by Northern now increasingly from North America. cultural and other resulting controlling such populations, But it does not have to stay that way. a initially the migration Given the ethnic result was imported, baggage influences, patterns, of composition virtually from the inevitable. Suitable policies, a good philosophy policy, could change things. The culture, thought is of regional a philosophy, In 1923, a New Zealand hardly a new one. regional a matching perhaps correspondent to the newly-launched Australasian Journal of Psychology and Philosophy mentioned the possibility of ’a new kind or temper of philosophy under these southern skies’ which the Journal might such a reaching role not community). (or, for merely And foster.The Journal that matter, professional although some actively has pursued philosophers things however hardly fulfilled but have changed solid foundation for a new regionalism in philosophy, its a pronounced wider Australasian in Australia, that of alm laying a possibility of a new temper of philosophy has hardly been realised. There is little in the way of a new kind and which the southern skies were intended to include: but few distinguishing features, ’no distinctively New temper of Zealand XAJPP, March 1923, p.74. same volume, p.292ff; his Appendix 1. philosophy under New Zealand characteristics, have shown up skies, in New Zealand The question was taken up by the Editor in the discussion is considered below, especially in �philosophy’. 2 The situation of colonial dominance that used to prevail in and philosophers. Australia, importer of philosophy, New Zealand remains a substantial net where virtually all chairs, and many philosophy, were filled by academics from the North, other academic and considered and Given the usual in courses designed, power and influence of professors in small departments, covered in tends to persist in New Zealand, where no established chairs are occupied by locals/ topics posts especially appointments made, the heavy Northern orientation of philosophy taught and researched in New Zealand is not surprising. oldest of The Northern control is perhaps most strikingly exhibited at the New Zealand universities, the University of Otago, where the Philosophy Department has been substantially captured by a British School and increasingly looks event, like an offshoot of the University of London/ In any the overwhelming Anglo-American dominance of New Zealand philosophy - also a feature only in slightly lesser degree of Australian philosophy - can be confirmed by a content survey of the courses offered and research papers written at New Zealand universities. Even when local people have been appointed to positions in Australasia, 2 , S.A. Grave, A_ History of Philosophy in Australia, Queensland University Press, 1984, p.l. Page references are to the manuscript. The paper draws heavily on this history. 3 This claim was correct at the time of presentation of the paper (August 198':!). With the recent loss of a chair at Wellington, the claim requires qualification, but the pattern of domination persists. In the 1983 Commonwealth University Handbook listing, 6 of the 8 members of the Department held their main degree, Ph.D., from London, and one of the remainder from Exeter. Only one member of the Department, soon to retire, falls outside the nexus. �3 they have been brought up on a solid diet of Anglo-American material, and they have often been reforged or finished in the North as well. of requirements post-World War philosophy by remain full the II in were conveniently seen Oxford B.Phil. of products finished candidates universities expansion the of Australasian this Many degree. mill: cultural in Oxford were hard to beat In particular, the the in to departments the of case of philosophy the mid 70s when they applied for until indeed out of period major positions, such was the (unwarranted) prestige of Oxford and the regrettable, but still continuing, "cultural cringe". despite Nonetheless, been occurring scene in dominance, Northern the Antipodes, be will (as the indicated). especially on is It worth significant the Australian asking changes have philosophical whether Australian philosophy is moving towards the sort of change that occurred in USA more than 100 year; ago when the Harvard Philosophy Department was brought (or bought) together, and its go'den age' began. ’ American philosophy was never quite the same again, and became its own thing. There are now new forces operating which could help to move Australian philosophy in such a direction. the widespread regionalism, other 6 ^See B. which applies choices; local fashioning emergence, of national and particularly to in science cultural stark and in and culture, alternative ideological contrast, technology there There is of a choice along is policies, the new with centralised which not only Kuklick, The Rise of American Philosophy; Cambridge, Massachusetts 1860-1930, Yale University Press, 1977, Parts 2 and 3. 6 On this bio-regionalism, see especially, Fourth World News, vol. 1, and K. Sale, Human Scale, Coward, McCann and Geoghegan, New York, 1980. 1983, �provides model a for reflection regional in directly bears on parts of the philosophy of science. soon appear, there are also some also Unfortunately, as will to regional serious obstacles but policy philosophy philosophies and to the very idea of a regional philosophy. USA, long an importer of culture from Europe, has recently become a net culture, of exporter components of higher philosophical not from lower of Oxford following has suit, but culture, evidently taken). should Are not balance of payments, especially in philosophy? Yes, reasons there achieve also of the American turn philosophy (witness such as culture output if Australasia, certainly a better there are why cultural reasons. In the first place, the change in the cultural position of the USA went with, and relations. If little prospect for perhaps in part derived from, vast changes in economic power economic of most dominance entails Australasia’s cultural dominance, since culture, there there is is no serious that prospect Australasia will ever emulate or attain American economic eminence (at least nuclear destruction of not without flow of commodities, not only increasingly of Americans, of former group, Northern cultural they. As priorities, contain they long component also whose and disruption of the entire­ Secondly, as observed, Antipodean large a fellow-travellers, include research Northern academics, substantial additional of a teaching and is bent to It is unlikely that this Influential segment, especially Northern concerns. the North, cultural and other). universities contingent the will (become commitments, as so apart Antipodeans they are in a bind locally acclimatised as do from the not situation; isolated drastically to) person. alter give up Nor their its should cultural for it can be persuasively argued that they would be better off, as far as quality and product goes, stocking �/ / A 5 o’ ( universities their with American teaching components and researching American-oriented concerns. One simple numerical argument that Antipodean universities would be better off with Americans in the main, takes the following lines:- The (higher graduates degree) of Australasian and American are significantly not culturally distinguished, at least in subjects such as philosophy. now the quality academics number of Austroamerican graduates; produced per of number higher say there is 1 per every n graduates. preponderance of graduates will be Americans, Consider degree The (great) just by virtue of their vastly greater population and their more extensive system of university education. So also then, just by ratio considerations, the great preponderance of quality academics from an drawn upper percentiles they interested universities. Austroamerican base among those in Such quality, an Clearly, quality products. would argument be does be American, will appointing not work to more show as will Antipodeans, Americans that, for the were their to similar reasons, American universities should be full of Chinese or Indian professors, for two Asians reasons; and first Americans, there are especially significant in cultural disciplines such differences as between philosophy; and secondly, their university systems do not deliver such great quotas of higher degree or high quality graduates, at least in philosophy. The ratio of U.S. philosophy graduautes with doctorates as compared with Australian exceeded 30 to 1 in each of the years 1974 to 1980. In 1977 it was 110 to 1. New Zealand compares even less favourably with U.S. output. For details see Digest of Education Statistics (U.S. National Center for Education Statistics, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, 1976, 1977-78, 1979, 1980, 1981 and 1982); University Statistics, (Australian Bureau of Statistics, Canberra, 1974, 1975, 1976, 1977, 1978, ‘1979, 1980); Education Statistics of New Zealand, (N.Z. Department of Education, Wellington, 1974, '1975, 1976, 1977, 1978, 1979, 1980). �The conclusion of the numerical argument will not be a popular one. The anti Amei icanism felt in portions of the Australasian community extends into the universities; and recently there been has increasing Insistence, especially by the now aging younger Turks that university positions should be This at the same time as these Turks often preach of an reserved for locals. international community of scholars, presumably then with "free” interchange, etc. They cannot have it all ways.^ So long continues, as the economically; the present centre will free-flow dominate they will have more large to them if it interchange the than us, periphery and is (centrally-determined) of ideas and culturally jobs here personnel as should well as go by and quality in this high cultural business that we seek, as mostly claim. Now anyway, it that arguments. is widely there is enough recognised, something For we are not lower-down drastically wrong hierarchical with these ladders sorts of flooded with high-quality Northerners who would 8 A reverse flow of the better orthodox academics from Australasia to America should also be expected (outside times of university contraction). According to assumptions of this brain drain argument, which is based on labour market considerations, appointment and lifestyle conditions for academics are generally better in USA than Australia and much better than those in economically-depressed New Zealand (e.g. higher salaries, better standard of living, superior research conditions, etc.). So, other things being equal, able academics from the Antipodes will relocate in USA as academic positions become available. The argument also helps explain why Antipodean universities cannot expect, for the most part, to attract really top-drawer Northerners for very long. Of course, economically irrelevant factors do induce interference; e.g. perverse commitments to odd-ball Antipodean intellectual enterprises which reduce market acceptability, or pre-industrial ties to place or persons or lifestyle which unduly restrict mobility (such as local roots, family attachments, even distaste for American urban lifestyles). �regularly drive out local contenders for positions, if we only preferred the Northerners when they were quite visibly superior: rather we are inundated by Americans with inflated references, who have the messages of the centre better do, locals than higher-echelon remote and Northern Northern (often biassed) fields appointment locals whose shortcomings are known better. the Northern centres too, tend greener look to committees dusty than As is beginning to be recognised retain their higher-quality products, tend to to and allow them to be exiled to the periphery only if they somehow fall foul of the system (e.g. of the academic system for political or personal reasons). the often Northern centres have intellectually their disposed of Too inferior products in the periphery. All this makes the position look doubly bad. We ought, appointing Northerners, especially Americans, even seems, to be if they are overrated in it their references, and usually not out of the top drawer, in order to maximize quality. And yet doing so does not achieve the desired quality result, and breeds discontent elsewhere, especially among the aging Turks. Fortunately shaky arguments; and obtain we from this awkward and that is the way of regionalism. sufficient subtitutable for us. before is a way out there elaborate cultural distance,so that situation these and We do our own things; they are not simply Then the shaky numerical argument does fall down. the emerging proposal there are other But influential . . This is easier in the cultural than the technological sphere. However it is also possible technologically: (stronger) theses of technological determinism, and so of cultural determinism, are false. We can choose different options, technologically, as well as culturally. 9 �8 arguments to dispose of, and the disposal bears on the proposal. There is, to begin with, far been conceded: have so elements of which the argument for excellence, that there is an objective commodity, quality or excellence, which we all more or less which is agree about, proportionately in the North, and which is what academic institutions crave and more abundant seek and what appointments aim to capture, indeed maximize. That at least is the type of myth most of us have encountered; and many of us now know it is a in myth, fact appointments profit, a that dangerous myth. way, more any Most that don’t places organisations aim but rather seek to satisfice on a mix of factors, quality is to try even just to make maximize of which assessed only one, and not often the highest ranking one. Ability to fit into some sort of program, teaching or research, is another, and commonly more Important factor; and there is no good reason why such a program should not sometimes be a regionally oriented one. So given the prevailing practices, argument from excellence does not exclude regional philosophy programs. And, in any event, there are enough local candidates of sufficient worth to proceed with regional programs without sacrifice clearcut of excellence. Local enterprise need entail no loss of excellence, and could well increase it. The deeper-cutting objection is that there is something seriously amiss with the idea of objective objective importance; criticism as bracketed out notions the that of excellence, these objective and notions values with are open more contextual-relativisation the to connected the generally, component of same that notion of sorts of they valuing: have the �’S- 9 framework or viewpoint within rather a to which these values relate.^ narrow such paradigm, intellectual While those operating as Oxbridge ordinary language philosophy or Sydney materialism say, can bracket out the viewpoint,. since it Incorporated is operational the in paradigm, and so at arrive seemingly objective quality judgements, the judgements are not preserved (e.g. in truth va1ue) when Marxist viewpoints. quality or worth Consider, of a other to transposed for forest, frameworks, the comparison, made variously by of a holistically-inclined judgements a deep environmental who seemingly because pretend that environmental such it is not done by members of as or to rhe an ecologist, philosopher, language, Marxist, and Californian environmental philosophers. philosophers idealistic Compare judgements as to the industrial forester, and a recreational officer. quality e.g. work by ordinary There are even cannot be judged, the main philosophical peer group at Harvard and like institutions. As this judgements of begins to the. reveal, importance judgements of work of quality are not Independent of done or problems tackled. importance of problems and issues is highly paradigm dependent. But the For example, problems such as those of quant if ying-in and of possible worlds and of de re thought, which assume immense importance for fashionable referential theories within the mainstream empiricist paradigm, vanish outside that restricted viewpoint. Now observe to relative that most insignificance judgements as to What follows also begins to bring out what is omitted in a main theme of R.S. Pirsig, Zen and the Art of Motor Cycle Maintenance, Bodley Head, London, 1974. Note that defusing the notion of objective excellence does not lead to subjectivism. To avoid the customary false dichotomy, compare the notion of validity (usually ceded to themselves these days by classical logicians) with that of quality. �10 what are the important problems and what constitutes important work - matters helping quality determine - is relative to their concerned are exported to the Antipodes importance down shipped are paradigmatic from the and placement, through the Their North.11 paradigms the main channels already indicated. We are free to reject these paradigms and select alternatives, and there are, it can be argued, good reasons to do just that, much as there are to reasons good choose different energy technology (or different military technology) from that generally favoured in the North which the North is eager to export southwards. Similar which points against alternatively might argument, apply that be -marketed mass-produced and cosmopolitan. The argument called people sophisticated from cosmopolitan/international the the Peter everywhere Holland; international Stuyvesant smoke this argument superior product cigarette-sophistication is is based on the assumption that philosophy is a ’cosmopolitan subject’, that is is not the sort of enterprise for which place and people are significant as they are for poetry assumption has only to be presented to be questioned. for one important thing, that philosophy is a or the novel.12 The It takes for granted, finished product sort (a propositional theory), not a process of production also. of a certain But in the Often enough fashionability is mistaken for importance. As to the unsatisfactory way in which such "important" problems are commonly set, see F. Dyson, ’Unfashionable pursuits’, The Mathematical Intelligencer 5 (1983) 47-54. 12 Grave, op.cit., p.2: ------- the term ’cosmopolitan subject' used there comes from Donegan. As to the significance of place and people for literature, see further C. Partridge, The Making of New Cultures, Editions Rodopi, Amsterdam, 1982. �11 process of production the place and people involved (e.g. in discussion) are ot material. if And the product Is like a work of like art, a d literature, not and 1 just theorems and arguments assembled piece of in an internationally-approved format, 13 then again the historical setting matters, since philosophy, more no than literature, does not in emerge a vacuum. Plato s philosophy could not have emerged in ancient Australia, and if cribbed in mid 20th century Oxford would surely have been marked down or rejected. It is important not to be sidetracked into issues ~ resembling problems in aesthetics extent sets that do not need to of themes and arguments be contested, such as whether and what produced in one place and setting could have been produced in another. A nonnuclear technology of some sort could be adopted prospect in but Europe that New apparently will Zealand, nonnuclear energy strategy. rasters here. Dialethic in not contrast be, with whereas there Australia, is will reasonable pursue a It is the doing, and not what could be done, that logic, which invalidates methodology of much Anglo-American philosophy, could the technique perhaps be done in and the North (though there would be substantial cultural resistance): it is not being 13tLike a paper in the biological sciences. But here again technique methodology, which may both be regional, are crucially important. x4Related points can be made using less extreme examples, e.g. and concerning modern American work. Consider, for Instance such texts as W.V. Quine’s Word ajll—(Wiley, Now York, 1960) or R. Nozick’s Anarchy, State and Utopia (Basic Books, New York, 1974). The assumptions taken for granted" the arguments involved, etc., are especially American: it is not just the style. The acceptability of arguments and positions is dependent on place and received paradigm. �12 done there, and is not likely to be done in the Anglo-American sphere.15 this extent, logical can Antipodeans techniques, do choose their their own international/cosmopolitan argument, own distinctive distinctive technology thing. stated in a form that would be To and The telling, fails. Of course it can be argued, it is being argued, that Antipodeans don’t need to be, or even oughtn’t to be pursuing their own energy or logic policies and apparatus. But meeting these considerations takes us to a whole new set of issues concerning the merit of various policies and programs, diversity, etc. - far beyond the cosmopolitan argument. the point of The new arguments, to which we shall return, are not a lot more convincing however than comparable arguments concerning cooking: that we don’t devising our own cuisine or wine styles. need to be or oughtn’t to be British, or at least cosmopolitan, cooking is adequate: we should stick to that and buy it off the shelf from the North, ideally importing the cooks also. Do we have good reasons to think that British philosophy is better, these days, than British cooking? Antipodeans are free, in principle then, to pursue their own paradigms; and to do so they will by and large want to, and mostly have to, appoint their own people, people they have educated - not saboteurs or people who have (had) 15 Much as communist anarchism, a live possibility for communes and perhaps communities in Australia, is culturally excluded in North America, owing to the extreme possessive individualism of that culture. On dialethic logic, see G. Priest and R. Routley, On Paraconsistency, Research Papers in Logic, #13, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University, 1983. �13 to be re-educated, from elsewhere, in particular from the North. Intellectual paradigms features of the local pursued tie with cultural paradigms, with distinctive culture? In a at loose way, least, they may tie in with the philosophy will not usually though works of But will the link, culture in the integral fashion that novels (as distinct from more technical works) sometimes do. Indeed, certain to a cultural limited extent, features, not they restricted to hastens to though add. this But is style, compared with acceptability, what philosophical particular programs, that help mark philosophy in Australia as ’unimportant Grave considers do already link. ’an Australian product’ - matters truth, philosophy’ in do matter, and are he not Independent - or independent so far as their perception goes in the case truth and correctness of - from underlying broad theory or received paradigm. However the marks which can be extracted from Grave, significant though they are, do not serve to distinguish the Australian product, the first two being features Australian philosophy exhibits in lesser degree than the more adventurous and polemical philosophy of Greek antiquity. by Passmore as ’most typical of Australian philosophy’, The first, described is a 'diversity of approach and readiness to put forward an unconventional or unfashionable point ’Nothing need be conceded to strong cultural relativity themes, though they would support the case. It is enough that our theories remain radically incomplete and that there can accordingly be rival theories as to what is true. Similarly, however philosophy is conceived - as the search for truth, explanation, understanding and wisdom (all of these and more, really), or as, more vaguely, inquiry of a certain sort - there can be, and will be, competing accounts; so a pluralistic theory is inevitable in giving a fuller view. �view’, 17 of something philosophy, some (with which typical more of philosophy ancient notable exceptions) than exhibits an Canada, is that Africa, South adventurous compared with other recent diverse. and provincial and The second, and ... the line-up between Australian more manifestoed character’ of Australian philosophy, being "Oxbridge colonies", England, far from Australian philosophy isolated: others mark surprising, materialism , departments the and Melbourne (both confrontation concerning the them concern extraordinary discussed the political by is is ’the ’the most notable example ... Wittgensteinian among such as philosophy Andersonian This example Sydney, if it was not the Andersonian philosophy Itself’ (p.2). is austere What may be uniformity reflecting that often attributed to the land Itself. nearer true Australian fervour generated engagement Grave), some growing the and relevant/paraconsistent program, by by with the local (’adversarial’) style leading to sharp criticism by Americans. Connected with these first philosophy, century two as Cambridge marks of much are further characteristics of much 18th century Scottish philosophy and philosophy: namely directness, Australian turn-of-this- unwillingness to muffle points, surface clarity, and, some would unkindly add (in the hope perhaps of locating a genuine difference), bluntness, unsubtlety and crudity. 17 Both preceding quotations, while included as such in Grave’s Introduction, are from J. Passmore, ’Philosophy’, in The Pattern of Australian Culture (ed. A.L. McLeod), Cornell University Press, Ithaca, N.Y., 1963, pp.131-168. The same annotation also applies to the third mark. 18 Ihough again for the most part that influenced by Sydney rather than that originating in Melbourne. To some extent this reflects the different historical influences shaping Sydney and Melbourne philosophy: roughly, Scottish as opposed to Continental antecedents. �15 third The and the fourth but again very different, marks are hardly distinguishing features of Australian philosophy as Grave, who wouldn't them marks at all, in effect observes. Intellectual is areas, the The third, which applies well to other of contrast Australian the reputation the anti-intellectual national stereotype of Australians as a people to physical achievement nark ia especially isolation of a academic rather than feature of philosophy indifference or even hostility to, to intellectual Anglo-American Australasia in subtlety'. 'devoted fourth The philosophy; from, in Inquiry', with 'center of philosophical Indeed of Australia as a philosophy, call namely its and the general the sort of imported philosophy (e.g. that of Nietzsche and the existentialists) generating Interest in literary and arts circles. The failure of such marks to entirely separate out Australian philosophy does not For matter. thing, one separated by its research projects. confused with nationalism, nor Australian the produce as encouraged; and in most the new other more regional things, regionalism sufficiently For another, regionalism should not be positions such as materialism or Wellington modal!sm with national philosophies. philosophy, is is is an undesirable commonly linked, Sydneyside Nationalism in trait, not in other to be cultural things, with the breakdown of nations and contraction of state power.19 19c See, e.g., London, 1957. Sale, op.cit., and L. Kohr, The Breakdown of Nations, RKP, The Editor of the new 1923 AJPP did however take seriously the notion of National Philosophy, of (what must have surprised some New Zealand readers) an Australian Philosophy; some of the issu< s there raised (p.292ff) are addressed in Appendix 1. �To get back to where we were: emerging proposal the is this, that we start - or better much Increase - doing our own distinctive things, and that we team up so. to do there are In fact that begin several suggestions to emerge, concerning research and teaching, publications and appointments, study These are not just that we do our own selection leave and sponsored visitors. of topics and people, and style and decide methods, our priorities, own instead of having these foisted upon us - not just, that is, that we play our own games (whether invented here or taken over from the North) and not theirs, Rules and Rugby instead of Gridiron and Basketball - but that we abandon the individual competitive model of cultural achievement, sold to us and fostered by the North, in favour of a group cooperative approach (elements of which are already modelled in Antipodean social clubs). The thoughts here are digging example, ditch more separately. rapidly simple and On familiar. the side is the it Is well-known that two people cooperating can dig a and enjoyably than two people working on the ditch Cooperative work tends to pay off - in philosophy or elsewhere - in terms of output, quality, and enjoyment in the doing. experience one shows that we successfully with several reasons periphery cannot the centre on achievements for this. highly competitive in the One in On the other side, individually compete very their programs. is the communication situation. There are Despite the predominantly individualistic nature of American academic �17 enterprise, 20 communication much in the attainment of and access to work is jointly based, individualism myth, unpublished material. nationalistic are and the assignment of credit for it. considerations same verbally conveyed. tend to time and as There an outsider). through face-to-face Here There are a mix of reasons (e.g. Polish results, Russians will cite a Russian who the the several clever people will be again people at the periphery tend to lose out. there despite Then again communications are important in obtaining rapid publication of the idea or result, Again For, verbal and builds on the work of many; when the time is ripe for some idea or result, able to hit on it. upon rapid results depends Poles tend to promote. achieves a result at about is the fact that seminars so that local much is results conveyed will be There is the fact of limited reading, and that people at the centre concentrate when they read on material from the centre by central people, so that published items and results from the periphery will often not be noticed, and may well lose out to central competitors even if they achieve central publication. receive, merit There is also the fact that people at the centre tend to for merit, more publication than people towards the periphery. and communication opportunities Here economic factors do begin to enter; consider the size and distribution of the academic market (there are, e.g., a great many more academic philosophers in North America than in the whole rest of the world), control of publishing outlets and journals (with few exceptions 20 Reflecting other features of the culture and enterprise of the centre which are not so deeply embedded in Australasia: see further R. Routley, ’Culture, philosophy, and approaches to the natural environment - an Australian perspective', in The Environment, Ethics and Ecology (ed. D. Bennett), The Faculties, Australian National University, 1984, and also 'Culture and the roots of social and political divergence, with emphasis on the Australian/American contrast’, typescript, Canberra, 1983; both referred to subsequently as ’Culture’. �18 all Northern), ere. However economic power does not, and need not, determine culture - we can shut off the Northern philosophical propaganda shut off our television sets If we really want to. way we by Impressed being middle-men philosophical those And we can stop make who in much the living a by importing the Northern stuff. So what do we do? We adapt to the cultural-philosophical level, of those things, that have been suggested In the newer regionalism. some regional awakeningand importer.. andimitators doctrines and and local For We alm at not remain slavish We do on commentators the North. example, and we peddlars don’t spend of, our trying totease out what Davidson or Dummett or Kripke meant by in the hope that or that To be through. of, positions from academic lives this local self-reliance. several sure, I some pale Northern light suggesting am not we that will perhaps emulate filter appalling the ignorance of people from the North who visit the Antipodes and know little or nothing about eminent through what has been done or visitors, their Australian the bags heavy National is being done here;21 with cultural (now University so that we have accoutrements, main the trekking centre for Investigation of relevant logics) and informing us that, or relying crucially on the assumption that, a contradiction entails every proposition. that these Northerners know often little positions and advances is the Antipodes is inferiority colonies; 21 of cultural another is the and Intellectual narrow or nothing about One reason distinctive the prevailing assumption of life (predominantly in these local) and former limited the southern reading Regrettably, the ignorance extends to many locals. In particular those _nrected with Sydney materialism appear remarkably ill-informed as to’ basic features of other Australasian programs. �undertaken by Northern luminaries. But, having despite been given cause, sufficient we shouldn’t cut ourselves off from Northern paradigms and influences (we could hardly manage to anyway, propaganda is different). so we should stay informed of, but not imitators these continuing traditions: of, or part of, their enterprises. m older Northern traditions, So far from cutting these nowhere, loose In any case, regional cultures are rooted just as the people are largely European stock. from (and older We can reasonably use what we need from these likely traditions and traditions, minority) from starting afresh and the local variations that have already appeared are what we want to develop and perhaps mutate, as again with wine styles. Part of the things, encourage proposal then that Northern paradigms. increasingly rather than working with and so shape newer try to to create fortunately, features of of cultural the larger culture.22 do we need to make the story up - though helping to shape is part of what the proposal is about. is a different and Much of more difficult already indicated in Grave’s survey of Australian philosophy. 22 local For there are research programs already initiated, which have the Australia - New Zealand has own our It is not as if we have to build from nothing, to do - very great advantage of being grounded in the future do pale northern reflections very difficult - entirely original work, components. Nor, we and develop our own research programs, Antipodean paradigms, wnat is is the story, proposition - for is All one really to do is to bring out programs he has already indicated and provide some See Culture, op.cit. �20 To pull the investigation down to a more concrete elaboration and commentary. I shall sketch some more prominent cooperative programs - by no means level, the only programs - and remark on some relevant features of them. The longest running and best known program is, without much doubt, of naturalism, Australian and which aims to see the that world, natural and everything else, as suitably encompassed within the framework of the world of (physical) science. program The is generally back traced to Anderson’s empiricist metaphysics,^^ and is now best exhibited in Armstrong’s work. contains as a major materialism, subprogram Sydney Adelaide which subsequently died out there. such famous components as central state version of failures in program initiated and nowadays Faced functionalism. reduction plans, like it it takes in, identity theme and more derivatively, physicalisms all now in The latter program has included the mental-material contingent materialism, its a It incorporates with a a conspicuous "scientifically" trimmed theory of universals, and an account of natural laws as relations of universals, both components of the developing Sydney realism. Parts of the naturalism program, especially materialism and central state reductionism and the unified science ideal, have had counterparts in the North, but the program has, for the most part, despite export efforts, smoothly, moreover, and earthy, so retained its distinctively it never caught on in New Zealand. into Australian culture. far as Australian character philosophy can ""^Anderson’s metaphysics was however - The program fits It is similarly down-to-earth, be, without the fancy ideas or effete far more opposed to reductions than what has succeeded it. For an account of Anderson’s philosophy, and a history and account of Australian naturalism and materialism, see especially Grave, op.cit. �idealism of European philosophy or the spirituality and suppressed puritanism with much which pragmatism). of yet And and commitments, North American does it though it is thinking not simmers shrink from metaphysical explicit it is not from the basically empiricist, nowadays, (including positivistic (rejecting a verification principle, in particular). It is a city program, based broadcast mainly University of Sydney to other metropolitan universities; but the program does extend outside the universities a bit (a tiny bit) to the larger metropolitan culture. No th America, the broader Russell, so in Australasia, little professional philosophy Impinges on + community, Popper AusLralasia As in and would be or Kuhn quite even on being an the wider academic (To exceptional. achievement, one community, turn worth this working work by around for.) now reaches in The naturalism program used to Perth, and in Canberra, as well as a core of opposition there. has outliers stretch Apart from notable exceptions, more than a rather through to Adelaide; the program has never had precarious hold, it the in Melbourne:nor, more same hold, to or surprisingly, 24, Jn Canada, for example, while most academics from other disciplines would know of, and perhaps a little about, Russell, far fewer would know of Wittgenstein (though he is becoming known to lit. crit. groups), and virtually none would know of Quine. (The sampling Is subjective.) On the fairly recent ’triumph of professionalism’ in philosophy in USA, see Kuklick, op.cit., p.565ff. Kuklick brings out well some of the more disastrous features of professionalism, but does not sufficiently notice that the virtuous features resulting from some professionalisation can be synthesized with broader philosophical activity. 25 The exceptions include Ellis's distinctive program, which can be accounted part of the broader naturalist program, and at Monash the work of F. Jackson and, earlier, of H. Munro in value theory. �22 has it had heavyweight criticism from there (or indeed much external criticism from elsewhere), Melbourne out. the old confrontation of major city philosophies having died is more philosophy stricken than Sydney; Melbourne by dominated Continental a philosophy; then, a fashions: Northern recently, more philosophy; remarkable religion philosophy, much more than Sydney, has been of procession historically oriented and more Quine, Davidson and and language ordinary Wittgenstein, turnabout, idealism earlier extensional reduction; now perhaps Lewis,iKripke and Dummett? one The program reaches that beyond confines the of the cities in Australia - which is after all a metropolitan dominated culture, the vast land always being the other - a rather Australian environmentalism, is diffuse program, which has connections with the Colleges of Advanced Education in the country towns and the communes on the North Coast. So far the program is as much distinguished is. environmental Europe by what positions are specifically having it a not is as feature of what it Serious the New World, of transformed most its and deeper the Old World, and environment and natural having little wild untouched country left, and little sensitivity accordingly to issues Europe that such as tend admit European those to concern of the wilderness. built shallow approaches superficiality environmentalism outside continues North environmental human-transformed and (and The main encourage to America. environment, techno-fix dominate North much Issues situations). of American the New in issues And World environmentalism differs significantly however from Antipodean environmentalism, most obviously in the religious-spiritual component respects as well (see further Culture). of the former, but in several other �23 More positively, there are three strands to Australian environmentalism:Firstly, there is an extended utilitarianism, differing little in theory from Bentham’s enlarged position, which insists upon counting in the utilities of creatures. all sentient figured though prominently it This in animal focussed has position, developed from a British base, has animal liberation movements: and welfare and on domestic animals, animals used in and research hunted (wild) animals, it has also become entangled in issues of bio-research more generally such as genetic engineering. or much interested in, endangered species, the conversion of forests, animal pain and pleasure. except deal. Secondly, utilitarian forests and differs insofar as these have a and which American Thirdly, naturalism.26 inadequate there is a wider and a deeper ecological position, which is recognises irreducible which finds value elsewhere intrinsic value ecosystems, especially wild and natural systems. from lands, bearing on and so deeper concerns get an psychological states, sentience or the disappearance of wild Wider and deeper environmental concerns appear only spinoff from animal welfare, as a not etc., It is not however concerned with, and spiritualism is there of from an extension than in trees and This position of American course as almost everywhere, a reactionary component, critical of the other strands, which Insists that all that needs to be accomplished on the environmental front can be achieved within older established (European) ethical and political frameworks. Whereas materialism is based in Sydney, environmentalism is centred in Melbourne and Canberra, but also includes Brisbane and Perth. Also centred in described more fully elsewhere: see, in particular, <ed- D- Mannison and others), RSSS, Australian National University, 1980. It has been �Canberra, and reaching across the country, with good connections in Melbourne, few but in Sydney, is the materialism and environmental further from input affecting program other which program, elsewhere. and and is of Includes more to extends essentially philosophy, centres New in metaphysics, with respectively, the theory value a Zealand , program, logic especially in the Whereas but one metaphysics. Australia than has been also any The other described 27 The main logic perhaps which program areas major their core programs have epistemology relevant/paraconsistent program. relevant/paraconsistent. grounded research program evident program. in New Zealand from the work of A program emanating located mainly in Wellington, philosophy is also a Prior and now it might be. called the extended modal program. The impact of the program on philosophy is perhaps best seen in Cresswell’s work. Australian philosophy used to be known, for its hard-headed empiricism; not known and still is in some quarters, regrettably New Zealand philosophy is mostly for anything much, except perhaps, in UK, that Prior brought his 27 Again, like all the Australian programs, both those mentioned and others, in Grave, op.cit. But see further, R. Routley, ’Research in Logic in Australia, New Zealand and Oceania’, Research Papers in Logic #14, Australian National University, 1983 (which also considers other programs in logic); G. Priest and R. Routley, op. cit.; and R. Routley, R.K. Meyer and others, Relevant Logics and Their Rivals, Ridgeview, California, 1982. 28 See especially M.J. Cresswell, Logics and Languages, Methuen, London, 1973; but see also work by Goldblatt and by Hughes referred to in Research in Logic, op.cit. Also described there is an original version of the modal program (transparent intensional logic) elaborated by Tichy at Otago. �25 unusual adaption of Russellian philosophy from that remote place. Neither of these impressions is particularly accurate; both are rather out-of-date. But the aim of work of the present type is, of course, not just to correct these impressions, not just to reflect or report on culture - for what one would like to reflect upon is not sufficiently there - but also to help manufacture elements of a culture, to make an image. To resist the already flourishing North, we should increase our efforts to programs, and perhaps other sunrise projects; further 29 the to build teaching and research around the programs selected for promotion, elaboration, and criticism, to orient appointments, especially of involved local people, to 29 Among sunrise projects in Australian philosophy so far suggested (not all of them feasible) are these: Australian feminism, Antipodean social and political alternatives, peace studies, indigenous regional philosophies (especially Aboriginal, Melanesian, and Polynesian). Another promising field, with practical consequences, for local initiative is the philosophy of education, where material produced by R.S. Peters has dominated the market, with stultifying effects it is now alleged. As foreshadowed with the notion of "sunrise projects", much of the rhetoric, and argument, concerning science and technology policy (presented in the case of Australia in Jones, op.cit.) can be taken over to apply to X policy, where X is some subject discipline, such as philosophy. �/ 26 on Why bother? these programs. Why not simply buy our philosophy, like almost all our technology, off the shelf, from the North? There are several arguments for not doing this, in more than a limited fashion, which are now sketched. There is, firstly, Northern products, the inferiority despite their and built-in attractive packaging. obsolence of most putting too fine a point on it, many of the imported intellectual goods are shoddy, and Without only work for a very limited range of applications (e.g. the vicinity Antipodean of contradictions philosophy dilemmas). or undoubtedly derives from Much they’re hopeless in that shoddy is wrong intellectual with goods 30 In fact something like the last has been the policy of the LSE Philosophy Department, where the only outside appointment over a long period was that of Lakatos (hardly a person far removed ideologically). As observed, it now looks like the practice of the Otago Department also; and apparently it used to be a tendency at Melbourne. But in most places the practice is condemned as nepotistic or parochial, and overridden by the call for "new (Northern) blood". However there can be significant differences between nepotistic appointments and those strengthening local programs. It is at this stage, among others that administrative measures do matter; for example, to ensure that suitable locally-engaged locals gain employment rather than Northern stooges, to direct funds into on-going local programs rather than imported fashions, etc. There are various ways appropriate administrative details can be handled, locally or nationally; but nothing draconian, such as wholesale exclusion of noncitizens, is required. Observe, indeed, that no restriction of academic appointments to nationals (in Canadian style) or the like is being advocated. Anyone who arrives at a conclusion of that sort from what has been argued has misunderstood the case in crucial respects. As a matter of simple mathematics, restricting appointment fields characteristically reduces both quality of candidates available (however quality is assessed) and range of possibilities open for future research; and no such restrictions are advocated. The author has witnessed the debilitating effects of field restrictions at the Australian National University and elsewhere. 31 Some of these centre also. arguments support change (perhaps revolutionary) at the �27 Yet buying this material is encouraged by hard-sell imported from the North. cultural ambassadors from the North, who are often enough paid Lo visit. is part of Northern the philosophical imperialism from the North — colonialism that - the Antipodes too willing This the successor suffers, or, to more remarkable, encourages I Secondly, there is the inappropriateness of much of the Northern product, especially considered as a metaphysics, environmental package, concerns. to instance, for cover, well as as The European North has no satisfactory land or environmental ethic fit for Antipodean circumstances, and the deeper American package too is spiritually-loaded mainstream for Australian In political theory, American work is much too individualistic and culture. competition-based, and the European product, especially the Marxist form, unsuited being both too precious and for local too high-tech is circumstances, especially again for more environmentally-perceptive people. features of telling also Thirdly, import world’s markets power structures against substitution and comparative advantage, regionalism; namely, and pressures and fashions, (including the Old Boy’s are appealing avoidance of the removal of overseas control and network in jobs, policies, etc.), and gaining of local control, employment of local people, etc. Fourthly, 32 there are arguments for cultural diversity, applied to The point is elaborated in Culture. At a more practical level Northern products are again often unsuitable, though for different reasons. For example, the transfer of American agricultural methods and equipment to the thin poor soils of the Antipodes has had disastrous effects, at last beginning to be recognised. �28 philosophy as complexity, sheer part of intellectual diversity, stability, culture: etc.33 arguments In fact, built into the whole notion of 'culture’ transfers. dense, Naturally we want a rich, weeds and many We obtain not only good products, being introduced. Indian maize and European cultivars, but European pests and American weeds. selectiveness and control are essential, as richness, the garden analogy But not only seeds and plants but productive garden. pests are from This is why previous against haphazard procedures. The proposal is not for, nor would the case sustain, a narrow localism, with local products, whatever their quality, heroes, replacing Northern ones. local fashions, and local cq|t That is certainly not the preferred way of the newer regionalism, which tends to do without fashions and heroes and which seeks durable quality in products, low environmental impact, and so on; nor is it the way of technology policy. Rather, as with technology policy, we select niches which are not occupied or satisfactorily filled, where we difference, and use and develop local skills and methods. has to outlets, be selective etc.). given our resource But granting regionalism, base (of can make a Indeed the policy philosophers, publishing to what extent should components, for instance people, books and other teaching elements, theories and ideas, be imported and to what extent should they be produced, trained, conceived locally? The possibility of selectiveness in different components means that many mixes are possible. particular mix. There is no need to insist, so far at least, on a The case for the present is mainly for a regional shift, for 33c See, for instance, A.A. Mazrui, A World Federation of Cultures: An African Perspective, Free Press, New York, 1976. ------ -- ---------- --- �a significantly greater degree of local autonomy and production. But it will do local favour. no harm Negatively, elements Indicate to of a mix removal of the Locke-Berkelcy-Hume undue (a that finds much the suggestion is that we try to eradicate much of the Oxford style of teaching and doing philosophy. as Q/ on emphasis standard British That includes such things empiricism British focus); of the centred on quasi-historleal approach with however no proper attention to sources; of reinforcement of the prevailing Anglo-American status quo. The heavy particular, has mostly been a very conservative one. the main movements philosophy, but emanating also the from England, Moore-Wittgenstein Oxford influence, in More generally, many of especially practice, ordinary have language been very protective of the Northern status quo; they tend to leave things very much as they are, and recommend just this. 35 Positively, the proposal is that we achieve further disassociation from the Anglo-American empiricist past in two 34 Does it sound familiar? Outside philosophy, it should. For example, we have now been told by the Americans that our defence role, unlike theirs, is regional, not global: this is supposed to shed great light on our previously confused defence policies. 35 The point is laboured in E. Gellner, Words_ and Things, Victor Gollancz, London, 1959. But even ordinary language philosophy, though conservative, and though it much contracted the proper range of philosophical investigations, had its liberating elements, e.g. removal of some of the narrowness and more cramping assumptions induced by technical jargon. Nor has the social impact changed much with the subsequent decline, since 1959, of ordinary language philosophy, the increasing insolvency of Oxbridge philosophy, and its consequent limited take-over by right-wing Ivy League American philosophy. By contrast, the less economically influential growth of redbrick and applied philosophy in some of the British redbrick and polytechnic institutes has touched no more than the surface of Oxbridge practice. �30 by ways: local emphasizing framework, by and diversifying move that projects of range the outside constricting that traditions philosophical selectively drawn upon, to include not only neglected Continental strands and but also parts of Eastern thought, The philosophy. is idea that Pacific ethnic material and Australasian plurality of such a especially sources, in teaching, will assist in removing narrower cultural biasses, such as British parochialism, enable more and discrimination be obtained. to Then too we should be better able to see the ranges of theories that are open to us in the Antipodes and how to advance our own programs. There remain some things we should want to see whatever mixes are chosen One crucial issue is the removal of Northern in different Antipodean regions. bias from papers and publications, research seminars and lectures, letters of This Northern bias is a disposition to cite and discuss reference, and so on. the projects and works irrespective and discussion the of to of Northern quality ignore of the authors, their works the more of authors, local irrespective of the quality of their contribution. defer to write oi not been opinions of worth, importance, It etc. better, topic again under largely It is the disposition to authors from prestigious Northern institutions, accept their the to contribution the famous is and to uncritically the disposition to lecture as though work produced locally either does not exist or has influential philosopl e s, are, (thus if ensuring anything, more that it Inclined is to not). Northern And Australasian bias than many overseas intellectuals, who are perhaps less concerned to be seen as belonging to the Northern mainstream. bias affects not only the The reduction, and eventual removal, practice of Individual of Northern philosophers, but the policies of selection and review committees as well as of editors and referees �31 of local reorientation, innovations It journals. with better, involves, philosophers Antipodean so they among can cite work initiatives and developments - things that would b< content in courses leave, and so on. taught, more time spent at intellectual to know local getting local things, other or point out work and regional assisted by greater local local institutions on study �32 APPENDIX 1. considering the corresponding initial Lebensanchauung’ argument Philosophy both Anderson, as is truth and its theory may not a that be or confirmation independent of national sympathies or prejudices'. mean Science’. The ’are falsification Granted: but that does not fostered, etc., held, and Weltanschauung Christian a as senses two ’a scheme of the universe’, that of ridiculous (Australian) distinguished between distinction In the first, (p.292). that is German the Philosophy’, National a Francis AJPP, ’the to ’an Australian of possibility ’the of Editor In On the earlier idea of a National Philosophy for Australia. in one region but not others, as intultionism was for long in in Holland, or Cartesianism in France. In a second 'more intimate and personal’ way, 'a nation like an individual may develop a certain temperamental attitude to the problems of existence, which we may A nation’s philosophy, like its art ... call its philosophy of life. and its literature, is a mode of expression for the national It is a specialised form of the national genius ....’ short, part of the evolving national culture. is by no entirely means from separate (pp.292-3). It is, in the first place, But, initial the consciousness. sense, a in this philosophy comprising not merely a fairly comprehensive theory but also an integrated set of attitudes (like an operational paradigm). are such items as accounted ’the national consciousness’ and units single philosophy, like particularly Furthermore, only by concession meriting Australian distinctive (in definite of literature, has any sense): does not Australian descriptors. many such 'the Australian landscape' strands things to form it, some rather not loose families. Anderson does not find, really hope to find in ’a modern industrialised community’ - with its modular parts interchangeable with those of others - a national philosophy of life, with a difference. In fact he �33 claims to find a (somewhat) trite moral base to build on, humour, fair and courage particularly phllosphical. at least various apart of but life, regional is So far, not; this problems about nothing does however not local as research Identifying and trouble derives from the extravagant claim that with Goodness these and - distinctive, all or there exclude programs). legitimating being So a far, national But shortly Anderson is plunged into inconsistency: the philosophy, so good. do at there could a national philosophy, then, (such philosophies from rational but dealing', 'traditions ... of the Beauty - then of values eternal and only Philosophy' (p.295 with rearrangement). the then 'if Australia has nothing to Spirit, has she the Ideals nothing to of Truth, with do But, as Australia has nothing per se to do with these - as is virtually conceded, these values involving a 'wider sweep' than any national boundaries ~ "she" has nothing to do with Philosophy, contradicting the possibility of a National Philosophy. Though the contradiction is easily avoided by rescinding the extravagant claim, the ideal of a National Philosophy should be allowed to rest in peace: nationalism has had its time. Richard Routley^ Research School of Social Sciences Australian National University or With thanks to R. Elliot, W. Godfrey-Smith, S. Grave and L. Mirlin, to several members of the audience at the presentation of the paper at the 1983 Australasian Association of Philosophy Conference, University of Adelaide, to several referees for this Journal, and, not least, to the present Editor. �..A PROSPECTS FOR REGIONAL PHILOSOPHIES IN AUSTRALASIA Philosophy, especially academic philosophy but also folk intellectual other dominated, indeed Europe, swamped, largely by Northern now increasingly from North America. a such populations, have to stay that way. like higher cultural activity in Australasia, has long been and influences, composition of result was virtually inevitable. Suitable policies, from initially Given the migration patterns, the cultural and other baggage imported, the ethnic ruling philosophy, a good philosophy the resulting But it does not policy, could change things. The thought of a regional philosophy, perhaps matching a regional In 1923, a New Zealand correspondent to the newly-launched is hardly a new one. Australasian Journal of Psychology and Philosophy mentioned the ’a new kind or culture, temper philosophy of possibility of under these southern skies’ which the Journal might foster.1 The Journal has however hardly fulfilled such a role (or, for that matter, actively pursued professional philosophers but a wider things some have changed in its pronounced aim of reaching not merely Australasian Australia, community). laying a solid foundation for a new regionalism in philosophy, that possibility of a new temper hardly been realised. but few of philosophy had There is little in the way of a new kind and temper of philosophy under New Zealand skies, which the southern skies include: although And features, distinctive ‘no were distinctively characteristics, have shown up in New Zealand philosophy’2. intended New Zealand New Zealand remains 1. AJPP, March 1923, p.74. The question was taken up by the Editor same volume, p.292.ff; his discussion is considered below. 2. S.A. Grave, A History pf Philosophy in Australia, Queensland Press, 1983, p.l. Page references are to the manuscript. 1 to in the University �v, •? 1 nSOphy of a substantial net importer of dominance colonial but also philosophy, inns been , philosophers. and used to prevail in Australia, where virtually all that chairs, and many other academic posts in philosophy, were the from no established chairs are where most strikingly exhibited at the of orientation Northern New Zealand is not surprising. in academics small courses designed, topics covered and considered and especially in appointments made, the heavy researched Zealand, New by filled Given the usual power and influence of professors in occupied by locals. departments, in persists North, situation The oldest of philosophy taught and (The Northern control is perhaps Zealand New universities, the University of Otago, where the Philosophy Department has been virtually captured by a British School and looks increasingly like an offshoot of the London School q, of In Economics.) kC-f" Ct event the overwhelming Anglo-American dominance of New any Zealand philosophy — also a feature only in slightly lesser degree of Australian philosophy - confirmed by a content survey of the courses offered and be can research papers written at New Zealand universities. to Even when local people have been appointed they have been generally forged requirements brought or up on finished the North as B.Phil. hard well. In particular, the to beat case of philosophy by the Many departments of philosophy remain full of products degree. of this cultural mill: were Australasia, of the Australasian universities in the major period of post-World War II expansion were conveniently seen to in the Oxford in solid diet of Anglo-American material, and a in positions indeed until the mid 70s candidates finished out when they applied for positions, in such Oxford was the (unwarranted) prestige of Oxford and the continuing "cultural cringe". Nonetheless, despite the Northern dominance, significant changes have been occurring in the Antipodes, especially on the Australian philosophical scene (as will be indicated). It is worth asking whether Australian philosophy is 2 moving �hiiosophy towards the sort of change that occurred in USA more than 100 years ago when the Harvard Philosophy Department was brought (or bought) together, and its age "golden American philosophy was never quite the same again, and became its began. own thing. There are Australian philosophy now new operating forces in such a direction. which help could to move There is the widespread emergence, particularly in alternative culture, of a new (bio-)regionalism^, which to cultural and ideological choice along with other local choices; applies and in stark contrast, there is the centralised fashioning of national science and technology which not only provides a model for reflection in regional philosophy policies, but policy also directly bears on parts of the of philosophy science. Unfortunately there are also some serious obstacles to regional philosophies and to the very idea of a regional philosophy. USA, long an importer of culture from Europe, has of certainly of lower components of higher culture such as philosophy exporter philosophical culture, output from Oxford has culture, taken). recently but evidently (witness Are become net also any of turn American the there a reasons why Australasia, if not following suit, should not achieve a better cultural balance of payments, especially Yes, there are reasons. in philosophy? In the first place, the change in the cultural position of the USA went with, and perhaps part derived from, vast in changes economic^power relations. dominance entails cultural dominance, there Australasia’s is little prospect in If economic for most of culture, since there is no serious prospect that Australasia will ever emulate or attain American economic eminence (at least not without nuclear 3. See B. Kuklick, The Rise of American Philosophy; Cambridge, Massachusetts 1860-1930, Yale University Press, 1977, Parts 2 and 3. 4. See especially, Fourth World News, vol. 1, 1983, and Scale, Coward, McCann and Geoghegan, New York, 1980. 3 K. Sale, Human �-uilosopM but also has long '’een destruction of the North, and disruption of cultural entire flow of commodities, Secondly, as observed, Antipodean universities not only other). and the contain a large component of Northern academics, increasingly of Americans, they also include a substantial additional contingent of fellow-travellers, whose research and teaching is bent to Northern concerns. influential jL segment, 4A4X y e unlikely that this (become so locally will group, former the It is Gy I acclimatised as to) give up its Northern^cultural commitments, isolated person. Nor apart the from As long as Antipodeans do not drastically should they. alter their cultural priorities, they are in a bind situation; for it can be persuasively argued that they would be better off, as far as quality and product goes, stocking their universities with American teaching components and researching American-oriented concerns. One simple numerical argument that Antipodean universities would be off with Americans in the main, takes the following lines:graduates Australasian of and American, are A distinguished, at least in subjects such as philosophy. academics of quality produced per number of say there is 1 per every n graduates. graduates; The (higher degree) significantly not culturally Consider now the number higher degree Austroamerican The (great) preponderance of graduates will be Americans, just by virtue of their vastly and better their more extensive system of university education. greater population So also then, just by ratio considerations, the great preponderance of quality academics drawn from an Austroamerican base will be American, as will the upper percentiles among those quality products. be 5. appointing Clearly, Antipodeans, were they interested in quality, more Americans to their universities. would Such an argument does not As indicated in Appendix 1, the ratio of philosophy graduates with doctorates is in the order of 30 to 1 for USA as compared with Australia. And, ; > is well-known, the extent of university education is much greater in USA than in Australasia: indeed Australia is in this respect the worst educated of the developed nations, as OECD figures have made plain (see, e.g., B. Jones, Sleepers Awake, Penguin, 1982, p. ). Co***) fa /o �.. w. also folk work to show that, for similar reasons, American universities should be full or Chinese Indian professors, two reasons; for cultural differences between Asians and as philosophy; such of first there are significant especially Americans, disciplines in and secondly, their university systems do not deliver such great quotas of higher degree or high quality graduates, at least in philosophy. The conclusion of the numerical argument will not be a popular one. The anti Americanism felt in portions of the Australasian community extends into the and recently there has been increasing insistence, especially universities; the aging now younger Turks that university positions should be reserved for This at the same time as these Turks often preach of locals. community of scholars, by presumably^/ then an international "free" interchange, etc. They cannot have it ail ways. So long as there is a free—flow interchange of will centre dominate the ideas personnel, and periphery culturally as well as economically; will have more than us, and jobs here should go by and large to them if the they it is quality in this high cultural business that we seek, as we mostly claim. Now it is widely enough recognised, lower-down hierarchical ladders anyway, that there is something drastically wrong with these sorts of arguments. are not flooded with high-quality Northerners local contenders who better. retain have appointment the messages of out the centre better than locals do, and higher—echelon (often Northern committees than dusty locals whose shortcomings are known As is beginning to be recognised too, their drive rather we are inundated by Americans with inflated remote Northern fields tend to look greener to biassed) regularly for positions, if we only preferred the Northerners when they were quite visibly superior: references, would who For we higher-quality products, periphery only if they somehow fall foul 5 and of Northern the allow the them system centres to (e.s5. tend to be exiled to the the academic �philosophy» folk w also • it All this makes the position look doubly bad. /Wejought, appointing especially Northerners, Americans, yet And doing so to seems, to order maximize does not achieve the desired quality result, and J? breeds discontent elsewhere, especially among the aging Turks. Cx-z'J2-^ Fortunately there is a way out from this awkward situation and these arguments; and that the is us. the Then shaky shaky way of regionalism. (^We) do our own things; obtain sufficient cultural distance, for be if they are overrated in even their references, and usually not out of the top drawer, in quality. /■jxc*</-C-vuaxt so that they are not numerical argument simply does fall down. and sul^itutable But before we elaborate the emerging proposal there are other influential arguments to dispose of, and the disposal bears on the proposal. There is, to begin with, the argument for have so far been conceded: all more or institutions maximize. most of crave and seek excellence, elements of which that there is an objective commodity, quality or less__agree and what about, which appointments is what academic to capture, indeed aim That at least is the type of myth most of us have encountered; ow know it is a myth, in fact a dangerous myth. Host places don’t even try to make appointments that way, any more that organisations aim just maximize profit, but rather seek some Ability to fit sort of program, teaching or research, is another, and commonly more important factor; 6. to to satisfice on a mix of factors, of which assessed qualityjis only one, and not the highest ranking one. into and and there is no good reason why such a program should not This is easier in the cultural than the technological sphere. However it is also possible technologically: (stronger) theses of technological determinism, and so of cultural determinism, are false. We can choose different options, technologically, as well as culturally. �sometimes be a regionally oriented one. So like Mii 1 OSOphy * 1 prevailing given the practices, argument from excellence does not exclude regional philosophy programs. The deeper-cutting objection is that there the with that objective importancej criticism as excellence, objective of idea notions these notions objective of is something and with the are open to values more seriously connected notion of the same sorts generally, that they have viewpoint rather narrow to which these intellectual of the framework bracketed out the contextual—relativisation component of valuing: or amiss relate.? While those operating within a values paradigm, as such ordinary Oxbridge language philosophy or Sydney materialism say, can bracket out the viewpoint, since it is objective incorporated in the operational paradigm, and so arrive at seemingly quality judgements, the judgements are not preserved (e.g. in truth value) when transposed Consider, to frameworks, other e.g. idealistic or for comparison, the judgements as to the quality or worth of a forest made variously by a deep ecologist, an industrial forester, and officer. viewpoints. Marxist Compare environmental judgements as by philosopher, Califorman—environmentalist to the quality There recreational of a holistically-inclined Marxist language, ordinary philosophers. a are philosophers who even pretend that such environmental work cannot be judged, seemingly because not done by institutions. members of such is ■F the importance of work quality done or importance of problems and issues is highly paradigm problems it of the main philosophical peer group at Harvard and like As this begins to reveal, judgements of judgements and as those are not problems independent tackled. dependent. For of But the example, of quantifying-in and of possible worlds and of de re What follows also begins to bring out what is om^Qitted in a main R.S. Pirsig, Zen and the Art of Motor Cycle Maintenance, 197 . -- theme of �thought which assume immense importance within mainstream the for referential fashionable theories paradigm, vanish to relative insignificance empiricist outside that restricted viewpoint. Now observe that most judgements as to what are the important problems and what constitutes important work - matters helping determine quality - are shipped relative to their down from placement, paradigmatic the Their North. and the importance is paradigms concerned are exported to the Antipodes through the main channels already indicated. We are free to reject these paradigms and select alternatives, and there are, it can be argued, good reasons to do just that, much as there are good reasons different energy technology different (or military technology) choose to that from generally favoured in the North which the North is eager to export southwards. Similar points apply against the cosmopolitan/international argument might which alternatively be called the Peter Stuyvesant international argument, that sophisticated people everywhere smoke this superior -marketed from Holland; product mass-produced cigarette-sophistication is cosmopolitan. and The argument is based on the assumption that philosophy is a ’cosmopolitan subject’, that is is not the sort of enterprise for which place and people are significant as they are for poetry or the novel.8 The assumption has only questioned. to be production also. like a process of But in the process of production the place and people involved And if the product is like a work in discussion) are material. of art, a piece of literature, and not just theorems and arguments assembled in an internationally-approved format, Q then again the historical setting since philosophy, no more than literature, does not emerge in a vacuum. 8. be It takes for granted, for one important thing, that philosophy is a finished product of a certain sort (a propositional theory), not (e.g. to presented matters, Plato's Grave, op.cit, p.2: the term ’cosmopolitan subject’ is said to come from Donegan. As to the significance of place and people for literature, see further C. Partridge, The Making of New Cultures, Editions Rodopi, Amsterdam, 1982. 8 �philosophy could not have emerged in ancient Australia, and if cribbed in mid 20th century Oxford would surely have been marked down or rejected.111 It is important not to be sidetracked into issues - resembling problems aesthetics - that do not need to be contested, such as whether and what extent sets of themes and arguments produced in one place and setting could produced in in another. have been A nonnuclear technology of some sort could be adopted in Europe but apparently will not be, whereas there is reasonable prospect that New Zealand, in contrast with Australia, will pursue a nonnuclear energy strategy. It is the doing* and not what could logic, which be substantial cultural resistance): to be done in the Anglo-American their done, that matters Dialethic here. invalidates the technique and methodology of much philosophy done in the North, could perhaps choose be own distinctive thing. distinctive done in the North (though there would be it is not being done there, and is not likely sphere.11 To this extent, Antipodeans can technology and logical techniques, do their own The international/cosmopolitan argument, stated in a form that would be telling, fails. 9. Like a paper Ln the biological sciences. But here again technique methodology, which may both be regional, are crucially important. 10. Related points can be made concerning modern American work. Consider, for instance such texts as W.V. Quine's Word and Object, (Wiley, New York, 1960) or R. Nozick's Anarchy, State and Utopia (Basic Books, New York, 1974). The assumptions taken for granted, the arguments involved, etc., are especially American: it is not just the style. The acceptability of arguments and positions is dependent on place and received paradigm. 11. Much as communist anarchism, a live possibility for communes and perhaps communities in Australia, is culturally excluded in North America, owing to the extreme individualism of that culture. 9 and �tUK KLUJLUNAL Hi JLLUbUrdltb IN AUblKALAbLA Of course it can be argued, it is being argued, that Antipodeans don’t need to be, or even oughtn’t to be pursuing their own energy or logic policies and But meeting these considerations takes us to apparatus. concerning issues merit the of a we shall return, our own cuisine cooking is adequate: that we don't or wine styles. arguments, The new need to be or oughtn’t to to be British, or at least cosmopolitan, we should stick to that and buy it off the shelf from ideally importing the cooks also. North, of are not a lot more convincing however than comparable arguments concerning cooking: devising set policies and programs, the point of various diversity, etc.— far beyond the cosmopolitan argument. which new whole the Do we have good reasons to think that British philosophy is better, these days, than British cooking? 12 Antipodeans are free in principle, then, to and to pursue their own paradigms; do so they will by and large want to, and mostly have to, appoint their own people, people they have educated - not saboteurs or people who to be re-educated, from elsewhere, in particular from the North. (had) have But will their intellectual paradigms tie with cultural paradigms, with distinctive features of the local 7 culture. In a loose way, at least, they may link, though works of philosophy will not usually tie in with the culture in the integral fashion that novels (as distinct from more technical works) sometimes do. Grave considers two cultural features, not restricted to particular philosophical programs, that help mark philosophy in Australia as ’an Australian product’ - ’unimportant though this is compared with what matters in philosophy’ he hastens to add. But style, acceptability, truth, do matter, and are not independent - or independent mofar as their perception goes in the case of truth and 12. correctness13 - from One correspondent (name supplied) suggested I ’might note the stultifying crap produced by R.S. Peters Inc. and marketed as philosophy of education’. Certainly, as Grave’s discussion (op.cit. p.318) reveals, Peters’ influence in this area has been very substantial: this indicates another field for local initiative. saco-s. -fo (K t* th- �STS FOR REGIONAL PHILOSOPHIES IN AUSTRALASIA underlying broad theory or received paradigm. However the marks Grave cautiously advances do not serve to distinguish the Australian product, being features philosophy exhibits in lesser Australian degree than the more adventurous and polemical philosophy antiquity. Greek first, described by Passmore as ’most typical of Australian philosophy’, is The a ’diversity of approach and readiness unfashionable point of view’, put to forward much something more an unconventional typical or classical of The second, and more surprising, mark is the manifestoed characte^ philosophy. of of Australian philosophy, 'the most notable example ... between Wittgensteinian Melbourne and Andersonian Sydney, philosophy Andersonian itself' (p.2). This example being ... if is it the line-up was not the far from isolated: others among them concern the fervour generated by "Australian materialism", the extraordinary discussed by political Grave), engagement and the by some growing philosophy confrontation departments concerning (both the relevant/paraconsistent program, with the local ("adversarial") style leading to sharp criticism by Americans. Grave The third and especially the fourth marks are, as notes, hardly distinguishing marks, namely the contrast of the Australian reputation in philosophy with that in other subjects and the anti-intellectual national stereotype, and the separation of the academic philosophy from the sort of mostly-imported philosophy of interest in literary and arty-crafty circles. 13. Nothing need be conceded to strong cultural relativity themes, though they would support the case. It is enough that our theories remain radically incomplete and that there can accordingly be rival theories as to what is true. Similarly, however philosophy is conceived, as the search for truth, explanation, understanding (all of these really), or as inquiry of a certain sort, there can be - will be - competing accounts. 11 �— ruK REGIONAL PHILOSOPHIES IN AUSTRALAQi A The failure of the marks to adequately separate off Australian from the particular local examples) does not matter. (apart Australian produce is sufficiently separated another, by projects. For regionalism should not be confused with nationalism, nor more regional positions such as Sydneyside materialism or Wellington Nationalism philosophies. in philosophy, undesirable trait, not to be encouraged: cultural other For one thing, the research its philosophy as in modalism most with national things, is an other and the new regionalism is linked, in with the breakdown of nations and contraction of state things, power. 14 To get back to where we were: - better much increase - doing our own distinctive things, and that we team or In fact there are several suggestions that begin to up to do so. just the emerging proposal is this, thatQ^e/start emerge; not that we do our own selection, decide our own priorities, instead of having these foisted upon us; invented instead here of competitive or taken Gridiron model in favour of a not just, that is, that we play our own and over from Basketball, games, whether the North and not theirs, Rules and Rugby but that we abandon the individual of cultural achievement sold to us and fostered by the North group cooperative approach (elements of which are already modelled in Antipodean social clubs). 14. See, e.g., Sale, op.cit., and L. London, 1957. Kohr, The Breakdown of Nations, RKP, The Editor of the new 1923 AJPP did however take seriously the notion of National Philosophy, of an Australian Philosophy; some of the issues there raised (p.292ff) are addressed in Appendix 2. 12 �p_FOR regional PHILOSOPHIES in AUSTRAtacta The thoughts here are example: ditch-digging more ditch rapidly the On than enjoyably and two people On the other side, experience cannot individually achievements in their programs. situation. communi ation working complete very shows depends results builds on Despite the For, despite, the individualism the work of in obtaining we that highly myth rapid publication of competitive predominantly much in the attainment work is jointly based, Then again communications the idea or the are tend to lose There are nationalistic considerations (e.g. fact achieves There is the fact that much is conveyed verbally and through face-to-face seminars so that local is and result, and the Here again people at the periphery a result at about the same time as an outsider). There the when the time is ripe for some idea or result, many: There are a mix of reasons:- conveyed. in One is the Poles tend to promote Polish results, Russians will cite a Russian who be ditch rapid verbal communication and access to unpublished upon assignment of credit for it. out. the There are several reasons for this. several clever people will be able to hit on it. important on successfully with the centre on individualistic nature of American academic enterprise,15 material. the is it is well-known that two people cooperating can dig a enjoyment in the doing. of side one Cooperative work tends to pay off in terms of output, quality, and separately. periphery familiar. and simple results will of limited reading, and that people at the centre tend to concentrate when they read on material from the centre by central people, so that published items and results from the periphery will often not be noticed, and may well lose out to 15. central competitors even if they achieve Reflecting other features of the culture and enterprise of the centre which are not so deeply embedded in Australasia: see further R. Routley, ’Culture, philosophy, and approaches to the natural environment - an Australian perspective’, and ’Culture and the roots of political divergence: the Australian/American contrast’, typescripts, Canberra, 1983; both referred to subsequently as ’Culture’. 13 �^2^Sl2IWL_PHILOSOPHTro T. central publication. There is also the fact that people at the centre to merit for merit, more publication and communication opportunities than receive, Here economic factors such as people towards the periphery. market tend (there are, a e.g., many great size of academic more academic philosophers in North America than in the whole rest of the world), control of publishing outlets etc. journals, (with few exceptions all Northern), do begin to enter. economic power does not, and need not, determine culture -^we)can shut philosophical Northern we sets if propaganda want really to. in we And and However off the much the way we shut off our television can stop being impressed by those philosophical middle-men who make a living by importing the Northern stuff. So what do we do? We adapt to the cultural-philosophical level, several of things, that have been suggested in the new (bio-)regionalism. those some regional awakening and local self-management. We do not We aim at slavish remain importers and imitators of, and local commentators on and peddlars of, doctrines and positions from the North. to trying tease out For example, we don’t spend our academic what Wittgenstein or Dummett16 or Quine meant by this or that in the hope that some pale Northern light will perhaps filter through. be lives To I am not suggesting that we emulate the appalling ignorance of people sure, from the North who visit the Antipodes and know little or nothing about what has been done or is being done here; so that we have eminent visitors, their bags heavy with cultural accroutrements, trekking University (now the main for centre through investigation the Australian of relevant logics) and informing us that, or relying crucially on the assumption that, a entails 16. every proposition. National contradiction One reason that these Northerners often know little Nor do we really need C. Martin (an American, formerly professor at Sydney University, now at Calgary) coming by to tell us there are severe difficulties in making Dummett’s stuff work or even cohere (though it’s nice to see him again). 14 �^~^-^S2NAL PHiLosn 1 or nothing about distinctive positions and advances prevailing of assumption the is Antipodes is the the inferiority of cultural and intellectual life in these former southern colonies; another is the narrow (predominantly local) and limited reading undertaken by Northern luminaries. But, despite having been given sufficient cause, we shouldn’t cut ourselves off We can reasonably use what we need from these anyway). so from Northern paradigms and influences (we could hardly manage to entirely we should enterprises. stay informed In any case, but of, imitators not cultures regional continuing are in just as the people are largely European stock. traditions, or part of, their of, rooted older minority) and traditions, Northern So far from cutting loose from these traditions and starting afresh from nowhere, these likely traditions: older (and the local variations that have emerged, are what we want to develop and perhaps mutate, as again with wine styles. The proposal is encourage then develop and paradigms, rather than paradigms we that do increasingly own our working with pale nor-thorn reflections research of fortunately, being do we programs already grounded in need to features make New Zealand is a different and which initiated, of the to pull have larger For the very great culture.17 Nor, more Australia difficult proposition - is already All one really has to do out programs he has already indicated and provide some elaboration and commentary. 17. components. Much of the story, for indicated in Grave’s survey of Australian philosophy. is Northern the story up - though helping to shape the future is part of what the proposal is about. - of It is not as if we have to build from nothing, to do - what is very are advantage things, own research programs, and so shape new Antipodean our difficult - entirely original work, to try to create cultural there local To pull the investigation down to See Culture, op.cit. 15 a more concrete level, I �PHTr mo____ shall list some more prominent programs — not the only ones — and remark on some features of them. The longest running and best known program is, without much doubt, that AusfcraATan naturalism, which is generally traced back to Anderson’s empiricist and which aims to see the natural world, and everything else, metaphysics, encompassed suitably program a and Smart in Adelaide which has since died out there. has included such famous components as the mental-material theme and central materialism, state derivatively, a version of functionalism. failures conspicuous scientifically relations of as the frame work of the world of /physical scienc^f. within It contains as a major subprogram Sydney materialism, Place of its in nowadays and Faced like plans, reduction The latter program contingent it all it by initiated identity in, more physicalisms with takes incorporates now a trimmed theory of universals, and an account of natural laws as universals. Parts of the program, especially materialism and central state reductionism and the unified science ideal, have had counterparts in the North, but the program has, for the most part, retained its distinctively Australian character (it never caught on in smoothly, moreover, into Australian culture. New Zealand). The program It is similarly down—to—earth, and earthy, so far as philosophy can be, without the fancy ideas or effete of idealism European philosophy or the spirituality and suppressed puritanism with which much of North American thinking simmers (including nowadays, yet fits pragmatism). And it does not shrink from explicit metaphysical commitments, and though it is basically empiricist, it is positivistic not (rejecting a verification principle, in particular). 18. Anderson’s metaphysics was far more opposed to reductions than what has succeeded it. For an account of Anderson’s philosophy, and a history and account of Australian naturalism and materialism, see especially Grave, op.cit. 16 �It is a city, primarily «G4t-y o£ Sydney, based program, but the program does extend outside universities a bit (a tiny bit) to the larger metropolitan the As in North America, so in Australasia, little professional philosophy impinges on broader community1920 , or even on the wider academic community the work by Russell, Popper and Kuhn being exceptional. Australasia would be an quite Perth, and has outliers in Apart from notable exceptions, one achievement, naturalism program used to stretch through to elsewhere), the old from worth it the program has never had there now for.) reaches in The to (or indeed the same hold, or nor, surprisingly, has it had much external criticism from confrontation of major city philosophies having died out. more religion stricken Melbourne philosophy, much more than Sydney, has been dominated by a procession of Northern fashions: more working around Canberra, as well as a core of opposition there. Melbourne philosophy is more historically oriented and than Sydney; this turn Adelaide; more than a rather precarious hold, in Melbourne: heavyweight criticism (To recently, earlier idealism and Continental philosophy; Wittgenstein, ordinary language philosophy; turnabout, Quine, Davidson and extensional reduction; then, a remarkable now perhaps Lewis, Kripke and Dummett? 19. In Canada while most academics from other disciplines would know of, and perhaps a little about, Russell, far fewer would know of Wittgenstein (though he is becoming known to lit. crit. groups), and virtually none would know of Quine. (Subjective sampling). On the ’triumph of professionalism’ in philosophy in USA, see Kuklick, op.cit., p.565ff. Kuklick brings out well some of the more disastrous features of professionalism, but does not sufficiently notice that the virtuous features resulting from some professionalisation can be synthesized with broader philosophical activity. 20. Ellis’s work, and more recently the work of F. Jackson and others (e.g in value theory, H. Munro), which can be accounted part of the broader naturalist program. 17 *• I culture. �The one program that reaches beyond the confines of the cities in Australia - is which a metropolitan dominated culture, the vast land always all after environmentalism, being the other - is Australian which has the Colleges of Advanced Education in the country with connections towns and the communes on the North Coast. So far distinguished by what it is not as what it is. of most transformed Europe World, to untouched country left, and little sensitivity accordingly those the and built approaches. human-transformed environment, specifically, issues as such that issues admit shallow European superficiality continues to dominate much of the New And World environmentalism outside North America. differs much as The main environmental issues in Europe tend to concern wilderness. of is and having little wild environment natural its program the Serious and deeper environmental positions are a feature of the New World, the Old having program, diffuse rather a significantly North environmentalism American however from Antipodean environmentalism, most obviously in the religious-spiritual of component former, the in but other several respects as well (see further Culture). Australian More positively, there are three strands to there Firstly, is an extended utilitarianism, differing little from Bentham’s enlarged position, which insists upon counting the This creatures. environmentalism#*- position, developed from a of utilities British base, prominently in animal welfare and animal liberation movements: on focussed animals, domestic animals used in as engineering. genetic interested in, conversion of endangered forests, pain and pleasure. spinoff from It species, is the not of figured it has wild generally with, or much the lands, etc., except insofar as these have a bearing on animal Wider and deeper environmental concerns animal more concerned disappearance sentient and hunted (wild) research however has though animals, it has also become entangled in issues of bio-research such all welfare, and 18 appear only as a so deeper concerns get an inadequate deal. �Secondly, there is a wider and utilitarian and ecological deeper a especially wild and in value trees is is not forests and and This position differs from natural systems. American spiritualism and from an extension of American there which which recognises irreducible value elsewhere than sentience or psychological states, which finds intrinsic ecosystems, position, Thirdly, naturalism. of course, as almost everywhere, a reactionary component, critical of the other strands, which insists that all that needs to be accomplished environmental front be can achieved within older established on the ethical and political frameworks. Whereas materialism is based in Canberra and Sydney, environmentalism Melbourne, but also includes Brisbane and Perth. none in Sydney, is the relevant/paraconsistent materialism and environmental programs have further input from relevant/paraconsistent affecting epistemology program and a in in logic metaphysics, respectively, program, other major areas of philosophy, especially metaphysics. which perhaps includes more centres in Australia than any Melbourne, Whereas the program. theory value essentially is core their in Also centred in Canberra, and reaching across the country, with good connections but centred is other but with the one The program program, and which extends to New Zealand, has also been described elsewhere.* 22 21. It has been described more fully elsewhere: see, in particular, Environmental Philosophy (ed. D. Mannison and others), RSSS, Australian National University, 1980. 22. Again, like all the Australian programs, both those mentionedand others, in Grave, op.cit. But see further, R. Routley, ’Research in Logic in Australia, New Zealand and Oceania’, Research Papers in Logic #14, Australian National University, 1983; G. Priest and R. Routley, On Paraconsistency, Research Papers in Logic #13, 1983; R. Routley and others, Relevant Logics and Their PJLvals, Ridgeview, California, 1983. 19 �The main research program evident in New Zealand philosophy is also a logic A program. grounded program emanating from the work of Prior and now located mainly in Wellington, it might be called the extended modal program. of the on program The impact is perhaps best seen in Cresswell’s Logics and philosophy Languages. Australian philosophy used to be known, and still is in some quarters, its hard-headed empiricism; regrettably New Zealand philosophy is mostly not known for anything much, except perhaps, in UK, that Prior brought adaption of philosophy Russellian work the of present type that remote place. from impressions is particularly accurate; of for is, his Neither of these both are rather out-of-date. of course, not just unusual to But the aim correct these impressions, not just to reflect or report on culture - for what one would to reflect upon is not sufficiently there - like but also to help manufacture elements of a culture, to make an image. To resist the North, we should increase our efforts to further the flourishing already programs, and perhaps other sunrise projects, to build teaching and research around the programs selected for promotion, elaboration, and criticism, to orient appointments, programs. 23 24 Why bother? technology, especially of involved local people, off the shelf, from the North? There is, firstly, the inferiority built-in and despite their attractive packaging. 23. limited range of applications (e.g. obsolence 25 of Northern Without putting too fine a point for a they're hopeless in the vicinity of Methuen, London, 1973. See also work by Goldblatt and by to in Research in Logic, op.cit. 20 our There are several arguments for not on it, many of the imported intellectual goods are shoddy, and only work very these Why not simply buy our philosophy, like almost all doing this, in more than a limited fashion, which are now sketched. products, to Hughes referred �contradictions or dilemmas). Much that is wrong with philosophy Antipodean undoubtedly derives from shoddy intellectual goods imported from the North. Yet buying this material is encouraged by hard-sell cultural the North, who are often enough paid to visit. from ambassadors This is part of the philosophical imperialism from the North - the successor to Northern colonialism that - the Antipodes too willingfysuffers , or, more remarkable, encourages! Secondly, there is the inappropriateness of much of the especially considered as a package, metaphysics, environmental concerns. land or for instance, The European North to Northern cover, has no as product, well as satisfactory environmental ethic fit for Antipodean circumstances, and the American 24. In fact something like the last has been the policy of the LSE. Philosophy Department, where the only outside appointment over a long period was that of Lakatos (hardly a person far removed ideologically). As observed, it now loc s like the practice of the Otago Department also: and apparently it used to be a tendency at Melbourne. But in most places the practice^ is condemned as nepotistic or parochial, and overridden by the call for new (Northern) blood". It is at this stage, among others that administrative measures do matter; for example, to ensure that suitable locally-engaged locals gain employment rather than Northern stooges, in order to inject funds for on-going or new programs, etc. Among sunrise projects in Australian philosophy so far suggested are these: Australian feminism, Antipodean social alternatives, indigenous regiona philosophies (especially Aboriginal, Melanesian, and Polynesian). As foreshadowed with the notion "sunrise projects", much of the rhetoric, and arguments, concerning science policy can be taken over to aPP-Y to > policy, where X is some subject discipline, such as philosophy. 25. Some of these arguments change support centre also. 21 (perhaps revolutionary) at the �I too product is spiritually-loaded theory, political Australian mainstream for culture. 26 In work is much too individualistic, and the European American product, especially the Marxist form, unsuited too and for high-tech, local circumstances, especially again for more environmentally-perceptive people. Thirdly, also telling against comparative advantage, are appealing features of and markets and substitution import (including removal fashions, the Old Boy’s of overseas of the world’s avoidance namely, regionalism; control and structures power network in jobs, policies, etc.) and local control, employment of local people, etc. Fourthly, there are arguments for cultural diversity, applied to philosophy as part of intellectual arguments from richness, complexity, sheer culture: into diversity, stability, etc.26 27 In fact, the garden analogy built notion of garden. ’culture’ transfers. introduced. We obtain not only but good whole we want a rich, dense, productive Naturally But not only seeds and plants the and weeds products, cultivars, but European pests and American weeds. many pests are being maize and European Indian This is why selectiveness and control are essential, as against previous haphazard procedures. The proposal is not for, nor would the case sustain, a narrow localism. The suggestion is for carefully selective penetration of intellectual areas. with technology policy, we select niches which are not occupied As or satisfactorily filled, where we can make a difference, and use and develop local skills and methods. base Indeed the policy has to be selective (of philosophers, publishing outlets, etc.). what extent should components, for instance people, our resource But granting regionalism, to books 26. The point is elaborated in Culture. 27. See, for instance, A.A. Mazrui, A World Federation African Perspective, Free Press, New York, 1976. 22 given and of other teaching Cultures: An �elements, theories and ideas, be imported and to trained, produced, conceived locally? The extent what possibility different components means that many mixes are possible. insist, so far at least, on they be of selectLveness in There is no need to The case for the present is a particular mix. of local But it will do no harm to indicate elements of a mix that finds much local merely for a regional shift, autonomy and production. Negatively, favour. for significantly a undue emphasis is suggestion the on the (also a Cambridge focus); proper conservative that we try to get rid of the Oxford That includes such things as removal of quasi-historical with one. generally More practice, have the proposal is no however The heavy Oxford influence, in particular, has mostly been many been that a very of the main movements emanating from but also the Moore - later very protective of the Northern status quo; they tend to leave things very much as they Positively, approach of reinforcement of the prevailing Anglo-American England, especially ordinary language philosophy, Wittgenstein degree British empiricism centred on Locke-Berkeley-Hume of the attention to sources; status quo. greater 28 style of teaching and doing philosophy. the should are, and recommend just this. 29 we achieve further disassociation from the Anglo-American empiricist past by widening the range of philosophical traditions 28. Does it sound familiar? Outside philosophy, it should. For example, we have now been told by the Americans that our defence role, unlike theirs, is regional, not global: this is supposed to shed great light on our previously confused defence policies. 29. The point is laboured in E. Gellner, Words and Things, Victor Collancz, London, 1959. But even ordinary language philosophy, though it much contracted the proper range of philosophical investigations, had its liberating elements, e.g. removal of some of the narrowness and more cramping assumptions induced by technical jargon. �drawn upon, to include not only thought, Eastern neglected in parts of but also Pacific ethnic material and Australasian philosophy. The idea is that such a plurality assist and strands continental sources, of especially in will teaching, removing narrower cultural biasses and enable more discrimination to Then too we should be better able to see the be obtained. ranges theories of that are open to us in the Antipodes and how to advance our own programs. APPENDIX 1. Notes investigation of on the philosophical supply situation. Sociological the philosophy labour market in Australia and New Zealand has yet to be attempted. of But a picture some the underlying elements simple numerical argument of the text can be gained from the following table: TABLE 1. Ph.Ds in Philosophy: a USA/Australian comparison USA Number (Male/Female) 1977 330 (264/66) 1978 283 (235/48) 1979 285 (204/54) Australia Number 9 1980 4 1981 4 Notes: 1. New Zealand Number The breakdown of the USA numbers by sexes is (male/female) given. Similar figures do not appear to be available for Australia. 2. The US figures are for the academic year ending in the e.g. 1978 covers the Northern Year academic year 1977-78. shown, Southern figures are for the calendar year shown. In applying table 1 some simplifying assumptions are made. candidates for appointment to regular university It is positions assumed now that require a �9 find trite a moral fair dealing'), but nothing at all distinctive. national philosophy, exclude there being programs). So Australia has at least various life, of regional far, then, all is well. the inconsistency: of humour, courage and base to build on ('traditions ... trouble derives but So far, then, there be (such as local research But shortly the Editor is plunged into from the extravagant claim that Philosophy' (p.295; with rearrangement). sweep' than any national boundaries — these "she values is a Though the easily avoided by rescinding the extravagant claim, the ideal of a National Philosophy should be allowed to rest in had its time. involving has nothing to do with Philosophy, contradicting the possibility of a National Philosophy. contradiction do But, as Australia has nothing per se to do with these - as is virtually conceded, 'wider 'if nothing to do with these - the eternal values of the Spirit, the Ideals of Truth, Goodness and Beauty - then and only then has she nothing to with a this does not however is not: philosophies can peace: nationalism has �PROSPECTS FOR REGIONAL PHILOSOPHIES IN AUSTRALASIA Philosophy, especially academic philosophy but also folk philosophy, like intellectual and higher cultural activity in Australasia, has long been (Uhfi swainped, by Northern increayngly from North America. Europe, now inltutal i!t largely indeed dominated, the from patterns, of composition ethnic resulting uU-HT; populations, such a result was virtually does not initially the migration Given imported, baggage and/other Influences, the But it inevitable. Suitable policies, a good philosophy policy, have to stay that way. could change things. I he of thought is cultuie, hardly a regional a new one. philosophy, In 1923, a matching perhaps a regional correspondent to the New Zealand newly-1aunched Aust r a1asIan Journa1 of Psychology and Philosophy mentioned the possibility of 'a new kind or temper of philosophy under these southern skies’ which the 11 o *5 SIK reaching for (or, not community). soi id might Journal, merely foundation that for a matter, professional although And The foster. some Journal has actively pursued philosophers things new regionalism however hardly but have changed in philosophy, its a fulfilled pronounced wider of aim Australasian in Australia, laying a that possibility of a new Lemper of phiLosophy has hardly been realised. There is little in the way of a new kind and temper of philosophy southern skies were intended to include: distinctively New Zealand skies, which the but few distinguishing features, ’no under characteristics, New have Zealand shown up in New Zealand The question was taken up by the Editor in the discussion is considered below, especially in p/ces 1 �pin losophy' .- New Zealand remains a substantial net The situation of colonial dominance that used to prevail in and philosophers. Aus 11.11. la, wheie virtually all chairs, were filled by academics philosophy, Importer of philosophy, and many from the North, posts academic other in tends to persist in New Zealand, where no established chairs are occupied by locals.\ Given the usual power and Influence of professors topics coveted considered and in small and in courses designed, departments, especially appointments made, the heavy Northern orientation of philosophy taught and researched in New Zealand is not The Northern control is perhaps most strikingly exhibited at the surprising. oldest of New Zealand Philosophy Department event , the the University of has been substantially captured by a like increasingly looks universities, an offshoot of overwhelming Anglo-American the Otago, where the British School and University of London.In any dominance of New Zealand philosophy 1 so <1 feature only in slightly lesser degree of Australian philosophy — can be confirmed by a content survey of the courses offered and research papers written at Now Zealand universities. Even when local people have been appointed to positions in Australasia, they have been brought up on a solid diet of Anglo-American material, and they have often been reforged or finished in the North as well. In particular, the S.A. Grave, A History of Philosophy in Australia, Queensland University Piess, 1)84, p.l. Page references are to the manuscript. The paper draws/ heavily on this history. / / was correct at the t^me of presentation of J ' J/ ' v/i th the recent loss of^Xiair at Wellington, the qualification, but the pattern of domination persists. the pager (August claimrequires *ln the 1981 Commonwealth University Handbook listing, 6 of the 8 members of the Department held their main degree, Ph.D., from London, and one of the remainder from Exeter. Only one member of the Department, soon to retire, falls outside the nexus. �of requirements the major period post­ of li expansion were conveniently seen to in the case of philosophy by World War the in the Australasian universities B.Phil, Oxford products of Many degree. fill's cultural mill: in Oxford were hard (unwarranted) departments of indeed until philosophy full remain of the mid 70s candidates finished to beat out when they applied for positions, such was the prestige of Oxford and the regrettable, but still continuing, "cultural cringe". Nonetheless, been occurring scene (as in Northern it indicated). significant dominance, especially on the Antipodes, be will the despite the Australian worth is asking changes have philosophical Australian whether phiLosophy is moving towards the sort of change that occurred in USA more than 100 years ago when the Harvard Philosophy Department was brought (or bought) together, its "golden and age" began.’ American the same again, and became its own thing. philosophy was never quite There are now new forces operating which could help to move Australian philosophy in such a direction. the widespread regionalism/' other provides a which applies choices; local fashioning emergence, of national model for and particularly cultural to in in alternative and there are of choice along ideological contrast, there and technology policies, reflection in regional also some is philosophy directly bears on parts of the philosophy of science. soon appear, culture, stark science serious obstacles There is the a new with centralised which not only policy but also Unfortunately, as will to regional philosophies and to the very idea of a regional philosophy. See B. Kuklick, The Rise of American Philosophy; Cambridge, Massachusetts 1860-1930, Yale University Press, 1977 , Parts 2 and 3. On this bio-regionalism, see especially, Fourth World News, vol. 1, and K. Sale, Hitman Scale, Coward, McCann and Geoghegan, New York, 1930. 1983, �1 other seek b,1! (Iu<i'!iy fs to satisfice on a mix of factors, of which assessed only one, and not often the highest ranking one. Ability to fit program, teaching or research, is another, and commonly more lnto 8ort iiipo/iant factor; and so H ! linGS bc a regionally reason why such a program should not is no good there So given prevailing practices, oriented one. the argument from excellence does not exclude regional philosophy programs. in my event, there are enough local candidates of sufficient worth to proceed >‘-giona] w!I;i And, programs without sacrifice clearcut excellence. of Local enterprise need entail no loss of excellence, and could well increase it. btP'! 1 s" v • 1 i! ■ 1 b'J objection is that cutting of excellence, objective obJt( ■ * importance; that criticism is of notions llL'J' ' ' 1 '".ll_ ff".l these there is something seriously amiss and notions objective values with open are more contextual-re lativisation a rather narrow intellectual the to generally, of component paradigm, notion same sorts they that of of have the valuing: While those operating framework or viewpoint to which these values relate.10 within connected the as such ordinary Oxbridge language philosophy or Sydney materialism say, can bracket out the viewpoint, '1 's incorporated in the operat ional paradigm, and so arrive at set !! :s’’1 y objective quality judgements, the judgements are not preserved (e.g. m truth Marxist value) when viewpoints. transposed ConsidcZ to for other frameworks, comparison, the e.g. idealistic judgements as to or the quality or worth of a forestWade variously by a deep ecologist, an industrial forester, and a recreational officer. Compare judgements as to the quality of What fol lows also begins to bring out what is omitted in a main theme if R.S. Pirsig, Zen and the Art of Motor Cyc1e Maintenance, Bodley Head, Lond 1974. Note that efusing the notion of objective excellence does not lea^ subjectivism. T avoid the customary false dichotomy , compare the noti validity (usuall Ci1 led to themselves these days by classical logicians' with that of quality^/. �9 a ho 1 i s i /c a I 1 y-i nc I. i ned Marxi st, philosophers it group As because the of problems such '!lt » is importance of are be cannot even judged, main philosophical work are not of quality peer done problems or independent of But tackled. issues is highly paradigm dependent. the For example, those of qu in t i f y i ng-i n and of poss l b Le worlds and of de re importance for immense mainsti -am empiricist restricted that ire judgements reveal, to which assume the language, There work by members of the not done problems and import nice of whit is ordinary philosophers. environmental such that by like institutions. begins this outside it Harvard and judgements witiiiii pretend who philosopher, environmental Californian and seemi ng 1y environmental the important fashionable referential theories paradigm, vanish to relative insignificance Now observe viewpoint. that most judgements as to problems and what constitutes importkj/t work - matters tbechelping, determine quality - are shipped down from the North. is relative to their paradigmatic placement, and Their importance the paradigms concerned are exported to the Antipodes through the main channels already indicated. fri'e to reject be .argued, choose that these paradigms and select alternatives, good reasons different generally energy favoured to do just technology in the that, much as (or different North the which We are and there are, it can there are military North is good reasons technology) eager to to from export southwards. against which might alternatively be the called cosmopolitan/internalional the Peter Stuyvesant argument international r argument , everrywhere smoke that mass-produced and -marketed The argument ' cosmopol i t in subject', pJL Jo-Zj cvnYy' c. Pi ^e/S3)r?'5"?. is based that is a from i s not Holland; this superior product.. cigarette-sophist lest ion on the assumption that pM the sort of enterprise for wht f '/is c^ra- �10 poetry for assumpt ion has only important sori (a to be presented propositional to be questioned. that philosophy thing, theory), not a is a 1 i terature , and work not just. theorems i nternati ona11y-approved format,12 ’ philosophy, since no more than It and The takes for granted, finished product of a certain (e.g. involved the if And novel.11 the process of production also. process of production the place and people mater i a I or of in discussion) art , a rg urn e n t s But in the like a piece assembled in are of an then again the historical setting ma t ters , literature, does not emerge in a vacuum. Plato's philosophy could not have emerged in ancient Australia, and if cribbed in mid 20th century Oxford would surely have been marked down or rejected. fmpoi taut not 1 in aesthet ics extent sets ol adopted in prospect themes nonnucleai Europe that do not that been produced New to be sidetracked need and arguments in another. but to be contested, produced . such as whether and what in one place and setting could A nonnuclear technology of some sort could be apparently will Zealand, into issues — resembling problems in not contrast It is J be, with whereas there Australia, is will reasonable pursue a >t what could be done, that Eravi.’, op.cit., p.2: the term 'cosmopolitan subject' used there comes fioni Donegan. As to the significance of place and people for literature, see fin ! hi’i C. Partridge, The Making of New Cultures, Editions Rodopi, Amsterdam, bike i paper in the biological sciences. But here again technique methodology, which may both be regional, are crucially important. and 13 ■pies, e.g. concerning modem American work. Consider, for instance such texts as W.V. Quine's Word _ (bi ley, New York, 1.960) or R. Nozick's Anarchy, State and Utopia (Basic Books, New York, 1974). The assumptions taken Tor granted, the arguments involved, etc., are especially American: it is not just the style. £9_c-ePta^j 1 i ty of arguments and positions is dependent on place and r e c e 1 v ed par a d I gm . �11 .71 a L t < • r s here . Dialethic much Anglo-American methodology of which logic, invalidates philosophy, could the and technique perhaps be done in the North (though there1 would be substantial cultural resistance): it is not being done there, this extent, and is not likely Antipodeans can their choose the! r own international/cosmopo11 tan argument, s tit ed techniques, Of course do it can the Anglo-American sphere.To to be done in be argued, o wn distinctive dis tine t ive and technology The thing. in a form that would be telling, it is being argued, that Antipodeans don’t need to be, or even oughtn't to be pursuing their own energy or logic policies and apparatus. of But meeting these considerations takes us to a whole new set issues concerning the merit of various policies and programs, diversity, etc. - far beyond the cosmopolitan argument. which we shall return, arguments concerning are not a cooking: the. point of The new arguments, to lot more convincing however than comparable that we don't, devising our own cuisine or wine, styles. need to be or oughtn't to be British, or at least cosmopolitan, cooking is adequate: we. should stick, to that and buy it off the shelf from the North, ideally importing the cooks also. Do we have good reasons to think that British philosophy is better, these days, than British cooking? Antipodeans are free, in principle then, to pursue their own paradigms; and to do so they will by and large want to, and mostly have to, appoint their own people, people they have educated - not saboteurs or people who have (had) 14, Much as communist anarchism, a live possibility for communes and perhaps communities in Australia, is culturally excluded in North America, owing to tiie extreme possessive individualism of that culture. On dialethic logic, see G. Priest and R. Routley, On Paraconsistency, Research Papers In Logic, #13, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University, 1983. �12 elsuJhere, in particular from the North. parad igms features of the I oca 1 though works of integral do. cultural paradigms, with distinctive culture? way, philosophy will to not usually programs, unimportant Independent features, not But or at least, with tie in style, I5 do already restricted with link, they may culture in the link. the truth, far considers Grave particular philosophical 'an Australian wha t matters acceptabilit/, so to Australia as compared is independent mJ correctness they philosophy in this though add. - extent, help mark that to limited a cultural certain truth tic 4 fashion that novels (as distinct from more technical works) sometimes Indeed, hastens perused But will the do product' he in philosophy’ and matter, are not percept ion from under lyi/g broad theory or received paradigm. CG'n £)Q_ However the marks Grave U-y ut Ivin ecu/, A do not features serve to the distinguish philosophy Australian Australian exhibits in s i g n i f 1 c a n t though they are, product, lesser the degree adventurous and polemical philosophy of Greek antiquity. by Passmore as 'most typical of Australian first two than the being more The first, described philosophy' , is a 'diversity of approach and readiness to put forward an unconventional or unfashionable point of v iew' ,' (> philosophy, something wh ich more (with typical some of notable ancient philosophy exceptions) than exhibits Australian an austere 15 Nothing need be conceded to strong cultural relativity themes, though they would support the case. It is enough that our theories remain radically incom|> 1 e te and th.11 there can accordingly be rival theories as to what is true. Similarly, however philosophy is conceived - as the search for truth, explan it. ion, understanding and wisdom (all of these and more, really), or as, more vaguely, inquiry of a certain soil - there can be, and will, be, competing accounts; so a pluralistic theory is inevitable in giving a fuller view. Both preceding quotations, while included as such in Grave's Introduction, are It™ J. Passmore, 'Philosophy', in The Pattern of Australian Culture fed. ' " 'lcL«'0O, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, N.Y., 1963 , pp.131-163. The same annotation also applies to the third mark. �13 uni1ormit y re fI ec t i ng more and that often at/rlbuted sorprising , most 'the philosophy, WittgensteLnian Andersonian notable Melbourne philosophy i s ^’the mark ... example and itself manifestoed character’ Andersonian Sydney, This example (p.2). the ... being 'The second, itself. Land to the is line-up it if Australian of the not was far between isolated: from ited by "Australian materialism", ■ discussed by Grave), relevant/pa raconsis tent to sharp criticism by and growing the program, with Americans. philosophy departments confrontation (both concerning the local ('adversarial’) style leading Connected with these first marks two furl her character 1st les of much Australian philosophy, as of much unkindly unwillingness add (in the mu file poi n t s , hope of locating A are 8th century turi^-of- this-century Cambridge philosophy! di rec tness , the namely surface clarity/and, some would difference), bluntness, genuine unsubtlety and crudity. third and the Jour th marks yklvnnci'^/ are very different- ~~ A Anglo-American philosophy; namely Australasia from, and its general the isolation of academic philosophy indifference or even hostility to, in the sort tZ7 1 7 Though:for the most p< that influenced by Sydney rather than that originating 1 n^JJpl bourne. "this reflects the different historical i nJ 1 u_e 11 c e s -rhrriT Sydney and Melbourne philosophy.f-oj-’ a-h4 y Scottish dZTf-rrf- Contineryfal antecedents. A 1 Cj? V A" I r V �of (e.g. philosophy imported of that Nietzsche and the existentialists) 8eneratlng Interest in literary and arts circlls. rhe philosophy failure does of not such marks matter. to one For lts Australian !cts- .nother, Australian is produce regionalism >ot more regional positions such as . •lism «fth national philosophies. ChlnJ, is an undesirable trait, > as In Na‘ the thing, r< nationa11 out separate "Ot in other cultural » 'S^nked, with the breakdown of nations and contraction of state power.18 * * : ............ merging proposal loin 1,1 181,1 irch in iiors- °f COP1CS 1 : ■ >d«. ind 18t< 1 “t”>n UB not 8 suggestions lecide , , Sale, that that begin to our own priorities, that is, that we play our th North) and not theirs, Gridiron and Basketball - but that we abandon the individual competitive model of cultural achievement, 18Q< aec > e.g., London, 1957. we that we do our own selection just, fr< RU1< that > Pt bllcatlons and appointments, study 1 styl this, oir own distinctive things, and 11 1 is op.cit., and L. ?’011 r > sold to us and fostered Tlu>_ breakdown of Nations , RKP , Ihe Editor of the new.1923 AJPP did however take seriously the notion of National Philosophy, of (what must have surprised some New Zealand readers) an Australian Philosophy; some of the issui s there raised (p.292ff) are addressed in Appendix 2. �In favour of a group cooperative approach (elements of which are by the .Iort.ii, already modelled in Antipodean social clubs). ihe thoughts here are simple and familiar. digging example: more rapidly On the one side is the ditch- it is well-known that two people cooperating c.an and enjoyably than two people working Cooperalive work ten Is to pay off output, quality, and enjoyment the in doing. on dig a ditch :he ditch separately. or el ewhere in terms of On the ot her side, experience shows that we in the periphery cannot individually cmip^el ete very successfully with the centre on achievements in ior this. the attainment nature of results of depends acce:;:i to unpublished material. There are several reasons Despite the highly competitive Ono is the communication situation. p r s ’ i omi nan tIy ind i vi iua 1is t ic in their programs. American academic upon enterprise,^ much verbal rapid communication and For, despite the individualism myth, work is joint ly based, and builds on the work of many; when the time is ripe for some- several clever people will idea or result, communications result:, an I periphery the tend na t i oiri 1 is t 1 c are to Important assignment lose out. considerations Russians will obtaining in of credit Again (e.g. for is th e facc~ I o- f ace scm 1 nars so that fact Poles that Local rapid Here it. much results tend Then again the publication of there is a mix Russian who achieves a The re be able to hit on it. to again result at or at the There are people of reasons:- promote idea Polish results, about the same time as is conveyed verbally and will be conveyed. through There is the IH'llecling other features oi Ihe culture and enterprise of the centre which are not so deeply embedded in Australasia: see further R. Routley, Culture, philosophy, and approaches to the natural environment an Austral I in perspective', in The Environment, Ethics and Ecology (ed. D. Bennett), The Faculties, Aust raIian National University, 1984, and also Culture and the roots of political divergence: the Australian/American contrast , typescript , Canberra, 1981; both referred to subsequently as ' Cu J ture ’ . �fact Limited of when 1.11 e y pub 1 i shed may reading, read on and that material from L terns and results we J I I ose out There publication. receive, to merit also for merit, the from the central is people at more by to tend central concentrate so people, that periphery wi 11, often not be noticed, and fact that publication towards the periphery. thin people centre competitors the the centre even they if the at people achieve Here economic tend centre communication and central to opportunities factors do begin to enter; ket (there are, e.g., a grept many more academic philosophers in North America than in the whole rest of the world), control of publishing outlets and journals (with few exceptions all Northern), etc. culture - we can shut off way we being However economic power does not, and need not, determine the Northern shut off our television impressed by sets if philosophical those philosophical propaganda in much the we really want middle-men to. who And we can stop make a living by importing the Northern stuff. So what do we do? We adapt to of the cultural-philosophical level, several those things, that have been suggested in the newer regionalism. some regional importers and doctrines and awakening and self-reliance. of, and local from the North. imitators positions local We do commentators For not remain on example, We aim at we and slavish peddlars of, spend our don't academic Lives trying to tease out what Davidson or Dumrnett or Kripke meant by this or through. that To in the be hope sure, I that am some pale not Northern light sugg esting that we will perhaps emulate the filter appalling ignorance of people from the No r t h who visit the Antipodes and know little or nothing about what has been done or Jis being done here;^ so that we Regrettably, the Ignorance extends to many locals. In particular, infected with Sydney materialism appear remarkably ill-informed as to features oi other Australasian programs. have those basic �17 vi: Hors, Australian the through investigation of heavy bags their cultural with University National the (now main relevant logics) and Informing us that, or relying crucially positions '■ n advances is ind ! ioiity colo!IJ( often Northerners these for centre One reason on tnu assumption that, a contradiction entails every proposition. that trekking accroutrements, cultural of and intellectual narrow nothing or is the t.he Antipodes the is another little know about distinctive prevailing assumption of life these in (predominantly local) and former the southern limited reading undertaken by Northern luminaries. despite /having But, ourselves off to anyway: been fro/ Northern paradigms and az I propaganda is different). of, or part of, in ' their enterprises. c u t ’ *1 k ’ these nowliere* 1 oose 1.r om (and older shouldn’t cut Influences (we could hardly manage We can reasonably use what we need from In any case, regional cultures are rooted ■ 1 we cause, so we should stay informed of, but not imitators continuing traditions: tiics< sufficient given these likely traditions minority) a nd rgely European stock. start! ng afresh traditions, and the from local variations that have already appeared are what we want to develop and perhaps mutate, as again with wine styles. 1,111 things, ol L-K‘ Proposal is then that encourage and develop our own Antlpodean paradigmfl, ’• rather H is increasingly research programs, than working not as we H ™ very Sreat a nt own local and so shape newer - to bui Id from nothing, to of do to try to create cultural programs ilready Initiated, which have the of being grounded 2I . ’ See Cuiture, op.cit. our with pale northern reflections “ entirely ori Inal work, are res< lrcl do in features of the larger culture.212 �18 Nor, do we need fortunately, - Australia part 1 j u'■ o! c New Zealand to do * more difficult the story, for proposition - is All one really To pull the investigation down to a more concrete sketch some more prominent cooperative programs - by no means on Ly programs - and remark on some rel evant features of them. ‘L?. longest running and PdJ 111 .... .IdJL and 1 r sin , science. (physical) best known program is, which ’ 1 >r program The c'.ipi r i <-ist metaphysics,... and state version of tr famed as materialism, both back and world, and* 22 Faced plans, like il takes it initiated in, identity theme more physicalisms all now Anderson's It in The latter program has included there. nowadays to program the mental-material contingent ’1reduction theory of uiiivcisals, that in Armstrong's work. a functionalism. ,n natural traced subpro components central generally is is now best exhibited Adelaide which subsequently died out famous the see to aims without much doubt, as suitably encompassed within the framework of the world of e[se, incorporates a derivatively, with and a conspicuous "scientifically" and an account of natural laws as relations of universals, components of the developing Sydney realism. Parts of the nd central state reduction^sm and y matei science ideal, have had counterparts in the North, but the program t!!l has, Much of about. to bring out programs he has already indicated and provide some is I. shall Jlie such is different and is a elaboration and commentary. level, proposal chough helping to shape in Grave's survey of Australian philosophy. already indicated has the what of the story up - to make for the most part, retained its distinctively Australian character 22 > An Arson's metaphysics was however far more opposed to reductions than whal has succeeded it. For an account of Anderson's philosophy, and a history and account op.cit. of Australian naturalism and materialism, see especially Grave r y , �19 respite export efforts, it never caught on in New Zealand. It is similarly down-to-earth, - earthy, and so far as whlch much of American North does not n city r ‘ from >23 or ' positivistic the University would be quite ropolitan culture. of the ,ider turn achievement, h one to through 1 notable community, icademic ■ an exceptions, the As in tonal philosophy impinges on 11 even on 8t from from mainly ' t£ny hit) to t ia, Apart not is it universltles; but the program does extend outside th lstrala81a metaphysical explicit in particular). broadcast program, based it ink piricist, (rejecting a verification principle, ’s effete nowadays, (including simmers thinking ba* 18 £t !t ideas or fancy the without philosophy or the spirituality and suppressed puritanistn 111901 01 Eu 01 Wlth be, philosophy can The program fits program worth this working lelaide; it work by around for.) now reaches in The to 1 core of opposition there. has never had the same hold, or ’or example, while most academics from other disciplines would °f’ and perhaps a little about, Russell, far fewer would know of iH;! - i'1 (though fie is becoming known to lit. crit. groups), and virtually none would know of Quine. (The sampling is subjective.) kHOW On the hL'?-’ fairly recent 'triumph of professionalism' in philosophy in USA, see b--’65ff. Kuklick brings out well some of the more r/Hls ''^Oures ol professionalism, but does not sufficiently notice that 7 1* 1 features resulting from some pro fess tonalisation can be synthesized with broader philosophical activity. �20 more i rather precarious hold, than in Melbourne: 4 nor, more surprisingly, has it. had heavyweight criticism from there (or indeed much external criticism from elsewhere), the old confrontation of major city philosophies having died Melbourne out. than stricken Continental procession a then, philosophy; fashions: recently, remarkable a Northern of more philosophy; oriented historically and more reLigion philosophy, much more than Sydney, Sydney; Melbourne by dominated is more philosophy earlier Wittgenstein, Quine, turnabout, has been idealism and language ordinary and Davidson extensional reduction; now perhaps Lewis, Kripke and Dumrnett? one The program beyond reaches that confines the of the cities in Australia - which is after all a metropolitan dominated culture, the vast land always the other being a Australian environmentalism, is - rather diffuse of Advanced Education in the towns and country much distinguished environmental by what positions are it a is not as feature of transformed the New most specifically having little wild untouched country left, and such as issues Europe that tend admit Ihii opt*.in to having those concern shallow the wilderness. built approaches superficiality environmentalism of outside (and continues North and it what Europe to So far the program is as the communes on the North Coast. is. World, its of natural America. deeper Old World, and environment and environmental human-trans formed to the and little sensitivity accordingly The main encourage Serious environment, techno-fix dominate North much issues situations). of American the New in Issues And World environmentalism differs significantly however from Antipodean environmentalism, most obviously ' ‘ihe exceptions include Ellis's distinctive program, which can be accounted part of the broader naturalist program, and at Monash the work of F. Jackson and, earlier, of il. Munro in value theory. �21 in the religious-spiritual component of the former but several in other respects as well (see further Culture). More there positively, are an is there enviton.nentallsmfirstly, strands three Australian to utilitarianism, extended differing 1‘' in theory from Bentham's enlarged position, which insists upon counting In the utilities of all Iris figured prominently In animal welfare and animal liberation British base, movements: This position, developed from a sentient creatures. though and it has focussed bio-research more generally such as genetic engineering. endangered species, or much interested in, concerned with, animals used in it has also become entangled in issues of animals, researm and hunted (wild) domestic animals, on It is not however the disappearance of wild lands, the conversion of forests, etc., except insofar as these have a bearing on animal pain and pleasure. Wider and deeper environmental concerns appear only as a spinoff from animal welfare, and so deeper concerns get an inadequate deal. Secondly, there is a wider and a deeper ecological position, which is not utilitarian and which recognises irreducible value elsewhere than sentience or forests and differs ecosystems, American from nature 1 Ism. s t a t es , p s y c h o 1 og i c. a 1 as Thirdly, which finds especially there is reactionary component, critical of needs that to be accomplished natural wild and spiritualism on and of intrinsic value from course, an as the other strands, the environmental systems. in trees This position of American extens ion everywhere, almost and a which insists that all front can be achieved within older estab I tshed (European) ethical and political frameworks. Whereas materialism is based in Sydney, environmentalism is centred in has been described more fully elsewhere: see, in particular, cn La 1 Philosophy (ed. D. Mannison and others), RSSS, Australian National University, 1980. It: �22 ;llld Canberra, but also Includes '11 ’*!) '111 Brisbane and Perth. Also centred in Canberra, and reaching across the country, with good connections Ln Melbourne, !ew b,lt in materialism and epistemology from reLevant/paraconsistent other affecting program wh i ch program, a nd programs have environmental input perhaps wh ich is program areas major program. relevant/paraconsistent the is Sydney, New in Zealand, respectively, the program, one logic especially centres more to extends a essentially but The metaphysics. Australia than also been has with in metaphysics, theory value philosophy, of includes and their core the Whereas any other described , 26 elsewhere. n 1 *n ! !H logic grounded research program program. A impact of the in New Zealand philosophy program emanating ton, Inc evident program on it might from the work of is also Prior and a now be called the extended modal program. philosophy is perhaps best seen in Cresswell’s work.27 Australian philosophy used for its hard-headed known fo1 empiricism; to be known, is in some quarters, regrettably New Zealand philosophy is mostly anything much, except unu.-,u.i] adaption o! and still t rh ps, in UK, that Prior brought Russellian philosophy from that remote place. his Neither of ...‘,ain, like al] the Australian programs, both those mentioned and others, {_’rave> op.cit. But see further, R. Routley, 'Research in Logic in KTU!,ral;a ’ NeW Ze Jceania' , R search Papers in Logic #14, Australian National University, 1983 (which also considers other programs in logic)* G- Priest and R. Routley, op. cit.; and R. Routley, R.K. Meyer and others’, -J- -£?C2JLL s a nd e i r Rivals, Ridgev lew, California , 1982. 2 7 c. , „-,,,Se,e especially N.J. Cresswell, Logics and , ' —o---......... .. Languages, Methuen, ucuuu^u, London, iy/3; but see also -1 — ----’ 1by Goldblatt - . . ■ and- -by Hughes --------------------work referred to in Research in Logic, op.cit. Also described there is <an original ,1....1 version of the modal program (transparent intensional logic) elaborated by Tlchy at Otago. �2J these impressions is particularly accurate; both are rather out-of-date. work of l!::i impress Lons, the present type is, of course, not just to reflect or report not just But to correct these on culture - for what one would like to reflect upon is not sufficiently there - but also to help manufacture elements of a culture, to make an image. io resist the North, we should Increase our efforts to further the sunrise projectsbuild f e,lr ding .Jiid research and criticism, iround tin’ programs selected for promotion, elaboration, to orient: appointments, especially of involved local people, to 28. 4 ...nong sunrise projects in Australian philosophy so far suggested (not all °* Ihiin feasible) are these: Australian feminism, Antipodean social and political. alternatives, peace studies, indigenous regional philosophies (especially Aboriginal, Melanesian, and Polynesian). Another promising field, witli practical consequences, for local initiative is the philosophy of education, where material produced by R.S. Peters has dominated the market, with stultifying effects It is now alleged. As foreshadowed with the notion of "sunrise projects", much of the rhetoric, cl nd a i gum on t, concerning science and technology policy (presented in the case of Australia in Jones, op.cit.) can be taken over to apply to X policy, where X is some subject discipline, such as philosophy. �24 i 2 9, these programs." Why bother? for not doing this, there Northern in more than a limited fashion, which are now sketched. the firstly, is, products, point on despite vicinity it, many of Antipodean of the imported obsolence of most Without putting too intellectual goods are shoddy, and packaging. dilemmas). or undoubtedly imported from Idle North. built-in range of applications (e.g. contradictions philosophy and inferiority their attractive only work for a very limited tiie simply buy our philosophy, like almost technology, off the shelf, from the North? There are several, arguments I oui fine a Why not derives from they’re hopeless in that Much shoddy is with wrong goods intellectual Yet buying this material is encouraged by hard-sell cultural ambassadors from the North, who are often enough paid to visit. This In fact something like the last has been the policy of the LSE Philosophy Department, where the only outside appointment over a long period was that of Lakatos (hardly a person far removed ideologically). As observed, it now looks like the practice of the Otago Department also; and apparently it used to be a tendency at Melbourne. But in most, places the practice is condemned as nepotistic or parochial, and overridden by the call for "new (Northern) blood . however there can be significant differences between nepotistic appointments and those strengthening local programs. Is ;,t this stage, among others that administrative measures do matter; for example, to ensure that suitable locally-engaged locals gain employment rather than Northern stooges, to direct funds into on-going local programs rather thin Imported fashions, etc. There are various ways appropriate administrative details can be handled, locally or nationally; but nothing draconian, such as wholesale exclusion of noncitizens, is required. Observe, indeed, that no restriction of academic appointments to nationals (in Canadian style) or the like is being advocated. Anyone who arrives at a conclusion of that sort from what has been argued has misunderstood the case in crucial respects. As a matter of simple mathematics, restricting appointment fields characteristically reduces both quality of candidates available (however quality is assessed) and range of possibilities open for future research; and no such restrictions are advocated. The author has witnessed the debilitating effects of field restrictions at the Australian National University and elsewhere. 30p Borne of centre also. t hesi! arguments support change (perhaps revolutionary) at the �25 is part Northern of philosophical the - colonialism Imperialism the that from the too Antipodes the successor North - suffers, willing to more- or, remarkable, encourages! Secondly, especially there is the inappropriateness of much of the Northern product, considered as metaphysics, environmental for package, a cover, to as well as The European North has no satisfactory concerns. land or environmental ethic instance, fit for Antipodean circumstances, the deeper and American pack ige is too spiritually-loaded for mainstream Australian culture. 31 In political is work the European product, and competition-based, unsuited being American theory, both too precious and much individualistic too especially the Marxist too high-tech for local form, and is circumstances, especially again for more environmentally-perceptive people. also thirdly, features of import woi Id's markets power substitution and structures against telling pressures and the (including and comparative advantage, regionalism; namely, fashions, Old Boy’s removal, of network in are appealing of the overseas control and avoidance jobs, policies, etc.), and gaining of local control, employment of local people, etc. Fourthly, there philosophy as complexity, sheer part are of arguments intellectual diversity, stability, for cultural arguments culture: 32 etc. “ diversity, In fact, from applied to richness, the garden analogy i’he point is elaborated in Culture. At a more practical level Northern products arc; again often unsuitable, though for different reasons. For example, the transfer of American agricultural methods and equipment to the thin poor soils of the Antipodes has bad disastrous effects, at last beginning to be recognised. See, for instance, A.A. Mazrui, A World Federat ion of Cultures: An African Per spec live, Free Press, New York, 1976. �Into the whole notion of 'culture’ built dense, garden. productive transfers. Naturally we want a rich, But not only seeds and plants but weeds and many being introduced. pests are We obtain not only good cultivars, but European pests and European and selectiveness are control products, Indian maize and American weeds. This is why as essantLal, against haphazard previous procedures. i'he proposal with local Is not whatever products, their quality, replacing Northern ones. heroes, the case sustain, nor would for, That local a narrow localisiiri^ fashions, and local. cMl t is certainly not the preferred wai of the newer regionalism, which tends to do without fashions and heroes and leeks impact, and so on; low environmental durable quality in products, nor is the way ol technology policy. Rather, as with technology policy, we select niches which are or not occupied filled, satisfactorily where to outlets, be selective etc.). given our base resource (of can make a Indeed the policy difference, and use and develop local skills and methods. has we philosophers, publishing to what extent should components, But granting regionalism, for instance people, books and other teaching elements, theories and ideas, be imported and locally? I’he to what extent should they be particular mix. There is no need The case for the present trained, conceived in different components means that possibility of selectiveness many mixes are possible. produced, to insist, so far at least, on a is mainly for a regional shift, for a significantly greater degree of local, autonomy and production But it will do no harm to indicate elements of a mix that finds much Docs it sound familiar? Outside philosophy, it should. For example, we have now been told by the Americans that our defence role, unlike theirs, is regional, not global: this is supposed to shed great light on our previously confused defence policies. �27 local the suggestion Negatively, favour. is that we try to eradicate much of the Oxford style of Leaching and doing philosophy. as undue removal of Berke1ey-Hume with the (a however no standard emphasis on British focus); attention proper empiricism British to of of sources; movements emanating from England, they are, pi the Northern status quo; recommend and this. just 1 approach the of influence, in More generally, many of especially the protective ol ord Locke- on reinforcement heavy particular, his mostly been a very conservative one. main centred quasi-historical the us the Includes such things That -lice, language ordinary have been very to leave things very much as they tend Positively, the proposal is that we achieve further disassociation from the Anglo-American empiricist past in two ways: by framework, emphasizing by and to Eastern thought, philosophy. teaching, will parochialism, The idea assist and projects diversifying selectively drawn upon, parts of local is the include not but also that that move range constricting that philosophical of traditions only neglected Continental strands and Pacific ethnic such a outside material and plural i ty of sources, Australasian especially in in removing narrower cultural biasses, such as British enable more discrimination to be obtained. Then too we should be better able to see the ranges of theories that are open to us in the Antipodes and how to advance our own programs. 36 I'he point is laboured in E. Gellner, Words and Things, Victor Gollancz, London, 1959. But even ordinary language? philosophy, though conservative, and though it much contracted the proper range of philosophical investigations, had its liberating elements, e.g. removal of some of the narrowness and more cramping assumptions induced by technical jargon. Nor lias the social impact changed much with the subsequent/ decline, since 1959, o 1 ordinary language philosophy, the Increasing insolvency of Oxbridge philosophy, and its consequent limited take-over by right-wing Ivy League American philosophy. By contrast, the less economically influential growth of redbrick and applied philosophy in some of the British r-fttl and polytechnic institutes his touched no more than the surface of Oxbridge Practice. T �There remain some things we should want to see whatever mixes are chosen in iiiiereni Antipodean regions. bias from papers and publications, research seminars and lectures, letters of reference, and so on. the works and irrespective discussion write not Northern to their of the ignore authors, works the contribution of famous more authors, local their lecture as or been under largely again etc. It and to uncritically the disposition is to to though work produced locally either does not exist or has influential philosophers, importance, worth, topic It is the disposition the quality of their contribution. opinions of better, the the to authors from prestigious Northern institutions, to accept of quality the and irrespective of defer This Northern bias is a disposition to cite and discuss projects of One crucial issue is the removal of Northern are, (thus if ensuring more anything, it that inclined Northern to Australasian And not). is than bias many overseas intellectuals, who are perhaps less concerned to be seen as belonging to tl-'l Northern mainstream. bias effects policies of ot local not only practice the of individual, philosophers, but the selection and review committees as well as of editors and referees journals. reorientation, with It developments ~ things taught, more so they that philosophers can would cite be other among involves, Antipodean it ions \ better, courses The reduction, and eventual removal, of Northern getting to work or local assisted time spent at local by intellectual things, know local point greater out local work and regional content in institutions on study leave, and so on. APPENDIX 1. Background notes on the philosophy supply situation. Sociological investigation of the philosophy labour market in Australia and New Zealand has 1° be numerical attempted. But a picture of some elements underlying the argument of the text can be gained from the following table: simple �29 TABLE 1. Ph.Ds In Philosophy: a USA ~ Australasian comparison USA Number (Male/Female) Aust ra1i a New Zealand 1974 413 (346/67) 6 0 19 75 375 (318/57) 5 0 1976 382 (319/63) 8 0 197 7 330 (264/66) 3 2 (1/1) 1978 2 83 (235/48) 5 5 (4/1) 1979 285 (204/54) 9 3 (2/1) 1980 2 4 6 (187/59) 4 N.A. 1981 N.A. 4 0 Notes: 1. The breakdown of the USA and New Zealand numbers by sexes (male/female) is given. SimiLar figures do not appear to be available for Australia. 2. The US figures are for the academic year ending in the Year shown, e.g. 1978 covers the Northern academic year 1977-78. Southern figures are for the calendar year shown. Sources: Di gest__of__ Education Statistics, US National Center for Education Statistics; University Statistics, Australian Bureau of Census Statistics; New Zealand Education Statistics. Comments: 1. The contraction of US doctoral, production and the concomitant rise in female representation, are clearly indicated. The Australian figures are likely too small to reflect such trends and responses to the academic market. 2. Nome of Llr* Australasian numbers include Americans; likewise the American figures provide no nationality breakdown. 3. There is no information available on the number of Australians proceeding to higher degrees in philosophy outside. Australia. Tn applying table 1 some simplifying assumptions are made. assumed tbit candidates for appointment to regular For example, it is university positions now would t.ave a doctorate or- the equivalent (until recently a B.Phll was taken as a near well). equivalent It is of a assumed, North what American seems to Ph.D. take publications the case, that could the serve as number of �30 Austi il is Lans proceeding to higher degrees in philosophy abroad is relatively Smail, and no more than the order of Ph.Ds. upsetting applications of table without say, Is no compiled I, that Australasian graduates match, information on academic vacancies in philosophy in Aust ra1 ia < r New Zealand Az matter to I di j oil,1'. on the lumbers of vacancies, on how the positions It would however be a routine, nationalities, sexes, etc. by what re1 It can be assumed, Lhe upper half of American graduates in standard attained. There if taken locally. some of assemble data, this which is considerable of ' incc to the planning of philosophy programs. Un considering 'the Editor In a National Philosophy', the (Australian) possibility r* , /r <( I initial AJPP^ d istinguished two senses corresponding to 'the the of of a National Phi 1osophy for Australia. the earlier APPENDIX 2. I G e rm an distinction b etwee n W e11 a n sc hauung I I the first, that of 'a scheme of the universe', ridiculous as con f i rm.a t ion a or Christian Sc ience . fa 1 sificationV Granted: but 'are Lebensanchauung7 a nd The In n Ihilos>phy I hlLos is as is argument independent that does not mean (p.292). that^Jirutly national of that a and sympathies its or theory may not be held, in one region but not. others, as intuitionism was for long in in Holland, or 'a nation second a in France. In like an individual may 'more develop ternperament a 1 attitude to the problems of existence, which we may life. is a mode of form of A nation's philosophy, expression for the national (.'VO I V I up, like its art and the national consciousness. But, a and certain . . call its Its 1i terature, It is a specialised short, genius intimate part of the by no means sepa ra t e from t he initial sense, a philosophy comprising no t merely a fairly comprehensive theory but also an integrated set of attitudes (like an .. �taaead up ysaa 03 queSt’AVjqxe •Xqdosoypqd aqp •auipy syj puq si.q uiw i p?uo j q i?u pa/Aoyyv eq pynoqs Xqdosoypqj yeuopyuN i' jo jvapy Suppupasaa yeuoppe^ e Xq papyoAB jo Xppypqpssod Xypsua sp uoy p ap pt?jyuoa aqy Supyappujpuoa op Supqyou si?q „aqsM - sapiBpunoq puojpuu Xuu ui.qy sanyuA asaqy ‘papaauoa XyyunyjpA sj spysaysny sc ‘ynq oqy eq p ‘uquya qf'noqj, ‘Xqdosoyyqj qi)M jdaews yappn, sv - asaqy qypw op op • (yuauia8ui?aat?aa qypi 1 op »?u j a [ OAiip as and Supqyou suq .Xqdosoyjqj qypw op oy Supqyou asaqy aqy jo senjBA yEuaaya eqp Xynvaq put? s teupoof) ‘qynai jo syvapy aqy ‘yyapdg eqs suq uaqp Xyuo pus uaq y uipeyo yuB§BAi?ayxo Y ST XOPT pg— aqy Xyyaoqs ons) yuaoy se saop spq j ‘uaqp uio j j 1 oq peej uy ^OAyya spp qpiM op op Supqyou st?q up yi?a ysny saAyjap apqnoap shot iua pv aqy op ast?q ‘/7^uTlBap apuj y 1? 'oiu/ay p a y^ u qd J0| Xqdoso ‘ojU yiuot you ‘Xqdosoypqd put? yuqj you aSeanoa sunny a saoqjo jo V \il\ ; j | saop qans :(usuas ‘ yp op spuuays Xut? • sjoydpaasap uvpjuaysny op pup j 1? ,Xy p uniuuioa pas r [t?j .1 p mi] tn you a^JI j1 ( Suyaq oaaqj apnyaxa aaAunoq Xqdosojpqd yBUopyuu 1? cjq^n&V^iaoqy TIB yi? yuyqr^u pnq ? qpjM •aauaaajjyp :Xauayspsuoaup oyup paSunyd ------------------------ —ogl J1 • (siur?a2oad qaaoasaa / [ ] an—k-4——q- eSyotyy ‘ auj apqdosoypqd y^uopSaa ! you sp pnq ‘ajpy jo ysuay y ‘aejJ og 7m* yh io Pljnq aq asoqp qyjtt uyqt?a2uc4]aaayu syaud aeynpoiu spy qypM uaapoui b4 up puyj oy od/q Xpyeaa you saop ‘pupJ •suyyiiuBj osooy aoqyea uiaoj s^ifiiy Xue up) aAipaupyspp Xyau ynap yat?d you aiuos uupyeaysny syyun aySups payunoaar? tadi?aspur?y ueypuaysny aqy, pin? 1 aanyuaoy y. [ ay j [i.uojjiu 4ssausnopasuoa nujiipaiu jo • (ui8p peavd yuiio j yuaado aqp, st? siuayj qans eat? uopssaauoa Xq Xyuo ‘ aaouiaaqyanj IC �•jojppq juasajd sip 04 ‘jseay jou ‘ pue ‘p.’ujnor syqj joj saojajaj ppjoAas 04 ‘apieyapy jo XijsjaAjun ‘oauajajuoo Xqdosoyjqj J° uornnj aossy ur yse p?a 4 sny £861 3tn jaded aqj jo uoyjejuasajd aip 31? aauajpne aip jo sjoqiuaui yejaAas 04 ‘uiyjyw -q pue oab.10 *s ‘ tpi y uis-Xaj j poo • m ‘loyyya pj 04 squuqi f □c Xrjy sjaAjufl '[vuoiqoN ueyyeajsny saauayas -yeyaos jo yooqas qaaeasan gcXaj4noH *8 �4 USA, expoi ter cul Lure, of certainly of higher culture philosophical output from components Australasia, as culture, philosophy has Oxford not in philosophy? but also evidently (witness the Are there taken). should suit, payments, especially balance of lower of such following not if has recently become a net importer of culture from Europe, m Long achieve a American turn reasons why cultural better there are reasons. Yes, of In the first place, the change in the cultural position of the USA went with, and perhaps economic dominance most of not only increasingly of former Northern they. prioi sties, that little prospect for there the contain also fellow-travellers, whose It is unlikely that group, (become will commitments, as Long so there is is serious no prospect in a bind and disruption of the Secondly, component Include that academics, Northern of and additional is teaching this influential segment, from not situation; acclimatised the isolated drastically as bent to especially to) give person. Nor alter entire Antipodean as observed, a substantial research locally apart Antipoduans’ do they are I hey would be North, large a they cultural As since culture, Americans, Northern concerns. the If cultural dominance, cultural and other). universities of in economic power relations. ever emulate or attain American economic eminence (at least commodities, cont ingent changes nuclear destruction of without flow of entails Australasia's Australasia will not from, vast part derived in their up its should cultural for it can be persuasively argued better off, as far as quality and product goes, stocking their universities with American teaching components and researching Americanoriented concerns. One simple arg urn e n t nurn er1c a I th it Antipodean universities would be better off with Americans in the main, takes the following lines:- The (higher degree) graduates of Australasian culturally distinguished, at and American are not significantly least in subjects such as philosophy. Consider �now the number quality of academics produced number per of higher uates. preponderance of The (great) just, by virtue of their vastly graduates will be Americans, greater population and degree their more extensive system of university education.'7 So also then, just by ratio considerations, the great preponderance of quality academics drawn an from percentiles among uppei interested they universities. in those quality quality, Such an base Austroamerlean argument does appointing not as will Clearly, Antipodeans, products. be would be American, will work to more show Americans that, for the were their to similar reasons, American universities should be full of Chinese or Indian professors, for two Asians reasons; and first there are especially Americans, significant in cultural disciplines such differences as between philosophy; and secondly, their university systems do not deliver such great quotas of higher degree or high quality graduates, at least in philosophy. fhe conclusion of the numerical argument will not be a popular one. anti-Americanism felt the universities; especially by and recently the Australasian community extends into there has been increasing insistence, the now aging younger Turks that university positions should be reserved for locals. international in portions of The This at the same time as these Turks often preach of an community of scholars, presumably then with "free" interchange, X' indicated in Appendix 1, where assumptions made In the argument are defended, the ratio of US philosophy graduates with doctorates as compared with Australian exceeds 30 to 1. And, as Is well-known, the extent of university education is much greater in USA than in Australasia: indeed Australia is in this respect among the ______ worst educated of the developed nations, as OECD figures have made plain (see, e.g., B. Jones, Sleepers Wake!, Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 1.982, Chapter 7). ■ �6 etc. I'hey cannot have it all ways.'' So as long the cont inues, present centre will they wi! I economically; large to the it them if is free-flow Interchange the dominate than us, have more jobs (centrally-determined) quality well as should here personnel and culturally periphery and ideas of go by as and in this high cultural business that we seek, as mostly claim. Now anyway, It is there that arguments. widely For is ire we regularly drive out enough recognised, drastically something not lower-down flooded wrong with high-quality local contenders for positions, ladders hierarchical with these sorts Northerners who of would if we only preferred the Northerners when they were quite visibly superior: rather we are inundated by Americans with inflated references, who have the messages of the centre better tbur local;; echelon wnocf do, (often and remote Northern Northern shortcomings biassed) are known the Northern centres tend fields tend appointment better. to look committees A.s is beginning greener to than dusty higherlocals to be recognised to retain their higher-quality products, too, and allow A reverse flow of the better orthodox academics from Australasia to America should also be expected (outside times of university contraction). According to issumptions of this brain drain argument, which is based on labour market considerations, appointment and lifestyle conditions for academics are general ly better in USA than Australia and much better than those in economicaLly-depressed New Zealand (e.g. higher salaries, better standard of living, superior research conditions, etc.). So, other things being equal, able academics from the Antipodes will relocate in USA as academic positions become available. The argument also helps explain why Antipodean universities cannot, expect, for the most part., t.o attract really top-drawer Northerners for very long. Of course, economically irrelevant factors do induce interference; e.g. perverse commitments to odd-ball Antipodean intellectual enterprises which reduce market acceptability, or pre-industrial ties to place or persons or lifestyle which unduly restrict mobility (such as local roots, family attachments, even distaste for American urban lifestyles). �7 them exiled be to the to periphery only if they fali somehow the foul of Too system (e.g. of the academic system for political or personal reasons) . often the Nori hern have centres disposed their of inferior intellectually products In the periphery. this makes the All appointing especially Americans, Northerners, their references, and usually not out And yet. quality. it seems, position look doubly bad. We ought, even if are overrated they of the top drawer, to be in in order to maximize doing so does not achieve the desired quality result, and breeds discontent elsewhere, especially among the aging Turks. there fortunately is cultural sufficient obtain lor us. subtitutabIe before way out this from t is the wraj ' and a We do our own Lonal Lsm. distance,' so and situation that they are these things; not simply Then the shaky numerical argument does fall down. elaborate we awkward the emerging proposal are there other But influential arguments to dispose of, and the disposal bears on the proposal. There have so is, to begin with, far been conceded: exce Hence, which the argument for excellence, that we all more or there is an objective commodity, quality or less agree seek and what appointments aim to capture, the type of myth most ol myth, In fact appointments about, which is proportionately in the North, and which is what academic more abundant a that institutions crave and indeed maximize. That at least is us have encountered; and many of us now know it is a dangerous way, elements of which any Most myth. more that places don't organisations aim even just try to to make maximize 9- M Iliis is easier in the cultural than the technological sphere. However it is also possible technologically: (stronger) theses of technological determinism, and so of cultural determinism, are false. We can choose different options, technologically, as well as culturally. �->) ) ./ A- u I PROSPECTS FOR REGIONAL PHILOSOPHIES IN AUSTRALASIA Philosophy, especially academic philosophy but also folk philosophy, 1 ike other intellectual and higher cultural activity in Australasia, has long been dominated, largely swamped, by Northern now increasingly from North America. Europe, the indeed and cultural resulting baggage other controlling such But it does not have to stay that way. a initially from the migration patterns, Given the ethnic result was imported, populations, influences, of composition virtually the inevitable. Suitable policies, a good philosophy policy, could change things. The culture, thought is of hardly a a philosophy, regional perhaps In 1923, a New Zealand new one. a matching regional correspondent to the newly-launched Australasian Journal of Psychology and Philosophy mentioned the possibility of ’a new kind or temper of philosophy under these southern skies’ which the Journal might such a role reaching (or, not community). for merely And The Journal foster.1 matter, that professional although some actively pursued philosophers things however hardly has but have changed solid foundation for a new regionalism in philosophy, its a fulfilled pronounced wider Australasian in Australia, that of aim laying a possibility of a new temper of philosophy has hardly been realised. There is little in the way of a new kind and temper of philosophy under New Zealand southern skies were intended to include: distinctively New Zealand AJPP, March 1923, p.74. same volume, p.292ff; his Appendix 2/ 7 skies, which the but few distinguishing features, ’no characteristics, have shown up in New Zealand The question was taken up by the Editor in the discussion is considered below, especially in �2 philosophy’. New Zealand remains a substantial net importer of philosophy, The situation of colonial dominance that used to prevail in and philosophers. Australia, where virtually all chairs, and many philosophy, were filled by academics from the North, and considered and Given the usual in courses designed, power and influence of professors in small departments, covered in tends to persist in New Zealand, where no established chairs are occupied by locals/ topics posts academic other especially appointments made, the heavy Northern orientation of philosophy taught and researched in New Zealand is not surprising. oldest of The Northern control is perhaps most strikingly exhibited at the New Zealand the universities, University of Otago, where the Philosophy Department has been substantially captured by a British School and increasingly looks event, like an offshoot of the University of London/ In any the overwhelming Anglo-American dominance of New Zealand philosophy - also a feature only in slightly lesser degree of Australian philosophy - can be confirmed by a content survey of the courses offered and research papers written at New Zealand universities. Even when local people have been appointed to positions in Australasia, 2 S.A. Grave, A History of Philosophy in Australia, Queensland University Press, 1984, p.l. Page references are to the manuscript. The paper draws heavily on this history. 3 This claim was correct at the time of presentation of the paper (August 1983). With the recent loss of a chair at Wellington, the claim requires qualification, but the pattern of domination persists. 4In the 1983 Commonwealth University Handbook listing, 6 of the 8 members of the Department held their main degree, Ph.D., from London, and one of the remainder from Exeter. Only one member of the Department, soon to retire, falls outside the nexus. �3 they have been brought up on a solid diet of Anglo-American material, and they In particular, the have often been reforged or finished in the North as well. post-World War philosophy by remain full candidates the of requirements II universities in were conveniently seen expansion Oxford the of Australasian of products finished B.Phil. this Many degree. cultural to in departments out period the of of case of philosophy the mid 70s when they applied for until indeed mill: to beat in Oxford were hard major the positions, such was the (unwarranted) prestige of Oxford and the regrettable, but still continuing, "cultural cringe". Nonetheless, (as will indicated). be dominance, Northern in the Antipodes, been occurring scene the despite especially on worth is It significant have changes the Australian philosophical whether asking Australian philosophy is moving towards the sort of change that occurred in USA more than 100 years ago when the Harvard Philosophy Department was brought (or bought) together, and its "golden age" American philosophy was never quite began.'' the same again, and became its own thing. There are now new forces operating which could help to move Australian philosophy in such a direction. the widespread regionalism,6 other 5See B. which applies choices; local fashioning emergence, of national and particularly to in science cultural in and alternative culture, ideological stark contrast, and technology there There is of a choice along is policies, the which new with centralised not only Kuklick, The Rise of American Philosophy; Cambridge, Massachusetts 1860-1930, Yale University Press, 1977, Parts 2 and 3. 6 On this bio-regionalism, see especially, Fourth World News, vol. I, and K. Sale, Human Scale, Coward, McCann and Geoghegan, New York, 1980. 1983, �4 a provides for model reflection philosophy regional in directly bears on parts of the philosophy of science. there are also some soon appear, policy Unfortunately, as will to regional serious obstacles also but philosophies and to the very idea of a regional philosophy. USA, long an importer of culture from Europe, has recently become a net culture, of exporter components of higher philosophical Australasia, from output if not Oxford following but evidently philosophy (witness such as culture culture, lower of certainly taken). has should suit, not balance of payments, especially in philosophy? the American there Are also achieve reasons better a turn why cultural there are reasons. Yes, of In the first place, the change in the cultural position of the USA went with, and perhaps in part derived from, vast changes in economic power relations. economic dominance most Australasia’s of entails cultural dominance, culture, since there there is is little prospect serious no prospect If for that Australasia will ever emulate or attain American economic eminence (at least nuclear destruction of not without the North, flow of commodities, cultural and other). universities not only increasingly of Americans, contingent of former Northern they. group, cultural As priorities, long component also include whose research they disruption of the entire as observed, Antipodean Secondly, large fellow-travellers, Northern academics, substantial additional of a and teaching is bent to It is unlikely that this influential segment, especially Northern concerns. the a contain and will commitments, as so (become apart Antipodeans they are in a bind locally acclimatised do from the not situation; isolated drastically as to) person. alter give up its Nor should their cultural for it can be persuasively argued that they would be better off, as far as quality and product goes, stocking �5 universities their American with and components teaching researching American-oriented concerns. that argument numerical simple One Antipodean universities would be better off with Americans in the main, takes the following lines:- The (higher degree) of graduates Australasian culturally distinguished, now the number of produced 0 population and then, So also just not number per of say there is 1 per every n graduates. preponderance of graduates will be Americans, greater are American significantly at least in subjects such as philosophy. quality academics Austroamerican graduates; and their more by ratio Consider higher degree The (great) just by virtue of their vastly extensive system of university education. considerations, the great preponderance of quality academics drawn from an Austroamerican base will be American, as will the upper percentiles among those quality products. Clearly, Antipodeans, were they interested in quality, would be appointing more Americans to their universities. Such an argument does not work to show that, for similar reasons, American universities should be full of Chinese or Indian professors, for two Asians reasons; and first Americans, there are especially significant in cultural disciplines such differences as between philosophy; and secondly, their university systems do not deliver such great quotas of higher degree or high quality graduates, at least in philosophy. As indicated in Appendix 1, where assumptions made in the argument are defended, the ratio of US philosophy graduates with doctorates as compared with Australian exceeds 30 to 1. And, as is well-known, the extent of university education is much greater in USA than in Australasia: indeed Australia is in this respect among the worst educated of the developed nations, as OECD figures have made plain (see, e.g., B. Jones, Sleepers Wake’, Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 1982, Chapter 7). / �6 The conclusion of the numerical argument will not be a popular one. The anti-Americanism felt in portions of the Australasian community extends into the universities; and recently has there been insistence, increasing especially by the now aging younger Turks that university positions should be This at the same time as these Turks often preach of an reserved for locals. international community of scholars, presumably then with "free" interchange, etc. They cannot have it all ways.^ So long as the continues, economically; the present centre will free-flow dominate they will have more large to them if it interchange the than us, periphery and of ideas culturally jobs here is (centrally-determined) quality in personnel and as should well as go by and this high cultural business that we seek, as mostly claim. Now anyway, it that arguments. is widely there For we is enough recognised something are not lower-down drastically wrong hierarchical with these ladders sorts of flooded with high-quality Northerners who would g A reverse flow of the better orthodox academics from Australasia to America should also be expected (outside times of university contraction). According to assumptions of this brain drain argument, which is based on labour market considerations, appointment and lifestyle conditions for academics are generally better in USA than Australia and much better than those in economically-depressed New Zealand (e.g. higher salaries, better standard of living, superior research conditions, etc.). So, other things being equal, able academics from the Antipodes will relocate in USA as academic positions become available. The argument also helps explain why Antipodean universities cannot expect, for the most part, to attract really top-drawer Northerners for very long. Of course, economically irrelevant factors do induce interference; e.g. perverse commitments to odd-ball Antipodean intellectual enterprises which reduce market acceptability, or pre-industrial ties to place or persons or lifestyle which unduly restrict mobility (such as local roots, family attachments, even distaste for American urban lifestyles). �7 regularly drive out local contenders for positions, if we only preferred the Northerners when they were quite visibly superior: rather we are inundated by Americans with inflated references, who have the messages of the centre better do, locals than higher-echelon remote and Northern (often Northern biassed) fields appointment the Northern centres greener look to committees than dusty retain their higher-quality products, tend to to As is beginning to be recognised locals whose shortcomings are known better. too, tend and allow them to be exiled to the periphery only if they somehow fall foul of the system (e.g. of the academic system for political or personal reasons). often Northern the centres have disposed o their intellectually Too inferior products in the periphery. to be especially Americans, even if they are overrated in All this makes the position look doubly bad. We ought, appointing Northerners, it seems, their references, and usually not out of the top drawer, in order to maximize And yet quality. doing so does not achieve the desired quality result, and breeds discontent elsewhere, especially among the aging Turks. Fortunately shaky arguments; and obtain there 9 we way out from this sufficient elaborate cultural distance,9 situation and awkward and that is the way of regionalism. subtitutable for us. before is a so that We do our own things; they are Then the shaky numerical argument does fall the emerging proposal there these are other not simply down. But influential This is easier in the cultural than the technological, sphere. However it is also possible technologically: (stronger) theses of technological determinism, and so of cultural determinism, are false. We can choose different options, technologically, as well as culturally. �8 arguments to dispose of, and the disposal bears on the proposal. There is, have so to begin with, far been conceded: the argument for excellence, that elements of which there is an objective commodity, quality or excellence, which we all more or less agree about, which is proportionately more abundant in the North, and which is what academic institutions crave and indeed maximize. seek and what appointments aim to capture, That at least is the type of myth most of us have encountered; and many of us now know it is a myth, in fact appointments dangerous a that any way, myth. more that don’t places Most organisations aim just profit, but rather seek to satisfice on a mix of factors, quality is make maximize to of which assessed and not often the highest ranking one. only one, to try even Ability to fit into some sort of program, teaching or research, is another, and commonly more important factor; and there is no good reason why such a program should not sometimes be a regionally oriented one. the So given prevailing practices, argument from excellence does not exclude regional philosophy programs. And, in any event, there are enough local candidates of sufficient worth to proceed with regional programs without clearcut sacrifice of excellence. Local enterprise need entail no loss of excellence, and could well increase it. The deeper-cutting objection is that there is something seriously amiss with the idea of objective objective importance; criticism as bracketed out notions the that of excellence, these objective and notions values with are open more contextual-relativisation the to connected the generally, component of same that notion of sorts of they valuing: have the �9 framework or viewpoint to which these values relate.While those operating within rather a narrow intellectual paradigm, as such ordinary Oxbridge language philosophy or Sydney materialism say, can bracket out the viewpoint, since incorporated is it the in operational paradigm, and arrive so at seemingly objective quality judgements, the judgements are not preserved (e.g. in truth value) when Marxist viewpoints. quality or worth for Consider, of to transposed a other the comparison, made forest, frameworks, variously industrial forester, and a recreational officer. quality of a holistically-inclined by who seemingly because pretend that a deep the ecologist, philosopher, environmental it is not done by members to or an Compare judgements as to the environmental such as judgements language, Marxist, and Californian environmental philosophers. philosophers idealistic e.g. of work by ordinary There are even be cannot judged, the main philosophical peer group at Harvard and like institutions. As this judgements of begins to the reveal, importance judgements of quality are not independent of of work done or problems tackled. importance of problems and issues is highly paradigm dependent. But the For example, problems such as those of quantifying-in and of possible worlds and of de re thought, which assume immense importance for fashionable referential theories within the mainstream empiricist paradigm, vanish outside that restricted viewpoint. Now observe to relative insignificance that most judgements as to What follows also begins to bring out what is omitted in a main theme of R.S. Pirsig, Zen and the Art of Motor Cycle Maintenance, Bodley Head, London, 1974. Note that defusing the notion of objective excellence does not lead to subjectivism. To avoid the customary false dichotomy, compare the notion of validity (usually ceded to themselves these days by classical logicians) with that of quality. �10 what are the Important problems and what constitutes important work - matters helping quality determine is relative to their are exported to the Antipodes importance concerned shipped are - from down the paradigmatic placement, through the North.11 and Their paradigms the main channels already indicated. We are free to reject these paradigms and select alternatives, and there are, it can be argued, good reasons to do just that, much as there are good reasons choose to energy technology different (or different military technology) from that generally favoured in the North which the North is eager to export southwards. points Similar which might argument, apply against alternatively that sophisticated people -marketed mass-produced and cosmopolitan. The argument called be from is based cosmopolitan/international the the Peter everywhere Holland; international Stuyvesant smoke this argument superior product cigarette-sophistication is on the assumption that philosophy is a ’cosmopolitan subject’, that is is not the sort of enterprise for which place and people are significant as they are for or poetry assumption has only to be presented to be questioned. for one important thing, that philosophy is a the novel.12 It takes for granted, finished product sort (a propositional theory), not a process of production also. 110ften enough fashionability is mistaken for The importance. of a certain But in the As to the unsatisfactory way in which such '’important" problems are commonly set, see F. Dyson, ’Unfashionable pursuits’, The Mathematical Intelligencer 5 (1983) 47-5?. -----12 Grave, op.cit., p.2: the term ’cosmopolitan subject’ used there comes from Donegan. As to the significance of place and people for literature, see further C. Partridge, The Making of New Cultures, Editions Rodopi, Amsterdam, 1982. ---------------------------- �11 process of production the place and people involved (e.g. material. And literature, the if and not product just is theorems more no philosophy, than work a and of art, arguments like a assembled piece of in an then again the historical setting matters, internationally-approved format, since like in discussion) are literature, not does emerge in a vacuum. Plato’s philosophy could not have emerged in ancient Australia, and if cribbed in mid 20th century Oxford would surely have been marked down or rejected.^ It is important not to be sidetracked into issues - resembling problems in aesthetics - that extent sets do not need to be contested, of themes and arguments such as whether and what produced in one place and setting could have been produced in another. A nonnuclear technology of some sort could be adopted prospect in Europe but that New apparently will Zealand, nonnuclear energy strategy. matters here. Dial ethic in not contrast whereas be, with there Australia, is will reasonable pursue a It is the doing, and not what could be done, that logic, which invalidates methodology of much Anglo-American philosophy, could the technique perhaps be done in and the North (though there would be substantial cultural resistance): it is not being 13 Like a paper in the biological sciences. But here again technique and methodology, which may both be regional, are crucially important. Related points can be made using less extreme examples, e.g. concerning modern American work. Consider, for instance such texts as W.V. Quine’s Word and Object, (Wiley, New York, 1960) or R. Nozick’s Anarchy, State and Utopia (Basic Books, New York, 1974). The assumptions taken for granted, the arguments involved, etc., are especially American: it is not just the style. The acceptability of arguments and positions is dependent on place and received paradigm. �12 and is not likely to be done in the Anglo-American sphere.to done there, this extent, logical Antipodeans techniques, can do choose their their own international/cosmopolitan argument, own distinctive distinctive technology thing. stated tn a form that would be and The telling, fails. Of course it can be argued, it is being argued, that Antipodeans don’t need to be, or even oughtn’t to be pursuing their own energy or logic policies and apparatus. But meeting these considerations takes us to a whole new set of issues concerning the merit of various policies and programs, diversity, etc. - far beyond the cosmopolitan argument. the point of The new arguments, to which we shall return, are not a lot more convincing however than comparable arguments concerning cooking: that we don’t devising our own cuisine or wine styles. need to be or oughtn’t to be British, or at least cosmopolitan, cooking is adequate: we should stick to that and buy it off the shelf from the North, ideally importing the cooks also. Do we have good reasons to think that British philosophy is better, these days, than British cooking? Antipodeans are free, in principle then, to pursue their own paradigms; and to do so they will by and large want to, and mostly have to, appoint their own people, people they have educated - not saboteurs or people who have (had) Much as communist anarchism, a live possibility for communes and perhaps communities in Australia, is culturally excluded in North America, owing to the extreme possessive individualism of that culture. On dialethic logic, see G. Priest and R. Routley, On Paraconsistency, Research Papers in Logic, #13, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University, 1983. �13 to be re-educated, from elsewhere, in particular from the North. But will the intellectual paradigms pursued tie with cultural paradigms, with distinctive features of local the culture? In a loose way, at they may least, tie in with the though works of philosophy will not usually link, culture in the integral fashion that novels (as distinct from more technical works) sometimes do. Indeed, certain to a cultural limited extent, features, not they restricted to particular programs, that help mark philosophy in Australia as ’unimportant hastens to though add. this But is style, compared Grave considers do already link. with acceptability, what ’an Australian product’ - matters truth, philosophical he philosophy’ in do matter, and are not independent - or independent so far as their perception goes in the case of truth and correctness16 - from underlying broad theory or received paradigm. However the marks which can be extracted from Grave, significant though they are, do not serve to distinguish the Australian product, the first two being features Australian philosophy exhibits in lesser degree than the more adventurous and polemical philosophy of Greek antiquity. by Passmore as ’most typical of Australian philosophy’, The first, described is a ’diversity of approach and readiness to put forward an unconventional or unfashionable point 16 Nothing need be conceded to strong cultural relativity themes, though they would support the case. It is enough that our theories remain radically incomplete and that there can accordingly be rival theories as to what is true. Similarly, however philosophy is conceived - as the search for truth, explanation, understanding and wisdom (all of these and more, really), or as, more vaguely, inquiry of a certain sort - there can be, and will be, competing accounts; so a pluralistic theory is inevitable in giving a fuller view. �14 of view*, 17 philosophy, something which more typical some (with of exceptions) notable exhibits an Canada, is that Africa, South adventurous compared with other recent and provincial and diverse. second, The ... the between line-up Australian and surprising, mark far from isolated: others Melbourne Wittgensteinian "Australian materialism", philosophy departments the (both confrontation concerning the among them concern extraordinary discussed the political by is is ’the ’the most notable example ... Andersonian and Sydney, if it was not the Andersonian philosophy itself’ (p.2). is such as philosophy England, manifestoed character* of Australian philosophy, being "Oxbridge colonies", more austere What may be uniformity reflecting that often attributed to the land itself. nearer true Australian than philosophy ancient This example fervour generated engagement Grave), the and relevant/paraconsistent program, by by some growing with the local (’adversarial*) style leading to sharp criticism by Americans. Connected with these first philosophy, century two marks J as of much Cambridge further are characteristics of much 18th century Scottish philosophy and philosophy: points, surface clarity, and, namely directness, Australian turn-of-this- unwillingness to muffle some would unkindly add (in the hope perhaps of locating a genuine difference), bluntness, unsubtlety and crudity. Both preceding quotations, while included as such in Grave’s Introduction, are from J. Passmore, ’Philosophy’, in The Pattern of Australian Culture (ed. A.L. McLeod), Cornell University Press, Ithaca, N.Y., 1963, pp.131-168. The same annotation also applies to the third mark. 18 Though again for the most part that influenced by Sydney rather than that originating in Melbourne. To some extent this reflects the different historical influences shaping Sydney and Melbourne philosophy: roughly, Scottish as opposed to Continental antecedents. �15 The third and the fourth marks are but very different, again hardly distinguishing features of Australian philosophy as Grave, who wouldn’t them marks at all, in effect observes. areas, intellectual the of Australian the anti-intellectual national stereotype of Australians as a people to physical mark is achievement especially of isolation a academic rather than feature of philosophy indifference or even hostility to, in reputation ’center of philosophical inquiry’, with indeed of Australia as a philosophy, The third, which applies well to other contrast the is call to intellectual Anglo-American Australasia in subtlety’. the namely general its and fourth The philosophy; from, ’devoted the sort of imported philosophy (e.g. that of Nietzsche and the existentialists) generating interest in literary and arts circles. The failure of such marks to entirely separate out Australian philosophy does not matter. For thing, one the separated by its research projects. confused with nationalism, nor Australian For another, produce such as materialism or Wellington modalism with national philosophies. philosophy, as encouraged; and in most the new other is things, regionalism is an undesirable commonly sufficiently regionalism should not regional positions more is linked, be Sydneyside Nationalism in trait, not in other to be cultural things, with the breakdown of nations and contraction of state power. 19 See, e.g., London, 1957. Sale, op.cit., and L. Kohr, The Breakdown of Nations, RKP, The Editor of the new 1923 AJPP did however take seriously the notion of National Philosophy, of (what must have surprised some New Zealand readers) an Australian Philosophy; some of the issues there raised (p.292ff) are addressed in Appendix 2. 1 �16 * To get back to where we were: * emerging proposal the is this, that we s.rsrt - or better much increase - doing our own distinctive things, and that we team up to do so. Tn fact there are several suggestions that begin to emerge, concerning research and teaching, publications and appointments, study leave and sponsored visitors. These are not just that we do our own selection of topics and style and people, and methods, decide priorities, own our instead of having these foisted upon us - not just, that is, that we play our own games (whether invented here or taken over from the North) and not theirs, Rules and Rugby instead of Gridiron and Basketball - but that we abandon the individual competitive model of cultural achievement, sold to us and fostered by the North, in favour of a group cooperative approach (elements of which are already modelled in Antipodean social clubs). The ditch-digging example: ditch more separately. rapidly simple and familiar. On the one side is the it is well-known that two people cooperating can dig a and enjoyably than two people working on the ditch Cooperative work tends to pay off - in philosophy or elsewhere - in terms of output, experience are here thoughts shows that we successfully with several reasons quality, and enjoyment in the doing. in the the centre for this. periphery cannot on achievements One highly competitive predominantly On the other side, individually compete very in their programs. is the communication situation. There are Despite the individualistic nature of American academic �1. <3 �enterprise, 20 ' much communication in the and individualism myth, attainment of results access to work is jointly based, unpublished upon rapid depends material. For, verbal despite the and builds on the work of many; when the time is ripe for some idea or result, several clever people will be Then again communications are important in obtaining rapid able to hit on it. publication of the idea or result, and the assignment of credit for it. again people at the periphery tend to lose out. Again there are nationalistic considerations There are a mix of reasons (e.g. Polish results, Russians will cite a Russian who the same verbally conveyed. tend time and as an outsider). through face-to-face There is seminars Here the so Poles achieves a fact that that local tend to promote result at much is results about conveyed will be There is the fact of limited reading, and that people at the centre to concentrate when they read on material from the centre by central people, so that published items and results from the periphery will often not be noticed, and may well lose out to central central publication. receive, merit competitors even if they achieve There is also the fact that people at the centre tend to for merit, more publication than people towards the periphery. and communication opportunities Here economic factors do begin to enter; consider the size and distribution of the academic market (there are, e.g., a great many more academic philosophers in North America than in the whole rest of the world), control of publishing outlets and journals (with few exceptions 20 Reflecting other features of the culture and enterprise of the centre which are not so deeply embedded in Australasia: see further R. Routley, ’Culture, philosophy, and approaches to the natural environment - an Australian perspective’, in The Environment, Ethics and Ecology (ed. D. Bennett), The Faculties,^ Australian National University, 1984, and also ’Culture and the roots of political divergence)^ the Australian/American contrast’, typescript, Canberra, 1983; both referred to subsequently as ’Culture’. . . // / - �18 However economic power does not, and need not, determine etc. all Northern), culture - we can shut off the Northern philosophical propaganda shut off way we being sets if we really want to. our television by impressed middle-men philosophical those the And we can stop a make who in much living by importing the Northern stuff. So what do we do? We adapt to the cultural-philosophical level, We aim at of those things, that have been suggested in the newer regionalism. some awakening and regional importers and doctrines and imitators local of, positions from and We do not remain slavish self-reliance. on commentators local the North. For several example, peddlars and don’t we spend of, our academic lives trying to tease out what Davidson or Dummett or Kripke meant by this in the hope that or that To through. be sure, I some pale Northern light will am not suggesting we that perhaps emulate filter appalling the ignorance of people from the North who visit the Antipodes and know little or nothing about what has been done or is eminent with through visitors, the their Australian bags heavy National being done here; cultural University (now so that we have accroutrements, the main trekking centre for investigation of relevant logics) and informing us that, or relying crucially on the assumption that, a contradiction entails every proposition. that these Northerners often know little positions and advances is the Antipodes is inferiority colonies; 21 of cultural another is the and intellectual narrow or nothing about One reason distinctive the prevailing assumption of life (predominantly in these local) and former limited the southern reading Regrettably, the ignorance extends to many locals. In particular, those infected with Sydney materialism appear remarkably ill-informed as to basic features of other Australasian programs. �19 undertaken by Northern luminaries. But, having despite been given sufficient we cause, shouldn’t cut ourselves off from Northern paradigms and influences (we could hardly manage to anyway: propaganda is different). so we should stay informed of, but not imitators these continuing traditions: of, or part of, far from cutting these nowhere, In any case, their enterprises. in older Northern traditions, So loose regional cultures are rooted just as the people are largely European stock. from these (and older We can reasonably use what we need from likely traditions and starting afresh and traditions, minority) the from local variations that have already appeared are what we want to develop and perhaps mutate, as again with wine styles. Part things, of the proposal then we that increasingly Northern paradigms. what is very great Nor, our own local rather than working with pale northern reflections of It is not as if we have to build from nothing, very difficult - entirely original work, components. do and so shape newer encourage and develop our own research programs, Antipodean paradigms, 22 is to to do - to create cultural try For there are research programs already initiated, which have the advantage fortunately, of being grounded do we need in to make features of the the story up - shape the future is part of what the proposal is about. larger culture. though helping to Much of the story, for Australia - New Zealand is a different and more difficult proposition - is already indicated in Grave’s survey of Australian philosophy. All one really has to do is to bring out programs he has already indicated and provide some 22 See Culture, op.cit. �20 To pull the investigation down to a more concrete elaboration and commentary. level, I shall sketch some more prominent cooperative programs - by no means the only programs - and remark on some relevant features of them. The longest running and best known program is, without much doubt, of Australian naturalism, and which aims to see natural the that world, and everything else, as suitably encompassed within the framework of the world of (physical) science. empiricist metaphysics, contains as program The 23 is generally materialism, Adelaide which subsequently died out there. such famous state version of failures in materialism, and functionalism. its a Anderson’s program initiated nowadays Faced reduction trimmed theory of universals, plans, like it it takes all now Tt in The latter program has included the mental-material contingent components as central to and is now best exhibited in Armstrong’s work. subprogram Sydney a major back traced in, identity theme and more derivatively, physicalisms incorporates a with a conspicuous "scientifically" and an account of natural laws as relations of universals, both components of the developing Sydney realism. Parts of the naturalism program, especially materialism and central state reductionism and the unified science ideal, have had counterparts in the North, but the program has, for the most part, despite export efforts, smoothly, moreover, and 23 earthy, so retained its distinctively it never caught on in New Zealand. into Australian culture. far as Australian character - The program fits It is similarly down-to-earth, philosophy can be, without the fancy ideas or effete Anderson’s metaphysics was however far more opposed to reductions than what has succeeded it. For an account of Anderson’s philosophy, and a history and account of Australian naturalism and materialism, see especially Grave, op.cit. �21 idealism of European philosophy or the spirituality and suppressed puritanism with which much pragmatism). commitments, of And and North it yet though it not does is (including simmers thinking American shrink from basically empiricist, explicit nowadays, metaphysical it is not from the positivistic (rejecting a verification principle, in particular). It is a city program, based broadcast mainly University of Sydney to other metropolitan universities; but the program does extend outside the universities a bit (a tiny bit) to the larger metropolitan culture. North America, the broader Russell, so in Australasia, community,or Popper Australasia would and be Kuhn quite little professional philosophy impinges on even on being an As in the wider academic community, (To exceptional. achievement, through one to turn worth this working work by around for.) now reaches in The naturalism program used to Perth, and has outliers in Canberra, as well as a core of opposition there. stretch Apart from notable exceptions, Adelaide; the program has never had more than a rather precarious hold, in Melbourne: 25 it the same hold, to or nor, more surprisingly, 24 In Canada, for example, while most academics from other disciplines would know of, and perhaps a little about, Russell, far fewer would know of Wittgenstein (though he is becoming known to lit. crit. groups), and virtually none would know of Quine. (The sampling is subjective.) On the fairly recent ’triumph of professionalism* in philosophy in USA, see Kuklick, op.cit., p.565ff. Kuklick brings out well some of the more disastrous features of professionalism, but does not sufficiently notice that the virtuous features resulting from some professionalisation can be synthesized with broader philosophical activity. 25 The exceptions include Ellis’s distinctive program, which can be accounted part of the broader naturalist program, and at Monash the work of F. Jackson and, earlier, of H. Munro in value theory. �22 has it had heavyweight criticism from there (or indeed much external criticism from elsewhere), the old confrontation of major city philosophies having died out. philosophy Melbourne is more historically oriented stricken than Sydney; Melbourne by dominated procession a a then, philosophy; been idealism and fashions: Northern earlier Wittgenstein, recently, remarkable religion philosophy, much more than Sydney, has of more philosophy; Continental and more turnabout, ordinary Davidson Quine, and language extensional reduction; now perhaps Lewis, Kripke and Dummett? one The program that reaches the beyond of confines the cities in Australia - which is after all a metropolitan dominated culture, the vast land always being the other Australian environmentalism, - is a rather diffuse program, which has connections with the Colleges of Advanced Education in the country towns and the communes on the North Coast. much distinguished environmental Europe by what positions it are a specifically having as not is feature of what So far the program is as it Serious and is. the New World, of transformed most its deeper the Old World, and environment and natural having little wild untouched country left, and little sensitivity accordingly to issues Europe that such as tend admit European to those of concern the wilderness. built shallow approaches superficiality environmentalism outside and (and continues North The main environmental human-transformed encourage to America. environment, situations). techno-fix dominate North much issues of American the New in issues And World environmentalism differs significantly however from Antipodean environmentalism, most obviously in the religious-spiritual component respects as well (see further Culture). of the former, but in several other �23 More positively, there are three strands to Australian environmentalism:- Firstly, there is an extended utilitarianism, differing little in theory from Bentham’s enlarged position, which insists upon counting in the utilities of all sentient figured though creatures. prominently it has position, This in animal from a British base, has animal liberation movements: and research and and welfare on domestic focussed developed animals animals, used in hunted (wild) animals, it has also become entangled in issues of bio-research more generally such as genetic engineering. or much interested in, endangered species, etc., except the conversion of forests, Secondly, not utilitarian forests and differs naturalism. and which ecosystems, from irreducible recognises which finds especially wild and American 26 lands, bearing on these have a an inadequate there is a wider and a deeper ecological position, which is psychological states, sentience or insofar as and so deeper concerns get spinoff from animal welfare, deal. the disappearance of wild Wider and deeper environmental concerns appear only animal pain and pleasure. as a It is not however concerned with, Thirdly, and spiritualism is there of value elsewhere intrinsic value natural from course, an as systems. in trees and This position of American extension almost than everywhere, a reactionary component, critical of the other strands, which insists that all that needs to be accomplished on the environmental front can be achieved within older established (European) ethical and political frameworks. Whereas materialism is based in Sydney, environmentalism is centred in Melbourne and Canberra, but also includes Brisbane and Perth. Also centred in 26 It has been described more Environmental Philosophy (ed. D. National University, 1980. fully elsewhere: see, in particular, Mannison and others), RSSS, Australian �Canberra, and reaching across the country, with good connections in Melbourne, but in few Sydney, and materialism program other which program, elsewhere. and major perhaps which philosophy, more includes to centres New in metaphysics, with respectively, the theory value essentially is of extends and their core logic a especially in Zealand , program, one but metaphysics. Australia than also been has the Whereas any The other described ?7 The main logic grounded research program evident program. of the in New Zealand philosophy is also A program emanating from the work of Prior and located mainly in Wellington, The impact programs have program areas program. relevant/paraconsistent epistemology from relevant/paraconsistent affecting the environmental input further is it might be called the extended modal a now program. program on philosophy is perhaps best seen in Cresswell’s work. Australian philosophy used to be known, for its hard-headed empiricism; not known and still is in some quarters, regrettably New Zealand philosophy is mostly for anything much, except perhaps, in UK, that Prior brought his 27 Again, like all the Australian programs, both those mentioned and others, in Grave, op.cit. But see further, R. Routley, ’Research in Logic in Australia, New Zealand and Oceania’, Research Papers in Logic #14, Australian National University, 1983 (which also considers other programs in logic); G. riest and R. Routley, op. cit.; and R. Routley, R.K. Meyer and others, Relevant Logics and Their Rivals, Ridgeview, California, 1982. 28 See especially M.J. Cresswell, Logics and Languages, Methuen, London, 1973; but see also work by Goldblatt and by Hughes referred to in Research in Logic, op.cit. Also described there is an original version of the modal program (transparent intensional logic) elaborated by Tlchy at Otago. �25 unusual adaption of Russellian philosophy from that remote place. Neither of these impressions is particularly accurate; both are rather out-of-date. the aim of work of the present type is, of course, impressions, not just to reflect or report But not just to correct these on culture - for what one would like to reflect upon is not sufficiently there - but also to help manufacture elements of a culture, to make an image. To resist the North, we should increase our efforts to further the nq already flourishing programs, and perhaps other sunrise projects; to build teaching and research around the programs selected for promotion, elaboration, and criticism, to orient appointments, especially of involved local people, to 29 Among sunrise projects in Australian philosophy so far suggested (not all of them feasible) are these: Australian feminism, Antipodean social and political alternatives, peace studies, indigenous regional philosophies (especially Aboriginal, Melanesian, and Polynesian). Another promising field, with practical consequences, for local initiative is the philosophy of education, where material produced by R.S. Peters has dominated the market, with stultifying effects it is now alleged. As foreshadowed with the notion of "sunrise projects", much of the rhetoric, and argument, concerning science and technology policy (presented in the case of Australia in Jones, op.cit.) can be taken over to apply to X policy, where X is some subject discipline, such as philosophy. �26 on Why bother? these programs. Why not simply buy our philosophy, like almost all our technology, off the shelf, from the North? There are several arguments for not doing this, in more than a limited fashion, which are now sketched. There is, firstly, Northern products, fine a the inferiority and built-in Without despite their attractive packaging. most of putting too point on it, many of the imported intellectual goods are shoddy, and only work for a very limited range of applications (e.g. the obsolence vicinity Antipodean of contradictions philosophy or undoubtedly dilemmas). derives from Much they’re hopeless in that shoddy is wrong intellectual with goods 30 In fact something like the last has been the policy of the LSE Philosophy Department, where the only outside appointment over a long period was that of Lakatos (hardly a person far removed ideologically). As observed, it now looks like the practice of the Otago Department also; and apparently it used to be a tendency at Melbourne. But in most places the practice is condemned as nepotistic or parochial, and overridden by the call for "new (Northern! blood". However there can be significant differences between nepotistic appointments and those strengthening local programs. It is at this stage, among others that administrative measures do matter; for example, to ensure that suitable locally-engaged locals gain employment rather than Northern stooges, to direct funds into on-going local programs rather than imported fashions, etc. There are various ways appropriate administrative details can be handled, locally or nationally; but nothing draconian, such as wholesale exclusion of noncitizens, is required. Observe, indeed, that no restriction of academic appointments to nationals (in Canadian style) or the like is being advocated. Anyone who arrives at a conclusion of that sort from what has been argued has misunderstood the case in crucial respects. As a matter of simple mathematics, restricting appointment fields characteristically reduces both quality of candidates available (however quality is assessed) and range of possibilities open for future research; and no such restrictions are advocated. The author has witnessed the debilitating effects of field restrictions at the Australian National University and elsewhere. 31 Some of these arguments centre also. support change (perhaps revolutionary) at the �Yet buying this material is encouraged by hard-sell imported from the North. cultural ambassadors from the North, who are often enough paid to visit. is part Northern of the philosophical imperialism colonialism that - the This from the North - the successor Antipodes too suffers, willing or, to more remarkable, encourages! Secondly, there is the inappropriateness of much of the Northern product, especially considered metaphysics, as package, a environmental concerns. for instance, to cover, well as as The European North has no satisfactory land or environmental ethic fit for Antipodean circumstances, and the deeper American package is too spiritually-loaded for mainstream Australian culture. 32 In political theory, work is much too individualistic the European product, especially the Marxist form, and competition-based, American unsuited being both too precious and for local too high-tech and is circumstances, especially again for more environmentally-perceptive people. Thirdly, features of telling also import comparative advantage, and regionalism; namely, substitution world’s markets and pressures power structures against and fashions, (including the Old Boy’s removal network in are appealing avoidance of the of overseas control and jobs, policies, etc.), and gaining of local control, employment of local people, etc. Fourthly, 32 there are arguments for cultural diversity, applied to The point is elaborated in Culture. At a more practical level Northern products are again often unsuitable, though for different reasons. For example, the transfer of American agricultural methods and equipment to the thin poor soils of the Antipodes has had disastrous effects, at last beginning to be recognised. �28 part philosophy as complexity, sheer diversity, of culture: intellectual stability, arguments In fact, etc. built into the whole notion of 'culture’ transfers. dense, productive garden. the garden analogy Naturally we want a rich, But not only seeds and plants but weeds and many We pests are being introduced. obtain not only good products, Indian maize This is why and European cultivars, but European pests and American weeds. selectiveness and control richness, from essential, are as against haphazard previous procedures. The proposal is not for, nor would the case sustain, a narrow localism, with local products, whatever their quality, heroes, replacing Northern ones. local fashions, and local cult That is certainly not the preferred way of the newer regionalism, which tends to do without fashions and heroes and which seeks durable quality in products, is it the way of low environmental impact, and so on|^ nor technology policy. Rather, as with technology policy, select niches which are not occupied or satisfactorily filled, make a difference, policy has to be publishing outlets, components, and ideas, and use and develop local skills and methods. selective etc.). given resource our But granting base (of can Indeed the philosophers, regionalism, to what extent should for instance people, books and other teaching elements, theories and to what extent should they be produced, trained, be imported conceived locally? The possibility of selectiveness means that many mixes are possible. least, on a particular mix. 33 where we we There in different is no need to insist, components so far at The case for the present is mainly for a regional See, for instance, A.A. Mazrui, A World Federation of Cultures: An African Perspective, Free Press, New York, 1976. �29 shift, for a significantly greater degree of local autonomy and production.^ But it will do no harm to Negatively, local favour. indicate elements of a mix that the suggestion is that we try to eradicate much of That includes such things the Oxford style of teaching and doing philosophy. removal as of the Locke-Berkeley-Hume emphasis undue (a finds much standard on British British focus); empiricism of centred on quasi-historical the approach with however no proper attention to sources; of reinforcement of the prevailing Anglo-American status quo. The heavy particular, has mostly been a very conservative one. the main movements philosophy, but emanating also the from England, Moore-Wittgenstein Oxford influence, in More generally, many of especially practice, ordinary have language been very protective of the Northern status quo; they tend to leave things very much as they are, and recommend just this. Positively, the proposal is that we achieve further disassociation from the Anglo-American empiricist past in two 34 Does it sound familiar? Outside philosophy, it should. For example, we have now been told by the Americans that our defence role, unlike theirs, is regional, not global: this is supposed to shed great light on our previously confused defence policies. 35 The point is laboured in E. Gellner, Words and Things, Victor Gollancz, London, 1959. But even ordinary language philosophy, though conservative, and though it much contracted the proper range of philosophical investigations, had its liberating elements, e.g. removal of some of the narrowness and more cramping assumptions induced by technical jargon. Nor has the social impact changed much with the subsequent decline, since 1959, of ordinary language philosophy, the increasing insolvency of Oxbridge philosophy, and its consequent limited take-over by right-wing Ivy League American philosophy. By contrast, the less economically influential growth of redbrick and applied philosophy in some of the British redbrick and polytechnic institutes has touched no more than the surface of Oxbridge practice. �30 local emphasizing by ways: framework, and projects range the diversifying by move that outside of that constricting philosophical traditions selectively drawn upon, to include not only neglected Continental strands and but also parts of Eastern thought, philosophy. idea The is that Australasian Pacific ethnic material and plurality of such a especially sources, in teaching, will assist in removing narrower cultural biasses, such as British enable more and parochialism, be obtained. to discrimination Then too we should be better able to see the ranges of theories that are open to us in the Antipodes and how to advance our own programs. There remain some things we should want to see whatever mixes are chosen in different Antipodean regions. One crucial issue is the removal of Northern bias from papers and publications, research seminars and lectures, letters of reference, and so on. the and works irrespective discussion This Northern bias is a disposition to cite and discuss projects of and Northern quality the to of ignore of the authors, their works the more contribution of the to authors, local irrespective of the quality of their contribution. defer to famous better, the under topic again largely It is the disposition to authors from prestigious Northern institutions, and to uncritically accept their opinions of worth, importance, It etc. is the disposition to write or lecture as though work produced locally either does not exist or has not been influential philosophers, are, (thus if ensuring anything, more that it inclined is to not). Northern And Australasian bias than many overseas intellectuals, who are perhaps less concerned to be seen as belonging to the Northern mainstream. bias affects not only the The reduction, and eventual removal, of Northern practice of individual philosophers, but the policies of selection and review committees as well as of editors and referees �of local reorientation, innovations It journals. among involves, Antipodean philosophers with so better, they can cite other getting local work things, intellectual to know local work and or point out regional Initiatives and developments - things that would be assisted by greater local content in courses taught, more time spent at local institutions on study leave, and so on. APPENDIX 1. Background notes on the philosophy supply situation. Sociological investigation of the philosophy labour market in Australia and New Zealand has yet to be attempted. But a picture of some elements underlying the numerical argument of the text can be gained from the following table: simple �32 TABLE 1. Ph.Ds in Philosophy: a USA - Australasian comparison USA Number (Male./Female) Australia New Zealand 1974 413 (346/67) 6 0 1975 375 (318/57) 5 0 1976 382 (319/63) 8 0 1977 330 (264/66) 3 2 (1/1) 1978 283 (235/48) 5 5 (4/1) 1979 285 (204/54) 9 3 (2/1) 1980 246 (187/59) 4 N.A. 1981 N.A. 4 0 Notes: 1. The breakdown of the USA and New Zealand numbers by sexes (male/female) is given. Similar figures do not appear to be available for Australia. 2. The US figures are for the academic year ending in the Year shown, e.g. 1978 covers the Northern academic year 1977-78. Southern figures are for the calendar year shown. Sources: Digest of Education Statistics, US National Center for Education Statistics; University Statistics, Australian Bureau of Census Statistics; New Zealand Education Statistics. Comments: 1. The contraction of US doctoral production and the concomitant rise in female representation, are clearly indicated. The Australian figures are likely too small to reflect such trends and responses to the academic market. 2. Some of the Australasian numbers include Americans; likewise the American figures provide no nationality breakdown. 3. There is no information available on the number of Australians proceeding to higher degrees in philosophy outside Australia. In applying table 1 some simplifying assumptions are made. assumed that For example, it is candidates for appointment to regular university positions now would have a doctorate or the equivalent (until recently a B.Phil was taken as �a near of equivalent It well). a North what assumed, is American Ph.D.; seems take to could publications case, the that serve as the number of Australasians proceeding to higher degrees in philosophy abroad is relatively small, and no more than the order of Ph.Ds. taken locally. without upsetting applications of table 1, It can be assumed, that Australasian graduates match, say, the upper half of American graduates in standard attained. There is no compiled information on academic vacancies in philosophy in Australia or New Zealand - on the numbers of vacancies, on how the positions It would however be a routine, are filled, by what nationalities, sexes, etc. if tedious, matter to assemble some of this data, is of considerable which relevance to the planning of philosophy programs. 4. On the earlier idea of a National Philosophy for Australia. APPENDIX 2. considering Editor the of initial to corresponding Lebensanchauung ’ ’an Australian argument is possibility ’the AJPP, Francis Philosophy is as truth and its between as that a theory may not be held, (Australian) two senses Weltanschauung and 'a scheme of the universe’, that of a Christian confirmation independent of national sympathies or prejudices’. mean distinguished Anderson, ridiculous the Philosophy’, distinction In the first, (p.292). both National a German ’the that of In or Science’. falsification The ’are Granted: but that does not fostered, etc., in one region but not others, as intuitionism was for long in in Holland, or Cartesianism in France. In a second ’more intimate and personal’ way, ’a nation like an individual may develop a certain temperamental attitude to the problems of existence, which we may ... call its philosophy of life. and its literature, is a mode of A nation’s philosophy, expression for the national like its art consciousness. �34 (pp.292-3). It is a specialised form of the national genius ....’ short, part of the evolving national culture. is from by entirely means no separate in the first place, But, the It is, initial sense, in this philosophy a comprising not merely a fairly comprehensive theory but also an integrated set Furthermore, only by concession of attitudes (like an operational paradigm). units single accounted philosophy, of meriting distinctive definite literature, Australian like particularly ’the Australian landscape’ ’the national consciousness’ and are such items as (in many has any sense): does not Australian descriptors. such strands things to form it, not some rather loose families. Anderson not does find, really to hope find ’a in modern industrialised community’ - with its modular parts interchangeable with those of others - a national philosophy of with life, a difference. claims to find a (somewhat) trite moral base to build on, humour, courage and fair particularly philosphical. at least various apart of life, regional is but dealing’, So far, not; philosophies then, this nothing however not local research identifying and trouble derives from the extravagant claim that with Goodness these and - ’traditions ... of distinctive, all or there exclude So programs). legitimating a being far, national But shortly Anderson is plunged into inconsistency: the philosophy, so good. do at he there could a national philosophy, does as (such problems about from rational but fact Tn the Beauty eternal - then of values and only Philosophy’ (p.295 with rearrangement). the then But, to do with these - as is virtually conceded, ’if Australia has nothing to Spirit, has she the Ideals nothing to of Truth, do with as Australia has nothing per se these values involving a ’wider sweep’ than any national boundaries - "she" has nothing to do with Philosophy, contradicting the possibility of a National Philosophy. Though the �35 contradiction is easily avoided by rescinding the extravagant claim, the ideal of a National Philosophy should be allowed to rest in peace: nationalism has had its time. -r /I ZR. Routley^ Research School of Social Sciences Australian National University With thanks to R. Elliot, W. Godfrey-Smith, S. Grave and L. Mirlin, to several members of the audience at the presentation of the paper at the 19R3 Australasian Association of Philosophy Conference, University of Adelaide, to several referees for this Journal, and, not least, to the present Editor. �PROSPECTS FOR REGIONAL PHILOSOPHIES IN AUSTRALASIA Philosophy, especially academic philosophy but also folk philosophy, like has long been other intellectual and higher cultural activity in Australasia, indeed dominated, swamped, Northern by increasingly from North America. Europe, now the largely and cultural baggage other imported, influences, Given the initially the migration ethnic patterns, composition of resulting ruling populations, such a result was virtually inevitable. does not have to stay that way. from the But it Suitable policies, a good philosophy policy, could change things. The of thought culture, is a philosophy, regional hardly a new one. In 1923, matching perhaps a regional correspondent to the a New Zealand newly-launched Australasian Journal of Psychology and Philosophy mentioned the possibility of ’a new kind or temper of philosophy under these southern skies’ which Journal might the such a reaching role for (or, not community). that although And matter, professional merely solid foundation foster.The Journal has for a some actively pursued philosophers things new regionalism however hardly but have changed in philosophy, its a fulfilled pronounced wider aim of Australasian in Australia, laying a that possibility of a new temper of philosophy has hardly been realised. There is little in the way the southern skies were intended to include: but few distinguishing features, ’no a new kind distinctively ^AJPP, March same volume, Appendix 2. and New temper of philosophy under New Zealand skies, which of Zealand 1923, p.74. p.292.ff; his characteristics, The have question was discussion is shown up in New Zealand taken up by the Editor in the considered below, especially in �2 philosophy’. 9 New Zealand remains a substantial net importer of philosophy, The situation of colonial dominance that used to prevail in and philosophers. Australia, where virtually and chairs, all many other philosophy, were filled by academics from the North, posts academic in tends to persist in New Zealand, where no established chairs are occupied by locals.Given the. usual power and influence of professors in small departments, topics covered and considered and in courses designed, especially appointments made, the heavy Northern orientation of philosophy taught and researched in New Zealand is not The Northern control is perhaps most strikingly exhibited at the surprising. oldest of New Zealand universities, University the of Otago, where the Philosophy Department has been substantially captured by a British School and increasingly looks event, the like an offshoot of overwhelming Anglo-American the University of London.In any dominance of New Zealand philosophy also a feature only in slightly lesser degree of Australian philosophy - can be confirmed by a content survey of the courses offered and research papers written at New Zealand universities. Even when local people have been appointed to positions in Australasia, they have been brought up on a solid diet of Anglo-American material, and they have often been reforged or finished in the North as well. In particular, the 2, S.A. Grave, A History of Philosophy in Australia, Queensland University Press, 1983, p.l. Page references are to the manuscript. The paper draws heavily on this history. ^This claim was correct at the time of presentation of 1983). With the recent loss of chair at Wellington, qualification, but the pattern of domination persists. the the paper (August claim may require 4In the 1983 Commonwealth University Handbook listing, 6 of the 8 members of the Department held their main degree, Ph.D., from London, and one of the remainder from Exeter. Only one member of the Department, soon to retire, falls outside the nexus. �3 requirements in the Australasian universities of period of the major post­ World War II expansion were conveniently seen to in the case of philosophy by the Oxford B.Phil. Many degree. of departments philosophy remain full of products of this cultural mill: indeed until the mid 70s candidates finished in Oxford were hard to beat out when they applied for positions, such was the prestige of Oxford and (unwarranted) the regrettable, continuing, but still "cultural cringe". Nonetheless, been in occurring scene the Northern the Antipodes, be will (as despite especially on indicated). significant dominance, is It the Australian worth asking changes have philosophical Australian whether philosophy is moving towards the sort of change that occurred in USA more than 100 years ago when the Harvard Philosophy Department was brought (or bought) and together, its "golden age" began.American the same again, and became its own thing. philosophy was never quite There are nouT new forces operating which could help to move Australian philosophy in such a direction. the widespread regionalism,0 other local fashioning provides a emergence, which applies choices; of national model for and particularly to in cultural stark science reflection and in in alternative and technology regional there there are also some of choice along is policies, philosophy directly bears on parts of the philosophy of science. soon appear, culture, ideological contrast, serious obstacles There is the a new with centralised which not only policy but also Unfortunately, as will to regional philosophies and to the very idea of a regional philosophy. See B. Kuklick, The Rise of American Philosophy; Cambridge, Massachusetts 1860-1930, Yale University Press, 1977, Parts 2 and 3. 60n this bio-regionalism, see especially, Fourth World News, vol. 1, and K. Sale, Human Scale, Cox^ard, McCann and Geoghegan, New York, 1980. 1983, �USA, long an importer of culture from Europe, of exporter culture, certainly components of higher culture philosophical output Australasia, not if from such as Oxford following philosophy should not but achieve also the American there Are Yes, in philosophy? evidently (witness taken). has suit, payments, especially balance of culture, lower of has recently become a net a reasons better of turn why cultural there are reasons. In the first place, the change in the cultural position of the USA went with, and perhaps in part derived entails economic dominance most Australasia’s of from, vast changes in economic power relations. cultural dominance, since culture, there there is is little prospect serious no prospect If for that Australasia will ever emulate or attain American economic eminence (at least nuclear destruction of not without the North, flow of commodities, cultural and other). universities not only increasingly of Americans, contingent of former group, Northern cultural As they. priorities, that they whose entire as observed, Antipodean Northern academics, of include a research and additional substantial teaching is bent to It is unlikely that this influential segment, especially will (become commitments, long component also fellow-travellers, Northern concerns. the Secondly, large a contain and disruption of the as so apart Antipoduans they are in a bind locally acclimatised as do from not situation; the isolated drastically to) give up Nor person. alter their its should cultural for it can be persuasively argued they would be better off, as far as quality and product goes, stocking their universities with American teaching components and researching Americanoriented concerns. One simple numerical argument that Antipodean universities would be better off with Americans in the main, takes the following lines:- The (higher degree) graduates of Australasian culturally distinguished, at and American are not significantly least in subjects such as philosophy. Consider �5 now number the quality of Austroamerican graduates; academics of higher per number produced say there is 1 per every n graduates. degree The (great) preponderance of graduates will be Americans, just by virtue of their vastly greater population and their more extensive system of university education. So also then, just by ratio considerations, the great preponderance of quality academics from an drawn percentiles among upper they interested universities. Austroamerican base those quality products. quality, in an Such be American, will would argument does CLearly, Antipodeans, appointing be not as will work to more show Americans that, for the were their to similar reasons, American universities should be full of Chinese or Indian professors, for two Asians reasons; and first Americans, there are especially significant in cultural differences disciplines such as between philosophy; and secondly, their university systems do not deliver such great quotas of higher degree or high quality graduates, at least in philosophy. The conclusion of the numerical argument will not be a popular one. anti-Americanism felt the universities; The in portions of the Australasian community extends into and recently there has been increasing insistence, especially by the now aging younger Turks that university positions should be reserved for locals. This at the same time as these Turks often preach of an international community of scholars, presumably then with "free" interchange, As indicated in Appendix 1, where assumptions made in the argument are defended, the ratio of US philosophy graduates with doctorates as compared with Australian exceeds 30 to 1. And, as is well-known, the extent of university education is much greater in USA than in Australasia: indeed Australia is in this respect among the worst educated of the developed nations, as OECD figures have made plain (see, e.g., B. Jones, Sleepers Wake', Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 1982, Chapter 7). �6 etc. They cannot have it all ways.3 So long the continues, the present centre will as they will economically; them if large to it is free-flow the dominate have more interchange than us, periphery and ideas of and culturally jobs here personnel as well as should go by and (centrally-determined) quality in this high cultural business that we seek, as mostly claim. it Now anyway, is that arguments. widely there For we is are enough recognised, something not lower-down drastically wrong hierarchical with these ladders sorts flooded with high-quality Northerners who regularly drive out local contenders for positions, of would if we only preferred the Northerners when they were quite visibly superior: rather we are inundated by Americans with inflated references, who have the messages of the centre better than locals echelon do, (often and remote Northern Northern whose shortcomings biassed) fields tend appointment are known better. to look greener to committees than dusty higherlocals As is beginning to be recognised too, the Northern centres tend to retain their higher-quality products, and allow g A reverse flow of the better orthodox academics from Australasia to America should also be expected (outside times of university contraction). According to assumptions of this brain, drain argument, which is based on labour market considerations, appointment and lifestyle conditions for academics are generally better in USA than Australia and much better than those in economically-depressed New Zealand (e.g. higher salaries, better standard of living, superior research conditions, etc.). So, other things being equal, able academics from the Antipodes will relocate in USA as academic positions become available. The argument also helps explain why Antipodean universities cannot expect, for the most part, to attract really top-drawer Northerners for very long. Of course, economically irrelevant factors do induce interference; e.g. perverse commitments to odd-ball Antipodean intellectual enterprises which reduce market acceptability, or pre-industrial ties to place or persons or lifestyle which unduly restrict mobility (such as local roots, family attachments, even distaste for American urban lifestyles). �7 them be to exiled the to periphery only if they fall somehow foul of the system (e.g. of the academic system for political or personal reasons). often Northern the have centres disposed of their intellectually Too inferior products in the periphery. All this makes the appointing Northerners, position look doubly bad. We ought, especially Americans, even if they are overrated their references, and usually not out of the top drawer, quality. And yet to be it seems, in in order to maximize doing so does not achieve the desired quality result, and breeds discontent elsewhere, especially among the aging Turks. there Fortunately obtain way out a from this awkward and that is the way of regionalism. shaky arguments; and is cultural sufficient distance,9 so that situation and these We do our own things; they are not simply subtitutable for us. Then the shaky numerical argument does fall down. before the we elaborate emerging proposal there are other But influential arguments to dispose of, and the disposal bears on the proposal. There is, have so to begin with, far been conceded: the argument for excellence, that excellence, which we all more or elements of which there is an objective commodity, quality or less agree about, which is proportionately more abundant in the North, and which is what academic institutions crave and seek and what appointments aim to capture, indeed maximize. That at least is the type of myth most of us have encountered; and many of us now know it is a myth, in fact appointments a that dangerous way, any Most myth. more that places don’t organisations aim even just try to to make maximize 9 This is easier in the cultural than the technological sphere. However it is also possible technologically: (stronger) theses of technological determinism, and so of cultural determinism, are false. We can choose different options, technologically, as well as culturally. �8 profit, but quality is to satisfice on a mix of factors, of which assessed rather seek only one, and not often the highest ranking one. Ability to fit into some sort of program, teaching or research, is another, and commonly more important factor; is no good reason why such a program should not and there So given prevailing practices, sometimes be a regionally oriented one. the argument from excellence does not exclude regional philosophy programs. And, in any event, there are enough local candidates of sufficient worth to proceed regional with programs without sacrifice clearcut of Local excellence. enterprise need entail no loss of excellence, and could well increase it. The deeper-cutting objection is that there is something seriously amiss with the idea of objective objective importance; criticism as bracketed out notions the that of excellence, and notions these values objective with are open more contextual-relativisation connected the to the generally, component of notion of sorts of same they that valuing: have the framework or viewpoint to which these values relate.10 While those operating within as a rather narrow intellectual paradigm, such ordinary Oxbridge language philosophy or Sydney materialism say, can bracket out the viewpoint, since it is incorporated in the operational paradigm, and so arrive at seemingly objective quality judgements, the judgements are not preserved (e.g. in truth Marxist value) when viewpoints. transposed Consider, to for other frameworks, comparison, the e.g. idealistic judgements as to or the quality or worth of a forest,made variously by a deep ecologist, an industrial forester, and a recreational officer. Compare judgements as to the quality of What follows also begins to bring out what is omitted in a main theme of R.S. Pirsig, Zen and the Art of Motor Cycle Maintenance, Bodley Head, London, 1974. Note that defusing the notion of objective excellence does not lead to subjectivism. To avoid the customary false dichotomy, compare the notion of validity (usually ceded to themselves these days by classical logicians with that of quality). �9 a holistically-inclined Marxist, and environmental Californian philosophers pretend who seemingly because it philosopher, environmental such language, are There work judged, be. cannot even of the main philosophical by members is not done ordinary philosophers. environmental that by peer group at Harvard and like institutions. this As judgements begins the of to reveal, judgements of quality are not independent of work of importance or done But tackled. problems importance of problems and issues is highly paradigm dependent. the For example, problems such as those of quantifying-in and of possible worlds and of de re thought, which assume immense importance for fashionable referential within the mainstream empiricist restricted that outside theories paradigm, vanish to relative insignificance viewpoint. Now observe that most judgements as to what are the important problems and what constitutes important work - matters helping determine quality - are shipped down from the North. Their Importance is relative to their paradigmatic placement, and the paradigms concerned are exported to the Antipodes through the main channels already indicated. We are free to reject these paradigms and select alternatives, and there are, it can good reasons be argued, choose that different generally energy favoured to do just technology in the that, much as (or different North the which there are good reasons military North is from technology) eager to to export southwards. Similar which might argument, points apply against alternatively that be mass-produced and cosmopolitan. The argument -marketed 'cosmopolitan subject', called people sophisticated the from is based cosmopolitan/international the Peter everywhere Holland; Stuyvesant smoke this argument international superior product cigarette-sophistication is on the assumption that philosophy is a that is is not the sort of enterprise for which place �10 and people are significant as they assumption has only to be presented important thing, for one for are poetry the or to be questioned. novel. is a finished product of a certain that philosophy process of production the place and people involved (e.g. And literature, the if and not product philosophy, no more 12 than work a like theorems just internationally-approved format, since is The It takes for granted, sort (a propositional theory), not a process of production also. material. 11 of in discussion) are art, arguments and But in the like a piece assembled in of an then again the historical setting matters, literature, not does emerge in a vacuum. Plato’s philosophy could not have emerged in ancient Australia, and if cribbed in mid 20th century Oxford would surely have been marked down or rejected. It is important not to be sidetracked do not in aesthetics - that extent sets of themes need to and arguments into issues - resembling problems be contested, such as whether and what produced in one place and setting could have been produced in another. A nonnuclear technology of some sort could be adopted prospect in Europe that New but apparently will Zealand, nonnuclear energy strategy. in not contrast be, with whereas there Australia, is will reasonable pursue a It is the doing, and not what could be done, that Grave, op.cit., p.2: the term ’cosmopolitan subject’ used there comes from Donegan. As to the significance of place and people for literature, see further C. Partridge, The Making of New Cultures, Editions Rodopi, Amsterdam, 1982. 12 Like a paper in the biological sciences. But here again technique methodology, which may both be regional, are crucially important. 13 and Related points can be made using less extreme examples, e.g. concerning modern American work. Consider, for instance such texts as W.V. Quine’s Word and Object, (Wiley, New York, 1960) or R. Nozick’s Anarchy, State and Utopia (Basic Books, New York, 1974). The assumptions taken for granted, the arguments involved, etc., are especially American: it is not just the style. The acceptability of arguments and positions is dependent on place and received paradigm. �11 here. matters Dialethic which logic, the invalidates methodology of much Anglo-American philosophy, could technique and perhaps be done in the North (though there would be substantial cultural resistance): it is not being and is not likely to be done in the Anglo-American sphere.To done there, this extent, Antipodeans do techniques, logical can choose their international/cosmopolitan argument, distinctive own their distinctive own technology thing. and The stated in a form that would be telling, fails. Of course it can be argued, it is being argued, that Antipodeans don't need to be, or even oughtn't to be pursuing their own energy or logic policies and apparatus. But meeting these considerations takes us to a whole new set of issues concerning the merit of various policies and programs, diversity, etc. - far beyond the cosmopolitan argument. which we shaLl return, arguments concerning the point of The new arguments, to are not a lot more convincing however than comparable cooking: that we don't devising our own cuisine or wine styles. need to be or oughtn't to be British, or at least cosmopolitan, cooking is adequate: we should stick to that and buy it off the shelf from the North, ideally importing the cooks also. Do we have good reasons to think that British philosophy is better, these days, than British cooking? Antipodeans are free, in principle then, to pursue their own paradigms; and to do so they will by and large want to, and mostly have to, appoint their own people, people they have educated - not saboteurs or people who have (had) Much as communist anarchism, a live possibility for communes and perhaps communities in Australia, is culturally excluded in North America, owing to the extreme possessive individualism of that culture. On dialethic logic, see G. Priest and R. Routley, On Paraconsistency, Research Papers in Logic, #13, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University, 1983. �12 to be re-educated, from elsewhere, in particular from the North. intellectual paradigms the of features local But will the perused tie with cultural paradigms, with distinctive In a culture? though works of philosophy will loose not usually at way, they may link, least, culture in tie in with the the integral fashion that novels (as distinct from more technical works) sometimes do. Indeed, cultural certain programs, - to limited extent, features, not they do restricted already link. add. But style, independent - or independent acceptability, truth, philosophical ’an Australian compared with what matters is this though considers Grave particular to help mark philosophy in Australia as that 'unimportant hastens a to product' in philosophy' do matter, and are he not so far as their perception goes in the case of truth and correctness^3 - from underlying broad theory or received paradigm. However the marks Grave cautiously advances, significant though they are, do not serve features to the distinguish Australian philosophy Australian exhibits in product, lesser the degree adventurous and polemical philosophy of Greek antiquity. by Passmore as 'most typical of first two the than being more The first, described Australian philosophy', is a 'diversity of approach and readiness to put forward an unconventional or unfashionable point of view', philosophy, something which more (with typical some of notable ancient philosophy exceptions) than exhibits Australian a.i austere Nothing need be conceded to strong cultural relativity themes, though they would support the case. It is enough that our theories remain radically incomplete and that there can accordingly be rival theories as to what is true. Similarly, however philosophy is conceived - as the search for truth, explanation, understanding and wisdom (all of these and more, really), or as, more vaguely, inquiry of a certain sort - there can be, and will be, competing accounts; so a pluralistic theory is inevitable in giving a fuller view. l^Both preceding quotations, while included as such in Grave's Introduction, are from J. Passmore, 'Philosophy', in The Pattern of Australian Culture (ed. A.L. McLeod), Cornell University Press, Ithaca, N.Y., 1963, pp.131-168. The same annotation also applies to the third mark. �13 uniformity reflecting that often attributed to the land itself. and surprising, more most 'the philosophy, Wittgensteinian extraordinary discussed by itself’ Grave) , criticism by sharp and political relevant/paraconsistent to example ... Andersonian (p.2). This of character' manifestoed the the __ being if Sydney, example is Australian line-up it was far from between the not isolated: them concern the fervour generated by "Australian materialism", others among the notable Melbourne philosophy Andersonian is mark The second, engagement the and by some growing philosophy departments confrontation (both concerning the program, with the local ('adversarial') style leading Connected Americans. these with first two marks are further characteristics of much Australian philosophy, as of much 18th century Scottish philosophy and directness, unkindly turn of unwillingness (in add the this century Cambridge philosophy:17 to muffle points, hope of locating a namely surface clarity and, some would difference), bluntness, genuine unsubtlety and crudity. The third and the fourth marks advanced Grave in philosophy. effect notes, hardly are very different, but again as distinguishing features of Australian The third, which applies well to other intellectual areas, is the contrast of the Australian reputation in philosophy indeed of Australia as a center of philosophical inquiry’, with the anti—intellectual national stereotype of Australians as a people ’devoted to physical achievement rather than to intellectual subtlety’. Anglo-American philosophy; namely The the fourth mark is especially a feature of isolation of academic philosophy Australasia from, and its general indifference or even hostility to, in the sort 17 • though for the most part that influenced by Sydney rather than that originating in Melbourne. This again reflects the different historical influences bearing in Sydney and Melbourne philosophy: roughly, Scottish versus Continental antecedents. �14 of imported philosophy (e.g. that Nietzsche of and the existentialists) generating interest in literary and arts circles. The failure philosophy sufficiently matter. not does separated For its by to marks such of adequately one the thing, out separate research projects. Australian For another, Australian produce is regionalism should not be confused with nationalism, nor more regional positions such as Sydneyside materialism modalism Wellington or with Nationalism in philosophy, as in most other things, not to be the and encouraged; new regionalism philosophies. national is an undesirable trait, is linked, in other cultural things, with the breakdown of nations and contraction of state power. -A ■A To get back * to where we were: A the A emerging proposal is this, that we start - or better much increase - doing our own distinctive things, and that we team up to do so. In fact there are several suggestions that begin to emerge, concerning research and teaching, publications and appointments, study These are not just that we do our own selection leave and sponsored visitors. topics of and people, and style and methods, decide instead of having these foisted upon us - not just, our own priorities, that is, that we play our own games (whether invented here or taken over from the North) and not theirs, Rules and Rugby instead of Gridiron and Basketball - but. that we abandon the individual competitive model of cultural achievement, sold to us and fostered 18 See, e.g., London, 1957. Sale, op.cit., and L. Kohr, The Breakdown of Nations, RKP, The Editor of the new 1923 AJPP did however take seriously the notion of National Philosophy, of (what must have surprised some New Zealand readers) an Australian Philosophy; some of the issues there raised (p.292ff) are addressed in Appendix 2. �15 by the North, in favour of a group cooperative approach (elements of which are already modelled in Antipodean social clubs). The thoughts here are simple and familiar. digging example: it is well-known that two people cooperating can dig a ditch and enjoyably more rapidly On the one side is the ditch­ than two people working on the ditch separately. Cooperative work tends to pay off - in philosophy or elsewhere - in terms of output, and enjoyment quality, in the doing. On the other side, experience shows that we in the periphery cannot individually complete very successfully with the centre on achievements in their programs. for this. the nature of American academic attainment of depends results access to unpublished material. and periphery nationalistic are the tend verbal rapid communication and For, despite the individualism myth, work is several clever people will be able to hit on it. idea or result, communications upon enterprise,^ much and builds on the work of many; when the time is ripe for some- jointly based, result, Despite the highly competitive One is the communication situation. predominantly individualistic in There are several reasons to important assignment lose out. considerations in obtaining of credit Again (e.g. for rapid it. publication of Here there is a mix PoLes tend Then again to again the people of reasons:promote idea or at the There are Polish results, Russians will cite a Russian who achieves a result at about the same time as an outsider). There face-to-face seminars 19 is the fact that much is conveyed verbally and through so that local results will be conveyed. There is the Reflecting other features of the culture and enterprise of the centre which are not so deeply embedded in Australasia: see further R. Routley, 'Culture, philosophy, and approaches to the natural environment an Australian perspective’, in The Environment, Ethics and Ecology (ed. D. Bennett), The Faculties, Australian National University, 1984, and also 'Culture and the roots of political divergence: the Australian/American contrast’, typescript, Canberra, 1983; both referred to subsequently as 'Culture'. �16 limited fact of they when reading, on read and that people at the from material the centre central by centre tend to concentrate peopLe, that so published items and results from the periphery will often not be noticed, and may well out lose to There publication. is the also for merit, receive, merit competitors central more fact that publication than people towards the periphery. if even people and they achieve the at centre communication central tend to opportunities Here economic factors do begin to enter; consider the size and distribution of the academic market (there are, e.g., a great many more academic philosophers in North America than in the whole rest of the world), control of publishing outlets and journals (with few exceptions all Northern), etc. culture — we can way we shut off the Northern philosophical propaganda in much the shut off our television impressed being However economic power does not, and need not, determine by philosophical those to. sets if we really want middle-men And we can stop make who a living by importing the Northern stuff. So what do we do? We adapt to the cultural-philosophical level, several of those things, that have been suggested in the newer regionalism. some regional importers and doctrines and awakening and self-reliance. of, and local from the North. imitators positions local We do not remain commentators For We aim at on example, we and slavish peddlars don’t spend of, our academic lives trying to tease out what Davidson or Dummett or Kripke meant by this or that through. To in the be hope that sure, I am some pale Northern light will perhaps not suggesting that we emulate the filter appalling ignorance of people from the North who visit the Antipodes and know little or nothing about what has been done or is being done here;^^ so that we have Regrettably, the ignorance extends to many locals. In particular, those infected with Sydney materialism appear remarkably ill-informed as to basic features of other Australasian programs. �17 eminent their visitors, the through bags National Australian cultural with heavy University accroutrements, (now the main trekking centre for investigation of relevant logics) and Informing us that, or relying crucially on the assumption that, a contradiction entails every proposition. that advances is positions and inferiority cultural of another colonies; is know often Northerners these little is the the Antipodes intellectual and the nothing or distinctive prevailing assumption of the in life these (predominantly local) narrow about One reason former and southern limited reading undertaken by Northern luminaries. But, despite having been sufficient given cause, we shouldn’t cut ourselves off from Northern paradigms and influences (we could hardly manage We can reasonably use what we need from propoganda is different). to anyway: so we should stay informed of, but not imitators these continuing traditions: of, or part of, In any case, their enterprises. the people are largely European stock. in older Northern traditions, just as So far from nowhere, cutting these loose from (and older these likely regional cultures are rooted traditions minority) and starting afresh traditions, and the from local variations that have already appeared are what we want to develop and perhaps mutate, as again with wine styles. Part of the proposal Is then that things, encourage and develop our own Antipodean Northern paradigms, paradigms. rather It is we increasingly research programs, very great 71 our own local and so shape newer than working with pale northern reflections not as if we have to - what is very difficult - entirely original work, components. do build from nothing, to of do to try to create cultural For there are research programs already initiated, which have the advantage of See Culture, op.cit. being grounded in features of the larger culture."1 �18 Nor, the do we need fortunately, future is part to make the story up - though helping to shape of what the Australia - New Zealand proposal Much of about. is different and more difficult is a is All one really to bring out programs he has already indicated and provide some to do is elaboration and commentary. level, for proposition - already indicated in Grave’s survey of Australian philosophy. has the story, To pull the investigation down to a more concrete I shall sketch some more prominent cooperative programs - by no means the only programs - and remark on some relevant features of them. The longest running and best known program is, without much doubt, of Australian naturalism, and which aims see to natural the that world, and everything else, as suitably encompassed within the framework of the world of (physical) science. The program is generally traced as a major subprogram Sydney materialism, Adelaide which subsequently died out there. such famous components central state version of failures functionalism. its in a reduction and nowadays Faced plans, like it It in The latter program has included takes it all now Anderson’s program initiated as the mental-material contingent materialism, to in Armstrong’s work. empiricist metaphysics,-- and is now best exhibited contains back in, identity theme and more derivatively, physicalisms incorporates a with a conspicuous "scientifically" trimmed theory of universals, and an account of natural laws as relations of universals, both components of the developing Sydney realism. Parts of the naturalism program, especially materialism and central state reductionism and the unified science ideal, have had counterparts in the North, but the program has, for the most part, retained its distinctively Australian character 22 Anderson’s metaphysics was however far more opposed to reductions than what has succeeded it. For an account of Anderson’s philosophy, and a history and account op.cit. of Australian naturalism and materialism, see especially Grave, �19 - despite export efforts, it never caught on in New Zealand. smoothly, moreover, and philosophy can far as so earthy, into Australian culture. The program fits It is similarly down-to-earth, be, without ideas or the fancy effete idealism of European philosophy or the spirituality and suppressed puritanism much which with pragmatism). North of And commitments, and American it yet it though not does is simmers thinking basically shrink from metaphysical explicit empiricist, nowadays, (including is it not positivistic (rejecting a verification principle, in particular). It is a city based program, broadcast mainly from the University of Sydney to other metropolitan universities; but the program does extend outside the universities a bit (a tiny bit) to the larger metropolitan culture. North America, the broader Russell, so in Australasia, little professional philosophy impinges on community,’-^ Popper and would naturalism program Perth, and has outliers Apart notable be or Kuhn Australasia from As in quite used to even on being an the wider exceptional. achievement, stretch through one academic (To community, turn worth to Adelaide; this working it work by around for.) now reaches in The to in Canberra, as well as a core of opposition there. exceptions, the program has never had the same hold, or In Canada, for example, while most academics from other disciplines would know of, and perhaps a little about, Russell, far fewer would know of Wittgenstein (though he is becoming known to lit. crit. groups), and virtually none would know of Quine. (The sampling is subjective.) On the fairly recent ’triumph of professionalism’ in philosophy in USA, see Kuklick, op.cit., p.565ff. Iluklick brings out well some of the more disastrous features of professionalism, but does not sufficiently notice that the virtuous features resulting from some professionalisation can be synthesized with broader philosophical activity. �20 0 more than a rather precarious hold, f in Melbourne:^2 4 * nor, more surprisingly, has it had heavyweight criticism from there (or indeed much external criticism the old confrontation of major city philosophies having died from elsewhere), Melbourne out. is more philosophy stricken than Sydney; Melbourne by dominated a procession philosophy; Continental then, philosophy; religion philosophy, much more than Sydney, has Northern of earlier fashions: recently, more remarkable a and more historically oriented and Davidson Quine, turnabout, idealism ordinary Wittgenstein, been and language extensional reduction; now perhaps Lewis, Kripke and Dummett? The one program that reaches the beyond confines of the cities in Australia - which is after all a metropolitan dominated culture, the vast land always the other being - Australian environmentalism, is a rather diffuse program, which has connections with the Colleges of Advanced Education in the the communes on the North Coast. country towns and much distinguished environmental Europe by what positions specifically it are a having is not as feature of transformed what So far the program is as it is. the New World, most its of Serious the natural and deeper Old World, and environment and having little wild untouched country left, and little sensitivity accordingly to such as issues Europe that tend admit European to those of concern shallow built approaches superficiality environmentalism the wilderness. outside (and continues North and The main environmental human-transformed encourage to America. environment, situations). techno-fix dominate North much issues of American the New in issues And World environmentalism differs significantly however from Antipodean environmentalism, most obviously 2A rhe exceptions include Ellis’s distinctive program, which can be accounted part of the broader naturalist program, and at Monash the work of F. Jackson and, earlier, of H. Munro in value theory. �21 in the religious-spiritual component of the former, in but several other respects as well (see further Culture). positively, More environmentalism:- there Firstly, three are an is there strands extended Australian to utilitarianism, differing little in theory from Bentham’s enlarged position, which insists upon counting in the utilities of all sentient creatures. British base, has figured prominently in animal welfare and animal liberation though and movements: This position, developed from a it has on domestic animals, focussed animals used in research and hunted (wild) animals, it has also become entangled in issues of bio-research more generally such as genetic or much interested in, concerned with, engineering. endangered species, It is not however the disappearance of wild lands, the conversion of forests, etc., except insofar as these have a bearing on animal pain and pleasure. Wider and deeper environmental concerns appear only as a spinoff from animal welfare, and so deeper concerns get an inadequate deal. Secondly, there is a wider and a deeper ecological position, which is not utilitarian and which recognises irreducible value elsewhere than forests and differs ecosystems, especially wild and American from naturalism. which finds states, psychological sentience or 25 Thirdly, spiritualism there is and of intrinsic value natural systems. from course, an as in trees This position of American extension everywhere, almost and a reactionary component, critical of the other strands, which insists that all that needs to be accomplished on the environmental front can be achieved within older established (European) ethical and political frameworks. Whereas materialism is based in Sydney, environmentalism is centred in It has been described more fully elsewhere: see, in particular, Environmental Philosophy (ed. D. Mannison and others), RSSS, Australian National University, 1980. �22 Melbourne and Canberra, but also includes Brisbane and Perth. Also centred in Canberra, and reaching across the country, with good connections in Melbourne, but in few Sydney, materialism and from program other which program, and logic program perhaps includes extends their core value more to centres New respectively, the especially philosophy, in the with Logic a Whereas in metaphysics, theory essentially is of areas major which and program. program, but one metaphysics. The Australia than also been described in New Zealand philosophy is also a Zealand, has any other 26 elsewhere The programs have epistemology relevant/paraconsistent affecting relevant/paraconsistent environmental input further the is main grounded research program program. A program emanating located mainly in Wellington, The impact of the evident program on from the it might be called work of Prior and now the extended modal program. philosophy is perhaps best seen in Cresswell’s 27 work. “ Australian philosophy used for its not hard-headed empiricism; known for to be known, and still is in some quarters, regrettably New Zealand philosophy is mostly anything much, except perhaps, in UK, that Prior brought unusual adaption of Russellian philosophy from that remote place. his Neither of 26 Again, like all the Australian programs, both those mentioned and others, in Grave, op.cit. But see further, R. Routley, 'Research in Logic in Australia, New Zealand and Oceania', Research Papers in Logic #14, Australian National University, 1983 (which also considers other programs in logic); G. Priest and R. Routley, op. cit.; and R. Routley, R.K. Meyer and others, Relevant Logics and Their Rivals, Ridgeview, California, 1982. 27 See especially M.J. Cresswel.1, Logics and Languages, Methuen, London, 1973; but see also work by Goldblatt and by Hughes referred to in Research in Logic, op.cit. Also described there is an original version of the modal program (transparent intensional logic) elaborated by Tichy at Otago. �23 these impressions is particularly accurate; both are rather out-of-date. But the aim of work of the present type is, of course, not just to correct these impressions, not just to reflect or report on culture - for what one would like to reflect upon is not sufficiently there - but also to help manufacture elements of a culture, to make an image. To resist the already flourishing North, we should increase our efforts to further the programs, and perhaps other sunrise projects;*'^ to build teaching and research around the programs selected for promotion, elaboration, and criticism, to orient appointments, especially of involved local people, to Among sunrise projects in Australian philosophy so far suggested (not all of them feasible) are these: Australian feminism, Antipodean social and political alternatives, peace studies, indigenous regional philosophies (especially Aboriginal, Melanesian, and Polynesian). Another promising field, with practical consequences, for local initiative is the philosophy of education, where material produced by R.S. Peters has dominated the market, with stultifying effects it is now alleged. As foreshadowed with the notion of "sunrise projects", much of the rhetoric, and argument, concerning science and technology policy (presented in the case of Australia in Jones, op.cit.) can be taken over to apply to X policy, where X is some subject discipline, such as philosophy. �24 these programs. 79 Why bother? Why not simply buy our philosophy, like almost all our technology, off the shelf, from the North? There are several arguments for not doing this, in more than a limited fashion, which are now sketched. There Northern fine a is, firstly, products, the despite inferiority their attractive and built-in packaging. of most Without putting too point on it, many of the imported intellectual goods are shoddy, and only work for a very limited range of applications (e.g. the obsolence vicinity Antipodean of contradictions philosophy undoubtedly imported from the North. dilemmas). or derives from Much shoddy they’re hopeless in that is wrong intellectual with goods Yet buying this material is encouraged by hard-sell cultural ambassadors from the North, who are often enough paid to visit. This 29 In fact something like the last has been the policy of the LSE Philosophy Department, where the only outside appointment over a long period was that of Lakatos (hardly a person far removed ideologically). As observed, it now looks like the practice of the Otago Department also; and apparently it used to be a tendency at Melbourne. But in most places the practice is condemned as nepotistic or parochial, and overridden by the call for "new (Northern) blood . However there can be significant differences between nepotistic appointments and those strengthening local programs. It is at this stage, among others that administrative measures do matter; for example, to ensure that suitable locally-engaged locals gain employment rather than Northern stooges, to direct funds into on-going local programs rather than imported fashions, etc. There are various ways appropriate administrative details can be handled, locally or nationally; but nothing draconian, such as wholesale exclusion of noncitizens, is required. Observe, indeed, that no restriction of academic appointments to nationals (in Canadian style) or the like is being advocated. Anyone who arrives at a conclusion of that sort from what has been argued has misunderstood the case in crucial respects. As a matter of simple mathematics, restricting appointment fields characteristically reduces both quality of candidates available (however quality is assessed) and range of possibilities open for future research; and no such restrictions are advocated. The author has witnessed the debilitating effects of field restrictions at the Australian National University and elsewhere. 30t, c Some of centre also. , these arguments support change (perhaps revolutionary) at the �25 is part of Northern philosophical the colonialism the that - imperialism North - from the too Antipodes willing the successor suffers, or, to more remarkable, encourages! Secondly, there is the inappropriateness of much of the Northern product, especially considered as metaphysics, environmental for package, a to cover, well as as The European North has no satisfactory concerns. land or environmental ethic instance, fit for Antipodean circumstances, and the deeper American package is too spiritually-loaded for mainstream Australian culture. In political American work is much too individualistic the European product, especially the Marxist form, and competition-based, unsuited being theory, both too precious and too high-tech for local and is circumstances, especially again for more environmentally-perceptive people. features of telling also Thirdly, import world’s markets power structures against substitution and pressures and comparative advantage, regionalism; namely, and fashions, (including the Old Boy’s are appealing avoidance of the removal of overseas control and network in jobs, policies, etc.), and gaining of local control, employment of local people, etc. Fourthly, there arguments are philosophy as complexity, sheer diversity, part of intellectual stability, for cultural culture: 39 etc. “ diversity, arguments In fact, from applied to richness, the garden analogy 31 The point is elaborated in Culture. At a more practical level Northern products are again often unsuitable, though for different reasons. For example, the transfer of American agricultural methods and equipment to the thin poor soils of the Antipodes has had disastrous effects, at last beginning to be recognised. “See, for instance, A.A. Mazrui, A World Federation of Cultures: An African Perspective, Free Press, New York, 1976. �26 built into the whole notion of ’culture' transfers. dense, But not only seeds and plants but weeds and many productive garden. pests are We being introduced. and European and are control obtain not only good products, European pests cultivars, but selectiveness Naturally we want a rich, Indian maize and American weeds. as essential, against This is why haphazard previous procedures. The proposal with local is not for, nor would the case sustain, a narrow localism, products, whatever local their quality, heroes, replacing Northern ones. fashions, and local cult That is certainly not the preferred way of the newer regionalism, which tends to do without fashions and heroes and seeks durable quality in products, way of technology policy. which are difference, has to outlets, be not occupied impact, and so on; low environmental Rather, as with technology policy, we select niches satisfactorily or where filled, given etc.). our resource But granting regionalism, base (of we can make a Indeed the policy and use and develop local skills and methods. selective nor is the philosophers, publishing to what extent should components, for instance people, books and other teaching elements, theories and ideas, be imported and Locally? The to what extent should they be produced, trained, conceived possibility of selectiveness in different components means that many mixes are possible. particular mix. There is no need to insist, so far at least, on a The case for the present is mainly for a regional shift, for a significantly greater degree of local autonomy and production.^ But it will do no harm to indicate elements of a mix that finds much Does it sound familiar? Outside philosophy, it should. For example, we have now been told by the Americans that our defence role, unlike theirs, is regional, not global: this is supposed to shed great light on our previously confused defence policies. �27 the suggestion is that we try to eradicate much of Negatively, local favour. the Oxford style of teaching and doing philosophy. as removal Berkeley-Hume with (a however prevailing undue the of no standard on British focus); attention proper status Anglo-American empiricism British emphasis to quo. That includes such things of of heavy The particular, has mostly been a very conservative one. the movements main philosophy, but from emanating also the England, protective of the Northern status quo; they are, recommend and this. just reinforcement Oxford Locke- approach the of in influence, More generally, many of especially Moore-Wittgenstein on quasi-historical the sources; centred practice, ordinary have language been very they tend to leave things very much as the Positively, proposal is that we achieve further disassociation from the Anglo-American empiricist past in two ways: by framework, emphasizing and by local projects diversifying the that move range outside of constricting that philosophical traditions selectively drawn upon, to include not only neglected Continental strands and parts of Eastern thought, philosophy. The idea is but also that Pacific ethnic such a material and plurality of sources, Australasian especially in teaching, will assist in removing narrower cultural biasses, such as British parochialism, and enable more discrimination to be obtained. Then too we should be better able to see the ranges of theories that are open to us in the Antipodes and how to advance our own programs. 34 The point is laboured in E. Gellner, Words and Things, Victor Gollancz, London, 1959. But even ordinary language philosophy, though conservative, and though it much contracted the proper range of philosophical investigations, had its liberating elements, e.g. removal of some of the narrowness and more cramping assumptions induced by technical jargon. Nor has the social impact changed much with the subsequent decline, since 1959, of ordinary language philosophy, the increasing insolvency of Oxbridge philosophy, and its consequent limited take-over by right-wing Ivy League American philosophy. By contrast, the less economically influential growth of redbrick and applied philosophy in some of the British radical and polytechnic institutes has touched no more than the surface of Oxbridge practice. �28 There remain some things we should want to see whatever mixes are chosen One crucial issue is the removal of Northern in different Antipodean regions. bias from papers and publications, research seminars and lectures, letters of This Northern bias is a disposition to cite and discuss reference, and so on. the and works of irrespective discussion projects and of quality the ignore to authors, Northern of their contribution works the more the of irrespective of the quality of their contribution. accept opinions of worth, their been (thus Influential philosophers, under topic largely again It is etc. to uncritically and the disposition to though work produced locally either does not exist or has write or lecture as not importance, better, It is the disposition to to authors from prestigious Northern institutions, defer the to authors, local the famous are, ensuring anything, if that it inclined more is not). And Northern to Australasian bias than many overseas intellectuals, who are perhaps less concerned to be seen as belonging to the Northern mainstream. bias effects not The reduction, and eventual removal, of Northern practice the only of individual philosophers, but the policies of selection and review committees as well as of editors and referees of It journals. local reorientation, with innovations better, development - involves, among Antipodean philosophers things so they that can would cite be getting local assisted things, other work by intellectual to know local work and out regional or point greater local content in courses taught, more time spent at local institutions on study leave, and so on. APPENDIX 1. Background notes on the philosophy supply situation. Sociological investigation of the philosophy labour market in Australia and New Zealand has yet to be attempted. But a picture of some elements underlying the numerical argument of the text can be gained from the following table: simple �29 TABLE 1. Ph.Ds in Philosophy: a USA - Australasian comparison USA Number (Male/Female) Australia New Zealand 1974 413 (346/67) 6 0 1975 375 (318/57) 5 0 1976 382 (319/63) 8 0 1977 330 (264/66) 3 2 (1/1) 1978 283 (235/43) 5 5 (4/1) 1979 285 (204/54) 9 3 (2/1) 1980 246 (187/59) 4 N. A. 1981 N.A. 4 0 Notes: 1. The breakdown of the USA and New Zealand numbers by sexes (male/female) is given. Similar figures do not appear to be available for Australia. 2. The US figures are. for the academic year ending in the Year shown, e.g. 1978 covers the Northern academic year 1977-78. Southern figures are for the calendar year shown. Sources: Digest of Education Statistics, US National Center for Education Statistics; University Statistics, Australian Bureau of Census Statistics; New Zealand Education Statistics. Comments: 1. The contraction of US doctoral production and the concomitant rise in female representation, are clearly indicated. The Australian figures are likely too small to reflect such trends and responses to the academic market. 2. Some of the Australasian numbers include Americans; likewise the American figures provide no nationality breakdown. 3. There is no information available on the number of Australians proceeding to higher degrees in philosophy outside Australia. In applying table 1 some simplifying assumptions are made. assumed that candidates for appointment For example, it is to regular university positions now would have a doctorate or the equivalent (until recently a B.Phil was taken as a near well). equivalent It is of a assumed, North what American seems to Ph.D.; take publications the case, that serve as the number of could �30 Australasians proceeding to higher degrees in philosophy abroad is relatively small, and no more than the order of Ph.Ds. taken locally. It can be assumed, without upsetting applications of table 1, that Australasian graduates match, say, the upper half of American graduates in standard attained. There is no compiled information on academic vacancies in philosophy in Australia or New Zealand - on the numbers of vacancies, on how the positions It would however be a routine, are filled, by what nationalities, sexes, etc. if matter tedious some of assemble to data, this is of considerable which relevlance to the planning of philosophy programs. APPENDIX 2. On the earlier considering the Editor of the idea of a National of possibility initial German distinction a National AJPP distinguished two between Weltanschauung and Philosophy for Australia. Philosophy’, the (Australian) corresponding senses In Lebensanchauung’ to (p.292). 'the In the first, that of ’a scheme of the universe’, ’an Australian Philosophy is as as ridiculous confirmation prejud ices’. Holland, personal’ Science’. falsification, or Granted: fostered, etc ., in Christian a ’are The is argument of independent truth, that national and sympathies its or but that does not mean that a theory may not be held, in one region but not others, as intuitionism was for long in or way, Cartesianism ’a nation in France. like an In a second individual may ’more develop intimate a and certain temperamental attitude to the problems of existence, which we may ... call its philosophy of life. A nation’s philosophy, like its art and its literature, is a mode of expression for the national consciousness. form of evolving the national genius national culture. ....’ But, (pp.292-3). in the first It is, place, It is a specialised in short, this is part of the by no means entirely separate from the initial sense, a philosophy comprising not merely a fairly comprehensive theory but also an integrated set of attitudes (like an �31 operational paradigm). Furthermore, only by concession are such items as ’the national consciousness’ and 'the Australian landscape’ of meriting definite Australian descriptors. literature, has many strands to it, accounted single units philosophy, Australian like some not particularly distinctive (in any sense): such things form rather loose families. Editor The does not find, does not really hope to in find ’a modern industrialised community’ - with its modular parts interchangeable with those of others - a claims find to and courage a fair trite life, with a difference. build on (’traditions but nothing at all distinctive. philosophy of national moral dealing’), base to In fact ... of humour, So far, be a national philosophy, at least of life, but is not; there can he then, this does not however exclude there being various regional philosophies (such as local research programs). plunged that into ’if So far, inconsistency: then, the all is well. trouble derives But shortly from the the Editor is extravagant claim Australia has nothing to do with these - the eternal values of the Spirit, the Ideals of Truth, Goodness and Beauty - then and only then has she nothing to do with Philosophy’ (p.295; with rearrangement). But, as Australia has nothing per se to do with these - as is virtually conceded, these values involving a 'wider sweep’ do with Philosophy, Though the than any national boundaries - "she" has nothing to contradicting the contradiction is easily possibility of avoided by a National Philosophy. the extravagant rescinding claim, the ideal of a National Philosophy should be allowed to rest in peace: nationalism has had its time. �32 R. Routley35 Research School of Social Sciences Australian National University 35 With thanks to R. Elliot, W. Godfrey-Smith, S. Grave and L. Mirlin, to several members of the audience at the presentation of the paper at the 1983 Australasian Association of Philosophy Conference, University of Adelaide, to several referees for this Journal, and, not least, to the present Editor. �t •r ■ PROSPECTS FOR REGIONAL PHILOSOPHIES IN AUSTRALASIA Philosophy, especially academic philosophy but also folk philosophy, like other intellectual and higher cultural activity in Australasia, has long been dominated, indeed Europe, now the largely swamped, by Northern Given increasingly from North America. cultural and other baggage the imported, influences, initially the migration patterns, composition ethnic resulting ruling populations, such a result was virtually inevitable. does not have to stay that way. from of the But it Suitable policies, a good philosophy policy, could change things. thought The of a is hardly a new one. culture, In 1923, a matching perhaps philosophy, regional regional a New Zealand correspondent to the newly-launched Australasian Journal of Psychology and Philosophy mentioned the possibility of ’a new kind or temper of philosophy under these southern skies’ which the such a reaching Journal might role (or, not community). for merely And that matter, professional although however hardly The Journal has foster.1 actively philosophers some things solid foundation for a new regionalism its pursued have changed pronounced aim wider a but in Australia, in philosophy, and temper of southern skies were intended distinctively 1AJPP, March same volume, Appendix 2. New Zealand 1923, p.74. p.292.ff; his philosophy under to include: but characteristics, The question was discussion is laying a that possibility of a New Zealan few distiri have of Australasian new temper of philosophy has hardly been realised. There is of a new kind fulfilled shown up le in the way ies, which the y features, ’ no in New Zealand taken up by the Editor in the considered below, especially in �2 7 philosophy’. New Zealand remains a substantial net importer of philosophy, The situation of colonial dominance that used to prevail in and philosophers. Australia, where virtually chairs, all and many philosophy, were filled by academics from the North, power and influence of professors in small departments, and covered considered and in tends to persist in New Zealand, where no established chairs are occupied by locals.2 3 topics posts academic other Given the usual in courses designed, especially appointments made, the heavy Northern orientation of philosophy taught and researched in New Zealand is not The Northern control is perhaps most strikingly exhibited at the surprising. oldest of New Zealand universities, the University of Otago, where the Philosophy Department has been substantially captured by a British School and increasingly looks event, the like an offshoot of overwhelming Anglo-American the University of London.4 dominance of New Zealand In any philosophy also a feature only in slightly lesser degree of Australian philosophy - can be confirmed by a content survey of the courses offered and research papers written at New Zealand universities. Even when local people have been appointed to positions in Australasia, they have been brought up on a solid diet of Anglo-American material, and they have often been reforged or finished in the North as well. * In particular, the 2 S.A. Grave, A History of Philosophy in Australia, Queensland University Press, 1983, p.l. Page references are to the manuscript. The paper draws heavily on this history. 3 This claim was correct at the 1983). With the recent loss of qualification, but the pattern of 4In the 1983 presentation of the paper (August Wellington, the claim may require mination persists. Commonwealth University Handbook listing, 6 of the 8 members of the Department held their main degree, Ph.D., from -the London/?and one of the remainder from. Exeter). Only one member of the Department, soon to retire, falls outside me nexus. �3 requirements of the Australasian universities in the major period of post­ World War II expansion were conveniently seen to in the case of philosophy by Many degree. B.Phil. the Oxford of departments philosophy remain full of products of this cultural mill: indeed until the mid 70s candidates finished in Oxford were hard to beat out when they applied for positions, such was the prestige of Oxford and (unwarranted) the regrettable, but still continuing, "cultural cringe". Nonetheless, in been occurring scene will (as despite the Northern the Antipodes, be especially on indicated). significant dominance, worth is It changes have the Australian philosophical asking whether Australian philosophy is moving towards the sort of change that occurred in USA more than 100 years ago when the Harvard Philosophy Department was brought (or bought) together, its "golden and age" began.American philosophy was never quite the same again, and became its own thing. There are now new forces operating which could help to move Australian philosophy in such a direction. the widespread emergence, particularly in alternative There is culture, of choice along a new £ which regionalism, other choices; local fashioning provides applies of a national model for and to in cultural stark science reflection and in and ideological contrast, technology regional there policies, philosophy directly bears on parts of the philosophy of science. soon appear, there are also some is serious obstacles the with centralised which not only policy but also Unfortunately, as will to regional philosophies and to the very idea of a regional philosophy. ^See B. Kuklick, The Rise of American Philosophy; Cambridge, Massachusetts 1860-1930, Yale University Press, 1977, Parts 2 and 3. On this bio-regionalism, see especially, Fourth World News, vol. 1, and K. Sale, Human Scale, Coward, McCann and Geoghegan, New York, 1980. 1983, �USA, long an importer of culture from Europe, has recently become a net components of philosophical following not culture, taken). suit, should evidently but Are reasons there achieve not also the gAmerican (witness philosophy has Oxford from output lower of such as higher culture if Australasia, balance of certainly culture, of exporter a better turn why cultural Yes, there are reasons. payments, especially in philosophy? of In the first place, the change in the cultural position of the USA went with, and perhaps in part derived economic of most dominance entails Australasia’s changes in economic power relations. from, vast there is cultural dominance, culture, there since is little prospect serious no prospect If for that Australasia will ever emulate or attain American economic eminence (at least not without nuclear destruction of the North, flow of commodities, cultural and other). universities not only increasingly of of contingent Americans, former group, Northern cultural they. As priorities, a they also component include whose research of Northern academics, substantial a and teaching additional is bent to It is unlikely that this influential segment, especially (become so will commitments, long entire Secondly, as observed, Antipodean large fellow-travellers, Northern concerns. the contain and disruption of the as apart Antipodeans they are in a bind locally acclimatised do from the not situation; isolated drastically as to) give up Nor person. alter their its should cultural for it can be persuasively argued that they would be better off, as far as quality and product goes, stocking their universities with American teaching components and researching American- oriented concerns. One simple numerical argument that Antipodean universities would be better off with Americans in the main, takes the following lines:- The (higher degree) graduates of Australasian culturally distinguished, and American are not significantly at least in subjects such as philosophy. Consider �now number the of quality Austroamerican graduates; academics produced of per number degree higher say there is 1 per every n graduates. The (great) preponderance of graduates will be Americans, just by virtue of their vastly greater population and their more extensive system of university education.7 So also then, just by ratio considerations, the great preponderance of quality academics from an drawn upper percentiles among they interested universities. Austroamerican base an Such would argument appointing be does not as will Clearly, Antipodeans, those quality products. quality, in will be American, work to more show Americans that, for to the were their similar reasons, American universities should be full of Chinese or Indian professors, for two Asians reasons; and first Americans, there are especially significant in cultural differences disciplines such as between philosophy; and secondly, their university systems do not deliver such great quotas of higher degree or high quality graduates, at least in philosophy. The conclusion of the numerical argument will not be a popular one. anti-Americanism felt the universities; The in portions of the Australasian community extends into and recently there has been increasing insistence, especially by the now aging younger Turks that university positions should be reserved for locals. This at the same time as these Turks often preach of an international community of scholars, presumably then with "free" interchange, As indicated in Appendix 1, whereassumptions made in the argument are . defended, the ratio of US philosophy graduates with doctorates as compared with Australian exceeds 30 to 1. And, as is weM-known, the extent of university education is much greater in USA than! in Australasia: indeed Australia is in this respect among the worst edlated of the developed nations, as OECD figures have made plain (see, e.g. Jb. Jones, Sleepers Wake^^ Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 1982, Chapter I I J / > �6 etc. They cannot have it all ways.3 So long continues, the present centre will as the dominate they will have more economically; them if large to free-flow than us, and and culturally periphery the ideas of interchange personnel well as as should go by and jobs here (centrally-determined) quality in this high cultural it is business that we seek, as mostly claim. Now anyway, it is there that arguments. For enough widely is we are recognised, something not lower-down drastically wrong hierarchical with these ladders sorts of flooded with high-quality Northerners who would regularly drive out local contenders for positions, if we only preferred the Northerners when they were quite visibly superior: rather we are inundated by Americans with inflated references, who have the messages of the centre better than locals echelon do, (often and remote Northern fields tend Northern biassed) appointment to look greener to higher- committees than dusty locals As is beginning to be recognised too, whose shortcomings are known better. the Northern centres tend to retain their higher-quality products, and allow them to be exiled to the periphery only if they somehow fall foul of system (e.g. of the academic system for political or personal reasons). 8A reverse flow of the better or the Too //K odox academics from Australasia to A Leica should also be expected (outside mes of university contraction). Acci yrding _____d argument, which is based on labour] larket to assumptions of this brain considerations, appointment and lifestyle conditions for academics arej etter in USA than Australia and much better than those in economically—depressed New jhejr salaries, better standard of living, superio Zealand (e.g. high' research conditions, etc.) things being £equal, able academic from the Antipodes will rel;||jBate in USA as academic positions become avai ble. The argument also help^^xplain why Antipodean ui 'versifies cannot ex :, for the most part, to attract really top-drawer Nojrt Nortl srners for very long.'T' Of course, economically illy irrelevant irrele factors do in^Tu® interference; e.g. perverse t«gTua itsl to oddJball Antipodean intellectual enterprises which reduce commitment -ceLtabilit*^ or pre-industrial ties to place or persons or lifestyle market acc which imsmulaiS-y L_ _ restrict mobility (such as local roots, family attachments, even distaste for American urban lifestyles). �7 often Northern the centres have disposed of intellectually their inferior products in the periphery. All this makes the especially Americans, Northerners, appointing position look doubly bad. We ought, it seems, to be even if they are overrated their references, and usually not out of the top drawer, And yet quality. in in order to maximize doing so does not achieve the desired quality result, and breeds discontent elsewhere, especially among the aging Turks. Fortunately there obtain cultural sufficient subtitutable for us. we before from this awkward and that is the way of regionalism. shaky arguments; and way out is a elaborate distance,so that situation and these We do our own things; they are not simply Then the shaky numerical argument does fall down. the emerging proposal there are other But influential arguments to dispose of, and the disposal bears on the proposal. to begin with, There is, have so far been conceded: the argument for excellence, that excellence, which we all more or elements of which there is an objective commodity, quality or less agree about, which is proportionately more abundant in the North, and which is what academic institutions crave and seek and what appointments aim to capture, indeed maximize. That at least is the type of myth most of us have encountered; and many of us now know it is a myth, in fact appointments profit, but a that dangerous way, rather seek any myth. more Most that places don’t organisations aim even try just to to make maximize to satisfice on a mix of factors, of which assessed quality is only one, and not often the highest ranking one. Ability to fit ^This is easier in the cultural than the technological sphere. However it is also possible technologically: (stronger) theses of technological determinism, and so of cultural determinism, are false. We can choose different options, technologically, as well as culturally. �8 into some sort of program, teaching or research, is another, and commonly more important factor; is no good reason why such a program should not and there sometimes be a regionally oriented one. So given prevailing practices, the And, argument from excellence does not exclude regional philosophy programs. in any event, there are enough local candidates of sufficient worth to proceed with regional programs clearcut without of/ excellence. sacrifice Local Jl enterprise need entail no loss of excellence, and could increase it. A The deeper-cutting with idea the objection is that there is something seriously amiss objective of objective importance; criticism as bracketed out notions the that excellence, these with more values contextual—relativisation a rather generally, component paradigm, intellectual narrow the to framework or viewpoint to which these values relate.10 within connected the open are notions objective of and of sorts of same they that of notion have the valuing: While those operating as such Oxbridge ordinary language philosophy or Sydney materialism say, can bracket out the viewpoint, since it is incorporated in the operational paradigm, and so arrive at seemingly objective quality judgements, the judgements are not preserved (e.g. in truth Marxist value) when viewpoints. transposed Consider, to for other frameworks, comparison, the e.g. idealistic judgements as to or the quality or worth of a forest^made variously by a deep ecologist, an industrial forester, and a recreational officer. a holistically-inclined Marxist, and philosophers Californian who pretend Compare judgements as to the quality of philosopher, environmental environmental that such by philosophers. environmental work language, ordinary There cannot are be even judged, hat follows also> Begins to bring out what is omitted in a main theme of R.S.JPirsig, _______ Zen and __ , d/e Art Motor Cycle Maintenance, Bodley H^lad , London, __ of — ---— the notion of objective excellence doe , Note that defSwring not lead to ivism. To avoid the customary false dichotomy, compare e notion of validity (usually ceded to themselves these days by classical lo cians). cw �9 seemingly because it of the main philosophical by members is not done peer group at Harvard and like institutions. As this begins the of judgements to reveal, judgements importance work of of quality are not independent of done or problems tackled. importance of problems and issues is highly paradigm dependent. the But For example, problems suet/ as those of quantifying-in and of possible worlds and of de re thought^ ^ich assume immense importance for fashionable referential theories within the mainstream empiricist paradigm, vanish to relative insignificance outside that restricted viewpoint. that most Now observe judgements as to what are the important problems and what constitutes important work - matters helping determine quality - are shipped down from the North. Their importance is relative to their paradigmatic placement, and the paradigms concerned are exported to the Antipodes through the main channels already indicated. We are free to reject these paradigms and select alternatives, and there are, it can be argued, good reasons choose different that generally energy favoured just that, much as to do technology the in (or different the which North there are good reasons to military technology) North is eager to from export southwards. Similar which might argument, points apply against alternatively that be sophisticated mass-produced and cosmopolitan. The argument 'cosmopolitan subject’, called people -marketed the from is based cosmopolitan/international the Peter everywhere Holland; Stuyvesant smoke this argument international superior product cigarette-sophistication is on the assumption that philosophy is a that is is not the sort of enterprise for which place �10 and people are as significant they are for poetry or that philosophy important thing, is a finished product of a certain sort (a propositional theory), not a process of production also. process of production the place and people involved (e.g. material. And and literature, the if not since no philosophy, format, 12 than more work a like theorems just internationally-approved is product The novel. It takes for granted, assumption has only to be presented to be questioned. for one the and of art, But in the in discussion) are like a piece assembled arguments in of an then again the historical setting matters, literature, does not emerge in a vacuum. Plato’s philosophy could not have emerged in ancient Australia, and if cribbed & 13 in mid 20th century Oxford would surely have been marked down or rejected. It is important not to be sidetracked into issues - resembling problems in aesthetics - that do not need to be contested, such as whether and what extent sets of themes and arguments produced in one place and setting could have been produced in another. A nonnuclear technology of some sort could be adopted in Europe but apparently will not be, whereas there is reasonable prospect that New Zealand, strategy. ^Grave, in It is contrast with the doing, op.cit., p.2: Australia, will and not what could the term pursue a be done, ’cosmopolitan subject’ nonnuclear energy that matters here. used there comes from Donegan. As to the significance of place and people for literature, see further C. Partridge, The Making of New Cultures, Editions Rodopi, Amsterdam, 1982. xz,Like a paper in the biological sciences. But here again technique methodology, which may both be regional, are crucially important. 1 3 Related and points can be made using less extreme examples, e.g. concerning modern American work. Consider, for instance such texts as W.V. Quine’s Word and Object, (Wiley, New York, 1960) or R. Nozick*s Anarchy, State and Utopia (Basic Books, New York, 1974). The assumptions taken for granted, the arguments involved, etc., are especially American: it is not just the style. The acceptability of arguments and positions is dependent on place and received paradigm. �11 logic, Dialethic which invalidates Anglo-American philosophy, the could perhaps technique and methodology of in the North (though be done much there would be substantial cultural resistance): it is not being done there, and is not likely Antipodeans techniques, to be in choose can do done the their Anglo-American own their own distinctive sphere.^ distinctive thing. The To technology this extent, and logical international/cosmopolitan argument, stated in a form that would be telling, fails. Of course it can be argued, it is being argued, that Antipodeans don’t need to be, or even oughtn’t to be pursuing their own energy or logic policies and apparatus. But meeting these considerations takes us to a whole new set of issues concerning the merit of various policies and programs, the point of diversity, etc. - far beyond the cosmopolitan argument. The new arguments, to which we shall return, are not a lot more convincing however than comparable arguments concerning cooking: that we don’t devising our own cuisine or wine styles. need to be or oughtn’t to be British, or at least cosmopolitan, cooking is adequate: we should stick to that and buy it off the shelf from the North, ideally importing the cooks also. Do we that British philosophy is have good reasons to think than British cooking? Antipodeans are free^in principle^ then, to pursue their own paradigms; and to do so they will by and large want to, and mostly have to, appoint their own people, people they have educated - not saboteurs or people who have (had ) to be re-educated, from el where, in particular from the North. But will •^Much as co communities the extreme nist anarchism, a live possibility for communes and perhaps Australia, is culturally excluded in North America, owing to ndividualism of that culture. On dialethic logic, see G. Priest and R. Routley, On Paraconsistency, Research Papers in Logic, #13, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University, 1983. �12 paradigms^, tie their intellectual of features the cultur local though works of with cultural In a loose way, philosophy wi not usually with paradigms, least, at distinctive they may link, tie in with the culture in the _______ ____ z sometimes distinct from_______________ more technical works) integral fashion that novels A> a. /sn-X'etL do.^ Grave considers certain cultural features, not restricted to particular programs, philosophical Australian product’ help that in philosophy Australia as ’ an - ’unimportant though this is compared with what matters But style, acceptability, truth, do matter, in philosophy' he hastens to add. and are mark not independent - or independent so far as their perception goes in the case of truth and correctness15 - from underlying broad theory or received paradigm. However the marks Grave cautiously advances, significant though they are, do not features serve to distinguish the philosophy Australian Australian exhibits in the product, lesser degree adventurous and polemical philosophy of Greek antiquity. by Passmore as 'most typical first two than the being more The first, described of Australian philosophy’, is a ’diversity of approach and readiness to put forward an unconventional or unfashionable point view',1^ of philosophy, something which more (with typical some of notable ancient philosophy exceptions) than exhibits uniformity reflecting that often attributed to the land itself. Australian an austere The second, 15Nothing need be conceded to trong cultural relativity themes, ough they would support the case L Iia L tour '/is enough that theories remain radically _ y bei incomplete and that there/^/^n accordingly b rival theories as what is is true. Similarly, however^ phy is j concaved ~as the sea or truth, seian/Mrore, really), or a explanation, uifierstanding^ these inquiry of a certain sort^Fthere can bez45^will be be, ^/competing accounts; so a pluralistic theory is inevitable in giving a fuller view. 1 Both preceding quotations, while included as such in Grave’s Introduction, are from J. Passmore, ’Philosophy', in The Pattern of Australian Culture (ed. A.L. McLeod), Cornell University Press, Ithaca, N.Y., 1963, pp.131-168. The same annotation also applies to the third mark. �Ke surprising, more and ’the philosophy, Wittgensteinian mark most notable political extraordinary by discussed Andersonian itself’ (p.2). ... being This the example is line-up it was far from if Sydney, Australian between the not isolated: them concern the fervour generated by "Australian materialism", others among the .. example and Melbourne Andersonian philosophy of character’ Grave), engagement and by some philosophy departments confrontation growing the (both concerning the relevant/paraconsistent program, with the local (’adversarial’) style leading to criticism by sharp Americans. with Connected these firs two marks are . —■--------------- ------ furthe part. of much characteristics Australian Aiilosophy y(^ho for hat influenced by jSydney rather than originating in Melb the most namely directness, unwillingne to muffle points, surface clarity /occj/ unkindly add, untne , unsubtjety and crudity.> The third and t A fourth marks as Grave i effect notes, hardly distinguishing features of Australian philosophy. areas, is third, which applies well to other intellectual the contrast of the Australian reputation in philosophy indeed of Australia as national The a ’center of philosophical inquiry’, with the anti-intellectual stereotype achievement Australians than rather especially a of feature of as intellectual to a people subtlety’. Anglo-American philosophy; ’devoted The namely physical to fourth the mark is isolation of academic philosophy in Australasia from, and its general indifference or even hostility to, the sort of imported philosophy (e.g. that of Nietzsche and the existentialists) generating interest in literary and arts circles. The philosophy failure does of not marks such matter. sufficiently separated by its For to adequately one thing, separate the research projects. out Australian For another, Australian produce is regionalism should not be confused with nationalism, nor more regional positions such as Sydneyside materialism or Wellington modalism with national philosophies. �14 as in mojjt other things, Nationalism in philoso^iy, to not be encouragedand the new regionalism is an undesirable trait, is linked, in other cultural things, with the breakdown of nations and contraction of state power. * To get back * * to where we were: * * the emerging proposal is this, that we start - or better much increase - doing our own distinctive things, and that we team up to do In fact so. there are several suggestions that begin to emerge, concerning research and teaching, publications and appointments, study leave and sponsored visitors. These are not just that we do our own selection of topics and people, and style and methods, decide instead of having these foisted upon us - not just, our own priorities, that is, that we play our own games (whether invented here or taken over from the North) and not theirs, Rules and Rugby instead of Gridiron and Basketball - but that we abandon the individual competitive model of cultural achievement, sold to us and fostered by the North, in favour of a group cooperative approach (elements of which are already modelled in Antipodean social clubs). The thoughts here are simple and familiar. digging example: it is well-known that two people cooperating can dig a ditch more rapidly and enjoyably 17 See, e.g., London, 1957. On the one side is the ditch­ Sale, than two op.cit., people working on the ditch separately. and L. Kohr, The Breakdown of Nations, RKP, The Editor of the new 1923 AJPP did however take seriously the notion of National Philosophy, of (what must have surprised some New Zealand readers) an Australian Philosophy; some of the issues there raised (p.292ff) are addressed in Appendix 2. �15 Cooperative work tends to pay off - in philosophy or elsewhere - in terms of output, quality, and enjoyment in the doing. On the other side, experience shows that we in the periphery cannot individually complete very successfully with the centre on achievements in their programs. predominantly individualistic the in Despite the highly competitive One is the communication situation. for this. attainment nature of results of depends There are several reasons American academic enterprise,much upon verbal rapid and communication For, despite the individualism myth, work is access to unpublished material. jointly based, and builds on the work of manyji^hen the time is ripe for some idea or result, several clever people will be able to hit on it. communications are nationalistic important considerations in obtaining rapid (e.g. Poles tend publication of to promote Then again the Polish idea or results, Russians will cite a Russian who achieves a result at about the same time as an outsider). There face-to-face seminars fact of when limited read they is the fact that much is conveyed verbally and through so that and that reading, on local results will be conveyed. material from people at the the centre centre by There is the tend to concentrate central people, so that published items and results from the periphery will often not be noticed, and may well lose publication. receive, 18 merit out There to is central also for merit, competitors the more fact that publication even if people they at the achieve centre and communication central tend to opportunities Reflecting other features of the culture and enterprise of the centre which are not so deeply embedded in Australasia: see further R. Routley, ’Culture, philosophy, and approaches to the natural environment - an Australian perspective’, in The Environment, Ethics and Ecology (Ed. D. Bennett), The Faculties, Australian National University, 1984, and also ’Culture and the roots of political divergence: the Australian/American contrast’, typescript, Canberra, 1983; both referred to subsequently as ’Culture’ . �16 than people towards the periphery. the size and Here economic factors do begin to enter;, distribution of the academic market e.g., a great (there are, many more academic phzilosophe s in North America than in the whole rest of the world), control of outlets and journalj^ (with few exceptions all Northern)^etc. economic power does and not, not, need determine culture - we can shut off the Northern philosophical propaganda in much the way we shut off our television sets if we really want to. stop being impressed by And we can those philosophical middle-men who make a living by importing the Northern stuff. So what do we do? We adapt to the cultural-philosophical level, several h of those things, that have been suggested in the regionalism. We aim at some A regional importers awakening and doctrines and and local imitators positions of, from self-reliance. and local the North. We do commentators For on example , we slavish remain not and peddlars don’t spend of, our academic lives trying to tease out what Davidson or Dummett or Kripke meant by this or that through. To in the hope that be sure, I am some pale Northern light will perhaps not suggesting that emulate the filter appalling �17 But, des xLte having been given sufficient cause, we shouldn’t cut ourselves off 'from Northern paradigms and influences (we could hardly manage A anyway). to We A traditions: use what we need these from continuing o we should stay informed of, but not imitators of, or part of, In enterprises. their reasonably can just as Northern traditions, from cutting from loose case, any regional are rooted in the people are largely European stock. these traditions and (and likely minority) traditions, these older cultures older So far starting afresh from nowhere, and the local variations that have already appeared are what we want to develop and perhaps mutate, as again with wine styles. of Part the proposal then is that encourage and develop our own things, Antipodean paradigms, Northern paradigms. rather It we research programs, very great Nor, the locaY and so shape nefer is not as if we have to build from nothing, to do to try to create cultural For there are research programs already initiated, which have the advantage of fortunately, future our own than working with pale northern reflections of - what is very difficult - entirely original work, components. do increasingly is being grounded in features of the larger culture. do we need to make the story up - though helping to shape part of what the Australia - New Zealand proposal is about. Much of is a different and more difficult already indicated in Grave’s survey of Australian philosophy. the story, for proposition - is All one really has to do is to bring out programs he has already indicated and provide some elaboration and commentary. level, I shall To pull the investigation down to a more concrete fooyxizci/li/esketch some more prominent programs - by no means the only A programs - and remark on some relevant features of them. 19 See Culture, op.cit. �18 The longest running and best known program is, without much doubt, of Australian naturalism, and which aims see to the that world, natural and everything else, as suitably encompassed within the framework of the world of science. (physical) The as generally is subprogram Sydney materialism, a major Adelaide which subsequently died out there. such famous components central state version of failures in to Anderson’s functionalism and nowadays like Faced reduction in The latter program has included takes all now it plans, it It program initiated a identity theme as the mental-material contingent materialism, its back traced and is now best exhibited in Armstrong’s work. empiricist metaphysics, contains program and more derivatively, in, with physicalisms incorporates a conspicuous "scientifically" a trimmed theory of universals, and an account/of natural laws as relations of universals, both components of the develop®®^ Sydney reali naturalism program, sm. Parts of the especially materialism and central state reductionism and the unified science ideal, have had counterparts in the North, but the program l^s, for the most part, retained its distinctively Austr^/ian character /(“despite export efforts, it never caught on in New Zealand^7 The program fits smoothly, moreover, and earthy, so into Australian culture. far as It is similarly down-to-earth, philosophy can be, without the fancy ideas or effete idealism of European philosophy or the spirituality and suppressed puritanism with which pragmatism). commitments, much of And and North yet though it it American does thinking not shrink (including simmers from is basically empiricist, explicit it is not nowadays, metaphysical positivistic (rejecting a verification principle, in particular). 20 Anderson’s metaphysics was however far more opposed to reductions than what has succeeded it. For an account of Anderson’s philosophy, and a history and account op.cit. of Australian naturalism and materialism, see especially Grave, �19 It is a city program, based broadcast from mainly the University of Sydney to other metropolitan universities; but the program does extend outside the universities a bit (a tiny bit) to the larger metropolitan culture. North America, the broader Russell, so in Australasia, little professional philosophy impinges on community, Popper and 21 naturalism program Perth, and has outliers from notable used even on being quite would be or Kuhn Australasia Apart As in to an the wider academic community, exceptional. achievement, stretch through one (To turn worth to Adelaide; in around this working work by for.) The it now reaches to in Canberra, as well as a core of opposition there. exceptions, the program has never had the more than a rather precarious hold, same hold, or nor, more surprisingly, in Melbourne: has it had heavyweight criticism from there (or indeed much external criticism from elsewhere), out. the old confrontation of major city philosophies having died Melbourne philosophy is more historically oriented stricken than Sydney; Melbourne dominated Continental philosophy; by a procession philosophy; then, a of more remarkable and more religion philosophy, much more than Sydney, has Northern recently, turnabout, fashions: earlier Wittgenstein, Quine, idealism ordinary Davidson and been and language extensional reduction; now perhaps Lewis, Kripke and Dummett? 21 In Canada, for example, while most academics from other disciplines would know of, and perhaps a little about, Russell, far fewer would know of Wittgenstein (though he is becoming known to lit. crit. groups), and virtually none would know of Quine. (The sampling is subjective.) On the fairly recent ’triumph of professionalism’ in philosophy in USA, see Kuklick, op.cit., p.565ff. Kuklick brings out well some of the more disastrous features of professionalism, but does not sufficiently notice that the virtuous features resulting from some professionalisation can be synthesized with broader philosophical activity. 22 The exceptions Include Ellis’s distinctive program, which can be accounted part of the broader naturalist program, and at Monash the work of F. Jackson and, earlier, of H. Munro in value theory. �20 one The reaches that program beyond the of confines the cities in Australia - which is after all a metropolitan dominated culture, the vast land always the other being Australian environmentalism, is - a rather diffuse program, which has connections with the Colleges of Advanced Education in the country towns and the communes on the North Coast. So far the program is as much distinguished is. environmental Europe by what positions specifically feature of are a having not as is it it what the New World, most of transformed Serious deeper and the Old World, its natural environment and and having little wild untouched country left, and little sensitivity accordingly to such as issues Europe that tend admit those of to concern shallow outside environmentalism the built approaches superficiality European The main wilderness. continues North issues human-transformed environment, and (and environmental encourage techno-fix dominate to America. North issues situations). of much the New in And World environmentalism American differs significantly however from Antipodean environmentalism, most obviously in the religious-spiritual of component the former, but in several other respects as well (see further Culture). positively, More environmentalism:- Firstly, there there three are an is strands to extended utilitarianism, Australian/ differing little in theory from Bentham’s enlarged position, which insists upon counting) the utilities British base, movements: of all sentient creatures. This position, developed from a has figured prominently in animal welfare and animal liberation and though it has focussed on domestic animals, animals used in research and hunted (wild) animals, it has also become entangled in issues of bio-research more generally such as genetic engineering. concerned with, or much interested in, endangered species, It is not however the disappearance of wild lands, the conversion of forests, etc., except insofar as these have a bearing on animal pain and pleasure. Wider and deeper environmental concerns �21 appear only as a spinoff from animal welfare, inadequate deal. Secondly, there is a wider and a deeper ecological position, and so deeper concerns get an which is not utilitarian and which recognises irreducible value elsewhere than sentience or forests and differs natural systems. ecosystems, especially wild and from spiritualism American Thirdly, naturalism. there intrinsic value which finds psychological states, and of is from an course, extension almost as in trees and This position of American everywhere, a reactionary component, critical of the other strands, which insists that all that be to needs on accomplished the environmental can be front achieved within older established (European) ethical and political frameworks. Whereas materialism is based in Sydney, environmentalism is centred in Melbourne and Canberra, but also includes Brisbane and Perth. Also centred in Canberra, and reaching across the country, with good connections in Melbourne, but few in Sydney, materialism and further environmental input from relevant/paraconsistent affecting program program other hich the is major perhaps relevant/paraconsistent programs have and epistemology program areas of includes and which extends is their core value philosophy, centres a the with respectively, the logic especially in Whereas in metaphysics, theory essentially more program. program, but metaphysics Australia than any one The other to New Zealand, has also been described elsewhere. 23 It has been described more fully elsewhere: see, in particular, Environmental Philosophy (ed. D. Mannison and others), RSSS, Australian National University, 1980. o/ Again, like all the Australian programs, both those mentioned and others, in Grave, op.cit. But see further/ R. Routley, ’Research in Logic in Australia, New Zealand and Oceania’, Research Papers in Logic #14, Australian National University, 1983 (which alto considers other programs in logic); G. Priest and R. Routley, op. cit.^and R. Routley, R.K. Meyer and others, Relevant Logics and Their Rivals, Ridgeview, California, 1982. �22 The main research grounded logic program program. of the in New Zealand philosophy is also A program emanating located mainly in Wellington, The impact evident from the work of Prior and a now it might be called the extended modal program. program on philosophy is perhaps best seen in Cresswell's work.2 Australian philosophy used to be known, for its is in some quarters, regrettably New Zealand philosophy is mostly hard-headed empiricism; not known and still for anything much, except perhaps, in UK, that Prior brought unusual adaption of Russellian philosophy from that remote place. his Neither of these impressions is particularly accurate; both are rather out-of-date. But the alm of work of the present type is, of course, not just to correct these impressions, not just to reflect or report on culture - for what one would like to reflect upon is not sufficiently there - but also to help manufacture elements of a culture, to make an image. To resist the already flourishing North, we should increase our efforts to further the programs, and perhaps other sunrige projects;26 to build* 7 ,^fjee especially M.J. Cresswell, _&ics and ^.anguages, Methuen, London, 1973; but see also work by Goldblatt, rra by Hugtrfs--referred to in Research in Logic, op.cit. Also described i h ifi anvoriginal version of the modal program (transparent intensional logic) elaborated by Tichy at Otago. 7A °Among sunrise projects in Australian philosophy so far suggested (not all of them feasible) are these: Australian feminism, Antipodean social and political alternatives, peace studies, indigenous regional philosophies (especially Aboriginal, Melanesian, and Polynesian). Another promising field, with practical consequences, for local initiative is the philosophy of education, where material produced yby R.S. Peters has dominated the market, with stultifying effects it is now Alleged. y As foreshadowed with the notion, "sunrise projects", much of the rhetoric, and argument, concerning science and technology policy (presented in the case of Australia in Jones, op.cit.) can be taken over to apply to X policy, where X is some subject discipline, such as philosophy. A �23 teaching and research around the programs selected for promotion, elaboration, and criticism, to orient appointments, especially of involved local people, to Why not simply buy our philosophy, like almost Why bother? these programs. all our technology, off the shelf, from the North? There are several arguments for not doing this, in more than a limited fashion, which are now sketched/. ° is, There firstly, the inferiority and built-in obsolence of Northern A products, despite their attractive packaging. Without putting too fine a point on it, many of the imported intellectual goods are shoddy, and only work for a very limited range of applications vicinity of contradictions or dilemmas). philosophy undoubtedly derives from (e.g. they’re hopeless in the Much that is wrong with Antipodean shoddy intellectual goods imported from 27 In fact something like the last has been the polictf of the LSE Philosophy Department, where the only outside appointment over a Aong period was that of Lakatos (hardly a person far removed ideologically)/. As observed, it now looks like the practice of the Otago Department also; and apparently it used to be a tendency at Melbourne. But in most places the practice is condemned as nepotistic or parochial, and overridden by the call for "new (Northern) blood'. However there can be significant differences between nepotistic appointments and those strengthening local programs. It is at this for example, to rather than Northern stc/oges, rather than imported fashions, administrative details draconian, do matter; employment n-going local programs ious ways appropriate Observe^ that no Canadian style) or the like is being advocated. conclusion of that sort from what has been argued has misunderstood the in crucial respects. As a t matter of simple mathematics, appointment fields characteristically reduces both quality of available (however quality i assessed) range of possibilities open future research; d no s h restrictioi/s are advocated. The author witnessed the se times disastrous eff s of field restrictions at Australian National University. — Some of centre also. 2g ___ these arguments support change (perhaps revolutionary) at the �24 the North. Yet buying this material is by hard-sell encouraged ambassadors from the North, who are often enough paid to visit. of the philosophical imperialism from the North that colonialism - the Antipodes too willing cultural This is part the successor to Northern suffers, or, remarkable, more encourages! Secondly, there is the inappropriateness of much of the Northern product, especially considered as metaphysics, environmental a for package, concerns. instance, to cover, as well as The European North has no satisfactory land or environmental ethic fit for Antipodean circumstances, and the deeper American package is too spiritually-loaded for mainstream Australian culture. 29 In political competition-based, unsuited being theory, American work is too much individualistic the European product, especially the Marxist form, and both too precious and too high-tech for local and is circumstances, especially again for more environmentally-perceptive people. Thirdly, features of telling also Import against substitution and comparative advantage, regionalism; namely, world’s markets and pressures and fashions, are appealing avoidance of the removal of overseas control anra power structures (including the Old Boy’s network in jobs, policies, etc.) and gaining of local control, employment of local people, etc. Fourthly, philosophy as there part are of arguments intellectual for cultural culture: diversity, arguments from applied to richness, . . / The point is elaborated in Culture. At a more practical level Northern products are again often unsuitable, though for different reasons. For example, the transfer of American agricultural methods and equipment to /the thin poor soils of the Antipodes has had disastrous effects, at ttfast beginning to be recognised. v—* 29 �25 complexity, sheer diversity, stability, etc. 30 In fact, built into the whole notion of ’culture’ transfers. dense, productive garden. We obtain not only good products, and European cultivars, but European pests and Naturally we want a rich, But not only seeds and plants but weeds and many pests are being introduced. selectiveness the garden analogy control are essential, and American weeds. as against Indian maize This is why previous haphazard / / procedures. The proposal is not for, nor would the case sustain as with technology policy, satisfactorily filled, local we select niches which a narrow localism are where we can make a difference, and skills and methods. Indeed the policy has to be not occupied or use and develop selective given our 30 See, for instance, A.A. Mazrui, A World Federation of Cultures: An African Perspective, Free Press, New York, 1976. 31 Does it sound familiar? Outside philosophy, it should. For example, we have now been told by the Americans that our defence role, unlike theirs, is regional, not global: this is supposed to shed great light on our previously confused defence policies. �26 That includes such things as Oxford style of teaching and doing philosophy. removal of the undue emphasis on British empiricism centred on Locke-BerkeleyHume (a standard British focus); of the quasi-historical approach with however no proper attention to quo. American status sources; reinforcement/of The heavy Oxford influence^ very conservative been a of emanating from England, the prevailing in particular, has mostly More generally; many of one. Anglo- the main movements especially ordinary language philosophy, but also the Moore-Wittgenstein practice, have been very protective of the Northern status quo; they tend to leave things very much as they are, and recommend just this. 32 Positively, the proposal is that we achieve further disassociation from the Anglo-American empiricist past in two ways: by emphasizing local projects that move outside that constricting framework, and by diversifying the range philosophical of traditions selectively drawn upon, include to not only neglected Continental strands and parts of Eastern thought, but also Pacific ethnic material and Australasian philosophy. The idea is that such a plurality of sources, especially in teaching, will assist in removing narrower cultural biasses, such as British parochialism, and enable more discrimination to be obtained. theories that Then too are open we to us should in be better the Antipodes able and to how see the ranges of to advance our own programs. 32 The point is laboured in E. Gellner, Words and Things, Victor Gollancz, London, 1959. But even ordinary language philosophy, though conservative, and though it much contracted the proper range of philosophical investigations, had its liberating elements, e.g. removal of some of the narrowness and more cramping assumptions induced by technical jargon. Nor has the social impact changed much with the subsequent decline, since 1959, of ordinary language philosophy, the increasing insolvency of Oxbridge philosophy, and its consequent limited take-over by righ^:-wing Ivy League American philosophy. By contrast, the less economically ^g/ljiential growth of radical and applied philosophy in some of the British r-aH icad, and polytechnic institutes has touched no more than the surface of Oxbridge practice. ��27 There remain some things we should want to see whatever mixes are chosen One crucial issue is the removal of Northern in different Ai^ipodean regions. bias from pap/rs and publications, research seminars and lectures, letters of referencez\o/ so on. the works and irrespective discussion This Northern bias is a disposition to cite and discuss of projects of and quality the of the ignore to authors, Northern their works the more contributyon of famous to the local/ authors, irrespective of the quality of their contribution. better, the topic again under largely It is the disposition to write or lecture as though work produced locally either does not exist or has not been influential philosophers, are, ensuring (thus if anything, that more it inclined is to not). Northern And Australasian bias than many overseas intellectuals, who are perhaps less concerned to be seen as belonging to the Northern The reduction, and eventual removal, of Northern tream. bias effects of fe/ec/'/ Inly -the policies and practice / * W cours * 2S philosophers, individual eferees of local journals. but the It involves, among other work\nd innovations better, so they can tg to point of i/Quc. that would be assisted by greater local out A taught, more time spent at local institutions on study oq/ leave, and so for-th. xS? c* /I x APPENDIX 1. Background notes on the philosophy supply situation. Sociological investigation of the philosophy labour market in Australia and New Zealand has o yet to be attempted. But a picture of some elements underlying the numerical argument of the text can be gained from the following table: simple �28 TABLE 1. Ph.Ds in Philosophy: a USA - Australasian comparison USA Number (Male/Female) New Zealand Australia 1974 413 (346/67) 6 0 1975 375 (318/57) 5 0 1976 382 (319/63) 8 0 1977 330 (264/66) 3 2 (1/1) 1978 283 (235^/48) 5 5 (4/1) 1979 285 (20-754) 9 3 (2/1) 4 N.A. 4 0 1980 N.A. 1981 1. The breakdown of the USA and New Zealand numbers by sexes (male/female) is given.- , Similar figures do not appear to be available for Australia, 2. The US figures are for the academic year ending in the Year shown, e.g. 1978 covers the Northern academic yeai 1977-78. Southern figures are for the calendar year shown Digest of Education Statistfcs, US National Center for Education Statistics; University STA1 STICS, Australian Bureau of Census Statistics; New Zealand Education Statistics. Sources: -41/ Comments: 1. The contraction of US doctoral female 0^. r representation, production and are cooarHn-itant Australian likely too small to reflect 2. the rise figures in are to the academic market. Some of the Australasian raaembers include Americans; likewise the American figures provide no nationality breakdown. 3 % There is no information available on the number’ proceeding to higher degrees in philosophy outside Australia. of Australians �29 For example, it is In applying table 1 some simplifying assumptions are made. assumed to regular university positions now for appointment that candidates would have a doctorate or the equivalent (until recently a B.Phil was taken as a near of equivalent well). It is a assumed, Ph.D.; North American seems what to take publications the case, serve as the number of could that Australasians proceeding to higher degrees in philosophy abroad is relatively small, and no more than the order of Ph.Ds. taken locally. It can be assumed, without upsetting applications of table 1, that Australasian graduates match, say, the upper half of American graduates in standard attained. There is no compiled information /n academic vacancies in philosophy in / of Australia or New Zealand -Mln the numbers, on how the positions are filled, by A what nationalities, sexes, etc. It would however be a routine, if tedious matter to assemble some of this data, which is of considerable relevlance to the planning of philosophy programs. On the earlier idea of a National Philosophy for Australia. APPENDIX 2. ’the considering Editor of the possibility initial of National a AJPP distinguished two German distinction between Weltanschauung and Philosophy*, senses the In (Australian) corresponding Lebensanchauung’ to ’the (p.292). In the first, that of ’a scheme of the universe’, ’an Australian Philosophy is as ridiculous as confirmation prejudices’. a Christian or Holland, personal’ falsification, ’are The argument independent is of that truth, national and sympathies its or Granted: but that does not mean that a theory may not be held, fostered, etc., in Science’. or way, in one region but not others, as intuitionism was for long in Cartesianism ’a nation in France. like an In a individual second may ’more develop intimate a and certain temperamental attitude to the problems of existence, which we may ... call its philosophy of life. A nation’s philosophy, like its art and its literature, �30 is a mode of expression for the national consciousness. form of (pp.292-3). the national genius evolving culture. national in But, the It is, first place, It is a specialised in short, part of the this is by no means entirely separate from the initial sense, a philosophy comprising not merely a fairly comprehensive theory but also an integrated set of attitudes (like an operational paradigm). Furthermore, only by concession are such items as ’the national consciousness’ and ’the Australian landscape’ of meriting definite Australian descriptors. literature, has many strands to it, accounted single units like philosophy, Australian some not particularly distinctive (in any sense): such things form rather loose families. The Editor does not find, does not really hope to in find ’a modern industrialised community’ - with its modular parts interchangeable with those of others - a claims courage to find and national a philosophy of trite moral fair dealing'), base life, to build In fact with a difference. on (’traditions but nothing at all distinctive. he ... of humour, So far, there can be a national philosophy, at least of life, but is not; then, this does not however exclude there being various regional philosophies (such as local research programs). plunged that into So then, far, Inconsistency: the all is well. trouble derives But shortly the Editor is from the extravagant claim ’if Australia has nothing to do with these - the eternal values of the Spirit, the Ideals of Truth, Goodness and Beauty - then and only then has she nothing to do with Philosophy' (p.295; with rearrangement). But, as Australia has nothing per se to do with these - as is virtually conceded, these values involving a 'wider sweep' do with Philosophy, Though the than any national boundaries - "she" has nothing to contradicting the contradiction is easily possibility of a National Philosophy. avoided by rescinding claim, the ideal of a National Philosophy should be allowed nationalism has had its time. the extravagant to rest in peace: �31 R. Routley 33 Research School of Social Sciences Australian National University 3^with thanks to R. Elliot, W. Godfrey-Smith, S. Grave and L. ? irlin, to several members of the audience at the presentation of the paper a: the 1983 to Australasian Association of Philosophy Conference, University of\Adelaide, ’ several referees for this Journal, and, not least, to the present ijai tor. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Draft Papers Description An account of the resource Sylvan's literary executor encountered an archive in which “all his projects were current", since manuscripts were undated and unattributed. Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document PROSPECTS FOR REGIONAL PHILOSOPHIES IN AUSTRALASIA Philosophy, especially academic philosophy but also folk philosophy, like other intellectual and higher cultural activity In Australasia, has long been indeed dominated, Europe, the largely swamped, by Northern now increasingly from North America. cultural and other resulting controlling such populations, But it does not have to stay that way. a initially the migration Given the ethnic result was imported, baggage influences, patterns, of composition virtually from the inevitable. Suitable policies, a good philosophy policy, could change things. The culture, thought is of regional a philosophy, In 1923, a New Zealand hardly a new one. regional a matching perhaps correspondent to the newly-launched Australasian Journal of Psychology and Philosophy mentioned the possibility of ’a new kind or temper of philosophy under these southern skies’ which the Journal might such a reaching role not community). (or, for merely And foster.The Journal that matter, professional although some actively has pursued philosophers things however hardly fulfilled but have changed solid foundation for a new regionalism in philosophy, its a pronounced wider Australasian in Australia, that of alm laying a possibility of a new temper of philosophy has hardly been realised. There is little in the way of a new kind and which the southern skies were intended to include: but few distinguishing features, ’no distinctively New temper of Zealand XAJPP, March 1923, p.74. same volume, p.292ff; his Appendix 1. philosophy under New Zealand characteristics, have shown up skies, in New Zealand The question was taken up by the Editor in the discussion is considered below, especially in philosophy’. 2 The situation of colonial dominance that used to prevail in and philosophers. Australia, importer of philosophy, New Zealand remains a substantial net where virtually all chairs, and many philosophy, were filled by academics from the North, other academic and considered and Given the usual in courses designed, power and influence of professors in small departments, covered in tends to persist in New Zealand, where no established chairs are occupied by locals/ topics posts especially appointments made, the heavy Northern orientation of philosophy taught and researched in New Zealand is not surprising. oldest of The Northern control is perhaps most strikingly exhibited at the New Zealand universities, the University of Otago, where the Philosophy Department has been substantially captured by a British School and increasingly looks event, like an offshoot of the University of London/ In any the overwhelming Anglo-American dominance of New Zealand philosophy - also a feature only in slightly lesser degree of Australian philosophy - can be confirmed by a content survey of the courses offered and research papers written at New Zealand universities. Even when local people have been appointed to positions in Australasia, 2 , S.A. Grave, A_ History of Philosophy in Australia, Queensland University Press, 1984, p.l. Page references are to the manuscript. The paper draws heavily on this history. 3 This claim was correct at the time of presentation of the paper (August 198':!). With the recent loss of a chair at Wellington, the claim requires qualification, but the pattern of domination persists. In the 1983 Commonwealth University Handbook listing, 6 of the 8 members of the Department held their main degree, Ph.D., from London, and one of the remainder from Exeter. Only one member of the Department, soon to retire, falls outside the nexus. 3 they have been brought up on a solid diet of Anglo-American material, and they have often been reforged or finished in the North as well. of requirements post-World War philosophy by remain full the II in were conveniently seen Oxford B.Phil. of products finished candidates universities expansion the of Australasian this Many degree. mill: cultural in Oxford were hard to beat In particular, the the in to departments the of case of philosophy the mid 70s when they applied for until indeed out of period major positions, such was the (unwarranted) prestige of Oxford and the regrettable, but still continuing, "cultural cringe". despite Nonetheless, been occurring scene in dominance, Northern the Antipodes, be will (as the indicated). especially on is It worth significant the Australian asking changes have philosophical whether Australian philosophy is moving towards the sort of change that occurred in USA more than 100 year; ago when the Harvard Philosophy Department was brought (or bought) together, and its go'den age' began. ’ American philosophy was never quite the same again, and became its own thing. There are now new forces operating which could help to move Australian philosophy in such a direction. the widespread regionalism, other 6 ^See B. which applies choices; local fashioning emergence, of national and particularly to in science cultural stark and in and culture, alternative ideological contrast, technology there There is of a choice along is policies, the new with centralised which not only Kuklick, The Rise of American Philosophy; Cambridge, Massachusetts 1860-1930, Yale University Press, 1977, Parts 2 and 3. 6 On this bio-regionalism, see especially, Fourth World News, vol. 1, and K. Sale, Human Scale, Coward, McCann and Geoghegan, New York, 1980. 1983, provides model a for reflection regional in directly bears on parts of the philosophy of science. soon appear, there are also some also Unfortunately, as will to regional serious obstacles but policy philosophy philosophies and to the very idea of a regional philosophy. USA, long an importer of culture from Europe, has recently become a net culture, of exporter components of higher philosophical not from lower of Oxford following has suit, but culture, evidently taken). should Are not balance of payments, especially in philosophy? Yes, reasons there achieve also of the American turn philosophy (witness such as culture output if Australasia, certainly a better there are why cultural reasons. In the first place, the change in the cultural position of the USA went with, and relations. If little prospect for perhaps in part derived from, vast changes in economic power economic of most dominance entails Australasia’s cultural dominance, since culture, there there is is no serious that prospect Australasia will ever emulate or attain American economic eminence (at least nuclear destruction of not without flow of commodities, not only increasingly of Americans, of former group, Northern cultural they. As priorities, contain they long component also whose and disruption of the entire­ Secondly, as observed, Antipodean large a fellow-travellers, include research Northern academics, substantial additional of a teaching and is bent to It is unlikely that this Influential segment, especially Northern concerns. the North, cultural and other). universities contingent the will (become commitments, as so apart Antipodeans they are in a bind locally acclimatised as do from the not situation; isolated drastically to) person. alter give up Nor their its should cultural for it can be persuasively argued that they would be better off, as far as quality and product goes, stocking / / A 5 o’ ( universities their with American teaching components and researching American-oriented concerns. One simple numerical argument that Antipodean universities would be better off with Americans in the main, takes the following lines:- The (higher graduates degree) of Australasian and American are significantly not culturally distinguished, at least in subjects such as philosophy. now the quality academics number of Austroamerican graduates; produced per of number higher say there is 1 per every n graduates. preponderance of graduates will be Americans, Consider degree The (great) just by virtue of their vastly greater population and their more extensive system of university education. So also then, just by ratio considerations, the great preponderance of quality academics from an drawn upper percentiles they interested universities. Austroamerican base among those in Such quality, an Clearly, quality products. would argument be does be American, will appointing not work to more show as will Antipodeans, Americans that, for the were their to similar reasons, American universities should be full of Chinese or Indian professors, for two Asians reasons; and first Americans, there are especially significant in cultural disciplines such differences as between philosophy; and secondly, their university systems do not deliver such great quotas of higher degree or high quality graduates, at least in philosophy. The ratio of U.S. philosophy graduautes with doctorates as compared with Australian exceeded 30 to 1 in each of the years 1974 to 1980. In 1977 it was 110 to 1. New Zealand compares even less favourably with U.S. output. For details see Digest of Education Statistics (U.S. National Center for Education Statistics, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, 1976, 1977-78, 1979, 1980, 1981 and 1982); University Statistics, (Australian Bureau of Statistics, Canberra, 1974, 1975, 1976, 1977, 1978, ‘1979, 1980); Education Statistics of New Zealand, (N.Z. Department of Education, Wellington, 1974, '1975, 1976, 1977, 1978, 1979, 1980). The conclusion of the numerical argument will not be a popular one. The anti Amei icanism felt in portions of the Australasian community extends into the universities; and recently there been has increasing Insistence, especially by the now aging younger Turks that university positions should be This at the same time as these Turks often preach of an reserved for locals. international community of scholars, presumably then with "free” interchange, etc. They cannot have it all ways.^ So long continues, as the economically; the present centre will free-flow dominate they will have more large to them if it interchange the than us, periphery and is (centrally-determined) of ideas and culturally jobs here personnel as should well as go by and quality in this high cultural business that we seek, as mostly claim. Now anyway, it that arguments. is widely there is enough recognised, something For we are not lower-down drastically wrong hierarchical with these ladders sorts of flooded with high-quality Northerners who would 8 A reverse flow of the better orthodox academics from Australasia to America should also be expected (outside times of university contraction). According to assumptions of this brain drain argument, which is based on labour market considerations, appointment and lifestyle conditions for academics are generally better in USA than Australia and much better than those in economically-depressed New Zealand (e.g. higher salaries, better standard of living, superior research conditions, etc.). So, other things being equal, able academics from the Antipodes will relocate in USA as academic positions become available. The argument also helps explain why Antipodean universities cannot expect, for the most part, to attract really top-drawer Northerners for very long. Of course, economically irrelevant factors do induce interference; e.g. perverse commitments to odd-ball Antipodean intellectual enterprises which reduce market acceptability, or pre-industrial ties to place or persons or lifestyle which unduly restrict mobility (such as local roots, family attachments, even distaste for American urban lifestyles). regularly drive out local contenders for positions, if we only preferred the Northerners when they were quite visibly superior: rather we are inundated by Americans with inflated references, who have the messages of the centre better do, locals than higher-echelon remote and Northern Northern (often biassed) fields appointment locals whose shortcomings are known better. the Northern centres too, tend greener look to committees dusty than As is beginning to be recognised retain their higher-quality products, tend to to and allow them to be exiled to the periphery only if they somehow fall foul of the system (e.g. of the academic system for political or personal reasons). the often Northern centres have intellectually their disposed of Too inferior products in the periphery. All this makes the position look doubly bad. We ought, appointing Northerners, especially Americans, even seems, to be if they are overrated in it their references, and usually not out of the top drawer, in order to maximize quality. And yet doing so does not achieve the desired quality result, and breeds discontent elsewhere, especially among the aging Turks. Fortunately shaky arguments; and obtain we from this awkward and that is the way of regionalism. sufficient subtitutable for us. before is a way out there elaborate cultural distance,so that situation these and We do our own things; they are not simply Then the shaky numerical argument does fall down. the emerging proposal there are other But influential . . This is easier in the cultural than the technological sphere. However it is also possible technologically: (stronger) theses of technological determinism, and so of cultural determinism, are false. We can choose different options, technologically, as well as culturally. 9 8 arguments to dispose of, and the disposal bears on the proposal. There is, to begin with, far been conceded: have so elements of which the argument for excellence, that there is an objective commodity, quality or excellence, which we all more or less which is agree about, proportionately in the North, and which is what academic institutions crave and more abundant seek and what appointments aim to capture, indeed maximize. That at least is the type of myth most of us have encountered; and many of us now know it is a in myth, fact appointments profit, a that dangerous myth. way, more any Most that don’t places organisations aim but rather seek to satisfice on a mix of factors, quality is to try even just to make maximize of which assessed only one, and not often the highest ranking one. Ability to fit into some sort of program, teaching or research, is another, and commonly more Important factor; and there is no good reason why such a program should not sometimes be a regionally oriented one. So given the prevailing practices, argument from excellence does not exclude regional philosophy programs. And, in any event, there are enough local candidates of sufficient worth to proceed with regional programs without sacrifice clearcut of excellence. Local enterprise need entail no loss of excellence, and could well increase it. The deeper-cutting objection is that there is something seriously amiss with the idea of objective objective importance; criticism as bracketed out notions the that of excellence, these objective and notions values with are open more contextual-relativisation the to connected the generally, component of same that notion of sorts of they valuing: have the ’S- 9 framework or viewpoint within rather a to which these values relate.^ narrow such paradigm, intellectual While those operating as Oxbridge ordinary language philosophy or Sydney materialism say, can bracket out the viewpoint,. since it Incorporated is operational the in paradigm, and so at arrive seemingly objective quality judgements, the judgements are not preserved (e.g. in truth va1ue) when Marxist viewpoints. quality or worth Consider, of a other to transposed for forest, frameworks, the comparison, made variously by of a holistically-inclined judgements a deep environmental who seemingly because pretend that environmental such it is not done by members of as or to rhe an ecologist, philosopher, language, Marxist, and Californian environmental philosophers. philosophers idealistic Compare judgements as to the industrial forester, and a recreational officer. quality e.g. work by ordinary There are even cannot be judged, the main philosophical peer group at Harvard and like institutions. As this judgements of begins to the. reveal, importance judgements of work of quality are not Independent of done or problems tackled. importance of problems and issues is highly paradigm dependent. But the For example, problems such as those of quant if ying-in and of possible worlds and of de re thought, which assume immense importance for fashionable referential theories within the mainstream empiricist paradigm, vanish outside that restricted viewpoint. Now observe to relative that most insignificance judgements as to What follows also begins to bring out what is omitted in a main theme of R.S. Pirsig, Zen and the Art of Motor Cycle Maintenance, Bodley Head, London, 1974. Note that defusing the notion of objective excellence does not lead to subjectivism. To avoid the customary false dichotomy, compare the notion of validity (usually ceded to themselves these days by classical logicians) with that of quality. 10 what are the important problems and what constitutes important work - matters helping quality determine - is relative to their concerned are exported to the Antipodes importance down shipped are paradigmatic from the and placement, through the Their North.11 paradigms the main channels already indicated. We are free to reject these paradigms and select alternatives, and there are, it can be argued, good reasons to do just that, much as there are to reasons good choose different energy technology (or different military technology) from that generally favoured in the North which the North is eager to export southwards. Similar which points against alternatively might argument, apply that be -marketed mass-produced and cosmopolitan. The argument called people sophisticated from cosmopolitan/international the the Peter everywhere Holland; international Stuyvesant smoke this argument superior product cigarette-sophistication is is based on the assumption that philosophy is a ’cosmopolitan subject’, that is is not the sort of enterprise for which place and people are significant as they are for poetry assumption has only to be presented to be questioned. for one important thing, that philosophy is a or the novel.12 The It takes for granted, finished product sort (a propositional theory), not a process of production also. of a certain But in the Often enough fashionability is mistaken for importance. As to the unsatisfactory way in which such "important" problems are commonly set, see F. Dyson, ’Unfashionable pursuits’, The Mathematical Intelligencer 5 (1983) 47-54. 12 Grave, op.cit., p.2: ------- the term ’cosmopolitan subject' used there comes from Donegan. As to the significance of place and people for literature, see further C. Partridge, The Making of New Cultures, Editions Rodopi, Amsterdam, 1982. 11 process of production the place and people involved (e.g. in discussion) are ot material. if And the product Is like a work of like art, a d literature, not and 1 just theorems and arguments assembled piece of in an internationally-approved format, 13 then again the historical setting matters, since philosophy, more no than literature, does not in emerge a vacuum. Plato s philosophy could not have emerged in ancient Australia, and if cribbed in mid 20th century Oxford would surely have been marked down or rejected. It is important not to be sidetracked into issues ~ resembling problems in aesthetics extent sets that do not need to of themes and arguments be contested, such as whether and what produced in one place and setting could have been produced in another. A nonnuclear technology of some sort could be adopted prospect in but Europe that New apparently will Zealand, nonnuclear energy strategy. rasters here. Dialethic in not contrast be, with whereas there Australia, is will reasonable pursue a It is the doing, and not what could be done, that logic, which invalidates methodology of much Anglo-American philosophy, could the technique perhaps be done in and the North (though there would be substantial cultural resistance): it is not being 13tLike a paper in the biological sciences. But here again technique methodology, which may both be regional, are crucially important. x4Related points can be made using less extreme examples, e.g. and concerning modern American work. Consider, for Instance such texts as W.V. Quine’s Word ajll—(Wiley, Now York, 1960) or R. Nozick’s Anarchy, State and Utopia (Basic Books, New York, 1974). The assumptions taken for granted" the arguments involved, etc., are especially American: it is not just the style. The acceptability of arguments and positions is dependent on place and received paradigm. 12 done there, and is not likely to be done in the Anglo-American sphere.15 this extent, logical can Antipodeans techniques, do choose their their own international/cosmopolitan argument, own distinctive distinctive technology thing. stated in a form that would be To and The telling, fails. Of course it can be argued, it is being argued, that Antipodeans don’t need to be, or even oughtn’t to be pursuing their own energy or logic policies and apparatus. But meeting these considerations takes us to a whole new set of issues concerning the merit of various policies and programs, diversity, etc. - far beyond the cosmopolitan argument. the point of The new arguments, to which we shall return, are not a lot more convincing however than comparable arguments concerning cooking: that we don’t devising our own cuisine or wine styles. need to be or oughtn’t to be British, or at least cosmopolitan, cooking is adequate: we should stick to that and buy it off the shelf from the North, ideally importing the cooks also. Do we have good reasons to think that British philosophy is better, these days, than British cooking? Antipodeans are free, in principle then, to pursue their own paradigms; and to do so they will by and large want to, and mostly have to, appoint their own people, people they have educated - not saboteurs or people who have (had) 15 Much as communist anarchism, a live possibility for communes and perhaps communities in Australia, is culturally excluded in North America, owing to the extreme possessive individualism of that culture. On dialethic logic, see G. Priest and R. Routley, On Paraconsistency, Research Papers in Logic, #13, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University, 1983. 13 to be re-educated, from elsewhere, in particular from the North. Intellectual paradigms features of the local pursued tie with cultural paradigms, with distinctive culture? In a at loose way, least, they may tie in with the philosophy will not usually though works of But will the link, culture in the integral fashion that novels (as distinct from more technical works) sometimes do. Indeed, certain to a cultural limited extent, features, not they restricted to hastens to though add. this But is style, compared with acceptability, what philosophical particular programs, that help mark philosophy in Australia as ’unimportant Grave considers do already link. ’an Australian product’ - matters truth, philosophy’ in do matter, and are he not Independent - or independent so far as their perception goes in the case truth and correctness of - from underlying broad theory or received paradigm. However the marks which can be extracted from Grave, significant though they are, do not serve to distinguish the Australian product, the first two being features Australian philosophy exhibits in lesser degree than the more adventurous and polemical philosophy of Greek antiquity. by Passmore as ’most typical of Australian philosophy’, The first, described is a 'diversity of approach and readiness to put forward an unconventional or unfashionable point ’Nothing need be conceded to strong cultural relativity themes, though they would support the case. It is enough that our theories remain radically incomplete and that there can accordingly be rival theories as to what is true. Similarly, however philosophy is conceived - as the search for truth, explanation, understanding and wisdom (all of these and more, really), or as, more vaguely, inquiry of a certain sort - there can be, and will be, competing accounts; so a pluralistic theory is inevitable in giving a fuller view. view’, 17 of something philosophy, some (with which typical more of philosophy ancient notable exceptions) than exhibits an Canada, is that Africa, South adventurous compared with other recent diverse. and provincial and The second, and ... the line-up between Australian more manifestoed character’ of Australian philosophy, being "Oxbridge colonies", England, far from Australian philosophy isolated: others mark surprising, materialism , departments the and Melbourne (both confrontation concerning the them concern extraordinary discussed the political by is is ’the ’the most notable example ... Wittgensteinian among such as philosophy Andersonian This example Sydney, if it was not the Andersonian philosophy Itself’ (p.2). is austere What may be uniformity reflecting that often attributed to the land Itself. nearer true Australian fervour generated engagement Grave), some growing the and relevant/paraconsistent program, by by with the local (’adversarial’) style leading to sharp criticism by Americans. Connected with these first philosophy, century two as Cambridge marks of much are further characteristics of much 18th century Scottish philosophy and philosophy: namely directness, Australian turn-of-this- unwillingness to muffle points, surface clarity, and, some would unkindly add (in the hope perhaps of locating a genuine difference), bluntness, unsubtlety and crudity. 17 Both preceding quotations, while included as such in Grave’s Introduction, are from J. Passmore, ’Philosophy’, in The Pattern of Australian Culture (ed. A.L. McLeod), Cornell University Press, Ithaca, N.Y., 1963, pp.131-168. The same annotation also applies to the third mark. 18 Ihough again for the most part that influenced by Sydney rather than that originating in Melbourne. To some extent this reflects the different historical influences shaping Sydney and Melbourne philosophy: roughly, Scottish as opposed to Continental antecedents. 15 third The and the fourth but again very different, marks are hardly distinguishing features of Australian philosophy as Grave, who wouldn't them marks at all, in effect observes. Intellectual is areas, the The third, which applies well to other of contrast Australian the reputation the anti-intellectual national stereotype of Australians as a people to physical achievement nark ia especially isolation of a academic rather than feature of philosophy indifference or even hostility to, to intellectual Anglo-American Australasia in subtlety'. 'devoted fourth The philosophy; from, in Inquiry', with 'center of philosophical Indeed of Australia as a philosophy, call namely its and the general the sort of imported philosophy (e.g. that of Nietzsche and the existentialists) generating Interest in literary and arts circles. The failure of such marks to entirely separate out Australian philosophy does not For matter. thing, one separated by its research projects. confused with nationalism, nor Australian the produce as encouraged; and in most the new other more regional things, regionalism sufficiently For another, regionalism should not be positions such as materialism or Wellington modal!sm with national philosophies. philosophy, is is is an undesirable commonly linked, Sydneyside Nationalism in trait, not in other to be cultural things, with the breakdown of nations and contraction of state power.19 19c See, e.g., London, 1957. Sale, op.cit., and L. Kohr, The Breakdown of Nations, RKP, The Editor of the new 1923 AJPP did however take seriously the notion of National Philosophy, of (what must have surprised some New Zealand readers) an Australian Philosophy; some of the issu< s there raised (p.292ff) are addressed in Appendix 1. To get back to where we were: emerging proposal the is this, that we start - or better much Increase - doing our own distinctive things, and that we team up so. to do there are In fact that begin several suggestions to emerge, concerning research and teaching, publications and appointments, study These are not just that we do our own selection leave and sponsored visitors. of topics and people, and style and decide methods, our priorities, own instead of having these foisted upon us - not just, that is, that we play our own games (whether invented here or taken over from the North) and not theirs, Rules and Rugby instead of Gridiron and Basketball - but that we abandon the individual competitive model of cultural achievement, sold to us and fostered by the North, in favour of a group cooperative approach (elements of which are already modelled in Antipodean social clubs). The thoughts here are digging example, ditch more separately. rapidly simple and On familiar. the side is the it Is well-known that two people cooperating can dig a and enjoyably than two people working on the ditch Cooperative work tends to pay off - in philosophy or elsewhere - in terms of output, quality, and enjoyment in the doing. experience one shows that we successfully with several reasons periphery cannot the centre on achievements for this. highly competitive in the One in On the other side, individually compete very their programs. is the communication situation. There are Despite the predominantly individualistic nature of American academic 17 enterprise, 20 communication much in the attainment of and access to work is jointly based, individualism myth, unpublished material. nationalistic are and the assignment of credit for it. considerations same verbally conveyed. tend to time and as There an outsider). through face-to-face Here There are a mix of reasons (e.g. Polish results, Russians will cite a Russian who the the several clever people will be again people at the periphery tend to lose out. there despite Then again communications are important in obtaining rapid publication of the idea or result, Again For, verbal and builds on the work of many; when the time is ripe for some idea or result, able to hit on it. upon rapid results depends Poles tend to promote. achieves a result at about is the fact that seminars so that local much is results conveyed will be There is the fact of limited reading, and that people at the centre concentrate when they read on material from the centre by central people, so that published items and results from the periphery will often not be noticed, and may well lose out to central competitors even if they achieve central publication. receive, merit There is also the fact that people at the centre tend to for merit, more publication than people towards the periphery. and communication opportunities Here economic factors do begin to enter; consider the size and distribution of the academic market (there are, e.g., a great many more academic philosophers in North America than in the whole rest of the world), control of publishing outlets and journals (with few exceptions 20 Reflecting other features of the culture and enterprise of the centre which are not so deeply embedded in Australasia: see further R. Routley, ’Culture, philosophy, and approaches to the natural environment - an Australian perspective', in The Environment, Ethics and Ecology (ed. D. Bennett), The Faculties, Australian National University, 1984, and also 'Culture and the roots of social and political divergence, with emphasis on the Australian/American contrast’, typescript, Canberra, 1983; both referred to subsequently as ’Culture’. 18 all Northern), ere. However economic power does not, and need not, determine culture - we can shut off the Northern philosophical propaganda shut off our television sets If we really want to. way we by Impressed being middle-men philosophical those And we can stop make who in much the living a by importing the Northern stuff. So what do we do? We adapt to the cultural-philosophical level, of those things, that have been suggested In the newer regionalism. some regional awakeningand importer.. andimitators doctrines and and local For We alm at not remain slavish We do on commentators the North. example, and we peddlars don’t spend of, our trying totease out what Davidson or Dummett or Kripke meant by in the hope that or that To be through. of, positions from academic lives this local self-reliance. several sure, I some pale Northern light suggesting am not we that will perhaps emulate filter appalling the ignorance of people from the North who visit the Antipodes and know little or nothing about eminent through what has been done or visitors, their Australian the bags heavy National is being done here;21 with cultural (now University so that we have accoutrements, main the trekking centre for Investigation of relevant logics) and informing us that, or relying crucially on the assumption that, a contradiction entails every proposition. that these Northerners know often little positions and advances is the Antipodes is inferiority colonies; 21 of cultural another is the and Intellectual narrow or nothing about One reason distinctive the prevailing assumption of life (predominantly in these local) and former limited the southern reading Regrettably, the ignorance extends to many locals. In particular those _nrected with Sydney materialism appear remarkably ill-informed as to’ basic features of other Australasian programs. undertaken by Northern luminaries. But, having despite been given cause, sufficient we shouldn’t cut ourselves off from Northern paradigms and influences (we could hardly manage to anyway, propaganda is different). so we should stay informed of, but not imitators these continuing traditions: of, or part of, their enterprises. m older Northern traditions, So far from cutting these nowhere, loose In any case, regional cultures are rooted just as the people are largely European stock. from (and older We can reasonably use what we need from these likely traditions and traditions, minority) from starting afresh and the local variations that have already appeared are what we want to develop and perhaps mutate, as again with wine styles. Part of the things, encourage proposal then that Northern paradigms. increasingly rather than working with and so shape newer try to to create fortunately, features of of cultural the larger culture.22 do we need to make the story up - though helping to shape is part of what the proposal is about. is a different and Much of more difficult already indicated in Grave’s survey of Australian philosophy. 22 local For there are research programs already initiated, which have the Australia - New Zealand has own our It is not as if we have to build from nothing, to do - very great advantage of being grounded in the future do pale northern reflections very difficult - entirely original work, components. Nor, we and develop our own research programs, Antipodean paradigms, wnat is is the story, proposition - for is All one really to do is to bring out programs he has already indicated and provide some See Culture, op.cit. 20 To pull the investigation down to a more concrete elaboration and commentary. I shall sketch some more prominent cooperative programs - by no means level, the only programs - and remark on some relevant features of them. The longest running and best known program is, without much doubt, of naturalism, Australian and which aims to see the that world, natural and everything else, as suitably encompassed within the framework of the world of (physical) science. program The is generally back traced to Anderson’s empiricist metaphysics,^^ and is now best exhibited in Armstrong’s work. contains as a major materialism, subprogram Sydney Adelaide which subsequently died out there. such famous components as central state version of failures in program initiated and nowadays Faced functionalism. reduction plans, like it it takes in, identity theme and more derivatively, physicalisms all now in The latter program has included the mental-material contingent materialism, its a It incorporates with a a conspicuous "scientifically" trimmed theory of universals, and an account of natural laws as relations of universals, both components of the developing Sydney realism. Parts of the naturalism program, especially materialism and central state reductionism and the unified science ideal, have had counterparts in the North, but the program has, for the most part, despite export efforts, smoothly, moreover, and earthy, so retained its distinctively it never caught on in New Zealand. into Australian culture. far as Australian character philosophy can ""^Anderson’s metaphysics was however - The program fits It is similarly down-to-earth, be, without the fancy ideas or effete far more opposed to reductions than what has succeeded it. For an account of Anderson’s philosophy, and a history and account of Australian naturalism and materialism, see especially Grave, op.cit. idealism of European philosophy or the spirituality and suppressed puritanism with much which pragmatism). of yet And and commitments, North American does it though it is thinking not simmers shrink from metaphysical explicit it is not from the basically empiricist, nowadays, (including positivistic (rejecting a verification principle, in particular). It is a city program, based broadcast mainly University of Sydney to other metropolitan universities; but the program does extend outside the universities a bit (a tiny bit) to the larger metropolitan culture. No th America, the broader Russell, so in Australasia, little professional philosophy Impinges on + community, Popper AusLralasia As in and would be or Kuhn quite even on being an the wider academic (To exceptional. achievement, one community, turn worth this working work by around for.) now reaches in The naturalism program used to Perth, and in Canberra, as well as a core of opposition there. has outliers stretch Apart from notable exceptions, more than a rather through to Adelaide; the program has never had precarious hold, it the in Melbourne:nor, more same hold, to or surprisingly, 24, Jn Canada, for example, while most academics from other disciplines would know of, and perhaps a little about, Russell, far fewer would know of Wittgenstein (though he is becoming known to lit. crit. groups), and virtually none would know of Quine. (The sampling Is subjective.) On the fairly recent ’triumph of professionalism’ in philosophy in USA, see Kuklick, op.cit., p.565ff. Kuklick brings out well some of the more disastrous features of professionalism, but does not sufficiently notice that the virtuous features resulting from some professionalisation can be synthesized with broader philosophical activity. 25 The exceptions include Ellis's distinctive program, which can be accounted part of the broader naturalist program, and at Monash the work of F. Jackson and, earlier, of H. Munro in value theory. 22 has it had heavyweight criticism from there (or indeed much external criticism from elsewhere), Melbourne out. the old confrontation of major city philosophies having died is more philosophy stricken than Sydney; Melbourne by dominated Continental a philosophy; then, a fashions: Northern recently, more philosophy; remarkable religion philosophy, much more than Sydney, has been of procession historically oriented and more Quine, Davidson and and language ordinary Wittgenstein, turnabout, idealism earlier extensional reduction; now perhaps Lewis,iKripke and Dummett? one The program reaches that beyond confines the of the cities in Australia - which is after all a metropolitan dominated culture, the vast land always being the other - a rather Australian environmentalism, is diffuse program, which has connections with the Colleges of Advanced Education in the country towns and the communes on the North Coast. So far the program is as much distinguished is. environmental Europe by what positions are specifically having it a not is as feature of what it Serious the New World, of transformed most its and deeper the Old World, and environment and natural having little wild untouched country left, and little sensitivity accordingly to issues Europe that such as tend admit European those to concern of the wilderness. built shallow approaches superficiality environmentalism outside continues North environmental human-transformed and (and The main encourage to America. environment, techno-fix dominate North much Issues situations). of American the New in issues And World environmentalism differs significantly however from Antipodean environmentalism, most obviously in the religious-spiritual component respects as well (see further Culture). of the former, but in several other 23 More positively, there are three strands to Australian environmentalism:Firstly, there is an extended utilitarianism, differing little in theory from Bentham’s enlarged position, which insists upon counting in the utilities of creatures. all sentient figured though prominently it This in animal focussed has position, developed from a British base, has animal liberation movements: and welfare and on domestic animals, animals used in and research hunted (wild) animals, it has also become entangled in issues of bio-research more generally such as genetic engineering. or much interested in, endangered species, the conversion of forests, animal pain and pleasure. except deal. Secondly, utilitarian forests and differs insofar as these have a and which American Thirdly, naturalism.26 inadequate there is a wider and a deeper ecological position, which is recognises irreducible which finds value elsewhere intrinsic value ecosystems, especially wild and natural systems. from lands, bearing on and so deeper concerns get an psychological states, sentience or the disappearance of wild Wider and deeper environmental concerns appear only spinoff from animal welfare, as a not etc., It is not however concerned with, and spiritualism is there of from an extension than in trees and This position of American course as almost everywhere, a reactionary component, critical of the other strands, which Insists that all that needs to be accomplished on the environmental front can be achieved within older established (European) ethical and political frameworks. Whereas materialism is based in Sydney, environmentalism is centred in Melbourne and Canberra, but also includes Brisbane and Perth. Also centred in described more fully elsewhere: see, in particular, <ed- D- Mannison and others), RSSS, Australian National University, 1980. It has been Canberra, and reaching across the country, with good connections in Melbourne, few but in Sydney, is the materialism and environmental further from input affecting program other which program, elsewhere. and and is of Includes more to extends essentially philosophy, centres New in metaphysics, with respectively, the theory value a Zealand , program, logic especially in the Whereas but one metaphysics. Australia than has been also any The other described 27 The main logic perhaps which program areas major their core programs have epistemology relevant/paraconsistent program. relevant/paraconsistent. grounded research program evident program. in New Zealand from the work of A program emanating located mainly in Wellington, philosophy is also a Prior and now it might be. called the extended modal program. The impact of the program on philosophy is perhaps best seen in Cresswell’s work. Australian philosophy used to be known, for its hard-headed empiricism; not known and still is in some quarters, regrettably New Zealand philosophy is mostly for anything much, except perhaps, in UK, that Prior brought his 27 Again, like all the Australian programs, both those mentioned and others, in Grave, op.cit. But see further, R. Routley, ’Research in Logic in Australia, New Zealand and Oceania’, Research Papers in Logic #14, Australian National University, 1983 (which also considers other programs in logic); G. Priest and R. Routley, op. cit.; and R. Routley, R.K. Meyer and others, Relevant Logics and Their Rivals, Ridgeview, California, 1982. 28 See especially M.J. Cresswell, Logics and Languages, Methuen, London, 1973; but see also work by Goldblatt and by Hughes referred to in Research in Logic, op.cit. Also described there is an original version of the modal program (transparent intensional logic) elaborated by Tichy at Otago. 25 unusual adaption of Russellian philosophy from that remote place. Neither of these impressions is particularly accurate; both are rather out-of-date. But the aim of work of the present type is, of course, not just to correct these impressions, not just to reflect or report on culture - for what one would like to reflect upon is not sufficiently there - but also to help manufacture elements of a culture, to make an image. To resist the already flourishing North, we should increase our efforts to programs, and perhaps other sunrise projects; further 29 the to build teaching and research around the programs selected for promotion, elaboration, and criticism, to orient appointments, especially of involved local people, to 29 Among sunrise projects in Australian philosophy so far suggested (not all of them feasible) are these: Australian feminism, Antipodean social and political alternatives, peace studies, indigenous regional philosophies (especially Aboriginal, Melanesian, and Polynesian). Another promising field, with practical consequences, for local initiative is the philosophy of education, where material produced by R.S. Peters has dominated the market, with stultifying effects it is now alleged. As foreshadowed with the notion of "sunrise projects", much of the rhetoric, and argument, concerning science and technology policy (presented in the case of Australia in Jones, op.cit.) can be taken over to apply to X policy, where X is some subject discipline, such as philosophy. / 26 on Why bother? these programs. Why not simply buy our philosophy, like almost all our technology, off the shelf, from the North? There are several arguments for not doing this, in more than a limited fashion, which are now sketched. There is, firstly, Northern products, the inferiority despite their and built-in attractive packaging. obsolence of most putting too fine a point on it, many of the imported intellectual goods are shoddy, and Without only work for a very limited range of applications (e.g. the vicinity Antipodean of contradictions philosophy dilemmas). or undoubtedly derives from Much they’re hopeless in that shoddy is wrong intellectual with goods 30 In fact something like the last has been the policy of the LSE Philosophy Department, where the only outside appointment over a long period was that of Lakatos (hardly a person far removed ideologically). As observed, it now looks like the practice of the Otago Department also; and apparently it used to be a tendency at Melbourne. But in most places the practice is condemned as nepotistic or parochial, and overridden by the call for "new (Northern) blood". However there can be significant differences between nepotistic appointments and those strengthening local programs. It is at this stage, among others that administrative measures do matter; for example, to ensure that suitable locally-engaged locals gain employment rather than Northern stooges, to direct funds into on-going local programs rather than imported fashions, etc. There are various ways appropriate administrative details can be handled, locally or nationally; but nothing draconian, such as wholesale exclusion of noncitizens, is required. Observe, indeed, that no restriction of academic appointments to nationals (in Canadian style) or the like is being advocated. Anyone who arrives at a conclusion of that sort from what has been argued has misunderstood the case in crucial respects. As a matter of simple mathematics, restricting appointment fields characteristically reduces both quality of candidates available (however quality is assessed) and range of possibilities open for future research; and no such restrictions are advocated. The author has witnessed the debilitating effects of field restrictions at the Australian National University and elsewhere. 31 Some of these centre also. arguments support change (perhaps revolutionary) at the 27 Yet buying this material is encouraged by hard-sell imported from the North. cultural ambassadors from the North, who are often enough paid Lo visit. is part of Northern the philosophical imperialism from the North — colonialism that - the Antipodes too willing This the successor suffers, or, to more remarkable, encourages I Secondly, there is the inappropriateness of much of the Northern product, especially considered as a metaphysics, environmental package, concerns. to instance, for cover, well as as The European North has no satisfactory land or environmental ethic fit for Antipodean circumstances, and the deeper American package too is spiritually-loaded mainstream for Australian In political theory, American work is much too individualistic and culture. competition-based, and the European product, especially the Marxist form, unsuited being both too precious and for local too high-tech is circumstances, especially again for more environmentally-perceptive people. features of telling also Thirdly, import world’s markets power structures against substitution and comparative advantage, regionalism; namely, and pressures and fashions, (including the Old Boy’s are appealing avoidance of the removal of overseas control and network in jobs, policies, etc.), and gaining of local control, employment of local people, etc. Fourthly, 32 there are arguments for cultural diversity, applied to The point is elaborated in Culture. At a more practical level Northern products are again often unsuitable, though for different reasons. For example, the transfer of American agricultural methods and equipment to the thin poor soils of the Antipodes has had disastrous effects, at last beginning to be recognised. 28 philosophy as complexity, sheer part of intellectual diversity, stability, culture: etc.33 arguments In fact, built into the whole notion of 'culture’ transfers. dense, Naturally we want a rich, weeds and many We obtain not only good products, being introduced. Indian maize and European cultivars, but European pests and American weeds. selectiveness and control are essential, as richness, the garden analogy But not only seeds and plants but productive garden. pests are from This is why previous against haphazard procedures. The proposal is not for, nor would the case sustain, a narrow localism, with local products, whatever their quality, heroes, replacing Northern ones. local fashions, and local cq|t That is certainly not the preferred way of the newer regionalism, which tends to do without fashions and heroes and which seeks durable quality in products, low environmental impact, and so on; nor is it the way of technology policy. Rather, as with technology policy, we select niches which are not occupied or satisfactorily filled, where we difference, and use and develop local skills and methods. has to outlets, be selective etc.). given our resource But granting regionalism, base (of can make a Indeed the policy philosophers, publishing to what extent should components, for instance people, books and other teaching elements, theories and ideas, be imported and to what extent should they be produced, trained, conceived locally? The possibility of selectiveness in different components means that many mixes are possible. particular mix. There is no need to insist, so far at least, on a The case for the present is mainly for a regional shift, for 33c See, for instance, A.A. Mazrui, A World Federation of Cultures: An African Perspective, Free Press, New York, 1976. ------ -- ---------- --- a significantly greater degree of local autonomy and production. But it will do local favour. no harm Negatively, elements Indicate to of a mix removal of the Locke-Berkelcy-Hume undue (a that finds much the suggestion is that we try to eradicate much of the Oxford style of teaching and doing philosophy. as Q/ on emphasis standard British That includes such things empiricism British focus); of the centred on quasi-historleal approach with however no proper attention to sources; of reinforcement of the prevailing Anglo-American status quo. The heavy particular, has mostly been a very conservative one. the main movements philosophy, but emanating also the from England, Moore-Wittgenstein Oxford influence, in More generally, many of especially practice, ordinary have language been very protective of the Northern status quo; they tend to leave things very much as they are, and recommend just this. 35 Positively, the proposal is that we achieve further disassociation from the Anglo-American empiricist past in two 34 Does it sound familiar? Outside philosophy, it should. For example, we have now been told by the Americans that our defence role, unlike theirs, is regional, not global: this is supposed to shed great light on our previously confused defence policies. 35 The point is laboured in E. Gellner, Words_ and Things, Victor Gollancz, London, 1959. But even ordinary language philosophy, though conservative, and though it much contracted the proper range of philosophical investigations, had its liberating elements, e.g. removal of some of the narrowness and more cramping assumptions induced by technical jargon. Nor has the social impact changed much with the subsequent decline, since 1959, of ordinary language philosophy, the increasing insolvency of Oxbridge philosophy, and its consequent limited take-over by right-wing Ivy League American philosophy. By contrast, the less economically influential growth of redbrick and applied philosophy in some of the British redbrick and polytechnic institutes has touched no more than the surface of Oxbridge practice. 30 by ways: local emphasizing framework, by and diversifying move that projects of range the outside constricting that traditions philosophical selectively drawn upon, to include not only neglected Continental strands and but also parts of Eastern thought, The philosophy. is idea that Pacific ethnic material and Australasian plurality of such a especially sources, in teaching, will assist in removing narrower cultural biasses, such as British parochialism, enable more and discrimination be obtained. to Then too we should be better able to see the ranges of theories that are open to us in the Antipodes and how to advance our own programs. There remain some things we should want to see whatever mixes are chosen One crucial issue is the removal of Northern in different Antipodean regions. bias from papers and publications, research seminars and lectures, letters of This Northern bias is a disposition to cite and discuss reference, and so on. the projects and works irrespective and discussion the of to of Northern quality ignore of the authors, their works the more of authors, local irrespective of the quality of their contribution. defer to write oi not been opinions of worth, importance, It etc. better, topic again under largely It is the disposition to authors from prestigious Northern institutions, accept their the to contribution the famous is and to uncritically the disposition to lecture as though work produced locally either does not exist or has influential philosopl e s, are, (thus if ensuring anything, more that it Inclined is to not). Northern And Australasian bias than many overseas intellectuals, who are perhaps less concerned to be seen as belonging to the Northern mainstream. bias affects not only the The reduction, and eventual removal, practice of Individual of Northern philosophers, but the policies of selection and review committees as well as of editors and referees 31 of local reorientation, innovations It journals. with better, involves, philosophers Antipodean so they among can cite work initiatives and developments - things that would b< content in courses leave, and so on. taught, more time spent at intellectual to know local getting local things, other or point out work and regional assisted by greater local local institutions on study 32 APPENDIX 1. considering the corresponding initial Lebensanchauung’ argument Philosophy both Anderson, as is truth and its theory may not a that be or confirmation independent of national sympathies or prejudices'. mean Science’. The ’are falsification Granted: but that does not fostered, etc., held, and Weltanschauung Christian a as senses two ’a scheme of the universe’, that of ridiculous (Australian) distinguished between distinction In the first, (p.292). that is German the Philosophy’, National a Francis AJPP, ’the to ’an Australian of possibility ’the of Editor In On the earlier idea of a National Philosophy for Australia. in one region but not others, as intultionism was for long in in Holland, or Cartesianism in France. In a second 'more intimate and personal’ way, 'a nation like an individual may develop a certain temperamental attitude to the problems of existence, which we may A nation’s philosophy, like its art ... call its philosophy of life. and its literature, is a mode of expression for the national It is a specialised form of the national genius ....’ short, part of the evolving national culture. is by no entirely means from separate (pp.292-3). It is, in the first place, But, initial the consciousness. sense, a in this philosophy comprising not merely a fairly comprehensive theory but also an integrated set of attitudes (like an operational paradigm). are such items as accounted ’the national consciousness’ and units single philosophy, like particularly Furthermore, only by concession meriting Australian distinctive (in definite of literature, has any sense): does not Australian descriptors. many such 'the Australian landscape' strands things to form it, some rather not loose families. Anderson does not find, really hope to find in ’a modern industrialised community’ - with its modular parts interchangeable with those of others - a national philosophy of life, with a difference. In fact he 33 claims to find a (somewhat) trite moral base to build on, humour, fair and courage particularly phllosphical. at least various apart of but life, regional is So far, not; this problems about nothing does however not local as research Identifying and trouble derives from the extravagant claim that with Goodness these and - distinctive, all or there exclude programs). legitimating being So a far, national But shortly Anderson is plunged into inconsistency: the philosophy, so good. do at there could a national philosophy, then, (such philosophies from rational but dealing', 'traditions ... of the Beauty - then of values eternal and only Philosophy' (p.295 with rearrangement). the then 'if Australia has nothing to Spirit, has she the Ideals nothing to of Truth, with do But, as Australia has nothing per se to do with these - as is virtually conceded, these values involving a 'wider sweep' than any national boundaries ~ "she" has nothing to do with Philosophy, contradicting the possibility of a National Philosophy. Though the contradiction is easily avoided by rescinding the extravagant claim, the ideal of a National Philosophy should be allowed to rest in peace: nationalism has had its time. Richard Routley^ Research School of Social Sciences Australian National University or With thanks to R. Elliot, W. Godfrey-Smith, S. Grave and L. Mirlin, to several members of the audience at the presentation of the paper at the 1983 Australasian Association of Philosophy Conference, University of Adelaide, to several referees for this Journal, and, not least, to the present Editor. ..A PROSPECTS FOR REGIONAL PHILOSOPHIES IN AUSTRALASIA Philosophy, especially academic philosophy but also folk intellectual other dominated, indeed Europe, swamped, largely by Northern now increasingly from North America. a such populations, have to stay that way. like higher cultural activity in Australasia, has long been and influences, composition of result was virtually inevitable. Suitable policies, from initially Given the migration patterns, the cultural and other baggage imported, the ethnic ruling philosophy, a good philosophy the resulting But it does not policy, could change things. The thought of a regional philosophy, perhaps matching a regional In 1923, a New Zealand correspondent to the newly-launched is hardly a new one. Australasian Journal of Psychology and Philosophy mentioned the ’a new kind or culture, temper philosophy of possibility of under these southern skies’ which the Journal might foster.1 The Journal has however hardly fulfilled such a role (or, for that matter, actively pursued professional philosophers but a wider things some have changed in its pronounced aim of reaching not merely Australasian Australia, community). laying a solid foundation for a new regionalism in philosophy, that possibility of a new temper hardly been realised. but few of philosophy had There is little in the way of a new kind and temper of philosophy under New Zealand skies, which the southern skies include: although And features, distinctive ‘no were distinctively characteristics, have shown up in New Zealand philosophy’2. intended New Zealand New Zealand remains 1. AJPP, March 1923, p.74. The question was taken up by the Editor same volume, p.292.ff; his discussion is considered below. 2. S.A. Grave, A History pf Philosophy in Australia, Queensland Press, 1983, p.l. Page references are to the manuscript. 1 to in the University v, •? 1 nSOphy of a substantial net importer of dominance colonial but also philosophy, inns been , philosophers. and used to prevail in Australia, where virtually all that chairs, and many other academic posts in philosophy, were the from no established chairs are where most strikingly exhibited at the of orientation Northern New Zealand is not surprising. in academics small courses designed, topics covered and considered and especially in appointments made, the heavy researched Zealand, New by filled Given the usual power and influence of professors in occupied by locals. departments, in persists North, situation The oldest of philosophy taught and (The Northern control is perhaps Zealand New universities, the University of Otago, where the Philosophy Department has been virtually captured by a British School and looks increasingly like an offshoot of the London School q, of In Economics.) kC-f" Ct event the overwhelming Anglo-American dominance of New any Zealand philosophy — also a feature only in slightly lesser degree of Australian philosophy - confirmed by a content survey of the courses offered and be can research papers written at New Zealand universities. to Even when local people have been appointed they have been generally forged requirements brought or up on finished the North as B.Phil. hard well. In particular, the to beat case of philosophy by the Many departments of philosophy remain full of products degree. of this cultural mill: were Australasia, of the Australasian universities in the major period of post-World War II expansion were conveniently seen to in the Oxford in solid diet of Anglo-American material, and a in positions indeed until the mid 70s candidates finished out when they applied for positions, in such Oxford was the (unwarranted) prestige of Oxford and the continuing "cultural cringe". Nonetheless, despite the Northern dominance, significant changes have been occurring in the Antipodes, especially on the Australian philosophical scene (as will be indicated). It is worth asking whether Australian philosophy is 2 moving hiiosophy towards the sort of change that occurred in USA more than 100 years ago when the Harvard Philosophy Department was brought (or bought) together, and its age "golden American philosophy was never quite the same again, and became its began. own thing. There are Australian philosophy now new operating forces in such a direction. which help could to move There is the widespread emergence, particularly in alternative culture, of a new (bio-)regionalism^, which to cultural and ideological choice along with other local choices; applies and in stark contrast, there is the centralised fashioning of national science and technology which not only provides a model for reflection in regional philosophy policies, but policy also directly bears on parts of the of philosophy science. Unfortunately there are also some serious obstacles to regional philosophies and to the very idea of a regional philosophy. USA, long an importer of culture from Europe, has of certainly of lower components of higher culture such as philosophy exporter philosophical culture, output from Oxford has culture, taken). recently but evidently (witness Are become net also any of turn American the there a reasons why Australasia, if not following suit, should not achieve a better cultural balance of payments, especially Yes, there are reasons. in philosophy? In the first place, the change in the cultural position of the USA went with, and perhaps part derived from, vast in changes economic^power relations. dominance entails cultural dominance, there Australasia’s is little prospect in If economic for most of culture, since there is no serious prospect that Australasia will ever emulate or attain American economic eminence (at least not without nuclear 3. See B. Kuklick, The Rise of American Philosophy; Cambridge, Massachusetts 1860-1930, Yale University Press, 1977, Parts 2 and 3. 4. See especially, Fourth World News, vol. 1, 1983, and Scale, Coward, McCann and Geoghegan, New York, 1980. 3 K. Sale, Human -uilosopM but also has long '’een destruction of the North, and disruption of cultural entire flow of commodities, Secondly, as observed, Antipodean universities not only other). and the contain a large component of Northern academics, increasingly of Americans, they also include a substantial additional contingent of fellow-travellers, whose research and teaching is bent to Northern concerns. influential jL segment, 4A4X y e unlikely that this (become so locally will group, former the It is Gy I acclimatised as to) give up its Northern^cultural commitments, isolated person. Nor apart the from As long as Antipodeans do not drastically should they. alter their cultural priorities, they are in a bind situation; for it can be persuasively argued that they would be better off, as far as quality and product goes, stocking their universities with American teaching components and researching American-oriented concerns. One simple numerical argument that Antipodean universities would be off with Americans in the main, takes the following lines:graduates Australasian of and American, are A distinguished, at least in subjects such as philosophy. academics of quality produced per number of say there is 1 per every n graduates. graduates; The (higher degree) significantly not culturally Consider now the number higher degree Austroamerican The (great) preponderance of graduates will be Americans, just by virtue of their vastly and better their more extensive system of university education. greater population So also then, just by ratio considerations, the great preponderance of quality academics drawn from an Austroamerican base will be American, as will the upper percentiles among those quality products. be 5. appointing Clearly, Antipodeans, were they interested in quality, more Americans to their universities. would Such an argument does not As indicated in Appendix 1, the ratio of philosophy graduates with doctorates is in the order of 30 to 1 for USA as compared with Australia. And, ; > is well-known, the extent of university education is much greater in USA than in Australasia: indeed Australia is in this respect the worst educated of the developed nations, as OECD figures have made plain (see, e.g., B. Jones, Sleepers Awake, Penguin, 1982, p. ). Co***) fa /o .. w. also folk work to show that, for similar reasons, American universities should be full or Chinese Indian professors, two reasons; for cultural differences between Asians and as philosophy; such of first there are significant especially Americans, disciplines in and secondly, their university systems do not deliver such great quotas of higher degree or high quality graduates, at least in philosophy. The conclusion of the numerical argument will not be a popular one. The anti Americanism felt in portions of the Australasian community extends into the and recently there has been increasing insistence, especially universities; the aging now younger Turks that university positions should be reserved for This at the same time as these Turks often preach of locals. community of scholars, by presumably^/ then an international "free" interchange, etc. They cannot have it ail ways. So long as there is a free—flow interchange of will centre dominate the ideas personnel, and periphery culturally as well as economically; will have more than us, and jobs here should go by and large to them if the they it is quality in this high cultural business that we seek, as we mostly claim. Now it is widely enough recognised, lower-down hierarchical ladders anyway, that there is something drastically wrong with these sorts of arguments. are not flooded with high-quality Northerners local contenders who better. retain have appointment the messages of out the centre better than locals do, and higher—echelon (often Northern committees than dusty locals whose shortcomings are known As is beginning to be recognised too, their drive rather we are inundated by Americans with inflated remote Northern fields tend to look greener to biassed) regularly for positions, if we only preferred the Northerners when they were quite visibly superior: references, would who For we higher-quality products, periphery only if they somehow fall foul 5 and of Northern the allow the them system centres to (e.s5. tend to be exiled to the the academic philosophy» folk w also • it All this makes the position look doubly bad. /Wejought, appointing especially Northerners, Americans, yet And doing so to seems, to order maximize does not achieve the desired quality result, and J? breeds discontent elsewhere, especially among the aging Turks. Cx-z'J2-^ Fortunately there is a way out from this awkward situation and these arguments; and that the is us. the Then shaky shaky way of regionalism. (^We) do our own things; obtain sufficient cultural distance, for be if they are overrated in even their references, and usually not out of the top drawer, in quality. /■jxc*</-C-vuaxt so that they are not numerical argument simply does fall down. and sul^itutable But before we elaborate the emerging proposal there are other influential arguments to dispose of, and the disposal bears on the proposal. There is, to begin with, the argument for have so far been conceded: all more or institutions maximize. most of crave and seek excellence, elements of which that there is an objective commodity, quality or less__agree and what about, which appointments is what academic to capture, indeed aim That at least is the type of myth most of us have encountered; ow know it is a myth, in fact a dangerous myth. Host places don’t even try to make appointments that way, any more that organisations aim just maximize profit, but rather seek some Ability to fit sort of program, teaching or research, is another, and commonly more important factor; 6. to to satisfice on a mix of factors, of which assessed qualityjis only one, and not the highest ranking one. into and and there is no good reason why such a program should not This is easier in the cultural than the technological sphere. However it is also possible technologically: (stronger) theses of technological determinism, and so of cultural determinism, are false. We can choose different options, technologically, as well as culturally. sometimes be a regionally oriented one. So like Mii 1 OSOphy * 1 prevailing given the practices, argument from excellence does not exclude regional philosophy programs. The deeper-cutting objection is that there the with that objective importancej criticism as excellence, objective of idea notions these notions objective of is something and with the are open to values more seriously connected notion of the same sorts generally, that they have viewpoint rather narrow to which these intellectual of the framework bracketed out the contextual—relativisation component of valuing: or amiss relate.? While those operating within a values paradigm, as such ordinary Oxbridge language philosophy or Sydney materialism say, can bracket out the viewpoint, since it is objective incorporated in the operational paradigm, and so arrive at seemingly quality judgements, the judgements are not preserved (e.g. in truth value) when transposed Consider, to frameworks, other e.g. idealistic or for comparison, the judgements as to the quality or worth of a forest made variously by a deep ecologist, an industrial forester, and officer. viewpoints. Marxist Compare environmental judgements as by philosopher, Califorman—environmentalist to the quality There recreational of a holistically-inclined Marxist language, ordinary philosophers. a are philosophers who even pretend that such environmental work cannot be judged, seemingly because not done by institutions. members of such is ■F the importance of work quality done or importance of problems and issues is highly paradigm problems it of the main philosophical peer group at Harvard and like As this begins to reveal, judgements of judgements and as those are not problems independent tackled. dependent. For of But the example, of quantifying-in and of possible worlds and of de re What follows also begins to bring out what is om^Qitted in a main R.S. Pirsig, Zen and the Art of Motor Cycle Maintenance, 197 . -- theme of thought which assume immense importance within mainstream the for referential fashionable theories paradigm, vanish to relative insignificance empiricist outside that restricted viewpoint. Now observe that most judgements as to what are the important problems and what constitutes important work - matters helping determine quality - are shipped relative to their down from placement, paradigmatic the Their North. and the importance is paradigms concerned are exported to the Antipodes through the main channels already indicated. We are free to reject these paradigms and select alternatives, and there are, it can be argued, good reasons to do just that, much as there are good reasons different energy technology different (or military technology) choose to that from generally favoured in the North which the North is eager to export southwards. Similar points apply against the cosmopolitan/international argument might which alternatively be called the Peter Stuyvesant international argument, that sophisticated people everywhere smoke this superior -marketed from Holland; product mass-produced cigarette-sophistication is cosmopolitan. and The argument is based on the assumption that philosophy is a ’cosmopolitan subject’, that is is not the sort of enterprise for which place and people are significant as they are for poetry or the novel.8 The assumption has only questioned. to be production also. like a process of But in the process of production the place and people involved And if the product is like a work in discussion) are material. of art, a piece of literature, and not just theorems and arguments assembled in an internationally-approved format, Q then again the historical setting since philosophy, no more than literature, does not emerge in a vacuum. 8. be It takes for granted, for one important thing, that philosophy is a finished product of a certain sort (a propositional theory), not (e.g. to presented matters, Plato's Grave, op.cit, p.2: the term ’cosmopolitan subject’ is said to come from Donegan. As to the significance of place and people for literature, see further C. Partridge, The Making of New Cultures, Editions Rodopi, Amsterdam, 1982. 8 philosophy could not have emerged in ancient Australia, and if cribbed in mid 20th century Oxford would surely have been marked down or rejected.111 It is important not to be sidetracked into issues - resembling problems aesthetics - that do not need to be contested, such as whether and what extent sets of themes and arguments produced in one place and setting could produced in in another. have been A nonnuclear technology of some sort could be adopted in Europe but apparently will not be, whereas there is reasonable prospect that New Zealand, in contrast with Australia, will pursue a nonnuclear energy strategy. It is the doing* and not what could logic, which be substantial cultural resistance): to be done in the Anglo-American their done, that matters Dialethic here. invalidates the technique and methodology of much philosophy done in the North, could perhaps choose be own distinctive thing. distinctive done in the North (though there would be it is not being done there, and is not likely sphere.11 To this extent, Antipodeans can technology and logical techniques, do their own The international/cosmopolitan argument, stated in a form that would be telling, fails. 9. Like a paper Ln the biological sciences. But here again technique methodology, which may both be regional, are crucially important. 10. Related points can be made concerning modern American work. Consider, for instance such texts as W.V. Quine's Word and Object, (Wiley, New York, 1960) or R. Nozick's Anarchy, State and Utopia (Basic Books, New York, 1974). The assumptions taken for granted, the arguments involved, etc., are especially American: it is not just the style. The acceptability of arguments and positions is dependent on place and received paradigm. 11. Much as communist anarchism, a live possibility for communes and perhaps communities in Australia, is culturally excluded in North America, owing to the extreme individualism of that culture. 9 and tUK KLUJLUNAL Hi JLLUbUrdltb IN AUblKALAbLA Of course it can be argued, it is being argued, that Antipodeans don’t need to be, or even oughtn’t to be pursuing their own energy or logic policies and But meeting these considerations takes us to apparatus. concerning issues merit the of a we shall return, our own cuisine cooking is adequate: that we don't or wine styles. arguments, The new need to be or oughtn’t to to be British, or at least cosmopolitan, we should stick to that and buy it off the shelf from ideally importing the cooks also. North, of are not a lot more convincing however than comparable arguments concerning cooking: devising set policies and programs, the point of various diversity, etc.— far beyond the cosmopolitan argument. which new whole the Do we have good reasons to think that British philosophy is better, these days, than British cooking? 12 Antipodeans are free in principle, then, to and to pursue their own paradigms; do so they will by and large want to, and mostly have to, appoint their own people, people they have educated - not saboteurs or people who to be re-educated, from elsewhere, in particular from the North. (had) have But will their intellectual paradigms tie with cultural paradigms, with distinctive features of the local 7 culture. In a loose way, at least, they may link, though works of philosophy will not usually tie in with the culture in the integral fashion that novels (as distinct from more technical works) sometimes do. Grave considers two cultural features, not restricted to particular philosophical programs, that help mark philosophy in Australia as ’an Australian product’ - ’unimportant though this is compared with what matters in philosophy’ he hastens to add. But style, acceptability, truth, do matter, and are not independent - or independent mofar as their perception goes in the case of truth and 12. correctness13 - from One correspondent (name supplied) suggested I ’might note the stultifying crap produced by R.S. Peters Inc. and marketed as philosophy of education’. Certainly, as Grave’s discussion (op.cit. p.318) reveals, Peters’ influence in this area has been very substantial: this indicates another field for local initiative. saco-s. -fo (K t* th- STS FOR REGIONAL PHILOSOPHIES IN AUSTRALASIA underlying broad theory or received paradigm. However the marks Grave cautiously advances do not serve to distinguish the Australian product, being features philosophy exhibits in lesser Australian degree than the more adventurous and polemical philosophy antiquity. Greek first, described by Passmore as ’most typical of Australian philosophy’, is The a ’diversity of approach and readiness unfashionable point of view’, put to forward much something more an unconventional typical or classical of The second, and more surprising, mark is the manifestoed characte^ philosophy. of of Australian philosophy, 'the most notable example ... between Wittgensteinian Melbourne and Andersonian Sydney, philosophy Andersonian itself' (p.2). This example being ... if is it the line-up was not the far from isolated: others among them concern the fervour generated by "Australian materialism", the extraordinary discussed by political Grave), engagement and the by some growing philosophy confrontation departments concerning (both the relevant/paraconsistent program, with the local ("adversarial") style leading to sharp criticism by Americans. Grave The third and especially the fourth marks are, as notes, hardly distinguishing marks, namely the contrast of the Australian reputation in philosophy with that in other subjects and the anti-intellectual national stereotype, and the separation of the academic philosophy from the sort of mostly-imported philosophy of interest in literary and arty-crafty circles. 13. Nothing need be conceded to strong cultural relativity themes, though they would support the case. It is enough that our theories remain radically incomplete and that there can accordingly be rival theories as to what is true. Similarly, however philosophy is conceived, as the search for truth, explanation, understanding (all of these really), or as inquiry of a certain sort, there can be - will be - competing accounts. 11 — ruK REGIONAL PHILOSOPHIES IN AUSTRALAQi A The failure of the marks to adequately separate off Australian from the particular local examples) does not matter. (apart Australian produce is sufficiently separated another, by projects. For regionalism should not be confused with nationalism, nor more regional positions such as Sydneyside materialism or Wellington Nationalism philosophies. in philosophy, undesirable trait, not to be encouraged: cultural other For one thing, the research its philosophy as in modalism most with national things, is an other and the new regionalism is linked, in with the breakdown of nations and contraction of state things, power. 14 To get back to where we were: - better much increase - doing our own distinctive things, and that we team or In fact there are several suggestions that begin to up to do so. just the emerging proposal is this, thatQ^e/start emerge; not that we do our own selection, decide our own priorities, instead of having these foisted upon us; invented instead here of competitive or taken Gridiron model in favour of a not just, that is, that we play our own and over from Basketball, games, whether the North and not theirs, Rules and Rugby but that we abandon the individual of cultural achievement sold to us and fostered by the North group cooperative approach (elements of which are already modelled in Antipodean social clubs). 14. See, e.g., Sale, op.cit., and L. London, 1957. Kohr, The Breakdown of Nations, RKP, The Editor of the new 1923 AJPP did however take seriously the notion of National Philosophy, of an Australian Philosophy; some of the issues there raised (p.292ff) are addressed in Appendix 2. 12 p_FOR regional PHILOSOPHIES in AUSTRAtacta The thoughts here are example: ditch-digging more ditch rapidly the On than enjoyably and two people On the other side, experience cannot individually achievements in their programs. situation. communi ation working complete very shows depends results builds on Despite the For, despite, the individualism the work of in obtaining we that highly myth rapid publication of competitive predominantly much in the attainment work is jointly based, Then again communications the idea or the are tend to lose There are nationalistic considerations (e.g. fact achieves There is the fact that much is conveyed verbally and through face-to-face seminars so that local is and result, and the Here again people at the periphery a result at about the same time as an outsider). There the when the time is ripe for some idea or result, many: There are a mix of reasons:- conveyed. in One is the Poles tend to promote Polish results, Russians will cite a Russian who be ditch rapid verbal communication and access to unpublished upon assignment of credit for it. out. the There are several reasons for this. several clever people will be able to hit on it. important on successfully with the centre on individualistic nature of American academic enterprise,15 material. the is it is well-known that two people cooperating can dig a enjoyment in the doing. of side one Cooperative work tends to pay off in terms of output, quality, and separately. periphery familiar. and simple results will of limited reading, and that people at the centre tend to concentrate when they read on material from the centre by central people, so that published items and results from the periphery will often not be noticed, and may well lose out to 15. central competitors even if they achieve Reflecting other features of the culture and enterprise of the centre which are not so deeply embedded in Australasia: see further R. Routley, ’Culture, philosophy, and approaches to the natural environment - an Australian perspective’, and ’Culture and the roots of political divergence: the Australian/American contrast’, typescripts, Canberra, 1983; both referred to subsequently as ’Culture’. 13 ^2^Sl2IWL_PHILOSOPHTro T. central publication. There is also the fact that people at the centre to merit for merit, more publication and communication opportunities than receive, Here economic factors such as people towards the periphery. market tend (there are, a e.g., many great size of academic more academic philosophers in North America than in the whole rest of the world), control of publishing outlets etc. journals, (with few exceptions all Northern), do begin to enter. economic power does not, and need not, determine culture -^we)can shut philosophical Northern we sets if propaganda want really to. in we And and However off the much the way we shut off our television can stop being impressed by those philosophical middle-men who make a living by importing the Northern stuff. So what do we do? We adapt to the cultural-philosophical level, several of things, that have been suggested in the new (bio-)regionalism. those some regional awakening and local self-management. We do not We aim at slavish remain importers and imitators of, and local commentators on and peddlars of, doctrines and positions from the North. to trying tease out For example, we don’t spend our academic what Wittgenstein or Dummett16 or Quine meant by this or that in the hope that some pale Northern light will perhaps filter through. be lives To I am not suggesting that we emulate the appalling ignorance of people sure, from the North who visit the Antipodes and know little or nothing about what has been done or is being done here; so that we have eminent visitors, their bags heavy with cultural accroutrements, trekking University (now the main for centre through investigation the Australian of relevant logics) and informing us that, or relying crucially on the assumption that, a entails 16. every proposition. National contradiction One reason that these Northerners often know little Nor do we really need C. Martin (an American, formerly professor at Sydney University, now at Calgary) coming by to tell us there are severe difficulties in making Dummett’s stuff work or even cohere (though it’s nice to see him again). 14 ^~^-^S2NAL PHiLosn 1 or nothing about distinctive positions and advances prevailing of assumption the is Antipodes is the the inferiority of cultural and intellectual life in these former southern colonies; another is the narrow (predominantly local) and limited reading undertaken by Northern luminaries. But, despite having been given sufficient cause, we shouldn’t cut ourselves off We can reasonably use what we need from these anyway). so from Northern paradigms and influences (we could hardly manage to entirely we should enterprises. stay informed In any case, but of, imitators not cultures regional continuing are in just as the people are largely European stock. traditions, or part of, their of, rooted older minority) and traditions, Northern So far from cutting loose from these traditions and starting afresh from nowhere, these likely traditions: older (and the local variations that have emerged, are what we want to develop and perhaps mutate, as again with wine styles. The proposal is encourage then develop and paradigms, rather than paradigms we that do increasingly own our working with pale nor-thorn reflections research of fortunately, being do we programs already grounded in need to features make New Zealand is a different and which initiated, of the to pull have larger For the very great culture.17 Nor, more Australia difficult proposition - is already All one really has to do out programs he has already indicated and provide some elaboration and commentary. 17. components. Much of the story, for indicated in Grave’s survey of Australian philosophy. is Northern the story up - though helping to shape the future is part of what the proposal is about. - of It is not as if we have to build from nothing, to do - what is very are advantage things, own research programs, and so shape new Antipodean our difficult - entirely original work, to try to create cultural there local To pull the investigation down to See Culture, op.cit. 15 a more concrete level, I PHTr mo____ shall list some more prominent programs — not the only ones — and remark on some features of them. The longest running and best known program is, without much doubt, that AusfcraATan naturalism, which is generally traced back to Anderson’s empiricist and which aims to see the natural world, and everything else, metaphysics, encompassed suitably program a and Smart in Adelaide which has since died out there. has included such famous components as the mental-material theme and central materialism, state derivatively, a version of functionalism. failures conspicuous scientifically relations of as the frame work of the world of /physical scienc^f. within It contains as a major subprogram Sydney materialism, Place of its in nowadays and Faced like plans, reduction The latter program contingent it all it by initiated identity in, more physicalisms with takes incorporates now a trimmed theory of universals, and an account of natural laws as universals. Parts of the program, especially materialism and central state reductionism and the unified science ideal, have had counterparts in the North, but the program has, for the most part, retained its distinctively Australian character (it never caught on in smoothly, moreover, into Australian culture. New Zealand). The program It is similarly down—to—earth, and earthy, so far as philosophy can be, without the fancy ideas or effete of idealism European philosophy or the spirituality and suppressed puritanism with which much of North American thinking simmers (including nowadays, yet fits pragmatism). And it does not shrink from explicit metaphysical commitments, and though it is basically empiricist, it is positivistic not (rejecting a verification principle, in particular). 18. Anderson’s metaphysics was far more opposed to reductions than what has succeeded it. For an account of Anderson’s philosophy, and a history and account of Australian naturalism and materialism, see especially Grave, op.cit. 16 It is a city, primarily «G4t-y o£ Sydney, based program, but the program does extend outside universities a bit (a tiny bit) to the larger metropolitan the As in North America, so in Australasia, little professional philosophy impinges on broader community1920 , or even on the wider academic community the work by Russell, Popper and Kuhn being exceptional. Australasia would be an quite Perth, and has outliers in Apart from notable exceptions, one achievement, naturalism program used to stretch through to elsewhere), the old from worth it the program has never had there now for.) reaches in The to (or indeed the same hold, or nor, surprisingly, has it had much external criticism from confrontation of major city philosophies having died out. more religion stricken Melbourne philosophy, much more than Sydney, has been dominated by a procession of Northern fashions: more working around Canberra, as well as a core of opposition there. Melbourne philosophy is more historically oriented and than Sydney; this turn Adelaide; more than a rather precarious hold, in Melbourne: heavyweight criticism (To recently, earlier idealism and Continental philosophy; Wittgenstein, ordinary language philosophy; turnabout, Quine, Davidson and extensional reduction; then, a remarkable now perhaps Lewis, Kripke and Dummett? 19. In Canada while most academics from other disciplines would know of, and perhaps a little about, Russell, far fewer would know of Wittgenstein (though he is becoming known to lit. crit. groups), and virtually none would know of Quine. (Subjective sampling). On the ’triumph of professionalism’ in philosophy in USA, see Kuklick, op.cit., p.565ff. Kuklick brings out well some of the more disastrous features of professionalism, but does not sufficiently notice that the virtuous features resulting from some professionalisation can be synthesized with broader philosophical activity. 20. Ellis’s work, and more recently the work of F. Jackson and others (e.g in value theory, H. Munro), which can be accounted part of the broader naturalist program. 17 *• I culture. The one program that reaches beyond the confines of the cities in Australia - is which a metropolitan dominated culture, the vast land always all after environmentalism, being the other - is Australian which has the Colleges of Advanced Education in the country with connections towns and the communes on the North Coast. So far distinguished by what it is not as what it is. of most transformed Europe World, to untouched country left, and little sensitivity accordingly those the and built approaches. human-transformed environment, specifically, issues as such that issues admit shallow European superficiality continues to dominate much of the New And World environmentalism outside North America. differs much as The main environmental issues in Europe tend to concern wilderness. of is and having little wild environment natural its program the Serious and deeper environmental positions are a feature of the New World, the Old having program, diffuse rather a significantly North environmentalism American however from Antipodean environmentalism, most obviously in the religious-spiritual of component former, the in but other several respects as well (see further Culture). Australian More positively, there are three strands to there Firstly, is an extended utilitarianism, differing little from Bentham’s enlarged position, which insists upon counting the This creatures. environmentalism#*- position, developed from a of utilities British base, prominently in animal welfare and animal liberation movements: on focussed animals, domestic animals used in as engineering. genetic interested in, conversion of endangered forests, pain and pleasure. spinoff from It species, is the not of figured it has wild generally with, or much the lands, etc., except insofar as these have a bearing on animal Wider and deeper environmental concerns animal more concerned disappearance sentient and hunted (wild) research however has though animals, it has also become entangled in issues of bio-research such all welfare, and 18 appear only as a so deeper concerns get an inadequate deal. Secondly, there is a wider and utilitarian and ecological deeper a especially wild and in value trees is is not forests and and This position differs from natural systems. American spiritualism and from an extension of American there which which recognises irreducible value elsewhere than sentience or psychological states, which finds intrinsic ecosystems, position, Thirdly, naturalism. of course, as almost everywhere, a reactionary component, critical of the other strands, which insists that all that needs to be accomplished environmental front be can achieved within older established on the ethical and political frameworks. Whereas materialism is based in Canberra and Sydney, environmentalism Melbourne, but also includes Brisbane and Perth. none in Sydney, is the relevant/paraconsistent materialism and environmental programs have further input from relevant/paraconsistent affecting epistemology program and a in in logic metaphysics, respectively, program, other major areas of philosophy, especially metaphysics. which perhaps includes more centres in Australia than any Melbourne, Whereas the program. theory value essentially is core their in Also centred in Canberra, and reaching across the country, with good connections but centred is other but with the one The program program, and which extends to New Zealand, has also been described elsewhere.* 22 21. It has been described more fully elsewhere: see, in particular, Environmental Philosophy (ed. D. Mannison and others), RSSS, Australian National University, 1980. 22. Again, like all the Australian programs, both those mentionedand others, in Grave, op.cit. But see further, R. Routley, ’Research in Logic in Australia, New Zealand and Oceania’, Research Papers in Logic #14, Australian National University, 1983; G. Priest and R. Routley, On Paraconsistency, Research Papers in Logic #13, 1983; R. Routley and others, Relevant Logics and Their PJLvals, Ridgeview, California, 1983. 19 The main research program evident in New Zealand philosophy is also a logic A program. grounded program emanating from the work of Prior and now located mainly in Wellington, it might be called the extended modal program. of the on program The impact is perhaps best seen in Cresswell’s Logics and philosophy Languages. Australian philosophy used to be known, and still is in some quarters, its hard-headed empiricism; regrettably New Zealand philosophy is mostly not known for anything much, except perhaps, in UK, that Prior brought adaption of philosophy Russellian work the of present type that remote place. from impressions is particularly accurate; of for is, his Neither of these both are rather out-of-date. of course, not just unusual to But the aim correct these impressions, not just to reflect or report on culture - for what one would to reflect upon is not sufficiently there - like but also to help manufacture elements of a culture, to make an image. To resist the North, we should increase our efforts to further the flourishing already programs, and perhaps other sunrise projects, to build teaching and research around the programs selected for promotion, elaboration, and criticism, to orient appointments, programs. 23 24 Why bother? technology, especially of involved local people, off the shelf, from the North? There is, firstly, the inferiority built-in and despite their attractive packaging. 23. limited range of applications (e.g. obsolence 25 of Northern Without putting too fine a point for a they're hopeless in the vicinity of Methuen, London, 1973. See also work by Goldblatt and by to in Research in Logic, op.cit. 20 our There are several arguments for not on it, many of the imported intellectual goods are shoddy, and only work very these Why not simply buy our philosophy, like almost all doing this, in more than a limited fashion, which are now sketched. products, to Hughes referred contradictions or dilemmas). Much that is wrong with philosophy Antipodean undoubtedly derives from shoddy intellectual goods imported from the North. Yet buying this material is encouraged by hard-sell cultural the North, who are often enough paid to visit. from ambassadors This is part of the philosophical imperialism from the North - the successor to Northern colonialism that - the Antipodes too willingfysuffers , or, more remarkable, encourages! Secondly, there is the inappropriateness of much of the especially considered as a package, metaphysics, environmental concerns. land or for instance, The European North to Northern cover, has no as product, well as satisfactory environmental ethic fit for Antipodean circumstances, and the American 24. In fact something like the last has been the policy of the LSE. Philosophy Department, where the only outside appointment over a long period was that of Lakatos (hardly a person far removed ideologically). As observed, it now loc s like the practice of the Otago Department also: and apparently it used to be a tendency at Melbourne. But in most places the practice^ is condemned as nepotistic or parochial, and overridden by the call for new (Northern) blood". It is at this stage, among others that administrative measures do matter; for example, to ensure that suitable locally-engaged locals gain employment rather than Northern stooges, in order to inject funds for on-going or new programs, etc. Among sunrise projects in Australian philosophy so far suggested are these: Australian feminism, Antipodean social alternatives, indigenous regiona philosophies (especially Aboriginal, Melanesian, and Polynesian). As foreshadowed with the notion "sunrise projects", much of the rhetoric, and arguments, concerning science policy can be taken over to aPP-Y to > policy, where X is some subject discipline, such as philosophy. 25. Some of these arguments change support centre also. 21 (perhaps revolutionary) at the I too product is spiritually-loaded theory, political Australian mainstream for culture. 26 In work is much too individualistic, and the European American product, especially the Marxist form, unsuited too and for high-tech, local circumstances, especially again for more environmentally-perceptive people. Thirdly, also telling against comparative advantage, are appealing features of and markets and substitution import (including removal fashions, the Old Boy’s of overseas of the world’s avoidance namely, regionalism; control and structures power network in jobs, policies, etc.) and local control, employment of local people, etc. Fourthly, there are arguments for cultural diversity, applied to philosophy as part of intellectual arguments from richness, complexity, sheer culture: into diversity, stability, etc.26 27 In fact, the garden analogy built notion of garden. ’culture’ transfers. introduced. We obtain not only but good whole we want a rich, dense, productive Naturally But not only seeds and plants the and weeds products, cultivars, but European pests and American weeds. many pests are being maize and European Indian This is why selectiveness and control are essential, as against previous haphazard procedures. The proposal is not for, nor would the case sustain, a narrow localism. The suggestion is for carefully selective penetration of intellectual areas. with technology policy, we select niches which are not occupied As or satisfactorily filled, where we can make a difference, and use and develop local skills and methods. base Indeed the policy has to be selective (of philosophers, publishing outlets, etc.). what extent should components, for instance people, our resource But granting regionalism, to books 26. The point is elaborated in Culture. 27. See, for instance, A.A. Mazrui, A World Federation African Perspective, Free Press, New York, 1976. 22 given and of other teaching Cultures: An elements, theories and ideas, be imported and to trained, produced, conceived locally? The extent what possibility different components means that many mixes are possible. insist, so far at least, on they be of selectLveness in There is no need to The case for the present is a particular mix. of local But it will do no harm to indicate elements of a mix that finds much local merely for a regional shift, autonomy and production. Negatively, favour. for significantly a undue emphasis is suggestion the on the (also a Cambridge focus); proper conservative that we try to get rid of the Oxford That includes such things as removal of quasi-historical with one. generally More practice, have the proposal is no however The heavy Oxford influence, in particular, has mostly been many been that a very of the main movements emanating from but also the Moore - later very protective of the Northern status quo; they tend to leave things very much as they Positively, approach of reinforcement of the prevailing Anglo-American England, especially ordinary language philosophy, Wittgenstein degree British empiricism centred on Locke-Berkeley-Hume of the attention to sources; status quo. greater 28 style of teaching and doing philosophy. the should are, and recommend just this. 29 we achieve further disassociation from the Anglo-American empiricist past by widening the range of philosophical traditions 28. Does it sound familiar? Outside philosophy, it should. For example, we have now been told by the Americans that our defence role, unlike theirs, is regional, not global: this is supposed to shed great light on our previously confused defence policies. 29. The point is laboured in E. Gellner, Words and Things, Victor Collancz, London, 1959. But even ordinary language philosophy, though it much contracted the proper range of philosophical investigations, had its liberating elements, e.g. removal of some of the narrowness and more cramping assumptions induced by technical jargon. drawn upon, to include not only thought, Eastern neglected in parts of but also Pacific ethnic material and Australasian philosophy. The idea is that such a plurality assist and strands continental sources, of especially in will teaching, removing narrower cultural biasses and enable more discrimination to Then too we should be better able to see the be obtained. ranges theories of that are open to us in the Antipodes and how to advance our own programs. APPENDIX 1. Notes investigation of on the philosophical supply situation. Sociological the philosophy labour market in Australia and New Zealand has yet to be attempted. of But a picture some the underlying elements simple numerical argument of the text can be gained from the following table: TABLE 1. Ph.Ds in Philosophy: a USA/Australian comparison USA Number (Male/Female) 1977 330 (264/66) 1978 283 (235/48) 1979 285 (204/54) Australia Number 9 1980 4 1981 4 Notes: 1. New Zealand Number The breakdown of the USA numbers by sexes is (male/female) given. Similar figures do not appear to be available for Australia. 2. The US figures are for the academic year ending in the e.g. 1978 covers the Northern Year academic year 1977-78. shown, Southern figures are for the calendar year shown. In applying table 1 some simplifying assumptions are made. candidates for appointment to regular university It is positions assumed now that require a 9 find trite a moral fair dealing'), but nothing at all distinctive. national philosophy, exclude there being programs). So Australia has at least various life, of regional far, then, all is well. the inconsistency: of humour, courage and base to build on ('traditions ... trouble derives but So far, then, there be (such as local research But shortly the Editor is plunged into from the extravagant claim that Philosophy' (p.295; with rearrangement). sweep' than any national boundaries — these "she values is a Though the easily avoided by rescinding the extravagant claim, the ideal of a National Philosophy should be allowed to rest in had its time. involving has nothing to do with Philosophy, contradicting the possibility of a National Philosophy. contradiction do But, as Australia has nothing per se to do with these - as is virtually conceded, 'wider 'if nothing to do with these - the eternal values of the Spirit, the Ideals of Truth, Goodness and Beauty - then and only then has she nothing to with a this does not however is not: philosophies can peace: nationalism has PROSPECTS FOR REGIONAL PHILOSOPHIES IN AUSTRALASIA Philosophy, especially academic philosophy but also folk philosophy, like intellectual and higher cultural activity in Australasia, has long been (Uhfi swainped, by Northern increayngly from North America. Europe, now inltutal i!t largely indeed dominated, the from patterns, of composition ethnic resulting uU-HT; populations, such a result was virtually does not initially the migration Given imported, baggage and/other Influences, the But it inevitable. Suitable policies, a good philosophy policy, have to stay that way. could change things. I he of thought is cultuie, hardly a regional a new one. philosophy, In 1923, a matching perhaps a regional correspondent to the New Zealand newly-1aunched Aust r a1asIan Journa1 of Psychology and Philosophy mentioned the possibility of 'a new kind or temper of philosophy under these southern skies’ which the 11 o *5 SIK reaching for (or, not community). soi id might Journal, merely foundation that for a matter, professional although And The foster. some Journal has actively pursued philosophers things new regionalism however hardly but have changed in philosophy, its a fulfilled pronounced wider of aim Australasian in Australia, laying a that possibility of a new Lemper of phiLosophy has hardly been realised. There is little in the way of a new kind and temper of philosophy southern skies were intended to include: distinctively New Zealand skies, which the but few distinguishing features, ’no under characteristics, New have Zealand shown up in New Zealand The question was taken up by the Editor in the discussion is considered below, especially in p/ces 1 pin losophy' .- New Zealand remains a substantial net The situation of colonial dominance that used to prevail in and philosophers. Aus 11.11. la, wheie virtually all chairs, were filled by academics philosophy, Importer of philosophy, and many from the North, posts academic other in tends to persist in New Zealand, where no established chairs are occupied by locals.\ Given the usual power and Influence of professors topics coveted considered and in small and in courses designed, departments, especially appointments made, the heavy Northern orientation of philosophy taught and researched in New Zealand is not The Northern control is perhaps most strikingly exhibited at the surprising. oldest of New Zealand Philosophy Department event , the the University of has been substantially captured by a like increasingly looks universities, an offshoot of overwhelming Anglo-American the Otago, where the British School and University of London.In any dominance of New Zealand philosophy 1 so <1 feature only in slightly lesser degree of Australian philosophy — can be confirmed by a content survey of the courses offered and research papers written at Now Zealand universities. Even when local people have been appointed to positions in Australasia, they have been brought up on a solid diet of Anglo-American material, and they have often been reforged or finished in the North as well. In particular, the S.A. Grave, A History of Philosophy in Australia, Queensland University Piess, 1)84, p.l. Page references are to the manuscript. The paper draws/ heavily on this history. / / was correct at the t^me of presentation of J ' J/ ' v/i th the recent loss of^Xiair at Wellington, the qualification, but the pattern of domination persists. the pager (August claimrequires *ln the 1981 Commonwealth University Handbook listing, 6 of the 8 members of the Department held their main degree, Ph.D., from London, and one of the remainder from Exeter. Only one member of the Department, soon to retire, falls outside the nexus. of requirements the major period post­ of li expansion were conveniently seen to in the case of philosophy by World War the in the Australasian universities B.Phil, Oxford products of Many degree. fill's cultural mill: in Oxford were hard (unwarranted) departments of indeed until philosophy full remain of the mid 70s candidates finished to beat out when they applied for positions, such was the prestige of Oxford and the regrettable, but still continuing, "cultural cringe". Nonetheless, been occurring scene (as in Northern it indicated). significant dominance, especially on the Antipodes, be will the despite the Australian worth is asking changes have philosophical Australian whether phiLosophy is moving towards the sort of change that occurred in USA more than 100 years ago when the Harvard Philosophy Department was brought (or bought) together, its "golden and age" began.’ American the same again, and became its own thing. philosophy was never quite There are now new forces operating which could help to move Australian philosophy in such a direction. the widespread regionalism/' other provides a which applies choices; local fashioning emergence, of national model for and particularly cultural to in in alternative and there are of choice along ideological contrast, there and technology policies, reflection in regional also some is philosophy directly bears on parts of the philosophy of science. soon appear, culture, stark science serious obstacles There is the a new with centralised which not only policy but also Unfortunately, as will to regional philosophies and to the very idea of a regional philosophy. See B. Kuklick, The Rise of American Philosophy; Cambridge, Massachusetts 1860-1930, Yale University Press, 1977 , Parts 2 and 3. On this bio-regionalism, see especially, Fourth World News, vol. 1, and K. Sale, Hitman Scale, Coward, McCann and Geoghegan, New York, 1930. 1983, 1 other seek b,1! (Iu<i'!iy fs to satisfice on a mix of factors, of which assessed only one, and not often the highest ranking one. Ability to fit program, teaching or research, is another, and commonly more lnto 8ort iiipo/iant factor; and so H ! linGS bc a regionally reason why such a program should not is no good there So given prevailing practices, oriented one. the argument from excellence does not exclude regional philosophy programs. in my event, there are enough local candidates of sufficient worth to proceed >‘-giona] w!I;i And, programs without sacrifice clearcut excellence. of Local enterprise need entail no loss of excellence, and could well increase it. btP'! 1 s" v • 1 i! ■ 1 b'J objection is that cutting of excellence, objective obJt( ■ * importance; that criticism is of notions llL'J' ' ' 1 '".ll_ ff".l these there is something seriously amiss and notions objective values with open are more contextual-re lativisation a rather narrow intellectual the to generally, of component paradigm, notion same sorts they that of of have the valuing: While those operating framework or viewpoint to which these values relate.10 within connected the as such ordinary Oxbridge language philosophy or Sydney materialism say, can bracket out the viewpoint, '1 's incorporated in the operat ional paradigm, and so arrive at set !! :s’’1 y objective quality judgements, the judgements are not preserved (e.g. m truth Marxist value) when viewpoints. transposed ConsidcZ to for other frameworks, comparison, the e.g. idealistic judgements as to or the quality or worth of a forestWade variously by a deep ecologist, an industrial forester, and a recreational officer. Compare judgements as to the quality of What fol lows also begins to bring out what is omitted in a main theme if R.S. Pirsig, Zen and the Art of Motor Cyc1e Maintenance, Bodley Head, Lond 1974. Note that efusing the notion of objective excellence does not lea^ subjectivism. T avoid the customary false dichotomy , compare the noti validity (usuall Ci1 led to themselves these days by classical logicians' with that of quality^/. 9 a ho 1 i s i /c a I 1 y-i nc I. i ned Marxi st, philosophers it group As because the of problems such '!lt » is importance of are be cannot even judged, main philosophical work are not of quality peer done problems or independent of But tackled. issues is highly paradigm dependent. the For example, those of qu in t i f y i ng-i n and of poss l b Le worlds and of de re importance for immense mainsti -am empiricist restricted that ire judgements reveal, to which assume the language, There work by members of the not done problems and import nice of whit is ordinary philosophers. environmental such that by like institutions. begins this outside it Harvard and judgements witiiiii pretend who philosopher, environmental Californian and seemi ng 1y environmental the important fashionable referential theories paradigm, vanish to relative insignificance Now observe viewpoint. that most judgements as to problems and what constitutes importkj/t work - matters tbechelping, determine quality - are shipped down from the North. is relative to their paradigmatic placement, and Their importance the paradigms concerned are exported to the Antipodes through the main channels already indicated. fri'e to reject be .argued, choose that these paradigms and select alternatives, good reasons different generally energy favoured to do just technology in the that, much as (or different North the which We are and there are, it can there are military North is good reasons technology) eager to to from export southwards. against which might alternatively be the called cosmopolitan/internalional the Peter Stuyvesant argument international r argument , everrywhere smoke that mass-produced and -marketed The argument ' cosmopol i t in subject', pJL Jo-Zj cvnYy' c. Pi ^e/S3)r?'5"?. is based that is a from i s not Holland; this superior product.. cigarette-sophist lest ion on the assumption that pM the sort of enterprise for wht f '/is c^ra- 10 poetry for assumpt ion has only important sori (a to be presented propositional to be questioned. that philosophy thing, theory), not a is a 1 i terature , and work not just. theorems i nternati ona11y-approved format,12 ’ philosophy, since no more than It and The takes for granted, finished product of a certain (e.g. involved the if And novel.11 the process of production also. process of production the place and people mater i a I or of in discussion) art , a rg urn e n t s But in the like a piece assembled in are of an then again the historical setting ma t ters , literature, does not emerge in a vacuum. Plato's philosophy could not have emerged in ancient Australia, and if cribbed in mid 20th century Oxford would surely have been marked down or rejected. fmpoi taut not 1 in aesthet ics extent sets ol adopted in prospect themes nonnucleai Europe that do not that been produced New to be sidetracked need and arguments in another. but to be contested, produced . such as whether and what in one place and setting could A nonnuclear technology of some sort could be apparently will Zealand, into issues — resembling problems in not contrast It is J be, with whereas there Australia, is will reasonable pursue a >t what could be done, that Eravi.’, op.cit., p.2: the term 'cosmopolitan subject' used there comes fioni Donegan. As to the significance of place and people for literature, see fin ! hi’i C. Partridge, The Making of New Cultures, Editions Rodopi, Amsterdam, bike i paper in the biological sciences. But here again technique methodology, which may both be regional, are crucially important. and 13 ■pies, e.g. concerning modem American work. Consider, for instance such texts as W.V. Quine's Word _ (bi ley, New York, 1.960) or R. Nozick's Anarchy, State and Utopia (Basic Books, New York, 1974). The assumptions taken Tor granted, the arguments involved, etc., are especially American: it is not just the style. £9_c-ePta^j 1 i ty of arguments and positions is dependent on place and r e c e 1 v ed par a d I gm . 11 .71 a L t < • r s here . Dialethic much Anglo-American methodology of which logic, invalidates philosophy, could the and technique perhaps be done in the North (though there1 would be substantial cultural resistance): it is not being done there, this extent, and is not likely Antipodeans can their choose the! r own international/cosmopo11 tan argument, s tit ed techniques, Of course do it can the Anglo-American sphere.To to be done in be argued, o wn distinctive dis tine t ive and technology The thing. in a form that would be telling, it is being argued, that Antipodeans don’t need to be, or even oughtn't to be pursuing their own energy or logic policies and apparatus. of But meeting these considerations takes us to a whole new set issues concerning the merit of various policies and programs, diversity, etc. - far beyond the cosmopolitan argument. which we shall return, arguments concerning are not a cooking: the. point of The new arguments, to lot more convincing however than comparable that we don't, devising our own cuisine or wine, styles. need to be or oughtn't to be British, or at least cosmopolitan, cooking is adequate: we. should stick, to that and buy it off the shelf from the North, ideally importing the cooks also. Do we have good reasons to think that British philosophy is better, these days, than British cooking? Antipodeans are free, in principle then, to pursue their own paradigms; and to do so they will by and large want to, and mostly have to, appoint their own people, people they have educated - not saboteurs or people who have (had) 14, Much as communist anarchism, a live possibility for communes and perhaps communities in Australia, is culturally excluded in North America, owing to tiie extreme possessive individualism of that culture. On dialethic logic, see G. Priest and R. Routley, On Paraconsistency, Research Papers In Logic, #13, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University, 1983. 12 elsuJhere, in particular from the North. parad igms features of the I oca 1 though works of integral do. cultural paradigms, with distinctive culture? way, philosophy will to not usually programs, unimportant Independent features, not But or at least, with tie in style, I5 do already restricted with link, they may culture in the link. the truth, far considers Grave particular philosophical 'an Australian wha t matters acceptabilit/, so to Australia as compared is independent mJ correctness they philosophy in this though add. - extent, help mark that to limited a cultural certain truth tic 4 fashion that novels (as distinct from more technical works) sometimes Indeed, hastens perused But will the do product' he in philosophy’ and matter, are not percept ion from under lyi/g broad theory or received paradigm. CG'n £)Q_ However the marks Grave U-y ut Ivin ecu/, A do not features serve to the distinguish philosophy Australian Australian exhibits in s i g n i f 1 c a n t though they are, product, lesser the degree adventurous and polemical philosophy of Greek antiquity. by Passmore as 'most typical of Australian first two than the being more The first, described philosophy' , is a 'diversity of approach and readiness to put forward an unconventional or unfashionable point of v iew' ,' (> philosophy, something wh ich more (with typical some of notable ancient philosophy exceptions) than exhibits Australian an austere 15 Nothing need be conceded to strong cultural relativity themes, though they would support the case. It is enough that our theories remain radically incom|> 1 e te and th.11 there can accordingly be rival theories as to what is true. Similarly, however philosophy is conceived - as the search for truth, explan it. ion, understanding and wisdom (all of these and more, really), or as, more vaguely, inquiry of a certain soil - there can be, and will, be, competing accounts; so a pluralistic theory is inevitable in giving a fuller view. Both preceding quotations, while included as such in Grave's Introduction, are It™ J. Passmore, 'Philosophy', in The Pattern of Australian Culture fed. ' " 'lcL«'0O, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, N.Y., 1963 , pp.131-163. The same annotation also applies to the third mark. 13 uni1ormit y re fI ec t i ng more and that often at/rlbuted sorprising , most 'the philosophy, WittgensteLnian Andersonian notable Melbourne philosophy i s ^’the mark ... example and itself manifestoed character’ Andersonian Sydney, This example (p.2). the ... being 'The second, itself. Land to the is line-up it if Australian of the not was far between isolated: from ited by "Australian materialism", ■ discussed by Grave), relevant/pa raconsis tent to sharp criticism by and growing the program, with Americans. philosophy departments confrontation (both concerning the local ('adversarial’) style leading Connected with these first marks two furl her character 1st les of much Australian philosophy, as of much unkindly unwillingness add (in the mu file poi n t s , hope of locating A are 8th century turi^-of- this-century Cambridge philosophy! di rec tness , the namely surface clarity/and, some would difference), bluntness, genuine unsubtlety and crudity. third and the Jour th marks yklvnnci'^/ are very different- ~~ A Anglo-American philosophy; namely Australasia from, and its general the isolation of academic philosophy indifference or even hostility to, in the sort tZ7 1 7 Though:for the most p< that influenced by Sydney rather than that originating 1 n^JJpl bourne. "this reflects the different historical i nJ 1 u_e 11 c e s -rhrriT Sydney and Melbourne philosophy.f-oj-’ a-h4 y Scottish dZTf-rrf- Contineryfal antecedents. A 1 Cj? V A" I r V of (e.g. philosophy imported of that Nietzsche and the existentialists) 8eneratlng Interest in literary and arts circlls. rhe philosophy failure does of not such marks matter. to one For lts Australian !cts- .nother, Australian is produce regionalism >ot more regional positions such as . •lism «fth national philosophies. ChlnJ, is an undesirable trait, > as In Na‘ the thing, r< nationa11 out separate "Ot in other cultural » 'S^nked, with the breakdown of nations and contraction of state power.18 * * : ............ merging proposal loin 1,1 181,1 irch in iiors- °f COP1CS 1 : ■ >d«. ind 18t< 1 “t”>n UB not 8 suggestions lecide , , Sale, that that begin to our own priorities, that is, that we play our th North) and not theirs, Gridiron and Basketball - but that we abandon the individual competitive model of cultural achievement, 18Q< aec > e.g., London, 1957. we that we do our own selection just, fr< RU1< that > Pt bllcatlons and appointments, study 1 styl this, oir own distinctive things, and 11 1 is op.cit., and L. ?’011 r > sold to us and fostered Tlu>_ breakdown of Nations , RKP , Ihe Editor of the new.1923 AJPP did however take seriously the notion of National Philosophy, of (what must have surprised some New Zealand readers) an Australian Philosophy; some of the issui s there raised (p.292ff) are addressed in Appendix 2. In favour of a group cooperative approach (elements of which are by the .Iort.ii, already modelled in Antipodean social clubs). ihe thoughts here are simple and familiar. digging example: more rapidly On the one side is the ditch- it is well-known that two people cooperating c.an and enjoyably than two people working Cooperalive work ten Is to pay off output, quality, and enjoyment the in doing. on dig a ditch :he ditch separately. or el ewhere in terms of On the ot her side, experience shows that we in the periphery cannot individually cmip^el ete very successfully with the centre on achievements in ior this. the attainment nature of results of depends acce:;:i to unpublished material. There are several reasons Despite the highly competitive Ono is the communication situation. p r s ’ i omi nan tIy ind i vi iua 1is t ic in their programs. American academic upon enterprise,^ much verbal rapid communication and For, despite the individualism myth, work is joint ly based, and builds on the work of many; when the time is ripe for some- several clever people will idea or result, communications result:, an I periphery the tend na t i oiri 1 is t 1 c are to Important assignment lose out. considerations Russians will obtaining in of credit Again (e.g. for is th e facc~ I o- f ace scm 1 nars so that fact Poles that Local rapid Here it. much results tend Then again the publication of there is a mix Russian who achieves a The re be able to hit on it. to again result at or at the There are people of reasons:- promote idea Polish results, about the same time as is conveyed verbally and will be conveyed. through There is the IH'llecling other features oi Ihe culture and enterprise of the centre which are not so deeply embedded in Australasia: see further R. Routley, Culture, philosophy, and approaches to the natural environment an Austral I in perspective', in The Environment, Ethics and Ecology (ed. D. Bennett), The Faculties, Aust raIian National University, 1984, and also Culture and the roots of political divergence: the Australian/American contrast , typescript , Canberra, 1981; both referred to subsequently as ' Cu J ture ’ . fact Limited of when 1.11 e y pub 1 i shed may reading, read on and that material from L terns and results we J I I ose out There publication. receive, to merit also for merit, the from the central is people at more by to tend central concentrate so people, that periphery wi 11, often not be noticed, and fact that publication towards the periphery. thin people centre competitors the the centre even they if the at people achieve Here economic tend centre communication and central to opportunities factors do begin to enter; ket (there are, e.g., a grept many more academic philosophers in North America than in the whole rest of the world), control of publishing outlets and journals (with few exceptions all Northern), etc. culture - we can shut off way we being However economic power does not, and need not, determine the Northern shut off our television impressed by sets if philosophical those philosophical propaganda in much the we really want middle-men to. who And we can stop make a living by importing the Northern stuff. So what do we do? We adapt to of the cultural-philosophical level, several those things, that have been suggested in the newer regionalism. some regional importers and doctrines and awakening and self-reliance. of, and local from the North. imitators positions local We do commentators For not remain on example, We aim at we and slavish peddlars of, spend our don't academic Lives trying to tease out what Davidson or Dumrnett or Kripke meant by this or through. that To in the be hope sure, I that am some pale not Northern light sugg esting that we will perhaps emulate the filter appalling ignorance of people from the No r t h who visit the Antipodes and know little or nothing about what has been done or Jis being done here;^ so that we Regrettably, the Ignorance extends to many locals. In particular, infected with Sydney materialism appear remarkably ill-informed as to features oi other Australasian programs. have those basic 17 vi: Hors, Australian the through investigation of heavy bags their cultural with University National the (now main relevant logics) and Informing us that, or relying crucially positions '■ n advances is ind ! ioiity colo!IJ( often Northerners these for centre One reason on tnu assumption that, a contradiction entails every proposition. that trekking accroutrements, cultural of and intellectual narrow nothing or is the t.he Antipodes the is another little know about distinctive prevailing assumption of life these in (predominantly local) and former the southern limited reading undertaken by Northern luminaries. despite /having But, ourselves off to anyway: been fro/ Northern paradigms and az I propaganda is different). of, or part of, in ' their enterprises. c u t ’ *1 k ’ these nowliere* 1 oose 1.r om (and older shouldn’t cut Influences (we could hardly manage We can reasonably use what we need from In any case, regional cultures are rooted ■ 1 we cause, so we should stay informed of, but not imitators continuing traditions: tiics< sufficient given these likely traditions minority) a nd rgely European stock. start! ng afresh traditions, and the from local variations that have already appeared are what we want to develop and perhaps mutate, as again with wine styles. 1,111 things, ol L-K‘ Proposal is then that encourage and develop our own Antlpodean paradigmfl, ’• rather H is increasingly research programs, than working not as we H ™ very Sreat a nt own local and so shape newer - to bui Id from nothing, to of do to try to create cultural programs ilready Initiated, which have the of being grounded 2I . ’ See Cuiture, op.cit. our with pale northern reflections “ entirely ori Inal work, are res< lrcl do in features of the larger culture.212 18 Nor, do we need fortunately, - Australia part 1 j u'■ o! c New Zealand to do * more difficult the story, for proposition - is All one really To pull the investigation down to a more concrete sketch some more prominent cooperative programs - by no means on Ly programs - and remark on some rel evant features of them. ‘L?. longest running and PdJ 111 .... .IdJL and 1 r sin , science. (physical) best known program is, which ’ 1 >r program The c'.ipi r i <-ist metaphysics,... and state version of tr famed as materialism, both back and world, and* 22 Faced plans, like il takes it initiated in, identity theme more physicalisms all now Anderson's It in The latter program has included there. nowadays to program the mental-material contingent ’1reduction theory of uiiivcisals, that in Armstrong's work. a functionalism. ,n natural traced subpro components central generally is is now best exhibited Adelaide which subsequently died out famous the see to aims without much doubt, as suitably encompassed within the framework of the world of e[se, incorporates a derivatively, with and a conspicuous "scientifically" and an account of natural laws as relations of universals, components of the developing Sydney realism. Parts of the nd central state reduction^sm and y matei science ideal, have had counterparts in the North, but the program t!!l has, Much of about. to bring out programs he has already indicated and provide some is I. shall Jlie such is different and is a elaboration and commentary. level, proposal chough helping to shape in Grave's survey of Australian philosophy. already indicated has the what of the story up - to make for the most part, retained its distinctively Australian character 22 > An Arson's metaphysics was however far more opposed to reductions than whal has succeeded it. For an account of Anderson's philosophy, and a history and account op.cit. of Australian naturalism and materialism, see especially Grave r y , 19 respite export efforts, it never caught on in New Zealand. It is similarly down-to-earth, - earthy, and so far as whlch much of American North does not n city r ‘ from >23 or ' positivistic the University would be quite ropolitan culture. of the ,ider turn achievement, h one to through 1 notable community, icademic ■ an exceptions, the As in tonal philosophy impinges on 11 even on 8t from from mainly ' t£ny hit) to t ia, Apart not is it universltles; but the program does extend outside th lstrala81a metaphysical explicit in particular). broadcast program, based it ink piricist, (rejecting a verification principle, ’s effete nowadays, (including simmers thinking ba* 18 £t !t ideas or fancy the without philosophy or the spirituality and suppressed puritanistn 111901 01 Eu 01 Wlth be, philosophy can The program fits program worth this working lelaide; it work by around for.) now reaches in The to 1 core of opposition there. has never had the same hold, or ’or example, while most academics from other disciplines would °f’ and perhaps a little about, Russell, far fewer would know of iH;! - i'1 (though fie is becoming known to lit. crit. groups), and virtually none would know of Quine. (The sampling is subjective.) kHOW On the hL'?-’ fairly recent 'triumph of professionalism' in philosophy in USA, see b--’65ff. Kuklick brings out well some of the more r/Hls ''^Oures ol professionalism, but does not sufficiently notice that 7 1* 1 features resulting from some pro fess tonalisation can be synthesized with broader philosophical activity. 20 more i rather precarious hold, than in Melbourne: 4 nor, more surprisingly, has it. had heavyweight criticism from there (or indeed much external criticism from elsewhere), the old confrontation of major city philosophies having died Melbourne out. than stricken Continental procession a then, philosophy; fashions: recently, remarkable a Northern of more philosophy; oriented historically and more reLigion philosophy, much more than Sydney, Sydney; Melbourne by dominated is more philosophy earlier Wittgenstein, Quine, turnabout, has been idealism and language ordinary and Davidson extensional reduction; now perhaps Lewis, Kripke and Dumrnett? one The program beyond reaches that confines the of the cities in Australia - which is after all a metropolitan dominated culture, the vast land always the other being a Australian environmentalism, is - rather diffuse of Advanced Education in the towns and country much distinguished environmental by what positions are it a is not as feature of transformed the New most specifically having little wild untouched country left, and such as issues Europe that tend admit Ihii opt*.in to having those concern shallow the wilderness. built approaches superficiality environmentalism of outside (and continues North and it what Europe to So far the program is as the communes on the North Coast. is. World, its of natural America. deeper Old World, and environment and environmental human-trans formed to the and little sensitivity accordingly The main encourage Serious environment, techno-fix dominate North much issues situations). of American the New in Issues And World environmentalism differs significantly however from Antipodean environmentalism, most obviously ' ‘ihe exceptions include Ellis's distinctive program, which can be accounted part of the broader naturalist program, and at Monash the work of F. Jackson and, earlier, of il. Munro in value theory. 21 in the religious-spiritual component of the former but several in other respects as well (see further Culture). More there positively, are an is there enviton.nentallsmfirstly, strands three Australian to utilitarianism, extended differing 1‘' in theory from Bentham's enlarged position, which insists upon counting In the utilities of all Iris figured prominently In animal welfare and animal liberation British base, movements: This position, developed from a sentient creatures. though and it has focussed bio-research more generally such as genetic engineering. endangered species, or much interested in, concerned with, animals used in it has also become entangled in issues of animals, researm and hunted (wild) domestic animals, on It is not however the disappearance of wild lands, the conversion of forests, etc., except insofar as these have a bearing on animal pain and pleasure. Wider and deeper environmental concerns appear only as a spinoff from animal welfare, and so deeper concerns get an inadequate deal. Secondly, there is a wider and a deeper ecological position, which is not utilitarian and which recognises irreducible value elsewhere than sentience or forests and differs ecosystems, American from nature 1 Ism. s t a t es , p s y c h o 1 og i c. a 1 as Thirdly, which finds especially there is reactionary component, critical of needs that to be accomplished natural wild and spiritualism on and of intrinsic value from course, an as the other strands, the environmental systems. in trees This position of American extens ion everywhere, almost and a which insists that all front can be achieved within older estab I tshed (European) ethical and political frameworks. Whereas materialism is based in Sydney, environmentalism is centred in has been described more fully elsewhere: see, in particular, cn La 1 Philosophy (ed. D. Mannison and others), RSSS, Australian National University, 1980. It: 22 ;llld Canberra, but also Includes '11 ’*!) '111 Brisbane and Perth. Also centred in Canberra, and reaching across the country, with good connections Ln Melbourne, !ew b,lt in materialism and epistemology from reLevant/paraconsistent other affecting program wh i ch program, a nd programs have environmental input perhaps wh ich is program areas major program. relevant/paraconsistent the is Sydney, New in Zealand, respectively, the program, one logic especially centres more to extends a essentially but The metaphysics. Australia than also been has with in metaphysics, theory value philosophy, of includes and their core the Whereas any other described , 26 elsewhere. n 1 *n ! !H logic grounded research program program. A impact of the in New Zealand philosophy program emanating ton, Inc evident program on it might from the work of is also Prior and a now be called the extended modal program. philosophy is perhaps best seen in Cresswell’s work.27 Australian philosophy used for its hard-headed known fo1 empiricism; to be known, is in some quarters, regrettably New Zealand philosophy is mostly anything much, except unu.-,u.i] adaption o! and still t rh ps, in UK, that Prior brought Russellian philosophy from that remote place. his Neither of ...‘,ain, like al] the Australian programs, both those mentioned and others, {_’rave> op.cit. But see further, R. Routley, 'Research in Logic in KTU!,ral;a ’ NeW Ze Jceania' , R search Papers in Logic #14, Australian National University, 1983 (which also considers other programs in logic)* G- Priest and R. Routley, op. cit.; and R. Routley, R.K. Meyer and others’, -J- -£?C2JLL s a nd e i r Rivals, Ridgev lew, California , 1982. 2 7 c. , „-,,,Se,e especially N.J. Cresswell, Logics and , ' —o---......... .. Languages, Methuen, ucuuu^u, London, iy/3; but see also -1 — ----’ 1by Goldblatt - . . ■ and- -by Hughes --------------------work referred to in Research in Logic, op.cit. Also described there is <an original ,1....1 version of the modal program (transparent intensional logic) elaborated by Tlchy at Otago. 2J these impressions is particularly accurate; both are rather out-of-date. work of l!::i impress Lons, the present type is, of course, not just to reflect or report not just But to correct these on culture - for what one would like to reflect upon is not sufficiently there - but also to help manufacture elements of a culture, to make an image. io resist the North, we should Increase our efforts to further the sunrise projectsbuild f e,lr ding .Jiid research and criticism, iround tin’ programs selected for promotion, elaboration, to orient: appointments, especially of involved local people, to 28. 4 ...nong sunrise projects in Australian philosophy so far suggested (not all °* Ihiin feasible) are these: Australian feminism, Antipodean social and political. alternatives, peace studies, indigenous regional philosophies (especially Aboriginal, Melanesian, and Polynesian). Another promising field, witli practical consequences, for local initiative is the philosophy of education, where material produced by R.S. Peters has dominated the market, with stultifying effects It is now alleged. As foreshadowed with the notion of "sunrise projects", much of the rhetoric, cl nd a i gum on t, concerning science and technology policy (presented in the case of Australia in Jones, op.cit.) can be taken over to apply to X policy, where X is some subject discipline, such as philosophy. 24 i 2 9, these programs." Why bother? for not doing this, there Northern in more than a limited fashion, which are now sketched. the firstly, is, products, point on despite vicinity it, many of Antipodean of the imported obsolence of most Without putting too intellectual goods are shoddy, and packaging. dilemmas). or undoubtedly imported from Idle North. built-in range of applications (e.g. contradictions philosophy and inferiority their attractive only work for a very limited tiie simply buy our philosophy, like almost technology, off the shelf, from the North? There are several, arguments I oui fine a Why not derives from they’re hopeless in that Much shoddy is with wrong goods intellectual Yet buying this material is encouraged by hard-sell cultural ambassadors from the North, who are often enough paid to visit. This In fact something like the last has been the policy of the LSE Philosophy Department, where the only outside appointment over a long period was that of Lakatos (hardly a person far removed ideologically). As observed, it now looks like the practice of the Otago Department also; and apparently it used to be a tendency at Melbourne. But in most, places the practice is condemned as nepotistic or parochial, and overridden by the call for "new (Northern) blood . however there can be significant differences between nepotistic appointments and those strengthening local programs. Is ;,t this stage, among others that administrative measures do matter; for example, to ensure that suitable locally-engaged locals gain employment rather than Northern stooges, to direct funds into on-going local programs rather thin Imported fashions, etc. There are various ways appropriate administrative details can be handled, locally or nationally; but nothing draconian, such as wholesale exclusion of noncitizens, is required. Observe, indeed, that no restriction of academic appointments to nationals (in Canadian style) or the like is being advocated. Anyone who arrives at a conclusion of that sort from what has been argued has misunderstood the case in crucial respects. As a matter of simple mathematics, restricting appointment fields characteristically reduces both quality of candidates available (however quality is assessed) and range of possibilities open for future research; and no such restrictions are advocated. The author has witnessed the debilitating effects of field restrictions at the Australian National University and elsewhere. 30p Borne of centre also. t hesi! arguments support change (perhaps revolutionary) at the 25 is part Northern of philosophical the - colonialism Imperialism the that from the too Antipodes the successor North - suffers, willing to more- or, remarkable, encourages! Secondly, especially there is the inappropriateness of much of the Northern product, considered as metaphysics, environmental for package, a cover, to as well as The European North has no satisfactory concerns. land or environmental ethic instance, fit for Antipodean circumstances, the deeper and American pack ige is too spiritually-loaded for mainstream Australian culture. 31 In political is work the European product, and competition-based, unsuited being American theory, both too precious and much individualistic too especially the Marxist too high-tech for local form, and is circumstances, especially again for more environmentally-perceptive people. also thirdly, features of import woi Id's markets power substitution and structures against telling pressures and the (including and comparative advantage, regionalism; namely, fashions, Old Boy’s removal, of network in are appealing of the overseas control and avoidance jobs, policies, etc.), and gaining of local control, employment of local people, etc. Fourthly, there philosophy as complexity, sheer part are of arguments intellectual diversity, stability, for cultural arguments culture: 32 etc. “ diversity, In fact, from applied to richness, the garden analogy i’he point is elaborated in Culture. At a more practical level Northern products arc; again often unsuitable, though for different reasons. For example, the transfer of American agricultural methods and equipment to the thin poor soils of the Antipodes has bad disastrous effects, at last beginning to be recognised. See, for instance, A.A. Mazrui, A World Federat ion of Cultures: An African Per spec live, Free Press, New York, 1976. Into the whole notion of 'culture’ built dense, garden. productive transfers. Naturally we want a rich, But not only seeds and plants but weeds and many being introduced. pests are We obtain not only good cultivars, but European pests and European and selectiveness are control products, Indian maize and American weeds. This is why as essantLal, against haphazard previous procedures. i'he proposal with local Is not whatever products, their quality, replacing Northern ones. heroes, the case sustain, nor would for, That local a narrow localisiiri^ fashions, and local. cMl t is certainly not the preferred wai of the newer regionalism, which tends to do without fashions and heroes and leeks impact, and so on; low environmental durable quality in products, nor is the way ol technology policy. Rather, as with technology policy, we select niches which are or not occupied filled, satisfactorily where to outlets, be selective etc.). given our base resource (of can make a Indeed the policy difference, and use and develop local skills and methods. has we philosophers, publishing to what extent should components, But granting regionalism, for instance people, books and other teaching elements, theories and ideas, be imported and locally? I’he to what extent should they be particular mix. There is no need The case for the present trained, conceived in different components means that possibility of selectiveness many mixes are possible. produced, to insist, so far at least, on a is mainly for a regional shift, for a significantly greater degree of local, autonomy and production But it will do no harm to indicate elements of a mix that finds much Docs it sound familiar? Outside philosophy, it should. For example, we have now been told by the Americans that our defence role, unlike theirs, is regional, not global: this is supposed to shed great light on our previously confused defence policies. 27 local the suggestion Negatively, favour. is that we try to eradicate much of the Oxford style of Leaching and doing philosophy. as undue removal of Berke1ey-Hume with the (a however no standard emphasis on British focus); attention proper empiricism British to of of sources; movements emanating from England, they are, pi the Northern status quo; recommend and this. just 1 approach the of influence, in More generally, many of especially the protective ol ord Locke- on reinforcement heavy particular, his mostly been a very conservative one. main centred quasi-historical the us the Includes such things That -lice, language ordinary have been very to leave things very much as they tend Positively, the proposal is that we achieve further disassociation from the Anglo-American empiricist past in two ways: by framework, emphasizing by and to Eastern thought, philosophy. teaching, will parochialism, The idea assist and projects diversifying selectively drawn upon, parts of local is the include not but also that that move range constricting that philosophical of traditions only neglected Continental strands and Pacific ethnic such a outside material and plural i ty of sources, Australasian especially in in removing narrower cultural biasses, such as British enable more discrimination to be obtained. Then too we should be better able to see the ranges of theories that are open to us in the Antipodes and how to advance our own programs. 36 I'he point is laboured in E. Gellner, Words and Things, Victor Gollancz, London, 1959. But even ordinary language? philosophy, though conservative, and though it much contracted the proper range of philosophical investigations, had its liberating elements, e.g. removal of some of the narrowness and more cramping assumptions induced by technical jargon. Nor lias the social impact changed much with the subsequent/ decline, since 1959, o 1 ordinary language philosophy, the Increasing insolvency of Oxbridge philosophy, and its consequent limited take-over by right-wing Ivy League American philosophy. By contrast, the less economically influential growth of redbrick and applied philosophy in some of the British r-fttl and polytechnic institutes his touched no more than the surface of Oxbridge Practice. T There remain some things we should want to see whatever mixes are chosen in iiiiereni Antipodean regions. bias from papers and publications, research seminars and lectures, letters of reference, and so on. the works and irrespective discussion write not Northern to their of the ignore authors, works the contribution of famous more authors, local their lecture as or been under largely again etc. It and to uncritically the disposition is to to though work produced locally either does not exist or has influential philosophers, importance, worth, topic It is the disposition the quality of their contribution. opinions of better, the the to authors from prestigious Northern institutions, to accept of quality the and irrespective of defer This Northern bias is a disposition to cite and discuss projects of One crucial issue is the removal of Northern are, (thus if ensuring more anything, it that inclined Northern to Australasian And not). is than bias many overseas intellectuals, who are perhaps less concerned to be seen as belonging to tl-'l Northern mainstream. bias effects policies of ot local not only practice the of individual, philosophers, but the selection and review committees as well as of editors and referees journals. reorientation, with It developments ~ things taught, more so they that philosophers can would cite be other among involves, Antipodean it ions \ better, courses The reduction, and eventual removal, of Northern getting to work or local assisted time spent at local by intellectual things, know local point greater out local work and regional content in institutions on study leave, and so on. APPENDIX 1. Background notes on the philosophy supply situation. Sociological investigation of the philosophy labour market in Australia and New Zealand has 1° be numerical attempted. But a picture of some elements underlying the argument of the text can be gained from the following table: simple 29 TABLE 1. Ph.Ds In Philosophy: a USA ~ Australasian comparison USA Number (Male/Female) Aust ra1i a New Zealand 1974 413 (346/67) 6 0 19 75 375 (318/57) 5 0 1976 382 (319/63) 8 0 197 7 330 (264/66) 3 2 (1/1) 1978 2 83 (235/48) 5 5 (4/1) 1979 285 (204/54) 9 3 (2/1) 1980 2 4 6 (187/59) 4 N.A. 1981 N.A. 4 0 Notes: 1. The breakdown of the USA and New Zealand numbers by sexes (male/female) is given. SimiLar figures do not appear to be available for Australia. 2. The US figures are for the academic year ending in the Year shown, e.g. 1978 covers the Northern academic year 1977-78. Southern figures are for the calendar year shown. Sources: Di gest__of__ Education Statistics, US National Center for Education Statistics; University Statistics, Australian Bureau of Census Statistics; New Zealand Education Statistics. Comments: 1. The contraction of US doctoral, production and the concomitant rise in female representation, are clearly indicated. The Australian figures are likely too small to reflect such trends and responses to the academic market. 2. Nome of Llr* Australasian numbers include Americans; likewise the American figures provide no nationality breakdown. 3. There is no information available on the number of Australians proceeding to higher degrees in philosophy outside. Australia. Tn applying table 1 some simplifying assumptions are made. assumed tbit candidates for appointment to regular For example, it is university positions now would t.ave a doctorate or- the equivalent (until recently a B.Phll was taken as a near well). equivalent It is of a assumed, North what American seems to Ph.D. take publications the case, that could the serve as number of 30 Austi il is Lans proceeding to higher degrees in philosophy abroad is relatively Smail, and no more than the order of Ph.Ds. upsetting applications of table without say, Is no compiled I, that Australasian graduates match, information on academic vacancies in philosophy in Aust ra1 ia < r New Zealand Az matter to I di j oil,1'. on the lumbers of vacancies, on how the positions It would however be a routine, nationalities, sexes, etc. by what re1 It can be assumed, Lhe upper half of American graduates in standard attained. There if taken locally. some of assemble data, this which is considerable of ' incc to the planning of philosophy programs. Un considering 'the Editor In a National Philosophy', the (Australian) possibility r* , /r <( I initial AJPP^ d istinguished two senses corresponding to 'the the of of a National Phi 1osophy for Australia. the earlier APPENDIX 2. I G e rm an distinction b etwee n W e11 a n sc hauung I I the first, that of 'a scheme of the universe', ridiculous as con f i rm.a t ion a or Christian Sc ience . fa 1 sificationV Granted: but 'are Lebensanchauung7 a nd The In n Ihilos>phy I hlLos is as is argument independent that does not mean (p.292). that^Jirutly national of that a and sympathies its or theory may not be held, in one region but not. others, as intuitionism was for long in in Holland, or 'a nation second a in France. In like an individual may 'more develop ternperament a 1 attitude to the problems of existence, which we may life. is a mode of form of A nation's philosophy, expression for the national (.'VO I V I up, like its art and the national consciousness. But, a and certain . . call its Its 1i terature, It is a specialised short, genius intimate part of the by no means sepa ra t e from t he initial sense, a philosophy comprising no t merely a fairly comprehensive theory but also an integrated set of attitudes (like an .. taaead up ysaa 03 queSt’AVjqxe •Xqdosoypqd aqp •auipy syj puq si.q uiw i p?uo j q i?u pa/Aoyyv eq pynoqs Xqdosoypqj yeuopyuN i' jo jvapy Suppupasaa yeuoppe^ e Xq papyoAB jo Xppypqpssod Xypsua sp uoy p ap pt?jyuoa aqy Supyappujpuoa op Supqyou si?q „aqsM - sapiBpunoq puojpuu Xuu ui.qy sanyuA asaqy ‘papaauoa XyyunyjpA sj spysaysny sc ‘ynq oqy eq p ‘uquya qf'noqj, ‘Xqdosoyyqj qi)M jdaews yappn, sv - asaqy qypw op op • (yuauia8ui?aat?aa qypi 1 op »?u j a [ OAiip as and Supqyou suq .Xqdosoyjqj qypw op oy Supqyou asaqy aqy jo senjBA yEuaaya eqp Xynvaq put? s teupoof) ‘qynai jo syvapy aqy ‘yyapdg eqs suq uaqp Xyuo pus uaq y uipeyo yuB§BAi?ayxo Y ST XOPT pg— aqy Xyyaoqs ons) yuaoy se saop spq j ‘uaqp uio j j 1 oq peej uy ^OAyya spp qpiM op op Supqyou st?q up yi?a ysny saAyjap apqnoap shot iua pv aqy op ast?q ‘/7^uTlBap apuj y 1? 'oiu/ay p a y^ u qd J0| Xqdoso ‘ojU yiuot you ‘Xqdosoypqd put? yuqj you aSeanoa sunny a saoqjo jo V \il\ ; j | saop qans :(usuas ‘ yp op spuuays Xut? • sjoydpaasap uvpjuaysny op pup j 1? ,Xy p uniuuioa pas r [t?j .1 p mi] tn you a^JI j1 ( Suyaq oaaqj apnyaxa aaAunoq Xqdosojpqd yBUopyuu 1? cjq^n&V^iaoqy TIB yi? yuyqr^u pnq ? qpjM •aauaaajjyp :Xauayspsuoaup oyup paSunyd ------------------------ —ogl J1 • (siur?a2oad qaaoasaa / [ ] an—k-4——q- eSyotyy ‘ auj apqdosoypqd y^uopSaa ! you sp pnq ‘ajpy jo ysuay y ‘aejJ og 7m* yh io Pljnq aq asoqp qyjtt uyqt?a2uc4]aaayu syaud aeynpoiu spy qypM uaapoui b4 up puyj oy od/q Xpyeaa you saop ‘pupJ •suyyiiuBj osooy aoqyea uiaoj s^ifiiy Xue up) aAipaupyspp Xyau ynap yat?d you aiuos uupyeaysny syyun aySups payunoaar? tadi?aspur?y ueypuaysny aqy, pin? 1 aanyuaoy y. [ ay j [i.uojjiu 4ssausnopasuoa nujiipaiu jo • (ui8p peavd yuiio j yuaado aqp, st? siuayj qans eat? uopssaauoa Xq Xyuo ‘ aaouiaaqyanj IC •jojppq juasajd sip 04 ‘jseay jou ‘ pue ‘p.’ujnor syqj joj saojajaj ppjoAas 04 ‘apieyapy jo XijsjaAjun ‘oauajajuoo Xqdosoyjqj J° uornnj aossy ur yse p?a 4 sny £861 3tn jaded aqj jo uoyjejuasajd aip 31? aauajpne aip jo sjoqiuaui yejaAas 04 ‘uiyjyw -q pue oab.10 *s ‘ tpi y uis-Xaj j poo • m ‘loyyya pj 04 squuqi f □c Xrjy sjaAjufl '[vuoiqoN ueyyeajsny saauayas -yeyaos jo yooqas qaaeasan gcXaj4noH *8 4 USA, expoi ter cul Lure, of certainly of higher culture philosophical output from components Australasia, as culture, philosophy has Oxford not in philosophy? but also evidently (witness the Are there taken). should suit, payments, especially balance of lower of such following not if has recently become a net importer of culture from Europe, m Long achieve a American turn reasons why cultural better there are reasons. Yes, of In the first place, the change in the cultural position of the USA went with, and perhaps economic dominance most of not only increasingly of former Northern they. prioi sties, that little prospect for there the contain also fellow-travellers, whose It is unlikely that group, (become will commitments, as Long so there is is serious no prospect in a bind and disruption of the Secondly, component Include that academics, Northern of and additional is teaching this influential segment, from not situation; acclimatised the isolated drastically as bent to especially to) give person. Nor alter entire Antipodean as observed, a substantial research locally apart Antipoduans’ do they are I hey would be North, large a they cultural As since culture, Americans, Northern concerns. the If cultural dominance, cultural and other). universities of in economic power relations. ever emulate or attain American economic eminence (at least commodities, cont ingent changes nuclear destruction of without flow of entails Australasia's Australasia will not from, vast part derived in their up its should cultural for it can be persuasively argued better off, as far as quality and product goes, stocking their universities with American teaching components and researching Americanoriented concerns. One simple arg urn e n t nurn er1c a I th it Antipodean universities would be better off with Americans in the main, takes the following lines:- The (higher degree) graduates of Australasian culturally distinguished, at and American are not significantly least in subjects such as philosophy. Consider now the number quality of academics produced number per of higher uates. preponderance of The (great) just, by virtue of their vastly graduates will be Americans, greater population and degree their more extensive system of university education.'7 So also then, just by ratio considerations, the great preponderance of quality academics drawn an from percentiles among uppei interested they universities. in those quality quality, Such an base Austroamerlean argument does appointing not as will Clearly, Antipodeans, products. be would be American, will work to more show Americans that, for the were their to similar reasons, American universities should be full of Chinese or Indian professors, for two Asians reasons; and first there are especially Americans, significant in cultural disciplines such differences as between philosophy; and secondly, their university systems do not deliver such great quotas of higher degree or high quality graduates, at least in philosophy. fhe conclusion of the numerical argument will not be a popular one. anti-Americanism felt the universities; especially by and recently the Australasian community extends into there has been increasing insistence, the now aging younger Turks that university positions should be reserved for locals. international in portions of The This at the same time as these Turks often preach of an community of scholars, presumably then with "free" interchange, X' indicated in Appendix 1, where assumptions made In the argument are defended, the ratio of US philosophy graduates with doctorates as compared with Australian exceeds 30 to 1. And, as Is well-known, the extent of university education is much greater in USA than in Australasia: indeed Australia is in this respect among the ______ worst educated of the developed nations, as OECD figures have made plain (see, e.g., B. Jones, Sleepers Wake!, Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 1.982, Chapter 7). ■ 6 etc. I'hey cannot have it all ways.'' So as long the cont inues, present centre will they wi! I economically; large to the it them if is free-flow Interchange the dominate than us, have more jobs (centrally-determined) quality well as should here personnel and culturally periphery and ideas of go by as and in this high cultural business that we seek, as mostly claim. Now anyway, It is there that arguments. widely For is ire we regularly drive out enough recognised, drastically something not lower-down flooded wrong with high-quality local contenders for positions, ladders hierarchical with these sorts Northerners who of would if we only preferred the Northerners when they were quite visibly superior: rather we are inundated by Americans with inflated references, who have the messages of the centre better tbur local;; echelon wnocf do, (often and remote Northern Northern shortcomings biassed) are known the Northern centres tend fields tend appointment better. to look committees A.s is beginning greener to than dusty higherlocals to be recognised to retain their higher-quality products, too, and allow A reverse flow of the better orthodox academics from Australasia to America should also be expected (outside times of university contraction). According to issumptions of this brain drain argument, which is based on labour market considerations, appointment and lifestyle conditions for academics are general ly better in USA than Australia and much better than those in economicaLly-depressed New Zealand (e.g. higher salaries, better standard of living, superior research conditions, etc.). So, other things being equal, able academics from the Antipodes will relocate in USA as academic positions become available. The argument also helps explain why Antipodean universities cannot, expect, for the most part., t.o attract really top-drawer Northerners for very long. Of course, economically irrelevant factors do induce interference; e.g. perverse commitments to odd-ball Antipodean intellectual enterprises which reduce market acceptability, or pre-industrial ties to place or persons or lifestyle which unduly restrict mobility (such as local roots, family attachments, even distaste for American urban lifestyles). 7 them exiled be to the to periphery only if they fali somehow the foul of Too system (e.g. of the academic system for political or personal reasons) . often the Nori hern have centres disposed their of inferior intellectually products In the periphery. this makes the All appointing especially Americans, Northerners, their references, and usually not out And yet. quality. it seems, position look doubly bad. We ought, even if are overrated they of the top drawer, to be in in order to maximize doing so does not achieve the desired quality result, and breeds discontent elsewhere, especially among the aging Turks. there fortunately is cultural sufficient obtain lor us. subtitutabIe before way out this from t is the wraj ' and a We do our own Lonal Lsm. distance,' so and situation that they are these things; not simply Then the shaky numerical argument does fall down. elaborate we awkward the emerging proposal are there other But influential arguments to dispose of, and the disposal bears on the proposal. There have so is, to begin with, far been conceded: exce Hence, which the argument for excellence, that we all more or there is an objective commodity, quality or less agree seek and what appointments aim to capture, the type of myth most ol myth, In fact appointments about, which is proportionately in the North, and which is what academic more abundant a that institutions crave and indeed maximize. That at least is us have encountered; and many of us now know it is a dangerous way, elements of which any Most myth. more that places don't organisations aim even just try to to make maximize 9- M Iliis is easier in the cultural than the technological sphere. However it is also possible technologically: (stronger) theses of technological determinism, and so of cultural determinism, are false. We can choose different options, technologically, as well as culturally. ->) ) ./ A- u I PROSPECTS FOR REGIONAL PHILOSOPHIES IN AUSTRALASIA Philosophy, especially academic philosophy but also folk philosophy, 1 ike other intellectual and higher cultural activity in Australasia, has long been dominated, largely swamped, by Northern now increasingly from North America. Europe, the indeed and cultural resulting baggage other controlling such But it does not have to stay that way. a initially from the migration patterns, Given the ethnic result was imported, populations, influences, of composition virtually the inevitable. Suitable policies, a good philosophy policy, could change things. The culture, thought is of hardly a a philosophy, regional perhaps In 1923, a New Zealand new one. a matching regional correspondent to the newly-launched Australasian Journal of Psychology and Philosophy mentioned the possibility of ’a new kind or temper of philosophy under these southern skies’ which the Journal might such a role reaching (or, not community). for merely And The Journal foster.1 matter, that professional although some actively pursued philosophers things however hardly has but have changed solid foundation for a new regionalism in philosophy, its a fulfilled pronounced wider Australasian in Australia, that of aim laying a possibility of a new temper of philosophy has hardly been realised. There is little in the way of a new kind and temper of philosophy under New Zealand southern skies were intended to include: distinctively New Zealand AJPP, March 1923, p.74. same volume, p.292ff; his Appendix 2/ 7 skies, which the but few distinguishing features, ’no characteristics, have shown up in New Zealand The question was taken up by the Editor in the discussion is considered below, especially in 2 philosophy’. New Zealand remains a substantial net importer of philosophy, The situation of colonial dominance that used to prevail in and philosophers. Australia, where virtually all chairs, and many philosophy, were filled by academics from the North, and considered and Given the usual in courses designed, power and influence of professors in small departments, covered in tends to persist in New Zealand, where no established chairs are occupied by locals/ topics posts academic other especially appointments made, the heavy Northern orientation of philosophy taught and researched in New Zealand is not surprising. oldest of The Northern control is perhaps most strikingly exhibited at the New Zealand the universities, University of Otago, where the Philosophy Department has been substantially captured by a British School and increasingly looks event, like an offshoot of the University of London/ In any the overwhelming Anglo-American dominance of New Zealand philosophy - also a feature only in slightly lesser degree of Australian philosophy - can be confirmed by a content survey of the courses offered and research papers written at New Zealand universities. Even when local people have been appointed to positions in Australasia, 2 S.A. Grave, A History of Philosophy in Australia, Queensland University Press, 1984, p.l. Page references are to the manuscript. The paper draws heavily on this history. 3 This claim was correct at the time of presentation of the paper (August 1983). With the recent loss of a chair at Wellington, the claim requires qualification, but the pattern of domination persists. 4In the 1983 Commonwealth University Handbook listing, 6 of the 8 members of the Department held their main degree, Ph.D., from London, and one of the remainder from Exeter. Only one member of the Department, soon to retire, falls outside the nexus. 3 they have been brought up on a solid diet of Anglo-American material, and they In particular, the have often been reforged or finished in the North as well. post-World War philosophy by remain full candidates the of requirements II universities in were conveniently seen expansion Oxford the of Australasian of products finished B.Phil. this Many degree. cultural to in departments out period the of of case of philosophy the mid 70s when they applied for until indeed mill: to beat in Oxford were hard major the positions, such was the (unwarranted) prestige of Oxford and the regrettable, but still continuing, "cultural cringe". Nonetheless, (as will indicated). be dominance, Northern in the Antipodes, been occurring scene the despite especially on worth is It significant have changes the Australian philosophical whether asking Australian philosophy is moving towards the sort of change that occurred in USA more than 100 years ago when the Harvard Philosophy Department was brought (or bought) together, and its "golden age" American philosophy was never quite began.'' the same again, and became its own thing. There are now new forces operating which could help to move Australian philosophy in such a direction. the widespread regionalism,6 other 5See B. which applies choices; local fashioning emergence, of national and particularly to in science cultural in and alternative culture, ideological stark contrast, and technology there There is of a choice along is policies, the which new with centralised not only Kuklick, The Rise of American Philosophy; Cambridge, Massachusetts 1860-1930, Yale University Press, 1977, Parts 2 and 3. 6 On this bio-regionalism, see especially, Fourth World News, vol. I, and K. Sale, Human Scale, Coward, McCann and Geoghegan, New York, 1980. 1983, 4 a provides for model reflection philosophy regional in directly bears on parts of the philosophy of science. there are also some soon appear, policy Unfortunately, as will to regional serious obstacles also but philosophies and to the very idea of a regional philosophy. USA, long an importer of culture from Europe, has recently become a net culture, of exporter components of higher philosophical Australasia, from output if not Oxford following but evidently philosophy (witness such as culture culture, lower of certainly taken). has should suit, not balance of payments, especially in philosophy? the American there Are also achieve reasons better a turn why cultural there are reasons. Yes, of In the first place, the change in the cultural position of the USA went with, and perhaps in part derived from, vast changes in economic power relations. economic dominance most Australasia’s of entails cultural dominance, culture, since there there is is little prospect serious no prospect If for that Australasia will ever emulate or attain American economic eminence (at least nuclear destruction of not without the North, flow of commodities, cultural and other). universities not only increasingly of Americans, contingent of former Northern they. group, cultural As priorities, long component also include whose research they disruption of the entire as observed, Antipodean Secondly, large fellow-travellers, Northern academics, substantial additional of a and teaching is bent to It is unlikely that this influential segment, especially Northern concerns. the a contain and will commitments, as so (become apart Antipodeans they are in a bind locally acclimatised do from the not situation; isolated drastically as to) person. alter give up its Nor should their cultural for it can be persuasively argued that they would be better off, as far as quality and product goes, stocking 5 universities their American with and components teaching researching American-oriented concerns. that argument numerical simple One Antipodean universities would be better off with Americans in the main, takes the following lines:- The (higher degree) of graduates Australasian culturally distinguished, now the number of produced 0 population and then, So also just not number per of say there is 1 per every n graduates. preponderance of graduates will be Americans, greater are American significantly at least in subjects such as philosophy. quality academics Austroamerican graduates; and their more by ratio Consider higher degree The (great) just by virtue of their vastly extensive system of university education. considerations, the great preponderance of quality academics drawn from an Austroamerican base will be American, as will the upper percentiles among those quality products. Clearly, Antipodeans, were they interested in quality, would be appointing more Americans to their universities. Such an argument does not work to show that, for similar reasons, American universities should be full of Chinese or Indian professors, for two Asians reasons; and first Americans, there are especially significant in cultural disciplines such differences as between philosophy; and secondly, their university systems do not deliver such great quotas of higher degree or high quality graduates, at least in philosophy. As indicated in Appendix 1, where assumptions made in the argument are defended, the ratio of US philosophy graduates with doctorates as compared with Australian exceeds 30 to 1. And, as is well-known, the extent of university education is much greater in USA than in Australasia: indeed Australia is in this respect among the worst educated of the developed nations, as OECD figures have made plain (see, e.g., B. Jones, Sleepers Wake’, Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 1982, Chapter 7). / 6 The conclusion of the numerical argument will not be a popular one. The anti-Americanism felt in portions of the Australasian community extends into the universities; and recently has there been insistence, increasing especially by the now aging younger Turks that university positions should be This at the same time as these Turks often preach of an reserved for locals. international community of scholars, presumably then with "free" interchange, etc. They cannot have it all ways.^ So long as the continues, economically; the present centre will free-flow dominate they will have more large to them if it interchange the than us, periphery and of ideas culturally jobs here is (centrally-determined) quality in personnel and as should well as go by and this high cultural business that we seek, as mostly claim. Now anyway, it that arguments. is widely there For we is enough recognised something are not lower-down drastically wrong hierarchical with these ladders sorts of flooded with high-quality Northerners who would g A reverse flow of the better orthodox academics from Australasia to America should also be expected (outside times of university contraction). According to assumptions of this brain drain argument, which is based on labour market considerations, appointment and lifestyle conditions for academics are generally better in USA than Australia and much better than those in economically-depressed New Zealand (e.g. higher salaries, better standard of living, superior research conditions, etc.). So, other things being equal, able academics from the Antipodes will relocate in USA as academic positions become available. The argument also helps explain why Antipodean universities cannot expect, for the most part, to attract really top-drawer Northerners for very long. Of course, economically irrelevant factors do induce interference; e.g. perverse commitments to odd-ball Antipodean intellectual enterprises which reduce market acceptability, or pre-industrial ties to place or persons or lifestyle which unduly restrict mobility (such as local roots, family attachments, even distaste for American urban lifestyles). 7 regularly drive out local contenders for positions, if we only preferred the Northerners when they were quite visibly superior: rather we are inundated by Americans with inflated references, who have the messages of the centre better do, locals than higher-echelon remote and Northern (often Northern biassed) fields appointment the Northern centres greener look to committees than dusty retain their higher-quality products, tend to to As is beginning to be recognised locals whose shortcomings are known better. too, tend and allow them to be exiled to the periphery only if they somehow fall foul of the system (e.g. of the academic system for political or personal reasons). often Northern the centres have disposed o their intellectually Too inferior products in the periphery. to be especially Americans, even if they are overrated in All this makes the position look doubly bad. We ought, appointing Northerners, it seems, their references, and usually not out of the top drawer, in order to maximize And yet quality. doing so does not achieve the desired quality result, and breeds discontent elsewhere, especially among the aging Turks. Fortunately shaky arguments; and obtain there 9 we way out from this sufficient elaborate cultural distance,9 situation and awkward and that is the way of regionalism. subtitutable for us. before is a so that We do our own things; they are Then the shaky numerical argument does fall the emerging proposal there these are other not simply down. But influential This is easier in the cultural than the technological, sphere. However it is also possible technologically: (stronger) theses of technological determinism, and so of cultural determinism, are false. We can choose different options, technologically, as well as culturally. 8 arguments to dispose of, and the disposal bears on the proposal. There is, have so to begin with, far been conceded: the argument for excellence, that elements of which there is an objective commodity, quality or excellence, which we all more or less agree about, which is proportionately more abundant in the North, and which is what academic institutions crave and indeed maximize. seek and what appointments aim to capture, That at least is the type of myth most of us have encountered; and many of us now know it is a myth, in fact appointments dangerous a that any way, myth. more that don’t places Most organisations aim just profit, but rather seek to satisfice on a mix of factors, quality is make maximize to of which assessed and not often the highest ranking one. only one, to try even Ability to fit into some sort of program, teaching or research, is another, and commonly more important factor; and there is no good reason why such a program should not sometimes be a regionally oriented one. the So given prevailing practices, argument from excellence does not exclude regional philosophy programs. And, in any event, there are enough local candidates of sufficient worth to proceed with regional programs without clearcut sacrifice of excellence. Local enterprise need entail no loss of excellence, and could well increase it. The deeper-cutting objection is that there is something seriously amiss with the idea of objective objective importance; criticism as bracketed out notions the that of excellence, these objective and notions values with are open more contextual-relativisation the to connected the generally, component of same that notion of sorts of they valuing: have the 9 framework or viewpoint to which these values relate.While those operating within rather a narrow intellectual paradigm, as such ordinary Oxbridge language philosophy or Sydney materialism say, can bracket out the viewpoint, since incorporated is it the in operational paradigm, and arrive so at seemingly objective quality judgements, the judgements are not preserved (e.g. in truth value) when Marxist viewpoints. quality or worth for Consider, of to transposed a other the comparison, made forest, frameworks, variously industrial forester, and a recreational officer. quality of a holistically-inclined by who seemingly because pretend that a deep the ecologist, philosopher, environmental it is not done by members to or an Compare judgements as to the environmental such as judgements language, Marxist, and Californian environmental philosophers. philosophers idealistic e.g. of work by ordinary There are even be cannot judged, the main philosophical peer group at Harvard and like institutions. As this judgements of begins to the reveal, importance judgements of quality are not independent of of work done or problems tackled. importance of problems and issues is highly paradigm dependent. But the For example, problems such as those of quantifying-in and of possible worlds and of de re thought, which assume immense importance for fashionable referential theories within the mainstream empiricist paradigm, vanish outside that restricted viewpoint. Now observe to relative insignificance that most judgements as to What follows also begins to bring out what is omitted in a main theme of R.S. Pirsig, Zen and the Art of Motor Cycle Maintenance, Bodley Head, London, 1974. Note that defusing the notion of objective excellence does not lead to subjectivism. To avoid the customary false dichotomy, compare the notion of validity (usually ceded to themselves these days by classical logicians) with that of quality. 10 what are the Important problems and what constitutes important work - matters helping quality determine is relative to their are exported to the Antipodes importance concerned shipped are - from down the paradigmatic placement, through the North.11 and Their paradigms the main channels already indicated. We are free to reject these paradigms and select alternatives, and there are, it can be argued, good reasons to do just that, much as there are good reasons choose to energy technology different (or different military technology) from that generally favoured in the North which the North is eager to export southwards. points Similar which might argument, apply against alternatively that sophisticated people -marketed mass-produced and cosmopolitan. The argument called be from is based cosmopolitan/international the the Peter everywhere Holland; international Stuyvesant smoke this argument superior product cigarette-sophistication is on the assumption that philosophy is a ’cosmopolitan subject’, that is is not the sort of enterprise for which place and people are significant as they are for or poetry assumption has only to be presented to be questioned. for one important thing, that philosophy is a the novel.12 It takes for granted, finished product sort (a propositional theory), not a process of production also. 110ften enough fashionability is mistaken for The importance. of a certain But in the As to the unsatisfactory way in which such '’important" problems are commonly set, see F. Dyson, ’Unfashionable pursuits’, The Mathematical Intelligencer 5 (1983) 47-5?. -----12 Grave, op.cit., p.2: the term ’cosmopolitan subject’ used there comes from Donegan. As to the significance of place and people for literature, see further C. Partridge, The Making of New Cultures, Editions Rodopi, Amsterdam, 1982. ---------------------------- 11 process of production the place and people involved (e.g. material. And literature, the if and not product just is theorems more no philosophy, than work a and of art, arguments like a assembled piece of in an then again the historical setting matters, internationally-approved format, since like in discussion) are literature, not does emerge in a vacuum. Plato’s philosophy could not have emerged in ancient Australia, and if cribbed in mid 20th century Oxford would surely have been marked down or rejected.^ It is important not to be sidetracked into issues - resembling problems in aesthetics - that extent sets do not need to be contested, of themes and arguments such as whether and what produced in one place and setting could have been produced in another. A nonnuclear technology of some sort could be adopted prospect in Europe but that New apparently will Zealand, nonnuclear energy strategy. matters here. Dial ethic in not contrast whereas be, with there Australia, is will reasonable pursue a It is the doing, and not what could be done, that logic, which invalidates methodology of much Anglo-American philosophy, could the technique perhaps be done in and the North (though there would be substantial cultural resistance): it is not being 13 Like a paper in the biological sciences. But here again technique and methodology, which may both be regional, are crucially important. Related points can be made using less extreme examples, e.g. concerning modern American work. Consider, for instance such texts as W.V. Quine’s Word and Object, (Wiley, New York, 1960) or R. Nozick’s Anarchy, State and Utopia (Basic Books, New York, 1974). The assumptions taken for granted, the arguments involved, etc., are especially American: it is not just the style. The acceptability of arguments and positions is dependent on place and received paradigm. 12 and is not likely to be done in the Anglo-American sphere.to done there, this extent, logical Antipodeans techniques, can do choose their their own international/cosmopolitan argument, own distinctive distinctive technology thing. stated tn a form that would be and The telling, fails. Of course it can be argued, it is being argued, that Antipodeans don’t need to be, or even oughtn’t to be pursuing their own energy or logic policies and apparatus. But meeting these considerations takes us to a whole new set of issues concerning the merit of various policies and programs, diversity, etc. - far beyond the cosmopolitan argument. the point of The new arguments, to which we shall return, are not a lot more convincing however than comparable arguments concerning cooking: that we don’t devising our own cuisine or wine styles. need to be or oughtn’t to be British, or at least cosmopolitan, cooking is adequate: we should stick to that and buy it off the shelf from the North, ideally importing the cooks also. Do we have good reasons to think that British philosophy is better, these days, than British cooking? Antipodeans are free, in principle then, to pursue their own paradigms; and to do so they will by and large want to, and mostly have to, appoint their own people, people they have educated - not saboteurs or people who have (had) Much as communist anarchism, a live possibility for communes and perhaps communities in Australia, is culturally excluded in North America, owing to the extreme possessive individualism of that culture. On dialethic logic, see G. Priest and R. Routley, On Paraconsistency, Research Papers in Logic, #13, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University, 1983. 13 to be re-educated, from elsewhere, in particular from the North. But will the intellectual paradigms pursued tie with cultural paradigms, with distinctive features of local the culture? In a loose way, at they may least, tie in with the though works of philosophy will not usually link, culture in the integral fashion that novels (as distinct from more technical works) sometimes do. Indeed, certain to a cultural limited extent, features, not they restricted to particular programs, that help mark philosophy in Australia as ’unimportant hastens to though add. this But is style, compared Grave considers do already link. with acceptability, what ’an Australian product’ - matters truth, philosophical he philosophy’ in do matter, and are not independent - or independent so far as their perception goes in the case of truth and correctness16 - from underlying broad theory or received paradigm. However the marks which can be extracted from Grave, significant though they are, do not serve to distinguish the Australian product, the first two being features Australian philosophy exhibits in lesser degree than the more adventurous and polemical philosophy of Greek antiquity. by Passmore as ’most typical of Australian philosophy’, The first, described is a ’diversity of approach and readiness to put forward an unconventional or unfashionable point 16 Nothing need be conceded to strong cultural relativity themes, though they would support the case. It is enough that our theories remain radically incomplete and that there can accordingly be rival theories as to what is true. Similarly, however philosophy is conceived - as the search for truth, explanation, understanding and wisdom (all of these and more, really), or as, more vaguely, inquiry of a certain sort - there can be, and will be, competing accounts; so a pluralistic theory is inevitable in giving a fuller view. 14 of view*, 17 philosophy, something which more typical some (with of exceptions) notable exhibits an Canada, is that Africa, South adventurous compared with other recent and provincial and diverse. second, The ... the between line-up Australian and surprising, mark far from isolated: others Melbourne Wittgensteinian "Australian materialism", philosophy departments the (both confrontation concerning the among them concern extraordinary discussed the political by is is ’the ’the most notable example ... Andersonian and Sydney, if it was not the Andersonian philosophy itself’ (p.2). is such as philosophy England, manifestoed character* of Australian philosophy, being "Oxbridge colonies", more austere What may be uniformity reflecting that often attributed to the land itself. nearer true Australian than philosophy ancient This example fervour generated engagement Grave), the and relevant/paraconsistent program, by by some growing with the local (’adversarial*) style leading to sharp criticism by Americans. Connected with these first philosophy, century two marks J as of much Cambridge further are characteristics of much 18th century Scottish philosophy and philosophy: points, surface clarity, and, namely directness, Australian turn-of-this- unwillingness to muffle some would unkindly add (in the hope perhaps of locating a genuine difference), bluntness, unsubtlety and crudity. Both preceding quotations, while included as such in Grave’s Introduction, are from J. Passmore, ’Philosophy’, in The Pattern of Australian Culture (ed. A.L. McLeod), Cornell University Press, Ithaca, N.Y., 1963, pp.131-168. The same annotation also applies to the third mark. 18 Though again for the most part that influenced by Sydney rather than that originating in Melbourne. To some extent this reflects the different historical influences shaping Sydney and Melbourne philosophy: roughly, Scottish as opposed to Continental antecedents. 15 The third and the fourth marks are but very different, again hardly distinguishing features of Australian philosophy as Grave, who wouldn’t them marks at all, in effect observes. areas, intellectual the of Australian the anti-intellectual national stereotype of Australians as a people to physical mark is achievement especially of isolation a academic rather than feature of philosophy indifference or even hostility to, in reputation ’center of philosophical inquiry’, with indeed of Australia as a philosophy, The third, which applies well to other contrast the is call to intellectual Anglo-American Australasia in subtlety’. the namely general its and fourth The philosophy; from, ’devoted the sort of imported philosophy (e.g. that of Nietzsche and the existentialists) generating interest in literary and arts circles. The failure of such marks to entirely separate out Australian philosophy does not matter. For thing, one the separated by its research projects. confused with nationalism, nor Australian For another, produce such as materialism or Wellington modalism with national philosophies. philosophy, as encouraged; and in most the new other is things, regionalism is an undesirable commonly sufficiently regionalism should not regional positions more is linked, be Sydneyside Nationalism in trait, not in other to be cultural things, with the breakdown of nations and contraction of state power. 19 See, e.g., London, 1957. Sale, op.cit., and L. Kohr, The Breakdown of Nations, RKP, The Editor of the new 1923 AJPP did however take seriously the notion of National Philosophy, of (what must have surprised some New Zealand readers) an Australian Philosophy; some of the issues there raised (p.292ff) are addressed in Appendix 2. 1 16 * To get back to where we were: * emerging proposal the is this, that we s.rsrt - or better much increase - doing our own distinctive things, and that we team up to do so. Tn fact there are several suggestions that begin to emerge, concerning research and teaching, publications and appointments, study leave and sponsored visitors. These are not just that we do our own selection of topics and style and people, and methods, decide priorities, own our instead of having these foisted upon us - not just, that is, that we play our own games (whether invented here or taken over from the North) and not theirs, Rules and Rugby instead of Gridiron and Basketball - but that we abandon the individual competitive model of cultural achievement, sold to us and fostered by the North, in favour of a group cooperative approach (elements of which are already modelled in Antipodean social clubs). The ditch-digging example: ditch more separately. rapidly simple and familiar. On the one side is the it is well-known that two people cooperating can dig a and enjoyably than two people working on the ditch Cooperative work tends to pay off - in philosophy or elsewhere - in terms of output, experience are here thoughts shows that we successfully with several reasons quality, and enjoyment in the doing. in the the centre for this. periphery cannot on achievements One highly competitive predominantly On the other side, individually compete very in their programs. is the communication situation. There are Despite the individualistic nature of American academic 1. <3 enterprise, 20 ' much communication in the and individualism myth, attainment of results access to work is jointly based, unpublished upon rapid depends material. For, verbal despite the and builds on the work of many; when the time is ripe for some idea or result, several clever people will be Then again communications are important in obtaining rapid able to hit on it. publication of the idea or result, and the assignment of credit for it. again people at the periphery tend to lose out. Again there are nationalistic considerations There are a mix of reasons (e.g. Polish results, Russians will cite a Russian who the same verbally conveyed. tend time and as an outsider). through face-to-face There is seminars Here the so Poles achieves a fact that that local tend to promote result at much is results about conveyed will be There is the fact of limited reading, and that people at the centre to concentrate when they read on material from the centre by central people, so that published items and results from the periphery will often not be noticed, and may well lose out to central central publication. receive, merit competitors even if they achieve There is also the fact that people at the centre tend to for merit, more publication than people towards the periphery. and communication opportunities Here economic factors do begin to enter; consider the size and distribution of the academic market (there are, e.g., a great many more academic philosophers in North America than in the whole rest of the world), control of publishing outlets and journals (with few exceptions 20 Reflecting other features of the culture and enterprise of the centre which are not so deeply embedded in Australasia: see further R. Routley, ’Culture, philosophy, and approaches to the natural environment - an Australian perspective’, in The Environment, Ethics and Ecology (ed. D. Bennett), The Faculties,^ Australian National University, 1984, and also ’Culture and the roots of political divergence)^ the Australian/American contrast’, typescript, Canberra, 1983; both referred to subsequently as ’Culture’. . . // / - 18 However economic power does not, and need not, determine etc. all Northern), culture - we can shut off the Northern philosophical propaganda shut off way we being sets if we really want to. our television by impressed middle-men philosophical those the And we can stop a make who in much living by importing the Northern stuff. So what do we do? We adapt to the cultural-philosophical level, We aim at of those things, that have been suggested in the newer regionalism. some awakening and regional importers and doctrines and imitators local of, positions from and We do not remain slavish self-reliance. on commentators local the North. For several example, peddlars and don’t we spend of, our academic lives trying to tease out what Davidson or Dummett or Kripke meant by this in the hope that or that To through. be sure, I some pale Northern light will am not suggesting we that perhaps emulate filter appalling the ignorance of people from the North who visit the Antipodes and know little or nothing about what has been done or is eminent with through visitors, the their Australian bags heavy National being done here; cultural University (now so that we have accroutrements, the main trekking centre for investigation of relevant logics) and informing us that, or relying crucially on the assumption that, a contradiction entails every proposition. that these Northerners often know little positions and advances is the Antipodes is inferiority colonies; 21 of cultural another is the and intellectual narrow or nothing about One reason distinctive the prevailing assumption of life (predominantly in these local) and former limited the southern reading Regrettably, the ignorance extends to many locals. In particular, those infected with Sydney materialism appear remarkably ill-informed as to basic features of other Australasian programs. 19 undertaken by Northern luminaries. But, having despite been given sufficient we cause, shouldn’t cut ourselves off from Northern paradigms and influences (we could hardly manage to anyway: propaganda is different). so we should stay informed of, but not imitators these continuing traditions: of, or part of, far from cutting these nowhere, In any case, their enterprises. in older Northern traditions, So loose regional cultures are rooted just as the people are largely European stock. from these (and older We can reasonably use what we need from likely traditions and starting afresh and traditions, minority) the from local variations that have already appeared are what we want to develop and perhaps mutate, as again with wine styles. Part things, of the proposal then we that increasingly Northern paradigms. what is very great Nor, our own local rather than working with pale northern reflections of It is not as if we have to build from nothing, very difficult - entirely original work, components. do and so shape newer encourage and develop our own research programs, Antipodean paradigms, 22 is to to do - to create cultural try For there are research programs already initiated, which have the advantage fortunately, of being grounded do we need in to make features of the the story up - shape the future is part of what the proposal is about. larger culture. though helping to Much of the story, for Australia - New Zealand is a different and more difficult proposition - is already indicated in Grave’s survey of Australian philosophy. All one really has to do is to bring out programs he has already indicated and provide some 22 See Culture, op.cit. 20 To pull the investigation down to a more concrete elaboration and commentary. level, I shall sketch some more prominent cooperative programs - by no means the only programs - and remark on some relevant features of them. The longest running and best known program is, without much doubt, of Australian naturalism, and which aims to see natural the that world, and everything else, as suitably encompassed within the framework of the world of (physical) science. empiricist metaphysics, contains as program The 23 is generally materialism, Adelaide which subsequently died out there. such famous state version of failures in materialism, and functionalism. its a Anderson’s program initiated nowadays Faced reduction trimmed theory of universals, plans, like it it takes all now Tt in The latter program has included the mental-material contingent components as central to and is now best exhibited in Armstrong’s work. subprogram Sydney a major back traced in, identity theme and more derivatively, physicalisms incorporates a with a conspicuous "scientifically" and an account of natural laws as relations of universals, both components of the developing Sydney realism. Parts of the naturalism program, especially materialism and central state reductionism and the unified science ideal, have had counterparts in the North, but the program has, for the most part, despite export efforts, smoothly, moreover, and 23 earthy, so retained its distinctively it never caught on in New Zealand. into Australian culture. far as Australian character - The program fits It is similarly down-to-earth, philosophy can be, without the fancy ideas or effete Anderson’s metaphysics was however far more opposed to reductions than what has succeeded it. For an account of Anderson’s philosophy, and a history and account of Australian naturalism and materialism, see especially Grave, op.cit. 21 idealism of European philosophy or the spirituality and suppressed puritanism with which much pragmatism). commitments, of And and North it yet though it not does is (including simmers thinking American shrink from basically empiricist, explicit nowadays, metaphysical it is not from the positivistic (rejecting a verification principle, in particular). It is a city program, based broadcast mainly University of Sydney to other metropolitan universities; but the program does extend outside the universities a bit (a tiny bit) to the larger metropolitan culture. North America, the broader Russell, so in Australasia, community,or Popper Australasia would and be Kuhn quite little professional philosophy impinges on even on being an As in the wider academic community, (To exceptional. achievement, through one to turn worth this working work by around for.) now reaches in The naturalism program used to Perth, and has outliers in Canberra, as well as a core of opposition there. stretch Apart from notable exceptions, Adelaide; the program has never had more than a rather precarious hold, in Melbourne: 25 it the same hold, to or nor, more surprisingly, 24 In Canada, for example, while most academics from other disciplines would know of, and perhaps a little about, Russell, far fewer would know of Wittgenstein (though he is becoming known to lit. crit. groups), and virtually none would know of Quine. (The sampling is subjective.) On the fairly recent ’triumph of professionalism* in philosophy in USA, see Kuklick, op.cit., p.565ff. Kuklick brings out well some of the more disastrous features of professionalism, but does not sufficiently notice that the virtuous features resulting from some professionalisation can be synthesized with broader philosophical activity. 25 The exceptions include Ellis’s distinctive program, which can be accounted part of the broader naturalist program, and at Monash the work of F. Jackson and, earlier, of H. Munro in value theory. 22 has it had heavyweight criticism from there (or indeed much external criticism from elsewhere), the old confrontation of major city philosophies having died out. philosophy Melbourne is more historically oriented stricken than Sydney; Melbourne by dominated procession a a then, philosophy; been idealism and fashions: Northern earlier Wittgenstein, recently, remarkable religion philosophy, much more than Sydney, has of more philosophy; Continental and more turnabout, ordinary Davidson Quine, and language extensional reduction; now perhaps Lewis, Kripke and Dummett? one The program that reaches the beyond of confines the cities in Australia - which is after all a metropolitan dominated culture, the vast land always being the other Australian environmentalism, - is a rather diffuse program, which has connections with the Colleges of Advanced Education in the country towns and the communes on the North Coast. much distinguished environmental Europe by what positions it are a specifically having as not is feature of what So far the program is as it Serious and is. the New World, of transformed most its deeper the Old World, and environment and natural having little wild untouched country left, and little sensitivity accordingly to issues Europe that such as tend admit European to those of concern the wilderness. built shallow approaches superficiality environmentalism outside and (and continues North The main environmental human-transformed encourage to America. environment, situations). techno-fix dominate North much issues of American the New in issues And World environmentalism differs significantly however from Antipodean environmentalism, most obviously in the religious-spiritual component respects as well (see further Culture). of the former, but in several other 23 More positively, there are three strands to Australian environmentalism:- Firstly, there is an extended utilitarianism, differing little in theory from Bentham’s enlarged position, which insists upon counting in the utilities of all sentient figured though creatures. prominently it has position, This in animal from a British base, has animal liberation movements: and research and and welfare on domestic focussed developed animals animals, used in hunted (wild) animals, it has also become entangled in issues of bio-research more generally such as genetic engineering. or much interested in, endangered species, etc., except the conversion of forests, Secondly, not utilitarian forests and differs naturalism. and which ecosystems, from irreducible recognises which finds especially wild and American 26 lands, bearing on these have a an inadequate there is a wider and a deeper ecological position, which is psychological states, sentience or insofar as and so deeper concerns get spinoff from animal welfare, deal. the disappearance of wild Wider and deeper environmental concerns appear only animal pain and pleasure. as a It is not however concerned with, Thirdly, and spiritualism is there of value elsewhere intrinsic value natural from course, an as systems. in trees and This position of American extension almost than everywhere, a reactionary component, critical of the other strands, which insists that all that needs to be accomplished on the environmental front can be achieved within older established (European) ethical and political frameworks. Whereas materialism is based in Sydney, environmentalism is centred in Melbourne and Canberra, but also includes Brisbane and Perth. Also centred in 26 It has been described more Environmental Philosophy (ed. D. National University, 1980. fully elsewhere: see, in particular, Mannison and others), RSSS, Australian Canberra, and reaching across the country, with good connections in Melbourne, but in few Sydney, and materialism program other which program, elsewhere. and major perhaps which philosophy, more includes to centres New in metaphysics, with respectively, the theory value essentially is of extends and their core logic a especially in Zealand , program, one but metaphysics. Australia than also been has the Whereas any The other described ?7 The main logic grounded research program evident program. of the in New Zealand philosophy is also A program emanating from the work of Prior and located mainly in Wellington, The impact programs have program areas program. relevant/paraconsistent epistemology from relevant/paraconsistent affecting the environmental input further is it might be called the extended modal a now program. program on philosophy is perhaps best seen in Cresswell’s work. Australian philosophy used to be known, for its hard-headed empiricism; not known and still is in some quarters, regrettably New Zealand philosophy is mostly for anything much, except perhaps, in UK, that Prior brought his 27 Again, like all the Australian programs, both those mentioned and others, in Grave, op.cit. But see further, R. Routley, ’Research in Logic in Australia, New Zealand and Oceania’, Research Papers in Logic #14, Australian National University, 1983 (which also considers other programs in logic); G. riest and R. Routley, op. cit.; and R. Routley, R.K. Meyer and others, Relevant Logics and Their Rivals, Ridgeview, California, 1982. 28 See especially M.J. Cresswell, Logics and Languages, Methuen, London, 1973; but see also work by Goldblatt and by Hughes referred to in Research in Logic, op.cit. Also described there is an original version of the modal program (transparent intensional logic) elaborated by Tlchy at Otago. 25 unusual adaption of Russellian philosophy from that remote place. Neither of these impressions is particularly accurate; both are rather out-of-date. the aim of work of the present type is, of course, impressions, not just to reflect or report But not just to correct these on culture - for what one would like to reflect upon is not sufficiently there - but also to help manufacture elements of a culture, to make an image. To resist the North, we should increase our efforts to further the nq already flourishing programs, and perhaps other sunrise projects; to build teaching and research around the programs selected for promotion, elaboration, and criticism, to orient appointments, especially of involved local people, to 29 Among sunrise projects in Australian philosophy so far suggested (not all of them feasible) are these: Australian feminism, Antipodean social and political alternatives, peace studies, indigenous regional philosophies (especially Aboriginal, Melanesian, and Polynesian). Another promising field, with practical consequences, for local initiative is the philosophy of education, where material produced by R.S. Peters has dominated the market, with stultifying effects it is now alleged. As foreshadowed with the notion of "sunrise projects", much of the rhetoric, and argument, concerning science and technology policy (presented in the case of Australia in Jones, op.cit.) can be taken over to apply to X policy, where X is some subject discipline, such as philosophy. 26 on Why bother? these programs. Why not simply buy our philosophy, like almost all our technology, off the shelf, from the North? There are several arguments for not doing this, in more than a limited fashion, which are now sketched. There is, firstly, Northern products, fine a the inferiority and built-in Without despite their attractive packaging. most of putting too point on it, many of the imported intellectual goods are shoddy, and only work for a very limited range of applications (e.g. the obsolence vicinity Antipodean of contradictions philosophy or undoubtedly dilemmas). derives from Much they’re hopeless in that shoddy is wrong intellectual with goods 30 In fact something like the last has been the policy of the LSE Philosophy Department, where the only outside appointment over a long period was that of Lakatos (hardly a person far removed ideologically). As observed, it now looks like the practice of the Otago Department also; and apparently it used to be a tendency at Melbourne. But in most places the practice is condemned as nepotistic or parochial, and overridden by the call for "new (Northern! blood". However there can be significant differences between nepotistic appointments and those strengthening local programs. It is at this stage, among others that administrative measures do matter; for example, to ensure that suitable locally-engaged locals gain employment rather than Northern stooges, to direct funds into on-going local programs rather than imported fashions, etc. There are various ways appropriate administrative details can be handled, locally or nationally; but nothing draconian, such as wholesale exclusion of noncitizens, is required. Observe, indeed, that no restriction of academic appointments to nationals (in Canadian style) or the like is being advocated. Anyone who arrives at a conclusion of that sort from what has been argued has misunderstood the case in crucial respects. As a matter of simple mathematics, restricting appointment fields characteristically reduces both quality of candidates available (however quality is assessed) and range of possibilities open for future research; and no such restrictions are advocated. The author has witnessed the debilitating effects of field restrictions at the Australian National University and elsewhere. 31 Some of these arguments centre also. support change (perhaps revolutionary) at the Yet buying this material is encouraged by hard-sell imported from the North. cultural ambassadors from the North, who are often enough paid to visit. is part Northern of the philosophical imperialism colonialism that - the This from the North - the successor Antipodes too suffers, willing or, to more remarkable, encourages! Secondly, there is the inappropriateness of much of the Northern product, especially considered metaphysics, as package, a environmental concerns. for instance, to cover, well as as The European North has no satisfactory land or environmental ethic fit for Antipodean circumstances, and the deeper American package is too spiritually-loaded for mainstream Australian culture. 32 In political theory, work is much too individualistic the European product, especially the Marxist form, and competition-based, American unsuited being both too precious and for local too high-tech and is circumstances, especially again for more environmentally-perceptive people. Thirdly, features of telling also import comparative advantage, and regionalism; namely, substitution world’s markets and pressures power structures against and fashions, (including the Old Boy’s removal network in are appealing avoidance of the of overseas control and jobs, policies, etc.), and gaining of local control, employment of local people, etc. Fourthly, 32 there are arguments for cultural diversity, applied to The point is elaborated in Culture. At a more practical level Northern products are again often unsuitable, though for different reasons. For example, the transfer of American agricultural methods and equipment to the thin poor soils of the Antipodes has had disastrous effects, at last beginning to be recognised. 28 part philosophy as complexity, sheer diversity, of culture: intellectual stability, arguments In fact, etc. built into the whole notion of 'culture’ transfers. dense, productive garden. the garden analogy Naturally we want a rich, But not only seeds and plants but weeds and many We pests are being introduced. obtain not only good products, Indian maize This is why and European cultivars, but European pests and American weeds. selectiveness and control richness, from essential, are as against haphazard previous procedures. The proposal is not for, nor would the case sustain, a narrow localism, with local products, whatever their quality, heroes, replacing Northern ones. local fashions, and local cult That is certainly not the preferred way of the newer regionalism, which tends to do without fashions and heroes and which seeks durable quality in products, is it the way of low environmental impact, and so on|^ nor technology policy. Rather, as with technology policy, select niches which are not occupied or satisfactorily filled, make a difference, policy has to be publishing outlets, components, and ideas, and use and develop local skills and methods. selective etc.). given resource our But granting base (of can Indeed the philosophers, regionalism, to what extent should for instance people, books and other teaching elements, theories and to what extent should they be produced, trained, be imported conceived locally? The possibility of selectiveness means that many mixes are possible. least, on a particular mix. 33 where we we There in different is no need to insist, components so far at The case for the present is mainly for a regional See, for instance, A.A. Mazrui, A World Federation of Cultures: An African Perspective, Free Press, New York, 1976. 29 shift, for a significantly greater degree of local autonomy and production.^ But it will do no harm to Negatively, local favour. indicate elements of a mix that the suggestion is that we try to eradicate much of That includes such things the Oxford style of teaching and doing philosophy. removal as of the Locke-Berkeley-Hume emphasis undue (a finds much standard on British British focus); empiricism of centred on quasi-historical the approach with however no proper attention to sources; of reinforcement of the prevailing Anglo-American status quo. The heavy particular, has mostly been a very conservative one. the main movements philosophy, but emanating also the from England, Moore-Wittgenstein Oxford influence, in More generally, many of especially practice, ordinary have language been very protective of the Northern status quo; they tend to leave things very much as they are, and recommend just this. Positively, the proposal is that we achieve further disassociation from the Anglo-American empiricist past in two 34 Does it sound familiar? Outside philosophy, it should. For example, we have now been told by the Americans that our defence role, unlike theirs, is regional, not global: this is supposed to shed great light on our previously confused defence policies. 35 The point is laboured in E. Gellner, Words and Things, Victor Gollancz, London, 1959. But even ordinary language philosophy, though conservative, and though it much contracted the proper range of philosophical investigations, had its liberating elements, e.g. removal of some of the narrowness and more cramping assumptions induced by technical jargon. Nor has the social impact changed much with the subsequent decline, since 1959, of ordinary language philosophy, the increasing insolvency of Oxbridge philosophy, and its consequent limited take-over by right-wing Ivy League American philosophy. By contrast, the less economically influential growth of redbrick and applied philosophy in some of the British redbrick and polytechnic institutes has touched no more than the surface of Oxbridge practice. 30 local emphasizing by ways: framework, and projects range the diversifying by move that outside of that constricting philosophical traditions selectively drawn upon, to include not only neglected Continental strands and but also parts of Eastern thought, philosophy. idea The is that Australasian Pacific ethnic material and plurality of such a especially sources, in teaching, will assist in removing narrower cultural biasses, such as British enable more and parochialism, be obtained. to discrimination Then too we should be better able to see the ranges of theories that are open to us in the Antipodes and how to advance our own programs. There remain some things we should want to see whatever mixes are chosen in different Antipodean regions. One crucial issue is the removal of Northern bias from papers and publications, research seminars and lectures, letters of reference, and so on. the and works irrespective discussion This Northern bias is a disposition to cite and discuss projects of and Northern quality the to of ignore of the authors, their works the more contribution of the to authors, local irrespective of the quality of their contribution. defer to famous better, the under topic again largely It is the disposition to authors from prestigious Northern institutions, and to uncritically accept their opinions of worth, importance, It etc. is the disposition to write or lecture as though work produced locally either does not exist or has not been influential philosophers, are, (thus if ensuring anything, more that it inclined is to not). Northern And Australasian bias than many overseas intellectuals, who are perhaps less concerned to be seen as belonging to the Northern mainstream. bias affects not only the The reduction, and eventual removal, of Northern practice of individual philosophers, but the policies of selection and review committees as well as of editors and referees of local reorientation, innovations It journals. among involves, Antipodean philosophers with so better, they can cite other getting local work things, intellectual to know local work and or point out regional Initiatives and developments - things that would be assisted by greater local content in courses taught, more time spent at local institutions on study leave, and so on. APPENDIX 1. Background notes on the philosophy supply situation. Sociological investigation of the philosophy labour market in Australia and New Zealand has yet to be attempted. But a picture of some elements underlying the numerical argument of the text can be gained from the following table: simple 32 TABLE 1. Ph.Ds in Philosophy: a USA - Australasian comparison USA Number (Male./Female) Australia New Zealand 1974 413 (346/67) 6 0 1975 375 (318/57) 5 0 1976 382 (319/63) 8 0 1977 330 (264/66) 3 2 (1/1) 1978 283 (235/48) 5 5 (4/1) 1979 285 (204/54) 9 3 (2/1) 1980 246 (187/59) 4 N.A. 1981 N.A. 4 0 Notes: 1. The breakdown of the USA and New Zealand numbers by sexes (male/female) is given. Similar figures do not appear to be available for Australia. 2. The US figures are for the academic year ending in the Year shown, e.g. 1978 covers the Northern academic year 1977-78. Southern figures are for the calendar year shown. Sources: Digest of Education Statistics, US National Center for Education Statistics; University Statistics, Australian Bureau of Census Statistics; New Zealand Education Statistics. Comments: 1. The contraction of US doctoral production and the concomitant rise in female representation, are clearly indicated. The Australian figures are likely too small to reflect such trends and responses to the academic market. 2. Some of the Australasian numbers include Americans; likewise the American figures provide no nationality breakdown. 3. There is no information available on the number of Australians proceeding to higher degrees in philosophy outside Australia. In applying table 1 some simplifying assumptions are made. assumed that For example, it is candidates for appointment to regular university positions now would have a doctorate or the equivalent (until recently a B.Phil was taken as a near of equivalent It well). a North what assumed, is American Ph.D.; seems take to could publications case, the that serve as the number of Australasians proceeding to higher degrees in philosophy abroad is relatively small, and no more than the order of Ph.Ds. taken locally. without upsetting applications of table 1, It can be assumed, that Australasian graduates match, say, the upper half of American graduates in standard attained. There is no compiled information on academic vacancies in philosophy in Australia or New Zealand - on the numbers of vacancies, on how the positions It would however be a routine, are filled, by what nationalities, sexes, etc. if tedious, matter to assemble some of this data, is of considerable which relevance to the planning of philosophy programs. 4. On the earlier idea of a National Philosophy for Australia. APPENDIX 2. considering Editor the of initial to corresponding Lebensanchauung ’ ’an Australian argument is possibility ’the AJPP, Francis Philosophy is as truth and its between as that a theory may not be held, (Australian) two senses Weltanschauung and 'a scheme of the universe’, that of a Christian confirmation independent of national sympathies or prejudices’. mean distinguished Anderson, ridiculous the Philosophy’, distinction In the first, (p.292). both National a German ’the that of In or Science’. falsification The ’are Granted: but that does not fostered, etc., in one region but not others, as intuitionism was for long in in Holland, or Cartesianism in France. In a second ’more intimate and personal’ way, ’a nation like an individual may develop a certain temperamental attitude to the problems of existence, which we may ... call its philosophy of life. and its literature, is a mode of A nation’s philosophy, expression for the national like its art consciousness. 34 (pp.292-3). It is a specialised form of the national genius ....’ short, part of the evolving national culture. is from by entirely means no separate in the first place, But, the It is, initial sense, in this philosophy a comprising not merely a fairly comprehensive theory but also an integrated set Furthermore, only by concession of attitudes (like an operational paradigm). units single accounted philosophy, of meriting distinctive definite literature, Australian like particularly ’the Australian landscape’ ’the national consciousness’ and are such items as (in many has any sense): does not Australian descriptors. such strands things to form it, not some rather loose families. Anderson not does find, really to hope find ’a in modern industrialised community’ - with its modular parts interchangeable with those of others - a national philosophy of with life, a difference. claims to find a (somewhat) trite moral base to build on, humour, courage and fair particularly philosphical. at least various apart of life, regional is but dealing’, So far, not; philosophies then, this nothing however not local research identifying and trouble derives from the extravagant claim that with Goodness these and - ’traditions ... of distinctive, all or there exclude So programs). legitimating a being far, national But shortly Anderson is plunged into inconsistency: the philosophy, so good. do at he there could a national philosophy, does as (such problems about from rational but fact Tn the Beauty eternal - then of values and only Philosophy’ (p.295 with rearrangement). the then But, to do with these - as is virtually conceded, ’if Australia has nothing to Spirit, has she the Ideals nothing to of Truth, do with as Australia has nothing per se these values involving a ’wider sweep’ than any national boundaries - "she" has nothing to do with Philosophy, contradicting the possibility of a National Philosophy. Though the 35 contradiction is easily avoided by rescinding the extravagant claim, the ideal of a National Philosophy should be allowed to rest in peace: nationalism has had its time. -r /I ZR. Routley^ Research School of Social Sciences Australian National University With thanks to R. Elliot, W. Godfrey-Smith, S. Grave and L. Mirlin, to several members of the audience at the presentation of the paper at the 19R3 Australasian Association of Philosophy Conference, University of Adelaide, to several referees for this Journal, and, not least, to the present Editor. PROSPECTS FOR REGIONAL PHILOSOPHIES IN AUSTRALASIA Philosophy, especially academic philosophy but also folk philosophy, like has long been other intellectual and higher cultural activity in Australasia, indeed dominated, swamped, Northern by increasingly from North America. Europe, now the largely and cultural baggage other imported, influences, Given the initially the migration ethnic patterns, composition of resulting ruling populations, such a result was virtually inevitable. does not have to stay that way. from the But it Suitable policies, a good philosophy policy, could change things. The of thought culture, is a philosophy, regional hardly a new one. In 1923, matching perhaps a regional correspondent to the a New Zealand newly-launched Australasian Journal of Psychology and Philosophy mentioned the possibility of ’a new kind or temper of philosophy under these southern skies’ which Journal might the such a reaching role for (or, not community). that although And matter, professional merely solid foundation foster.The Journal has for a some actively pursued philosophers things new regionalism however hardly but have changed in philosophy, its a fulfilled pronounced wider aim of Australasian in Australia, laying a that possibility of a new temper of philosophy has hardly been realised. There is little in the way the southern skies were intended to include: but few distinguishing features, ’no a new kind distinctively ^AJPP, March same volume, Appendix 2. and New temper of philosophy under New Zealand skies, which of Zealand 1923, p.74. p.292.ff; his characteristics, The have question was discussion is shown up in New Zealand taken up by the Editor in the considered below, especially in 2 philosophy’. 9 New Zealand remains a substantial net importer of philosophy, The situation of colonial dominance that used to prevail in and philosophers. Australia, where virtually and chairs, all many other philosophy, were filled by academics from the North, posts academic in tends to persist in New Zealand, where no established chairs are occupied by locals.Given the. usual power and influence of professors in small departments, topics covered and considered and in courses designed, especially appointments made, the heavy Northern orientation of philosophy taught and researched in New Zealand is not The Northern control is perhaps most strikingly exhibited at the surprising. oldest of New Zealand universities, University the of Otago, where the Philosophy Department has been substantially captured by a British School and increasingly looks event, the like an offshoot of overwhelming Anglo-American the University of London.In any dominance of New Zealand philosophy also a feature only in slightly lesser degree of Australian philosophy - can be confirmed by a content survey of the courses offered and research papers written at New Zealand universities. Even when local people have been appointed to positions in Australasia, they have been brought up on a solid diet of Anglo-American material, and they have often been reforged or finished in the North as well. In particular, the 2, S.A. Grave, A History of Philosophy in Australia, Queensland University Press, 1983, p.l. Page references are to the manuscript. The paper draws heavily on this history. ^This claim was correct at the time of presentation of 1983). With the recent loss of chair at Wellington, qualification, but the pattern of domination persists. the the paper (August claim may require 4In the 1983 Commonwealth University Handbook listing, 6 of the 8 members of the Department held their main degree, Ph.D., from London, and one of the remainder from Exeter. Only one member of the Department, soon to retire, falls outside the nexus. 