3 20 90 https://www.antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/4702be7f7ad689d9b8f0976dbfea321b.pdf 8ffeeac3fdaf406e7b76aa237ecb18fe PDF Text Text �DEEP ECOLOOY AHO OREEH POLITICS Deep Ecology ts an envtronMentaL theory or pLatforM wtth poLtttcaL stgntftcant wtth pLatforM LMpLtcattons. Green PoLtttcs ts a poLtttcaL envtronMentaL LMpLtcattons. Both arose tn Large part tn reactton to prevatLtng envtronMentaL practtces; but Deep Ecology concentrates rather on theorettcaL refLectton, Green PoLtttcs on practtcaL actton. Deep and tnvesttgatton questtontng of the underLytng doMtnant attttudes, seen as the Major source of ecoLogtcaL and other probLeMs, Led to arttcuLatton of the Deep Ecology pLatforM, partly outLtned tn "slogan" forM tn the foLLowtng table. TABLE 1. DEEP ECOLOGY CONTRASTED ~ITH OOMIHAHT ATTITUDES OOMrnAtn ATT HUDES (OOMrnAtH PARADIGM] DEEP ECOLOGY [RIVAL EttV IROHMEHTAL PARADIGM] Hature a Resource; Intrtnstc Value conftned to HuMans Natural EnvtronMent Valued for ltseLt; Btocentrtc E9aLttartantsM MatertaL EconoMtc Growth a predoMtnant goaL Hon-MatertaL Goals, espectaLLy ConsuMertsM Dotng wtth Enough/RecycLtng CoMpettttve LtfestyLe Cooperattve Ltfeway CentraLtzed/ Urban Centred/ DecentraLtzed/ Btoregtonat/ · Hetghbourhood focus tia t Lona L focus SeLf-ReaLtzatton Power structure HterarchtcaL Hon-hterarchtcaL/ Grassroots DeMocracy Htgh Technology Approprtate Technology ~htLe Deep Ecology grew froM the work of one envtronMentaL phtLosopher (Haess tn 1972), Green PoLtttcs arose (tn ~est GerMany stnce 1976) froM the synthests of several MoveMents - ecology, ctttzens, aLternattve, peace and other MoveMents. The platforM of Green PoLtttcs, whtch ts butlt around four ptllars soctaL responstbtltty, grassroots deMocracy, and non-vtoLence ecology, reflects these ortgtns. The ftrst of these ptLLars, ecology, ts based on the stMpLe theMe that LtMtted ecoLogtcaL systeMs cannot sustatn unltMtted econoMtc growth, or such questtonabLe types of growth as nuclear power, wtthout sertous rtsk of daMage and degeneratton. The Green atM ts to Move to systeMs of productlon and consuMptton whtch Matntatn and restore natural processes and cycles rather than doMtnate or destroy theM - a Move towards harMony wtth nature. The second ptllar of Green Poltttcs, soctal responstbtltty, tMpLtes opposttton to the tnequaltttes tn power and doMtnatton relattonshtps of present soctety, and reMovaL of dtscrtMtnatton, econoMtc hardshtp and explottatton, both regtonaLly and as regards the Thtrd ~orld. The Green atM - to be achteved prtMartly froM below, ts to butLd stable and just soctaL through those adversely affected arrangeMents, wtth coMprehenstve deMocrattc rtghts and freedoMs (both tn GerMany -1- �and where GerMan operatLons LMpLnge Ln the ThLrd ~orLd). These changes are to be brought about by grassroots deMocracy, the thLrd pLLLar, through Lncreased reaLLsatLon of dLrect decentraLLsed deMocracy. ThLs LnvoLves organLsatLon and coordLnatLon .of decentraLLsed basLc unLts (LocaL, coMMunLty and dLstrLct) whLch are 9Lven extensLve, but not coMpLete, autonoMy, as weLL as wLde use of referenda, deLegatLon practLces, and rotatLon of offLce-hoLders. The fourth and fLnaL pLLLar, non-vLoLence, LMpLLes the reMovaL of coercLve and aLso oppressLve practLces, not MereLy by More powerfuL peopLe, but especLaLLy by socLaL groups and states, and aLso, More posLtLveLy, actLve depoLyMent of varLous Methods of socLaL protest, resLstance and defence. The coMpatLbLLLty of Means wLth ends serves here as an LMportant underLyLng prLncLpLe: that a just, non-vLoLent, huMane• end-state cannot be satLsfactorLLy achLeved by unjust, vLoLent, LnhuMane Means. 1 Green PoLLtLcs offers then a broad prograM for socLaL change, whLch LncLudes the More specLfLc and ecoLogLcaLLy focussed Deep EcoLogy pLatforM as a quLte proper part. Put dLfferentLy, Green PoLLtLcs coMbLnes a wLder pLuraLLty of MoveMents of whLch Deep EcoLogy represents one LMportant strand. The Lnter-reLatLons are shown pLctorLaLLy at the second LeveL of the foLLowLng 12 dLagraM: DIAGRAM l. DOUBLE PYRAMID, SETTING DEEP ECOLOGY IN PLACE B p 1. Deep EcoLogy fundaMentaLs; e.g. BuddhLst (B), ChrLstLan (C) and (Eco)-Phi.LosophLc (P) uLtLMate bases C I 2 Exp Lana.t Lon DLrecti.on 2. Deep Ecology platforM 2C . ReforMi.st envLronMental posi.ti.on 2+. Vague fundaMentaLs of Green platforM Der Lvat Lon Di.recti.on j 3 . . General norMs and theMes, substantLaLLy derLved froM pLatforM ~- PartLcular norMs and concrete decLsLons, applyi.ng to relevant practLcaL sLtuatLons . The ecoLogLcaL coMponent of Green PolLtLcs May not 90 very deep; Lt May onLy be based upon reforM envLronMentaLLsM (or shaLLow ecoLogy as Lt used to be • Starred notes LndLcate poLnts at whLch readLngs wLth the correspondLng nuMbers May be Lnserted or undertaken. -2- �catted), whLch aLMs to reforM soMe of the worst abuses and excesses of the doMLnant posLtLon, such as gross pottutLon, extensLve despotLatLo n of land and takes and oceans, tLttte thought for the future, MLstreatMen t of anLMals, etc. On shallow ecology, nature Ls not valued for Ltsetf, but as a resource, that Ls LnstruMent atty, for what Lt can be used for by huMans. By contrast, Deep Ecology argues (e.g. froM preMLsses of level I) that the envLronMent Ls LntrLnsLcat ty valuable, that nature Ls valuable Ln and for Ltself; and that, LntrLnsLc value Ls equally dLstrLbuted . ThLs projectLon of furtherr,ore , egatLtarLan or Lr,partLatLt y prLncLptes, usually restrLcted to huMans, to the whole of tLfe Ln the natural world, gets dLgnLfLed by the tLtte, BLocentrLc EgalLtarLanL sM. The prLncLple, not part of Green PolLtLcs, Ls perhaps the Most controversL al of the central prLncLptes of Deep Ecology; but Lt or soMe substLtute for Lt Ls requLred, granted that the natural world contaLns value beyond that accruLng to huMans and theLr features, to explaLn how value Ls dLstrLbuted . Deep Ecology accounts for the dLstrLbutLo n through what Ls ' •3 . presented as a ' core der,ocracy Ln the b~osphere . Deep Ecology grew out of a phLtosophL cal dP~penLng of the new features of the scLence of ecology, whLch served to dLstance ecology froM the standard run of reductLonLs t scLences (through such features as holLsM; gestalt propertLes; systeMs whLch are More than the sur, of theLr ator,LstLc parts; eMergent eler,ents, tLke lLfe, organLsatLo n, etc.). Deep Ecology quLckly allLed Ltself wLth the subversLve features of unco-opted ecology, Ln partLcutar, the eMphasLs on the lLMLts, and ultLMate faLture of (atoMLstLc) reductLonLsM Ln scLence and phLlosophy. ~Lth such an orLgLn, Lt Ls not surpr~s~ng that there Ls lLttle dLrectty about such r,aLn pLllars of Green PotLtLcs as socLal responsLbLl Lty and non-vLotenc e Ln the platforM of Deep Ecology. However Deep Ecology Ls cor,patLble wLth these Green pLllar prLncLptes, and Lndeed perr,Lts theLr derLvatLon. ~hat Ls supposed to result are general norMs, lLke Ho exploLtatLo n, Ho subjectLon, Ho vLolence, at level 3. (Such a derLvatLon of a non-vLolenc e prLncLple froM the Deep Ecology prLncLple of r,axLMLzLng Self-realLs atLon Ls atter,pted by Haess Ln the frar,ework of hLs systeM of Eco-phLloso phy).•~ A MaLn focus of Deep Ecology Ls on changLng huMan relatLons wLth the natural envLronMen t, away froM doMLnant exploLtatLv e practLces. The natural envLronr,ent coMprLses Lter,s of LntrLnsLc value, LncludLng hur,ans (who are not above or separate fror, Lt), and accordLngty Ls to be treated wLth the care and respect valuable Lter,s warrant, and not LrresponsLb ly. Thus Lt would be contrary whLch to Deep Ecology to treat the envLronMent or Lts valued Lter,s vLolently such (consLder however Ls what Deep Ecology contends doMLnant practLces do wLdespread phenor,ena as "rape of the envLronMen t", ·of the land", •of the forests"). SLnce hur,ans are not apart fror, or superLor to nature, Lt follows froM the Deep Ecology platforr, that natural and proper relatLons also exclude vLolence towards other hur,ans or classes of huMans. Because Lt covers a pluralLty of posLtLons, LncludLng shallow ecologLcal posLtLons, Green PolLtLcs Ls Much More ar,elLoratLv e and reforMLst Ln character than Deep Ecology, whLch Ls further rer,oved froM dor,Lnant attLtudes, More hardLLne, and r,ore radLcat. ~hereas Deep Ecology goes to fundaMenta ts, and focusses on Ldeats and theory, Green PotLtLcs tends to concentrate on practLcal poLLtLcat probler,s of an envLronr,en tat or socLat kLnd, such as acLd raLn or rLver pottutLon or MLssLte deptoyMent, and (LLke the Peace Mover,ent Ln AustralLa) Ls not so Much concerned wLth refLnLng Lts rather vague prLncLples or workLng out an envLronMen tat (or peace) phLtosophy. Because of Lts envLronMen tal depth and natural world focus, Deep Ecology Ls concerned wLth a range of natural -3- �radLcaL the envLronMent Lssues, such as wLLderness, rare specLes, and transforMatLon of agrLcuLture, whLch are onLy of passLng Lnterest to a sMaLL MLnorLty Ln Green PoLLtLcs or are beyond Lts poLLtLcaL reach. Jn Lts reforMLst styLe Green PoLLtLcs does not venture far beyond prevLous Left-LeanLng poLLtLcaL MoveMents, except, fLrstLy, Ln Lts opposLtLon to envLronMent and aMenLty daMagLng LndustrLaLLsM and, secondLy, as regards non-vLoLence and Lts coMMLtMent to attaLnLng peace. Non-vLoLence Ls the Most controversLaL of the four pLLLars. For non-vLoLence ruLes out a range of poLLtLcaL actLon, LncLudLng typLcaL protests, confrontatLon and revoLutLons. Non-vLoLence aLso LMpLLes, what Ls very dLfferent froM current MLLLtary practLces, socLaL defence. WhLLe MaLn factLons Ln the Green MoveMent support non-vLoLent Methods and socLaL defence, other Lesser factLons hoLd that force Ls necessary to brLng about varLous necessary changes and for defence purposes. The Deep EcoLogy pLatforM LncLudes severaL prLncLpLes that wouLd be recognLsed by onLy a MLnorLty of the Green MoveMent. One of these prLncLpLes (whLch however, unLLke BLocentrLc EgaLLtarLanLsM, wouLd not be wLdeLy opposed by reforMLst Greens) Ls the core prLncLpLe of SeLf-reaLLsatLon, or More exactLy of MaxLML2Ln9 SeLf-reaLLsatLon. The notLon of seLf-reaLLsatLon of varLous reLLgLous posLtLons, of the fuLL unfoLdLng and deveLopMent of the person, Ls vastLy expanded Ln Deep EcoLogy to LncLude brLngLng to fuLL fruLtLon not MereLy one's own person, but aLL that one LdentLfLes wLth, that Ls the expanded SeLf, whLch Ls taken to be not MereLy one's faMLLy or feLLows or feLLow natLonaLs, nor MereLy ~as on huManLstLc ethLcs) the whoLe huMan race, but the whoLe naturaL 1 systeM. The SeLf-reaLLsatLon prLncLpLe, sprLngLng as Lt appears froM an enLLghtened personaL seLf-Lnterest prLncLpLe, has an exceLLent phLLosophLcaL pedLgree (at Least as appLLed to huMans or neLghbourLng cLasses of huMans). Thus rather than beLng argued for, a dLffLcuLt Matter Ln the case of uLtLMate prLncLpLes, SeLfreaLLsatLon Ls LMported froM syMpathetLc phLLosophLcaL or reLLgLous posLtLons at LeveL I of the doubLe pyraMLd, froM those that heLp sustaLn Deep EcoLogy. However the expansLon LnvoLved, the derLvatLon process froM narrow seLf to coMprehensLve SeLf, severs the usuaL justLfLcatory LLnks. It Ls hard to LdentLfy one's seLf-Lnterests wLth · those of a rock or an acorn. So the supposed LdentLfLcatLon - wLth soMe or aLL MountaLns, rLvers and raLnforests Ln the wLder reMaLns, LLke the assocLated extended EgaLLtarLan SeLf, Nature personLfLed prLncLpLe, decLdedLy probLeMatLc. Because Lt Ls assuMed that SeLf-reaLLsatLon Ls dLrected to ecoLogLcaL and spLrLtuaL ends, not at MaterLaL goods or Means, SeLf-reaLLsatLon Leads to the 16 AMong the raMLfLcatLons of the sLogan sLogan, "SLMpLe Ln Means, rLch Ln ends". one uses and where one LLves technoLogy of are those concernLng what kLnd (the Matter of dweLLLng Ln sLtuatLons of Lnherent vaLue and the LLke), what and how Much one consuMes, and so on. The doMLnant attLtudes, forMed around of econoMLc growth and econoMLc routes to happLness, have MaxLML2atLon eMphasLsed both MaterLaL goaLs and MaterLaL Means, partLcuLarLy personaL consuMerLsM. But Lf MaterLaL use and pure consuMptLon are to be reduced for envLronMentaL and other reasons, what LLfestyLes are approprLate? Deep EcoLogy, LLke Lts fundaMentaL sources, poLnts to experLentLaL and spLrLtuaL ends and eMphasL2es the rLchness of non-MaterLaL ends avaLLabLe. The resuLt, of course, Ls practLces whLch are sLMpLe, voluntary sLMpLLcLty, doLng wLth enough, and, More generaLLy, practLces whLch LLe LLght on the Land and the naturaL worLd. In a properLy ecoLogLcaL way of doLng thLngs, these wLLL be Lntegrated (Ln syMbLotLc and other naturaL styLes) wLth the naturaL systeMs LnvoLved, workLng wLth rather than agaLnst the naturaL fLow. The practLces, and organLsatLonaL approprLate to regLonaL wLLL accordLngLy be ecoregLonaL arrangeMents, -4- �ecologtcal grouptngs - or btoregtonal, as they have coNe to be called. • 7 Approprtate Means tnclude, tn turn, technLques approprLate to the practLce and theory .of Deep Ecology. HLgh technologLes such as nuclear power are not approprLate, even Ln advanced LndustrLal socLetLes, but LnapproprLate because of the envLronMental and socLal costs and rLsks such technologLcal forMs LMpose. On both deep and green perceptLons, what Ls requLred are relLable careful technologLes whLch are not ecologLcally daMagLng or socLally rLsky or otherwLse undesLrable; but the technologLes adMLtted wLll dLffer accordLng to the prLncLples of the posLtLons they answer back to (e.g . farMLng technLques wLlt need to be very dLfferent froM those prevaLtLng Ln rural GerMany to Meet such prLncLptes as bLospherLc egalLtarLanLsM). In each case the practLcat use of approprLate technology falls at the bottoM, actLon level, of the double . •a pyraN~d. WhLle Deep Ecology supplLes an appeatLng blueprLnt for dLfferent socLal and lLfe-ways, the questLon reMaLns: how Ls the proMLsed land reached? A MaLn part of the answer Ls taken to be gLven through a further crucLal feature of Deep Ecology: EcologLcal ConscLousness, a notLon agaLn expandLng upon conceptLons of other older LdeologLes (e.g. of relLgLous, or of revolutLonary, conscLousness). What Ls dLfferent Ls that spLrLtual or LdeologLcal conversLon Ls agaLn broadened froM the personal and socLat to coMprehend the full envLronMental predLcaMent. In thLs explanatLon, of how people get, and are got, to grasp Deep Ecology and Lts practLces, the pyraMLd Ls ascended, froM actLon to Ldeas, to deeper explanatory prLncLples. A thorough conversLon process Lnvolves elevatLon to the top livet, spLrLtuat transcendence of the daLly econoMLc and polLtLcat actLon level. 9 It Ls assuMed that, wLth enough converts and supporters, Deep Ecology wLlt be put Ln place, lLke Green PolLtLcs, by grassroots deMocratLc procedures. LLke the fundaMental sources upon whLch Lt draws, Deep Ecology prescrLbes practLces by whLch to achLeve such a conversLon and through whLch to arrLve at EcologLcal ConscLousness. SoMe of the MaLn practLces, such as MedLtatLon and conteMptatLon, are derLved froM the fundaMental sources. But other Methods whLch extend these, soMe of theM expandLng upon ecologLcat experLence, Lnclude value reorLentatLon and wLdened value perceptLon seeLng thLngs dLfferently, and coMLng to apprecLate the worth and well-beLng of other thLngs. Connected wLth these wLdened experLentLal bases, and LnforMLng theM, goes a holLstLc shLft Ln values and perceptLon, and an expanded LdentLfLcatLon, affordLng dLrect lLnkage wLth parts and wholes of the natural world. •IO By these Methods, a person May coMe to a deep and joyous apprecLatLon of the real world, a convert to Deep Ecology , a fellow and advocate of Lts Messages and lLfe-ways . ESSAY QUESTIOHS I. To what extent do Green PolLtLcs and Deep Ecology share the saMe values and address the saMe probleMs? CrLtLcally coMpare and contrast theLr proposa l s, especLally as regards the natural and the buLlt envLronMent. 2. Deep Ecology Ls soMetLMes assLgned four, levels. Try to descrLbe these, and to explaLn carefully the LnterrelatLons aMong these levels. Uhere does Green PolLtLcs fLt Lnto thLs probleMatLc scheMe? 3 . "BLocentrLc EgalLtarLanLsM - Ln prLncLple appears as a key theMe of Deep Ecology. CrLtLcally assess Lts adequacy. Shouldn't Green PolLtLcs Lnctude such a prLncLpte? 4. Is Non-vLolence an unstated prLncLple of Deep Ecology? ExplaLn why Deep Ecology Ls coMMLtted to non-vLolence to the degree Lt Ls? In your answers . take -5- \ �account of the foLLowLng dLffLcuLtLes: L. the contradLctLons between the use of vLoLence and the defence of the envLronMent; LL. the occurrence of vloLence Ln nature; ttt. the need for coerclve Methods to preserve the natural envtronMent. 5. Uhat justlfLes expandLng _seLf-reallsatLon to SeLf-reaLlsatlon? ExpLaLn the Meanlng and LMportance of SeLf-ReaLlsatLon for Deep Ecology and dLscuss Lts adequacy. Uhy does lt not feature ln Green PolLtlcs? 6. ExpLaLn the MeanLng of the deLLberateLy vague slogan ·slMple ln Means, rlch ln ends·, or of soMe other hlgh-lMpact slogan of Deep Ecology. Indlcate how the vagueness Mlght work for and agalnst the slogan, suggest how the slogan MLght be alternatLve LnterpretatLons, and lndlcate soMe of the suggest applled, alternattves. these of raMLflcatlons 7. OutLlne btoregtonaLL3M, lndlcatlng what practlcaL envlronMental probleMs bloreglonallsM lnduces. How Ln fact Ls bloreglonallsM derlved froM Deep Ecology? Conslder to what extent bloregLonallsM fLts wLth the slogan, •Thlnk globally, act LocaLly". deeper, or to any, envLronMental probLeMs? CoMpare and contrast the vlews of Deep Ecology and Green PolLtLcs on the role of varlous types of technology. 8~ Is More hLgh technology an unprobleMatLc soLutLon to 9. Uhat Ls EcoLogLcaL ConscLousness? And what Ls Lt supposed to do Ln and for Deep Ecology? If Lt ls so LMportant, why Ls Lt not a MaLn concern for Green PoLltlcs? 10. A reLatlonaL, total-fLeLd LMage of huMan reLatLonshLps wLth nature has been quletLy oMLtted froM the orLglnal pLatforM of Deep Ecology. Is thLs gestalt pLcture needed? Is Lt defensLbLe? Should Lt be reLnstated? READINGS 1: DEEP ECOLOGY AND GREEN POLITICS The Greens consLder theMseLves the poLltLcal voLce of the cLtLzens' MoveMents, that Ls, ecology, antl-nuclear-power, peace, feMLnLst, and others. Most MeMbers of the Green party are also actLvLsts Ln one or More of those MoveMents, and thLs dLverse orLentatLon Ls reflected Ln the wLngs, or factLons, of the party: the vLslonary/hollstlc Greens, the Eco-Greens, the peace-MoveMent Greens, and the radlcal-Left Greens. A great deaL of overlapplng occurs wlth any categor~z~ng of Green LdentltLes and soMe people say there are no actual factlons, but clearly there are dtfferent prtorltLes aMong the four clusters. The More that people perceLved the LnterconnectLons aMong prLncLpLes of ecologLcaL wlsdoM, a truly secure peace, an econoMy wLth a future, and a partLcLpatory deMocracy wLth power channeled dLrectly froM the grassroots Level, the More they notLces the absence of such LdeaLs aMong the exLsttng poLLtlcaL partles. [Green] pollcLes are gutded by long-terM v~s~ons for the future and are founded on four basLc prLncLples: ecology, socLal responsLbLLLty, grassroots deMocracy, and nonvLoLence. The fLrst of the ·four pLLlars, • ecology, has several MeanLngs Ln Green poLLtLcs. Green poLLtLcs, Ls Lnherently hoLLstLc Ln theory and practLce. It Ls based on ecoLogLcal, or ·network·, thLnkLng, a terM used frequently by the Greens. EcoLogLcaL thLnkLng also Lncludes the realLzatLon that the seeMLngLy -6- �rtgtd structures we percetve Ln our envLronMent are actually ManLfestatLons of underlytng processes, of nature's contLnual dynaMLc flux. Interrelatedness and ongoLng process are the lessons the Greens take froM and apply to the ecosysteMs surroundLng us. They support •soft" energy productLon (such as solar power) that works wLth the cycles of the sun, the water, and the wLnd, and the flow of the rLvers. They call for the developMent of approprLate technology that reflects our Lnterdependence wLth the Earth. They advocate regeneratLve agrLculture that replenLshes the soLl and Lncorporates natural Means of pest control. Above all, the Greens deMand a halt to our ravagLng of natural "resources" and our poLsonLng of the bLosphere through the duMpLng of toxLc wastes, the accuMulatLon of so-called acceptable levels of radLatLon exposure, and the pollutLon of the aLr. The broader applLcatLons of ecologLcal thLnkLng lead to ·socLal ecology, the perceptton of soctetal structures and huMan Lnteracttons as an Lntrtcate web of dynaMLc systeMs that are sLMultaneously Lnterrelated parts and coMplete Ln theMselves. That eMphasLs on relatLonshLps and Lnterconnecttons Ls the basts of the Greens' ecologtcal work that focuses specLfLcally on envLronMental protectLon. TheLr prograMs Ln thts area call for huMans to ftnd our place Ln the ecosysteMs: ~e defLne ecologLcal polLtLcs as those Measures that understand huMan betngs and our envLronMent as beLng part of nature. HuMan lLfe, too, Ls eMbedded Ln the lLfe cycles of the ecosysteMs; we Lnterfere wLth our actLons and thLs, Ln turn, acts back on us. ~e Must not destroy the stabLlLty of the ecosysteMs. In partLcular, ecologtcal polLtLcs presents an all-encoMpassLng rejectLon of an econoMy of exploLtatLon and plunderLng of natural resources and raw MaterLals, as well as the destructLve LnterventLon Lnto the cycles of nature's household. The second of the four pLllars, ·soctal responsLbLlLty, • Ls understood by Most Greens to Mean socLal justLce and assurance that the poor and the workLng class wLll not get hurt by prograMs to restructure the econoMy and our consuMer socLety ecologtcally. The radLcal-left Greens, however, read sozLal as a codeword for socLalLsM, that Ls, deMocratLc MarxLsM~ SLnce that polLtLcal Model Ls specLfLcally not what the vLsLonary, lLberal and conservatLve Greens have Ln MLnd, a battle developed over establLshLng the basLc prLncLples. The MajorLty wanted the new party to stand for possLbLlLtLes other than etther socLalLsM or the capLtalLst status quo. The radLcal-left contLngent, on the other hand, LnsLsted on not only Lncludtng socLalLsM but also on excludLng nonvLolence as a guLdLng prLncLple. So one of the four pLllars, lLke so Much else Ln the Green party, has a paradoxLcal character: Lt Means soMethLng dLfferent Ln dLfferent parts of the party. All factLons of the party concur that socLal, econoMLc and ecologLcal Lssues are Lnherently lLnked. The ecologLcal and socLal spheres belong Lnseparably together: the econoMy of nature Ls ltnked to the econoMy of huMans for better or worse . The thLrd pLllar, grassroots deMocracy, was LnspLred by the ~est GerMan cLtLzens' MoveMents throughout the 1970s, whLch Ln turn were Lnfluenced by the cLvLl rLghts, ecology, consuMer, and other MoveMents ~n the Un~ted States. OLrect, or partLcLpatory, deMocracy locates a greater aMount of power and control wLth the local groups, the grassroots. ThLs orLentatLon ~nforMs the structure of the Green party. An organLzatLon structured wtth partLcLpatory deMocracy sets Lts basLc polLcy accordLng to the votLng at large asseMblLes. It allows LndLvLduals access to all party offLcLals, and Lt eschews hLerarchLcal structure. Instead of allowtng power to be concentrated Ln a few people who -7- �reMaLn at the top of a hLerarchy for years, such groups generally elect steerLng coMMLttees. The fourth pLllar, nonvLolence, Means to the Greens the cessatLon of both personal vLolence and •structural vLolence, • that Ls, vLolence and oppress Lon LMposed by the state and by LnstLtutLons. (See ReadLng 4; Green PolLtLcs, pp.3-4, 29-43) The tenets of [the Deep Ecology] MoveMent Nay perhaps be roughly forNulated as follows: (1) The well-beLng of nonhuMan lLfe on Earth has value Ln Ltself. ThLs value Ls Lndependent of any LnstruNental usefulness for LLMLted huNan purposes. (2) RLchness and dLversLty Ln lLfe forMs contrLbute to thLs value and Lnterfere Ls a further value Ln Ltself. (3) HuMans have no rLght to destructLvely wLth nonhuMan lLfe except for purposes of satLsfyLng vLtal needs. (4) Present Lnterference Ls excessLve and detrLMental. (5) Present polLcLes Must therefore be changed. (6) The necessary polLcy changes affect basLc econoMLc and LdeologLcal structures and wLll be the More drastLc the longer Lt takes before sLgnLfLcant change Ls started. (7) The LdeologLcal change Ls MaLnly that of apprecLatLng lLfe qualLty (focusLng on sLtuatLons LnvolvLng Lnherent. value). (8) Those who subscrLbe to the foregoLng poLnts have an oblLgatLon dLrectly or LndLrectly to try to LMpleMent the necessary changes. (Defence, p.266) It should be fully apprecLated that the sLgnLfLcant tenets of the Deep Ecology MoveMent are clearly and forcefully norMatLve. They express a value prLorLty systeM only Ln part based on results (or lack of results) of scLentLfLc research. Today, ecologLsts try to Lnfluence polLcy-MakLng bodLes largely resource and through threats, through predLctLons concernLng pollutants depletLon, knowLng that polLcy-Makers accept at least certaLn MLnLMUM norMs concernLng health and just dLstrLbutLon. There are polLtLcal potentLals Ln thLs MoveNent whLch should not be overlooked and whLch have lLttle to do wLth pollutLon and resource depletLon. In plottLng possLble futures, the norMs should be freely used and elaborated. (Shallow and Oeep 1 p.99) A Major dLfference between the theorLes lLes Ln the dLstrLbutLon of values. Deep ecology, lLke sLMpler utLlLtarLanLsM, offers a unLque LnLtLal dLstrLbutLon: each lLvLng thLng Ls assLgned equal value and nothLng else has LntrLnsLc value. Value Ls assessed through soMe MLx of value-NakLng characterLstLcs, LncludLng such defeasLble ecologLcal unLversals as stabLlLty, resLlLence, naturalness, rLchness, scarcLty and so forth . But there are consLderable dLversLty, constraLnts on how thLs Ls done . . . . One constraLnt, that of LMpartLalLty whLch excludes certaLn types of class chauvLnLsM, a thLng cannot be ranked as valuable or ahead or another sLMply by vLrtue of belongLng to soNe specLes (e.g. beLng huNan) or favoured bLologLcal class; such class features are not Ln theMselves value-MakLng characterLstLcs. Such an account of how value Ls assessed reNaLn however far froM specLfLc, and soMetLMes of lLttle use Ln practLce. (CrLtLque, pp.59- 60) POINTS OF UNITY 1. NATURAL PHILOSOPHY. Ue base our phLlosophy on a proper understandLng of the purposes and workLngs of nature and do not try to LNpose an Ldeology upon Lt . Ue seek to transforM socLety based upon thLs understandLng. 2. CONSENSUS DEMOCRACY. Ue conduct all our MeetLngs accordLng to the prLncLples of consensus deNocracy, eNphasLzLng unanLMous or near-unanLMous agreeMent on all decLsLons. No representatLve May Make decLsLons on behalf of the Greens wLthout the approval of the entLre NeMbershLp. Ue encourage the use of consensus deMocracy Ln all socLal, econoMLc and polLtLcal LnstLtutLons. -8- �3. NONVIOLENCE AND FREEDOM. ~e oppose the threat or use of phystcal vtolence to resolve tnternatlonat, clvll, polltlcal and personal confllcts. ~e encourage the nonvlolent enforceMent of all prlvate and publlc rules and Laws. ~e recognlEe that a nonvlolent soclety would be a very free soclety and encourage tolerance of others' vlews and actlons. ~- SOCIAL ECOLOGY. ~e eMphaslze the connectton of doMlnatlon and vlolence toward the envlronMent and toward our fellow huMans. ~e seek a nonvlolent soclety ln whlch the needs of lndlvlduals, coMMunltles and bloreglons are balanced and lntegrated and ln whlch econoMtc resources are used consclousty, deMocratlcaLLy and approprlatety to further thls end. 5. STRATEGY. ~e wlLL oppose ecologlcatty and soclatty destructlve pollcles and dlsobedlence clvll and protest practlces through nonvlolent polltlcal actlvltles. ~e wlLL proMote alternatlve projects and lnstltutlons conslstent wlth our Green phllosophy. ~e wlLL cooperate ln solldarlty wlth all groups ln substantlal agreeMent wlth these polnts of unlty as partlclpants ln the lnternatlonal Green MoveMent. (Deep Ecology, pp.36-7). 2: DEEP ECOLOGY LEVELS In dlscusslng the relatlonshlp between deep ecology and Major tradltlons such as BuddhlsM and Chrlstlanlty, Naess stresses that people can agree broadly on a set of prlnctptes and dlsagree greatly on other aspects of ldeology and other tradttlons thusly: In order to factlttate dlscusslon lt May be helpful to dlsttngutsh a coMMon platforM (baste prlnclples) of deep ecology froM the fundaMentaL features of phllosophles and rellglons froM whlch that platforM (baste prlnctples) ls derlved, lf the platforM ls forMulated as a set of norMs and hypotheses lf . verballEed, are Buddhlst, (factual assuMptlons). The fundaMentals, or phllosophlc wlth persuaslons, rettgtous other Taolst, Chrtsttan or of afftnltles to the baste vlews of Splnoza, Uhltehead, Hetdegger, or others. The fundaMentals are Mutually More or Less lncoMpattble or at Least dtfflcult to coMpare l~ terMs of cognltlve contents. The tncoMpattblltty does not affect the deep ecology prlnclples adversely. The baste prlnclples wlthln the deep ecology MoveMent are grounded ln retlglon or phllosophy. In a Loose sense, tt May be sald to be dertved froM the fundaMentals. Because these are dtfferent, the sltuatlon only reMlnds us that very slMllar or even tdenttcal conclustons May be drawn froM dlvergent preMlses. The prlnclples (or platforM) are the . saMe, the fundaMentaL preMlses dtffer. In order to clartfy the dtscusston one Must avold Looktng for one deftntte phllosophy or rellgton aMong the supporters of the deep ecologlcal MoveMent. Fortunately there ls a rlch Manlfold of klnds of consequences dertved froM the prlnclples. The dtscusston has four Levels to take lnto account: verballzed fundaMentaL phllosophlcal and rellglous ldeas and lntultlons, the deep ecology baste prlnclples, the More or Less general consequences dertved froM the platforM Llfestytes and general pollcles of every klnd - and Lastly, descrlpttons of concrete sltuatlons and declstons Made ln theM. (See DlagraM 1) Arne Naess has atteMpted to provlde a Loglcal dlagraM or systeMatlzatlon of hls own verslon of deep ecology or ecosophy whtch he calls •Ecosophy r·. He -9- �caLLs thts a norMattve systeM whtch tncLudes both norMs (or baste values) and factual hypotheses_ The Lower norMs or actton stateMents are dertved froM the top norMs tn a Loosely LogtcaL sense_ The top or Most baste norMs are arrtved at by the deep questtontng Lntutttve process_ Naess stresses that Ecosophy T Ls onLy hts verston of deep ecology, and that Many versLons need to be worked out_ SoMe people NLght be crLtLcaL that Many of the norMs of deep ecology are heLd on an tntutttve basts, but Naess potnts out aLL theortes begtn soMewhere beyond LogtcaL constructtons_ (DEEP ECOLOGY, pp-225-7) In order to factLttate dtscusston about deep ecology aMong phtLosophers tt May be heLpfuL to dtsttngutsh a coMMon pLatforM of deep ecology froM the fundaMentaL features of phtLosophtes and reLtgtons froM whtch that pLatforM Ls derLved, tf tt ts forMuLated as a set of norMs and hypotheses (factual assuMpttons)_ The terM 'pLatforM' ts preferred to 'prtncLpLe' because the Latter May be NLsunderstood to refer to the uLtLMate fundaMentaLs_ FurtherMore, the forMuLatton of a pLatforM should be short and conctse (as a synopsts), whereas the fundaMentaLs, tf verbaLtzed, are Buddhtst, Taotst, ChrLstLan or of other reLtgtous ktnds, or they are phtLosophLc wtth afftntttes to the baste vtews of SpLnoza, ~hLtehead, HeLdegger, or others_ The fundaMentaLs are MutuaLLy More or Less LncoMpatLbLe or at Least dtffLcuLt to coMpare tn terMs of cognLttve contents_ Supporters of deep ecology May have great dLfftcuLttes understandtng each other's uLtLMate vLews_ The pLatforM of the deep ecology MoveMent Ls grounded tn reLtgLon or phLLosophy tncLudtng ethLcs_ It May be saLd to be derLved froM these fundaMentaLs_ As used here the terM 'dertved' ts open to a vartety of LnterpretatLons_ If the vaLLdLty of a norM or a hypothesLs Ls justLfLed by reference to one defLnLte set of assuMptLons of a phtLosophtcaL or reLLgtous ktnd, the norM or hypothests ts Ln a sense dertved froM those assuMpttons_ The set acquLres a character of preMLses for parttcuLar concLusLons_ But cLoseLy · sLMLLar or even tdenttcaL concLustons May be drawn froM sets of LncoMpatLbLe preMLses_ ThLs expLaLns the coMbLnatLon of 'bewLLderLng' dLverstty of vLews at the deepest LeveL wtth agreeMent of vtews at the next LeveL_ In assesstng constructLve crttLctsM of deep ecology Lt Ls useful to try to ftnd out whLch LeveL Ls LnvoLved_ An exaMpLe: In the tntroductLon to hLs The EthLcs of EnvtronMentaL Concern, (Oxford: BLackweLL 1983), Robtn AttfLeLd says: Yet I do not accept, wLth the so-caLLed 'deep, Long-range ecology MoveMent', the vtew that our prLncLpaL Loyalty should be focussed not on feLLow-huMans or feLLow creatures but on the bLosphere as an organtc whole, __ _ I suppose there are soMe supporters of the deep ecology MOVeMent who propose focusstng Loyalty on the bLosphere as an organLc whole Ln the sense suggested by AttfteLd_ The conceptLon of the bLosphere as an organLc whole and of such a kLnd of Loyalty belongs to the reaLM of fundaMentaLs, that Ls LeveL one, rather than to the other Levels_ Therefore that AttfLeLd does not accept the vtew he descrtbes ts not relevant tn arguMentatton for or agatnst deep ecology- One Matn potnt tn deep ecology ts tts deep arguMentatton, that ts, arguMentatton froM uLttMate (phLLosophLcaL, reLtgtous) preMtsses, but there Ls rooM for very dLfferent sets of such preMLsses_ A supporter of deep ecology May or May not have any conceptton of a prLMary Loyalty focussed on the bLosphere as an organtc whole_ [The] dtsttnctLon of Levels Ls useful when tryLng to ptn down exactly what a crttLcLsM Ls focusstng on_ The dLagraM furnLshes onLy a ktnd of stattc ModeL_ -10- �A supporter of deep ecology wLLL norMaLLy ModLfy the sentences at the dLfferent Levels froM tLMe to tLMe. Hew LnforMatLon May change any hypotheses and therefore also change norMs whLch Ln part have been justLfLed on the basLs of the hypotheses beLng changed. Renewed ethLcaL consLderatLon or new LnforMatLon May Make the supporter change a norM. If a norM Ls changed norMally new sets of hypotheses are Lnvolved, and old ones are dLscarded. ThLs agaLn wLLl cause reverberatLons Ln a sMaLLer or greater part of the fLeld. F roM a po Ln t of v Lew of no rMa t Lve sys teMa t t·~a t Lons what goes on when changes are Made at one or More Levels Ls rather coMpLLcated. But part of Lt Ls processes of derLvatLon. OLagraM l pretends only to Lllustrate LMportant dLfferences of the Levels of derLvatLon and the specLfLc character of Level 2. It represents a condensed forMulatLon of the deepest-Level norMs and hypotheses whLch supporters of the deep ecology MoveMent can agree upon. ThLs Level Ls LLLustrated as the penultLMate (next to ultLMate) Level of arguMentatLon characterLstLc of those supporters of deep ecology who try to artLculate theLr baste vLews. At the thLrd and fourth Level dLsagreeMents May arLse. At the fLrst Level supporters May dLsagree, or fLnd each others vLews' LncoMprehensLb le, or LncoMparable as to valLdLty. Ls not a Measure of value prLorLtLes or of A 'dLrectLon of derLvatLon ethLcaL prLorLtLes. And Lt does not LMply that what Ls derLved Ls a Means Ln relatLon to what Lt Ls derLved froM. A sLMple exaMple Ls enough to clarLfy thLs. FroM 'do not kLlL huMans! ·, follows, Lf you concede 'all Mothers are huMans' the conclusLon 'do not kLLL your Mother!'. ThLs rather concrete norM Ls here derLved froM the More general and abstract one. But thLs does not LMply that huMans Ln general have a hLgher value or a kLnd of prLorLty Ln relatLon to Mothers. It does not say that Ln a norM confLLct you should be More careful not to kLLL huMans than not to kLLL your Mother. An absurd posLtLon! And Lastly, Lt Ls rather strange to refraLn froM kLllLng your Mother as a Means to a goal, · naMely not to kLLL huMans. The forMulatLons of Level 2 have the character of proposals. It May turn out that proposals wLLL dLffer substantLaLLy or show a natural dLversLty of terMLnologLcal and conceptual LdLosyncracLes . UnhappLLy Lt Ls quLte coMMon to MLx the, Ln a broad sense, LogLcal relatLon of derLvatLon wLth other relatLons. These are at Least as LMportant, but nevertheless are dLfferent. (BASIC, pp.1-5) ScheMatLcally we May represent the total vLews LMpLLed Ln the MoveMent by and norMs streaMs of derLvatLon f roM 'h Lghest', L.e. Most fundaMentaL sLtuatLons. lLfe partLcular Ln descrLptLve assuMptLon, to partLcular decLsLons Answers to the deepest questLon, L.e. hLghest norMatLve prLncLples and basLc assuMptLons about the world MLddle range answers. Lower derLvatLonaL Level derLvatLons towards decLsLons Ln partLcular LLfe sLtuatLons. Level of actLon Ln concrete partLcular sLtuatLons. The LLLustratLon reseMbles those of hypothetLco-ded uctLve systeMs. One MaLn dLfference Ls that soMe sentences at the top Level are norMatLve, expressed by LMperatLves. ThLs Makes Lt possLble to furnLsh preferably LMperatLves at the Lowest derLvatLonaL Level, sentences such as ·Turn to the Left!" ·voteforN.N. !. Just as Ln hypothetLco-ded uctLve systeM, Let us say Ln physLcs, only the two upper Levels of the pyraMLd Ls thought of as part of physLcs as a systeM, only those parts are Ln norMatLve systeMs characterLstLc of the total systeM. -11- �The sentences change. Ln the Lowest part change froM day to day as LLfe sLtuatLons The above kLnd of presentLng the derLvatLonaL structure of a totaL vLew Must not be taken too serLousLy. SoMe wLLL absoLuteLy refuse even to consLder such a way of exposLtLon. And Lt does not Ln any Manner characterLze thLnkLng wLthLn the deep ecoLogLcaL MoveMents. SoMe of us wLth a professLonaL background of scLence and anaLytLcaL phLLosophy fLnd Lt heLpfuL, however. Arne Naess's systeMatLEatLon LLLustrates the reLatLonshLp of deep ecoLogy's basLc prLncLpLes or Lts "platforM" (LeveL 2), to varLous · possLbLe and relLgLous "fundaMentaL preMLsses on the one hand (LeveL 1) and varLous possLbLe theoretLcaL and practLcaL "consequences" on the other (LeveLs 3 and~). Althou~h thLs systeMatLzatLon Ls presented Ln terMs of "fundaMentaL preMLsses, consequences", and a dLrectLon of "derLvatLon• froM LeveLs (1) to(~), thLs should not be taken to Mean that a sentence at one Level Ls held to follow by vLrtue of necessLty or probabLLLty froN sentences at a prevLous Level L.e~, Naess Ls not proposLng a deductLve or an LnductLve systeM. As he coMMents hLMself, Lt Ls only Ln a "Loose sense• that the deep ecology pLatforM "May be saLd to be derLved froM fundaMentaLs·. In other words, derLvatLon or precLseness Ls a Matter of deLLMLtLng a range of possLble LnterpretatLons. For exaNpLe, we MLght proceed froN a fundaMentaL (L.e. Level 1) reLLgLous or phLLosophLcal preMLss such as "ALL Ls One" or the SpLnozLst Ldea that "there Ls onLy one 'substance• • and, Ln the sense descrLbed, "derLve" the (More precLse) central "plank" Ln the deep ecology "pLatforM" that "there are no boundarLes Ln the bLospherLcaL fLeld", or that "aLl entLtLes are constLtuted by theLr relatLonshLps" (LeveL 2). Further precLsatLon MLght express the realLsatLon that "the sense of oneself as a skLn encapsulated ego Ls not Ln accord wLth thLs ' seaMLess web' ontoLogy• (Level 3). None of the steps Ln the above exaMpLe Ls held to foLLow by necessLty (deductLve Lnference) or probabLLLty (LnductLve Lnference) froM sentences at a prevLous LeveL. ALL we have (Ln logLcaL terMs) Ls a chaLn of precLsatLons fLowLng Ln one or Many possLble dLrectLons of LnterpretatLon. Ue could have easLLy started froM the saMe vague, general fundaMentaL preMLss and proceeded to deveLop a chaLn of precLsatLons Ln a very dLfferent dLrectLon of LnterpretatLon. Thus, the "dLrectLon of derLvatLon· shown Ln the dLagraMMatLc LLlustratLon of Naess's systeMatLsatLon shouLd be understood as referrLng to both the leveL of precLsatLon and the dLrectLon of LnterpretatLon. The greater the Level of precLsatLon the More evLdent the dLrectLon of LnterpretatLon (or what Naess has prevLousLy referred to as the "defLnLteness of LntentLon")_ Uhat Ls the vaLue of tryLng to provLde a systeMatLsatLon of deep ecology (or any other faLrLy coMprehensLve vLew) when the connectLve LLnks between fundaMentaL preMLsses (LeveL I) and practLcaL consequences (Level~) are as weak as that of "possLbLe LnterpretatLon"? An LMportant answer Must be that such a systeNatLsatLon eMphasLses the contLnuaLLy-beLng-forgotten fact that our Most sophLstLcated and precLse, non-trLvLaL (L ~e. nontautoLogLcaL) reasonLngs are aLways eMbedded or grounded Ln a very generaL "underLyLng perceptLon of the way thLngs are." ThLs eMphasLs, thLs contLnual reMLndLng, constLtutes the Most sLgnLfLcant and dLstLnctLve structural feature of deep ecologLcaL thought. (GUIDING STARS, pp.203-4) OnLy LeveL one contaLns phLLosophLes (LncLudLng MetaphysLcs, of course) and expLLcLt reLLgLous foundations. There Ls, and hopefuLLy wLLL never be, Many sLgnLfLcant COMMon characterLstLcs on Level 1. The cLeanLng of 'rubbLsh' on thLs Level Ls a hazardous undertakLng froN MY poLnt of vLew. -12- �In a coMprehensLve phLLosophy of Level l, for lnstance ln an 'ecosophy' ln MY terMlnoLogy, every key terM of the pLatforM forMuLatlon, (Level 2), would have to be .coM"ented upon and elucLdated. ThLs "ay be seen as a clearLng up operatlon. A hlgher level of preclseness Ls achLeved and eLLMLnatlon of ph~Losoph~caLLy unsuLtable rhetorLcs. (HOTES ON SYLVAN, pp.8-9) 3: ON BIOCENTRIC EGALITARIANISM The Lntultlon of blocentrlc equaLlty ls that aLL thlngs Ln the blosphere have an equal rlght to Llve and bLossoM and to reach thelr own LndLvlduaL forMs of unfoLdLng and self-reaLlzatlon wlthln the Larger SeLf-reallzatlon. Thls basLc Lntultlon Ls that aLL organLsMs and entltles Ln the ecosphere, as parts of the lnterreLated whole, are equal Ln LntrlnsLc worth. Naess suggests that bLocentrlc equaLLty as an LntuLtlon Ls true ln prLncLpLe, although ln the process of LLvLng, aLL specLes use each other as food, shelter, etc. Mutual predatlon ls a b~ologLcal fact of lLfe, and "any of the world's relLgLons have struggled wLth the spLrltuaL lMpllcatlons of thts. SoMe anlMaL llberatlonLsts who atteMpted to sLde-step thLs probLeM by advocatlng vegetarLanlsM are forced to say that the entLre plant ktngdo" LncLudLng raLn forests have no rLght to thelr own exlstence. ThLs evaslon fLles ln the face of the basLc LntuLtlon of equalLty. Aldo Leopold expressed thLs Lntultlon when sald huMans are •pLaLn cLtlzens• of the btotlc coMMunlty, not Lord and Master over all other specLes. BlocentrLc equaLlty ls lntlMateLy related to the aLL-LnclusLve SeLfreaLlzatLon ln the sense that Lf we harM the rest of Nature then we are harMLng ourselves. There are no boundarles and everythlng ls lnterreLated. But Lnsofar as we percelve thlngs as LndLvLduaL organlsMs or entLtLes, the LnsLght draws us to respect aLL huMan and nonhuMan lndLvLduals ln theLr own rLght as parts of the whole wLthout feeLLng the need to set up hlerarchLes of specles wlth huMans at the top. The practlcaL LMpLlcatlons of thLs lntultlon or norM suggest that we should LLve wlthLn MlnLMuM rather than MaxlMUM lMpact on other specLes and on the Earth ln general. Thus we see another aspect of our guldlng prLnclpLe: ·slMpLe ln Means, rLch ln ends.• (Deep EcoLog~, pp.167-9) blospherLcaL egaLltarlanlsM Ln prlnclpLe' and certaln The abstract terM slMlLar terMs whlch I have used, do perhaps More harM than good. They suggest a posLtLve doctrLne, and that ls too Much. The LMportance of the LntultLon ls but MOMentary, only perhaps the rather lts capaclty to counteract, Less seeMs what towards attltude Lordly and consequentlaL, self-congratulatory developed, Less coMplex, Less MlracuLous. A rlch varLety of acceptable Motlves can be forMuLated for belng More reluctant to Lnjure of klLL a LLvLng beLng of klnd A than a beLng of klnd B. The cultural settlng ls dLfferent for each belng Ln each culture, furtherMore there are few general norMs, only vague guLdeLLnes. One factor: felt nearness, deterMlnes Largely our capactty to ldentLfy ourselves wlth a sort of beLng, to suffer when they suffer. One cannot put forth ethLcaL rules of conduct wlthout takLng such feeltngs and our lLMlted capacLtLes serLously. If Lt Ls dLffLcuLt to avotd klLLLng A because of Lts sMalLness, whereas klLLlng B ls easlLy avolded, we tend to protect B rather than A. Indeed we Llve wLth an obvLous dLversLty of obLlgatlons. Ue have speclaL oblLgatlons towards our own chLldren: Ln Most cultures any anlMaL May be kLLLed ln order to feed one's starvLng chlLd. ObLlgatLons toward specLes that have been MeMbers of our llfe coMMunLty for Long perLods are greater than toward accldentaL vlsltors. FurtherMore, we have the -13- �relevance of sufferLng: capacLty of sufferLng? Is the sufferLng of A less than that of B? Has A the The sLMpLe thLng I try to convey here L3 that an ethLcs concernLng dLfferences between non-huMan LLvLng beLngs Ls of a coMparable level of coMpLexLty to ethLcs concernLng dLfferent people and groups wLth whoM we have to do. (lntuLtLon, p.202) Those of us who procLaLM the rLght of all LLfe forMs to LLve and bLossoM thLnk of thLs rLght as an aspect of the 'value Ln LtseLf' whLch we attrLbute to the bLosphere wLth Lts closely Lnterconnected LLfe forMs. The procLaMatLon seeMs to steM froM an LntuLtLon for whLch a graduatLon Ls soMethLng foreLgn. If there Ls such a basLc rLght, Lf Lt can be gLven a faLrly precLse MeanLng, Lt Ls the naMe for all lLfe forMs. It Ls LMportant enough to be terMed bLospherLcaL egaLLtarLanLsM. But Lt Ls perhaps the best to abstaLn froM such Labels. They LnvLte a varLety of LnterpretatLons Most of whLch May be MLsLeadLng. As to the consequences of a posLtLve answer, I thLnk we can learn froM certaLn cultures of hunters and gatherers where bLg anLMaLs are only kLLled after elaborate cereMonLes and excuses'. There Ls acknowLedgeMent of equal rLght, but also of a rLght to kLlL Ln order to Meet vLtaL needs. There Ls a 'norM conflLct' whLch Ls solved through addLtLonal norMs: the perforMance of certaLn rLtes and behavLors of other kLnds. What I thLnk we need not proclaLM Ls that we as huMans are Most or More valuable, or have a hLgher rLght. ~e need not say '1 have a hLgher rLght to LLve and bLossoM than you have, obnoxLus MosquLto, so I kLLL you!' or 'BeLng Much More valuable than you are, I kLlL you and your offsprLng, dLrty rat!' In so far as we have vLtal needs to kLlL, and Ln so far as Lt Ls LnevLtabLe Ln practLce, we May justLfy thLs through varLous norMs whLch are Ln harMony wLth general ecoLogLcal thLnkLng. Do these words solve the relevant probLeMs? Of course not. ~hat I aM drLvLng at Ls the prLorLty of MaLntaLnLng a sort of egalLtarLanLsM Ln p~LncLple. How we can LLve thLs that prLncLpLe Ls a questLon of ethLcs Ln a very general sense, proceedLng froM Many prLncLples whLch LnevLtably Lead to norM confLLcts requLrLng adjustMents froM day to day. (PhLLosophLcaL Aspects, pp.27-9) AccordLng to Naess, a bLospherLc egaLLtarLan prLncLpLe, of equal value of to the all LLfe, Ls an LntuLtLveLy clear and obvLous value axLoM', at least aLMost ecoLogLcaL fLeLd-worker' (73, p96)!. But eMpLrLcaL surveys would certaLnLy not sustaLn Haess's claLMs. The prLncLpLe seeMs generally neLther LntuLtLve nor obvLous, and Ln several ways Lt appears LncoMpatLbLe wLth the wLder deep ecology pLatforM. It Ls not even obvLous that soMethLng has value by vLrtue of havLng LLfe. On the contrary, value seeMs, lLke yellowness, to be Much More patchLLy dLstrLbuted across the unLverse. SpecLal places, for Lnstance, are especLaLLy valuable. Hor Ls value always dLstrLbuted on LLvLng thLngs, but colours toMbs of the dead; and soMetLMes Lt flakes off consteLlatLons of LLvLng thLngs, for exaMpLe thLngs Ln excess, such as Locusts or rats Ln a plague. But even Lf every LLvLng thLng were assLgned value, Lt would not follow (Ln the way soMetLMes LnvaLLdLy argued) that every thLng has Lt equally. ~hLLe Lt could be saLd that thLngs are equal Ln havLng Lt, thLs Ls rather LLke pretendLng that people are equal Ln an LnegaLLtarLan socLety where all have soMe Money - a subterfuge. Indeed proposed prLncLpLes of deep ecology LnforM us, correctly, that soMe ecoLogLcaL LteMS are More valuable than others. For Lnstance, a certaLn sort of coMpLexLty Ls a vLrtue (Naess 73, prLncLpLe (6)), so presuMabLy an LteM wLth that coMpLexLty Ls More valuable than a sLMple bLoLogLcal LteM. SLMLLarLy, dLversLty of systeM Ls a vLrtue, a prLMe ground of value (prLncLpLe (2)). The upshot appears to be that a hLghly dLverse ecosysteM Ls More valuable -14- �than a sLMpLLfLed and LMpoverLshed one_ FurtherMore, bLospherLc egaLLtarLanLsM Ls LnconsLstent wLth the hoLLstLc, antL-reducLLonL3tLc, antL-LndLvLduaLL3tLc ethos whLch deep ecoLogy LMports froM hoLLstLc ecotogy. AnaLogous concLu3Lons can be reached for •equaL rLghts• forMuLatLons_ For one thLng, equaL rLghts are characterLstLcally based on equal MerLt or equal worth_ For another, arguMents lLke those gLven can be rerun wLth rLghts suppLantLng values_ As a theoretLcaL prLncLpLe, bLospherLc egalLtarLanLsM has to be scrapped_ The LMMense dLffLcuLtLes of such a prLncLpLe Ln practLce Naess had already partLally recognLsed, qualLfyLng egalLtarLanLsM to equalLty Ln prLncLple 'because any realLstLc praxLs necessLtates soMe kLllLng, exploLtatLon, and suppressLon' (p_95). The extent of erosLon Ln equalLty thLs affords reMaLns obscure; but Lt couLd be close to total, wLth theoretLcaL equaLLty LapsLng whenever confLLct of rLghts or values LooMed_ Such egaLLtarLanLsM would be LLke a MaxLM of honesty Ln prLncLpLe, whLch appLLed Ln practLce only when Lt was not LnconvenLent; that Ls, but an eMpty MaxLM_ ~hatever Naess's Lntended qualLfLcatLon, Lt stLLL seeMs to people wLth Much practLcaL experLence on the Land or Ln gardenLng, especLaLLy Ln places where the surroundLng natural envLronMent has not been totally transforMed, that he has consLderabLy underestLMated the extent of quaLLfLcatLon needed, and that the prLncLpLe. BLospherLc strangle to begLn does quaLLfLcatLon due theLr own shelter or supply not do who egaLLtarLanLsM Ln practLce Ls for people sustenance, but pass the busLness of ecosysteM Lnterference and ModLfLcatLon on to others (as they typLcaLLy pass the butchery of theLr Meat and the LLke on to others)_ Even were Lt desLrabLe, unLversaL hunter-gatherLng Ls no Longer possLbLe or feasLbLe, wLth so Many Mostly unsuLted and LLL-adapted huMans; and a substantLaL even hunter-gatherers terMLnate the LLves of Many creatures Lnterference wLth theLr rLghts to LLve and bLossoM - and, More LMportant, and dLrectty LnterferLng substantLaLLy ModLfy theLr envLronMents, thus LndLrectly wLth enorMous nuMbers of LLvLng thLngs_ ~hatever rLghts sLMpLer LLvLng organLsMs, especLaLLy ones such as bacterLa and vLruses, have to LLve and bLossoM, they have decLdedLy quaLLfLed and Much attentuated ones. ULth bLospherLc egaLLtarLanLsM (Ln prLncLpLe) the deep ecology MoveMent has Latched onto a prLncLple whLch Ls both too powerful, and yet, Lf the ·Ln prLncLpLe" quaLLfLcatLon Ls appLLed so as to cover typLcaL LLfestyLes of deep ecoLogLsts, a prLncLpLe so rLddLed wLth exceptLons as to barely hang together. But wLthout soMe of the Lntended force of bLospherLc egaLLtarLanLsM, deep ecology Ls Ln danger of coLLapsLng (LLke Many of Lts followers) Lnto an LnterMedLate posLtLon, as no other part of the pLatforM adequately sustaLns Lts LLMLted separatLon_ Part of what Ls sought wLth the egaLLtarLan prLncLpLe Lnterference, huMan Lnterference to an extent and on a scale far below that of theMe the Ls already afforded a basLs Ln presently prevaLLLng Ls what wLth values-Ln-nature and outsLde the huMan sphere, sLnce Lnterference of value Ls (Lpso facto) LLMLted. Such a prLncLpLe of LLMLted Interference deserves, Ln any case, separate forMuLatLon (whLch Lt usually gaLns Ln deep ecology pLatforMs)_ But even so Lt hardly achLeves the requLsLte separatLon, sLnce LnterMedLate posLtLons can, and do, grant or MaLntaLn soMe such prLncLpLe of lLMLted or reduced Lnterference (thus e-g- BLrch, AttfLeLd, SLnger)_ ~hat Ls requLred Ls a posLtLve equLvaLent of the separatLng feature, of the rejectLon of the greater vaLue assuMptLon, and therewLth of the rejectLon of huMan supreMacy, of the value pLcture of huMans as always nuMber one_ What Ls needed, More generaLLy, Ls a prLncLpLe teLLLng agaLnst the favourLng of one over others sLMpLy on the basLs of specLes, a specLes - huMans Ln partLcuLar -15- �prLncLple of bLospecLes LMpartLalLty, to gLve Lt a sLMLlar grandLose tLtle. There Ls soMe reason to suspect that, as elsewhere, a requLreMent of LMparttalLty has been hardened Lnto one of egalLtarLanLsM, that faLrness, because often dLfftcult to assess, has been MLstakenly taken to Lnvolve equaltty. BLospecLes LMpartLalLty LMplLes the avoLdance of specLes chauvLnLsM, that Ls the avotdance of unfaLr treatMent of LteMs outstde the gLven specLes. Because unfaLr, the treatMent concerned lacks any sufftctent justLfLcatLon. Hence, the avotdance of spectes chauvtnLsM Lnvolved Ls effectLvely that prevLously explaLned as a specLal case of class chauvLnLsM. SLMLlarly, the requLreMent of bLospecLes LMpartLalLty Ls a specLal case of the requlreMent of class (or natural group) LMpartlallty, for whlch the arguMents are the saMe as those for the avoldance of class chauvLnLsM. The danger of specLes partLalLty, of favourLng soMe specLes, Ls Much encouraged by a specles fallacy, whLch Ls coMMonly lnvoked ln favourlng huMans. ThLs Ls the error of concludLng that because a few MeMbers of the specles have accoMplLshed soMethtng of (LMMense) value, all MeMbers of the spectes therefore are (hlghly) valuable; all MeMbers of the specles Manage to free-load for the rtde, obtatned by a few MeMbers, so to say. The arguMent, once challenged, usually falls back on an arguMent that goes by way of capacltLes: the reMaLnLng MeMbers of the specles have the capactty to achleve these sorts of thlngs also. But, fLrstly, that Ls not true: LntellLgence, skLlls, and the lLke, vary soMewhat wtthLn specLes, and froM our narrow perspectLve, vary consLderably aMong huMans, soMe of whoM have no capacLty for advanced MatheMatLcs or MusLc. a Secondly, Lt requLres More than capacLty: Lt requLres cLrcuMstances, favourable envlronMent to exercLse theM (hence, ln part, the folly of More huMans ln conspLcuously suboptLMal cLtLes), together wLth a wlll and drlve actually to follow through approprLately on capacLtLes. (CrLtLque, pp.12-16) 4. NON-VIOLENCE The fourth plllar, nonvLolence, Means to the Greens the cessatLon of both personal vLolence and -structural vlolence·, that Ls, vLolence and oppresslon LMposed by the state and by Lnstltutlons. For these reasons the Greens support the concept of self-deterMlnatLon for lndLvLduals and groups. They also advocate peace educatLon Ln the schools, whLch would teach nonvLolent Means of conflLct resolutLon and show chLldren that the cult of the soldLer Ls a cultural, not a natural condltLon. The Greens also call for an end to the vLolence and oppressLon toward woMen, chLldren, and MLnorLty groups so coMMon Ln patrLarchal socLetLes. They want to develop a nonexploLtatlve econoMlc systeM Ln whLch eMployee-owned and -controlled busLnesses replace huge operatlons dLctated by or corporate lnterests. They want to transforM our vlolent state the relatLonshLp wlth nature lnto one of balance and respect. Petra Kelly expresses the centralLty of thLs prLncLple when she says, ·NonvLolence Ls the essentLal Lngredtent ln an ecologLcal socLety. • Most of the Greens eMphatLcally eMbrace the prLncLple of Although nonvLolence, they also realLze that Lts appllcatLon Ls often probleMatLc. Roland Vogt polnted out one of the areas of confll~tlng values: What we have not yet accoMplLshed Ls to say how we show ourselves to be nonvLolent at the MOMent when we partLcLpate Ln governMental functLons, because the state Ls Ltself an LnstLtutLon of vLolence. For exaMple, how wlll a Green cLty counctl act agalnst people who don't pay thelr rent, although they really could because they recelve welfare or because they earn enough. The norMal course Ls warnLng, warnLng, evLctLon notLce, and then evLctLon by force and by polLce. We haven't solved thLs. That Ls, there are stLll no thought-out concepts of how we can reconcLle the deMands of socLal -16- �responsLbLL Lty wLth the deMands of non vLoLence. The Greens extend theLr prLncLpLe of nonvLoLence to theLr actLve resLstance agaLnst the Most MassLve and potentLaLLy deadly "anLfestatL on of structural vLoLence: the nuclear arMs race proMoted by the MLLLtary-L ndustrLaL coMpLex and the governMent. In theLr natLonaL headquarter s Ln Bonn the Greens have a poster of OandhL s adage "there Ls no way to peace; peace Ls the way• and one of Thoreau 0 Those who eMbrace nonvLoLent cLvLL dLsobedLenc e, coMMLttLng breaches of Law on the grounds of conscLence, are prepared to suffer · vLoLence or punLshMent theMseLves rather than LnfLLct vLoLence or LnjustLce on others or share responsLbLL Lty for such acts by reMaLnLng passLve. •1,, however, the Law Ls so proMuLgated that Lt of necessLty Makes you an agent of LnjustLce agaLnst another, then I say to you: Break the Law." The MajorLty of Greens strongly endorse - and lLve - the concept of actLve, nonvLoLence resLstance. However, the MarxLst-orL ented MeMbers of the party have never been fully supportLve of that prLncLpLe. They vLew Lt "ereLy as a ·MoralLstLc " tactLc that should be abandoned Ln favor of escaLatLng resLstance Lf Lt does not prove suffLcLentL y effectLve. Petra Kelly's account of the LeftLsts' attLtude on thLs Lssue was sLMLlar to what we had heard froM Many other Greens: They do not understand that nonvLolent actLon Ls an extre"ely subversLve force. They thLnk Lt's harMLess, Ls a for" of obedLence, and changes nothLng, that Lt's LLke beggLng froM the state. ·1t's just a tactLc, a toot," they say. To theM everythLng Ls to be used. But there are soMe thLngs you should never "Lsuse - or even use. They are sLMpLy LntegraL. NonvLoLence cannot be coMproMLsed. Although Many of the advocates of nonvLoLent . resLstance argued that ·such a course cannot be dLsMLssed as "Merely MoraLLstLc" sLnce Lt Ls also absolutely ratLonaL (that Ls, hLstory shows that vLoLence breeds vLolence - structural as welt as personal - so we "ust fLnd another way to effect change, especLaLLy Ln the nuclear age). For Most MeMbers of the greens the choLce was clear, as expressed wLth a cLtatLon froM MartLn Luther KLng: •~e no Longer have a choLce or nonvLoLence between vLoLence and nonvLoLence . The choLce Ls eLther nonexLsten ce." (Green PoLLtLcs, pp.~3-7) Deeply coMMLtted persons Ln the ecology Move"ent sense the vuLnerabLLL ty of natural processes to huMan LnterventLo n, and the fundaMentaL necessLty of MaLntaLnLng bLologLcal dLversLty. AffLrMatLon of the LntegrLty of ecosysteMs frequently LnvoLves a caMpaLgn to save froM developMent soMe rLver of canyon or wLLderness area. In a real sense, ecologLcaL resLstance LnvoLves beco"Lng frLends wLth another specLes or a rLver or a MountaLn, for exaMpLe. In general, the resLster takes up the burden of responsLbLl Lty, the burden of wLtnessLng for the other as Self. ThLs process of befrLendLng "ay be based on ArLstotle's crLterLa for frLendshLp: the proMotLon of the other's good for the other's own sake. Or frLendshLp can be the extensLon of self. When OandhL was asked Lf hLs good deeds Ln a vLLLage expressed hLs huManLtarLa nLsM, he repLLed he worked "to serve no • GandhL s stateMent defLned MaturLty. ALtruLsM was one else but Myself unnecessary because hLs self eMbraced the whole vLLLage. 0 There are Many dLfferent tactLcs of LndLvLduaLs and organL2atLo ns Ln save the Earth•, but or poLLtLcaL caMpaLgns whLch seek to ·save the rLver -17- �there Ls one overrLdLng or baste norM of ecoLogLcaL resLstLng: non-vLoLence. Ecology teaches us that MankLnd Ls not the center of LLfe on the planet. Ecology has taught us that the whole earth Ls part of our "body" and that we Must Learn to respect Lt as we respect ourselves. As we feel for ourselves, we Must feel for aLL forMs of LLfe - the whales, the seals, the forests, the seas. The treMendous beauty of ecoLogLcaL thought Ls that Lt shows us a pathway back to an understandLng and an apprecLatLon of LLfe LtseLf - an understandLng and apprecLatLon that Lt Ls LMperatLve to that very way or LLfe. As wLth the whales and the seals, LLfe Must be saved by nonvLoLent confrontatLons, by what the Quakers caLL "bearLng wLtness•. A person bearLng wLtness Must accept responsLbLLLty for beLng aware of an LnjustLce. The person May then choose to do soMethLng or stand by, but he May not turn away Ln Lgnorance. The Greenpeace ethLc Ls not onty to personally bear wLtness to atrocLtLes agaLnst lLfe; Lt Ls to take dLrect actLon to prevent theM. ~hLLe actLon Must be dLrect, Lt Must also be non-vLoLent. Ue Must obstruct a wrong wLthout offerLng personal vLoLence to Lts perpetrators. Ue Must know that our greatest strength Ls LLfe LtseLf, and the coMMLtMent to dLrect our lLves to prbtect others. EcoLogLcaL resLstLng could be defLned as keepLng the peace of the neLghborhood. Rarely are vandals or vLolent neLghbors welcoMe Ln the neLghborhood. Uhen the neLghbors Lnclude rLvers and MountaLns, seashores and prarLes, then the LntegrLty of the ecosysteM Ls MaLntaLned. In hLs explLcatLon of GandhL's theory of nonvLoLence, Arne several norMs of nonvLoLent potLtLcat caMpaLgns. These Lnctude: Naess lLsts l. Announce your case and the goal of your caMpaLgn explLcLtty and clearly, dLstLnguLshLng essentLaLs froM nonessentLats. 2. Seek personal contact wLth your opponent and be avaLLable to hLM. · BrLng confLLctLng groups Lnto personal contact. 3. Turn your opponent Lnto a beLLever Ln and supporter of your case, but do not coerce or expLoLt hLM. ~- You provoke your opponent Lf you deLLberateLy or carelessly destroy hLs property. of ecoLogLcaL resLstLng denounce theorLsts LeadLng nonvLoLence as tactLcs. But as Rober ALtken RoshL wrote: vLoLence versus Non-vLoLence Ls not just a tactLc for people who Make Lt a practLce ... The end Ls the Means, Ln other words. Look at poLLtLcaL hLstory or at the hLstory of any MoveMents. Uhen we work for certaLn goals, those goals tend to betray us. Ue defeated L.B. Johnson only to get RLchard NLxon. Ue got rLd of the B-1 BoMber (teMporarLLy) and the CruLse MLssLle appeared. Ue have to Make our actLon the goal. Our actLon Must LtseLf be the truth. Our actLon Must be Lts own defense, Lts own procLaMatLon, Lts own purpose. (Letter to the author, June 1982) Both on practLcaL and ethLcaL grounds, vLoLence Ls rejected as a Mode of ecotogLcal resLstance. TerrorLst attacks on nuclear plants or MLssLle sLtes could cause ·red" alerts and vLolent responses froM governMent agencLes. PLacLng one's own LLfe at rLsk, such as sLttLng Ln front of bulldozers or polLce cars at a deMonstratLon to protest destructLon of the raLn forest, May be LLLegaL but not vLoLent. And spontaneous acts such as the decoMMLssLonLng of a power generator or bulldozer May draMatLze the contLnuLng destructLon of a -18- �spectal ecosysteM. Ecologtcal reststance also Means defendtng natural dtverstty through educatLon, publLc speakLng, and use of lawsuLts; tryLng to convert publtc opLnton to the cause; and tnforMLng poltttctans and dectsLon Makers. ResLstance Ls another naMe for afftrMatLon - joyful affLrMatton of the tntegrLty of Nature, natural dLversLty, and MLnLMuM huMan LMpact on place. (Deep Ecolo9H, pp.16-17) The Deep Ecology MOVeMent and peace MoveMent. Ftfteen years ago close cooperatton between supporters of deep ecology and actLvtsts Ln the peace MoveMent was out of reach. Rather suddenly thts sttuatton Ls totally changed. SoMe of us, ltke Myself, favour unLlateral dtsarMaMent and establtshMent of MtlLtant, but unherotc, non-vtolent defence. At thts potnt Lt ts tMportant for actLvtsts to stress the dtstLnctLon between actLon, caMpaLgn and MOVeMent. They May be tllustrated by three concentrLc cLrcles. The LnnerMost coMprLse the dLrect actLons wLthLn a caMpatgn, for Lnstance, a dated deMonstratLon at a parttcular locatLon agatnst the butldtng of a daM, or the non-vtolent obstructton of the transport of the MachLnery on the way to the daM sLte. ThLs May be part of a ten year old caMpaLgn to save a rtver (LncludLng of course tts ecosysteM) froM developMent of soMe sort. Ten dLrect acttons May be fatlure, but nevertheless theLr LMpact May conflLct, contrtbute to vLctory of the caMpaLgn. (Or May polarLze the antt-actLvtsts Many what Ls That contrLbutLng to the faLlure of the caMpatgn? MaLntaLn.) The rLver caMpaLgn together wLth other analogous caMpaLgns May be seen as part of a MoveMent of greater or lesser generaltty. A MoveMent to save rtvers, or More generally a conservatton MoveMent. Many caMpatgns May be fatlures, but the MOVeMent goes on. (Hates on Poltttcs, pp.l~-JS) Gandhtan and other forMs of non-vtolence are wtdely found wLthtn the deep ecologLcal MoVeMent. There Ls a reluctance to accept destructLon of MachLnery Ln efforts to stop destructton even of holy places. There Ls soMe dtsagreeMent on thts and related subjects. I do not thtnk that the coMpletely general norMs of care and consLderatLon should be looked upon as part of the specLftc platforM of the deep ecology MoveMent . . (PhLlosophLcal Aspects, p.31) In suM, the paradtgM of deep ecology Ls revolutLonary tn tts MetaphysLcs, epLsteMology, and cosMology, but deep ecologLsts do not seek to overthrow governMents by force of arMs or to Lssue anythLng lLke a coMprehensLve, alleMbracLng polLtLcal prograM for brLngLng about the new order. The conteMporary deep ecology MoveMent seeMs to be what Robert NLsbet has called a "wLthdrawal and renewal" MoveMent such as has perLodLcally arLsen .Ln ~estern socLety sLnce the fall of the RoMan EMpLre. There ts no poltttcal party of "deep ecology,· no cadre of poltttcal revoluttonarte s. Thts ts not an approprtate approach for deep ecologtsts. No frontal confrontatLons wLth reforMLst envLronMental tsts or wLth the doMLnant socLal/polttLc al order Ls destred. It would be counter-product Lve by Maktng people More defensLve of thetr LdeologLcal posLtLon. Deep ecology Ls not an atteMpt to add one More tdeology Ln the crowded fLeld of Modern LdeologLes. Deep ecologLsts are questLng for ways to lLberate and cultLvate the ecologLcal conscLousness. FroM ecologtcal conscLousness wtll naturally flow an ecologtcal reststance. (Deep Ecology MoveMent, pp.316-17) 5: ON SELF-REALIZATION Naess: Self-realtzatLo n ts the realtzatLon of -19- the potentLaltttes of ltfe. �OrganLsMs that dLffer froM each other Ln three ways gLve us Less dLversLty than organLsMs that dLffer froM each other Ln one hundred ways. Therefore, the selfreaLLzatLon we experLence when we LdentLfy wLth the unLverse Ls heLghtened by an Lncrease Ln the nuMber of ways Ln whLch LndLvLduals, socLetLes, and even specLes and lLfe forMs realLze theMselves. The greater the dLversLty, the, the greater the self-realLzatLon. ThLs seeMLng duaLLty between LndLvLduaLs and the totalLty Ls encoMpassed by what I call the Self and the ChLnese call the Tao. Most people Ln deep ecology have had the feelLng - usually, but not always, Ln nature - that they are connected wLth soMethLng greater than theLr ego, greater than theLr naMe, theLr faMLLy, theLr specLaL attrLbutes as an LndLvLdual - a feelLng that Ls often called oceanLc because Many have Lt on the ocean. ULthout that LdentLfLcatLon, one Ls not easLLy drawn to becoMe LnvoLved Ln deep ecology. Many people have thLs feeLLng when they see a death struggle - for Lnstance tLny anLMaLs LLke fLtes or Mosquttoes fLghtLng for thetr ltves. Uhen they see anLMals sufferLng, they May LdentLfy wLth LLfe forMs they usually don't LdentLfy wLth. Such sLtuatLons offer us an opportunLty to develop a More Mature poLnt of vLew. Insofar as thLs conversLon, these deep feelLngs are reLLgLous, deep ecology has a reLLgLous coMponent, and those people who have done the Most to Make socLetLes aware of the destructLve way Ln whLch we LLve Ln reLatLon to natural settLngs have had such relLgLous feeLLngs. Rachel Carson, for exaMpLe, says that we cannot do what we do, we have no reLLgLous or ethLcaL justLfLcatLon for behavLng as we do toward nature. Her arguMent Ls not calculated or reasonable Ln the usual sense, sayLng that, Lf we contLnue poLsonLng nature, we wLLl be Less healthy, or wLLL have fewer resources, and so on. She Ls sayLng that we are sLMply not perMLtted to behave Ln that way. SoMe wLll say that nature Ls not Man's property, Lt's the property of God; others wLLL say Lt Ln other ways. The MaLn poLnt Ls that deep ecology has a reLLgLous coMponent, fundaMental LntuLtLons that everyone Must cuLtLvate Lf he or she Ls to have a LLfe based on values and not functLon LLke a coMputer. Uhereas shallow ecology, Lf taken to Lts logLcaL extreMe, Ls lLke a coMputerLzed, cost-benefLt anaLysLs for huMans. (SLMpLe tn Means, p.11) If the terM seLf-reaLLzatLon Ls applLed, Lt should be kept Ln MLnd that Me", "ego , and self have shLftLng denotatLons. NothLng Ls evLdent and •1·, LndLsputabLe. Even that we are Ls debatable Lf we Make the questLon dependent upon answertng what we are. Self-realLzatLon Ln Lts absolute MaxLMUM Ls, as I see Lt, the Mature experLence of oneness Ln dLversLty as depLcted Ln the above verse. The MLnLMUM Ls the seLf-reaLL2atLon by More of Less consLstent egotLsM - by the narrowest experLence of what constLtutes one's self and a MaxLMUM of alLentatLon. As eMpLrLcaL beLngs we dweLL soMewhere Ln between, but Lncreased MaturLty LnvoLves tncrease of the wLdeness of the self. The seLf-reaLtzatton MaxLMuM should not necessarLLy be conceLved as a MystLcal or MedLtattonaL state. ·ey MedLtatLon soMe perceLve the Self tn the self by the self; others by the path of knowledge and stLLl others by the path of work (karMa-yoga) [Gtta: Chapter 13,, verse 2~]. GandhL was a karMa-yoga, reaLLzLng hLMseLf through socLaL and poLLtLcaL actLon. The terMs MystLcal unLon and MystLcLsM are avoLded here for three reasons: Ftrst, strong Mysttcal tradLtLons stress the dtssolutLon of Lndtvtdual selves Lnto a nondLversLfLed supreMe whole. Both froM cultural and ecoLogLcaL poLnt of vtew dLversLty and LndLvtdualLty are essentLaL. Second, there Ls a strong terMLnoLogtcaL trend wtthtn sctenttftc coMMuntttes to assoctate MysttcLsM wtth MystLcs tend to agree that MysttcaL ThLrd, confuston. and vagueness conscLousness Ls rarely sustatned under norMal, everyday condLttons. But strong, -20- �w~de LdentLfLcatLon can color experLence under such condLtLons. GandhL was only MargLnally concerned wLth 'nature'. In hLs ashraM poLsonous snakes were perMLtted to tLve LnsLde and outsLde huMan dwettLngs. AntL-poLson MedLcLnes were frowned upon~ GandhL LnsLsted that trust awakens trust, and that snakes have the saMe rLght to tLve land btossoM as the huMans. (IdentLfLcatLon, pp.259-6) In keepLng wLth the spLrLtual tradLtLons of Many of the worlds s retLgLons, the deep ecology norM of setf-reatL2atLon goes beyond the Modern western self hedonLstLc whLch Ls defLned as an Lsotated ego strLvLng prLMarLly for gratLfLcatLon or for a narrow sense of LndLvLduat satvatLon Ln thLs tLfe or the next. ThLs socLatty prograMMed sense of the narrow self or socLat self dLslocates us, and leaves us prey to whatever fad or fashLon Ls prevalent Ln our socLety or socLat reference group. Ue are thus robbed of be9LnnLn9 the search for our unLque spLrLtuat/b.LologLcal personhood. SpLrLtual growth, or unfotdLng, begLns when we cease to understand or see ourselves as Lsolated and narrow coMpetLng egos and begLn to LdentLfy wLth other huMans forM our faMLly and frLends to, eventually, our specLes. But the deep ecology sense of self requLres a further MaturLty and growth, an LdentLfLcatLon whLch goes beyond huManLty to Lnclude the nonhuMan world. Ue Must see beyond our narrow conteMporary cultural assuMptLons and values, and the conventLonat wLsdoM of our tLMe and place, and thLs Ls best achLeved by the MedLtatLve deep questLonLng process. Only Ln thLs way can we hope to attaLn full Mature personhood and unLqueness. A nurturLng nondoMLnatLng socLety can help Ln the "real work" of becoMLng a whole person. The ·real work• can be suMMarLzed syMbolLcally as the realLzatLon of "self-Ln-Self- where ·setf· stands for organLc wholeness. ThLs process of the full unfoldLng of the self can also be SUMMarLzed by the phrase, •No one Ls saved untLt we are all saved,· where the phrase •one• Lncludes not only Me, an LndLvLduat huMan, but all huMans, whales, grLzzly bears, whole raLn forest ecosysteMs, MountaLns and rLvers, the tLnLest MLcrobes Ln the soLt, and so on. (Deep Ecology, pp.66-7) of norM SubscrLbLng to these prLncLples, Naess asserts, coMes froM the self-realLzatLon, that ·.~. wLth MaturLty, huMan beLngs wLtl experLence joy and sorrow when other tLfe forMs experLence sorrow. Not only wLll we feet sad when our brother or the dog or cat feels sad, but we wLll grLeve when lLvLng beLngs, LncludLng landscapes, are destroyed. In our cLvLlLzatLon, we have vast Means' of destructLon at our dLsposal but extreMely lLttle MaturLty Ln our feelLngs. Only a very narrow range of feetLngs have Lnterested Most huMan beLngs untLt now.• ThLs deepenLng of feetLngs seeMs to run counter . to the trend Ln Modern socLety toward superfLcLat relatLonshLps . . . . Arne Naess asserts that ·setfrealLzatLon cannot develop far wLthout sharLng joys and sorrows wLth others, or More fundaMentalty, wLthout the developMent of the narrow ego of the sMall chLld Lnto the coMprehensLve structure of a Self that coMprLses all huMan beLngs. The ecologLcal MoveMent -- as Many earlLer phLlosophLcat MoveMents -- takes a step further and asks for developMent such that, there Ls a deep LdentLfLcatLon of LndLvLduals wLth all lLfe." I suggest that the leaders of the ecology MoveMent devetopMent theLr ethLcs after they had Moved along thLs path of Self-reatLzatLon. (Stone/Sky, pp.6-7) But what Ls wrong wLth the wLdely applauded atteMpt, runnLng through Much LdeatLstLc and Eastern thLnkLng, to explLcate value through self-realLsatLon? FLrstly, lLke utLlLtarLan explLcatLons, such as those through happLness and satLsfactLon, Lt Ls Much too experLentLal. It renders value a feature of those -21- �who exper~ence value - roughly of valuers - rather than of what ~s valued, and bears value. It Ls lLke sayLng that colour Ls a Matter of those (huMans) who perceLve colour, not of the (coMposLtLon of) thLngs that are coloured. And reMove the experLences, those undertakLng self-realLsatLon, as Ln the days before lLfe appears and value dLsappears. And that too Ls wrong. Secondly, even Lf self-realLsatLon were always worthwhLle and never tLed to by contrast wLth lLfe - there are exaMpLes of value whLch fall beyond evLl (Ln presented often seLf-reaLLsatLon. A certaLn sort of dLrectLon Ls bLocheMLstry texts Lnterested Ln explaLnLng lLfe) as a MLnLMal condLtLon of lLfe of an organLsr1 or syster1: caLL that dLrectLon, s·eLf-dLrecti.on. Thus, deep ecology, Lnsofar as Lt values (just) LLfe, values (just) self-dLrectLon. In these terMs, the contractLon froM seLf-dLrectLon to self-realLsatLon, as Ln Ecosophy T, Looks LLke a M~stake. A s~r1LLar M~stake appears to underLLe contractLons to ecologLcal conscLousness (as Ln Devall); for self-realLsatLon Looks rer1arkabLy L~ke consc~ous seLf-d~rectLon, roughly an LntersectLon of seLf-dLrectLon wLth conscLousness. The argur1ents asser1bLed thus underMLne both of what Devall presents as the uLtLMate norMs of deep ecology', nar1eL~eLf-reaLLsatLon and bLocentrLsM. 'These are not proved but "felt"' (83, p.5). But they are not felt, at least by those who perceLve value beyond what lLves; rather they are dLsproved, by a serLes of counterexar1ples to each as uLtLr1ate norr1s. (CrLtLque, pp.2~-5) In partLcular presentatLons of a partLcular phLLosophy froM whLch the Naess-SessLon platforM Ls derLved, naMely Ecosophy r' I use a Model where 'Self-realLzaHon!' and sLr1LLar short forr1uLatLons are taken to express a top norr1 of a norr1atLve systeM. ~e r1ay artLcuLate 'r1odeLs' of a very cor1prehensLve norr1atLve syster1, and use Lt to explore the LnterrelatLons of our own vLews and those of others. I have extensLvely used a Model of a cor1prehensLve yLew I call 'Ecosophy r ·' and I use only one top norM whLch on the Most crude ser1antLcaL Level Ls expressed by a one word sentence 'seLf-realLzatLon! '. A r1aLn LnspLratLon for - the choLce cor1es froM the use of the terN by GandhL. Another MaLn LnspLratLon Ls the strong trend Ln Uestern LndustrLaL states towards an LndLvLdualLsM favourLng lLfe as a Long ego-trLp full of 'happenLngs' . In France there Ls a group of 'egologLsts' , the nar1e beLng chosen as a contrast to 'ecologLsts ' : ~hatever the reLatLons between LndLvLdual beLngs, huMan nature Ls such that the egocentred Lnterests of each of us Ls stronger than any other. To foster the kLnds of soLLdar~ty the pol~t~cal left ~s taLkLng about, or the soLLdarLty wLth other lLfe forMs wh~ch . ecologLsts (the greens) preach, w~ll therefore never succeed and ~s apt to hurt the LndLvLduaL . ' seLf-reaL~zatLon!' Ls a norM that LnLtLaLLy arLses vLvLd Lnterest aMong those who are LnfLuenced by the ego-trLp trend, but are then astonLshed and bewLLdered by the d~stLnctLons between ego, self and Self. Th~s ~s new to Most of theM and they are often Led to recons~der theLr LndLvLduaL~st posLtLon. ThLs reconsLderLng Ls for Me a confLrMatLon of the SocratLc value of the choLce of forr1ulatLon. The r1aLn poLnt Ln thLs connectLon Ls that huMans undergo a r1aturLn9 process, and only Lf thLs process coMes to a 'prer1ature' halt, LndentLfLcatLon wLth others and solLdarLty faLL to develop. If we, as I do, add the SpLnozLst (courageous) hypothes~s that the joy and equLMLndedness you exper~ence as a Mature person ~s deeper and rLcher than that you exper~ence as an ~r1r1ature grown 'reaLLzaHon of the (wLde) Self!' gets to be an ~nstructi.ve and ~nsp~rLng up, -22- �forMu l,a. The Self-realLzatLo n norM proposed by Me has been taken too serLously as Lf one, two or three world expressLons were adequate phLLosophLcaL expressLons of a hL9hest' norM. An adequate expressLon LMplLes that the LntrLcate subject ego, se Lf, Se Lf ', that Ls, b Lo Log Lea L, soe La L and Hetaphys Lea L se Lf ar·e dLstLnguLshed. Only Ln relatLon to a faLrly Large body of phLlosophLcaL analysLs we can forMulate adequate phLlosophLcal prLncLples. It has always been that way. (Notes on Sylvan, pp.17-19) HY 0 6: OH LIFESTYLE The deep ecologLcal MoveMent Ls recruLted froM people who do not look upon natural surroundLngs as a Means for recreatLon and repaLr. LLfe and work Ln natural surroundLngs Ls a vLtal concern. The rLchness of that LLfe Ls so vast, and the Means are so sLMple, that they have dLffLculty understandLng why others seeM to need Means on a level of coMplLcatLon and sophLstLcatLon that Ls unLque Ln the hLstory of [huMan]kLnd. They cannot but fLght agaLnst the acceleratLng destructLon of nature due to the MaLntaLnLng and expandLng the productLon of such Means. They do not thLnk people who serLousLy reflect upon the reLatLon between Means and ultLMate LntrLnsLc values can justLfy the present polLcLes. As an LllustratLon of dLfferent Means/end ratLos, coMpare the dLrect and LndLrect technologLcal requLreMent of a faMLly wLth MeMbers froM 8 to 80 years old lLvLng Ln a natural surroundLng and goLng cross-country skLLng together, wLth that of a faMLly doLng slaloM at a bLg fashLonable skL resort. (PhLlosophLcal. Aspects, pp.35-6) 0 RLch Ln ends, sLMple Ln Means!.' HuMan Lnterference Ln the ecosphere can only be reduced to tolerable levels Lf people, and especLally the average (or econoMLcally above average) people of the LndustrLal states adopt lLfe styles requLrLng sLMple MaterLal Means. ThLs Ls coMpatLble wLth or even favourable towards rLchness of goals. 'Increase the sensLtLvLty to and apprecLatLon of what there Ls suffLcLent of for all!' The educatLonal slogan fLghts agaLnst the confusLon of value wLth Market value and prLce. A way to MaxLMLze our abLlLty to derLve deep satLsfactLon froM the goods of whLch there stLll, Ls, or coul.d be, enough. The present lLfe style of average people Ln LndustrLal socLetLes cannot be a global lLfe style wLthout LrreversLble, colossal destructLon of condLtLons of LLfe on Earth. (Hotes on PolLtLcs, p.2) It ' s a shLft froM beLng doMLnated by Means, LnstruMents, gadgets, all the Many thLngs we thLnk wLLl gLve us pleasure or Make us happy or perfect. The shLft coMes about when we serLously ask ourselves, In what sLtuatLons do I experLence the MaxLMUM satLsfactLon of MY whole beLng? and fLnd that we need practLcally nothLng of what we are supposed to need for a rLght and fuLfLlLLng LLfe. And Lf we Make that shLft toward a LLfe sLMple Ln Means but rLch Ln goals, we are not threatened by the plans elaborated by envLronMentalL sts. For Lnstance, we can see that, Lnstead of an ene~gy cr~s~s, we have a crLsLs of consuMptLon - we have More than enough energy. There Ls no reason to contLnue LncreasLng our consuMptLon of energy or of any of the other MaterLaL aspects of lLfe. In countrLes lLke the UnLted States the crLsLs Ls rather one of LLfestyle, of our tradLtLons of thoughtlessness and confusLon, or our LnabLLLty to questLon what Ls and Ls not worthwhLLe Ln l,Lfe. ULthLn fLfty years, eLther we wLl,l, need a dLctatorshLp to save what Ls Left of the dLversLty of LLfe forMs, or we wLLl have a shLft of values, a shLft of our total vLew such that no dLctatorshLp wLLL -23- �be . needed. It Ls thoroughly natural to stop doMLnatLng and expLoLtLng and destroyLng the planet. A "sMooth" ~ay, LnvoLvLng harMonLous LLvLng wLth nature, or a "rough" way, LnvoLvLng dLctatorshLp and coercion - those are the optLdns. I tell people that, Lf they Make clear theLr fundaMentaL assuMptLons about what Ls needed for a LLfe sLMpLe Ln Means and rLch Ln ends, they wLLL necessarLLy coMe to the conctusLon that Lt Ls not tack of energy consuMptLon that Makes theM unhappy. They can then oppose nuclear power wLthout havLng read thLck books and wLthout knowLng the MyrLad facts that are used Ln newspapers and perLodLcaLs. And they Must also fLnd others who feel the saMe and forM cLrcLes of frLends who gLve one another confidence and support Ln lLvLng Ln a way that the MajorLty fLnds rLdLcuLous, naLve, stupLd, and sLMpt~stLc. But Ln order to do that, one Must already have enough seLf-confLdenc e to follow one's LntuLtLon - a quaLLty very Much LackLng Ln broad sectLons of the populace. Most people follow the trends and advertLseMents and becoMe phLLosophLcaL and ethLcaL crLpples. I thLnk that, Ln the long run, Ln order to joyfully and wholeheartedly partLcLpate Ln the deep ecology MoveMent you have to take your own LLfe very seriously. People who successfully MaLntaLn a Low MaterLaL standard of lLvLng and successfully cultLvate a deep, Lntense Lnner lLfe are Much better able to consLstentLy MaLntaLn a deep ecoLogLcat vLew and to act on behalf of Lt. As 1· sLt down and breathe deeply and just feel where I aM, I can ask Myself where and when I really enjoy MY LLfe and what would be the MLnLMuM Means necessary to MaLntaLn those enjoyable feelLngs and sLtuatLons. For exaMpLe, I Myself have too eager to go cLLMbLng Ln the HLMaLayas, whereas the pecutLar been satLsfactLon I have as a MountaLneer could be had Ln Norway . If you concentrate on what gLves you satLsfactLon, you wLLL fLnd that Lt can be obtaLned Much More easLly and sLMply than we are educated to belLeve Ln our socLety, where bL99er, More elaborate and More expensLve are always consLdered better. The deveLopMent of sensLtLvLty toward the good thLngs whLch we already have Ln suffLcLent quantLty Ls the true goal of educatLon. Not that we need to LLMLt our desLres. I'M not for the sLMple lLfe, except Ln the sense of a tLfe sLMpLe Ln Means but rLch Ln goals and values. I have treMendous aMbLtLon. Only the best Ls good enough for Me. I LLke rLchness, and I feel rLcher than the rLchest person when I'M Ln MY cottage Ln the country wLth water I've carrLed froM a certaLn well and wood I've gathered froM the forest. Uhen you take a heLLcopter to the SUMMLt of a MountaLn,° the vLew Looks LLke a postcard, and, Lf there ' s a restaurant on the top, you wLll coMplaLn that the food Ls not properly Made. ~hereas Lf you struggle up froM the bottoM, you have thLs deep feeLLng of satLsfactLon, and even sandwLches MLxed wLth skL wax and sand taste fantastLc. (SLMple Ln Means, pp . 11-12) (1) Use of s LMple Means, avoidance of unnecessary coMplLcated LnstruMents and other sorts of Means. (2) ChoLce of actLvLtLes Most dLrectLy servLng values Ln theMselves and havLng LntrLnsLc value. AvoLdance of actLvLtLes whLch are Merely auxLlLary, havLng no LntrLnsLc value , or beLng Many stages away froM fundaMentaL goals. (3) AntL-consuMerLs M . ThLs negatLve attLtude follows froM (1) and (2). (~) Endeavour to MaLntaLn and Lncrease the sensLtLvLty and apprecLatLon of goods of whLch there Ls enough for all to enjoy. ' (5) Absence or low degree of novophLLL - the love of what Ls new Merely because Lt Ls new. (6) Effort to dwell Ln sLtuatLons of LntrLnsLc value and to act rather than beLng busy . (7) ApprecLatLon of ethnLc and cultural differences aMon9 people, not feelLn9 theM as threats . (8) Concern about the sLtuatLon of the thLrd and fourth world and atteMpt to -24- �avoLd a standard of LLvLng too Much dLfferent froM and hLgher than the needy. (Global soLLdarLt y of LLfe style). (9) ApprecLat Lon of LLfe styles whLch are unLversaL LzabLe, whLch are not blatantly LMpossLbLe to sustaLn wLthout LnjustLce toward fellow huMans or other specLes. (10) To go for depth and rLchness of experLenc e rather than LntensLty . (11) To apprecLat e and choose, when possLbLe, MeanLngfuL work rather than just MakLng a LLvLng. (12) To Lead a coMpLex, not a coMpLLca ted LLfe, tryLn9 to reaLLze as Many aspects of posLtLve experLenc es as possLbLe wLthLn each tLMe-Lnte rvaL. (13) CuLtLvatL ng LLfe Ln coMMunLty (GeMeLns chaft) rather than Ln socLety (OeseLLs chaft}. sMaLL scale Ln prLMary productLo n (14) ApprecLat Lon of or partLcLpa tLon agrLcuLtu re, forestry, fLshLng. (15) Effort to satLsfy vLtaL needs rather than desLres. (Paradox, pp.57-8) In soMe Eastern tradLtLon s, the student Ls presented wLth a koan, a sLMpLe story or stateMent whLch May sound paradoxLc aL or nonsensLc aL on the surface but as the student turns and turns Lt Ln hLs or her MLnd, authentLc understan dLng eMerges. ThLs dLrect actLon · of turnLng and turnLn9, seeLn9 froM dLfferent perspectL ves and froM dLfferent depths, Ls requLred for the cuLtLvatL on of conscLou sness. The koan-LLke phrase for deep ecology, suggested by proMLnen t NorwegLan phLLosoph er Arne Naess Ls: ·sLMpLe Ln Means, rLch Ln ends.· (Deep Ecology, p.10) The LdeoLogLcaL change Ls MaLnLy that of apprecLat Lng LLfe quaLLty Ln sLtuatLon s of Lnherent value) rather than adherLng to an (dweLLLng LncreasLn gLy hLgher standard of LLvLng. There wLLL be a profound awareness of the dLfferenc e between bLg and great. SoMe econoMLs ts crLtLcLze the terM "quaLLty of LLfe" because Lt Ls supposed to be vague. But on closer LnspectLo n, what they consLder to be vague Ls actuaLLy the non-quan tLtatLve nature of the terM. One cannot quantLfy adequatel y what Ls LMportant for the quaLLty of LLfe as dLscussed here, and there Ls no need to do so. There Ls aMple rooM for dLfferent op~n~ons about prLorLtLe s: what should be done fLrst, what next? What Cs Most urgent? What Ls necessary as opposed to what Ls hL9hLy desLrabLe ? But the dLfferenc es do not exclude vLgorous cooperatL on. ~hat Ls gaLned froM tentatLve Ly forMuLatL ng basLc vLews shared today by Most or all supporter s of the deep ecology MoveMent? Hopefully Lt Makes Lt a LLttLe easLer to LocaLLze the MoveMent aMong the Many 'aLternat Lve' MoveMents. Hopefully thLs does not Lead to LsoLatLon but rather to even better cooperatL on wLth Many other aLternatL ve MoveMents. It MLght also Make soMe of us More clear about where we stand, and More clear about whLch dLsagreeM ents MLght profLtabL y be reduced and whLch ones MLght profLtabL y be sharpened . After aLL dLversLt y!' Ls a hLgh Level norM! (BasLc, p.6,9) 0 A set of platforM forMulatL on should be vague and aMbLguous enough to be capable or rather dLfferen t phLLosoph LcalLy relevant Lnterpret atLons. The prLncLpLe s of Lnterpret atLon of pLatforMs of MoveMents reseMbLe those of Lnterpret atLon of Laws. Vagueness Ls here essentLaL prLMarLLy because those appLyLng the Laws Must have soMe freedoM Ln adaptLng theM to ever changLng cLrcuMst ances, but also because the forMuLatL on Must slur over, or abstract froM MLnor dLfferenc es of relevant opLnLon aMon9 those who have supported the Lssue of the Law. On the other hand, the Lnterpret atLon of the text of a phLLosop her reseMbLes that of a testaMent ( 'wLLL' ). Exactly what the testator Lntends Ls the -25- �sole crLterLon of correctness of the LnterpretatLon . Uhether hLs or her terMLnology Ls abhorent or crazy Ls Lrrelevant. (Hates on Sylvan, pp.10-11) 7: ON BIOREGIOHALISM The central eleMent of bLoregLon Ls the LMportance gLven to natural systeMs "both as the source of physLcal nutrLtLon and as the body of Metaphors froM whLch our spLrLts draw sustenance. To understand natural systeMs Ls to begLn an understandLng of the self." A second eleMent of bLoregLon Ls setf-regulatLo n: •anarchy doesn't Mean out Lt Means out of theLr control.• Local coMMunLtLes LnspLred by a control; of shared concern for the bLoregLon, for "tettLng be• the plants and natLve anLMals of that place, ~an Make decLsLons concernLng LndLvLduat and coMMunat actLons whLc respect the LntegrLty of natural processes Ln that place. CarLng for a place Means avoLdLng exptoLtatLon. thLrd eleMent coMposLng the bLoregLonal notLon Ls spLrLt. • There Ls no sLngle relLgLous practLce for thLs sense of bLoregLonat spLrLt. It can be ChrLstLan, BuddhLst, NatLve AMerLcan or others; based on deep ecologLcal LnsLghts, Lt can be expressed Ln nuMerous ways. (Deep Ecology, pp.21-22) ·A UhLte the bLoregLonal, MLnorLty tradLtLon seeMs approprLate to us for cuttLvatLng ecotogLcal conscLousness, atlowLng for bLologLcat dLversLty wLth sLMplLcLty of Means, there are tough, practLcat decLsLons to Make. ConsLstent wLth our uttLMate norMs, Lt seeMs that one prLncLple Ls protectLon of endangered specLes of plants and anLMals as part of the general norM of unLty Ln dLversLty. Another norM Ls bLoregLonal responsLbLlLty . The local coMMunLty Ls the place for decLsLons. However, what happens when a local COMMunLty's needs conflLct wLth the norM of protectLng specLes dLversLty? Such a sLtuatLon occurred on the north slope of Alaska where natLve EskLMos were huntLng bowhead whales Ln the 1970s. The InternatLonat UhatLng Co~MLssLon ruled that thLs was an endangered specLes of whale and consLdered a total ban on the kLttLng of bowhead. However, the natLve EskLMos pleaded that Lt was part of theLr tradLtLon to kLtt whales. TheLr Myths and tLfestyle were dependent on Lt. It they dLdn't kLll whales they would be More dependent on canned Meat froM the "tower forty-eLght": gLven theM by welfare departMents. ThLs soMewhat sptLt the envLronMentalL sts . Many groups supported a total ban on the kLllLng of bowheads untLl ecologLsts deterMLned that theLr poputatLon had "suffLcLently Lncreased, • but FrLends of the Earth took the posLtLon that EskLMos be allowed to take a regulated nuMber of bowheads usLng theLr tradLtLonal Methods (no advanced technology for kLtlLng theM was allowed). Arne Haess provLdes an exaMple froM the bLoregLon ·of northern Horway where farMers and herders, through expansLon of farMs and nuMber of sheep , were rapLdty encroachLng on habLtat of wolves and bears. SoMe suggested kLllLng all bears sLnce a few bears seeMed to be eatLng soMe sheep. But others suggested LdentLfyLng the probleM More carefully. Uas a specLfLc bear becoMLng More and More Lnterested Ln sheep? Could that bear be entLced to refraLn froM eatLng sheep? Could Lt be reMoved to another tocat(on? Could the farMers agree to keep theLr sheep out of areas where bears were known to have dens or graze? Only as a last resort would the coMMunLty consLder the optLon of kLllLng that bear. ThLs approach Ls Ln great contrast wLth that favoured by soMe ranchers and such as wolves, farMers Ln the AMerLcan Uest . Uhen a •predator" Ls defLned to elLMLnate Lt, undertaken are efforts systeMLc then etc. coyotes, eagles, poLson •1oso", of spreadLng LncludLng aerLal huntLng of wolves (Ln Alaska), -26- �shootLn g eagles wLth hLgh-po wered rLfles and destroyL ng habLtat (dennLng areas, rLparLan habLtat of rats, etc.). (Deep Ecology , pp.148- 9) DasMann wrLtes about "bLoregL onalLsM " and •ecodeve lopMent " for the peoples of of AfrLca and the South PacLfLc , and refers approvL ngly to the concept Ln are ("~e House Lynn and e 6orslLn "future prLMLtL ve• develop ed by Jerry another to ve prLMLtL transLtL on froM one condLtL on of syMbLot Lc balance - the a whLch we wLll call future prLMLtLve ... a condLtL on havLng the attrLbu tes of Mature ecosyste M: stable, dLverse , Ln syMbLot Lc balance agaLn") . OasMann dLstLng uLshes between what he calls ecosyste M people and bLosphe re people: "Ecosyst eM people lLve wLthLn a sLngle ecosyste M, or at Most two or three M adjacen t and closely related ecosyste Ms. They are depende nt upon that ecosyste BLosphe re people draw theLr support , not froM the for theLr survLva l resource s of any one ecosyste M, but froM the entLre bLosphe re. BLosphe re people can exert LncredL ble pressure upon an ecosyste M they wLsh to exploLt , and create great devastat Lon - soMethL ng that would be LMpossLble or unthLnk able for people who were depende nt upon that partLcu lar ecosyste M ... BLosphe re people create a natLona l parks. Ecosyste M people have always lLved Ln the equLval ent of at natLona l park ... I propose that the future belongs to those who can regaLn, a hLgher level, the old sense of balance and belon9Ln 9 between Man and nature (ecosyst eM people) .· (SessLo ns, pp-~18- 19) A bLoregL on Ls a part of earth's surface whose rough boundar Les are deterML ned by natural rather than huMan dLctate s, dLstLng uLshable froM other and areas by attrLbu tes of flora, fauna, water, clLMate , soLls, and land-for Ms, The to. rLse the huMan settleM ents and culture s those attrLbu tes have gLven borders between such areas are usually not rLgLd - Nature works wLth More flexLbL lLty and fluLdLty than that - but the general contour s of the regLons theMselv es are not hard to LdentLfy , and Lndeed wLll probabl y be felt, and understo od, sensed, or Ln soMe way known to Many of the LnhabLt ants, , partLcu larly those rooted Ln the land, farMers , rancher s, hunters and fLshers n, AMerlca of face the across foreste rs and botanLs ts, and Most especLa lly, the trlbal Indlans, those stLll Ln touch wLth a culture that for centurl es knew earth as sacred and Lts well-beL ng as LMperat Lve. The wLdest regLon, takLng Lts charact er froM the broades t Measure s of natLve vegetatL on and soLl contour s, May be called the ecore9Lo n and wLll general ly cover several hundred thousand s of square Mlles. But wlthln these ecoregL ons Lt Ls easy to dLstLngu Lsh other coheren t terrLtor Les that defLne a theMselv es prLMarL ly by theLr surface feature s - a watersh ed, or rLver basLn, the valley, a desert, a plateau , a MountaLn range - and whLch we May all call stLll locate often can one turn, Ln 9eore9L on. And wLthLn these 9eore9L ons, sMaller areas, of perhaps several thousand square MLles dLscret e and Ldentof LfLable wLth theLr own topograp hLes and LnhabLt ants, theLr own varLatLo ns huMan culture and agrLcul ture, to whLch we May gLve the · naMe vLtaregL on. Uhether we speak of ecoregL on or 9eore9Lo n or vLtaregL on, after all, we speak of bLoregLons , and Lt Ls that essentL al archetyp e that Ls Most LMporta nt to coMprehend. For once that Ls done on any sLgnLfL cant scale then the Matter of MakLng to dLstLnc tLons and creatLn g huMan LnstLtut Lons to Match theM can be safely left best. theM the LnhabLt ants, the dweller s on the land, who wLll always know The econoMy that coMes lnto belng wlthln a charact er froM the condLtL ons, the laws of Nature. what we can be sald to know wLth soMe surety llvlng on the soLl has been cogently SUMMarLsed as be dLstLng uLshed, froM the laws of TherMod ynaMLcs . The flrst law ls that conserv atlon, bloreglo n also derlves lts Our Lgnoranc e Ls LMMense, but after these Many centurL es of the laws of EcodynaMLcs - to preserv atlon, -27- sustena nce, ls the �central goat of the natural world, hence Lts fundaMentat resLstance to largescale structural change; the second law Ls that, far froM beLng entropLc Nature Ls Lnherently stable, workLng Ln all tLMes and places toward that ecology calls a ctLMax, that Ls, a balanced, harMonLous, LntegratLve state of MaturLty whLch, once reached, Ls MaLntaLned for prolonged perLods. FroM thLs Lt follows that a bLoregLonal econoMy would seek to MaLntaLn rather than exploLt the natural world, accoMModate to the envLronMent, rather than resLst Lt; Lt would atteMpt to create condLtLons for a clLMax, a balance, for what soMe econoMLsts have recently taken to callLng a "steady state," rather than for perpetual change and contLnuat growth, Ln servLce to "progress", a false and delusory goddess Lf ever there was one. It would, Ln practLcat terMs, MLnLMLse resource use, eMphasLse conservatLon and recyclLng, avoLd poltutLon and waste. It would adopt Lts systeMs to the gLven bLoregLonal resources - energy based on wLnd, for exaMple, where Nature catted for that, or wood where that was approprLate, and food based on what the regLon Ltself - partLcularly Ln Lts natLve, pre-agrLcutturat state could grow. And thus Lt would be based, above all, on the Most eleMentat and Most elegant prLncLpte of the natural world, that of setf-suffLcLency. Just as Nature does not depend on trade, does not create elaborate networks of contLnentat for the dependency, so the bLoregLon would fLnd all Lts needed resources Lts own wLthLn luxury Manufacture, craft, energy, food, shelter, clothLng, thus beLng envLronMent. And far froM Lt beLng deprLved, far froM Lt LMpoverLshed, Lt would gaLn Ln every Measure of econoMLc health. It would be More stable, free froM booM-and-bust cycles and dLstant potLtLcat crLses; Lt would be able to plan, to allocate at the safest pace, Ln the Most ecotogLcal Manner_ It would not be at the Mercy of dLstant and uncontrollable natLonal bureaucracLes and transnatLonal governMents, and thus More self regardLng, More cohesLve, developLng a sense of place, of COMMunLty of coMradeshLp, and the prLde that coMes froM stabLlLty, control, coMpetence, and Lndependence. In one of hLs More prescLent perceptLons FrLtz SchuMacher reatLsed that the Market econoMy of twentLeth century capLtatLsM erred fundaMentatty, because Lt erred repeatedly, agaLnst Nature. "It Ls Lnherent Ln the Methodology of econoMLcs to Lgnore Man's dependence on the natural world," he wrote. "The Market represents only the surface of socLety and Lts sLgnLfLcance relates to the MOMentary sLtuatLon as Lt exLsts there and then. There Ls no probLng Lnto the depths of thLngs, Lnlo the natural or socLat facts that lLe behLnd theM. • And thLs Ls why, as he poLnts out, conventLonal econoMLcs Makes no dLstLnctLons at all between prLMary goods, "whLch Man has to wLn froM nature," and secondary goods Manufactured froM theM, or between renewable or nonrenewable resources, or the envLronMental and socLal costs of developLng one agaLnst the other. A bLothese regLonal econoMy, Ln sharpest contrast, Makes - Ln fact Ls grounded Ln vLtal dLstLnctLons. PolLtLcal prLncLples on a bLoregLonal scale are also grounded Ln the dLctates presented by Nature, Ln whLch what Ls forever valued are not the LMperatLves of gLgantLsM, centralLzatLon, hLerarchy, and MonolLthLcLty, but rather, Ln starkest contraposLtLon, those of scale, decentralLsatLon, dLvLsLon, and dLversLty. The lessons are obvLous, and suggest LMMedLately the desLgn for a bLoregLon as for a contLnent of bLoregLons. Each unLt, of the sL2e that the natural settLngs proMote, May be unLfLed and cohesLve - startLng froM the base up wLth a neLghbourhood, a coMMUnLty, a sMatl town, att tLvLng sLde-by-sLde wLth others Ln settled and Mutual pattern, together wLth coMprLsLng a vLtare9Lon; and that a vLtaregLon May have Lts own unLfLcatLon and cohesLveness, Lts own Method of governance, and yet lLve sLde-by-sLde wLth other regLons, organLsed as they May -28- �see fLt; and so on, outward, Ln selfsuffLcLent collaboratLon, unLt upon unLt, for so long as the natural boundarLes May perMLt and the natural affLnLtLes be kept Lntact. SLMLlar lessons May be derLved froM the patterns of huHan nature. Thus throughout all huMan hLstory people have tended to lLve Ln separate and Lndependent groups, a "fragMentatLon of huMan socLety· that Harold Isaccs has descrLbed as soMethLng akLn to •a pervasLve force Ln huMan affaLrs and always has been.• Even when natLons and eMpLres have arLsen, he notes, they have no stayLng power agaLnst the Lnnate huMan drLve to fragMentatLon. In a bLoregLonal socLety, the dLvLsLon between urban and rural, LndustrLal and agrLcuttural, populatLon and resources, would be replaced by an equLLLbrLuM, a syMbLosLs. On the one hand, the cLty would be necessary as a producer of certaLn kLnds of goods, as a centre of artLstLc culture, as a source of the asseMbled cLvLc vLrtues, though the cLty need not be of LMMense sLze - Lndeed, no larger than 50,000 or 100,000 people - and Ln fact Ldeally would replLcate rather than grow so that Lnstead of a sLngle MetropolLs there would be a MultLplLcLty of cLtLes of Modest sLzes scattered throughout the bLoregLon. On the other hand, the country would be necessary as the prLMe source of food and water and the HaterLals of shelter and clothLng and artLsanshLp and trade, and especLatty as the eMbodLHent of the bLoregLonal spLrLt of Gaea, whose presence should be felt daLly by the LnhabLtants of every settleMent, of whatever sLze. BLoregLonalLsM Ls no More than the Modern versLon of a very old perceptLon of the world held not Merely by the Greeks but by vLrtually every prelLterate socLety of whLch we have knowledge. (Sate, 167-72) 8: TECHNOLOGY The qualLty of huMan exLstence and huMan welfare should not be Measured of products. Technology Ls returned to Lts ancLent place as an quantLty by only approprLate tool for huMan welfare, not an end Ln Ltself. There should be a rapLd MoveMent toward "soft• energy paths and "approprLate technology~ and toward lLfestytes whLch wLll result Ln drastLc decrease Ln per capLta energy consuMptLon Ln advanced LnductrLal socLetLes whLcl LncreasLng approprLate energy Ln decentralLzed vLllages Ln so-called "thLrd world" natLons. Deep ecologLst5 are coMMLtted to rapLd MOVeMent to a •steady-state• or •conservor socLety· both froH ethLcal prLncLples of har~onLous LntegratLon of huMans wLth nature and froM apprecLatLon of ecologLcal realLtLes. IntegratLon of sophLstLcated, elegant, unobtrusLve, ecologLcalty sound, approprLate technology wLth greatly scaled down, dLversLfLed, organLc, labor-LntensLve agrLculture, huntLng, and gatherLng Ls another goal. (Deep Ecology pp.311-12) QuestLonLng technology Ls a process of dLrect actLon that anyone can develop. It Ls one of the Host serLous act Lons that can ·be taken Ln a technocratLc socLety where the assuMptLon that •technology wLll solve all probleMs• Ls so deeply held. as a systeM or as a specLfLc devLce such as a To questLon technology coMputer - can often arouse hostLlLty, defena certaLn type of vehLcle or sLveness, LrrLtatLon, and resentMent Ln lLsteners. Anyone who questLons technology can be branded a "LuddLte" or antLModernLst. A person who says ·no to any technologLcal devLce Ls often charged as beLng antLprogressLve. Yet Ls crucLat to questLon technology, Ln spLte of these crLtLcLsMs. ~e need technology whLch Ls coMpatLble wLth the growth of autonoMous, selfdeterMLnLng LndLvLduats Ln nonhLerarchLcal coMHunLtLes. ~e need prLncLples that wLll help us escape the trap of technocratLc socLety, where technology Ls the -29- �central LnstLtutLon. Technology can be crLtLcLzed and evaluated based on general prLncLples, scale or structure. The followLng questLons can be asked of any technologLcal devLce or systeM: I. Does thLs technologLcal devLce serve vLtal needs? 2. ls thLs devLce or systeM of the sort that can be LMMedLately understood by nonexperts? 3. Does Lt have a hLgh degree of flexLbLlLty and MutabLlLty or does Lt LMpose a perManent, rLgLd, LrreversLble LMprLnt on the lLves of cLtLzens? local ~- Does thLs technologLcal devLce or systeM foster greater autonoMy of coMMunLtLes or greater dependency on soMe centralLzed "authorLty"? 5. ls thLs devLce or systeM ecologLcally destructLve or conducLve to a deep ecology way of lLfe? 6. Does thLs devLce or systeM enhance the LndLvLdualLty of persons or does Lt lead to bureaucratLc hLerarchLes? 7. Does thLs devLce or systeM encourage people to behave and thLnk lLke MachLnes? A fully LnforMed, approprLate technology Ls a MeetLng ground of ethLcs , polLtLcs, MechanLcal understandLng and deep ecologLcal conscLousness. As Langdon WLnner concludes Ln AutonoMous Technology, "If one lacks a clear and knowledgeable sense of what Means are approprLate lo the cLrcuMstances at hand, one's These Means do not choLce of Means can easLly lead to excesses and danger. Lnvolve just narrow utLlLty or effLcLency of productLon or profLt Ln soMe short-terM calculatLon. Indeed, the narrow eMphasLs upon effLcLency of Means drLves us away froM the larger Lssues of envLronMental ethLcs asnd LndLvLdual responsLbLlLty for the consequences of our actLons. (Deep Ecology, pp.35-6) Shallow approach: AcceptLng LndustrLalLzatLon of the kLnd ManLfested Ln the West as the natural goal for developLng countrLes. Low estLNatLon of deep cultural dLfferences wLth sLgnLfLcant devLatLons froM Western standards. Deep approach: SocLal and cultural dLversLty of dLfferent specLes Ls an essentLal IntensLfLed Measures to part of general rLchness and varLatLon of lLfe forMs. exLstLng non-LndustrLal stLll lLMLt the LMpact of Western technology upon cultures . Defence of the fourth world agaLnst cultural foreLgn doMLnatLon. PolLtLcal and econoMLc polLcLes Ln favour of subcultures and MLnorLtLes Ln LndustrLalLzed socLetLes. Support of local and soft technologLes as a Means to MaLntaLn baste cultural assessMent of technLcal LnnovatLon. Due regard to anLMal socLetLes and cultures. SurvLval of populatLons does not ensure survLval of socLal LnstLtutLons . QuestLonLng whether so-called advanced, Modern technologLes are approprLate relatLve to levels of pollutLon, resources, populatLon and as subordLnate part of general culture. (PhLlosophLcal Aspects, pp.12-13) Technology Ls More helpless than ever because the technology beLng produced doesn ' t fulfLll baste huNan needs, such as MeanLngful work Ln a MeanLngful envLronMent . TechnLcal progress Ls shaM progress because the terM technLcal progress Ls a cultural, not a technLcal, terM . Our culture Ls the only one Ln the hLstory of MankLnd Ln whLch the culture has adjusted Ltself to the technology, rather than vLce versa. (SLMple ' Ln Means, p.11) Once the scLentLfLc probleMs have been solved, once Lt Ls understood how a partLcular forM of pollutLon arLses and Ln what Lts danger consLsts, the next probleM Ls technologLcal : to dLscover a Method of reducLng thLs LncLdence. That Lnvolves decLdLng, Ln the fLrst place, whLch of the causatLve factors Lt wLll be easLest to control . KnowLng, for exaMple, that the Los Angeles sMog Ls a joLnt product of the sLtLng of Los Angeles, Lts hours of sunlLght and the exhaust -30- �fuMes froM the LnternaL coMbustLon engLne, Lt Ls at once apparent that onLy the thLrd of these Lf controLLabLe at a toLerabLe cost. So what has to be Lnvented Ls a devLce whLch wLLL reduce the output of hydrocarbons Ln exhaust fuMes. ThLs constLtutes a technoLogLcaL probLeM, the soLutLon to whLch LLes Ln the LnventLon of a devLce whLch wouLd satLsfy partLcuLar technLcaL specLfLcatLons . (The word devLce' Ls h~re beLng used Ln a very broad sense; an LnsectLcLde Ls a devLce and so Ls the sterLLLsLng of Lnsects as a Means of bLoLogLcaL control.) 0 The Ldea of a 'technoLogLcaL soLutLon' Ls, however, a good deaL Less straLghtforward than Lt at fLrst appears to be, as the phrase I used above 'at a toLerabLe cost' aLready hLnts. It Ls very easy to thLnk up technLcaL soLutLons of ecoLogLcaL probLeMs Lf we consLder theM Ln LsoLatLon~ and Lf we defLne a technLcaL soLutLon, wLthout any reference to costs, as one whLch descrLbes a way of freeLng ourselves froM the ecoLogLcaL condLtLon whLch concerns us. Such a soLutLon Ls soMetLMes saLd to be 'practLcaL' but not 'operatLonal'. So Los AngeLes sMog could be reduced Ln LntensLty by roofLng over the entLre cLty, or by MakLng everybody use pubLLc transport, or by substLtutLng fuel-ceLls, Ln theLr present state of developMent, for Lnternal coHbustLon engLnes. But few wouLd serLousLy advance these proposals as 'solutLons', as satLsfactory ways of deaLLng wLth the sMog probleM. ~hy not? SLMply because the costs, or so Lt Ls w~deLy beLLeved, wouLd be too great, costs of varLous sorts, socLal, ecologLcal, econoMLc and poLLtLcaL. In so far as ecologLcaL probleMs can be solved only wLth the help of scLentLfLc dLscovery and technoLogLcaL LnventLon, they can be soLved only wLthLn the ~estern ratLonal tradLtLons. That Much Ls obvLous. MystLcaL conteMplatLon wLlL not reveal to the cheMLst the orLgLns of the Los Angeles sMog or enabLe the engLneer to desLgn an effectLve devLce for reducLng Lts LntensLty. But Lt Ls a enthusLasM proper crLtLcLsM of ~estern socLety that, Ln Lts - often chLldLsh for technoLogLcaL 'advance', Lt has faLled adequateLy to consLder the costs of LntroducLng new devLces and has defLned 'costs' far too narrowly. ThLs objectLon can be dLrected, even, agaLnst antL-pollutLon devLces. The Manufacture of such devLces wLLL norMaLLy create · More polLutLon. It May, by ModLfyLng the character of the poLlutant, Lntroduce new dangers - reducLng the percentage of carbon MonoxLde Ln exhaust fuMes whLle LncreasLng the percentage of the no Less dangerous nLtrogen dLoxLde. Or Lt May shLft the LncLdence of the poLLutLon froM a weaLthLer to a poorer coMMunLty - ManufacturLng sMokeless fueLs Ln an LndustrLaL town to Make the London aLr cLeaner - wLthout reducLng Lts total voLuMe. Any technoLogLcal LnnovatLon, furtherMore, LnvoLves an eleMent of ecoLoe LcaL rLsk; Lt Ls LMpossLbLe to calculate all Lts consequences Ln every possLbLe cLrcuMstance. The best the technologLst can do Ls to exclude effects whLch are already known to be dangerous and to LnvestLgate further effects whLch are suspect . That Ls why, as I saLd earLLer, caLlLng upon the technologLst to save us Ls so often equated wLth caLLLng Ln the devLL as an exorcLst. But Lt wouLd be quLte wrong to conclude that for the reasons just advanced the technologLcaL Method of overcoMLng ecoLogLcaL probleMs would be abandoned, that what ~estern socLetLes should do Ls to shut down factorLes, Let us say, rather than LnsLst on theLr reducLng, by technoLogLcal Means, theLr eMLssLon of pollutants. For econoMLc and socLaL rLsks ~ and, Ln the end, greater ecoLogLcal rLsks Lf the socLaL resentMent engendered by the closure Ls dLrected agaLnst the whoLe systeM of ecoLogLcaL controls. It, too, May do no More than shLft the LncLdence of poLLutLon froM rLcher to poorer regLons, as the factory-owner takes hLs capLtal elsewhere. To gLve up takLng any rLsks would be to gLve up actLng . Every actLon costs soMethLng, rLsks soMethLng. Uhat can properLy be deManded Ls not that Men should cease to act Ln ways whLch LnvoLve ecologLcal rLsks - there are no such ways, as Matters now stand, whatever the sLtuatLon Ln the Garden of -31- �Eden - but rather that they shouLd take More account of the ecoLogLcaL costs and benefLts of theLr actLon. And thLs Means, once agaLn, that they wLLL hav~ to Make fuLLer use of ratLonaL Western-type Methods, cost benefLt anaLyses or decLsLon-procedures. (PassMore, pp.~8-50) EcoLogLcaL resLsters do not accept that there are onLy narrow technLcaL soLutLons to narrowLy defLned socLal probLeMs (such as aLr poLLutLon). These probLeMs are seen onLy as syMptoMs of the Larger Lssues. There are three MaLn dangers to technocratLc soLutLons. FLrst Ls the danger Ln beLLevLng there Ls a coMpLete or acceptabLe soLutLon usLng Modern doMLnant LdeoLogLes and technoLogy. The second danger Ls the presentatLon of an LMpressLon that soMethLng Ls beLng done when Ln fact the reaL probLeM contLnues. reaL work". FLnaLLy, there Ls the danger of TLnkerLng dLstracts froM the assuMLng there wLLL be new experts - such as professLonaL ecoLogLsts - who wLLL provLde the soLutLon but who May Ln fact be constraLned to be pubLLc reLatLons spokespersons for the agenda of profLt or power of soMe corporatLon or agency. EcoLogLcaL resLstance Ls actLon froM centraL prLncLpLes of doLng what Ls necessary, of wLtnessLng nonvLoLentLy. It arLses froM a shLft Ln conscLouness. EcoLogLcaL resLstLng Ls deeper, soMe wouLd say More radLcaL,. than just reforMLsM. SoMe of the reforMLst actLons to MLtLgate soMe of the worse forMs of aLr and water poLLutLon (due to auto exhaust, for exaMpLe) are MotLvated by concern onLy for huMan heaLth and safety and not by the LntrLnsLc vaLues of the bLosphere. But th LLMLts of reforMLSM are by now weLL known. (Deep EcoLog~, pp.195-6) In tryLng to exaMLne technoLogy and productLon, we encounter a curLous paradox. ~e are deepLy rLven by a great sense of proMLse about technLcaL LnnovatLon, on the one hand, and by a thorough sense of dLsenchantMent wLth Lts resuLts, on the other. ThLs duaL attLtude not onLy refLects a confLLct Ln the popuLar LdeologLes concernLng technoLogy but aLso expresses strong doubts about the nature of the Modern technologLcaL LMagLnatLon LtseLf. We are puzzLed that the very LnstruMents our MLnds have conceLved and our hands have created can be so easLly turned agaLnst us, wLth dLsastrous resuLts for our weLL-beLng Lndeed, for our very survLval as a specLes. Techne, Moreover, covered a wLder scope of experLence than the Modern word technLcs. The goaL of techne Ls not restrLcted to MereLy "LLvLng weLL. or lLvLng wLthLn the lLMLt. Techne LncLudes LLvLng an ethLcaL LLfe accordLng to an orLgLnatLve and orderLng prLncLple conceLved as "potency". VLewed even Ln an LnstruMental sense, techne thus encoMpasses not MereLy raw MaterLaLs, tooLs, MachLnes, and products but aLso the producer - Ln short, a hLghly sophLstLcated subject froM whLch aLL eLse orLgLnates. To ArLstotle, the "Master-craftsMan" Ls dLstLnguLshed subjectLveLy froM hLs apprentLces or assLstants by vLrtue of honor, a sense of "why" products are created, and generaLLy a wLsdoM of thLngs ArLstotLe subject, and phenoMena. By startLng wLth the ratLonaLLty of productLon the to estabLLshes a poLnt of departure for brLngLng ratLonaLLzatLon of the object. Modern LndustrLaL productLon functLons Ln precLseLy the opposLte way. Not only Ls the Modern LMage of techne LLMLted to Mere technLcs Ln the LnstruMentaL sense of the terM, but aLso Lts goaLs are LnextrLcabLy tLed to unLLMLted Ls conceLved as LLMLtLess consuMptLon wLthLn the productLon. "LLvLng weLL fraMework of a totaLLy unethLcaL, prLvatLzed LeveL of seLf-Lnterest. TechnLcs, not the producer and hLs or her ethLcaL standards LncLudes Moreover, (proLetarLans, after aLL, servLce the Modern LndustrLal apparatus Ln totaL anonyMLty) but the product and Lts constLtuLnts. The technLcaL focus shLfts froM -32- �the subject to the object, froM the producer to the product, froM the creator to the created. Honor, a sense of •why," and any generaL wLsdoM of thLngs and phenoMena have no pLace Ln the worLd requLred by Modern Lndustry. ~hat reaLLy counts Ln technLcs Ls effLcLency, quantLty, and an LntensLfLcatLon of the Labor process. The specLous ratLonaLLty LnvoLved Ln producLng the object Ls foLsted on the ratLonaLLzatLon of the subject to a poLnt where producer's subjectLvLty Ls totally atrophLed and reduced to an object aMong objects. (BookchLn, pp.219-22) 9: ON ECOLOGICAL CONSCIOUSNESS Deep ecoLogy Ls eMergLng as a way of developLng a new balance and harMony between LndLvLduaLs, coMMunLtLes and aLl of Nature. It can potentLaLLy satsLfy our deepest yearnLngs: faLth and trust Ln our Most basLc LntuLtLons; courage to take dLrect actLon; joyous confLdence to dance wLth the sensuous harMonLes dLscovered through spontaneous, playfuL Lntercourse wLth the rhythMs of our bodLes, the rhythMs of fLowLng water, changes Ln the weather and seasons, and the overaLL processes of LLfe on Earth. The deep ecology MoveMent Lnvolves workLng on ourselves, what poetphLLosopher Gary Snyder caLls "the reaL work,• the work of reaLLy LookLng at ourselves, of becoMLng More real. ThLs Ls the work we call cultLvatLng ecoLogLcaL conscLousness. ThLs process LnvoLves becoMLng More aware of the actuaLLty of rocks, wolves, trees, and rLvers - the cultLvatLon of the LnsLght that everythLng Ls connected. CultLvatLng ecologLcal conscLousness Ls a process of learnLng apprecLate sLLence and solLtude and redLscoverLng how to lLsten. It Ls learnLng how to be More receptLve, trustLng, holLstLc Ln perceptLon, and Ls grounded Ln a vLsLon of nonexploLtLve scLence and technology. ThLs process Lnvolves beLng honest wLth ourselves and seekLng clarLty Ln our LntuLtLons, then actLng froM cLear prLncLpLes, practLcLng seLf-dLscLpLLne and workLng honestLy wLthLn our coMMunLty. It Ls sLMpLe but not easy work. Henry DavLd Thoreau, nLneteenth-century naturalLst and wrLter, adMonLshes us, ·Let your lLfe be a frLctLon agaLnst the MachLne. • CuLtLvatLng ecoLogLcal conscLousness Ls correlated wLth the cultLvatLon of conscLence. CuLtural hLstorLan Theordore Roszak suggests Ln Person/PLanet conscLousness, how LnstructLve the overLappLng and "conscLence (1978), sLMLLarLty of those two words Ls. FroM the new conscLousness we are gaLnLng of ourseLves as persons perhaps we wLLL yet create a new conscLence, one whose ethLcaL sensLtLvLty Ls at Least tuned to a sLgnLfLcant good, a sLgnLfLcant evLL. We beLLeve that huMans have a vLtaL need to cuLtLvate ecologLcaL conscLousness and that thLs need Ls related to the needs of the planet. At the saMe tLMe, huMans need dLrect contact wLth untraMMeLed wLLderness, places undoMestLcated for narrow huMan purposes. Many people sense the needs of the pLanet and the need for wLLderness preservatLon. But we need not be technLcal experts Ln order to cultLvate ecotogLcal conscLousness, as Thoreau saLd, cuLtLvatLng ecotogLcaL conscLousness requLres that "we front up to the facts and deterMLne to lLve our lLves delLberately, or not at all." We belLeve that people can clarLfy theLr own LntuLtLons, and act froM deep prLncLpLes. Deep ecology Ls a process of even-deeper questLonLng of ourselves, the assuMptLons of the doMLnant worLdvLew Ln our culture, and the MeanLng and truth Ln our realLty. We cannot change conscLousness by only lLstenLng to others, we Must Lnvolve ourselves. We Mu~t take dLrect actLon. -33- �One hopeful poLLtLcaL MoveMent wLth deep ecology as a base Ls the Uest GerMan Green poLLtLcaL party. They have as theLr slogan, "ue are neLther Left nor rLght, we are Ln front.· Green poLLtLcs Ln Uest GerMany, and to soMe extent Ln Great BrLtaLn, BeLgLuM and AustraLLa Ln the 1980s, goes beyond the conventLonaL, tLberaL defLnLtLon of a party, coMbLnLng personal work (that Ls, work on cLarLfyLng one's own character) and polLtLcal actLvLsM. The Greens present a proMLsLng poLLtLcaL strategy because they encourage the cultLvatLon of personal ecoLogLcaL conscLousness as well as address Lssues of pubLLc polLcy. If the Greens propogate the bLocentrLc perspectLve - the Lnherent worth of other specLes besLdes huMans - then they can help change the current vLew whLch says we should use Nature only to serve narrow huMan Lnterests. CuLtLvatLng ecoLogLcaL conscLousness Ln conteMporary socLetLes, however, Ls a two-edged sword. Ue Must not be MLsLed by our zeaL for change so that we are concerned only wLth the narrow self or ego. If we seek only personal redeMptLon we could becoMe soLLtary ecologLcal saLnts aMong the Masses of those we MLght cLassLfy as "sLnners" who contLnue to pollute. Change Ln persons requLres a change Ln culture and vLce versa. We cannot Lgnore the personal arena nor the socLaL, for our project Ls to enhance harMony wLth each other, the planet and ourselves. (Deep Ecology, pp.7-1~) ~e began by suggestLng a varLety of specLfLc actLons whLch people can take dLrected at reforMLng publLc polLcy, developLng bLoregLonal coMMunLtLes, and cuLtLvatLng ecoLogLcaL conscLousness. Ue return to the theMe of dLrect actLon. ~e have deMonstrated that deep ecology Ls not just a gaMe of ~bstract theorLzLng. As a perspectLve Lt Ls lLved, danced, celebrated. It has resonance. Ln part, cuLtLvatLng what CuLtLvatLng ecoLogLcaL conscLousness Means, Ls engaged Ln the LnteLLect RhapsodLc Theodore Roszak caLLs rhapsodLc LntelLect. process of LntegratLng LntelLect, body, and joyous eMotLon. Based on the LnsLghts, uLtLMate norMs, prLncLples and theorLes of deep ecology, the central practLcaL questLon Ls how do we becoMe More Mature persons, gLven the constraLnts of th~s culture? Ue suggest there Ls an LnterpLay between outward dLrect actLon and Lnward dLrect actLon, between actLng on one's self and actLng Ln the world, wLth the result of further and deeper MaturLty Ln the deep ecologLcaL sense of LdentLfLcatLon wLth alL LLfe. There Ls no sharp break between Lnward and outward. People take dLrectLon actLon froM dLrect ecoLogLcal prLncLpLes and they becoMe More Mature through dLrect actLon. The Label we use for the type of dLrect actLon Ln Lts outward forM Ls ecoLogLcaL resLstLng. (Deep Ecology, p.19~) 'Deep ecology', an envLronMental scLence broadsheet tells us, Ls Naess's expressLon for an ecologLcaL awareness or conscLousness' . SpeLLLng deep ecology out then becoMes a Matter of settLng down the types of conscLousness and awareness and recognLtLon LnvoLved, SOMethLns that Ls done Ln a thoroughly anthropocentrL c way, begLnnLng as foLLows: 'a conscLousness of the LMplLcatLons of ecology for huMan beLng'. It Ls all Ln fact done Ln terMs of huMan responses, fundaMentaLLy Ls approach the AccordLn9Ly capacLtLes and psychology. MLsconceLved. For deep ecology Ls not so anthropocentrL c, and Ls no More a Matter of envLronMentaL psychology than Ls the value theory or MetaphysLcs whLch are part of Lt. The psychoL09LcaL conversLon Ls LLke cLaLMLng that 'MarxLsM' Ls an expressLon for socLaLLst conscLousness, or 'MusLc' for MusLco-LogLcal awareness. -34- �The conversLon of deep ecology Lnto awareness psychology, Lnto a certaLn sort of exercLse Ln self-realLsatLon or 'lLberatLng ecologLcal conscLousness, or conscLousness raLsLng', Ls open to sLMLlar objectLons. Ecology, deep or shallow or systeMatLc, Ls not ego-trLppLng or a personal thLng. Granted those who do have and share certaLn attLtudes and feelLngs to natural envLronMents are "uch More lLkely to becoMe actLve supporters or followers of deep ecology or to adopt a deeper ecologLcal stance. Even so such states as self-realLsatLon or ecologLcal conscLousness are neLther necessary nor suffLcLent for thLs. Such subjectLve states are not necessary because soMeone can beco"e a supporter of deep ecology wLthout havLng attaLned, or Made any effort to attaLn, these states. Thus consLder soMeone, a dedLcated naturalLst for Lnstance, who has no deep Lnterest Ln or understandLng of huMan psychology or socLology so far as these bear on the envLronMent. Such a person Ls a deep ecologLst, but lacks ecologLcal conscLousness as Lt Ls explaLned. The case of Peter SLnger Ln the anLMal lLberatLon "oveMent Ls LnstructLve; for SLnger goes out of hLs way to explaLn hLs dLsLnterest, hLs coMparatLve lack of zoologLcal conscLousness, that he does not LdentLfy wLth anLMals and so on, yet hLs LMpact for anLMal lLberatLon has been Most sLgnLfLcant. Analogously, a Deeper SLnger need not be Ln love wLth the Earth but feel rather Lsolated froM Lt and feel rLghtly that Most of Lts LnhabLtants dLslLke hLM or are frLghtened by hLM. He May have lLttle Ldea what Lt Ls lLke to be one of theM or a MountaLn, ... ; but he "ay have the rLght values, adhere to the rLght phLlosophy and undertake the rLght sorts of actLon and lLfestyle. GenuLnely and specLfLcally deep ecologLcal conscLousness has not been well descrLbed and Ls not partLcularly well defLned. And soMe of the requLreMents LMposed upon Lt, whatever Lt aMounts to, render Lt LMpossLble. Thus Fox, echoLng others, claLMs that 'to the extent that we perceLve boundarLes, we fall short of a deep ecologLcal conscLousness'. Then we all fall short, sLnce we are regularly confronted by, and perceLve, terrLtorLal boundarLes and a wLde range of other deMarcatLon lLnes and contrasts. Indeed fallLng short Ls LnevLtable; for hence and perceptLon necessarLly Lnvolves selectLon and dLscrLMLnatLon, separatLon and boundarLes. Deep conscLousness Ls also rendered LMpossLble by soMe of the LdentLfLcatLon requLreMents, drawn froM nature MystLcLsM, whLch are LMposed upon Lt. It Ls one thLng to be Ln tune wLth the unLverse (a Metaphor that can be spelled out), quLte another, and LMpossLble, feat to be LdentLcal wLth Lt, sLnce then a proper part would be LdentLcal wLth a whole contaLnLng Lt. SoMe explLcatLon of LdentLfLcatLon (trans-specLes and other) Ls LMportant for the elaboratLon of deep ecology, but the relatLon Lnvolved (though Lt concerns shared features, such as perhaps experLences) Ls not one of LdentLty or MakLng LdentLcal, as sLMplLstLc etyMology May suggest. Other requLreMents coMMonly placed on deep conscLousness, whLle they do not exclude Lt, render Lt unduly anthropocentrLc. (CrLtLque, pp.30-2) Deep ecologLsts agree wLth BLrch and Cobb's LnsLght that "huMan beLngs are More deeply Moved by the way they experLence theLr ~orld than by the claLMs ethLcs Makes on theM." Thus, where conteMporary envLronMental phLlosophy Ls doMLna~ed by the questLon "How do we construct an adequate envLron"ental ethLc? , deep ecology asks the questLon "How do we cultLvate a deep ecologLcal conscLousness?" The forMer questLon looks to conceptual answers, the latter to experLentLal answers. In seekLng to change the way Ln whLch we experLence the world, deep ecologLsts place theLr prLMary eMphasLs upon changLng our ·underlyLng perceptLon of the way thLngs are" (L.e. changLng our ontology) rather than upon what we MLght terM the "conceptual fLx• approach of "bL99er and better" ethLcs. ThLs atteMpt to shLft the prLMary focus of envLronMental phLlosophLcal concern froM ethLcs to ontology clearly constLtutes a fundaMental or revolutLon- -35- �ary chaLLenge to norMaL envLronMentaL phLLosophy. It Ls (and should be) deep ecology's guLdLng star. (GuLdLng Stars, p.204) 10: ON HOLISM AccordLng to deep ecology: A new cosMLc/ecoLogLcaL MetaphysLcs whLch stresses the LdentLty (I/thou) of huMans wLth non-huMan nature Ls a necessary condLLons for a vLabLe approach to buLLdLng an eco-phLLosophy. In deep ecology, the wholeness and LntegrLty of a person/planet together wLth the prLncLpLe of what Arne Naess caLLs "bLoLogLcaL egaLLtarLanLsM" are the Most LMportant Ldeas. Man Ls an LntegraL part of nature, not over or apart froM nature. Man Ls a "pLaLn cLtLzen· of the bLosphere, not Lts conqueror or Manager .. There should be a "deMocracy of aLL God's creatures" accordLng to St. FrancLs; or as SpLnoza saLd, Man Ls a "teMporary and dependent Mode of the whole of God/Nature.· Man flows wLth the systeM of nature rather than atteMptLng to control aLL of the rest of nature. The hand of Man LLes LLghtLy on the Land. Man does not perfect nature, nor Ls Man's prLMary duty to Make nature More effLcLent. A new psychology Ls needed to Lntegrate the MetaphysLcs Ln the MLnd fLeLd of post-LndurtrLaL socLety. A Major paradLgM shLft results froM psychoLogLcaL changes of perceptLon. The new paradLgM requLres rejectLon of subject/object, Man/nature duaLLsMs and wLLL requLre a pervasLve awareness of total LnterMLngLLng of the planet earth. Psychotherapy seen as adjustMent to eco-orLented socLety Ls replaced by a new LdeaL of psychotherapy as spLrLtuaL deveLopMent. The new MetaphysLcs and psychology Leads LogLcaLLy to a posture of bLospherLc egaLLtarLanLsM and LLberatLon Ln the sense of autonoMy, physoLogLcaL/eMotLona L freedoM of the LndLvLduaL, spLrLtuaL deveLopMent of HoMo sapLens, and the rLght of other specLes to pursue theLr own evoLutLonary destLnLes. (Deep Ecology MoveMent, pp.310-11) RejectLon of the Man-Ln-envLronMent LMage Ln favour of the reLatLonaL, totaL-fLeLd LMage. OrganLsMs as knots Ln the bLospherLcaL net or fLeLd of LntrLnsLc reLatLons. As LntrLnsLc reLatLon between two thLngs ~ and B Ls such that the reLatLon belongs to the defLnLtLons or basLc constLtutLons of A and ~• so that wLthout a reLatLon, ~and~ are no Longer the saMe thLngs. The totaLfLeLd Model dLssoLves not only the Man-Ln-envLronMent concept, but every coMpact thLng-Ln-MLLLeu concept - except when taLkLng at a superfLcLaL or preLLMLnary Level of coMMunLcatLon. (Shallow and Deep, p.95) Shallow envLronMentaLLsM atteMpts to curb soMe of the Most gLarLng envLronMentaL abuse such as poLLutLon and resource depLetLon whLLe caLLLng for no basLc change Ln the anthropocentrLc urban-LndustrLaL socLaL paradLgM. Naess descrLbes Lts central objectLve as "the health and affluence of people Ln the developed countrLes." The Deep Ecology MoveMent, on the other hand, gathers LnspLratLon froM the fLeLd ecoLogLst and Ls a rejectLon of the Man-Ln-envLronMent LMage Ln favor of the reLatLonaL, totaL-fLeLd LMage. OrganLsMs are knots Ln the bLospherLcaL net or fLeLd of LntrLnsLc reLatLons. w (SessLons, p . 398) 0 Because they cannot conceLve Man apart' they experLence no dLffLcuLty Ln attrLbutLng LntrLnsLc value to nature. In so far as they conceLve theMseLves as havLng such value, the LnabLLLty to separate theLr selves froM nature, LnescapabLy Leads to thLnkLng of "Man" and ·envLronMent' as a whole. (Gestalt thLnkLng.) In thLs century the reactLon agaLnst conceLvLng the LndLvLduaL self as soMethLng separable froM the socLaL settLng has been Largely successful, but not the paraLLeL reactLon agaLnst the separabLLLty froM the natural settLng. (PhLLosophLcaL Aspects, p.35) By subtractLng your own self-centred and seLf-servLng -36- thoughts froM the �world you coMe to reaLLze that "the other Ls none other than yourself: that the fundaMentaL deLusLon of huManlty ls to suppose I aM here and you are out there_· ThLs understandLng perMeates the MystLcaL tradLtLons and Ls exeMpLLfLed Ln the TaoLst advLce to "LdentLfy yourself wLth non-dLstLnctLon_ • It ls now becoMlng coMMonpLace to polnt to the fundaMentaLLy slMlLar cosMoLogLes eMobdLed Ln the MystLcaL tradLtLons on the one hand and the 'new physlcs' on the other_ What Ls structurally sLMllar about these cosMoLogLes Ls that they reveal a 'seaMLess web' vLew of the unLverse_ Both the MystLcaL tradLtLons and the new physLcs' serve to generate Lnter aLLa, what we MLght now caLL 'ecoLoglcaL awareness', .that Ls, awareness of the fundaMentaL LnterreLatedne~s of aLL thLngs or, More accurately, aLL events_ The theoretlcaL physLclst Frltjof Capra has been quLte expLlcLt about thls: "1 thLnk what physLcs can do Ls help to generate ecoLogLcaL awareness_ You see, Ln MY vLew now Ln the Western versLon of MystLcaL awareness, our versLon of BuddhLsM or TaoLsM, wLLl be ecologLcal awareness_" Where the physLcLst, the Mystlc, and the deep ecologLst (as phLlosopher) dLffer Ls Ln theLr Means of arrLvLng at 'ecologLcal awareness ' ___ _ The deep ecologLst's conceptLon of unLty Ln process' need not LMpLy that, at any gLven MOMent, all 'knots' (L_e_ organLsMs) Ln the 'bLospherLcal net' are constLtuted of equally coMpLex reLatLons_ To the extent that value Lnheres Ln coMplexLty of relatLons, and to the extent that coMplexLty of reLatLons Ls evLdenced Ln the degree of an organLsM's central organLzatLon (and therefore capacLty for rLchness of experLence), then organLsMs are entLtLed to Moral consLderatLon coMMensurate wLth theLr degree of central organLzatLon (or capaclty for rlchness of experlence) for the duratlon of thelr exlstence - as transLent as that May be Ln terMs of evolutLonary tLMe_ In pursulng theLr central LntuLtLon of 'unLty' (L_e_ of no boundarLes Ln the bLospherLcal fLeLd), deep ecoLogLsts have possLbly Lost sLght of the sLgnLfaspect of theLr 'unLty Ln process' MetaphysLcs_ Lcance of the 'Ln process AttentLon to thLs Latter aspect suggests that any process contLnuousLy produces LMperManent, uneven dLstrLbutLons (L_e_, dLfferent values) of varLous attrLbutes (and Ln the process of the world these attrLbutes May be Money, LnforMatLon, coMplexLty of relatLons, and so on)_ If thLs were not so then we would have no process but a perfectly unLforM, hoMogenous and, therefore, LLfeless fLeld_ The only unLverse where value Ls spread evenly across the fLeLd Ls a dead unLverse _ RecognLsLng thLs, we should be clear that the central LntuLtLon of deep ecology does not entaLl the vLew that LntrLnsLc value Ls spread evenly across the MeMbershLp of the bLotLc coMMunLty_ Moreover, Ln sLtuatLons of genuLne value conflLct, justLce Ls better served by not subscrLbLng to the vLew of ecoLogLcal -egaLLtarLanLsM_ (Fox, pp-196-200) An arctLc Landscape May superfLcLaLly Look rather dead Ln wLnter. In sprLng Lt May Look overwheLMLngLy aLLve_ It would take a Long traLnLng to force perceptLon to dLstLnguLsh organLsM froM non-organLsMs Ln such a LLve Landscape_ Even Ln wLnter the Lover of the Landscape sees abundance of LndLvLduaL LLfe forMs and also hLgher order gestaLts_ Why Ls the gestalt ontology not MentLoned Ln the platforN forMulatLon_ A Landscape wLth organLsMs - and aLL Landscapes have organLsMs Ln MLcro-organLsMs are counted - Ls a hLgh order, natural gestalt_ The separatLon of organLsMs and non-organLsMs Ls very unnatural Ln gestalt thLnkLng and apperceptLon. But the concepts of 9estaLt-thlnkln9 are too specLaL for pLatforM forMuLatLons- Only a MLnorLty of supporters of deed ecology are acadeMLcs_ (Notes on Sylvan, p-7) -37- �BIBLIOGRAPHY Sources used 0 S. BodLan, S LMple Ln Means, rLch Ln ends: A conversatLon wLth Arne Naess', Ten DLrectLons, SuMMer/Fall, 1982, 7,10-12; referred to as SLMple Ln Means. M. BookchLn, The Ecology of FreedoM, CheshLre, Londong, 1982; referred to as F. Capra and C. Spretnak, Green PolLtLcs, HutchLnson, London, 198~; referred as Green PolLtLcs. to Bookch i,n. B. Devall, 'The Deep Ecology MoveMent', Natural Resources Journal 20, 1980, 299-322; referred to as Deep Ecology MoveMent. B. Devall, 'stone/Sky: ReflectLons on the 'Real ~ork' of Deep Ecology', paper delLvered at EnvLronMent, EthLcs and Ecology Conference, Canberra, August 1983, 20ff.; referred to as Stone/Sky . 8. Devall and G. SessLons, Deep Ecology, PeregrLne SMLth, Layton, Utah, 1985; referred to as Deep Ecology. U. Fox, Deep Ecology: A new phLlosophy 194-200; referred to as Fox. of our tLMe', EcologLst 1~, 1984, U. Fox, 'on guLdLng stars to Deep Ecology', EcologLst 14, 1984, 203-4; to as GuLdLng Stars. A. Naess, 'The shallow and the deep, long-range ecology MoveMent. InquLry 18, 1973, 95-100; referred to as Shallow and Deep. A. Naess, 'PhLlosophLcal Aspects of Deep Ecology ' , unpublLshed 1983, 35ff.; referred to as PhLlosophLcal Aspects. A. N.3 ess, • IntuLtLon, LntrLnsLc value and Deep 201-3; referred to as IntuLtLon. Ecology', referred A SUMMary. paper, EcologLst 14, Oslo, 1984, A. Naess, Notes on the PolLtLcs of the Deep Ecology MoveMent ' , unpublLshed paper, Canberra, 1984, 17ff.; referred to as PolLtLcs of the Deep Ecology MoveMent. A. Naess, 'What Ls basLc to Deep Ecology?', unpublLshed paper, 12ff . ; referred to as BasLc. A. Naess, A defence of the Deep Ecology 1984, 265-70; referred to as Defence. MoveMent', Canberra, 1984, EnvLronMental EthLcs A. Naess, 'The paradox of envLronMentalLsM' SyMposLuM ProceedLngs, (ed.), York UnLversLty, 1984, 57-60; referred to as Paradox. N. S, Everden A. Naess, 'IdentLfLcatLon as a source of Deep EcologLcal attLtudes', Deep Ecology, M. TobLas (ed.), Avant Books, San DLego, 1985, s256-70; referred to as ldentLfLcatLon. A. Naess, Notes on Professor Sylvan's crLtLque of the Deep Ecology MoveMent, unpublLshed paper, Olso, 1985, 19ff.; referred to as Notes on Sylvan. J. PassMore, Man's ResponsLb~lLty For Nature, 2nd ed., Duckworth, London, 1980; -38- �referred to as PassMore. A new way to treat the Land', EcoLogLst 14, 1984, BLoregLonaLLsM K. Sale, 167-73; referred to as Sale. the ph~Losoph~cal and Deep Ecology: A rev~ew of 'shallow G. Sess~ons, EcoLogLcaL (eds.), Hughes J.D. and Ln R.C. Schultz unfortune', UnLvers~ty Press of AMer~ca, ~ash~ngton, D.C., 1981, Consc~ousness, 391- 4 62; referred to as Sess~ons. R. Sylvan, A Cr~t~que of Deep Ecology, Research School of SocLaL AustraLLan Hat~onaL Un~vers~ty, 1985; referred to as Cr~t~que. ScLences, Further Read~ngs R.F. OasMann, Env~ronMentaL Conservat~on, 5th ed., ~LLey, New York, 1984. A. Leopold, A Sand Country ALManac, CheshLre, New York, 1966. E. PapadukLs, The Green MoveMent Ln ~est GerMany, Croon HeLM, London, 1984. -39- �DEEP ECOLOGY AHO GREEN POLITICS Deep Ecology Ls an envLronMe~tal theory or platforM wLth polLtLcal sLgnLfLcant wLth pLatforM i..MplLcatLons. Breen PoLLtLcs Ls a poLi..tLcaL envLronMentaL LMpLLcatLons. Both arose Ln Large part Ln reactLon to prevaLLLng envi..ronMentaL practLces; but Deep Ecology concentrates rather on theoretLcal reflectLon, Green PolLtLcs on practLcaL actLon . Deep and LnvestLgatLon questLoni..ng of the underlyLng doMi,nant attLtudes, seen as the Major source of ecoL09Lcal and other probLeMs, Led to artLcuLatLon of the Deep EcoLogy pLatforM, partLy outLi..ned Ln ·slogan" forM Ln the foLLowi..ng tabLe. ). TABLE 1. DEEP ECOLOGY CONTRASTED WITH DOMINANT ATT ITIJOES DOMINANT ATTITUDES [OOMIHAHT PARADIGM] DEEP ECOLOGY [RIVAL EHVIRONMEHTAL PARADIGM] OoMi..nati..on over Nature Nature a Resource; IntrLnsLc VaLue confi..ned to HuMans NaturaL EnvLronMent VaLued for Itself; Bi..ocentri..c EgaLi..tari..ani..sM AMp Le Reso1J rces/Subs t i.. tu tes Earth SuppLLes Li..MLted MaterLaL EconoMLc Growth a predoMLnant goaL Non-MaterLaL GoaLs, especLaLLy SeLf-ReaLi..zati..on ConsuMer i,sM DoLng wLth Enough/RecycLLng CoMpetLti..ve Li..festyLe Cooperati..ve Li..feway CentraLLzed/ Urban Centred/ Hati..onaL focus Decentral.i..zed/ Bi..oregi..onaL/ Nei..ghbourhood focus Power structure Hi..erarchLcaL Non-h i,erarch Lea L/ Grass roots DeMocrac!::I HLgh TechnoL09y Appropri..ate Technology Whi..Le Deep Ecol.og!::j grew froM the work of one envLronMentaL phi..Losopher (Naess Ln 1872), Green PolLtLcs arose (Ln West GerMany sLnce 1876) froM the synthesLs of several. MoveMents - ecol.09!::j, cLtLzens, aLternatLve, peace and other MoveMents. The pLatforM of Green PoLLtLcs, whLch Ls buLLt around four pLLLars socLaL responsLbLLLty, grassroots deMocracy , and non-vLoLence ecology, refLects these orLgLns. The fLrst of these pLLLars, ecoLog!::j, Ls based on the sLMpLe theMe that LLMLted ecoLogi..caL systeMs cannot sustai..n unLi..MLted econoMi..c growth, or such questi..onabLe types of growth as nucLear power, wi..thout serLous rLsk of daMage and degeneratLon. The Green aLM Ls to Move to S!::jsteMs of producti..on and consuMptLon whLch MaLntai..n and restore natural processes and C!::fCLes rather than doMLnate or destroy theM - a Move towards harMony wLth nature. The second pi..LLar of Green PoLLtLcs, socLaL responsLbLLLt!::j, LMpLLes opposi..tLon to the LnequaLLti..es i..n power and doMLnati..on reLati..onshi..ps of present soci..ety, and reMovaL of di..scri..Mi..nati..on, econoMLc hardshi..p and exploi..tati..on, both regi..onally and as regards the ThLrd ~orLd. The Green aLM - to be achi..eved pri..Mari..Ly froM below, Ls to bui..ld stable and just soci..al through those adversely affected arrangeMents, wLth coMprehensLve deMocrati..c rLghts and freedoMs (both i..n 6erMan~ -1- �and where GerMan operatLons LMpLnge Ln the ThLrd WorLd). These changes are to be brought about by grassroots deMocracy, the thLrd pLLLar, through Lncreased reaLLsatLon of dLrect decentraLLsed deMocracy. ThLs LnvoLves organLsatLon and coordLnatLon of decentraLLsed basLc unLts (Local, COMMunLty and dLstrLct) whi..ch are gLven extensLve, but not coMpLete, autonoMy, as weLL as wLde use of : referenda, deLegatLon practLces, and rotatLon of offLce-hoLders. The fourth and fLnaL pLLLar, non-vLoLence, LMpli..es the reMovaL of coercLve and aLso oppressLve practLces, not Merely by More powerful people, but especLaLLy by socLaL groups and states, and also, More posLtLveLy, acti..ve depoLyMent of varLous Methods of socLal protest, resLstance and defence . The coMpatLbLlLty of Means wLth ends serves here as an LMportant underlyLng prLncLple: that a just, non-vLolent, huMane end-state cannot be satLsfactorLLy achLeved by unjust, vi..oLent, LnhuMane Means . • l Gr een PolLtLcs offers then a broad prograM for socLal change, whLch LncLudes the More specLfLc and ecologLcalLy focussed Deep Ecology platforM as a quLte proper part. Put dLfferentLy, Green PoLLtLcs coMbLnes a wLder pLuraLLty of The strand. LMportant MoveMents of whLch Deep Ecology represents one Lnter-relatLons are shown pLctorLaLly at the second level of the foLlowLng 12 dLagraM: DIAGRAM 1. DOUBLE PYRAMID, SETTING DEEP ECOLOGY IM PLACE p B \ '\ I 2C ] ~ Oer Lva ti..on Di,recti,on 2+ ExpLanatLon Oi,recti..on 2. Deep Ecology pLatforM 2C. ReforMLst envLronMentaL 2 p1Jsi.. t i.,Qn 2+. Vague fundaMentaLs of Green pLatforM -/ //' ;/ e.g. Buddhi..st (B), ChrLstLan (C) and (Eco)-PhLLosophLc (P) ultLMate bases j / -\,r - [ 1. Deep Ecology fundaMentaLs; C \ \ \ 3. s \ General norMs and theMes , substanti,ally derLved froM pl,atforM PartLcuLar norMs and concrete decLsLons , appLyLng to reLevant practLcal sLtuatLons. The ecologLcaL coMponent of Green PolLtLcs May not go very deep; Lt May on l y be based upon reforM envLronMentalLsM (or shallow ecology as i,t used to be I Starred notes LndLcate poi..nts at wh i..ch readLngs wi..th the correspondLng nuMbers May be Lnserted or undertaken . -2- �caLLed), whLch aLM3 to reforM 30Me of the wor3t abuse3 and exces3e3 of the doMLnant posLtLon, such as gross poLLutLon, extensLve despoLLatLon of Land and Lakes and oceans, LLttLe thought for the future, MLstreatMent of anLMals, etc_ On shaLlow ecology, nature Ls not valued for Ltself, but as a resource, that Ls LnstruMentalLy, for what Lt can be used for by huMans_ By contrast, Deep Ecology argues (e_g_ froM preMLsses of Level I) that the envLronMent Ls LntrLnsLcaLLy valuable, that nature Ls valuable Ln and for Ltself; and that, furtherMore, LntrLnsLc value Ls equally dLstrLbuted_ ThLs projectLon of egsLLtarLan or LMpartLalLty prLncLpLes, usually restrLcted to huMans, to the whole of lLfe Ln the natural worLd, gets dLgnLfLed by the tLtle, BLocentrLc EgalLtarLanLsM_ The prLncLple, not part of Green PoLLtLcs, Ls perhaps the Most controversLal of the central prLncLpLes of Deep Ecology; but Lt or soMe substLtute for Lt Ls requLred, granted that the natural world contaLns value beyond that accruLng to huMans and theLr features, to expLaLn how value Ls dLstrLbuted_ Deep Ecology accounts for the dLstrLbutLon through what Ls . . presented as a core deMocracy ~n the bLosphere . _•3 Deep Ecology grew out of a phLlosophLcal deepenLng of the new features of the scLence of ecology, whLch served to dLstance ecology froM the standard run of reductLonLst scLences (through such features as holLsM; gestalt propertLes; systeMs whLch are More than the suM of theLr atoMLstLc parts; eMergent eleMents, lLke lLfe, organLsatLon, etc_ )_ Deep Ecology quLckLy aLLLed Ltself wLth the subversLve features of unco-opted ecology, Ln partLcuLar, the eMphasLs on the lLMLts, and ultLMate faLlure of (atoMLstLc) reductLonLsM Ln scLence and phLlosophy_ WLth such an orLgLn, Lt Ls not surprLsLng that there Ls lLttle dLrectLy about such MaLn pLllars of Green PolLtLcs as socLaL responsLbLLLty and non-vLoLence Ln the pLatforM of Deep Ecology- However Deep Ecology Ls coMpatLbLe wLth these Green pLlLar prLncLpLes, and Lndeed perMLts theLr derLvatLon_ ~hat Ls supposed to resuLt are generaL norMs, LLke No exploLtatLon, No subjectLon, No vLoLence, at leveL 3_ (Such a derLvatLon of a non-vLoLence prLncLpLe froM tne Deep Ecology prLncLpLe of MaxLMLzLng Self-reaLLsatLon Ls atteMpted by Naess Ln the fraMework of hLs systeM of Eco-phLLosophy)_•l A MaLn focus of Deep Ecology Ls on changLng huMan reLatLons wLth the natural envLronMent, away froM doMLnant expLoLtatLve practLces_ The naturaL envLronMent coMprLses LteMs of LntrLnsLc value, LncludLng huMans (who are not above or separate froM Lt), and accordLn9ly Ls to be treated wLth the care and respect valuable LteMs warrant, and not LrresponsLbLy_ Thus Lt would be contrary to Deep Ecology to treat the envLronMent or Lts valued LteMs vLolently whLch however Ls what Deep Ecology contends doMLnant practLces do (consLder such wLdespread phenoMena as "rape of the envLronMent", "of the Land", "of the forestsu)_ SLnce huMans are not apart froM or superLor to nature, Lt follows froM the Deep Ecology pLatforM that natural and proper relatLons also exclude vLoLence towards other huMans or classes of huMans_ Because Lt covers a pluraLLty of posLt~ons, LncludLng shaLLow ecoLogLcaL posLtLons, Green PolLtLcs Ls Much More aMelLoratLve and reforMLst Ln character than Deep Ecology, whLch Ls further reMoved froM doMLnant attLtudes, More hardLLne, and More radLcaL_ ~hereas Deep Ecology goes to fundaMentaLs, and focusses on Ldeals and theory, Green PolLtLcs tends to concentrate on practLcal polLtLcal probleMs of an envLronMental or socLal kLnd, such as acLd raLn or rLver pollutLon or MLssLle deplo8Ment, and (lLke the Peace MoveMent Ln AustralLa) Ls not so Much concerned wLth refLnLng Lts rather vague prLncLpLes or wor~Lng out an env~ronMentaL (or peace) ph~Losophy_ Because of Lts envLronMentaL depth and natural world focus, Deep Ecology Ls concerned wLth a range of natural envLronMent Lssues, such as wLlderness, rare specLes, and the radLcal -3- �transforMatLon of agrLcuLture, whLch are onLy of passLng Lnterest to a sMaLL MLnorLty Ln Green PoLLtLcs or are beyond Lts poLLtLcaL reach. Jn Lts reforMLst styLe Green PoLLtLcs does not venture far beyond prevLous Left-LeanLng poLLtLcaL MoveMents, except, fLrstLy, Ln Lts opposLtLon to envLronMent and aMenLty daMa9Ln9 LndustrLaLLsM and, secondLy, as regards non-vLolence and Lts coMMLtMent to attaLnLng peace. Non-vLoLence Ls the Most controversLaL of the four pLLLars. For non-vLoLence ruLes out a range of poLLtLcal actLon, LncLudLn9 typLcal protests, confrontatLon and revoLutLons. Non-vLolence also LMplLes, what Ls very dLfferent froM current MLLLtary pra~tLces, socLal defence. WhLLe MaLn factLons Ln the Green MoveMent support non-vLolent Methods and socLal defence, other Lesser factLons hold that force Ls necessary to brLn9 about varLous necessary changes and for defence purposes. The Deep EcoLogy platforM Lncludes severaL prLncLpLes that would be recognLsed by onLy a MLnorLty of the Green MoveMent. One of these prLncLples (whLch however, unlLke BLocentrLc EgalLtarLanLsM, would not be wLdeLy opposed by reforMLst Greens) Ls the core prLncLpLe of SeLf-reaLLsatLon, or More exactLy of MaxLMLzLng SeLf-reaLLsatLon. The notLon of self-realLsatLon of varLous relLgLous posLtLons, of the full unfoldLng and developMent of the person, Ls vastly expanded Ln Deep EcoLogy to Lnclude brLngLng to fuLl fruLtLon not MereLy one's own person, but all that one LdentLfLes wLth, that Ls the expanded Self, whLch Ls taken to be not Merely one's faMLLy or feLlows or fellow natLonals, nor Merely ~as on huManLstLc ethLcs) the whole huMan race, but the whole naturaL 1 systeM. The SeLf-realLsatLon prLncLpLe, sprLngLng as Lt appears froM an enLLghtened personal self-Lnterest prLncLple, has an excellent phLlosophLcaL pedLgree (at Least as applLed to huMans or neL9hbourLn9 classes of huMans). Thus rather than beLng argued for, a dLffLcult Matter Ln the case of ultLMate prLncLples, SeLfrealLsatLon Ls LMported froM syMpathetLc phLlosophLcal or reLLgLous posLtLons at Level 1 of the double pyraMLd, froM those that help sustaLn Deep Ecology. However the expansLon Lnvolved, the derLvatLon process froM narrow self to coMprehensLve Self, severs the usual justLfLcatory lLnks. It Ls hard to LdentLfy one's self-Lnterests wLth those of a rock or an acorn. So the supposed LdentLfLcatLon - wLth soMe or aLL MountaLns, rLvers and raLnforests Ln the wLder reMaLns, LLke the assocLated extended EgaLLtarLan Self, Nature personLfLed prLncLpLe, decLdedLy probLeMatLc. Because Lt Ls assuMed that SeLf-reaLLsatLon Ls dLrected to ecoLogLcal and spLrLtual ends, not at MaterLaL goods or Means, SeLf-reaLLsatLon Leads to the 16 AMong the raMLfLcatLons of the slogan slogan, USLMpLe Ln Means, rLch Ln endsn. are those concernLng what kLnd of technology one uses and where one lLves (the Matter of dwellLng Ln sLtuatLons of Lnherent value and the lLke), what and how Much one consuMes, and so on. The doMLnant attLtudes, forMed around of econoMLc growth and econoMLc routes to happLness, have MaxLMLzatLon eMphasLsed both MaterLal goals and MaterLal Means, partLcuLarly personal consuMerLsM. But Lf MaterLaL use and pure consuMptLon are to be reduced for envLronMentaL and other reasons, what LLfestyles are approprLate? Deep Ecology, LLke Lts fundaMentaL sources, poLnts to experLentLal and spLrLtuaL ends and eMphasLzes the rLchness of non-MaterLaL ends avaLlabLe. The result, of course, Ls practLces whLch are sLMpLe, voluntary sLMpLLcLty, do~ng wLth enough, and, More 9enerall8, practLces whLch lLe lLght on the Land and the naturaL world. In way of d0Ln9 thLngs, these wLLL be Lnte9rated (Ln ~ properly ecoLogLcaL syMbLotLc and other naturaL styles) wLth the natural systeMs LnvoLved, workLng wLth rather than agaLnst the natural fLow. The practLces, and organLsatLonaL approprLate to regLonaL wLLl accordLngly be ecoregLonaL arrangeMents, 17 to be caLLed. coMe have they as bLore9LonaL, ecoL09LcaL 9roupLn9s - or -4- �ApproprLate Means LncLude, Ln turn, technLques approprLate to the practLce and theory of Deep Ecology- HLgh technoL09Les such as nuclear power are not approprLate, even Ln advanced LndustrLaL socLetLes, but LnapproprLate because of the envLronMentaL and socLaL costs and rLsks such technoLogLcaL forMs LMpose_ On both deep and green percept i,ons, wh-3 t Ls requ Lred a re re LLab Le c-:1 ref u L technoLogLes whLch are not ecoLogLcaLLy daMa9Ln9 or socLaLLy rLsky or otherwLse undesLrabLe; but the technoLogi,es adl"li,tted wLLl dLffer accordLng to the prLncLpLes of the posLtLons they answer back to (e_g_ farMLng technLques wLLL need to be very dLfferent froM those prevaLLLng Ln rural GerMany to Meet such prLncLpLes as bLospherLc egaLLtarLanLsM )_ In each case the practLcaL use of approprLate technoLogy faLLs at the bottoM, actLon Level, of the doubLe pyral"I ,,"d _•8 WhLLe Deep Ecology suppLLes an appeaLLng bLueprLnt for dLfferent socLaL and LLfe-ways, the questLon reMaLns: how Ls the proMLsed Land reached? A MaLn part of the answer Ls taken to be gLven through a further crucLaL feature of Deep Ecology: EcoLogLcaL ConscLousness, a notLon agaLn expandLng upon conceptLons of other oLder LdeoLogLes (e_g_ of reLL9Lous, or of revoLutLonary, conscLousness)_ What Ls dLfferent Ls that spLrLtuaL or LdeoLogLcaL conversLon Ls agaLn broadened froM the personaL and socLaL to coMprehend the fuLL envLronMentaL predLcaMent_ In thLs expLanatLon, of how peopLe get, and are got, to grasp Deep Ecology and Lts practLces, the pyraMLd Ls ascended, froM actLon to Ldeas, to deeper explanatory prLncLpLes_ A thorough conversLon process LnvoLves eLevatLon to the top LiveL, spLrLtuaL transcendence of the daLLy econoMLc and poLLtLcaL actLon LeveL. 9 It Ls assuMed that, wLth enough converts and supporters, Deep Ecology wLLL be put Ln place, LLke Green PoLLtLcs, by grassroots deMocratLc procedures_ LLke the fundaMentaL sources upon whLch Lt draws, Deep Ecology prescrLbes practLces by whLch to achLeve such a conversLon and through whLch to arrLve at EcoLogLcaL ConscLousness_ SoMe of the MaLn practLces, such as MedLtatLon and conteMpLatLon, are derLved frol"I the fundaMentaL sources_ But other Methods whLch extend these, soMe of theM expandLng upon ecoLogLcaL experLence, LncLude value seeLng thLngs dLfferentLy, and reorLentatLon and wLdened value perceptLon of other thLngs - Connected wLth weLL-beLng and worth the coMLng to apprecLate goes a hoLLstLc shLft Ln theM, these wLdened experLentLaL bases, and LnforMLng vaLues and perceptLon, and an expanded LdentLfLcatLon , affordLng dLrect LLnkage wLth parts and whoLes of the natural worLd_•IO By these Methods, a person May coMe to a deep and joyous apprecLatLon of the reaL world, a convert to Deep Ecology, a feLLow and advocate of Lts Messages and LLfe-ways. ESSAY QUESTIONS }_ To what extent do Green PoLLtLcs and Deep Ecology share the saMe values and address the sal"le probLel"ls? CrLtLcaLLy coMpare and contrast theLr proposals, especLaLLy as regards the naturaL and the buLLt envLronMent_ 2_ Deep Ecology Ls soMetLMes assLgned four Levels. Try to descrLbe these, and to expLaLn carefuLLy the LnterreLatLons aMong PoLLtLcs fLt Lnto thLs probLeMatLc scheMe? these Levels. Where does Green Ln prLncLpLe" appears as a key theMe of Deep Eco~ogy. Cri.tLcaLLy assess Lts adequacy_ Shouldn't Green PoLLtLcs LncLude such a pri.nci.pLe? 3_ ·sLocentrLc EgaLLtarLanLsM - Non-vLo~ence an unstated pr~nc~p~e of Deep Ecoiog~? Expia~n why Deep Ecology Ls coMMLtted to non-vLoLence to the degree i.t Ls? In your answers take account of the foLLowLng dLffLcuLtLes: L. the contradLcti.ons between the use of I+- 1:5 -5- �vLolence and the defence of the envLronMent; LL. the occurrence of vLolence Ln nature; LLL. the need for coercLve Methods to preserve the natural envLronMent. 5. What justLfLes expandLng self-realLsatLo n to Self-realLsatLo n? ExpLaLn the MeanLng and LMportance of SeLf-ReaLLsatL on for Deep EcoLogy and dLscuss Lts adequacy. Why does Lt not feature Ln Green PolLtLcs? 6. ExplaLn the MeanLng of the delLberateLy vague slogan °SLMple Ln Means, rLch Ln ends", or of soMe other hLgh-LMpact sLogan of Deep EcoLogy. IndLcate how the vagueness MLght work for and a9aLnst the slogan, suggest how the slogan MLght be alternatLve LnterpretatLon s, and LndLcate soMe of the suggest applLed, aLternatLves. these of raMLfLcatLons 7. OutLLne bLoregLonalLsM , LndLcatLng what practLcaL envLronMentaL probLeMs bLoregLonalLsM Lnduces. How Ln fact Ls bLoregLonalLsM derLved froM Deep EcoLogy? ConsLder to what extent bLoregLonalLsM fLts wLth the sLogan, ·rhLnk globally, act locally·. 8. Is More hLgh technology an unprobLeMatLc solutLon to deeper, or to any, envLronMental probLeMs? CoMpare and contrast the vLews of Deep Ecology and Green PoLLtLcs on the role of varLous types of technoLogy. 9. What Ls Ecolo9Lcal ConscLousness? And what Ls Lt supposed to do Ln and for Deep Ec0Lo9y? If Lt Ls so LMportant, why Ls Lt not a MaLn concern for Green PoLLtLcs? A reLatLonaL, total-fLeLd LMa9e of huMan reLatLonshLps wLth nature has been quLetLy oMLtted froM the orLgLnaL pLatforM of Deep Ecology. Is thLs gestalt pLcture needed? Is Lt defensLbLe? Should Lt be reLnstated? 10. -6- � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Draft Papers Description An account of the resource Sylvan's literary executor encountered an archive in which “all his projects were current", since manuscripts were undated and unattributed. Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document DEEP ECOLOOY AHO OREEH POLITICS Deep Ecology ts an envtronMentaL theory or pLatforM wtth poLtttcaL stgntftcant wtth pLatforM LMpLtcattons. Green PoLtttcs ts a poLtttcaL envtronMentaL LMpLtcattons. Both arose tn Large part tn reactton to prevatLtng envtronMentaL practtces; but Deep Ecology concentrates rather on theorettcaL refLectton, Green PoLtttcs on practtcaL actton. Deep and tnvesttgatton questtontng of the underLytng doMtnant attttudes, seen as the Major source of ecoLogtcaL and other probLeMs, Led to arttcuLatton of the Deep Ecology pLatforM, partly outLtned tn "slogan" forM tn the foLLowtng table. TABLE 1. DEEP ECOLOGY CONTRASTED ~ITH OOMIHAHT ATTITUDES OOMrnAtn ATT HUDES (OOMrnAtH PARADIGM] DEEP ECOLOGY [RIVAL EttV IROHMEHTAL PARADIGM] Hature a Resource; Intrtnstc Value conftned to HuMans Natural EnvtronMent Valued for ltseLt; Btocentrtc E9aLttartantsM MatertaL EconoMtc Growth a predoMtnant goaL Hon-MatertaL Goals, espectaLLy ConsuMertsM Dotng wtth Enough/RecycLtng CoMpettttve LtfestyLe Cooperattve Ltfeway CentraLtzed/ Urban Centred/ DecentraLtzed/ Btoregtonat/ · Hetghbourhood focus tia t Lona L focus SeLf-ReaLtzatton Power structure HterarchtcaL Hon-hterarchtcaL/ Grassroots DeMocracy Htgh Technology Approprtate Technology ~htLe Deep Ecology grew froM the work of one envtronMentaL phtLosopher (Haess tn 1972), Green PoLtttcs arose (tn ~est GerMany stnce 1976) froM the synthests of several MoveMents - ecology, ctttzens, aLternattve, peace and other MoveMents. The platforM of Green PoLtttcs, whtch ts butlt around four ptllars soctaL responstbtltty, grassroots deMocracy, and non-vtoLence ecology, reflects these ortgtns. The ftrst of these ptLLars, ecology, ts based on the stMpLe theMe that LtMtted ecoLogtcaL systeMs cannot sustatn unltMtted econoMtc growth, or such questtonabLe types of growth as nuclear power, wtthout sertous rtsk of daMage and degeneratton. The Green atM ts to Move to systeMs of productlon and consuMptton whtch Matntatn and restore natural processes and cycles rather than doMtnate or destroy theM - a Move towards harMony wtth nature. The second ptllar of Green Poltttcs, soctal responstbtltty, tMpLtes opposttton to the tnequaltttes tn power and doMtnatton relattonshtps of present soctety, and reMovaL of dtscrtMtnatton, econoMtc hardshtp and explottatton, both regtonaLly and as regards the Thtrd ~orld. The Green atM - to be achteved prtMartly froM below, ts to butLd stable and just soctaL through those adversely affected arrangeMents, wtth coMprehenstve deMocrattc rtghts and freedoMs (both tn GerMany -1- and where GerMan operatLons LMpLnge Ln the ThLrd ~orLd). These changes are to be brought about by grassroots deMocracy, the thLrd pLLLar, through Lncreased reaLLsatLon of dLrect decentraLLsed deMocracy. ThLs LnvoLves organLsatLon and coordLnatLon .of decentraLLsed basLc unLts (LocaL, coMMunLty and dLstrLct) whLch are 9Lven extensLve, but not coMpLete, autonoMy, as weLL as wLde use of referenda, deLegatLon practLces, and rotatLon of offLce-hoLders. The fourth and fLnaL pLLLar, non-vLoLence, LMpLLes the reMovaL of coercLve and aLso oppressLve practLces, not MereLy by More powerfuL peopLe, but especLaLLy by socLaL groups and states, and aLso, More posLtLveLy, actLve depoLyMent of varLous Methods of socLaL protest, resLstance and defence. The coMpatLbLLLty of Means wLth ends serves here as an LMportant underLyLng prLncLpLe: that a just, non-vLoLent, huMane• end-state cannot be satLsfactorLLy achLeved by unjust, vLoLent, LnhuMane Means. 1 Green PoLLtLcs offers then a broad prograM for socLaL change, whLch LncLudes the More specLfLc and ecoLogLcaLLy focussed Deep EcoLogy pLatforM as a quLte proper part. Put dLfferentLy, Green PoLLtLcs coMbLnes a wLder pLuraLLty of MoveMents of whLch Deep EcoLogy represents one LMportant strand. The Lnter-reLatLons are shown pLctorLaLLy at the second LeveL of the foLLowLng 12 dLagraM: DIAGRAM l. DOUBLE PYRAMID, SETTING DEEP ECOLOGY IN PLACE B p 1. Deep EcoLogy fundaMentaLs; e.g. BuddhLst (B), ChrLstLan (C) and (Eco)-Phi.LosophLc (P) uLtLMate bases C I 2 Exp Lana.t Lon DLrecti.on 2. Deep Ecology platforM 2C . ReforMi.st envLronMental posi.ti.on 2+. Vague fundaMentaLs of Green platforM Der Lvat Lon Di.recti.on j 3 . . General norMs and theMes, substantLaLLy derLved froM pLatforM ~- PartLcular norMs and concrete decLsLons, applyi.ng to relevant practLcaL sLtuatLons . The ecoLogLcaL coMponent of Green PolLtLcs May not 90 very deep; Lt May onLy be based upon reforM envLronMentaLLsM (or shaLLow ecoLogy as Lt used to be • Starred notes LndLcate poLnts at whLch readLngs wLth the correspondLng nuMbers May be Lnserted or undertaken. -2- catted), whLch aLMs to reforM soMe of the worst abuses and excesses of the doMLnant posLtLon, such as gross pottutLon, extensLve despotLatLo n of land and takes and oceans, tLttte thought for the future, MLstreatMen t of anLMals, etc. On shallow ecology, nature Ls not valued for Ltsetf, but as a resource, that Ls LnstruMent atty, for what Lt can be used for by huMans. By contrast, Deep Ecology argues (e.g. froM preMLsses of level I) that the envLronMent Ls LntrLnsLcat ty valuable, that nature Ls valuable Ln and for Ltself; and that, LntrLnsLc value Ls equally dLstrLbuted . ThLs projectLon of furtherr,ore , egatLtarLan or Lr,partLatLt y prLncLptes, usually restrLcted to huMans, to the whole of tLfe Ln the natural world, gets dLgnLfLed by the tLtte, BLocentrLc EgalLtarLanL sM. The prLncLple, not part of Green PolLtLcs, Ls perhaps the Most controversL al of the central prLncLptes of Deep Ecology; but Lt or soMe substLtute for Lt Ls requLred, granted that the natural world contaLns value beyond that accruLng to huMans and theLr features, to explaLn how value Ls dLstrLbuted . Deep Ecology accounts for the dLstrLbutLo n through what Ls ' •3 . presented as a ' core der,ocracy Ln the b~osphere . Deep Ecology grew out of a phLtosophL cal dP~penLng of the new features of the scLence of ecology, whLch served to dLstance ecology froM the standard run of reductLonLs t scLences (through such features as holLsM; gestalt propertLes; systeMs whLch are More than the sur, of theLr ator,LstLc parts; eMergent eler,ents, tLke lLfe, organLsatLo n, etc.). Deep Ecology quLckly allLed Ltself wLth the subversLve features of unco-opted ecology, Ln partLcutar, the eMphasLs on the lLMLts, and ultLMate faLture of (atoMLstLc) reductLonLsM Ln scLence and phLlosophy. ~Lth such an orLgLn, Lt Ls not surpr~s~ng that there Ls lLttle dLrectty about such r,aLn pLllars of Green PotLtLcs as socLal responsLbLl Lty and non-vLotenc e Ln the platforM of Deep Ecology. However Deep Ecology Ls cor,patLble wLth these Green pLllar prLncLptes, and Lndeed perr,Lts theLr derLvatLon. ~hat Ls supposed to result are general norMs, lLke Ho exploLtatLo n, Ho subjectLon, Ho vLolence, at level 3. (Such a derLvatLon of a non-vLolenc e prLncLple froM the Deep Ecology prLncLple of r,axLMLzLng Self-realLs atLon Ls atter,pted by Haess Ln the frar,ework of hLs systeM of Eco-phLloso phy).•~ A MaLn focus of Deep Ecology Ls on changLng huMan relatLons wLth the natural envLronMen t, away froM doMLnant exploLtatLv e practLces. The natural envLronr,ent coMprLses Lter,s of LntrLnsLc value, LncludLng hur,ans (who are not above or separate fror, Lt), and accordLngty Ls to be treated wLth the care and respect valuable Lter,s warrant, and not LrresponsLb ly. Thus Lt would be contrary whLch to Deep Ecology to treat the envLronMent or Lts valued Lter,s vLolently such (consLder however Ls what Deep Ecology contends doMLnant practLces do wLdespread phenor,ena as "rape of the envLronMen t", ·of the land", •of the forests"). SLnce hur,ans are not apart fror, or superLor to nature, Lt follows froM the Deep Ecology platforr, that natural and proper relatLons also exclude vLolence towards other hur,ans or classes of huMans. Because Lt covers a pluralLty of posLtLons, LncludLng shallow ecologLcal posLtLons, Green PolLtLcs Ls Much More ar,elLoratLv e and reforMLst Ln character than Deep Ecology, whLch Ls further rer,oved froM dor,Lnant attLtudes, More hardLLne, and r,ore radLcat. ~hereas Deep Ecology goes to fundaMenta ts, and focusses on Ldeats and theory, Green PotLtLcs tends to concentrate on practLcal poLLtLcat probler,s of an envLronr,en tat or socLat kLnd, such as acLd raLn or rLver pottutLon or MLssLte deptoyMent, and (LLke the Peace Mover,ent Ln AustralLa) Ls not so Much concerned wLth refLnLng Lts rather vague prLncLples or workLng out an envLronMen tat (or peace) phLtosophy. Because of Lts envLronMen tal depth and natural world focus, Deep Ecology Ls concerned wLth a range of natural -3- radLcaL the envLronMent Lssues, such as wLLderness, rare specLes, and transforMatLon of agrLcuLture, whLch are onLy of passLng Lnterest to a sMaLL MLnorLty Ln Green PoLLtLcs or are beyond Lts poLLtLcaL reach. Jn Lts reforMLst styLe Green PoLLtLcs does not venture far beyond prevLous Left-LeanLng poLLtLcaL MoveMents, except, fLrstLy, Ln Lts opposLtLon to envLronMent and aMenLty daMagLng LndustrLaLLsM and, secondLy, as regards non-vLoLence and Lts coMMLtMent to attaLnLng peace. Non-vLoLence Ls the Most controversLaL of the four pLLLars. For non-vLoLence ruLes out a range of poLLtLcaL actLon, LncLudLng typLcaL protests, confrontatLon and revoLutLons. Non-vLoLence aLso LMpLLes, what Ls very dLfferent froM current MLLLtary practLces, socLaL defence. WhLLe MaLn factLons Ln the Green MoveMent support non-vLoLent Methods and socLaL defence, other Lesser factLons hoLd that force Ls necessary to brLng about varLous necessary changes and for defence purposes. The Deep EcoLogy pLatforM LncLudes severaL prLncLpLes that wouLd be recognLsed by onLy a MLnorLty of the Green MoveMent. One of these prLncLpLes (whLch however, unLLke BLocentrLc EgaLLtarLanLsM, wouLd not be wLdeLy opposed by reforMLst Greens) Ls the core prLncLpLe of SeLf-reaLLsatLon, or More exactLy of MaxLML2Ln9 SeLf-reaLLsatLon. The notLon of seLf-reaLLsatLon of varLous reLLgLous posLtLons, of the fuLL unfoLdLng and deveLopMent of the person, Ls vastLy expanded Ln Deep EcoLogy to LncLude brLngLng to fuLL fruLtLon not MereLy one's own person, but aLL that one LdentLfLes wLth, that Ls the expanded SeLf, whLch Ls taken to be not MereLy one's faMLLy or feLLows or feLLow natLonaLs, nor MereLy ~as on huManLstLc ethLcs) the whoLe huMan race, but the whoLe naturaL 1 systeM. The SeLf-reaLLsatLon prLncLpLe, sprLngLng as Lt appears froM an enLLghtened personaL seLf-Lnterest prLncLpLe, has an exceLLent phLLosophLcaL pedLgree (at Least as appLLed to huMans or neLghbourLng cLasses of huMans). Thus rather than beLng argued for, a dLffLcuLt Matter Ln the case of uLtLMate prLncLpLes, SeLfreaLLsatLon Ls LMported froM syMpathetLc phLLosophLcaL or reLLgLous posLtLons at LeveL I of the doubLe pyraMLd, froM those that heLp sustaLn Deep EcoLogy. However the expansLon LnvoLved, the derLvatLon process froM narrow seLf to coMprehensLve SeLf, severs the usuaL justLfLcatory LLnks. It Ls hard to LdentLfy one's seLf-Lnterests wLth · those of a rock or an acorn. So the supposed LdentLfLcatLon - wLth soMe or aLL MountaLns, rLvers and raLnforests Ln the wLder reMaLns, LLke the assocLated extended EgaLLtarLan SeLf, Nature personLfLed prLncLpLe, decLdedLy probLeMatLc. Because Lt Ls assuMed that SeLf-reaLLsatLon Ls dLrected to ecoLogLcaL and spLrLtuaL ends, not at MaterLaL goods or Means, SeLf-reaLLsatLon Leads to the 16 AMong the raMLfLcatLons of the sLogan sLogan, "SLMpLe Ln Means, rLch Ln ends". one uses and where one LLves technoLogy of are those concernLng what kLnd (the Matter of dweLLLng Ln sLtuatLons of Lnherent vaLue and the LLke), what and how Much one consuMes, and so on. The doMLnant attLtudes, forMed around of econoMLc growth and econoMLc routes to happLness, have MaxLML2atLon eMphasLsed both MaterLaL goaLs and MaterLaL Means, partLcuLarLy personaL consuMerLsM. But Lf MaterLaL use and pure consuMptLon are to be reduced for envLronMentaL and other reasons, what LLfestyLes are approprLate? Deep EcoLogy, LLke Lts fundaMentaL sources, poLnts to experLentLaL and spLrLtuaL ends and eMphasL2es the rLchness of non-MaterLaL ends avaLLabLe. The resuLt, of course, Ls practLces whLch are sLMpLe, voluntary sLMpLLcLty, doLng wLth enough, and, More generaLLy, practLces whLch LLe LLght on the Land and the naturaL worLd. In a properLy ecoLogLcaL way of doLng thLngs, these wLLL be Lntegrated (Ln syMbLotLc and other naturaL styLes) wLth the naturaL systeMs LnvoLved, workLng wLth rather than agaLnst the naturaL fLow. The practLces, and organLsatLonaL approprLate to regLonaL wLLL accordLngLy be ecoregLonaL arrangeMents, -4- ecologtcal grouptngs - or btoregtonal, as they have coNe to be called. • 7 Approprtate Means tnclude, tn turn, technLques approprLate to the practLce and theory .of Deep Ecology. HLgh technologLes such as nuclear power are not approprLate, even Ln advanced LndustrLal socLetLes, but LnapproprLate because of the envLronMental and socLal costs and rLsks such technologLcal forMs LMpose. On both deep and green perceptLons, what Ls requLred are relLable careful technologLes whLch are not ecologLcally daMagLng or socLally rLsky or otherwLse undesLrable; but the technologLes adMLtted wLll dLffer accordLng to the prLncLples of the posLtLons they answer back to (e.g . farMLng technLques wLlt need to be very dLfferent froM those prevaLtLng Ln rural GerMany to Meet such prLncLptes as bLospherLc egalLtarLanLsM). In each case the practLcat use of approprLate technology falls at the bottoM, actLon level, of the double . •a pyraN~d. WhLle Deep Ecology supplLes an appeatLng blueprLnt for dLfferent socLal and lLfe-ways, the questLon reMaLns: how Ls the proMLsed land reached? A MaLn part of the answer Ls taken to be gLven through a further crucLal feature of Deep Ecology: EcologLcal ConscLousness, a notLon agaLn expandLng upon conceptLons of other older LdeologLes (e.g. of relLgLous, or of revolutLonary, conscLousness). What Ls dLfferent Ls that spLrLtual or LdeologLcal conversLon Ls agaLn broadened froM the personal and socLat to coMprehend the full envLronMental predLcaMent. In thLs explanatLon, of how people get, and are got, to grasp Deep Ecology and Lts practLces, the pyraMLd Ls ascended, froM actLon to Ldeas, to deeper explanatory prLncLples. A thorough conversLon process Lnvolves elevatLon to the top livet, spLrLtuat transcendence of the daLly econoMLc and polLtLcat actLon level. 9 It Ls assuMed that, wLth enough converts and supporters, Deep Ecology wLlt be put Ln place, lLke Green PolLtLcs, by grassroots deMocratLc procedures. LLke the fundaMental sources upon whLch Lt draws, Deep Ecology prescrLbes practLces by whLch to achLeve such a conversLon and through whLch to arrLve at EcologLcal ConscLousness. SoMe of the MaLn practLces, such as MedLtatLon and conteMptatLon, are derLved froM the fundaMental sources. But other Methods whLch extend these, soMe of theM expandLng upon ecologLcat experLence, Lnclude value reorLentatLon and wLdened value perceptLon seeLng thLngs dLfferently, and coMLng to apprecLate the worth and well-beLng of other thLngs. Connected wLth these wLdened experLentLal bases, and LnforMLng theM, goes a holLstLc shLft Ln values and perceptLon, and an expanded LdentLfLcatLon, affordLng dLrect lLnkage wLth parts and wholes of the natural world. •IO By these Methods, a person May coMe to a deep and joyous apprecLatLon of the real world, a convert to Deep Ecology , a fellow and advocate of Lts Messages and lLfe-ways . ESSAY QUESTIOHS I. To what extent do Green PolLtLcs and Deep Ecology share the saMe values and address the saMe probleMs? CrLtLcally coMpare and contrast theLr proposa l s, especLally as regards the natural and the buLlt envLronMent. 2. Deep Ecology Ls soMetLMes assLgned four, levels. Try to descrLbe these, and to explaLn carefully the LnterrelatLons aMong these levels. Uhere does Green PolLtLcs fLt Lnto thLs probleMatLc scheMe? 3 . "BLocentrLc EgalLtarLanLsM - Ln prLncLple appears as a key theMe of Deep Ecology. CrLtLcally assess Lts adequacy. Shouldn't Green PolLtLcs Lnctude such a prLncLpte? 4. Is Non-vLolence an unstated prLncLple of Deep Ecology? ExplaLn why Deep Ecology Ls coMMLtted to non-vLolence to the degree Lt Ls? In your answers . take -5- \ account of the foLLowLng dLffLcuLtLes: L. the contradLctLons between the use of vLoLence and the defence of the envLronMent; LL. the occurrence of vloLence Ln nature; ttt. the need for coerclve Methods to preserve the natural envtronMent. 5. Uhat justlfLes expandLng _seLf-reallsatLon to SeLf-reaLlsatlon? ExpLaLn the Meanlng and LMportance of SeLf-ReaLlsatLon for Deep Ecology and dLscuss Lts adequacy. Uhy does lt not feature ln Green PolLtlcs? 6. ExpLaLn the MeanLng of the deLLberateLy vague slogan ·slMple ln Means, rlch ln ends·, or of soMe other hlgh-lMpact slogan of Deep Ecology. Indlcate how the vagueness Mlght work for and agalnst the slogan, suggest how the slogan MLght be alternatLve LnterpretatLons, and lndlcate soMe of the suggest applled, alternattves. these of raMLflcatlons 7. OutLlne btoregtonaLL3M, lndlcatlng what practlcaL envlronMental probleMs bloreglonallsM lnduces. How Ln fact Ls bloreglonallsM derlved froM Deep Ecology? Conslder to what extent bloregLonallsM fLts wLth the slogan, •Thlnk globally, act LocaLly". deeper, or to any, envLronMental probLeMs? CoMpare and contrast the vlews of Deep Ecology and Green PolLtLcs on the role of varlous types of technology. 8~ Is More hLgh technology an unprobleMatLc soLutLon to 9. Uhat Ls EcoLogLcaL ConscLousness? And what Ls Lt supposed to do Ln and for Deep Ecology? If Lt ls so LMportant, why Ls Lt not a MaLn concern for Green PoLltlcs? 10. A reLatlonaL, total-fLeLd LMage of huMan reLatLonshLps wLth nature has been quletLy oMLtted froM the orLglnal pLatforM of Deep Ecology. Is thLs gestalt pLcture needed? Is Lt defensLbLe? Should Lt be reLnstated? READINGS 1: DEEP ECOLOGY AND GREEN POLITICS The Greens consLder theMseLves the poLltLcal voLce of the cLtLzens' MoveMents, that Ls, ecology, antl-nuclear-power, peace, feMLnLst, and others. Most MeMbers of the Green party are also actLvLsts Ln one or More of those MoveMents, and thLs dLverse orLentatLon Ls reflected Ln the wLngs, or factLons, of the party: the vLslonary/hollstlc Greens, the Eco-Greens, the peace-MoveMent Greens, and the radlcal-Left Greens. A great deaL of overlapplng occurs wlth any categor~z~ng of Green LdentltLes and soMe people say there are no actual factlons, but clearly there are dtfferent prtorltLes aMong the four clusters. The More that people perceLved the LnterconnectLons aMong prLncLpLes of ecologLcaL wlsdoM, a truly secure peace, an econoMy wLth a future, and a partLcLpatory deMocracy wLth power channeled dLrectly froM the grassroots Level, the More they notLces the absence of such LdeaLs aMong the exLsttng poLLtlcaL partles. [Green] pollcLes are gutded by long-terM v~s~ons for the future and are founded on four basLc prLncLples: ecology, socLal responsLbLLLty, grassroots deMocracy, and nonvLoLence. The fLrst of the ·four pLLlars, • ecology, has several MeanLngs Ln Green poLLtLcs. Green poLLtLcs, Ls Lnherently hoLLstLc Ln theory and practLce. It Ls based on ecoLogLcal, or ·network·, thLnkLng, a terM used frequently by the Greens. EcoLogLcaL thLnkLng also Lncludes the realLzatLon that the seeMLngLy -6- rtgtd structures we percetve Ln our envLronMent are actually ManLfestatLons of underlytng processes, of nature's contLnual dynaMLc flux. Interrelatedness and ongoLng process are the lessons the Greens take froM and apply to the ecosysteMs surroundLng us. They support •soft" energy productLon (such as solar power) that works wLth the cycles of the sun, the water, and the wLnd, and the flow of the rLvers. They call for the developMent of approprLate technology that reflects our Lnterdependence wLth the Earth. They advocate regeneratLve agrLculture that replenLshes the soLl and Lncorporates natural Means of pest control. Above all, the Greens deMand a halt to our ravagLng of natural "resources" and our poLsonLng of the bLosphere through the duMpLng of toxLc wastes, the accuMulatLon of so-called acceptable levels of radLatLon exposure, and the pollutLon of the aLr. The broader applLcatLons of ecologLcal thLnkLng lead to ·socLal ecology, the perceptton of soctetal structures and huMan Lnteracttons as an Lntrtcate web of dynaMLc systeMs that are sLMultaneously Lnterrelated parts and coMplete Ln theMselves. That eMphasLs on relatLonshLps and Lnterconnecttons Ls the basts of the Greens' ecologtcal work that focuses specLfLcally on envLronMental protectLon. TheLr prograMs Ln thts area call for huMans to ftnd our place Ln the ecosysteMs: ~e defLne ecologLcal polLtLcs as those Measures that understand huMan betngs and our envLronMent as beLng part of nature. HuMan lLfe, too, Ls eMbedded Ln the lLfe cycles of the ecosysteMs; we Lnterfere wLth our actLons and thLs, Ln turn, acts back on us. ~e Must not destroy the stabLlLty of the ecosysteMs. In partLcular, ecologtcal polLtLcs presents an all-encoMpassLng rejectLon of an econoMy of exploLtatLon and plunderLng of natural resources and raw MaterLals, as well as the destructLve LnterventLon Lnto the cycles of nature's household. The second of the four pLllars, ·soctal responsLbLlLty, • Ls understood by Most Greens to Mean socLal justLce and assurance that the poor and the workLng class wLll not get hurt by prograMs to restructure the econoMy and our consuMer socLety ecologtcally. The radLcal-left Greens, however, read sozLal as a codeword for socLalLsM, that Ls, deMocratLc MarxLsM~ SLnce that polLtLcal Model Ls specLfLcally not what the vLsLonary, lLberal and conservatLve Greens have Ln MLnd, a battle developed over establLshLng the basLc prLncLples. The MajorLty wanted the new party to stand for possLbLlLtLes other than etther socLalLsM or the capLtalLst status quo. The radLcal-left contLngent, on the other hand, LnsLsted on not only Lncludtng socLalLsM but also on excludLng nonvLolence as a guLdLng prLncLple. So one of the four pLllars, lLke so Much else Ln the Green party, has a paradoxLcal character: Lt Means soMethLng dLfferent Ln dLfferent parts of the party. All factLons of the party concur that socLal, econoMLc and ecologLcal Lssues are Lnherently lLnked. The ecologLcal and socLal spheres belong Lnseparably together: the econoMy of nature Ls ltnked to the econoMy of huMans for better or worse . The thLrd pLllar, grassroots deMocracy, was LnspLred by the ~est GerMan cLtLzens' MoveMents throughout the 1970s, whLch Ln turn were Lnfluenced by the cLvLl rLghts, ecology, consuMer, and other MoveMents ~n the Un~ted States. OLrect, or partLcLpatory, deMocracy locates a greater aMount of power and control wLth the local groups, the grassroots. ThLs orLentatLon ~nforMs the structure of the Green party. An organLzatLon structured wtth partLcLpatory deMocracy sets Lts basLc polLcy accordLng to the votLng at large asseMblLes. It allows LndLvLduals access to all party offLcLals, and Lt eschews hLerarchLcal structure. Instead of allowtng power to be concentrated Ln a few people who -7- reMaLn at the top of a hLerarchy for years, such groups generally elect steerLng coMMLttees. The fourth pLllar, nonvLolence, Means to the Greens the cessatLon of both personal vLolence and •structural vLolence, • that Ls, vLolence and oppress Lon LMposed by the state and by LnstLtutLons. (See ReadLng 4; Green PolLtLcs, pp.3-4, 29-43) The tenets of [the Deep Ecology] MoveMent Nay perhaps be roughly forNulated as follows: (1) The well-beLng of nonhuMan lLfe on Earth has value Ln Ltself. ThLs value Ls Lndependent of any LnstruNental usefulness for LLMLted huNan purposes. (2) RLchness and dLversLty Ln lLfe forMs contrLbute to thLs value and Lnterfere Ls a further value Ln Ltself. (3) HuMans have no rLght to destructLvely wLth nonhuMan lLfe except for purposes of satLsfyLng vLtal needs. (4) Present Lnterference Ls excessLve and detrLMental. (5) Present polLcLes Must therefore be changed. (6) The necessary polLcy changes affect basLc econoMLc and LdeologLcal structures and wLll be the More drastLc the longer Lt takes before sLgnLfLcant change Ls started. (7) The LdeologLcal change Ls MaLnly that of apprecLatLng lLfe qualLty (focusLng on sLtuatLons LnvolvLng Lnherent. value). (8) Those who subscrLbe to the foregoLng poLnts have an oblLgatLon dLrectly or LndLrectly to try to LMpleMent the necessary changes. (Defence, p.266) It should be fully apprecLated that the sLgnLfLcant tenets of the Deep Ecology MoveMent are clearly and forcefully norMatLve. They express a value prLorLty systeM only Ln part based on results (or lack of results) of scLentLfLc research. Today, ecologLsts try to Lnfluence polLcy-MakLng bodLes largely resource and through threats, through predLctLons concernLng pollutants depletLon, knowLng that polLcy-Makers accept at least certaLn MLnLMUM norMs concernLng health and just dLstrLbutLon. There are polLtLcal potentLals Ln thLs MoveNent whLch should not be overlooked and whLch have lLttle to do wLth pollutLon and resource depletLon. In plottLng possLble futures, the norMs should be freely used and elaborated. (Shallow and Oeep 1 p.99) A Major dLfference between the theorLes lLes Ln the dLstrLbutLon of values. Deep ecology, lLke sLMpler utLlLtarLanLsM, offers a unLque LnLtLal dLstrLbutLon: each lLvLng thLng Ls assLgned equal value and nothLng else has LntrLnsLc value. Value Ls assessed through soMe MLx of value-NakLng characterLstLcs, LncludLng such defeasLble ecologLcal unLversals as stabLlLty, resLlLence, naturalness, rLchness, scarcLty and so forth . But there are consLderable dLversLty, constraLnts on how thLs Ls done . . . . One constraLnt, that of LMpartLalLty whLch excludes certaLn types of class chauvLnLsM, a thLng cannot be ranked as valuable or ahead or another sLMply by vLrtue of belongLng to soNe specLes (e.g. beLng huNan) or favoured bLologLcal class; such class features are not Ln theMselves value-MakLng characterLstLcs. Such an account of how value Ls assessed reNaLn however far froM specLfLc, and soMetLMes of lLttle use Ln practLce. (CrLtLque, pp.59- 60) POINTS OF UNITY 1. NATURAL PHILOSOPHY. Ue base our phLlosophy on a proper understandLng of the purposes and workLngs of nature and do not try to LNpose an Ldeology upon Lt . Ue seek to transforM socLety based upon thLs understandLng. 2. CONSENSUS DEMOCRACY. Ue conduct all our MeetLngs accordLng to the prLncLples of consensus deNocracy, eNphasLzLng unanLMous or near-unanLMous agreeMent on all decLsLons. No representatLve May Make decLsLons on behalf of the Greens wLthout the approval of the entLre NeMbershLp. Ue encourage the use of consensus deMocracy Ln all socLal, econoMLc and polLtLcal LnstLtutLons. -8- 3. NONVIOLENCE AND FREEDOM. ~e oppose the threat or use of phystcal vtolence to resolve tnternatlonat, clvll, polltlcal and personal confllcts. ~e encourage the nonvlolent enforceMent of all prlvate and publlc rules and Laws. ~e recognlEe that a nonvlolent soclety would be a very free soclety and encourage tolerance of others' vlews and actlons. ~- SOCIAL ECOLOGY. ~e eMphaslze the connectton of doMlnatlon and vlolence toward the envlronMent and toward our fellow huMans. ~e seek a nonvlolent soclety ln whlch the needs of lndlvlduals, coMMunltles and bloreglons are balanced and lntegrated and ln whlch econoMtc resources are used consclousty, deMocratlcaLLy and approprlatety to further thls end. 5. STRATEGY. ~e wlLL oppose ecologlcatty and soclatty destructlve pollcles and dlsobedlence clvll and protest practlces through nonvlolent polltlcal actlvltles. ~e wlLL proMote alternatlve projects and lnstltutlons conslstent wlth our Green phllosophy. ~e wlLL cooperate ln solldarlty wlth all groups ln substantlal agreeMent wlth these polnts of unlty as partlclpants ln the lnternatlonal Green MoveMent. (Deep Ecology, pp.36-7). 2: DEEP ECOLOGY LEVELS In dlscusslng the relatlonshlp between deep ecology and Major tradltlons such as BuddhlsM and Chrlstlanlty, Naess stresses that people can agree broadly on a set of prlnctptes and dlsagree greatly on other aspects of ldeology and other tradttlons thusly: In order to factlttate dlscusslon lt May be helpful to dlsttngutsh a coMMon platforM (baste prlnclples) of deep ecology froM the fundaMentaL features of phllosophles and rellglons froM whlch that platforM (baste prlnctples) ls derlved, lf the platforM ls forMulated as a set of norMs and hypotheses lf . verballEed, are Buddhlst, (factual assuMptlons). The fundaMentals, or phllosophlc wlth persuaslons, rettgtous other Taolst, Chrtsttan or of afftnltles to the baste vlews of Splnoza, Uhltehead, Hetdegger, or others. The fundaMentals are Mutually More or Less lncoMpattble or at Least dtfflcult to coMpare l~ terMs of cognltlve contents. The tncoMpattblltty does not affect the deep ecology prlnclples adversely. The baste prlnclples wlthln the deep ecology MoveMent are grounded ln retlglon or phllosophy. In a Loose sense, tt May be sald to be dertved froM the fundaMentals. Because these are dtfferent, the sltuatlon only reMlnds us that very slMllar or even tdenttcal conclustons May be drawn froM dlvergent preMlses. The prlnclples (or platforM) are the . saMe, the fundaMentaL preMlses dtffer. In order to clartfy the dtscusston one Must avold Looktng for one deftntte phllosophy or rellgton aMong the supporters of the deep ecologlcal MoveMent. Fortunately there ls a rlch Manlfold of klnds of consequences dertved froM the prlnclples. The dtscusston has four Levels to take lnto account: verballzed fundaMentaL phllosophlcal and rellglous ldeas and lntultlons, the deep ecology baste prlnclples, the More or Less general consequences dertved froM the platforM Llfestytes and general pollcles of every klnd - and Lastly, descrlpttons of concrete sltuatlons and declstons Made ln theM. (See DlagraM 1) Arne Naess has atteMpted to provlde a Loglcal dlagraM or systeMatlzatlon of hls own verslon of deep ecology or ecosophy whtch he calls •Ecosophy r·. He -9- caLLs thts a norMattve systeM whtch tncLudes both norMs (or baste values) and factual hypotheses_ The Lower norMs or actton stateMents are dertved froM the top norMs tn a Loosely LogtcaL sense_ The top or Most baste norMs are arrtved at by the deep questtontng Lntutttve process_ Naess stresses that Ecosophy T Ls onLy hts verston of deep ecology, and that Many versLons need to be worked out_ SoMe people NLght be crLtLcaL that Many of the norMs of deep ecology are heLd on an tntutttve basts, but Naess potnts out aLL theortes begtn soMewhere beyond LogtcaL constructtons_ (DEEP ECOLOGY, pp-225-7) In order to factLttate dtscusston about deep ecology aMong phtLosophers tt May be heLpfuL to dtsttngutsh a coMMon pLatforM of deep ecology froM the fundaMentaL features of phtLosophtes and reLtgtons froM whtch that pLatforM Ls derLved, tf tt ts forMuLated as a set of norMs and hypotheses (factual assuMpttons)_ The terM 'pLatforM' ts preferred to 'prtncLpLe' because the Latter May be NLsunderstood to refer to the uLtLMate fundaMentaLs_ FurtherMore, the forMuLatton of a pLatforM should be short and conctse (as a synopsts), whereas the fundaMentaLs, tf verbaLtzed, are Buddhtst, Taotst, ChrLstLan or of other reLtgtous ktnds, or they are phtLosophLc wtth afftntttes to the baste vtews of SpLnoza, ~hLtehead, HeLdegger, or others_ The fundaMentaLs are MutuaLLy More or Less LncoMpatLbLe or at Least dtffLcuLt to coMpare tn terMs of cognLttve contents_ Supporters of deep ecology May have great dLfftcuLttes understandtng each other's uLtLMate vLews_ The pLatforM of the deep ecology MoveMent Ls grounded tn reLtgLon or phLLosophy tncLudtng ethLcs_ It May be saLd to be derLved froM these fundaMentaLs_ As used here the terM 'dertved' ts open to a vartety of LnterpretatLons_ If the vaLLdLty of a norM or a hypothesLs Ls justLfLed by reference to one defLnLte set of assuMptLons of a phtLosophtcaL or reLLgtous ktnd, the norM or hypothests ts Ln a sense dertved froM those assuMpttons_ The set acquLres a character of preMLses for parttcuLar concLusLons_ But cLoseLy · sLMLLar or even tdenttcaL concLustons May be drawn froM sets of LncoMpatLbLe preMLses_ ThLs expLaLns the coMbLnatLon of 'bewLLderLng' dLverstty of vLews at the deepest LeveL wtth agreeMent of vtews at the next LeveL_ In assesstng constructLve crttLctsM of deep ecology Lt Ls useful to try to ftnd out whLch LeveL Ls LnvoLved_ An exaMpLe: In the tntroductLon to hLs The EthLcs of EnvtronMentaL Concern, (Oxford: BLackweLL 1983), Robtn AttfLeLd says: Yet I do not accept, wLth the so-caLLed 'deep, Long-range ecology MoveMent', the vtew that our prLncLpaL Loyalty should be focussed not on feLLow-huMans or feLLow creatures but on the bLosphere as an organtc whole, __ _ I suppose there are soMe supporters of the deep ecology MOVeMent who propose focusstng Loyalty on the bLosphere as an organLc whole Ln the sense suggested by AttfteLd_ The conceptLon of the bLosphere as an organLc whole and of such a kLnd of Loyalty belongs to the reaLM of fundaMentaLs, that Ls LeveL one, rather than to the other Levels_ Therefore that AttfLeLd does not accept the vtew he descrtbes ts not relevant tn arguMentatton for or agatnst deep ecology- One Matn potnt tn deep ecology ts tts deep arguMentatton, that ts, arguMentatton froM uLttMate (phLLosophLcaL, reLtgtous) preMtsses, but there Ls rooM for very dLfferent sets of such preMLsses_ A supporter of deep ecology May or May not have any conceptton of a prLMary Loyalty focussed on the bLosphere as an organtc whole_ [The] dtsttnctLon of Levels Ls useful when tryLng to ptn down exactly what a crttLcLsM Ls focusstng on_ The dLagraM furnLshes onLy a ktnd of stattc ModeL_ -10- A supporter of deep ecology wLLL norMaLLy ModLfy the sentences at the dLfferent Levels froM tLMe to tLMe. Hew LnforMatLon May change any hypotheses and therefore also change norMs whLch Ln part have been justLfLed on the basLs of the hypotheses beLng changed. Renewed ethLcaL consLderatLon or new LnforMatLon May Make the supporter change a norM. If a norM Ls changed norMally new sets of hypotheses are Lnvolved, and old ones are dLscarded. ThLs agaLn wLLl cause reverberatLons Ln a sMaLLer or greater part of the fLeld. F roM a po Ln t of v Lew of no rMa t Lve sys teMa t t·~a t Lons what goes on when changes are Made at one or More Levels Ls rather coMpLLcated. But part of Lt Ls processes of derLvatLon. OLagraM l pretends only to Lllustrate LMportant dLfferences of the Levels of derLvatLon and the specLfLc character of Level 2. It represents a condensed forMulatLon of the deepest-Level norMs and hypotheses whLch supporters of the deep ecology MoveMent can agree upon. ThLs Level Ls LLLustrated as the penultLMate (next to ultLMate) Level of arguMentatLon characterLstLc of those supporters of deep ecology who try to artLculate theLr baste vLews. At the thLrd and fourth Level dLsagreeMents May arLse. At the fLrst Level supporters May dLsagree, or fLnd each others vLews' LncoMprehensLb le, or LncoMparable as to valLdLty. Ls not a Measure of value prLorLtLes or of A 'dLrectLon of derLvatLon ethLcaL prLorLtLes. And Lt does not LMply that what Ls derLved Ls a Means Ln relatLon to what Lt Ls derLved froM. A sLMple exaMple Ls enough to clarLfy thLs. FroM 'do not kLlL huMans! ·, follows, Lf you concede 'all Mothers are huMans' the conclusLon 'do not kLLL your Mother!'. ThLs rather concrete norM Ls here derLved froM the More general and abstract one. But thLs does not LMply that huMans Ln general have a hLgher value or a kLnd of prLorLty Ln relatLon to Mothers. It does not say that Ln a norM confLLct you should be More careful not to kLLL huMans than not to kLLL your Mother. An absurd posLtLon! And Lastly, Lt Ls rather strange to refraLn froM kLllLng your Mother as a Means to a goal, · naMely not to kLLL huMans. The forMulatLons of Level 2 have the character of proposals. It May turn out that proposals wLLL dLffer substantLaLLy or show a natural dLversLty of terMLnologLcal and conceptual LdLosyncracLes . UnhappLLy Lt Ls quLte coMMon to MLx the, Ln a broad sense, LogLcal relatLon of derLvatLon wLth other relatLons. These are at Least as LMportant, but nevertheless are dLfferent. (BASIC, pp.1-5) ScheMatLcally we May represent the total vLews LMpLLed Ln the MoveMent by and norMs streaMs of derLvatLon f roM 'h Lghest', L.e. Most fundaMentaL sLtuatLons. lLfe partLcular Ln descrLptLve assuMptLon, to partLcular decLsLons Answers to the deepest questLon, L.e. hLghest norMatLve prLncLples and basLc assuMptLons about the world MLddle range answers. Lower derLvatLonaL Level derLvatLons towards decLsLons Ln partLcular LLfe sLtuatLons. Level of actLon Ln concrete partLcular sLtuatLons. The LLLustratLon reseMbles those of hypothetLco-ded uctLve systeMs. One MaLn dLfference Ls that soMe sentences at the top Level are norMatLve, expressed by LMperatLves. ThLs Makes Lt possLble to furnLsh preferably LMperatLves at the Lowest derLvatLonaL Level, sentences such as ·Turn to the Left!" ·voteforN.N. !. Just as Ln hypothetLco-ded uctLve systeM, Let us say Ln physLcs, only the two upper Levels of the pyraMLd Ls thought of as part of physLcs as a systeM, only those parts are Ln norMatLve systeMs characterLstLc of the total systeM. -11- The sentences change. Ln the Lowest part change froM day to day as LLfe sLtuatLons The above kLnd of presentLng the derLvatLonaL structure of a totaL vLew Must not be taken too serLousLy. SoMe wLLL absoLuteLy refuse even to consLder such a way of exposLtLon. And Lt does not Ln any Manner characterLze thLnkLng wLthLn the deep ecoLogLcaL MoveMents. SoMe of us wLth a professLonaL background of scLence and anaLytLcaL phLLosophy fLnd Lt heLpfuL, however. Arne Naess's systeMatLEatLon LLLustrates the reLatLonshLp of deep ecoLogy's basLc prLncLpLes or Lts "platforM" (LeveL 2), to varLous · possLbLe and relLgLous "fundaMentaL preMLsses on the one hand (LeveL 1) and varLous possLbLe theoretLcaL and practLcaL "consequences" on the other (LeveLs 3 and~). Althou~h thLs systeMatLzatLon Ls presented Ln terMs of "fundaMentaL preMLsses, consequences", and a dLrectLon of "derLvatLon• froM LeveLs (1) to(~), thLs should not be taken to Mean that a sentence at one Level Ls held to follow by vLrtue of necessLty or probabLLLty froN sentences at a prevLous Level L.e~, Naess Ls not proposLng a deductLve or an LnductLve systeM. As he coMMents hLMself, Lt Ls only Ln a "Loose sense• that the deep ecology pLatforM "May be saLd to be derLved froM fundaMentaLs·. In other words, derLvatLon or precLseness Ls a Matter of deLLMLtLng a range of possLble LnterpretatLons. For exaNpLe, we MLght proceed froN a fundaMentaL (L.e. Level 1) reLLgLous or phLLosophLcal preMLss such as "ALL Ls One" or the SpLnozLst Ldea that "there Ls onLy one 'substance• • and, Ln the sense descrLbed, "derLve" the (More precLse) central "plank" Ln the deep ecology "pLatforM" that "there are no boundarLes Ln the bLospherLcaL fLeld", or that "aLl entLtLes are constLtuted by theLr relatLonshLps" (LeveL 2). Further precLsatLon MLght express the realLsatLon that "the sense of oneself as a skLn encapsulated ego Ls not Ln accord wLth thLs ' seaMLess web' ontoLogy• (Level 3). None of the steps Ln the above exaMpLe Ls held to foLLow by necessLty (deductLve Lnference) or probabLLLty (LnductLve Lnference) froM sentences at a prevLous LeveL. ALL we have (Ln logLcaL terMs) Ls a chaLn of precLsatLons fLowLng Ln one or Many possLble dLrectLons of LnterpretatLon. Ue could have easLLy started froM the saMe vague, general fundaMentaL preMLss and proceeded to deveLop a chaLn of precLsatLons Ln a very dLfferent dLrectLon of LnterpretatLon. Thus, the "dLrectLon of derLvatLon· shown Ln the dLagraMMatLc LLlustratLon of Naess's systeMatLsatLon shouLd be understood as referrLng to both the leveL of precLsatLon and the dLrectLon of LnterpretatLon. The greater the Level of precLsatLon the More evLdent the dLrectLon of LnterpretatLon (or what Naess has prevLousLy referred to as the "defLnLteness of LntentLon")_ Uhat Ls the vaLue of tryLng to provLde a systeMatLsatLon of deep ecology (or any other faLrLy coMprehensLve vLew) when the connectLve LLnks between fundaMentaL preMLsses (LeveL I) and practLcaL consequences (Level~) are as weak as that of "possLbLe LnterpretatLon"? An LMportant answer Must be that such a systeNatLsatLon eMphasLses the contLnuaLLy-beLng-forgotten fact that our Most sophLstLcated and precLse, non-trLvLaL (L ~e. nontautoLogLcaL) reasonLngs are aLways eMbedded or grounded Ln a very generaL "underLyLng perceptLon of the way thLngs are." ThLs eMphasLs, thLs contLnual reMLndLng, constLtutes the Most sLgnLfLcant and dLstLnctLve structural feature of deep ecologLcaL thought. (GUIDING STARS, pp.203-4) OnLy LeveL one contaLns phLLosophLes (LncLudLng MetaphysLcs, of course) and expLLcLt reLLgLous foundations. There Ls, and hopefuLLy wLLL never be, Many sLgnLfLcant COMMon characterLstLcs on Level 1. The cLeanLng of 'rubbLsh' on thLs Level Ls a hazardous undertakLng froN MY poLnt of vLew. -12- In a coMprehensLve phLLosophy of Level l, for lnstance ln an 'ecosophy' ln MY terMlnoLogy, every key terM of the pLatforM forMuLatlon, (Level 2), would have to be .coM"ented upon and elucLdated. ThLs "ay be seen as a clearLng up operatlon. A hlgher level of preclseness Ls achLeved and eLLMLnatlon of ph~Losoph~caLLy unsuLtable rhetorLcs. (HOTES ON SYLVAN, pp.8-9) 3: ON BIOCENTRIC EGALITARIANISM The Lntultlon of blocentrlc equaLlty ls that aLL thlngs Ln the blosphere have an equal rlght to Llve and bLossoM and to reach thelr own LndLvlduaL forMs of unfoLdLng and self-reaLlzatlon wlthln the Larger SeLf-reallzatlon. Thls basLc Lntultlon Ls that aLL organLsMs and entltles Ln the ecosphere, as parts of the lnterreLated whole, are equal Ln LntrlnsLc worth. Naess suggests that bLocentrlc equaLLty as an LntuLtlon Ls true ln prLncLpLe, although ln the process of LLvLng, aLL specLes use each other as food, shelter, etc. Mutual predatlon ls a b~ologLcal fact of lLfe, and "any of the world's relLgLons have struggled wLth the spLrltuaL lMpllcatlons of thts. SoMe anlMaL llberatlonLsts who atteMpted to sLde-step thLs probLeM by advocatlng vegetarLanlsM are forced to say that the entLre plant ktngdo" LncLudLng raLn forests have no rLght to thelr own exlstence. ThLs evaslon fLles ln the face of the basLc LntuLtlon of equalLty. Aldo Leopold expressed thLs Lntultlon when sald huMans are •pLaLn cLtlzens• of the btotlc coMMunlty, not Lord and Master over all other specLes. BlocentrLc equaLlty ls lntlMateLy related to the aLL-LnclusLve SeLfreaLlzatLon ln the sense that Lf we harM the rest of Nature then we are harMLng ourselves. There are no boundarles and everythlng ls lnterreLated. But Lnsofar as we percelve thlngs as LndLvLduaL organlsMs or entLtLes, the LnsLght draws us to respect aLL huMan and nonhuMan lndLvLduals ln theLr own rLght as parts of the whole wLthout feeLLng the need to set up hlerarchLes of specles wlth huMans at the top. The practlcaL LMpLlcatlons of thLs lntultlon or norM suggest that we should LLve wlthLn MlnLMuM rather than MaxlMUM lMpact on other specLes and on the Earth ln general. Thus we see another aspect of our guldlng prLnclpLe: ·slMpLe ln Means, rLch ln ends.• (Deep EcoLog~, pp.167-9) blospherLcaL egaLltarlanlsM Ln prlnclpLe' and certaln The abstract terM slMlLar terMs whlch I have used, do perhaps More harM than good. They suggest a posLtLve doctrLne, and that ls too Much. The LMportance of the LntultLon ls but MOMentary, only perhaps the rather lts capaclty to counteract, Less seeMs what towards attltude Lordly and consequentlaL, self-congratulatory developed, Less coMplex, Less MlracuLous. A rlch varLety of acceptable Motlves can be forMuLated for belng More reluctant to Lnjure of klLL a LLvLng beLng of klnd A than a beLng of klnd B. The cultural settlng ls dLfferent for each belng Ln each culture, furtherMore there are few general norMs, only vague guLdeLLnes. One factor: felt nearness, deterMlnes Largely our capactty to ldentLfy ourselves wlth a sort of beLng, to suffer when they suffer. One cannot put forth ethLcaL rules of conduct wlthout takLng such feeltngs and our lLMlted capacLtLes serLously. If Lt Ls dLffLcuLt to avotd klLLLng A because of Lts sMalLness, whereas klLLlng B ls easlLy avolded, we tend to protect B rather than A. Indeed we Llve wLth an obvLous dLversLty of obLlgatlons. Ue have speclaL oblLgatlons towards our own chLldren: Ln Most cultures any anlMaL May be kLLLed ln order to feed one's starvLng chlLd. ObLlgatLons toward specLes that have been MeMbers of our llfe coMMunLty for Long perLods are greater than toward accldentaL vlsltors. FurtherMore, we have the -13- relevance of sufferLng: capacLty of sufferLng? Is the sufferLng of A less than that of B? Has A the The sLMpLe thLng I try to convey here L3 that an ethLcs concernLng dLfferences between non-huMan LLvLng beLngs Ls of a coMparable level of coMpLexLty to ethLcs concernLng dLfferent people and groups wLth whoM we have to do. (lntuLtLon, p.202) Those of us who procLaLM the rLght of all LLfe forMs to LLve and bLossoM thLnk of thLs rLght as an aspect of the 'value Ln LtseLf' whLch we attrLbute to the bLosphere wLth Lts closely Lnterconnected LLfe forMs. The procLaMatLon seeMs to steM froM an LntuLtLon for whLch a graduatLon Ls soMethLng foreLgn. If there Ls such a basLc rLght, Lf Lt can be gLven a faLrly precLse MeanLng, Lt Ls the naMe for all lLfe forMs. It Ls LMportant enough to be terMed bLospherLcaL egaLLtarLanLsM. But Lt Ls perhaps the best to abstaLn froM such Labels. They LnvLte a varLety of LnterpretatLons Most of whLch May be MLsLeadLng. As to the consequences of a posLtLve answer, I thLnk we can learn froM certaLn cultures of hunters and gatherers where bLg anLMaLs are only kLLled after elaborate cereMonLes and excuses'. There Ls acknowLedgeMent of equal rLght, but also of a rLght to kLlL Ln order to Meet vLtaL needs. There Ls a 'norM conflLct' whLch Ls solved through addLtLonal norMs: the perforMance of certaLn rLtes and behavLors of other kLnds. What I thLnk we need not proclaLM Ls that we as huMans are Most or More valuable, or have a hLgher rLght. ~e need not say '1 have a hLgher rLght to LLve and bLossoM than you have, obnoxLus MosquLto, so I kLLL you!' or 'BeLng Much More valuable than you are, I kLlL you and your offsprLng, dLrty rat!' In so far as we have vLtal needs to kLlL, and Ln so far as Lt Ls LnevLtabLe Ln practLce, we May justLfy thLs through varLous norMs whLch are Ln harMony wLth general ecoLogLcal thLnkLng. Do these words solve the relevant probLeMs? Of course not. ~hat I aM drLvLng at Ls the prLorLty of MaLntaLnLng a sort of egalLtarLanLsM Ln p~LncLple. How we can LLve thLs that prLncLpLe Ls a questLon of ethLcs Ln a very general sense, proceedLng froM Many prLncLples whLch LnevLtably Lead to norM confLLcts requLrLng adjustMents froM day to day. (PhLLosophLcaL Aspects, pp.27-9) AccordLng to Naess, a bLospherLc egaLLtarLan prLncLpLe, of equal value of to the all LLfe, Ls an LntuLtLveLy clear and obvLous value axLoM', at least aLMost ecoLogLcaL fLeLd-worker' (73, p96)!. But eMpLrLcaL surveys would certaLnLy not sustaLn Haess's claLMs. The prLncLpLe seeMs generally neLther LntuLtLve nor obvLous, and Ln several ways Lt appears LncoMpatLbLe wLth the wLder deep ecology pLatforM. It Ls not even obvLous that soMethLng has value by vLrtue of havLng LLfe. On the contrary, value seeMs, lLke yellowness, to be Much More patchLLy dLstrLbuted across the unLverse. SpecLal places, for Lnstance, are especLaLLy valuable. Hor Ls value always dLstrLbuted on LLvLng thLngs, but colours toMbs of the dead; and soMetLMes Lt flakes off consteLlatLons of LLvLng thLngs, for exaMpLe thLngs Ln excess, such as Locusts or rats Ln a plague. But even Lf every LLvLng thLng were assLgned value, Lt would not follow (Ln the way soMetLMes LnvaLLdLy argued) that every thLng has Lt equally. ~hLLe Lt could be saLd that thLngs are equal Ln havLng Lt, thLs Ls rather LLke pretendLng that people are equal Ln an LnegaLLtarLan socLety where all have soMe Money - a subterfuge. Indeed proposed prLncLpLes of deep ecology LnforM us, correctly, that soMe ecoLogLcaL LteMS are More valuable than others. For Lnstance, a certaLn sort of coMpLexLty Ls a vLrtue (Naess 73, prLncLpLe (6)), so presuMabLy an LteM wLth that coMpLexLty Ls More valuable than a sLMple bLoLogLcal LteM. SLMLLarLy, dLversLty of systeM Ls a vLrtue, a prLMe ground of value (prLncLpLe (2)). The upshot appears to be that a hLghly dLverse ecosysteM Ls More valuable -14- than a sLMpLLfLed and LMpoverLshed one_ FurtherMore, bLospherLc egaLLtarLanLsM Ls LnconsLstent wLth the hoLLstLc, antL-reducLLonL3tLc, antL-LndLvLduaLL3tLc ethos whLch deep ecoLogy LMports froM hoLLstLc ecotogy. AnaLogous concLu3Lons can be reached for •equaL rLghts• forMuLatLons_ For one thLng, equaL rLghts are characterLstLcally based on equal MerLt or equal worth_ For another, arguMents lLke those gLven can be rerun wLth rLghts suppLantLng values_ As a theoretLcaL prLncLpLe, bLospherLc egalLtarLanLsM has to be scrapped_ The LMMense dLffLcuLtLes of such a prLncLpLe Ln practLce Naess had already partLally recognLsed, qualLfyLng egalLtarLanLsM to equalLty Ln prLncLple 'because any realLstLc praxLs necessLtates soMe kLllLng, exploLtatLon, and suppressLon' (p_95). The extent of erosLon Ln equalLty thLs affords reMaLns obscure; but Lt couLd be close to total, wLth theoretLcaL equaLLty LapsLng whenever confLLct of rLghts or values LooMed_ Such egaLLtarLanLsM would be LLke a MaxLM of honesty Ln prLncLpLe, whLch appLLed Ln practLce only when Lt was not LnconvenLent; that Ls, but an eMpty MaxLM_ ~hatever Naess's Lntended qualLfLcatLon, Lt stLLL seeMs to people wLth Much practLcaL experLence on the Land or Ln gardenLng, especLaLLy Ln places where the surroundLng natural envLronMent has not been totally transforMed, that he has consLderabLy underestLMated the extent of quaLLfLcatLon needed, and that the prLncLpLe. BLospherLc strangle to begLn does quaLLfLcatLon due theLr own shelter or supply not do who egaLLtarLanLsM Ln practLce Ls for people sustenance, but pass the busLness of ecosysteM Lnterference and ModLfLcatLon on to others (as they typLcaLLy pass the butchery of theLr Meat and the LLke on to others)_ Even were Lt desLrabLe, unLversaL hunter-gatherLng Ls no Longer possLbLe or feasLbLe, wLth so Many Mostly unsuLted and LLL-adapted huMans; and a substantLaL even hunter-gatherers terMLnate the LLves of Many creatures Lnterference wLth theLr rLghts to LLve and bLossoM - and, More LMportant, and dLrectty LnterferLng substantLaLLy ModLfy theLr envLronMents, thus LndLrectly wLth enorMous nuMbers of LLvLng thLngs_ ~hatever rLghts sLMpLer LLvLng organLsMs, especLaLLy ones such as bacterLa and vLruses, have to LLve and bLossoM, they have decLdedLy quaLLfLed and Much attentuated ones. ULth bLospherLc egaLLtarLanLsM (Ln prLncLpLe) the deep ecology MoveMent has Latched onto a prLncLple whLch Ls both too powerful, and yet, Lf the ·Ln prLncLpLe" quaLLfLcatLon Ls appLLed so as to cover typLcaL LLfestyLes of deep ecoLogLsts, a prLncLpLe so rLddLed wLth exceptLons as to barely hang together. But wLthout soMe of the Lntended force of bLospherLc egaLLtarLanLsM, deep ecology Ls Ln danger of coLLapsLng (LLke Many of Lts followers) Lnto an LnterMedLate posLtLon, as no other part of the pLatforM adequately sustaLns Lts LLMLted separatLon_ Part of what Ls sought wLth the egaLLtarLan prLncLpLe Lnterference, huMan Lnterference to an extent and on a scale far below that of theMe the Ls already afforded a basLs Ln presently prevaLLLng Ls what wLth values-Ln-nature and outsLde the huMan sphere, sLnce Lnterference of value Ls (Lpso facto) LLMLted. Such a prLncLpLe of LLMLted Interference deserves, Ln any case, separate forMuLatLon (whLch Lt usually gaLns Ln deep ecology pLatforMs)_ But even so Lt hardly achLeves the requLsLte separatLon, sLnce LnterMedLate posLtLons can, and do, grant or MaLntaLn soMe such prLncLpLe of lLMLted or reduced Lnterference (thus e-g- BLrch, AttfLeLd, SLnger)_ ~hat Ls requLred Ls a posLtLve equLvaLent of the separatLng feature, of the rejectLon of the greater vaLue assuMptLon, and therewLth of the rejectLon of huMan supreMacy, of the value pLcture of huMans as always nuMber one_ What Ls needed, More generaLLy, Ls a prLncLpLe teLLLng agaLnst the favourLng of one over others sLMpLy on the basLs of specLes, a specLes - huMans Ln partLcuLar -15- prLncLple of bLospecLes LMpartLalLty, to gLve Lt a sLMLlar grandLose tLtle. There Ls soMe reason to suspect that, as elsewhere, a requLreMent of LMparttalLty has been hardened Lnto one of egalLtarLanLsM, that faLrness, because often dLfftcult to assess, has been MLstakenly taken to Lnvolve equaltty. BLospecLes LMpartLalLty LMplLes the avoLdance of specLes chauvLnLsM, that Ls the avotdance of unfaLr treatMent of LteMs outstde the gLven specLes. Because unfaLr, the treatMent concerned lacks any sufftctent justLfLcatLon. Hence, the avotdance of spectes chauvtnLsM Lnvolved Ls effectLvely that prevLously explaLned as a specLal case of class chauvLnLsM. SLMLlarly, the requLreMent of bLospecLes LMpartLalLty Ls a specLal case of the requlreMent of class (or natural group) LMpartlallty, for whlch the arguMents are the saMe as those for the avoldance of class chauvLnLsM. The danger of specLes partLalLty, of favourLng soMe specLes, Ls Much encouraged by a specles fallacy, whLch Ls coMMonly lnvoked ln favourlng huMans. ThLs Ls the error of concludLng that because a few MeMbers of the specles have accoMplLshed soMethtng of (LMMense) value, all MeMbers of the spectes therefore are (hlghly) valuable; all MeMbers of the specles Manage to free-load for the rtde, obtatned by a few MeMbers, so to say. The arguMent, once challenged, usually falls back on an arguMent that goes by way of capacltLes: the reMaLnLng MeMbers of the specles have the capactty to achleve these sorts of thlngs also. But, fLrstly, that Ls not true: LntellLgence, skLlls, and the lLke, vary soMewhat wtthLn specLes, and froM our narrow perspectLve, vary consLderably aMong huMans, soMe of whoM have no capacLty for advanced MatheMatLcs or MusLc. a Secondly, Lt requLres More than capacLty: Lt requLres cLrcuMstances, favourable envlronMent to exercLse theM (hence, ln part, the folly of More huMans ln conspLcuously suboptLMal cLtLes), together wLth a wlll and drlve actually to follow through approprLately on capacLtLes. (CrLtLque, pp.12-16) 4. NON-VIOLENCE The fourth plllar, nonvLolence, Means to the Greens the cessatLon of both personal vLolence and -structural vlolence·, that Ls, vLolence and oppresslon LMposed by the state and by Lnstltutlons. For these reasons the Greens support the concept of self-deterMlnatLon for lndLvLduals and groups. They also advocate peace educatLon Ln the schools, whLch would teach nonvLolent Means of conflLct resolutLon and show chLldren that the cult of the soldLer Ls a cultural, not a natural condltLon. The Greens also call for an end to the vLolence and oppressLon toward woMen, chLldren, and MLnorLty groups so coMMon Ln patrLarchal socLetLes. They want to develop a nonexploLtatlve econoMlc systeM Ln whLch eMployee-owned and -controlled busLnesses replace huge operatlons dLctated by or corporate lnterests. They want to transforM our vlolent state the relatLonshLp wlth nature lnto one of balance and respect. Petra Kelly expresses the centralLty of thLs prLncLple when she says, ·NonvLolence Ls the essentLal Lngredtent ln an ecologLcal socLety. • Most of the Greens eMphatLcally eMbrace the prLncLple of Although nonvLolence, they also realLze that Lts appllcatLon Ls often probleMatLc. Roland Vogt polnted out one of the areas of confll~tlng values: What we have not yet accoMplLshed Ls to say how we show ourselves to be nonvLolent at the MOMent when we partLcLpate Ln governMental functLons, because the state Ls Ltself an LnstLtutLon of vLolence. For exaMple, how wlll a Green cLty counctl act agalnst people who don't pay thelr rent, although they really could because they recelve welfare or because they earn enough. The norMal course Ls warnLng, warnLng, evLctLon notLce, and then evLctLon by force and by polLce. We haven't solved thLs. That Ls, there are stLll no thought-out concepts of how we can reconcLle the deMands of socLal -16- responsLbLL Lty wLth the deMands of non vLoLence. The Greens extend theLr prLncLpLe of nonvLoLence to theLr actLve resLstance agaLnst the Most MassLve and potentLaLLy deadly "anLfestatL on of structural vLoLence: the nuclear arMs race proMoted by the MLLLtary-L ndustrLaL coMpLex and the governMent. In theLr natLonaL headquarter s Ln Bonn the Greens have a poster of OandhL s adage "there Ls no way to peace; peace Ls the way• and one of Thoreau 0 Those who eMbrace nonvLoLent cLvLL dLsobedLenc e, coMMLttLng breaches of Law on the grounds of conscLence, are prepared to suffer · vLoLence or punLshMent theMseLves rather than LnfLLct vLoLence or LnjustLce on others or share responsLbLL Lty for such acts by reMaLnLng passLve. •1,, however, the Law Ls so proMuLgated that Lt of necessLty Makes you an agent of LnjustLce agaLnst another, then I say to you: Break the Law." The MajorLty of Greens strongly endorse - and lLve - the concept of actLve, nonvLoLence resLstance. However, the MarxLst-orL ented MeMbers of the party have never been fully supportLve of that prLncLpLe. They vLew Lt "ereLy as a ·MoralLstLc " tactLc that should be abandoned Ln favor of escaLatLng resLstance Lf Lt does not prove suffLcLentL y effectLve. Petra Kelly's account of the LeftLsts' attLtude on thLs Lssue was sLMLlar to what we had heard froM Many other Greens: They do not understand that nonvLolent actLon Ls an extre"ely subversLve force. They thLnk Lt's harMLess, Ls a for" of obedLence, and changes nothLng, that Lt's LLke beggLng froM the state. ·1t's just a tactLc, a toot," they say. To theM everythLng Ls to be used. But there are soMe thLngs you should never "Lsuse - or even use. They are sLMpLy LntegraL. NonvLoLence cannot be coMproMLsed. Although Many of the advocates of nonvLoLent . resLstance argued that ·such a course cannot be dLsMLssed as "Merely MoraLLstLc" sLnce Lt Ls also absolutely ratLonaL (that Ls, hLstory shows that vLoLence breeds vLolence - structural as welt as personal - so we "ust fLnd another way to effect change, especLaLLy Ln the nuclear age). For Most MeMbers of the greens the choLce was clear, as expressed wLth a cLtatLon froM MartLn Luther KLng: •~e no Longer have a choLce or nonvLoLence between vLoLence and nonvLoLence . The choLce Ls eLther nonexLsten ce." (Green PoLLtLcs, pp.~3-7) Deeply coMMLtted persons Ln the ecology Move"ent sense the vuLnerabLLL ty of natural processes to huMan LnterventLo n, and the fundaMentaL necessLty of MaLntaLnLng bLologLcal dLversLty. AffLrMatLon of the LntegrLty of ecosysteMs frequently LnvoLves a caMpaLgn to save froM developMent soMe rLver of canyon or wLLderness area. In a real sense, ecologLcaL resLstance LnvoLves beco"Lng frLends wLth another specLes or a rLver or a MountaLn, for exaMpLe. In general, the resLster takes up the burden of responsLbLl Lty, the burden of wLtnessLng for the other as Self. ThLs process of befrLendLng "ay be based on ArLstotle's crLterLa for frLendshLp: the proMotLon of the other's good for the other's own sake. Or frLendshLp can be the extensLon of self. When OandhL was asked Lf hLs good deeds Ln a vLLLage expressed hLs huManLtarLa nLsM, he repLLed he worked "to serve no • GandhL s stateMent defLned MaturLty. ALtruLsM was one else but Myself unnecessary because hLs self eMbraced the whole vLLLage. 0 There are Many dLfferent tactLcs of LndLvLduaLs and organL2atLo ns Ln save the Earth•, but or poLLtLcaL caMpaLgns whLch seek to ·save the rLver -17- there Ls one overrLdLng or baste norM of ecoLogLcaL resLstLng: non-vLoLence. Ecology teaches us that MankLnd Ls not the center of LLfe on the planet. Ecology has taught us that the whole earth Ls part of our "body" and that we Must Learn to respect Lt as we respect ourselves. As we feel for ourselves, we Must feel for aLL forMs of LLfe - the whales, the seals, the forests, the seas. The treMendous beauty of ecoLogLcaL thought Ls that Lt shows us a pathway back to an understandLng and an apprecLatLon of LLfe LtseLf - an understandLng and apprecLatLon that Lt Ls LMperatLve to that very way or LLfe. As wLth the whales and the seals, LLfe Must be saved by nonvLoLent confrontatLons, by what the Quakers caLL "bearLng wLtness•. A person bearLng wLtness Must accept responsLbLLLty for beLng aware of an LnjustLce. The person May then choose to do soMethLng or stand by, but he May not turn away Ln Lgnorance. The Greenpeace ethLc Ls not onty to personally bear wLtness to atrocLtLes agaLnst lLfe; Lt Ls to take dLrect actLon to prevent theM. ~hLLe actLon Must be dLrect, Lt Must also be non-vLoLent. Ue Must obstruct a wrong wLthout offerLng personal vLoLence to Lts perpetrators. Ue Must know that our greatest strength Ls LLfe LtseLf, and the coMMLtMent to dLrect our lLves to prbtect others. EcoLogLcaL resLstLng could be defLned as keepLng the peace of the neLghborhood. Rarely are vandals or vLolent neLghbors welcoMe Ln the neLghborhood. Uhen the neLghbors Lnclude rLvers and MountaLns, seashores and prarLes, then the LntegrLty of the ecosysteM Ls MaLntaLned. In hLs explLcatLon of GandhL's theory of nonvLoLence, Arne several norMs of nonvLoLent potLtLcat caMpaLgns. These Lnctude: Naess lLsts l. Announce your case and the goal of your caMpaLgn explLcLtty and clearly, dLstLnguLshLng essentLaLs froM nonessentLats. 2. Seek personal contact wLth your opponent and be avaLLable to hLM. · BrLng confLLctLng groups Lnto personal contact. 