3 requirements in the Australasian universities of period of the major post­ World War II expansion were conveniently seen to in the case of philosophy by the Oxford B.Phil. Many degree. of departments philosophy remain full of products of this cultural mill: indeed until the mid 70s candidates finished in Oxford were hard to beat out when they applied for positions, such was the prestige of Oxford and (unwarranted) the regrettable, continuing, but still "cultural cringe". Nonetheless, been in occurring scene the Northern the Antipodes, be will (as despite especially on indicated). significant dominance, is It the Australian worth asking changes have philosophical Australian whether philosophy is moving towards the sort of change that occurred in USA more than 100 years ago when the Harvard Philosophy Department was brought (or bought) and together, its "golden age" began.American the same again, and became its own thing. philosophy was never quite There are nouT new forces operating which could help to move Australian philosophy in such a direction. the widespread regionalism,0 other local fashioning provides a emergence, which applies choices; of national model for and particularly to in cultural stark science reflection and in in alternative and technology regional there there are also some of choice along is policies, philosophy directly bears on parts of the philosophy of science. soon appear, culture, ideological contrast, serious obstacles There is the a new with centralised which not only policy but also Unfortunately, as will to regional philosophies and to the very idea of a regional philosophy. See B. Kuklick, The Rise of American Philosophy; Cambridge, Massachusetts 1860-1930, Yale University Press, 1977, Parts 2 and 3. 60n this bio-regionalism, see especially, Fourth World News, vol. 1, and K. Sale, Human Scale, Cox^ard, McCann and Geoghegan, New York, 1980. 1983, USA, long an importer of culture from Europe, of exporter culture, certainly components of higher culture philosophical output Australasia, not if from such as Oxford following philosophy should not but achieve also the American there Are Yes, in philosophy? evidently (witness taken). has suit, payments, especially balance of culture, lower of has recently become a net a reasons better of turn why cultural there are reasons. In the first place, the change in the cultural position of the USA went with, and perhaps in part derived entails economic dominance most Australasia’s of from, vast changes in economic power relations. cultural dominance, since culture, there there is is little prospect serious no prospect If for that Australasia will ever emulate or attain American economic eminence (at least nuclear destruction of not without the North, flow of commodities, cultural and other). universities not only increasingly of Americans, contingent of former group, Northern cultural As they. priorities, that they whose entire as observed, Antipodean Northern academics, of include a research and additional substantial teaching is bent to It is unlikely that this influential segment, especially will (become commitments, long component also fellow-travellers, Northern concerns. the Secondly, large a contain and disruption of the as so apart Antipoduans they are in a bind locally acclimatised as do from not situation; the isolated drastically to) give up Nor person. alter their its should cultural for it can be persuasively argued they would be better off, as far as quality and product goes, stocking their universities with American teaching components and researching Americanoriented concerns. One simple numerical argument that Antipodean universities would be better off with Americans in the main, takes the following lines:- The (higher degree) graduates of Australasian culturally distinguished, at and American are not significantly least in subjects such as philosophy. Consider 5 now number the quality of Austroamerican graduates; academics of higher per number produced say there is 1 per every n graduates. degree The (great) preponderance of graduates will be Americans, just by virtue of their vastly greater population and their more extensive system of university education. So also then, just by ratio considerations, the great preponderance of quality academics from an drawn percentiles among upper they interested universities. Austroamerican base those quality products. quality, in an Such be American, will would argument does CLearly, Antipodeans, appointing be not as will work to more show Americans that, for the were their to similar reasons, American universities should be full of Chinese or Indian professors, for two Asians reasons; and first Americans, there are especially significant in cultural differences disciplines such as between philosophy; and secondly, their university systems do not deliver such great quotas of higher degree or high quality graduates, at least in philosophy. The conclusion of the numerical argument will not be a popular one. anti-Americanism felt the universities; The in portions of the Australasian community extends into and recently there has been increasing insistence, especially by the now aging younger Turks that university positions should be reserved for locals. This at the same time as these Turks often preach of an international community of scholars, presumably then with "free" interchange, As indicated in Appendix 1, where assumptions made in the argument are defended, the ratio of US philosophy graduates with doctorates as compared with Australian exceeds 30 to 1. And, as is well-known, the extent of university education is much greater in USA than in Australasia: indeed Australia is in this respect among the worst educated of the developed nations, as OECD figures have made plain (see, e.g., B. Jones, Sleepers Wake', Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 1982, Chapter 7). 6 etc. They cannot have it all ways.3 So long the continues, the present centre will as they will economically; them if large to it is free-flow the dominate have more interchange than us, periphery and ideas of and culturally jobs here personnel as well as should go by and (centrally-determined) quality in this high cultural business that we seek, as mostly claim. it Now anyway, is that arguments. widely there For we is are enough recognised, something not lower-down drastically wrong hierarchical with these ladders sorts flooded with high-quality Northerners who regularly drive out local contenders for positions, of would if we only preferred the Northerners when they were quite visibly superior: rather we are inundated by Americans with inflated references, who have the messages of the centre better than locals echelon do, (often and remote Northern Northern whose shortcomings biassed) fields tend appointment are known better. to look greener to committees than dusty higherlocals As is beginning to be recognised too, the Northern centres tend to retain their higher-quality products, and allow g A reverse flow of the better orthodox academics from Australasia to America should also be expected (outside times of university contraction). According to assumptions of this brain, drain argument, which is based on labour market considerations, appointment and lifestyle conditions for academics are generally better in USA than Australia and much better than those in economically-depressed New Zealand (e.g. higher salaries, better standard of living, superior research conditions, etc.). So, other things being equal, able academics from the Antipodes will relocate in USA as academic positions become available. The argument also helps explain why Antipodean universities cannot expect, for the most part, to attract really top-drawer Northerners for very long. Of course, economically irrelevant factors do induce interference; e.g. perverse commitments to odd-ball Antipodean intellectual enterprises which reduce market acceptability, or pre-industrial ties to place or persons or lifestyle which unduly restrict mobility (such as local roots, family attachments, even distaste for American urban lifestyles). 7 them be to exiled the to periphery only if they fall somehow foul of the system (e.g. of the academic system for political or personal reasons). often Northern the have centres disposed of their intellectually Too inferior products in the periphery. All this makes the appointing Northerners, position look doubly bad. We ought, especially Americans, even if they are overrated their references, and usually not out of the top drawer, quality. And yet to be it seems, in in order to maximize doing so does not achieve the desired quality result, and breeds discontent elsewhere, especially among the aging Turks. there Fortunately obtain way out a from this awkward and that is the way of regionalism. shaky arguments; and is cultural sufficient distance,9 so that situation and these We do our own things; they are not simply subtitutable for us. Then the shaky numerical argument does fall down. before the we elaborate emerging proposal there are other But influential arguments to dispose of, and the disposal bears on the proposal. There is, have so to begin with, far been conceded: the argument for excellence, that excellence, which we all more or elements of which there is an objective commodity, quality or less agree about, which is proportionately more abundant in the North, and which is what academic institutions crave and seek and what appointments aim to capture, indeed maximize. That at least is the type of myth most of us have encountered; and many of us now know it is a myth, in fact appointments a that dangerous way, any Most myth. more that places don’t organisations aim even just try to to make maximize 9 This is easier in the cultural than the technological sphere. However it is also possible technologically: (stronger) theses of technological determinism, and so of cultural determinism, are false. We can choose different options, technologically, as well as culturally. 8 profit, but quality is to satisfice on a mix of factors, of which assessed rather seek only one, and not often the highest ranking one. Ability to fit into some sort of program, teaching or research, is another, and commonly more important factor; is no good reason why such a program should not and there So given prevailing practices, sometimes be a regionally oriented one. the argument from excellence does not exclude regional philosophy programs. And, in any event, there are enough local candidates of sufficient worth to proceed regional with programs without sacrifice clearcut of Local excellence. enterprise need entail no loss of excellence, and could well increase it. The deeper-cutting objection is that there is something seriously amiss with the idea of objective objective importance; criticism as bracketed out notions the that of excellence, and notions these values objective with are open more contextual-relativisation connected the to the generally, component of notion of sorts of same they that valuing: have the framework or viewpoint to which these values relate.10 While those operating within as a rather narrow intellectual paradigm, such ordinary Oxbridge language philosophy or Sydney materialism say, can bracket out the viewpoint, since it is incorporated in the operational paradigm, and so arrive at seemingly objective quality judgements, the judgements are not preserved (e.g. in truth Marxist value) when viewpoints. transposed Consider, to for other frameworks, comparison, the e.g. idealistic judgements as to or the quality or worth of a forest,made variously by a deep ecologist, an industrial forester, and a recreational officer. Compare judgements as to the quality of What follows also begins to bring out what is omitted in a main theme of R.S. Pirsig, Zen and the Art of Motor Cycle Maintenance, Bodley Head, London, 1974. Note that defusing the notion of objective excellence does not lead to subjectivism. To avoid the customary false dichotomy, compare the notion of validity (usually ceded to themselves these days by classical logicians with that of quality). 9 a holistically-inclined Marxist, and environmental Californian philosophers pretend who seemingly because it philosopher, environmental such language, are There work judged, be. cannot even of the main philosophical by members is not done ordinary philosophers. environmental that by peer group at Harvard and like institutions. this As judgements begins the of to reveal, judgements of quality are not independent of work of importance or done But tackled. problems importance of problems and issues is highly paradigm dependent. the For example, problems such as those of quantifying-in and of possible worlds and of de re thought, which assume immense importance for fashionable referential within the mainstream empiricist restricted that outside theories paradigm, vanish to relative insignificance viewpoint. Now observe that most judgements as to what are the important problems and what constitutes important work - matters helping determine quality - are shipped down from the North. Their Importance is relative to their paradigmatic placement, and the paradigms concerned are exported to the Antipodes through the main channels already indicated. We are free to reject these paradigms and select alternatives, and there are, it can good reasons be argued, choose that different generally energy favoured to do just technology in the that, much as (or different North the which there are good reasons military North is from technology) eager to to export southwards. Similar which might argument, points apply against alternatively that be mass-produced and cosmopolitan. The argument -marketed 'cosmopolitan subject', called people sophisticated the from is based cosmopolitan/international the Peter everywhere Holland; Stuyvesant smoke this argument international superior product cigarette-sophistication is on the assumption that philosophy is a that is is not the sort of enterprise for which place 10 and people are significant as they assumption has only to be presented important thing, for one for are poetry the or to be questioned. novel. is a finished product of a certain that philosophy process of production the place and people involved (e.g. And literature, the if and not product philosophy, no more 12 than work a like theorems just internationally-approved format, since is The It takes for granted, sort (a propositional theory), not a process of production also. material. 11 of in discussion) are art, arguments and But in the like a piece assembled in of an then again the historical setting matters, literature, not does emerge in a vacuum. Plato’s philosophy could not have emerged in ancient Australia, and if cribbed in mid 20th century Oxford would surely have been marked down or rejected. It is important not to be sidetracked do not in aesthetics - that extent sets of themes need to and arguments into issues - resembling problems be contested, such as whether and what produced in one place and setting could have been produced in another. A nonnuclear technology of some sort could be adopted prospect in Europe that New but apparently will Zealand, nonnuclear energy strategy. in not contrast be, with whereas there Australia, is will reasonable pursue a It is the doing, and not what could be done, that Grave, op.cit., p.2: the term ’cosmopolitan subject’ used there comes from Donegan. As to the significance of place and people for literature, see further C. Partridge, The Making of New Cultures, Editions Rodopi, Amsterdam, 1982. 12 Like a paper in the biological sciences. But here again technique methodology, which may both be regional, are crucially important. 13 and Related points can be made using less extreme examples, e.g. concerning modern American work. Consider, for instance such texts as W.V. Quine’s Word and Object, (Wiley, New York, 1960) or R. Nozick’s Anarchy, State and Utopia (Basic Books, New York, 1974). The assumptions taken for granted, the arguments involved, etc., are especially American: it is not just the style. The acceptability of arguments and positions is dependent on place and received paradigm. 11 here. matters Dialethic which logic, the invalidates methodology of much Anglo-American philosophy, could technique and perhaps be done in the North (though there would be substantial cultural resistance): it is not being and is not likely to be done in the Anglo-American sphere.To done there, this extent, Antipodeans do techniques, logical can choose their international/cosmopolitan argument, distinctive own their distinctive own technology thing. and The stated in a form that would be telling, fails. Of course it can be argued, it is being argued, that Antipodeans don't need to be, or even oughtn't to be pursuing their own energy or logic policies and apparatus. But meeting these considerations takes us to a whole new set of issues concerning the merit of various policies and programs, diversity, etc. - far beyond the cosmopolitan argument. which we shaLl return, arguments concerning the point of The new arguments, to are not a lot more convincing however than comparable cooking: that we don't devising our own cuisine or wine styles. need to be or oughtn't to be British, or at least cosmopolitan, cooking is adequate: we should stick to that and buy it off the shelf from the North, ideally importing the cooks also. Do we have good reasons to think that British philosophy is better, these days, than British cooking? Antipodeans are free, in principle then, to pursue their own paradigms; and to do so they will by and large want to, and mostly have to, appoint their own people, people they have educated - not saboteurs or people who have (had) Much as communist anarchism, a live possibility for communes and perhaps communities in Australia, is culturally excluded in North America, owing to the extreme possessive individualism of that culture. On dialethic logic, see G. Priest and R. Routley, On Paraconsistency, Research Papers in Logic, #13, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University, 1983. 12 to be re-educated, from elsewhere, in particular from the North. intellectual paradigms the of features local But will the perused tie with cultural paradigms, with distinctive In a culture? though works of philosophy will loose not usually at way, they may link, least, culture in tie in with the the integral fashion that novels (as distinct from more technical works) sometimes do. Indeed, cultural certain programs, - to limited extent, features, not they do restricted already link. add. But style, independent - or independent acceptability, truth, philosophical ’an Australian compared with what matters is this though considers Grave particular to help mark philosophy in Australia as that 'unimportant hastens a to product' in philosophy' do matter, and are he not so far as their perception goes in the case of truth and correctness^3 - from underlying broad theory or received paradigm. However the marks Grave cautiously advances, significant though they are, do not serve features to the distinguish Australian philosophy Australian exhibits in product, lesser the degree adventurous and polemical philosophy of Greek antiquity. by Passmore as 'most typical of first two the than being more The first, described Australian philosophy', is a 'diversity of approach and readiness to put forward an unconventional or unfashionable point of view', philosophy, something which more (with typical some of notable ancient philosophy exceptions) than exhibits Australian a.i austere Nothing need be conceded to strong cultural relativity themes, though they would support the case. It is enough that our theories remain radically incomplete and that there can accordingly be rival theories as to what is true. Similarly, however philosophy is conceived - as the search for truth, explanation, understanding and wisdom (all of these and more, really), or as, more vaguely, inquiry of a certain sort - there can be, and will be, competing accounts; so a pluralistic theory is inevitable in giving a fuller view. l^Both preceding quotations, while included as such in Grave's Introduction, are from J. Passmore, 'Philosophy', in The Pattern of Australian Culture (ed. A.L. McLeod), Cornell University Press, Ithaca, N.Y., 1963, pp.131-168. The same annotation also applies to the third mark. 13 uniformity reflecting that often attributed to the land itself. and surprising, more most 'the philosophy, Wittgensteinian extraordinary discussed by itself’ Grave) , criticism by sharp and political relevant/paraconsistent to example ... Andersonian (p.2). This of character' manifestoed the the __ being if Sydney, example is Australian line-up it was far from between the not isolated: them concern the fervour generated by "Australian materialism", others among the notable Melbourne philosophy Andersonian is mark The second, engagement the and by some growing philosophy departments confrontation (both concerning the program, with the local ('adversarial') style leading Connected Americans. these with first two marks are further characteristics of much Australian philosophy, as of much 18th century Scottish philosophy and directness, unkindly turn of unwillingness (in add the this century Cambridge philosophy:17 to muffle points, hope of locating a namely surface clarity and, some would difference), bluntness, genuine unsubtlety and crudity. The third and the fourth marks advanced Grave in philosophy. effect notes, hardly are very different, but again as distinguishing features of Australian The third, which applies well to other intellectual areas, is the contrast of the Australian reputation in philosophy indeed of Australia as a center of philosophical inquiry’, with the anti—intellectual national stereotype of Australians as a people ’devoted to physical achievement rather than to intellectual subtlety’. Anglo-American philosophy; namely The the fourth mark is especially a feature of isolation of academic philosophy Australasia from, and its general indifference or even hostility to, in the sort 17 • though for the most part that influenced by Sydney rather than that originating in Melbourne. This again reflects the different historical influences bearing in Sydney and Melbourne philosophy: roughly, Scottish versus Continental antecedents. 14 of imported philosophy (e.g. that Nietzsche of and the existentialists) generating interest in literary and arts circles. The failure philosophy sufficiently matter. not does separated For its by to marks such of adequately one the thing, out separate research projects. Australian For another, Australian produce is regionalism should not be confused with nationalism, nor more regional positions such as Sydneyside materialism modalism Wellington or with Nationalism in philosophy, as in most other things, not to be the and encouraged; new regionalism philosophies. national is an undesirable trait, is linked, in other cultural things, with the breakdown of nations and contraction of state power. -A ■A To get back * to where we were: A the A emerging proposal is this, that we start - or better much increase - doing our own distinctive things, and that we team up to do so. In fact there are several suggestions that begin to emerge, concerning research and teaching, publications and appointments, study These are not just that we do our own selection leave and sponsored visitors. topics of and people, and style and methods, decide instead of having these foisted upon us - not just, our own priorities, that is, that we play our own games (whether invented here or taken over from the North) and not theirs, Rules and Rugby instead of Gridiron and Basketball - but. that we abandon the individual competitive model of cultural achievement, sold to us and fostered 18 See, e.g., London, 1957. Sale, op.cit., and L. Kohr, The Breakdown of Nations, RKP, The Editor of the new 1923 AJPP did however take seriously the notion of National Philosophy, of (what must have surprised some New Zealand readers) an Australian Philosophy; some of the issues there raised (p.292ff) are addressed in Appendix 2. 15 by the North, in favour of a group cooperative approach (elements of which are already modelled in Antipodean social clubs). The thoughts here are simple and familiar. digging example: it is well-known that two people cooperating can dig a ditch and enjoyably more rapidly On the one side is the ditch­ than two people working on the ditch separately. Cooperative work tends to pay off - in philosophy or elsewhere - in terms of output, and enjoyment quality, in the doing. On the other side, experience shows that we in the periphery cannot individually complete very successfully with the centre on achievements in their programs. for this. the nature of American academic attainment of depends results access to unpublished material. and periphery nationalistic are the tend verbal rapid communication and For, despite the individualism myth, work is several clever people will be able to hit on it. idea or result, communications upon enterprise,^ much and builds on the work of many; when the time is ripe for some- jointly based, result, Despite the highly competitive One is the communication situation. predominantly individualistic in There are several reasons to important assignment lose out. considerations in obtaining of credit Again (e.g. for rapid it. publication of Here there is a mix PoLes tend Then again to again the people of reasons:promote idea or at the There are Polish results, Russians will cite a Russian who achieves a result at about the same time as an outsider). There face-to-face seminars 19 is the fact that much is conveyed verbally and through so that local results will be conveyed. There is the Reflecting other features of the culture and enterprise of the centre which are not so deeply embedded in Australasia: see further R. Routley, 'Culture, philosophy, and approaches to the natural environment an Australian perspective’, in The Environment, Ethics and Ecology (ed. D. Bennett), The Faculties, Australian National University, 1984, and also 'Culture and the roots of political divergence: the Australian/American contrast’, typescript, Canberra, 1983; both referred to subsequently as 'Culture'. 16 limited fact of they when reading, on read and that people at the from material the centre central by centre tend to concentrate peopLe, that so published items and results from the periphery will often not be noticed, and may well out lose to There publication. is the also for merit, receive, merit competitors central more fact that publication than people towards the periphery. if even people and they achieve the at centre communication central tend to opportunities Here economic factors do begin to enter; consider the size and distribution of the academic market (there are, e.g., a great many more academic philosophers in North America than in the whole rest of the world), control of publishing outlets and journals (with few exceptions all Northern), etc. culture — we can way we shut off the Northern philosophical propaganda in much the shut off our television impressed being However economic power does not, and need not, determine by philosophical those to. sets if we really want middle-men And we can stop make who a living by importing the Northern stuff. So what do we do? We adapt to the cultural-philosophical level, several of those things, that have been suggested in the newer regionalism. some regional importers and doctrines and awakening and self-reliance. of, and local from the North. imitators positions local We do not remain commentators For We aim at on example, we and slavish peddlars don’t spend of, our academic lives trying to tease out what Davidson or Dummett or Kripke meant by this or that through. To in the be hope that sure, I am some pale Northern light will perhaps not suggesting that we emulate the filter appalling ignorance of people from the North who visit the Antipodes and know little or nothing about what has been done or is being done here;^^ so that we have Regrettably, the ignorance extends to many locals. In particular, those infected with Sydney materialism appear remarkably ill-informed as to basic features of other Australasian programs. 17 eminent their visitors, the through bags National Australian cultural with heavy University accroutrements, (now the main trekking centre for investigation of relevant logics) and Informing us that, or relying crucially on the assumption that, a contradiction entails every proposition. that advances is positions and inferiority cultural of another colonies; is know often Northerners these little is the the Antipodes intellectual and the nothing or distinctive prevailing assumption of the in life these (predominantly local) narrow about One reason former and southern limited reading undertaken by Northern luminaries. But, despite having been sufficient given cause, we shouldn’t cut ourselves off from Northern paradigms and influences (we could hardly manage We can reasonably use what we need from propoganda is different). to anyway: so we should stay informed of, but not imitators these continuing traditions: of, or part of, In any case, their enterprises. the people are largely European stock. in older Northern traditions, just as So far from nowhere, cutting these loose from (and older these likely regional cultures are rooted traditions minority) and starting afresh traditions, and the from local variations that have already appeared are what we want to develop and perhaps mutate, as again with wine styles. Part of the proposal Is then that things, encourage and develop our own Antipodean Northern paradigms, paradigms. rather It is we increasingly research programs, very great 71 our own local and so shape newer than working with pale northern reflections not as if we have to - what is very difficult - entirely original work, components. do build from nothing, to of do to try to create cultural For there are research programs already initiated, which have the advantage of See Culture, op.cit. being grounded in features of the larger culture."1 18 Nor, the do we need fortunately, future is part to make the story up - though helping to shape of what the Australia - New Zealand proposal Much of about. is different and more difficult is a is All one really to bring out programs he has already indicated and provide some to do is elaboration and commentary. level, for proposition - already indicated in Grave’s survey of Australian philosophy. has the story, To pull the investigation down to a more concrete I shall sketch some more prominent cooperative programs - by no means the only programs - and remark on some relevant features of them. The longest running and best known program is, without much doubt, of Australian naturalism, and which aims see to natural the that world, and everything else, as suitably encompassed within the framework of the world of (physical) science. The program is generally traced as a major subprogram Sydney materialism, Adelaide which subsequently died out there. such famous components central state version of failures functionalism. its in a reduction and nowadays Faced plans, like it It in The latter program has included takes it all now Anderson’s program initiated as the mental-material contingent materialism, to in Armstrong’s work. empiricist metaphysics,-- and is now best exhibited contains back in, identity theme and more derivatively, physicalisms incorporates a with a conspicuous "scientifically" trimmed theory of universals, and an account of natural laws as relations of universals, both components of the developing Sydney realism. Parts of the naturalism program, especially materialism and central state reductionism and the unified science ideal, have had counterparts in the North, but the program has, for the most part, retained its distinctively Australian character 22 Anderson’s metaphysics was however far more opposed to reductions than what has succeeded it. For an account of Anderson’s philosophy, and a history and account op.cit. of Australian naturalism and materialism, see especially Grave, 19 - despite export efforts, it never caught on in New Zealand. smoothly, moreover, and philosophy can far as so earthy, into Australian culture. The program fits It is similarly down-to-earth, be, without ideas or the fancy effete idealism of European philosophy or the spirituality and suppressed puritanism much which with pragmatism). North of And commitments, and American it yet it though not does is simmers thinking basically shrink from metaphysical explicit empiricist, nowadays, (including is it not positivistic (rejecting a verification principle, in particular). It is a city based program, broadcast mainly from the University of Sydney to other metropolitan universities; but the program does extend outside the universities a bit (a tiny bit) to the larger metropolitan culture. North America, the broader Russell, so in Australasia, little professional philosophy impinges on community,’-^ Popper and would naturalism program Perth, and has outliers Apart notable be or Kuhn Australasia from As in quite used to even on being an the wider exceptional. achievement, stretch through one academic (To community, turn worth to Adelaide; this working it work by around for.) now reaches in The to in Canberra, as well as a core of opposition there. exceptions, the program has never had the same hold, or In Canada, for example, while most academics from other disciplines would know of, and perhaps a little about, Russell, far fewer would know of Wittgenstein (though he is becoming known to lit. crit. groups), and virtually none would know of Quine. (The sampling is subjective.) On the fairly recent ’triumph of professionalism’ in philosophy in USA, see Kuklick, op.cit., p.565ff. Iluklick brings out well some of the more disastrous features of professionalism, but does not sufficiently notice that the virtuous features resulting from some professionalisation can be synthesized with broader philosophical activity. 20 0 more than a rather precarious hold, f in Melbourne:^2 4 * nor, more surprisingly, has it had heavyweight criticism from there (or indeed much external criticism the old confrontation of major city philosophies having died from elsewhere), Melbourne out. is more philosophy stricken than Sydney; Melbourne by dominated a procession philosophy; Continental then, philosophy; religion philosophy, much more than Sydney, has Northern of earlier fashions: recently, more remarkable a and more historically oriented and Davidson Quine, turnabout, idealism ordinary Wittgenstein, been and language extensional reduction; now perhaps Lewis, Kripke and Dummett? The one program that reaches the beyond confines of the cities in Australia - which is after all a metropolitan dominated culture, the vast land always the other being - Australian environmentalism, is a rather diffuse program, which has connections with the Colleges of Advanced Education in the the communes on the North Coast. country towns and much distinguished environmental Europe by what positions specifically it are a having is not as feature of transformed what So far the program is as it is. the New World, most its of Serious the natural and deeper Old World, and environment and having little wild untouched country left, and little sensitivity accordingly to such as issues Europe that tend admit European to those of concern shallow built approaches superficiality environmentalism the wilderness. outside (and continues North and The main environmental human-transformed encourage to America. environment, situations). techno-fix dominate North much issues of American the New in issues And World environmentalism differs significantly however from Antipodean environmentalism, most obviously 2A rhe exceptions include Ellis’s distinctive program, which can be accounted part of the broader naturalist program, and at Monash the work of F. Jackson and, earlier, of H. Munro in value theory. 21 in the religious-spiritual component of the former, in but several other respects as well (see further Culture). positively, More environmentalism:- there Firstly, three are an is there strands extended Australian to utilitarianism, differing little in theory from Bentham’s enlarged position, which insists upon counting in the utilities of all sentient creatures. British base, has figured prominently in animal welfare and animal liberation though and movements: This position, developed from a it has on domestic animals, focussed animals used in research and hunted (wild) animals, it has also become entangled in issues of bio-research more generally such as genetic or much interested in, concerned with, engineering. endangered species, It is not however the disappearance of wild lands, the conversion of forests, etc., except insofar as these have a bearing on animal pain and pleasure. Wider and deeper environmental concerns appear only as a spinoff from animal welfare, and so deeper concerns get an inadequate deal. Secondly, there is a wider and a deeper ecological position, which is not utilitarian and which recognises irreducible value elsewhere than forests and differs ecosystems, especially wild and American from naturalism. which finds states, psychological sentience or 25 Thirdly, spiritualism there is and of intrinsic value natural systems. from course, an as in trees This position of American extension everywhere, almost and a reactionary component, critical of the other strands, which insists that all that needs to be accomplished on the environmental front can be achieved within older established (European) ethical and political frameworks. Whereas materialism is based in Sydney, environmentalism is centred in It has been described more fully elsewhere: see, in particular, Environmental Philosophy (ed. D. Mannison and others), RSSS, Australian National University, 1980. 22 Melbourne and Canberra, but also includes Brisbane and Perth. Also centred in Canberra, and reaching across the country, with good connections in Melbourne, but in few Sydney, materialism and from program other which program, and logic program perhaps includes extends their core value more to centres New respectively, the especially philosophy, in the with Logic a Whereas in metaphysics, theory essentially is of areas major which and program. program, but one metaphysics. The Australia than also been described in New Zealand philosophy is also a Zealand, has any other 26 elsewhere The programs have epistemology relevant/paraconsistent affecting relevant/paraconsistent environmental input further the is main grounded research program program. A program emanating located mainly in Wellington, The impact of the evident program on from the it might be called work of Prior and now the extended modal program. philosophy is perhaps best seen in Cresswell’s 27 work. “ Australian philosophy used for its not hard-headed empiricism; known for to be known, and still is in some quarters, regrettably New Zealand philosophy is mostly anything much, except perhaps, in UK, that Prior brought unusual adaption of Russellian philosophy from that remote place. his Neither of 26 Again, like all the Australian programs, both those mentioned and others, in Grave, op.cit. But see further, R. Routley, 'Research in Logic in Australia, New Zealand and Oceania', Research Papers in Logic #14, Australian National University, 1983 (which also considers other programs in logic); G. Priest and R. Routley, op. cit.; and R. Routley, R.K. Meyer and others, Relevant Logics and Their Rivals, Ridgeview, California, 1982. 27 See especially M.J. Cresswel.1, Logics and Languages, Methuen, London, 1973; but see also work by Goldblatt and by Hughes referred to in Research in Logic, op.cit. Also described there is an original version of the modal program (transparent intensional logic) elaborated by Tichy at Otago. 23 these impressions is particularly accurate; both are rather out-of-date. But the aim of work of the present type is, of course, not just to correct these impressions, not just to reflect or report on culture - for what one would like to reflect upon is not sufficiently there - but also to help manufacture elements of a culture, to make an image. To resist the already flourishing North, we should increase our efforts to further the programs, and perhaps other sunrise projects;*'^ to build teaching and research around the programs selected for promotion, elaboration, and criticism, to orient appointments, especially of involved local people, to Among sunrise projects in Australian philosophy so far suggested (not all of them feasible) are these: Australian feminism, Antipodean social and political alternatives, peace studies, indigenous regional philosophies (especially Aboriginal, Melanesian, and Polynesian). Another promising field, with practical consequences, for local initiative is the philosophy of education, where material produced by R.S. Peters has dominated the market, with stultifying effects it is now alleged. As foreshadowed with the notion of "sunrise projects", much of the rhetoric, and argument, concerning science and technology policy (presented in the case of Australia in Jones, op.cit.) can be taken over to apply to X policy, where X is some subject discipline, such as philosophy. 24 these programs. 79 Why bother? Why not simply buy our philosophy, like almost all our technology, off the shelf, from the North? There are several arguments for not doing this, in more than a limited fashion, which are now sketched. There Northern fine a is, firstly, products, the despite inferiority their attractive and built-in packaging. of most Without putting too point on it, many of the imported intellectual goods are shoddy, and only work for a very limited range of applications (e.g. the obsolence vicinity Antipodean of contradictions philosophy undoubtedly imported from the North. dilemmas). or derives from Much shoddy they’re hopeless in that is wrong intellectual with goods Yet buying this material is encouraged by hard-sell cultural ambassadors from the North, who are often enough paid to visit. This 29 In fact something like the last has been the policy of the LSE Philosophy Department, where the only outside appointment over a long period was that of Lakatos (hardly a person far removed ideologically). As observed, it now looks like the practice of the Otago Department also; and apparently it used to be a tendency at Melbourne. But in most places the practice is condemned as nepotistic or parochial, and overridden by the call for "new (Northern) blood . However there can be significant differences between nepotistic appointments and those strengthening local programs. It is at this stage, among others that administrative measures do matter; for example, to ensure that suitable locally-engaged locals gain employment rather than Northern stooges, to direct funds into on-going local programs rather than imported fashions, etc. There are various ways appropriate administrative details can be handled, locally or nationally; but nothing draconian, such as wholesale exclusion of noncitizens, is required. Observe, indeed, that no restriction of academic appointments to nationals (in Canadian style) or the like is being advocated. Anyone who arrives at a conclusion of that sort from what has been argued has misunderstood the case in crucial respects. As a matter of simple mathematics, restricting appointment fields characteristically reduces both quality of candidates available (however quality is assessed) and range of possibilities open for future research; and no such restrictions are advocated. The author has witnessed the debilitating effects of field restrictions at the Australian National University and elsewhere. 30t, c Some of centre also. , these arguments support change (perhaps revolutionary) at the 25 is part of Northern philosophical the colonialism the that - imperialism North - from the too Antipodes willing the successor suffers, or, to more remarkable, encourages! Secondly, there is the inappropriateness of much of the Northern product, especially considered as metaphysics, environmental for package, a to cover, well as as The European North has no satisfactory concerns. land or environmental ethic instance, fit for Antipodean circumstances, and the deeper American package is too spiritually-loaded for mainstream Australian culture. In political American work is much too individualistic the European product, especially the Marxist form, and competition-based, unsuited being theory, both too precious and too high-tech for local and is circumstances, especially again for more environmentally-perceptive people. features of telling also Thirdly, import world’s markets power structures against substitution and pressures and comparative advantage, regionalism; namely, and fashions, (including the Old Boy’s are appealing avoidance of the removal of overseas control and network in jobs, policies, etc.), and gaining of local control, employment of local people, etc. Fourthly, there arguments are philosophy as complexity, sheer diversity, part of intellectual stability, for cultural culture: 39 etc. “ diversity, arguments In fact, from applied to richness, the garden analogy 31 The point is elaborated in Culture. At a more practical level Northern products are again often unsuitable, though for different reasons. For example, the transfer of American agricultural methods and equipment to the thin poor soils of the Antipodes has had disastrous effects, at last beginning to be recognised. “See, for instance, A.A. Mazrui, A World Federation of Cultures: An African Perspective, Free Press, New York, 1976. 26 built into the whole notion of ’culture' transfers. dense, But not only seeds and plants but weeds and many productive garden. pests are We being introduced. and European and are control obtain not only good products, European pests cultivars, but selectiveness Naturally we want a rich, Indian maize and American weeds. as essential, against This is why haphazard previous procedures. The proposal with local is not for, nor would the case sustain, a narrow localism, products, whatever local their quality, heroes, replacing Northern ones. fashions, and local cult That is certainly not the preferred way of the newer regionalism, which tends to do without fashions and heroes and seeks durable quality in products, way of technology policy. which are difference, has to outlets, be not occupied impact, and so on; low environmental Rather, as with technology policy, we select niches satisfactorily or where filled, given etc.). our resource But granting regionalism, base (of we can make a Indeed the policy and use and develop local skills and methods. selective nor is the philosophers, publishing to what extent should components, for instance people, books and other teaching elements, theories and ideas, be imported and Locally? The to what extent should they be produced, trained, conceived possibility of selectiveness in different components means that many mixes are possible. particular mix. There is no need to insist, so far at least, on a The case for the present is mainly for a regional shift, for a significantly greater degree of local autonomy and production.^ But it will do no harm to indicate elements of a mix that finds much Does it sound familiar? Outside philosophy, it should. For example, we have now been told by the Americans that our defence role, unlike theirs, is regional, not global: this is supposed to shed great light on our previously confused defence policies. 27 the suggestion is that we try to eradicate much of Negatively, local favour. the Oxford style of teaching and doing philosophy. as removal Berkeley-Hume with (a however prevailing undue the of no standard on British focus); attention proper status Anglo-American empiricism British emphasis to quo. That includes such things of of heavy The particular, has mostly been a very conservative one. the movements main philosophy, but from emanating also the England, protective of the Northern status quo; they are, recommend and this. just reinforcement Oxford Locke- approach the of in influence, More generally, many of especially Moore-Wittgenstein on quasi-historical the sources; centred practice, ordinary have language been very they tend to leave things very much as the Positively, proposal is that we achieve further disassociation from the Anglo-American empiricist past in two ways: by framework, emphasizing and by local projects diversifying the that move range outside of constricting that philosophical traditions selectively drawn upon, to include not only neglected Continental strands and parts of Eastern thought, philosophy. The idea is but also that Pacific ethnic such a material and plurality of sources, Australasian especially in teaching, will assist in removing narrower cultural biasses, such as British parochialism, and enable more discrimination to be obtained. Then too we should be better able to see the ranges of theories that are open to us in the Antipodes and how to advance our own programs. 34 The point is laboured in E. Gellner, Words and Things, Victor Gollancz, London, 1959. But even ordinary language philosophy, though conservative, and though it much contracted the proper range of philosophical investigations, had its liberating elements, e.g. removal of some of the narrowness and more cramping assumptions induced by technical jargon. Nor has the social impact changed much with the subsequent decline, since 1959, of ordinary language philosophy, the increasing insolvency of Oxbridge philosophy, and its consequent limited take-over by right-wing Ivy League American philosophy. By contrast, the less economically influential growth of redbrick and applied philosophy in some of the British radical and polytechnic institutes has touched no more than the surface of Oxbridge practice. 28 There remain some things we should want to see whatever mixes are chosen One crucial issue is the removal of Northern in different Antipodean regions. bias from papers and publications, research seminars and lectures, letters of This Northern bias is a disposition to cite and discuss reference, and so on. the and works of irrespective discussion projects and of quality the ignore to authors, Northern of their contribution works the more the of irrespective of the quality of their contribution. accept opinions of worth, their been (thus Influential philosophers, under topic largely again It is etc. to uncritically and the disposition to though work produced locally either does not exist or has write or lecture as not importance, better, It is the disposition to to authors from prestigious Northern institutions, defer the to authors, local the famous are, ensuring anything, if that it inclined more is not). And Northern to Australasian bias than many overseas intellectuals, who are perhaps less concerned to be seen as belonging to the Northern mainstream. bias effects not The reduction, and eventual removal, of Northern practice the only of individual philosophers, but the policies of selection and review committees as well as of editors and referees of It journals. local reorientation, with innovations better, development - involves, among Antipodean philosophers things so they that can would cite be getting local assisted things, other work by intellectual to know local work and out regional or point greater local content in courses taught, more time spent at local institutions on study leave, and so on. APPENDIX 1. Background notes on the philosophy supply situation. Sociological investigation of the philosophy labour market in Australia and New Zealand has yet to be attempted. But a picture of some elements underlying the numerical argument of the text can be gained from the following table: simple 29 TABLE 1. Ph.Ds in Philosophy: a USA - Australasian comparison USA Number (Male/Female) Australia New Zealand 1974 413 (346/67) 6 0 1975 375 (318/57) 5 0 1976 382 (319/63) 8 0 1977 330 (264/66) 3 2 (1/1) 1978 283 (235/43) 5 5 (4/1) 1979 285 (204/54) 9 3 (2/1) 1980 246 (187/59) 4 N. A. 1981 N.A. 4 0 Notes: 1. The breakdown of the USA and New Zealand numbers by sexes (male/female) is given. Similar figures do not appear to be available for Australia. 2. The US figures are. for the academic year ending in the Year shown, e.g. 1978 covers the Northern academic year 1977-78. Southern figures are for the calendar year shown. Sources: Digest of Education Statistics, US National Center for Education Statistics; University Statistics, Australian Bureau of Census Statistics; New Zealand Education Statistics. Comments: 1. The contraction of US doctoral production and the concomitant rise in female representation, are clearly indicated. The Australian figures are likely too small to reflect such trends and responses to the academic market. 2. Some of the Australasian numbers include Americans; likewise the American figures provide no nationality breakdown. 3. There is no information available on the number of Australians proceeding to higher degrees in philosophy outside Australia. In applying table 1 some simplifying assumptions are made. assumed that candidates for appointment For example, it is to regular university positions now would have a doctorate or the equivalent (until recently a B.Phil was taken as a near well). equivalent It is of a assumed, North what American seems to Ph.D.; take publications the case, that serve as the number of could 30 Australasians proceeding to higher degrees in philosophy abroad is relatively small, and no more than the order of Ph.Ds. taken locally. It can be assumed, without upsetting applications of table 1, that Australasian graduates match, say, the upper half of American graduates in standard attained. There is no compiled information on academic vacancies in philosophy in Australia or New Zealand - on the numbers of vacancies, on how the positions It would however be a routine, are filled, by what nationalities, sexes, etc. if matter tedious some of assemble to data, this is of considerable which relevlance to the planning of philosophy programs. APPENDIX 2. On the earlier considering the Editor of the idea of a National of possibility initial German distinction a National AJPP distinguished two between Weltanschauung and Philosophy for Australia. Philosophy’, the (Australian) corresponding senses In Lebensanchauung’ to (p.292). 'the In the first, that of ’a scheme of the universe’, ’an Australian Philosophy is as as ridiculous confirmation prejud ices’. Holland, personal’ Science’. falsification, or Granted: fostered, etc ., in Christian a ’are The is argument of independent truth, that national and sympathies its or but that does not mean that a theory may not be held, in one region but not others, as intuitionism was for long in or way, Cartesianism ’a nation in France. like an In a second individual may ’more develop intimate a and certain temperamental attitude to the problems of existence, which we may ... call its philosophy of life. A nation’s philosophy, like its art and its literature, is a mode of expression for the national consciousness. form of evolving the national genius national culture. ....’ But, (pp.292-3). in the first It is, place, It is a specialised in short, this is part of the by no means entirely separate from the initial sense, a philosophy comprising not merely a fairly comprehensive theory but also an integrated set of attitudes (like an 31 operational paradigm). Furthermore, only by concession are such items as ’the national consciousness’ and 'the Australian landscape’ of meriting definite Australian descriptors. literature, has many strands to it, accounted single units philosophy, Australian like some not particularly distinctive (in any sense): such things form rather loose families. Editor The does not find, does not really hope to in find ’a modern industrialised community’ - with its modular parts interchangeable with those of others - a claims find to and courage a fair trite life, with a difference. build on (’traditions but nothing at all distinctive. philosophy of national moral dealing’), base to In fact ... of humour, So far, be a national philosophy, at least of life, but is not; there can he then, this does not however exclude there being various regional philosophies (such as local research programs). plunged that into ’if So far, inconsistency: then, the all is well. trouble derives But shortly from the the Editor is extravagant claim Australia has nothing to do with these - the eternal values of the Spirit, the Ideals of Truth, Goodness and Beauty - then and only then has she nothing to do with Philosophy’ (p.295; with rearrangement). But, as Australia has nothing per se to do with these - as is virtually conceded, these values involving a 'wider sweep’ do with Philosophy, Though the than any national boundaries - "she" has nothing to contradicting the contradiction is easily possibility of avoided by a National Philosophy. the extravagant rescinding claim, the ideal of a National Philosophy should be allowed to rest in peace: nationalism has had its time. 32 R. Routley35 Research School of Social Sciences Australian National University 35 With thanks to R. Elliot, W. Godfrey-Smith, S. Grave and L. Mirlin, to several members of the audience at the presentation of the paper at the 1983 Australasian Association of Philosophy Conference, University of Adelaide, to several referees for this Journal, and, not least, to the present Editor. t •r ■ PROSPECTS FOR REGIONAL PHILOSOPHIES IN AUSTRALASIA Philosophy, especially academic philosophy but also folk philosophy, like other intellectual and higher cultural activity in Australasia, has long been dominated, indeed Europe, now the largely swamped, by Northern Given increasingly from North America. cultural and other baggage the imported, influences, initially the migration patterns, composition ethnic resulting ruling populations, such a result was virtually inevitable. does not have to stay that way. from of the But it Suitable policies, a good philosophy policy, could change things. thought The of a is hardly a new one. culture, In 1923, a matching perhaps philosophy, regional regional a New Zealand correspondent to the newly-launched Australasian Journal of Psychology and Philosophy mentioned the possibility of ’a new kind or temper of philosophy under these southern skies’ which the such a reaching Journal might role (or, not community). for merely And that matter, professional although however hardly The Journal has foster.1 actively philosophers some things solid foundation for a new regionalism its pursued have changed pronounced aim wider a but in Australia, in philosophy, and temper of southern skies were intended distinctively 1AJPP, March same volume, Appendix 2. New Zealand 1923, p.74. p.292.ff; his philosophy under to include: but characteristics, The question was discussion is laying a that possibility of a New Zealan few distiri have of Australasian new temper of philosophy has hardly been realised. There is of a new kind fulfilled shown up le in the way ies, which the y features, ’ no in New Zealand taken up by the Editor in the considered below, especially in 2 7 philosophy’. New Zealand remains a substantial net importer of philosophy, The situation of colonial dominance that used to prevail in and philosophers. Australia, where virtually chairs, all and many philosophy, were filled by academics from the North, power and influence of professors in small departments, and covered considered and in tends to persist in New Zealand, where no established chairs are occupied by locals.2 3 topics posts academic other Given the usual in courses designed, especially appointments made, the heavy Northern orientation of philosophy taught and researched in New Zealand is not The Northern control is perhaps most strikingly exhibited at the surprising. oldest of New Zealand universities, the University of Otago, where the Philosophy Department has been substantially captured by a British School and increasingly looks event, the like an offshoot of overwhelming Anglo-American the University of London.4 dominance of New Zealand In any philosophy also a feature only in slightly lesser degree of Australian philosophy - can be confirmed by a content survey of the courses offered and research papers written at New Zealand universities. Even when local people have been appointed to positions in Australasia, they have been brought up on a solid diet of Anglo-American material, and they have often been reforged or finished in the North as well. * In particular, the 2 S.A. Grave, A History of Philosophy in Australia, Queensland University Press, 1983, p.l. Page references are to the manuscript. The paper draws heavily on this history. 3 This claim was correct at the 1983). With the recent loss of qualification, but the pattern of 4In the 1983 presentation of the paper (August Wellington, the claim may require mination persists. Commonwealth University Handbook listing, 6 of the 8 members of the Department held their main degree, Ph.D., from -the London/?and one of the remainder from. Exeter). Only one member of the Department, soon to retire, falls outside me nexus. 3 requirements of the Australasian universities in the major period of post­ World War II expansion were conveniently seen to in the case of philosophy by Many degree. B.Phil. the Oxford of departments philosophy remain full of products of this cultural mill: indeed until the mid 70s candidates finished in Oxford were hard to beat out when they applied for positions, such was the prestige of Oxford and (unwarranted) the regrettable, but still continuing, "cultural cringe". Nonetheless, in been occurring scene will (as despite the Northern the Antipodes, be especially on indicated). significant dominance, worth is It changes have the Australian philosophical asking whether Australian philosophy is moving towards the sort of change that occurred in USA more than 100 years ago when the Harvard Philosophy Department was brought (or bought) together, its "golden and age" began.American philosophy was never quite the same again, and became its own thing. There are now new forces operating which could help to move Australian philosophy in such a direction. the widespread emergence, particularly in alternative There is culture, of choice along a new £ which regionalism, other choices; local fashioning provides applies of a national model for and to in cultural stark science reflection and in and ideological contrast, technology regional there policies, philosophy directly bears on parts of the philosophy of science. soon appear, there are also some is serious obstacles the with centralised which not only policy but also Unfortunately, as will to regional philosophies and to the very idea of a regional philosophy. ^See B. Kuklick, The Rise of American Philosophy; Cambridge, Massachusetts 1860-1930, Yale University Press, 1977, Parts 2 and 3. On this bio-regionalism, see especially, Fourth World News, vol. 1, and K. Sale, Human Scale, Coward, McCann and Geoghegan, New York, 1980. 1983, USA, long an importer of culture from Europe, has recently become a net components of philosophical following not culture, taken). suit, should evidently but Are reasons there achieve not also the gAmerican (witness philosophy has Oxford from output lower of such as higher culture if Australasia, balance of certainly culture, of exporter a better turn why cultural Yes, there are reasons. payments, especially in philosophy? of In the first place, the change in the cultural position of the USA went with, and perhaps in part derived economic of most dominance entails Australasia’s changes in economic power relations. from, vast there is cultural dominance, culture, there since is little prospect serious no prospect If for that Australasia will ever emulate or attain American economic eminence (at least not without nuclear destruction of the North, flow of commodities, cultural and other). universities not only increasingly of of contingent Americans, former group, Northern cultural they. As priorities, a they also component include whose research of Northern academics, substantial a and teaching additional is bent to It is unlikely that this influential segment, especially (become so will commitments, long entire Secondly, as observed, Antipodean large fellow-travellers, Northern concerns. the contain and disruption of the as apart Antipodeans they are in a bind locally acclimatised do from the not situation; isolated drastically as to) give up Nor person. alter their its should cultural for it can be persuasively argued that they would be better off, as far as quality and product goes, stocking their universities with American teaching components and researching American- oriented concerns. One simple numerical argument that Antipodean universities would be better off with Americans in the main, takes the following lines:- The (higher degree) graduates of Australasian culturally distinguished, and American are not significantly at least in subjects such as philosophy. Consider now number the of quality Austroamerican graduates; academics produced of per number degree higher say there is 1 per every n graduates. The (great) preponderance of graduates will be Americans, just by virtue of their vastly greater population and their more extensive system of university education.7 So also then, just by ratio considerations, the great preponderance of quality academics from an drawn upper percentiles among they interested universities. Austroamerican base an Such would argument appointing be does not as will Clearly, Antipodeans, those quality products. quality, in will be American, work to more show Americans that, for to the were their similar reasons, American universities should be full of Chinese or Indian professors, for two Asians reasons; and first Americans, there are especially significant in cultural differences disciplines such as between philosophy; and secondly, their university systems do not deliver such great quotas of higher degree or high quality graduates, at least in philosophy. The conclusion of the numerical argument will not be a popular one. anti-Americanism felt the universities; The in portions of the Australasian community extends into and recently there has been increasing insistence, especially by the now aging younger Turks that university positions should be reserved for locals. This at the same time as these Turks often preach of an international community of scholars, presumably then with "free" interchange, As indicated in Appendix 1, whereassumptions made in the argument are . defended, the ratio of US philosophy graduates with doctorates as compared with Australian exceeds 30 to 1. And, as is weM-known, the extent of university education is much greater in USA than! in Australasia: indeed Australia is in this respect among the worst edlated of the developed nations, as OECD figures have made plain (see, e.g. Jb. Jones, Sleepers Wake^^ Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 1982, Chapter I I J / > 6 etc. They cannot have it all ways.3 So long continues, the present centre will as the dominate they will have more economically; them if large to free-flow than us, and and culturally periphery the ideas of interchange personnel well as as should go by and jobs here (centrally-determined) quality in this high cultural it is business that we seek, as mostly claim. Now anyway, it is there that arguments. For enough widely is we are recognised, something not lower-down drastically wrong hierarchical with these ladders sorts of flooded with high-quality Northerners who would regularly drive out local contenders for positions, if we only preferred the Northerners when they were quite visibly superior: rather we are inundated by Americans with inflated references, who have the messages of the centre better than locals echelon do, (often and remote Northern fields tend Northern biassed) appointment to look greener to higher- committees than dusty locals As is beginning to be recognised too, whose shortcomings are known better. the Northern centres tend to retain their higher-quality products, and allow them to be exiled to the periphery only if they somehow fall foul of system (e.g. of the academic system for political or personal reasons). 8A reverse flow of the better or the Too //K odox academics from Australasia to A Leica should also be expected (outside mes of university contraction). Acci yrding _____d argument, which is based on labour] larket to assumptions of this brain considerations, appointment and lifestyle conditions for academics arej etter in USA than Australia and much better than those in economically—depressed New jhejr salaries, better standard of living, superio Zealand (e.g. high' research conditions, etc.) things being £equal, able academic from the Antipodes will rel;||jBate in USA as academic positions become avai ble. The argument also help^^xplain why Antipodean ui 'versifies cannot ex :, for the most part, to attract really top-drawer Nojrt Nortl srners for very long.'T' Of course, economically illy irrelevant irrele factors do in^Tu® interference; e.g. perverse t«gTua itsl to oddJball Antipodean intellectual enterprises which reduce commitment -ceLtabilit*^ or pre-industrial ties to place or persons or lifestyle market acc which imsmulaiS-y L_ _ restrict mobility (such as local roots, family attachments, even distaste for American urban lifestyles). 7 often Northern the centres have disposed of intellectually their inferior products in the periphery. All this makes the especially Americans, Northerners, appointing position look doubly bad. We ought, it seems, to be even if they are overrated their references, and usually not out of the top drawer, And yet quality. in in order to maximize doing so does not achieve the desired quality result, and breeds discontent elsewhere, especially among the aging Turks. Fortunately there obtain cultural sufficient subtitutable for us. we before from this awkward and that is the way of regionalism. shaky arguments; and way out is a elaborate distance,so that situation and these We do our own things; they are not simply Then the shaky numerical argument does fall down. the emerging proposal there are other But influential arguments to dispose of, and the disposal bears on the proposal. to begin with, There is, have so far been conceded: the argument for excellence, that excellence, which we all more or elements of which there is an objective commodity, quality or less agree about, which is proportionately more abundant in the North, and which is what academic institutions crave and seek and what appointments aim to capture, indeed maximize. That at least is the type of myth most of us have encountered; and many of us now know it is a myth, in fact appointments profit, but a that dangerous way, rather seek any myth. more Most that places don’t organisations aim even try just to to make maximize to satisfice on a mix of factors, of which assessed quality is only one, and not often the highest ranking one. Ability to fit ^This is easier in the cultural than the technological sphere. However it is also possible technologically: (stronger) theses of technological determinism, and so of cultural determinism, are false. We can choose different options, technologically, as well as culturally. 8 into some sort of program, teaching or research, is another, and commonly more important factor; is no good reason why such a program should not and there sometimes be a regionally oriented one. So given prevailing practices, the And, argument from excellence does not exclude regional philosophy programs. in any event, there are enough local candidates of sufficient worth to proceed with regional programs clearcut without of/ excellence. sacrifice Local Jl enterprise need entail no loss of excellence, and could increase it. A The deeper-cutting with idea the objection is that there is something seriously amiss objective of objective importance; criticism as bracketed out notions the that excellence, these with more values contextual—relativisation a rather generally, component paradigm, intellectual narrow the to framework or viewpoint to which these values relate.10 within connected the open are notions objective of and of sorts of same they that of notion have the valuing: While those operating as such Oxbridge ordinary language philosophy or Sydney materialism say, can bracket out the viewpoint, since it is incorporated in the operational paradigm, and so arrive at seemingly objective quality judgements, the judgements are not preserved (e.g. in truth Marxist value) when viewpoints. transposed Consider, to for other frameworks, comparison, the e.g. idealistic judgements as to or the quality or worth of a forest^made variously by a deep ecologist, an industrial forester, and a recreational officer. a holistically-inclined Marxist, and philosophers Californian who pretend Compare judgements as to the quality of philosopher, environmental environmental that such by philosophers. environmental work language, ordinary There cannot are be even judged, hat follows also> Begins to bring out what is omitted in a main theme of R.S.JPirsig, _______ Zen and __ , d/e Art Motor Cycle Maintenance, Bodley H^lad , London, __ of — ---— the notion of objective excellence doe , Note that defSwring not lead to ivism. To avoid the customary false dichotomy, compare e notion of validity (usually ceded to themselves these days by classical lo cians). cw 9 seemingly because it of the main philosophical by members is not done peer group at Harvard and like institutions. As this begins the of judgements to reveal, judgements importance work of of quality are not independent of done or problems tackled. importance of problems and issues is highly paradigm dependent. the But For example, problems suet/ as those of quantifying-in and of possible worlds and of de re thought^ ^ich assume immense importance for fashionable referential theories within the mainstream empiricist paradigm, vanish to relative insignificance outside that restricted viewpoint. that most Now observe judgements as to what are the important problems and what constitutes important work - matters helping determine quality - are shipped down from the North. Their importance is relative to their paradigmatic placement, and the paradigms concerned are exported to the Antipodes through the main channels already indicated. We are free to reject these paradigms and select alternatives, and there are, it can be argued, good reasons choose different that generally energy favoured just that, much as to do technology the in (or different the which North there are good reasons to military technology) North is eager to from export southwards. Similar which might argument, points apply against alternatively that be sophisticated mass-produced and cosmopolitan. The argument 'cosmopolitan subject’, called people -marketed the from is based cosmopolitan/international the Peter everywhere Holland; Stuyvesant smoke this argument international superior product cigarette-sophistication is on the assumption that philosophy is a that is is not the sort of enterprise for which place 10 and people are as significant they are for poetry or that philosophy important thing, is a finished product of a certain sort (a propositional theory), not a process of production also. process of production the place and people involved (e.g. material. And and literature, the if not since no philosophy, format, 12 than more work a like theorems just internationally-approved is product The novel. It takes for granted, assumption has only to be presented to be questioned. for one the and of art, But in the in discussion) are like a piece assembled arguments in of an then again the historical setting matters, literature, does not emerge in a vacuum. Plato’s philosophy could not have emerged in ancient Australia, and if cribbed & 13 in mid 20th century Oxford would surely have been marked down or rejected. It is important not to be sidetracked into issues - resembling problems in aesthetics - that do not need to be contested, such as whether and what extent sets of themes and arguments produced in one place and setting could have been produced in another. A nonnuclear technology of some sort could be adopted in Europe but apparently will not be, whereas there is reasonable prospect that New Zealand, strategy. ^Grave, in It is contrast with the doing, op.cit., p.2: Australia, will and not what could the term pursue a be done, ’cosmopolitan subject’ nonnuclear energy that matters here. used there comes from Donegan. As to the significance of place and people for literature, see further C. Partridge, The Making of New Cultures, Editions Rodopi, Amsterdam, 1982. xz,Like a paper in the biological sciences. But here again technique methodology, which may both be regional, are crucially important. 1 3 Related and points can be made using less extreme examples, e.g. concerning modern American work. Consider, for instance such texts as W.V. Quine’s Word and Object, (Wiley, New York, 1960) or R. Nozick*s Anarchy, State and Utopia (Basic Books, New York, 1974). The assumptions taken for granted, the arguments involved, etc., are especially American: it is not just the style. The acceptability of arguments and positions is dependent on place and received paradigm. 11 logic, Dialethic which invalidates Anglo-American philosophy, the could perhaps technique and methodology of in the North (though be done much there would be substantial cultural resistance): it is not being done there, and is not likely Antipodeans techniques, to be in choose can do done the their Anglo-American own their own distinctive sphere.^ distinctive thing. The To technology this extent, and logical international/cosmopolitan argument, stated in a form that would be telling, fails. Of course it can be argued, it is being argued, that Antipodeans don’t need to be, or even oughtn’t to be pursuing their own energy or logic policies and apparatus. But meeting these considerations takes us to a whole new set of issues concerning the merit of various policies and programs, the point of diversity, etc. - far beyond the cosmopolitan argument. The new arguments, to which we shall return, are not a lot more convincing however than comparable arguments concerning cooking: that we don’t devising our own cuisine or wine styles. need to be or oughtn’t to be British, or at least cosmopolitan, cooking is adequate: we should stick to that and buy it off the shelf from the North, ideally importing the cooks also. Do we that British philosophy is have good reasons to think than British cooking? Antipodeans are free^in principle^ then, to pursue their own paradigms; and to do so they will by and large want to, and mostly have to, appoint their own people, people they have educated - not saboteurs or people who have (had ) to be re-educated, from el where, in particular from the North. But will •^Much as co communities the extreme nist anarchism, a live possibility for communes and perhaps Australia, is culturally excluded in North America, owing to ndividualism of that culture. On dialethic logic, see G. Priest and R. Routley, On Paraconsistency, Research Papers in Logic, #13, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University, 1983. 12 paradigms^, tie their intellectual of features the cultur local though works of with cultural In a loose way, philosophy wi not usually with paradigms, least, at distinctive they may link, tie in with the culture in the _______ ____ z sometimes distinct from_______________ more technical works) integral fashion that novels A> a. /sn-X'etL do.^ Grave considers certain cultural features, not restricted to particular programs, philosophical Australian product’ help that in philosophy Australia as ’ an - ’unimportant though this is compared with what matters But style, acceptability, truth, do matter, in philosophy' he hastens to add. and are mark not independent - or independent so far as their perception goes in the case of truth and correctness15 - from underlying broad theory or received paradigm. However the marks Grave cautiously advances, significant though they are, do not features serve to distinguish the philosophy Australian Australian exhibits in the product, lesser degree adventurous and polemical philosophy of Greek antiquity. by Passmore as 'most typical first two than the being more The first, described of Australian philosophy’, is a ’diversity of approach and readiness to put forward an unconventional or unfashionable point view',1^ of philosophy, something which more (with typical some of notable ancient philosophy exceptions) than exhibits uniformity reflecting that often attributed to the land itself. Australian an austere The second, 15Nothing need be conceded to trong cultural relativity themes, ough they would support the case L Iia L tour '/is enough that theories remain radically _ y bei incomplete and that there/^/^n accordingly b rival theories as what is is true. Similarly, however^ phy is j concaved ~as the sea or truth, seian/Mrore, really), or a explanation, uifierstanding^ these inquiry of a certain sort^Fthere can bez45^will be be, ^/competing accounts; so a pluralistic theory is inevitable in giving a fuller view. 1 Both preceding quotations, while included as such in Grave’s Introduction, are from J. Passmore, ’Philosophy', in The Pattern of Australian Culture (ed. A.L. McLeod), Cornell University Press, Ithaca, N.Y., 1963, pp.131-168. The same annotation also applies to the third mark. Ke surprising, more and ’the philosophy, Wittgensteinian mark most notable political extraordinary by discussed Andersonian itself’ (p.2). ... being This the example is line-up it was far from if Sydney, Australian between the not isolated: them concern the fervour generated by "Australian materialism", others among the .. example and Melbourne Andersonian philosophy of character’ Grave), engagement and by some philosophy departments confrontation growing the (both concerning the relevant/paraconsistent program, with the local (’adversarial’) style leading to criticism by sharp Americans. with Connected these firs two marks are . —■--------------- ------ furthe part. of much characteristics Australian Aiilosophy y(^ho for hat influenced by jSydney rather than originating in Melb the most namely directness, unwillingne to muffle points, surface clarity /occj/ unkindly add, untne , unsubtjety and crudity.> The third and t A fourth marks as Grave i effect notes, hardly distinguishing features of Australian philosophy. areas, is third, which applies well to other intellectual the contrast of the Australian reputation in philosophy indeed of Australia as national The a ’center of philosophical inquiry’, with the anti-intellectual stereotype achievement Australians than rather especially a of feature of as intellectual to a people subtlety’. Anglo-American philosophy; ’devoted The namely physical to fourth the mark is isolation of academic philosophy in Australasia from, and its general indifference or even hostility to, the sort of imported philosophy (e.g. that of Nietzsche and the existentialists) generating interest in literary and arts circles. The philosophy failure does of not marks such matter. sufficiently separated by its For to adequately one thing, separate the research projects. out Australian For another, Australian produce is regionalism should not be confused with nationalism, nor more regional positions such as Sydneyside materialism or Wellington modalism with national philosophies. 14 as in mojjt other things, Nationalism in philoso^iy, to not be encouragedand the new regionalism is an undesirable trait, is linked, in other cultural things, with the breakdown of nations and contraction of state power. * To get back * * to where we were: * * the emerging proposal is this, that we start - or better much increase - doing our own distinctive things, and that we team up to do In fact so. there are several suggestions that begin to emerge, concerning research and teaching, publications and appointments, study leave and sponsored visitors. These are not just that we do our own selection of topics and people, and style and methods, decide instead of having these foisted upon us - not just, our own priorities, that is, that we play our own games (whether invented here or taken over from the North) and not theirs, Rules and Rugby instead of Gridiron and Basketball - but that we abandon the individual competitive model of cultural achievement, sold to us and fostered by the North, in favour of a group cooperative approach (elements of which are already modelled in Antipodean social clubs). The thoughts here are simple and familiar. digging example: it is well-known that two people cooperating can dig a ditch more rapidly and enjoyably 17 See, e.g., London, 1957. On the one side is the ditch­ Sale, than two op.cit., people working on the ditch separately. and L. Kohr, The Breakdown of Nations, RKP, The Editor of the new 1923 AJPP did however take seriously the notion of National Philosophy, of (what must have surprised some New Zealand readers) an Australian Philosophy; some of the issues there raised (p.292ff) are addressed in Appendix 2. 15 Cooperative work tends to pay off - in philosophy or elsewhere - in terms of output, quality, and enjoyment in the doing. On the other side, experience shows that we in the periphery cannot individually complete very successfully with the centre on achievements in their programs. predominantly individualistic the in Despite the highly competitive One is the communication situation. for this. attainment nature of results of depends There are several reasons American academic enterprise,much upon verbal rapid and communication For, despite the individualism myth, work is access to unpublished material. jointly based, and builds on the work of manyji^hen the time is ripe for some idea or result, several clever people will be able to hit on it. communications are nationalistic important considerations in obtaining rapid (e.g. Poles tend publication of to promote Then again the Polish idea or results, Russians will cite a Russian who achieves a result at about the same time as an outsider). There face-to-face seminars fact of when limited read they is the fact that much is conveyed verbally and through so that and that reading, on local results will be conveyed. material from people at the the centre centre by There is the tend to concentrate central people, so that published items and results from the periphery will often not be noticed, and may well lose publication. receive, 18 merit out There to is central also for merit, competitors the more fact that publication even if people they at the achieve centre and communication central tend to opportunities Reflecting other features of the culture and enterprise of the centre which are not so deeply embedded in Australasia: see further R. Routley, ’Culture, philosophy, and approaches to the natural environment - an Australian perspective’, in The Environment, Ethics and Ecology (Ed. D. Bennett), The Faculties, Australian National University, 1984, and also ’Culture and the roots of political divergence: the Australian/American contrast’, typescript, Canberra, 1983; both referred to subsequently as ’Culture’ . 16 than people towards the periphery. the size and Here economic factors do begin to enter;, distribution of the academic market e.g., a great (there are, many more academic phzilosophe s in North America than in the whole rest of the world), control of outlets and journalj^ (with few exceptions all Northern)^etc. economic power does and not, not, need determine culture - we can shut off the Northern philosophical propaganda in much the way we shut off our television sets if we really want to. stop being impressed by And we can those philosophical middle-men who make a living by importing the Northern stuff. So what do we do? We adapt to the cultural-philosophical level, several h of those things, that have been suggested in the regionalism. We aim at some A regional importers awakening and doctrines and and local imitators positions of, from self-reliance. and local the North. We do commentators For on example , we slavish remain not and peddlars don’t spend of, our academic lives trying to tease out what Davidson or Dummett or Kripke meant by this or that through. To in the hope that be sure, I am some pale Northern light will perhaps not suggesting that emulate the filter appalling 17 But, des xLte having been given sufficient cause, we shouldn’t cut ourselves off 'from Northern paradigms and influences (we could hardly manage A anyway). to We A traditions: use what we need these from continuing o we should stay informed of, but not imitators of, or part of, In enterprises. their reasonably can just as Northern traditions, from cutting from loose case, any regional are rooted in the people are largely European stock. these traditions and (and likely minority) traditions, these older cultures older So far starting afresh from nowhere, and the local variations that have already appeared are what we want to develop and perhaps mutate, as again with wine styles. of Part the proposal then is that encourage and develop our own things, Antipodean paradigms, Northern paradigms. rather It we research programs, very great Nor, the locaY and so shape nefer is not as if we have to build from nothing, to do to try to create cultural For there are research programs already initiated, which have the advantage of fortunately, future our own than working with pale northern reflections of - what is very difficult - entirely original work, components. do increasingly is being grounded in features of the larger culture. do we need to make the story up - though helping to shape part of what the Australia - New Zealand proposal is about. Much of is a different and more difficult already indicated in Grave’s survey of Australian philosophy. the story, for proposition - is All one really has to do is to bring out programs he has already indicated and provide some elaboration and commentary. level, I shall To pull the investigation down to a more concrete fooyxizci/li/esketch some more prominent programs - by no means the only A programs - and remark on some relevant features of them. 19 See Culture, op.cit. 18 The longest running and best known program is, without much doubt, of Australian naturalism, and which aims see to the that world, natural and everything else, as suitably encompassed within the framework of the world of science. (physical) The as generally is subprogram Sydney materialism, a major Adelaide which subsequently died out there. such famous components central state version of failures in to Anderson’s functionalism and nowadays like Faced reduction in The latter program has included takes all now it plans, it It program initiated a identity theme as the mental-material contingent materialism, its back traced and is now best exhibited in Armstrong’s work. empiricist metaphysics, contains program and more derivatively, in, with physicalisms incorporates a conspicuous "scientifically" a trimmed theory of universals, and an account/of natural laws as relations of universals, both components of the develop®®^ Sydney reali naturalism program, sm. Parts of the especially materialism and central state reductionism and the unified science ideal, have had counterparts in the North, but the program l^s, for the most part, retained its distinctively Austr^/ian character /(“despite export efforts, it never caught on in New Zealand^7 The program fits smoothly, moreover, and earthy, so into Australian culture. far as It is similarly down-to-earth, philosophy can be, without the fancy ideas or effete idealism of European philosophy or the spirituality and suppressed puritanism with which pragmatism). commitments, much of And and North yet though it it American does thinking not shrink (including simmers from is basically empiricist, explicit it is not nowadays, metaphysical positivistic (rejecting a verification principle, in particular). 20 Anderson’s metaphysics was however far more opposed to reductions than what has succeeded it. For an account of Anderson’s philosophy, and a history and account op.cit. of Australian naturalism and materialism, see especially Grave, 19 It is a city program, based broadcast from mainly the University of Sydney to other metropolitan universities; but the program does extend outside the universities a bit (a tiny bit) to the larger metropolitan culture. North America, the broader Russell, so in Australasia, little professional philosophy impinges on community, Popper and 21 naturalism program Perth, and has outliers from notable used even on being quite would be or Kuhn Australasia Apart As in to an the wider academic community, exceptional. achievement, stretch through one (To turn worth to Adelaide; in around this working work by for.) The it now reaches to in Canberra, as well as a core of opposition there. exceptions, the program has never had the more than a rather precarious hold, same hold, or nor, more surprisingly, in Melbourne: has it had heavyweight criticism from there (or indeed much external criticism from elsewhere), out. the old confrontation of major city philosophies having died Melbourne philosophy is more historically oriented stricken than Sydney; Melbourne dominated Continental philosophy; by a procession philosophy; then, a of more remarkable and more religion philosophy, much more than Sydney, has Northern recently, turnabout, fashions: earlier Wittgenstein, Quine, idealism ordinary Davidson and been and language extensional reduction; now perhaps Lewis, Kripke and Dummett? 21 In Canada, for example, while most academics from other disciplines would know of, and perhaps a little about, Russell, far fewer would know of Wittgenstein (though he is becoming known to lit. crit. groups), and virtually none would know of Quine. (The sampling is subjective.) On the fairly recent ’triumph of professionalism’ in philosophy in USA, see Kuklick, op.cit., p.565ff. Kuklick brings out well some of the more disastrous features of professionalism, but does not sufficiently notice that the virtuous features resulting from some professionalisation can be synthesized with broader philosophical activity. 22 The exceptions Include Ellis’s distinctive program, which can be accounted part of the broader naturalist program, and at Monash the work of F. Jackson and, earlier, of H. Munro in value theory. 20 one The reaches that program beyond the of confines the cities in Australia - which is after all a metropolitan dominated culture, the vast land always the other being Australian environmentalism, is - a rather diffuse program, which has connections with the Colleges of Advanced Education in the country towns and the communes on the North Coast. So far the program is as much distinguished is. environmental Europe by what positions specifically feature of are a having not as is it it what the New World, most of transformed Serious deeper and the Old World, its natural environment and and having little wild untouched country left, and little sensitivity accordingly to such as issues Europe that tend admit those of to concern shallow outside environmentalism the built approaches superficiality European The main wilderness. continues North issues human-transformed environment, and (and environmental encourage techno-fix dominate to America. North issues situations). of much the New in And World environmentalism American differs significantly however from Antipodean environmentalism, most obviously in the religious-spiritual of component the former, but in several other respects as well (see further Culture). positively, More environmentalism:- Firstly, there there three are an is strands to extended utilitarianism, Australian/ differing little in theory from Bentham’s enlarged position, which insists upon counting) the utilities British base, movements: of all sentient creatures. This position, developed from a has figured prominently in animal welfare and animal liberation and though it has focussed on domestic animals, animals used in research and hunted (wild) animals, it has also become entangled in issues of bio-research more generally such as genetic engineering. concerned with, or much interested in, endangered species, It is not however the disappearance of wild lands, the conversion of forests, etc., except insofar as these have a bearing on animal pain and pleasure. Wider and deeper environmental concerns 21 appear only as a spinoff from animal welfare, inadequate deal. Secondly, there is a wider and a deeper ecological position, and so deeper concerns get an which is not utilitarian and which recognises irreducible value elsewhere than sentience or forests and differs natural systems. ecosystems, especially wild and from spiritualism American Thirdly, naturalism. there intrinsic value which finds psychological states, and of is from an course, extension almost as in trees and This position of American everywhere, a reactionary component, critical of the other strands, which insists that all that be to needs on accomplished the environmental can be front achieved within older established (European) ethical and political frameworks. Whereas materialism is based in Sydney, environmentalism is centred in Melbourne and Canberra, but also includes Brisbane and Perth. Also centred in Canberra, and reaching across the country, with good connections in Melbourne, but few in Sydney, materialism and further environmental input from relevant/paraconsistent affecting program program other hich the is major perhaps relevant/paraconsistent programs have and epistemology program areas of includes and which extends is their core value philosophy, centres a the with respectively, the logic especially in Whereas in metaphysics, theory essentially more program. program, but metaphysics Australia than any one The other to New Zealand, has also been described elsewhere. 23 It has been described more fully elsewhere: see, in particular, Environmental Philosophy (ed. D. Mannison and others), RSSS, Australian National University, 1980. o/ Again, like all the Australian programs, both those mentioned and others, in Grave, op.cit. But see further/ R. Routley, ’Research in Logic in Australia, New Zealand and Oceania’, Research Papers in Logic #14, Australian National University, 1983 (which alto considers other programs in logic); G. Priest and R. Routley, op. cit.^and R. Routley, R.K. Meyer and others, Relevant Logics and Their Rivals, Ridgeview, California, 1982. 22 The main research grounded logic program program. of the in New Zealand philosophy is also A program emanating located mainly in Wellington, The impact evident from the work of Prior and a now it might be called the extended modal program. program on philosophy is perhaps best seen in Cresswell's work.2 Australian philosophy used to be known, for its is in some quarters, regrettably New Zealand philosophy is mostly hard-headed empiricism; not known and still for anything much, except perhaps, in UK, that Prior brought unusual adaption of Russellian philosophy from that remote place. his Neither of these impressions is particularly accurate; both are rather out-of-date. But the alm of work of the present type is, of course, not just to correct these impressions, not just to reflect or report on culture - for what one would like to reflect upon is not sufficiently there - but also to help manufacture elements of a culture, to make an image. To resist the already flourishing North, we should increase our efforts to further the programs, and perhaps other sunrige projects;26 to build* 7 ,^fjee especially M.J. Cresswell, _&ics and ^.anguages, Methuen, London, 1973; but see also work by Goldblatt, rra by Hugtrfs--referred to in Research in Logic, op.cit. Also described i h ifi anvoriginal version of the modal program (transparent intensional logic) elaborated by Tichy at Otago. 7A °Among sunrise projects in Australian philosophy so far suggested (not all of them feasible) are these: Australian feminism, Antipodean social and political alternatives, peace studies, indigenous regional philosophies (especially Aboriginal, Melanesian, and Polynesian). Another promising field, with practical consequences, for local initiative is the philosophy of education, where material produced yby R.S. Peters has dominated the market, with stultifying effects it is now Alleged. y As foreshadowed with the notion, "sunrise projects", much of the rhetoric, and argument, concerning science and technology policy (presented in the case of Australia in Jones, op.cit.) can be taken over to apply to X policy, where X is some subject discipline, such as philosophy. A 23 teaching and research around the programs selected for promotion, elaboration, and criticism, to orient appointments, especially of involved local people, to Why not simply buy our philosophy, like almost Why bother? these programs. all our technology, off the shelf, from the North? There are several arguments for not doing this, in more than a limited fashion, which are now sketched/. ° is, There firstly, the inferiority and built-in obsolence of Northern A products, despite their attractive packaging. Without putting too fine a point on it, many of the imported intellectual goods are shoddy, and only work for a very limited range of applications vicinity of contradictions or dilemmas). philosophy undoubtedly derives from (e.g. they’re hopeless in the Much that is wrong with Antipodean shoddy intellectual goods imported from 27 In fact something like the last has been the polictf of the LSE Philosophy Department, where the only outside appointment over a Aong period was that of Lakatos (hardly a person far removed ideologically)/. As observed, it now looks like the practice of the Otago Department also; and apparently it used to be a tendency at Melbourne. But in most places the practice is condemned as nepotistic or parochial, and overridden by the call for "new (Northern) blood'. However there can be significant differences between nepotistic appointments and those strengthening local programs. It is at this for example, to rather than Northern stc/oges, rather than imported fashions, administrative details draconian, do matter; employment n-going local programs ious ways appropriate Observe^ that no Canadian style) or the like is being advocated. conclusion of that sort from what has been argued has misunderstood the in crucial respects. As a t matter of simple mathematics, appointment fields characteristically reduces both quality of available (however quality i assessed) range of possibilities open future research; d no s h restrictioi/s are advocated. The author witnessed the se times disastrous eff s of field restrictions at Australian National University. — Some of centre also. 2g ___ these arguments support change (perhaps revolutionary) at the 24 the North. Yet buying this material is by hard-sell encouraged ambassadors from the North, who are often enough paid to visit. of the philosophical imperialism from the North that colonialism - the Antipodes too willing cultural This is part the successor to Northern suffers, or, remarkable, more encourages! Secondly, there is the inappropriateness of much of the Northern product, especially considered as metaphysics, environmental a for package, concerns. instance, to cover, as well as The European North has no satisfactory land or environmental ethic fit for Antipodean circumstances, and the deeper American package is too spiritually-loaded for mainstream Australian culture. 29 In political competition-based, unsuited being theory, American work is too much individualistic the European product, especially the Marxist form, and both too precious and too high-tech for local and is circumstances, especially again for more environmentally-perceptive people. Thirdly, features of telling also Import against substitution and comparative advantage, regionalism; namely, world’s markets and pressures and fashions, are appealing avoidance of the removal of overseas control anra power structures (including the Old Boy’s network in jobs, policies, etc.) and gaining of local control, employment of local people, etc. Fourthly, philosophy as there part are of arguments intellectual for cultural culture: diversity, arguments from applied to richness, . . / The point is elaborated in Culture. At a more practical level Northern products are again often unsuitable, though for different reasons. For example, the transfer of American agricultural methods and equipment to /the thin poor soils of the Antipodes has had disastrous effects, at ttfast beginning to be recognised. v—* 29 25 complexity, sheer diversity, stability, etc. 30 In fact, built into the whole notion of ’culture’ transfers. dense, productive garden. We obtain not only good products, and European cultivars, but European pests and Naturally we want a rich, But not only seeds and plants but weeds and many pests are being introduced. selectiveness the garden analogy control are essential, and American weeds. as against Indian maize This is why previous haphazard / / procedures. The proposal is not for, nor would the case sustain as with technology policy, satisfactorily filled, local we select niches which a narrow localism are where we can make a difference, and skills and methods. Indeed the policy has to be not occupied or use and develop selective given our 30 See, for instance, A.A. Mazrui, A World Federation of Cultures: An African Perspective, Free Press, New York, 1976. 31 Does it sound familiar? Outside philosophy, it should. For example, we have now been told by the Americans that our defence role, unlike theirs, is regional, not global: this is supposed to shed great light on our previously confused defence policies. 26 That includes such things as Oxford style of teaching and doing philosophy. removal of the undue emphasis on British empiricism centred on Locke-BerkeleyHume (a standard British focus); of the quasi-historical approach with however no proper attention to quo. American status sources; reinforcement/of The heavy Oxford influence^ very conservative been a of emanating from England, the prevailing in particular, has mostly More generally; many of one. Anglo- the main movements especially ordinary language philosophy, but also the Moore-Wittgenstein practice, have been very protective of the Northern status quo; they tend to leave things very much as they are, and recommend just this. 32 Positively, the proposal is that we achieve further disassociation from the Anglo-American empiricist past in two ways: by emphasizing local projects that move outside that constricting framework, and by diversifying the range philosophical of traditions selectively drawn upon, include to not only neglected Continental strands and parts of Eastern thought, but also Pacific ethnic material and Australasian philosophy. The idea is that such a plurality of sources, especially in teaching, will assist in removing narrower cultural biasses, such as British parochialism, and enable more discrimination to be obtained. theories that Then too are open we to us should in be better the Antipodes able and to how see the ranges of to advance our own programs. 32 The point is laboured in E. Gellner, Words and Things, Victor Gollancz, London, 1959. But even ordinary language philosophy, though conservative, and though it much contracted the proper range of philosophical investigations, had its liberating elements, e.g. removal of some of the narrowness and more cramping assumptions induced by technical jargon. Nor has the social impact changed much with the subsequent decline, since 1959, of ordinary language philosophy, the increasing insolvency of Oxbridge philosophy, and its consequent limited take-over by righ^:-wing Ivy League American philosophy. By contrast, the less economically ^g/ljiential growth of radical and applied philosophy in some of the British r-aH icad, and polytechnic institutes has touched no more than the surface of Oxbridge practice. 27 There remain some things we should want to see whatever mixes are chosen One crucial issue is the removal of Northern in different Ai^ipodean regions. bias from pap/rs and publications, research seminars and lectures, letters of referencez\o/ so on. the works and irrespective discussion This Northern bias is a disposition to cite and discuss of projects of and quality the of the ignore to authors, Northern their works the more contributyon of famous to the local/ authors, irrespective of the quality of their contribution. better, the topic again under largely It is the disposition to write or lecture as though work produced locally either does not exist or has not been influential philosophers, are, ensuring (thus if anything, that more it inclined is to not). Northern And Australasian bias than many overseas intellectuals, who are perhaps less concerned to be seen as belonging to the Northern The reduction, and eventual removal, of Northern tream. bias effects of fe/ec/'/ Inly -the policies and practice / * W cours * 2S philosophers, individual eferees of local journals. but the It involves, among other work\nd innovations better, so they can tg to point of i/Quc. that would be assisted by greater local out A taught, more time spent at local institutions on study oq/ leave, and so for-th. xS? c* /I x APPENDIX 1. Background notes on the philosophy supply situation. Sociological investigation of the philosophy labour market in Australia and New Zealand has o yet to be attempted. But a picture of some elements underlying the numerical argument of the text can be gained from the following table: simple 28 TABLE 1. Ph.Ds in Philosophy: a USA - Australasian comparison USA Number (Male/Female) New Zealand Australia 1974 413 (346/67) 6 0 1975 375 (318/57) 5 0 1976 382 (319/63) 8 0 1977 330 (264/66) 3 2 (1/1) 1978 283 (235^/48) 5 5 (4/1) 1979 285 (20-754) 9 3 (2/1) 4 N.A. 4 0 1980 N.A. 1981 1. The breakdown of the USA and New Zealand numbers by sexes (male/female) is given.- , Similar figures do not appear to be available for Australia, 2. The US figures are for the academic year ending in the Year shown, e.g. 1978 covers the Northern academic yeai 1977-78. Southern figures are for the calendar year shown Digest of Education Statistfcs, US National Center for Education Statistics; University STA1 STICS, Australian Bureau of Census Statistics; New Zealand Education Statistics. Sources: -41/ Comments: 1. The contraction of US doctoral female 0^. r representation, production and are cooarHn-itant Australian likely too small to reflect 2. the rise figures in are to the academic market. Some of the Australasian raaembers include Americans; likewise the American figures provide no nationality breakdown. 3 % There is no information available on the number’ proceeding to higher degrees in philosophy outside Australia. of Australians 29 For example, it is In applying table 1 some simplifying assumptions are made. assumed to regular university positions now for appointment that candidates would have a doctorate or the equivalent (until recently a B.Phil was taken as a near of equivalent well). It is a assumed, Ph.D.; North American seems what to take publications the case, serve as the number of could that Australasians proceeding to higher degrees in philosophy abroad is relatively small, and no more than the order of Ph.Ds. taken locally. It can be assumed, without upsetting applications of table 1, that Australasian graduates match, say, the upper half of American graduates in standard attained. There is no compiled information /n academic vacancies in philosophy in / of Australia or New Zealand -Mln the numbers, on how the positions are filled, by A what nationalities, sexes, etc. It would however be a routine, if tedious matter to assemble some of this data, which is of considerable relevlance to the planning of philosophy programs. On the earlier idea of a National Philosophy for Australia. APPENDIX 2. ’the considering Editor of the possibility initial of National a AJPP distinguished two German distinction between Weltanschauung and Philosophy*, senses the In (Australian) corresponding Lebensanchauung’ to ’the (p.292). In the first, that of ’a scheme of the universe’, ’an Australian Philosophy is as ridiculous as confirmation prejudices’. a Christian or Holland, personal’ falsification, ’are The argument independent is of that truth, national and sympathies its or Granted: but that does not mean that a theory may not be held, fostered, etc., in Science’. or way, in one region but not others, as intuitionism was for long in Cartesianism ’a nation in France. like an In a individual second may ’more develop intimate a and certain temperamental attitude to the problems of existence, which we may ... call its philosophy of life. A nation’s philosophy, like its art and its literature, 30 is a mode of expression for the national consciousness. form of (pp.292-3). the national genius evolving culture. national in But, the It is, first place, It is a specialised in short, part of the this is by no means entirely separate from the initial sense, a philosophy comprising not merely a fairly comprehensive theory but also an integrated set of attitudes (like an operational paradigm). Furthermore, only by concession are such items as ’the national consciousness’ and ’the Australian landscape’ of meriting definite Australian descriptors. literature, has many strands to it, accounted single units like philosophy, Australian some not particularly distinctive (in any sense): such things form rather loose families. The Editor does not find, does not really hope to in find ’a modern industrialised community’ - with its modular parts interchangeable with those of others - a claims courage to find and national a philosophy of trite moral fair dealing'), base life, to build In fact with a difference. on (’traditions but nothing at all distinctive. he ... of humour, So far, there can be a national philosophy, at least of life, but is not; then, this does not however exclude there being various regional philosophies (such as local research programs). plunged that into So then, far, Inconsistency: the all is well. trouble derives But shortly the Editor is from the extravagant claim ’if Australia has nothing to do with these - the eternal values of the Spirit, the Ideals of Truth, Goodness and Beauty - then and only then has she nothing to do with Philosophy' (p.295; with rearrangement). But, as Australia has nothing per se to do with these - as is virtually conceded, these values involving a 'wider sweep' do with Philosophy, Though the than any national boundaries - "she" has nothing to contradicting the contradiction is easily possibility of a National Philosophy. avoided by rescinding claim, the ideal of a National Philosophy should be allowed nationalism has had its time. the extravagant to rest in peace: 31 R. Routley 33 Research School of Social Sciences Australian National University 3^with thanks to R. Elliot, W. Godfrey-Smith, S. Grave and L. ? irlin, to several members of the audience at the presentation of the paper a: the 1983 to Australasian Association of Philosophy Conference, University of\Adelaide, ’ several referees for this Journal, and, not least, to the present ijai tor.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Box 95, Item 1: Various drafts of Prospects for regional philosophies in Australasia Subject The topic of the resource Various typescript drafts, some with handwritten emendations. Paper published, Sylvan R (1985) 'Prospects for regional philosophies in Australasia', Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 63(2):188-204, https://doi.org/10.1080/00048408512341801. Description An account of the resource Unnumbered paper from collection, item number assigned by library staff. 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Type The nature or genre of the resource Manuscript Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context <a href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:86ac5fc">https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:86ac5fc</a> Coverage The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant n/a not listed in manuscript finding aid Box 95: Paper - Extracts - Articles and Chapters by Richard Sylvan https://www.antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/70406ef7cfc803de88ef9fd9cea0686d.pdf 4ee8bd2d1def9dc91f7e4737d71124bf PDF Text Text . .. . , TOWARDS A SOCIAL THEORY FOR ECOTOPIA Participation in attempts at social change often has the .. effect of revealing to participants the structure of the soci e ty in which they live. It is hard to be a practical environmentalist th1/:: i v.: J _e:ng;a~eEl in or s1.,1pporting a range of environmental batt le s without observing that most environmental problems in our sort of soci a l system are generated basically by the domination of the society by J corporate interests, which have a strong interest in ma i ntaining an industrial and consumption system which appears to produce environmental problems as a matter of necessity. If one is not directly engaged in opposing the plans or activities of sawrnillers , miningcompanies, power and energy compan ie s, transport firms, chemic al and pesticide comp a nies, p a ckaging companies, real-estate developers and tourist-resor t promoters, to name a few, one is engaged in battling thei r political or bureaucratic advocates and protecto rs (nominally 'regulators') in the sh ape of forestry commissi on s, mining departments or authorities, hydro-electricity authorities, energy authori ties, transport corm iss ions, l and commissions, politicians and the l i ke. ' Usually t h e battles by citizen environ- /qsr1~j mental groups h ave littleAsuc c ess, and the chances o f success appear highly cor related with the degree of corporate domination within the political unit concerned. Even where environmental problems appear to a rise from the interests of non-corpor ate groups, for example workers or consumers, it can be conv incingly argued that the y are still primarily a reflection of corporate domination and st r ucturing of both the employment and consumption a n d life-s t yle choices ope n to peopl e , that is, of indirect cor po rate or capitalist influence in shaping the social structtlre values. : Environmental issues throw up sharply again the question as to whether it is possib le to devise a social structure which does not have this feature of direct or indirect cciporate domination, without ..--·--· ----·-·•··-•·--·-·--·-·· · · - - - - - - - - - - - - _... . --···------x- �2. r~placing it by some -1 other equally or e~e? __ more _undesirab_l _e ____~_ind of domina tion-=__s_~E~ as -/ bureaucratic or totalitarian domination-which is such that replacement would be unlikely to produce anything which could be described as a solution or improvement. Our belief is that we can devise a better system which dispenses with this disastrous element, and furthermore that we must do so if environmental problems, as well as a whole set of other problems which are also consequences of the same structure of domination, are to be resolved at any but a superficia½ temporary and inadequate level. wa ys to see the problem. or size. There are of course other We might see it as just one of technology But the technology we have seems to be a consequence of other features of our society, rather than the ca use ·_ al though it is certainly true that there is an inte~a ctive process and certain kinds of technology strengthen certain interests in the society over others~ :~S for smallness, we might remember that the industries of' I IISu} d... I , ::___ currently destroying the Border Ranges rainforesi~(' in relative terms) quite small. Or we might feel that we are in the grip~ of a runaway or out o f control machine - a point of view put forward first by Jacques Ellu./ [ ] • Or as Peter van Dresser very nicely puts it ''We have built a Frankenstein monster of industrial and commercial relationships which is almos t totally running our lives." True ~but the machine was was not built on random lines, and it systematically serves the interests of some groups at the expense of others. So the machine is not 'out of control' in one sense - it is doing the job it was designed for. ff-some environmentalists, espe ci ally of the more cons ervative kind, do believe that the system in which they live is basically sound, but that it consistently delivers mainly destructive results and decisions either because -th.2.- it is run by the wrong people ('Oh! for a statesman'; seeABorder Ranges sheet), or because we do not yet have go od mechanisms for �3. takin g accou nt of envir onme ntal inter ests, which .is seen as a new consi derat ion. Such an appro ach tends to overl ook the limit ation .C'.'f>·''}~i=t on resu lts throu gh. polit ical/ burea ucrat i c actio n or mecha nisms which resul t from the exist ing struc tu re of corpo rate domin ation of the socie ty, and to the exten t that it is succe ssful it would depen d upon reduc ing or balan cing that domi nation anywa y. ·- Some impro ved mecha nisms may enabl e some impro vemen ts in limit ed areas , but they will not be able to chang e a basic ally destr uctiv e lifestyle based on conti nuous and growi ng indu stria l produ ction and consu mptio n, and so unles s more basic chang es in the socia l struc ture are sough t, will proba bly only succe ed as delay ing tacti cs in the inevi t a ble destr uctio n of what remai ns of the natur al world and l , · ·¥;1 / >fr'J I a H lr-.rt r? t 1~ reaso nable socia l enviro nrnen t. · \'\ J rn this neces sarily rathe r A paper we want to try to devel op sorre of the basis for a socia l theor y which might be descr ibed as a form of Liber tar i an or SelfManag e d Socia lism. J~~~ \ ~- It migh t seem odd that anyon e shoul d advoc ate a basic ally +i.1/ liber taria n type of posit ion as neces sary for aAso lution to envir onmenta l probl ems, since envir onme nta lists are mostl y seen to be advoc ates of great er restr i cti ons, mor~_ rules and regul ation s, legis latio n, burea ucrat ic contr ol and plann ing, to restr ict and reduc e the damag e peopl e can do by their consw ning and produ cing activ ities . This restr ictiv e appro ach seems to be dicta ted to a large exten t by the failu re to quest ion the basic soci~l struc ture which makes peopl e ' s produ cing and consu ming so destr uctiv e in the first place . If a frame work o f essen tially damag ing life- style s is accep ted as 'natu ral' and uncha ngeab le, then of cours e envir onmenta l prote ction will seem to be a matte r of limit ing these sorts of a llege d freedo ms by furth er restr ictio n; but if the probl em is "-r se e n rathe r as one of struc: ;\ing socie ty so as to remov e the force s which make peop le's 1 ,... ~-y"\ .._ _ __ _ '"'"\ ... a · pro ucing and consu ming so destr uctiv e, the �3. 1. Pootnot e 1 from page 3. J_ We don't of course wish to suggest that working within the system is a just a waste of time, and we should watch it all But in each go while we sit back and wait for the revoluti on. 1 each hard that fgct of urgent battle it s easy to lose sight necessit y urgent won victory is on l y temporar y, to lose sightJcff will IJ_Ot they to; begin construc ting the sort of society in which imposing of This is not and canno.t be a matter be~ t emp o rary. some sort of Boy Scout 'Conserv ation Ethic' or minor changes in the directio n of energy savtng on a soci~y which produces environm ental degrada tion a~ a matt.er of its fundame ntal :?__!:_ructu_r.:-_ e . 0 2 �4. need for a restrictive approach is less obvious. The problem of how to reconcile environmental aims with the aim of a free society and with other goals is essentially one of obtaining an 1 ~ b 1 . J. environmenta ~ o f 1 1. f-e. -. . . society/way enign The restrictive approach then) is a cons equence of accepting C the existing se c. in/ f framework and,,\ attempts to graft environmental considerations onto a basically hostile structure restrictions. as further The situation might be compared to what happens when an attempt is made to enlarge an o ld theory which has encountered data it cannot _handle - the initial reaction is to try to maintain theoretical framework and ac count for the further the material by the 'enlargement' of the theor ~ usually through a series of ad hoe further assumptions or makeshift subsidiary theories which have the effect of restricting the application of the theory. We arrive at a vast and complicated structure , such as the Ptolemai c theory or certain fashionable mod ern logico-semantical theories of natural language, which for a time may appear adequate and succeed in delay,j the realisation that the original theory itself is in need of fundame ntal revision. The existing mass of environmental an d planning legislation and proliferation of bureaucratic procedures J---J- s uchf Environment al Impact Statements plays much the same role in modifying a fundamentally environmentally-hostile social struc tur e and life-style a s the addition o f further epicycles did in Ptolemaic the ory. X The env:ironmentalist who appreciates the need for basic change finds himself however confronted by rather unattr a ctive conventional choices. dom inat ed On the one hand capitalism offers a system wru'ch ,-s by private capital interests which depend crucially h;'resou r ces\and where unequa l economic �5. is seen ~ri d other power On the other side of the as ad essential condition for freedom. conventional choice we are presented with a system which does not appear t o offer an essentially different life style and which ,,~. . (_~ f f( I~ I 1: t/ 1 clearly endorses many of the ~ame values - industrialisation ~~~ogress, J 11 .i 111/, r / /4./,,-;..Jf p1J'. J i:,. ,·i,.{;,,<f,c'. ,, high technology 1,and so forth, as the capit alist o !tu/'lt, f-,c. e:_ . I In addition I the conventional Marxist alternative offers an account of t he role of the individual and society which provides many reasons for libertarian concern. We a re faced in fact with the option of opposing distortions, one offeri ng a distorted and re duced account of community and communal life forms, and the other of the individual and individual life forms. Although the pure, theoretical form of capitalism is supposed to operate on the basis of purely individual activity, decision and production, in existing forms of capitalism thi s has long since been abandoned in favour of a 'mi xed' economy, with community control through elected government and public sector activities ensuring that we collectively control the collective part o f our destinies, and that communi ty is represented as well l"r cJ At least that's/the mythology has it. as individuality. In practice however these communal life forms are v ery largely a sham, and do not amount to !eal recognition of c ommunity. Usually these forms are forced into an individual reductionist model so that the instead of 9, v _i ng,\ community control I~~J merely give a further set of individuals who then make the decisions ~, is the case with the institution of This government by Representative Individuals, for ,instance, which instead of providing community control over the framework, merely selects a further set of individuals who then control 'or manage' the community. · In Victorian times women who inherited property were obliged to have �6. a male executor to manage it for them. Later this was liberalised to allow them a say in selecting him. It is better to be able to choose an executor or managerth a n to have one imposed on you, but no one who has to operate under such a system should deceive themselves that they are really managing or controlling things themselves. l People in our soci~ty are of course largely blind to the fact that real con@unity control has quite a different form, a ~cl regard such individual reductionism in corr@unity decision - making inevitable. as natural and People now accept as normal political phenomena such a s systematical ly broken election promises, government manipulation of sources of information, deception and s1'!.ights of hand such as wa iting until public interest has died down or worn itself out before proceeding with unpopular moves, and so on. What these phenomena seem to indicate is that the amount of real communal control which can be exercised through the system of representativ e individuals is not very large, even if the fact that the political system tends largely to reflect the economic system and economic power rather than to control it 1 is ignored. The 'public sector' which is supposed to express the common will, is not community controlled either in any realistic sense. ' L ' I,{ '~ Thus bureaucra~ managing public resources or allegedly regulating industries normally operate largely in the interests of private corporations , as anyone who has worked on issues like forestry or nuclear power is aware. Crucial information is kept secre t from the cornmuni ty, ma de inaccessible, or handed out selectively> usually to commercial interests. ( we won't go through all the points that could beQ;sed here in detail - they are too well known - we just want to set the points in a certain light ~ Even where they compete with private corporations instead of me rely serving them, 'nationa- lised' public sector organisation s act like further corporations or powerful individuals, and there is very little real community �1 . -1,,.c) 1:,t---2i--t ~,t P.--t1 I , le-,__,~L-, {\ ~ c,.j- - . ~~ s-: ~ - -·· C~~ -~ ~ -c - ~ L-:.. ~..zx/\_, _~) \..A.,,\. • [ ..:....}--{c ~ c •1J,-.-,{',,/_,,t C _A A,i4- (_,~ l-r-:1 (f't-o-~---l)-v'--0 f) - - V'---'2, dl>--Cf- 0 'l[..z_ cZt,__...,...--14_)_1 ( , D .___ t ~ -r ,c.,.__ C~-z_ __ �7• control. Finall~ those individuals or corporations who control the means of production can exe rcise enormous power, both through these alle9ed 'community' institutions, and through their abi l ity to control what will be produced, how much, how and where, and their monopolisation of the abi~ity t? direct productive labour , -.;(K_,t:.\ their control of the pro ductio~, (\ control the in short ~ ,:· ._• c..::., .:'.' \' Those who . means of production are thus able to obtain a very large measure of control over the social framewor~ which comes to be structured largely in their interests. This domination through 4/. I structuring now extends to almost/areas of life, and has been documented independently in many areas, from the food we eat to the way we travel1 from the houses we live in.i to the way we re lax. The control does not of course, take the form of control of individual decisions at the individual level; they do not decide that you or I will purchase a purple~ a green car, for example, but the social i framework in which the places in which peo~le live and many other aspects of their lives are structured around cars is determined in their interests, and so is the kind of car the market provides. The fact that individuals are free at the individual level, and that such mechanisms operate at the level of controlling the largely (.•\ i! ~ i.A""\.'• I n.S invisi ble social framework which coT$,-a-ins and channels the choices /1l 1My the individual can make, explains why people retain the iJ/ 1,<;, ~ ,.1 1 ,\ freedom and of full control over the ir lives in such a system. These distortions are not merely occasional of 1 'abuses' or aberrati ons - they are structural features which occur systematically 1 in all capitalist societies which have free ~ublic life forms. rI'hey are the result of a reduction of communal life forms to various extensions of individual life forms;of the fact that communal life . rv IC ,_.. .l.{1\, 1 forms occur in a reduced and impoverished indi vidualist) ,A.H3fttr. The result ~tha t commun al control of the social framework is ~)j~~ et ineffective. and that some individuals and group s are able to I �8• obtain great power through their capture and control of the social forces of organisation and production. If capitalism offers a distorted,individualised account of community which allows for no genuine co,1,,,1u11ttl control over the social framework of li fe . on the Marxist side we are offered a matc hing and impoverished distorted account of individual which allows for no genuine individual control over individual life! Marxist~ very commonly present line account of ~cc.;cfj (f what is in effe_~t a r,~oduction A:,- - (.,,cl.. - - ~) /(. individuals - l(c role of t he individual is Iv) \ .1 -~f):Or- r,·(;e ~-& their concept constantly and revealingly illustrated by appealing to the individual as a unit in a production .- - 1 line. Accordi.ng to this account the individual IS I l.'v\:. l~ji/,1 1 ~ •. IJ,2 ,,K{1~•,i{uii. / L-_ t;:: 1 no·+h ing, the soc~fty h, _ is entirely a social product/,,\is no more than his role in the pro duction line, he has no separate 'self ' but only the characteri~tics he acq uir es as a re sult of his ...___. membership of a society or class ~ Indiv iduals are in effect to be . l ,\·~ We don't make any cla im to be Marx scholars, we shall be making (' heavy use i n elucidating and criticizing the a ccount, of the S . U. Gene ral Philosophy Department recent publication Paper Tigers Although this book will be a major target in much of what follows we would like to record that it ·seems to us a valuable piece of work, which does a great deal to illuminate the nature of the conventional ideological choice and expose their philosophical base~ . It is also an ad ])t i r ably clear piece of work (in contrast to most Marxist scholarshi~ which casts lig~t into many dark corners, including some which, from the point of view of the attractiveness of the Marxist a lte rnative , might perhaps better h ave been kept a little dimmer. . conten -t J.o n that The acco unt offered makes it clear that the ·(> (_ ~) S:l::-Fl-ee a p osition is 'totalitarian' is by no means a capitalist p lot but h as an important point. I I 3 Any per son can fill role in the production li ne as well as any other (Ste ve ns). Quote from �9. treated as cells in the group body, and the only legitimate formso f individual expression are through community life forms. ·c· ·L ,. · · rtf; ,- TIL), H t.'.•t1tf-• •'.r , (· r, ·1 , ~ • 1'1, 1, ,•,,U,/ ♦ :,4, ) The al t ernative to such a position - I~dividualism A - is . seen by Marxist s as the position underlying capitalism, which holds that indivi duals contain no social influences which are not ultimately re duced to individual forms o f influence. Individualism - which is taken as the alternative to the view pres e nted above - is seen as the source of c a pitalism and inevi tably lea d s to a ll the excesses and distorts of that ,\ system. Individ ualism must be stamped out r oo t and branch if '- L /;I ,~...-f. it• al·te,nutive to ca1;,alism is to be built 1fthe failures and admittedly authoritarian cha~acter of existing Marxist systems ii-tti.._,1·lif-·} are, according to this line of~traced to the failure to do a thorough e r1 o tl3 A job of stamping it out in spheres other than that of economic life. ! Indeed Individualism in this variety of Marxist theory seems to play much the same role as sex did in Christian theory - it is the source of all evil, and the f'I\ [' \- f ' mojification of the individual ego and its submission to the ~' group replaces the mortification of the flesh and its subjection to the spirit. f\ v' J (\ To condemn all individ_ualism because some distorti'ons of i t produce bad results is like condemning sex on a ccount of the objectionable nature of, sa~ prostitution. J./( ;d /, Ii I ), . -~ <; ~-.. :~ ., . ,, :.:. 1'11\ .~ ~ , I~\ t :, h Howeve r , on€=.ffiay.:-==inc-l-ineL::::to-·:··be' j t wo u 1 d be 10 ( I,.. , ' < /1 n a ive to s ee no connecti on between such a doctrine, and the actual p r act i ce of Marxist societies (as /lli(n/ r. Blackburn). Marxists do J (- ,J - Such a position must if followed out consist1 ently, be suspicious o f e v ery sort of individual independence and activity which cannot be subsum_.ed in some sort of collective interest, even something as simple and ap p arently non-capitalist as producing your own food becomes suspect (see for example the Kronstadt man i festo). It appears to provide a justification tc,,l �10. for any amount of suppression of individual views and dis s ent And where these are seen as being opposed to class interest. "~Yth1 '> (V if 1 ~ social products)-t:.My_.. appeaL to provid e if individuals are /' a justification for manipulation of individuals for collective e nds, as bad or worse th<3n the indirect manipulation for pri vate interests of capitalism. ,,Such a do c trine seem s indee-d to make life very easy for the capital is t, who does not have to exert himself greatly I its ,~1,uthortarian potential f or the individual. to demonstrate?, as a free individual, freedom For if there is no such th1ny -J and if there is no such thing cannot be taken f!:;,9JTI someone ; as individual choice, individual choices cannot be qbr c7d te d or is that individuals just trodden upon. don't matter, except of course insofar,_,, as the production line There are few people who can fail to is short of hands. be repelled by such a position once it is stated in its stark simplicity - which of course it usually is not. From an individual point of view such a situation would have many of the drawbacks of capitalism, and in some ways might even be worse - goals, modes of re ~hi ng them and suchlike would all be externally imposed on individuals. i r-£ ttr±-s==±s_ i 11 de. e-d·--ctre--nas±c-t-1a r x is L sociai- theury----:;:.md - - I ~--_,,,,.., ------- I ------ -- ever the v a r i a t i o n s ~-hl-e._ under the label------.-Marxisrn' / I ~ - - ---- / tf .f erqn --:::-......... ___1 ------h . . an - entiu::=~,tl:_to se e now- J:.bey can alL--na:ve s hard ----::-:---...._, ~t_ V • ,::i • --------1 ~--- ------- ---------- t h ore t i ~GU.Qd at i o Tl------~ ~ s ± e n _ Q J an En 1 i g h ten ea / !1 LX.i.Sln~ ~ e ~ _ Q l l t to k :, It is difficult to see how ~~ t ofAmora l to concern I ---------- ------~ 11S. ,.,,~ ( \."\. by the _Nf'W ,·...... \_, ~\.... .... ~J -..-.~~ with any ..:.- can be compatible . ~~ -'-/' concern for individuals and their fa te, as opposed for daiJ C ~ . or societies. It is difficult in fact to see how the.re_ can be room for any but the most �11. attenuated moral considerations at all i n such a view, since even the comparison of societies in te~~s of the sort of suffering they inflict on individuals i5 . th~ illegitimate. It does however seem to be individuals who su.t fer ,...__whQ__.a re ,)~ :; ~,_ ,--t :... , ,.. \ t ".I f b ..:. ' "'f . ·- . -~ exploited or ~ominated, so unless an attempt .. ( is made to give an al terna ti ve a(:count of these in t e rn1·s of I \ the Class Mind ; it is difficult to see how such a position tould even justify the choice of one soci·cil S~S}t?-,n. over the other on v ' moral grounds. If this is indeed the basic Marxist social theory - and whatever the variations available under the label 'Marxism• it is hard to see how they can all have an entirely different theoretical foundation - then the vision of an Enlightened 0 .._,..__ . ~t: L: • r ."" -, ( ·' ,! Marxi sm which has been held out to us by the New Left is a t-- mirage. The consequences of this system can be seen then as the 1 • ,iJ I Ov\ el , m:nt.~ of A u.r;C.'tf..lf-< j V f power - or individuals (as in capitalism) in favour of their having no power at all as individuals, but only through their membership of some collective, class or community. For anyone who does not accept the ,d reduction of legitimate indi1ual life forms to group life forms, such a system of power must be seen as oppressive. From the I point of view of the individual$ power to control his own life, Q S opposed to participating in controlling group life, to opt such a position app ea~ to be oph~ , for the exchange of one set J of masters for another, of one form of domination for another, ~ and possibly ~~worse formo C l J ./ following una ttrativ.e t er ,rs: ~ So then our choice appears in the _./ if capitalism allows some individuals ,\ to dominate over others and control collective life through the social framework, 1.1kr-, 11•, • • the Marxist alternative allows collective-. hc,,, C\ �12. control o f collective life, bu t also collective control of indi v id u a l life, allowing no ~ep,:-1, rate legitimate individu al {,c.....;_ life forms. If Marxist s are right in point in g t o the disas t rous I' i H'--' results o f covert domin ation of ,.,social f ramework by private capi talist interest the capita l ist is su rely also right in pointing to the oppressive character t o th e individual o f their 0 lternat ive. * Of course both sides would dt~Y that the problem can be set up this way , the capitalists bec auIB social framework to dominate the/ de11_1/ that there is a (because o f the i r reductionist - the Marxists, because th ey would deny 1, th at there is any legitimate f o rm of individua l control to lose in collective domination. a 3rd point of view. ,r - ~ ',(. f l( ,;,, ·K · It is di ffic ult t o accept that we are face d with such .J f J f:i, The problem i s seen esse ntially from -' -- - -· - --- - - (111 f 11/" ,j'(' unpalatab le choices . }(' / .; ii1C..- And indeed lo ~] ic and,, coit,tJ strate that we are not. to demon- There have been, and in a fe w places where l1es te rn cul tur--al destruction is not yet compl ete, the re rc, ,.:.,,1 1 soc iet ies which a r e not capitalistic , wh ich are anti1~.n capitalistis but where a vigorous individual\ is va lued o r not I dis cour ~ged and for ms o f independent individual economic activity n1 ;, y ,: ,· \ /1 ~j°> \ ,, \'( .{ .'~f. \j ( "· . T-~,i,.! ·-; , f ·, :~: '{!. ~-"1 '1 / ., I J, ,: f ::· and lead t o 1 cap ifo1, iSr.> · , in the way the Mar xi st critiaue it must, and which coexists wit h true co:u1munal ins is t s life-forms. 1 ~;0c:~ 1~•- :~ s~:h ~~~·~~ti~; •;~~p(:\~ ; ;e'd as individuals, co ll- ~-1abora ted \ ·; ··: 'I In such societ ies th ere is a form '\ of in di vidualism whi ch does not inevitably undermine the socie tie s . I proc eed and even dominate . ' ._._) in groups, or as whole communities, more or less as the . o~-;~·~ion demand~d~:,yw hile s ome of the , product .,' } ;>,d, :.'j ,~ ~ \ might be given to those who had no thing, it was not u s u a lly -J �13. regarded as a purely communal product unless commu~=ally use produce~b~ t was primarly for the of he who had t f J obtained it or his kin. (See HOWftt in t~e~ Aboriginal case; The t=orest Peo2-J.-~ ; for the rules _Wai-Wai ) , I,. some g ar dening societies too, such as that of Melanesia, individual eco n omic activity of a certain kind migh t even be th e dominan : t mode of production, yet the society is not capi t alist, and is even strongly opposed to the attitudes of ~apitalism.* The existence of such societies seems to show * See the failure of individually owned Waiko, 11 trade stfs [encouraged by the Australian adm i nistration] was ... mainly because such individualism , _t_u_,._t_i..__ _ _ _---=-p_r_o_f_i_t_a_c ___c_r_u_1_·n--"'-g_t_o__o_n_e person, was disapproved of by the villagers" , p.418. that it is possible to obtain both communal control of c o 111munal life and individual control of individual life, that the one does not necessarily drive out the other. It seems clear fhm the anthropol o gical facts that the Marxis t critique that individualism produc~ s capi t alism has failed to make some important d1'stinctions between kinds of individualism. It may of course claim to allow ade quately for individuals and distinguish a kind of 'individualism' which is legitimate in the Marxist view. On further inquiry it turns out to be the case that what is labell e d individual activity in :.:i 'q cl1 c .A s-2.s is the kind of secondary and derived life forms the individual may engage in as part of the group collectivity or class, as in the Marxist / distinction between what is called 'Individualism'and'Possessive Individ~1ism' (see MacPherson} But since this continues to �14. ,. ' M S 15 only legitimate forms of individual life are .t that the· those which can be reduced to collective life forms and that no dist1 n -:.. C:-, independent economic individual life forms I for example, are legitirnate 1 it is a dist,n.ction in net me on:i:y perpetuates the false J~hdnm~ .J .Jt iin fact : merely , now as the choice between Possessive Individualism (as in capitalism) and 'Legitimate The latter is however only another and misleading Individualism' .. name for the participa tton of the individual production units 111 the production line. Since it continues to admit no legitimate individual independent activity , espe cially economic activity, distinct from or not reducible to that of the group, it - cannot e xplain our anthropological facts that these so c 1c ties do al low some i,·1d7K',k·l~ ,d in divi dual life forms, am/ - JS v ---- including economic ones _merely as in attempt to dispel the .A uneasy feeling the . ,...------··· -- a- (t hrough confusing --. .. ,\ . - production line theory arouses in most of us , te i-minological . ' ,r -r,, , Marxises in fact shuffle. / dd.Sthe same trick with this sort of recognition of legitimate individualism as Social Democracy does with the reco0nition of the social - it offers a terminological label which pretends µ to recognise a distinct life form but iryfact reduces it to an .impoverished and limited subvoJ--i<=:1-J of the dominant life form. 77The Marxist cr.i tique appears to have confused · the recognition of distinct individual life forms - distinct that is from those of the collectivity - with the attempt to reduce all legitimate life forms to in dividual life forms or constructions from them. It has confused Individual i sm, in the sense of the recognition of individuals, with Individual Reductionism, which is the recognition of nothing els~ but individuals. It is not the former but the latter which underlies capitalism and its variations. On the economic level the Marxist critique has failed to recognize that not all forms of individual economic �15. 1(r activity lead , capitalism, and at the soci al that not all forms of individual power le~d to power over rrh e triba l s oc iet ies ~...; ~ ~ others. considered were examples of societies which had individu alism - distinct individual life forms and economic activity - without individual reduction- i j m ~ ') ,, 1((.1{ , 1l'J Individ u al reductionism produces distortions and gre~t inequality of power because the social forces and means of decision-making, of organi~ ation and of production, are turned into concentrated power for the selected individuals who . ff represenithose forces in the indi vidualisa/ forms. In the tribal societies we considered this did not happen - decision r . P making was not usually the preogative of an individual h~d ' A or chief, organisation and production were not directed and controlled by bureaucrats and powerful individual capitalis ~ or groups such as corporations. In societies which took a similar form, individuals would have secure ind i vidual use right s for certain limited purposes to the means of produc ti on , for example the land, which would give them the right to produce for their own needs but not the rights they have in a property system~ For example, they would not have the right to dispose of it as they saw fit, or the corresponding right to accumulate larger shares of the means of production than others, or the right which in practice arises from this last, to employ another person's labour. The mean'.,;" communJal ly, 11 of production wou/.-{ como, o m be seen as basically held t.c: al 1 for the use of each". Individuals would have, as individ uals, secure access rights to the communal means of production to produce for their own needs. Var ious forms of mixed individual, group and community production could develop, based on mutual interes~as people see fit, but the important point is that access rights to produce oould accrue to individuals as su ch. Provided th7 ao not encroach on �16. others, 1ndi vidudfs could set their own goals, decide (A,·hu.. t _,.\ they, as individuals need and like to work on, and pursue these goals in their own way at their own time. each could· In such a situation, pu~sue his own way, instead of all marching in <~ I tl' j. ,, step - the situ,it,;,1 in whic "'h all must pursue a .. -& . i ~ and collectively determined set of goals, at a collectively determined time, place and in a collectively determined wa~ would I be avoidedQ C!S""' Such a system would Ado tribal land tenure 3ys tems, involve two levels of decision-ma~ ~ing and of life forms. On the one hand decisions at the social framework level would be determined through communal decision-mak ing processes/ wh r( h would normally, ~nvol ve communal participati.,1:y 't---(__y •-<.. i :r ~ , ,t -1 ., ' \ ( forms ,...._ rather than i-04-i -v~:r-. methods. The sorts of decisions which would come up here concerning the use and creation of 1hL t{0_ means of production would be those that affected,\ community ( e.g. in the Melanesian case the; included the t/«2. issue of whether Acommunal for es t land cou}cl be wood chippe~ w~ -~l, could not be decided by individuals and holders), ( u't :I 1 ( / If .. 1u. "'-J; 1 f\ I' • , I :) / .. . , ' ) / f in our case, what sort of public transport systemsAto have, all sorts of social framework and infrastructur e questions, question~ abou t the sort of c c mmunally-ope rated production enterpri ___ses tc have/ and so on~ This sort of society could admit a form of vigorous individualism , capitalism. b ut it would not be and could not lead to The sort of individualism admitted here would be one which could coexist with a great deal of rich communal life, and which did not eliminate or reduce communal life forms. rrhe indi vid·;_,iJd s in such a society would have the rnJps to control their own lives, both as distinct individuals diff[-:.J-0.,,-ff.J _, as members of a cornmuni ty. and also, but 1 have would be the means to cont;.~\ ,~.~e ..li '-'.t s_ ~~-·othe; s !' C (r r": ,tu,-,. • (,~·{, ,_-,, 11; ,· i ifr ,.: .I- ,< /1 ,, (' ·, ( jJ~' ,.,_ F J ! '' //, ,., , < ~ (. ,• //, 7 r ..-_ ; , 7 2-f ' . .· ' "/',. 1 ., , /·;,, ""?(. , .1.·1~ . "· ·. . rr~~. What they woul~ !1ot . 4 , , 1 . ' lc . { ..rf,t '. < �17. The sort of po sition embodie d in these so r ts of societies is in many ways a very natural one. two levels - It allows for control at the social framework level is controlled communally, and the level o f p rod uction for i nd i vidual nee~s is controlled by individuals~ It i s the n a mixed picture. (but a very different one t o that whi ch appears in th e capitalistl' mixed econo my '). 4,1.,{ In such a picture, people ar e both individua~A· members of communiti es. For a f ree society in which peopl e control th c.. L1 own lives both sor t s of control are needed. (.( ,v· So, if y ou ask someone in China what occupation he would l i k e . to f ollow , he replies, according to report, that h e 0 has no des ire s of his own in this respect, he would l ike t o be whatever t h e community wa n t s or n eeds him to be . ,1 ., ( A very p ro pe r answer according to the th eo ry set out in ' P a per Tiger s '). If you ask someone here what he woul d like to be, you would very likely get th e reply that he woul d like to be what or ever he can find a job in,,\ if h e is inr t t) a mbitious, whate v er pays best or offers the best long-term monitary prospects ; i.e. whatever capitali sm needs him to be. (A good an swer also syst em) . acconli-1'1 '. 1 t o t h e In neither c ase does the answer indicate a person who is I (I in control of his own li fe, who do es what he wants to do, or J\- ·- · tk~ what he finds s_ati_~_fying . _ At the ,; be st A distortion:; L ---~ap.i tali sm a nd Marxism offer us, in each cas e on e kind of con fr ol wi thout t h e other, or the other l evel o nly I -J,;, I i mpo verished and \ qt"t-c•,li1. i:1/-r..rl. f orm. Bu t , \ ( \ \ \ ( , , I~ ,I C( i •Ii I ; I ii, an since the l e vels . j ' t ,/ ,._- tf ) I of con trol have a large level of interdependence1 . each 11,, 1 lev el of control become s in fi,:,~it irnpover irlr- d t :--· ,·· -._...,/ .. \S . h ·"l, -r c . v~' . wi 7'~ut its compl~=:.m ent....-;_,.. 'rhu s for example, mo st individual s 1 cannot live a fully free or satisfying individual life in a society structured at the frame work or inf~s t rat~r ·e �18. ·fo leve\ provide mainly dr~~~7 , repetitive work, or no work at all, and so on. Both sorts of control are necessary, and to achieve this a society must first control the social framework, including the means of production, communally, and second ; give each individual secure acce~to the means of production for his own use to enable the individual to control his own life at the individual level. Su6h a society would be 'self- managed' at both crucial levels. * (from page 17) Of course./,. - t hat is what these positions offer at their best,., f thi:-; ·---is an idealisa~i~ In practice most capitalist countries -• •--•--•·-•---•-•---•••---•--•--•-••-- --•--•---•••n------••-- do not offer even individual control (that is they do not have the individual freedoms appropriate to liberal capita l ism), and most communist countries do not practice genuine commun ity control or self-management on the social framework level (that is collective life Ain fact controlled by individuals in the ·:; ha pe of bureaucrats or politic al codu11 ,lie~-' .c An alternative of this basic ,., f c,· .-·;;'/t .... .J, -t" . I; 1 J fr1_ 1~ <- J_ ) • sort_,\ has been_ J by a few thinkers, mo~s::tiA recently in a modified form by Ernest '" ,, c , ~ , C~11lenbach~ in ~arly ,.- b<:t{::).k Ecotopia ,,.r/, '<i. r , and a c~l:so,\ by Bertrand Russer! in h-i-~ Roads to Freedom . have been the intention It may behind a few others,e.g. William Morris in _News from Nowhere (although there are serious discrepancies here, which we will ,, ~ ( "()•;\)_ ,,; mention later), and in ~the work of Proudh. on, and there are ~ some points i n common with some forms of anachism - again with A S ignificant d i 'i.<ilp{,{11(,C J we shall discuss later. Neverthelsss it seems to have l)e·en largely overlook· ·:ea, and we are normally . - A ~ con fr onted with a ba sic false d; dwt or"'y -capitalism in some 1 orm �19. versus some ve r·sion of ~a~x ,s t · socialism. This ba1!c fa lse dichotomy is backed up by a systematic series of false dicho t omies in the subsia'ary notions of each theory, 1\ which reinforc e and perpetua·. ~te the basic false dichotomy. ) There are at least r,1/--:;~,,, I(; /c.--u.._r · /\ sets of reasons why we a re conventionally presented with this <; .yst("t,.~ 1-i11c. false dichotomy. a third position is sytem~ at ically discounted~suppressed} by both sides of the conventional confrontation because it is very much in their inte r ests that it should be. The r~ esent co~batants i do very well out of a game where each can point to the opposition as the only option and can play off the drawbacks of the opposing system to counter dissatisfac t [on with it s o ~n - system - an ideological or theoretical version of the balance of power, to to speak ,, /n which tlJ t!- $/:d<1r quo is maintained by the tension between these two ideological cor,1 6 atants. The intrusion of a third position, especially one which seems to have many of the advantages of both sides and the drawbacks of neither, could spoil this strategy completely. As someone else, ;f we remember rightly, hasr~rnar ' ked, capitalism and Marxism are li ke two sides of an a:c h - they prop one another A up by the match1•'.J weight of the - dis cu-lvantages of each side. ~ Both sides, insof ar '-../ as they ad,1,:-l such an option {:!.- exists at all 1 strive to present it as either a subv;1r\ty of their own one. so<:_ 1Q( theory or as a subvc1.riety of the opposigng Thus Chom. sky in his introduction to Dan1 .el GL-Lq:-,;-.n' s _bnarchism in effect assumes a false choice between the means of production being cont rolled by individuals, and there being no individual control of the means of pr?duction and no distinc ~ individual economic activity. Thus that any position which is genuinely iu... Wti\• t.'~ -~e able to conclude a~t~ -capitalist must �ultimately be in agreement with the go\~ of the Marxist vari e ty of socialism, and is differing only about details like the position of the state. But the non - reductionist sort of position will not fit into such a simple and loaded classification which writes in the false dict:'Ptomy -· since it allows the mean.:~ of production to be, Q_Oth communally and individually (~-=-/"\ 1::-li\ i :~- - -1 ,....' , ' ' f r ~ - -" {J.r..i"ll~.J..:A cont ro 11 e dA It is L 11 e c t i ve l~ i_~ --d±ti~re~~~~~y_~~; ;: co controlled at the social framework level but is individually controlled at the level of the individual's production for his ow n needs. rrhe other option open to Cht,,1\. sky and co. is to characteriz e suc h an alternative as mend y a form (perhaps ,, ~ ~ {~~r as a p.: .: e t it-b<Y.1tgu, 01s ,fo rm, a charge remi 11.scc 1.(-.;1 that levelled I • ' • ' 1 1 o,,,[ against 1· 1.J.·( ,~ ~/ ../ . _., . -- ., .,, his followers ) ,I Proud!-,c n by Marx ' r;(tf...!:.::!,tf ( -,/,.,1 :·,!1,,r-J\ I capi talism/A in terms 'of th~ ~eary._s of production not being ,n r-t "h- c:, ., t collectively owned and allowing some individual economi c / ·, activity. But since this will lnake the tribal societies which do not fit into this loaded classification capitalist also, it il). hardly seems a convincing move. __ In the same vein B I.-~ ckburn •, 1· · , / ' ( •; 1? r ;,'?' .- <, ri-r 1:., _ rt/,)(( I<< ' values in the Social Sciences/ presehtr thEf only 11 1. 1 alternative t o capital.ism as Marxism, while 'Paper Tigers' ( __;tp,_;c,,1.r ) asser~' s that there is no th1 i-· d position - social p l1~ nomena are to be accounted for i n terms of one or other o f the two main social theories. Simi lar strategies are of cours ~. ,_ .' L_._ -· '-.__ adopted on the capitalist side, wh-e- vr-i--1-l--e rnploy-- the criterion is., of individual pro perty ownership ' a 1 t-e rna t-iveS.A· j ' ) (' v,1 ., ~\ v,. ('., \' \1 ·}.'. I ~'"' '-- : ·- . _ -1l"-' f:. ,➔ ~ t 11 h \ 1 ~efin~ 'so ci""alis~t / , ' • \__ .t. (._. \i1 I \) --- .... __..,,- /' _ ' ,,. ~ I . I/ - 1 '> _t ; i'. \ There are however more substan tial philosphica l r e ason s f or the false dictptomy, which lie in the basic reduction p os i t ions underlying capitalism and Marxism, 1,,-•, / •;; , ,/ 1c'?. • {_ .c ·( . t. /j Io 7;'t,J •/ i(,,: , I '/ I/ t:t,, d ~iR/o:,a,.J �21. The basic reduction underlyi ng the ideology of capitalism is the reduction of communal life forms to certain sorts of individual life forms, or mere rough~ J.y, of communities to individuals, while that underly ing Marx,sr:11 is a reduction of individual life forms to certain sorts of communal life forms, that is , of individuals to elements of certain sorts wholes . * * Burnheim in rpaper Tigers' points out that the usual contras ~f between individualism and reduction of ' i-l~_>f15'~--. \ in the sense of a !) ' • 1) dr 1.A,.-t.-ctt/.J' to parts of societies which are then 1,·1 -t- . c,t1 .__: ho·~c1•-·; ., treated is fu \ her individuals, is a f u/:;e_ <!l~a.ti:Gn"'. He points out t h h t Marxists want to reduce individuals to elem t n J s of only certain sor~-~ of wholes (v iz. classes, which are not then treated as f uf- /!1-.er indi vid~ls) . ever goe s on to set up a further, He then how- ore basic false dichotomy r'H between this position and a capitalist reduction to individuals. 1· ---- How are such reduktions justifjea? ,,"' appeal t The argume t involves / the subsidizations tvupport the reductions. systematic .:. lse dictatomie9---~i~h.__ justify / '-, ,./ as follows: ' " (1) capita~ // ( 2) /4 t ineifidualism -~~sus ind'i~idual c l,_; , ( / alter c· ~·/, .> f r~~nershipf /1 // / .j_,._, of ,,tc.,· '·- / / '-.C-~ <_ __.../ ~ ..... ; / / o ollectivism. proquction versus "',,, ~ ~ ·~- �22. According to the third theory, both these sets of reduction alternatives should be rejected. ! A non-reductionist position, accordin g to which there are legitimate in~i vidual life forms which are not reducible to soc ~ / life forms, and legitimate soc~ I life forms which are not reducible to individual life forms, can give a more adequate account of t he data than either of the reductions and s ynthesi ze much of the material eac.lt uses to support his case t.<-•!1 ; le ,',· I•~,·\// avoiding -~ difficulties the reductions engender. of the Individualism, in the sense of recognition of legitimate non-reducible individu~/ forms, is one th ir1J - the lif~ individual reduction position that all life f orms ultimately can be reduced to these, is a very different thing. How are th e. reductions justified·? The argument involves appeal to the subsidiary notions to support the reductions. The systematic false d;~otomies which justify them in argument are as follows: (1) capitalist ( 2) ;ndividualism - versus coll e ctivism. individual c' l<)1<..,2,t s--ly) of means of production versus '· ., • ) : ' Cl a-l--t erna ti ve ownership. versus ( 3) (a) indivi (L..c als as not SO'Cil~/ly determined at all (b) the individual is completely soc io. l ly determined. (4) {a) 'obse rvational data' as theory-free versus (.} 5,. ( b) 1 o bservational data' the or- y - depend ~_nt. t, (5) (a) individuals as completely free , versus (b) indiv iduals as complo tely determined (atl choices ,ndividuals make are in fact d etermined) . ( 6) (a) The free soc iety as one .in which individuals can control individual life, versus (b) the free society a s one in which people collectively determine collective life. All these false dkl1 0 tomies are reje.c ted by the nonreductionist postiion .. �2 3. (1) and (2) we have already partly dealt with. To j,.,i-1_1.I / ,. ;~ / sum up, the false dichotomy over fo L/3 the alternative of a mixed form of control of the m eaus of production which does not fit into the simple classification, which enables the form of :c ~ m,v-~Aily the infrastructure to be cG-Jd..ect~ controlled -<-0.!id H~ use of it to be individually-controlled, as advocated by the non-reductionist position. The presentation of the individual as not soc✓(~ ,,/;;_' ci I/ l determined P'~ at 11 appears quite freql.lntly in capitalist 7 ( 3) (a) , I' \' \ arguments, espec rct. lly in the economi"l c sphere. Most capitalist '-.. / e conomic a rguments depend upon taking ind i vidual choices as 'raw', as not in any way in £ lue n ced by o r dependent upon a social framework. They appear to presuppose an absolute indiv i dual who would make the same choic es in any society. Th~s for example env ironmentallsts who suggest that things like a~r tT condi tio~s are u 1-w1 ,:c_,.,:__~sct"1/ and wasteful of energy are ,n<? t with the response from status-qua supporting economists just choose to r~-..i:> 11~ H: \f 4 , 1 {, raw, and The choice is represented_ have air -cond itioners. a that peopl e rreducible - to interfere with it would be ...~~ .A. "' authorita~ because it is presented as a choice at the level of individua l li f e-control, instead of as a social framewor k dependent choice, A good e xamp le is McCracken [ ] . This is part of the strate gy of reduction to individuals through trying does not exist, or if it does, i s a lso chosen by the individual on the level of personal 'raw' choice - ('a legally elected government determined it'.). Environmentalists are always encountering the related, arg ument that a certain predicted level o f consumption, say for forest products, energy demand, �24. space, must be met , no matter how disastrous its environmental consequences'. 'Demand' is treated as expressing the individual~ raw needs or choices, which are ,coN.:.e.11J.ed as lacking a social context, and therefore, it is argued, as being essential to meet a ~d authoritarian not to meet. To deny such demands would be to abrogate individual freedom. rrhis is the basic argument for Cons1u1,:r ism, and it is widely employed by those who wish to promote industrial growth t o meet alleged cop (_.il.i,, 1 t: r-- ~ eeds ' reg a rdless of the consequences. Courses of action which fail to accommo date cons!-< 11-iu; i nl t hus ruled out, and are consumerism and its consequences repre s ented as necessary and inevitable. Of course many people,especially environmentalists, realise there is something wrong with this argument. do not just up a,vJ ' demand' expres~~~ays, People junk paper f or packaging, or energy capacity to power hea~ed swimming pools or electric toothbrushes. All these 'needs' are the product [ 1,.r7 -'·- of a certain sort of;\ social co ntext, which the Con sume .ri sin igno r es, or presents as inevitable, wh e n it is /lrgument not, or chosen by people ge1rally/when >r is not. The Consomerist Argument, then, is a pa.rt of the capitalist reduction choices to individual choices, which is pJrt of -the~ reduction of : so c ~I life forms to individual life forms. [Accompanying th=js r e duction is a picture of th e individ tt~ l s ~ s c ontaining no s 6 cial elements which are not i n some way f}-1· 1--<. l.·-~\. C --- ~ t,; :_+ ,. : -~: _,, ; c ..{ · ,) , ,.)_ --·· l ~reducible to p- roperties of individuals &'\, l] \ . (b) On the oth er side of the conventi on al battle we are presented with an equally distorted and reductionist picture o f the individual os completely so c. ; -= ally determined. I :f the capitalist picture presents social choices as just certain kinds of individual choices, the Marxist picture tells us that there are no individual choices which · at-e.. ,H·[ reducible, �2 5. orl exarnina,tion, to socja/ choices. Marxists ,uj}if- (r l- reject the 'J capitalist a ccount of the individual and society and ~s ~st on the importan ce of the social fram ewo rk, but in th e process eliminate# the i ndividu al . In 'Paper Tiger ~' two main arguments are presented for this positi o n . · (i) The Invariance Argument: This argument appears in several pap ers in the 'Paper Tigers' coll ection and seems to be central. Essentially it argues that the individual does not him- self d ete rmine his own choice unless the determination would b e invariant in any social framework. , Thu s Steve ns, SuchtiJ Chal;,1, ers, and Burnheim. and In Burnheim's paper the argument appears in the f orm of the demand for cor e an of self, which would be unchanged under any variation of social U11 k'.;:; co ntext or framework,~ t his can be provided 1 there is tJ;1( re,\/ s. 1,> as J 'the sear ch for the real self proves illusory' , 1 ) ,7 nd the pictu re of individuals as completely s-r, ,,,,;/l mi ned is e stab l ish~<l. deter- Of course if the de P1 J nd for our core Abefore i ndependent no n-reduc i ble individual self-hood were admitted). was correct, i t wou ld be very ea s y to demonst r ate the Ma rxist reducti on . Bu t the demand is far too stron g, and the argument is thoroughly fallacious; for it a~sumes that the relevant proper ties of individua l s mus t be purely individually determined befo re the re can be a non- reduqible indiv i dual. All that is required howe ve r is that the re should . be an i ndividual eleme:nt in their d etermination, a nd. thL:; would not lead to the expectation of an invct~t--~,,..it: class of I sel f i properties which were unchanged in ~QY soc i al context. The f allacy in th e argument is perhaps best illustrate d /1 ,'.' by an analogy. ;,£' J We know t hat the genetic inheritance of indivi duals ;\ can determine within a broad range wh a t they can become or cannot become, e.g. if they are genetically male they cannot become mothers, ,r:1""/;, (, ,,r:, ,,,,., (( •. / i· (:· ,.('' -.·; .--:. ,,-· ...,.. .f" . .,,,/'.,, �26. if they are genetica lly members of the c o rr o t fam i ly they and so on. will grow in a different way from 1egu"mes, .....__,, Any g i ven property an individual has will pro bably be the result of both genetic ~nd environmenta l factors, and will vary as So we cannot argue that individuals either factor is changed. are completely environmenta lly determined unless there i s a class of 'core' properties which are invariant under genetic Of course there are no such properties. change! But that is what the invariance argument demands - that before we can claim an independ~t individuality , 'a 'real self' other than the soc i4 tly determined self, there must be a class of purely self-determin ed properties which would be the same regardless of different social environments . There are, of course, no such prope !··ties, so, th e argument con c_.l udes fallw:;u~rd,1, there are no real individuals. is a mi x ture of soc ;cd/11 But if an individual's cha racter determined and individu a lly determined . .J f eatures, and if any one pro perty showed in fact the influen c e of both i n t~ ~es, then we could no t expect such invaricince. But t he case of social versus individual determination does in fact seem to b e in the crucial respect a good analogy to the genetic/envir onmental case - the social context, like the th genetic inheritance, deterines, in a broad way what the A individual Lan -Or cannot become, what he ca n CL.. do or choose , * * <! 1 The analogy also throws an interesTin on the individual' s i light on the Lysen Ko that genetic inheritance -:_,,·..!_,/ ·IJ,._ the theo:rJ 6,-,;1 L,d ft f ,!(_·k , J l.//,t/4,, k,dk,y;I C/ A ~ rh . flfi?i1~11_'-!f. 11.,',/'t"fllr;e.~ {·.,/{J _ the u(gts of the social reduction, as required in Marxi~t theories. I/~ ,.: ,/.l;"r,.i /.-.... lr l r,/' l ·:-n , :,,-,,-,. 2 '"'<· ...... /,•. ( ;rt',: ~' .O>' ,.'--,fZf ,'J(~, L;"'I ,:'" (~ . ..,. fc.: J ,,.;1 ,· /. ..,· 11/J " ''j,., lc.-,J c./ Pr~suP1l,4 7 affair. . . 1 constraint It acts a j A ...,. - -·· 1 ,(..' ( ! [ 0 . -•..., • ' , / u,.. vrt;.( /(C /J I '\\ ',"'·,..__ ____ __ p:t.h ~ • , I I/..-, ~ r\..i.- , I) _, /:: (·,/ - · ~t'"" (, / , II/1/Jt of development, and its influence will therefo r e be seen ( �27. in all the properties he displays, without1 of course, being the l/is actual complete determinant of those properties. development involves as well his own indi viduallj de termine d -f~L1/u:--r1 .,· in the same way that the actual development of aH individual with a certain genetic inher i tance also involves environmental fa ctors . This is the sort of picture of the individual in relation to h is social context which u..r1de-rl ;e. s the non- re:1uctionist position , and it is in most respect s a fai-r!J natural one. In contrast the two reductionist positions present, in term s of the analogy, a false d ic hotomy picture 1./ of t he individua l as comple tel yg·enet ic ally determined i-:!'11- -- ' ~-, ·t~ .--• - l ~ the one han d . (Marxism\ and as comp.J:_etely ,1'fl- environmental ly determined on the other (cap ita lism). (ii) The second set of arguments for the complete social de te rminat ion of the individual f is L papero presented in It is an interesti n g a nd ,, sugges tive but l ikewi s e fallacious argument , which proceeds fr om the assumed theory= ..c:=-_aepen d en t characte r o f al l data, to the conclusion that ' individual' obscrv.d r<' ;u, { C'< '~t obs e rvation, \ entire ly dependent on shared social ,.tr tifact s; 1 I.e. theor ie s, is a social and not an ind ividual phenomenon. {u e.nce and duct s . knowledge I tfw 11. , are social and no t individual pro- It is p ointed out that the phenomenol o gy and epistem- ology associated wi th capitalism - empiricism and th e individua lis t red ucti on - holds that observation al data is completely theory - indepe nden t, and this approach is correctly rej e ct~~ d as in compatible with th e, o f theory forma ._,___ r--- ti on /At1(l actual process fa lsification . Even if the o ther connections in the argument are admi tte d, we contin ue to be p resented with a f alse contrast, this time between obs ervation a~ completrly 'hard' or as �2 8. completely 'soft', a s compl etely theory - depe ndent, or as comple t e l y th eo ry - independe nt. Again the obvious p osi ti on s ee ms to b e overlooked by the opp os ing reduc tio nist c a mps. gi Ve L--t. The point n eeds more elabora tion than c..an b ....:. h· ,f l0 ½~ , but briefly, what i s o verlooke d in the a rgume nt is the po ssibility of saying that some observations are theorydependent, and some are not ,\ that is, that there 'so ft' da t a. cffe~ 'ha rd' and the comple te Su c h a position would explain wh a t theory-depen dent theses cannot explain,the unden~b/e fact that some theories are fals ,; fied. It can also explain - what t he e mpirici st position cannot - ~ hy theories are not nearly as f alsifi a bl e as t he e mp iricist takes them to be, and some not falsifiable at all, and why in many cases what is n ee ded is a c once pt ual shift, that is a shift to rei,1 h--rpreJ1,4f,;,, of the theory·-depend e.nt area of data along the li nes presen fo,l. b...J a dif ferent theory. The theory - depende nc e aspect might be s een a s gi ving a certain cl~~ (the 'so ft data'), or it d ependi~t data [' 01 mjh~ theory- be seen as giving certain t heory-depe nd e nt constraints on observati on, while still leaving room f o r a no n - the ory depende nt area to op.~rate within those constraints, t h at is, an area in which , ,n ~ peop le opercit1 11t , with J c/,fl c, (:~1f- theories can reac h agreement . (Neither of the two reduct ion ist theories can adequately expla in agreement and di~agreemen t be tween people h ol ding different of such a non-reductio nist account of theor i esV_/) observation an d theory would be that they are seen as both u 11d_ social and individual - scienceA knowledge have but they s sooQI elements ;;-l 1 1 occur at the individual level, they are both f1lfd . social ~nd ind iv idual products. AA similar account in all o f free-will and determinism would see individuals as partly 4.. • f r ee, a n d a s Pftly determined - . • the latter determination occ urri ng as constraints on individual action rather than as �29. giving an area of completely determined action and another different area of completely free action. i,..J., £ ~;(b) '1 he notion of freed(l.m and of a free society is A one of the most important suffering from systematic ambiguity . 1 Each position defines the notion in accordanc e with its own concept of individua l and society; thus the capitalis t position ck~hes freedom as the control by the individua l of his own life (with appropria te safeguard s), the Marxist as the con t rol by the collective or class of its own life and so on. The non-reduc tionist position would reject the notions of l, 'J C'{ ,r·1 freedom which each reduction position offers, and would see 1\, the choice as involving a false dichotomy . According to the non-reduc tionist position, to be free is to be free as an individua l and also as a member of a community , to be able to control one's own individua l life as an individua l, and also to be able to act freely with others in controllin g and determinin g the social framework . ;,< 'f. ¥- -~ --- ~ ~"I:-~ The false dichotomi es presented by the two-reduc tion cire.. reason positionsA clearly systemati c in nattire. for them lies in a logical assumption and approach which is com m on to both theories - the reduction positions are the result of extension alism 'm. 2~te:rlalisrn ') in logic and metaphysi cs,oper~ti ng both through the accounts of the subsidiary n otion ~ and resul6~ . i n the the basic reduction position of individua ls reduced to eleme nfr of cul u,,,~ sorts of social wholes versus social wholes as reduced to constructi ons out of certain sorts of elements. �29 . Those who do not appreciate that everything is connected to everything else, and that relevant logic particularly is connected to everything else, would probably be surprised to learn that the basis of these false dichot.01les lies in logical theory. The two ,{ reductionist positions apply in social theory a particular set of reductionist doctrines a bot.ft the whole-part relation. The individual reduction position which underlies basic capitalism is that the whole is reduced to no more than the sum of its parts the parts are the thing and the whole i s a mere fiction or certain sort of construction. The opposite reduction holds that the whole is the thing and that the parts are no more than components of the whole - the y have no real function or role of their own except to make up the whole. This is of course the approach which matches the Marxist reduction of individuals, and it results from buying~~l~same logical assumptions about wholes and parts and applying the reduction move in the opposite direction. The logical assumption behind the reductionist approach is that the social whole-part relation is extensional, as it is treated in standard mereology. <.? r o ./r:,.·_ .~"' '-··• ,. / :J.. ti ·, r• i J ("~ \., C l' l •'-·\.. ) C • . ~\__(_ ___ · '-- '-- 'c l ... • : ,: · - v•~,1-. .__,, :;>>··\- ', '.\ I (_,-..._ .... l-··"' '- �- It is the seeing of th e whole~ part relation as extensional which forces the choice be.tween seeing wholes as just aggregations of parts, as on t he capitalist side, and seeing parts as j ust bits of wholes, as on the Marx ist side. If the relation is extensional, then one or the other reduction is inevitable, so th at someone who w, she~ to reject one reduction, say the re duction of wholes to parts, Cf!JD -fi,'j is ob li ged to embrace the one, the reduction of parts to wholes so that the Marxist reduction of individuals is an outcome of sharing s uch an extensional outlook. With an intensional relation this choic e can be avoided, there can be both wholes and parts, each with properties not reducible to those of the oth er. Consider;for example, the /mplicational case where we represent the proposition that A as the class of sta temen ts implied by A, or equivalently the class of consequences of A. Then if the notion of consequence is treated e xtensi onally, for oF example as material implication, the joint consequences ~ A & BJ that r:F -1 i 42.., is the consequences~ proposition {A & B} will just be the sum of the separate con sequences of A and the separate consequences of B. That is {A & B} = {A} U {B}, or, in terms of wholes and parts, the whole {A & B} is just the extensional sum of the parts {A} and {B}, and is therefore reducible t o it in a straightforward and common sense. If on the other hand, the notion of cons£ },enc(;,. is treated 1 intensionally as in re levant implication, the n the joint conseque nces of A & B exceed and are not reducible to the sum of the separate consequences of A plus the separa te consequences of B. That is i' B} · not just and can 11c: t be reduc ed to the ,' The residue or sum of its part~ proposition A and proposition B. the whole proposition {A & difference between the joint consequences of A & Band the sum of their s _e parate consequences might then cal led an emergent fea t ure; ·\ k __:-. The relation between suc h emergence results from intensionality. reductionisrn · of the whole-part relation and extensional treatment ' ' .1 Cr./) N,!/- , !f,dvhr//l-7 '/)_ft. ('. . . J1l7'UJ 1 11 //i,c✓ t'1. d(c: -, { l • A • r:-.I /)c!tf.·c·.:JlA~/,-. 1/J)7 1. �of it is so close that the {A & B} for the ~ = {A} U {B} feature is sufficient • of the whole,-_- '_part relation. extensional~ In opposition to this 1 it is possible to develop a theory for an intensional whole_:-:._~ part relation in an intensional mereol og y which models the whole ·-- -~part relation in terms of an intensional implication relation such as entailment. It would be rather surprising if the social whole ~~ part relation . -- ,.,,.-- an extensional one which enabled simple summation except in were certain special cases. It is after all rather well-known that people can do in combination what they cannot do separately, not just in the to extensional sense in which they can sum their joint forces (e . g. I . lift a rock), but al.so in the more important sense which is no~_ extensional in which what they can produce i n cc-mbination may be far more than (and different from ) the sum of the separate efforts of each (e.g. in writing a joint paper). Such emergence seems especially to be a feature of activities which involve combined inte nsion ~ __,.lity l as many activities which are characteristically social seem to. The simple reduction of social wholes to sums of individual parts is the basic reduction of basic capitalism. The position is "({ f:t-•c· ,·1 ( , __ very important from a theoretical standpoint as the crucial r--e-l-e.v~nee point for the understanding of other positions / .just as are the Basic Reference Theory and Basic Empiricism to the understanding oV pos~tions ~ in epitemology . and logic. . 1, However as with the Basic Reference Theory and Basic Empiricism, the numerous difficulties the primitive form encounters lead to many refinements, elaborations and extensions, and there are few who now hold the basic primitive position. The reduction of social wholes to individuals view points is liberalised correspondingly - [thus it is no good identifying the position of �Jf.4. capitalism with the primitive reduction and attaching t~at, in the fashion of Bwnheirn. ref J. One lih.eralisrd reduction position, which appears to correspond to the extension of capitalism in Social !Je111ocracy, holds that social wholes can be reduced through anal:'.{Sing them in ten:ns of a theory concerning the assumed components and their interrelations. Thus the reduction is liberalised hyond a simple whole-part one, to provide a theoretical explanation and to take account of yet furt her features of wholes in terms of th e behaviour and interrelations of their compon e nts. Such a th eo ry would however be extensional, in accordance with the usual assumptions motivating this kind of reduction, so that the essential, non-reducible emergent features of the social will still be missed. The reduction - although i t will be ab le to take account of a more complex set of interrelations, between comp onents, will con tinue to be inadeouate and to leaitimise /\ (::, an impoverished version of communal life "orns ~ ".'here is ·' j strong logical case that such reductions cannot be made. This ~ is provided by such results as I] rrow' s the:erem ancl. pa ral lel results in voting theory. * The fact oi complex interdependence between the individual and the social whole also provides a strong prima facie case against a reduction, since if some characteristics o ~ individuals depend essentially on the social whole, the latter obviously plays an irreducible role. But some characteristics of individuals do seem to depend on and be modified by the social framework, tn the same vwy that the growth and species composition of the plants in a f)'lic<O rainforest is modified by a partly determined by the . climate ,\ * ~ See P.ou t.ley [ J' )The Impossibi lity of General ionist Social Theory.' 1\ Reduct- �and other matters which a r e determ ined by the biolo g ical commun it y . The irredu cibilit y of the social , of soci al levels of exp lanatio n and occ urrenc e seems to parall el very closely ~ the irr e duc l bi li ty of th e i.n tension al, and th e relat ed i rred ucibil ity of non-re ferenti al to refer e ntial occ urrenc es el the irredu cibilit v,. of commun a l in semant ics. seems to narall ) life forms to individ ual life forms . The non-re ducti onist t he sis in logic and metaph ysics, that objects have b oth e xten sion al and irreduc ible int e nsiona l prooer ties, . l;t -{ I, I "~'i oarall els in a Away that the non-re ductio nist thesis in social theory , that the proper ties of individ uals are determ ined by both individ ual and irreduc ible social forces, that is, are both individ u a l a nd social. There seems in fact to be a close and direct conn e ction betwee n the social and the int ension al - as we noted earlie r, on l y intensi onal relatio ns between the i ndivi dua l and the commun ity seem t o be ab le to c apture the e me r~en t feature s which charac teri.se the social. It seems impo ssibl e to charac terise the notion of a social commun ity withou t .~) ~ \ .'...,-' . ..J appeal ing t o inte n sional notions - .~ ims, shared p r op os es , shared commu nication and sha red values . Not a ll int ensio n al not ions are related to th e so c ia l of course , but if some are essent ial to it , as we have s uggeste d, then the d e ni a l or reducti on of the i nt e nsiona l, on e of th e l eadi n g thesis of the lo g ical and metaph ysical theorie s as s o c i a t ed with empiric ism, is the denial or reducti on of the basis of the social . �The proble ms and positi ons relati ng to th e attenp ted so reduc tion of the intens ional to the exte nsion al parall e l closel y and str,i,.. l<ingly those relati ng to the attemp ted reduc tion of the socia l to the indi vi- -dual that it is tempti ng to conclu de that they are in fact differ ent aspec ts of the ons sawe positi ons, that such interr elated pro bl ems and positi reapp earing in differ ent areas form a world view. :!?or a o fte n worke r in the mode1-n. philos ophic al produ ction line, it is diffic ult to see where and how the little piece of the puzzle he is workin g on fits in to the who le. * And as Smal le n.t.p .f :ound , journe ys of inqu iry to discov er conne ctions and overa ll signif icanc e are not encou raged. 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We suggest that it is not a coincidence, and that the following rough connections and correspondences hold which provide mappings between positions in different areas of intensional (in logic)- non- philosophy: referential (in semantics) - theoretical (in philosophy of ( 0 - extensional (in logic) - /t, v-J!,J Jl t:t I A referential science) - social ( in social theory) j observational (philosophy of individual (in social theory). science) ( in semantics)- Some of the routes connecting these concepts are fairly clear, others are less so. Some of them, for example the epistemological-logical connections, are elucidated in Beyond ] ~ ~ ploring ~einong's Jungle and . These correspondences give rise to the table on the previous page. This table should not be read as indicating that people who hold one of the positions on the line hold the others, or even that they logically should. For first most / of the connections have been overlooked, especially in this century, and second, the positions do not even ehtail one another because the ronnecting links are suppressed; and these , even if logically necessary, may be rejected by peGple who hold one but not another position in the line. Positions do however form closely linked ways of looking at the world they are world views. ~~st of the positions can be seen as modifications of or responses to~l , the basic reference world view position, within its own intellectual framework. This is especially true o f 1 's conventional ~pponent, Marxist socialism. In 3, the necessity and rationale for the ~arxist converse reduction is created by the acceptance of the main intellectual apparatus of the basic individual reductionist worldview, and ~~arxism �challenges ea! i talisrn very intellectual framework. ·1tHtd1 from within its own In contrast postion 5, the non- reductionist position, challenges 1 from a auite different s tandpo in t. The table should make it possible to distinguish clearly between two positions which, although entirely different, might on some theories (e.g. a r~arxist thecry) run some risk of confusion, that is, between the Libertarian Socialist position and the Social Democratic one. The difference parallels that between .the Fregean Double Referenre theory and the non-reductionist position regarding intensionality. Social De mocracy must be seen as an liberalisation or extension of basic capitalism, in the same way that the Double Reference theory is an extension of the Reference Theory which enables it to take account, albeit in a quite inadequate way, of much further material which the basic Referenm Theory cannot ,- .. ! ,.. handle. ~ . :> t•( ·f\ t1•~ l ..J,.J.._ .,,.._ ..;· ' ! ,·, '· / This is done through setting. up individualised substitutes fo;-- communal life forms, usually through the medium o:f so-called w- ~epresentative' or 'public' individualp institutions which control the 'publid sector and much of the social framework. ,';',i I ~!.:'• .I Given an individual reduction1),...(such as that of Mill, the major theorist of representative government) such representativeness appears inevitable, the only possible and logical way to handle communal life forms insofaras they can exist at all. is far From the standpoint of a different theory, it from inevitable; and the increasing destruction of communal life forms in :f:avour of such 'public' ones is dama g ing, impoverishing, and leads to great concentration of power. Social Democracy operates normally with a capitalist basis and grafts the 'public' sector on as an extension J just as the Double Re f erence theory operates with the Reference Theory for �the normal case and extends the theory to d ea l with difficult cases. The Double Reference Theory employs a substitute reference, the sense, for cases whe re the will not work, just as Social Democracy employs substitute individuals to represent community life forms for cases where a purely 'private' approach does not work. sense, is treated as a The second mode, the further sort of reference, just as the 'public' sector in Social Democracy is treated as a f urther sort of individual life form. Both these positions extend and liberalize the reduction of the basic position, rather than providing a genuine alternative to it. )'I. How do the reductions connect with the basic position .. of each theory? -----, I l_ /--------✓ ~- Each position uses its reduction to vindicate i t's own vision of a satisfactory societ~_L,{'~he capitalist �30. - reduction..---_:-· to-individuals position vindi cates capilalist ' . society through the following CJ1'v ' j\, /v I - Ayn Bandish type of argument:- If individuals are entirely self-made, and none of their properties are the result of the social framework, then the fact that some people are superior to others in certain respec ts must simply be due to their being inherently superior individuals in those respects. But if some individuals, by being more able than others, are able to acquire more power or more advantages for themselves, this is only right and ( C? 1,'f-isrn) Such inequality is unjust to no one, and prope~. I\ the result is the admirable one that the better are better rewarded and have more control over the shape of society. w, #1 Th~s the individualist reduction lead~ only a AH.:,. l\ with few further assumptions which not implausible, to a /\ position justi fyi ng inequality of power .. The Marxist position, equally, uses its reduction to vindicate ,ts vision of the social order, as one in which the individual can express himself or exercise power only through participation in the whole, the collectivity. Individuals can, in this soDq( and especially~ economic order, exercise n~ power as individuals, and power is held only by the collective, or class o rganisation . In contrast to these positions of inequality of power for the .individual on the one side, and of no power for the individual as such, on the other side, the non- reduc tionist theory co rresponds to a position of equality of power for individuals, both as individuals 9 n~ through the social framework. In its vision of the good society, individuals have equal power to determine the social framework, and equal power to control thsir own lives at the individual level . The social frame(,J c•rk 1 for example insti tutions1 should allow �31. life and deve lop each indiv idua l to maxi mize cont rol of his own comm unal his own disti nct pote ntial , as well as optim ise pote ntial . ccftr ol of comm unal life is commLJJl._~3 1, o.tic:l. that of indiv id ual life is indiv idua l. l Capi talis m is view ed as a disto rtion of indiv idua The oppo site uctio nism . life forms whic h is impo sed by indiv idua l-redA.>hrll'o ,,.1-,,:t._ c JJ ,• 6 · c i.l(,,t ( [nr.n:n,t:;,.J (dfi'f( ,:,..- /i h - f/,('_ h.·t ·fto abs orb th e pt\ attem 1 rrti~~J? h whic es a disto rtion r\ redu ction prod~ A ~+· 1 renc es in goQI~ indiv idua l comp letel y, to swal lo~ up, deny diffe and need s. This is an equal . dist o rt ion. iced The disto rtion s have some para llel wi t ~ othe ~not in rece nt w ~1 Cing . For exam ple / there is a para llel with the and oppo site forci ng of peop le's char acter s into disto rted the m expr essio n, sex role stere otyp e s whic h frus trate and deny thei r lives . and impo veris h and limi t thei r oppo rtuni ties and force d by the Ther e is a para llel also with the disto rtion s In the d. sepa ratio n of sexu ality and love notic ed by Freu that the same way the non- redu ction ist posi tion woul d hold t were ove rcom e good socie ty could be acA1e..,.: e cl only if the spli and the two sides reun ited:-\ ~~~•·:~~"gl~c i :~i:i~u :~\:~ ' ~~~•h :~ · ,, , . - -~ f\ s, and part of a disti nct 'self ' with disti nct need s and goal ,.,. . . .,,._~ I . . \vr. J. • r .} ,' / , . . , ,.: , . _ ,7 ;,t ' Both must be r ecogn ise d comm unity with common need s and goal s. ,\ IJ /. •· t -' I' j 1 in the struc ture of the s ocie ty. up some Such a non- redu ction ist posi tion can then take redu ction of the data that each side uses to supp ort its with out howe ver redu ction . 1,1cui- t i ~ J_ ___ t he pena l ties impo sed by the Thus it can claim s~pe rior expl anato ry powe r. as we have For exam ple, the non- redu ction ist posi ti o n can s of each othe r, po i nte d out, acce pt each side~ basic criti cisma11c{ -, also thei r it can re cogn ise the claim s of the indiv idua ls I . limi tatio ns. limi tatio ns , an d the claim s of the soci al its d criti que. It can admi t th e va l idity of much Marx ist-in spire �32 . For instance , it can agree that in capitalism people are frequently unaware of the real social determinants of their actions and values a nd see as free choices on the individual level what are in fact determined at the framework level. It can agree that the utility of the invisibility of the manipulated social framework to capitalism is to dis~uise the existence of other options and make a situation~ which is to the advantage of so~e gr oups, appear necessary or ine scapable , ~ * or to the advantage~and chosen by all. This is however not evidence for the Marxist theory as opposed to th e nonreductionist theory which it supports just as well or better/ 1 a nd it does not show that there is no such thin g as free individual choic e . S imil arly most of the valuabl e part of the Marxist critique of capitalism can be seen as evidence for the lack of re al communal control at the social framework level, rather than as .,or··· supporting the thesis ~hat that N,·11 /Je_: on!_y level on which anythi n r; really occurs. is Thus also the t heury can take accou nt of classes without bein~ stuck with the ~l g iditi es and difficulties of a class reduction or a class view of history . ., ,1, ·; ..\ •~ ~ ' I\'-\ \ ~~ Class explanations for ind ividual action can be used where they a.re required, but individual aL.+1cr1 C<.H o.lso be reco gnized and there is no need to explain all the a. r:t ions of in di v i cl u a 1 s in his t or y forces and so on . ,1 s u 1 t j_ mat e 1 y the pro c/cL d of c 1 as s Such a theory can also provide t h e basis for - what is lacking in Marxist theory - * For documentation of this thesis, see Conscio usness . t Captains of Thus also some, but not all, of the >.I... Marxist critµq~ of the last twenty years remains of value to the non-reductionist position . �32.1 a critique of socia l Democracy which distinguis hes i t clearly from Basic ( apitalism . Th e majo r the oretical feature of ,ocial Democracy is th e attemnt to take account of communal LLfe for rns and other cases wh1 eh obviously cannot be accoun ted for adequately in basic capitalism , in terms of an individua l subs tit w~s for them-as in the ' publ ic' sector , Governmen t by represent ative A Marxist-ty pe theory cannot take individua ls , and so on. adequate account of this individua lisation , because it is committed to seeing all the actions of individua ls as represent ative of class forces, so that the indivi dual ' captt!Ye ' of social life fo rms in Social Democracy ' becomes for them just their capture by various class forces. measures bt.d'('t<Gtcratic ' fv4:.,/c,i;a-n.. The welfare and so on of Social J ' Democracy must they be written down as cynical manoevres by the capitalis t with th e intention of keeping the working J.t ,u/._ classes quie t removin~ obvious sources of grievance , while I\ ' public ' sector activity is seen as merelJ re~ulatory for caoitalism . This may be an aspect, but it is not adequate as an a nal ysis . In reassessin g the Marxist critique in the light of the non-reduc tionist positio n, it is crucial to distinguis h , as the Marxist critique Joes not, between individua l reductioni sm a n d individua lism, in the broader sense of the recognitio n of individua ls and distinct nonreducible individua l life forms . Privatisat ion , Elitism , Encroachin g Individ ua li sm , etc. , the way in which what people can choose to consume, produce, and do , is g overned at the framework level by the machinery of �33. private profits, th e great inequalities of power an d of wearth resulting from that - all these are prod ucts of Individual reductionism, not of individualism as such . r.Jr.{. p.: r Jl ;'/f . jt:.. ;-- ,¥- 'Jf- -~ .,>f'.... A'--. .;i«: From a~philoso p hical viewpoint the reduction positions have their bas i s i n a part icular,and ~~dequate,but widespread logical and me taphy s ical theory. It would be surprising --...,_ how ever if these b a sic redrutions, wh oi~ distor.___.,.tions underlie n_ early all tHcc/.r,,r,1_ social thought, originated entirely i n a particular logic al theory . The logical theories ct.U--rt:,z. t at a particular time indirectly reflect social values and intellectual currents a t that time, like every other sort of theory, and do not stand in some unique way above and beyond them. If a different kind of logic has been needed, it would probably have been developed. The prev~knL c of this now established logical theory may explain why few now see through the reductions, but it does not entirely explain why they we r e developed. A / "" J'&"' /.~r</'~·- ,i(1/"7° of reasons for the overlooking of the non-reductionist position lies in a s et of SC'C;r -·· • ( di;,,,1.,':r; fu;.__ t[ !{~.,- -✓ ..1.f;, ,1 0-k d',c.__ l -,- t;, ,1.,/-(;/(_) • . economic assumptions,\ common to the red_u ction posit.ions. p o.r..11½; 1 , '- 1 Our confidence that the non-reductionist position was a ~eal and A' not merely a theoretical pos s ib li ty or utopi aJt'f'aritcdJ; lay in the fact that the tribal societies we considered in the early part of the pape r had a structure which enabled Individualism a nd some individual economic actively to munal ly-controlle d social framework. with a u -n1.- Such societies clearly had structural features which meant that t hey did not have to make the U.Yt.palatable choice between the o prc) .S. ·ing disto :.:-tions o f totally collective o r totally individualisti c.. life. control of There are other advantageous characteristics also which (>-,l.. fl'/ are common to such socie t ies, L/1.d racteristics which (' �34. sophisticated ~0cttd despite the rising d eM•cracies to-day seek, but which ~DP and the 'high standard of living', which is supposed to provide justice and the good life for all / always The l ow level of environ- seem to be further off than before . ~" 1 P-, r,y mental d e struction cl /\ t-r; ~u( conscious life-style) · '·'-·~ and the environmenta lly- src;~{~i;.1 -_ . frctture.~ which ha~( often been noticed, t-... s ha l~? the almost total lack of in ;.,~uali ty and poverty-' the ")...•'-·◄ }'-'- \,._:, \ '-,__-\ V·' ,:. c.l-11,·, ·,•-7' high level of equa1, ·7 of power and relative lack of ~e\fe-r-R-me-Ft-t-r ,..._ domination; the considerable level of leisure ( o fte:ri, as SaA/eAl .f . /1 as pointed out, greater than that in modern western societies) and the frequerlly rich cultural and communal l ife [Ref. Sahlens?]. These features have been attributed to various things th e.. low level of technology, the communal living feature, the hunting -- 3ei fttc;..ing life- s-fJ Jc: and the norn a ti ic life ,~hich was 1 The first we can definitely ru le out. The mountain forests of Gr e ece were destroyed, the Middleof its rich topsoil and stri_: ppped of J1'HidZ by erosion, (r e f . Lowdermilk~b y a people with a 7 uite low (9 1 e v e l o:E technology by u,..;--- QWa standards, who also had a culture :). .,.._J.._ which was Mark .ea by great inequality -e-:r en s/cpJ<.:'...-.me nt. ...(_., \ ,.''1-/·, ,,_: .. Living ,Jt ;. d , 1)\ -(_ \. \ l ,y r ant e es/\ th e se features, as by no means gua .. a/ modern cities demonstrate · &Fra the success of communism appears .I t.t. c (J'(t t:< ( --1~1.rl; ,Je__ i I\ to be a consequentia l rather than;\. wh ile the no roadie life {;,Jic-<.u;f,:tl with the hunting/gath ering ,:S; style cannot be the whole story ~(J """'- t{ 7 I\ YI L ~ some societies which gardened also had or have I' these features feature seems to be one Th! f~ ) (e.g. Melanesia). of soC;Ct( structure. if t ·;-ut:-}s very good ner~,d for us, because we can hope to work for a di f ferent so C~Q/ structure, whereas we cannot r e alistically hope to obtain a collective and arrow, the woo :1en \t-1()-(_ ' . return to the bow or the hunting-gath ering way of life• ; �35 The structural feature which makes possible th e combination of collectivity and individuality and the other >v,v'-( ,, attr active features of tribal life, is, we suggest, the fact that the dominant mod e of production in su ch societies is that the producer of an item is, in general, also the person or group who uses or consumes it. People produce for their own needs, It and not , in general, for other people or for exchaDg_~. - is this feature which makes it possible for tribal people to live in a collective framework which is nevertheless not ---- oppressive to · individuality, for while the structure is collect- ,..,,...-- , , - - -----··- i vely determined and '\::ollecti vely h e l ~ ~ land, for ~~~_p_le_-,) ·h•. ri 1 fr: 11n .~, ('... ·i ht., ; r (' \:: n. their own it is p ossible for individuals or groups 1.\ needs,set . I goo , s, and how best to pursue them. J(\I This featureApr~ t-~ -cons umer identitv ; is in fact a feature which i s closely associated with, or even necessary to, a hunting-gathering way of life, but it is not confined to such a of life (that is , it is not af s0 su ff icient f or it) . l1t{J I(. C'lt The condition of producer-consumer identity oJ the/\ ckn ..:.r~f\;-/, f, ·<. \S - dominant)mode of produ -~tion~ the condition upon which the , . socJ~ty which is self-managed at all levels can be obtained. When production and consumption become S'e/!).Jr. f .;_ ,L and production f o r other people's :n:eds becomes the dominant mode of production, the choice between private or individual control of the means of production,or collective contr~= l/is forced on us and we are back again to ec,t other th an the producer mvst r u npalatable choices. ~~n .?om~ody· control production, decide and organise what will be produced and used, and control ~ r,\~+-t (-1 ,ml;; l;.r c (' other people's labour. / Whether the 'somebody' is l an individual or group of individuals ( as in CC/< ·fl{ 1t ·1 ;,,l· ) Cc,rnintu1t,t j et , or class collectively deciding what will be produced and how, we have the situation where not all individ uals can a_. �36. determine their . ctol\. what it produces. distinct needs or control tried- CLC•\ Iv 110,,.r - and A. The separation of production CinrL consumptio n then forces the choices which underlie the reductions and distortion s of capitalism and Marxism, and the resulting split between the individua l as Hte separate and individua l 21.s a mQmbt:?.-t· of a community . Capitalism and Marxist socialism have in common a commitmen t to this separation o f production and consumpti on, di ,ht_,,,1 r•r \ fragmenta tion of lcJJc,lr which reac_h ~s its resulting; and to the highest pitch . in the production line sys tems of modern indu,stry. Such systems of production were of course devised ancl implement ed first by capitalis ts, but were, as we know f~m Marx's works, greatly admired by Marx, who saw them as necessary to lift humanity f rom its previous condition of rural i db cy. { ~~eals itself clearly In this respect the Marxist posi tio~·';I\ as accepting a great deal of the intellectu al and eronomic framework o f c ~pitalism . ) I I The positive Marxist attj tud~ \ to the fragmentat ~on of labour is not just an optional extra tacked onto the theory because of Marx's own personal prejudice s. It is a feature of the theory, which basically views proauction in a fragmented way. *The theory arose * The Marxist picture of the tota i h~torical l y arnong1 and was supported primarily byJ the labour forces engaged in fragmented production in capitalis t enterpris es, rather than among independe nt workers. dependenc e of each individua l element on the other elements of the whole obviously is closely connected with a model of pro- d(cf.;.:. ,~ b.,.l c ,1 7 �37. ducers. The reduction positions appear in fact to be very closely connected with the way in which production l' IGH•; :/ is A andfupecia lly with the attitudes to the fragmenta tion for the Marxist reduction of individual to ~ of labour; of a class or collectivi~ C.:i . ._ ~- derives its motivation precisely from the acceptance of the capitalist production t<PP«rat~s . For the fragmentation of labour means that what the individual worker does makes sense only in the context of the total production of the collective. ,~}< Thus · the capitalist and Marxist both share a vision of work in terms of the production /i;1c, but interpret it differently. (The production line is an excellent repres- entation of the dominance of the fragmentation of labour, the assumption which both the reductionist positions accept) The capitalist view is production line o:f the for the purpose of production)of the workers or operators / extensions of the machines - their goals , their intentio ns are irrelevant, they are not part of the production. The object of the production line system~to be understood in terms of t he qoals of the Q,;,,,~-e~~--t ov;;:\h~f ~ A t~~~~~,~; of the goods. 'rhese are of course the characteristics of capitalist society and especially of typical work in capitalist society. Work is ((\:. ~, meaningless, directed from above by someone else , goals are external, to be understood in terms of the goals of individual capitalists or consumers) c\ c~ (~.,... J. I}:- b,___,. f'--.i'. r;L ~~ c:-~,.Js•.• The Marxist also has a production line image, but for him the work of the production line, which is not meaningful when each worker is viewed in isolation, c a n be understood in terms of the goal of the totality of wor kers. Each individual can make only a part of the ~hole, and everyone is needed to make the whole ,tern. /1 i :·:.,-:v--.\,·,__l ~ v ~ Work is mechanical, so �38. there is no place for individual differences and so on. There is plainly no place for 'individualism' in any shape or f . 1 1.ne. . t _..:orrn on th. e pro d uction Mind, rh e . i . mind, b1e goa 1 , is a C1 ass 1 to the workers on the production line. purpose of production must be viewed e n f, ;-(~.I ,,,, 1 The terms ''J /1 u.r/1(> f C sha r ed or goal of the whole group. k- But for those of us who regard the production line as a degraded and distorted form of labou~, to empl'?y ,-~~eh .·. _ ). __ (u.-1,~( c \.\ ' ,1 <I ; ~(I_ c,u,un,.,, (,,(,,~, d J,. /l(' y_, (-·.{4l' c:.. \ --- ' an image as the model of product io n and of society;\ is simply('.'' 1.T:'--~:'.L.:· amazing! For these are precisely the characteristics that make the production line an detested and oppressive form of work. The image - like the assumption of the ffrl-1"- Jmentation o f labour itself -:- betrays the basic capitalist origins of th e Marxist social model extremely clearly. In this as in other respects much Marxist thought is the basf :..ril.. capitalist parents. child of For the fragmentation of labour seen in one form in the production line was set up by cap i talists for their own b e nefit, and is neither more rewarding for the workers, or More productive for the consumers, than other forms of work. The non-reductionist position would simply reject the {Ill model o f work or of society, production l i ne asAappropriate Si nce the production line is not a form of work in which the 1,.._, .... ,c h 1>\-\~-1.. \ individual worker has (\ control - it is ,,the form in which he . ·1 ~ ~_:Sy,"s. ~has J...l..t..t..1..-~ ~r--=ne- control. The image of production, the non- reductionist position would employ would be that of a person or group of persons - making something f or hi .s 0UJ1L o. se. The work is purposeful and not undertaken for external re Lc,·cu l-L or exchange/the goals are inter l\t< producing a whole piece of work. ! I. The worker~ If he is working with a ?Np/,_ group of people, some differentAp1ay be doing different parts of the task, but all the work ers will share in the final product. _\,; . (. �39. In the non-reductionist position the intention or purpose of the work is ~ - that of the individual workers, that is~work is viewed in an intentional rather than in an mechanical way. Here is another important source of the reductionist positions which lies in the treatment of intensionality. cc,nJ1'cfL?,.r If WE\ work a:. s relation between the maker and the c.c made_, the three positions come out as follows: the relation between the individual 1. Capitalist: worker and the made object is not a ~®WHXfMi purposeful one, the purpose is someone else 's. In short the maker - made relation is rna.cl1r7t, n,\::o( , and extensional. The hired worker is an extension of the machine and th e purpose or int en tion '1--\l \ _.::,.·1 of the work is exter-te-€d to it. 2. Marxist: the relation between the individual worker and the made object is still seen as not purposeful, the purpose is in the w_tio l_s?. production line, the society. The maker - made relation, as such, is still viewed as extensional. 3. 3rd position: the relation between the maker and t he made is inteniional, it is purposeful, the goal is directly in the work itself. What differenh~t r work (e.g. under take n by a machine) mechanical and meaningful work is t he lack of intention in case of the former. The relation between t he creat iJe artist and what he makes - the only Ui!t- - sort o.fl\ in which capitalism admits this k1',1 cL of intentionality - is the ~ypical work A designs B _1 A case ♦ The model is: creates B. If the mechaniqal, extensional picture of the maker/ made relation is to be rejected, along with the unpalatable l reductionist choices which it creates, : it is essential to �4 0. i~fuse the individual worker back again into the picture as the creator and designer of whole objects, as the initiator anA. goal setter of h i s own work. This implies a theory which recognises irreducible individual life forms, and thus again, The fact that the a theory which is not Marxist in character . commitment to the fragmentation of l.a.bour cannot be dropped J.:.f h 1,;..,.. 1.,~t / from Marxist theory without ft eornplet~ reconstruction (so great as to render it no longer a Marxist theory) means that the Marxist position is, from the environmental point of view, At bottom it buys the same production apparatus a dead-- end. c..:,. an-a- capitalism, and therefore it can be expected that, even if the management of the firm is changed, it w i 11 turn . out essentially the same line of go~ds. y,,u~(! ,t ( l)J.Y l~-r b411c or ( Acl-1<1.:l; n· ·,!i'c.. the ,\ as Producer-consumer identity'>. O:' b~ Ii d, ,,rf) / mode of production does not of course mean that every individual produces everything he needs for himself entirely on his It means that people produce for their own needs, own. in the combinations they choose. Individuals could of course do so, and some harct-.Y soul s no doubt would want to; provided that they do not interfere with other people's equal entitlements or use more than their fair share of (';'{ IJ .,./.i (Lk,,1:.§ production-land or other commu~~( resources, there is no '\ reason why they should not. Many more pe o.ple, given free choice in the matter, would probably want to produce some I for their own or their households use~and some in common work with others for common needs or interests. /thittZ.-- S ince some activities are more bothAefficient and more enjoyably done with other people, and some are less r ,1 1 (Ji h~ so, it ee-e4-d be expected that most people would work in a mixed system of individual (I M c cllei: I , iN. or communal work ) perhaps varying the combintions at different stages of their lives. /\ �41. But there is a great deal of individual variation in the degree of contact with other people that is ~~~¥iN~ pleasing. Some people at the other end of the spectrum might want to do everything in conjunction with other people. What is essential however/ if the combinations are to be freely chosen, is that the individual option should be open. Freedom and independence is enhanced rather than destroyed by Choosing to work with others, b~t such a choice is free only if there is an option. People do not control their own lives if they cannot set their own goals and determine their own needs, choose what to work o n, with whom and when, how mu ch contact with other· people is op t imal, and so forth. Real control of one's life would be impossible .in a system which envisaged only most collective or communal production, as m0sxx~MiXMXX alternatives to capitalism do. The option o f individual ,, /I production, even if it should t urn out that it was not of t en ft;, ._,} used, is essential to ensure that people remained in control of their own lives ~~~~~i~~ in crucial respects. �We have already suggested that a s oc iety in which DIY as the c/1.Cttiu._ (u; 1tic. n-: ode of production would have the conditions which are necessary for and wo uld tend to lead to a truly free s o ciety, one 1 all levels both the oellcctive and the which was self-managed at / and the principle individual ., To complete the conditions self management . ~ of DIY must of course extend a lso through the rest of the institutional Ivan Illich has made a substantial start on suggesting strudure. what some self-managed in'i hfv1.l,c'iir might be like, and on exposing the institutions they are to replace~ although structure of the existing ct.,_!\.- t-he seems to lack a f\ vision of how they fit into a larger framework. This is not the only area ill which DIY would appear to deliver a superior society; t h ere are many ot h ers, 1 d · . t o concen t ra t e but we 1nten At the production here on those relevant to environmental issues. level the basic features of such society have already been suggested A c ommuna/ly control l ed infrastructure would by a number of people. provi de t he basis for prod uction of common basic needs and make these available on a fair basis to any individuals or gro ups who ,, to use them to produce for their own needs. wished __,, We want to stress that DIY is not a proposal for a return to a primitive life-style, ,· 1r 1 1 abandonment of technology, endless hours of grinding labour as a ff /)J y fou "e.~ eu>4..ld ;-i f1t.d- 6rL. ~ '/,"1TQ_ -fad>t(JtliJILCto/ .!'of>,U.d,c~t. k)<...ie.-J:J. It wo>1.h/ of course involve and subsi~te~c-~ _fa'.·1ne~>and so forth.). _ ,Jre.,·.:,,.J{..r- ,1c;.,__ /t!(i __,-!)._/ ,: L1,. t.J.l ~ , 7J,.,_,-J. if1..<- ifti ~------ ------------ - - ----- - - - d.,Pi-e.f"Tl11..-t result in a ·a ifferent life-styl~ a Akind of technolo gy1 and a different kind of ap proach to work. d ;l, ,,,'\ beneficial. Moit of these changes would appe3r to be / , f:. ( ~j !l e.( For example most peof~le could provide for theh- _l~c:l.__§_~c I /\ 1i·J1 '.7. standard in a more satisfqctory way than at present, with perhaps 1 li, f, ,· . l l -. ,-.,,,{_ 4 hours ..jk'V'{_l, .,-..i) 1 l· 1:,· ,:.:,./J /i..( f t, za•I I J ';,._.,• /-4.. per day of work, and probably 1-ers--S;,/as nt.Dre appropriate technology develops and for people wh o work in larger communal groups. 1 The typical feature of solutions to the problem in our society or Marxist soci ety is that~o nesolves one set of problems by creating a nother . oft~n more formR-ble , e. ._~· as one 'sol v:es' . the p~oblern of pciJt.:.r~ y . · in a rather inadequate way by utc,cdi 1-y cm environmental This £eatur~ is avoided to a reasonable probl~rns or some o t her problem. further problems created appear much the where system, DIY a in t ext e n that in the or y constructt_on parallels The situation less formibl e . thi~almost invariab~ ~ of kind t th eory th wrong where on~ has the or equally bad one hap!?3ns, a problem resolved in one area :r.eapr:ears as a worse �B (2) A crucial question for a DIY society is: sort of s ub s titu t ion s of labour can be made? what A be ginnin g on answering this question is s u ggested by construin g sub s t i tut ion ·~ -.-the. __ s..ub s t i _t _1Jt,j__prl' as the s u b s t it i on of an ·~ equivale nt economic oroduct. Thus su bstitui on in ,f- economics parallels and reflects identity theory in logic. [Expla in ~it uation in identity theory and intensional lo g ic]. The DIY economic system will plainly re q uire much greater r estriction on substitutivity of identic als , j ust as i t s corresponding intensional logical counterpart does. In contrast the economic theory of the existing system can be seen as extensional, it allows un restricted substitutio n, and the same way it leaves a hu~e range of important factors out of acc ount which are taken account of without diff i culty in a n in tensional system. Unrestricted exchange (or substitution) and the associated division of labour c reates these difficulties , in part thr ou gh the (!f, t rans fer of costs of product i ~ and be n e Lit s from consumption onto different par t ies, and in part through the fact t hat equivalent products~ in the weaker sense of the standard economic theory may !:1~?_!;_ be eq uiv alent in social and environmental respects . 1V\ •·- c(; ~1 '-' Moves such as environmental t:.___, p ricin g are i G . ~ efforts to qualify such substituU.on. �B. The most important de fections from pure DIY lie in qualLfied s ub stitutio ns, s ubs titut io n of on e pe r t:;on ' s labou r for a nother' s in particular. Labour exchan ge i s admissible provided it does not int erfere with o th er va lu es , e. g . does not dest r oy o r things the co mm unit y val ues. C 11 rrhe restrictions~ substitution may profitably be comp ,1,red with th ose in extens ional identity , whi ch excl ud e int e n sional conte~t-s as ille gi tima te for sub s titution.,e-x-tensimLo.i' i n d i..v i d-u.al--m-e-an-S �I Such an estimate would presuppose retaining some limited kinds ,vI 1 J · / • •' it\) of lar :)J t · -· :,:tc./L. ','\ production, perhaps communally owned., and operated perhaps by those who would use the product~or by people working on a \storage' system, for example, the mass production of cheap durable Cc,-- NPl basic clothing and housing as proposed tn ._~topia. __Jro suggest that hi/J ,~ <.,,., <-l1u.,/r..(,{.:. -1(ft(c_, /"<.rlcv-.__ • e/ DI Y should be the\ v · mode o~ production is also not to suggest 1 1 Vil\ " ~l ~-, ?- bLe__ that it should be the -~-- -- _,__ ·- - . mode of productioni the system ;: ,;,n J)} /t<.J<.. j can be liberalised, to allow for some limited kinds of exchange 1\ production and some limited kinds of free communal productio~without destroying its overall character, in the same way that the present system allows for certain limited kinds of DIY - 'Do-it-yourself' - product ion without lo..s.ing its overall character as a system of exchange f.rJJ .-· _ :;;) The'. Dr.'/ tf -~ fc,,11... /"" l ~ 1f,; production. ~A could also/be extended to allow people who wished to concentrate heavily on some project and needed a lot of free !1·11,~J time to 'store' basic credits o ver a time period. For example,, u ,:,ii(:/\_ in 'Communita s' ; . ," A in the late 1940' s/'Paul Goodman estimated that ;;- +l.1. plant, equipment a n d technology avai lable were used efficiently ~ ~ people could provide for their basic needs for an entire lifetime in two years, ,:, and could then organise the rest of their time freel y~ _,,1 ----- -·- c ~~ce~t;ated - ~~0 That is a high tech_. picture,, even allowing for the increase in productivity since he wrote•but the basic idea is ,J adaptable to a lower tech. one, albei t with a larger time period. MX<'S Most people though would probably prefer to provide for their basic ne~~ by production outside the basic community ·~ - ~ontrolled A - _,,- mass-production system.,1as in Ecotopia, obtaining both more pleasing goods and more satisfying work in doing so; and even many of those \,v o.~......-ttQi who w-c • -:-Gl to have a large amount of time free for the pursuit of some project might find the production of part of their own food on a daily basis an enjoyable and satisfying form of relaxation. �Production beyond that for basic needs is an optional extra which -,) people can pursue as and how they desi re. ( It will certainly be objected that such a system would not all ow sufficient leisure or free time. The sharp distinction between 'leisure' and 'work' is of course to a product of a system ' r-... where work is typically q l·1e,_;,_ nated tfl the sense that those who work on it do not control it and its gon./J are extetll(d. to to process in that the m6tivation for doing it is to obtain something other than the fina l product or the satisfaction of the work. working on wh at Someone who is he enjoys do ing and finds satisfying to do to produce for his own need~does not draw a sharp distinction between 'work' and 1 leisure 1 • Furthermore it would appear that such a society could allow for a great deal more 'leisure' in the sense of time not spe nt on the basic needs for living, than the present one and such leisure would be in principle avai lable to all, which is not the case in the present system. The price which would be _paid for free time would however be quite different. The price of free time for non-production Uc~ J ities e.g . intellectual or artistic projects, or just to contemplate the universe, would not be the price of inequalityJo f being able to rely on other peqie lower down the scale to do the basic need:; production in an alienated way. The pri ce would be simplicity of life. In the same way the price of indepen dence from other people is not a private income which enables one to made use of the labou r of others, but an \ {'.:. - :, ~:, I( ,c~,\ independent, self-reliant mode of ~roduction. The ob;,J e c tion that such I\ a society would extinguish the intel lectual and creative lights which are alleg edly fostered so well in this society does no t hold water, t but it is sure to be made much of because a major justification for 1,, equa lity and for production for exchange is that i s is supposed to \)t --? - release some specially gifted individuals w-~ \ sufficient full-time leisure to pursue such things.] /lcf. 1 ,,/J r. c , 1cf,1 rr,, �A DIY system will of course be pronounced by economists to be 'inefficient' and therefore denounced as one which 'lowered living standards'~ t1c,1 It is fairly well known to Rconomists that efficiency is a relative and evaluative notion that is that if it is 4f measuredAthe total output of value per unit of imput then the term 'value' cannot be explicated in terms of the market as just 1'141 what the market deliver s without ernplOYJtt he J_ . t1Clfu--(Qi;111c fallacy. It is not sufficiently often realised that it is also a relatiV istic notion, that is, that it is relative to the socio-economic framework I adopted, and that appeal s to 'e ff iciency' ~n t err> i S of the present system are really appeals back to a fo~m of individual reductionism. It is not a question of abandoning the concept of efficiency, but of realisation of the dependenc e on a J·t 1 U1 f 1") C; r - econonomic base. For some things which are efficient to produce in the present centralised structure based on a high degree of fragmentation of labour would be extremely inefficient to produce in a DIY system, and some things which are inefficient to produce in the present system would be efficient to produce in a DIY system. Centrai; \cftion depends upon fragmentation of labour, and therefore on the social and political choices which are forced by it. A DIY system would have a radical form of decentralisation as a natural consequence for people who have regai~ed control of their productive force would <"( ~ naturally combine in smaller decentralised groups a.n d suited their needs and interests. Th~s in a DIY system smaller scale or ga nic gardening, which makes use of local organic material instead of wasting them, would be more efficient than gardening which depended upon imputs from a high energy, cf11fr4./,· ru/ fertilise,·-plant, for instance,.If the people who wanted to use something hcttl time producing it, then anything requiring a large measure of transport or manufacture elsewh ere away from the in effi cient compared with a n (, .te of use would tend to be Q/~rnat ive way of doing something which �could be produced or made locally from local materials and which did t unpleasan t work processes . materials would then be t>l i{( t\ )i,f U-/ .", f l <( In general ' 1 available loc al -i lt (') L }·n ore efficient to use thar, which /\ required a high level of manufactu re, low technical processes would 1 usua lly tend to be more efficient than high level ones, and .so on. These chan ges are strengths· pre· c;seiy the sources of its environme nt; and other and to suggest that such a system can sim; 1J be written off as 'inefficie nt' to try to wri te a social framework into economics and absolute in a quite invalid way. A DIY society would be as naturally decentral ised as ours is natural l y c entralised ~ The role of this kind of radical decentral isation in reducing enviro nment al impact through encouragem ent of a decentralised small- S,cE)_/e;. low impact technology has o ften been pointed o ut. Another consequen ce which i s not so often remarked on but is equally important is the role of s uch decentral isation in enabling a natural accounting of many sorts ~f environme ntal costs occ urin g as a result of productio n. Local production for local needs means that normally the environme ntal costs associated with production are borne by the local population whic h uses and produces the items concerned . There is thus a strong natural basis for taking such costs as the destructio n of local ame nity into account as part of the perceived cost of producing that destructiv e sort of item. Accounting of costs which takes account of environme ntal values is extremely difficult to do in a n a tural way in a system which spreads costs around in a widesprea d 1 The dividing line between self-manag ed technology and the opposite does not however entirely coincide with the high tech/low tech For example, good two-way commun ications system coul~ ~ distinctio n. have an invaluable role in cre at ing a network of flexible cornrnuni t i,_ es, other than the spatially local community , in which individua ls could Computers could, as Illich points ou~be used to participa te. further and create such a network of communiti es and cit'-<__ invaluable aids in self-manag ed education medical and legal systems J IAJh...(l,t--(1_ they could be used to overcome the ~onoDolis ations of skills, knowledge , In ::,_ short some and informatio n by professio nalg and technocra ts. power, instead of of co uld serve decentral isation high-techn olo gJ being used to increase the concentra tion of power as in the present system . �fashion as centralised integrated production - for example, the commonly encountered situation of concentrated major benefit going to a small numbf~r of people and s ma l ler but very widespread costs accruing to a very large number of people. This situation typifies the subtle way in which environmental degradation occurs in such systems. If the environmental costs of production occur in the same region as and accrue to the same people as the benefits, we could expect that the environment costs of producing certain destructive items would be much less easily overlooked or shrugged off. A DIY system would be 'pluralistic' in the sense that it could provide for a very large range of different diversity in gords and needs. life-styles and a great There are however a number of bu~lt-in .i. -n1.t' ;,· : •. ..,/f features which would work strongly against environmen~llyAdestructive life-styles .. It is important to realise that these features are the result of DIY and are not obtained simply by the feature of comr:u.mo..l control of the means of production. 1 , , Consume. rism and Waste~ --·-· ·--, ... ~ ~ I] feature of DIY _,..,. rs a built-in defence against the complex of problems known as consumerism{ t ha~is 1 the taking o f satisfaction in accumulating unneeded goods). �Consumerism arises primarily when people find little which they do not control, satisfaction in their work, and which is frequently, for most peopl~repetitious and boring a 1 iv, ~~J and undertaken only to mak:1 ., or for reward s mainly 12 1', t J. 111.)( Satisfaction must be found outside to the production process. the production process, in consuming the products of other people's labour . Such consumption is the reward of work, and the consumer society rewards its members for the unpleasantness of their work mainly in terms of opportunities for increased consumption . In lead to a situation where goals contrast, since DIY wc ,dd. were mostly internal to work, satisfaction in such a society would be obtained though the work process itself and not in a never-ending chase for satisfaction through consumption. Reward s would be through the production process I not !_rom work ·- lying just in the product. Work would be undertaken in part because it was satisfying itself, As any self- and not usually tu_st to obtain the final product. builder knows, even apparently mundane projects such as building o n e's own hous e can become,if the worker can control his own labour and match what he does to his needs, a source of great satisfaction and of self-expression. 1 In this situation people express themselves a nd their individuality through what they make, not through consumption of mass-produced items e.g. buying a new model car . of the make the individual thin'k fits his /n1ccge . 11 In a DIY system, these sorts of satisfactions are available to everyone, not just a few people selected and designated as "gifted" or "creative 11 , and allowed to work creatively, as in capitalism. Secondly, there are in fact very substantial limits to the extent to which one could be an indiscriminate consumer in a DIY society Je cD~1Jone wanted to , lonsum e rism depends upon other people 's labour to If people have to make their g ood s themselves a crc;cial extent. (for example 1 if you have to go and work in a bicycle works for a while /1 ._,.,. t.' ' ,...., J'/ ;.. ;\). . . ~ -· .. ' 0-11"'. t: , rL. .... t ,.....___ \:: • _ 1 • •, • _• - , / ) ,:,..:_ .. ,, .... -t ~ l_ -~A. ,_\. \ 1. . • C /- 1 ·,._ ).•.•.•. 0\1 r . . tl ·'t-y \\ . _/_ �if you want a bicycle), then there will be a serious trade -of f b e twe en work time and consumption, which would act as a built - in The more goods are accumulated, the less brake to overconsumpt ion. time one would have to use them . leisure would have fe~r~oods. People who want large amounts of Many people even in the present society , standard " - ·fh,., ·t . givife) such a choice, might in fact prefer a "lower l1vii1j /;(e i.r > tt n m1 h.-r The work situation in and more free time for their own pursuits. capitalism encourage consumerism in man_y ways, one of the most important being that people do !:"lot usually have a choice to obtain shorter work hours, have fewer consumer goods and more leAsure or more time for their own projects. They have to work certain hours, they h a ve a surplus, so they might as well use it to obtain the customary rewards. DIY would allow the 1wd,hi"J of work in a flexible way to needs, rff-' for more free time, which and e ncourage such a tradeAof fewer go ods could be spent on non-consumer pr ojec ts. \ Thirdly, a DIY society would be a noh-waste socie ty. No one would work to make things he did not really need when there were othe r I thi n gs he could be doing I ) ( instead. ' ', '--: ,. , - .,-, : , ' A.: ,◄ \ ) As Brian Martin has pointed ou~many presently environmenta ] y damaging systems, such as the private car system, would tend to disappear if people has to make their own, repair them, and help the roads. Buses, bicycles and horses, or other transport systems would b e more efficient in such a society. One cannot imagine people in a DIY society.work ing for a month a year, for example, in a packaging factory to make a lot o f unnecessary package s th~yhad to throw away as soon as the item was unwrapped/and then/fur ther had dispose of by their own efforts. The goods they / would manufacture for themselves would be as durable as they could be made, and would be made to be easily repaired. Materials would be made to go as far as they possibly could - technology would be developed which would do as much as possible with as little as possible " �could not be manufactured in a l~cal area would tend to be replaced [0, th ose which did not have these characteristics. Since high- ..~;.f . _ l ,_ \\/ technology materials eq\1aLly- have the characteristics, the y would t e nd to be replaced by low tech materials, with consequent benefit to the environment. fNlf The DIY society would Abe a low-consumption/low resource-use Since waste represents unnecessary and avoidable .1.. ·: u- (\J ,-.. r 1": ·-:- l c, b,~ , ..,. k I uld avoid it. labour/wo own their controlled who people labour, no-waste society . ~ t c ,....t (A. I,._• .. •J - " . • --- , • 2. Poverty a nd ~nequality . l t present the main capitalist argument for never-ending growth and the production of environmentally b,,f i.f ,1fl(}_ ( C Jj(~ damaging ~E:J~goods is that it is necess ary to help the poor. This is supposed to occur through "Trickle Down", a process whereby people at the top of t he must 3et far more than they need hcnp reach those at t he bottom of the he a p. so that a few drops can A more ;n.efficien t or envi6nmentally damaging system for providing ,{ for the poor can hardly be conceived. Different people have many different ab ili ties and capaci ~e_i but people who are not very young or very old and are in a norma! state (l, J '\ , ' ; / ; ' .,/ ;, -' f • ,' 1·, ,,· f ,· ( of health 1are basically fairly equal in their ability to provide I for themselves the basics they need for a g ood life. At present V poor p e o p ~ poverty and inequality come about primaril y are prevented from providing themselves with what they need in a s ati sfactory way. (Three cheers for Winstanley!) They are prevented b e cause the right to use the means of production is made scarce, ,I: (usually by private property), and the skills to use efficieJly are A also made scarce ( usually by the bureacra tic cJqfl-1) 1 Restriction in access to use of the means of production is also tt.t. ( I J1J l I Ji!. l( / {;J L , Rr 1( a main source of 1nequality throughAso on, since the restrictions are used to disadvantage thrue people not in certain favoured categories. 2 f \ ,_. h,_.• 2 ' • \ I >/- , The point is driven here in all of Il l ichs work especially Dese-Fe#trg Society /and 'Energy and Equity' and of course the older school of (\~ ,_',A.· . .._, , anarchist w_i ll also stres s ed it. ~l'..ti 'fhc,N,:~---- .1 --\ l·j ...,• _ '\ �A syst em of comm unal con trol of the of prod ucti on tn:,[( 11.J with ~cces s r ig hts for all who wan t them a~:V in DIYJ 1 toge ther with the free disp,v ~~~1· of t ~{_ skil ls to use them pres entl y "' wou ld remo ve this maJ· or sour ce of pov erty with out the need for was tefu l ,.I inef f i.cie nt and c: 1111 ,'rt-1111:~1tl&lj dam agin g econ omic grow th. �The pure DIY society would 1 i t t 1 e r o o m f o r h :t e r a r c.1h yl and from a t he g uid e wou ld that division of to be sort e qual the of access social picture would hiera r chy and and fact that without allowin g the of pleasure, Such a position would be able th at but to not misse s th e presuppos e The mark. l evel allow for t o needs, or the ( , for f alse individual a bilities their a social dif fe rences differences, capacities, power it a nd be a s ociety. they 'level' in ability, that and people have th at this level objection does presupposes not only ,, /-,,, ( d i ffer e nces in ability of be t ween kind of capitalist ability d iversity and that framework a rea s; Such in present i n dicat e s pow e r a nd and and so in a bili ty on, an d as relie s a the inequality on areas. level the justification for on inequality a nd false dichotomy an absolute f ram ewo rk levels based on a needs. in oth e r inequality on justification for inequalities equal level of conservative premiss as of the in e q ua 1 r i g h t . a nd }a b·±--1-i.ty::=t:#> s take i n c on t r o 1. .,. , ·1 whatever at both indi vi dual as differences of this level, system could s oci e t i es , ability in all What pow e r people's typical i l legitimately uses level, equal source of pro f i t , The capitalist argument framework framework goals become a picture the provide goods is not required. to me e t Equality a t p eo ple have a n their own lives, can Equality on on. of power ·{-(, th a t social produc t i on, 'egalitarian' two equality o f th e d iffere nt on the ar i si ng p owe r soci e ty would provide. can allow a d e qua tely c apacit i es. account Exc el len ce in such a egalitarianism is based equal it differences so urc e do not so of problem of how to allow for in e qu a lities . an d of individual frame work people and people h a v e capitalist obj e ct i on such a elitism; thes e two-lev e l the means framework, without the The be equality on to resolve i nequ a1 i t i e s ot her equality individual production and a f or labour. r e quired would is, forming the ob vi o usly be one which had ver y false equalit y assumption �:, /. 2. In practice equality on the social framework level would guarantee a reasonable level of equality on the individual level, since great differences lisation CJ r of in this the means of production, accumulation of other people's labour, would reduce differences area can arise only when monopo- are possible. Equality of that ex a mple Jane likes and asfemale Thorea u ) It is that it it should do can only be achieved if differences carpentry, household an especially fine house; universe , but in material goods or i t is of cour~e undesirable this kind equal i ty and Anne on the other hand Suppose builds herself and her (whom we may envisage likes to contemplate the and wants only a minimum level of basic needs i mpos s ible to obtain absolute equality without satisfied. either preventing Jane from doing work she likes and exercising her the benefit of hersel f for without in the demand ~_ ?c i..?-1__ or needs for to. equality, f r am e w o r k ... 1 e v e 1 , production and skills and others, or, what is equally undesirable forcing or pressing Anne than she wants no t to work more and consume more What is then, legitimate and necessary is ~q -~~it._y ___Q_f __ p_ o_w_e r:, e q ua 1i t y a t t he 1ev e 1 of at the i n d iv :i. d u a 1 consumption. Social Democracy often claims , 1 e v e 1 o f " p u b 1 i. c ri 1i f e • to deliver equality at the This claim should be rejected however because:(1) i t does not provide equal access . product lo n , ( 1 . ·. .- .. to the common means treats th 1 s as an in di v id u a 1 mat t er ~------------·-- ---···'/ ra t her /I than as one for /· of . \--------,) m 1 s taken 1 y \. but so. in interests and needs are denied or discouraged. abilities, for and Social framework in people's living standards, would not guarantee absolute equality ac h ievem e nts, or employment social framework control �,., ;; } 3 /I . (2) the individua l isation of comm LJ. n c1 / life forms inequalities of power at (3) is only, and in fact opportunity is all' confusion. in though equality of opportunity such equality occurs in any case, the concept of to a equality this case defecti v e, S l:\ C.<?- to do so.* priv ; leged and through equal i t is based on an 'each- the rest of the except in an Alice-in-Wonderland sense, even if the opportunities for equal for each person but clearly not _.§.Q The opportunity to be selec ted as on e of a powerful elite which controls population does not, equality, very limited extent Each person might have the theoretical opportunity to become Prime Min ister or win the lottery, can hope to great the framework level. the claim to provide equality specious; leads • (which provide selection were in fact they are not in Social Democracy). Real equality of opportunity and power requires ways o f making decisions and exercising power in which all can participate to an equal extent. X ,,,.- * Such 'equality of opp ortunit y' arguments for the egalitarian character of Social Democracy are a similar swindl e based on a scope confusion. So, for example, 'everyone has an equal opportunity to do i t ' (win the lottery, become Prime Minister) is ambiguous between (1) (x) Q fx and (2) ◊(x)fx. �.,,l ·- ) _J ~·I \ t~ \ '- J I I -.J 1 ! .• '1 l ;b ) ) <, I .~ ( .~ ·' .J , ..J I ) J J ' :, r' J r' . ) (J ) ) J ) ) r<'O ) -·{ ·1 { ,..l --l-- ( ~- ; -j / ...;, s I -~ I f _i I >' .:";) 1-- .r '/t,\/ -tp ~ j ) . _) -----s ~ ) ·•J I ',I :5 ' ...... j ' l j .J <,} .J ~ . . ~-i , ) . ..> . ...J ), j 4 ) ', -t) j \ l ~ ✓ , J_ . .{ ..) '1 l u) ·.;, r ? ' I', \~ .., ) " ~ I (,> I I I . j - ) A ; '1 _( c..J\ JJ( ~ t C, _) ~ lJ 0 ) 'l .. ) ) ~) .J -~ ) 'J ) . -(7 I vj t } 1) •..J ,J f ) I > ) ) ) ,.. ' .,) ( :1 c..-i <+,) (_,) c) _.,. ) 'i _,.) .. L ) l I r' ·-(f r ... r-• :, d ..I ) } ~ •.J -; ) .) _j ,--,. -1 . I ·t j } ',) (1 ) j ( ·" ·'},, ', ) -~ ~ " ) t -· l ,'l; __l, ) -,! ... J ) ( ) ) L . J J ..J , ) _) ,,\ ~ ' ) I ...) ,.\ t~I $ ...) .) 7XJ J ) . ), -.), _.._ J ~ - ),,1 .J.. f) --r' ) ___,,,. J .,~ 'j < -- J (~ (-::; r j ,_, ~ ) l - .J t _) _.) '-..I ( ·~. _,,,, ) ~· ) .....l r' .1 r I -..,c7 \' 2 ' ~ I) ) '/ t-! f, \ \; r, l ~ \ I ·') · "I ...,.. 1-=; ) 7 \, ( .1.-- " .J .( '.J :~ 'f ~~ ) "; :},..) ·,"-' \ (> -✓ ,.,,., ) ----... uJ 'i ~I 1, ) --.J~ ,J J ,.:' " ·1 ':./ ") ) ~ ~ ·r '; -~ __.) tJ ,., ' J,, \ ~ ,_) ; .) J r: \ _c ) , - J 01 ,.. ) ...) < 1 ;_;, ( ).... 7 .. ,) 'l 1 )' t:: • - j '.'j ,!) I I J ' .J,) l .J I _) I ) 7 I ) • .J ) } ..:.) ,, _..) ') ~--.... ' ,) :( I 1 ? ··'I ·1 ..J J ~} ·1 ' ( • .> c-: :.,.._ ~<r \.~ ....,_ .) J ,j ,,, -i ) ) --·r-:i I ,) (( '( . -> - \·· --< .J ' l I ) " ) l / .. �j r··s ~ \'\ ~ ~ \t I I ~ I cuts straight through the problem which plagued Anarchist thought - \ the problem of how production is to be organised , whether it was ... .., ·, , \ to be communist ic as Kro p otkin wanted wi t.h each person w, rt(l;-.,_1 to ,_ ""-' ;j \) 1 " " ........ ~ ...\) the best of his ability and taking according to his needs from the c01Tu11on store, or collecti \.,, i..st, as Bahu11, :1 ~ ~ . \) J ..._, , 'l ~ \ \I ' The adoption of a system I -~ . )( ·•·i·-.._ .\.. I I., \ ~ t r e mun e... ·"rat.ion in the fonn of wages according to the amount of .--------------= ~ DD1 r~~, £ ,~, ,:7 ,r-c-.jo r /'o ., 1'7 71 u [/ 7 ✓·~work done;41 , allows a pluralist ic and flexible approach;- and, is A A certainly ( ,'1Y1/?"1!,/41(i I / ruHl others wanted, with I [j/l,' t with the first, 1 and perhaps the second, as hU ,.·. the organisat ional 1\ of subgroups within the total society. Each of these systems has serious disadvanta ges ~f applied organising principles for the total society. system, as Kro;>d41'n pointed out, would restore wage-slave ~y, and lead to systems and kinds of work not greatly different from that in capitalis t society. The communist system Kropot1::. 1,1 proposed was an attempt to get away f·rom exc h ange pro d uction · l an d appears to h a ve b e en a n attempt to production and consumpti on, which in the collecti ·/ ist system remained split, thus Kropotl(,>1 writes "Common possession of -,1,, the necessarie s for production implies the common eJoyment of the /\ fruits of the common productio n". This seems to be an attempt to reunite production and consumptio n at the level of the total community 1 i.e. to a pply PCI at the community level. Unfortuna tely it cannot be effective at that leve l, because such common production and cons umption also, implies identical production goals a nd identical interests . But to a ssume this at the total community level is unr e asonable, and ult i mately 1~pressiv e. It ties e1d1 personfu production to every oth e r~ n e ed and g o ~~ a nd each person' s n ee d t o 1 rrhe term "communis t" cannot of course accurately be applied to the systems it is popularly applied to to-day. �to everyone elsis production, in a way which would plainly not allow the sort of individual life control, the freedom to .~>1:eh one's i: work to one's godl ·i, and vice--versa, which a true.ly free socity rm s t 1\ allow. So for example, a person who wanted to work little and 1ri:·:,i,,f a si{( ple life with few gOl:cCs in order to have :free time for some 1 projec~would be unable to do so under this system, he would be pressured into working "to the contribute to the common well-being to the fullest extent of his capacities" He would in effect have to remove his own non-consumer gord to provide for someone else, desire to consume at a much higher level. I<ropott in' s suggestic,t would plainly have required a very l a rge measure of soc i al conformity and indirect social control or pressure to succeed. Kropotl ~ of course envisaged that people would willingly submerge their own ,} gooi .s in the common goo/ because of his view of the human nature. u',l~C 1-ti~ness of Nevertheless his system appeared to invole to a larg e extent compulsory self- nlJ n ~·-,;,t! ,·/\( / , which is very different from not allowing one person to exploit another. He did of course envisage that collabora tion in his common work system would be freely and c1ose~ but since he nev~r appeared to envisage any a l ternative, it is hard to know wh~t this comes to. This problem is of course resolved by a sy s tem allowing flexible The collecti y .ist principle - that the worker /\ . entitled to the A fru i ts of his labour - is retained ih such a system, but without the problems of production for exchange and witho ut the wage-slavery tha t drove the critics of that form of organisation to a communist alternative. The communist difficulty that people's work is to the needs of others in a way which makes a self-managed life /) I Y difficult and would impose conformity, is resolved also. .P-G~I · allows flexible production groups to form based on common go·;/.s and needs, and allows each to be the judge of his own needs to direct �his own work. i ~' !:' k'. \j . People with common go,ik., and interests and needs mayA !i,ute to form such groups bu t (e.g. a hous e hold or a commune). society is not envisaged as one big household, as appears to be in Kropotlc i / 1' ' s s y stern. Kropo6:. 1 11 would have rejected this of course, since he wished to argue that there could be no individual entitlement even to the fruits of one's own labour but only so:_cial ones. In many ways his arguments to the effect that no person do anything on his own, a re reminisc~ nt of the Marxist arguments for total social determination of individuals, a ·~.scussed later. His argument that there can be no such thing as an individual entitlement is not clearly stated in • 'Anarchist Commun\ sn\:' Quote. The passage in effect assumes that work of previous generations has been benificial, an assumption which seems to derive from Kropotl~ i'il. 's fervent belief in modern progress. It ignores the fact that the clearing of the forest has often been, and has long since become in most cases, the excessive clearing of the forest, that the results of the work of our ancestors is not only soil improvements but also soil erosion, that perhaps our predecessors have not left us the best of all possible worlds in respect of natural wealth. At best then the work of the past can be seen as a mixed blessing. This does a good deal to undermine Kropot~1~j argument which assumes that any i n d ividual working on his own project has received help from past human's but if it is a/50 hinderance, exactly what the existence of past human work is supposed to show is notAclear. Kropot~~ wanted to argue that people who created wealth entirely by their own efforts were entit led to what they created, but that in fact this was impossible. No one could create wealth or indeed do anything, entirely on their own, because their is always dependence on other people at some point, therefore all wealth was enti1tBly �sou ;~i and should be shared in common. distingu ish W~S The argumen t fails to of relative independ ence and appears to rest on a high redefin ition of 'on your own' . If someone clears and digs his own vegetab le patch, manures it himself with his own wastes and by green manuring , it see~s hard to suggest that he does not have il 1;/r /, ,/ some special claim on the carrots he has sown and, or that his 1 A g rowing of them for his own use is a selfish action which deprives others of their due. It might be objected that the carrot varietie s he has sown are the product of vegetab le improvem ent by untold generati ons of his predece ssors. But that does not seem to be a good reason for the claim that he has no special claim on the carrots, an:zinore than the fact that the author of a book did not invent from ·, scratch the language in which it is written shows that he is not the real author of his work and does not have any special entitlem ents to make certain kinds of decision s regardin g it, because it is a product. Work can be distingu ished is primaril y that of some person or group, even where they have made some use of the precedin g work of others. Kropotk,~ 's argumen t would show that no one could ever do anything on his own, and depends upon adopting a quite excessiv e standard for producti on being someone 's own - that it should owe nothing wh__~-atever to the efforts of any other human being instead of, what is more reasonab le, that it should be primari ly(In the case of the authorsh ip of a book even th r~ standard is probably excessiv e) . •. No _ one acts in a social vacuum there is always a framewor k or backgrou nd, but that does show everything is a social product. rrhis to ,,di ci;;.. 5 c.1,}';.111 0,. ,J - _ might suggest that Anarchis m adopted the reductio n C i :._ i which underlie s Marxist so~ism . would be mistaken however. Such an impressi on Kropotki n .:;and other leading anarchi sts constan tly emphasis ed the importan ce and autonomy of the individu al and stressed that their aim was the optimum developm ent and maximum �liberty of the individual the maximisation of individual initiative and so on. It is quite clear that they did not subscribe to the Marx ist reduction of individuals to bits of t:r:- l lecti ves or classes, which they saw quite rightly, as ~ irnical to liberty. The Marxist reduction is quite expl icitly rejecte d in Malat'e Jtlc'1 (an important and ,~K;~ ,Jc. ·,p , 'rl tLc h i"tl'Jk '- f.: "l. . 0 1tu .r d~, :>'t c..>1'1··{- ·,_ ,-- ) 1 who also stressed the importance of individuals. ~ n ki nds of tribes ~-, , , 1 Often peo~hder (or gathered) as ina.":i-vj_duals, or t h e ri ght }yu=rt(-- ' ' ---~ ~ in col laborative ~ g r ~ of various sizes or were--~ ~ a_.,t:r::-itie were I .." ><- [ '-,--~.•, 1;1ore · ~r less a~ t he occasi~anded ( H ~-~ 1 I t ~ f groups -or:,,tr ib al hunting procedure w o u l ~ be shared among the g - ~ of t ~ l tribe, but in ~ i v i d u a l c a se usually, a lthough some ~ ~ ' might be given regar~eing l. 6se who had mostly the resulting produce was -·1z__for the use of he veo obtained it as -~ k i.00-_(.s.e.eJT ow i t t far d ~i_J_s._in_ t b r=> A11 s t r a J ian_char.g.e..cLoneA- It seems that the non-reductionist position we have sketched is in fact the unde r lying philosophical base of most of the main stream of anarchist thought from Proudho.rr through to Ma kd-a-1.}1-✓.>_ _ ,, that part I ,,u 1 which was prepared to desc; ,?L itself as 'libertarian s61\ lism 1 • There was also of course, the so called 'individualist' position of and a number of Anarchists which is clearly an individuali s t reduction position, and to that extent quite distinct from the main tradition. 1 Footnote on 'News from Nowhere' �(7. It is perhaps surp r ising that despite such a basic outlook traditiona l anarchist thought remained stuck with an entirely communist propos ed · for the organisation of production in which the personal 'intiati ve' and 'individual' autonomy and originality so stressed by anarchist thinkers would have to be directed ,n the Jji/1(~ ;---f.> of production entirely to commun.-~al or sh ared aims and needs as the Marist positions, so in practice in the area of production in this system despite its different th .eo;-i1:-~t~_::.cr/ base ;}om Marxism _. ,n //J>,r ,, i >1-::i;•d~;1, at any rate individual expression woul be confined to communal life forms. The positi on c onlVl. be said therefore to have worked out a consistent position en the issue of the control of individual life and in lifl king i t _.i theory of production with its overall view of the individual and the cormnuni ty. have resolved . There seem to be several reasons why traditional an a rchist thought problem . This part of problem a DIY system could ~A~~ arrived at a convincing reso lution of this First)anarchisrn never developed its philosophical foundations and philosophical identity property in the way t hat Marxism was able to do, and hence was always subject to corrupt ion by the influe nc e of that position. As Mai:a:kxx fltk11'--r.·Jhc_ puts is (quote) Second, tr aditional anarchism was unable to resolve the problem of individual production in a convin cing way because it brought the capit a list production machine and the fragmentation of labour it invol~d, 1\ ,jA as well as nearly all the associated Enl;?tenment values of Modernity !) 3-1,• c/c; ,h ;._f-) j, ., Science, Progress, Profess ·.1c-rd ,\i,,, the Conquest of Natu.~ re and so on. . , 'v' This is espei $ally clear in Kropotk1n· 's work. Although anarchism advocated regional decentralisation and was f 3 r more critical of the division of labour than the Marxist school( see Kropot~1 ,1 's remat~s on the rnanu f acture of r; "' h0cu,/ S i ) it s till held that the fragmentation i of labour (which Kropoth' u; describes as 'our modern integrated system of prod~ction')was politically neutral and held the key to progress and the good life for all. The sort of critique of this method of �production and of its associated values are encounters today seemed 1 to be entirely absent from anarchist thought. Given such assumptions the possibility of individuals and groups freely determining the production gou ls and needs and achieving them for themselves as in DIY disappears. The capitalist production app /:nrh1 s is not of course as we now realise only to well, neutral with respect to social structur~and the sort of social options it rules out are precisely the ones needed to resolve the anarchist dilemma of the freedom of the individual in the sphere of production. The result of failing to resolve the problem in a convincing way was always a serious source of conflict within anarchist ranks. (.'., It is clear from Malatsta's writing that by the early decade of the '\ century it had reached substantial proportions, and considerable effort was dirtcted towards resolving it. 2 To as certain extent the failure to resolve the problem may have contributed to the decline of anarchism, since the position then lost much of its appeal for peasants and the independent workers who formed a major part of its constituency. 1 Although it is not missing from some contemporary anarchist thought, see Brown 'Smallcreep's Day'. 2 M~latesta thought that individual production from the producer's own needs was theoretically admissible provided the producer had only He thought however that no an equal share of communal resources. one would be able to produce entirely for themselves at a reasonable The obvious option standard,an assumption which seems to be false. o f partially individual and politicaly communal production was for He also believed that it would be impossible some reason overlooked. to get an equal division of land because not all was equally This problem is readily overcome using modern watered and so on. land system assessment techniques in which scores are allote~ for different characteris~-t.ics. �57.2 Nonetheless in outlining features a DIY society there is much that can be taken from anarchist and near. t so urces. 1 a n arc h is For instance, the details of the cooperation of network$ of communities in main,~ tTaining .__. _.. such infrastructure or railway systems, quarantine arrangements, and such like 1 can be taken over largely intact. What cannot be extracted, however, from traditional anarchist sources i s much that is satisfactory concerning the attitudes to the natural world that a DIY society would find appropriate, 2 1 What need not be taken are some of the more controv ersi al features of anar chism , in particular the usual proposals for the (Tion) administration of justice. There is no reason in a DIY framework why a community, or set of communities j _n co:opara t ion, sho uld not evo 1 ve their own ( deprofe s s ional--- i sed) legal forms. What wil l vanish, as in anarchism.are rulers, nations and I' states, and more gene rally, hierar chial power structures. However, a community will have an organisational structure, and its political organisation may include components of what would not inappropriately be called ' government' . 2 The us u a 1 an arch i s t view , e s p e c i a 11 y s t ro n g in Kr op o t k i rt , was one of transformation of nature for human end.s. view was quite exceptional. ~orris ' � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Draft Papers Description An account of the resource Sylvan's literary executor encountered an archive in which “all his projects were current", since manuscripts were undated and unattributed. Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document . .. . , TOWARDS A SOCIAL THEORY FOR ECOTOPIA Participation in attempts at social change often has the .. effect of revealing to participants the structure of the soci e ty in which they live. It is hard to be a practical environmentalist th1/:: i v.: J _e:ng;a~eEl in or s1.,1pporting a range of environmental batt le s without observing that most environmental problems in our sort of soci a l system are generated basically by the domination of the society by J corporate interests, which have a strong interest in ma i ntaining an industrial and consumption system which appears to produce environmental problems as a matter of necessity. If one is not directly engaged in opposing the plans or activities of sawrnillers , miningcompanies, power and energy compan ie s, transport firms, chemic al and pesticide comp a nies, p a ckaging companies, real-estate developers and tourist-resor t promoters, to name a few, one is engaged in battling thei r political or bureaucratic advocates and protecto rs (nominally 'regulators') in the sh ape of forestry commissi on s, mining departments or authorities, hydro-electricity authorities, energy authori ties, transport corm iss ions, l and commissions, politicians and the l i ke. ' Usually t h e battles by citizen environ- /qsr1~j mental groups h ave littleAsuc c ess, and the chances o f success appear highly cor related with the degree of corporate domination within the political unit concerned. Even where environmental problems appear to a rise from the interests of non-corpor ate groups, for example workers or consumers, it can be conv incingly argued that the y are still primarily a reflection of corporate domination and st r ucturing of both the employment and consumption a n d life-s t yle choices ope n to peopl e , that is, of indirect cor po rate or capitalist influence in shaping the social structtlre values. : Environmental issues throw up sharply again the question as to whether it is possib le to devise a social structure which does not have this feature of direct or indirect cciporate domination, without ..--·--· ----·-·•··-•·--·-·--·-·· · · - - - - - - - - - - - - _... . --···------x- 2. r~placing it by some -1 other equally or e~e? __ more _undesirab_l _e ____~_ind of domina tion-=__s_~E~ as -/ bureaucratic or totalitarian domination-which is such that replacement would be unlikely to produce anything which could be described as a solution or improvement. Our belief is that we can devise a better system which dispenses with this disastrous element, and furthermore that we must do so if environmental problems, as well as a whole set of other problems which are also consequences of the same structure of domination, are to be resolved at any but a superficia½ temporary and inadequate level. wa ys to see the problem. or size. There are of course other We might see it as just one of technology But the technology we have seems to be a consequence of other features of our society, rather than the ca use ·_ al though it is certainly true that there is an inte~a ctive process and certain kinds of technology strengthen certain interests in the society over others~ :~S for smallness, we might remember that the industries of' I IISu} d... I , ::___ currently destroying the Border Ranges rainforesi~(' in relative terms) quite small. Or we might feel that we are in the grip~ of a runaway or out o f control machine - a point of view put forward first by Jacques Ellu./ [ ] • Or as Peter van Dresser very nicely puts it ''We have built a Frankenstein monster of industrial and commercial relationships which is almos t totally running our lives." True ~but the machine was was not built on random lines, and it systematically serves the interests of some groups at the expense of others. So the machine is not 'out of control' in one sense - it is doing the job it was designed for. ff-some environmentalists, espe ci ally of the more cons ervative kind, do believe that the system in which they live is basically sound, but that it consistently delivers mainly destructive results and decisions either because -th.2.- it is run by the wrong people ('Oh! for a statesman'; seeABorder Ranges sheet), or because we do not yet have go od mechanisms for 3. takin g accou nt of envir onme ntal inter ests, which .is seen as a new consi derat ion. Such an appro ach tends to overl ook the limit ation .C'.'f>·''}~i=t on resu lts throu gh. polit ical/ burea ucrat i c actio n or mecha nisms which resul t from the exist ing struc tu re of corpo rate domin ation of the socie ty, and to the exten t that it is succe ssful it would depen d upon reduc ing or balan cing that domi nation anywa y. ·- Some impro ved mecha nisms may enabl e some impro vemen ts in limit ed areas , but they will not be able to chang e a basic ally destr uctiv e lifestyle based on conti nuous and growi ng indu stria l produ ction and consu mptio n, and so unles s more basic chang es in the socia l struc ture are sough t, will proba bly only succe ed as delay ing tacti cs in the inevi t a ble destr uctio n of what remai ns of the natur al world and l , · ·¥;1 / >fr'J I a H lr-.rt r? t 1~ reaso nable socia l enviro nrnen t. · \'\ J rn this neces sarily rathe r A paper we want to try to devel op sorre of the basis for a socia l theor y which might be descr ibed as a form of Liber tar i an or SelfManag e d Socia lism. J~~~ \ ~- It migh t seem odd that anyon e shoul d advoc ate a basic ally +i.1/ liber taria n type of posit ion as neces sary for aAso lution to envir onmenta l probl ems, since envir onme nta lists are mostl y seen to be advoc ates of great er restr i cti ons, mor~_ rules and regul ation s, legis latio n, burea ucrat ic contr ol and plann ing, to restr ict and reduc e the damag e peopl e can do by their consw ning and produ cing activ ities . This restr ictiv e appro ach seems to be dicta ted to a large exten t by the failu re to quest ion the basic soci~l struc ture which makes peopl e ' s produ cing and consu ming so destr uctiv e in the first place . If a frame work o f essen tially damag ing life- style s is accep ted as 'natu ral' and uncha ngeab le, then of cours e envir onmenta l prote ction will seem to be a matte r of limit ing these sorts of a llege d freedo ms by furth er restr ictio n; but if the probl em is "-r se e n rathe r as one of struc: ;\ing socie ty so as to remov e the force s which make peop le's 1 ,... ~-y"\ .._ _ __ _ '"'"\ ... a · pro ucing and consu ming so destr uctiv e, the 3. 1. Pootnot e 1 from page 3. J_ We don't of course wish to suggest that working within the system is a just a waste of time, and we should watch it all But in each go while we sit back and wait for the revoluti on. 1 each hard that fgct of urgent battle it s easy to lose sight necessit y urgent won victory is on l y temporar y, to lose sightJcff will IJ_Ot they to; begin construc ting the sort of society in which imposing of This is not and canno.t be a matter be~ t emp o rary. some sort of Boy Scout 'Conserv ation Ethic' or minor changes in the directio n of energy savtng on a soci~y which produces environm ental degrada tion a~ a matt.er of its fundame ntal :?__!:_ructu_r.:-_ e . 0 2 4. need for a restrictive approach is less obvious. The problem of how to reconcile environmental aims with the aim of a free society and with other goals is essentially one of obtaining an 1 ~ b 1 . J. environmenta ~ o f 1 1. f-e. -. . . society/way enign The restrictive approach then) is a cons equence of accepting C the existing se c. in/ f framework and,,\ attempts to graft environmental considerations onto a basically hostile structure restrictions. as further The situation might be compared to what happens when an attempt is made to enlarge an o ld theory which has encountered data it cannot _handle - the initial reaction is to try to maintain theoretical framework and ac count for the further the material by the 'enlargement' of the theor ~ usually through a series of ad hoe further assumptions or makeshift subsidiary theories which have the effect of restricting the application of the theory. We arrive at a vast and complicated structure , such as the Ptolemai c theory or certain fashionable mod ern logico-semantical theories of natural language, which for a time may appear adequate and succeed in delay,j the realisation that the original theory itself is in need of fundame ntal revision. The existing mass of environmental an d planning legislation and proliferation of bureaucratic procedures J---J- s uchf Environment al Impact Statements plays much the same role in modifying a fundamentally environmentally-hostile social struc tur e and life-style a s the addition o f further epicycles did in Ptolemaic the ory. X The env:ironmentalist who appreciates the need for basic change finds himself however confronted by rather unattr a ctive conventional choices. dom inat ed On the one hand capitalism offers a system wru'ch ,-s by private capital interests which depend crucially h;'resou r ces\and where unequa l economic 5. is seen ~ri d other power On the other side of the as ad essential condition for freedom. conventional choice we are presented with a system which does not appear t o offer an essentially different life style and which ,,~. . (_~ f f( I~ I 1: t/ 1 clearly endorses many of the ~ame values - industrialisation ~~~ogress, J 11 .i 111/, r / /4./,,-;..Jf p1J'. J i:,. ,·i,.{;,,<f,c'. ,, high technology 1,and so forth, as the capit alist o !tu/'lt, f-,c. e:_ . I In addition I the conventional Marxist alternative offers an account of t he role of the individual and society which provides many reasons for libertarian concern. We a re faced in fact with the option of opposing distortions, one offeri ng a distorted and re duced account of community and communal life forms, and the other of the individual and individual life forms. Although the pure, theoretical form of capitalism is supposed to operate on the basis of purely individual activity, decision and production, in existing forms of capitalism thi s has long since been abandoned in favour of a 'mi xed' economy, with community control through elected government and public sector activities ensuring that we collectively control the collective part o f our destinies, and that communi ty is represented as well l"r cJ At least that's/the mythology has it. as individuality. In practice however these communal life forms are v ery largely a sham, and do not amount to !eal recognition of c ommunity. Usually these forms are forced into an individual reductionist model so that the instead of 9, v _i ng,\ community control I~~J merely give a further set of individuals who then make the decisions ~, is the case with the institution of This government by Representative Individuals, for ,instance, which instead of providing community control over the framework, merely selects a further set of individuals who then control 'or manage' the community. · In Victorian times women who inherited property were obliged to have 6. a male executor to manage it for them. Later this was liberalised to allow them a say in selecting him. It is better to be able to choose an executor or managerth a n to have one imposed on you, but no one who has to operate under such a system should deceive themselves that they are really managing or controlling things themselves. l People in our soci~ty are of course largely blind to the fact that real con@unity control has quite a different form, a ~cl regard such individual reductionism in corr@unity decision - making inevitable. as natural and People now accept as normal political phenomena such a s systematical ly broken election promises, government manipulation of sources of information, deception and s1'!.ights of hand such as wa iting until public interest has died down or worn itself out before proceeding with unpopular moves, and so on. What these phenomena seem to indicate is that the amount of real communal control which can be exercised through the system of representativ e individuals is not very large, even if the fact that the political system tends largely to reflect the economic system and economic power rather than to control it 1 is ignored. The 'public sector' which is supposed to express the common will, is not community controlled either in any realistic sense. ' L ' I,{ '~ Thus bureaucra~ managing public resources or allegedly regulating industries normally operate largely in the interests of private corporations , as anyone who has worked on issues like forestry or nuclear power is aware. Crucial information is kept secre t from the cornmuni ty, ma de inaccessible, or handed out selectively> usually to commercial interests. ( we won't go through all the points that could beQ;sed here in detail - they are too well known - we just want to set the points in a certain light ~ Even where they compete with private corporations instead of me rely serving them, 'nationa- lised' public sector organisation s act like further corporations or powerful individuals, and there is very little real community 1 . -1,,.c) 1:,t---2i--t ~,t P.--t1 I , le-,__,~L-, {\ ~ c,.j- - . ~~ s-: ~ - -·· C~~ -~ ~ -c - ~ L-:.. ~..zx/\_, _~) \..A.,,\. • [ ..:....}--{c ~ c •1J,-.-,{',,/_,,t C _A A,i4- (_,~ l-r-:1 (f't-o-~---l)-v'--0 f) - - V'---'2, dl>--Cf- 0 'l[..z_ cZt,__...,...--14_)_1 ( , D .___ t ~ -r ,c.,.__ C~-z_ __ 7• control. Finall~ those individuals or corporations who control the means of production can exe rcise enormous power, both through these alle9ed 'community' institutions, and through their abi l ity to control what will be produced, how much, how and where, and their monopolisation of the abi~ity t? direct productive labour , -.;(K_,t:.\ their control of the pro ductio~, (\ control the in short ~ ,:· ._• c..::., .:'.' \' Those who . means of production are thus able to obtain a very large measure of control over the social framewor~ which comes to be structured largely in their interests. This domination through 4/. I structuring now extends to almost/areas of life, and has been documented independently in many areas, from the food we eat to the way we travel1 from the houses we live in.i to the way we re lax. The control does not of course, take the form of control of individual decisions at the individual level; they do not decide that you or I will purchase a purple~ a green car, for example, but the social i framework in which the places in which peo~le live and many other aspects of their lives are structured around cars is determined in their interests, and so is the kind of car the market provides. The fact that individuals are free at the individual level, and that such mechanisms operate at the level of controlling the largely (.•\ i! ~ i.A""\.'• I n.S invisi ble social framework which coT$,-a-ins and channels the choices /1l 1My the individual can make, explains why people retain the iJ/ 1,<;, ~ ,.1 1 ,\ freedom and of full control over the ir lives in such a system. These distortions are not merely occasional of 1 'abuses' or aberrati ons - they are structural features which occur systematically 1 in all capitalist societies which have free ~ublic life forms. rI'hey are the result of a reduction of communal life forms to various extensions of individual life forms;of the fact that communal life . rv IC ,_.. .l.{1\, 1 forms occur in a reduced and impoverished indi vidualist) ,A.H3fttr. The result ~tha t commun al control of the social framework is ~)j~~ et ineffective. and that some individuals and group s are able to I 8• obtain great power through their capture and control of the social forces of organisation and production. If capitalism offers a distorted,individualised account of community which allows for no genuine co,1,,,1u11ttl control over the social framework of li fe . on the Marxist side we are offered a matc hing and impoverished distorted account of individual which allows for no genuine individual control over individual life! Marxist~ very commonly present line account of ~cc.;cfj (f what is in effe_~t a r,~oduction A:,- - (.,,cl.. - - ~) /(. individuals - l(c role of t he individual is Iv) \ .1 -~f):Or- r,·(;e ~-& their concept constantly and revealingly illustrated by appealing to the individual as a unit in a production .- - 1 line. Accordi.ng to this account the individual IS I l.'v\:. l~ji/,1 1 ~ •. IJ,2 ,,K{1~•,i{uii. / L-_ t;:: 1 no·+h ing, the soc~fty h, _ is entirely a social product/,,\is no more than his role in the pro duction line, he has no separate 'self ' but only the characteri~tics he acq uir es as a re sult of his ...___. membership of a society or class ~ Indiv iduals are in effect to be . l ,\·~ We don't make any cla im to be Marx scholars, we shall be making (' heavy use i n elucidating and criticizing the a ccount, of the S . U. Gene ral Philosophy Department recent publication Paper Tigers Although this book will be a major target in much of what follows we would like to record that it ·seems to us a valuable piece of work, which does a great deal to illuminate the nature of the conventional ideological choice and expose their philosophical base~ . It is also an ad ])t i r ably clear piece of work (in contrast to most Marxist scholarshi~ which casts lig~t into many dark corners, including some which, from the point of view of the attractiveness of the Marxist a lte rnative , might perhaps better h ave been kept a little dimmer. . conten -t J.o n that The acco unt offered makes it clear that the ·(> (_ ~) S:l::-Fl-ee a p osition is 'totalitarian' is by no means a capitalist p lot but h as an important point. I I 3 Any per son can fill role in the production li ne as well as any other (Ste ve ns). Quote from 9. treated as cells in the group body, and the only legitimate formso f individual expression are through community life forms. ·c· ·L ,. · · rtf; ,- TIL), H t.'.•t1tf-• •'.r , (· r, ·1 , ~ • 1'1, 1, ,•,,U,/ ♦ :,4, ) The al t ernative to such a position - I~dividualism A - is . seen by Marxist s as the position underlying capitalism, which holds that indivi duals contain no social influences which are not ultimately re duced to individual forms o f influence. Individualism - which is taken as the alternative to the view pres e nted above - is seen as the source of c a pitalism and inevi tably lea d s to a ll the excesses and distorts of that ,\ system. Individ ualism must be stamped out r oo t and branch if '- L /;I ,~...-f. it• al·te,nutive to ca1;,alism is to be built 1fthe failures and admittedly authoritarian cha~acter of existing Marxist systems ii-tti.._,1·lif-·} are, according to this line of~traced to the failure to do a thorough e r1 o tl3 A job of stamping it out in spheres other than that of economic life. ! Indeed Individualism in this variety of Marxist theory seems to play much the same role as sex did in Christian theory - it is the source of all evil, and the f'I\ [' \- f ' mojification of the individual ego and its submission to the ~' group replaces the mortification of the flesh and its subjection to the spirit. f\ v' J (\ To condemn all individ_ualism because some distorti'ons of i t produce bad results is like condemning sex on a ccount of the objectionable nature of, sa~ prostitution. J./( ;d /, Ii I ), . -~ <; ~-.. :~ ., . ,, :.:. 1'11\ .~ ~ , I~\ t :, h Howeve r , on€=.ffiay.:-==inc-l-ineL::::to-·:··be' j t wo u 1 d be 10 ( I,.. , ' < /1 n a ive to s ee no connecti on between such a doctrine, and the actual p r act i ce of Marxist societies (as /lli(n/ r. Blackburn). Marxists do J (- ,J - Such a position must if followed out consist1 ently, be suspicious o f e v ery sort of individual independence and activity which cannot be subsum_.ed in some sort of collective interest, even something as simple and ap p arently non-capitalist as producing your own food becomes suspect (see for example the Kronstadt man i festo). It appears to provide a justification tc,,l 10. for any amount of suppression of individual views and dis s ent And where these are seen as being opposed to class interest. "~Yth1 '> (V if 1 ~ social products)-t:.My_.. appeaL to provid e if individuals are /' a justification for manipulation of individuals for collective e nds, as bad or worse th<3n the indirect manipulation for pri vate interests of capitalism. ,,Such a do c trine seem s indee-d to make life very easy for the capital is t, who does not have to exert himself greatly I its ,~1,uthortarian potential f or the individual. to demonstrate?, as a free individual, freedom For if there is no such th1ny -J and if there is no such thing cannot be taken f!:;,9JTI someone ; as individual choice, individual choices cannot be qbr c7d te d or is that individuals just trodden upon. don't matter, except of course insofar,_,, as the production line There are few people who can fail to is short of hands. be repelled by such a position once it is stated in its stark simplicity - which of course it usually is not. From an individual point of view such a situation would have many of the drawbacks of capitalism, and in some ways might even be worse - goals, modes of re ~hi ng them and suchlike would all be externally imposed on individuals. i r-£ ttr±-s==±s_ i 11 de. e-d·--ctre--nas±c-t-1a r x is L sociai- theury----:;:.md - - I ~--_,,,,.., ------- I ------ -- ever the v a r i a t i o n s ~-hl-e._ under the label------.-Marxisrn' / I ~ - - ---- / tf .f erqn --:::-......... ___1 ------h . . an - entiu::=~,tl:_to se e now- J:.bey can alL--na:ve s hard ----::-:---...._, ~t_ V • ,::i • --------1 ~--- ------- ---------- t h ore t i ~GU.Qd at i o Tl------~ ~ s ± e n _ Q J an En 1 i g h ten ea / !1 LX.i.Sln~ ~ e ~ _ Q l l t to k :, It is difficult to see how ~~ t ofAmora l to concern I ---------- ------~ 11S. ,.,,~ ( \."\. by the _Nf'W ,·...... \_, ~\.... .... ~J -..-.~~ with any ..:.- can be compatible . ~~ -'-/' concern for individuals and their fa te, as opposed for daiJ C ~ . or societies. It is difficult in fact to see how the.re_ can be room for any but the most 11. attenuated moral considerations at all i n such a view, since even the comparison of societies in te~~s of the sort of suffering they inflict on individuals i5 . th~ illegitimate. It does however seem to be individuals who su.t fer ,...__whQ__.a re ,)~ :; ~,_ ,--t :... , ,.. \ t ".I f b ..:. ' "'f . ·- . -~ exploited or ~ominated, so unless an attempt .. ( is made to give an al terna ti ve a(:count of these in t e rn1·s of I \ the Class Mind ; it is difficult to see how such a position tould even justify the choice of one soci·cil S~S}t?-,n. over the other on v ' moral grounds. If this is indeed the basic Marxist social theory - and whatever the variations available under the label 'Marxism• it is hard to see how they can all have an entirely different theoretical foundation - then the vision of an Enlightened 0 .._,..__ . ~t: L: • r ."" -, ( ·' ,! Marxi sm which has been held out to us by the New Left is a t-- mirage. The consequences of this system can be seen then as the 1 • ,iJ I Ov\ el , m:nt.~ of A u.r;C.'tf..lf-< j V f power - or individuals (as in capitalism) in favour of their having no power at all as individuals, but only through their membership of some collective, class or community. For anyone who does not accept the ,d reduction of legitimate indi1ual life forms to group life forms, such a system of power must be seen as oppressive. From the I point of view of the individual$ power to control his own life, Q S opposed to participating in controlling group life, to opt such a position app ea~ to be oph~ , for the exchange of one set J of masters for another, of one form of domination for another, ~ and possibly ~~worse formo C l J ./ following una ttrativ.e t er ,rs: ~ So then our choice appears in the _./ if capitalism allows some individuals ,\ to dominate over others and control collective life through the social framework, 1.1kr-, 11•, • • the Marxist alternative allows collective-. hc,,, C\ 12. control o f collective life, bu t also collective control of indi v id u a l life, allowing no ~ep,:-1, rate legitimate individu al {,c.....;_ life forms. If Marxist s are right in point in g t o the disas t rous I' i H'--' results o f covert domin ation of ,.,social f ramework by private capi talist interest the capita l ist is su rely also right in pointing to the oppressive character t o th e individual o f their 0 lternat ive. * Of course both sides would dt~Y that the problem can be set up this way , the capitalists bec auIB social framework to dominate the/ de11_1/ that there is a (because o f the i r reductionist - the Marxists, because th ey would deny 1, th at there is any legitimate f o rm of individua l control to lose in collective domination. a 3rd point of view. ,r - ~ ',(. f l( ,;,, ·K · It is di ffic ult t o accept that we are face d with such .J f J f:i, The problem i s seen esse ntially from -' -- - -· - --- - - (111 f 11/" ,j'(' unpalatab le choices . }(' / .; ii1C..- And indeed lo ~] ic and,, coit,tJ strate that we are not. to demon- There have been, and in a fe w places where l1es te rn cul tur--al destruction is not yet compl ete, the re rc, ,.:.,,1 1 soc iet ies which a r e not capitalistic , wh ich are anti1~.n capitalistis but where a vigorous individual\ is va lued o r not I dis cour ~ged and for ms o f independent individual economic activity n1 ;, y ,: ,· \ /1 ~j°> \ ,, \'( .{ .'~f. \j ( "· . T-~,i,.! ·-; , f ·, :~: '{!. ~-"1 '1 / ., I J, ,: f ::· and lead t o 1 cap ifo1, iSr.> · , in the way the Mar xi st critiaue it must, and which coexists wit h true co:u1munal ins is t s life-forms. 1 ~;0c:~ 1~•- :~ s~:h ~~~·~~ti~; •;~~p(:\~ ; ;e'd as individuals, co ll- ~-1abora ted \ ·; ··: 'I In such societ ies th ere is a form '\ of in di vidualism whi ch does not inevitably undermine the socie tie s . I proc eed and even dominate . ' ._._) in groups, or as whole communities, more or less as the . o~-;~·~ion demand~d~:,yw hile s ome of the , product .,' } ;>,d, :.'j ,~ ~ \ might be given to those who had no thing, it was not u s u a lly -J 13. regarded as a purely communal product unless commu~=ally use produce~b~ t was primarly for the of he who had t f J obtained it or his kin. (See HOWftt in t~e~ Aboriginal case; The t=orest Peo2-J.-~ ; for the rules _Wai-Wai ) , I,. some g ar dening societies too, such as that of Melanesia, individual eco n omic activity of a certain kind migh t even be th e dominan : t mode of production, yet the society is not capi t alist, and is even strongly opposed to the attitudes of ~apitalism.* The existence of such societies seems to show * See the failure of individually owned Waiko, 11 trade stfs [encouraged by the Australian adm i nistration] was ... mainly because such individualism , _t_u_,._t_i..__ _ _ _---=-p_r_o_f_i_t_a_c ___c_r_u_1_·n--"'-g_t_o__o_n_e person, was disapproved of by the villagers" , p.418. that it is possible to obtain both communal control of c o 111munal life and individual control of individual life, that the one does not necessarily drive out the other. It seems clear fhm the anthropol o gical facts that the Marxis t critique that individualism produc~ s capi t alism has failed to make some important d1'stinctions between kinds of individualism. It may of course claim to allow ade quately for individuals and distinguish a kind of 'individualism' which is legitimate in the Marxist view. On further inquiry it turns out to be the case that what is labell e d individual activity in :.:i 'q cl1 c .A s-2.s is the kind of secondary and derived life forms the individual may engage in as part of the group collectivity or class, as in the Marxist / distinction between what is called 'Individualism'and'Possessive Individ~1ism' (see MacPherson} But since this continues to 14. ,. ' M S 15 only legitimate forms of individual life are .t that the· those which can be reduced to collective life forms and that no dist1 n -:.. C:-, independent economic individual life forms I for example, are legitirnate 1 it is a dist,n.ction in net me on:i:y perpetuates the false J~hdnm~ .J .Jt iin fact : merely , now as the choice between Possessive Individualism (as in capitalism) and 'Legitimate The latter is however only another and misleading Individualism' .. name for the participa tton of the individual production units 111 the production line. Since it continues to admit no legitimate individual independent activity , espe cially economic activity, distinct from or not reducible to that of the group, it - cannot e xplain our anthropological facts that these so c 1c ties do al low some i,·1d7K',k·l~ ,d in divi dual life forms, am/ - JS v ---- including economic ones _merely as in attempt to dispel the .A uneasy feeling the . ,...------··· -- a- (t hrough confusing --. .. ,\ . - production line theory arouses in most of us , te i-minological . ' ,r -r,, , Marxises in fact shuffle. / dd.Sthe same trick with this sort of recognition of legitimate individualism as Social Democracy does with the reco0nition of the social - it offers a terminological label which pretends µ to recognise a distinct life form but iryfact reduces it to an .impoverished and limited subvoJ--i<=:1-J of the dominant life form. 77The Marxist cr.i tique appears to have confused · the recognition of distinct individual life forms - distinct that is from those of the collectivity - with the attempt to reduce all legitimate life forms to in dividual life forms or constructions from them. It has confused Individual i sm, in the sense of the recognition of individuals, with Individual Reductionism, which is the recognition of nothing els~ but individuals. It is not the former but the latter which underlies capitalism and its variations. On the economic level the Marxist critique has failed to recognize that not all forms of individual economic 15. 1(r activity lead , capitalism, and at the soci al that not all forms of individual power le~d to power over rrh e triba l s oc iet ies ~...; ~ ~ others. considered were examples of societies which had individu alism - distinct individual life forms and economic activity - without individual reduction- i j m ~ ') ,, 1((.1{ , 1l'J Individ u al reductionism produces distortions and gre~t inequality of power because the social forces and means of decision-making, of organi~ ation and of production, are turned into concentrated power for the selected individuals who . ff represenithose forces in the indi vidualisa/ forms. In the tribal societies we considered this did not happen - decision r . P making was not usually the preogative of an individual h~d ' A or chief, organisation and production were not directed and controlled by bureaucrats and powerful individual capitalis ~ or groups such as corporations. In societies which took a similar form, individuals would have secure ind i vidual use right s for certain limited purposes to the means of produc ti on , for example the land, which would give them the right to produce for their own needs but not the rights they have in a property system~ For example, they would not have the right to dispose of it as they saw fit, or the corresponding right to accumulate larger shares of the means of production than others, or the right which in practice arises from this last, to employ another person's labour. The mean'.,;" communJal ly, 11 of production wou/.-{ como, o m be seen as basically held t.c: al 1 for the use of each". Individuals would have, as individ uals, secure access rights to the communal means of production to produce for their own needs. Var ious forms of mixed individual, group and community production could develop, based on mutual interes~as people see fit, but the important point is that access rights to produce oould accrue to individuals as su ch. Provided th7 ao not encroach on 16. others, 1ndi vidudfs could set their own goals, decide (A,·hu.. t _,.