3. Turn your opponent Lnto a beLLever Ln and supporter of your case, but do not coerce or expLoLt hLM. ~- You provoke your opponent Lf you deLLberateLy or carelessly destroy hLs property. of ecoLogLcaL resLstLng denounce theorLsts LeadLng nonvLoLence as tactLcs. But as Rober ALtken RoshL wrote: vLoLence versus Non-vLoLence Ls not just a tactLc for people who Make Lt a practLce ... The end Ls the Means, Ln other words. Look at poLLtLcaL hLstory or at the hLstory of any MoveMents. Uhen we work for certaLn goals, those goals tend to betray us. Ue defeated L.B. Johnson only to get RLchard NLxon. Ue got rLd of the B-1 BoMber (teMporarLLy) and the CruLse MLssLle appeared. Ue have to Make our actLon the goal. Our actLon Must LtseLf be the truth. Our actLon Must be Lts own defense, Lts own procLaMatLon, Lts own purpose. (Letter to the author, June 1982) Both on practLcaL and ethLcaL grounds, vLoLence Ls rejected as a Mode of ecotogLcal resLstance. TerrorLst attacks on nuclear plants or MLssLle sLtes could cause ·red" alerts and vLolent responses froM governMent agencLes. PLacLng one's own LLfe at rLsk, such as sLttLng Ln front of bulldozers or polLce cars at a deMonstratLon to protest destructLon of the raLn forest, May be LLLegaL but not vLoLent. And spontaneous acts such as the decoMMLssLonLng of a power generator or bulldozer May draMatLze the contLnuLng destructLon of a -18- spectal ecosysteM. Ecologtcal reststance also Means defendtng natural dtverstty through educatLon, publLc speakLng, and use of lawsuLts; tryLng to convert publtc opLnton to the cause; and tnforMLng poltttctans and dectsLon Makers. ResLstance Ls another naMe for afftrMatLon - joyful affLrMatton of the tntegrLty of Nature, natural dLversLty, and MLnLMuM huMan LMpact on place. (Deep Ecolo9H, pp.16-17) The Deep Ecology MOVeMent and peace MoveMent. Ftfteen years ago close cooperatton between supporters of deep ecology and actLvtsts Ln the peace MoveMent was out of reach. Rather suddenly thts sttuatton Ls totally changed. SoMe of us, ltke Myself, favour unLlateral dtsarMaMent and establtshMent of MtlLtant, but unherotc, non-vtolent defence. At thts potnt Lt ts tMportant for actLvtsts to stress the dtstLnctLon between actLon, caMpaLgn and MOVeMent. They May be tllustrated by three concentrLc cLrcles. The LnnerMost coMprLse the dLrect actLons wLthLn a caMpatgn, for Lnstance, a dated deMonstratLon at a parttcular locatLon agatnst the butldtng of a daM, or the non-vtolent obstructton of the transport of the MachLnery on the way to the daM sLte. ThLs May be part of a ten year old caMpaLgn to save a rtver (LncludLng of course tts ecosysteM) froM developMent of soMe sort. Ten dLrect acttons May be fatlure, but nevertheless theLr LMpact May conflLct, contrtbute to vLctory of the caMpaLgn. (Or May polarLze the antt-actLvtsts Many what Ls That contrLbutLng to the faLlure of the caMpatgn? MaLntaLn.) The rLver caMpaLgn together wLth other analogous caMpaLgns May be seen as part of a MoveMent of greater or lesser generaltty. A MoveMent to save rtvers, or More generally a conservatton MoveMent. Many caMpatgns May be fatlures, but the MOVeMent goes on. (Hates on Poltttcs, pp.l~-JS) Gandhtan and other forMs of non-vtolence are wtdely found wLthtn the deep ecologLcal MoVeMent. There Ls a reluctance to accept destructLon of MachLnery Ln efforts to stop destructton even of holy places. There Ls soMe dtsagreeMent on thts and related subjects. I do not thtnk that the coMpletely general norMs of care and consLderatLon should be looked upon as part of the specLftc platforM of the deep ecology MoveMent . . (PhLlosophLcal Aspects, p.31) In suM, the paradtgM of deep ecology Ls revolutLonary tn tts MetaphysLcs, epLsteMology, and cosMology, but deep ecologLsts do not seek to overthrow governMents by force of arMs or to Lssue anythLng lLke a coMprehensLve, alleMbracLng polLtLcal prograM for brLngLng about the new order. The conteMporary deep ecology MoveMent seeMs to be what Robert NLsbet has called a "wLthdrawal and renewal" MoveMent such as has perLodLcally arLsen .Ln ~estern socLety sLnce the fall of the RoMan EMpLre. There ts no poltttcal party of "deep ecology,· no cadre of poltttcal revoluttonarte s. Thts ts not an approprtate approach for deep ecologtsts. No frontal confrontatLons wLth reforMLst envLronMental tsts or wLth the doMLnant socLal/polttLc al order Ls destred. It would be counter-product Lve by Maktng people More defensLve of thetr LdeologLcal posLtLon. Deep ecology Ls not an atteMpt to add one More tdeology Ln the crowded fLeld of Modern LdeologLes. Deep ecologLsts are questLng for ways to lLberate and cultLvate the ecologLcal conscLousness. FroM ecologtcal conscLousness wtll naturally flow an ecologtcal reststance. (Deep Ecology MoveMent, pp.316-17) 5: ON SELF-REALIZATION Naess: Self-realtzatLo n ts the realtzatLon of -19- the potentLaltttes of ltfe. OrganLsMs that dLffer froM each other Ln three ways gLve us Less dLversLty than organLsMs that dLffer froM each other Ln one hundred ways. Therefore, the selfreaLLzatLon we experLence when we LdentLfy wLth the unLverse Ls heLghtened by an Lncrease Ln the nuMber of ways Ln whLch LndLvLduals, socLetLes, and even specLes and lLfe forMs realLze theMselves. The greater the dLversLty, the, the greater the self-realLzatLon. ThLs seeMLng duaLLty between LndLvLduaLs and the totalLty Ls encoMpassed by what I call the Self and the ChLnese call the Tao. Most people Ln deep ecology have had the feelLng - usually, but not always, Ln nature - that they are connected wLth soMethLng greater than theLr ego, greater than theLr naMe, theLr faMLLy, theLr specLaL attrLbutes as an LndLvLdual - a feelLng that Ls often called oceanLc because Many have Lt on the ocean. ULthout that LdentLfLcatLon, one Ls not easLLy drawn to becoMe LnvoLved Ln deep ecology. Many people have thLs feeLLng when they see a death struggle - for Lnstance tLny anLMaLs LLke fLtes or Mosquttoes fLghtLng for thetr ltves. Uhen they see anLMals sufferLng, they May LdentLfy wLth LLfe forMs they usually don't LdentLfy wLth. Such sLtuatLons offer us an opportunLty to develop a More Mature poLnt of vLew. Insofar as thLs conversLon, these deep feelLngs are reLLgLous, deep ecology has a reLLgLous coMponent, and those people who have done the Most to Make socLetLes aware of the destructLve way Ln whLch we LLve Ln reLatLon to natural settLngs have had such relLgLous feeLLngs. Rachel Carson, for exaMpLe, says that we cannot do what we do, we have no reLLgLous or ethLcaL justLfLcatLon for behavLng as we do toward nature. Her arguMent Ls not calculated or reasonable Ln the usual sense, sayLng that, Lf we contLnue poLsonLng nature, we wLLl be Less healthy, or wLLL have fewer resources, and so on. She Ls sayLng that we are sLMply not perMLtted to behave Ln that way. SoMe wLll say that nature Ls not Man's property, Lt's the property of God; others wLLL say Lt Ln other ways. The MaLn poLnt Ls that deep ecology has a reLLgLous coMponent, fundaMental LntuLtLons that everyone Must cuLtLvate Lf he or she Ls to have a LLfe based on values and not functLon LLke a coMputer. Uhereas shallow ecology, Lf taken to Lts logLcaL extreMe, Ls lLke a coMputerLzed, cost-benefLt anaLysLs for huMans. (SLMpLe tn Means, p.11) If the terM seLf-reaLLzatLon Ls applLed, Lt should be kept Ln MLnd that Me", "ego , and self have shLftLng denotatLons. NothLng Ls evLdent and •1·, LndLsputabLe. Even that we are Ls debatable Lf we Make the questLon dependent upon answertng what we are. Self-realLzatLon Ln Lts absolute MaxLMUM Ls, as I see Lt, the Mature experLence of oneness Ln dLversLty as depLcted Ln the above verse. The MLnLMUM Ls the seLf-reaLL2atLon by More of Less consLstent egotLsM - by the narrowest experLence of what constLtutes one's self and a MaxLMUM of alLentatLon. As eMpLrLcaL beLngs we dweLL soMewhere Ln between, but Lncreased MaturLty LnvoLves tncrease of the wLdeness of the self. The seLf-reaLtzatton MaxLMuM should not necessarLLy be conceLved as a MystLcal or MedLtattonaL state. ·ey MedLtatLon soMe perceLve the Self tn the self by the self; others by the path of knowledge and stLLl others by the path of work (karMa-yoga) [Gtta: Chapter 13,, verse 2~]. GandhL was a karMa-yoga, reaLLzLng hLMseLf through socLaL and poLLtLcaL actLon. The terMs MystLcal unLon and MystLcLsM are avoLded here for three reasons: Ftrst, strong Mysttcal tradLtLons stress the dtssolutLon of Lndtvtdual selves Lnto a nondLversLfLed supreMe whole. Both froM cultural and ecoLogLcaL poLnt of vtew dLversLty and LndLvtdualLty are essentLaL. Second, there Ls a strong terMLnoLogtcaL trend wtthtn sctenttftc coMMuntttes to assoctate MysttcLsM wtth MystLcs tend to agree that MysttcaL ThLrd, confuston. and vagueness conscLousness Ls rarely sustatned under norMal, everyday condLttons. But strong, -20- w~de LdentLfLcatLon can color experLence under such condLtLons. GandhL was only MargLnally concerned wLth 'nature'. In hLs ashraM poLsonous snakes were perMLtted to tLve LnsLde and outsLde huMan dwettLngs. AntL-poLson MedLcLnes were frowned upon~ GandhL LnsLsted that trust awakens trust, and that snakes have the saMe rLght to tLve land btossoM as the huMans. (IdentLfLcatLon, pp.259-6) In keepLng wLth the spLrLtual tradLtLons of Many of the worlds s retLgLons, the deep ecology norM of setf-reatL2atLon goes beyond the Modern western self hedonLstLc whLch Ls defLned as an Lsotated ego strLvLng prLMarLly for gratLfLcatLon or for a narrow sense of LndLvLduat satvatLon Ln thLs tLfe or the next. ThLs socLatty prograMMed sense of the narrow self or socLat self dLslocates us, and leaves us prey to whatever fad or fashLon Ls prevalent Ln our socLety or socLat reference group. Ue are thus robbed of be9LnnLn9 the search for our unLque spLrLtuat/b.LologLcal personhood. SpLrLtual growth, or unfotdLng, begLns when we cease to understand or see ourselves as Lsolated and narrow coMpetLng egos and begLn to LdentLfy wLth other huMans forM our faMLly and frLends to, eventually, our specLes. But the deep ecology sense of self requLres a further MaturLty and growth, an LdentLfLcatLon whLch goes beyond huManLty to Lnclude the nonhuMan world. Ue Must see beyond our narrow conteMporary cultural assuMptLons and values, and the conventLonat wLsdoM of our tLMe and place, and thLs Ls best achLeved by the MedLtatLve deep questLonLng process. Only Ln thLs way can we hope to attaLn full Mature personhood and unLqueness. A nurturLng nondoMLnatLng socLety can help Ln the "real work" of becoMLng a whole person. The ·real work• can be suMMarLzed syMbolLcally as the realLzatLon of "self-Ln-Self- where ·setf· stands for organLc wholeness. ThLs process of the full unfoldLng of the self can also be SUMMarLzed by the phrase, •No one Ls saved untLt we are all saved,· where the phrase •one• Lncludes not only Me, an LndLvLduat huMan, but all huMans, whales, grLzzly bears, whole raLn forest ecosysteMs, MountaLns and rLvers, the tLnLest MLcrobes Ln the soLt, and so on. (Deep Ecology, pp.66-7) of norM SubscrLbLng to these prLncLples, Naess asserts, coMes froM the self-realLzatLon, that ·.~. wLth MaturLty, huMan beLngs wLtl experLence joy and sorrow when other tLfe forMs experLence sorrow. Not only wLll we feet sad when our brother or the dog or cat feels sad, but we wLll grLeve when lLvLng beLngs, LncludLng landscapes, are destroyed. In our cLvLlLzatLon, we have vast Means' of destructLon at our dLsposal but extreMely lLttle MaturLty Ln our feelLngs. Only a very narrow range of feetLngs have Lnterested Most huMan beLngs untLt now.• ThLs deepenLng of feetLngs seeMs to run counter . to the trend Ln Modern socLety toward superfLcLat relatLonshLps . . . . Arne Naess asserts that ·setfrealLzatLon cannot develop far wLthout sharLng joys and sorrows wLth others, or More fundaMentalty, wLthout the developMent of the narrow ego of the sMall chLld Lnto the coMprehensLve structure of a Self that coMprLses all huMan beLngs. The ecologLcal MoveMent -- as Many earlLer phLlosophLcat MoveMents -- takes a step further and asks for developMent such that, there Ls a deep LdentLfLcatLon of LndLvLduals wLth all lLfe." I suggest that the leaders of the ecology MoveMent devetopMent theLr ethLcs after they had Moved along thLs path of Self-reatLzatLon. (Stone/Sky, pp.6-7) But what Ls wrong wLth the wLdely applauded atteMpt, runnLng through Much LdeatLstLc and Eastern thLnkLng, to explLcate value through self-realLsatLon? FLrstly, lLke utLlLtarLan explLcatLons, such as those through happLness and satLsfactLon, Lt Ls Much too experLentLal. It renders value a feature of those -21- who exper~ence value - roughly of valuers - rather than of what ~s valued, and bears value. It Ls lLke sayLng that colour Ls a Matter of those (huMans) who perceLve colour, not of the (coMposLtLon of) thLngs that are coloured. And reMove the experLences, those undertakLng self-realLsatLon, as Ln the days before lLfe appears and value dLsappears. And that too Ls wrong. Secondly, even Lf self-realLsatLon were always worthwhLle and never tLed to by contrast wLth lLfe - there are exaMpLes of value whLch fall beyond evLl (Ln presented often seLf-reaLLsatLon. A certaLn sort of dLrectLon Ls bLocheMLstry texts Lnterested Ln explaLnLng lLfe) as a MLnLMal condLtLon of lLfe of an organLsr1 or syster1: caLL that dLrectLon, s·eLf-dLrecti.on. Thus, deep ecology, Lnsofar as Lt values (just) LLfe, values (just) self-dLrectLon. In these terMs, the contractLon froM seLf-dLrectLon to self-realLsatLon, as Ln Ecosophy T, Looks LLke a M~stake. A s~r1LLar M~stake appears to underLLe contractLons to ecologLcal conscLousness (as Ln Devall); for self-realLsatLon Looks rer1arkabLy L~ke consc~ous seLf-d~rectLon, roughly an LntersectLon of seLf-dLrectLon wLth conscLousness. The argur1ents asser1bLed thus underMLne both of what Devall presents as the uLtLMate norMs of deep ecology', nar1eL~eLf-reaLLsatLon and bLocentrLsM. 'These are not proved but "felt"' (83, p.5). But they are not felt, at least by those who perceLve value beyond what lLves; rather they are dLsproved, by a serLes of counterexar1ples to each as uLtLr1ate norr1s. (CrLtLque, pp.2~-5) In partLcular presentatLons of a partLcular phLLosophy froM whLch the Naess-SessLon platforM Ls derLved, naMely Ecosophy r' I use a Model where 'Self-realLzaHon!' and sLr1LLar short forr1uLatLons are taken to express a top norr1 of a norr1atLve systeM. ~e r1ay artLcuLate 'r1odeLs' of a very cor1prehensLve norr1atLve syster1, and use Lt to explore the LnterrelatLons of our own vLews and those of others. I have extensLvely used a Model of a cor1prehensLve yLew I call 'Ecosophy r ·' and I use only one top norM whLch on the Most crude ser1antLcaL Level Ls expressed by a one word sentence 'seLf-realLzatLon! '. A r1aLn LnspLratLon for - the choLce cor1es froM the use of the terN by GandhL. Another MaLn LnspLratLon Ls the strong trend Ln Uestern LndustrLaL states towards an LndLvLdualLsM favourLng lLfe as a Long ego-trLp full of 'happenLngs' . In France there Ls a group of 'egologLsts' , the nar1e beLng chosen as a contrast to 'ecologLsts ' : ~hatever the reLatLons between LndLvLdual beLngs, huMan nature Ls such that the egocentred Lnterests of each of us Ls stronger than any other. To foster the kLnds of soLLdar~ty the pol~t~cal left ~s taLkLng about, or the soLLdarLty wLth other lLfe forMs wh~ch . ecologLsts (the greens) preach, w~ll therefore never succeed and ~s apt to hurt the LndLvLduaL . ' seLf-reaL~zatLon!' Ls a norM that LnLtLaLLy arLses vLvLd Lnterest aMong those who are LnfLuenced by the ego-trLp trend, but are then astonLshed and bewLLdered by the d~stLnctLons between ego, self and Self. Th~s ~s new to Most of theM and they are often Led to recons~der theLr LndLvLduaL~st posLtLon. ThLs reconsLderLng Ls for Me a confLrMatLon of the SocratLc value of the choLce of forr1ulatLon. The r1aLn poLnt Ln thLs connectLon Ls that huMans undergo a r1aturLn9 process, and only Lf thLs process coMes to a 'prer1ature' halt, LndentLfLcatLon wLth others and solLdarLty faLL to develop. If we, as I do, add the SpLnozLst (courageous) hypothes~s that the joy and equLMLndedness you exper~ence as a Mature person ~s deeper and rLcher than that you exper~ence as an ~r1r1ature grown 'reaLLzaHon of the (wLde) Self!' gets to be an ~nstructi.ve and ~nsp~rLng up, -22- forMu l,a. The Self-realLzatLo n norM proposed by Me has been taken too serLously as Lf one, two or three world expressLons were adequate phLLosophLcaL expressLons of a hL9hest' norM. An adequate expressLon LMplLes that the LntrLcate subject ego, se Lf, Se Lf ', that Ls, b Lo Log Lea L, soe La L and Hetaphys Lea L se Lf ar·e dLstLnguLshed. Only Ln relatLon to a faLrly Large body of phLlosophLcaL analysLs we can forMulate adequate phLlosophLcal prLncLples. It has always been that way. (Notes on Sylvan, pp.17-19) HY 0 6: OH LIFESTYLE The deep ecologLcal MoveMent Ls recruLted froM people who do not look upon natural surroundLngs as a Means for recreatLon and repaLr. LLfe and work Ln natural surroundLngs Ls a vLtal concern. The rLchness of that LLfe Ls so vast, and the Means are so sLMple, that they have dLffLculty understandLng why others seeM to need Means on a level of coMplLcatLon and sophLstLcatLon that Ls unLque Ln the hLstory of [huMan]kLnd. They cannot but fLght agaLnst the acceleratLng destructLon of nature due to the MaLntaLnLng and expandLng the productLon of such Means. They do not thLnk people who serLousLy reflect upon the reLatLon between Means and ultLMate LntrLnsLc values can justLfy the present polLcLes. As an LllustratLon of dLfferent Means/end ratLos, coMpare the dLrect and LndLrect technologLcal requLreMent of a faMLly wLth MeMbers froM 8 to 80 years old lLvLng Ln a natural surroundLng and goLng cross-country skLLng together, wLth that of a faMLly doLng slaloM at a bLg fashLonable skL resort. (PhLlosophLcal. Aspects, pp.35-6) 0 RLch Ln ends, sLMple Ln Means!.' HuMan Lnterference Ln the ecosphere can only be reduced to tolerable levels Lf people, and especLally the average (or econoMLcally above average) people of the LndustrLal states adopt lLfe styles requLrLng sLMple MaterLal Means. ThLs Ls coMpatLble wLth or even favourable towards rLchness of goals. 'Increase the sensLtLvLty to and apprecLatLon of what there Ls suffLcLent of for all!' The educatLonal slogan fLghts agaLnst the confusLon of value wLth Market value and prLce. A way to MaxLMLze our abLlLty to derLve deep satLsfactLon froM the goods of whLch there stLll, Ls, or coul.d be, enough. The present lLfe style of average people Ln LndustrLal socLetLes cannot be a global lLfe style wLthout LrreversLble, colossal destructLon of condLtLons of LLfe on Earth. (Hotes on PolLtLcs, p.2) It ' s a shLft froM beLng doMLnated by Means, LnstruMents, gadgets, all the Many thLngs we thLnk wLLl gLve us pleasure or Make us happy or perfect. The shLft coMes about when we serLously ask ourselves, In what sLtuatLons do I experLence the MaxLMUM satLsfactLon of MY whole beLng? and fLnd that we need practLcally nothLng of what we are supposed to need for a rLght and fuLfLlLLng LLfe. And Lf we Make that shLft toward a LLfe sLMple Ln Means but rLch Ln goals, we are not threatened by the plans elaborated by envLronMentalL sts. For Lnstance, we can see that, Lnstead of an ene~gy cr~s~s, we have a crLsLs of consuMptLon - we have More than enough energy. There Ls no reason to contLnue LncreasLng our consuMptLon of energy or of any of the other MaterLaL aspects of lLfe. In countrLes lLke the UnLted States the crLsLs Ls rather one of LLfestyle, of our tradLtLons of thoughtlessness and confusLon, or our LnabLLLty to questLon what Ls and Ls not worthwhLLe Ln l,Lfe. ULthLn fLfty years, eLther we wLl,l, need a dLctatorshLp to save what Ls Left of the dLversLty of LLfe forMs, or we wLLl have a shLft of values, a shLft of our total vLew such that no dLctatorshLp wLLL -23- be . needed. It Ls thoroughly natural to stop doMLnatLng and expLoLtLng and destroyLng the planet. A "sMooth" ~ay, LnvoLvLng harMonLous LLvLng wLth nature, or a "rough" way, LnvoLvLng dLctatorshLp and coercion - those are the optLdns. I tell people that, Lf they Make clear theLr fundaMentaL assuMptLons about what Ls needed for a LLfe sLMpLe Ln Means and rLch Ln ends, they wLLL necessarLLy coMe to the conctusLon that Lt Ls not tack of energy consuMptLon that Makes theM unhappy. They can then oppose nuclear power wLthout havLng read thLck books and wLthout knowLng the MyrLad facts that are used Ln newspapers and perLodLcaLs. And they Must also fLnd others who feel the saMe and forM cLrcLes of frLends who gLve one another confidence and support Ln lLvLng Ln a way that the MajorLty fLnds rLdLcuLous, naLve, stupLd, and sLMpt~stLc. But Ln order to do that, one Must already have enough seLf-confLdenc e to follow one's LntuLtLon - a quaLLty very Much LackLng Ln broad sectLons of the populace. Most people follow the trends and advertLseMents and becoMe phLLosophLcaL and ethLcaL crLpples. I thLnk that, Ln the long run, Ln order to joyfully and wholeheartedly partLcLpate Ln the deep ecology MoveMent you have to take your own LLfe very seriously. People who successfully MaLntaLn a Low MaterLaL standard of lLvLng and successfully cultLvate a deep, Lntense Lnner lLfe are Much better able to consLstentLy MaLntaLn a deep ecoLogLcat vLew and to act on behalf of Lt. As 1· sLt down and breathe deeply and just feel where I aM, I can ask Myself where and when I really enjoy MY LLfe and what would be the MLnLMuM Means necessary to MaLntaLn those enjoyable feelLngs and sLtuatLons. For exaMpLe, I Myself have too eager to go cLLMbLng Ln the HLMaLayas, whereas the pecutLar been satLsfactLon I have as a MountaLneer could be had Ln Norway . If you concentrate on what gLves you satLsfactLon, you wLLL fLnd that Lt can be obtaLned Much More easLly and sLMply than we are educated to belLeve Ln our socLety, where bL99er, More elaborate and More expensLve are always consLdered better. The deveLopMent of sensLtLvLty toward the good thLngs whLch we already have Ln suffLcLent quantLty Ls the true goal of educatLon. Not that we need to LLMLt our desLres. I'M not for the sLMple lLfe, except Ln the sense of a tLfe sLMpLe Ln Means but rLch Ln goals and values. I have treMendous aMbLtLon. Only the best Ls good enough for Me. I LLke rLchness, and I feel rLcher than the rLchest person when I'M Ln MY cottage Ln the country wLth water I've carrLed froM a certaLn well and wood I've gathered froM the forest. Uhen you take a heLLcopter to the SUMMLt of a MountaLn,° the vLew Looks LLke a postcard, and, Lf there ' s a restaurant on the top, you wLll coMplaLn that the food Ls not properly Made. ~hereas Lf you struggle up froM the bottoM, you have thLs deep feeLLng of satLsfactLon, and even sandwLches MLxed wLth skL wax and sand taste fantastLc. (SLMple Ln Means, pp . 11-12) (1) Use of s LMple Means, avoidance of unnecessary coMplLcated LnstruMents and other sorts of Means. (2) ChoLce of actLvLtLes Most dLrectLy servLng values Ln theMselves and havLng LntrLnsLc value. AvoLdance of actLvLtLes whLch are Merely auxLlLary, havLng no LntrLnsLc value , or beLng Many stages away froM fundaMentaL goals. (3) AntL-consuMerLs M . ThLs negatLve attLtude follows froM (1) and (2). (~) Endeavour to MaLntaLn and Lncrease the sensLtLvLty and apprecLatLon of goods of whLch there Ls enough for all to enjoy. ' (5) Absence or low degree of novophLLL - the love of what Ls new Merely because Lt Ls new. (6) Effort to dwell Ln sLtuatLons of LntrLnsLc value and to act rather than beLng busy . (7) ApprecLatLon of ethnLc and cultural differences aMon9 people, not feelLn9 theM as threats . (8) Concern about the sLtuatLon of the thLrd and fourth world and atteMpt to -24- avoLd a standard of LLvLng too Much dLfferent froM and hLgher than the needy. (Global soLLdarLt y of LLfe style). (9) ApprecLat Lon of LLfe styles whLch are unLversaL LzabLe, whLch are not blatantly LMpossLbLe to sustaLn wLthout LnjustLce toward fellow huMans or other specLes. (10) To go for depth and rLchness of experLenc e rather than LntensLty . (11) To apprecLat e and choose, when possLbLe, MeanLngfuL work rather than just MakLng a LLvLng. (12) To Lead a coMpLex, not a coMpLLca ted LLfe, tryLn9 to reaLLze as Many aspects of posLtLve experLenc es as possLbLe wLthLn each tLMe-Lnte rvaL. (13) CuLtLvatL ng LLfe Ln coMMunLty (GeMeLns chaft) rather than Ln socLety (OeseLLs chaft}. sMaLL scale Ln prLMary productLo n (14) ApprecLat Lon of or partLcLpa tLon agrLcuLtu re, forestry, fLshLng. (15) Effort to satLsfy vLtaL needs rather than desLres. (Paradox, pp.57-8) In soMe Eastern tradLtLon s, the student Ls presented wLth a koan, a sLMpLe story or stateMent whLch May sound paradoxLc aL or nonsensLc aL on the surface but as the student turns and turns Lt Ln hLs or her MLnd, authentLc understan dLng eMerges. ThLs dLrect actLon · of turnLng and turnLn9, seeLn9 froM dLfferent perspectL ves and froM dLfferent depths, Ls requLred for the cuLtLvatL on of conscLou sness. The koan-LLke phrase for deep ecology, suggested by proMLnen t NorwegLan phLLosoph er Arne Naess Ls: ·sLMpLe Ln Means, rLch Ln ends.· (Deep Ecology, p.10) The LdeoLogLcaL change Ls MaLnLy that of apprecLat Lng LLfe quaLLty Ln sLtuatLon s of Lnherent value) rather than adherLng to an (dweLLLng LncreasLn gLy hLgher standard of LLvLng. There wLLL be a profound awareness of the dLfferenc e between bLg and great. SoMe econoMLs ts crLtLcLze the terM "quaLLty of LLfe" because Lt Ls supposed to be vague. But on closer LnspectLo n, what they consLder to be vague Ls actuaLLy the non-quan tLtatLve nature of the terM. One cannot quantLfy adequatel y what Ls LMportant for the quaLLty of LLfe as dLscussed here, and there Ls no need to do so. There Ls aMple rooM for dLfferent op~n~ons about prLorLtLe s: what should be done fLrst, what next? What Cs Most urgent? What Ls necessary as opposed to what Ls hL9hLy desLrabLe ? But the dLfferenc es do not exclude vLgorous cooperatL on. ~hat Ls gaLned froM tentatLve Ly forMuLatL ng basLc vLews shared today by Most or all supporter s of the deep ecology MoveMent? Hopefully Lt Makes Lt a LLttLe easLer to LocaLLze the MoveMent aMong the Many 'aLternat Lve' MoveMents. Hopefully thLs does not Lead to LsoLatLon but rather to even better cooperatL on wLth Many other aLternatL ve MoveMents. It MLght also Make soMe of us More clear about where we stand, and More clear about whLch dLsagreeM ents MLght profLtabL y be reduced and whLch ones MLght profLtabL y be sharpened . After aLL dLversLt y!' Ls a hLgh Level norM! (BasLc, p.6,9) 0 A set of platforM forMulatL on should be vague and aMbLguous enough to be capable or rather dLfferen t phLLosoph LcalLy relevant Lnterpret atLons. The prLncLpLe s of Lnterpret atLon of pLatforMs of MoveMents reseMbLe those of Lnterpret atLon of Laws. Vagueness Ls here essentLaL prLMarLLy because those appLyLng the Laws Must have soMe freedoM Ln adaptLng theM to ever changLng cLrcuMst ances, but also because the forMuLatL on Must slur over, or abstract froM MLnor dLfferenc es of relevant opLnLon aMon9 those who have supported the Lssue of the Law. On the other hand, the Lnterpret atLon of the text of a phLLosop her reseMbLes that of a testaMent ( 'wLLL' ). Exactly what the testator Lntends Ls the -25- sole crLterLon of correctness of the LnterpretatLon . Uhether hLs or her terMLnology Ls abhorent or crazy Ls Lrrelevant. (Hates on Sylvan, pp.10-11) 7: ON BIOREGIOHALISM The central eleMent of bLoregLon Ls the LMportance gLven to natural systeMs "both as the source of physLcal nutrLtLon and as the body of Metaphors froM whLch our spLrLts draw sustenance. To understand natural systeMs Ls to begLn an understandLng of the self." A second eleMent of bLoregLon Ls setf-regulatLo n: •anarchy doesn't Mean out Lt Means out of theLr control.• Local coMMunLtLes LnspLred by a control; of shared concern for the bLoregLon, for "tettLng be• the plants and natLve anLMals of that place, ~an Make decLsLons concernLng LndLvLduat and coMMunat actLons whLc respect the LntegrLty of natural processes Ln that place. CarLng for a place Means avoLdLng exptoLtatLon. thLrd eleMent coMposLng the bLoregLonal notLon Ls spLrLt. • There Ls no sLngle relLgLous practLce for thLs sense of bLoregLonat spLrLt. It can be ChrLstLan, BuddhLst, NatLve AMerLcan or others; based on deep ecologLcal LnsLghts, Lt can be expressed Ln nuMerous ways. (Deep Ecology, pp.21-22) ·A UhLte the bLoregLonal, MLnorLty tradLtLon seeMs approprLate to us for cuttLvatLng ecotogLcal conscLousness, atlowLng for bLologLcat dLversLty wLth sLMplLcLty of Means, there are tough, practLcat decLsLons to Make. ConsLstent wLth our uttLMate norMs, Lt seeMs that one prLncLple Ls protectLon of endangered specLes of plants and anLMals as part of the general norM of unLty Ln dLversLty. Another norM Ls bLoregLonal responsLbLlLty . The local coMMunLty Ls the place for decLsLons. However, what happens when a local COMMunLty's needs conflLct wLth the norM of protectLng specLes dLversLty? Such a sLtuatLon occurred on the north slope of Alaska where natLve EskLMos were huntLng bowhead whales Ln the 1970s. The InternatLonat UhatLng Co~MLssLon ruled that thLs was an endangered specLes of whale and consLdered a total ban on the kLttLng of bowhead. However, the natLve EskLMos pleaded that Lt was part of theLr tradLtLon to kLtt whales. TheLr Myths and tLfestyle were dependent on Lt. It they dLdn't kLll whales they would be More dependent on canned Meat froM the "tower forty-eLght": gLven theM by welfare departMents. ThLs soMewhat sptLt the envLronMentalL sts . Many groups supported a total ban on the kLllLng of bowheads untLl ecologLsts deterMLned that theLr poputatLon had "suffLcLently Lncreased, • but FrLends of the Earth took the posLtLon that EskLMos be allowed to take a regulated nuMber of bowheads usLng theLr tradLtLonal Methods (no advanced technology for kLtlLng theM was allowed). Arne Haess provLdes an exaMple froM the bLoregLon ·of northern Horway where farMers and herders, through expansLon of farMs and nuMber of sheep , were rapLdty encroachLng on habLtat of wolves and bears. SoMe suggested kLllLng all bears sLnce a few bears seeMed to be eatLng soMe sheep. But others suggested LdentLfyLng the probleM More carefully. Uas a specLfLc bear becoMLng More and More Lnterested Ln sheep? Could that bear be entLced to refraLn froM eatLng sheep? Could Lt be reMoved to another tocat(on? Could the farMers agree to keep theLr sheep out of areas where bears were known to have dens or graze? Only as a last resort would the coMMunLty consLder the optLon of kLllLng that bear. ThLs approach Ls Ln great contrast wLth that favoured by soMe ranchers and such as wolves, farMers Ln the AMerLcan Uest . Uhen a •predator" Ls defLned to elLMLnate Lt, undertaken are efforts systeMLc then etc. coyotes, eagles, poLson •1oso", of spreadLng LncludLng aerLal huntLng of wolves (Ln Alaska), -26- shootLn g eagles wLth hLgh-po wered rLfles and destroyL ng habLtat (dennLng areas, rLparLan habLtat of rats, etc.). (Deep Ecology , pp.148- 9) DasMann wrLtes about "bLoregL onalLsM " and •ecodeve lopMent " for the peoples of of AfrLca and the South PacLfLc , and refers approvL ngly to the concept Ln are ("~e House Lynn and e 6orslLn "future prLMLtL ve• develop ed by Jerry another to ve prLMLtL transLtL on froM one condLtL on of syMbLot Lc balance - the a whLch we wLll call future prLMLtLve ... a condLtL on havLng the attrLbu tes of Mature ecosyste M: stable, dLverse , Ln syMbLot Lc balance agaLn") . OasMann dLstLng uLshes between what he calls ecosyste M people and bLosphe re people: "Ecosyst eM people lLve wLthLn a sLngle ecosyste M, or at Most two or three M adjacen t and closely related ecosyste Ms. They are depende nt upon that ecosyste BLosphe re people draw theLr support , not froM the for theLr survLva l resource s of any one ecosyste M, but froM the entLre bLosphe re. BLosphe re people can exert LncredL ble pressure upon an ecosyste M they wLsh to exploLt , and create great devastat Lon - soMethL ng that would be LMpossLble or unthLnk able for people who were depende nt upon that partLcu lar ecosyste M ... BLosphe re people create a natLona l parks. Ecosyste M people have always lLved Ln the equLval ent of at natLona l park ... I propose that the future belongs to those who can regaLn, a hLgher level, the old sense of balance and belon9Ln 9 between Man and nature (ecosyst eM people) .· (SessLo ns, pp-~18- 19) A bLoregL on Ls a part of earth's surface whose rough boundar Les are deterML ned by natural rather than huMan dLctate s, dLstLng uLshable froM other and areas by attrLbu tes of flora, fauna, water, clLMate , soLls, and land-for Ms, The to. rLse the huMan settleM ents and culture s those attrLbu tes have gLven borders between such areas are usually not rLgLd - Nature works wLth More flexLbL lLty and fluLdLty than that - but the general contour s of the regLons theMselv es are not hard to LdentLfy , and Lndeed wLll probabl y be felt, and understo od, sensed, or Ln soMe way known to Many of the LnhabLt ants, , partLcu larly those rooted Ln the land, farMers , rancher s, hunters and fLshers n, AMerlca of face the across foreste rs and botanLs ts, and Most especLa lly, the trlbal Indlans, those stLll Ln touch wLth a culture that for centurl es knew earth as sacred and Lts well-beL ng as LMperat Lve. The wLdest regLon, takLng Lts charact er froM the broades t Measure s of natLve vegetatL on and soLl contour s, May be called the ecore9Lo n and wLll general ly cover several hundred thousand s of square Mlles. But wlthln these ecoregL ons Lt Ls easy to dLstLngu Lsh other coheren t terrLtor Les that defLne a theMselv es prLMarL ly by theLr surface feature s - a watersh ed, or rLver basLn, the valley, a desert, a plateau , a MountaLn range - and whLch we May all call stLll locate often can one turn, Ln 9eore9L on. And wLthLn these 9eore9L ons, sMaller areas, of perhaps several thousand square MLles dLscret e and Ldentof LfLable wLth theLr own topograp hLes and LnhabLt ants, theLr own varLatLo ns huMan culture and agrLcul ture, to whLch we May gLve the · naMe vLtaregL on. Uhether we speak of ecoregL on or 9eore9Lo n or vLtaregL on, after all, we speak of bLoregLons , and Lt Ls that essentL al archetyp e that Ls Most LMporta nt to coMprehend. For once that Ls done on any sLgnLfL cant scale then the Matter of MakLng to dLstLnc tLons and creatLn g huMan LnstLtut Lons to Match theM can be safely left best. theM the LnhabLt ants, the dweller s on the land, who wLll always know The econoMy that coMes lnto belng wlthln a charact er froM the condLtL ons, the laws of Nature. what we can be sald to know wLth soMe surety llvlng on the soLl has been cogently SUMMarLsed as be dLstLng uLshed, froM the laws of TherMod ynaMLcs . The flrst law ls that conserv atlon, bloreglo n also derlves lts Our Lgnoranc e Ls LMMense, but after these Many centurL es of the laws of EcodynaMLcs - to preserv atlon, -27- sustena nce, ls the central goat of the natural world, hence Lts fundaMentat resLstance to largescale structural change; the second law Ls that, far froM beLng entropLc Nature Ls Lnherently stable, workLng Ln all tLMes and places toward that ecology calls a ctLMax, that Ls, a balanced, harMonLous, LntegratLve state of MaturLty whLch, once reached, Ls MaLntaLned for prolonged perLods. FroM thLs Lt follows that a bLoregLonal econoMy would seek to MaLntaLn rather than exploLt the natural world, accoMModate to the envLronMent, rather than resLst Lt; Lt would atteMpt to create condLtLons for a clLMax, a balance, for what soMe econoMLsts have recently taken to callLng a "steady state," rather than for perpetual change and contLnuat growth, Ln servLce to "progress", a false and delusory goddess Lf ever there was one. It would, Ln practLcat terMs, MLnLMLse resource use, eMphasLse conservatLon and recyclLng, avoLd poltutLon and waste. It would adopt Lts systeMs to the gLven bLoregLonal resources - energy based on wLnd, for exaMple, where Nature catted for that, or wood where that was approprLate, and food based on what the regLon Ltself - partLcularly Ln Lts natLve, pre-agrLcutturat state could grow. And thus Lt would be based, above all, on the Most eleMentat and Most elegant prLncLpte of the natural world, that of setf-suffLcLency. Just as Nature does not depend on trade, does not create elaborate networks of contLnentat for the dependency, so the bLoregLon would fLnd all Lts needed resources Lts own wLthLn luxury Manufacture, craft, energy, food, shelter, clothLng, thus beLng envLronMent. And far froM Lt beLng deprLved, far froM Lt LMpoverLshed, Lt would gaLn Ln every Measure of econoMLc health. It would be More stable, free froM booM-and-bust cycles and dLstant potLtLcat crLses; Lt would be able to plan, to allocate at the safest pace, Ln the Most ecotogLcal Manner_ It would not be at the Mercy of dLstant and uncontrollable natLonal bureaucracLes and transnatLonal governMents, and thus More self regardLng, More cohesLve, developLng a sense of place, of COMMunLty of coMradeshLp, and the prLde that coMes froM stabLlLty, control, coMpetence, and Lndependence. In one of hLs More prescLent perceptLons FrLtz SchuMacher reatLsed that the Market econoMy of twentLeth century capLtatLsM erred fundaMentatty, because Lt erred repeatedly, agaLnst Nature. "It Ls Lnherent Ln the Methodology of econoMLcs to Lgnore Man's dependence on the natural world," he wrote. "The Market represents only the surface of socLety and Lts sLgnLfLcance relates to the MOMentary sLtuatLon as Lt exLsts there and then. There Ls no probLng Lnto the depths of thLngs, Lnlo the natural or socLat facts that lLe behLnd theM. • And thLs Ls why, as he poLnts out, conventLonal econoMLcs Makes no dLstLnctLons at all between prLMary goods, "whLch Man has to wLn froM nature," and secondary goods Manufactured froM theM, or between renewable or nonrenewable resources, or the envLronMental and socLal costs of developLng one agaLnst the other. A bLothese regLonal econoMy, Ln sharpest contrast, Makes - Ln fact Ls grounded Ln vLtal dLstLnctLons. PolLtLcal prLncLples on a bLoregLonal scale are also grounded Ln the dLctates presented by Nature, Ln whLch what Ls forever valued are not the LMperatLves of gLgantLsM, centralLzatLon, hLerarchy, and MonolLthLcLty, but rather, Ln starkest contraposLtLon, those of scale, decentralLsatLon, dLvLsLon, and dLversLty. The lessons are obvLous, and suggest LMMedLately the desLgn for a bLoregLon as for a contLnent of bLoregLons. Each unLt, of the sL2e that the natural settLngs proMote, May be unLfLed and cohesLve - startLng froM the base up wLth a neLghbourhood, a coMMUnLty, a sMatl town, att tLvLng sLde-by-sLde wLth others Ln settled and Mutual pattern, together wLth coMprLsLng a vLtare9Lon; and that a vLtaregLon May have Lts own unLfLcatLon and cohesLveness, Lts own Method of governance, and yet lLve sLde-by-sLde wLth other regLons, organLsed as they May -28- see fLt; and so on, outward, Ln selfsuffLcLent collaboratLon, unLt upon unLt, for so long as the natural boundarLes May perMLt and the natural affLnLtLes be kept Lntact. SLMLlar lessons May be derLved froM the patterns of huHan nature. Thus throughout all huMan hLstory people have tended to lLve Ln separate and Lndependent groups, a "fragMentatLon of huMan socLety· that Harold Isaccs has descrLbed as soMethLng akLn to •a pervasLve force Ln huMan affaLrs and always has been.• Even when natLons and eMpLres have arLsen, he notes, they have no stayLng power agaLnst the Lnnate huMan drLve to fragMentatLon. In a bLoregLonal socLety, the dLvLsLon between urban and rural, LndustrLal and agrLcuttural, populatLon and resources, would be replaced by an equLLLbrLuM, a syMbLosLs. On the one hand, the cLty would be necessary as a producer of certaLn kLnds of goods, as a centre of artLstLc culture, as a source of the asseMbled cLvLc vLrtues, though the cLty need not be of LMMense sLze - Lndeed, no larger than 50,000 or 100,000 people - and Ln fact Ldeally would replLcate rather than grow so that Lnstead of a sLngle MetropolLs there would be a MultLplLcLty of cLtLes of Modest sLzes scattered throughout the bLoregLon. On the other hand, the country would be necessary as the prLMe source of food and water and the HaterLals of shelter and clothLng and artLsanshLp and trade, and especLatty as the eMbodLHent of the bLoregLonal spLrLt of Gaea, whose presence should be felt daLly by the LnhabLtants of every settleMent, of whatever sLze. BLoregLonalLsM Ls no More than the Modern versLon of a very old perceptLon of the world held not Merely by the Greeks but by vLrtually every prelLterate socLety of whLch we have knowledge. (Sate, 167-72) 8: TECHNOLOGY The qualLty of huMan exLstence and huMan welfare should not be Measured of products. Technology Ls returned to Lts ancLent place as an quantLty by only approprLate tool for huMan welfare, not an end Ln Ltself. There should be a rapLd MoveMent toward "soft• energy paths and "approprLate technology~ and toward lLfestytes whLch wLll result Ln drastLc decrease Ln per capLta energy consuMptLon Ln advanced LnductrLal socLetLes whLcl LncreasLng approprLate energy Ln decentralLzed vLllages Ln so-called "thLrd world" natLons. Deep ecologLst5 are coMMLtted to rapLd MOVeMent to a •steady-state• or •conservor socLety· both froH ethLcal prLncLples of har~onLous LntegratLon of huMans wLth nature and froM apprecLatLon of ecologLcal realLtLes. IntegratLon of sophLstLcated, elegant, unobtrusLve, ecologLcalty sound, approprLate technology wLth greatly scaled down, dLversLfLed, organLc, labor-LntensLve agrLculture, huntLng, and gatherLng Ls another goal. (Deep Ecology pp.311-12) QuestLonLng technology Ls a process of dLrect actLon that anyone can develop. It Ls one of the Host serLous act Lons that can ·be taken Ln a technocratLc socLety where the assuMptLon that •technology wLll solve all probleMs• Ls so deeply held. as a systeM or as a specLfLc devLce such as a To questLon technology coMputer - can often arouse hostLlLty, defena certaLn type of vehLcle or sLveness, LrrLtatLon, and resentMent Ln lLsteners. Anyone who questLons technology can be branded a "LuddLte" or antLModernLst. A person who says ·no to any technologLcal devLce Ls often charged as beLng antLprogressLve. Yet Ls crucLat to questLon technology, Ln spLte of these crLtLcLsMs. ~e need technology whLch Ls coMpatLble wLth the growth of autonoMous, selfdeterMLnLng LndLvLduats Ln nonhLerarchLcal coMHunLtLes. ~e need prLncLples that wLll help us escape the trap of technocratLc socLety, where technology Ls the -29- central LnstLtutLon. Technology can be crLtLcLzed and evaluated based on general prLncLples, scale or structure. The followLng questLons can be asked of any technologLcal devLce or systeM: I. Does thLs technologLcal devLce serve vLtal needs? 2. ls thLs devLce or systeM of the sort that can be LMMedLately understood by nonexperts? 3. Does Lt have a hLgh degree of flexLbLlLty and MutabLlLty or does Lt LMpose a perManent, rLgLd, LrreversLble LMprLnt on the lLves of cLtLzens? local ~- Does thLs technologLcal devLce or systeM foster greater autonoMy of coMMunLtLes or greater dependency on soMe centralLzed "authorLty"? 5. ls thLs devLce or systeM ecologLcally destructLve or conducLve to a deep ecology way of lLfe? 6. Does thLs devLce or systeM enhance the LndLvLdualLty of persons or does Lt lead to bureaucratLc hLerarchLes? 7. Does thLs devLce or systeM encourage people to behave and thLnk lLke MachLnes? A fully LnforMed, approprLate technology Ls a MeetLng ground of ethLcs , polLtLcs, MechanLcal understandLng and deep ecologLcal conscLousness. As Langdon WLnner concludes Ln AutonoMous Technology, "If one lacks a clear and knowledgeable sense of what Means are approprLate lo the cLrcuMstances at hand, one's These Means do not choLce of Means can easLly lead to excesses and danger. Lnvolve just narrow utLlLty or effLcLency of productLon or profLt Ln soMe short-terM calculatLon. Indeed, the narrow eMphasLs upon effLcLency of Means drLves us away froM the larger Lssues of envLronMental ethLcs asnd LndLvLdual responsLbLlLty for the consequences of our actLons. (Deep Ecology, pp.35-6) Shallow approach: AcceptLng LndustrLalLzatLon of the kLnd ManLfested Ln the West as the natural goal for developLng countrLes. Low estLNatLon of deep cultural dLfferences wLth sLgnLfLcant devLatLons froM Western standards. Deep approach: SocLal and cultural dLversLty of dLfferent specLes Ls an essentLal IntensLfLed Measures to part of general rLchness and varLatLon of lLfe forMs. exLstLng non-LndustrLal stLll lLMLt the LMpact of Western technology upon cultures . Defence of the fourth world agaLnst cultural foreLgn doMLnatLon. PolLtLcal and econoMLc polLcLes Ln favour of subcultures and MLnorLtLes Ln LndustrLalLzed socLetLes. Support of local and soft technologLes as a Means to MaLntaLn baste cultural assessMent of technLcal LnnovatLon. Due regard to anLMal socLetLes and cultures. SurvLval of populatLons does not ensure survLval of socLal LnstLtutLons . QuestLonLng whether so-called advanced, Modern technologLes are approprLate relatLve to levels of pollutLon, resources, populatLon and as subordLnate part of general culture. (PhLlosophLcal Aspects, pp.12-13) Technology Ls More helpless than ever because the technology beLng produced doesn ' t fulfLll baste huNan needs, such as MeanLngful work Ln a MeanLngful envLronMent . TechnLcal progress Ls shaM progress because the terM technLcal progress Ls a cultural, not a technLcal, terM . Our culture Ls the only one Ln the hLstory of MankLnd Ln whLch the culture has adjusted Ltself to the technology, rather than vLce versa. (SLMple ' Ln Means, p.11) Once the scLentLfLc probleMs have been solved, once Lt Ls understood how a partLcular forM of pollutLon arLses and Ln what Lts danger consLsts, the next probleM Ls technologLcal : to dLscover a Method of reducLng thLs LncLdence. That Lnvolves decLdLng, Ln the fLrst place, whLch of the causatLve factors Lt wLll be easLest to control . KnowLng, for exaMple, that the Los Angeles sMog Ls a joLnt product of the sLtLng of Los Angeles, Lts hours of sunlLght and the exhaust -30- fuMes froM the LnternaL coMbustLon engLne, Lt Ls at once apparent that onLy the thLrd of these Lf controLLabLe at a toLerabLe cost. So what has to be Lnvented Ls a devLce whLch wLLL reduce the output of hydrocarbons Ln exhaust fuMes. ThLs constLtutes a technoLogLcaL probLeM, the soLutLon to whLch LLes Ln the LnventLon of a devLce whLch wouLd satLsfy partLcuLar technLcaL specLfLcatLons . (The word devLce' Ls h~re beLng used Ln a very broad sense; an LnsectLcLde Ls a devLce and so Ls the sterLLLsLng of Lnsects as a Means of bLoLogLcaL control.) 0 The Ldea of a 'technoLogLcaL soLutLon' Ls, however, a good deaL Less straLghtforward than Lt at fLrst appears to be, as the phrase I used above 'at a toLerabLe cost' aLready hLnts. It Ls very easy to thLnk up technLcaL soLutLons of ecoLogLcaL probLeMs Lf we consLder theM Ln LsoLatLon~ and Lf we defLne a technLcaL soLutLon, wLthout any reference to costs, as one whLch descrLbes a way of freeLng ourselves froM the ecoLogLcaL condLtLon whLch concerns us. Such a soLutLon Ls soMetLMes saLd to be 'practLcaL' but not 'operatLonal'. So Los AngeLes sMog could be reduced Ln LntensLty by roofLng over the entLre cLty, or by MakLng everybody use pubLLc transport, or by substLtutLng fuel-ceLls, Ln theLr present state of developMent, for Lnternal coHbustLon engLnes. But few wouLd serLousLy advance these proposals as 'solutLons', as satLsfactory ways of deaLLng wLth the sMog probleM. ~hy not? SLMply because the costs, or so Lt Ls w~deLy beLLeved, wouLd be too great, costs of varLous sorts, socLal, ecologLcal, econoMLc and poLLtLcaL. In so far as ecologLcaL probleMs can be solved only wLth the help of scLentLfLc dLscovery and technoLogLcaL LnventLon, they can be soLved only wLthLn the ~estern ratLonal tradLtLons. That Much Ls obvLous. MystLcaL conteMplatLon wLlL not reveal to the cheMLst the orLgLns of the Los Angeles sMog or enabLe the engLneer to desLgn an effectLve devLce for reducLng Lts LntensLty. But Lt Ls a enthusLasM proper crLtLcLsM of ~estern socLety that, Ln Lts - often chLldLsh for technoLogLcaL 'advance', Lt has faLled adequateLy to consLder the costs of LntroducLng new devLces and has defLned 'costs' far too narrowly. ThLs objectLon can be dLrected, even, agaLnst antL-pollutLon devLces. The Manufacture of such devLces wLLL norMaLLy create · More polLutLon. It May, by ModLfyLng the character of the poLlutant, Lntroduce new dangers - reducLng the percentage of carbon MonoxLde Ln exhaust fuMes whLle LncreasLng the percentage of the no Less dangerous nLtrogen dLoxLde. Or Lt May shLft the LncLdence of the poLLutLon froM a weaLthLer to a poorer coMMunLty - ManufacturLng sMokeless fueLs Ln an LndustrLaL town to Make the London aLr cLeaner - wLthout reducLng Lts total voLuMe. Any technoLogLcal LnnovatLon, furtherMore, LnvoLves an eleMent of ecoLoe LcaL rLsk; Lt Ls LMpossLbLe to calculate all Lts consequences Ln every possLbLe cLrcuMstance. The best the technologLst can do Ls to exclude effects whLch are already known to be dangerous and to LnvestLgate further effects whLch are suspect . That Ls why, as I saLd earLLer, caLlLng upon the technologLst to save us Ls so often equated wLth caLLLng Ln the devLL as an exorcLst. But Lt wouLd be quLte wrong to conclude that for the reasons just advanced the technologLcaL Method of overcoMLng ecoLogLcaL probleMs would be abandoned, that what ~estern socLetLes should do Ls to shut down factorLes, Let us say, rather than LnsLst on theLr reducLng, by technoLogLcal Means, theLr eMLssLon of pollutants. For econoMLc and socLaL rLsks ~ and, Ln the end, greater ecoLogLcal rLsks Lf the socLaL resentMent engendered by the closure Ls dLrected agaLnst the whoLe systeM of ecoLogLcaL controls. It, too, May do no More than shLft the LncLdence of poLLutLon froM rLcher to poorer regLons, as the factory-owner takes hLs capLtal elsewhere. To gLve up takLng any rLsks would be to gLve up actLng . Every actLon costs soMethLng, rLsks soMethLng. Uhat can properLy be deManded Ls not that Men should cease to act Ln ways whLch LnvoLve ecologLcal rLsks - there are no such ways, as Matters now stand, whatever the sLtuatLon Ln the Garden of -31- Eden - but rather that they shouLd take More account of the ecoLogLcaL costs and benefLts of theLr actLon. And thLs Means, once agaLn, that they wLLL hav~ to Make fuLLer use of ratLonaL Western-type Methods, cost benefLt anaLyses or decLsLon-procedures. (PassMore, pp.~8-50) EcoLogLcaL resLsters do not accept that there are onLy narrow technLcaL soLutLons to narrowLy defLned socLal probLeMs (such as aLr poLLutLon). These probLeMs are seen onLy as syMptoMs of the Larger Lssues. There are three MaLn dangers to technocratLc soLutLons. FLrst Ls the danger Ln beLLevLng there Ls a coMpLete or acceptabLe soLutLon usLng Modern doMLnant LdeoLogLes and technoLogy. The second danger Ls the presentatLon of an LMpressLon that soMethLng Ls beLng done when Ln fact the reaL probLeM contLnues. reaL work". FLnaLLy, there Ls the danger of TLnkerLng dLstracts froM the assuMLng there wLLL be new experts - such as professLonaL ecoLogLsts - who wLLL provLde the soLutLon but who May Ln fact be constraLned to be pubLLc reLatLons spokespersons for the agenda of profLt or power of soMe corporatLon or agency. EcoLogLcaL resLstance Ls actLon froM centraL prLncLpLes of doLng what Ls necessary, of wLtnessLng nonvLoLentLy. It arLses froM a shLft Ln conscLouness. EcoLogLcaL resLstLng Ls deeper, soMe wouLd say More radLcaL,. than just reforMLsM. SoMe of the reforMLst actLons to MLtLgate soMe of the worse forMs of aLr and water poLLutLon (due to auto exhaust, for exaMpLe) are MotLvated by concern onLy for huMan heaLth and safety and not by the LntrLnsLc vaLues of the bLosphere. But th LLMLts of reforMLSM are by now weLL known. (Deep EcoLog~, pp.195-6) In tryLng to exaMLne technoLogy and productLon, we encounter a curLous paradox. ~e are deepLy rLven by a great sense of proMLse about technLcaL LnnovatLon, on the one hand, and by a thorough sense of dLsenchantMent wLth Lts resuLts, on the other. ThLs duaL attLtude not onLy refLects a confLLct Ln the popuLar LdeologLes concernLng technoLogy but aLso expresses strong doubts about the nature of the Modern technologLcaL LMagLnatLon LtseLf. We are puzzLed that the very LnstruMents our MLnds have conceLved and our hands have created can be so easLly turned agaLnst us, wLth dLsastrous resuLts for our weLL-beLng Lndeed, for our very survLval as a specLes. Techne, Moreover, covered a wLder scope of experLence than the Modern word technLcs. The goaL of techne Ls not restrLcted to MereLy "LLvLng weLL. or lLvLng wLthLn the lLMLt. Techne LncLudes LLvLng an ethLcaL LLfe accordLng to an orLgLnatLve and orderLng prLncLple conceLved as "potency". VLewed even Ln an LnstruMental sense, techne thus encoMpasses not MereLy raw MaterLaLs, tooLs, MachLnes, and products but aLso the producer - Ln short, a hLghly sophLstLcated subject froM whLch aLL eLse orLgLnates. To ArLstotle, the "Master-craftsMan" Ls dLstLnguLshed subjectLveLy froM hLs apprentLces or assLstants by vLrtue of honor, a sense of "why" products are created, and generaLLy a wLsdoM of thLngs ArLstotLe subject, and phenoMena. By startLng wLth the ratLonaLLty of productLon the to estabLLshes a poLnt of departure for brLngLng ratLonaLLzatLon of the object. Modern LndustrLaL productLon functLons Ln precLseLy the opposLte way. Not only Ls the Modern LMage of techne LLMLted to Mere technLcs Ln the LnstruMentaL sense of the terM, but aLso Lts goaLs are LnextrLcabLy tLed to unLLMLted Ls conceLved as LLMLtLess consuMptLon wLthLn the productLon. "LLvLng weLL fraMework of a totaLLy unethLcaL, prLvatLzed LeveL of seLf-Lnterest. TechnLcs, not the producer and hLs or her ethLcaL standards LncLudes Moreover, (proLetarLans, after aLL, servLce the Modern LndustrLal apparatus Ln totaL anonyMLty) but the product and Lts constLtuLnts. The technLcaL focus shLfts froM -32- the subject to the object, froM the producer to the product, froM the creator to the created. Honor, a sense of •why," and any generaL wLsdoM of thLngs and phenoMena have no pLace Ln the worLd requLred by Modern Lndustry. ~hat reaLLy counts Ln technLcs Ls effLcLency, quantLty, and an LntensLfLcatLon of the Labor process. The specLous ratLonaLLty LnvoLved Ln producLng the object Ls foLsted on the ratLonaLLzatLon of the subject to a poLnt where producer's subjectLvLty Ls totally atrophLed and reduced to an object aMong objects. (BookchLn, pp.219-22) 9: ON ECOLOGICAL CONSCIOUSNESS Deep ecoLogy Ls eMergLng as a way of developLng a new balance and harMony between LndLvLduaLs, coMMunLtLes and aLl of Nature. It can potentLaLLy satsLfy our deepest yearnLngs: faLth and trust Ln our Most basLc LntuLtLons; courage to take dLrect actLon; joyous confLdence to dance wLth the sensuous harMonLes dLscovered through spontaneous, playfuL Lntercourse wLth the rhythMs of our bodLes, the rhythMs of fLowLng water, changes Ln the weather and seasons, and the overaLL processes of LLfe on Earth. The deep ecology MoveMent Lnvolves workLng on ourselves, what poetphLLosopher Gary Snyder caLls "the reaL work,• the work of reaLLy LookLng at ourselves, of becoMLng More real. ThLs Ls the work we call cultLvatLng ecoLogLcaL conscLousness. ThLs process LnvoLves becoMLng More aware of the actuaLLty of rocks, wolves, trees, and rLvers - the cultLvatLon of the LnsLght that everythLng Ls connected. CultLvatLng ecologLcal conscLousness Ls a process of learnLng apprecLate sLLence and solLtude and redLscoverLng how to lLsten. It Ls learnLng how to be More receptLve, trustLng, holLstLc Ln perceptLon, and Ls grounded Ln a vLsLon of nonexploLtLve scLence and technology. ThLs process Lnvolves beLng honest wLth ourselves and seekLng clarLty Ln our LntuLtLons, then actLng froM cLear prLncLpLes, practLcLng seLf-dLscLpLLne and workLng honestLy wLthLn our coMMunLty. It Ls sLMpLe but not easy work. Henry DavLd Thoreau, nLneteenth-century naturalLst and wrLter, adMonLshes us, ·Let your lLfe be a frLctLon agaLnst the MachLne. • CuLtLvatLng ecoLogLcal conscLousness Ls correlated wLth the cultLvatLon of conscLence. CuLtural hLstorLan Theordore Roszak suggests Ln Person/PLanet conscLousness, how LnstructLve the overLappLng and "conscLence (1978), sLMLLarLty of those two words Ls. FroM the new conscLousness we are gaLnLng of ourseLves as persons perhaps we wLLL yet create a new conscLence, one whose ethLcaL sensLtLvLty Ls at Least tuned to a sLgnLfLcant good, a sLgnLfLcant evLL. We beLLeve that huMans have a vLtaL need to cuLtLvate ecologLcaL conscLousness and that thLs need Ls related to the needs of the planet. At the saMe tLMe, huMans need dLrect contact wLth untraMMeLed wLLderness, places undoMestLcated for narrow huMan purposes. Many people sense the needs of the pLanet and the need for wLLderness preservatLon. But we need not be technLcal experts Ln order to cultLvate ecotogLcal conscLousness, as Thoreau saLd, cuLtLvatLng ecotogLcaL conscLousness requLres that "we front up to the facts and deterMLne to lLve our lLves delLberately, or not at all." We belLeve that people can clarLfy theLr own LntuLtLons, and act froM deep prLncLpLes. Deep ecology Ls a process of even-deeper questLonLng of ourselves, the assuMptLons of the doMLnant worLdvLew Ln our culture, and the MeanLng and truth Ln our realLty. We cannot change conscLousness by only lLstenLng to others, we Must Lnvolve ourselves. We Mu~t take dLrect actLon. -33- One hopeful poLLtLcaL MoveMent wLth deep ecology as a base Ls the Uest GerMan Green poLLtLcaL party. They have as theLr slogan, "ue are neLther Left nor rLght, we are Ln front.· Green poLLtLcs Ln Uest GerMany, and to soMe extent Ln Great BrLtaLn, BeLgLuM and AustraLLa Ln the 1980s, goes beyond the conventLonaL, tLberaL defLnLtLon of a party, coMbLnLng personal work (that Ls, work on cLarLfyLng one's own character) and polLtLcal actLvLsM. The Greens present a proMLsLng poLLtLcaL strategy because they encourage the cultLvatLon of personal ecoLogLcaL conscLousness as well as address Lssues of pubLLc polLcy. If the Greens propogate the bLocentrLc perspectLve - the Lnherent worth of other specLes besLdes huMans - then they can help change the current vLew whLch says we should use Nature only to serve narrow huMan Lnterests. CuLtLvatLng ecoLogLcaL conscLousness Ln conteMporary socLetLes, however, Ls a two-edged sword. Ue Must not be MLsLed by our zeaL for change so that we are concerned only wLth the narrow self or ego. If we seek only personal redeMptLon we could becoMe soLLtary ecologLcal saLnts aMong the Masses of those we MLght cLassLfy as "sLnners" who contLnue to pollute. Change Ln persons requLres a change Ln culture and vLce versa. We cannot Lgnore the personal arena nor the socLaL, for our project Ls to enhance harMony wLth each other, the planet and ourselves. (Deep Ecology, pp.7-1~) ~e began by suggestLng a varLety of specLfLc actLons whLch people can take dLrected at reforMLng publLc polLcy, developLng bLoregLonal coMMunLtLes, and cuLtLvatLng ecoLogLcaL conscLousness. Ue return to the theMe of dLrect actLon. ~e have deMonstrated that deep ecology Ls not just a gaMe of ~bstract theorLzLng. As a perspectLve Lt Ls lLved, danced, celebrated. It has resonance. Ln part, cuLtLvatLng what CuLtLvatLng ecoLogLcaL conscLousness Means, Ls engaged Ln the LnteLLect RhapsodLc Theodore Roszak caLLs rhapsodLc LntelLect. process of LntegratLng LntelLect, body, and joyous eMotLon. Based on the LnsLghts, uLtLMate norMs, prLncLples and theorLes of deep ecology, the central practLcaL questLon Ls how do we becoMe More Mature persons, gLven the constraLnts of th~s culture? Ue suggest there Ls an LnterpLay between outward dLrect actLon and Lnward dLrect actLon, between actLng on one's self and actLng Ln the world, wLth the result of further and deeper MaturLty Ln the deep ecologLcaL sense of LdentLfLcatLon wLth alL LLfe. There Ls no sharp break between Lnward and outward. People take dLrectLon actLon froM dLrect ecoLogLcal prLncLpLes and they becoMe More Mature through dLrect actLon. The Label we use for the type of dLrect actLon Ln Lts outward forM Ls ecoLogLcaL resLstLng. (Deep Ecology, p.19~) 'Deep ecology', an envLronMental scLence broadsheet tells us, Ls Naess's expressLon for an ecologLcaL awareness or conscLousness' . SpeLLLng deep ecology out then becoMes a Matter of settLng down the types of conscLousness and awareness and recognLtLon LnvoLved, SOMethLns that Ls done Ln a thoroughly anthropocentrL c way, begLnnLng as foLLows: 'a conscLousness of the LMplLcatLons of ecology for huMan beLng'. It Ls all Ln fact done Ln terMs of huMan responses, fundaMentaLLy Ls approach the AccordLn9Ly capacLtLes and psychology. MLsconceLved. For deep ecology Ls not so anthropocentrL c, and Ls no More a Matter of envLronMentaL psychology than Ls the value theory or MetaphysLcs whLch are part of Lt. The psychoL09LcaL conversLon Ls LLke cLaLMLng that 'MarxLsM' Ls an expressLon for socLaLLst conscLousness, or 'MusLc' for MusLco-LogLcal awareness. -34- The conversLon of deep ecology Lnto awareness psychology, Lnto a certaLn sort of exercLse Ln self-realLsatLon or 'lLberatLng ecologLcal conscLousness, or conscLousness raLsLng', Ls open to sLMLlar objectLons. Ecology, deep or shallow or systeMatLc, Ls not ego-trLppLng or a personal thLng. Granted those who do have and share certaLn attLtudes and feelLngs to natural envLronMents are "uch More lLkely to becoMe actLve supporters or followers of deep ecology or to adopt a deeper ecologLcal stance. Even so such states as self-realLsatLon or ecologLcal conscLousness are neLther necessary nor suffLcLent for thLs. Such subjectLve states are not necessary because soMeone can beco"e a supporter of deep ecology wLthout havLng attaLned, or Made any effort to attaLn, these states. Thus consLder soMeone, a dedLcated naturalLst for Lnstance, who has no deep Lnterest Ln or understandLng of huMan psychology or socLology so far as these bear on the envLronMent. Such a person Ls a deep ecologLst, but lacks ecologLcal conscLousness as Lt Ls explaLned. The case of Peter SLnger Ln the anLMal lLberatLon "oveMent Ls LnstructLve; for SLnger goes out of hLs way to explaLn hLs dLsLnterest, hLs coMparatLve lack of zoologLcal conscLousness, that he does not LdentLfy wLth anLMals and so on, yet hLs LMpact for anLMal lLberatLon has been Most sLgnLfLcant. Analogously, a Deeper SLnger need not be Ln love wLth the Earth but feel rather Lsolated froM Lt and feel rLghtly that Most of Lts LnhabLtants dLslLke hLM or are frLghtened by hLM. He May have lLttle Ldea what Lt Ls lLke to be one of theM or a MountaLn, ... ; but he "ay have the rLght values, adhere to the rLght phLlosophy and undertake the rLght sorts of actLon and lLfestyle. GenuLnely and specLfLcally deep ecologLcal conscLousness has not been well descrLbed and Ls not partLcularly well defLned. And soMe of the requLreMents LMposed upon Lt, whatever Lt aMounts to, render Lt LMpossLble. Thus Fox, echoLng others, claLMs that 'to the extent that we perceLve boundarLes, we fall short of a deep ecologLcal conscLousness'. Then we all fall short, sLnce we are regularly confronted by, and perceLve, terrLtorLal boundarLes and a wLde range of other deMarcatLon lLnes and contrasts. Indeed fallLng short Ls LnevLtable; for hence and perceptLon necessarLly Lnvolves selectLon and dLscrLMLnatLon, separatLon and boundarLes. Deep conscLousness Ls also rendered LMpossLble by soMe of the LdentLfLcatLon requLreMents, drawn froM nature MystLcLsM, whLch are LMposed upon Lt. It Ls one thLng to be Ln tune wLth the unLverse (a Metaphor that can be spelled out), quLte another, and LMpossLble, feat to be LdentLcal wLth Lt, sLnce then a proper part would be LdentLcal wLth a whole contaLnLng Lt. SoMe explLcatLon of LdentLfLcatLon (trans-specLes and other) Ls LMportant for the elaboratLon of deep ecology, but the relatLon Lnvolved (though Lt concerns shared features, such as perhaps experLences) Ls not one of LdentLty or MakLng LdentLcal, as sLMplLstLc etyMology May suggest. Other requLreMents coMMonly placed on deep conscLousness, whLle they do not exclude Lt, render Lt unduly anthropocentrLc. (CrLtLque, pp.30-2) Deep ecologLsts agree wLth BLrch and Cobb's LnsLght that "huMan beLngs are More deeply Moved by the way they experLence theLr ~orld than by the claLMs ethLcs Makes on theM." Thus, where conteMporary envLronMental phLlosophy Ls doMLna~ed by the questLon "How do we construct an adequate envLron"ental ethLc? , deep ecology asks the questLon "How do we cultLvate a deep ecologLcal conscLousness?" The forMer questLon looks to conceptual answers, the latter to experLentLal answers. In seekLng to change the way Ln whLch we experLence the world, deep ecologLsts place theLr prLMary eMphasLs upon changLng our ·underlyLng perceptLon of the way thLngs are" (L.e. changLng our ontology) rather than upon what we MLght terM the "conceptual fLx• approach of "bL99er and better" ethLcs. ThLs atteMpt to shLft the prLMary focus of envLronMental phLlosophLcal concern froM ethLcs to ontology clearly constLtutes a fundaMental or revolutLon- -35- ary chaLLenge to norMaL envLronMentaL phLLosophy. It Ls (and should be) deep ecology's guLdLng star. (GuLdLng Stars, p.204) 10: ON HOLISM AccordLng to deep ecology: A new cosMLc/ecoLogLcaL MetaphysLcs whLch stresses the LdentLty (I/thou) of huMans wLth non-huMan nature Ls a necessary condLLons for a vLabLe approach to buLLdLng an eco-phLLosophy. In deep ecology, the wholeness and LntegrLty of a person/planet together wLth the prLncLpLe of what Arne Naess caLLs "bLoLogLcaL egaLLtarLanLsM" are the Most LMportant Ldeas. Man Ls an LntegraL part of nature, not over or apart froM nature. Man Ls a "pLaLn cLtLzen· of the bLosphere, not Lts conqueror or Manager .. There should be a "deMocracy of aLL God's creatures" accordLng to St. FrancLs; or as SpLnoza saLd, Man Ls a "teMporary and dependent Mode of the whole of God/Nature.· Man flows wLth the systeM of nature rather than atteMptLng to control aLL of the rest of nature. The hand of Man LLes LLghtLy on the Land. Man does not perfect nature, nor Ls Man's prLMary duty to Make nature More effLcLent. A new psychology Ls needed to Lntegrate the MetaphysLcs Ln the MLnd fLeLd of post-LndurtrLaL socLety. A Major paradLgM shLft results froM psychoLogLcaL changes of perceptLon. The new paradLgM requLres rejectLon of subject/object, Man/nature duaLLsMs and wLLL requLre a pervasLve awareness of total LnterMLngLLng of the planet earth. Psychotherapy seen as adjustMent to eco-orLented socLety Ls replaced by a new LdeaL of psychotherapy as spLrLtuaL deveLopMent. The new MetaphysLcs and psychology Leads LogLcaLLy to a posture of bLospherLc egaLLtarLanLsM and LLberatLon Ln the sense of autonoMy, physoLogLcaL/eMotLona L freedoM of the LndLvLduaL, spLrLtuaL deveLopMent of HoMo sapLens, and the rLght of other specLes to pursue theLr own evoLutLonary destLnLes. (Deep Ecology MoveMent, pp.310-11) RejectLon of the Man-Ln-envLronMent LMage Ln favour of the reLatLonaL, totaL-fLeLd LMage. OrganLsMs as knots Ln the bLospherLcaL net or fLeLd of LntrLnsLc reLatLons. As LntrLnsLc reLatLon between two thLngs ~ and B Ls such that the reLatLon belongs to the defLnLtLons or basLc constLtutLons of A and ~• so that wLthout a reLatLon, ~and~ are no Longer the saMe thLngs. The totaLfLeLd Model dLssoLves not only the Man-Ln-envLronMent concept, but every coMpact thLng-Ln-MLLLeu concept - except when taLkLng at a superfLcLaL or preLLMLnary Level of coMMunLcatLon. (Shallow and Deep, p.95) Shallow envLronMentaLLsM atteMpts to curb soMe of the Most gLarLng envLronMentaL abuse such as poLLutLon and resource depLetLon whLLe caLLLng for no basLc change Ln the anthropocentrLc urban-LndustrLaL socLaL paradLgM. Naess descrLbes Lts central objectLve as "the health and affluence of people Ln the developed countrLes." The Deep Ecology MoveMent, on the other hand, gathers LnspLratLon froM the fLeLd ecoLogLst and Ls a rejectLon of the Man-Ln-envLronMent LMage Ln favor of the reLatLonaL, totaL-fLeLd LMage. OrganLsMs are knots Ln the bLospherLcaL net or fLeLd of LntrLnsLc reLatLons. w (SessLons, p . 398) 0 Because they cannot conceLve Man apart' they experLence no dLffLcuLty Ln attrLbutLng LntrLnsLc value to nature. In so far as they conceLve theMseLves as havLng such value, the LnabLLLty to separate theLr selves froM nature, LnescapabLy Leads to thLnkLng of "Man" and ·envLronMent' as a whole. (Gestalt thLnkLng.) In thLs century the reactLon agaLnst conceLvLng the LndLvLduaL self as soMethLng separable froM the socLaL settLng has been Largely successful, but not the paraLLeL reactLon agaLnst the separabLLLty froM the natural settLng. (PhLLosophLcaL Aspects, p.35) By subtractLng your own self-centred and seLf-servLng -36- thoughts froM the world you coMe to reaLLze that "the other Ls none other than yourself: that the fundaMentaL deLusLon of huManlty ls to suppose I aM here and you are out there_· ThLs understandLng perMeates the MystLcaL tradLtLons and Ls exeMpLLfLed Ln the TaoLst advLce to "LdentLfy yourself wLth non-dLstLnctLon_ • It ls now becoMlng coMMonpLace to polnt to the fundaMentaLLy slMlLar cosMoLogLes eMobdLed Ln the MystLcaL tradLtLons on the one hand and the 'new physlcs' on the other_ What Ls structurally sLMllar about these cosMoLogLes Ls that they reveal a 'seaMLess web' vLew of the unLverse_ Both the MystLcaL tradLtLons and the new physLcs' serve to generate Lnter aLLa, what we MLght now caLL 'ecoLoglcaL awareness', .that Ls, awareness of the fundaMentaL LnterreLatedne~s of aLL thLngs or, More accurately, aLL events_ The theoretlcaL physLclst Frltjof Capra has been quLte expLlcLt about thls: "1 thLnk what physLcs can do Ls help to generate ecoLogLcaL awareness_ You see, Ln MY vLew now Ln the Western versLon of MystLcaL awareness, our versLon of BuddhLsM or TaoLsM, wLLl be ecologLcal awareness_" Where the physLcLst, the Mystlc, and the deep ecologLst (as phLlosopher) dLffer Ls Ln theLr Means of arrLvLng at 'ecologLcal awareness ' ___ _ The deep ecologLst's conceptLon of unLty Ln process' need not LMpLy that, at any gLven MOMent, all 'knots' (L_e_ organLsMs) Ln the 'bLospherLcal net' are constLtuted of equally coMpLex reLatLons_ To the extent that value Lnheres Ln coMplexLty of relatLons, and to the extent that coMplexLty of reLatLons Ls evLdenced Ln the degree of an organLsM's central organLzatLon (and therefore capacLty for rLchness of experLence), then organLsMs are entLtLed to Moral consLderatLon coMMensurate wLth theLr degree of central organLzatLon (or capaclty for rlchness of experlence) for the duratlon of thelr exlstence - as transLent as that May be Ln terMs of evolutLonary tLMe_ In pursulng theLr central LntuLtLon of 'unLty' (L_e_ of no boundarLes Ln the bLospherLcal fLeLd), deep ecoLogLsts have possLbly Lost sLght of the sLgnLfaspect of theLr 'unLty Ln process' MetaphysLcs_ Lcance of the 'Ln process AttentLon to thLs Latter aspect suggests that any process contLnuousLy produces LMperManent, uneven dLstrLbutLons (L_e_, dLfferent values) of varLous attrLbutes (and Ln the process of the world these attrLbutes May be Money, LnforMatLon, coMplexLty of relatLons, and so on)_ If thLs were not so then we would have no process but a perfectly unLforM, hoMogenous and, therefore, LLfeless fLeld_ The only unLverse where value Ls spread evenly across the fLeLd Ls a dead unLverse _ RecognLsLng thLs, we should be clear that the central LntuLtLon of deep ecology does not entaLl the vLew that LntrLnsLc value Ls spread evenly across the MeMbershLp of the bLotLc coMMunLty_ Moreover, Ln sLtuatLons of genuLne value conflLct, justLce Ls better served by not subscrLbLng to the vLew of ecoLogLcal -egaLLtarLanLsM_ (Fox, pp-196-200) An arctLc Landscape May superfLcLaLly Look rather dead Ln wLnter. In sprLng Lt May Look overwheLMLngLy aLLve_ It would take a Long traLnLng to force perceptLon to dLstLnguLsh organLsM froM non-organLsMs Ln such a LLve Landscape_ Even Ln wLnter the Lover of the Landscape sees abundance of LndLvLduaL LLfe forMs and also hLgher order gestaLts_ Why Ls the gestalt ontology not MentLoned Ln the platforN forMulatLon_ A Landscape wLth organLsMs - and aLL Landscapes have organLsMs Ln MLcro-organLsMs are counted - Ls a hLgh order, natural gestalt_ The separatLon of organLsMs and non-organLsMs Ls very unnatural Ln gestalt thLnkLng and apperceptLon. But the concepts of 9estaLt-thlnkln9 are too specLaL for pLatforM forMuLatLons- Only a MLnorLty of supporters of deed ecology are acadeMLcs_ (Notes on Sylvan, p-7) -37- BIBLIOGRAPHY Sources used 0 S. BodLan, S LMple Ln Means, rLch Ln ends: A conversatLon wLth Arne Naess', Ten DLrectLons, SuMMer/Fall, 1982, 7,10-12; referred to as SLMple Ln Means. M. BookchLn, The Ecology of FreedoM, CheshLre, Londong, 1982; referred to as F. Capra and C. Spretnak, Green PolLtLcs, HutchLnson, London, 198~; referred as Green PolLtLcs. to Bookch i,n. B. Devall, 'The Deep Ecology MoveMent', Natural Resources Journal 20, 1980, 299-322; referred to as Deep Ecology MoveMent. B. Devall, 'stone/Sky: ReflectLons on the 'Real ~ork' of Deep Ecology', paper delLvered at EnvLronMent, EthLcs and Ecology Conference, Canberra, August 1983, 20ff.; referred to as Stone/Sky . 8. Devall and G. SessLons, Deep Ecology, PeregrLne SMLth, Layton, Utah, 1985; referred to as Deep Ecology. U. Fox, Deep Ecology: A new phLlosophy 194-200; referred to as Fox. of our tLMe', EcologLst 1~, 1984, U. Fox, 'on guLdLng stars to Deep Ecology', EcologLst 14, 1984, 203-4; to as GuLdLng Stars. A. Naess, 'The shallow and the deep, long-range ecology MoveMent. InquLry 18, 1973, 95-100; referred to as Shallow and Deep. A. Naess, 'PhLlosophLcal Aspects of Deep Ecology ' , unpublLshed 1983, 35ff.; referred to as PhLlosophLcal Aspects. A. N.3 ess, • IntuLtLon, LntrLnsLc value and Deep 201-3; referred to as IntuLtLon. Ecology', referred A SUMMary. paper, EcologLst 14, Oslo, 1984, A. Naess, Notes on the PolLtLcs of the Deep Ecology MoveMent ' , unpublLshed paper, Canberra, 1984, 17ff.; referred to as PolLtLcs of the Deep Ecology MoveMent. A. Naess, 'What Ls basLc to Deep Ecology?', unpublLshed paper, 12ff . ; referred to as BasLc. A. Naess, A defence of the Deep Ecology 1984, 265-70; referred to as Defence. MoveMent', Canberra, 1984, EnvLronMental EthLcs A. Naess, 'The paradox of envLronMentalLsM' SyMposLuM ProceedLngs, (ed.), York UnLversLty, 1984, 57-60; referred to as Paradox. N. S, Everden A. Naess, 'IdentLfLcatLon as a source of Deep EcologLcal attLtudes', Deep Ecology, M. TobLas (ed.), Avant Books, San DLego, 1985, s256-70; referred to as ldentLfLcatLon. A. Naess, Notes on Professor Sylvan's crLtLque of the Deep Ecology MoveMent, unpublLshed paper, Olso, 1985, 19ff.; referred to as Notes on Sylvan. J. PassMore, Man's ResponsLb~lLty For Nature, 2nd ed., Duckworth, London, 1980; -38- referred to as PassMore. A new way to treat the Land', EcoLogLst 14, 1984, BLoregLonaLLsM K. Sale, 167-73; referred to as Sale. the ph~Losoph~cal and Deep Ecology: A rev~ew of 'shallow G. Sess~ons, EcoLogLcaL (eds.), Hughes J.D. and Ln R.C. Schultz unfortune', UnLvers~ty Press of AMer~ca, ~ash~ngton, D.C., 1981, Consc~ousness, 391- 4 62; referred to as Sess~ons. R. Sylvan, A Cr~t~que of Deep Ecology, Research School of SocLaL AustraLLan Hat~onaL Un~vers~ty, 1985; referred to as Cr~t~que. ScLences, Further Read~ngs R.F. OasMann, Env~ronMentaL Conservat~on, 5th ed., ~LLey, New York, 1984. A. Leopold, A Sand Country ALManac, CheshLre, New York, 1966. E. PapadukLs, The Green MoveMent Ln ~est GerMany, Croon HeLM, London, 1984. -39- DEEP ECOLOGY AHO GREEN POLITICS Deep Ecology Ls an envLronMe~tal theory or platforM wLth polLtLcal sLgnLfLcant wLth pLatforM i..MplLcatLons. Breen PoLLtLcs Ls a poLi..tLcaL envLronMentaL LMpLLcatLons. Both arose Ln Large part Ln reactLon to prevaLLLng envi..ronMentaL practLces; but Deep Ecology concentrates rather on theoretLcal reflectLon, Green PolLtLcs on practLcaL actLon . Deep and LnvestLgatLon questLoni..ng of the underlyLng doMi,nant attLtudes, seen as the Major source of ecoL09Lcal and other probLeMs, Led to artLcuLatLon of the Deep EcoLogy pLatforM, partLy outLi..ned Ln ·slogan" forM Ln the foLLowi..ng tabLe. ). TABLE 1. DEEP ECOLOGY CONTRASTED WITH DOMINANT ATT ITIJOES DOMINANT ATTITUDES [OOMIHAHT PARADIGM] DEEP ECOLOGY [RIVAL EHVIRONMEHTAL PARADIGM] OoMi..nati..on over Nature Nature a Resource; IntrLnsLc VaLue confi..ned to HuMans NaturaL EnvLronMent VaLued for Itself; Bi..ocentri..c EgaLi..tari..ani..sM AMp Le Reso1J rces/Subs t i.. tu tes Earth SuppLLes Li..MLted MaterLaL EconoMLc Growth a predoMLnant goaL Non-MaterLaL GoaLs, especLaLLy SeLf-ReaLi..zati..on ConsuMer i,sM DoLng wLth Enough/RecycLLng CoMpetLti..ve Li..festyLe Cooperati..ve Li..feway CentraLLzed/ Urban Centred/ Hati..onaL focus Decentral.i..zed/ Bi..oregi..onaL/ Nei..ghbourhood focus Power structure Hi..erarchLcaL Non-h i,erarch Lea L/ Grass roots DeMocrac!::I HLgh TechnoL09y Appropri..ate Technology Whi..Le Deep Ecol.og!::j grew froM the work of one envLronMentaL phi..Losopher (Naess Ln 1872), Green PolLtLcs arose (Ln West GerMany sLnce 1876) froM the synthesLs of several. MoveMents - ecol.09!::j, cLtLzens, aLternatLve, peace and other MoveMents. The pLatforM of Green PoLLtLcs, whLch Ls buLLt around four pLLLars socLaL responsLbLLLty, grassroots deMocracy , and non-vLoLence ecology, refLects these orLgLns. The fLrst of these pLLLars, ecoLog!::j, Ls based on the sLMpLe theMe that LLMLted ecoLogi..caL systeMs cannot sustai..n unLi..MLted econoMi..c growth, or such questi..onabLe types of growth as nucLear power, wi..thout serLous rLsk of daMage and degeneratLon. The Green aLM Ls to Move to S!::jsteMs of producti..on and consuMptLon whLch MaLntai..n and restore natural processes and C!::fCLes rather than doMLnate or destroy theM - a Move towards harMony wLth nature. The second pi..LLar of Green PoLLtLcs, socLaL responsLbLLLt!::j, LMpLLes opposi..tLon to the LnequaLLti..es i..n power and doMLnati..on reLati..onshi..ps of present soci..ety, and reMovaL of di..scri..Mi..nati..on, econoMLc hardshi..p and exploi..tati..on, both regi..onally and as regards the ThLrd ~orLd. The Green aLM - to be achi..eved pri..Mari..Ly froM below, Ls to bui..ld stable and just soci..al through those adversely affected arrangeMents, wLth coMprehensLve deMocrati..c rLghts and freedoMs (both i..n 6erMan~ -1- and where GerMan operatLons LMpLnge Ln the ThLrd WorLd). These changes are to be brought about by grassroots deMocracy, the thLrd pLLLar, through Lncreased reaLLsatLon of dLrect decentraLLsed deMocracy. ThLs LnvoLves organLsatLon and coordLnatLon of decentraLLsed basLc unLts (Local, COMMunLty and dLstrLct) whi..ch are gLven extensLve, but not coMpLete, autonoMy, as weLL as wLde use of : referenda, deLegatLon practLces, and rotatLon of offLce-hoLders. The fourth and fLnaL pLLLar, non-vLoLence, LMpli..es the reMovaL of coercLve and aLso oppressLve practLces, not Merely by More powerful people, but especLaLLy by socLaL groups and states, and also, More posLtLveLy, acti..ve depoLyMent of varLous Methods of socLal protest, resLstance and defence . The coMpatLbLlLty of Means wLth ends serves here as an LMportant underlyLng prLncLple: that a just, non-vLolent, huMane end-state cannot be satLsfactorLLy achLeved by unjust, vi..oLent, LnhuMane Means . • l Gr een PolLtLcs offers then a broad prograM for socLal change, whLch LncLudes the More specLfLc and ecologLcalLy focussed Deep Ecology platforM as a quLte proper part. Put dLfferentLy, Green PoLLtLcs coMbLnes a wLder pLuraLLty of The strand. LMportant MoveMents of whLch Deep Ecology represents one Lnter-relatLons are shown pLctorLaLly at the second level of the foLlowLng 12 dLagraM: DIAGRAM 1. DOUBLE PYRAMID, SETTING DEEP ECOLOGY IM PLACE p B \ '\ I 2C ] ~ Oer Lva ti..on Di,recti,on 2+ ExpLanatLon Oi,recti..on 2. Deep Ecology pLatforM 2C. ReforMLst envLronMentaL 2 p1Jsi.. t i.,Qn 2+. Vague fundaMentaLs of Green pLatforM -/ //' ;/ e.g. Buddhi..st (B), ChrLstLan (C) and (Eco)-PhLLosophLc (P) ultLMate bases j / -\,r - [ 1. Deep Ecology fundaMentaLs; C \ \ \ 3. s \ General norMs and theMes , substanti,ally derLved froM pl,atforM PartLcuLar norMs and concrete decLsLons , appLyLng to reLevant practLcal sLtuatLons. The ecologLcaL coMponent of Green PolLtLcs May not go very deep; Lt May on l y be based upon reforM envLronMentalLsM (or shallow ecology as i,t used to be I Starred notes LndLcate poi..nts at wh i..ch readLngs wi..th the correspondLng nuMbers May be Lnserted or undertaken . -2- caLLed), whLch aLM3 to reforM 30Me of the wor3t abuse3 and exces3e3 of the doMLnant posLtLon, such as gross poLLutLon, extensLve despoLLatLon of Land and Lakes and oceans, LLttLe thought for the future, MLstreatMent of anLMals, etc_ On shaLlow ecology, nature Ls not valued for Ltself, but as a resource, that Ls LnstruMentalLy, for what Lt can be used for by huMans_ By contrast, Deep Ecology argues (e_g_ froM preMLsses of Level I) that the envLronMent Ls LntrLnsLcaLLy valuable, that nature Ls valuable Ln and for Ltself; and that, furtherMore, LntrLnsLc value Ls equally dLstrLbuted_ ThLs projectLon of egsLLtarLan or LMpartLalLty prLncLpLes, usually restrLcted to huMans, to the whole of lLfe Ln the natural worLd, gets dLgnLfLed by the tLtle, BLocentrLc EgalLtarLanLsM_ The prLncLple, not part of Green PoLLtLcs, Ls perhaps the Most controversLal of the central prLncLpLes of Deep Ecology; but Lt or soMe substLtute for Lt Ls requLred, granted that the natural world contaLns value beyond that accruLng to huMans and theLr features, to expLaLn how value Ls dLstrLbuted_ Deep Ecology accounts for the dLstrLbutLon through what Ls . . presented as a core deMocracy ~n the bLosphere . _•3 Deep Ecology grew out of a phLlosophLcal deepenLng of the new features of the scLence of ecology, whLch served to dLstance ecology froM the standard run of reductLonLst scLences (through such features as holLsM; gestalt propertLes; systeMs whLch are More than the suM of theLr atoMLstLc parts; eMergent eleMents, lLke lLfe, organLsatLon, etc_ )_ Deep Ecology quLckLy aLLLed Ltself wLth the subversLve features of unco-opted ecology, Ln partLcuLar, the eMphasLs on the lLMLts, and ultLMate faLlure of (atoMLstLc) reductLonLsM Ln scLence and phLlosophy_ WLth such an orLgLn, Lt Ls not surprLsLng that there Ls lLttle dLrectLy about such MaLn pLllars of Green PolLtLcs as socLaL responsLbLLLty and non-vLoLence Ln the pLatforM of Deep Ecology- However Deep Ecology Ls coMpatLbLe wLth these Green pLlLar prLncLpLes, and Lndeed perMLts theLr derLvatLon_ ~hat Ls supposed to resuLt are generaL norMs, LLke No exploLtatLon, No subjectLon, No vLoLence, at leveL 3_ (Such a derLvatLon of a non-vLoLence prLncLpLe froM tne Deep Ecology prLncLpLe of MaxLMLzLng Self-reaLLsatLon Ls atteMpted by Naess Ln the fraMework of hLs systeM of Eco-phLLosophy)_•l A MaLn focus of Deep Ecology Ls on changLng huMan reLatLons wLth the natural envLronMent, away froM doMLnant expLoLtatLve practLces_ The naturaL envLronMent coMprLses LteMs of LntrLnsLc value, LncludLng huMans (who are not above or separate froM Lt), and accordLn9ly Ls to be treated wLth the care and respect valuable LteMs warrant, and not LrresponsLbLy_ Thus Lt would be contrary to Deep Ecology to treat the envLronMent or Lts valued LteMs vLolently whLch however Ls what Deep Ecology contends doMLnant practLces do (consLder such wLdespread phenoMena as "rape of the envLronMent", "of the Land", "of the forestsu)_ SLnce huMans are not apart froM or superLor to nature, Lt follows froM the Deep Ecology pLatforM that natural and proper relatLons also exclude vLoLence towards other huMans or classes of huMans_ Because Lt covers a pluraLLty of posLt~ons, LncludLng shaLLow ecoLogLcaL posLtLons, Green PolLtLcs Ls Much More aMelLoratLve and reforMLst Ln character than Deep Ecology, whLch Ls further reMoved froM doMLnant attLtudes, More hardLLne, and More radLcaL_ ~hereas Deep Ecology goes to fundaMentaLs, and focusses on Ldeals and theory, Green PolLtLcs tends to concentrate on practLcal polLtLcal probleMs of an envLronMental or socLal kLnd, such as acLd raLn or rLver pollutLon or MLssLle deplo8Ment, and (lLke the Peace MoveMent Ln AustralLa) Ls not so Much concerned wLth refLnLng Lts rather vague prLncLpLes or wor~Lng out an env~ronMentaL (or peace) ph~Losophy_ Because of Lts envLronMentaL depth and natural world focus, Deep Ecology Ls concerned wLth a range of natural envLronMent Lssues, such as wLlderness, rare specLes, and the radLcal -3- transforMatLon of agrLcuLture, whLch are onLy of passLng Lnterest to a sMaLL MLnorLty Ln Green PoLLtLcs or are beyond Lts poLLtLcaL reach. Jn Lts reforMLst styLe Green PoLLtLcs does not venture far beyond prevLous Left-LeanLng poLLtLcaL MoveMents, except, fLrstLy, Ln Lts opposLtLon to envLronMent and aMenLty daMa9Ln9 LndustrLaLLsM and, secondLy, as regards non-vLolence and Lts coMMLtMent to attaLnLng peace. Non-vLoLence Ls the Most controversLaL of the four pLLLars. For non-vLoLence ruLes out a range of poLLtLcal actLon, LncLudLn9 typLcal protests, confrontatLon and revoLutLons. Non-vLolence also LMplLes, what Ls very dLfferent froM current MLLLtary pra~tLces, socLal defence. WhLLe MaLn factLons Ln the Green MoveMent support non-vLolent Methods and socLal defence, other Lesser factLons hold that force Ls necessary to brLn9 about varLous necessary changes and for defence purposes. The Deep EcoLogy platforM Lncludes severaL prLncLpLes that would be recognLsed by onLy a MLnorLty of the Green MoveMent. One of these prLncLples (whLch however, unlLke BLocentrLc EgalLtarLanLsM, would not be wLdeLy opposed by reforMLst Greens) Ls the core prLncLpLe of SeLf-reaLLsatLon, or More exactLy of MaxLMLzLng SeLf-reaLLsatLon. The notLon of self-realLsatLon of varLous relLgLous posLtLons, of the full unfoldLng and developMent of the person, Ls vastly expanded Ln Deep EcoLogy to Lnclude brLngLng to fuLl fruLtLon not MereLy one's own person, but all that one LdentLfLes wLth, that Ls the expanded Self, whLch Ls taken to be not Merely one's faMLLy or feLlows or fellow natLonals, nor Merely ~as on huManLstLc ethLcs) the whole huMan race, but the whole naturaL 1 systeM. The SeLf-realLsatLon prLncLpLe, sprLngLng as Lt appears froM an enLLghtened personal self-Lnterest prLncLple, has an excellent phLlosophLcaL pedLgree (at Least as applLed to huMans or neL9hbourLn9 classes of huMans). Thus rather than beLng argued for, a dLffLcult Matter Ln the case of ultLMate prLncLples, SeLfrealLsatLon Ls LMported froM syMpathetLc phLlosophLcal or reLLgLous posLtLons at Level 1 of the double pyraMLd, froM those that help sustaLn Deep Ecology. However the expansLon Lnvolved, the derLvatLon process froM narrow self to coMprehensLve Self, severs the usual justLfLcatory lLnks. It Ls hard to LdentLfy one's self-Lnterests wLth those of a rock or an acorn. So the supposed LdentLfLcatLon - wLth soMe or aLL MountaLns, rLvers and raLnforests Ln the wLder reMaLns, LLke the assocLated extended EgaLLtarLan Self, Nature personLfLed prLncLpLe, decLdedLy probLeMatLc. Because Lt Ls assuMed that SeLf-reaLLsatLon Ls dLrected to ecoLogLcal and spLrLtual ends, not at MaterLaL goods or Means, SeLf-reaLLsatLon Leads to the 16 AMong the raMLfLcatLons of the slogan slogan, USLMpLe Ln Means, rLch Ln endsn. are those concernLng what kLnd of technology one uses and where one lLves (the Matter of dwellLng Ln sLtuatLons of Lnherent value and the lLke), what and how Much one consuMes, and so on. The doMLnant attLtudes, forMed around of econoMLc growth and econoMLc routes to happLness, have MaxLMLzatLon eMphasLsed both MaterLal goals and MaterLal Means, partLcuLarly personal consuMerLsM. But Lf MaterLaL use and pure consuMptLon are to be reduced for envLronMentaL and other reasons, what LLfestyles are approprLate? Deep Ecology, LLke Lts fundaMentaL sources, poLnts to experLentLal and spLrLtuaL ends and eMphasLzes the rLchness of non-MaterLaL ends avaLlabLe. The result, of course, Ls practLces whLch are sLMpLe, voluntary sLMpLLcLty, do~ng wLth enough, and, More 9enerall8, practLces whLch lLe lLght on the Land and the naturaL world. In way of d0Ln9 thLngs, these wLLL be Lnte9rated (Ln ~ properly ecoLogLcaL syMbLotLc and other naturaL styles) wLth the natural systeMs LnvoLved, workLng wLth rather than agaLnst the natural fLow. The practLces, and organLsatLonaL approprLate to regLonaL wLLl accordLngly be ecoregLonaL arrangeMents, 17 to be caLLed. coMe have they as bLore9LonaL, ecoL09LcaL 9roupLn9s - or -4- ApproprLate Means LncLude, Ln turn, technLques approprLate to the practLce and theory of Deep Ecology- HLgh technoL09Les such as nuclear power are not approprLate, even Ln advanced LndustrLaL socLetLes, but LnapproprLate because of the envLronMentaL and socLaL costs and rLsks such technoLogLcaL forMs LMpose_ On both deep and green percept i,ons, wh-3 t Ls requ Lred a re re LLab Le c-:1 ref u L technoLogLes whLch are not ecoLogLcaLLy daMa9Ln9 or socLaLLy rLsky or otherwLse undesLrabLe; but the technoLogi,es adl"li,tted wLLl dLffer accordLng to the prLncLpLes of the posLtLons they answer back to (e_g_ farMLng technLques wLLL need to be very dLfferent froM those prevaLLLng Ln rural GerMany to Meet such prLncLpLes as bLospherLc egaLLtarLanLsM )_ In each case the practLcaL use of approprLate technoLogy faLLs at the bottoM, actLon Level, of the doubLe pyral"I ,,"d _•8 WhLLe Deep Ecology suppLLes an appeaLLng bLueprLnt for dLfferent socLaL and LLfe-ways, the questLon reMaLns: how Ls the proMLsed Land reached? A MaLn part of the answer Ls taken to be gLven through a further crucLaL feature of Deep Ecology: EcoLogLcaL ConscLousness, a notLon agaLn expandLng upon conceptLons of other oLder LdeoLogLes (e_g_ of reLL9Lous, or of revoLutLonary, conscLousness)_ What Ls dLfferent Ls that spLrLtuaL or LdeoLogLcaL conversLon Ls agaLn broadened froM the personaL and socLaL to coMprehend the fuLL envLronMentaL predLcaMent_ In thLs expLanatLon, of how peopLe get, and are got, to grasp Deep Ecology and Lts practLces, the pyraMLd Ls ascended, froM actLon to Ldeas, to deeper explanatory prLncLpLes_ A thorough conversLon process LnvoLves eLevatLon to the top LiveL, spLrLtuaL transcendence of the daLLy econoMLc and poLLtLcaL actLon LeveL. 9 It Ls assuMed that, wLth enough converts and supporters, Deep Ecology wLLL be put Ln place, LLke Green PoLLtLcs, by grassroots deMocratLc procedures_ LLke the fundaMentaL sources upon whLch Lt draws, Deep Ecology prescrLbes practLces by whLch to achLeve such a conversLon and through whLch to arrLve at EcoLogLcaL ConscLousness_ SoMe of the MaLn practLces, such as MedLtatLon and conteMpLatLon, are derLved frol"I the fundaMentaL sources_ But other Methods whLch extend these, soMe of theM expandLng upon ecoLogLcaL experLence, LncLude value seeLng thLngs dLfferentLy, and reorLentatLon and wLdened value perceptLon of other thLngs - Connected wLth weLL-beLng and worth the coMLng to apprecLate goes a hoLLstLc shLft Ln theM, these wLdened experLentLaL bases, and LnforMLng vaLues and perceptLon, and an expanded LdentLfLcatLon , affordLng dLrect LLnkage wLth parts and whoLes of the natural worLd_•IO By these Methods, a person May coMe to a deep and joyous apprecLatLon of the reaL world, a convert to Deep Ecology, a feLLow and advocate of Lts Messages and LLfe-ways. ESSAY QUESTIONS }_ To what extent do Green PoLLtLcs and Deep Ecology share the saMe values and address the sal"le probLel"ls? CrLtLcaLLy coMpare and contrast theLr proposals, especLaLLy as regards the naturaL and the buLLt envLronMent_ 2_ Deep Ecology Ls soMetLMes assLgned four Levels. Try to descrLbe these, and to expLaLn carefuLLy the LnterreLatLons aMong PoLLtLcs fLt Lnto thLs probLeMatLc scheMe? these Levels. Where does Green Ln prLncLpLe" appears as a key theMe of Deep Eco~ogy. Cri.tLcaLLy assess Lts adequacy_ Shouldn't Green PoLLtLcs LncLude such a pri.nci.pLe? 3_ ·sLocentrLc EgaLLtarLanLsM - Non-vLo~ence an unstated pr~nc~p~e of Deep Ecoiog~? Expia~n why Deep Ecology Ls coMMLtted to non-vLoLence to the degree i.t Ls? In your answers take account of the foLLowLng dLffLcuLtLes: L. the contradLcti.ons between the use of I+- 1:5 -5- vLolence and the defence of the envLronMent; LL. the occurrence of vLolence Ln nature; LLL. the need for coercLve Methods to preserve the natural envLronMent. 5. What justLfLes expandLng self-realLsatLo n to Self-realLsatLo n? ExpLaLn the MeanLng and LMportance of SeLf-ReaLLsatL on for Deep EcoLogy and dLscuss Lts adequacy. Why does Lt not feature Ln Green PolLtLcs? 6. ExplaLn the MeanLng of the delLberateLy vague slogan °SLMple Ln Means, rLch Ln ends", or of soMe other hLgh-LMpact sLogan of Deep EcoLogy. IndLcate how the vagueness MLght work for and a9aLnst the slogan, suggest how the slogan MLght be alternatLve LnterpretatLon s, and LndLcate soMe of the suggest applLed, aLternatLves. these of raMLfLcatLons 7. OutLLne bLoregLonalLsM , LndLcatLng what practLcaL envLronMentaL probLeMs bLoregLonalLsM Lnduces. How Ln fact Ls bLoregLonalLsM derLved froM Deep EcoLogy? ConsLder to what extent bLoregLonalLsM fLts wLth the sLogan, ·rhLnk globally, act locally·. 8. Is More hLgh technology an unprobLeMatLc solutLon to deeper, or to any, envLronMental probLeMs? CoMpare and contrast the vLews of Deep Ecology and Green PoLLtLcs on the role of varLous types of technoLogy. 9. What Ls Ecolo9Lcal ConscLousness? And what Ls Lt supposed to do Ln and for Deep Ec0Lo9y? If Lt Ls so LMportant, why Ls Lt not a MaLn concern for Green PoLLtLcs? A reLatLonaL, total-fLeLd LMa9e of huMan reLatLonshLps wLth nature has been quLetLy oMLtted froM the orLgLnaL pLatforM of Deep Ecology. Is thLs gestalt pLcture needed? Is Lt defensLbLe? Should Lt be reLnstated? 10. -6-  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. 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Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/browse?search=Richard+Routley&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bjoiner%5D=and&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=&amp;range=&amp;collection=&amp;type=&amp;user=&amp;tags=&amp;public=&amp;featured=&amp;exhibit=&amp;geolocation-mapped=&amp;geolocation-address=&amp;geolocation-latitude=&amp;geolocation-longitude=&amp;geolocation-radius=10&amp;submit_search=Search+for+items">Richard Routley</a> Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived <span class="MuiTypography-root-125 MuiTypography-body2-126">The University of Queensland's <a data-testid="rek-series" href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/records/search?page=1&amp;pageSize=20&amp;sortBy=score&amp;sortDirection=Desc&amp;searchQueryParams%5Brek_series%5D%5Bvalue%5D=Richard+Sylvan+Papers%2C+UQFL291&amp;searchMode=advanced">Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291</a></span>, Box 24, Item 1697 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org">Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy</a> Contributor An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, <a href="https://najtaylor.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Dr. N.A.J. 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Type The nature or genre of the resource Manuscript Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context <a href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:476be48">https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:476be48</a> Coverage The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant Australian National University - Filing Cabinet 1 - Top Drawer Australian National University Office Australian National University Office > Filing Cabinet 1 > Top Drawer Box 24: Files on Articles https://www.antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/979159be0f3d1109bd5b22759db1f0fd.pdf 249a2a5345757b3734cdd80aed300e08 PDF Text Text WORKING DRAFT 1'l}l' T1 1,,i··) CULTURE, PHILOSOPHY, AND APPROACHES TO THE NATURAL ENVIRONMENT - AN AUSTRALIAN PERSPECTIVE Many of you know that Canberra was originally designed by Walter Burley 'lO Griffin. This talk is dedicated to him. You may not know that Griffin, an c111,d l,ee,tJ>,, I! a ,~cJ/2...ru/.1t-l/ '";~1/n,-,l,c1... American who migrated to Australia in 1913, was not simply an architect and A lantlscape designer_, but one of Australia's early deeper ecologists. key elements of the Western industrial paradigm, especially on making nature the servant of man', 'land to be accorded the 'concentration and discerned instead elements of a different 'consciousness' (the word is his). took the He rejected His approach was holistic, and respect he due to a highly developed and perfected living organism not to be exterminated or treated as dead material, or as a mere section of a map'. Canberra, now no mere section of map, is still, for all its deficiencies, perhaps the best approximation anywhere .eco~osic-.w, city; but it is not only removed from Griffin's original conception but far from deep ecological ideals. * * *3 * * * * The objective of the larger investigation, of which this part, is to gauge the extent to which Australian contrasted with American culture, contains developable will underpin a under which many suffers. talk sketches a culture, especially as elements (seeds) which different political framework from the bastardised capitalism people presently labour and local environment frequently It is not necessary to see the present political arrangements and the political course interested to in charted as environmentally alternative structures: socially disastrous to be it is enough, for example, to view them r ,i,v~c~ntL..:f- [.<-ol"l,-" hd<--t r7' <-.~ .::.. P,r~t- f tl. /~J 1 or J I C-IJll·A-r~u... ) ~ tn "S. �those as far from satisfactory, or very far from the of best to be interested in the prospects of turning things around somewhat, to worlds, increasing ecological resistance [negative action] against vandalism and like, and ecological construction [direct positive action]. the grounds give remarkable level of environmental activism that has the especially hope, damage, environment There are several distinctive features of Australian culture that for attainable of somehow emerged among the people. It is worth trying to pull together some of these features of the culture, to look at ways of furthering the valuable parts, and increasing the level of concern and activism. the towards practices, and attitudes different approaches, different 1 Indeed appreciation of, environment. have cultures different Without doubt practices towards, and respect for the natural environment are highly culturally dependent: and where they still survive uncorrupted still have - nonimperial cultures had much exploitative less whose North, industrial exploitation approaches to practices not vandalism and the environment merely environmental but to a marked extent depend upon such practices. control" their of local typically under the missionary, colonial or imperial domination. in But occasionally, notably retained the of those than gross permit Mostly these more benign cultures have however "lost environments, Most American Jews and American Indians. instance, for compare, sufficient autonomy the to adjacent Pacific, regional cultures 2 have slow or even halt environmental destruction. Thus, for example, rainforest damaging projects have been delayed or blocked in Melanesia largely through Melanesian attitudes to the land. One important way then to try to slow environmental degradation, especially in the South, is to foster certain both sweepingly, regional cultural autonomy; socialism and indigenous for cultural instance land rights movements. 2 differences to support and, more Melanesian For, where the cultures have �not been excessively corrupted by Northern influences, this is rapid way of paradigms. in the a cultural differences can also serve Antipodes, in particular in Australia, to at least assist in transition to different Such comparatively activating alternative paradigms to the dominant Northern social The question arises whether elsewhere a less environmentally exploitative social paradigms. transition is unlikely to occur unless it is based on the culture. Can features of the culture and the social life be used to foster and make requisite differences? In the case of Australia, a basis culture, is there both in the land and the and things appear sufficiently different from those in the cultures of the industrialised North to allow (some hope) for cultural differentiation. the need for change, at least if the natural environment is to retain some It semblance of integrity, there is little doubt. that there is, in is becoming platitudinous the longer run not much prospect for the integrity of many local natural environments and ecosystems loose Of 3 unless we in the Antipodes break from the damaging cultural assumptions and practice of the industrialised North and work destructive towards establishment of a less in some parts, rising tide war. of For despite environmental the industrialised North still appears in the grip of established forces and unlikely to budge in time - short of nuclear environmentally culture, towards a certain regional cultural autonomy. elements of regionalism in the North, despite a concern different disaster, such Though we who seek change can count on some support from minority movements in the North, nonetheless if we are to achieve changes, we must go largely alone. Nor is the Australia because as well as the location, the advantage of the ground and its southern seeds of cultural difference are already there and growing. cultivation. Such a it task of paradigm transition entirely hopeless in like most new and more fragile developments they need attention and speedy as careful But if task is rendered urgent also by other matters of 3 �environmental and human concern, not just the gathering signs but colossal biological losses through of nuclear rapid destruction of, e.g. war, tropical rainforests, indeed mounting evidence of environmental decline almost everywhere humans now establish. How does philosophy fit into the strategy of harnessing regional culture to alter approaches to the environment? As in the title of the talk it operates in the middle, not as an idle middleman, but more like and design culture. principles A working picture that the main components of the discussion together - a picture that also like most images of the more abstract distorts across organising of the dynamic linkage in a good suspension bridge, which lifts the environmental way on the ropes of regional links the is that of a suspension the gap often separating people from the natural environment. bridge There are people, and the environment, and approaches by bridges to the environment, like so:- approach ➔ Natural Environment People (Of course people may be part of the natural environment: the picture doesn't exclude that important overlap.) The connecting bridges may be of very different sorts, ranging from rustic bridges good for careful foot traffic, through the monumental suspension bridge at Middle Harbour, to modern high-tech bridges able to carry nuclear tanks and bulldozers over large spans. of But it is the structure all these types of bridges carrying the approaches that matter particularly. The spans are carried by the ropes of culture, and the pylons of culture if 4 you �will. ~ {dC"' CULTURE l (--.__ APPROACH ~ ____,___.- ·'--- So with approaches. different ------- ----- - cultures, different carrying bridges different It is better to see the link component in the middle - philosophy, but it might almost as well be sociology - not as part of the nuts and bolts and rivets of the structures. types, bridges, but rather It has its analytical computing the loads and as parts, the design looking stresses at on them; and engineering of the the components, and it also has its more holistic elements, considering the bridges themselves and of them their - the social paradigms embedded in the cultures. select substructures Philosophy, the link subject, is then the architecture and engineering of the business. Less figuratively, assumptions of a philosophy replacement, or marxist philosophies. deep ecology, asks deeper assumptions of all and and assumptions paradigms. the operative for example of free Philosophy, especially metaphysics and not deeper questions, extracting the fundamental other subjects and assembling the intellectual assumptions embodied in a culture or social way of life, i.e. social assembles culture applied in environmental practices, the assumptions, that is, to be considered for enterprise isolates In what are sometimes called the this respect philosophy - which includes much more than conceptual analysis - is first among the intellectual subjects, as logic, the science of reasoning, is the first among the sciences, investigating the form of arguments and methodology of all other sciences. philosophical investigation extracts, 5 The deeper assumptions such when put together yield a philosophy in �the more popular sense (as e.g. enterprise philosophy): in philosophy of life or again the free in any case the result will be a philosophical theory or the rudiments of a philosophical paradigm, depending on how it is done. By largely philosophical investigation then, assumptions of the techniques we try contrasted base. with operative to test apparent we trace and Northern social paradigms; the adequacy social of the organise the and by sociological assemblage, especially as alternatives with some environmental support So much has already been accomplished, in a rough and ready way, and some results are illustrated in diagram 1. Details of other positions, the old culture (as positions typically offer environmental a projected), transition alternative. are from And and new left and the counter included in the diagram because these the while the dominant it may Western appear paradigm to indeed is - a long political way from the dominant paradigm to the environmental alternative, of the intermediate taken one at a time. details steps is not so great; To illustrate the way transitions can of the first line (row) in macro-economic form. construed as representing package typically includes environment, so the in components each and the steps can, and have, been be made, consider The dominant objective is to maximize some economic package of goods and services being such as GDP, a rough way standard of living. minimal to quality of life this But the and and pollution, and perhaps with additions for non-material features excluded in dominant consciousness. this way we arrive at New Left thinking with the objective to considerable reservations, X(RR). of material goes back to Greek philosophy; 6 In growth The real break however comes with members of the counterculture, the Hippies and Yippies for example, idea the objective function to be maximized gets much complicated, with subtractions for externalities such as noise subject the though the namely, the abandonment of growth and �maximization objectives altogether, for less material nonmaximizing the macroeconomic steady-state objective or will level, for economy, something economists have so far sketched. which Daly for At the idea gets partially represented by the goal of a sustainable be goals. example though the alternative environmental much less inflexible and nationalistic than In fact the "emerging steady-state advocates, paradigm", affords only a shallow alternative to the dominant paradigm, differing only as to growth and reserves themes. But a fuller diagram of paradigms would include - among others such advanced corporate capitalism the higher-dimensional steady state position; involve would However, the higher dimensional how a better argued transition can be made; diagram essentially by combining steady-state arguments against macroeconomic growth and stocks assumptions the Left-socialist combination, which framework would a diagram, and remove the convenient ~simplification of the two dimensional left-right transition. indicates it so case does not against microeconomic themes. touch human relations, a with Even so, even with the narrower anthropocentric have been left behind, deeper environmental concern would have only began to enter. Reaching behind the dominant Western paradigm so outlined to the underlying social model takes us towards the following familiar picture: society consists of a set of individual humans of decidedly impoverished type, e.g. they are not genuinely interrelated, so they are isolated, and, though they are the only sort of items that have intensional (mental) features, they have (e.g. a certain ability to calculate). but few of these At bottom, these individuals have utilities, reflecting preferences or self-interests, which they aim to maximize; and so they are competitive (by virtue of scarcity). that they are possessive, and possess capital. The distinctive the feature means of Their other feature is production, e.g. land, of the American model is of course is that individuals can separately accumulate the means of production. 7 To ensure their �rABLI J. COMPLll NG SOC IAL l'ARAD IGMS <ENVIRONMENTALLY - OR I [ifl [D REPRESEIITAT IONJ .... RIGHT - LEFT POLITICAL ORIENTAT!Otl DOMINANT (XJ WESTERN PARADIGM CORE THEMES ECONOMIC ORGANISATIONAL POLITICAL FURTHER ENVIRONMENTAL MATERIAL (ECONOMIC) GROWTH DOMINANCE OVER NATURE NATURAL ENVIRONMENT A RESOURCE MARKET FORCES (MINIMALLY REGULATED, PRODUCTIVITY AND PROFIT MAXIMIZING) PREDOMINANTLY PRIVATE OWNERSHIP OF PRODUCTIVE MEANS I ND IV I DUALI ST I c/ COMPETITIVE ETHOS ELITIST/REWARDS FOR APPROVED ACHIEVEMENT CONSUMERISM ENCOURAGED URBAN-INDUSTRIAL COMMODITY/CULTURAL PACKAGING CENTRALISED : URBAN CENTRED LARGE-SCALE: ORDERED (POWER-) HIERARCHICAL HUMAN RELATIONS SECONDARY /OLD 1LEFT /NEW LEFT 1 I X 1X<R) X X I X IX 1X<RRl I y IX<R) I X ➔ Y 1X<Rl I X(RR) !COMMAND SYSTEM I I I I y y I y :X(Q) I y I X I X(Q) I X I X xrn> 1 IX :x-v I X X<R) I X-'>Y NATIONAL FOCUS; MILITARY DEFENCE X I I X ALTERNATIVE STRUCTURES (POWER-BROKERS AND EXPERTS PROMINENT) LAW AND ORDER; LEGAL REGULATION, POLICE BACKED X X 1X<Q> IX(Q) i X I ly(R) FAITH IN SCIENCE: HIGH TECHNOLOGICAL PROGRESS SEPARATION OF REASON/ EMOTION, FACT/VALUE, SCIENTIFIC/UTILITARIAN RATIONALITY; ANALYTIC REDUCTIONISTIC y ly(Q) I AMPLE RESERV~S (OR (SUBSTITUTES) [NVIRONMENTAL CONTROLLABLE! y IXCQ) I X->Y I I Y<Q> I y I I v Y X<R) y /HUMAN RELATIONS !PRIMARY 'v<Q> I X X·->Y y y 'xrn> 'x<R> y X I 1X<R) X I X X X I X IX X :x<R> y X I X y X I X I RATIONALITY I I I /REJECTED I IDEEP ECOLOGY 1DISTINGU!Sfl[D I I !GREATER VALUE ASSUMPTIOt-j /REJECTED (FOR BIOSPECIES /IMPART I ALI TY) /TRADITIONAL MARKETS WITHIN PUBLIC INTEREST / FRAMEWORK LIMITED OWNERSHIP OF / PRODUCTIVE MEANS jDECENTRALISED: I I I Y/NON OWNERSHIP COMMUNAL I I /SMALL-SCALE; FLEXIBLE NON-(POWER)HIERARCHJCAL /HUMAN RELATIONS WITHIN / ECO-COMMUN I TY REGIONAL/NEIGHBOURHOOD I FOCUS; SOCIAL (NON- /VIOLENT) DEFENCE / PARTICIPATIVE STRUCTURES l(cJTIZEN-WORKER I INVOLVEMENT) /LIBERATION; SOCIAL /REGULATION /EARTH SUPPLIES LIMITED y /NATURE DELICATELY BALANCED 1NATURE BENIGN /OTHER ANIMALS ALSO INTENTIONAL X➔Y I /COLLECTIVE ETHOS/ ,soCJAL PROVISION EGALITARIAN/INCOME NEED I RELATED / CAREFUL USE/RECYCLING ' /Y(ES SENT IAL) LOCALIS~LF-MANAGEMENT /PRODUCT/CULTURE EMPHASIS/ y y ? !ALTERNATIVE (Y) ENVIRONMENTAL PAR.4DIGM 1 / LE SS MATERIAL GOALS (E,G, SELF- REALISATION) /HARMON Y WITH NATURE /NATURAL ENVIRONMENT VALUED FOR ITSELF I y I y I I ICOUNTER 1CULTURE I I I STATE lowNERSHIP X X X NATURE HOSTILE/NEUTRAL NONHUMANS ESSENTIALLY ME CHAN I ST! C EPISTEMIC/ PHILOSOPHIC DOMINANT ISTATE I SOCIALIST ... I LIMITS TO SCIENCE: IAPPROPRIATE TECHNOLOGY ! INTEGRATION OF REASON/ EMOTION, FACT/VALUE , , , I~/J DER RATIONALITY (OR) REJECTION OF NARROWER; /HOLi ST IC IV /NATURAL AS TELEOLOGICAL I I ..• • I �entitlement to this is the initial argument, on this model, for the coercive apparatus of the (minimal) state. natural, this about self-interested Features There is nothing compulsory, or Individuals picture. competing individuals are matter of these nurture, abstract not nature. of the American economic archtype are a matter of culture, a result of training, not human nature, as a comparison where approximating particularly individuals are not like this, individuals embody rationality either: with helps other traditional show. cultures, Nor do these archtypal only a question-begging argument leads to the American model as something naturally required. The transitions to the left already go beyond the American model. certain introduces human The relations. chauvinistic (anthropocentric) but they do left not models omit are social The left still human relations: the further big step to the environmental alternative is to widen these relations to full community relations, independent value. recognising That is a creatures and nonhuman things as of bigger step, a step that no Western political institutions make requisite allowance for, and that mainstream underpinning Western value theories do not accommodate. The arguments from traditional cultures can also be illustrated paradigms and cultures such as those the of models Melanesia that and directed underlie Polynesia, them. many of against the In traditional the operative assumptions of the Northern social paradigms are, very reasonably, not accepted. Where these cultures still prevail with some measure of regional autonomy, there is good prospect of thwarting more environmentally destructive practices. Features of the local culture can be immediately harnessed. But much of the inhabited and there are already New governed and by environmentally less unscathed World peoples of predominantly European stock. distinctive features 8 observable in New World is now Although cultures, �assumptions of the dominant Northern paradigms have hardly been sufficiently questioned, let alone overthrown, especially among the manag~rial other, or even lesser, features of surprisingly leave out There are cultures significant as artistic and intellectual usually cultural industrial culture, though economically dominated accompanying other conspicuous The incomplete social paradigms outlined do not exhaust features of the accompanying rather to be icing. discerned, features. sure, This does affords European culture. This alternatives. a discrepancies. established have an somewhat as that in romanticism and a significant feature of American Indian gives *l but Northern precarious foothold for an aesthetic approach to the environment, such evidenced So the cultures will have to be invoked if change in approach is to be hastened in this way. cultural features to be considered. classes. But the basis there of are the as aesthetic well more route to important environmental omissions and In particular, the dominant American paradigm omits reference to religion; also neglected are many of the connected older and formerly more prominent values of American culture. The American search for environmentally acceptable alternatives has regularly turned to these omitted features of American culture, and religious or spiritual elements, and associated past values 4 • establish "the gospel of ecology" and displace the dominant paradigm have taken a spiritual route, a quasi-religious way. and Indeed the primary attempts to representative new environmentalism: (For example, Nash provides a sample list of the books he considers important in the rise of the virtually all that proceed beyond ecology depend on an appeal to religious elements, to divine or sacred features of natural things.) In the context of American culture the appeal something to be said for it. to religious features has For, firstly, a high proportion of the American population profess some active religious commitment; • 9 and, unlike Australia, a �substantial do proportion act response. And, secondly, religious values do clash with dominant Northern paradigm. This sort of socially that with accordance in conflict precepts the was approved of perceived, considerable puzzlement, by colonised cultures, as Lini reports in the case the with of Melanesian society (p.9): The fabric of this society, with its inherent communal discipline was torn by the arrival of European commercial practices which ••• carried with it the message of materialism, together with the creed of Both aspects were a direct contradiction enlightened self-interest. of Melanesian values and priorities. The introduction to Melanesia of Christianity added a further element of division and confusion in the While the Christian religion was widely minds of the people. compatible with the ethics and principles of Melanesian communalism, with its emphasis on mutuality, compassion and caring for one another, it was a practice that very few of the Europeans appeared to follow. and individualism of religion It ran also contrary to the self-interest, which not just (had) more important exponents, but was followed by the majority of Europeans ••• It is something a a puzzle how the assimilation of elements of the dominant paradigm with prospects of Christianity is pulled off, though achieved Northern There is it certainly is in a great many Northerners, and too many Antipodeans. a compartmentalisation. partial answer: Religion for most is a separate thing fitted into a Sunday morning box, important elements of which do not the upset standard penetrate deep. business to Thus for most believers religion does not week. Only for a minority does it directly such as human poverty: escape touch immediate matters why should we expect it to work for the Environment? Nonetheless widespread real adoption of religious perceptions within the American population, and reflected in the Administration, would presumably alter things. But even if some of the effects of a religious return would beneficial, and to nature domination highly be welcomed, it is also true that some of the effects of a narrow fundamentalism would be highly undesirable. of be were Unless moreover the position abandoned in favour of one of the lesser religious traditions the environmental effects would 10 be negative (as Watt testifies). �Religion could be more of a drawback than an asset. Religion in America has lost out to with any depth to it appears most unlikely. the There existence of God, the fallaciousness of the arguments involved, etc. no But nor is the so-called scientific front-end-in. cannot account for; it is that this perspective, a paradigm, a richer more intellectually satisfactory rivals (e.g. view). such great the incorporates There are it is far from uniquely determined. So paradigm. social dominant in view world is not just that there is much that this sort of view leaves out or It shape. is view with these sorts of weaknesses the to return to trying in virtue rival Consider, for instance, the matter of the view could explain. scientific much for world view was seriously deficient and it did not account more the case for its In part it failed deservedly: view". world scientific "the In any case such a reversal intensional scientific These rivals allow for value and wonder in natural things without taking a theological way. character quasi-religious reasons of set second There is a of some sort, for not endeavouring Christian, strongly These on turn the irreligious character of the culture, where an appeal through religion is unlikely to have much as understood a (the Australia, success. first) post-Christian it has been irreligious character the of understanding much else about the culture, society e.g. 'best is said, society, in which religion (is) barely relevant culturally'. *4 Even if that formulation is an generally a Pantheistic or Jewish, whatever, on deeper environmental approaches in Australia. impose to exaggeration the is a fact and is the key to the curious extent of the state's protrusion into Australian social life. If an approach through religion is accordingly ruled out as a main approach to hastened paradigm transition - and a related approach through mysticism or transcendentalism excluded for analogous reasons and because of 11 the earthiness �of the culture - what alternatives are open? There are other significant features of the culture running against major elements of the dominant paradigm, effectively which can perhaps applied be much quasi-religious approaches to turn matters around. more Western than To indicate the prospects of applying features of the culture to detach from dominant paradigms, consider how Australian culture contrasts with American. Australian mainstream culture transition from the dominant is already American political left has much stronger support in difficult to some culture. Australia way It along the leftward is not merely that the than USA. It is not indicate features of the Australian cultural situation which show its left-displacement from the dominant Western paradigm. some elements of the contrast:- 12 The next table lists �TABLE 2. CONTRASTING ELEMENTS IN AUSTRALIAN AND AMERICAN CULTURE SCALE OF INCREASE *2 individualistic ethos inacceptability of socialist institutions inegalitarian attitudes POSITIVE inegalitarian practices ITEMS (PER level of consumerism CAPITA maximization quest WHERE imperialist drive RELEVANT) extent of violence police and military commitment high technology involvement functional rationality environmental inactivism USA AUSTRALIA SCALE OF INCREASE level of urbanisation legal obstacles to environmental action NEGATIVE official opposition to environmental practices, such as dedication of ITEMS wilderness administrative delays in implementing environmental practices, such as pollution requirements, recycling, etc. 13 �Thus there are some offsetting negative items as well as positive items in the in the contrast. Since, however, most of these contrasting elements bear on first diagram of rival paradigms in a way favourable to Australian culture as opposed to American, it appears that prospects indeed better. themes for applying the culture are This important theme requires elaboration and confirmation. The task can profitably be combined with others: there is much work here both for environmental spectators with an empirical bent and for environmental activists. A first task is to separate out what is known, what requires and what ought to be done (ideologically). and their surrounds, distinguishing firstly theses: A weak confirmation, Let us focus on transition theses, factual and normative transition factual transition thesis, that Western (European) culture is undergoing a transition away from the dominant confirmed by several Northern sociologists (e.g. better results could be obtained in Australia; social Marsh). paradigm, has been Presumably similar or but appropriate samplings of the community have not been done, analysed and so on - environmental sociology being a neglected undoubtedly field also in Another Australia. weak factual transition thesis holds, namely that since 1960 a significant percentage of the each human community in specifiable advanced Western countries such as Australia have come to adopt main assumptions of the alternative environmental paradigm. But again comparative-figures sociological work are entirely of data to Though impressionistic tells us that environmental activism is greater in Australia than USA - indeed more intensive than piece lacking. anywhere else, an immensely build upon - we lack solid confirmation. sociogeographers to do. 14 important There is much for �Throughout, as you may have noticed, a normative transition thesis has been taken largely for granted, that Australian culture, indeed Western culture generally, ought to be undergoing a major paradigm Western paradigms and their away from dominant variations (such as those of advocated corporate capitalism and of the post-industrial society), transiting shift, and towards an environmental alternative. furthermore ought the arguments. It is also be That complex normative thesis is argued for in environmental philosophy, and fortunately there isn't repeat to time to argued against there, but, to sum up the opposition case cavalierly, unconvincingly. Given then that the transition is going on, indeed emerging are are clear doing environmental encourage enough. for it in Australia? example, directing action going be aiming swing major Preliminary against the to organisations. on, answers sources of They should increase their support bases, but not merely by membership They should be endeavouring to influence the dominant regional culture, for the potential appears to be there for a considerably greater change than has thus far been two be despoilation and the like, primarily industrial organisations and drives and environmental education. and to Not only should activists be continuing with what those supposed to regulate them, further (public) also ought ought then to be going on with greater rapidity, how is it hastened, how do environmental activists they and parts to this further practice which achieved. There are can run in tandem, a more negative and a more positive part: • More negatively, it involves cutting down and countering the flow of propaganda in favour of the dominant paradigms both locally but especially from the North. That is important in reversing the extent of Northern co-option. includes gently a range of activities some with solid bases in local culture, such as lopping anti-American It off the tall poppies pedalling and anti-Northern activities. 15 the stuff, and careful The latter practices (which should �not of course reduce merely to personally directed antagonism) fit in well other regional environmental with aims, such as independent and nonaligned defence policies. • More positively, it consists in promoting and adapting other also despised features of alternative paradigms. ambassadors, Australian It is culture that work directly towards themes of commonly are, of course, those Lawrence). like nonmaximizing making-do socialistic ones, appreciation Northern intellectuals of local natural the The features to be egalitarian, along environments. with the combines enough: cultural with promoted or anti-authoritarian, rapidly increasing Nonmaximizing, for example, is reflected in the She'll be right and It'll do approach often and and note, that are responsible for the low repute in which some of the cultural characters are held (e.g. adapted commonly taken to things, egalitarian methods as encapsulated in Fair go and Enough's consider the effects of these, decently applied, in economics, in local markets. As for mateship, sure it could use widening, a main problem being its restriction in practice to extension male relationships: to communities (including nonhumans). is there for deep cultural transformation: but why not encourage its So, to conclude, the potential we must help to realise it. FOOTNOTES 1. The term 'approaches' is intended to include both theory and both espoused ideology and behaviour. 2. They did not go under because of the weakness of their intellectual positions. At bottom their religious beliefs, for example, were no more ridiculous than those of Christianity. Typically they were much weakened by new diseases, and overwhelmed by new technology often applied in violent fashion. 3. By integrity is meant much more than retaining representative samples of this and that system or species; not representative southern sassafras, parma wallabies and Torres Strait Islanders, but sufficiently many. 16 practice, �4. Another past philosophical basis for environmental philosophy, American naturalism, seems to have been little developed, despite the promise some have seen in it. *1 The aesthetic route Highwater. is well-illustrated by the main approach in *2 Note well that it is not being claimed that Australian culture is egalitarian (in conformity with a popular myth); only that it is less inegalitarian than American. The hard data underlying the claim---ri assembled in 'Culture and the roots of political divergence'. *3 For Griffin's conception of Canberra - a much smaller Canberra, which included a rail loop - see, to start with, Birrell (still the best source on Griffin). The first quotation from Griffin is quoted in Birrell, p.178; the second is from Griffin's article in Australian Wild Life. *4 P. O'Farrell. REFERENCES J. Highwater, The Primal Mind. Vision Harper & Row, New York, 1981. J. Birrell, Walter Burley Griffin, Queensland U.P., 1964. W.B. Griffin, (,0· cc,,/' «.,PL'0"1 d I (on and Reality in Indian America, · __ ,.,.,, ja,n;~, Australian Wild Life J_ (f9Jt-f/), ty ·-J, W. Lini, Keynote Address, Australia and the South Pacific, Proceedings a Conference held at the Australian National University, 1982. P. O'Farrell, 'The cultural ambivalence of Australian religion', in Culture and the State in Australia, Australian Cultural History 1 (1982) Canberra. R. Nash, 'Rounding out the American revolution: ethical extension and the new environmentalism', typescript, University of California at Santa Barbara, 1982. A. Marsh, Protect and Political Consciousness, Sage Beverley Hills, 1977. s. Cotgrove, Catastrophe R. Routley, 'Roles and limits of paradigms action', in Elliot and Qlre, 260-293. R. Elliot and A. Gare, Environmental Philosophy. Readings, University of Queensland Press, 1983. or- aae Cornucopia, Wiley, 17 ~~J~rh , of 1982. in environmental thought A Collection and of �Job No. ................................................................................. . 7/J>/JVh SOCPAC PRINTERY Received ........................................................................... REQUEST FOR PRINTING 05471 No Research Schools of Social Sciences & Pacific Studies (/. I L tJC,;c_ )1 -1 Department ............................................................................................................................................ . rl Person Requiring Work ......... ?. 1-......... e.. . .<..t ... ./.. . . . ':l.............................. 5. . . .... . . . . ... ..... .... . . .... . . .. . .. . . .. . ... ... .. c c School ............................................................................................................................................................. . 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Please print name of Requisitioner here - .................................................. Signature ..................................................................................................................................... (REQUISITIONER/ DEPT: SECRETARY) NOTE: If papers submitted tor offset printing/photocopying contain copyright material other than Australian National University copyright Form COP-1 must accompany this request In lieu of the Declaration as above. �r r" WORKING DRAFT ·. , ' I · CULTURE, PHILOSOPHY, AND APPROACHES TO THE NATURAL ENVIRONMENT - AN AUSTRALIAN PERSPECTIVE Many of you know tha~ Canberra was originally Griffin. This talk is (, ,~ ,/ h (: (tJ m, , . designed by Walter Burley 'i.C to him. You may not know that Griffin, an dedicated / 1,• <, , ' ' ! I ·,/ .• r : , J,,--.T~- l, c :.... American who migrated to Australia in 1913, was not simply an architect and ,1 lantlscape designe ~ but one of Australia's early deeper ecologists. key elements of the Western industrial paradigm, especially on making nature the servant of man', 'land to be accorded the 'concentration and discerned instead elements of a different 'consciousness' (the word is his). took the He rejected His approach was holistic, and respect he due to a highly developed and perfected living organism not to be exterminated or treated as dead material, or as a mere section of a map'. Canberra, now no mere section of map, is still, ,.,i/f . ,:i:. for all its deficiencies, perhaps the best approximation anywhere ~~l-0gical city; * to * * * * * gauge the extent to which Australian contrasted with American culture, contains developable will underpin a under which many suffers. -,/ /h ,1 ;1 ~11._r talk sketches a culture, especially as elements (seeds) which different political framework from the bastardised capitalism people presently labour and local environment frequently It is not necessary to see the present political arrangements and the political course interested aeeper *3 The objective of the larger investigation, of which this is a but it is not only removed from Griffin's original conception but far from deep ecological ideals. part, to in charted as environmentally alternative structures: f) ' r ,nt 1 or socially disastrous to be it is enough, for example, to view them t__ ri __f. _________ ---1 n__ {- ,-; ,:_... --1 (. "'I n,l ._ 1 ,. (•✓ L / ~• • } ' <: l7' 1 •-rt,,,_ c, , /---5-0-J. i +- I~.,, )• I �as far from satisfactory, or very far from worlds, those of the best attainable to be interested in the prospects of turning things around somewhat, to increasing ecological resistance [negative action] against vandalism and the environment hope, damage, like, and ecological construction [direct positive action]. There are several distinctive features of Australian culture that for of especially the give grounds remarkable level of environmental activism that has somehow emerged among the people. It is worth trying to pull together some of these features of the culture, to look at ways of furthering the valuable parts, and increasing the level of concern and activism. Without doubt attitudes and different practices, cultures towards have the different environment. approaches, 1 different Indeed appreciation of, practices towards, and respect for the natural environment are highly culturally dependent: compare, for nonimperial cultures had much less North, exploitation and American Jews and American Indians. whose approaches to practices not vandalism the environment merely permit those of the environmental gross control" of their local typically under the missionary, colonial or imperial domination. But occasionally, notably retained than but to a marked extent depend upon such practices. Mostly these more benign cultures have however "lost environments, Most and where they still survive uncorrupted still have - exploitative industrial instance, sufficient in autonomy the to adjacent Pacific, regional cultures 2 have slow or even halt environmental destruction. Thus, for example, rainforest damaging projects have been delayed or blocked in Melanesia largely through Melanesian attitudes to the land. One important way then to try to slow environmental degradation, especially in the South, is to foster both certain sweepingly, regional cultural autonomy; socialism and indigenous for cultural instance land rights movements. 2 differences to support and, more Melanesian For, where the cultures have �not been excessively corrupted by Northern influences, this is rapid way of paradigms. in the a cultural differences can also serve Antipodes, in particular in Australia, to at least assist in transition to different Such comparatively activating alternative paradigms to the dominant Northern social The question arises whether elsewhere a less environmentally exploitative social paradigms. transition is unlikely to occur unless it is based on the culture. Can features of the culture and the social life be used to foster and make requisite differences? In the case of Australia, a basis culture, is there both in the land and and things appear sufficiently different from those in the cultures of the industrialised North to allow (some hope) for cultural differentiation . the need for change, at least there is, in It is becoming platitudinous the longer run not much prospect for the integrity of many local natural environments and ecosystems loose Of if the natural environment is to retain some semblance of integrity, there is little doubt. that 3 unless we in the Antipodes break from the damaging cultural assumptions and practice of the industrialised North and work destructive towards establishment of a concern in different less some parts, rising tide war. of For despite environmental the industrialised North still appears in the grip of established forces and unlikely to budge in time - short of nuclear environmentally culture, towards a certain regional cultural autonomy. elements of regionalism in the North, despite a disaster, such largely alone. Nor is the Australia because as well as the location, the as Though we who seek change can count on some support from minority movements in the North, nonetheless if we are to achieve changes, we must go advantage of the ground and its southern seeds of cultural difference are already there and growing. cultivation. Such a it task of paradigm transition entirely hopeless in like most new and more fragile developments they need attention and speedy the careful But if task is rendered urgent also by other matters of 3 �environmental and human concern, not just the gathering signs but colossal biological losses through of nuclear rapid destruction of, e.g. war, tropical rainforests, indeed mounting evidence of environmental decline almost everywhere humans now establish. How does philosophy fit into the strategy of harnessing regional culture to alter approaches to the environment? As in the title of the talk it operates in the middle, not as an idle middleman, but more like and design culture. principles A working picture that the main components of the discussion together - a picture that also like most images of the more abstract distorts across organising of the dynamic linkage in a good suspension bridge, which lifts the environmental way on the ropes of regional links the is that of a suspension the gap often separating people from the natural environment. bridge There are people, and the environment, and approaches by bridges to the environment, like so:- approach ➔ People Natural Environment (Of course people may be part of the natural environment: the picture doesn't exclude that important overlap.) The connecting bridges may be of very different sorts, ranging from rustic bridges good for careful foot traffic, through the monumental suspension bridge at Middle Harbour, to modern high-tech bridges able to carry nuclear tanks and bulldozers over large spans. of But it is the structure all these types of bridges carrying the approaches that matter particularly. The spans are carried by the ropes of culture, and the pylons of culture if 4 you �will. \ \ \ \ ) (......._ APPROACH _ .,__ _. So with approaches. different '-- --------- ---~ cultures, __,.;::;f --- different carrying bridges different It is better to see the link component in the middle - philosophy, but it might almost as well be sociology - not as part of the nuts and bolts and rivets of the structures. types, bridges, but rather It has its analytical computing the loads and as parts, the design looking stresses at on them; and engineering of the the components, and it also has its more holistic elements, considering the bridges themselves and of them their - the social paradigms embedded in the cultures. select substructures Philosophy, the link subject, is then the architecture and engineering of the business. Less figuratively, assumptions of a philosophy replacement, or marxist philosophies. deep ecology, asks deeper assumptions of all and and assumptions paradigms. the operative for example of free Philosophy, especially metaphysics and not deeper questions, extracting the fundamental other subjects and assembling the intellectual assumptions embodied in a culture or social way of life, i.e. social assembles culture applied in environmental practices, the assumptions, that is, to be considered for enterprise isolates In what are sometimes called the this respect philosophy - which includes much more than conceptual analysis - is first among the intellectual subjects, as logic, the science of reasoning, is the first among the sciences, investigating the form of arguments and methodology of all other sciences. philosophical investigation extracts, 5 The deeper assumptions such when put together yield a philosophy in �the more popular sense (as e.g. enterprise philosophy): in philosophy of life or again the free in any case the result will be a philosophical theory or the rudiments of a philosophical paradigm, depending on how it is done. By largely philosophical investigation then, assumptions of the techniques we try contrasted base. with operative to test apparent we trace and Northern social paradigms; the adequacy social of the organise the and by sociological assemblage, especially as alternatives with some environmental support So much has already been accomplished, in a rough and ready way, and some results are illustrated in diagram 1. Details of other positions, the old culture (as positions typically offer environmental a projected), transition alternative. are from And and new left and the counter included in the diagram because these the while the dominant it may Western appear paradigm to indeed is - a long political way from the dominant paradigm to the environmental alternative, of the intermediate taken one at a time. details steps is not so great; To illustrate the way transitions can of the first line (row) in macro-economic form. construed as representing package typically includes environment, so the in components be made, consider The dominant objective such as GDP, a rough way standard of living. minimal to quality of life this But the and and pollution, and perhaps with additions for non-material features excluded in dominant consciousness. this way we arrive at New Left thinking with the objective to considerable reservations, X(RR). of material goes back to Greek philosophy; 6 In growth The real break however comes with members of the counterculture, the Hippies and Yippies for example, idea the objective function to be maximized gets much complicated, with subtractions for externalities such as noise subject each and the steps can, and have, been is to maximize some economic package of goods and services being the though the namely, the abandonment of growth and �maximization objectives altogether, for less material nonmaximizing the macroeconomic steady-state objective or will level, for economy, something economists have so far sketched. which Daly for At the idea gets partially represented by the goal of a sustainable be goals. example though the alternative environmental much less inflexible and nationalistic than In fact the ''emerging steady-state advocates, paradigm", affords only a shallow alternative to the dominant paradigm, differing only as to growth and reserves But themes. a fuller diagram of paradigms would include - among others such advanced corporate capitalism the higher-dimensional steady position; state it would involve However, the higher dimensional how a better argued transition can be made; diagram essentially by combining steady-state arguments against macroeconomic growth and stocks assumptions the Left-socialist combination, which framework would a diagram, and remove the convenient oversimplification of the two dimensional left-right transition. indicates so case does not against microeconomic themes. touch human relations, a with Even so, even with the narrower anthropocentric have been left behind, deeper environmental concern would have only began to enter. Reaching behind the dominant Western paradigm so outlined to the underlying social model takes us towards the following familiar picture: society consists of a set of individual humans of decidedly impoverished type, e.g. they are not genuinely interrelated, so they are isolated, and, though they are the only sort of items that have intensional (mental) features, they have (e.g. a certain ability to calculate). but few of these At bottom, these individuals have utilities, reflecting preferences or self-interests, which they aim to maximize; and so they are competitive (by virtue of scarcity). that they are possessive, and possess capital. The distinctive the feature means of Their other feature is production, e.g. land, of the American model is of course is that individuals can separately accumulate the means of production. 7 To ensure their �T/\HLI 1. rnr·Al INCi SUC l/\L 1'/IRi\UIC,MS <lNVIRUNMINli\LLY-ORILiilrlJ REl'RESUH/\TION) "··· RIGllf - LEFT POLI T!Ci\L OHIUH/\l 10,J uo•;1NAtll m ~[STERN P/\RAD!GM LORE TII EM[ S Mr.TERIAL (ECONOMI C) GROWTH LJOMI NAN CE OVER NATURE NATUR,\L ENVIR ONM ENT A RESOURCE DOM! N/\N l ISTATE SOCI/\LI ST 1 IOLD INEW I COUNTE.R- I LffT I LEFT I CULTURE I ,X<Rl X 1 ' I X I X X X I ECONOMIC ORG.l\N[S/\T[ON/\L POLIT l CAL FURTHER ENVIRONMENTAL EPISTEMIC/ PHILOSOPHIC MARKET FORCES (MINIMALLY REGULATED, PRODU CT IVITY AN D PROFIT MAXIMIZING) PREDOMINANTLY PRIVATE OWNER SHIP OF PRODUCTIVE MEA NS [NDIVIDUALISTJC/ COMPETITIVE ETHOS EL IT IST/REWARDS FOR APPROVED ACHIEVEMENT CONSUMERISM ENCOURAGED URBAN-INDUSTRIAL co~~ODITYICULTURAL PACKAGING CENTRALISED: URBAN CE:;TRED Lr.RGE-SC ALE: ORDERED (POWER -) HIERARCHICAL HUMAr1 RE LAT I ONS SECONDARY I I y !COMMAND SYSTEM IX<Rl X<R) 1 I X<RR) y y y y y xrnJ ly(QJ X->Y X IX(Ql I I Y I Y I 1X<Q) X(Ql I 1 I I X(Q) 1X<QJ I X I X I X X I I X X<Rl X X X ly(R) NAT IONAL FOCUS; MILITARY DEFENCE X I I X ALTERN ATIVE STRUCTURES (POWER-BROKERS ANO EXPERTS PROMINENT) LAW AND ORDER; LEGAL REGULATION, POLICE BACKED X : X·➔Y I I X ➔Y X<R) X ➔Y I I Y<Q) y Y Y V IHUMAN RELATIONS jPRIMARY IY(Q) X X·->Y y y I y ITRADITIONAL MARKETS WITH IN PUBLIC INTEREST I FRAMEWORK LIMITED OWNERSHIP OF IPRODUCTIVE MEANS !DECENTRAL ISED: I COMMUNAL i 0 1REGIONALINEIGHBOURHOOD FOCUS; SOCIAL (NONIV IOLENT) DEFENCE I PARTICIPATIVE STRUCTURES J(c ITIZEN-WORKER I INVOLVEMENT) 1LIBERAT!O N; SOCIAL I IREGULATION I I X 1X<Rl I y JEARTH SUPPLIES LIMITED X I X y NATURE HOSTILE/NEUTRAL NoNHUMANS ESSENTIALLY ME CHAN l ST IC X X I X I X FAITH IN SCIENCE: HIGH TECHNOLOGICAL PROGRESS SEPARATION OF REASON/ EMOTION, FACT/VALUE, , , , ScIENTIF!C/UT!L!TARIAN RATIONALITY; ANALYTIC REDUCTIONISTIC X :x(R) iNATURE DELICATELY BALANCED 1NATURE BENIGN !OTHER ANIMALS ALSO INTENTIONAL y X IX y X IX I IRATIONALITY I REJECTED y X➔ Y ! 1SMALL-SCALE; FLEXIBLE NoN-(POWER)H!ERARCHJC,\L IHUMAN RELATIONS WITHIN IECO - COMMUN I TY 1 ? I o . ,:, ,u <r 4l1 n 1 lx<Rl AMPLE RESERV~S (OR (SUBSTITUTES) ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROLLABLE I I ''' ' I Y/NON OWNERSHIP I !COLLECTIVE ETHOS/ !SOCIAL PROVISION EGALITARIAN/INCOME NEED IRELATED l(AREFUL USE/RECYCLING , 1Y(ESSENTIAL) LOCAL/SELF-MANAGEMENT !PRODUCT/CULTURE EMPHASIS! X x<R> IDEEP ECOLOGY , orsT[NGU[SIIED 1LE SS MATERIAL GOALS ' (E.G. SE LF-REALISATION) ! lir.RMONY WI TH NATURE ,NATURAL ENVIRONMENT IGREATER VALUE ' VALUED FOR ITSELF ASSUMPTIOrj !REJECTED (FOR I BIOSPEC I ES I IMPARTIALITY) X--"Y I I iALTERN/\TlVE (Y) !ENVIRONMENTAL P/\R.l\D!GM y x<RR) I STATE !OWNERSHIP " I LIMITS TO SCIENCE: !APPROPRIATE TECHNOLOGY JINTEGRATION OF REASON/ EMOTION, FACT/VALUE , , , !HIDER RATIONALITY (OR REJECTION OF NARROWER); IHOLISTIC IV/NATURAL AS TELEOLOGICAL I I �entitlement to this is the initial argument, on this model, for the coercive apparatus of the (minimal) state. natural, this about self-interested Features There is nothing compulsory, or picture. competing Individuals individuals are matter of these nurture, abstract not nature. of the American economic archtype are a matter of culture, a result of training, not human nature, as a comparison where approximating particularly individuals are not like this, individuals embody rationality either: with helps other traditional cultures, Nor do these archtypal show. only a question-begging argument leads to the American model as something naturally required. The transitions to the left already go beyond the American model. introduces certain relations. human chauvinistic (anthropocentric) but they The do left not models omit are social The left still human relations: the further big step to the environmental alternative is to widen these relations to full community relations, independent value. recognising That is a creatures and nonhuman things as of bigger step, a step that no Western political institutions make requisite allowance for, and that mainstream underpinning Western value theories do not accommodate. The arguments from traditional cultures can also be illustrated paradigms cultures such as those and of the models Melanesia that and directed underlie Polynesia, them. many against the In traditional of the operative assumptions of the Northern social paradigms are, very reasonably, not accepted. Where these cultures still prevail with some measure of regional autonomy, there is good prospect of thwarting more environmentally destructive practices. Features of the local culture can be immediately harnessed. But much of the inhabited and there are already New governed and by environmentally less unscathed World peoples of predominantly European stock. distinctive features 8 observable in New World is now Although cultures, �assumptions of the dominant Northern paradigms have hardly been sufficiently questioned, let alone overthrown, especially among the managerial other, or even lesser, features of surprisingly leave There are out cultures significant as artistic and intellectual usually cultural industrial culture, though economically dominated accompanying other conspicuous The incomplete social paradigms outlined do not exhaust features of the accompanying rather to be sure, does affords European culture. This alternatives. a discrepancies. established have an somewhat as that in romanticism and a significant feature of American Indian gives *l but Northern features. This icing. discerned, precarious foothold for an aesthetic approach to the environment, such evidenced So the cultures will have to be invoked if change in approach is to be hastened in this way. cultural features to be considered. classes. But the basis there of the as are aesthetic well more route to important environmental omissions and In particular, the dominant American paradigm omits reference to religion; also neglected are many of the connected older and formerly more prominent values of American culture. The American search for environmentally acceptable alternatives has regularly turned to these omitted features of American culture, and religious or spiritual elements, and associated past values 4 • establish "the gospel of ecology" and displace the dominant paradigm have taken a spiritual route, a quasi-religious way. and Indeed the primary attempts to representative (For example, Nash provides a sample list of the books he considers important in the rise of the new environmentalis m: virtually all that proceed beyond ecology depend on an appeal to religious elements, to divine or sacred features of natural things.) In the context of American culture the appeal something to be said for it. to religious features has For, firstly, a high proportion of the American population profess some active religious commitment; 9 and, unlike Australia, a �substantial proportion do act in accordance with that response. And, secondly, religious values do clash with dominant Northern paradigm. This sort of conflict socially the precepts was approved of perceived, considerable puzzlement, by colonised cultures, as Lini reports in the case the with of Melanesian society (p.9): The fabric of this society, with its inherent communal discipline was torn by the arrival of European commercial practices which carried with it the message of materialism, together with the creed of enlightened self-int-erest. Both aspects were a direct contradiction of Melanesian values and priorities. The introduction to Melanesia of Christianity added a further element of division and confusion in the minds of the people. While the Christian religion was widely compatible with the ethics and principles of Melanesian communalism, with its emphasis on mutuality, compassion and caring for one another, it was a practice that very few of the Europeans appeared to follow. It ran also contrary to the religion of individualism and self-interest, which not just (had) more important exponents, but was followed by the majority of Europeans ••• It is something a a puzzle how the assimilation of elements of the dominant Northern paradigm with prospects of Christianity is pulled off, though achieved it certainly is in a great many Northerners, and too many Antipodeans. a partial answer: compartmentalisation. Religion for most is a separate thing fitted into a Sunday morning box, important elements of which do not upset the standard penetrate deep. business week. escape to Thus for most believers religion does not Only for a minority does it directly such as human poverty: There is touch immediate matters why should we expect it to work for the Environment? Nonetheless widespread real adoption of religious perceptions within the American population, and reflected in the Administration, would presumably alter things. But even if some of the effects of a religious return would beneficial, and to nature domination highly be welcomed, it is also true that some of the effects of a narrow fundamentalism would be highly undesirable. of be were Unless moreover the position abandoned in favour of one of the lesser relig ious traditions the environmental effects would 10 be negative (as Watt testifies). �Religion could be more of a drawback than an asset. with any depth to it appears most unlikely. "the scientific world view". In any case such a reversal Religion in America has lost out to In part it failed deservedly: world view was seriously deficient and it did not account more scientific view could explain. the case for its for much the Consider, for instance, the matter of the existence of God, the fallaciousness of the arguments involved, etc. no virtue in front-end-in. shape. It trying return to the is world view in such great is not just that there is much that this sort of view leaves out or social it is that this perspective, a paradigm, paradigm. So incorporates it is far from uniquely determined. more intellectually satisfactory rivals (e.g. view). There view with these sorts of weaknesses But nor is the so-called scientific cannot account for; dominant to rival a richer intensional the There are scientific These rivals allow for value and wonder in natural things without taking a theological way. There is a second quasi-religious set character of of reasons some sort, for not endeavouring Christian, Jewish, whatever, on deeper environmental approaches in Australia. strongly impose a Pantheistic or These turn on the irreligious character of the culture, where an appeal through religion is unlikely to have much understood as a (the success. first) Australia, post-Christian it has been irreligious character of the understanding much else about the culture, society e.g. said, is 'best society, in which religion (is) barely relevant culturally'. *4 Even if that formulation is an generally to exaggeration the is a fact and is the key to the curious extent of the state's protrusion into Australian social life. If an approach through religion is accordingly ruled out as a main approach to hastened paradigm transition - and a related approach through mysticism or transcendentali sm excluded for analogous reasons and because of 11 the earthiness �of the culture what alternative s are open? There are other significant features of the culture running against major elements of the dominant paradigm, effectively which can perhaps be much applied quasi-relig ious approaches to turn matters around. more Western than To indicate the prospects of applying features of the culture to detach from dominant paradigms, consider how Australian culture contrasts with American. Australian mainstream culture transition from the dominant is already American political left has much stronger support in difficult to some culture. Australia way It along the leftward is not merely that the than USA. It is not indicate features of the Australian cultural situation which show its left-displac ement from the dominant Western paradigm. some elements of the contrast:- 12 The next table lists �TABLE 2. CONTRASTING ELEMENTS IN AUSTRALIAN AND AMERICAN CULTURE SCALE OF INCREASE *2 individualistic ethos inacceptability of socialist institutions inegalitarian attitudes POSITIVE inegalitarian practices ITEMS (PER level of consumerism CAPITA maximization quest WHERE imperialist drive RELEVANT) extent of violence police and military commitment high technology involvement functional rationality environmental inactivism AUSTRALIA USA SCALE OF INCREASE level of urbanisation legal obstacles to environmental action NEGATIVE official opposition to environmental practices, such as dedication of ITEMS wilderness administrative delays in implementing environmental practices, such as pollution requirements, recycling, etc. 13 �Thus there are some offsetting negative items as well as positive items in the in the contrast. Since, however, most of these contrasting elements bear on first diagram of rival paradigms in a way favourable to Australian culture as opposed to American, it appears that prospects indeed better. themes for applying the culture are This important theme requires elaboration and confirmation. The task can profitably be combined with others: there is much work here both for environmental spectators with an empirical bent and for environmental activists. A first task is to separate out what is known, what requires and what ought to be done (ideologically ). and their surrounds, distinguishing firstly theses: A weak confirmation, Let us focus on transition theses, factual and normative transition factual transition thesis, that Western (European) culture is undergoing a transition away from the dominant confirmed by several Northern sociologists (e.g. better results could be obtained in Australia; social Marsh). paradigm, has been Presumably similar or but appropriate samplings of the community have not been done, analysed and so on - environmental sociology being a neglected undoubtedly field also in Australia. Another weak factual transition thesis holds, namely that since 1960 a significant percentage of the each human community in specifiable advanced Western countries such as Australia have come to adopt main assumptions of the alternative environmental paradigm. But again comparative-fig ures sociological work are entirely of data to Though impressionistic tells us that environmental activism is greater in Australia than USA - indeed more intensive than piece lacking. anywhere else, an immensely build upon - we lack solid confirmation. sociogeographer s to do. 14 important There is much for �Throughout, · as you may have noticed, a normative transition thesis has been taken largely for granted, that Australian culture, indeed Western culture generally, ought to be undergoing a major paradigm Western paradigms and their away from dominant variations (such as those of advocated corporate capitalism and of the post-indus trial society), transiting shift, and towards an environmen tal alternative . furthermore ought the arguments. It is also be That complex normative thesis is argued for in environmen tal philosophy, and fortunately there isn't repeat to time to argued against there, but, to sum up the opposition case cavalierly, unconvincin gly. Given then that the transition is going on, indeed emerging are are clear doing environmen tal encourage enough. for it in Australia? example, directing action going be aiming swing major Preliminary against the to organisatio ns. on, answers sources of They should increase their support bases, but not merely by membership They should be endeavourin g to influence the dominant regional culture, for the potential appears to be there for a considerabl y greater change than has thus far been two be despoilatio n and the like, primarily industrial organisatio ns and drives and environmen tal education. and to Not only should activists be continuing with what those supposed to regulate them, further (public) also ought ought then to be going on with greater rapidity, how is it hastened, how do environmen tal activists they and parts to this further practice which achieved. There are can run in tandem, a more negative and a more positive part: • More negatively, it involves cutting down and countering the flow of propaganda in favour of the dominant paradigms both locally but especially from the North. That is important in reversing the extent of Northern co-option. includes gently a range of activities some with solid bases in local culture, such as lopping anti-Americ an It off the tall poppies pedalling and anti-Northe rn activities. 15 the stuff, and careful The latter practices (which should �. . not of course reduce merely to personall y directed antagonism ) fit in well other regional environm ental with aims, such as independe nt and nonaligne d defence policies. • More positivel y, it consists in promoting and adapting other also despised features of alternati ve paradigms . ambassado rs, Australia n It is culture that work directly towards themes of commonly Northern intellect uals Lawrence ). adapted like are, of course, those nonmaxim izing making-do socialist ic ones, of local natural the The features to be egalitari an, along environm ents. with the combines enough: cultural with promoted or anti-auth oritarian , rapidly increasin g Nonmaxim izing, for example, is reflected in the She'll be right and It'll do approach often and and note, that are responsib le for the low repute in which some of the cultural character s are held (e.g. appreciat ion commonly taken to things, egalitari an methods as encapsula ted in Fair go and Enough's consider the effects of these, decently applied, in economics , in local markets. As for mateship, sure it could use widening, a main problem being its restrictio n in practice to extension male relations hips: to communit ies (includin g nonhuman s). is there for deep cultural transform ation: but why not encourage its So, to conclude, the potential we must help to realise it. FOOTNOTES 1. The term 'approach es' is intended to include both theory and both espoused ideology and behaviour . 2. They did not go under because of the weakness of their intellect ual positions . At bottom their religious beliefs, for example, were no more ridiculou s than those of Christian ity. Typically they were much weakened by new diseases, and overwhelm ed by new technolog y often applied in violent fashion. 3. By integrity is meant much more than retaining represent ative samples of this and that system or species; not represent ative southern sassafras , parma wallabies and Torres Strait Islanders , but sufficien tly many. 16 practice, �4. Another past philosophic al basis for environmen tal philosophy, American naturalism, seems to have been little developed, despite the promise some have seen in it. *1 The aesthetic route Highwater. *2 Note well that it is not being claimed that Australian culture is egalitarian (in conformity with a popular myth); only that it is less inegalitari an than American. The hard data underlying the claim--rs assembled in 'Culture and the roots of political divergence '. *3 For Griffin's conception of Canberra - a much smaller Canberra, which included a rail loop - see, to start with, Birrell (still the best source on Griffin). The first quotation from Griffin is quoted in Birrell, p.178; the second is from Griffin's article in Australian Wild Life. *4 P. is well-illust rated by the main approach in O'Farrell. REFERENCES J. Highwater, The Primal Mind. Vision Harper & Row, New York, 1981. J. Birrell, Walter Burley Griffin, Queensland U.P., 1964. W.B. Griffin, -. ) , '\ and ,• Reality in Indian America, Australian Wild Life W. Lini, Keynote Address, Australia and the South Pacific, Proceedings a Conference held at the Australian National University, 1982. P. O'Farrell, 'The cultural ambivalence of Australian religion', in Culture and the State in Australia, Australian Cultural History 1 (1982) Canberra. R. Nash, 'Rounding out the American revolution: ethical extension and the new environmen talism', typescript, University of California at Santa Barbara, 1982. A. Marsh, Protect and Political Consciousne ss, Sage Beverley Hills, 1977. s. Cotgrove, Catastrophe and Cornucopia, Wiley, ,\,'. ~· , ,, R. Routley, 'Roles and limits of paradigms action', in Elliot and Gare, 260-293. R. Elliot and A. Ga:re, Environmen tal Philosophy. Readings, University of Queensland Press, 1983. of c- r- 17 , 1982. in environmen tal A thought Collection and of � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Draft Papers Description An account of the resource Sylvan's literary executor encountered an archive in which “all his projects were current", since manuscripts were undated and unattributed. Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document WORKING DRAFT 1'l}l' T1 1,,i··) CULTURE, PHILOSOPHY, AND APPROACHES TO THE NATURAL ENVIRONMENT - AN AUSTRALIAN PERSPECTIVE Many of you know that Canberra was originally designed by Walter Burley 'lO Griffin. This talk is dedicated to him. You may not know that Griffin, an c111,d l,ee,tJ>,, I! a ,~cJ/2...ru/.1t-l/ '";~1/n,-,l,c1... American who migrated to Australia in 1913, was not simply an architect and A lantlscape designer_, but one of Australia's early deeper ecologists. key elements of the Western industrial paradigm, especially on making nature the servant of man', 'land to be accorded the 'concentration and discerned instead elements of a different 'consciousness' (the word is his). took the He rejected His approach was holistic, and respect he due to a highly developed and perfected living organism not to be exterminated or treated as dead material, or as a mere section of a map'. Canberra, now no mere section of map, is still, for all its deficiencies, perhaps the best approximation anywhere .eco~osic-.w, city; but it is not only removed from Griffin's original conception but far from deep ecological ideals. * * *3 * * * * The objective of the larger investigation, of which this part, is to gauge the extent to which Australian contrasted with American culture, contains developable will underpin a under which many suffers. talk sketches a culture, especially as elements (seeds) which different political framework from the bastardised capitalism people presently labour and local environment frequently It is not necessary to see the present political arrangements and the political course interested to in charted as environmentally alternative structures: socially disastrous to be it is enough, for example, to view them r ,i,v~c~ntL..:f- [.<-ol"l,-" hd<--t r7' <-.~ .::.. P,r~t- f tl. /~J 1 or J I C-IJll·A-r~u... ) ~ tn "S. those as far from satisfactory, or very far from the of best to be interested in the prospects of turning things around somewhat, to worlds, increasing ecological resistance [negative action] against vandalism and like, and ecological construction [direct positive action]. the grounds give remarkable level of environmental activism that has the especially hope, damage, environment There are several distinctive features of Australian culture that for attainable of somehow emerged among the people. It is worth trying to pull together some of these features of the culture, to look at ways of furthering the valuable parts, and increasing the level of concern and activism. the towards practices, and attitudes different approaches, different 1 Indeed appreciation of, environment. have cultures different Without doubt practices towards, and respect for the natural environment are highly culturally dependent: and where they still survive uncorrupted still have - nonimperial cultures had much exploitative less whose North, industrial exploitation approaches to practices not vandalism and the environment merely environmental but to a marked extent depend upon such practices. control" their of local typically under the missionary, colonial or imperial domination. in But occasionally, notably retained the of those than gross permit Mostly these more benign cultures have however "lost environments, Most American Jews and American Indians. instance, for compare, sufficient autonomy the to adjacent Pacific, regional cultures 2 have slow or even halt environmental destruction. Thus, for example, rainforest damaging projects have been delayed or blocked in Melanesia largely through Melanesian attitudes to the land. One important way then to try to slow environmental degradation, especially in the South, is to foster certain both sweepingly, regional cultural autonomy; socialism and indigenous for cultural instance land rights movements. 2 differences to support and, more Melanesian For, where the cultures have not been excessively corrupted by Northern influences, this is rapid way of paradigms. in the a cultural differences can also serve Antipodes, in particular in Australia, to at least assist in transition to different Such comparatively activating alternative paradigms to the dominant Northern social The question arises whether elsewhere a less environmentally exploitative social paradigms. transition is unlikely to occur unless it is based on the culture. Can features of the culture and the social life be used to foster and make requisite differences? In the case of Australia, a basis culture, is there both in the land and the and things appear sufficiently different from those in the cultures of the industrialised North to allow (some hope) for cultural differentiation. the need for change, at least if the natural environment is to retain some It semblance of integrity, there is little doubt. that there is, in is becoming platitudinous the longer run not much prospect for the integrity of many local natural environments and ecosystems loose Of 3 unless we in the Antipodes break from the damaging cultural assumptions and practice of the industrialised North and work destructive towards establishment of a less in some parts, rising tide war. of For despite environmental the industrialised North still appears in the grip of established forces and unlikely to budge in time - short of nuclear environmentally culture, towards a certain regional cultural autonomy. elements of regionalism in the North, despite a concern different disaster, such Though we who seek change can count on some support from minority movements in the North, nonetheless if we are to achieve changes, we must go largely alone. Nor is the Australia because as well as the location, the advantage of the ground and its southern seeds of cultural difference are already there and growing. cultivation. Such a it task of paradigm transition entirely hopeless in like most new and more fragile developments they need attention and speedy as careful But if task is rendered urgent also by other matters of 3 environmental and human concern, not just the gathering signs but colossal biological losses through of nuclear rapid destruction of, e.g. war, tropical rainforests, indeed mounting evidence of environmental decline almost everywhere humans now establish. How does philosophy fit into the strategy of harnessing regional culture to alter approaches to the environment? As in the title of the talk it operates in the middle, not as an idle middleman, but more like and design culture. principles A working picture that the main components of the discussion together - a picture that also like most images of the more abstract distorts across organising of the dynamic linkage in a good suspension bridge, which lifts the environmental way on the ropes of regional links the is that of a suspension the gap often separating people from the natural environment. bridge There are people, and the environment, and approaches by bridges to the environment, like so:- approach ➔ Natural Environment People (Of course people may be part of the natural environment: the picture doesn't exclude that important overlap.) The connecting bridges may be of very different sorts, ranging from rustic bridges good for careful foot traffic, through the monumental suspension bridge at Middle Harbour, to modern high-tech bridges able to carry nuclear tanks and bulldozers over large spans. of But it is the structure all these types of bridges carrying the approaches that matter particularly. The spans are carried by the ropes of culture, and the pylons of culture if 4 you will. ~ {dC"' CULTURE l (--.__ APPROACH ~ ____,___.- ·'--- So with approaches. different ------- ----- - cultures, different carrying bridges different It is better to see the link component in the middle - philosophy, but it might almost as well be sociology - not as part of the nuts and bolts and rivets of the structures. types, bridges, but rather It has its analytical computing the loads and as parts, the design looking stresses at on them; and engineering of the the components, and it also has its more holistic elements, considering the bridges themselves and of them their - the social paradigms embedded in the cultures. select substructures Philosophy, the link subject, is then the architecture and engineering of the business. Less figuratively, assumptions of a philosophy replacement, or marxist philosophies. deep ecology, asks deeper assumptions of all and and assumptions paradigms. the operative for example of free Philosophy, especially metaphysics and not deeper questions, extracting the fundamental other subjects and assembling the intellectual assumptions embodied in a culture or social way of life, i.e. social assembles culture applied in environmental practices, the assumptions, that is, to be considered for enterprise isolates In what are sometimes called the this respect philosophy - which includes much more than conceptual analysis - is first among the intellectual subjects, as logic, the science of reasoning, is the first among the sciences, investigating the form of arguments and methodology of all other sciences. philosophical investigation extracts, 5 The deeper assumptions such when put together yield a philosophy in the more popular sense (as e.g. enterprise philosophy): in philosophy of life or again the free in any case the result will be a philosophical theory or the rudiments of a philosophical paradigm, depending on how it is done. By largely philosophical investigation then, assumptions of the techniques we try contrasted base. with operative to test apparent we trace and Northern social paradigms; the adequacy social of the organise the and by sociological assemblage, especially as alternatives with some environmental support So much has already been accomplished, in a rough and ready way, and some results are illustrated in diagram 1. Details of other positions, the old culture (as positions typically offer environmental a projected), transition alternative. are from And and new left and the counter included in the diagram because these the while the dominant it may Western appear paradigm to indeed is - a long political way from the dominant paradigm to the environmental alternative, of the intermediate taken one at a time. details steps is not so great; To illustrate the way transitions can of the first line (row) in macro-economic form. construed as representing package typically includes environment, so the in components each and the steps can, and have, been be made, consider The dominant objective is to maximize some economic package of goods and services being such as GDP, a rough way standard of living. minimal to quality of life this But the and and pollution, and perhaps with additions for non-material features excluded in dominant consciousness. this way we arrive at New Left thinking with the objective to considerable reservations, X(RR). of material goes back to Greek philosophy; 6 In growth The real break however comes with members of the counterculture, the Hippies and Yippies for example, idea the objective function to be maximized gets much complicated, with subtractions for externalities such as noise subject the though the namely, the abandonment of growth and maximization objectives altogether, for less material nonmaximizing the macroeconomic steady-state objective or will level, for economy, something economists have so far sketched. which Daly for At the idea gets partially represented by the goal of a sustainable be goals. example though the alternative environmental much less inflexible and nationalistic than In fact the "emerging steady-state advocates, paradigm", affords only a shallow alternative to the dominant paradigm, differing only as to growth and reserves themes. But a fuller diagram of paradigms would include - among others such advanced corporate capitalism the higher-dimensional steady state position; involve would However, the higher dimensional how a better argued transition can be made; diagram essentially by combining steady-state arguments against macroeconomic growth and stocks assumptions the Left-socialist combination, which framework would a diagram, and remove the convenient ~simplification of the two dimensional left-right transition. indicates it so case does not against microeconomic themes. touch human relations, a with Even so, even with the narrower anthropocentric have been left behind, deeper environmental concern would have only began to enter. Reaching behind the dominant Western paradigm so outlined to the underlying social model takes us towards the following familiar picture: society consists of a set of individual humans of decidedly impoverished type, e.g. they are not genuinely interrelated, so they are isolated, and, though they are the only sort of items that have intensional (mental) features, they have (e.g. a certain ability to calculate). but few of these At bottom, these individuals have utilities, reflecting preferences or self-interests, which they aim to maximize; and so they are competitive (by virtue of scarcity). that they are possessive, and possess capital. The distinctive the feature means of Their other feature is production, e.g. land, of the American model is of course is that individuals can separately accumulate the means of production. 7 To ensure their rABLI J. COMPLll NG SOC IAL l'ARAD IGMS <ENVIRONMENTALLY - OR I [ifl [D REPRESEIITAT IONJ .... RIGHT - LEFT POLITICAL ORIENTAT!Otl DOMINANT (XJ WESTERN PARADIGM CORE THEMES ECONOMIC ORGANISATIONAL POLITICAL FURTHER ENVIRONMENTAL MATERIAL (ECONOMIC) GROWTH DOMINANCE OVER NATURE NATURAL ENVIRONMENT A RESOURCE MARKET FORCES (MINIMALLY REGULATED, PRODUCTIVITY AND PROFIT MAXIMIZING) PREDOMINANTLY PRIVATE OWNERSHIP OF PRODUCTIVE MEANS I ND IV I DUALI ST I c/ COMPETITIVE ETHOS ELITIST/REWARDS FOR APPROVED ACHIEVEMENT CONSUMERISM ENCOURAGED URBAN-INDUSTRIAL COMMODITY/CULTURAL PACKAGING CENTRALISED : URBAN CENTRED LARGE-SCALE: ORDERED (POWER-) HIERARCHICAL HUMAN RELATIONS SECONDARY /OLD 1LEFT /NEW LEFT 1 I X 1X<R) X X I X IX 1X<RRl I y IX<R) I X ➔ Y 1X<Rl I X(RR) !COMMAND SYSTEM I I I I y y I y :X(Q) I y I X I X(Q) I X I X xrn> 1 IX :x-v I X X<R) I X-'>Y NATIONAL FOCUS; MILITARY DEFENCE X I I X ALTERNATIVE STRUCTURES (POWER-BROKERS AND EXPERTS PROMINENT) LAW AND ORDER; LEGAL REGULATION, POLICE BACKED X X 1X<Q> IX(Q) i X I ly(R) FAITH IN SCIENCE: HIGH TECHNOLOGICAL PROGRESS SEPARATION OF REASON/ EMOTION, FACT/VALUE, SCIENTIFIC/UTILITARIAN RATIONALITY; ANALYTIC REDUCTIONISTIC y ly(Q) I AMPLE RESERV~S (OR (SUBSTITUTES) [NVIRONMENTAL CONTROLLABLE! y IXCQ) I X->Y I I Y<Q> I y I I v Y X<R) y /HUMAN RELATIONS !PRIMARY 'v<Q> I X X·->Y y y 'xrn> 'x<R> y X I 1X<R) X I X X X I X IX X :x<R> y X I X y X I X I RATIONALITY I I I /REJECTED I IDEEP ECOLOGY 1DISTINGU!Sfl[D I I !GREATER VALUE ASSUMPTIOt-j /REJECTED (FOR BIOSPECIES /IMPART I ALI TY) /TRADITIONAL MARKETS WITHIN PUBLIC INTEREST / FRAMEWORK LIMITED OWNERSHIP OF / PRODUCTIVE MEANS jDECENTRALISED: I I I Y/NON OWNERSHIP COMMUNAL I I /SMALL-SCALE; FLEXIBLE NON-(POWER)HIERARCHJCAL /HUMAN RELATIONS WITHIN / ECO-COMMUN I TY REGIONAL/NEIGHBOURHOOD I FOCUS; SOCIAL (NON- /VIOLENT) DEFENCE / PARTICIPATIVE STRUCTURES l(cJTIZEN-WORKER I INVOLVEMENT) /LIBERATION; SOCIAL /REGULATION /EARTH SUPPLIES LIMITED y /NATURE DELICATELY BALANCED 1NATURE BENIGN /OTHER ANIMALS ALSO INTENTIONAL X➔Y I /COLLECTIVE ETHOS/ ,soCJAL PROVISION EGALITARIAN/INCOME NEED I RELATED / CAREFUL USE/RECYCLING ' /Y(ES SENT IAL) LOCALIS~LF-MANAGEMENT /PRODUCT/CULTURE EMPHASIS/ y y ? !ALTERNATIVE (Y) ENVIRONMENTAL PAR.4DIGM 1 / LE SS MATERIAL GOALS (E,G, SELF- REALISATION) /HARMON Y WITH NATURE /NATURAL ENVIRONMENT VALUED FOR ITSELF I y I y I I ICOUNTER 1CULTURE I I I STATE lowNERSHIP X X X NATURE HOSTILE/NEUTRAL NONHUMANS ESSENTIALLY ME CHAN I ST! C EPISTEMIC/ PHILOSOPHIC DOMINANT ISTATE I SOCIALIST ... I LIMITS TO SCIENCE: IAPPROPRIATE TECHNOLOGY ! INTEGRATION OF REASON/ EMOTION, FACT/VALUE , , , I~/J DER RATIONALITY (OR) REJECTION OF NARROWER; /HOLi ST IC IV /NATURAL AS TELEOLOGICAL I I ..• • I entitlement to this is the initial argument, on this model, for the coercive apparatus of the (minimal) state. natural, this about self-interested Features There is nothing compulsory, or Individuals picture. competing individuals are matter of these nurture, abstract not nature. of the American economic archtype are a matter of culture, a result of training, not human nature, as a comparison where approximating particularly individuals are not like this, individuals embody rationality either: with helps other traditional show. cultures, Nor do these archtypal only a question-begging argument leads to the American model as something naturally required. The transitions to the left already go beyond the American model. certain introduces human The relations. chauvinistic (anthropocentric) but they do left not models omit are social The left still human relations: the further big step to the environmental alternative is to widen these relations to full community relations, independent value. recognising That is a creatures and nonhuman things as of bigger step, a step that no Western political institutions make requisite allowance for, and that mainstream underpinning Western value theories do not accommodate. The arguments from traditional cultures can also be illustrated paradigms and cultures such as those the of models Melanesia that and directed underlie Polynesia, them. many of against the In traditional the operative assumptions of the Northern social paradigms are, very reasonably, not accepted. Where these cultures still prevail with some measure of regional autonomy, there is good prospect of thwarting more environmentally destructive practices. Features of the local culture can be immediately harnessed. But much of the inhabited and there are already New governed and by environmentally less unscathed World peoples of predominantly European stock. distinctive features 8 observable in New World is now Although cultures, assumptions of the dominant Northern paradigms have hardly been sufficiently questioned, let alone overthrown, especially among the manag~rial other, or even lesser, features of surprisingly leave out There are cultures significant as artistic and intellectual usually cultural industrial culture, though economically dominated accompanying other conspicuous The incomplete social paradigms outlined do not exhaust features of the accompanying rather to be icing. discerned, features. sure, This does affords European culture. This alternatives. a discrepancies. established have an somewhat as that in romanticism and a significant feature of American Indian gives *l but Northern precarious foothold for an aesthetic approach to the environment, such evidenced So the cultures will have to be invoked if change in approach is to be hastened in this way. cultural features to be considered. classes. But the basis there of are the as aesthetic well more route to important environmental omissions and In particular, the dominant American paradigm omits reference to religion; also neglected are many of the connected older and formerly more prominent values of American culture. The American search for environmentally acceptable alternatives has regularly turned to these omitted features of American culture, and religious or spiritual elements, and associated past values 4 • establish "the gospel of ecology" and displace the dominant paradigm have taken a spiritual route, a quasi-religious way. and Indeed the primary attempts to representative new environmentalism: (For example, Nash provides a sample list of the books he considers important in the rise of the virtually all that proceed beyond ecology depend on an appeal to religious elements, to divine or sacred features of natural things.) In the context of American culture the appeal something to be said for it. to religious features has For, firstly, a high proportion of the American population profess some active religious commitment; • 9 and, unlike Australia, a substantial do proportion act response. And, secondly, religious values do clash with dominant Northern paradigm. This sort of socially that with accordance in conflict precepts the was approved of perceived, considerable puzzlement, by colonised cultures, as Lini reports in the case the with of Melanesian society (p.9): The fabric of this society, with its inherent communal discipline was torn by the arrival of European commercial practices which ••• carried with it the message of materialism, together with the creed of Both aspects were a direct contradiction enlightened self-interest. of Melanesian values and priorities. The introduction to Melanesia of Christianity added a further element of division and confusion in the While the Christian religion was widely minds of the people. compatible with the ethics and principles of Melanesian communalism, with its emphasis on mutuality, compassion and caring for one another, it was a practice that very few of the Europeans appeared to follow. and individualism of religion It ran also contrary to the self-interest, which not just (had) more important exponents, but was followed by the majority of Europeans ••• It is something a a puzzle how the assimilation of elements of the dominant paradigm with prospects of Christianity is pulled off, though achieved Northern There is it certainly is in a great many Northerners, and too many Antipodeans. a compartmentalisation. partial answer: Religion for most is a separate thing fitted into a Sunday morning box, important elements of which do not the upset standard penetrate deep. business to Thus for most believers religion does not week. Only for a minority does it directly such as human poverty: escape touch immediate matters why should we expect it to work for the Environment? Nonetheless widespread real adoption of religious perceptions within the American population, and reflected in the Administration, would presumably alter things. But even if some of the effects of a religious return would beneficial, and to nature domination highly be welcomed, it is also true that some of the effects of a narrow fundamentalism would be highly undesirable. of be were Unless moreover the position abandoned in favour of one of the lesser religious traditions the environmental effects would 10 be negative (as Watt testifies). Religion could be more of a drawback than an asset. Religion in America has lost out to with any depth to it appears most unlikely. the There existence of God, the fallaciousness of the arguments involved, etc. no But nor is the so-called scientific front-end-in. cannot account for; it is that this perspective, a paradigm, a richer more intellectually satisfactory rivals (e.g. view). such great the incorporates There are it is far from uniquely determined. So paradigm. social dominant in view world is not just that there is much that this sort of view leaves out or It shape. is view with these sorts of weaknesses the to return to trying in virtue rival Consider, for instance, the matter of the view could explain. scientific much for world view was seriously deficient and it did not account more the case for its In part it failed deservedly: view". world scientific "the In any case such a reversal intensional scientific These rivals allow for value and wonder in natural things without taking a theological way. character quasi-religious reasons of set second There is a of some sort, for not endeavouring Christian, strongly These on turn the irreligious character of the culture, where an appeal through religion is unlikely to have much as understood a (the Australia, success. first) post-Christian it has been irreligious character the of understanding much else about the culture, society e.g. 'best is said, society, in which religion (is) barely relevant culturally'. *4 Even if that formulation is an generally a Pantheistic or Jewish, whatever, on deeper environmental approaches in Australia. impose to exaggeration the is a fact and is the key to the curious extent of the state's protrusion into Australian social life. If an approach through religion is accordingly ruled out as a main approach to hastened paradigm transition - and a related approach through mysticism or transcendentalism excluded for analogous reasons and because of 11 the earthiness of the culture - what alternatives are open? There are other significant features of the culture running against major elements of the dominant paradigm, effectively which can perhaps applied be much quasi-religious approaches to turn matters around. more Western than To indicate the prospects of applying features of the culture to detach from dominant paradigms, consider how Australian culture contrasts with American. Australian mainstream culture transition from the dominant is already American political left has much stronger support in difficult to some culture. Australia way It along the leftward is not merely that the than USA. It is not indicate features of the Australian cultural situation which show its left-displacement from the dominant Western paradigm. some elements of the contrast:- 12 The next table lists TABLE 2. CONTRASTING ELEMENTS IN AUSTRALIAN AND AMERICAN CULTURE SCALE OF INCREASE *2 individualistic ethos inacceptability of socialist institutions inegalitarian attitudes POSITIVE inegalitarian practices ITEMS (PER level of consumerism CAPITA maximization quest WHERE imperialist drive RELEVANT) extent of violence police and military commitment high technology involvement functional rationality environmental inactivism USA AUSTRALIA SCALE OF INCREASE level of urbanisation legal obstacles to environmental action NEGATIVE official opposition to environmental practices, such as dedication of ITEMS wilderness administrative delays in implementing environmental practices, such as pollution requirements, recycling, etc. 13 Thus there are some offsetting negative items as well as positive items in the in the contrast. Since, however, most of these contrasting elements bear on first diagram of rival paradigms in a way favourable to Australian culture as opposed to American, it appears that prospects indeed better. themes for applying the culture are This important theme requires elaboration and confirmation. The task can profitably be combined with others: there is much work here both for environmental spectators with an empirical bent and for environmental activists. A first task is to separate out what is known, what requires and what ought to be done (ideologically). and their surrounds, distinguishing firstly theses: A weak confirmation, Let us focus on transition theses, factual and normative transition factual transition thesis, that Western (European) culture is undergoing a transition away from the dominant confirmed by several Northern sociologists (e.g. better results could be obtained in Australia; social Marsh). paradigm, has been Presumably similar or but appropriate samplings of the community have not been done, analysed and so on - environmental sociology being a neglected undoubtedly field also in Another Australia. weak factual transition thesis holds, namely that since 1960 a significant percentage of the each human community in specifiable advanced Western countries such as Australia have come to adopt main assumptions of the alternative environmental paradigm. But again comparative-figures sociological work are entirely of data to Though impressionistic tells us that environmental activism is greater in Australia than USA - indeed more intensive than piece lacking. anywhere else, an immensely build upon - we lack solid confirmation. sociogeographers to do. 14 important There is much for Throughout, as you may have noticed, a normative transition thesis has been taken largely for granted, that Australian culture, indeed Western culture generally, ought to be undergoing a major paradigm Western paradigms and their away from dominant variations (such as those of advocated corporate capitalism and of the post-industrial society), transiting shift, and towards an environmental alternative. furthermore ought the arguments. It is also be That complex normative thesis is argued for in environmental philosophy, and fortunately there isn't repeat to time to argued against there, but, to sum up the opposition case cavalierly, unconvincingly. Given then that the transition is going on, indeed emerging are are clear doing environmental encourage enough. for it in Australia? example, directing action going be aiming swing major Preliminary against the to organisations. on, answers sources of They should increase their support bases, but not merely by membership They should be endeavouring to influence the dominant regional culture, for the potential appears to be there for a considerably greater change than has thus far been two be despoilation and the like, primarily industrial organisations and drives and environmental education. and to Not only should activists be continuing with what those supposed to regulate them, further (public) also ought ought then to be going on with greater rapidity, how is it hastened, how do environmental activists they and parts to this further practice which achieved. There are can run in tandem, a more negative and a more positive part: • More negatively, it involves cutting down and countering the flow of propaganda in favour of the dominant paradigms both locally but especially from the North. That is important in reversing the extent of Northern co-option. includes gently a range of activities some with solid bases in local culture, such as lopping anti-American It off the tall poppies pedalling and anti-Northern activities. 15 the stuff, and careful The latter practices (which should not of course reduce merely to personally directed antagonism) fit in well other regional environmental with aims, such as independent and nonaligned defence policies. • More positively, it consists in promoting and adapting other also despised features of alternative paradigms. ambassadors, Australian It is culture that work directly towards themes of commonly are, of course, those Lawrence). like nonmaximizing making-do socialistic ones, appreciation Northern intellectuals of local natural the The features to be egalitarian, along environments. with the combines enough: cultural with promoted or anti-authoritarian, rapidly increasing Nonmaximizing, for example, is reflected in the She'll be right and It'll do approach often and and note, that are responsible for the low repute in which some of the cultural characters are held (e.g. adapted commonly taken to things, egalitarian methods as encapsulated in Fair go and Enough's consider the effects of these, decently applied, in economics, in local markets. As for mateship, sure it could use widening, a main problem being its restriction in practice to extension male relationships: to communities (including nonhumans). is there for deep cultural transformation: but why not encourage its So, to conclude, the potential we must help to realise it. FOOTNOTES 1. The term 'approaches' is intended to include both theory and both espoused ideology and behaviour. 2. They did not go under because of the weakness of their intellectual positions. At bottom their religious beliefs, for example, were no more ridiculous than those of Christianity. Typically they were much weakened by new diseases, and overwhelmed by new technology often applied in violent fashion. 3. By integrity is meant much more than retaining representative samples of this and that system or species; not representative southern sassafras, parma wallabies and Torres Strait Islanders, but sufficiently many. 16 practice, 4. Another past philosophical basis for environmental philosophy, American naturalism, seems to have been little developed, despite the promise some have seen in it. *1 The aesthetic route Highwater. is well-illustrated by the main approach in *2 Note well that it is not being claimed that Australian culture is egalitarian (in conformity with a popular myth); only that it is less inegalitarian than American. The hard data underlying the claim---ri assembled in 'Culture and the roots of political divergence'. *3 For Griffin's conception of Canberra - a much smaller Canberra, which included a rail loop - see, to start with, Birrell (still the best source on Griffin). The first quotation from Griffin is quoted in Birrell, p.178; the second is from Griffin's article in Australian Wild Life. *4 P. O'Farrell. REFERENCES J. Highwater, The Primal Mind. Vision Harper & Row, New York, 1981. J. Birrell, Walter Burley Griffin, Queensland U.P., 1964. W.B. Griffin, (,0· cc,,/' «.,PL'0"1 d I (on and Reality in Indian America, · __ ,.,.,, ja,n;~, Australian Wild Life J_ (f9Jt-f/), ty ·-J, W. Lini, Keynote Address, Australia and the South Pacific, Proceedings a Conference held at the Australian National University, 1982. P. O'Farrell, 'The cultural ambivalence of Australian religion', in Culture and the State in Australia, Australian Cultural History 1 (1982) Canberra. R. Nash, 'Rounding out the American revolution: ethical extension and the new environmentalism', typescript, University of California at Santa Barbara, 1982. A. Marsh, Protect and Political Consciousness, Sage Beverley Hills, 1977. s. Cotgrove, Catastrophe R. Routley, 'Roles and limits of paradigms action', in Elliot and Qlre, 260-293. R. Elliot and A. Gare, Environmental Philosophy. Readings, University of Queensland Press, 1983. or- aae Cornucopia, Wiley, 17 ~~J~rh , of 1982. in environmental thought A Collection and of Job No. ................................................................................. . 7/J>/JVh SOCPAC PRINTERY Received ........................................................................... REQUEST FOR PRINTING 05471 No Research Schools of Social Sciences & Pacific Studies (/. I L tJC,;c_ )1 -1 Department ............................................................................................................................................ . rl Person Requiring Work ......... ?. 1-......... e.. . .<..t ... ./.. . . . ':l.............................. 5. . . .... . . . . ... ..... .... . . .... . . .. . .. . . .. . ... ... .. c c School ............................................................................................................................................................. . 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Please print name of Requisitioner here - .................................................. Signature ..................................................................................................................................... (REQUISITIONER/ DEPT: SECRETARY) NOTE: If papers submitted tor offset printing/photocopying contain copyright material other than Australian National University copyright Form COP-1 must accompany this request In lieu of the Declaration as above. r r" WORKING DRAFT ·. , ' I · CULTURE, PHILOSOPHY, AND APPROACHES TO THE NATURAL ENVIRONMENT - AN AUSTRALIAN PERSPECTIVE Many of you know tha~ Canberra was originally Griffin. This talk is (, ,~ ,/ h (: (tJ m, , . designed by Walter Burley 'i.C to him. You may not know that Griffin, an dedicated / 1,• <, , ' ' ! I ·,/ .• r : , J,,--.T~- l, c :.... American who migrated to Australia in 1913, was not simply an architect and ,1 lantlscape designe ~ but one of Australia's early deeper ecologists. key elements of the Western industrial paradigm, especially on making nature the servant of man', 'land to be accorded the 'concentration and discerned instead elements of a different 'consciousness' (the word is his). took the He rejected His approach was holistic, and respect he due to a highly developed and perfected living organism not to be exterminated or treated as dead material, or as a mere section of a map'. Canberra, now no mere section of map, is still, ,.,i/f . ,:i:. for all its deficiencies, perhaps the best approximation anywhere ~~l-0gical city; * to * * * * * gauge the extent to which Australian contrasted with American culture, contains developable will underpin a under which many suffers. -,/ /h ,1 ;1 ~11._r talk sketches a culture, especially as elements (seeds) which different political framework from the bastardised capitalism people presently labour and local environment frequently It is not necessary to see the present political arrangements and the political course interested aeeper *3 The objective of the larger investigation, of which this is a but it is not only removed from Griffin's original conception but far from deep ecological ideals. part, to in charted as environmentally alternative structures: f) ' r ,nt 1 or socially disastrous to be it is enough, for example, to view them t__ ri __f. _________ ---1 n__ {- ,-; ,:_... --1 (. "'I n,l ._ 1 ,. (•✓ L / ~• • } ' <: l7' 1 •-rt,,,_ c, , /---5-0-J. i +- I~.,, )• I as far from satisfactory, or very far from worlds, those of the best attainable to be interested in the prospects of turning things around somewhat, to increasing ecological resistance [negative action] against vandalism and the environment hope, damage, like, and ecological construction [direct positive action]. There are several distinctive features of Australian culture that for of especially the give grounds remarkable level of environmental activism that has somehow emerged among the people. It is worth trying to pull together some of these features of the culture, to look at ways of furthering the valuable parts, and increasing the level of concern and activism. Without doubt attitudes and different practices, cultures towards have the different environment. approaches, 1 different Indeed appreciation of, practices towards, and respect for the natural environment are highly culturally dependent: compare, for nonimperial cultures had much less North, exploitation and American Jews and American Indians. whose approaches to practices not vandalism the environment merely permit those of the environmental gross control" of their local typically under the missionary, colonial or imperial domination. But occasionally, notably retained than but to a marked extent depend upon such practices. Mostly these more benign cultures have however "lost environments, Most and where they still survive uncorrupted still have - exploitative industrial instance, sufficient in autonomy the to adjacent Pacific, regional cultures 2 have slow or even halt environmental destruction. Thus, for example, rainforest damaging projects have been delayed or blocked in Melanesia largely through Melanesian attitudes to the land. One important way then to try to slow environmental degradation, especially in the South, is to foster both certain sweepingly, regional cultural autonomy; socialism and indigenous for cultural instance land rights movements. 2 differences to support and, more Melanesian For, where the cultures have not been excessively corrupted by Northern influences, this is rapid way of paradigms. in the a cultural differences can also serve Antipodes, in particular in Australia, to at least assist in transition to different Such comparatively activating alternative paradigms to the dominant Northern social The question arises whether elsewhere a less environmentally exploitative social paradigms. transition is unlikely to occur unless it is based on the culture. Can features of the culture and the social life be used to foster and make requisite differences? In the case of Australia, a basis culture, is there both in the land and and things appear sufficiently different from those in the cultures of the industrialised North to allow (some hope) for cultural differentiation . the need for change, at least there is, in It is becoming platitudinous the longer run not much prospect for the integrity of many local natural environments and ecosystems loose Of if the natural environment is to retain some semblance of integrity, there is little doubt. that 3 unless we in the Antipodes break from the damaging cultural assumptions and practice of the industrialised North and work destructive towards establishment of a concern in different less some parts, rising tide war. of For despite environmental the industrialised North still appears in the grip of established forces and unlikely to budge in time - short of nuclear environmentally culture, towards a certain regional cultural autonomy. elements of regionalism in the North, despite a disaster, such largely alone. Nor is the Australia because as well as the location, the as Though we who seek change can count on some support from minority movements in the North, nonetheless if we are to achieve changes, we must go advantage of the ground and its southern seeds of cultural difference are already there and growing. cultivation. Such a it task of paradigm transition entirely hopeless in like most new and more fragile developments they need attention and speedy the careful But if task is rendered urgent also by other matters of 3 environmental and human concern, not just the gathering signs but colossal biological losses through of nuclear rapid destruction of, e.g. war, tropical rainforests, indeed mounting evidence of environmental decline almost everywhere humans now establish. How does philosophy fit into the strategy of harnessing regional culture to alter approaches to the environment? As in the title of the talk it operates in the middle, not as an idle middleman, but more like and design culture. principles A working picture that the main components of the discussion together - a picture that also like most images of the more abstract distorts across organising of the dynamic linkage in a good suspension bridge, which lifts the environmental way on the ropes of regional links the is that of a suspension the gap often separating people from the natural environment. bridge There are people, and the environment, and approaches by bridges to the environment, like so:- approach ➔ People Natural Environment (Of course people may be part of the natural environment: the picture doesn't exclude that important overlap.) The connecting bridges may be of very different sorts, ranging from rustic bridges good for careful foot traffic, through the monumental suspension bridge at Middle Harbour, to modern high-tech bridges able to carry nuclear tanks and bulldozers over large spans. of But it is the structure all these types of bridges carrying the approaches that matter particularly. The spans are carried by the ropes of culture, and the pylons of culture if 4 you will. \ \ \ \ ) (......._ APPROACH _ .,__ _. So with approaches. different '-- --------- ---~ cultures, __,.;::;f --- different carrying bridges different It is better to see the link component in the middle - philosophy, but it might almost as well be sociology - not as part of the nuts and bolts and rivets of the structures. types, bridges, but rather It has its analytical computing the loads and as parts, the design looking stresses at on them; and engineering of the the components, and it also has its more holistic elements, considering the bridges themselves and of them their - the social paradigms embedded in the cultures. select substructures Philosophy, the link subject, is then the architecture and engineering of the business. Less figuratively, assumptions of a philosophy replacement, or marxist philosophies. deep ecology, asks deeper assumptions of all and and assumptions paradigms. the operative for example of free Philosophy, especially metaphysics and not deeper questions, extracting the fundamental other subjects and assembling the intellectual assumptions embodied in a culture or social way of life, i.e. social assembles culture applied in environmental practices, the assumptions, that is, to be considered for enterprise isolates In what are sometimes called the this respect philosophy - which includes much more than conceptual analysis - is first among the intellectual subjects, as logic, the science of reasoning, is the first among the sciences, investigating the form of arguments and methodology of all other sciences. philosophical investigation extracts, 5 The deeper assumptions such when put together yield a philosophy in the more popular sense (as e.g. enterprise philosophy): in philosophy of life or again the free in any case the result will be a philosophical theory or the rudiments of a philosophical paradigm, depending on how it is done. By largely philosophical investigation then, assumptions of the techniques we try contrasted base. with operative to test apparent we trace and Northern social paradigms; the adequacy social of the organise the and by sociological assemblage, especially as alternatives with some environmental support So much has already been accomplished, in a rough and ready way, and some results are illustrated in diagram 1. Details of other positions, the old culture (as positions typically offer environmental a projected), transition alternative. are from And and new left and the counter included in the diagram because these the while the dominant it may Western appear paradigm to indeed is - a long political way from the dominant paradigm to the environmental alternative, of the intermediate taken one at a time. details steps is not so great; To illustrate the way transitions can of the first line (row) in macro-economic form. construed as representing package typically includes environment, so the in components be made, consider The dominant objective such as GDP, a rough way standard of living. minimal to quality of life this But the and and pollution, and perhaps with additions for non-material features excluded in dominant consciousness. this way we arrive at New Left thinking with the objective to considerable reservations, X(RR). of material goes back to Greek philosophy; 6 In growth The real break however comes with members of the counterculture, the Hippies and Yippies for example, idea the objective function to be maximized gets much complicated, with subtractions for externalities such as noise subject each and the steps can, and have, been is to maximize some economic package of goods and services being the though the namely, the abandonment of growth and maximization objectives altogether, for less material nonmaximizing the macroeconomic steady-state objective or will level, for economy, something economists have so far sketched. which Daly for At the idea gets partially represented by the goal of a sustainable be goals. example though the alternative environmental much less inflexible and nationalistic than In fact the ''emerging steady-state advocates, paradigm", affords only a shallow alternative to the dominant paradigm, differing only as to growth and reserves But themes. a fuller diagram of paradigms would include - among others such advanced corporate capitalism the higher-dimensional steady position; state it would involve However, the higher dimensional how a better argued transition can be made; diagram essentially by combining steady-state arguments against macroeconomic growth and stocks assumptions the Left-socialist combination, which framework would a diagram, and remove the convenient oversimplification of the two dimensional left-right transition. indicates so case does not against microeconomic themes. touch human relations, a with Even so, even with the narrower anthropocentric have been left behind, deeper environmental concern would have only began to enter. Reaching behind the dominant Western paradigm so outlined to the underlying social model takes us towards the following familiar picture: society consists of a set of individual humans of decidedly impoverished type, e.g. they are not genuinely interrelated, so they are isolated, and, though they are the only sort of items that have intensional (mental) features, they have (e.g. a certain ability to calculate). but few of these At bottom, these individuals have utilities, reflecting preferences or self-interests, which they aim to maximize; and so they are competitive (by virtue of scarcity). that they are possessive, and possess capital. The distinctive the feature means of Their other feature is production, e.g. land, of the American model is of course is that individuals can separately accumulate the means of production. 7 To ensure their T/\HLI 1. rnr·Al INCi SUC l/\L 1'/IRi\UIC,MS <lNVIRUNMINli\LLY-ORILiilrlJ REl'RESUH/\TION) "··· RIGllf - LEFT POLI T!Ci\L OHIUH/\l 10,J uo•;1NAtll m ~[STERN P/\RAD!GM LORE TII EM[ S Mr.TERIAL (ECONOMI C) GROWTH LJOMI NAN CE OVER NATURE NATUR,\L ENVIR ONM ENT A RESOURCE DOM! N/\N l ISTATE SOCI/\LI ST 1 IOLD INEW I COUNTE.R- I LffT I LEFT I CULTURE I ,X<Rl X 1 ' I X I X X X I ECONOMIC ORG.l\N[S/\T[ON/\L POLIT l CAL FURTHER ENVIRONMENTAL EPISTEMIC/ PHILOSOPHIC MARKET FORCES (MINIMALLY REGULATED, PRODU CT IVITY AN D PROFIT MAXIMIZING) PREDOMINANTLY PRIVATE OWNER SHIP OF PRODUCTIVE MEA NS [NDIVIDUALISTJC/ COMPETITIVE ETHOS EL IT IST/REWARDS FOR APPROVED ACHIEVEMENT CONSUMERISM ENCOURAGED URBAN-INDUSTRIAL co~~ODITYICULTURAL PACKAGING CENTRALISED: URBAN CE:;TRED Lr.RGE-SC ALE: ORDERED (POWER -) HIERARCHICAL HUMAr1 RE LAT I ONS SECONDARY I I y !COMMAND SYSTEM IX<Rl X<R) 1 I X<RR) y y y y y xrnJ ly(QJ X->Y X IX(Ql I I Y I Y I 1X<Q) X(Ql I 1 I I X(Q) 1X<QJ I X I X I X X I I X X<Rl X X X ly(R) NAT IONAL FOCUS; MILITARY DEFENCE X I I X ALTERN ATIVE STRUCTURES (POWER-BROKERS ANO EXPERTS PROMINENT) LAW AND ORDER; LEGAL REGULATION, POLICE BACKED X : X·➔Y I I X ➔Y X<R) X ➔Y I I Y<Q) y Y Y V IHUMAN RELATIONS jPRIMARY IY(Q) X X·->Y y y I y ITRADITIONAL MARKETS WITH IN PUBLIC INTEREST I FRAMEWORK LIMITED OWNERSHIP OF IPRODUCTIVE MEANS !DECENTRAL ISED: I COMMUNAL i 0 1REGIONALINEIGHBOURHOOD FOCUS; SOCIAL (NONIV IOLENT) DEFENCE I PARTICIPATIVE STRUCTURES J(c ITIZEN-WORKER I INVOLVEMENT) 1LIBERAT!O N; SOCIAL I IREGULATION I I X 1X<Rl I y JEARTH SUPPLIES LIMITED X I X y NATURE HOSTILE/NEUTRAL NoNHUMANS ESSENTIALLY ME CHAN l ST IC X X I X I X FAITH IN SCIENCE: HIGH TECHNOLOGICAL PROGRESS SEPARATION OF REASON/ EMOTION, FACT/VALUE, , , , ScIENTIF!C/UT!L!TARIAN RATIONALITY; ANALYTIC REDUCTIONISTIC X :x(R) iNATURE DELICATELY BALANCED 1NATURE BENIGN !OTHER ANIMALS ALSO INTENTIONAL y X IX y X IX I IRATIONALITY I REJECTED y X➔ Y ! 