\ they, as individuals need and like to work on, and pursue these goals in their own way at their own time. each could· In such a situation, pu~sue his own way, instead of all marching in <~ I tl' j. ,, step - the situ,it,;,1 in whic "'h all must pursue a .. -& . i ~ and collectively determined set of goals, at a collectively determined time, place and in a collectively determined wa~ would I be avoidedQ C!S""' Such a system would Ado tribal land tenure 3ys tems, involve two levels of decision-ma~ ~ing and of life forms. On the one hand decisions at the social framework level would be determined through communal decision-mak ing processes/ wh r( h would normally, ~nvol ve communal participati.,1:y 't---(__y •-<.. i :r ~ , ,t -1 ., ' \ ( forms ,...._ rather than i-04-i -v~:r-. methods. The sorts of decisions which would come up here concerning the use and creation of 1hL t{0_ means of production would be those that affected,\ community ( e.g. in the Melanesian case the; included the t/«2. issue of whether Acommunal for es t land cou}cl be wood chippe~ w~ -~l, could not be decided by individuals and holders), ( u't :I 1 ( / If .. 1u. "'-J; 1 f\ I' • , I :) / .. . , ' ) / f in our case, what sort of public transport systemsAto have, all sorts of social framework and infrastructur e questions, question~ abou t the sort of c c mmunally-ope rated production enterpri ___ses tc have/ and so on~ This sort of society could admit a form of vigorous individualism , capitalism. b ut it would not be and could not lead to The sort of individualism admitted here would be one which could coexist with a great deal of rich communal life, and which did not eliminate or reduce communal life forms. rrhe indi vid·;_,iJd s in such a society would have the rnJps to control their own lives, both as distinct individuals diff[-:.J-0.,,-ff.J _, as members of a cornmuni ty. and also, but 1 have would be the means to cont;.~\ ,~.~e ..li '-'.t s_ ~~-·othe; s !' C (r r": ,tu,-,. • (,~·{, ,_-,, 11; ,· i ifr ,.: .I- ,< /1 ,, (' ·, ( jJ~' ,.,_ F J ! '' //, ,., , < ~ (. ,• //, 7 r ..-_ ; , 7 2-f ' . .· ' "/',. 1 ., , /·;,, ""?(. , .1.·1~ . "· ·. . rr~~. What they woul~ !1ot . 4 , , 1 . ' lc . { ..rf,t '. < 17. The sort of po sition embodie d in these so r ts of societies is in many ways a very natural one. two levels - It allows for control at the social framework level is controlled communally, and the level o f p rod uction for i nd i vidual nee~s is controlled by individuals~ It i s the n a mixed picture. (but a very different one t o that whi ch appears in th e capitalistl' mixed econo my '). 4,1.,{ In such a picture, people ar e both individua~A· members of communiti es. For a f ree society in which peopl e control th c.. L1 own lives both sor t s of control are needed. (.( ,v· So, if y ou ask someone in China what occupation he would l i k e . to f ollow , he replies, according to report, that h e 0 has no des ire s of his own in this respect, he would l ike t o be whatever t h e community wa n t s or n eeds him to be . ,1 ., ( A very p ro pe r answer according to the th eo ry set out in ' P a per Tiger s '). If you ask someone here what he woul d like to be, you would very likely get th e reply that he woul d like to be what or ever he can find a job in,,\ if h e is inr t t) a mbitious, whate v er pays best or offers the best long-term monitary prospects ; i.e. whatever capitali sm needs him to be. (A good an swer also syst em) . acconli-1'1 '. 1 t o t h e In neither c ase does the answer indicate a person who is I (I in control of his own li fe, who do es what he wants to do, or J\- ·- · tk~ what he finds s_ati_~_fying . _ At the ,; be st A distortion:; L ---~ap.i tali sm a nd Marxism offer us, in each cas e on e kind of con fr ol wi thout t h e other, or the other l evel o nly I -J,;, I i mpo verished and \ qt"t-c•,li1. i:1/-r..rl. f orm. Bu t , \ ( \ \ \ ( , , I~ ,I C( i •Ii I ; I ii, an since the l e vels . j ' t ,/ ,._- tf ) I of con trol have a large level of interdependence1 . each 11,, 1 lev el of control become s in fi,:,~it irnpover irlr- d t :--· ,·· -._...,/ .. \S . h ·"l, -r c . v~' . wi 7'~ut its compl~=:.m ent....-;_,.. 'rhu s for example, mo st individual s 1 cannot live a fully free or satisfying individual life in a society structured at the frame work or inf~s t rat~r ·e 18. ·fo leve\ provide mainly dr~~~7 , repetitive work, or no work at all, and so on. Both sorts of control are necessary, and to achieve this a society must first control the social framework, including the means of production, communally, and second ; give each individual secure acce~to the means of production for his own use to enable the individual to control his own life at the individual level. Su6h a society would be 'self- managed' at both crucial levels. * (from page 17) Of course./,. - t hat is what these positions offer at their best,., f thi:-; ·---is an idealisa~i~ In practice most capitalist countries -• •--•--•·-•---•-•---•••---•--•--•-••-- --•--•---•••n------••-- do not offer even individual control (that is they do not have the individual freedoms appropriate to liberal capita l ism), and most communist countries do not practice genuine commun ity control or self-management on the social framework level (that is collective life Ain fact controlled by individuals in the ·:; ha pe of bureaucrats or politic al codu11 ,lie~-' .c An alternative of this basic ,., f c,· .-·;;'/t .... .J, -t" . I; 1 J fr1_ 1~ <- J_ ) • sort_,\ has been_ J by a few thinkers, mo~s::tiA recently in a modified form by Ernest '" ,, c , ~ , C~11lenbach~ in ~arly ,.- b<:t{::).k Ecotopia ,,.r/, '<i. r , and a c~l:so,\ by Bertrand Russer! in h-i-~ Roads to Freedom . have been the intention It may behind a few others,e.g. William Morris in _News from Nowhere (although there are serious discrepancies here, which we will ,, ~ ( "()•;\)_ ,,; mention later), and in ~the work of Proudh. on, and there are ~ some points i n common with some forms of anachism - again with A S ignificant d i 'i.<ilp{,{11(,C J we shall discuss later. Neverthelsss it seems to have l)e·en largely overlook· ·:ea, and we are normally . - A ~ con fr onted with a ba sic false d; dwt or"'y -capitalism in some 1 orm 19. versus some ve r·sion of ~a~x ,s t · socialism. This ba1!c fa lse dichotomy is backed up by a systematic series of false dicho t omies in the subsia'ary notions of each theory, 1\ which reinforc e and perpetua·. ~te the basic false dichotomy. ) There are at least r,1/--:;~,,, I(; /c.--u.._r · /\ sets of reasons why we a re conventionally presented with this <; .yst("t,.~ 1-i11c. false dichotomy. a third position is sytem~ at ically discounted~suppressed} by both sides of the conventional confrontation because it is very much in their inte r ests that it should be. The r~ esent co~batants i do very well out of a game where each can point to the opposition as the only option and can play off the drawbacks of the opposing system to counter dissatisfac t [on with it s o ~n - system - an ideological or theoretical version of the balance of power, to to speak ,, /n which tlJ t!- $/:d<1r quo is maintained by the tension between these two ideological cor,1 6 atants. The intrusion of a third position, especially one which seems to have many of the advantages of both sides and the drawbacks of neither, could spoil this strategy completely. As someone else, ;f we remember rightly, hasr~rnar ' ked, capitalism and Marxism are li ke two sides of an a:c h - they prop one another A up by the match1•'.J weight of the - dis cu-lvantages of each side. ~ Both sides, insof ar '-../ as they ad,1,:-l such an option {:!.- exists at all 1 strive to present it as either a subv;1r\ty of their own one. so<:_ 1Q( theory or as a subvc1.riety of the opposigng Thus Chom. sky in his introduction to Dan1 .el GL-Lq:-,;-.n' s _bnarchism in effect assumes a false choice between the means of production being cont rolled by individuals, and there being no individual control of the means of pr?duction and no distinc ~ individual economic activity. Thus that any position which is genuinely iu... Wti\• t.'~ -~e able to conclude a~t~ -capitalist must ultimately be in agreement with the go\~ of the Marxist vari e ty of socialism, and is differing only about details like the position of the state. But the non - reductionist sort of position will not fit into such a simple and loaded classification which writes in the false dict:'Ptomy -· since it allows the mean.:~ of production to be, Q_Oth communally and individually (~-=-/"\ 1::-li\ i :~- - -1 ,....' , ' ' f r ~ - -" {J.r..i"ll~.J..:A cont ro 11 e dA It is L 11 e c t i ve l~ i_~ --d±ti~re~~~~~y_~~; ;: co controlled at the social framework level but is individually controlled at the level of the individual's production for his ow n needs. rrhe other option open to Cht,,1\. sky and co. is to characteriz e suc h an alternative as mend y a form (perhaps ,, ~ ~ {~~r as a p.: .: e t it-b<Y.1tgu, 01s ,fo rm, a charge remi 11.scc 1.(-.;1 that levelled I • ' • ' 1 1 o,,,[ against 1· 1.J.·( ,~ ~/ ../ . _., . -- ., .,, his followers ) ,I Proud!-,c n by Marx ' r;(tf...!:.::!,tf ( -,/,.,1 :·,!1,,r-J\ I capi talism/A in terms 'of th~ ~eary._s of production not being ,n r-t "h- c:, ., t collectively owned and allowing some individual economi c / ·, activity. But since this will lnake the tribal societies which do not fit into this loaded classification capitalist also, it il). hardly seems a convincing move. __ In the same vein B I.-~ ckburn •, 1· · , / ' ( •; 1? r ;,'?' .- <, ri-r 1:., _ rt/,)(( I<< ' values in the Social Sciences/ presehtr thEf only 11 1. 1 alternative t o capital.ism as Marxism, while 'Paper Tigers' ( __;tp,_;c,,1.r ) asser~' s that there is no th1 i-· d position - social p l1~ nomena are to be accounted for i n terms of one or other o f the two main social theories. Simi lar strategies are of cours ~. ,_ .' L_._ -· '-.__ adopted on the capitalist side, wh-e- vr-i--1-l--e rnploy-- the criterion is., of individual pro perty ownership ' a 1 t-e rna t-iveS.A· j ' ) (' v,1 ., ~\ v,. ('., \' \1 ·}.'. I ~'"' '-- : ·- . _ -1l"-' f:. ,➔ ~ t 11 h \ 1 ~efin~ 'so ci""alis~t / , ' • \__ .t. (._. \i1 I \) --- .... __..,,- /' _ ' ,,. ~ I . I/ - 1 '> _t ; i'. \ There are however more substan tial philosphica l r e ason s f or the false dictptomy, which lie in the basic reduction p os i t ions underlying capitalism and Marxism, 1,,-•, / •;; , ,/ 1c'?. • {_ .c ·( . t. /j Io 7;'t,J •/ i(,,: , I '/ I/ t:t,, d ~iR/o:,a,.J 21. The basic reduction underlyi ng the ideology of capitalism is the reduction of communal life forms to certain sorts of individual life forms, or mere rough~ J.y, of communities to individuals, while that underly ing Marx,sr:11 is a reduction of individual life forms to certain sorts of communal life forms, that is , of individuals to elements of certain sorts wholes . * * Burnheim in rpaper Tigers' points out that the usual contras ~f between individualism and reduction of ' i-l~_>f15'~--. \ in the sense of a !) ' • 1) dr 1.A,.-t.-ctt/.J' to parts of societies which are then 1,·1 -t- . c,t1 .__: ho·~c1•-·; ., treated is fu \ her individuals, is a f u/:;e_ <!l~a.ti:Gn"'. He points out t h h t Marxists want to reduce individuals to elem t n J s of only certain sor~-~ of wholes (v iz. classes, which are not then treated as f uf- /!1-.er indi vid~ls) . ever goe s on to set up a further, He then how- ore basic false dichotomy r'H between this position and a capitalist reduction to individuals. 1· ---- How are such reduktions justifjea? ,,"' appeal t The argume t involves / the subsidizations tvupport the reductions. systematic .:. lse dictatomie9---~i~h.__ justify / '-, ,./ as follows: ' " (1) capita~ // ( 2) /4 t ineifidualism -~~sus ind'i~idual c l,_; , ( / alter c· ~·/, .> f r~~nershipf /1 // / .j_,._, of ,,tc.,· '·- / / '-.C-~ <_ __.../ ~ ..... ; / / o ollectivism. proquction versus "',,, ~ ~ ·~- 22. According to the third theory, both these sets of reduction alternatives should be rejected. ! A non-reductionist position, accordin g to which there are legitimate in~i vidual life forms which are not reducible to soc ~ / life forms, and legitimate soc~ I life forms which are not reducible to individual life forms, can give a more adequate account of t he data than either of the reductions and s ynthesi ze much of the material eac.lt uses to support his case t.<-•!1 ; le ,',· I•~,·\// avoiding -~ difficulties the reductions engender. of the Individualism, in the sense of recognition of legitimate non-reducible individu~/ forms, is one th ir1J - the lif~ individual reduction position that all life f orms ultimately can be reduced to these, is a very different thing. How are th e. reductions justified·? The argument involves appeal to the subsidiary notions to support the reductions. The systematic false d;~otomies which justify them in argument are as follows: (1) capitalist ( 2) ;ndividualism - versus coll e ctivism. individual c' l<)1<..,2,t s--ly) of means of production versus '· ., • ) : ' Cl a-l--t erna ti ve ownership. versus ( 3) (a) indivi (L..c als as not SO'Cil~/ly determined at all (b) the individual is completely soc io. l ly determined. (4) {a) 'obse rvational data' as theory-free versus (.} 5,. ( b) 1 o bservational data' the or- y - depend ~_nt. t, (5) (a) individuals as completely free , versus (b) indiv iduals as complo tely determined (atl choices ,ndividuals make are in fact d etermined) . ( 6) (a) The free soc iety as one .in which individuals can control individual life, versus (b) the free society a s one in which people collectively determine collective life. All these false dkl1 0 tomies are reje.c ted by the nonreductionist postiion .. 2 3. (1) and (2) we have already partly dealt with. To j,.,i-1_1.I / ,. ;~ / sum up, the false dichotomy over fo L/3 the alternative of a mixed form of control of the m eaus of production which does not fit into the simple classification, which enables the form of :c ~ m,v-~Aily the infrastructure to be cG-Jd..ect~ controlled -<-0.!id H~ use of it to be individually-controlled, as advocated by the non-reductionist position. The presentation of the individual as not soc✓(~ ,,/;;_' ci I/ l determined P'~ at 11 appears quite freql.lntly in capitalist 7 ( 3) (a) , I' \' \ arguments, espec rct. lly in the economi"l c sphere. Most capitalist '-.. / e conomic a rguments depend upon taking ind i vidual choices as 'raw', as not in any way in £ lue n ced by o r dependent upon a social framework. They appear to presuppose an absolute indiv i dual who would make the same choic es in any society. Th~s for example env ironmentallsts who suggest that things like a~r tT condi tio~s are u 1-w1 ,:c_,.,:__~sct"1/ and wasteful of energy are ,n<? t with the response from status-qua supporting economists just choose to r~-..i:> 11~ H: \f 4 , 1 {, raw, and The choice is represented_ have air -cond itioners. a that peopl e rreducible - to interfere with it would be ...~~ .A. "' authorita~ because it is presented as a choice at the level of individua l li f e-control, instead of as a social framewor k dependent choice, A good e xamp le is McCracken [ ] . This is part of the strate gy of reduction to individuals through trying does not exist, or if it does, i s a lso chosen by the individual on the level of personal 'raw' choice - ('a legally elected government determined it'.). Environmentalists are always encountering the related, arg ument that a certain predicted level o f consumption, say for forest products, energy demand, 24. space, must be met , no matter how disastrous its environmental consequences'. 'Demand' is treated as expressing the individual~ raw needs or choices, which are ,coN.:.e.11J.ed as lacking a social context, and therefore, it is argued, as being essential to meet a ~d authoritarian not to meet. To deny such demands would be to abrogate individual freedom. rrhis is the basic argument for Cons1u1,:r ism, and it is widely employed by those who wish to promote industrial growth t o meet alleged cop (_.il.i,, 1 t: r-- ~ eeds ' reg a rdless of the consequences. Courses of action which fail to accommo date cons!-< 11-iu; i nl t hus ruled out, and are consumerism and its consequences repre s ented as necessary and inevitable. Of course many people,especially environmentalists, realise there is something wrong with this argument. do not just up a,vJ ' demand' expres~~~ays, People junk paper f or packaging, or energy capacity to power hea~ed swimming pools or electric toothbrushes. All these 'needs' are the product [ 1,.r7 -'·- of a certain sort of;\ social co ntext, which the Con sume .ri sin igno r es, or presents as inevitable, wh e n it is /lrgument not, or chosen by people ge1rally/when >r is not. The Consomerist Argument, then, is a pa.rt of the capitalist reduction choices to individual choices, which is pJrt of -the~ reduction of : so c ~I life forms to individual life forms. [Accompanying th=js r e duction is a picture of th e individ tt~ l s ~ s c ontaining no s 6 cial elements which are not i n some way f}-1· 1--<. l.·-~\. C --- ~ t,; :_+ ,. : -~: _,, ; c ..{ · ,) , ,.)_ --·· l ~reducible to p- roperties of individuals &'\, l] \ . (b) On the oth er side of the conventi on al battle we are presented with an equally distorted and reductionist picture o f the individual os completely so c. ; -= ally determined. I :f the capitalist picture presents social choices as just certain kinds of individual choices, the Marxist picture tells us that there are no individual choices which · at-e.. ,H·[ reducible, 2 5. orl exarnina,tion, to socja/ choices. Marxists ,uj}if- (r l- reject the 'J capitalist a ccount of the individual and society and ~s ~st on the importan ce of the social fram ewo rk, but in th e process eliminate# the i ndividu al . In 'Paper Tiger ~' two main arguments are presented for this positi o n . · (i) The Invariance Argument: This argument appears in several pap ers in the 'Paper Tigers' coll ection and seems to be central. Essentially it argues that the individual does not him- self d ete rmine his own choice unless the determination would b e invariant in any social framework. , Thu s Steve ns, SuchtiJ Chal;,1, ers, and Burnheim. and In Burnheim's paper the argument appears in the f orm of the demand for cor e an of self, which would be unchanged under any variation of social U11 k'.;:; co ntext or framework,~ t his can be provided 1 there is tJ;1( re,\/ s. 1,> as J 'the sear ch for the real self proves illusory' , 1 ) ,7 nd the pictu re of individuals as completely s-r, ,,,,;/l mi ned is e stab l ish~<l. deter- Of course if the de P1 J nd for our core Abefore i ndependent no n-reduc i ble individual self-hood were admitted). was correct, i t wou ld be very ea s y to demonst r ate the Ma rxist reducti on . Bu t the demand is far too stron g, and the argument is thoroughly fallacious; for it a~sumes that the relevant proper ties of individua l s mus t be purely individually determined befo re the re can be a non- reduqible indiv i dual. All that is required howe ve r is that the re should . be an i ndividual eleme:nt in their d etermination, a nd. thL:; would not lead to the expectation of an invct~t--~,,..it: class of I sel f i properties which were unchanged in ~QY soc i al context. The f allacy in th e argument is perhaps best illustrate d /1 ,'.' by an analogy. ;,£' J We know t hat the genetic inheritance of indivi duals ;\ can determine within a broad range wh a t they can become or cannot become, e.g. if they are genetically male they cannot become mothers, ,r:1""/;, (, ,,r:, ,,,,., (( •. / i· (:· ,.('' -.·; .--:. ,,-· ...,.. .f" . .,,,/'.,, 26. if they are genetica lly members of the c o rr o t fam i ly they and so on. will grow in a different way from 1egu"mes, .....__,, Any g i ven property an individual has will pro bably be the result of both genetic ~nd environmenta l factors, and will vary as So we cannot argue that individuals either factor is changed. are completely environmenta lly determined unless there i s a class of 'core' properties which are invariant under genetic Of course there are no such properties. change! But that is what the invariance argument demands - that before we can claim an independ~t individuality , 'a 'real self' other than the soc i4 tly determined self, there must be a class of purely self-determin ed properties which would be the same regardless of different social environments . There are, of course, no such prope !··ties, so, th e argument con c_.l udes fallw:;u~rd,1, there are no real individuals. is a mi x ture of soc ;cd/11 But if an individual's cha racter determined and individu a lly determined . .J f eatures, and if any one pro perty showed in fact the influen c e of both i n t~ ~es, then we could no t expect such invaricince. But t he case of social versus individual determination does in fact seem to b e in the crucial respect a good analogy to the genetic/envir onmental case - the social context, like the th genetic inheritance, deterines, in a broad way what the A individual Lan -Or cannot become, what he ca n CL.. do or choose , * * <! 1 The analogy also throws an interesTin on the individual' s i light on the Lysen Ko that genetic inheritance -:_,,·..!_,/ ·IJ,._ the theo:rJ 6,-,;1 L,d ft f ,!(_·k , J l.//,t/4,, k,dk,y;I C/ A ~ rh . flfi?i1~11_'-!f. 11.,',/'t"fllr;e.~ {·.,/{J _ the u(gts of the social reduction, as required in Marxi~t theories. I/~ ,.: ,/.l;"r,.i /.-.... lr l r,/' l ·:-n , :,,-,,-,. 2 '"'<· ...... /,•. ( ;rt',: ~' .O>' ,.'--,fZf ,'J(~, L;"'I ,:'" (~ . ..,. fc.: J ,,.;1 ,· /. ..,· 11/J " ''j,., lc.-,J c./ Pr~suP1l,4 7 affair. . . 1 constraint It acts a j A ...,. - -·· 1 ,(..' ( ! [ 0 . -•..., • ' , / u,.. vrt;.( /(C /J I '\\ ',"'·,..__ ____ __ p:t.h ~ • , I I/..-, ~ r\..i.- , I) _, /:: (·,/ - · ~t'"" (, / , II/1/Jt of development, and its influence will therefo r e be seen ( 27. in all the properties he displays, without1 of course, being the l/is actual complete determinant of those properties. development involves as well his own indi viduallj de termine d -f~L1/u:--r1 .,· in the same way that the actual development of aH individual with a certain genetic inher i tance also involves environmental fa ctors . This is the sort of picture of the individual in relation to h is social context which u..r1de-rl ;e. s the non- re:1uctionist position , and it is in most respect s a fai-r!J natural one. In contrast the two reductionist positions present, in term s of the analogy, a false d ic hotomy picture 1./ of t he individua l as comple tel yg·enet ic ally determined i-:!'11- -- ' ~-, ·t~ .--• - l ~ the one han d . (Marxism\ and as comp.J:_etely ,1'fl- environmental ly determined on the other (cap ita lism). (ii) The second set of arguments for the complete social de te rminat ion of the individual f is L papero presented in It is an interesti n g a nd ,, sugges tive but l ikewi s e fallacious argument , which proceeds fr om the assumed theory= ..c:=-_aepen d en t characte r o f al l data, to the conclusion that ' individual' obscrv.d r<' ;u, { C'< '~t obs e rvation, \ entire ly dependent on shared social ,.tr tifact s; 1 I.e. theor ie s, is a social and not an ind ividual phenomenon. {u e.nce and duct s . knowledge I tfw 11. , are social and no t individual pro- It is p ointed out that the phenomenol o gy and epistem- ology associated wi th capitalism - empiricism and th e individua lis t red ucti on - holds that observation al data is completely theory - indepe nden t, and this approach is correctly rej e ct~~ d as in compatible with th e, o f theory forma ._,___ r--- ti on /At1(l actual process fa lsification . Even if the o ther connections in the argument are admi tte d, we contin ue to be p resented with a f alse contrast, this time between obs ervation a~ completrly 'hard' or as 2 8. completely 'soft', a s compl etely theory - depe ndent, or as comple t e l y th eo ry - independe nt. Again the obvious p osi ti on s ee ms to b e overlooked by the opp os ing reduc tio nist c a mps. gi Ve L--t. The point n eeds more elabora tion than c..an b ....:. h· ,f l0 ½~ , but briefly, what i s o verlooke d in the a rgume nt is the po ssibility of saying that some observations are theorydependent, and some are not ,\ that is, that there 'so ft' da t a. cffe~ 'ha rd' and the comple te Su c h a position would explain wh a t theory-depen dent theses cannot explain,the unden~b/e fact that some theories are fals ,; fied. It can also explain - what t he e mpirici st position cannot - ~ hy theories are not nearly as f alsifi a bl e as t he e mp iricist takes them to be, and some not falsifiable at all, and why in many cases what is n ee ded is a c once pt ual shift, that is a shift to rei,1 h--rpreJ1,4f,;,, of the theory·-depend e.nt area of data along the li nes presen fo,l. b...J a dif ferent theory. The theory - depende nc e aspect might be s een a s gi ving a certain cl~~ (the 'so ft data'), or it d ependi~t data [' 01 mjh~ theory- be seen as giving certain t heory-depe nd e nt constraints on observati on, while still leaving room f o r a no n - the ory depende nt area to op.~rate within those constraints, t h at is, an area in which , ,n ~ peop le opercit1 11t , with J c/,fl c, (:~1f- theories can reac h agreement . (Neither of the two reduct ion ist theories can adequately expla in agreement and di~agreemen t be tween people h ol ding different of such a non-reductio nist account of theor i esV_/) observation an d theory would be that they are seen as both u 11d_ social and individual - scienceA knowledge have but they s sooQI elements ;;-l 1 1 occur at the individual level, they are both f1lfd . social ~nd ind iv idual products. AA similar account in all o f free-will and determinism would see individuals as partly 4.. • f r ee, a n d a s Pftly determined - . • the latter determination occ urri ng as constraints on individual action rather than as 29. giving an area of completely determined action and another different area of completely free action. i,..J., £ ~;(b) '1 he notion of freed(l.m and of a free society is A one of the most important suffering from systematic ambiguity . 1 Each position defines the notion in accordanc e with its own concept of individua l and society; thus the capitalis t position ck~hes freedom as the control by the individua l of his own life (with appropria te safeguard s), the Marxist as the con t rol by the collective or class of its own life and so on. The non-reduc tionist position would reject the notions of l, 'J C'{ ,r·1 freedom which each reduction position offers, and would see 1\, the choice as involving a false dichotomy . According to the non-reduc tionist position, to be free is to be free as an individua l and also as a member of a community , to be able to control one's own individua l life as an individua l, and also to be able to act freely with others in controllin g and determinin g the social framework . ;,< 'f. ¥- -~ --- ~ ~"I:-~ The false dichotomi es presented by the two-reduc tion cire.. reason positionsA clearly systemati c in nattire. for them lies in a logical assumption and approach which is com m on to both theories - the reduction positions are the result of extension alism 'm. 2~te:rlalisrn ') in logic and metaphysi cs,oper~ti ng both through the accounts of the subsidiary n otion ~ and resul6~ . i n the the basic reduction position of individua ls reduced to eleme nfr of cul u,,,~ sorts of social wholes versus social wholes as reduced to constructi ons out of certain sorts of elements. 29 . Those who do not appreciate that everything is connected to everything else, and that relevant logic particularly is connected to everything else, would probably be surprised to learn that the basis of these false dichot.01les lies in logical theory. The two ,{ reductionist positions apply in social theory a particular set of reductionist doctrines a bot.ft the whole-part relation. The individual reduction position which underlies basic capitalism is that the whole is reduced to no more than the sum of its parts the parts are the thing and the whole i s a mere fiction or certain sort of construction. The opposite reduction holds that the whole is the thing and that the parts are no more than components of the whole - the y have no real function or role of their own except to make up the whole. This is of course the approach which matches the Marxist reduction of individuals, and it results from buying~~l~same logical assumptions about wholes and parts and applying the reduction move in the opposite direction. The logical assumption behind the reductionist approach is that the social whole-part relation is extensional, as it is treated in standard mereology. <.? r o ./r:,.·_ .~"' '-··• ,. / :J.. ti ·, r• i J ("~ \., C l' l •'-·\.. ) C • . ~\__(_ ___ · '-- '-- 'c l ... • : ,: · - v•~,1-. .__,, :;>>··\- ', '.\ I (_,-..._ .... l-··"' '- - It is the seeing of th e whole~ part relation as extensional which forces the choice be.tween seeing wholes as just aggregations of parts, as on t he capitalist side, and seeing parts as j ust bits of wholes, as on the Marx ist side. If the relation is extensional, then one or the other reduction is inevitable, so th at someone who w, she~ to reject one reduction, say the re duction of wholes to parts, Cf!JD -fi,'j is ob li ged to embrace the one, the reduction of parts to wholes so that the Marxist reduction of individuals is an outcome of sharing s uch an extensional outlook. With an intensional relation this choic e can be avoided, there can be both wholes and parts, each with properties not reducible to those of the oth er. Consider;for example, the /mplicational case where we represent the proposition that A as the class of sta temen ts implied by A, or equivalently the class of consequences of A. Then if the notion of consequence is treated e xtensi onally, for oF example as material implication, the joint consequences ~ A & BJ that r:F -1 i 42.., is the consequences~ proposition {A & B} will just be the sum of the separate con sequences of A and the separate consequences of B. That is {A & B} = {A} U {B}, or, in terms of wholes and parts, the whole {A & B} is just the extensional sum of the parts {A} and {B}, and is therefore reducible t o it in a straightforward and common sense. If on the other hand, the notion of cons£ },enc(;,. is treated 1 intensionally as in re levant implication, the n the joint conseque nces of A & B exceed and are not reducible to the sum of the separate consequences of A plus the separa te consequences of B. That is i' B} · not just and can 11c: t be reduc ed to the ,' The residue or sum of its part~ proposition A and proposition B. the whole proposition {A & difference between the joint consequences of A & Band the sum of their s _e parate consequences might then cal led an emergent fea t ure; ·\ k __:-. The relation between suc h emergence results from intensionality. reductionisrn · of the whole-part relation and extensional treatment ' ' .1 Cr./) N,!/- , !f,dvhr//l-7 '/)_ft. ('. . . J1l7'UJ 1 11 //i,c✓ t'1. d(c: -, { l • A • r:-.I /)c!tf.·c·.:JlA~/,-. 1/J)7 1. of it is so close that the {A & B} for the ~ = {A} U {B} feature is sufficient • of the whole,-_- '_part relation. extensional~ In opposition to this 1 it is possible to develop a theory for an intensional whole_:-:._~ part relation in an intensional mereol og y which models the whole ·-- -~part relation in terms of an intensional implication relation such as entailment. It would be rather surprising if the social whole ~~ part relation . -- ,.,,.-- an extensional one which enabled simple summation except in were certain special cases. It is after all rather well-known that people can do in combination what they cannot do separately, not just in the to extensional sense in which they can sum their joint forces (e . g. I . lift a rock), but al.so in the more important sense which is no~_ extensional in which what they can produce i n cc-mbination may be far more than (and different from ) the sum of the separate efforts of each (e.g. in writing a joint paper). Such emergence seems especially to be a feature of activities which involve combined inte nsion ~ __,.lity l as many activities which are characteristically social seem to. The simple reduction of social wholes to sums of individual parts is the basic reduction of basic capitalism. The position is "({ f:t-•c· ,·1 ( , __ very important from a theoretical standpoint as the crucial r--e-l-e.v~nee point for the understanding of other positions / .just as are the Basic Reference Theory and Basic Empiricism to the understanding oV pos~tions ~ in epitemology . and logic. . 1, However as with the Basic Reference Theory and Basic Empiricism, the numerous difficulties the primitive form encounters lead to many refinements, elaborations and extensions, and there are few who now hold the basic primitive position. The reduction of social wholes to individuals view points is liberalised correspondingly - [thus it is no good identifying the position of Jf.4. capitalism with the primitive reduction and attaching t~at, in the fashion of Bwnheirn. ref J. One lih.eralisrd reduction position, which appears to correspond to the extension of capitalism in Social !Je111ocracy, holds that social wholes can be reduced through anal:'.{Sing them in ten:ns of a theory concerning the assumed components and their interrelations. Thus the reduction is liberalised hyond a simple whole-part one, to provide a theoretical explanation and to take account of yet furt her features of wholes in terms of th e behaviour and interrelations of their compon e nts. Such a th eo ry would however be extensional, in accordance with the usual assumptions motivating this kind of reduction, so that the essential, non-reducible emergent features of the social will still be missed. The reduction - although i t will be ab le to take account of a more complex set of interrelations, between comp onents, will con tinue to be inadeouate and to leaitimise /\ (::, an impoverished version of communal life "orns ~ ".'here is ·' j strong logical case that such reductions cannot be made. This ~ is provided by such results as I] rrow' s the:erem ancl. pa ral lel results in voting theory. * The fact oi complex interdependence between the individual and the social whole also provides a strong prima facie case against a reduction, since if some characteristics o ~ individuals depend essentially on the social whole, the latter obviously plays an irreducible role. But some characteristics of individuals do seem to depend on and be modified by the social framework, tn the same vwy that the growth and species composition of the plants in a f)'lic<O rainforest is modified by a partly determined by the . climate ,\ * ~ See P.ou t.ley [ J' )The Impossibi lity of General ionist Social Theory.' 1\ Reduct- and other matters which a r e determ ined by the biolo g ical commun it y . The irredu cibilit y of the social , of soci al levels of exp lanatio n and occ urrenc e seems to parall el very closely ~ the irr e duc l bi li ty of th e i.n tension al, and th e relat ed i rred ucibil ity of non-re ferenti al to refer e ntial occ urrenc es el the irredu cibilit v,. of commun a l in semant ics. seems to narall ) life forms to individ ual life forms . The non-re ducti onist t he sis in logic and metaph ysics, that objects have b oth e xten sion al and irreduc ible int e nsiona l prooer ties, . l;t -{ I, I "~'i oarall els in a Away that the non-re ductio nist thesis in social theory , that the proper ties of individ uals are determ ined by both individ ual and irreduc ible social forces, that is, are both individ u a l a nd social. There seems in fact to be a close and direct conn e ction betwee n the social and the int ension al - as we noted earlie r, on l y intensi onal relatio ns between the i ndivi dua l and the commun ity seem t o be ab le to c apture the e me r~en t feature s which charac teri.se the social. It seems impo ssibl e to charac terise the notion of a social commun ity withou t .~) ~ \ .'...,-' . ..J appeal ing t o inte n sional notions - .~ ims, shared p r op os es , shared commu nication and sha red values . Not a ll int ensio n al not ions are related to th e so c ia l of course , but if some are essent ial to it , as we have s uggeste d, then the d e ni a l or reducti on of the i nt e nsiona l, on e of th e l eadi n g thesis of the lo g ical and metaph ysical theorie s as s o c i a t ed with empiric ism, is the denial or reducti on of the basis of the social . The proble ms and positi ons relati ng to th e attenp ted so reduc tion of the intens ional to the exte nsion al parall e l closel y and str,i,.. l<ingly those relati ng to the attemp ted reduc tion of the socia l to the indi vi- -dual that it is tempti ng to conclu de that they are in fact differ ent aspec ts of the ons sawe positi ons, that such interr elated pro bl ems and positi reapp earing in differ ent areas form a world view. :!?or a o fte n worke r in the mode1-n. philos ophic al produ ction line, it is diffic ult to see where and how the little piece of the puzzle he is workin g on fits in to the who le. * And as Smal le n.t.p .f :ound , journe ys of inqu iry to discov er conne ctions and overa ll signif icanc e are not encou raged. It becom es possib le to see er s as little more than a coinci dence the fact that the found of emp iricis m and of its logica l count erpart ~ the Refere nce -4:,..-- Theory ;, * Locke , Hume , :"'!il l, and so on-r were also the found ers Refere n c e Smal l creep 's Day. Los I(_ ~ r 1- - - - ---\,-·- ' ~ M . . . . . · h \} ----- -------....____ a.,,_P .. v, n . ~ '~ .;,. ·~ (\.-• ..__ 1_ ~,~ \r---c v, fZ..:.. \ .~~-.:.._~,~( ~ -:-i\. .., _... \.¼,·\J':, \ C ~-, ~--t---t ~(?'..I-" ('' \ ': ~ • --L(_ l (_ ; 1-z Y\ l.",--v ...... v~ !. . 'A· \ \ ~ ~ -H v--'1,,. , 0:-v-...i-h_ ~'""'- l) t\'I -+"'- l.. , .1·,·•, -~ ' ~°'o \.~ ~ (>..' -..:.... Ob 'i,• ' ..,' "·- 1\~' ·'- ,~ .. -.. . .,.\ 0 -(-,-( \ "'r-~s,.~ ...: ."' n,~\ _c....:i ...... Ct.C... 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We suggest that it is not a coincidence, and that the following rough connections and correspondences hold which provide mappings between positions in different areas of intensional (in logic)- non- philosophy: referential (in semantics) - theoretical (in philosophy of ( 0 - extensional (in logic) - /t, v-J!,J Jl t:t I A referential science) - social ( in social theory) j observational (philosophy of individual (in social theory). science) ( in semantics)- Some of the routes connecting these concepts are fairly clear, others are less so. Some of them, for example the epistemological-logical connections, are elucidated in Beyond ] ~ ~ ploring ~einong's Jungle and . These correspondences give rise to the table on the previous page. This table should not be read as indicating that people who hold one of the positions on the line hold the others, or even that they logically should. For first most / of the connections have been overlooked, especially in this century, and second, the positions do not even ehtail one another because the ronnecting links are suppressed; and these , even if logically necessary, may be rejected by peGple who hold one but not another position in the line. Positions do however form closely linked ways of looking at the world they are world views. ~~st of the positions can be seen as modifications of or responses to~l , the basic reference world view position, within its own intellectual framework. This is especially true o f 1 's conventional ~pponent, Marxist socialism. In 3, the necessity and rationale for the ~arxist converse reduction is created by the acceptance of the main intellectual apparatus of the basic individual reductionist worldview, and ~~arxism challenges ea! i talisrn very intellectual framework. ·1tHtd1 from within its own In contrast postion 5, the non- reductionist position, challenges 1 from a auite different s tandpo in t. The table should make it possible to distinguish clearly between two positions which, although entirely different, might on some theories (e.g. a r~arxist thecry) run some risk of confusion, that is, between the Libertarian Socialist position and the Social Democratic one. The difference parallels that between .the Fregean Double Referenre theory and the non-reductionist position regarding intensionality. Social De mocracy must be seen as an liberalisation or extension of basic capitalism, in the same way that the Double Reference theory is an extension of the Reference Theory which enables it to take account, albeit in a quite inadequate way, of much further material which the basic Referenm Theory cannot ,- .. ! ,.. handle. ~ . :> t•( ·f\ t1•~ l ..J,.J.._ .,,.._ ..;· ' ! ,·, '· / This is done through setting. up individualised substitutes fo;-- communal life forms, usually through the medium o:f so-called w- ~epresentative' or 'public' individualp institutions which control the 'publid sector and much of the social framework. ,';',i I ~!.:'• .I Given an individual reduction1),...(such as that of Mill, the major theorist of representative government) such representativeness appears inevitable, the only possible and logical way to handle communal life forms insofaras they can exist at all. is far From the standpoint of a different theory, it from inevitable; and the increasing destruction of communal life forms in :f:avour of such 'public' ones is dama g ing, impoverishing, and leads to great concentration of power. Social Democracy operates normally with a capitalist basis and grafts the 'public' sector on as an extension J just as the Double Re f erence theory operates with the Reference Theory for the normal case and extends the theory to d ea l with difficult cases. The Double Reference Theory employs a substitute reference, the sense, for cases whe re the will not work, just as Social Democracy employs substitute individuals to represent community life forms for cases where a purely 'private' approach does not work. sense, is treated as a The second mode, the further sort of reference, just as the 'public' sector in Social Democracy is treated as a f urther sort of individual life form. Both these positions extend and liberalize the reduction of the basic position, rather than providing a genuine alternative to it. )'I. How do the reductions connect with the basic position .. of each theory? -----, I l_ /--------✓ ~- Each position uses its reduction to vindicate i t's own vision of a satisfactory societ~_L,{'~he capitalist 30. - reduction..---_:-· to-individuals position vindi cates capilalist ' . society through the following CJ1'v ' j\, /v I - Ayn Bandish type of argument:- If individuals are entirely self-made, and none of their properties are the result of the social framework, then the fact that some people are superior to others in certain respec ts must simply be due to their being inherently superior individuals in those respects. But if some individuals, by being more able than others, are able to acquire more power or more advantages for themselves, this is only right and ( C? 1,'f-isrn) Such inequality is unjust to no one, and prope~. I\ the result is the admirable one that the better are better rewarded and have more control over the shape of society. w, #1 Th~s the individualist reduction lead~ only a AH.:,. l\ with few further assumptions which not implausible, to a /\ position justi fyi ng inequality of power .. The Marxist position, equally, uses its reduction to vindicate ,ts vision of the social order, as one in which the individual can express himself or exercise power only through participation in the whole, the collectivity. Individuals can, in this soDq( and especially~ economic order, exercise n~ power as individuals, and power is held only by the collective, or class o rganisation . In contrast to these positions of inequality of power for the .individual on the one side, and of no power for the individual as such, on the other side, the non- reduc tionist theory co rresponds to a position of equality of power for individuals, both as individuals 9 n~ through the social framework. In its vision of the good society, individuals have equal power to determine the social framework, and equal power to control thsir own lives at the individual level . The social frame(,J c•rk 1 for example insti tutions1 should allow 31. life and deve lop each indiv idua l to maxi mize cont rol of his own comm unal his own disti nct pote ntial , as well as optim ise pote ntial . ccftr ol of comm unal life is commLJJl._~3 1, o.tic:l. that of indiv id ual life is indiv idua l. l Capi talis m is view ed as a disto rtion of indiv idua The oppo site uctio nism . life forms whic h is impo sed by indiv idua l-redA.>hrll'o ,,.1-,,:t._ c JJ ,• 6 · c i.l(,,t ( [nr.n:n,t:;,.J (dfi'f( ,:,..- /i h - f/,('_ h.·t ·fto abs orb th e pt\ attem 1 rrti~~J? h whic es a disto rtion r\ redu ction prod~ A ~+· 1 renc es in goQI~ indiv idua l comp letel y, to swal lo~ up, deny diffe and need s. This is an equal . dist o rt ion. iced The disto rtion s have some para llel wi t ~ othe ~not in rece nt w ~1 Cing . For exam ple / there is a para llel with the and oppo site forci ng of peop le's char acter s into disto rted the m expr essio n, sex role stere otyp e s whic h frus trate and deny thei r lives . and impo veris h and limi t thei r oppo rtuni ties and force d by the Ther e is a para llel also with the disto rtion s In the d. sepa ratio n of sexu ality and love notic ed by Freu that the same way the non- redu ction ist posi tion woul d hold t were ove rcom e good socie ty could be acA1e..,.: e cl only if the spli and the two sides reun ited:-\ ~~~•·:~~"gl~c i :~i:i~u :~\:~ ' ~~~•h :~ · ,, , . - -~ f\ s, and part of a disti nct 'self ' with disti nct need s and goal ,.,. . . .,,._~ I . . \vr. J. • r .} ,' / , . . , ,.: , . _ ,7 ;,t ' Both must be r ecogn ise d comm unity with common need s and goal s. ,\ IJ /. •· t -' I' j 1 in the struc ture of the s ocie ty. up some Such a non- redu ction ist posi tion can then take redu ction of the data that each side uses to supp ort its with out howe ver redu ction . 1,1cui- t i ~ J_ ___ t he pena l ties impo sed by the Thus it can claim s~pe rior expl anato ry powe r. as we have For exam ple, the non- redu ction ist posi ti o n can s of each othe r, po i nte d out, acce pt each side~ basic criti cisma11c{ -, also thei r it can re cogn ise the claim s of the indiv idua ls I . limi tatio ns. limi tatio ns , an d the claim s of the soci al its d criti que. It can admi t th e va l idity of much Marx ist-in spire 32 . For instance , it can agree that in capitalism people are frequently unaware of the real social determinants of their actions and values a nd see as free choices on the individual level what are in fact determined at the framework level. It can agree that the utility of the invisibility of the manipulated social framework to capitalism is to dis~uise the existence of other options and make a situation~ which is to the advantage of so~e gr oups, appear necessary or ine scapable , ~ * or to the advantage~and chosen by all. This is however not evidence for the Marxist theory as opposed to th e nonreductionist theory which it supports just as well or better/ 1 a nd it does not show that there is no such thin g as free individual choic e . S imil arly most of the valuabl e part of the Marxist critique of capitalism can be seen as evidence for the lack of re al communal control at the social framework level, rather than as .,or··· supporting the thesis ~hat that N,·11 /Je_: on!_y level on which anythi n r; really occurs. is Thus also the t heury can take accou nt of classes without bein~ stuck with the ~l g iditi es and difficulties of a class reduction or a class view of history . ., ,1, ·; ..\ •~ ~ ' I\'-\ \ ~~ Class explanations for ind ividual action can be used where they a.re required, but individual aL.+1cr1 C<.H o.lso be reco gnized and there is no need to explain all the a. r:t ions of in di v i cl u a 1 s in his t or y forces and so on . ,1 s u 1 t j_ mat e 1 y the pro c/cL d of c 1 as s Such a theory can also provide t h e basis for - what is lacking in Marxist theory - * For documentation of this thesis, see Conscio usness . t Captains of Thus also some, but not all, of the >.I... Marxist critµq~ of the last twenty years remains of value to the non-reductionist position . 32.1 a critique of socia l Democracy which distinguis hes i t clearly from Basic ( apitalism . Th e majo r the oretical feature of ,ocial Democracy is th e attemnt to take account of communal LLfe for rns and other cases wh1 eh obviously cannot be accoun ted for adequately in basic capitalism , in terms of an individua l subs tit w~s for them-as in the ' publ ic' sector , Governmen t by represent ative A Marxist-ty pe theory cannot take individua ls , and so on. adequate account of this individua lisation , because it is committed to seeing all the actions of individua ls as represent ative of class forces, so that the indivi dual ' captt!Ye ' of social life fo rms in Social Democracy ' becomes for them just their capture by various class forces. measures bt.d'('t<Gtcratic ' fv4:.,/c,i;a-n.. The welfare and so on of Social J ' Democracy must they be written down as cynical manoevres by the capitalis t with th e intention of keeping the working J.t ,u/._ classes quie t removin~ obvious sources of grievance , while I\ ' public ' sector activity is seen as merelJ re~ulatory for caoitalism . This may be an aspect, but it is not adequate as an a nal ysis . In reassessin g the Marxist critique in the light of the non-reduc tionist positio n, it is crucial to distinguis h , as the Marxist critique Joes not, between individua l reductioni sm a n d individua lism, in the broader sense of the recognitio n of individua ls and distinct nonreducible individua l life forms . Privatisat ion , Elitism , Encroachin g Individ ua li sm , etc. , the way in which what people can choose to consume, produce, and do , is g overned at the framework level by the machinery of 33. private profits, th e great inequalities of power an d of wearth resulting from that - all these are prod ucts of Individual reductionism, not of individualism as such . r.Jr.{. p.: r Jl ;'/f . jt:.. ;-- ,¥- 'Jf- -~ .,>f'.... A'--. .;i«: From a~philoso p hical viewpoint the reduction positions have their bas i s i n a part icular,and ~~dequate,but widespread logical and me taphy s ical theory. It would be surprising --...,_ how ever if these b a sic redrutions, wh oi~ distor.___.,.tions underlie n_ early all tHcc/.r,,r,1_ social thought, originated entirely i n a particular logic al theory . The logical theories ct.U--rt:,z. t at a particular time indirectly reflect social values and intellectual currents a t that time, like every other sort of theory, and do not stand in some unique way above and beyond them. If a different kind of logic has been needed, it would probably have been developed. The prev~knL c of this now established logical theory may explain why few now see through the reductions, but it does not entirely explain why they we r e developed. A / "" J'&"' /.~r</'~·- ,i(1/"7° of reasons for the overlooking of the non-reductionist position lies in a s et of SC'C;r -·· • ( di;,,,1.,':r; fu;.__ t[ !{~.,- -✓ ..1.f;, ,1 0-k d',c.__ l -,- t;, ,1.,/-(;/(_) • . economic assumptions,\ common to the red_u ction posit.ions. p o.r..11½; 1 , '- 1 Our confidence that the non-reductionist position was a ~eal and A' not merely a theoretical pos s ib li ty or utopi aJt'f'aritcdJ; lay in the fact that the tribal societies we considered in the early part of the pape r had a structure which enabled Individualism a nd some individual economic actively to munal ly-controlle d social framework. with a u -n1.- Such societies clearly had structural features which meant that t hey did not have to make the U.Yt.palatable choice between the o prc) .S. ·ing disto :.:-tions o f totally collective o r totally individualisti c.. life. control of There are other advantageous characteristics also which (>-,l.. fl'/ are common to such socie t ies, L/1.d racteristics which (' 34. sophisticated ~0cttd despite the rising d eM•cracies to-day seek, but which ~DP and the 'high standard of living', which is supposed to provide justice and the good life for all / always The l ow level of environ- seem to be further off than before . ~" 1 P-, r,y mental d e struction cl /\ t-r; ~u( conscious life-style) · '·'-·~ and the environmenta lly- src;~{~i;.1 -_ . frctture.~ which ha~( often been noticed, t-... s ha l~? the almost total lack of in ;.,~uali ty and poverty-' the ")...•'-·◄ }'-'- \,._:, \ '-,__-\ V·' ,:. c.l-11,·, ·,•-7' high level of equa1, ·7 of power and relative lack of ~e\fe-r-R-me-Ft-t-r ,..._ domination; the considerable level of leisure ( o fte:ri, as SaA/eAl .f . /1 as pointed out, greater than that in modern western societies) and the frequerlly rich cultural and communal l ife [Ref. Sahlens?]. These features have been attributed to various things th e.. low level of technology, the communal living feature, the hunting -- 3ei fttc;..ing life- s-fJ Jc: and the norn a ti ic life ,~hich was 1 The first we can definitely ru le out. The mountain forests of Gr e ece were destroyed, the Middleof its rich topsoil and stri_: ppped of J1'HidZ by erosion, (r e f . Lowdermilk~b y a people with a 7 uite low (9 1 e v e l o:E technology by u,..;--- QWa standards, who also had a culture :). .,.._J.._ which was Mark .ea by great inequality -e-:r en s/cpJ<.:'...-.me nt. ...(_., \ ,.''1-/·, ,,_: .. Living ,Jt ;. d , 1)\ -(_ \. \ l ,y r ant e es/\ th e se features, as by no means gua .. a/ modern cities demonstrate · &Fra the success of communism appears .I t.t. c (J'(t t:< ( --1~1.rl; ,Je__ i I\ to be a consequentia l rather than;\. wh ile the no roadie life {;,Jic-<.u;f,:tl with the hunting/gath ering ,:S; style cannot be the whole story ~(J """'- t{ 7 I\ YI L ~ some societies which gardened also had or have I' these features feature seems to be one Th! f~ ) (e.g. Melanesia). of soC;Ct( structure. if t ·;-ut:-}s very good ner~,d for us, because we can hope to work for a di f ferent so C~Q/ structure, whereas we cannot r e alistically hope to obtain a collective and arrow, the woo :1en \t-1()-(_ ' . return to the bow or the hunting-gath ering way of life• ; 35 The structural feature which makes possible th e combination of collectivity and individuality and the other >v,v'-( ,, attr active features of tribal life, is, we suggest, the fact that the dominant mod e of production in su ch societies is that the producer of an item is, in general, also the person or group who uses or consumes it. People produce for their own needs, It and not , in general, for other people or for exchaDg_~. - is this feature which makes it possible for tribal people to live in a collective framework which is nevertheless not ---- oppressive to · individuality, for while the structure is collect- ,..,,...-- , , - - -----··- i vely determined and '\::ollecti vely h e l ~ ~ land, for ~~~_p_le_-,) ·h•. ri 1 fr: 11n .~, ('... ·i ht., ; r (' \:: n. their own it is p ossible for individuals or groups 1.\ needs,set . I goo , s, and how best to pursue them. J(\I This featureApr~ t-~ -cons umer identitv ; is in fact a feature which i s closely associated with, or even necessary to, a hunting-gathering way of life, but it is not confined to such a of life (that is , it is not af s0 su ff icient f or it) . l1t{J I(. C'lt The condition of producer-consumer identity oJ the/\ ckn ..:.r~f\;-/, f, ·<. \S - dominant)mode of produ -~tion~ the condition upon which the , . socJ~ty which is self-managed at all levels can be obtained. When production and consumption become S'e/!).Jr. f .;_ ,L and production f o r other people's :n:eds becomes the dominant mode of production, the choice between private or individual control of the means of production,or collective contr~= l/is forced on us and we are back again to ec,t other th an the producer mvst r u npalatable choices. ~~n .?om~ody· control production, decide and organise what will be produced and used, and control ~ r,\~+-t (-1 ,ml;; l;.r c (' other people's labour. / Whether the 'somebody' is l an individual or group of individuals ( as in CC/< ·fl{ 1t ·1 ;,,l· ) Cc,rnintu1t,t j et , or class collectively deciding what will be produced and how, we have the situation where not all individ uals can a_. 36. determine their . ctol\. what it produces. distinct needs or control tried- CLC•\ Iv 110,,.r - and A. The separation of production CinrL consumptio n then forces the choices which underlie the reductions and distortion s of capitalism and Marxism, and the resulting split between the individua l as Hte separate and individua l 21.s a mQmbt:?.-t· of a community . Capitalism and Marxist socialism have in common a commitmen t to this separation o f production and consumpti on, di ,ht_,,,1 r•r \ fragmenta tion of lcJJc,lr which reac_h ~s its resulting; and to the highest pitch . in the production line sys tems of modern indu,stry. Such systems of production were of course devised ancl implement ed first by capitalis ts, but were, as we know f~m Marx's works, greatly admired by Marx, who saw them as necessary to lift humanity f rom its previous condition of rural i db cy. { ~~eals itself clearly In this respect the Marxist posi tio~·';I\ as accepting a great deal of the intellectu al and eronomic framework o f c ~pitalism . ) I I The positive Marxist attj tud~ \ to the fragmentat ~on of labour is not just an optional extra tacked onto the theory because of Marx's own personal prejudice s. It is a feature of the theory, which basically views proauction in a fragmented way. *The theory arose * The Marxist picture of the tota i h~torical l y arnong1 and was supported primarily byJ the labour forces engaged in fragmented production in capitalis t enterpris es, rather than among independe nt workers. dependenc e of each individua l element on the other elements of the whole obviously is closely connected with a model of pro- d(cf.;.:. ,~ b.,.l c ,1 7 37. ducers. The reduction positions appear in fact to be very closely connected with the way in which production l' IGH•; :/ is A andfupecia lly with the attitudes to the fragmenta tion for the Marxist reduction of individual to ~ of labour; of a class or collectivi~ C.:i . ._ ~- derives its motivation precisely from the acceptance of the capitalist production t<PP«rat~s . For the fragmentation of labour means that what the individual worker does makes sense only in the context of the total production of the collective. ,~}< Thus · the capitalist and Marxist both share a vision of work in terms of the production /i;1c, but interpret it differently. (The production line is an excellent repres- entation of the dominance of the fragmentation of labour, the assumption which both the reductionist positions accept) The capitalist view is production line o:f the for the purpose of production)of the workers or operators / extensions of the machines - their goals , their intentio ns are irrelevant, they are not part of the production. The object of the production line system~to be understood in terms of t he qoals of the Q,;,,,~-e~~--t ov;;:\h~f ~ A t~~~~~,~; of the goods. 'rhese are of course the characteristics of capitalist society and especially of typical work in capitalist society. Work is ((\:. ~, meaningless, directed from above by someone else , goals are external, to be understood in terms of the goals of individual capitalists or consumers) c\ c~ (~.,... J. I}:- b,___,. f'--.i'. r;L ~~ c:-~,.Js•.• The Marxist also has a production line image, but for him the work of the production line, which is not meaningful when each worker is viewed in isolation, c a n be understood in terms of the goal of the totality of wor kers. Each individual can make only a part of the ~hole, and everyone is needed to make the whole ,tern. /1 i :·:.,-:v--.\,·,__l ~ v ~ Work is mechanical, so 38. there is no place for individual differences and so on. There is plainly no place for 'individualism' in any shape or f . 1 1.ne. . t _..:orrn on th. e pro d uction Mind, rh e . i . mind, b1e goa 1 , is a C1 ass 1 to the workers on the production line. purpose of production must be viewed e n f, ;-(~.I ,,,, 1 The terms ''J /1 u.r/1(> f C sha r ed or goal of the whole group. k- But for those of us who regard the production line as a degraded and distorted form of labou~, to empl'?y ,-~~eh .·. _ ). __ (u.-1,~( c \.\ ' ,1 <I ; ~(I_ c,u,un,.,, (,,(,,~, d J,. /l(' y_, (-·.{4l' c:.. \ --- ' an image as the model of product io n and of society;\ is simply('.'' 1.T:'--~:'.L.:· amazing! For these are precisely the characteristics that make the production line an detested and oppressive form of work. The image - like the assumption of the ffrl-1"- Jmentation o f labour itself -:- betrays the basic capitalist origins of th e Marxist social model extremely clearly. In this as in other respects much Marxist thought is the basf :..ril.. capitalist parents. child of For the fragmentation of labour seen in one form in the production line was set up by cap i talists for their own b e nefit, and is neither more rewarding for the workers, or More productive for the consumers, than other forms of work. The non-reductionist position would simply reject the {Ill model o f work or of society, production l i ne asAappropriate Si nce the production line is not a form of work in which the 1,.._, .... ,c h 1>\-\~-1.. \ individual worker has (\ control - it is ,,the form in which he . ·1 ~ ~_:Sy,"s. ~has J...l..t..t..1..-~ ~r--=ne- control. The image of production, the non- reductionist position would employ would be that of a person or group of persons - making something f or hi .s 0UJ1L o. se. The work is purposeful and not undertaken for external re Lc,·cu l-L or exchange/the goals are inter l\t< producing a whole piece of work. ! I. The worker~ If he is working with a ?Np/,_ group of people, some differentAp1ay be doing different parts of the task, but all the work ers will share in the final product. _\,; . (. 39. In the non-reductionist position the intention or purpose of the work is ~ - that of the individual workers, that is~work is viewed in an intentional rather than in an mechanical way. Here is another important source of the reductionist positions which lies in the treatment of intensionality. cc,nJ1'cfL?,.r If WE\ work a:. s relation between the maker and the c.c made_, the three positions come out as follows: the relation between the individual 1. Capitalist: worker and the made object is not a ~®WHXfMi purposeful one, the purpose is someone else 's. In short the maker - made relation is rna.cl1r7t, n,\::o( , and extensional. The hired worker is an extension of the machine and th e purpose or int en tion '1--\l \ _.::,.·1 of the work is exter-te-€d to it. 2. Marxist: the relation between the individual worker and the made object is still seen as not purposeful, the purpose is in the w_tio l_s?. production line, the society. The maker - made relation, as such, is still viewed as extensional. 3. 3rd position: the relation between the maker and t he made is inteniional, it is purposeful, the goal is directly in the work itself. What differenh~t r work (e.g. under take n by a machine) mechanical and meaningful work is t he lack of intention in case of the former. The relation between t he creat iJe artist and what he makes - the only Ui!t- - sort o.fl\ in which capitalism admits this k1',1 cL of intentionality - is the ~ypical work A designs B _1 A case ♦ The model is: creates B. If the mechaniqal, extensional picture of the maker/ made relation is to be rejected, along with the unpalatable l reductionist choices which it creates, : it is essential to 4 0. i~fuse the individual worker back again into the picture as the creator and designer of whole objects, as the initiator anA. goal setter of h i s own work. This implies a theory which recognises irreducible individual life forms, and thus again, The fact that the a theory which is not Marxist in character . commitment to the fragmentation of l.a.bour cannot be dropped J.:.f h 1,;..,.. 1.,~t / from Marxist theory without ft eornplet~ reconstruction (so great as to render it no longer a Marxist theory) means that the Marxist position is, from the environmental point of view, At bottom it buys the same production apparatus a dead-- end. c..:,. an-a- capitalism, and therefore it can be expected that, even if the management of the firm is changed, it w i 11 turn . out essentially the same line of go~ds. y,,u~(! ,t ( l)J.Y l~-r b411c or ( Acl-1<1.:l; n· ·,!i'c.. the ,\ as Producer-consumer identity'>. O:' b~ Ii d, ,,rf) / mode of production does not of course mean that every individual produces everything he needs for himself entirely on his It means that people produce for their own needs, own. in the combinations they choose. Individuals could of course do so, and some harct-.Y soul s no doubt would want to; provided that they do not interfere with other people's equal entitlements or use more than their fair share of (';'{ IJ .,./.i (Lk,,1:.§ production-land or other commu~~( resources, there is no '\ reason why they should not. Many more pe o.ple, given free choice in the matter, would probably want to produce some I for their own or their households use~and some in common work with others for common needs or interests. /thittZ.-- S ince some activities are more bothAefficient and more enjoyably done with other people, and some are less r ,1 1 (Ji h~ so, it ee-e4-d be expected that most people would work in a mixed system of individual (I M c cllei: I , iN. or communal work ) perhaps varying the combintions at different stages of their lives. /\ 41. But there is a great deal of individual variation in the degree of contact with other people that is ~~~¥iN~ pleasing. Some people at the other end of the spectrum might want to do everything in conjunction with other people. What is essential however/ if the combinations are to be freely chosen, is that the individual option should be open. Freedom and independence is enhanced rather than destroyed by Choosing to work with others, b~t such a choice is free only if there is an option. People do not control their own lives if they cannot set their own goals and determine their own needs, choose what to work o n, with whom and when, how mu ch contact with other· people is op t imal, and so forth. Real control of one's life would be impossible .in a system which envisaged only most collective or communal production, as m0sxx~MiXMXX alternatives to capitalism do. The option o f individual ,, /I production, even if it should t urn out that it was not of t en ft;, ._,} used, is essential to ensure that people remained in control of their own lives ~~~~~i~~ in crucial respects. We have already suggested that a s oc iety in which DIY as the c/1.Cttiu._ (u; 1tic. n-: ode of production would have the conditions which are necessary for and wo uld tend to lead to a truly free s o ciety, one 1 all levels both the oellcctive and the which was self-managed at / and the principle individual ., To complete the conditions self management . ~ of DIY must of course extend a lso through the rest of the institutional Ivan Illich has made a substantial start on suggesting strudure. what some self-managed in'i hfv1.l,c'iir might be like, and on exposing the institutions they are to replace~ although structure of the existing ct.,_!\.- t-he seems to lack a f\ vision of how they fit into a larger framework. This is not the only area ill which DIY would appear to deliver a superior society; t h ere are many ot h ers, 1 d · . t o concen t ra t e but we 1nten At the production here on those relevant to environmental issues. level the basic features of such society have already been suggested A c ommuna/ly control l ed infrastructure would by a number of people. provi de t he basis for prod uction of common basic needs and make these available on a fair basis to any individuals or gro ups who ,, to use them to produce for their own needs. wished __,, We want to stress that DIY is not a proposal for a return to a primitive life-style, ,· 1r 1 1 abandonment of technology, endless hours of grinding labour as a ff /)J y fou "e.~ eu>4..ld ;-i f1t.d- 6rL. ~ '/,"1TQ_ -fad>t(JtliJILCto/ .!'of>,U.d,c~t. k)<...ie.-J:J. It wo>1.h/ of course involve and subsi~te~c-~ _fa'.·1ne~>and so forth.). _ ,Jre.,·.:,,.J{..r- ,1c;.,__ /t!(i __,-!)._/ ,: L1,. t.J.l ~ , 7J,.,_,-J. if1..<- ifti ~------ ------------ - - ----- - - - d.,Pi-e.f"Tl11..-t result in a ·a ifferent life-styl~ a Akind of technolo gy1 and a different kind of ap proach to work. d ;l, ,,,'\ beneficial. Moit of these changes would appe3r to be / , f:. ( ~j !l e.( For example most peof~le could provide for theh- _l~c:l.__§_~c I /\ 1i·J1 '.7. standard in a more satisfqctory way than at present, with perhaps 1 li, f, ,· . l l -. ,-.,,,{_ 4 hours ..jk'V'{_l, .,-..i) 1 l· 1:,· ,:.:,./J /i..( f t, za•I I J ';,._.,• /-4.. per day of work, and probably 1-ers--S;,/as nt.Dre appropriate technology develops and for people wh o work in larger communal groups. 1 The typical feature of solutions to the problem in our society or Marxist soci ety is that~o nesolves one set of problems by creating a nother . oft~n more formR-ble , e. ._~· as one 'sol v:es' . the p~oblern of pciJt.:.r~ y . · in a rather inadequate way by utc,cdi 1-y cm environmental This £eatur~ is avoided to a reasonable probl~rns or some o t her problem. further problems created appear much the where system, DIY a in t ext e n that in the or y constructt_on parallels The situation less formibl e . thi~almost invariab~ ~ of kind t th eory th wrong where on~ has the or equally bad one hap!?3ns, a problem resolved in one area :r.eapr:ears as a worse B (2) A crucial question for a DIY society is: sort of s ub s titu t ion s of labour can be made? what A be ginnin g on answering this question is s u ggested by construin g sub s t i tut ion ·~ -.-the. __ s..ub s t i _t _1Jt,j__prl' as the s u b s t it i on of an ·~ equivale nt economic oroduct. Thus su bstitui on in ,f- economics parallels and reflects identity theory in logic. [Expla in ~it uation in identity theory and intensional lo g ic]. The DIY economic system will plainly re q uire much greater r estriction on substitutivity of identic als , j ust as i t s corresponding intensional logical counterpart does. In contrast the economic theory of the existing system can be seen as extensional, it allows un restricted substitutio n, and the same way it leaves a hu~e range of important factors out of acc ount which are taken account of without diff i culty in a n in tensional system. Unrestricted exchange (or substitution) and the associated division of labour c reates these difficulties , in part thr ou gh the (!f, t rans fer of costs of product i ~ and be n e Lit s from consumption onto different par t ies, and in part through the fact t hat equivalent products~ in the weaker sense of the standard economic theory may !:1~?_!;_ be eq uiv alent in social and environmental respects . 1V\ •·- c(; ~1 '-' Moves such as environmental t:.___, p ricin g are i G . ~ efforts to qualify such substituU.on. B. The most important de fections from pure DIY lie in qualLfied s ub stitutio ns, s ubs titut io n of on e pe r t:;on ' s labou r for a nother' s in particular. Labour exchan ge i s admissible provided it does not int erfere with o th er va lu es , e. g . does not dest r oy o r things the co mm unit y val ues. C 11 rrhe restrictions~ substitution may profitably be comp ,1,red with th ose in extens ional identity , whi ch excl ud e int e n sional conte~t-s as ille gi tima te for sub s titution.,e-x-tensimLo.i' i n d i..v i d-u.al--m-e-an-S I Such an estimate would presuppose retaining some limited kinds ,vI 1 J · / • •' it\) of lar :)J t · -· :,:tc./L. ','\ production, perhaps communally owned., and operated perhaps by those who would use the product~or by people working on a \storage' system, for example, the mass production of cheap durable Cc,-- NPl basic clothing and housing as proposed tn ._~topia. __Jro suggest that hi/J ,~ <.,,., <-l1u.,/r..(,{.:. -1(ft(c_, /"<.rlcv-.__ • e/ DI Y should be the\ v · mode o~ production is also not to suggest 1 1 Vil\ " ~l ~-, ?- bLe__ that it should be the -~-- -- _,__ ·- - . mode of productioni the system ;: ,;,n J)} /t<.J<.. j can be liberalised, to allow for some limited kinds of exchange 1\ production and some limited kinds of free communal productio~without destroying its overall character, in the same way that the present system allows for certain limited kinds of DIY - 'Do-it-yourself' - product ion without lo..s.ing its overall character as a system of exchange f.rJJ .-· _ :;;) The'. Dr.'/ tf -~ fc,,11... /"" l ~ 1f,; production. ~A could also/be extended to allow people who wished to concentrate heavily on some project and needed a lot of free !1·11,~J time to 'store' basic credits o ver a time period. For example,, u ,:,ii(:/\_ in 'Communita s' ; . ," A in the late 1940' s/'Paul Goodman estimated that ;;- +l.1. plant, equipment a n d technology avai lable were used efficiently ~ ~ people could provide for their basic needs for an entire lifetime in two years, ,:, and could then organise the rest of their time freel y~ _,,1 ----- -·- c ~~ce~t;ated - ~~0 That is a high tech_. picture,, even allowing for the increase in productivity since he wrote•but the basic idea is ,J adaptable to a lower tech. one, albei t with a larger time period. MX<'S Most people though would probably prefer to provide for their basic ne~~ by production outside the basic community ·~ - ~ontrolled A - _,,- mass-production system.,1as in Ecotopia, obtaining both more pleasing goods and more satisfying work in doing so; and even many of those \,v o.~......-ttQi who w-c • -:-Gl to have a large amount of time free for the pursuit of some project might find the production of part of their own food on a daily basis an enjoyable and satisfying form of relaxation. Production beyond that for basic needs is an optional extra which -,) people can pursue as and how they desi re. ( It will certainly be objected that such a system would not all ow sufficient leisure or free time. The sharp distinction between 'leisure' and 'work' is of course to a product of a system ' r-... where work is typically q l·1e,_;,_ nated tfl the sense that those who work on it do not control it and its gon./J are extetll(d. to to process in that the m6tivation for doing it is to obtain something other than the fina l product or the satisfaction of the work. working on wh at Someone who is he enjoys do ing and finds satisfying to do to produce for his own need~does not draw a sharp distinction between 'work' and 1 leisure 1 • Furthermore it would appear that such a society could allow for a great deal more 'leisure' in the sense of time not spe nt on the basic needs for living, than the present one and such leisure would be in principle avai lable to all, which is not the case in the present system. The price which would be _paid for free time would however be quite different. The price of free time for non-production Uc~ J ities e.g . intellectual or artistic projects, or just to contemplate the universe, would not be the price of inequalityJo f being able to rely on other peqie lower down the scale to do the basic need:; production in an alienated way. The pri ce would be simplicity of life. In the same way the price of indepen dence from other people is not a private income which enables one to made use of the labou r of others, but an \ {'.:. - :, ~:, I( ,c~,\ independent, self-reliant mode of ~roduction. The ob;,J e c tion that such I\ a society would extinguish the intel lectual and creative lights which are alleg edly fostered so well in this society does no t hold water, t but it is sure to be made much of because a major justification for 1,, equa lity and for production for exchange is that i s is supposed to \)t --? - release some specially gifted individuals w-~ \ sufficient full-time leisure to pursue such things.] /lcf. 1 ,,/J r. c , 1cf,1 rr,, A DIY system will of course be pronounced by economists to be 'inefficient' and therefore denounced as one which 'lowered living standards'~ t1c,1 It is fairly well known to Rconomists that efficiency is a relative and evaluative notion that is that if it is 4f measuredAthe total output of value per unit of imput then the term 'value' cannot be explicated in terms of the market as just 1'141 what the market deliver s without ernplOYJtt he J_ . t1Clfu--(Qi;111c fallacy. It is not sufficiently often realised that it is also a relatiV istic notion, that is, that it is relative to the socio-economic framework I adopted, and that appeal s to 'e ff iciency' ~n t err> i S of the present system are really appeals back to a fo~m of individual reductionism. It is not a question of abandoning the concept of efficiency, but of realisation of the dependenc e on a J·t 1 U1 f 1") C; r - econonomic base. For some things which are efficient to produce in the present centralised structure based on a high degree of fragmentation of labour would be extremely inefficient to produce in a DIY system, and some things which are inefficient to produce in the present system would be efficient to produce in a DIY system. Centrai; \cftion depends upon fragmentation of labour, and therefore on the social and political choices which are forced by it. A DIY system would have a radical form of decentralisation as a natural consequence for people who have regai~ed control of their productive force would <"( ~ naturally combine in smaller decentralised groups a.n d suited their needs and interests. Th~s in a DIY system smaller scale or ga nic gardening, which makes use of local organic material instead of wasting them, would be more efficient than gardening which depended upon imputs from a high energy, cf11fr4./,· ru/ fertilise,·-plant, for instance,.If the people who wanted to use something hcttl time producing it, then anything requiring a large measure of transport or manufacture elsewh ere away from the in effi cient compared with a n (, .te of use would tend to be Q/~rnat ive way of doing something which could be produced or made locally from local materials and which did t unpleasan t work processes . materials would then be t>l i{( t\ )i,f U-/ .", f l <( In general ' 1 available loc al -i lt (') L }·n ore efficient to use thar, which /\ required a high level of manufactu re, low technical processes would 1 usua lly tend to be more efficient than high level ones, and .so on. These chan ges are strengths· pre· c;seiy the sources of its environme nt; and other and to suggest that such a system can sim; 1J be written off as 'inefficie nt' to try to wri te a social framework into economics and absolute in a quite invalid way. A DIY society would be as naturally decentral ised as ours is natural l y c entralised ~ The role of this kind of radical decentral isation in reducing enviro nment al impact through encouragem ent of a decentralised small- S,cE)_/e;. low impact technology has o ften been pointed o ut. Another consequen ce which i s not so often remarked on but is equally important is the role of s uch decentral isation in enabling a natural accounting of many sorts ~f environme ntal costs occ urin g as a result of productio n. Local production for local needs means that normally the environme ntal costs associated with production are borne by the local population whic h uses and produces the items concerned . There is thus a strong natural basis for taking such costs as the destructio n of local ame nity into account as part of the perceived cost of producing that destructiv e sort of item. Accounting of costs which takes account of environme ntal values is extremely difficult to do in a n a tural way in a system which spreads costs around in a widesprea d 1 The dividing line between self-manag ed technology and the opposite does not however entirely coincide with the high tech/low tech For example, good two-way commun ications system coul~ ~ distinctio n. have an invaluable role in cre at ing a network of flexible cornrnuni t i,_ es, other than the spatially local community , in which individua ls could Computers could, as Illich points ou~be used to participa te. further and create such a network of communiti es and cit'-<__ invaluable aids in self-manag ed education medical and legal systems J IAJh...(l,t--(1_ they could be used to overcome the ~onoDolis ations of skills, knowledge , In ::,_ short some and informatio n by professio nalg and technocra ts. power, instead of of co uld serve decentral isation high-techn olo gJ being used to increase the concentra tion of power as in the present system . fashion as centralised integrated production - for example, the commonly encountered situation of concentrated major benefit going to a small numbf~r of people and s ma l ler but very widespread costs accruing to a very large number of people. This situation typifies the subtle way in which environmental degradation occurs in such systems. If the environmental costs of production occur in the same region as and accrue to the same people as the benefits, we could expect that the environment costs of producing certain destructive items would be much less easily overlooked or shrugged off. A DIY system would be 'pluralistic' in the sense that it could provide for a very large range of different diversity in gords and needs. life-styles and a great There are however a number of bu~lt-in .i. -n1.t' ;,· : •. ..,/f features which would work strongly against environmen~llyAdestructive life-styles .. It is important to realise that these features are the result of DIY and are not obtained simply by the feature of comr:u.mo..l control of the means of production. 1 , , Consume. rism and Waste~ --·-· ·--, ... ~ ~ I] feature of DIY _,..,. rs a built-in defence against the complex of problems known as consumerism{ t ha~is 1 the taking o f satisfaction in accumulating unneeded goods). Consumerism arises primarily when people find little which they do not control, satisfaction in their work, and which is frequently, for most peopl~repetitious and boring a 1 iv, ~~J and undertaken only to mak:1 ., or for reward s mainly 12 1', t J. 111.)( Satisfaction must be found outside to the production process. the production process, in consuming the products of other people's labour . Such consumption is the reward of work, and the consumer society rewards its members for the unpleasantness of their work mainly in terms of opportunities for increased consumption . In lead to a situation where goals contrast, since DIY wc ,dd. were mostly internal to work, satisfaction in such a society would be obtained though the work process itself and not in a never-ending chase for satisfaction through consumption. Reward s would be through the production process I not !_rom work ·- lying just in the product. Work would be undertaken in part because it was satisfying itself, As any self- and not usually tu_st to obtain the final product. builder knows, even apparently mundane projects such as building o n e's own hous e can become,if the worker can control his own labour and match what he does to his needs, a source of great satisfaction and of self-expression. 1 In this situation people express themselves a nd their individuality through what they make, not through consumption of mass-produced items e.g. buying a new model car . of the make the individual thin'k fits his /n1ccge . 11 In a DIY system, these sorts of satisfactions are available to everyone, not just a few people selected and designated as "gifted" or "creative 11 , and allowed to work creatively, as in capitalism. Secondly, there are in fact very substantial limits to the extent to which one could be an indiscriminate consumer in a DIY society Je cD~1Jone wanted to , lonsum e rism depends upon other people 's labour to If people have to make their g ood s themselves a crc;cial extent. (for example 1 if you have to go and work in a bicycle works for a while /1 ._,.,. t.' ' ,...., J'/ ;.. ;\). . . ~ -· .. ' 0-11"'. t: , rL. .... t ,.....___ \:: • _ 1 • •, • _• - , / ) ,:,..:_ .. ,, .... -t ~ l_ -~A. ,_\. \ 1. . • C /- 1 ·,._ ).•.•.•. 0\1 r . . tl ·'t-y \\ . _/_ if you want a bicycle), then there will be a serious trade -of f b e twe en work time and consumption, which would act as a built - in The more goods are accumulated, the less brake to overconsumpt ion. time one would have to use them . leisure would have fe~r~oods. People who want large amounts of Many people even in the present society , standard " - ·fh,., ·t . givife) such a choice, might in fact prefer a "lower l1vii1j /;(e i.r > tt n m1 h.-r The work situation in and more free time for their own pursuits. capitalism encourage consumerism in man_y ways, one of the most important being that people do !:"lot usually have a choice to obtain shorter work hours, have fewer consumer goods and more leAsure or more time for their own projects. They have to work certain hours, they h a ve a surplus, so they might as well use it to obtain the customary rewards. DIY would allow the 1wd,hi"J of work in a flexible way to needs, rff-' for more free time, which and e ncourage such a tradeAof fewer go ods could be spent on non-consumer pr ojec ts. \ Thirdly, a DIY society would be a noh-waste socie ty. No one would work to make things he did not really need when there were othe r I thi n gs he could be doing I ) ( instead. ' ', '--: ,. , - .,-, : , ' A.: ,◄ \ ) As Brian Martin has pointed ou~many presently environmenta ] y damaging systems, such as the private car system, would tend to disappear if people has to make their own, repair them, and help the roads. Buses, bicycles and horses, or other transport systems would b e more efficient in such a society. One cannot imagine people in a DIY society.work ing for a month a year, for example, in a packaging factory to make a lot o f unnecessary package s th~yhad to throw away as soon as the item was unwrapped/and then/fur ther had dispose of by their own efforts. The goods they / would manufacture for themselves would be as durable as they could be made, and would be made to be easily repaired. Materials would be made to go as far as they possibly could - technology would be developed which would do as much as possible with as little as possible " could not be manufactured in a l~cal area would tend to be replaced [0, th ose which did not have these characteristics. Since high- ..~;.f . _ l ,_ \\/ technology materials eq\1aLly- have the characteristics, the y would t e nd to be replaced by low tech materials, with consequent benefit to the environment. fNlf The DIY society would Abe a low-consumption/low resource-use Since waste represents unnecessary and avoidable .1.. ·: u- (\J ,-.. r 1": ·-:- l c, b,~ , ..,. k I uld avoid it. labour/wo own their controlled who people labour, no-waste society . ~ t c ,....t (A. I,._• .. •J - " . • --- , • 2. Poverty a nd ~nequality . l t present the main capitalist argument for never-ending growth and the production of environmentally b,,f i.f ,1fl(}_ ( C Jj(~ damaging ~E:J~goods is that it is necess ary to help the poor. This is supposed to occur through "Trickle Down", a process whereby people at the top of t he must 3et far more than they need hcnp reach those at t he bottom of the he a p. so that a few drops can A more ;n.efficien t or envi6nmentally damaging system for providing ,{ for the poor can hardly be conceived. Different people have many different ab ili ties and capaci ~e_i but people who are not very young or very old and are in a norma! state (l, J '\ , ' ; / ; ' .,/ ;, -' f • ,' 1·, ,,· f ,· ( of health 1are basically fairly equal in their ability to provide I for themselves the basics they need for a g ood life. At present V poor p e o p ~ poverty and inequality come about primaril y are prevented from providing themselves with what they need in a s ati sfactory way. (Three cheers for Winstanley!) They are prevented b e cause the right to use the means of production is made scarce, ,I: (usually by private property), and the skills to use efficieJly are A also made scarce ( usually by the bureacra tic cJqfl-1) 1 Restriction in access to use of the means of production is also tt.t. ( I J1J l I Ji!. l( / {;J L , Rr 1( a main source of 1nequality throughAso on, since the restrictions are used to disadvantage thrue people not in certain favoured categories. 2 f \ ,_. h,_.• 2 ' • \ I >/- , The point is driven here in all of Il l ichs work especially Dese-Fe#trg Society /and 'Energy and Equity' and of course the older school of (\~ ,_',A.· . .._, , anarchist w_i ll also stres s ed it. ~l'..ti 'fhc,N,:~---- .1 --\ l·j ...,• _ '\ A syst em of comm unal con trol of the of prod ucti on tn:,[( 11.J with ~cces s r ig hts for all who wan t them a~:V in DIYJ 1 toge ther with the free disp,v ~~~1· of t ~{_ skil ls to use them pres entl y "' wou ld remo ve this maJ· or sour ce of pov erty with out the need for was tefu l ,.I inef f i.cie nt and c: 1111 ,'rt-1111:~1tl&lj dam agin g econ omic grow th. The pure DIY society would 1 i t t 1 e r o o m f o r h :t e r a r c.1h yl and from a t he g uid e wou ld that division of to be sort e qual the of access social picture would hiera r chy and and fact that without allowin g the of pleasure, Such a position would be able th at but to not misse s th e presuppos e The mark. l evel allow for t o needs, or the ( , for f alse individual a bilities their a social dif fe rences differences, capacities, power it a nd be a s ociety. they 'level' in ability, that and people have th at this level objection does presupposes not only ,, /-,,, ( d i ffer e nces in ability of be t ween kind of capitalist ability d iversity and that framework a rea s; Such in present i n dicat e s pow e r a nd and and so in a bili ty on, an d as relie s a the inequality on areas. level the justification for on inequality a nd false dichotomy an absolute f ram ewo rk levels based on a needs. in oth e r inequality on justification for inequalities equal level of conservative premiss as of the in e q ua 1 r i g h t . a nd }a b·±--1-i.ty::=t:#> s take i n c on t r o 1. .,. , ·1 whatever at both indi vi dual as differences of this level, system could s oci e t i es , ability in all What pow e r people's typical i l legitimately uses level, equal source of pro f i t , The capitalist argument framework framework goals become a picture the provide goods is not required. to me e t Equality a t p eo ple have a n their own lives, can Equality on on. of power ·{-(, th a t social produc t i on, 'egalitarian' two equality o f th e d iffere nt on the ar i si ng p owe r soci e ty would provide. can allow a d e qua tely c apacit i es. account Exc el len ce in such a egalitarianism is based equal it differences so urc e do not so of problem of how to allow for in e qu a lities . an d of individual frame work people and people h a v e capitalist obj e ct i on such a elitism; thes e two-lev e l the means framework, without the The be equality on to resolve i nequ a1 i t i e s ot her equality individual production and a f or labour. r e quired would is, forming the ob vi o usly be one which had ver y false equalit y assumption :, /. 2. In practice equality on the social framework level would guarantee a reasonable level of equality on the individual level, since great differences lisation CJ r of in this the means of production, accumulation of other people's labour, would reduce differences area can arise only when monopo- are possible. Equality of that ex a mple Jane likes and asfemale Thorea u ) It is that it it should do can only be achieved if differences carpentry, household an especially fine house; universe , but in material goods or i t is of cour~e undesirable this kind equal i ty and Anne on the other hand Suppose builds herself and her (whom we may envisage likes to contemplate the and wants only a minimum level of basic needs i mpos s ible to obtain absolute equality without satisfied. either preventing Jane from doing work she likes and exercising her the benefit of hersel f for without in the demand ~_ ?c i..?-1__ or needs for to. equality, f r am e w o r k ... 1 e v e 1 , production and skills and others, or, what is equally undesirable forcing or pressing Anne than she wants no t to work more and consume more What is then, legitimate and necessary is ~q -~~it._y ___Q_f __ p_ o_w_e r:, e q ua 1i t y a t t he 1ev e 1 of at the i n d iv :i. d u a 1 consumption. Social Democracy often claims , 1 e v e 1 o f " p u b 1 i. c ri 1i f e • to deliver equality at the This claim should be rejected however because:(1) i t does not provide equal access . product lo n , ( 1 . ·. .- .. to the common means treats th 1 s as an in di v id u a 1 mat t er ~------------·-- ---···'/ ra t her /I than as one for /· of . \--------,) m 1 s taken 1 y \. but so. in interests and needs are denied or discouraged. abilities, for and Social framework in people's living standards, would not guarantee absolute equality ac h ievem e nts, or employment social framework control ,., ;; } 3 /I . (2) the individua l isation of comm LJ. n c1 / life forms inequalities of power at (3) is only, and in fact opportunity is all' confusion. in though equality of opportunity such equality occurs in any case, the concept of to a equality this case defecti v e, S l:\ C.<?- to do so.* priv ; leged and through equal i t is based on an 'each- the rest of the except in an Alice-in-Wonderland sense, even if the opportunities for equal for each person but clearly not _.§.Q The opportunity to be selec ted as on e of a powerful elite which controls population does not, equality, very limited extent Each person might have the theoretical opportunity to become Prime Min ister or win the lottery, can hope to great the framework level. the claim to provide equality specious; leads • (which provide selection were in fact they are not in Social Democracy). Real equality of opportunity and power requires ways o f making decisions and exercising power in which all can participate to an equal extent. X ,,,.- * Such 'equality of opp ortunit y' arguments for the egalitarian character of Social Democracy are a similar swindl e based on a scope confusion. So, for example, 'everyone has an equal opportunity to do i t ' (win the lottery, become Prime Minister) is ambiguous between (1) (x) Q fx and (2) ◊(x)fx. .,,l ·- ) _J ~·I \ t~ \ '- J I I -.J 1 ! .• '1 l ;b ) ) <, I .~ ( .~ ·' .J , ..J I ) J J ' :, r' J r' . ) (J ) ) J ) ) r<'O ) -·{ ·1 { ,..l --l-- ( ~- ; -j / ...;, s I -~ I f _i I >' .:";) 1-- .r '/t,\/ -tp ~ j ) . _) -----s ~ ) ·•J I ',I :5 ' ...... j ' l j .J <,} .J ~ . . ~-i , ) . ..> . ...J ), j 4 ) ', -t) j \ l ~ ✓ , J_ . .{ ..) '1 l u) ·.;, r ? ' I', \~ .., ) " ~ I (,> I I I . j - ) A ; '1 _( c..J\ JJ( ~ t C, _) ~ lJ 0 ) 'l .. ) ) ~) .J -~ ) 'J ) . -(7 I vj t } 1) •..J ,J f ) I > ) ) ) ,.. ' .,) ( :1 c..-i <+,) (_,) c) _.,. ) 'i _,.) .. L ) l I r' ·-(f r ... r-• :, d ..I ) } ~ •.J -; ) .) _j ,--,. -1 . I ·t j } ',) (1 ) j ( ·" ·'},, ', ) -~ ~ " ) t -· l ,'l; __l, ) -,! ... J ) ( ) ) L . J J ..J , ) _) ,,\ ~ ' ) I ...) ,.\ t~I $ ...) .) 7XJ J ) . ), -.), _.._ J ~ - ),,1 .J.. f) --r' ) ___,,,. J .,~ 'j < -- J (~ (-::; r j ,_, ~ ) l - .J t _) _.) '-..I ( ·~. _,,,, ) ~· ) .....l r' .1 r I -..,c7 \' 2 ' ~ I) ) '/ t-! f, \ \; r, l ~ \ I ·') · "I ...,.. 1-=; ) 7 \, ( .1.-- " .J .( '.J :~ 'f ~~ ) "; :},..) ·,"-' \ (> -✓ ,.,,., ) ----... uJ 'i ~I 1, ) --.J~ ,J J ,.:' " ·1 ':./ ") ) ~ ~ ·r '; -~ __.) tJ ,., ' J,, \ ~ ,_) ; .) J r: \ _c ) , - J 01 ,.. ) ...) < 1 ;_;, ( ).... 7 .. ,) 'l 1 )' t:: • - j '.'j ,!) I I J ' .J,) l .J I _) I ) 7 I ) • .J ) } ..:.) ,, _..) ') ~--.... ' ,) :( I 1 ? ··'I ·1 ..J J ~} ·1 ' ( • .> c-: :.,.._ ~<r \.~ ....,_ .) J ,j ,,, -i ) ) --·r-:i I ,) (( '( . -> - \·· --< .J ' l I ) " ) l / .. j r··s ~ \'\ ~ ~ \t I I ~ I cuts straight through the problem which plagued Anarchist thought - \ the problem of how production is to be organised , whether it was ... .., ·, , \ to be communist ic as Kro p otkin wanted wi t.h each person w, rt(l;-.,_1 to ,_ ""-' ;j \) 1 " " ........ ~ ...\) the best of his ability and taking according to his needs from the c01Tu11on store, or collecti \.,, i..st, as Bahu11, :1 ~ ~ . \) J ..._, , 'l ~ \ \I ' The adoption of a system I -~ . )( ·•·i·-.._ .\.. I I., \ ~ t r e mun e... ·"rat.ion in the fonn of wages according to the amount of .--------------= ~ DD1 r~~, £ ,~, ,:7 ,r-c-.jo r /'o ., 1'7 71 u [/ 7 ✓·~work done;41 , allows a pluralist ic and flexible approach;- and, is A A certainly ( ,'1Y1/?"1!,/41(i I / ruHl others wanted, with I [j/l,' t with the first, 1 and perhaps the second, as hU ,.·. the organisat ional 1\ of subgroups within the total society. Each of these systems has serious disadvanta ges ~f applied organising principles for the total society. system, as Kro;>d41'n pointed out, would restore wage-slave ~y, and lead to systems and kinds of work not greatly different from that in capitalis t society. The communist system Kropot1::. 1,1 proposed was an attempt to get away f·rom exc h ange pro d uction · l an d appears to h a ve b e en a n attempt to production and consumpti on, which in the collecti ·/ ist system remained split, thus Kropotl(,>1 writes "Common possession of -,1,, the necessarie s for production implies the common eJoyment of the /\ fruits of the common productio n". This seems to be an attempt to reunite production and consumptio n at the level of the total community 1 i.e. to a pply PCI at the community level. Unfortuna tely it cannot be effective at that leve l, because such common production and cons umption also, implies identical production goals a nd identical interests . But to a ssume this at the total community level is unr e asonable, and ult i mately 1~pressiv e. It ties e1d1 personfu production to every oth e r~ n e ed and g o ~~ a nd each person' s n ee d t o 1 rrhe term "communis t" cannot of course accurately be applied to the systems it is popularly applied to to-day. to everyone elsis production, in a way which would plainly not allow the sort of individual life control, the freedom to .~>1:eh one's i: work to one's godl ·i, and vice--versa, which a true.ly free socity rm s t 1\ allow. So for example, a person who wanted to work little and 1ri:·:,i,,f a si{( ple life with few gOl:cCs in order to have :free time for some 1 projec~would be unable to do so under this system, he would be pressured into working "to the contribute to the common well-being to the fullest extent of his capacities" He would in effect have to remove his own non-consumer gord to provide for someone else, desire to consume at a much higher level. I<ropott in' s suggestic,t would plainly have required a very l a rge measure of soc i al conformity and indirect social control or pressure to succeed. Kropotl ~ of course envisaged that people would willingly submerge their own ,} gooi .s in the common goo/ because of his view of the human nature. u',l~C 1-ti~ness of Nevertheless his system appeared to invole to a larg e extent compulsory self- nlJ n ~·-,;,t! ,·/\( / , which is very different from not allowing one person to exploit another. He did of course envisage that collabora tion in his common work system would be freely and c1ose~ but since he nev~r appeared to envisage any a l ternative, it is hard to know wh~t this comes to. This problem is of course resolved by a sy s tem allowing flexible The collecti y .ist principle - that the worker /\ . entitled to the A fru i ts of his labour - is retained ih such a system, but without the problems of production for exchange and witho ut the wage-slavery tha t drove the critics of that form of organisation to a communist alternative. The communist difficulty that people's work is to the needs of others in a way which makes a self-managed life /) I Y difficult and would impose conformity, is resolved also. .P-G~I · allows flexible production groups to form based on common go·;/.s and needs, and allows each to be the judge of his own needs to direct his own work. i ~' !:' k'. \j . People with common go,ik., and interests and needs mayA !i,ute to form such groups bu t (e.g. a hous e hold or a commune). society is not envisaged as one big household, as appears to be in Kropotlc i / 1' ' s s y stern. Kropo6:. 1 11 would have rejected this of course, since he wished to argue that there could be no individual entitlement even to the fruits of one's own labour but only so:_cial ones. In many ways his arguments to the effect that no person do anything on his own, a re reminisc~ nt of the Marxist arguments for total social determination of individuals, a ·~.scussed later. His argument that there can be no such thing as an individual entitlement is not clearly stated in • 'Anarchist Commun\ sn\:' Quote. The passage in effect assumes that work of previous generations has been benificial, an assumption which seems to derive from Kropotl~ i'il. 's fervent belief in modern progress. It ignores the fact that the clearing of the forest has often been, and has long since become in most cases, the excessive clearing of the forest, that the results of the work of our ancestors is not only soil improvements but also soil erosion, that perhaps our predecessors have not left us the best of all possible worlds in respect of natural wealth. At best then the work of the past can be seen as a mixed blessing. This does a good deal to undermine Kropot~1~j argument which assumes that any i n d ividual working on his own project has received help from past human's but if it is a/50 hinderance, exactly what the existence of past human work is supposed to show is notAclear. Kropot~~ wanted to argue that people who created wealth entirely by their own efforts were entit led to what they created, but that in fact this was impossible. No one could create wealth or indeed do anything, entirely on their own, because their is always dependence on other people at some point, therefore all wealth was enti1tBly sou ;~i and should be shared in common. distingu ish W~S The argumen t fails to of relative independ ence and appears to rest on a high redefin ition of 'on your own' . If someone clears and digs his own vegetab le patch, manures it himself with his own wastes and by green manuring , it see~s hard to suggest that he does not have il 1;/r /, ,/ some special claim on the carrots he has sown and, or that his 1 A g rowing of them for his own use is a selfish action which deprives others of their due. It might be objected that the carrot varietie s he has sown are the product of vegetab le improvem ent by untold generati ons of his predece ssors. But that does not seem to be a good reason for the claim that he has no special claim on the carrots, an:zinore than the fact that the author of a book did not invent from ·, scratch the language in which it is written shows that he is not the real author of his work and does not have any special entitlem ents to make certain kinds of decision s regardin g it, because it is a product. Work can be distingu ished is primaril y that of some person or group, even where they have made some use of the precedin g work of others. Kropotk,~ 's argumen t would show that no one could ever do anything on his own, and depends upon adopting a quite excessiv e standard for producti on being someone 's own - that it should owe nothing wh__~-atever to the efforts of any other human being instead of, what is more reasonab le, that it should be primari ly(In the case of the authorsh ip of a book even th r~ standard is probably excessiv e) . •. No _ one acts in a social vacuum there is always a framewor k or backgrou nd, but that does show everything is a social product. rrhis to ,,di ci;;.. 5 c.1,}';.111 0,. ,J - _ might suggest that Anarchis m adopted the reductio n C i :._ i which underlie s Marxist so~ism . would be mistaken however. Such an impressi on Kropotki n .:;and other leading anarchi sts constan tly emphasis ed the importan ce and autonomy of the individu al and stressed that their aim was the optimum developm ent and maximum liberty of the individual the maximisation of individual initiative and so on. It is quite clear that they did not subscribe to the Marx ist reduction of individuals to bits of t:r:- l lecti ves or classes, which they saw quite rightly, as ~ irnical to liberty. The Marxist reduction is quite expl icitly rejecte d in Malat'e Jtlc'1 (an important and ,~K;~ ,Jc. ·,p , 'rl tLc h i"tl'Jk '- f.: "l. . 0 1tu .r d~, :>'t c..>1'1··{- ·,_ ,-- ) 1 who also stressed the importance of individuals. ~ n ki nds of tribes ~-, , , 1 Often peo~hder (or gathered) as ina.":i-vj_duals, or t h e ri ght }yu=rt(-- ' ' ---~ ~ in col laborative ~ g r ~ of various sizes or were--~ ~ a_.,t:r::-itie were I .." ><- [ '-,--~.•, 1;1ore · ~r less a~ t he occasi~anded ( H ~-~ 1 I t ~ f groups -or:,,tr ib al hunting procedure w o u l ~ be shared among the g - ~ of t ~ l tribe, but in ~ i v i d u a l c a se usually, a lthough some ~ ~ ' might be given regar~eing l. 6se who had mostly the resulting produce was -·1z__for the use of he veo obtained it as -~ k i.00-_(.s.e.eJT ow i t t far d ~i_J_s._in_ t b r=> A11 s t r a J ian_char.g.e..cLoneA- It seems that the non-reductionist position we have sketched is in fact the unde r lying philosophical base of most of the main stream of anarchist thought from Proudho.rr through to Ma kd-a-1.}1-✓.>_ _ ,, that part I ,,u 1 which was prepared to desc; ,?L itself as 'libertarian s61\ lism 1 • There was also of course, the so called 'individualist' position of and a number of Anarchists which is clearly an individuali s t reduction position, and to that extent quite distinct from the main tradition. 1 Footnote on 'News from Nowhere' (7. It is perhaps surp r ising that despite such a basic outlook traditiona l anarchist thought remained stuck with an entirely communist propos ed · for the organisation of production in which the personal 'intiati ve' and 'individual' autonomy and originality so stressed by anarchist thinkers would have to be directed ,n the Jji/1(~ ;---f.> of production entirely to commun.-~al or sh ared aims and needs as the Marist positions, so in practice in the area of production in this system despite its different th .eo;-i1:-~t~_::.cr/ base ;}om Marxism _. ,n //J>,r ,, i >1-::i;•d~;1, at any rate individual expression woul be confined to communal life forms. The positi on c onlVl. be said therefore to have worked out a consistent position en the issue of the control of individual life and in lifl king i t _.i theory of production with its overall view of the individual and the cormnuni ty. have resolved . There seem to be several reasons why traditional an a rchist thought problem . This part of problem a DIY system could ~A~~ arrived at a convincing reso lution of this First)anarchisrn never developed its philosophical foundations and philosophical identity property in the way t hat Marxism was able to do, and hence was always subject to corrupt ion by the influe nc e of that position. As Mai:a:kxx fltk11'--r.·Jhc_ puts is (quote) Second, tr aditional anarchism was unable to resolve the problem of individual production in a convin cing way because it brought the capit a list production machine and the fragmentation of labour it invol~d, 1\ ,jA as well as nearly all the associated Enl;?tenment values of Modernity !) 3-1,• c/c; ,h ;._f-) j, ., Science, Progress, Profess ·.1c-rd ,\i,,, the Conquest of Natu.~ re and so on. . , 'v' This is espei $ally clear in Kropotk1n· 's work. Although anarchism advocated regional decentralisation and was f 3 r more critical of the division of labour than the Marxist school( see Kropot~1 ,1 's remat~s on the rnanu f acture of r; "' h0cu,/ S i ) it s till held that the fragmentation i of labour (which Kropoth' u; describes as 'our modern integrated system of prod~ction')was politically neutral and held the key to progress and the good life for all. The sort of critique of this method of production and of its associated values are encounters today seemed 1 to be entirely absent from anarchist thought. Given such assumptions the possibility of individuals and groups freely determining the production gou ls and needs and achieving them for themselves as in DIY disappears. The capitalist production app /:nrh1 s is not of course as we now realise only to well, neutral with respect to social structur~and the sort of social options it rules out are precisely the ones needed to resolve the anarchist dilemma of the freedom of the individual in the sphere of production. The result of failing to resolve the problem in a convincing way was always a serious source of conflict within anarchist ranks. (.'., It is clear from Malatsta's writing that by the early decade of the '\ century it had reached substantial proportions, and considerable effort was dirtcted towards resolving it. 2 To as certain extent the failure to resolve the problem may have contributed to the decline of anarchism, since the position then lost much of its appeal for peasants and the independent workers who formed a major part of its constituency. 1 Although it is not missing from some contemporary anarchist thought, see Brown 'Smallcreep's Day'. 2 M~latesta thought that individual production from the producer's own needs was theoretically admissible provided the producer had only He thought however that no an equal share of communal resources. one would be able to produce entirely for themselves at a reasonable The obvious option standard,an assumption which seems to be false. o f partially individual and politicaly communal production was for He also believed that it would be impossible some reason overlooked. to get an equal division of land because not all was equally This problem is readily overcome using modern watered and so on. land system assessment techniques in which scores are allote~ for different characteris~-t.ics. 57.2 Nonetheless in outlining features a DIY society there is much that can be taken from anarchist and near. t so urces. 1 a n arc h is For instance, the details of the cooperation of network$ of communities in main,~ tTaining .__. _.. such infrastructure or railway systems, quarantine arrangements, and such like 1 can be taken over largely intact. What cannot be extracted, however, from traditional anarchist sources i s much that is satisfactory concerning the attitudes to the natural world that a DIY society would find appropriate, 2 1 What need not be taken are some of the more controv ersi al features of anar chism , in particular the usual proposals for the (Tion) administration of justice. There is no reason in a DIY framework why a community, or set of communities j _n co:opara t ion, sho uld not evo 1 ve their own ( deprofe s s ional--- i sed) legal forms. What wil l vanish, as in anarchism.are rulers, nations and I' states, and more gene rally, hierar chial power structures. However, a community will have an organisational structure, and its political organisation may include components of what would not inappropriately be called ' government' . 2 The us u a 1 an arch i s t view , e s p e c i a 11 y s t ro n g in Kr op o t k i rt , was one of transformation of nature for human end.s. view was quite exceptional. ~orris '  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Box 89, Item 1900: Draft of Towards a social theory for ecotopia Subject The topic of the resource Typescript (photocopy) draft, with handwritten emendations. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/browse?search=Richard+Sylvan&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bjoiner%5D=and&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=&amp;range=&amp;collection=&amp;type=&amp;user=&amp;tags=&amp;public=&amp;featured=&amp;exhibit=&amp;geolocation-mapped=&amp;geolocation-address=&amp;geolocation-latitude=&amp;geolocation-longitude=&amp;geolocation-radius=10&amp;submit_search=Search+for+items">Richard Sylvan</a> Contributor An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource <span>This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, </span><a href="https://najtaylor.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Dr. N.A.J. Taylor</a><span>.</span> Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library. Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource [79] leaves. 55.77 MB. Type The nature or genre of the resource Manuscript Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context <a href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:cbc0b65">https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:cbc0b65</a> Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived <span class="MuiTypography-root-125 MuiTypography-body2-126">The University of Queensland's <a data-testid="rek-series" href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/records/search?page=1&amp;pageSize=20&amp;sortBy=score&amp;sortDirection=Desc&amp;searchQueryParams%5Brek_series%5D%5Bvalue%5D=Richard+Sylvan+Papers%2C+UQFL291&amp;searchMode=advanced">Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291</a></span>, <span>Box 89, Item 1900</span> Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org">Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy</a> Coverage The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant Australian National University - Far Bookcase - Second Bay - Second Shelf - Pile 4 Australian National University Office Australian National University Office > Far Bookcase > Second Bay > Second Shelf > Pile 4 Box 89: Older Green - GAIA - Greenhouse https://www.antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/2d934445390e1dac0464981d63d8a44b.pdf a9f58a819968cfdacb537761e77d478d PDF Text Text UAR AND PEACE I Abstract Several arguNents, constdered tn detatl, converge to show the tNNoraltty of (large-scale) nuclear war. By way of several connectLng prLncLples, the LNNoralLty extends to nuclear deterrence. By contrast, several other arguNents, especLally those froN baste rLghts and values, justLfy soNe kLnd of defence strategy norNalLy taken to Lnclude nuclear deterrence. So result both the nuclear fLx and several poLLtLcaLly sLgnLfLcant but Lll-understood subsLdLary dLleNNas. It Ls contended that the nuclear dLLeNNa Ls a fLx of states' own NakLng, and at bottoN a product of natLon-state arrangeNents. Uays out of the nucLear fLx are classLfLed, and LNportant ways assessed. A NultL-track Uay Out Ls canvassed. UnderlyLng NetaphysLcal Lssues, and questLons of LndLvLdual and colLectLve responsLbLLLty, are exaNLned Ln two appendLces. �UAR AHO PEACE I Abstract Several arguMents, cons~dered ~n deta~l, converge to show the ~MMoral~ty of (large-scale) nuclear war. By way of several connectLng prLncLples, the LMMoralLty extends to nuclear deterrence. By contrast, several other arguMents, especLally t ~ e froM basLc rLghts and values, just~fy soMe k~nd of defence strategy norMally taken to ~nclude nuclear deterrence. So result both the nuclear fLx and several polLtLcaLLy sLgnLfLcant but LLl-understood subsLdLary dLleMMas. It Ls contended that the nuclear dLLeMMa ~s a fLx of states' o~ MakLng, and at bottoM a product of natLon-state arrangeMents. Uays out of the nuclear fLx are cLassLfLed, and LMP'r\?)tant ways assessed. A MuLtL-track Uay Out Ls canvassed. UnderlyLng MetaphysLcal Lssues, and questLons of LndLvLdual and coLlectLve responsLbLLLty, are exaMLned Ln two appendLces. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Draft Papers Description An account of the resource Sylvan's literary executor encountered an archive in which “all his projects were current", since manuscripts were undated and unattributed. Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document UAR AND PEACE I Abstract Several arguNents, constdered tn detatl, converge to show the tNNoraltty of (large-scale) nuclear war. By way of several connectLng prLncLples, the LNNoralLty extends to nuclear deterrence. By contrast, several other arguNents, especLally those froN baste rLghts and values, justLfy soNe kLnd of defence strategy norNalLy taken to Lnclude nuclear deterrence. So result both the nuclear fLx and several poLLtLcaLly sLgnLfLcant but Lll-understood subsLdLary dLleNNas. It Ls contended that the nuclear dLLeNNa Ls a fLx of states' own NakLng, and at bottoN a product of natLon-state arrangeNents. Uays out of the nucLear fLx are classLfLed, and LNportant ways assessed. A NultL-track Uay Out Ls canvassed. UnderlyLng NetaphysLcal Lssues, and questLons of LndLvLdual and colLectLve responsLbLLLty, are exaNLned Ln two appendLces. UAR AHO PEACE I Abstract Several arguMents, cons~dered ~n deta~l, converge to show the ~MMoral~ty of (large-scale) nuclear war. By way of several connectLng prLncLples, the LMMoralLty extends to nuclear deterrence. By contrast, several other arguMents, especLally t ~ e froM basLc rLghts and values, just~fy soMe k~nd of defence strategy norMally taken to ~nclude nuclear deterrence. So result both the nuclear fLx and several polLtLcaLLy sLgnLfLcant but LLl-understood subsLdLary dLleMMas. It Ls contended that the nuclear dLLeMMa ~s a fLx of states' o~ MakLng, and at bottoM a product of natLon-state arrangeMents. Uays out of the nuclear fLx are cLassLfLed, and LMP'r\?)tant ways assessed. A MuLtL-track Uay Out Ls canvassed. UnderlyLng MetaphysLcal Lssues, and questLons of LndLvLdual and coLlectLve responsLbLLLty, are exaMLned Ln two appendLces.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Box 89, Item 1: Two drafts of War and Peace I abstract Subject The topic of the resource Two typescript drafts, one with handwritten emendations, the other with typed corrections. Description An account of the resource Unnumbered paper from collection, item number assigned by library staff. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/browse?search=Richard+Sylvan&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bjoiner%5D=and&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=&amp;range=&amp;collection=&amp;type=&amp;user=&amp;tags=&amp;public=&amp;featured=&amp;exhibit=&amp;geolocation-mapped=&amp;geolocation-address=&amp;geolocation-latitude=&amp;geolocation-longitude=&amp;geolocation-radius=10&amp;submit_search=Search+for+items">Richard Sylvan</a> Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived <span class="MuiTypography-root-125 MuiTypography-body2-126">The University of Queensland's <a data-testid="rek-series" href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/records/search?page=1&amp;pageSize=20&amp;sortBy=score&amp;sortDirection=Desc&amp;searchQueryParams%5Brek_series%5D%5Bvalue%5D=Richard+Sylvan+Papers%2C+UQFL291&amp;searchMode=advanced">Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291</a></span>, Box 89, Item 1 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org">Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy</a> Contributor An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource <span>This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, </span><a href="https://najtaylor.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Dr. N.A.J. Taylor</a><span>.</span> Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library. Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource [2] leaves. 1.79 MB. Type The nature or genre of the resource Manuscript Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context <a href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:406aa75">https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:406aa75</a> Coverage The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant n/a - not listed in manuscript finding aid Box 89: Older Green - GAIA - Greenhouse https://www.antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/4fe1fe98ae8c68a6133b900b99cc64c3.pdf 6d0edff22c3ea28d0c8ed53a3961f5b8 PDF Text Text AN ALTERNATIVE ANGLE ON THE HUMANITIES by Richard Routley Higher education in the humanities, beyond the basics of literacy, has been under attack for a Long time. This is partly because it costs money and public resources that might be otherwise invested (e.g. for technological education, for industrial assistance or subsidization); it is also because education in the humanities can lead to dissatisfac­ tion with established ways, and criticism of them^i.e. "rocking the boat . While it is impossible to develop a definitive argument for extensive education in the humanities—any more than it is possible to mount a conclusive argument against it—a telling case can nonetheless be made. There tends to be little dispute about some of the things humanities' subjects teach, much better than other areas: competence and skills in composition and communication, for example, both essential for many roles in modern technological society. University courses Ln humanities teach these things, mostly as a by—product of the other topics they rightly focus upon. It is about subjects and topics beyond this usually conceded minimal level that questions are asked: Why should universities teach, or teach so much of, typical humanities' subjects English, other languages and literatures, linguistics, history and philosophy when a university education in these areas affords direct access to but few jobs, and is, it is assumed, inessential for most day-to-day ^The social sciences, which are sometimes grouped with the humanities, have been excluded from consideration; that is, humanities is being used in its narrower modern sense. This artificial separation sharpens the issues; for the case for university, or at least polytechnic education in economics, for instance, is straightforward in much the way that forestry and engineering is. �2 living? It is obvious enough why they should be offered and taught: because they comprise a significant part of knowledge. But this reply does not meet the complaint that they are still too much taught. The older response to this type of challenge appealed to the importance of culture, to "the utilization of the intellect as an end", to the desirability of having cultivated and civilized men and women in the community. Higher education in the humanities was taken to be distinctively fitted to confer these virtues. The older response has force, but it has to meet the tedious objection that much humanities' education merely delivers "dreamers who can converse well over cocktails;" moreover, it needs supplementation if it is to be sustained nowadays. In particular, it requires underpinning by an argument, independently called for, which counteracts the narrow industrial utilitarianism into the framework of which answers are all too often supposed to fit. According to this type of industrial philosophy, university education is important if it contributes directly to such things as providing (typically at public expense) a technically skilled but not surplus workforce, if it helps to enlarge the industrial base, enables expansion or improvements in sales and marketing of industrial products, and so on—taking it for granted that all these industrial activities are worthwhile. But the further and deeper issue is: these industrial activities and makes them valuable? What justifies To put it bluntly, these activities are valuable not for the profits they inequitably distribute, but rather for what they add to the communities they should serve, in the way of net value (such as a richer life for members of the community, making some allowance for the costs involved, by way of pollution, despoiliation of urban, rural and �- 3 - and natural environments, etc.)- And it is to these same values that higher education in the humanities should also answer—not, to consider a worst case, to the direct demands of a damaging and undesirable industry furnishing dangerous or alienated jobs. If we do look at these more ultimate values, the attainment of rich and rewarding and varied lifestyles, then it is evident, without much elaboration, that higher education in the humanities has much to recommend it, that people whose lives are fuller and richer and who add to the variety and culture of the communities in which they live will be produced by humanities education at its best., that the older argument can be pushed through. There are, however, further responses, reinforcing the older response, which it is now necessary to indicate. All the older response generally implies is that an educated person can simply be pumped full of a stuff called "culture"—a supply of allegedly factual information, views, and prejudices on this or that area. What higher education in the humanities teach s at its best is much more, and more important than this: namely, the acquisition of a range of critical and analytical skills of practical value. These include such analytical skills as being able to dissect an issue or problem, to break it down to its components and determine the basic assumptions, to work out the presuppositions made, to draw out the implications of the matter, and to view the problem from various angles. They include such critical skills as the ability to assess a problem or work analysed; for instance the ability to criticise the assumptions made and to locate and evaluate alternatives to them, to weigh evidence, to see faults in arguments and fallacies when they occur, and so on. They also include such skills as the �4 ability to obtain further information and to apply the methods, and to research new areas and new problems independently of a teacher. In short, the humanities, properly done, teach an analytical and critical method, and above all the ability "to reason well in all matters". As an integral part of this, they should teach the awareness of alternatives, an appreciation of alternative situations, cultures, and worlds. A first step in the critical evaluation of an institution, for example, is often the awareness of alternatives, that things do not have to be exactly the way the institution is, but that there are alternative situations where the institution is variously modified or even eliminated. It is not difficult to see how depth education in history or the languages leads to an appreciation of options, by placing the student in contexts where things are done and seen differently. Philosophy and parts of modern linguistics, specifically semantics, take this whole enterprise much further and now, in the explicit investigation of possible worlds, render it systematic. Indeed, a significant part of the history of philosophy has consisted in the envisaging and following through of certain such alternatives. And such a devising of alternative situations is tied intimately to reasoning. For example, an argument is valid if there are no alternative situations where its premisses hold but its conclusion does not. Finally, the critical method, in particular the ability to discern alternatives, helps people to become aware of their own intellectual assumptions, and where necessary to change them. Thus too, it leads to an intellectual flexibility and adaptability, which is increasingly important for modern, practical problem-solving, �- 5 - and for the adjustments in lifestyle many of us may confront. Systematic philosophy teaches critical reasoning explicitly; a central part of philosophy is the assessment of arguments and the detection of fallacies. Other humanities' disciplines teach the analytic and critical method also, though less directly, and more by example. English does it through the medium of literary criticism; languages, in analogous ways, by the analysis and critical evaluation of "foreign" literature and the critical examination of the practices, customs, and thought of a culture with a different language and literature. A good language education can not only introduce people to alternatives, but can in the process reveal to them their own cultural assumptions, and so open the way to alternative possibilities they have not previously considered. So it is also with history, which involves similar interpretative skills in the investigation of far-removed societies. What is the virtue of critical and analytical reasoning, of being able to think in a concentrated, systematic imaginative way, of being able to approach problems from several angles? What, in particular, is the relevance of these skills to that obtrusive part of the practical world, business, commerce, etc.? Not only will there be many problems for firms and services to handle and try to resolve, problems often best dealt with using just such skills, but the problems arising will increasingly be of a different character, of a type for which purely technological educations are inappropriate or inadequate, and where new alternatives will have to be devised, seriously considered, and sometimes adopted. newer problems include two important overlapping types: mental problems and resource problems. These environ­ The resource problems are �- 6 - due to increasing scarcity and escalating prices of materials, especially oil^but also lumber, etc. As a result, industry and government, as well as the private individual, will have to be re­ conciled to, and make, very considerable adaptations and adjustments (of kinds still to be determined), to adopt alternative practices and solutions to problems on a wide range of fronts. The environ­ mental problems arise because present and historical practices are often damaging, sometimes destructive, to the environment or the people who live in it, and because these practices, such as rapacious forestry and injurious pollution, are not going to be tolerated^ indefinitely, but will require much modification at the very least. In each case, resource and environmental, much innovation will be essential, much new and alternative thinking required, far better if it is analytical and critical, and so does not lead to a compounding of old and bad technological fixes. In sum, the problems to be faced, many of them of considerable complexity, are of a different character: successful resolution of them, where it can be accomplished, and superior decision-making will more and more demand substantial and imaginatively-deployed analytical and critical skills. The requisite skills are inculcated in a good education in the humanities. Of course, some of these skills are acquired in the theore­ tical sciences—though the critical skills usually in a lesser way, much as compositional skills are acquired in a lesser way in the sciences. What further distinguishes most of the humanities is the way they relate to, and take account of, humans—of people as people and not merely as statistics. Those educated in the humanities tend to have a sensitivity to people, and understanding of them, �-7 - that technologists often lack. So it is that they can introduce important elements into problem-solving, due respect for persons (and not mere fobbing off by public relations exercises), that technological resolutions of problems frequently, but inadmissibly, neglect. A corollary of all this is that there is a sound case for deploying people well educated in the humanities more widely in organizations engaged in research and problem solving. It would be rash to pretend that either industry, governments, and so on (the potential employers) on the one side, or the universities (the potential suppliers of humanities graduates) on the other, are entirely ready for this already initiated scenario. It is not that universities do not always teach humanities at their best (that could hardly be expected), but that the skills and methods called for, analytical and critical, are often not sought and are sometimes deliberately devalued. Sometimes indeed the critical method is forgotten and university education—not just in the humanities— degenerates into something approaching a brainwashing process, reinforcing prevailing practices, attitudes and ideologies instead of indicating serious weaknesses in prevailing practices and revealing the range of alternatives open in one way or another. Nor do universities make much effort, so far, to prepare students for the possibility that the critical skills they acquire may be put into practice outside class assignments, not just in their day-to-day living, but in the workplace and in their attempts to enter it (e.g. by being duly prepared for interviews). There is also apparently some resistance by humanities' students to �8 - entering employment in industry, owing to a blanket condemnation of industry^ instead of a more discriminating attitude which makes due criticism where it is warranted. on the other side as well. Faults of similar magnitude appear For example, even where senior management does recognize the modern relevance of the skills humanities' students acquire, personnel selection staff are usually unequipped to select for such skills. A further corollary is that an integral part of a modern technological education is a training in the humanities. 2 'Both Professor Raymond Bradley of Simon Fraser University and the Editor of this Newsletter made many useful suggestions which have been incorporated in the text. The main quotations are from Cardinal Newman's The Idea of a University. �/ AN ALTERNATIVE ANGLE ON THE HUMANITIES by Richard Routley* Higher education in the humanities, beyond the basics of literacy, has been under attack for a long time, in part because it costs money and public resources that might be otherwise invested (e.g. for technological education, for industrial assistance and subsidization), but also because it can lead to (sometimes warranted) dissatisfaction with established ways and criticism of them (e.g. to "rocking the boat"). While it is impossible to develop a definitive argument for extensive education in the humanities—any more than it is possible to mount a conclusive argument against it—a telling caye can nonetheless be made. About some of the things humanities* subjects teach, much better than other areas such as the sciences and technologies, competence and skills in composition and communication—essential for many roles in modern technological society—there tends to be little dispute. University courses in humanities teach these things, sometimes, initially, directly, but more often as a by-product of the other topics they rightly focus upon. It is about subjects and topics beyond this usually conced ed minimal level that questions are asked:—Why should universities teach, or teach so much of, typical humanities' subjects— such as English, and other languages and literatures, linguistics, history and philosophy^—when a university education in these areas affords direct access to but few jobs, and is, it is assumed, inessential for most day-to-day living? It is obvious enough '"The author is a Fellow of the Australian Academy of Humanities and Senior Fellow in Philosophy at the Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University. He is visiting the University of Victoria as a Canadian Commonwealth Fellow. ^The social sciences, which are sometimes grouped with the humanities, have been excluded from consideration; that is, 'humanities' is being used in its narrower modern sense. This (artificial) separation sharpens the issues; for the case for university, or at least polytechnic, education in economics, for instance, is straightforward in much the way that forestry and engineering is. �2 - why they should be offered and taught: cant part of knowledge. because they comprise a signifi­ But this reply does not meet the complaint that they are still too much taught. The older response to this type of challenge appealed to the importance of culture and of "the utilization of the intellect as an end", of having cultivated and civilized men (and women) in the community, higher education in the humanities being taken to be distinctively fitted to confer, at least often, these virtues. The older response has force, but it has to meet the %ne^riiag objection that much humanities' education merely delivers "god-damn dreamers who can converse well over cocktails," and it needs supplementation if it is to be sustained nowadays. In addition, it requires underpinning by a move, independently called for, which takes on the narrow industrial utilitarianism into the framework of which answers are all too often supposed to fit. According to this type of industrial philosophy, university education is important if it contributes directly to such things as providing (typically at public expense) a technically skilled but not surplus workforce, if it helps enlarge the industrial base, enables expansion or improvements in sales and marketing of industrial products, and so on—taking it for granted that all these industrial activities are worthwhile. But the further and deeper issue is what justifies these industrial activities and makes them valuable when they are (which is far from always the case). To put it bluntly, they are valuable not for the profits they inequitably distribute, but rather for what they add to the communities they should serve, in the way of net value (such as a richer life for members of the community, making some allowance for the costs involved, by way of pollution, despoiliation of urban, rural and natural environments, etc.). And it is to these values, that industrial activities themselves have ultimately to answer, that higher education in the humanities should also answer—not, to consider a worst case, to the direct demands of a damaging and undesirable industry furnishing dangerous or alienated jobs. If we do look at these more ultimate values, the attainment of rich and rewarding and varied lifestyles, then it is evident , �- 3 - / without much elaboration, that higher education in the humanities has much to recommend it., that people whose lives are fuller and richer and who add to the variety and culture of the communities in which they live will be produced by humanities education at its best, coat the older argument can be pushed through. There are, however, further responses, reinforcing the older response, which it is now necessary to indicate. response sometimes says, an educated For all tae older person can simply be pumped full of a stuff called culture, a supply of (allegedly) factual information, views, and also prejudices, on this or that area. What higher education in the humanities, at its best, teaches is much more, and more important than this; namely the acquisition of a range of crff*Ktal and analytical skills of practical value. These include such analytical skills as being able to dissect an issue or problem, to break it down to^components and determine the basic assumptions; to work out the presuppositions made, and to draw out the implications of the matter; to view the problem from various They include such critical skills as the ability to assess angles. critically a problem or w^rk analysed, for instance to criticise the assumptions made and to locate and evaluate alternatives to them, the ability to weigh evidence, to see faults in arguments and fallacies when they occur, and so on. They also include such skills as the ability to obtain further information and to apply the methods, to research independently of a teacher in new areas and on new problems. In short, the humanities, properly done, teach an analytical and critical method, and above all the ability "to reason well in all matters". As an integral part of this they (should) t.^ctch the aware­ ness of alternatives, an appreciation of alternative situations, cultures, worlds. A first step in the critical evaluation of an institution, for example, is often the awareness of alternatives, that things do not have to be exactly that way, the way the institution is, but that there are alternative situations where the institution is variously modified or even eliminated. It is not difficult to see how depth education in history or the languages leads to an appreciation of alternatives, by placing the student in contexts where things are done and seen differently. Philosophy and parts �4 of modern linguistics (specifically semantics) take this whole enter­ prise much further and now, in the explicit investigation of (possible) worlds, render it systematic: but a significant part of the history of philosophy has consisted (it can now be seen) in the envisaging and following through of certain such alternatives. And such a devising of alternative situations is tied intimately to reasoning. For example, whether an argument is valid or not is a matter of there are not or are alternative situations where its premises hold but its conclusion does not. Finally, the critical method, in particular the ability to discern alternatives, helps people to become aware of their own intellectual assumptions, and where necessary to change them. Thus too it leads to an intellectual flexibility and adaptability, which is increasingly important for modern, practical problem-solving and for the adjustments in lifestyle many of us may confront. Systematic philosophy teaches critical reasoning explicitly: a central part of philosophy is the assessment of arguments and the detection of fallacies. Other humanities' disciplines teach the analytic and critical method also, though less directly, and more by example. English does it through, for instance, the medium of literary criticism, languages in analogous ways, by the analysis and critical evaluation of "foreign" literature and the critical examination of the practices, customs, and thought of a culture with a different language and literature. A good language education can not only introduce people to alternatives, but can in the process reveal to them their own cultural assumptions, and so open the way to alternative possibilities they have not previously considered. So it is also with history, which often involves similar interpretative skills, e.g. in the investigation of some period in the history of a society as far removed from modern societies as that of ancient Athens. What is the virtue, or relevance, of critical and analytical reasoning, of being able to think in a concentrated, systematic imaginative way, of being able to approach problems from several angles? What, in particular, is the relevance to that obtrusive part of the practical world, business, commerce, etc. Not only will there be many many problems for firms and services to handle and �5 try to resolve, problems often best dealt with using just such skills, but the problems arising will increasingly be of a different character, of a type for which purely technological educations are inappropriate or inadequate, and where new alternatives will have to be devised, seriously considered and sometimes adopted. These newer problems include two important (overlapping) types, environmental problems and resource problems. The resource problems are due to increasing scarcity and escalating prices of materials, especially oil (but also, e.g., lumber)—as a result of which industry and government (as well as the private individual) will have to be reconciled to and niaoke very considerably, adaptations and adjustments of kinds still to be determined, to adopt alternative practices and solutions to problems on a wide range of fronts. The environmental problems arise because present practices are frequently damaging, * - ' 1 destructive, to the environment or the people who live in it (e.g. through pollution and effects such as cancer), and because these practices, such as rapacious forestry and ser^oct^s pollution, are not going to be tolerated indefinitely, but will require much modification at the very least. In each case, resource and environmental, much, innovation will be essential, much new and alternative thinking required, far better if it is analytical and critical, and so does not lead, for example, to a compounding of old and bad technological fixes. In sum, the problems to be faced, many of them of considerable complexity, are of a different character: successful resolution of them, where it can be accomplished, and superior decision-making will more and more demand, among other things, substantial and imaginatively-deployed analytical and critical skills. The requisite skills are inculcated in a good education in the humanities. Of course, some of these skills are acquired in the theoretical sciences—though usually in a m^rked^-lesser way, piuch as compositional skills (which typically increase with further training in the humanities) are acquired in a-de-eide<Hy lesser way in the sciences. What further distinguishes most of the humanities is the way they relate to, and take account of, humans people and not merely as statistics. of people as Those educated in the humanities tend to have a sensitivity to people, and understanding of them, that technologists often lack. So it is that they can introduce importune �6 -- elements into problem-solving, due respect for persons (and not mere fobbing off by public relations exercises), that technological resolutions of problems frequently, but inadmissibly, neglect. A corollary of all this is that there is a sound case for deploying people well educated in the humanities more widely in organizations engaged in research and problem solving. It would be rash to pretend that either industry, governments, and so on (the potential employers) on the one side, or the universities (the potential suppliers of humanities graduates) on the other, are entirely ready for this already initiated scenario. It is not that universities do not always teach humanities at their best (that could hardly be expected), but that the skills and methods called for, analytical and critical, are often (e.g. in language ers) not sought and are sometimes (deliberately) devalued. Sometimes indeed the critical method is forgotten and university education—not just in the humanities—degenerates into something approaching a brainwashing process, reinforcing prevailing practices, attitudes and ideologies instead of indicating < ; in prevailing practices and.the range of alternatives open in one way A or another. Nor do universities fticke much effort, so far, to prepare students for the possibility that the. critical skills they acquire may be put into practice outside class assignments, not just in their day-to-day living, but in the workplace and in their attempts to enter it (e.g. by being duly prepared for interviews). There is also apparently some resistance by humanities' students to entering employment in industry, owing to a blanket condemnation of industry (not altogether unexpected given the performances and attitudes of some industries), instead of a mere discriminating attitude which makes due criticism where it is warranted. of similar magnitude appear on the other side as well. Faults For example, even where senior management does re&o<? nize the modern relevance of the skills humanities' students acquire, personnel selection staff (who often have a technological background) are usually § unequipped to select for such skills and reluctant to do so. �§Both Professor Raymond Bradley of Simon Fraser University and the Editor of this Newsletter made many useful suggestions which have been incorporated in the text. The main quotations are from Cardinal Newman' s Tire Idea of a University. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Draft Papers Description An account of the resource Sylvan's literary executor encountered an archive in which “all his projects were current", since manuscripts were undated and unattributed. Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document AN ALTERNATIVE ANGLE ON THE HUMANITIES by Richard Routley Higher education in the humanities, beyond the basics of literacy, has been under attack for a Long time. This is partly because it costs money and public resources that might be otherwise invested (e.g. for technological education, for industrial assistance or subsidization); it is also because education in the humanities can lead to dissatisfac­ tion with established ways, and criticism of them^i.e. "rocking the boat . While it is impossible to develop a definitive argument for extensive education in the humanities—any more than it is possible to mount a conclusive argument against it—a telling case can nonetheless be made. There tends to be little dispute about some of the things humanities' subjects teach, much better than other areas: competence and skills in composition and communication, for example, both essential for many roles in modern technological society. University courses Ln humanities teach these things, mostly as a by—product of the other topics they rightly focus upon. It is about subjects and topics beyond this usually conceded minimal level that questions are asked: Why should universities teach, or teach so much of, typical humanities' subjects English, other languages and literatures, linguistics, history and philosophy when a university education in these areas affords direct access to but few jobs, and is, it is assumed, inessential for most day-to-day ^The social sciences, which are sometimes grouped with the humanities, have been excluded from consideration; that is, humanities is being used in its narrower modern sense. This artificial separation sharpens the issues; for the case for university, or at least polytechnic education in economics, for instance, is straightforward in much the way that forestry and engineering is. 2 living? It is obvious enough why they should be offered and taught: because they comprise a significant part of knowledge. But this reply does not meet the complaint that they are still too much taught. The older response to this type of challenge appealed to the importance of culture, to "the utilization of the intellect as an end", to the desirability of having cultivated and civilized men and women in the community. Higher education in the humanities was taken to be distinctively fitted to confer these virtues. The older response has force, but it has to meet the tedious objection that much humanities' education merely delivers "dreamers who can converse well over cocktails;" moreover, it needs supplementation if it is to be sustained nowadays. In particular, it requires underpinning by an argument, independently called for, which counteracts the narrow industrial utilitarianism into the framework of which answers are all too often supposed to fit. According to this type of industrial philosophy, university education is important if it contributes directly to such things as providing (typically at public expense) a technically skilled but not surplus workforce, if it helps to enlarge the industrial base, enables expansion or improvements in sales and marketing of industrial products, and so on—taking it for granted that all these industrial activities are worthwhile. But the further and deeper issue is: these industrial activities and makes them valuable? What justifies To put it bluntly, these activities are valuable not for the profits they inequitably distribute, but rather for what they add to the communities they should serve, in the way of net value (such as a richer life for members of the community, making some allowance for the costs involved, by way of pollution, despoiliation of urban, rural and - 3 - and natural environments, etc.)- And it is to these same values that higher education in the humanities should also answer—not, to consider a worst case, to the direct demands of a damaging and undesirable industry furnishing dangerous or alienated jobs. If we do look at these more ultimate values, the attainment of rich and rewarding and varied lifestyles, then it is evident, without much elaboration, that higher education in the humanities has much to recommend it, that people whose lives are fuller and richer and who add to the variety and culture of the communities in which they live will be produced by humanities education at its best., that the older argument can be pushed through. There are, however, further responses, reinforcing the older response, which it is now necessary to indicate. All the older response generally implies is that an educated person can simply be pumped full of a stuff called "culture"—a supply of allegedly factual information, views, and prejudices on this or that area. What higher education in the humanities teach s at its best is much more, and more important than this: namely, the acquisition of a range of critical and analytical skills of practical value. These include such analytical skills as being able to dissect an issue or problem, to break it down to its components and determine the basic assumptions, to work out the presuppositions made, to draw out the implications of the matter, and to view the problem from various angles. They include such critical skills as the ability to assess a problem or work analysed; for instance the ability to criticise the assumptions made and to locate and evaluate alternatives to them, to weigh evidence, to see faults in arguments and fallacies when they occur, and so on. They also include such skills as the 4 ability to obtain further information and to apply the methods, and to research new areas and new problems independently of a teacher. In short, the humanities, properly done, teach an analytical and critical method, and above all the ability "to reason well in all matters". As an integral part of this, they should teach the awareness of alternatives, an appreciation of alternative situations, cultures, and worlds. A first step in the critical evaluation of an institution, for example, is often the awareness of alternatives, that things do not have to be exactly the way the institution is, but that there are alternative situations where the institution is variously modified or even eliminated. It is not difficult to see how depth education in history or the languages leads to an appreciation of options, by placing the student in contexts where things are done and seen differently. Philosophy and parts of modern linguistics, specifically semantics, take this whole enterprise much further and now, in the explicit investigation of possible worlds, render it systematic. Indeed, a significant part of the history of philosophy has consisted in the envisaging and following through of certain such alternatives. And such a devising of alternative situations is tied intimately to reasoning. For example, an argument is valid if there are no alternative situations where its premisses hold but its conclusion does not. Finally, the critical method, in particular the ability to discern alternatives, helps people to become aware of their own intellectual assumptions, and where necessary to change them. Thus too, it leads to an intellectual flexibility and adaptability, which is increasingly important for modern, practical problem-solving, - 5 - and for the adjustments in lifestyle many of us may confront. Systematic philosophy teaches critical reasoning explicitly; a central part of philosophy is the assessment of arguments and the detection of fallacies. Other humanities' disciplines teach the analytic and critical method also, though less directly, and more by example. English does it through the medium of literary criticism; languages, in analogous ways, by the analysis and critical evaluation of "foreign" literature and the critical examination of the practices, customs, and thought of a culture with a different language and literature. A good language education can not only introduce people to alternatives, but can in the process reveal to them their own cultural assumptions, and so open the way to alternative possibilities they have not previously considered. So it is also with history, which involves similar interpretative skills in the investigation of far-removed societies. What is the virtue of critical and analytical reasoning, of being able to think in a concentrated, systematic imaginative way, of being able to approach problems from several angles? What, in particular, is the relevance of these skills to that obtrusive part of the practical world, business, commerce, etc.? Not only will there be many problems for firms and services to handle and try to resolve, problems often best dealt with using just such skills, but the problems arising will increasingly be of a different character, of a type for which purely technological educations are inappropriate or inadequate, and where new alternatives will have to be devised, seriously considered, and sometimes adopted. newer problems include two important overlapping types: mental problems and resource problems. These environ­ The resource problems are - 6 - due to increasing scarcity and escalating prices of materials, especially oil^but also lumber, etc. As a result, industry and government, as well as the private individual, will have to be re­ conciled to, and make, very considerable adaptations and adjustments (of kinds still to be determined), to adopt alternative practices and solutions to problems on a wide range of fronts. The environ­ mental problems arise because present and historical practices are often damaging, sometimes destructive, to the environment or the people who live in it, and because these practices, such as rapacious forestry and injurious pollution, are not going to be tolerated^ indefinitely, but will require much modification at the very least. In each case, resource and environmental, much innovation will be essential, much new and alternative thinking required, far better if it is analytical and critical, and so does not lead to a compounding of old and bad technological fixes. In sum, the problems to be faced, many of them of considerable complexity, are of a different character: successful resolution of them, where it can be accomplished, and superior decision-making will more and more demand substantial and imaginatively-deployed analytical and critical skills. The requisite skills are inculcated in a good education in the humanities. Of course, some of these skills are acquired in the theore­ tical sciences—though the critical skills usually in a lesser way, much as compositional skills are acquired in a lesser way in the sciences. What further distinguishes most of the humanities is the way they relate to, and take account of, humans—of people as people and not merely as statistics. Those educated in the humanities tend to have a sensitivity to people, and understanding of them, -7 - that technologists often lack. So it is that they can introduce important elements into problem-solving, due respect for persons (and not mere fobbing off by public relations exercises), that technological resolutions of problems frequently, but inadmissibly, neglect. A corollary of all this is that there is a sound case for deploying people well educated in the humanities more widely in organizations engaged in research and problem solving. It would be rash to pretend that either industry, governments, and so on (the potential employers) on the one side, or the universities (the potential suppliers of humanities graduates) on the other, are entirely ready for this already initiated scenario. It is not that universities do not always teach humanities at their best (that could hardly be expected), but that the skills and methods called for, analytical and critical, are often not sought and are sometimes deliberately devalued. Sometimes indeed the critical method is forgotten and university education—not just in the humanities— degenerates into something approaching a brainwashing process, reinforcing prevailing practices, attitudes and ideologies instead of indicating serious weaknesses in prevailing practices and revealing the range of alternatives open in one way or another. Nor do universities make much effort, so far, to prepare students for the possibility that the critical skills they acquire may be put into practice outside class assignments, not just in their day-to-day living, but in the workplace and in their attempts to enter it (e.g. by being duly prepared for interviews). There is also apparently some resistance by humanities' students to 8 - entering employment in industry, owing to a blanket condemnation of industry^ instead of a more discriminating attitude which makes due criticism where it is warranted. on the other side as well. Faults of similar magnitude appear For example, even where senior management does recognize the modern relevance of the skills humanities' students acquire, personnel selection staff are usually unequipped to select for such skills. A further corollary is that an integral part of a modern technological education is a training in the humanities. 2 'Both Professor Raymond Bradley of Simon Fraser University and the Editor of this Newsletter made many useful suggestions which have been incorporated in the text. The main quotations are from Cardinal Newman's The Idea of a University. / AN ALTERNATIVE ANGLE ON THE HUMANITIES by Richard Routley* Higher education in the humanities, beyond the basics of literacy, has been under attack for a long time, in part because it costs money and public resources that might be otherwise invested (e.g. for technological education, for industrial assistance and subsidization), but also because it can lead to (sometimes warranted) dissatisfaction with established ways and criticism of them (e.g. to "rocking the boat"). While it is impossible to develop a definitive argument for extensive education in the humanities—any more than it is possible to mount a conclusive argument against it—a telling caye can nonetheless be made. About some of the things humanities* subjects teach, much better than other areas such as the sciences and technologies, competence and skills in composition and communication—essential for many roles in modern technological society—there tends to be little dispute. University courses in humanities teach these things, sometimes, initially, directly, but more often as a by-product of the other topics they rightly focus upon. It is about subjects and topics beyond this usually conced ed minimal level that questions are asked:—Why should universities teach, or teach so much of, typical humanities' subjects— such as English, and other languages and literatures, linguistics, history and philosophy^—when a university education in these areas affords direct access to but few jobs, and is, it is assumed, inessential for most day-to-day living? It is obvious enough '"The author is a Fellow of the Australian Academy of Humanities and Senior Fellow in Philosophy at the Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University. He is visiting the University of Victoria as a Canadian Commonwealth Fellow. ^The social sciences, which are sometimes grouped with the humanities, have been excluded from consideration; that is, 'humanities' is being used in its narrower modern sense. This (artificial) separation sharpens the issues; for the case for university, or at least polytechnic, education in economics, for instance, is straightforward in much the way that forestry and engineering is. 2 - why they should be offered and taught: cant part of knowledge. because they comprise a signifi­ But this reply does not meet the complaint that they are still too much taught. The older response to this type of challenge appealed to the importance of culture and of "the utilization of the intellect as an end", of having cultivated and civilized men (and women) in the community, higher education in the humanities being taken to be distinctively fitted to confer, at least often, these virtues. The older response has force, but it has to meet the %ne^riiag objection that much humanities' education merely delivers "god-damn dreamers who can converse well over cocktails," and it needs supplementation if it is to be sustained nowadays. In addition, it requires underpinning by a move, independently called for, which takes on the narrow industrial utilitarianism into the framework of which answers are all too often supposed to fit. According to this type of industrial philosophy, university education is important if it contributes directly to such things as providing (typically at public expense) a technically skilled but not surplus workforce, if it helps enlarge the industrial base, enables expansion or improvements in sales and marketing of industrial products, and so on—taking it for granted that all these industrial activities are worthwhile. But the further and deeper issue is what justifies these industrial activities and makes them valuable when they are (which is far from always the case). To put it bluntly, they are valuable not for the profits they inequitably distribute, but rather for what they add to the communities they should serve, in the way of net value (such as a richer life for members of the community, making some allowance for the costs involved, by way of pollution, despoiliation of urban, rural and natural environments, etc.). And it is to these values, that industrial activities themselves have ultimately to answer, that higher education in the humanities should also answer—not, to consider a worst case, to the direct demands of a damaging and undesirable industry furnishing dangerous or alienated jobs. If we do look at these more ultimate values, the attainment of rich and rewarding and varied lifestyles, then it is evident , - 3 - / without much elaboration, that higher education in the humanities has much to recommend it., that people whose lives are fuller and richer and who add to the variety and culture of the communities in which they live will be produced by humanities education at its best, coat the older argument can be pushed through. There are, however, further responses, reinforcing the older response, which it is now necessary to indicate. response sometimes says, an educated For all tae older person can simply be pumped full of a stuff called culture, a supply of (allegedly) factual information, views, and also prejudices, on this or that area. What higher education in the humanities, at its best, teaches is much more, and more important than this; namely the acquisition of a range of crff*Ktal and analytical skills of practical value. These include such analytical skills as being able to dissect an issue or problem, to break it down to^components and determine the basic assumptions; to work out the presuppositions made, and to draw out the implications of the matter; to view the problem from various They include such critical skills as the ability to assess angles. critically a problem or w^rk analysed, for instance to criticise the assumptions made and to locate and evaluate alternatives to them, the ability to weigh evidence, to see faults in arguments and fallacies when they occur, and so on. They also include such skills as the ability to obtain further information and to apply the methods, to research independently of a teacher in new areas and on new problems. In short, the humanities, properly done, teach an analytical and critical method, and above all the ability "to reason well in all matters". As an integral part of this they (should) t.^ctch the aware­ ness of alternatives, an appreciation of alternative situations, cultures, worlds. A first step in the critical evaluation of an institution, for example, is often the awareness of alternatives, that things do not have to be exactly that way, the way the institution is, but that there are alternative situations where the institution is variously modified or even eliminated. It is not difficult to see how depth education in history or the languages leads to an appreciation of alternatives, by placing the student in contexts where things are done and seen differently. Philosophy and parts 4 of modern linguistics (specifically semantics) take this whole enter­ prise much further and now, in the explicit investigation of (possible) worlds, render it systematic: but a significant part of the history of philosophy has consisted (it can now be seen) in the envisaging and following through of certain such alternatives. And such a devising of alternative situations is tied intimately to reasoning. For example, whether an argument is valid or not is a matter of there are not or are alternative situations where its premises hold but its conclusion does not. Finally, the critical method, in particular the ability to discern alternatives, helps people to become aware of their own intellectual assumptions, and where necessary to change them. Thus too it leads to an intellectual flexibility and adaptability, which is increasingly important for modern, practical problem-solving and for the adjustments in lifestyle many of us may confront. Systematic philosophy teaches critical reasoning explicitly: a central part of philosophy is the assessment of arguments and the detection of fallacies. Other humanities' disciplines teach the analytic and critical method also, though less directly, and more by example. English does it through, for instance, the medium of literary criticism, languages in analogous ways, by the analysis and critical evaluation of "foreign" literature and the critical examination of the practices, customs, and thought of a culture with a different language and literature. A good language education can not only introduce people to alternatives, but can in the process reveal to them their own cultural assumptions, and so open the way to alternative possibilities they have not previously considered. So it is also with history, which often involves similar interpretative skills, e.g. in the investigation of some period in the history of a society as far removed from modern societies as that of ancient Athens. What is the virtue, or relevance, of critical and analytical reasoning, of being able to think in a concentrated, systematic imaginative way, of being able to approach problems from several angles? What, in particular, is the relevance to that obtrusive part of the practical world, business, commerce, etc. Not only will there be many many problems for firms and services to handle and 5 try to resolve, problems often best dealt with using just such skills, but the problems arising will increasingly be of a different character, of a type for which purely technological educations are inappropriate or inadequate, and where new alternatives will have to be devised, seriously considered and sometimes adopted. These newer problems include two important (overlapping) types, environmental problems and resource problems. The resource problems are due to increasing scarcity and escalating prices of materials, especially oil (but also, e.g., lumber)—as a result of which industry and government (as well as the private individual) will have to be reconciled to and niaoke very considerably, adaptations and adjustments of kinds still to be determined, to adopt alternative practices and solutions to problems on a wide range of fronts. The environmental problems arise because present practices are frequently damaging, * - ' 1 destructive, to the environment or the people who live in it (e.g. through pollution and effects such as cancer), and because these practices, such as rapacious forestry and ser^oct^s pollution, are not going to be tolerated indefinitely, but will require much modification at the very least. In each case, resource and environmental, much, innovation will be essential, much new and alternative thinking required, far better if it is analytical and critical, and so does not lead, for example, to a compounding of old and bad technological fixes. In sum, the problems to be faced, many of them of considerable complexity, are of a different character: successful resolution of them, where it can be accomplished, and superior decision-making will more and more demand, among other things, substantial and imaginatively-deployed analytical and critical skills. The requisite skills are inculcated in a good education in the humanities. Of course, some of these skills are acquired in the theoretical sciences—though usually in a m^rked^-lesser way, piuch as compositional skills (which typically increase with further training in the humanities) are acquired in a-de-eide<Hy lesser way in the sciences. What further distinguishes most of the humanities is the way they relate to, and take account of, humans people and not merely as statistics. of people as Those educated in the humanities tend to have a sensitivity to people, and understanding of them, that technologists often lack. So it is that they can introduce importune 6 -- elements into problem-solving, due respect for persons (and not mere fobbing off by public relations exercises), that technological resolutions of problems frequently, but inadmissibly, neglect. A corollary of all this is that there is a sound case for deploying people well educated in the humanities more widely in organizations engaged in research and problem solving. It would be rash to pretend that either industry, governments, and so on (the potential employers) on the one side, or the universities (the potential suppliers of humanities graduates) on the other, are entirely ready for this already initiated scenario. It is not that universities do not always teach humanities at their best (that could hardly be expected), but that the skills and methods called for, analytical and critical, are often (e.g. in language ers) not sought and are sometimes (deliberately) devalued. Sometimes indeed the critical method is forgotten and university education—not just in the humanities—degenerates into something approaching a brainwashing process, reinforcing prevailing practices, attitudes and ideologies instead of indicating < ; in prevailing practices and.the range of alternatives open in one way A or another. Nor do universities fticke much effort, so far, to prepare students for the possibility that the. critical skills they acquire may be put into practice outside class assignments, not just in their day-to-day living, but in the workplace and in their attempts to enter it (e.g. by being duly prepared for interviews). There is also apparently some resistance by humanities' students to entering employment in industry, owing to a blanket condemnation of industry (not altogether unexpected given the performances and attitudes of some industries), instead of a mere discriminating attitude which makes due criticism where it is warranted. of similar magnitude appear on the other side as well. Faults For example, even where senior management does re&o<? nize the modern relevance of the skills humanities' students acquire, personnel selection staff (who often have a technological background) are usually § unequipped to select for such skills and reluctant to do so. §Both Professor Raymond Bradley of Simon Fraser University and the Editor of this Newsletter made many useful suggestions which have been incorporated in the text. The main quotations are from Cardinal Newman' s Tire Idea of a University.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Box 72, Item 3: Two drafts of An alternate angle on the humanities Subject The topic of the resource Two typescript drafts, handwritten emendations. Description An account of the resource Unnumbered paper from collection, item number assigned by library staff. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/browse?search=Richard+Routley&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bjoiner%5D=and&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=&amp;range=&amp;collection=&amp;type=&amp;user=&amp;tags=&amp;public=&amp;featured=&amp;exhibit=&amp;geolocation-mapped=&amp;geolocation-address=&amp;geolocation-latitude=&amp;geolocation-longitude=&amp;geolocation-radius=10&amp;submit_search=Search+for+items">Richard Routley</a> Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived <span class="MuiTypography-root-125 MuiTypography-body2-126">The University of Queensland's <a data-testid="rek-series" href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/records/search?page=1&amp;pageSize=20&amp;sortBy=score&amp;sortDirection=Desc&amp;searchQueryParams%5Brek_series%5D%5Bvalue%5D=Richard+Sylvan+Papers%2C+UQFL291&amp;searchMode=advanced">Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291</a></span>, Box 72, Item 3 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org">Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy</a> Contributor An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, <a href="https://najtaylor.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Dr. N.A.J. Taylor</a>. Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library. Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource [15] leaves. 32.46 MB. Type The nature or genre of the resource Manuscript Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context <a href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:8054ad6">https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:8054ad6</a> Box 72: Unlisted and Untitled Boxes https://www.antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/4a68c59658b0327290244eaa123b1a1c.pdf 9cdae0065a05f92db97d3155a90e0b6b PDF Text Text ■k METAPHYSICAL FALL-OUT FROM THE NUCLEAR PREDICAMENT A series of nuclear prophets has produced a series of philosophically-oriented works on nuclear war.^ The series is important for its deeper penetration into the main nuclear predicament, r’own to metaphysical levels; in this the series contrasts The most transient superficialities of much of the political commentary, circulated and influential text of the series is undoubtedly that of the with the widely slightest of the "prophets", Schell’s The Fate of the Earth, This skillful piece of unc annily redeploys some of the apparently deep phenomenological themes of Anders. So, conveniently, main assumptions of Schell and Anders can often To criticise their assumptions is not of course to belittle be considered together, media-philosophy In particular, Schell’s little book, for all its political shortcomings, their work. is having a significant and much needed effect in shifting attitudes towards nuclear It is especially valuable for its vivid and horrifying scenarios of arrangements. the exhibits, both the claim that species .... that we undertake together can make any practical or moral sense ...’ of aftermath nuclear Unfortunately attack. it also philosophically and factually, severe defects. ’without is it Some of simply rubbish: to take one example, consider ... a world-wide program of action for preserving the [human] nothing else (p.173, rearranged). This should certainly be rejected philosophically; for there is no separate moral issue of such overwhelming importance that all other issues become morally neutral. compared with Moral more issues remain moral issues: important elsewhere, e.g. p.130). moral issues (as they don’t cease to be so when Schell effectively acknowledges And the claim should be questioned on more factual grounds. Humans form a highly resilient species, like rats a survivor species, unlikely to be entirely exterminated under presently-arranged nuclear holocausts. The example was selected however because it leads into, indeed presupposes, two of the major defective assumptions in the work of Schell and Anders. 51. Nuclear war will eliminate life, human life at least, on earth (the extinction assumption); and 52. In the absence of humans, very many notions, not only those of morality and value, but those of time and space for example, make no sense; or, to put it into a more sympathetic philosophical form, these notions depend for actual human context (the extravagant anthropocentric assumption) . their sense on an �2 S2 which give Anders’ It is applications of philosophical depth, paradoxical and Schell’s work some of its apparent and certainly induce much philosophical puzzlement through the propositions But generated. the frequent applications S2 of depend essentially on SI.3 For without total extinction there will be humans about, to make past and future, good and evil, go on making sense! the Granted that assumption SI is by no means ruled out as a real possibility, as technological means appear available extinct;^ granted centres of prospect the of to make it large-scale nuclear Western civilization with obliteration. the light of present - admittedly inadequate - true, to render Homo sapiens war does threaten leading Even so SI appears unlikely in Even in Canada, which information. lies on the polar route of Soviet missiles, human life should be able to continue in certain northern areas (according to Canadian medical studies). SI is extremely flimsy. It depends, for example, Schell’s argument to on an unjustified extrapolation from the Northern to the Southern Hemisphere, but for the most part it does that very North American thing, of contracting the world to North America. all worthwhile civilization, is in USA, or at least, to be more charitable, in North America and Europe, which will also be wiped out, i.e. eliminated in the nuclear holocaust.) Some of (All that matters, its human population will be the data upon, Schell relies for example the effect of nuclear explosions on the .ozone layer, was significantly out of date even when he wrote. Other effects than ozone destruction, such as variations in ultraviolent radiation and temperature levels, apparently extrapolate even less well from North A factually superior study of nuclear disaster produced to South. about the same time as Schell’s, by Preddey and others, Southern Hemisphere, such as New Zealand and southern at indicates that parts of the latitudes of Latin America could escape relatively unscathed from even most massive northern exchanges. Doomsday prophets may appear to have gained new purchase through recent belated) scientific forecasts of a nuclear winter following upon nuclear war. (if But although these forecasts certainly add a new, and alarming, ecological dimension to the very damaging consequences of large-scale nuclear war, extinction assumption3. they do not sustain the On the available evidence, human life will continue, though no doubt with new complications and simplifications, for example^ in many southern mid-latitude coastal reqions outside zones of radiation fall-out. More generally, life will go on, though likely seriously and irreversibly impoverished through loss of valuable nonhuman systems and creatures. Nuclear prophets usually see the world (though with most of it carried along) as already set , in crucial respects, on the route to nuclear catastrophe. Much of the /r �3 way taken is seen as both inevitable and irreversible. insist the upon of "impossibility unlearning” the Thus both Anders and Schell means of manufacturing nuclear It would seem that extinction, which they both foresee, would furnish a good bombs. medium for unlearning nuclear technology (something very like this emerges from van theory Daniken’s of an "high" earlier In virtue technology). they would of S2, however exclude such a possibility as a case of unlearning, contending wrongly that the notion no longer made impossibility-of-unlearning eventual use of sense. But what message is the - as if technology the they again want inevitability having learnt to suggest have been advanced.But technological advances cases of they that have are not not been tenable. the development and else was of the the means determined, and manufacture and use ceased to be a matter of choice. views with There all Certainly such are many taken advantage of, and examples of there are even technological developments that have been manufactured but not marketed or used. There is not something very special about nuclear apparatus that puts it beyond the scope of such generalisations. Both Schell and Anders do claim that there are very special things about nuclear Even if this were true just "experiments". weapons, notably that they do not allow "experiments" of nuclear weapons - and it is certainly not of smaller weapons - it would not rebut And in fact the previous argument against the inevitability of nuclear weapons. Anders and (even) Schell hedge their claims about testing, and the limits to nuclear scientific work, 1to large-scale weapons and independent experiments which do not Again they have interfere with the■ observers and those outside the "laboratories" . latched onto major points: in particular, we have at present no way of testing the cumulative effects of large nuclear weapons in concert, e.g. for more holistic effects, such circulation and enough with it in character, or changes in coupled atmospheric Short of a large-scale nuclear war, and likely radiation fields. these crucial effects must remain largely untested and hypothetical as fireballs or firestorms, Nonetheless enough data can be assembled to carry through informative modellings, which point to the improbability of SI, and so undermine applications of S2 . The penetration Schell and Anders, of but in S2, is not something peculiar to Western philosophy, European philosophy human chauvinism, as is product a of This chauvinism is unfortunately alive and still well, Anders’ version It has also deeply of S2 being just one striking illustration (cf. AA p.252ff.). penetrated Anglo-American philosophy, and has been extended under the influence of especially. Wittgenstein’s work, where even the necessary truths of mathematics are taken to be a product of human conventions, and would vanish with humans! Such are alleged MB �4 implications of extinction: but the fact is that the truths of arithmetic are in no way dependent on the existence of humans or humanoids or of gods or giraffes. As very many propositions with necessary truths and falsehoods so with contingent ones: about the world do not depend in any way for their truth-value or content on humans or their communities. In Schell, Kantian obnoxious is chauvinism human dished Thoughts and form. up a in particularly time propositions, powerful history and tenses, and and memories, values and morality, all depend on the life-giving presence of human beings - future or merely potential past or humans are certainly not enough. humans are not enough, persons that are not Thus, according to Schell (p.140, e.g.), ’... the thought "Humanity is now extinct" is an impossible one for a rational person, because as soon as it is, we are not. In imagining any other event, we look ahead moment that is still within the stream of human time, a later rational Though we no doubt have it into past, (p.143). local may well be able to truly. it have Schell there is no "later" ’outside the human tenses of past, (p.140)*^. Human extinction eliminates ’the creature that erroneously denies that: present, and future ...’ divides time creature The thought is however ... ’. perfectly possible for humans; we can have it right now. falsely, to a present and future’: so annihilation cannot ’come to pass’ But it is simply false that the tenses are human; the tenses depend on a time ordering (perceptible to many creatures other than humans, but not depending at all on that perceptibility for its viability) relating other times to to now (also a human-independent location, evident to other creatures, the present, and borne witness to by such sequences as the passing seasons). And annihilation may also too easily come to pass, for many humans in the North at least, as it came to pass in recent geological times that humans began to exist upon earth. Before that there was a time before there were any human beings. argument for the demise of time, that ’what has been will no longer be Anders’ even what has been’ , is also explicitly (and narrowly) ’for what verificationist : would the difference be between what has only been and what has never been, is no remain one remember the to many sorts of things difference; organisms would be different. that have been’ for one, Temporal the (AA p.245). history themes do not lack if there There would recorded in many still other ’legitimacy because not registered [or verified] by anyone’; truth, significance, still less meaning, are not matters of human verification. Here, as elsewhere, the human chauvinism is mixed with other distorting metaphysical assumptions of our Western heritage, in particular, verificationism and �ontological assumptions (to the effect that there are severe difficulties in talking about does what exist) not Thus, for metaphysics from Freud, according to whom example, takes Schell dubious over it is indeed impossible to imagine our own death; and whenever we attempt to do so, we can perceive that we are in fact still present spectators" as refuting the (p.138). fact In first. clause goes second The is there counterfactual situations which undermine both Freud’s distance difficulty great no a good describing in The claims. towards same, goes for Schell’s extensions of human chauvinism into one of its main traditional strongholds, value theory: evil, ’... the simple and basic fact [sic!] harm, or service lamenting rejoicing or that before there can be good or must there be life , human life These are no facts, but deeply entrenched philosophical dogmas (which have (p.171). been exposed and criticised elsewhere/, e.g. HC). Naturally many things will disappear with the extinction of humans: trivially there will be no more humans (unless humans re-evolve or are recreated), and thus no more human communities, human institutions, human activities, human emotions, and so But it is already going too far to suggest, as Anders does, that there will forth. accordingly be ’no thought, no love, sacrifice, no image, no song ...'. For there are, and may continue to exist, other than humans with emotion, creatures no struggle, no pain, no hope, no comfort, no struggles, songs, ... Nor will the ending of . all such human ventures, if it comes to pass, show that all past human ventures have been ’all in vain’, meaningless, and already so to say dead. The decay of the solar system, or the heat-death of the universe even, will not show that worthwhile human A activities were not worthwhile.* Several of the other notions and themes common to Schell and Anders derive from their shared assumptions SI of a Second Death, (in Revelations) under SI, is reckoned meaningless rendered and S2. a and species death’, and all extinction came redeployed by both. ’second death’ , already already ’overhung with death’ ’a second It is these that underlie the biblical notion ’seems (S p.166). because to Thus, not merely one’s own but future to pass, generations the (S stronger be by ’The death of mankind , S2 and dead’ (AA SI p.244, remaining S p.166) life is and is too, more trivially, a person faces in addition that greater death of the p.166, p.115). However even notion would not be vindicated, if nuclear because it depends on the fallacious inference to the meaninglessness of preceding life and on the very questionable representation of this meaninglessness as a sort of death. There is no such Second Death: creatures die just once, perhaps all at about the same time. The idea of a Second Death lacks even a solid metaphysical base. �6 From SI, together with the minor principle that extinction being an absolute in degree, doesn’t differ theme that the universality of peril comes ’we are all exposed to peril in the same degree’, which is accordingly ’disguised’ and ’difficult to with SI. In situation, there is no contrast (AE p.64; because recognise’, event, any are peoples southern Patagonia Indians of the all not This theme falls S p.150). by imperilled equally the better placed being rather nuclear than the Nor are all people equally locked into the situation or Germans of northern Europe. incapacitated by it; the prospects are different in different countries and places. likewise, Nor, Schell are all contrast (in to people equally responsible, a pernicious repeatedly infiltrates. Anders) This is theme^ which, the theme, Pogo according to which S3. Responsibility for the present nuclear predicament (fiasco, really) distributes onto everybody, it belongs to every human in the world. But there is also, mixed in, a weaker more plausible claim that gives lie to the stronger one, namely that we have some responsibility (the Nazi situation is compared). An especially blatant example of the Pogo theme11 runs as follows: ’... the world’s leaders political ... they though now menace the earth with nuclear At least, this is weapons, do so only with our permission, and even at our bidding. true for democracies' (pp.229-30). pose since we pay for extinction and sense, threat of it, the ... we are (For the populations of the superpowers this is true the authors of that extinction. in a positive theme is elaborated elsewhere: The while for support the governments that the peoples of the non-nuclear-armed world it is true only in the negative sense that they fail try to do anything about the danger) (p.152). But this is more of an argument indicting representative government, by revealing its allegedly govern, insensitivity not to and unresponsiveness to affected by mention those its the activities populace who are they not But Schell conveniently neglects all such represented at all (namely foreigners). points: of many '... we are potential mass killers. The moral cost of nuclear armaments is it makes of all of us underwriters of the slaughter of hundreds of millions' And again '[as] perpetrators ... we convey the steady message ... that life (p.152), that not only is not sacred but is worthless; that ... it had been judged acceptable for to be killed' (p.153). Little of this is true. Those who campaign against nuclear arrangements, vote against nuclear—committed parties so far as is possible, destruction, and responsibility for the nuclear situation does not simply distribute onto them. Nor and the are like, does responsibility attributes decisions to certainly — or everyone taken — not the the unlikely fall in "liberal on authors opinions as those democracies" who have of potential to worth done less. Schell illegitimately Responsibility for even by representatives (in the unlikely �event of this happening in the case of anything as important as defence) cannot be traced back to those represented, since among many other things, a representative is only representative of a party which offers a complex and often ill-characterised package of policies, and a voter may vote for zero or more policies of this package. Only in the (uncommon) can responsibility, event of a clear still of a qualified single issue referendum, which is adopted, sort, be for it, not to everyone in the community. sheeted home, to those who voted While S3 is false, there is an important related theme that is much more plausible; namely that the present nuclear situation generates responsibilities for every socially involved person. When moreover the Pogo assumption is disentangled from accompanying themes, part of what results is decidedly along the right lines; namely S4. The controllers [not to be confused, in Schell’s fashion, with all of us] have failed to change our pre-nuclear institutions. The sovereign system is out of step with the nuclear age, the one-earth system, etc. (the whole earth theme). Though Schell remains relatively clear about the serious defects of the state and the frequently immoral purposes for which the state is used, unfortunately he often loses sight of this important critique of the theme (indicated state whi?V the conclusion arrives at is, that by and pp.187-8). Yet S4 forms part of Schell s scattered large, the nation-state and has outlasted Schell fragmentary. its usefulness, and that new political institutions more ’consonant with the global reality’ are required as a matter of urgency. But he evades what he admits is the major task, making out viable alternatives.12 At most he makes some passing gestures, some pointing towards the Way Up to world political control. Solutions to the nuclear dilemma come, way, from the Top Down; (cf. p.230). if not easily, in a similar simplistic those who can must appeal to the Top, to those who govern Schell places his hope in treaties for arms reduction and limitations, such as SALT, and in world government, through the United Nations (see p.225ff. and especially p.227, treaties, bottom paragraph). Given the record of these organisations and the negotiations and regulators, it is by now a pathetic faith. Nor is a serious need felt for further analysis of the nuclear situation, to investigate the origins of nuclear technology, to explore the roots of nuclear blindness, to consider effective changes to military-industrial organisation and ways of life. But some of the requisite deeper analysis of the nuclear situation and , more generally, of the roots of war can be found in Anders$f and elsewhere.13 The roots of the nuclear predicament are not confined to the ideologically-aligned arrangements of nation-states, but penetrate also into key components of those states, their �8 and controlling classes, their military, their supporting bureaucracies. And both within the arrangements of states, what accounts in part for the arrangements, and in key components of states, the power and domination (and, often, superiority by the [nuclear] science interrelated forms. surplus product nature) to super-states, to involves accumulated can be is enables is the for Thus the push for domination, large nation-state, at home (from the drive be achieved through military-oriented and main power-base The feature the accompanying privilege). which technology, and and crucial a conspicuous and from abroad, several in where enough and bled from proceed with military and bureaucratic ambitions and to found the high- technology research and development means to ever more expendable power and energy. In changing the prospect of to eliminate arrangements structural the nuclear war, it is not ultimately enough just to downgrade the main power-base, the nation­ state; it sweepingly, also is important remove to state relations, political alter trouble-making political arrangements, in to key components patterns embedded namely patterns of domination, organisation, human-animal relations, but in of in state, and, all these social and patterns manifested not only relations, white-coloured human-nature more the relations; to male-female in remove, short, However not everything needs to be accomplished at once; and chauvinistic relations. the cluster of damaging power and domination relations tied into war can be tackled separately. And there the problems can largely be narrowed to certain problems of states and certain key components of states. In what analysis he does offer of the contrast of familiar false "raison d’etat" and the justifies the means is themselves to problem with states, state expediency with morality, Socratic-Christian ethics. every sort’ (p.134). anything whatever in the name of [their] survival’. argument is as a contrast between teaching that ’the end the basis on which governments, in all times, have licensed commit crimes of extinction nullifies The Schell repeats the So ’states may do virtually Schell then argues however, that end-means justification by destroying every end; but again the far from sound, and depends on human chauvinism (as under S2) combined with ontological assumptions. Even if all humans were extinguished (as under SI) ends could remain, for instance for nonhumans such as animals and extraterrestrials, actual or not. The ends-means argument can however be repaired to remove such objections: instead it is claimed that extinction nullifies ends-means justification by frustrating the realisation of every relevant end - meaning by ’relevant’, in this context, those ends the realisation of which the state appeals to in justification of its nuclear policies.a nuclear war, even without human extinction but with severe enough losses, would undoubtedly frustrate the realisation of relevant state ends. �9 So even expediency an from perspective, policies super-state are open severe to criticism, for example as motivationally irrational in the nuclear risks taken. As to the part of the state and (state) sovereignty in war, Schell leaves us in A sovereign state is virtually defined as one that enjoys the right and no doubt. to go to war in defence or pursuit of its interests (p.187). power War arises from how things are; from the arrangement of political affairs via jealous nation-states Indeed there is a two-way linkage between having sovereignty and capacity^ (p.188). to wage war. to organise On the one side, sovereignty is, Schell contends, necessary for people sovereignty. is impossible side, without war it On the other for war. to preserve Neither of these contentions is transparently clear as it stands. The first is damaged by civil war and the like, the second by the persistence of small nonmilitary states. the macro-state system is entrenched, it Now that easy for conservatives (in particular) to argue from the "realities life, which include self-interest, that peace readily are arrangements aggression, dismissed as of international It is on this basis hatred. fear, is however unrealistic, utopian, even (amusingly) as extremist (cf. p.185). Schell’s further nuclear "war" that theme is not war threatens, however, to undermine his case against the sovereign state; for example, his ends-means argument and the argument based on its nuclear-war making capacity. Fortunately the not-war theme needs much qualification, and starts out from an erroneous characterisation of war as ’a violent means employed by a nation to achieve an end’ (p.189): but this is neither necessary nor sufficient for war. What is correct is that nuclear wars are very different from previous conventional wars (cf. WP) . that war requires an end which nuclear "war" does not have. to claim Schell goes on But nuclear attacks can certainly have ends (even if large nuclear wars cannot be won in the older sense: but It is also claimed that war depends on weakness; on not all wars or games are won). one side ’no one’s happen, But being defeated what these on a decision by arms. strength fails sorts of until considerations nuclear wars are not wars, but But in nuclear "war this doesn’t both sides have been annihilated’ contribute to showing is (p.190). again that they are not wars of certain sorts, not that e.g., not just wars (because they fail on such criteria as reasonable prospect of success and improvement), not rational wars (in a good sense), and so on. have persisted into nuclear times does damage to That conventional wars Schell's argument that nuclear weapons have also ruined "conventional" wars, and his connected theme that the demise of war court has left no means of appeal has mistaken propositions: been to finally settle disputes between nations, for the final removed (pp.192-193). The theme depends on a pair of that concerning the demise of conventional war, and the idea �10 that war of some sort has to be the final court of appeal between nations (for there are other types of contests that could serve, and there is also the possibility of more cooperative behaviour, e.g. joint referenda). The social-Darwinian assumption of Clausewicz (the 'logic of war theme also imports the theme) that war has to proceed to the technological limit — as if war and violence were thoroughly natural activities, independent of recognised social settings (for winning, surrender, etc.), and ruleless activities. On the contrary, wars are parasitic on social organisations such as states and are governed by a range of understandings, conventions and rules. They are a social phenomenon, with a rule structure, if not a logic. Much capital has been made not merely from "the logic of war but from what is now called "the logic of deterrence" and the "logic of nuclear [strategic] planning . The message that is usually supposed to emerge is that the massive arrangements the world is now entangled in are perfectly sound, logical, rational. However Logic in no way justifies the represents little more than a cheap semantical trick. present arrangements, or anything like them, or renders them reasonable. logics of decision (as presented, e.g., be applied planning; in strategic but this There are for the classical case in Jeffrey) which can they do not yield specific results without desirability measures being assigned to alternative outcomes, that is without values being pumped in, extralogically . There are various ways these value assignments may be determined, to meet moral requirements or not; but in nuclear strategic planning they have invariably been settled on the basis of expediency^?. For the most part, however, ’logic of’ tends to be used very loosely, as a word of general commendation, to cover something like ’reasoning and rational considerations entering into the In these terms, Schell, who like others enjoys playing with policy or strategy of’. the term ’logic of’, should write of 'the illogic of deterrence', for he emphasizes its unreasonableness. supposed rationality (even from a national fail:^ yet threat of the this further and For of stresses (p.213) instance he threatening use interest viewpoint) success of deterrence unjustifiable and of nuclear the disparity between the weapons and the irrationality of actually using them should the threat doctrine depends on the credibility of irrational use. the Indeed Schell wants to go still locate a contradiction in deterrence (e.g. but the argument depends on an interesting confusion of contradiction with cancellation, along with the assumption that deterrence involves cancellation. irrational, it is immoral, but it is not inconsistent. pp.201-2); Nuclear deterrence may well be �11 NOTES This is a revised version of ’Appendix 1. On the fate of mankind and the earth, according to Schell, and to Anders’ of my monograph referred to as WP, where Several points, only touched ijpcn in this review, are further developed. References are by way of authors’ names or else through obvious acronyms, given in the list of references which follows. 1. The distinguishing term is from Foley’s Nuclear Prophets, where many leading anti-nuclear prophets are assessed. One well-known prophet not so considered there is Jaspers, presumably because his main work comes out in entirely the wrong direction. It gives heavy philosophical attire to the better-dead-than-red abomination. A main argument against Jaspers so presented is simple. However bad being red might become (at present it is debatably worse than living under some of the totalitarian regimes the free West props up) , it still gives humans a further chance for goou lives, since regimes fall or can be toppled: but total annihilation removes that all-important opportunity. But of course Jaspers does not present his position so simply. Rather his contention is that there are circumstances where, and principles for which, a person or group of persons ought to sacrifice even their lives. Freedom is such: a life worth living is a free life. But the latter point can be granted without conceding that sacrifice is a possible means to it. While the sacrifice of one or a few lives may be a possible (if dubiously effective) way to free lives for others, certainly the sacrifice of all lives is not a possible route to free lives for all, since no human lives remain. To this extent Schell is right (on p.131) in accusing Jaspers of an each to all fallacy. Jasper’s idea that "the free life that they try to save by all possible means is more than mere life or lives" breaks down when applied to all participating people. None can gain free lives by extinction of all: that is not a possible route to life even. 2. A detailed comparison of Schell and Anders’ remarkably similar versions of S2 is made in Foley Ju. 3. Should S2 appeal, as it may, to suitable communities of humans, SI will require reformulation in similar terms; and the argument that follows needs minor adjustment, with appropriate groups replacing individuals. 4. Thus the Last Person argument, important in environmental ethics (as HC explains), is no longer merely hypothetical, awaiting for instance the remote death of the Sun, but assumes new urgency. It is this sort of argument that connects environmental ethics and nuclear ethics, at a deeper metaphysical level. The Bomb and Bulldozer are out of the same technological Pandora’s box. Nuclear technology is not the only route to human extinction, nor the only Pandora's box. Biological and chemical means are perhaps even more effective, and certainly can be more selective in what gets extinguished. Nuclear extinction would presumably require a different and more massive exchange than is usually assumed in nuclear war scenarios, with heavy �targeting in particular of Southern Hemispheric internationally-recognised nuclear-free zones). sites (including 5. Nor do recent scientific studies claim as much. The most intrepid of these studies. Erlich and others, only contends that in certain worstQ ' case circumstances, ’the possibility of the extinction of Homo sapiens cannot be excluded’ (p.1299). The study admits that, in the scenario described, ’it seems unlikely ... Homo spaiens would be forced to extinctions immediately’, and the difficulties indicated in the way of long-term human survival are exaggerated. In particular, many of the drastic effects predicted for Northern mid latitudes are reflected in very much milder form in equivalent Southern latitudes. For example, temperatures for regions with maritine climates appear likely to vary by only a few degrees and perhaps neglibly for many agricultural purposes after 100 days (cf. Turco and others, p.1287 case 29, and p.1286). Similarly the extent of nuclear darkness and of surface ultraviolet radiation will be appreciably less in the South and perhaps minor for many crucial purposes, such as photosynthesis and human outdoor activity, after 100 dayss (cf. the data in Benton and Partridge). No doubt some scientifically respectable sections of the environmental and peace movements have an interest in exaggerating the probable effects of nuclear holocaust for life on earth, much as many statesmen and strategists have an interest in minimizing them. And there is certainly substantial margin for error and for variation in conclusions drawn. For Crutzen (p.59) is right that ’analyses of the environmental effects of a global nuclear war remain ... uncertain ... because of a lack of information on various important processes [among other things] ... the environment might become extremely hostile, because of hitherto overlooked changes in the composition of the atmosphere’, again among other things. Such uncertainty bodes considerable caution as rational. The way to err is clear. marxist persuasion, determinists of merely by technological 6. Not induction that if the argues by straight Hackworth, a former US general, use it. US military has a weapon it will present and future (etc.) is 7. The appalling theme that humans create past, repeated elsewhere, e.g. p.173. 8. For detailed refutation of these assumptions, see JB. 9. Anders is here (AA pp.244-5) relying upon a version of the argument from perserverence, criticised in detail in Routley and Griffin. 10. An interesting converse of this theme is sometimes advanced, that no one is responsible, the whole thing is out of control. The technological version of this no-responsibility theme is discussed below (fn 15). More satisfactory is the theme that nuclear arrangements are out of political control, but for reasons, in terms of vested interests in keeping nuclear things going, which enable responsibility to be distributed. The vested interests, which bear considerable responsibility, include the military �13 weapons industry, and research and academic communities (cf. Barnaby). Under pressures for re-election especially, politicians give in to these powerful groups, so losing control of political processes. The argument is flawed at its final stage. For many influential politicians either belong to or represent vested interests. Thus, though there is no doubt some ’lack of control’, political processes tend rather to reflect vested interests than to run out of political control. 11. Another example of spreading the responsibility runs as follows: ’The self-extinction of our species is not an act that anyone describes as sane or sensible; nevertheless, it is an act that, without quite admitting it to ourselves, we plan in certain circumstances to commit’ (p.185). Even for most of the planners, extinction is presumably not part of "the plan", but an unintended consequence; and most of us have little or no role in the planning, enough of us even campaign against the planning. Further ’the world ... chose the course of attempting to refashion the system of sovereignty to accommodate nuclear weapons’ (p.194): the world? This connects of course with the faulty ideological argument from defence of fundamentals, e.g. for liberty, for the 'free enterprise (USA) nation, and against socialism. 12. A more detailed discussion is given in WP §8, where too the case against the state from nuclear dilemmqj'is elaborated. 13. Anders’ explanation is elaborated in Foley; some of the themes are presented more straightforwardly in Martin. The incomplete list of items given, to be investigated in a deeper analysis of the nuclear situation, paraphrases Foley JS p.164. 14. These motivating drives form part of a larger integrated package, comprising maximisation drives for power, knowledge, control, wealth, energy, speed, satisfaction, . .., for the newer Enlightenment (but Faustian) virtues. Frequently there are attempts (the human failing for excessive neatness and simplicity manifested) to reduce the package to one main component, preference—satisfaction, for instance, or utility. And the type of drive is justified (especially for those who have it, but worry about it) not only as virtuous, which it is not, but also as rational, which again it is not. C Rationality, the deeply entrenched myth has it. consists in maximisation,.a suitable mix of these virtues. * 4 Maximisation of the objects of the drives runs, however, into limitation The maximisation of self-interest theorems and associated paradoxes, runs into Newcomb ’s paraj^dox and special cases (individual or national) situations. The maximisation of power, as such as Prisoners Dilemma Christian-Islamic God, encounters the paradox of the symbolised in parallel maximisation of knowledge, paradoxes of the omnipotence, or no consistent objects which are omnipotent There are omniscience. the The drive for maximum consistency, often taken to be omniscient. epitome of rationality, also leads leads to to inconsistency in the case of more important theories, such as arithmetic and set theory (by virtue of Godel’s theorem and associated limitative theorems). 15. R & D, though directed by military requirements and the arms race, also �14 drives the arms race. science. Its role is partly disguised by the myth of neutral There have been attempts, not only by those committed to technological determinism, to involve technology more deeply as the main, or single, source of the nuclear fix (thus especially Mumford, in part thereby anticipating Commoner’s parallel indictment of technology-choice in the ecological fix). It is technology, the mega-machine, running out of control, that has brought us to this predicament, the nuclear abyss. Sometimes this serves to exonerate states and their key components and those who control them, for they are simply caught up by this out-ofcontrol machine; but sometimes the state itself is seen as a machine also running out of control. But technological determinism, like other varieties of stronger (nonanalytic) determinism, is false. Nuclear technology was selected and proceeded with, after a well-known political dispute involving distinguished scientists; it was deliberated, funded and promoted, while other alternatives were not. Damaging technologies of the nuclear age were not inevitable, but deliberately chosen by certain components of the large nation-states. And much as they need not have been chosen, so they do not have to be persisted with. The fashionable inevitability/determinism themes admit not only of refutation by bringing out the many choices made in persisting with often recalcitrant technologies. They also admit of being made to look ridiculous. If the Bomb is determined, as part of human evolution, then if it functions (as it probably will, a matter also determined), it will serve as a human population control device, a matter also determined. That is, the Bomb has its fixed evolutionary place in human population regulation! 16. This reformulation was proposed by N. Griffin, who suggested that the main qualification can be inferred from Schell’s context. 17. Selecting the usual game theory setting sees to this almost automatically; for it is then assumed that each player plays to maximize his or her own advantage. Thus too the presumption in Walzer, p.277, that ’the logic of deterrence’ is based on eye-for-eye and tooth-for-tooth assumptions. (ar 18. Even the irrationality of /retaliatory * first-strike) use has been contested, e.g. it has been wishfully thougnt that America will rise like a phoenix from the radioactive ashes. There is moreover a simple solution to Schell’s problem of the "missing motive" for retaliating to a large strike (p.204), namely, not a retributive one, but an ideological one: eliminate the prospect of the future dominance of the rival ideology. Such a motive has been offered -tor the conjecturAL targeting of Latin America. 19. An analogous confusion of negation with cancellation or obliteration appears in recent US "star-war" thinking, where US missiles are supposed to "negate" incoming USSR missiles. Moral paradoxes of deterrence take a different direction. For although �15 involving negation, they depend upon perhaps questionable interconnexions of intensional functors. One type of paradox (considered in WP §5, where the immorality of deterrence is argued) derives from a policy of credibly threatening war without however intending to proceed to war, though credible threats [appear to] imply an intention to proceed. Another style derives from acclaimed intention to reduce the number of nuclear missiles when the persistent practice, which Implies an intention, is to increase the number. This paradox is technically removed - how satisfactorily is another matter - by a distinction between longer-term aims and immediate practice, a time-honoured method of removing contradictions by conveniently discerned temporal distinctions. REFERENCES G. Anders, Die Antiquiertheit des Menschen, C.H. Beck, Munchen, 1956; referred to as AA. G. Anders, Zeitenende: Endzeitand Gedanken atomaren zur Situation, C.H. Beck, Munchen, 1972; referred to as AE. 7 ' F. Barnaby, ’Will be there a War' ,//» Aus tralia Nuclear Nuclear War, J (ed. M. Denborough) , Croom Helm, Australia, 1983? I.J. Benton and G.W. Partridge, ’"Twilight at Noon" overstated’, 13 Ambio (1984) 49-51. B. Commoner, The Closing Circle: Nature, Man P.J. Crutzen, Technology, Knopf, New York, 1972. ’Darkness after a nuclear war’, Ambio 13 (1984) 52-4. M. Denborough (ed.), Australian & Nuclear War, Croom Helm, Australia, 1983. P.R. Erlich and others, ’Long-term biological consequences of nuclear war’, Science 222 (1983) 1293-1300. G. Foley, ’Jonathan Schell: Genius - Philosopher - Rewrite Man’, typescript, Brisbane, 1982; referred to as JS. G. Foley, Nuclear Prophets. The True and the False, typescript, Brisbane, 1983. �16 in ’A Soldier’s Refragfljt’, , Australia D. Hackworth, Croom Helm, Australia, 1983 vi^vC Nuclear War, (ed. M. Denborough), /zor-/z » K. Jaspers, The Future of Mankind, (trans. E.B. Ashton), University of Chicago Press, 1961. B. Martin, Strategy Against Roots Grass War, Freedom Press, 1984, "ter Nottingham, a-p-peax. L. Mumford, The Myth of the Machine, 2 vols., Harcourt Brifce , New York, 1970. G.F. Preddey and others, Future Contingencies 4. Nuclear Disasters, A Report to the Commission for the Future, Government Printer, Wellington, New Zealand, 1982. R. Routley and N. Griffin, 'Unravelling the meanings of life’, Discussion Papers in Environmental Philosophy #3, Australian National University, Canberra, 1982. R. Routley, Meinong’s Exploring Jungle and Beyond, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University, 1980; referred to as JB. R. Routley, War and Peace I. On the Ethics of Large-Scale Nuclear War and Nuclear deterrence and the Political Fall-Out, Discussion Papers in Environmental Philosophy #5, Australian National University, 1984j R. and V. Routley, Philosophy (ed. 'Human chauvinism D. Manujson and and Environmental others), Research ethics’, School of in Environmental Social Sciences, Australian National University, 1980; referred to as HC. J. Schell, The Fate of the Earth, Knopf, New York, 1982; referred to as S./F. R.P. Turco and others, 'Nuclear winter: global consequences explosions’ , Science 222 (1983) 1283-92. M. Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, Basic Books, New York, 1977. of multiple nuclear �Appendix 1: On the fate of mankind and tht?_ _ea£_t]i, according to SchelT~and Anders. Nuclear prophets and prophetic rubbish. The extinction assumption. Common emerging themes of Schell and Anders. The extravagant anthro­ pocentric assumption, and some of what is wrong with it. Second death dismissed. The universality of peril. The alleged universality of responsibility: the Pogo theme. The correct, but undeveloped, whole earth theme. Ultimately Schell offers little hope and superficiality. Nuclear war is war. The logic and illogic of deterrence. �METAPHYSICAL FALL-OUT FROM THE NUCLEAR PREDICAMENT* A series of nuclear prophets has produced a series of philosophically-oriented works on nuclear war.^ The series is important for its deeper penetration into the main nuclear predicament, down to metaphysical levels; with the widely in this the series contrasts transient superficialities of much of the political commentary. circulated influential and text the of series is undoubtedly that uncannily some of the the apparently deep phenomenological So, conveniently, main assumptions of Schell and Anders can often themes of Anders. be considered together. their work. redeploys of This skillful piece of slightest of the "prophets", Schell’s The Fate of the Earth. media-philosophy The most To criticise their assumptions is not of course to belittle In particular, Schell’s little book, for all its political shortcomings, is having a significant and much needed effect in shifting attitudes towards nuclear It is especially valuable for its arrangements. the aftermath of nuclear vivid and horrifying scenarios of Unfortunately attack. it also exhibits, both philosophically and factually, severe defects. Some of ’without is it simply rubbish: to take one example, consider the ... a world-wide program of action for preserving the [human] nothing else claim that species .... that we undertake together can make any practical or moral sense . . . ’ (p.173, rearranged). This should certainly be rejected philosophically; for there is no separate moral issue of such overwhelming importance that all other issues become Moral morally neutral. compared with more issues remain moral issues: they don’t cease to be so when important elsewhere, e.g. p.130). moral issues (as Schell effectively acknowledges And the claim should be questioned on more factual grounds. Humans form a highly resilient species, like rats a survivor species, unlikely to be entirely exterminated under presently-arranged nuclear holocausts. The example was selected however because it leads into, indeed presupposes, two of the major defective assumptions in the work of Schell and Anders: 51. Nuclear war will eliminate life, human life at least, on earth (the extinction assumption); and 52. value, In the absence of humans, very many notions, not only those of morality and but those of time and space for example, make no sense; or, to put it into a form, for their X 2 actual human context (the extravagant anthropocentric assumption). more sympathetic philosophical these notions depend sense on an �2 S2 which give Anders’ and Schell’s work some of its apparent It is applications of and certainly induce much philosophical puzzlement through the philosophical depth, paradoxical propositions generated. But the frequent applications of S2 depend essentially on SI.3 For without total extinction there will be humans about, to make past and future, good and evil, go on making sense! Granted that assumption SI the technological means appear extinctgranted the prospect is by no means ruled out as a real possibility, as available to of make it nuclear large-scale to render Homo sapiens true, war does threaten leading Even so SI appears unlikely in centres of Western civilization with obliteration. the light of present - admittedly inadequate - information. Even in Canada, which lies on the polar route of Soviet missiles, human life should be able to continue in certain northern areas (according to Canadian medical studies). SI is extremely flimsy. for example, It depends, Schell s argument to on an unjustified extrapolation from the Northern to the Southern Hemisphere, but for the most part it does that very North Zunerican thing, of contracting the world to North America. (All that matters, all worthwhile civilization, is in USA, or at least, to be more charitable, in North America and Europe, which will also be wiped out, i.e. its human population will be eliminated in the nuclear holocaust.) Some of the data Schell relies upon, for example the effect of nuclear explosions on the ozone layer, was significantly out of date even when he wrote. Other effects than ozone destruction, such as variations in ultraviolent radiation and temperature levels, apparently extrapolate even less well from North A factually superior study of nuclear disaster produced at to South. about the same time as Schell’s, by Preddey and others, indicates that parts of the Southern Hemisphere, latitudes of such as New Zealand and southern Latin America could escape relatively unscathed from even most massive northern exchanges. Doomsday prophets belated) scientific may appear forecasts of to have gained new purchase through recent a nuclear winter following upon nuclear war. (if But although these forecasts certainly add a new, and alarming, ecological dimension to the very damaging consequences of large-scale nuclear war, they do not sustain the extinction assumption3. On the available evidence, human life will continue, though no doubt with new complications and mid-latitude coastal life will go on, for example in many southern regions outside zones of radiation fall-out. More generally, simplifications, though likely seriously and irreversibly impoverished through loss of valuable nonhuman systems and creatures. Nuclear prophets usually see the world (though with most of it carried along) as already set , in crucial respects, on the route to nuclear catastrophe. Much of the �3 way taken is seen as both inevitable and irreversible. insist upon unlearning" of "impossibility the Thus both Anders and Schell means of the manufacturing nuclear It would seem that extinction, which they both foresee, would furnish a good bombs. medium for unlearning nuclear technology (something very like this emerges from van Daniken’s of an theory "high" earlier they would of S2, In virtue technology). however exclude such a possibility as a case of unlearning, contending wrongly that the notion longer no made sense. But what message is the - as if impossibility-of-unlearning eventual use of the technology they to suggest again want learnt having the of inevitability with the development and all the means determined, and manufacture and use ceased to be a matter of choice. views have been advanced. technological advances cases of But are not they that have been not tenable. Certainly such are many There taken advantage of, was else examples of there are even and technological developments that have been manufactured but not marketed or used. There is not something very special about nuclear apparatus that puts it beyond the scope of such generalisations. Both Schell and Anders do claim that there are very special things about nuclear weapons, notably that they do not allow "experiments". Even if this were true just of nuclear weapons - and it is certainly not of smaller weapons - it would not rebut the argument against previous inevitability the of nuclear weapons. And in fact Anders and (even) Schell hedge their claims about testing, and the limits to nuclear work, scientific large-scale to weapons and independent experiments which interfere with the observers and those outside the "laboratories". latched onto major points: cumulative such effects, of effects as in particular, fireballs or Again they have we have at present no way of testing the wreapons in concert, firestorms, or changes nuclear large do not e.g. in for more holistic atmospheric coupled circulation and radiation fields. enough with these crucial effects must remain largely untested and hypothetical it, in character. Short of a large-scale nuclear war, and likely Nonetheless enough data can be assembled to carry through informative modellings, which point to the improbability of SI, and so undermine applications of S2. The Schell penetration and Anders, of human but is a chauvinism, product of as in S2, Western is not something peculiar philosophy, European to philosophy especially. This chauvinism is unfortunately alive and still well, Anders’ version of just one striking illustration (cf. AA p.252ff.). S2 being penetrated Anglo-American philosophy, and has been extended It has also deeply under the influence of Wittgenstein’s work, where even the necessary truths of mathematics are taken to be a product of human conventions, and would vanish with humans! Such are alleged �4 implications of extinction: but the fact is that the truths of arithmetic are in no way dependent on the existence of humans or humanoids or of gods or giraffes. with necessary truths and falsehoods so with contingent ones: As very many propositions about the world do not depend in any way for their truth-value or content on humans or their communities. In human Schell, obnoxious Kantian form. dished is chauvinism and Thoughts up in propositions, a particularly time powerful history and tenses, and and memories, values and morality, all depend on the life-giving presence of human beings future or merely potential humans are not enough, - past or that are not persons Thus, according to Schell (p.140, e.g.), humans are certainly not enough. ’... the thought "Humanity is now extinct" is an impossible one for a rational person, because as it soon as is, we are not. In imagining any other event, we look ahead moment that is still within the stream of human time, ... ’. a later rational erroneously denies that: present, and future ...’ into past, divides time may well be to able ordering time it have Schell truly. there is no "later" ’outside the human tenses of past, (p.140)7. Human extinction eliminates ’the creature that present and future’: so annihilation cannot But it is simply false that the tenses are human; (p.143). local creature The thought is however Though we no doubt have it perfectly possible for humans; we can have it right now. falsely, to a (perceptible to many creatures ’come to pass’ the tenses depend on a other than humans, but not depending at all on that perceptibility for its viability) relating other times to to now (also a human-independent location, evident to other creatures, the present, and borne witness to by such sequences as the passing seasons). And annihilation may also too easily come to pass, for many humans in the North at least, as it came to pass in recent geological times that humans began to exist upon earth. Before that there was a time before there were any human beings. Anders’ argument for the demise of time, even what has been’, is also that ’what has been will no longer be explicitly (and narrowly) ’for what verif icationist: would the difference be between what has only been and what has never been, is no remain one remember the things to many sorts organisms would of difference; be different. that have been’ for one, Temporal the (AA p.245). history themes do not lack if there There would still many other recorded in ’legitimacy because not registered [or verified] by anyone’; truth, significance, still less meaning, are not matters of human verification. Here, as elsewhere, the human chauvinism is mixed with other distorting metaphysical assumptions of our Western heritage, in particular, verificationism and �5 ontological assumptions (to the effect that there are severe difficulties in talking about exist)0. not does what Thus, Schell example, for takes over dubious metaphysics from Freud, according to whom "it is indeed impossible to imagine our own death; and whenever we attempt to do so, we can perceive that we are in fact still present spectators" as refuting (p.138). fact In first. the clause goes second The there is great no situations which undermine both Freud’s counterfactual a good distance difficulty claims. in towards describing The same goes for Schell’s extensions of human chauvinism into one of its main traditional strongholds, value theory: evil, '... the simple and basic fact [sic!] or service (p.171). lamenting harm, rejoicing or that before there can be good or there be must life’, human life These are no facts, but deeply entrenched philosophical dogmas (which have been exposed and criticised elsewhere, e.g. LIC). Naturally many things will disappear with the extinction of humans: trivially there will be no more humans (unless humans re-evolve or are recreated), and thus no more human communities, human institutions, human activities, human emotions, and so But it is already going too far to suggest, as Anders does, that there will forth. ’no thought, accordingly be no love, sacrifice, no image, no song no struggle, no pain, no hope, no comfort, no For there are, and may continue to exist, other ...’. creatures than humans with emotion, struggles, songs, ... Nor will the ending of . all such human ventures, if it comes to pass, show that all past human ventures have been 'all in vain', meaningless, and already so to say dead. The decay of the solar system, or the heat-death of the universe even, will not show that worthwhile human 9 activities were not worthwhile. Several of the other notions and themes common to Schell and Anders derive from their shared assumptions SI of a Second Death, (in Revelations) under SI, rendered is and S2. reckoned meaningless a and species and all extinction came redeployed 'second death', already already 'overhung with death' 'a second death', It is these that underlie the biblical notion 'seems (S p.166). because by to to pass, generations the (S stronger be Thus, not merely one's own but future by both. 'The death of mankind', S2 and dead' (AA SI remaining p.244, S p.166) life is and is too, more trivially, a person faces in addition that greater death of the p.166, p.115). However even notion would not be vindicated, if nuclear because it depends on the fallacious inference to the meaninglessness of preceding life and on the very questionable representation of. this meaninglessness as a sort of death. There is no such Second Death: creatures die just once, perhaps all at about the same time. The idea of a Second Death lacks even a solid metaphysical base. �6 together with the minor principle From SI, doesn’t differ in degree, comes extinction being an absolute that the universality of peril theme that we are all exposed to peril in the same degree’, which is accordingly ’disguised’ and ’difficult to recognise’, with In SI. situation, there is no contrast (AE p.64; because any event, not Indians of the peoples all Germans of northern Europe. ihis theme falls imperilled equally are southern Patagonia S p.150). being rather by nuclear the better placed than the Nor are all people equally locked into the situation or incapacitated by it; the prospects are different in different countries and places. Nor, Schell likewise, contrast (in all are to people equally responsible, a repeatedly infiltrates. Anders) pernicious This is the theme which Pogo theme, according to which S3. Responsibility for the present nuclear predicament (fiasco, really) distributes onto everybody, it belongs to every human in the world. But there is also, mixed a weaker more in, plausible claim that gives lie to the stronger one, namely that we have some responsibility (the Nazi situation is compared). An especially blatant example of the Pogo themeH runs as follows: ’... the world’s leaders political ... though they now menace weapons, do so only with our permission, and even at our bidding. true for democracies’ (pp.229-30). positive pose the since we sense, threat of it, At least, this is theme is elaborated elsewhere: The ... we are (For the populations of the superpowers this is true the authors of that extinction. in a with nuclear the earth pay for extinction and support the governments that the peoples of the non-nuclear-armed world it is while for true only in the negative sense that they fail try to do anything about the danger/ But this is more of an argument indicting representative government, by (p.152). revealing insensitivity its unresponsiveness and to many of the populace they allegedly govern, not to mention those affected by its activities who are not represented at all (namely foreigners). But Schell conveniently neglects all such ’... we are potential mass killers. points: that it makes of all of us underwriters of (p.152). The moral cost of nuclear armaments is the slaughter of hundreds of millions And again ’[as] perpetrators ... we convey the steady message ... that life not only is not sacred but is worthless; (p.153). everyone to be killed’ that ... .it had been judged acceptable for Little of this is true. Those who campaign against nuclear arrangements, vote against nuclear—committed parties so far as is possible, destruction, and responsibility for the nuclear situation does not simply distribute onto them. Nor and the are like, does responsibility certainly — or everyone attributes to decisions taken — not the the unlikely fall in "liberal on authors opinions as those democracies" who have of to done potential worth Schell less. even by representatives illegitimately Responsibility for (in the unlikely �7 event of this happening in the case of anything as important as defence) cannot be traced back to those represented, since among many other things, a representative is only representative of a party which offers a complex and often ill-characterised package of policies, and a voter may vote for zero or more policies of this package. Only in the (uncommon) event of a clear single issue referendum, which is adopted, still of a qualified sort, be sheeted home, to those who voted can responsibility, for it, not to everyone in the community. While S3 is false, there is an important related theme that is much more plausible; namely that the present nuclear situation generates responsibilities for every socially involved person. When moreover the Pogo assumption is disentangled from accompanying themes, part of what results is decidedly along the right lines; namely S4. The controllers [not to be confused, in Schell’s fashion, with all of us] have failed to change our pre-nuclear institutions. The sovereign system is out of step with the nuclear age, the one-earth system, etc. (the whole earth theme). Though Schell remains relatively clear about the serious defects of the state and the frequently immoral purposes for which the state is used, unfortunately he often loses sight of this important arrives at state which is, the critique of theme (indicated pp.187-8). the conclusion that by and large, Yet S4 forms part of Schell s scattered and the nation-state has outlasted fragmentary. Schell its usefulness, and that new political institutions more ’consonant with the global reality’ are required as a matter of urgency. But he evades what he admits is the major task, making out viable alternatives.12 At most he makes some passing gestures, some pointing towards the Way Up to world political control. Solutions to way, the nuclear dilemma come, from the Top Down; (cf. p.230). those if not easily, in a similar simplistic who can must appeal to the Top, to those who govern Schell places his hope in treaties for arms reduction and limitations, such as SALT, and in world government, especially p.227, bottom paragraph). through the United Nations (see p.225ff. and Given the record of these organisations and treaties, the negotiations and regulators, it is by now a pathetic faith. Nor is a serious need felt for further analysis of the nuclear situation, to investigate the origins of nuclear technology, to explore the roots of nuclear blindness, to consider effective changes to military-industrial organisation and ways of life. But some of the requisite deeper analysis of the nuclear situation and, more The roots of generally, of the roots of war can be found in Anders and elsewhere. the nuclear predicament are not confined to the ideologically —aligned arrangements of nation-states, but penetrate also into key components of those states, their �8 and their supporting bureaucracies. their controlling classes, military, And both within the arrangements of states, what accounts in part for the arrangements, and in key components of states, the science for super-states, to be achieved through military-oriented in several enables domination, and which involves superiority by the and technology, forms. interrelated surplus the drive Thus the push for the accompanying privilege). power and domination (and, often, [nuclear] feature is a conspicuous and crucial product can be accumulated at home (from where enough large nation-state, is the The main power-base from abroad, and and bled from nature) to proceed with military and bureaucratic ambitions and to found the highj 15 technology research and development means to ever more expendable powei and energy* prospect of nuclear war, it is not ultimately enough just to downgrade the mam power-base, the nation­ state; it is also important to alter key components of the state, and, more sweepingly, to remove trouble-making patterns embedded in all these social and In changing the structural political arrangements, in state relations, political arrangements chauvinistic relations . relations, but in the eliminate namely patterns of domination, organisation, human-animal to patterns manifested not only relations, white-coloured human-nature relations; to remove, male-female in short, However not everything needs to be accomplished at once; and the cluster of damaging power and domination relations tied into war can be tackled And there the problems can largely be narrowed to certain problems of separately. states and certain key components of states. analysis he does offer of the problem with states, Schell repeats the familiar false contrast of state expediency with morality, as a contrast between The teaching that 'the end "raison d’etat" and the Socratic—Christian ethics. justifies the means is the basis on which governments, in all times, have licensed In what themselves to commit crimes of every sort’ (p.134). So 'states may do virtually Schell then argues however, that extinction nullifies end-means justification by destroying every end; but again the argument is far from sound, and depends on human chauvinism (as under S2) combined anything whatever in the name of [their] survival’. with ontological assumptions. Even if all humans were extinguished (as under SI) ends could remain, for instance for nonhumans such as animals and extraterrestrials, The ends-means argument can however be repaired to remove such actual or not. objections: instead it is claimed that extinction nullifies ends-means justification by frustrating the realisation of every relevant end - meaning by 'relevant', in this context, those ends the realisation of which the state appeals to in justification of I6 its nuclear policies. A nuclear war, even without human extinction but with severe enough losses, would undoubtedly frustrate the realisation of relevant state ends. �9 So even from an perspective, expediency policies super-state open are severe to criticism, for example as motivationally irrational in the nuclear risks taken. As to the part of the state and (state) sovereignty in war, Schell leaves us in A sovereign state is virtually defined as one that enjoys the right and no doubt. power to go to war in defence or pursuit of its interests (p.187). War arises from how things are; from the arrangement of political affairs via jealous nation-states Indeed there is a two-way linkage between having sovereignty and capacity (p.188). to wage war. to organise On the one side, sovereignty is, Schell contends, necessary for people for war. sovereignty. On the other side, without war it is impossible to preserve The Neither of these contentions is transparently clear as it stands. first is damaged by civil war and the like, the second by the persistence of small the macro-state Now that nonmilitary states. system is entrenched, it is however easy for conservatives (in particular) to argue from the "realities life, which include self-interest, that peace are arrangements aggression, readily fear, hatred. as dismissed of international is on this basis It unrealistic, utopian, even (amusingly) as extremist (cf. p.L85). Schell’s further theme nuclear that "war" is not war threatens, however, to undermine his case against the sovereign state; for example, his ends-means argument and the argument based on its nuclear-war making capacity. theme needs much qualification, Fortunately the not-war and starts out from an erroneous characterisation of war as ’a violent means employed by a nation to achieve an end’ (p.189): but this is neither necessary nor sufficient for war. very different What is correct is that nuclear wars are from previous conventional wars (cf. WP). Schell goes on that war requires an end which nuclear "war" does not have. to claim But nuclear attacks can certainly have ends (even if large nuclear wars cannot be won in the older sense: but It is also claimed that war depends on weakness; on not all wars or games are won). one side being defeated ’no happen, But what one’s these on a decision by arms. strength sorts of fails war this doesn t until both sides have been annihilated’ considerations nuclear wars are not wars, but But in nuclear contribute to showing is (p.190). again that they are not wars of certain sorts, not that e.g., not just wars (because they fail on such criteria as reasonable prospect of success anu improvement), not rational wars (in a good sense), and so on. that conventional wars have argument persisted into nuclear times does damage to Schell’s that nuclear weapons have also ruined "conventional" wars, and his connected theme that the demise of war court has left no means of appeal has mistaken propositions: been to finally settle disputes between nations, for the final removed (pp. 192—193) • The theme depends on a pair of that concerning the demise of conventional war, and the idea �10 that war of some sort has to be final "court of appeal" between nations (for the there are other types of contests that could serve, and there is also the possibility of more cooperative behaviour, joint referenda). e.g. imports the The theme also social-Darwinian assumption of Clausewicz (the "logic of war that war has to theme) proceed to the technological limit ~ as if war and violence were thoroughly natural activities, independent of recognised social settings (for winning, surrender, etc.), On the contrary, wars are parasitic on social organisations and ruleless activities. such as states and are governed by a range of understandings, conventions and rules. They are a social phenomenon, with a rule structure, if not a logic. Much capital has been made not merely from "the logic of war but from what is now called "the logic of deterrence" and the "logic of nuclear [strategic] planning . The message that is usually supposed to emerge is that the massive arrangements the world is entangled now in are perfectly sound, logical, represents little more than a cheap semantical trick. rational. however this Logic in no way justifies the present arrangements, or anything like them, or renders them reasonable. There are logics of decision (as presented, e.g., for the classical case in Jeffrey) which can be applied in strategic planning; but yield specific results without they do not desirability measures being assigned to alternative outcomes, that is without values being pumped in, extralogically . There are various ways these value assignments may be determined, to meet moral requirements or not; but in nuclear strategic planning they have invariably been settled on the basis of expediency however, to cover something like ’reasoning (even from a national fail:18 yet threat of further and of stresses (p.213) threatening use interest viewpoint) the success this considerations entering into the ’the illogic of deterrence’, for he emphasizes For instance he unreasonableness. rationality rational and In these terms, Schell, who like others enjoys playing with the term ’logic of’, should write of supposed lor the most pait, ’logic of’ tends to be used very loosely, as a word of general commendation, policy or strategy of’. its . of deterrence unjustifiable and the disparity between the weapons and of nuclear the irrationality of actually using them should the threat doctrine depends on the credibility of irrational use. the Indeed Schell wants to go still locate a contradiction in deterrence (e.g. but the argument depends on an interesting confusion of contradiction with cancellation, along with the assumption that deterrence involves cancellation. irrational, it is immoral, but it is not inconsistent. pp.z-01~2>; Nuclear deterrence may well be ft �NOTES This is a revised version of ’Appendix 1. On the fate of mankind and the earth, according to Schell, and to Anders' of my monograph referred to as WP, where several points, only touched upon in this review, are further developed. References are by way of authors' names or else through obvious acronyms, given in the list of references which follows. . The distinguishing term is from Foley's Nuclear Prophets, where many leading anti-nuclear prophets are assessed. One well-known prophet not so considered there is Jaspers, presumably because his main work comes out in entirely the wrong direction. It gives heavy philosophical attire to the better-dead-than-red abomination. A main argument against Jaspers so presented is simple. However bad being red might become (at present it is debatably worse than living under some of the totalitarian regimes the free West props up), it still gives humans a further chance for good lives, since regimes fall or can be toppled: but total annihilation removes that all-important opportunity. But of course Jaspers does not present his position so simply. Rather his contention is that there are circumstances where, and principles for which, a person or group of persons ought to sacrifice even their lives. Freedom is such: a life worth living is a free life. But the latter point can be granted without conceding that sacrifice is a possible means to it. While the sacrifice of one or a few lives may be a possible (if dubiously effective) way to free lives for others, certainly the sacrifice of all lives is not a possible route to free lives for all, since no human lives remain. To this extent Schell is right (on p.131) in accusing Jaspers of an each to all fallacy. Jasper's idea that "the free life that they try to save by all possible means is more than mere life or lives" breaks down when applied to all participating people. None can gain free lives by extinction of all: that is not a possible route to life even. . A detailed comparison of Schell and Anders' remarkably similar versions of S2 is made in Foley JS. . Should S2 appeal, as it may, to suitable communities of humans, SI will require reformulation in similar terms; and the argument that follows needs minor adjustment, with appropriate groups replacing individuals. . Thus the Last Person argument, important in environmental ethics (as HC explains), is no longer merely hypothetical, awaiting for instance the remote death of the Sun, but assumes new urgency. It is this sort of argument that connects environmental ethics and nuclear ethics, at a deeper metaphysical level. The Bomb and Bulldozer are out of the same technological Pandora's box. Nuclear technology is not the only route to human extinction, nor the only Pandora's box. Biological and chemical means are perhaps even more effective, and certainly can be more selective in what gets extinguished. Nuclear extinction would presumably require a different and more massive exchange than is usually assumed in nuclear war scenarios, with heavy �12 targeting in particular of Southern Hemispheric internationally-recognised nuclear-free zones). sites (including 5. Nor do recent scientific studies claim as much. The most intrepid of these studies, Erlich and others, only contends that in certain worst-case circumstances, ’the possibility of the extinction of Homo sapiens cannot be excluded’ (p.1299). The study admits that, in the scenario described, ’it seems unlikely ... Homo spaiens would be forced to extinctions immediately ’, and the difficulties indicated in the way of long-term human survival are exaggerated. In particular, many of the drastic effects predicted for Northern mid­ latitudes are reflected in very much milder form in equivalent Southern latitudes. For example, temperatures for regions with maritine climates appear likely to vary by only a few degrees and perhaps neglibly for many agricultural purposes after 100 days (cf. Turco and others, p.1237 case 29, and p.1286). Similarly the extent of nuclear darkness and of surface ultraviolet radiation will be appreciably less in the South and perhaps minor for many crucial purposes, such as photosynthesis and human outdoor activity, after 100 dayss (cf. the data in Benton and Partridge). No doubt some scientifically respectable sections of the environmental and peace movements have an interest in exaggerating the probable effects of nuclear holocaust for life on earth, much as many statesmen and strategists have an interest in minimizing them. And there is certainly substantial margin for error and for variation in conclusions drawn. For Crutzen (p.59) is right that ’analyses of the environmental effects of a global nuclear war remain . . . uncertain .. . because of a lack of information on various important processes [among other things] ... The environment might become extremely hostile, because of hitherto overlooked changes in the composition of the atmosphere*, again among other things. Such uncertainty bodes considerable caution as rational. The way to err is clear. 6. Not merely by technological determinists of marxist persuasion. Hackworth, a former US general, argues by straight induction that if the US military has a weapon it will use it. 7. The appalling theme that humans create past, present and future (etc.) is repeated elsewhere, e.g. p.173. 8. For detailed refutation of these assumptions, see JB. 9. Anders is here (AA pp.244-5) relying upon a version of the argument from perserverence, criticised in detail in Routley and Griffin. 10. An interesting converse of this theme is sometimes advanced, that no one is responsible, the whole thing is out of control. The technological version of this no-responsibility theme is discussed below (fn 15). More satisfactory is the theme that nuclear arrangements are out of political control, but for reasons, in terms of vested interests in keeping nuclear things going, which enable responsibility to be distributed. The vested interests, which bear considerable responsibility, include the military �13 weapons industry, and research and academic communities (cf. Barnaby). Under pressures for re-election especially, politicians give in to these powerful groups, so losing control of political processes. The argument is flawed at its final stage. For many influential politicians either belong to or represent vested interests. Thus, though there is no doubt some ’lack of control’, political processes tend rather to reflect vested interests than to run out of political control. 11. Another example of spreading the responsibility runs as follows: ’The self-extinction of our species is not an act that anyone describes as sane or sensible; nevertheless, it is an act that, without quite admitting it to ourselves, we plan in certain circumstances to commit’ (p.185). Even for most of the planners, extinction is presumably not part of "the plan", but an unintended consequence; and most of us have little or no role in the planning, enough of us even campaign against the planning. Further 'the world ... chose the course of attempting to refashion the system of sovereignty to accommodate nuclear weapons' (p.194): the world? This connects of course with the faulty ideological argument from defence of fundamentals, e.g. for liberty, for the "free enterprise" (USA) nation, and against socialism. 12. A more detailed discussion is given in WP ^8, where too the case against the state from nuclear dilemmas is elaborated. 13. Anders' explanation is elaborated in Foley; some of the themes are presented more straightforwardly in Martin. The incomplete list of items given, to be investigated in a deeper analysis of the nuclear situation, paraphrases Foley JS p.164. 14. These motivating drives form part of a larger integrated package, comprising maximisation drives for power, knowledge, control, wealth, energy, speed, satisfaction, ..., for the "newer" Enlightenment (but Faustian) virtues. Frequently there are attempts (the human failing for excessive neatness and simplicity manifested) to reduce the package to one main component, preference-satisfaction, for instance, or utility. And the type of drive is justified (especially for those who have it, but worry about it) not only as virtuous, which it is not, but also as rational, which again it is not. Rationality, the deeply entrenched myth has it, consists in maximisation, of a suitable mix of these virtues. Maximisation of the objects of the drives runs, however, into limitation The maximisation of self-interest theorems and associated paradoxes (individual or national) runs into Newcomb's paradox and special cases of The maximisation of power, as it such as Prisoners Dilemma situations. the Christian-lslamic God, encounters the paradox of symbolised in the parallel maximisation of knowledge, paradoxes of omnipotence, or There are no consistent objects which arc omnipotent omniscience. the The drive for maximum consistency, often taken to be omniscient. epitome of rationality, also leads to inconsistency in the case of more important theories, such as arithmetic and set theory (by virtue of Godel’s theorem and associated limitative theorems). 15. R & D, though directed by military requirements and the arms race, also �14 drives the arms race. science. Its role is partly disguised by the myth of neutral There have been attempts, not only by those committed to technological determinism, to involve technology more deeply as the main, or single, source of the nuclear fix (thus especially Mumford, in part thereby anticipating Commoner’s parallel indictment of technology-choice in the ecological fix). It is technology, the mega-machine, running out of control, that has brought us to this predicament, the nuclear abyss. Sometimes this serves to exonerate states and their key components and those who control them, for they are simply caught up by this out-ofcontrol machine; but sometimes the state itself is seen as a machine also running out of control. But technological determinism, like other varieties of stronger (nonanalytlc) determinism, is false. Nuclear technology was selected and proceeded with, after a well-known political dispute involving distinguished scientists; it was deliberated, funded and promoted, while other alternatives were not. Damaging technologies of the nuclear age were not inevitable, but deliberately chosen by certain components of the large nation-states. And much as they need not have been chosen, so they do not have to be persisted with. The fashionable inevitability/determinism themes admit not only of refutation by bringing out the many choices made in persisting with often recalcitrant technologies. They also admit of being made to look ridiculous. If the Bomb is determined, as part of human evolution, then if it functions (as it probably will, a matter also determined), it will serve as a human population control device, a matter also determined. That is, the Bomb has its fixed evolutionary place in human population regulation! 16. This reformulation was proposed by N. Griffin, who suggested that the main qualification can be inferred from Schell’s context. 17. Selecting the usual game theory setting sees to this almost automatically; for it is then assumed that each player plays to maximize his or her own advantage. Thus too the presumption in Walzer, p.277, that ’the logic of deterrence’ is based on eye-for-eye and tooth-for-tooth assumptions. 18. Even the irrationality of retaliatory (or first-strike) use has been contested, e.g. it has been wishfully thought that America will rise like a phoenix from the radioactive ashes. There is moreover a simple solution to Schell’s problem of the "missing motive" for retaliating to a large strike (p.204), namely, not a retributive one, but an ideological one: eliminate the prospect of the future dominance of the rival ideology. Such a motive has been offered for the conjectured targeting of Latin America. 19. An analogous confusion of negation with cancellation or obliteration appears in recent US "star-war" thinking, where US missiles are supposed to "negate" incoming USSR missiles. Moral paradoxes of deterrence take a different direction. For although �involving negation, they depend upon perhaps questionable interconnexions of intensional functors. One type of paradox (considered in WP §5, where the immorality of deterrence is argued) derives from a policy of credibly threatening war without however intending to proceed to war, though credible threats [appear to] imply an intention to proceed. Another style derives from acclaimed intention to reduce the number of nuclear missiles when the persistent practice, which implies an intention, is to increase the number. This paradox is technically removed - how satisfactorily is another matter - by a distinction between longer-term aims and immediate practice, a time-honoured method of removing contradictions by conveniently discerned temporal distinctions. REFERENCES G. Anders, AA. Die Antiquiertheit des Menschen, C.H. G. z\nders, Endzeitand Zeitenende: Gedanken Munchen, 1972; referred to as AE. zur Beck, Munchen, 1956; referred to as atomaren F. Barnaby, ’Will there be a Nuclear War’, in Australia M. Denborough), Croom Helm, Australia, 1983, 2-37. I.J. Benton 49-51. and G.W. Partridge, ’"Twilight at Noon" Situation, and Beck, C.H. War, Nuclear overstated', Ambio (ed. (1984) 13 B. Commoner, The Closing Circle: Nature, Man and Technology, Knopf, New York, 1972. P.J. Crutzen, ’Darkness after a nuclear war', Ambio 13 (1984) 52-4. M. Denborough (ed.), Australian & Nuclear War, Croom Helm, Australia, 1983. P.R. Erlich and others, ’Long-term biological consequences of nuclear war’, 222 (1983) 1293-1300. G. Foley, 'Jonathan Schell: Genius Brisbane, 1982; referred to as JS. Philosopher - Rewrite Man', Science typescript, G. Foley, Nuclear Prophets. The True and the False, typescript, Brisbane, 1983. D. Hackworth, 'A Soldier's Report’, Australia and Nuclear War, Croom Helm, Australia, 1983, 209-12. (ed. M. Denborough), K. Jaspers, The Future of Mankind, (trans. E.B. Ashton), University of Chicago Press, �16 1961. B. Martin, Grass Roots Strategy Against War, Freedom Press, Nottingham, 1984. L. Mumford, The Myth of the Machine, 2 vols., Harcourt Brace, New York, 1970. G.F. Preddey and others, Future Contingencies 4. Nuclear Disasters, A Report to the Commission for the Future, Government Printer, Wellington, New Zealand, 1982. R. Routley and N. Griffin, ’Unravelling the meanings of life’, Discussion Papers in Environmental Philosophy #3, Australian National University, Canberra, 1982. R. Routley, Exploring Meinong’s Jungle and Beyond, Research School Sciences, Australian National University, 1980; referred to as JB. of Social R. Routley, War and Peace I. On the Ethics of Large-Scale Nuclear War and Nuclear deterrence and the Political Fall-Out, Discussion Papers in Environmental Philosophy #5, Australian National University, 1984; referred to as WP. R. and V. Routley, ’Human chauvinism and Environmental ethics’, in Environmental Philosophy (ed. D. Mannison and others), Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University, 1980; referred to as HC. J. Schell, The Fate of the Earth, Knopf, New York, 1982; referred to as S./F. R.P. Turco and others, ’Nuclear winter: global explosions’, Science 222 (1983) 1283-92. consequences M. Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, Basic Books, New York, 1977. of multiple nuclear � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. 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Text Any textual data included in the document ■k METAPHYSICAL FALL-OUT FROM THE NUCLEAR PREDICAMENT A series of nuclear prophets has produced a series of philosophically-oriented works on nuclear war.^ The series is important for its deeper penetration into the main nuclear predicament, r’own to metaphysical levels; in this the series contrasts The most transient superficialities of much of the political commentary, circulated and influential text of the series is undoubtedly that of the with the widely slightest of the "prophets", Schell’s The Fate of the Earth, This skillful piece of unc annily redeploys some of the apparently deep phenomenological themes of Anders. So, conveniently, main assumptions of Schell and Anders can often To criticise their assumptions is not of course to belittle be considered together, media-philosophy In particular, Schell’s little book, for all its political shortcomings, their work. is having a significant and much needed effect in shifting attitudes towards nuclear It is especially valuable for its vivid and horrifying scenarios of arrangements. the exhibits, both the claim that species .... that we undertake together can make any practical or moral sense ...’ of aftermath nuclear Unfortunately attack. it also philosophically and factually, severe defects. ’without is it Some of simply rubbish: to take one example, consider ... a world-wide program of action for preserving the [human] nothing else (p.173, rearranged). This should certainly be rejected philosophically; for there is no separate moral issue of such overwhelming importance that all other issues become morally neutral. compared with Moral more issues remain moral issues: important elsewhere, e.g. p.130). moral issues (as they don’t cease to be so when Schell effectively acknowledges And the claim should be questioned on more factual grounds. Humans form a highly resilient species, like rats a survivor species, unlikely to be entirely exterminated under presently-arranged nuclear holocausts. The example was selected however because it leads into, indeed presupposes, two of the major defective assumptions in the work of Schell and Anders. 51. Nuclear war will eliminate life, human life at least, on earth (the extinction assumption); and 52. In the absence of humans, very many notions, not only those of morality and value, but those of time and space for example, make no sense; or, to put it into a more sympathetic philosophical form, these notions depend for actual human context (the extravagant anthropocentric assumption) . their sense on an 2 S2 which give Anders’ It is applications of philosophical depth, paradoxical and Schell’s work some of its apparent and certainly induce much philosophical puzzlement through the propositions But generated. the frequent applications S2 of depend essentially on SI.3 For without total extinction there will be humans about, to make past and future, good and evil, go on making sense! the Granted that assumption SI is by no means ruled out as a real possibility, as technological means appear available extinct;^ granted centres of prospect the of to make it large-scale nuclear Western civilization with obliteration. the light of present - admittedly inadequate - true, to render Homo sapiens war does threaten leading Even so SI appears unlikely in Even in Canada, which information. lies on the polar route of Soviet missiles, human life should be able to continue in certain northern areas (according to Canadian medical studies). SI is extremely flimsy. It depends, for example, Schell’s argument to on an unjustified extrapolation from the Northern to the Southern Hemisphere, but for the most part it does that very North American thing, of contracting the world to North America. all worthwhile civilization, is in USA, or at least, to be more charitable, in North America and Europe, which will also be wiped out, i.e. eliminated in the nuclear holocaust.) Some of (All that matters, its human population will be the data upon, Schell relies for example the effect of nuclear explosions on the .ozone layer, was significantly out of date even when he wrote. Other effects than ozone destruction, such as variations in ultraviolent radiation and temperature levels, apparently extrapolate even less well from North A factually superior study of nuclear disaster produced to South. about the same time as Schell’s, by Preddey and others, Southern Hemisphere, such as New Zealand and southern at indicates that parts of the latitudes of Latin America could escape relatively unscathed from even most massive northern exchanges. Doomsday prophets may appear to have gained new purchase through recent belated) scientific forecasts of a nuclear winter following upon nuclear war. (if But although these forecasts certainly add a new, and alarming, ecological dimension to the very damaging consequences of large-scale nuclear war, extinction assumption3. they do not sustain the On the available evidence, human life will continue, though no doubt with new complications and simplifications, for example^ in many southern mid-latitude coastal reqions outside zones of radiation fall-out. More generally, life will go on, though likely seriously and irreversibly impoverished through loss of valuable nonhuman systems and creatures. Nuclear prophets usually see the world (though with most of it carried along) as already set , in crucial respects, on the route to nuclear catastrophe. Much of the /r 3 way taken is seen as both inevitable and irreversible. insist the upon of "impossibility unlearning” the Thus both Anders and Schell means of manufacturing nuclear It would seem that extinction, which they both foresee, would furnish a good bombs. medium for unlearning nuclear technology (something very like this emerges from van theory Daniken’s of an "high" earlier In virtue technology). they would of S2, however exclude such a possibility as a case of unlearning, contending wrongly that the notion no longer made impossibility-of-unlearning eventual use of sense. But what message is the - as if technology the they again want inevitability having learnt to suggest have been advanced.But technological advances cases of they that have are not not been tenable. the development and else was of the the means determined, and manufacture and use ceased to be a matter of choice. views with There all Certainly such are many taken advantage of, and examples of there are even technological developments that have been manufactured but not marketed or used. There is not something very special about nuclear apparatus that puts it beyond the scope of such generalisations. Both Schell and Anders do claim that there are very special things about nuclear Even if this were true just "experiments". weapons, notably that they do not allow "experiments" of nuclear weapons - and it is certainly not of smaller weapons - it would not rebut And in fact the previous argument against the inevitability of nuclear weapons. Anders and (even) Schell hedge their claims about testing, and the limits to nuclear scientific work, 1to large-scale weapons and independent experiments which do not Again they have interfere with the■ observers and those outside the "laboratories" . latched onto major points: in particular, we have at present no way of testing the cumulative effects of large nuclear weapons in concert, e.g. for more holistic effects, such circulation and enough with it in character, or changes in coupled atmospheric Short of a large-scale nuclear war, and likely radiation fields. these crucial effects must remain largely untested and hypothetical as fireballs or firestorms, Nonetheless enough data can be assembled to carry through informative modellings, which point to the improbability of SI, and so undermine applications of S2 . The penetration Schell and Anders, of but in S2, is not something peculiar to Western philosophy, European philosophy human chauvinism, as is product a of This chauvinism is unfortunately alive and still well, Anders’ version It has also deeply of S2 being just one striking illustration (cf. AA p.252ff.). penetrated Anglo-American philosophy, and has been extended under the influence of especially. Wittgenstein’s work, where even the necessary truths of mathematics are taken to be a product of human conventions, and would vanish with humans! Such are alleged MB 4 implications of extinction: but the fact is that the truths of arithmetic are in no way dependent on the existence of humans or humanoids or of gods or giraffes. As very many propositions with necessary truths and falsehoods so with contingent ones: about the world do not depend in any way for their truth-value or content on humans or their communities. In Schell, Kantian obnoxious is chauvinism human dished Thoughts and form. up a in particularly time propositions, powerful history and tenses, and and memories, values and morality, all depend on the life-giving presence of human beings - future or merely potential past or humans are certainly not enough. humans are not enough, persons that are not Thus, according to Schell (p.140, e.g.), ’... the thought "Humanity is now extinct" is an impossible one for a rational person, because as soon as it is, we are not. In imagining any other event, we look ahead moment that is still within the stream of human time, a later rational Though we no doubt have it into past, (p.143). local may well be able to truly. it have Schell there is no "later" ’outside the human tenses of past, (p.140)*^. Human extinction eliminates ’the creature that erroneously denies that: present, and future ...’ divides time creature The thought is however ... ’. perfectly possible for humans; we can have it right now. falsely, to a present and future’: so annihilation cannot ’come to pass’ But it is simply false that the tenses are human; the tenses depend on a time ordering (perceptible to many creatures other than humans, but not depending at all on that perceptibility for its viability) relating other times to to now (also a human-independent location, evident to other creatures, the present, and borne witness to by such sequences as the passing seasons). And annihilation may also too easily come to pass, for many humans in the North at least, as it came to pass in recent geological times that humans began to exist upon earth. Before that there was a time before there were any human beings. argument for the demise of time, that ’what has been will no longer be Anders’ even what has been’ , is also explicitly (and narrowly) ’for what verificationist : would the difference be between what has only been and what has never been, is no remain one remember the to many sorts of things difference; organisms would be different. that have been’ for one, Temporal the (AA p.245). history themes do not lack if there There would recorded in many still other ’legitimacy because not registered [or verified] by anyone’; truth, significance, still less meaning, are not matters of human verification. Here, as elsewhere, the human chauvinism is mixed with other distorting metaphysical assumptions of our Western heritage, in particular, verificationism and ontological assumptions (to the effect that there are severe difficulties in talking about does what exist) not Thus, for metaphysics from Freud, according to whom example, takes Schell dubious over it is indeed impossible to imagine our own death; and whenever we attempt to do so, we can perceive that we are in fact still present spectators" as refuting the (p.138). fact In first. clause goes second The is there counterfactual situations which undermine both Freud’s distance difficulty great no a good describing in The claims. towards same, goes for Schell’s extensions of human chauvinism into one of its main traditional strongholds, value theory: evil, ’... the simple and basic fact [sic!] harm, or service lamenting rejoicing or that before there can be good or must there be life , human life These are no facts, but deeply entrenched philosophical dogmas (which have (p.171). been exposed and criticised elsewhere/, e.g. HC). Naturally many things will disappear with the extinction of humans: trivially there will be no more humans (unless humans re-evolve or are recreated), and thus no more human communities, human institutions, human activities, human emotions, and so But it is already going too far to suggest, as Anders does, that there will forth. accordingly be ’no thought, no love, sacrifice, no image, no song ...'. For there are, and may continue to exist, other than humans with emotion, creatures no struggle, no pain, no hope, no comfort, no struggles, songs, ... Nor will the ending of . all such human ventures, if it comes to pass, show that all past human ventures have been ’all in vain’, meaningless, and already so to say dead. The decay of the solar system, or the heat-death of the universe even, will not show that worthwhile human A activities were not worthwhile.* Several of the other notions and themes common to Schell and Anders derive from their shared assumptions SI of a Second Death, (in Revelations) under SI, is reckoned meaningless rendered and S2. a and species death’, and all extinction came redeployed by both. ’second death’ , already already ’overhung with death’ ’a second It is these that underlie the biblical notion ’seems (S p.166). because to Thus, not merely one’s own but future to pass, generations the (S stronger be by ’The death of mankind , S2 and dead’ (AA SI p.244, remaining S p.166) life is and is too, more trivially, a person faces in addition that greater death of the p.166, p.115). However even notion would not be vindicated, if nuclear because it depends on the fallacious inference to the meaninglessness of preceding life and on the very questionable representation of this meaninglessness as a sort of death. There is no such Second Death: creatures die just once, perhaps all at about the same time. The idea of a Second Death lacks even a solid metaphysical base. 6 From SI, together with the minor principle that extinction being an absolute in degree, doesn’t differ theme that the universality of peril comes ’we are all exposed to peril in the same degree’, which is accordingly ’disguised’ and ’difficult to with SI. In situation, there is no contrast (AE p.64; because recognise’, event, any are peoples southern Patagonia Indians of the all not This theme falls S p.150). by imperilled equally the better placed being rather nuclear than the Nor are all people equally locked into the situation or Germans of northern Europe. incapacitated by it; the prospects are different in different countries and places. likewise, Nor, Schell are all contrast (in to people equally responsible, a pernicious repeatedly infiltrates. Anders) This is theme^ which, the theme, Pogo according to which S3. Responsibility for the present nuclear predicament (fiasco, really) distributes onto everybody, it belongs to every human in the world. But there is also, mixed in, a weaker more plausible claim that gives lie to the stronger one, namely that we have some responsibility (the Nazi situation is compared). An especially blatant example of the Pogo theme11 runs as follows: ’... the world’s leaders political ... they though now menace the earth with nuclear At least, this is weapons, do so only with our permission, and even at our bidding. true for democracies' (pp.229-30). pose since we pay for extinction and sense, threat of it, the ... we are (For the populations of the superpowers this is true the authors of that extinction. in a positive theme is elaborated elsewhere: The while for support the governments that the peoples of the non-nuclear-armed world it is true only in the negative sense that they fail try to do anything about the danger) (p.152). But this is more of an argument indicting representative government, by revealing its allegedly govern, insensitivity not to and unresponsiveness to affected by mention those its the activities populace who are they not But Schell conveniently neglects all such represented at all (namely foreigners). points: of many '... we are potential mass killers. The moral cost of nuclear armaments is it makes of all of us underwriters of the slaughter of hundreds of millions' And again '[as] perpetrators ... we convey the steady message ... that life (p.152), that not only is not sacred but is worthless; that ... it had been judged acceptable for to be killed' (p.153). Little of this is true. Those who campaign against nuclear arrangements, vote against nuclear—committed parties so far as is possible, destruction, and responsibility for the nuclear situation does not simply distribute onto them. Nor and the are like, does responsibility attributes decisions to certainly — or everyone taken — not the the unlikely fall in "liberal on authors opinions as those democracies" who have of potential to worth done less. Schell illegitimately Responsibility for even by representatives (in the unlikely event of this happening in the case of anything as important as defence) cannot be traced back to those represented, since among many other things, a representative is only representative of a party which offers a complex and often ill-characterised package of policies, and a voter may vote for zero or more policies of this package. Only in the (uncommon) can responsibility, event of a clear still of a qualified single issue referendum, which is adopted, sort, be for it, not to everyone in the community. sheeted home, to those who voted While S3 is false, there is an important related theme that is much more plausible; namely that the present nuclear situation generates responsibilities for every socially involved person. When moreover the Pogo assumption is disentangled from accompanying themes, part of what results is decidedly along the right lines; namely S4. The controllers [not to be confused, in Schell’s fashion, with all of us] have failed to change our pre-nuclear institutions. The sovereign system is out of step with the nuclear age, the one-earth system, etc. (the whole earth theme). Though Schell remains relatively clear about the serious defects of the state and the frequently immoral purposes for which the state is used, unfortunately he often loses sight of this important critique of the theme (indicated state whi?V the conclusion arrives at is, that by and pp.187-8). Yet S4 forms part of Schell s scattered large, the nation-state and has outlasted Schell fragmentary. its usefulness, and that new political institutions more ’consonant with the global reality’ are required as a matter of urgency. But he evades what he admits is the major task, making out viable alternatives.12 At most he makes some passing gestures, some pointing towards the Way Up to world political control. Solutions to the nuclear dilemma come, way, from the Top Down; (cf. p.230). if not easily, in a similar simplistic those who can must appeal to the Top, to those who govern Schell places his hope in treaties for arms reduction and limitations, such as SALT, and in world government, through the United Nations (see p.225ff. and especially p.227, treaties, bottom paragraph). Given the record of these organisations and the negotiations and regulators, it is by now a pathetic faith. Nor is a serious need felt for further analysis of the nuclear situation, to investigate the origins of nuclear technology, to explore the roots of nuclear blindness, to consider effective changes to military-industrial organisation and ways of life. But some of the requisite deeper analysis of the nuclear situation and , more generally, of the roots of war can be found in Anders$f and elsewhere.13 The roots of the nuclear predicament are not confined to the ideologically-aligned arrangements of nation-states, but penetrate also into key components of those states, their 8 and controlling classes, their military, their supporting bureaucracies. And both within the arrangements of states, what accounts in part for the arrangements, and in key components of states, the power and domination (and, often, superiority by the [nuclear] science interrelated forms. surplus product nature) to super-states, to involves accumulated can be is enables is the for Thus the push for domination, large nation-state, at home (from the drive be achieved through military-oriented and main power-base The feature the accompanying privilege). which technology, and and crucial a conspicuous and from abroad, several in where enough and bled from proceed with military and bureaucratic ambitions and to found the high- technology research and development means to ever more expendable power and energy. In changing the prospect of to eliminate arrangements structural the nuclear war, it is not ultimately enough just to downgrade the main power-base, the nation­ state; it sweepingly, also is important remove to state relations, political alter trouble-making political arrangements, in to key components patterns embedded namely patterns of domination, organisation, human-animal relations, but in of in state, and, all these social and patterns manifested not only relations, white-coloured human-nature more the relations; to male-female in remove, short, However not everything needs to be accomplished at once; and chauvinistic relations. the cluster of damaging power and domination relations tied into war can be tackled separately. And there the problems can largely be narrowed to certain problems of states and certain key components of states. In what analysis he does offer of the contrast of familiar false "raison d’etat" and the justifies the means is themselves to problem with states, state expediency with morality, Socratic-Christian ethics. every sort’ (p.134). anything whatever in the name of [their] survival’. argument is as a contrast between teaching that ’the end the basis on which governments, in all times, have licensed commit crimes of extinction nullifies The Schell repeats the So ’states may do virtually Schell then argues however, that end-means justification by destroying every end; but again the far from sound, and depends on human chauvinism (as under S2) combined with ontological assumptions. Even if all humans were extinguished (as under SI) ends could remain, for instance for nonhumans such as animals and extraterrestrials, actual or not. The ends-means argument can however be repaired to remove such objections: instead it is claimed that extinction nullifies ends-means justification by frustrating the realisation of every relevant end - meaning by ’relevant’, in this context, those ends the realisation of which the state appeals to in justification of its nuclear policies.a nuclear war, even without human extinction but with severe enough losses, would undoubtedly frustrate the realisation of relevant state ends. 9 So even expediency an from perspective, policies super-state are open severe to criticism, for example as motivationally irrational in the nuclear risks taken. As to the part of the state and (state) sovereignty in war, Schell leaves us in A sovereign state is virtually defined as one that enjoys the right and no doubt. to go to war in defence or pursuit of its interests (p.187). power War arises from how things are; from the arrangement of political affairs via jealous nation-states Indeed there is a two-way linkage between having sovereignty and capacity^ (p.188). to wage war. to organise On the one side, sovereignty is, Schell contends, necessary for people sovereignty. is impossible side, without war it On the other for war. to preserve Neither of these contentions is transparently clear as it stands. The first is damaged by civil war and the like, the second by the persistence of small nonmilitary states. the macro-state system is entrenched, it Now that easy for conservatives (in particular) to argue from the "realities life, which include self-interest, that peace readily are arrangements aggression, dismissed as of international It is on this basis hatred. fear, is however unrealistic, utopian, even (amusingly) as extremist (cf. p.185). Schell’s further nuclear "war" that theme is not war threatens, however, to undermine his case against the sovereign state; for example, his ends-means argument and the argument based on its nuclear-war making capacity. Fortunately the not-war theme needs much qualification, and starts out from an erroneous characterisation of war as ’a violent means employed by a nation to achieve an end’ (p.189): but this is neither necessary nor sufficient for war. What is correct is that nuclear wars are very different from previous conventional wars (cf. WP) . that war requires an end which nuclear "war" does not have. to claim Schell goes on But nuclear attacks can certainly have ends (even if large nuclear wars cannot be won in the older sense: but It is also claimed that war depends on weakness; on not all wars or games are won). one side ’no one’s happen, But being defeated what these on a decision by arms. strength fails sorts of until considerations nuclear wars are not wars, but But in nuclear "war this doesn’t both sides have been annihilated’ contribute to showing is (p.190). again that they are not wars of certain sorts, not that e.g., not just wars (because they fail on such criteria as reasonable prospect of success and improvement), not rational wars (in a good sense), and so on. have persisted into nuclear times does damage to That conventional wars Schell's argument that nuclear weapons have also ruined "conventional" wars, and his connected theme that the demise of war court has left no means of appeal has mistaken propositions: been to finally settle disputes between nations, for the final removed (pp.192-193). The theme depends on a pair of that concerning the demise of conventional war, and the idea 10 that war of some sort has to be the final court of appeal between nations (for there are other types of contests that could serve, and there is also the possibility of more cooperative behaviour, e.g. joint referenda). The social-Darwinian assumption of Clausewicz (the 'logic of war theme also imports the theme) that war has to proceed to the technological limit — as if war and violence were thoroughly natural activities, independent of recognised social settings (for winning, surrender, etc.), and ruleless activities. On the contrary, wars are parasitic on social organisations such as states and are governed by a range of understandings, conventions and rules. They are a social phenomenon, with a rule structure, if not a logic. Much capital has been made not merely from "the logic of war but from what is now called "the logic of deterrence" and the "logic of nuclear [strategic] planning . The message that is usually supposed to emerge is that the massive arrangements the world is now entangled in are perfectly sound, logical, rational. However Logic in no way justifies the represents little more than a cheap semantical trick. present arrangements, or anything like them, or renders them reasonable. logics of decision (as presented, e.g., be applied planning; in strategic but this There are for the classical case in Jeffrey) which can they do not yield specific results without desirability measures being assigned to alternative outcomes, that is without values being pumped in, extralogically . There are various ways these value assignments may be determined, to meet moral requirements or not; but in nuclear strategic planning they have invariably been settled on the basis of expediency^?. For the most part, however, ’logic of’ tends to be used very loosely, as a word of general commendation, to cover something like ’reasoning and rational considerations entering into the In these terms, Schell, who like others enjoys playing with policy or strategy of’. the term ’logic of’, should write of 'the illogic of deterrence', for he emphasizes its unreasonableness. supposed rationality (even from a national fail:^ yet threat of the this further and For of stresses (p.213) instance he threatening use interest viewpoint) success of deterrence unjustifiable and of nuclear the disparity between the weapons and the irrationality of actually using them should the threat doctrine depends on the credibility of irrational use. the Indeed Schell wants to go still locate a contradiction in deterrence (e.g. but the argument depends on an interesting confusion of contradiction with cancellation, along with the assumption that deterrence involves cancellation. irrational, it is immoral, but it is not inconsistent. pp.201-2); Nuclear deterrence may well be 11 NOTES This is a revised version of ’Appendix 1. On the fate of mankind and the earth, according to Schell, and to Anders’ of my monograph referred to as WP, where Several points, only touched ijpcn in this review, are further developed. References are by way of authors’ names or else through obvious acronyms, given in the list of references which follows. 