1SMALL-SCALE; FLEXIBLE NoN-(POWER)H!ERARCHJC,\L IHUMAN RELATIONS WITHIN IECO - COMMUN I TY 1 ? I o . ,:, ,u <r 4l1 n 1 lx<Rl AMPLE RESERV~S (OR (SUBSTITUTES) ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROLLABLE I I ''' ' I Y/NON OWNERSHIP I !COLLECTIVE ETHOS/ !SOCIAL PROVISION EGALITARIAN/INCOME NEED IRELATED l(AREFUL USE/RECYCLING , 1Y(ESSENTIAL) LOCAL/SELF-MANAGEMENT !PRODUCT/CULTURE EMPHASIS! X x<R> IDEEP ECOLOGY , orsT[NGU[SIIED 1LE SS MATERIAL GOALS ' (E.G. SE LF-REALISATION) ! lir.RMONY WI TH NATURE ,NATURAL ENVIRONMENT IGREATER VALUE ' VALUED FOR ITSELF ASSUMPTIOrj !REJECTED (FOR I BIOSPEC I ES I IMPARTIALITY) X--"Y I I iALTERN/\TlVE (Y) !ENVIRONMENTAL P/\R.l\D!GM y x<RR) I STATE !OWNERSHIP " I LIMITS TO SCIENCE: !APPROPRIATE TECHNOLOGY JINTEGRATION OF REASON/ EMOTION, FACT/VALUE , , , !HIDER RATIONALITY (OR REJECTION OF NARROWER); IHOLISTIC IV/NATURAL AS TELEOLOGICAL I I entitlement to this is the initial argument, on this model, for the coercive apparatus of the (minimal) state. natural, this about self-interested Features There is nothing compulsory, or picture. competing Individuals individuals are matter of these nurture, abstract not nature. of the American economic archtype are a matter of culture, a result of training, not human nature, as a comparison where approximating particularly individuals are not like this, individuals embody rationality either: with helps other traditional cultures, Nor do these archtypal show. only a question-begging argument leads to the American model as something naturally required. The transitions to the left already go beyond the American model. introduces certain relations. human chauvinistic (anthropocentric) but they The do left not models omit are social The left still human relations: the further big step to the environmental alternative is to widen these relations to full community relations, independent value. recognising That is a creatures and nonhuman things as of bigger step, a step that no Western political institutions make requisite allowance for, and that mainstream underpinning Western value theories do not accommodate. The arguments from traditional cultures can also be illustrated paradigms cultures such as those and of the models Melanesia that and directed underlie Polynesia, them. many against the In traditional of the operative assumptions of the Northern social paradigms are, very reasonably, not accepted. Where these cultures still prevail with some measure of regional autonomy, there is good prospect of thwarting more environmentally destructive practices. Features of the local culture can be immediately harnessed. But much of the inhabited and there are already New governed and by environmentally less unscathed World peoples of predominantly European stock. distinctive features 8 observable in New World is now Although cultures, assumptions of the dominant Northern paradigms have hardly been sufficiently questioned, let alone overthrown, especially among the managerial other, or even lesser, features of surprisingly leave There are out cultures significant as artistic and intellectual usually cultural industrial culture, though economically dominated accompanying other conspicuous The incomplete social paradigms outlined do not exhaust features of the accompanying rather to be sure, does affords European culture. This alternatives. a discrepancies. established have an somewhat as that in romanticism and a significant feature of American Indian gives *l but Northern features. This icing. discerned, precarious foothold for an aesthetic approach to the environment, such evidenced So the cultures will have to be invoked if change in approach is to be hastened in this way. cultural features to be considered. classes. But the basis there of the as are aesthetic well more route to important environmental omissions and In particular, the dominant American paradigm omits reference to religion; also neglected are many of the connected older and formerly more prominent values of American culture. The American search for environmentally acceptable alternatives has regularly turned to these omitted features of American culture, and religious or spiritual elements, and associated past values 4 • establish "the gospel of ecology" and displace the dominant paradigm have taken a spiritual route, a quasi-religious way. and Indeed the primary attempts to representative (For example, Nash provides a sample list of the books he considers important in the rise of the new environmentalis m: virtually all that proceed beyond ecology depend on an appeal to religious elements, to divine or sacred features of natural things.) In the context of American culture the appeal something to be said for it. to religious features has For, firstly, a high proportion of the American population profess some active religious commitment; 9 and, unlike Australia, a substantial proportion do act in accordance with that response. And, secondly, religious values do clash with dominant Northern paradigm. This sort of conflict socially the precepts was approved of perceived, considerable puzzlement, by colonised cultures, as Lini reports in the case the with of Melanesian society (p.9): The fabric of this society, with its inherent communal discipline was torn by the arrival of European commercial practices which carried with it the message of materialism, together with the creed of enlightened self-int-erest. Both aspects were a direct contradiction of Melanesian values and priorities. The introduction to Melanesia of Christianity added a further element of division and confusion in the minds of the people. While the Christian religion was widely compatible with the ethics and principles of Melanesian communalism, with its emphasis on mutuality, compassion and caring for one another, it was a practice that very few of the Europeans appeared to follow. It ran also contrary to the religion of individualism and self-interest, which not just (had) more important exponents, but was followed by the majority of Europeans ••• It is something a a puzzle how the assimilation of elements of the dominant Northern paradigm with prospects of Christianity is pulled off, though achieved it certainly is in a great many Northerners, and too many Antipodeans. a partial answer: compartmentalisation. Religion for most is a separate thing fitted into a Sunday morning box, important elements of which do not upset the standard penetrate deep. business week. escape to Thus for most believers religion does not Only for a minority does it directly such as human poverty: There is touch immediate matters why should we expect it to work for the Environment? Nonetheless widespread real adoption of religious perceptions within the American population, and reflected in the Administration, would presumably alter things. But even if some of the effects of a religious return would beneficial, and to nature domination highly be welcomed, it is also true that some of the effects of a narrow fundamentalism would be highly undesirable. of be were Unless moreover the position abandoned in favour of one of the lesser relig ious traditions the environmental effects would 10 be negative (as Watt testifies). Religion could be more of a drawback than an asset. with any depth to it appears most unlikely. "the scientific world view". In any case such a reversal Religion in America has lost out to In part it failed deservedly: world view was seriously deficient and it did not account more scientific view could explain. the case for its for much the Consider, for instance, the matter of the existence of God, the fallaciousness of the arguments involved, etc. no virtue in front-end-in. shape. It trying return to the is world view in such great is not just that there is much that this sort of view leaves out or social it is that this perspective, a paradigm, paradigm. So incorporates it is far from uniquely determined. more intellectually satisfactory rivals (e.g. view). There view with these sorts of weaknesses But nor is the so-called scientific cannot account for; dominant to rival a richer intensional the There are scientific These rivals allow for value and wonder in natural things without taking a theological way. There is a second quasi-religious set character of of reasons some sort, for not endeavouring Christian, Jewish, whatever, on deeper environmental approaches in Australia. strongly impose a Pantheistic or These turn on the irreligious character of the culture, where an appeal through religion is unlikely to have much understood as a (the success. first) Australia, post-Christian it has been irreligious character of the understanding much else about the culture, society e.g. said, is 'best society, in which religion (is) barely relevant culturally'. *4 Even if that formulation is an generally to exaggeration the is a fact and is the key to the curious extent of the state's protrusion into Australian social life. If an approach through religion is accordingly ruled out as a main approach to hastened paradigm transition - and a related approach through mysticism or transcendentali sm excluded for analogous reasons and because of 11 the earthiness of the culture what alternative s are open? There are other significant features of the culture running against major elements of the dominant paradigm, effectively which can perhaps be much applied quasi-relig ious approaches to turn matters around. more Western than To indicate the prospects of applying features of the culture to detach from dominant paradigms, consider how Australian culture contrasts with American. Australian mainstream culture transition from the dominant is already American political left has much stronger support in difficult to some culture. Australia way It along the leftward is not merely that the than USA. It is not indicate features of the Australian cultural situation which show its left-displac ement from the dominant Western paradigm. some elements of the contrast:- 12 The next table lists TABLE 2. CONTRASTING ELEMENTS IN AUSTRALIAN AND AMERICAN CULTURE SCALE OF INCREASE *2 individualistic ethos inacceptability of socialist institutions inegalitarian attitudes POSITIVE inegalitarian practices ITEMS (PER level of consumerism CAPITA maximization quest WHERE imperialist drive RELEVANT) extent of violence police and military commitment high technology involvement functional rationality environmental inactivism AUSTRALIA USA SCALE OF INCREASE level of urbanisation legal obstacles to environmental action NEGATIVE official opposition to environmental practices, such as dedication of ITEMS wilderness administrative delays in implementing environmental practices, such as pollution requirements, recycling, etc. 13 Thus there are some offsetting negative items as well as positive items in the in the contrast. Since, however, most of these contrasting elements bear on first diagram of rival paradigms in a way favourable to Australian culture as opposed to American, it appears that prospects indeed better. themes for applying the culture are This important theme requires elaboration and confirmation. The task can profitably be combined with others: there is much work here both for environmental spectators with an empirical bent and for environmental activists. A first task is to separate out what is known, what requires and what ought to be done (ideologically ). and their surrounds, distinguishing firstly theses: A weak confirmation, Let us focus on transition theses, factual and normative transition factual transition thesis, that Western (European) culture is undergoing a transition away from the dominant confirmed by several Northern sociologists (e.g. better results could be obtained in Australia; social Marsh). paradigm, has been Presumably similar or but appropriate samplings of the community have not been done, analysed and so on - environmental sociology being a neglected undoubtedly field also in Australia. Another weak factual transition thesis holds, namely that since 1960 a significant percentage of the each human community in specifiable advanced Western countries such as Australia have come to adopt main assumptions of the alternative environmental paradigm. But again comparative-fig ures sociological work are entirely of data to Though impressionistic tells us that environmental activism is greater in Australia than USA - indeed more intensive than piece lacking. anywhere else, an immensely build upon - we lack solid confirmation. sociogeographer s to do. 14 important There is much for Throughout, · as you may have noticed, a normative transition thesis has been taken largely for granted, that Australian culture, indeed Western culture generally, ought to be undergoing a major paradigm Western paradigms and their away from dominant variations (such as those of advocated corporate capitalism and of the post-indus trial society), transiting shift, and towards an environmen tal alternative . furthermore ought the arguments. It is also be That complex normative thesis is argued for in environmen tal philosophy, and fortunately there isn't repeat to time to argued against there, but, to sum up the opposition case cavalierly, unconvincin gly. Given then that the transition is going on, indeed emerging are are clear doing environmen tal encourage enough. for it in Australia? example, directing action going be aiming swing major Preliminary against the to organisatio ns. on, answers sources of They should increase their support bases, but not merely by membership They should be endeavourin g to influence the dominant regional culture, for the potential appears to be there for a considerabl y greater change than has thus far been two be despoilatio n and the like, primarily industrial organisatio ns and drives and environmen tal education. and to Not only should activists be continuing with what those supposed to regulate them, further (public) also ought ought then to be going on with greater rapidity, how is it hastened, how do environmen tal activists they and parts to this further practice which achieved. There are can run in tandem, a more negative and a more positive part: • More negatively, it involves cutting down and countering the flow of propaganda in favour of the dominant paradigms both locally but especially from the North. That is important in reversing the extent of Northern co-option. includes gently a range of activities some with solid bases in local culture, such as lopping anti-Americ an It off the tall poppies pedalling and anti-Northe rn activities. 15 the stuff, and careful The latter practices (which should . . not of course reduce merely to personall y directed antagonism ) fit in well other regional environm ental with aims, such as independe nt and nonaligne d defence policies. • More positivel y, it consists in promoting and adapting other also despised features of alternati ve paradigms . ambassado rs, Australia n It is culture that work directly towards themes of commonly Northern intellect uals Lawrence ). adapted like are, of course, those nonmaxim izing making-do socialist ic ones, of local natural the The features to be egalitari an, along environm ents. with the combines enough: cultural with promoted or anti-auth oritarian , rapidly increasin g Nonmaxim izing, for example, is reflected in the She'll be right and It'll do approach often and and note, that are responsib le for the low repute in which some of the cultural character s are held (e.g. appreciat ion commonly taken to things, egalitari an methods as encapsula ted in Fair go and Enough's consider the effects of these, decently applied, in economics , in local markets. As for mateship, sure it could use widening, a main problem being its restrictio n in practice to extension male relations hips: to communit ies (includin g nonhuman s). is there for deep cultural transform ation: but why not encourage its So, to conclude, the potential we must help to realise it. FOOTNOTES 1. The term 'approach es' is intended to include both theory and both espoused ideology and behaviour . 2. They did not go under because of the weakness of their intellect ual positions . At bottom their religious beliefs, for example, were no more ridiculou s than those of Christian ity. Typically they were much weakened by new diseases, and overwhelm ed by new technolog y often applied in violent fashion. 3. By integrity is meant much more than retaining represent ative samples of this and that system or species; not represent ative southern sassafras , parma wallabies and Torres Strait Islanders , but sufficien tly many. 16 practice, 4. Another past philosophic al basis for environmen tal philosophy, American naturalism, seems to have been little developed, despite the promise some have seen in it. *1 The aesthetic route Highwater. *2 Note well that it is not being claimed that Australian culture is egalitarian (in conformity with a popular myth); only that it is less inegalitari an than American. The hard data underlying the claim--rs assembled in 'Culture and the roots of political divergence '. *3 For Griffin's conception of Canberra - a much smaller Canberra, which included a rail loop - see, to start with, Birrell (still the best source on Griffin). The first quotation from Griffin is quoted in Birrell, p.178; the second is from Griffin's article in Australian Wild Life. *4 P. is well-illust rated by the main approach in O'Farrell. REFERENCES J. Highwater, The Primal Mind. Vision Harper & Row, New York, 1981. J. Birrell, Walter Burley Griffin, Queensland U.P., 1964. W.B. Griffin, -. ) , '\ and ,• Reality in Indian America, Australian Wild Life W. Lini, Keynote Address, Australia and the South Pacific, Proceedings a Conference held at the Australian National University, 1982. P. O'Farrell, 'The cultural ambivalence of Australian religion', in Culture and the State in Australia, Australian Cultural History 1 (1982) Canberra. R. Nash, 'Rounding out the American revolution: ethical extension and the new environmen talism', typescript, University of California at Santa Barbara, 1982. A. Marsh, Protect and Political Consciousne ss, Sage Beverley Hills, 1977. s. Cotgrove, Catastrophe and Cornucopia, Wiley, ,\,'. ~· , ,, R. Routley, 'Roles and limits of paradigms action', in Elliot and Gare, 260-293. R. Elliot and A. Ga:re, Environmen tal Philosophy. Readings, University of Queensland Press, 1983. of c- r- 17 , 1982. in environmen tal A thought Collection and of  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Box 24, Item 1699: Working draft of Culture, philosophy and approaches to the natural environment - an Australian perspective Subject The topic of the resource Typescript of draft, with emendations and annotation, undated. Includes photocopy of draft. 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Type The nature or genre of the resource Manuscript Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context <a href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:f3f9764">https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:f3f9764</a> Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1983 Coverage The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant Australian National University - Filing Cabinet 1 - Top Drawer Australian National University Office Australian National University Office > Filing Cabinet 1 > Top Drawer Box 24: Files on Articles https://www.antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/1b9f49b772fc52be8bd76afae0dd73a7.pdf a87f09d687c26e038cbebfae6678172f PDF Text Text 13.6.96 GREEN POLITICAL THEORY: a different account Green political theory is divided according to one of our guides1, rather like Gaul according to Caesar, into three parts: —a green theory of value, —a subordinate green theory of agency, and —a green lifestyle program, portrayed as a set of altogether dispensible lifestyle recommendations. While it is the high-handed insistent dismissal of green lifestyles by this guide, Goodin, that has captured the attention of critics and been highlighted, the brash partitioning of green political theory, and the surreptitious dismissal therewith of significant parts of it, should not pass unnoticed. To the contrary, virtually the whole of what political theory is taken to treat comes up for reassessment once green lights are played upon it, certainly under deeper green illumination. That bogus exhaustiveness taken for granted, that all there is to it amounts to value and action, no doubt derives largely from an underlying utilitarianism, according to which other theoretical matters can be subsumed under these.2 In short, partly through dispensing with lifestyle considerations, primarily by virtue of a background utilitarianism operating within a conventional state-setting, Goodin can suppose that green political theory reduces to these two parts: a theory of value and a subordinate theory of agency. Such a reduction is however much too simple, leaving out, as it does, much of ethics of political relevance, as well as a large slab of politics. For example, ethical omissions include the fields of deontology (environmental permissions, prescriptives, directives; environmental justice, rights and so on), of virtue theory, and of accountability. Among political omissions most striking is the absence of any due consideration of institutional and ideological alternatives to what now prevails. Prevailing Western political arrangements—with staged elections, urban bureaucratic control, incremental reformism (often environmentally regressive), and so on—are simply taken for granted. Above all, there is no critique of the state, an increasingly important part of radical green politics. One reason for this gross omission— f radical green theory from what is presented as green political theory—is that Goodin does not question the conventional political assumption that the appropriate objective of green political activity consists in gaining power or influence within established statist arrangements, for example at best through electoral 1 R. Goodin Green Political Theory, Polity Press, Cambridge 1992. This was undoubtedly a book worth criticizing. 2 See the appendix. �2 success enabling control of some of the administrative and executive functions of state (we shall encounter this conventional “political realism^^ again later). However significant strands of green political theory no longer accept this assumption. A related reason, reaching deeper, is that Goodin likewise does not question, as strands of green theory now do, what helps undergird the conventional political assumption and reformist utilitarianism, an Enlightenment ideology with its faith in reason and science, technologically-based progress, overall human goodness and dominance, and so on.3 The bold overstatement of claims, along with misrepresentation as to what green political theory comprises, is symptomatic of much of the book: overstatement and undersubstantiation.4 Virtually all main themes of the book are false, indeed rather patently so once exhibited unadorned, because limited truths are overextended; and they are undersupplied with cogent support. So it is with the green theory of value, which inflates what is a significant factor in green evaluation into the supposed total green theory. So it is with the green package, which is presented as having an absolutely tight integration, which it in fact lacks. And so on, as will appear. Not only are main themes seriously defective; more disappointing, a salvage operation will not yield a lode of green gold. As troubling is the anti-subversive character of the work. Goodin has wheeled another Trojan horse into green territory, a horse bringing a number of anti-green academic warriors armed with anti-green ideas and sentiments, and engaged in and advocating anti-green lifestyles, (as will emerge).5 Of course, 'Green political theory' is a clever title, which is complemented by a politically clever introduction on the crises which are not minimized or marginalised but given considerable weight—all of which suggest that the text might be of much more interest to politically inclined greens than the usual academic fare. But the title does not say how the green theory is to be treated, explained and encouraged, exposed and condemned. Neither really. The text is not written for greens (though the publishers obviously hope they may buy it,6 or be 3 For an exposition and criticism of Enlightenment Ideology, see Sylvan TM. 4 In part because these sorts of deficiencies have not been addressed in reviews of the book, I decided to persevere with this less charitable critique (a tiresome exercise bound to alienate). Regrettably most of the reviews appear to derive from a political science orientation. They trip lightly by philosophical fundamentals, where the book is noticeably weak, and vulnerable. And they tend to be very light on argument. 5 Trojan horses are in extensive use by academics, particularly in green regions. We will encounter a number of these horses. They are evident from sociology to biogeography and climatology, and particularly prominent around economic enslaves. 6 They form part of the intended audience for the book according to accompanying publishers' work and flyers. Indeed the publishers have participated in the deception, supplying a cover featuring a boss of the Green Man from the cloisters of Norwich cathedral, which sends, as they �3 tricked into buying it), but for a cohert of academic colleagues—for colleagues who form part of the prevailing system, of politics-more-or-less-as-usual and so on. Deapite its character, there are several useful and attractive features of Goodin's book, which do make it worthwhile reading for awake greens of theoretical bent (one of these features is an Appendix, putting together succinctly a green political program). It is a smoothly written book, encouraging readers to glide along, glossing over the underlying content and messages, and not grasping the enormity of some of what is presented, for instance even as green gospel. It may be just the style that is attractive (the cut of the book, the easy flow, an appealingly simple structure, and other stylish features), rather than details of the real content. If the book has a weakness from the PR angle, it may lie in its flippancy, and failure to take several green issues seriously, both of which sometimes enter irritatingly and will turn off some committed greens. But, by and large, it is a splendidly packaged work; it is what is packaged and what is pushed on greens that is the trouble. For a book purportedly on green theory, treatment of greens is extraordinary condescending. Not much notice is going to be taken of 'what self-styled greens... happen to believe', 'what positions greens actually do take' (p.vii). (How then does he justify the green attributions he proceeds to make, e.g. 'green theory of value5? Evidently his procedure is methodologically unsound). No, it is 'an attempt to saves greens from themselves5 (p.viii). To rescue them,4to tidy up' their slovenly positions—while throwing away critical features of green approaches, such as green lifestyles—Goodin is particularly concerned that green lifestyles should not be seen as part of a rectified green political package. Green lifestyle recommendations are entirely dispensible (so he and others can look and indeed be green without deffort, without making any green contribution; they are conveniently absolved from any relevant action, or lifestyle adjustment). At one stage Goodin claims that the theory is 'moderately deep'. But elsewhere he has more accurately said that it is a pale green theory, very pale green given the attitude taken to green lifestyles. Green Political Theory it may be called: deeper green political theory, at least, it certainly is not, even genuine green it but dubiously is. However Goodin's aim, he regularly informs us, is once again not 4to describe what positions greens actually do take5. His project is a normative one, aimed instead to show what positions greens should take, given their core concerns... what they have to say given their core values'?. In this attempt he should be seen to remarks, 'precisely the contrary signal concerning the nature of the author's project in there behind the Green Man's work*. 7 P. viii - p.vii, itals added. �4 fail entirely. He is astray not merely on the core concerns of many of them (which concerns are far from uniform), but also in loosely coupled resultant positions. Greens are under no such obligations as Goodin would load them with; they are not boxed in as he would suppose. The approach is not only condescending towards greens; it is a touch arrogant. The aim is said to be 'to show greens how to cast their position in the strongest possible form\8 This will turn out to be not a strong theoretical form, by any means, but merely a strong form pragmatically, given a raft of assumptions about prevailing electoral arrangements, an interests theory of voting and human behaviour, and so on. According to many a green however, thereby made are some of the assumptions that have to be turned around if humanly undesirable features are to be avoided, if social collapse of one sort or another is to be avoided. At the very outset, Goodin does something to offset such concerns, as those concerning limits of growth.9 He rolls out a familiar quasi-inductive argument, beloved of economists, that past predictions of limits have been riotously astray (e.g. Jeavons on coal, Meadows and others in Limits of Growth on tin). Granted some predictions have, those regularly offered as illustrations; though others have not, naturally such examples are not emphasized. Not only is the inductive base for the quasi-inductive argument defective, the argument itself exhibits some flaws. That it has been claimed before and shown wrong is hardly decisive evidence that it will not be right a next time. Recall not only the boy who cried "wolf' too often and was eventually consumed, but also the turkeys who every week approaching Christmas triumphantly announced that everything was proceeding just fine. [Simple enumerative induction is not reliable in such settings.] On this-here green theory of value. Much of Goodin's text, that segment that is not pleasant enough "ecopolitical fiir5 (stock descriptions of ecological problems, green movement and their platforms, and so on), is occupied in one way or another with what he is pleased call to 'a green theory of value', quickly to become 'the green theory of value'. Most of the remainder develops from a complementing 4green theory of action5.10 This green theory of value is pushed in a surprisingly deontological fashion, likely to arouse immediate suspicions: as what greens should adopt and wear, if they know what is good for them. A theory of value is just a theory of the good, so it is engagingly asserted at the outset. Not so, unless the rest of what is considered to belong to value theory (standing, 8 P.viii. 9 See the beginning of the main text p.l. 10 This theory of value is also presented in a much published paper, 'A green theory of value'. As to the definite formulation, the green theory, see many places in the text, e.g. p.87. �5 considerability, worth, rating, and so on) reduces. It does not (and Goodin makes no effort to effect a reduction). It will become plain that Goodin is rather good at presenting topics as what they are not. The practice goes beyond introductory and presentational matters to what is taken to be central, value theory. 'A theory of value is, quite simply, a theory of the good', so we are engagingly informed.11 A theory of value is much more comprehensive than a theory of the good (as a perusal of Austrian value theory will quickly confirm), and does not contract, without extensive and dubious reductions (there is the 'quite simply5), to a theory of the good. Do not anticipate then what is promised: a green theory of value. As it turns out, not only are greens short­ changed on value, they get a very small serve of theory, and again a very pale green offering at that. There are certain peripheral obstacles to this purported green theory of value. In particular, does it even measure up to admittedly lax standards for a theory as to value? As is readily ascertained, the "theory” does not even say what a value is like and is, what kind of object, what identity criteria it satisfies, what postulates it conforms to. Let us call what is presented a pseudo-theory. Perhaps it can be upgraded to a theory, but requisite work is so far lacking. Is this "green pseudo-theory" green? This sort of challenge Goodin is aware of and aims to deflect. Granted the pseudo-theory is admittedly shallow, all politically acceptable theories have to be, he suggests, for instance to seize wide common ground, etc. But this too is astray, because of pluralistic alternatives. According to this green pseudo-theory, not only is naturalness a source of green value, naturalness is the source of value (i.e. goodness). How does Goodin arrive at this identification? By various unsound moves. Most simply, he invalidly concludes, from a consideration of 'naturalness as a source of (green) value', that it is the source of value.12 Such an inference from an indefinite to a definite description is invalid unless uniqueness conditions are independently ensured. Less simply, there is a simplistic derivation of "theories of value" from the three conventional factors of economic production: land (or resources), labour, and capital, each of which is schematically linked to corresponding theories of value. No doubt the land ethic and the labour theory of value just could suggest as much, but it is dubious that anyone much, green or otherwise disposed, would rest content for long with such a “pure" theory, as the factors operate together, not separately. Moreover, the economic “derivations" of these theories should be enough to raise serious green doubts about them. 11 P.19. This claim is also made in several other overlapping Goodin productions. 12 Ibid. p.30. �6 The core theme resulting from the identification is that natural objects are valuable, i.e. good, because they are the result of natural processes and not artificial or human ones. What gives natural objects their value is precisely their naturalness.13 In support of his green theory, Goodin produces a rather nauseating sociological argument, along the following lines: 'humans' have a deeply felt need to find meaning in their lives, i.e. to see their lives as set within a larger context with which they can feel linked. Such a context is provided by nature. In fuller presentation, it is claimed that people want coherence 'between their inner worlds and the external world'; that 'whatever makes people strive for harmony within their own lives would also lead them to strive to lead their lives in harmony with the external world'; and that 'natural processes provide just such a larger context... within which we can set out our own life plans and projects5.14 The argument is entirely shallow, appealing to what some humans want (if they do, not even to what might be good for them); it is utterly instrumental, with nature an instrument for human wants and needs; it is extraordinarily weak, each step being highly contestable; and it does not lead to the intended conclusion, uniqueness of naturalness not being shown. Moreover, for what it is worth, the argument also commits the naturalistic fallacy, purportedly arriving at an identification of value, as what is natural, on the basis of "natural" human wants and needs.15 Observe that this is Goodin's theory as to green theory, an ultimately shallow theory, reached in a shallow economic way, defended in a shallow sociological way, hardly likely to be reflective of deeper green thought. However, it is made to look in some places as if it were some sort of descriptive account; while at other places it appears as a normative account, as if it 13 find quote 14 Ibid p.3& 15 An identification of that Moorean nonnatural feature as natural furthermore. It is worth appending a relevant point from Brennan (pp.805-6): For theorists like Goodin, the status of environmental systems, species and non-human animals appears to be problematic. Although he regards them as proivind a large, independent context within which human life makes sense, it seems that he at the same time regards them as akin to consumer goods, to be displayed, consumed or prozed according to our informed preferences. For those influenced by the resource economists, it can be hard to understand the challenge posed by environmental ethics»>. Once nature is thought of as a resource, a standing reserve, a set of processes and objects that have the potential to satisfy human desires, it is easy to think of it as a nothing more than that. And the challenge posed by any ethic which is properly called 'environmental' is to find a way of articulating the attitude that nature is indeed a great deal more than that. �7 were a very reasonable thing for greens to expouse. But really it is of neither sort; it is neither descriptive of green positions, nor something they should, or would reasonably, adopt; rather it is a theory foisted on greens. It might be pretended that Goodin has offered a "reconstruction”， a rational reconstruction even, of green theory; but such a pretence fails as the construction fails, to meet even basic adequacy conditions, as will appear. As regards descriptive elements, no solid evidence is assembled that most, or even some, greens adopt this green theory, with naturalness as the sole source. Indeed Goodin offers no evidence that any do, and perhaps none of any standing do.16 Furthermore, as but little investigation reveals, there is not a single green "theory" of value, but various different, sometimes competing, positions. Nor could a single essence be satisfactorily distilled from those positions, and even what could be distilled would not resemble Goodin's construction. For some conspicuous green positions, such as ecofeminism or deep ecology, would in no way underwrite naturalness as the source of value, or for that matter a single source of value. More generally, the principles and arguments advanced within green critiques of reductionist science—including that central lesson of ecology, that meaning is to be found in connections, in patterns, in relations—similarly militate against any reductionist grounding of value. Conveniently Goodin appears to absolve us from more detailed fieldwork on green positions. His intention, he boldly announces, is to make it clear to greens and others not what greens in fact think, but what they should think. Indeed he pushes this normative tack to amazing length; only if greens change in the direction he indicates will they be able to make any practical difference to public policies! That rash claim has already been resoundingly falsified. But as regards prescriptive aspects, no intellectually alert greens would adopt Goodin's theory, either. It is not simply because they have other objectives on their agendas, than directly influencing party politics. It is because the theory is seriously defective, and open to evident, damaging objections. So it should not be sought by greens. A central reason why no aware greens should adopt the theory, and why it should be rejected is that it is open to a range of fairly decisive counterexamples. There are many natural items, natural objects or processes, that are not, either on the face of it or after reflection, valuable, as they are or were or where they are. Much that is natural is at least very problematic, some is downright bad. A first class of problematic examples, not involving life in a direct way, 16 It is suggested, by Achtenberg, that McKibben may, but a reading of The End of Nature does not support such a suggestion. As it happens, the situation with McKibben is more than a little curious. For what McKibben want to insist upon—adopting an inadmissibly high redefinition of natural—is that realy nothing is natural any more (hence The End) whence courtesy of Goodin, nothing is valuable any more. But that is not what McKibben wants to say, or says. �8 are those occurrences clustered together as natural disasters, catastrophes, and the like. Included therewith are earthquakes, landslides, soil erosion, meteorite collisions, volcanic eruptions, tidal waves, cyclones, ice ages, and so on. These examples include dramatic and damaging (natural) variations in the natural more stable course of events, variations with climatic or geophysical origins. Consider the devastating Lisbon earthquake of 1775 which so shocked European intellectuals (and was construed by Voltaire as evidence that Gthe natural world is farm from the best of all possible). By contrast, Goodin would be obliged to maintain that it was a good event, because natural (just as good as the new arrival of a passenger pigeon on a splendid autumnal morning) and presumably not at all shocking because of the natural beneficence of the whole disaster. No doubt the problems with global warming, ozone depletion, and so forth, that so exercise Goodin at the outset of his text, are that these are not natural (being induced by human activity which falls outside what is natural, under one conventional ruling); no doubt these would be valuable, and unproblematic, processes were they to proceed naturally without human intervention or assistance. So it was with the volcanic eruptions that demolished the splendid pink and white terraces and laid waste much beautiful New Zealand forest last century; so it was with the earlier ice-age which much reduced the richness of New Zealand flora, eliminating 3 of 4 groups of palms; these were good, even admirable, events. Similar ridiculous outcomes issue when we turn to life (life forms somehow still achieve a privileged role in Goodin, though they are no more natural). Consider the wide range of monsters, cripples, sports, freaks, and so on that natural processes, such as birth, regularly deliver: deformities, malignant mutations, and so on, outcomes that are still generally hidden away, put out of general sight, or quietly removed, at least in the case of more hideous outputs. It is very difficult to see that all these objects are good, even just as good as the most splendid products of nature.17 Roughly Goodin has landed in a similar awkward position to the theist 17 It seems admissible to record that I put several such counterexamples to Goodin well before he undertook final revision of his working typescript. Here is his response on these and connected issues (Goodin, personal communication, numbered and reordered with [1] now proceeding [2]): [1] [2] A somatic organism in a natural environment is a (nonmoral) normative system. Whatever has that much complexity, richness, self-organization, telos has (presumptively) value. I think I still incline to say (despite your chastening) that a sponaneous biological life is always of prima facie value (intrinsic). Though I recognize at once that such value can sometimes be overridden and become in some environmental contexts a new disvalue. And here I just hold in abeyance what the overlay of moral agency with the moral (past biological) life in humans does to the presumption. �9 who announces that all the natural works of God are good, and is then confronted by awful work such as monstrosities or catastrophes. He can try, like the theist, to fall back to some larger valuable setting of which these prima facie nonvaluable components are an integral part; in Goodin's case there is a wider encompassing theory available, namely evolutionary theory (with variation required for natural selection).18 But already this means significant qualification and modification of Goodin's original theory, and shift to a different and so far undeveloped theory. Better to abandon the original theory, given that superior alternatives are on offer namely multiple factor theories, with naturalness one factor in the mix.19 There remain many other lesser difficulties for theories like Goodin's which try to reduce value-making factors to one, such as naturalness (or biological life, richness, or whatever). For naturalness, difficulties arise with pests and weeds, which may be quite natural objects, but objects which are located in the wrong places, notably outside their natural range. No doubt Goodin's theory can be elaborated to take account of such exceptions, but elaborated it needs to be. Other difficulties arise with natural objects which are in natural places, but which are in some way out of balance with their natural environment, for instance through excess numbers, excessive predation (leading to population collapses, etc.). Consider, for example, members of a natural herd of elephants, grown too large for their natural environment, who become destroyers, demolishing significant forests in their range. Again this is natural enough in the circumstances, but the outcomes are certainly not good, nor praiseworthy or the like. The deficiencies of the approach as offering a “theory” of value are accentuated by the specific narrow recipe Goodin tries to impose on greens. In particular, it appears to supply only an on-off qualitative assessment. An item is either good or not according as it is natural, and that [3] I will have to interpet monstrosities, mutation, deformities as struggling life, somehow a necessary part of the process, even though they are in some respects failures. Anyway, more on that some other time. [4] I also hold that (geo) physical nature can sometimes have intrinsic value, so that life, while sufficient for value prima facie, is not necessary for it. A few comments:- Paragraph [1] already points to a more satisfactory, sophisticated theory than greens are saddled with, with a mix of factors (of which naturalness is surely one) yielding presumptive value. Paragraphs [2] and [3] also indicate elements of a more sensitive theory, again at substantial odds with that presented in the book. Paragraph [3] suggest the sort of theological or evolutionary escape discussed in the text below; it does nothing to counter the counterexamples. 18 Also the theist's problems concerning maximization are perhaps reduced in this setting. 19 See e.g. EE or FF. �10 is all. But not all items are of the same value, which is all this allows: valuable because natural. Some, while not being “more natural”，are much more valuable than others. It is well known that comparative assessments, such as bettemess, and likewise quantitative assessments cannot be directly defined in terms of mere quantitative assessments, and it is sufficiently appreciated that a satisfactory axiological theory should account at least for comparative assessments. In this respect too, Goodin's pseudo-theory falls far short of adequacy. On the other side of the qualitative divide, even the best art museums and the best painings within them are not valuable, not good, because not natural. Even if Goodin should say, what his text sometimes suggests, that his green "theory" applies only to natural objects, artifacts are left out, then the theory is at best seriously incomplete. Greens will have some more comprehensive theory of value which covers all items, and integrates a range of assessments of artifacts with natural objects: naturalness will properly disappear as sole criterion, becoming but one factor. It is noteworthy that much of the subsequent development of green political theory in Goodin's text does not depend upon the excessively strong value theory he tries to load upon greens; it does not require—r always, for that matter, use—naturalness as sole criterion. Much of what comes later, all that appears right enough, will "go through" will naturalness as a critical factor. Where appropriate call this the alternate scheme, according to which naturalness is only one critical, but not always decisive, factor in a mix. The alternate scheme is an integral part of that different green account alluded to above. On the touted tightly-integrated Green package, and strong holism. Certain extraordinarily bold claims are advanced, under the banner of 'a unified moral vision5 in the chapter advertised as 4the unity of the green programme\ Notably the green theory of value...[as] elaborated... is what underlies and unifies the entire green political programme .... It is what makes it illogical and inconsistent for other, more established parties to try picking and choosing some bits off that agenda, without accepting all the rest of its demands as well.20 The claims are never established, would not be established by what is suggested, and indeed cannot be satisfactorily established, because the claims do not stand up. The arguments outlined are seriously wanting. Even what is said would make good the claims would not (traces are not enough for "making good^^); but in any case Goodin does not attempt these things, opting to proceed 'more impressionistically *. 20 p.87. The same sort of theme is reiterated (with but minor variations) subsequently, e.g. p.92. Note the ascent from an everyday theory of the good to a unified moral vision. �11 Even impressionistically little works satisfactorily. For 'the green theory of value' of Goodin is not 'uniquely able to account for the coherence of the green public-policy proposals\2122Apart from the critical features, to be considered below, that green proposals do not enjoy the sort of coherence alleged, and that established parties can, and do, pick over green programs selectively, the uniqueness claim, the special position of Goodin's theory, is quietly dropped in the impressionistic "argument". All that is used is the alternate scheme, that a concern for nature informs, directly or indirectly, all the connected 'plants in the green programme'.22 Evidently a variety of concerns for nature can motivate and justify attitudes and procedures regarding pollution, waste, environmental destruction, and so forth. Uniqueness lapses. Worse, the more remote, less directly environmental parts of the green agenda do not fall out eith of Goodin's theory or from the alternate scheme. In a note, Goodin concedes as much; but these (decentralization, grass roots democracy, nonviolence, and much else) derive so he claims, from the subsidiary, but logically separate, green theory of agency.23 Whether they do so derive or not (they do not), they do not derive indirectly from a green theory of value, because of the separation of agency from value. For similar reasons, the "integrated" green programme (outlined in an Appendix) begins to unravel. All that Goodin tries to make out, then only suggestively, is that the alternative scheme helps in explaining certain green attitudes that appear anomalous or otherwise problematic. Even should this exercise succeed (and its success is at best mixed), it would not achieve what is required. Interestingly, the Appendix, 'The Green Political Programme5—far from demonstrating that the narrow green theory of value runs through all green policy, not just the overly 'environmental5 parts—helps in revealing what a patchwork the presented programme is really, a patchwork from which separate patches can be unsewn. A basic problem with the whole approach is this: that there is not a single green program, different green groups have different programms. Witness the many internal disputes, the very public conflicts between social and deep ecology, between animal liberationists and nature greens, between luddites and smart new- age technologists, between spiritual and secular greens, and son. Granted various loose conalitions may be stitched together; but they are various, not unique, and the stitching is very loose, and may easily be undone, for different repackaging. In short, there are many green packages, corresponding to different green theories of value and agency and so on. As there is 21 Ibid p.87. 22 Ibid. p.87. Goodin himself slides back to the indefinite, to a green theory of value, e.g. p.88. 23 Note & p.8& �12 no single green theory, so there is no such tightly unified single package, which is what empirical evidence also seems to show. Moreover, established parties have drawn very selectively upon these sorts of packages, and filched elements selectively. Witness the fate of the early Values party in New Zealand. 'The prima facie wrongness of ... piecemeal borrowing from the greens is easily explicated. It derives straight forwardly from the logic of consistency. It would be simply wrong to embrace a theory of value... for some purposes while shunning it for others. The truth status of value theories just does not flicker on and off like that/2425Embedded therein, in this strong holism, is one basic confusion that pervades the book, a confusion between a theory and what derives from it, between a source and its outputs. Nothing in logic stops selective borrowing from what derives from a program, however tightly integrated. Strong holism is far too strong; it would imply that we cannot adopt, or even toy with, one part of some value theory, or ethical theory on Goodin's account of the matter, without embracing the lot. We cannot accept some on Moore's claims, some of Spinoza's analyses, part of Aristotle without being stuck with the whole. Eclecticism, at least as regards a theory of value, is impossible. Which is absurd, and a reductio thereto of a seriously defective argument. The conclusion has to be that yet another of Goodin's main themes is seriously astray and should be rejected: that 'greens make (radical) demands on an all-or-nothing basis525, that greens 'might reasonably demand that we implement their political program on an all-or-nothing basis5.26 On the misadvertised green theory of agency: green collective organization・ The title 'The Green Theory of Agency5 is something of a misnomer. Most of the chapter consemed (chapter 4) is taken up with what is inaccurately headed 'Principles of green political structures*, which treats not agency but certain elements of macro-political organisation, notably decentralization and policy coordination (itself headed, misleadingly, 'think globally, act locally5). Most of the remainder of the chapter is occupied with what is headed, generally, 'Principles of green political action', but reduces to 'democratic participation5 and 'nonviolence5, and with 'Principles of green party organisation', cut down to 'grassroots democracy5 and 'nrotation in office*, both something of travesties, given the indicated sweep and generality. The theory of "agency" is itself rather a part of a theory of collective action. Virtually nothing on agency in the usual sense of individual action theory enters, except a footnote 24 p.92, partly reiterating the integrated package theme. 25 p.168? [check, locate] 26 Back cover. �13 referring to some work on the topic, and no theory at all of green individual agents (their lifestyles, etc.). The relevant part of collective action theory looks not so much at the roles of operative agents and their individual instrumentality, as at the character and corodinating mechanisms of collective action, namely that needed or designed to realize green values. And really, what is considered is green collective organization, which comprises not only action and practices, but also associated political procedures and structures. Into this expanded account, furthermore, some large assumptions are written, assumptions not accepted by many greens: roughly, reduction of the political to the collective, and of the collective to aggregated individuals, i.e. themes of individualism.2728These reductive assumptions, which are inserted and infiltrated unargued, come to matter in the material on policy coordination, which adopts a standard game-theory approach drawn from the received reductive theory of collective action, a theory unlikely to gain much green applause, for all its academic fashionability. The case for green engagement in coalitions is less straightforward than depicted. No doubt greens who opt for this course of action—what Goodin tries to insist upon, involvement in the politics of the established system—do not then have the option of spuming power-sharing opportunities when those opportunities present themselves. Our guide is, however, too optimistic about how often such opportunies are like to occur, and too sanguine about how they are likely to operate to green advantage. For one thing, greens are not the only political forces within conventional politics who have a theory of value. Furthermore, just as greens seeking to enter into a coalition with a party of the electoral left (at present the only plausible option) must look askance at the likely ttincohe^ence^^ of the compromise reached, so too must the other coalescing party. If, under such circumstances, 'the blame for the logical incoherence would lie with the parties that insisted on adulterating the green programme528, so too, from the perspective of the party of the left, must *the blame for the logical incoherence lie with the greens who insisted on adulterating the pink programme'. It should come as little surprise then, that the evidence suggests that parties of the moderate left are every bit as reluctant to enter into coalitions with the greens as the greens are with them.29 Green agents: their lifestyles, their commitments, their changed consciousness. These matters feature large in American deep ecology; they are neglected or dismissed in Goodin. His rejection of green personal lifestyles is indicative, in these terms, of personal green consciousness and commitment, and of but subdued or diminished green values. It seems fair to remark that only weak environmental commitments are displayed in the book (however 27 See e.g. p.l 14 top. 28 To cite Goodin p.179. 29 Hay op.cit., where various examples confirming the final claim are assembled. �14 even weak commitments, typical of much academic literature, are better than none, typical of former academic literature); or, more provocatively, to infer that Goodin has not really absorbed genuine green values (else he would act personally). What does come through from the book is that Goodin remains something of an outsider to green activism. That he is not together at the cutting edge of things green is betrayed by occasional telling slips, as with what greens worry about in different places (esp. pp. 180-1). It is not that what he asserts is wrong; it is that emphases and contrasts are different. Reasons offered for rejection of green lifestyles are, where clear, extraordinarily weak. Consider what is offered: • living too close to nature, too much in harmony with it, might cause it to lose its valued role for us30一which is (remember) to provide us with a larger context in which we can see our lives as being set! Test the force of the argument by comparing living in the vicinity of other valued items: worthy lives, art, music, intellectual accomplishments. Moreover, there are counter­ arguments and considerations: that closeness brings respect and awe, and can enhance appreciation of value. Consider the idea of Christians distancing themselves from Cathedrals and Churches, ritual and practice. • to achieve political change, greens should make every effort to minimise the perceived distance between themselves and the “orthodox” community一whereas the association of 'alternative lifestyling5 with 'green' has exactly the opposite effect. Such a claim reveals much as regards subcontests, such as: claimants commitments and seriousness, type and extent of change envisaged, and so on. Christians, feminists, revolutionaries and others would not be too impressed. As in other reaches where orthodoxy may be morally or otherwise amiss, so with regard to green lifestyles: There is a case for a politics of “exemplary practice”； for whilst some people will treat those who so engage as objects of scorn and ridicule, it is evident that many people have been recruited to green values through positive contact with experiments in "right living”，or with elements of green lifestyles. It is important too that at least some people endeavour to demonstrate how green principles might be put into practice at the level of daily living. • Bizarre examples, selective unfavourable examples, advanced under the heading 'green heresies5.31 Granted 'some of this “exemplary practice” might be so outlandish that it reflects negatively on larger green projects. But the influence of this can be overstated; this sort of game can be played with many things that have features to recommend parts of them. After all, every social movement and every tradition of political philosophy, has its fringe-dwellers, even its 30 Thus p.81ff. 31 pp.78-81. �15 practitioners of a particular reductio ad absurdum extracted from a larger coherency.32 • local lifestyle set the focus astray. It should be on grander issues, on global environmental problems, fate of earth, etc. But plainly more regional and local problems also matter, esp. for preservation of habitats, creatures, etc. And here personal and local things can be very important. Finally, there are other reasons for green lifestyles. For example, for the structural changes necessary for environmentally satisfactory societies of one sort or another, something like internalization of green values and adoption of a green lifestyle proves highly advantageous. To this end and others, committed green subcultures and inspiring individual examples are extremely valuable. APPENDIX: a defective setting. Many productions that may look new and interesting in fact prove conservative, brushing off and wheeling out old ideas as if they would accomplish all requisite work. That is, it is implicitly claimed, under conservative approaches, that prevailing paradigms offer all necessary resources for capturing what has (wrongly) been presented as radically new.33 In environmental philosophy a classical exercise of this sort, well received by an environmentally conservative or reactionary establishment, was Passmore's text. Passmore's (and was followed, in a slightly expanded and apparently more liberal setting by Attfield, in a series of broadly consequentialist productions. Now the exercise repeated in environmental political theory by Goodin, who simply imports utilitarianism as supplying a unique and unquestionable rationality, in place of Passmore's vague utilitarianism of humans interests. It does not bode well for a genuinely green theory that its presentation lies virtually entirely within a shallow utilitarian setting, the setting of the dominant economic and public policy paradigm. For just such a setting is what has assisted significantly in getting the Earth into the present environmental mess. Consider what Goodin tries to insist upon in his section (s.1.3) on the arguments (and also elsewhere):- He assumes, in so trying to preempt the range of arguments, both that —the case for environmental protection has to be made in utilitarian terms if it is to prove effective —the most telling arguments concern the ways environmental protection measures are required to further human interests (and intertwined items: people, profits, property, resources, etc.). It is worth commencing erosion of these commonplace assumptions immediately. As for what arguments "work”，are telling or effective, that depends heavily on the context, who is engaged 32 This paragraph borrows heavily from Hay. 33 Brennan's third reductive trend(p.800. �16 in a dialogue, and so on. Those with deep green sympathies are not going to be vastly impressed by a sheaf of utilitarian and human interests (first and only) arguments, any more than by other privileged class arguments. Goodin seems to have rather assumed that, in effect, we are always paired with our political masters, who are and will remain shallow utilitarians. Even now this is by no means uniformly so, and there are grounds for hope that things could be much ameliorated in the future. Accordingly there is little reason to accept Goodin's further excessive claim that the 'essence' of the arguments (all satisfactory arguments he really wants to have us concede) remains the same: 'inadequate protection of the human environment, seriously compromised human interests\34 Pretty much the same problematic ethos is likewise taken for granted for proposed remedies: a standard economic public policy framework, with the essence of the remedy consisting in correcting market failure. From deeper green perspectives this is extraordinarily tired stuff, with "remedies" that have been tried and tried and continue to fail. As part of his case, he tries the stock shallow strategy of rubbishing the idea of admitting interests beyond humans (to grant animals interests is hardly to ''widen'' or ttextend^^ interests). The arguments are all very cheap, and the counter-case is not properly addressed. Regrettably, a shallow utilitarianism raises its ugly head all over the place. A few examples: 'it is more important that the right things be done than that they be done in any particular way or through any particular agency * (p.120). But it is unnecessary to document utilitarian imput as Goodin himself has provided it in susequent work. A main orientation of Goodin's work一which help explain several of its features一 is towards policy-makers or would-be policy-makers. Among such audiences utilitarian and economic rationales contue to be greeted enthusistically. For one reason, such rationales seem made to order when policy makers, or "bureaucratic rationality,5, require 'a means of justifying decisions that may be unpopular with large members of people5. For through these rationales they have seemed able to give principled reasons for action. The policy-maker can claim to have weighed up all the relevant considerations for and against a course of action; each consideration was in some way commensurable with every other—perhaps because each had a dollar value associated with it—and so it was possible to reach a determinate conclusion, by fair and objective means. The appearance of determinacy, fairness and objectivity is an important tool for those who wield and manipulate power in business, government, and even universities. But this rationalizing use of economic approaches should be resisted by everyone, including economists themselves.35 34 Ibid p.8 (check). 35 Brennan p.807. �17 The reasons are now entirely familiar ones. References Achtenberg, W., Review of Goodin, Environmental Values, (1994). Foucault, M., 'What is Enlightenment5 Goodin, R., Green political Theory, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1992. Habermus, J., 'Modernity—an incomplete project*, in Postmodern Culture (ed. H. Foster), Pluto Press, London, 1987. Hay, P., Review of Goodin typescript, University of Tasmania, 1994. McGowan, J., Postmodernism and Its Critics, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 199x. Osborne, P, 'Modernity is a qualitative, not a stromological, category: notes on the dialectics of differential historical time', in Postmodernism and the re-reading of modernity (ed. F. Barker and others) Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1991/2. Priest, G., 'On alternative geometries, arithmetics, and logics; a tribute to Lukasiewicz5, typsescript, 1996. Routley, R. and V., “Human chauvinism and environmental ethics' referred to as EE Routley, R. and V., The Fight for the Forests，referred to as FF. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Draft Papers Description An account of the resource Sylvan's literary executor encountered an archive in which “all his projects were current", since manuscripts were undated and unattributed. Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document 13.6.96 GREEN POLITICAL THEORY: a different account Green political theory is divided according to one of our guides1, rather like Gaul according to Caesar, into three parts: —a green theory of value, —a subordinate green theory of agency, and —a green lifestyle program, portrayed as a set of altogether dispensible lifestyle recommendations. While it is the high-handed insistent dismissal of green lifestyles by this guide, Goodin, that has captured the attention of critics and been highlighted, the brash partitioning of green political theory, and the surreptitious dismissal therewith of significant parts of it, should not pass unnoticed. To the contrary, virtually the whole of what political theory is taken to treat comes up for reassessment once green lights are played upon it, certainly under deeper green illumination. That bogus exhaustiveness taken for granted, that all there is to it amounts to value and action, no doubt derives largely from an underlying utilitarianism, according to which other theoretical matters can be subsumed under these.2 In short, partly through dispensing with lifestyle considerations, primarily by virtue of a background utilitarianism operating within a conventional state-setting, Goodin can suppose that green political theory reduces to these two parts: a theory of value and a subordinate theory of agency. Such a reduction is however much too simple, leaving out, as it does, much of ethics of political relevance, as well as a large slab of politics. For example, ethical omissions include the fields of deontology (environmental permissions, prescriptives, directives; environmental justice, rights and so on), of virtue theory, and of accountability. Among political omissions most striking is the absence of any due consideration of institutional and ideological alternatives to what now prevails. Prevailing Western political arrangements—with staged elections, urban bureaucratic control, incremental reformism (often environmentally regressive), and so on—are simply taken for granted. Above all, there is no critique of the state, an increasingly important part of radical green politics. One reason for this gross omission— f radical green theory from what is presented as green political theory—is that Goodin does not question the conventional political assumption that the appropriate objective of green political activity consists in gaining power or influence within established statist arrangements, for example at best through electoral 1 R. Goodin Green Political Theory, Polity Press, Cambridge 1992. This was undoubtedly a book worth criticizing. 2 See the appendix. 2 success enabling control of some of the administrative and executive functions of state (we shall encounter this conventional “political realism^^ again later). However significant strands of green political theory no longer accept this assumption. A related reason, reaching deeper, is that Goodin likewise does not question, as strands of green theory now do, what helps undergird the conventional political assumption and reformist utilitarianism, an Enlightenment ideology with its faith in reason and science, technologically-based progress, overall human goodness and dominance, and so on.3 The bold overstatement of claims, along with misrepresentation as to what green political theory comprises, is symptomatic of much of the book: overstatement and undersubstantiation.4 Virtually all main themes of the book are false, indeed rather patently so once exhibited unadorned, because limited truths are overextended; and they are undersupplied with cogent support. So it is with the green theory of value, which inflates what is a significant factor in green evaluation into the supposed total green theory. So it is with the green package, which is presented as having an absolutely tight integration, which it in fact lacks. And so on, as will appear. Not only are main themes seriously defective; more disappointing, a salvage operation will not yield a lode of green gold. As troubling is the anti-subversive character of the work. Goodin has wheeled another Trojan horse into green territory, a horse bringing a number of anti-green academic warriors armed with anti-green ideas and sentiments, and engaged in and advocating anti-green lifestyles, (as will emerge).5 Of course, 'Green political theory' is a clever title, which is complemented by a politically clever introduction on the crises which are not minimized or marginalised but given considerable weight—all of which suggest that the text might be of much more interest to politically inclined greens than the usual academic fare. But the title does not say how the green theory is to be treated, explained and encouraged, exposed and condemned. Neither really. The text is not written for greens (though the publishers obviously hope they may buy it,6 or be 3 For an exposition and criticism of Enlightenment Ideology, see Sylvan TM. 4 In part because these sorts of deficiencies have not been addressed in reviews of the book, I decided to persevere with this less charitable critique (a tiresome exercise bound to alienate). Regrettably most of the reviews appear to derive from a political science orientation. They trip lightly by philosophical fundamentals, where the book is noticeably weak, and vulnerable. And they tend to be very light on argument. 5 Trojan horses are in extensive use by academics, particularly in green regions. We will encounter a number of these horses. They are evident from sociology to biogeography and climatology, and particularly prominent around economic enslaves. 6 They form part of the intended audience for the book according to accompanying publishers' work and flyers. Indeed the publishers have participated in the deception, supplying a cover featuring a boss of the Green Man from the cloisters of Norwich cathedral, which sends, as they 3 tricked into buying it), but for a cohert of academic colleagues—for colleagues who form part of the prevailing system, of politics-more-or-less-as-usual and so on. Deapite its character, there are several useful and attractive features of Goodin's book, which do make it worthwhile reading for awake greens of theoretical bent (one of these features is an Appendix, putting together succinctly a green political program). It is a smoothly written book, encouraging readers to glide along, glossing over the underlying content and messages, and not grasping the enormity of some of what is presented, for instance even as green gospel. It may be just the style that is attractive (the cut of the book, the easy flow, an appealingly simple structure, and other stylish features), rather than details of the real content. If the book has a weakness from the PR angle, it may lie in its flippancy, and failure to take several green issues seriously, both of which sometimes enter irritatingly and will turn off some committed greens. But, by and large, it is a splendidly packaged work; it is what is packaged and what is pushed on greens that is the trouble. For a book purportedly on green theory, treatment of greens is extraordinary condescending. Not much notice is going to be taken of 'what self-styled greens... happen to believe', 'what positions greens actually do take' (p.vii). (How then does he justify the green attributions he proceeds to make, e.g. 'green theory of value5? Evidently his procedure is methodologically unsound). No, it is 'an attempt to saves greens from themselves5 (p.viii). To rescue them,4to tidy up' their slovenly positions—while throwing away critical features of green approaches, such as green lifestyles—Goodin is particularly concerned that green lifestyles should not be seen as part of a rectified green political package. Green lifestyle recommendations are entirely dispensible (so he and others can look and indeed be green without deffort, without making any green contribution; they are conveniently absolved from any relevant action, or lifestyle adjustment). At one stage Goodin claims that the theory is 'moderately deep'. But elsewhere he has more accurately said that it is a pale green theory, very pale green given the attitude taken to green lifestyles. Green Political Theory it may be called: deeper green political theory, at least, it certainly is not, even genuine green it but dubiously is. However Goodin's aim, he regularly informs us, is once again not 4to describe what positions greens actually do take5. His project is a normative one, aimed instead to show what positions greens should take, given their core concerns... what they have to say given their core values'?. In this attempt he should be seen to remarks, 'precisely the contrary signal concerning the nature of the author's project in there behind the Green Man's work*. 7 P. viii - p.vii, itals added. 4 fail entirely. He is astray not merely on the core concerns of many of them (which concerns are far from uniform), but also in loosely coupled resultant positions. Greens are under no such obligations as Goodin would load them with; they are not boxed in as he would suppose. The approach is not only condescending towards greens; it is a touch arrogant. The aim is said to be 'to show greens how to cast their position in the strongest possible form\8 This will turn out to be not a strong theoretical form, by any means, but merely a strong form pragmatically, given a raft of assumptions about prevailing electoral arrangements, an interests theory of voting and human behaviour, and so on. According to many a green however, thereby made are some of the assumptions that have to be turned around if humanly undesirable features are to be avoided, if social collapse of one sort or another is to be avoided. At the very outset, Goodin does something to offset such concerns, as those concerning limits of growth.9 He rolls out a familiar quasi-inductive argument, beloved of economists, that past predictions of limits have been riotously astray (e.g. Jeavons on coal, Meadows and others in Limits of Growth on tin). Granted some predictions have, those regularly offered as illustrations; though others have not, naturally such examples are not emphasized. Not only is the inductive base for the quasi-inductive argument defective, the argument itself exhibits some flaws. That it has been claimed before and shown wrong is hardly decisive evidence that it will not be right a next time. Recall not only the boy who cried "wolf' too often and was eventually consumed, but also the turkeys who every week approaching Christmas triumphantly announced that everything was proceeding just fine. [Simple enumerative induction is not reliable in such settings.] On this-here green theory of value. Much of Goodin's text, that segment that is not pleasant enough "ecopolitical fiir5 (stock descriptions of ecological problems, green movement and their platforms, and so on), is occupied in one way or another with what he is pleased call to 'a green theory of value', quickly to become 'the green theory of value'. Most of the remainder develops from a complementing 4green theory of action5.10 This green theory of value is pushed in a surprisingly deontological fashion, likely to arouse immediate suspicions: as what greens should adopt and wear, if they know what is good for them. A theory of value is just a theory of the good, so it is engagingly asserted at the outset. Not so, unless the rest of what is considered to belong to value theory (standing, 8 P.viii. 9 See the beginning of the main text p.l. 10 This theory of value is also presented in a much published paper, 'A green theory of value'. As to the definite formulation, the green theory, see many places in the text, e.g. p.87. 5 considerability, worth, rating, and so on) reduces. It does not (and Goodin makes no effort to effect a reduction). It will become plain that Goodin is rather good at presenting topics as what they are not. The practice goes beyond introductory and presentational matters to what is taken to be central, value theory. 'A theory of value is, quite simply, a theory of the good', so we are engagingly informed.11 A theory of value is much more comprehensive than a theory of the good (as a perusal of Austrian value theory will quickly confirm), and does not contract, without extensive and dubious reductions (there is the 'quite simply5), to a theory of the good. Do not anticipate then what is promised: a green theory of value. As it turns out, not only are greens short­ changed on value, they get a very small serve of theory, and again a very pale green offering at that. There are certain peripheral obstacles to this purported green theory of value. In particular, does it even measure up to admittedly lax standards for a theory as to value? As is readily ascertained, the "theory” does not even say what a value is like and is, what kind of object, what identity criteria it satisfies, what postulates it conforms to. Let us call what is presented a pseudo-theory. Perhaps it can be upgraded to a theory, but requisite work is so far lacking. Is this "green pseudo-theory" green? This sort of challenge Goodin is aware of and aims to deflect. Granted the pseudo-theory is admittedly shallow, all politically acceptable theories have to be, he suggests, for instance to seize wide common ground, etc. But this too is astray, because of pluralistic alternatives. According to this green pseudo-theory, not only is naturalness a source of green value, naturalness is the source of value (i.e. goodness). How does Goodin arrive at this identification? By various unsound moves. Most simply, he invalidly concludes, from a consideration of 'naturalness as a source of (green) value', that it is the source of value.12 Such an inference from an indefinite to a definite description is invalid unless uniqueness conditions are independently ensured. Less simply, there is a simplistic derivation of "theories of value" from the three conventional factors of economic production: land (or resources), labour, and capital, each of which is schematically linked to corresponding theories of value. No doubt the land ethic and the labour theory of value just could suggest as much, but it is dubious that anyone much, green or otherwise disposed, would rest content for long with such a “pure" theory, as the factors operate together, not separately. Moreover, the economic “derivations" of these theories should be enough to raise serious green doubts about them. 11 P.19. This claim is also made in several other overlapping Goodin productions. 12 Ibid. p.30. 6 The core theme resulting from the identification is that natural objects are valuable, i.e. good, because they are the result of natural processes and not artificial or human ones. What gives natural objects their value is precisely their naturalness.13 In support of his green theory, Goodin produces a rather nauseating sociological argument, along the following lines: 'humans' have a deeply felt need to find meaning in their lives, i.e. to see their lives as set within a larger context with which they can feel linked. Such a context is provided by nature. In fuller presentation, it is claimed that people want coherence 'between their inner worlds and the external world'; that 'whatever makes people strive for harmony within their own lives would also lead them to strive to lead their lives in harmony with the external world'; and that 'natural processes provide just such a larger context... within which we can set out our own life plans and projects5.14 The argument is entirely shallow, appealing to what some humans want (if they do, not even to what might be good for them); it is utterly instrumental, with nature an instrument for human wants and needs; it is extraordinarily weak, each step being highly contestable; and it does not lead to the intended conclusion, uniqueness of naturalness not being shown. Moreover, for what it is worth, the argument also commits the naturalistic fallacy, purportedly arriving at an identification of value, as what is natural, on the basis of "natural" human wants and needs.15 Observe that this is Goodin's theory as to green theory, an ultimately shallow theory, reached in a shallow economic way, defended in a shallow sociological way, hardly likely to be reflective of deeper green thought. However, it is made to look in some places as if it were some sort of descriptive account; while at other places it appears as a normative account, as if it 13 find quote 14 Ibid p.3& 15 An identification of that Moorean nonnatural feature as natural furthermore. It is worth appending a relevant point from Brennan (pp.805-6): For theorists like Goodin, the status of environmental systems, species and non-human animals appears to be problematic. Although he regards them as proivind a large, independent context within which human life makes sense, it seems that he at the same time regards them as akin to consumer goods, to be displayed, consumed or prozed according to our informed preferences. For those influenced by the resource economists, it can be hard to understand the challenge posed by environmental ethics»>. Once nature is thought of as a resource, a standing reserve, a set of processes and objects that have the potential to satisfy human desires, it is easy to think of it as a nothing more than that. And the challenge posed by any ethic which is properly called 'environmental' is to find a way of articulating the attitude that nature is indeed a great deal more than that. 7 were a very reasonable thing for greens to expouse. But really it is of neither sort; it is neither descriptive of green positions, nor something they should, or would reasonably, adopt; rather it is a theory foisted on greens. It might be pretended that Goodin has offered a "reconstruction”， a rational reconstruction even, of green theory; but such a pretence fails as the construction fails, to meet even basic adequacy conditions, as will appear. As regards descriptive elements, no solid evidence is assembled that most, or even some, greens adopt this green theory, with naturalness as the sole source. Indeed Goodin offers no evidence that any do, and perhaps none of any standing do.16 Furthermore, as but little investigation reveals, there is not a single green "theory" of value, but various different, sometimes competing, positions. Nor could a single essence be satisfactorily distilled from those positions, and even what could be distilled would not resemble Goodin's construction. For some conspicuous green positions, such as ecofeminism or deep ecology, would in no way underwrite naturalness as the source of value, or for that matter a single source of value. More generally, the principles and arguments advanced within green critiques of reductionist science—including that central lesson of ecology, that meaning is to be found in connections, in patterns, in relations—similarly militate against any reductionist grounding of value. Conveniently Goodin appears to absolve us from more detailed fieldwork on green positions. His intention, he boldly announces, is to make it clear to greens and others not what greens in fact think, but what they should think. Indeed he pushes this normative tack to amazing length; only if greens change in the direction he indicates will they be able to make any practical difference to public policies! That rash claim has already been resoundingly falsified. But as regards prescriptive aspects, no intellectually alert greens would adopt Goodin's theory, either. It is not simply because they have other objectives on their agendas, than directly influencing party politics. It is because the theory is seriously defective, and open to evident, damaging objections. So it should not be sought by greens. A central reason why no aware greens should adopt the theory, and why it should be rejected is that it is open to a range of fairly decisive counterexamples. There are many natural items, natural objects or processes, that are not, either on the face of it or after reflection, valuable, as they are or were or where they are. Much that is natural is at least very problematic, some is downright bad. A first class of problematic examples, not involving life in a direct way, 16 It is suggested, by Achtenberg, that McKibben may, but a reading of The End of Nature does not support such a suggestion. As it happens, the situation with McKibben is more than a little curious. For what McKibben want to insist upon—adopting an inadmissibly high redefinition of natural—is that realy nothing is natural any more (hence The End) whence courtesy of Goodin, nothing is valuable any more. But that is not what McKibben wants to say, or says. 8 are those occurrences clustered together as natural disasters, catastrophes, and the like. Included therewith are earthquakes, landslides, soil erosion, meteorite collisions, volcanic eruptions, tidal waves, cyclones, ice ages, and so on. These examples include dramatic and damaging (natural) variations in the natural more stable course of events, variations with climatic or geophysical origins. Consider the devastating Lisbon earthquake of 1775 which so shocked European intellectuals (and was construed by Voltaire as evidence that Gthe natural world is farm from the best of all possible). By contrast, Goodin would be obliged to maintain that it was a good event, because natural (just as good as the new arrival of a passenger pigeon on a splendid autumnal morning) and presumably not at all shocking because of the natural beneficence of the whole disaster. No doubt the problems with global warming, ozone depletion, and so forth, that so exercise Goodin at the outset of his text, are that these are not natural (being induced by human activity which falls outside what is natural, under one conventional ruling); no doubt these would be valuable, and unproblematic, processes were they to proceed naturally without human intervention or assistance. So it was with the volcanic eruptions that demolished the splendid pink and white terraces and laid waste much beautiful New Zealand forest last century; so it was with the earlier ice-age which much reduced the richness of New Zealand flora, eliminating 3 of 4 groups of palms; these were good, even admirable, events. Similar ridiculous outcomes issue when we turn to life (life forms somehow still achieve a privileged role in Goodin, though they are no more natural). Consider the wide range of monsters, cripples, sports, freaks, and so on that natural processes, such as birth, regularly deliver: deformities, malignant mutations, and so on, outcomes that are still generally hidden away, put out of general sight, or quietly removed, at least in the case of more hideous outputs. It is very difficult to see that all these objects are good, even just as good as the most splendid products of nature.17 Roughly Goodin has landed in a similar awkward position to the theist 17 It seems admissible to record that I put several such counterexamples to Goodin well before he undertook final revision of his working typescript. Here is his response on these and connected issues (Goodin, personal communication, numbered and reordered with [1] now proceeding [2]): [1] [2] A somatic organism in a natural environment is a (nonmoral) normative system. Whatever has that much complexity, richness, self-organization, telos has (presumptively) value. I think I still incline to say (despite your chastening) that a sponaneous biological life is always of prima facie value (intrinsic). Though I recognize at once that such value can sometimes be overridden and become in some environmental contexts a new disvalue. And here I just hold in abeyance what the overlay of moral agency with the moral (past biological) life in humans does to the presumption. 9 who announces that all the natural works of God are good, and is then confronted by awful work such as monstrosities or catastrophes. He can try, like the theist, to fall back to some larger valuable setting of which these prima facie nonvaluable components are an integral part; in Goodin's case there is a wider encompassing theory available, namely evolutionary theory (with variation required for natural selection).18 But already this means significant qualification and modification of Goodin's original theory, and shift to a different and so far undeveloped theory. Better to abandon the original theory, given that superior alternatives are on offer namely multiple factor theories, with naturalness one factor in the mix.19 There remain many other lesser difficulties for theories like Goodin's which try to reduce value-making factors to one, such as naturalness (or biological life, richness, or whatever). For naturalness, difficulties arise with pests and weeds, which may be quite natural objects, but objects which are located in the wrong places, notably outside their natural range. No doubt Goodin's theory can be elaborated to take account of such exceptions, but elaborated it needs to be. Other difficulties arise with natural objects which are in natural places, but which are in some way out of balance with their natural environment, for instance through excess numbers, excessive predation (leading to population collapses, etc.). Consider, for example, members of a natural herd of elephants, grown too large for their natural environment, who become destroyers, demolishing significant forests in their range. Again this is natural enough in the circumstances, but the outcomes are certainly not good, nor praiseworthy or the like. The deficiencies of the approach as offering a “theory” of value are accentuated by the specific narrow recipe Goodin tries to impose on greens. In particular, it appears to supply only an on-off qualitative assessment. An item is either good or not according as it is natural, and that [3] I will have to interpet monstrosities, mutation, deformities as struggling life, somehow a necessary part of the process, even though they are in some respects failures. Anyway, more on that some other time. [4] I also hold that (geo) physical nature can sometimes have intrinsic value, so that life, while sufficient for value prima facie, is not necessary for it. A few comments:- Paragraph [1] already points to a more satisfactory, sophisticated theory than greens are saddled with, with a mix of factors (of which naturalness is surely one) yielding presumptive value. Paragraphs [2] and [3] also indicate elements of a more sensitive theory, again at substantial odds with that presented in the book. Paragraph [3] suggest the sort of theological or evolutionary escape discussed in the text below; it does nothing to counter the counterexamples. 18 Also the theist's problems concerning maximization are perhaps reduced in this setting. 19 See e.g. EE or FF. 10 is all. But not all items are of the same value, which is all this allows: valuable because natural. Some, while not being “more natural”，are much more valuable than others. It is well known that comparative assessments, such as bettemess, and likewise quantitative assessments cannot be directly defined in terms of mere quantitative assessments, and it is sufficiently appreciated that a satisfactory axiological theory should account at least for comparative assessments. In this respect too, Goodin's pseudo-theory falls far short of adequacy. On the other side of the qualitative divide, even the best art museums and the best painings within them are not valuable, not good, because not natural. Even if Goodin should say, what his text sometimes suggests, that his green "theory" applies only to natural objects, artifacts are left out, then the theory is at best seriously incomplete. Greens will have some more comprehensive theory of value which covers all items, and integrates a range of assessments of artifacts with natural objects: naturalness will properly disappear as sole criterion, becoming but one factor. It is noteworthy that much of the subsequent development of green political theory in Goodin's text does not depend upon the excessively strong value theory he tries to load upon greens; it does not require—r always, for that matter, use—naturalness as sole criterion. Much of what comes later, all that appears right enough, will "go through" will naturalness as a critical factor. Where appropriate call this the alternate scheme, according to which naturalness is only one critical, but not always decisive, factor in a mix. The alternate scheme is an integral part of that different green account alluded to above. On the touted tightly-integrated Green package, and strong holism. Certain extraordinarily bold claims are advanced, under the banner of 'a unified moral vision5 in the chapter advertised as 4the unity of the green programme\ Notably the green theory of value...[as] elaborated... is what underlies and unifies the entire green political programme .... It is what makes it illogical and inconsistent for other, more established parties to try picking and choosing some bits off that agenda, without accepting all the rest of its demands as well.20 The claims are never established, would not be established by what is suggested, and indeed cannot be satisfactorily established, because the claims do not stand up. The arguments outlined are seriously wanting. Even what is said would make good the claims would not (traces are not enough for "making good^^); but in any case Goodin does not attempt these things, opting to proceed 'more impressionistically *. 20 p.87. The same sort of theme is reiterated (with but minor variations) subsequently, e.g. p.92. Note the ascent from an everyday theory of the good to a unified moral vision. 11 Even impressionistically little works satisfactorily. For 'the green theory of value' of Goodin is not 'uniquely able to account for the coherence of the green public-policy proposals\2122Apart from the critical features, to be considered below, that green proposals do not enjoy the sort of coherence alleged, and that established parties can, and do, pick over green programs selectively, the uniqueness claim, the special position of Goodin's theory, is quietly dropped in the impressionistic "argument". All that is used is the alternate scheme, that a concern for nature informs, directly or indirectly, all the connected 'plants in the green programme'.22 Evidently a variety of concerns for nature can motivate and justify attitudes and procedures regarding pollution, waste, environmental destruction, and so forth. Uniqueness lapses. Worse, the more remote, less directly environmental parts of the green agenda do not fall out eith of Goodin's theory or from the alternate scheme. In a note, Goodin concedes as much; but these (decentralization, grass roots democracy, nonviolence, and much else) derive so he claims, from the subsidiary, but logically separate, green theory of agency.23 Whether they do so derive or not (they do not), they do not derive indirectly from a green theory of value, because of the separation of agency from value. For similar reasons, the "integrated" green programme (outlined in an Appendix) begins to unravel. All that Goodin tries to make out, then only suggestively, is that the alternative scheme helps in explaining certain green attitudes that appear anomalous or otherwise problematic. Even should this exercise succeed (and its success is at best mixed), it would not achieve what is required. Interestingly, the Appendix, 'The Green Political Programme5—far from demonstrating that the narrow green theory of value runs through all green policy, not just the overly 'environmental5 parts—helps in revealing what a patchwork the presented programme is really, a patchwork from which separate patches can be unsewn. A basic problem with the whole approach is this: that there is not a single green program, different green groups have different programms. Witness the many internal disputes, the very public conflicts between social and deep ecology, between animal liberationists and nature greens, between luddites and smart new- age technologists, between spiritual and secular greens, and son. Granted various loose conalitions may be stitched together; but they are various, not unique, and the stitching is very loose, and may easily be undone, for different repackaging. In short, there are many green packages, corresponding to different green theories of value and agency and so on. As there is 21 Ibid p.87. 22 Ibid. p.87. Goodin himself slides back to the indefinite, to a green theory of value, e.g. p.88. 23 Note & p.8& 12 no single green theory, so there is no such tightly unified single package, which is what empirical evidence also seems to show. Moreover, established parties have drawn very selectively upon these sorts of packages, and filched elements selectively. Witness the fate of the early Values party in New Zealand. 'The prima facie wrongness of ... piecemeal borrowing from the greens is easily explicated. It derives straight forwardly from the logic of consistency. It would be simply wrong to embrace a theory of value... for some purposes while shunning it for others. The truth status of value theories just does not flicker on and off like that/2425Embedded therein, in this strong holism, is one basic confusion that pervades the book, a confusion between a theory and what derives from it, between a source and its outputs. Nothing in logic stops selective borrowing from what derives from a program, however tightly integrated. Strong holism is far too strong; it would imply that we cannot adopt, or even toy with, one part of some value theory, or ethical theory on Goodin's account of the matter, without embracing the lot. We cannot accept some on Moore's claims, some of Spinoza's analyses, part of Aristotle without being stuck with the whole. Eclecticism, at least as regards a theory of value, is impossible. Which is absurd, and a reductio thereto of a seriously defective argument. The conclusion has to be that yet another of Goodin's main themes is seriously astray and should be rejected: that 'greens make (radical) demands on an all-or-nothing basis525, that greens 'might reasonably demand that we implement their political program on an all-or-nothing basis5.26 On the misadvertised green theory of agency: green collective organization・ The title 'The Green Theory of Agency5 is something of a misnomer. Most of the chapter consemed (chapter 4) is taken up with what is inaccurately headed 'Principles of green political structures*, which treats not agency but certain elements of macro-political organisation, notably decentralization and policy coordination (itself headed, misleadingly, 'think globally, act locally5). Most of the remainder of the chapter is occupied with what is headed, generally, 'Principles of green political action', but reduces to 'democratic participation5 and 'nonviolence5, and with 'Principles of green party organisation', cut down to 'grassroots democracy5 and 'nrotation in office*, both something of travesties, given the indicated sweep and generality. The theory of "agency" is itself rather a part of a theory of collective action. Virtually nothing on agency in the usual sense of individual action theory enters, except a footnote 24 p.92, partly reiterating the integrated package theme. 25 p.168? [check, locate] 26 Back cover. 13 referring to some work on the topic, and no theory at all of green individual agents (their lifestyles, etc.). The relevant part of collective action theory looks not so much at the roles of operative agents and their individual instrumentality, as at the character and corodinating mechanisms of collective action, namely that needed or designed to realize green values. And really, what is considered is green collective organization, which comprises not only action and practices, but also associated political procedures and structures. Into this expanded account, furthermore, some large assumptions are written, assumptions not accepted by many greens: roughly, reduction of the political to the collective, and of the collective to aggregated individuals, i.e. themes of individualism.2728These reductive assumptions, which are inserted and infiltrated unargued, come to matter in the material on policy coordination, which adopts a standard game-theory approach drawn from the received reductive theory of collective action, a theory unlikely to gain much green applause, for all its academic fashionability. The case for green engagement in coalitions is less straightforward than depicted. No doubt greens who opt for this course of action—what Goodin tries to insist upon, involvement in the politics of the established system—do not then have the option of spuming power-sharing opportunities when those opportunities present themselves. Our guide is, however, too optimistic about how often such opportunies are like to occur, and too sanguine about how they are likely to operate to green advantage. For one thing, greens are not the only political forces within conventional politics who have a theory of value. Furthermore, just as greens seeking to enter into a coalition with a party of the electoral left (at present the only plausible option) must look askance at the likely ttincohe^ence^^ of the compromise reached, so too must the other coalescing party. If, under such circumstances, 'the blame for the logical incoherence would lie with the parties that insisted on adulterating the green programme528, so too, from the perspective of the party of the left, must *the blame for the logical incoherence lie with the greens who insisted on adulterating the pink programme'. It should come as little surprise then, that the evidence suggests that parties of the moderate left are every bit as reluctant to enter into coalitions with the greens as the greens are with them.29 Green agents: their lifestyles, their commitments, their changed consciousness. These matters feature large in American deep ecology; they are neglected or dismissed in Goodin. His rejection of green personal lifestyles is indicative, in these terms, of personal green consciousness and commitment, and of but subdued or diminished green values. It seems fair to remark that only weak environmental commitments are displayed in the book (however 27 See e.g. p.l 14 top. 28 To cite Goodin p.179. 29 Hay op.cit., where various examples confirming the final claim are assembled. 14 even weak commitments, typical of much academic literature, are better than none, typical of former academic literature); or, more provocatively, to infer that Goodin has not really absorbed genuine green values (else he would act personally). What does come through from the book is that Goodin remains something of an outsider to green activism. That he is not together at the cutting edge of things green is betrayed by occasional telling slips, as with what greens worry about in different places (esp. pp. 180-1). It is not that what he asserts is wrong; it is that emphases and contrasts are different. Reasons offered for rejection of green lifestyles are, where clear, extraordinarily weak. Consider what is offered: • living too close to nature, too much in harmony with it, might cause it to lose its valued role for us30一which is (remember) to provide us with a larger context in which we can see our lives as being set! Test the force of the argument by comparing living in the vicinity of other valued items: worthy lives, art, music, intellectual accomplishments. Moreover, there are counter­ arguments and considerations: that closeness brings respect and awe, and can enhance appreciation of value. Consider the idea of Christians distancing themselves from Cathedrals and Churches, ritual and practice. • to achieve political change, greens should make every effort to minimise the perceived distance between themselves and the “orthodox” community一whereas the association of 'alternative lifestyling5 with 'green' has exactly the opposite effect. Such a claim reveals much as regards subcontests, such as: claimants commitments and seriousness, type and extent of change envisaged, and so on. Christians, feminists, revolutionaries and others would not be too impressed. As in other reaches where orthodoxy may be morally or otherwise amiss, so with regard to green lifestyles: There is a case for a politics of “exemplary practice”； for whilst some people will treat those who so engage as objects of scorn and ridicule, it is evident that many people have been recruited to green values through positive contact with experiments in "right living”，or with elements of green lifestyles. It is important too that at least some people endeavour to demonstrate how green principles might be put into practice at the level of daily living. • Bizarre examples, selective unfavourable examples, advanced under the heading 'green heresies5.31 Granted 'some of this “exemplary practice” might be so outlandish that it reflects negatively on larger green projects. But the influence of this can be overstated; this sort of game can be played with many things that have features to recommend parts of them. After all, every social movement and every tradition of political philosophy, has its fringe-dwellers, even its 30 Thus p.81ff. 31 pp.78-81. 15 practitioners of a particular reductio ad absurdum extracted from a larger coherency.32 • local lifestyle set the focus astray. It should be on grander issues, on global environmental problems, fate of earth, etc. But plainly more regional and local problems also matter, esp. for preservation of habitats, creatures, etc. And here personal and local things can be very important. Finally, there are other reasons for green lifestyles. For example, for the structural changes necessary for environmentally satisfactory societies of one sort or another, something like internalization of green values and adoption of a green lifestyle proves highly advantageous. To this end and others, committed green subcultures and inspiring individual examples are extremely valuable. APPENDIX: a defective setting. Many productions that may look new and interesting in fact prove conservative, brushing off and wheeling out old ideas as if they would accomplish all requisite work. That is, it is implicitly claimed, under conservative approaches, that prevailing paradigms offer all necessary resources for capturing what has (wrongly) been presented as radically new.33 In environmental philosophy a classical exercise of this sort, well received by an environmentally conservative or reactionary establishment, was Passmore's text. Passmore's (and was followed, in a slightly expanded and apparently more liberal setting by Attfield, in a series of broadly consequentialist productions. Now the exercise repeated in environmental political theory by Goodin, who simply imports utilitarianism as supplying a unique and unquestionable rationality, in place of Passmore's vague utilitarianism of humans interests. It does not bode well for a genuinely green theory that its presentation lies virtually entirely within a shallow utilitarian setting, the setting of the dominant economic and public policy paradigm. For just such a setting is what has assisted significantly in getting the Earth into the present environmental mess. Consider what Goodin tries to insist upon in his section (s.1.3) on the arguments (and also elsewhere):- He assumes, in so trying to preempt the range of arguments, both that —the case for environmental protection has to be made in utilitarian terms if it is to prove effective —the most telling arguments concern the ways environmental protection measures are required to further human interests (and intertwined items: people, profits, property, resources, etc.). It is worth commencing erosion of these commonplace assumptions immediately. As for what arguments "work”，are telling or effective, that depends heavily on the context, who is engaged 32 This paragraph borrows heavily from Hay. 33 Brennan's third reductive trend(p.800. 16 in a dialogue, and so on. Those with deep green sympathies are not going to be vastly impressed by a sheaf of utilitarian and human interests (first and only) arguments, any more than by other privileged class arguments. Goodin seems to have rather assumed that, in effect, we are always paired with our political masters, who are and will remain shallow utilitarians. Even now this is by no means uniformly so, and there are grounds for hope that things could be much ameliorated in the future. Accordingly there is little reason to accept Goodin's further excessive claim that the 'essence' of the arguments (all satisfactory arguments he really wants to have us concede) remains the same: 'inadequate protection of the human environment, seriously compromised human interests\34 Pretty much the same problematic ethos is likewise taken for granted for proposed remedies: a standard economic public policy framework, with the essence of the remedy consisting in correcting market failure. From deeper green perspectives this is extraordinarily tired stuff, with "remedies" that have been tried and tried and continue to fail. As part of his case, he tries the stock shallow strategy of rubbishing the idea of admitting interests beyond humans (to grant animals interests is hardly to ''widen'' or ttextend^^ interests). The arguments are all very cheap, and the counter-case is not properly addressed. Regrettably, a shallow utilitarianism raises its ugly head all over the place. A few examples: 'it is more important that the right things be done than that they be done in any particular way or through any particular agency * (p.120). But it is unnecessary to document utilitarian imput as Goodin himself has provided it in susequent work. A main orientation of Goodin's work一which help explain several of its features一 is towards policy-makers or would-be policy-makers. Among such audiences utilitarian and economic rationales contue to be greeted enthusistically. For one reason, such rationales seem made to order when policy makers, or "bureaucratic rationality,5, require 'a means of justifying decisions that may be unpopular with large members of people5. For through these rationales they have seemed able to give principled reasons for action. The policy-maker can claim to have weighed up all the relevant considerations for and against a course of action; each consideration was in some way commensurable with every other—perhaps because each had a dollar value associated with it—and so it was possible to reach a determinate conclusion, by fair and objective means. The appearance of determinacy, fairness and objectivity is an important tool for those who wield and manipulate power in business, government, and even universities. But this rationalizing use of economic approaches should be resisted by everyone, including economists themselves.35 34 Ibid p.8 (check). 35 Brennan p.807. 17 The reasons are now entirely familiar ones. References Achtenberg, W., Review of Goodin, Environmental Values, (1994). Foucault, M., 'What is Enlightenment5 Goodin, R., Green political Theory, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1992. Habermus, J., 'Modernity—an incomplete project*, in Postmodern Culture (ed. H. Foster), Pluto Press, London, 1987. Hay, P., Review of Goodin typescript, University of Tasmania, 1994. McGowan, J., Postmodernism and Its Critics, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 199x. Osborne, P, 'Modernity is a qualitative, not a stromological, category: notes on the dialectics of differential historical time', in Postmodernism and the re-reading of modernity (ed. F. Barker and others) Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1991/2. Priest, G., 'On alternative geometries, arithmetics, and logics; a tribute to Lukasiewicz5, typsescript, 1996. Routley, R. and V., “Human chauvinism and environmental ethics' referred to as EE Routley, R. and V., The Fight for the Forests，referred to as FF.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Box 18, Item 1225: Draft of Green political theory: a different account Subject The topic of the resource Printout of draft, dated 13 Jun 1996. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/browse?search=Richard+Sylvan&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bjoiner%5D=and&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=&amp;range=&amp;collection=&amp;type=&amp;user=&amp;tags=&amp;public=&amp;featured=&amp;exhibit=&amp;geolocation-mapped=&amp;geolocation-address=&amp;geolocation-latitude=&amp;geolocation-longitude=&amp;geolocation-radius=10&amp;submit_search=Search+for+items">Richard Sylvan</a> Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived <span class="MuiTypography-root-125 MuiTypography-body2-126">The University of Queensland's <a data-testid="rek-series" href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/records/search?page=1&amp;pageSize=20&amp;sortBy=score&amp;sortDirection=Desc&amp;searchQueryParams%5Brek_series%5D%5Bvalue%5D=Richard+Sylvan+Papers%2C+UQFL291&amp;searchMode=advanced">Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291</a></span>, Box 18, Item 1225 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org">Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy</a> Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1996-06-13 Contributor An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, <a href="https://najtaylor.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Dr. N.A.J. Taylor</a>. Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library. Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource [17] leaves. 11.63 MB Type The nature or genre of the resource Manuscript Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context <a href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:960c201">https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:960c201</a> Description An account of the resource One of seven papers digitised from item 1225. Australian National University Office Australian National University Office > Typing Table at End of Desk Box 18: Green Projects in Progress https://www.antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/32f5493dacdd446e2ae9e35b3cc88d4d.pdf 9d3fc6065bb7275f9e8cd80f95ca58c2 PDF Text Text WORKING DRAFT AUSTRALIA'S DEFENCE PHILOSOPHY? Investigations of the nonexistent # MX504 'The opinions of philosophers, with regard to the conditions of the possibility of a public peace, shall be taken into consideration by states armed for war'' (Kant, 'A [the only] secret article for perpetual peace', p.158, an article flattering no doubt to philosophers, but neglecting their dominant bellicose tradition). A defence philosophy is much more than a defence policy. A policy can be merely by a list of directives as to what do in various given at even its philosophy policy best it need only involve practical into a theoretical setting, contrast, integration of a the which looks at the key concepts involved: security, stability, control, here, By wisdom. goes deeper and requires theoretical wisdom, circumstances; protection, defence, interests, national interests, intelligence, war, etc. Defence philosophy is a branch of political and social philosophy, and has long been treated as such, though under such more familiar and honest headings as "of war" and "of peace" (see Appendix Like most of philosophy it can be applied, parts in regional 3}. among ways others. defence A approaches to philosophy should embed appropriate defence arrangements war not merely and peace, or superficially into and "foreign policy", but into the way and intended way of life of a country, both into on­ going culture policy defence power and into the intended or planned typically takes prevailing socio-political structures for granted; questioning of merits cultural arrangements. arrangements a defence philosophy again penetrates or rejecting features of these structures, enquiring as things and institutions of which defence is planned, society should be defended by what sort of appropriate sort of what lengths. What, for instance, 1 is Australia what are A and deeper, to asking methods the what and Australi ans, �concerned to defend, aiming to defend? defending, How much of what others have, Abroad? region? defending, Does preserving? defending? Would Indonesians made anyone a Randwick stage a or what we have, Eagle or racecourse, last stand for is worth Farm, merit Estate? Oaks strike in Australia .just lightning In the Here in Australia? to If remove the B.jelke- Petersen, should we resist? of the necessary prerequisites have been adequately thought about in Few Australia, unplanned where muddling through immediate problem - reactive contingency 1 generous - is the main style of political "planning", life, immediate if you help to supply it with one or more, to problem want and ipso facto of be to defence Its phi1osophers Australia does not yet have a defence philosophy. planning. could from and to inject some depth into broader defence theorizing. 1. Australian defence inappropriate "policy"; incoherent, obsolescent American, Indeed Australia seems to lack even a clear and coherent defence This pol icy. charge (made even by friends of Defence commonplace interested in 2 obtaining extra public funding for defence and elements of C3I). The reasons is concern not merely the major unsolved issues of exactly what is being defended, what things and objects and what interests, and whose, what freedoms and values; and what role American defence facilities in Australia supposed to have in this - but a range of more detailed lacunae such as: of clearly-defined on what needs defending and how it is priorities accomplished; doubtful contingencies in are lack to be capacity of present defence forces to handle low-level and to the north of Australia and in maritime zones; and 1. The point, which is not uncontroversial, is argued in effect in Gilbert. 2. Amazingly, in the Strategic Basis Papers, Australia criticizes New Zealand because 'it has still developed no policy for national defence and tends to look to ... the US as its primary source of defence guidance'' (p.29) . Note that C3I abbreviates the mouthful , Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence. 2 �unsatisfactory (or no) defence civil and administration, arrangements and planning for use of protection civil infrastructure, key facilities and of "defence-in-depth", wartime mobilisation, areas, and for post-nuclear organization. is equally damaqinq, if its policy makers do have a coherent policy it 3 nowhere satisfactorily revealed to the peoples of Australia. It is left to .journalists And, what out installations may be for and to make various conjectures as defence the newspaper-watching academics to winkle and policy may Australian policy makers As to coherence, be. local to what have only recently found out that Australia has a (purely) regional defence role, one. global they were told by the Americans in Hashington to clarify commitments under treaty arrangements with the designed begins thus This to look as if Australia's defence policy is as much not a talks in It USA. determined abroad, by US policy makers, as it is locally in Australia. Much circumstantial evidence can be assembled to confirm the claim Australia defence policy can now be stamped Made in USA, the last Nor Id Har (and British abandonment), one thing, as it that before used, to be stamped Made in UK. Australia has had a bipartisan defence policy, For so it is claimed. That "policy" has however been essentially shaped by the Liberal party, has governed most of the time (as senior partner in a for ANZUS) Hashington the Liberal and still does. US and in of US The Strategic Basis give virtually unqualified support Military practices and to the American view of situation, the the latest package from packaged under a local cover. endorsed by the Labor Government, Papers, planned Party "Defence and Foreign Policy Unit" consists largely Defence Department material to For instance, But coalition). Party simply took over US arrangements for Australia (as Liberal which commit Australia to supporting, the global strategic without any due reservation, 3. An Australian policy should moreover fit with the genuine needs and shared aspirations of the people - to the extent, presumably, that these are commendable. 3 �4 American positions in world forums. be reached by more devious arguments. out it had a regional defence role? could longer no The same dependent policy conclusion can When, for example, did Australia find afford to police the world on their own and would delegate some of that role have to and offload some of the heavy associated costs, on towards and also after Labor took some faltering steps reliable dogs-bodies; they After the Americans had found that a broader foreign policy with some indigenous elements (Hayden was developing promptly flattened by Schultz). Australian but Iags it. respects, and foreign policy simply copies American older American defence policy, American war policy. American administration main in The Australian defence policy presented by the Labor to the extent that it is visible, government, with defence is conservative; and diverges from the new it coincides (.post-Reagan) the For Australian Labor defence policy supports what used to support, namely DI. nuclear Multilateral disarmament (within the framework of a series of treaties and agreements), and D2. Deterrence in the interim, deterrence through mutual The presence .justified assured destruction. of American military facilities in Australia is supposed to in the framework of these assumptions. For they are to assist be in making deterrence under D2 effective and to provide verification for the arms There is much reduction arrangements under DI (both stabilizing functions). evidence indicating however that American policy makers have both DI and D2 and any serious attempts at nuclear arms they 4. have now 5 control . moved on to the following highly destabilizing abandoned Certainly doctrines; namely For theJe amq^ing evidence that Australia falls into the inexact class of cl ient states the following Australian contribution is noteworthy: 'The US prefers to act as a member of a group, and a contribution by Australia can also assist in demonstrating to Congressional and public opinion that the objectives sought are significant enough to attract allied support' (SB, p.28) 5. As to DI and arms control, see, e.g. Mack PR. As to D2, 'USA has now an announced first-strike nuclear targeting policy' technologically reinforced (Hayes, p.4). The goal of the Reagan administration is superiority (a conveniently ambiguous term). 4 �war-fighting; Nuclear war American government, al 1 Labor 1985 may policy nuclear wars; Limited of these government. well be accepted by military doctrines, and Star the next this While wars. coalition Liberal are explicitly rejected by the Since the American "Joint" facilities in Australia also facilitate the rejected objectives, the problems concerning these dubious facilities are much aggravated. information withholding their particularly Government concerning the full range of war-fighting certainly unsatisfactory, the The Government's approach concerning them appears their functions, roles from Parliament and the as several of its members realise; in not atypical disarray, further public and - is and as a result grist for the incoherence theme. is a coherent Australian defence policy somewhere 6 public exposure, it is almost certainly an ol d American policy. If there away from But in that case it certainly lacks - what it in any case appears to lack - justification. 7 For American interests by no means coincide with Australian . Consider, for such instance, matters as enriching Americans, American business, for undercutting to Nicaragua, differently Allende's government in Chile to again, its escalation of the nuclear arms and all Europe Southern as Consider, practices methods. race. against Consider, consider Or the game- and decisi on-theoretic models concern just USA and its adversary USSR, which its its extensive export of arms and violent strategic planning, American American. promoting Americans and things American practices in Latin America (or elsewhere in the world), differently, from making conditions favourable part of the monolithic West, perhaps occasionally adding but rarely or never considering Hemisphere - so that either Australia is part of America as the Poland It had better be away from too much public exposure because Australians, no more* th-atffrNew Zealanders, mostly do not like being pushed around, even by Americans. 7. Nor, though this is a longer story , does Australian culture by any means coincide with American: see CPD. Thus a uniform treatment is entirely inappropriate. Similarly, a single overarching treatment for a mono­ lithic West is thoroughly inadequate. 5 �8 may be of Russia or it is nothing. Or consider American interests not merely in Soviet and communist containment, but. in containing socialism such as might (under more auspicious conditions) flourish in Australia. to answering inappropriate American interests is accordingly inappropriate for Australia, for their defence thinking applies also and to work out a policy appropriate Australian do Australians should Antipodean socialism. for Australia. representatives, political who implausible American views and begin on developing parroting and original ones.) local An American policy America, like Russia, own (That should stop genuinely some is busy meddling in Africa, (SB, p.24) . but 'Australian security interests are not directly involved'’ Should we be tagging along after the Americans in support of installation of the their free-enterprise (rip-off) capitalism everywhere feasible (i.e. socialists state seriously course - or of Much opposition governments, in has, freedom umbrella, active already this sort What 'keeping the free world of context, multiple what mainstream American culture to and undermining of social and socialist quite free7? Of meanings and admits mainstream Australian culture would exclude: bullying they control)? heavily is it laughingly - call freedom associations. don't that under the for instance, programs and of smal1 countries that impose barriers to US business part of "free enterprise"), etc. freedom Misinformation, agree about, to live and work where one chooses, on. These are certainly important freedoms, better upheld in some parts of the unaligned West (e.g. Sweden, Switzerland) of the Eastern Block. But many of the older freedoms century, such as freedom to travel, requires permits, 8. licences, than in most parts have to work and live abroad, passports, ... vanished etc.; And many more of these this now one former Australian planning should be looking at strategic models (game-theoretic and other) which include Australia. For, as argued below, adandoning the uniformity assumption of the monolithic West, of the West as one parish, makes very significant differences to the results yielded. 6 �are being or have been eroded; •freedoms restricted zones, nuclearism in soon it will be identity documents-, as already in parts of the "free ID cards, Now West". to protect, [the Greens] point to the new laws proposed in 1983 designed to keep citizens Europe 'is devouring the very freedom it is said assembling to protest deployment of the Pershing II and cruise missiles' from of security 'secrecy, the lack state, of Further structural changes required for pp.58-9). (Capra and Spretnak, incompatible with permanent commentability, freedoms, democratic emergency, the include of concentration authority, peacetime militarism, extensive apparatus of state intelligence and Nuclearism is not a smart strategy to preserve police'’ (Falk, in Feith p.24) . remaining freedoms. Inherited 2. other-reliance, and the populist and elitist___ cases—for patronaqe. Australia's defence rather than regularly policy, such as it is, (re)thought through. the legal method of precedence, may wel1, furthermore But that procedure - essentially and here does, applied to defence. exclude significant The unsatisfactory decision-making practices that will For al ternatives. be revealed in the of defence are by no means restricted to defence but are typical of case kind of advanced age (or aged) 1abours those both inheri.ted whatever its very limited satisfactoriness in legalistic decision making - is defective when precedence is under. Cock capi tali sm Australia operates under, has summed up these practices neatly in features of aged capitalism (what he calls the or rather setting the Corporate State) New Left and the Alternative Australia movements were the down which reacting revoI ting against: Decisions were made from the top and on the basis of vested political interests, rather than by rational goals and means that served public interests. The people were rarely consulted effectively before a decision and often only partially informed afterwards. Pl an ni ng..was. based on a mere extension of the present. ... activists felt they were given little opportunity to choose how they lived or worked. The availability of space, time, trees and air was also determined by others . ..(2/(p.l8 italics added). 7 or �As also is one's defence, military and civil, the matter of whether one lives in a nuclear target or not, etc. A major inherited assumption is that of other reliance, defence depends on other more powerful allies. Australia That ally was firstly Britain, but in any event the assumption is that to be and since World War II America; safe that Australia's needs a powerful patron, a protector. A corollary is that Australia adopts a suitably submissive relation to its patron, making expected And for the most part it has; 10 policy does not come cheap. concessions. The however such a defence insurance other-reliance assumption is unsound, important, it for several reasons. characteristically depends upon the following themes, Most all which lack solid foundation: 1. Austral i ar/ is threatened - or at least 1A. Australia/ is likely to be threatened in the near future. 2. Australia cannot defend itself. 3. It can however rely upon its patron (or ally?, i.e. upon the USA. three themes in fact make up what has been cal led the populist case for 11 the ANZUS alliance. It is very different from the elitist case for ANZUS, These said to hold sway with the Australian government, which, while insisting upon premiss 3, essentially rejects 1 and 2 and claims instead 4. Australia has a vital interest in global stability. 9, (From previous page) Cock goes on: 'These basic issues increasingly become lost in the array of consumer choices'. [Add Covernment__ react_ive poi n t]. 10. It costs not only money, but independence.'... the serf societies - more or less willingly - accept the status of "allies", i.e. protection with rights and duties as in feudal societies. They become client countries' (Galtung, p.169). 11. So-called by Mack PC. But the formulation presented follows G. Davidson's more satisfactory account in Canberra Times, Wednesday, May 8, 1985, p.2. Mack considers that what amounts to the elitist case is the 'altogether more sophisticated argument [which] holds sway ... in government' (p.l). 8 �Global 5. stability is under threat (constantly) by an expansionist Soviet Un ion. 6. Only USA can contain the Soviet threat and hold the global balance. But the USA technique for holding global balance is in part through a network of alliances like ANZUS. further Obviously premisses are required to reach the that conclusion Australia should be participating in an alliance, and what is more, hosting US defence facilities and so forth. A first such premise is no-shirking the theme that Australia should be contributing its part to "holding the balance". Even this first further step is pretty shaky; in a rather ramshackle case, (and since premisses 5 and 6 are decidedly 4 may involve some equivocation). Australia’s vital interests as we shall see, one shaky step are not dubious For it can be plausibly argued guaranteed by US techniques, that which threaten to upset the whole applecart, and can be obtained by alternative more satisfactory means outside of such soft alliances as ANZUS. contends, Mack it In any case, is unclear that our contribution enhances global as nuclear stability (see Davidson). There is a more pernicious regionalist version of the elitist which might be called the offshore el i t i st. position. Australia can defend itself against regional 2R)t. position, This position grants threats, and can look after i tself regional Iy. But it does not (as indeed other qualified elitist positions may 1A. Nhat the offshore position insists is 1AH. Since these interests companies abroad, internal Australian Australians or or whatever - may have little or nothing to do -perhaps security, concerned with this premiss trade, represents an extremely important shift (a shift not unrelated to the inverse bureaucratic shift war In grant Australia's interests could be threatened in the near future. Australian with not) to defence). extended form from It goes further than what has been called forward defence. the offshore position does call 9 for some sort of global �or police force ready to intervene whenever a "free port" policeman looks like closing its doors,. the elitist position is anywhere Part of the difficulty in getting to grips with that it tends to slide to through the offshore position (by way of now evident immediate positions). against both the populist and elitist cases, arguments The against virtually justify but a fairly brief outline of some of the main points course a just couple of themes 1 through 7 are but there have been through some indeed familiar sufficiently of defections from themes 1 both cases, defeat logically al 1 and Of involved. would 7 to serve repair interesting attempts, designed to float the arguments on diminished premisses. 3. The brief against the popular populist case. While Australia is not at present under notice of Contra 1 and 1A. veiled threat or harassment from abroad, appears to believe that it is. or parliamentary view, view as persists, kept deliberately parties are populist well case alliance (e.g. the public. in way in the dark (or even purposes. enough false, are aware that the misinformed), main main this because assumptions the to interest In particular they have gone out of their cast doubt upon the connected assumption that US is to the American are much more difficult to sell a reliable threats. Thus long-standing Australian psychological allowed suits underlying Accordingly the parties and Government have no political to been political Australian the reasons for which they support those of the elitist case) guarantor against all been informed, the The populace has it has. Although both undermining the populist case. not not it is worth inquiring why the popular the opinion polls reveal government bipartisan a (bare) majority of its population As the popular view is administrative, threat, stand,, and has informational and educational effort. 10 not been insecurity about security has assuaged In particular, by any requisite older attitudes to Asia �X persist not far below the surface of popular Australia: fear, and mistrust xenophobia, patched over by a pragmatic attachment to trade and tourism. This misplaced insecurity is fuelled by popular misconceptions of Australia and its place in the world: metaphorically, that Australia is a luscious plum ripe for instead of the Asian view that Australia, so far as they are Eastern picking, as a remote desiccated place perhaps good for some trade. aware of it at all, to get towards more concrete assumptions, Or, Australians apparently tend to view their country as affluent but underpopulated, resource rich but largely Yet not far to the north are Asian hordes who are impoverished, defenceless. 12 resource poor, etc. The view is seriously out of touch with reality. Parts of Asia are at least as affluent (on conventional economic indicators.) do not see themselves as overpopulated, as Australia. now They in a way that calls for mass exodus; and in those areas which are as overpopulated as Europe, such as Java, bribes and force are required to move people on transmigration programs to relatively unoccupied parts of the Indonesian empire. can So far as they require them, they purchase Australian resources - which are not unique - much more (even carrying significant local cheaply subsidies) and easily than they could obtain 13 them by seizure. For these sorts of reasons, and because Australia itself poses no threat, no other state has an interest in attempting to invade Australia. for interests, to launch so it is for capabilities. a successful invasion of Australia, capacity in the near future. TF. No regional As it is power has the capacity or is likely to have such a As the joint Parliamentary Committee concluded, The "Asian hordes" fd\dn one of the less spoken about successors to Yellow Peril, of immediate past days of the Asian communist threat the and the Domino theory. 13. As Stephenson argued, less fortunately, 20 years ago. Even when around World War II Japan, did have interest in access to strategic raw materials, the Japanese High Command decided against invading Australia because of the difficulty of dealing with the people - a point of much impor tance. 11 �Currently only the United States would have the physical launch a -full scale invasion of Australia, motive to do so (TAS, p.94) . to capacity and it clearly lacks any As the report also stated, quoting Synnot (former Chief of Defence Staff), ... to raise the sort of force which would be required for a mass invasion of Australia could not possibly be done in under five years by other than the superpowers (TAS) . But neither superpower is at all likely to expend effort or resources to such an end. obvious An which at once arises is: (A later serious question to entertain is: defence? on question security, collectively provided global forthwith to unilateral disarmament? now-standard telling bother Why with why not be a free-rider Why such as it is?) Mack for one, then not proceed having reassembled the for the case that Australia is not threatened 'now or foreseeable future', and so having broken the populist argument, is confronted by the awkward option of unilateral disarmament for Australia. proceeds and points to the dependence of premisses 1 and 1A on premiss retreat, hasty to claim that 'the populist case for ANZUS is without premisses 1 and 1A. While it sustained' assumptions which is approximating appears capabilities it decisive of potential 2, even may sometimes take it is true that the arguments against 1 and 1A resistance, a It is however a decidedly problematic retreat. for granted that Australia can look after itself to some some He stages far from clear that premiss 2. given the invaders. they Consider the (estimated) put up essentially on extent, depend no-interests argument, limited invasion very The main consideration adduced appears to depend in no essential way, indeed in no obvious way at all, on Australia s dynamic fighting forces. Australia mineral resources, for instance, obtained more readily and cheaply by market methods than simply be ones. What this seems to show is that a rather minimal military streamlined force, if any, would presently meet Australia's military requirements. 12 can �It is as not if Australia The whole nonmilitary defence is available on a continent well popular training in defence methods, character that apparatus of suited to its use, though requisite to Australia would be a difficult place govern, Australians a difficult lot to subjugate. Australian a But even without a population trained in its techniques. lacking without defenceless'’ 'entirely 1 ike a babe-in-arms. mi 1itary force, conventional is deterred It was such features of the the Japanese a on previous occasion ^If the invasion is attempted, the Australians, in view of their national character, would resist to the end. Also, because the geographical conditions of Australia present numerous difficulties in a military sense, it is apparent that a military venture in that country would be a diff icul t one** (.TAS, p.62) . The still hold good, points parts any such program of nonmilitary to putting and could be strengthened. defence: making it abroad (ideally with dinkum Australian exaggeration) it several There are happen, and that it has happened. the issue of alternative defence we are bound to To when Australia is not threatened, appropriate, is a good occasion to reconsider adapt defence arrangements. now, For return. and, if For example, it looks very much as if enormous sums, which could be valuably directed elsewhere, are being spent, But a much more effective and to make many Australians feel secure. largely inexpensive way to such results would be through requisite mass education therapy - with, psychological if it were well done, much more and satisfactory results, a more secure and better informa^~popu1 ace. Contra 2. As capabilities, basically enormous isolation. well in a a result of post-War developments in weapons systems and the military defence of Australia has become much easier. matter advantages strategic In advance of enhancing through robust particular, of and Australia enjoys by reliable virtue of systems through modern destroyed by precision guided munitions. radar warning It is the geographical any maritime invading force can now be arrival, C3I detected systems, and And any invaders that did manage to gain a foothold on Australian soil would face severe logistic problems, and be 13 �subject deal There is to disproportionate response -from local defence. Boys'’ of and weapon Own War Games stuff concerning contemporary great a which would serve to turn Australia into a pretty invulnerable systems C3I armed fortress, and into an extremely difficult territory even were the oceanic moat crossed and the fortress entered (see especially D. Martin). such Under invasion even armed neutrality and fortified Australia defence from outside the region by an inimical world resisted with reasonable prospect of success. to such an invasion; mount There is no power at all Nonetheless the threat their elected representatives. But the Soviet undertaken such a long-range massive force projection, so, be likely one ooviet a of is taken seriously not only by the larger populace but by committees invasion of could there is apparently (according to TAS) only the Australian population!). of power our good ally the USA (reckoned however a likely invader by power that could, 6-77. scenarios, has military never is ill-equipped to do lacks any plausible reason to try such a stunt (for details see e.g. and The only credible Soviet threat to Australia is in the context of D. Martin). a superpower war, when American facilities in Australia and perhaps Australian would be struck at by intercontinental missiles. cities, it is highly unlikely that it would be followed or accompanied by bad enough, an Soviet forces are once again not sufficent, invasion. sufficient elsewhere While this would be by the Soviets for that sort of diversion; in a superpower war; and not thought they would be required and they would be devastated, unless UoA is militarily even more incompetent than sometimes depicted. Contra 3. cannot be relied upon, rash What will be argued is not the negation of 3, but that premiss 3 is dubious, to place excess reliance on American protection. that the Americans and that it would That being so, be and other patrons being even less promising, Australia should look more to its own resources, as the American administration is kindly advising. Especially since the American "Vietnam debacle" and the fall of 14 Saigon, �things have changed in important ways which cast doubt on the reliability of American patronage. The relative economic and military strength of the USA has declined. a. no longer has such a large share of world product(ivity) a of policy, matter (see Appendix 1); US world warfighting aspirations have Its ability to act as, reduced. It as explicitly been and afford to be, global policeman has also significantly declined (see further Appendix 1) . b. The willingness of Americans to engage in foreign wars has correspondingly tumbled. hawks, sure, be to American administration includes the Although more people and Congress are no longer in the enough than for a /mood gratuitous foreign adventures, especially when the fun may not appear to be in American This "Vietnam syndrome" popular opposition to overseas military involvement. has major a as served strong US opinion polls regularly show Since Vietnam, interests. constraint on US military policy foreign and involvement. c. One Doctrine manifestation important called which 196'?, of the foregoing of elements upon US regional allies responsibility for their own defence in regional conflicts. to the is take Guam primary Another important are outcome is Defense statements to the pointed effect that before US troops committed abroad there must be reasonable assurance no US vital each and 'such is impossible to guarantee - especially for remote countries where national Certainly that Congressional As Mack comments, popular support (Weinberger, assurance of no interests are at stake''. more is assured under the ANZUS treaty which only signatory constitutional consultation; reported in PC p.14). 'act to meet the common danger in accordance processes' (article 4). All reassurances? 15 its is Isn't the treaty backed None that are not undermined by in American administrative multiple-speak. with the treaty strictly requires there is no undertaking or commitment. up by informal verbal provide others, �the elite view is that Australia has to 'work ... Even 'the threshold of direct US combat involvement could be quite For the of US support'" and that the Americans cannot be counted upon always. prospect to help Australia in other ways'". a However special case has been made American for military undertakings (in Vietnam, Cambodia, Iran) common friendship, and shared values and democratic interests, second, and, culture earlier traditions. as first, and slow constitutional already indicated, the basis is shaky. And here, a common pleading: hardly sustains the adequacy of the basis evidence in to as to the adequacy of the basis for the possibility the American people, Congress, cases. reliability - on the basis of permanent There are two difficul ties with this type of special His tori cal (SB, pp. 29-30) . case - as opposed to examples of American abandonment of Australia's and cannot rely upon Ub support in a ... defence emer qen c y ar i s i n g w i t h i n ou r own n e i gh bou r h ood' the basis, high, at the time could significantly limit US willingness or ability circumstances a to maximize significantly on quite crucial issues. rather America: shared by Australia and processes. analogous in For there is not values diverge interests always common, Even as missile testing and nuclear ships issues in the South Pacific have recently confirmed. Common Indonesia opposing did not appear wheir? Australia was interests claim to West Papua. It is dubious at considering least that American interests would coincide with Australian in disputes or confrontation with Asian nations to the North, e.g. Indonesia, Japan, etc. special case argument did hold water, Australia and America really were mates, There was in fact no treaty in operation in then the treaty would be otiose. 1942; Of course if the but by then American interests in countering the are at present Japanese were independently aroused. 14. Although neighbourhood contingencies ... impossible', as the pauper ap-i+e-’ 16 assessed a �4. Other-reliance and regional self-reliance A major problem with other-reliance for defence is then that it cannot be entirely reliable, deemed be tolerated. yet this is a place where unreliability can hardly for When the Indonesians are rolling into Brisbane it won't do Defence to call up with a message like that from Services, "We can't get there tomorrow", till "Or until after Congress meets". More seriously, handing defence over to others means handing control of our lives over to others, nuclear defence, given very which Antipodean administrations have opted means for many of us handing our lives likely In principle, Another problem is its cost. over, and for, it literally. quite if a btate hires out its defence it would no doubt look, other things being equal, for the cheaper bidder - if, that defence is, meterological market is complexion is a services, monopolistic, 15 , who commodity a sort, like The trouble with global etc. with currently only one at a national level, All shipping, national of supplier right the i • making and has this part of the case, the that defence is accordingly can exact a very high price, the whole country a nuclear target. appreciated of enough well, for not trying to force defence, which is plainly a collective good, into a marketable commodity. When a country can provide its own defence, it certainly makes very good for it to do so, since it normally has a stronger interest in sense its own defence than matter, then self-reliance not Just makes good sense but pays; other-reliance does not. most other parties. Should it also be cheaper in costs that But in that event, it does not need nuclear patrons, or to farm out some of its defence. 15. The French, who operate a global network second only to the Americans and more extensive than the Russians, with many forces in the Pacific region, have never been seriously considered. Yet in certain significant respects French social and cultural arrangements are closer to Antipodean ones than American arrangements are. In these days of technological warfare, the post-Waterloo loss record of the French should not be given too much weight; we don't after all look very hard at the American record of defeats and incompetence. 17 �r self-reliance Such as ANZUS and much of the apparent point such alliances undermines an important part of the older such of alliances. newer bipartisan approaches to defence try to combine them (thus e.g. However Beazley as reported by Davidson) - approaches which thus begin to empty of what content it had. little understanding, content, a but are merely vague ANZUS clear no contain of articles simple course is of course to allow them to be emptied an expensive and outdated insurance that the alliance, so Since the arrangements consultations beyond commitments of policy, It may however be death by seizure or convulsion should dies a natural death. American defence facilities American nuclear equipped or powered transport be excluded passage be c1osed or internationalised and from of Australia. treaty would no doubt sacrifice the deterrence and other advantages the That for case 16 supposedly affords , while making way for the greater advantages o+ neutralized nonalignment, of no longer being a nuclear target, etc. self-reliance pure and simple is insufficient. But consist of separable isolated pieces, dramatically, picture Australia will self-sufficient not as becomes increasingly evident. Most winter. The such as plants which are not not escape the effects of nuclear is much the same as for other objects, internally The world does but depend crucially on their environment - and indeed as for States themselves. The question then is what form the additional holistic component of policy should take? that appropriate the cricket game move is not taking sides (as in a kids' that is already set up) and doing one's bit for For that will not contribute to stability, rather to Put this way, it is almost obvious sectionalism and fragmentation, war game or confrontation. to a proper holistic approach, but and to bringing nuclear winter cIoser . 757 If Australia is not likely to be threatened there is no real deterrence advantage because nothinq to deter. Other advantages of the ANZUS alliance such as access to high-level intelligence are not only dubious (see PC, Martin) but not always guaranteed by the alliance as the black out of New Zealand shows. 18 �Other-re 1iance and self-reliance typically present a false contract, certainly do with pure self-reliance - a false contrast like that of partism and (EE, or p.223), at a particular level of and holism versus dependence In between lie a range of positions, one of which - favoured by isolationism. a long line of peacefully-disposed philosophers from Rousseau and Kant onwards - might be called integrated reliance or federated reliance. reach only certain inadequate levels, may which alignment, the monolithic East (or West). 5. Against elitist arguments stability, very as related arguments revolve around that securi ty and side, are value-laden terms, of are which But security. not cultural What stability comprehends in American administrative perception invariants. is other and 4 and 5 of the elitist argument turn around the crucial notion Premisses stabi1i ty the level of modern alliances are essentially coupled with opposition to an e.g. of But integration different from what highland villagers take it to include. In each case a system is stable if it returns to a given stationary state But relevant states and under perturbations of sufficiently small magnitude. the stationary among them are both relative to given frames of reference, /e.g, what is stable at a macrolevel may well not be at a microlevel. said of the superpowers, even remote events can threaten their interests or their associates ' and stability. disturb Trudeau As 'they share a global perception according to But lesser states or people, not counting which (p.10) remote IVA business or military^ as invariably view stability; by relevant, report bombs a* necessary to stability, contrast philosophers increasingly terrorism and as characteristically antithetical ad 4: a vital no and the see nuclear bombs as fix a* tools of to peace. interest in global stability and secur i ty? 1? Bureaucrats instability. Of course Australia �have, does what sizeable nation does not. interpretation conceals crucial differences, For Australia. in highly material to the argument. stability may well mean something different in USA from global means Certainly vitai interests are different. interested in containing socialism (in Australia as elsewhere), in rhetoric at least, popular more to socialism (or Mon-Soviet communism) global upset to containing equate communism and both with Soviet containment. containing motherhood But the determinable stability on American in Latin America, it America is and it tends, wi th socialism A continental swing or i n Africa, wou 1 d indeed wou I d and perception what significant effects on US business and investment; but it wou 1 d not on its own or affect most Australians or directly threaten upset and it certainly need not affect nuclear stability. Antipodean stability, Australians generally are not opposed in principle to socialism or notably interested in containing perhaps the opposite). (indeed spread not ought to be interested in defence of the the in system, Australia is not interested defence (American) it in, or enterprise" “free wherever of advanced capitalism its is presently initiated or imposed. It can be conceded, without granting the main thrust of the premiss Contra 5. that the Soviets are expansi onistic, in interested empires, extending their influence where they can. including American academics and sales people). spread, Marxism-Leninism, everywhere. in at least a weak sense that they The and are So also are most matter are many Indonesian (so for that But the Soviets have an ideological message an ideology they anticipate Americans also have a capitalist message, being installed free enterprise, which they are working to sell pretty much everywhere accessible to them; they need to be expansi onistic to have it adopted, Chinese little would and whereas the Russians and need simply wait for history to take its determined course (though assistance surely - reflecting legitimate doubt about spread progress wi thou t interfering). message is pernicious: this a determinism? Bu t (^he\^jreb^ Russian both are pernicious (for familiar reasons; 20 to see e.g., �Erlichs). some in threatens, proper question is whether Soviet international activity The damaging way, stability. global Soviet-American doubt No confrontation, as in the Cuba missile affair, does threaten stability; but not in way that has any bearing on Australian defence. a expansionary none Australia, military tendency, or has otherwise, fact In direct a of significance reaches into the Antipodes. Russian no effect on bo what is all the local excitement and anticipation about? The effect of Soviet expansionism is much exaggerated and from the Antipodes it is hardly a problem, Viewed qet locked addressed. of into unless the Soviets confrontation with USA - a real military internationalism, be hardly the heavies But confrontation apart, Soviet a great success story, does not seriously disturb stability, as seen from Australia. should distinguished be military access, involvement World control involving anything since influence. War II, In actual of global on the militarily, that of Afghanistan, have accomplished, especially in Europe. but success in western strategic lacks Europe, has they the force ratio And 21 case little had concerns might. not attempt lacking much plausibility. needed to be assured of both by their own standards of what is required standards. by But the idea of Soviet military adventure Europe is a Western invention and bogey, military what striking conspicuous The usual Western apprehension stability. and expansion the Russian record is hardly new territory, Soviets military The one with influence military, with the USA or several other states. comparison effect mere and potential -military, expansion types of a proper assessment of Soviet internationalism, For Soviet to problem a third nonaligned group which helps to referee and to prize global should With that problem however, the Antipodes can better assist as part apart, not by seconding and inciting the USA. in overexploited. the Soviets have no good The military and by reasons or �in undertaking such an exercise which would draw them into interests war. They client nuclear already -Face economic difficulties and trouble with East European states which they cannot control satisfactorily. The of Soviet inf1uence has largely been in the Third extension But it has hardly been successful, with as many failures and losses to record as Soviet "gains" - gains which add to the imperial burden countries wracked with problems, world. such as Uietnam. since they involve The Third World exercises are marred by Soviet ineptitude and limited by the state of their own economy. They scarcely displace the global structure enough to test its stability; and they produce no shock waves or even ripples in the Antipodes. 6. Contra the dancers the in East-West dance confrontation between the lead dancers. have destabilizing new weapons arms tension control an from escalating the With this US policies and Recent US practices and indeed highly destabilising, and weapons systems, because of rejection of arms race on earth and begin a new one in space. A vast practices more are because of control and because of star wars preparation which both and accelerate increase in and suspicion accompanies the arms race which is in large measure due to US intransigence and US war-fighting doctrines, built-in but than Soviet ones, Soviet proposals, the death, of as much to do as USSR ones. least at of The main current threat to world stability comes not from one incentives (see FAC). alliance or for pre-emption, new weapons systems, and deliberate abandonment of with arms Such considerations duly assembled demolish the theme that alignment with USA helps increase stability. American practices are to be resisted as much as Soviet. 6. The East-West balance argument; alignment versus neutrality. The need for Australian alignment with the USA is supposed to be shown by the East-W^st balance argument. This balance argument, which 17 premisses with the related elitist argument, runs as follows ; 7. Global stability is the key to world peace. shares key �8. of the international order is a matter of maintaining a Stability global But balance. 5. The global balance is constantly threatened by an expansionist USSR. The threat is [only] checked by the USA, which (6A.1) guarantees an open 6A. and pluralistic international ■?. order. indeed most vital Australia's primary security concern, is this interest, stability. Hence Australia's 10. role is to help America maintain the balance. The rest of Australia's in tervolvement to follow. taken then before practical assumes much that has already been rebutted, argument threat argument But there are many reasons for halting the reaches this stage of moral and it Soviet with American military arrangements is thesis is correct (i.e. detail. The for instance that the stabilizing 5) and that US policy is It also takes for granted, balance what now is at least (part of 6A). doubt, that American policy is directed at balance and deterrence, rather than serious in what the administration appears to be aiming at, straight superiority. event, that is not really engaged Australia balancing in some longer term so much as in helping USA win a nuclear war, feat, But in contradicting the goal of world peace of premiss 7. and its derivation. Contra 10 follow that strength is indicate, the Ta role is such a lackey's one. leaning America's direction, in as be If most the Presumably premiss balance of seems to evidence 5A.1 is designed to exclude putting its weight where it is effective, this not does team (that is what such images as the balanced tug-of-war of Australia teaming up with totalitarians. thouqht, should Australia's it then Australia should surely be throwing its slight weight in Eastern suggest). The derivation is inadequate; with would deplorable Nevertheless Australia given its own broader (From previous page) After some reconstruction, that is. For the argument, curiously referred as that of "central balance in newspaper level publications of academics, is never presented in requisite detail which is one reason why it has proved hard to criticise and refute. �interests objectives, could Australia fulfil and principles. which would enable it to make to world peace, contribution There are several satisfactory more among them nonalignment and neutrality. A more direct approach may Thus 10 is hardly wel1-supported or evident. be a better than throwing our Australian weight unrefIectively on one the balance. roles different of side the balance images and argument As a little reflection attests, points not in the direction intended, but towards nonalignment. Contra 4A (and peace, the preserves if of course false. USSR in this munitions dance, the escalation (the USSR relation). balance, hence and Again it takes two at least to checks the the history of the dance reveals that pace flowed from the interaction of the one partner of with the but for the USA, the USA would not be required to check the That is, other. the it can be granted that the USA is interlocked with and While tango. The theme that US maintains 4). interaction is two-way as with Hegel's master-slave famous Furthermore it looks as if, on a different historical trajectory, the main states of Western Europe could match the Soviet Union militarily (for they have comparable combined GNP, etc.) Thus it is doubtful see Appendix 1, resources, technological that the current Soviet build-up, produced in interaction with the USA, could only be, or have been, checked by the US. de 6A.1. As the premiss is only of marginal relevance to the argument, need only be noted that the international order the USA helps maintain very much to be desired. In its intervention, militarily, it leaves economically and indirectly, USA has assisted substantially in reducing plurality and openness, as well as in establishing or propping up rotten regimes, side of American imperialism is well enough documented, etc. The negative if not widely enough read or known by Americans. ad 8 and maintaining pass, the the equivocation on the balance. While balance is one stabi1i ty in the world arrangements that have presently balance structure can only carry so much loading. 24 way of come to Add too much �weight (of arms, and so forth) tension, The increasing probability of catastrophic probably catastrophically. fail, to both sides and the structure will breakdown, for a variety of reasons (accident, miscalculation, computer error, human interference, etc.), has been argued elsewhere (e.g. WPI) . While a certain neither overloaded nor overstressed balance may serve for stability, the present increasingly stressed balance will probably not. however, balance argument, neglects this dynamical situation, illegitimately balance switching from a (certain) balance in premiss 8 to the (on-going) subsequent premisses. The balance argument itself The breaks in down through of removing equivocati on. What dynamic picture also indicates is the importance the weight -from the balance, some reduction. position It most obviously by arms limitation and tension to a neutral points to a different role for Australia, too within the nonaligned grouping. It is to the emerging case for a different role for Australia, and to action for achieving this different role, that the positive argument will now gradually swing. The attacks inadequate upon East-West proposals (its to repair it. alleged good administrators This For example, Australia than with American trade argue, is a nonsequitur, and lots to the argument, and do not against nonalignment or neutralism is set pervasiveness of nuclear winter. for for The additions are inessential confusion and dust. the for a different role combined The main effect of these additions is to generate extra alliance and service. serve balance argument is typically of other He might as well things), so aligned be our sagacious because if the control balance fails we are all worse than ex nihilo quodlibet (for it also that balance is necessary for the stability). dead. suggests But, in the main, the attack is irrelevant because the point of nonalignment, is to help remove overload and to break down confrontation and its escalation to war; before winter descends, it is a thing to do to delay or halt its descent, 25 now, and most important, to �reduce its severity. Australia's weight may be slight, another irrelevant addition goes, psychologically it is important for the West. disease" would show the weakening f or Sovi e t ex pan s i on ism. virtual 1y alignment, Australi a gives the Bell, Any further spread of the "Kiwi of Western resolve, and give the green light a leading exponent of the balance argument, impression that if Australia dropped through the isles to Russians would be on the road down 18 the tomorrow. Much of this sort of rhetoric i =■ reminiscent of f such military interests, set route, major American of out the The Russians have no baseless fear-mongering of an earlier pre-Uietnam time, and but out, t ie or present capabli A of they would be met by substantial resistance along most the for one, has and the resistance obtaining Western assistance. interests, Philippines, strengthening And if they were to gear up different as well the from Australia's, as elsewhere in East Asia. depends, argument, in For America, Indonesia in both The addition, its "green light from so far for expansion" comparison, on the previously faulted premiss 5 of Soviet expansionism. or another In fact most of the case against alignment of one sort it is argued. for often nonalignment and neutrality are, au th or i tar i an assumptions. style, Cat 1ey, simply for denounced example, - turns - when in good old-fashioned upon al ready another exponent of "central fau1 ted balance", presents the following 'consideration'': ... whatever the Swedes or Swiss may think about the matter, Australia is locked by considerations of culture, economics, and political philosophy into the defence of the Western world. It has both an obligation and a duty to contribute its share to that cannot easily be defence if necessary by hosting facilities which located elsewhere (p.15). The premiss is false for reasons essentially indicated: Nay sustains the conclusion, prescriptive 18. and the premiss in no the argument involving among other things, (is-ought) fallacy. Consider the premiss. Australia is See the discussion of Bell's claims in D. Martin and in Mack PC. 26 the not, �k unless Catley has information withheld from most of the rest of us,locked into Western nuclear defence, its but in principle free to reconsider and rethink use of the "facilities" is not irrevocable, and shortly options. (American comes up . >, economics and political philosophy provide locks and chains for Australia but f©.r reconsideration.) in principle at least, not for nonaligned Western European states? part USA or altogether a client of frameworks economic and They do not: state; and philosophies political significantly different (for details, defence (as, practices e.g., ANZUS in al 1 of culture, Australia is not a cultures, the interests, are nations two But even if the ideological see CPD) . frameworks were much more similar than they are, the How do that would not entail its weakness similar nor shows), any defence obligations. of Most worse. the arguments against nonalignment are of Catley Fortunately, calibre - or the case against nonalignment is (as with several then, o-f the above points) developed in detail elsewhere, especially by 0. Martin in his examination of counter-arguments to Australian armed neutrality, legally recognised nonbelligerent form of nonalignment he favours. al 1 of Martin's argument is couched in negative form; very brief. make this his positive brief us secure against such dangers as we may one day have to meet, needlessless is exposes to other dangers, correct enough, Virtual 1y alignment or alliance with the USA It reduces to thi including nuclear war' and in need of wide propagation, exhausts the positive case for nonalignment. posi t ive case of much theoretical interest, the it cannot while means no In particular there is a to be drawn from the it Wh i 1 e (p.l). by is more burgeon i ng theory of collective goods and action. 7. Free riding, group size, and increasing variety. The with strategic more convenience) world situation we now confront can be viewed as than 100 players, major a game counting in nation-states and leaving out (for organisations such as the largest 100 transnational �These compan i es. organisational players align themselves around two arge poles. East and West, as indicated: EAST NON-ALIGNED N WEST N India N Sweden# Swi tzer 1 and# Tanzani a Most Latin . American States! ## Costa Rica State commmun i st State capitali st N: Nuclear weapons states #: Neutral states ##: Nonmi 1i tary states Key: There are various - a great many - games these state players are playing, Some of these of which are practically important for peace and for stability. such games, as representation), World are Empire and Chicken (already There are several problems about East-Nest games: have, the Russian what under played played essentially between the East-Nest representation negative sum characters of some games. may, as they will with the Big One), end after one round, And the monolithic East - way simplifications may). So game theoretical representation they like the monolithic Nest dichotomy is misleading, and, as will appear, discards crucial detail the one superplayers. repeatability of the games (clearly some nuclear games roulette, =ome will (in be approached differently and more obliquely. Nor 1d security, (technically, in like regional and local joint security, is a collective good supply and precluding exclusion). 28 That is not of �to course say that there are not conditions under which security for instance where security is guaranteed by a narrow and much to be desired, intolerant despotism; provisioning, it can be argued, but then, not the particular product. collection of N nation-states. It is, the trouble lies with the It is a collective good G for the furthermore, a collective good permits the possibility of free-riding by nation-states. perspective the American complaint about its allies, insufficient expenditure on defence, their leave may which Looked at from this and Japan for example, is a complaint about their free riding. Within the balance of power framework the conditions for free-riding extracted by Pettit) are satisfied, disarming states. For to the achievement (or maintenance) of G by any will make every member­ and any, unilaterally is available to all N members of the collective if it is available G 1. for instance by neutral and (as better off. 2. G is achieved iff some number m^K contribute towards its provision, where under the balance of power assumption IICTK^N and II = (USA, USSR}. The 3. expected value of contributing to G or its maintenance is less than the expected value of not doing so, i.e. likely costs exceed likely benefits except for perhaps members of II given that G is provided by II. is There pegged by what free-rider problem, members of II for whom the free-rider option is not open - within ran be called a pegged (or asymmetric) the confines of the balance of power assumption - and for whom condition 3 only satisfied under certain ways of looking at the matter (e.g. a war 10 years down the road so the expected costs each—year is there will be exceed the expected benefits). There regional) is a straightforward case for recommending free riding on the balance of power provision of 6. 2? Australian (and Some arguments, �beyond or adding to those already in effect presented, are these:- Either If it does then the region is better off than it would be if or it does not. (strongly) the as and there is a large-scale war stability breaks down catastrophically aligned because it is unlikely to be (so heavily) targetted. (Here dreadful new argument that nuclear winter means that the Antipodes might well be involved gets challenged and rejected: see MF). doesn't break down then the region has the benefits in any case, enhances global USA stability, indeed, as remarked and wi11 etc.; regional weight significant? of delusional the in That power? framework. Ne shouldn't: we believe seriously it and if we do we're is the in living in a Australia has been left out of the picture in virtually strategic planning exercises, all do Australian voice makes much real difference the Northern Western block, be As regards Australasian further argued, the evidence points to the contrary. halls the without For there is no clear evidence that our alignment and cooperation with costs. the stability If most difference-making peace initiative^, etc., etc. Now riding, Eastern rather countries would hardly block th an suppor t of f ering object (h owever to free Antipodean c omf or t trifling), an d Furthermore free riding is how the Americans, incitement to their opposition. the rational would expect Australia to act, on their theoretical principles self interested procedure (see CPD). It is economically rational; contributing is not. But won't the Americans make things economically dear for Australia? In threats and theory, do yes; but in practice, no more than they threatened already in the case of New Zealand with the nuclear-ships issue. short term arrangements: aberrations, America will never give up trade But or to for market one gets the impression that America would trade with the Devil Himself if it could open some new markets in Hell. Despite its political stigma, way immoral or irregular. voluntary payment system, free riding need be no problem, Perhaps the buses are free; perhaps there to which only some need contribute, 30 or in any etc. i => a Hi th the �contributing is not (see nuclear fix, free riding is indeed the moral course; HPI). Free riding, though often portrayed as a problem, is only a problem in certain and desirable sufficiently riders. collective of cases is This in Australia stays the the escalating treadmill or gets is, off is involved many too free which will whether or security, and precarious way that it curious on good will not be provided because of the situation with global not the provided, where provisioning, rides and be not free. Australia's free riding may be a problem for America; it is not for Australia. Interests diverge again. of stability by building, tripod or bipedal one, for example, if it is a wind tower or of supports increases stability. instance in the theory of "spreading the risks" certain a cybernetics. free The increases and by similar Then a than a has in diversity ecology, for The related theme, (see EH). stability, that theme The elaborated been in core eco-systemic idea to be developed is that Australia's and consequent nonalignment in defence riding variety, variety topple point the Increasing the diversity, with stability has been sharpened and confirmed correlates that ground. a quadrapod tower is much less likely to and requires less guying to stay up. variety, certain increasing its rigid ties or supports to the better terms, pictorial structure is typically increased up to a it more adequately; securing or a In riding increases stability. free Judicious enhances diversity accordingly increases stability (especially if done in and concert with other client states). Two hardly interlocked well precarious guyed, structure well dug in but stability of the Hhat makes engineering sense is not supports in tension, are inadequate of world peace. East and Hest, for the long term however strengthening the supports that are there, balance is disturbed by the Host's surging ahead and likely overburdening the structure, helping the East when the but increasing the variety of supports, enlarging and diversifying 31 �group size. East-monolithic monolithic The West picture misconceptualism perhaps convenient ■for some players. in conceptualism, main reason for mistakes concerns group size. collective but is significantly differs behaviour of large groups theory in group size is a highly significant factor (though group ■from that of smal I One Whereas 11+ = (West, East) is a N of nation-states is not. number the group, a It may ■force mistakes convenient simplification, e.g. for strategic thinking. smal1 than more much is i t s pr ec i se i mpor t is increasingly contested). N of nation-states is a large group The group, of interested parties, indeed of substantially economic actors. the American theory of collective action applies: that interest, counterintuitive way. a in behave self essentially So we may expect wi 1 1 that the groups Though expec ted to act in the to obtain security in particular, the collection will not. common On this account (that elaborated by Olson), the common interest can only be guaranteed by outside influence or imposition (coercion in Olson's rapid thinking). there is, as experience has shown, no outside with the collective of nations, mediator collective or influence good. The But of sufficient authority to ensure attainment prognosis looks very gloomy: this of the important most (though far from unique) collective good will not be provided. Fortunately the reasoning, has been containing shift economic virtually (subjectively) back actors though large. highly is to basics, all privileged, for whom costs of war exceed benefits in perspective from the earlier free riding condi t i on important that The group, too swift. several like much of the "logic" of collective action, 3). effect of the knowledge of an ominous nuclear actors involved should now be expected in that (note in the Indeed an winter is posit i on; costs of nuclear war have become very high. for go Olson's grand theory is based on the accountants/-----tautology (defining 'net') 32 �gross agent benefits - gross agent costs. net agent benefit i.e. A for each agent or actor i ymbols, in show i for virtually all that in N. is positive for some i is privi1eqed if A group (in collective N) , European to benefi t s of global security are decidedly positive (e.g. respective future GDPs would expectedly fal 1 needs 1 the net wi th a nuclear war nation-states argument their It to near zero). The fact the group of nation-states is privileged does not however imply that the that good i nvo1ved, c o1 Iec t i ve longer term. error, stability ■ JI instabi1i ty. dynamics, An achieved improved particularly in wi11 be supplied, secur i ty, dynami c ; it takes no account of mistake. through superiority modelling or intermediate - which can take some account iterated games — is gained by returning to through the the of game theoretic ground A free rider "problem" is tantamount to a dilemma of some sort; according to conventional wisdom, the contrast Taylor and Hard). it is a prisoners' (cf. dilemma The argument can go this but Pettit, way;- a free rider problem or issue is defined in terms of the provisioning of a collective good; theory the but of collective goods is equivalent to that of a prisoners 20 dilemma. dilemma; in detail which more Certainly the global nuclear situation as much is a commonplace claim. appears Elsewhere (HPI) that it does indeed present a moral dilemma. to present a it has been argued Here the argument can proceed through the theoretical route just sketched above or in the piecemeal way to be indicated - is that it is also a prudential dilemma 21 (for members of N). 19. The less than perspicuous symbolism is that used in Hardin (82, p.20, p.39), but with agents' costs or contributions, C, duly agent relativized. Hardin misleadingly treats C as a fixed parameter, thus strictly falsifying the tautology. 20. Thus Hardin who (in 82) claims to 'demonstrate the equivalence of the logic of collective action and the Prisoners' Dilemma' (p.4). The demonstration, which will be contested elsewhere, is given on p.x.5ff. 21. But of course the two types of dilemma interconnect. �the range of apparent two party games being played by the US Hardin 83), Union Soviet (labelled US and SU respectively) administration regards the moves of further nuclear armament. (It is supposed, A, from the or nuclear disarmament, N. It is important here, as other French that The American people seem rather more were clearly opposed to the new nuclear missiles their people the towards nuclear disarmament than their administration; inclined to proceeded German administration The strategy games involved are then install. shots It is administrations or governments etc. take people into war; to places, administration - which for the most part calls the the society and the people. generally as that the game is set in some background context, naturally, Chinese nuclear armament). distinguish and 1985 in nuclear disarmament is not considered in isolation from on-going e.q. and (e.q. since these have obtained some discussion us consider -first, Let administration which we can suppose to be played over successive time intervals, e.q. games, years; so there is interaction and feedback as the games go on - until the Big Ones explode. The apparent games of US and SU are those diagrammed next: Pr i soners' A 4,1 D 2,2 O 1,4 this being played. According professions!1ez the A 1,4 CP presumably also represented US policy, it no aggressive, D A 4,1 D 3,2 US CP 1,4 to Hardin, 'giving evidence of Dilemma Prisoners' ordering of virtually all that A 4,1 that simplistic setting those represent the apparent games Within and D D 3,3 US IJS A SU SU SU D New Initial Game Revised Game Dilemma Game in (PD) 'represents [his] deformation the preference the articulate policy analysts in the United the Soviet Union' (p.248) . While PD there is considerable evidence (as already longer does, war-fighting, 34 That is, the US has States may have indicated) that the US administration has shifted to phase. are a interchanged more its �rankings of (D,D) Soviets, The have who been much more consistent no (and bound to try to keep up with the Americans, their changed However they are have stuck with deterrence and no-first-strike. but better doubt appear not to have in their policy pronouncements, censored) game, and (A,A), presumably some time between 1978 and 1984 games. and so pushed towards the Revised Game shown, which p1easan11y restores symmetry. Stable or equilibrium outcomes for each game are circled. said be to stable if neither player has unilaterally on the strength of the game, influencing provide in broad sense, a and dangerous outcome. strategy for each player; dominant that equilibirum In all All strategies. is hence its economic fascination. results which are socially suboptimal (and games that might plausibly be taken to represent situation, and A recognisably guaranteed by the independent "stable" strategies. substantial to political substantially the games satisficing the suboptimal superpower outcome socially superior is there are What is worse, and military incentives for the superpower players adjust their preferences in after repeated games, an And the same applies to suggested alternative Chicken. other a below all as in Pareto- even But as the threshold), such achieved yet in the PD game that is these games are di 1emmas. games these the apparent games arming is and suboptimal, strategies switch i.e. to alter the outcome except by player also to alter other dilemmas undesirable deliver the to incentive An outcome is not directions but to do what the US appears to have done, to make the situation worse. socially preferable would be change to a coordination game of Much some sort, for instance, to the game which neutrals tend to play (and which Lackey, in contrast to other more bellicose utilitarians, sees utilitarian superpowers playing; hence Hardin's label diagrammed, WN inclined neutral represents a for this game, 'Lackey's Game'). Western-inclined (e.g. Yugos1avi a): neutral and EN In the game an Eastern �A 3,2 D D (D A 2,3 NN Now 4,4 dilemmatic and coordination games are not played in the integrated since [Other coordination games, with (D,D) assigned (1,1) 1 in settings such as Uni ted Nations' committees games coordination are (and games peoples' -frequently but isolation, elsewhere, as well). Superimposing the games, as applied to US and SU games, leads to the following augmented games: SU SU SU A D A 2,2 4,1 1 2/3 3,3 • 1 4,1 . 2/3 1,4 • 2/3 2,2 D J,3 ■ 4 1,4 ■ A 2/3! A m represents a sequence of ms, and 3s in some order. As the agumented games reveal, a stable deadlock. on the superpowers. 4 i ■ e? ■ 2/3 4 ■ 2/3 a sequence of 2s m < m w rn in fact in several ways. on For example, would For one, enough significant much greater as a Superpower militarism Australia's nonaligned free impact, rider for disarmament and regional nuclear freedom (instead of by wash polemics and token ambassadors, US support) . 36 strategy with less support, unilateral action by US arms build-up can be exposed. be in much more pressure can be brought to bear- power excursions would stand naked, and unsupported. seriously <2,3 to play with a superpower is to help reinforce For another, towards disarmament. particular, 1,4 A a coordination game can alter the overall dominant playing administration 4,1 • 2/3 But playing an independent coordination game can help breaking the deadlock, players 3,2 ■ D 1 US US US A D D D New Game, Augmented Revi sed Game, Augmented Prisoners" Dilemma Augmented and in pressing white­ undermined by a none-too-tacit policy of �8. On the need for, possibility of, and prospect of basic structural change- The peace (in world has changed enormously since the time of Kant's proposals and even since the time of Veblen's more cynical (of 1795), additions Hard science and destructive power have grown enormously; and even 1917). especially that admitting knowledge of collective behaviour, theoretical game-theoretic treatment, what for though still has increased markedly. slight, be accomplished politically has in certain can little, since Rousseau complained (around 1761) of respects But changed very that governments were probably too short-sighted to appreciate the merits of his project for perpetual peace. Governments have obstacles to peace. long of source been seen as Xthe main (contingent) if the peace is Thus Veblen rightly maintains that ' ... to be kept it will have to come about irrespective of governmental management, - in spite of the State rather than by its good offices'- (p.7) . against the State on the basis that 'governmental Veblen argues and establishments powers ... are derived from feudal establishments of the Middle Ages; which in turn, However a predatory origin and of an irresponsible of are character Christian-feudal origin of the State provides only one the (p.r). - and a coercive - evolutionary pattern of organisation (pp. 12-13). There are major blockages to peace proposals and projects at two main and critical levels of organisation, that, organisation of collectives of states and, organisation deep, and domination of removal and to nothing set in part by devolution, themselves. these blockages, and exploitation of other forms, sights rather lower, short organisation of states, upon, The problems involved ones intertangled appears to call genuine global appear adequate. impossible in present political climates. 37 Yet even much the for are concerning extensive reached, to be attained, levels of political stability of extensive structural changes at both would of that of the Indeed if a permanent and satisfactory peace is to be adjustments. or individual focussed already smaller changes look �There is little doubt that certain sorts of structural change are to conducive peace and that certain fundamental permanent peace. for changes would be With that in view they have long been least from Rousseau and Kant onwards. transform the structures that lead to war'- (B. theme immune to criticisms, obvious further desiderata, modest material freedoms, ~ at advocated for 'it is also necessary instance to To render this Martin, p.12). that straightforward extension of certain established structures could bring an authoritarian to war, sufficient But it has also long been supposed that such changes are necessary for lasting peace: some highly end typically presupposed, are invoked, e.g. certain standards of life, etc., and the type of necessity involved is set at some lower technical level (not excluded however by present These adjustments make the necessity theme more difficult to practicalities). assess, but also difficult to sustain. are There part, critical positive part, part negative According marxist demolishing and range of arguments a defence, from a negative determinism, of comprising direct arguments for the theme. 22 this enterprise will simply be illustrated. to deterministic and mechanistic approaches, technological determinism, human nuclear weapons, The large such as that like of megamachines They are an integral part of the business of generally, are no aberration. industrial and ecological conquest, a further stage in human intervention which has already involved substantial disruption through pesticides, etc. The argument tends to the fatalistic. made, and once made they wi11 22. and etc., that arrangements have to be more or less the way they are, and nature, a parts to its assessment two be used. wastes, The megamachines of conquest are No change in political arrangement, More of the negative enterprise is attempted elsewhere, e.g. a critique of the supposed strait-jacket of human nature is begun in CPD. From Plato through Hegel and into contemporary times it has been supposed that war, like aggression, is part of human nature, that war is a permanent condition of human and social existence. 38 �would which enthusiasts any make difference, possible. is their position and luck, push While there is, unfortunately, a induction from the manufacture of weapons, batches machines are to this one, depl oyed) , never (and organisation deterministic position would possible either; political not frustrate the and other, is false, Different political arrangements, been have inductions. broader The are changes arrangements too, like the rest of social not life, are But (nonanalytical) determinism, technologically or economically determined. technological many that a change in background of course that such background is made of But even the good inductions do not that weapons of various sorts must be used, political many invention from induction's:- machines that do eventually get many reinvented or independently discovered). show of any given type (for or the like to their manufacture are unreliable and subject to counterexamples or weapon there is no stopping progress. But in doing so they overextend themsleves. fair technological that a even further, once invented by humans will be used: device Sometimes so it is argued which alleviate problems, are possible and would be different in differently evolved worlds. CPD). (JB, elsewhere technically Things did not and do not have to be the way they are or the social and political sort of way they are. Many routes, dominant require none of deductive strength, political extensive lead to the conclusion that the structures of our time, evolved from feudal structural alteration. In particular, institutions, they need to superseded by alternative structures which do not promote or lead to war. theme has been argued directly from the nuclear fix (see e.g. But suppose, improbable as it may seem, thereby removing the current nuclear fix; quietly seif-destructing,or nuclear disarmament HF I, p.4/ft.). that nuclear weapons all vanished, for instance, thermodynamic actually took place. The they turned out to be miracle occurred, or not be The problem of war would t-hat of nuclear war would only be given a short respite. 23 Conventional the structural arrangements for war would remain intact. removed For a massive be and even 3'? �remain, weapons would weapons such as chemical and biological ones, were they prevent the in sot ar 3S could seem be Nu clear weapon s, if nuclear power plants remained especially nothing and intact; development of (Star wars) weapons more nuclear- as dangerous caches are easily hidden away), removed ("for smal 1 replaced, would along with weapons perhaps as than diabolical nuclear ones. War cannot be eliminated while leaving the rest of society as it is by freezing the status quo. ... The structural conditions for war need to be removed - not reinforced as appeals to elites may do - and superseded by alternative structures which do not lead to war (B. Martin, p.12). Structural adjustments peace. An can provide conditions for Kantian initial for the argument satisfactory lasting proposition that is peace possible, presented by Latta (introducing Permanent Peace), runs as follows:Peace, perpetual peace, is an ideal, not merely of a speculative kind but a practical ideal, a moral principle. ought to be realised, i.e. there ought (morally) Hence this ideal to be peace. But ought entails can; therefore peace is possible. From Heracleitus philosophers by 24 be with war as one limit, is essential swarm more widely conceded, ought to though often not on of Some are even captivated stop, to motion and progress. the recent shift in philosophical fashions the second premiss would Kantian grounds, now but Such grounds do support the theme that peace ...is—desirable be realised, indicate what sort of peace. but are more discriminating in Unfortunately, premiss does not sustain the conclusion, 23? impressive such extravagant counter-claims as that with peace everything would consequentialist. and there buzzes an Hegel who have rejected the second premiss. that competition, With through that they help however/ it is done, the second ought does not entail can, as many (From previous page) As B. Martin, who uses this important form of argument for institutional change to get his thick book started, points ou t (pp. 12-13). 24. The swarm includes some anomalies, ecology, Spinoza: see Appendix 3. 40 such as that tarnished hero of deep �dilemmas reveal moral Fortunately (see MD) . conclusion that peace is possible, method of (semantical) modelling: societies where recall persists present in detail scenarios of it may be necessary to (for the sceptical with n = 1 or n = 0). n-human models, the to That is the more and indeed is feasible. elaborate peace route a more satisfactory and revealing is there This sort of thing is of course in more pleasing fashion than logicians could hope to emulate if 25 less precisely, by novelists. Hhat all these scenarios point to, already done, rather however, are societies considerably different from our own, not in the people involved who have their weaknesses, forth, and so their power drives, but because of significant structural alterations in the societies depi c ted. way of such modellings we can not merely argue to the feasibi1i ty By peace, sorts restructured push ahead with the argument - that societies but desirable alternatives to contemporary are For those of us industrial arrangements. pacific the alternatives, Heilbroner is has and possible said thoroughly entrenched, of the desirable, human and enforced, power. That has not deterred social before him and many after him, Kant, 25. in his search these military or then who want to move towards such from inference, feasibility and we shou1d begin on the real work of structural change. desirability is clear: Peace practical of of but the prospect). prospects Present poor (as arrangements are are both ideologically and by much physical theorists such as Kant, who like Rousseau were concerned with obtaining lasting for the indispensible conditions peace. for__ 1 asting—peace, Perhaps Kant had some such modellings in view in his theme that peace is empirically possible, which he coupled with his striking claim that it is morally and rationally imperative. The latter claim, running in direct opposition to the longline of bellicose philosophers, really relies on the correct but controversial assumption that states are subject to the same moral relations as individual persons. Both then have an obligation to seek peace derived from forms of the categorial morality, notably from rational autonomy , the universality of maxims, and the ultimate value of persons (or, more chauvinistically, of humanity). 41 �claimed, others as have claimed since, that peace is not possible present structural arrangements of a competing nation-states kind. times changed, have and so have state structural In particular there is now, under To be sure since arrangements, in the shape of the United Kant Nations, a very weak reflection of what Kant looked for, a world (or European) federation of nations. namely, But crucial the at ingredients in Kant's resolution are still upper level, what is required for a standard resolution Dilemma type situations - some surrender of Prisoners lacking:- of sovereignty, national 26 especially as regards war; Much has now accumulated that more evidence the and, at the lower level, "republican" state*. nation-state level far-reaching changes if peace is to be secured, or required at movement is even to get its message through already fixed channels control systems. succeed, tn informational and democratic are practical 27. and not (p.52) , to alter which the theoretical arguments for not that it has fallen very Kant's claim, as well as arguments of an inductive sort. Such is also the new message from America: for the peace movement to get through to the administration, American democracy must be overhauled and revitalised, capitalist democracy superseded by true democracy or "republicanism" (see e.g. Cohen and Ragers). But the message, like the US peace movements'" very limited demands for peace, leaves the state, as the bringer of wars, and the main source of violence, essentially intac.; the structural changes suggested, which will be slow to achieve, are much too narrowly conceived. 28. state has traced some of the economic consequences of 'the rise and subsequent fall of the American imperium'’ There to The significant decline of the American imperium Heilbroner 26^ peace Movements on a single front, such as peace, are unlikely to channels, 27 character and membership of state control system^. widen APPENDIX 1; a need to be linked into a broader plurality of movements, but are My thanks for information to David Bennett and Andrew Mack. �'Empires f ar . empire was no Thp =h<=pr military cost ... for the United States a 1 one ... 12 px c e p t i on « is always been expensive and the American have ten roughly imperial American dol1ars)". GNP for the last 25 years ... percent of supplemented spending enhanced poverty, countries fueled inflation, what it was represented as required by, $2X10 in capitalist other by 1972 etc., and was complemented by, counterexpenditure and efforts by the USSR. establishment of an American hegemony [consisted and] resulted 'The just in American large very capital American-owned billion" payments and Between 1950 and 1970, equipment abroad 1 eaped from $ 12 (negative build-up of value of the to billion "capital flows" and balances), and a $78 growing On this sort of basis Heilbroner speculates that of IOUs. operation rapid A result of the expenditure abroad was a serious balance of problem accumulation mere investments abroad. plant (p.54). but in the military expenditures, not of the American imperium by itself - deemed of such 'the critical importance to preserve the peace and security of the capitalist world - was in likelihood all a inflationary phenomena' the for the globalisation of the (p.57 with insert from p.56). According to Heilbroner, that condition sufficient 'Long before the Vietnam debacle, it was clear American arms could not prevent the rise of revolutionary governments in under-developed collapse there world" (p.57). is presented by Heilbroner; But and seemingly there little is evidence little. is more substantial evidence for is the marked dec H ng of *he imperium in the period (1973-3) concerned. decline really very in America's select leading national share of World GDP, economies: 43 of What American One piece of evidence is the sharp shown in the following table of �POPULATION SHARE (1984 est) SHARE OF WORLD GDP (X) RANK 1968 1975 1984 USA 1 35.0 24.3 25.0 5.2 USSR 2 11.1 11.0 13.8 6.2 .JAPAN 3 5.2 3.0 9.5 2.7 GERMANY FDR 4 5.1 6.7 5.7 1.5 FRANCE 5 4.6 5.4 4.4 1.3 CHINA 6 2.9 4.8 4.3 22.6 UK 8 2.8 2.8 2.3 1.3 INDIA 12 1.3 1.5 1.1 15.1 AUSTRALIA 15 1.1 1.4 1.0 0.3 COUNTRY The qrand table empire, also make it clear that if the USA cannot should nor can the USSR. sustain A totalitarian Pax Sovietica is even a le=s likely than a capitalistic Pax Americana was. APPENDIX 2: A pluralistic framework for defence policy The policy (broadeni ng Cami11 er izs suggest ions) 1. ensures Australian security to some minimal but reasonable extent; 2. is entirely non-nuclear (.and so is not aligned); 3. is defensive in posture with weapons system devoid of offensive application and capacity, focussing on direct defence of Continent, is decentralised, comprising wel1-trained, dispersed but coordinated small units. is partly at least social, defence, nonmilitary deploying, in combination [?] with territorial forms of popular resistance trained in noncooperat i on. 44 sabotage a �APPENDIX 3? The philosophical record; a preliminary tabulation. Reflection on war and peace has had a strong polarising effect, dividing philosophers into two main groups: Group B. Those who regard war as inevitable, perhaps even as desirable; Group G. Those who consider war an evil, capable of being replaced by lasting and peace through goodwill or improved social arrangements. The groups are not however exhaustive; fence-sitters; and there are there are ambivalent philosophers, and those who have the supported battered themes of a war to end wars and of world empire. at one stage in his development, to a despotic world state, peace. Russell, idealists. reached by imposition or war, B and G are sometimes described, But while Thus, for example, who looked, like Dante before him, So strictly the classification is (once again) Groups historically- as a guarantor of four valued. respectively, as realists and these overworked terms reflect accurately enough the historic human condition and the present prospects, they are prejudicial, and they conflict with other classifications using these terms; for instance, both Plato and Hegel, condition of human existence. idealists would Northedge, accept war as normally accounted idealists, have been a Such concoctions as war-realists preferable to the labels from whom much of the record is drawn, the c on serva t i ve t r ad i t i on a n d aboli t i on i sts. the concoctions, 45 terms and of sets the contrast: peace- which namely We shall prefer adaptions namely war-riors and peace-niks, simply (real) baddies and goodies. in permanent or, not to be of partisan, �DEFINING POLES R adi c a 1 s GROUP 8: war-riors RESIDUE GROUP GROUP G peace-niks Virtually all classic Greek phi1osophers except early Stoics: especially Heracleitus, Plato (P) Author of Revel at ions Early Christians (non-violence pr i n c i p 1 e) Dubois (1306); but with anti­ Musi im aim Erasmus ( 1570) Cruce (1623; early world order model Roman Stoics and Christians Scholastics: Aquinas (P) Dante •Just war theorists: (Au Qu s t i n e) , SuIr ez, Grotius (1425) IJ t op i an s: More (war­ games of modern utopias in direct descen t) European peace projects, some extended to (Christian) wor1d: Bel 1ers ( 1710), Penn (1693), abb£ de Saint-Pierre (1713) European peace and hegemony: Duke of Sully (1620) Nation-state theorists Machiave1 1 i, Hobbes, Locke, Spinoza I-<2'1 b n /f’-j German idealists: Hegel, Schopenhauer Perpetual peace: Rousseau, Kant Mili t ar i st s: Nietzsche; Treitschke, Bernhardi, Clausewi tz Some utili tar i ans: Bentham, the Mil Is, Bren tano Some anarchists and 1ibertarians: Kropotkin (?), Spencer Russel 1 ■James Hi t tgenstei n Key: In Dewey P, peace a prime objective. sort of investigation there are disappointments as this Spinoza was admiration madness to a major disappointment, of Greek thought, allow Brentano a find. well For, as finds. despite his 'Brentano was a decided pacifist and thought it questions of international fortunes of war'- (Kraus in Brentano, p.122). 46 justice to be decided by the �REFERENCES H.G. Andrewortha Birch, and L.C. University of Chicago The Ecological Neb, 1984. Press, H.R. Ashby, Design -for a Brain, Second edition. Hi ley. New York, I960. S. Beer, Desiqninq Freedom, Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, Toronto, F. Brentano, The Origin of our Knowledge of Right and Wrong, Keegan Paul, London 1969. 'Setting the J. Camilleri, disarmament agenda", l?/4. Routledge and Peace------ Studies 9, ( 1984) ,17-19. F. Capra and C. Spretnak, Green Politics, Hutchinson, London, R. Catley, with the Bomb ... 'Along Australian Magazine, 7-8 April, (Review o-f 1984. Martin), D. The—Weekend 1984. 1979. P. Cock, Alternative Australia, Qu ar t er Book s, Me1 hourn e, J. Cohen and J. Rogers, On Democracy, Penguin, New York, 1984. P. and A. Erlich, Popu1 ation, Resourses, Environment, Second edition, Freeman, San Francisco, H. Feith, 197x. 'Richard Falk, Peace Studies 24 (June 1985) World order radical', 24-5. J. Galtung, There are Alternatives, Spokesman, Nottingham, 17’84. A. Gilbert, 'The state and nature in Australia', Au s t r a 1i an Cu 1 t yral—Hist or 1981 (ed. S. Goldberg and F.B. Smith), Canberra, 1982, pp.9-28. R. Hardin, Co 1 1 ec 1 tive Action , Resources -for the Future, Washington, R. Hardin, M.D. Hayes, Ph i 1 osop_hy—and—Pub He 236-254. 'Defending September 1983) mutual disarmament', versus 'Unilateral Affairs 12 (1983) the sunburnt country', Chain Reaction 33 (August 11-17. R.L. Heilbroner, Beyond Boom and Bust, Norton, New York, 19/8. I. Kant, Perpetual Peace (trans, and introd. M. Campbell Sonnerschein, London, 1903 (first published 1795). A. Mack, 'Farewell 1?82. Smith), Swan to Arms Controls' 9 (1984) 9ff. A. Mack, 'The pros and cons of ANZUS', Fabian ANZUS Conference, Lome, 4-5 May 1985; referred to as PC. B. Martin, Uprooting War, Freedom Press, London, 1984. D. Martin, Armed Neutrality for Australia, Drummond Books, Melbourne, 47 1984. �Northedge, 'Peace , war and philosophy', in Encyclopedia of Phi 1osophy (ed. P. Edwards), Volume 6, Macmillan, New York, 1767, 63 t>< . M. Olson, The Logic of Collective Action, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1965. P. Pettit, 'Tree riding and foul dealing', typescript, Canberra, J.-J. Rousseau, A Project for Perpetual Peace C trans. 1927 (first published 1761). E.M. 1985 Nut tai), London, large-scale nuclear war and nuclear deterrence, 'On the ethics of R. Rout ley, out' , Discussion__ Papers__ in Environmental and the political fall School of Social Sciences, Australian National Ph i1osophy #5, Research University, 1984. R. R. Routlpy, 'Metaphysical fall-out from the nuclear predicament', 1 Ph 11osophy "and 1 Social Criticism 3/4 ( 1984) 19-34; referred to as MF. Rout ley and V. Plumwood, 'Moral dilemmas and the logic of deontic^notions , 'ni\r,.^.ign Papers in Environmen tai ..Philosophy #4, Research School of SociaT~Sciences, Australian National University, 1984; referred to as MD. P.R. Stephen son, The Foundation s of Cu1t u r e, N.J. M i1es, oydn ey, R. Sylvan, 'Culture Canberra, 1985; and the roots of political divergence', 1 ? 36. typescript, referred to as CPD. M. Taylor and H. Hard, 'Chickens, whales, and bumpy goods: al ternative models of public-goods provision', Poli tical Studies 30 (19821 350 370. The Strategic Basis of Australian Defence .Policy, the National Times, March 30-April 5, leaked extracts published in 1984, 23-30. to Australian Security, Pariiamentary Joint Committee for Foreign Affairs and Defence, Australian Government Printer, Canberra; referred .o 3. s TAS. T. Veblen, An Inquiry into the Nature of Peace and the Terms of Perpetuation, Viking Press, New York, 1945 (first published 191,). 48 its � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Draft Papers Description An account of the resource Sylvan's literary executor encountered an archive in which “all his projects were current", since manuscripts were undated and unattributed. Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document WORKING DRAFT AUSTRALIA'S DEFENCE PHILOSOPHY? Investigations of the nonexistent # MX504 'The opinions of philosophers, with regard to the conditions of the possibility of a public peace, shall be taken into consideration by states armed for war'' (Kant, 'A [the only] secret article for perpetual peace', p.158, an article flattering no doubt to philosophers, but neglecting their dominant bellicose tradition). A defence philosophy is much more than a defence policy. A policy can be merely by a list of directives as to what do in various given at even its philosophy policy best it need only involve practical into a theoretical setting, contrast, integration of a the which looks at the key concepts involved: security, stability, control, here, By wisdom. goes deeper and requires theoretical wisdom, circumstances; protection, defence, interests, national interests, intelligence, war, etc. Defence philosophy is a branch of political and social philosophy, and has long been treated as such, though under such more familiar and honest headings as "of war" and "of peace" (see Appendix Like most of philosophy it can be applied, parts in regional 3}. among ways others. defence A approaches to philosophy should embed appropriate defence arrangements war not merely and peace, or superficially into and "foreign policy", but into the way and intended way of life of a country, both into on­ going culture policy defence power and into the intended or planned typically takes prevailing socio-political structures for granted; questioning of merits cultural arrangements. arrangements a defence philosophy again penetrates or rejecting features of these structures, enquiring as things and institutions of which defence is planned, society should be defended by what sort of appropriate sort of what lengths. What, for instance, 1 is Australia what are A and deeper, to asking methods the what and Australi ans, concerned to defend, aiming to defend? defending, How much of what others have, Abroad? region? defending, Does preserving? defending? Would Indonesians made anyone a Randwick stage a or what we have, Eagle or racecourse, last stand for is worth Farm, merit Estate? Oaks strike in Australia .just lightning In the Here in Australia? to If remove the B.jelke- Petersen, should we resist? of the necessary prerequisites have been adequately thought about in Few Australia, unplanned where muddling through immediate problem - reactive contingency 1 generous - is the main style of political "planning", life, immediate if you help to supply it with one or more, to problem want and ipso facto of be to defence Its phi1osophers Australia does not yet have a defence philosophy. planning. could from and to inject some depth into broader defence theorizing. 1. Australian defence inappropriate "policy"; incoherent, obsolescent American, Indeed Australia seems to lack even a clear and coherent defence This pol icy. charge (made even by friends of Defence commonplace interested in 2 obtaining extra public funding for defence and elements of C3I). The reasons is concern not merely the major unsolved issues of exactly what is being defended, what things and objects and what interests, and whose, what freedoms and values; and what role American defence facilities in Australia supposed to have in this - but a range of more detailed lacunae such as: of clearly-defined on what needs defending and how it is priorities accomplished; doubtful contingencies in are lack to be capacity of present defence forces to handle low-level and to the north of Australia and in maritime zones; and 1. The point, which is not uncontroversial, is argued in effect in Gilbert. 2. Amazingly, in the Strategic Basis Papers, Australia criticizes New Zealand because 'it has still developed no policy for national defence and tends to look to ... the US as its primary source of defence guidance'' (p.29) . Note that C3I abbreviates the mouthful , Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence. 2 unsatisfactory (or no) defence civil and administration, arrangements and planning for use of protection civil infrastructure, key facilities and of "defence-in-depth", wartime mobilisation, areas, and for post-nuclear organization. is equally damaqinq, if its policy makers do have a coherent policy it 3 nowhere satisfactorily revealed to the peoples of Australia. It is left to .journalists And, what out installations may be for and to make various conjectures as defence the newspaper-watching academics to winkle and policy may Australian policy makers As to coherence, be. local to what have only recently found out that Australia has a (purely) regional defence role, one. global they were told by the Americans in Hashington to clarify commitments under treaty arrangements with the designed begins thus This to look as if Australia's defence policy is as much not a talks in It USA. determined abroad, by US policy makers, as it is locally in Australia. Much circumstantial evidence can be assembled to confirm the claim Australia defence policy can now be stamped Made in USA, the last Nor Id Har (and British abandonment), one thing, as it that before used, to be stamped Made in UK. Australia has had a bipartisan defence policy, For so it is claimed. That "policy" has however been essentially shaped by the Liberal party, has governed most of the time (as senior partner in a for ANZUS) Hashington the Liberal and still does. US and in of US The Strategic Basis give virtually unqualified support Military practices and to the American view of situation, the the latest package from packaged under a local cover. endorsed by the Labor Government, Papers, planned Party "Defence and Foreign Policy Unit" consists largely Defence Department material to For instance, But coalition). Party simply took over US arrangements for Australia (as Liberal which commit Australia to supporting, the global strategic without any due reservation, 3. An Australian policy should moreover fit with the genuine needs and shared aspirations of the people - to the extent, presumably, that these are commendable. 3 4 American positions in world forums. be reached by more devious arguments. out it had a regional defence role? could longer no The same dependent policy conclusion can When, for example, did Australia find afford to police the world on their own and would delegate some of that role have to and offload some of the heavy associated costs, on towards and also after Labor took some faltering steps reliable dogs-bodies; they After the Americans had found that a broader foreign policy with some indigenous elements (Hayden was developing promptly flattened by Schultz). Australian but Iags it. respects, and foreign policy simply copies American older American defence policy, American war policy. American administration main in The Australian defence policy presented by the Labor to the extent that it is visible, government, with defence is conservative; and diverges from the new it coincides (.post-Reagan) the For Australian Labor defence policy supports what used to support, namely DI. nuclear Multilateral disarmament (within the framework of a series of treaties and agreements), and D2. Deterrence in the interim, deterrence through mutual The presence .justified assured destruction. of American military facilities in Australia is supposed to in the framework of these assumptions. For they are to assist be in making deterrence under D2 effective and to provide verification for the arms There is much reduction arrangements under DI (both stabilizing functions). evidence indicating however that American policy makers have both DI and D2 and any serious attempts at nuclear arms they 4. have now 5 control . moved on to the following highly destabilizing abandoned Certainly doctrines; namely For theJe amq^ing evidence that Australia falls into the inexact class of cl ient states the following Australian contribution is noteworthy: 'The US prefers to act as a member of a group, and a contribution by Australia can also assist in demonstrating to Congressional and public opinion that the objectives sought are significant enough to attract allied support' (SB, p.28) 5. As to DI and arms control, see, e.g. Mack PR. As to D2, 'USA has now an announced first-strike nuclear targeting policy' technologically reinforced (Hayes, p.4). The goal of the Reagan administration is superiority (a conveniently ambiguous term). 