1. The distinguishing term is from Foley’s Nuclear Prophets, where many leading anti-nuclear prophets are assessed. One well-known prophet not so considered there is Jaspers, presumably because his main work comes out in entirely the wrong direction. It gives heavy philosophical attire to the better-dead-than-red abomination. A main argument against Jaspers so presented is simple. However bad being red might become (at present it is debatably worse than living under some of the totalitarian regimes the free West props up) , it still gives humans a further chance for goou lives, since regimes fall or can be toppled: but total annihilation removes that all-important opportunity. But of course Jaspers does not present his position so simply. Rather his contention is that there are circumstances where, and principles for which, a person or group of persons ought to sacrifice even their lives. Freedom is such: a life worth living is a free life. But the latter point can be granted without conceding that sacrifice is a possible means to it. While the sacrifice of one or a few lives may be a possible (if dubiously effective) way to free lives for others, certainly the sacrifice of all lives is not a possible route to free lives for all, since no human lives remain. To this extent Schell is right (on p.131) in accusing Jaspers of an each to all fallacy. Jasper’s idea that "the free life that they try to save by all possible means is more than mere life or lives" breaks down when applied to all participating people. None can gain free lives by extinction of all: that is not a possible route to life even. 2. A detailed comparison of Schell and Anders’ remarkably similar versions of S2 is made in Foley Ju. 3. Should S2 appeal, as it may, to suitable communities of humans, SI will require reformulation in similar terms; and the argument that follows needs minor adjustment, with appropriate groups replacing individuals. 4. Thus the Last Person argument, important in environmental ethics (as HC explains), is no longer merely hypothetical, awaiting for instance the remote death of the Sun, but assumes new urgency. It is this sort of argument that connects environmental ethics and nuclear ethics, at a deeper metaphysical level. The Bomb and Bulldozer are out of the same technological Pandora’s box. Nuclear technology is not the only route to human extinction, nor the only Pandora's box. Biological and chemical means are perhaps even more effective, and certainly can be more selective in what gets extinguished. Nuclear extinction would presumably require a different and more massive exchange than is usually assumed in nuclear war scenarios, with heavy targeting in particular of Southern Hemispheric internationally-recognised nuclear-free zones). sites (including 5. Nor do recent scientific studies claim as much. The most intrepid of these studies. Erlich and others, only contends that in certain worstQ ' case circumstances, ’the possibility of the extinction of Homo sapiens cannot be excluded’ (p.1299). The study admits that, in the scenario described, ’it seems unlikely ... Homo spaiens would be forced to extinctions immediately’, and the difficulties indicated in the way of long-term human survival are exaggerated. In particular, many of the drastic effects predicted for Northern mid latitudes are reflected in very much milder form in equivalent Southern latitudes. For example, temperatures for regions with maritine climates appear likely to vary by only a few degrees and perhaps neglibly for many agricultural purposes after 100 days (cf. Turco and others, p.1287 case 29, and p.1286). Similarly the extent of nuclear darkness and of surface ultraviolet radiation will be appreciably less in the South and perhaps minor for many crucial purposes, such as photosynthesis and human outdoor activity, after 100 dayss (cf. the data in Benton and Partridge). No doubt some scientifically respectable sections of the environmental and peace movements have an interest in exaggerating the probable effects of nuclear holocaust for life on earth, much as many statesmen and strategists have an interest in minimizing them. And there is certainly substantial margin for error and for variation in conclusions drawn. For Crutzen (p.59) is right that ’analyses of the environmental effects of a global nuclear war remain ... uncertain ... because of a lack of information on various important processes [among other things] ... the environment might become extremely hostile, because of hitherto overlooked changes in the composition of the atmosphere’, again among other things. Such uncertainty bodes considerable caution as rational. The way to err is clear. marxist persuasion, determinists of merely by technological 6. Not induction that if the argues by straight Hackworth, a former US general, use it. US military has a weapon it will present and future (etc.) is 7. The appalling theme that humans create past, repeated elsewhere, e.g. p.173. 8. For detailed refutation of these assumptions, see JB. 9. Anders is here (AA pp.244-5) relying upon a version of the argument from perserverence, criticised in detail in Routley and Griffin. 10. An interesting converse of this theme is sometimes advanced, that no one is responsible, the whole thing is out of control. The technological version of this no-responsibility theme is discussed below (fn 15). More satisfactory is the theme that nuclear arrangements are out of political control, but for reasons, in terms of vested interests in keeping nuclear things going, which enable responsibility to be distributed. The vested interests, which bear considerable responsibility, include the military 13 weapons industry, and research and academic communities (cf. Barnaby). Under pressures for re-election especially, politicians give in to these powerful groups, so losing control of political processes. The argument is flawed at its final stage. For many influential politicians either belong to or represent vested interests. Thus, though there is no doubt some ’lack of control’, political processes tend rather to reflect vested interests than to run out of political control. 11. Another example of spreading the responsibility runs as follows: ’The self-extinction of our species is not an act that anyone describes as sane or sensible; nevertheless, it is an act that, without quite admitting it to ourselves, we plan in certain circumstances to commit’ (p.185). Even for most of the planners, extinction is presumably not part of "the plan", but an unintended consequence; and most of us have little or no role in the planning, enough of us even campaign against the planning. Further ’the world ... chose the course of attempting to refashion the system of sovereignty to accommodate nuclear weapons’ (p.194): the world? This connects of course with the faulty ideological argument from defence of fundamentals, e.g. for liberty, for the 'free enterprise (USA) nation, and against socialism. 12. A more detailed discussion is given in WP §8, where too the case against the state from nuclear dilemmqj'is elaborated. 13. Anders’ explanation is elaborated in Foley; some of the themes are presented more straightforwardly in Martin. The incomplete list of items given, to be investigated in a deeper analysis of the nuclear situation, paraphrases Foley JS p.164. 14. These motivating drives form part of a larger integrated package, comprising maximisation drives for power, knowledge, control, wealth, energy, speed, satisfaction, . .., for the newer Enlightenment (but Faustian) virtues. Frequently there are attempts (the human failing for excessive neatness and simplicity manifested) to reduce the package to one main component, preference—satisfaction, for instance, or utility. And the type of drive is justified (especially for those who have it, but worry about it) not only as virtuous, which it is not, but also as rational, which again it is not. C Rationality, the deeply entrenched myth has it. consists in maximisation,.a suitable mix of these virtues. * 4 Maximisation of the objects of the drives runs, however, into limitation The maximisation of self-interest theorems and associated paradoxes, runs into Newcomb ’s paraj^dox and special cases (individual or national) situations. The maximisation of power, as such as Prisoners Dilemma Christian-Islamic God, encounters the paradox of the symbolised in parallel maximisation of knowledge, paradoxes of the omnipotence, or no consistent objects which are omnipotent There are omniscience. the The drive for maximum consistency, often taken to be omniscient. epitome of rationality, also leads leads to to inconsistency in the case of more important theories, such as arithmetic and set theory (by virtue of Godel’s theorem and associated limitative theorems). 15. R & D, though directed by military requirements and the arms race, also 14 drives the arms race. science. Its role is partly disguised by the myth of neutral There have been attempts, not only by those committed to technological determinism, to involve technology more deeply as the main, or single, source of the nuclear fix (thus especially Mumford, in part thereby anticipating Commoner’s parallel indictment of technology-choice in the ecological fix). It is technology, the mega-machine, running out of control, that has brought us to this predicament, the nuclear abyss. Sometimes this serves to exonerate states and their key components and those who control them, for they are simply caught up by this out-ofcontrol machine; but sometimes the state itself is seen as a machine also running out of control. But technological determinism, like other varieties of stronger (nonanalytic) determinism, is false. Nuclear technology was selected and proceeded with, after a well-known political dispute involving distinguished scientists; it was deliberated, funded and promoted, while other alternatives were not. Damaging technologies of the nuclear age were not inevitable, but deliberately chosen by certain components of the large nation-states. And much as they need not have been chosen, so they do not have to be persisted with. The fashionable inevitability/determinism themes admit not only of refutation by bringing out the many choices made in persisting with often recalcitrant technologies. They also admit of being made to look ridiculous. If the Bomb is determined, as part of human evolution, then if it functions (as it probably will, a matter also determined), it will serve as a human population control device, a matter also determined. That is, the Bomb has its fixed evolutionary place in human population regulation! 16. This reformulation was proposed by N. Griffin, who suggested that the main qualification can be inferred from Schell’s context. 17. Selecting the usual game theory setting sees to this almost automatically; for it is then assumed that each player plays to maximize his or her own advantage. Thus too the presumption in Walzer, p.277, that ’the logic of deterrence’ is based on eye-for-eye and tooth-for-tooth assumptions. (ar 18. Even the irrationality of /retaliatory * first-strike) use has been contested, e.g. it has been wishfully thougnt that America will rise like a phoenix from the radioactive ashes. There is moreover a simple solution to Schell’s problem of the "missing motive" for retaliating to a large strike (p.204), namely, not a retributive one, but an ideological one: eliminate the prospect of the future dominance of the rival ideology. Such a motive has been offered -tor the conjecturAL targeting of Latin America. 19. An analogous confusion of negation with cancellation or obliteration appears in recent US "star-war" thinking, where US missiles are supposed to "negate" incoming USSR missiles. Moral paradoxes of deterrence take a different direction. For although 15 involving negation, they depend upon perhaps questionable interconnexions of intensional functors. One type of paradox (considered in WP §5, where the immorality of deterrence is argued) derives from a policy of credibly threatening war without however intending to proceed to war, though credible threats [appear to] imply an intention to proceed. Another style derives from acclaimed intention to reduce the number of nuclear missiles when the persistent practice, which Implies an intention, is to increase the number. This paradox is technically removed - how satisfactorily is another matter - by a distinction between longer-term aims and immediate practice, a time-honoured method of removing contradictions by conveniently discerned temporal distinctions. REFERENCES G. Anders, Die Antiquiertheit des Menschen, C.H. Beck, Munchen, 1956; referred to as AA. G. Anders, Zeitenende: Endzeitand Gedanken atomaren zur Situation, C.H. Beck, Munchen, 1972; referred to as AE. 7 ' F. Barnaby, ’Will be there a War' ,//» Aus tralia Nuclear Nuclear War, J (ed. M. Denborough) , Croom Helm, Australia, 1983? I.J. Benton and G.W. Partridge, ’"Twilight at Noon" overstated’, 13 Ambio (1984) 49-51. B. Commoner, The Closing Circle: Nature, Man P.J. Crutzen, Technology, Knopf, New York, 1972. ’Darkness after a nuclear war’, Ambio 13 (1984) 52-4. M. Denborough (ed.), Australian & Nuclear War, Croom Helm, Australia, 1983. P.R. Erlich and others, ’Long-term biological consequences of nuclear war’, Science 222 (1983) 1293-1300. G. Foley, ’Jonathan Schell: Genius - Philosopher - Rewrite Man’, typescript, Brisbane, 1982; referred to as JS. G. Foley, Nuclear Prophets. The True and the False, typescript, Brisbane, 1983. 16 in ’A Soldier’s Refragfljt’, , Australia D. Hackworth, Croom Helm, Australia, 1983 vi^vC Nuclear War, (ed. M. Denborough), /zor-/z » K. Jaspers, The Future of Mankind, (trans. E.B. Ashton), University of Chicago Press, 1961. B. Martin, Strategy Against Roots Grass War, Freedom Press, 1984, "ter Nottingham, a-p-peax. L. Mumford, The Myth of the Machine, 2 vols., Harcourt Brifce , New York, 1970. G.F. Preddey and others, Future Contingencies 4. Nuclear Disasters, A Report to the Commission for the Future, Government Printer, Wellington, New Zealand, 1982. R. Routley and N. Griffin, 'Unravelling the meanings of life’, Discussion Papers in Environmental Philosophy #3, Australian National University, Canberra, 1982. R. Routley, Meinong’s Exploring Jungle and Beyond, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University, 1980; referred to as JB. R. Routley, War and Peace I. On the Ethics of Large-Scale Nuclear War and Nuclear deterrence and the Political Fall-Out, Discussion Papers in Environmental Philosophy #5, Australian National University, 1984j R. and V. Routley, Philosophy (ed. 'Human chauvinism D. Manujson and and Environmental others), Research ethics’, School of in Environmental Social Sciences, Australian National University, 1980; referred to as HC. J. Schell, The Fate of the Earth, Knopf, New York, 1982; referred to as S./F. R.P. Turco and others, 'Nuclear winter: global consequences explosions’ , Science 222 (1983) 1283-92. M. Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, Basic Books, New York, 1977. of multiple nuclear Appendix 1: On the fate of mankind and tht?_ _ea£_t]i, according to SchelT~and Anders. Nuclear prophets and prophetic rubbish. The extinction assumption. Common emerging themes of Schell and Anders. The extravagant anthro­ pocentric assumption, and some of what is wrong with it. Second death dismissed. The universality of peril. The alleged universality of responsibility: the Pogo theme. The correct, but undeveloped, whole earth theme. Ultimately Schell offers little hope and superficiality. Nuclear war is war. The logic and illogic of deterrence. METAPHYSICAL FALL-OUT FROM THE NUCLEAR PREDICAMENT* A series of nuclear prophets has produced a series of philosophically-oriented works on nuclear war.^ The series is important for its deeper penetration into the main nuclear predicament, down to metaphysical levels; with the widely in this the series contrasts transient superficialities of much of the political commentary. circulated influential and text the of series is undoubtedly that uncannily some of the the apparently deep phenomenological So, conveniently, main assumptions of Schell and Anders can often themes of Anders. be considered together. their work. redeploys of This skillful piece of slightest of the "prophets", Schell’s The Fate of the Earth. media-philosophy The most To criticise their assumptions is not of course to belittle In particular, Schell’s little book, for all its political shortcomings, is having a significant and much needed effect in shifting attitudes towards nuclear It is especially valuable for its arrangements. the aftermath of nuclear vivid and horrifying scenarios of Unfortunately attack. it also exhibits, both philosophically and factually, severe defects. Some of ’without is it simply rubbish: to take one example, consider the ... a world-wide program of action for preserving the [human] nothing else claim that species .... that we undertake together can make any practical or moral sense . . . ’ (p.173, rearranged). This should certainly be rejected philosophically; for there is no separate moral issue of such overwhelming importance that all other issues become Moral morally neutral. compared with more issues remain moral issues: they don’t cease to be so when important elsewhere, e.g. p.130). moral issues (as Schell effectively acknowledges And the claim should be questioned on more factual grounds. Humans form a highly resilient species, like rats a survivor species, unlikely to be entirely exterminated under presently-arranged nuclear holocausts. The example was selected however because it leads into, indeed presupposes, two of the major defective assumptions in the work of Schell and Anders: 51. Nuclear war will eliminate life, human life at least, on earth (the extinction assumption); and 52. value, In the absence of humans, very many notions, not only those of morality and but those of time and space for example, make no sense; or, to put it into a form, for their X 2 actual human context (the extravagant anthropocentric assumption). more sympathetic philosophical these notions depend sense on an 2 S2 which give Anders’ and Schell’s work some of its apparent It is applications of and certainly induce much philosophical puzzlement through the philosophical depth, paradoxical propositions generated. But the frequent applications of S2 depend essentially on SI.3 For without total extinction there will be humans about, to make past and future, good and evil, go on making sense! Granted that assumption SI the technological means appear extinctgranted the prospect is by no means ruled out as a real possibility, as available to of make it nuclear large-scale to render Homo sapiens true, war does threaten leading Even so SI appears unlikely in centres of Western civilization with obliteration. the light of present - admittedly inadequate - information. Even in Canada, which lies on the polar route of Soviet missiles, human life should be able to continue in certain northern areas (according to Canadian medical studies). SI is extremely flimsy. for example, It depends, Schell s argument to on an unjustified extrapolation from the Northern to the Southern Hemisphere, but for the most part it does that very North Zunerican thing, of contracting the world to North America. (All that matters, all worthwhile civilization, is in USA, or at least, to be more charitable, in North America and Europe, which will also be wiped out, i.e. its human population will be eliminated in the nuclear holocaust.) Some of the data Schell relies upon, for example the effect of nuclear explosions on the ozone layer, was significantly out of date even when he wrote. Other effects than ozone destruction, such as variations in ultraviolent radiation and temperature levels, apparently extrapolate even less well from North A factually superior study of nuclear disaster produced at to South. about the same time as Schell’s, by Preddey and others, indicates that parts of the Southern Hemisphere, latitudes of such as New Zealand and southern Latin America could escape relatively unscathed from even most massive northern exchanges. Doomsday prophets belated) scientific may appear forecasts of to have gained new purchase through recent a nuclear winter following upon nuclear war. (if But although these forecasts certainly add a new, and alarming, ecological dimension to the very damaging consequences of large-scale nuclear war, they do not sustain the extinction assumption3. On the available evidence, human life will continue, though no doubt with new complications and mid-latitude coastal life will go on, for example in many southern regions outside zones of radiation fall-out. More generally, simplifications, though likely seriously and irreversibly impoverished through loss of valuable nonhuman systems and creatures. Nuclear prophets usually see the world (though with most of it carried along) as already set , in crucial respects, on the route to nuclear catastrophe. Much of the 3 way taken is seen as both inevitable and irreversible. insist upon unlearning" of "impossibility the Thus both Anders and Schell means of the manufacturing nuclear It would seem that extinction, which they both foresee, would furnish a good bombs. medium for unlearning nuclear technology (something very like this emerges from van Daniken’s of an theory "high" earlier they would of S2, In virtue technology). however exclude such a possibility as a case of unlearning, contending wrongly that the notion longer no made sense. But what message is the - as if impossibility-of-unlearning eventual use of the technology they to suggest again want learnt having the of inevitability with the development and all the means determined, and manufacture and use ceased to be a matter of choice. views have been advanced. technological advances cases of But are not they that have been not tenable. Certainly such are many There taken advantage of, was else examples of there are even and technological developments that have been manufactured but not marketed or used. There is not something very special about nuclear apparatus that puts it beyond the scope of such generalisations. Both Schell and Anders do claim that there are very special things about nuclear weapons, notably that they do not allow "experiments". Even if this were true just of nuclear weapons - and it is certainly not of smaller weapons - it would not rebut the argument against previous inevitability the of nuclear weapons. And in fact Anders and (even) Schell hedge their claims about testing, and the limits to nuclear work, scientific large-scale to weapons and independent experiments which interfere with the observers and those outside the "laboratories". latched onto major points: cumulative such effects, of effects as in particular, fireballs or Again they have we have at present no way of testing the wreapons in concert, firestorms, or changes nuclear large do not e.g. in for more holistic atmospheric coupled circulation and radiation fields. enough with these crucial effects must remain largely untested and hypothetical it, in character. Short of a large-scale nuclear war, and likely Nonetheless enough data can be assembled to carry through informative modellings, which point to the improbability of SI, and so undermine applications of S2. The Schell penetration and Anders, of human but is a chauvinism, product of as in S2, Western is not something peculiar philosophy, European to philosophy especially. This chauvinism is unfortunately alive and still well, Anders’ version of just one striking illustration (cf. AA p.252ff.). S2 being penetrated Anglo-American philosophy, and has been extended It has also deeply under the influence of Wittgenstein’s work, where even the necessary truths of mathematics are taken to be a product of human conventions, and would vanish with humans! Such are alleged 4 implications of extinction: but the fact is that the truths of arithmetic are in no way dependent on the existence of humans or humanoids or of gods or giraffes. with necessary truths and falsehoods so with contingent ones: As very many propositions about the world do not depend in any way for their truth-value or content on humans or their communities. In human Schell, obnoxious Kantian form. dished is chauvinism and Thoughts up in propositions, a particularly time powerful history and tenses, and and memories, values and morality, all depend on the life-giving presence of human beings future or merely potential humans are not enough, - past or that are not persons Thus, according to Schell (p.140, e.g.), humans are certainly not enough. ’... the thought "Humanity is now extinct" is an impossible one for a rational person, because as it soon as is, we are not. In imagining any other event, we look ahead moment that is still within the stream of human time, ... ’. a later rational erroneously denies that: present, and future ...’ into past, divides time may well be to able ordering time it have Schell truly. there is no "later" ’outside the human tenses of past, (p.140)7. Human extinction eliminates ’the creature that present and future’: so annihilation cannot But it is simply false that the tenses are human; (p.143). local creature The thought is however Though we no doubt have it perfectly possible for humans; we can have it right now. falsely, to a (perceptible to many creatures ’come to pass’ the tenses depend on a other than humans, but not depending at all on that perceptibility for its viability) relating other times to to now (also a human-independent location, evident to other creatures, the present, and borne witness to by such sequences as the passing seasons). And annihilation may also too easily come to pass, for many humans in the North at least, as it came to pass in recent geological times that humans began to exist upon earth. Before that there was a time before there were any human beings. Anders’ argument for the demise of time, even what has been’, is also that ’what has been will no longer be explicitly (and narrowly) ’for what verif icationist: would the difference be between what has only been and what has never been, is no remain one remember the things to many sorts organisms would of difference; be different. that have been’ for one, Temporal the (AA p.245). history themes do not lack if there There would still many other recorded in ’legitimacy because not registered [or verified] by anyone’; truth, significance, still less meaning, are not matters of human verification. Here, as elsewhere, the human chauvinism is mixed with other distorting metaphysical assumptions of our Western heritage, in particular, verificationism and 5 ontological assumptions (to the effect that there are severe difficulties in talking about exist)0. not does what Thus, Schell example, for takes over dubious metaphysics from Freud, according to whom "it is indeed impossible to imagine our own death; and whenever we attempt to do so, we can perceive that we are in fact still present spectators" as refuting (p.138). fact In first. the clause goes second The there is great no situations which undermine both Freud’s counterfactual a good distance difficulty claims. in towards describing The same goes for Schell’s extensions of human chauvinism into one of its main traditional strongholds, value theory: evil, '... the simple and basic fact [sic!] or service (p.171). lamenting harm, rejoicing or that before there can be good or there be must life’, human life These are no facts, but deeply entrenched philosophical dogmas (which have been exposed and criticised elsewhere, e.g. LIC). Naturally many things will disappear with the extinction of humans: trivially there will be no more humans (unless humans re-evolve or are recreated), and thus no more human communities, human institutions, human activities, human emotions, and so But it is already going too far to suggest, as Anders does, that there will forth. ’no thought, accordingly be no love, sacrifice, no image, no song no struggle, no pain, no hope, no comfort, no For there are, and may continue to exist, other ...’. creatures than humans with emotion, struggles, songs, ... Nor will the ending of . all such human ventures, if it comes to pass, show that all past human ventures have been 'all in vain', meaningless, and already so to say dead. The decay of the solar system, or the heat-death of the universe even, will not show that worthwhile human 9 activities were not worthwhile. Several of the other notions and themes common to Schell and Anders derive from their shared assumptions SI of a Second Death, (in Revelations) under SI, rendered is and S2. reckoned meaningless a and species and all extinction came redeployed 'second death', already already 'overhung with death' 'a second death', It is these that underlie the biblical notion 'seems (S p.166). because by to to pass, generations the (S stronger be Thus, not merely one's own but future by both. 'The death of mankind', S2 and dead' (AA SI remaining p.244, S p.166) life is and is too, more trivially, a person faces in addition that greater death of the p.166, p.115). However even notion would not be vindicated, if nuclear because it depends on the fallacious inference to the meaninglessness of preceding life and on the very questionable representation of. this meaninglessness as a sort of death. There is no such Second Death: creatures die just once, perhaps all at about the same time. The idea of a Second Death lacks even a solid metaphysical base. 6 together with the minor principle From SI, doesn’t differ in degree, comes extinction being an absolute that the universality of peril theme that we are all exposed to peril in the same degree’, which is accordingly ’disguised’ and ’difficult to recognise’, with In SI. situation, there is no contrast (AE p.64; because any event, not Indians of the peoples all Germans of northern Europe. ihis theme falls imperilled equally are southern Patagonia S p.150). being rather by nuclear the better placed than the Nor are all people equally locked into the situation or incapacitated by it; the prospects are different in different countries and places. Nor, Schell likewise, contrast (in all are to people equally responsible, a repeatedly infiltrates. Anders) pernicious This is the theme which Pogo theme, according to which S3. Responsibility for the present nuclear predicament (fiasco, really) distributes onto everybody, it belongs to every human in the world. But there is also, mixed a weaker more in, plausible claim that gives lie to the stronger one, namely that we have some responsibility (the Nazi situation is compared). An especially blatant example of the Pogo themeH runs as follows: ’... the world’s leaders political ... though they now menace weapons, do so only with our permission, and even at our bidding. true for democracies’ (pp.229-30). positive pose the since we sense, threat of it, At least, this is theme is elaborated elsewhere: The ... we are (For the populations of the superpowers this is true the authors of that extinction. in a with nuclear the earth pay for extinction and support the governments that the peoples of the non-nuclear-armed world it is while for true only in the negative sense that they fail try to do anything about the danger/ But this is more of an argument indicting representative government, by (p.152). revealing insensitivity its unresponsiveness and to many of the populace they allegedly govern, not to mention those affected by its activities who are not represented at all (namely foreigners). But Schell conveniently neglects all such ’... we are potential mass killers. points: that it makes of all of us underwriters of (p.152). The moral cost of nuclear armaments is the slaughter of hundreds of millions And again ’[as] perpetrators ... we convey the steady message ... that life not only is not sacred but is worthless; (p.153). everyone to be killed’ that ... .it had been judged acceptable for Little of this is true. Those who campaign against nuclear arrangements, vote against nuclear—committed parties so far as is possible, destruction, and responsibility for the nuclear situation does not simply distribute onto them. Nor and the are like, does responsibility certainly — or everyone attributes to decisions taken — not the the unlikely fall in "liberal on authors opinions as those democracies" who have of to done potential worth Schell less. even by representatives illegitimately Responsibility for (in the unlikely 7 event of this happening in the case of anything as important as defence) cannot be traced back to those represented, since among many other things, a representative is only representative of a party which offers a complex and often ill-characterised package of policies, and a voter may vote for zero or more policies of this package. Only in the (uncommon) event of a clear single issue referendum, which is adopted, still of a qualified sort, be sheeted home, to those who voted can responsibility, for it, not to everyone in the community. While S3 is false, there is an important related theme that is much more plausible; namely that the present nuclear situation generates responsibilities for every socially involved person. When moreover the Pogo assumption is disentangled from accompanying themes, part of what results is decidedly along the right lines; namely S4. The controllers [not to be confused, in Schell’s fashion, with all of us] have failed to change our pre-nuclear institutions. The sovereign system is out of step with the nuclear age, the one-earth system, etc. (the whole earth theme). Though Schell remains relatively clear about the serious defects of the state and the frequently immoral purposes for which the state is used, unfortunately he often loses sight of this important arrives at state which is, the critique of theme (indicated pp.187-8). the conclusion that by and large, Yet S4 forms part of Schell s scattered and the nation-state has outlasted fragmentary. Schell its usefulness, and that new political institutions more ’consonant with the global reality’ are required as a matter of urgency. But he evades what he admits is the major task, making out viable alternatives.12 At most he makes some passing gestures, some pointing towards the Way Up to world political control. Solutions to way, the nuclear dilemma come, from the Top Down; (cf. p.230). those if not easily, in a similar simplistic who can must appeal to the Top, to those who govern Schell places his hope in treaties for arms reduction and limitations, such as SALT, and in world government, especially p.227, bottom paragraph). through the United Nations (see p.225ff. and Given the record of these organisations and treaties, the negotiations and regulators, it is by now a pathetic faith. Nor is a serious need felt for further analysis of the nuclear situation, to investigate the origins of nuclear technology, to explore the roots of nuclear blindness, to consider effective changes to military-industrial organisation and ways of life. But some of the requisite deeper analysis of the nuclear situation and, more The roots of generally, of the roots of war can be found in Anders and elsewhere. the nuclear predicament are not confined to the ideologically —aligned arrangements of nation-states, but penetrate also into key components of those states, their 8 and their supporting bureaucracies. their controlling classes, military, And both within the arrangements of states, what accounts in part for the arrangements, and in key components of states, the science for super-states, to be achieved through military-oriented in several enables domination, and which involves superiority by the and technology, forms. interrelated surplus the drive Thus the push for the accompanying privilege). power and domination (and, often, [nuclear] feature is a conspicuous and crucial product can be accumulated at home (from where enough large nation-state, is the The main power-base from abroad, and and bled from nature) to proceed with military and bureaucratic ambitions and to found the highj 15 technology research and development means to ever more expendable powei and energy* prospect of nuclear war, it is not ultimately enough just to downgrade the mam power-base, the nation­ state; it is also important to alter key components of the state, and, more sweepingly, to remove trouble-making patterns embedded in all these social and In changing the structural political arrangements, in state relations, political arrangements chauvinistic relations . relations, but in the eliminate namely patterns of domination, organisation, human-animal to patterns manifested not only relations, white-coloured human-nature relations; to remove, male-female in short, However not everything needs to be accomplished at once; and the cluster of damaging power and domination relations tied into war can be tackled And there the problems can largely be narrowed to certain problems of separately. states and certain key components of states. analysis he does offer of the problem with states, Schell repeats the familiar false contrast of state expediency with morality, as a contrast between The teaching that 'the end "raison d’etat" and the Socratic—Christian ethics. justifies the means is the basis on which governments, in all times, have licensed In what themselves to commit crimes of every sort’ (p.134). So 'states may do virtually Schell then argues however, that extinction nullifies end-means justification by destroying every end; but again the argument is far from sound, and depends on human chauvinism (as under S2) combined anything whatever in the name of [their] survival’. with ontological assumptions. Even if all humans were extinguished (as under SI) ends could remain, for instance for nonhumans such as animals and extraterrestrials, The ends-means argument can however be repaired to remove such actual or not. objections: instead it is claimed that extinction nullifies ends-means justification by frustrating the realisation of every relevant end - meaning by 'relevant', in this context, those ends the realisation of which the state appeals to in justification of I6 its nuclear policies. A nuclear war, even without human extinction but with severe enough losses, would undoubtedly frustrate the realisation of relevant state ends. 9 So even from an perspective, expediency policies super-state open are severe to criticism, for example as motivationally irrational in the nuclear risks taken. As to the part of the state and (state) sovereignty in war, Schell leaves us in A sovereign state is virtually defined as one that enjoys the right and no doubt. power to go to war in defence or pursuit of its interests (p.187). War arises from how things are; from the arrangement of political affairs via jealous nation-states Indeed there is a two-way linkage between having sovereignty and capacity (p.188). to wage war. to organise On the one side, sovereignty is, Schell contends, necessary for people for war. sovereignty. On the other side, without war it is impossible to preserve The Neither of these contentions is transparently clear as it stands. first is damaged by civil war and the like, the second by the persistence of small the macro-state Now that nonmilitary states. system is entrenched, it is however easy for conservatives (in particular) to argue from the "realities life, which include self-interest, that peace are arrangements aggression, readily fear, hatred. as dismissed of international is on this basis It unrealistic, utopian, even (amusingly) as extremist (cf. p.L85). Schell’s further theme nuclear that "war" is not war threatens, however, to undermine his case against the sovereign state; for example, his ends-means argument and the argument based on its nuclear-war making capacity. theme needs much qualification, Fortunately the not-war and starts out from an erroneous characterisation of war as ’a violent means employed by a nation to achieve an end’ (p.189): but this is neither necessary nor sufficient for war. very different What is correct is that nuclear wars are from previous conventional wars (cf. WP). Schell goes on that war requires an end which nuclear "war" does not have. to claim But nuclear attacks can certainly have ends (even if large nuclear wars cannot be won in the older sense: but It is also claimed that war depends on weakness; on not all wars or games are won). one side being defeated ’no happen, But what one’s these on a decision by arms. strength sorts of fails war this doesn t until both sides have been annihilated’ considerations nuclear wars are not wars, but But in nuclear contribute to showing is (p.190). again that they are not wars of certain sorts, not that e.g., not just wars (because they fail on such criteria as reasonable prospect of success anu improvement), not rational wars (in a good sense), and so on. that conventional wars have argument persisted into nuclear times does damage to Schell’s that nuclear weapons have also ruined "conventional" wars, and his connected theme that the demise of war court has left no means of appeal has mistaken propositions: been to finally settle disputes between nations, for the final removed (pp. 192—193) • The theme depends on a pair of that concerning the demise of conventional war, and the idea 10 that war of some sort has to be final "court of appeal" between nations (for the there are other types of contests that could serve, and there is also the possibility of more cooperative behaviour, joint referenda). e.g. imports the The theme also social-Darwinian assumption of Clausewicz (the "logic of war that war has to theme) proceed to the technological limit ~ as if war and violence were thoroughly natural activities, independent of recognised social settings (for winning, surrender, etc.), On the contrary, wars are parasitic on social organisations and ruleless activities. such as states and are governed by a range of understandings, conventions and rules. They are a social phenomenon, with a rule structure, if not a logic. Much capital has been made not merely from "the logic of war but from what is now called "the logic of deterrence" and the "logic of nuclear [strategic] planning . The message that is usually supposed to emerge is that the massive arrangements the world is entangled now in are perfectly sound, logical, represents little more than a cheap semantical trick. rational. however this Logic in no way justifies the present arrangements, or anything like them, or renders them reasonable. There are logics of decision (as presented, e.g., for the classical case in Jeffrey) which can be applied in strategic planning; but yield specific results without they do not desirability measures being assigned to alternative outcomes, that is without values being pumped in, extralogically . There are various ways these value assignments may be determined, to meet moral requirements or not; but in nuclear strategic planning they have invariably been settled on the basis of expediency however, to cover something like ’reasoning (even from a national fail:18 yet threat of further and of stresses (p.213) threatening use interest viewpoint) the success this considerations entering into the ’the illogic of deterrence’, for he emphasizes For instance he unreasonableness. rationality rational and In these terms, Schell, who like others enjoys playing with the term ’logic of’, should write of supposed lor the most pait, ’logic of’ tends to be used very loosely, as a word of general commendation, policy or strategy of’. its . of deterrence unjustifiable and the disparity between the weapons and of nuclear the irrationality of actually using them should the threat doctrine depends on the credibility of irrational use. the Indeed Schell wants to go still locate a contradiction in deterrence (e.g. but the argument depends on an interesting confusion of contradiction with cancellation, along with the assumption that deterrence involves cancellation. irrational, it is immoral, but it is not inconsistent. pp.z-01~2>; Nuclear deterrence may well be ft NOTES This is a revised version of ’Appendix 1. On the fate of mankind and the earth, according to Schell, and to Anders' of my monograph referred to as WP, where several points, only touched upon in this review, are further developed. References are by way of authors' names or else through obvious acronyms, given in the list of references which follows. . The distinguishing term is from Foley's Nuclear Prophets, where many leading anti-nuclear prophets are assessed. One well-known prophet not so considered there is Jaspers, presumably because his main work comes out in entirely the wrong direction. It gives heavy philosophical attire to the better-dead-than-red abomination. A main argument against Jaspers so presented is simple. However bad being red might become (at present it is debatably worse than living under some of the totalitarian regimes the free West props up), it still gives humans a further chance for good lives, since regimes fall or can be toppled: but total annihilation removes that all-important opportunity. But of course Jaspers does not present his position so simply. Rather his contention is that there are circumstances where, and principles for which, a person or group of persons ought to sacrifice even their lives. Freedom is such: a life worth living is a free life. But the latter point can be granted without conceding that sacrifice is a possible means to it. While the sacrifice of one or a few lives may be a possible (if dubiously effective) way to free lives for others, certainly the sacrifice of all lives is not a possible route to free lives for all, since no human lives remain. To this extent Schell is right (on p.131) in accusing Jaspers of an each to all fallacy. Jasper's idea that "the free life that they try to save by all possible means is more than mere life or lives" breaks down when applied to all participating people. None can gain free lives by extinction of all: that is not a possible route to life even. . A detailed comparison of Schell and Anders' remarkably similar versions of S2 is made in Foley JS. . Should S2 appeal, as it may, to suitable communities of humans, SI will require reformulation in similar terms; and the argument that follows needs minor adjustment, with appropriate groups replacing individuals. . Thus the Last Person argument, important in environmental ethics (as HC explains), is no longer merely hypothetical, awaiting for instance the remote death of the Sun, but assumes new urgency. It is this sort of argument that connects environmental ethics and nuclear ethics, at a deeper metaphysical level. The Bomb and Bulldozer are out of the same technological Pandora's box. Nuclear technology is not the only route to human extinction, nor the only Pandora's box. Biological and chemical means are perhaps even more effective, and certainly can be more selective in what gets extinguished. Nuclear extinction would presumably require a different and more massive exchange than is usually assumed in nuclear war scenarios, with heavy 12 targeting in particular of Southern Hemispheric internationally-recognised nuclear-free zones). sites (including 5. Nor do recent scientific studies claim as much. The most intrepid of these studies, Erlich and others, only contends that in certain worst-case circumstances, ’the possibility of the extinction of Homo sapiens cannot be excluded’ (p.1299). The study admits that, in the scenario described, ’it seems unlikely ... Homo spaiens would be forced to extinctions immediately ’, and the difficulties indicated in the way of long-term human survival are exaggerated. In particular, many of the drastic effects predicted for Northern mid­ latitudes are reflected in very much milder form in equivalent Southern latitudes. For example, temperatures for regions with maritine climates appear likely to vary by only a few degrees and perhaps neglibly for many agricultural purposes after 100 days (cf. Turco and others, p.1237 case 29, and p.1286). Similarly the extent of nuclear darkness and of surface ultraviolet radiation will be appreciably less in the South and perhaps minor for many crucial purposes, such as photosynthesis and human outdoor activity, after 100 dayss (cf. the data in Benton and Partridge). No doubt some scientifically respectable sections of the environmental and peace movements have an interest in exaggerating the probable effects of nuclear holocaust for life on earth, much as many statesmen and strategists have an interest in minimizing them. And there is certainly substantial margin for error and for variation in conclusions drawn. For Crutzen (p.59) is right that ’analyses of the environmental effects of a global nuclear war remain . . . uncertain .. . because of a lack of information on various important processes [among other things] ... The environment might become extremely hostile, because of hitherto overlooked changes in the composition of the atmosphere*, again among other things. Such uncertainty bodes considerable caution as rational. The way to err is clear. 6. Not merely by technological determinists of marxist persuasion. Hackworth, a former US general, argues by straight induction that if the US military has a weapon it will use it. 7. The appalling theme that humans create past, present and future (etc.) is repeated elsewhere, e.g. p.173. 8. For detailed refutation of these assumptions, see JB. 9. Anders is here (AA pp.244-5) relying upon a version of the argument from perserverence, criticised in detail in Routley and Griffin. 10. An interesting converse of this theme is sometimes advanced, that no one is responsible, the whole thing is out of control. The technological version of this no-responsibility theme is discussed below (fn 15). More satisfactory is the theme that nuclear arrangements are out of political control, but for reasons, in terms of vested interests in keeping nuclear things going, which enable responsibility to be distributed. The vested interests, which bear considerable responsibility, include the military 13 weapons industry, and research and academic communities (cf. Barnaby). Under pressures for re-election especially, politicians give in to these powerful groups, so losing control of political processes. The argument is flawed at its final stage. For many influential politicians either belong to or represent vested interests. Thus, though there is no doubt some ’lack of control’, political processes tend rather to reflect vested interests than to run out of political control. 11. Another example of spreading the responsibility runs as follows: ’The self-extinction of our species is not an act that anyone describes as sane or sensible; nevertheless, it is an act that, without quite admitting it to ourselves, we plan in certain circumstances to commit’ (p.185). Even for most of the planners, extinction is presumably not part of "the plan", but an unintended consequence; and most of us have little or no role in the planning, enough of us even campaign against the planning. Further 'the world ... chose the course of attempting to refashion the system of sovereignty to accommodate nuclear weapons' (p.194): the world? This connects of course with the faulty ideological argument from defence of fundamentals, e.g. for liberty, for the "free enterprise" (USA) nation, and against socialism. 12. A more detailed discussion is given in WP ^8, where too the case against the state from nuclear dilemmas is elaborated. 13. Anders' explanation is elaborated in Foley; some of the themes are presented more straightforwardly in Martin. The incomplete list of items given, to be investigated in a deeper analysis of the nuclear situation, paraphrases Foley JS p.164. 14. These motivating drives form part of a larger integrated package, comprising maximisation drives for power, knowledge, control, wealth, energy, speed, satisfaction, ..., for the "newer" Enlightenment (but Faustian) virtues. Frequently there are attempts (the human failing for excessive neatness and simplicity manifested) to reduce the package to one main component, preference-satisfaction, for instance, or utility. And the type of drive is justified (especially for those who have it, but worry about it) not only as virtuous, which it is not, but also as rational, which again it is not. Rationality, the deeply entrenched myth has it, consists in maximisation, of a suitable mix of these virtues. Maximisation of the objects of the drives runs, however, into limitation The maximisation of self-interest theorems and associated paradoxes (individual or national) runs into Newcomb's paradox and special cases of The maximisation of power, as it such as Prisoners Dilemma situations. the Christian-lslamic God, encounters the paradox of symbolised in the parallel maximisation of knowledge, paradoxes of omnipotence, or There are no consistent objects which arc omnipotent omniscience. the The drive for maximum consistency, often taken to be omniscient. epitome of rationality, also leads to inconsistency in the case of more important theories, such as arithmetic and set theory (by virtue of Godel’s theorem and associated limitative theorems). 15. R & D, though directed by military requirements and the arms race, also 14 drives the arms race. science. Its role is partly disguised by the myth of neutral There have been attempts, not only by those committed to technological determinism, to involve technology more deeply as the main, or single, source of the nuclear fix (thus especially Mumford, in part thereby anticipating Commoner’s parallel indictment of technology-choice in the ecological fix). It is technology, the mega-machine, running out of control, that has brought us to this predicament, the nuclear abyss. Sometimes this serves to exonerate states and their key components and those who control them, for they are simply caught up by this out-ofcontrol machine; but sometimes the state itself is seen as a machine also running out of control. But technological determinism, like other varieties of stronger (nonanalytlc) determinism, is false. Nuclear technology was selected and proceeded with, after a well-known political dispute involving distinguished scientists; it was deliberated, funded and promoted, while other alternatives were not. Damaging technologies of the nuclear age were not inevitable, but deliberately chosen by certain components of the large nation-states. And much as they need not have been chosen, so they do not have to be persisted with. The fashionable inevitability/determinism themes admit not only of refutation by bringing out the many choices made in persisting with often recalcitrant technologies. They also admit of being made to look ridiculous. If the Bomb is determined, as part of human evolution, then if it functions (as it probably will, a matter also determined), it will serve as a human population control device, a matter also determined. That is, the Bomb has its fixed evolutionary place in human population regulation! 16. This reformulation was proposed by N. Griffin, who suggested that the main qualification can be inferred from Schell’s context. 17. Selecting the usual game theory setting sees to this almost automatically; for it is then assumed that each player plays to maximize his or her own advantage. Thus too the presumption in Walzer, p.277, that ’the logic of deterrence’ is based on eye-for-eye and tooth-for-tooth assumptions. 18. Even the irrationality of retaliatory (or first-strike) use has been contested, e.g. it has been wishfully thought that America will rise like a phoenix from the radioactive ashes. There is moreover a simple solution to Schell’s problem of the "missing motive" for retaliating to a large strike (p.204), namely, not a retributive one, but an ideological one: eliminate the prospect of the future dominance of the rival ideology. Such a motive has been offered for the conjectured targeting of Latin America. 19. An analogous confusion of negation with cancellation or obliteration appears in recent US "star-war" thinking, where US missiles are supposed to "negate" incoming USSR missiles. Moral paradoxes of deterrence take a different direction. For although involving negation, they depend upon perhaps questionable interconnexions of intensional functors. One type of paradox (considered in WP §5, where the immorality of deterrence is argued) derives from a policy of credibly threatening war without however intending to proceed to war, though credible threats [appear to] imply an intention to proceed. Another style derives from acclaimed intention to reduce the number of nuclear missiles when the persistent practice, which implies an intention, is to increase the number. This paradox is technically removed - how satisfactorily is another matter - by a distinction between longer-term aims and immediate practice, a time-honoured method of removing contradictions by conveniently discerned temporal distinctions. REFERENCES G. Anders, AA. Die Antiquiertheit des Menschen, C.H. G. z\nders, Endzeitand Zeitenende: Gedanken Munchen, 1972; referred to as AE. zur Beck, Munchen, 1956; referred to as atomaren F. Barnaby, ’Will there be a Nuclear War’, in Australia M. Denborough), Croom Helm, Australia, 1983, 2-37. I.J. Benton 49-51. and G.W. Partridge, ’"Twilight at Noon" Situation, and Beck, C.H. War, Nuclear overstated', Ambio (ed. (1984) 13 B. Commoner, The Closing Circle: Nature, Man and Technology, Knopf, New York, 1972. P.J. Crutzen, ’Darkness after a nuclear war', Ambio 13 (1984) 52-4. M. Denborough (ed.), Australian & Nuclear War, Croom Helm, Australia, 1983. P.R. Erlich and others, ’Long-term biological consequences of nuclear war’, 222 (1983) 1293-1300. G. Foley, 'Jonathan Schell: Genius Brisbane, 1982; referred to as JS. Philosopher - Rewrite Man', Science typescript, G. Foley, Nuclear Prophets. The True and the False, typescript, Brisbane, 1983. D. Hackworth, 'A Soldier's Report’, Australia and Nuclear War, Croom Helm, Australia, 1983, 209-12. (ed. M. Denborough), K. Jaspers, The Future of Mankind, (trans. E.B. Ashton), University of Chicago Press, 16 1961. B. Martin, Grass Roots Strategy Against War, Freedom Press, Nottingham, 1984. L. Mumford, The Myth of the Machine, 2 vols., Harcourt Brace, New York, 1970. G.F. Preddey and others, Future Contingencies 4. Nuclear Disasters, A Report to the Commission for the Future, Government Printer, Wellington, New Zealand, 1982. R. Routley and N. Griffin, ’Unravelling the meanings of life’, Discussion Papers in Environmental Philosophy #3, Australian National University, Canberra, 1982. R. Routley, Exploring Meinong’s Jungle and Beyond, Research School Sciences, Australian National University, 1980; referred to as JB. of Social R. Routley, War and Peace I. On the Ethics of Large-Scale Nuclear War and Nuclear deterrence and the Political Fall-Out, Discussion Papers in Environmental Philosophy #5, Australian National University, 1984; referred to as WP. R. and V. Routley, ’Human chauvinism and Environmental ethics’, in Environmental Philosophy (ed. D. Mannison and others), Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University, 1980; referred to as HC. J. Schell, The Fate of the Earth, Knopf, New York, 1982; referred to as S./F. R.P. Turco and others, ’Nuclear winter: global explosions’, Science 222 (1983) 1283-92. consequences M. Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, Basic Books, New York, 1977. of multiple nuclear  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Box 71, Item 4: Two drafts of Metaphysical fallout from the nuclear predicament Subject The topic of the resource Two typescript drafts, one with handwritten emendations, the other with typed corrections. Paper published, Routley R (1984) 'metaphysical fallout from the nuclear predicament', Philosophy & Social Criticism, 10(3-4):19-34, https://doi.org/10.1177/019145378401000303. Description An account of the resource Unnumbered paper from collection, item number assigned by library staff. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/browse?search=Richard+Sylvan&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bjoiner%5D=and&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=&amp;range=&amp;collection=&amp;type=&amp;user=&amp;tags=&amp;public=&amp;featured=&amp;exhibit=&amp;geolocation-mapped=&amp;geolocation-address=&amp;geolocation-latitude=&amp;geolocation-longitude=&amp;geolocation-radius=10&amp;submit_search=Search+for+items">Richard Sylvan</a> Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived <span class="MuiTypography-root-125 MuiTypography-body2-126">The University of Queensland's <a data-testid="rek-series" href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/records/search?page=1&amp;pageSize=20&amp;sortBy=score&amp;sortDirection=Desc&amp;searchQueryParams%5Brek_series%5D%5Bvalue%5D=Richard+Sylvan+Papers%2C+UQFL291&amp;searchMode=advanced">Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291</a></span>, Box 71, Item 4 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org">Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy</a> Contributor An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, <a href="https://najtaylor.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Dr. N.A.J. Taylor</a>. Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library. Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource [33] leaves. 26.34 MB. Type The nature or genre of the resource Manuscript Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context <a href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:223e07d">https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:223e07d</a> Box 71: Unlisted and Untitled Boxes https://www.antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/67b27de117524030d45b6db0a625bad2.pdf a92ad477704fdf667fdab4a346c2f0f2 PDF Text Text WORKING DRAFT CULTURE, PHILOSOPHY, AND APPROACHES TO THE NATURAL ENVIRONMENT Many of you know that Canberra was originally Griffin. This talk is dedicated by designed simply not an key elements of the Western industrial paradigm, especially making Servant the Nature of Man, 'land to ... be the accorded He rejected 'concentration discerned instead elements of a and His approach was holistic, and different 'consciousness' (the word is his). took the and architect designer but one of Australia’s early deeper ecologists. landscape Burley You may not know that Griffin, an to him. American who migrated to Australia in 1913, was on Walter respect he due to a highly developed and perfected living organism not to be exterminated or treated as dead material, or as mere section of a map’. a Canberra, now no mere section of map, is perhaps the best approximation anywhere to a deeper ecological city; but it is not only removed from Griffin’s original conception but far from deep ecological ideals. * * * * * The objective of the larger investigation, of which this is part, to gauge the extent to Australian which contrasted with American culture, contains developable will underpin under which many a sketches a culture, especially as elements (seeds) which different political framework from the bastardised capitalism people presently labour and local environment frequently It is not necessary to see the present political arrangements and the suffers. political course interested in charted as environmentally alternative structures: or socially disastrous to be it is enough, for example, to view them as far from satisfactory, or very far from worlds, talk those of the best of attainable to be interested in the prospects of turning things around somewhat, to �increasing ecological resistance [negative action j against environment like^and ecological construction [direct positive action]. the and vandalism^/ There are several distinctive features of Australian culture that for the especially hope, damage^?, grounds give remarkable level of environmental activism that has It is worth trying to pull together somehow emerged among the people. some of these features of the culture, to look at ways of furthering the valuable parts, and increasing the level of concern and activism. Without doubt attitudes different towards practices, and cultures have the approaches, different different Indeed appreciation of, environment. practices towards, and respect for the natural environment are highly culturally dependent: for compare, American Jews and American Indians. instance, Most nonimperial cultures had ~ and where they still survive uncorrupted still havi. less much exploitative industrial and to not practices whose North, exploitation approaches the merely environmental control lost their of local typically under the missionary, colonial or imperial domination. in But occasionally, notably retained gross permit the of those than but to a marked extent depend upon such practices. vandalism Mostly these more benign cultures have however environments, environment sufficient autonomy the to adjacent Pacific, regional cultures have slow or even halt environmental destruction. Thus, for example, rainforest damaging projects have been delayed or blocked in Melanesia largely through Melanesian attitudes to the land. One important way then to try to slow environmental degradation, especially in the South, is to foster both sweepingly, regional cultural autonomy; socialism and indigenous certain for cultural instance land rights movements. differences to support way of Melanesian For, where the cultures have not been excessively corrupted by Northern influences, this is rapid and, more a comparatively activating alternative paradigms to the dominant Northern social �The question arises whether paradigms. elsewhere the in also can differences serve Antipodes, in particular in Australia, to at least assist in transition to different less environmentally social exploitative paradigms. transition is unlikely to occur unless it is based on the culture. a Such cultural Can features of the culture and the social life be used to foster and make requisite differences? In the case of Australia, a basis is there both the / land in </* U culture, and things and the <L- appear sufficiently different from that in the cultures A of the industrialised North to allow (some hope) for Of the for change, at least if the natural environment is to retain some need semblance of integrity, there is little doubt. that is, there differentiation. cultural in is It platitudinous becoming the longer run not much prospect for the integrity of many local natural environments and ecosystems unless the in we Antipodes break from the damaging cultural assumptions and practice of the industrialised loose work North and towards establishment of a elements of regionalism in the North, despite a in some parts, rising tide war. of For despite environmental the industrialised North still appears in the grip of established forces and unlikely to budge in time - short of nuclear environmentally culture, towards a certain regional cultural autonomy. destructive concern less different disaster, such Though we who seek change can count on some support from minority movements in the North, nonetheless if we are to achieve changes, we must go largely alone as Nor is it task of paradigm transition entirely hopeless in the Australia because as well as the advantage of the ground and its southern KJ and seeds of cultural difference are already there and growing. But A like, most] new and more fragile developments they need attention and^if speedy location, careful cultivation Such a task is rendered urgent also by other matters of 0 environmental and human concern, not but colossal biological losses st the gathering signs of nuclear ykthrough rapid destruction of, e.g. r 3 war, tropical �rainforests, indeed, mounting evidence of environmental decline almost everywhere humans now establish. How does philosophy fit into the strategy of harnessing regional culture to & A ; alter approaches to the environment? As i/ the title of the ^lk it operates in organising principles L okr the dynamic linkage in a good suspension bridge^which lifts the the middle, not as an idle middleman, but more like and design environmental way on the ropes of regional links A culture. working picture that the main components of the discussion together - a picture that also like most images of the more abstract distorts across the is that of a bridge suspension the gap often separating people from the natural environment. There are people, and the environment, and approaches by bridges to the environment, like so (Of course people may be part of the natural environment: exclude ' -hew that important overlap.) The different sorts, ranging from rustic bridges the picture doesn’t connecting bridges may be of very good for careful foot traffic, �through the monumental suspension bridge at Middle Harbour, to modern high-tech bridges able to carry nuclear tanks and bulldozers over large spans. the But it is structure of all these types of bridges carrying the approaches that matter The spans are carried by the ropes of culture, and the pylons particularly. ot culture if you will. So different witii different cultures, carrying bridges see the,component in the middle d philosophy, but it might almost as well be sociology - not as part of approaches. It is better different to the nuts and bolts and rivets of the bridges, but rather as the design and engineering of the structures. types, computing It has its analytical parts, looking at the the loads stresses and on them; them - the social paradigms embedded in the cultures. select substructures Philosophy, the link subject is then the architecture and engineering of the business. 5 their and it also has its more holistic elements, considering the bridges themselves and of components, �philosophy figuratively, Less assumptions that is, to be considered for deep ecology, asks deeper of assumptions assumptions replacement, and deeper questions, of example free fundamenta] the other subjects and assembling the intellectual assumptions all paradigms. for extracting embodied in a culture or social way or life, i.e. social operative Philosophy, especially metaphysics and not or marxist philosophies. enterprise the assembles ancl culture applied in environmental practices, the assumptions, a of isolates In what are sometimes called the tills respect philosophy - which includes much more than conceptual analysis - is first among the intellectual subjects, logic, as the science of reasoning, is the first among the sciences, investigating the form of arguments and methodology of all other sciences. philosophical investigation 1'he assumptions deeper such when put together yield a philosophy in extracts, ci c^y the more popular sense (as e.g. in philosophy of life or , the free enterprise 4 philosophy): any in case the will be a philosophical theory or the result rudiments of a philosophical paradigm, depending on how it is done. By largely philosophical investigation then, of assumptions the techniques we try with contrasted operative test to apparent we trij.ce Northern social paradigms; the adequacy social of and especially as alternatives with some environmental support So much has already been accomplished, in a rough and ready way, and some base. results are illustrated in diagram^ • J. s. Details of other positions, the old /and culture positions (as typically offer environmental a projected), transition alternative And from are left and the counter included in the diagram the while new the dominant it may Wester/l paradigm appear to indeed is - a long political way from the dominant paradigm to the environmental alternative, of the and by sociological assemblage, the organise the intermediate steps is not so great; each and the steps can, and have, been �To illustrate the way transitions can taken one at a time. of the first line (row) in macro-economic form. details construed components package typically includes environmient , as this to minimal quality life of But the and with subtractions for externalities such as noise and and pollution, perhaps *--- —, M with additions for non-material features excluded in dominant consciousness. this way we arrive si Mew left thinking with the objective subject to considerable reservations, X(RR). of material goes back philosophy; Greek to In growth The real break however comes with members of the counterculture, the hippies and Yippiesy for example, though idea the objective functin to be maximized gets much complicated, A the so such in a rough way stanadard of living. representing as consider The dominant objective is to maximize some economic package of goods and services being made, be the namely, the abandonment of growth and maximization objectives altogether, for less material nonmaximizing goals At the macroeconopic level, the idea gets^represented by the goal of a steady-state or sustain able economy, though the alternative environmental objective will be for something much less inflexible and ^rationalistic than economists have so tar sketched. I In fact the "emerging steady-state paradigm", which Daly/ ' for example^/advocates, affords only a shallow alternative to the dominant paradigm, differing only as to growth and paradigms would include steady state position; remove the transition. convenient reserves themes. But a fuller diagram of among others such advanced corporate capitalism - the so it would involve a JI simplification over higher-dimensional diagram, and of the two dimensional left-right However, the high" dimensional diagram indicates how a better argued A transition ,can be made; essentially by combining steady-state arguments against 0 macroeconomic growth and stocks assumptions with the Left -yocialist case against Even so, even with the combin/catioms, which does touch themes. Cl human relations , ^anthropocentric framework would not have been left behind, microeconomic T deeper environmental concern would have only began to enter 7 G-fiP �Reaching behind the dominant Western paradigm so outlined to the underlying model takes us towards the following familiar picture: social society consists of a set of individual humans of decidedly impoverished type, e.g. they are not genuinely interrelated, so they are isolated, and, though they are the only sort of items that have intensional (mental) features, they have (e.g. certain a to ability few but of these At bottom, these individuals have calculate). utilities, reflecting preferences or self-interests, which they aim to maximize; and competitive (by virtue of scarcity). are they so that they are possessive, and possess capital. The distinctive the means Their other feature is production, of to this about self-interested Features There is nothing compulsory, or Individuals picture. this are individuals competing these approximating matter of particularly nurture, abstract nature. not of the American economic archtype are a matter of culture, a result oi training, not human nature, as a comparison where their To ensure the initial argument, on this model, for the coercive is apparatus of the (minimal) state. natural, land, of the American model is of course is that feature individuals can separately accumulate the means of production. entitlement e.g. individuals are like not helps this, individuals embody rationality either: with othei' show. traditional cultures, lior do these archtypal only a question-begging argument leads to the American model as something naturally required. The transitions to the left already go beyond the American model. introduces certain The relations. human chauvinistic (anthropocentric) but they do not left omit models are social The left still human relations: the further big step to the environmental alternative is to widen these relations to full community relations, independent value. That recognising is a creatures and nonhuman things as of bigger step, a step that no Western political institutions make requisite allowance for, Western value theories do not accommodate. 8 and that mainstream underpinning �The arguments from traditional cultures can also be illustrated the and paradigms cultures such as those models Melanesia of them. underlie that and directed Polynesia, the In traditional of many against the operative assumptions of the Northern social paradigms are, very reasonably, not accepted. Where these cultures still prevail with some measure of regional autonomy, there is good prospect more thwarting of destructive practices. environmentally Features of the local culture can be immediately harnessed. But much of the inhabited and there are already observable features distinctive unscathed World in questioned, let alone overthrown, especially among the managerial other, even or lesser, of features not exhaust features of the accompanying out leave There are cultures significant as artistic and intellectual to icing. be This discerned, sure, does affords European culture This alternatives. a have an somewhat as that in romanticism and a significant feature of American Indian gives the basis of the aesthetic route to environmental But there are as well more important omissions and discrepancies In particular, the dominant American paradigm religion; but Northern features. precarious foothold for an aesthetic approach to the environment, such evidenced So conspicuous other usually cultural industrial culture, though economically dominated accompanying classes The incomplete social paradigms outlined do cultural features to be considered surprisingly Although the cultures will have to be invoked if change in approach is to be hastened in this way. rather now cultures, World New is Northern paradigms have hardly been sufficiently dominant the less environmentally peoples of predominantly European stock. by governed of assumptions and New also neglected are many prominent values of American culture. 9 omits reference to established of the connected older and formerly more �The American search tor environmentally acceptable has alternatives regularly turned to these omitted features of American culture, and religious or Indeed the primary attempts to spiritual elements, and associated past values . "the gospel of ecology" and displace the dominant paradigm have taken establish a spiritual route, a quasi-religious way. and sample (For example, Nash provides a list of the books he considers important in the rise of the representative virtually all that proceed beyond ecology new environmentalism: depend on an appeal to religious elements, to divine or sacred features of natural things.) In the context of American culture the appeal something to be said for it. to proportion do act in accordance and, unlike with response. And, secondly, religious values do clash with dominant Northern paradigm. has features For, firstly, a high proportion of the American population profess some active religious commitment; substantial religious This sort of that conflict the was Australia, socially precepts approved of perceived, considerable puzzlement, by colonised cultures, as Lini reports in the a case the with of Melanesian society (p.9): The fabric of this society, with its inherent communal discipline was ... torn by the arrival of European commercial practices which carried with it the message of materialism, together with the creed of enlightened self-interest. Both aspects were a direct contradiction of Melanesian values and priorities. The introduction to Melanesia of Christianity added a further element of division and confusion in the minds of the people. While the Christian religion was widely compatible with the ethics and principles of Melanesian communalism, with its emphasis on mutuality, compassion and caring for one another, it was a practice that very few of the Europeans appeared to follow. It ran also contrary to the religion of individualism and self-interest, which not just (had) more important exponents, but was followed by the majority of Europeans ... It is something a a puzzle how the assimilation of elements of the dominant Northern paradigm with prospects of Christianity is pulled off, though achieved it certainly is in a great many Northerners, and too many Antipodeans. a partial answer: compartmentalisation. 10 There is Religion tor most is a separate thing �fitted into a Sunday morning box, important elements of which do not upset the business standard week. such as human poverty: to Thus for most believers religion does not Only for a minority does it directly penetrate deep. escape touch immediate matters why should we expect it to work for the Environment? Nonetheless widespread real adoption of religious perceptions the within American population, and^reflected in the Administration, would presumably alter things. but even if some of the effects of a religious return would beneficial, and domination nature were be negative Religion could be more of a drawback than an asset. with any depth to it appears most unlikely. scientific world Unless moreover the position abandoned in favour of one of the lesser religious traditions the environmental effects would "the view". scientific (as for the case for its much virtue front-end-in. shape. trying in It return to the There is world view in such great is not just that there is much that this sort of view leaves out or social it is that this perspective, a paradigm, paradigm. So incorporates it is far from uniquely determined. more intellectually satisfactory rivals (e.g. view). rival view with these sorts of weaknesses But nor is the so called scientific cannot account for; dominant to the Consider, for instance, the matter of the existence of God, the fallaciousness of the arguments involved, etc. no testifies). Religion in America has lost out to In part it failed deservedly: view could explain. Watt In any case such a reversal world view was seriously deficient and it did not account more highly be welcomed, it is also true that some of the effects of a to narrow fundamentalism would be highly undesirable. of be a richer intensional the There are scientific These rivals allow for value and wonder in natural things without taking a theological way. 11 �There is a set second quasi-religious character reasons of of some not tor sort, a These the on turn irreligious character of the culture, where an appeal through religion success. is unlikely to have much understood as (the a barely relevant generally impose Pantheistic or Jewish, Christian, whatever, on deeper environmental approaches in Australia. strongly to endeavouring first) ’. irreligious Australia, post-Christian has it society, in which religion (is) Even if that formulation character of understanding much else about the culture, the e.g. an is the exaggeration is a fact and is the society the ’best is said, been curious to extent the state’s protrusion into Australian social life. If an approach through religion is accordingly ruled out as a main approach to hastened j paradigm transition - and a related approach through mysticism or transcen f1 ism excluded for analogous reasons and because of the the earthiness There are other significant features culture - what alternatives are open? of the culture running against major elements of the dominant Western which can be perhaps applied approaches to turn matters features of the culture around. to more much detach effectively indicate To of from than quasi-religious prospects the paradigms, dominant paradigm, of applying consider how Australian culture contrasts with American. Australian mainstream culture transition from the dominant is already American political left has much stronger support in difficult to some culture. Australia way along the leftward is not merely that the It than USA. It is not indicate features of the Australian cultural situation which show its left—displacement from the dominant Western paradigm. some elements of the contrast:- 12 The next table lists �TABLE 2. CONTRASTING ELEMENTS IN AUSTRALIAN AND AMERICAN CULTURE —-- —> SCALE OF INCREASE individualistic ethos inacceptability of socialist institutions inegalitarian attitudes POSITIVE inegalitarian practices ITEMS (PER level of consumerism CAPITA maximization quest WHERE imperialist drive relevant) extent of violence police and military commitment high technology involvement functional rationality environmental inactivism USA AUSTRALIA SCALE OF INCREASE level of urbanisation legal obstacles to environmental action NEGATIVE {practices, such as dedication of wilderness ITEMS administrative delays in implementing environmental practices, such as pollution requirements, recycling, etc. Thus there are some offsetting negative items as well as positive items 13 in the �contrast. themes Since, however, most of these contrasting elements bear on first for opposed to American, it appears that prospects indeed This better. important environmental spectators the applying culture are theme requires ela^boration and confirmation. The task can profitably be combined with others: for the rival paradigms in a way favourable to Australian culture as of diagram in an with there is much work empirical here both and for environmental bent activists. A first task is to separate out what is known, what requires and their eommund'B, distinguishing theses: / Let us focus on transition theses, ought to be done (ideologically) what and normative and factual transition factual transition thesis, that Western (European) culture is weak A firstly confirmation, ^/undergoing a transition away from the dominant confirmed by several Northern sociologists (e.g. better results could be obtained in Australia; paradigm, social has been Presumably similar or Marsh). but appropriate samplings of the community have not been done, analysed and so on - environmental sociology being a neglected undoubtedly field in Another Australia. weak transition factual thesis holds, namely that since 1960 a significant percentage of the also ertreii human community in specifiable advanced Western countries such as Australia have to adopt main assumptions of the alternative environmental paradigm, come but again comparative—figures sociological work are entirely of data to Though impressionistic tells us that environmental activism is greater in Australia than OSA - indeed more intensive than piece lacking. anywhere else, an immensely build upon - we lack solid confirmation. sociogeographers to do. 14 important There is much for �Throughout, as you may have noticed, a normative transition thesis has been largely taken granted, for that generally, l&ght to^undergoing Western and paradigms an towards and to rguments. the repeat furthermore alternative. environmental thesis is argued for in environmental philosophy, and time dominant from away variations (such as those of advocated corporate their capitalism an.d of the post-industrial society) , transitivity* shift, paradigm major a culture, indeed Western culture Australian to ought be complex normative That isn’t there fortunately It is also argued against there, but> to sum up the opposition case, unconvincingly. Given then that the transition is going on, and to ought going be on, ought then to be going on with greater rapidity, how is it hastened, how indeed do environmental activists emerging are enough. clear it encourage in Australia. Preliminary answers Not only should activists be continuing with what I they are directing doing organisations the and environmental and those like, to supposed action (public) further them, of industrial prluwryprimarily, regulate not merely by membership drives and environmental influence to and swing the should education. be dominant^ regional culture , for the w potential appears to be there for a considerably greater change been achieved. sources They should also be aiming to increase their support bases , but organisations. endeavouring the against than has thus/ There are two major parts to this further practice which can run in tandem, a more negative and a more positive part: 0 More negatively.it z involves curring down and countering the flow propaganda in favour of the dominant paradigms both locally but especiall the North. That is important in reversing the extent It includes Northern from co-^option a range of activities some with solid bases in local culture, such as gently lopping anti-American of of off the tall poppies and anti-Nor them activities. 15 pedalling the stuff, and careful The latter practices (which should �not of course reduce merely to personally directed antagonism) fit in well aims, such as independent and nonaligned defence environmental regional other with policies • More positively, it consists in promoting and adapting other despised features It alternative paradigms commonly is intellectuals Northern are, of course, like those nonmaximizing making-do socialistic ones, of appreciation natural local The features to tye Lawrence). cultural characters are held (e.g I the egalitarian, along environments. with the consider the effects of these, decently applied, in or antiauthoritarian, A rapidly increasing taken to things, conomics, in local As for mateship, sure it could use widening, a pain problem being its I hra/sv restriction in communities promoted in Fair go and Enough* s with egalitarian methods as combines markets. cultural Nonmaximizing, for example, is reflected in the She’ll be right and It'11 do approach dften enough: and note, that are responsible for the low repute in which some of the ambassadors, and commonly culture that work directly towards themes of Australian of also to male relationships: (including cultural transformation: nonhumans). but encourage its extension So, to conclude, the potential is^for we must help to realise it FOOTNOTES 1. The term ’approaches’ is intended to include both theory and practice, espoused ideology and behaviour. 2. They did not go under because of the weakness of their intellectual positions. At bottom their religious beliefs, for example, were no more ridiculous than those of Christianity. Typically they were much weakened by new diseases, and overwhelmed by new technology often applied in violent fashion. 3. Another past philosophical basis for environmental philosophy, American naturalism, seems to have been little developed, despite the promise some have seen in it. 16 both �4. By integrity is meant much more than retaining representative samples of this and that system or species; not representative southern sassafras, parma wallabies and Torres Strait Islanders, but sufficiently many. 17 �P X c 3 & X O P P x X 3 C P HX X 5 O 3 P4 Hrt CD P P4 H* CD X P H CD X p. P X O SS CD X CD X H> CJ4 F—1 CD Hi CD Qu Hp CD CD p X H P P H« P CD 3 nJ P4 P X C H CD . 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For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Draft Papers Description An account of the resource Sylvan's literary executor encountered an archive in which “all his projects were current", since manuscripts were undated and unattributed. Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document WORKING DRAFT CULTURE, PHILOSOPHY, AND APPROACHES TO THE NATURAL ENVIRONMENT Many of you know that Canberra was originally Griffin. This talk is dedicated by designed simply not an key elements of the Western industrial paradigm, especially making Servant the Nature of Man, 'land to ... be the accorded He rejected 'concentration discerned instead elements of a and His approach was holistic, and different 'consciousness' (the word is his). took the and architect designer but one of Australia’s early deeper ecologists. landscape Burley You may not know that Griffin, an to him. American who migrated to Australia in 1913, was on Walter respect he due to a highly developed and perfected living organism not to be exterminated or treated as dead material, or as mere section of a map’. a Canberra, now no mere section of map, is perhaps the best approximation anywhere to a deeper ecological city; but it is not only removed from Griffin’s original conception but far from deep ecological ideals. * * * * * The objective of the larger investigation, of which this is part, to gauge the extent to Australian which contrasted with American culture, contains developable will underpin under which many a sketches a culture, especially as elements (seeds) which different political framework from the bastardised capitalism people presently labour and local environment frequently It is not necessary to see the present political arrangements and the suffers. political course interested in charted as environmentally alternative structures: or socially disastrous to be it is enough, for example, to view them as far from satisfactory, or very far from worlds, talk those of the best of attainable to be interested in the prospects of turning things around somewhat, to increasing ecological resistance [negative action j against environment like^and ecological construction [direct positive action]. the and vandalism^/ There are several distinctive features of Australian culture that for the especially hope, damage^?, grounds give remarkable level of environmental activism that has It is worth trying to pull together somehow emerged among the people. some of these features of the culture, to look at ways of furthering the valuable parts, and increasing the level of concern and activism. Without doubt attitudes different towards practices, and cultures have the approaches, different different Indeed appreciation of, environment. practices towards, and respect for the natural environment are highly culturally dependent: for compare, American Jews and American Indians. instance, Most nonimperial cultures had ~ and where they still survive uncorrupted still havi. less much exploitative industrial and to not practices whose North, exploitation approaches the merely environmental control lost their of local typically under the missionary, colonial or imperial domination. in But occasionally, notably retained gross permit the of those than but to a marked extent depend upon such practices. vandalism Mostly these more benign cultures have however environments, environment sufficient autonomy the to adjacent Pacific, regional cultures have slow or even halt environmental destruction. Thus, for example, rainforest damaging projects have been delayed or blocked in Melanesia largely through Melanesian attitudes to the land. One important way then to try to slow environmental degradation, especially in the South, is to foster both sweepingly, regional cultural autonomy; socialism and indigenous certain for cultural instance land rights movements. differences to support way of Melanesian For, where the cultures have not been excessively corrupted by Northern influences, this is rapid and, more a comparatively activating alternative paradigms to the dominant Northern social The question arises whether paradigms. elsewhere the in also can differences serve Antipodes, in particular in Australia, to at least assist in transition to different less environmentally social exploitative paradigms. transition is unlikely to occur unless it is based on the culture. a Such cultural Can features of the culture and the social life be used to foster and make requisite differences? In the case of Australia, a basis is there both the / land in </* U culture, and things and the <L- appear sufficiently different from that in the cultures A of the industrialised North to allow (some hope) for Of the for change, at least if the natural environment is to retain some need semblance of integrity, there is little doubt. that is, there differentiation. cultural in is It platitudinous becoming the longer run not much prospect for the integrity of many local natural environments and ecosystems unless the in we Antipodes break from the damaging cultural assumptions and practice of the industrialised loose work North and towards establishment of a elements of regionalism in the North, despite a in some parts, rising tide war. of For despite environmental the industrialised North still appears in the grip of established forces and unlikely to budge in time - short of nuclear environmentally culture, towards a certain regional cultural autonomy. destructive concern less different disaster, such Though we who seek change can count on some support from minority movements in the North, nonetheless if we are to achieve changes, we must go largely alone as Nor is it task of paradigm transition entirely hopeless in the Australia because as well as the advantage of the ground and its southern KJ and seeds of cultural difference are already there and growing. But A like, most] new and more fragile developments they need attention and^if speedy location, careful cultivation Such a task is rendered urgent also by other matters of 0 environmental and human concern, not but colossal biological losses st the gathering signs of nuclear ykthrough rapid destruction of, e.g. r 3 war, tropical rainforests, indeed, mounting evidence of environmental decline almost everywhere humans now establish. How does philosophy fit into the strategy of harnessing regional culture to & A ; alter approaches to the environment? As i/ the title of the ^lk it operates in organising principles L okr the dynamic linkage in a good suspension bridge^which lifts the the middle, not as an idle middleman, but more like and design environmental way on the ropes of regional links A culture. working picture that the main components of the discussion together - a picture that also like most images of the more abstract distorts across the is that of a bridge suspension the gap often separating people from the natural environment. There are people, and the environment, and approaches by bridges to the environment, like so (Of course people may be part of the natural environment: exclude ' -hew that important overlap.) The different sorts, ranging from rustic bridges the picture doesn’t connecting bridges may be of very good for careful foot traffic, through the monumental suspension bridge at Middle Harbour, to modern high-tech bridges able to carry nuclear tanks and bulldozers over large spans. the But it is structure of all these types of bridges carrying the approaches that matter The spans are carried by the ropes of culture, and the pylons particularly. ot culture if you will. So different witii different cultures, carrying bridges see the,component in the middle d philosophy, but it might almost as well be sociology - not as part of approaches. It is better different to the nuts and bolts and rivets of the bridges, but rather as the design and engineering of the structures. types, computing It has its analytical parts, looking at the the loads stresses and on them; them - the social paradigms embedded in the cultures. select substructures Philosophy, the link subject is then the architecture and engineering of the business. 5 their and it also has its more holistic elements, considering the bridges themselves and of components, philosophy figuratively, Less assumptions that is, to be considered for deep ecology, asks deeper of assumptions assumptions replacement, and deeper questions, of example free fundamenta] the other subjects and assembling the intellectual assumptions all paradigms. for extracting embodied in a culture or social way or life, i.e. social operative Philosophy, especially metaphysics and not or marxist philosophies. enterprise the assembles ancl culture applied in environmental practices, the assumptions, a of isolates In what are sometimes called the tills respect philosophy - which includes much more than conceptual analysis - is first among the intellectual subjects, logic, as the science of reasoning, is the first among the sciences, investigating the form of arguments and methodology of all other sciences. philosophical investigation 1'he assumptions deeper such when put together yield a philosophy in extracts, ci c^y the more popular sense (as e.g. in philosophy of life or , the free enterprise 4 philosophy): any in case the will be a philosophical theory or the result rudiments of a philosophical paradigm, depending on how it is done. By largely philosophical investigation then, of assumptions the techniques we try with contrasted operative test to apparent we trij.ce Northern social paradigms; the adequacy social of and especially as alternatives with some environmental support So much has already been accomplished, in a rough and ready way, and some base. results are illustrated in diagram^ • J. s. Details of other positions, the old /and culture positions (as typically offer environmental a projected), transition alternative And from are left and the counter included in the diagram the while new the dominant it may Wester/l paradigm appear to indeed is - a long political way from the dominant paradigm to the environmental alternative, of the and by sociological assemblage, the organise the intermediate steps is not so great; each and the steps can, and have, been To illustrate the way transitions can taken one at a time. of the first line (row) in macro-economic form. details construed components package typically includes environmient , as this to minimal quality life of But the and with subtractions for externalities such as noise and and pollution, perhaps *--- —, M with additions for non-material features excluded in dominant consciousness. this way we arrive si Mew left thinking with the objective subject to considerable reservations, X(RR). of material goes back philosophy; Greek to In growth The real break however comes with members of the counterculture, the hippies and Yippiesy for example, though idea the objective functin to be maximized gets much complicated, A the so such in a rough way stanadard of living. representing as consider The dominant objective is to maximize some economic package of goods and services being made, be the namely, the abandonment of growth and maximization objectives altogether, for less material nonmaximizing goals At the macroeconopic level, the idea gets^represented by the goal of a steady-state or sustain able economy, though the alternative environmental objective will be for something much less inflexible and ^rationalistic than economists have so tar sketched. I In fact the "emerging steady-state paradigm", which Daly/ ' for example^/advocates, affords only a shallow alternative to the dominant paradigm, differing only as to growth and paradigms would include steady state position; remove the transition. convenient reserves themes. But a fuller diagram of among others such advanced corporate capitalism - the so it would involve a JI simplification over higher-dimensional diagram, and of the two dimensional left-right However, the high" dimensional diagram indicates how a better argued A transition ,can be made; essentially by combining steady-state arguments against 0 macroeconomic growth and stocks assumptions with the Left -yocialist case against Even so, even with the combin/catioms, which does touch themes. Cl human relations , ^anthropocentric framework would not have been left behind, microeconomic T deeper environmental concern would have only began to enter 7 G-fiP Reaching behind the dominant Western paradigm so outlined to the underlying model takes us towards the following familiar picture: social society consists of a set of individual humans of decidedly impoverished type, e.g. they are not genuinely interrelated, so they are isolated, and, though they are the only sort of items that have intensional (mental) features, they have (e.g. certain a to ability few but of these At bottom, these individuals have calculate). utilities, reflecting preferences or self-interests, which they aim to maximize; and competitive (by virtue of scarcity). are they so that they are possessive, and possess capital. The distinctive the means Their other feature is production, of to this about self-interested Features There is nothing compulsory, or Individuals picture. this are individuals competing these approximating matter of particularly nurture, abstract nature. not of the American economic archtype are a matter of culture, a result oi training, not human nature, as a comparison where their To ensure the initial argument, on this model, for the coercive is apparatus of the (minimal) state. natural, land, of the American model is of course is that feature individuals can separately accumulate the means of production. entitlement e.g. individuals are like not helps this, individuals embody rationality either: with othei' show. traditional cultures, lior do these archtypal only a question-begging argument leads to the American model as something naturally required. The transitions to the left already go beyond the American model. introduces certain The relations. human chauvinistic (anthropocentric) but they do not left omit models are social The left still human relations: the further big step to the environmental alternative is to widen these relations to full community relations, independent value. That recognising is a creatures and nonhuman things as of bigger step, a step that no Western political institutions make requisite allowance for, Western value theories do not accommodate. 8 and that mainstream underpinning The arguments from traditional cultures can also be illustrated the and paradigms cultures such as those models Melanesia of them. underlie that and directed Polynesia, the In traditional of many against the operative assumptions of the Northern social paradigms are, very reasonably, not accepted. Where these cultures still prevail with some measure of regional autonomy, there is good prospect more thwarting of destructive practices. environmentally Features of the local culture can be immediately harnessed. But much of the inhabited and there are already observable features distinctive unscathed World in questioned, let alone overthrown, especially among the managerial other, even or lesser, of features not exhaust features of the accompanying out leave There are cultures significant as artistic and intellectual to icing. be This discerned, sure, does affords European culture This alternatives. a have an somewhat as that in romanticism and a significant feature of American Indian gives the basis of the aesthetic route to environmental But there are as well more important omissions and discrepancies In particular, the dominant American paradigm religion; but Northern features. precarious foothold for an aesthetic approach to the environment, such evidenced So conspicuous other usually cultural industrial culture, though economically dominated accompanying classes The incomplete social paradigms outlined do cultural features to be considered surprisingly Although the cultures will have to be invoked if change in approach is to be hastened in this way. rather now cultures, World New is Northern paradigms have hardly been sufficiently dominant the less environmentally peoples of predominantly European stock. by governed of assumptions and New also neglected are many prominent values of American culture. 9 omits reference to established of the connected older and formerly more The American search tor environmentally acceptable has alternatives regularly turned to these omitted features of American culture, and religious or Indeed the primary attempts to spiritual elements, and associated past values . "the gospel of ecology" and displace the dominant paradigm have taken establish a spiritual route, a quasi-religious way. and sample (For example, Nash provides a list of the books he considers important in the rise of the representative virtually all that proceed beyond ecology new environmentalism: depend on an appeal to religious elements, to divine or sacred features of natural things.) In the context of American culture the appeal something to be said for it. to proportion do act in accordance and, unlike with response. And, secondly, religious values do clash with dominant Northern paradigm. has features For, firstly, a high proportion of the American population profess some active religious commitment; substantial religious This sort of that conflict the was Australia, socially precepts approved of perceived, considerable puzzlement, by colonised cultures, as Lini reports in the a case the with of Melanesian society (p.9): The fabric of this society, with its inherent communal discipline was ... torn by the arrival of European commercial practices which carried with it the message of materialism, together with the creed of enlightened self-interest. Both aspects were a direct contradiction of Melanesian values and priorities. The introduction to Melanesia of Christianity added a further element of division and confusion in the minds of the people. While the Christian religion was widely compatible with the ethics and principles of Melanesian communalism, with its emphasis on mutuality, compassion and caring for one another, it was a practice that very few of the Europeans appeared to follow. It ran also contrary to the religion of individualism and self-interest, which not just (had) more important exponents, but was followed by the majority of Europeans ... It is something a a puzzle how the assimilation of elements of the dominant Northern paradigm with prospects of Christianity is pulled off, though achieved it certainly is in a great many Northerners, and too many Antipodeans. a partial answer: compartmentalisation. 10 There is Religion tor most is a separate thing fitted into a Sunday morning box, important elements of which do not upset the business standard week. such as human poverty: to Thus for most believers religion does not Only for a minority does it directly penetrate deep. escape touch immediate matters why should we expect it to work for the Environment? Nonetheless widespread real adoption of religious perceptions the within American population, and^reflected in the Administration, would presumably alter things. but even if some of the effects of a religious return would beneficial, and domination nature were be negative Religion could be more of a drawback than an asset. with any depth to it appears most unlikely. scientific world Unless moreover the position abandoned in favour of one of the lesser religious traditions the environmental effects would "the view". scientific (as for the case for its much virtue front-end-in. shape. trying in It return to the There is world view in such great is not just that there is much that this sort of view leaves out or social it is that this perspective, a paradigm, paradigm. So incorporates it is far from uniquely determined. more intellectually satisfactory rivals (e.g. view). rival view with these sorts of weaknesses But nor is the so called scientific cannot account for; dominant to the Consider, for instance, the matter of the existence of God, the fallaciousness of the arguments involved, etc. no testifies). Religion in America has lost out to In part it failed deservedly: view could explain. Watt In any case such a reversal world view was seriously deficient and it did not account more highly be welcomed, it is also true that some of the effects of a to narrow fundamentalism would be highly undesirable. of be a richer intensional the There are scientific These rivals allow for value and wonder in natural things without taking a theological way. 11 There is a set second quasi-religious character reasons of of some not tor sort, a These the on turn irreligious character of the culture, where an appeal through religion success. is unlikely to have much understood as (the a barely relevant generally impose Pantheistic or Jewish, Christian, whatever, on deeper environmental approaches in Australia. strongly to endeavouring first) ’. irreligious Australia, post-Christian has it society, in which religion (is) Even if that formulation character of understanding much else about the culture, the e.g. an is the exaggeration is a fact and is the society the ’best is said, been curious to extent the state’s protrusion into Australian social life. If an approach through religion is accordingly ruled out as a main approach to hastened j paradigm transition - and a related approach through mysticism or transcen f1 ism excluded for analogous reasons and because of the the earthiness There are other significant features culture - what alternatives are open? of the culture running against major elements of the dominant Western which can be perhaps applied approaches to turn matters features of the culture around. to more much detach effectively indicate To of from than quasi-religious prospects the paradigms, dominant paradigm, of applying consider how Australian culture contrasts with American. Australian mainstream culture transition from the dominant is already American political left has much stronger support in difficult to some culture. Australia way along the leftward is not merely that the It than USA. It is not indicate features of the Australian cultural situation which show its left—displacement from the dominant Western paradigm. some elements of the contrast:- 12 The next table lists TABLE 2. CONTRASTING ELEMENTS IN AUSTRALIAN AND AMERICAN CULTURE —-- —> SCALE OF INCREASE individualistic ethos inacceptability of socialist institutions inegalitarian attitudes POSITIVE inegalitarian practices ITEMS (PER level of consumerism CAPITA maximization quest WHERE imperialist drive relevant) extent of violence police and military commitment high technology involvement functional rationality environmental inactivism USA AUSTRALIA SCALE OF INCREASE level of urbanisation legal obstacles to environmental action NEGATIVE {practices, such as dedication of wilderness ITEMS administrative delays in implementing environmental practices, such as pollution requirements, recycling, etc. Thus there are some offsetting negative items as well as positive items 13 in the contrast. themes Since, however, most of these contrasting elements bear on first for opposed to American, it appears that prospects indeed This better. important environmental spectators the applying culture are theme requires ela^boration and confirmation. The task can profitably be combined with others: for the rival paradigms in a way favourable to Australian culture as of diagram in an with there is much work empirical here both and for environmental bent activists. A first task is to separate out what is known, what requires and their eommund'B, distinguishing theses: / Let us focus on transition theses, ought to be done (ideologically) what and normative and factual transition factual transition thesis, that Western (European) culture is weak A firstly confirmation, ^/undergoing a transition away from the dominant confirmed by several Northern sociologists (e.g. better results could be obtained in Australia; paradigm, social has been Presumably similar or Marsh). but appropriate samplings of the community have not been done, analysed and so on - environmental sociology being a neglected undoubtedly field in Another Australia. weak transition factual thesis holds, namely that since 1960 a significant percentage of the also ertreii human community in specifiable advanced Western countries such as Australia have to adopt main assumptions of the alternative environmental paradigm, come but again comparative—figures sociological work are entirely of data to Though impressionistic tells us that environmental activism is greater in Australia than OSA - indeed more intensive than piece lacking. anywhere else, an immensely build upon - we lack solid confirmation. sociogeographers to do. 14 important There is much for Throughout, as you may have noticed, a normative transition thesis has been largely taken granted, for that generally, l&ght to^undergoing Western and paradigms an towards and to rguments. the repeat furthermore alternative. environmental thesis is argued for in environmental philosophy, and time dominant from away variations (such as those of advocated corporate their capitalism an.d of the post-industrial society) , transitivity* shift, paradigm major a culture, indeed Western culture Australian to ought be complex normative That isn’t there fortunately It is also argued against there, but> to sum up the opposition case, unconvincingly. Given then that the transition is going on, and to ought going be on, ought then to be going on with greater rapidity, how is it hastened, how indeed do environmental activists emerging are enough. clear it encourage in Australia. Preliminary answers Not only should activists be continuing with what I they are directing doing organisations the and environmental and those like, to supposed action (public) further them, of industrial prluwryprimarily, regulate not merely by membership drives and environmental influence to and swing the should education. be dominant^ regional culture , for the w potential appears to be there for a considerably greater change been achieved. sources They should also be aiming to increase their support bases , but organisations. endeavouring the against than has thus/ There are two major parts to this further practice which can run in tandem, a more negative and a more positive part: 0 More negatively.it z involves curring down and countering the flow propaganda in favour of the dominant paradigms both locally but especiall the North. That is important in reversing the extent It includes Northern from co-^option a range of activities some with solid bases in local culture, such as gently lopping anti-American of of off the tall poppies and anti-Nor them activities. 15 pedalling the stuff, and careful The latter practices (which should not of course reduce merely to personally directed antagonism) fit in well aims, such as independent and nonaligned defence environmental regional other with policies • More positively, it consists in promoting and adapting other despised features It alternative paradigms commonly is intellectuals Northern are, of course, like those nonmaximizing making-do socialistic ones, of appreciation natural local The features to tye Lawrence). cultural characters are held (e.g I the egalitarian, along environments. with the consider the effects of these, decently applied, in or antiauthoritarian, A rapidly increasing taken to things, conomics, in local As for mateship, sure it could use widening, a pain problem being its I hra/sv restriction in communities promoted in Fair go and Enough* s with egalitarian methods as combines markets. cultural Nonmaximizing, for example, is reflected in the She’ll be right and It'11 do approach dften enough: and note, that are responsible for the low repute in which some of the ambassadors, and commonly culture that work directly towards themes of Australian of also to male relationships: (including cultural transformation: nonhumans). but encourage its extension So, to conclude, the potential is^for we must help to realise it FOOTNOTES 1. The term ’approaches’ is intended to include both theory and practice, espoused ideology and behaviour. 2. They did not go under because of the weakness of their intellectual positions. At bottom their religious beliefs, for example, were no more ridiculous than those of Christianity. Typically they were much weakened by new diseases, and overwhelmed by new technology often applied in violent fashion. 3. Another past philosophical basis for environmental philosophy, American naturalism, seems to have been little developed, despite the promise some have seen in it. 16 both 4. By integrity is meant much more than retaining representative samples of this and that system or species; not representative southern sassafras, parma wallabies and Torres Strait Islanders, but sufficiently many. 17 P X c 3 & X O P P x X 3 C P HX X 5 O 3 P4 Hrt CD P P4 H* CD X P H CD X p. P X O SS CD X CD X H> CJ4 F—1 CD Hi CD Qu Hp CD CD p X H P P H« P CD 3 nJ P4 P X C H CD . 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CD d CD CD •« a 0 a CD a CD O a O OQ a- a a p CD P P a p a a d P d X P a p O p d a2 P a p CD a a 0 a2 a* a p hD DO a 0 hD a aP a CD p ta p 2 0 a a> 0 d a CD d aQQ d Z P a d a CD d CD C a a d* O P r+ aa CD r+ d H CD z CD a CD d a aHi a- CD CD CD p a a CD p p a a p d d a CD CD CD ex pu CD a aCD P a CD a X a z CD o a r+ a o a a a O y 3 CD a a hi p d a P a a* a a a2 d d d a a« CD P p a d 0 a CD OQ a tx X P CD P cd oq s d CD a p CX CO d rt ex aO o d a V» ex CD U a M O • a H- F—4 CD CD CD OQ P F-1 er a hi p X o a P > d 3 cad p a rt CD art a d CD rt p CD CD P a X._ z < CD P < z"0 I—if-] ?o z o m z XJ i s hl hi Z >—] > ta hi z c on a tn Odd "d \ i—< saw a X H n H tri t- s O ' r-x > cd CD a p a a d CD a d a CD P — —— —• DO a- O CD O CD 0Q a d aCD p 0 d -• d a p x—z p a O a. ex CD d CD a- cd Hl p aCD aoo d1 d CD z-> er CD d 0 0 d d h • a 0 0 ex CD aa aa c Hi X X X 2 H* F—4 a- Hi O n d p s. • Z P rt H« O d P F- P a a a* CD cd a* d "d \ P £ a O aa < ex CD Hi CD d n CD z-> a r—x zO X kd a o rt £ CD CD a a d i p CT rt d a aa o < o CD 3 CD H- a P d VJ rt a CD d P c a d CD x—z £X rt d a CD X "d CD a rt P Cd a zO tn hl DO H z a cd n n a 0 hi a hl U a 0 XI > z--- X zO X > X__ z td an CD 2 H z > z 1—1 O s: o hi CCD H hi Z Z hi Z H > H 0 Dd 1—i  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Box 71, Item 2: Working draft of Culture, philosophy, and approaches to the natural environment Subject The topic of the resource Typescript draft, with handwritten emendations. Description An account of the resource Unnumbered paper from collection, item number assigned by library staff. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/browse?search=Richard+Sylvan&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bjoiner%5D=and&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=&amp;range=&amp;collection=&amp;type=&amp;user=&amp;tags=&amp;public=&amp;featured=&amp;exhibit=&amp;geolocation-mapped=&amp;geolocation-address=&amp;geolocation-latitude=&amp;geolocation-longitude=&amp;geolocation-radius=10&amp;submit_search=Search+for+items">Richard Sylvan</a> Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived <span class="MuiTypography-root-125 MuiTypography-body2-126">The University of Queensland's <a data-testid="rek-series" href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/records/search?page=1&amp;pageSize=20&amp;sortBy=score&amp;sortDirection=Desc&amp;searchQueryParams%5Brek_series%5D%5Bvalue%5D=Richard+Sylvan+Papers%2C+UQFL291&amp;searchMode=advanced">Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291</a></span>, Box 71, Item 2 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org">Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy</a> Contributor An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, <a href="https://najtaylor.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Dr. N.A.J. Taylor</a>. Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library. Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource [19] leaves. 12.25 MB. Type The nature or genre of the resource Manuscript Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context <a href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:32ab889">https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:32ab889</a> Box 71: Unlisted and Untitled Boxes https://www.antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/da79e877dfd528d678ba527ad6c2d477.pdf b61884f3fdbb2ccbdfb99fd2eead7fd1 PDF Text Text BRIEF CORRECTION VERSION THE END OF THE WORLD of the grandest philosophical problems are formulated In terms of the Hany way of the world, how the world Is, what there Is In the world - using, that vs, an uncritical and pre-analytic notion of the world. Thus It Is with questcons as to the nature the world, the basic stuff and components of the world, the of arguments for realism, the Issue of universals and categories, of the objectivity and of ethics (e.g. whether values and directives are In the world); values thus It Is especially with the foundations semantics of supposedly (meaning being determined through what Is In or corresponds In the world); and so on. But the under dissolves notion critical Investigation, and therewith many grand problems - often pressing on always on-going reductionist agendas such of empiricism - are. the The world one God, as that If not resolved, at least relocated. goes the the way of the good life, the meaning of life, the Bomb, one 1?^ ... theory, (a)<^ . For there are many worlds, a whole lattice of worlds, bottoming on the null world Into which all the apparent richness encountered Is worlds projected, allegedly ascending through the austere of the nominalism and empiricism, through the richer world of Platonism, to the very rich worlds of romanticism and Hegelianism, as lllustrated:- Lattlce of putatively actual worlds (p-actuaI worIds) Rn example of an austere world Is Smart's world, the world Smart would see for adequate Individuals science composed by (which Is set-theoretic all that upon to a world of certain counts), operations Uke them, but with no properties or relations (except set membership), no propositions, no beliefs, no lntent(s )lons, categories, no values, consciousness, nothing Insofar else. unlikely null world everything else - values, as It matters, reduces; the rest comprises constructions, projections, and the like. Rs apparently For where well everything -1- as the bottom world, the Is somehow fabricated from �nothing (even extreme Idealists contractions start projections), and with batch some Ideas of their tor Is a top world, but a trivial one which there Includes everything, all properties true and false and other, all objects both as existing and not, etc. Before details proceed very far, then, distinctions are usually Introduced, belongs In a world, to Its domain or one of Its domains, and what what between holds In It In one way or another ordinance, the In outlined type slgnlfleantly, (truly, Imperatively or by This refinement leads to a more complex theory of worlds (of etc.). which Integrates the apparently separate worlds of JB) Wittgenstein’s Tractalus, “the" world that comprises the domain of objects with “the" world as everything that Is the case, the totality of true propositions or of facts. But the salient point Is that after this Integrating there remain many worlds, many not merely possible and Impossible worlds, but many candidates for "the" actual world, wang actual worlds1. For Instance, whatever physically adequate worlds are contained In the selected actual world of a theory will also be actual. If Incomplete. These If that s what they are, do not prevent us re levatIons, distressing speaking as we normally do, sensibly and significantly, of and about the any than more fact that there are several sorts and styles of meaningful the Ilves along with a variety of modern lifestyles that are logical particles (Imp I les, not, every, most very not all at or us from thinking and talking about the meaning of life. Like stops meaningful, world, ...), the world Is a determinable, with the worlds of the refined lattice Its determinates. this By protested, that's ways and rendering of the world we unique enough?! we share’, empiricists philosophers, pretty mad, and ready to especially, are usually objections earlier, stage,or the world burst In and realists with a unique. Surely, suitably though perhaps narrowing the class of determinates under us, the world But descriptions like the world we live In , are still far from uniquely discriminating. It s and around live In, the world we share, out there of range the world , That Is to forget about culture for one thing; much depends on who we are, which subculture belong we to. Tribal will find themselves In a spIrIt-saturated landscape, where Qulneans aborigines live In a highly Impoverished '‘land". (But the aborigines mistake. But mistake or not, either can be what Is but about spoken Is a primitive those by speaking about the world In which they dwell. ) There’s unless we re something phenomenologlstIc something else. That, the theories, there, out which theories, though Is there Idealistic), objection what Is has a Isn't there? Something or other (we grant, but continues, Is uniquely to determining jA Is conflate worlds with been going on here all along. No worlds are not partial Isomorphism. But worlds too have a multiplicity, [to elaborate] What Is neglected Is that ’world’ Itself Is -2- a theoretical term, not an �observational one, there are Important observational components In any though determination of this or that world. There can be well as one (actual) world theory, since theories multiple world theories as Indeed not merely as well as but better than, data commonsense match multiple better, and only defective ontological themes force retreat to one world theories. to save the world, from radical fragmentat Ion, Ua Ismann Perhaps levels of descriptions and Ryle talked doubt, a given sizeable enough thick bag high enough, successful of of thin and thick talked of No descriptions. enough level of worlds? or corresponding reductions, this sort of trick will work, [explain trick] But It Is not how we do commonly talk. Ue talk - and this Just two world sort of talk was what the levels of description theory was designed to get of - of the physicists' (or Eddington's) world and the commonsense (or rid StebbIngs') world, find descriptions do describe, look we when at what correspond Ing the levels of It Is these different worlds. i i i » If a determinate world Is not given, what guides selection Is the choice of base for world 3nd semantical philosophical Investigations. As for theory choice, a range of factors do so. But there Is considerable virtue In taking the object-theoretic minimizing direction, which Is dlametrIcally opposed the to main directIonof empirical and positivistic philosophy, namely the way of richness, diversity ecologies I-type and features, complexity. subject The recipe Is: Satlslze those on naturally to common-sens lea I constraints on what exists and what Is true. Richard Sy Ivan NOTES 1. At least on 3 pluralist view of things, such as Is taken In PPP. Of course any non-trlvlal theory will rule some rivals centrally true from Its stance. For Instance Platonic out as not object-theory true so or not rules out worlds with their existent universals and Lewis s theory wtth Its Implausible existent counterpart worlds. (These other theories are at best plural1stIcally-true). 2. While Ualsmann's levels or strata are discrete, Ryle s account appears to- allow for a continuous alternative. Ryle s suggestions are explained and applied In Ceertz, p.Bff. 3. Hence the max ImIzIng of reductions? which has great technical appeal. I*. As will be explained In a later version of this paper, the theory of worlds 3- �given has very little In common with Goodman s ways of world Making. Indeed Goodman’s fletlonallsm-cum-conventlonallsm will be severely criticised. REFERENCES C. Geertz, The InterpretatIon of Cultures, Basic Books, Hew York, 1373. N. GoodMan, Problems and Projects, BObbs-Merrlll, New York, N. GoodMan, Ways of Uorldmaklng, Harvester, Sussex, R. Rout ley, 1372. 1378. Exploring Melnong's Jungle and Beyond, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University, 1380; referred to as JB. 6. Ryle, Collected Papers, Volume 2 the relevant essays are J Thinking and reflecting and The thinking of thoughts ’ . R. Sylvan, Philosophy, politics and pluralism: relevant modellings and arguments , Research Series In Logic and Metaphysics #2, Research bchool of Social Sciences, Australian National University, 1385; referred to as PPP. A. F. Ualsmann, Flew)/Serles , Blackwell, Oxford, -4- � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Draft Papers Description An account of the resource Sylvan's literary executor encountered an archive in which “all his projects were current", since manuscripts were undated and unattributed. Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document BRIEF CORRECTION VERSION THE END OF THE WORLD of the grandest philosophical problems are formulated In terms of the Hany way of the world, how the world Is, what there Is In the world - using, that vs, an uncritical and pre-analytic notion of the world. Thus It Is with questcons as to the nature the world, the basic stuff and components of the world, the of arguments for realism, the Issue of universals and categories, of the objectivity and of ethics (e.g. whether values and directives are In the world); values thus It Is especially with the foundations semantics of supposedly (meaning being determined through what Is In or corresponds In the world); and so on. But the under dissolves notion critical Investigation, and therewith many grand problems - often pressing on always on-going reductionist agendas such of empiricism - are. the The world one God, as that If not resolved, at least relocated. goes the the way of the good life, the meaning of life, the Bomb, one 1?^ ... theory, (a)<^ . For there are many worlds, a whole lattice of worlds, bottoming on the null world Into which all the apparent richness encountered Is worlds projected, allegedly ascending through the austere of the nominalism and empiricism, through the richer world of Platonism, to the very rich worlds of romanticism and Hegelianism, as lllustrated:- Lattlce of putatively actual worlds (p-actuaI worIds) Rn example of an austere world Is Smart's world, the world Smart would see for adequate Individuals science composed by (which Is set-theoretic all that upon to a world of certain counts), operations Uke them, but with no properties or relations (except set membership), no propositions, no beliefs, no lntent(s )lons, categories, no values, consciousness, nothing Insofar else. unlikely null world everything else - values, as It matters, reduces; the rest comprises constructions, projections, and the like. Rs apparently For where well everything -1- as the bottom world, the Is somehow fabricated from nothing (even extreme Idealists contractions start projections), and with batch some Ideas of their tor Is a top world, but a trivial one which there Includes everything, all properties true and false and other, all objects both as existing and not, etc. Before details proceed very far, then, distinctions are usually Introduced, belongs In a world, to Its domain or one of Its domains, and what what between holds In It In one way or another ordinance, the In outlined type slgnlfleantly, (truly, Imperatively or by This refinement leads to a more complex theory of worlds (of etc.). which Integrates the apparently separate worlds of JB) Wittgenstein’s Tractalus, “the" world that comprises the domain of objects with “the" world as everything that Is the case, the totality of true propositions or of facts. But the salient point Is that after this Integrating there remain many worlds, many not merely possible and Impossible worlds, but many candidates for "the" actual world, wang actual worlds1. For Instance, whatever physically adequate worlds are contained In the selected actual world of a theory will also be actual. If Incomplete. These If that s what they are, do not prevent us re levatIons, distressing speaking as we normally do, sensibly and significantly, of and about the any than more fact that there are several sorts and styles of meaningful the Ilves along with a variety of modern lifestyles that are logical particles (Imp I les, not, every, most very not all at or us from thinking and talking about the meaning of life. Like stops meaningful, world, ...), the world Is a determinable, with the worlds of the refined lattice Its determinates. this By protested, that's ways and rendering of the world we unique enough?! we share’, empiricists philosophers, pretty mad, and ready to especially, are usually objections earlier, stage,or the world burst In and realists with a unique. Surely, suitably though perhaps narrowing the class of determinates under us, the world But descriptions like the world we live In , are still far from uniquely discriminating. It s and around live In, the world we share, out there of range the world , That Is to forget about culture for one thing; much depends on who we are, which subculture belong we to. Tribal will find themselves In a spIrIt-saturated landscape, where Qulneans aborigines live In a highly Impoverished '‘land". (But the aborigines mistake. But mistake or not, either can be what Is but about spoken Is a primitive those by speaking about the world In which they dwell. ) There’s unless we re something phenomenologlstIc something else. That, the theories, there, out which theories, though Is there Idealistic), objection what Is has a Isn't there? Something or other (we grant, but continues, Is uniquely to determining jA Is conflate worlds with been going on here all along. No worlds are not partial Isomorphism. But worlds too have a multiplicity, [to elaborate] What Is neglected Is that ’world’ Itself Is -2- a theoretical term, not an observational one, there are Important observational components In any though determination of this or that world. There can be well as one (actual) world theory, since theories multiple world theories as Indeed not merely as well as but better than, data commonsense match multiple better, and only defective ontological themes force retreat to one world theories. to save the world, from radical fragmentat Ion, Ua Ismann Perhaps levels of descriptions and Ryle talked doubt, a given sizeable enough thick bag high enough, successful of of thin and thick talked of No descriptions. enough level of worlds? or corresponding reductions, this sort of trick will work, [explain trick] But It Is not how we do commonly talk. Ue talk - and this Just two world sort of talk was what the levels of description theory was designed to get of - of the physicists' (or Eddington's) world and the commonsense (or rid StebbIngs') world, find descriptions do describe, look we when at what correspond Ing the levels of It Is these different worlds. i i i » If a determinate world Is not given, what guides selection Is the choice of base for world 3nd semantical philosophical Investigations. As for theory choice, a range of factors do so. But there Is considerable virtue In taking the object-theoretic minimizing direction, which Is dlametrIcally opposed the to main directIonof empirical and positivistic philosophy, namely the way of richness, diversity ecologies I-type and features, complexity. subject The recipe Is: Satlslze those on naturally to common-sens lea I constraints on what exists and what Is true. Richard Sy Ivan NOTES 1. At least on 3 pluralist view of things, such as Is taken In PPP. Of course any non-trlvlal theory will rule some rivals centrally true from Its stance. For Instance Platonic out as not object-theory true so or not rules out worlds with their existent universals and Lewis s theory wtth Its Implausible existent counterpart worlds. (These other theories are at best plural1stIcally-true). 2. While Ualsmann's levels or strata are discrete, Ryle s account appears to- allow for a continuous alternative. Ryle s suggestions are explained and applied In Ceertz, p.Bff. 3. Hence the max ImIzIng of reductions? which has great technical appeal. I*. As will be explained In a later version of this paper, the theory of worlds 3- given has very little In common with Goodman s ways of world Making. Indeed Goodman’s fletlonallsm-cum-conventlonallsm will be severely criticised. REFERENCES C. Geertz, The InterpretatIon of Cultures, Basic Books, Hew York, 1373. N. GoodMan, Problems and Projects, BObbs-Merrlll, New York, N. GoodMan, Ways of Uorldmaklng, Harvester, Sussex, R. Rout ley, 1372. 1378. Exploring Melnong's Jungle and Beyond, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University, 1380; referred to as JB. 6. Ryle, Collected Papers, Volume 2 the relevant essays are J Thinking and reflecting and The thinking of thoughts ’ . R. Sylvan, Philosophy, politics and pluralism: relevant modellings and arguments , Research Series In Logic and Metaphysics #2, Research bchool of Social Sciences, Australian National University, 1385; referred to as PPP. A. F. Ualsmann, Flew)/Serles , Blackwell, Oxford, -4-  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Box 69, Item 3: Draft, brief correction version of The end of the world Subject The topic of the resource Typescript draft, with handwritten emendations. Description An account of the resource Unnumbered paper from collection, item number assigned by library staff. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/browse?search=Richard+Sylvan&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bjoiner%5D=and&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=&amp;range=&amp;collection=&amp;type=&amp;user=&amp;tags=&amp;public=&amp;featured=&amp;exhibit=&amp;geolocation-mapped=&amp;geolocation-address=&amp;geolocation-latitude=&amp;geolocation-longitude=&amp;geolocation-radius=10&amp;submit_search=Search+for+items">Richard Sylvan</a> Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived <span class="MuiTypography-root-125 MuiTypography-body2-126">The University of Queensland's <a data-testid="rek-series" href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/records/search?page=1&amp;pageSize=20&amp;sortBy=score&amp;sortDirection=Desc&amp;searchQueryParams%5Brek_series%5D%5Bvalue%5D=Richard+Sylvan+Papers%2C+UQFL291&amp;searchMode=advanced">Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291</a></span>, Box 69, Item 3 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org">Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy</a> Contributor An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, <a href="https://najtaylor.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Dr. N.A.J. Taylor</a>. Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library. Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource [4] leaves. 2.8 MB. Type The nature or genre of the resource Manuscript Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context <a href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:957e4c8">https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:957e4c8</a> Box 69: Unlisted and Untitled Boxes https://www.antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/81ee8015160149176a29c6e7277d4166.pdf f8dbfafa04f175a0e96dc872f5237aae PDF Text Text ��������� Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Draft Papers Description An account of the resource Sylvan's literary executor encountered an archive in which “all his projects were current", since manuscripts were undated and unattributed. Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Box 60, Item 1883: My engagement with social and political theory Subject The topic of the resource Typescript (photocopy). Description An account of the resource Draft paper housed in blue folder of large bundle of older papers on various topics. Note, one of two papers digitised from item 1883. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/browse?search=Richard+Sylvan&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bjoiner%5D=and&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=&amp;range=&amp;collection=&amp;type=&amp;user=&amp;tags=&amp;public=&amp;featured=&amp;exhibit=&amp;geolocation-mapped=&amp;geolocation-address=&amp;geolocation-latitude=&amp;geolocation-longitude=&amp;geolocation-radius=10&amp;submit_search=Search+for+items">Richard Sylvan</a> Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived <span class="MuiTypography-root-125 MuiTypography-body2-126">The University of Queensland's <a data-testid="rek-series" href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/records/search?page=1&amp;pageSize=20&amp;sortBy=score&amp;sortDirection=Desc&amp;searchQueryParams%5Brek_series%5D%5Bvalue%5D=Richard+Sylvan+Papers%2C+UQFL291&amp;searchMode=advanced">Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291</a></span><span>,</span> Box 60, Item 1883 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org">Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy</a> Contributor An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, <a href="https://najtaylor.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Dr. N.A.J. Taylor</a>. Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library. Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource [9] leaves. 10.13 MB. Type The nature or genre of the resource Manuscript Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context <a href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:a549cf5">https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:a549cf5</a> Australian National University Office Australian National University Office > Far Bookshelf > Second Bay > Top Shelf > Pile 3 Box 60: Ethics and Theoretical Ethics https://www.antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/ad201336c70df57d8530257a28f9c7e9.pdf 2cf05c0cc5f0c0bbaa9c9eaf56116252 PDF Text Text �������������� Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Draft Papers Description An account of the resource Sylvan's literary executor encountered an archive in which “all his projects were current", since manuscripts were undated and unattributed. Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Box 60, Item 1883: Draft of Metaphysical fallout from the nuclear predicament Subject The topic of the resource Typescript draft, with handwritten emendations and annotations. Paper published, Routley R (1984) 'metaphysical fallout from the nuclear predicament', Philosophy & Social Criticism, 10(3-4):19-34, https://doi.org/10.1177/019145378401000303. Description An account of the resource Draft paper housed in blue folder of large bundle of older papers on various topics. Note, one of two papers digitised from item 1883. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/browse?search=Richard+Sylvan&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bjoiner%5D=and&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=&amp;range=&amp;collection=&amp;type=&amp;user=&amp;tags=&amp;public=&amp;featured=&amp;exhibit=&amp;geolocation-mapped=&amp;geolocation-address=&amp;geolocation-latitude=&amp;geolocation-longitude=&amp;geolocation-radius=10&amp;submit_search=Search+for+items">Richard Sylvan</a> Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived <span class="MuiTypography-root-125 MuiTypography-body2-126">The University of Queensland's <a data-testid="rek-series" href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/records/search?page=1&amp;pageSize=20&amp;sortBy=score&amp;sortDirection=Desc&amp;searchQueryParams%5Brek_series%5D%5Bvalue%5D=Richard+Sylvan+Papers%2C+UQFL291&amp;searchMode=advanced">Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291</a></span><span>,</span> Box 60, Item 1883 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org">Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy</a> Contributor An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, <a href="https://najtaylor.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Dr. N.A.J. Taylor</a>. Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library. Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource [12] leaves. 21.61 MB. Type The nature or genre of the resource Manuscript Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context <a href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:78f73ce">https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:78f73ce</a> Australian National University Office Australian National University Office > Far Bookshelf > Second Bay > Top Shelf > Pile 3 Box 59: Nuclear https://www.antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/b7e96b71fefc9988ef3929fd7866bb10.pdf 5fb8e8a6531d12dab3e477279d64ead8 PDF Text Text l 89 - .r 1 NTRO!)UCT f 0N. Vlrt· uc1l ly .11 1 t h e ph i1os ophi.c ;l1 lit cri'!ture on nur.le a r war ls wr i t te n from ;-1 SllfK·rpower (predomin an tly Amer i can) or e lse European (mainl.y German, British or Fre nch) viewpoint. This art:icle, a f ter connecting in initial section s with Northern Catholic literatur e , adopts a very different Antipodean s La nce . Such re gional per spective s , whil e t he should not affect the morality o [ t he mat t e r, ,ff , highly po1i ticaJly relevrmt. eitlH_•t t he phJ.lo so ph i ca l li tera tun~, c>spec ially t:ha t emanating from th e als o a i l s th e test of morality. lt is c oncerned only or primAr i ly with what i s good o r "rati onal" or prudential f o r A.raer.i.cans, or for the American sl.ltc, t o do ~ whereas mora l ity is ind e pende n t o f place, race , natio na lity and t ile li ke . This article tries t.o take the morality of the matter, and the r es ult ing r ed is tribution of mora l and political obligations, seriously. It c onc l ud es, amon g other things, that th e Ame r i can and Russian states have no moral bu s ine ss putting nonaligned peoples at suc h grave risk as pre sent nuclear ar r angemen ts involve. Mtwh o f U~A, CUNTENTS AND OUTLINE: Itali ci sed heading s §3 - §8 indicate the ma i n structure of the argument Pag e No §O. Introduction. Nuclear vs conventional wa rs, and new moral l. i ss llPS . L,1 rg e-sc nle (LSN) vs limited nuel ea r wars , the focus on the f ormer , but the l mplic tions for the latter. §1 . J_l5)w nuclea r wa rs differ from o t her wars; wars and Htates, and the 2::.9s ulti ng l imi ted appr~riateness of older models and theories of war. War chc1rac t e ri sed. The e ss e ntial role of th e state. New and diff~r nt featur es o f nucle ar wars. 2 0 §2 . The mora l si tuation: the recent: tendE:'n_c::L of moral consid e rations -~-~~s_ome e_n t.i.re ly submerge d_ in_ the context o f war. The nncl e nt d ist i nction of morality and expediency. Strategic planning base on expe di enc y. Argume nts tha t war must be expediency-base d refuted. Mor a l i ty dues nol have to, and ought not to, give way to expediency. Uti lit ari a ni sm nnd expediency distinguish ed . Limits to consensus: s upermen and s u pe rhawks. National Interest and expediency assimilated. Li mits of st ate e n titlement. §3 . The initial a rgum':nt to the immorality of LSN wars. One ke y argume nt, from the wrongness of ki.lling noncombatants in mass, is pr esen t ed, ass es sed, and criticisms met. Ar guments for the premisses of the ke y argumen t elabo r ated. §L1. Argum e nt s f r om historica] r equirement s on ,just wars: the important a rgume nt from convergence, and env:l.ronment a_l ar~Ements_ . Argume nts from just war requJrements: di sc rimination; proportionality , p r ospe ct of success. The detailed convergence argument, from rival moral positions. Arguments from enviro1nental principles. § 5. The shift t:o nuclear deterrence: nrgume nts to its immora~-~~· De t e rre nc e seen a s the only prac tical way to satisfy major desiderata: p re ve ntion of wa r: and maintenance of pruden t ial values. Pure deterrence not t. he po H e y. De terr c nce ais prac t.! c (• d has i.ncreased the probability of nuclea r war. Th e first argume nt to imruorHlity of deterrence, from the pla u s ibi l i t y of probab-Ui.ty of Immorality. F11rther arguments through <l ~u n t i c conn e ct.l.ng principl(~S : the probahl ll Ly l.inkage. Refuti.ng the c ou n t e rargume nt from the succe ss of deterr ence . The way the onus of 1. 5 11 1 !• 17 �Page No !,ills on deterrence policy , 1.Jhi ·h cannot mt>et. evidcnlla J. requireThe second connecting principle: the wrongness of serious prc'p.tralio n for nuclear war. The general form of connecting pri nc ipl es; separating out t hose hat arc correct . Th e third connecting principle: the wrongness of se rious threats of nuclear devastati.on . Criticism of this principle lead s to further connecting principles, th rough i n te ntion and through commitment. Meet i ng counterargumen ts from utilitarianism . AppJying the connec ting prlncip1es to argue to the jmmoral:tty of deterrence. Arguments from limited convergence: pro- and anti -ut ilitarian versions. Other reasons for deep dissatisfaction with de terrence . piu,.,f Till·lll H. 56. ~£0Ctical ,___pru<lcnU.al and more moral arguments from national daugers Lo nuclear build-up of the ~upe r statc.s, and the genes i s . - of nu c 1 t',ff di lemmas . The tirgume nts from nucle,:-ir black.ma:!.l and foreign domination, and from risk of nuclear destruction. The crucial arg ume11t from basic ri g ht s and f11ncl;iml.'nl.al values. The argument from i solated people to superstate iwnoral ity. The supers tat e theme, and rea&ons for its appeal . The much less p0rsuasive de endcnt state theme. Ch:1llcnging the assumptions of tllr> undt'rlying rc latiatory mode]. §7. The rcsulring nuclear di~emmas ·- fo r nligned states and their _supporl e rs. Ch,nc1ct. er ot the nuclear fix. Subsid iary di lemmas: natio na l securit y vs 37 43 fre edo m nnd democratic arrangements; personal and role dilemmas. Features of deontlc dilemmas. Deterrence presented as second-bes t escape from the nud.car fix . The nuclear fix a fix of s t ates' own making . Interconnection s between the nuclear fix and nation-state arrangeme nts. §8. Wavs out of nuc lear dilemmas: initial political fall-out f rom th e ethical res 1lts. Tl1e inevit.c1bil i ty of limitation s on nat1onal sovereignt y. In terstate and ex trastate approache s . The Way Up and th e Way Down of extrastate approaches . Arguments for the Way Up, and the decisive case aga i.ns t it. FaiJurc of internati onal agreement s) espe ci ally on human rights and geno ci de. Excl11s ion of nuclear dete rrence und er the Genocid e Convention. Need fur the reexam i na t i on of current political arrangements i mpo sed b y the nuclear fix. Deficiencies in present antiquated politi cal a r ra ngen.ents revealed by nuclear problems . Further arguments from the nucle a r 1 ix for polll lc:il reassessme nt. The we . k J i.nk: the sovereig n nationstatc. Forfeit11re of political obligation by many st~tes . Alternative po 1 I. Lical arr;__ingcmen t s vs nuc lcar time hor 1.zons. 49 The rnultt-track Way Out of the nuclear dilemma. The main polit ica l mea ns lle outside state governmenta l apparatus. Laying the s pectre of ideo1ogicnl domination. Social restr uct u ring a nd devolution of powe r. Graduated disarmament and transarmament, and letting state sovereignty go. Dissolving the arguments f r om natiorrnl dangers. S .. a e r e si.stance to loss of po wer . Further lines of o r ganised act ion agains t nuclear states. Appendix 1: On Scl1;!1l t he fate of mankind and the ea r th, according to and Anders. Nuclear prophets a nd prophet .i c ru bb ish . The ext in ct ion assumption . Common emerging themes of Sc-hell and Anders. The extravagant anthropocentric assumption , and some of wha t is wrong wi.th i t. Second death dlsmlssed . The universal i ty of peril. The alleged universality of responsibili t y : the Pogo theme . The correct, but undeveloped, whole earth theme . Ultimately Schell offers little hope and s upe rf icialiqy. Nuclear war is war. The logic and illogic of de t er renc e. H 64 �.1,t . . .. Page No ~~~_cl_:!~~; On mat t ers of co lJective and individual rt'sp oirn:ibilit.y a nd on regional strat egies. Individual and state responsibi.J.ity. Opt-·ouL positions , and o.rguments t.o Lhem. Failure of the arguments, and the impact of group co peration . Arguments to direct obligations of individ1rnls to the nuclear dissociation. Limitations of rival political ob l igati ons. Dif f eren L pol ic y r e organi sati on for d:i ff 're n l regions. Shallm,•er and deeper g a]s. Th e important opportunity for deepe r r eo rg.nnisution afforde d by nuclear dilemmas. Ob.ligations of those in the Antipodes: what i. s required, and justifi d . Soci a l and ec onomic reorganisation in the An tipodes, and reducing costs i.nvolv1~d. Bloc kages to social and po litical adjus tment. iii 73 �ON THE ETHICS OF LARGE-SCALE NUCLEA! WAR AN!) NtlCLEAR DETERRENCE AND THE POLITICAL FALL-OUT Large -seal ~ nuclear wars raise cthlcal questions not generated, ~ Ll o r n~ arly HO th11 n e of even t he larges d if f0 r· c n c:' !n kln<l of war. invo l ve, and threatened sa id to so differ co nv entiona l wars ( t he World Wars ) as to yield a CertFdnly ma s sive PX hAnges Gt1ch as nuc.le:ir wars exchanges such a s nuc lear deterrence presupposes , ar e neither envisaced nor fully accommodate d by tr·d ltional theories of Muc h at forcefully, by previo us human mili tar y cncounters. 1 This is at bottom because of their projected effect . , which are often f r om eit her just wars. new philosophic al reflection and inveRtigatio n is required, even if r a ther wel l -t est d and old-fashion ed moral princip l es will se rv e as initial ethical ba se. Al though nuclear wars are, thus non ex i s tent (extrapolat e va r ie tiea, objects, 1 nuclear wa rs from n very limited Ia fnr, only a decidedly menac1.ng class of proper have several distinctive properties nu .lear experlence 2 ) and come in several particular, confined or limited nuclear war s, of which tactical or st rat eg ic ar c subvarietie s, contrast witl1 lirge-scale nuclear wars (LSN wars) - - - ------- ---- -1, The US Catholic Bi shops i n t heir Pastoral Letter (PL) make the point forc e fully: 'Nuclear weapons •.. and nuclear warfare ••• are new moral issu s . •. The re exists a capacity to do something no other age could ima g ine: we can threaten the created ord 1· • • • We could des roy [God ' s] work' (PL, p.312). While the independent analysis offered in what follows has a great deal .i n common with the Bishop ' s position, it differs significant ly in removing the religious backdrop and associated fe a tures and, it is hoped, in bringing out the logical structure of the argument more clearly and sharply. To illust ra t e the differences tha t emerge with removal of the religious backdrop ~nd its the associated unity-of-ev il theme, consider what happens to two examples from PL, p.323:- First l y, peace is possible without religious enligh t enment if it is possible wit h it: religious enlightenme nt is not an essential c ondition as there implied . Secondly, violence does no take all the forms the Bishops tr y to give it , e .g. sexual discriminat ion is hardly a form of violence, pornography an aper tc without it , etc. It ia a serious m stok e to try to heap so many diverse and independent issues together under the one heading (forms or violence) along wi.th war aa if t hey stood and fell together, e.g. abortion and nuclear war. Note tha t referencing , ·where not through an au thor's name, :ls by way of acronym explained in the references at the end. 2. an The isolal ed, and unnece sary, bombing of two Japanese cities at the very end of World War II did not render that war a genuine nuclear war. Nuclear wars proper will he very different and v ry nmeh mo re horrifying. Nuclear wars proper, though elements of uncomfortab ly adjacent possible wor l ds, ought therefore to be onfined t o merely possible worlds. Enough of their features we can appreciate without their being brought to act~ality. �111hicl. r1c'ed not howe ver. be unlimited 3 • explosio n A large-sca le nuclear involv es war of l arge quantitie s of nucl ear devices ove r a sizeable region; a [unction of two main parameter s: distr i bution. Such strnt.egic ) nuclear quant l t leo of a war war quantity diffe rs which explosivc n, ts markedly limited, nnd (megatonn age wh ere from by the a of t:,Hget.s it i s ex plosive) limited assumptio n, the to and (tactical much or smaller chnr.uctcr i Rtic ,111.y arc cl rcumscr ibed, f or instance confined in pr i ncip l e to military inst al l ations in a given reg ion. Though t he focus in what follows is upon I.SN wars and th eir prev e nti.on, limLted nuclear wars are by no nucl.car arsenal means a separate st r ike 1 s ince a is a prereq utsite, an d th e probabil ities of escalatio n of suc l1 waxs to LS N wars arc high (given usual reasonabl e aosumptio ns second iss ue , et c. ). 4 Because of these of follow -up or connecti ons, much of the ca se made acainst LSN wars transfers to more limited wars, as wi l l become evid ent . How nuclear wars reHultlng d-Lffer from oth er war s: wars and states and th e -- ---------- - -- - -- llmltcd appropria teness of old er modelY and theories of war. of war that has dominated mucl1 thinking, including strategi c two party (or thinking, A model is th e severa l person) game or, as a complicat ion of that, th e clan or trib e bat tle ~. A picture of war thu s refle c tion r e quirement s for legitimat e and just wa rs, which technolog ical on advances have trad iti ona l now theo ry ender ed of war, emerg ed, inapprop riate ha rdly and especiall y sometimes surprisin gly, as a result inapplica ble. of The made no allowance for such J. Another dimension of varia tion concerns the sequence of the war, es pe cially the type of strike :lnvolved. Though the sequence is j_mportant for the mo r al ass es smen t , for example of th e ma in actors , it in no way alters the immorali ty of LS N wars, as will emerge. 4. 'T he overwhelm in pro babi li.ty [.is1 that a nucl e ar exchange would have no limits ' (PL, p.31 !+). He nce am, Jor org ument. against limited nuclear wars: t hat any such war risks , inde ed renders highly probable, an unlimited war, and the ris k is far too large to take. The point in fact follows by s Lrai g htforwanl a ppli a_tio n of decislon theory, multi.plyi ng the mass lv e undesira bi lit y (mora l and ot h ~rw ise ) of n LSN war by 'ts probabill ty gi ven a limited nuclear war.-Giv en th e character of weapons developme nt and present communica tion ar.rangem ents, the id e a of a highly circumscr ibed purel y nuclea r exchange between the s upe rpower s , perhaps in the European "theatre'' , is really a myth. 5. There was a substanti al element of sport (and connec ted features of prowess) in t radi tional wars tha t bas been eroded in modern t echnologi cal wars. Nuc lear wars may be not just un s po r ting , in that no notice is given, etc. , t hey a re also remote and impersona l, and different ly unjust, in a mu h deeper wa y, �j phenomena ns mass bomb.lng o f lar.ge citJes, such a s Tokyo. rn1clear bomb.fng , wi.th And j t.' many occurred wi.th Dre s d e n and further crucial effects be yond mass bombJng, adds furthe r new d imens ions . Ycl lt is impor t a nt for tic argument 1Jnchors, Lo historica l were accounted unjust war l s essential ly a ma tter of states and their control: the Oxford Eng l is h Dictionar y acc ount, w~..!::_ is 'hos t .ile contentio n ar1ncd 'war' of content io n or comba t; cxct1i1nge is the actual e xp<irience . but other are not literal, but transferr ed, metaphor ic, etc. 8 proLagon ists, antag onists or players; means and or wrong. to elabo rate by means of forces, car ried on betwe en nations, states , or rulers, or between part i es in t he same nation or state' for control of the state7 ; noun linkages G to be awa re of what counted as war (the :emantice of the matter), and of wh Pn , 2nd why, w;-1rs an<l military ac tions Firstly , r e tain always a f nction of sens es of the States are the forces c omprising armed soldiers are the a nd comba t or forceful and typically viol_ent Thus wars ar _ external or internal states or their rule. (c.ivi.l), Thus too wars have grown in quantity and fr eque ncy as states hav e expanded , wars have changed as states have transform ~d, and nuclear war has emerged with nuclear states. lhf,on°tic al way then to eliminate wars is t o remove states : 6. An obvious :i.n short, wars ar e There arc interes ting si delights concernin g eve n the etymology of the term 1 war' , wh ich wa s deri ved from a term meaning 'confusio n ' . In particula r, 'it is a curious fact that no Germanic nation in early historic times ha d in living use any word pro pe r ly meani ng 'war'': Oxford English Dictiona rt ( OED) o n wa r, 7. But of co urse there can be something quite a nalogous to war waged between clans , gangs, multinati onal firms, even against Nature , and still more me taphorica lly against poverty, etc. To this extent , a strict definitio n of 'war' is being insisted upon. Even so the diffusion of power structure s the argumen t will direct us to, has to ex t end beyond just the brea k-down of nation--s tates. 8. Tn to thls category (si.n ce Natu re i s no naU.on) falls the ubiquitou s and unwa rranted war against Nature of modern times , wh ic h features just as large in Marxism as in capitalism . As could have be en guessed , someone .t was James - suggest ed channelli ng all war into "war'' in the me taphorica l sens e agai.nst that unarmed and nonaggres sive "opponen t'', Natur e. James proposed a s a substitut e for war proper, conscripU .on of the youth for a wa r again st Nature (see Wasserstr om, p.12). What it boiled down to, howev er , was that youth -was to be c hannelled into all the dirty work, in that way to acqui r e manly virtu.s mil i tary ac.tivit.ie s "rightly" i.nstil, especia lly discipline ;---but also service, devotion, physical fitness, con struc tive exertion, responsi bility, and order. Another less diabolica l sub st it ute for wars p r oper (in America n ecoropian literatur e) is through wnr gam es and other game s of competit i ve cast. Again specious arguments enter for t hose bringing- out the "best" in human males, etc . �.:1n uut ,~01•1p of ro llt:ica l :.ind asso ci ated t cclmoJ .ogJ--n l st ru cture, and are nltcr i ng by the s tructu r e. Wars j _Lu a t from c an thu s be seen as a struct ural problem of (other wi se defect ive) politi ca l organ isatio n of states ; they are a ional fix , n struct ural malfor mation . helps wa r arise War Thls seman t.ically based pictur e of exp.la in why th e rad ical a rgumen t agains t nuclea r wars and deterr ence d t: vo lves into an war-m akers , argume nt agains t aga.in st states . In the fact ( s<'1 f-legit i.mise d) on the war-d eclare rs and tradit ional theory , wars wer e r estric ted to extern al wars, which were coni:;tr u ed as t heir r emoved t1 e right of r ulers (p ri nces) to conduc t for certai n politi cal purpos es; states or the argume nt was that priva t e person s with grieva nces had access to the c our ts 9, while states did not ( wa r s w_re, so to speak, the intern a ti.onal analog ue of th e law courts ). But this is itself a very sta tist conce pti on of th• legitim at e place of wars; ll1c• scmiJn tica i s not so rest.r .i ctive and permtt s intern a l wars with i.n i; t ate s, for examp le t.o end wars, injust ice, etc. Let. us a h OW\ ) V1_. r to brlng out what is differ ent now - confin e att e nt1on - basic and moat famili ar cas e, extern al wa rs hetwe n two s tates or sets (axes) of st a t. es , two-pl a yer ex t cr n;il wars. ·ompr litive game s, could be won. attent uated form for some "victo rs") Lhc World vfars. strate gy. surrou nding trad i tional ly firstl y for mass ive armed wa rs, Like exchan ges such as th •re may well be no winnin g in ar e as the of No r thern very hemisp here countr yside. Thus, and the second ly, for laying the was te _£Dint of of substa ntially substa ntiall y oblite rated 10 , (cxe rcl sed and most as nothin g all worse off than at the outset of the "play" . are huge war seen, to settle seriou s inters tate disput es , is remove d: a nothe r point of diff e rcn ~e , the phenom enon of wars that prepar ed that: That assum ption still held good ~hough in Wj th LSN wars it no longer holds; is settle d with main protag onists player s It war; assume d An LS N war could involv e destru c t ion of all main Wester n metro polita n agglom e ra tio ns 9. to main Hence elabor ately f0r , etc,), but which can never be pointf ully fought ; Thus Aquina s a nd Grotiu s for examp le (see Ba rnes , p . 776, top). The argume nt presup poses rather a lo t , includ ing a neat public /priva te dis t inctio n . Put Aquin as's way, it looks as if it could be readil y t r .-:m sf erred into an argume nt for intern atio·n al govern ment, or at least effect ive law-co urt s , Yet all Christe ndom was suppos ed a t that time to be one state! �5 hence t he ineviL Bl>Je emphasis on .l:..l!.E.~- deterrenc e. .:uid ot her Lhf' e lements o f gamesmen ship ha d a role in earlier wars, but it was not pu re de t e rr e nc e . to mil i tary Certainly , deterrenc e, bluff, Lastly, tradition al wars could be confined in tar gets r egn rd s ju s t wa r s ; and military e xchanges. principle 11 This feature iG fundnnent al as for, as will appear, wars that spill over in gross uni nvolved par t ie s sac rifice any pretensio n to morality. ways to The special effects of nu -lea r exp lo s i •cs , e s pecially operated in mass, mean however that large nuclear canno t w3rs be legitimat e ly confined. l1orrify lng det a i l i n popu l a r so 1rce s uz0ne <lestr uc ti on, s hockwav es, suc h effe cts gign nt l c fum i gat i on s §2. a nd th e e nti re l y rapid ••. speed special effects (presente d in Schell) include radioacti vity, pu lses, fireball or firestorm e tc., etc. As a result of these of exchange, LSN wars will resembl e mor e than they re semble old e r - style war:s. The mora l s ituation: be c ome as el ec troma gnet1 c <lcv .,su1t .i o11, rog ue bac t e r in ;.rnd viru se s, com pounded Th e se the r ecent tend e ncy submerged in the context of war. of moral considera tions to It is particula rly important i n t he ca se of war to mainta in a firm grasp on the ancient distinctio n mo r a lity or local or nat :l. onal and ~ ..e5:..diency. What is done in war, especiall y between advant a ge, may be very diff e r ent from what ought morally to be done, whether the l ') . There is however the degen e rate idea of war as i.nvolving annihilat ion or extinctio n, and of winning a nuclear war as annihilat ion of the enemy whil e no t be i ng e ntirely annl.hilat ed oneself: the side that somehow "survlves " suff ic iently to r ebuild is said to "win". But this is, at best, an extremely t e nuous sense of winning , wl1ich in any case neglects the medical ev idence conce rning nuclear destructi on. Recen t t alk a bout winning or even s urviving a nuclear war must reflect a failure to appre ciate a medical reality: Any nuclear war would inevitabl y cause death, disease and suffering of pa nde~onic proportio ns and without the possibili ty of effective me d ical int e rvention (PL, p.313). Mo reov e r an y such phoenix war is r adically unjust, because of violat ion cf the tr adit i onal requireme nt of pro portional ity, and for other reasons de veloped in the tex~. Unf o rtunat e ly as doc umented ir Sch ee r, significa nt off i cials who are resp o nsibl e for the nuclear destiny of the USA - and so of t he world t hink that the devast a tion o nuc l ear war an be survived by Americans and t hat a gl oba l nucl e2 r war can actua lly be "won"! They re ly , among other things, on a n incredibl y low , and unaccepta ble, redefinit ion of "winning" . 11. In prac t i ce they often were not, they drained limited economies , they layed wa s te countr yside (though to a minor extent compared with nuclear or c hemic al wa rf Rre or mod er n min i ng), im poverishi ng inhabit·n ts, etc. �l all('.l" f u determ in e d usi ng the cod es :ind conv en l:lotH' Much t.h at oug h t war , of or othenlis e 12, not t o be do 1c i n wa r is do ne, for one (alleged) advantage or anothr·r, desplte modern m:i l tt ar y cod es a n d co nv ent i ons ani the like . we liv e not go in a rat her bar barous age : unremarke d, if the th e horrors of the twentieth century will history Furt.l1c1inore rn Ll tta ry t h i nki n g a nd ge t s writt e n as wi pi ng moves : based on "stra t e gy" disad van t ages , of mor a lly excluded actions, ·a J.culaU o ns. charncterist i ca---1J:x its is. that rur al populations, be come real 1o ss ib i liti e s, included in o t con,w<ptr·n ti nli.sr d0.Lcrmi nes (accurately) str ate gtc pl an n ing tend (.1s Nagel ex plains) t o induce a ce r ta i n mo ral numbing, so th a t a r ang e such Hllitarily its e xp<'di e n cy . by gains own i.t _o u~ !:_, morally, cons i d e r i n g and Eac h side only lo s 8e s a s a in a military encounter own its advantages and r e sult. of alterna tJve possible to consider those of the other side( s) as well. In t h is way stra t eg ic planning di s places morality . I nd eed l t ha s been contended that wa r should be planned and conducted wa y, a no-holds barred combat fought to the maximal (local) advantage, without l i mit s , moral or other (except insofar a s technology limits the means of eLc.) . Such t he class lcal through "bald an inc r emental a distinct nrgumen t tc.tt1s . g a r gument from an t ha t th e It would And (bu t The externally wil l be broken by each pl a yer in turn for advantag e . ext r aordi na r i l y na rrow motivat1ona l bas e i s assumed. the of li mit) escalation man" f a llac yi 3), t hat there can be no limit. assum p tion is t hat a ny merely s e lected limit (as enforced force, Js the so-called "classic " view of Clausewicz, oft: repeated. Cl ause wicz Lr ics to argue, reall y this Thus t oo follow from i d ea of a limited wa r is some so r t of contradiction i n nut i t i. s not, though breaking off i n the he at of war, or the s upposedl y l imited nucle a r exchange, may be s ingularly impr obable . c onfusion Nuclear 12. For a s Nage l c ontend s (early on), there are moral restr ic tions on the c onduct of warfare which are not legalistic only and which are neither a r bit r a ry no merely conventional, nor a mat t e r of usefulness. These t li cn1<•s run er Lindy co11n t •r Lo the. cll.llrn :l.c t heory of war of Clnuscwic z - n th e ory outlin ed In Walz e r. 13. As one l e s s hair does not, at any stage, dis t inguish a bald man from a hirsute ma n, there a r , starting from the hirsute end, no ba ld men. Th e prog~e ssiv e escalation ar.gument concerning war is an inc remental ar gument Jike the t e chnic a l Sorites syJlo gisms , formalising the type of fallaciou s a r g ume n t which shows that one more straw never makes a heap. Th e fn l l;i.cio us e scalation argument 'i. s pa rt of the so-called "logi.c of war ", f or more on whJch see the conclusion of Appendtx 1.. �i' war s thus appear dec i dedl y Cla usewiczj_ a n . for the l anc, r or players Still the !irgument is inc onclu s ive; can choose, at leafJ t J n sma ll er calmer wars, not t o e scnlate, examplt!, agree to abide b y arranged practlccs , t y pes of we a pons, etc. l· 4 A s t 11tc engaged in war se ld om sees i t self a s e ntirely bound by of mo ·al i t y: lt i s t ake n to be me r e prude nce on t he pa r t o f those attacked to take account of the no-imr oral- holds-ban:-e d appr oa ch t h e y c<;p,~, f,11 ly t lw 1 constraint s from the ot her s'ido. 11w~Liou not onl y as to ma y well enc ount e r, So 0a , h g1·oup po t e n t i a 1l y e ngn g cd in war f;1cps it wlw t o u g ht to do in mor a lly permi ss ibl e si. lu<1tlons , but al s o both wha t i t ou g h~_ r ea l ly do, a nd wh a t it can morally do in the morally flawed situati on s it finds i t s e lf. But the last question do e s not, in tli,1L cnsc•, r e d uce t o o ne of ex pe di e nc y . There i s no que st ion, then, of moral i t y giving or having 0:x.pe<.lienc y, even under extreme to give way to circumst a nc e s such as the prospect of LSN war involves . Fo r it i s not as if s haky con Ri de r a tions of give to the f i rm ground of exped iency when t he c hips are down, since often way morality eno1gh such mora l ero s ion does not occ ur in c risis s ituations. t hcorc~ical fac t is that both deliver f r om us But the the vnlue the o q'.: . to Expedlency fact, but urg('s , tba t does foreign takes local va l.ue s - o f sel f , family, clan, class, or nation - ar e conside rat i on s . proper charact risa t i on , a remote By cont r ast, mo rality requires, as a matter of its much univ• r sa lizable mor e univ e rsal pr inciples . rePultan t i1,tersu bstlt uti vit y fairness, eq u ita billty and of value and, And morality thereby imposes, through principl e s, jus t ice. distributio n c ertain requ i rements of general Ex pe di e ncy yields an unfair , inequitable value system, one tha t subscribe rs would not a dh e re to if differe n tly Ttie no t It assumes, or what really coun t, and ov e rride or are t o be max imized at the expe ns e of or to cruci al simply narrowl.y-co nstr;.icd l oca l a dv anta ge or powe r a s wha t i s valuable . even bound moral i ty a nd expe dien c y fall within the same, eq 1:. 'J l y f~lrnky or equally sol ! d , doma tn_ of v al ue miraculousl y are placed 1 :., . Jeep thcorcL ical u1 s ati sfact orinc ss of ex pedi e ncy, and associa t ed strategic Lhinldne , n l so Jer lv ci; from Lh i s faU. ur e of ·va l untioi1~:; pe r so ns X and Y are interchange d under 14. 11nd r es ults not ho ld -f ng whe1 i nt e rr e pla cement, from the same As Wa l zer a r gue s, p. 24. An histori cal ex ample i s the era of ge nu inely I imi t cd w:1 rs l n Europe fo ll owi ng t he hilrba rl s m o f th e Thirty Years war. �B . expr d 1e1cy assessm ents 16 • ic c~ n For expedie ncy loes not elude deontic presen tation: be pr er;ented as through such popul a r slogans as "local might i.s right", or ft lvcn tight formal rest•mb le charac terisat ion . The charac terisat ion will normal ly that o[ utilita rianism , except Lhat util i tic . are only assigne d to, or arc bi asse d in favo ur of, certnin indivld u~ds. Howeve r, theorie s of ut.llity ~ol have to he posi tions of expedie ncy if utility is 11ot locally confi ned. util llariun ism prope r is not to be dismiss ed as cnn Thus onside ring only expedie ncy; intcrsu bstitut iv:i. y rc'quire ments of morali ty ; meet do it Lt does not, unlike the me hods of war game theory, assign differe nt weights to the individ ual uti.lity of ( ce rtnin) Americ ans, as opposed to Russi ans , say. There are dc•ont.o .logis ts r egardin g war mora ll y howeve r signlfic a11t e.speci ally, 17 • which differe nces, between utilita rians serve to further compli cate the moral pie t u re In particu lar , utilita rian approac hes have permis sible, or to seemed to effect some to rend er justify , ugly strateg i es and practic es as regards ~nemy civi. lians, that deonto logical princ iples wo uld not permit. already and partisa nship , since utilita rians But this is would reject the descrip tion of pr.ctic es permitt ed under thei r princip les as 'ugly'; wherea s an a im in what follows is to avoid meta-e thical me ta-ethi cal neutra lity, though of course not there is a neutra lity. to achieve And morally large area of consen sus, or at least moral converg ence, from which ar gumt'n l ,an bt'gtn. S('Vcr al moral partisa nship, VJ.rtua ily all positio n s grc• that the obltter ation of major ci ties ln a LSN war. would be wrong, indeed morally outrage ous. If tltere is diss e nsion, as there may be among nuclea r stra tegists who seem to feel no qur.Jms when lt. comes to trading loss of some Americ an cities for some Rus si a n ones, s imply increas e the costs involve d, up to loss of whole nations if l.5. The severe limitat ions of t:hoBe l esse r ''virtue s ", nationa lism and pAlriot isrn, also come from the failure of replace men t which exces siv e applica tions of nationa lism easily engend er. Try for example swappi ng a person from inside the homelan d with one from outs i de as regards treatme nt. The point of, and reaso·n s for , intersu bs t itutivi ty as a require ment of morali ty, is well explain ed in Har e , p.78ff. Hare applies the require ment to make a telling case agains t nEtion ali sm (a case which exte nds to strat eg ic decisio n-theo ry). Nation alism, al ong with fanatic ism, is the main cause of war, so Hare conten ds, p . 72. 16. The case aga inst expedie ncy was develop ed in detail especi ally the critici sm of Thrasym achus in The Republ ic . 17. Thus the differe nces between Nagel on the one side, and Brandt and Hare the other, i.n Collen et al. by Pl ato ; see on �:iccesi:iary , unti.l moral repugnanc e :fs Tile ncounlere d; _!: hen try to work down again. fact remains howe ver that Jn the nuclear area things have got substanti ally oul of perspecti ve, morally. abandon or Strategic thinking, i n particula r, has tended to suppress moral considera tions ( as indeed theories of the state also do, somet imes flamboyan tly, in favour of partisan values). Naturally Lhe fact of broad consensus as to the morality of th e matter does not m ·an that there are none who would welcome such outrageou s happening s, that to t al nu clear destructio n of the North even, would be Cons id er t he w11rld ,·inpl r1•. be so thern risi.ng (hemisphe re) no one's advant3ge . strongman , SS, who has v :lsions of Wlillo l.lH' t,uperpowt• rn of lli<' no ·t. h rcm:i in, SS ' 1.1 dnwm ·a n realised. Thus his best strategy, having rid s ubmarines and ·outhern lands of US bases, is to try nil lear to exchange in the North, There would southern to be waters encourage a hardly an of US all - out point then in securing institutio nal arra ng emen ts so that potential SS's do not accum ulate much espe . ially given the apparent instabi lity of crucial world arrangeme nts. tlrnt is to nnt1eipnt e: lhc present point :1. has and tts power, limitatio ns, is an thnt ( t he fnct of) moral inadequat e But conse nsus const r aint without accompany ing struct ural adjus tments. For , typJrnlly , <lifferc11 tly to nationa l impose interest ls taken hosta ges or override morality, e ven holding civilian populatio ns kill:lng m111.lons in the national :i.nterest 18 ). unfortuna tely, these assumptio ns are not confined to more totalitar ian such as of those those of Eastern Europe. things. substitut ion of jus tificatio n; fails in The first, expedienc y , . C.!.BSSC,S And, regimes, But morally national interest can do neither the overridin g for morality , of morality, which the second, the alleged mor a l dominance of :important or irresi stibl e ethic a l claims t ha t dominate mo r e ordinary cthicnl considera tions (such as those conc er ni g nuclear to is entirely national simply lacks the mo r al interests , of cases, including , so the argument wi.11 go, the case of LSN war. 18 . As Sche ll blun l:ly puts it, 'What io being cl.aj_med is that one or two countries have the right to jeopardis e all countries and their descenden ts in the name of certain bel iefs' (p.132). However this way of putting it leaves room for ambiguity , since the belie fs may be morally grounded rat her than based on national interests . �Stales may i ns i st upon opera ting one self ish national interest basis , Ii:!. It nol be pretended expcJ i<"ncy (na me l y , that tha t of it i.s "group but n montl basi, as distJnct from one of ego1 sm " ). There no 1s special moral d.ispensa ll on fo r governments. j ndiv iduals : ther e ia no loe;i.cal diffe ' nee .ln the patter1 of jus ti fi.cation, or analys is of obligation. Morality works :ln the same way for groups as for For e xample , what ought to be as regards Xis (analy~ed semant i cally) what would happen as reg a rd s X in all ideal worlds; no di ff e r e nce organisation. extenuating killers: whether X is an · individual States such as Israel (in i ts recent invasion reaso ns aside, be having just as beeu conce ded , special moral dispensations; more Lhan tha.t and do not sta nd up to crit.i.cism. cannot immorally makes system, grou p or of Lebano n) are, as brigands or mass there is no moral difference. Certainly t here are gro unds on which states or individual or and it f11rnish two (incompatibl e) their a gents 01: have claimed , but the excuses offered are no A moralities , a s atis factory state moral theory or public one and a private or individual ci tiz en one - state expediency Rnd individual morality becaur;e thi s would lead t o violations of sub st itutlvity , neutrality, etc. 1 '3 ins t ance , a state ope ra ti e X could us e s tate mor~lJy impermi ssi ble ways, ways ruled Y are permuted . special 01 1t cover (e.g. to considerati.ons citizen Y in by state interests) when X and A group or organisation or pe rson can be der iv ati ve damage For bound of course by in virtue of role, but these are der ivative prin c iples - good for any such 1nstitution - which fit within and answer back to general moral principles. So it is also with a state which is an institutional arrangement justlfied ( i nsofar as it is) by the way it answers back to some least) of its citizens: its charter does not legitimate emergent allegedly 1orR l principles which convenien tl y coincide with those of state expediency . particular, a sta te is not 1 morally) survivrd . In entitled to risk the lives of many of its own citizens and of other p~oplcs and creatures for its own ends, even ow n ( at for its Thus it is not entJ.t led to do what both nuclear war and nuclear de terre n ce r equ l re, as will emerge. 19 . There a n ~ also othc•r arguments agai nst two (or see Routley a nd Plumwood. multiple) morality Lines: �11 !-: ' ) 'j.J. The i_ni t i<d argument p:1cifli;m yield arguments to the tmmora1 lt.1_ of _ LSN wars. to tb e 1mmora1it.y of war. But 1wch a rgum ents ;ire controversi a l in an area where th ere is no go od r·ason to Argumen ts be for controve rsial. Pacifism can accordingly be se t aside as a spec i a l case, stnce the immorality of LSN wars follows . All but pacif is t positions concede that war in itsel f is not a c rime. nil wars are immo ral, though eve n inoffensive wars may be pointless or inferior ways of settling po litlcal issues between states . wa r s who Not are Among more or l es s admissible th e inte rna tiona l " tourname n ts '' of arlstocrat ic young men or warriors volu11l'cer :w Ho ldlers nnd whos<' actfon does no t 6pi.ll ov er on to noncombar.an ts , a nd some early a nd medievvL wars , wh ere few or evet no combatants were kjl.led in war. conscrip tlon, Since the esta bl i shme nt press-gangs and recruitment of such of the lHrgely ceased to take these less offe nsive for ms; induction prac tices as near-d es titute, wars hav e modern massive war s are far removed from the ideal war-tourn ament typ es (which fea ture now only in ecotopian por traya l s, in ways that are in creasingly dub ious ). imrnornl, Most s orts of wars are because of what is done to the essentially un5_nvolved, but few to such a n exte nt as LS N war s . The first argument to th e immorality of LSN wars and of sufficientl y larg e-sca l e wars ge neral ly, takes the following form: Pl. The (deliberate ) killing in mass of noncombatan ts is wrong. P2. LS N wars involve the killing in mass of noncombatan ts. P3. Wha t inv olv es wha t Is wrong is wrong . ( KA) LSN wnrs ar• wrong. The parttcular a rgument g lven i s ju st one r epresenta tive of a set of Lhis type. the (KA ) t·cpL1ccs But the qu1. te 'kl.11:!.ng su ff i c l en tly 11v :i.l. crcH tu res' . Thu s t n ma ss o f noncombatan ts' by a cl~rnse concerning 'huge des truct-lon of 11.f esty l e of uninvolved or i. nvolvecl f ocus can destructio n cf li.festyle of nonhumans and humans fJJ i k(~ Ll w t :in L'., N war wJ 11 brf ng l a on arguments Cha racte ri sti cally, in Western culture, it is thought that mass kl l Ling of h11m<1ns ls a bout the worst th i ng that can happen. vadu tlo n of not ll fir s t uitable directly Other vuriatlons will emerge in the di.scussi.on (i.ncluding �th at: where the bracketed 'de.liberate' figures ) . The argumenL Js valid, ,1L t a .kcd) on the basi :3 but of may each be attacked ( and of its p1·emisses. has in ef fe ct been Let us consider these in reverse order. The principle, P3, used in the argument, that what involves 11 what is wrong" is -wrong, has been c hallenged on r:1ther Scholastic grounds. There are, in partic ular. problems like those generated by Good Samaritan arguments, purport o shot.J tha t some proper obligations involve wrongdoing. as~~lst.i.ng :rn in jured robbed per son is said robbed; but, s ince the ro bbin g is wrong, to "involve." providing For which instance, that person ' s assistance belng is also wrong. But thes e pr oblems derive from too slack a not1on of i.nvolvement; w:i:th a tighter accoun t of invo lvement th e problems disappear and P3 stands . 20 As aga inst P2, it may legitimately directed be argued against that mi lit ary nuclear targets. wars can be encounters But given the character of nuc lear wea pon s, LSN war s could in no way be co nfined to such targets. net merely the likelihood that many missiles ex plode off target, ther e are all the ot:he r eff ects of large-scale nuclear. bombings. fnlloul There i s down-wlnd from military pcopJc, es pecial Ly in the cas e of uninvo.lved co u11 t rl cs aucl tnrgcts US and For example, t he radioactive will affect large conc entratio ns o( European t argets , and may affe ct as Conn <l o. There may be an attempt to avoid the problem of massive civilian casualties by appeal cffcrl ) 2 1. t o s uch dubious pri nciples as the doctri ne of double effect (or side If missiles wer e c haracte ristically r.eliAbly on target, and one 20. The challenge to P3, which is often expanded to a "distribution of obl igat ion over entailment " pd.nciple ,, can be removed by a ti.ghter involvement connective, linked to a good paradox-free entailment. For de t a il s s ec Routley nnd Plumwood, where Good Snmar.i tan problems arc diagn osed. 21. According t o the doctrine , which is one concerni ng responsibility, we are rcs ponsJblc only for the intended e ffects or consequenc ~s of our freely-c hos e n actions, and not for other (side) effects or consequences, even U these are foreseen and/or intimately tied to the intended conseq uences . Unless carefully hedg ed, the doctrine is pernicious , a llowing those who suitably adjust their intention to escape responsibility for evi l th e y knowingly perpetrate. Thus, for instance, a Russian supreme comma nd which intended only to take out US military targets would, under double effect , have no responsi bil ity for the resultant effect on American and Canadian cities! Taking the i ssues concerning do ub le effect to a more satisfactory conclusion would however require a larger theory of action, which duly dis tingui s hed acts (what is done) and outcomes from attached intentions . �whicl1 was intend ed unfort unatel y only went off to destro y an unma1H1<HI und e r g round Such claims shou ld be reject ed : ci ty. dou bl e effect Noneth e l ess the circum sta nc es differ ence , for they m.ay mitiga te atti tu des to tho s e rcflpo ns lbl f' ,1 for firing the nd ssi.le, .·i.nce the the thr actjo n would be wrong, and th e ~.:_~:~ ~css nol ]c$sen cd by the g lv n lntent l.on. innkc silo course and destro yed a large ci ty, it c ould be claime d th.:it t.h ~~ (uni.nt cndcd) mass dest ructio n is legitim ised under could missil e j t was not as if t he y had del iberat ely aimed at The double effect princ ipl e confla te s [dimin u tion of] respo nsibil ity Assign ed for an act with the [dimin ution of ] wrong ness of the act. ~s agains t Pl, and as regard s the middle term of argued tha t there is an impor tant equivo cation . the br~cke ted term, ' delibe rate ' . killin g and P2, it The equivo cation is induc ed by be conc eded that de libera te milJta ry , e . g. farmer s or goods or servic es bootma ke r s or ente rtaine rs . used exclud ed as innoce nt . The s econd d~ten sible - versio n of pr emis s P2. other. for re a sons, it by proper ly point concer ns a much narrow er - and les s Bec a use P2 s o amende d is less defen sible, is bes t to l eave out the "modi fier" 'd el ibera te'. What is import ant for the presen t purpos es i s the moral status of what is mixtur e of tha t wi th the motive s of the perpet ra to rs. requir e the qualif icatio n 'delib e rate' or done, So 'delib erate' gets left out, equiv ocatio n is avo ided, P2 stands , and so does Pl. not t he Second ly, it will be conten ded thAt LSN wars do no t i nvolve t he delibe rate killin g of t hos e a It no means al l inn ocent , many being direct ly involv ed in mi litary ef f ort, whethe r just as taxpay ers or as s upplie r s of not be charge d firs tly that noncom batant s, insofa r as they are distin guish able, by and ma y of genuin e innoc ents is imperm issible , two challe nges will be made . will b are While it will Pl For Pl do es 'int e ntiona l' or the like. 22 Admit tedly nlso 'nonco mbat a nt' is a fuzzy term , but none the worse for that, and Lhere is no seriou s p·o blem in markin g out a class of clear noncom batant s, people who a rc not <lir cctly involv ed i n the comman d and J.s, mnrco v'r, no need to adopt action chains . There the prncti c e , derivi ng from catho li c ism, of statin g rn init i.al verslo n of Pl in terms of in noce nts at l e ast as proble matic 22. Despit e Na3el ' s sugge stion that it does (p.158 ). The sugge stion depend s upon oimila r mistak en assim ilati ons , of ac t wi t h intent ion, and wrong ness with respo nsibil ity, to t ho se of the double effect doctri ne. �,1 rlns:; ":'i ,c mnk.t~ t,-,nt of r~on ,~omb:1t ants to try t:(, endenvourlng c..hnrac t er i z .. , -- Rnd then i:h c dif f ic11.Lt transiti.on to noncombatants. there Nnt only can arguments aga i ns t the premlsses of the argument be met, .tr,~ for ;ir311mcnts the prt:'ndsses, thongh for t he subc-tant iv e moral premiss Pl and Lhcy aru of the cha tacterlstlcally nonconclu sive moral sor t tend will For examp le, one argument for v3ry sowcwhat with th e underlyi ng ethical th e ory. Pl, .rnd for objecting to the kil l ing of non~ombatan ts, ts the Kant i a n one, (to poi.nt) , re s pect: owe d to tnem a<· pc so ns mi n f nn l from -~_gume nts §4 . the understate sc,rio usly doing so 23 histori_ca~ __ ..::_e~qu i rcm nts on wars, just ur dreamed by conlemporary "free·-enl<'. rp r fs c" cap:l. Lalist st.ale (and opponents communis t im portant the The conclusion t hat LS,' wars cacno t be justly waged - nnd accordingly are ?njustified - 1e that fail s to treat them with the .0..1~Jl~l5:!..'..~- from con-:_er_ger~£:::J and cnv.t ronment al arguments . r.;omet. lti to of is Americ a inspired, me r ely not or et c), th e of same The conclus ion fnlls out of vc1rlouR trc1dj t i0nc1l requirements, worked out i.n mediev al t:irnt•s , (or jusL wars. first One of t h e r equi r ements gives but a varia nt on the ;>1 :irgumen t (KA). · 1 For a necesso r y co nd i Lion for fighting a wat· justly was th a t it to no t be the case t hat large numb e rs of [innocent] noncombatants are bound killc.:<l (cf. be Barnes , p .77.5) . A just war req ui res just means , that t he war should be fought by morally which impli es in partic ula r that there is no indis c riminate killing of noncombatants . The implied principle was escapsulated in a princi pl e legitimate of means , discrimination (betwee n combata nts and othe rs) whi c h 'prohibits all actions directly intended to take the lives of p.312) /. ~:, . civilians and of noncombatants' (PL, LSN wars, where not only military installations are targeted, violate ') ( I.lits ·cqulremcnt '' . 7.3. Of course there are co~nterarg uments too , and not merely from t c military in the case of small numbers of obst r uc tive noncomb a tants. One ;.rngLP favored argument is a va r i at ion on the Bald Man: the re is no clear line between combatants and noncombata11ts. Howe v er a s Nag el a rgues (p . 20) there in are distinctions between t hem, firstly in terms of thei r roles , e.g. c,irry-Lng or u!,in? ;irm · o r dircc . ing t. lnBe who do, a nd s econdly in terms of See a l so PL , p.312, where a their liarmf.uJ.ness , the threat they offe r. uj rr.p1, and ef fec ive paradigm case nrg11mcnt is up pli ed . 2 1~. Note th at throughout, tile• te:xt adopts Llie OED eq u.:itio ns, reflecting common lust wit h mo~ally right or correct, and unjust with morally usage. of �- - - -··---·-- Overlapping the requirement of Just means is thac 6f being that of net evil to net good: pro ro rLi on cor; tr-: up proporclonality, 'the damage to be infljcted and lnc urn.> d by the war must be pro porti.onate to the good ex pect ed the damage and costs , req 1irement: disproportio nate to goods moral pr0p0 rt lonnl ·l ty re qui.r ement i R er i t1! rlon of the which doctrine through war . "improvement" ln achieved of confined, nationally no t ar that way. ov e r a ll co n sequences of abstaining i mprov ement "puts wrongs to righ ts": c ondi. tion s "nmel.ioratlve " wn y the 'a nation wages war justly than Similarly on l y if the for that nation or the wronged n8tion it is supporting have a decent s:1tisfy for bad, from war ' (Barnes, p.72) . LSN wars can in these conditio ns, as scen.-i:rios depicting the aftermath of s 1ch Some oft.h e lesser r e quirements for a just war are also wa rLl , nnd war According to the fl.rst, 'X wages wa r c han ce of be ing better after the fighting ends' (Wakin, p.20). no are Entangl ed with the justly upon Y if the overall consequences of wa r a re bette r, or less th e taking by p,312). 27 Tt Ls not difflcu lt to see that LSN wars violate this (PL, arms' the e :a mple that of infringed reasonable expectation of success. by LSN It seems that tl ie r· c ca n b e no rea onable expe c tation of suite success in nn LSN war ·- whatev e r t!il' v0 ry d lf !<r<' n t'Jy, cx rhanges . 1 lmilcd prospccUJ of: succl'SS for whatever the p rospcct:s of succf•ss in Wha t some sm11ll strictly state limited clltc , or nucl ea r is le ss clear cut is th e question of whether LSN wars conflict with th e requir ements of just cause or due fnu lt, and of right intention. Fo r One (by no means be arg ued to in various ways. c onclusive) way is Nage l's way, from the requirements of directness and r e l e vance in combat, the underlying ( co ntroversial) principle being that, 1 wh<1tcvcr on<.> does t:o another person inte ntionally must be ai med at him as a subject, wlth the intention that he receive it as a subject' (p.15). 25 . Til e principle can 26 . wars where t he targets ar e c8 s cntially military ones, and noncombatants are unaccountably killed "!nd:lrectly",would b~~ :i.ffe r cnt. Such wars are no t however excused by t he For such wars remain unjust on pe rnicious doctrine ~f double effect . on lif e several counts, e.g. they inflict disproportionate damage, e.g. As Zuckcrmnun says, 1 Tt is st ill inevitable t hat were s ys tnms, etc. mil i tary i nstalla t ions rather than cities to become the objectives of nt lack, millions, even Lens of mlll.lons of ci v.Lli a.ns w-ould be nucl 'lH kill e d .. • ' (quoted i.n Thomp s on and Sm i.th , p .14, where the italics are The situation witli strlctly llmi ted nuclear ndded ). Zi. Tli! r; i s riol Lo b e confus0d wi.tli wlwt lB very different, the vi.cious anclent doctrine of proportional response - an eye for eye, tooth for tooth, and so on - recently adapted by the Americans in their latest offi cial policy of fli>;,cib1e r e so0T1se. ,vii11~ted to the level " f att ack, �t hi i, ilc> p e nds on the s e nsitive jssue of the weight assigned to what are se e n as b:J1; i c human r1. gh ts and fundame ntal value s , a nd the extent to which just wars can b e i.dco J og i.c a lly justif i ed. Whil<': the ma instr eam pos1.tion of medieva l theory oppo s ed to id e ologica ll y jus tifi ed war s a nd "humani tarian" wars, these wer e was no L ck f' nitlvely exclud ed by the trndiU.o nal theory ( cf. lltt J e is wlw n 1.;o m,rn y arc se nsitive howe ver, me rit, ( a nd when issue s will ari s e again subsequ ently). a r g uments are not do There .In puzzling ov e r dubi usly effcctlv e requirem ents, dec isive ng a lnst LS N war s h i st orica l r e quireme nts Barnes, p .778). not simply commit argumen t s matters underlyi ng the Finally , these argumen ts from any presc r iptive fallacy; from historic al autho r ity for to th e mo r al c oncl 11 s i ons, but use also premisse s to the effect that th e requirem ents imposed, a nd nome times applied , were justifie d. As they are. I n the Christia n traditio n t here were two main strands of r eflectio n on the mo ral rightnes s or justness of wars, the just war t heory and a rival pacifist str a nd, promine nt in early Christia nity, but largely submerge d from Augustin e on co ntempor ary u n ti l times. Both exc lude nuclear wars, one strand because they arc ine v i tably unjust, the other because they are wa rs and This ls the involve beginnin g of the converge nce argumen t agai ns t nuclear wars : such wari, a re exclud e d from all ethical perspec tives, once remov ed ( a nd e ven, howr• vcr you look conse ns us violence 28 • Ht very f requentl y , when it is not) . il morally . a r gument; it The argume nt i.s not proceeds expedi.en cy that is duly They a re morally wrong the same as the weaker fr om similar results from the full sweep of ge nui nely e thi c al position s, not from massive agreeme nt of opinion. The deta :! le d conv ergence argumen t is an exhausti ve case by case each type of moral theory. Fortuna tely deta ils can be de ontolog ical a nd contrac tual theories l ead back to requirem ents 28. one, from shortcu t. For for just war These alte rnatives are not as far. removed .r..ractic ally as may appear. For the aim of just wa ~ theory is not 'to legitimi ze war but t o pr event it. The pr1~sump tion is against the use of force ' (PL, p.312 ) . And ~..£. types of wa r s a r c ruled out by Lite theory. However not all wars or violent revoluti ons a re excluded , and that is enough to guarante e the distinct ion be tween t he a ltern a tives. In particu lar, defensiv e ware are allowed - at l e ast for th e defendin g side, though from a wider viewpoi nt these too may be co nd emned 'the classic case [of the just war] ••• was the use of l et ha l forc e to prevent aggressi on against innocen t victims' (PL, p.311). Und e r rec e nt internat ional law, defence , narrowly construe d, is the only legi Uma t e basis for wa r; Roma n law was only slightly more generou s, in a llow i ng for th e restitut ion of eoods (see Barnes , p.780). �.l / whi c l1, it ha s ,ilrcady been s hown, LSN wai·s violate. w.1r were i_;ornctimes a rriv ed at or l n fact conditions for just defended through pr inciples of such moral th12ori · s , so tl,at a good deal of the r equls i. te argumentative been done . work already The latter point hold s a lso as r egards ut ilitarianism, where it has in c[fec t bee n c•hown that whatever br a nd of utilitarianism is maxim j.sati on utl lHy has is final ly ac complished, LSN adopted, wars are howe ve r excluded ut1· 1 ·Ltar1an · g r oun d s . 2 9 Tl,e reason f or suc1 l converg nee .i snot f ar to see k ; wars Llw l involv e on LSN 1:uch ma ssive infliction of pa in and colossal removal of pleasure, tills dominates i n assessmentn howev •r Lhey 1:1 te accomplished in utllitarlan Tilu s any genuine alternative to LSN war ls bette r 30 • L1i; ldon. The arguments ovcrwhc .lming so moral far case outlined against such mora J princi ples whi ch the waging of a n principles are de riv able from agains t some LSN wa rs. LSN would su bstanti ally wo rse are tha n exhaust th e violate thes e of the theories just considered). These ac countable, condition not ( again th e obligation to maint a in earth jn proper shape a nd not de grade it s systems : we do For there are oth e r significant war pri q•f pl es include e nvironmental ones, such ns : p,cnera tions, to whom wars we the r.-esponsibility to futur e pas s to th e " recei ved the world it". Such on" not in conservative principl 0s - howeve r they are finally s atisfact or i ly formulated - are bound to be vio lat ed in t he event of a n LSN war. §5. The shi ft to nuclear deterrence: suppo rt nuclear arguments to its immorality . Those who arrangements have had a way of halting - and if not defeating, certainly turning and deflating - arguments from the immorality of LSN wars , by pointing out that there is no actual engagemen t in any such wars. What i s being done ls, it is cla imed, quite different fr om war: deterrence is most important precisely engagement in preventing in LSN such wars from ever occur ri ng , as we ll as in mR int ai ning other fundamental Western values. it is continued , deterrence is the .9nly practical d e siderata, prevention of war and maintenance of values. way indeed Indeed, of obtaining both Similar arguments 29. For details see, e.g ., Lackey, especially MM. 30. An argwnent of this sort is devel oped in more detail, complete gc ner ality, j r Goodin, esp •c i £tlly 'Disarmame nt'. are But compare Hardin. though not in �a<lvnncerl for all tl1e va ri ous guises that de terrence is presented in: mutually ;.~ssurcd des truction as fnrrnerly, fle xi ble r espo nse as latter ly, or otherw.ise. 31 Su,h c1aims as to the roles and dubious, for seve ral reasons. objective s of deterrence If i.t t.rere, "sufficiency" to deter would be an adequate goal. s uperior ity. than th i s, and sometime s even a mili ta ry goal. In fac t there ha s renewed driv e for Pure delerrence can account nei t her for act ual nuclear weapons nor for orthodox Wester n military strategy 32 process decidedl y A first reason is th a t there i s much e vid e nce, despite pronouncements, that dete rrence is not the - the only - been a que st for more are Nor has deterrence set in motion the of disarmament to be expected to reduce armaments to levels ap propriate for dctct"rence . On the cont rn ry, un<ler " its" impu.ls e there has been almost unli mi te d acce l era tion in building arms (to pa ra phr a se PL p.318). A other major re a son for serious doubt a bout what sold 31. is being 11nder "d e terrence" labe ls conce r ns th e _proba bility f actor: marketed a nd deterrence has It ts important to observe that the di sc ussion is not restricted to one form of deterrence, such as that of mutually assured destruction (MAD), but applies t o al l for ms of response likely to engender LSN wa r. This includ es "flex ible r es ponse", since the lik e ly further development i s massiv e ret al iation to a n ini tia l Soviet nuclear raid. Part of the reason for thi s is the extreme vuln erabilit y of the US defence systems, especially the communication systems, e.g. to early strikes a nd to electromagnetic pulses. In the result i ng great confusion, escalation appears the likely out come . I n a ny case, fle x ible response includes massive retaliations, as part of its ra ng e and is ultimat e ly backed by it. It is a l so im portant to observe that deterrence as practised is not confined to responses to (nuclear) a ttack. The threat of nuclear action has been made in cases where a rival encroaches on a zone of interest of a nucle a r power. I t is in part because deterrence includes nuclear responses to what is construed as serious misbehaviour of rivals that the practice of deterrence raises the probability of LSN war to the extent it does. 32. As to the firs t po int, there is not onl y overkill capacity and the driv e for suped ori ty ( oft e n repr esent ed as '"negotiating'" strength) but the matter of counterforce weapons which are offensive weapons. As regards the second point, US policy has been de cidedly expansionist with regul a r intervertion in o ther nations; there have been r epe ated US threats to use nucl0ar weapons, espec ially to deal wi th revolutionary activities in t he third wo rld , but also in Europe in "li.mited'" nuclear war; and i n official military stra tegy no s ha rp line has be e n drawn between c.onventi.onal and nuclear weapons: on these and other r elated points see furth e r Lackey MM, p.19lff., and also Thompson and Smith. The argument can be pressed [1rLher, to the alarming conclus ion that deterrence is larg e ly a front, which plays onl y a minor, but justificatory, role in actual US policy. Among fu rther evidence is behavioural data: a government with a genuine deterrenc e policy would repeatedl y emphasize its strength (even when it la c ks strengt h), whereas the US govcrrnnent ofte n parades its vulnerability and weakness in public . For other evidence see Smith, e.g. p.46ff. �i.ncrt.:ascd the probability nrms-race type t hat of LSN war. More precis ely, deterrence of th e is being practised, which invol·es full-scale prepar a tion for Lota] nuclear war, has prepared the cond i tions for nuclear war to occur, and hns to that ,,,·te nt least en hanced its prospect s of occurring . at r easons also, connected with pure original setting), the last 30 years. the deterrence and with the For other "cold war"' (its probability of a LSN war has increased consid erabl y in The reasons include the threatening posture called for by deterrence, the propaganda, which comes to be believed, that must be promulgated to main tain credibility overridden or with ''sacrificed" a population whos e real for military objectives; state of military readiness; etc. The situation has many ther e sober analysts century , i.e. think before 2000 . is a high There are s e veral interests are being the dangerous and risky now been reached where pr obability of an LSN war this routes to such a probability assir,nrnc•n t.33 It wo uld only rccp ii re one in ' id e nt wi.th a 20% chance of leading to an rscalating wnr every 8 years between 1960 and Amer lean 2000. alerts, hav e been lucky already . In of nuclear markedly. the years ahead it appears likely that th e For the danger supplicant nations resources declines. and the worsens and the extent The danger is enhanced by connected increasing chance of the lot. 33. Cox). easily as the plight extractable continuation of of crucia l the arms of nuclear acci dent and human or t ec l1nical error, none of them negligible factors as (cf . :l.ncrease zones separating the superstates are increasing in sjze and number, with Soviet and American expansionism, and r e veals the exchange . number of incidents with a real chance of engendering nuclear war wil l race, on sidE? ;i.lone, have been at least as frequent, and sometimes , as with the Cuban missile crisis , carry a considerably higher chance We Full past experience copiously Such a sketch can of course be elaborated and tidied up a Even so every substantial point involved can be contested, and many are Another route to a moie than subjective assessment is to apply Delphi methods: weigh up the experts' a sse ssments. In this regard it is worth noting that it is not only ''nuclear doves" who consider the probability of nuclear war has increased in r e cent years. Amer ica n officials have themselves admitted that the policies of r ealis ing th e st rategic potential of counterforce attacks and of selective and flexible responses have increased the probability of nuclear wnr (Hall, p.128). �20 conlcntlous (thoug h not always for good reasons) . s e em s no way Fof better or worse, ther e to rna~e such an overall probability argument particularly tight; a nd ti1t: r E:! arc p] a usi. b le arguments , from the complexity of th e data concerned and t he conti ng ency of the future, that it cannot be made tight . IL is bad enough however that l.t 2-._~_ de c idedly pla usible that it proha bJ~ that LSN an war will d i st r ibu tion pri c iples) that it proba bl e that c entury. And that is enough a grossly occur this ce ntury. is immoral to decidedly morally on moral grounds, to change deterrence as policy is i.mmoral. For then it follows ( by plausi ble that it highly is sequence of events will be perpetrated this warrant morally to take acti on to avert the outc ome. de terrence highly is evasiv e act.Lon. We ought That in turn implies taking steps , presently practised. Thus present That i.s but the first of several ways we shall nrrivc at that damaging conclusion for pres ent super-state deterrence policies. The plnusibil ity of claims as to the hi gh or increasing probability of war h a s of cour s e been disputed. LSN The mai n counte rargument runs as fol lows : Nuclear war is unlikely , be ca use the consequ ences are too horri fying. The underlying assumption i.s that wars and the like, with ar c improbable. assumption. Unfortunately however horrifying outcomes, much ava i lable evidence counters this More th an enough humans have not shrunk from brutal exchanges horr if y i ng wars , or even from genocide, as human history attests (cf. Kuper ). What ts le!;s assailable than the high probabili ty claim, what the ce r tnin ly Ther e by, through det errence, we si t uation, since have already got into t.h e probA.bility. immoral of r aising The mor e detai led underlyi.n g arg ument s , then, to the immora lity of nucle ar deterrence proceed by LSN an deterrence operates by the perverse practice of preparing for thereby perhaps helping t o bring it about, in the sense war, against evidence s eems to support, ls that there is a non-negl i g ible probability of an LSN war . LSN a nd way of princ iple s mapping war into ar.gum~nts a gaJns t deter r ence of LSN war. mi.gilt appropriately be called deont:ic connecti ng pr inciples . moral arg uments Such principles The fl rst of the s e principles t a kes the foll owing preliminary form: Cl. should If 1t is wro ng that X s ho uld occur, t hen not only be pr ob3ble is it wrong that it that X occur, but, more important, it is wrong to directly �i ncrease t he pt' o ba bility that X occur . Thus, f or example , s i nc e is it wrong to ki l l a large noncomb atant po~ulatf on in LSN wa r (by §4) it is al s o wr ong to put the populati on at ris k and wrong to increase t he chance tha t the hostage popul a tion is wiped out, which nuclea r de terre nce does . botl1 of For simil ar r eas ons a super s t te is not morally entitled to im pose nucl ea r r i sks upon un invo l ved noncomb atants, esp ecial ly t ho se of third part y no nal i gned most Like "' t tuations . defeat by example , 0 t a te s . sub s t an ti ve Unless mo ra l count erexamp l es, the second principl es oc c u r s. probabi lity that par t princ ipl e s in Cl runs into dilemma. and of a c c ord i ng l y, Cl e ncount e rs to require complic ation. For apparen t trouble where clash of Thu s it may be argued th a t it is permiss ible to increase the oc curs X ord er to apartmen t bui l dings 3 4 • nuclec1r ethi s, d l l emmas a r e duly all owed for, Cl appears li a ble to t o avoid a greater evil. pilot who increase s the pr obabilit y c r ashes, in dct:crrcn ce , make that t he Cons i der for example the passeng er plane he ic flying sure that the troubled aircraf t does not hit cit y Suc h a defeatin g cond i tion do e s not apply in the case of ihe r e (though the r e explains ) wro ngness of a pr a ct ic e is not ls a of fs e t clash or of principl e s, as §6 removed by its role in avoiding greate r e vil. I L can be a r gued that it is: argumen t from t he pr e vious a r gumen t. de s erves lit t le perhaps f rom more such is pa rt of succe s s credence t he de terrence . th a n the of the popular However this inductiv e racing world As Barnett argues, driver's argumen t, 'the happy acciden t has surv iv ed the first thirty-f ive years of th e nuclear era is unimp r e s si ve e v i d e nce that we can avoid nuclea r war 34. point a s imilar time base, that because he hasn't had a fa tal crash yet (des pite some close calla ) , he won't, th a t of the in the coming era, This dilemma exampl e was s uppli ed by D. Johnston . There are more dif f i c ul t putative coun t e rexampl es. For example , in inciting people to c ivil disobedi ence, the ri s k of stat e violence in r etaliat i on is increase d. Thus, t o ta ke C, Pigden's example , 1.n encourag ing disobed ience, Gandhi i nc r ea s ed t he proba bility of wrongdo ing by the British Raj. But surely Ga ndhi, un l i ke th e Raj, did not act wrongly? It can be claimed that Gandhi d i d no t d irect ly incre a s e the probabi l i ty of viol ence . But spelling out what 'dir ec tly' means in terms of short causal chains over which r espo nsi bil i ty ca n be distribu ted - i s not only problem atic but leads on to ot her connect ing princ i ples. �·2 (p. 100) . lie offers fami.liar reasons suc h as the changing power incrt.' ,ise 111 Russian strengt h, the ri se r e 1aU. ons, th e of other nu c lear powcr·s, etc . (cf. simllarly Cox ). There ar e, a ccordingly, powerful reasons for concluding that Dl. De errencc will not continu e to work, and. more lmportant for the present argumenl, that D2 . De t e rrence does increase the proba bi lity of LSN war. The themes are of course i.nter related, and t he re as ons for t hem (which are again persuasive bu t in: oncl usive) can be t a ken together : some respects) weaker D2 ·- the probability facto r. proliferati on, the emergence bu t the focus is on the ( in An initial of lesser nuc lear powers. reason concerns As a result there are many more ways of starting a nuclear conflagrat.i on, and so enhanced prospect Some nnnlyula co ns id e r that lt. -i~i us e of nuclear weapons by confrontation a 11 lesser very Jf ke ly route to I.SN war l · th stat e . Moreover scarcitJ ;::i nd o f chea per suppli es, etc , weapo n systems, more or Lcrror s ltua ttons, deterrence power lnvolv e s 36 , being mainta.ined : costs Wi t h so many more Arms races, and interwoven balanc e of have an exc eed ingly bad 1,istorical track record. lncr cas lng as tl1c race p roce eds . of resource A second group of reasons concerns the Ther e is substantial inductive evi dence that pres en t for wi<iel y d lstributed, the probabili.ty of war through accide nt o r e rr o r is inc reased. powrr opportunities growing nuclear arms race which deterr e nc e, as practised, is ti ed to. wec1pons .lnltlnl to lead on to war are increasing, with increasing world political Jnstnbillty , relat ing to thlrd world economic de cline, and the of lead escalating eventually to arms war , races, with such as probabili.ty Next, deterrence dep ends on a certai n balance if that balance is unduly disturbed, as can happen during escalation, deterrence may well fail. A related reason for 35. that deterrence practice increases It can be the or etically a r gued t hat the fewer the nations weap ons, t.he l ess the chance of nuclear. war: cf. n 1clcar p .. 2JO n. 36. supposi ng th e armed with Lackey, MM, The standard ar gument for deterrence as significantly decreasing the proboblli y of wa r, would be decidedly better if the arms race were nbandoned, a nd weapons held at the much smaller levels required just for dcle rrenc e. Of c our se s uch a probability-well assumption is only one of scvera l_ thi. ngs required if det erre nce i.s to be just:!.fled. �probabili ty of war conce rn s the continuin g shifts in poli c y, US especiall y th e rcncwc<l quest for superio rity wh i ch is in creasing the inc en tiv e of both sides to rcsorL to nuclcJr war, the USSR t o avoid being advantage of ov erwhelme d, USA the to take superiori ty ac hi eved . 37 Rece nt dangerous shifts in US poli cy the tow;Jrds war fighting a r e .in part induce d by a much inc re ased accuracy of nuclear missiles, which both weakens the case for MAD deterrenc e (sinc e mi l itary tar-gets con be selected for strike and ci ties to some extent r emoved as hostages ), thereby war. also weakens the case against resort to nucle a r detrrrenc c requires a certain (admitted l y r a ther minimal, ye t of mutual understan ding, leaders, and even some nuclear. sha r ed principle s , cooperati on supe r-states. and soundness transmi ss i on Finally, impor tant) level judgement among of of and informati on between It is not just that t he increasin g numbers of operator s in n position to J.aunch nuclear weapons must remain of " sound mind" and not, for instance, follow through on delusions of one sort or another. deterrenc e depends upon judgeme nts seriously mistaken: 'each is regarding the other It is al so tha t side , which slde ' s threat is to the other' (P L, p.313) . we think' • 38 But about what the o t her considera ble , and perhaps catastrop hic , margin of evidence, that on e perceptio n of what is possible resul t As s ide side thinks e rror. Not thinks , there only not can be is a there sid e (the USA) has misjudged the other side's (the USSR's) rational, as regards limited nuclear war, of a first strike countered by massive retaliatio n; must now be severe doubts cffectlvc ly. "conv inc ing " There is a grain of truth in the c1a"im that 'deterren ce is primarily about what t he other what be a t the mercy of t he o the r's percept io n of wha t strategy is "r.atio al", what kind of damage .is " un nccept able", how one may as to whether rationa l principle s are with the but there operating to the last consider, to take just one example, the erroneous 37. The point is discus sed in Dahlitz, e.g. p.213, where the US quest for super iority is doct1me nted. The v.lci ssi tudes of US "d efenc e" policy - not to say its shiftines s and occas ional incoheren ce (as in strategic forward defence) have confused many of lts supporter s even . Perhaps there is some advantage in the ver y incomplet e and limited exposure of USSR war and imperial policies : we don't see, wit h alarm, their incohe renc e and i.rrntiona llty . J8. Pym, quot,.• d .Ln Thompson , p .19. Yet a fundamen tal problem Russi a and the West fac e, Lt is sometimes claimed, is not merely that they do not understan d one another but that 'ther, is a lack of a wish to understan d'. This casts into douht the psycholog ical basis of nuclear deterrenc e. �24 idea (alread y allu<led to , as he l d in hi.gh pl a ces of powe r in USA and in UK) that LSN war cnn be sur viv ed i n r ud ime ntary s hel ters , and also won. The suppor ter of det er rence connec ting rrlnci ple s ri val case. such J1as not onl y to defeat a rgumen ts Cl, but, more difficu lt, to fie ld a convin cing as For the onus of pr oof lies in showing that the costly ~:.:..!.~_rr.cncc Ls justifi ed_. t hr o ugh practic e of Bu t for from th e fair ly decisiv (~ case that i s requi r ed ( Lo contras t with t he argume nt through Cl), only a feeble case through the questio na b le obv ers e of Cl, Cl i. If Xis wr ong then it is right to reduce the probab ility of X, nppears open . • For it has to be shown that deterre nce ( s ubstan tially) r e duc e s the proba bility of LSN war , and st ri ct lt (this indica tes part of the trouble with Clt) that deterre nce does this bett e r (more morally ) than availab le options . o The latter uniquen ess condit. ion ce rtainly fails, so it r,.,ill be argu e d. reasons already gi ven, does the probab ility claim. up i-hc v ery cond 1 t:1.ons probab ility of suc h for a an LSN war, it So , for When nuclear deterr e nce set s can ha rdly have reduced th e war , e speci a lly over the situati on a mere 25 years ag o when such an LS N wa r was not technic ally possib le. More genera lly , i n showlng that nuclear deterre nc e ls justifi e d, it i s c..! l1 0l l f',h refute the theme Lhat deterr e nce is wrong. LO out that deterre nce is permis sible, or alrigh t. altcrn1 1LJvc pe rmissi ble courses of a c tion condit:f . on ha s to be est a bli.shed ; to be no t merely alrigh t , bu t ;H:cc·p ' ah l<' cvidt!n tin l ato nd nrdA, r ig ht. But I t is not enough to make For t he re certain ly seem to withou t deterr ence , wh ic h appear more morally satisfa ctory. uniciue ne s s includi ng fright To surpass t hese option s, a nuclea r deterre nc e has to be shown es tablish ing such a 39. LSN war s , withou t .(cf. Jl 11 claim, to fear or is vf.nunl ly tmposa iblc. 39 OED) 40 • For most people, portray ing the horror of LSN wa rs would serve adequa tely enough from be the costs or problem s of Deterre nce cons ists in preven ting someth ing (often some wrong ) by t hr ea t s not the enormo us expense , t rouble vivid scenari os to deter t hem and wastage of An analogo us point will ap pea r whe n i.t is asked whethe r deterre nce is the way o ut oft.he nuclear fix, the thin g to persist with in the circum stances . Given that there are appare ntly super ior, le ss dangero us procedu res , the an s wl!r hn-, to be, No. �- - - - - - -- - - -- - - - - - p r epar i ng to e ngag e i n th em. det t·r rl'ncc And deterren ce i.n a ny cas e de pends upon) is of by such means ourse not immoral . (whi ch miJit4ry (Sc.h e ll was not immora l in publ ish ing hi s gra phic descri p tions of the nuclear destruc tion of New Yo rk .) But t hou gh de te rrence per se is permi ssible, nuclea~ deterren ce, that is deterren ce by complete prepa ration for the object to be preven te d , is no t , where this o bj e ct, a LSN war., itself is no t permiss ible. The argumen t for this is thro ug h t he pr lnc J ple C2 . l f X is wrong then c omplete prepara tion for (carryin g out) Xis wrong. Hence since p re para t i on, LS N wars nuc l ear are wrong and nuclear deterren ce deterren ce of LSN wars is wrong . claimed th a t prepa ring for Xis just as bad as doing X: wr ong a n d Z ( mue h) worse t1wn i Y• wi11at W.'.1 S wrong. complete It is not however being Y and Z may both be 41 i s wrong i s b y no means un if orm l y ev1.1. " Tn 19115 Lhcre would ha ve been littl e doubt that L SN wa r implies complete prepara tion for Among the three types of crime s pecif led in Article 6 of the Cha rt e r f or th e I nternati onal Military Tribuna ls (which tr ied the major war c r iminals a t Nurcm burg) we r e Cr1- mes a ga ins t peace: namely planning , .:e_repar ation, initiati on or waging o f a wa r of aggr e ssion, or a war in violatio n of internat iona l tr eat:!.es , ag reements or a s surance s, or particip ation in a common plan or cons pi ra c y for the accompl ishment of any of the followin g ( cited in Ku pe r , p.2 1; ita lic s added). But af t e r ma ny yea rs of nuclear deterren ce, the become J ncreasi ngly liable to question . wrongne ss implied in C2 has However the doubts mainly come from 40. De t er r e nc e a lso commonly includes elements of mendaci ty, deceptio n, mi si nforma t ion, that is elements of what a re, for the roost part, morally unde sirable traits. Li l . Nor a re ordered be cause wrong, equally degr e es of wrongne ss required : wrongs can simply be as reg a rds relative worsene ss. The point requires some it has been quite erroneo usly assumed t hat if y and z cat egorica lly or absolute ly , then they mus t be equally evil. Thus, e.g. William s: . partiall y labourin g are both wrong or . there is no moral differen ce between running a deterren t st r ategy on the one hand, and intentio nally - indeed wantonly - start i ng a nuclear war on the other; so that the first is as totally evil a s the second. This is because both are held to be absolute ly forbidde n. Not a t a ll. The argume n ts from "Y and Z are both absolute ly forbidde n" to "S o Y i s a s totally evil as Z" and to "Therefo re Y and Z do not differ mor all y " a r e both ent:i.rely without validity . Compare : 2 is a number, and 3 lg a numbe r; s o 2 is the same number as 3, or does not differ numeri c , lly from 3! �26 a~sum ing t!w l comp l e t e prepara t.i o n i nc }udc i:; l ss t: lwn Lt nee ds to or do e s. Complete prepa ration for something, s uch as sever~] other fea tures. LSN war , already writes in In particular, i t presup po ses the preparation is no t ha1 (·-hea rt ed hnt is serious, is not merely for show and is not simply pret e nce. Obser e tha t mere pretence, or ot her more psychologic a l ploys, cannot substi tut e for comp l ete prepa r a tion in nuclea r deterrence. too sophistica t ed for bluff alone to Military succeed: t here preparatJon for wa r accompanyin g the t h rea t s involved in t he ot her hand , has to is now be serious deterr ence . But, on c omplet e prepara tion does not imply that what i s prepared for wi l l be attempted other than condi tona lly: imply attemp t ed X. c omplete preparatio n for X does not It does however 1.nvolve a conditional undertaki ng to proc eed with wha l is prcpa·ed whell1er intelligenc e for under c ertain conditio ns. Comple te preparation , for a we dding or murder or wha tevcr, wo uld be po int les s otherwise, so a (proclaimed ) comm itment to proceed under given circumstanc es c an be taken of connecting for granted . Principle C2 principles . is part way not the line in a series pr inciple of the same sort that is hig he r in the series is that A con necting X with a tt empted X: perh,ps down if Xis wrong then attempted Xis wrong as bad ) , whether X succeeds or not . But the se ries ends ; off well before th e l ower limits of i nte ns ionalit y, contrary to the (thoug h it cuts claims of various religious pos i tio ns. For example, it does not foll ow that if Xis wrong then X the co n temp l ati on con sidcra t Jon of of is wrong carrying out Xis wrong. or that non-action- oriented The point ap plies equally to sexual fant asie s, power fan tasies, and nuclear nightmares . no Lhing mere In particular, there is wrong with contemplatin g nuclear war, or reflecting upon it, as we are: nuclear wars, even lf their horrors don't be ar thinki.ng on, a re not unthinkable , and in some senses are all too thinka ble. Indeed one of the reas on s why the connecting principles appeal is that each common ly involves lt connects with. decidedl y increased pro ab ility of the wrongdoing or outcome Accompanyin g the increased probability are certain r eprehensibl e atti tud e s tied t o the ac tion t he evil outcome involves; nol I ho:a· of mere pas s ! vc .o nt emµ l at f on I,, 1 '. Howev er oll the sets of these are connectl.ng �n prL nc lple s invoked except Cl ho l d, where the y do, ~, a n when the proba bi lity of wrongdo i ng ev e ntuating is not inc r eased. c ho:;c n One rea son for th1s is that the means o r epre hensible end s may be ineffica cious, for instance intendin g to do s omeo ne harm using witchcr aft . The inc r eased prohabi llty of an evil out come o l.mply makcB things worse . Nu clear deter r ence involves not only war pre parat ion, but thi s accompa nied by threats and a threaten ing posture . pot e ntial e nemy, has to be sui tably frighten ed or moved, announce ment For some pa rty , th e if deterr e nce s ucce ed : the threat must be recognis ed as s uch and be cr edible . n uc 1 L' i1 r deterren ce yie l ds a further conne cting princip le: CJ. of is to This aspect of if Xis wrong the n serious threat ening of X und er gi ven conditio ns is also wr o ng ; or , in br ief, If Xis wrong then conditio nal thre a tening of Xis wro ng . The r ema in i ng connecti ng conditio ns invoked all take this general form CG . If Xis wrong so is a cond itional r eq uires some further ex planati on. the fo rm, ~ ( X if C), wl1ere of' • 4 3 thre ate ning ~ Apar t intensio n to A condit'o na l do intentio ns e . g. themselv es, 1 the t ha t ) . C to (or in pr opos iti onal ra ther than event style: the most cond i tion a l lnte1slo ns are conditio nal obligati ons where~ is the oblj gati on form a are not impossi ble claim in whnt or even remote or imp r obable: (spe c ifica lly those involvin g cornmitn e nt) for follows certain is tha t s ort s there of discusse d an it is obligato ry conditio ns the conditi ons typicall y conc e rn those specif ying a rtuclear st rike by a potentia l fund ame ntal cred1ble functor: To r emove complica tion it can b e ass umed hencefo rth that the involv ed whic h intensio n is a judgemen t of is some intensio nal functor, f rom X enemy . The are intensio nal funct ors threaten ing , intendin g , and whic h CG holds , and that these versions suffice to demonst rate the immoral ity 42 . There is plenty of scope for f ur ther elabora tion here. Passiv e s pectntor shJp of evil e vent s where one is in an appropr iate pos i tion to make a differen ce i s quite another thing, from contemp lation of other worlds where e vil oc curs . 43. The condi tionnl i.nt nsion, ~ ( X if C), whic h is an intensio n , should not be confused wit h the provisio nal form, 1f C then ~x. which is not . The Ame rfcnns nre t hr eatening the Russians with retaliat ory action If tl1ey strike : Lt is not that: if the Russians strike the American s will threaten them with reta l ia t ory action . Such confusi on has arisen because of the problems of formalis ing conditio nal obligati on given usual defectiv e theories of condi ti onality. of nuclear deterren ce. Natural ly again there are many �28 no11-;-1ction ·-oriented functors for whi ch ve r s ions c.ont. :•mplat J.on, t'1l nld.ng, dreaming, etc. of e.g . fail, those of The.r e is also a n interesting group of more borderline functors, those of hoping ( for) , expecting, awaiting and the like, for which CG is only dub:i.ously correct:. Connecting pri nciple C3 evolved from the simp ler pri~ciple, if X is then threatcn.ing X 1s also wrong, or, as f ormulated by Ramsay: is wrong to threaten .•• ' 44 The r e ason is that to do into prac tic e (e.g. if wrong 'What is wrong putting something committ ing rape) is wrong then so also is what goes into tlin•at<'nl ne t o pu t that lnto practice , in pn rti c ul ar the declflred intent to that into pract i ce. beginning as fo] lows: The point ca n if worlds where alternative ly X happens be are put argued semanti cal ly, exclude d then so are adjacent wo rlds where Xis poised to happen. The comp li cat lon of the simple form is required for two reasons. nuclear war obta i n. However t he required c onditional form can be derived form, is through only c onditionall y threatened , i.e . the f ollowing wh ic h is pe rf ectly general , X if argument:- c. should certain cond itions particular, (of §§3-4) LSN oppo si. tion has struck, or not , and so wrong when it wrong, 44. so a lso is simple if it weren't it wouldn't (The converse route fails arg uments the Observe, furthermore that if something Xis have b en wrong in the first place. ear lier from su bstitute for X in the simple form, wrong, it is a l so wrong under restrictive co nditions; by Firstly , threatening X if C, war has. of course.) In is wrong whether the Hence, where X is More generally, to e sta blish CG it is Ramsay's formula tion of simplified CJ is considered in Wal zer, p.272. It i s this principle especially that forces Ramsay, a Protestant theologian who is a nuclear hawk , int o the awkward position he ends in, whi c h as Walzer explains , really leaves no room to move. For in virtue of slmp li.f led CJ H must he allowed that the threatened wars are permissible to carry out. Ramsay tries to limit these to military exchanges. But to be effective as a deterrent, Lhe exchange permitted must both threaten and also, i.n view of CJ, not threaten nonmi.lit ary targets, collateral oon-cornbata nt populations . It appears that Ramsay's position, if worked out, wou1d be inconsi.sten t. S!mpllf1cd pri nclple CJ 1.£ nlso invok<'d by the US Catholic Bishops: se PL, p.316. They put the point both in terms of threat and of declared "i.ntent to use nuclenr we apons, which they pronounce morally wrong. Ho wever s implifi ed CJ is rejected by Hare and Joynt (pp.106-7), who want to nssess Lhe moral stntus of u threat by way of expected utility. This is open to Rll the objec tions to expected utility as a test of morality mentione d below. �29 enough to e sta blish the s i mpl e r If Xis wron g s o i s a n int e nsion t o do X. CG'. The s e cond com plic ation in C3, modifying the threat to ca us es more t roubl e . a serious threat, Some modi f ica tion a ppears required, because it is often contend e d tha t empt y t hrea t s or bluff a r e wa rranted on occasion even whe r e is t l1r e o.tene d what l . i s wrong , to prevent t,1c occ urrence o f som et h.1 ng worse .11 s A"n d 1.n f ac t one wny o f tr ying to vi ndica te de te rrence , a s morally permissible , has been by pre se nti ng de t er rence as lnvo lv ing thr eats which do not involve any i nt en tion at all to pr oceed t o action on plaus ible Lhrc a t s . removes i t the support bas i s for of threats. s i mpl i f ied CJ. Insofar A seri ous th r eat th e n, in the slJ ghtly t echnic a l. sense co nditi on s, is con s i de r a accide nt . intended, For the challenge grossly immo r al unconvincing, case wh e r e conduct under certain not and calls for moral double-think. ci rcum st ances th e result from improbable To bring this an intricat e Eithe r the threat is followed through, automatically (as ordered, by Doomsday Mac h in e c ircui try, etc.) or w1th further choice, or - somehow Eit her not . is in ef fect tha t it is perfectly morally permissible to issue serious thr ea t s to under t a ke out is Principle CJ is not ope n to the same c ha l lenges as sJmplified a nd unqualified CJ. says this Hence the shift to serious one tha t i s no t a pre t ence, empty or a blu ff , but credible. which as it is way the out c ome is morally wrong, in the first case obviously , in the s e c ond cas e be cause the intermedia te reconsideration makes it plain that the thr eat nor ought not to have been issued at a ll, be ing justifiable on neither mo r al more .. pra ctic al " rep r es e n t atives grounds. Further more, while states thei r and ma y accept moral double at t itudes, such as morally assenting to immor a l threa t s, les s corrupt agents cannot: it moral principled agents they ar e or take natu r es , to t he kinds of th emse l ves to be ( a s Benn exp lains). i nsignif i c ant mora lly would run For su c h agents , who may counter to comprise their a not proportion _ of the electorate of a nuclear state, principles such a s CJ are no t in doubt. The a r gum e nt agai nst nu c le a r deterr e nce using C3 is as follows:- Either th e --- ---- ---- - - -- - - For a di sc us s ion of threats whe r e the threatener has no intention of ca r r ying ou t t he threat, or inc e ntive to do so, see Schelling, p.JSff . The quest ion of t he mo r ality of th e s e threa ts, where the item threatened is i.m,-,, or a l , ca n be left ope n. �30 t.hrcnt involved then is it Ln deterren ce is ser .!. 1);..i1.. or l t is m 1 t, inadequ ate. s o deterren ce is no Lhen by CJ deterren ce depcn<l is wrong . The maintain ed. sub-argu ment on se ri ous threats is a practica l one: Lf it s no t seri ous Bu t if i t j s ser io us that nu c l ea r dete r re nce name l y , that if the t h rea t s were not serio us , but merely gave the lmpressi o n that they would be fo l lowed thro ugh , then the op posit ion would flnd out, in one way or a nother. could not be entlorseJ i.n an open or democra tic polit i ca l wi LhouL A policy of bluff system , f or examp l e, coining some discussi on, and so giving the game away to the oppos iti o n . Even i n close d non-demo cratic systems maintain ing such a po licy weapons , espec ially informa lion would clown during l i kel y times escape the of there would be ma jor di f fic u l t ies i.n chains of c ommand i nv olved wit h nuc l ear change through in gov e rn ing el i t es , a nd the op pos itio n i ntellige nce. But then , since t he bluff could be called, deterren ce wou ld no t ha ve su c ceede d . Ther e a re as we l l ot her argumen t s t hat the thr ats invo l ved mu st he s e r io u s. On e is t hat nucl e ar d terrcnce already faces a cred i bility probl em , namely tha t do ubts a bo ut the r ationa lity of carry i ng out t he big nuclea r t hre a t weak e n th e c r e di bil ity essentia l. to its effec t iven ess . To be effec tive then i t mu s t be s e r i ous ( c f. Benn). Meeting obj ec tions t o pri ncip l e C3 leads on t o two fur t he r ve r sions of one centred on intent io n , one on commitm ent. CG, Princ ip l e CJ is int1ma t e ly linke d with , and it some times co nside r ed bu t a variant upon , t he pr i ncipl e C4 . If Xis wrong then t o conditio nally intend to do X [kn owing it is wrong ] is n!so wr0ng. The' prJrcJpl cs arc intimate ly a ssoci at ed because a th ea t is, ac c ordi ng t o die tionarie s, etc . ' . of 'a d claratio r of intent to 1nfU.c t puni shment, l oss , injury, It i s their intercon nect i o n which lies a t the bo t t om of deter rence, which in tend ing to go to war . princip l e , th a t turn 0 11 C4 is s ome pa r a doxes the prob l em of c red ibly t hrea tening war wi thout Princ i ple C4 is j us t i f i e d th rough th e s i mplified inte ndi ng to do wrong j_s wr ong, a nd s o al s o i s i nte ndl ng to do wrong unl es s favoura b le circums tanc es f o r one' s p inc.iple some an ex tr emel y position prevail. Si mplif i ed wi del y assumed mora l thesis, 46 perhap s for the excellen t reason that it holds a nalytica lly. Its ela bo ra t io n C4 can be us e d to �Jl agains t nuclear deterre nce , ea follows : argue siQ ~a pfoce eding to LSN war when the Qnemy duly misbeha ve s is wrong (by §§J-4) , by C4. intendi ng to go to LSN wa r when the enemy duly misbeh aves is also wrong . Nuclea r deterre nce involve s such an intenti on, all the availab le evidenc e shows. He nc e nuclear deter rence is wrong. But like virtua lly every utilita rian princip les utiJita rian grounds . deontic t hems e lv es , princip le , princ i ples For it is not difficu lt to except thos e flowing from CJ and C4 c a n be challe ng ed on outline str a tegic situati ons wher e mnxlrnum ex pected utility result s from a poli cy of nuclear det e rr ence. But on il s own this conces sion casts but little doub t upon C4. For it likewis e fs not princip les C3 difficu lt t o ou tli ne situati ons where the hanging oE innoce nt people , or other injusti ces , are sa nctio ne d or enjoine d by maximum expe cted a nd utility . pu rsuit Those who appeal to utilita rian assump tions try t o avoid suc h more obvious di fficult ies with .elianc e upon utilita rianism , scrappi ng the sp ots not by doctrin e, bu t by hedging app licatio ns of their princip les around with quall ficatio ns , whic h, they hope , will trou bl e of wit h utilit a riani sm. enable So .i. t them to evade the worst is with Kavka, whose work ni ce l y illustr ates that whatev er (little ) deterre nce has in its mo r al f avour depend s upon uti.lita rian ass umption s . Kavka 'bcgin[ s ] by no t ing that any reas ona ble system of fwbst,r ntial 1itil.ita ri a n e l ements ' (PD, p.287). consequ e n tia l elemen ts systems incl ud e must infiltr ate, an with the ' ass umption if Eve n observ atio n were correc t - it is nox, dep e nding f or one e thic s thing this upon must hav e astonis hing confla ting utilita rian - it would not follow that reasona bl e particu lar that assump tion produce s normat ive assump tio n involv e d is that t he a ct Kavka thereup on t ries the paradox es of · deterre nce'. wi t h maximum expecte d to The utility '( the most useful ac t) should be performe d whe never a very great deal of utility - - 46. ·•---- ---- - Ka vka , who labels simpli fie d C4 the Wr ongf ul Inte ntions Princip le (PD , p.289 ), attri butes th e princip le to Abela rd, Aquina s, Butler, Bentham , Kan t, Sldgwi. ck, Kenny and Narveso n. Ka vka also gi ves reasons as to why the pr i nciple ap pe ars 's o obviou sly tr ue'. Kenny and others apply C4 to argue, like the US Cathol ic Bishop s , that ' nuclea r deterre nce is immora l' (cf . Kavb p.29 1 ). It is the clas h of C4 with certain utJ li tarian princip les (espec iall y the maximi sation pr inc iple of p. 28 7) that directl y genera tes Kavka 's f irst paradox of dete rrenc e and l ies behind his other "parado xes'' : see PD. �. , •" . 12 i.s s t. a ke ' ( p .Z87). :;t obj ec tions as This as s um p t io n is ope n to es s e n tia lly the same ba t c h ut il i taria nism i self: it is mainl y a mat t er o f i ncre a sing or vary! ,1g the s t okes i nvol ved s uf ficient l y in a y co unte r examp l e . usud l stratc ~y of of Kavka tries t he weakening a nd fudging the nor mative a s s umption to a voi d the ~o r sl pro bl e ms of distri butive i n justice , and t he like , t hat max i mising u t i lit y can mora l ly e njo i u. But the c ru cial defect in Ka vka ' s argume n t l ies fo l Low fr om t he normative ( p . 28 7) • 11 7 what ov erridde n by C4 s u ppo sed u t il i t a rian to a ssumptio ns ' Though Kavka tends t o a pply t he fudg ed normat iv e as sumption s in thi s way, as If it domina ted C/4 ( see e s pe c ia lly p , 29 0), wh a t and is assump t i on howeve r fudged, namely that ' t his mea ns o t he r mo r al ass ump t io ns a r e t h at .•. in produce , situa t i on s , are whe n moral c ombi ned dilemmas . in si tu a t i ons These are not s uc h th e f udg ed as sump ti on as special de t e rr e nt c a ses where one decnti c pr inc ipl e , tl1a t yie l ded by ut i l i t a r ian i sm , ove rrid e s o t hers, but wher e t he r e ar e c ompe ting, ev en c nt ra d ic tory de ont ic pr inc i p l e s , such a s tha t it int e nd right to to pro c eed to LS N war whe n t he e nemy mi sbe ha ves (on specious u til i tarian gr ound s ) and. also wrong to i n te nd to do s o ( by C4) . wr ong : that judg ement is not ov e rr i den. Nuc lear de t e rr e nce is also t he case is t hat in r emai ns Nor do es it in any way foll ow that C4 i s in 1eed of qu a lifica ti on as a r es ult (Ka vka' s a ssump t ion, what is th e~e s pe cial p.290) . situations, Howeve r , t her e ar e count e r vall i ng u t ili t arian cons i dera tions s ugge sti ng different imperatives . For .ln t he s e is wrong . s pe c i a l ci rcumst a nce s a greater uti l:lty can be realised by doing what Howe ver it is ha rdly ne ws, but a standing objection, that ut ili t a ri a nism some time s en joins wl1at is wron g . Spec ial s pons on s hip de t e rre nt may appea r s itua t i.on a, where under ntl lit a ri a n t o get a foot i n t he moral door, ar e very speci a l. char a c ter is ed by Ka vka , the y a r e s uch that t he 47 . deterrence de t e r r e nce is very likely As to Lacke y ' s utiljt a rian app ro ach r e s t s on o similar fallacy, that u ti litari a n cons iderations predom~n a te wher e s t a k es are larg e enough: see hi s argument f or the ;i pp ro nch in MM p. 192 . Wha · hap p n s i s not that importa n t c ons quenc es ov e rrid e moral principles, but tha t Applica t ion of one pr inc iple wit h important consequence s conflic t s with t hat of ano t he r pr inci pl e wi t h less s i gni f i cant consequence s, and in the we igh-·up of what t o do in t he pro blemat ic circumstanc es the principl e with impor ta nt con s eq uence pr evai l s . �sucr<"£:d , and nothing else .i s likely tp lodc ed in a deep pr.obability-well. This is ve ry far removed from the real world su.:, ceed (see p . .2~16), i.e. si.tuat.J.on whe re nuc lear deterrence appears to be increasing the deterrence probabiU.ty is of LSN wRr, and where other procedures such as graduated nuclear disarmament are at least as J.ikely to succeed as deterrence . that <l1~ont <: principles sllbject Even if it were mistakenly to real-life d .1 .lcmmas should be qualified to avoid di.l mmas, there is little point in qualifying working such RS supposed de ontic principles C4, given the remoteness of the special deterrent situati ons. Instead of pul ling nuclear deterrence down though the immoral inte nt:lons it involves, it can be criticized more broadly throug h the commitments it equi. r es, by wa y of the following principle: CS. If Xis wrong then a conditional commltment to carry out Xis The reason is that the commitment is a commitment circumstances; and that commitment is to act itself wrong . lso wrong. wrongly in cer-tain Nuclear deterrence is however a poli cy which commits states to war under certain conditions . And as wi th conditional intention, so with conditional commitment, there is no doubt th a t su perstates and controlling commitmen t and their intention to use representatives nuclear weapons. did not occur) is enough to establish the relevant The dangerous strategy of launc h-on-warning (which could , for instanc e , result J n a thut have response to attacks the point, for which there is otherwise quite s ufficient factual evidence. Now the connecting principles suffice logically , but are nucl ar deterrence, for weighty principle would detachment from the by complete preparat i on fo r and Deterrence of this type is wrong. also reveals why the suggestion, that the morality of the whole deterrence trip depended on war itself never occurring, was so parad ox ical: det e rrence. ir self By case . i nstance conditi.onal comm.ltment to LSN war, is wrong. This sound wh n all are liable to be disputed, several defensible ones, ideally in concert, make for a principles one applied: it ou t the connections between and not be engaged in (unl ess i ts ha s appeared nuclear war and nuclear Nuclear deterrence should not be practised given that should chang ed, e.g . left bizarre nuclear war direct ion can be drastically at .least limited, per impossibile in the case of nucl ea r warfare, �to purely mi l i t ary targe ts). Til e a rguments t hrou gh conn e cting pr i nc i. ple s, can be reinforced by different sort s of ar gument s agai ns t the mo ral c orre c t ne s s of nuclear deterrenc e . a n 1 a r g uments from lim i ted c~nv erge nc e of et h i cal t heori e s I There wh i ch start from the commonplace ob se r va ti o n that ~ All the ethi c al a t"gum ents in favou r of nuclear deterrence are broadl y ut ilitar i an. In f nct roost of the arguments i.n favour of de t e rrence, including many t hat inf iltra t ed hav e the e thi.c a l l i t erature , ar e those of ge ner., l ly drawn f rom game t heory, and primar :tly intere sted in the one playe r, t h r> USA. Utilitar ia nism , t hough s till looking of those expedie ncy -· advantage of basically at ~dva n tages , i n t e r es t s and ( t ypi ca lly ind i vidual) utilities, has to take a partisan pain of posi t io n, a nd consider [ or[eiti ng i ts claim t o mor a lity sup po r t t d by o t he r na tional i ties othe rwi s e . The as well, commonplace on less observation is the fa c t that such qual i fied moral support as deter rence obtains, dflrive s from ut il i tarianism. 118 Th e re a r e two d ir e c tions on to a gene ra l cla1m ag a i.nst de terrence, either by wa y of t h e pro- ut il itar i an theme Uti l ita r ianism properly a pplied also comes out against deterrence or, 1n o r e s t rongly, by way of the a nti- utilt t arion t heme , Utilita r la nism doe s not furnish satisfactory moral arg uments. The n , by t h e ;rnti. -utilitarian theme, there are no satisfactory in f av our d ir ec tion: 48 . of de terrence. moral arguments Na turally, it would be easy to strengthen the second a ft e r all it is widely thought that u tilitarianism is a false, Thu s t he hed g ed utilitarian defences of Kavka and of Hare and J oynt, and a l s o within th e broadly utilitarian r ange , of Gautier . Showing that cogent de f ence s of nuclear deterrence have to take a util i tarian r ou te would he a much t oug her ent e rprise. Though it is a reasonable conjecture that the e n te r pr i se c ould be carried through, much would depend on what was · cc oun t e d cogent. For ce rtainly biz ar re principles, e.g. obverses of the conne ct ing pr incip l es, · can be i ntroduc ed, which afford deontological routes t.o deterre nce . An,l, rl e spi t r some back sliding by bi s hop s , all other ethical positions can be m., d c to "' penk again s t deterrence and i. t s cont.l.nuntio n . • A deontological ~RRC ngnln At dctc rr c nc · , pr ima rily he way of <lcontic connecting pr i ncip l e s, has been a rgued i n some detail. In the light of these prlnciplcs , Lt i s not difficul t to s e e how c a ses from other ethical positi ons would go. After a ll C4 ha s been defended from a wide range of stanc es , e.g . contra c t ua l, natural law, utilitarian even. �seriousl y as tray, or even shabby ethic~ ] pg&ition. pol it i ca l s yst em whic h depends in some uL l l lt:arJan a rgum e nts for its policieo. It hardly does measure then for a upon consensus , to rely on Yet with nuclear de.terrenc e just thnt appe;1rs to be happe ning, with readily ove rturned arguments at that. For whether even utilitari.a nism supports deterrenc e depends ess entia lly on: how it ls applied; with which maximisa tion recipes; along with what other r estrictiv e assum pti ons (such as those of a deep probabili ty-well); genc>rous arc utll i.ty· assignmen ts or upon With different (and · a rguably superior) va rying the guestimat ion methods, very differen t results emerge, oppo sing deterrenc e and favouring unilatera l nuclear disarmame nt. 49 basic reas on for this is straightfo rward (and like that ending §4). LSN war has a n extremely large negative utility. deterrenc e out to whi.c h increases th other recipes of feasible a how for such things as preservat l on of national sovereign ty , nationa l security, etc. assumptio ns , and on Any policy such The It is that as nuclear probabili ty of this, or even risks it , must los e alternati ves, conseque ntialist type whatever are initially applied (e.g. plausible decision Minimax, Dominance , Di.s as ter Avoidance , Expected Value) . The anti-ut ilitarian theme can be def ended either by a full-scal e criticism o[ ut j lltaria nlsm, beginning for instance with its well-know n justifica tion of l ocalised In justic e s , SO or else 11t i l i tarla ni sm when applied One obvi.ous dcflc iency is this: by to addressin g s ome of the inadequac ies of issues like that at hand, nuclear deterrenc e. on standard util itarianism , what to do , whether to proceed with deterrenc e, depends on the probabili ty of its success and on the improbabi l ity of other options working. deep, uti ~itarlanis m If the deterrenc e probabili ty-well is morally requires deterrenc e, otherwise not. 51 But what is morally required, or wrong, does not fluctuate with what outcomes are pro babl e. 49. Th e ins ab ility of utilitari anism is illustrate d by the discussio n inv olving KovkR, Lackey and Hardln, continued in Philosoph y and Public Affairs 12(3), 1983, where, on the basis of utilita r ianism, diametric ally opposed conclusio ns are reached. (Hardin 's approach tends however to expedienc y reasoning of the strategic type.) 50. Such wider critic isms of utilitaria nism, in all its forms, as an ethical theory are too well-know n to repeat. Some of the main defects are considere d in another article in this series, 'An expensive repair kit for utilit arl.an ism'. The point that util:Ltari anism gi ves no firm place to stand comes from L, Mirlin. �36 wheLh<'r deterrence i..s moraJ.ly wrong or not, i. s likPly to work or not. indepe nde nt deterrence are decidedly essentially nowhere i.s Moral princi p~s not are through expected Vf.llues, whether utilities or o th e rwis e - though how ba d :rnme outcome is ma y be . depend .Lt If nuclear deterrence is wrong wher e it increases the probablllty of war, the n ls it wrong, simpllclter . det:crmlne<l whcrhc r of upon firm to stand. Wor s e, si nce the expected utilities in the case uncertain, these a nd of the results util i ta r ianism delivers uncert ainty measures> util itari anism off ers In con t rast wi t h the soli.d deo nti c ground of principle , utilitariani sm provide s only shifting s and. The objections made apply esp eciall y aga ins t act uti l ita r ianism. (orm shows at special int e rests, such as conditions security (the of estimation rules are pulled in). probability- well state , have hi gh 1s deep , utilities, nat io n- s tat e and spe cial It does not yie ld a deterrence polici; ind eed hnrdly yields policies. tall (other than act utilitariani sm it s elf ). 11nd certain othe r diff i ulties may be avoided by considering instead a o[ act most that nuclear deter re nce is "wrong" a c c ordi ng to its l ig ht s under very il The acts. 52 But the method lacks sta bi lity; These seque nce di f fe r en t prescription s will res ult dependi11g upon how the sequence is se l ected, what is inc luded and what left (as also associa ted p obabilit i es depend crit ically on the sequence selected). No unequivocal rec ipe is delivered. selected out to To see this, suppose the sequence is include worst cases , for instance cases where deterrence fails a nd war breaks out. In this event it can hardl y be argued that deterrence is t he pol lcy that maximizes u til it y ov er the sequence. Along wit h the argument s, there are dissatisfac tion with nuc lear deterrence. other concom.itant conventiona l wa rs . f or Firstly, the peace it has provided 011l y nuclear pc~ce, or rather lack of nuclear war , as the re smaller-s cale reasons is no deep is s hort age of And the "peace " provided is a t best a tenuous pe3ce, which Is not stable , ~ut liable to upset at any stage by a r ange of 51.. Though this is to oversimplif y, the po int s made ar e not affected by the simplificat ion . In any case the simpl ifi ed picture reflects well enoug h the difference s between Kavka and Lacke y that matter in their debat e (ref rred to in footnote 49 ). 52. Whether thjs is rule util itarianism , or still act util i tariani sm the sequence can be construed as one long ac t, may be left open. becaus e �- - - -- - -- - - - - - · - 37 fn,t_0 rs, lncl 11d1ng er rot· , both human and t ec lrn1 .:fl.1, j)C:lc (_~ , p 0:i It thofl not offer genu i ne of the sort re riuir e d fo r a stabl e intec nat.lo nal 1. 1. fe, but only o fragi l e ·e o f a sort" (PL , p.316 ). Secon dly, there enorm ous is cost, mora l -~!_p_po r_t_~.r~~ _: ___ cost of de.ter renc_ ':_, be cause expe nditu re on it exclu des othe r urgen t moral prio ritie s. The US Bisho ps put th is fami liar poin t, in a surpr ising ly Marx i st way, in terms of destr uctiv e capac i ty and what 'the ls contr a dic tion ne e ded f or betwe en what cons truct iv the is spent for devel opme nt' ( PL, p . 316) . §6. Prac tical , prude ntial and more mora l arg umen ts from natio nal dange rs nuclr•ar build -up of the supe rstat es , a nd the gene sis of nucle ar dilem mas. to Whil e there are argum ents to the immo ra lity of nucle ar war prepa ra ti on, there are also counr c ·-arg ument s, that have prove d rema rkabl y persu asive (espe ciall y to Amer I c;wi, ), to the mora l just:!.fiab ili ty of nucle ar war pr e para tion in the _p_!.c s':~- circu mstan c es. The unde rlyin g style of argum ent is simpl y an elabo ratio n, or state -upl ift, of Liw1- for the esca lnti on of weapo ns at the local leve l, for acqu iring a gun or f o r s to c king- tip the neig hbour hood armou ry - and every bit a r gu1r.e nt from local dang ers. dom inati on ; a nd dubio us fir st of all seco nd of nucle ar destr uctio 11 . atom ic s urren der and so avoid the destr uct io n' (Wal zer, p.273 ). prepa ratio n is suppo sed to guard again st more than these ; third eleme nt , name ly, loss of basic rig hts there with these . black mail of forei gn appea seme nt In fact nucle ar is ways a cruc ial of life This furth er set of elem ents is linke d to the dange r of forei gn domi natio n - which is reall y a separ at e eleme nt from risk of Thoug h and (free dom, equa lity, etc .) and fund amen tal value s (upho lding of truth , human dign ity, etc .) and int eg rat ed that The two go toget her, sinc e lf we dtcl not f ea r the black mail , we migh t adop t a polic y or as It is that nucle ar prepa ratJo n, 'so we have be en tol d , gua r ds again st the doub le dang er: forei gn as black mail. dom inntl on -need not imply the loss of most basic value s it does imply the loss of a t le a st of one , self- de te rmin ation , freed om to choos e vario us natio nal objec tives ; conv ersel y loss or erosi on or infri ngeme n t of basic value s can occur witho ut fo re ign demi. natio n, for insta nce, as is comm onpla ce in the �"[ r •e " world, by internal change of go,wnmtent or irnvij,fnroenta l approach, through the iiicrc>nsed security and contro l a nti clcnr prepnratlon incr easi ngly nuclear risks, state demands, extensive etc. But what nuclear destruction, also involves loss of basic rights and values, through destruction ti, _ material of 53 of the cherJshed life-style. So nuclear preparation is hardly n c l earcut bnse me ans of guaranteeJng basic values. 51• fn other respe cts too t he argument from loss of lncku cogency an d rings ho 1 low, It is basic values and ri ghts hnrd to avoid th' f •cling r:hnt tl1c: oft-appealed-to basic values often function as something of a front, like ci tati.o n of religious values at politica l ceremonies; clean cover for economic consideration of one sort from demand s of the military-indus trial of private wealth and vnl \les appealed to category: in and anot he r, them having However arising to do with th e an argument isn't, or associations. And the rights and But not all the values commonly appealed to fall into particular nationalistic ones do not. And one of the main a l leged values of deterrence, the resistance to and containment or many are, most:ly, of the utmost importance, indeed fundamental, and worth much sacrifice . this of power. oughtn 't to be, defeated by lts unsavoury that t he argument 1.s a omplex , many concerned with foreign domJnatiun of other lesser states, and many conccut ·at:1.on pious of "communism" of "socialism ", can hardly be accounted fundamental, any more than retention of cnpi talism. communi.sm has What has been happened here confused with of course (the t o tal i tarianism, which does remove certain more freedoms (of opinion , association, is reality basic information, that ( the of) state values, etc., ideal socialist namely etc.), of) and certain so does derivative~ threaten basic values. One critical q uest i on, then, is whether extens ive nuclear LSN wa r, and indeed for rational way of preservtng nuclear those holocaust, fundamenmtal preparation for is a good or effective or even values, which we have left. 53. The converse obviously does not hold. Basic values and cherished life-style can be lost without nuclear destruction, or nuclear preparation, as when a more powerfuJ state imposes its values and way of life. 54 . The argument from freedom , advanced by Jaspers and repeatedly rolled out by state representatives , is further conside red early in Appendix 1. .... , �'lQ J, Simi la r ci. ue s tions dominntion and arJs e as regard s blackmail. argumeq;; H from er, e Justification danger which is itself open questioned (i n §8 ), both from the to ser i ous point foreign of the methods of extensi ve nuclear preparation depends essent i ally on an arrangement of hostil e structure of of question, v iew of nation and basic states, a i s subsequently valu s, such as freedom, and oth r wise. But whether ul tima tely jusU(ied or dangers are no t, t hese from natlonal those that have been taken to morally underwrite extensive nuclear prcpnration, and jus tific, tlon. have They been have par t of many people ' s accepted in moral by policy outlook. particular , that ex tens i ve nucle ar however , the makers as affording moral fact be e n wide ly accepte d, and undoubt e dly form Wi thi n frnmework the moral justification holds good . others, ar gumen t s arguments not a c onv entio nal Northern It i s within such a fram ewo rk, in preparatio n do such engenders establis h a moral fix. For the morality of extensive nuclear preparat ion, but only make a prudential case for such preparation. people not also face a nucl e ar dilemma, but, though evaluative in character, it ls specif ically moral one. ,1 impressed by And for ma ny other s again, who are who not so or as familiar wi th Soviet and American culture and ways of life, and thci.r r espec tive r ights and freedoms, there is no serious dilemma. peop)c Such live beyond For such the "beneficial" reach of t he supers t ates , prudenti al counter-arguments from national dang ers carry little weight, and the moral case against deterrence is not offset but stands unchallenged . Thls is the ge nesis of the argument fr om isolated people who live in people. Consi de r some a comparatively remote a rea, whose freedoms are not (yet) under threat from superpower expansionism, but whose lifestyle is put at risk by nucl~ar d ter r c nce (a s under pr inciple Cl). For such isolated people, who may ha ve little interes t i n the preservation of nuc lear states , there is no nucl ea r diJ emma , and nuclear lo cations may have problems problems people. as deterrence to natio nal is wro ng. dangers, genuine People in less fo r tu na te but in meeting these they are not entitled to impo se grave risks on the uninvolved isolated In doing so i mmorally; and f or through similar nuclea r reasons deterrence , superstates the are proceeding conventi onal No rthern framework is �j_mpug rwd. conclusion can be al ter n ' tlvely -c t>rl c hc<l Tht'. same argument:: put a reflective i s olat e d pe rson, and check S! 11 ci> Amer ican the or- resulting by a substitution Russi.an 1n the position of such an asse ssment of nuclear deterrence. IL wor Jd be th e snm c as that of n reflecti ve isolated person, stripped o f m1p, rs lntc bins, moral ly opposed to de terr ence and not rnot·all.y transfixed, t h <~ c onventional framework fails t o sati sfy requirement s of morality. The outcome of the arguments fr om dang e rs is, the~ ver y different depending whc her on the arguments are appU.ed as rega rds a superstate or not. The superstate theme which emerges is, in brief, SST. Because o f multiple connected dang e rs from other states which have nuclear weapons, a state - any state that is too large to rely upon other states - is obllged to invest in at least matching nuclear weapons. Henc e, by detachment, a super- nation-stat e, such as USA, ought to have something Jn orde r t hP meet of the nuclear armoury that it has. Or, weakening the theme to ol.Jjecli on s concerning excess, "overkU.l" capacity, it retain i1 t l east solid a ou~ core of the nu c 1ear devices it has. (moretlly] to For su bs equent argumc~nt it can be left open whether the oblig-'¾tion involved is a moral one, for inst a nce be cause of the character the of pro r·c·c tcd, or only (as nrg ued a bove) one of g rou nds to those di. sa rmame nL supporting ag ainst a the dangerous SS reason 55• prudent:ial the me nuclea r Northern values supposedly being On similar it can be argued that unilateral opponent would be prudentiall y Jrralto nal. It will be fr ely admitted that what is prudentiall y or morally requir ed is a s11 hopLimal st rategy , li.ke the famili.a r strategies of the prisoners ' dilemma si tu a tions and of certain related competitive games . that a su peri or would be cooperative For expen sive , re source s, dr ai ning of such t he details are wel l- enoug h kno~1. 55. admitted arrangement s. Cooperation and be better not merely in removing the nuclear dilemma, but in a ra nge of other r espects . future be strategy for nuclear adversaries , if sufficient trust and the lik . could be achif?Ved , would agreeme nt So it should arrangement s would be much less risky , destructive of the environment , a nd so on; However for the present and the foreseeable the prospe cts of cooperation a ppear - so we are repeatedly told by state It can stil l, a nd presumably does, amount to more than mere local expedi e ncy, s ince the 'freedom of Europe' is part of what is at issue. �rcprcscnlat lve s , who are (not always ~ ltt t~gly ) helpin~ unfortunate ly rather remote: only the ca make their polici es sure insurance is ex t e nsiv e nu c l ear preparntion and full preparednes s t o 3pply nuclear force. At least this is so where one is a superstate : proceed, largely unabated . nuclear preparation Where one is not a superstate , but a lesser state one must, the r e presentativ es continue, _t::_':l..l_ on a larger ally who has a one's a rsen a l, umbrella. nu c l ear pre paration , th e lA ck of trust d l splaye d, ,md for huddl es conf l.dencc in !ts and which under co ntrast s ncouragcd elsewhe r e . st·at (• , one whic h r.clics for i ts nuclear grrH1nd one anoth e r's But he r e a level of tr ust and coope ration is_ called for, by dep0 nd ent states, which is far from foolproof, with nu clear in s uranc e (which is pres umably not fre e ) is obtained indirectly thr oug h some supcrstate 's nuclear COVt!r super-· ally Does a "d epe nd ent" on a s 1pc r -a lly, rather tha n strangely have that exchange on its territory? mu ch Jt s ally's opponen t ? Confidence, for instanc e , that its ally will not r e nder i t a ta rget or nuclear must stag e a Given the pr ocliv i ty of states , especia ll y l arg0 states, to res ort to expediency, and give n the recen t histo ric al record of superstates and t heir leaders , too much fait h would be mi spl ace d . Thus, whatever th e l imited force of t he argume nt f or the superstat e it <loes theme , not extend t o the analogous them e for a dependent state, which d if fers f rom SST nnd end s as follows: DST. Because ... , a st a t e without adeq uate (or any) nuclear weapons is obliged to r e ly upo n a s u pe rstat e ally , and within that arrangement , to accommodate t he facilities and nuclear in stallations of the protecting ally . ln pa r t for reaso ns already given, principle DST is not very plausible (a nd same goes for mo re obvious variants upon it ). Nor do the arguments of f ered for SST t ranspose parti cularly well to direct arguments striking l y illu str ated by the case the for DST. 56 This is more of more remot e nuclear dependent states. Consider the a rgument from basic values, for instance , from the angle of nuclear dependent Australia. Basic values ln Australia are not threatened by, o r put in j eopardy through, the ac io ns or plans of the Sovi et Union. Nor ar e they thr eatened by the other superstate, t he USA, the only country with ' the physical 56. As ls widely known, inadmissi ble and usual l y much overrated considerat ions o f expediency frequently enter into reaso ns why states allow foreign nuc lea r facilit i e s upon th e ir territories , e. g. eco nomic consideratio ns such as trade or local revenue and short- term jobs. �ca1 1acity to launc h mot j .ve Lo <.111y <l o look convincing . carries full scale invasion of Aust r alia ', but R wc .i ght. reasons In fact, the with a rgumen t from of For there arg ument t he only is qucstLonable non-n l lf~twd prnc.ticcs. of 58 domina tion In this way too) the from dang er of nuclear destruction could be nullified . such supe r state foreign li t tl e care, the pr e s e nt level of a economic and political dom i nati on could be much reduc e d. fore(• lack(ing] so , , so far . 5 7 CJ.ear ly the argumen t from basic values does nol For similar 1 it t le 'clearly danger because nuclear of umbrella, superstate dang er facilities and th e tha t would be removed wi th With 1 ess remot e dependent Europc 1rn states these sorts a rguments from nationa l dangers are only marginally more convincing , and may b e defeated along analogous lines . The differe nces in the situations of st ate s, and peoples, break theme the of a of monolithic West. differently situated This is a theme especially favoured by US and the Wes t European rep resentati ves, who present the West, its freedom, as t hr eatened by Soviet domin atio n. und i.ffrrentiatcd unit. dep1!nd0nL i;tntes with But this l eadi ng idea, NATO desig ne d powers , and In this the West is a single in and part to align lesser to justify pu tting them at nuclear rl sk is as muc h a my th as th e idea of the Golde n West. The West is not so monolithic, it ls not so comprehensive, some of it is not so free , much of it (i ncluding the Ant ipodes) is not thr eate ned by Soviet domination. Principle DST - li kewise what it dep ends upon , SST - is now coming unde r attack by Eu ropean disarmament groups , who c hallenge the core assumptions of the. und er lying retaliatory model that 0 Safety lies in weapons , More weapons i mply more. security59 , Cerlainly, for mo:ce :f.s ol ated states, such as New Zealand, safety from nuclear. a t ack l i es not in wea pons bu t in excluding nuclear facilities (including visit s from nuclear submar ines ) . Europe ans are ar guing in present of syslem is more a similar wa y, that the a ris k, indeed l ia bility, than a protection (e.g. 57. For t he quote d c laim, and some of th e Au stralia ' s Se curi ty , p .94 . 58 . The Jssuc is furt her pursued in Ap pendix 2. 59 . Sec, for exam ple, t he las t article in Thom pson. argument for it, s ee Threats to �Thompson, p.251); envi s -1ged and thnt: w-ithou!: Lhcut.r e for a h\icJ. ,;,)ll'' instal1.st:!on1>i Europe cannot be limited nucle r wnr , in the way .l thf' is now seen by US ( ut not Soviet) strategists. Once the weapons assumptions are qu es tioned, other assumptions of the retaliatory model a nd its variants come up for examination, namely ci Whether the proper response to danger is armament, in particular o Whe th er tle proper response is through nuclear armament, as opposed , say, to other military responses, such as convent.ional arms, or, takin g off from the previ ous point, ~ Whcthrr military approaches and procedures (through ar e proper methods, armaments , etc.) or should be such dominant methods, of conflict resoLuti.on at the int er national level. It ls plausibly arg ued, against military procedures, that at no ordinary level do we sens5bly s et about meeting danger or settling disputes by acquiring lethal weapons and thr eatening to use them - except perhaps on an out-dated, and r e ally warranted, frontier ethics. This leads into the issue of alternative defence systems, a vital matter beginning to obtain the contemporary 60 and explana tion it deserves, questioning of the framework of but never one that already nation-states. While emphasis anticipates subsequent the state system is inrac · , force ls far from exceptional and military procedures are to be expe cted and are l LkcJ y ine vitnhl c. nation-state system ': For 'forc e has [a] permanent plac,~ in the thus Ramsay (on p.xv), who uses this as part of his very orthodox case for nuclear war arrangements. §7. Th resulting nuclear dilemmas for aligned st;:ites Ass~mbli.ng r eferred th~ to as themes the so far nuclear de v e lope d fix:- States war-deterrence, because (as argued in §J-§5 ) to engage jn war.-·deterrence , at l east 60. yields the both and their supporters. deontic dilemma. often ought not to engage in it is immoral, and also ought for prudential reasons (as Alternative defence systems were considered long ago in Mohists. For contemporary work on alter native systems , see su rvey in Sharp. There is in fact a considerable literature and social defence arrangemen ts, and a growing literature on i . e . convercd.on t o such arr angement s . argu ed using China by the especially the on non-violent transarmament, �·,,,,._ 44 SST and DST). tl w Th i s dilemma i.s no idle construction of virtues parac.onsisteot logic), but ( c onc octed 61 prod uced by war itself 62 , or at war and its version of the deon tic least war which spr.·eads beyond purely mjlitary la r gc ts, as larger wars in evi tably e . g. nuclear , a, wel l as bei ng virtu a lly ublqultous i.n nuclear war discu ssions. ThP nuclear fi.x 1s in part simply a mor e intense di 1 emma demonstrate a serious real-life dilemma, t he ouLJ.i n s of which are r e peatedly encountered i .n text s on asper.ts to do (since ra il t ra nsport , typically rely on ci.vilian ones) . military arrangeme nt s, The ma in dil emma arises from a combination of t he retaliat ory model with t he feat ures of war. War is requlr 0cl for defence of th e state and valu es it upholds (or pretend s to uphold); but war also invo lves imm oral ac ts and cv.tl co nseque nc es . war can undPr also ce rtain justified. be se e n as a t temp ting a rec onciliation by tryi ng t o show that ctrcumstanees Thus ' some these reall y ju tifications 0 evi l consequences Regis of war ' (Walls , p.260). accept ab l e than falla c ious ,symptotic are morally of war aim to show that a ctio ns deemed normally forbi dd en by moral ma nd ates are now pe rmissible the The doctrine of " ju st But this argume nts when perfo rmed under is no better or mor e morally for uti l itorianism as bein g corre c L \~hen the s takes are larg e . W;n· and preparedness for 61 . wa r als o gene rate s ubsidiary di.lemmas f or Thus Green, along with many others, ' find[s ] nucle a r deterrence the best of pra c tical policies available to us now •.. give n the realities of world politics ' bu t ' s till demur[ s ) because of mo ral qualms' (p . xii). Green also r e presents both Morgent hau a nd Halle as having 'rather agonisingly presented a • • . case for a deterrenc e strategy, even whil e asserting that the stra.tegy is morally indefensible according to the traditional et hical codes' (p.2 52 ). Walze r ends in a similar dil emma (he is committed to a str onge r a nd less qualif i ed form of it tha n he set s down): though it [deterrence ] is a bad way, there may well be no othe r tha t is practi cal in a world of sove reign and suspicious state s' (p.274) - an indictment of the state system that Walzer does not pur sue. Similar ly th e US Catho lic Bishops d :llemma; they s peak of ' th e dilemma of how to prev ent the use Fa s kius nn<l Dockrill and i n Benn terms of moral dilemmas. present the situation i n terms of a mora l political paradox of de terrence •.. the of nuclear weapons • .. ' (PL, p.3 13). In too the nuclear situation is pre s ent ed in Th e nuclear dilemma is of course not a dilemma for everyone, for those who think they have seen the clear admis sib i lity of deterrence, or differently for those who have seen through the argumen ts fr om nati onal dang e rs. But it i.s a dilemma for th ose locked into the conventional f r amework. 62. Situatior.s in war are als o a major so urce of moral dilemmas: see Routley and Plumwo od where several exampl es are gi ven. A general logic a l account of and theo r y of moral di.lemmas is elaborated therein. �. ... inst;ince, a sevc t·e tensio n be tween freedom and difficult prohlcms au t ho f· t c y: 'one of th e ~0s t o[ war involv es defending a free society witho u t destroying the values that g ive it meaning and vali dity' (PL, p.324). The problems are greatly enhanced by modern nuclear arra ng emen ts. The nuclear fix not onl y i nt ensifies a nd complicates other d-Lle rnm:-is induc ed by t he co ntemporary s ov ere i gn s t at~ 63 , in particula r the dee p tension c betwee n national security and the ope r at ion o f libera l-democrati c arrangement s (sucl1 a ., " lnd.lvidual li.herty , popular control of institution s, etc) . othe>r more persona l subsidiary d i l emmas , ( poll U ca l) obl lgations to s for example (the question the extent of one' s a nuclea r stat e, and ro le-induced d Uemmas such as one's conf licting obligatio ns as a docto r or a nuclear res c•archer It also accentuates of politic a l obligation s armame nt s and processor or eva sion is their considered f urther in Appendix 2). At the more personal level, tha t of individual and group ac tion, the re several ques Ions to 'Wh, t. should my sta t e be disen tangled - questions di ffere nt from the key issu e be doing and influence, d epending on who one is. I do? 1 one Jives, - do?', on whi c h one may exert influences, i.e. in what l it tle There is not only the question 'What shou ld a question whi c h will have a quite different force de pending a nd ar e on whe re sort of stat e, where one wo rks, what one contr ols or on who on e ls and one ' s role s - but also the questions ' What sort of person do I wan t to be ?', 'What am I prepared to answer for morally?'. 64 Answe rs to thes e latter char a cter questions will feed back to influence those t o act ion-or ien t ed questions . Each of thos e questions c an , in gi ven situations, induce subsidiary dilemmas . The essential fea t ure of a deontic dil emma is that both A and the of A are wrong (or di ffe rently, pursu ing a nuclear def ence policy. obliga tory), negation for some suitable A, such as The place and essential role of deontic and 63. The nuclear dilemma is not alo ne re sponsibl e fo r these other dilemmas. T.arg -sca l e nuclear power generation, a nd other types of warfare and security ar rangements, also contribute. But a conflict of freedom and autho rity is already an outcome of the la rge central state. 64. For gro up formula t i on of t he que stio ns rep l ace 'I' by 'my group', etc. The l mpo rtnn ce of distilling ouL th e se qu•s t ions, and the moral und es ir a bility of r!Pt0rrr,n~0 fn terms of whnt: Lt docs to p oplc morally, are brought out Ln Benn , where however the issues a r e made t o l ook somewhat more separate than they are . �moral d il emmas ure not l i t.t>r;,Lure f, !., • widely or well und er stood, p...." t'ticular]y __ e 1-1 ~ 1i in ca .1 Thi s l s par t ly be c a us e c urre ntly domin a nt e thic a l positlons lik e utilitarlnnism "annot at al l e asil y accommod a t e moral dilemmas or the data which giv•s to rise them but the n such positions do not r eally offer reporti ve acco11nU; of wr on~ an d obli ga_~_:!:_on anyw.-1 y. d i lemma doe Cont r ary t o utilitarian per ce pt:Lons a not neces s arily have any mo ral s olution , though there may be better a nd worse ways By 01t . wh c h assessments, contr a st f orm the with basis s uc h e thical theories , preanalytical oE se n s itive theories, do recognise mor a l dil~mmaa and reflect t he i r f e a tur e s. Reactions an f rom the res ponse s t hat a re c ha r ac t e ristic of deonti.c dilemmas fix. nuclear The r e 1<• an un s t end iness, an uncertainty a s to whnt to <lo , whJ.ch wny tu pr.occed , whl c h pr ind pl •n i n wa ter e d- down for m to temporary Thus , crutch . for as world' GG , that b st" j ethical RU;l1 ,)ps wt-o way a of neve r exerci s ing "mora lly ou r s J. n a morally-str a pped wor ld . fu nctor s peak moral A similar th e 'strictly mor;il Dete r r ence ha s a strlc tly temporary role but de t e er e nc: e th e c i rc um s t a nce s. de ter r .nc e, is be in a fallen to " second a acceptability ' object mus t cert ainly one str ictly and wrong, is of from th e conditional be to move beyond det er r ence, 'towards a optlon as to of what the to nucl ear do in Thus Wal z er, for example, s t r ugg les t o the conclusion though a "morally try to escape 'the paradox of deterrence', i.e. world free o f the threat of deterrence' (PL, p.317), out And can shift 'moral c ond i tional ' while a ccepta bi U.ty , good", responsibility d~t c rrcnce fix. ·s (as from good to a c ceptable) is made by the US Catholic of we gra s p examp l e , th e Bishop of London contends t hat the possession of nuclear wea pons 'whil e acceptable'' emerge neverthel e ss the policy to fix. awkward that war in the pursu e circumstances ( p .274) . 6 7 Howe ver as more than a n immediate stepping stone to a 65. There are exce pt i ons of course, e .g . i n the Catholic educated such as Sar t re; a nd Na ge l's f i nal example i s very instructive. For a fuller t h e or y of mo r a l dil emma s s ee howe ve r Routl e y and Plumwood. 66. Repo r ted in The Ec onoml s t; re pr i nted i n 1983, We ekend Magazin e p.2. 6 7. As a response to a moral dil e mma , Walz er ' s approach is perfectly in order logtcal ly. Tho se who, l i k e Be n n , ' f lnd i t ne ither coherent nor cceptable' hnvl! no t gras ped t he logic of mo r al di l emma s . The Australian, February 12-13 �!i '.rnp erior pol Ley ~ nsscrabled (in sufficien tly it is §5-§6), a dt! cidetlly reasons of ·1 }-toor the opti_ n, sort reasons i'o r that are decisive already for those, outside the conventio nal Northern f r amework, who find no genuine of nuc le ar nuclear dilemma. To make matters worse the nuclear fix ls, furthermo re, stal1.:s' own mald.n&_. fix a It is not somethi ng they blundered into, by accident. initial nuclear jnvolveme nt was deli berat e l y c hosen, primarily by the Lhc escaJAtio n of In these respects the situation is like peop.1 e who deliberat ely let themselve s be invo lved in two incompati ble relations hips , and build up though and U.:, A, has by and large also be en deliberat ely chos e n, again mainly by the USA and the USSR in in teractio n. th:1 t The one there by. It is build-up. The fact i programme is t o be in addition to existing ( which are to Sovi et that the USA initiated nuclear armament, and has frequentl y l ed escalatio n, and apparentl y still does. esources myth, a some currency, that adoption of nuclear weaponry, an d nuclear in North Amerlca occurred on a defensive basj_s in response bui ld·-up, nucl~a · with onflJctin g obligatio ns generally agr eed The recent (1980) United to States' strategic be already in excess of Russia ' s , and which always have been so ) (Thompson , p.21) . The present dilemma , that many people fe e l acute ly, state policy, allies, and Naturally not the USSR policies. indicates especiall y that merely route by a taken advanced response to capita list t he nations, Soviets (or of USA and its NATO state socialism ). would not have been feasible without compleme nting And independe nt evidence, t l1 ere is then a direct outcome suc h as Soviet-Si no confronta tion, is a strong internal military dynamic in state socialist n.:.iti.ons . There is a t wo-way co nn ecti on between world political arrangeme nts nation-st.' .ltes and the nuclear f ix . arrangeme nts are an evident source of the nuclear situation is increa singly present wo rld polJU.cal structure . is widely promulgat ed .'.lrrangcm ents : it .is' seen On the dil emma as one hand, with t he these result through political that the i nd icat ing the inadequac y of the Indeed it is no longer a radical theme but that: the source of the nucl ear problem comes from state n world of sovereign states . • . which brought the �wo.ld to the prese n t dangerous situation' ( PL, p,JlJ). nucJ.e11r fix tends to lo':.~ political arrangements into On th e other hand, th e the statist form, into arrangemen ts of an increas ing ly authoritarian and centralist cast. stutlst espoused purpose of nuclear weapons may be to kee p the and security, to defend national inter est s , reasons such as perpetuating the system advantageous of confrontation, st ate to (!), provid e but underneath there ore other sovereign st a tes and frame work the rlnd peace The military-indus t rial in ter ests, dependent state explo itation, and polit i cally favoured of inequa l ity it supports . The ~merg ing t heme is t he n that the ve ry nuc l ea r s i tuatio n arising from th e statist arrangements a nd interr e lations ( conomic ideologies , etc.) tends to , and is used to, lock a rr nngcme nl.s of s overeign where the pa ttern world states And zones of inter e st . t heme is a pi ecemea l pr a cti cal one . side the rivalries, into conflict i ng the present The argument to th1. s Consider first, the matter from the Soviet of nati ona l control and progressive military-economic reorientation common to all nuclear states is clearer . The threat from the West, whether it exi.sts or not (and in Soviet perception it certainly does) , has become a necessary legitimatio n for the power of the ruling elites , an excuse for their many ec onomic a nd social fa i lures , and an argument to isolate and silence critics within their own bo rders. In the West we have ••. care fully con trolled and se l ec tive release of 'offi c ial information ' (Thompson, p.20 ) . "We" in the West, e specially the Americans, also integrated with state appara tus, have, in forms increasingly the military-industrial complex, which is a major. benefi c iary a nd promoter of the nu c l eR r. arms race . 