4 war-fighting; Nuclear war American government, al 1 Labor 1985 may policy nuclear wars; Limited of these government. well be accepted by military doctrines, and Star the next this While wars. coalition Liberal are explicitly rejected by the Since the American "Joint" facilities in Australia also facilitate the rejected objectives, the problems concerning these dubious facilities are much aggravated. information withholding their particularly Government concerning the full range of war-fighting certainly unsatisfactory, the The Government's approach concerning them appears their functions, roles from Parliament and the as several of its members realise; in not atypical disarray, further public and - is and as a result grist for the incoherence theme. is a coherent Australian defence policy somewhere 6 public exposure, it is almost certainly an ol d American policy. If there away from But in that case it certainly lacks - what it in any case appears to lack - justification. 7 For American interests by no means coincide with Australian . Consider, for such instance, matters as enriching Americans, American business, for undercutting to Nicaragua, differently Allende's government in Chile to again, its escalation of the nuclear arms and all Europe Southern as Consider, practices methods. race. against Consider, consider Or the game- and decisi on-theoretic models concern just USA and its adversary USSR, which its its extensive export of arms and violent strategic planning, American American. promoting Americans and things American practices in Latin America (or elsewhere in the world), differently, from making conditions favourable part of the monolithic West, perhaps occasionally adding but rarely or never considering Hemisphere - so that either Australia is part of America as the Poland It had better be away from too much public exposure because Australians, no more* th-atffrNew Zealanders, mostly do not like being pushed around, even by Americans. 7. Nor, though this is a longer story , does Australian culture by any means coincide with American: see CPD. Thus a uniform treatment is entirely inappropriate. Similarly, a single overarching treatment for a mono­ lithic West is thoroughly inadequate. 5 8 may be of Russia or it is nothing. Or consider American interests not merely in Soviet and communist containment, but. in containing socialism such as might (under more auspicious conditions) flourish in Australia. to answering inappropriate American interests is accordingly inappropriate for Australia, for their defence thinking applies also and to work out a policy appropriate Australian do Australians should Antipodean socialism. for Australia. representatives, political who implausible American views and begin on developing parroting and original ones.) local An American policy America, like Russia, own (That should stop genuinely some is busy meddling in Africa, (SB, p.24) . but 'Australian security interests are not directly involved'’ Should we be tagging along after the Americans in support of installation of the their free-enterprise (rip-off) capitalism everywhere feasible (i.e. socialists state seriously course - or of Much opposition governments, in has, freedom umbrella, active already this sort What 'keeping the free world of context, multiple what mainstream American culture to and undermining of social and socialist quite free7? Of meanings and admits mainstream Australian culture would exclude: bullying they control)? heavily is it laughingly - call freedom associations. don't that under the for instance, programs and of smal1 countries that impose barriers to US business part of "free enterprise"), etc. freedom Misinformation, agree about, to live and work where one chooses, on. These are certainly important freedoms, better upheld in some parts of the unaligned West (e.g. Sweden, Switzerland) of the Eastern Block. But many of the older freedoms century, such as freedom to travel, requires permits, 8. licences, than in most parts have to work and live abroad, passports, ... vanished etc.; And many more of these this now one former Australian planning should be looking at strategic models (game-theoretic and other) which include Australia. For, as argued below, adandoning the uniformity assumption of the monolithic West, of the West as one parish, makes very significant differences to the results yielded. 6 are being or have been eroded; •freedoms restricted zones, nuclearism in soon it will be identity documents-, as already in parts of the "free ID cards, Now West". to protect, [the Greens] point to the new laws proposed in 1983 designed to keep citizens Europe 'is devouring the very freedom it is said assembling to protest deployment of the Pershing II and cruise missiles' from of security 'secrecy, the lack state, of Further structural changes required for pp.58-9). (Capra and Spretnak, incompatible with permanent commentability, freedoms, democratic emergency, the include of concentration authority, peacetime militarism, extensive apparatus of state intelligence and Nuclearism is not a smart strategy to preserve police'’ (Falk, in Feith p.24) . remaining freedoms. Inherited 2. other-reliance, and the populist and elitist___ cases—for patronaqe. Australia's defence rather than regularly policy, such as it is, (re)thought through. the legal method of precedence, may wel1, furthermore But that procedure - essentially and here does, applied to defence. exclude significant The unsatisfactory decision-making practices that will For al ternatives. be revealed in the of defence are by no means restricted to defence but are typical of case kind of advanced age (or aged) 1abours those both inheri.ted whatever its very limited satisfactoriness in legalistic decision making - is defective when precedence is under. Cock capi tali sm Australia operates under, has summed up these practices neatly in features of aged capitalism (what he calls the or rather setting the Corporate State) New Left and the Alternative Australia movements were the down which reacting revoI ting against: Decisions were made from the top and on the basis of vested political interests, rather than by rational goals and means that served public interests. The people were rarely consulted effectively before a decision and often only partially informed afterwards. Pl an ni ng..was. based on a mere extension of the present. ... activists felt they were given little opportunity to choose how they lived or worked. The availability of space, time, trees and air was also determined by others . ..(2/(p.l8 italics added). 7 or As also is one's defence, military and civil, the matter of whether one lives in a nuclear target or not, etc. A major inherited assumption is that of other reliance, defence depends on other more powerful allies. Australia That ally was firstly Britain, but in any event the assumption is that to be and since World War II America; safe that Australia's needs a powerful patron, a protector. A corollary is that Australia adopts a suitably submissive relation to its patron, making expected And for the most part it has; 10 policy does not come cheap. concessions. The however such a defence insurance other-reliance assumption is unsound, important, it for several reasons. characteristically depends upon the following themes, Most all which lack solid foundation: 1. Austral i ar/ is threatened - or at least 1A. Australia/ is likely to be threatened in the near future. 2. Australia cannot defend itself. 3. It can however rely upon its patron (or ally?, i.e. upon the USA. three themes in fact make up what has been cal led the populist case for 11 the ANZUS alliance. It is very different from the elitist case for ANZUS, These said to hold sway with the Australian government, which, while insisting upon premiss 3, essentially rejects 1 and 2 and claims instead 4. Australia has a vital interest in global stability. 9, (From previous page) Cock goes on: 'These basic issues increasingly become lost in the array of consumer choices'. [Add Covernment__ react_ive poi n t]. 10. It costs not only money, but independence.'... the serf societies - more or less willingly - accept the status of "allies", i.e. protection with rights and duties as in feudal societies. They become client countries' (Galtung, p.169). 11. So-called by Mack PC. But the formulation presented follows G. Davidson's more satisfactory account in Canberra Times, Wednesday, May 8, 1985, p.2. Mack considers that what amounts to the elitist case is the 'altogether more sophisticated argument [which] holds sway ... in government' (p.l). 8 Global 5. stability is under threat (constantly) by an expansionist Soviet Un ion. 6. Only USA can contain the Soviet threat and hold the global balance. But the USA technique for holding global balance is in part through a network of alliances like ANZUS. further Obviously premisses are required to reach the that conclusion Australia should be participating in an alliance, and what is more, hosting US defence facilities and so forth. A first such premise is no-shirking the theme that Australia should be contributing its part to "holding the balance". Even this first further step is pretty shaky; in a rather ramshackle case, (and since premisses 5 and 6 are decidedly 4 may involve some equivocation). Australia’s vital interests as we shall see, one shaky step are not dubious For it can be plausibly argued guaranteed by US techniques, that which threaten to upset the whole applecart, and can be obtained by alternative more satisfactory means outside of such soft alliances as ANZUS. contends, Mack it In any case, is unclear that our contribution enhances global as nuclear stability (see Davidson). There is a more pernicious regionalist version of the elitist which might be called the offshore el i t i st. position. Australia can defend itself against regional 2R)t. position, This position grants threats, and can look after i tself regional Iy. But it does not (as indeed other qualified elitist positions may 1A. Nhat the offshore position insists is 1AH. Since these interests companies abroad, internal Australian Australians or or whatever - may have little or nothing to do -perhaps security, concerned with this premiss trade, represents an extremely important shift (a shift not unrelated to the inverse bureaucratic shift war In grant Australia's interests could be threatened in the near future. Australian with not) to defence). extended form from It goes further than what has been called forward defence. the offshore position does call 9 for some sort of global or police force ready to intervene whenever a "free port" policeman looks like closing its doors,. the elitist position is anywhere Part of the difficulty in getting to grips with that it tends to slide to through the offshore position (by way of now evident immediate positions). against both the populist and elitist cases, arguments The against virtually justify but a fairly brief outline of some of the main points course a just couple of themes 1 through 7 are but there have been through some indeed familiar sufficiently of defections from themes 1 both cases, defeat logically al 1 and Of involved. would 7 to serve repair interesting attempts, designed to float the arguments on diminished premisses. 3. The brief against the popular populist case. While Australia is not at present under notice of Contra 1 and 1A. veiled threat or harassment from abroad, appears to believe that it is. or parliamentary view, view as persists, kept deliberately parties are populist well case alliance (e.g. the public. in way in the dark (or even purposes. enough false, are aware that the misinformed), main main this because assumptions the to interest In particular they have gone out of their cast doubt upon the connected assumption that US is to the American are much more difficult to sell a reliable threats. Thus long-standing Australian psychological allowed suits underlying Accordingly the parties and Government have no political to been political Australian the reasons for which they support those of the elitist case) guarantor against all been informed, the The populace has it has. Although both undermining the populist case. not not it is worth inquiring why the popular the opinion polls reveal government bipartisan a (bare) majority of its population As the popular view is administrative, threat, stand,, and has informational and educational effort. 10 not been insecurity about security has assuaged In particular, by any requisite older attitudes to Asia X persist not far below the surface of popular Australia: fear, and mistrust xenophobia, patched over by a pragmatic attachment to trade and tourism. This misplaced insecurity is fuelled by popular misconceptions of Australia and its place in the world: metaphorically, that Australia is a luscious plum ripe for instead of the Asian view that Australia, so far as they are Eastern picking, as a remote desiccated place perhaps good for some trade. aware of it at all, to get towards more concrete assumptions, Or, Australians apparently tend to view their country as affluent but underpopulated, resource rich but largely Yet not far to the north are Asian hordes who are impoverished, defenceless. 12 resource poor, etc. The view is seriously out of touch with reality. Parts of Asia are at least as affluent (on conventional economic indicators.) do not see themselves as overpopulated, as Australia. now They in a way that calls for mass exodus; and in those areas which are as overpopulated as Europe, such as Java, bribes and force are required to move people on transmigration programs to relatively unoccupied parts of the Indonesian empire. can So far as they require them, they purchase Australian resources - which are not unique - much more (even carrying significant local cheaply subsidies) and easily than they could obtain 13 them by seizure. For these sorts of reasons, and because Australia itself poses no threat, no other state has an interest in attempting to invade Australia. for interests, to launch so it is for capabilities. a successful invasion of Australia, capacity in the near future. TF. No regional As it is power has the capacity or is likely to have such a As the joint Parliamentary Committee concluded, The "Asian hordes" fd\dn one of the less spoken about successors to Yellow Peril, of immediate past days of the Asian communist threat the and the Domino theory. 13. As Stephenson argued, less fortunately, 20 years ago. Even when around World War II Japan, did have interest in access to strategic raw materials, the Japanese High Command decided against invading Australia because of the difficulty of dealing with the people - a point of much impor tance. 11 Currently only the United States would have the physical launch a -full scale invasion of Australia, motive to do so (TAS, p.94) . to capacity and it clearly lacks any As the report also stated, quoting Synnot (former Chief of Defence Staff), ... to raise the sort of force which would be required for a mass invasion of Australia could not possibly be done in under five years by other than the superpowers (TAS) . But neither superpower is at all likely to expend effort or resources to such an end. obvious An which at once arises is: (A later serious question to entertain is: defence? on question security, collectively provided global forthwith to unilateral disarmament? now-standard telling bother Why with why not be a free-rider Why such as it is?) Mack for one, then not proceed having reassembled the for the case that Australia is not threatened 'now or foreseeable future', and so having broken the populist argument, is confronted by the awkward option of unilateral disarmament for Australia. proceeds and points to the dependence of premisses 1 and 1A on premiss retreat, hasty to claim that 'the populist case for ANZUS is without premisses 1 and 1A. While it sustained' assumptions which is approximating appears capabilities it decisive of potential 2, even may sometimes take it is true that the arguments against 1 and 1A resistance, a It is however a decidedly problematic retreat. for granted that Australia can look after itself to some some He stages far from clear that premiss 2. given the invaders. they Consider the (estimated) put up essentially on extent, depend no-interests argument, limited invasion very The main consideration adduced appears to depend in no essential way, indeed in no obvious way at all, on Australia s dynamic fighting forces. Australia mineral resources, for instance, obtained more readily and cheaply by market methods than simply be ones. What this seems to show is that a rather minimal military streamlined force, if any, would presently meet Australia's military requirements. 12 can It is as not if Australia The whole nonmilitary defence is available on a continent well popular training in defence methods, character that apparatus of suited to its use, though requisite to Australia would be a difficult place govern, Australians a difficult lot to subjugate. Australian a But even without a population trained in its techniques. lacking without defenceless'’ 'entirely 1 ike a babe-in-arms. mi 1itary force, conventional is deterred It was such features of the the Japanese a on previous occasion ^If the invasion is attempted, the Australians, in view of their national character, would resist to the end. Also, because the geographical conditions of Australia present numerous difficulties in a military sense, it is apparent that a military venture in that country would be a diff icul t one** (.TAS, p.62) . The still hold good, points parts any such program of nonmilitary to putting and could be strengthened. defence: making it abroad (ideally with dinkum Australian exaggeration) it several There are happen, and that it has happened. the issue of alternative defence we are bound to To when Australia is not threatened, appropriate, is a good occasion to reconsider adapt defence arrangements. now, For return. and, if For example, it looks very much as if enormous sums, which could be valuably directed elsewhere, are being spent, But a much more effective and to make many Australians feel secure. largely inexpensive way to such results would be through requisite mass education therapy - with, psychological if it were well done, much more and satisfactory results, a more secure and better informa^~popu1 ace. Contra 2. As capabilities, basically enormous isolation. well in a a result of post-War developments in weapons systems and the military defence of Australia has become much easier. matter advantages strategic In advance of enhancing through robust particular, of and Australia enjoys by reliable virtue of systems through modern destroyed by precision guided munitions. radar warning It is the geographical any maritime invading force can now be arrival, C3I detected systems, and And any invaders that did manage to gain a foothold on Australian soil would face severe logistic problems, and be 13 subject deal There is to disproportionate response -from local defence. Boys'’ of and weapon Own War Games stuff concerning contemporary great a which would serve to turn Australia into a pretty invulnerable systems C3I armed fortress, and into an extremely difficult territory even were the oceanic moat crossed and the fortress entered (see especially D. Martin). such Under invasion even armed neutrality and fortified Australia defence from outside the region by an inimical world resisted with reasonable prospect of success. to such an invasion; mount There is no power at all Nonetheless the threat their elected representatives. But the Soviet undertaken such a long-range massive force projection, so, be likely one ooviet a of is taken seriously not only by the larger populace but by committees invasion of could there is apparently (according to TAS) only the Australian population!). of power our good ally the USA (reckoned however a likely invader by power that could, 6-77. scenarios, has military never is ill-equipped to do lacks any plausible reason to try such a stunt (for details see e.g. and The only credible Soviet threat to Australia is in the context of D. Martin). a superpower war, when American facilities in Australia and perhaps Australian would be struck at by intercontinental missiles. cities, it is highly unlikely that it would be followed or accompanied by bad enough, an Soviet forces are once again not sufficent, invasion. sufficient elsewhere While this would be by the Soviets for that sort of diversion; in a superpower war; and not thought they would be required and they would be devastated, unless UoA is militarily even more incompetent than sometimes depicted. Contra 3. cannot be relied upon, rash What will be argued is not the negation of 3, but that premiss 3 is dubious, to place excess reliance on American protection. that the Americans and that it would That being so, be and other patrons being even less promising, Australia should look more to its own resources, as the American administration is kindly advising. Especially since the American "Vietnam debacle" and the fall of 14 Saigon, things have changed in important ways which cast doubt on the reliability of American patronage. The relative economic and military strength of the USA has declined. a. no longer has such a large share of world product(ivity) a of policy, matter (see Appendix 1); US world warfighting aspirations have Its ability to act as, reduced. It as explicitly been and afford to be, global policeman has also significantly declined (see further Appendix 1) . b. The willingness of Americans to engage in foreign wars has correspondingly tumbled. hawks, sure, be to American administration includes the Although more people and Congress are no longer in the enough than for a /mood gratuitous foreign adventures, especially when the fun may not appear to be in American This "Vietnam syndrome" popular opposition to overseas military involvement. has major a as served strong US opinion polls regularly show Since Vietnam, interests. constraint on US military policy foreign and involvement. c. One Doctrine manifestation important called which 196'?, of the foregoing of elements upon US regional allies responsibility for their own defence in regional conflicts. to the is take Guam primary Another important are outcome is Defense statements to the pointed effect that before US troops committed abroad there must be reasonable assurance no US vital each and 'such is impossible to guarantee - especially for remote countries where national Certainly that Congressional As Mack comments, popular support (Weinberger, assurance of no interests are at stake''. more is assured under the ANZUS treaty which only signatory constitutional consultation; reported in PC p.14). 'act to meet the common danger in accordance processes' (article 4). All reassurances? 15 its is Isn't the treaty backed None that are not undermined by in American administrative multiple-speak. with the treaty strictly requires there is no undertaking or commitment. up by informal verbal provide others, the elite view is that Australia has to 'work ... Even 'the threshold of direct US combat involvement could be quite For the of US support'" and that the Americans cannot be counted upon always. prospect to help Australia in other ways'". a However special case has been made American for military undertakings (in Vietnam, Cambodia, Iran) common friendship, and shared values and democratic interests, second, and, culture earlier traditions. as first, and slow constitutional already indicated, the basis is shaky. And here, a common pleading: hardly sustains the adequacy of the basis evidence in to as to the adequacy of the basis for the possibility the American people, Congress, cases. reliability - on the basis of permanent There are two difficul ties with this type of special His tori cal (SB, pp. 29-30) . case - as opposed to examples of American abandonment of Australia's and cannot rely upon Ub support in a ... defence emer qen c y ar i s i n g w i t h i n ou r own n e i gh bou r h ood' the basis, high, at the time could significantly limit US willingness or ability circumstances a to maximize significantly on quite crucial issues. rather America: shared by Australia and processes. analogous in For there is not values diverge interests always common, Even as missile testing and nuclear ships issues in the South Pacific have recently confirmed. Common Indonesia opposing did not appear wheir? Australia was interests claim to West Papua. It is dubious at considering least that American interests would coincide with Australian in disputes or confrontation with Asian nations to the North, e.g. Indonesia, Japan, etc. special case argument did hold water, Australia and America really were mates, There was in fact no treaty in operation in then the treaty would be otiose. 1942; Of course if the but by then American interests in countering the are at present Japanese were independently aroused. 14. Although neighbourhood contingencies ... impossible', as the pauper ap-i+e-’ 16 assessed a 4. Other-reliance and regional self-reliance A major problem with other-reliance for defence is then that it cannot be entirely reliable, deemed be tolerated. yet this is a place where unreliability can hardly for When the Indonesians are rolling into Brisbane it won't do Defence to call up with a message like that from Services, "We can't get there tomorrow", till "Or until after Congress meets". More seriously, handing defence over to others means handing control of our lives over to others, nuclear defence, given very which Antipodean administrations have opted means for many of us handing our lives likely In principle, Another problem is its cost. over, and for, it literally. quite if a btate hires out its defence it would no doubt look, other things being equal, for the cheaper bidder - if, that defence is, meterological market is complexion is a services, monopolistic, 15 , who commodity a sort, like The trouble with global etc. with currently only one at a national level, All shipping, national of supplier right the i • making and has this part of the case, the that defence is accordingly can exact a very high price, the whole country a nuclear target. appreciated of enough well, for not trying to force defence, which is plainly a collective good, into a marketable commodity. When a country can provide its own defence, it certainly makes very good for it to do so, since it normally has a stronger interest in sense its own defence than matter, then self-reliance not Just makes good sense but pays; other-reliance does not. most other parties. Should it also be cheaper in costs that But in that event, it does not need nuclear patrons, or to farm out some of its defence. 15. The French, who operate a global network second only to the Americans and more extensive than the Russians, with many forces in the Pacific region, have never been seriously considered. Yet in certain significant respects French social and cultural arrangements are closer to Antipodean ones than American arrangements are. In these days of technological warfare, the post-Waterloo loss record of the French should not be given too much weight; we don't after all look very hard at the American record of defeats and incompetence. 17 r self-reliance Such as ANZUS and much of the apparent point such alliances undermines an important part of the older such of alliances. newer bipartisan approaches to defence try to combine them (thus e.g. However Beazley as reported by Davidson) - approaches which thus begin to empty of what content it had. little understanding, content, a but are merely vague ANZUS clear no contain of articles simple course is of course to allow them to be emptied an expensive and outdated insurance that the alliance, so Since the arrangements consultations beyond commitments of policy, It may however be death by seizure or convulsion should dies a natural death. American defence facilities American nuclear equipped or powered transport be excluded passage be c1osed or internationalised and from of Australia. treaty would no doubt sacrifice the deterrence and other advantages the That for case 16 supposedly affords , while making way for the greater advantages o+ neutralized nonalignment, of no longer being a nuclear target, etc. self-reliance pure and simple is insufficient. But consist of separable isolated pieces, dramatically, picture Australia will self-sufficient not as becomes increasingly evident. Most winter. The such as plants which are not not escape the effects of nuclear is much the same as for other objects, internally The world does but depend crucially on their environment - and indeed as for States themselves. The question then is what form the additional holistic component of policy should take? that appropriate the cricket game move is not taking sides (as in a kids' that is already set up) and doing one's bit for For that will not contribute to stability, rather to Put this way, it is almost obvious sectionalism and fragmentation, war game or confrontation. to a proper holistic approach, but and to bringing nuclear winter cIoser . 757 If Australia is not likely to be threatened there is no real deterrence advantage because nothinq to deter. Other advantages of the ANZUS alliance such as access to high-level intelligence are not only dubious (see PC, Martin) but not always guaranteed by the alliance as the black out of New Zealand shows. 18 Other-re 1iance and self-reliance typically present a false contract, certainly do with pure self-reliance - a false contrast like that of partism and (EE, or p.223), at a particular level of and holism versus dependence In between lie a range of positions, one of which - favoured by isolationism. a long line of peacefully-disposed philosophers from Rousseau and Kant onwards - might be called integrated reliance or federated reliance. reach only certain inadequate levels, may which alignment, the monolithic East (or West). 5. Against elitist arguments stability, very as related arguments revolve around that securi ty and side, are value-laden terms, of are which But security. not cultural What stability comprehends in American administrative perception invariants. is other and 4 and 5 of the elitist argument turn around the crucial notion Premisses stabi1i ty the level of modern alliances are essentially coupled with opposition to an e.g. of But integration different from what highland villagers take it to include. In each case a system is stable if it returns to a given stationary state But relevant states and under perturbations of sufficiently small magnitude. the stationary among them are both relative to given frames of reference, /e.g, what is stable at a macrolevel may well not be at a microlevel. said of the superpowers, even remote events can threaten their interests or their associates ' and stability. disturb Trudeau As 'they share a global perception according to But lesser states or people, not counting which (p.10) remote IVA business or military^ as invariably view stability; by relevant, report bombs a* necessary to stability, contrast philosophers increasingly terrorism and as characteristically antithetical ad 4: a vital no and the see nuclear bombs as fix a* tools of to peace. interest in global stability and secur i ty? 1? Bureaucrats instability. Of course Australia have, does what sizeable nation does not. interpretation conceals crucial differences, For Australia. in highly material to the argument. stability may well mean something different in USA from global means Certainly vitai interests are different. interested in containing socialism (in Australia as elsewhere), in rhetoric at least, popular more to socialism (or Mon-Soviet communism) global upset to containing equate communism and both with Soviet containment. containing motherhood But the determinable stability on American in Latin America, it America is and it tends, wi th socialism A continental swing or i n Africa, wou 1 d indeed wou I d and perception what significant effects on US business and investment; but it wou 1 d not on its own or affect most Australians or directly threaten upset and it certainly need not affect nuclear stability. Antipodean stability, Australians generally are not opposed in principle to socialism or notably interested in containing perhaps the opposite). (indeed spread not ought to be interested in defence of the the in system, Australia is not interested defence (American) it in, or enterprise" “free wherever of advanced capitalism its is presently initiated or imposed. It can be conceded, without granting the main thrust of the premiss Contra 5. that the Soviets are expansi onistic, in interested empires, extending their influence where they can. including American academics and sales people). spread, Marxism-Leninism, everywhere. in at least a weak sense that they The and are So also are most matter are many Indonesian (so for that But the Soviets have an ideological message an ideology they anticipate Americans also have a capitalist message, being installed free enterprise, which they are working to sell pretty much everywhere accessible to them; they need to be expansi onistic to have it adopted, Chinese little would and whereas the Russians and need simply wait for history to take its determined course (though assistance surely - reflecting legitimate doubt about spread progress wi thou t interfering). message is pernicious: this a determinism? Bu t (^he\^jreb^ Russian both are pernicious (for familiar reasons; 20 to see e.g., Erlichs). some in threatens, proper question is whether Soviet international activity The damaging way, stability. global Soviet-American doubt No confrontation, as in the Cuba missile affair, does threaten stability; but not in way that has any bearing on Australian defence. a expansionary none Australia, military tendency, or has otherwise, fact In direct a of significance reaches into the Antipodes. Russian no effect on bo what is all the local excitement and anticipation about? The effect of Soviet expansionism is much exaggerated and from the Antipodes it is hardly a problem, Viewed qet locked addressed. of into unless the Soviets confrontation with USA - a real military internationalism, be hardly the heavies But confrontation apart, Soviet a great success story, does not seriously disturb stability, as seen from Australia. should distinguished be military access, involvement World control involving anything since influence. War II, In actual of global on the militarily, that of Afghanistan, have accomplished, especially in Europe. but success in western strategic lacks Europe, has they the force ratio And 21 case little had concerns might. not attempt lacking much plausibility. needed to be assured of both by their own standards of what is required standards. by But the idea of Soviet military adventure Europe is a Western invention and bogey, military what striking conspicuous The usual Western apprehension stability. and expansion the Russian record is hardly new territory, Soviets military The one with influence military, with the USA or several other states. comparison effect mere and potential -military, expansion types of a proper assessment of Soviet internationalism, For Soviet to problem a third nonaligned group which helps to referee and to prize global should With that problem however, the Antipodes can better assist as part apart, not by seconding and inciting the USA. in overexploited. the Soviets have no good The military and by reasons or in undertaking such an exercise which would draw them into interests war. They client nuclear already -Face economic difficulties and trouble with East European states which they cannot control satisfactorily. The of Soviet inf1uence has largely been in the Third extension But it has hardly been successful, with as many failures and losses to record as Soviet "gains" - gains which add to the imperial burden countries wracked with problems, world. such as Uietnam. since they involve The Third World exercises are marred by Soviet ineptitude and limited by the state of their own economy. They scarcely displace the global structure enough to test its stability; and they produce no shock waves or even ripples in the Antipodes. 6. Contra the dancers the in East-West dance confrontation between the lead dancers. have destabilizing new weapons arms tension control an from escalating the With this US policies and Recent US practices and indeed highly destabilising, and weapons systems, because of rejection of arms race on earth and begin a new one in space. A vast practices more are because of control and because of star wars preparation which both and accelerate increase in and suspicion accompanies the arms race which is in large measure due to US intransigence and US war-fighting doctrines, built-in but than Soviet ones, Soviet proposals, the death, of as much to do as USSR ones. least at of The main current threat to world stability comes not from one incentives (see FAC). alliance or for pre-emption, new weapons systems, and deliberate abandonment of with arms Such considerations duly assembled demolish the theme that alignment with USA helps increase stability. American practices are to be resisted as much as Soviet. 6. The East-West balance argument; alignment versus neutrality. The need for Australian alignment with the USA is supposed to be shown by the East-W^st balance argument. This balance argument, which 17 premisses with the related elitist argument, runs as follows ; 7. Global stability is the key to world peace. shares key 8. of the international order is a matter of maintaining a Stability global But balance. 5. The global balance is constantly threatened by an expansionist USSR. The threat is [only] checked by the USA, which (6A.1) guarantees an open 6A. and pluralistic international ■?. order. indeed most vital Australia's primary security concern, is this interest, stability. Hence Australia's 10. role is to help America maintain the balance. The rest of Australia's in tervolvement to follow. taken then before practical assumes much that has already been rebutted, argument threat argument But there are many reasons for halting the reaches this stage of moral and it Soviet with American military arrangements is thesis is correct (i.e. detail. The for instance that the stabilizing 5) and that US policy is It also takes for granted, balance what now is at least (part of 6A). doubt, that American policy is directed at balance and deterrence, rather than serious in what the administration appears to be aiming at, straight superiority. event, that is not really engaged Australia balancing in some longer term so much as in helping USA win a nuclear war, feat, But in contradicting the goal of world peace of premiss 7. and its derivation. Contra 10 follow that strength is indicate, the Ta role is such a lackey's one. leaning America's direction, in as be If most the Presumably premiss balance of seems to evidence 5A.1 is designed to exclude putting its weight where it is effective, this not does team (that is what such images as the balanced tug-of-war of Australia teaming up with totalitarians. thouqht, should Australia's it then Australia should surely be throwing its slight weight in Eastern suggest). The derivation is inadequate; with would deplorable Nevertheless Australia given its own broader (From previous page) After some reconstruction, that is. For the argument, curiously referred as that of "central balance in newspaper level publications of academics, is never presented in requisite detail which is one reason why it has proved hard to criticise and refute. interests objectives, could Australia fulfil and principles. which would enable it to make to world peace, contribution There are several satisfactory more among them nonalignment and neutrality. A more direct approach may Thus 10 is hardly wel1-supported or evident. be a better than throwing our Australian weight unrefIectively on one the balance. roles different of side the balance images and argument As a little reflection attests, points not in the direction intended, but towards nonalignment. Contra 4A (and peace, the preserves if of course false. USSR in this munitions dance, the escalation (the USSR relation). balance, hence and Again it takes two at least to checks the the history of the dance reveals that pace flowed from the interaction of the one partner of with the but for the USA, the USA would not be required to check the That is, other. the it can be granted that the USA is interlocked with and While tango. The theme that US maintains 4). interaction is two-way as with Hegel's master-slave famous Furthermore it looks as if, on a different historical trajectory, the main states of Western Europe could match the Soviet Union militarily (for they have comparable combined GNP, etc.) Thus it is doubtful see Appendix 1, resources, technological that the current Soviet build-up, produced in interaction with the USA, could only be, or have been, checked by the US. de 6A.1. As the premiss is only of marginal relevance to the argument, need only be noted that the international order the USA helps maintain very much to be desired. In its intervention, militarily, it leaves economically and indirectly, USA has assisted substantially in reducing plurality and openness, as well as in establishing or propping up rotten regimes, side of American imperialism is well enough documented, etc. The negative if not widely enough read or known by Americans. ad 8 and maintaining pass, the the equivocation on the balance. While balance is one stabi1i ty in the world arrangements that have presently balance structure can only carry so much loading. 24 way of come to Add too much weight (of arms, and so forth) tension, The increasing probability of catastrophic probably catastrophically. fail, to both sides and the structure will breakdown, for a variety of reasons (accident, miscalculation, computer error, human interference, etc.), has been argued elsewhere (e.g. WPI) . While a certain neither overloaded nor overstressed balance may serve for stability, the present increasingly stressed balance will probably not. however, balance argument, neglects this dynamical situation, illegitimately balance switching from a (certain) balance in premiss 8 to the (on-going) subsequent premisses. The balance argument itself The breaks in down through of removing equivocati on. What dynamic picture also indicates is the importance the weight -from the balance, some reduction. position It most obviously by arms limitation and tension to a neutral points to a different role for Australia, too within the nonaligned grouping. It is to the emerging case for a different role for Australia, and to action for achieving this different role, that the positive argument will now gradually swing. The attacks inadequate upon East-West proposals (its to repair it. alleged good administrators This For example, Australia than with American trade argue, is a nonsequitur, and lots to the argument, and do not against nonalignment or neutralism is set pervasiveness of nuclear winter. for for The additions are inessential confusion and dust. the for a different role combined The main effect of these additions is to generate extra alliance and service. serve balance argument is typically of other He might as well things), so aligned be our sagacious because if the control balance fails we are all worse than ex nihilo quodlibet (for it also that balance is necessary for the stability). dead. suggests But, in the main, the attack is irrelevant because the point of nonalignment, is to help remove overload and to break down confrontation and its escalation to war; before winter descends, it is a thing to do to delay or halt its descent, 25 now, and most important, to reduce its severity. Australia's weight may be slight, another irrelevant addition goes, psychologically it is important for the West. disease" would show the weakening f or Sovi e t ex pan s i on ism. virtual 1y alignment, Australi a gives the Bell, Any further spread of the "Kiwi of Western resolve, and give the green light a leading exponent of the balance argument, impression that if Australia dropped through the isles to Russians would be on the road down 18 the tomorrow. Much of this sort of rhetoric i =■ reminiscent of f such military interests, set route, major American of out the The Russians have no baseless fear-mongering of an earlier pre-Uietnam time, and but out, t ie or present capabli A of they would be met by substantial resistance along most the for one, has and the resistance obtaining Western assistance. interests, Philippines, strengthening And if they were to gear up different as well the from Australia's, as elsewhere in East Asia. depends, argument, in For America, Indonesia in both The addition, its "green light from so far for expansion" comparison, on the previously faulted premiss 5 of Soviet expansionism. or another In fact most of the case against alignment of one sort it is argued. for often nonalignment and neutrality are, au th or i tar i an assumptions. style, Cat 1ey, simply for denounced example, - turns - when in good old-fashioned upon al ready another exponent of "central fau1 ted balance", presents the following 'consideration'': ... whatever the Swedes or Swiss may think about the matter, Australia is locked by considerations of culture, economics, and political philosophy into the defence of the Western world. It has both an obligation and a duty to contribute its share to that cannot easily be defence if necessary by hosting facilities which located elsewhere (p.15). The premiss is false for reasons essentially indicated: Nay sustains the conclusion, prescriptive 18. and the premiss in no the argument involving among other things, (is-ought) fallacy. Consider the premiss. Australia is See the discussion of Bell's claims in D. Martin and in Mack PC. 26 the not, k unless Catley has information withheld from most of the rest of us,locked into Western nuclear defence, its but in principle free to reconsider and rethink use of the "facilities" is not irrevocable, and shortly options. (American comes up . >, economics and political philosophy provide locks and chains for Australia but f©.r reconsideration.) in principle at least, not for nonaligned Western European states? part USA or altogether a client of frameworks economic and They do not: state; and philosophies political significantly different (for details, defence (as, practices e.g., ANZUS in al 1 of culture, Australia is not a cultures, the interests, are nations two But even if the ideological see CPD) . frameworks were much more similar than they are, the How do that would not entail its weakness similar nor shows), any defence obligations. of Most worse. the arguments against nonalignment are of Catley Fortunately, calibre - or the case against nonalignment is (as with several then, o-f the above points) developed in detail elsewhere, especially by 0. Martin in his examination of counter-arguments to Australian armed neutrality, legally recognised nonbelligerent form of nonalignment he favours. al 1 of Martin's argument is couched in negative form; very brief. make this his positive brief us secure against such dangers as we may one day have to meet, needlessless is exposes to other dangers, correct enough, Virtual 1y alignment or alliance with the USA It reduces to thi including nuclear war' and in need of wide propagation, exhausts the positive case for nonalignment. posi t ive case of much theoretical interest, the it cannot while means no In particular there is a to be drawn from the it Wh i 1 e (p.l). by is more burgeon i ng theory of collective goods and action. 7. Free riding, group size, and increasing variety. The with strategic more convenience) world situation we now confront can be viewed as than 100 players, major a game counting in nation-states and leaving out (for organisations such as the largest 100 transnational These compan i es. organisational players align themselves around two arge poles. East and West, as indicated: EAST NON-ALIGNED N WEST N India N Sweden# Swi tzer 1 and# Tanzani a Most Latin . American States! ## Costa Rica State commmun i st State capitali st N: Nuclear weapons states #: Neutral states ##: Nonmi 1i tary states Key: There are various - a great many - games these state players are playing, Some of these of which are practically important for peace and for stability. such games, as representation), World are Empire and Chicken (already There are several problems about East-Nest games: have, the Russian what under played played essentially between the East-Nest representation negative sum characters of some games. may, as they will with the Big One), end after one round, And the monolithic East - way simplifications may). So game theoretical representation they like the monolithic Nest dichotomy is misleading, and, as will appear, discards crucial detail the one superplayers. repeatability of the games (clearly some nuclear games roulette, =ome will (in be approached differently and more obliquely. Nor 1d security, (technically, in like regional and local joint security, is a collective good supply and precluding exclusion). 28 That is not of to course say that there are not conditions under which security for instance where security is guaranteed by a narrow and much to be desired, intolerant despotism; provisioning, it can be argued, but then, not the particular product. collection of N nation-states. It is, the trouble lies with the It is a collective good G for the furthermore, a collective good permits the possibility of free-riding by nation-states. perspective the American complaint about its allies, insufficient expenditure on defence, their leave may which Looked at from this and Japan for example, is a complaint about their free riding. Within the balance of power framework the conditions for free-riding extracted by Pettit) are satisfied, disarming states. For to the achievement (or maintenance) of G by any will make every member­ and any, unilaterally is available to all N members of the collective if it is available G 1. for instance by neutral and (as better off. 2. G is achieved iff some number m^K contribute towards its provision, where under the balance of power assumption IICTK^N and II = (USA, USSR}. The 3. expected value of contributing to G or its maintenance is less than the expected value of not doing so, i.e. likely costs exceed likely benefits except for perhaps members of II given that G is provided by II. is There pegged by what free-rider problem, members of II for whom the free-rider option is not open - within ran be called a pegged (or asymmetric) the confines of the balance of power assumption - and for whom condition 3 only satisfied under certain ways of looking at the matter (e.g. a war 10 years down the road so the expected costs each—year is there will be exceed the expected benefits). There regional) is a straightforward case for recommending free riding on the balance of power provision of 6. 2? Australian (and Some arguments, beyond or adding to those already in effect presented, are these:- Either If it does then the region is better off than it would be if or it does not. (strongly) the as and there is a large-scale war stability breaks down catastrophically aligned because it is unlikely to be (so heavily) targetted. (Here dreadful new argument that nuclear winter means that the Antipodes might well be involved gets challenged and rejected: see MF). doesn't break down then the region has the benefits in any case, enhances global USA stability, indeed, as remarked and wi11 etc.; regional weight significant? of delusional the in That power? framework. Ne shouldn't: we believe seriously it and if we do we're is the in living in a Australia has been left out of the picture in virtually strategic planning exercises, all do Australian voice makes much real difference the Northern Western block, be As regards Australasian further argued, the evidence points to the contrary. halls the without For there is no clear evidence that our alignment and cooperation with costs. the stability If most difference-making peace initiative^, etc., etc. Now riding, Eastern rather countries would hardly block th an suppor t of f ering object (h owever to free Antipodean c omf or t trifling), an d Furthermore free riding is how the Americans, incitement to their opposition. the rational would expect Australia to act, on their theoretical principles self interested procedure (see CPD). It is economically rational; contributing is not. But won't the Americans make things economically dear for Australia? In threats and theory, do yes; but in practice, no more than they threatened already in the case of New Zealand with the nuclear-ships issue. short term arrangements: aberrations, America will never give up trade But or to for market one gets the impression that America would trade with the Devil Himself if it could open some new markets in Hell. Despite its political stigma, way immoral or irregular. voluntary payment system, free riding need be no problem, Perhaps the buses are free; perhaps there to which only some need contribute, 30 or in any etc. i => a Hi th the contributing is not (see nuclear fix, free riding is indeed the moral course; HPI). Free riding, though often portrayed as a problem, is only a problem in certain and desirable sufficiently riders. collective of cases is This in Australia stays the the escalating treadmill or gets is, off is involved many too free which will whether or security, and precarious way that it curious on good will not be provided because of the situation with global not the provided, where provisioning, rides and be not free. Australia's free riding may be a problem for America; it is not for Australia. Interests diverge again. of stability by building, tripod or bipedal one, for example, if it is a wind tower or of supports increases stability. instance in the theory of "spreading the risks" certain a cybernetics. free The increases and by similar Then a than a has in diversity ecology, for The related theme, (see EH). stability, that theme The elaborated been in core eco-systemic idea to be developed is that Australia's and consequent nonalignment in defence riding variety, variety topple point the Increasing the diversity, with stability has been sharpened and confirmed correlates that ground. a quadrapod tower is much less likely to and requires less guying to stay up. variety, certain increasing its rigid ties or supports to the better terms, pictorial structure is typically increased up to a it more adequately; securing or a In riding increases stability. free Judicious enhances diversity accordingly increases stability (especially if done in and concert with other client states). Two hardly interlocked well precarious guyed, structure well dug in but stability of the Hhat makes engineering sense is not supports in tension, are inadequate of world peace. East and Hest, for the long term however strengthening the supports that are there, balance is disturbed by the Host's surging ahead and likely overburdening the structure, helping the East when the but increasing the variety of supports, enlarging and diversifying 31 group size. East-monolithic monolithic The West picture misconceptualism perhaps convenient ■for some players. in conceptualism, main reason for mistakes concerns group size. collective but is significantly differs behaviour of large groups theory in group size is a highly significant factor (though group ■from that of smal I One Whereas 11+ = (West, East) is a N of nation-states is not. number the group, a It may ■force mistakes convenient simplification, e.g. for strategic thinking. smal1 than more much is i t s pr ec i se i mpor t is increasingly contested). N of nation-states is a large group The group, of interested parties, indeed of substantially economic actors. the American theory of collective action applies: that interest, counterintuitive way. a in behave self essentially So we may expect wi 1 1 that the groups Though expec ted to act in the to obtain security in particular, the collection will not. common On this account (that elaborated by Olson), the common interest can only be guaranteed by outside influence or imposition (coercion in Olson's rapid thinking). there is, as experience has shown, no outside with the collective of nations, mediator collective or influence good. The But of sufficient authority to ensure attainment prognosis looks very gloomy: this of the important most (though far from unique) collective good will not be provided. Fortunately the reasoning, has been containing shift economic virtually (subjectively) back actors though large. highly is to basics, all privileged, for whom costs of war exceed benefits in perspective from the earlier free riding condi t i on important that The group, too swift. several like much of the "logic" of collective action, 3). effect of the knowledge of an ominous nuclear actors involved should now be expected in that (note in the Indeed an winter is posit i on; costs of nuclear war have become very high. for go Olson's grand theory is based on the accountants/-----tautology (defining 'net') 32 gross agent benefits - gross agent costs. net agent benefit i.e. A for each agent or actor i ymbols, in show i for virtually all that in N. is positive for some i is privi1eqed if A group (in collective N) , European to benefi t s of global security are decidedly positive (e.g. respective future GDPs would expectedly fal 1 needs 1 the net wi th a nuclear war nation-states argument their It to near zero). The fact the group of nation-states is privileged does not however imply that the that good i nvo1ved, c o1 Iec t i ve longer term. error, stability ■ JI instabi1i ty. dynamics, An achieved improved particularly in wi11 be supplied, secur i ty, dynami c ; it takes no account of mistake. through superiority modelling or intermediate - which can take some account iterated games — is gained by returning to through the the of game theoretic ground A free rider "problem" is tantamount to a dilemma of some sort; according to conventional wisdom, the contrast Taylor and Hard). it is a prisoners' (cf. dilemma The argument can go this but Pettit, way;- a free rider problem or issue is defined in terms of the provisioning of a collective good; theory the but of collective goods is equivalent to that of a prisoners 20 dilemma. dilemma; in detail which more Certainly the global nuclear situation as much is a commonplace claim. appears Elsewhere (HPI) that it does indeed present a moral dilemma. to present a it has been argued Here the argument can proceed through the theoretical route just sketched above or in the piecemeal way to be indicated - is that it is also a prudential dilemma 21 (for members of N). 19. The less than perspicuous symbolism is that used in Hardin (82, p.20, p.39), but with agents' costs or contributions, C, duly agent relativized. Hardin misleadingly treats C as a fixed parameter, thus strictly falsifying the tautology. 20. Thus Hardin who (in 82) claims to 'demonstrate the equivalence of the logic of collective action and the Prisoners' Dilemma' (p.4). The demonstration, which will be contested elsewhere, is given on p.x.5ff. 21. But of course the two types of dilemma interconnect. the range of apparent two party games being played by the US Hardin 83), Union Soviet (labelled US and SU respectively) administration regards the moves of further nuclear armament. (It is supposed, A, from the or nuclear disarmament, N. It is important here, as other French that The American people seem rather more were clearly opposed to the new nuclear missiles their people the towards nuclear disarmament than their administration; inclined to proceeded German administration The strategy games involved are then install. shots It is administrations or governments etc. take people into war; to places, administration - which for the most part calls the the society and the people. generally as that the game is set in some background context, naturally, Chinese nuclear armament). distinguish and 1985 in nuclear disarmament is not considered in isolation from on-going e.q. and (e.q. since these have obtained some discussion us consider -first, Let administration which we can suppose to be played over successive time intervals, e.q. games, years; so there is interaction and feedback as the games go on - until the Big Ones explode. The apparent games of US and SU are those diagrammed next: Pr i soners' A 4,1 D 2,2 O 1,4 this being played. According professions!1ez the A 1,4 CP presumably also represented US policy, it no aggressive, D A 4,1 D 3,2 US CP 1,4 to Hardin, 'giving evidence of Dilemma Prisoners' ordering of virtually all that A 4,1 that simplistic setting those represent the apparent games Within and D D 3,3 US IJS A SU SU SU D New Initial Game Revised Game Dilemma Game in (PD) 'represents [his] deformation the preference the articulate policy analysts in the United the Soviet Union' (p.248) . While PD there is considerable evidence (as already longer does, war-fighting, 34 That is, the US has States may have indicated) that the US administration has shifted to phase. are a interchanged more its rankings of (D,D) Soviets, The have who been much more consistent no (and bound to try to keep up with the Americans, their changed However they are have stuck with deterrence and no-first-strike. but better doubt appear not to have in their policy pronouncements, censored) game, and (A,A), presumably some time between 1978 and 1984 games. and so pushed towards the Revised Game shown, which p1easan11y restores symmetry. Stable or equilibrium outcomes for each game are circled. said be to stable if neither player has unilaterally on the strength of the game, influencing provide in broad sense, a and dangerous outcome. strategy for each player; dominant that equilibirum In all All strategies. is hence its economic fascination. results which are socially suboptimal (and games that might plausibly be taken to represent situation, and A recognisably guaranteed by the independent "stable" strategies. substantial to political substantially the games satisficing the suboptimal superpower outcome socially superior is there are What is worse, and military incentives for the superpower players adjust their preferences in after repeated games, an And the same applies to suggested alternative Chicken. other a below all as in Pareto- even But as the threshold), such achieved yet in the PD game that is these games are di 1emmas. games these the apparent games arming is and suboptimal, strategies switch i.e. to alter the outcome except by player also to alter other dilemmas undesirable deliver the to incentive An outcome is not directions but to do what the US appears to have done, to make the situation worse. socially preferable would be change to a coordination game of Much some sort, for instance, to the game which neutrals tend to play (and which Lackey, in contrast to other more bellicose utilitarians, sees utilitarian superpowers playing; hence Hardin's label diagrammed, WN inclined neutral represents a for this game, 'Lackey's Game'). Western-inclined (e.g. Yugos1avi a): neutral and EN In the game an Eastern A 3,2 D D (D A 2,3 NN Now 4,4 dilemmatic and coordination games are not played in the integrated since [Other coordination games, with (D,D) assigned (1,1) 1 in settings such as Uni ted Nations' committees games coordination are (and games peoples' -frequently but isolation, elsewhere, as well). Superimposing the games, as applied to US and SU games, leads to the following augmented games: SU SU SU A D A 2,2 4,1 1 2/3 3,3 • 1 4,1 . 2/3 1,4 • 2/3 2,2 D J,3 ■ 4 1,4 ■ A 2/3! A m represents a sequence of ms, and 3s in some order. As the agumented games reveal, a stable deadlock. on the superpowers. 4 i ■ e? ■ 2/3 4 ■ 2/3 a sequence of 2s m < m w rn in fact in several ways. on For example, would For one, enough significant much greater as a Superpower militarism Australia's nonaligned free impact, rider for disarmament and regional nuclear freedom (instead of by wash polemics and token ambassadors, US support) . 36 strategy with less support, unilateral action by US arms build-up can be exposed. be in much more pressure can be brought to bear- power excursions would stand naked, and unsupported. seriously <2,3 to play with a superpower is to help reinforce For another, towards disarmament. particular, 1,4 A a coordination game can alter the overall dominant playing administration 4,1 • 2/3 But playing an independent coordination game can help breaking the deadlock, players 3,2 ■ D 1 US US US A D D D New Game, Augmented Revi sed Game, Augmented Prisoners" Dilemma Augmented and in pressing white­ undermined by a none-too-tacit policy of 8. On the need for, possibility of, and prospect of basic structural change- The peace (in world has changed enormously since the time of Kant's proposals and even since the time of Veblen's more cynical (of 1795), additions Hard science and destructive power have grown enormously; and even 1917). especially that admitting knowledge of collective behaviour, theoretical game-theoretic treatment, what for though still has increased markedly. slight, be accomplished politically has in certain can little, since Rousseau complained (around 1761) of respects But changed very that governments were probably too short-sighted to appreciate the merits of his project for perpetual peace. Governments have obstacles to peace. long of source been seen as Xthe main (contingent) if the peace is Thus Veblen rightly maintains that ' ... to be kept it will have to come about irrespective of governmental management, - in spite of the State rather than by its good offices'- (p.7) . against the State on the basis that 'governmental Veblen argues and establishments powers ... are derived from feudal establishments of the Middle Ages; which in turn, However a predatory origin and of an irresponsible of are character Christian-feudal origin of the State provides only one the (p.r). - and a coercive - evolutionary pattern of organisation (pp. 12-13). There are major blockages to peace proposals and projects at two main and critical levels of organisation, that, organisation of collectives of states and, organisation deep, and domination of removal and to nothing set in part by devolution, themselves. these blockages, and exploitation of other forms, sights rather lower, short organisation of states, upon, The problems involved ones intertangled appears to call genuine global appear adequate. impossible in present political climates. 37 Yet even much the for are concerning extensive reached, to be attained, levels of political stability of extensive structural changes at both would of that of the Indeed if a permanent and satisfactory peace is to be adjustments. or individual focussed already smaller changes look There is little doubt that certain sorts of structural change are to conducive peace and that certain fundamental permanent peace. for changes would be With that in view they have long been least from Rousseau and Kant onwards. transform the structures that lead to war'- (B. theme immune to criticisms, obvious further desiderata, modest material freedoms, ~ at advocated for 'it is also necessary instance to To render this Martin, p.12). that straightforward extension of certain established structures could bring an authoritarian to war, sufficient But it has also long been supposed that such changes are necessary for lasting peace: some highly end typically presupposed, are invoked, e.g. certain standards of life, etc., and the type of necessity involved is set at some lower technical level (not excluded however by present These adjustments make the necessity theme more difficult to practicalities). assess, but also difficult to sustain. are There part, critical positive part, part negative According marxist demolishing and range of arguments a defence, from a negative determinism, of comprising direct arguments for the theme. 22 this enterprise will simply be illustrated. to deterministic and mechanistic approaches, technological determinism, human nuclear weapons, The large such as that like of megamachines They are an integral part of the business of generally, are no aberration. industrial and ecological conquest, a further stage in human intervention which has already involved substantial disruption through pesticides, etc. The argument tends to the fatalistic. made, and once made they wi11 22. and etc., that arrangements have to be more or less the way they are, and nature, a parts to its assessment two be used. wastes, The megamachines of conquest are No change in political arrangement, More of the negative enterprise is attempted elsewhere, e.g. a critique of the supposed strait-jacket of human nature is begun in CPD. From Plato through Hegel and into contemporary times it has been supposed that war, like aggression, is part of human nature, that war is a permanent condition of human and social existence. 38 would which enthusiasts any make difference, possible. is their position and luck, push While there is, unfortunately, a induction from the manufacture of weapons, batches machines are to this one, depl oyed) , never (and organisation deterministic position would possible either; political not frustrate the and other, is false, Different political arrangements, been have inductions. broader The are changes arrangements too, like the rest of social not life, are But (nonanalytical) determinism, technologically or economically determined. technological many that a change in background of course that such background is made of But even the good inductions do not that weapons of various sorts must be used, political many invention from induction's:- machines that do eventually get many reinvented or independently discovered). show of any given type (for or the like to their manufacture are unreliable and subject to counterexamples or weapon there is no stopping progress. But in doing so they overextend themsleves. fair technological that a even further, once invented by humans will be used: device Sometimes so it is argued which alleviate problems, are possible and would be different in differently evolved worlds. CPD). (JB, elsewhere technically Things did not and do not have to be the way they are or the social and political sort of way they are. Many routes, dominant require none of deductive strength, political extensive lead to the conclusion that the structures of our time, evolved from feudal structural alteration. In particular, institutions, they need to superseded by alternative structures which do not promote or lead to war. theme has been argued directly from the nuclear fix (see e.g. But suppose, improbable as it may seem, thereby removing the current nuclear fix; quietly seif-destructing,or nuclear disarmament HF I, p.4/ft.). that nuclear weapons all vanished, for instance, thermodynamic actually took place. The they turned out to be miracle occurred, or not be The problem of war would t-hat of nuclear war would only be given a short respite. 23 Conventional the structural arrangements for war would remain intact. removed For a massive be and even 3'? remain, weapons would weapons such as chemical and biological ones, were they prevent the in sot ar 3S could seem be Nu clear weapon s, if nuclear power plants remained especially nothing and intact; development of (Star wars) weapons more nuclear- as dangerous caches are easily hidden away), removed ("for smal 1 replaced, would along with weapons perhaps as than diabolical nuclear ones. War cannot be eliminated while leaving the rest of society as it is by freezing the status quo. ... The structural conditions for war need to be removed - not reinforced as appeals to elites may do - and superseded by alternative structures which do not lead to war (B. Martin, p.12). Structural adjustments peace. An can provide conditions for Kantian initial for the argument satisfactory lasting proposition that is peace possible, presented by Latta (introducing Permanent Peace), runs as follows:Peace, perpetual peace, is an ideal, not merely of a speculative kind but a practical ideal, a moral principle. ought to be realised, i.e. there ought (morally) Hence this ideal to be peace. But ought entails can; therefore peace is possible. From Heracleitus philosophers by 24 be with war as one limit, is essential swarm more widely conceded, ought to though often not on of Some are even captivated stop, to motion and progress. the recent shift in philosophical fashions the second premiss would Kantian grounds, now but Such grounds do support the theme that peace ...is—desirable be realised, indicate what sort of peace. but are more discriminating in Unfortunately, premiss does not sustain the conclusion, 23? impressive such extravagant counter-claims as that with peace everything would consequentialist. and there buzzes an Hegel who have rejected the second premiss. that competition, With through that they help however/ it is done, the second ought does not entail can, as many (From previous page) As B. Martin, who uses this important form of argument for institutional change to get his thick book started, points ou t (pp. 12-13). 24. The swarm includes some anomalies, ecology, Spinoza: see Appendix 3. 40 such as that tarnished hero of deep dilemmas reveal moral Fortunately (see MD) . conclusion that peace is possible, method of (semantical) modelling: societies where recall persists present in detail scenarios of it may be necessary to (for the sceptical with n = 1 or n = 0). n-human models, the to That is the more and indeed is feasible. elaborate peace route a more satisfactory and revealing is there This sort of thing is of course in more pleasing fashion than logicians could hope to emulate if 25 less precisely, by novelists. Hhat all these scenarios point to, already done, rather however, are societies considerably different from our own, not in the people involved who have their weaknesses, forth, and so their power drives, but because of significant structural alterations in the societies depi c ted. way of such modellings we can not merely argue to the feasibi1i ty By peace, sorts restructured push ahead with the argument - that societies but desirable alternatives to contemporary are For those of us industrial arrangements. pacific the alternatives, Heilbroner is has and possible said thoroughly entrenched, of the desirable, human and enforced, power. That has not deterred social before him and many after him, Kant, 25. in his search these military or then who want to move towards such from inference, feasibility and we shou1d begin on the real work of structural change. desirability is clear: Peace practical of of but the prospect). prospects Present poor (as arrangements are are both ideologically and by much physical theorists such as Kant, who like Rousseau were concerned with obtaining lasting for the indispensible conditions peace. for__ 1 asting—peace, Perhaps Kant had some such modellings in view in his theme that peace is empirically possible, which he coupled with his striking claim that it is morally and rationally imperative. The latter claim, running in direct opposition to the longline of bellicose philosophers, really relies on the correct but controversial assumption that states are subject to the same moral relations as individual persons. Both then have an obligation to seek peace derived from forms of the categorial morality, notably from rational autonomy , the universality of maxims, and the ultimate value of persons (or, more chauvinistically, of humanity). 41 claimed, others as have claimed since, that peace is not possible present structural arrangements of a competing nation-states kind. times changed, have and so have state structural In particular there is now, under To be sure since arrangements, in the shape of the United Kant Nations, a very weak reflection of what Kant looked for, a world (or European) federation of nations. namely, But crucial the at ingredients in Kant's resolution are still upper level, what is required for a standard resolution Dilemma type situations - some surrender of Prisoners lacking:- of sovereignty, national 26 especially as regards war; Much has now accumulated that more evidence the and, at the lower level, "republican" state*. nation-state level far-reaching changes if peace is to be secured, or required at movement is even to get its message through already fixed channels control systems. succeed, tn informational and democratic are practical 27. and not (p.52) , to alter which the theoretical arguments for not that it has fallen very Kant's claim, as well as arguments of an inductive sort. Such is also the new message from America: for the peace movement to get through to the administration, American democracy must be overhauled and revitalised, capitalist democracy superseded by true democracy or "republicanism" (see e.g. Cohen and Ragers). But the message, like the US peace movements'" very limited demands for peace, leaves the state, as the bringer of wars, and the main source of violence, essentially intac.; the structural changes suggested, which will be slow to achieve, are much too narrowly conceived. 28. state has traced some of the economic consequences of 'the rise and subsequent fall of the American imperium'’ There to The significant decline of the American imperium Heilbroner 26^ peace Movements on a single front, such as peace, are unlikely to channels, 27 character and membership of state control system^. widen APPENDIX 1; a need to be linked into a broader plurality of movements, but are My thanks for information to David Bennett and Andrew Mack. 'Empires f ar . empire was no Thp =h<=pr military cost ... for the United States a 1 one ... 12 px c e p t i on « is always been expensive and the American have ten roughly imperial American dol1ars)". GNP for the last 25 years ... percent of supplemented spending enhanced poverty, countries fueled inflation, what it was represented as required by, $2X10 in capitalist other by 1972 etc., and was complemented by, counterexpenditure and efforts by the USSR. establishment of an American hegemony [consisted and] resulted 'The just in American large very capital American-owned billion" payments and Between 1950 and 1970, equipment abroad 1 eaped from $ 12 (negative build-up of value of the to billion "capital flows" and balances), and a $78 growing On this sort of basis Heilbroner speculates that of IOUs. operation rapid A result of the expenditure abroad was a serious balance of problem accumulation mere investments abroad. plant (p.54). but in the military expenditures, not of the American imperium by itself - deemed of such 'the critical importance to preserve the peace and security of the capitalist world - was in likelihood all a inflationary phenomena' the for the globalisation of the (p.57 with insert from p.56). According to Heilbroner, that condition sufficient 'Long before the Vietnam debacle, it was clear American arms could not prevent the rise of revolutionary governments in under-developed collapse there world" (p.57). is presented by Heilbroner; But and seemingly there little is evidence little. is more substantial evidence for is the marked dec H ng of *he imperium in the period (1973-3) concerned. decline really very in America's select leading national share of World GDP, economies: 43 of What American One piece of evidence is the sharp shown in the following table of POPULATION SHARE (1984 est) SHARE OF WORLD GDP (X) RANK 1968 1975 1984 USA 1 35.0 24.3 25.0 5.2 USSR 2 11.1 11.0 13.8 6.2 .JAPAN 3 5.2 3.0 9.5 2.7 GERMANY FDR 4 5.1 6.7 5.7 1.5 FRANCE 5 4.6 5.4 4.4 1.3 CHINA 6 2.9 4.8 4.3 22.6 UK 8 2.8 2.8 2.3 1.3 INDIA 12 1.3 1.5 1.1 15.1 AUSTRALIA 15 1.1 1.4 1.0 0.3 COUNTRY The qrand table empire, also make it clear that if the USA cannot should nor can the USSR. sustain A totalitarian Pax Sovietica is even a le=s likely than a capitalistic Pax Americana was. APPENDIX 2: A pluralistic framework for defence policy The policy (broadeni ng Cami11 er izs suggest ions) 1. ensures Australian security to some minimal but reasonable extent; 2. is entirely non-nuclear (.and so is not aligned); 3. is defensive in posture with weapons system devoid of offensive application and capacity, focussing on direct defence of Continent, is decentralised, comprising wel1-trained, dispersed but coordinated small units. is partly at least social, defence, nonmilitary deploying, in combination [?] with territorial forms of popular resistance trained in noncooperat i on. 44 sabotage a APPENDIX 3? The philosophical record; a preliminary tabulation. Reflection on war and peace has had a strong polarising effect, dividing philosophers into two main groups: Group B. Those who regard war as inevitable, perhaps even as desirable; Group G. Those who consider war an evil, capable of being replaced by lasting and peace through goodwill or improved social arrangements. The groups are not however exhaustive; fence-sitters; and there are there are ambivalent philosophers, and those who have the supported battered themes of a war to end wars and of world empire. at one stage in his development, to a despotic world state, peace. Russell, idealists. reached by imposition or war, B and G are sometimes described, But while Thus, for example, who looked, like Dante before him, So strictly the classification is (once again) Groups historically- as a guarantor of four valued. respectively, as realists and these overworked terms reflect accurately enough the historic human condition and the present prospects, they are prejudicial, and they conflict with other classifications using these terms; for instance, both Plato and Hegel, condition of human existence. idealists would Northedge, accept war as normally accounted idealists, have been a Such concoctions as war-realists preferable to the labels from whom much of the record is drawn, the c on serva t i ve t r ad i t i on a n d aboli t i on i sts. the concoctions, 45 terms and of sets the contrast: peace- which namely We shall prefer adaptions namely war-riors and peace-niks, simply (real) baddies and goodies. in permanent or, not to be of partisan, DEFINING POLES R adi c a 1 s GROUP 8: war-riors RESIDUE GROUP GROUP G peace-niks Virtually all classic Greek phi1osophers except early Stoics: especially Heracleitus, Plato (P) Author of Revel at ions Early Christians (non-violence pr i n c i p 1 e) Dubois (1306); but with anti­ Musi im aim Erasmus ( 1570) Cruce (1623; early world order model Roman Stoics and Christians Scholastics: Aquinas (P) Dante •Just war theorists: (Au Qu s t i n e) , SuIr ez, Grotius (1425) IJ t op i an s: More (war­ games of modern utopias in direct descen t) European peace projects, some extended to (Christian) wor1d: Bel 1ers ( 1710), Penn (1693), abb£ de Saint-Pierre (1713) European peace and hegemony: Duke of Sully (1620) Nation-state theorists Machiave1 1 i, Hobbes, Locke, Spinoza I-<2'1 b n /f’-j German idealists: Hegel, Schopenhauer Perpetual peace: Rousseau, Kant Mili t ar i st s: Nietzsche; Treitschke, Bernhardi, Clausewi tz Some utili tar i ans: Bentham, the Mil Is, Bren tano Some anarchists and 1ibertarians: Kropotkin (?), Spencer Russel 1 ■James Hi t tgenstei n Key: In Dewey P, peace a prime objective. sort of investigation there are disappointments as this Spinoza was admiration madness to a major disappointment, of Greek thought, allow Brentano a find. well For, as finds. despite his 'Brentano was a decided pacifist and thought it questions of international fortunes of war'- (Kraus in Brentano, p.122). 46 justice to be decided by the REFERENCES H.G. Andrewortha Birch, and L.C. University of Chicago The Ecological Neb, 1984. Press, H.R. Ashby, Design -for a Brain, Second edition. Hi ley. New York, I960. S. Beer, Desiqninq Freedom, Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, Toronto, F. Brentano, The Origin of our Knowledge of Right and Wrong, Keegan Paul, London 1969. 'Setting the J. Camilleri, disarmament agenda", l?/4. Routledge and Peace------ Studies 9, ( 1984) ,17-19. F. Capra and C. Spretnak, Green Politics, Hutchinson, London, R. Catley, with the Bomb ... 'Along Australian Magazine, 7-8 April, (Review o-f 1984. Martin), D. The—Weekend 1984. 1979. P. Cock, Alternative Australia, Qu ar t er Book s, Me1 hourn e, J. Cohen and J. Rogers, On Democracy, Penguin, New York, 1984. P. and A. Erlich, Popu1 ation, Resourses, Environment, Second edition, Freeman, San Francisco, H. Feith, 197x. 'Richard Falk, Peace Studies 24 (June 1985) World order radical', 24-5. J. Galtung, There are Alternatives, Spokesman, Nottingham, 17’84. A. Gilbert, 'The state and nature in Australia', Au s t r a 1i an Cu 1 t yral—Hist or 1981 (ed. S. Goldberg and F.B. Smith), Canberra, 1982, pp.9-28. R. Hardin, Co 1 1 ec 1 tive Action , Resources -for the Future, Washington, R. Hardin, M.D. Hayes, Ph i 1 osop_hy—and—Pub He 236-254. 'Defending September 1983) mutual disarmament', versus 'Unilateral Affairs 12 (1983) the sunburnt country', Chain Reaction 33 (August 11-17. R.L. Heilbroner, Beyond Boom and Bust, Norton, New York, 19/8. I. Kant, Perpetual Peace (trans, and introd. M. Campbell Sonnerschein, London, 1903 (first published 1795). A. Mack, 'Farewell 1?82. Smith), Swan to Arms Controls' 9 (1984) 9ff. A. Mack, 'The pros and cons of ANZUS', Fabian ANZUS Conference, Lome, 4-5 May 1985; referred to as PC. B. Martin, Uprooting War, Freedom Press, London, 1984. D. Martin, Armed Neutrality for Australia, Drummond Books, Melbourne, 47 1984. Northedge, 'Peace , war and philosophy', in Encyclopedia of Phi 1osophy (ed. P. Edwards), Volume 6, Macmillan, New York, 1767, 63 t>< . M. Olson, The Logic of Collective Action, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1965. P. Pettit, 'Tree riding and foul dealing', typescript, Canberra, J.-J. Rousseau, A Project for Perpetual Peace C trans. 1927 (first published 1761). E.M. 1985 Nut tai), London, large-scale nuclear war and nuclear deterrence, 'On the ethics of R. Rout ley, out' , Discussion__ Papers__ in Environmental and the political fall School of Social Sciences, Australian National Ph i1osophy #5, Research University, 1984. R. R. Routlpy, 'Metaphysical fall-out from the nuclear predicament', 1 Ph 11osophy "and 1 Social Criticism 3/4 ( 1984) 19-34; referred to as MF. Rout ley and V. Plumwood, 'Moral dilemmas and the logic of deontic^notions , 'ni\r,.^.ign Papers in Environmen tai ..Philosophy #4, Research School of SociaT~Sciences, Australian National University, 1984; referred to as MD. P.R. Stephen son, The Foundation s of Cu1t u r e, N.J. M i1es, oydn ey, R. Sylvan, 'Culture Canberra, 1985; and the roots of political divergence', 1 ? 36. typescript, referred to as CPD. M. Taylor and H. Hard, 'Chickens, whales, and bumpy goods: al ternative models of public-goods provision', Poli tical Studies 30 (19821 350 370. The Strategic Basis of Australian Defence .Policy, the National Times, March 30-April 5, leaked extracts published in 1984, 23-30. to Australian Security, Pariiamentary Joint Committee for Foreign Affairs and Defence, Australian Government Printer, Canberra; referred .o 3. s TAS. T. Veblen, An Inquiry into the Nature of Peace and the Terms of Perpetuation, Viking Press, New York, 1945 (first published 191,). 48 its  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Box 71, Item 1: Working draft of Australia's defence philosophy: investigations of the nonexistent # MX504 Subject The topic of the resource Computer printout of working draft. Paper published, Routley R (1984) 'On the alleged inconsistency, moral insensitivity and fanaticism of pacifism', Inquiry (Oslo), 27(1): 117-136. https://doi.org/10.1080/00201748408602030. Description An account of the resource Unnumbered paper from collection, item number assigned by library staff Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/browse?search=Richard+Sylvan&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bjoiner%5D=and&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=&amp;range=&amp;collection=&amp;type=&amp;user=&amp;tags=&amp;public=&amp;featured=&amp;exhibit=&amp;geolocation-mapped=&amp;geolocation-address=&amp;geolocation-latitude=&amp;geolocation-longitude=&amp;geolocation-radius=10&amp;submit_search=Search+for+items">Richard Sylvan</a> Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived <span class="MuiTypography-root-125 MuiTypography-body2-126">The University of Queensland's <a data-testid="rek-series" href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/records/search?page=1&amp;pageSize=20&amp;sortBy=score&amp;sortDirection=Desc&amp;searchQueryParams%5Brek_series%5D%5Bvalue%5D=Richard+Sylvan+Papers%2C+UQFL291&amp;searchMode=advanced">Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291</a></span>, Box 71, Item 1 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org">Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy</a> Contributor An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, <a href="https://najtaylor.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Dr. N.A.J. 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TYPES OF ADMISSIBLE AND INADMISSIBLE CANNIBALISM Richard Routley Philosophy Department Research School of Social Sciences Australian National University and Environmental Studies University of Victoria Canada �IN DEFENCE OF CANNIBALISM~ It is a commonplace of mainstream Western thought that cannibalism - the eating of human flesh by humans, and, more generally, the feeding of animals on members of their own species is, at least in the human case, morally outrageous. © Ri chard Routley, 1982 This repugnan cy thesis appears to be a legacy especially (but not only) of Christianity, probably derived from Jewish teaching, which went much further and excluded the eating of pig, for instance, as well as "long pig". Also in this series: It is a thesis reinforced by the substitution of Man for God of the World rainforest destruction - the social factors "Enlightenment" and consequent elevation and separation of humans Semantical foundations for value theory from other creatures. Unravelling the meanings of life substantially undermined, have for the most part been observed to Nihilisms and nihilist logics rest on a tangle of false views and prejudices about the world, its Nuclear power - ethical, social and political dimensions origin, evolution and purposes , and about the creatures that inl~bit Now that all these positions have been it, their separateness, and their order (in an a lleged chain of be in g ) Disappearing species and vanishing rainforests: wrong directions and the philosophical roots of the problem with humans at the apex, it is past time that major moral theses that these positions have sustained are re-examined and reassessed. The irrefutability of anarchism, enlarged Up for re-examination are, in particular, all theses that Roles and limits of paradigms in environmental thought and action depend essentially on the common but mistaken assumption that there is something morally very special or distinctive about simply being a human, that Homo sapiens as a species deserves special treatment. On the contrary, there is no morally relevant distinction between humans and all other creatures. Of course there are various morally relevant distinctions between things, but none concerns the biological species Homo sapiens. What holds rather is an annular 1 model which can be depicted schematically as follows:- �3 instance in removing the idea that the wrongness of such practices 2 as cannibalism is not even open to question 3 . Diagram 1: High in a list of inherited moral assumptions that are ripe ANNULAR PICTURE OF MORAL RINGS IN OBJECT SPACE (and the position of humans). of sapiens for reassessment are those concerning the almost universal ~oral prohibition of and repugnance to cannibalism, a practice that used to be extremely widespread, but that has now been almost e;.tirely extirpated 4 with the very successful cultural conquest of the world by Western thought. But instead of the re-examination that should follow the intellectual erosion of mainstream Western social thought, the growing recognition of its theoretical inadequacy, not to say ~:Notional labels for the interiors of such morally relevant rings (or ellipses), from outer to inner: Objects of value, objects of moral concern Objects having well-being Preference havers, choice makers Rights holders Obligation holders, responsibility bearers Contractual obligation makers poverty, what has followed is the often shoddy defence of many of its leading moral theses, mostly on anthropocentric grounds, but sometimes on other grounds, some of them drawn from contemporary philosophy (e.g. the conventionalistic rejection of cannibalism of Diamond, considered below). Many of the defences preferred of total prohibition of There are also more comprehensive philosophical reasons cannibalism are ludicrously weak, and withstand little examination. for the periodic intellectual review of deeper assumptions (and Consider, to illustrate, the main argument in (what was until very prejudices), reasons furnished by dialectics in combination with recently one of the few books in English on cannibalism) Hogg, the theory of objects. namely 'the innate repugnance of contemporary man to touch human According to the theory of objects there is no assumption that has to be held,that cannot be disbelieved, flesh' (p . 188, also earlier) . while according to dialectics proper every assumption is open to represented as a matter of fact, it does not appear to hold generally, questioning and reconsideration by its methods , and assumptions in and may be largely a matter of background and conditioning. order to be rationally maintained should withstand such critical scrutiny. imply 2 Naturally these (methodological) considerations do not that assumptions under examination do not (frequently) withstand critical discussion, or that there are not (or never could be) good reasons for adhering to them. But the considerations are important in opening larger moral assumptions to due reconsideration, for Insofar as the repugnance is There is no evidence that - what seems unlikely given the former prevalence of cannibalism - it is innate; and insofar as it is a matter of fact it does not support moral prohibition of eating human flesh, any more than the apparently very widespread repugnance of urban Americans �5 4 as observed, it has recently been argued, successfully, that this to eating raw snake underwrites a moral prohibition on consumption of raw snake meat. distinction will not carry very much of the moral weight that has been imposed upon it. 7 On the other hand, if the repugnance in With the breakdown of this sharp moral distinction question is (intended to be) warranted moral repugnance, then the argument is trivially circular, the premiss assuming the point at between humans and other species.orthod ox anthropocentr ic options, which sanction human consumption of animals other than humans but issue. never humans, collapse. One reason why the proferred defences look weak is that it has not been thought necessary to provide any defence; for 'Directly daylight falls on the habit it withers away' 5 - the "daylight" is that of contemporary Western civilization. appears in Langton (initial page): A similar theme cannibalism is 'a custom that of civilization' - or, one might say, before the triumph of human (pure) vegeta!ian options and on the other, cannibal(istic ) options (mixes of these options which allow some human flesh eating will it will be seen that by no means all forms of cannibalism are morally inadmissable. present exercise. Showing as much is the main object of the Though the results arrived at are part of the process of elaborating a non-chauvinis tic ethics, and accordingly have implications for policy, no policy conclusions are drawn in what no recommendatio ns for the implementation , or institution- The vegetarian options face, it certainly seems, insuperable difficulties, especially concerning such issues as animal predation (which is an important, immensely frequent, and often _<!~~rab.!!'_, What will be argued is that, on the contrary, when some daylight does penetrate to the issues concerning cannibalism, follows: (at least as regards "higher" creatures) are, on the one side fall under the latter head). must soon become extinct all over the world before the great march chauvinism. Among the important options left open ecological fact), and concerning the reduction in numbers of animals, especially introduced animals, which build up to "pest proportions" (some reduction is often required for vegetable growing to operate successfully) . But it is unnecessary to elaborate these and connected points here because there are cases where consumption of human flesh is perfectly admissible. The main argument advanced is modelled upon simple inductive arguments: a base case is argued, and this base is expanded step by step to cover other cases. alisation, of cannibalistic practices are made 6. Hardly necessary to say, better defences of the mainstream anti-cannibal istic tradition can be devised or pieced together from the literature than those so far alluded to. for example, on the assumption of sanctity Such defences - based, of all human life, on the theme that cannibalism is a brutalising experience, which puts humans in the same category as the brutes - characteristic ally rely on a sharp distinction between humans and other creatures. But, §1. The Base Cases: Eating the Dead. In setting out the first of these cases it is taken for granted that the practice in some American states and Canadian provinces of allowing accident victims (e.g. those of automobile casualties) to consent to the use of parts of their bodies for organ transplants and also for other medical purposes is admissible, and that the use itself in such cases is �Restricted forms of cannibalism in the interests of 6 survival are now quite widely accepted as admissible. admissible 8. Then, is there any good reason why persons should So there is really nothing extravagant at all in contending that sometimes not similarly consent to the use of their bodies for food upon cannibalism is perfectly alright: their death? fact that the admissible cases lead, naturally and coherently, once For food transfusions, instead of blood or transfuslons · or transplants. plasma And if they do, or so bequeath their bodies, why should their bodies not be eaten? What differences human chauvinism is properly cases. any extravagance is due to the left behind, to much more controversial There are several examples of human cannibalism undertaken there are in the types of cases can be minimized, and those that for survival, which have won establishment approval, from remain seem not to make much - or any relevant - moral difference. or church hierarchies. For example, in order for human parts to be intially taken and used, of members of a Uruguayan rugby party who survived an airplane crash the bodies have to be more or less butchered; in the high Andes (dramatised by Read). but then they may be in much less pretty shape after a serious accident. Again, in each typ e of case, the parts may - or may not - be supplied to people who are in genuine need; etc. Nor does internal ingestion appear to differ, in any way that matters morally, from internal connection, from organ transplantation. It could be objected that with an organ transplant a specific organ is required, whereas with a starving or undernourished person alternative sources of food are - or ought legal A striking recent example is the cannibalism Their eating of dead companions, evidently necessary for survival, was condoned by the Catholic Church of Uruguay and by other prominent Catholic thinkers. Interestingly, Rubio, Auxiliary Bishop of Montevideo, justified such cannibalism, necessary for survival, through a medical transplant comparison 10 .•• Eating someone who has died in order to survive is incorporating their substance, and it is quite possible to compare this with a graft. Flesh survives when assimilated by someone in extreme need, to be - available. But where the parts are used for nonspecific just as it does when an eye or heart of a dead man is grafted onto a living man ••. (as quoted in Read, p. 308). medical testing, e.g. cell culture, or just disposed of (e.g. by But the Bishop tactfully rejected, except 'as a source of inspiration', incineration) without any other use, the specific need consideration the equivalence, appealed to by some members of the team, between does not work. Anyway what would it show? eating the flesh of their friends and participating in communion, as The claim staked is accordingly this:_ where the human initiated by Christ at the Last Supper, where he (figuratively) shared eaten is dead, and certain other conditions are satisfied, cannibalism his flesh and blood with his apostles (Read, p.309; is admissr e. also p. 299). The other conditions~ comprise such things as Exactly why this correlation, which undoubtedly helped the survivors, the following: that the whole thing is done decently (in ways, gets discounted, remains tantalisingly obscure. that is . LO be spelled out specifically); that the person eaten consented (or, differently, would consent) to being eaten, perhaps by the parties concerned, or more strongly that the person directed tha t he or .;he be eaten (or otherwise used); or differently again, tha t the ~onsumption was necessary for survival or well-being. etc. seems worth pursuing further. The correlation For though survival was not a problem �9 Suc h d es pi cable motives as those of the ge t-even s yndrome ("we'll 8 fix the ba s t a rd, we'll eat him") are pointl ess (as well as stup id l y for the apostles at the Last Supper (so destroying a strict correlation), survival is not the only basis justifying the eating of human flesh. As with blood, the gift relation is another v i ndi c tiv e ) wh e re the part y is already dead. It can be argued that eating certain pieces of human flesh out of respect is an exceptional case (like eating a fellow creature to avoid starvation), and that a general principle of respect for important basis. A consent or bequeathal clause 11 is important in under- the dead overrides any consent that may be given. The short cutting various objections to the consumption of dead humans, for answe r to this is, firstly, that grantin g of exceptional cases alr eady in s tance, that it is an affront to human dignity, that it is a mark allows that some cases of cannibalism are admissible, and secondly , of total d isr espec t, that the 'sanctity of the human being' is that no general principle applies in a decisive way to exclude the compl e tely disregarded (Hp. 186), that it is impious (Dp. 467). exampl es alr ea dy considered. Fo r if the person consents it can hardly be an affront to that general principles can always be thwarted, it is instructive to consider per s on's dignity, or violate that person's sanctity (as seen from one po int of view). Nor is it an affront to the dignity of creatures of an irreligious cast, for whom a dead body whether of a human or an animal is a d ead body - though perhaps a dead body of a fellow creature o r of a friend. So it is an affront only to those of particular ( religious) groups, perhaps the same groups for whom dead human bodies are sacred and their disfigurement by humans (whether for medical or 5 other purposes) impious . Just as it is legitimate for one to discount the often illfounded views of such groups - insofar as the views are int ended to have universal applicability - as regards medical use of (forme rly ) consenting humans, as regards sexual relations, abortion, e uthanasia, and so forth, so it is legitimate to discount them in the case at hand. Dev ine ' s argument against cannibalism, namely as a paradigmatic applica tion of his overflow principle. On the contrary, the eating of certain parts of the bodies of dead humans was, amon g certain tribes who used to practice cannibalism, for it was thought that in that way the eaters could acquire or participate in some of the (former) virtues o f the dead , e. g . wisdom, strength, hunting skills, etc. still be, that eating is not disrespectful: So it can what is sometimes dis- respectful is raising for food nnd killing, e.g. in order to ent. The overflow principle~ formed -chiefly to cope with the treatment of animals, is this: Act towaPds that which, while not itself a pePson, is clos ely associated with pePsonhood in a way cohePent with an attitude of Pespect fop pePsons (Vp . 503) . Instead of arguing directly for the principle, Devine suggests firstl y that it may be argued for in rule-cons equ e ntial fashion, secondly tha t it may be made plausible as part of a way of life having respect for persons at its centre, and thirdly that th e prin ciple is well ensconced in the moral consciousness of the plain man. Each of these suggestions can be faulted both in general and as regards the relevant application. For instance, plain men mostly do not object to the bulldozing of old cemeteries to make way for a development. Nor need the eating of a dead human be a mark of disrespect. an act of consider a ble res pect; To illustrate how application of suc h On the other hand, the principle can be rendered analytic by taking up the slack in "associated with" and "coherent with" appropriately - only then it won't yield the relevant substantive application. In application of the principle Devine makes two alternative moves. First, �11 It is by no means obvious, however, that a cons~n 10 is required. similarly if it is going to be incinerated and the ashes s pread, it might better be carefully composted. The point ma de does not exclude organ transplants, eating, and so ecological alternatives to burial or cremation. The most the overflow principle The suggestion that the already dead can, at least in s e ems to show, under this move, is - what does not exclude consumption, certain circumstances, be eaten without moral qualm, innocuous though and what one may well concur with - that the dead (and not merely the human dead) ought to be eaten respectfully; it is, is liable to spark off a series of protests. and even this much some ugly scenes could result i f "long pig" caught on; is not shown if the tense change, the transformation from alive to dead, destroys the requisite closeness of association. outback Australia) competing to pick up "accident" victims. ambulances or tow trucks, are readily enough avoided (by suitable body, which forms the visible aspect of the bulk of persons with whom we are acquainted, and which persists when the person ceases to exist in death. (Vp. 593) organization), and more respectful practices adopted. would, if the objection is to have force - lead to what is normally a~sumcs, overflow to the subsequently dead body (which is no longer inadmissible, for example, to a perverse lust for human flesh, and And again respectful eating be marketable commodities, if there was commerce not just in human flesh. but in bags, shoes, and belts made from human hides, decorations from human bones and teeth, glue and fertilizer from other parts and so on 12 in the way that there is commerce in animal parts? Perhaps, disre sp ec t wo uld be an outcome, but perhaps for the wrong re aso ns. What s ee ms clear is that giving human flesh to the ne edful, s ~y , i s one thing, a llowing commerce in human parts is another. More serious is the objection that such "admissible cannibalism" could - or rather ov e rflow to thl' llvlng body docs not however guarantee, what Devine Wouldn't disrespect be inevitable if human parts become But these types of scenes, which can already occur with competing ... respect for persons overflows to the human to dead bodies. e.g. the the way that refrigerated trucks follow the kangaroo shooters in some heavy assumptions as to features of persons, reveals: could, it appears, be coherent with the alleged overflow of respect It is true that spectacle of the refrigerated vans patrolling the highways (in much Devine assumes it does not, as his second move which begins to buy into the "visible aspect" of a person). so in nci cher case is value diminished, it seems, by (respectful) cannibalism or ordinary garbage (in the literal sense) is not eaten (except in desperation, etc.). A dead body does nee have the value of the person whose body it is in life; Garbage is commonly thrown away, things in these end uses are mostly not; For i f a body is going to be buried and "eat,~" by bacteria, or various carnivores, it might as well be eaten; although a dead body is not a person, still the fact that it (so to speak) was a person means that it ought not to be treated like ordinary garbage (Vp. 503). forth. clause perhaps, thereby to the deliberate killing of humans for food. Hogg makes much of the first of these points, the (unintended) impression he gives being that human flesh is so delicious that it is highly addictive. Whether this is so or not (it would seem unlikely with a preponderance of older stringier humans, though the number of "battery humans" is increasing).it appears not to matter, unless it does lead to what would be more disconcerting, e.g. the establishment of a black market or the like in human flesh, with inputs from killer or Mafia syndicates. But the problem is not substantially different �13 12 of our unwillingness to kill people for food or other purposes, from problems that already arise with the treatment of animals (e.g. traffic in rare species), and over the distribution of dangerous drugs to humans, and can be met in similar ways, i.e. through a similar range of political or organizationa l options. The usual utilitarian defence of vegetarianism based on suffering, pain, and the like caused in raising and killing creatures for food, co llapses. 