68 Secondly, there i s evidence of entrenchmen t of the arrangements, by th ing s S llCh as the SALT negotiation s ; shown there are f i xed s uperpower s an d a (growing) nucle ar club of nations all governed by a rule , partly held in place by deterrence . as flimsy negotiated set Connected with this , there are cases rev ea ling the fixing of zones of interest, such as the Afghanistan example. Soviet US i s 68 . of The invasion is not regarded as threatening US "vital interests", and so th e not over.duly worried about Afghanistan and its people. What was The role of the military-industrial complex in present US escalation is sketched i.n Cox. Marxists, with their dogma of economic determinism , would assign even more weight to this point. As some of them would free ly concede, a similar complex has figured prominently in USSR escalation. �diff~rent, what it was worried a bout a nd made ~uc]d a r threat~ adj~c ~nt ~estcrn oil supp li es : concerning, were these lay within the US zone of interest (cf . th e d Lscuss ion in Sche ll, p.212). §8 . Ways out of nuclear dilemmas: results. in itia l political fall-out from the ethical Virtual ly all the ways are wa ys of limitat:i.on , and they all invol ve in one way or another limitations on nuclear arms or the way they are deployed, and limJt~tions on the thu s inevitable. and more or power s of states. Limitations on national sovere~.EX _~re The limitations may be reache d by agreement and negotiation , less voluntarily agre ed to 69 , or they may be imposed, or possibly worst of all, they may eme rg e from an ini.t i. al war. As with other fixes produced by there are suggested ways the structural ar rangements of states, ou t which do not interfere with these ac-rangemen ts, inter.stR-te approache s, and there a r.e ways which do seriously alter the struct ure nnd power ·elations extrastate approaches . of state s (and, in the limit, remove t hem altogether) , All the familiar , allegedly "practical" and "realistic" , attempt~ to resolve the nuclear problem, for instance disarmament by mutual arms limitations , etc . , are interstate ; sovereign state . The s ame goes (graduated) unilate ral disarmament . about the nation- state; they do not tamper with that sacred cow, the for les s "realistic" But in fact there is proposals, nothing or empi rical fact , is it part icula r ly a stable one. nor, and its replacement by alternat.ive arrangement s. as a We are certainly free - Jn more libera l states, it should be eve rywhere - to theorise a s demise sacred it is not a particularl y well justified political form; it js 1ot even a very long-standin g form of political arrangement ; matter very such as to its And nuclear dilemmas s houl d have e nc ouraged such reflection. 69. In principle it would be relatively easy for sta tes to agree to settlement of their disputes by less damaging a nd expensive contests than military ones, e.g. by contests of selected rep re sentatives, and not just through fiB l1Llng ln some form, but by contests of footballers , singers, da ncers, lawyers , or etc . In prac ti c e, however, such more civilized alternative s are never much consldered in thes e days of superstates . Animals, by conLrast, are smart enough to settle dis pute s by means much more like these . Even the a nci en t Greeks - though they had a clear appreciatio n of limits, which has been lost by post-Enligh tenment leaders regarded the institution of war as fi nal ( al l egedly inevitable ) means of arbitration between city-st a t es , not seeing its social, structurally -emergent, characte r. �50 approaches take one of Extrnstr1te ittlernat ional of slate s. r.ol two rou tes, way ~Ile to l~, ge nuine power, or the way down, throt1gh fractio nation or deunionisat lon 7 0 The ways up and down are by no means one and the same; ,10ccss;1rily incompatibl e . but they are Some of the impo rt ant machinery, for a way up to world governmen t, is alre ady there in the international law-courts. Wer e the courts ns signed suf fi cien t authorit y and po we r, the remedy , namely through legal acl ion, that· medie val principle theo ri. t s saw to all disputes, could in be rxtended to in t ers ta te disput es , and th e just war between states S and T supersed ed by the just ~ase of S versLs T. given intrastate s n fflcienl least jilitial]y) But if the law courts were power then their a uthority and efficacy would likely rely (a t upon war deterrence , though not by military means. perhaps Law courts, as usually conceived, are not effective without police and jails or their and equiva l ent supcr-statist back-up eq uivalent for of economic other penalties; and the either wi l l involve the capacity to inflict quite substi'.tntial amounts of damage on "delinquents" -· which, bec ause delinquents will typicnlJy be organisations, will also involve damage to innocent, and perhaps dissent 'ng , participants in those organisations, as well as to other In pa rt i es. repC'ilt uninvolved short t such an approach does not resolve the problem but tends to rt . Tl1 • Way Up is one more stnt i s t, legali stic , authoritarian way of trying ec:t t. n gri.ps with the nuclear though mostly 1n passing to be to problem, and accordi ngly is often men tioned, dismi ss ed 71 , in orthodox strategic texts on -·--------- - - - -- -70. Am e ricans, for example, tend to forget that their state (like the US SR) is a union, of fairly recen t orig in, and that a differ e ntly-oriented State of the Union message could well consi der dissolution of the uni on. Regional movements in USA unfortunately lack much popular s upport at present. By contras t, the re are signif i cant se para ti on movemen ts , some deserving aid and e ncouragement, which affect most other nuclear states, especially USSR , UK and France . The USSR already has tr oub le in holding its (supposedly voluntarily integrated) satellite em pire together; and the one recent attempted add ition right on its frontier is proving extremely recalcitrant. Nor s ho uld powerful political unions under centralised state apparatus be f no t c rcd c l ocwhc r e . The some appli es to state empire expansion, ns .illustrated in contemporary Indonesia. Mos t important, the reunification of Germany should be resi sted; instead a more rational regional deuni fication than the p resent East-·West division of post-war Germany sho uld be oought , al ong wlth removal of nuclear weapons from the border regio n, and so on. 71 . Thus for example, Ka hn, where such a "solution" is quickly dismissed as, impractical , etc. Hardly ne ces sary to s a y the Way Up has won most favour wllh the 1 ga l f r a ternity , and from more Authoritaria n organi s ations. �5l thermonuclear war . By contrast, the Way Down, thoug h like the new, is sca rcely mentioned in the orthodox discussions; means an appcara nc Q (a comeback) in some more radi ca l discussions, combined with the Way Up (in "world ord e r" mode.ls: unl i ke t he Way Down, i.s considered however beginning to be cf. Way and is more sometimes The Way Up, sympatheti cally by those who take a moral rather than strategic viewpoint. a r e newed emphasis on world order, in rea c hing inte rna tiona l system'; and 'the 'towards a no but lt is making Galtung). much by Up mora lly There is integrated missing element of world order today is the absence of a properly constitu ted political authority' (PL, p . 320). A main argume nt for the Way Up is just a repetition of that which is commonly supposed to underpin sta.tist arrangements in the first place, namely an argument fr om ( gene rous) variations upon the Prisoners' Tragedy of t he Commons. traditionally, ecological order. not herdsmen as best solutions regards to problems as the of organisation, public order and, more rec ently, as to So with the "tragedy of nation-states") where the players are but nation·-states , and one of the prospects is destruction of a r,ood parl of th e commons by rwclear wa r, the solution is now sort such It is that authorlty and coerc ion - in the form of the state - a r e r equired to ensure espe cially, Dilemma, of superstnt e. said to be some Of course, this begins to undermine an earlier application of the "traged y" argument, since states will lose their sovereignty and some of thcjr be order-imposing corr espo, dingly weakened. ar gum ent s are role, and But all political this is obligation to There a re, then, many problems through these A further theoretical with h:1.tch the is Way that Up, a both "tragedy" theoretical and the Way Up merely repeats arrangements. It is contingency, of there being no rival intelligent civilisations nearby, that the probl ems of interstate relations are not repeated 72 . will 72. stalist arrangements at a level up, by way of superstate only that states good ones in the first place, when in fact they are not, but are only sound under quite restrictive assumptions. prac t ical. assume to See further loutley and Routley especially Griffin. and material referred to a level therein, up and The rea reas ons for th e state are of course very different from the thf!oretic::il c:ov er such argume nts af ord. Among other things, the state enables and guarant ees the accumulntlon of power, privilege and capital. �again . The maj or pra ctical hi tch is that there h no prospect at all of getting su ·ha "solution " t o work in tim e t o Aerve 5.ts intended purpose. Tn rc:,1.li l y , we ar e no ne arer a world gove rnment than we were a century ago , In fact, it is even arguable t hat since World War II we have moved furthe r a way from a world government than we were before Wo rld War TI. The disint e gration of empires has mul tiplied soverei g ntles . I t ia true that we hav e s omething called t he United Nations, but eve n the United Nations has decline d in power as it has grown in memb e rship. By the beg i nni ng of the 1970' s the United Nations ha d bec ome, in some ways, a l e ss powerful and e ven less influen tial organisati o n than it wa s a t the end of the 1950's (Hazrui, pp.2-3 ). The reaso n s for thj s Mazr ui goes on to o u t line . future For t he foreseeable nuclea r ideologica l d i ff e r e n ces be t we e n s tates , including especia l ly differenc e s as to how politica l arr angeme nts shoul d be e ff e cted, exclude any prospect of opcrnt l vc world governmen t or a worl d legal s ystem capable of resolving nuclear hostlllt i es . extre~ely I n some ways, this is just as well. monol ithic, woul d World gov ernme n t would cer t ainly , whatever it s ( g ray?) politic al colour, {~xplo l tatJ v e eco nomic sys tem whi ch would do i mmens e impose damage on to It undesira b le l eve l Ideological, r equ1 site the world an many remaining of inde e d u nity political and parad 'gmatic , cannot be and, e c o nomi c sepa r atio n expect e d in some crucial respects, unity. of Moreover , give n Northern main within nuclea r dea dlines. swee ping more sovereig nty , c o ul d blockages and agr ~ements, be negotiated? dea dl ocks i1 the involving genuine There an way is When not even endless of of that state series of s uch state reconciliation. a pp lies to int e rst a te arrang eme nts, whi .h ma y make limited us e the of The s ame Way Up nego tia tions or other conc i liation pr ocedu r es within a fram ewo rk arranged • - through the Unit ed Nations); 73. it limitations almost the cultures, nuc l ear weapon s li mitations can be worked out, how much less l ikely is (e .g . would systems. 7 3 The Way Up thu s presupposes an unlike ly much be f ost e r e conomism, would ent r ench bureaucracy with all l t s damaging f ea tur e s, a nd could e asil y tend to totalitarianism. ·1 n .:ltur.:iL an 7 11 Fo r a mor e de tailed (bu t decidedly mediocre) critique of the idea of a world gov e rnment, see Galtung. Naturall y the objections to world gov •rnmcnt , 11nd dlffl c ult lca in the woy of oht in i ng 1t, do not extend to mo r e f l ex ible world arrangements, such a world federation ofcultu res (cf . Ma zrui ). Such a plura l lstic ana rchlstic Way Up can be genuinely s yn thesized with the Way Down. �jJ There is arrnrgemant s regrettably and als o conventions much are e~ tdert ce frequ ently concerning war and human rights 75), a nd are scntJments signed does slide smoothly that not not 1nce rnational observed (especially those worth into despicable dee d s . bode well ever be rcc1chcd. ln <'nnv,•11t f< n any great deal: openly violated. I ndeed there:.> already appears to he at least one fon·C!, of lofty It for nuclear arms limitations , s hould suffl c i en t ag reemen t wl 1I C'h tn nl1 the following intEirna t i ona l i1P mtljor 11u clc•nr sL 1t:es ore slgnnt:o r l.en, w!1fc:h w11uld rule ·11t LSN war and nuclc11r cl ic• rcnc includes a Even agreements states have are oft e n enough disre ga rd ed, sklrted ar ound, or not tr ea tie s , 1 , t h ton genocide. Genoc i de ac.ts commit ted, in time of peace or war, with inl ~nt to destroy in whole or part a natural, e thical, racinl or rel igio us group as such: ki.11:lng members of the group, causi.ng serious bodily or me ntal harm to the members of the group , d e llbcrately inflicting condittons of life to bring about physical destruction i.n who l e or i n pa rt. f ollowing associated a ct s are also punishabl e : dJrcct and public shall Beside genoc ide th e c onspira cy to commit be Persons committing genocide o r any of punl.shed , whether they are the othe r act s responsible rul er s, priva te individuals or public officials. 76 It is not diffi cult to argue nucl~ar genocide, inc itement to commit ge no ci de , attempts to comm.it ge nocid e , complf.ci.ty i.n genoci de. mentioned ca lculat ed that a larg er st rike (such as det e r rence policy requires as a ba ck-up respon se ) would almost cer t ainl y consti tute an act of genocide, through what minority groups. conspir acy repr:esentati .v 'S does to some But then, by virtue of connecting principles like CS, nuclear deterrence stands indicted pa r ticular it of the and as involving i.ncitement . nuclea r s t a tes acts ass oci a ted with genocide, in Some wel.i - known political and military would thus ap pear to be li.able to indictment . and punishment und er internation al law . 7L1. Even Dahl itz, who gi.ves a detailed and s ympathetic accoun t of nuclear arms control at t empts and lost opportuniti es, is by no means confident th a t suitable arrangement s onn now be achieved (se e pp. 210- 13). Reasons include technologic al advance s now taki.ng place, and the renewed America n drlvc f or strategic super ior ity . 75. See Brownlie, Kuper, and Amnesty Int e rnat ional reports. in t his paragraph were sugg est ed by c. Pigden. 76. The accow1t of genocide given is taken directly f rom the Genocide Convention, whic h is reproduced i n Kuper, p . 210ff . Most of the points text of the �The nuclear fi.x cmergi.ng fr om nat.io ,,-stnte arran!_1, 111 ~nz:s - c ombin ed wi th the appare11t I mpot ence interstate relations to alleviate the situati on , indeed of with the apparent ability only to push the world further into the situation ne:.rer to nuclear the " brink" is now taken to ind ica te contemporary angle) the inad equacy of natio n-state po litica l tias gi v en new impetus sovereignty the best-seller and to co nsiderat ion of other extrastate r es olut ions . The According to can reorganise the radical namely n iclear in Sc.hell ' s 1 unsatis factoriness situat .l on The should the foundations of politic c l thought' pollllcal t.iicy opvrate •. , the indicates inst itutions Fate lead political of to req u i red a t he Earth . ' ful l-sca le to make 't he co n sonant with t he g lobal reality in which and in ' work [ lng] out the practicnl s teps by which mankind ... its political li fe' (p.219). However Schell himself tri e s to avoid the se ' awesome urgen t tasks, which , imposed on us by the of the present system of nati on stat e s has even reach ed stands, Schell reexaminatio n o f world ' c and book a new a rrangements, thesis that the nuc l ear problem national ( f r om and work of our age' else overimpressed by political t he oris ts. the 7 Z history, c onstitute So, no t feeling th e pressures of history or real ities of (unstable) nation-states , do most But there i s no good r eason to av oid the task of politic al rea ssessmen t, made so much more urgent by the nuclea r situation. There i.s li.tt l e doub t bu t t ha t we live ( too 11nthinklngly) with an an tiquated s ystem many present state arrangements, representative century communications •ery different condition; in a 77. when and the mai n outlines of the mod ern totalitari a n state and its mauifold defic i en cies recogni sed, even ea rl ier. of ( a llegedly 17th we re willing ly , The feat ures go vernme nt: , were largel y fashi oned in t he especially , us even of poli t ical a rrangements which t he nuclear impasse , among others, calls in to q 1est ion . best of even dem ocratic) techno log y, more were t he and primit i v e d iscerned, In the br iefs prese nt ed A similar theme , similarly qu estioning 'such sacred tradi tions as a bs olut e national so ve reignty', was p r essed by Bradley, a significant US g enera l ( sec Co x , p. 225). Sch 11. (like Bradley) does not mak e it entirely clear whether he is thi nking of the Way Up or t h e Way Down, but the names he drops suggest the Way Up. So does the mai n t hrus t of what he says, e.g. ' Thus the pe ril of extinction is the price that the world pays not f or "safet y" or "survival " bu t for ito [sic !] insistence on co ntinui ng to divide itse l f up into sovereign nations' (p.210), as if the natural or original st ate were an undivided one ? On Schell's position , see further Append ix 1. �for political a r rangements such as repr~nontat ive government, the excessive siz an,! compl ex ity of modern states was not envisaged . But such systems con tinue to opcrn Lc , i ns ufflciently questloned, though tl1el r justificato ry bas es und c r mi ne<l. prese nt Nuclear problems rep r esentative have political emphasized have been several other defici encies in arrangement s. In particular, they have rcv cn l ed how governments can thwart popular opinion, and act against the evident will of t he people on an issue , for instance in installing US missiles Euro pe a n countri es. cen tury ca s e for r e pr e sentative proced ires is dissolved. issues, ~ i s sues. The least, be reduced. reduced excessive power back at dev e lopme nts , pro cedures, But the route down through issue-regul ated large i mposes and complex other modern requirement s. states What lnl t .t1-1.l s maller a s iL ls to inf or med citizens gro uping than approx i mate of a g lant satisfa ctory good will. As the re .1 r c se riou s dcfic encies .f.n the l.nf ormation by are stn tes, government recent tec hnologic al called for a re smaller Firstly, in present information and democratic progressive procedure, of control, nation-stat es, channels, and so f o r.th. ncc e ptable the from These upon nuclear problems have again made patent, even ·release the and distributio n distortion r estrictive of most liberal of them (and Aga in, especi a lly with new and less systems , there is little excuse for thls. information , upward depends But there ar e e vi dently vest ed i.nterests whi c h stand to benefit from the limited pub} l t:1 y and Secondly , democracy, insofar political rela t ed clcfi c i ncies as regards educati.on). flow major li ke many other social arrangement s, appear to function better with lnt egraLJon of groups by principles of federation. a nd on of governments would, to that ex tent at grou p.i.ng s , information flo w, communicati on and education. cx pe n,, ive lea st governmenta l power to more participato ry democratic forms, a rout e mad e poss ibl e ev en in mu ch elected wny that is thoroughly ambiguous on most issues ) are not given an almost f r ee hand on eve ry issue, but are required to answer polic:y th e It is past time for mor e is sue-control led d mocratic procedures , where governments once (i n some Now that modern communicati ons a nd info r mati on-processin g make i t fe a si bl e to dete rmine the mi.x of public positions on major 19tl1 in of data featu res in have a vailab ility major communicati on helped in making present delib e rat e ly fostered pattern of nation-stat e �56 co11frontatl on, and in establishin g the prisoner's nuclear superstates are often seen to be gJlemma type situation th e locked into (on which see, e.g., llardin1. A central a rgument, arising from the nuclear fix, for political questi oning current arrangement s and seriously considering their adjustment (in theory at le~sl), takes the following shape:• Political arrangement s shoul d answer ba c k to certain j,rnt iff.-.d 111 te1·ms of dolng ut .eas t where and are so. 78 The s<.i r e quir ements lnclude ,mch things ns en;,blJ ng good and meaningful and moral l lve s for those arrangement s, requirement s (as certainly in who operate under the muc h of the West) the basic mat e rial condit i ons for such lives are met . • l\ccaus c of the nuclear [ix, nation-stat ~ arrangement s have these requirement s. For guarnntce the prospect of arrangement s. nation-stat es, good meaningful lives those to under their yet ther e ls a non-negligi ble probability that person's morality is jeopardised if the person is obliged a meet at least in the North, can no longer such 1.lv •s may terminate, leas tl11rn fulfilled, 1.n this way. support to A life's meaningfuln ess ls certainly diminished if it ends before its 1,rimc inn nuclear d i~aster ; m.-iny and ceased s tate to Furthermore a acquiesc e in or engaged in nucl ear war preparation or nuclear deterrence (cf. Benn) . Th_erefore, nation-stat e arrangement s have should be amended . have their justificatio n, and Variations on this type of argument apply to many (though not all) natlon-stat es: natio n- s t ate f orfeited it ls not only because of the forfeited their mandate. nuclear Political fix that some obligations to such states a r e corr espo ndingly dissolv ed . There is enough evidence that power- brokers who control stght of, or worse have lost don't care about, t11e point of political arrangement s, of wha t justifies or is supposed to justify their sta tes. 78. states This applies both to How they answer back admits of expansion in various ways, depending on the irn lerlyi.ng politica l theory. Rawls, for example, puts it in familiar contract ual form: that the political order is 'a cooperative venture for mutual adva ntage' (p.4). Mao puts i.t in a standard democratic way: 'since Lhe purpose of all political processes is nothing but to serve the people and the i r interests, it is the people who should control in a meaningful way, the gove rnment' (see Soo, p. 68). �r;7 rnnre powerful s tates nnd to lesser states, both c lai m popular Ln and mandate ag;iinsL the wllL of the pcopl(! , power~. put a value hi3 lier where, nlrea y illustrated milita ry situa ti ons: viol.1ted the 'IH' t:.1k er s on some have more often , they act without it or as The sit1.1at-ton has been reached sove reignty nation al survival. ' (Scliel1's conclu sion, p . 210; is -✓ hl.'lfe where than 'nuc l ear: they do on human for copio us evidence see Kupe r). Thi s by I srael, Vietnam and many other states in nonnuclear the principles of just warfare repeated ly, as hav e ma ny other pr i nciples. much of whn t c l .:i im they lv1d to externa l have been blatantJ.y Such states have forfeited respect or internal political obedienc e; so, on other grounds, have many other state s . It could just be, of course, as is oft en a lt er nat ives, that have been re s arc hlng glimpsed, though of world go vernment). dismissed, for s tirc withou very no possibly better alterna tives . but little As to whether all has such are no been expended on opportunity do to work, a nd not Appea r to give we alternative s w~y Down. There working tow ar d s the wea kening es pec .i.ally can be the may and ha ve been given know very little a bou t how humans suff icicnt org anisi ng and trying out alternative accessi ble alter natives instance as lacking feasibil ty , it is diff i cult to be enti r ely operate under su bstantially different arrangement s. But, t ime arrangemen t s, to even once again, proc eed thos e nuclear very far on of the mor e be time to pr oceed a l i ttle way ho wever , in breakdown of t he large r s uperunion s , which are the immedia te problem. ln valid to simp ly conclud e that alternative poli t ica l a nd while t here But alternat i ves the r e are, effor t toking the risk of being dogmati c; little d e ad ii ne[, tha t t1e r a nge of alte r na t ives or their features (except pe r haps for th e 0 op Li. on or insinuated , nuclear st a tes, Thus i t woul d be s oc i a l arrangemen t s, theoretic a lly feasible and certainly a l onge r- te rm goa l , do not present ly off er a part of t he practical response to the nuclear fi x. But there is no need to insist upon a s1 nglc-trac~ Way Out of dll emrna to th t: exclusion of all olh .rs: quite the contra r y . t he nuclear We can no t only afford to be fa:!.rly catholic about " second best " ap proache s and embra ce wha teve r seems to be working or looks like helpinJi • wUhin re c ogn i sed e thi c al ( and o t her ) con st rain ts ; Indeed, given the urge ncy, the direness of t he si tuat i on , we �58 :,hou1d ~s be fairly catholic and not lnflexibly co~mitt ed to narrow methods, such boRged rlown ( a nd v ery on a rms limitations ner,ot inti o n s m"thod::i should si~nifica nt be undemocratic perservered concessions unrepr•sentativ e) between main nuclear states. wi.th, from cert ai nly tJ nd and the attemp t s superstates, made to e.g . No-first···use declarat.lon, a ban on weapons in space, etc. But even s uch a wring further jointly signed The direction of most hope for progress has however come into view, a direction that is not especially new . The politica l means of the Way Out are what they have la rg e r eve r y liberal or huma nitarian been on issue that has matte r ed: from ou tside state governmental apparatus by organised pressure fr om within or nnd it ' by furnishing self ·- organising characte r is tically Bottom-Up famiL l ar cons i de rations are methods an alternatives practically wi t hout which never virtually upon bypass it , Top-Down. Such but part of the more general , and very effective, case agai nst relia nce upon states for a range of things they are now supposed to supply, but whic h effectively and [or can almost t hat invariably mnttcr le ss be obta i ned, where required, more e x pensive ly without them (and their monopo1 i.es) • In the case of security it i s states , with very few exceptions, impo sed , or acqulc s ced and nuclear weapons . frequently from time being , movement have in, milit a ry solutions involving nuclear installations The opposition to th e local a nd neighbourhood esca lating grou ps, nuclear fix has come some of them now feder a ted :1cr,;11s nntions ( " o the dir c cLion :!.a not rcnlly interstate). !we n rrnc:ccr-rn fu1 that These groups have in blo cki ng some nuclear ln s tal lat.tons and establishing, for the some a ga inst nuclear-free nu c le a r neighbourhoods . equipment The patchwo r k grass-roo ts is strongest in Europe, which is - as the mov emen t realised , and what gave it impetus - a leading thea tr e, on US strategic thinking, for a limited nuclear war not touching ext r eme ly doubtful th a t i~1crea i ng NATO and American Europe will E11 ropc wil l these mnke it a saf er place : American shores. nuclear r emoved installations in on the contrary it seems probable that bec nme much eafcr lf t he anti-nuclear movements installations It is succeed a nd Europe r e ndered nuclear-free. g ro ss ly lmmoral condu c t will ther e by also be conside1.·ably reduced. Ln having The chances of �mrnt of the spectre of Soviet dc)tnl.11t\don, mil..ib:Jt:t, ideological and Exc:c•p l in the case of Eu ope, where th e inexcusable suppression of Eastern Eu ru pe a ll too ev iden tly persis ts, this is a n obvious fabrication . 8Cr i ou s ly And even ir Western Europe the spec tre is failing partly g iant fashioned military-in dustrial allianc e. inc r easJ. ngly dominated and largely domi na t ed financially ideo l ogically. much propped exaggerat ed. no t nnd c1d c quatcJJ and ec onomically some of and, in some mea sure, Indeed much of the "free" world countered as mil.itary by The means . i .," in basic any mode of mUitary . But mil itary, and associated poli tl c al, domtnatlon of We ste rn Europe by the Sovi e ts is a problem, t here are several ways other predomi na ntly American nuclear weapons to mi tigate it. on] y local def e nc e arrangement s - whethe r top·-down alternative is it domina ted economicall y , by the US A. doml na ti on to whic h nuclea r weapons are con s ide r e d relevant in sofa r a up by the NATO powers ' i s not ge ncraJ. ly considered so much of a problem (as it ts 79 ), and ls anyon' Since the l ast World War, Western Europ e ha s be e n polHlcally and ideologica lly , by the USA , c a1;e Does expect the united Soviets to absorb China, let alone take over Canad a or Brasil say? Th Rt other? social methods but also some and much r eliance on These should include not state-suppl ied social decentralis ation , regionalisa tion and devolution of orga nlsat{ons, than me thods, or r estructurin g, such as power to dispersed local mo r e cooperation and interchange with the Soviets and East e rn Europe. Part of the point of whether external or r es tructuring internal, so is especiall y situa tions, is to st a t e-contrived 79. break make any military takeover, much more difficult and pointless, and the rest o r ation of loca l control easier . 80 Part of int e rch1nge, to the point of cooperation and at the level of more ordinary people, in more ordinary down conditions of hostility and distrust and to s abotage the West-East confrontati ons, and thereby to remove For many pe opl es of the world , and in it s impact on the natural world, advanced corporate capitalism is an oppress ive and damaging doctrine. But, in contrast wit h a ustere Marxism-·Len i.nism whic h would i mprove the lot of some of Lhe oppressed world while even worsening the impact on the natural world, corpora t e capitalism admits a certain pluralism, and recognises many mo r e individual ri gh t s and libertie s. Ce rtainly Marxism-Len inism which appears to degene rat e in practice to an authoritari an and totalitarian position is a less welcome alternative . It is fortunate, then. that we need be saddled wi t h neither: there are s u per ior options. �60 ot.hC'r motl ves fo r, and Western popul ar suppor t Eu r ope , for f or, long j. much Uitary too adventures partial to and military advt'nturcs, sho uld now be hel ping i t se lf rath e r: than relying on a leaky Amer.lean nucl e ar umbrella for its defe nce . Moreover it ough t to be, at the ve ry least, 1ncomfortable about the risls of c a tastrophi ca lly damaging t he world in the i nterests of its own security . extensive parts of Nor should other "nuclear depende nt" states be prepared to ac qui esce in this not uncharacteristic European impositlon. There wo rl<l, wha t LS N war is no risks, enormous for virtue Western in sacrificing othe r parts of t he Europe, rn i. li t r1ry-base d dom ina tio n to other parts of the worl d. which has long exporte d There ar e better. options than clublou s and ris ky nuclea r shields for Europe. -·-·- ----- --·- . ·-- 80. Thus , for exampl e, t o the exte nt that lo cal defence groups a re integrated under more centralised direction, it would be a built-in principle th at s urre nder of the central directing sect i on absolved the federated groups fr om following suit or following further dir ec tions. That is, through devolution of power, surrender becomes structurally impossible (though individuals or baste groups may surrender). Moreover, the central section wnuld ho ld only limited informa t ion about the federated uni ts it in tegra t e d. The locally organised groups themselves, which would mer ge wilh local po pulati ons, would be train e d in tact ics of passiv e resist ance, sabotage, (nonviolent) guerilla warfare, et c. The net effect (as c. Pigden, who made most of these points , argues) would be to make the cost of militar y conq uest, occupations and exploit a tion prohibitively high. One reason why t he Japanese Army High Conunand decided aga inst invasion of Au s LraHa i n March 1942 was th e cha r acte r of Australi.ans and the fact th a t th ey 'wo uld resist to the end' ( Threa t s to Australia's Secu rity, p . 62). Ycl th 1 9 112 (wa r r edu ced ) Aust ralian populatton was substantI.nlly untrained a nd unorganised for loc ally-based defenc e . With such a defence r estruc t uring, Aus tralia wou· d not only much reduce its vulnerab ility to military adventures, but remove standard reaso ns for succumbing to threat s of outside military domination, blackmail, and the like. 81 . In par ti cular , with sufficient cooperation and trust, competitive prisoner's dilemma situations, which depend on the prisoners being kept separa te, are removed. So too a main mode l supporting deterrenc e policy would be undercut. And the arguments from national dangers would b e further co rroded. In the same direc t io n, i t is import a nt to extend cooperation between USA and USSR down below t he l e vel of state trade deals, e.g. in grai n and gas, to communicati on and coope r ation between people. For such commercial deal s there is suff ici e n t tr us t, even in periods of intensive confrontation: why should it not be so also a t more significa nt people-to-people levels? Many f ur ther Ror ts of lnt c r rclo tionshfp ore fe slble, nnd jnexpenaive by m:llltary st a ndards, e . g . sister cities, common clubs, worker exchanges, gi.( t pro Jee ts . If, for ins tnnce , 100 1 000 o r mo r e ord lnnry Americans wer e l i ving, working or holiday i ng in USSR ( and vice versa), Americans would feel less enthusiasm for hurling nuclea r missiles into Russ ia (or vic e versa ) . Only quite inadequate efforts have been made to build up mutual respect and trust; or the con tr ary , a l ot of resources have been expended to enco urage pr ecisely th e opposite a tt itudes, e.g. as part of the strnteg y of the "cold war". ~ �6J What th e anti-nucle a r movement s must press b,oa rl out1 i.nc; fof ::tccordingly i.ic> perceptive t r ansarmamen t, to i.e. conversion outer edges of graduat e d the movements, alternative social defence arrangements). Bu t t h e ar gume n t a lso makes it clearer how f a r this should go, t hrough in i n pa rt it i s what they hav e_ been pushing for, nuclear reduction an d rlisarmamen t ( a nd, on the more wa y clear namely all the disarmament 82 to total nuclear disarmament, unilateral c e rt a inl y to lo cal disarmame nt across progr e ssively larger parts of the planet's s ur t~cc , inc luding especially Europe. For once the state is demoted , its i mpo r t ance a nd t he necessity of its maintena nce properly downgraded and reliance on dec i s i on- making its diminished de ci s ion-making - once all that is happe n ) , one in duly favour of allowed more localised cont r ol and for (it does not need to major component in the nucle a r fix is removed, namely the problem o f red 11ction or even loss of state sove reignty . Ma'ntenance of that sovereign ty has been ass i gned a mistake n importance, which in turn acco un ts for the mistaken we ig ht ass i gned to the arguments from national dangers. What is important and wo rt h pres e r vi ng is not the sovereign state, but certain ways of life within the stn r- c . The na ti o n- state and dangers to it, and accompanying features s uch as mis p.l aced natl.onal J.sm, are the weakest links i.n the nuclear fix situation . On ce th e demise of the soverei.gn nation-state is allowed f or, the arguments fr om nat iona l conce rni ng part i cul a r. dangers .lndividual also and grou p rights and In their freedoms, by t he that nation- s tate . matter The are to arguments liberties in for t hem, as sma ller or exclusivel y nation-state is neith r sufficient for are disappearing, nor community arrangements can ensure them. But a r guments f r om lnd i vidual and group dangers remain , do they not? ri sks are civil necessarily th em , since i n inc r eas ingly many states the s e liberties nec e ss ary pl ace None of these require national sovereignty or even a national life. None o f ti e rights and freedoms g ua r a n te ed disintegrate. in div id11a ls 11nd groups r e maln: To be sure, th a t has always been so, 83 and ls not ---~------ ----82. The In i ti a l but impor ta nt st e ps are at zero cost as regards deterrence. Wer e det e r re nce re a lJ.y the pol icy there would be little case for more than a f r a c t io n of pr ese11t nuclear arsennJ.s. The ste ps to disarmament ;ire well-known , e.g. the scrapping of obs olete weapons, and an end t o modernisati on, the removal of nuclea . weapons in crucial theatres such as Euro pe, et c . �62 hci n1~ clwnged but only woH,f!ncd in thi. s age of moslly to wont be sure t hat nucle or arc othe r outsiders. People t hclr li v es will contlnue to run their course, i.denlly i n a flourishing fash ion , a nd wi ll not be Russ nns natlon- states. t controlle d by Amiirican s or Nucl e ar arrangeme nts which threaten t he ir lives not a rational rout e to these ends . In t he weigh-u p t hat should occur in char t.tri g a way dilemmas the as nuclear out of such deo ntic fix and its subsid i ary dilemmas, there ar e then much more i mport a n t elements than featut·es of the nat :ion-st:ate, namely E~-~ of things those the st at e is s uppos ed to safeguard, such as individual and local we lfare and a ut onomy; wc,1pons. but those th i ngs are bett e r ensured by The main reasons are fam il iar : threaten Lhe lo ss of basic values, such the removal nuclear of in particular, nuclear circumstanc es as welfare and autonomy, for many cr•ntures and reg ions, and the potential los s is in general much great er than in a nuclear-frcP si tuation ( even should another with nuclear weapons ). ideological party the o pportunity armed There are also well -kn own supplementa ry reasons; example, the production of nuclear weapons reduces both local of remain welfare for (because costs of wea pons manu fa cture) and autonomy (bec ause of th e accompanyin g sec urity measures). Thus the appropriate ly de vi ces and nuclea r fix limiting weapo ns is resolv ed , theoretical ly it can deploy, and how ), and rate, by by allowing for the But, although that is a reasonable Way Out , at little c ost in the circums tances , it will be s ince any sovereignty of the st ate (especially as to what nuclear con sidera bl e reduc tion of st a t e sovereignty . pra ctice , at strongly resisted in those who hold power hold it , in one way or another, unde r th e au s pices of the state. This is a main reason why people must organise and act aga i nsl the state . Again the resolution also lo ok s practicnl enough, since sovereignt y reduction in ne ed apply es s e nt ially only to the the production and deployment of nuclear weapons . 83. the Ind eed it could in principle be obtained by negotiated It will rema in so und er any satisfactor y political arrangement s. Until human s ocial arrangement s change substantial ly , there is no substitute for on-golng vigi lance to ensure or maintain political liberty. �agreement ( at the top l e ve l s of s tat e) . to far with the superstates , the li mitations of s tate- powe r will likely ha ve to proceed further: for nuclear weapo nr y doc s no t stand in sp l endid isolation. i.nto both milita ry s yst ems - and ( c ivil) Rather it is industrial production of the states So, uns u r pr i s ingly, practica l- look ing resolu t ions are being concerned. ti ed solidly resisted by super states. Accordingly more popul a r (bottom up) act ion aga ins t nuclear-involved state s and espec i ally against the supe rstate s , af t e r all the stat e s causing the mo s t serious dilemmas, wil l have to be t aken much furth e r. variety of organ is ed forms. These in clud e a refusal to contribute to nuclear war preparatio n , e ithe r d i rectly or wld •l y, from such s t e ps ns Once again it will take a The indir ect l y. the forms of action range block adin g o f shipme nts of ur a nium, and the rc f1 1!:lal of suppJ 1, Qa a nd se rv i c es to sa i1or n o n nuc le ar ships and subma r i ne s, t he to withho lding or r ed i rect i on of t axes des t i ned for nuclear security purposes. They inc l ud e as we ll the whole r a ng e nuclea r facilities i nstal l a tions and of nonviolent (methods protest which method s against do exclude not i ncapaci t a t i on a nd decommissioning of equipment l and which do include new model . 8'~ resistance and de f e nce organisations). It is important to realise that petitioning of powe r state representat i ves and ho l d e rs, f or instance through letter campaigns, demonstrations and direct ap pea l, t s far f rom a complete strategy , a nd may be ine ffecti ve or ignored, th e r esul t s disco u r aging. and This is one reason why popular action should be based on a mor e com prehensive politi c al strategy, which also involves withdrawing s up po rt f r om prevailing state arrangements, and working out and partic ipati ng in alter nati v e a r r a ng emen ts, especially alternative defence forms. 85 Sufficient d etn' l s as t o what to do ar e already known, enough to make an immediate start. 84. For some imp r e ssion of the rang e of me thods, see aga i n Sharp. 85. For muc h mor e on all these points, s e e e .g. fu rt her Appe ndix 2. Martin . As to what to do, see �64 APPENDI X l. ON THE FATE or MANKIND AND THE EARTH, according to Sch e ll, and to Anders. A ncrtes of nucl cn r prophet s lw a pr odu c ed a EJ e r:les of ph ilosophj cal ly-·o riented works on nucl e ar war and the all e ged impl i.c c tions of l1 uman ex t inct io n . 1 The series is important for its dee pe r penetration into the nuclear d ilemma , down to metaphysical leve ls; i n this the series contrasts ith the transie nt s u pe rficialities of much o f the political commentary. The most wi de l y c i rc ul ated and influential text of the series is undoubtedly that of the s l ightest of t he ''prophets", Schell' s The Fate of the Ear th. This skillful piec e o f medi a -philo so phy uncannily redeploys some of the appar e ntly deep phenomcno]ogi cal themes of Anders . So, conveniently, main assumptions of Schell and And ers ca n often be considered together. To critic i se their a ssumptions is not of co u r s e t o belittle their wo rk. In pa rticular , Schell's little book, for a ll i.ts politic al shortcomings, is having a significant a nd much needed ef f ect j n sh i ft i.ng att: lt udes towards nuclear arrangements. It is especially valuable f or i ts vivid and horrifying scenarios of the aftermath of nuclear attack. Unfor t 1111,i t ely it: a lso exhibits, both phi losopld.cally and fac tually, sever e defects . Somr of it 1s simp ly ga rbage: to selec t one example , consider the claim that ' witho u t . . . a world-wide program of action for preserving th e [ human] spec i.es nothing else t hat we undertake together can make any pr a c t tea l or. moral sense (p.1 73, rearranged ). Th is s1ou l d cer t a inly be rejected phi losophica lly ; for ther e is no separate moral issue of s uch overwhelming importance that a ll other lssues become mor ally ne 11 t r al. Mo r a l issue s remain moral issues: they don 't cease to be so when compar ed wi t h more important moral issues ( as Schell effective ly acknowledge s el s ewhe r e, p . 130 ) . And the claim should a l so be junked on more f actual grounds. Humans fo rm a highl y resilient sped.es, like r abbit s i n Australia a survivor spec i es, unl i kely t o be exterminated unde r presently a rrang ed nuclear ho l oca usts . l. The di.st i ng ui shing term i s from Foley's Nuclear Prophets, wher e many of th e l eadi ng prophets are assessed. One well-known pro ph et not so consider e d there i s Jas pers , presumably because hJs ma in work (which might equally we ll ha ve been translated as The Fa te of Mankind) comes out in entirely th e wrong direction. For it gives heavy philosophi c al attire to the be tt e r -d e ad -than-red abomination, A ma ln argument agai nst Jaspers so presented i s simple. Howeve r bad being r d mig h t be come ( at present it is debatably worse than living under some of Lh e tot a l i tarian regimes th e free We st props u p), it still gives human s a fu rth e r chance for good lives , since r e gimes fall or can be topp led: bu t t o t al a nnihil a tion removes that all-important oppor t unity . But J as pe r s does not pr e sent his po s ition so simply . Rather his con t e nti on i s t hat there a re circum st a nc e s whe re a nd princ ip les for which a person or group of per sons ought .to s acri f ic e even their lives . Freedom is such: a l i f e worth living i s a fr e e life. But the latter pint can be granted w!. 1:liout conceding tha t s a c rlf1cc is a possible means to it , While the sai:rifice of one or a f e w l i ve s may be a possible ( if dub i ously effec tiv e) w~y t o fr • . l ivc D for oth e r s , c er t a inl y the sacrifi c e of all l ives is not a poss i ble rout e to fr e e llve s for a l l, s ince no human l i.ves r ·emain. To thi s rx Le nt Sche ll l s ri g h t (on p . 131) i n a ccusing Jasper s of an ea ch to all f al l Rcy. J aspe r 1 s i dea that "the f r ee life that they try to save by all po s s ibl e mea ns is mor e th a n me r e lif e or lives'' breaks down when applied to al l participating pe ople. None c a n ga in free live s by extinction of all: t hat is not a possibl e route to l ife e ve1. �was selected howev e .· b1?ca,.1se it 1eads i0to, lndeed presupposes, two of the major defec tive assumptiono in the work ot Mchell and And ers: Sl. Nuclear w,n· will ellroinate life, humnn li.fe r1t least, on arth (the 2x~_~nc:Uon assumption); and S2. 111 the absence of humans, very many notions, not only those of morality a nd value, but t hose of time and space for example, make no sense ; or, to put it into a more sympathetic philosophical form, these notions depend for their s nse on a n act ua l human context ( the ext ravagant a nthropocentric assumptlon). It is appli cations of S2 which giv Anders' and Schell 's work 2 some of its apparent phllosophical depth, and certainly induce much philosophical puzzlement through the paradoxica l propositions generated. B11t the frequ ent applications of S2 depend esse ntially on Sl. For without total extinction there will he humans abo ut, to make past and future, good and evil, go on making sense! Th ·-- exDmp l e Granled the factual assumpti on Sl is by no means ruled out as a real po ssibilit y; granted the technological means are now available to make it true, to render Homo sapiens extinct; 3 granted the prospect of nuclear war does t hreaten leacfing centres of Western c .i vilizat ion witb obliteration. Even so Sl appea r s unlikely in the light of present - admittedly inadequate - information. Even in Ca nada, which lies on the pol ar route of Soviet missiles, human li fe should be able to continue in certain northern areas (according to Canadian medi cal studies) . Sche l l's argument to Sl is extremely flimsy. It depends, for example, on an unjustified extrapolation from the Northern to the Southern Hem i s ph ere , but for the most part it does that very North American thing , of con tracting the world to North Arner.lea . (All that matters, all worthwhile civili zati on, i.s in USA, or at least, to be more char.itable, in North Ameri cA and Europe, which will also be wiped out, i.e. its human population will be eliminated in the nuclear holocaust.) Some of the data Schell relies upon , for example the effect of nuclear explosions on the ozone layer, is significant l y out of <late. Other effects than ozone destruction apparently transfer even less we ll f rom Nortl1 to South. A factually superior study of nuclear disaster than Schel l's, by Preddey and others, indicates that parts of the Southern Hemisp here , New Zealand and southern latitudes of Africa a nd Latin America could escape relatively unscathed from even most massive northern exchanges. 4 Roth Anders a nd Schell remark on the "impossibility of unlearning" th e mean s of manufacturing nuclear bombs. It would seem that extinction, which they both foresee as at least a live possibilit y, would furnish a good medium for unl e 3rning nuclear technolog y (something very like this emerges from van Daniken's theor y of an earlier "high" technology). In v i rtue of S2, they would however 0xc lud e such a possibility as a case of unlearning, contending wrongly 2. For a deta iled comparison of Schell and Anders' remarkably similar versions o( S2 , se Foley JS. 3. Thus the Las t Man argument, important in environmental ethics, is no longer merely hypothetical, awaiting the remote death of the Sun, but assumes new ur gt'ncy. It is this sort of argumen t: that connects environmental et hic s and nucl ear ethics, at a deeper metaphysical level. The Bomb and Bulld oz er are out of the s ame technological Pandora's box . Nuclear technology is not the only route to human extinction, nor the only Pando ra's box. Biological and chemical mea ns are perhaps even more effective, and ce rtain l y can be more selective in what gets extinguished. 4. Howev er, new modellifig~ and estimates, none so far very reliable, keep appearing, and amending the picture. On the basis of one recent scenario, generated by a computer modelling of a 5000 megaton nuclear exchange, th e immuni.ty of the Southern Hemisphere to the dire consequences of a northern LSN war has been questioned . In particular, Sagan, no doubt overreaching the evidence , has 'warn[ed] that the nuclear blasts would create enormous diff e rences in temperature between south and north, shifting normal wind pa tt e rns and carrying smoke and radioactivity south' (Newsweek, November 7 1983, p .56). Some sections of the environmental and peace movements have a vested interest in exaggerating the probable effects of nuclear holocaust for life on earth, much as many stotesmen have an interest in minimizing t'r""l . �66 th n t lhc notion no long er rnnde sense. But what tlh•y s(H'm t.o want to s uggest wi. Lh th e impo ssi bility-of-unle a rning mes sage is th "' inevitability of the de velopment and event ual use of the technology - as if having learnt th e means ull else was dete rmi ned , and manufac tur e and use ceased to be a matter of c hoi ce. Certainly such vie ws have been flo ated 5• But: they are no t t e na bl e . Ther e are man y examples of technological advances that have not been t ak en adva nt r1gc of, and there are even cases of tec hnological developme nts that have be en mRnufact u rcd but not marke ted or used. The re is not something ve ry special a bo ut n11 c l ear appa ratus that puts it beyond the scope of such· generalis;<1 tio ns . Both Schell a nd Anders do claim tha t the re are very special things about nu clear wea pon s , in particular that they do not allow "expe riments ". Even if thi s were tru e - i. t is certainly not of smal ler weapons i t would not tell aga .inr,t the pr e v.lous argument: against the ine vitability of nuclear weapons. And in fac t Anders and (e ven) Schell hedge thejr claims a bout testing , and the limits to nuclear sc..ient if i c work , to large-scale weapons and independent experiments which do not interfere w.ith tl1 e observers and those outside the " J.abnrn t.ories". Again they have latched ont o major po i nts: in parti c ular, we hnv e at present no way of testing the c umul a tive effe cts of large nuclea r weapons in concer t, e . g . for more holistic effe cts such as fireballs or firestorms , e le ct romagnet ic puls e or ozone destruct ion. Sho r t of an LSN war, and l ike ly eno ugh with it, these crucial effects must rema in largely untested and lypothelical in chara ct er. The penetrat.ion of human chauvini sm , a s in S2 , is not something peculiar to Sch e ll, but is a product of Western ph ilosop hy, European philoso phy especially. This cl,auvinism is unfortuna tely alive and sti ll well, Anders' ve rsi on of S2 being ju s t on e striking illustration ( c:f . AA p . 252ff . ) . It ha s a lso deeply penetra ted Anglo- Amer i can phi.losophy, and has recently been extended by Wittgenslein ' s wo rk , where even the necessary t ruths of mathematics are taken to be a pro duct of I um:rn co nv enti ons , and would va nish w.lth bumnnsl Such ar e all eged imp lications of ex tinction ; but the fact is that the truths of arithm PLlc a r e in no way dependent on the existence of humans or humano ids or of gods or g iraffes . In Sche ll, human c hauvinis m is dished up in a particularly powerfu l and obnoxious Kant ian form. Th oug ht s and proposit ion s, time and tens e s, history and memories , values and morality, al l depend on the life- giving pres e nce nf human being s - past or fu ture or me rely potential humans are not e nough , persons t hat are not humans are cer t ai nly not enough. Thus, a ccording to Sc hell (p.1 40 , e .g. ), ' ... t he thought "Humanity is now extinct" i s an impo ssi ble one for a rati onal person, because as soon as it is, we are not. In imagining a ny ot her event , we l ook ahead to a moment that is still within the strea m of huma n t.ime, The thought is howeve r perfectly possible for huma ns; we can have it right now. Though we no doubt have it falsely, a later ratl onal creature may well be able to hav e it tr uly. Schell erroneously denies that: t here is no "later" ' . . . outside th e human tens es of past, pres en t, and futur e (p . 14 0) 6 • Human ext inc t ion eliminates ' the creature that divide s time into past, presen t and f uture ' : so anni h ilati on canno t 'come t o pass' (p. lli3) . But it: is simply false that the tenses are human; the tens e s depend on a local time ordering (per ce ptible to many creature s ot her than humans, but no t depending at all on that perceptibilit y f or its via bil ity) relating other time s to the present , to now (a l so a huma n-independent location, evident t o other cr eatures, an d borne witness to by suc h sequences as the passing seasons). And nnn ih llntion may als o too easily come to pa ss , for ma ny humans in the Nort h at l e ast, as it came to pa ss in recent ge ologic al times that human s began to exist upon earth. Bef ore t hat ther e was a time befor there were any human beings. - •••-- - - H•--- - --- - - - - - S. Not merely by technologica l determinists of marxist persuasion. Hackworth, a form e r US general , a r gues by straight induction, that if the US mili ta ry ha s a wea pon it will u se it. 6. Th e ap palling theme that humans c reat e past, present and future repeated e l s ewhere , e . g . p .1 73. (etc.) is �Anders ' arg um ent for the demise of time, that 'what has been will no .Longer even what has been', is also explicitl y and narrowly verificat ioni.st: 'for wrwl wo u ld t he d iffer e nce be betwe en what. ha s only been and what has never been, if the r e J s no one t o r emember the things that have been' (AA p.245). Ther e would st l ll remai n ma ny sorts of differenc e; for one, the history record ed i n mm1y other org anisms would be differe n t. Temporal themes do not la c k ' legl lma y be ca use not regist e red [or verified] by anyone'; truth, signl Eica nc e , sti l l less meaning, are not matters of human verificat ion. be Here , a s e ls e where, the human cha uv i nism is mixed with other distortin g metapl1ysi ca l assumptio ns of our Western he ritage , in particula r, verificati onism and on t ol og ical assumptio ns (to the effect that there are severe difficult ies in talki ng ab out what does not exist). Thus, for example, Schell takes over dub I.o ns metaphys ic s from Freud, according to whom "it is indeed impossibl e to i magi ne our own death; and whenever we a ttempt to do so, we can perceive that we are i n f a ct s till present as spectator s" (p.138). The second clause goes a good dJ e l a ncc t owards refutjng the first. In fact there is no g r eet dlfficult y in descri bing coun terfactua l s ituations which undermJne both Freud's claims. The same go e s for Schell ' s extension s of human chauvinism into one of i t s main tr a<l 1 ti o nal str ong holds, value theory: the simple and basic fact [si c!] th at befor e t here can be good or evil, service or harm, lamenting or rejoici.ng there must be li f e' , human life ( p. 171) . These are no facts, but deeply entrenche d philo sophical dogmas whi c h have been exposed and criticise d elsewhere 7. Natura l ly s ome t hi ng s will disappear with the extinctio n of humans: trivial l y t here wi l l be no mor e humans (unless humans re-evolve or are rec eated ) , and t hus no mor e human ins ti tutions, human activitie s, huma n emo ti on s , and so forth. But it is a lready going too far to suggest, as Anders does, that t he r e will a c cord i ngly be 'no thought, no love, no struggle, no pain, no hope , no comf ort, no sa crifice, no imag e, no song ... '. For there are, and may eontlnue to exist, othe r creatures th a n humans with emotion, struggles , songs , Nor will the endJng of all such human Vf?ntures, if it comes to p3ss, show that nl l past huma n ve ntu res have be en 'all in vain', meaningle ss , and already so Lo say dead. The decay of t he s olar system, or the heat-deat h of the uni.ve r s,~ cv~n, wi l l no t s how t hat worthwhil e human activitie s were not worthwhi. le. 8 Sev er.a l of tbe other notions and themes common to Schell and Anders derive from t he i r shared assumptio ns Sl and S2. It is these that underlie the biblical no t io n (in Re vela tions ) of a Second Death , redeploye d by both. 'The death of mankind ', und e r Sl, is reckon d a ' second death', because by S2 end Sl remaining lJ fe i.s r e nder ed mean.lngle ss and already ' seems to be dead' (AA p .244, S p.166) a nd Ls already 'overhung with death' (S p.166). Thus, too, more trivially , a per son f a ··es ' a s econd death ', not merely one's own but in addition that greater de ath of the spe c ies and all future generatio ns (S p.166, p . 115). However even if nu c l e ar ext inction came to pass, the stronger notion would not be vindicate d, becau s e it de pe nds on the fallaciou s inference to the meaningle ssness of prec edi ng lif e and on the very questiona ble represent ation of this mea ni ng l ess nes s as a sort of death. There is no Second Death: creatures die just once , pe rh a ps all at about the same ti me . The idea of a Second Death lacks even a s o li d met aphys i cal bas e . From Sl , t og ether with the minor pr inciple that extinctio n being an absolu t e does n ' t d i ff er in deg ree, come s the universa lity of peril them e that ' we are al l exposed to pe r il in t he same degree', which is according ly 'd isguised' a nd 'diff ic ul t to rec ogni s e', be cause there is no contrast (AE p.61+; S p.15 0 ) . Thi s th eme fall s with Sl. In a ny event, not all peoples are equally i mperilled by t he nuclea r situation , th e Indians of southern Patagonia being 7. See , e .g ., ' ll uma n chauvi ni s m a nd env .l r onmental ethics', in Environm ental Ph i l oso n~ (ed i ted D. Mann.ison and other s )) Research School of Social Sciences , Aue trallnn Na tio na l Univ er0 l t y 1 1980. 8. Anders is here ( AA pp .244-5) r e l yi ng upon a ve rs i on of the argument from �68 rnLher betlcr pJac d than the Germans of northern gu , e . 1 011 Nor are all pe opl e C<JuaJJy locked in to the situation or inca pacitated by it; as exp l.aine d, th e po s ition is different in different countries a nd placeR. Nor, --- 1 i ke wise , are all people equally res ponsible, an obnoxious theme, (in co ntrast to Anders) r-c pc a tedly infiltrates . This is the Po go theme, ,iccord ing to which -S3.- · Responsibi lit y for t he pre sent nuclear si.tuation (fiasco, really) distributes onto e verybody, it be longs to very human in the world . 9 B11t there is 3lso , mixed in, a weaker more plausible claim that gives lie to the stronger one , namely that we have some responsi bil i ty (the Nazi situation is compared). An es peci ally blatant example of the Pogo theme 10 runs as follows: ' t he world's political leaders ... though they now menace the earth with nucl cnr wcapo nG, do so only with our permis si on, and even at our bidding. At least, this is true for democracies ' (pp .229- 30) . The theme is elaborated e l sewhere : we are the authors of that extinc tion. (For the populati ons of the super powe rs this is true in a positive sense, since we pay for extinction and support the governments that pose th e t hrea t of it, while for the peoples of t he non-nuc lear-armed world it is true only in the negative sense that they fail to try to do anythi ng about the danger)' (p . 152) . But this is more of an argt1ment indicting r epresentati ve government, by revealing its insensitiv ity and unr es pon s iveness to many of the populace they alleged ly govern, not to mention those affec t ed by its activJties who are not represented at all (namely ioreigne t-s ). But Schell convenient ly neglects all such points: we are pote n tial mass ki llers. The moral cost of nuclear a r maments is that it makes of all of us underwri. ters of t he slaughter of hundreds of m.lllions ' ( p .152). And again '[ as] perpe trators we co nvey t he steady message that life not only is not sacred but is worthless; that it had bee n judg ed acceptable fo r ever yone to be killed' (p.153) . Little of this is true . Those who campaign against nucl ear a rrangements , vote against nu c lear- committed parties so far as is possible , a nd the like, are certainly not the authors of potential des t r uction, and responsibi lity .for the nuclear situation does not simply dist r ibute onto them. Nor does responsibil ity - or the unlikely opinions as to worth Schell tl l eg itima ely attributes to everyone - fall on those who have don e less . Responslbil ity for de cisi ons taken in "liberal democracies " even by representat i ves (in the unlikely event of this happening in the case of anything as important as defence) cannot be traced back to those represented , since among wi ll c :1 Schell --- ·------·---- - - - 9. An inter•stJng converse of thls t heme is sometimes advanced , that no one is responsi bl e , the whole thing is out of control. The technologit al vers i on of this no-responsi bi l ity the me is dis cus sed s hort ly. More satisfactory is the theme that nuclear arrangement s are ou t of political cont ro l , but fo r re aso ns, in terms of vested interests in keeping nuclea r things goi ng, whic h enable respons ibility to be distributed . The vested interests , wh i ch bear considerabl e responsibil ity, include the mi li tary weapons i ndustry, a nd r e sea r ch and a cademic commurd.t.ies , Under pressure s for re-election especiall y, politicians give in to these powerf ul groups, so losing contro l o f pol itic a l. processes. The argument fai l s at it s final stag e. For many politicians either belong to or represent vested interests . Thus polit ic al processes tend rather to reflect vested interests than to run ou t of political control . 10. Another example of spreading the responsibil ity runs as follows: 'The self-extinc tion of our species is not an act that anyone describes as sa ne or sens ible; neverthel ess, it is an ac t that, without qu ite admitting it to ourselves, we pla.n in certain circumstanc e s to commit' (p . 186). Ev en for most of the plnnners, ex tinction is presumably not part of "the plan", but an 1ninte nd ed consequenc ; and most of us have little or no role in the pl a nning, enough of us even campaig n agai nst the planning . Fur ther 't he world chose the course of attemp ting to refashion the system of sovereignty to acconm1oda te nuclear weapons ' ( p . 194): the world'? This connec ts of course with the ideological argument from defence of fuodamental s, e .g. for libe rty, for the (USA ) nation, and against soc inli.sm. In the' .nurse of th:fA argument yet Rn o thm: fallR 1011s assumption is rolled out: ' The means to the end are not limited , for the end itself ~ets the limits in each case' (p,189 ) . �mnny otller th1.ngs, a representative .LH only represf.ltiJ:ai:ive of a p· rty which offers a complex and often ill-characteris ed package of policies, and a voter may vote for ze ro or more policies of this package. Only in the (uncommon) event of a clear single issue referendum, which is adopted, can respo n s i bility, st .Ill of a qualified sort, be sheeted home, to those who voted for it, not to e ve ry one in the community. While S3 is false, there is an important refated th eme that is much more plausible; namely that the present nucl ear situation generates responsibilitie s for every social ly involved person (thi s theme is discussed in Appendix 2). When moreover the Pogo assumption is disentangled from accompanying theme s, part of what r es ults is decidedly along the right lines; namely S4. The controllers (not to be confused, in Schell's fashion, with all of us] have failed to change our pre-nuclear institutions. The sovereign system is out f step with the nuclear age , the one-earth system, etc. (the whole ea r th theme ). Thoug h Schell remains relatively clear about the serious defects of the state and the frequently immoral purpo es for which the state is us ed, unfortunat el y he often loses sight of this i mportant theme (indicated pp.187-8). Yet S4 forms part of Schell's critique of the state which is, by and large, scatter ed and fragmentary. As observed (in §8) , Schell arrives at the conclusion t hat the nation-state has outlasted its usefulness, and that new pol iLlcal institutions more 'consonant with t he global reality' are required as a matter of urgency. But he evades what he admits is the major task, making out viable alternative s. At mos t he makes some passing gestures, some pointing towards the Wa y Up. So l utions to the nuclear dilemma come, if not easily, in a similar simpllstlc way, from the Top Down; tho se who can must appeal to the Top (cf. p.230). Schell places his hope in treaties for arms reduction and pmitat io ns ( such as SALT) and in worl d government ( as with the United Nations) . 1 Given the r ec ord of these organisations and treaties, the negotiations a nd regulators, it is by now a pathetic fai th. Nor is a serious need felt for further analysis of the nuclear situation, to investigate the origins of nuclear technology, to explore the roots of nuclear blindness, to consider effective changes to military-indus trial organisation and ways of life . But some of the requisite deeper analysis of the nuclear situation a nd , more generally, of t he roots of war can be found elsewhere. 12 The roots of the nuclear fix are not confi ned to the ideologically-a ligned arrangements of nation-slates , but penetrate also into key components of those states, their mjlit.ary, their controlli.ng classes, and their supporting bureaucracies . And both within the arrangements of states, what accounts in part for th e a rrangements, and in key components of the states , a con spicuous and crucial feature Ls the drive for power and domination . 13 Thus the push for [nuclear] supe r iority by the super-states, to be achie ved through military-orient ed science and technology, which involves a nd enables domination, in seve r al inter.related forms. The main power-base is the large nation-state, where enough surplus product can be accumulated (from at home and from abroad, and bled from nature) to proceed wlth military and bureaucratic ambitions and to found t he h.lgh-te)~nology research and devel opment means to ever more expendable power and energy. In changin g t he structural arrangements to eliminate the prospect of nucl e ar war, it is not ultimately enough just to downgrade the mai n power·-base, the natlon-stat0.; it ls also Important to alter key component s of the state, and, mor e swe epingly, to ·remove trouble-maki.ng patterns embedded in all these social and political arrangements , namely pat tern s of domina tion, patterns anife sted not only in state political organisation, but in white-coloured relations, ma le- female re l ations, human-animal relations, human-nature relations; to remove, in short , chauvinistic relations . However not everything 11. Sec p.225ff. 12. In Anders and el-borated in Foley, and more straightforward ly, in Martin. The inco1iplete list of items given ab ove, to be investigated in a deep er analysis of the ruclear situation, paraphrases Foley JS p,164. and especially p.227, bottom paragraph . j �nee ds to be accompl ished at once; and the clus~~ - of damaging power and do1nlnaL l on relatlons tied into war can be tackled separately. And there the probl e ms can largely be narrowed to certain problems of states and certain key components of sta tes. [n ~1at analysis he does offer of the problem with states, Schell repeats th<• familiar false contrast of state cxpedie.ncy with morality, as a c ontra st between "raison d'etat" and the Socratic-Ch ristian ethics. The teaching that 'tl1e end justifies the means j_s the basi s on which governments , in all times, ha ve li. ccnsed themselves to commit cr::imes of every sort' (p.134). So 'stat es may do virtually anything whatever in the name of [their] survival ' . Schel l then argues however, that extinction nullifies end-means justificatio n by destroying e very end; but again the argument is far from sound, a nd depends on human chauvinism (as under S2) combined with ontological assumptions . Even if all humans were extinguishe d (as under Sl) ends could remain, for instance for nonhumans such as animal s and extraterres trials , actual or not. The e nds-mea ns argument can however be repaired to remove such objections : instead i t is 13. These motivating drives form pa rt of a larger int egrated packag e, compris ing maximisatio n drives for power, knowledge, control, wealth, ('TI C" rgy, sp ecr, sat:f.sfnctto n, . • . • for the newer Enlightenme nt (but Faustian ) vlr tues. Frequently there are attempts (the human failing for excessiv e neatness nod implic1ty manifested ) to reduce th package to one main component, prefer e nce-satisfa c tion for 1nstance, or ut .i lity. And the type of drive ls justified (especially for those who have it, but worry abo11t i t) not 01ly as virtuous, which it is not, but also as rational, which agai.n it is not. Rationality , the deeply entrenched myth has it, consists in maximisatio n, of the virtues . Maxjmisatio n of the objects of the drives runs, however, into limitation theorems and associated paradoxes. The maximisatio n of power, as with the Christian-I slamic God, encounters the paradox of omnipotence , the parallel maximls ation of knowledge paradoxes of omniscience . There are no consistent objects which are omnipotent or omniscient. The drive for ma x i mum consistency , often taken to be the epit ome of rationality , also l e nd s to inconsisten cy in the case of more important theor i es, s uch as arithmetic and set theory (Godel's theorem and associated limitative t heo rems). IL, . R & D, though directed by military requirement s and the arms race, also drives the a rms race. Its role .is partly disguJsed by the myth of neu tral science. There have been a tt empts, not only by those committed to technologic al dcterminlsm , to involve technology more dee ply as the main, or single, source of t he nucle a r fix . It is technology, th e mega- machine, running out of control , that has brought us to this pred cament, the nuclear abyss. Sometimes t his serves to exonerate states and thei.r key components and those who control them, for they are simply caught up by this out-of-cont rol machine; but sometimes the s tate itself is se en as a machine also running out of control. But technologic al determinism , like other varieties of stronger (nonana lytic) determinism , is false . Nuclear technology was selected and proceeded with, after a well-known po l itical dispu te involv:i.ng distingu1.sh ed scientists ; it was deliberated , fund ed and promoted , while other alternative s were not. Damag ing technologie s of th e nuclear age were not inevitable, but dellbcra el y chosen by certain components of the large nation-sta tes. And murh as they need not have been chosen, so they do not have to be persisted with. The fashionable inevitability /determi.nis m themes admit not only of refutation by bringing out the many choices made in persisting with often recalcitran t technologie s. They also admit of being made t o look r idic ulous. If the Bomb is determined, as part of human evolut ion, then if it fu nctions (as it p ·obably will , a matter also determined ), it will serve as a human population control device, a matter also determined. That is, the Bomb has its fixed evolutionar y place in human population regulation. �7l claimed tha t ext inction null i fies ends-me ans justlft&A~ion by frustrating the r a J iqntion of ev ery re levant end - me a ning by ' r e levant', in this context, t hose end,, the rea li sa tion of which th e stat e appeals t o in justification of its n uc l ear pol i cies . 15 An LSN-war, even without human extinction but with severe c no1 1gh 1 sses , would undoubt e dly frustrat e the realisation of relevant state ends. So eve n f rom an ex pediency perspective, superstate policies are open to severe c r i t icism , for exampl e a s motivationa lly irrational. As to th~~ pa r. t of the st a te and (state) sovereignty tn war, Schell leave s us i n no do ub t . A s ov e r e ign state is virtually defin ed as one that enjoys the right and powe r to go to wa r ln defenc e or pursuit of its intet"ests (p,187). Wa r ari s es fro m how thi ngs are; from the a rrangement of politic a l affairs via jealous na t i o n stat es (p.188). Ind e ed th e r e is a two-way linkage betwe e n having s~:".'_E:_r~}:_f;;22.._~ a n d _ca pad 1:.7 t o wage war. On the one side, sovereignty is, Schell c o11Lends , nec e ss a r y f o r people to org a ni se fo r war. On the other side, withou t war it is impossibl e t o preserve s overeignty. Neither of these c ontentions i s t r Rnsparen t l y c lea r a s the y stand. The f l rst is damaged by civil war and the like, t h e s eco nd by t he per sistence of sma ll nonmilitary states. Now that the mac r o-state s ystem is e ntrenched, it is however easy for conservatives (in pci r ticu l ar ) t o a rgue from t he "'real:1.ti e s"' of international life, which include sel f··i n terest , agg r ,~ss i on, f em.· , ha tred. It is on this basis th a t peace ar r angeme nts are r e adi ly d ismissed as un rea listic, utopian, even (amu s ingly) as •xtrcmlsl (c f . p . 185). Schell's f ur ther th eme that nuclear "wa r"' is not war threatens, however, to undermine hi s ca s e a ga inst the s overeign state; for example, his ends-means arg11m nt and t he a rgument based on its nucl e ar war-maki ng capacity. Fortunately th e nol-wa r t heme needs much qualifi c ation, and starts out from an erroneous c ha rac t e r i s ati on of wa r as 'a violent mea ns employed by a nation to achieve an end' ( p .189 ): but--this is neither ne c e s s a ry nor sufficient for war. What is ri ght ( s o it i s a rgued in §1) is that nuclear wars are very different. from ea r lie r c onvent i onal wars. Schell goes on to claim that war requires an end whic h nuc l ear "' va r" does not have. But nuc l ear attacks can certainly have ends ( ev en if LSN war s cannot be won in the older sense: but not all wars or games a r e wo n). It is a lso cla imed that war depends on weakness; on one side being defeated on a de cision by arms. But in nuclear "war" thi.s doesn't happen, ' no o ne's st r e ng t h fa ils until both sides have been annihilated' (p.190). But what t hese sorts o f considerations contribute to showing is again not that nuclear wa r s a r e not wa r s, but that they are not wars of certain s o rts, e.g., not just wa r s (be cause they fall on such criteria a s reasonable prospect of successand improveme n t ), not rational wars (in a good sense), and so on. That conve n tional war s have pe rs isted into nuclear times does damage to Schell's argument that nu r:10,1r we a po ns h av also ru i ned " c onventio nal"' wars, and his connected theme t hat t he demise of war has left no me a ns to finally settle di.sputes between na t lo ns, f or th e final court of appeal has been removed (pp.192- 193 ) . The theme d epend s on the mistaken proposition concerning the demise of conventional war a nd t he mi s t ak e n proposition that war of some sort has to be the final "court of a ppea l'' betwe e n nations (for, as observed, there are other types of contests tha t coul d s e rv e , and there is also th e possibility of more cooperative behaviour, e . g. joint refer e nda) . The theme also imports the social-Darwinia n assum ption of Clausewicz (the "logic of wa r" theme criticised in §2) that war has to pr oc eed to the t e c hnological li mit as if war and violence were thoroughly nat 1 r a l actlvitLes independ e nt of recognised social settings (for winni ng, su r rende r, etc.) a nd rul e -less activities. On the contrary, wars are pa r asitic on s oc i a l organisations such as sta t es and are governed by a range of understandl ngs , conventions and rules . The y are a social phenomenon, with a rule structure, if no t a logic . Huch ca pital has bee n ma de not me rely from "the logic of war" but from what i s now cal l ed "'the logic of deterrenc e " a nd the "'logic of nuclear [strategic] plann lng'". The me ssage that is usually supposed to emerge is that the massive n uc l cnr 11rr.1 ngemc nt a t he wo d<l l s now en ll ng 1. ed in a rc perfectly loglcnl, sotmd, 15. Thi s re for mu lation was proposed by N. Griffin, who suggested that the main qual ificat ion can be inferred from Sche ll's context. - j �72 rcnGonab.le, rational. However thJs represents li l i:. le more than a cheap semn nti.cal trJ.ck . Logic in no way justifies the present arrangement s, or nnythiu g 1·ke them , or renders them reasonable. There is a logic of deci.sion (as presented , e .g., in Jeffrey) which ca n be appUed in strat eg ic. planning; but it does not yield s pecific results without desirabilit y measures being assigned to alternative outcomes, that is without values being pumped in, extraloglca lly. There are various ways these va lue assignments may be determined, to meet moral requirement s or not; but in nuclear s tr ~tegic planning they have invariably been set tled on the bas iG of expediency. l& In fact, 'logic of' tends to be used very gener ously, as a word of general commendatio n, to cover something like 'rational consideratio ns ente r ing into t he policy or strategy of '. In these terms, S hell, who like o thers enjoys pl.e ying with the term 'logic of', should write o f ' the il logi c of deterrence' , f or he emµlic1size~~ (p.21.J) tlP disparity bct:wc11n the supposed rati.onali ty o f t:hret1t~nl.ng 11se of nuclear weapons and the irrational i ty ( even from a national i n te r e s i viewpoint) of act ually using th m should the threat fail: 17 ~ the success of deterrence doctrine depends on the c redibili ty of the threat of thi s unjustifiab le and irrati onal use. I nd eed Schell wants to go sti l l further a nd locate a contradict ion in deterrence (e. g . pp.201-2): but the argume nt depends on an interesting conf uaion of cont:radictl on with cancell at ion , 18 along with the Rss •mption that deterrence invo lves cancellatio n . Nucl ear deterrence ma y wel l be irrational, i.t is immoral, but it is not inconsisten t . 16. Selecting the 11sual came theory scttlng sees to th is almost automaticnl ly; for it is then assumed that each player plays to ma ximiz e his or her own ndvantagc. Thus too th e presumption Jn Walze r, p .277, that 'the logi c of deterrence' is based on eye-for-eye and toot h- for-tooth as sumptions . 17. Even the irrationali ty of the use hac been contested, e . g . it wishful]y thought that America will rise l ike a phoe nix radioactiv ~ ashes . has be en f rom th e The r e is moreover a simple solution to Schell's problem of th e mis sing mo..!_ivc for retaliating to a first strike (p.204), namely, not a r etributiv e one, but a n ideological one: eliminate t he prospe ct of the f uture dominance of the riva i deo l ogy . 18. An anal ogous confusion of negation with cancel lation or obliteratio n appears in recent US " st a r war" thinking, where US missiles are supposed to "'negate" incoming USSR missiles . Moral paradoxes of deterrence take a diffe re nt dire ction; although involving negation t hey dep end upon perhaps questionabl e i nterconnexi ons of intensional func t ors. One type of paradox (consider ed in §5) derives from a policy of credibly threatening LSN war without however intending to proc eed to LSN war, though credible th reats ( ap pear to) imply an intention to proceed. Another s tyle derives from acclaimed intention to reduce the number of nuclear missiles when t he persis tent pract ice, which impl ies an intention, is to increase th e number. This paradox is technically r emov ed how satisfactor ily in another matter by a dis ti nction between longer- term ai.ms and :1.mmediate practic e , a time-ho noured method of removing �.PPENDIX 2. On the Matter of Collt>,.•Uyr,, and Indiyi,hli1 1 Responsi bility and on Regional ~~rategie ~ What one do e s depend s , naturally , on where one lives and what mea ns one hns , AS we ll as on wha t one should do and what sort of person one seeks to be . So too what s tr a t egy a stat e should adopt depends on where it is located and what sort of power it is , on national as we ll as on moral co nsi de r ations . In presen t circumsta nces states have an evident responsib il tty to work ouc th~lt• pol te l. cs . The r e nre however some pcrs uua iv • argum ents that this is where uLl r espo ns i bi l i ty ends : t he se major re sponsibi lities accrue entirely to states, a nd ther e is no individua l, or (smal le r scale) c oll ec tive, responsib ilit y to work out a pol i cy or stance on such matters as nuclear ar rangement s and still l ess to ac t, perh a ps against a state, on the basis of such a stance. While such a no-respon sibi l ity or ~-out posit ion no doubt suits many people many for th emsel ve s, s ome (especial ly mor e a u thoritari an power-hol ders) on behalf of othe s - it do e s involve i nadmissib ly opting out of moral responsib il itie s, r e spon si bil it i e s ac quired by vir t ue of being a person wHhin the fr amework of ce r tain soci al a r r angements . Now the r e is no doubt that individua ls a nd groups can do t his, c an opt ou t. They ca n neglect t he:tr moral re sponsibi liti e s; b ut they are not ju stified tn doing so. Against th i s clai.m, whi ch is bas ed ultimatel y upo n each person's being set i n a we b of respons i bj_lity-- induci.ng social r elat ions, whether they like it or no t so long a s they choose to liv e with others, there are some neat arguments which a ppear to pe r mi t , or even wa rrant, opting out. One influenti a l argument take s t he following lin es: 1. The (o r dina ry) ind i vidual, or group, ha s no poss ibil ity of making a d i fference t o wha t happens. Theref ore 2. Such ind ivid ua ls, or grou ps, have no obligatio n to try to make a differenc e . Hence 3. Suc h i ndivid uals, or groups, are not mor a lly responsib le , f or instance when thint s go wr ong. There are two mai n a ssumption s in this a rgument , both of which should be resiste d: fir stly, in gett i ng from l to 2, a varia n t of the "ought implies can " t heme 1 , and se condly, the ass1mptio n tha t individua ls can't make a differenc e . While it is true tha t individua ls cannot accomplis h much on their own, together th ey can. Wha t a n individua l can achieve depe nd s on what suff ic ien tly many other i. nd lvidua ls do. In highly competiti ve communi ties, full of hopeful f r ee- riders, a pe rson may encounter a familiar impasse: that he or she acts in ma nner M (e.g. morally, against nuclear arrangeme nt s , r a tio nally), at con si de r a ble pe r s onal cost , with no gua ra ntee that othe rs wil l also ac t M-ly. Suc h nn impasse no long e r faces so many in the West, at least as regards initi al s t eps agai nst nuclear a rrangemen ts. The individua l can cooperate with others in ways t hat do make a differenc e. An i ndividual is not exonerate d from r e s ponslb1.l ity by the argument . While ind iv iduals can re s pond by joining organisat ions whose activitie s are di rected a t mak i ng some differenc e , many individua ls a l so have the option of more indi vldu All st i c action in such forms as boycotts , go slows, po l itical di s obedi enc e. An important form of individua l resistanc e, a lready adopted in Canada and nor t h··we stern USA, is refusa l to pay income taxes directed towards defenc e or v·r ious pa r t s thereof ( e.g. nuc lear weapons productio n and de plo yment ), or a l ternat ively redirec t ion of such taxes , for instance to peace fun ds, Evi de n tl y, however) all these more indivi dualistic forms of political act ivi ty wo r k mo re ef fe ct iv~ly if individua ls integrate their activitie s, since th e i mpac t s aggregate ( a nd appear aft e r a certain stage to exponenti ate). As we l l co l lective action he lps in distribut ing the impact of retributio n or puni ti ve ac t io n by st a te aut horities. 1. Any sat i s f a c t ory d _ontic th e ory which t akes mora l dilemmas with du e se r io usn e ss is bound to r eject th i s theme. There are als o independe nt g rounds for j e ttisoning this Kantian theme : see Routley a nd Plurowood. - II �.,I<,' Th 0 re are, furthermo re, arguments of some weight that individua ls are under Ro1ne sort of moral obligati on to t a ke political ac t ion to disaffili ate tlwm,, l' lves f rom wlrnt contribut es to the prospects of nuclear war. What type of ac t ion Lhjs is depends on the sort of state one resides in, for instance, whether i l is a nuclea r power, whether it provides nuclear bases or facilitie s, etc., and o such complicat ing issues as what kind of preventiv e action the state iN l ikely to take in return. (Any state seriously practis ing deterrenc e Js bound to take some action against effective protest, or ri sk losing cred ibi l ity ; but there are limits to the amount of state coercion any one individua l need bear.) One a rgumen t - it is one of a type that can be varied from making nuclear wea pon s to, fo example, providing fac ili ties for them - proceeds from th e wron g ness of nu c lear war to the pos'ition that it is not right to be making the we~pons for such war. The argument here appli.es connectin g principle s (like those of §5), while appealing to such backgroun d informati on as that the manuf act ure and de ployment of such weapons j_ncreases the risk of s uch war. But j f it is not morally righ t to be making s uch weapons t hen those who live in a state that is doing so ought to d isaffilia te themselve s from such defence productio n, an1 disaffili ation includes not paying for such prodtictio n through d e fence taxes . The argument is not without substanti ve as sumption, but the a s sumptions appear morally reasonabl e and defensi ble. Another effective argument proceeds from the question of the type of moral person one wants to be : Does one want to le, or effective ly to be seen as, the kind of person who goes along with the nuclear destructi on of human populatio ns? Or with making c red i bl e a threat to do so, or th e like? What follows applies primarily to people wh o do not want to be, or be seen as, such people . Arguments like hese not only put opt-outer s and do-nothin gers on the spot insofar as they contribut e to national objective s; they also raise questions , perhaps eve n dil emmas, as to pol:L ti cal obligatio n fo r those who would take act ion, ev en limited action such as redirectio n of taxes 3. For are there not political obligatio ns to the state, such as paying due taxes and supportin g the national defenc e effort? It i.s usually assumed that there are. However, no dile mma occurs under a theory which, properly, takes political obligatio ns to be re gulated in some fashion by moral obligatio ns ; for in this case moral obli ga t i ons ov_rride political obligatio ns. In fact political obligatio ns are alread y significa ntly limited by moral constrain ts. The nuclear situation does not so muc h bring out new limits on political obligatio n, as em phasize the respects in which those obligatio ns are already limited, and introduce further moral considera tions against sponsorsh ip of national defence arrangeme nts. \n obligatio n to try 4 to dissociat e oneself from preparati on for nuclear war or from nuclear-d eterrence , for instance by not spending part of one' s working life contribut ing indirectl y to it, does not commit one to more t ha n this: to an obligatio n, for example, to work for an alternativ e nat ional defenc e policy which avoids nuclear elements. But no doubt this wou ld be a good thing to try to contribut e towards. Once again, what one attempts depends on wher e one lives, the level of one ' s commitme nts, e.g . to nonviolen ce, and so forth. For not only are different types of policy reorienta tion appropria te for different nations and regions, but there are more superfici al and deeper rcori ntations that can be worked out and promoted, e . g. schemes that leave 2. An argument of this type was deployed by Bishop Hunthauss en of s upport of his refusal to pay defense taxes. 3. This dilemma and op ti on is now removed in practice for most wage earners by Pay As You Earn taxation schemes - schemes ap parently introduce d to give t he state interest on gross earnings, bu t obviously very effective in remov .i ng taxation power from most workers, and so in further transferr ing ower from ind ividuals to the state. 4. Given the power of institutio ns and the state one may be able to do little more than .!:El_, without giving up one's work and thereby one's abili.ty to contribut e to other deserving causes. For example, it may be v ir tua lly mpossiblc for one to avoid contribut ing to a superannu ation fund which is Seattle in �"co nven ti on,'.11" warf a re a pparatus more that ch:ing,.. tha t . H T ~~ s intact, and deeper (ecological ) sch emes Th<:! US Bisho p , f or examplet pr esent R rather shallow set of goals for a su pe rp owe r s uc h as the USA, which includes such objectives as preventing the d e velo pmP n t a nd deployment of destabilizin g nuclear weapons systems and 1o1orking for better co nt r 1 of already operational systems (see PL, p.317). The nuclear s i t ua t i on a ffords an import ant opportunity to press however for a much deeper se t of cha nge s in the superstates . For those whose very limited political i nfluence is exe rted in cons i derably less powerful states, even the shallow goa ] ma y look quite different: there are no nuclear weapons (except perhaps t ho se of a nother power stationed on local territory) to redeploy or to bett er c ontr ol . The vi ew from the very minor powers in the Antipodes i s furthermor e diffe r e nt from that of the medium powers in Europe. There is some prospect ln much of the Antipodes of avoid.i.ng the more immediate effects of an LSN war, whi le t her e is Little such prospect in Europe (cf. Preddey and o thers). There i s ac cordingly some obligation - an obligation little considered and not grasped by the powe r holders - on those in the Antipodes to make some effort to preserve th e r e in the South elements of what is valuable in world civilizatio n. Local a nd re g ional self-intere st would also suggest substantial steps towards s e l f-p r e s e r va tion that (foolishly) have not been initiated. Wha t i s broadly required in the Antipodes is not difficult to discern once th e gonls are gli.mpsed. Steps include wlthdrawal from the American alliance, wh jch i s in an y case of questionabl e merit since its main advantages lie with the US a nd J.t affords no guarantee of local defence; 5 c losur e of American bases and wi t hd r awa l of Ame r ican a cess ri.ghts for. nuclear-car ryi ng equipment to por ts , a ir bas e s and other facilities, espe cially so as to remove local nuclear ta rget s; pursu i t of a mor e evenhanded policy of nonalignmen t (something quite s mal l powe rs elsewher e have managed to achieve ). That much is easy, in pri nci pl e ; and justified. It is justified because local commitment to th e Am e r ica n mi lit a ry operations in the r egion lacks a solid f oundation; it is preml s s ed prim a rily on t e acceptance of deterrence, which, so it has been a r r, ue <l ( in §5ff.), lacks justificatj_ · n. That Australian commitment to joint Aus t r al ian-US f acilities and to US military operations in the region is e x pl i citly bas e d on acceptance of deterrence emerges from several recent s t a t eme nt s of gov e rnm e nt policy. The jolnt fAcilities are 'part of a system of d e t erre nc e ' • 6 More dif f icult to e nsure, at least without much preparation , is that economi c and cultural collapse does not follow an LSN war in the North. Se condly, then, the building of increased socio-ec onomic independenc e in th e Antipod e s is r e quired. It is not enough to make the region a nuclear- free zone not wo rth targeting militarily: the regio n must also have a sustainabl e life of 1.ts own. For a small region, thcit lo oks a very costly exercise unless combined with other desirable objectives; for example, in Preddey and others it is estimated that a substantial portion of GDP would have to be diverted to build up New Zealand' s economic independenc e. 7 For a larger region whi ch included Aus t ra l ia, the costs would be less. They would compare favourably with many Northe rn military budgets, and l1ave the advantage that much of the expenditure is genuinely productive. If furthermore - what seems unlikely - the structu r al readjustmen t were combined with t he .independen tly desirable aims of moving th e 5. Se e the dJ s cussion in Ball, chapter 13, especially pp.14O-1. How slight t he commitments are, under the ANZUS treaty in particular, has been e mpha si ze d again in recent defence discussions between Australia and the USA . Of cour s e, the ANZUS Treaty is only one, and a comparative ly minor one , of he many mi.litary treaties that should be terminated: from a Eu rop ean nnd world viewpoint the winding down of NATO and the Warsaw Pact ar r a ngeme n t s , and the r moval of American and Russian forces from Europe ( a nd el s ewhere ), are very much more important. A ful l e r d i scussion of Austr.alia's defence phil osophy will appe nr in a subsequent publication in this series . and alternative s, �76 whole reg i on towa rd s a multi- c u ltural conserver societ y and perha ps even dh,r ,, r t i ng "d e fence " spend i ng to conne cted self-managem ent and soci al dt'!f ence gon l s, the costs would be very considerabl y lessened . They only appear so g r eat in th e s e tting of a consumer-s atellite soci ety. In any case, wher e lif e and c ul tu r e themselv e s are conce rned , the cos t s do not appear excessive. I n sum, Southern countries s ho uld be s e vering their milita ry linkages with Northern nuclear powers 8 , a nd s hould be preparing now, socia lly and e conom i cally, for the time af t er the LSN war, the g reat No rth ern war. Howev er ther e are serious blockages in the way of such th ngs in the Ant ipodes) and inde e d impeding an y substantial attempts to lessen the impact of LSN war. Some of the blockages derive agai n from the f act that present nuc l ear arrangement s favour man y of the power holders and s u it strong cor porate interests which wield poli t i c al powe r . But the main blockages to mo r e popular action a r e sl og a nis ed r.n the false dlchotomy: "either it won't hnppc.n or we ' re all dead a n}•wayj so why bot he r". One reason for blocka ge is then the extinction assumption ( S l of Appendi x 1), the unwarr · nted a doption of which is excessively nihil is tic . A mor e i mportan t reaso n is that most people, and most of the ir political re pres entatives, do not bel ieve that majo r repercussio ns of LSN war are going t o bcf;1l l th e m. These are e vents which , .l i. ke starvntion and tortur e , happen to o th ~r ( r mot) pe o ple , not them. It is no t tha t LSN war i s unthinkabl e : rather i t is that i t seems unb,~llev a hl e t ha t it should make any d ifference . Most people in t he Antipodes ~eal l y do not believe that thei r lives are likely to be shattered by nuclear. war. Wa king up and mo bi lis ing t hese peo ple is a major part of the problem in 6. Se e th e letter by R.G. Hawke, Prime Min1.ster , replying to a symposium on conseque nces of nuclear war, Canberra Times, Saturday July 23, l.9 83. The point is also made by the Fore ig n Minister in his Evat t Memor ial Lecture , as Hawke~ notes. The point is softe ne d by r e pr ese nting the fac i li ties as also having a role i n verificatio n, as well a s dete rr ence, 'that mak es arms c o nt rol and reduction feasi ble': the known role of the facilities in war fighting i s not alluded t o , and nor i s t he fact that any verificatio n role can be alte rnat iv ely a ccomplished us i ng satellites. However the matter is not in any do u bt: 'successive Australian governments . • . have taken the vi e w that our primary conce rn should be to suppo rt the effectivene ss of th e Uni ted States deterrent to war itself' (D.J. Killen, Minister for De fe nc e; quoted in Threats to Aust ralia ' s Sc ur.lty, p.17). Government representat ives (e. g . Hawke ) conc ed e that the joint facilities put Austr a lia at nucl ea r risk. ' Howev e r it is t he judgement of t hi s Government that the benef.its to Australia in terms of its immediate int e rest and globa l st r a tegic consideratio n outweigh potential risks'. A prope r de cision-t heoretic analysis would not sup port Hawke's claim: since Australia is known to be a nuclenr t arget because of American bas es (c f . Ball, pp.130-8 ), the pot e n t ial risks given that an LSN war has a non-ne gligible probability far outweigh a ny i mme diate benefit s . Since Australia has only a r egiona°i strategic role, the global st r ategic consideratio ns are , as could be othe rwi s e i nferred, primarily those of the ma in user of t he facilities , the USA. The Governme nt is prepare d to put Australia , its peoples and e cosystems , a t what is decide dly serious risk .for i.mmediate and Ame r ica n i.nt ere st s . A worthwhile re presenta tive government docs not hold its people s hostage for such re asons . Not only i s tha t short-sighte d expediency decision maki ng: it seems virtually cer tain t ha t the <letai l s of the decision mak ing, were they ever. revealed, would not justify the policy in the longer term even on the basis of expediency, bu t wou l d turn on s uch things as present trade advanta ges and short-term co mme r c ial considerati ons. 7. As to the e c onomic and so cial problems Aus tralia would face in t he event of a n LSN wa r, see Coombs fo r a preliminary as s es sment. 8. Id e ally the removal of s igni f icant nuclear targets should t a ke pl c e nc ro as the whole Sou thern Hemisphere , because this is the zone that is r e latively insulated, a t mosph e rically, from the Northern Hemisphe r e. �77 achie ving requ isi te social and politi e Rl ~djustmen t. -yen those who believe tha t LSN war ls no t improbabl e (but may well not be totally destructi v e of life) do little to reo r ganise their lives in a way that would reflect their assessmen t: . 9 Richard Routle y* 9. Aga in , for some of what to do, for some ways to reorg a nise, see e.g. Mart in . There is als o much in teJ.J.ec tual work to be undert ake n, for example , searching out details of alternati ve arrangeme nts, and al so dJ.scredit ing establis hment experts, especiall y economist s and poli.tical scienti s ts , who intellect ually underwrit e present nucl e ar arrangeme nts . * The tex t has bee n much improved as a result of detailed commen t s by C. Pigden , R. Good in, N. Gri ff in t B. Martin and L. Mirlin, and through cor r espondenc e with G. Fo ley. J. Norma n has helped in its final organisat ion. The initia l outlines of the pa pe r were worked out in Victoria , Canada; and an early version was read a t Simon Fraser Universit y in 1982 . �REFERENCES c;. Anders, Die __Ant_~q •i erthe!.t des Menschen, C.H. Beck, Munchen, 1956; to a$ A/i,. G. And0rs, Endzeitan d Zeitenend e : Gedanken zur atomaren Munc hen;--Pfi2 ; referred to as AE. Situation , referred c.u. Beck, T. Brownlie , e d., Basic Documents on Human Ri.ghts, Oxford, 19 71. D. Bnl.1, A su i.table. piece of real estate. American installttt ions Hale & Iremonger , Sydney, 1980. in Australia , J. Barnes, 'The just war' in N. Kretzmann , A. Kenny and J . Pinborg (eds). The Cambridge Histo r y of La ter Medieval Philosoph y, Carnbri.dge Universit y Press, 1982, pp . 771-784. R.J. Barnett, Real Security, Simon s. & Schuster , New York, 1981 . Benn, 'Deterren ce or appeaseme nt? Or, on trying to be rational about war', Appl led Philosoph y, to appear. nuclear P. Berg, Re!:._1::habitlng a Sepa_rate Countr.y, Pl anet Drum, San Francisco , 1979. M, Cohen, T. Nagel and T. Scanlan Pr inceton, Princeton UP, 19 74. (eds.), War and H.C. Coombs, 'The ec onomi c and social consequen ces of (Septembe r 1983) 8-9. Moral nuclear Responsi bility, Natuni war ', 5 A.i'!. Cox, Russian Roulette: the Superpowe r Game , Times Books, London, 1982 . J. Dahlltz, Nuclear Arms Control: with McPhec Gribble, Melbourne , 1983. effective internati onal G. Foley, ' Jonathan Schell : Genius - Phi losop her - Rewrite Brisbane, 1982; referred to as JS. Man ', agreemen ts. t ypescript , G. Foley, Nucl ea r Prophets. The True and the False_, typescrip t, Bri sbane, 1983. J. Galtung, The True Worlds, Free Press, New Yo r k, 1981. D, Gautier, 'Deterren ce, maximisa tion , and rationali ty ' , in The Security Gamble: Deterrenc e Dilemmas in the Nuclear Age, (ed. D. MacLean), Rowman and Littlefie ld , To t owa, N.J ., to appear ; also f ort hcoming in Et hics, April 198/¼. R.E . Goodin, 'Disarmin g nuclear apo l ogists', typescr i pt , 1982 . R.E. Goodin, 'Disarmam ent as a moral certainty ', Et_l2ics 95 ( 1984 ) , to appear. P(hilip) Green, Deadly Logic : The Theory Universit y Press, Columbus, 1966. of Nuclear Deterrenc e, Ohio State N. Griffi n, ' Lifeboat USA', Discussio n Papers in Environme ntal Philosoph y fi8, Research School of SociRl Sciences, Australia n National Universit y , 1983. Grou nd Ze ro Orgnnisat ion, Nuclear War: What's lo It For York, 1982. You? Pocke t Books , New R. Bardin, 'Unilater al vers us mutual disarmame nt', Philosoph y and Public Affairs 12 (1983) 236-54. J.E. Hare nnd C.B. Joynt, Ethi c s and Internati onal Affairs, 1982. Macmillan , London , �79 R.M. ll;,r.e, Applicati ons o[ Moral Philosop ~, M&Q1t1illan, l,~rn,hin , 1972. R. Jeffrey, The Logic of Decis~on, McGraw-H ill, York, 1965. New H. Kahn, On Thermonu clear War, Princeton Universit y Press , 1960. G.S . Kavka, 'Some paradoxeG of deterrenc e', Journal 285-302; referred to as PD. of Philosol?.!"1y G.S. K.-ivka, 'Deterren ce, utility and rational choice', Theory (1980) 41-60; referred to as RC . and 75 (1978) Decision 12 G,S. Kavkn, 'Doubts about unilatera l nuclear disarmame nt ' , Philosoph y and Public Affairs 12 ( 1983) 255-60; referred to as DU. L. Kuper, Genoclde: its Eoli~ical use Jn the Twentieth Century, Yale UP, 1982 . D,P. Lackey, 'Ethics and nuclear deterrenc e', Rachels), Harper and Row, New York, 1979. in Moral Problems (ed. James D.P. Lackey, 'Missiles and morals: a utilitaria n look at nuclea r det e rren ce' , Philosoph y and Public Affai.rs 11 (1982) 189-231; referred to as MM. D.P. Lackey, 'Disarmam ent revisited : A reply to Kavka and Public Affairs 12 (1 983) 261-64. a nd Har de n', Phil osopl'l_ B. MarU.n , Grass Roots Strategy Against War, Freedom Pr ess , Nottingha m, 1984 , to appear. A.A. Mazrui , A World Federatio n of Cultures: An African Pe rspective , Free Press, New York , 1976. J.C. Murray, Morality and Modern War, Affairs , New York, 1959. Cou ncil on Reli.gi on and Inte r nati onal T. Nagel, 'War and Massacre ', in Cohen et al, pp.3-24. J. Narveson, 'Vlolence and War ', i n Regan, pp.109 -146. National Conferenc e of Catholic Bishops, Committee on Wa r and Peace, ' The challenge of peace: God's promise and our re s ponse' , Origins 12 (20) (1982) 306-328; refer red to as PL, for 'New Draft of Pastoral Letter '. Oxford E_i~~lish Dictionar y, Oxford, 1971; referred to as QED. B. Paski.ns and M. Dockrill, The Ethics of War, Duckworth , London, 1979. G.F. Preddey and others, Future Contingen cies 4. Nuclear Disasters , A Rep o rt to the Comn1issio n for the Future, Governmen t Printer, Wel lington, New Zealand, 1982. P. Ramsay, The Just War : force and political responsib il itt, Scribner, New York, 1968. J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, Harvard Universit y Press, Cambridge Ma ss., 1971 . T. Regan (ed.), Matters of Life and Deat h, Random Hous e , New York , 1980. R. Routley and N, Griffin, 'Unrave l ling the meanings of life' , Discussio n Papers in Env i ronmental Philosoph y 113, Aust ralian Natio na l Universit y, Canberra, 1982. R. Routley and V. Routley , 'The Alternati ves 2 (1982), 23-8. irrefutab ility of ana rchism' , Social �80 R. Rou tl ey ~nd V. Plumwood, 'Moral dilemmas and the logic of deontic notions' in Paracons i stent Logic (ed. G. Priest, and others~ Philosop hia Verlag, 1984. R. Scheer , Wi t h Enough Shovels: Reagan, Bush and Nuclear War, Random House, York, 1982. New J . Sche l l, 'Refle ctions (Nuclea r Arms - Parts I-III) ', The New Yorker, February 48- 109, and 45-10 7, respecti vely. This P.<>rinr; , trnh tl t lcd Th£> Fat e of th Enrth, hfls now appcnred as a hook wlth t hat tit l e (Knopf, New York, 1982). Referenc es in the t ex t are to the book. 1, 8, and 15, 1982, pp.47-11 3, T.C. Sche lling, The St rategy of Conflic t , Ha rvard Univers ity Press, 1980 . G. Sharp, Explo ri ng Nonvio l ent Alterna tives, Boston, 1971. D. and R. Smith , The Economi cs of Militari sm, Pluto, London, 1983. F . Soo, ' Mao's vision for China', in ContemP?_rary Chinese Philosop hy Adelm ann ) Nijhof f , The Hague , 1982, pp.62-80 . T . Taylo r, Nurembu r g and V:letnam: An 19 72. American Tr agedy, Times (ed. Books, F.T. London, E . P. Thompson and D. Smith , Prot est and Survive , Monthly Review Press, New York, 198 1. Threats to Aus tr alia's Security . The ir na ture and Gove r nmen t Publishi ng Service , Ca nb erra , 1981. probabi lity, Austral ian R. W. Tuc ker , The J ust W r, John Hopkins Pr ess, Baltimo re, 1960. M.M. Wakin (ed.), War, Morality and the Mil i tary Professi .on, Westview , Colorado . 1979. Boulder , t M. Wa l ze r, Ju st and Unjust Wars , Basic Books, New York, 1977. R. A. Wasse rstr om ( ed.) War and Morality , Wadswor th, Belmont , Cal i forni a , 1970. B. Will.lams , ' How to t hink sceptic ally about t he bomb', New 1982). Society S. Zuck.e rma nn, Nuc lea r Illus :l.on and Reality, Collins , Lo ndon, 1982. ( Nov . 18, � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Draft Papers Description An account of the resource Sylvan's literary executor encountered an archive in which “all his projects were current", since manuscripts were undated and unattributed. Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document l 89 - .r 1 NTRO!)UCT f 0N. Vlrt· uc1l ly .11 1 t h e ph i1os ophi.c ;l1 lit cri'!ture on nur.le a r war ls wr i t te n from ;-1 SllfK·rpower (predomin an tly Amer i can) or e lse European (mainl.y German, British or Fre nch) viewpoint. This art:icle, a f ter connecting in initial section s with Northern Catholic literatur e , adopts a very different Antipodean s La nce . Such re gional per spective s , whil e t he should not affect the morality o [ t he mat t e r, ,ff , highly po1i ticaJly relevrmt. eitlH_•t t he phJ.lo so ph i ca l li tera tun~, c>spec ially t:ha t emanating from th e als o a i l s th e test of morality. lt is c oncerned only or primAr i ly with what i s good o r "rati onal" or prudential f o r A.raer.i.cans, or for the American sl.ltc, t o do ~ whereas mora l ity is ind e pende n t o f place, race , natio na lity and t ile li ke . This article tries t.o take the morality of the matter, and the r es ult ing r ed is tribution of mora l and political obligations, seriously. It c onc l ud es, amon g other things, that th e Ame r i can and Russian states have no moral bu s ine ss putting nonaligned peoples at suc h grave risk as pre sent nuclear ar r angemen ts involve. Mtwh o f U~A, CUNTENTS AND OUTLINE: Itali ci sed heading s §3 - §8 indicate the ma i n structure of the argument Pag e No §O. Introduction. Nuclear vs conventional wa rs, and new moral l. i ss llPS . L,1 rg e-sc nle (LSN) vs limited nuel ea r wars , the focus on the f ormer , but the l mplic tions for the latter. §1 . J_l5)w nuclea r wa rs differ from o t her wars; wars and Htates, and the 2::.9s ulti ng l imi ted appr~riateness of older models and theories of war. War chc1rac t e ri sed. The e ss e ntial role of th e state. New and diff~r nt featur es o f nucle ar wars. 2 0 §2 . The mora l si tuation: the recent: tendE:'n_c::L of moral consid e rations -~-~~s_ome e_n t.i.re ly submerge d_ in_ the context o f war. The nncl e nt d ist i nction of morality and expediency. Strategic planning base on expe di enc y. Argume nts tha t war must be expediency-base d refuted. Mor a l i ty dues nol have to, and ought not to, give way to expediency. Uti lit ari a ni sm nnd expediency distinguish ed . Limits to consensus: s upermen and s u pe rhawks. National Interest and expediency assimilated. Li mits of st ate e n titlement. §3 . The initial a rgum':nt to the immorality of LSN wars. One ke y argume nt, from the wrongness of ki.lling noncombatants in mass, is pr esen t ed, ass es sed, and criticisms met. Ar guments for the premisses of the ke y argumen t elabo r ated. §L1. Argum e nt s f r om historica] r equirement s on ,just wars: the important a rgume nt from convergence, and env:l.ronment a_l ar~Ements_ . Argume nts from just war requJrements: di sc rimination; proportionality , p r ospe ct of success. The detailed convergence argument, from rival moral positions. Arguments from enviro1nental principles. § 5. The shift t:o nuclear deterrence: nrgume nts to its immora~-~~· De t e rre nc e seen a s the only prac tical way to satisfy major desiderata: p re ve ntion of wa r: and maintenance of pruden t ial values. Pure deterrence not t. he po H e y. De terr c nce ais prac t.! c (• d has i.ncreased the probability of nuclea r war. Th e first argume nt to imruorHlity of deterrence, from the pla u s ibi l i t y of probab-Ui.ty of Immorality. F11rther arguments through <l ~u n t i c conn e ct.l.ng principl(~S : the probahl ll Ly l.inkage. Refuti.ng the c ou n t e rargume nt from the succe ss of deterr ence . The way the onus of 1. 5 11 1 !• 17 Page No !,ills on deterrence policy , 1.Jhi ·h cannot mt>et. evidcnlla J. requireThe second connecting principle: the wrongness of serious prc'p.tralio n for nuclear war. The general form of connecting pri nc ipl es; separating out t hose hat arc correct . Th e third connecting principle: the wrongness of se rious threats of nuclear devastati.on . Criticism of this principle lead s to further connecting principles, th rough i n te ntion and through commitment. Meet i ng counterargumen ts from utilitarianism . AppJying the connec ting prlncip1es to argue to the jmmoral:tty of deterrence. Arguments from limited convergence: pro- and anti -ut ilitarian versions. Other reasons for deep dissatisfaction with de terrence . piu,.,f Till·lll H. 56. ~£0Ctical ,___pru<lcnU.al and more moral arguments from national daugers Lo nuclear build-up of the ~upe r statc.s, and the genes i s . - of nu c 1 t',ff di lemmas . The tirgume nts from nucle,:-ir black.ma:!.l and foreign domination, and from risk of nuclear destruction. The crucial arg ume11t from basic ri g ht s and f11ncl;iml.'nl.al values. The argument from i solated people to superstate iwnoral ity. The supers tat e theme, and rea&ons for its appeal . The much less p0rsuasive de endcnt state theme. Ch:1llcnging the assumptions of tllr> undt'rlying rc latiatory mode]. §7. The rcsulring nuclear di~emmas ·- fo r nligned states and their _supporl e rs. Ch,nc1ct. er ot the nuclear fix. Subsid iary di lemmas: natio na l securit y vs 37 43 fre edo m nnd democratic arrangements; personal and role dilemmas. Features of deontlc dilemmas. Deterrence presented as second-bes t escape from the nud.car fix . The nuclear fix a fix of s t ates' own making . Interconnection s between the nuclear fix and nation-state arrangeme nts. §8. Wavs out of nuc lear dilemmas: initial political fall-out f rom th e ethical res 1lts. Tl1e inevit.c1bil i ty of limitation s on nat1onal sovereignt y. In terstate and ex trastate approache s . The Way Up and th e Way Down of extrastate approaches . Arguments for the Way Up, and the decisive case aga i.ns t it. FaiJurc of internati onal agreement s) espe ci ally on human rights and geno ci de. Excl11s ion of nuclear dete rrence und er the Genocid e Convention. Need fur the reexam i na t i on of current political arrangements i mpo sed b y the nuclear fix. Deficiencies in present antiquated politi cal a r ra ngen.ents revealed by nuclear problems . Further arguments from the nucle a r 1 ix for polll lc:il reassessme nt. The we . k J i.nk: the sovereig n nationstatc. Forfeit11re of political obligation by many st~tes . Alternative po 1 I. Lical arr;__ingcmen t s vs nuc lcar time hor 1.zons. 49 The rnultt-track Way Out of the nuclear dilemma. The main polit ica l mea ns lle outside state governmenta l apparatus. Laying the s pectre of ideo1ogicnl domination. Social restr uct u ring a nd devolution of powe r. Graduated disarmament and transarmament, and letting state sovereignty go. Dissolving the arguments f r om natiorrnl dangers. S .. a e r e si.stance to loss of po wer . Further lines of o r ganised act ion agains t nuclear states. Appendix 1: On Scl1;!1l t he fate of mankind and the ea r th, according to and Anders. Nuclear prophets a nd prophet .i c ru bb ish . The ext in ct ion assumption . Common emerging themes of Sc-hell and Anders. The extravagant anthropocentric assumption , and some of wha t is wrong wi.th i t. Second death dlsmlssed . The universal i ty of peril. The alleged universality of responsibili t y : the Pogo theme . The correct, but undeveloped, whole earth theme . Ultimately Schell offers little hope and s upe rf icialiqy. Nuclear war is war. The logic and illogic of de t er renc e. H 64 .1,t . . .. Page No ~~~_cl_:!~~; On mat t ers of co lJective and individual rt'sp oirn:ibilit.y a nd on regional strat egies. Individual and state responsibi.J.ity. Opt-·ouL positions , and o.rguments t.o Lhem. Failure of the arguments, and the impact of group co peration . Arguments to direct obligations of individ1rnls to the nuclear dissociation. Limitations of rival political ob l igati ons. Dif f eren L pol ic y r e organi sati on for d:i ff 're n l regions. Shallm,•er and deeper g a]s. Th e important opportunity for deepe r r eo rg.nnisution afforde d by nuclear dilemmas. Ob.ligations of those in the Antipodes: what i. s required, and justifi d . Soci a l and ec onomic reorganisation in the An tipodes, and reducing costs i.nvolv1~d. Bloc kages to social and po litical adjus tment. iii 73 ON THE ETHICS OF LARGE-SCALE NUCLEA! WAR AN!) NtlCLEAR DETERRENCE AND THE POLITICAL FALL-OUT Large -seal ~ nuclear wars raise cthlcal questions not generated, ~ Ll o r n~ arly HO th11 n e of even t he larges d if f0 r· c n c:' !n kln<l of war. invo l ve, and threatened sa id to so differ co nv entiona l wars ( t he World Wars ) as to yield a CertFdnly ma s sive PX hAnges Gt1ch as nuc.le:ir wars exchanges such a s nuc lear deterrence presupposes , ar e neither envisaced nor fully accommodate d by tr·d ltional theories of Muc h at forcefully, by previo us human mili tar y cncounters. 1 This is at bottom because of their projected effect . , which are often f r om eit her just wars. new philosophic al reflection and inveRtigatio n is required, even if r a ther wel l -t est d and old-fashion ed moral princip l es will se rv e as initial ethical ba se. Al though nuclear wars are, thus non ex i s tent (extrapolat e va r ie tiea, objects, 1 nuclear wa rs from n very limited Ia fnr, only a decidedly menac1.ng class of proper have several distinctive properties nu .lear experlence 2 ) and come in several particular, confined or limited nuclear war s, of which tactical or st rat eg ic ar c subvarietie s, contrast witl1 lirge-scale nuclear wars (LSN wars) - - - ------- ---- -1, The US Catholic Bi shops i n t heir Pastoral Letter (PL) make the point forc e fully: 'Nuclear weapons •.. and nuclear warfare ••• are new moral issu s . •. The re exists a capacity to do something no other age could ima g ine: we can threaten the created ord 1· • • • We could des roy [God ' s] work' (PL, p.312). While the independent analysis offered in what follows has a great deal .i n common with the Bishop ' s position, it differs significant ly in removing the religious backdrop and associated fe a tures and, it is hoped, in bringing out the logical structure of the argument more clearly and sharply. To illust ra t e the differences tha t emerge with removal of the religious backdrop ~nd its the associated unity-of-ev il theme, consider what happens to two examples from PL, p.323:- First l y, peace is possible without religious enligh t enment if it is possible wit h it: religious enlightenme nt is not an essential c ondition as there implied . Secondly, violence does no take all the forms the Bishops tr y to give it , e .g. sexual discriminat ion is hardly a form of violence, pornography an aper tc without it , etc. It ia a serious m stok e to try to heap so many diverse and independent issues together under the one heading (forms or violence) along wi.th war aa if t hey stood and fell together, e.g. abortion and nuclear war. Note tha t referencing , ·where not through an au thor's name, :ls by way of acronym explained in the references at the end. 2. an The isolal ed, and unnece sary, bombing of two Japanese cities at the very end of World War II did not render that war a genuine nuclear war. Nuclear wars proper will he very different and v ry nmeh mo re horrifying. Nuclear wars proper, though elements of uncomfortab ly adjacent possible wor l ds, ought therefore to be onfined t o merely possible worlds. Enough of their features we can appreciate without their being brought to act~ality. 111hicl. r1c'ed not howe ver. be unlimited 3 • explosio n A large-sca le nuclear involv es war of l arge quantitie s of nucl ear devices ove r a sizeable region; a [unction of two main parameter s: distr i bution. Such strnt.egic ) nuclear quant l t leo of a war war quantity diffe rs which explosivc n, ts markedly limited, nnd (megatonn age wh ere from by the a of t:,Hget.s it i s ex plosive) limited assumptio n, the to and (tactical much or smaller chnr.uctcr i Rtic ,111.y arc cl rcumscr ibed, f or instance confined in pr i ncip l e to military inst al l ations in a given reg ion. Though t he focus in what follows is upon I.SN wars and th eir prev e nti.on, limLted nuclear wars are by no nucl.car arsenal means a separate st r ike 1 s ince a is a prereq utsite, an d th e probabil ities of escalatio n of suc l1 waxs to LS N wars arc high (given usual reasonabl e aosumptio ns second iss ue , et c. ). 4 Because of these of follow -up or connecti ons, much of the ca se made acainst LSN wars transfers to more limited wars, as wi l l become evid ent . How nuclear wars reHultlng d-Lffer from oth er war s: wars and states and th e -- ---------- - -- - -- llmltcd appropria teness of old er modelY and theories of war. of war that has dominated mucl1 thinking, including strategi c two party (or thinking, A model is th e severa l person) game or, as a complicat ion of that, th e clan or trib e bat tle ~. A picture of war thu s refle c tion r e quirement s for legitimat e and just wa rs, which technolog ical on advances have trad iti ona l now theo ry ender ed of war, emerg ed, inapprop riate ha rdly and especiall y sometimes surprisin gly, as a result inapplica ble. of The made no allowance for such J. Another dimension of varia tion concerns the sequence of the war, es pe cially the type of strike :lnvolved. Though the sequence is j_mportant for the mo r al ass es smen t , for example of th e ma in actors , it in no way alters the immorali ty of LS N wars, as will emerge. 4. 'T he overwhelm in pro babi li.ty [.is1 that a nucl e ar exchange would have no limits ' (PL, p.31 !+). He nce am, Jor org ument. against limited nuclear wars: t hat any such war risks , inde ed renders highly probable, an unlimited war, and the ris k is far too large to take. The point in fact follows by s Lrai g htforwanl a ppli a_tio n of decislon theory, multi.plyi ng the mass lv e undesira bi lit y (mora l and ot h ~rw ise ) of n LSN war by 'ts probabill ty gi ven a limited nuclear war.-Giv en th e character of weapons developme nt and present communica tion ar.rangem ents, the id e a of a highly circumscr ibed purel y nuclea r exchange between the s upe rpower s , perhaps in the European "theatre'' , is really a myth. 5. There was a substanti al element of sport (and connec ted features of prowess) in t radi tional wars tha t bas been eroded in modern t echnologi cal wars. Nuc lear wars may be not just un s po r ting , in that no notice is given, etc. , t hey a re also remote and impersona l, and different ly unjust, in a mu h deeper wa y, j phenomena ns mass bomb.lng o f lar.ge citJes, such a s Tokyo. rn1clear bomb.fng , wi.th And j t.' many occurred wi.th Dre s d e n and further crucial effects be yond mass bombJng, adds furthe r new d imens ions . Ycl lt is impor t a nt for tic argument 1Jnchors, Lo historica l were accounted unjust war l s essential ly a ma tter of states and their control: the Oxford Eng l is h Dictionar y acc ount, w~..!::_ is 'hos t .ile contentio n ar1ncd 'war' of content io n or comba t; cxct1i1nge is the actual e xp<irience . but other are not literal, but transferr ed, metaphor ic, etc. 8 proLagon ists, antag onists or players; means and or wrong. to elabo rate by means of forces, car ried on betwe en nations, states , or rulers, or between part i es in t he same nation or state' for control of the state7 ; noun linkages G to be awa re of what counted as war (the :emantice of the matter), and of wh Pn , 2nd why, w;-1rs an<l military ac tions Firstly , r e tain always a f nction of sens es of the States are the forces c omprising armed soldiers are the a nd comba t or forceful and typically viol_ent Thus wars ar _ external or internal states or their rule. (c.ivi.l), Thus too wars have grown in quantity and fr eque ncy as states hav e expanded , wars have changed as states have transform ~d, and nuclear war has emerged with nuclear states. lhf,on°tic al way then to eliminate wars is t o remove states : 6. An obvious :i.n short, wars ar e There arc interes ting si delights concernin g eve n the etymology of the term 1 war' , wh ich wa s deri ved from a term meaning 'confusio n ' . In particula r, 'it is a curious fact that no Germanic nation in early historic times ha d in living use any word pro pe r ly meani ng 'war'': Oxford English Dictiona rt ( OED) o n wa r, 7. But of co urse there can be something quite a nalogous to war waged between clans , gangs, multinati onal firms, even against Nature , and still more me taphorica lly against poverty, etc. To this extent , a strict definitio n of 'war' is being insisted upon. Even so the diffusion of power structure s the argumen t will direct us to, has to ex t end beyond just the brea k-down of nation--s tates. 8. Tn to thls category (si.n ce Natu re i s no naU.on) falls the ubiquitou s and unwa rranted war against Nature of modern times , wh ic h features just as large in Marxism as in capitalism . As could have be en guessed , someone .t was James - suggest ed channelli ng all war into "war'' in the me taphorica l sens e agai.nst that unarmed and nonaggres sive "opponen t'', Natur e. James proposed a s a substitut e for war proper, conscripU .on of the youth for a wa r again st Nature (see Wasserstr om, p.12). What it boiled down to, howev er , was that youth -was to be c hannelled into all the dirty work, in that way to acqui r e manly virtu.s mil i tary ac.tivit.ie s "rightly" i.nstil, especia lly discipline ;---but also service, devotion, physical fitness, con struc tive exertion, responsi bility, and order. Another less diabolica l sub st it ute for wars p r oper (in America n ecoropian literatur e) is through wnr gam es and other game s of competit i ve cast. Again specious arguments enter for t hose bringing- out the "best" in human males, etc . .:1n uut ,~01•1p of ro llt:ica l :.ind asso ci ated t cclmoJ .ogJ--n l st ru cture, and are nltcr i ng by the s tructu r e. Wars j _Lu a t from c an thu s be seen as a struct ural problem of (other wi se defect ive) politi ca l organ isatio n of states ; they are a ional fix , n struct ural malfor mation . helps wa r arise War Thls seman t.ically based pictur e of exp.la in why th e rad ical a rgumen t agains t nuclea r wars and deterr ence d t: vo lves into an war-m akers , argume nt agains t aga.in st states . In the fact ( s<'1 f-legit i.mise d) on the war-d eclare rs and tradit ional theory , wars wer e r estric ted to extern al wars, which were coni:;tr u ed as t heir r emoved t1 e right of r ulers (p ri nces) to conduc t for certai n politi cal purpos es; states or the argume nt was that priva t e person s with grieva nces had access to the c our ts 9, while states did not ( wa r s w_re, so to speak, the intern a ti.onal analog ue of th e law courts ). But this is itself a very sta tist conce pti on of th• legitim at e place of wars; ll1c• scmiJn tica i s not so rest.r .i ctive and permtt s intern a l wars with i.n i; t ate s, for examp le t.o end wars, injust ice, etc. Let. us a h OW\ ) V1_. r to brlng out what is differ ent now - confin e att e nt1on - basic and moat famili ar cas e, extern al wa rs hetwe n two s tates or sets (axes) of st a t. es , two-pl a yer ex t cr n;il wars. ·ompr litive game s, could be won. attent uated form for some "victo rs") Lhc World vfars. strate gy. surrou nding trad i tional ly firstl y for mass ive armed wa rs, Like exchan ges such as th •re may well be no winnin g in ar e as the of No r thern very hemisp here countr yside. Thus, and the second ly, for laying the was te _£Dint of of substa ntially substa ntiall y oblite rated 10 , (cxe rcl sed and most as nothin g all worse off than at the outset of the "play" . are huge war seen, to settle seriou s inters tate disput es , is remove d: a nothe r point of diff e rcn ~e , the phenom enon of wars that prepar ed that: That assum ption still held good ~hough in Wj th LSN wars it no longer holds; is settle d with main protag onists player s It war; assume d An LS N war could involv e destru c t ion of all main Wester n metro polita n agglom e ra tio ns 9. to main Hence elabor ately f0r , etc,), but which can never be pointf ully fought ; Thus Aquina s a nd Grotiu s for examp le (see Ba rnes , p . 776, top). The argume nt presup poses rather a lo t , includ ing a neat public /priva te dis t inctio n . Put Aquin as's way, it looks as if it could be readil y t r .-:m sf erred into an argume nt for intern atio·n al govern ment, or at least effect ive law-co urt s , Yet all Christe ndom was suppos ed a t that time to be one state! 5 hence t he ineviL Bl>Je emphasis on .l:..l!.E.~- deterrenc e. .:uid ot her Lhf' e lements o f gamesmen ship ha d a role in earlier wars, but it was not pu re de t e rr e nc e . to mil i tary Certainly , deterrenc e, bluff, Lastly, tradition al wars could be confined in tar gets r egn rd s ju s t wa r s ; and military e xchanges. principle 11 This feature iG fundnnent al as for, as will appear, wars that spill over in gross uni nvolved par t ie s sac rifice any pretensio n to morality. ways to The special effects of nu -lea r exp lo s i •cs , e s pecially operated in mass, mean however that large nuclear canno t w3rs be legitimat e ly confined. l1orrify lng det a i l i n popu l a r so 1rce s uz0ne <lestr uc ti on, s hockwav es, suc h effe cts gign nt l c fum i gat i on s §2. a nd th e e nti re l y rapid ••. speed special effects (presente d in Schell) include radioacti vity, pu lses, fireball or firestorm e tc., etc. As a result of these of exchange, LSN wars will resembl e mor e than they re semble old e r - style war:s. The mora l s ituation: be c ome as el ec troma gnet1 c <lcv .,su1t .i o11, rog ue bac t e r in ;.rnd viru se s, com pounded Th e se the r ecent tend e ncy submerged in the context of war. of moral considera tions to It is particula rly important i n t he ca se of war to mainta in a firm grasp on the ancient distinctio n mo r a lity or local or nat :l. onal and ~ ..e5:..diency. What is done in war, especiall y between advant a ge, may be very diff e r ent from what ought morally to be done, whether the l ') . There is however the degen e rate idea of war as i.nvolving annihilat ion or extinctio n, and of winning a nuclear war as annihilat ion of the enemy whil e no t be i ng e ntirely annl.hilat ed oneself: the side that somehow "survlves " suff ic iently to r ebuild is said to "win". But this is, at best, an extremely t e nuous sense of winning , wl1ich in any case neglects the medical ev idence conce rning nuclear destructi on. Recen t t alk a bout winning or even s urviving a nuclear war must reflect a failure to appre ciate a medical reality: Any nuclear war would inevitabl y cause death, disease and suffering of pa nde~onic proportio ns and without the possibili ty of effective me d ical int e rvention (PL, p.313). Mo reov e r an y such phoenix war is r adically unjust, because of violat ion cf the tr adit i onal requireme nt of pro portional ity, and for other reasons de veloped in the tex~. Unf o rtunat e ly as doc umented ir Sch ee r, significa nt off i cials who are resp o nsibl e for the nuclear destiny of the USA - and so of t he world t hink that the devast a tion o nuc l ear war an be survived by Americans and t hat a gl oba l nucl e2 r war can actua lly be "won"! They re ly , among other things, on a n incredibl y low , and unaccepta ble, redefinit ion of "winning" . 11. In prac t i ce they often were not, they drained limited economies , they layed wa s te countr yside (though to a minor extent compared with nuclear or c hemic al wa rf Rre or mod er n min i ng), im poverishi ng inhabit·n ts, etc. l all('.l" f u determ in e d usi ng the cod es :ind conv en l:lotH' Much t.h at oug h t war , of or othenlis e 12, not t o be do 1c i n wa r is do ne, for one (alleged) advantage or anothr·r, desplte modern m:i l tt ar y cod es a n d co nv ent i ons ani the like . we liv e not go in a rat her bar barous age : unremarke d, if the th e horrors of the twentieth century will history Furt.l1c1inore rn Ll tta ry t h i nki n g a nd ge t s writt e n as wi pi ng moves : based on "stra t e gy" disad van t ages , of mor a lly excluded actions, ·a J.culaU o ns. charncterist i ca---1J:x its is. that rur al populations, be come real 1o ss ib i liti e s, included in o t con,w<ptr·n ti nli.sr d0.Lcrmi nes (accurately) str ate gtc pl an n ing tend (.1s Nagel ex plains) t o induce a ce r ta i n mo ral numbing, so th a t a r ang e such Hllitarily its e xp<'di e n cy . by gains own i.t _o u~ !:_, morally, cons i d e r i n g and Eac h side only lo s 8e s a s a in a military encounter own its advantages and r e sult. of alterna tJve possible to consider those of the other side( s) as well. In t h is way stra t eg ic planning di s places morality . I nd eed l t ha s been contended that wa r should be planned and conducted wa y, a no-holds barred combat fought to the maximal (local) advantage, without l i mit s , moral or other (except insofar a s technology limits the means of eLc.) . Such t he class lcal through "bald an inc r emental a distinct nrgumen t tc.tt1s . g a r gument from an t ha t th e It would And (bu t The externally wil l be broken by each pl a yer in turn for advantag e . ext r aordi na r i l y na rrow motivat1ona l bas e i s assumed. the of li mit) escalation man" f a llac yi 3), t hat there can be no limit. assum p tion is t hat a ny merely s e lected limit (as enforced force, Js the so-called "classic " view of Clausewicz, oft: repeated. Cl ause wicz Lr ics to argue, reall y this Thus t oo follow from i d ea of a limited wa r is some so r t of contradiction i n nut i t i. s not, though breaking off i n the he at of war, or the s upposedl y l imited nucle a r exchange, may be s ingularly impr obable . c onfusion Nuclear 12. For a s Nage l c ontend s (early on), there are moral restr ic tions on the c onduct of warfare which are not legalistic only and which are neither a r bit r a ry no merely conventional, nor a mat t e r of usefulness. These t li cn1<•s run er Lindy co11n t •r Lo the. cll.llrn :l.c t heory of war of Clnuscwic z - n th e ory outlin ed In Walz e r. 13. As one l e s s hair does not, at any stage, dis t inguish a bald man from a hirsute ma n, there a r , starting from the hirsute end, no ba ld men. Th e prog~e ssiv e escalation ar.gument concerning war is an inc remental ar gument Jike the t e chnic a l Sorites syJlo gisms , formalising the type of fallaciou s a r g ume n t which shows that one more straw never makes a heap. Th e fn l l;i.cio us e scalation argument 'i. s pa rt of the so-called "logi.c of war ", f or more on whJch see the conclusion of Appendtx 1.. i' war s thus appear dec i dedl y Cla usewiczj_ a n . for the l anc, r or players Still the !irgument is inc onclu s ive; can choose, at leafJ t J n sma ll er calmer wars, not t o e scnlate, examplt!, agree to abide b y arranged practlccs , t y pes of we a pons, etc. l· 4 A s t 11tc engaged in war se ld om sees i t self a s e ntirely bound by of mo ·al i t y: lt i s t ake n to be me r e prude nce on t he pa r t o f those attacked to take account of the no-imr oral- holds-ban:-e d appr oa ch t h e y c<;p,~, f,11 ly t lw 1 constraint s from the ot her s'ido. 11w~Liou not onl y as to ma y well enc ount e r, So 0a , h g1·oup po t e n t i a 1l y e ngn g cd in war f;1cps it wlw t o u g ht to do in mor a lly permi ss ibl e si. lu<1tlons , but al s o both wha t i t ou g h~_ r ea l ly do, a nd wh a t it can morally do in the morally flawed situati on s it finds i t s e lf. But the last question do e s not, in tli,1L cnsc•, r e d uce t o o ne of ex pe di e nc y . There i s no que st ion, then, of moral i t y giving or having 0:x.pe<.lienc y, even under extreme to give way to circumst a nc e s such as the prospect of LSN war involves . Fo r it i s not as if s haky con Ri de r a tions of give to the f i rm ground of exped iency when t he c hips are down, since often way morality eno1gh such mora l ero s ion does not occ ur in c risis s ituations. t hcorc~ical fac t is that both deliver f r om us But the the vnlue the o q'.: . to Expedlency fact, but urg('s , tba t does foreign takes local va l.ue s - o f sel f , family, clan, class, or nation - ar e conside rat i on s . proper charact risa t i on , a remote By cont r ast, mo rality requires, as a matter of its much univ• r sa lizable mor e univ e rsal pr inciples . rePultan t i1,tersu bstlt uti vit y fairness, eq u ita billty and of value and, And morality thereby imposes, through principl e s, jus t ice. distributio n c ertain requ i rements of general Ex pe di e ncy yields an unfair , inequitable value system, one tha t subscribe rs would not a dh e re to if differe n tly Ttie no t It assumes, or what really coun t, and ov e rride or are t o be max imized at the expe ns e of or to cruci al simply narrowl.y-co nstr;.icd l oca l a dv anta ge or powe r a s wha t i s valuable . even bound moral i ty a nd expe dien c y fall within the same, eq 1:. 'J l y f~lrnky or equally sol ! d , doma tn_ of v al ue miraculousl y are placed 1 :., . Jeep thcorcL ical u1 s ati sfact orinc ss of ex pedi e ncy, and associa t ed strategic Lhinldne , n l so Jer lv ci; from Lh i s faU. ur e of ·va l untioi1~:; pe r so ns X and Y are interchange d under 14. 11nd r es ults not ho ld -f ng whe1 i nt e rr e pla cement, from the same As Wa l zer a r gue s, p. 24. An histori cal ex ample i s the era of ge nu inely I imi t cd w:1 rs l n Europe fo ll owi ng t he hilrba rl s m o f th e Thirty Years war. B . expr d 1e1cy assessm ents 16 • ic c~ n For expedie ncy loes not elude deontic presen tation: be pr er;ented as through such popul a r slogans as "local might i.s right", or ft lvcn tight formal rest•mb le charac terisat ion . The charac terisat ion will normal ly that o[ utilita rianism , except Lhat util i tic . are only assigne d to, or arc bi asse d in favo ur of, certnin indivld u~ds. Howeve r, theorie s of ut.llity ~ol have to he posi tions of expedie ncy if utility is 11ot locally confi ned. util llariun ism prope r is not to be dismiss ed as cnn Thus onside ring only expedie ncy; intcrsu bstitut iv:i. y rc'quire ments of morali ty ; meet do it Lt does not, unlike the me hods of war game theory, assign differe nt weights to the individ ual uti.lity of ( ce rtnin) Americ ans, as opposed to Russi ans , say. There are dc•ont.o .logis ts r egardin g war mora ll y howeve r signlfic a11t e.speci ally, 17 • which differe nces, between utilita rians serve to further compli cate the moral pie t u re In particu lar , utilita rian approac hes have permis sible, or to seemed to effect some to rend er justify , ugly strateg i es and practic es as regards ~nemy civi. lians, that deonto logical princ iples wo uld not permit. already and partisa nship , since utilita rians But this is would reject the descrip tion of pr.ctic es permitt ed under thei r princip les as 'ugly'; wherea s an a im in what follows is to avoid meta-e thical me ta-ethi cal neutra lity, though of course not there is a neutra lity. to achieve And morally large area of consen sus, or at least moral converg ence, from which ar gumt'n l ,an bt'gtn. S('Vcr al moral partisa nship, VJ.rtua ily all positio n s grc• that the obltter ation of major ci ties ln a LSN war. would be wrong, indeed morally outrage ous. If tltere is diss e nsion, as there may be among nuclea r stra tegists who seem to feel no qur.Jms when lt. comes to trading loss of some Americ an cities for some Rus si a n ones, s imply increas e the costs involve d, up to loss of whole nations if l.5. The severe limitat ions of t:hoBe l esse r ''virtue s ", nationa lism and pAlriot isrn, also come from the failure of replace men t which exces siv e applica tions of nationa lism easily engend er. Try for example swappi ng a person from inside the homelan d with one from outs i de as regards treatme nt. The point of, and reaso·n s for , intersu bs t itutivi ty as a require ment of morali ty, is well explain ed in Har e , p.78ff. Hare applies the require ment to make a telling case agains t nEtion ali sm (a case which exte nds to strat eg ic decisio n-theo ry). Nation alism, al ong with fanatic ism, is the main cause of war, so Hare conten ds, p . 72. 16. The case aga inst expedie ncy was develop ed in detail especi ally the critici sm of Thrasym achus in The Republ ic . 17. Thus the differe nces between Nagel on the one side, and Brandt and Hare the other, i.n Collen et al. by Pl ato ; see on :iccesi:iary , unti.l moral repugnanc e :fs Tile ncounlere d; _!: hen try to work down again. fact remains howe ver that Jn the nuclear area things have got substanti ally oul of perspecti ve, morally. abandon or Strategic thinking, i n particula r, has tended to suppress moral considera tions ( as indeed theories of the state also do, somet imes flamboyan tly, in favour of partisan values). Naturally Lhe fact of broad consensus as to the morality of th e matter does not m ·an that there are none who would welcome such outrageou s happening s, that to t al nu clear destructio n of the North even, would be Cons id er t he w11rld ,·inpl r1•. be so thern risi.ng (hemisphe re) no one's advant3ge . strongman , SS, who has v :lsions of Wlillo l.lH' t,uperpowt• rn of lli<' no ·t. h rcm:i in, SS ' 1.1 dnwm ·a n realised. Thus his best strategy, having rid s ubmarines and ·outhern lands of US bases, is to try nil lear to exchange in the North, There would southern to be waters encourage a hardly an of US all - out point then in securing institutio nal arra ng emen ts so that potential SS's do not accum ulate much espe . ially given the apparent instabi lity of crucial world arrangeme nts. tlrnt is to nnt1eipnt e: lhc present point :1. has and tts power, limitatio ns, is an thnt ( t he fnct of) moral inadequat e But conse nsus const r aint without accompany ing struct ural adjus tments. For , typJrnlly , <lifferc11 tly to nationa l impose interest ls taken hosta ges or override morality, e ven holding civilian populatio ns kill:lng m111.lons in the national :i.nterest 18 ). unfortuna tely, these assumptio ns are not confined to more totalitar ian such as of those those of Eastern Europe. things. substitut ion of jus tificatio n; fails in The first, expedienc y , . C.!.BSSC,S And, regimes, But morally national interest can do neither the overridin g for morality , of morality, which the second, the alleged mor a l dominance of :important or irresi stibl e ethic a l claims t ha t dominate mo r e ordinary cthicnl considera tions (such as those conc er ni g nuclear to is entirely national simply lacks the mo r al interests , of cases, including , so the argument wi.11 go, the case of LSN war. 18 . As Sche ll blun l:ly puts it, 'What io being cl.aj_med is that one or two countries have the right to jeopardis e all countries and their descenden ts in the name of certain bel iefs' (p.132). However this way of putting it leaves room for ambiguity , since the belie fs may be morally grounded rat her than based on national interests . Stales may i ns i st upon opera ting one self ish national interest basis , Ii:!. It nol be pretended expcJ i<"ncy (na me l y , that tha t of it i.s "group but n montl basi, as distJnct from one of ego1 sm " ). There no 1s special moral d.ispensa ll on fo r governments. j ndiv iduals : ther e ia no loe;i.cal diffe ' nee .ln the patter1 of jus ti fi.cation, or analys is of obligation. Morality works :ln the same way for groups as for For e xample , what ought to be as regards Xis (analy~ed semant i cally) what would happen as reg a rd s X in all ideal worlds; no di ff e r e nce organisation. extenuating killers: whether X is an · individual States such as Israel (in i ts recent invasion reaso ns aside, be having just as beeu conce ded , special moral dispensations; more Lhan tha.t and do not sta nd up to crit.i.cism. cannot immorally makes system, grou p or of Lebano n) are, as brigands or mass there is no moral difference. Certainly t here are gro unds on which states or individual or and it f11rnish two (incompatibl e) their a gents 01: have claimed , but the excuses offered are no A moralities , a s atis factory state moral theory or public one and a private or individual ci tiz en one - state expediency Rnd individual morality becaur;e thi s would lead t o violations of sub st itutlvity , neutrality, etc. 1 '3 ins t ance , a state ope ra ti e X could us e s tate mor~lJy impermi ssi ble ways, ways ruled Y are permuted . special 01 1t cover (e.g. to considerati.ons citizen Y in by state interests) when X and A group or organisation or pe rson can be der iv ati ve damage For bound of course by in virtue of role, but these are der ivative prin c iples - good for any such 1nstitution - which fit within and answer back to general moral principles. So it is also with a state which is an institutional arrangement justlfied ( i nsofar as it is) by the way it answers back to some least) of its citizens: its charter does not legitimate emergent allegedly 1orR l principles which convenien tl y coincide with those of state expediency . particular, a sta te is not 1 morally) survivrd . In entitled to risk the lives of many of its own citizens and of other p~oplcs and creatures for its own ends, even ow n ( at for its Thus it is not entJ.t led to do what both nuclear war and nuclear de terre n ce r equ l re, as will emerge. 19 . There a n ~ also othc•r arguments agai nst two (or see Routley a nd Plumwood. multiple) morality Lines: 11 !-: ' ) 'j.J. The i_ni t i<d argument p:1cifli;m yield arguments to the tmmora1 lt.1_ of _ LSN wars. to tb e 1mmora1it.y of war. But 1wch a rgum ents ;ire controversi a l in an area where th ere is no go od r·ason to Argumen ts be for controve rsial. Pacifism can accordingly be se t aside as a spec i a l case, stnce the immorality of LSN wars follows . All but pacif is t positions concede that war in itsel f is not a c rime. nil wars are immo ral, though eve n inoffensive wars may be pointless or inferior ways of settling po litlcal issues between states . wa r s who Not are Among more or l es s admissible th e inte rna tiona l " tourname n ts '' of arlstocrat ic young men or warriors volu11l'cer :w Ho ldlers nnd whos<' actfon does no t 6pi.ll ov er on to noncombar.an ts , a nd some early a nd medievvL wars , wh ere few or evet no combatants were kjl.led in war. conscrip tlon, Since the esta bl i shme nt press-gangs and recruitment of such of the lHrgely ceased to take these less offe nsive for ms; induction prac tices as near-d es titute, wars hav e modern massive war s are far removed from the ideal war-tourn ament typ es (which fea ture now only in ecotopian por traya l s, in ways that are in creasingly dub ious ). imrnornl, Most s orts of wars are because of what is done to the essentially un5_nvolved, but few to such a n exte nt as LS N war s . The first argument to th e immorality of LSN wars and of sufficientl y larg e-sca l e wars ge neral ly, takes the following form: Pl. The (deliberate ) killing in mass of noncombatan ts is wrong. P2. LS N wars involve the killing in mass of noncombatan ts. P3. Wha t inv olv es wha t Is wrong is wrong . ( KA) LSN wnrs ar• wrong. The parttcular a rgument g lven i s ju st one r epresenta tive of a set of Lhis type. the (KA ) t·cpL1ccs But the qu1. te 'kl.11:!.ng su ff i c l en tly 11v :i.l. crcH tu res' . Thu s t n ma ss o f noncombatan ts' by a cl~rnse concerning 'huge des truct-lon of 11.f esty l e of uninvolved or i. nvolvecl f ocus can destructio n cf li.festyle of nonhumans and humans fJJ i k(~ Ll w t :in L'., N war wJ 11 brf ng l a on arguments Cha racte ri sti cally, in Western culture, it is thought that mass kl l Ling of h11m<1ns ls a bout the worst th i ng that can happen. vadu tlo n of not ll fir s t uitable directly Other vuriatlons will emerge in the di.scussi.on (i.ncluding th at: where the bracketed 'de.liberate' figures ) . The argumenL Js valid, ,1L t a .kcd) on the basi :3 but of may each be attacked ( and of its p1·emisses. has in ef fe ct been Let us consider these in reverse order. The principle, P3, used in the argument, that what involves 11 what is wrong" is -wrong, has been c hallenged on r:1ther Scholastic grounds. There are, in partic ular. problems like those generated by Good Samaritan arguments, purport o shot.J tha t some proper obligations involve wrongdoing. as~~lst.i.ng :rn in jured robbed per son is said robbed; but, s ince the ro bbin g is wrong, to "involve." providing For which instance, that person ' s assistance belng is also wrong. But thes e pr oblems derive from too slack a not1on of i.nvolvement; w:i:th a tighter accoun t of invo lvement th e problems disappear and P3 stands . 20 As aga inst P2, it may legitimately directed be argued against that mi lit ary nuclear targets. wars can be encounters But given the character of nuc lear wea pon s, LSN war s could in no way be co nfined to such targets. net merely the likelihood that many missiles ex plode off target, ther e are all the ot:he r eff ects of large-scale nuclear. bombings. fnlloul There i s down-wlnd from military pcopJc, es pecial Ly in the cas e of uninvo.lved co u11 t rl cs aucl tnrgcts US and For example, t he radioactive will affect large conc entratio ns o( European t argets , and may affe ct as Conn <l o. There may be an attempt to avoid the problem of massive civilian casualties by appeal cffcrl ) 2 1. t o s uch dubious pri nciples as the doctri ne of double effect (or side If missiles wer e c haracte ristically r.eliAbly on target, and one 20. The challenge to P3, which is often expanded to a "distribution of obl igat ion over entailment " pd.nciple ,, can be removed by a ti.ghter involvement connective, linked to a good paradox-free entailment. For de t a il s s ec Routley nnd Plumwood, where Good Snmar.i tan problems arc diagn osed. 21. According t o the doctrine , which is one concerni ng responsibility, we are rcs ponsJblc only for the intended e ffects or consequenc ~s of our freely-c hos e n actions, and not for other (side) effects or consequences, even U these are foreseen and/or intimately tied to the intended conseq uences . Unless carefully hedg ed, the doctrine is pernicious , a llowing those who suitably adjust their intention to escape responsibility for evi l th e y knowingly perpetrate. Thus, for instance, a Russian supreme comma nd which intended only to take out US military targets would, under double effect , have no responsi bil ity for the resultant effect on American and Canadian cities! Taking the i ssues concerning do ub le effect to a more satisfactory conclusion would however require a larger theory of action, which duly dis tingui s hed acts (what is done) and outcomes from attached intentions . whicl1 was intend ed unfort unatel y only went off to destro y an unma1H1<HI und e r g round Such claims shou ld be reject ed : ci ty. dou bl e effect Noneth e l ess the circum sta nc es differ ence , for they m.ay mitiga te atti tu des to tho s e rcflpo ns lbl f' ,1 for firing the nd ssi.le, .·i.nce the the thr actjo n would be wrong, and th e ~.:_~:~ ~css nol ]c$sen cd by the g lv n lntent l.on. innkc silo course and destro yed a large ci ty, it c ould be claime d th.:it t.h ~~ (uni.nt cndcd) mass dest ructio n is legitim ised under could missil e j t was not as if t he y had del iberat ely aimed at The double effect princ ipl e confla te s [dimin u tion of] respo nsibil ity Assign ed for an act with the [dimin ution of ] wrong ness of the act. ~s agains t Pl, and as regard s the middle term of argued tha t there is an impor tant equivo cation . the br~cke ted term, ' delibe rate ' . killin g and P2, it The equivo cation is induc ed by be conc eded that de libera te milJta ry , e . g. farmer s or goods or servic es bootma ke r s or ente rtaine rs . used exclud ed as innoce nt . The s econd d~ten sible - versio n of pr emis s P2. other. for re a sons, it by proper ly point concer ns a much narrow er - and les s Bec a use P2 s o amende d is less defen sible, is bes t to l eave out the "modi fier" 'd el ibera te'. What is import ant for the presen t purpos es i s the moral status of what is mixtur e of tha t wi th the motive s of the perpet ra to rs. requir e the qualif icatio n 'delib e rate' or done, So 'delib erate' gets left out, equiv ocatio n is avo ided, P2 stands , and so does Pl. not t he Second ly, it will be conten ded thAt LSN wars do no t i nvolve t he delibe rate killin g of t hos e a It no means al l inn ocent , many being direct ly involv ed in mi litary ef f ort, whethe r just as taxpay ers or as s upplie r s of not be charge d firs tly that noncom batant s, insofa r as they are distin guish able, by and ma y of genuin e innoc ents is imperm issible , two challe nges will be made . will b are While it will Pl For Pl do es 'int e ntiona l' or the like. 22 Admit tedly nlso 'nonco mbat a nt' is a fuzzy term , but none the worse for that, and Lhere is no seriou s p·o blem in markin g out a class of clear noncom batant s, people who a rc not <lir cctly involv ed i n the comman d and J.s, mnrco v'r, no need to adopt action chains . There the prncti c e , derivi ng from catho li c ism, of statin g rn init i.al verslo n of Pl in terms of in noce nts at l e ast as proble matic 22. Despit e Na3el ' s sugge stion that it does (p.158 ). The sugge stion depend s upon oimila r mistak en assim ilati ons , of ac t wi t h intent ion, and wrong ness with respo nsibil ity, to t ho se of the double effect doctri ne. ,1 rlns:; ":'i ,c mnk.t~ t,-,nt of r~on ,~omb:1t ants to try t:(, endenvourlng c..hnrac t er i z .. , -- Rnd then i:h c dif f ic11.Lt transiti.on to noncombatants. there Nnt only can arguments aga i ns t the premlsses of the argument be met, .tr,~ for ;ir311mcnts the prt:'ndsses, thongh for t he subc-tant iv e moral premiss Pl and Lhcy aru of the cha tacterlstlcally nonconclu sive moral sor t tend will For examp le, one argument for v3ry sowcwhat with th e underlyi ng ethical th e ory. Pl, .rnd for objecting to the kil l ing of non~ombatan ts, ts the Kant i a n one, (to poi.nt) , re s pect: owe d to tnem a<· pc so ns mi n f nn l from -~_gume nts §4 . the understate sc,rio usly doing so 23 histori_ca~ __ ..::_e~qu i rcm nts on wars, just ur dreamed by conlemporary "free·-enl<'. rp r fs c" cap:l. Lalist st.ale (and opponents communis t im portant the The conclusion t hat LS,' wars cacno t be justly waged - nnd accordingly are ?njustified - 1e that fail s to treat them with the .0..1~Jl~l5:!..'..~- from con-:_er_ger~£:::J and cnv.t ronment al arguments . r.;omet. lti to of is Americ a inspired, me r ely not or et c), th e of same The conclus ion fnlls out of vc1rlouR trc1dj t i0nc1l requirements, worked out i.n mediev al t:irnt•s , (or jusL wars. first One of t h e r equi r ements gives but a varia nt on the ;>1 :irgumen t (KA). · 1 For a necesso r y co nd i Lion for fighting a wat· justly was th a t it to no t be the case t hat large numb e rs of [innocent] noncombatants are bound killc.:<l (cf. be Barnes , p .77.5) . A just war req ui res just means , that t he war should be fought by morally which impli es in partic ula r that there is no indis c riminate killing of noncombatants . The implied principle was escapsulated in a princi pl e legitimate of means , discrimination (betwee n combata nts and othe rs) whi c h 'prohibits all actions directly intended to take the lives of p.312) /. ~:, . civilians and of noncombatants' (PL, LSN wars, where not only military installations are targeted, violate ') ( I.lits ·cqulremcnt '' . 7.3. Of course there are co~nterarg uments too , and not merely from t c military in the case of small numbers of obst r uc tive noncomb a tants. One ;.rngLP favored argument is a va r i at ion on the Bald Man: the re is no clear line between combatants and noncombata11ts. Howe v er a s Nag el a rgues (p . 20) there in are distinctions between t hem, firstly in terms of thei r roles , e.g. c,irry-Lng or u!,in? ;irm · o r dircc . ing t. lnBe who do, a nd s econdly in terms of See a l so PL , p.312, where a their liarmf.uJ.ness , the threat they offe r. uj rr.p1, and ef fec ive paradigm case nrg11mcnt is up pli ed . 2 1~. Note th at throughout, tile• te:xt adopts Llie OED eq u.:itio ns, reflecting common lust wit h mo~ally right or correct, and unjust with morally usage. of - - - -··---·-- Overlapping the requirement of Just means is thac 6f being that of net evil to net good: pro ro rLi on cor; tr-: up proporclonality, 'the damage to be infljcted and lnc urn.> d by the war must be pro porti.onate to the good ex pect ed the damage and costs , req 1irement: disproportio nate to goods moral pr0p0 rt lonnl ·l ty re qui.r ement i R er i t1! rlon of the which doctrine through war . "improvement" ln achieved of confined, nationally no t ar that way. ov e r a ll co n sequences of abstaining i mprov ement "puts wrongs to righ ts": c ondi. tion s "nmel.ioratlve " wn y the 'a nation wages war justly than Similarly on l y if the for that nation or the wronged n8tion it is supporting have a decent s:1tisfy for bad, from war ' (Barnes, p.72) . LSN wars can in these conditio ns, as scen.-i:rios depicting the aftermath of s 1ch Some oft.h e lesser r e quirements for a just war are also wa rLl , nnd war According to the fl.rst, 'X wages wa r c han ce of be ing better after the fighting ends' (Wakin, p.20). no are Entangl ed with the justly upon Y if the overall consequences of wa r a re bette r, or less th e taking by p,312). 27 Tt Ls not difflcu lt to see that LSN wars violate this (PL, arms' the e :a mple that of infringed reasonable expectation of success. by LSN It seems that tl ie r· c ca n b e no rea onable expe c tation of suite success in nn LSN war ·- whatev e r t!il' v0 ry d lf !<r<' n t'Jy, cx rhanges . 1 lmilcd prospccUJ of: succl'SS for whatever the p rospcct:s of succf•ss in Wha t some sm11ll strictly state limited clltc , or nucl ea r is le ss clear cut is th e question of whether LSN wars conflict with th e requir ements of just cause or due fnu lt, and of right intention. Fo r One (by no means be arg ued to in various ways. c onclusive) way is Nage l's way, from the requirements of directness and r e l e vance in combat, the underlying ( co ntroversial) principle being that, 1 wh<1tcvcr on<.> does t:o another person inte ntionally must be ai med at him as a subject, wlth the intention that he receive it as a subject' (p.15). 25 . Til e principle can 26 . wars where t he targets ar e c8 s cntially military ones, and noncombatants are unaccountably killed "!nd:lrectly",would b~~ :i.ffe r cnt. Such wars are no t however excused by t he For such wars remain unjust on pe rnicious doctrine ~f double effect . on lif e several counts, e.g. they inflict disproportionate damage, e.g. As Zuckcrmnun says, 1 Tt is st ill inevitable t hat were s ys tnms, etc. mil i tary i nstalla t ions rather than cities to become the objectives of nt lack, millions, even Lens of mlll.lons of ci v.Lli a.ns w-ould be nucl 'lH kill e d .. • ' (quoted i.n Thomp s on and Sm i.th , p .14, where the italics are The situation witli strlctly llmi ted nuclear ndded ). Zi. Tli! r; i s riol Lo b e confus0d wi.tli wlwt lB very different, the vi.cious anclent doctrine of proportional response - an eye for eye, tooth for tooth, and so on - recently adapted by the Americans in their latest offi cial policy of fli>;,cib1e r e so0T1se. ,vii11~ted to the level " f att ack, t hi i, ilc> p e nds on the s e nsitive jssue of the weight assigned to what are se e n as b:J1; i c human r1. gh ts and fundame ntal value s , a nd the extent to which just wars can b e i.dco J og i.c a lly justif i ed. Whil<': the ma instr eam pos1.tion of medieva l theory oppo s ed to id e ologica ll y jus tifi ed war s a nd "humani tarian" wars, these wer e was no L ck f' nitlvely exclud ed by the trndiU.o nal theory ( cf. lltt J e is wlw n 1.;o m,rn y arc se nsitive howe ver, me rit, ( a nd when issue s will ari s e again subsequ ently). a r g uments are not do There .In puzzling ov e r dubi usly effcctlv e requirem ents, dec isive ng a lnst LS N war s h i st orica l r e quireme nts Barnes, p .778). not simply commit argumen t s matters underlyi ng the Finally , these argumen ts from any presc r iptive fallacy; from historic al autho r ity for to th e mo r al c oncl 11 s i ons, but use also premisse s to the effect that th e requirem ents imposed, a nd nome times applied , were justifie d. As they are. I n the Christia n traditio n t here were two main strands of r eflectio n on the mo ral rightnes s or justness of wars, the just war t heory and a rival pacifist str a nd, promine nt in early Christia nity, but largely submerge d from Augustin e on co ntempor ary u n ti l times. Both exc lude nuclear wars, one strand because they arc ine v i tably unjust, the other because they are wa rs and This ls the involve beginnin g of the converge nce argumen t agai ns t nuclear wars : such wari, a re exclud e d from all ethical perspec tives, once remov ed ( a nd e ven, howr• vcr you look conse ns us violence 28 • Ht very f requentl y , when it is not) . il morally . a r gument; it The argume nt i.s not proceeds expedi.en cy that is duly They a re morally wrong the same as the weaker fr om similar results from the full sweep of ge nui nely e thi c al position s, not from massive agreeme nt of opinion. The deta :! le d conv ergence argumen t is an exhausti ve case by case each type of moral theory. Fortuna tely deta ils can be de ontolog ical a nd contrac tual theories l ead back to requirem ents 28. one, from shortcu t. For for just war These alte rnatives are not as far. removed .r..ractic ally as may appear. For the aim of just wa ~ theory is not 'to legitimi ze war but t o pr event it. The pr1~sump tion is against the use of force ' (PL, p.312 ) . And ~..£. types of wa r s a r c ruled out by Lite theory. However not all wars or violent revoluti ons a re excluded , and that is enough to guarante e the distinct ion be tween t he a ltern a tives. In particu lar, defensiv e ware are allowed - at l e ast for th e defendin g side, though from a wider viewpoi nt these too may be co nd emned 'the classic case [of the just war] ••• was the use of l et ha l forc e to prevent aggressi on against innocen t victims' (PL, p.311). Und e r rec e nt internat ional law, defence , narrowly construe d, is the only legi Uma t e basis for wa r; Roma n law was only slightly more generou s, in a llow i ng for th e restitut ion of eoods (see Barnes , p.780). .l / whi c l1, it ha s ,ilrcady been s hown, LSN wai·s violate. w.1r were i_;ornctimes a rriv ed at or l n fact conditions for just defended through pr inciples of such moral th12ori · s , so tl,at a good deal of the r equls i. te argumentative been done . work already The latter point hold s a lso as r egards ut ilitarianism, where it has in c[fec t bee n c•hown that whatever br a nd of utilitarianism is maxim j.sati on utl lHy has is final ly ac complished, LSN adopted, wars are howe ve r excluded ut1· 1 ·Ltar1an · g r oun d s . 2 9 Tl,e reason f or suc1 l converg nee .i snot f ar to see k ; wars Llw l involv e on LSN 1:uch ma ssive infliction of pa in and colossal removal of pleasure, tills dominates i n assessmentn howev •r Lhey 1:1 te accomplished in utllitarlan Tilu s any genuine alternative to LSN war ls bette r 30 • L1i; ldon. The arguments ovcrwhc .lming so moral far case outlined against such mora J princi ples whi ch the waging of a n principles are de riv able from agains t some LSN wa rs. LSN would su bstanti ally wo rse are tha n exhaust th e violate thes e of the theories just considered). These ac countable, condition not ( again th e obligation to maint a in earth jn proper shape a nd not de grade it s systems : we do For there are oth e r significant war pri q•f pl es include e nvironmental ones, such ns : p,cnera tions, to whom wars we the r.-esponsibility to futur e pas s to th e " recei ved the world it". Such on" not in conservative principl 0s - howeve r they are finally s atisfact or i ly formulated - are bound to be vio lat ed in t he event of a n LSN war. §5. The shi ft to nuclear deterrence: suppo rt nuclear arguments to its immorality . Those who arrangements have had a way of halting - and if not defeating, certainly turning and deflating - arguments from the immorality of LSN wars , by pointing out that there is no actual engagemen t in any such wars. What i s being done ls, it is cla imed, quite different fr om war: deterrence is most important precisely engagement in preventing in LSN such wars from ever occur ri ng , as we ll as in mR int ai ning other fundamental Western values. it is continued , deterrence is the .9nly practical d e siderata, prevention of war and maintenance of values. way indeed Indeed, of obtaining both Similar arguments 29. For details see, e.g ., Lackey, especially MM. 30. An argwnent of this sort is devel oped in more detail, complete gc ner ality, j r Goodin, esp •c i £tlly 'Disarmame nt'. are But compare Hardin. though not in a<lvnncerl for all tl1e va ri ous guises that de terrence is presented in: mutually ;.~ssurcd des truction as fnrrnerly, fle xi ble r espo nse as latter ly, or otherw.ise. 31 Su,h c1aims as to the roles and dubious, for seve ral reasons. objective s of deterrence If i.t t.rere, "sufficiency" to deter would be an adequate goal. s uperior ity. than th i s, and sometime s even a mili ta ry goal. In fac t there ha s renewed driv e for Pure delerrence can account nei t her for act ual nuclear weapons nor for orthodox Wester n military strategy 32 process decidedl y A first reason is th a t there i s much e vid e nce, despite pronouncements, that dete rrence is not the - the only - been a que st for more are Nor has deterrence set in motion the of disarmament to be expected to reduce armaments to levels ap propriate for dctct"rence . On the cont rn ry, un<ler " its" impu.ls e there has been almost unli mi te d acce l era tion in building arms (to pa ra phr a se PL p.318). A other major re a son for serious doubt a bout what sold 31. is being 11nder "d e terrence" labe ls conce r ns th e _proba bility f actor: marketed a nd deterrence has It ts important to observe that the di sc ussion is not restricted to one form of deterrence, such as that of mutually assured destruction (MAD), but applies t o al l for ms of response likely to engender LSN wa r. This includ es "flex ible r es ponse", since the lik e ly further development i s massiv e ret al iation to a n ini tia l Soviet nuclear raid. Part of the reason for thi s is the extreme vuln erabilit y of the US defence systems, especially the communication systems, e.g. to early strikes a nd to electromagnetic pulses. In the result i ng great confusion, escalation appears the likely out come . I n a ny case, fle x ible response includes massive retaliations, as part of its ra ng e and is ultimat e ly backed by it. It is a l so im portant to observe that deterrence as practised is not confined to responses to (nuclear) a ttack. The threat of nuclear action has been made in cases where a rival encroaches on a zone of interest of a nucle a r power. I t is in part because deterrence includes nuclear responses to what is construed as serious misbehaviour of rivals that the practice of deterrence raises the probability of LSN war to the extent it does. 32. As to the firs t po int, there is not onl y overkill capacity and the driv e for suped ori ty ( oft e n repr esent ed as '"negotiating'" strength) but the matter of counterforce weapons which are offensive weapons. As regards the second point, US policy has been de cidedly expansionist with regul a r intervertion in o ther nations; there have been r epe ated US threats to use nucl0ar weapons, espec ially to deal wi th revolutionary activities in t he third wo rld , but also in Europe in "li.mited'" nuclear war; and i n official military stra tegy no s ha rp line has be e n drawn between c.onventi.onal and nuclear weapons: on these and other r elated points see furth e r Lackey MM, p.19lff., and also Thompson and Smith. The argument can be pressed [1rLher, to the alarming conclus ion that deterrence is larg e ly a front, which plays onl y a minor, but justificatory, role in actual US policy. Among fu rther evidence is behavioural data: a government with a genuine deterrenc e policy would repeatedl y emphasize its strength (even when it la c ks strengt h), whereas the US govcrrnnent ofte n parades its vulnerability and weakness in public . For other evidence see Smith, e.g. p.46ff. i.ncrt.:ascd the probability nrms-race type t hat of LSN war. More precis ely, deterrence of th e is being practised, which invol·es full-scale prepar a tion for Lota] nuclear war, has prepared the cond i tions for nuclear war to occur, and hns to that ,,,·te nt least en hanced its prospect s of occurring . at r easons also, connected with pure original setting), the last 30 years. the deterrence and with the For other "cold war"' (its probability of a LSN war has increased consid erabl y in The reasons include the threatening posture called for by deterrence, the propaganda, which comes to be believed, that must be promulgated to main tain credibility overridden or with ''sacrificed" a population whos e real for military objectives; state of military readiness; etc. The situation has many ther e sober analysts century , i.e. think before 2000 . is a high There are s e veral interests are being the dangerous and risky now been reached where pr obability of an LSN war this routes to such a probability assir,nrnc•n t.33 It wo uld only rccp ii re one in ' id e nt wi.th a 20% chance of leading to an rscalating wnr every 8 years between 1960 and Amer lean 2000. alerts, hav e been lucky already . In of nuclear markedly. the years ahead it appears likely that th e For the danger supplicant nations resources declines. and the worsens and the extent The danger is enhanced by connected increasing chance of the lot. 33. Cox). easily as the plight extractable continuation of of crucia l the arms of nuclear acci dent and human or t ec l1nical error, none of them negligible factors as (cf . :l.ncrease zones separating the superstates are increasing in sjze and number, with Soviet and American expansionism, and r e veals the exchange . number of incidents with a real chance of engendering nuclear war wil l race, on sidE? ;i.lone, have been at least as frequent, and sometimes , as with the Cuban missile crisis , carry a considerably higher chance We Full past experience copiously Such a sketch can of course be elaborated and tidied up a Even so every substantial point involved can be contested, and many are Another route to a moie than subjective assessment is to apply Delphi methods: weigh up the experts' a sse ssments. In this regard it is worth noting that it is not only ''nuclear doves" who consider the probability of nuclear war has increased in r e cent years. Amer ica n officials have themselves admitted that the policies of r ealis ing th e st rategic potential of counterforce attacks and of selective and flexible responses have increased the probability of nuclear wnr (Hall, p.128). 20 conlcntlous (thoug h not always for good reasons) . s e em s no way Fof better or worse, ther e to rna~e such an overall probability argument particularly tight; a nd ti1t: r E:! arc p] a usi. b le arguments , from the complexity of th e data concerned and t he conti ng ency of the future, that it cannot be made tight . IL is bad enough however that l.t 2-._~_ de c idedly pla usible that it proha bJ~ that LSN an war will d i st r ibu tion pri c iples) that it proba bl e that c entury. And that is enough a grossly occur this ce ntury. is immoral to decidedly morally on moral grounds, to change deterrence as policy is i.mmoral. For then it follows ( by plausi ble that it highly is sequence of events will be perpetrated this warrant morally to take acti on to avert the outc ome. de terrence highly is evasiv e act.Lon. We ought That in turn implies taking steps , presently practised. Thus present That i.s but the first of several ways we shall nrrivc at that damaging conclusion for pres ent super-state deterrence policies. The plnusibil ity of claims as to the hi gh or increasing probability of war h a s of cour s e been disputed. LSN The mai n counte rargument runs as fol lows : Nuclear war is unlikely , be ca use the consequ ences are too horri fying. The underlying assumption i.s that wars and the like, with ar c improbable. assumption. Unfortunately however horrifying outcomes, much ava i lable evidence counters this More th an enough humans have not shrunk from brutal exchanges horr if y i ng wars , or even from genocide, as human history attests (cf. Kuper ). What ts le!;s assailable than the high probabili ty claim, what the ce r tnin ly Ther e by, through det errence, we si t uation, since have already got into t.h e probA.bility. immoral of r aising The mor e detai led underlyi.n g arg ument s , then, to the immora lity of nucle ar deterrence proceed by LSN an deterrence operates by the perverse practice of preparing for thereby perhaps helping t o bring it about, in the sense war, against evidence s eems to support, ls that there is a non-negl i g ible probability of an LSN war . LSN a nd way of princ iple s mapping war into ar.gum~nts a gaJns t deter r ence of LSN war. mi.gilt appropriately be called deont:ic connecti ng pr inciples . moral arg uments Such principles The fl rst of the s e principles t a kes the foll owing preliminary form: Cl. should If 1t is wro ng that X s ho uld occur, t hen not only be pr ob3ble is it wrong that it that X occur, but, more important, it is wrong to directly i ncrease t he pt' o ba bility that X occur . Thus, f or example , s i nc e is it wrong to ki l l a large noncomb atant po~ulatf on in LSN wa r (by §4) it is al s o wr ong to put the populati on at ris k and wrong to increase t he chance tha t the hostage popul a tion is wiped out, which nuclea r de terre nce does . botl1 of For simil ar r eas ons a super s t te is not morally entitled to im pose nucl ea r r i sks upon un invo l ved noncomb atants, esp ecial ly t ho se of third part y no nal i gned most Like "' t tuations . defeat by example , 0 t a te s . sub s t an ti ve Unless mo ra l count erexamp l es, the second principl es oc c u r s. probabi lity that par t princ ipl e s in Cl runs into dilemma. and of a c c ord i ng l y, Cl e ncount e rs to require complic ation. For apparen t trouble where clash of Thu s it may be argued th a t it is permiss ible to increase the oc curs X ord er to apartmen t bui l dings 3 4 • nuclec1r ethi s, d l l emmas a r e duly all owed for, Cl appears li a ble to t o avoid a greater evil. pilot who increase s the pr obabilit y c r ashes, in dct:crrcn ce , make that t he Cons i der for example the passeng er plane he ic flying sure that the troubled aircraf t does not hit cit y Suc h a defeatin g cond i tion do e s not apply in the case of ihe r e (though the r e explains ) wro ngness of a pr a ct ic e is not ls a of fs e t clash or of principl e s, as §6 removed by its role in avoiding greate r e vil. I L can be a r gued that it is: argumen t from t he pr e vious a r gumen t. de s erves lit t le perhaps f rom more such is pa rt of succe s s credence t he de terrence . th a n the of the popular However this inductiv e racing world As Barnett argues, driver's argumen t, 'the happy acciden t has surv iv ed the first thirty-f ive years of th e nuclear era is unimp r e s si ve e v i d e nce that we can avoid nuclea r war 34. point a s imilar time base, that because he hasn't had a fa tal crash yet (des pite some close calla ) , he won't, th a t of the in the coming era, This dilemma exampl e was s uppli ed by D. Johnston . There are more dif f i c ul t putative coun t e rexampl es. For example , in inciting people to c ivil disobedi ence, the ri s k of stat e violence in r etaliat i on is increase d. Thus, t o ta ke C, Pigden's example , 1.n encourag ing disobed ience, Gandhi i nc r ea s ed t he proba bility of wrongdo ing by the British Raj. But surely Ga ndhi, un l i ke th e Raj, did not act wrongly? It can be claimed that Gandhi d i d no t d irect ly incre a s e the probabi l i ty of viol ence . But spelling out what 'dir ec tly' means in terms of short causal chains over which r espo nsi bil i ty ca n be distribu ted - i s not only problem atic but leads on to ot her connect ing princ i ples. ·2 (p. 100) . lie offers fami.liar reasons suc h as the changing power incrt.' ,ise 111 Russian strengt h, the ri se r e 1aU. ons, th e of other nu c lear powcr·s, etc . (cf. simllarly Cox ). There ar e, a ccordingly, powerful reasons for concluding that Dl. De errencc will not continu e to work, and. more lmportant for the present argumenl, that D2 . De t e rrence does increase the proba bi lity of LSN war. The themes are of course i.nter related, and t he re as ons for t hem (which are again persuasive bu t in: oncl usive) can be t a ken together : some respects) weaker D2 ·- the probability facto r. proliferati on, the emergence bu t the focus is on the ( in An initial of lesser nuc lear powers. reason concerns As a result there are many more ways of starting a nuclear conflagrat.i on, and so enhanced prospect Some nnnlyula co ns id e r that lt. -i~i us e of nuclear weapons by confrontation a 11 lesser very Jf ke ly route to I.SN war l · th stat e . Moreover scarcitJ ;::i nd o f chea per suppli es, etc , weapo n systems, more or Lcrror s ltua ttons, deterrence power lnvolv e s 36 , being mainta.ined : costs Wi t h so many more Arms races, and interwoven balanc e of have an exc eed ingly bad 1,istorical track record. lncr cas lng as tl1c race p roce eds . of resource A second group of reasons concerns the Ther e is substantial inductive evi dence that pres en t for wi<iel y d lstributed, the probabili.ty of war through accide nt o r e rr o r is inc reased. powrr opportunities growing nuclear arms race which deterr e nc e, as practised, is ti ed to. wec1pons .lnltlnl to lead on to war are increasing, with increasing world political Jnstnbillty , relat ing to thlrd world economic de cline, and the of lead escalating eventually to arms war , races, with such as probabili.ty Next, deterrence dep ends on a certai n balance if that balance is unduly disturbed, as can happen during escalation, deterrence may well fail. A related reason for 35. that deterrence practice increases It can be the or etically a r gued t hat the fewer the nations weap ons, t.he l ess the chance of nuclear. war: cf. n 1clcar p .. 2JO n. 36. supposi ng th e armed with Lackey, MM, The standard ar gument for deterrence as significantly decreasing the proboblli y of wa r, would be decidedly better if the arms race were nbandoned, a nd weapons held at the much smaller levels required just for dcle rrenc e. Of c our se s uch a probability-well assumption is only one of scvera l_ thi. ngs required if det erre nce i.s to be just:!.fled. probabili ty of war conce rn s the continuin g shifts in poli c y, US especiall y th e rcncwc<l quest for superio rity wh i ch is in creasing the inc en tiv e of both sides to rcsorL to nuclcJr war, the USSR t o avoid being advantage of ov erwhelme d, USA the to take superiori ty ac hi eved . 37 Rece nt dangerous shifts in US poli cy the tow;Jrds war fighting a r e .in part induce d by a much inc re ased accuracy of nuclear missiles, which both weakens the case for MAD deterrenc e (sinc e mi l itary tar-gets con be selected for strike and ci ties to some extent r emoved as hostages ), thereby war. also weakens the case against resort to nucle a r detrrrenc c requires a certain (admitted l y r a ther minimal, ye t of mutual understan ding, leaders, and even some nuclear. sha r ed principle s , cooperati on supe r-states. and soundness transmi ss i on Finally, impor tant) level judgement among of of and informati on between It is not just that t he increasin g numbers of operator s in n position to J.aunch nuclear weapons must remain of " sound mind" and not, for instance, follow through on delusions of one sort or another. deterrenc e depends upon judgeme nts seriously mistaken: 'each is regarding the other It is al so tha t side , which slde ' s threat is to the other' (P L, p.313) . we think' • 38 But about what the o t her considera ble , and perhaps catastrop hic , margin of evidence, that on e perceptio n of what is possible resul t As s ide side thinks e rror. Not thinks , there only not can be is a there sid e (the USA) has misjudged the other side's (the USSR's) rational, as regards limited nuclear war, of a first strike countered by massive retaliatio n; must now be severe doubts cffectlvc ly. "conv inc ing " There is a grain of truth in the c1a"im that 'deterren ce is primarily about what t he other what be a t the mercy of t he o the r's percept io n of wha t strategy is "r.atio al", what kind of damage .is " un nccept able", how one may as to whether rationa l principle s are with the but there operating to the last consider, to take just one example, the erroneous 37. The point is discus sed in Dahlitz, e.g. p.213, where the US quest for super iority is doct1me nted. The v.lci ssi tudes of US "d efenc e" policy - not to say its shiftines s and occas ional incoheren ce (as in strategic forward defence) have confused many of lts supporter s even . Perhaps there is some advantage in the ver y incomplet e and limited exposure of USSR war and imperial policies : we don't see, wit h alarm, their incohe renc e and i.rrntiona llty . J8. Pym, quot,.• d .Ln Thompson , p .19. Yet a fundamen tal problem Russi a and the West fac e, Lt is sometimes claimed, is not merely that they do not understan d one another but that 'ther, is a lack of a wish to understan d'. This casts into douht the psycholog ical basis of nuclear deterrenc e. 24 idea (alread y allu<led to , as he l d in hi.gh pl a ces of powe r in USA and in UK) that LSN war cnn be sur viv ed i n r ud ime ntary s hel ters , and also won. The suppor ter of det er rence connec ting rrlnci ple s ri val case. such J1as not onl y to defeat a rgumen ts Cl, but, more difficu lt, to fie ld a convin cing as For the onus of pr oof lies in showing that the costly ~:.:..!.~_rr.cncc Ls justifi ed_. t hr o ugh practic e of Bu t for from th e fair ly decisiv (~ case that i s requi r ed ( Lo contras t with t he argume nt through Cl), only a feeble case through the questio na b le obv ers e of Cl, Cl i. If Xis wr ong then it is right to reduce the probab ility of X, nppears open . • For it has to be shown that deterre nce ( s ubstan tially) r e duc e s the proba bility of LSN war , and st ri ct lt (this indica tes part of the trouble with Clt) that deterre nce does this bett e r (more morally ) than availab le options . o The latter uniquen ess condit. ion ce rtainly fails, so it r,.,ill be argu e d. reasons already gi ven, does the probab ility claim. up i-hc v ery cond 1 t:1.ons probab ility of suc h for a an LSN war, it So , for When nuclear deterr e nce set s can ha rdly have reduced th e war , e speci a lly over the situati on a mere 25 years ag o when such an LS N wa r was not technic ally possib le. More genera lly , i n showlng that nuclear deterre nc e ls justifi e d, it i s c..! l1 0l l f',h refute the theme Lhat deterr e nce is wrong. LO out that deterre nce is permis sible, or alrigh t. altcrn1 1LJvc pe rmissi ble courses of a c tion condit:f . on ha s to be est a bli.shed ; to be no t merely alrigh t , bu t ;H:cc·p ' ah l<' cvidt!n tin l ato nd nrdA, r ig ht. But I t is not enough to make For t he re certain ly seem to withou t deterr ence , wh ic h appear more morally satisfa ctory. uniciue ne s s includi ng fright To surpass t hese option s, a nuclea r deterre nc e has to be shown es tablish ing such a 39. LSN war s , withou t .(cf. Jl 11 claim, to fear or is vf.nunl ly tmposa iblc. 39 OED) 40 • For most people, portray ing the horror of LSN wa rs would serve adequa tely enough from be the costs or problem s of Deterre nce cons ists in preven ting someth ing (often some wrong ) by t hr ea t s not the enormo us expense , t rouble vivid scenari os to deter t hem and wastage of An analogo us point will ap pea r whe n i.t is asked whethe r deterre nce is the way o ut oft.he nuclear fix, the thin g to persist with in the circum stances . Given that there are appare ntly super ior, le ss dangero us procedu res , the an s wl!r hn-, to be, No. - - - - - - -- - - -- - - - - - p r epar i ng to e ngag e i n th em. det t·r rl'ncc And deterren ce i.n a ny cas e de pends upon) is of by such means ourse not immoral . (whi ch miJit4ry (Sc.h e ll was not immora l in publ ish ing hi s gra phic descri p tions of the nuclear destruc tion of New Yo rk .) But t hou gh de te rrence per se is permi ssible, nuclea~ deterren ce, that is deterren ce by complete prepa ration for the object to be preven te d , is no t , where this o bj e ct, a LSN war., itself is no t permiss ible. The argumen t for this is thro ug h t he pr lnc J ple C2 . l f X is wrong then c omplete prepara tion for (carryin g out) Xis wrong. Hence since p re para t i on, LS N wars nuc l ear are wrong and nuclear deterren ce deterren ce of LSN wars is wrong . claimed th a t prepa ring for Xis just as bad as doing X: wr ong a n d Z ( mue h) worse t1wn i Y• wi11at W.'.1 S wrong. complete It is not however being Y and Z may both be 41 i s wrong i s b y no means un if orm l y ev1.1. " Tn 19115 Lhcre would ha ve been littl e doubt that L SN wa r implies complete prepara tion for Among the three types of crime s pecif led in Article 6 of the Cha rt e r f or th e I nternati onal Military Tribuna ls (which tr ied the major war c r iminals a t Nurcm burg) we r e Cr1- mes a ga ins t peace: namely planning , .:e_repar ation, initiati on or waging o f a wa r of aggr e ssion, or a war in violatio n of internat iona l tr eat:!.es , ag reements or a s surance s, or particip ation in a common plan or cons pi ra c y for the accompl ishment of any of the followin g ( cited in Ku pe r , p.2 1; ita lic s added). But af t e r ma ny yea rs of nuclear deterren ce, the become J ncreasi ngly liable to question . wrongne ss implied in C2 has However the doubts mainly come from 40. De t er r e nc e a lso commonly includes elements of mendaci ty, deceptio n, mi si nforma t ion, that is elements of what a re, for the roost part, morally unde sirable traits. Li l . Nor a re ordered be cause wrong, equally degr e es of wrongne ss required : wrongs can simply be as reg a rds relative worsene ss. The point requires some it has been quite erroneo usly assumed t hat if y and z cat egorica lly or absolute ly , then they mus t be equally evil. Thus, e.g. William s: . partiall y labourin g are both wrong or . there is no moral differen ce between running a deterren t st r ategy on the one hand, and intentio nally - indeed wantonly - start i ng a nuclear war on the other; so that the first is as totally evil a s the second. This is because both are held to be absolute ly forbidde n. Not a t a ll. The argume n ts from "Y and Z are both absolute ly forbidde n" to "S o Y i s a s totally evil as Z" and to "Therefo re Y and Z do not differ mor all y " a r e both ent:i.rely without validity . Compare : 2 is a number, and 3 lg a numbe r; s o 2 is the same number as 3, or does not differ numeri c , lly from 3! 26 a~sum ing t!w l comp l e t e prepara t.i o n i nc }udc i:; l ss t: lwn Lt nee ds to or do e s. Complete prepa ration for something, s uch as sever~] other fea tures. LSN war , already writes in In particular, i t presup po ses the preparation is no t ha1 (·-hea rt ed hnt is serious, is not merely for show and is not simply pret e nce. Obser e tha t mere pretence, or ot her more psychologic a l ploys, cannot substi tut e for comp l ete prepa r a tion in nuclea r deterrence. too sophistica t ed for bluff alone to Military succeed: t here preparatJon for wa r accompanyin g the t h rea t s involved in t he ot her hand , has to is now be serious deterr ence . But, on c omplet e prepara tion does not imply that what i s prepared for wi l l be attempted other than condi tona lly: imply attemp t ed X. c omplete preparatio n for X does not It does however 1.nvolve a conditional undertaki ng to proc eed with wha l is prcpa·ed whell1er intelligenc e for under c ertain conditio ns. Comple te preparation , for a we dding or murder or wha tevcr, wo uld be po int les s otherwise, so a (proclaimed ) comm itment to proceed under given circumstanc es c an be taken of connecting for granted . Principle C2 principles . is part way not the line in a series pr inciple of the same sort that is hig he r in the series is that A con necting X with a tt empted X: perh,ps down if Xis wrong then attempted Xis wrong as bad ) , whether X succeeds or not . But the se ries ends ; off well before th e l ower limits of i nte ns ionalit y, contrary to the (thoug h it cuts claims of various religious pos i tio ns. For example, it does not foll ow that if Xis wrong then X the co n temp l ati on con sidcra t Jon of of is wrong carrying out Xis wrong. or that non-action- oriented The point ap plies equally to sexual fant asie s, power fan tasies, and nuclear nightmares . no Lhing mere In particular, there is wrong with contemplatin g nuclear war, or reflecting upon it, as we are: nuclear wars, even lf their horrors don't be ar thinki.ng on, a re not unthinkable , and in some senses are all too thinka ble. Indeed one of the reas on s why the connecting principles appeal is that each common ly involves lt connects with. decidedl y increased pro ab ility of the wrongdoing or outcome Accompanyin g the increased probability are certain r eprehensibl e atti tud e s tied t o the ac tion t he evil outcome involves; nol I ho:a· of mere pas s ! vc .o nt emµ l at f on I,, 1 '. Howev er oll the sets of these are connectl.ng n prL nc lple s invoked except Cl ho l d, where the y do, ~, a n when the proba bi lity of wrongdo i ng ev e ntuating is not inc r eased. c ho:;c n One rea son for th1s is that the means o r epre hensible end s may be ineffica cious, for instance intendin g to do s omeo ne harm using witchcr aft . The inc r eased prohabi llty of an evil out come o l.mply makcB things worse . Nu clear deter r ence involves not only war pre parat ion, but thi s accompa nied by threats and a threaten ing posture . pot e ntial e nemy, has to be sui tably frighten ed or moved, announce ment For some pa rty , th e if deterr e nce s ucce ed : the threat must be recognis ed as s uch and be cr edible . n uc 1 L' i1 r deterren ce yie l ds a further conne cting princip le: CJ. of is to This aspect of if Xis wrong the n serious threat ening of X und er gi ven conditio ns is also wr o ng ; or , in br ief, If Xis wrong then conditio nal thre a tening of Xis wro ng . The r ema in i ng connecti ng conditio ns invoked all take this general form CG . If Xis wrong so is a cond itional r eq uires some further ex planati on. the fo rm, ~ ( X if C), wl1ere of' • 4 3 thre ate ning ~ Apar t intensio n to A condit'o na l do intentio ns e . g. themselv es, 1 the t ha t ) . C to (or in pr opos iti onal ra ther than event style: the most cond i tion a l lnte1slo ns are conditio nal obligati ons where~ is the oblj gati on form a are not impossi ble claim in whnt or even remote or imp r obable: (spe c ifica lly those involvin g cornmitn e nt) for follows certain is tha t s ort s there of discusse d an it is obligato ry conditio ns the conditi ons typicall y conc e rn those specif ying a rtuclear st rike by a potentia l fund ame ntal cred1ble functor: To r emove complica tion it can b e ass umed hencefo rth that the involv ed whic h intensio n is a judgemen t of is some intensio nal functor, f rom X enemy . The are intensio nal funct ors threaten ing , intendin g , and whic h CG holds , and that these versions suffice to demonst rate the immoral ity 42 . There is plenty of scope for f ur ther elabora tion here. Passiv e s pectntor shJp of evil e vent s where one is in an appropr iate pos i tion to make a differen ce i s quite another thing, from contemp lation of other worlds where e vil oc curs . 43. The condi tionnl i.nt nsion, ~ ( X if C), whic h is an intensio n , should not be confused wit h the provisio nal form, 1f C then ~x. which is not . The Ame rfcnns nre t hr eatening the Russians with retaliat ory action If tl1ey strike : Lt is not that: if the Russians strike the American s will threaten them with reta l ia t ory action . Such confusi on has arisen because of the problems of formalis ing conditio nal obligati on given usual defectiv e theories of condi ti onality. of nuclear deterren ce. Natural ly again there are many 28 no11-;-1ction ·-oriented functors for whi ch ve r s ions c.ont. :•mplat J.on, t'1l nld.ng, dreaming, etc. of e.g . fail, those of The.r e is also a n interesting group of more borderline functors, those of hoping ( for) , expecting, awaiting and the like, for which CG is only dub:i.ously correct:. Connecting pri nciple C3 evolved from the simp ler pri~ciple, if X is then threatcn.ing X 1s also wrong, or, as f ormulated by Ramsay: is wrong to threaten .•• ' 44 The r e ason is that to do into prac tic e (e.g. if wrong 'What is wrong putting something committ ing rape) is wrong then so also is what goes into tlin•at<'nl ne t o pu t that lnto practice , in pn rti c ul ar the declflred intent to that into pract i ce. beginning as fo] lows: The point ca n if worlds where alternative ly X happens be are put argued semanti cal ly, exclude d then so are adjacent wo rlds where Xis poised to happen. The comp li cat lon of the simple form is required for two reasons. nuclear war obta i n. However t he required c onditional form can be derived form, is through only c onditionall y threatened , i.e . the f ollowing wh ic h is pe rf ectly general , X if argument:- c. should certain cond itions particular, (of §§3-4) LSN oppo si. tion has struck, or not , and so wrong when it wrong, 44. so a lso is simple if it weren't it wouldn't (The converse route fails arg uments the Observe, furthermore that if something Xis have b en wrong in the first place. ear lier from su bstitute for X in the simple form, wrong, it is a l so wrong under restrictive co nditions; by Firstly , threatening X if C, war has. of course.) In is wrong whether the Hence, where X is More generally, to e sta blish CG it is Ramsay's formula tion of simplified CJ is considered in Wal zer, p.272. It i s this principle especially that forces Ramsay, a Protestant theologian who is a nuclear hawk , int o the awkward position he ends in, whi c h as Walzer explains , really leaves no room to move. For in virtue of slmp li.f led CJ H must he allowed that the threatened wars are permissible to carry out. Ramsay tries to limit these to military exchanges. But to be effective as a deterrent, Lhe exchange permitted must both threaten and also, i.n view of CJ, not threaten nonmi.lit ary targets, collateral oon-cornbata nt populations . It appears that Ramsay's position, if worked out, wou1d be inconsi.sten t. S!mpllf1cd pri nclple CJ 1.£ nlso invok<'d by the US Catholic Bishops: se PL, p.316. They put the point both in terms of threat and of declared "i.ntent to use nuclenr we apons, which they pronounce morally wrong. Ho wever s implifi ed CJ is rejected by Hare and Joynt (pp.106-7), who want to nssess Lhe moral stntus of u threat by way of expected utility. This is open to Rll the objec tions to expected utility as a test of morality mentione d below. 29 enough to e sta blish the s i mpl e r If Xis wron g s o i s a n int e nsion t o do X. CG'. The s e cond com plic ation in C3, modifying the threat to ca us es more t roubl e . a serious threat, Some modi f ica tion a ppears required, because it is often contend e d tha t empt y t hrea t s or bluff a r e wa rranted on occasion even whe r e is t l1r e o.tene d what l . i s wrong , to prevent t,1c occ urrence o f som et h.1 ng worse .11 s A"n d 1.n f ac t one wny o f tr ying to vi ndica te de te rrence , a s morally permissible , has been by pre se nti ng de t er rence as lnvo lv ing thr eats which do not involve any i nt en tion at all to pr oceed t o action on plaus ible Lhrc a t s . removes i t the support bas i s for of threats. s i mpl i f ied CJ. Insofar A seri ous th r eat th e n, in the slJ ghtly t echnic a l. sense co nditi on s, is con s i de r a accide nt . intended, For the challenge grossly immo r al unconvincing, case wh e r e conduct under certain not and calls for moral double-think. ci rcum st ances th e result from improbable To bring this an intricat e Eithe r the threat is followed through, automatically (as ordered, by Doomsday Mac h in e c ircui try, etc.) or w1th further choice, or - somehow Eit her not . is in ef fect tha t it is perfectly morally permissible to issue serious thr ea t s to under t a ke out is Principle CJ is not ope n to the same c ha l lenges as sJmplified a nd unqualified CJ. says this Hence the shift to serious one tha t i s no t a pre t ence, empty or a blu ff , but credible. which as it is way the out c ome is morally wrong, in the first case obviously , in the s e c ond cas e be cause the intermedia te reconsideration makes it plain that the thr eat nor ought not to have been issued at a ll, be ing justifiable on neither mo r al more .. pra ctic al " rep r es e n t atives grounds. Further more, while states thei r and ma y accept moral double at t itudes, such as morally assenting to immor a l threa t s, les s corrupt agents cannot: it moral principled agents they ar e or take natu r es , to t he kinds of th emse l ves to be ( a s Benn exp lains). i nsignif i c ant mora lly would run For su c h agents , who may counter to comprise their a not proportion _ of the electorate of a nuclear state, principles such a s CJ are no t in doubt. The a r gum e nt agai nst nu c le a r deterr e nce using C3 is as follows:- Either th e --- ---- ---- - - -- - - For a di sc us s ion of threats whe r e the threatener has no intention of ca r r ying ou t t he threat, or inc e ntive to do so, see Schelling, p.JSff . The quest ion of t he mo r ality of th e s e threa ts, where the item threatened is i.m,-,, or a l , ca n be left ope n. 30 t.hrcnt involved then is it Ln deterren ce is ser .!. 1);..i1.. or l t is m 1 t, inadequ ate. s o deterren ce is no Lhen by CJ deterren ce depcn<l is wrong . The maintain ed. sub-argu ment on se ri ous threats is a practica l one: Lf it s no t seri ous Bu t if i t j s ser io us that nu c l ea r dete r re nce name l y , that if the t h rea t s were not serio us , but merely gave the lmpressi o n that they would be fo l lowed thro ugh , then the op posit ion would flnd out, in one way or a nother. could not be entlorseJ i.n an open or democra tic polit i ca l wi LhouL A policy of bluff system , f or examp l e, coining some discussi on, and so giving the game away to the oppos iti o n . Even i n close d non-demo cratic systems maintain ing such a po licy weapons , espec ially informa lion would clown during l i kel y times escape the of there would be ma jor di f fic u l t ies i.n chains of c ommand i nv olved wit h nuc l ear change through in gov e rn ing el i t es , a nd the op pos itio n i ntellige nce. But then , since t he bluff could be called, deterren ce wou ld no t ha ve su c ceede d . Ther e a re as we l l ot her argumen t s t hat the thr ats invo l ved mu st he s e r io u s. On e is t hat nucl e ar d terrcnce already faces a cred i bility probl em , namely tha t do ubts a bo ut the r ationa lity of carry i ng out t he big nuclea r t hre a t weak e n th e c r e di bil ity essentia l. to its effec t iven ess . To be effec tive then i t mu s t be s e r i ous ( c f. Benn). Meeting obj ec tions t o pri ncip l e C3 leads on t o two fur t he r ve r sions of one centred on intent io n , one on commitm ent. CG, Princ ip l e CJ is int1ma t e ly linke d with , and it some times co nside r ed bu t a variant upon , t he pr i ncipl e C4 . If Xis wrong then t o conditio nally intend to do X [kn owing it is wrong ] is n!so wr0ng. The' prJrcJpl cs arc intimate ly a ssoci at ed because a th ea t is, ac c ordi ng t o die tionarie s, etc . ' . of 'a d claratio r of intent to 1nfU.c t puni shment, l oss , injury, It i s their intercon nect i o n which lies a t the bo t t om of deter rence, which in tend ing to go to war . princip l e , th a t turn 0 11 C4 is s ome pa r a doxes the prob l em of c red ibly t hrea tening war wi thout Princ i ple C4 is j us t i f i e d th rough th e s i mplified inte ndi ng to do wrong j_s wr ong, a nd s o al s o i s i nte ndl ng to do wrong unl es s favoura b le circums tanc es f o r one' s p inc.iple some an ex tr emel y position prevail. Si mplif i ed wi del y assumed mora l thesis, 46 perhap s for the excellen t reason that it holds a nalytica lly. Its ela bo ra t io n C4 can be us e d to Jl agains t nuclear deterre nce , ea follows : argue siQ ~a pfoce eding to LSN war when the Qnemy duly misbeha ve s is wrong (by §§J-4) , by C4. intendi ng to go to LSN wa r when the enemy duly misbeh aves is also wrong . Nuclea r deterre nce involve s such an intenti on, all the availab le evidenc e shows. He nc e nuclear deter rence is wrong. But like virtua lly every utilita rian princip les utiJita rian grounds . deontic t hems e lv es , princip le , princ i ples For it is not difficu lt to except thos e flowing from CJ and C4 c a n be challe ng ed on outline str a tegic situati ons wher e mnxlrnum ex pected utility result s from a poli cy of nuclear det e rr ence. But on il s own this conces sion casts but little doub t upon C4. For it likewis e fs not princip les C3 difficu lt t o ou tli ne situati ons where the hanging oE innoce nt people , or other injusti ces , are sa nctio ne d or enjoine d by maximum expe cted a nd utility . pu rsuit Those who appeal to utilita rian assump tions try t o avoid suc h more obvious di fficult ies with .elianc e upon utilita rianism , scrappi ng the sp ots not by doctrin e, bu t by hedging app licatio ns of their princip les around with quall ficatio ns , whic h, they hope , will trou bl e of wit h utilit a riani sm. enable So .i. t them to evade the worst is with Kavka, whose work ni ce l y illustr ates that whatev er (little ) deterre nce has in its mo r al f avour depend s upon uti.lita rian ass umption s . Kavka 'bcgin[ s ] by no t ing that any reas ona ble system of fwbst,r ntial 1itil.ita ri a n e l ements ' (PD, p.287). consequ e n tia l elemen ts systems incl ud e must infiltr ate, an with the ' ass umption if Eve n observ atio n were correc t - it is nox, dep e nding f or one e thic s thing this upon must hav e astonis hing confla ting utilita rian - it would not follow that reasona bl e particu lar that assump tion produce s normat ive assump tio n involv e d is that t he a ct Kavka thereup on t ries the paradox es of · deterre nce'. wi t h maximum expecte d to The utility '( the most useful ac t) should be performe d whe never a very great deal of utility - - 46. ·•---- ---- - Ka vka , who labels simpli fie d C4 the Wr ongf ul Inte ntions Princip le (PD , p.289 ), attri butes th e princip le to Abela rd, Aquina s, Butler, Bentham , Kan t, Sldgwi. ck, Kenny and Narveso n. Ka vka also gi ves reasons as to why the pr i nciple ap pe ars 's o obviou sly tr ue'. Kenny and others apply C4 to argue, like the US Cathol ic Bishop s , that ' nuclea r deterre nce is immora l' (cf . Kavb p.29 1 ). It is the clas h of C4 with certain utJ li tarian princip les (espec iall y the maximi sation pr inc iple of p. 28 7) that directl y genera tes Kavka 's f irst paradox of dete rrenc e and l ies behind his other "parado xes'' : see PD. . , •" . 12 i.s s t. a ke ' ( p .Z87). :;t obj ec tions as This as s um p t io n is ope n to es s e n tia lly the same ba t c h ut il i taria nism i self: it is mainl y a mat t er o f i ncre a sing or vary! ,1g the s t okes i nvol ved s uf ficient l y in a y co unte r examp l e . usud l stratc ~y of of Kavka tries t he weakening a nd fudging the nor mative a s s umption to a voi d the ~o r sl pro bl e ms of distri butive i n justice , and t he like , t hat max i mising u t i lit y can mora l ly e njo i u. But the c ru cial defect in Ka vka ' s argume n t l ies fo l Low fr om t he normative ( p . 28 7) • 11 7 what ov erridde n by C4 s u ppo sed u t il i t a rian to a ssumptio ns ' Though Kavka tends t o a pply t he fudg ed normat iv e as sumption s in thi s way, as If it domina ted C/4 ( see e s pe c ia lly p , 29 0), wh a t and is assump t i on howeve r fudged, namely that ' t his mea ns o t he r mo r al ass ump t io ns a r e t h at .•. in produce , situa t i on s , are whe n moral c ombi ned dilemmas . in si tu a t i ons These are not s uc h th e f udg ed as sump ti on as special de t e rr e nt c a ses where one decnti c pr inc ipl e , tl1a t yie l ded by ut i l i t a r ian i sm , ove rrid e s o t hers, but wher e t he r e ar e c ompe ting, ev en c nt ra d ic tory de ont ic pr inc i p l e s , such a s tha t it int e nd right to to pro c eed to LS N war whe n t he e nemy mi sbe ha ves (on specious u til i tarian gr ound s ) and. also wrong to i n te nd to do s o ( by C4) . wr ong : that judg ement is not ov e rr i den. Nuc lear de t e rr e nce is also t he case is t hat in r emai ns Nor do es it in any way foll ow that C4 i s in 1eed of qu a lifica ti on as a r es ult (Ka vka' s a ssump t ion, what is th e~e s pe cial p.290) . situations, Howeve r , t her e ar e count e r vall i ng u t ili t arian cons i dera tions s ugge sti ng different imperatives . For .ln t he s e is wrong . s pe c i a l ci rcumst a nce s a greater uti l:lty can be realised by doing what Howe ver it is ha rdly ne ws, but a standing objection, that ut ili t a ri a nism some time s en joins wl1at is wron g . Spec ial s pons on s hip de t e rre nt may appea r s itua t i.on a, where under ntl lit a ri a n t o get a foot i n t he moral door, ar e very speci a l. char a c ter is ed by Ka vka , the y a r e s uch that t he 47 . deterrence de t e r r e nce is very likely As to Lacke y ' s utiljt a rian app ro ach r e s t s on o similar fallacy, that u ti litari a n cons iderations predom~n a te wher e s t a k es are larg e enough: see hi s argument f or the ;i pp ro nch in MM p. 192 . Wha · hap p n s i s not that importa n t c ons quenc es ov e rrid e moral principles, but tha t Applica t ion of one pr inc iple wit h important consequence s conflic t s with t hat of ano t he r pr inci pl e wi t h less s i gni f i cant consequence s, and in the we igh-·up of what t o do in t he pro blemat ic circumstanc es the principl e with impor ta nt con s eq uence pr evai l s . sucr<"£:d , and nothing else .i s likely tp lodc ed in a deep pr.obability-well. This is ve ry far removed from the real world su.:, ceed (see p . .2~16), i.e. si.tuat.J.on whe re nuc lear deterrence appears to be increasing the deterrence probabiU.ty is of LSN wRr, and where other procedures such as graduated nuclear disarmament are at least as J.ikely to succeed as deterrence . that <l1~ont <: principles sllbject Even if it were mistakenly to real-life d .1 .lcmmas should be qualified to avoid di.l mmas, there is little point in qualifying working such RS supposed de ontic principles C4, given the remoteness of the special deterrent situati ons. Instead of pul ling nuclear deterrence down though the immoral inte nt:lons it involves, it can be criticized more broadly throug h the commitments it equi. r es, by wa y of the following principle: CS. If Xis wrong then a conditional commltment to carry out Xis The reason is that the commitment is a commitment circumstances; and that commitment is to act itself wrong . lso wrong. wrongly in cer-tain Nuclear deterrence is however a poli cy which commits states to war under certain conditions . And as wi th conditional intention, so with conditional commitment, there is no doubt th a t su perstates and controlling commitmen t and their intention to use representatives nuclear weapons. did not occur) is enough to establish the relevant The dangerous strategy of launc h-on-warning (which could , for instanc e , result J n a thut have response to attacks the point, for which there is otherwise quite s ufficient factual evidence. Now the connecting principles suffice logically , but are nucl ar deterrence, for weighty principle would detachment from the by complete preparat i on fo r and Deterrence of this type is wrong. also reveals why the suggestion, that the morality of the whole deterrence trip depended on war itself never occurring, was so parad ox ical: det e rrence. ir self By case . i nstance conditi.onal comm.ltment to LSN war, is wrong. This sound wh n all are liable to be disputed, several defensible ones, ideally in concert, make for a principles one applied: it ou t the connections between and not be engaged in (unl ess i ts ha s appeared nuclear war and nuclear Nuclear deterrence should not be practised given that should chang ed, e.g . left bizarre nuclear war direct ion can be drastically at .least limited, per impossibile in the case of nucl ea r warfare, to purely mi l i t ary targe ts). Til e a rguments t hrou gh conn e cting pr i nc i. ple s, can be reinforced by different sort s of ar gument s agai ns t the mo ral c orre c t ne s s of nuclear deterrenc e . a n 1 a r g uments from lim i ted c~nv erge nc e of et h i cal t heori e s I There wh i ch start from the commonplace ob se r va ti o n that ~ All the ethi c al a t"gum ents in favou r of nuclear deterrence are broadl y ut ilitar i an. In f nct roost of the arguments i.n favour of de t e rrence, including many t hat inf iltra t ed hav e the e thi.c a l l i t erature , ar e those of ge ner., l ly drawn f rom game t heory, and primar :tly intere sted in the one playe r, t h r> USA. Utilitar ia nism , t hough s till looking of those expedie ncy -· advantage of basically at ~dva n tages , i n t e r es t s and ( t ypi ca lly ind i vidual) utilities, has to take a partisan pain of posi t io n, a nd consider [ or[eiti ng i ts claim t o mor a lity sup po r t t d by o t he r na tional i ties othe rwi s e . The as well, commonplace on less observation is the fa c t that such qual i fied moral support as deter rence obtains, dflrive s from ut il i tarianism. 118 Th e re a r e two d ir e c tions on to a gene ra l cla1m ag a i.nst de terrence, either by wa y of t h e pro- ut il itar i an theme Uti l ita r ianism properly a pplied also comes out against deterrence or, 1n o r e s t rongly, by way of the a nti- utilt t arion t heme , Utilita r la nism doe s not furnish satisfactory moral arg uments. The n , by t h e ;rnti. -utilitarian theme, there are no satisfactory in f av our d ir ec tion: 48 . of de terrence. moral arguments Na turally, it would be easy to strengthen the second a ft e r all it is widely thought that u tilitarianism is a false, Thu s t he hed g ed utilitarian defences of Kavka and of Hare and J oynt, and a l s o within th e broadly utilitarian r ange , of Gautier . Showing that cogent de f ence s of nuclear deterrence have to take a util i tarian r ou te would he a much t oug her ent e rprise. Though it is a reasonable conjecture that the e n te r pr i se c ould be carried through, much would depend on what was · cc oun t e d cogent. For ce rtainly biz ar re principles, e.g. obverses of the conne ct ing pr incip l es, · can be i ntroduc ed, which afford deontological routes t.o deterre nce . An,l, rl e spi t r some back sliding by bi s hop s , all other ethical positions can be m., d c to "' penk again s t deterrence and i. t s cont.l.nuntio n . • A deontological ~RRC ngnln At dctc rr c nc · , pr ima rily he way of <lcontic connecting pr i ncip l e s, has been a rgued i n some detail. In the light of these prlnciplcs , Lt i s not difficul t to s e e how c a ses from other ethical positi ons would go. After a ll C4 ha s been defended from a wide range of stanc es , e.g . contra c t ua l, natural law, utilitarian even. seriousl y as tray, or even shabby ethic~ ] pg&ition. pol it i ca l s yst em whic h depends in some uL l l lt:arJan a rgum e nts for its policieo. It hardly does measure then for a upon consensus , to rely on Yet with nuclear de.terrenc e just thnt appe;1rs to be happe ning, with readily ove rturned arguments at that. For whether even utilitari.a nism supports deterrenc e depends ess entia lly on: how it ls applied; with which maximisa tion recipes; along with what other r estrictiv e assum pti ons (such as those of a deep probabili ty-well); genc>rous arc utll i.ty· assignmen ts or upon With different (and · a rguably superior) va rying the guestimat ion methods, very differen t results emerge, oppo sing deterrenc e and favouring unilatera l nuclear disarmame nt. 49 basic reas on for this is straightfo rward (and like that ending §4). LSN war has a n extremely large negative utility. deterrenc e out to whi.c h increases th other recipes of feasible a how for such things as preservat l on of national sovereign ty , nationa l security, etc. assumptio ns , and on Any policy such The It is that as nuclear probabili ty of this, or even risks it , must los e alternati ves, conseque ntialist type whatever are initially applied (e.g. plausible decision Minimax, Dominance , Di.s as ter Avoidance , Expected Value) . The anti-ut ilitarian theme can be def ended either by a full-scal e criticism o[ ut j lltaria nlsm, beginning for instance with its well-know n justifica tion of l ocalised In justic e s , SO or else 11t i l i tarla ni sm when applied One obvi.ous dcflc iency is this: by to addressin g s ome of the inadequac ies of issues like that at hand, nuclear deterrenc e. on standard util itarianism , what to do , whether to proceed with deterrenc e, depends on the probabili ty of its success and on the improbabi l ity of other options working. deep, uti ~itarlanis m If the deterrenc e probabili ty-well is morally requires deterrenc e, otherwise not. 51 But what is morally required, or wrong, does not fluctuate with what outcomes are pro babl e. 49. Th e ins ab ility of utilitari anism is illustrate d by the discussio n inv olving KovkR, Lackey and Hardln, continued in Philosoph y and Public Affairs 12(3), 1983, where, on the basis of utilita r ianism, diametric ally opposed conclusio ns are reached. (Hardin 's approach tends however to expedienc y reasoning of the strategic type.) 50. Such wider critic isms of utilitaria nism, in all its forms, as an ethical theory are too well-know n to repeat. Some of the main defects are considere d in another article in this series, 'An expensive repair kit for utilit arl.an ism'. The point that util:Ltari anism gi ves no firm place to stand comes from L, Mirlin. 36 wheLh<'r deterrence i..s moraJ.ly wrong or not, i. s likPly to work or not. indepe nde nt deterrence are decidedly essentially nowhere i.s Moral princi p~s not are through expected Vf.llues, whether utilities or o th e rwis e - though how ba d :rnme outcome is ma y be . depend .Lt If nuclear deterrence is wrong wher e it increases the probablllty of war, the n ls it wrong, simpllclter . det:crmlne<l whcrhc r of upon firm to stand. Wor s e, si nce the expected utilities in the case uncertain, these a nd of the results util i ta r ianism delivers uncert ainty measures> util itari anism off ers In con t rast wi t h the soli.d deo nti c ground of principle , utilitariani sm provide s only shifting s and. The objections made apply esp eciall y aga ins t act uti l ita r ianism. (orm shows at special int e rests, such as conditions security (the of estimation rules are pulled in). probability- well state , have hi gh 1s deep , utilities, nat io n- s tat e and spe cial It does not yie ld a deterrence polici; ind eed hnrdly yields policies. tall (other than act utilitariani sm it s elf ). 11nd certain othe r diff i ulties may be avoided by considering instead a o[ act most that nuclear deter re nce is "wrong" a c c ordi ng to its l ig ht s under very il The acts. 52 But the method lacks sta bi lity; These seque nce di f fe r en t prescription s will res ult dependi11g upon how the sequence is se l ected, what is inc luded and what left (as also associa ted p obabilit i es depend crit ically on the sequence selected). No unequivocal rec ipe is delivered. selected out to To see this, suppose the sequence is include worst cases , for instance cases where deterrence fails a nd war breaks out. In this event it can hardl y be argued that deterrence is t he pol lcy that maximizes u til it y ov er the sequence. Along wit h the argument s, there are dissatisfac tion with nuc lear deterrence. other concom.itant conventiona l wa rs . f or Firstly, the peace it has provided 011l y nuclear pc~ce, or rather lack of nuclear war , as the re smaller-s cale reasons is no deep is s hort age of And the "peace " provided is a t best a tenuous pe3ce, which Is not stable , ~ut liable to upset at any stage by a r ange of 51.. Though this is to oversimplif y, the po int s made ar e not affected by the simplificat ion . In any case the simpl ifi ed picture reflects well enoug h the difference s between Kavka and Lacke y that matter in their debat e (ref rred to in footnote 49 ). 52. Whether thjs is rule util itarianism , or still act util i tariani sm the sequence can be construed as one long ac t, may be left open. becaus e - - - -- - -- - - - - - · - 37 fn,t_0 rs, lncl 11d1ng er rot· , both human and t ec lrn1 .:fl.1, j)C:lc (_~ , p 0:i It thofl not offer genu i ne of the sort re riuir e d fo r a stabl e intec nat.lo nal 1. 1. fe, but only o fragi l e ·e o f a sort" (PL , p.316 ). Secon dly, there enorm ous is cost, mora l -~!_p_po r_t_~.r~~ _: ___ cost of de.ter renc_ ':_, be cause expe nditu re on it exclu des othe r urgen t moral prio ritie s. The US Bisho ps put th is fami liar poin t, in a surpr ising ly Marx i st way, in terms of destr uctiv e capac i ty and what 'the ls contr a dic tion ne e ded f or betwe en what cons truct iv the is spent for devel opme nt' ( PL, p . 316) . §6. Prac tical , prude ntial and more mora l arg umen ts from natio nal dange rs nuclr•ar build -up of the supe rstat es , a nd the gene sis of nucle ar dilem mas. to Whil e there are argum ents to the immo ra lity of nucle ar war prepa ra ti on, there are also counr c ·-arg ument s, that have prove d rema rkabl y persu asive (espe ciall y to Amer I c;wi, ), to the mora l just:!.fiab ili ty of nucle ar war pr e para tion in the _p_!.c s':~- circu mstan c es. The unde rlyin g style of argum ent is simpl y an elabo ratio n, or state -upl ift, of Liw1- for the esca lnti on of weapo ns at the local leve l, for acqu iring a gun or f o r s to c king- tip the neig hbour hood armou ry - and every bit a r gu1r.e nt from local dang ers. dom inati on ; a nd dubio us fir st of all seco nd of nucle ar destr uctio 11 . atom ic s urren der and so avoid the destr uct io n' (Wal zer, p.273 ). prepa ratio n is suppo sed to guard again st more than these ; third eleme nt , name ly, loss of basic rig hts there with these . black mail of forei gn appea seme nt In fact nucle ar is ways a cruc ial of life This furth er set of elem ents is linke d to the dange r of forei gn domi natio n - which is reall y a separ at e eleme nt from risk of Thoug h and (free dom, equa lity, etc .) and fund amen tal value s (upho lding of truth , human dign ity, etc .) and int eg rat ed that The two go toget her, sinc e lf we dtcl not f ea r the black mail , we migh t adop t a polic y or as It is that nucle ar prepa ratJo n, 'so we have be en tol d , gua r ds again st the doub le dang er: forei gn as black mail. dom inntl on -need not imply the loss of most basic value s it does imply the loss of a t le a st of one , self- de te rmin ation , freed om to choos e vario us natio nal objec tives ; conv ersel y loss or erosi on or infri ngeme n t of basic value s can occur witho ut fo re ign demi. natio n, for insta nce, as is comm onpla ce in the "[ r •e " world, by internal change of go,wnmtent or irnvij,fnroenta l approach, through the iiicrc>nsed security and contro l a nti clcnr prepnratlon incr easi ngly nuclear risks, state demands, extensive etc. But what nuclear destruction, also involves loss of basic rights and values, through destruction ti, _ material of 53 of the cherJshed life-style. So nuclear preparation is hardly n c l earcut bnse me ans of guaranteeJng basic values. 51• fn other respe cts too t he argument from loss of lncku cogency an d rings ho 1 low, It is basic values and ri ghts hnrd to avoid th' f •cling r:hnt tl1c: oft-appealed-to basic values often function as something of a front, like ci tati.o n of religious values at politica l ceremonies; clean cover for economic consideration of one sort from demand s of the military-indus trial of private wealth and vnl \les appealed to category: in and anot he r, them having However arising to do with th e an argument isn't, or associations. And the rights and But not all the values commonly appealed to fall into particular nationalistic ones do not. And one of the main a l leged values of deterrence, the resistance to and containment or many are, most:ly, of the utmost importance, indeed fundamental, and worth much sacrifice . this of power. oughtn 't to be, defeated by lts unsavoury that t he argument 1.s a omplex , many concerned with foreign domJnatiun of other lesser states, and many conccut ·at:1.on pious of "communism" of "socialism ", can hardly be accounted fundamental, any more than retention of cnpi talism. communi.sm has What has been happened here confused with of course (the t o tal i tarianism, which does remove certain more freedoms (of opinion , association, is reality basic information, that ( the of) state values, etc., ideal socialist namely etc.), of) and certain so does derivative~ threaten basic values. One critical q uest i on, then, is whether extens ive nuclear LSN wa r, and indeed for rational way of preservtng nuclear those holocaust, fundamenmtal preparation for is a good or effective or even values, which we have left. 53. The converse obviously does not hold. Basic values and cherished life-style can be lost without nuclear destruction, or nuclear preparation, as when a more powerfuJ state imposes its values and way of life. 54 . The argument from freedom , advanced by Jaspers and repeatedly rolled out by state representatives , is further conside red early in Appendix 1. .... , 'lQ J, Simi la r ci. ue s tions dominntion and arJs e as regard s blackmail. argumeq;; H from er, e Justification danger which is itself open questioned (i n §8 ), both from the to ser i ous point foreign of the methods of extensi ve nuclear preparation depends essent i ally on an arrangement of hostil e structure of of question, v iew of nation and basic states, a i s subsequently valu s, such as freedom, and oth r wise. But whether ul tima tely jusU(ied or dangers are no t, t hese from natlonal those that have been taken to morally underwrite extensive nuclear prcpnration, and jus tific, tlon. have They been have par t of many people ' s accepted in moral by policy outlook. particular , that ex tens i ve nucle ar however , the makers as affording moral fact be e n wide ly accepte d, and undoubt e dly form Wi thi n frnmework the moral justification holds good . others, ar gumen t s arguments not a c onv entio nal Northern It i s within such a fram ewo rk, in preparatio n do such engenders establis h a moral fix. For the morality of extensive nuclear preparat ion, but only make a prudential case for such preparation. people not also face a nucl e ar dilemma, but, though evaluative in character, it ls specif ically moral one. ,1 impressed by And for ma ny other s again, who are who not so or as familiar wi th Soviet and American culture and ways of life, and thci.r r espec tive r ights and freedoms, there is no serious dilemma. peop)c Such live beyond For such the "beneficial" reach of t he supers t ates , prudenti al counter-arguments from national dang ers carry little weight, and the moral case against deterrence is not offset but stands unchallenged . Thls is the ge nesis of the argument fr om isolated people who live in people. Consi de r some a comparatively remote a rea, whose freedoms are not (yet) under threat from superpower expansionism, but whose lifestyle is put at risk by nucl~ar d ter r c nce (a s under pr inciple Cl). For such isolated people, who may ha ve little interes t i n the preservation of nuc lear states , there is no nucl ea r diJ emma , and nuclear lo cations may have problems problems people. as deterrence to natio nal is wro ng. dangers, genuine People in less fo r tu na te but in meeting these they are not entitled to impo se grave risks on the uninvolved isolated In doing so i mmorally; and f or through similar nuclea r reasons deterrence , superstates the are proceeding conventi onal No rthern framework is j_mpug rwd. conclusion can be al ter n ' tlvely -c t>rl c hc<l Tht'. same argument:: put a reflective i s olat e d pe rson, and check S! 11 ci> Amer ican the or- resulting by a substitution Russi.an 1n the position of such an asse ssment of nuclear deterrence. IL wor Jd be th e snm c as that of n reflecti ve isolated person, stripped o f m1p, rs lntc bins, moral ly opposed to de terr ence and not rnot·all.y transfixed, t h <~ c onventional framework fails t o sati sfy requirement s of morality. The outcome of the arguments fr om dang e rs is, the~ ver y different depending whc her on the arguments are appU.ed as rega rds a superstate or not. The superstate theme which emerges is, in brief, SST. Because o f multiple connected dang e rs from other states which have nuclear weapons, a state - any state that is too large to rely upon other states - is obllged to invest in at least matching nuclear weapons. Henc e, by detachment, a super- nation-stat e, such as USA, ought to have something Jn orde r t hP meet of the nuclear armoury that it has. Or, weakening the theme to ol.Jjecli on s concerning excess, "overkU.l" capacity, it retain i1 t l east solid a ou~ core of the nu c 1ear devices it has. (moretlly] to For su bs equent argumc~nt it can be left open whether the oblig-'¾tion involved is a moral one, for inst a nce be cause of the character the of pro r·c·c tcd, or only (as nrg ued a bove) one of g rou nds to those di. sa rmame nL supporting ag ainst a the dangerous SS reason 55• prudent:ial the me nuclea r Northern values supposedly being On similar it can be argued that unilateral opponent would be prudentiall y Jrralto nal. It will be fr ely admitted that what is prudentiall y or morally requir ed is a s11 hopLimal st rategy , li.ke the famili.a r strategies of the prisoners ' dilemma si tu a tions and of certain related competitive games . that a su peri or would be cooperative For expen sive , re source s, dr ai ning of such t he details are wel l- enoug h kno~1. 55. admitted arrangement s. Cooperation and be better not merely in removing the nuclear dilemma, but in a ra nge of other r espects . future be strategy for nuclear adversaries , if sufficient trust and the lik . could be achif?Ved , would agreeme nt So it should arrangement s would be much less risky , destructive of the environment , a nd so on; However for the present and the foreseeable the prospe cts of cooperation a ppear - so we are repeatedly told by state It can stil l, a nd presumably does, amount to more than mere local expedi e ncy, s ince the 'freedom of Europe' is part of what is at issue. rcprcscnlat lve s , who are (not always ~ ltt t~gly ) helpin~ unfortunate ly rather remote: only the ca make their polici es sure insurance is ex t e nsiv e nu c l ear preparntion and full preparednes s t o 3pply nuclear force. At least this is so where one is a superstate : proceed, largely unabated . nuclear preparation Where one is not a superstate , but a lesser state one must, the r e presentativ es continue, _t::_':l..l_ on a larger ally who has a one's a rsen a l, umbrella. nu c l ear pre paration , th e lA ck of trust d l splaye d, ,md for huddl es conf l.dencc in !ts and which under co ntrast s ncouragcd elsewhe r e . st·at (• , one whic h r.clics for i ts nuclear grrH1nd one anoth e r's But he r e a level of tr ust and coope ration is_ called for, by dep0 nd ent states, which is far from foolproof, with nu clear in s uranc e (which is pres umably not fre e ) is obtained indirectly thr oug h some supcrstate 's nuclear COVt!r super-· ally Does a "d epe nd ent" on a s 1pc r -a lly, rather tha n strangely have that exchange on its territory? mu ch Jt s ally's opponen t ? Confidence, for instanc e , that its ally will not r e nder i t a ta rget or nuclear must stag e a Given the pr ocliv i ty of states , especia ll y l arg0 states, to res ort to expediency, and give n the recen t histo ric al record of superstates and t heir leaders , too much fait h would be mi spl ace d . Thus, whatever th e l imited force of t he argume nt f or the superstat e it <loes theme , not extend t o the analogous them e for a dependent state, which d if fers f rom SST nnd end s as follows: DST. Because ... , a st a t e without adeq uate (or any) nuclear weapons is obliged to r e ly upo n a s u pe rstat e ally , and within that arrangement , to accommodate t he facilities and nuclear in stallations of the protecting ally . ln pa r t for reaso ns already given, principle DST is not very plausible (a nd same goes for mo re obvious variants upon it ). Nor do the arguments of f ered for SST t ranspose parti cularly well to direct arguments striking l y illu str ated by the case the for DST. 56 This is more of more remot e nuclear dependent states. Consider the a rgument from basic values, for instance , from the angle of nuclear dependent Australia. Basic values ln Australia are not threatened by, o r put in j eopardy through, the ac io ns or plans of the Sovi et Union. Nor ar e they thr eatened by the other superstate, t he USA, the only country with ' the physical 56. As ls widely known, inadmissi ble and usual l y much overrated considerat ions o f expediency frequently enter into reaso ns why states allow foreign nuc lea r facilit i e s upon th e ir territories , e. g. eco nomic consideratio ns such as trade or local revenue and short- term jobs. ca1 1acity to launc h mot j .ve Lo <.111y <l o look convincing . carries full scale invasion of Aust r alia ', but R wc .i ght. reasons In fact, the with a rgumen t from of For there arg ument t he only is qucstLonable non-n l lf~twd prnc.ticcs. of 58 domina tion In this way too) the from dang er of nuclear destruction could be nullified . such supe r state foreign li t tl e care, the pr e s e nt level of a economic and political dom i nati on could be much reduc e d. fore(• lack(ing] so , , so far . 5 7 CJ.ear ly the argumen t from basic values does nol For similar 1 it t le 'clearly danger because nuclear of umbrella, superstate dang er facilities and th e tha t would be removed wi th With 1 ess remot e dependent Europc 1rn states these sorts a rguments from nationa l dangers are only marginally more convincing , and may b e defeated along analogous lines . The differe nces in the situations of st ate s, and peoples, break theme the of a of monolithic West. differently situated This is a theme especially favoured by US and the Wes t European rep resentati ves, who present the West, its freedom, as t hr eatened by Soviet domin atio n. und i.ffrrentiatcd unit. dep1!nd0nL i;tntes with But this l eadi ng idea, NATO desig ne d powers , and In this the West is a single in and part to align lesser to justify pu tting them at nuclear rl sk is as muc h a my th as th e idea of the Golde n West. The West is not so monolithic, it ls not so comprehensive, some of it is not so free , much of it (i ncluding the Ant ipodes) is not thr eate ned by Soviet domination. Principle DST - li kewise what it dep ends upon , SST - is now coming unde r attack by Eu ropean disarmament groups , who c hallenge the core assumptions of the. und er lying retaliatory model that 0 Safety lies in weapons , More weapons i mply more. security59 , Cerlainly, for mo:ce :f.s ol ated states, such as New Zealand, safety from nuclear. a t ack l i es not in wea pons bu t in excluding nuclear facilities (including visit s from nuclear submar ines ) . Europe ans are ar guing in present of syslem is more a similar wa y, that the a ris k, indeed l ia bility, than a protection (e.g. 57. For t he quote d c laim, and some of th e Au stralia ' s Se curi ty , p .94 . 58 . The Jssuc is furt her pursued in Ap pendix 2. 59 . Sec, for exam ple, t he las t article in Thom pson. argument for it, s ee Threats to Thompson, p.251); envi s -1ged and thnt: w-ithou!: Lhcut.r e for a h\icJ. ,;,)ll'' instal1.st:!on1>i Europe cannot be limited nucle r wnr , in the way .l thf' is now seen by US ( ut not Soviet) strategists. Once the weapons assumptions are qu es tioned, other assumptions of the retaliatory model a nd its variants come up for examination, namely ci Whether the proper response to danger is armament, in particular o Whe th er tle proper response is through nuclear armament, as opposed , say, to other military responses, such as convent.ional arms, or, takin g off from the previ ous point, ~ Whcthrr military approaches and procedures (through ar e proper methods, armaments , etc.) or should be such dominant methods, of conflict resoLuti.on at the int er national level. It ls plausibly arg ued, against military procedures, that at no ordinary level do we sens5bly s et about meeting danger or settling disputes by acquiring lethal weapons and thr eatening to use them - except perhaps on an out-dated, and r e ally warranted, frontier ethics. This leads into the issue of alternative defence systems, a vital matter beginning to obtain the contemporary 60 and explana tion it deserves, questioning of the framework of but never one that already nation-states. While emphasis anticipates subsequent the state system is inrac · , force ls far from exceptional and military procedures are to be expe cted and are l LkcJ y ine vitnhl c. nation-state system ': For 'forc e has [a] permanent plac,~ in the thus Ramsay (on p.xv), who uses this as part of his very orthodox case for nuclear war arrangements. §7. Th resulting nuclear dilemmas for aligned st;:ites Ass~mbli.ng r eferred th~ to as themes the so far nuclear de v e lope d fix:- States war-deterrence, because (as argued in §J-§5 ) to engage jn war.-·deterrence , at l east 60. yields the both and their supporters. deontic dilemma. often ought not to engage in it is immoral, and also ought for prudential reasons (as Alternative defence systems were considered long ago in Mohists. For contemporary work on alter native systems , see su rvey in Sharp. There is in fact a considerable literature and social defence arrangemen ts, and a growing literature on i . e . convercd.on t o such arr angement s . argu ed using China by the especially the on non-violent transarmament, ·,,,,._ 44 SST and DST). tl w Th i s dilemma i.s no idle construction of virtues parac.onsisteot logic), but ( c onc octed 61 prod uced by war itself 62 , or at war and its version of the deon tic least war which spr.·eads beyond purely mjlitary la r gc ts, as larger wars in evi tably e . g. nuclear , a, wel l as bei ng virtu a lly ublqultous i.n nuclear war discu ssions. ThP nuclear fi.x 1s in part simply a mor e intense di 1 emma demonstrate a serious real-life dilemma, t he ouLJ.i n s of which are r e peatedly encountered i .n text s on asper.ts to do (since ra il t ra nsport , typically rely on ci.vilian ones) . military arrangeme nt s, The ma in dil emma arises from a combination of t he retaliat ory model with t he feat ures of war. War is requlr 0cl for defence of th e state and valu es it upholds (or pretend s to uphold); but war also invo lves imm oral ac ts and cv.tl co nseque nc es . war can undPr also ce rtain justified. be se e n as a t temp ting a rec onciliation by tryi ng t o show that ctrcumstanees Thus ' some these reall y ju tifications 0 evi l consequences Regis of war ' (Walls , p.260). accept ab l e than falla c ious ,symptotic are morally of war aim to show that a ctio ns deemed normally forbi dd en by moral ma nd ates are now pe rmissible the The doctrine of " ju st But this argume nts when perfo rmed under is no better or mor e morally for uti l itorianism as bein g corre c L \~hen the s takes are larg e . W;n· and preparedness for 61 . wa r als o gene rate s ubsidiary di.lemmas f or Thus Green, along with many others, ' find[s ] nucle a r deterrence the best of pra c tical policies available to us now •.. give n the realities of world politics ' bu t ' s till demur[ s ) because of mo ral qualms' (p . xii). Green also r e presents both Morgent hau a nd Halle as having 'rather agonisingly presented a • • . case for a deterrenc e strategy, even whil e asserting that the stra.tegy is morally indefensible according to the traditional et hical codes' (p.2 52 ). Walze r ends in a similar dil emma (he is committed to a str onge r a nd less qualif i ed form of it tha n he set s down): though it [deterrence ] is a bad way, there may well be no othe r tha t is practi cal in a world of sove reign and suspicious state s' (p.274) - an indictment of the state system that Walzer does not pur sue. Similar ly th e US Catho lic Bishops d :llemma; they s peak of ' th e dilemma of how to prev ent the use Fa s kius nn<l Dockrill and i n Benn terms of moral dilemmas. present the situation i n terms of a mora l political paradox of de terrence •.. the of nuclear weapons • .. ' (PL, p.3 13). In too the nuclear situation is pre s ent ed in Th e nuclear dilemma is of course not a dilemma for everyone, for those who think they have seen the clear admis sib i lity of deterrence, or differently for those who have seen through the argumen ts fr om nati onal dang e rs. But it i.s a dilemma for th ose locked into the conventional f r amework. 62. Situatior.s in war are als o a major so urce of moral dilemmas: see Routley and Plumwo od where several exampl es are gi ven. A general logic a l account of and theo r y of moral di.lemmas is elaborated therein. . ... inst;ince, a sevc t·e tensio n be tween freedom and difficult prohlcms au t ho f· t c y: 'one of th e ~0s t o[ war involv es defending a free society witho u t destroying the values that g ive it meaning and vali dity' (PL, p.324). The problems are greatly enhanced by modern nuclear arra ng emen ts. The nuclear fix not onl y i nt ensifies a nd complicates other d-Lle rnm:-is induc ed by t he co ntemporary s ov ere i gn s t at~ 63 , in particula r the dee p tension c betwee n national security and the ope r at ion o f libera l-democrati c arrangement s (sucl1 a ., " lnd.lvidual li.herty , popular control of institution s, etc) . othe>r more persona l subsidiary d i l emmas , ( poll U ca l) obl lgations to s for example (the question the extent of one' s a nuclea r stat e, and ro le-induced d Uemmas such as one's conf licting obligatio ns as a docto r or a nuclear res c•archer It also accentuates of politic a l obligation s armame nt s and processor or eva sion is their considered f urther in Appendix 2). At the more personal level, tha t of individual and group ac tion, the re several ques Ions to 'Wh, t. should my sta t e be disen tangled - questions di ffere nt from the key issu e be doing and influence, d epending on who one is. I do? 1 one Jives, - do?', on whi c h one may exert influences, i.e. in what l it tle There is not only the question 'What shou ld a question whi c h will have a quite different force de pending a nd ar e on whe re sort of stat e, where one wo rks, what one contr ols or on who on e ls and one ' s role s - but also the questions ' What sort of person do I wan t to be ?', 'What am I prepared to answer for morally?'. 64 Answe rs to thes e latter char a cter questions will feed back to influence those t o act ion-or ien t ed questions . Each of thos e questions c an , in gi ven situations, induce subsidiary dilemmas . The essential fea t ure of a deontic dil emma is that both A and the of A are wrong (or di ffe rently, pursu ing a nuclear def ence policy. obliga tory), negation for some suitable A, such as The place and essential role of deontic and 63. The nuclear dilemma is not alo ne re sponsibl e fo r these other dilemmas. T.arg -sca l e nuclear power generation, a nd other types of warfare and security ar rangements, also contribute. But a conflict of freedom and autho rity is already an outcome of the la rge central state. 64. For gro up formula t i on of t he que stio ns rep l ace 'I' by 'my group', etc. The l mpo rtnn ce of distilling ouL th e se qu•s t ions, and the moral und es ir a bility of r!Pt0rrr,n~0 fn terms of whnt: Lt docs to p oplc morally, are brought out Ln Benn , where however the issues a r e made t o l ook somewhat more separate than they are . moral d il emmas ure not l i t.t>r;,Lure f, !., • widely or well und er stood, p...." t'ticular]y __ e 1-1 ~ 1i in ca .1 Thi s l s par t ly be c a us e c urre ntly domin a nt e thic a l positlons lik e utilitarlnnism "annot at al l e asil y accommod a t e moral dilemmas or the data which giv•s to rise them but the n such positions do not r eally offer reporti ve acco11nU; of wr on~ an d obli ga_~_:!:_on anyw.-1 y. d i lemma doe Cont r ary t o utilitarian per ce pt:Lons a not neces s arily have any mo ral s olution , though there may be better a nd worse ways By 01t . wh c h assessments, contr a st f orm the with basis s uc h e thical theories , preanalytical oE se n s itive theories, do recognise mor a l dil~mmaa and reflect t he i r f e a tur e s. Reactions an f rom the res ponse s t hat a re c ha r ac t e ristic of deonti.c dilemmas fix. nuclear The r e 1<• an un s t end iness, an uncertainty a s to whnt to <lo , whJ.ch wny tu pr.occed , whl c h pr ind pl •n i n wa ter e d- down for m to temporary Thus , crutch . for as world' GG , that b st" j ethical RU;l1 ,)ps wt-o way a of neve r exerci s ing "mora lly ou r s J. n a morally-str a pped wor ld . fu nctor s peak moral A similar th e 'strictly mor;il Dete r r ence ha s a strlc tly temporary role but de t e er e nc: e th e c i rc um s t a nce s. de ter r .nc e, is be in a fallen to " second a acceptability ' object mus t cert ainly one str ictly and wrong, is of from th e conditional be to move beyond det er r ence, 'towards a optlon as to of what the to nucl ear do in Thus Wal z er, for example, s t r ugg les t o the conclusion though a "morally try to escape 'the paradox of deterrence', i.e. world free o f the threat of deterrence' (PL, p.317), out And can shift 'moral c ond i tional ' while a ccepta bi U.ty , good", responsibility d~t c rrcnce fix. ·s (as from good to a c ceptable) is made by the US Catholic of we gra s p examp l e , th e Bishop of London contends t hat the possession of nuclear wea pons 'whil e acceptable'' emerge neverthel e ss the policy to fix. awkward that war in the pursu e circumstances ( p .274) . 6 7 Howe ver as more than a n immediate stepping stone to a 65. There are exce pt i ons of course, e .g . i n the Catholic educated such as Sar t re; a nd Na ge l's f i nal example i s very instructive. For a fuller t h e or y of mo r a l dil emma s s ee howe ve r Routl e y and Plumwood. 66. Repo r ted in The Ec onoml s t; re pr i nted i n 1983, We ekend Magazin e p.2. 6 7. As a response to a moral dil e mma , Walz er ' s approach is perfectly in order logtcal ly. Tho se who, l i k e Be n n , ' f lnd i t ne ither coherent nor cceptable' hnvl! no t gras ped t he logic of mo r al di l emma s . The Australian, February 12-13 !i '.rnp erior pol Ley ~ nsscrabled (in sufficien tly it is §5-§6), a dt! cidetlly reasons of ·1 }-toor the opti_ n, sort reasons i'o r that are decisive already for those, outside the conventio nal Northern f r amework, who find no genuine of nuc le ar nuclear dilemma. To make matters worse the nuclear fix ls, furthermo re, stal1.:s' own mald.n&_. fix a It is not somethi ng they blundered into, by accident. initial nuclear jnvolveme nt was deli berat e l y c hosen, primarily by the Lhc escaJAtio n of In these respects the situation is like peop.1 e who deliberat ely let themselve s be invo lved in two incompati ble relations hips , and build up though and U.:, A, has by and large also be en deliberat ely chos e n, again mainly by the USA and the USSR in in teractio n. th:1 t The one there by. It is build-up. The fact i programme is t o be in addition to existing ( which are to Sovi et that the USA initiated nuclear armament, and has frequentl y l ed escalatio n, and apparentl y still does. esources myth, a some currency, that adoption of nuclear weaponry, an d nuclear in North Amerlca occurred on a defensive basj_s in response bui ld·-up, nucl~a · with onflJctin g obligatio ns generally agr eed The recent (1980) United to States' strategic be already in excess of Russia ' s , and which always have been so ) (Thompson , p.21) . The present dilemma , that many people fe e l acute ly, state policy, allies, and Naturally not the USSR policies. indicates especiall y that merely route by a taken advanced response to capita list t he nations, Soviets (or of USA and its NATO state socialism ). would not have been feasible without compleme nting And independe nt evidence, t l1 ere is then a direct outcome suc h as Soviet-Si no confronta tion, is a strong internal military dynamic in state socialist n.:.iti.ons . There is a t wo-way co nn ecti on between world political arrangeme nts nation-st.' .ltes and the nuclear f ix . arrangeme nts are an evident source of the nuclear situation is increa singly present wo rld polJU.cal structure . is widely promulgat ed .'.lrrangcm ents : it .is' seen On the dil emma as one hand, with t he these result through political that the i nd icat ing the inadequac y of the Indeed it is no longer a radical theme but that: the source of the nucl ear problem comes from state n world of sovereign states . • . which brought the wo.ld to the prese n t dangerous situation' ( PL, p,JlJ). nucJ.e11r fix tends to lo':.~ political arrangements into On th e other hand, th e the statist form, into arrangemen ts of an increas ing ly authoritarian and centralist cast. stutlst espoused purpose of nuclear weapons may be to kee p the and security, to defend national inter est s , reasons such as perpetuating the system advantageous of confrontation, st ate to (!), provid e but underneath there ore other sovereign st a tes and frame work the rlnd peace The military-indus t rial in ter ests, dependent state explo itation, and polit i cally favoured of inequa l ity it supports . The ~merg ing t heme is t he n that the ve ry nuc l ea r s i tuatio n arising from th e statist arrangements a nd interr e lations ( conomic ideologies , etc.) tends to , and is used to, lock a rr nngcme nl.s of s overeign where the pa ttern world states And zones of inter e st . t heme is a pi ecemea l pr a cti cal one . side the rivalries, into conflict i ng the present The argument to th1. s Consider first, the matter from the Soviet of nati ona l control and progressive military-economic reorientation common to all nuclear states is clearer . The threat from the West, whether it exi.sts or not (and in Soviet perception it certainly does) , has become a necessary legitimatio n for the power of the ruling elites , an excuse for their many ec onomic a nd social fa i lures , and an argument to isolate and silence critics within their own bo rders. In the West we have ••. care fully con trolled and se l ec tive release of 'offi c ial information ' (Thompson, p.20 ) . "We" in the West, e specially the Americans, also integrated with state appara tus, have, in forms increasingly the military-industrial complex, which is a major. benefi c iary a nd promoter of the nu c l eR r. arms race . 68 Secondly, there i s evidence of entrenchmen t of the arrangements, by th ing s S llCh as the SALT negotiation s ; shown there are f i xed s uperpower s an d a (growing) nucle ar club of nations all governed by a rule , partly held in place by deterrence . as flimsy negotiated set Connected with this , there are cases rev ea ling the fixing of zones of interest, such as the Afghanistan example. Soviet US i s 68 . of The invasion is not regarded as threatening US "vital interests", and so th e not over.duly worried about Afghanistan and its people. What was The role of the military-industrial complex in present US escalation is sketched i.n Cox. Marxists, with their dogma of economic determinism , would assign even more weight to this point. As some of them would free ly concede, a similar complex has figured prominently in USSR escalation. diff~rent, what it was worried a bout a nd made ~uc]d a r threat~ adj~c ~nt ~estcrn oil supp li es : concerning, were these lay within the US zone of interest (cf . th e d Lscuss ion in Sche ll, p.212). §8 . Ways out of nuclear dilemmas: results. in itia l political fall-out from the ethical Virtual ly all the ways are wa ys of limitat:i.on , and they all invol ve in one way or another limitations on nuclear arms or the way they are deployed, and limJt~tions on the thu s inevitable. and more or power s of states. Limitations on national sovere~.EX _~re The limitations may be reache d by agreement and negotiation , less voluntarily agre ed to 69 , or they may be imposed, or possibly worst of all, they may eme rg e from an ini.t i. al war. As with other fixes produced by there are suggested ways the structural ar rangements of states, ou t which do not interfere with these ac-rangemen ts, inter.stR-te approache s, and there a r.e ways which do seriously alter the struct ure nnd power ·elations extrastate approaches . of state s (and, in the limit, remove t hem altogether) , All the familiar , allegedly "practical" and "realistic" , attempt~ to resolve the nuclear problem, for instance disarmament by mutual arms limitations , etc . , are interstate ; sovereign state . The s ame goes (graduated) unilate ral disarmament . about the nation- state; they do not tamper with that sacred cow, the for les s "realistic" But in fact there is proposals, nothing or empi rical fact , is it part icula r ly a stable one. nor, and its replacement by alternat.ive arrangement s. as a We are certainly free - Jn more libera l states, it should be eve rywhere - to theorise a s demise sacred it is not a particularl y well justified political form; it js 1ot even a very long-standin g form of political arrangement ; matter very such as to its And nuclear dilemmas s houl d have e nc ouraged such reflection. 69. In principle it would be relatively easy for sta tes to agree to settlement of their disputes by less damaging a nd expensive contests than military ones, e.g. by contests of selected rep re sentatives, and not just through fiB l1Llng ln some form, but by contests of footballers , singers, da ncers, lawyers , or etc . In prac ti c e, however, such more civilized alternative s are never much consldered in thes e days of superstates . Animals, by conLrast, are smart enough to settle dis pute s by means much more like these . Even the a nci en t Greeks - though they had a clear appreciatio n of limits, which has been lost by post-Enligh tenment leaders regarded the institution of war as fi nal ( al l egedly inevitable ) means of arbitration between city-st a t es , not seeing its social, structurally -emergent, characte r. 50 approaches take one of Extrnstr1te ittlernat ional of slate s. r.ol two rou tes, way ~Ile to l~, ge nuine power, or the way down, throt1gh fractio nation or deunionisat lon 7 0 The ways up and down are by no means one and the same; ,10ccss;1rily incompatibl e . but they are Some of the impo rt ant machinery, for a way up to world governmen t, is alre ady there in the international law-courts. Wer e the courts ns signed suf fi cien t authorit y and po we r, the remedy , namely through legal acl ion, that· medie val principle theo ri. t s saw to all disputes, could in be rxtended to in t ers ta te disput es , and th e just war between states S and T supersed ed by the just ~ase of S versLs T. given intrastate s n fflcienl least jilitial]y) But if the law courts were power then their a uthority and efficacy would likely rely (a t upon war deterrence , though not by military means. perhaps Law courts, as usually conceived, are not effective without police and jails or their and equiva l ent supcr-statist back-up eq uivalent for of economic other penalties; and the either wi l l involve the capacity to inflict quite substi'.tntial amounts of damage on "delinquents" -· which, bec ause delinquents will typicnlJy be organisations, will also involve damage to innocent, and perhaps dissent 'ng , participants in those organisations, as well as to other In pa rt i es. repC'ilt uninvolved short t such an approach does not resolve the problem but tends to rt . Tl1 • Way Up is one more stnt i s t, legali stic , authoritarian way of trying ec:t t. n gri.ps with the nuclear though mostly 1n passing to be to problem, and accordi ngly is often men tioned, dismi ss ed 71 , in orthodox strategic texts on -·--------- - - - -- -70. Am e ricans, for example, tend to forget that their state (like the US SR) is a union, of fairly recen t orig in, and that a differ e ntly-oriented State of the Union message could well consi der dissolution of the uni on. Regional movements in USA unfortunately lack much popular s upport at present. By contras t, the re are signif i cant se para ti on movemen ts , some deserving aid and e ncouragement, which affect most other nuclear states, especially USSR , UK and France . The USSR already has tr oub le in holding its (supposedly voluntarily integrated) satellite em pire together; and the one recent attempted add ition right on its frontier is proving extremely recalcitrant. Nor s ho uld powerful political unions under centralised state apparatus be f no t c rcd c l ocwhc r e . The some appli es to state empire expansion, ns .illustrated in contemporary Indonesia. Mos t important, the reunification of Germany should be resi sted; instead a more rational regional deuni fication than the p resent East-·West division of post-war Germany sho uld be oought , al ong wlth removal of nuclear weapons from the border regio n, and so on. 71 . Thus for example, Ka hn, where such a "solution" is quickly dismissed as, impractical , etc. Hardly ne ces sary to s a y the Way Up has won most favour wllh the 1 ga l f r a ternity , and from more Authoritaria n organi s ations. 5l thermonuclear war . By contrast, the Way Down, thoug h like the new, is sca rcely mentioned in the orthodox discussions; means an appcara nc Q (a comeback) in some more radi ca l discussions, combined with the Way Up (in "world ord e r" mode.ls: unl i ke t he Way Down, i.s considered however beginning to be cf. Way and is more sometimes The Way Up, sympatheti cally by those who take a moral rather than strategic viewpoint. a r e newed emphasis on world order, in rea c hing inte rna tiona l system'; and 'the 'towards a no but lt is making Galtung). much by Up mora lly There is integrated missing element of world order today is the absence of a properly constitu ted political authority' (PL, p . 320). A main argume nt for the Way Up is just a repetition of that which is commonly supposed to underpin sta.tist arrangements in the first place, namely an argument fr om ( gene rous) variations upon the Prisoners' Tragedy of t he Commons. traditionally, ecological order. not herdsmen as best solutions regards to problems as the of organisation, public order and, more rec ently, as to So with the "tragedy of nation-states") where the players are but nation·-states , and one of the prospects is destruction of a r,ood parl of th e commons by rwclear wa r, the solution is now sort such It is that authorlty and coerc ion - in the form of the state - a r e r equired to ensure espe cially, Dilemma, of superstnt e. said to be some Of course, this begins to undermine an earlier application of the "traged y" argument, since states will lose their sovereignty and some of thcjr be order-imposing corr espo, dingly weakened. ar gum ent s are role, and But all political this is obligation to There a re, then, many problems through these A further theoretical with h:1.tch the is Way that Up, a both "tragedy" theoretical and the Way Up merely repeats arrangements. It is contingency, of there being no rival intelligent civilisations nearby, that the probl ems of interstate relations are not repeated 72 . will 72. stalist arrangements at a level up, by way of superstate only that states good ones in the first place, when in fact they are not, but are only sound under quite restrictive assumptions. prac t ical. assume to See further loutley and Routley especially Griffin. and material referred to a level therein, up and The rea reas ons for th e state are of course very different from the thf!oretic::il c:ov er such argume nts af ord. Among other things, the state enables and guarant ees the accumulntlon of power, privilege and capital. again . The maj or pra ctical hi tch is that there h no prospect at all of getting su ·ha "solution " t o work in tim e t o Aerve 5.ts intended purpose. Tn rc:,1.li l y , we ar e no ne arer a world gove rnment than we were a century ago , In fact, it is even arguable t hat since World War II we have moved furthe r a way from a world government than we were before Wo rld War TI. The disint e gration of empires has mul tiplied soverei g ntles . I t ia true that we hav e s omething called t he United Nations, but eve n the United Nations has decline d in power as it has grown in memb e rship. By the beg i nni ng of the 1970' s the United Nations ha d bec ome, in some ways, a l e ss powerful and e ven less influen tial organisati o n than it wa s a t the end of the 1950's (Hazrui, pp.2-3 ). The reaso n s for thj s Mazr ui goes on to o u t line . future For t he foreseeable nuclea r ideologica l d i ff e r e n ces be t we e n s tates , including especia l ly differenc e s as to how politica l arr angeme nts shoul d be e ff e cted, exclude any prospect of opcrnt l vc world governmen t or a worl d legal s ystem capable of resolving nuclear hostlllt i es . extre~ely I n some ways, this is just as well. monol ithic, woul d World gov ernme n t would cer t ainly , whatever it s ( g ray?) politic al colour, {~xplo l tatJ v e eco nomic sys tem whi ch would do i mmens e impose damage on to It undesira b le l eve l Ideological, r equ1 site the world an many remaining of inde e d u nity political and parad 'gmatic , cannot be and, e c o nomi c sepa r atio n expect e d in some crucial respects, unity. of Moreover , give n Northern main within nuclea r dea dlines. swee ping more sovereig nty , c o ul d blockages and agr ~ements, be negotiated? dea dl ocks i1 the involving genuine There an way is When not even endless of of that state series of s uch state reconciliation. a pp lies to int e rst a te arrang eme nts, whi .h ma y make limited us e the of The s ame Way Up nego tia tions or other conc i liation pr ocedu r es within a fram ewo rk arranged • - through the Unit ed Nations); 73. it limitations almost the cultures, nuc l ear weapon s li mitations can be worked out, how much less l ikely is (e .g . would systems. 7 3 The Way Up thu s presupposes an unlike ly much be f ost e r e conomism, would ent r ench bureaucracy with all l t s damaging f ea tur e s, a nd could e asil y tend to totalitarianism. ·1 n .:ltur.:iL an 7 11 Fo r a mor e de tailed (bu t decidedly mediocre) critique of the idea of a world gov e rnment, see Galtung. Naturall y the objections to world gov •rnmcnt , 11nd dlffl c ult lca in the woy of oht in i ng 1t, do not extend to mo r e f l ex ible world arrangements, such a world federation ofcultu res (cf . Ma zrui ). Such a plura l lstic ana rchlstic Way Up can be genuinely s yn thesized with the Way Down. jJ There is arrnrgemant s regrettably and als o conventions much are e~ tdert ce frequ ently concerning war and human rights 75), a nd are scntJments signed does slide smoothly that not not 1nce rnational observed (especially those worth into despicable dee d s . bode well ever be rcc1chcd. ln <'nnv,•11t f< n any great deal: openly violated. I ndeed there:.> already appears to he at least one fon·C!, of lofty It for nuclear arms limitations , s hould suffl c i en t ag reemen t wl 1I C'h tn nl1 the following intEirna t i ona l i1P mtljor 11u clc•nr sL 1t:es ore slgnnt:o r l.en, w!1fc:h w11uld rule ·11t LSN war and nuclc11r cl ic• rcnc includes a Even agreements states have are oft e n enough disre ga rd ed, sklrted ar ound, or not tr ea tie s , 1 , t h ton genocide. Genoc i de ac.ts commit ted, in time of peace or war, with inl ~nt to destroy in whole or part a natural, e thical, racinl or rel igio us group as such: ki.11:lng members of the group, causi.ng serious bodily or me ntal harm to the members of the group , d e llbcrately inflicting condittons of life to bring about physical destruction i.n who l e or i n pa rt. f ollowing associated a ct s are also punishabl e : dJrcct and public shall Beside genoc ide th e c onspira cy to commit be Persons committing genocide o r any of punl.shed , whether they are the othe r act s responsible rul er s, priva te individuals or public officials. 76 It is not diffi cult to argue nucl~ar genocide, inc itement to commit ge no ci de , attempts to comm.it ge nocid e , complf.ci.ty i.n genoci de. mentioned ca lculat ed that a larg er st rike (such as det e r rence policy requires as a ba ck-up respon se ) would almost cer t ainl y consti tute an act of genocide, through what minority groups. conspir acy repr:esentati .v 'S does to some But then, by virtue of connecting principles like CS, nuclear deterrence stands indicted pa r ticular it of the and as involving i.ncitement . nuclea r s t a tes acts ass oci a ted with genocide, in Some wel.i - known political and military would thus ap pear to be li.able to indictment . and punishment und er internation al law . 7L1. Even Dahl itz, who gi.ves a detailed and s ympathetic accoun t of nuclear arms control at t empts and lost opportuniti es, is by no means confident th a t suitable arrangement s onn now be achieved (se e pp. 210- 13). Reasons include technologic al advance s now taki.ng place, and the renewed America n drlvc f or strategic super ior ity . 75. See Brownlie, Kuper, and Amnesty Int e rnat ional reports. in t his paragraph were sugg est ed by c. Pigden. 76. The accow1t of genocide given is taken directly f rom the Genocide Convention, whic h is reproduced i n Kuper, p . 210ff . Most of the points text of the The nuclear fi.x cmergi.ng fr om nat.io ,,-stnte arran!_1, 111 ~nz:s - c ombin ed wi th the appare11t I mpot ence interstate relations to alleviate the situati on , indeed of with the apparent ability only to push the world further into the situation ne:.rer to nuclear the " brink" is now taken to ind ica te contemporary angle) the inad equacy of natio n-state po litica l tias gi v en new impetus sovereignty the best-seller and to co nsiderat ion of other extrastate r es olut ions . The According to can reorganise the radical namely n iclear in Sc.hell ' s 1 unsatis factoriness situat .l on The should the foundations of politic c l thought' pollllcal t.iicy opvrate •. , the indicates inst itutions Fate lead political of to req u i red a t he Earth . ' ful l-sca le to make 't he co n sonant with t he g lobal reality in which and in ' work [ lng] out the practicnl s teps by which mankind ... its political li fe' (p.219). However Schell himself tri e s to avoid the se ' awesome urgen t tasks, which , imposed on us by the of the present system of nati on stat e s has even reach ed stands, Schell reexaminatio n o f world ' c and book a new a rrangements, thesis that the nuc l ear problem national ( f r om and work of our age' else overimpressed by political t he oris ts. the 7 Z history, c onstitute So, no t feeling th e pressures of history or real ities of (unstable) nation-states , do most But there i s no good r eason to av oid the task of politic al rea ssessmen t, made so much more urgent by the nuclea r situation. There i.s li.tt l e doub t bu t t ha t we live ( too 11nthinklngly) with an an tiquated s ystem many present state arrangements, representative century communications •ery different condition; in a 77. when and the mai n outlines of the mod ern totalitari a n state and its mauifold defic i en cies recogni sed, even ea rl ier. of ( a llegedly 17th we re willing ly , The feat ures go vernme nt: , were largel y fashi oned in t he especially , us even of poli t ical a rrangements which t he nuclear impasse , among others, calls in to q 1est ion . best of even dem ocratic) techno log y, more were t he and primit i v e d iscerned, In the br iefs prese nt ed A similar theme , similarly qu estioning 'such sacred tradi tions as a bs olut e national so ve reignty', was p r essed by Bradley, a significant US g enera l ( sec Co x , p. 225). Sch 11. (like Bradley) does not mak e it entirely clear whether he is thi nking of the Way Up or t h e Way Down, but the names he drops suggest the Way Up. So does the mai n t hrus t of what he says, e.g. ' Thus the pe ril of extinction is the price that the world pays not f or "safet y" or "survival " bu t for ito [sic !] insistence on co ntinui ng to divide itse l f up into sovereign nations' (p.210), as if the natural or original st ate were an undivided one ? On Schell's position , see further Append ix 1. for political a r rangements such as repr~nontat ive government, the excessive siz an,! compl ex ity of modern states was not envisaged . But such systems con tinue to opcrn Lc , i ns ufflciently questloned, though tl1el r justificato ry bas es und c r mi ne<l. prese nt Nuclear problems rep r esentative have political emphasized have been several other defici encies in arrangement s. In particular, they have rcv cn l ed how governments can thwart popular opinion, and act against the evident will of t he people on an issue , for instance in installing US missiles Euro pe a n countri es. cen tury ca s e for r e pr e sentative proced ires is dissolved. issues, ~ i s sues. The least, be reduced. reduced excessive power back at dev e lopme nts , pro cedures, But the route down through issue-regul ated large i mposes and complex other modern requirement s. states What lnl t .t1-1.l s maller a s iL ls to inf or med citizens gro uping than approx i mate of a g lant satisfa ctory good will. As the re .1 r c se riou s dcfic encies .f.n the l.nf ormation by are stn tes, government recent tec hnologic al called for a re smaller Firstly, in present information and democratic progressive procedure, of control, nation-stat es, channels, and so f o r.th. ncc e ptable the from These upon nuclear problems have again made patent, even ·release the and distributio n distortion r estrictive of most liberal of them (and Aga in, especi a lly with new and less systems , there is little excuse for thls. information , upward depends But there ar e e vi dently vest ed i.nterests whi c h stand to benefit from the limited pub} l t:1 y and Secondly , democracy, insofar political rela t ed clcfi c i ncies as regards educati.on). flow major li ke many other social arrangement s, appear to function better with lnt egraLJon of groups by principles of federation. a nd on of governments would, to that ex tent at grou p.i.ng s , information flo w, communicati on and education. cx pe n,, ive lea st governmenta l power to more participato ry democratic forms, a rout e mad e poss ibl e ev en in mu ch elected wny that is thoroughly ambiguous on most issues ) are not given an almost f r ee hand on eve ry issue, but are required to answer polic:y th e It is past time for mor e is sue-control led d mocratic procedures , where governments once (i n some Now that modern communicati ons a nd info r mati on-processin g make i t fe a si bl e to dete rmine the mi.x of public positions on major 19tl1 in of data featu res in have a vailab ility major communicati on helped in making present delib e rat e ly fostered pattern of nation-stat e 56 co11frontatl on, and in establishin g the prisoner's nuclear superstates are often seen to be gJlemma type situation th e locked into (on which see, e.g., llardin1. A central a rgument, arising from the nuclear fix, for political questi oning current arrangement s and seriously considering their adjustment (in theory at le~sl), takes the following shape:• Political arrangement s shoul d answer ba c k to certain j,rnt iff.-.d 111 te1·ms of dolng ut .eas t where and are so. 78 The s<.i r e quir ements lnclude ,mch things ns en;,blJ ng good and meaningful and moral l lve s for those arrangement s, requirement s (as certainly in who operate under the muc h of the West) the basic mat e rial condit i ons for such lives are met . • l\ccaus c of the nuclear [ix, nation-stat ~ arrangement s have these requirement s. For guarnntce the prospect of arrangement s. nation-stat es, good meaningful lives those to under their yet ther e ls a non-negligi ble probability that person's morality is jeopardised if the person is obliged a meet at least in the North, can no longer such 1.lv •s may terminate, leas tl11rn fulfilled, 1.n this way. support to A life's meaningfuln ess ls certainly diminished if it ends before its 1,rimc inn nuclear d i~aster ; m.-iny and ceased s tate to Furthermore a acquiesc e in or engaged in nucl ear war preparation or nuclear deterrence (cf. Benn) . Th_erefore, nation-stat e arrangement s have should be amended . have their justificatio n, and Variations on this type of argument apply to many (though not all) natlon-stat es: natio n- s t ate f orfeited it ls not only because of the forfeited their mandate. nuclear Political fix that some obligations to such states a r e corr espo ndingly dissolv ed . There is enough evidence that power- brokers who control stght of, or worse have lost don't care about, t11e point of political arrangement s, of wha t justifies or is supposed to justify their sta tes. 78. states This applies both to How they answer back admits of expansion in various ways, depending on the irn lerlyi.ng politica l theory. Rawls, for example, puts it in familiar contract ual form: that the political order is 'a cooperative venture for mutual adva ntage' (p.4). Mao puts i.t in a standard democratic way: 'since Lhe purpose of all political processes is nothing but to serve the people and the i r interests, it is the people who should control in a meaningful way, the gove rnment' (see Soo, p. 68). r;7 rnnre powerful s tates nnd to lesser states, both c lai m popular Ln and mandate ag;iinsL the wllL of the pcopl(! , power~. put a value hi3 lier where, nlrea y illustrated milita ry situa ti ons: viol.1ted the 'IH' t:.1k er s on some have more often , they act without it or as The sit1.1at-ton has been reached sove reignty nation al survival. ' (Scliel1's conclu sion, p . 210; is -✓ hl.'lfe where than 'nuc l ear: they do on human for copio us evidence see Kupe r). Thi s by I srael, Vietnam and many other states in nonnuclear the principles of just warfare repeated ly, as hav e ma ny other pr i nciples. much of whn t c l .:i im they lv1d to externa l have been blatantJ.y Such states have forfeited respect or internal political obedienc e; so, on other grounds, have many other state s . It could just be, of course, as is oft en a lt er nat ives, that have been re s arc hlng glimpsed, though of world go vernment). dismissed, for s tirc withou very no possibly better alterna tives . but little As to whether all has such are no been expended on opportunity do to work, a nd not Appea r to give we alternative s w~y Down. There working tow ar d s the wea kening es pec .i.ally can be the may and ha ve been given know very little a bou t how humans suff icicnt org anisi ng and trying out alternative accessi ble alter natives instance as lacking feasibil ty , it is diff i cult to be enti r ely operate under su bstantially different arrangement s. But, t ime arrangemen t s, to even once again, proc eed thos e nuclear very far on of the mor e be time to pr oceed a l i ttle way ho wever , in breakdown of t he large r s uperunion s , which are the immedia te problem. ln valid to simp ly conclud e that alternative poli t ica l a nd while t here But alternat i ves the r e are, effor t toking the risk of being dogmati c; little d e ad ii ne[, tha t t1e r a nge of alte r na t ives or their features (except pe r haps for th e 0 op Li. on or insinuated , nuclear st a tes, Thus i t woul d be s oc i a l arrangemen t s, theoretic a lly feasible and certainly a l onge r- te rm goa l , do not present ly off er a part of t he practical response to the nuclear fi x. But there is no need to insist upon a s1 nglc-trac~ Way Out of dll emrna to th t: exclusion of all olh .rs: quite the contra r y . t he nuclear We can no t only afford to be fa:!.rly catholic about " second best " ap proache s and embra ce wha teve r seems to be working or looks like helpinJi • wUhin re c ogn i sed e thi c al ( and o t her ) con st rain ts ; Indeed, given the urge ncy, the direness of t he si tuat i on , we 58 :,hou1d ~s be fairly catholic and not lnflexibly co~mitt ed to narrow methods, such boRged rlown ( a nd v ery on a rms limitations ner,ot inti o n s m"thod::i should si~nifica nt be undemocratic perservered concessions unrepr•sentativ e) between main nuclear states. wi.th, from cert ai nly tJ nd and the attemp t s superstates, made to e.g . No-first···use declarat.lon, a ban on weapons in space, etc. But even s uch a wring further jointly signed The direction of most hope for progress has however come into view, a direction that is not especially new . The politica l means of the Way Out are what they have la rg e r eve r y liberal or huma nitarian been on issue that has matte r ed: from ou tside state governmental apparatus by organised pressure fr om within or nnd it ' by furnishing self ·- organising characte r is tically Bottom-Up famiL l ar cons i de rations are methods an alternatives practically wi t hout which never virtually upon bypass it , Top-Down. Such but part of the more general , and very effective, case agai nst relia nce upon states for a range of things they are now supposed to supply, but whic h effectively and [or can almost t hat invariably mnttcr le ss be obta i ned, where required, more e x pensive ly without them (and their monopo1 i.es) • In the case of security it i s states , with very few exceptions, impo sed , or acqulc s ced and nuclear weapons . frequently from time being , movement have in, milit a ry solutions involving nuclear installations The opposition to th e local a nd neighbourhood esca lating grou ps, nuclear fix has come some of them now feder a ted :1cr,;11s nntions ( " o the dir c cLion :!.a not rcnlly interstate). !we n rrnc:ccr-rn fu1 that These groups have in blo cki ng some nuclear ln s tal lat.tons and establishing, for the some a ga inst nuclear-free nu c le a r neighbourhoods . equipment The patchwo r k grass-roo ts is strongest in Europe, which is - as the mov emen t realised , and what gave it impetus - a leading thea tr e, on US strategic thinking, for a limited nuclear war not touching ext r eme ly doubtful th a t i~1crea i ng NATO and American Europe will E11 ropc wil l these mnke it a saf er place : American shores. nuclear r emoved installations in on the contrary it seems probable that bec nme much eafcr lf t he anti-nuclear movements installations It is succeed a nd Europe r e ndered nuclear-free. g ro ss ly lmmoral condu c t will ther e by also be conside1.·ably reduced. Ln having The chances of mrnt of the spectre of Soviet dc)tnl.11t\don, mil..ib:Jt:t, ideological and Exc:c•p l in the case of Eu ope, where th e inexcusable suppression of Eastern Eu ru pe a ll too ev iden tly persis ts, this is a n obvious fabrication . 8Cr i ou s ly And even ir Western Europe the spec tre is failing partly g iant fashioned military-in dustrial allianc e. inc r easJ. ngly dominated and largely domi na t ed financially ideo l ogically. much propped exaggerat ed. no t nnd c1d c quatcJJ and ec onomically some of and, in some mea sure, Indeed much of the "free" world countered as mil.itary by The means . i .," in basic any mode of mUitary . But mil itary, and associated poli tl c al, domtnatlon of We ste rn Europe by the Sovi e ts is a problem, t here are several ways other predomi na ntly American nuclear weapons to mi tigate it. on] y local def e nc e arrangement s - whethe r top·-down alternative is it domina ted economicall y , by the US A. doml na ti on to whic h nuclea r weapons are con s ide r e d relevant in sofa r a up by the NATO powers ' i s not ge ncraJ. ly considered so much of a problem (as it ts 79 ), and ls anyon' Since the l ast World War, Western Europ e ha s be e n polHlcally and ideologica lly , by the USA , c a1;e Does expect the united Soviets to absorb China, let alone take over Canad a or Brasil say? Th Rt other? social methods but also some and much r eliance on These should include not state-suppl ied social decentralis ation , regionalisa tion and devolution of orga nlsat{ons, than me thods, or r estructurin g, such as power to dispersed local mo r e cooperation and interchange with the Soviets and East e rn Europe. Part of the point of whether external or r es tructuring internal, so is especiall y situa tions, is to st a t e-contrived 79. break make any military takeover, much more difficult and pointless, and the rest o r ation of loca l control easier . 80 Part of int e rch1nge, to the point of cooperation and at the level of more ordinary people, in more ordinary down conditions of hostility and distrust and to s abotage the West-East confrontati ons, and thereby to remove For many pe opl es of the world , and in it s impact on the natural world, advanced corporate capitalism is an oppress ive and damaging doctrine. But, in contrast wit h a ustere Marxism-·Len i.nism whic h would i mprove the lot of some of Lhe oppressed world while even worsening the impact on the natural world, corpora t e capitalism admits a certain pluralism, and recognises many mo r e individual ri gh t s and libertie s. Ce rtainly Marxism-Len inism which appears to degene rat e in practice to an authoritari an and totalitarian position is a less welcome alternative . It is fortunate, then. that we need be saddled wi t h neither: there are s u per ior options. 60 ot.hC'r motl ves fo r, and Western popul ar suppor t Eu r ope , for f or, long j. much Uitary too adventures partial to and military advt'nturcs, sho uld now be hel ping i t se lf rath e r: than relying on a leaky Amer.lean nucl e ar umbrella for its defe nce . Moreover it ough t to be, at the ve ry least, 1ncomfortable about the risls of c a tastrophi ca lly damaging t he world in the i nterests of its own security . extensive parts of Nor should other "nuclear depende nt" states be prepared to ac qui esce in this not uncharacteristic European impositlon. There wo rl<l, wha t LS N war is no risks, enormous for virtue Western in sacrificing othe r parts of t he Europe, rn i. li t r1ry-base d dom ina tio n to other parts of the worl d. which has long exporte d There ar e better. options than clublou s and ris ky nuclea r shields for Europe. -·-·- ----- --·- . ·-- 80. Thus , for exampl e, t o the exte nt that lo cal defence groups a re integrated under more centralised direction, it would be a built-in principle th at s urre nder of the central directing sect i on absolved the federated groups fr om following suit or following further dir ec tions. That is, through devolution of power, surrender becomes structurally impossible (though individuals or baste groups may surrender). Moreover, the central section wnuld ho ld only limited informa t ion about the federated uni ts it in tegra t e d. The locally organised groups themselves, which would mer ge wilh local po pulati ons, would be train e d in tact ics of passiv e resist ance, sabotage, (nonviolent) guerilla warfare, et c. The net effect (as c. Pigden, who made most of these points , argues) would be to make the cost of militar y conq uest, occupations and exploit a tion prohibitively high. One reason why t he Japanese Army High Conunand decided aga inst invasion of Au s LraHa i n March 1942 was th e cha r acte r of Australi.ans and the fact th a t th ey 'wo uld resist to the end' ( Threa t s to Australia's Secu rity, p . 62). Ycl th 1 9 112 (wa r r edu ced ) Aust ralian populatton was substantI.nlly untrained a nd unorganised for loc ally-based defenc e . With such a defence r estruc t uring, Aus tralia wou· d not only much reduce its vulnerab ility to military adventures, but remove standard reaso ns for succumbing to threat s of outside military domination, blackmail, and the like. 81 . In par ti cular , with sufficient cooperation and trust, competitive prisoner's dilemma situations, which depend on the prisoners being kept separa te, are removed. So too a main mode l supporting deterrenc e policy would be undercut. And the arguments from national dangers would b e further co rroded. In the same direc t io n, i t is import a nt to extend cooperation between USA and USSR down below t he l e vel of state trade deals, e.g. in grai n and gas, to communicati on and coope r ation between people. For such commercial deal s there is suff ici e n t tr us t, even in periods of intensive confrontation: why should it not be so also a t more significa nt people-to-people levels? Many f ur ther Ror ts of lnt c r rclo tionshfp ore fe slble, nnd jnexpenaive by m:llltary st a ndards, e . g . sister cities, common clubs, worker exchanges, gi.( t pro Jee ts . If, for ins tnnce , 100 1 000 o r mo r e ord lnnry Americans wer e l i ving, working or holiday i ng in USSR ( and vice versa), Americans would feel less enthusiasm for hurling nuclea r missiles into Russ ia (or vic e versa ) . Only quite inadequate efforts have been made to build up mutual respect and trust; or the con tr ary , a l ot of resources have been expended to enco urage pr ecisely th e opposite a tt itudes, e.g. as part of the strnteg y of the "cold war". ~ 6J What th e anti-nucle a r movement s must press b,oa rl out1 i.nc; fof ::tccordingly i.ic> perceptive t r ansarmamen t, to i.e. conversion outer edges of graduat e d the movements, alternative social defence arrangements). Bu t t h e ar gume n t a lso makes it clearer how f a r this should go, t hrough in i n pa rt it i s what they hav e_ been pushing for, nuclear reduction an d rlisarmamen t ( a nd, on the more wa y clear namely all the disarmament 82 to total nuclear disarmament, unilateral c e rt a inl y to lo cal disarmame nt across progr e ssively larger parts of the planet's s ur t~cc , inc luding especially Europe. For once the state is demoted , its i mpo r t ance a nd t he necessity of its maintena nce properly downgraded and reliance on dec i s i on- making its diminished de ci s ion-making - once all that is happe n ) , one in duly favour of allowed more localised cont r ol and for (it does not need to major component in the nucle a r fix is removed, namely the problem o f red 11ction or even loss of state sove reignty . Ma'ntenance of that sovereign ty has been ass i gned a mistake n importance, which in turn acco un ts for the mistaken we ig ht ass i gned to the arguments from national dangers. What is important and wo rt h pres e r vi ng is not the sovereign state, but certain ways of life within the stn r- c . The na ti o n- state and dangers to it, and accompanying features s uch as mis p.l aced natl.onal J.sm, are the weakest links i.n the nuclear fix situation . On ce th e demise of the soverei.gn nation-state is allowed f or, the arguments fr om nat iona l conce rni ng part i cul a r. dangers .lndividual also and grou p rights and In their freedoms, by t he that nation- s tate . matter The are to arguments liberties in for t hem, as sma ller or exclusivel y nation-state is neith r sufficient for are disappearing, nor community arrangements can ensure them. But a r guments f r om lnd i vidual and group dangers remain , do they not? ri sks are civil necessarily th em , since i n inc r eas ingly many states the s e liberties nec e ss ary pl ace None of these require national sovereignty or even a national life. None o f ti e rights and freedoms g ua r a n te ed disintegrate. in div id11a ls 11nd groups r e maln: To be sure, th a t has always been so, 83 and ls not ---~------ ----82. The In i ti a l but impor ta nt st e ps are at zero cost as regards deterrence. Wer e det e r re nce re a lJ.y the pol icy there would be little case for more than a f r a c t io n of pr ese11t nuclear arsennJ.s. The ste ps to disarmament ;ire well-known , e.g. the scrapping of obs olete weapons, and an end t o modernisati on, the removal of nuclea . weapons in crucial theatres such as Euro pe, et c . 62 hci n1~ clwnged but only woH,f!ncd in thi. s age of moslly to wont be sure t hat nucle or arc othe r outsiders. People t hclr li v es will contlnue to run their course, i.denlly i n a flourishing fash ion , a nd wi ll not be Russ nns natlon- states. t controlle d by Amiirican s or Nucl e ar arrangeme nts which threaten t he ir lives not a rational rout e to these ends . In t he weigh-u p t hat should occur in char t.tri g a way dilemmas the as nuclear out of such deo ntic fix and its subsid i ary dilemmas, there ar e then much more i mport a n t elements than featut·es of the nat :ion-st:ate, namely E~-~ of things those the st at e is s uppos ed to safeguard, such as individual and local we lfare and a ut onomy; wc,1pons. but those th i ngs are bett e r ensured by The main reasons are fam il iar : threaten Lhe lo ss of basic values, such the removal nuclear of in particular, nuclear circumstanc es as welfare and autonomy, for many cr•ntures and reg ions, and the potential los s is in general much great er than in a nuclear-frcP si tuation ( even should another with nuclear weapons ). ideological party the o pportunity armed There are also well -kn own supplementa ry reasons; example, the production of nuclear weapons reduces both local of remain welfare for (because costs of wea pons manu fa cture) and autonomy (bec ause of th e accompanyin g sec urity measures). Thus the appropriate ly de vi ces and nuclea r fix limiting weapo ns is resolv ed , theoretical ly it can deploy, and how ), and rate, by by allowing for the But, although that is a reasonable Way Out , at little c ost in the circums tances , it will be s ince any sovereignty of the st ate (especially as to what nuclear con sidera bl e reduc tion of st a t e sovereignty . pra ctice , at strongly resisted in those who hold power hold it , in one way or another, unde r th e au s pices of the state. This is a main reason why people must organise and act aga i nsl the state . Again the resolution also lo ok s practicnl enough, since sovereignt y reduction in ne ed apply es s e nt ially only to the the production and deployment of nuclear weapons . 83. the Ind eed it could in principle be obtained by negotiated It will rema in so und er any satisfactor y political arrangement s. Until human s ocial arrangement s change substantial ly , there is no substitute for on-golng vigi lance to ensure or maintain political liberty. agreement ( at the top l e ve l s of s tat e) . to far with the superstates , the li mitations of s tate- powe r will likely ha ve to proceed further: for nuclear weapo nr y doc s no t stand in sp l endid isolation. i.nto both milita ry s yst ems - and ( c ivil) Rather it is industrial production of the states So, uns u r pr i s ingly, practica l- look ing resolu t ions are being concerned. ti ed solidly resisted by super states. Accordingly more popul a r (bottom up) act ion aga ins t nuclear-involved state s and espec i ally against the supe rstate s , af t e r all the stat e s causing the mo s t serious dilemmas, wil l have to be t aken much furth e r. variety of organ is ed forms. These in clud e a refusal to contribute to nuclear war preparatio n , e ithe r d i rectly or wld •l y, from such s t e ps ns Once again it will take a The indir ect l y. the forms of action range block adin g o f shipme nts of ur a nium, and the rc f1 1!:lal of suppJ 1, Qa a nd se rv i c es to sa i1or n o n nuc le ar ships and subma r i ne s, t he to withho lding or r ed i rect i on of t axes des t i ned for nuclear security purposes. They inc l ud e as we ll the whole r a ng e nuclea r facilities i nstal l a tions and of nonviolent (methods protest which method s against do exclude not i ncapaci t a t i on a nd decommissioning of equipment l and which do include new model . 8'~ resistance and de f e nce organisations). It is important to realise that petitioning of powe r state representat i ves and ho l d e rs, f or instance through letter campaigns, demonstrations and direct ap pea l, t s far f rom a complete strategy , a nd may be ine ffecti ve or ignored, th e r esul t s disco u r aging. and This is one reason why popular action should be based on a mor e com prehensive politi c al strategy, which also involves withdrawing s up po rt f r om prevailing state arrangements, and working out and partic ipati ng in alter nati v e a r r a ng emen ts, especially alternative defence forms. 85 Sufficient d etn' l s as t o what to do ar e already known, enough to make an immediate start. 84. For some imp r e ssion of the rang e of me thods, see aga i n Sharp. 85. For muc h mor e on all these points, s e e e .g. fu rt her Appe ndix 2. Martin . As to what to do, see 64 APPENDI X l. ON THE FATE or MANKIND AND THE EARTH, according to Sch e ll, and to Anders. A ncrtes of nucl cn r prophet s lw a pr odu c ed a EJ e r:les of ph ilosophj cal ly-·o riented works on nucl e ar war and the all e ged impl i.c c tions of l1 uman ex t inct io n . 1 The series is important for its dee pe r penetration into the nuclear d ilemma , down to metaphysical leve ls; i n this the series contrasts ith the transie nt s u pe rficialities of much o f the political commentary. The most wi de l y c i rc ul ated and influential text of the series is undoubtedly that of the s l ightest of t he ''prophets", Schell' s The Fate of the Ear th. This skillful piec e o f medi a -philo so phy uncannily redeploys some of the appar e ntly deep phenomcno]ogi cal themes of Anders . So, conveniently, main assumptions of Schell and And ers ca n often be considered together. To critic i se their a ssumptions is not of co u r s e t o belittle their wo rk. In pa rticular , Schell's little book, for a ll i.ts politic al shortcomings, is having a significant a nd much needed ef f ect j n sh i ft i.ng att: lt udes towards nuclear arrangements. It is especially valuable f or i ts vivid and horrifying scenarios of the aftermath of nuclear attack. Unfor t 1111,i t ely it: a lso exhibits, both phi losopld.cally and fac tually, sever e defects . Somr of it 1s simp ly ga rbage: to selec t one example , consider the claim that ' witho u t . . . a world-wide program of action for preserving th e [ human] spec i.es nothing else t hat we undertake together can make any pr a c t tea l or. moral sense (p.1 73, rearranged ). Th is s1ou l d cer t a inly be rejected phi losophica lly ; for ther e is no separate moral issue of s uch overwhelming importance that a ll other lssues become mor ally ne 11 t r al. Mo r a l issue s remain moral issues: they don 't cease to be so when compar ed wi t h more important moral issues ( as Schell effective ly acknowledge s el s ewhe r e, p . 130 ) . And the claim should a l so be junked on more f actual grounds. Humans fo rm a highl y resilient sped.es, like r abbit s i n Australia a survivor spec i es, unl i kely t o be exterminated unde r presently a rrang ed nuclear ho l oca usts . l. The di.st i ng ui shing term i s from Foley's Nuclear Prophets, wher e many of th e l eadi ng prophets are assessed. One well-known pro ph et not so consider e d there i s Jas pers , presumably because hJs ma in work (which might equally we ll ha ve been translated as The Fa te of Mankind) comes out in entirely th e wrong direction. For it gives heavy philosophi c al attire to the be tt e r -d e ad -than-red abomination, A ma ln argument agai nst Jaspers so presented i s simple. Howeve r bad being r d mig h t be come ( at present it is debatably worse than living under some of Lh e tot a l i tarian regimes th e free We st props u p), it still gives human s a fu rth e r chance for good lives , since r e gimes fall or can be topp led: bu t t o t al a nnihil a tion removes that all-important oppor t unity . But J as pe r s does not pr e sent his po s ition so simply . Rather his con t e nti on i s t hat there a re circum st a nc e s whe re a nd princ ip les for which a person or group of per sons ought .to s acri f ic e even their lives . Freedom is such: a l i f e worth living i s a fr e e life. But the latter pint can be granted w!. 1:liout conceding tha t s a c rlf1cc is a possible means to it , While the sai:rifice of one or a f e w l i ve s may be a possible ( if dub i ously effec tiv e) w~y t o fr • . l ivc D for oth e r s , c er t a inl y the sacrifi c e of all l ives is not a poss i ble rout e to fr e e llve s for a l l, s ince no human l i.ves r ·emain. To thi s rx Le nt Sche ll l s ri g h t (on p . 131) i n a ccusing Jasper s of an ea ch to all f al l Rcy. J aspe r 1 s i dea that "the f r ee life that they try to save by all po s s ibl e mea ns is mor e th a n me r e lif e or lives'' breaks down when applied to al l participating pe ople. None c a n ga in free live s by extinction of all: t hat is not a possibl e route to l ife e ve1. was selected howev e .· b1?ca,.1se it 1eads i0to, lndeed presupposes, two of the major defec tive assumptiono in the work ot Mchell and And ers: Sl. Nuclear w,n· will ellroinate life, humnn li.fe r1t least, on arth (the 2x~_~nc:Uon assumption); and S2. 111 the absence of humans, very many notions, not only those of morality a nd value, but t hose of time and space for example, make no sense ; or, to put it into a more sympathetic philosophical form, these notions depend for their s nse on a n act ua l human context ( the ext ravagant a nthropocentric assumptlon). It is appli cations of S2 which giv Anders' and Schell 's work 2 some of its apparent phllosophical depth, and certainly induce much philosophical puzzlement through the paradoxica l propositions generated. B11t the frequ ent applications of S2 depend esse ntially on Sl. For without total extinction there will he humans abo ut, to make past and future, good and evil, go on making sense! Th ·-- exDmp l e Granled the factual assumpti on Sl is by no means ruled out as a real po ssibilit y; granted the technological means are now available to make it true, to render Homo sapiens extinct; 3 granted the prospect of nuclear war does t hreaten leacfing centres of Western c .i vilizat ion witb obliteration. Even so Sl appea r s unlikely in the light of present - admittedly inadequate - information. Even in Ca nada, which lies on the pol ar route of Soviet missiles, human li fe should be able to continue in certain northern areas (according to Canadian medi cal studies) . Sche l l's argument to Sl is extremely flimsy. It depends, for example, on an unjustified extrapolation from the Northern to the Southern Hem i s ph ere , but for the most part it does that very North American thing , of con tracting the world to North Arner.lea . (All that matters, all worthwhile civili zati on, i.s in USA, or at least, to be more char.itable, in North Ameri cA and Europe, which will also be wiped out, i.e. its human population will be eliminated in the nuclear holocaust.) Some of the data Schell relies upon , for example the effect of nuclear explosions on the ozone layer, is significant l y out of <late. Other effects than ozone destruction apparently transfer even less we ll f rom Nortl1 to South. A factually superior study of nuclear disaster than Schel l's, by Preddey and others, indicates that parts of the Southern Hemisp here , New Zealand and southern latitudes of Africa a nd Latin America could escape relatively unscathed from even most massive northern exchanges. 4 Roth Anders a nd Schell remark on the "impossibility of unlearning" th e mean s of manufacturing nuclear bombs. It would seem that extinction, which they both foresee as at least a live possibilit y, would furnish a good medium for unl e 3rning nuclear technolog y (something very like this emerges from van Daniken's theor y of an earlier "high" technology). In v i rtue of S2, they would however 0xc lud e such a possibility as a case of unlearning, contending wrongly 2. For a deta iled comparison of Schell and Anders' remarkably similar versions o( S2 , se Foley JS. 3. Thus the Las t Man argument, important in environmental ethics, is no longer merely hypothetical, awaiting the remote death of the Sun, but assumes new ur gt'ncy. It is this sort of argumen t: that connects environmental et hic s and nucl ear ethics, at a deeper metaphysical level. The Bomb and Bulld oz er are out of the s ame technological Pandora's box . Nuclear technology is not the only route to human extinction, nor the only Pando ra's box. Biological and chemical mea ns are perhaps even more effective, and ce rtain l y can be more selective in what gets extinguished. 4. Howev er, new modellifig~ and estimates, none so far very reliable, keep appearing, and amending the picture. On the basis of one recent scenario, generated by a computer modelling of a 5000 megaton nuclear exchange, th e immuni.ty of the Southern Hemisphere to the dire consequences of a northern LSN war has been questioned . In particular, Sagan, no doubt overreaching the evidence , has 'warn[ed] that the nuclear blasts would create enormous diff e rences in temperature between south and north, shifting normal wind pa tt e rns and carrying smoke and radioactivity south' (Newsweek, November 7 1983, p .56). Some sections of the environmental and peace movements have a vested interest in exaggerating the probable effects of nuclear holocaust for life on earth, much as many stotesmen have an interest in minimizing t'r""l . 66 th n t lhc notion no long er rnnde sense. But what tlh•y s(H'm t.o want to s uggest wi. Lh th e impo ssi bility-of-unle a rning mes sage is th "' inevitability of the de velopment and event ual use of the technology - as if having learnt th e means ull else was dete rmi ned , and manufac tur e and use ceased to be a matter of c hoi ce. Certainly such vie ws have been flo ated 5• But: they are no t t e na bl e . Ther e are man y examples of technological advances that have not been t ak en adva nt r1gc of, and there are even cases of tec hnological developme nts that have be en mRnufact u rcd but not marke ted or used. The re is not something ve ry special a bo ut n11 c l ear appa ratus that puts it beyond the scope of such· generalis;<1 tio ns . Both Schell a nd Anders do claim tha t the re are very special things about nu clear wea pon s , in particular that they do not allow "expe riments ". Even if thi s were tru e - i. t is certainly not of smal ler weapons i t would not tell aga .inr,t the pr e v.lous argument: against the ine vitability of nuclear weapons. And in fac t Anders and (e ven) Schell hedge thejr claims a bout testing , and the limits to nuclear sc..ient if i c work , to large-scale weapons and independent experiments which do not interfere w.ith tl1 e observers and those outside the " J.abnrn t.ories". Again they have latched ont o major po i nts: in parti c ular, we hnv e at present no way of testing the c umul a tive effe cts of large nuclea r weapons in concer t, e . g . for more holistic effe cts such as fireballs or firestorms , e le ct romagnet ic puls e or ozone destruct ion. Sho r t of an LSN war, and l ike ly eno ugh with it, these crucial effects must rema in largely untested and lypothelical in chara ct er. The penetrat.ion of human chauvini sm , a s in S2 , is not something peculiar to Sch e ll, but is a product of Western ph ilosop hy, European philoso phy especially. This cl,auvinism is unfortuna tely alive and sti ll well, Anders' ve rsi on of S2 being ju s t on e striking illustration ( c:f . AA p . 252ff . ) . It ha s a lso deeply penetra ted Anglo- Amer i can phi.losophy, and has recently been extended by Wittgenslein ' s wo rk , where even the necessary t ruths of mathematics are taken to be a pro duct of I um:rn co nv enti ons , and would va nish w.lth bumnnsl Such ar e all eged imp lications of ex tinction ; but the fact is that the truths of arithm PLlc a r e in no way dependent on the existence of humans or humano ids or of gods or g iraffes . In Sche ll, human c hauvinis m is dished up in a particularly powerfu l and obnoxious Kant ian form. Th oug ht s and proposit ion s, time and tens e s, history and memories , values and morality, al l depend on the life- giving pres e nce nf human being s - past or fu ture or me rely potential humans are not e nough , persons t hat are not humans are cer t ai nly not enough. Thus, a ccording to Sc hell (p.1 40 , e .g. ), ' ... t he thought "Humanity is now extinct" i s an impo ssi ble one for a rati onal person, because as soon as it is, we are not. In imagining a ny ot her event , we l ook ahead to a moment that is still within the strea m of huma n t.ime, The thought is howeve r perfectly possible for huma ns; we can have it right now. Though we no doubt have it falsely, a later ratl onal creature may well be able to hav e it tr uly. Schell erroneously denies that: t here is no "later" ' . . . outside th e human tens es of past, pres en t, and futur e (p . 14 0) 6 • Human ext inc t ion eliminates ' the creature that divide s time into past, presen t and f uture ' : so anni h ilati on canno t 'come t o pass' (p. lli3) . But it: is simply false that the tenses are human; the tens e s depend on a local time ordering (per ce ptible to many creature s ot her than humans, but no t depending at all on that perceptibilit y f or its via bil ity) relating other time s to the present , to now (a l so a huma n-independent location, evident t o other cr eatures, an d borne witness to by suc h sequences as the passing seasons). And nnn ih llntion may als o too easily come to pa ss , for ma ny humans in the Nort h at l e ast, as it came to pa ss in recent ge ologic al times that human s began to exist upon earth. Bef ore t hat ther e was a time befor there were any human beings. - •••-- - - H•--- - --- - - - - - S. Not merely by technologica l determinists of marxist persuasion. Hackworth, a form e r US general , a r gues by straight induction, that if the US mili ta ry ha s a wea pon it will u se it. 6. Th e ap palling theme that humans c reat e past, present and future repeated e l s ewhere , e . g . p .1 73. (etc.) is Anders ' arg um ent for the demise of time, that 'what has been will no .Longer even what has been', is also explicitl y and narrowly verificat ioni.st: 'for wrwl wo u ld t he d iffer e nce be betwe en what. ha s only been and what has never been, if the r e J s no one t o r emember the things that have been' (AA p.245). Ther e would st l ll remai n ma ny sorts of differenc e; for one, the history record ed i n mm1y other org anisms would be differe n t. Temporal themes do not la c k ' legl lma y be ca use not regist e red [or verified] by anyone'; truth, signl Eica nc e , sti l l less meaning, are not matters of human verificat ion. be Here , a s e ls e where, the human cha uv i nism is mixed with other distortin g metapl1ysi ca l assumptio ns of our Western he ritage , in particula r, verificati onism and on t ol og ical assumptio ns (to the effect that there are severe difficult ies in talki ng ab out what does not exist). Thus, for example, Schell takes over dub I.o ns metaphys ic s from Freud, according to whom "it is indeed impossibl e to i magi ne our own death; and whenever we a ttempt to do so, we can perceive that we are i n f a ct s till present as spectator s" (p.138). The second clause goes a good dJ e l a ncc t owards refutjng the first. In fact there is no g r eet dlfficult y in descri bing coun terfactua l s ituations which undermJne both Freud's claims. The same go e s for Schell ' s extension s of human chauvinism into one of i t s main tr a<l 1 ti o nal str ong holds, value theory: the simple and basic fact [si c!] th at befor e t here can be good or evil, service or harm, lamenting or rejoici.ng there must be li f e' , human life ( p. 171) . These are no facts, but deeply entrenche d philo sophical dogmas whi c h have been exposed and criticise d elsewhere 7. Natura l ly s ome t hi ng s will disappear with the extinctio n of humans: trivial l y t here wi l l be no mor e humans (unless humans re-evolve or are rec eated ) , and t hus no mor e human ins ti tutions, human activitie s, huma n emo ti on s , and so forth. But it is a lready going too far to suggest, as Anders does, that t he r e will a c cord i ngly be 'no thought, no love, no struggle, no pain, no hope , no comf ort, no sa crifice, no imag e, no song ... '. For there are, and may eontlnue to exist, othe r creatures th a n humans with emotion, struggles , songs , Nor will the endJng of all such human Vf?ntures, if it comes to p3ss, show that nl l past huma n ve ntu res have be en 'all in vain', meaningle ss , and already so Lo say dead. The decay of t he s olar system, or the heat-deat h of the uni.ve r s,~ cv~n, wi l l no t s how t hat worthwhil e human activitie s were not worthwhi. le. 8 Sev er.a l of tbe other notions and themes common to Schell and Anders derive from t he i r shared assumptio ns Sl and S2. It is these that underlie the biblical no t io n (in Re vela tions ) of a Second Death , redeploye d by both. 'The death of mankind ', und e r Sl, is reckon d a ' second death', because by S2 end Sl remaining lJ fe i.s r e nder ed mean.lngle ss and already ' seems to be dead' (AA p .244, S p.166) a nd Ls already 'overhung with death' (S p.166). Thus, too, more trivially , a per son f a ··es ' a s econd death ', not merely one's own but in addition that greater de ath of the spe c ies and all future generatio ns (S p.166, p . 115). However even if nu c l e ar ext inction came to pass, the stronger notion would not be vindicate d, becau s e it de pe nds on the fallaciou s inference to the meaningle ssness of prec edi ng lif e and on the very questiona ble represent ation of this mea ni ng l ess nes s as a sort of death. There is no Second Death: creatures die just once , pe rh a ps all at about the same ti me . The idea of a Second Death lacks even a s o li d met aphys i cal bas e . From Sl , t og ether with the minor pr inciple that extinctio n being an absolu t e does n ' t d i ff er in deg ree, come s the universa lity of peril them e that ' we are al l exposed to pe r il in t he same degree', which is according ly 'd isguised' a nd 'diff ic ul t to rec ogni s e', be cause there is no contrast (AE p.61+; S p.15 0 ) . Thi s th eme fall s with Sl. In a ny event, not all peoples are equally i mperilled by t he nuclea r situation , th e Indians of southern Patagonia being 7. See , e .g ., ' ll uma n chauvi ni s m a nd env .l r onmental ethics', in Environm ental Ph i l oso n~ (ed i ted D. Mann.ison and other s )) Research School of Social Sciences , Aue trallnn Na tio na l Univ er0 l t y 1 1980. 8. Anders is here ( AA pp .244-5) r e l yi ng upon a ve rs i on of the argument from 68 rnLher betlcr pJac d than the Germans of northern gu , e . 1 011 Nor are all pe opl e C<JuaJJy locked in to the situation or inca pacitated by it; as exp l.aine d, th e po s ition is different in different countries a nd placeR. Nor, --- 1 i ke wise , are all people equally res ponsible, an obnoxious theme, (in co ntrast to Anders) r-c pc a tedly infiltrates . This is the Po go theme, ,iccord ing to which -S3.- · Responsibi lit y for t he pre sent nuclear si.tuation (fiasco, really) distributes onto e verybody, it be longs to very human in the world . 9 B11t there is 3lso , mixed in, a weaker more plausible claim that gives lie to the stronger one , namely that we have some responsi bil i ty (the Nazi situation is compared). An es peci ally blatant example of the Pogo theme 10 runs as follows: ' t he world's political leaders ... though they now menace the earth with nucl cnr wcapo nG, do so only with our permis si on, and even at our bidding. At least, this is true for democracies ' (pp .229- 30) . The theme is elaborated e l sewhere : we are the authors of that extinc tion. (For the populati ons of the super powe rs this is true in a positive sense, since we pay for extinction and support the governments that pose th e t hrea t of it, while for the peoples of t he non-nuc lear-armed world it is true only in the negative sense that they fail to try to do anythi ng about the danger)' (p . 152) . But this is more of an argt1ment indicting r epresentati ve government, by revealing its insensitiv ity and unr es pon s iveness to many of the populace they alleged ly govern, not to mention those affec t ed by its activJties who are not represented at all (namely ioreigne t-s ). But Schell convenient ly neglects all such points: we are pote n tial mass ki llers. The moral cost of nuclear a r maments is that it makes of all of us underwri. ters of t he slaughter of hundreds of m.lllions ' ( p .152). And again '[ as] perpe trators we co nvey t he steady message that life not only is not sacred but is worthless; that it had bee n judg ed acceptable fo r ever yone to be killed' (p.153) . Little of this is true . Those who campaign against nucl ear a rrangements , vote against nu c lear- committed parties so far as is possible , a nd the like, are certainly not the authors of potential des t r uction, and responsibi lity .for the nuclear situation does not simply dist r ibute onto them. Nor does responsibil ity - or the unlikely opinions as to worth Schell tl l eg itima ely attributes to everyone - fall on those who have don e less . Responslbil ity for de cisi ons taken in "liberal democracies " even by representat i ves (in the unlikely event of this happening in the case of anything as important as defence) cannot be traced back to those represented , since among wi ll c :1 Schell --- ·------·---- - - - 9. An inter•stJng converse of thls t heme is sometimes advanced , that no one is responsi bl e , the whole thing is out of control. The technologit al vers i on of this no-responsi bi l ity the me is dis cus sed s hort ly. More satisfactory is the theme that nuclear arrangement s are ou t of political cont ro l , but fo r re aso ns, in terms of vested interests in keeping nuclea r things goi ng, whic h enable respons ibility to be distributed . The vested interests , wh i ch bear considerabl e responsibil ity, include the mi li tary weapons i ndustry, a nd r e sea r ch and a cademic commurd.t.ies , Under pressure s for re-election especiall y, politicians give in to these powerf ul groups, so losing contro l o f pol itic a l. processes. The argument fai l s at it s final stag e. For many politicians either belong to or represent vested interests . Thus polit ic al processes tend rather to reflect vested interests than to run ou t of political control . 10. Another example of spreading the responsibil ity runs as follows: 'The self-extinc tion of our species is not an act that anyone describes as sa ne or sens ible; neverthel ess, it is an ac t that, without qu ite admitting it to ourselves, we pla.n in certain circumstanc e s to commit' (p . 186). Ev en for most of the plnnners, ex tinction is presumably not part of "the plan", but an 1ninte nd ed consequenc ; and most of us have little or no role in the pl a nning, enough of us even campaig n agai nst the planning . Fur ther 't he world chose the course of attemp ting to refashion the system of sovereignty to acconm1oda te nuclear weapons ' ( p . 194): the world'? This connec ts of course with the ideological argument from defence of fuodamental s, e .g. for libe rty, for the (USA ) nation, and against soc inli.sm. In the' .nurse of th:fA argument yet Rn o thm: fallR 1011s assumption is rolled out: ' The means to the end are not limited , for the end itself ~ets the limits in each case' (p,189 ) . mnny otller th1.ngs, a representative .LH only represf.ltiJ:ai:ive of a p· rty which offers a complex and often ill-characteris ed package of policies, and a voter may vote for ze ro or more policies of this package. Only in the (uncommon) event of a clear single issue referendum, which is adopted, can respo n s i bility, st .Ill of a qualified sort, be sheeted home, to those who voted for it, not to e ve ry one in the community. While S3 is false, there is an important refated th eme that is much more plausible; namely that the present nucl ear situation generates responsibilitie s for every social ly involved person (thi s theme is discussed in Appendix 2). When moreover the Pogo assumption is disentangled from accompanying theme s, part of what r es ults is decidedly along the right lines; namely S4. The controllers (not to be confused, in Schell's fashion, with all of us] have failed to change our pre-nuclear institutions. The sovereign system is out f step with the nuclear age , the one-earth system, etc. (the whole ea r th theme ). Thoug h Schell remains relatively clear about the serious defects of the state and the frequently immoral purpo es for which the state is us ed, unfortunat el y he often loses sight of this i mportant theme (indicated pp.187-8). Yet S4 forms part of Schell's critique of the state which is, by and large, scatter ed and fragmentary. As observed (in §8) , Schell arrives at the conclusion t hat the nation-state has outlasted its usefulness, and that new pol iLlcal institutions more 'consonant with t he global reality' are required as a matter of urgency. But he evades what he admits is the major task, making out viable alternative s. At mos t he makes some passing gestures, some pointing towards the Wa y Up. So l utions to the nuclear dilemma come, if not easily, in a similar simpllstlc way, from the Top Down; tho se who can must appeal to the Top (cf. p.230). Schell places his hope in treaties for arms reduction and pmitat io ns ( such as SALT) and in worl d government ( as with the United Nations) . 1 Given the r ec ord of these organisations and treaties, the negotiations a nd regulators, it is by now a pathetic fai th. Nor is a serious need felt for further analysis of the nuclear situation, to investigate the origins of nuclear technology, to explore the roots of nuclear blindness, to consider effective changes to military-indus trial organisation and ways of life . But some of the requisite deeper analysis of the nuclear situation a nd , more generally, of t he roots of war can be found elsewhere. 12 The roots of the nuclear fix are not confi ned to the ideologically-a ligned arrangements of nation-slates , but penetrate also into key components of those states, their mjlit.ary, their controlli.ng classes, and their supporting bureaucracies . And both within the arrangements of states, what accounts in part for th e a rrangements, and in key components of the states , a con spicuous and crucial feature Ls the drive for power and domination . 13 Thus the push for [nuclear] supe r iority by the super-states, to be achie ved through military-orient ed science and technology, which involves a nd enables domination, in seve r al inter.related forms. The main power-base is the large nation-state, where enough surplus product can be accumulated (from at home and from abroad, and bled from nature) to proceed wlth military and bureaucratic ambitions and to found t he h.lgh-te)~nology research and devel opment means to ever more expendable power and energy. In changin g t he structural arrangements to eliminate the prospect of nucl e ar war, it is not ultimately enough just to downgrade the mai n power·-base, the natlon-stat0.; it ls also Important to alter key component s of the state, and, mor e swe epingly, to ·remove trouble-maki.ng patterns embedded in all these social and political arrangements , namely pat tern s of domina tion, patterns anife sted not only in state political organisation, but in white-coloured relations, ma le- female re l ations, human-animal relations, human-nature relations; to remove, in short , chauvinistic relations . However not everything 11. Sec p.225ff. 12. In Anders and el-borated in Foley, and more straightforward ly, in Martin. The inco1iplete list of items given ab ove, to be investigated in a deep er analysis of the ruclear situation, paraphrases Foley JS p,164. and especially p.227, bottom paragraph . j nee ds to be accompl ished at once; and the clus~~ - of damaging power and do1nlnaL l on relatlons tied into war can be tackled separately. And there the probl e ms can largely be narrowed to certain problems of states and certain key components of sta tes. [n ~1at analysis he does offer of the problem with states, Schell repeats th<• familiar false contrast of state cxpedie.ncy with morality, as a c ontra st between "raison d'etat" and the Socratic-Ch ristian ethics. The teaching that 'tl1e end justifies the means j_s the basi s on which governments , in all times, ha ve li. ccnsed themselves to commit cr::imes of every sort' (p.134). So 'stat es may do virtually anything whatever in the name of [their] survival ' . Schel l then argues however, that extinction nullifies end-means justificatio n by destroying e very end; but again the argument is far from sound, a nd depends on human chauvinism (as under S2) combined with ontological assumptions . Even if all humans were extinguishe d (as under Sl) ends could remain, for instance for nonhumans such as animal s and extraterres trials , actual or not. The e nds-mea ns argument can however be repaired to remove such objections : instead i t is 13. These motivating drives form pa rt of a larger int egrated packag e, compris ing maximisatio n drives for power, knowledge, control, wealth, ('TI C" rgy, sp ecr, sat:f.sfnctto n, . • . • for the newer Enlightenme nt (but Faustian ) vlr tues. Frequently there are attempts (the human failing for excessiv e neatness nod implic1ty manifested ) to reduce th package to one main component, prefer e nce-satisfa c tion for 1nstance, or ut .i lity. And the type of drive ls justified (especially for those who have it, but worry abo11t i t) not 01ly as virtuous, which it is not, but also as rational, which agai.n it is not. Rationality , the deeply entrenched myth has it, consists in maximisatio n, of the virtues . Maxjmisatio n of the objects of the drives runs, however, into limitation theorems and associated paradoxes. The maximisatio n of power, as with the Christian-I slamic God, encounters the paradox of omnipotence , the parallel maximls ation of knowledge paradoxes of omniscience . There are no consistent objects which are omnipotent or omniscient. The drive for ma x i mum consistency , often taken to be the epit ome of rationality , also l e nd s to inconsisten cy in the case of more important theor i es, s uch as arithmetic and set theory (Godel's theorem and associated limitative t heo rems). IL, . R & D, though directed by military requirement s and the arms race, also drives the a rms race. Its role .is partly disguJsed by the myth of neu tral science. There have been a tt empts, not only by those committed to technologic al dcterminlsm , to involve technology more dee ply as the main, or single, source of t he nucle a r fix . It is technology, th e mega- machine, running out of control , that has brought us to this pred cament, the nuclear abyss. Sometimes t his serves to exonerate states and thei.r key components and those who control them, for they are simply caught up by this out-of-cont rol machine; but sometimes the s tate itself is se en as a machine also running out of control. But technologic al determinism , like other varieties of stronger (nonana lytic) determinism , is false . Nuclear technology was selected and proceeded with, after a well-known po l itical dispu te involv:i.ng distingu1.sh ed scientists ; it was deliberated , fund ed and promoted , while other alternative s were not. Damag ing technologie s of th e nuclear age were not inevitable, but dellbcra el y chosen by certain components of the large nation-sta tes. And murh as they need not have been chosen, so they do not have to be persisted with. The fashionable inevitability /determi.nis m themes admit not only of refutation by bringing out the many choices made in persisting with often recalcitran t technologie s. They also admit of being made t o look r idic ulous. If the Bomb is determined, as part of human evolut ion, then if it fu nctions (as it p ·obably will , a matter also determined ), it will serve as a human population control device, a matter also determined. That is, the Bomb has its fixed evolutionar y place in human population regulation. 7l claimed tha t ext inction null i fies ends-me ans justlft&A~ion by frustrating the r a J iqntion of ev ery re levant end - me a ning by ' r e levant', in this context, t hose end,, the rea li sa tion of which th e stat e appeals t o in justification of its n uc l ear pol i cies . 15 An LSN-war, even without human extinction but with severe c no1 1gh 1 sses , would undoubt e dly frustrat e the realisation of relevant state ends. So eve n f rom an ex pediency perspective, superstate policies are open to severe c r i t icism , for exampl e a s motivationa lly irrational. As to th~~ pa r. t of the st a te and (state) sovereignty tn war, Schell leave s us i n no do ub t . A s ov e r e ign state is virtually defin ed as one that enjoys the right and powe r to go to wa r ln defenc e or pursuit of its intet"ests (p,187). Wa r ari s es fro m how thi ngs are; from the a rrangement of politic a l affairs via jealous na t i o n stat es (p.188). Ind e ed th e r e is a two-way linkage betwe e n having s~:".'_E:_r~}:_f;;22.._~ a n d _ca pad 1:.7 t o wage war. On the one side, sovereignty is, Schell c o11Lends , nec e ss a r y f o r people to org a ni se fo r war. On the other side, withou t war it is impossibl e t o preserve s overeignty. Neither of these c ontentions i s t r Rnsparen t l y c lea r a s the y stand. The f l rst is damaged by civil war and the like, t h e s eco nd by t he per sistence of sma ll nonmilitary states. Now that the mac r o-state s ystem is e ntrenched, it is however easy for conservatives (in pci r ticu l ar ) t o a rgue from t he "'real:1.ti e s"' of international life, which include sel f··i n terest , agg r ,~ss i on, f em.· , ha tred. It is on this basis th a t peace ar r angeme nts are r e adi ly d ismissed as un rea listic, utopian, even (amu s ingly) as •xtrcmlsl (c f . p . 185). Schell's f ur ther th eme that nuclear "wa r"' is not war threatens, however, to undermine hi s ca s e a ga inst the s overeign state; for example, his ends-means arg11m nt and t he a rgument based on its nucl e ar war-maki ng capacity. Fortunately th e nol-wa r t heme needs much qualifi c ation, and starts out from an erroneous c ha rac t e r i s ati on of wa r as 'a violent mea ns employed by a nation to achieve an end' ( p .189 ): but--this is neither ne c e s s a ry nor sufficient for war. What is ri ght ( s o it i s a rgued in §1) is that nuclear wars are very different. from ea r lie r c onvent i onal wars. Schell goes on to claim that war requires an end whic h nuc l ear "' va r" does not have. But nuc l ear attacks can certainly have ends ( ev en if LSN war s cannot be won in the older sense: but not all wars or games a r e wo n). It is a lso cla imed that war depends on weakness; on one side being defeated on a de cision by arms. But in nuclear "war" thi.s doesn't happen, ' no o ne's st r e ng t h fa ils until both sides have been annihilated' (p.190). But what t hese sorts o f considerations contribute to showing is again not that nuclear wa r s a r e not wa r s, but that they are not wars of certain s o rts, e.g., not just wa r s (be cause they fall on such criteria a s reasonable prospect of successand improveme n t ), not rational wars (in a good sense), and so on. That conve n tional war s have pe rs isted into nuclear times does damage to Schell's argument that nu r:10,1r we a po ns h av also ru i ned " c onventio nal"' wars, and his connected theme t hat t he demise of war has left no me a ns to finally settle di.sputes between na t lo ns, f or th e final court of appeal has been removed (pp.192- 193 ) . The theme d epend s on the mistaken proposition concerning the demise of conventional war a nd t he mi s t ak e n proposition that war of some sort has to be the final "court of a ppea l'' betwe e n nations (for, as observed, there are other types of contests tha t coul d s e rv e , and there is also th e possibility of more cooperative behaviour, e . g. joint refer e nda) . The theme also imports the social-Darwinia n assum ption of Clausewicz (the "logic of wa r" theme criticised in §2) that war has to pr oc eed to the t e c hnological li mit as if war and violence were thoroughly nat 1 r a l actlvitLes independ e nt of recognised social settings (for winni ng, su r rende r, etc.) a nd rul e -less activities. On the contrary, wars are pa r asitic on s oc i a l organisations such as sta t es and are governed by a range of understandl ngs , conventions and rules . The y are a social phenomenon, with a rule structure, if no t a logic . Huch ca pital has bee n ma de not me rely from "the logic of war" but from what i s now cal l ed "'the logic of deterrenc e " a nd the "'logic of nuclear [strategic] plann lng'". The me ssage that is usually supposed to emerge is that the massive n uc l cnr 11rr.1 ngemc nt a t he wo d<l l s now en ll ng 1. ed in a rc perfectly loglcnl, sotmd, 15. Thi s re for mu lation was proposed by N. Griffin, who suggested that the main qual ificat ion can be inferred from Sche ll's context. - j 72 rcnGonab.le, rational. However thJs represents li l i:. le more than a cheap semn nti.cal trJ.ck . Logic in no way justifies the present arrangement s, or nnythiu g 1·ke them , or renders them reasonable. There is a logic of deci.sion (as presented , e .g., in Jeffrey) which ca n be appUed in strat eg ic. planning; but it does not yield s pecific results without desirabilit y measures being assigned to alternative outcomes, that is without values being pumped in, extraloglca lly. There are various ways these va lue assignments may be determined, to meet moral requirement s or not; but in nuclear s tr ~tegic planning they have invariably been set tled on the bas iG of expediency. l& In fact, 'logic of' tends to be used very gener ously, as a word of general commendatio n, to cover something like 'rational consideratio ns ente r ing into t he policy or strategy of '. In these terms, S hell, who like o thers enjoys pl.e ying with the term 'logic of', should write o f ' the il logi c of deterrence' , f or he emµlic1size~~ (p.21.J) tlP disparity bct:wc11n the supposed rati.onali ty o f t:hret1t~nl.ng 11se of nuclear weapons and the irrational i ty ( even from a national i n te r e s i viewpoint) of act ually using th m should the threat fail: 17 ~ the success of deterrence doctrine depends on the c redibili ty of the threat of thi s unjustifiab le and irrati onal use. I nd eed Schell wants to go sti l l further a nd locate a contradict ion in deterrence (e. g . pp.201-2): but the argume nt depends on an interesting conf uaion of cont:radictl on with cancell at ion , 18 along with the Rss •mption that deterrence invo lves cancellatio n . Nucl ear deterrence ma y wel l be irrational, i.t is immoral, but it is not inconsisten t . 16. Selecting the 11sual came theory scttlng sees to th is almost automaticnl ly; for it is then assumed that each player plays to ma ximiz e his or her own ndvantagc. Thus too th e presumption Jn Walze r, p .277, that 'the logi c of deterrence' is based on eye-for-eye and toot h- for-tooth as sumptions . 17. Even the irrationali ty of the use hac been contested, e . g . it wishful]y thought that America will rise l ike a phoe nix radioactiv ~ ashes . has be en f rom th e The r e is moreover a simple solution to Schell's problem of th e mis sing mo..!_ivc for retaliating to a first strike (p.204), namely, not a r etributiv e one, but a n ideological one: eliminate t he prospe ct of the f uture dominance of the riva i deo l ogy . 18. An anal ogous confusion of negation with cancel lation or obliteratio n appears in recent US " st a r war" thinking, where US missiles are supposed to "'negate" incoming USSR missiles . Moral paradoxes of deterrence take a diffe re nt dire ction; although involving negation t hey dep end upon perhaps questionabl e i nterconnexi ons of intensional func t ors. One type of paradox (consider ed in §5) derives from a policy of credibly threatening LSN war without however intending to proc eed to LSN war, though credible th reats ( ap pear to) imply an intention to proceed. Another s tyle derives from acclaimed intention to reduce the number of nuclear missiles when t he persis tent pract ice, which impl ies an intention, is to increase th e number. This paradox is technically r emov ed how satisfactor ily in another matter by a dis ti nction between longer- term ai.ms and :1.mmediate practic e , a time-ho noured method of removing .PPENDIX 2. On the Matter of Collt>,.•Uyr,, and Indiyi,hli1 1 Responsi bility and on Regional ~~rategie ~ What one do e s depend s , naturally , on where one lives and what mea ns one hns , AS we ll as on wha t one should do and what sort of person one seeks to be . So too what s tr a t egy a stat e should adopt depends on where it is located and what sort of power it is , on national as we ll as on moral co nsi de r ations . In presen t circumsta nces states have an evident responsib il tty to work ouc th~lt• pol te l. cs . The r e nre however some pcrs uua iv • argum ents that this is where uLl r espo ns i bi l i ty ends : t he se major re sponsibi lities accrue entirely to states, a nd ther e is no individua l, or (smal le r scale) c oll ec tive, responsib ilit y to work out a pol i cy or stance on such matters as nuclear ar rangement s and still l ess to ac t, perh a ps against a state, on the basis of such a stance. While such a no-respon sibi l ity or ~-out posit ion no doubt suits many people many for th emsel ve s, s ome (especial ly mor e a u thoritari an power-hol ders) on behalf of othe s - it do e s involve i nadmissib ly opting out of moral responsib il itie s, r e spon si bil it i e s ac quired by vir t ue of being a person wHhin the fr amework of ce r tain soci al a r r angements . Now the r e is no doubt that individua ls a nd groups can do t his, c an opt ou t. They ca n neglect t he:tr moral re sponsibi liti e s; b ut they are not ju stified tn doing so. Against th i s clai.m, whi ch is bas ed ultimatel y upo n each person's being set i n a we b of respons i bj_lity-- induci.ng social r elat ions, whether they like it or no t so long a s they choose to liv e with others, there are some neat arguments which a ppear to pe r mi t , or even wa rrant, opting out. One influenti a l argument take s t he following lin es: 1. The (o r dina ry) ind i vidual, or group, ha s no poss ibil ity of making a d i fference t o wha t happens. Theref ore 2. Such ind ivid ua ls, or grou ps, have no obligatio n to try to make a differenc e . Hence 3. Suc h i ndivid uals, or groups, are not mor a lly responsib le , f or instance when thint s go wr ong. There are two mai n a ssumption s in this a rgument , both of which should be resiste d: fir stly, in gett i ng from l to 2, a varia n t of the "ought implies can " t heme 1 , and se condly, the ass1mptio n tha t individua ls can't make a differenc e . While it is true tha t individua ls cannot accomplis h much on their own, together th ey can. Wha t a n individua l can achieve depe nd s on what suff ic ien tly many other i. nd lvidua ls do. In highly competiti ve communi ties, full of hopeful f r ee- riders, a pe rson may encounter a familiar impasse: that he or she acts in ma nner M (e.g. morally, against nuclear arrangeme nt s , r a tio nally), at con si de r a ble pe r s onal cost , with no gua ra ntee that othe rs wil l also ac t M-ly. Suc h nn impasse no long e r faces so many in the West, at least as regards initi al s t eps agai nst nuclear a rrangemen ts. The individua l can cooperate with others in ways t hat do make a differenc e. An i ndividual is not exonerate d from r e s ponslb1.l ity by the argument . While ind iv iduals can re s pond by joining organisat ions whose activitie s are di rected a t mak i ng some differenc e , many individua ls a l so have the option of more indi vldu All st i c action in such forms as boycotts , go slows, po l itical di s obedi enc e. An important form of individua l resistanc e, a lready adopted in Canada and nor t h··we stern USA, is refusa l to pay income taxes directed towards defenc e or v·r ious pa r t s thereof ( e.g. nuc lear weapons productio n and de plo yment ), or a l ternat ively redirec t ion of such taxes , for instance to peace fun ds, Evi de n tl y, however) all these more indivi dualistic forms of political act ivi ty wo r k mo re ef fe ct iv~ly if individua ls integrate their activitie s, since th e i mpac t s aggregate ( a nd appear aft e r a certain stage to exponenti ate). As we l l co l lective action he lps in distribut ing the impact of retributio n or puni ti ve ac t io n by st a te aut horities. 1. Any sat i s f a c t ory d _ontic th e ory which t akes mora l dilemmas with du e se r io usn e ss is bound to r eject th i s theme. There are als o independe nt g rounds for j e ttisoning this Kantian theme : see Routley a nd Plurowood. - II .,I<,' Th 0 re are, furthermo re, arguments of some weight that individua ls are under Ro1ne sort of moral obligati on to t a ke political ac t ion to disaffili ate tlwm,, l' lves f rom wlrnt contribut es to the prospects of nuclear war. What type of ac t ion Lhjs is depends on the sort of state one resides in, for instance, whether i l is a nuclea r power, whether it provides nuclear bases or facilitie s, etc., and o such complicat ing issues as what kind of preventiv e action the state iN l ikely to take in return. (Any state seriously practis ing deterrenc e Js bound to take some action against effective protest, or ri sk losing cred ibi l ity ; but there are limits to the amount of state coercion any one individua l need bear.) One a rgumen t - it is one of a type that can be varied from making nuclear wea pon s to, fo example, providing fac ili ties for them - proceeds from th e wron g ness of nu c lear war to the pos'ition that it is not right to be making the we~pons for such war. The argument here appli.es connectin g principle s (like those of §5), while appealing to such backgroun d informati on as that the manuf act ure and de ployment of such weapons j_ncreases the risk of s uch war. But j f it is not morally righ t to be making s uch weapons t hen those who live in a state that is doing so ought to d isaffilia te themselve s from such defence productio n, an1 disaffili ation includes not paying for such prodtictio n through d e fence taxes . The argument is not without substanti ve as sumption, but the a s sumptions appear morally reasonabl e and defensi ble. Another effective argument proceeds from the question of the type of moral person one wants to be : Does one want to le, or effective ly to be seen as, the kind of person who goes along with the nuclear destructi on of human populatio ns? Or with making c red i bl e a threat to do so, or th e like? What follows applies primarily to people wh o do not want to be, or be seen as, such people . Arguments like hese not only put opt-outer s and do-nothin gers on the spot insofar as they contribut e to national objective s; they also raise questions , perhaps eve n dil emmas, as to pol:L ti cal obligatio n fo r those who would take act ion, ev en limited action such as redirectio n of taxes 3. For are there not political obligatio ns to the state, such as paying due taxes and supportin g the national defenc e effort? It i.s usually assumed that there are. However, no dile mma occurs under a theory which, properly, takes political obligatio ns to be re gulated in some fashion by moral obligatio ns ; for in this case moral obli ga t i ons ov_rride political obligatio ns. In fact political obligatio ns are alread y significa ntly limited by moral constrain ts. The nuclear situation does not so muc h bring out new limits on political obligatio n, as em phasize the respects in which those obligatio ns are already limited, and introduce further moral considera tions against sponsorsh ip of national defence arrangeme nts. \n obligatio n to try 4 to dissociat e oneself from preparati on for nuclear war or from nuclear-d eterrence , for instance by not spending part of one' s working life contribut ing indirectl y to it, does not commit one to more t ha n this: to an obligatio n, for example, to work for an alternativ e nat ional defenc e policy which avoids nuclear elements. But no doubt this wou ld be a good thing to try to contribut e towards. Once again, what one attempts depends on wher e one lives, the level of one ' s commitme nts, e.g . to nonviolen ce, and so forth. For not only are different types of policy reorienta tion appropria te for different nations and regions, but there are more superfici al and deeper rcori ntations that can be worked out and promoted, e . g. schemes that leave 2. An argument of this type was deployed by Bishop Hunthauss en of s upport of his refusal to pay defense taxes. 3. This dilemma and op ti on is now removed in practice for most wage earners by Pay As You Earn taxation schemes - schemes ap parently introduce d to give t he state interest on gross earnings, bu t obviously very effective in remov .i ng taxation power from most workers, and so in further transferr ing ower from ind ividuals to the state. 4. Given the power of institutio ns and the state one may be able to do little more than .!:El_, without giving up one's work and thereby one's abili.ty to contribut e to other deserving causes. For example, it may be v ir tua lly mpossiblc for one to avoid contribut ing to a superannu ation fund which is Seattle in "co nven ti on,'.11" warf a re a pparatus more that ch:ing,.. tha t . H T ~~ s intact, and deeper (ecological ) sch emes Th<:! US Bisho p , f or examplet pr esent R rather shallow set of goals for a su pe rp owe r s uc h as the USA, which includes such objectives as preventing the d e velo pmP n t a nd deployment of destabilizin g nuclear weapons systems and 1o1orking for better co nt r 1 of already operational systems (see PL, p.317). The nuclear s i t ua t i on a ffords an import ant opportunity to press however for a much deeper se t of cha nge s in the superstates . For those whose very limited political i nfluence is exe rted in cons i derably less powerful states, even the shallow goa ] ma y look quite different: there are no nuclear weapons (except perhaps t ho se of a nother power stationed on local territory) to redeploy or to bett er c ontr ol . The vi ew from the very minor powers in the Antipodes i s furthermor e diffe r e nt from that of the medium powers in Europe. There is some prospect ln much of the Antipodes of avoid.i.ng the more immediate effects of an LSN war, whi le t her e is Little such prospect in Europe (cf. Preddey and o thers). There i s ac cordingly some obligation - an obligation little considered and not grasped by the powe r holders - on those in the Antipodes to make some effort to preserve th e r e in the South elements of what is valuable in world civilizatio n. Local a nd re g ional self-intere st would also suggest substantial steps towards s e l f-p r e s e r va tion that (foolishly) have not been initiated. Wha t i s broadly required in the Antipodes is not difficult to discern once th e gonls are gli.mpsed. Steps include wlthdrawal from the American alliance, wh jch i s in an y case of questionabl e merit since its main advantages lie with the US a nd J.t affords no guarantee of local defence; 5 c losur e of American bases and wi t hd r awa l of Ame r ican a cess ri.ghts for. nuclear-car ryi ng equipment to por ts , a ir bas e s and other facilities, espe cially so as to remove local nuclear ta rget s; pursu i t of a mor e evenhanded policy of nonalignmen t (something quite s mal l powe rs elsewher e have managed to achieve ). That much is easy, in pri nci pl e ; and justified. It is justified because local commitment to th e Am e r ica n mi lit a ry operations in the r egion lacks a solid f oundation; it is preml s s ed prim a rily on t e acceptance of deterrence, which, so it has been a r r, ue <l ( in §5ff.), lacks justificatj_ · n. That Australian commitment to joint Aus t r al ian-US f acilities and to US military operations in the region is e x pl i citly bas e d on acceptance of deterrence emerges from several recent s t a t eme nt s of gov e rnm e nt policy. The jolnt fAcilities are 'part of a system of d e t erre nc e ' • 6 More dif f icult to e nsure, at least without much preparation , is that economi c and cultural collapse does not follow an LSN war in the North. Se condly, then, the building of increased socio-ec onomic independenc e in th e Antipod e s is r e quired. It is not enough to make the region a nuclear- free zone not wo rth targeting militarily: the regio n must also have a sustainabl e life of 1.ts own. For a small region, thcit lo oks a very costly exercise unless combined with other desirable objectives; for example, in Preddey and others it is estimated that a substantial portion of GDP would have to be diverted to build up New Zealand' s economic independenc e. 7 For a larger region whi ch included Aus t ra l ia, the costs would be less. They would compare favourably with many Northe rn military budgets, and l1ave the advantage that much of the expenditure is genuinely productive. If furthermore - what seems unlikely - the structu r al readjustmen t were combined with t he .independen tly desirable aims of moving th e 5. Se e the dJ s cussion in Ball, chapter 13, especially pp.14O-1. How slight t he commitments are, under the ANZUS treaty in particular, has been e mpha si ze d again in recent defence discussions between Australia and the USA . Of cour s e, the ANZUS Treaty is only one, and a comparative ly minor one , of he many mi.litary treaties that should be terminated: from a Eu rop ean nnd world viewpoint the winding down of NATO and the Warsaw Pact ar r a ngeme n t s , and the r moval of American and Russian forces from Europe ( a nd el s ewhere ), are very much more important. A ful l e r d i scussion of Austr.alia's defence phil osophy will appe nr in a subsequent publication in this series . and alternative s, 76 whole reg i on towa rd s a multi- c u ltural conserver societ y and perha ps even dh,r ,, r t i ng "d e fence " spend i ng to conne cted self-managem ent and soci al dt'!f ence gon l s, the costs would be very considerabl y lessened . They only appear so g r eat in th e s e tting of a consumer-s atellite soci ety. In any case, wher e lif e and c ul tu r e themselv e s are conce rned , the cos t s do not appear excessive. I n sum, Southern countries s ho uld be s e vering their milita ry linkages with Northern nuclear powers 8 , a nd s hould be preparing now, socia lly and e conom i cally, for the time af t er the LSN war, the g reat No rth ern war. Howev er ther e are serious blockages in the way of such th ngs in the Ant ipodes) and inde e d impeding an y substantial attempts to lessen the impact of LSN war. Some of the blockages derive agai n from the f act that present nuc l ear arrangement s favour man y of the power holders and s u it strong cor porate interests which wield poli t i c al powe r . But the main blockages to mo r e popular action a r e sl og a nis ed r.n the false dlchotomy: "either it won't hnppc.n or we ' re all dead a n}•wayj so why bot he r". One reason for blocka ge is then the extinction assumption ( S l of Appendi x 1), the unwarr · nted a doption of which is excessively nihil is tic . A mor e i mportan t reaso n is that most people, and most of the ir political re pres entatives, do not bel ieve that majo r repercussio ns of LSN war are going t o bcf;1l l th e m. These are e vents which , .l i. ke starvntion and tortur e , happen to o th ~r ( r mot) pe o ple , not them. It is no t tha t LSN war i s unthinkabl e : rather i t is that i t seems unb,~llev a hl e t ha t it should make any d ifference . Most people in t he Antipodes ~eal l y do not believe that thei r lives are likely to be shattered by nuclear. war. Wa king up and mo bi lis ing t hese peo ple is a major part of the problem in 6. Se e th e letter by R.G. Hawke, Prime Min1.ster , replying to a symposium on conseque nces of nuclear war, Canberra Times, Saturday July 23, l.9 83. The point is also made by the Fore ig n Minister in his Evat t Memor ial Lecture , as Hawke~ notes. The point is softe ne d by r e pr ese nting the fac i li ties as also having a role i n verificatio n, as well a s dete rr ence, 'that mak es arms c o nt rol and reduction feasi ble': the known role of the facilities in war fighting i s not alluded t o , and nor i s t he fact that any verificatio n role can be alte rnat iv ely a ccomplished us i ng satellites. However the matter is not in any do u bt: 'successive Australian governments . • . have taken the vi e w that our primary conce rn should be to suppo rt the effectivene ss of th e Uni ted States deterrent to war itself' (D.J. Killen, Minister for De fe nc e; quoted in Threats to Aust ralia ' s Sc ur.lty, p.17). Government representat ives (e. g . Hawke ) conc ed e that the joint facilities put Austr a lia at nucl ea r risk. ' Howev e r it is t he judgement of t hi s Government that the benef.its to Australia in terms of its immediate int e rest and globa l st r a tegic consideratio n outweigh potential risks'. A prope r de cision-t heoretic analysis would not sup port Hawke's claim: since Australia is known to be a nuclenr t arget because of American bas es (c f . Ball, pp.130-8 ), the pot e n t ial risks given that an LSN war has a non-ne gligible probability far outweigh a ny i mme diate benefit s . Since Australia has only a r egiona°i strategic role, the global st r ategic consideratio ns are , as could be othe rwi s e i nferred, primarily those of the ma in user of t he facilities , the USA. The Governme nt is prepare d to put Australia , its peoples and e cosystems , a t what is decide dly serious risk .for i.mmediate and Ame r ica n i.nt ere st s . A worthwhile re presenta tive government docs not hold its people s hostage for such re asons . Not only i s tha t short-sighte d expediency decision maki ng: it seems virtually cer tain t ha t the <letai l s of the decision mak ing, were they ever. revealed, would not justify the policy in the longer term even on the basis of expediency, bu t wou l d turn on s uch things as present trade advanta ges and short-term co mme r c ial considerati ons. 7. As to the e c onomic and so cial problems Aus tralia would face in t he event of a n LSN wa r, see Coombs fo r a preliminary as s es sment. 8. Id e ally the removal of s igni f icant nuclear targets should t a ke pl c e nc ro as the whole Sou thern Hemisphere , because this is the zone that is r e latively insulated, a t mosph e rically, from the Northern Hemisphe r e. 77 achie ving requ isi te social and politi e Rl ~djustmen t. -yen those who believe tha t LSN war ls no t improbabl e (but may well not be totally destructi v e of life) do little to reo r ganise their lives in a way that would reflect their assessmen t: . 9 Richard Routle y* 9. Aga in , for some of what to do, for some ways to reorg a nise, see e.g. Mart in . There is als o much in teJ.J.ec tual work to be undert ake n, for example , searching out details of alternati ve arrangeme nts, and al so dJ.scredit ing establis hment experts, especiall y economist s and poli.tical scienti s ts , who intellect ually underwrit e present nucl e ar arrangeme nts . * The tex t has bee n much improved as a result of detailed commen t s by C. Pigden , R. Good in, N. Gri ff in t B. Martin and L. Mirlin, and through cor r espondenc e with G. Fo ley. J. Norma n has helped in its final organisat ion. The initia l outlines of the pa pe r were worked out in Victoria , Canada; and an early version was read a t Simon Fraser Universit y in 1982 . REFERENCES c;. Anders, Die __Ant_~q •i erthe!.t des Menschen, C.H. Beck, Munchen, 1956; to a$ A/i,. G. And0rs, Endzeitan d Zeitenend e : Gedanken zur atomaren Munc hen;--Pfi2 ; referred to as AE. Situation , referred c.u. Beck, T. Brownlie , e d., Basic Documents on Human Ri.ghts, Oxford, 19 71. D. Bnl.1, A su i.table. piece of real estate. American installttt ions Hale & Iremonger , Sydney, 1980. in Australia , J. Barnes, 'The just war' in N. Kretzmann , A. Kenny and J . Pinborg (eds). The Cambridge Histo r y of La ter Medieval Philosoph y, Carnbri.dge Universit y Press, 1982, pp . 771-784. R.J. Barnett, Real Security, Simon s. & Schuster , New York, 1981 . Benn, 'Deterren ce or appeaseme nt? Or, on trying to be rational about war', Appl led Philosoph y, to appear. nuclear P. Berg, Re!:._1::habitlng a Sepa_rate Countr.y, Pl anet Drum, San Francisco , 1979. M, Cohen, T. Nagel and T. Scanlan Pr inceton, Princeton UP, 19 74. (eds.), War and H.C. Coombs, 'The ec onomi c and social consequen ces of (Septembe r 1983) 8-9. Moral nuclear Responsi bility, Natuni war ', 5 A.i'!. Cox, Russian Roulette: the Superpowe r Game , Times Books, London, 1982 . J. Dahlltz, Nuclear Arms Control: with McPhec Gribble, Melbourne , 1983. effective internati onal G. Foley, ' Jonathan Schell : Genius - Phi losop her - Rewrite Brisbane, 1982; referred to as JS. Man ', agreemen ts. t ypescript , G. Foley, Nucl ea r Prophets. The True and the False_, typescrip t, Bri sbane, 1983. J. Galtung, The True Worlds, Free Press, New Yo r k, 1981. D, Gautier, 'Deterren ce, maximisa tion , and rationali ty ' , in The Security Gamble: Deterrenc e Dilemmas in the Nuclear Age, (ed. D. MacLean), Rowman and Littlefie ld , To t owa, N.J ., to appear ; also f ort hcoming in Et hics, April 198/¼. R.E . Goodin, 'Disarmin g nuclear apo l ogists', typescr i pt , 1982 . R.E. Goodin, 'Disarmam ent as a moral certainty ', Et_l2ics 95 ( 1984 ) , to appear. P(hilip) Green, Deadly Logic : The Theory Universit y Press, Columbus, 1966. of Nuclear Deterrenc e, Ohio State N. Griffi n, ' Lifeboat USA', Discussio n Papers in Environme ntal Philosoph y fi8, Research School of SociRl Sciences, Australia n National Universit y , 1983. Grou nd Ze ro Orgnnisat ion, Nuclear War: What's lo It For York, 1982. You? Pocke t Books , New R. Bardin, 'Unilater al vers us mutual disarmame nt', Philosoph y and Public Affairs 12 (1983) 236-54. J.E. Hare nnd C.B. Joynt, Ethi c s and Internati onal Affairs, 1982. Macmillan , London , 79 R.M. ll;,r.e, Applicati ons o[ Moral Philosop ~, M&Q1t1illan, l,~rn,hin , 1972. R. Jeffrey, The Logic of Decis~on, McGraw-H ill, York, 1965. New H. Kahn, On Thermonu clear War, Princeton Universit y Press , 1960. G.S . Kavka, 'Some paradoxeG of deterrenc e', Journal 285-302; referred to as PD. of Philosol?.!"1y G.S. K.-ivka, 'Deterren ce, utility and rational choice', Theory (1980) 41-60; referred to as RC . and 75 (1978) Decision 12 G,S. Kavkn, 'Doubts about unilatera l nuclear disarmame nt ' , Philosoph y and Public Affairs 12 ( 1983) 255-60; referred to as DU. L. Kuper, Genoclde: its Eoli~ical use Jn the Twentieth Century, Yale UP, 1982 . D,P. Lackey, 'Ethics and nuclear deterrenc e', Rachels), Harper and Row, New York, 1979. in Moral Problems (ed. James D.P. Lackey, 'Missiles and morals: a utilitaria n look at nuclea r det e rren ce' , Philosoph y and Public Affai.rs 11 (1982) 189-231; referred to as MM. D.P. Lackey, 'Disarmam ent revisited : A reply to Kavka and Public Affairs 12 (1 983) 261-64. a nd Har de n', Phil osopl'l_ B. MarU.n , Grass Roots Strategy Against War, Freedom Pr ess , Nottingha m, 1984 , to appear. A.A. Mazrui , A World Federatio n of Cultures: An African Pe rspective , Free Press, New York , 1976. J.C. Murray, Morality and Modern War, Affairs , New York, 1959. Cou ncil on Reli.gi on and Inte r nati onal T. Nagel, 'War and Massacre ', in Cohen et al, pp.3-24. J. Narveson, 'Vlolence and War ', i n Regan, pp.109 -146. National Conferenc e of Catholic Bishops, Committee on Wa r and Peace, ' The challenge of peace: God's promise and our re s ponse' , Origins 12 (20) (1982) 306-328; refer red to as PL, for 'New Draft of Pastoral Letter '. Oxford E_i~~lish Dictionar y, Oxford, 1971; referred to as QED. B. Paski.ns and M. Dockrill, The Ethics of War, Duckworth , London, 1979. G.F. Preddey and others, Future Contingen cies 4. Nuclear Disasters , A Rep o rt to the Comn1issio n for the Future, Governmen t Printer, Wel lington, New Zealand, 1982. P. Ramsay, The Just War : force and political responsib il itt, Scribner, New York, 1968. J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, Harvard Universit y Press, Cambridge Ma ss., 1971 . T. Regan (ed.), Matters of Life and Deat h, Random Hous e , New York , 1980. R. Routley and N, Griffin, 'Unrave l ling the meanings of life' , Discussio n Papers in Env i ronmental Philosoph y 113, Aust ralian Natio na l Universit y, Canberra, 1982. R. Routley and V. Routley , 'The Alternati ves 2 (1982), 23-8. irrefutab ility of ana rchism' , Social 80 R. Rou tl ey ~nd V. Plumwood, 'Moral dilemmas and the logic of deontic notions' in Paracons i stent Logic (ed. G. Priest, and others~ Philosop hia Verlag, 1984. R. Scheer , Wi t h Enough Shovels: Reagan, Bush and Nuclear War, Random House, York, 1982. New J . Sche l l, 'Refle ctions (Nuclea r Arms - Parts I-III) ', The New Yorker, February 48- 109, and 45-10 7, respecti vely. This P.<>rinr; , trnh tl t lcd Th£> Fat e of th Enrth, hfls now appcnred as a hook wlth t hat tit l e (Knopf, New York, 1982). Referenc es in the t ex t are to the book. 1, 8, and 15, 1982, pp.47-11 3, T.C. Sche lling, The St rategy of Conflic t , Ha rvard Univers ity Press, 1980 . G. Sharp, Explo ri ng Nonvio l ent Alterna tives, Boston, 1971. D. and R. Smith , The Economi cs of Militari sm, Pluto, London, 1983. F . Soo, ' Mao's vision for China', in ContemP?_rary Chinese Philosop hy Adelm ann ) Nijhof f , The Hague , 1982, pp.62-80 . T . Taylo r, Nurembu r g and V:letnam: An 19 72. American Tr agedy, Times (ed. Books, F.T. London, E . P. Thompson and D. Smith , Prot est and Survive , Monthly Review Press, New York, 198 1. Threats to Aus tr alia's Security . The ir na ture and Gove r nmen t Publishi ng Service , Ca nb erra , 1981. probabi lity, Austral ian R. W. Tuc ker , The J ust W r, John Hopkins Pr ess, Baltimo re, 1960. M.M. Wakin (ed.), War, Morality and the Mil i tary Professi .on, Westview , Colorado . 1979. Boulder , t M. Wa l ze r, Ju st and Unjust Wars , Basic Books, New York, 1977. R. A. Wasse rstr om ( ed.) War and Morality , Wadswor th, Belmont , Cal i forni a , 1970. B. Will.lams , ' How to t hink sceptic ally about t he bomb', New 1982). Society S. Zuck.e rma nn, Nuc lea r Illus :l.on and Reality, Collins , Lo ndon, 1982. ( Nov . 18,  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Box 59, Item 1894: Draft of On the ethics of large-scale nuclear war and nuclear deterrence and the political fall-out Subject The topic of the resource Typescript (photocopy) draft. Paper published, Routley R (1984) 'War and peace. 1: on the ethics of large-scale nuclear war and nuclear deterrence and the political fall-out', Discussion papers in environmental philosophy, 5. Dept. of Philosophy, Australian National University. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/browse?search=Richard+Sylvan&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bjoiner%5D=and&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=&amp;range=&amp;collection=&amp;type=&amp;user=&amp;tags=&amp;public=&amp;featured=&amp;exhibit=&amp;geolocation-mapped=&amp;geolocation-address=&amp;geolocation-latitude=&amp;geolocation-longitude=&amp;geolocation-radius=10&amp;submit_search=Search+for+items">Richard Sylvan</a> Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived <span class="MuiTypography-root-125 MuiTypography-body2-126">The University of Queensland's <a data-testid="rek-series" href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/records/search?page=1&amp;pageSize=20&amp;sortBy=score&amp;sortDirection=Desc&amp;searchQueryParams%5Brek_series%5D%5Bvalue%5D=Richard+Sylvan+Papers%2C+UQFL291&amp;searchMode=advanced">Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291</a></span><span>,</span> Box 59, Item 1894 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org">Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy</a> Contributor An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, <a href="https://najtaylor.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Dr. N.A.J. Taylor</a>. Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library. Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource iii, [80] leaves. 43.93 MB. Type The nature or genre of the resource Manuscript Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context <a href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:7122938">https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:7122938</a> https://www.antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/7b1c84739c22e1c37ca763396ee394af.pdf 2304fe555b3c35b58cc702e12a63a8a7 PDF Text Text MORRL fWERS WHER - EM-JIROtVEtfrOLLV? Begond moraL extens ion isms. Some find us of mereig not ourseives at with odds mainstream environmentaL thinking - which remains shaLLow, heaviig exptoitative, and LikeLg disastrous, not ontg for mang other species but for mang humans as weLL - but uneasg atso with main deeper environmentaL approaches, most of which now emanate from North Rmerica. ELsewhere I have, to mg cost, taken issue with Deep Ecotogg, a movement with European origins quickig captured Ln CaLifornia; but here I wLsh to crLtLcLse forms of Norat Extensionism that now have a main base Ln Southern USF)!, forms that etaborate moraL standtng, consLderabLLLtg, and rLghts theorLes. the crLtLcLsm wLLL not be puretg negative; posLtLve atternatLve posLtLons Rgain wLLL beg Ln to emerge Ln earLg mornLng outLLne. extensLonLsms extend moraL Ltg and convent Lona L chauvLnLstLc moraL MoraL apparatus conventLonaL Lts begond (but certaLnLg subjects and areas where Lt has not been appLLed, certaLn confLnes to unwarranted) or eLse, more LLkeLg, has been used for dLscrLmLnatLon and other negatLve purposes. Theg sLmpLg extend wag the moraL apparatus wLthout much Ln the assumptions vatue, (equaL appLLed to a wider cLass equat of rLghts, of adjustment, consLderatLons, etc.) sLmpLg equaL a (Rs subjects. moraL egaLLtarLan wLth tgpe, generaL moraL ex tens Lon isms have been described and criticised Ln some detaiL Ln EE, p.lSSff., under and the tgpicaL and usefuL weapon movements of Liberation with proceed couLd Ln Rodman.) MoraL ex tens LonLsm is a MoraLisms Nature LabLe more rLghts and accurate movements Less but equipment). Seen from a conservative opposition, moraL to moraLitg bend to iLLegitimate certain interests, etc), are equaLitg, standing, but in ang case evergthing is sufficientLg in order, at Least on the boundaries, as it ex tens Lon isms endeavour not onLg do the since (rights, such impressive pubLLcLg extensLonLsms purposes, extensions make nonsense of the notions invoLved (though is! from Seen a wider perspective, environmentaL not aLwags unjustified in where theg go, but Ln how theg go, in the pseudo-egaLitarian facades of the extensions, and more important in where theg stop. For though priviLege is widened and so diiuted, it remains. The zones of extension remain too Limited, and things outside the usuai as forests, species, ecosgstems, continue mistreatment, expioitation and so on (see EE, things be to p.llf.1). Nor can such substantiaL to open the sorts of invoLved pLausibLg be brought within the extension foLd (though isoLated efforts are not Lacking); for theg appear to Lack requisite which extensions, extensions operate, such as sentience, LndividuaLitg, or whatever. For exampLe, the verg characteristics pain-receptivitg, idea of an on interests, environmentaL ethic, which serves to protect uninhabited environments and to Justifg requisite respect for naturat sgstems and communities, founders on the moraL rights position propounded bg Regan in defence of certain animats (RR p.35^ff). �Mang a Ls MoraLLtg weapon, purpose depLoged bg pressure and often interest groups. Throughout Modern hLstorg Lt has tgpLcaLLg been used to and justLfg wLde a actLvLtg of range and hostLLe practices ground naturaL to envLronnents. HuMans are entLtLed to thLs or that, whLch interfere; thetr needs generate these or those requLreMents, whLch ought to be Met there though even are costs to LocaL envLronnents, and so forth. Those opposed to MoraLLtg - there Ls a Long and dLstLnguLshed phLLosophLcaL chaLn froM Lao-tsu and PLgden - have a poLnt MoraLLtLes Lt when MoraL-poLnts-of-vLew and to coMes The MoraLLtg. such HLnckfuss through daMage of seeM substanttaLLg hLgher than the often benefLts conferred. For the restrLctLons theg LMpose are heavg, and work often the wrong wags. R sort of cost/benefLt assessMent of MoraLLtg thus gets under wag2, supposedLg gLetdLng negatLve resutts. Mang are the arguMents for MoraLLtg, begLnntng wLth the cLaLM that Lt Ls oneseLf and one s LLfe wLthout LapsLng Lnto Morat taLk, conduct to LMpossLbLe concepts, practLces and, generaLLsLng, back Lnto MoraLLtg. Part of the response to such fauttg arguMents Ls atwags that there are dLstLnctLons, LnsLsted upon bg LeadLng MoraL theorLsts theMsetves, between vaLue Matters and MoraLLtg, tougher dLstLnctLon, (practLcaL hard j^s (whLch axLoLogg to to avoLd) MaLntaLn, between there Ls a further deontLc expressLons Rnd deontLes. and practLcat between expedLent oughts and shouLds for Lnstance) and MoraL ones. ULth and such dev Lees, antL-MoroLLsts, who do have a soLLd case agaLnst objectLve or absoLute MoraLLtLes, can escape MoraL hooks. Hagbe the net a carefuL practLtLoner can shun deontLc dLscourse, but wouLdn t on the treatMent of envtronMents be worse rather than better?, LMpact soMe of the grossest practLces? The quest Lons can doesn t MoraLLtg coLLect a range of answers, LncLudLng such uncharLtabLe ones as: Not so cLearLg constraLn that one wouLd notLce. The MaLn LMpact of MoraLLtg affaLrs; and even here onLg the grossest appear to be turned around through abuses, of an Ls Lnput on chauvLnLstLc, as such froM sLaverg, huMan MoraLLtg. huMan Even so the persuavLve force and LnfLuence of MoraL consLderatLons, properLg redLrected, are not thLngs to be LLghtLg abandoned. For rLghtLg dLrected theg posLtLveLg Ln thLngs contrLbute couLd that Matter socLaLLg and envLronMentaLLg. In partLcuLar, MoraLLtg affords soMe needed protect Lon and, especLaLLg as rectLfLed, offers the prospect of More, More protectLon, Less dLscrLMLnatLon. But actuaL protectLon Ls tgpLcaLLg provLded, where Lt Ls, through verg channeLLed MoraL ftowLng, through aLL too LegaL often, rather to the than wrong dLfferent LnstLtutLons; wLth fraMeworks, part Les, such as the Lt Ls the benefLts strong and estabLLshed. HakLng MoraLLtg work the rLght wags, where Lt does ftgure serLousLg, Ls, Moreover, uncoMfortabtg LLke MakLng weapons work for peace (MoraLLtg beLng a MaLn force behLnd wars and preparatLon for wars), More LLke than Lt ought to be. -2- �Nor is Lt nearLg as easg as Lt was: beating swords Lnto pioughshares, to provide an assauit on the environMent instead of other creatures, subMarine to peaceful purposes (genuineLg peacefut ones, or a prettg easg feat coMpared wLth converting an Fl-11 fighter-boMber or a Modern technoLogicaL LLke was that course, of is; Ln the Liest, theg re peacenakers). For Locat chauvLnLsn, Ln one fom guns another or (huMan, Ls now deeptg natLonat, state or race), LLkeLg, More entrenched Ln Most bureaucratLc arrangeMents and an LntegaL part supportLng of scLences and technoLogg. Even so, whatever Locat practLces, MoraL theorg socLaL can be rectified; the theorLsLng can be accoMpLLshed, even Lf a new MoraLLtg not and appLLed, successfuttg Must awaLt Ls Lts post-RrMeggedon dag. Thus the protected battte to dutg expand MoraLLtg goes on. There are two Ma Ln battLe—LLnes over whLch LdeoLogLcaL wars antL-MoraLLsts) equated) nottons: MoraL status, rLghts, sag, even an outsLde surveg such as thLs But the tern can scarceLg escape attogether MoraL def Ln Lt tons Ls so stack (as dLet tonarg reveaL) that tern (Ln LatLn ortgLn Just a substitute for the Greek expressLon for to have becoMe Linked to features and behaviour of accountabLe such MoraL group: narrower the ang Ls bound to be partLg LegLsLatLve. R Ma Ln Modern tendeneg Ls for the use ttght of as to what Makes soMethtng, a consLderatLon or perMLssLon, MoraL. Lssue coMMon cLuster consLderatLon, retevance, a on foLLowLng These LLnes wLLL be surveged Ln turn; needLess to . ... the standing, consLderabLLLtg,... The second LLne concentrates perMissions, to are fought as regards MoraL extensLon Lssues, LLnes parportedLg MarkLng MoraL outer bounds. The fLrst LLne concerns (often (guaLnt ethicai ) (hunan) actors, as character, disposition, action, virtue. These are the areas where MoraL attributes are at hoMe. Hence MoraL notions tend to occupg inner pLaces Ln the Much Larger evaLuative circLe, and not to extend without sone forcing to naturaL that are not accountabLe actors. PartLg for these reasons too, the terM objects MoraL , Much favoured Ln ex tens Lona List enterprises, tends to be shunned Ln The notion of deeper environMentaL theorg. SiMoraL RgaLnst MoraL standing and siMpiistic ethicaL tgpoLogies. standing, introduced notion of LegaL standing, is coning to pLag environMentaL heavg, but ethics. It is anaiogg questionabte bg a Major, with the RngLo-RMerLcan but d3Maging, danaging because, verg briefLg, rote it wouLd paint a rather arbitrarg, bLack/white boundarg - segregating off those that have not froM those territorg. that have MoraL standing - across Much conpLex More Rs to its rote, it Ls soMetiMes ctaiMed that adoption and defence criterion in of MoraL standing is probieM soLving; absoiuteLg basic reasonabLg addressing of a in environMentaL thinking and the Lssue of MoraL standLng Must be vLewed as a benchMark of ang pLausLbLe "environMentaL ethic"' (PP, pl6). None of thLs Ls so evLdent, especLaLLg gLven the MurkLness of the not Lon of MoraL �standing. In the sane vein, an a necessarg condition ... for Lt is stated that ethicaL theorg is the Most [}] defensibLe criterion of moraL standing adequate Such statements are suretg overstatements. For, Ln pLace, fLrst the there can be, and Lndeed appear to be eth Les, which count as environmentaL ones, which do not LncLude a not Lon of moraL ecoLogLcat Rodman s deep Naess s (e.g. ecotogg, sensLbLLLtg). Secondtg, etaboratLons of these theorLes can cLaLms to adequacg, wtthout introducing, and perhaps expLLcLttg warranted make standing rejecting (for the sorts of reasons gLven betow), a notLon of morat standing. For these sorts of reasons, too, Regan's moraL of notLon attempt (Ln NP) to a make standing Lntegrat to the verg Ldea of an environmentaL ethic, part of the conditions of adequacg for such as ethic, is far off course (as weii as ahistoricai, a piece of footnoted Regan s retrospective account of Legisiation). as But, it happens, standing, according to which a being has moraL morat standing if and onig if we moratig ought to consider how it is affected bg a given action or poiieg, both enabies elimination of the notion as a parasitic middieman) bg substitution using the exposed (thus biconditionaL invoLved in the conditions of adequacg, and aiso enabies straightforward satisfaction of the conditions tgpes of ethics that are hardLg environmental. Consider a forest bg sgstem about be to buiidozed, or the Moon about to be bg tourized an Rmerican—based transnational Hang the development or progress ethics these dags that wiii at Low we ought to consider how the forest or the Moon wiLL be that affected, but then cLaim that we shouid proceed, though perhaps in a modified wag. Thus, in such contexts, the forest and the Moon have moraL standing. Rn so, such a deveiopment ethics meets Regan s conditions for an environmentaL ethic; for the forest and the Moon are nonhuman beings, and indeed nonconscious beings, which have moraL standing. The resuLt is not what Regan intended; for he proceed to suggest (p.21^,p.3O) that intrinsic vaLue is a necessarg condition standLng, something his footnoted for moraL account does not guarantee. The LegaListic notion of moraL standing is not so cLear and distinct after aLL. Rn initiaL tacticaL point against the notion of moraL standing concerns its origin, on the modei of LegaL standing. LegaL standing is for ang sufficientLg comprehensive notion of a sometimes entering into moraL consideration (which can be true of aLmost angthing). For one reason, some decidedtg restrictive assumptions, concerning interests and whatever has such standing. But mang things of vaLue, which enter assessment on modeL dubious it imports rights into ethicaL occasions, do not have, and are not the sorts of things that can significantig have, interests or hoLd rights. LegaL standing aLwags operates terms of having of thing in certain sorts of interests, which can be represented, whereas what has or deserves environmentaL standing mag not have interests, sort of that couLd or be the have interests, even as derived (as in the case of LegaL persons, such as companies) from those of its members. More often -4- indeed, �Legat have to standing to have certain rights, duties, protectton, etc., is begtnntng with the rtght of betng abLe to proceed to the courts. room Of course there ts constderabte standtng not ton the widen to Legat of tn RustraLia can even exctude environmentaL organtsattons) and (which "cLaimants to admit, through representatton, other to the PresentLg, courts. for sure, the modeL ts Much too narrow, restrtcttng access to certatn capitalist cLaimants. But there are severe conceptuat dtfftcutttes tn the wag and persons of broadentng the standtng not ton objects, agatn because to encompass Limitations the the mang requisite environmentaL nottons of tnterests and rtghts impose. Organtsattons of persons, such as partnershtps, coattttons and so on, do not exceed (easg stretchtng at Most of) these Limits, stnce tnterests and rtghts accrue frow coMponent members: untnhabtted ecosgsteMs, the MonuMents, and bg a brazen, and tMptaustbte, overrtdtng of Ontg constderabtg. do, Like naturat these conceptuat ttMttattons (such as Stone ts prepared to fancg Rmerican courts tndutgtng tn) can the in-buiLt severe tnternat restrtcttons of the wodet Legat be overcome. coutd be recogntsed, account of the Stttt the tnadequactes of Lts Legat 3natogg anaLogg behtnd, Left unimpeded fresh a and now standtng woraL rather propose free-fLoattng not Lon offered. Van De Veer and Pterce are rash enough to an expLLcatton of Recordtng to them, can be construed atong these LLnes. whtch For ang thtng X, X has woraL standtng Lff the continued extstence of X fISl. tnterests Lts theg sag Ln that weLL-betng have postttve moraL weight stLpuLattng theg re the but this; theg re or (PP. p.3). RctuaLLg, not free simpig to given that Lt ts a notton wtth some currencg aLreadg, soMethtng theg sttputate, recogntze Ln proceeding at once to consider various to their standard answers basic question Llhich things have MoraL standing? . The account proposed is wore in LittLe curious, not to sag obscure and scarceLg graMMaticat. Later theg a than effect substitute a tortuous Less nameLg account, generaLLtg (in interpretation) MS2. X has moraL standing iff the (continued) existence positive moraL weight (see e.g. p^., plG: pureLg since future items mag have ancestors). Either wag the account is weight and having moraL continued some moraL circutar, or shouLd however be significance, since having X of wetfare has deLeted, as mag dead positive moraL standing are interdependent notions (cf. Goodpaster. p-311). In fact some of the probLems with the account coutd have been avoided bg cutting out the troubLesome middLe part and moving on to the simpLer, expLLcitLg circutar, H33. But has X then as moraL standing Lff X possesses (or obtains) positive moraL weight. a expLication, the definition might aimost as weLL drop out; Lt expticates nothing, connecting some near sgnongms onLg. Perhaps it is better to ask: Uhat work does the notion do? -5- The troubie �Ls except that theories, whLch LegLsLate as to what has moraL partLcuLar on standing, the notion Ln fact does verg because hoMe Ma Ln whose eth Les, chauvLnLstLc base does whLch LLes wLthLn the not extend or traveL unsatLsfactorg; wLth as coMpetence, or m s Ln sorts of reason for theLr Lnadequacg are weLL The personhood). are (such cLassLfLcatLons bLoLogLcaL socLopsgchoLogLcsL dLstLnctLons (such as LLnguLstLc capacLtg or potentLaL standLng MoraL Homo sap Lens or of the zooLogLcaL bLngdon) or wLth spec Les the of the wLder to onLg unstabLe and rather arbLtrarg, but tend to not ctassLfLcatLons ethLcaL MeMbershLp are theg trad Lt LonaL of weLL for ethLcs, It Ls one of those confLnes envLronMentaL settLng. RLL the MaLn crLterLa proposed confuse envLronmentaL Ln work Ls LLttLe agreement about what determLnes Lt. there not Lons, LLttLe enough documented Ln PP (and Ln Much other earLLer LLterature, e.g. EE) DespLte the enthusLasM shown for the not Lon of Morat standLng, then, no satLsfactorg crLterLon for Morat standLng eMerges, or Ls Ln ctear sLght, Ln PP - or Lt eLsewhere It remaLns to be denonstrated that there Ls a stabLe, seens. non-arbttrarg context-LnvarLant notLon of MoraL standLng worth pursuLng. Rather the notLon tends to force awkward choLces (e.g. those offered Ln PP on p.S.) The for reason the needs what cost-benefLt LMperatLves be to Looked at presuppose a Morat Ln appLLcatLons assessments, (whLch thLs dLffLcuLt notLon, that does no present Lt wouLd decLsLvetg Ls evLdent enough: usefuL work, space, about enthusLasM and deLLMLt of the categorLcaL of deLLMLtatLons behLnd proposed some notLon, for Lnstance use of the dLstLnctLon to reduce the humanLstLc/chauvLnLstLc foLd (partLg moraL ). MoraL standLng Ls not a MoraLLg bg use of the term achLeved Ls search unLverse, usuaLLg of persons), and so Morat search space towards the confLnes of the thLs MoraL confLLct Lssues, utLLLtarLan forth. There are as weLL More sLnLster uLterLor purposes appLLcatLons the neutraL notLon, but a fraMework and cuLturaLLg dependent one; hence some of Lts LLmLtatLons. ConsLder standLng moraL Lnstead of work, Lnstead of straLghtforward pragmatLcs, what supposed to confer or remove? It Ls assumed that Lf X has moraL standLng (m-s) then moraL agents have presumptLve obLLgatLons, and dutLes to X, e.g. Let to Lt theg otherwLse not atone, do not to confLne Lt or underMLne Lts Lnterests; but (cf-p.3-p.tt). Or, to put Lt the other wag around, thLng has m-s Lt Ls entLtLed to conttnued exLstence, pursuLt of whereas Lf Lacks m-s, Lt Lt does not have thLs protectLon, 3 Lnstead there Ls entLtLement to Lnterfere wLth Lt . def Ln Lt Lon of moraL standLng ... Lf somethLng weLL-beLng Just does not LtseLf moraLLg count Lts Lf a Lnterests, Lt does not count, .... Indeed, so Lt Ls Lacks (p.t+). The moraL saLd, standLng, defLnLtLon Bg Lts however deLLvers no such resuLt; a further LmpLausLbLe assumptLons, (reductLon of weLght to weLL-beLng, equaLLtg condLtLons for countLng) from an underLgLng moraL wLthout pLcture of assessment are LmpLLcLtLg Lncorporated (a utLLLtarLan pLcture where Ltems m-s are dLscounted, and trade-offs contempLated, p.16). -6- of Ltems wLth m-s are soon �Such appLication an if division; accordingtg LmpLies an unfortunate aLL-or-nothing item is tn tt gets (carefut) constderatton, otherwise Lt gets nothing - exacttg what the Legat anatogg impLies: a proper heartng Lf be and otherwise nothtng. Hhat this bLack-and-white division shoutd standing contrasted with ts not removaL of att distinctions, but rather a wore sophisticated ethicat such tgpoLogg, that of the annutar picture (of EE, p.107 and DC, p.2). The as tgpoiogg is based on a Listing of ethicaiLg re Levant such as having vaiue, weLL-being, appropriate p.!2).^ the character aLL-or-nothing from at Least Modified becomes evident of various (e.g. p.5) to keep it afLoat, e.g. duties capacities, so and and forth; to moraL standing distinctions soon duties) (direct to needs be introduced as opposed to (indirect, and perhaps derivative, duties). The wain strategg regarding duties autonomg, and postuLates and princ ip Les are geared to these (cf. aLso PP ethicaL That preferences, features adopted in PP to save the aLL-or-nothing context-independent boundarg consists in appeaL to the speciaLLg-adjusted notion of presumptive duties. MoraL standing is assumed to be necessarg and sufficient for presumptive duties: specificaLLg PSI. floraL agents iff But have a presumptive dutg to X has moraL standing (this takes up the content of signposted item 1, p.t*.). presumptive are duties even more prone to be bg upset circumstances than the oider prima facie duties (which the notion the notion overriding expands); standing, p.S), the forged connections things than without much too simpLe, as wiLL are for appear. FirstLg, a more comptex cLassification of things is required purposes so operates even more as a theorg-saving device. But even as so hedged around, and so extended (bg derivative duties, duties regarding moraL decentLg] X [to treat it moraLLg moraL a hard division into moraL countabLes and others, a nonarbitrarg cLassification such as that of the annutar picture. SecondLg, rights and duties, which the notion of moraL standing is supposed to bound. Link rather with vaLue, and extent of vaLue (see SM). Much of the importance ascribed to moraL standing or moraL consideration comes from confLating it with vaLue consideration, which is in turn equated with having some (non-negLigibLe) vaLue, bearing account, and counted, perhaps (if sometimes that wouLd be taken into in ang compLete vaLue assessment. Though moraL attributes are evidentLg a subcLass commonpLace vaLue of surprising, vaLue as attributes, e.g. in the confiation CaLLicott). is Possessing intrinsic or inherent vaLue is even offered sometimes as an aLternative to moraL status (cf. PP, p.16 fn 3); but more often the confusion is Less bLatant. Indeed PP begin bg warning us about sLipperiness (fn 3), soon stides itsetf from m-s to intrinsic vaLue with their being evident, and considerabLe, (p.S) and before Long has identified moraL standing of things vaLuabte prove in damaging. Goodpaster themseLves Towards Lapses (p.I6). Such equations are not the end of his essag, on being moraLLg from -7- moraL considerabiLitg into �that Hag that natters for ctains wade. For exanpte, Ln vatue-for-itsetf, psgchotogicat or hedonLstLc capacities sophLstLcated unnecessaritg seen Lt Ls true when Lt cones to Locating the ntnLnaL condLtLons for sonethLng s deserving to be Lts for vatued own (p.320); sake Lt not so obvious that theg are too but sophLstLcated for the capture of norat consLderabLLLtg. R sLnLLar conftatLon at work Ln Goodpaster s hgpothesis that that there Ls a nonaccLdentaL affLnLtg between a person s or a socLetg s conceptLon of and vatue ontg — consLderabLLLtg to appears obtaLn where vatue Ls unreduced (LLLLcLtg) contracted to a range where norat considerations enter; for exanpte tn Goodpaster's sotitarg LLLustration, the setting is hedonisn (when as where, of conceptLon Lts (p.3t*). The affLnLtg — nore than accLdentat for vatue and noraL consLderabLLLtg vatue Ls no doubt norat considerabititg Ls, so far as norat natters are attowed to enter, characteristicattg bounded at botton bg sone sentience criterion). The biocentric criterion for norat considerabititg that Goodpaster Leaps to (p.313) has itsetf to be differenttg Looked at if exchanged for vatue-in-itsetf. For Life is point even norat the obvioustg Less stopping vatue consideration. Rssune, for instance, that Wars or the Moon has for estate no [significient] Life. Theg stitt have vatue; indeed theg nag have reat vatue verg chauvinistic vatue "neasure ) now that theg are beconing hunantg (a accessibte nining, residentiat and other transfiguring purposes). Suppose (for further, what is not at att untiketg, that sgstens natch that Moon the has fornations sone shoutd be the that thensetves, into account in ang environnentat inpact assessnent of taken projects interfering with parts of the Moon. But insist or naturat nonunents of the Rnerican arid Lands. It is a the defensible ctain, these dags, that the Moon nonunents have vatue in which is considerabititg Lt woutd be LnptausLbte to Moon nonunents are norattg considerabte; for theg are not the right sorts of things (as a natter of significance) to have noraL attributes. It is just not the feature of having intrinsic vatue that shoutd be separated fron that of having norat status. Sone of the circte have suggests different sone exanpte, For connotations. notions beLng Ln noraL the consLderabLe norat dinension, sone weight to be taken into account, suitabte not neretg sone retevance. Consideration atso characteristicattg requires the iten in question has interests or at Least a such tetos), an that agent discussion-setting can phrase be deserves norat weLL-being towards considerate notions are deptoged that wag (eg. p.31 does norat retevance, R different get nere artifacts are norattg etc., dependent, quarrg that (a Goodpaster s Rnd nornattg the notion do presunabtg nornattg woutd not. Nor, not it erroneoustg, reLevant on occasions (for sinitar reasons norat significance differs fron standing). MoraL retevance renains context Like that another different notion sonetines equated with norat standing (e.g. PLuhar p.^7), though since does nornattg an organisn'; PP p.3 inpose these Linitations, e.g. those of awe, respect, appear, (as or consideration ). certain organisns'; and in Goodpaster's Leap.) woutd norat an etusive, has evaded contenporarg norat phitosophers of -8- �high standing, despite Much effort put Lnto other chase. the however, Since these are not goLng to be put to serLous work - Most of theM are, Like notLons MoraL standing, better MothbaLLed or - scrapped we qutetLg can bgpass the vaiue the nuances and differences. CertaLnLg MoraL considerations and vaiue interconnect, wider notion and Moraiitg, if wag theg inportant in which not at derivative, Least with R dependent. Most connect is through LiMitat ions on interference. MoraLitg preciudes the gross reduction of vaLue. LittLe R More preciseLg, a actor is not norMaLLg entitLed to interfere deLiberateLg in such a wag as MoraL to reduce signifLeantLg overaLL vaLue (or risk the various possibiLitg of such reduction^). But exact forMuLation of such noninterference princ ip Les is a sensitive Matter MainLg because deontic principLes do not excLude soMe vaLue, provided it is sufficientLg Linited - a Matter to which we of reduction - shaLL be obLiged to return. Bg contrast with MoraL considerabiLitg, and standing Like, the vaLue notions are fundaMentaL, and not at aLL easiLg avoided, even bg anti-Moraiists, in the regions of environMentat ethics.^ SoMe of the anaiogue notions are however, e.g. a thing warrants vaLue consideration iff it has vaLue; it triviaL is of vaLue reLevance iff it has nonnegiigibte vaLue circuMstances); the (in Even so the ana Logue notions heLp in shifting the issues and showing where the reaL prob ten Lies with the group of MoraL notions, naneig in what Makes soMething Morai. It this notion too that has induced the unwarranted narrow ing of focus, to chauvinistic concerns. For a coMMonp Lace answer, certainig wrong, to what deternines what is MoraL is: hunan concerns. Rather, etc. what is MoraL has to do with interest-independent vaLue and with a certain iMpartiaLitg and Lack of discrininations (i.e. in More oLd-fashioned forMs, with justice and goodness), features refLected fornaLLg in suitabLe universaLizabiiitg of principie.^ So conceived, MoraL Matters do not terMinate at narrower certain ethicaL tgpes, which excLude the wider environnent. The width of concern wouLd be better revested bg repLacing ethicaL*. equivaLent ethics a of (For coMparison, rec Lass ification as consider "environMentat bg MoraL its originaL the effect in environMentat MoraLs" environMentat or Moratitg"). $2. Rgainst environMentaLLg-restrictive rights packages. EthicaL standing does not striettg get or grant a thing rights. Standing gets an iteM door for hearing. a hearing; in an ethicaL it Mag, or Mag not, be conceded or granted rights in the Rights inpLg sone standing, but not vice versa; sone standing is even, if gou Like, a proper part of a right. MhiLe such an equation is not Much excuse for identifging standing and rights (short assuMption that of the astonishing but prevaLent aLL reLations are identities), stiLL too often the differences are giossed over, having MoraL rights is equated with having MoraL standing �The stoppage between the notions Goodpaster exptoits (p.3I8) CaLLicott). (e.g. Ln converting conditions on having rights into conditions (expioitation consideration free not exersibie rights is Much Less piausibie for Underneath consideration). MoraL these equations and conventions Lie important assunptions; triviaL MoraL deserving since wh3t is piausibie for costs, of for just not the More that what has a status therebg has a right, for instance to get in one but the ethicaL door, consideration are assuMption the rendered that equivaLent having and rights standing or a coMMon Middie terM, such as through having interests, being capabLe of being represented, being abLe to benefit. For exaMpte, an iteM has MoraL standing (or deserves MoraL consideration) iff it has iff it has (or even have) rights. (or can have) interests, i.e. iMpiicit appear but (with Minor Such equations quaLifications) in Goodpaster, and exp Lie it etsewhere, for a wide notion if "interests" extending to aLL Living things; but Much More coMMontg theg appear (e.g. as in Freg) for a verg Much More restricted of (huManoid) interest. notion If such fauLtg equations did hoLd, what has been said against MoraL standing wouLd appLg to that extend aiso against rights. But theg do not, and rights require More independent investigation. contrast Bg with anti-Moratists, who wouLd reject (MoraL) rights taLk and institutions aitogether, and with Mang utiLitarians, who view notion of considerabte suspicion at Least, it wiLL be argued, in g passing, that rights are aLrcght . The chief targets for criticisM wiLL be (MoraL) rights with certain unduLg narrow theories rights, of which wouLd have, if theg stood, decidedLg unfavourabLe environMentat consequences. RLthough for which he has iLLegitiMateig bagged the titie view, Regan's particuLar the rights view (as if an aniMat rights supporter had to adopt his sort of view), is verg far froM the attention, worst of these theories, it is worth singLing out for speciaL it has score heaviLg been proMoted since in environMentat ethics Literature and it does exceedingig weLL, coMpared with its usuaL chauvinistic rivaLs, in certain areas of Major environMentat concern, such as the (Mis-)treatMent of aniMats. R theorg of rights a coMprises representation (in the fashion of other package, which can be given fornaL theories) genetic as containing the foLLowing coMponents: D. a definition of a right, and P. further postuLates (perhaps independentLg argued for) deLiMiting rights. Rs MatheMaticaL exaMpLes (such as those of vector space and categorg) reveaL there is a good deat of stippage between D ord inarg usage controts and P. But because of the More on phiLosophicaL theories, onLg so Much in the wag of postuLates can be puMped into the definitions offered. The package aLso coMMontg includes as weLL 0. a set of canonicaL forMS into which aLL (nondiscarded) rights Locutions or cases can be put, and perhaps aLso (with ground prepared through C) R. a set of reduction scheMes for eiiMinating transLation, reduction ruLes, etc. -10- rights Locutions, e.g. bg �The of rLghts advocated bg Regan convenLentLg Lends theory partLcuLar LtseLf to separatLon Lnto these components, as weLL as suggestLng genetLc such breakdown. It begLns wLth a neat defLnLtLon of rLght drawn from HLLL, accordLng to whLch a rLght Ls, roughLg, a vaLLd (or suffLcLent) cLaLm whLch socLetg shouLd It guarantee. Ls coup Led wLth a serLes of prLncLpLes or postubates, each gLven some Lndependent support, of whLch the most basLc Ls the rLght of and treatment. respectfuL to patLents canonLcat RLthough expLLcLtLg addressed, one does emerge, whLch takes the form to [not] , where - onLg rLghts-hotder on the theorg, but Lt X[s] of The rLght as for Lnstance not Ln to permtts (the pLuraLLsatLon partLcuLar to some sort of utLLLtarLan anatgsLs, Ls strongLg resisted the rLghts vLew features onto LndLvLduaLs). FLnaLLg reductLon of rLghts, Ln back dLstrLbutLng context not are The basLc form Ls sLnguLar, appLgLng to LndLvLduaLs, who are the harm . LncLuded forms Lntroduces an LnfLnLtLvaL ctause LndLcatLng a tgpe of to actLon or actLvLtg. The cLauses mag be negated, unduLg agents moraL has a LLttLe more thLs LrreducLbLe the Ls Lt poLnt, (Ln rLghts vLew as opposed to a mot Leg arrag of reduct LonLstLc posLtLons, wLth 'the' sLgnLfgLng a coLLectLve.) be UhLLe Regan s rLghts package wLLL crLtLcLsed, Ln sLgnLfLeant rejected, through Lts varLatLon a dLfferent rLghts theorg wLLL emerge. respects Some of the crucLaL prLncLpLes Regan arrLves at depend theg and heavLLg upon - though do not foLLow from - defLnLtLon of rLght(s) he defends. Hnd severaL of the unnecessarLLg restrLctLve features of the vLew do fLow from eLaboratLon of thLs defLnLtLon, Ln partLcuLar the LLmLtatLon of rLghts to certaLn LndLvLduaL thLngs, to anLmaLs. It Ls Lmportant then to begLn wLth, and hard to avoLd, the certaLn Lssue of defLnLtLon. To ground the varLant defLnLtLon and theorg of rLghts to be reached fLrmLg Ln usage, consLder fLrst the maLn reLevant sense^' of rLght (to) gLven bg the Oxford EngLLsh DLctLonarg, vLz. 11.7 JustLfLabLe cLaLms, on LegaL or grounds, to have or obtaLn some thLng, or to act Ln a certaLn wag. of gLven rLghts sLmLLar core: hLm the Ln bg MLLL (whLch of ... account Regan cLaLms to endorse, p.369.) contaLns a a person s rLght ....[Ls] a vaLLd cLaLm upon socLetg possessLon The moraL somethLng socLetg to protect ought to defend...', MLLL provtdes, however, an Lmportant Lnsurance or cover cLause, as to who Ls supposed to cover the cLaLm, whLch the OED account does whLch Regan after a brLef dLscussLon aLso correctLg omLts (begLnnLng p.270). That Ls, rLght not LncLude, and quLckLg contracts to the Less than adequate vaLLd cLaLm; but the force of MLLL s Lnsurance cover Ls supposed to foLLow, prLmarLLg Ln vLrtue of what Ls pushed Lnto the Ldea of a cLaLm. Rs Lt turns out, Regan, now features of rLghts LmLtatLng FeLnberg s Lt does foLLow, but not Ln that wag. trLcks, trLes to puLL substantLve out of the notLon of a cLaLm. But the notLon does not bear the weLght theg trg to Lmpose upon Lt; a stronger rope Ls needed for -11- such acts �than ciaim can suppig. The cruciai act, which tries to read anticipated features of the notion of riqht into that of ciaim, faiis at the outset: is entitied to treatment of a certain kind is to assert that someone... ... To wake a ciaim and that the treatment is due or owed directig to the individuai ... in question. To a make individuais, ciaim thus, invoives both ciaims-to and ciaims-against... (p.271). Such an anaigsis of making a ciaim imports much the that ordinarg notion does not support, nameig, in the first piace, that it invoives or asserts entitiement, entitiement to treatment of a certain sort, secondig, that it is a transaction between individuais^, thirdig, that the imputed treatment is owed it is a ciaim-against given individuais. But in making directig to the ciaimant, such ciaims as that one has visited Mount Rthos, has seen the iark ascend, at tea one sunset, doing ang of those things in ang straightforward not is sense. There is nothing significant due or owed, directed at other took individuais in the the demanding assertions wag, or at need not be aii; and no entitiement to speciai treatment is asked for. Ciaim is a transitive verb, so it as requires weii as subjects, ciaimants, objects, ciaims, propositionai items tgpicaiig introduced bg or 'to . Someone who makes a that ciaims ciaim that something or to (have or have done) something. But that is aii. Onig some ciaims are directed against others, onig some ciaims are entitiements. Rnd if is it ciaims that are entitiements that are to be distinguished, it wouid be better to start with entitiements (cf McCioskeg). Just such a fresh start wiii be made, in the first stage of modification of the definitions OED integration and it with Miii's definition. Upon of separating off iegai rights (which Regan correctig distinguishes in prettg much the standard wag, p.267), the foiiowing then resuits: M2. Vaiid entitiement, on morai grounds, to something (of a correct categorg). The changes (from 11.7) deserve some justification. Firstig, or have obtain or something, characteristic fiii to to in act a certain "justifiabie justifiabie to (to) something , iogicaiig adds iittie content. For each something entaiis and mag to be entitiement ciaims sufficient, ent ireig warrant vaiid. from Thirdig, and ang case entitiing ones, and that in are i.e. dubious ciaims-against preconceptions, without be regarded appears most need not ciaim restrict to on but aiso the ciaim because make or the sheds unduig and expected ciass of rights havers or haver of a it, but it is hard to escape the assumption that if something has a ciaim then it shouid be the sort of thing potentiaiig?) important entitiement hoiders, what can have or ho id rights, to ciaimants. Of course the right as grounds morai ciaim , not mereig for the reasons given, that improves upon invoived an sort of justification, which as it turns out is not fuiig some adequate, can be given, whereas for a right the derivation has converseig an entitiement to have something. Secondig, is not strong enough; a ciaimed entitiement if (To) phrase wag , which gives the of the sorts of entitiement is an entitiement to something, entitiement the stake that ciaims. Thus use of the term -12- can ciaim (at ieast makes it an �even tougher uphiLL struggLe to work the powerfut rights medicine on behatf of wttd animats and wiLde messes. Of course too, what cLaims are wade coutd be wade through indirectLg, representatives; the tern but representatives" suggests verg easiig that rights havers have interests to be represented. Opportunitg wake the to interests" shouid not be afforded rights" to dubious inference from bg the basic definition; and "entitLement" gives appropriate distance. R Lot hangs on choice of basic (as then terms other in chaiienging phiiosophicai areas, such as the fundamentsLs of reasoning), even if it seems to right' newcomers, as it does to dictionaries, that entitLement cLaim' and are more or Less interchangeabLe (each is characterised in standard dictionaries partLg in terms of the others) tautoLogous. and expticative satisfactorg UeLL, Like definitions that M2 definitions virtuaLLg are are but anaLgtic, preferabLg not trivaLLg circuiar, eLse informativeness is sacrificed. R weakness of the entitLement account (hard to credit after Regan's attack upon it) is that it risks the Latter. Mhat is needed in pLace of entitLement, putative entitLement' expression, right , i.e. it a since doesn t a becomes an entitLement, or right, when vaLiditg is that appropriateLg estabLished, and so on. From this angLe, better something, is write in To vaLiditg. avoid a is sLightLg a reaL or supposed to amounts sometimes cLaim cLaim' these probLems with avaiiabie terminoiogg, there is a case for coining a rather immediate expression basic definition something, R vaLid in that something (after fiLL to into in M2) and avoid disappearance of the VaLid something, on to something , which couLd embrace Lots of items other than rights). term suitabie entitLement, titiement ; is which a or a is titiement aLLeged or putative mag or mag not be correctLg vaLidated, en-ed (cf. titLe *6. That which justifies or substantiates a cLaim; a aLLeged (e.g. vacuitg quant ificationaL recognised right', Const, with cLaimed .) R titiement is a transformation ground inf. of a or right; of to, suitabie hence, an of the thing in, deontic principLe, cat Led a susta in ing principLe. For instance, the form It is mostig permissibie [for X] to R , where suitabie, gieLds the titiement form There is a titiement [for X] R . Requirements for what conditions objects (Rs) and suitabiLitg, subjects (Xs) shouLd satisfg, are investigated in what foLLows. Before trging for a mark-3 definition of right (to), MiLL, as interpreted bg Regan (pp.270-1). MiLL titiements are to be vaLidated: depend on compLiance its independentLg estabLished' the vaLiditg of with (p.270), derivation from these correct moraL stack, the vaguer a right (to) moraL principLes us return a right, whose correct that he beiieves, takes up, must have been vaLiditg principLes. to as to how provides...guidance princ ip Les i.e. Let It is the removing the "moraL grounds" (cf. M2 and 11.7). Then in the mark-3 version, is a M3. VaLid titiement, from correct moraL principLes, appropriate) item. The LogicaL form is aLmost immediate: -13- to some (categoriaLLg �H3S. premLsses correct worst prtncLpLes SustaLnLng prtnctpLe as to R vaLLd dertvatton cone Lus con There Ls a tttLement to R RssumLng evergthtng Ls Ln order Ln the scheme H3S, the inference to a rLght-to R Ls then LmmedLate, bg f13. The whoLe pattern Ls at once duLg reLatLvLsabLe to suLtabLe havers. Thus X has a rLght to R Lff X has a tttLement, vaLLd Trow correct woraL prtncLpLes, to R, somethtng that a suLtabLe reLatLvLsed derLvatLon wag estabLLsh. candLdates The fLLL to R provLde a famLLLar LLst, e.g. out freedom from unnecessarg sufferLng, respectfuL treatment, satLsfg sound LLfe, needs, support, rewarding work, a fatr go, etc.. Bg no means aLL of these candLdates can be vaLLdated, wLthout at Least severaL basLc restrLct the quaLLftcatLon, consLderabLe and categorg of subjects, L.e. the LogLcaL sort of Ltem that can have the purported tttLement. Such a scheme, as f13S not (whLLe entLretg wLthout adequate eLaborated notLon of tLtLement) both enabLes further features of and revests much about rtghts. derLved important addttLon to the deftnLtLon of ought to protect can hoLders, be regards as correct moraL rLght , of a requLrement and therefore rLghts, to Lnsure protectLon, dLffuse correLatLve dutLes 3pptg prtncLpLes, to Ls no doubt Ls thus a consequentLaL over vaLLd characterLstLc poLnt of R tLtLements. as socLetLes Lt transmLt uphoLd, feature. SLmLLarLg such obLLgatLons to uphoLd rLghts are not feature from thetr character. In parttcuLar, the FeLnberg-Regan cLaLm-agaLnst component of thetr proposed anaLgsts Ls not part of the meanLng of that soctetg that that reLevant soctettes ought to part of the deftnLtLon of rLghts, but a LogLcaLLg emergent dertvatLve be separated as a consequence; Lt Ls not (as uphoLd them. But such functors, as obLLgatLon to derLvatLons; to rtghts In the fLrst pLace, Lt shows that HLLLs dLcttonarg defLnLtLons atso LndLcate) a deftntng feature. For true duLg 3 rLght, but somethtng foLLows from the prtncLpLes sustatntng a rLght to somethtng. For Lnstance, Lf Lt Ls generaLLg permtsstbLe to LLve others, free from unnecessarg suffering then moraL agents are therebg prohtbLted from causing unnecessarg sufferLng; -14- �and prohLbLtLon the functor Ls transnLtted the down cLaLn-agaLnst certain, tgpLcaLLg unspecLfLed, norat agents R derLvatLon.^ Ls consequentLaL a feature of vaLLd tLtLenents to, transnLtted fron the sustaLnLng noraL prLncLpLe. (ThLs Ls whg Regan can aLwags easLLg nanage to fLLL out a cLaLn-agaLnst forn where a McCLoskeg ent Lt Lenent can be estabLLshed; see RR p.231). SecondLg, the schene and defLnLtLon nake Lt evLdent that seLf-evLdent puretg or rLghts. axLonatLc a aLwags defence It foLLows, then, that ang theorg rLghts bg reference to such derLvatLons. cLaLns are no For ang rLght that stands up, that connands the tLtte, has a vaLLd derLvatLon. Rnd there Ls Lags there of that seLf-evLdent rLghts (such as FIcCLoskeg s), or axLonatLc rLghts to (such as DworkLn's), and ang decLaratLons, constLtuttons or bLLL of rLghts (such as that RnerLcan) the announces seLf-evLdent rLghts, Ls nLstaken. RLghts are aLwags derLvatLve fron other parts of an ethLcaL sgsten. ThLrdLg, the theorg shows dLrectLg the "derLvatLve character" of rLghts, and hetps to LndLcate the extent of theLr eLLnLnabLLLtg. For Lf rLghts are ever to be estabLLshed, then there nust, Ln the end, be correct noraL prLncLpLes, as there are, fron whLch tLtLenents do derLve. Thus a requLrenent of ground hoLds, are rLghts and generated fron other noraL prLncLpLes, Ln partLcuLar those of pernLssLon and obLLgatLon. RLghts are derLvatLve, not Ln the sense that there Ls a precLse recLpe for transLatLng rLghts dLscourse out - ang adequate transLatLon renaLns wLthLn the rLghts cLrcLe, of entLtLenent, cLaLns, etc. - but Ln the derLvatLonaL sense, that theg derLve fron another part of the deontLc area, that argunents and JustLfLcatLons for then go back to deontLc prLncLpLes. Because of theLr nuLtLpLg derLvatLve character, rLghts are dLspensLbLe after a fashLon, and at sone cost. So theg envLronnentaL ethLcaL enterprLses. not are But Ln essentLaL absoLuteLg a strongLg for LndLvLduaLLstLc rLghts-orLented socLetg, such as the USR, where rLghts notLons (and partLcuLarLg LndLvLduaL propertg notLons) are taken verg serLousLg, Lt Ls a snart strategg to nake heavg use of then, after the node of Regan. EnvLronnentaL posLtLons can do thLs aLso, bg derLvLng approprLate tLtLenents. RLghts are not nereLg derLvatLve, because, for Lnstance, of the force theg are accorded and the rotes theg can pLag when adnLtted. Rs RnerLcan wrLters stress, rLghts are anong the weLghtLest of others (hence the Lnportance Ln a noraL consLderatLons, whLch noraL or evLronnentaL cause of obtaLnLng rLghts accredLtatLon). RLghts certaLnLg have Lnportant protectLve and rotes, of Ln persuasLve so Lnsurance sheLterLng Ltens fron powerfuL actors and Lnterests. For those sorts prLncLpLes, and truno on. argunentatLve reasons too, Lnputed rLghts are Lnportant Ln reLnforcLng gettLng others to take Ltens serLousLg, to treat then decentLg, Ln The socLaL advantages LnstLtutLonaLLsatLon of rLghts accordLngLg offers not to be taken LLghtLg or abandoned. For these sorts of reasons, too, rLghts are not superfLuous (as Freg Ls LncLLned to suggest: -15- he �aLso incLined to suggest, not aLtogether consistentLg, that there aren t ang is woraL rtghts, p.7, p.17). Granted that for Mang purposes we can proceed back Lt ts not a consequence that Me prtnctpLes froM which rtghts derive; stLLL, the can get a Long as weLL without theM, stLLL Less that there potnt no ts advantage or Set-theorettctans can get a Long without nunbers; woMen can get theM. to to aLong wtthout thetr bras, soMe of theM teLL us; nucLear reactors can get aLong wtthout doubLe shteLdtng, so Russ Lan experts used to teLL us. R fourth set of consequences of the rtghts package offered Ls that there Ls no basts for various restrtcttons wtdetg tMposed upon the having senttence, tnterest, as such etc. (a rather now rtghts, of faniLiar test). Constder tnterests ftrst, stnee an "tnterests" restr Let Lon on rights-havers Ls pervasive. Nothtng Ln the deftnttton and dertvatton schene gtven, or Ln Ln the Ln suttabLLLtg requtreMents). Yet a cruciaL theg coutd be incorporated, Ln defLntttons McCLoskeg, MiLL, ...), requtres such tnterests (though (OED, vLctnttg other preMtss the issue of whether things other than persons, aninats especiaLLg, can have rights Links rights-hoLding with interest. R tgpicaL bridge princLpLe is RI. OnLg iteMs which (can) have MoraL rights (cf. Freg, p.5). Rs Freg RI is observes, not obvious (he Later appLies a strong forM of RI, without 3ngthing Much in the wag of argunent, nonetheiess), and has had Mang with notabtg rivaLs, interests repLaced bg other candidates put up for gaining MoraL standing (rationaLitg, Language, sentience, etc. - the saMe tiresoMe List).^ How then does the interest requireMent, RI, gain its wide accreditation and grip? For an astonishing series of bad reasons (as FreedMan Ln effect brings out), 1) inc Lud ing: we Usage; speak of Ltens Lacking interests (individuaLitg, etc.) as don't possessing rights (thus Ln effect McCLoskeg). and non-usage to has be backed In fact we do, bg other consideration if arbitrariness and prejudice are to be avoided (FreedMan pp. 160-1). 2) RbgsMaL anaigses, such as TooLeg s anaLgsis of X has a right to R as to refrain fron actions that wouLd deprive hiM (again dissected bg FreedMan p.161 ff.)^ it of and coupied 3) Mistaken thenes, such as Feinberg s (drawn fron McCLoskeg) that protection of an interest, and hence [it is ciaiMed] for right it cLaiM). Must have Nothing characteristicaLLg an interest however requires afford (FreedMan, is that reasoning a right is a sonething to a have p.16^., who upsets the inferred the protection rights that of an interest; as far as the Meaning of goes it can be of a thing or a sgsteM. t*) exercising roughig if R desires X, then others are under a prina-facie obLLgation with sgnongnous have; others and Confusion of having right with right a a right (pp.162-3), or even with being abLe to cLain a right. Though these are evidentLg different, and entaitMents froM having to exercising or to cLaining evidentLg faiL, such confLations are encouraged bg easg but unwarranted transition, such as those froM having a cLaiM to Making or being abLe to Make a cLain. But, to reiterate, rights have nothing highig intiMate -16- to do with the �Mak Lng bg c La LMS of a hoLder (though no doubt an art Lou Late Maker of cLaLMS hoLds soMe advantage Ln achLevLng Lts and others cLaLns). R creature or LteM wLth cLaLMS Mag have no abLLLtg or coMpetence to Make or present theM; or be the sort of thLng that can. ^a) ContractLons of rLghts to a subcLass of rLghts, such as exercLsabLe rLghts, Lndeed Lnterest-protectLng rLghts, accountabLe rLghts, etc. Then conatLve requLreMents do foLLow (e.g. what has an exercLsabLe rLght Must presunabLg at sone stage be suLtabLg aLLve and capabLe but reLevant actLvLtg), requLreMents foLLow froM the subcLassLfLcatLon LnvoLved, not froM the such notLon of rLght. of For Lnstance, the Lnterest-protectLng aspect of tnterest-protecttng rLghts foLLows froM the Lnterest-protectLng restrLctLon, not froM the notLon of rLghts, whLch Mag serve to protect thLngs LackLng interests (especLaLLg under chauvLnLstLcaLLg-favoured hLgh redefLnLtLons of Lnterests). R reLated cLuster of poLnts appLLes to attenpts to rLghts restrLct to persons or to LndLvLduaLs, atteMpts aLso tgpLcaLLg underpLnned bg the assuMptton that what has or can have rLghts Must have Lnterests, or desLres, or a suLtabLe conatLve LLfe, or whatever. But nothLng Ln the notLon of rLghts restrLcts rLghts to persons, or to LndLvLduaLs, or persons" Ln a generous LegaL sense; nothLng restrLcts theM to LndLvLduaLs and "persons". RLL these restr Let Lons on rLght-hoLders are Lnposed, wLthout Much or suffLcLent justLfLcatLon, usuaLLg for LdeoLogLcaL reasons, such as bLockLng LegLtLMate cLaLMS on behaLf of daMaged dLsadvantaqe LteMs or sgsteMs, MerLtLng protect Lon. or �§3. and rebuiLding environMentaLLg. the rLghts vLew Deconstructing Most iMportant, Regan's sharp LiMitation of rLghts LndLvLduaL to Consider, a subjects, LLMLtatLon whLch has a Most daMaging effect on the abLLLtg of hLs rLghts vLew to cope decentLg spec Les, concernLng rare 3nd endangered (e.g. Regan s pp.395-6). prob Lens of our tines, such as those envLronnentaL Major wLth forest does restrLctLon ecosgsteMs, wLLderness, foLLow froM not even etc. hLs own defLnLtLon of a rLght, as a vaLLd ciaiM. Rather the restrLctLon Ls progressLveLg LnfLLtrated, as postuLates the concerning are eLaborated. It is not rights uniforMig inf titrated (and in other work Rgan appears to abandon restrictions to individuaLs, e.g. HP, p.32). For instance at a cLosing stage (in p.39S) RR, a arguMent against priviLeged status for rare or endangered species begins, brief because paradigMatic right-hoLders are individuaLs (In sgLLogistic extended IndividuaLs forM the arguMents runs: ParadigM3tic right-hoLders are individuaLs. not acquire ang further rights if theg beLong to rare or endangered species. do Therefore, paradigMatic right-hoLders do not so acquire further rights. So the rights view does not acknow Ledge ang priviLeged MoraL status on the part of rare endangered or species right-hoLders needn t be individuaLs, aniMais.) of so The restricted beginning after aLL, onLg the species (with a if are paradigMs MoraL the about or MeMbers species e.g., as Hutiean entities, certaintg then treated, individuaLs, at Least BoodnanesqLg). But earLier Regan view as Look undercutting the brief argunent. For siMpig consider sone further non-paradignatic right-hoLders, such as endangered species theiisetves. it Makes of announces, rights The Species are not individuaLs, and the rights view does not recognise the MoraL rights of species to is view 3ngthing rights individuaLs. (p.3S9). Thus individuaLs, whatever theg are (no characterisation is actuaLLg offered), are not MereLg the right-hoLders; paradigMatic theg right-hoLders. The More conciiiatorg paradigMatic Line gives wag to the exhaust iron-fisted thene of (p.361), according the to aLLeged individuaListic nature of MoraL rights which the notion of MoraL rights cannot be neaningfuLLg appiied other than to individuaLs (p.36I). Rs far as evergdag, MoraL and LegaL usage goes this just isn t true; there is no such categoriaL restriction. Uhg trg to iMpose such an iMpLausibLe and environnentaLLg daMaginq atoMistic restriction on a rights view? Or, siMiLarLg, on a MoraL standing view? EMending the brief arguMent awag froM anti-environMentaL ends indicates whg. a rebuiit rights view, an individuaL Mag acquire More rights, and warrant More protection, bg be Longing to an endangered group, in virtue of princ ip Les such as that significant endangered species ought to be protected. creatures wouLd hoLd different But then different rights, contradicting Regan's assuMption that aLL aniMaLs are equaL* (p.395) - at Least in rights heid, this, On but as a Matter of definition) in and basis (the of inherent vaLue'. Here is the source of the troubLe, of individuaListic restrictions, not the basic account but the adjoined equaLitg assuMptions. -18- of rights, �restriction to individuats Ls not just an optionaL extra Ln Regan s The package, that can simpig be pee Led off. rLghts appt LeatLons of super-imposed theorg, the but Ls essentLaL wLth for the given coherence a super-individuaL, such as a specLes, If postuLates. equaLLtg hetd rLghts on an equaL basts It Ls requLred not ontg Ln major Lt, composLng LndLvLduaLs the then the wouLd both have more rLghts than Lts LndLvLduaLs (those of aLL super-individuaL Lts components) and the same rLghts (cf.DE on bLocentrLc egaLitarianism; DC, Furthermore, equaLLtg assumptLons are verg heavLLg depLoged Ln foLLowing p.3S). through LmpLLcatLons of the LndLvLduaL rLghts view, where dLfferentLaL treatment of different sorts of creatures Ls repeatedLg ruLed out bg appeats to equaLLtg. IntegraL as equaLLtg assumptLons are to Regan s LndLvLduaL-rLghts view, theg are neLther part of more ordLnarg ref Leet Lons on rLghts nor part of what Ls meant bg rLghts, but addLtLonat postuLates. Theg can accordLngLg be removed, and deconstructLon on of the rLghts exactLg view thLs Ls EquaLLtg done. assumptLons concernLng moraL rLghts are supposed, Ln the fLrst pLace, to from dLrectLg dLstLnguLshLng moraL rLghts, for Lnstance unLversaLLtg features absoLute are quaLLt Les, theg do Ls aspect ref Leets and equaLLtg features (p.267). But aLL thLs "equaLLtg rLghts foLLow that (p.368). It does not come Ln degrees not foLLow that one Ltem cannot have more rLghts than another (because, e.g., of Ltems the sort of thLng Lt Ls), or therefore that aLL bund Les equaL that have have rLghts of (even baste) rLghts. Nor does equaLLtg of basLc rLghts foLLow from unLversaLLtg requLrements, but ontg a certain Ln LmpartLaLLtg treatment (often confused however wLth egatttartanLsm). equaLLtg NeLther nor assumptLons LndLvLduaLLstLc restrtctLons emerge then; and Ln fact theg do not fLgure eLsewhere Ln the anaLgsLs of rLghts To them fend we have to foLLow gLven. the text past the anaLgsLs, through to the LntroductLon of the fundamentaL respect prtncLpLe and the rLght respectfuL to treatment (p.277 ff.), where both equaLLtg and LndLvLduaLLtg enter Ln a bLg wag, both beLng imported parts of the theorg of Lnherent vaLue (and assocLated as justLce prLncLpLe) from a previous chapter. For what Ls rLght those of who have argued Ls basic the Lnherent vaLue to... respectfuL treatment (p.277), where Lnherent vaLue Ls bg def Ln Lt Lon confLned to LndLvLduaLs and somethLng aLL suLtabLg conatLve LndLvLduaLs (those subject-of-a-Life) have equaLLg. ConsLder subjects' vaLue as - what we LL caLL Lnherent LndLvLduaLs vaLue. ... aLL who have Lnherent vaLue have Lt equaLLg p.23S ff.). (pp p.37; Inherent vaLue Ls thus a theoretLcaL notLon, conforming sLmLLarLg to HR various postuLates, notabLg LndLvLduaLLtg and equaLLtg. ObviousLg the theorg of Lnherent vaLue can be varied, pLace of Lnherent vaLue, LndLvLduaL as Regan effectiveLg admits (p.362). Consider, then, Ln LnLtLaL or connate vaLue, X, or not, as foLLows: the vaLue of X, defined, for ang Ltem if ang, as an Ltem (and not as a mere receptacLe). In pLace of the equaLitg postuLated for Lnherent vaLue, Lt assumed that, for Ls ang X and Y of the same ethicaL tgpe, X and Y have the came -17- �connate vaLue. Then, white connate vaLue Ls not verg Mett characterised, Ls Lt as adequateLg specified as Lnherent V3tue, and can carrg Lts work-Load. showing Before that Let s Look at differences, and Limitations, of the notion. Mhite inherent vaLue is an aLL-or-nothing (certain affairs individual tgpes have Lt, nothing eLse does, but has zero vaLue), connate vaLue Ls not. Not that have (non-zero) connate vaLue need have equaL positive vaLue or tgpes aLL positive vaLue at aLL. DeviLs, certainLg if theg existed, wouLd negative vaLue connate disboLicainess, if (their ontoLogicaL no nonexistence proofs objects are to be beLLeved.) Connate doubt have decidedLg to adding their the existence of top connate vaLue of are vaLues somewhat thus initiaL Like LeveLs of perfection. Connate vaLue Ls, Like inherent vaLue properLg understood, at an best initiaL assignment. The assignments Like those of initiaL are probabiLLtg under a principLe of indifference (particuLarLg vaLue; connate out themseLves presumptive those of inherent vaLue invoLves a further tgpoLogg). UntiL actors, objects, sort their bg initiaL Life-stgLes, can which vaLue, then intrinsic vaLue gets cLarified; compare a be theg states worLd-Lines, posteriori a diminished as or increased receive probabiLLtg assignments. Thus too connate vaLue is not aLL that is taken into account in discerning moraL and so Ln deriving rights. Further vaLue-making or vaiue-detracting prtncLpLes, features of things which affect intrinsic vaLue are aLso reLevant. 0 criticaL question is whether connate vaLue can serve to carrg enough (not aLL, of course) of the requisite argument; in particuLar, that to a respect principLe. appears Examination to show that it can, at Least to this extent: insofar as the argument (pp.277-9) based on respectfuL fact, Ln individuat bg to item substitute connate made is principLe, principLe as aLso to repLace required, nameig resuLts defence of the modified, succeeds. It does, as inspection of the bg shows, where the the same substitutions as before. The modified principLe Looks near-anaLgtic: Ue are to treat those items which have connate that respect their connate vaLue (pp.2t+8). The modified respect wags in and presupposed argument (pp.258-60) for the modified respect principLe soon vaLue right throughout, and to verifg bg inspection that aLL detaiLs that evergthing does work as weLL, given that the modified the features of moraL rights. But it is straightforward to verifg concerning respect to inherent for work just as weLL. Minor use of some points aireadg those vaLue succeeds, so does that based instead on connate vaLue. It treatment suffices, inherent principLe appLies of course to species and sgstems, as weLL as for individuaLs, and so does the expanded right to respectfuL treatment. Much of the remainder of Regan's text can be simiLarLg reinterpreted, but again bg no means aLL.15 (Limitations of space, time, and energg preciude a fuLLer de- and re-construction). Some initiaL indication onLg of the expanded environmentaL rights theorg offered. But it which repLaces the moraL rights view wiLL be is important to observe right awag, that mang of the goats of -20- �the anLmaL rights Movement, as Regan conceives Lt Largetg intact under the expanded rLghts theorg (e.g. can PP,p.32), perhaps (minus remain totaLitg the cLaims), for instance, the theme of aboLition of the use of animats Ln scLence. But not aLL the further postulates of Regan's rLghts view remain intact, most notabLg that of vegetarianism, which Ls not a consequence of themes of rLghts movement. Nonethe Less? animat the rLghts view hotds that the LndLvLduaL h3s a dutg to Lead a vegetarian Mag of LLfe supererogatorg; Lt (p.351,p.3^.6) to thLs permLssLbLe Ls vegetarianism Ls (p.39!+); But (p.3^6). obLLgatorg' cone Lus Lon the appear to most the arguments the not Ls Lt that Ls estab LLsh not to consume the products of commercLaL animat agrLcuLture (LncLudLng Since the anLmaL Lndustrg routLneLg presumabLg eggs and pureLg bread sausages). vLoLates the rLghts of these anLmaLs, for the reasons Ls Lt given, wrong to purchase Lts products. That Ls whg, on the rLghts view, vegetarLanLsm Ls moraLLg obLLgatorg, (p.3SI,LtaLLs added). Rs an argument to vegetarLanLsm (a vegetarLan beLng, one who abstaLns from anLmaL food, and LLves on veqatabLe food, and, '16 ----usuaLLg eggs, mitk, etc ), the argument Ls a major nonsequLtur (Likewise the argument, p.3^.6)^\ For there are mang wags of obtaLnLng anLmaL food whLch do not LnvoLve commercLaL anLmaL agrLcuLture or commercLaL practLces (the no proper of focus Regan's sLnce attach, such practLces tgpLcaLLg dLsrespectfuL and insensitive use and rLghts vLoLatLons). Examp Les of practLces huntLng-gatherLng LLfestgLes, of doubt Lead LncLude to the the gardenLng cuLtures of the Pie Lanes La and PoLgnesia, of subsLstence farmLng and of some of the new communes. Regan's further argument (Lt wouLd be unfaLr to stick hLm wLth the awfuL page 3nd 351 with eatLng dogs) commLts hLm, moreover, to the moraL LmproprLetg of (as these extensive tradLtLonaL LLfestgLes weLL as mtnor ones), newfangLed Lnsofar as theg LnvoLve the kiLLLng of pLgs and fLsh and occasLonaL wLLdLLfe and so R chLef reason gLven Ls that on. end theLr LLves are brought to an untLmeLg antmaLs' (e.g. p.39^.). But suppose, to dLspose fLrst of strLct tLme has come, vegetarLanLsm, that or, more straLghtforwardLg, that theg are aLreadg dead. Mhat precLudes respectfuL use? Rn expanded rLghts theorg does not entaLL vegetarLanLsm - ang more connected theorLes, such as aLL that consLderatLon, or rLvaL theorLes such as restrLctLons, wLthout further Large sent Lent utLLLtarLanLsm, are Longer no sentient or entaLL moraL deserve such dLetarg assumptLons. For there are mang tgpes of circumstance where Lt Ls perfectLg permLssLbLe to which beLngs than eat dead creatures, things which wLLL not now attain sentience (as DC exp Lains and argues). The more probLematic area Ls not that of consuming what is aLreadg dead, but of causing prematureLg, Ln order death (or, to a Lesser extent, Letting die) to achieve that option or, to gieLd it as a bg-product. For this appears to infringe rights to Life and LLveLihood and to vioLate moraL standing of creatures interfered with so drasticaLLg. Rppears to. For even ethicaL theorLes that now concede various rLghts to -21- �anLmaLs bauLk anLmaLs. Rnd at for sone patLents, Papuans the rLghts extensive to LLfe and LLveLhood to own vLew provLdes, Ln the categorLaL dLstLnctLon between Regan's noraL agents and moraL treatment, such admLttLng ground of treatment dLfferentLaL further and pLgs, a peopLe dLstLnctLon Ln whLch Regan hLmseLf takes refuge when pressed. Regan s dLfferentLaL justLfgLng for So how tLght Ls Ln partLcuLar when reconsLdered as appLgLng agaLnst arguMent, tradLtLonaL LLfestgLes rather than agaLnst modern commercLaL practLces? The buLk of the crucLaL argument ff.) dLd not treat resources. Nor dLd theg (p.3{+^); receptacLes does sLmpLg cuLtures tradLtLonaL renewabLe (p.3t*3 appLg. not anLmaLs just as resources, stLLL Less as as anLmaLs treat Lnstruments mere excLude some kLLLLng of anLmaLs - or do theg? It wouLd seem that of tradLtLonaL unLLke peopLes, provLsLon (p.3t*3), are prLncLpLe dubLous admLtted commercLaL under derLved supposedLg who farmers Regan's from prLncLpLe LLbertg respect prLncLpLe, p.332). R the LncLudLng fundumentaL respect prLncLpLe LtseLf. On a straLght readLng requLres whLch that treatment creatures of vaLue Lnherent are however Some excLuded. Ls not of for prLncLpLe, the countervaLLLng respectfuL No excLuded. LnfrLnged because a creature of Lnher- nt vaLue persLst, come what mag. There use Ls respectfuL of the kLnd of vatue theg have (p.277), such uses of anLmaLs are not wLth a (p.331, stgLe of better tradLtLonaL practLces Ls excLuded under the more the Ln practLces the vLoLate the respect crLtLcaL quest Lon Ls whether the respectfuL use of anLmaLs, food, Papua, pLgs before kLLLLng. CarefuL, respectfuL practLces do not exchanged often or consLder the respectfuL treatment of mang hunter-gatherer groups Ln aborLgLnaL RustraLLa, or the practLces of gardenLng peopLes Ln who Large and Bg does rLghts are therebg a acquLre not Ln LndLctLons Lnterference rLght text Regan s to (and eLsewhere Ln hLs "preservatLon prLncLpLe") whLch wouLd go far towards sustaLnLng the vegetarLan concLusLons he faLLs to reach, and therebg to ruLLng tradLtLonaL the bLoconatLvLst assumptLons that Lt Ls LLfestgLes LnadmLssLbLe. Such are aLwags wrong to destrog LLfe (verg specLat cLrcumstances apart perhaps), that Lt Ls never permLssLbLe to reduce vaLue catastrophLcaLLg the wag that LLfe anLmaLs brLnqtrg to an untLMeLg end does. But Ln fact Regan does not endorse such prLncLpLes, strongLg rejectLng prLncLpLes LLke the pacLfLst prLncLpLe use or harmfuL destructLve wLth LncompatLbLe bLoconatLvLst the vLoLence "LLbertg" assumptLons, no (p.287); prLncLpLes matter as Lnterpreted. dLffLcuLt how wouLd maxLMLae never to bLoconatLvLsm appears Lndeed to NonetheLess, LLve bg, are hLghLg appeaLLng to mang ethLcaL pacesetters and theorg desLgners, especLaLLg who an to mang vaLue. But theg throw the whoLe naturaL order Lnto ethLcaL dLsorder; predatLon, fuLL terrLtorLaL defence and mang other commonpLace naturaL happenLngs are thrown Lnto ethLcaL doubt or MorLd magbe a Ls not verg rendered LnadmLssLbLe. ilagbe The RequLred the wag Lt surprLsLngLg Ls (LesLLe's thesLs) after aLL; dLfferent predator-free sLn-eradLcated RequLred, where V3tue j^s maxLmLzed? -22- post-naturaL worLd Ls �$4.' Ti'tt'eMsnts and substantiaL prob tews. tivehood: and predation, territoriatitg other the dust that status-quo-supporting phiiosophers Despite have raised, there is no doubt, tooking through the ctoud, but that * Rnimats have various interests, mang of then of the human as those of instance, sustenance, survivat, sex, species, sheiter (see for animats, sort sane e.g. RR, PR). * Rnimats have various For exampte, theg have, in the same wag that rights. humans do, a right to iive free from unnecessarg suffering, and from excessive interference. these ciaims are substantiaitg independent (having interests is Logicaitg Mhite neither necessarg nor sufficient significant connections, inasmuch rights), having for as rights are nonethetess protect permissibie there to serve worthwhiie interests which more powerfui operators, such de-foresters, as mag otherwise override or ignore. There is no doubt, furthermore, that present human practices sgstematicaLLg infringe animai rights, especiatig those tied to their interests. For exampie, much animai suffering. causes experimentation unnecessarg quite there is a powerfui case for changing these practices (compare Thus and contrast Freg p.t*.), a case both enhanced, and easier obtain to positive action upon, bg the due admission of relevant rights. Rttainment of the sorts of sociai protection the widespread admission of rights can iead to shouid not be underestimated, in the wag it is bg utiiitarians and anti-moraiists. Granted animats have rights, some of them higher humans rights nohumans, widespread a have, main animats phenomenon of predation, a par with those that question (pace Freg) concerns which outstanding particutartg, on have. Because especiatig of the essential to the continued tivetihood of mang creatures, the issue can took tike an exceedingtg difficult one (and one comes to grief upon). There are undoubtedtg serious confticts of interest Regan induced through the phenomenon, some of them unavoidable as when a herbivore s interest in continued existence ctashes with a carnivore s interest in continued sustenance, avoidabte others as in human Predation is not of course the ontg source of territoriatitg, slaughter of whates and dotphins. serious conflict of interests; for instance, C3n atso iead to serious encounters, particutartg in situations of expanding poputations (thus too the issues are connected). Such matters as predation, territoriatitg and population been converted into increase serious prob terns bg mistaken atomistic views of vaiue and associated excessive ciaims as to rights. Removing these defective the but integral part much of atomistic non-utititarian positions such as Regan's, hotds that vaiue (or utititg) is a feature, at bottom, of atomistic as themes probtematic. The vatue theorg involved, tgpified bg utilitarianism reduces an have individuats, that those items items such (constituting the base ctass) have a fixed -23- �(equaL) vaLue whLLe theg persist, which Ls not substitutibLe for and that vaLues (derived) Ls ecosystems, of whaLes additive an simpLy functLon the of aLLenabLe, such structures, organised and or atoms as Lt. within CharacteristicaLLg aLso theses of maximization and preservatLon of present vaLue are incorporated Lnto the theorg. On such assumptions, predatLon and LnvoLve a reductLon Ln vaLue, at Least Ln the shorter tern, and so a infringing path, and maximization preservatLon enhances the prob Lens bg postuLating a rLght to has that LndLvLduaL (Lnherent) LnLtLaL to everg simiLarLy woraL exLstence (and vaLue suboptimaL The rights view desLderata. contLnued Like the considerabLLitg posLtLons add to the dLffLcuLtLes). But the assumptions LnvoLved shouLd be removed. Both the wag the probLems are generated fron the assumptions, and the reasons for revising the vaLue eLsewhere than which are wore LncLude sun the of predators, theLr LndLvLduaL escaLation The the of theg though components, be hLghLg vaLuabLe Ln theLr own rLght, wLth mag LLves of herbLvores substituted for wLthtn vaLue. detaLL Ln the Breen SerLes, especLaLLg OC ^). Host important, ecosystems, (Ln tgpLcaLLg expLaLned are assumptions, the through probLems wLthout system, reductLon of theorLes deserves, rights however, some eLaboratLon. R serLous cLash of Lnterest, as between carnLvores and herbLvores, fortunateLg does not therebg Lnduce an imcompatibLLLtg rLghts, of unLess too Lnterests are eievated to rLghts. But just thLs appears to happen when the many extensLve (but not LnvarLabLe) Lnterests of LLvLng creatures exLst are sharpLg upgraded to unquaLLfLed rLghts to LLfe (a Ln contLnuLng mistaken to eLevatLon that Ls common Ln ethLcaL thought). The rLght to LLfe of a success Lon of gnus Ls LnfrLnged bg LLon whLch aLso has a rLght to sustenance to sustaLn Lts LLfe. a MLth the advance of technoLogg Lt wouLd now be possLbLe cases of to Lnterfere some Ln predatLon, e.g. that of the remaLnLng Large carnLvores, to uphoLd gnu rLghts , bg switchLng the carnLvores to an appropriate vegetarian dLet (and, to avoLd cuLLLng, our spLended contraceptLve technoLogg couLd be appLLed hoLd to gnu popuLatLon Ln check). But to deaL wLth aLL cases of predatLon and assocLated issues in these bizarre sorts of wags Ls not onig practicaLLg LmpossLbLe; but at further, such extensLve interference with naturaL ecosgstems is LtseLf, verg Least, dubiousLg permissibLe. High-tech vegetarLan-stgLe resoLutLons of probLems of predatLon, territoriaLitg and so on, are On contrary, the virtuaLLy aLL the remaining naturaL radicaLLg unsatisfactory. systems containing Large carnLvores shouLd be Left substantiaLLg intact or restored towards their naturaL states. These ecosystems ought to persist, and have a Can t an rights to, right fLourishing LnvoLves reguLar vioLation of aLLeged absoLute though their rLghts to Life. to LLfe be Left intact (L.e. mereLg moraLLg extended from unauthentic human setting), and the probLems skirted around? Rfter aLL, some confLict, and inconsistency even, of rights, obLigations and so on, is inevitabLe, and can be LogLcaLLg Lived with in these Latter paraconsistent dags. Some can, but not too much. ConfLict shouLd be confined to exceptionaL (often -24- �significant) sorts of cases. In these terns, bg accommodated Mag of up confLLct sgstematic reguLar such confLLct anatogous S3tisfactoriig It Ls too reguLar, deontLc does sgstem not because theg remove part of the poLnt of deontLc cases, structures: for then much too much rather not of rLghts or prLncLpLes. confLLet sgstematic and commonpLace. R sufficientLg effLcLent muLtipLg is predatton Ls time cases. R confLLct, repuzziing spent undermines MhLch fash Lon to deaL wLth sattsfactorg more redecLdLng and the point and force of prLncLpLes, is revision of principLe. Furthermore, a confLLct of rights approach (no more than a confLLct of vaLues approach: right. feeL doesn't p.33) DC, at aLL Lion Ls not acting MrongLg or infringing rights MhoLesaLe, everg Meek R Mhen it mag kLLL an anteLope or other creature. R aLternative, atreadg indicated, consists then in Minding in superior excessive titLement concessions, so as to avoid extensive confLLct. R strong and Legitimate interest in a continuing LiveLihood to right does not an give unquaLified Life, which can be conferred against associated predators. It affords onLg a defeasibLe right, which can be forfeited or Lapse. In these terms, a Lion that takes a Meaker aged gnu, taiLing or separated from a herd, does not vioLate Lts defeasibLe right to Life. The different. Mith situation their take chances. rights to Life are not predatorg is essentiaLLg not LLL-equipped or reck Less humans who put themseLves Ln or find LJeak, themseives in threatening situations, such as traveL humans animats or wiiderness If theg therebu Lose their Lives, their defeasibLe therebg or action highspeed infringed animats where (and defending their animats are territories LnvoLved, not shouid be HL id animats such as gnus are aLmost aiwags on Mitderness traveL, persecuted). except when imprisoned in zoos; theg properLg take their chances with naturaL predators. Rs pursuit of this approach suggests, a hetpfuL wag of coming with predation and Like issues happens, what grips is through zoning, or more generaLLg through bioregionaLLsm, which zones regions of the earth s surface what to and eisewhere. is protected, what Ls permissibie and right, Ln wiiderness can be significantLg different from that in urban areas. R tiger that moves of out a wiiderness to a supposedLg easier Life in a citg where incautious citizens are pLentifuL, cannot expect 3nd doesn t merit the same treatment as Lt did wiiderness, nameLg being Left LargeLg atone. Moreover, with bioregions big For wiiderness as Locus, Lt is much to think hoLLsticaLLg, easier predation as an LntegraL and significant part of such a rich naturaL the as to see structure rather than isoLated action of individuaLs without a further just ifg ing setting. (The adjustment of ethicaL principtes to regions, and Large communities, need invoLves no Loss of universaLizabLLitg; wiiderness is an appropriatetg generat notion, not get a proper name.) The action of carnivores (LncLuding traditionaL peoptes) in wiiderness areas, in taking preg conservativeLg, Ln defending their territories and so -25- on, �LnvoLves no LtseLf Ln infringeMents of rLghts then, whether what Ls taken Ls huMan or not (Ls "repL3cabLe" or not). There Ls Moreover no need for Lnstance Lf a carnLvore had coMsuMed a career. that tresspassLng Darwin Ln earLg hLs brash utLLLtarLan wouLd LnsLst, or pretend, that, when aLL the a OnLg deng Lts frequent vioLence and death, nag LnvoLve Loss of vaLue, as with predatLon, to undo-abLe cowputat tons are done, the sufferLng and Losses and repLacenents of sgsteMS, net vaLue of overaLL naturaL processes Ls aLwags approxtMattng naturaL MaxtMaLLtg. On the other stde, thought Lt wouLd be a supreMe technoLogtcaL opttMtst sgsteMS couLd perforw nearLg as sattsfactortLg, huMan-engtneered that even on a qutte Modest scaLe. HuMan breakdown, who efforts, whtch especLaLLg are prone to soMettMes Make soMe SMaLL iMproveMents around the edges; MostLg can theg reLg upon expottLng what Ls aLreadg there or nearbg. Rs a worktng ruLe, the More huMans interfere wLth naturaL processes, the More probLeMs the as there are and More thtngs go wrong. Med LeaL experience wLth intervention, even in Matters norMaLLg straightforward huMan chLLdbirth, provide weLL-docuMented ruLe at work. The chances of huMans iMproving, technicaLLg or the of evidence as MoraLLg, upon Nature Ln wLLderness areas Ls exceedLngLg sLight. To adapt one the ecoLogicaL Laws to of encapsuLate the working ruLe: Nature generaLLg does better than huMans. Its coroLLarg Ls: CurtaLL excessive huMan interference Ln naturaL regions. It does not Matter if, because of predation and the Like, vaLue a Lwags as poLiticaL high wickedness, evoLutionarg not it Might be. Mith the persistence of sin and prevaLence of as Ls copious reason for conjecturing that we do not there inhabit the best of possibLe worLds. Besides we 3re free to specuLate Long is process - that the no doubt a rather restricted, heaviLg interfered with, and verg hit and Miss business - did not turn out as perfectLg as Lt Might have. Major ecosgsteMs certainLg do not appear to have evoLved adapted in weLL wag a to (or anticipating, so to sag) the 3rrivai of Modern huMans with their enorMOUs destructive capacitg and wLLL to power. But, even apart froM the advent it is far froM cLear that Nature of such huMans, provides rather Nature satisizes (an adjustMent of ecoLogicaL an optiMat sgsteM; Law" argued for eLsewhere: see SM). The facts of satisization do not put Nature out of step with deontic best MoraLLtg, principLes. For deontic principLes aLso answer back eventuaLLg to sufficient LeveLs of vaLue, not to MaxiMaL consequences (see were with that vaLue SH). Even it be Maximized, obLigation certainLg does not require Lt. Predation can take a rightfuL pLace Ln such a satisizing environnent; naturaL sgsteMS which have evoLved with predation seeM to offer quite and often dazzLing, Lf LeveLs of vaLue. Richard SgLvan via Bungendore -26- for the adequate, �RustraLia 2621 NOTES 1- For aLL that I an crLtLcaL of Much of that thought environmentaL Lt far of southern and western Rmerican schooLs, out fLows the surpasses the drearg and reactionary anti-environmentaL dross that emerges typLcaLLy the froM prestigious More universities Ln LndustrLaL north-eastern USR and British LLght-engLneerLng centres LLke Oxford. 2. May ThLs a strike MoraL as theorist aiMost cost/benefit ana Lysis of (mainstream) econoMics - as curious as a order in aLso and having reaL point - wouLd strike econoMists. But the cases are different. assessMents Cost/benefit depend on a vaLue theory of soMe (perhaps degenerate) sort, but not necessarily on MoraLity. 3- EntitLement to whom? On traditionaL views, and amounts what choice seLf-appointed chosen, (p.!*). makers entitLement a to in There are probiems according PP, to we free and rationaL use regarding of contexts, since entitLement moves in the these rights-circLe and items with m-s May Lack rights. The annuLar picture is open to the separate charges of being but a devious sort of moraL ex tens ion ism and of introducing or invoLving a moraL hierarchy, both of which set scenes for condemnation. But neither charge is justified in a form that wouLd do damage. MoraL notions are not extended, rather their proper significience ranges and catagoriaL features are investigated and put to principLed work. Rs to the matter of hierarchy, the dLvisions of ref Leets cLassification things in terms of such features, where theg appLy, as capacities and capabiiities. This wouLd yieLd a hierarchy these features ranked, which on the annuLar picture they are not. (Even if they were and a hierarchy aLL Not probiematic. resuLted, hierarchies are need that damaging, e.g. ciassificatoru ones, such as BioLogicaL divisions may oniy were when be. not be mereLy It is hierarchies serve to distribute, or become a means to, power or priviLege or favour, that theg warrant the criticism hierarchies have encountered. That criticism wouLd have deservedLy been directed at certain power hierarchies are of this sort.) -27- hierarchies; but not aLL �UorrLes about LnstaLLLng a MoraL power hterarchg or pecktng order and accoMpangtng MoraL eLLtes are one reason whg sone philosophers an (west go qutteLg atong wLth eLLtes) operate wtth LMpoverLshed ethLcaL tgpotogg. For instance, a Mtsp Laced egaLLtartantsM appears both as deep ecoLogg, Ln bLo-con3ttvtsM 3nd Ln rLghts vLews such Ln where both Lnherent vaLue and the equaL basLc rLghts Regan's, Lt supports behave Ln an aLL-or-nothLng fash Lon. 5. StwLLar funng busLness Ls goLng on standLng vaLue-Ln-LtseLf wLth Freg, Ln equates who worst and proceeds to bound Lt (p.!+S), beLow, not bLocentrLcaLLg as Ln Goodpaster, but bg sentLence. ThLs part happens as coLLapse of a of wore wLdespread huwanLstLc utLLLtarLan Major ethtcaL dtsttnctLons, wLth rLghts as a further casuaLLtg. 6. PossLbLLLtg and forws of nonLnterference prLncLpLes probabtLLtg are basLc to the Ma Ln arguwents the to LMMoraLLtg of nucLear arrangements: see LiP. 7. But Fox has M3de a sustaLned - though now apparentLg parttaLLg repeated - attewpt to do so, tn hts crtttctsM of axtotogg. Such an attempt Ls bound to faLL. VaLues are baste and LnescapabLe (theg enter even Lnto truth cLatms). Thus, for Lnstance, a crtttctsM woraLLtg as Ln a generaL bad Lnstttutton, cost/beneftt record and, has wrought Much enMeshed whtch damage, Ls of has a poor thoroughtg Ln vaLue concerns. RntL-MoraLtsm depends on axLoLogg; Lt does not sustain and antt-axtoLogg. 8. UnLversaLLzabLLLtg Ls used Ln the text because Lt Ls famLLLar. But what are reaLLg Lwportant are LntersubstLtutLvLLg and reptaceMent prLncLpLes, whtch underLLe generaLLztbLLLtg and other features. 8. SoMe of opposttton and standard objeettons to rLghts taLk resuLt froM Mtsgutded ontoLogtcaL assuMpttons. For exaMpLe, Lt Ls aLteged that rLghts are verg curtous sorts of entctLes, untversaLs that sctence casts no LLght upon and does not need. RccordtngLg, prtncLpLe of such p3rstMong, as OccuM s weLL as provLdtng a pasttng such propertLes, such as betng objeettons of such crude LnstruMents as OccoM s razor: consutt JB, Lndex). Creatures have have a razor, such ent Lt Les shouLd be dLscarded. Object-theorg shortcLrcuLts (as bg derLvatLve rLghts; froM rLghts certaLn obLtgattons; but rLghts do not exLst, soMewhere, or at aLL. RLghts are LogtcaLLg weLL-enough behaved nonexLatent objects. -28- �10. The not Lon of right[sj, though -a coMparativetg Modern Ls one, a verg coMpLex one, sone of the conpLexLtg beLng ref Leoted Ln the 20 right' LLsted Ln the OED. Rn atteMpt to senses of the substantive brLng sone order and sgsteM to thLs coMptexLtg Ls Made Ln SN. RLthough the takes anaLgsis frow off one Ma Ln OED sense, the eLaboratLon wLLL Lead bg or through other connected 1.3 as whLch that MoraLLg just or due concerned Ls (as in LnvoLveMent activities); be no issues concerning opportunitg (as in rights to work) or LLbertg (as in rights state-iMposed such equitg or ... which is right-doing ). But there wiLL Main Ln wLth senses, not to in participate are priMariig issues for MoraL these actors. 11. reLevant or coMMunities to capabie or individuats within theM, i.e. he reguLarLg resorts to individualizing strategies. The status of iterated deontic princ ip Les invoLved in such exact arguMents can be Left open, e.g. whether OOC is entaLLed bg 00 is or further substantive principie which can be asserted when 00 a is. 13. Not aLL these substitutes are incoMpatibLe, fortunateLg for who Leaps to the cone Lus ion that sentience, beings and the "higher ... is an the fact that huMan aniMats have experiences or MentaL states the uLtiMate and fundaMentai basis of the ctaiM that theg (p.^3). No arguMent at aLL are possessors of MoraL rights than appeaL to (other is to be found for this ciatM, a authoritg) surprising OMission in an author who is fond of LaMbasting for Freg, faiLure suppig to others arguMents (e.g. p.7) - especiaLLg in the MereLg citing Light of his eartier reMarks that sentieneg as a criterion for the possession of MoraL rights neither shows that it is one nor even creates the presuMption that it is, ... untiL soMe respects are provided ... arguMents in these subsequent chapters, such arguMents are . Rs we shaLL see in scarce on the ground (p.33). lit- Too Leg s anaLgsis standard account substituting can "right of for desires , an wouLd Mark out onLg subcLass rights, of be upgraded, and brought into Line with (adopted to" Ln EE, p.176), chooses or wouLd chose . Even so Lt iMportant roughLg consequentiai exercisabLe criticisM teLLs against EE). -2?- feature rLghts (a of a siMLLar �IS. Rn important exanpLe is the argunent which bg broken is concedLng to that vaLue, equat not p.33, PP aLL hunans, serLousLg genet LeaLLg defectLve and weLL-endowed contractuaLLg-capabLe, need have equat connate vaLue, and thus renoving the preniss. 16. London,1932). RecordLng to the Concise EngLLsh DLcttonarg (Onega, the But qutte not Ls natter not a reputation of sLnpLe, so vegetartantsn on the basts of the avaiLabititg of dead aninats decisive. carefuL definition, which wouLd however render nore R sone hunter-gathers (and even sone cannibats) vegetarians, is 'one who Lives whoLLg or principaLLg OED account, so upon the vegetabie a person who on principle abstains fron ang forn of aninaL foods; food, or at Least such as Ls obtained bg the direct destruction of Life'. 17. that not decisivetg support vegetartantsn, even inproved connerciat faming does UtLLitarianisn invoLving s Laugh ter and of so Regan correctLg contends (p.3S0 suns up his extensive aninats, argunent). Ln Rnd fact fLawed the case utititarian vegetartantsn Ls effectiveLg abandoned in the recent work for of one choice of of its Leading proponents, Singer (see DC, p.36). 13. sone Uhite such terntnoLogg distinction singuLarLg is unfortunate given the non-obsoiete patient . Most aninats are not patients. senses of the noun 13. the inportant, is For exanpLe, in a range of, adnittedLg difficuLt, confiict such as Lifeboat situations (p.32^,p.351), and nore inportant, as regards interspecies reL3tions (p.357 ff.). and threats to rabid foxes to the crunch; hunans aLwags outrank aninats. (So nuch for the then strict norat restrictions, grounded in ... inherent vaiue , the sane aLL and hunans (e.g. p.353). Despite his discLainers, Regan s egaLitarian princ ip Les ring hoLLow when Lt cones for cases, for subjects-of-a-LLfe, on the strength of which even carefuL and respectfuL defective farngard greater C3n practices vaLue assunption be p.3^.2). condenned, R is snuggLed into the rights view, seriousLg detracting fron its environnentaL depth (see DE, si). 20. On bioconativisn see CaLLicott; Leading ideas go back to -Jainisn. 21. Predation bg Large carnivores can conpared with hunan travet be usefuLLg, sporting and predation (no accident of -30- course) favourabig, accidents. UhiLe the nunber of kiLLings annuaLLg are of a siniLar order aninaL and of nagnitude, appears to invoLve �rather Less suffertng and pstn. Rnd though reduct ton tn vatue tn the removat tt tnvotve may some of on-gotng ttves, tt atso offers some very constderabte compensattng ecosystemtc beneftts. REFERENCES J.B. A t Catttcott, On the tntrtnstc vatues of nonhuman spectes' tn The Preservatton of Spectes (e.d. B.G.Norton) Prtnceton Untverstty Press, 1386; pp.138-172. R. Dworktns, Taktng Rtghts Sertousty, Duckworth, London, 1377. J. Fetnberg, The rtghts of antmats and unborn generattons, tn Phttosophy and Envtronmentat Crtsts (e.d. M.J. Btackstone) Untverstty of Georgta Press; Rthens, 1371+, pp. 1+3-68. U. Fox, R postcrtpt on 2(1+) (1385) 17-23. deep ecotogy and tntrtnstc vatue , The Trumoeter The enttty-restrtctton of rights: Notes on a fashion tn ethtcs B. Freedman, Hetaphttosophy 12(1381) 153-168. R.G. Frey, Interests and Rtghts. The Case Rgatnst Rntmats, 1880. K.E. Goodpaster, 308-325. Ctarendon, Oxford, On betnq moratty constderabte , Journat of Phttosophy 75(1378) I. H tnckf uss, The Morat Soctety: Its Structure and Effects, rev used ve rs con, Untverstty of Queenstand, 1386. J. Lestte, Vatue and Extstence, Oxford, 1373. H.J. McCtoskey, Respect for humans morat rtghts versus maxtmtztng good tn Uttttty and Rtghts (e.d. R.6. Frey), Btackwett, Oxford, 1385 pp.121-136. C. Ptgden, Nthtttsm: a Defence, Ph.D Thests, LaTrobe Untverstty, 1385. E.B. PLuhar, The Justtftcatton for envtronmentat etttc , Envtronmentat Ethtcs 5(1383 )l+7-61. T. Regan, The Case for Rntmat Rtghts, Routtedge & Kegan Paut, London, 1383; to as HR. T. Regan, On the nature and posstbtttty of on envtronmentat ethtcs', Envtronmentat Ethtcs 3(1381) 13-31+; referred to as NP. J. Rodman, Theory and practtce tn the envtronnentat Movement: notes towards an -31- �ecoiogg of experience', Ln The Search for Rbsotute VaLues Ln a Changing UorLd, InternationaL CuLturaL Foundation, New Yorh 1978, pp.1+5-56. J. Rodman, Ecoiogg sensibiLitg , in Ethics and the Environment (ed. D. Scherer and T. Rttig), Prentice HiLL, NJ, 1983, pp.88-92; reprinted in VanDeVeer and Pierce, pp.185-8. R. RoutLeg, RLLeged probLems in attributing beLiefs and intensionaiitg to animats , Inquirg 21+ (1981) 387-L17; referred to as PR. R. Rout Leg, In defence of cannibaLism. I. Tgpes of admissibte and LnadmissibLe cannibatism , Green Series, RSSS. RNU; referred to as DC. R. Rout Leg, Exp Loring Pie inong's JungLe and Begond, RSSS, RustraLian NationaL Universitg, 1979; referred to as JB. R. Rout Leg, Liar and Peace I On the ethics of Large-scaLe nucLear Mar and nucLear-deferrence and the poLiticaL faLL-out , Green Series, RSSS, RNU 1981+; referred to as UP. R. and V. Rout Leg, Human chauvinism and environmentaL ethics , in Environmental Ph i Losophg (e.d. D. Plannison and others) RSSS, RustraLian NationaL Universitg, 1980, pp.98-189; referred to as EE. ' 1 T. Rgan, The case for animaL rights' in VanDeVeer and Pierce, pp.32-39. % C.D. Stone, ShouLd Trees have Standing? Towards Legat Rights for NaturaL Objects Kaufmann, Los RLtos, 197!+. R. SgLvan, R critique of deep ecoiogg', 1+1(1985); referred to as DE. Radicatj^hiLosophg 1+0(1985) ana R. SgLvan, SuppLanting maximization, and other utiLitarian assumptions, in Western ethicai ideoiogg , Topci, 1986, to appear; referred to as SN. D. VanDeVeer and C. Pierce (e.ds), PeopLe, Penguins, and PLas tic Trees, UadsMorth, CaLLfornia, 1988; referred to as PP. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Draft Papers Description An account of the resource Sylvan's literary executor encountered an archive in which “all his projects were current", since manuscripts were undated and unattributed. Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document MORRL fWERS WHER - EM-JIROtVEtfrOLLV? Begond moraL extens ion isms. Some find us of mereig not ourseives at with odds mainstream environmentaL thinking - which remains shaLLow, heaviig exptoitative, and LikeLg disastrous, not ontg for mang other species but for mang humans as weLL - but uneasg atso with main deeper environmentaL approaches, most of which now emanate from North Rmerica. ELsewhere I have, to mg cost, taken issue with Deep Ecotogg, a movement with European origins quickig captured Ln CaLifornia; but here I wLsh to crLtLcLse forms of Norat Extensionism that now have a main base Ln Southern USF)!, forms that etaborate moraL standtng, consLderabLLLtg, and rLghts theorLes. the crLtLcLsm wLLL not be puretg negative; posLtLve atternatLve posLtLons Rgain wLLL beg Ln to emerge Ln earLg mornLng outLLne. extensLonLsms extend moraL Ltg and convent Lona L chauvLnLstLc moraL MoraL apparatus conventLonaL Lts begond (but certaLnLg subjects and areas where Lt has not been appLLed, certaLn confLnes to unwarranted) or eLse, more LLkeLg, has been used for dLscrLmLnatLon and other negatLve purposes. Theg sLmpLg extend wag the moraL apparatus wLthout much Ln the assumptions vatue, (equaL appLLed to a wider cLass equat of rLghts, of adjustment, consLderatLons, etc.) sLmpLg equaL a (Rs subjects. moraL egaLLtarLan wLth tgpe, generaL moraL ex tens Lon isms have been described and criticised Ln some detaiL Ln EE, p.lSSff., under and the tgpicaL and usefuL weapon movements of Liberation with proceed couLd Ln Rodman.) MoraL ex tens LonLsm is a MoraLisms Nature LabLe more rLghts and accurate movements Less but equipment). Seen from a conservative opposition, moraL to moraLitg bend to iLLegitimate certain interests, etc), are equaLitg, standing, but in ang case evergthing is sufficientLg in order, at Least on the boundaries, as it ex tens Lon isms endeavour not onLg do the since (rights, such impressive pubLLcLg extensLonLsms purposes, extensions make nonsense of the notions invoLved (though is! from Seen a wider perspective, environmentaL not aLwags unjustified in where theg go, but Ln how theg go, in the pseudo-egaLitarian facades of the extensions, and more important in where theg stop. For though priviLege is widened and so diiuted, it remains. The zones of extension remain too Limited, and things outside the usuai as forests, species, ecosgstems, continue mistreatment, expioitation and so on (see EE, things be to p.llf.1). Nor can such substantiaL to open the sorts of invoLved pLausibLg be brought within the extension foLd (though isoLated efforts are not Lacking); for theg appear to Lack requisite which extensions, extensions operate, such as sentience, LndividuaLitg, or whatever. For exampLe, the verg characteristics pain-receptivitg, idea of an on interests, environmentaL ethic, which serves to protect uninhabited environments and to Justifg requisite respect for naturat sgstems and communities, founders on the moraL rights position propounded bg Regan in defence of certain animats (RR p.35^ff). Mang a Ls MoraLLtg weapon, purpose depLoged bg pressure and often interest groups. Throughout Modern hLstorg Lt has tgpLcaLLg been used to and justLfg wLde a actLvLtg of range and hostLLe practices ground naturaL to envLronnents. HuMans are entLtLed to thLs or that, whLch interfere; thetr needs generate these or those requLreMents, whLch ought to be Met there though even are costs to LocaL envLronnents, and so forth. Those opposed to MoraLLtg - there Ls a Long and dLstLnguLshed phLLosophLcaL chaLn froM Lao-tsu and PLgden - have a poLnt MoraLLtLes Lt when MoraL-poLnts-of-vLew and to coMes The MoraLLtg. such HLnckfuss through daMage of seeM substanttaLLg hLgher than the often benefLts conferred. For the restrLctLons theg LMpose are heavg, and work often the wrong wags. R sort of cost/benefLt assessMent of MoraLLtg thus gets under wag2, supposedLg gLetdLng negatLve resutts. Mang are the arguMents for MoraLLtg, begLnntng wLth the cLaLM that Lt Ls oneseLf and one s LLfe wLthout LapsLng Lnto Morat taLk, conduct to LMpossLbLe concepts, practLces and, generaLLsLng, back Lnto MoraLLtg. Part of the response to such fauttg arguMents Ls atwags that there are dLstLnctLons, LnsLsted upon bg LeadLng MoraL theorLsts theMsetves, between vaLue Matters and MoraLLtg, tougher dLstLnctLon, (practLcaL hard j^s (whLch axLoLogg to to avoLd) MaLntaLn, between there Ls a further deontLc expressLons Rnd deontLes. and practLcat between expedLent oughts and shouLds for Lnstance) and MoraL ones. ULth and such dev Lees, antL-MoroLLsts, who do have a soLLd case agaLnst objectLve or absoLute MoraLLtLes, can escape MoraL hooks. Hagbe the net a carefuL practLtLoner can shun deontLc dLscourse, but wouLdn t on the treatMent of envtronMents be worse rather than better?, LMpact soMe of the grossest practLces? The quest Lons can doesn t MoraLLtg coLLect a range of answers, LncLudLng such uncharLtabLe ones as: Not so cLearLg constraLn that one wouLd notLce. The MaLn LMpact of MoraLLtg affaLrs; and even here onLg the grossest appear to be turned around through abuses, of an Ls Lnput on chauvLnLstLc, as such froM sLaverg, huMan MoraLLtg. huMan Even so the persuavLve force and LnfLuence of MoraL consLderatLons, properLg redLrected, are not thLngs to be LLghtLg abandoned. For rLghtLg dLrected theg posLtLveLg Ln thLngs contrLbute couLd that Matter socLaLLg and envLronMentaLLg. In partLcuLar, MoraLLtg affords soMe needed protect Lon and, especLaLLg as rectLfLed, offers the prospect of More, More protectLon, Less dLscrLMLnatLon. But actuaL protectLon Ls tgpLcaLLg provLded, where Lt Ls, through verg channeLLed MoraL ftowLng, through aLL too LegaL often, rather to the than wrong dLfferent LnstLtutLons; wLth fraMeworks, part Les, such as the Lt Ls the benefLts strong and estabLLshed. HakLng MoraLLtg work the rLght wags, where Lt does ftgure serLousLg, Ls, Moreover, uncoMfortabtg LLke MakLng weapons work for peace (MoraLLtg beLng a MaLn force behLnd wars and preparatLon for wars), More LLke than Lt ought to be. -2- Nor is Lt nearLg as easg as Lt was: beating swords Lnto pioughshares, to provide an assauit on the environMent instead of other creatures, subMarine to peaceful purposes (genuineLg peacefut ones, or a prettg easg feat coMpared wLth converting an Fl-11 fighter-boMber or a Modern technoLogicaL LLke was that course, of is; Ln the Liest, theg re peacenakers). For Locat chauvLnLsn, Ln one fom guns another or (huMan, Ls now deeptg natLonat, state or race), LLkeLg, More entrenched Ln Most bureaucratLc arrangeMents and an LntegaL part supportLng of scLences and technoLogg. Even so, whatever Locat practLces, MoraL theorg socLaL can be rectified; the theorLsLng can be accoMpLLshed, even Lf a new MoraLLtg not and appLLed, successfuttg Must awaLt Ls Lts post-RrMeggedon dag. Thus the protected battte to dutg expand MoraLLtg goes on. There are two Ma Ln battLe—LLnes over whLch LdeoLogLcaL wars antL-MoraLLsts) equated) nottons: MoraL status, rLghts, sag, even an outsLde surveg such as thLs But the tern can scarceLg escape attogether MoraL def Ln Lt tons Ls so stack (as dLet tonarg reveaL) that tern (Ln LatLn ortgLn Just a substitute for the Greek expressLon for to have becoMe Linked to features and behaviour of accountabLe such MoraL group: narrower the ang Ls bound to be partLg LegLsLatLve. R Ma Ln Modern tendeneg Ls for the use ttght of as to what Makes soMethtng, a consLderatLon or perMLssLon, MoraL. Lssue coMMon cLuster consLderatLon, retevance, a on foLLowLng These LLnes wLLL be surveged Ln turn; needLess to . ... the standing, consLderabLLLtg,... The second LLne concentrates perMissions, to are fought as regards MoraL extensLon Lssues, LLnes parportedLg MarkLng MoraL outer bounds. The fLrst LLne concerns (often (guaLnt ethicai ) (hunan) actors, as character, disposition, action, virtue. These are the areas where MoraL attributes are at hoMe. Hence MoraL notions tend to occupg inner pLaces Ln the Much Larger evaLuative circLe, and not to extend without sone forcing to naturaL that are not accountabLe actors. PartLg for these reasons too, the terM objects MoraL , Much favoured Ln ex tens Lona List enterprises, tends to be shunned Ln The notion of deeper environMentaL theorg. SiMoraL RgaLnst MoraL standing and siMpiistic ethicaL tgpoLogies. standing, introduced notion of LegaL standing, is coning to pLag environMentaL heavg, but ethics. It is anaiogg questionabte bg a Major, with the RngLo-RMerLcan but d3Maging, danaging because, verg briefLg, rote it wouLd paint a rather arbitrarg, bLack/white boundarg - segregating off those that have not froM those territorg. that have MoraL standing - across Much conpLex More Rs to its rote, it Ls soMetiMes ctaiMed that adoption and defence criterion in of MoraL standing is probieM soLving; absoiuteLg basic reasonabLg addressing of a in environMentaL thinking and the Lssue of MoraL standLng Must be vLewed as a benchMark of ang pLausLbLe "environMentaL ethic"' (PP, pl6). None of thLs Ls so evLdent, especLaLLg gLven the MurkLness of the not Lon of MoraL standing. In the sane vein, an a necessarg condition ... for Lt is stated that ethicaL theorg is the Most [}] defensibLe criterion of moraL standing adequate Such statements are suretg overstatements. For, Ln pLace, fLrst the there can be, and Lndeed appear to be eth Les, which count as environmentaL ones, which do not LncLude a not Lon of moraL ecoLogLcat Rodman s deep Naess s (e.g. ecotogg, sensLbLLLtg). Secondtg, etaboratLons of these theorLes can cLaLms to adequacg, wtthout introducing, and perhaps expLLcLttg warranted make standing rejecting (for the sorts of reasons gLven betow), a notLon of morat standing. For these sorts of reasons, too, Regan's moraL of notLon attempt (Ln NP) to a make standing Lntegrat to the verg Ldea of an environmentaL ethic, part of the conditions of adequacg for such as ethic, is far off course (as weii as ahistoricai, a piece of footnoted Regan s retrospective account of Legisiation). as But, it happens, standing, according to which a being has moraL morat standing if and onig if we moratig ought to consider how it is affected bg a given action or poiieg, both enabies elimination of the notion as a parasitic middieman) bg substitution using the exposed (thus biconditionaL invoLved in the conditions of adequacg, and aiso enabies straightforward satisfaction of the conditions tgpes of ethics that are hardLg environmental. Consider a forest bg sgstem about be to buiidozed, or the Moon about to be bg tourized an Rmerican—based transnational Hang the development or progress ethics these dags that wiii at Low we ought to consider how the forest or the Moon wiLL be that affected, but then cLaim that we shouid proceed, though perhaps in a modified wag. Thus, in such contexts, the forest and the Moon have moraL standing. Rn so, such a deveiopment ethics meets Regan s conditions for an environmentaL ethic; for the forest and the Moon are nonhuman beings, and indeed nonconscious beings, which have moraL standing. The resuLt is not what Regan intended; for he proceed to suggest (p.21^,p.3O) that intrinsic vaLue is a necessarg condition standLng, something his footnoted for moraL account does not guarantee. The LegaListic notion of moraL standing is not so cLear and distinct after aLL. Rn initiaL tacticaL point against the notion of moraL standing concerns its origin, on the modei of LegaL standing. LegaL standing is for ang sufficientLg comprehensive notion of a sometimes entering into moraL consideration (which can be true of aLmost angthing). For one reason, some decidedtg restrictive assumptions, concerning interests and whatever has such standing. But mang things of vaLue, which enter assessment on modeL dubious it imports rights into ethicaL occasions, do not have, and are not the sorts of things that can significantig have, interests or hoLd rights. LegaL standing aLwags operates terms of having of thing in certain sorts of interests, which can be represented, whereas what has or deserves environmentaL standing mag not have interests, sort of that couLd or be the have interests, even as derived (as in the case of LegaL persons, such as companies) from those of its members. More often -4- indeed, Legat have to standing to have certain rights, duties, protectton, etc., is begtnntng with the rtght of betng abLe to proceed to the courts. room Of course there ts constderabte standtng not ton the widen to Legat of tn RustraLia can even exctude environmentaL organtsattons) and (which "cLaimants to admit, through representatton, other to the PresentLg, courts. for sure, the modeL ts Much too narrow, restrtcttng access to certatn capitalist cLaimants. But there are severe conceptuat dtfftcutttes tn the wag and persons of broadentng the standtng not ton objects, agatn because to encompass Limitations the the mang requisite environmentaL nottons of tnterests and rtghts impose. Organtsattons of persons, such as partnershtps, coattttons and so on, do not exceed (easg stretchtng at Most of) these Limits, stnce tnterests and rtghts accrue frow coMponent members: untnhabtted ecosgsteMs, the MonuMents, and bg a brazen, and tMptaustbte, overrtdtng of Ontg constderabtg. do, Like naturat these conceptuat ttMttattons (such as Stone ts prepared to fancg Rmerican courts tndutgtng tn) can the in-buiLt severe tnternat restrtcttons of the wodet Legat be overcome. coutd be recogntsed, account of the Stttt the tnadequactes of Lts Legat 3natogg anaLogg behtnd, Left unimpeded fresh a and now standtng woraL rather propose free-fLoattng not Lon offered. Van De Veer and Pterce are rash enough to an expLLcatton of Recordtng to them, can be construed atong these LLnes. whtch For ang thtng X, X has woraL standtng Lff the continued extstence of X fISl. tnterests Lts theg sag Ln that weLL-betng have postttve moraL weight stLpuLattng theg re the but this; theg re or (PP. p.3). RctuaLLg, not free simpig to given that Lt ts a notton wtth some currencg aLreadg, soMethtng theg sttputate, recogntze Ln proceeding at once to consider various to their standard answers basic question Llhich things have MoraL standing? . The account proposed is wore in LittLe curious, not to sag obscure and scarceLg graMMaticat. Later theg a than effect substitute a tortuous Less nameLg account, generaLLtg (in interpretation) MS2. X has moraL standing iff the (continued) existence positive moraL weight (see e.g. p^., plG: pureLg since future items mag have ancestors). Either wag the account is weight and having moraL continued some moraL circutar, or shouLd however be significance, since having X of wetfare has deLeted, as mag dead positive moraL standing are interdependent notions (cf. Goodpaster. p-311). In fact some of the probLems with the account coutd have been avoided bg cutting out the troubLesome middLe part and moving on to the simpLer, expLLcitLg circutar, H33. But has X then as moraL standing Lff X possesses (or obtains) positive moraL weight. a expLication, the definition might aimost as weLL drop out; Lt expticates nothing, connecting some near sgnongms onLg. Perhaps it is better to ask: Uhat work does the notion do? -5- The troubie Ls except that theories, whLch LegLsLate as to what has moraL partLcuLar on standing, the notion Ln fact does verg because hoMe Ma Ln whose eth Les, chauvLnLstLc base does whLch LLes wLthLn the not extend or traveL unsatLsfactorg; wLth as coMpetence, or m s Ln sorts of reason for theLr Lnadequacg are weLL The personhood). are (such cLassLfLcatLons bLoLogLcaL socLopsgchoLogLcsL dLstLnctLons (such as LLnguLstLc capacLtg or potentLaL standLng MoraL Homo sap Lens or of the zooLogLcaL bLngdon) or wLth spec Les the of the wLder to onLg unstabLe and rather arbLtrarg, but tend to not ctassLfLcatLons ethLcaL MeMbershLp are theg trad Lt LonaL of weLL for ethLcs, It Ls one of those confLnes envLronMentaL settLng. RLL the MaLn crLterLa proposed confuse envLronmentaL Ln work Ls LLttLe agreement about what determLnes Lt. there not Lons, LLttLe enough documented Ln PP (and Ln Much other earLLer LLterature, e.g. EE) DespLte the enthusLasM shown for the not Lon of Morat standLng, then, no satLsfactorg crLterLon for Morat standLng eMerges, or Ls Ln ctear sLght, Ln PP - or Lt eLsewhere It remaLns to be denonstrated that there Ls a stabLe, seens. non-arbttrarg context-LnvarLant notLon of MoraL standLng worth pursuLng. Rather the notLon tends to force awkward choLces (e.g. those offered Ln PP on p.S.) The for reason the needs what cost-benefLt LMperatLves be to Looked at presuppose a Morat Ln appLLcatLons assessments, (whLch thLs dLffLcuLt notLon, that does no present Lt wouLd decLsLvetg Ls evLdent enough: usefuL work, space, about enthusLasM and deLLMLt of the categorLcaL of deLLMLtatLons behLnd proposed some notLon, for Lnstance use of the dLstLnctLon to reduce the humanLstLc/chauvLnLstLc foLd (partLg moraL ). MoraL standLng Ls not a MoraLLg bg use of the term achLeved Ls search unLverse, usuaLLg of persons), and so Morat search space towards the confLnes of the thLs MoraL confLLct Lssues, utLLLtarLan forth. There are as weLL More sLnLster uLterLor purposes appLLcatLons the neutraL notLon, but a fraMework and cuLturaLLg dependent one; hence some of Lts LLmLtatLons. ConsLder standLng moraL Lnstead of work, Lnstead of straLghtforward pragmatLcs, what supposed to confer or remove? It Ls assumed that Lf X has moraL standLng (m-s) then moraL agents have presumptLve obLLgatLons, and dutLes to X, e.g. Let to Lt theg otherwLse not atone, do not to confLne Lt or underMLne Lts Lnterests; but (cf-p.3-p.tt). Or, to put Lt the other wag around, thLng has m-s Lt Ls entLtLed to conttnued exLstence, pursuLt of whereas Lf Lacks m-s, Lt Lt does not have thLs protectLon, 3 Lnstead there Ls entLtLement to Lnterfere wLth Lt . def Ln Lt Lon of moraL standLng ... Lf somethLng weLL-beLng Just does not LtseLf moraLLg count Lts Lf a Lnterests, Lt does not count, .... Indeed, so Lt Ls Lacks (p.t+). The moraL saLd, standLng, defLnLtLon Bg Lts however deLLvers no such resuLt; a further LmpLausLbLe assumptLons, (reductLon of weLght to weLL-beLng, equaLLtg condLtLons for countLng) from an underLgLng moraL wLthout pLcture of assessment are LmpLLcLtLg Lncorporated (a utLLLtarLan pLcture where Ltems m-s are dLscounted, and trade-offs contempLated, p.16). -6- of Ltems wLth m-s are soon Such appLication an if division; accordingtg LmpLies an unfortunate aLL-or-nothing item is tn tt gets (carefut) constderatton, otherwise Lt gets nothing - exacttg what the Legat anatogg impLies: a proper heartng Lf be and otherwise nothtng. Hhat this bLack-and-white division shoutd standing contrasted with ts not removaL of att distinctions, but rather a wore sophisticated ethicat such tgpoLogg, that of the annutar picture (of EE, p.107 and DC, p.2). The as tgpoiogg is based on a Listing of ethicaiLg re Levant such as having vaiue, weLL-being, appropriate p.!2).^ the character aLL-or-nothing from at Least Modified becomes evident of various (e.g. p.5) to keep it afLoat, e.g. duties capacities, so and and forth; to moraL standing distinctions soon duties) (direct to needs be introduced as opposed to (indirect, and perhaps derivative, duties). The wain strategg regarding duties autonomg, and postuLates and princ ip Les are geared to these (cf. aLso PP ethicaL That preferences, features adopted in PP to save the aLL-or-nothing context-independent boundarg consists in appeaL to the speciaLLg-adjusted notion of presumptive duties. MoraL standing is assumed to be necessarg and sufficient for presumptive duties: specificaLLg PSI. floraL agents iff But have a presumptive dutg to X has moraL standing (this takes up the content of signposted item 1, p.t*.). presumptive are duties even more prone to be bg upset circumstances than the oider prima facie duties (which the notion the notion overriding expands); standing, p.S), the forged connections things than without much too simpLe, as wiLL are for appear. FirstLg, a more comptex cLassification of things is required purposes so operates even more as a theorg-saving device. But even as so hedged around, and so extended (bg derivative duties, duties regarding moraL decentLg] X [to treat it moraLLg moraL a hard division into moraL countabLes and others, a nonarbitrarg cLassification such as that of the annutar picture. SecondLg, rights and duties, which the notion of moraL standing is supposed to bound. Link rather with vaLue, and extent of vaLue (see SM). Much of the importance ascribed to moraL standing or moraL consideration comes from confLating it with vaLue consideration, which is in turn equated with having some (non-negLigibLe) vaLue, bearing account, and counted, perhaps (if sometimes that wouLd be taken into in ang compLete vaLue assessment. Though moraL attributes are evidentLg a subcLass commonpLace vaLue of surprising, vaLue as attributes, e.g. in the confiation CaLLicott). is Possessing intrinsic or inherent vaLue is even offered sometimes as an aLternative to moraL status (cf. PP, p.16 fn 3); but more often the confusion is Less bLatant. Indeed PP begin bg warning us about sLipperiness (fn 3), soon stides itsetf from m-s to intrinsic vaLue with their being evident, and considerabLe, (p.S) and before Long has identified moraL standing of things vaLuabte prove in damaging. Goodpaster themseLves Towards Lapses (p.I6). Such equations are not the end of his essag, on being moraLLg from -7- moraL considerabiLitg into that Hag that natters for ctains wade. For exanpte, Ln vatue-for-itsetf, psgchotogicat or hedonLstLc capacities sophLstLcated unnecessaritg seen Lt Ls true when Lt cones to Locating the ntnLnaL condLtLons for sonethLng s deserving to be Lts for vatued own (p.320); sake Lt not so obvious that theg are too but sophLstLcated for the capture of norat consLderabLLLtg. R sLnLLar conftatLon at work Ln Goodpaster s hgpothesis that that there Ls a nonaccLdentaL affLnLtg between a person s or a socLetg s conceptLon of and vatue ontg — consLderabLLLtg to appears obtaLn where vatue Ls unreduced (LLLLcLtg) contracted to a range where norat considerations enter; for exanpte tn Goodpaster's sotitarg LLLustration, the setting is hedonisn (when as where, of conceptLon Lts (p.3t*). The affLnLtg — nore than accLdentat for vatue and noraL consLderabLLLtg vatue Ls no doubt norat considerabititg Ls, so far as norat natters are attowed to enter, characteristicattg bounded at botton bg sone sentience criterion). The biocentric criterion for norat considerabititg that Goodpaster Leaps to (p.313) has itsetf to be differenttg Looked at if exchanged for vatue-in-itsetf. For Life is point even norat the obvioustg Less stopping vatue consideration. Rssune, for instance, that Wars or the Moon has for estate no [significient] Life. Theg stitt have vatue; indeed theg nag have reat vatue verg chauvinistic vatue "neasure ) now that theg are beconing hunantg (a accessibte nining, residentiat and other transfiguring purposes). Suppose (for further, what is not at att untiketg, that sgstens natch that Moon the has fornations sone shoutd be the that thensetves, into account in ang environnentat inpact assessnent of taken projects interfering with parts of the Moon. But insist or naturat nonunents of the Rnerican arid Lands. It is a the defensible ctain, these dags, that the Moon nonunents have vatue in which is considerabititg Lt woutd be LnptausLbte to Moon nonunents are norattg considerabte; for theg are not the right sorts of things (as a natter of significance) to have noraL attributes. It is just not the feature of having intrinsic vatue that shoutd be separated fron that of having norat status. Sone of the circte have suggests different sone exanpte, For connotations. notions beLng Ln noraL the consLderabLe norat dinension, sone weight to be taken into account, suitabte not neretg sone retevance. Consideration atso characteristicattg requires the iten in question has interests or at Least a such tetos), an that agent discussion-setting can phrase be deserves norat weLL-being towards considerate notions are deptoged that wag (eg. p.31 does norat retevance, R different get nere artifacts are norattg etc., dependent, quarrg that (a Goodpaster s Rnd nornattg the notion do presunabtg nornattg woutd not. Nor, not it erroneoustg, reLevant on occasions (for sinitar reasons norat significance differs fron standing). MoraL retevance renains context Like that another different notion sonetines equated with norat standing (e.g. PLuhar p.^7), though since does nornattg an organisn'; PP p.3 inpose these Linitations, e.g. those of awe, respect, appear, (as or consideration ). certain organisns'; and in Goodpaster's Leap.) woutd norat an etusive, has evaded contenporarg norat phitosophers of -8- high standing, despite Much effort put Lnto other chase. the however, Since these are not goLng to be put to serLous work - Most of theM are, Like notLons MoraL standing, better MothbaLLed or - scrapped we qutetLg can bgpass the vaiue the nuances and differences. CertaLnLg MoraL considerations and vaiue interconnect, wider notion and Moraiitg, if wag theg inportant in which not at derivative, Least with R dependent. Most connect is through LiMitat ions on interference. MoraLitg preciudes the gross reduction of vaLue. LittLe R More preciseLg, a actor is not norMaLLg entitLed to interfere deLiberateLg in such a wag as MoraL to reduce signifLeantLg overaLL vaLue (or risk the various possibiLitg of such reduction^). But exact forMuLation of such noninterference princ ip Les is a sensitive Matter MainLg because deontic principLes do not excLude soMe vaLue, provided it is sufficientLg Linited - a Matter to which we of reduction - shaLL be obLiged to return. Bg contrast with MoraL considerabiLitg, and standing Like, the vaLue notions are fundaMentaL, and not at aLL easiLg avoided, even bg anti-Moraiists, in the regions of environMentat ethics.^ SoMe of the anaiogue notions are however, e.g. a thing warrants vaLue consideration iff it has vaLue; it triviaL is of vaLue reLevance iff it has nonnegiigibte vaLue circuMstances); the (in Even so the ana Logue notions heLp in shifting the issues and showing where the reaL prob ten Lies with the group of MoraL notions, naneig in what Makes soMething Morai. It this notion too that has induced the unwarranted narrow ing of focus, to chauvinistic concerns. For a coMMonp Lace answer, certainig wrong, to what deternines what is MoraL is: hunan concerns. Rather, etc. what is MoraL has to do with interest-independent vaLue and with a certain iMpartiaLitg and Lack of discrininations (i.e. in More oLd-fashioned forMs, with justice and goodness), features refLected fornaLLg in suitabLe universaLizabiiitg of principie.^ So conceived, MoraL Matters do not terMinate at narrower certain ethicaL tgpes, which excLude the wider environnent. The width of concern wouLd be better revested bg repLacing ethicaL*. equivaLent ethics a of (For coMparison, rec Lass ification as consider "environMentat bg MoraL its originaL the effect in environMentat MoraLs" environMentat or Moratitg"). $2. Rgainst environMentaLLg-restrictive rights packages. EthicaL standing does not striettg get or grant a thing rights. Standing gets an iteM door for hearing. a hearing; in an ethicaL it Mag, or Mag not, be conceded or granted rights in the Rights inpLg sone standing, but not vice versa; sone standing is even, if gou Like, a proper part of a right. MhiLe such an equation is not Much excuse for identifging standing and rights (short assuMption that of the astonishing but prevaLent aLL reLations are identities), stiLL too often the differences are giossed over, having MoraL rights is equated with having MoraL standing The stoppage between the notions Goodpaster exptoits (p.3I8) CaLLicott). (e.g. Ln converting conditions on having rights into conditions (expioitation consideration free not exersibie rights is Much Less piausibie for Underneath consideration). MoraL these equations and conventions Lie important assunptions; triviaL MoraL deserving since wh3t is piausibie for costs, of for just not the More that what has a status therebg has a right, for instance to get in one but the ethicaL door, consideration are assuMption the rendered that equivaLent having and rights standing or a coMMon Middie terM, such as through having interests, being capabLe of being represented, being abLe to benefit. For exaMpte, an iteM has MoraL standing (or deserves MoraL consideration) iff it has iff it has (or even have) rights. (or can have) interests, i.e. iMpiicit appear but (with Minor Such equations quaLifications) in Goodpaster, and exp Lie it etsewhere, for a wide notion if "interests" extending to aLL Living things; but Much More coMMontg theg appear (e.g. as in Freg) for a verg Much More restricted of (huManoid) interest. notion If such fauLtg equations did hoLd, what has been said against MoraL standing wouLd appLg to that extend aiso against rights. But theg do not, and rights require More independent investigation. contrast Bg with anti-Moratists, who wouLd reject (MoraL) rights taLk and institutions aitogether, and with Mang utiLitarians, who view notion of considerabte suspicion at Least, it wiLL be argued, in g passing, that rights are aLrcght . The chief targets for criticisM wiLL be (MoraL) rights with certain unduLg narrow theories rights, of which wouLd have, if theg stood, decidedLg unfavourabLe environMentat consequences. RLthough for which he has iLLegitiMateig bagged the titie view, Regan's particuLar the rights view (as if an aniMat rights supporter had to adopt his sort of view), is verg far froM the attention, worst of these theories, it is worth singLing out for speciaL it has score heaviLg been proMoted since in environMentat ethics Literature and it does exceedingig weLL, coMpared with its usuaL chauvinistic rivaLs, in certain areas of Major environMentat concern, such as the (Mis-)treatMent of aniMats. R theorg of rights a coMprises representation (in the fashion of other package, which can be given fornaL theories) genetic as containing the foLLowing coMponents: D. a definition of a right, and P. further postuLates (perhaps independentLg argued for) deLiMiting rights. Rs MatheMaticaL exaMpLes (such as those of vector space and categorg) reveaL there is a good deat of stippage between D ord inarg usage controts and P. But because of the More on phiLosophicaL theories, onLg so Much in the wag of postuLates can be puMped into the definitions offered. The package aLso coMMontg includes as weLL 0. a set of canonicaL forMS into which aLL (nondiscarded) rights Locutions or cases can be put, and perhaps aLso (with ground prepared through C) R. a set of reduction scheMes for eiiMinating transLation, reduction ruLes, etc. -10- rights Locutions, e.g. bg The of rLghts advocated bg Regan convenLentLg Lends theory partLcuLar LtseLf to separatLon Lnto these components, as weLL as suggestLng genetLc such breakdown. It begLns wLth a neat defLnLtLon of rLght drawn from HLLL, accordLng to whLch a rLght Ls, roughLg, a vaLLd (or suffLcLent) cLaLm whLch socLetg shouLd It guarantee. Ls coup Led wLth a serLes of prLncLpLes or postubates, each gLven some Lndependent support, of whLch the most basLc Ls the rLght of and treatment. respectfuL to patLents canonLcat RLthough expLLcLtLg addressed, one does emerge, whLch takes the form to [not] , where - onLg rLghts-hotder on the theorg, but Lt X[s] of The rLght as for Lnstance not Ln to permtts (the pLuraLLsatLon partLcuLar to some sort of utLLLtarLan anatgsLs, Ls strongLg resisted the rLghts vLew features onto LndLvLduaLs). FLnaLLg reductLon of rLghts, Ln back dLstrLbutLng context not are The basLc form Ls sLnguLar, appLgLng to LndLvLduaLs, who are the harm . LncLuded forms Lntroduces an LnfLnLtLvaL ctause LndLcatLng a tgpe of to actLon or actLvLtg. The cLauses mag be negated, unduLg agents moraL has a LLttLe more thLs LrreducLbLe the Ls Lt poLnt, (Ln rLghts vLew as opposed to a mot Leg arrag of reduct LonLstLc posLtLons, wLth 'the' sLgnLfgLng a coLLectLve.) be UhLLe Regan s rLghts package wLLL crLtLcLsed, Ln sLgnLfLeant rejected, through Lts varLatLon a dLfferent rLghts theorg wLLL emerge. respects Some of the crucLaL prLncLpLes Regan arrLves at depend theg and heavLLg upon - though do not foLLow from - defLnLtLon of rLght(s) he defends. Hnd severaL of the unnecessarLLg restrLctLve features of the vLew do fLow from eLaboratLon of thLs defLnLtLon, Ln partLcuLar the LLmLtatLon of rLghts to certaLn LndLvLduaL thLngs, to anLmaLs. It Ls Lmportant then to begLn wLth, and hard to avoLd, the certaLn Lssue of defLnLtLon. To ground the varLant defLnLtLon and theorg of rLghts to be reached fLrmLg Ln usage, consLder fLrst the maLn reLevant sense^' of rLght (to) gLven bg the Oxford EngLLsh DLctLonarg, vLz. 11.7 JustLfLabLe cLaLms, on LegaL or grounds, to have or obtaLn some thLng, or to act Ln a certaLn wag. of gLven rLghts sLmLLar core: hLm the Ln bg MLLL (whLch of ... account Regan cLaLms to endorse, p.369.) contaLns a a person s rLght ....[Ls] a vaLLd cLaLm upon socLetg possessLon The moraL somethLng socLetg to protect ought to defend...', MLLL provtdes, however, an Lmportant Lnsurance or cover cLause, as to who Ls supposed to cover the cLaLm, whLch the OED account does whLch Regan after a brLef dLscussLon aLso correctLg omLts (begLnnLng p.270). That Ls, rLght not LncLude, and quLckLg contracts to the Less than adequate vaLLd cLaLm; but the force of MLLL s Lnsurance cover Ls supposed to foLLow, prLmarLLg Ln vLrtue of what Ls pushed Lnto the Ldea of a cLaLm. Rs Lt turns out, Regan, now features of rLghts LmLtatLng FeLnberg s Lt does foLLow, but not Ln that wag. trLcks, trLes to puLL substantLve out of the notLon of a cLaLm. But the notLon does not bear the weLght theg trg to Lmpose upon Lt; a stronger rope Ls needed for -11- such acts than ciaim can suppig. The cruciai act, which tries to read anticipated features of the notion of riqht into that of ciaim, faiis at the outset: is entitied to treatment of a certain kind is to assert that someone... ... To wake a ciaim and that the treatment is due or owed directig to the individuai ... in question. To a make individuais, ciaim thus, invoives both ciaims-to and ciaims-against... (p.271). Such an anaigsis of making a ciaim imports much the that ordinarg notion does not support, nameig, in the first piace, that it invoives or asserts entitiement, entitiement to treatment of a certain sort, secondig, that it is a transaction between individuais^, thirdig, that the imputed treatment is owed it is a ciaim-against given individuais. But in making directig to the ciaimant, such ciaims as that one has visited Mount Rthos, has seen the iark ascend, at tea one sunset, doing ang of those things in ang straightforward not is sense. There is nothing significant due or owed, directed at other took individuais in the the demanding assertions wag, or at need not be aii; and no entitiement to speciai treatment is asked for. Ciaim is a transitive verb, so it as requires weii as subjects, ciaimants, objects, ciaims, propositionai items tgpicaiig introduced bg or 'to . Someone who makes a that ciaims ciaim that something or to (have or have done) something. But that is aii. Onig some ciaims are directed against others, onig some ciaims are entitiements. Rnd if is it ciaims that are entitiements that are to be distinguished, it wouid be better to start with entitiements (cf McCioskeg). Just such a fresh start wiii be made, in the first stage of modification of the definitions OED integration and it with Miii's definition. Upon of separating off iegai rights (which Regan correctig distinguishes in prettg much the standard wag, p.267), the foiiowing then resuits: M2. Vaiid entitiement, on morai grounds, to something (of a correct categorg). The changes (from 11.7) deserve some justification. Firstig, or have obtain or something, characteristic fiii to to in act a certain "justifiabie justifiabie to (to) something , iogicaiig adds iittie content. For each something entaiis and mag to be entitiement ciaims sufficient, ent ireig warrant vaiid. from Thirdig, and ang case entitiing ones, and that in are i.e. dubious ciaims-against preconceptions, without be regarded appears most need not ciaim restrict to on but aiso the ciaim because make or the sheds unduig and expected ciass of rights havers or haver of a it, but it is hard to escape the assumption that if something has a ciaim then it shouid be the sort of thing potentiaiig?) important entitiement hoiders, what can have or ho id rights, to ciaimants. Of course the right as grounds morai ciaim , not mereig for the reasons given, that improves upon invoived an sort of justification, which as it turns out is not fuiig some adequate, can be given, whereas for a right the derivation has converseig an entitiement to have something. Secondig, is not strong enough; a ciaimed entitiement if (To) phrase wag , which gives the of the sorts of entitiement is an entitiement to something, entitiement the stake that ciaims. Thus use of the term -12- can ciaim (at ieast makes it an even tougher uphiLL struggLe to work the powerfut rights medicine on behatf of wttd animats and wiLde messes. Of course too, what cLaims are wade coutd be wade through indirectLg, representatives; the tern but representatives" suggests verg easiig that rights havers have interests to be represented. Opportunitg wake the to interests" shouid not be afforded rights" to dubious inference from bg the basic definition; and "entitLement" gives appropriate distance. R Lot hangs on choice of basic (as then terms other in chaiienging phiiosophicai areas, such as the fundamentsLs of reasoning), even if it seems to right' newcomers, as it does to dictionaries, that entitLement cLaim' and are more or Less interchangeabLe (each is characterised in standard dictionaries partLg in terms of the others) tautoLogous. and expticative satisfactorg UeLL, Like definitions that M2 definitions virtuaLLg are are but anaLgtic, preferabLg not trivaLLg circuiar, eLse informativeness is sacrificed. R weakness of the entitLement account (hard to credit after Regan's attack upon it) is that it risks the Latter. Mhat is needed in pLace of entitLement, putative entitLement' expression, right , i.e. it a since doesn t a becomes an entitLement, or right, when vaLiditg is that appropriateLg estabLished, and so on. From this angLe, better something, is write in To vaLiditg. avoid a is sLightLg a reaL or supposed to amounts sometimes cLaim cLaim' these probLems with avaiiabie terminoiogg, there is a case for coining a rather immediate expression basic definition something, R vaLid in that something (after fiLL to into in M2) and avoid disappearance of the VaLid something, on to something , which couLd embrace Lots of items other than rights). term suitabie entitLement, titiement ; is which a or a is titiement aLLeged or putative mag or mag not be correctLg vaLidated, en-ed (cf. titLe *6. That which justifies or substantiates a cLaim; a aLLeged (e.g. vacuitg quant ificationaL recognised right', Const, with cLaimed .) R titiement is a transformation ground inf. of a or right; of to, suitabie hence, an of the thing in, deontic principLe, cat Led a susta in ing principLe. For instance, the form It is mostig permissibie [for X] to R , where suitabie, gieLds the titiement form There is a titiement [for X] R . Requirements for what conditions objects (Rs) and suitabiLitg, subjects (Xs) shouLd satisfg, are investigated in what foLLows. Before trging for a mark-3 definition of right (to), MiLL, as interpreted bg Regan (pp.270-1). MiLL titiements are to be vaLidated: depend on compLiance its independentLg estabLished' the vaLiditg of with (p.270), derivation from these correct moraL stack, the vaguer a right (to) moraL principLes us return a right, whose correct that he beiieves, takes up, must have been vaLiditg principLes. to as to how provides...guidance princ ip Les i.e. Let It is the removing the "moraL grounds" (cf. M2 and 11.7). Then in the mark-3 version, is a M3. VaLid titiement, from correct moraL principLes, appropriate) item. The LogicaL form is aLmost immediate: -13- to some (categoriaLLg H3S. premLsses correct worst prtncLpLes SustaLnLng prtnctpLe as to R vaLLd dertvatton cone Lus con There Ls a tttLement to R RssumLng evergthtng Ls Ln order Ln the scheme H3S, the inference to a rLght-to R Ls then LmmedLate, bg f13. The whoLe pattern Ls at once duLg reLatLvLsabLe to suLtabLe havers. Thus X has a rLght to R Lff X has a tttLement, vaLLd Trow correct woraL prtncLpLes, to R, somethtng that a suLtabLe reLatLvLsed derLvatLon wag estabLLsh. candLdates The fLLL to R provLde a famLLLar LLst, e.g. out freedom from unnecessarg sufferLng, respectfuL treatment, satLsfg sound LLfe, needs, support, rewarding work, a fatr go, etc.. Bg no means aLL of these candLdates can be vaLLdated, wLthout at Least severaL basLc restrLct the quaLLftcatLon, consLderabLe and categorg of subjects, L.e. the LogLcaL sort of Ltem that can have the purported tttLement. Such a scheme, as f13S not (whLLe entLretg wLthout adequate eLaborated notLon of tLtLement) both enabLes further features of and revests much about rtghts. derLved important addttLon to the deftnLtLon of ought to protect can hoLders, be regards as correct moraL rLght , of a requLrement and therefore rLghts, to Lnsure protectLon, dLffuse correLatLve dutLes 3pptg prtncLpLes, to Ls no doubt Ls thus a consequentLaL over vaLLd characterLstLc poLnt of R tLtLements. as socLetLes Lt transmLt uphoLd, feature. SLmLLarLg such obLLgatLons to uphoLd rLghts are not feature from thetr character. In parttcuLar, the FeLnberg-Regan cLaLm-agaLnst component of thetr proposed anaLgsts Ls not part of the meanLng of that soctetg that that reLevant soctettes ought to part of the deftnLtLon of rLghts, but a LogLcaLLg emergent dertvatLve be separated as a consequence; Lt Ls not (as uphoLd them. But such functors, as obLLgatLon to derLvatLons; to rtghts In the fLrst pLace, Lt shows that HLLLs dLcttonarg defLnLtLons atso LndLcate) a deftntng feature. For true duLg 3 rLght, but somethtng foLLows from the prtncLpLes sustatntng a rLght to somethtng. For Lnstance, Lf Lt Ls generaLLg permtsstbLe to LLve others, free from unnecessarg suffering then moraL agents are therebg prohtbLted from causing unnecessarg sufferLng; -14- and prohLbLtLon the functor Ls transnLtted the down cLaLn-agaLnst certain, tgpLcaLLg unspecLfLed, norat agents R derLvatLon.^ Ls consequentLaL a feature of vaLLd tLtLenents to, transnLtted fron the sustaLnLng noraL prLncLpLe. (ThLs Ls whg Regan can aLwags easLLg nanage to fLLL out a cLaLn-agaLnst forn where a McCLoskeg ent Lt Lenent can be estabLLshed; see RR p.231). SecondLg, the schene and defLnLtLon nake Lt evLdent that seLf-evLdent puretg or rLghts. axLonatLc a aLwags defence It foLLows, then, that ang theorg rLghts bg reference to such derLvatLons. cLaLns are no For ang rLght that stands up, that connands the tLtte, has a vaLLd derLvatLon. Rnd there Ls Lags there of that seLf-evLdent rLghts (such as FIcCLoskeg s), or axLonatLc rLghts to (such as DworkLn's), and ang decLaratLons, constLtuttons or bLLL of rLghts (such as that RnerLcan) the announces seLf-evLdent rLghts, Ls nLstaken. RLghts are aLwags derLvatLve fron other parts of an ethLcaL sgsten. ThLrdLg, the theorg shows dLrectLg the "derLvatLve character" of rLghts, and hetps to LndLcate the extent of theLr eLLnLnabLLLtg. For Lf rLghts are ever to be estabLLshed, then there nust, Ln the end, be correct noraL prLncLpLes, as there are, fron whLch tLtLenents do derLve. Thus a requLrenent of ground hoLds, are rLghts and generated fron other noraL prLncLpLes, Ln partLcuLar those of pernLssLon and obLLgatLon. RLghts are derLvatLve, not Ln the sense that there Ls a precLse recLpe for transLatLng rLghts dLscourse out - ang adequate transLatLon renaLns wLthLn the rLghts cLrcLe, of entLtLenent, cLaLns, etc. - but Ln the derLvatLonaL sense, that theg derLve fron another part of the deontLc area, that argunents and JustLfLcatLons for then go back to deontLc prLncLpLes. Because of theLr nuLtLpLg derLvatLve character, rLghts are dLspensLbLe after a fashLon, and at sone cost. So theg envLronnentaL ethLcaL enterprLses. not are But Ln essentLaL absoLuteLg a strongLg for LndLvLduaLLstLc rLghts-orLented socLetg, such as the USR, where rLghts notLons (and partLcuLarLg LndLvLduaL propertg notLons) are taken verg serLousLg, Lt Ls a snart strategg to nake heavg use of then, after the node of Regan. EnvLronnentaL posLtLons can do thLs aLso, bg derLvLng approprLate tLtLenents. RLghts are not nereLg derLvatLve, because, for Lnstance, of the force theg are accorded and the rotes theg can pLag when adnLtted. Rs RnerLcan wrLters stress, rLghts are anong the weLghtLest of others (hence the Lnportance Ln a noraL consLderatLons, whLch noraL or evLronnentaL cause of obtaLnLng rLghts accredLtatLon). RLghts certaLnLg have Lnportant protectLve and rotes, of Ln persuasLve so Lnsurance sheLterLng Ltens fron powerfuL actors and Lnterests. For those sorts prLncLpLes, and truno on. argunentatLve reasons too, Lnputed rLghts are Lnportant Ln reLnforcLng gettLng others to take Ltens serLousLg, to treat then decentLg, Ln The socLaL advantages LnstLtutLonaLLsatLon of rLghts accordLngLg offers not to be taken LLghtLg or abandoned. For these sorts of reasons, too, rLghts are not superfLuous (as Freg Ls LncLLned to suggest: -15- he aLso incLined to suggest, not aLtogether consistentLg, that there aren t ang is woraL rtghts, p.7, p.17). Granted that for Mang purposes we can proceed back Lt ts not a consequence that Me prtnctpLes froM which rtghts derive; stLLL, the can get a Long as weLL without theM, stLLL Less that there potnt no ts advantage or Set-theorettctans can get a Long without nunbers; woMen can get theM. to to aLong wtthout thetr bras, soMe of theM teLL us; nucLear reactors can get aLong wtthout doubLe shteLdtng, so Russ Lan experts used to teLL us. R fourth set of consequences of the rtghts package offered Ls that there Ls no basts for various restrtcttons wtdetg tMposed upon the having senttence, tnterest, as such etc. (a rather now rtghts, of faniLiar test). Constder tnterests ftrst, stnee an "tnterests" restr Let Lon on rights-havers Ls pervasive. Nothtng Ln the deftnttton and dertvatton schene gtven, or Ln Ln the Ln suttabLLLtg requtreMents). Yet a cruciaL theg coutd be incorporated, Ln defLntttons McCLoskeg, MiLL, ...), requtres such tnterests (though (OED, vLctnttg other preMtss the issue of whether things other than persons, aninats especiaLLg, can have rights Links rights-hoLding with interest. R tgpicaL bridge princLpLe is RI. OnLg iteMs which (can) have MoraL rights (cf. Freg, p.5). Rs Freg RI is observes, not obvious (he Later appLies a strong forM of RI, without 3ngthing Much in the wag of argunent, nonetheiess), and has had Mang with notabtg rivaLs, interests repLaced bg other candidates put up for gaining MoraL standing (rationaLitg, Language, sentience, etc. - the saMe tiresoMe List).^ How then does the interest requireMent, RI, gain its wide accreditation and grip? For an astonishing series of bad reasons (as FreedMan Ln effect brings out), 1) inc Lud ing: we Usage; speak of Ltens Lacking interests (individuaLitg, etc.) as don't possessing rights (thus Ln effect McCLoskeg). and non-usage to has be backed In fact we do, bg other consideration if arbitrariness and prejudice are to be avoided (FreedMan pp. 160-1). 2) RbgsMaL anaigses, such as TooLeg s anaLgsis of X has a right to R as to refrain fron actions that wouLd deprive hiM (again dissected bg FreedMan p.161 ff.)^ it of and coupied 3) Mistaken thenes, such as Feinberg s (drawn fron McCLoskeg) that protection of an interest, and hence [it is ciaiMed] for right it cLaiM). Must have Nothing characteristicaLLg an interest however requires afford (FreedMan, is that reasoning a right is a sonething to a have p.16^., who upsets the inferred the protection rights that of an interest; as far as the Meaning of goes it can be of a thing or a sgsteM. t*) exercising roughig if R desires X, then others are under a prina-facie obLLgation with sgnongnous have; others and Confusion of having right with right a a right (pp.162-3), or even with being abLe to cLain a right. Though these are evidentLg different, and entaitMents froM having to exercising or to cLaining evidentLg faiL, such confLations are encouraged bg easg but unwarranted transition, such as those froM having a cLaiM to Making or being abLe to Make a cLain. But, to reiterate, rights have nothing highig intiMate -16- to do with the Mak Lng bg c La LMS of a hoLder (though no doubt an art Lou Late Maker of cLaLMS hoLds soMe advantage Ln achLevLng Lts and others cLaLns). R creature or LteM wLth cLaLMS Mag have no abLLLtg or coMpetence to Make or present theM; or be the sort of thLng that can. ^a) ContractLons of rLghts to a subcLass of rLghts, such as exercLsabLe rLghts, Lndeed Lnterest-protectLng rLghts, accountabLe rLghts, etc. Then conatLve requLreMents do foLLow (e.g. what has an exercLsabLe rLght Must presunabLg at sone stage be suLtabLg aLLve and capabLe but reLevant actLvLtg), requLreMents foLLow froM the subcLassLfLcatLon LnvoLved, not froM the such notLon of rLght. of For Lnstance, the Lnterest-protectLng aspect of tnterest-protecttng rLghts foLLows froM the Lnterest-protectLng restrLctLon, not froM the notLon of rLghts, whLch Mag serve to protect thLngs LackLng interests (especLaLLg under chauvLnLstLcaLLg-favoured hLgh redefLnLtLons of Lnterests). R reLated cLuster of poLnts appLLes to attenpts to rLghts restrLct to persons or to LndLvLduaLs, atteMpts aLso tgpLcaLLg underpLnned bg the assuMptton that what has or can have rLghts Must have Lnterests, or desLres, or a suLtabLe conatLve LLfe, or whatever. But nothLng Ln the notLon of rLghts restrLcts rLghts to persons, or to LndLvLduaLs, or persons" Ln a generous LegaL sense; nothLng restrLcts theM to LndLvLduaLs and "persons". RLL these restr Let Lons on rLght-hoLders are Lnposed, wLthout Much or suffLcLent justLfLcatLon, usuaLLg for LdeoLogLcaL reasons, such as bLockLng LegLtLMate cLaLMS on behaLf of daMaged dLsadvantaqe LteMs or sgsteMs, MerLtLng protect Lon. or §3. and rebuiLding environMentaLLg. the rLghts vLew Deconstructing Most iMportant, Regan's sharp LiMitation of rLghts LndLvLduaL to Consider, a subjects, LLMLtatLon whLch has a Most daMaging effect on the abLLLtg of hLs rLghts vLew to cope decentLg spec Les, concernLng rare 3nd endangered (e.g. Regan s pp.395-6). prob Lens of our tines, such as those envLronnentaL Major wLth forest does restrLctLon ecosgsteMs, wLLderness, foLLow froM not even etc. hLs own defLnLtLon of a rLght, as a vaLLd ciaiM. Rather the restrLctLon Ls progressLveLg LnfLLtrated, as postuLates the concerning are eLaborated. It is not rights uniforMig inf titrated (and in other work Rgan appears to abandon restrictions to individuaLs, e.g. HP, p.32). For instance at a cLosing stage (in p.39S) RR, a arguMent against priviLeged status for rare or endangered species begins, brief because paradigMatic right-hoLders are individuaLs (In sgLLogistic extended IndividuaLs forM the arguMents runs: ParadigM3tic right-hoLders are individuaLs. not acquire ang further rights if theg beLong to rare or endangered species. do Therefore, paradigMatic right-hoLders do not so acquire further rights. So the rights view does not acknow Ledge ang priviLeged MoraL status on the part of rare endangered or species right-hoLders needn t be individuaLs, aniMais.) of so The restricted beginning after aLL, onLg the species (with a if are paradigMs MoraL the about or MeMbers species e.g., as Hutiean entities, certaintg then treated, individuaLs, at Least BoodnanesqLg). But earLier Regan view as Look undercutting the brief argunent. For siMpig consider sone further non-paradignatic right-hoLders, such as endangered species theiisetves. it Makes of announces, rights The Species are not individuaLs, and the rights view does not recognise the MoraL rights of species to is view 3ngthing rights individuaLs. (p.3S9). Thus individuaLs, whatever theg are (no characterisation is actuaLLg offered), are not MereLg the right-hoLders; paradigMatic theg right-hoLders. The More conciiiatorg paradigMatic Line gives wag to the exhaust iron-fisted thene of (p.361), according the to aLLeged individuaListic nature of MoraL rights which the notion of MoraL rights cannot be neaningfuLLg appiied other than to individuaLs (p.36I). Rs far as evergdag, MoraL and LegaL usage goes this just isn t true; there is no such categoriaL restriction. Uhg trg to iMpose such an iMpLausibLe and environnentaLLg daMaginq atoMistic restriction on a rights view? Or, siMiLarLg, on a MoraL standing view? EMending the brief arguMent awag froM anti-environMentaL ends indicates whg. a rebuiit rights view, an individuaL Mag acquire More rights, and warrant More protection, bg be Longing to an endangered group, in virtue of princ ip Les such as that significant endangered species ought to be protected. creatures wouLd hoLd different But then different rights, contradicting Regan's assuMption that aLL aniMaLs are equaL* (p.395) - at Least in rights heid, this, On but as a Matter of definition) in and basis (the of inherent vaLue'. Here is the source of the troubLe, of individuaListic restrictions, not the basic account but the adjoined equaLitg assuMptions. -18- of rights, restriction to individuats Ls not just an optionaL extra Ln Regan s The package, that can simpig be pee Led off. rLghts appt LeatLons of super-imposed theorg, the but Ls essentLaL wLth for the given coherence a super-individuaL, such as a specLes, If postuLates. equaLLtg hetd rLghts on an equaL basts It Ls requLred not ontg Ln major Lt, composLng LndLvLduaLs the then the wouLd both have more rLghts than Lts LndLvLduaLs (those of aLL super-individuaL Lts components) and the same rLghts (cf.DE on bLocentrLc egaLitarianism; DC, Furthermore, equaLLtg assumptLons are verg heavLLg depLoged Ln foLLowing p.3S). through LmpLLcatLons of the LndLvLduaL rLghts view, where dLfferentLaL treatment of different sorts of creatures Ls repeatedLg ruLed out bg appeats to equaLLtg. IntegraL as equaLLtg assumptLons are to Regan s LndLvLduaL-rLghts view, theg are neLther part of more ordLnarg ref Leet Lons on rLghts nor part of what Ls meant bg rLghts, but addLtLonat postuLates. Theg can accordLngLg be removed, and deconstructLon on of the rLghts exactLg view thLs Ls EquaLLtg done. assumptLons concernLng moraL rLghts are supposed, Ln the fLrst pLace, to from dLrectLg dLstLnguLshLng moraL rLghts, for Lnstance unLversaLLtg features absoLute are quaLLt Les, theg do Ls aspect ref Leets and equaLLtg features (p.267). But aLL thLs "equaLLtg rLghts foLLow that (p.368). It does not come Ln degrees not foLLow that one Ltem cannot have more rLghts than another (because, e.g., of Ltems the sort of thLng Lt Ls), or therefore that aLL bund Les equaL that have have rLghts of (even baste) rLghts. Nor does equaLLtg of basLc rLghts foLLow from unLversaLLtg requLrements, but ontg a certain Ln LmpartLaLLtg treatment (often confused however wLth egatttartanLsm). equaLLtg NeLther nor assumptLons LndLvLduaLLstLc restrtctLons emerge then; and Ln fact theg do not fLgure eLsewhere Ln the anaLgsLs of rLghts To them fend we have to foLLow gLven. the text past the anaLgsLs, through to the LntroductLon of the fundamentaL respect prtncLpLe and the rLght respectfuL to treatment (p.277 ff.), where both equaLLtg and LndLvLduaLLtg enter Ln a bLg wag, both beLng imported parts of the theorg of Lnherent vaLue (and assocLated as justLce prLncLpLe) from a previous chapter. For what Ls rLght those of who have argued Ls basic the Lnherent vaLue to... respectfuL treatment (p.277), where Lnherent vaLue Ls bg def Ln Lt Lon confLned to LndLvLduaLs and somethLng aLL suLtabLg conatLve LndLvLduaLs (those subject-of-a-Life) have equaLLg. ConsLder subjects' vaLue as - what we LL caLL Lnherent LndLvLduaLs vaLue. ... aLL who have Lnherent vaLue have Lt equaLLg p.23S ff.). (pp p.37; Inherent vaLue Ls thus a theoretLcaL notLon, conforming sLmLLarLg to HR various postuLates, notabLg LndLvLduaLLtg and equaLLtg. ObviousLg the theorg of Lnherent vaLue can be varied, pLace of Lnherent vaLue, LndLvLduaL as Regan effectiveLg admits (p.362). Consider, then, Ln LnLtLaL or connate vaLue, X, or not, as foLLows: the vaLue of X, defined, for ang Ltem if ang, as an Ltem (and not as a mere receptacLe). In pLace of the equaLitg postuLated for Lnherent vaLue, Lt assumed that, for Ls ang X and Y of the same ethicaL tgpe, X and Y have the came -17- connate vaLue. Then, white connate vaLue Ls not verg Mett characterised, Ls Lt as adequateLg specified as Lnherent V3tue, and can carrg Lts work-Load. showing Before that Let s Look at differences, and Limitations, of the notion. Mhite inherent vaLue is an aLL-or-nothing (certain affairs individual tgpes have Lt, nothing eLse does, but has zero vaLue), connate vaLue Ls not. Not that have (non-zero) connate vaLue need have equaL positive vaLue or tgpes aLL positive vaLue at aLL. DeviLs, certainLg if theg existed, wouLd negative vaLue connate disboLicainess, if (their ontoLogicaL no nonexistence proofs objects are to be beLLeved.) Connate doubt have decidedLg to adding their the existence of top connate vaLue of are vaLues somewhat thus initiaL Like LeveLs of perfection. Connate vaLue Ls, Like inherent vaLue properLg understood, at an best initiaL assignment. The assignments Like those of initiaL are probabiLLtg under a principLe of indifference (particuLarLg vaLue; connate out themseLves presumptive those of inherent vaLue invoLves a further tgpoLogg). UntiL actors, objects, sort their bg initiaL Life-stgLes, can which vaLue, then intrinsic vaLue gets cLarified; compare a be theg states worLd-Lines, posteriori a diminished as or increased receive probabiLLtg assignments. Thus too connate vaLue is not aLL that is taken into account in discerning moraL and so Ln deriving rights. Further vaLue-making or vaiue-detracting prtncLpLes, features of things which affect intrinsic vaLue are aLso reLevant. 0 criticaL question is whether connate vaLue can serve to carrg enough (not aLL, of course) of the requisite argument; in particuLar, that to a respect principLe. appears Examination to show that it can, at Least to this extent: insofar as the argument (pp.277-9) based on respectfuL fact, Ln individuat bg to item substitute connate made is principLe, principLe as aLso to repLace required, nameig resuLts defence of the modified, succeeds. It does, as inspection of the bg shows, where the the same substitutions as before. The modified principLe Looks near-anaLgtic: Ue are to treat those items which have connate that respect their connate vaLue (pp.2t+8). The modified respect wags in and presupposed argument (pp.258-60) for the modified respect principLe soon vaLue right throughout, and to verifg bg inspection that aLL detaiLs that evergthing does work as weLL, given that the modified the features of moraL rights. But it is straightforward to verifg concerning respect to inherent for work just as weLL. Minor use of some points aireadg those vaLue succeeds, so does that based instead on connate vaLue. It treatment suffices, inherent principLe appLies of course to species and sgstems, as weLL as for individuaLs, and so does the expanded right to respectfuL treatment. Much of the remainder of Regan's text can be simiLarLg reinterpreted, but again bg no means aLL.15 (Limitations of space, time, and energg preciude a fuLLer de- and re-construction). Some initiaL indication onLg of the expanded environmentaL rights theorg offered. But it which repLaces the moraL rights view wiLL be is important to observe right awag, that mang of the goats of -20- the anLmaL rights Movement, as Regan conceives Lt Largetg intact under the expanded rLghts theorg (e.g. can PP,p.32), perhaps (minus remain totaLitg the cLaims), for instance, the theme of aboLition of the use of animats Ln scLence. But not aLL the further postulates of Regan's rLghts view remain intact, most notabLg that of vegetarianism, which Ls not a consequence of themes of rLghts movement. Nonethe Less? animat the rLghts view hotds that the LndLvLduaL h3s a dutg to Lead a vegetarian Mag of LLfe supererogatorg; Lt (p.351,p.3^.6) to thLs permLssLbLe Ls vegetarianism Ls (p.39!+); But (p.3^6). obLLgatorg' cone Lus Lon the appear to most the arguments the not Ls Lt that Ls estab LLsh not to consume the products of commercLaL animat agrLcuLture (LncLudLng Since the anLmaL Lndustrg routLneLg presumabLg eggs and pureLg bread sausages). vLoLates the rLghts of these anLmaLs, for the reasons Ls Lt given, wrong to purchase Lts products. That Ls whg, on the rLghts view, vegetarLanLsm Ls moraLLg obLLgatorg, (p.3SI,LtaLLs added). Rs an argument to vegetarLanLsm (a vegetarLan beLng, one who abstaLns from anLmaL food, and LLves on veqatabLe food, and, '16 ----usuaLLg eggs, mitk, etc ), the argument Ls a major nonsequLtur (Likewise the argument, p.3^.6)^\ For there are mang wags of obtaLnLng anLmaL food whLch do not LnvoLve commercLaL anLmaL agrLcuLture or commercLaL practLces (the no proper of focus Regan's sLnce attach, such practLces tgpLcaLLg dLsrespectfuL and insensitive use and rLghts vLoLatLons). Examp Les of practLces huntLng-gatherLng LLfestgLes, of doubt Lead LncLude to the the gardenLng cuLtures of the Pie Lanes La and PoLgnesia, of subsLstence farmLng and of some of the new communes. Regan's further argument (Lt wouLd be unfaLr to stick hLm wLth the awfuL page 3nd 351 with eatLng dogs) commLts hLm, moreover, to the moraL LmproprLetg of (as these extensive tradLtLonaL LLfestgLes weLL as mtnor ones), newfangLed Lnsofar as theg LnvoLve the kiLLLng of pLgs and fLsh and occasLonaL wLLdLLfe and so R chLef reason gLven Ls that on. end theLr LLves are brought to an untLmeLg antmaLs' (e.g. p.39^.). But suppose, to dLspose fLrst of strLct tLme has come, vegetarLanLsm, that or, more straLghtforwardLg, that theg are aLreadg dead. Mhat precLudes respectfuL use? Rn expanded rLghts theorg does not entaLL vegetarLanLsm - ang more connected theorLes, such as aLL that consLderatLon, or rLvaL theorLes such as restrLctLons, wLthout further Large sent Lent utLLLtarLanLsm, are Longer no sentient or entaLL moraL deserve such dLetarg assumptLons. For there are mang tgpes of circumstance where Lt Ls perfectLg permLssLbLe to which beLngs than eat dead creatures, things which wLLL not now attain sentience (as DC exp Lains and argues). The more probLematic area Ls not that of consuming what is aLreadg dead, but of causing prematureLg, Ln order death (or, to a Lesser extent, Letting die) to achieve that option or, to gieLd it as a bg-product. For this appears to infringe rights to Life and LLveLihood and to vioLate moraL standing of creatures interfered with so drasticaLLg. Rppears to. For even ethicaL theorLes that now concede various rLghts to -21- anLmaLs bauLk anLmaLs. Rnd at for sone patLents, Papuans the rLghts extensive to LLfe and LLveLhood to own vLew provLdes, Ln the categorLaL dLstLnctLon between Regan's noraL agents and moraL treatment, such admLttLng ground of treatment dLfferentLaL further and pLgs, a peopLe dLstLnctLon Ln whLch Regan hLmseLf takes refuge when pressed. Regan s dLfferentLaL justLfgLng for So how tLght Ls Ln partLcuLar when reconsLdered as appLgLng agaLnst arguMent, tradLtLonaL LLfestgLes rather than agaLnst modern commercLaL practLces? The buLk of the crucLaL argument ff.) dLd not treat resources. Nor dLd theg (p.3{+^); receptacLes does sLmpLg cuLtures tradLtLonaL renewabLe (p.3t*3 appLg. not anLmaLs just as resources, stLLL Less as as anLmaLs treat Lnstruments mere excLude some kLLLLng of anLmaLs - or do theg? It wouLd seem that of tradLtLonaL unLLke peopLes, provLsLon (p.3t*3), are prLncLpLe dubLous admLtted commercLaL under derLved supposedLg who farmers Regan's from prLncLpLe LLbertg respect prLncLpLe, p.332). R the LncLudLng fundumentaL respect prLncLpLe LtseLf. On a straLght readLng requLres whLch that treatment creatures of vaLue Lnherent are however Some excLuded. Ls not of for prLncLpLe, the countervaLLLng respectfuL No excLuded. LnfrLnged because a creature of Lnher- nt vaLue persLst, come what mag. There use Ls respectfuL of the kLnd of vatue theg have (p.277), such uses of anLmaLs are not wLth a (p.331, stgLe of better tradLtLonaL practLces Ls excLuded under the more the Ln practLces the vLoLate the respect crLtLcaL quest Lon Ls whether the respectfuL use of anLmaLs, food, Papua, pLgs before kLLLLng. CarefuL, respectfuL practLces do not exchanged often or consLder the respectfuL treatment of mang hunter-gatherer groups Ln aborLgLnaL RustraLLa, or the practLces of gardenLng peopLes Ln who Large and Bg does rLghts are therebg a acquLre not Ln LndLctLons Lnterference rLght text Regan s to (and eLsewhere Ln hLs "preservatLon prLncLpLe") whLch wouLd go far towards sustaLnLng the vegetarLan concLusLons he faLLs to reach, and therebg to ruLLng tradLtLonaL the bLoconatLvLst assumptLons that Lt Ls LLfestgLes LnadmLssLbLe. Such are aLwags wrong to destrog LLfe (verg specLat cLrcumstances apart perhaps), that Lt Ls never permLssLbLe to reduce vaLue catastrophLcaLLg the wag that LLfe anLmaLs brLnqtrg to an untLMeLg end does. But Ln fact Regan does not endorse such prLncLpLes, strongLg rejectLng prLncLpLes LLke the pacLfLst prLncLpLe use or harmfuL destructLve wLth LncompatLbLe bLoconatLvLst the vLoLence "LLbertg" assumptLons, no (p.287); prLncLpLes matter as Lnterpreted. dLffLcuLt how wouLd maxLMLae never to bLoconatLvLsm appears Lndeed to NonetheLess, LLve bg, are hLghLg appeaLLng to mang ethLcaL pacesetters and theorg desLgners, especLaLLg who an to mang vaLue. But theg throw the whoLe naturaL order Lnto ethLcaL dLsorder; predatLon, fuLL terrLtorLaL defence and mang other commonpLace naturaL happenLngs are thrown Lnto ethLcaL doubt or MorLd magbe a Ls not verg rendered LnadmLssLbLe. ilagbe The RequLred the wag Lt surprLsLngLg Ls (LesLLe's thesLs) after aLL; dLfferent predator-free sLn-eradLcated RequLred, where V3tue j^s maxLmLzed? -22- post-naturaL worLd Ls $4.' Ti'tt'eMsnts and substantiaL prob tews. tivehood: and predation, territoriatitg other the dust that status-quo-supporting phiiosophers Despite have raised, there is no doubt, tooking through the ctoud, but that * Rnimats have various interests, mang of then of the human as those of instance, sustenance, survivat, sex, species, sheiter (see for animats, sort sane e.g. RR, PR). * Rnimats have various For exampte, theg have, in the same wag that rights. humans do, a right to iive free from unnecessarg suffering, and from excessive interference. these ciaims are substantiaitg independent (having interests is Logicaitg Mhite neither necessarg nor sufficient significant connections, inasmuch rights), having for as rights are nonethetess protect permissibie there to serve worthwhiie interests which more powerfui operators, such de-foresters, as mag otherwise override or ignore. There is no doubt, furthermore, that present human practices sgstematicaLLg infringe animai rights, especiatig those tied to their interests. For exampie, much animai suffering. causes experimentation unnecessarg quite there is a powerfui case for changing these practices (compare Thus and contrast Freg p.t*.), a case both enhanced, and easier obtain to positive action upon, bg the due admission of relevant rights. Rttainment of the sorts of sociai protection the widespread admission of rights can iead to shouid not be underestimated, in the wag it is bg utiiitarians and anti-moraiists. Granted animats have rights, some of them higher humans rights nohumans, widespread a have, main animats phenomenon of predation, a par with those that question (pace Freg) concerns which outstanding particutartg, on have. Because especiatig of the essential to the continued tivetihood of mang creatures, the issue can took tike an exceedingtg difficult one (and one comes to grief upon). There are undoubtedtg serious confticts of interest Regan induced through the phenomenon, some of them unavoidable as when a herbivore s interest in continued existence ctashes with a carnivore s interest in continued sustenance, avoidabte others as in human Predation is not of course the ontg source of territoriatitg, slaughter of whates and dotphins. serious conflict of interests; for instance, C3n atso iead to serious encounters, particutartg in situations of expanding poputations (thus too the issues are connected). Such matters as predation, territoriatitg and population been converted into increase serious prob terns bg mistaken atomistic views of vaiue and associated excessive ciaims as to rights. Removing these defective the but integral part much of atomistic non-utititarian positions such as Regan's, hotds that vaiue (or utititg) is a feature, at bottom, of atomistic as themes probtematic. The vatue theorg involved, tgpified bg utilitarianism reduces an have individuats, that those items items such (constituting the base ctass) have a fixed -23- (equaL) vaLue whLLe theg persist, which Ls not substitutibLe for and that vaLues (derived) Ls ecosystems, of whaLes additive an simpLy functLon the of aLLenabLe, such structures, organised and or atoms as Lt. within CharacteristicaLLg aLso theses of maximization and preservatLon of present vaLue are incorporated Lnto the theorg. On such assumptions, predatLon and LnvoLve a reductLon Ln vaLue, at Least Ln the shorter tern, and so a infringing path, and maximization preservatLon enhances the prob Lens bg postuLating a rLght to has that LndLvLduaL (Lnherent) LnLtLaL to everg simiLarLy woraL exLstence (and vaLue suboptimaL The rights view desLderata. contLnued Like the considerabLLitg posLtLons add to the dLffLcuLtLes). But the assumptions LnvoLved shouLd be removed. Both the wag the probLems are generated fron the assumptions, and the reasons for revising the vaLue eLsewhere than which are wore LncLude sun the of predators, theLr LndLvLduaL escaLation The the of theg though components, be hLghLg vaLuabLe Ln theLr own rLght, wLth mag LLves of herbLvores substituted for wLthtn vaLue. detaLL Ln the Breen SerLes, especLaLLg OC ^). Host important, ecosystems, (Ln tgpLcaLLg expLaLned are assumptions, the through probLems wLthout system, reductLon of theorLes deserves, rights however, some eLaboratLon. R serLous cLash of Lnterest, as between carnLvores and herbLvores, fortunateLg does not therebg Lnduce an imcompatibLLLtg rLghts, of unLess too Lnterests are eievated to rLghts. But just thLs appears to happen when the many extensLve (but not LnvarLabLe) Lnterests of LLvLng creatures exLst are sharpLg upgraded to unquaLLfLed rLghts to LLfe (a Ln contLnuLng mistaken to eLevatLon that Ls common Ln ethLcaL thought). The rLght to LLfe of a success Lon of gnus Ls LnfrLnged bg LLon whLch aLso has a rLght to sustenance to sustaLn Lts LLfe. a MLth the advance of technoLogg Lt wouLd now be possLbLe cases of to Lnterfere some Ln predatLon, e.g. that of the remaLnLng Large carnLvores, to uphoLd gnu rLghts , bg switchLng the carnLvores to an appropriate vegetarian dLet (and, to avoLd cuLLLng, our spLended contraceptLve technoLogg couLd be appLLed hoLd to gnu popuLatLon Ln check). But to deaL wLth aLL cases of predatLon and assocLated issues in these bizarre sorts of wags Ls not onig practicaLLg LmpossLbLe; but at further, such extensLve interference with naturaL ecosgstems is LtseLf, verg Least, dubiousLg permissibLe. High-tech vegetarLan-stgLe resoLutLons of probLems of predatLon, territoriaLitg and so on, are On contrary, the virtuaLLy aLL the remaining naturaL radicaLLg unsatisfactory. systems containing Large carnLvores shouLd be Left substantiaLLg intact or restored towards their naturaL states. These ecosystems ought to persist, and have a Can t an rights to, right fLourishing LnvoLves reguLar vioLation of aLLeged absoLute though their rLghts to Life. to LLfe be Left intact (L.e. mereLg moraLLg extended from unauthentic human setting), and the probLems skirted around? Rfter aLL, some confLict, and inconsistency even, of rights, obLigations and so on, is inevitabLe, and can be LogLcaLLg Lived with in these Latter paraconsistent dags. Some can, but not too much. ConfLict shouLd be confined to exceptionaL (often -24- significant) sorts of cases. In these terns, bg accommodated Mag of up confLLct sgstematic reguLar such confLLct anatogous S3tisfactoriig It Ls too reguLar, deontLc does sgstem not because theg remove part of the poLnt of deontLc cases, structures: for then much too much rather not of rLghts or prLncLpLes. confLLet sgstematic and commonpLace. R sufficientLg effLcLent muLtipLg is predatton Ls time cases. R confLLct, repuzziing spent undermines MhLch fash Lon to deaL wLth sattsfactorg more redecLdLng and the point and force of prLncLpLes, is revision of principLe. Furthermore, a confLLct of rights approach (no more than a confLLct of vaLues approach: right. feeL doesn't p.33) DC, at aLL Lion Ls not acting MrongLg or infringing rights MhoLesaLe, everg Meek R Mhen it mag kLLL an anteLope or other creature. R aLternative, atreadg indicated, consists then in Minding in superior excessive titLement concessions, so as to avoid extensive confLLct. R strong and Legitimate interest in a continuing LiveLihood to right does not an give unquaLified Life, which can be conferred against associated predators. It affords onLg a defeasibLe right, which can be forfeited or Lapse. In these terms, a Lion that takes a Meaker aged gnu, taiLing or separated from a herd, does not vioLate Lts defeasibLe right to Life. The different. Mith situation their take chances. rights to Life are not predatorg is essentiaLLg not LLL-equipped or reck Less humans who put themseLves Ln or find LJeak, themseives in threatening situations, such as traveL humans animats or wiiderness If theg therebu Lose their Lives, their defeasibLe therebg or action highspeed infringed animats where (and defending their animats are territories LnvoLved, not shouid be HL id animats such as gnus are aLmost aiwags on Mitderness traveL, persecuted). except when imprisoned in zoos; theg properLg take their chances with naturaL predators. Rs pursuit of this approach suggests, a hetpfuL wag of coming with predation and Like issues happens, what grips is through zoning, or more generaLLg through bioregionaLLsm, which zones regions of the earth s surface what to and eisewhere. is protected, what Ls permissibie and right, Ln wiiderness can be significantLg different from that in urban areas. R tiger that moves of out a wiiderness to a supposedLg easier Life in a citg where incautious citizens are pLentifuL, cannot expect 3nd doesn t merit the same treatment as Lt did wiiderness, nameLg being Left LargeLg atone. Moreover, with bioregions big For wiiderness as Locus, Lt is much to think hoLLsticaLLg, easier predation as an LntegraL and significant part of such a rich naturaL the as to see structure rather than isoLated action of individuaLs without a further just ifg ing setting. (The adjustment of ethicaL principtes to regions, and Large communities, need invoLves no Loss of universaLizabLLitg; wiiderness is an appropriatetg generat notion, not get a proper name.) The action of carnivores (LncLuding traditionaL peoptes) in wiiderness areas, in taking preg conservativeLg, Ln defending their territories and so -25- on, LnvoLves no LtseLf Ln infringeMents of rLghts then, whether what Ls taken Ls huMan or not (Ls "repL3cabLe" or not). There Ls Moreover no need for Lnstance Lf a carnLvore had coMsuMed a career. that tresspassLng Darwin Ln earLg hLs brash utLLLtarLan wouLd LnsLst, or pretend, that, when aLL the a OnLg deng Lts frequent vioLence and death, nag LnvoLve Loss of vaLue, as with predatLon, to undo-abLe cowputat tons are done, the sufferLng and Losses and repLacenents of sgsteMS, net vaLue of overaLL naturaL processes Ls aLwags approxtMattng naturaL MaxtMaLLtg. On the other stde, thought Lt wouLd be a supreMe technoLogtcaL opttMtst sgsteMS couLd perforw nearLg as sattsfactortLg, huMan-engtneered that even on a qutte Modest scaLe. HuMan breakdown, who efforts, whtch especLaLLg are prone to soMettMes Make soMe SMaLL iMproveMents around the edges; MostLg can theg reLg upon expottLng what Ls aLreadg there or nearbg. Rs a worktng ruLe, the More huMans interfere wLth naturaL processes, the More probLeMs the as there are and More thtngs go wrong. Med LeaL experience wLth intervention, even in Matters norMaLLg straightforward huMan chLLdbirth, provide weLL-docuMented ruLe at work. The chances of huMans iMproving, technicaLLg or the of evidence as MoraLLg, upon Nature Ln wLLderness areas Ls exceedLngLg sLight. To adapt one the ecoLogicaL Laws to of encapsuLate the working ruLe: Nature generaLLg does better than huMans. Its coroLLarg Ls: CurtaLL excessive huMan interference Ln naturaL regions. It does not Matter if, because of predation and the Like, vaLue a Lwags as poLiticaL high wickedness, evoLutionarg not it Might be. Mith the persistence of sin and prevaLence of as Ls copious reason for conjecturing that we do not there inhabit the best of possibLe worLds. Besides we 3re free to specuLate Long is process - that the no doubt a rather restricted, heaviLg interfered with, and verg hit and Miss business - did not turn out as perfectLg as Lt Might have. Major ecosgsteMs certainLg do not appear to have evoLved adapted in weLL wag a to (or anticipating, so to sag) the 3rrivai of Modern huMans with their enorMOUs destructive capacitg and wLLL to power. But, even apart froM the advent it is far froM cLear that Nature of such huMans, provides rather Nature satisizes (an adjustMent of ecoLogicaL an optiMat sgsteM; Law" argued for eLsewhere: see SM). The facts of satisization do not put Nature out of step with deontic best MoraLLtg, principLes. For deontic principLes aLso answer back eventuaLLg to sufficient LeveLs of vaLue, not to MaxiMaL consequences (see were with that vaLue SH). Even it be Maximized, obLigation certainLg does not require Lt. Predation can take a rightfuL pLace Ln such a satisizing environnent; naturaL sgsteMS which have evoLved with predation seeM to offer quite and often dazzLing, Lf LeveLs of vaLue. Richard SgLvan via Bungendore -26- for the adequate, RustraLia 2621 NOTES 1- For aLL that I an crLtLcaL of Much of that thought environmentaL Lt far of southern and western Rmerican schooLs, out fLows the surpasses the drearg and reactionary anti-environmentaL dross that emerges typLcaLLy the froM prestigious More universities Ln LndustrLaL north-eastern USR and British LLght-engLneerLng centres LLke Oxford. 2. May ThLs a strike MoraL as theorist aiMost cost/benefit ana Lysis of (mainstream) econoMics - as curious as a order in aLso and having reaL point - wouLd strike econoMists. But the cases are different. assessMents Cost/benefit depend on a vaLue theory of soMe (perhaps degenerate) sort, but not necessarily on MoraLity. 3- EntitLement to whom? On traditionaL views, and amounts what choice seLf-appointed chosen, (p.!*). makers entitLement a to in There are probiems according PP, to we free and rationaL use regarding of contexts, since entitLement moves in the these rights-circLe and items with m-s May Lack rights. The annuLar picture is open to the separate charges of being but a devious sort of moraL ex tens ion ism and of introducing or invoLving a moraL hierarchy, both of which set scenes for condemnation. But neither charge is justified in a form that wouLd do damage. MoraL notions are not extended, rather their proper significience ranges and catagoriaL features are investigated and put to principLed work. Rs to the matter of hierarchy, the dLvisions of ref Leets cLassification things in terms of such features, where theg appLy, as capacities and capabiiities. This wouLd yieLd a hierarchy these features ranked, which on the annuLar picture they are not. (Even if they were and a hierarchy aLL Not probiematic. resuLted, hierarchies are need that damaging, e.g. ciassificatoru ones, such as BioLogicaL divisions may oniy were when be. not be mereLy It is hierarchies serve to distribute, or become a means to, power or priviLege or favour, that theg warrant the criticism hierarchies have encountered. That criticism wouLd have deservedLy been directed at certain power hierarchies are of this sort.) -27- hierarchies; but not aLL UorrLes about LnstaLLLng a MoraL power hterarchg or pecktng order and accoMpangtng MoraL eLLtes are one reason whg sone philosophers an (west go qutteLg atong wLth eLLtes) operate wtth LMpoverLshed ethLcaL tgpotogg. For instance, a Mtsp Laced egaLLtartantsM appears both as deep ecoLogg, Ln bLo-con3ttvtsM 3nd Ln rLghts vLews such Ln where both Lnherent vaLue and the equaL basLc rLghts Regan's, Lt supports behave Ln an aLL-or-nothLng fash Lon. 5. StwLLar funng busLness Ls goLng on standLng vaLue-Ln-LtseLf wLth Freg, Ln equates who worst and proceeds to bound Lt (p.!+S), beLow, not bLocentrLcaLLg as Ln Goodpaster, but bg sentLence. ThLs part happens as coLLapse of a of wore wLdespread huwanLstLc utLLLtarLan Major ethtcaL dtsttnctLons, wLth rLghts as a further casuaLLtg. 6. PossLbLLLtg and forws of nonLnterference prLncLpLes probabtLLtg are basLc to the Ma Ln arguwents the to LMMoraLLtg of nucLear arrangements: see LiP. 7. But Fox has M3de a sustaLned - though now apparentLg parttaLLg repeated - attewpt to do so, tn hts crtttctsM of axtotogg. Such an attempt Ls bound to faLL. VaLues are baste and LnescapabLe (theg enter even Lnto truth cLatms). Thus, for Lnstance, a crtttctsM woraLLtg as Ln a generaL bad Lnstttutton, cost/beneftt record and, has wrought Much enMeshed whtch damage, Ls of has a poor thoroughtg Ln vaLue concerns. RntL-MoraLtsm depends on axLoLogg; Lt does not sustain and antt-axtoLogg. 8. UnLversaLLzabLLLtg Ls used Ln the text because Lt Ls famLLLar. But what are reaLLg Lwportant are LntersubstLtutLvLLg and reptaceMent prLncLpLes, whtch underLLe generaLLztbLLLtg and other features. 8. SoMe of opposttton and standard objeettons to rLghts taLk resuLt froM Mtsgutded ontoLogtcaL assuMpttons. For exaMpLe, Lt Ls aLteged that rLghts are verg curtous sorts of entctLes, untversaLs that sctence casts no LLght upon and does not need. RccordtngLg, prtncLpLe of such p3rstMong, as OccuM s weLL as provLdtng a pasttng such propertLes, such as betng objeettons of such crude LnstruMents as OccoM s razor: consutt JB, Lndex). Creatures have have a razor, such ent Lt Les shouLd be dLscarded. Object-theorg shortcLrcuLts (as bg derLvatLve rLghts; froM rLghts certaLn obLtgattons; but rLghts do not exLst, soMewhere, or at aLL. RLghts are LogtcaLLg weLL-enough behaved nonexLatent objects. -28- 10. The not Lon of right[sj, though -a coMparativetg Modern Ls one, a verg coMpLex one, sone of the conpLexLtg beLng ref Leoted Ln the 20 right' LLsted Ln the OED. Rn atteMpt to senses of the substantive brLng sone order and sgsteM to thLs coMptexLtg Ls Made Ln SN. RLthough the takes anaLgsis frow off one Ma Ln OED sense, the eLaboratLon wLLL Lead bg or through other connected 1.3 as whLch that MoraLLg just or due concerned Ls (as in LnvoLveMent activities); be no issues concerning opportunitg (as in rights to work) or LLbertg (as in rights state-iMposed such equitg or ... which is right-doing ). But there wiLL Main Ln wLth senses, not to in participate are priMariig issues for MoraL these actors. 11. reLevant or coMMunities to capabie or individuats within theM, i.e. he reguLarLg resorts to individualizing strategies. The status of iterated deontic princ ip Les invoLved in such exact arguMents can be Left open, e.g. whether OOC is entaLLed bg 00 is or further substantive principie which can be asserted when 00 a is. 13. Not aLL these substitutes are incoMpatibLe, fortunateLg for who Leaps to the cone Lus ion that sentience, beings and the "higher ... is an the fact that huMan aniMats have experiences or MentaL states the uLtiMate and fundaMentai basis of the ctaiM that theg (p.^3). No arguMent at aLL are possessors of MoraL rights than appeaL to (other is to be found for this ciatM, a authoritg) surprising OMission in an author who is fond of LaMbasting for Freg, faiLure suppig to others arguMents (e.g. p.7) - especiaLLg in the MereLg citing Light of his eartier reMarks that sentieneg as a criterion for the possession of MoraL rights neither shows that it is one nor even creates the presuMption that it is, ... untiL soMe respects are provided ... arguMents in these subsequent chapters, such arguMents are . Rs we shaLL see in scarce on the ground (p.33). lit- Too Leg s anaLgsis standard account substituting can "right of for desires , an wouLd Mark out onLg subcLass rights, of be upgraded, and brought into Line with (adopted to" Ln EE, p.176), chooses or wouLd chose . Even so Lt iMportant roughLg consequentiai exercisabLe criticisM teLLs against EE). -2?- feature rLghts (a of a siMLLar IS. Rn important exanpLe is the argunent which bg broken is concedLng to that vaLue, equat not p.33, PP aLL hunans, serLousLg genet LeaLLg defectLve and weLL-endowed contractuaLLg-capabLe, need have equat connate vaLue, and thus renoving the preniss. 16. London,1932). RecordLng to the Concise EngLLsh DLcttonarg (Onega, the But qutte not Ls natter not a reputation of sLnpLe, so vegetartantsn on the basts of the avaiLabititg of dead aninats decisive. carefuL definition, which wouLd however render nore R sone hunter-gathers (and even sone cannibats) vegetarians, is 'one who Lives whoLLg or principaLLg OED account, so upon the vegetabie a person who on principle abstains fron ang forn of aninaL foods; food, or at Least such as Ls obtained bg the direct destruction of Life'. 17. that not decisivetg support vegetartantsn, even inproved connerciat faming does UtLLitarianisn invoLving s Laugh ter and of so Regan correctLg contends (p.3S0 suns up his extensive aninats, argunent). Ln Rnd fact fLawed the case utititarian vegetartantsn Ls effectiveLg abandoned in the recent work for of one choice of of its Leading proponents, Singer (see DC, p.36). 13. sone Uhite such terntnoLogg distinction singuLarLg is unfortunate given the non-obsoiete patient . Most aninats are not patients. senses of the noun 13. the inportant, is For exanpLe, in a range of, adnittedLg difficuLt, confiict such as Lifeboat situations (p.32^,p.351), and nore inportant, as regards interspecies reL3tions (p.357 ff.). and threats to rabid foxes to the crunch; hunans aLwags outrank aninats. (So nuch for the then strict norat restrictions, grounded in ... inherent vaiue , the sane aLL and hunans (e.g. p.353). Despite his discLainers, Regan s egaLitarian princ ip Les ring hoLLow when Lt cones for cases, for subjects-of-a-LLfe, on the strength of which even carefuL and respectfuL defective farngard greater C3n practices vaLue assunption be p.3^.2). condenned, R is snuggLed into the rights view, seriousLg detracting fron its environnentaL depth (see DE, si). 20. On bioconativisn see CaLLicott; Leading ideas go back to -Jainisn. 21. Predation bg Large carnivores can conpared with hunan travet be usefuLLg, sporting and predation (no accident of -30- course) favourabig, accidents. UhiLe the nunber of kiLLings annuaLLg are of a siniLar order aninaL and of nagnitude, appears to invoLve rather Less suffertng and pstn. Rnd though reduct ton tn vatue tn the removat tt tnvotve may some of on-gotng ttves, tt atso offers some very constderabte compensattng ecosystemtc beneftts. REFERENCES J.B. A t Catttcott, On the tntrtnstc vatues of nonhuman spectes' tn The Preservatton of Spectes (e.d. B.G.Norton) Prtnceton Untverstty Press, 1386; pp.138-172. R. Dworktns, Taktng Rtghts Sertousty, Duckworth, London, 1377. J. Fetnberg, The rtghts of antmats and unborn generattons, tn Phttosophy and Envtronmentat Crtsts (e.d. M.J. Btackstone) Untverstty of Georgta Press; Rthens, 1371+, pp. 1+3-68. U. Fox, R postcrtpt on 2(1+) (1385) 17-23. deep ecotogy and tntrtnstc vatue , The Trumoeter The enttty-restrtctton of rights: Notes on a fashion tn ethtcs B. Freedman, Hetaphttosophy 12(1381) 153-168. R.G. Frey, Interests and Rtghts. The Case Rgatnst Rntmats, 1880. K.E. Goodpaster, 308-325. Ctarendon, Oxford, On betnq moratty constderabte , Journat of Phttosophy 75(1378) I. H tnckf uss, The Morat Soctety: Its Structure and Effects, rev used ve rs con, Untverstty of Queenstand, 1386. J. Lestte, Vatue and Extstence, Oxford, 1373. H.J. McCtoskey, Respect for humans morat rtghts versus maxtmtztng good tn Uttttty and Rtghts (e.d. R.6. Frey), Btackwett, Oxford, 1385 pp.121-136. C. Ptgden, Nthtttsm: a Defence, Ph.D Thests, LaTrobe Untverstty, 1385. E.B. PLuhar, The Justtftcatton for envtronmentat etttc , Envtronmentat Ethtcs 5(1383 )l+7-61. T. Regan, The Case for Rntmat Rtghts, Routtedge & Kegan Paut, London, 1383; to as HR. T. Regan, On the nature and posstbtttty of on envtronmentat ethtcs', Envtronmentat Ethtcs 3(1381) 13-31+; referred to as NP. J. Rodman, Theory and practtce tn the envtronnentat Movement: notes towards an -31- ecoiogg of experience', Ln The Search for Rbsotute VaLues Ln a Changing UorLd, InternationaL CuLturaL Foundation, New Yorh 1978, pp.1+5-56. J. Rodman, Ecoiogg sensibiLitg , in Ethics and the Environment (ed. D. Scherer and T. Rttig), Prentice HiLL, NJ, 1983, pp.88-92; reprinted in VanDeVeer and Pierce, pp.185-8. R. RoutLeg, RLLeged probLems in attributing beLiefs and intensionaiitg to animats , Inquirg 21+ (1981) 387-L17; referred to as PR. R. Rout Leg, In defence of cannibaLism. I. Tgpes of admissibte and LnadmissibLe cannibatism , Green Series, RSSS. RNU; referred to as DC. R. Rout Leg, Exp Loring Pie inong's JungLe and Begond, RSSS, RustraLian NationaL Universitg, 1979; referred to as JB. R. Rout Leg, Liar and Peace I On the ethics of Large-scaLe nucLear Mar and nucLear-deferrence and the poLiticaL faLL-out , Green Series, RSSS, RNU 1981+; referred to as UP. R. and V. Rout Leg, Human chauvinism and environmentaL ethics , in Environmental Ph i Losophg (e.d. D. Plannison and others) RSSS, RustraLian NationaL Universitg, 1980, pp.98-189; referred to as EE. ' 1 T. Rgan, The case for animaL rights' in VanDeVeer and Pierce, pp.32-39. % C.D. Stone, ShouLd Trees have Standing? Towards Legat Rights for NaturaL Objects Kaufmann, Los RLtos, 197!+. R. SgLvan, R critique of deep ecoiogg', 1+1(1985); referred to as DE. Radicatj^hiLosophg 1+0(1985) ana R. SgLvan, SuppLanting maximization, and other utiLitarian assumptions, in Western ethicai ideoiogg , Topci, 1986, to appear; referred to as SN. D. VanDeVeer and C. Pierce (e.ds), PeopLe, Penguins, and PLas tic Trees, UadsMorth, CaLLfornia, 1988; referred to as PP.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Box 20, Item 1: Draft of Moral matters matter - environmentally? Subject The topic of the resource Typescript draft. Paper published, Sylvan R (1997) 'Do moral matters matter- environmentally?', Between the species, 3(4):163-176. https://doi.org/10.15368/bts.1987v3n4.2 Description An account of the resource Unnumbered paper from collection, item number assigned by library staff. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/browse?search=Richard+Sylvan&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bjoiner%5D=and&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=&amp;range=&amp;collection=&amp;type=&amp;user=&amp;tags=&amp;public=&amp;featured=&amp;exhibit=&amp;geolocation-mapped=&amp;geolocation-address=&amp;geolocation-latitude=&amp;geolocation-longitude=&amp;geolocation-radius=10&amp;submit_search=Search+for+items">Richard Sylvan</a> Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived <span class="MuiTypography-root-125 MuiTypography-body2-126">The University of Queensland's <a data-testid="rek-series" href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/records/search?page=1&amp;pageSize=20&amp;sortBy=score&amp;sortDirection=Desc&amp;searchQueryParams%5Brek_series%5D%5Bvalue%5D=Richard+Sylvan+Papers%2C+UQFL291&amp;searchMode=advanced">Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291</a></span><span>,</span> Box 20, Item 1 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org">Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy</a> Contributor An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, <a href="https://najtaylor.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Dr. N.A.J. Taylor</a>. Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library. Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource [32] leaves. 80.71 MB. Type The nature or genre of the resource Manuscript Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context <a href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:dde401f">https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:dde401f</a> Coverage The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant Como - [Item not listed with location] Box 20: More Green Como House Como House > [Item not listed with location] https://www.antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/68d29df80f9d20e41a77ef7fdb412966.pdf f2093594e525a6ba4c68813d0f8e0eb4 PDF Text Text GAEAN GREENHOUSE, NUCLEAR WINTER, AND ANTHROPIC DOOMSDAY. ... climate change, like no other issue, calls the whole notion of human progress into question. The [ever promised] benefits of newer technologies, more efficient economics, and improved political systems could be overwhelmed by uncontrolled global warming. ... the pace of climate change will soon overwhelm natural variability in the earth's climate. Indeed, it can be improved with nuclear war for its potential to disrupt a wide range of human and natural systems, [severely] complicating the back of moneying economics and coping with other problems. Irrigation works, settlement patterns, and food production [among others] would be tragically disrupted ... (Worldwatch 89, p.ll, p.10) There are many approaches to the Greenhouse problematique, upon which this philosophical investigation focuses. These approaches, range from playing the issue down entirely, dismissing it as not a problem, not something anyone should worry about, at the one end of the range, to playing it up at the other. Those who play it up may even foresee the demise of the human race, the substantially new socio-economic arrangements soon eventuate. There is certainly plenty of room for different approaches, and for some eclecticism. For what is being relied upon, in every case, comprises shaky and contestable arguments, from flimsy forecasting models lacking many apparently relevant details. No one of sound judgment, aware that weather reports for twelve hours ahead can be wildly astray, would place a very high level of confidence on climatic forests for fifty years ahead down a very hazardous track. But there is enough information to act; and there is information rationally requiring action. For things in the future are not going to be the same. It is very doubtful that they are going to be any better (though much important economic theorizing presupposes as much, such as the monetary discounting of the future). They are not going to be similar even, because so many parameters important to life are changing, several at exponential rates. Significant in these changes are likely climatic changes. The Greenhouse effect is among those, a result of the increases of “greenhouse” gases, especially carbon dioxide and methane, in the Earth's atmosphere, which have followed exponential paths since the highenergy phase of industrial culture. The growth in gas concentration produces, what it is lagged by, but is now apparent, a significant increase in mean global temperatures. This has major implications for much of life on Earth. �2 Diagram 1. Spectrum of approaches: Course of action Reasons offered Short response No problem Refutable No certainty Irrational Adaptive capacity Exaggerated High tech resolution Wishful thinking Severe dislocation otherwise Utopian Individual survival Pointless No action1 Moderate action Considerable action These very condensed responses will be expanded and explained as we proceed. Breifly too the outcome is that there is no easy path; future humans should expect a hard landing. 1. Investigative philosophy, argument and rational decision The role of philosophy in such a complex problematique as that of Greenhouse is not difficult to state briefly. Philosophy, Anglo-American philosophy especially, is concerned above all with argument. Investigative philosophy is applied philosophy, investigating arguments, their features - assumptions, reliability, etc. - and their generalisation to rational processes, but outside normal philosophical topics. The generalisation to rational processes comprehends a wider range of philosophical throughput than the orthodox range of argument typically addressed in logic courses; to probabilistic and plausibilistic reasoning, to decision processing and making. A main objective in this piece of investigative philosophy is to consider certain arguments for severe dislocation pprobabilities, as a result of Greenhouse effects, and the resulting impact on rational decision formation and action. There are certain arguments of particular interest radical decision and action: various neo-Malthusian arguments, and doomsday arguments. 1 Taoist no-action would be different. It would not have undertaken excessive industrial action in the first place. �3 The main run of arguments to considerable action are neo-Malthusian in character. The general form of these arguments is simply this: growth in some parameter encounters limits, with severe effects. A characteristic graphic representation is as follows: limits growth parameter time exponential growth pattern J encountering limits subsequent varying unstable behavior The limits are often imposed just by finitude, e.g. finiteness of a resource or a sink. But other limits can be important, for instance where new phenomena or thresholds come into play. General Malthusian arguments loom in the background in what follows. But a different argument, of especial concern as regard climatic changes, is the following anthropic doomsday argument:• There is some probability that the Gaean “greenhouse effect”, generated by human activity, will get out of control, that Gaean control mechanisms will fail, and that the Earth will, for example, overheat (Runaway Greenhouse, or Lesser Venus Prospect, premiss). • That result would be disastrous for human activities, and indeed for humans (Catastrophe Prospect). • Because of the unusual, and unusually precarious, position of humans, such a probability of disaster is not in fact small but decidedly large As a consequence then, the human species will probably sharply decline, and even become extinct (Catastrophe Probability). That is, by a rectified version of Murphy's law - that if something can go wrong then in appropriate unusual conditions, it very probability will - an incrementally small probability is inflated into a very large probability. �4 It would be a mistake to conclude that because the argument itself is an unlikely one, everyone can stop worrying. The argument is but one of a substantial raft of arguments that should have everyone worried; it is but a final intellectual string, so to say, from the inconspicuous cosmological tail. Such a doomsday argument no doubt puts together, in one more exact form, some of the sorts of considerations that are troubling many people, especially concerned youth, about the Greenhouse business: that humans (including themselves) are on a decline or extinction path. It is no doubt not the only consideration that should be troubling them or us. For whether or not doomsday warnings are warranted, there are other matters that should be sufficiently worrisome, to anyone of moral integrity:• Future times are likely to be exceedingly uncomfortable for very many creatures, as habitats are destroyed, food producing regions are eliminated, and environments seriously impoverished. (Many of these creatures are nonexistents, mere future existents, i.e. creatures that do not yet exist or participate in market or voting rituals, but who -will exist and may participate. But, despite their presently unfavourable ontological status, they are entitled to fair and decent treatment.) • Given such future prospects, present practices which do nothing or vanishingly little to ameliorate these prospects, are decidedly irrational. Indeed a main message that will emerge from the present exercise is the moral irrationality of critical large-scale human practices. The irrationality, morally-weighed-down irrationality, of present large-scale human practices is already conspicuous from the wintry downside of climatic prospects of which Greenhouse warming is the upside. Diagram 2. Macro-climatic setting. Bands: all boundaries fuzzy mean global temperature (degrees C) escalating emissions Disequilibrium: Venus prospect increasing dislocation possible adaptation increasing dislocation thermonuclear war disequilibrium: Mars prospect �5 1860 1990 The apparatus for conducting a world-wide nuclear wars is entirely in place and indeed on alert. The probability of such a war, even if small, is not zero. Among the many awful effects of a large nuclear war is that of nuclear winter, which would bring about the demise of present human civilisation, and would at the very least mean enormous dislocation for most surviving humans and other creatures. A sufficiently diabolical chemo-nuclear war, reaching into all inhabited parts of the globe, could indeed drive the human species close to extinction. The decidedly dubious rationality and morality of these nuclear arrangements - both through what they are in themselves for what purposes, and through their moral opportunity costs - are widely appreciated. The thesis that the arrangements and practices are immoral, irrational, and ought to be dismantled - already much argued, and also contested2 - is not the present concern. The thermonuclear downside is, by comparison, a very easy case to examine philosophically, and argue, as compared with the greenhouse upside.3 For there is, for instance, a case of sorts, for much increased use of greenhouse gases, such as CFCs in refrigerators, a case that hardly extends very plausibly to nuclear weapons. It is a case heavily pressed by some “developing” nations, for polluting devices already in widespread use in more affluent places, as necessary for local standards of living. Greenhouse and nuclear winter are more intricately connected than being the upside and downside of meteorological phenomena. One of the high-tech solutions suggestions for atmospheric overheating, involves the generation of wintering effects - to cool things down - by flinging enough dust up into the atmosphere, a trick most easily achieved no doubt on the requisite scale by nuclear explosives. Needless to say, like backburning against out-of- control fires, artificial winter would be a pretty desperate and, given present expertise, irrational expedient. 2. The Greenhouse debate, main policy responses, and irrational decision. The Greenhouse debate, as to what to do, if anything, about forecast Greenhouse effects on Earth, is intellectually disturbing. For it has revealed, as we shall soon see, that many of those who have spoken, worse that many who have some role in decision making For my very small contribution to this, see the War and Peace series in Discussion Papers in Environmental Philosophy, RSSS, Australian National UniversityGlobal warming, by no means entirely certain, is assumed to be the outcome of increasing greenhouse gas build up. Of course though some temperatures will rise, cooling will probably occur also in some localized regions. �6 (including both experts and politicians), lack a firm grasp on decision-making in conditions of uncertainty or possible risk.4 The main canvassed policy approaches to the Greenhouse problematique lie firmly within the dominant social paradigm, the high-tech growth and development ideology. Diagram 2 Broad policy responses to the Greenhouse problematique. Dominant paradigm Alternative paradigm Procrastination (wait-and-see) Soft energy paths and alternative regulation Adaptation (sink-or-swim) Socio-economic transformation Regulation Intervention (star wars) We will briefly outline, and find wanting, all the dominant approaches. • Procrastination, the prevailing response. In fact the main gooon mental and conservative response thus far has been procrastination, or “wait-and-see” as it is more benignly known.5 The approach makes much of the uncertainties, of the shortcomings in even the most elaborate general circulation models, of the high noise-to-signal levels. On such bases, it contends that it is too early to do anything, except staging some meetings, organising some review committees, undertaking some monitoring, and funding a little more “research”. It obviously does nothing to rock the growth ideology boat. There is the pretence that we do not know enough to act6 But it is known that carbon dioxide, methane and other greenhouse gases are fast increasing. The main causes and enough likely consequences are also known. Theoretical consideration, have already been partially confirmed by rising temperatures in the eighties. Outlines of rising temperatures are also known in broad outline, rising sea levels, and so forth. In addition, there are partial Following Knight, some economists (try to) distinguish between uncertainty and risk. Risk is said to obtain when some more or less objective numberable probabilities can be assigned to outcomes, a situation not obtaining as regards the global greenhouse effect. Bayesians, who can always assign subjective probabilities tend to eschew the distinction, e.g. Cyert and DeGroot, also say that ‘decision making under uncertainty refers to situations in which the outcome of the decision is not precisely predictable’ (p.3). Either way, Greenhouse involves uncertainty. There is significant rhetorical art in the choice of classificatory labels, a rather philosophically neglected art. A PR person must have been hired to produce the Greenhouse adaptation of ‘adaptation’. Part of the problem is that scientists have been caught out (e.g. crying wolf) and have become ultra-cautious. With the advent of thermodymumies, for instance, scientists begin ‘threatening mankind with a rather swift “bad death’” as the universe random ‘Thus m. Aber, on ‘balant ideological use of science even by scientists themselves’ (Bernard p.9). �7 small-scale models of the Greenhouse effect in action. For example a city such as MexicoCity, which is situated in the bowl-like valley is placed in an environment traps heat as well as pollution. The ecological affects, like the human affects, are pretty dramatic even at this small level, and hardly to be sought, or amelated elsewhere. There is a pretence, fostered also by many scientists, that Greenhouse difficulties have only just been discovered; a date commonly set for that watershed even is the Villiers conference and statement of 1986 (e.g. Pittoch ....). Actually there have been Greenhouse warmings for more than a decade, and there has been a corresponding decade of inaction. Nor is any action of much significance presently seriously contemplated. Back in 1979 Bernard wrote at length about and reported the substantial concern of climate logists about Greenhouse effects. Even the magazine Nature, not noted for its green sympathies, recorded that ‘the release of carbon dioxide to the atmosphere by the burning of fossil fuels is, concemally, the most important environmental issue in the world today’ (May ? 1975). Bernard quotes many other concerned scientists, several asserting that ‘the government must start dealing with this problem now’. They meant the United States government. “The” government didn't take the hint. For more than a decade then scientists have been emphasizing that the greenhouse threat is a major environmental problem, and that action should be taken immediately. Over 10 years nothing of real significance to counter the problem has happened. There has been more than a decade of inaction , during which matters have got worse, and the time frame for evasive action disturbingly shorter. It is already evident that requisite decision making under uncertainty is not taking place. On straight inductive grounds, it would be reasonable to expect nothing will be done. While there are theoretical grounds to bark up such an assessment, still it is only just beginning to get through to a much wider public (which can exercise a marginal influence on what politicians say) that there is - or may be, as some more reactionary modal-managering academics would have - a problem or two. Many scientists have joined the wait-and-see queue, with their begging bowls, hoping for more hand-outs for research. They assume, rightly enough, that more information would assist with rational decision-making, and also, quite wrongly, that “scientific activity” is required for action to be taken. Physical scientists are not done in their misapprehension of rational decision methods. Although there is a good deal of practical experience available of statistical-type decision making order uncertainty, for instance as regards insurance coverage and engineering projects, decision theory, especially as regards unreputable situations, has not penetrated very far into standard scientific methodology or much into mainstream parts of social sciences. ‘Economists in particular have shown a talent for bringing ever problem back to a world of certainty where all solutions are known or can be easily found.’ Natural scientists �including dematologists are, for the most part, on the same erroneous-reduction-toconlittainable-certainty trip. ‘This is not to say that economists have not worked on uncertainty. ... however ... uncertainty is introduced and then taken out by assumption’ (Cyort and DeGroot p.l). But there are several classes of problematic situations, where decision and action may be required, where uncertainty cannot be discarded by first, reduction strategeness or otherwise, notably:• inheritantly probabilistic situations, such as those of indeterminacy in quantum theory; • essentially unpredictable situations (which may be deterministic) such as those now under investigation chaos theory; • presently uncertain situations and outcomes, which may eventually resolve into certain cases, or may turn into some of the above classes, where there is not time to wait for resolution. The Greenhouse problem is regularly put into the latter class, a standard assumption being that with enough money and research effort thrown at it, it will resolve to decent certainty. But it may well not; there are grounds for supposing that critical parts of climatology will fall into the essentially unpredictable class. The standard approach of too many research scientists is a pathetic begging-bowl posture: Supply more funding so we can go on researching until we obtain certainty.7 There are some severe problems with this standard response. Firstly, it is irrational. Certainty if achieved may be achieved too late. What was required for rationality was decision making in advance of certainty. Secondly, certainty may be unobtainable. The meteorological equations may be non additive (non additive) and so incapable of delivering stable results over slightly fluctuating in strict data. The standard response is methodologically unsound. • Adaptation, learning to live with and love the Greenhouse. The policy ‘that tends to be favoured by most economists’ is an adaptive strategy: “Let society adjust to environmental changes without attempting to mitigate or prevent the changes in advance” We could adapt to climate change for example, by planting alternative crop strain [themselves] ... more widely adopted... ’ (Schneider p.8). Observe, however, that it is a decidedly restricted “adaptation” that is being proposed, that humans adjust to the results of present economic and industrial practices, rather than adjusting them. It is assumed that economic growth comes first, that we do not change (e.g. through decent regulation) high energy industrial practices. A fuller and smarter adaptation would adapt these practices. The policy is like a pernicious agriculture policy that says, “Let farmers adjust to the results of soil erosion, salination and 7 It does not seem to have occurred to most research scientists demanding more money (even more per article) that an important reason why they are not obtaining the funding they expect is because their research results could, if unfavorable, act a serious drag on the industrial establishment. They are not going to be funded to delegitimize modem industrial society. �9 so on, without attempting to mitigate or prevent these deleterious changes in advance.” Such “adaptative agriculture”, the present predominant practice in advanced agriculture, is antienvironmental, but is given a spurious air of evolutionary inevitability and evolutionary redistributive justice; you can't back natural evolution, which is entirely natural, can you. Let us condense such far-from-inevitable and highly artificial mal-adaptation in the neologism badaptation. Greenhouse adaptation, like nuclear adaptation, is badaptation (some, less kind, would say medaptation). There is a pragmatic, if cynical, political argument for badaptation, namely, that unilateral action to prevent a warning is unfeasible and requisite international cooperation unattainble. Both contentions open to doubt. Unilateral action by the USA, by far the World's heaviest resource and energy consumer (per capita and on several other relevant domains) backed up by pressure (familiar from other settings, such as the narcotics war) on other nations and through the United Nations could make a major difference. Unfortunately the USA is also the world's largest supplier of influential grown economists. In any case, international agreements such as those in whaling and Antarctica, are attainable, and sometimes effective. The ozone protocols, limiting production of CFCs show that results can be achieved to limit trace gas emissions. The adaptation proposal is presently compatible with wait-and-see; both mean no hauling back on trace gas production. Indeed procrastination will force societies towards badaptation. Typical of adaptation, like procrastination, is an (over-)emphasis on the uncertainties of Greenhouse forecasts, and on the decision-theoretic paralysis such uncertainties are alleged to produce. Characteristic of adaptation too is a minimisation of the extent of Greenhouse modification. No doubt the impression that things won't be so very different, or far removed from what has already been experienced, is important in getting adaptationism more readily accepted, as a rational course of action (instead of the seemingly irrational course it is). Thus badaptation tends to play with figures at the law end of projected ranges of temperature increase, such as 1.5°C for 2050, when in fact present data indicates something rather in the vicinity of 4°C - in a setting, furthermore, where fractions of a degree centigrade may well be linked ot macro-physical and macro-biological change. Recent modellings deliver, an average, on increase in 2°C attributable to carbon dioxide, and it is widely thought that other trace gases will double the CO2 effect, yielding a 4°C temperature increase.8 8 Sources. Note that methane is beginning to rival carbon dioxide as a gas where atmospheric propostems really matter and whose present increase is excessive. �10 The colossal extent of future human dislocation has correspondingly been deliberately underemphasized. The adaptive capacities of human arrangements, when humans are living at the margin, to massive natural shifts, has been grossly exaggerated. Consider agriculture alone - set aside flooded cities, sunken atoll islands, and all the rest. Some of the Earth's major grain producing regions - upon which famine relief projects depend - could be pushed substantially out of business. The conditions which prevailed during the American dust-bowl experience of the nineteen-thirties were benign indeed compared with those which threaten with mid twenty-first century Greenhouse conditions. The mid continental summer temperatures were only 1-2° C warmer than the present average, under greenhouse conditions they could be more than 3-4° C warmer. In the dustbowl rainfall only slipped at critical growing times (e.g. July for northern com) to 80% of the contemporary norm; but under Greenhouse conditions it could be significantly less again. A super dust-bowl is not improbable (for much more detail, see Bernard). Similarly for other similar latitude Northern grain producing regions. But the high-energy industrial superstructure is crucially based upon sufficient cheap food (bread) for the urban masses. • Intervention, high-tech Gaean engineering. Interventionist proposals so far floated include • New oceans in parts of the Earth's land surface lying below, at, or near sea level. These projects would make the mega-dams of recent times look like childrens' play. • Wintering effects. Production of sufficient dust in the atmosphere, achieved for instance by nuclear detonations, to mitigate heating effects. Such enterprise would make modification of the weather by cloud seeding look like childs' play. Fortunately these and other expensive and grandiose proposals, which would call for considerable international cooperation, are far down the planning track; with these schemes procrastination is rational. • Regulation, controlling free(-wheeling) enterprise. Regulation itself, not so bureaucratically popular under that presentation in these latter days of economic irrationalism, is of course transparadigmatic, where it belongs depend on what measures (what sorts of constraints, rights, etc.) are proposed and how they are imposed or enforced. If it is, for example, some industrial law-and-order, smokestack scrubbing regulations or Greenhouse polluting rights, within the status quo, that is one thing, but if a minimally-constrained growth paradigm is questioned and alternative socio-economic arrangements advocated, that is quite another, and falls outside the dominant paradigm. Such policies involving regulations controlling fossil fuel emissions especially, are negatively labelled prevention in the predominantly American policy literature, though there is now no preventing some Greenhouse effects; but the worse to follow could still be prevented. What is usually covered under the label is however some regulation within prevailing political arrangements. So energy efficiencies and savings for investment in �11 growth elsewhere is comprehensible, straight growth-curtailing non-consumption is not contemplated. But the latter is just what alternatives do contemplate. Democratic political arrangements do not exclude such alternatives both the power bases of political leaders and economic prescriptions do. Adequate regulation within prevailing socio-economic arrangements is going to prove impossible, without adjustment of power structures and economic imperatives, in effect without far-reaching systems and a devological adjustment. While such adjustment may be rational, it is unlikely. Power structures have too much to lose.9 This is an opposite point to record the chauvinism and environmental shallowness of the Greenhouse debate. Like heart disease and cancer, the Greenhouse effect is gaining much discussion and some funding because it just may severely effect the affluent, affluent people and affluent nations, that have a good deal to lose, in North America especially. The impact will, however, be at least as severe in some third world nations, whose lands or much of them will be flooded, countries which cannot afford extensive expensive dyking (or where such effort would be in the longer term, as seas rise, pointless), countries such as Pacific coral atoll nations and delta states like Bangladesh. But the really serious losers will no doubt be, not humans , rich or poor, but nonhumans. Biological diversity, already being reduced by various human activities, may be one of the chief casualties of global worming. Massive destruction of forests, wetlands, and even the polar tundra could irrevocably destroy complex ecosystems that have existed for millennia. Indeed, various biological reserves created in the past decade to protect species diversity could become virtual death traps as wildlife attempt to survive in conditions for which they are poorly suited. Accelerated species extinction is an inevitable consequence of a rapid warming (Worldwatch p.10). 3. Arguments to dislocation and for a Lesser Venus Prospect. There is at least a small probability that predicted increase in mean atmospheric temperatures will seriously interfere with most remaining natural environments and result in the degeneration or destruction of many of them, especially forests wetlands, maritime environments. Nor will adaptationism help here; for natural evolution is much too slow for adaptationism to succeed (cf. Keeton pp.763-4). Natural ecosystems will not adapt effectively to rapid climatic change,... With regard to forests, habitats for plants and animals cannot be re-created or transplanted rapidly. Continuing climatic changes would strain the capabilities Holistic problems are too extensive for individuals, or even small collectives, to make much difference acting or their own. Some are too beg even for large collectives or states, but would require whole regions of the Earth acting in concerte. But of course some state players, such as the superpowers, as regards nuclear winter, can make a substantial difference, or even all the difference. �12 of management practices even in commercial tree plantations (Beijer Institute Report pp.21-3). The decline or demise of these systems, vast reservoirs for greenhouse gases will accelerate the warming, and accordingly make matters substantially worse: Trees are adapted to a narrow range of temperature and moisture levels, and cannot cope with rapid climate change. A temperature increase of 1 degree Celsius per decade in mid- to upper latitudes translates into a shift in vegetation zones of 60-100 miles northward. Terrestrial ecosystems cannot migrate that fast. Vast numbers of trees are likely to die, and new trees adapted to warmer temperatures are unlikely to be able to replace them rapidly. During such a disruption, huge areas of forest could die and, as they decay or bum, send large quantities of additional CO2 into the atmosphere, accelerating the warming (Brown p.10). Of course the immediate climate patterns would be somewhat more complex. If enough soot and ash from fires were flung into the atmosphere there would be a cooling effect, like that of a small nuclear winter, before heating accelerated. The present pattern of ecosystemic loss would also be sharply accelerated. When natural ecosystems get reduced to about 30% of their initial size, they tend to collapse of themselves. Moreover, there would be other significant positive feedback from ecosystems other than the terrestrial forests, from the oceans especially. As the oceans warm, they lose their capacity to serve as carbon dioxide reservoirs. So they too release additional gases, including previously absorbed CO2, back into the atmosphere, further accelerating the warming. A critical question arises as to how much danger such positive feedback poses? As so often, informed opinions, and so probability estimates differ. However ‘several scientists working in the area consider that positive feedback effects will force a very bleak picture to be drawn’ (p.19 ref?)10 Unlike the interim effect of a small nuclear winter, where after a few years at most, climatic behavior (as distinct from radioactivity levels) would presumably return towards the previous norm, there will be no similar recovery under greenhouse impact. Technically then, stability would be lost under the impact,11 disequilibrium induced. An eventual longterm return to some different equilibrium could well be excluded. Under new climatic regimes plants themselves may be able to do little more than hang on for part of their own lives. In many places conditions would be too severe for much of the “year” to permit normal plant functioning, including what is crucial for greenhouse amelioration, photosynthesis. In most plants, photosynthesis only occurs across a narrow band of Second order probabilities, probabilities and uncertainties in the light of first order subjective probabilities, enter importantly. Stability is defined in physics in terms of return to an initial (inertial) position after small disturbance. �13 temperatures (e.g. 6 - 34°C); outside that range the plants shut down operations.12 Even more important, many plants would leave few or no successful successors. Even where plants set seed, seedlings would not survive under the severe conditions expected; for instance, they would be killed by hot dry summer conditions, or in other places by frosts to which they are not adapted, both phenomena already familiar after clearfelling of forests. The situation at... in southern Sahara, where there is but one ancient tree hanging on in thousands of square kilometers of desert, a tree with viable seeds which sets no seedlings, could be more or less replicated in many other places where forests or woody plants once grew. In fact we are already witnessing the demise of the trees in much of Australia. Already dead and dying trees form a predominant feature of the Australian rural landscape. Virtually whichever way ecologists travel in Australia where trees remain, they are confronted with dead and dying trees 13 The reasons for the present decline of trees in rural Australia is, for the most part, not to be attributed to early greenhouse or even pollution effects.14 It is thought to be due to a complex of factors, including a range of insect predators whose effects are enhanced on isolated trees left after an excessive zeal for clearing (i.e. holistic effects enter as regards healthy persistence of trees). The relevant point is that these features are likely to be accelerated given the additional impact of greenhouse warming on plant functioning and reproduction. There are several major ways through which the maintenance structures of the Earth can be not merely awkwardly disturbed, but thrown right out of kilter - perhaps, given the delicacy of several critical matters, never to return present norms. Most obvious and immediately threatening is • nuclear warfare, and therewith nuclear Winter. But there are of course other severe shocks the planet could suffer than those chemo-nuclear warfare, some human induced, some a “chance” matter of the planets' position in space, namely • a mini Big Bang, or an undermining of metastability, brought about through very high energy experimentation (see Leslie) • a collision with a large meteorite or asteroid. Such uncertainties, not germane to the main climatic arguments, are listed, not to achieve a bogus completeness, but to emphasize that complete certainty is not to expected, not rationally.. Should we obtain it, should we obtain easy relatively unproblematic lives, then we have, by world standards, been rather lucky. Moreover, these latter uncertainties do The upper bound may be difficult to appreciate in most of Aotearoa. But in much of Australia, during the summer, many plants close down their operations for much of the day. Reported by Recher on Earthworm. Thus coastline vegetational destruction through detergents in sewerage waters. �14 appear negligible compared with those bound up with climate, ascribable to: • excess economic development. The practices involve a complex and sustained assault on most of the Earth's major ecosystems, forests, seas, etc, along with the alteration of atmospheric composition by greenhouse gases. For example, the forests are cut down, burnt, poisoned by herbicides and acid rain, or otherwise removed or destroyed. (Therewith too a great deal more carbon dioxide is released into the atmosphere and major sinks of carbon dioxide are removed.) As a result of these concerted growth-and-development activities such systems are driven to limits, and breakdown occurs. Once it occurs at some weak point it can escalate elsewhere, like a conflagration.; thus again ecosystemic collapse for example. Quite apart from breakdown at or approaching limits, for instance because of systemic overload, remarkable changes can occur in desiccative systems under stress or strain. • excess energy or chemical loading. Though such striking examples as the chemical clock, it has been demonstrated that dissipative systems can suddenly, and often rather unpredictably, undergo extraordinary changes, as for instance energy flux is increased (Prigogine and others), [describe briefly] Such non-additive, or nonlinear, effects, characteristic of more holistic dissipative systems, are bound to occur within the Earth's atmosphere and oceans as they undergo compositional changes. Carbon dioxide itself provides a good example. With small quantities its effect on the temperature of the air is proportional to the amount added; there is a linear effect. However once the carbon dioxide concentration in the air approaches 1%, new nonlinear effects come into play and heating greatly increases. In the absence of a biosphere to fix carbon dioxide, its concentration in the atmosphere would probably exceed the critical figure of 1%. The Earth would then heat up rapidly to a temperature near to that of boiling water. Increasing temperatures would speed up chemical reactions and accelerate their progress towards chemical equilibrium. ... eventually ... the Earth would become permanently cocooned in a brilliant white cloud - a second Venus, although not quite as hot (Lovelock pp.45-6). Fortunately for Gaean prospects, the percentage of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere is now nowhere near 1% nor likely to be pushed near 1% by projected doubting of carbon dioxide levels under economic activity over the next 50 years15. However eventual exponential growth will lead towards levels, and the side effect of such growth, the release of carbon dioxide from forests and oceans and the considerable reduction in fixation of carbon dioxide with the decline of forests, will lead in that disastrous direction rather more rapidly. The 1% 15 In the atmosphere of the very early Earth, CO2 exceeded the critical 1% figure; but solar luminority was about 25% less than now. With increasing solar flux the Earth would have overheated had the proposition of CO2 not been much reduced (e.g. see Lovelock 88 p.56). �15 bound constitutes just one of the many serious limits to continuation of present developmental practices. Now there can be no rational confidence with respect to complex dissipative systems - about the behavior of which we presently know comparatively little - that no other nonadditive effects will no be encountered at a much earlier stage. After all, the Gaean system, its atmosphere, oceans and ecosystems, will be pushed into essentially unexperienced and substantially unknown reaches. There is, for example, no experience from past times of such elevated temperatures as Green house effects will lead to, to draw upon. ‘There is no evidence that the land-bound glaciers in Greenland and Antarctica have ever completely melted in the last two million years’. There is experience of much colder periods. ‘During ice ages, the earth's average temperature has been about 5°C colder than at present, with glaciers covering major portions of continents’ (Barth p.7). But there is no similar experience of temperatures 4-5° C warmer than at present (in a warm interglacial period), ‘a global increase of more than 2°C above present is unprecedented in the era of human civilization’ (Schneider p.6) It would accordingly be decidedly rash, rash decision makings, to assign a zero or negligible probability to the emergence of new or unknown effects of relevance, to assume all will go smoothly and well. That would presuppose, in any event, a completeness in present scientific knowledge, contrary to the information we have that present investigation of holistic systems, among much else, is still in its infancy. The probability of something critical (e.g. perhaps radicals like hydroxyl) having been left out of estimations, of room accordingly for something unexpected or for something to go wrong, may be small, though experience implies it is not always so but it certainly appears to be non-zero. For the overconfident, with excess faith in the flimsy scientific edifice, there is a salutary lesson to be drawn from the erratic and stumbling path of the main proponent of Gaia hypotheses, Lovelock. Lovelock, coming from a working life as an industrial chemist, part of that time for a giant chemical transnational, had, and retained for a considerable time after he began his holistic hypothesizing a strong antipathy for environmentalists.16 Even Gaia was for industry and against the environmentalists; she was going to laughingly soak up all the pollution, courtesy of the chemical companies especially, that we humans could throw at her. In particular, we did not really need to worry much about ozone depletion or greenhouse gas escalation.17 ‘Contrary to the forebodings of many environmentalists, Coupled with this, there is a certain schizophrenia in Lovelock's attitude to the natural environment. There is also a matching schizophrenia as to the fragility of life on Earth. On the one side, it required very delicate settings and fine barring to arise; this is part of the argument for a Gaia hypothesis. On the other side, life is ‘tough, robust, and [highly] adaptable’, virtually indestructable (p.90). But though a flawed hero, Lovelock is a hero nonetheless. See Lovelock 79, p.40ff; and also 88? [detail] �16 finding a suitable’ destructive agent to bring about a ‘doom scenario’ ‘turns out to be an almost insoluble problem’ (p.40). Lovelock makes it easier for himself by helping himself to the assumption that a doomsday scenario involves the destruction of all “life”, ‘down to the last spore of some deep-buried anaerobic bacteria’ (p.40). But even for the least chauvinistic of environmentalists, destruction of all humans but the select elect would be quite enough for a decent doomsday. Lovelock's high redefinition of a environmental ‘doomsday scenario’ is unacceptable. Lovelock does not however stay within the bound of his redefinition. He proceeds to pooh-pooh the idea that anything much that we humans could accomplish would make any difference to Gaia (p.41) or even to most humans, including use of nuclear devices. Unfortunately for Lovelock's credibility, he was writing three years before the seemingly obvious wintering effects of a major nuclear war were realised by the accredited scientific community. Appealing in a common scientific fashion to scientific authority, he proceeds to minimalize the human and ecological effects of a major war. The report he relies upon as authoritative was a 1975 (unreferenced) one of ‘the US National Academy of Sciences ... prepared by an eight-man committee of their own distinguished members, assisted by forty-eight other scientists chosen from those expert in the effects of nuclear explosions and all things subsequent to them’ (p.41, italics added). Lovelock draws from the distinguished expert report the findings that ... if half of all the nuclear weapons in the world's arsenals, about 10,000 megatons, were used in a nuclear war the effects on most of the human and man-made ecosystems of the world would be small at first and would become negligible within thirty years. Both aggressor and victim nations would of course suffer catastrophic local devastation, but areas remote from the battle and, especially important in the biosphere, marine and coastal ecosystems would be minimally disturbed (p.41). Three years later Turco and others proceeded to detail a very different scenario that of widespread and ecologically damaging nuclear winter.. Not for the first time, Lovelock had been caught out badly. As with pollution, Lovelock has more recently shifted ground18 considerably in the vulnerability of the Earth to human-induced disturbance. When a system such as Gaia in homeostatis is stressed to near the limits of regulation even a small disturbance may cause it to jump to a new stable state or even fail entirely.... Shifting ground may be fine, especially when it is to an improved position. But it should be done honestly and openly, not stealthily or shiftily. Lovelock proceeds to attribute a caricuture of his own previous position to critics of the Gaia hypothesis (as a clever ‘fabrication’ which it was not); that it is ‘an argument developed to allow industry to pollute at will, since mother Gaia will clean up the mess (85 p.53). �17 It could be that the regulation of the Earth's climate is not far from one of these limits. Thus if some part of climate regulation is connected with the natural level of CO2 then clearly we are close to the limits of its regulation. This is because CO2 cannot be reduced much below the level observed for the last glaciation, about 180 ppm, without seriously limiting the rate of growth of the more abundant C3 type plants. If we perturb the Earth's radiation balance by adding more CO2 and other greenhouse gases to the atmosphere or reduce its capacity to regulate by decreasing the area of forests or both of these together then we could be surprised by a sudden jump of both CO2 and temperature to a new and much warmer steady state; or by the initiation of periodic fluctuations between that state and our present climate. The anomalously low abundance of CO2 on Earth when compared with the other terrestrial planets and especially the fact that the mean temperature of the Earth is on the cool side of the optimum for regulation, suggests strongly that the biota is regulating the climate by pumping CO2 from the air. The common feature of most of our pollutions and of our exploitation of the land surface seems to be unintentionally to thwart this natural process (Lovelock 85 pp5354). The argument to the lesser Venus path, to significant disequilibrium with the Earth's ecological support system destabilized, takes the following lines. The Earth appears to be a discipative (far-from-equilibrium) system held at its present balance by a combination of an (increasing) solar flux - a main energy input into the system - and its major ecological arrangements, especially vegetation complanes and live oceans. The sheer extent to which the resulting system differs from the stable dead system it could otherwise be is shown by the following table for atmospheric and oceanic composition. TABLE 1. Substance Carbon dioxide A Nitrogen T R Oxygen Argon 0 C E A N S Water Planetary comparisons (principal components per cent). Equilibrium Earth Venus Lifeless Earth Mass Present Earth 99 0 98 1.9 98 1.9 95 2.7 0.03 79 0 1 trace 0.1 trace 0.1 0.13 2 21 1 63 Salt 3.5 Sodium nitrate 1.7 96 n.a. n.a. 3.5 traces Surface temperatures (°C) n.a 477 Total pressure (bars) n.a. 90 290±50 60 -53 13 0064 1 The table is based upon tables 1 and 2 of Lovelock 79, pp37 and p.39. �18 The whole Earth system is accordingly far from equilibrium. Unpredictable behavior as locals increase is therefore almost to be expected. A likely moral is presumably: stress they system, or destabilize ecosystem controls sufficiently, and the system may be in deep trouble. It is relevant to inquire into what evidence we have on this case. To do so let us reconsider some of the array of arguments there are from some sort of holistic organisation of the Earth (for a modest Gaia hypothesis). But for the participation of the Earth's ecological support systems, plant complexes especially the Earth would not be blessed with its present life-benign physical characteristics. The oceans would be much saltios and too salty for most life, the air would not contain the present rich mixture of oxygen and carbon dioxide so important for terrestrial life, and so on, perhaps most important the Earth would be significantly hotter and too hot for most life, for what of what does the regulating and stabilizing of present conditions. For the solar flux has increased in intensity about 30% since life appeared on Earth, but the mean global temperatures have exhibited no corresponding increase, but have remained relatively constant. Such an expected consistency in the face of disturbing inputs is ascribed, under holistic approaches that do something to explain it, to the concerted activity of plants, [detail] Lovelock and collaberaters have devised an elementary daisy world model which reveals how a feedback system with two types of daisies can, within limits, stabilize temperatures despite increasing energy input. The limits are important, for as these limits are approached the maintenance systems break down. diagram Q Similarly several of the well-known chemical cycles, such as those for nitrogen, sulphur, sodium and so forth depends for their maintenance on the adequate operation of active ecological structures. Plainly if a cycle loops through a component, such as forests, which is severely disturbed then the cycle itself could be disrupted. There is some probability furthermore that the foregoing changes will disturb crucial equilibrium systems and chemical cycles. Some of these feedback systems are in fact maintained in equilibrium by natural ecosystems (an example is Lovelock's daisy world model, which becomes unstable when temperature rises too high). Instability could ensue under disturbance [explain, include Greenhouse holism]. Without doubt these matters are bad enough. Demise of most of the Earth's richness19 is not a minor matter. Worse could follow. Natural richness is the main richness, much exceeding human artifice. �19 The general tenor of the argument is so far this:- By arguments from physical models, and because of uncertainties, the probability that something could go badly wrong is nonzero,20 and indeed far from negligible. Part of the argument can be put as follows: there is a decent probability that a modest Gaia hypothesis holds. But then, there is a considerable probability that excessive Greenhouse build up will lead to damaging system destabilization. So containing probabilities, there at least a nonneglizible probability of such destabilization. An analogy should now emphasize both the dubiousness of what is being proposed under adaptationism and the precariousness of the human predicament. The proposal is to take this ancient craft, now overloaded with human passengers and their heavy baggage, a cargo it was never organised to carry, out on new routes and run it fast and higher than it has ever travelled before. Even for an experimental prototype, a now very fast (air-)bus say, with a select text crew, such a procedure, of running over new uncharted routes at speeds and heights never attained before, would be risky enterprise. With an ancient craft, with a heavy nonelite cargo of baggage and passengers (some whom try to interfere with the controls), the proposal is extremely rash. For the chances that the craft will breakdown and perhaps crash, with serious consequences to passengers and for the baggage, are greatly elevated over the risks of proceeding as usual much more slowly. With the costs of crashing so severe, rational operators and sensible pilots would not take them.21 Unfortunately the analogy is not at all far-fetched, but resembles what is in store for spaceship Earth, already under significant stress with its excessive human passenger load and their heavy ecological practices. Not only is the future itself pretty new territory, but it is a future at terrestrial temperatures, important processes will proceed faster than ever before, in particular all chemical processes. Simply to take the craft up there, as do-nothing and adaptation approaches would have is to emulate the risks and hubris of Daedelus; such approaches are aptly rarely Daedelian 4. The Sting in the Cosmic Tail: the mini-Furphy theorem and the likely demise of homo sapiens, spp. economicus.. The trouble with the initial formulation of Murphy's law: if anything can go wrong, it will, From logical theories of probability such as Carnap's non-zero probabilities are rather easily reached (perhaps too easily, with the converse feature that natural laws never obtain high probabilities. The difficulty can be characteristed, to some extent, by restruction to physical models). The analogy is an old one, which we exploited before in the nuclear case; for the “bus analogy”, see Routley and Routley. The analogy admits of much graphic variation. Instead of running the craft at excess speed, an alternative or additional image is that of destroying the controls of the craft. Lovelock deploys this opposite image (88 p.63), which corresponds to the demolition of Gaians control systems. �20 was that it was insufficiently qualified, much too absolutist, and apparently self-refuting..22 Certain crucial qualifications are required:• Replacement of the certain (certainlistic) conclusion by a somewhat weaker probabilistic one: namely, it probably will. • Correlative to weakening the conclusion, strengthening the premiss, by rendering it more specific; namely, in place of ‘anything’ or ‘something’ put ‘some thing ... given a chancy situation’. The modified formulation is accordingly the following Mini-Furphy result:23 if some thing can genuinely go wrong, given a relatively chancy situation, it probably will. Here ‘chancy’ means more or less what it means according to the dictionaries: doubtful, decidedly risky, or as we shall construe it, having a comparatively low probability vis-a-vis its alternatives. The precise extent of relative chanciness will be explained as we go. To prove this proposition, let us first recast it in appropriate symbolic form. Let D be some arbitrary bad situation, a suitable disaster. Let the possibility of D's happening something's going wrong - be represented by a non-zero probability, and genuineness by non-negligible probability. It can be assumed that that probability, P(D), is small, otherwise the requisite conclusion would follow in any case. Let C represent the features that render the situation chancy. Then what we aim to show is that where P(D) is small positive, P(D < C) is probable. The proof applies a special case of Bayes' theorem, which take the following form where there are n alternative hypotheses hi,...,hn including h: Pv(h) x P(i < h) P(h < i) X P(hr) X P(i < hr) r = 1 Here h is the hypothesis, which in our application is D, i is the additional information (or, is in Carnap, a new observation), which in our case is C.24 P(h < i) is the probability of h 22 23 24 For this and other formulations of Murphy's law, and many loosely associated humorous maxims with grains of truth encapsulated, see Block. As to the history of the “law”, which originated with J.M. Chase, editor of Aviation Mechanics, see the Encyclopaedia Americana', Chase's initial formulation in a 1955 issue read ‘If an aircraft part can be installed in correctly, someone will install it the way”. This little theorem was originally more accurately entitled the Murphy-Leslie theorem. It is an adaptation, suggested by Leslie's work, of Murphy's Law. This section is overwhelmingly indebted to Leslie; for Leslie's debts, and so the transitive debts of this section, see Leslie himself, who deserves to be read in defence his legitimate doomsday apprehensions. The next not indicates the limited extent to which Leslie's arguments are endorsed. The formulation is a special case of that proved in Carnap, p.331; namely that (absolute) case where the evidence e is elided, or e set = 1. A similar result follows, subject to slightly more rigorous conditions, in relevant probability theory; see Routley 79 p.954. �21 given i, or of h on condition i (the backward arrow notation, <, symbolises the condition involved and shows its direction). For simplicity we shall suppose that all the alternatives to D are concentrated (as far as symbolic exposure goes) in one, namely D*. Then the form we seek to apply is simply: p(D < C) __________ P(D) x P(C < D)__________ P(D) x P(C < D) + P(D*) x P(C < D*)' = The arithmetic details needed can be tabulated in a revealing form as follows: Cases D D* Initial (or prior) probability d 1-d m, say Vd m/l, say 1/dl of outcome relative chance that C As it is the relative chance of C that matters, we can rescale to set m = 1/d. To make C relatively chancy, I has some modest size; specifically let I exceed 1-d/d. Then the probability to be estimated, P(D < C), is d x 1/d d x 1/d + (l-d)/dl where k = • 1 1+k _ “ That is» and P(D < C) | y when k < 1, i.e. when I [ p(D < C) = where k = 1, . Thud D is probable, at least in being more probable than not, given C, when I is of at least modest size, i.e. given C is relatively chancy. In a merely apparently more general form of the estimation, where we do not align m to d, In effect we shall look at the form P(h < i) = --------------- < h)------------------------------P(h) X P(i < h) + XP(hr) X P(i < hr)’ n with the sum excluding the product for h. Though demonstrable given satisfiable exclusion and exhaustion conditions, Bayes' theorem is not lacking critics, in part because of the surprises this bit of logic can deliver. Carnap meets the objection that Bayes' theorem has sometimes ‘been applied to cases where it led to strange or even absurd results’ thus: ‘This was mostly due to an uncritical use of the principle of indifference :... [The] theorem is provable ... on the basis of those weak assumptions which practically all theories of probability seem to have in common’ (p.331, sub 1 elided). Of course the present applications could (just) be objected to on the grounds that the logical conditions for the theorem to apply are not fully satisfied. �P(D [ C) 22 d x m d x m + (1-d) x m/l 1 1 + k’ 1 as before. That is m drops out, only the relative chanciness really matters. The little Furphy theorem follows as before. Now to put some relevant flesh on these abstract statements and figures. Let D be some future disaster such as the catastrophic decline, for instance, through summer or winter phenomena of the human species, from which the enormous present population never recovers. At worst (from a chauvinistic angle) the population, like many catastrophically effected by human activities, goes extinct. Suppose, for a bifurcating outcome, there is a catastrophe stage, before halfway through next century, 2050. If humans do not get their act together before then, they go into catastrophic decline, as already indicated. If however they do get their ecopolitical act together then humans, while they hardly live happily ever after (poverty, inequality, domination, and other evils not being removed), they continue to persist or even grow in numbers, perhaps fanning out through the solar system ( in the way envisaged by too many physicists). Suppose further we are optimists, imagining that the prior probability of D ecodisaster and human decline, is small, say 1%. That is d = .01, and the initial probability of D*, human “success”, is .99. The figures are pretty notional. Supreme optimists would want to set d much smaller, pessimists rather at a higher probability. Application Table 1. Cases D human decline D* human success Initial probabilities 1%, i.e. .01 99%, i.e. .99 Relative chanciness, VlOO, i.e. .01 1/100 x l/l ofC Then the probability of human decline given .01 x ,01 P(D < C) .01 x .01 + .99 x .01/1 1 !/2 , when I > 99. �23 It remains to fill out C, thereby showing that I is likely much much larger, and correspondingly human decline so much the more probable in the light of additional information, i.e. a posteriori probable in the usual jargon. There are several high risk factors, acting in a certain concert, factors emphasized more than a decade ago in world systems modellings (such as, most famously that, of the Club of Rome) Malthusian factors such as human population, economic product, pollution, energy consumption,.... It is appropriate for estimate posterier probability relative to anyone of these, any of which can serve as C, in order to expose the riskiness of present gross human practices. In brief, because there are several high risk factors, so there are several appropriate relative or reference classes. Thus the posterier probability is assessed relative to such matters as our being alive, humans being thus and so (Leslie's reference class), this being present energy use, present wast output, present forest destruction and so forth.25 The anthropic argument considers the environmentally invidious situation of present humans on the Earth. The argument can be carried through either in terms of sheer population, gross numbers, or in terms of human resource grabbing, as estimated for instance through energy consumption. Let us consider the prospects given additional information as to the present phase of gross human population. C will be some such proposition as: the proportional preponderance of humans who have ever lived alive now, or to personalize it: the chance that you or your family, is alive now. Chart: Our present population predictment on the two scenerios. Demise scenerio “Success” scenerio - representative zjs human numbers human numbers On of the weaknesses in the argument may appear to be its dependence on an appropriate choice of relative class. For, the relative probabilities can fall away if different reference classes, not exhibiting such growth patterns are taken, e.g. present wattle distribution, birds being thus and so. On the other hand, probabilities can be elevated even more by selection of more unusual reference classes cuh as our being scientists, or being computer programmers, etc.. �24 Humans have got themselves - to some extent put themselves, though much may be the result of muddling through - into an extremely dubious, environmentally insidious and unsustainable position, on a range of critical parameters. Their numbers are excessive, their high energy use is excessive, their waste and their pollution are both excessive - and all chose and other excesses are at the steep end of upward exponential curves. Several relevant graphs are distressingly exponential, with the present in the near vertical growth phase: graphs Many other similarly shaped graphs26 could be added, for instance for growth of pollution, of waste products, of weapons (in terms of tonnes of explosive power), of other greenhouse gases such as methane, and so on. The display typifies the accelerating human roller coaster. Those curves are tightly interconnected, in criss-crossing fashion. For example, the productivity of contemporary agriculture which enables the feeding of hugh urbanised human populations depends on a very high energy use (in term of energy efficiency, contemporary high-tech agriculture falls below that of much traditional agriculture). The maintenance of high populations with supplies of cheap food depends in turn on fossil fuel agriculture. Because of the intertwining of these phenomena, there is no easy way of getting off the accelerating roller-coaster. 26 All the graphs exhibited are drawn from Boyden. �25 Nor, as observed, is there much effort devoted to slowing the coaster. For politicians it would be politically risky and inexpedient to try (for them the rhetoric about an ecologically sustainable future must remain just that, more rhetoric). For many other power holders and brokers such ideas are ideologically excluded: growth remains the gospel. So a precarious position becomes ever more precarious. Humans are in a decidedly chancy position, because of their population situation and other Malthusian factors; they are becoming very disasterprone. If humans want an acceptable future for themselves - they have virtually ruled out an acceptable future for many other creatures, through their predominantly selfish thoughtless greedy practices - then they will probably have to mend their ways, very considerably and very soon. But, given the nature of the beast, that itself seems improbable. Humans, if they seek a more assured future, should make a concerted effort to put themselves into a less precarious position. That could be achieved by proceeding to reduce relative risks. These relative risks, sharply reducing prospects for a reliable future, fall into two classes:• manufactured risk factors, including weaponry such as mega-nuclear devices and elements of biochemical warfard, and experimental equipment such as very high energy particle accelerators (which could perhaps tunnel under a metastable state or induce a min-Big-Bang; see Leslie). • Accumulated risk factors, such as the hugh relative size of human population, energy consumption, greenhouse gas production, etc..27 Despite the ideological obstacles, enormous political, religious and economic obstacles blocking the way of requisite change, major efforts should be put into reducing both these types of risks. Philosophers could have a significant role in breaking down the ideological barriers and in clarifying and developing the arguments involved. 5. What ought to be done about Greenhouse? The general result already reached, that humans collectively should reduce their risk taking, and in particular reduce their gross numbers, extends to rational Greenhouse decision and action theory. But that large and difficult challenge is not all that there is to try, that should rationally be attempted. While some increase in mean global temperatures, and all that implies, can no longer be averted, the potentially most damaging effects can be: namely, by curtailing human-induced 27 As before, there are various different reasons why these induce risk, neo-Malthusian and probabilistic in particular. �26 output of Greenhouse gases. Moreover, there is an approximate upper bound upon temperature of importance, which can serve to supply a significant limit as output. That bound - which reduces risk taking by confining encountered situations to those where there is some past experiential basis - is given by estimated temperatures during Altithermal and Eemian eras. Those temperatures are estimated to have been between about 1/2 a degree and 1 degree Centigrade above contemporary (pre-1980) temperatures; so the upper bound is about 1°C. Not only will a continuation of current emission trends take global temperatures clean through and way beyond that bound, so also will an alternative set-up where emission rates are fixed more or less at current rates. The only apparent way to remain rationally within an experiential domain is to curtail sharply trace gas emissions beginning easily in the 1990s. That means shifting from the dominant growth paradigm; it means expensive re- and deindustrialisation. It is unlikely. Final corollary: Humans collectively are not (particularly) rational. But we had already guessed as much from the latest...... in the long history of human wars. References H.W. Bernard, The Greenhouse Effect, Ballinger, Cambridge Mass., 1980. A. Block, Murphy's Law. Book Two, Magnum, Methuen, ... S. Boyden, Western Civilization in Biological Perspective, Clarendon, Oxford, 1987. L.R. Brown and others, State of the World 1989, Norton/Worldwatch, New York, 1989; referred to as Worldwatch. R. Carnap, Logical Foundations of Probability, Second edition, University of Chicago Press, 1962. R.M. Cyert and M.H. DeGroot, Bayesian Analysis and Uncertainty in Economic Theory, Rowman & Littfield, New Jersey, 1987. ‘Developing policies for responding to climatic change’, Report of the Beijer Institute, February 1988. Keeton, J. Leslie, ‘Risking and World's End’, Bulletin of the Curiadian Nuclear Society 10(3) (1989) 1-6; all references to Leslie are to this article unless otherwise indicated. J. Leslie, ‘Is the end of the world nigh?’, The Philosophical Quarterly, to appear; referred to as PQ. J.E. Lovelock, Gaia. A new look at life on Earth, Oxford University Press, 1979. J. Lovelock, ‘Are we destabilising world climate?’, The Ecologist 15(1985) 52-55. �27 J.Lovelock, ‘Man and Gaia’, The Earth Report Monitoring the Battle for Our Environment, (ed. E. Goldsmith and N. Hilgard) Mitchell Benzley, London, 1988, 51-64. R. and V. Routley, ‘Nuclear energy and obligations to the future’, Inquirey 21(1978) 133R. Routley, ‘Ultralogic as universal?’ reprinted as an Appendix in Exploring Meinong's Jungle, RSSS, Australian National University, 1979. S. Schneider ‘Not to decide is to decide’, in Greenhouse 1988: Planning for Climate Change (ed. T. Dendy), Department of Environment and Planning, Adelaide, 1989, 5-10. R.P. Turco and others, ‘Nuclear winter: Global consequences of multiple nuclear explosions’, Science 222 (1983) 1283-1292. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Draft Papers Description An account of the resource Sylvan's literary executor encountered an archive in which “all his projects were current", since manuscripts were undated and unattributed. Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document GAEAN GREENHOUSE, NUCLEAR WINTER, AND ANTHROPIC DOOMSDAY. ... climate change, like no other issue, calls the whole notion of human progress into question. The [ever promised] benefits of newer technologies, more efficient economics, and improved political systems could be overwhelmed by uncontrolled global warming. ... the pace of climate change will soon overwhelm natural variability in the earth's climate. Indeed, it can be improved with nuclear war for its potential to disrupt a wide range of human and natural systems, [severely] complicating the back of moneying economics and coping with other problems. Irrigation works, settlement patterns, and food production [among others] would be tragically disrupted ... (Worldwatch 89, p.ll, p.10) There are many approaches to the Greenhouse problematique, upon which this philosophical investigation focuses. These approaches, range from playing the issue down entirely, dismissing it as not a problem, not something anyone should worry about, at the one end of the range, to playing it up at the other. Those who play it up may even foresee the demise of the human race, the substantially new socio-economic arrangements soon eventuate. There is certainly plenty of room for different approaches, and for some eclecticism. For what is being relied upon, in every case, comprises shaky and contestable arguments, from flimsy forecasting models lacking many apparently relevant details. No one of sound judgment, aware that weather reports for twelve hours ahead can be wildly astray, would place a very high level of confidence on climatic forests for fifty years ahead down a very hazardous track. But there is enough information to act; and there is information rationally requiring action. For things in the future are not going to be the same. It is very doubtful that they are going to be any better (though much important economic theorizing presupposes as much, such as the monetary discounting of the future). They are not going to be similar even, because so many parameters important to life are changing, several at exponential rates. Significant in these changes are likely climatic changes. The Greenhouse effect is among those, a result of the increases of “greenhouse” gases, especially carbon dioxide and methane, in the Earth's atmosphere, which have followed exponential paths since the highenergy phase of industrial culture. The growth in gas concentration produces, what it is lagged by, but is now apparent, a significant increase in mean global temperatures. This has major implications for much of life on Earth. 2 Diagram 1. Spectrum of approaches: Course of action Reasons offered Short response No problem Refutable No certainty Irrational Adaptive capacity Exaggerated High tech resolution Wishful thinking Severe dislocation otherwise Utopian Individual survival Pointless No action1 Moderate action Considerable action These very condensed responses will be expanded and explained as we proceed. Breifly too the outcome is that there is no easy path; future humans should expect a hard landing. 1. Investigative philosophy, argument and rational decision The role of philosophy in such a complex problematique as that of Greenhouse is not difficult to state briefly. Philosophy, Anglo-American philosophy especially, is concerned above all with argument. Investigative philosophy is applied philosophy, investigating arguments, their features - assumptions, reliability, etc. - and their generalisation to rational processes, but outside normal philosophical topics. The generalisation to rational processes comprehends a wider range of philosophical throughput than the orthodox range of argument typically addressed in logic courses; to probabilistic and plausibilistic reasoning, to decision processing and making. A main objective in this piece of investigative philosophy is to consider certain arguments for severe dislocation pprobabilities, as a result of Greenhouse effects, and the resulting impact on rational decision formation and action. There are certain arguments of particular interest radical decision and action: various neo-Malthusian arguments, and doomsday arguments. 1 Taoist no-action would be different. It would not have undertaken excessive industrial action in the first place. 3 The main run of arguments to considerable action are neo-Malthusian in character. The general form of these arguments is simply this: growth in some parameter encounters limits, with severe effects. A characteristic graphic representation is as follows: limits growth parameter time exponential growth pattern J encountering limits subsequent varying unstable behavior The limits are often imposed just by finitude, e.g. finiteness of a resource or a sink. But other limits can be important, for instance where new phenomena or thresholds come into play. General Malthusian arguments loom in the background in what follows. But a different argument, of especial concern as regard climatic changes, is the following anthropic doomsday argument:• There is some probability that the Gaean “greenhouse effect”, generated by human activity, will get out of control, that Gaean control mechanisms will fail, and that the Earth will, for example, overheat (Runaway Greenhouse, or Lesser Venus Prospect, premiss). • That result would be disastrous for human activities, and indeed for humans (Catastrophe Prospect). • Because of the unusual, and unusually precarious, position of humans, such a probability of disaster is not in fact small but decidedly large As a consequence then, the human species will probably sharply decline, and even become extinct (Catastrophe Probability). That is, by a rectified version of Murphy's law - that if something can go wrong then in appropriate unusual conditions, it very probability will - an incrementally small probability is inflated into a very large probability. 4 It would be a mistake to conclude that because the argument itself is an unlikely one, everyone can stop worrying. The argument is but one of a substantial raft of arguments that should have everyone worried; it is but a final intellectual string, so to say, from the inconspicuous cosmological tail. Such a doomsday argument no doubt puts together, in one more exact form, some of the sorts of considerations that are troubling many people, especially concerned youth, about the Greenhouse business: that humans (including themselves) are on a decline or extinction path. It is no doubt not the only consideration that should be troubling them or us. For whether or not doomsday warnings are warranted, there are other matters that should be sufficiently worrisome, to anyone of moral integrity:• Future times are likely to be exceedingly uncomfortable for very many creatures, as habitats are destroyed, food producing regions are eliminated, and environments seriously impoverished. (Many of these creatures are nonexistents, mere future existents, i.e. creatures that do not yet exist or participate in market or voting rituals, but who -will exist and may participate. But, despite their presently unfavourable ontological status, they are entitled to fair and decent treatment.) • Given such future prospects, present practices which do nothing or vanishingly little to ameliorate these prospects, are decidedly irrational. Indeed a main message that will emerge from the present exercise is the moral irrationality of critical large-scale human practices. The irrationality, morally-weighed-down irrationality, of present large-scale human practices is already conspicuous from the wintry downside of climatic prospects of which Greenhouse warming is the upside. Diagram 2. Macro-climatic setting. Bands: all boundaries fuzzy mean global temperature (degrees C) escalating emissions Disequilibrium: Venus prospect increasing dislocation possible adaptation increasing dislocation thermonuclear war disequilibrium: Mars prospect 5 1860 1990 The apparatus for conducting a world-wide nuclear wars is entirely in place and indeed on alert. The probability of such a war, even if small, is not zero. Among the many awful effects of a large nuclear war is that of nuclear winter, which would bring about the demise of present human civilisation, and would at the very least mean enormous dislocation for most surviving humans and other creatures. A sufficiently diabolical chemo-nuclear war, reaching into all inhabited parts of the globe, could indeed drive the human species close to extinction. The decidedly dubious rationality and morality of these nuclear arrangements - both through what they are in themselves for what purposes, and through their moral opportunity costs - are widely appreciated. The thesis that the arrangements and practices are immoral, irrational, and ought to be dismantled - already much argued, and also contested2 - is not the present concern. The thermonuclear downside is, by comparison, a very easy case to examine philosophically, and argue, as compared with the greenhouse upside.3 For there is, for instance, a case of sorts, for much increased use of greenhouse gases, such as CFCs in refrigerators, a case that hardly extends very plausibly to nuclear weapons. It is a case heavily pressed by some “developing” nations, for polluting devices already in widespread use in more affluent places, as necessary for local standards of living. Greenhouse and nuclear winter are more intricately connected than being the upside and downside of meteorological phenomena. One of the high-tech solutions suggestions for atmospheric overheating, involves the generation of wintering effects - to cool things down - by flinging enough dust up into the atmosphere, a trick most easily achieved no doubt on the requisite scale by nuclear explosives. Needless to say, like backburning against out-of- control fires, artificial winter would be a pretty desperate and, given present expertise, irrational expedient. 2. The Greenhouse debate, main policy responses, and irrational decision. The Greenhouse debate, as to what to do, if anything, about forecast Greenhouse effects on Earth, is intellectually disturbing. For it has revealed, as we shall soon see, that many of those who have spoken, worse that many who have some role in decision making For my very small contribution to this, see the War and Peace series in Discussion Papers in Environmental Philosophy, RSSS, Australian National UniversityGlobal warming, by no means entirely certain, is assumed to be the outcome of increasing greenhouse gas build up. Of course though some temperatures will rise, cooling will probably occur also in some localized regions. 6 (including both experts and politicians), lack a firm grasp on decision-making in conditions of uncertainty or possible risk.4 The main canvassed policy approaches to the Greenhouse problematique lie firmly within the dominant social paradigm, the high-tech growth and development ideology. Diagram 2 Broad policy responses to the Greenhouse problematique. Dominant paradigm Alternative paradigm Procrastination (wait-and-see) Soft energy paths and alternative regulation Adaptation (sink-or-swim) Socio-economic transformation Regulation Intervention (star wars) We will briefly outline, and find wanting, all the dominant approaches. • Procrastination, the prevailing response. In fact the main gooon mental and conservative response thus far has been procrastination, or “wait-and-see” as it is more benignly known.5 The approach makes much of the uncertainties, of the shortcomings in even the most elaborate general circulation models, of the high noise-to-signal levels. On such bases, it contends that it is too early to do anything, except staging some meetings, organising some review committees, undertaking some monitoring, and funding a little more “research”. It obviously does nothing to rock the growth ideology boat. There is the pretence that we do not know enough to act6 But it is known that carbon dioxide, methane and other greenhouse gases are fast increasing. The main causes and enough likely consequences are also known. Theoretical consideration, have already been partially confirmed by rising temperatures in the eighties. Outlines of rising temperatures are also known in broad outline, rising sea levels, and so forth. In addition, there are partial Following Knight, some economists (try to) distinguish between uncertainty and risk. Risk is said to obtain when some more or less objective numberable probabilities can be assigned to outcomes, a situation not obtaining as regards the global greenhouse effect. Bayesians, who can always assign subjective probabilities tend to eschew the distinction, e.g. Cyert and DeGroot, also say that ‘decision making under uncertainty refers to situations in which the outcome of the decision is not precisely predictable’ (p.3). Either way, Greenhouse involves uncertainty. There is significant rhetorical art in the choice of classificatory labels, a rather philosophically neglected art. A PR person must have been hired to produce the Greenhouse adaptation of ‘adaptation’. Part of the problem is that scientists have been caught out (e.g. crying wolf) and have become ultra-cautious. With the advent of thermodymumies, for instance, scientists begin ‘threatening mankind with a rather swift “bad death’” as the universe random ‘Thus m. Aber, on ‘balant ideological use of science even by scientists themselves’ (Bernard p.9). 7 small-scale models of the Greenhouse effect in action. For example a city such as MexicoCity, which is situated in the bowl-like valley is placed in an environment traps heat as well as pollution. The ecological affects, like the human affects, are pretty dramatic even at this small level, and hardly to be sought, or amelated elsewhere. There is a pretence, fostered also by many scientists, that Greenhouse difficulties have only just been discovered; a date commonly set for that watershed even is the Villiers conference and statement of 1986 (e.g. Pittoch ....). Actually there have been Greenhouse warmings for more than a decade, and there has been a corresponding decade of inaction. Nor is any action of much significance presently seriously contemplated. Back in 1979 Bernard wrote at length about and reported the substantial concern of climate logists about Greenhouse effects. Even the magazine Nature, not noted for its green sympathies, recorded that ‘the release of carbon dioxide to the atmosphere by the burning of fossil fuels is, concemally, the most important environmental issue in the world today’ (May ? 1975). Bernard quotes many other concerned scientists, several asserting that ‘the government must start dealing with this problem now’. They meant the United States government. “The” government didn't take the hint. For more than a decade then scientists have been emphasizing that the greenhouse threat is a major environmental problem, and that action should be taken immediately. Over 10 years nothing of real significance to counter the problem has happened. There has been more than a decade of inaction , during which matters have got worse, and the time frame for evasive action disturbingly shorter. It is already evident that requisite decision making under uncertainty is not taking place. On straight inductive grounds, it would be reasonable to expect nothing will be done. While there are theoretical grounds to bark up such an assessment, still it is only just beginning to get through to a much wider public (which can exercise a marginal influence on what politicians say) that there is - or may be, as some more reactionary modal-managering academics would have - a problem or two. Many scientists have joined the wait-and-see queue, with their begging bowls, hoping for more hand-outs for research. They assume, rightly enough, that more information would assist with rational decision-making, and also, quite wrongly, that “scientific activity” is required for action to be taken. Physical scientists are not done in their misapprehension of rational decision methods. Although there is a good deal of practical experience available of statistical-type decision making order uncertainty, for instance as regards insurance coverage and engineering projects, decision theory, especially as regards unreputable situations, has not penetrated very far into standard scientific methodology or much into mainstream parts of social sciences. ‘Economists in particular have shown a talent for bringing ever problem back to a world of certainty where all solutions are known or can be easily found.’ Natural scientists including dematologists are, for the most part, on the same erroneous-reduction-toconlittainable-certainty trip. ‘This is not to say that economists have not worked on uncertainty. ... however ... uncertainty is introduced and then taken out by assumption’ (Cyort and DeGroot p.l). But there are several classes of problematic situations, where decision and action may be required, where uncertainty cannot be discarded by first, reduction strategeness or otherwise, notably:• inheritantly probabilistic situations, such as those of indeterminacy in quantum theory; • essentially unpredictable situations (which may be deterministic) such as those now under investigation chaos theory; • presently uncertain situations and outcomes, which may eventually resolve into certain cases, or may turn into some of the above classes, where there is not time to wait for resolution. The Greenhouse problem is regularly put into the latter class, a standard assumption being that with enough money and research effort thrown at it, it will resolve to decent certainty. But it may well not; there are grounds for supposing that critical parts of climatology will fall into the essentially unpredictable class. The standard approach of too many research scientists is a pathetic begging-bowl posture: Supply more funding so we can go on researching until we obtain certainty.7 There are some severe problems with this standard response. Firstly, it is irrational. Certainty if achieved may be achieved too late. What was required for rationality was decision making in advance of certainty. Secondly, certainty may be unobtainable. The meteorological equations may be non additive (non additive) and so incapable of delivering stable results over slightly fluctuating in strict data. The standard response is methodologically unsound. • Adaptation, learning to live with and love the Greenhouse. The policy ‘that tends to be favoured by most economists’ is an adaptive strategy: “Let society adjust to environmental changes without attempting to mitigate or prevent the changes in advance” We could adapt to climate change for example, by planting alternative crop strain [themselves] ... more widely adopted... ’ (Schneider p.8). Observe, however, that it is a decidedly restricted “adaptation” that is being proposed, that humans adjust to the results of present economic and industrial practices, rather than adjusting them. It is assumed that economic growth comes first, that we do not change (e.g. through decent regulation) high energy industrial practices. A fuller and smarter adaptation would adapt these practices. The policy is like a pernicious agriculture policy that says, “Let farmers adjust to the results of soil erosion, salination and 7 It does not seem to have occurred to most research scientists demanding more money (even more per article) that an important reason why they are not obtaining the funding they expect is because their research results could, if unfavorable, act a serious drag on the industrial establishment. They are not going to be funded to delegitimize modem industrial society. 9 so on, without attempting to mitigate or prevent these deleterious changes in advance.” Such “adaptative agriculture”, the present predominant practice in advanced agriculture, is antienvironmental, but is given a spurious air of evolutionary inevitability and evolutionary redistributive justice; you can't back natural evolution, which is entirely natural, can you. Let us condense such far-from-inevitable and highly artificial mal-adaptation in the neologism badaptation. Greenhouse adaptation, like nuclear adaptation, is badaptation (some, less kind, would say medaptation). There is a pragmatic, if cynical, political argument for badaptation, namely, that unilateral action to prevent a warning is unfeasible and requisite international cooperation unattainble. Both contentions open to doubt. Unilateral action by the USA, by far the World's heaviest resource and energy consumer (per capita and on several other relevant domains) backed up by pressure (familiar from other settings, such as the narcotics war) on other nations and through the United Nations could make a major difference. Unfortunately the USA is also the world's largest supplier of influential grown economists. In any case, international agreements such as those in whaling and Antarctica, are attainable, and sometimes effective. The ozone protocols, limiting production of CFCs show that results can be achieved to limit trace gas emissions. The adaptation proposal is presently compatible with wait-and-see; both mean no hauling back on trace gas production. Indeed procrastination will force societies towards badaptation. Typical of adaptation, like procrastination, is an (over-)emphasis on the uncertainties of Greenhouse forecasts, and on the decision-theoretic paralysis such uncertainties are alleged to produce. Characteristic of adaptation too is a minimisation of the extent of Greenhouse modification. No doubt the impression that things won't be so very different, or far removed from what has already been experienced, is important in getting adaptationism more readily accepted, as a rational course of action (instead of the seemingly irrational course it is). Thus badaptation tends to play with figures at the law end of projected ranges of temperature increase, such as 1.5°C for 2050, when in fact present data indicates something rather in the vicinity of 4°C - in a setting, furthermore, where fractions of a degree centigrade may well be linked ot macro-physical and macro-biological change. Recent modellings deliver, an average, on increase in 2°C attributable to carbon dioxide, and it is widely thought that other trace gases will double the CO2 effect, yielding a 4°C temperature increase.8 8 Sources. Note that methane is beginning to rival carbon dioxide as a gas where atmospheric propostems really matter and whose present increase is excessive. 10 The colossal extent of future human dislocation has correspondingly been deliberately underemphasized. The adaptive capacities of human arrangements, when humans are living at the margin, to massive natural shifts, has been grossly exaggerated. Consider agriculture alone - set aside flooded cities, sunken atoll islands, and all the rest. Some of the Earth's major grain producing regions - upon which famine relief projects depend - could be pushed substantially out of business. The conditions which prevailed during the American dust-bowl experience of the nineteen-thirties were benign indeed compared with those which threaten with mid twenty-first century Greenhouse conditions. The mid continental summer temperatures were only 1-2° C warmer than the present average, under greenhouse conditions they could be more than 3-4° C warmer. In the dustbowl rainfall only slipped at critical growing times (e.g. July for northern com) to 80% of the contemporary norm; but under Greenhouse conditions it could be significantly less again. A super dust-bowl is not improbable (for much more detail, see Bernard). Similarly for other similar latitude Northern grain producing regions. But the high-energy industrial superstructure is crucially based upon sufficient cheap food (bread) for the urban masses. • Intervention, high-tech Gaean engineering. Interventionist proposals so far floated include • New oceans in parts of the Earth's land surface lying below, at, or near sea level. These projects would make the mega-dams of recent times look like childrens' play. • Wintering effects. Production of sufficient dust in the atmosphere, achieved for instance by nuclear detonations, to mitigate heating effects. Such enterprise would make modification of the weather by cloud seeding look like childs' play. Fortunately these and other expensive and grandiose proposals, which would call for considerable international cooperation, are far down the planning track; with these schemes procrastination is rational. • Regulation, controlling free(-wheeling) enterprise. Regulation itself, not so bureaucratically popular under that presentation in these latter days of economic irrationalism, is of course transparadigmatic, where it belongs depend on what measures (what sorts of constraints, rights, etc.) are proposed and how they are imposed or enforced. If it is, for example, some industrial law-and-order, smokestack scrubbing regulations or Greenhouse polluting rights, within the status quo, that is one thing, but if a minimally-constrained growth paradigm is questioned and alternative socio-economic arrangements advocated, that is quite another, and falls outside the dominant paradigm. Such policies involving regulations controlling fossil fuel emissions especially, are negatively labelled prevention in the predominantly American policy literature, though there is now no preventing some Greenhouse effects; but the worse to follow could still be prevented. What is usually covered under the label is however some regulation within prevailing political arrangements. So energy efficiencies and savings for investment in 11 growth elsewhere is comprehensible, straight growth-curtailing non-consumption is not contemplated. But the latter is just what alternatives do contemplate. Democratic political arrangements do not exclude such alternatives both the power bases of political leaders and economic prescriptions do. Adequate regulation within prevailing socio-economic arrangements is going to prove impossible, without adjustment of power structures and economic imperatives, in effect without far-reaching systems and a devological adjustment. While such adjustment may be rational, it is unlikely. Power structures have too much to lose.9 This is an opposite point to record the chauvinism and environmental shallowness of the Greenhouse debate. Like heart disease and cancer, the Greenhouse effect is gaining much discussion and some funding because it just may severely effect the affluent, affluent people and affluent nations, that have a good deal to lose, in North America especially. The impact will, however, be at least as severe in some third world nations, whose lands or much of them will be flooded, countries which cannot afford extensive expensive dyking (or where such effort would be in the longer term, as seas rise, pointless), countries such as Pacific coral atoll nations and delta states like Bangladesh. But the really serious losers will no doubt be, not humans , rich or poor, but nonhumans. Biological diversity, already being reduced by various human activities, may be one of the chief casualties of global worming. Massive destruction of forests, wetlands, and even the polar tundra could irrevocably destroy complex ecosystems that have existed for millennia. Indeed, various biological reserves created in the past decade to protect species diversity could become virtual death traps as wildlife attempt to survive in conditions for which they are poorly suited. Accelerated species extinction is an inevitable consequence of a rapid warming (Worldwatch p.10). 3. Arguments to dislocation and for a Lesser Venus Prospect. There is at least a small probability that predicted increase in mean atmospheric temperatures will seriously interfere with most remaining natural environments and result in the degeneration or destruction of many of them, especially forests wetlands, maritime environments. Nor will adaptationism help here; for natural evolution is much too slow for adaptationism to succeed (cf. Keeton pp.763-4). Natural ecosystems will not adapt effectively to rapid climatic change,... With regard to forests, habitats for plants and animals cannot be re-created or transplanted rapidly. Continuing climatic changes would strain the capabilities Holistic problems are too extensive for individuals, or even small collectives, to make much difference acting or their own. Some are too beg even for large collectives or states, but would require whole regions of the Earth acting in concerte. But of course some state players, such as the superpowers, as regards nuclear winter, can make a substantial difference, or even all the difference. 12 of management practices even in commercial tree plantations (Beijer Institute Report pp.21-3). The decline or demise of these systems, vast reservoirs for greenhouse gases will accelerate the warming, and accordingly make matters substantially worse: Trees are adapted to a narrow range of temperature and moisture levels, and cannot cope with rapid climate change. A temperature increase of 1 degree Celsius per decade in mid- to upper latitudes translates into a shift in vegetation zones of 60-100 miles northward. Terrestrial ecosystems cannot migrate that fast. Vast numbers of trees are likely to die, and new trees adapted to warmer temperatures are unlikely to be able to replace them rapidly. During such a disruption, huge areas of forest could die and, as they decay or bum, send large quantities of additional CO2 into the atmosphere, accelerating the warming (Brown p.10). Of course the immediate climate patterns would be somewhat more complex. If enough soot and ash from fires were flung into the atmosphere there would be a cooling effect, like that of a small nuclear winter, before heating accelerated. The present pattern of ecosystemic loss would also be sharply accelerated. When natural ecosystems get reduced to about 30% of their initial size, they tend to collapse of themselves. Moreover, there would be other significant positive feedback from ecosystems other than the terrestrial forests, from the oceans especially. As the oceans warm, they lose their capacity to serve as carbon dioxide reservoirs. So they too release additional gases, including previously absorbed CO2, back into the atmosphere, further accelerating the warming. A critical question arises as to how much danger such positive feedback poses? As so often, informed opinions, and so probability estimates differ. However ‘several scientists working in the area consider that positive feedback effects will force a very bleak picture to be drawn’ (p.19 ref?)10 Unlike the interim effect of a small nuclear winter, where after a few years at most, climatic behavior (as distinct from radioactivity levels) would presumably return towards the previous norm, there will be no similar recovery under greenhouse impact. Technically then, stability would be lost under the impact,11 disequilibrium induced. An eventual longterm return to some different equilibrium could well be excluded. Under new climatic regimes plants themselves may be able to do little more than hang on for part of their own lives. In many places conditions would be too severe for much of the “year” to permit normal plant functioning, including what is crucial for greenhouse amelioration, photosynthesis. In most plants, photosynthesis only occurs across a narrow band of Second order probabilities, probabilities and uncertainties in the light of first order subjective probabilities, enter importantly. Stability is defined in physics in terms of return to an initial (inertial) position after small disturbance. 13 temperatures (e.g. 6 - 34°C); outside that range the plants shut down operations.12 Even more important, many plants would leave few or no successful successors. Even where plants set seed, seedlings would not survive under the severe conditions expected; for instance, they would be killed by hot dry summer conditions, or in other places by frosts to which they are not adapted, both phenomena already familiar after clearfelling of forests. The situation at... in southern Sahara, where there is but one ancient tree hanging on in thousands of square kilometers of desert, a tree with viable seeds which sets no seedlings, could be more or less replicated in many other places where forests or woody plants once grew. In fact we are already witnessing the demise of the trees in much of Australia. Already dead and dying trees form a predominant feature of the Australian rural landscape. Virtually whichever way ecologists travel in Australia where trees remain, they are confronted with dead and dying trees 13 The reasons for the present decline of trees in rural Australia is, for the most part, not to be attributed to early greenhouse or even pollution effects.14 It is thought to be due to a complex of factors, including a range of insect predators whose effects are enhanced on isolated trees left after an excessive zeal for clearing (i.e. holistic effects enter as regards healthy persistence of trees). The relevant point is that these features are likely to be accelerated given the additional impact of greenhouse warming on plant functioning and reproduction. There are several major ways through which the maintenance structures of the Earth can be not merely awkwardly disturbed, but thrown right out of kilter - perhaps, given the delicacy of several critical matters, never to return present norms. Most obvious and immediately threatening is • nuclear warfare, and therewith nuclear Winter. But there are of course other severe shocks the planet could suffer than those chemo-nuclear warfare, some human induced, some a “chance” matter of the planets' position in space, namely • a mini Big Bang, or an undermining of metastability, brought about through very high energy experimentation (see Leslie) • a collision with a large meteorite or asteroid. Such uncertainties, not germane to the main climatic arguments, are listed, not to achieve a bogus completeness, but to emphasize that complete certainty is not to expected, not rationally.. Should we obtain it, should we obtain easy relatively unproblematic lives, then we have, by world standards, been rather lucky. Moreover, these latter uncertainties do The upper bound may be difficult to appreciate in most of Aotearoa. But in much of Australia, during the summer, many plants close down their operations for much of the day. Reported by Recher on Earthworm. Thus coastline vegetational destruction through detergents in sewerage waters. 14 appear negligible compared with those bound up with climate, ascribable to: • excess economic development. The practices involve a complex and sustained assault on most of the Earth's major ecosystems, forests, seas, etc, along with the alteration of atmospheric composition by greenhouse gases. For example, the forests are cut down, burnt, poisoned by herbicides and acid rain, or otherwise removed or destroyed. (Therewith too a great deal more carbon dioxide is released into the atmosphere and major sinks of carbon dioxide are removed.) As a result of these concerted growth-and-development activities such systems are driven to limits, and breakdown occurs. Once it occurs at some weak point it can escalate elsewhere, like a conflagration.; thus again ecosystemic collapse for example. Quite apart from breakdown at or approaching limits, for instance because of systemic overload, remarkable changes can occur in desiccative systems under stress or strain. • excess energy or chemical loading. Though such striking examples as the chemical clock, it has been demonstrated that dissipative systems can suddenly, and often rather unpredictably, undergo extraordinary changes, as for instance energy flux is increased (Prigogine and others), [describe briefly] Such non-additive, or nonlinear, effects, characteristic of more holistic dissipative systems, are bound to occur within the Earth's atmosphere and oceans as they undergo compositional changes. Carbon dioxide itself provides a good example. With small quantities its effect on the temperature of the air is proportional to the amount added; there is a linear effect. However once the carbon dioxide concentration in the air approaches 1%, new nonlinear effects come into play and heating greatly increases. In the absence of a biosphere to fix carbon dioxide, its concentration in the atmosphere would probably exceed the critical figure of 1%. The Earth would then heat up rapidly to a temperature near to that of boiling water. Increasing temperatures would speed up chemical reactions and accelerate their progress towards chemical equilibrium. ... eventually ... the Earth would become permanently cocooned in a brilliant white cloud - a second Venus, although not quite as hot (Lovelock pp.45-6). Fortunately for Gaean prospects, the percentage of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere is now nowhere near 1% nor likely to be pushed near 1% by projected doubting of carbon dioxide levels under economic activity over the next 50 years15. However eventual exponential growth will lead towards levels, and the side effect of such growth, the release of carbon dioxide from forests and oceans and the considerable reduction in fixation of carbon dioxide with the decline of forests, will lead in that disastrous direction rather more rapidly. The 1% 15 In the atmosphere of the very early Earth, CO2 exceeded the critical 1% figure; but solar luminority was about 25% less than now. With increasing solar flux the Earth would have overheated had the proposition of CO2 not been much reduced (e.g. see Lovelock 88 p.56). 15 bound constitutes just one of the many serious limits to continuation of present developmental practices. Now there can be no rational confidence with respect to complex dissipative systems - about the behavior of which we presently know comparatively little - that no other nonadditive effects will no be encountered at a much earlier stage. After all, the Gaean system, its atmosphere, oceans and ecosystems, will be pushed into essentially unexperienced and substantially unknown reaches. There is, for example, no experience from past times of such elevated temperatures as Green house effects will lead to, to draw upon. ‘There is no evidence that the land-bound glaciers in Greenland and Antarctica have ever completely melted in the last two million years’. There is experience of much colder periods. ‘During ice ages, the earth's average temperature has been about 5°C colder than at present, with glaciers covering major portions of continents’ (Barth p.7). But there is no similar experience of temperatures 4-5° C warmer than at present (in a warm interglacial period), ‘a global increase of more than 2°C above present is unprecedented in the era of human civilization’ (Schneider p.6) It would accordingly be decidedly rash, rash decision makings, to assign a zero or negligible probability to the emergence of new or unknown effects of relevance, to assume all will go smoothly and well. That would presuppose, in any event, a completeness in present scientific knowledge, contrary to the information we have that present investigation of holistic systems, among much else, is still in its infancy. The probability of something critical (e.g. perhaps radicals like hydroxyl) having been left out of estimations, of room accordingly for something unexpected or for something to go wrong, may be small, though experience implies it is not always so but it certainly appears to be non-zero. For the overconfident, with excess faith in the flimsy scientific edifice, there is a salutary lesson to be drawn from the erratic and stumbling path of the main proponent of Gaia hypotheses, Lovelock. Lovelock, coming from a working life as an industrial chemist, part of that time for a giant chemical transnational, had, and retained for a considerable time after he began his holistic hypothesizing a strong antipathy for environmentalists.16 Even Gaia was for industry and against the environmentalists; she was going to laughingly soak up all the pollution, courtesy of the chemical companies especially, that we humans could throw at her. In particular, we did not really need to worry much about ozone depletion or greenhouse gas escalation.17 ‘Contrary to the forebodings of many environmentalists, Coupled with this, there is a certain schizophrenia in Lovelock's attitude to the natural environment. There is also a matching schizophrenia as to the fragility of life on Earth. On the one side, it required very delicate settings and fine barring to arise; this is part of the argument for a Gaia hypothesis. On the other side, life is ‘tough, robust, and [highly] adaptable’, virtually indestructable (p.90). But though a flawed hero, Lovelock is a hero nonetheless. See Lovelock 79, p.40ff; and also 88? [detail] 16 finding a suitable’ destructive agent to bring about a ‘doom scenario’ ‘turns out to be an almost insoluble problem’ (p.40). Lovelock makes it easier for himself by helping himself to the assumption that a doomsday scenario involves the destruction of all “life”, ‘down to the last spore of some deep-buried anaerobic bacteria’ (p.40). But even for the least chauvinistic of environmentalists, destruction of all humans but the select elect would be quite enough for a decent doomsday. Lovelock's high redefinition of a environmental ‘doomsday scenario’ is unacceptable. Lovelock does not however stay within the bound of his redefinition. He proceeds to pooh-pooh the idea that anything much that we humans could accomplish would make any difference to Gaia (p.41) or even to most humans, including use of nuclear devices. Unfortunately for Lovelock's credibility, he was writing three years before the seemingly obvious wintering effects of a major nuclear war were realised by the accredited scientific community. Appealing in a common scientific fashion to scientific authority, he proceeds to minimalize the human and ecological effects of a major war. The report he relies upon as authoritative was a 1975 (unreferenced) one of ‘the US National Academy of Sciences ... prepared by an eight-man committee of their own distinguished members, assisted by forty-eight other scientists chosen from those expert in the effects of nuclear explosions and all things subsequent to them’ (p.41, italics added). Lovelock draws from the distinguished expert report the findings that ... if half of all the nuclear weapons in the world's arsenals, about 10,000 megatons, were used in a nuclear war the effects on most of the human and man-made ecosystems of the world would be small at first and would become negligible within thirty years. Both aggressor and victim nations would of course suffer catastrophic local devastation, but areas remote from the battle and, especially important in the biosphere, marine and coastal ecosystems would be minimally disturbed (p.41). Three years later Turco and others proceeded to detail a very different scenario that of widespread and ecologically damaging nuclear winter.. Not for the first time, Lovelock had been caught out badly. As with pollution, Lovelock has more recently shifted ground18 considerably in the vulnerability of the Earth to human-induced disturbance. When a system such as Gaia in homeostatis is stressed to near the limits of regulation even a small disturbance may cause it to jump to a new stable state or even fail entirely.... Shifting ground may be fine, especially when it is to an improved position. But it should be done honestly and openly, not stealthily or shiftily. Lovelock proceeds to attribute a caricuture of his own previous position to critics of the Gaia hypothesis (as a clever ‘fabrication’ which it was not); that it is ‘an argument developed to allow industry to pollute at will, since mother Gaia will clean up the mess (85 p.53). 17 It could be that the regulation of the Earth's climate is not far from one of these limits. Thus if some part of climate regulation is connected with the natural level of CO2 then clearly we are close to the limits of its regulation. This is because CO2 cannot be reduced much below the level observed for the last glaciation, about 180 ppm, without seriously limiting the rate of growth of the more abundant C3 type plants. If we perturb the Earth's radiation balance by adding more CO2 and other greenhouse gases to the atmosphere or reduce its capacity to regulate by decreasing the area of forests or both of these together then we could be surprised by a sudden jump of both CO2 and temperature to a new and much warmer steady state; or by the initiation of periodic fluctuations between that state and our present climate. The anomalously low abundance of CO2 on Earth when compared with the other terrestrial planets and especially the fact that the mean temperature of the Earth is on the cool side of the optimum for regulation, suggests strongly that the biota is regulating the climate by pumping CO2 from the air. The common feature of most of our pollutions and of our exploitation of the land surface seems to be unintentionally to thwart this natural process (Lovelock 85 pp5354). The argument to the lesser Venus path, to significant disequilibrium with the Earth's ecological support system destabilized, takes the following lines. The Earth appears to be a discipative (far-from-equilibrium) system held at its present balance by a combination of an (increasing) solar flux - a main energy input into the system - and its major ecological arrangements, especially vegetation complanes and live oceans. The sheer extent to which the resulting system differs from the stable dead system it could otherwise be is shown by the following table for atmospheric and oceanic composition. TABLE 1. Substance Carbon dioxide A Nitrogen T R Oxygen Argon 0 C E A N S Water Planetary comparisons (principal components per cent). Equilibrium Earth Venus Lifeless Earth Mass Present Earth 99 0 98 1.9 98 1.9 95 2.7 0.03 79 0 1 trace 0.1 trace 0.1 0.13 2 21 1 63 Salt 3.5 Sodium nitrate 1.7 96 n.a. n.a. 3.5 traces Surface temperatures (°C) n.a 477 Total pressure (bars) n.a. 90 290±50 60 -53 13 0064 1 The table is based upon tables 1 and 2 of Lovelock 79, pp37 and p.39. 18 The whole Earth system is accordingly far from equilibrium. Unpredictable behavior as locals increase is therefore almost to be expected. A likely moral is presumably: stress they system, or destabilize ecosystem controls sufficiently, and the system may be in deep trouble. It is relevant to inquire into what evidence we have on this case. To do so let us reconsider some of the array of arguments there are from some sort of holistic organisation of the Earth (for a modest Gaia hypothesis). But for the participation of the Earth's ecological support systems, plant complexes especially the Earth would not be blessed with its present life-benign physical characteristics. The oceans would be much saltios and too salty for most life, the air would not contain the present rich mixture of oxygen and carbon dioxide so important for terrestrial life, and so on, perhaps most important the Earth would be significantly hotter and too hot for most life, for what of what does the regulating and stabilizing of present conditions. For the solar flux has increased in intensity about 30% since life appeared on Earth, but the mean global temperatures have exhibited no corresponding increase, but have remained relatively constant. Such an expected consistency in the face of disturbing inputs is ascribed, under holistic approaches that do something to explain it, to the concerted activity of plants, [detail] Lovelock and collaberaters have devised an elementary daisy world model which reveals how a feedback system with two types of daisies can, within limits, stabilize temperatures despite increasing energy input. The limits are important, for as these limits are approached the maintenance systems break down. diagram Q Similarly several of the well-known chemical cycles, such as those for nitrogen, sulphur, sodium and so forth depends for their maintenance on the adequate operation of active ecological structures. Plainly if a cycle loops through a component, such as forests, which is severely disturbed then the cycle itself could be disrupted. There is some probability furthermore that the foregoing changes will disturb crucial equilibrium systems and chemical cycles. Some of these feedback systems are in fact maintained in equilibrium by natural ecosystems (an example is Lovelock's daisy world model, which becomes unstable when temperature rises too high). Instability could ensue under disturbance [explain, include Greenhouse holism]. Without doubt these matters are bad enough. Demise of most of the Earth's richness19 is not a minor matter. Worse could follow. Natural richness is the main richness, much exceeding human artifice. 19 The general tenor of the argument is so far this:- By arguments from physical models, and because of uncertainties, the probability that something could go badly wrong is nonzero,20 and indeed far from negligible. Part of the argument can be put as follows: there is a decent probability that a modest Gaia hypothesis holds. But then, there is a considerable probability that excessive Greenhouse build up will lead to damaging system destabilization. So containing probabilities, there at least a nonneglizible probability of such destabilization. An analogy should now emphasize both the dubiousness of what is being proposed under adaptationism and the precariousness of the human predicament. The proposal is to take this ancient craft, now overloaded with human passengers and their heavy baggage, a cargo it was never organised to carry, out on new routes and run it fast and higher than it has ever travelled before. Even for an experimental prototype, a now very fast (air-)bus say, with a select text crew, such a procedure, of running over new uncharted routes at speeds and heights never attained before, would be risky enterprise. With an ancient craft, with a heavy nonelite cargo of baggage and passengers (some whom try to interfere with the controls), the proposal is extremely rash. For the chances that the craft will breakdown and perhaps crash, with serious consequences to passengers and for the baggage, are greatly elevated over the risks of proceeding as usual much more slowly. With the costs of crashing so severe, rational operators and sensible pilots would not take them.21 Unfortunately the analogy is not at all far-fetched, but resembles what is in store for spaceship Earth, already under significant stress with its excessive human passenger load and their heavy ecological practices. Not only is the future itself pretty new territory, but it is a future at terrestrial temperatures, important processes will proceed faster than ever before, in particular all chemical processes. Simply to take the craft up there, as do-nothing and adaptation approaches would have is to emulate the risks and hubris of Daedelus; such approaches are aptly rarely Daedelian 4. The Sting in the Cosmic Tail: the mini-Furphy theorem and the likely demise of homo sapiens, spp. economicus.. The trouble with the initial formulation of Murphy's law: if anything can go wrong, it will, From logical theories of probability such as Carnap's non-zero probabilities are rather easily reached (perhaps too easily, with the converse feature that natural laws never obtain high probabilities. The difficulty can be characteristed, to some extent, by restruction to physical models). The analogy is an old one, which we exploited before in the nuclear case; for the “bus analogy”, see Routley and Routley. The analogy admits of much graphic variation. Instead of running the craft at excess speed, an alternative or additional image is that of destroying the controls of the craft. Lovelock deploys this opposite image (88 p.63), which corresponds to the demolition of Gaians control systems. 20 was that it was insufficiently qualified, much too absolutist, and apparently self-refuting..22 Certain crucial qualifications are required:• Replacement of the certain (certainlistic) conclusion by a somewhat weaker probabilistic one: namely, it probably will. • Correlative to weakening the conclusion, strengthening the premiss, by rendering it more specific; namely, in place of ‘anything’ or ‘something’ put ‘some thing ... given a chancy situation’. The modified formulation is accordingly the following Mini-Furphy result:23 if some thing can genuinely go wrong, given a relatively chancy situation, it probably will. Here ‘chancy’ means more or less what it means according to the dictionaries: doubtful, decidedly risky, or as we shall construe it, having a comparatively low probability vis-a-vis its alternatives. The precise extent of relative chanciness will be explained as we go. To prove this proposition, let us first recast it in appropriate symbolic form. Let D be some arbitrary bad situation, a suitable disaster. Let the possibility of D's happening something's going wrong - be represented by a non-zero probability, and genuineness by non-negligible probability. It can be assumed that that probability, P(D), is small, otherwise the requisite conclusion would follow in any case. Let C represent the features that render the situation chancy. Then what we aim to show is that where P(D) is small positive, P(D < C) is probable. The proof applies a special case of Bayes' theorem, which take the following form where there are n alternative hypotheses hi,...,hn including h: Pv(h) x P(i < h) P(h < i) X P(hr) X P(i < hr) r = 1 Here h is the hypothesis, which in our application is D, i is the additional information (or, is in Carnap, a new observation), which in our case is C.24 P(h < i) is the probability of h 22 23 24 For this and other formulations of Murphy's law, and many loosely associated humorous maxims with grains of truth encapsulated, see Block. As to the history of the “law”, which originated with J.M. Chase, editor of Aviation Mechanics, see the Encyclopaedia Americana', Chase's initial formulation in a 1955 issue read ‘If an aircraft part can be installed in correctly, someone will install it the way”. This little theorem was originally more accurately entitled the Murphy-Leslie theorem. It is an adaptation, suggested by Leslie's work, of Murphy's Law. This section is overwhelmingly indebted to Leslie; for Leslie's debts, and so the transitive debts of this section, see Leslie himself, who deserves to be read in defence his legitimate doomsday apprehensions. The next not indicates the limited extent to which Leslie's arguments are endorsed. The formulation is a special case of that proved in Carnap, p.331; namely that (absolute) case where the evidence e is elided, or e set = 1. A similar result follows, subject to slightly more rigorous conditions, in relevant probability theory; see Routley 79 p.954. 21 given i, or of h on condition i (the backward arrow notation, <, symbolises the condition involved and shows its direction). For simplicity we shall suppose that all the alternatives to D are concentrated (as far as symbolic exposure goes) in one, namely D*. Then the form we seek to apply is simply: p(D < C) __________ P(D) x P(C < D)__________ P(D) x P(C < D) + P(D*) x P(C < D*)' = The arithmetic details needed can be tabulated in a revealing form as follows: Cases D D* Initial (or prior) probability d 1-d m, say Vd m/l, say 1/dl of outcome relative chance that C As it is the relative chance of C that matters, we can rescale to set m = 1/d. To make C relatively chancy, I has some modest size; specifically let I exceed 1-d/d. Then the probability to be estimated, P(D < C), is d x 1/d d x 1/d + (l-d)/dl where k = • 1 1+k _ “ That is» and P(D < C) | y when k < 1, i.e. when I [ p(D < C) = where k = 1, . Thud D is probable, at least in being more probable than not, given C, when I is of at least modest size, i.e. given C is relatively chancy. In a merely apparently more general form of the estimation, where we do not align m to d, In effect we shall look at the form P(h < i) = --------------- < h)------------------------------P(h) X P(i < h) + XP(hr) X P(i < hr)’ n with the sum excluding the product for h. Though demonstrable given satisfiable exclusion and exhaustion conditions, Bayes' theorem is not lacking critics, in part because of the surprises this bit of logic can deliver. Carnap meets the objection that Bayes' theorem has sometimes ‘been applied to cases where it led to strange or even absurd results’ thus: ‘This was mostly due to an uncritical use of the principle of indifference :... [The] theorem is provable ... on the basis of those weak assumptions which practically all theories of probability seem to have in common’ (p.331, sub 1 elided). Of course the present applications could (just) be objected to on the grounds that the logical conditions for the theorem to apply are not fully satisfied. P(D [ C) 22 d x m d x m + (1-d) x m/l 1 1 + k’ 1 as before. That is m drops out, only the relative chanciness really matters. The little Furphy theorem follows as before. Now to put some relevant flesh on these abstract statements and figures. Let D be some future disaster such as the catastrophic decline, for instance, through summer or winter phenomena of the human species, from which the enormous present population never recovers. At worst (from a chauvinistic angle) the population, like many catastrophically effected by human activities, goes extinct. Suppose, for a bifurcating outcome, there is a catastrophe stage, before halfway through next century, 2050. If humans do not get their act together before then, they go into catastrophic decline, as already indicated. If however they do get their ecopolitical act together then humans, while they hardly live happily ever after (poverty, inequality, domination, and other evils not being removed), they continue to persist or even grow in numbers, perhaps fanning out through the solar system ( in the way envisaged by too many physicists). Suppose further we are optimists, imagining that the prior probability of D ecodisaster and human decline, is small, say 1%. That is d = .01, and the initial probability of D*, human “success”, is .99. The figures are pretty notional. Supreme optimists would want to set d much smaller, pessimists rather at a higher probability. Application Table 1. Cases D human decline D* human success Initial probabilities 1%, i.e. .01 99%, i.e. .99 Relative chanciness, VlOO, i.e. .01 1/100 x l/l ofC Then the probability of human decline given .01 x ,01 P(D < C) .01 x .01 + .99 x .01/1 1 !/2 , when I > 99. 23 It remains to fill out C, thereby showing that I is likely much much larger, and correspondingly human decline so much the more probable in the light of additional information, i.e. a posteriori probable in the usual jargon. There are several high risk factors, acting in a certain concert, factors emphasized more than a decade ago in world systems modellings (such as, most famously that, of the Club of Rome) Malthusian factors such as human population, economic product, pollution, energy consumption,.... It is appropriate for estimate posterier probability relative to anyone of these, any of which can serve as C, in order to expose the riskiness of present gross human practices. In brief, because there are several high risk factors, so there are several appropriate relative or reference classes. Thus the posterier probability is assessed relative to such matters as our being alive, humans being thus and so (Leslie's reference class), this being present energy use, present wast output, present forest destruction and so forth.25 The anthropic argument considers the environmentally invidious situation of present humans on the Earth. The argument can be carried through either in terms of sheer population, gross numbers, or in terms of human resource grabbing, as estimated for instance through energy consumption. Let us consider the prospects given additional information as to the present phase of gross human population. C will be some such proposition as: the proportional preponderance of humans who have ever lived alive now, or to personalize it: the chance that you or your family, is alive now. Chart: Our present population predictment on the two scenerios. Demise scenerio “Success” scenerio - representative zjs human numbers human numbers On of the weaknesses in the argument may appear to be its dependence on an appropriate choice of relative class. For, the relative probabilities can fall away if different reference classes, not exhibiting such growth patterns are taken, e.g. present wattle distribution, birds being thus and so. On the other hand, probabilities can be elevated even more by selection of more unusual reference classes cuh as our being scientists, or being computer programmers, etc.. 24 Humans have got themselves - to some extent put themselves, though much may be the result of muddling through - into an extremely dubious, environmentally insidious and unsustainable position, on a range of critical parameters. Their numbers are excessive, their high energy use is excessive, their waste and their pollution are both excessive - and all chose and other excesses are at the steep end of upward exponential curves. Several relevant graphs are distressingly exponential, with the present in the near vertical growth phase: graphs Many other similarly shaped graphs26 could be added, for instance for growth of pollution, of waste products, of weapons (in terms of tonnes of explosive power), of other greenhouse gases such as methane, and so on. The display typifies the accelerating human roller coaster. Those curves are tightly interconnected, in criss-crossing fashion. For example, the productivity of contemporary agriculture which enables the feeding of hugh urbanised human populations depends on a very high energy use (in term of energy efficiency, contemporary high-tech agriculture falls below that of much traditional agriculture). The maintenance of high populations with supplies of cheap food depends in turn on fossil fuel agriculture. Because of the intertwining of these phenomena, there is no easy way of getting off the accelerating roller-coaster. 26 All the graphs exhibited are drawn from Boyden. 25 Nor, as observed, is there much effort devoted to slowing the coaster. For politicians it would be politically risky and inexpedient to try (for them the rhetoric about an ecologically sustainable future must remain just that, more rhetoric). For many other power holders and brokers such ideas are ideologically excluded: growth remains the gospel. So a precarious position becomes ever more precarious. Humans are in a decidedly chancy position, because of their population situation and other Malthusian factors; they are becoming very disasterprone. If humans want an acceptable future for themselves - they have virtually ruled out an acceptable future for many other creatures, through their predominantly selfish thoughtless greedy practices - then they will probably have to mend their ways, very considerably and very soon. But, given the nature of the beast, that itself seems improbable. Humans, if they seek a more assured future, should make a concerted effort to put themselves into a less precarious position. That could be achieved by proceeding to reduce relative risks. These relative risks, sharply reducing prospects for a reliable future, fall into two classes:• manufactured risk factors, including weaponry such as mega-nuclear devices and elements of biochemical warfard, and experimental equipment such as very high energy particle accelerators (which could perhaps tunnel under a metastable state or induce a min-Big-Bang; see Leslie). • Accumulated risk factors, such as the hugh relative size of human population, energy consumption, greenhouse gas production, etc..27 Despite the ideological obstacles, enormous political, religious and economic obstacles blocking the way of requisite change, major efforts should be put into reducing both these types of risks. Philosophers could have a significant role in breaking down the ideological barriers and in clarifying and developing the arguments involved. 5. What ought to be done about Greenhouse? The general result already reached, that humans collectively should reduce their risk taking, and in particular reduce their gross numbers, extends to rational Greenhouse decision and action theory. But that large and difficult challenge is not all that there is to try, that should rationally be attempted. While some increase in mean global temperatures, and all that implies, can no longer be averted, the potentially most damaging effects can be: namely, by curtailing human-induced 27 As before, there are various different reasons why these induce risk, neo-Malthusian and probabilistic in particular. 26 output of Greenhouse gases. Moreover, there is an approximate upper bound upon temperature of importance, which can serve to supply a significant limit as output. That bound - which reduces risk taking by confining encountered situations to those where there is some past experiential basis - is given by estimated temperatures during Altithermal and Eemian eras. Those temperatures are estimated to have been between about 1/2 a degree and 1 degree Centigrade above contemporary (pre-1980) temperatures; so the upper bound is about 1°C. Not only will a continuation of current emission trends take global temperatures clean through and way beyond that bound, so also will an alternative set-up where emission rates are fixed more or less at current rates. The only apparent way to remain rationally within an experiential domain is to curtail sharply trace gas emissions beginning easily in the 1990s. That means shifting from the dominant growth paradigm; it means expensive re- and deindustrialisation. It is unlikely. Final corollary: Humans collectively are not (particularly) rational. But we had already guessed as much from the latest...... in the long history of human wars. References H.W. Bernard, The Greenhouse Effect, Ballinger, Cambridge Mass., 1980. A. Block, Murphy's Law. Book Two, Magnum, Methuen, ... S. Boyden, Western Civilization in Biological Perspective, Clarendon, Oxford, 1987. L.R. Brown and others, State of the World 1989, Norton/Worldwatch, New York, 1989; referred to as Worldwatch. R. Carnap, Logical Foundations of Probability, Second edition, University of Chicago Press, 1962. R.M. Cyert and M.H. DeGroot, Bayesian Analysis and Uncertainty in Economic Theory, Rowman & Littfield, New Jersey, 1987. ‘Developing policies for responding to climatic change’, Report of the Beijer Institute, February 1988. Keeton, J. Leslie, ‘Risking and World's End’, Bulletin of the Curiadian Nuclear Society 10(3) (1989) 1-6; all references to Leslie are to this article unless otherwise indicated. J. Leslie, ‘Is the end of the world nigh?’, The Philosophical Quarterly, to appear; referred to as PQ. J.E. Lovelock, Gaia. A new look at life on Earth, Oxford University Press, 1979. J. Lovelock, ‘Are we destabilising world climate?’, The Ecologist 15(1985) 52-55. 27 J.Lovelock, ‘Man and Gaia’, The Earth Report Monitoring the Battle for Our Environment, (ed. E. Goldsmith and N. Hilgard) Mitchell Benzley, London, 1988, 51-64. R. and V. Routley, ‘Nuclear energy and obligations to the future’, Inquirey 21(1978) 133R. Routley, ‘Ultralogic as universal?’ reprinted as an Appendix in Exploring Meinong's Jungle, RSSS, Australian National University, 1979. S. Schneider ‘Not to decide is to decide’, in Greenhouse 1988: Planning for Climate Change (ed. T. Dendy), Department of Environment and Planning, Adelaide, 1989, 5-10. R.P. Turco and others, ‘Nuclear winter: Global consequences of multiple nuclear explosions’, Science 222 (1983) 1283-1292.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Box 14, item 2064: Gaean Greenhouse, Nuclear Winter, and Anthropic Doomsday Subject The topic of the resource Typescript of paper published in Australian National University. Department of Philosophy (1990) Research series in unfashionable philosophy, 4. Description An account of the resource Title in collection finding aid: RS: Gaean Greenhouse, Nuclear Winter, Anthropic Doomsday ts. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/browse?search=Richard+Routley&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bjoiner%5D=and&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=&amp;range=&amp;collection=&amp;type=&amp;user=&amp;tags=&amp;public=&amp;featured=&amp;exhibit=&amp;geolocation-mapped=&amp;geolocation-address=&amp;geolocation-latitude=&amp;geolocation-longitude=&amp;geolocation-radius=10&amp;submit_search=Search+for+items">Richard Routley</a> Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived <span class="MuiTypography-root-125 MuiTypography-body2-126">The University of Queensland's <a data-testid="rek-series" href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/records/search?page=1&amp;pageSize=20&amp;sortBy=score&amp;sortDirection=Desc&amp;searchQueryParams%5Brek_series%5D%5Bvalue%5D=Richard+Sylvan+Papers%2C+UQFL291&amp;searchMode=advanced">Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291</a></span><span>,</span> Box 14, item 2064 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org">Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy</a> Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1990-01-01. Contributor An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, <a href="https://najtaylor.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Dr. N.A.J. Taylor</a>. Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library. Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource [27] leaves. 18.58 MB. Type The nature or genre of the resource Manuscript Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context <div class="element-set"> <div id="dublin-core-identifier" class="element"> <div class="element-text"><a href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:fdb034b" target="_blank" rel="noopener">https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:fdb034b</a></div> </div> </div> Australian National University Office Australian National University Office > Miscellaneous Box 14: Green Projects in Progress https://www.antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/2a58a736a0fbf8719d74d4ee50c7d4ca.pdf 07f4f100b518084f6934e2d356da87a8 PDF Text Text PARADIGMATIC ROOTS OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS Abstract. Virtually all diagnoses of the roots, and sources, of environmental problems are defective. While defective diagnoses persist, problems will not be adequately addressed. Focal questions ask why human communities so frequently degrade, impoverish or even destroy their own environments, and more generally why the whole earth is now in jeopardy through human enterprise. More immediate answers, sometimes correct so far as they go (which is not far enough), look to components of environmental impact equations. More thorough-going answers fall into two classes: first those that do not question entrenched paradigms, but seek (unsuccessfully) to explain widespread problems simply through defective practice, and secondly those that, rightly recognising that defective practice is no adequate answer, look to deeper paradigmatic sources of problems. A fatal flaw in most of the latter answers lies in their monistic concentration on a single paradigm, or single narrow band of paradigms. These flaws are exposed, whence a wider, more satisfactory answer can be broached. Background busywork includes firstly, explaining problems and relevant paradigms and how paradigms operate regarding environmental problems, and secondly, detailed disentangling of proposed and alleged sources of the problems. With this done, it is argued that none of these fashionable answers to the focal questions is satisfactory. A different more complex answer through broader classes of paradigms is accordingly investigated. Among significant corollaries, this one stands out: philosophy as portrayed through its standard history is dismal environmental news. 0. Focal questions and deeper answers. Human activity is now degrading terrestrial eco-systems at an extraordinarily rapid rate. In modem times humans have devised sophisticated and sophistical idea-systems which justify such system degradation; formerly they would have seen such transformation for not mattering, many still do, transformation as increasing wealth (as in mainstream economics). More recently they have developed social systems which induct most humans into degradation procedures (through need, induction into cash economies, and so on) and which weave entrapping justificatory webs (through agencies, bureaus, courts, and so on). Whence an increasingly broached question1: Why is this happening? More explicitly, Why do human communities so frequently degrade and impoverish their environments, their own habitats? Indeed why do they sometimes, persistently, perhaps over a long period, destroy their own habitats? More sweepingly, why is the whole earth now perhaps in jeopardy through human enterprise? The answer to be arrived at to these focal questions is in essence this: because too many humans, especially those in control of environmentally impacting enterprises, are committed to or caught within environmentally unfriendly paradigms, paradigms displaying quite insufficient regard for the health and well-being of relevant habitats and of the earth. 1 In sources as diverse as Shepard (first page) and Jacobs (p.23). �Parts of the answers to such focal questions come immediately through environmental impact equations, conservation laws, and such like. For example, degradation is occurring through the impact of overpopulation, excessive pollution, damaging or faulty technologies, and so on. While such answers are important, often correct as far as they go, and while they may correctly indicate what has to be changed somehow, they are nonetheless somewhat superficial, and they leave much to be explained. For example, they do not explain why a community persisted upon a course that deliberately led to such problems, or why it is so resistant to changes that might reduce impacts and pull it out of its problem-holes. Less superficial answers look to ideologically entrenched attitudes and commitments, to pervasive paradigms that underwrite anti-environmental practices, as for instance the wood-production ideology does forestry practice, even so-called “new forestry”.2 An illustrative example which reveals the power of paradigms in blocking or facilitating action will shortcut a more elaborate argument, through action theory, to the efficacy of idea­ systems. Consider an unwanted pregnancy, resulting despite due precautions or whatever. Observe that, more and more there are comparatively safe technologies available to effect termination and seemingly solve the immediate problem. Ask: why so many people are opposed to choice of abortion? A very common answer is: because they are operating under an elaborate paradigm, typically organised religion (bureaucratic Christianity in the West), themes of which, the creeds of which, prohibit such choices.3 Of course pro-choice considerations are also paradigmatically embedded, for instance in forms of liberalism. Picturesquely, a social paradigm imposes controls on action, a system of red and green lights on a captured agent's routing procedures. Or with a different picture, paradigms project a steeply impeding topography on action space. Paradigms not only guide, control and limit; they also correlatively give permission, as, for instance, space to play god, freedom to release a new species or variety which may or has proved a pest or noxious or has been biologically engineered, liberty to neglect or degrade or vandalize. The settings in terms of which agents such as humans act and operate, even down-toearth everyday agents, invariably include, not far in the background, paradigms, cultures, creeds, ideologies, myths or the like, all idea-systems, all involving models (in a technical sense) of one sort or another. Even the most practical (and vociferously practical) of humans are governed by background ideosystems. It is in terms of these background ideosystems that a great deal concerning human practices with respect to natural environments can be explained, what would otherwise lack satisfactory explanation.4 That explanation comes not however 2 3 4 For main details of this illustrative example, see FF. For more on this style of explanation, see further Routley. I am not, however, going to maintain that religion, or a certain religion such as Christianity, is the main villain of the environmental piece. Religions in general borrowed much in their damaging articles from philosophies (see below). What I shall be suggesting is that dominant philosophies do have much to answer for in this regard. As logical positivists observed, explanation and justification patterns tend to coincide. How people justify their practices offers an explanation, though perhaps a misleading or superficial �3 through a single paradigm, as has too often been supposed, but through a bundle of apparently aligned paradigms. One working image for what is going on here is appropriately ecological: that of a fig cluster (similarly a mangrove or bamboo thicket): Diagram 1: Structural diagram connecting problems with their multiple roots many emergent problems interlinked proximate causes plural supporting sources multiple interlinked roots Observe systematic plurality. Notice however a countervailing human propensity to seek single answers and uniqueness (as depicted in the rhomboidal box), where causes and sources are plural. So it is with paradigmatic sources and roots of environmental problems. They are plural.5 What is sought are ultimate sources, or roots, not immediate causes. The cause of the pollution may be a factory that the agent installed, to produce more flim-flam. That too may be the physical source of the immediate problem. But deeper questioning seeks the reasons for such production and such factories. While there may be problems with ideas and idea­ structures as causes, as causally efficacious, these problems do not transfer to reasons and sources. (But there are buried metaphors, and linkages, to be unscrambled: how are “A is source of B” and “A is a root of B” to be explicated? In terms of directional explanatory and other rational transmission connections.6) explanation, of them. History too is not singular, but plural, as has occasionally been recognized; at the very least there are plausible alternative histories. While there is much written on roots and sources of environmental problems or developments virtually none of it addresses die question of what is meant by the partially buried metaphors ot roots and sources (the metaphors are evidently different; more literally, plants have roots, normally below them, streams rise from sources, not roots, normally above them, and so on). A striking example is supplied by Pepper's useful introductory text. Although this text, The �4 These deeper sources are important. Without locating them, perhaps all of them (if they resemble blackberry), problems may not get properly addressed. Should we wrongly locate roots, then proposed resolutions directed at ±ese, cutting them off or replacing them, will also go astray, wrongly directed or whatever. There are several parts to the approach sketched, if it is to be properly elaborated— including a working classification of environmental problems and their proximate solutions, and an account of paradigms and their roles—before getting to paradigmatic answers to focal questions. But we can be brief on the necessary preliminaries, because they have been addressed elsewhere. 1. Problems and paradigms. Although these will be duly connected, paradigms implicated in problems, they are different components, and admit and deserve separate explanation. la. Environmental problems and proximate solutions. A definition of ‘environmental problem’, and a classification of such problems, has already been proposed.7 Observe that the final sets of problems that emerge are not value-framework independent. What constitutes a major problem on deeper perceptions may be but a minor problem, or written off as not a problem at all, on shallower perspectives. Among such indicator problems, that it is here presumed are serious problems, are those of • sustaining biodiversity and • maintaining significant wilderness.8 Even if the broad impact of human enterprise is sufficiently reduced to guarantee comfortable survival of future humans, these, desiderata may not be guaranteed. There will be outstanding problems. In any event, it is not too difficult to say more or less what environmental problems are (at worst by furnishing familiar lists), and in many cases to indicate at least in principle how they are to be resolved. Impact equations, emerging immediately from a classification of Roots of Modem Environmentalism, presents itself specifically as concerning roots, there is in fact no explication offered of the crucial roots metaphor, and for that matter no direct account of what the roots of environmentalism—still less, though quite different, of environmental problems to which environmentalism answers—are supposed to be (granted there is much oblique material). It is apparent that Pepper has become rather carried away with the roots metaphor, throwing it into several chapter headings and applying it pretty indiscriminately to mean simply elements (from some earlier occurrence); thus for instance, ‘the roots of the theme of reconciliation of freedom and authority’ (p.193). Such a usage is unsound. Because rudiments of some idea make an earlier appearance in some authority or work, later workers may not have arrived at such an idea by expanding on these rudiments; they may have arrived where they did quite independently or by a different route. The mistake is that of reading a source or (genetic) causal linkage into a mere temporal injunction: post hoc, propter hoc. Dictionaries do better, with a short listing for the figurature use of root running: the basis, bottom, the fundamental part, or that which supplies origin, sustenance, means of development, etc.’ (Concise English Dictionary). That will serve, for a start. 7 See Sylvan and Bennett, GE. 8 As to the extent of the problem in North America, and a proposed remedy, see The Wildlands Project. �5 problems, reveal how they are to be resolved.9 Namely, by altering relevant impact parameters. Given this why are they proving so intractable? Why is so little done? Why is so very little spent, despite all the talk.10 Proximate solutions, about as far as positive science conveys us, are not a satisfactory stopping point. How is it, given so much scientific information and expertise, that humans are continuing to sharply degrade, and risk substantially destroying, their habitats. To these, the focal questions of this exercise, there is an array of competing answers on offer. As we will soon see, most of these answers too simple, and taken as intended as comprehensive, they are wrong. The questions however are important, because if we fail to get to bottom of these, there is even less prospect of satisfactory action to turn around a very difficult situation. That these issues do not matter, that casual human relationships or how many dollars uncaring humans can stuff in their pockets, matter more than whole islands of habitats—these sorts of value judgements (after all matter is a value term par excellence) derive from and are supported by particular ideologies. lb. Model-like objects: paradigms, ideologies, cultures ,and so on. A paradigm was explicated, in previous work, as a model in precisely a generous logical sense.11 That is, a paradigm amounts to a structure supplied by an elaborate interpretation function on a general system, i.e. on an integrated relational structure. Naturally it is required to faithful to what it models, the social forms and norms, scientific research programs, etc. A social paradigm, in contrast to a scientific paradigm, is a paradigm where the propositional and imperatival theory, the socio-political themes and value judgements, is that of a social group. A pure culture is but a comprehensive social paradigm, where by “comprehensive” is meant that it covers a sufficiently comprehensive part of the life-styles and life-forms of the community concerned. There are now many examples of capsule formulations of the themes delivered under rival social paradigms and under different cultures; from these formulations we can work back towards the underlying models. The basic vehicle, a situations or worlds model, is a semantical object, an item like a complex universal12 similarly open to a range of construals and reduction attempts, e.g. metaphysical, conceptual, epistemic, linguistic and so on. Once this is realised, it can be seen that successive cohorts of philosophers and sociologists have repeated one another in vaguely discerning essentially the same sorts of underlying structures under different categorisations: thus, for instance, forms of understanding (Kant), of consciousness (Marx), of life (Wittgenstein), conceptual schemes (Conant), presuppositions (Collingwood), For details see again Greening of Ethics. See e.g. The cost ofpast environmental policy in OECD countries, Box 1.7, in Pearce et al, p.24. See Routley, where many environmentally relevant examples are documented. For an analogous account of culture see Sylvan 86. It resembles a structured universal, e.g. Plato’s system of forms, Locke’s of complex ideas. �6 Weltanschauungs, total views (Naess), perspectives, outlooks, ideologies, programs, ... . An ideology, for instance, in the nonderogatory (non-Marxist) sense is an ideas-system, initially a propositional system or theory with a relevant domain of ideas operative, from which a paradigm can be discerned and elaborated. Paradigms are now regularly presented, in extremely truncated form, through a tabulation of capsule themes. Here is a combination example: TABLE 2: Elements of Taoism as contrasted with Deep Ecology and with the dominant paradigm: an initial capsule formulation ,13 Taoism Deep Ecology Dominant (Western) Paradigm Harmony with nature, ±rough Tao Harmony with nature Domination over nature Nature valuable in itself; “humanism” rejected Natural environment valued for itself Nature a resource; intrinsic value confined to humans Levelling of differences; wide impartiality Biocentric egalitarianism Human supremacy Supplies ample Earth supplies limited Ample resources with substitutes Following Tao-te Spiritual goals, especially self-realisation Material economic growth a predominant goal Enlightenment Self-realisation Personal (material) enrichment Doing with enough (recycling inappropriate) Doing with enough; recycling Consumerism Non-competitive lifestyle; voluntary simplicity Cooperative lifestyle Competitive lifestyle Decentralised/neighbourhood and village focus Decentralised/bioregional /neighbourhood focus Centralised/urban centred/ national focus Hierarchy without power structure; anarchoid Non-hierarchical/ grassroots democracy Power structure hierarchical Limited technology Appropriate technology High technology Considerable caution Precautionary practice Risking taking (verging upon adventurism) 13 This tripartite example is adapted from UTD, where capsule elements of Taoism are duly expanded. �7 I As observed, paradigms control action space by some equivalent of directives; red and green lights duly interpreted. They may not supply direct commands, general obligations and prohibitions, but may operate more indirectly. For instance an enlightened person, a role model, a person following Tao, would act this way, not that. (Taoism, like certain modem ideosystems, eschews deontics.) Paradigms are absorbed and they guide practice. They commonly form part of actors' worlds; they are certainly part of actors' programs for practice and considered action in a world. In a sense then, they are things, programs actors carry round in their heads; so heads have to be changed, not rolled. 2. Proposed answers to focal questions; a preliminary classification of inadequate answers and suggested remedies. Most of the wide range of answers proposed supply a single source, and are defective. Roughly, virtually everything you have read on this (or may read elsewhere) is wrong. TABLE 3. Main tabulation of answers and remedies Source Defective practice answers Remedy Objections DI. Ignorance Relevant information Information now available D2. Unintended consequences Relevant information Information now available D2a Faulty technique, or technology Repairs Repairs already made D3 Deviation (from theory, etc.) Education (for failure to limit deviance) Adherence a. Deviation uneliminable, or b. Adherence no remedy D4. Systemic lock-in (through poverty, ensnarement in market forces, etc.) Trap removal a. Explains only certain cases, and b. Due to paradigmatic features D5. Insensitivity or insensibility Problem apprised Remedy tried; background ideological blockage Source single paradigm Remedies proposed (among others) Christianity (mainstream Catholicism) Scientific enlightenment, or alternative (Eastern) religion D3a Defective paradigm answers Pl. i �8 Pla. Protestantism and its ethic P2. P2a Cartesianism Dualism P2b Mechanism Monism Anti-dualism Modified holism Substance metaphysics P3. P3a Possessive individualism P3aa Personalism Organicism Process metaphysics Non-reductionism Transpersonalism P4. Capitalism Socialism P5. Industrialism Pre-industrialism (romanticism) Post-industrialism P5a Technocratic bureaucracy P5aa. Transnational business Enlightenment Anti-enlightenment P6a Materialism Anti-materialism Spiritualism P8. P8a Patriarchy, Masculinism Human domination of humans Feminism Anti-domination (anti-hierarchy) P6. Further sample listings of this paradigmatic sort (but with the paradigms often subject specific or partial) include: Source Typical remedy suggested Platonism New metaphysics Leibnitzianism New metaphysics Kantianism C onsequentialism Mainstrand Anglo-American philosophy: reductive empiricism-cum-utilitarianism Continental philosophy Utilitarianism Economism New social science, or ethics Contractarianism Consequentialism Domination transfer Domination removal Adolescencism Infantilism (from Freudian physchology) Maturation Maturation And so on. A very rough recipe runs as follows: draw up a potted list of major movements and factors in dominant Western thought. Then most elements in that list will have been nominated, likely �9 separately but perhaps only in combination, by someone as the source of the problems. That list accordingly continues (even including sometimes entries like Taylorism), but what is included is representative of the important and more interesting answers to be encountered. There are other answers however, some varying from interesting to crazy, that we should also take into account, for instance Shepard's answers. Although Shepard dismisses ideologies, what he offers is a further ideosystem, of similar dubious or false cast. Strange answers include pushing it back to human psychology (thus not only Shepard, but also Fox, and Ehrlich with talk of ‘mental maladaptation’). Basically, there is something wrong with a society that does that to its habitat. It is sick — in a popular sense, yes, it is sick. It is the slides that follow, however, that are to be resisted. The slide begins invitingly: As it is not literally sick, well not physically usually, it must be mentally sick; that is, sliding further and fast, insane or mad. But the sources of mental sickness lie in childhood (as Freudianism erroneously insists). The slide continues to: what we have are immature societies, frozen at an early stage of development. No doubt there is something to theme that dominant societies, USA especially (which influences so much now in other cultures), are locked into youth culture, a sort of late consumptive adolescence.1415No doubt, too, that maturity — but a environmental maturity — is desirable, even mandatory. Meanwhile, immaturity is fostered right through human life. Considerable effort is put into trying to induct older people, who are often marginalised, into active consumptive society, to spend their money through tourism, on new housing, in those most wasteful of modern institutions such as airliners and hotels, hospitals and old-age homes, and so forth. 3. Documentation as to some of the acclaimed purer sources. Like the lists of proposals and intricated paradigms, the documentation too is somewhat perfunctory, tending towards notes. While whole theses could be spun out on several of these topics, already beginning to elicit such treatment, a prime objective here is different from usual: neither to convict, nor to clear or excuse, but to partially implicate most items cited in the main tabulation above. Consider, in brief, some of the usually accredited sources: • Western religion, above all Christianity. The theme that the source of ecological problems, ‘the historical roots of our ecological crisis’, are to be found in Western religion, and specifically in ‘the Judaeo-Christian belief that mankind was created to have dominion over nature’, was advanced in a particularly pointed and subsequently influential way by White. One useful summary of White's line of argument runs as follows: Allied with technological and scientific developments, orthodox Christianity has produced arrogant exploitation of nature, and a contemporary ecological crisis. White's thesis is that the West's successful science and technology 14 15 It interestingly matches the locking of primary production systems into pioneering stages such as preclimax formations. Shepard’s dialectic is investigated in more detail in Appendix 3. White's article has generated an enormous defensive literature, primarily from Christian apologists, but also from softer environmentalists and from testy historians of ideas. The whole area looks in danger of disappearing from intellectual view under a heavy blanketing snowfall, snowed. �10 developed between the 8th and 12th centuries — it is much older than the scientific revolution though it was not until about 1850 — following the democratic revolutions — that the science and technology were combined to produce truly immense powers to change nature. The early development, however, was paralleled by the development of exploitative attitudes to nature which seemed to be ‘in harmony with larger intellectual patterns’, namely the victory of Christianity over paganism. This destroyed the animistic beliefs whereby men thought twice before they plundered and destroyed natural objects. It substituted instead a faith in perpetual progress, a belief that God designed nature for man's benefit and rule, and that action, not contemplation, was the correct Christian behaviour. Science formed an extension of theology (for to know God you had to find out how his creation worked), and technology provided the active means to carry out God's will. Because today’s attitudes are essentially inherited from Christianity, then it ‘bears the burden of guilt’ for contemporary ecological disruption.16 What has happened with the divisive charge, advanced by White, that Christianity was the prime source of environmental problems, is particularly instructive. In an attempt to diffuse the charge Christian apologists pointed to, what there undoubtedly were, recessive strands or isolated seeds in Christianity which were much more environmentally benign (though some such as stewardship, which has evolved toward total managerialism and sustainable development, have proved increasingly problematic). That does little or nothing to meet a more sensitive criticism that mainstream (or dominant) Christianity has much to answer for as regards destruction and degradation of natural environments.17 Similar responses are apposite for attempts to exonerate their wider sources, such as Western philosophy. Against the sheeting of responsibility to religion, dominant forms of which should undoubtedly cop some heavy criticism, it has been contended that philosophy ... is the primary source of most Western ideas [and] is ... responsible for the ideas and attitudes that inhibit environmental protection today.... Religion... though often criticized ... as the chief culprit, has played a much less fundamental role. Most of the environmentally offensive ideas in Western religion originated not in religion but in Western philosophy.18 • Classical Greek philosophy, above all the peak philosophies of Plato and Aristotle. Greek philosophers approached natural phenomena in a way that (1) prevented the development of an ecological perspective, (2) discouraged the aesthetic appreciation of the natural world, and (3) promoted a conception of reality that made the idea of nature preservation conceptually difficult, if not impossible.19 16 17 18 19 Pepper pp.44-5. Pepper then embarks upon the murky story of alternative interpretations of Biblical data and the Christian tradition, dredged up by a series of White's critiques. The issue continues to be debated; for an interesting recent contribution see Callicott. Each religion is multistranded. But we should look hardest at dominant operative forms. Ask, first, not what they say, but what they do, and would do. Hargrove p.15. Certainly the sort of message that Pentecostal missionaries even now try to preach to resistant Australian Aboriginals, that the earth is just filth, mere rubbish, can be traced back in direct line to Plato’s attitude to the land, an attitude Hargrove and Plumwood help expose. Hargrove p.21. Hargrove’s claims may appear to have been confuted by Attfield, but really, while they have been subject to minor qualification, they have been highlighted: see Appendix 1. There is a much fuller story still to be told about classical Greek philosophy reassessed environmentally, of the very different roles and impacts ot Plato (with his unearthly philosophy), of Aristotle (with his earthier chauvinism), of Stoics and of Epicureans. For a modest beginning, �11 More sweepingly, they set Western philosophy on a ruinous environmental course, a course accentuated with the appearance of modem rationalist and empiricist philosophies. • Cartesian philosophy. The dominant modern environmental approach is sometimes denominated Cartesianism, or the Cartesian Technocratic paradigm, in honour of Descartes, upon whom (as a conveniently select individual from a swag of like-minded people) several of the leading themes and ideas can be pinned.20 While Descartes was undoubtedly extraordinarily influential, so were others; Newton for one, Locke for another. The paradigm is accordingly better denominated the Atomist-Empiricist-Technocratic paradigm, or some such. Evidently it substantially overlaps other modem ideologies, such as that of the Enlightenment, widely implicated as major sources of environmental problems. • Western metaphysics. While some conglomeration of the preceding sources and others (some potted history of Western metaphysics, so to say) may be offered, more often what is presented is some selection of Western metaphysical elements. Here is one example, plainly exhibiting a heavy Heideggerean influence: The root of our environmental problems lie in Western metaphysics. For metaphysics, Being is presencing; no allowance is made for any other mode (sheltering, declining, concealing). Once metaphysics has established the absolute dominion of the present over the not-present or no-longer-present, the way is paved for the scientific method, with its emphasis on replicability of results, predicability, quantification, and control. Nature becomes a “natural resource” —and people become “human resources”. The sources of anthropocentricism, -imperialism, colonialism, sexism and consumerism can all be traced back to metaphysics. Western metaphysics has more or less conquered the world, and there is no going back. Western metaphysics is more than simply a false consciousness overlaid on top of “authentic” experience. Being changes historically, and metaphysics is the index of that change... Metaphysics has a conquering, exclusive imperative, ... and different [former] modes now exist only as vestigial trances. They cannot be resurrected through ancient wisdom, native healing, goddess worship, or any other supposedly intact, dormant system. We cannot create a “new order”. That would simply be another form of the Will to Power... We can—and must—turn away from the dominant rhythms of western metaphysics if we are to avoid the nihilism of a perpetually ensconced technocratic rationalism.21 An alternative to turning entirely away from Western metaphysics, consists in combining 20 21 see Plumwood on Plato, Toulmin on Stoics as contrasted with Epicureans, and Glacken on lesser or lost Greek strands. For encapsulation of the Cartesianism paradigm (a dominant dualistic form), summarising Drengson’s exposition, see Routley, table 5. For certain critical elements of Descartes contribution, see Appendix 2. Drengson, for one, has helped portray Descartes as the environmentally evil genius (or demiurge). That some orthodox philosophers, not merely maverick philosophers, are now rushing to the defence of Descartes should be seen as entirely in keeping with the character and roles of Western philosophy. Undisclosed source. Amusingly, I have seen myself accused of ‘reject[ing] in its entirety mainstream western philosophy and science, ... seen as the cause of the [environmental] problem’ and instead basing my ‘ecocentric values on Eastern philosophies (thus Bellett). This charge was levelled on the strength of a peripheral exercise on classical Taoism and Deep Ecology (now included in UTD). �12 rejection of standard Western metaphysics (or, less sweepingly, of dominant metaphysics, characteristically individualistic and atomistic) in favour of development of recessive traditions or mere Western seeds. Such a more sophisticated approach, also critical of Western metaphysics, with atomism a main villain, is pursued by those who promote instead process or plenum metaphysics.22 • Enlightenment. The source of problems lies in ‘the intellectual heritage of the Enlightenment’ (e.g. Dobson). Of course the main doctrines of the Enlightenment substantially overlap those of modem mainstream philosophy and of Descartes’ philosophy (but they shed dualistic and theistic scholastic hang-overs). • Capitalism. The assumption that capitalism is responsible for environmental as well as social evils, widespread until recently in state-socialist countries (when their own records were revealed) can be traced back to Marx. According to Marx, with capitalism for the first time, nature becomes purely an object for humankind, purely a matter of utility; ceases to be recognised as a power for itself; and the theoretical discovery of its autonomous laws appears merely as a ruse so as to subject it under human needs, whether as an object of consumption or as a means of production.23 But, as observed, the main theme had appeared in earlier philosophy; for instance, the idea of nature as purely an object for humankind, was advanced in Aristotle: ‘Now if nature makes nothing incomplete and nothing in vain, the inference must be that she has made all animals for the sake of man’.24 Aristotle adopted a similar stance on nature as on other species. The theme was to be oft repeated in subsequent Aristotelianism, and reiterated apparently in shallower Stoicism. But the subjection of everything to utility appears to be a distinctively modem contribution. ♦ Modem industrial society. Modem industrialism (‘the smooth-superhighway of industrial progress’) is the source, such is an extraordinarily popular theme: ‘... the root causes of the present crisis lie deep with the very foundations of the industrial paradigm’.25 Similarly ‘roots [of] the environment crisis ... go deeper to the foundations of modem industrial society .26 Again, ‘the structural roots of the environmental crises [are found in] industrialism, in commoditization, in commercialism, and in competition and greed’27 The popular theme, that industrialism is the source, tends to confuse mere means— industrial technology can without 22 23 24 25 26 27 For the first process option, see Gare; for the second, where the plenum is that of a holistic relativity theory (more exactly holistic relativistic geometrodynamics), see Mathews. Grundrisse p.409f. Aristotle, Politics, Book 1, ch.8. What an inference, you might well exclaim. See further Hargrove p.25. M. Gabriel, ‘How “attitudes and implements” have brought us to “the end of nature , a paper presented at UNE Environmental Paradigms Conference, April 1993. Gabriel proposes a managerial resolution: ‘for us to learn to manage both our relationship to our environment, and more broadly the environment itself (quotes from abstract of paper). This amounts to the flip side of an old problematic record. For the “solution” derives from the same defective box as the evident problem. Gabriel ibid. Similarly in McLauglin. Editorial in The Ecologist, Jan-Feb 1992, p.2. �13 any doubt at all vastly facilitate environmental degradation (as well as, less satisfactorily, subsequent clean-up and environmental repair)— with sources and causes, what directs and powers those uses of industrial technique and practice. • Patriarchy. The source is patriarchy, and androgyny; problems derive from mistreatment of women. ‘Our troubles begin with the invention of male deities located off the planet’.28 ‘patriarchy is the source of the environmental crisis’.29 One sample linkage statement runs as follows: ... there is a huge denial ... of the violence perpetrated on women both historically and ... presently] and ... this the same energy that, turned against the Earth, is destroying the very life-support systems and rapidly destroying the conditions that makes complex life possible. The fires that consume the Amazon are the very same fires that burned 9 million witches and I believe that there can be no solution of our ecological problems unless we simultaneously address our gender issues.30 Patriarchy, as source, is evidently a special case of long invoked domination transfer themes: • Human domination and exploitation of humans: It is an extraordinarily widespread assumption that the impact of humans (or, until recently, of Man!) on the environment, or creatures or things in it, is a product of that of humans with each other, typically of groups or classes. In misleadingly brief form, the source is social: Man’s inhumanity to Man; and the solution correspondingly is social. Unremarkably, this unlikely assumption comes in a variety of different forms: early, concerning the mistreatment of animals as an (inevitable) spill-over from mistreatment of humans, recently concerning maltreatment of nature spilling over from, or being one with, that of women. The fashionable assumption runs, in one form or another, from Aquinas through Kant to a range of recent trend setters, including Marcuse, Ulich, Passmore, Bookchin ... and some leading feminists. In particular, it is part of the very meaning of social ecology, an ideology shaped and championed by Bookchin: ‘ecological problems arise from deep-seated social problems’.31 On this theme among others, Bookchin simply follows a prominent trend in social anarchism set by Kropotkin and his contemporary Reclus: all see that the domination and exploitation of nature by man is but an extension of the domination of man by man. Thus, ‘Both Kropotkin and Reclus ... laid the foundations of a radical theory of human ecology. Ecological despoliation was seen to reflect imbalances in human relationships —domination of nature thus following from human domination’.... It follows that if domineering and exploitative human relationships can be avoided in small-scale decentralised societies then such societies are also best for a Quoted in Eckersley p.64, who develops and begins to assess patriarchical source themes. For a more critical assessment see GEF. See Seed, quoted in GEF; also Salleh (see e.g. EP3). John Seed’s Workshop Schedule 1992, Rainforest Information Centre, Lismore, 12. 12.91. Seed’s extravagant identity claims are but a dramatic extension of that popular tendency to transform comparison and similarity statements into identity claims. Indeed reductionism often reaches further, with attempted conversion of all relational statements into identity ones, along with unrelational property claims. Bookchin sometimes qualifies this central claim, with ‘nearly all present’, e.g. EP3 p.354. But he is not strictly entitled to any such qualification, given his invariant theme that the domination of nature always results from die humans domination ot other humans (see e.g. Clark EP3, p.346). The text EP3 contains a big section providing a useful introduction to social ecology. �14 harmonious man-nature relationship.32 Domination and exploitation of one division by another can in turn be seen as a case of dualism at work, between the one, the dominator or dominating class, and the other, the dominated. • A snare of dualisms. Environmental problems derive from operation of a set of connected ideologically-entrenched and defective dualisms.33 • Modern educational systems: Roots of environmental problems lie in educational systems. Or if roots don't, solutions do. However, roots of environmental or social problems do not lie in educational systems. Parts of their solutions may however. For education is critical, for instance, in correcting insufficient adherence to established satisfactory arrangements, such as, so it is claimed, Enlightenment ideals or traditional ethical systems.34 Therewith we are transported full circle back to defective practice answers. 4. Commentary on, and objections to, proposed answers A main part of this exercise consists in a detailed critical commentary on the entries in the main tabulation, and on proposals like them. Small beginnings are made on the exercise, in two stages reflecting the major division in the main tabulation. D. Defective practice answers tend to come from those who presume we are already in possession of adequate theories, or what approximates them or supplies main elements of them. (Such answers are also more liable to emanate from conservatives, opposed to new or radical theories, advanced on the basis of inadequacy of prevailing theories in practice.) Defective practice answers are especially popular in economic reaches. There was a time, perhaps not past yet, when all market failures in the shape of negative externalities were passed off as unintended consequences of economic activity. While outputs or “consequences” such matters as pollution certainly are, unintended they mostly are not now, without emptying ‘unintended’ of its normal sense. For example, industrialists, apprised of conservation laws and unsurprised by polluted wastes, who dump their waste where and when regulators and waste­ watchers are not looking, can hardly pretend that that output is an unintended consequence of their industry. That should now be a bad joke. Accordingly new green economics insists that we dig deeper—without however exceeding economic settings—to discover why markets may foreseeably fail and why environmentally rectifying technology is not delivered.35 Where they usually arrive, travelling 32 33 34 35 Pepper p.192, with internal quotation from Breitbart. Unfortunately it is all too evident, given humans could so socially organise, that they could setde into harmonious small-scale communities which retained but little of pristine natural environments. Such a proposition, outlined in V. and R. Routley, obtains a much fuller elaboration within Plumwood. In an interesting way, such a proposal can hardly be wrong, given the conclusion reached below that a set of defective paradigms in at work. For evidently paradigms can be covered by dualisms, represented by set of diem in each case, somewhat as numbers can be represented in binary terms, generated from a basic two-oneness duality. Thus Passmore, Attfield, and others. For a critical assessment of education, see Sylvan and Bennett. Thus e.g. Jacobs, p.24. �a 15 within such unduly confined settings, is, like welfare economics before green, at better regulated markets, with business set as before within frameworks of plans and incentives, controls and penalties. Environmentally, however, such approaches do not reach very deep, or tap into underlying paradigmatic problem-sources. But these sorts of defective practice answers do not always derive from standard economic sources. A deviation-style answer is much favoured by Marxists to explain failure, environmental and other, of the former Soviet Union and other Eastern block countries; namely that true Marxism was not practiced. Unfortunately, even if it had been, environmental consequences would be no better, given the heavy industrial commitments and environmental shallowness, at best, of true Marxism.36 Differently, enlightenment liberals like Passmore try to ascribe failures in Western environmental practice, not to any deficiencies in mainstream theory, but to deviation from well established principles. Unfortunately adherence to these “well established principles” is just one way in which the Earth will lose what remains of its wilderness and remarkable diversity. Now there are no doubt cases, past especially but also present, some resulting (collectively) in extensive environmental degradation, where defective practice answers may be correct. For example, there is harrowing case after harrowing case (brought together in texts like Topsoil and Civilization ) of degradation of prime agricultural lands by imposed farming practices, where at least early on (before damage became visible) ignorance and unintended consequences could be legitimately claimed. In most historical cases we do not have enough information to be able to say with much assurance that agriculture proceeded until effective collapse because of continuing ignorance, or because practices were locked-in in one way or another, or because of sheer obduracy. But we do know more about present agricultural practices, for example in more arid parts of Australia, concerning both irrigated and dry-land agriculture. Many of these practices are undoubtedly sharply degrading lands, and the consequences of the practices, which cannot plead or pretend ignorance, are sufficiently appreciated. But the practices persist, and are encouraged by a sweep of subsidies or concessions. No doubt some of the practitioners can reasonably claim that they are locked into bad practices through circumstance, circumstances now beyond their control such as financial pressures, unfavourable terms-of-trade, and so on, coupled with the need to make a living. But some, such as companies controlling large tracts of land, can make no such claims or excuses, nor can claim such things as family precedence, attachment to place, and similar. Their obdurate practice has to be attributed to something else, most obviously not deviation from theory, but commitment to an environmentally defective paradigm. P. Dealing with defective paradigm answers is an even more complex, and vexed, 36 It is surprising how much of the practice of later Socialist states is prefigured in texts like The Communist Manifesto. Thus “industrial armies” are to be set up; credit, communications and transport are to become state monopolies; “migrants and rebels” are to have dieir property confiscated; and so on. All this runs contrary to much Marxist apologetics (as A. Urquhart, who made those points, also observed). �16 business. Let us try to condense main matters to a few themes: 1. Many of the (incomplete) paradigms listed are not even sufficient for environmental impasses. They may be seriously mistaken, they may have undesirable intellectual and perhaps social effects, but a society could persist sustainably with those drawbacks. Thus, for example, substance metaphysics (under modified Spinozism), dualisms, even patriarchy. The same might even hold for materialism and mechanism, (assuming these practices can be coherently made out, that depending on how differentiated ideologies and values are accommodated, and so forth). To illustrate: a metaphysics, of any sort, cannot be the whole story, because it does not, on it own, account for action, anti-environmental or other. Without special bridges from metaphysics to value-intricating action theory, a sort of naturalistic fallacy operates. Thus subverted, in essentially Hume’s way, are all the vulgar sources of environmental problems which take them as derived from metaphysics. 2. While several—not just one—of the paradigms listed are sufficient—in the right circumstances (given long historical development, accumulation, and so on37)—none are necessary. Similar impasses could arise, and locally have arisen, given significantly different paradigms; for example given, instead of main Western trouble-making paradigms, Confucianism or advanced Polynesianism. At this stage in dialectic, green history or ecohistory, and related virtual histories, enter decisively. Ponting's Green History of the World begins with a graphic account of the rise and ecological fall of Easter Island under the impact of Polynesian projects. The work also conveniently documents many other examples, well-known to biohistorians, of ecological degradation or collapse, far from the influence of Western paradigms. An important example (much less speculative than some of the examples because of a comparative wealth of primary documentation) outlines the destruction of accessible Chinese ecosystems under Confucian dynasties. What several of these examples also reveal is that no very high level of technology is needed to inflict serious environmental damage; persistence in pursuit of an ideological project (with nothing directly to do with basic needs) will suffice. Other cultures did, or would have (given the technology and numbers), wrecked similar damage. For instance, deforestation, salination, megafaunal elimination, and so on, were well established before rise of modem Western paradigms, or in regions outside their influence. 3. The list of paradigms, as so far presented, is entirely Western in orientation. Moreover environmental woes are regularly ascribed to Western sources — wrongly. For non-Western paradigms have led, or would lead given the opportunities (including access to the technologies), to outcomes as undesirable as under dominant Western paradigm. Witness 37 While it is easy to imagine ineffectual or incompetent tribes which live benignly environmentally, by just muddling along, under even the worst of paradigms, that is not really to the point. A pertinent tribe needs to have developed the structure which leads to problems, to have the means, and so on. �17 again Confucianism, for instance, and its role and influence in Asian regions. Confucianism incorporates human chauvinism par excellence (as well as, some might say, Chinese chauvinism).38 Or Islam, with its reach across the Middle East. The main tabulation (of table 3) should accordingly be extended to take due account of non-Westem paradigms, including for example: Other Abrahamic religions Islam (Judaism Confucianism Shintoism Polynesianism, at least in advanced forms as on Easter Island. What is “Western” is tending to blur also. Is Judaism Western, how western, or Islam? There is also a tendency to suppose that more Western religions, Abrahamic religions, with their intense monotheism, are significantly ideologically worse than non-Westem. But the contrasts are different and much more complex than that. A better divide is into monistic and pluralistic. Even so, many undesirable social and environmental features are incorporated in or encouraged by religious pluralisms from the Indian subcontinent. 4. All the single paradigm answers are inadequate, all are too simple. Even so some are less inadequate than others. It is the same, more or less, for the combined answers, often to be encountered. For generally they represent but one thin cross-section of Western paradigms. While all the single one-source one-shot paradigmatic answers, occur on their own, often they are combined. For instance, although Descartes is often cited as a villain, more often criticism of Cartesianism is combined with criticism of other concurrent ideological elements, such as Baconian empiricism (less incompatibly, Drengson, for one, regularly combines criticism of the technocratic paradigm with criticism of Cartesianism—though Descartes, for all his rich and appalling thought, contributed little to the rise of technocratic organisation.) Similarly Hargrove combines Greek philosophy, as original source, with modern rationalism and much else. 5. Towards a more satisfactory explanation. Not only are the paradigmatic roots seriously intertangled (because of connections of one paradigm with another, because for instance of heavy philosophical inputs into religious paradigms), but further there is not a single defective paradigm. Rather there is a family or sheaf of paradigms, commitment to any of which, or any suitable combination of which, in requisite circumstances, appears to have yielded environmentally untoward outcomes (requisite circumstances including availability of technology, extent of social support, and so on). Within that plurality there are of course gradations—and not only gradations but major differences—in calibre, in environmental friendliness. A Cartesianism which regards animals as mere auto­ 38 Its net of effects extends widely. Consider, e.g., the role of Chinese medicine in decline of large fauna. �18 mata incapable of feeling genuine pain, is significantly worse as regards other life-forms and their decent treatment than a utilitarianism which positively values animal sentience. The family is not exclusively Western, or Northern, though (through colonialism and cultural imperialism) paradigm of these sorts now predominate. Paradigms and cultures of less “advanced” and third world communities have also operated to enhance environmental vandalism and degradation locally and regionally. Industrialization and technological advance are, without doubt, what have inflated environmental problems from rather localised ones, damaging islands and river catchments, to grander and global ones. They are the engines, powerhouses, of major problems/9 They did not however run on their own, nor do they continue on their own. Such engines were not designed and built, fuelled and tended, independently.39 40 They evolved primarily in the specially favoured culture of capitalism, though parallel developments could have occurred, and later did, in other prepared and heavily controlled surroundings, such as state socialism. Now however these engines have been rendered more reliable and less dependent on careful cultural support, and have been transferred to run in less favourable settings. TABLE 4: Connected continuing sources of global environmental problems Transfer of technology, industry and problems to other regions Inflation intensification and spread of problems to larger regions Technologicalindustrial development within ideological cultural framework development within another , \ or different / • framework / Multiple sources of various regional problems 39 40 The picture of development of environmental problems preferred accordingly bears passing resemblance to that now tendered for development of the early Universe, where a source event, the Big Bang, was followed by a huge inflationary phenomenon. Naturally the resemblance has limitations; for instance, universe inflation is not terrestrially replicable in the way industrialization now is (hired or delivered off the shelf, pollution problems and all, with a big price tag). Lacking such favourable ideological surroundings, earlier technological “break throughs were not duly developed: thus early wheels, steam engines, gunpowder, etc. �19 Even if the whole “West” went into a terminal decline, and its paradigms disappeared into history, serious environmental exploitation and degradation would continue, driven by other cultures. For instance, the West could collapse through protracted war, through choking on its own toxic wastes, or whatever (there are many routes to catastrophic decline, outlined for instance in “Limits to Growth” scenarios, that could differentially impact on the West). Degradation would now continue, however; there would be only temporary respite from environmental crises. While most of the problems, awfully aggregated in contemporary environmental crises, are produced or accelerated by — what connects them — contemporary industrial society, not all environmental problems are or have been of this sort. But many of the other problems, such as destruction of rainforests by itinerant peasants, can be seen as by-products, or similar; thus, in the example, the peasants displaced by agribusiness, absentee wealth-holders or similar, arrived there on industrially-made roads opening the forests, and often wrecked this damage using industrial machinery. An environmental friendly culture has to be much more critical concerning certain types of industrialization, and much more selective regarding technology than present dominant cultures, Western or non-Westem. While there are such paradigms, on the ideas market, they mostly lack sophisticated contemporary elaboration. Examples of more friendly paradigms, that do not lead of themselves to massive environmental problems and crises include those now tabulated: TABLE 5: Examples, several flawed, of environmentally friendly paradigms. Oriental ideologies: Taoism (classical) Jainism recessive traditions, now with tiny followings and little political influence. Indigenous cultures: Australian Aboriginals (e.g. Aranda) Amazonian Indians, etc. Western philosophies: old Stoicism Spinozism new Deep green theories, such as deep ecology. under certain favourable interpretations Given the remoteness of most of these examples from contemporary life, and difficulties with their wide adaptability, it is a short step to a familiar conclusion that new paradigms need to be worked out. Much more intellectual effort should be devoted to such enterprise. What we have arrived at, then, is a rough classification of paradigms into two large �20 families: environmentally friendly and unfriendly. No doubt there is a fuzzy residue class (neither, and perhaps both). DIAGRAM 6: Broad environmental division of paradigms. To questions as to why agents adhere, or continue to adhere, to environmentally unfriendly paradigms, the answers are likewise plural, and diverse (and some match answers in Table 3). Reasons are psychological, social and cultural (with circularity here encountered), and include considerations of the following sorts and others: because that is how things are done, or have always been done; because needs can be met, perhaps only met, in that way, so it is believed; because there are no alternatives, or none seen, perhaps because none have been sought; because negative outcomes can be overcome, or do not really matter; and so on. It is not difficult to indicate, more or less, which paradigms will, if duly, diligently or religiously practiced, lead to environmental problems and impasse. Some family characteristics, then, of unfriendly paradigms: * Combination effects, illustrated through Leibnitzianism. Any which guarantees satisfaction of all or enough elements of the consumption impact equation, and so would generate excessive impacts. To illustrate, consider what might be called Leibnitzianism, in honour of Leibnitz (though Leibnitz's fragmentary work did not initiate any genuine historic school). Leibnitz was heavily committed to all of human population growth, unfettered technological advance, and human lifestyles of consumption, in short, to precisely those factors that combine in the impact recipe to produce excessive human impacts upon environments. There is fair evidence for these contentions. First, Leibnitz was an early exponent of utilitarianism, indeed he was all-round an enthusiastic maximizer. From his formulation of utilitarianism, he drew an immediate obvious corollary: the directive to increase human population (maximizing on aggregate human pleasure is most obviously achieved by production of more happy humans, other aspects of which technology and affluence can assure).41 Secondly, Leibnitz was a technology enthusiast; he was heavily committed to the developments and use of scientific technology, for which he had all sorts of schemes (e.g. the characteristic universalis intended to encapsulate all of knowledge in an accessible useable form, a complete calculus duly mechanised, as well as numerous technological projects.42). Thirdly, he was committed to an affluent lifestyle for himself and (through symmetry and basic assumptions of utilitarianism) for others. For his own part, he For Leibnitz’s anticipation of utilitarianism, see Hruschka. For Leibnitz’s immediate application of the principle, to support human population increase, see p.172. ‘Leibnitz's interest in machinery is illustrated by his complicated plan to drain the Harz mines, which involved the construction of a new type of windmill, and a virtually friction-free pump’, Cottingham p.193. For a detailed account of Leibnitz’s extensive entrepreneurial and technological activities, see Aiton. �21 abandoned an academic career at an obscure German university ‘in favour of the more active and lucrative pursuits of the courtier and diplomat’ and, so it turned out, the bright lights of major European cities and grand tours of Europe.43 Leibnitz has sometimes been accounted environmentally friendly. Some of that apparent friendliness was due to scholastic conservativism. Thus he was opposed to mechanism; he was sympathetic to the organic and teleological, which did not contract to isolated human and superhuman loci. His metaphysical theory of monads, which are centres of living energy, effectively distributed life everywhere, though not equally. Harmony and order too prevailed throughout the universe, though under God's maximizing management, the presence of which they duly established! But even this life-expanding harmonious order, variants of which are now familiar from Whiteheadian and deep ecological quarters, was not as benign as it has superficially appeared. Leibnitz supposed that, by virtue of pre-established harmony and final causes governing inevitable progress, humans would not go wrong in the longer term in their environmental activities, that they could not 'cumulatively make undesirable changes in nature’.44 Leibnitz joyfully foresaw more and more of the Earth coming under cultivation, and its long-term advancement to a complete intensive garden, even if there were occasional relapses where parts deteriorated back temporarily towards wild state. Leibnitz even criticised Cartesianism, now widely regarded as prime villain of the environmental piece, as failing ‘to provide the modal stimulus .... to the control of nature’ ... ‘to scientific advance’. The idea of control, advancing to total control, total management, is prophesized in Leibnitz (in a sort of chauvinistic Gaia hypothesis). He saw ‘order as progressively increasing, with the help of man [as] a finisher of nature. He boldly applauded the idea of progress to the earth as a unit, assuming both an orderliness on earth and an orderliness in the changes it had undergone by man’.45 No doubt Leibnitz’s lifestyle commitments need not (and may not) be reflected in his philosophy, which may have independent environmental merit, for example as stimulation or input for later developments. There is unfortunately little evidence that that is so. Nonetheless, substantial fragments of Leibnitz’s philosophy do admit environmental bending and adaptation, in a way that Descartes’ philosophy does not at all easily. An important corollary does emerge: that a promising new metaphysics is no panacea for improved environmental performance or paradigms. Not merely neutral metaphysics, but even positive metaphysics, such as certain organic and process theories, are compatible with, and can be coupled with, damaging social theories and life-styles. It is almost enough to consider the theories, practices and lifestyles of Aristotle, Leibnitz and Whitehead.46 43 44 45 46 Cottingham p.24, p.26. Glacken p.478. As he remarks, these bold assumptions made by Leibnitz have proved wrong. Glacken p.506. Leibnitz’s standing in die history of philosophy is somewhat curious. His main achievement, setting aside his reputation as an intellectual wizard with lots of ideas, appears to be spasmodic work upon a beautiful ruin, an incomplete (and incompletable) metaphysics, of which only �22 * Direct untoward effects, illustrated through Cartesianism and Confucianism, or indeed any system which attributes little or no value to natural items, and perhaps much value to nature transforming or interfering human (or elite) projects. So it is with Confucianism, which is entirely human focussed. ‘Centering his attention on man in his present life, Confucius had as his goal the achievement of a good society characterized by harmonious social relations.’47 The outside world, the nature environment, was of no moral significance. It mattered only instrumentally, to humans. Descartes went further. Human bodies too were automata, complex machinery. ‘The exception is [mind, or specifically] thought, and its external manifestation language: this alone cannot be explained mechanistically—a thesis which leads Descartes to assert a fundamental divide between human beings and “the beasts”’.48 The remaining world, the natural environment—lacking humanity, thought, mind—was again of no moral significance. It possessed derivatively only what value and meaning humans, or minds, chose to confer or project upon it. Since, either way, any way, a natural environment devoid of humans had no thoughts, purposes or interests, no value or meaning of its own, it could not matter what happened to it. It could be regarded, justifiably, as nothing but a reservoir of resources for humans.49 Cartesians drew just such conclusions; similar conclusions derive from Platonism and Pentecostalism, and are implicit at least in Confucianism. Descartes again went further. His practices and methods, like those of Bacon, were ‘aimed at making men the masters and possessors of nature’.50 * devaluation of natural items as against human elements or artefacts (typically exhibiting human chauvinism);51 as a corollary, * entitlement to domination, dominion over nature; * short-term framework; * maximization assumptions, coupled with grand projects. Family characteristic of friendly paradigms will tend to invert (in effect negate) these features. An environmentally friendly paradigm can be expected to yield environmentally significant corollaries, such as: * an end to degrading primary production, wherever it prevails. 47 48 49 50 51 Instead ecological forestry tantalizing fragmentary structures were ever available. It is not even as if there is a surviving supply of challenging bad arguments that can be put before baffled students, as with Descartes and Berkeley for instance. Reese p. 102. Cottingham p.15. The utter invalidity of Descartes' argument to this divide (cited by Cottingham) is now comparatively easy to expose, given almost 400 years of hindsight. There are no such status divides. See further Appendix 2. Borrowing some nice phraseology from F. Mathews. See Discourse VI. Shallow will work out only with right mix ol humans. But in any case, it is implausible. An appealing ecological dieorem insinuates itself hereabouts: Given certain conditions (such as short-term vision, techno-fix, ...), shallowness is necessary and sulficient for environmental crisis. �23 and ecological agriculture will come to prevail. • a calling off of grand ideologically-grounded projects, interfering with or damaging natural environments, such as major dams, river diversions, demolished islands (e.g. for airports), new mountains, terraforming, extensive rainmaking, climatic interference, and generally the sweep of “playing God” projects. A little of this sort of technology can go a very long way. A short answer can now be ventured to the focal questions: Because most agents are bound to (locked into, committed to, or captively go along with) environmentally unfriendly paradigms. As a result the (long-term) health of the rest of environments does not matter, or matter enough. 6. Resulting unfavourable report on dominant philosophy. It will hardly have escaped notice that virtually all dominant philosophical roads lead to Rome, to environmentally unfriendly paradigms. Stripped of metaphor, there are environmental conditions of adequacy, which most philosophical systems fail to meet In an environmentally friendly new world, most philosophy that is remembered, indeed most of the humanities, is destined for scrapping. Prevailing philosophy is a serious impediment to satisfactory environmental outcomes. Philosophy, not just Western philosophy, has by and large been bad environmental news.52 It has supplied, or mightily assisted in supplying, main unfriendly paradigms under which environments labour. Of course not everything has to be tipped; much can be salvaged, arguments, subtheories and so on (and with intellectual tipping there need be little material waste). Nor therefore is it as if an entirely fresh start has to be made. As well as salvaged bits and pieces (which need to be carefully tested for soundness), there are recessive paradigms and neglected traditions to look to for suggestions, and inspiration, and perhaps to rehabilitate. Richard Sylvan* via Bungendore, OZ. APPENDIX 1. Dominant philosophy has aided and abetted ruination of terrestrial environments. That dominant intellectual paradigms are dismal news for deep (nonchauvinistic) environmental theory has been previously argued, in contraposed form.53 More recently Hargrove has investigated, in detail, negative implications of the main philosophical tradition 53 It may be insisted that philosophy can make no difference, for instance to environmental practice. It is not an expression of basic needs, or of any such practical matters. Exceptions to such practical bravado have however to be recognised almost immediately; philosophy soon enters for organizational, justificatory and explanatory ends. That concession still grossly under­ estimates the extent to which ideas, and more generally paradigms, influence and even govern action and practice, especially reflective and rational action. On the substantial point, not dierefore removed through the alleged practical impotence ot philosophy, see Appendix 1. An earlier version of this article was presented at die Environmental Paradigms Conference, University of New England, Armidale, April 93. It would not have been written otherwise. Notably at the end of EE, pp. 188-9. �24 for environmental theory and practice, especially/or environmental attitudes concerned with nature and creature preservation, with nature appreciation and development of a proper ecological perspective.54 However Hargrove has ventured some of his particularly challenging themes in insufficiently careful form, thereby leaving himself unnecessarily vulnerable to criticism and counter-claims. These include the criticisms assembled by Attfield, who, though not unsympathetic to Hargrove’s case, has excessively weakened the themes. For example, what Attfield presents as ‘substantially correct’ is Hargrove’s ‘verdict that the history of philosophy has discouraged preservationist attitudes’, vastly less than Hargrove’s actual negative verdict which comprehended considerably more than just “preservationist attitudes”, and recorded a situation conspicuously worse than mere “discouragement” of nature and creature preservation, as well as much else. Indeed it is worse than Hargrove has charged; Hargrove’s indictment of mainstream philosophy is itself weaker than that here ventured, which takes mainstream philosophy as thoroughly implicated in the present escalating environmental mess, through its roles as a major source and supplier of operative ideas and paradigms. There is a single qualification, invoked incidentally by Attfield himself, that would remove much of Attfield’s criticism: a restriction to mainstream philosophy (or differently, to dominant philosophy). Consider Attfield’s exceptions to ‘the adverse impacts of Western philosophy’, those alleged ‘philosophical traditions that have encouraged taking nature seriously’. Firstly, insofar as the Church Fathers, medieval Christians and others Attfield alludes to are philosophers at all, they are entirely minor figures, unlikely to be known to many philosophers, and but rarely or never referred to in regular philosophy courses; they do not form part of mainstream philosophy.55 Secondly, these minor figures do not afford the clear support for his claims that Attfield has regularly assumed.56 Many of the statements supposed to offer support are ambivalent, or environmentally dubious, supporting some form of managerialism (e.g. perfectionism or stewardship); and in any case they have to be set against the remainder of what a figure says and does (so far as can be ascertained). After all, as regards the latter matter, there are isolated claims in major philosophers (Plato is regularly cited in this regard) which may make them appear environmentally aware and even sympathetic. Although Plato’s philosophy generally suggests that he neither knew or cared about environmental problems, one passage in the Critias shows that he was very much aware of at least one problem: the effect of deforestation on soil See e.g. Hargrove, p.21. Consider the sorts of exceptions: • minor philosophers, many of whom we know very little about, outside gossip and speculation, such as Ilieophrastus, early Stoics, and lesser Epicureans. • figures who are only secondarily or marginally philosophers, such as Hooke, Boyle, Ray and Evelyn. • medieval and early modem Christians, who typically are not significant philosophers, and were usually committed not the nature preservation and the like, but to nature management or perfection. In work referred to on p. 127. The main historical claims, many of them based on secondary sources, are stated in his The Ethics of Environmental Concern A more detailed criticism of these claims will be made elsewhere. �25 ♦ quality in Greece during his own lifetime.57 Unfortunately Hargrove does but a comparatively poor job in accounting for what he alleges, Plato’s indifference and lack of ecological concern.58 The reasons for Plato’s indifference to serious ecological degradation of forests and soils in Greece can be ascribed to a combination of several elements of Plato’s philosophy (a natural-world-dismissive ideology) including: elevation of transcendental forms as what was truly real and really of value, denigration and dismissal of the everyday natural world as utterly inferior, of entirely lower existence or even illusory and certainly not of rational concern. This dualistic ontology and axiology—a wonderfully valuable world of forms standing in complete contrast with the illusory material world of perception—was supplemented and reinforced by a corresponding epistemology. Under a tripartite theory of mind, the higher rational part, which gave epistemic access to the forms, a part exhibited only by humans and more elevated beings, was sharply separated from the two lower animal parts. Thus under Plato’s conception of the human, humans and especially the important rational component of the human, stood in opposition to nature; the distinctively human task is completely separate from nature and concerned with control of it and its unruly elements. It is because what really has value—rational selves cavorting among the forms—is separate from nature, transcending it, with nature at best comprising very inferior copies, of lower existence, that it does not matter what happens to the earth and earthly things, to mere matter, that is a matter of indifference. 59 APPENDIX 2. On the prominent roles of dominant philosophy in the inferiorization and mistreatment of (mere) animals. Although the attitudes concerned reach back to antiquity, and were rationalized in classical Greek philosophy (through a theory of separate parts, “highest” of which was a soul or rational component), the whole appalling affair was given an enormous stimulus by Cartesian philosophy. Descartes cherished a scheme for a purely mechanistic science of physiology. Descartes compares the human body to an ‘automaton’ and argues that had we sufficient knowledge of the structure of its working parts we could explain even highly complex behavioural responses in purely mechanical terms. The exception is thought, and its external manifestation, language: this leads Descartes to assert a fundamental divide between human beings and ‘the beasts’: There are no men so dull-witted or stupid—and this includes even madmen— that they are incapable of arranging various words together and forming an utterance in order to make their thoughts understood, whereas no animal, however perfect, can do the like. This is not because they lack the necessary organs, for we see that magpies and parrots can utter words as we do, and yet cannot speak as we do (i.e. show that they are thinking what they are saying). By contrast, even men born deaf and dumb, and thus deprived of speech organs as much as the beasts, or more so, normally invent their own signs to make 59 Hargrove, p.29. This sort of problem arises not merely in regard to Plato, as Attfield observes, with decided relish. There is little doubt but that Hargrove’s historical excess needs to be sharpened and much elaborated, and, in some critical areas, rectified. On this classical polarisation of nature and higher humanity, see Plumwood. �26 themselves understood ... This shows that the beasts do not merely have less reason than man, but have no reason at all ...^® These sorts of considerations have been immensely influential in establishing a received fundamental ontological divide, not merely between humans and (other) animals, but between humans and nature. But, as we should now appreciate, they are all subtly, or less subtly, astray, and do not sustain the conclusion drawn. Firstly, investigation reveals internal incoherence. No men are incapable of stringing words together and forming utterances, yet many men are so incapable, not least those who are dumb. As his differential objective demands, Descartes exaggerates what those bom deaf and dumb may do—they do not ‘normally invent their own signs’, but may painstakingly learn a sign language—by contrast with ‘the beasts’. But, as we are now learning, many animals, whose organs are not well adapted to speech, can also painstakingly learn sign language. Indeed they may communicate by signs and sounds (though not usually speech) “in the wild”. There is no sharp cut-off, such as a fundamental divide presumes, between creatures that can, or do, communicate by signs and sounds, and those who cannot, or do not. Secondly, even less is there a significant boundary between those that can understand inputs and reason, and those that cannot, or do not. None of reasoning, thought and understanding are inextricably or inexorably tied to speech, nor, more broadly, to language.60 61 For example, dogs, whose speech is rather limited (though they certainly communicate, including to humans, by a range of different sounds, as well as signs), can understand and respond to several hundred commands and the like (that is, to a number of the same order as the vocabulary of basic languages). As for reasoning, the problem-solving capabilities of many sorts of animals, especially laboratory rats, are now well (even excessively, for primal comfort) documented. Regrettably, Descartes has not been on his own, or out on an exceptional limb. Virtually all past great philosophers insisted, if not on an unbridgeable gap, certainly on a difference in kind of supreme philosophical importance, between humans and other animals. Only Hume afforded a conspicuous exception to unedifying philosophical orthodoxy. Worse with other supposedly fundamental divides, such as that partitioning off nonsentients, there appear to have been no exceptions. The world was and is sharply divided, so it was and is imagined, into fixed inflexible categories. Furthermore, despite Hume, Cartesian inputs have persisted, for instance in the widespread philosophical idea—running contrary to an enormous body of evidence—that animals have no interests, preferences or intentions, that they receive no satisfaction from what they do or choose to do, and so on. Cartesianism certainly assisted, not merely in changing philosophical method importantly, 60 61 Cottingham, Three Rationalists, p.15, also quoting Descartes. For this reason, the “language of thought” conception, pervading much cognitive science, is decidedly regressive. Nor is it necessary: combinatorial operations, which can perform a fine representational job, provide an improved replacement for such a “language”: see DP chapter 11. �27 but in altering metaphysics irrevocably, above all as regards human place in nature. As an outcome of rectified method, Philosophy, including physical science, becomes in Descartes a selfcontained discipline, guided by the light of reason; it has no need to be supplemented by revelation, scripture, or ecclesiastic teaching.62 As to the new physics and its outcome in metaphysics, despite a certain amount of judicious fudging over whether the earth ‘really’ moves, Descartes was firmly committed to the new Copernican cosmology, whereby the Earth is dethroned from its central position. The Earth is simply a planet, it has the same status as Mars and Saturn—‘bodies we do not make so much of’... . What is more, the sun itself is only one star among innumerable others, each of which is the centre of its own celestial ‘vortex’. Descartes [rightly] saw all this as having important implications for human life. The universe, as conceived of in medieval and scholastic cosmology, was one which revealed, in all its details, the purposes of a benevolent creator. In the words of Paracelsus, writing some hundred years before Descartes ‘all things belonging to nature exist for the benefit of man’. For Descartes the vastly expanded size of the post-Copernican universe, the possibility of innumerable other worlds, and the insignificance of our planet in comparison with the hugeness of the whole, made it impossible to continue to regard man as the ‘dearest of God’s creatures’.... The belief that all things exist for our benefit alone, says Descartes ..., involves a presumptuous view of our status and a failure to recognize the unlimited vastness of God’s creation....63 So, in important respects, Cartesianism offered improvements and a way forward. environmentally. But the message was mixed and muffled, as with that concerning final causes, hostility to which Descartes justified as a corollary. No doubt final causes were used to smuggle in divine purposes, specifically God’s special concern for the welfare of humans (no doubt the Church and Church fathers who engaged in this smuggling were not to be trusted). However undesirable practices could be weeded out, without eradicating respectable ones. Over-zealous in just this fashion was the common 17th Century slogan, ‘Abandon final causes and look for underlying structures’, which affords another example of explanatory skimping.64 Sound methodology can admit both internal structures and final causes. Nonetheless, dethroning, relegating or abandoning final causes was a major movement within modern deanthropocentrization, so far as it has yet proceeded. Lovejoy has highlighted the matter. For, according to him, ...physico-theological ideas came to rest on the assumption that all other elements of nature were created for man’s sake, and therefore put man and nature into an unequal relationship: Tout est cree pour Thomme is at once the tacit premise and the triumphant conclusion of that long series of teleological arguments which ... is one of the 62 63 64 Cottingham pp. 176-177. Unfortunately for Descartes’ grand systematic-doubt project, reason was far from sufficient, and did need supplementation, though not through reinstatement of established prejudice. Though judiciously shedding some ancient conventional wisdom (e.g. concerning humans’ privileged control place in nature), Descartes was either forced or else felt obliged to reinstate much received wisdom, through poorly concealed subterfuges, in order to get his rationalistic roadshow moving. Cottingham, ibid. On the slogan, and the Church, see Cottingham p. 178. On skimping, see DP chapter 11. �most curious moments of human imbecility.65 APPENDIX 3. On Shepard’s approach to focal questions. A remarkably sustained investigation of the focal questions is found in Shepard’s books. In his Nature and Madness, he considers and quickly dismisses many of the stock responses to focal questions suggested by contemporary luminaries (or by himself in earlier work), such as lack of information, faulty technique, insensibility, greed, political inertia, change to agriculture and settlement,66.... He would (and should, for his eliminative argument) have also dismissed industrialization, state and corporate control, and so on. More disconcertingly, for present purposes, Shepard claims that ‘a history of ideas’— similarly no doubt a story of paradigms—will not serve; for it ‘is not enough to explain human behaviour’ (p.3), it ‘seems too easy and academic’ (p.3), itself an easy and superficial criticism. But if, for instance, the ‘dictum that nature should serve man’ and ‘insistence that animals feels no pain’ should become widely entrenched, then they may well impact heavily on practice, as accordingly appears to be the case. His slight further argument appears to miss the intended target: ‘The meticulous analysis of these philosophies and the discovery that they articulate an ethos beg the question’ (p.3). How, it can reasonably be inquired? What is offered is but the facile, false, ‘ideas are impotent’ consideration, fostered by thinking and operating in terms of causes (e.g. lower p.3), rather than reasons and (rational) explanation, and encouraged through an attempted move to (what is explanatorily inadequate) pure behaviour. For a simple example of the familiar explanatory roles of ideas and paradigms, consider an alternative explanation through them. The admittedly bizarre (“crazy”) ‘turning everything into something man-made and [or] man-used’ (p.5) is readily explained through dominant paradigms: that is the way it acquires value, otherwise it is worthless. There is no need at all for psychopathology here. Correspondingly Shepard briefly reviews and rejects several of the very partial, and often hopeless, solutions suggested under stock responses to focal questions such as making information, or better information, more widely available, bringing people from all walks of like together, encouraging conviviality, hitting problems with smart technology, practicing conservation, and so on. Shepard’s own resolution is more readily reached from a further (meta-focal) question that he proceeds to ask: why do humans persist in degrading their habitats once sources and solutions are made transparent? He effectively argues by elimination: other sources (read as causes) do not succeed in providing an answer; but ‘the idea of a sick society’ (which he leaps to, without argument, p.4) does. Wrong on both counts: On the first because a non-causal explanation in terms of ideological wiring can provide answers (listen to politicians, 65 66 Pepper p.44, quoting Lovejoy. No doubt a popular picture of human social changes with agriculture and settlement ir simplistic: that before societies lived in harmony, afterwards they did not. But it is also too simple to go on to claim, as Shepard does, that ‘the economic and material demands of growing villages and towns are ... not causes but results of this change’ (p.3). Some demands appear to derive from factors, such as population pressures, which were among causes of the changes. �29 representative of the people, again, just a little time). On the second because some industrial societies are not sick in a normal sense (though some may be), rather sickness has to be so redefined (such low redefinitions are among underlying subplots67) that having certain ideological commitments that are carried into practice counts as “sickness”. So it is that Shepard arrives at his theme of ‘general, culturally-ratified distortions of childhood, of massive disablement of ontogeny as the basis of irrational and self-destructive attitudes towards the natural environment’ (p.ix). Succinctly, ‘there are profound psychic dislocation at the root of modem society’ (p.xii). Psychic disorders have evolved: ‘over the centuries major institutions and metaphysics might finally celebrate attitudes and ideas originating in the normal context of immaturity [or]... adolescence ...’ (p. 15). Having glided easily and invalidly to the idea of sick societies, in a mere three pages, Shepard proceeds to diagnose in more detail the nature of the alleged sickness.68 It supposedly arises, like other psychopathy with which it is immediately associated, in infancy, and is manifest in life-long immaturity, with whole societies stuck in a kind of destractive adolescence. No doubt there is something to some of what Shepard describes in child and person development (not the ‘private demons’ and so on) or might well have described. There is evidently, conspicuously in “new world” societies, wide commitment to a shallow juvenile culture, adulation or imitation of immature media and sport models and flawed authority figures, marginalization of the elderly, and so on, coupled with hyper-activity, violence and vandalism. But, like political commitment to extensive economic activity, this is hardly satisfactorily accounted for through psychopathological reduction, concentrating the whole social problematic in the ontogeny of individuals.69 A superior explanation to widespread individual psychic disorder proceeds through ideological commitment, that industrial human are raised and educated in, inducted into and committed to, defective ideologies without coming to know or properly experience alternatives. The ‘portraits of maturity’ alluded to likewise appear individualistic and culture-bound, resembling those of deep ecology, directed at embroidery of person and self, through personal For trickery through redefinition of sickness and madness, Wisdom has already prepared us. Observe that Shepard’s redefinition of sickness to include sick (i.e. debasing and devaluing) practices with regard to natural habitats (and conjoined therewith, to, older people) does not leave no contrast classes. For there remain benign ‘relic tribal’ societies, such as the Manus, Crow and Comanche, Aranda and !Kung San (p.xii), ‘people who feel themselves to be guests rather than masters’ (p.6 empasis added)—an elegant analogy. ‘The idea of a sick society’, which as Shepard confesses (on p.4) is hardly new, is reached on the third page of the main text. A psychopathic reduction is in part made plausible by reexpression in medical or psychological terms of what would better be otherwise expressed. Consider, for instance the language of the following clever paragraph, which infiltrates much with no argument: ‘The person himself is, of course, caught between his inner calendar and the surgeries of society. His momentum for further growth may be twisted or amputated according to the hostilities, fears, or fantasies required of him, as his retardation is silently engineered to domesticate his integrity or to allow him to share in the collective dream of mastery (p.16). But the trapping of agents between inner directives and social conditions and demands, or between rival ideologies, can be retold in different, less medical and metaphorical terms. �30 growth and identity, wider identification and relatedness, self-realization.70 They are not exactly those of older and ecologically wiser societies. They do not reveal ecologically mature mixed communities. Furthermore, comparisons with relic tribal societies, which are important, can be decoupled from psychopathological analysis and reduction. Different lifeways, commitments and ideologies, are what they are and do not all reduce to matters of mental health. Undoubtedly we can learn of and from these different societies. We can still witness ‘smallgroup, leisured, foraging life-ways with[in] natural surroundings.... there is the rub—... for us, now, that world no longer exists’ (p. 14 rearranged). Nor is it really true that such a world is no longer accessible to most of us; more leisured small-group ways can be retrieved, some natural surrounding can even now be restored. In a curious fashion, Shepard has managed to invert likely causal relations. While a certain interaction can no doubt be conceded, it is not so much human ill-health that is leading to environmental degradation, but rather environmental degradation, generally brought about for other reasons, that is increasingly leading to human ill-health, and in the longer term causing erosion of life-support systems. REFERENCES E.J. Aiton, Leibnitz A Biography, Adam Hilger, Bristol, 1985. R. Attfield, ‘Has the history of philosophy ruined the environment?’ Environmental Ethics 13(1991) 127-137. A. Bellett, ‘The evaluation of values compatible with ecological sustainability’, Fundamental Questions Papers, No.2 CRES, Australian National University, 1990. J. Callicott, ‘Genesis and John Muir’ Re Vision 12(3) (1990) 31-41. J. Cottingham, The Rationalists, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1988. C. Dale, V.G. Carter, Topsoil and Civilization, Rev ed. Norman; University of Oklahama Press, 1974. A Dobson, Green Reader, Routledge, London, 1991? A. Drengson, ‘Ecosophy’, Positive Vibrations, (1990?) 8-10. R. Eckersley, Environmentalism and Political Theory, UCL Press, London, 1992. A. Gare, Beyond European Civilization, Eco-logical Press, Bun gendore, 1993. C.J. Glacken, Traces on the Rhodian Shore, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1967. E.C. Hargrove, Foundations of Environmental Ethics, Prentice Hall, N.J., 1989. J. Hruschka, ‘The greatest happiness principle and other early German anticipations of utilitarian theory’, Utilitas 3(2)(1991) 165-177 M. Jacobs, The Green Economy, Pluto, London, 1991. Cf pp.12-14. Likewise there is a conservative underlay, more oppressive than that of deep ecology: insistence on ‘one particular mother’ (p.7) even suggestion of unsatisfactoriness in ‘taking mothers off to work’ (p.l5)! �31 A. McLaughlin, Regarding Nature'. Industrialism and Deep Ecology SUNY Press, Albany N.Y., 1993. F. Mathews, The Ecological Self, Bames and Noble, Maryland, 1991. J. Passmore, Man’s Responsibility for Nature, Duckworth, London, 1974 D. Pearce and others, Blueprintfor a Green Economy, Earthscan Publications, London, 1989. D. Pepper, The Roots of Modern Environmentalism, Ed: Tom Colveson London; Dover N.H. Croom Helm 1984. V. Plumwood, Feminism and the Master of Nature, Routledge, London, 1993. C. Ponting, A Green History of the World, Sinclair-Stevenson, London, 1991. V. and R. Routley, The Fight for the Forests, RSSS, Australian National University, 1973; referred to as FF. R. and V. Routley, ‘Social themes, self-management and environmental problems’, in Environmental Philosophy (eds. D. Mannison and others) RSSS, Australian National University, 1980. R. and V. Routley ‘Human chauvinism and environmental ethics’, in Environmental Philosophy (eds. D. Mannison and others), RSSS Australian National University, 1980; referred to as EE. R. Routley, ‘Roles and limits of paradigms in environmental thought and action’, Discussion papers in environmental philosophy #1, RSSS, Australian National University, 1982. P. Shephard, Nature and Madness, Sierra Club Books, San Francisco, 1982. R. Sylvan and D. Bennett, The Greening of Ethics, White Horse Press, Cambridge, 1994. R. Sylvan with D. Bennett, Of Utopias, Tao and Deep Ecology, Green Series #19, RSSS Australian National University, 1990; referred to as UTD. R. Sylvan, Culture and the Roots of Political Divergence, mimeographed, Canberra, 1986. R. Sylvan, Deep Pluralism, University of Edinburgh Press, 1994; referred to as DP. The Wildlands Project, World Earth, special issue, Canton NY, 1993. S. Toulmin, The Return to Cosmology, University of California, Berkeley, 1982. J. Wisdom, Philosophy and Psychoanalysis. Blackwell, Oxford, 1953. M. Zimmerman and others (eds.) Environmental Philosophy, Prentice Hall, N.J. 1993; referred to as EP3. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Draft Papers Description An account of the resource Sylvan's literary executor encountered an archive in which “all his projects were current", since manuscripts were undated and unattributed. Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document PARADIGMATIC ROOTS OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS Abstract. Virtually all diagnoses of the roots, and sources, of environmental problems are defective. While defective diagnoses persist, problems will not be adequately addressed. Focal questions ask why human communities so frequently degrade, impoverish or even destroy their own environments, and more generally why the whole earth is now in jeopardy through human enterprise. More immediate answers, sometimes correct so far as they go (which is not far enough), look to components of environmental impact equations. More thorough-going answers fall into two classes: first those that do not question entrenched paradigms, but seek (unsuccessfully) to explain widespread problems simply through defective practice, and secondly those that, rightly recognising that defective practice is no adequate answer, look to deeper paradigmatic sources of problems. A fatal flaw in most of the latter answers lies in their monistic concentration on a single paradigm, or single narrow band of paradigms. These flaws are exposed, whence a wider, more satisfactory answer can be broached. Background busywork includes firstly, explaining problems and relevant paradigms and how paradigms operate regarding environmental problems, and secondly, detailed disentangling of proposed and alleged sources of the problems. With this done, it is argued that none of these fashionable answers to the focal questions is satisfactory. A different more complex answer through broader classes of paradigms is accordingly investigated. Among significant corollaries, this one stands out: philosophy as portrayed through its standard history is dismal environmental news. 0. Focal questions and deeper answers. Human activity is now degrading terrestrial eco-systems at an extraordinarily rapid rate. In modem times humans have devised sophisticated and sophistical idea-systems which justify such system degradation; formerly they would have seen such transformation for not mattering, many still do, transformation as increasing wealth (as in mainstream economics). More recently they have developed social systems which induct most humans into degradation procedures (through need, induction into cash economies, and so on) and which weave entrapping justificatory webs (through agencies, bureaus, courts, and so on). Whence an increasingly broached question1: Why is this happening? More explicitly, Why do human communities so frequently degrade and impoverish their environments, their own habitats? Indeed why do they sometimes, persistently, perhaps over a long period, destroy their own habitats? More sweepingly, why is the whole earth now perhaps in jeopardy through human enterprise? The answer to be arrived at to these focal questions is in essence this: because too many humans, especially those in control of environmentally impacting enterprises, are committed to or caught within environmentally unfriendly paradigms, paradigms displaying quite insufficient regard for the health and well-being of relevant habitats and of the earth. 1 In sources as diverse as Shepard (first page) and Jacobs (p.23). Parts of the answers to such focal questions come immediately through environmental impact equations, conservation laws, and such like. For example, degradation is occurring through the impact of overpopulation, excessive pollution, damaging or faulty technologies, and so on. While such answers are important, often correct as far as they go, and while they may correctly indicate what has to be changed somehow, they are nonetheless somewhat superficial, and they leave much to be explained. For example, they do not explain why a community persisted upon a course that deliberately led to such problems, or why it is so resistant to changes that might reduce impacts and pull it out of its problem-holes. Less superficial answers look to ideologically entrenched attitudes and commitments, to pervasive paradigms that underwrite anti-environmental practices, as for instance the wood-production ideology does forestry practice, even so-called “new forestry”.2 An illustrative example which reveals the power of paradigms in blocking or facilitating action will shortcut a more elaborate argument, through action theory, to the efficacy of idea­ systems. Consider an unwanted pregnancy, resulting despite due precautions or whatever. Observe that, more and more there are comparatively safe technologies available to effect termination and seemingly solve the immediate problem. Ask: why so many people are opposed to choice of abortion? A very common answer is: because they are operating under an elaborate paradigm, typically organised religion (bureaucratic Christianity in the West), themes of which, the creeds of which, prohibit such choices.3 Of course pro-choice considerations are also paradigmatically embedded, for instance in forms of liberalism. Picturesquely, a social paradigm imposes controls on action, a system of red and green lights on a captured agent's routing procedures. Or with a different picture, paradigms project a steeply impeding topography on action space. Paradigms not only guide, control and limit; they also correlatively give permission, as, for instance, space to play god, freedom to release a new species or variety which may or has proved a pest or noxious or has been biologically engineered, liberty to neglect or degrade or vandalize. The settings in terms of which agents such as humans act and operate, even down-toearth everyday agents, invariably include, not far in the background, paradigms, cultures, creeds, ideologies, myths or the like, all idea-systems, all involving models (in a technical sense) of one sort or another. Even the most practical (and vociferously practical) of humans are governed by background ideosystems. It is in terms of these background ideosystems that a great deal concerning human practices with respect to natural environments can be explained, what would otherwise lack satisfactory explanation.4 That explanation comes not however 2 3 4 For main details of this illustrative example, see FF. For more on this style of explanation, see further Routley. I am not, however, going to maintain that religion, or a certain religion such as Christianity, is the main villain of the environmental piece. Religions in general borrowed much in their damaging articles from philosophies (see below). What I shall be suggesting is that dominant philosophies do have much to answer for in this regard. As logical positivists observed, explanation and justification patterns tend to coincide. How people justify their practices offers an explanation, though perhaps a misleading or superficial 3 through a single paradigm, as has too often been supposed, but through a bundle of apparently aligned paradigms. One working image for what is going on here is appropriately ecological: that of a fig cluster (similarly a mangrove or bamboo thicket): Diagram 1: Structural diagram connecting problems with their multiple roots many emergent problems interlinked proximate causes plural supporting sources multiple interlinked roots Observe systematic plurality. Notice however a countervailing human propensity to seek single answers and uniqueness (as depicted in the rhomboidal box), where causes and sources are plural. So it is with paradigmatic sources and roots of environmental problems. They are plural.5 What is sought are ultimate sources, or roots, not immediate causes. The cause of the pollution may be a factory that the agent installed, to produce more flim-flam. That too may be the physical source of the immediate problem. But deeper questioning seeks the reasons for such production and such factories. While there may be problems with ideas and idea­ structures as causes, as causally efficacious, these problems do not transfer to reasons and sources. (But there are buried metaphors, and linkages, to be unscrambled: how are “A is source of B” and “A is a root of B” to be explicated? In terms of directional explanatory and other rational transmission connections.6) explanation, of them. History too is not singular, but plural, as has occasionally been recognized; at the very least there are plausible alternative histories. While there is much written on roots and sources of environmental problems or developments virtually none of it addresses die question of what is meant by the partially buried metaphors ot roots and sources (the metaphors are evidently different; more literally, plants have roots, normally below them, streams rise from sources, not roots, normally above them, and so on). A striking example is supplied by Pepper's useful introductory text. Although this text, The 4 These deeper sources are important. Without locating them, perhaps all of them (if they resemble blackberry), problems may not get properly addressed. Should we wrongly locate roots, then proposed resolutions directed at ±ese, cutting them off or replacing them, will also go astray, wrongly directed or whatever. There are several parts to the approach sketched, if it is to be properly elaborated— including a working classification of environmental problems and their proximate solutions, and an account of paradigms and their roles—before getting to paradigmatic answers to focal questions. But we can be brief on the necessary preliminaries, because they have been addressed elsewhere. 1. Problems and paradigms. Although these will be duly connected, paradigms implicated in problems, they are different components, and admit and deserve separate explanation. la. Environmental problems and proximate solutions. A definition of ‘environmental problem’, and a classification of such problems, has already been proposed.7 Observe that the final sets of problems that emerge are not value-framework independent. What constitutes a major problem on deeper perceptions may be but a minor problem, or written off as not a problem at all, on shallower perspectives. Among such indicator problems, that it is here presumed are serious problems, are those of • sustaining biodiversity and • maintaining significant wilderness.8 Even if the broad impact of human enterprise is sufficiently reduced to guarantee comfortable survival of future humans, these, desiderata may not be guaranteed. There will be outstanding problems. In any event, it is not too difficult to say more or less what environmental problems are (at worst by furnishing familiar lists), and in many cases to indicate at least in principle how they are to be resolved. Impact equations, emerging immediately from a classification of Roots of Modem Environmentalism, presents itself specifically as concerning roots, there is in fact no explication offered of the crucial roots metaphor, and for that matter no direct account of what the roots of environmentalism—still less, though quite different, of environmental problems to which environmentalism answers—are supposed to be (granted there is much oblique material). It is apparent that Pepper has become rather carried away with the roots metaphor, throwing it into several chapter headings and applying it pretty indiscriminately to mean simply elements (from some earlier occurrence); thus for instance, ‘the roots of the theme of reconciliation of freedom and authority’ (p.193). Such a usage is unsound. Because rudiments of some idea make an earlier appearance in some authority or work, later workers may not have arrived at such an idea by expanding on these rudiments; they may have arrived where they did quite independently or by a different route. The mistake is that of reading a source or (genetic) causal linkage into a mere temporal injunction: post hoc, propter hoc. Dictionaries do better, with a short listing for the figurature use of root running: the basis, bottom, the fundamental part, or that which supplies origin, sustenance, means of development, etc.’ (Concise English Dictionary). That will serve, for a start. 7 See Sylvan and Bennett, GE. 8 As to the extent of the problem in North America, and a proposed remedy, see The Wildlands Project. 5 problems, reveal how they are to be resolved.9 Namely, by altering relevant impact parameters. Given this why are they proving so intractable? Why is so little done? Why is so very little spent, despite all the talk.10 Proximate solutions, about as far as positive science conveys us, are not a satisfactory stopping point. How is it, given so much scientific information and expertise, that humans are continuing to sharply degrade, and risk substantially destroying, their habitats. To these, the focal questions of this exercise, there is an array of competing answers on offer. As we will soon see, most of these answers too simple, and taken as intended as comprehensive, they are wrong. The questions however are important, because if we fail to get to bottom of these, there is even less prospect of satisfactory action to turn around a very difficult situation. That these issues do not matter, that casual human relationships or how many dollars uncaring humans can stuff in their pockets, matter more than whole islands of habitats—these sorts of value judgements (after all matter is a value term par excellence) derive from and are supported by particular ideologies. lb. Model-like objects: paradigms, ideologies, cultures ,and so on. A paradigm was explicated, in previous work, as a model in precisely a generous logical sense.11 That is, a paradigm amounts to a structure supplied by an elaborate interpretation function on a general system, i.e. on an integrated relational structure. Naturally it is required to faithful to what it models, the social forms and norms, scientific research programs, etc. A social paradigm, in contrast to a scientific paradigm, is a paradigm where the propositional and imperatival theory, the socio-political themes and value judgements, is that of a social group. A pure culture is but a comprehensive social paradigm, where by “comprehensive” is meant that it covers a sufficiently comprehensive part of the life-styles and life-forms of the community concerned. There are now many examples of capsule formulations of the themes delivered under rival social paradigms and under different cultures; from these formulations we can work back towards the underlying models. The basic vehicle, a situations or worlds model, is a semantical object, an item like a complex universal12 similarly open to a range of construals and reduction attempts, e.g. metaphysical, conceptual, epistemic, linguistic and so on. Once this is realised, it can be seen that successive cohorts of philosophers and sociologists have repeated one another in vaguely discerning essentially the same sorts of underlying structures under different categorisations: thus, for instance, forms of understanding (Kant), of consciousness (Marx), of life (Wittgenstein), conceptual schemes (Conant), presuppositions (Collingwood), For details see again Greening of Ethics. See e.g. The cost ofpast environmental policy in OECD countries, Box 1.7, in Pearce et al, p.24. See Routley, where many environmentally relevant examples are documented. For an analogous account of culture see Sylvan 86. It resembles a structured universal, e.g. Plato’s system of forms, Locke’s of complex ideas. 6 Weltanschauungs, total views (Naess), perspectives, outlooks, ideologies, programs, ... . An ideology, for instance, in the nonderogatory (non-Marxist) sense is an ideas-system, initially a propositional system or theory with a relevant domain of ideas operative, from which a paradigm can be discerned and elaborated. Paradigms are now regularly presented, in extremely truncated form, through a tabulation of capsule themes. Here is a combination example: TABLE 2: Elements of Taoism as contrasted with Deep Ecology and with the dominant paradigm: an initial capsule formulation ,13 Taoism Deep Ecology Dominant (Western) Paradigm Harmony with nature, ±rough Tao Harmony with nature Domination over nature Nature valuable in itself; “humanism” rejected Natural environment valued for itself Nature a resource; intrinsic value confined to humans Levelling of differences; wide impartiality Biocentric egalitarianism Human supremacy Supplies ample Earth supplies limited Ample resources with substitutes Following Tao-te Spiritual goals, especially self-realisation Material economic growth a predominant goal Enlightenment Self-realisation Personal (material) enrichment Doing with enough (recycling inappropriate) Doing with enough; recycling Consumerism Non-competitive lifestyle; voluntary simplicity Cooperative lifestyle Competitive lifestyle Decentralised/neighbourhood and village focus Decentralised/bioregional /neighbourhood focus Centralised/urban centred/ national focus Hierarchy without power structure; anarchoid Non-hierarchical/ grassroots democracy Power structure hierarchical Limited technology Appropriate technology High technology Considerable caution Precautionary practice Risking taking (verging upon adventurism) 13 This tripartite example is adapted from UTD, where capsule elements of Taoism are duly expanded. 7 I As observed, paradigms control action space by some equivalent of directives; red and green lights duly interpreted. They may not supply direct commands, general obligations and prohibitions, but may operate more indirectly. For instance an enlightened person, a role model, a person following Tao, would act this way, not that. (Taoism, like certain modem ideosystems, eschews deontics.) Paradigms are absorbed and they guide practice. They commonly form part of actors' worlds; they are certainly part of actors' programs for practice and considered action in a world. In a sense then, they are things, programs actors carry round in their heads; so heads have to be changed, not rolled. 2. Proposed answers to focal questions; a preliminary classification of inadequate answers and suggested remedies. Most of the wide range of answers proposed supply a single source, and are defective. Roughly, virtually everything you have read on this (or may read elsewhere) is wrong. TABLE 3. Main tabulation of answers and remedies Source Defective practice answers Remedy Objections DI. Ignorance Relevant information Information now available D2. Unintended consequences Relevant information Information now available D2a Faulty technique, or technology Repairs Repairs already made D3 Deviation (from theory, etc.) Education (for failure to limit deviance) Adherence a. Deviation uneliminable, or b. Adherence no remedy D4. Systemic lock-in (through poverty, ensnarement in market forces, etc.) Trap removal a. Explains only certain cases, and b. Due to paradigmatic features D5. Insensitivity or insensibility Problem apprised Remedy tried; background ideological blockage Source single paradigm Remedies proposed (among others) Christianity (mainstream Catholicism) Scientific enlightenment, or alternative (Eastern) religion D3a Defective paradigm answers Pl. i 8 Pla. Protestantism and its ethic P2. P2a Cartesianism Dualism P2b Mechanism Monism Anti-dualism Modified holism Substance metaphysics P3. P3a Possessive individualism P3aa Personalism Organicism Process metaphysics Non-reductionism Transpersonalism P4. Capitalism Socialism P5. Industrialism Pre-industrialism (romanticism) Post-industrialism P5a Technocratic bureaucracy P5aa. Transnational business Enlightenment Anti-enlightenment P6a Materialism Anti-materialism Spiritualism P8. P8a Patriarchy, Masculinism Human domination of humans Feminism Anti-domination (anti-hierarchy) P6. Further sample listings of this paradigmatic sort (but with the paradigms often subject specific or partial) include: Source Typical remedy suggested Platonism New metaphysics Leibnitzianism New metaphysics Kantianism C onsequentialism Mainstrand Anglo-American philosophy: reductive empiricism-cum-utilitarianism Continental philosophy Utilitarianism Economism New social science, or ethics Contractarianism Consequentialism Domination transfer Domination removal Adolescencism Infantilism (from Freudian physchology) Maturation Maturation And so on. A very rough recipe runs as follows: draw up a potted list of major movements and factors in dominant Western thought. Then most elements in that list will have been nominated, likely 9 separately but perhaps only in combination, by someone as the source of the problems. That list accordingly continues (even including sometimes entries like Taylorism), but what is included is representative of the important and more interesting answers to be encountered. There are other answers however, some varying from interesting to crazy, that we should also take into account, for instance Shepard's answers. Although Shepard dismisses ideologies, what he offers is a further ideosystem, of similar dubious or false cast. Strange answers include pushing it back to human psychology (thus not only Shepard, but also Fox, and Ehrlich with talk of ‘mental maladaptation’). Basically, there is something wrong with a society that does that to its habitat. It is sick — in a popular sense, yes, it is sick. It is the slides that follow, however, that are to be resisted. The slide begins invitingly: As it is not literally sick, well not physically usually, it must be mentally sick; that is, sliding further and fast, insane or mad. But the sources of mental sickness lie in childhood (as Freudianism erroneously insists). The slide continues to: what we have are immature societies, frozen at an early stage of development. No doubt there is something to theme that dominant societies, USA especially (which influences so much now in other cultures), are locked into youth culture, a sort of late consumptive adolescence.1415No doubt, too, that maturity — but a environmental maturity — is desirable, even mandatory. Meanwhile, immaturity is fostered right through human life. Considerable effort is put into trying to induct older people, who are often marginalised, into active consumptive society, to spend their money through tourism, on new housing, in those most wasteful of modern institutions such as airliners and hotels, hospitals and old-age homes, and so forth. 3. Documentation as to some of the acclaimed purer sources. Like the lists of proposals and intricated paradigms, the documentation too is somewhat perfunctory, tending towards notes. While whole theses could be spun out on several of these topics, already beginning to elicit such treatment, a prime objective here is different from usual: neither to convict, nor to clear or excuse, but to partially implicate most items cited in the main tabulation above. Consider, in brief, some of the usually accredited sources: • Western religion, above all Christianity. The theme that the source of ecological problems, ‘the historical roots of our ecological crisis’, are to be found in Western religion, and specifically in ‘the Judaeo-Christian belief that mankind was created to have dominion over nature’, was advanced in a particularly pointed and subsequently influential way by White. One useful summary of White's line of argument runs as follows: Allied with technological and scientific developments, orthodox Christianity has produced arrogant exploitation of nature, and a contemporary ecological crisis. White's thesis is that the West's successful science and technology 14 15 It interestingly matches the locking of primary production systems into pioneering stages such as preclimax formations. Shepard’s dialectic is investigated in more detail in Appendix 3. White's article has generated an enormous defensive literature, primarily from Christian apologists, but also from softer environmentalists and from testy historians of ideas. The whole area looks in danger of disappearing from intellectual view under a heavy blanketing snowfall, snowed. 10 developed between the 8th and 12th centuries — it is much older than the scientific revolution though it was not until about 1850 — following the democratic revolutions — that the science and technology were combined to produce truly immense powers to change nature. The early development, however, was paralleled by the development of exploitative attitudes to nature which seemed to be ‘in harmony with larger intellectual patterns’, namely the victory of Christianity over paganism. This destroyed the animistic beliefs whereby men thought twice before they plundered and destroyed natural objects. It substituted instead a faith in perpetual progress, a belief that God designed nature for man's benefit and rule, and that action, not contemplation, was the correct Christian behaviour. Science formed an extension of theology (for to know God you had to find out how his creation worked), and technology provided the active means to carry out God's will. Because today’s attitudes are essentially inherited from Christianity, then it ‘bears the burden of guilt’ for contemporary ecological disruption.16 What has happened with the divisive charge, advanced by White, that Christianity was the prime source of environmental problems, is particularly instructive. In an attempt to diffuse the charge Christian apologists pointed to, what there undoubtedly were, recessive strands or isolated seeds in Christianity which were much more environmentally benign (though some such as stewardship, which has evolved toward total managerialism and sustainable development, have proved increasingly problematic). That does little or nothing to meet a more sensitive criticism that mainstream (or dominant) Christianity has much to answer for as regards destruction and degradation of natural environments.17 Similar responses are apposite for attempts to exonerate their wider sources, such as Western philosophy. Against the sheeting of responsibility to religion, dominant forms of which should undoubtedly cop some heavy criticism, it has been contended that philosophy ... is the primary source of most Western ideas [and] is ... responsible for the ideas and attitudes that inhibit environmental protection today.... Religion... though often criticized ... as the chief culprit, has played a much less fundamental role. Most of the environmentally offensive ideas in Western religion originated not in religion but in Western philosophy.18 • Classical Greek philosophy, above all the peak philosophies of Plato and Aristotle. Greek philosophers approached natural phenomena in a way that (1) prevented the development of an ecological perspective, (2) discouraged the aesthetic appreciation of the natural world, and (3) promoted a conception of reality that made the idea of nature preservation conceptually difficult, if not impossible.19 16 17 18 19 Pepper pp.44-5. Pepper then embarks upon the murky story of alternative interpretations of Biblical data and the Christian tradition, dredged up by a series of White's critiques. The issue continues to be debated; for an interesting recent contribution see Callicott. Each religion is multistranded. But we should look hardest at dominant operative forms. Ask, first, not what they say, but what they do, and would do. Hargrove p.15. Certainly the sort of message that Pentecostal missionaries even now try to preach to resistant Australian Aboriginals, that the earth is just filth, mere rubbish, can be traced back in direct line to Plato’s attitude to the land, an attitude Hargrove and Plumwood help expose. Hargrove p.21. Hargrove’s claims may appear to have been confuted by Attfield, but really, while they have been subject to minor qualification, they have been highlighted: see Appendix 1. There is a much fuller story still to be told about classical Greek philosophy reassessed environmentally, of the very different roles and impacts ot Plato (with his unearthly philosophy), of Aristotle (with his earthier chauvinism), of Stoics and of Epicureans. For a modest beginning, 11 More sweepingly, they set Western philosophy on a ruinous environmental course, a course accentuated with the appearance of modem rationalist and empiricist philosophies. • Cartesian philosophy. The dominant modern environmental approach is sometimes denominated Cartesianism, or the Cartesian Technocratic paradigm, in honour of Descartes, upon whom (as a conveniently select individual from a swag of like-minded people) several of the leading themes and ideas can be pinned.20 While Descartes was undoubtedly extraordinarily influential, so were others; Newton for one, Locke for another. The paradigm is accordingly better denominated the Atomist-Empiricist-Technocratic paradigm, or some such. Evidently it substantially overlaps other modem ideologies, such as that of the Enlightenment, widely implicated as major sources of environmental problems. • Western metaphysics. While some conglomeration of the preceding sources and others (some potted history of Western metaphysics, so to say) may be offered, more often what is presented is some selection of Western metaphysical elements. Here is one example, plainly exhibiting a heavy Heideggerean influence: The root of our environmental problems lie in Western metaphysics. For metaphysics, Being is presencing; no allowance is made for any other mode (sheltering, declining, concealing). Once metaphysics has established the absolute dominion of the present over the not-present or no-longer-present, the way is paved for the scientific method, with its emphasis on replicability of results, predicability, quantification, and control. Nature becomes a “natural resource” —and people become “human resources”. The sources of anthropocentricism, -imperialism, colonialism, sexism and consumerism can all be traced back to metaphysics. Western metaphysics has more or less conquered the world, and there is no going back. Western metaphysics is more than simply a false consciousness overlaid on top of “authentic” experience. Being changes historically, and metaphysics is the index of that change... Metaphysics has a conquering, exclusive imperative, ... and different [former] modes now exist only as vestigial trances. They cannot be resurrected through ancient wisdom, native healing, goddess worship, or any other supposedly intact, dormant system. We cannot create a “new order”. That would simply be another form of the Will to Power... We can—and must—turn away from the dominant rhythms of western metaphysics if we are to avoid the nihilism of a perpetually ensconced technocratic rationalism.21 An alternative to turning entirely away from Western metaphysics, consists in combining 20 21 see Plumwood on Plato, Toulmin on Stoics as contrasted with Epicureans, and Glacken on lesser or lost Greek strands. For encapsulation of the Cartesianism paradigm (a dominant dualistic form), summarising Drengson’s exposition, see Routley, table 5. For certain critical elements of Descartes contribution, see Appendix 2. Drengson, for one, has helped portray Descartes as the environmentally evil genius (or demiurge). That some orthodox philosophers, not merely maverick philosophers, are now rushing to the defence of Descartes should be seen as entirely in keeping with the character and roles of Western philosophy. Undisclosed source. Amusingly, I have seen myself accused of ‘reject[ing] in its entirety mainstream western philosophy and science, ... seen as the cause of the [environmental] problem’ and instead basing my ‘ecocentric values on Eastern philosophies (thus Bellett). This charge was levelled on the strength of a peripheral exercise on classical Taoism and Deep Ecology (now included in UTD). 12 rejection of standard Western metaphysics (or, less sweepingly, of dominant metaphysics, characteristically individualistic and atomistic) in favour of development of recessive traditions or mere Western seeds. Such a more sophisticated approach, also critical of Western metaphysics, with atomism a main villain, is pursued by those who promote instead process or plenum metaphysics.22 • Enlightenment. The source of problems lies in ‘the intellectual heritage of the Enlightenment’ (e.g. Dobson). Of course the main doctrines of the Enlightenment substantially overlap those of modem mainstream philosophy and of Descartes’ philosophy (but they shed dualistic and theistic scholastic hang-overs). • Capitalism. The assumption that capitalism is responsible for environmental as well as social evils, widespread until recently in state-socialist countries (when their own records were revealed) can be traced back to Marx. According to Marx, with capitalism for the first time, nature becomes purely an object for humankind, purely a matter of utility; ceases to be recognised as a power for itself; and the theoretical discovery of its autonomous laws appears merely as a ruse so as to subject it under human needs, whether as an object of consumption or as a means of production.23 But, as observed, the main theme had appeared in earlier philosophy; for instance, the idea of nature as purely an object for humankind, was advanced in Aristotle: ‘Now if nature makes nothing incomplete and nothing in vain, the inference must be that she has made all animals for the sake of man’.24 Aristotle adopted a similar stance on nature as on other species. The theme was to be oft repeated in subsequent Aristotelianism, and reiterated apparently in shallower Stoicism. But the subjection of everything to utility appears to be a distinctively modem contribution. ♦ Modem industrial society. Modem industrialism (‘the smooth-superhighway of industrial progress’) is the source, such is an extraordinarily popular theme: ‘... the root causes of the present crisis lie deep with the very foundations of the industrial paradigm’.25 Similarly ‘roots [of] the environment crisis ... go deeper to the foundations of modem industrial society .26 Again, ‘the structural roots of the environmental crises [are found in] industrialism, in commoditization, in commercialism, and in competition and greed’27 The popular theme, that industrialism is the source, tends to confuse mere means— industrial technology can without 22 23 24 25 26 27 For the first process option, see Gare; for the second, where the plenum is that of a holistic relativity theory (more exactly holistic relativistic geometrodynamics), see Mathews. Grundrisse p.409f. Aristotle, Politics, Book 1, ch.8. What an inference, you might well exclaim. See further Hargrove p.25. M. Gabriel, ‘How “attitudes and implements” have brought us to “the end of nature , a paper presented at UNE Environmental Paradigms Conference, April 1993. Gabriel proposes a managerial resolution: ‘for us to learn to manage both our relationship to our environment, and more broadly the environment itself (quotes from abstract of paper). This amounts to the flip side of an old problematic record. For the “solution” derives from the same defective box as the evident problem. Gabriel ibid. Similarly in McLauglin. Editorial in The Ecologist, Jan-Feb 1992, p.2. 13 any doubt at all vastly facilitate environmental degradation (as well as, less satisfactorily, subsequent clean-up and environmental repair)— with sources and causes, what directs and powers those uses of industrial technique and practice. • Patriarchy. The source is patriarchy, and androgyny; problems derive from mistreatment of women. ‘Our troubles begin with the invention of male deities located off the planet’.28 ‘patriarchy is the source of the environmental crisis’.29 One sample linkage statement runs as follows: ... there is a huge denial ... of the violence perpetrated on women both historically and ... presently] and ... this the same energy that, turned against the Earth, is destroying the very life-support systems and rapidly destroying the conditions that makes complex life possible. The fires that consume the Amazon are the very same fires that burned 9 million witches and I believe that there can be no solution of our ecological problems unless we simultaneously address our gender issues.30 Patriarchy, as source, is evidently a special case of long invoked domination transfer themes: • Human domination and exploitation of humans: It is an extraordinarily widespread assumption that the impact of humans (or, until recently, of Man!) on the environment, or creatures or things in it, is a product of that of humans with each other, typically of groups or classes. In misleadingly brief form, the source is social: Man’s inhumanity to Man; and the solution correspondingly is social. Unremarkably, this unlikely assumption comes in a variety of different forms: early, concerning the mistreatment of animals as an (inevitable) spill-over from mistreatment of humans, recently concerning maltreatment of nature spilling over from, or being one with, that of women. The fashionable assumption runs, in one form or another, from Aquinas through Kant to a range of recent trend setters, including Marcuse, Ulich, Passmore, Bookchin ... and some leading feminists. In particular, it is part of the very meaning of social ecology, an ideology shaped and championed by Bookchin: ‘ecological problems arise from deep-seated social problems’.31 On this theme among others, Bookchin simply follows a prominent trend in social anarchism set by Kropotkin and his contemporary Reclus: all see that the domination and exploitation of nature by man is but an extension of the domination of man by man. Thus, ‘Both Kropotkin and Reclus ... laid the foundations of a radical theory of human ecology. Ecological despoliation was seen to reflect imbalances in human relationships —domination of nature thus following from human domination’.... It follows that if domineering and exploitative human relationships can be avoided in small-scale decentralised societies then such societies are also best for a Quoted in Eckersley p.64, who develops and begins to assess patriarchical source themes. For a more critical assessment see GEF. See Seed, quoted in GEF; also Salleh (see e.g. EP3). John Seed’s Workshop Schedule 1992, Rainforest Information Centre, Lismore, 12. 12.91. Seed’s extravagant identity claims are but a dramatic extension of that popular tendency to transform comparison and similarity statements into identity claims. Indeed reductionism often reaches further, with attempted conversion of all relational statements into identity ones, along with unrelational property claims. Bookchin sometimes qualifies this central claim, with ‘nearly all present’, e.g. EP3 p.354. But he is not strictly entitled to any such qualification, given his invariant theme that the domination of nature always results from die humans domination ot other humans (see e.g. Clark EP3, p.346). The text EP3 contains a big section providing a useful introduction to social ecology. 14 harmonious man-nature relationship.32 Domination and exploitation of one division by another can in turn be seen as a case of dualism at work, between the one, the dominator or dominating class, and the other, the dominated. • A snare of dualisms. Environmental problems derive from operation of a set of connected ideologically-entrenched and defective dualisms.33 • Modern educational systems: Roots of environmental problems lie in educational systems. Or if roots don't, solutions do. However, roots of environmental or social problems do not lie in educational systems. Parts of their solutions may however. For education is critical, for instance, in correcting insufficient adherence to established satisfactory arrangements, such as, so it is claimed, Enlightenment ideals or traditional ethical systems.34 Therewith we are transported full circle back to defective practice answers. 4. Commentary on, and objections to, proposed answers A main part of this exercise consists in a detailed critical commentary on the entries in the main tabulation, and on proposals like them. Small beginnings are made on the exercise, in two stages reflecting the major division in the main tabulation. D. Defective practice answers tend to come from those who presume we are already in possession of adequate theories, or what approximates them or supplies main elements of them. (Such answers are also more liable to emanate from conservatives, opposed to new or radical theories, advanced on the basis of inadequacy of prevailing theories in practice.) Defective practice answers are especially popular in economic reaches. There was a time, perhaps not past yet, when all market failures in the shape of negative externalities were passed off as unintended consequences of economic activity. While outputs or “consequences” such matters as pollution certainly are, unintended they mostly are not now, without emptying ‘unintended’ of its normal sense. For example, industrialists, apprised of conservation laws and unsurprised by polluted wastes, who dump their waste where and when regulators and waste­ watchers are not looking, can hardly pretend that that output is an unintended consequence of their industry. That should now be a bad joke. Accordingly new green economics insists that we dig deeper—without however exceeding economic settings—to discover why markets may foreseeably fail and why environmentally rectifying technology is not delivered.35 Where they usually arrive, travelling 32 33 34 35 Pepper p.192, with internal quotation from Breitbart. Unfortunately it is all too evident, given humans could so socially organise, that they could setde into harmonious small-scale communities which retained but little of pristine natural environments. Such a proposition, outlined in V. and R. Routley, obtains a much fuller elaboration within Plumwood. In an interesting way, such a proposal can hardly be wrong, given the conclusion reached below that a set of defective paradigms in at work. For evidently paradigms can be covered by dualisms, represented by set of diem in each case, somewhat as numbers can be represented in binary terms, generated from a basic two-oneness duality. Thus Passmore, Attfield, and others. For a critical assessment of education, see Sylvan and Bennett. Thus e.g. Jacobs, p.24. a 15 within such unduly confined settings, is, like welfare economics before green, at better regulated markets, with business set as before within frameworks of plans and incentives, controls and penalties. Environmentally, however, such approaches do not reach very deep, or tap into underlying paradigmatic problem-sources. But these sorts of defective practice answers do not always derive from standard economic sources. A deviation-style answer is much favoured by Marxists to explain failure, environmental and other, of the former Soviet Union and other Eastern block countries; namely that true Marxism was not practiced. Unfortunately, even if it had been, environmental consequences would be no better, given the heavy industrial commitments and environmental shallowness, at best, of true Marxism.36 Differently, enlightenment liberals like Passmore try to ascribe failures in Western environmental practice, not to any deficiencies in mainstream theory, but to deviation from well established principles. Unfortunately adherence to these “well established principles” is just one way in which the Earth will lose what remains of its wilderness and remarkable diversity. Now there are no doubt cases, past especially but also present, some resulting (collectively) in extensive environmental degradation, where defective practice answers may be correct. For example, there is harrowing case after harrowing case (brought together in texts like Topsoil and Civilization ) of degradation of prime agricultural lands by imposed farming practices, where at least early on (before damage became visible) ignorance and unintended consequences could be legitimately claimed. In most historical cases we do not have enough information to be able to say with much assurance that agriculture proceeded until effective collapse because of continuing ignorance, or because practices were locked-in in one way or another, or because of sheer obduracy. But we do know more about present agricultural practices, for example in more arid parts of Australia, concerning both irrigated and dry-land agriculture. Many of these practices are undoubtedly sharply degrading lands, and the consequences of the practices, which cannot plead or pretend ignorance, are sufficiently appreciated. But the practices persist, and are encouraged by a sweep of subsidies or concessions. No doubt some of the practitioners can reasonably claim that they are locked into bad practices through circumstance, circumstances now beyond their control such as financial pressures, unfavourable terms-of-trade, and so on, coupled with the need to make a living. But some, such as companies controlling large tracts of land, can make no such claims or excuses, nor can claim such things as family precedence, attachment to place, and similar. Their obdurate practice has to be attributed to something else, most obviously not deviation from theory, but commitment to an environmentally defective paradigm. P. Dealing with defective paradigm answers is an even more complex, and vexed, 36 It is surprising how much of the practice of later Socialist states is prefigured in texts like The Communist Manifesto. Thus “industrial armies” are to be set up; credit, communications and transport are to become state monopolies; “migrants and rebels” are to have dieir property confiscated; and so on. All this runs contrary to much Marxist apologetics (as A. Urquhart, who made those points, also observed). 16 business. Let us try to condense main matters to a few themes: 1. Many of the (incomplete) paradigms listed are not even sufficient for environmental impasses. They may be seriously mistaken, they may have undesirable intellectual and perhaps social effects, but a society could persist sustainably with those drawbacks. Thus, for example, substance metaphysics (under modified Spinozism), dualisms, even patriarchy. The same might even hold for materialism and mechanism, (assuming these practices can be coherently made out, that depending on how differentiated ideologies and values are accommodated, and so forth). To illustrate: a metaphysics, of any sort, cannot be the whole story, because it does not, on it own, account for action, anti-environmental or other. Without special bridges from metaphysics to value-intricating action theory, a sort of naturalistic fallacy operates. Thus subverted, in essentially Hume’s way, are all the vulgar sources of environmental problems which take them as derived from metaphysics. 2. While several—not just one—of the paradigms listed are sufficient—in the right circumstances (given long historical development, accumulation, and so on37)—none are necessary. Similar impasses could arise, and locally have arisen, given significantly different paradigms; for example given, instead of main Western trouble-making paradigms, Confucianism or advanced Polynesianism. At this stage in dialectic, green history or ecohistory, and related virtual histories, enter decisively. Ponting's Green History of the World begins with a graphic account of the rise and ecological fall of Easter Island under the impact of Polynesian projects. The work also conveniently documents many other examples, well-known to biohistorians, of ecological degradation or collapse, far from the influence of Western paradigms. An important example (much less speculative than some of the examples because of a comparative wealth of primary documentation) outlines the destruction of accessible Chinese ecosystems under Confucian dynasties. What several of these examples also reveal is that no very high level of technology is needed to inflict serious environmental damage; persistence in pursuit of an ideological project (with nothing directly to do with basic needs) will suffice. Other cultures did, or would have (given the technology and numbers), wrecked similar damage. For instance, deforestation, salination, megafaunal elimination, and so on, were well established before rise of modem Western paradigms, or in regions outside their influence. 3. The list of paradigms, as so far presented, is entirely Western in orientation. Moreover environmental woes are regularly ascribed to Western sources — wrongly. For non-Western paradigms have led, or would lead given the opportunities (including access to the technologies), to outcomes as undesirable as under dominant Western paradigm. Witness 37 While it is easy to imagine ineffectual or incompetent tribes which live benignly environmentally, by just muddling along, under even the worst of paradigms, that is not really to the point. A pertinent tribe needs to have developed the structure which leads to problems, to have the means, and so on. 17 again Confucianism, for instance, and its role and influence in Asian regions. Confucianism incorporates human chauvinism par excellence (as well as, some might say, Chinese chauvinism).38 Or Islam, with its reach across the Middle East. The main tabulation (of table 3) should accordingly be extended to take due account of non-Westem paradigms, including for example: Other Abrahamic religions Islam (Judaism Confucianism Shintoism Polynesianism, at least in advanced forms as on Easter Island. What is “Western” is tending to blur also. Is Judaism Western, how western, or Islam? There is also a tendency to suppose that more Western religions, Abrahamic religions, with their intense monotheism, are significantly ideologically worse than non-Westem. But the contrasts are different and much more complex than that. A better divide is into monistic and pluralistic. Even so, many undesirable social and environmental features are incorporated in or encouraged by religious pluralisms from the Indian subcontinent. 4. All the single paradigm answers are inadequate, all are too simple. Even so some are less inadequate than others. It is the same, more or less, for the combined answers, often to be encountered. For generally they represent but one thin cross-section of Western paradigms. While all the single one-source one-shot paradigmatic answers, occur on their own, often they are combined. For instance, although Descartes is often cited as a villain, more often criticism of Cartesianism is combined with criticism of other concurrent ideological elements, such as Baconian empiricism (less incompatibly, Drengson, for one, regularly combines criticism of the technocratic paradigm with criticism of Cartesianism—though Descartes, for all his rich and appalling thought, contributed little to the rise of technocratic organisation.) Similarly Hargrove combines Greek philosophy, as original source, with modern rationalism and much else. 5. Towards a more satisfactory explanation. Not only are the paradigmatic roots seriously intertangled (because of connections of one paradigm with another, because for instance of heavy philosophical inputs into religious paradigms), but further there is not a single defective paradigm. Rather there is a family or sheaf of paradigms, commitment to any of which, or any suitable combination of which, in requisite circumstances, appears to have yielded environmentally untoward outcomes (requisite circumstances including availability of technology, extent of social support, and so on). Within that plurality there are of course gradations—and not only gradations but major differences—in calibre, in environmental friendliness. A Cartesianism which regards animals as mere auto­ 38 Its net of effects extends widely. Consider, e.g., the role of Chinese medicine in decline of large fauna. 18 mata incapable of feeling genuine pain, is significantly worse as regards other life-forms and their decent treatment than a utilitarianism which positively values animal sentience. The family is not exclusively Western, or Northern, though (through colonialism and cultural imperialism) paradigm of these sorts now predominate. Paradigms and cultures of less “advanced” and third world communities have also operated to enhance environmental vandalism and degradation locally and regionally. Industrialization and technological advance are, without doubt, what have inflated environmental problems from rather localised ones, damaging islands and river catchments, to grander and global ones. They are the engines, powerhouses, of major problems/9 They did not however run on their own, nor do they continue on their own. Such engines were not designed and built, fuelled and tended, independently.39 40 They evolved primarily in the specially favoured culture of capitalism, though parallel developments could have occurred, and later did, in other prepared and heavily controlled surroundings, such as state socialism. Now however these engines have been rendered more reliable and less dependent on careful cultural support, and have been transferred to run in less favourable settings. TABLE 4: Connected continuing sources of global environmental problems Transfer of technology, industry and problems to other regions Inflation intensification and spread of problems to larger regions Technologicalindustrial development within ideological cultural framework development within another , \ or different / • framework / Multiple sources of various regional problems 39 40 The picture of development of environmental problems preferred accordingly bears passing resemblance to that now tendered for development of the early Universe, where a source event, the Big Bang, was followed by a huge inflationary phenomenon. Naturally the resemblance has limitations; for instance, universe inflation is not terrestrially replicable in the way industrialization now is (hired or delivered off the shelf, pollution problems and all, with a big price tag). Lacking such favourable ideological surroundings, earlier technological “break throughs were not duly developed: thus early wheels, steam engines, gunpowder, etc. 19 Even if the whole “West” went into a terminal decline, and its paradigms disappeared into history, serious environmental exploitation and degradation would continue, driven by other cultures. For instance, the West could collapse through protracted war, through choking on its own toxic wastes, or whatever (there are many routes to catastrophic decline, outlined for instance in “Limits to Growth” scenarios, that could differentially impact on the West). Degradation would now continue, however; there would be only temporary respite from environmental crises. While most of the problems, awfully aggregated in contemporary environmental crises, are produced or accelerated by — what connects them — contemporary industrial society, not all environmental problems are or have been of this sort. But many of the other problems, such as destruction of rainforests by itinerant peasants, can be seen as by-products, or similar; thus, in the example, the peasants displaced by agribusiness, absentee wealth-holders or similar, arrived there on industrially-made roads opening the forests, and often wrecked this damage using industrial machinery. An environmental friendly culture has to be much more critical concerning certain types of industrialization, and much more selective regarding technology than present dominant cultures, Western or non-Westem. While there are such paradigms, on the ideas market, they mostly lack sophisticated contemporary elaboration. Examples of more friendly paradigms, that do not lead of themselves to massive environmental problems and crises include those now tabulated: TABLE 5: Examples, several flawed, of environmentally friendly paradigms. Oriental ideologies: Taoism (classical) Jainism recessive traditions, now with tiny followings and little political influence. Indigenous cultures: Australian Aboriginals (e.g. Aranda) Amazonian Indians, etc. Western philosophies: old Stoicism Spinozism new Deep green theories, such as deep ecology. under certain favourable interpretations Given the remoteness of most of these examples from contemporary life, and difficulties with their wide adaptability, it is a short step to a familiar conclusion that new paradigms need to be worked out. Much more intellectual effort should be devoted to such enterprise. What we have arrived at, then, is a rough classification of paradigms into two large 20 families: environmentally friendly and unfriendly. No doubt there is a fuzzy residue class (neither, and perhaps both). DIAGRAM 6: Broad environmental division of paradigms. To questions as to why agents adhere, or continue to adhere, to environmentally unfriendly paradigms, the answers are likewise plural, and diverse (and some match answers in Table 3). Reasons are psychological, social and cultural (with circularity here encountered), and include considerations of the following sorts and others: because that is how things are done, or have always been done; because needs can be met, perhaps only met, in that way, so it is believed; because there are no alternatives, or none seen, perhaps because none have been sought; because negative outcomes can be overcome, or do not really matter; and so on. It is not difficult to indicate, more or less, which paradigms will, if duly, diligently or religiously practiced, lead to environmental problems and impasse. Some family characteristics, then, of unfriendly paradigms: * Combination effects, illustrated through Leibnitzianism. Any which guarantees satisfaction of all or enough elements of the consumption impact equation, and so would generate excessive impacts. To illustrate, consider what might be called Leibnitzianism, in honour of Leibnitz (though Leibnitz's fragmentary work did not initiate any genuine historic school). Leibnitz was heavily committed to all of human population growth, unfettered technological advance, and human lifestyles of consumption, in short, to precisely those factors that combine in the impact recipe to produce excessive human impacts upon environments. There is fair evidence for these contentions. First, Leibnitz was an early exponent of utilitarianism, indeed he was all-round an enthusiastic maximizer. From his formulation of utilitarianism, he drew an immediate obvious corollary: the directive to increase human population (maximizing on aggregate human pleasure is most obviously achieved by production of more happy humans, other aspects of which technology and affluence can assure).41 Secondly, Leibnitz was a technology enthusiast; he was heavily committed to the developments and use of scientific technology, for which he had all sorts of schemes (e.g. the characteristic universalis intended to encapsulate all of knowledge in an accessible useable form, a complete calculus duly mechanised, as well as numerous technological projects.42). Thirdly, he was committed to an affluent lifestyle for himself and (through symmetry and basic assumptions of utilitarianism) for others. For his own part, he For Leibnitz’s anticipation of utilitarianism, see Hruschka. For Leibnitz’s immediate application of the principle, to support human population increase, see p.172. ‘Leibnitz's interest in machinery is illustrated by his complicated plan to drain the Harz mines, which involved the construction of a new type of windmill, and a virtually friction-free pump’, Cottingham p.193. For a detailed account of Leibnitz’s extensive entrepreneurial and technological activities, see Aiton. 21 abandoned an academic career at an obscure German university ‘in favour of the more active and lucrative pursuits of the courtier and diplomat’ and, so it turned out, the bright lights of major European cities and grand tours of Europe.43 Leibnitz has sometimes been accounted environmentally friendly. Some of that apparent friendliness was due to scholastic conservativism. Thus he was opposed to mechanism; he was sympathetic to the organic and teleological, which did not contract to isolated human and superhuman loci. His metaphysical theory of monads, which are centres of living energy, effectively distributed life everywhere, though not equally. Harmony and order too prevailed throughout the universe, though under God's maximizing management, the presence of which they duly established! But even this life-expanding harmonious order, variants of which are now familiar from Whiteheadian and deep ecological quarters, was not as benign as it has superficially appeared. Leibnitz supposed that, by virtue of pre-established harmony and final causes governing inevitable progress, humans would not go wrong in the longer term in their environmental activities, that they could not 'cumulatively make undesirable changes in nature’.44 Leibnitz joyfully foresaw more and more of the Earth coming under cultivation, and its long-term advancement to a complete intensive garden, even if there were occasional relapses where parts deteriorated back temporarily towards wild state. Leibnitz even criticised Cartesianism, now widely regarded as prime villain of the environmental piece, as failing ‘to provide the modal stimulus .... to the control of nature’ ... ‘to scientific advance’. The idea of control, advancing to total control, total management, is prophesized in Leibnitz (in a sort of chauvinistic Gaia hypothesis). He saw ‘order as progressively increasing, with the help of man [as] a finisher of nature. He boldly applauded the idea of progress to the earth as a unit, assuming both an orderliness on earth and an orderliness in the changes it had undergone by man’.45 No doubt Leibnitz’s lifestyle commitments need not (and may not) be reflected in his philosophy, which may have independent environmental merit, for example as stimulation or input for later developments. There is unfortunately little evidence that that is so. Nonetheless, substantial fragments of Leibnitz’s philosophy do admit environmental bending and adaptation, in a way that Descartes’ philosophy does not at all easily. An important corollary does emerge: that a promising new metaphysics is no panacea for improved environmental performance or paradigms. Not merely neutral metaphysics, but even positive metaphysics, such as certain organic and process theories, are compatible with, and can be coupled with, damaging social theories and life-styles. It is almost enough to consider the theories, practices and lifestyles of Aristotle, Leibnitz and Whitehead.46 43 44 45 46 Cottingham p.24, p.26. Glacken p.478. As he remarks, these bold assumptions made by Leibnitz have proved wrong. Glacken p.506. Leibnitz’s standing in die history of philosophy is somewhat curious. His main achievement, setting aside his reputation as an intellectual wizard with lots of ideas, appears to be spasmodic work upon a beautiful ruin, an incomplete (and incompletable) metaphysics, of which only 22 * Direct untoward effects, illustrated through Cartesianism and Confucianism, or indeed any system which attributes little or no value to natural items, and perhaps much value to nature transforming or interfering human (or elite) projects. So it is with Confucianism, which is entirely human focussed. ‘Centering his attention on man in his present life, Confucius had as his goal the achievement of a good society characterized by harmonious social relations.’47 The outside world, the nature environment, was of no moral significance. It mattered only instrumentally, to humans. Descartes went further. Human bodies too were automata, complex machinery. ‘The exception is [mind, or specifically] thought, and its external manifestation language: this alone cannot be explained mechanistically—a thesis which leads Descartes to assert a fundamental divide between human beings and “the beasts”’.48 The remaining world, the natural environment—lacking humanity, thought, mind—was again of no moral significance. It possessed derivatively only what value and meaning humans, or minds, chose to confer or project upon it. Since, either way, any way, a natural environment devoid of humans had no thoughts, purposes or interests, no value or meaning of its own, it could not matter what happened to it. It could be regarded, justifiably, as nothing but a reservoir of resources for humans.49 Cartesians drew just such conclusions; similar conclusions derive from Platonism and Pentecostalism, and are implicit at least in Confucianism. Descartes again went further. His practices and methods, like those of Bacon, were ‘aimed at making men the masters and possessors of nature’.50 * devaluation of natural items as against human elements or artefacts (typically exhibiting human chauvinism);51 as a corollary, * entitlement to domination, dominion over nature; * short-term framework; * maximization assumptions, coupled with grand projects. Family characteristic of friendly paradigms will tend to invert (in effect negate) these features. An environmentally friendly paradigm can be expected to yield environmentally significant corollaries, such as: * an end to degrading primary production, wherever it prevails. 47 48 49 50 51 Instead ecological forestry tantalizing fragmentary structures were ever available. It is not even as if there is a surviving supply of challenging bad arguments that can be put before baffled students, as with Descartes and Berkeley for instance. Reese p. 102. Cottingham p.15. The utter invalidity of Descartes' argument to this divide (cited by Cottingham) is now comparatively easy to expose, given almost 400 years of hindsight. There are no such status divides. See further Appendix 2. Borrowing some nice phraseology from F. Mathews. See Discourse VI. Shallow will work out only with right mix ol humans. But in any case, it is implausible. An appealing ecological dieorem insinuates itself hereabouts: Given certain conditions (such as short-term vision, techno-fix, ...), shallowness is necessary and sulficient for environmental crisis. 23 and ecological agriculture will come to prevail. • a calling off of grand ideologically-grounded projects, interfering with or damaging natural environments, such as major dams, river diversions, demolished islands (e.g. for airports), new mountains, terraforming, extensive rainmaking, climatic interference, and generally the sweep of “playing God” projects. A little of this sort of technology can go a very long way. A short answer can now be ventured to the focal questions: Because most agents are bound to (locked into, committed to, or captively go along with) environmentally unfriendly paradigms. As a result the (long-term) health of the rest of environments does not matter, or matter enough. 6. Resulting unfavourable report on dominant philosophy. It will hardly have escaped notice that virtually all dominant philosophical roads lead to Rome, to environmentally unfriendly paradigms. Stripped of metaphor, there are environmental conditions of adequacy, which most philosophical systems fail to meet In an environmentally friendly new world, most philosophy that is remembered, indeed most of the humanities, is destined for scrapping. Prevailing philosophy is a serious impediment to satisfactory environmental outcomes. Philosophy, not just Western philosophy, has by and large been bad environmental news.52 It has supplied, or mightily assisted in supplying, main unfriendly paradigms under which environments labour. Of course not everything has to be tipped; much can be salvaged, arguments, subtheories and so on (and with intellectual tipping there need be little material waste). Nor therefore is it as if an entirely fresh start has to be made. As well as salvaged bits and pieces (which need to be carefully tested for soundness), there are recessive paradigms and neglected traditions to look to for suggestions, and inspiration, and perhaps to rehabilitate. Richard Sylvan* via Bungendore, OZ. APPENDIX 1. Dominant philosophy has aided and abetted ruination of terrestrial environments. That dominant intellectual paradigms are dismal news for deep (nonchauvinistic) environmental theory has been previously argued, in contraposed form.53 More recently Hargrove has investigated, in detail, negative implications of the main philosophical tradition 53 It may be insisted that philosophy can make no difference, for instance to environmental practice. It is not an expression of basic needs, or of any such practical matters. Exceptions to such practical bravado have however to be recognised almost immediately; philosophy soon enters for organizational, justificatory and explanatory ends. That concession still grossly under­ estimates the extent to which ideas, and more generally paradigms, influence and even govern action and practice, especially reflective and rational action. On the substantial point, not dierefore removed through the alleged practical impotence ot philosophy, see Appendix 1. An earlier version of this article was presented at die Environmental Paradigms Conference, University of New England, Armidale, April 93. It would not have been written otherwise. Notably at the end of EE, pp. 188-9. 24 for environmental theory and practice, especially/or environmental attitudes concerned with nature and creature preservation, with nature appreciation and development of a proper ecological perspective.54 However Hargrove has ventured some of his particularly challenging themes in insufficiently careful form, thereby leaving himself unnecessarily vulnerable to criticism and counter-claims. These include the criticisms assembled by Attfield, who, though not unsympathetic to Hargrove’s case, has excessively weakened the themes. For example, what Attfield presents as ‘substantially correct’ is Hargrove’s ‘verdict that the history of philosophy has discouraged preservationist attitudes’, vastly less than Hargrove’s actual negative verdict which comprehended considerably more than just “preservationist attitudes”, and recorded a situation conspicuously worse than mere “discouragement” of nature and creature preservation, as well as much else. Indeed it is worse than Hargrove has charged; Hargrove’s indictment of mainstream philosophy is itself weaker than that here ventured, which takes mainstream philosophy as thoroughly implicated in the present escalating environmental mess, through its roles as a major source and supplier of operative ideas and paradigms. There is a single qualification, invoked incidentally by Attfield himself, that would remove much of Attfield’s criticism: a restriction to mainstream philosophy (or differently, to dominant philosophy). Consider Attfield’s exceptions to ‘the adverse impacts of Western philosophy’, those alleged ‘philosophical traditions that have encouraged taking nature seriously’. Firstly, insofar as the Church Fathers, medieval Christians and others Attfield alludes to are philosophers at all, they are entirely minor figures, unlikely to be known to many philosophers, and but rarely or never referred to in regular philosophy courses; they do not form part of mainstream philosophy.55 Secondly, these minor figures do not afford the clear support for his claims that Attfield has regularly assumed.56 Many of the statements supposed to offer support are ambivalent, or environmentally dubious, supporting some form of managerialism (e.g. perfectionism or stewardship); and in any case they have to be set against the remainder of what a figure says and does (so far as can be ascertained). After all, as regards the latter matter, there are isolated claims in major philosophers (Plato is regularly cited in this regard) which may make them appear environmentally aware and even sympathetic. Although Plato’s philosophy generally suggests that he neither knew or cared about environmental problems, one passage in the Critias shows that he was very much aware of at least one problem: the effect of deforestation on soil See e.g. Hargrove, p.21. Consider the sorts of exceptions: • minor philosophers, many of whom we know very little about, outside gossip and speculation, such as Ilieophrastus, early Stoics, and lesser Epicureans. • figures who are only secondarily or marginally philosophers, such as Hooke, Boyle, Ray and Evelyn. • medieval and early modem Christians, who typically are not significant philosophers, and were usually committed not the nature preservation and the like, but to nature management or perfection. In work referred to on p. 127. The main historical claims, many of them based on secondary sources, are stated in his The Ethics of Environmental Concern A more detailed criticism of these claims will be made elsewhere. 25 ♦ quality in Greece during his own lifetime.57 Unfortunately Hargrove does but a comparatively poor job in accounting for what he alleges, Plato’s indifference and lack of ecological concern.58 The reasons for Plato’s indifference to serious ecological degradation of forests and soils in Greece can be ascribed to a combination of several elements of Plato’s philosophy (a natural-world-dismissive ideology) including: elevation of transcendental forms as what was truly real and really of value, denigration and dismissal of the everyday natural world as utterly inferior, of entirely lower existence or even illusory and certainly not of rational concern. This dualistic ontology and axiology—a wonderfully valuable world of forms standing in complete contrast with the illusory material world of perception—was supplemented and reinforced by a corresponding epistemology. Under a tripartite theory of mind, the higher rational part, which gave epistemic access to the forms, a part exhibited only by humans and more elevated beings, was sharply separated from the two lower animal parts. Thus under Plato’s conception of the human, humans and especially the important rational component of the human, stood in opposition to nature; the distinctively human task is completely separate from nature and concerned with control of it and its unruly elements. It is because what really has value—rational selves cavorting among the forms—is separate from nature, transcending it, with nature at best comprising very inferior copies, of lower existence, that it does not matter what happens to the earth and earthly things, to mere matter, that is a matter of indifference. 59 APPENDIX 2. On the prominent roles of dominant philosophy in the inferiorization and mistreatment of (mere) animals. Although the attitudes concerned reach back to antiquity, and were rationalized in classical Greek philosophy (through a theory of separate parts, “highest” of which was a soul or rational component), the whole appalling affair was given an enormous stimulus by Cartesian philosophy. Descartes cherished a scheme for a purely mechanistic science of physiology. Descartes compares the human body to an ‘automaton’ and argues that had we sufficient knowledge of the structure of its working parts we could explain even highly complex behavioural responses in purely mechanical terms. The exception is thought, and its external manifestation, language: this leads Descartes to assert a fundamental divide between human beings and ‘the beasts’: There are no men so dull-witted or stupid—and this includes even madmen— that they are incapable of arranging various words together and forming an utterance in order to make their thoughts understood, whereas no animal, however perfect, can do the like. This is not because they lack the necessary organs, for we see that magpies and parrots can utter words as we do, and yet cannot speak as we do (i.e. show that they are thinking what they are saying). By contrast, even men born deaf and dumb, and thus deprived of speech organs as much as the beasts, or more so, normally invent their own signs to make 59 Hargrove, p.29. This sort of problem arises not merely in regard to Plato, as Attfield observes, with decided relish. There is little doubt but that Hargrove’s historical excess needs to be sharpened and much elaborated, and, in some critical areas, rectified. On this classical polarisation of nature and higher humanity, see Plumwood. 26 themselves understood ... This shows that the beasts do not merely have less reason than man, but have no reason at all ...^® These sorts of considerations have been immensely influential in establishing a received fundamental ontological divide, not merely between humans and (other) animals, but between humans and nature. But, as we should now appreciate, they are all subtly, or less subtly, astray, and do not sustain the conclusion drawn. Firstly, investigation reveals internal incoherence. No men are incapable of stringing words together and forming utterances, yet many men are so incapable, not least those who are dumb. As his differential objective demands, Descartes exaggerates what those bom deaf and dumb may do—they do not ‘normally invent their own signs’, but may painstakingly learn a sign language—by contrast with ‘the beasts’. But, as we are now learning, many animals, whose organs are not well adapted to speech, can also painstakingly learn sign language. Indeed they may communicate by signs and sounds (though not usually speech) “in the wild”. There is no sharp cut-off, such as a fundamental divide presumes, between creatures that can, or do, communicate by signs and sounds, and those who cannot, or do not. Secondly, even less is there a significant boundary between those that can understand inputs and reason, and those that cannot, or do not. None of reasoning, thought and understanding are inextricably or inexorably tied to speech, nor, more broadly, to language.60 61 For example, dogs, whose speech is rather limited (though they certainly communicate, including to humans, by a range of different sounds, as well as signs), can understand and respond to several hundred commands and the like (that is, to a number of the same order as the vocabulary of basic languages). As for reasoning, the problem-solving capabilities of many sorts of animals, especially laboratory rats, are now well (even excessively, for primal comfort) documented. Regrettably, Descartes has not been on his own, or out on an exceptional limb. Virtually all past great philosophers insisted, if not on an unbridgeable gap, certainly on a difference in kind of supreme philosophical importance, between humans and other animals. Only Hume afforded a conspicuous exception to unedifying philosophical orthodoxy. Worse with other supposedly fundamental divides, such as that partitioning off nonsentients, there appear to have been no exceptions. The world was and is sharply divided, so it was and is imagined, into fixed inflexible categories. Furthermore, despite Hume, Cartesian inputs have persisted, for instance in the widespread philosophical idea—running contrary to an enormous body of evidence—that animals have no interests, preferences or intentions, that they receive no satisfaction from what they do or choose to do, and so on. Cartesianism certainly assisted, not merely in changing philosophical method importantly, 60 61 Cottingham, Three Rationalists, p.15, also quoting Descartes. For this reason, the “language of thought” conception, pervading much cognitive science, is decidedly regressive. Nor is it necessary: combinatorial operations, which can perform a fine representational job, provide an improved replacement for such a “language”: see DP chapter 11. 27 but in altering metaphysics irrevocably, above all as regards human place in nature. As an outcome of rectified method, Philosophy, including physical science, becomes in Descartes a selfcontained discipline, guided by the light of reason; it has no need to be supplemented by revelation, scripture, or ecclesiastic teaching.62 As to the new physics and its outcome in metaphysics, despite a certain amount of judicious fudging over whether the earth ‘really’ moves, Descartes was firmly committed to the new Copernican cosmology, whereby the Earth is dethroned from its central position. The Earth is simply a planet, it has the same status as Mars and Saturn—‘bodies we do not make so much of’... . What is more, the sun itself is only one star among innumerable others, each of which is the centre of its own celestial ‘vortex’. Descartes [rightly] saw all this as having important implications for human life. The universe, as conceived of in medieval and scholastic cosmology, was one which revealed, in all its details, the purposes of a benevolent creator. In the words of Paracelsus, writing some hundred years before Descartes ‘all things belonging to nature exist for the benefit of man’. For Descartes the vastly expanded size of the post-Copernican universe, the possibility of innumerable other worlds, and the insignificance of our planet in comparison with the hugeness of the whole, made it impossible to continue to regard man as the ‘dearest of God’s creatures’.... The belief that all things exist for our benefit alone, says Descartes ..., involves a presumptuous view of our status and a failure to recognize the unlimited vastness of God’s creation....63 So, in important respects, Cartesianism offered improvements and a way forward. environmentally. But the message was mixed and muffled, as with that concerning final causes, hostility to which Descartes justified as a corollary. No doubt final causes were used to smuggle in divine purposes, specifically God’s special concern for the welfare of humans (no doubt the Church and Church fathers who engaged in this smuggling were not to be trusted). However undesirable practices could be weeded out, without eradicating respectable ones. Over-zealous in just this fashion was the common 17th Century slogan, ‘Abandon final causes and look for underlying structures’, which affords another example of explanatory skimping.64 Sound methodology can admit both internal structures and final causes. Nonetheless, dethroning, relegating or abandoning final causes was a major movement within modern deanthropocentrization, so far as it has yet proceeded. Lovejoy has highlighted the matter. For, according to him, ...physico-theological ideas came to rest on the assumption that all other elements of nature were created for man’s sake, and therefore put man and nature into an unequal relationship: Tout est cree pour Thomme is at once the tacit premise and the triumphant conclusion of that long series of teleological arguments which ... is one of the 62 63 64 Cottingham pp. 176-177. Unfortunately for Descartes’ grand systematic-doubt project, reason was far from sufficient, and did need supplementation, though not through reinstatement of established prejudice. Though judiciously shedding some ancient conventional wisdom (e.g. concerning humans’ privileged control place in nature), Descartes was either forced or else felt obliged to reinstate much received wisdom, through poorly concealed subterfuges, in order to get his rationalistic roadshow moving. Cottingham, ibid. On the slogan, and the Church, see Cottingham p. 178. On skimping, see DP chapter 11. most curious moments of human imbecility.65 APPENDIX 3. On Shepard’s approach to focal questions. A remarkably sustained investigation of the focal questions is found in Shepard’s books. In his Nature and Madness, he considers and quickly dismisses many of the stock responses to focal questions suggested by contemporary luminaries (or by himself in earlier work), such as lack of information, faulty technique, insensibility, greed, political inertia, change to agriculture and settlement,66.... He would (and should, for his eliminative argument) have also dismissed industrialization, state and corporate control, and so on. More disconcertingly, for present purposes, Shepard claims that ‘a history of ideas’— similarly no doubt a story of paradigms—will not serve; for it ‘is not enough to explain human behaviour’ (p.3), it ‘seems too easy and academic’ (p.3), itself an easy and superficial criticism. But if, for instance, the ‘dictum that nature should serve man’ and ‘insistence that animals feels no pain’ should become widely entrenched, then they may well impact heavily on practice, as accordingly appears to be the case. His slight further argument appears to miss the intended target: ‘The meticulous analysis of these philosophies and the discovery that they articulate an ethos beg the question’ (p.3). How, it can reasonably be inquired? What is offered is but the facile, false, ‘ideas are impotent’ consideration, fostered by thinking and operating in terms of causes (e.g. lower p.3), rather than reasons and (rational) explanation, and encouraged through an attempted move to (what is explanatorily inadequate) pure behaviour. For a simple example of the familiar explanatory roles of ideas and paradigms, consider an alternative explanation through them. The admittedly bizarre (“crazy”) ‘turning everything into something man-made and [or] man-used’ (p.5) is readily explained through dominant paradigms: that is the way it acquires value, otherwise it is worthless. There is no need at all for psychopathology here. Correspondingly Shepard briefly reviews and rejects several of the very partial, and often hopeless, solutions suggested under stock responses to focal questions such as making information, or better information, more widely available, bringing people from all walks of like together, encouraging conviviality, hitting problems with smart technology, practicing conservation, and so on. Shepard’s own resolution is more readily reached from a further (meta-focal) question that he proceeds to ask: why do humans persist in degrading their habitats once sources and solutions are made transparent? He effectively argues by elimination: other sources (read as causes) do not succeed in providing an answer; but ‘the idea of a sick society’ (which he leaps to, without argument, p.4) does. Wrong on both counts: On the first because a non-causal explanation in terms of ideological wiring can provide answers (listen to politicians, 65 66 Pepper p.44, quoting Lovejoy. No doubt a popular picture of human social changes with agriculture and settlement ir simplistic: that before societies lived in harmony, afterwards they did not. But it is also too simple to go on to claim, as Shepard does, that ‘the economic and material demands of growing villages and towns are ... not causes but results of this change’ (p.3). Some demands appear to derive from factors, such as population pressures, which were among causes of the changes. 29 representative of the people, again, just a little time). On the second because some industrial societies are not sick in a normal sense (though some may be), rather sickness has to be so redefined (such low redefinitions are among underlying subplots67) that having certain ideological commitments that are carried into practice counts as “sickness”. So it is that Shepard arrives at his theme of ‘general, culturally-ratified distortions of childhood, of massive disablement of ontogeny as the basis of irrational and self-destructive attitudes towards the natural environment’ (p.ix). Succinctly, ‘there are profound psychic dislocation at the root of modem society’ (p.xii). Psychic disorders have evolved: ‘over the centuries major institutions and metaphysics might finally celebrate attitudes and ideas originating in the normal context of immaturity [or]... adolescence ...’ (p. 15). Having glided easily and invalidly to the idea of sick societies, in a mere three pages, Shepard proceeds to diagnose in more detail the nature of the alleged sickness.68 It supposedly arises, like other psychopathy with which it is immediately associated, in infancy, and is manifest in life-long immaturity, with whole societies stuck in a kind of destractive adolescence. No doubt there is something to some of what Shepard describes in child and person development (not the ‘private demons’ and so on) or might well have described. There is evidently, conspicuously in “new world” societies, wide commitment to a shallow juvenile culture, adulation or imitation of immature media and sport models and flawed authority figures, marginalization of the elderly, and so on, coupled with hyper-activity, violence and vandalism. But, like political commitment to extensive economic activity, this is hardly satisfactorily accounted for through psychopathological reduction, concentrating the whole social problematic in the ontogeny of individuals.69 A superior explanation to widespread individual psychic disorder proceeds through ideological commitment, that industrial human are raised and educated in, inducted into and committed to, defective ideologies without coming to know or properly experience alternatives. The ‘portraits of maturity’ alluded to likewise appear individualistic and culture-bound, resembling those of deep ecology, directed at embroidery of person and self, through personal For trickery through redefinition of sickness and madness, Wisdom has already prepared us. Observe that Shepard’s redefinition of sickness to include sick (i.e. debasing and devaluing) practices with regard to natural habitats (and conjoined therewith, to, older people) does not leave no contrast classes. For there remain benign ‘relic tribal’ societies, such as the Manus, Crow and Comanche, Aranda and !Kung San (p.xii), ‘people who feel themselves to be guests rather than masters’ (p.6 empasis added)—an elegant analogy. ‘The idea of a sick society’, which as Shepard confesses (on p.4) is hardly new, is reached on the third page of the main text. A psychopathic reduction is in part made plausible by reexpression in medical or psychological terms of what would better be otherwise expressed. Consider, for instance the language of the following clever paragraph, which infiltrates much with no argument: ‘The person himself is, of course, caught between his inner calendar and the surgeries of society. His momentum for further growth may be twisted or amputated according to the hostilities, fears, or fantasies required of him, as his retardation is silently engineered to domesticate his integrity or to allow him to share in the collective dream of mastery (p.16). But the trapping of agents between inner directives and social conditions and demands, or between rival ideologies, can be retold in different, less medical and metaphorical terms. 30 growth and identity, wider identification and relatedness, self-realization.70 They are not exactly those of older and ecologically wiser societies. They do not reveal ecologically mature mixed communities. Furthermore, comparisons with relic tribal societies, which are important, can be decoupled from psychopathological analysis and reduction. Different lifeways, commitments and ideologies, are what they are and do not all reduce to matters of mental health. Undoubtedly we can learn of and from these different societies. We can still witness ‘smallgroup, leisured, foraging life-ways with[in] natural surroundings.... there is the rub—... for us, now, that world no longer exists’ (p. 14 rearranged). Nor is it really true that such a world is no longer accessible to most of us; more leisured small-group ways can be retrieved, some natural surrounding can even now be restored. In a curious fashion, Shepard has managed to invert likely causal relations. While a certain interaction can no doubt be conceded, it is not so much human ill-health that is leading to environmental degradation, but rather environmental degradation, generally brought about for other reasons, that is increasingly leading to human ill-health, and in the longer term causing erosion of life-support systems. REFERENCES E.J. Aiton, Leibnitz A Biography, Adam Hilger, Bristol, 1985. R. Attfield, ‘Has the history of philosophy ruined the environment?’ Environmental Ethics 13(1991) 127-137. A. Bellett, ‘The evaluation of values compatible with ecological sustainability’, Fundamental Questions Papers, No.2 CRES, Australian National University, 1990. J. Callicott, ‘Genesis and John Muir’ Re Vision 12(3) (1990) 31-41. J. Cottingham, The Rationalists, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1988. C. Dale, V.G. Carter, Topsoil and Civilization, Rev ed. Norman; University of Oklahama Press, 1974. A Dobson, Green Reader, Routledge, London, 1991? A. Drengson, ‘Ecosophy’, Positive Vibrations, (1990?) 8-10. R. Eckersley, Environmentalism and Political Theory, UCL Press, London, 1992. A. Gare, Beyond European Civilization, Eco-logical Press, Bun gendore, 1993. C.J. Glacken, Traces on the Rhodian Shore, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1967. E.C. Hargrove, Foundations of Environmental Ethics, Prentice Hall, N.J., 1989. J. Hruschka, ‘The greatest happiness principle and other early German anticipations of utilitarian theory’, Utilitas 3(2)(1991) 165-177 M. Jacobs, The Green Economy, Pluto, London, 1991. Cf pp.12-14. Likewise there is a conservative underlay, more oppressive than that of deep ecology: insistence on ‘one particular mother’ (p.7) even suggestion of unsatisfactoriness in ‘taking mothers off to work’ (p.l5)! 31 A. McLaughlin, Regarding Nature'. Industrialism and Deep Ecology SUNY Press, Albany N.Y., 1993. F. Mathews, The Ecological Self, Bames and Noble, Maryland, 1991. J. Passmore, Man’s Responsibility for Nature, Duckworth, London, 1974 D. Pearce and others, Blueprintfor a Green Economy, Earthscan Publications, London, 1989. D. Pepper, The Roots of Modern Environmentalism, Ed: Tom Colveson London; Dover N.H. Croom Helm 1984. V. Plumwood, Feminism and the Master of Nature, Routledge, London, 1993. C. Ponting, A Green History of the World, Sinclair-Stevenson, London, 1991. V. and R. Routley, The Fight for the Forests, RSSS, Australian National University, 1973; referred to as FF. R. and V. Routley, ‘Social themes, self-management and environmental problems’, in Environmental Philosophy (eds. D. Mannison and others) RSSS, Australian National University, 1980. R. and V. Routley ‘Human chauvinism and environmental ethics’, in Environmental Philosophy (eds. D. Mannison and others), RSSS Australian National University, 1980; referred to as EE. R. Routley, ‘Roles and limits of paradigms in environmental thought and action’, Discussion papers in environmental philosophy #1, RSSS, Australian National University, 1982. P. Shephard, Nature and Madness, Sierra Club Books, San Francisco, 1982. R. Sylvan and D. Bennett, The Greening of Ethics, White Horse Press, Cambridge, 1994. R. Sylvan with D. Bennett, Of Utopias, Tao and Deep Ecology, Green Series #19, RSSS Australian National University, 1990; referred to as UTD. R. Sylvan, Culture and the Roots of Political Divergence, mimeographed, Canberra, 1986. R. Sylvan, Deep Pluralism, University of Edinburgh Press, 1994; referred to as DP. The Wildlands Project, World Earth, special issue, Canton NY, 1993. S. Toulmin, The Return to Cosmology, University of California, Berkeley, 1982. J. Wisdom, Philosophy and Psychoanalysis. Blackwell, Oxford, 1953. M. Zimmerman and others (eds.) Environmental Philosophy, Prentice Hall, N.J. 1993; referred to as EP3.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Box 15, item 951: Paradigmatic roots on environmental problems Subject The topic of the resource Uncorrected paper (typescript, photocopy). Description An account of the resource Title in collection finding aid: RS: Paradigmatic Roots of Environmental Problems uncorrected ts. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/browse?search=Richard+Sylvan&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bjoiner%5D=and&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=&amp;range=&amp;collection=&amp;type=&amp;user=&amp;tags=&amp;public=&amp;featured=&amp;exhibit=&amp;geolocation-mapped=&amp;geolocation-address=&amp;geolocation-latitude=&amp;geolocation-longitude=&amp;geolocation-radius=10&amp;submit_search=Search+for+items">Richard Sylvan</a> Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived <span class="MuiTypography-root-125 MuiTypography-body2-126">The University of Queensland's <a data-testid="rek-series" href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/records/search?page=1&amp;pageSize=20&amp;sortBy=score&amp;sortDirection=Desc&amp;searchQueryParams%5Brek_series%5D%5Bvalue%5D=Richard+Sylvan+Papers%2C+UQFL291&amp;searchMode=advanced">Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291</a></span><span>,</span> Box 15, item 951 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org">Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy</a> Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library. Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource [31] leaves. 27.82 MB. Type The nature or genre of the resource Manuscript Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context <a href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:04c2bd6" target="_blank" rel="noopener">https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:04c2bd6</a> Contributor An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, <a href="https://najtaylor.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Dr. N.A.J. Taylor</a>. https://www.antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/448d8517e9ca68f07df1452eec947883.pdf 5534af9a9b545e7a7587c7c0c0504e3a PDF Text Text ���������������������������������������������������������������������������������� Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Draft Papers Description An account of the resource Sylvan's literary executor encountered an archive in which “all his projects were current", since manuscripts were undated and unattributed. Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Draft of Nuclear Power—Some Ethical, Social and Political Dimensions Type The nature or genre of the resource Manuscript Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/browse?search=Richard+Routley&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bjoiner%5D=and&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=&amp;range=&amp;collection=&amp;type=&amp;user=&amp;tags=&amp;public=&amp;featured=&amp;exhibit=&amp;geolocation-mapped=&amp;geolocation-address=&amp;geolocation-latitude=&amp;geolocation-longitude=&amp;geolocation-radius=10&amp;submit_search=Search+for+items">Richard Routley</a> <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/browse?search=val+routley&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bjoiner%5D=and&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=&amp;range=&amp;collection=&amp;type=&amp;user=&amp;tags=&amp;public=&amp;featured=&amp;exhibit=&amp;geolocation-mapped=&amp;geolocation-address=&amp;geolocation-latitude=&amp;geolocation-longitude=&amp;geolocation-radius=10&amp;submit_search=Search+for+items">Val Routley</a> Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1984 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available <a href="https://manuscripts.library.uq.edu.au/index.php/uqfl291" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Richard Sylvan Papers, UQFL291</a> Contributor An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, <a href="https://najtaylor.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Dr. N.A.J. 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Title A name given to the resource Nuclear Power—Some Ethical, Social and Political Dimensions Type The nature or genre of the resource Manuscript Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/browse?search=Richard+Routley&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bjoiner%5D=and&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=&amp;range=&amp;collection=&amp;type=&amp;user=&amp;tags=&amp;public=&amp;featured=&amp;exhibit=&amp;geolocation-mapped=&amp;geolocation-address=&amp;geolocation-latitude=&amp;geolocation-longitude=&amp;geolocation-radius=10&amp;submit_search=Search+for+items">Richard Routley</a> <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/browse?search=val+routley&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bjoiner%5D=and&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=&amp;range=&amp;collection=&amp;type=&amp;user=&amp;tags=&amp;public=&amp;featured=&amp;exhibit=&amp;geolocation-mapped=&amp;geolocation-address=&amp;geolocation-latitude=&amp;geolocation-longitude=&amp;geolocation-radius=10&amp;submit_search=Search+for+items">Val Routley</a> Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1984 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available <a href="https://manuscripts.library.uq.edu.au/index.php/uqfl291" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Richard Sylvan Papers, UQFL291</a> Contributor An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, <a href="https://najtaylor.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Dr. N.A.J. Taylor</a>. Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library. Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource Manuscript