13 For no direct suff~ring, pain or the like occurs, with the creatures eaten already dead; and any sorts of suffering that might be marshalled among some of the still living who are pained by the consumption can be more than compensated for by th e alleviation of suffering of the meat consumers, for a suitable and secondly not a (direct) consequence of our unwillingness to cause distress to people - not that it always would (contrary to Diamond's assumption) - but rather 'what conditions our attitude to not dining on ourselves is the view that a person is not something The argument turns however on a slide on the mi.ddl.e term 'something to eat' which is ambiguous between (i) something that may be eaten and (ii) something that is eaten; In the second sense the justification given of the fact dead people are not eaten, namely people are not eaten, while in a sense "logically adequate" is trivial, and proves no requisite grounding, and the "justification " does not imply that dead people may not be eaten. In the first sense, a nontrivial justification is offered, that it is impermissible choice of consumers. to eat people,but in this case we cend to repeat the initial question; Some vegetarians however (rightly) reject utilitarian defenses; Diamond, in particular, tries to argue that they involve 'fundamental confusions about the moral relations between people and people and between people and animals ' (Dp. 465), and introduces instead convent ionalist arguments - unfortunately of wide philosophical appea l - against eating people. Some of the reasons for not eating people, she subsequently argues, extend to grounds for not eating animals either. Diamond's argument begins from certain quite central facts ... We do not eat our dead, even when they have died in auto- mobile accidents or been struck by lightning • .. (Dp. 467) An immediate objection is that this is little more than a local fact, Why is it? Diamond has a surprising answer: in effect that it is analytic on, or at least a consequence of, our notion of what a person or human being is. ••• it is not respect for our interests which is involved in our not eating each other . These are all things which go to determine what sort of concept 'human being' is it is one of those things which go to build our notion of human beings (Opp. 469-70). But such a thing as not eating other people is certainly not part of the concept 'human being', indeed it is not merely ~ot analytic or normic (near-analytic ) of human beings,it is not even true of them - good for certain ' we ' but by no means generally, as the history of given that, on well-authentic ated evidence, cannibalism was formerly canniba lism shows. widespread, and that it still persists in isolated place s today. It is equally a fact in the context of quite extensive groups, that .EE~L2o not eat l'i~.· So either the central fact has to be morally grounded or has to have moral consequences. The second option would involve a prescriptive fallacy (deduction of an ought from an is); followin g fashion:- in any case, Diamond tries the first, in the The fact is, firstly, not a (direct) consequence The answer is, in short, radically unsatisfactory . That this is �15 Tt may s eem ... I should find myself havin g t o jus tify slav e ry. For do we not learn - if 14 we liv e in a slav e soci e ty - what slaves ar e the answer Diamond is offering is however at once confirmed by how she goes on (writing in speciesist assumptions 15 in the same revolting fashion): and what masters are through the structure of a life in which we are here and do this, and they are there and do that? Do we not learn the difference between a master and a slave that way? (Dp. 470) Diamond does not manage to escape these difficulties, though sh e And so too - very much so - [built into the notion] the idea of the difference between human beings and animals. We learn what a human being is in - among other things sitting at a table where WE eat THEM. We 16 are around the table and they are on it (Dp. 470) . While we may learn something about what some human beings - not makes various attempts (p. 470 and especially pp. 476-7): the notion of a slave or an enemy or an outlaw assumes a background of response to persons, and recognition that what happens in these cases is that we have something which ;;;;-;;,::-e not treating as what it - in a way - is ( Dp. 476). vegetarians - are like in this way, in the way we can learn what But this is to assume a background of norms, of how things morally some other human beings are like from cannibal feasts where 11 we" are, that a person is not something to enslave, etc. (and to attempt are on the table as well as around it, we learn little of the once more to build a presupposed morality into conv entional facts). notion of human being in this way. Nor does what correct information Furthermore, as this reveals, the same ploy could be worked in the we acquire in this way provide a firm basis for moral judgements case of animals, namely that in hunting them, killing them, serving about the possibility of eating humans, though Diamond appears to them up for dinner, we are ~ treating them as what - in a way think that it does; for she later says that the source of moral they are (or, more accurately, as they mora lly deserve treating). life derives from ways in which we mark what human life is (Dp. 418), Such comparisons make it evident then what Diamond is about, and that another move which involves a prescriptive fallacy, as well as he r conventionalistic approach fails. obvious anthropoce ntri cit y . However, to remove objections to eating the already dead, Indeed many of the sorts of conventional patterns of response under specified conditions, is simply to avoid, rather than face up a nd conventional facts that Diamond alludes to are a fairly direct to, the real opposition to even qualified cannibalism. For an o utcome of human chauvinism, e.g. that drivers mostly stop for important part of the real opposition to qualified canniba lism relies injured humans, not for injured animals, that humans are commonly upon illicit assimilation of cases of eating already dead people given funerals, animals mostly not. Diamond needs to say, and with killing humans for food, and, differently again, rearing some proceeds to say, that these sorts of differences are appropriate, but that is to slide to a value judgement which concedes to he rself part of what is at issue. Diamond's approach encounters serious difficulties when applied to such matters as slavery, the treatment of outlaws and enemies of them, e.g. certain infants, for food . and in an obvious sense ! .!1.~~~., Thus Devine's ambiguous, �17 what is entire l y different, permitting the killin g of humans for 16 food, or to, what is different again, the deliberate raisin g of human s for food. claim that 'a meat diet requires that animals be killed' (Vp. 483). And thus Diamond again, the cases are entirely different. involved both rearing and slaughtering Swift's "proposal" of children for food. Nor is the base position so far reached a new one, but an ancient proposition. it i s one thin g morally to eat an already dead deer, another to let a deer die and then eat it, another again to shoo t What we should be going against in adopting Swift 's "Modest proposal" is something one should be going against in salvaging the dead, more generally useful organs for transplantation, and the rest for supper or the compost heap. (Dp. 469) 17 Not a t all: animals: The differences are already clea r as rega rds For instance, Chrysippus, the Stoic, in his or otherwise kill it and then (perhaps) eat it, and yet another to eat a deer raised (in one or another of very different ways) for food. Within each of these different categories, it is important to distinguish cases. For while eating a dead human, even after it has been allowed to die (by omission), may be admissible, killing humans for food is often not, and raising a human for food (and other goods) is, it is now generally assumed by humans, certainly not. treatise On Justice, 'permitt ed eating of the corpses of the dead• 18 There are several separate issues here, in particular the So also apparently did Diogenes in his Republic, Zeno in his Republic, ~~ban~ or raising for food issue, on which much literature on and Cleanthes, all of whom may have authorised cannibalism on a the moral basis of vegetarianism has in fact focussed, and the broader scale. general l?I~'!_ati~ issue, which includes matters of killing and letting die. Limited extensions of cannibalism beyond the base cases, where humans are allowed to die or are killed . eat ing of (certain of) their parts . Eating dead humans involves But if eating such parts is (often) The issues are separate because creatures may be killed for food, e.g . in hunting, though they are not raised for food, and conversely creatures may be raised for food (or treated as slaves) without, for one reason or another, being killed. Cases of humans admiss ibl e , then so also presumably is consumption of such parts when raising humans for food have apparently never occurred, though humans they are (irrevocably or freely) severed from a living human, e.g. have sometimes been fed up for the pot (e.g. in the Aztec empire and in Fiji). ea ting the amputated limb of a friend or enemy or drinking the blood Humans are the only creatures we in fact know who might (having l ost consider- donated by another, able touch with the natural world) just adopt such a practice: These rather special cases, involving (what is no other ca lled, for s h o r t ) ~ human parts, provide a first set of extensions animals ever raise creatures for food, not did cannibalistic cu ltures of the base cases. ever apparently raise humans for food. These extensions include some bizarre cases, in particular where the part concerned is one's own. However, allowing the eating of dead humans and nonlive hum~ n parts under certai n conditions offers no slippery slide to, It is a serious and difficult question (to which moral philosophers have not sufficiently addressed themselves) why it is that if humans are not under !!.!!i'. conditions entitled to raise other humans for food, they are entitled under many �19 18 th e gene ral i ss ue as to wh e n, or wh e n prec i se l y , killin g f o r food i s jus tifiable can be largely skirt ed. For it is justifiable , it is conditions - indeed, it is often assumed, under a sweeping ra~ th e n claimed, whe n and only when killing itself i s justified, whe ne ve r of factory conditions - to raise other animals for food? that is. They can only be justified in so doing if there are significant and While one half of the italicised equivalence is uncontrover s ial - relevant differences between humans and other creatures raised, if killing for food (or for purpose P) is permissible, so is what it or that might be raised, for human or animal food. involves, killing - the converse is not. Yet there are, For consider some circum- it has already been pointed out, no such appropriate species-wide stances (assuming you can find them) where killing of person x is differences. justifie d, e.g. in war, in retribution, in self-defence, in r e ducin g g reat A fresh start can be made on the issue from a cannibalistic perspective. evil. Since it is not eating human f l e s h ~ that is Th e n killing x for these reasons is not killing for food, even if x is in fact subsequently eaten. There is an important intensional wrong, what is it that is wrong, if anything, with raising humans difference, so that being justified in killing x for some crime say , or other creatures for food? does not justify killing him for food, much as thinking of killing him or is it both? both. Is it the raising, or is it the killing, The answer is, of course, that trouble lies with for the one reason is very different from thinking of killing him for Raising of creatures frequently has one or both of two dama ging features accompanying it: first, the other purpose. deprivation of the What can be argued given the permissibility of- eating dead rai s ed creatures, and secondly, treatment of the raised animal humans, is that where killing of z is permissible, cannibalism of z merely as a means (not as an end). is also IN FACT permissible. The second, attitudinal, difference may have little or no impact beyond the first. For example, if infanticide i s alri ght under certain conditions (as Tooley contends, and others have hinted), And the first may be avoided, e.g. whe re the creatures stay by choice but then in fact cannibalism of infants is alright also under the given could depart if they wished. conditions (but the issues as regards the raising of infants for fo od Kept geese, for instance, may be in that position; they are seemingly not deprived, but may live in rather are, of course, not thereby resolved). natural conditions (except that migration and much that goes with it is permissible can, to this limited extent, be bypassed. II has been lost). Thus the issue of when killing It is worth elaborating these points, since important Killing involves something different again: extensions - not the only extensions - of cannibalism beyond the base all that goes with removing of a life, the termination of projects, purposes, cases depend upon them, and since - very differently - they furnish associations of value, etc. (and also the definitive end of con- clear cases of inadmissible cannibalism. sciousness, etc.). of situations to distinguish:- With the predation issue also, a central issue ls as to when killing an animal for food is permissible. It may be thought indeed that the killing for food issue just is, or is t a ntamount to, the general issue of killing, and that accordingly • There are several clas se s �21 survive themselves, the survivors of an aircrash in a remote area, 20 people on a life raft, etc. Such examples, where defensible, as they sometimes are, provide a further class of examples of admissible la. Killing , causing to die, is impermissible. cannibalism - what might be called exceptional cannibalism, since the lb. Letting die (passive killing, as it is sometimes misleadingly , but conveniently , called) is circumstances are, at present anyway, among higher mammals, rather impermissible . exceptional . Then, in either case , killing or letting die for eating or followed by An important and often times questionable practice, which eating is also impermissible, by preceding principles (essentially can in principle at any rate, deliver exceptional examples 20 , is ~Pp ➔ ~P (p & q)), hunting (in the intransitive form, which involves capture or killing So in particular it is where the creature is of the same species. That is, cannibalism is in these cases inadmissible . But some of these cases are clear; for instance, where creature (or if the object sought is duly located). Men continue to hunt in the French fields, and sometimes still their own species 21 , not at present human) x is leading a worthwhile nonaggressive independent and pro- in the shape of enemy soldiers , but those cast as outlaws (manhunts) . ductive life in a peaceful countryside. (Intransitive) Hunting divides into several types, according to its 2a. Killing is permissible. 2b. Letting die is permissible. end purpose, for sport , for food, for extermination, for capture. Hunting humans for sport (hunting for "sport " , so called, typically In common reckoning there are many examples of both second classes, involves killing) is a practice that has persisted well into this "passive" infanticide, suicide and gambling with life, euthanasia, century, in Australia for example . killing or allowing to die to maximise community values where there though it can be given philosophical support by chauvinistic theories are large numbers of people or choices between them, execution and such as a limited and racially prejudiced group-utilitarianism or by assassination, self-defence , killing in war (the list follows roughly appeal to the "ideal" of pure subspecies (the stud ideal). t he later chapter headings in Glover, where these well-known types such hunting is impermissible, so, for the same sorts of reasons, is of examp les are set out in some detail). the hunting of many animals for sport . In all these types of cases, It has nothing to recommend it, But if Hunting otherwise, except for death can be followed by eating, provided the base class conditions capture, is a restricted form of killing, and to what extent it is are satisfied . permissible turns on when that sort of killing is permissible . In such cases, henceforth called de facto extensions, cannibalism is also in fact admissible . The position arrived at thus far is pulled together in rhe Almost always the killing or letting die in 2a and 2b is not spec ifically for eating. conjoined: Eating the resulting dead is simply th e source of food is adventitious. Sometimes, however, in unusual circumstances some members of a party of the one species kill certain members of the party or allow them to die in order to fo ll owing diagram, which subsequent sections (and parts) endeavol1r to fil l out and render more precise:- �23 §3. 22 Unavoidable detours: when is killing a creature wrong, and when is letting a creature die wrong? It is not necessary, nor is it easy or desirable, to avoid entirely the issues of when killing Diagram 2: TYPES OF ADMISSIBLE AND INADMISSIBLE CANNIBALISM is wrong and when killing for food is wrong, and when such kinds of l( ,- killing are not wrong . Type 1 cases (exemplified e.g. in hunting for sport) - - -- ___ _] Base case I ,< conditions fail I X other than rather weak or circular principles. had seemed to be clear turn out on further reflection to be much l ess ,< obvious. \ ESSENTIAL / ,-...__ _ _ _ _ _'-! \ PREDATION..,, For example, it had seemed evident that the onus of jus tification (where this makes sense) characteristically lay with the WATERSHED J(. XCEPTIONAL EXTENSIONS Worse, things chat INADMISSIBLE ADMISSIBLE BASE CASES But it is not so easy to elicit or to defend action-taking party; \t 'I,( that it is the killing or removal of life that muse be justified, not the letting live. Some things, however, are clearer . 'J{ NONLIVE EXTENSIONS First and foremost, a satisfacto ry (nonchauvinistic) a c count K -J KILLING BOUNDARY of when and why killing a creature is wrong won't make exceptions for REARING FOR SLAUGHTER BOUNDARY humans and, more generally, won't contain the term 'human' or logical So far, in considering examples of killing, issue has not equivalents. This important requirement disposes of much of the been taken with enlightened conventional wisdom, with the result chat philosophical literature. a serious , and perhaps unwarranted, discrepancy between the treatment (9p. 135-9), which refer to the (contractual) conditions for human dished out to animals and that accorded humans is beginning to emerge. social life (the mixed account given should be faulted on several other So the judgements made tend to follow conventional practice: grounds as well). killing It wipes out, for example, Ewin's attempts Similarly it removes the main condition eventually humans for food is admitted but happens only in exceptional circumstances, achieved in Glover (a whole text devoted to moral issues concerning killing killing, which fails to present, or seriously address, the matter of animals for food is a pervasive practice. More generally, killing animals for food is considered permissible in a wide range of circumstances where killing humans is not , yet on what solid grounds? . As regards killing, even enlightened conventional moral wisdom returns us to the heartlands of human chauvinism. necessary and sufficient conditions for when killing is wrong) . The first main condition Glover arrives at is that ' taking human life is normally directly wrong: that most acts of killing people would be J/ To avoid it, the matter of wrong in the absence of harmful side-effects' (Gp . 42), i.e . so long killing and letting die will have (like most moral issues) to be as 'the best total outcome' does not involve killing (cf. p . 286), to reconsidered, nonchauvinistically. set down the underlying utilitarian recipe . Other conditions Glover outlines - similarly unacceptable even to their author when 'animal' replaces 'human' - are likewise faulted as damagingly cha,·vinistic, �25 24 for instance that it is wrong to kill a human whose life is worth l iv i ng (Gp . 53) , whenever that is. e . g. burning a collection of seeds (er seedlings) is one thing, burning Secondly , unremarkably, most of the recipes suggested in the a forest is another, slicing up or eating a raw egg is one thing, slicing literature are defective, first among them utili t arian proposals , which, as is well-known can sanction unjust killing. 22 up or eating an eagle is another, etc. Other (non- utilitarian) potential ys me rit the same consideration as ys, as if th ey we r e ys. recipes are also problematic, as a proposal by Young, wh i ch will he l p Call the r.esult of making the required deletio n, th e us on our way, serves to indicate: modified proposal . . . . what makes killing another person [more genera lly a considered . realisation either of the victim's life purposes or of such life- purposes as the victim may reasonably have been narrower utilitarian frameworks and induces a decided circularity, The proposa l requires some brief explanation. The term ' unjust ' , which takes the proposal outside is qualified in the final proposal (p.519) by 'maximally' , the point expected to resume or to come to have (Yp.518; repeated p.519 with 'maximally ' included). of which (though it is not fully explained) is to permit killing or The qualifying term sacrificing of one person in order to save others . 'irrevocable' is inserted to separate killing from life imprisonment I It is the modified proposal that will be chiefly creature] wrong on occasions is its characte r as an irrevocable, [maximally] unjust preventing of their I It is a popular fallacy that which may, as a matter of fact , defeat the prisoner ' s purposes . The long some members of a group (on a lifeboat or from a remote airplane crash) final disjunction is designed to delegitimize killing of sometime comatose are sacrificed for, or by, others of the group . persons (it also would include people undergoing reform programs) - -,hat is ac counled [maximally] unjust. an additional clause is required - and killing of potential future in way, and almost (but not) captial punishment. debatable judgements , such as that in the common case (on Young ' s ified' (p . 528) , ified. 23 from which it follows that abortion is commonly unjust- The disjunct should, it certainly seems, be deleted - especially since what justifies the main part of Young ' s proposal, considerations of what has value, does not justify the final disjunct, because merely potential persons do not appear to have requisite value, though they might (or might not) come to have such. Generally, potential ys do not have the same range of features (including acquired value, etc.) ll Similarly what one is entitled t o do , or feels like doing with r espect to them may differ; If , however, there are no just wars then most killing in war is wrong; and if punishment by death is sometimes just , capital punishment is sometimes not wr.ong. If, for instance, a person's life purposes are sufficiently evil~ e.g. they include genocide, then their fulfilment is certainly pro1, ~ rJ y , justly, thwarted. 0 1· Thus some proviso as to the chara c t e r or qua lit y of life purposes , such as the term 'unjustly ' obliquely supplies , is essential (but often omitted in ethical discussions) . It is not evident however that killing such a person (as distinct, e.g. from imprisonment , re-education, etc.) is permissible, exc ept perhaps in worst cases. ~ • what they become if their potential is realised . For example, Young claims (Ypp.520-1) that the proposal lets through various types of killing persons such as infants and foetl1ses - thereby writing in some very has only 'morally trivial or no moral support abortion will be unjust- But generally what the proposal permits and what it excludes depends critically upon cases already apparently covered, so that it is not obvious that such construal of 'moral') where the expressed wish of the pregnant woman The qualification makes way for certain cases of cannibalism, for instance those where �I 26 Ther e is no good r eason to restrict the proposal to persons , and Young does not intend to. 27 Many killings of animals constitute , he t ells us (Yp.526), maximally unjust prevention of their realisation of life purposes, and accordingl y are wrong. ' Killing such animals for food is only justifiable when no adequate of other crea tures). acts are avoided. food supply is available and food i s needful' (Yp . 526), in which event, presumably, justice prevails. A characteris tic remnant of Further it is simply assumed - though it could no doubt be argued (rather as below) - that requisite unjust Young's proposal as applied has bite; human chauvinism also intrudes , with Young a ppealing to the ' greater eschewing killing of creatures for food. 25 range of life-purpose s normally human beings have' (Yp.527, italics that the modified proposal has bite: amended) ; 24 and thereby smuggling in a greater value assumptio n as regards humans. Here, as elsewl1ere also , the account of when killin g is wrong is progressive ly l oaded , almost manipulated , to yield the sought r esults : in particular , what is unjust - including which killings are unjust and which class of life-purpos es are more valuable relevant to det e rmining maximal injustice - are bot h open to rigging. These points help to bring out too how back of Young's accoun t and application s of his proposal lie more basic consideratio ns of justice and value (and it is to such considera tions that we should no doubt eventually turn). Consider, for instance, the route to the permissibil ity of systematic cullings of a herd. Wants , now substituting for li fe -purpose s , are simply supposed to be summed up utilitarian- fashion, except th at (somewhat as with Mill ' s utilitariani sm) a weighting is imposed to reflect the respective values of different wants (those of humans, e . g ., as opposed to those It is an illusion however the bite all turns on Young's cunning application , since the modified proposal itself reduces to near tautologous ness. purposes occur? taken. For when does irrevocable prevention of a life's When, and only when (since it is irrevocable) that life is So the modified proposal reduces effectively to AP. Killing x is wrong iff taking x's life is maximally unjust. But killing x is, according to OED, causing the death of x, which is tantamount, in terms of sense, to taking the life of x. And what is wrong is, according to OED again, what is unjust, and would be, if the OED were sharpened 1,1p a little, what is maximally unjust. Whence the adjusted proposal, AP. The proposal does not rule out killings which have the effect overall of fostering th e wants of the largest subset of some group like a wild herd where otherwise the wants of an even larger subset will be thwarted. Systematic cullings in the absence of feasible alternative s, therefore, may be morally pe rmissible. (Yp.527) for example, it would oblige most of us to adopt a largely vegetarian life-style We have come round a circle, but much was glimpsed on the way, so the circuitous route was not without its rewards. By working through other l ess chauvinistic accounts of the wrongness of killing (e.g. the nonchauvin istic base of Ewin's account) we can come a similar circular way and arrive at the same fairly stable result. Moveover, in the adjusted proposal we do have an account, not yet a hi ghly usable account, since circular, but an account nonetheless . In terms of this account clear cases where cannibalism is morally inadmissable can be distinguishe d, for example as follows: Cannibalism of x is wrong wherever it involves maximally unjust taking of x's life. Conversely, there are many cases where �28 the killing of one creature by another creature is, because not maximally unjust, quite permissible; 29 e.g. certain instances of killing in self-defenc e, exceptional cannibalism , abortion, etc . But if the creature is killed, then it is dead, so by the earli er Now let x and y be of the same species, say Homo Sapiens: argument it is permissible to eat it (under certain conditions) . CAP provides exact conditions for when cannibalism is wrong, in So there are many cases where killing a creature and then eating it, cases where cannibalism involves killing. or its then being eaten, are permissible . conditions are satisfied; If some of the many cases of permissible killing are, as they seem to be, cases of killing a then Sometimes these often they are not. Sorting out when they are, and when they are not, will occupy many a controversi al creature of the same species, then active cannibalism involving killing is, in such cases, permissible . The argument needs of course filling out in crucial respects, especially by some enumeration of types of cases where killing is permissible , and a sub-listing of cases where these are intra-specie s killings. Would this suffice? However, it of the) distinction between killing and letting die, by blurring or rejecting the distinction on which it is based~ that betweem omission and One question is whether the account determines (even in its circular way) the precise conditions under which killing for food can permissibly occur. Letting die is not the same as (active) killing . has recently become fashionable to try to remove the (moral significance The question reduces commission (or else it is pretended that it is frightfully difficl1lt to make this distinction s out, etc.). Rejection of the omission/ commission distinction appears to rest on a mix of fallacious moves:- to the logical issue of whether AP as a strong logical equivalence FMl. A some to all argument, warrants intersubsti tutivity in more highly intensional frames such FM2. A confusion of the thesis that the distinction is morally as those declaring purposes. Though I've tended to vacillate on this issue, my feeling increasingly is that substitutiv ity is warranted, important with the quite different thesis that only commi.ssions can be morally blameworthy and that omissions are morally guiltless (the the reason being that the equivalence of AP is of virtually synonymity position reportedly held by some religious groups in the past). strength, which legitimates replacement in all but quotational (type) FM3. An extensional approach to nonextensio nal differences . sentence contexts. But purpose sentence contexts, such as' ... for eating' are not quotational . FAP. Hence it follows using AP that Killing x for food purposes is wrong iff taking x's life for food is maximally unjust, heavily upon the fact that there are some cases where it is morally difficult to distinguish between certain commissions and certain and that CAP. These points are considered briefly in turn:- ad FMl. Those attempting to discredit the distinction usually rely y's killing x for (and followed by) eating is wrong iff y's taking x's life for eating is maximally unjust. omissions, e.g. that in appropriate circumstanc es exposing the baby may be little different morally from directly smothering it. (The Greeks believed it wasn't but that was because exposure gave the gods a chance to intervene and save from death those who were fated to perform especially important tasks). �r JO But the fact that there a r c ~ cases where the JI distinctio n is not of great moral significan ce does not show that it is dispensabl e. In order to show that lt is dispensabl e it is extension ality assumption which removes scope. The principle necessa ry to show that there are no cases where it is needed, that appears to be that failing to provide a condition which would have for all cases failing to provide a condition which would prevent been causally responsibl e for preventing x is morally equivalent to ~x is (morally) equivalent to providing a condition for x. providing a condition which is causally responsibl e for x . But Moral it is easy to produce some cases where the distinctio n seems to be equivalenc e requires interchang eability witin deonitic contexts, essential if we are to account for what we wish intuitivel y to say. indeed it could be characteri sed in terms of such substituti bility . For example, to take a case those who wish to abolish the distinctio n The equivalenc e yielded is of the form -F-x are fnnd nf appealing to, we may wish to say that the people who did commonly falls, especially where Fis not extensiona l. not attempt to help in the Kitty Genovese case were morally culpable, moveover that the causal responsib ility functor is not extension al, perhaps to a high degree, but few of us would wish to say that their and that such a principle fails for it. moral culpabilit y was exactly the same or of exactly the same kind as that of the murderer, and that they should equally be brought to trial on murder ch~rges. Or, to take another case, placing poison in your husband ' s tea is not the moral equivalent of failing to give him the antidote when he has placed it in himself. In order to say +-> Fx. But such a principle It is clear Though letting die differs significan tly, then, from killing, conditions upon when it is wrong may be reached in similar ways. How the condition for letting die correspond ing to AP should go becomes rather more obvious if the righthand side of AP is expanded to: taking (the) action which terminates x's life is maximally unjust. what is evident in such cases, some equivalent of the omission/c ommission The parallel passive condition can th en presumably be formulated distinctio n is needed . thus:- ad FM2. But the thesis that the distinctio n is needed and is morally DP. significan t in many, or at l e a s t ~ , cases must be clearly dis- which continues x ' s life is maximally unjust. 26 tinguished from the very much stronger thesis that all omissions are blameless, and that any commission s are morally open ~o blame - or praisewort hy. This thesis is, rather plainly, indefensib le, yet has been responsibl e for much of the bad light in which appeal to distinctio n appears . ad FMJ. Then in turn, substituti on principles again yield clauses EDP and CDP, correspond ing to EAP and CAP, special cases of which yield conditions under which cannibalism is wrong where it involves letting die. Principle CDP which supplies this condition, where x and y are of the same species, runs as follows:- The principle of moral symmetry between omissions and commission s is in fact refutable. Letting x die is wrong iff refraining from taking (the) action It appears to be based on an CDP. y ' s letting x die for eating purposes is wrong iff y's refraining from taking (the) action which continues x's life, for purposes of eating x, is maximally unjust. Since letting die is, for the most �32 part, less heinous than killing, cannibalism involving letting die 33 i s more widely permissible than cannibalism involving killing . 27 §4 . The matter of predation, and important cases of l egit imat e killing and letting die for food. One tempting model that underlies the conflict picture of Paradigmatic examples of legitimate predation, of predation as basically undesirable but an unavoidable killing are provided by predation, where bis prey of a and a depen ds fact, a model that leads to human vegetarianism, is the following (essentially) for its livelihood, indeed for its survival, on eating kind of atomistic axiological theory (or utilitarianism):- bs.28 Such predat ion i s a n essential part of any su ffici e ntl y rich ecosystem . Essential pr eda tio n i s pre dation which is essent i a l to according to the initial positive value thesis, every living creature (every sentient creature , every higher animal , etc .) has an initial positive the nor,~11 livelihood of tl1e predat or , and where the prcd alor takes non-instrumental value which it retains unless it does something to for itself no more than it requires for it s livelihood. forf eit that value. carn.ivores , such as the big cats , but some humans, such traditional Eskimos, are essential predators. Not only ilS some (On the even simpler position of biospheric egalitarianism, discussed below, all living things have equal worth, The fact that humans ar e part of the natural predatory food chains should not be lost s i g ht o[ . Observe that the argument to permissibility of essential pre- in some nontrivial sense.) These positive values just sum ; and maximisation of value (or suitably averaged value) is, of course , the (or an) ethical objective . Then killing is generally undesirable , dation does ~ take the invalid form: such predation is a fact (a fact because it results in a reduction in net value, and survival is generally of life), therefore it is permissible. That arguments of this type , desirable. 29 The exceptions occur when a creature has forfeited its selectively relied upon by Diamond and (earlier) Hegel, are inval id is value, e . g . it per sists in value-reducing behaviour, so that killing well-enough known (they commit a prescriptive fallacy), and is evident it would prevent a further decline in net value or lead to increase in from such fallacious arguments as the diplomacists' argument, e.g. it is total value . a fact of life that Indonesia has occupied (absorbed) East Timar; when it leads to an overall reduction in value . the re- The underlying theme is that killing is unjustifiable The onus of proof, fore it is pe rfectly alright that Indonesia occupied (absorbed) East Timar. when it can be assigned, lies with those who make the exceptions, who Naturally it would be decidedly awkward if the fact of essential predation do or license the killing . turned out to be impermissible: since, with one item of value consuming another item of value, it trouble. the whole natural order would be in moral This brings us to another defect of the argument from· "facts", Predation now appears as an awkward fact , leads to an overall reduction in value. Since inessential preda tion that it suggests that essential predation is really, at base, something is inessential, it is ruled out as inadmissible. pretty undesirable, but nonetheless something we have to live with - in (nonindigenous) humans for whom predation is, it is plausibl~ argu ed , Thus in particular, contrast with predation, in its associated meaning, as plunder, which we iness en tial, are not entitled to kill for f ood : do n't, or rather oughtn 't to, have to live with morally, and which is usual rai si ng of animals for food, etc . are all excluded in one st r oke , commonly reprehensible. and a l eading feature of vegetarianism imposed . therewith hunting, �34 35 Essential predation is not so satisfactorily dispos ed o f, but introduces conflict. For either one creature, the prey, is sacrificed or another creature, the predator, is: value de c lines . Similar objections apply against biological egalitarianism, either way tot 8 1 In the interim, while vegetarian scientists work even when it is qualified as in Drengson and Naess by an in principle 30 on new diets and new lifestyles for predators, there is an obvious clause. recipe to be applied, which while not eliminating conflict, minimises that predation is rather suboptimal: its effe c t: is strictly ruled out as a general practice. just as steam gives way to sail, so the less valuable gives way to t h e ~ valuable. Thus if humans are reckoned to be It is not (or not only) that it is taken for granted the trouble is that predation Since each lion and each antelope is assigned one unit of whatever is assigned equally, mo re valuable than polar bears - the usual human evaluation - then there is no way of justifying the lifestyle of a lion that consumes polar bea rs are not going to be entitled to prey on humans, in the sens e several antelopes. at least that their predation is not justified. Any equalitarian approach that is E££ atomistic is liable Application of the recip e 31 presupposes a value ranking on creatures under which some are more valuabl e to further incoherence, as Drengson's holism reveals. than others: some living system of living things, e.g . the Earth as on the Gaia otherwise if all are equal, predation is never admissible, and Lets be essential predators just die out - at least that is the simple ethical pic t - hypothesis (p. 233). ure. least of the living things that comprise it, has the same value as This points up one of the many problems for biological egaltarianism. But the picture presented so far is too simple, and tl1e recipes suggested dubious. Then s, which should(?) have the value at each of them (in effect 1 = n, for n>l). Some of t~e ecological consequences of implementing the For if the matter is properly considered not at a given time, but over a time interval, dynamically and not suggested recipes, and reform of essential predators, can now be just statically, it is not so simple, and a rather different result gauged. emerges . the chains of predation are long and complex; One predator takes, over a typical lifetime, rather a lot of prey . Unless the predator ranks very much more highly than Massive environmental interference would be required, since distortions especially in lower-level prey would occur, with resulting the prey, the value of the sum of the prey will exceed that of the ecological instability and often catastrophe. predator. that is, are ecologically highly undesirable. These considerations, in combination with a positive and gross population The consequences, What this and the value thesis, suggest a very different result, that predators should summation problems begin to reveal is that the initial atomistic be allowed to, or encouraged to, die out - unless they are somehow, value distribution picture is inadequate because it leaves out systems what seems improbable for predators that remain wild, converted to and systemic connections such as a more ecological approach would vegetarianism, include, The dynamic picture resorted to is still too simple in one important respect, that over a time interval, prey, which would often exceed natural (and sometimes reasonable) population levels without predation, are replaced. Where population of a preyed-upon species of creature is at an ecological limit, and minor culling of the sort �36 natural predation induces does not, owing to replacement, reduce 37 population levels significantly below that limit, predation has no significant effect on total value, So results yet another, different, recipe, one which is a little nearer the ecologica l mark. 32 farm animals (all of them) can be appropriately filled out, to Some utilitarians, Singer in particular, have recognised exclude replacement of animals with unusual or special properties, the role of replacement a·,1d made some allowance for it (at a serious cost to Singer ' s vegetarianism , it should be added), e.g. those carrying valuable genes, and to allow slaughter, without Singer now allows for killing and replacement of nonselfconscious life, but advances a nonreplaceabllity thesis for self-conscious life. Furthermore, even if a replacement thesis for free-range shorter-term replacement, of those carrying damaging diseases or genes - as it no doubt can, in a modified replacement thesis - still For the basic division Singer appeals to 'Tooley 's distinction' between a nonreplacement thesis fails to allow even for essential predation of selfconscious creatures, and accordingly should be scrapped, beings that are merely conscious and ••• those that Since this pronouncement is likely to be disputed, at least are also self -conscious, in the sense of being able to conceive of themselves as distinct entities, existing by some vegetarians, it is worth trying to indicate why essential over time with a past and a future (Sp.151), At the same time it can be In fact most of the sorts of free-range farmyard animals that Singer predation is perfectly admissible, seems to be envisaging as nonselfconscious, and accordingly replaceable, explained what is still wrong with the tempting dynamic picture and creatures, for instance geese and hens, appear to satisfy Tooley's the initial positive value thesis. tests for selfconsciousness. what is put in as what is left out, Geese are certainly aware of themselves they value members of their own community ; trees, and inanimate such as rocks and buildings,~ have initial and they remember value, but that complexes and wholes, in particular ecosystems, may elements of their past and, in things like nest building (practice), anticipate the future. More important, what has selfconsciousness (reflex- ive consciousness), or consciousness to do with the moral dimension? Until well have initial value, The reduction assumptions underlying value decomposition thereof, itself, because by no means all consciousness of conscious life is _ 32 a to atoms fail , Singer's theses lack foundation and look, while perhaps convenient for that it cannot be duly explained; There are grounds for anticipating for instance, being too valuable to be Such wholes may have value furthermore which is not dissolvable into values of component parts, or atoms this is duly explained - it is not satisfactorily explained as valuable in some traditional farmers, rather ad hoe, What is left out is not just that objects other than living creatures, both animate such as plants and as distinct entities, and of geese as distinct from (and superior to) hens; What is wrong is not So much In terms of the value of wholes such as ecosystems, one of the arguments for essential predation is disarmingly elementary . It takes the form: (sufficiently) rich (natural) ecosystems are Predation is an essential part of these systems . simply replaced, in the sense of having irreplaceable experiences, worth- very valuable, while projects, etc., does not have the requisite linkage with self- What is an essential part of what is very valuable is admissible. consc iousness. Therefore, predation is admissible. Such predation, which may be argued for in other ways , admits of extension by the following principle : �38 EP. If something is entitled to kill for food under certain 39 conditions, e.g. respectfully and when in need, then so are others under the same conditions. §5. The argument for EP is of the same type as that for other Postscript . The paper is very incomplete . It fails to address several issues intimately connected with cannibalism, such as hunting similar indifference, or interchangeability, principles in ethics. of humans and other animals, in particular for food, and as raising It follows from EP and essential predation that, since a tiger may humans and other animals, especially defective infants, for food. when in need kill a cow to eat, then so may humans in need. If Worse, it is evasive on some fundamental issues, and it fails to penetrate very taking the cow's life is not maximally unjust in the one case, nor deeply into some of the issues it does begin to consider, such as is it in the other, since the circumstances are similar. predation, or as the necessary and/or sufficient conditions for admiss- The results reached may be alternatively argued for using principle CP. 33 Perhaps Singer is also on the right track, though he has latched onto the wrong distinction. Perhaps there is a (descriptive) condition q (or a condition qs for each sorts of agent), appropriately ible killing. position. It is little consolation that others are in the same Hopefully some of these deficiencies will be compensated for in subsequent parts. At the same time several themes will be developed that may tied with causing to die, such that while killing creatures without q not have been evident so far, e.g. that in under suitable conditions is permissible, killing creatures with q is far too much killing taken much too lightly, but far too little is not, except under special conditions . 34 general experience of killing and death when it does occur, that is Given that q is 11 modern 11 societies there appropriately morally connected such a procedure would fit into the except usually among small groups mostly of inured professionals, annular picture (given earlier: q would mark out the interior of the which "shield" most humans from the phenomena involved. dotted elipse). Nor need the distinction be chauvinistic, because it cuts across species in a morally defensible way. anything, is q? located? made good? But, what, if Can a suitable morally-unloaded category-based distinction And how disconcerting would it be if some such distinction could no Wait for the next exciting episode . 35 �' 40 FOOTNOTES 41 It was singularly appropriate that this paper should have otained its first (and only) public presentation at the Alfred E. Packer Memorial Center, University of Colorado. I am indepted to several members of the audience for comments and references, and in particular for the first extension of the base case . It is noticeable how people who have never been cannibals despise the horrible thing; and how quickly it disappears when a cannibal tribe comes into contact with a wider world than that Directly merely of their own bush village. daylight falls on the habit, it Withers away . This is remarkable when we remember the sanctity The cannibal of it in primitive man's eyes . is not necessarily a hopelessly degraded brute, but-;-man who has not yet lived out of the dark obscurity of bush tribalism, and so had bli~dly_ followed a practice deep-rooted in the sacrificial These themes are defended, and the annular model explained, in The themes are also defended in HC, p. 103ff., and in AHC. other recent work, e.g. by Tooley and Singer. As the schematic diagram shows, humans do not occupy a central ring. Thus adoption of the model does not imply, what Pickering assumes (p. 374), that 'humans are more~ntral ' or, for that matter, that 'humans are owed more extensive moral consideration Nothing in the model itself depends on humans . than plants'. The model is not species based, or biologically based, but category basect";-and designed to reflect the different sorts of things there are, e . g. things capable of entering into contracts conferring obligations, and things not so capable, things that can have preferences and make choices as opposed to things that cannot (truly, or significantly), things, including systems and Nor, therefore, organisations, with a telos and things without. does the model write in a new type of chauvinism, or confer privilege or moral advantage on things in more central rings. Indeed, things in central rings will have obligations and commitments, and be subject to limitations on what they do, in ways that things further out cannot be; so there will be some As this moral disadvantages in occupying a more central place. indicates, the categories selected are intended to have moral And different sorts of behaviour are morally linkages . appropriate with respect to the different categories of objects. 2. 3. 4. The popular view that dialectics and adoption fraction of assumption themes are dangerous is partly based on a modal fallacy, For the fallacy e.g. that what can be believed is believed . in operation in more intellectually respectable quarters see WW. the Epilogue of Harris Some dialectics are accordingly recommended for anyone convinced that cannibalism must be wrong. The investigations undertaken in this paper alwshare other features with (classic) dialectics: there are many loose ends, and in several crucial areas firm conclusions are not reached. Later parts of the paper will take care of some of these things. Thus Hogg (p. 188), Cannibalism . .. can hardly be said to exist in There may be isolated the world of today. pockets of survival in the heart of New Guinea and among some of the tribes in the remotest corner of South America or African jungles; but they will be no more than the rarest of phenomena. 5. Hopkins, given the last word by Hogg, p. 192. quote from Hopkins is of passing interest: The whole ideas common to man the world over from his earliest days. 6. Some of the advantages of institutionalisation of certain cannibalistic practices are evident, e.g. a_much enh~nced Various disadvantages if not evident should supply of protein. become so in the course of the text. 7. See again in HC and similar. Although the human/nonhuman distinction is not, so it is argued, one of moral significance, not all Other distinctions of moral importance distinctions vanish. - those of the annular model - naturally remain. 8. Of coures, this practice is (still) controversial, and But a offensive to various religious and other groups. great advantage of a pluralistic society is t~at it can acconnnodate (better than alternatives) such differences Issues such as human_ . over the morality of practices . burial and restricted cannibalism, however, make the limits of present pluralism evident . 9. Or else did not incur official establishment disapproval, though the acts strictly appeared to infringe the Every s~~ond_ra~onteur has prevailing law of the land. examples of cannibals not brought to Justice . 10. . This clearly anticipates an initial argument of this My thanks to W. Berryman for drawing my attention paper. to the attitude of the Catholic Church, as presented in Read. 11. Consent in principle will carry the requisited load, and for this it is normally enough that the person would consent. This indicates one logical route to the liberalisation, and removal, of the consent clause. 12. There would (so far) be no trophies, e.g. Z's head ~n the hall, Y's skull on a stand, because trophies involve hunting and killing (for which see below). 13. As some vegetarians would freely admit; other 11 vegetar i ans II f rther and regard the killing of certain (nonself) an1•mals for food as admissible provided no suffering u, go i conscious is incurred and that the animals are replaced. . But it s true that usually 'vegeta;ians do not touch the issue of our attitudes to the dead (D., p.9) . �42 14. 15. In a like vein it is suggested that Singer and Regan do not see that 'a cow is not something to eat; (for them) it is only that one must not help the process along' (D., p. 468). The latter incidentally would not exclude the use of dead creatures for food, leather goods, etc.; things that animal liberationists like Singer definitely exclude. 43 21. Diamond recognizes this objection, p. 471, but does not meet Pace K. Bell, according to whom, Men have always hunted in the fields around Potigny and Falaise . They still do, but no longer their it. own species. 16. 17. 18. In similar ways we are said to gain the concept of an animal; s~~ p. 476. -Diamond introduces this piece of serious confusion in the course of emphasizing why the 'assumption that we all agree that it is morally wrong to raise people for meat ... is not, or not merely, ... too weak' (D.• p . 469). Diogenes Laertius, vol. 11, p. 297. Some of the complex issues concerning hunting will be considered in subsequent parts, others elsewhere. 22. See, e.g., Henson, and also Ewin and RKU . 23. A notable piece of male chauvinism also slides through, in the suggestion that, in Lhe absence of more weighty moral backing, the expressed wish of a pregnant woman is morally trivial. And Sayre reports (p. 25), Cannibalism (uv0pwno~ayCa) is alleged to have been a practice of the Cynics by Philodemus and by Theophilus Antiochenus; but, if so, it must have been confined to their early history, for they had a number of critics during the Christian era who would have mentioned it if they had known of it. Both Philodemus and Theophilus were biassed and we must remember that similar stories were told of the early Christians. However, cannibalism is said to have been authorized by the Republic and Thyestes (or Atreus) attributed to Diogenes and also by the Republic of Zeno and by Cleanthes and Chrysippus (Philodemus, On the Stoics; Theophilus Antiochenus, Ad. Autolycum 3, 5; D.L. 6, 73; Ibid. 7, 188; cf. 28th Letter of Diogenes; Dio Chrysostom 8, 14). As Diogenes Laertius goes on to explain, that 'Chrysippus did countenance the eating of dead humans was one of the points brought against him by those who 'ran him down as having written much in a tone that was gross and indecent'. As regards such attitudes to the dead, times have not changed that much. The (idea of) eating "the dead" (dead humans, of course), under ~ circumstances, is still widely regarded as scandalous, and highly newsworthy (see Read, p . 296 ff). 19. Cannibalism which involves explicit killing for food is a kind of reflexive predation, but generally (cases of) cannibalism and predation only properly overlap. 20. An example would be where some of the survivors of a crash or wreck hunt other "survivors" in order to survive; cf. W. Golding, Lord of the Flies. 24. But one's life-purposes are diminished lhow can this be on Young's picture?) if they jeopDrdise those of others. Hence Young's preparedness to let Amin be killed by the stampeding horses, Yp. 527. 25 . Indeed it leads, as Young interprets it, to a more sensible vegetarianism than Singer's initial position (in Animal Liberation, not as significantly modified in Sp.153). neither culling nor predation are simply ruled out. 26. For Action and taking action should be construed in a wide, but common enough fashion, e.g. the action taken may amount to doing nothing or getting-the-hell-out-of-it. 27. It is tempting to try to prove this on the basis of a proper inclusion assumption, that where letting die is wrong so is killing, but not conversely. The assumption may, however, need qualification; e . g. killing may sometimes be preferable to letting died in a lingering way . 28. 'Predation" is a singularly unfortunate word to be stuck with to describe this universal phenomenon. It is unfortunate both because of its etymology, and because of its other meaning . At to the first, ' predation' derives from praedari, 'to plunder', which derives in turn from praedo, 'booty', As to the second, 'predation' also means a 'practice or addiction to plunder or robbery'. Both carry strong negative connotations. There is a similar damaging duality in the expressions 'prey' and 'prey upon'. 29. These defective considerations also lead to a maximisati~n of population of creatures of the base class assigned values, up to the limit - if any (on frontier philosophers there are none) where declining returns set in . Where, further, humans are typically, but erroneously, assigned greater value than other creatures, the considerations support the rapid biassing of terrestial fauna! population in favour of humans that we are witnessing. The second point does not apply, in that form, . against biol0gical egalitarianism, and the first objection fails where total value is replaced, as under some utilitarianisms (with what justification is less clear, since surely we want to maximise value so far as constraints permit: see RKU), by average value, average value per (base class) life lived, etc. �44 The argument in the text is not affected materially by switching from value analogues of total utilitarianism to analogues of some form of average utilitarianism. On some of the serious problems with these utilitarianisms, see Jamieson. 30. Drengson, following Naess and others, espouses 'biospheric egalitarianism and the intrinsic value of all life' (p. 222). According to the theory, each (living) being has intrinsic value (pp.233-4), and hence each presumably has equal worth (and is entitled, in Singer's terms, to equal consideration , if not equal treatment). In Naess and Drengson this biospheric egalitarianism is qualified by an in principle clause. According to Naess, 'The 'in principle' clause is inserted because any realistic praxis necessitates some killing, exploitation and suppression' (p.95), and according to Drengson, 'This qualification is made with the simple recognition that we cannot live without affecting the world to some degree' (the latter claim is inadequate, because it is not just 'we' who are involved). 31. Axiological approaches that are atomistic have other problems, some reminiscent of those Wittgenstein discusses for logical atomism. In particular, how do we locate the atoms to which value is supposed to adhere fundamentally. A first bad feature of this approach is invariance failure: it matters for final summations how the atoms are chosen, for different choices will assign complexes quite different values. Secondly (Wittgenstein's question), why are some things said to be atoms not complexes, and vice versa. A third group of problems, brought out in HC, concerns the choice of a base class. 32. An environmental ethic s:1oul.:l. also be an ccologic:1 I et!dc, sense of an ecologically realistic ethic. facts are certainly relevant. 32a. A detailed case for this claim 33. j:1 t lH· In this resepct too the appears in Routley and Griffin. Thus rp can be made to yield a good deal more than Young's application of his proposal (for which he offers no proper justification): A creature is entitled to kill another creature of lesser value when its life (and so all its functions, prospects, etc.) depends on it and when it does not kill more creatures than it needs for these purposes. And the dubious business of imposing such order rankings on creatures can be bypassed. 34. The qualifications are necessary. If the latter exceptional conditions clause were not adjoined, the prospe ct of finding a condition q would be wiped out by such cases of essential predation as exceptional human cannibalism. The qualifications, although they enhance the prospects of locating such a q, do not appear to make it analytic or near analytic that such a descriptive q can be found. 45 35. Not only are there many proposals for q to sift through - most of which however seem to fail for reasons already indicated in the text - but also there are apparent options to finding such a distinction, such as resetting the problem, in a less individualistic way, in the framework of (ecological) communities. �REFERENCES K. Bell, Not in Vain, University of Toronto Press, 1973, REFERENCES CONTINUED P.E, Devine, 'The moral basis of vegetarianism ', Philosophy 53 (1978) · 481-505 . (all references prefixed with 'V' are to this article) , C. Diamond, ' Eating meat and eating people', Philosophy (references hereto are prefixed by 'D'). 53 (1978) 465-77, Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers (edited, with English translation, by R. D. Hicks), Heinemann , London, 1925, A.R . Drengson, ' Shifting paradigms: from the Technocratic to the PersonPlanetary', Environmental Ethics 2 (1980) 221-40, R. E. Ewin, ' What is wrong with killing people? ' Philosophical Quarterly tl..<. (197;t) 126-39. M, Harris, Cows, Pigs, Wars and Witches, Fontana, London , 1977 (hereafter prefixed by 'W.W.'). M, Harris, Cannibals and Kings , Collins , London, 1978 (hereafter prefixed by ' CK '), R. Henson, ' Utilitarianism and the wrongness of killing', Philosophical Review 80 (1971) :1.u,- n7. D. Jamieson,'Utilitarianis m and the value of life', typescript, University of Colorado, 1981. J, Glover, Causing Death and Saving Lives, Penguin, Middlesex, England, 1977 . L.P. Pickering, Review of ' Ethics and Problems of the 21st Century ', Environmental£.£,.~-~ 2 (1980) 373-78 . G. Hogg , Cannibalism and Human Sacrifice, Robert Hale, London, 1958. (references hereto are prefixed by 'H'), R. and V. Routley, 'Against the inevitability of human chauvinism ' in Ethics and Problems of the 21st Century, eds , K, E. Goodpaster and K. M. Sayre, University of Notre Dame Press, 1979, (Hereafter prefixed by ' AHC') . J. Langton, Cannibal Feast, Herbert Joseph, London, 1937. L, Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, Blackwell, Oxford, 1953. A. Naess, 'Self-realisation in a mixed community of humans ·, bears, sheep and wolves', Inquiry 22 (1971) 231-41 , A. Naess, ' The shallow and the deep . long-range ecology movement. Inquiry A s11mmr1ry'~ 16 (1':173) 95-100. P.P, Read, Alive, Avon, New York, 1974. R. and V. Routley, 'An expensive repair kit for utilitarianism', typescript 1976 (hereafter referred to as ' RKU ' ). R. and V, Routley, ' Human chauvinism and environmental ethics' in Environmental Philos~ (ed. D. Mannison, M. McRobbie and R. Routley), RSSS , Australian National University , 1980 (the article is referred to as ' HC' , the book as ' EP ' ), F. Sayre, Diogenes of Sinope , A study of Greek Cynicism, Johns Hopkins University , Baltimore, 1938. P. Singer, 'Killing humans and killing animals', Inquiry 22 (1979) 146- 56, (references hereto are prefixed by ' S '). R. Tannahill, Flesh and Blood. A History of the Cannibal Complex , Hamilton , London, 1975 . Hamish M. Tooley , Abortion and Infanticide, typescript, Australian National University, 1980, R. Young, ' What is so wrong with killing people?' Philosophy 5¥ (1979) (all references prefixed with ' Y' are to this article) , 515-528 R. Routley and N. Griffin, 'Unravelling the meanings of life', available in this series , 1982. �) /.o,..,.,,,, l. ~ / , . ~ tA-- ~ <'"'1 ---- 3/ }o/t/v/~}~4--( ~~ ·~~O·\o ~ --..., \0~'203.l\. <;c..c.tt.,. ~ ~ a.I) . ~~ ~✓:. ,;,,tf �~ .r. ..... ---,(7> o-,.J /' ,,,((; 11 / c, ~ I ( _ ///,;.,/ /c/ (',.,./// 1' ,. ~ L: 1 -=y' 1/ ,/L ~ -=~ t<..,(' •.r<-- <-r-? ,r"'t, 7 ; /4... I ~,. �/J/4/,JJ ( 0 -/4, -;IL l r~ rk . rr_!j, ~lb f f.o fvr-~ ~tf?>J ;_/.. « ~ YL r1.M- ~~ J'fM~J Cif ~✓ ,/.~ ) . <=<- ,,._., wh ~ 1 ~ ~ ~ ?/;1 ~ ~~ rry~t ~ ,t(!__ 16;=,·~--f:; ~ h ~ ¥,-I- ..<-D /4 ~ :f f/-L -. J,¥i~~ f 9~ (3/-~~) (I ~~ 1- h,c>_~ x /~~ -/2-(;:L r J,?-- l ~re:- )( 07A~ c/4;t-~ ,4,,.~ 7' ~rrvf j e1~,k 'U"- 0 ~ vl'f.. /411-1 ~~ 1 ,...~,._£.~ I~ 7"Y-'? ,• or ' 7 ,/.tL~ =- #--~✓ " -,/ ~~ "'~ e.~.,__,,., ..l<A--C- , 7 l'/4~ (k/v( ~ A-Ld , c-£-{,~.,.,. t-/~r;;,;-,,.:__ , C, - ~1 < "'t: ~ 4- 7,1; ,..~~ I �/Jo N T T,,f'/c,- y•1 1//;rE r,vt{l. /2 <",I!.,.. '::.. {-,A/ j,._~ __:_ /,._,_ 'd / ~~-;. ,, 11 o,r ;i'a '7 .~/2 ?,(_ C/ I /;,(if'-:J;J__(;1:,-· J',(J; JJ;<~'r;b,f'/ ... Y ,1,f; ;,;--,ftlfr -~, £' .r.::._/, /•;· /''"/.' f.// / /, (cf,,,_;..,<-f (,_) :y;-._7 ,//<--"f .j•,/7 • C ~ • ~.:!__,,_ •-v, f//dl#l£ , < ~, r/ • 1,-e.--., t. ~ �#J tq- 7' : ~ , ,.':_ J/'C4(. ~ &nJltJ[e "71fLt..H "1/'~ c~ "4 C/1 .. 't ,.,. ... ~;: .. t.t..4 r~ c~ /~J I~ ~~ ,H" ._ ~t/ ~l-d_ I (' rt-lrC , I ,,I, /.,_,.. .,.,.____ /4-..- C- ,,,,_ ~ , /4,L._ '-- . ,.__,_ te(A~ / 4 ~ , , fc. ~,;,,d~ t;, ~~7Y24~ h /c r n.., ,W·r ht<I I t!l"--vv-t_. t : - ;{ c.--<- u....., ( , It ~'-? I 1 ,JKc} ~ ~-✓f ;,z.. M~ / tkl-· .:I- / 1 t.~ ,.,e1 ;,-,:. ~ ~"7 f cjrl; ~ I_;.,_ 1 L,,3:-:r;-,1 •-v->-1- • 4, pS,.,(£-.,-. . ftr~ J/4. /red-,~ , _;, ~·~/~<l ' /""= cd/7 ;/ ~<¥<- J,r 7""° 1,/,,:,A -z/1.,/h/7 /,(~ • t:i.C.1 / /d'tr 7 ;:. rJ- ~:,,1 "l j 1 ( ,"'p> '(. f (,~ 0 11/'- 1 t<~ ~ ~ 4-7/J t /2-c. ) 7 /~ ?'~J 1/)):-/. ( / ~r,,.,,__,, ~,:,,..,,...,~ . l)';•.:Z:~-e-M-;I /fa ! ") ;; ,' ~ ~~ L ' A-7~ J~j 1/ ~ ~£" v:_._i eye- ,c. y),6 7 ) \ d,; ~ 1 a,___ r/ d't .ru), Cl»,~ ' ~L �The following has been redacted from access file (PDF) due to copyright restrictions. Cutting, Scholfield B (17 August 1988) 'A human role for the pig', The Weekly Times, 14. (1 leaf) �- / / / . -7 / <et ? -·- -·-- C:; /~ ~, u / f l ~ Jc,._ '? ~ (,, ?0_/~ c c:i--l 7 ,5'<.. / 17 -~ ,..-tt'!' . : . - - - ---- ·-- - · · - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- ~oc-. r-c- a., r..,_,/- t .)I~ , ) / ~ ?! / . / c..rc.v ~~ //._ J �OAJ 77/c /~/?t:J/f??pvc~ c:>~ 77rr" , I /}(,ifth('i/l'J7lt>p)( ;T//VC/73 ,v - cJ,,,C ~E ./,PH/6:-J ,,f/t;I~ I �The following have been redacted from access file (PDF) due to copyright restrictions. • • Typescript, with handwritten emendations and annotation. Two reference reports on Cannibalism I. (2 leaves) Cutting (photocopy) of 'Necessity as a common law doctrine? [6.40] R v Dudley and Systems', The system of criminal law: cases and materials, 544-551. (4 leaves) ��The following have been redacted from access file (PDF) due to copyright restrictions. • • • Cutting (photocopy) of 20 pages from unidentified publication on Pioneers-Donner Party-The Mormons, 526-545. (10 leaves) Letter, Bill to Richard, 7 Oct 1981 re feedback on Richard Sylvan's paper on cannibalism. (2 leaves) Letter, Robert to Richard, 7 Oct 1981 re feedback on Richard Sylvan’s paper on cannibalism. (2 leaves) �I I - I :/.,, f. - - - -- ----------------- - - - - - ----- ---- ----- ___________, --------- ----------·------------- - - ----- - - -- - - -- - - - - - - - -- ------ - - - - - - - - --- $ ~ /~ .2Z- - - - --- - _ _L __ /4 r<./ ...---a~ l 2, ck?- _.:., t';_.~ ~ o_ _s_ ,,. .,/:,_ ~ , {- ~ M7-e;:__ /4?-l, _:., /.: ~ / ; ~ / /--/ ,a-~~ ,4d - - ~ c 1 /dLC4'--=·- - C4--~ _,t:?~7 ,-4,-,/4._ / - /2.; ~<"F' �§5 . Raising humans and other animals for food. Humans have lit tle compuncti on, for the most part, in rearing other animals for food . Since healthy animals that are raised for food often excell humans, especially humans that are "defective " in one way or another , little , except considera tions of species , seems to stand in the way of raising such humans for food . We are in the region of Swift ' s modest proposal again . What distinguis hes creatures humans (and other creatures capable of animal husbandry) are entitled to raise for food from creatures that they are not? It is not difficult to state some constrain ts on t he solution of this problem, which also rule out usual solutions . First , the distinctio n should be independe nt of reference to particula r species , especially of reference to the human species , and also indirect reference thereto, by way of phrases such as ' standard ... ' , ' normal ... . ' 'potential ... ' . Secondly - and this furnishes the ground of the first requireme nt the basis of the distinctio n should be morally relevant i n the way that mere zoologica l distinctio ns are not: otherwise chauvinism is not avoided . ' The replaceme nt principle Singer adopts for benign farmyard husbandry fails on this score , among others (the others being that many farmyard animals seem to satisfy the requireme nts for being selfconsci ous beings) . Not being selfconsc ious , which is supposed to justify replaceme nt, under ideal farming condition s , lacks requisite moral linkage . Singer ' s move does however emphasi ze �' 31. two important things . First , the familiar objections to animal husbandry, e.g. on grounds of cruelty or deprivation to animals, are remove.e\ by considering only (ideal) free-range individualised farmyard husbandry . Secondly, some distinction (fit to take its place in the annular picture) with requisite moral linkage is what is sought . Any distinction that is going to work will have to involve the capacities of the creatures concerned , in such a way that the capacities tie with moral features . The capacities concerned are, obviously, capacities connected with being aware of being raised for food . But this is not sufficiently general, being raised for killing or for cartage or for skin or fur or feathers would be similar, and similarly bad or whatever; lacks moral connection . and it still What all the cases have in common which is general, one which has (as already noted) moral connections , is being used as a means . The sought distinction is accordingly made in terms of creatures that are capable of being aware of their case primarily as means for other, for their food , etc. U-creatures, say, as opposed to A-creatures . 21 no means all, are A-creatures: infants are not . Many humans, but Why this distinction? 21 There are probably other requir e ments as we ll: e . g. that not in midst of present worthwhile projects; e.g. Mrs. Goose is not raising young, etc. �The following have been redacted from access file (PDF) due to copyright restrictions. • • • • • Photocopy of Young R (1979) 'What is so wrong with killing people?', Philosophy, 54(21):515-528, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0031819100063531. (8 leaves) Cutting, Ewin R (1972) 'What is so wrong with killing people?', The Philosophical Quarterly, 22(87): 126-139, https://doi.org/10.2307/2217540. (14 leaves) Typescript (carbon copy) of untitled paper attached to Ewin cutting. (18 leaves) Photocopy of Singer P (1979) 'Killing humans and killing animals', Inquiry, 22:1-4, 145156, https://doi.org/10.1080/00201747908601869. (6 leaves) Photocopy of one page (157) from Lockwood M (1979) 'Singer on killing and the preference for Life', Inquiry, 22:1-4, 157-170, https://doi.org/10.1080/00201747908601870. (1 leaf) �t . • �~ /,o.R-,4-.. ~t ~,, ,,_,;L ~ C~"'1 /C'.tt---? ,.... ,._._ ~ e.-;- __ jf1~ ~ rur 6 ""efc7'/ ~ ,,,<e,,,.,;z,r4? ~ c,,__,,,- .1 ------~ ,,-v-9"' ~ "'-<- r = c:e/4 /4--,- ~/~~-~ P.f.?4 ,..,.,,PE' r e ~ 7~~ y?f /2 ~c;k__/"7'/~ 7 ~ / 7~ / /,..,;,, ~ ,?£ / ~J" r-tr= / t:t_ ~7, /9-7 r~ o-/4-~ ,.ve- / _,/~,/ ;:7'/ /re-v -~ (~ ,,{~9 C'l<-,r /4 ~vr,, 1~ /c{. rL r ,' ~ ,~ 7-£ ~ - - ~ ~ . , , ~; / " ' - - /c~V-- ~ ~ -~ ~ L <r7J\ _0 / ~ ~~ 0 - ~ 7L 7 C-£-..,/,4c,.~~ ~~ ~ ~ ~ ~ /.? ~ ~ =,/---6-- ~ . ~(' ~ ~ cv;·n! ' To -J~ > /~&:, -6-,e> ~ ~ ~7f 7~ ~ /~~ ~,,,_7 ,;,_~ 4/ ~/ C ~~ o/· //4- ~ / ~ /~ 7~ �~ ?¼_ 11 ~ M,- '--+-€- /~1) / ~ ,~ --/?~/ 4:- ..,,.,,,, ,,./" &-"'7/<" c, /4 Ye-/ U.:.... ~ ;/ / 7'~L. . ~ ~,, i 7,2 ~ ~ .,/4 /< ; e-.,, ' ~ ;,I'£ .Y CJ/-?!' , ,_, ·/,,.r.,.-........-,. , ,,__ s « ~ ?< 0~ /~L,, ,4_._ / Cb- i,_,.__1 c-.r r~ /2 re:_ ~ h'L 7 '---71J r-"-"- 3-.. d..-. ~~:; d:....-../ ~ ~_/~ �The following have been redacted from access file (PDF) due to copyright restrictions. • • • • • • Photocopy of Diamond C (1978). 'Eating meat and eating people', Philosophy, 53(206): 465-479, http://www.jstor.org/stable/3749876. (8 leaves) Photocopy from The Encyclopedia Americana (1978) 'Cannibalism', The Encyclopedia Americana, 2: 543-544. (2 leaves) Photocopy from Britannica Encyclopedia (1969) 'Cannibalism', Britannica Encyclopedia, 4: 785. (1 leaf) Photocopy from Chambers's Encyclopaedia (1966) 'Cannibalism', Chambers's Encyclopaedia, 3: 50. (1 leaf) Photocopy of Naess A (1979) 'Self‐realization in mixed communities of humans, bears, Sheep, and Wolves', Inquiry, 22:1-4, 231-241, https://doi.org/10.1080/00201747908601874. (6 leaves). Photocopy of one page (2273) from unidentified dictionary, Pre-collection to Predecree. (1 leaf) �r)I':, t; 1 ·-et I r o-f 6 ?\/ih'i I Jet ~t·.?t'cc If33 •• 11t1;,.,_4,, ;; w ; ~ ) ~,,c._! / //,,,,.---: J:~w ~ J/4 ~"~t New- f'-w1r- > ~:/~4-;-, L 1/75 /I ~-~erY �/, • ,I J �Lcz ~ ' d cc c e::es ,f c::::e.. ~ �.. . -1~ ~~ ;/w,;.,L;:;,',,,._ ,;/ a,~}:z;:__ dL-0~ " 7 1 f,t} 0 ~ ~ A. ~~ - 7'~ - . ' -f ~i,t;i,:___ ~✓~ ~~ . - - /z;j/M?!, ,<4 n/41"? r - / ·~ ·7 - Jo - ~ C:~~ - ~..,;t,J;j,,. - ... c.-C~1/~ - 7"1(~ /'<d~ ..£.... ,;:_~ 74::,,,'~ /k,,. ~~ ~ -4- . ~/17 '_ ~ �1IIE !1i l/lL/7? . ··• .,. Men have always hunted in the fields around They still do, but no • longer their own species. (K. Bell, Not in Vain, University of ~oronto Press, 1973) .,, Petigny and Falaise . � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Draft Papers Description An account of the resource Sylvan's literary executor encountered an archive in which “all his projects were current", since manuscripts were undated and unattributed. Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document - • 00681 ' ' {; /) f¼i:<:LL I f ~sif0l J IN DEFENCE OF CANNIBALISM I. TYPES OF ADMISSIBLE AND INADMISSIBLE CANNIBALISM Richard Routley Philosophy Department Research School of Social Sciences Australian National University and Environmental Studies University of Victoria Canada IN DEFENCE OF CANNIBALISM~ It is a commonplace of mainstream Western thought that cannibalism - the eating of human flesh by humans, and, more generally, the feeding of animals on members of their own species is, at least in the human case, morally outrageous. © Ri chard Routley, 1982 This repugnan cy thesis appears to be a legacy especially (but not only) of Christianity, probably derived from Jewish teaching, which went much further and excluded the eating of pig, for instance, as well as "long pig". Also in this series: It is a thesis reinforced by the substitution of Man for God of the World rainforest destruction - the social factors "Enlightenment" and consequent elevation and separation of humans Semantical foundations for value theory from other creatures. Unravelling the meanings of life substantially undermined, have for the most part been observed to Nihilisms and nihilist logics rest on a tangle of false views and prejudices about the world, its Nuclear power - ethical, social and political dimensions origin, evolution and purposes , and about the creatures that inl~bit Now that all these positions have been it, their separateness, and their order (in an a lleged chain of be in g ) Disappearing species and vanishing rainforests: wrong directions and the philosophical roots of the problem with humans at the apex, it is past time that major moral theses that these positions have sustained are re-examined and reassessed. The irrefutability of anarchism, enlarged Up for re-examination are, in particular, all theses that Roles and limits of paradigms in environmental thought and action depend essentially on the common but mistaken assumption that there is something morally very special or distinctive about simply being a human, that Homo sapiens as a species deserves special treatment. On the contrary, there is no morally relevant distinction between humans and all other creatures. Of course there are various morally relevant distinctions between things, but none concerns the biological species Homo sapiens. What holds rather is an annular 1 model which can be depicted schematically as follows:- 3 instance in removing the idea that the wrongness of such practices 2 as cannibalism is not even open to question 3 . Diagram 1: High in a list of inherited moral assumptions that are ripe ANNULAR PICTURE OF MORAL RINGS IN OBJECT SPACE (and the position of humans). of sapiens for reassessment are those concerning the almost universal ~oral prohibition of and repugnance to cannibalism, a practice that used to be extremely widespread, but that has now been almost e;.tirely extirpated 4 with the very successful cultural conquest of the world by Western thought. But instead of the re-examination that should follow the intellectual erosion of mainstream Western social thought, the growing recognition of its theoretical inadequacy, not to say ~:Notional labels for the interiors of such morally relevant rings (or ellipses), from outer to inner: Objects of value, objects of moral concern Objects having well-being Preference havers, choice makers Rights holders Obligation holders, responsibility bearers Contractual obligation makers poverty, what has followed is the often shoddy defence of many of its leading moral theses, mostly on anthropocentric grounds, but sometimes on other grounds, some of them drawn from contemporary philosophy (e.g. the conventionalistic rejection of cannibalism of Diamond, considered below). Many of the defences preferred of total prohibition of There are also more comprehensive philosophical reasons cannibalism are ludicrously weak, and withstand little examination. for the periodic intellectual review of deeper assumptions (and Consider, to illustrate, the main argument in (what was until very prejudices), reasons furnished by dialectics in combination with recently one of the few books in English on cannibalism) Hogg, the theory of objects. namely 'the innate repugnance of contemporary man to touch human According to the theory of objects there is no assumption that has to be held,that cannot be disbelieved, flesh' (p . 188, also earlier) . while according to dialectics proper every assumption is open to represented as a matter of fact, it does not appear to hold generally, questioning and reconsideration by its methods , and assumptions in and may be largely a matter of background and conditioning. order to be rationally maintained should withstand such critical scrutiny. imply 2 Naturally these (methodological) considerations do not that assumptions under examination do not (frequently) withstand critical discussion, or that there are not (or never could be) good reasons for adhering to them. But the considerations are important in opening larger moral assumptions to due reconsideration, for Insofar as the repugnance is There is no evidence that - what seems unlikely given the former prevalence of cannibalism - it is innate; and insofar as it is a matter of fact it does not support moral prohibition of eating human flesh, any more than the apparently very widespread repugnance of urban Americans 5 4 as observed, it has recently been argued, successfully, that this to eating raw snake underwrites a moral prohibition on consumption of raw snake meat. distinction will not carry very much of the moral weight that has been imposed upon it. 7 On the other hand, if the repugnance in With the breakdown of this sharp moral distinction question is (intended to be) warranted moral repugnance, then the argument is trivially circular, the premiss assuming the point at between humans and other species.orthod ox anthropocentr ic options, which sanction human consumption of animals other than humans but issue. never humans, collapse. One reason why the proferred defences look weak is that it has not been thought necessary to provide any defence; for 'Directly daylight falls on the habit it withers away' 5 - the "daylight" is that of contemporary Western civilization. appears in Langton (initial page): A similar theme cannibalism is 'a custom that of civilization' - or, one might say, before the triumph of human (pure) vegeta!ian options and on the other, cannibal(istic ) options (mixes of these options which allow some human flesh eating will it will be seen that by no means all forms of cannibalism are morally inadmissable. present exercise. Showing as much is the main object of the Though the results arrived at are part of the process of elaborating a non-chauvinis tic ethics, and accordingly have implications for policy, no policy conclusions are drawn in what no recommendatio ns for the implementation , or institution- The vegetarian options face, it certainly seems, insuperable difficulties, especially concerning such issues as animal predation (which is an important, immensely frequent, and often _<!~~rab.!!'_, What will be argued is that, on the contrary, when some daylight does penetrate to the issues concerning cannibalism, follows: (at least as regards "higher" creatures) are, on the one side fall under the latter head). must soon become extinct all over the world before the great march chauvinism. Among the important options left open ecological fact), and concerning the reduction in numbers of animals, especially introduced animals, which build up to "pest proportions" (some reduction is often required for vegetable growing to operate successfully) . But it is unnecessary to elaborate these and connected points here because there are cases where consumption of human flesh is perfectly admissible. The main argument advanced is modelled upon simple inductive arguments: a base case is argued, and this base is expanded step by step to cover other cases. alisation, of cannibalistic practices are made 6. Hardly necessary to say, better defences of the mainstream anti-cannibal istic tradition can be devised or pieced together from the literature than those so far alluded to. for example, on the assumption of sanctity Such defences - based, of all human life, on the theme that cannibalism is a brutalising experience, which puts humans in the same category as the brutes - characteristic ally rely on a sharp distinction between humans and other creatures. But, §1. The Base Cases: Eating the Dead. In setting out the first of these cases it is taken for granted that the practice in some American states and Canadian provinces of allowing accident victims (e.g. those of automobile casualties) to consent to the use of parts of their bodies for organ transplants and also for other medical purposes is admissible, and that the use itself in such cases is Restricted forms of cannibalism in the interests of 6 survival are now quite widely accepted as admissible. admissible 8. Then, is there any good reason why persons should So there is really nothing extravagant at all in contending that sometimes not similarly consent to the use of their bodies for food upon cannibalism is perfectly alright: their death? fact that the admissible cases lead, naturally and coherently, once For food transfusions, instead of blood or transfuslons · or transplants. plasma And if they do, or so bequeath their bodies, why should their bodies not be eaten? What differences human chauvinism is properly cases. any extravagance is due to the left behind, to much more controversial There are several examples of human cannibalism undertaken there are in the types of cases can be minimized, and those that for survival, which have won establishment approval, from remain seem not to make much - or any relevant - moral difference. or church hierarchies. For example, in order for human parts to be intially taken and used, of members of a Uruguayan rugby party who survived an airplane crash the bodies have to be more or less butchered; in the high Andes (dramatised by Read). but then they may be in much less pretty shape after a serious accident. Again, in each typ e of case, the parts may - or may not - be supplied to people who are in genuine need; etc. Nor does internal ingestion appear to differ, in any way that matters morally, from internal connection, from organ transplantation. It could be objected that with an organ transplant a specific organ is required, whereas with a starving or undernourished person alternative sources of food are - or ought legal A striking recent example is the cannibalism Their eating of dead companions, evidently necessary for survival, was condoned by the Catholic Church of Uruguay and by other prominent Catholic thinkers. Interestingly, Rubio, Auxiliary Bishop of Montevideo, justified such cannibalism, necessary for survival, through a medical transplant comparison 10 .•• Eating someone who has died in order to survive is incorporating their substance, and it is quite possible to compare this with a graft. Flesh survives when assimilated by someone in extreme need, to be - available. But where the parts are used for nonspecific just as it does when an eye or heart of a dead man is grafted onto a living man ••. (as quoted in Read, p. 308). medical testing, e.g. cell culture, or just disposed of (e.g. by But the Bishop tactfully rejected, except 'as a source of inspiration', incineration) without any other use, the specific need consideration the equivalence, appealed to by some members of the team, between does not work. Anyway what would it show? eating the flesh of their friends and participating in communion, as The claim staked is accordingly this:_ where the human initiated by Christ at the Last Supper, where he (figuratively) shared eaten is dead, and certain other conditions are satisfied, cannibalism his flesh and blood with his apostles (Read, p.309; is admissr e. also p. 299). The other conditions~ comprise such things as Exactly why this correlation, which undoubtedly helped the survivors, the following: that the whole thing is done decently (in ways, gets discounted, remains tantalisingly obscure. that is . LO be spelled out specifically); that the person eaten consented (or, differently, would consent) to being eaten, perhaps by the parties concerned, or more strongly that the person directed tha t he or .;he be eaten (or otherwise used); or differently again, tha t the ~onsumption was necessary for survival or well-being. etc. seems worth pursuing further. The correlation For though survival was not a problem 9 Suc h d es pi cable motives as those of the ge t-even s yndrome ("we'll 8 fix the ba s t a rd, we'll eat him") are pointl ess (as well as stup id l y for the apostles at the Last Supper (so destroying a strict correlation), survival is not the only basis justifying the eating of human flesh. As with blood, the gift relation is another v i ndi c tiv e ) wh e re the part y is already dead. It can be argued that eating certain pieces of human flesh out of respect is an exceptional case (like eating a fellow creature to avoid starvation), and that a general principle of respect for important basis. A consent or bequeathal clause 11 is important in under- the dead overrides any consent that may be given. The short cutting various objections to the consumption of dead humans, for answe r to this is, firstly, that grantin g of exceptional cases alr eady in s tance, that it is an affront to human dignity, that it is a mark allows that some cases of cannibalism are admissible, and secondly , of total d isr espec t, that the 'sanctity of the human being' is that no general principle applies in a decisive way to exclude the compl e tely disregarded (Hp. 186), that it is impious (Dp. 467). exampl es alr ea dy considered. Fo r if the person consents it can hardly be an affront to that general principles can always be thwarted, it is instructive to consider per s on's dignity, or violate that person's sanctity (as seen from one po int of view). Nor is it an affront to the dignity of creatures of an irreligious cast, for whom a dead body whether of a human or an animal is a d ead body - though perhaps a dead body of a fellow creature o r of a friend. So it is an affront only to those of particular ( religious) groups, perhaps the same groups for whom dead human bodies are sacred and their disfigurement by humans (whether for medical or 5 other purposes) impious . Just as it is legitimate for one to discount the often illfounded views of such groups - insofar as the views are int ended to have universal applicability - as regards medical use of (forme rly ) consenting humans, as regards sexual relations, abortion, e uthanasia, and so forth, so it is legitimate to discount them in the case at hand. Dev ine ' s argument against cannibalism, namely as a paradigmatic applica tion of his overflow principle. On the contrary, the eating of certain parts of the bodies of dead humans was, amon g certain tribes who used to practice cannibalism, for it was thought that in that way the eaters could acquire or participate in some of the (former) virtues o f the dead , e. g . wisdom, strength, hunting skills, etc. still be, that eating is not disrespectful: So it can what is sometimes dis- respectful is raising for food nnd killing, e.g. in order to ent. The overflow principle~ formed -chiefly to cope with the treatment of animals, is this: Act towaPds that which, while not itself a pePson, is clos ely associated with pePsonhood in a way cohePent with an attitude of Pespect fop pePsons (Vp . 503) . Instead of arguing directly for the principle, Devine suggests firstl y that it may be argued for in rule-cons equ e ntial fashion, secondly tha t it may be made plausible as part of a way of life having respect for persons at its centre, and thirdly that th e prin ciple is well ensconced in the moral consciousness of the plain man. Each of these suggestions can be faulted both in general and as regards the relevant application. For instance, plain men mostly do not object to the bulldozing of old cemeteries to make way for a development. Nor need the eating of a dead human be a mark of disrespect. an act of consider a ble res pect; To illustrate how application of suc h On the other hand, the principle can be rendered analytic by taking up the slack in "associated with" and "coherent with" appropriately - only then it won't yield the relevant substantive application. In application of the principle Devine makes two alternative moves. First, 11 It is by no means obvious, however, that a cons~n 10 is required. similarly if it is going to be incinerated and the ashes s pread, it might better be carefully composted. The point ma de does not exclude organ transplants, eating, and so ecological alternatives to burial or cremation. The most the overflow principle The suggestion that the already dead can, at least in s e ems to show, under this move, is - what does not exclude consumption, certain circumstances, be eaten without moral qualm, innocuous though and what one may well concur with - that the dead (and not merely the human dead) ought to be eaten respectfully; it is, is liable to spark off a series of protests. and even this much some ugly scenes could result i f "long pig" caught on; is not shown if the tense change, the transformation from alive to dead, destroys the requisite closeness of association. outback Australia) competing to pick up "accident" victims. ambulances or tow trucks, are readily enough avoided (by suitable body, which forms the visible aspect of the bulk of persons with whom we are acquainted, and which persists when the person ceases to exist in death. (Vp. 593) organization), and more respectful practices adopted. would, if the objection is to have force - lead to what is normally a~sumcs, overflow to the subsequently dead body (which is no longer inadmissible, for example, to a perverse lust for human flesh, and And again respectful eating be marketable commodities, if there was commerce not just in human flesh. but in bags, shoes, and belts made from human hides, decorations from human bones and teeth, glue and fertilizer from other parts and so on 12 in the way that there is commerce in animal parts? Perhaps, disre sp ec t wo uld be an outcome, but perhaps for the wrong re aso ns. What s ee ms clear is that giving human flesh to the ne edful, s ~y , i s one thing, a llowing commerce in human parts is another. More serious is the objection that such "admissible cannibalism" could - or rather ov e rflow to thl' llvlng body docs not however guarantee, what Devine Wouldn't disrespect be inevitable if human parts become But these types of scenes, which can already occur with competing ... respect for persons overflows to the human to dead bodies. e.g. the the way that refrigerated trucks follow the kangaroo shooters in some heavy assumptions as to features of persons, reveals: could, it appears, be coherent with the alleged overflow of respect It is true that spectacle of the refrigerated vans patrolling the highways (in much Devine assumes it does not, as his second move which begins to buy into the "visible aspect" of a person). so in nci cher case is value diminished, it seems, by (respectful) cannibalism or ordinary garbage (in the literal sense) is not eaten (except in desperation, etc.). A dead body does nee have the value of the person whose body it is in life; Garbage is commonly thrown away, things in these end uses are mostly not; For i f a body is going to be buried and "eat,~" by bacteria, or various carnivores, it might as well be eaten; although a dead body is not a person, still the fact that it (so to speak) was a person means that it ought not to be treated like ordinary garbage (Vp. 503). forth. clause perhaps, thereby to the deliberate killing of humans for food. Hogg makes much of the first of these points, the (unintended) impression he gives being that human flesh is so delicious that it is highly addictive. Whether this is so or not (it would seem unlikely with a preponderance of older stringier humans, though the number of "battery humans" is increasing).it appears not to matter, unless it does lead to what would be more disconcerting, e.g. the establishment of a black market or the like in human flesh, with inputs from killer or Mafia syndicates. But the problem is not substantially different 13 12 of our unwillingness to kill people for food or other purposes, from problems that already arise with the treatment of animals (e.g. traffic in rare species), and over the distribution of dangerous drugs to humans, and can be met in similar ways, i.e. through a similar range of political or organizationa l options. The usual utilitarian defence of vegetarianism based on suffering, pain, and the like caused in raising and killing creatures for food, co llapses. 13 For no direct suff~ring, pain or the like occurs, with the creatures eaten already dead; and any sorts of suffering that might be marshalled among some of the still living who are pained by the consumption can be more than compensated for by th e alleviation of suffering of the meat consumers, for a suitable and secondly not a (direct) consequence of our unwillingness to cause distress to people - not that it always would (contrary to Diamond's assumption) - but rather 'what conditions our attitude to not dining on ourselves is the view that a person is not something The argument turns however on a slide on the mi.ddl.e term 'something to eat' which is ambiguous between (i) something that may be eaten and (ii) something that is eaten; In the second sense the justification given of the fact dead people are not eaten, namely people are not eaten, while in a sense "logically adequate" is trivial, and proves no requisite grounding, and the "justification " does not imply that dead people may not be eaten. In the first sense, a nontrivial justification is offered, that it is impermissible choice of consumers. to eat people,but in this case we cend to repeat the initial question; Some vegetarians however (rightly) reject utilitarian defenses; Diamond, in particular, tries to argue that they involve 'fundamental confusions about the moral relations between people and people and between people and animals ' (Dp. 465), and introduces instead convent ionalist arguments - unfortunately of wide philosophical appea l - against eating people. Some of the reasons for not eating people, she subsequently argues, extend to grounds for not eating animals either. Diamond's argument begins from certain quite central facts ... We do not eat our dead, even when they have died in auto- mobile accidents or been struck by lightning • .. (Dp. 467) An immediate objection is that this is little more than a local fact, Why is it? Diamond has a surprising answer: in effect that it is analytic on, or at least a consequence of, our notion of what a person or human being is. ••• it is not respect for our interests which is involved in our not eating each other . These are all things which go to determine what sort of concept 'human being' is it is one of those things which go to build our notion of human beings (Opp. 469-70). But such a thing as not eating other people is certainly not part of the concept 'human being', indeed it is not merely ~ot analytic or normic (near-analytic ) of human beings,it is not even true of them - good for certain ' we ' but by no means generally, as the history of given that, on well-authentic ated evidence, cannibalism was formerly canniba lism shows. widespread, and that it still persists in isolated place s today. It is equally a fact in the context of quite extensive groups, that .EE~L2o not eat l'i~.· So either the central fact has to be morally grounded or has to have moral consequences. The second option would involve a prescriptive fallacy (deduction of an ought from an is); followin g fashion:- in any case, Diamond tries the first, in the The fact is, firstly, not a (direct) consequence The answer is, in short, radically unsatisfactory . That this is 15 Tt may s eem ... I should find myself havin g t o jus tify slav e ry. For do we not learn - if 14 we liv e in a slav e soci e ty - what slaves ar e the answer Diamond is offering is however at once confirmed by how she goes on (writing in speciesist assumptions 15 in the same revolting fashion): and what masters are through the structure of a life in which we are here and do this, and they are there and do that? Do we not learn the difference between a master and a slave that way? (Dp. 470) Diamond does not manage to escape these difficulties, though sh e And so too - very much so - [built into the notion] the idea of the difference between human beings and animals. We learn what a human being is in - among other things sitting at a table where WE eat THEM. We 16 are around the table and they are on it (Dp. 470) . While we may learn something about what some human beings - not makes various attempts (p. 470 and especially pp. 476-7): the notion of a slave or an enemy or an outlaw assumes a background of response to persons, and recognition that what happens in these cases is that we have something which ;;;;-;;,::-e not treating as what it - in a way - is ( Dp. 476). vegetarians - are like in this way, in the way we can learn what But this is to assume a background of norms, of how things morally some other human beings are like from cannibal feasts where 11 we" are, that a person is not something to enslave, etc. (and to attempt are on the table as well as around it, we learn little of the once more to build a presupposed morality into conv entional facts). notion of human being in this way. Nor does what correct information Furthermore, as this reveals, the same ploy could be worked in the we acquire in this way provide a firm basis for moral judgements case of animals, namely that in hunting them, killing them, serving about the possibility of eating humans, though Diamond appears to them up for dinner, we are ~ treating them as what - in a way think that it does; for she later says that the source of moral they are (or, more accurately, as they mora lly deserve treating). life derives from ways in which we mark what human life is (Dp. 418), Such comparisons make it evident then what Diamond is about, and that another move which involves a prescriptive fallacy, as well as he r conventionalistic approach fails. obvious anthropoce ntri cit y . However, to remove objections to eating the already dead, Indeed many of the sorts of conventional patterns of response under specified conditions, is simply to avoid, rather than face up a nd conventional facts that Diamond alludes to are a fairly direct to, the real opposition to even qualified cannibalism. For an o utcome of human chauvinism, e.g. that drivers mostly stop for important part of the real opposition to qualified canniba lism relies injured humans, not for injured animals, that humans are commonly upon illicit assimilation of cases of eating already dead people given funerals, animals mostly not. Diamond needs to say, and with killing humans for food, and, differently again, rearing some proceeds to say, that these sorts of differences are appropriate, but that is to slide to a value judgement which concedes to he rself part of what is at issue. Diamond's approach encounters serious difficulties when applied to such matters as slavery, the treatment of outlaws and enemies of them, e.g. certain infants, for food . and in an obvious sense ! .!1.~~~., Thus Devine's ambiguous, 17 what is entire l y different, permitting the killin g of humans for 16 food, or to, what is different again, the deliberate raisin g of human s for food. claim that 'a meat diet requires that animals be killed' (Vp. 483). And thus Diamond again, the cases are entirely different. involved both rearing and slaughtering Swift's "proposal" of children for food. Nor is the base position so far reached a new one, but an ancient proposition. it i s one thin g morally to eat an already dead deer, another to let a deer die and then eat it, another again to shoo t What we should be going against in adopting Swift 's "Modest proposal" is something one should be going against in salvaging the dead, more generally useful organs for transplantation, and the rest for supper or the compost heap. (Dp. 469) 17 Not a t all: animals: The differences are already clea r as rega rds For instance, Chrysippus, the Stoic, in his or otherwise kill it and then (perhaps) eat it, and yet another to eat a deer raised (in one or another of very different ways) for food. Within each of these different categories, it is important to distinguish cases. For while eating a dead human, even after it has been allowed to die (by omission), may be admissible, killing humans for food is often not, and raising a human for food (and other goods) is, it is now generally assumed by humans, certainly not. treatise On Justice, 'permitt ed eating of the corpses of the dead• 18 There are several separate issues here, in particular the So also apparently did Diogenes in his Republic, Zeno in his Republic, ~~ban~ or raising for food issue, on which much literature on and Cleanthes, all of whom may have authorised cannibalism on a the moral basis of vegetarianism has in fact focussed, and the broader scale. general l?I~'!_ati~ issue, which includes matters of killing and letting die. Limited extensions of cannibalism beyond the base cases, where humans are allowed to die or are killed . eat ing of (certain of) their parts . Eating dead humans involves But if eating such parts is (often) The issues are separate because creatures may be killed for food, e.g . in hunting, though they are not raised for food, and conversely creatures may be raised for food (or treated as slaves) without, for one reason or another, being killed. Cases of humans admiss ibl e , then so also presumably is consumption of such parts when raising humans for food have apparently never occurred, though humans they are (irrevocably or freely) severed from a living human, e.g. have sometimes been fed up for the pot (e.g. in the Aztec empire and in Fiji). ea ting the amputated limb of a friend or enemy or drinking the blood Humans are the only creatures we in fact know who might (having l ost consider- donated by another, able touch with the natural world) just adopt such a practice: These rather special cases, involving (what is no other ca lled, for s h o r t ) ~ human parts, provide a first set of extensions animals ever raise creatures for food, not did cannibalistic cu ltures of the base cases. ever apparently raise humans for food. These extensions include some bizarre cases, in particular where the part concerned is one's own. However, allowing the eating of dead humans and nonlive hum~ n parts under certai n conditions offers no slippery slide to, It is a serious and difficult question (to which moral philosophers have not sufficiently addressed themselves) why it is that if humans are not under !!.!!i'. conditions entitled to raise other humans for food, they are entitled under many 19 18 th e gene ral i ss ue as to wh e n, or wh e n prec i se l y , killin g f o r food i s jus tifiable can be largely skirt ed. For it is justifiable , it is conditions - indeed, it is often assumed, under a sweeping ra~ th e n claimed, whe n and only when killing itself i s justified, whe ne ve r of factory conditions - to raise other animals for food? that is. They can only be justified in so doing if there are significant and While one half of the italicised equivalence is uncontrover s ial - relevant differences between humans and other creatures raised, if killing for food (or for purpose P) is permissible, so is what it or that might be raised, for human or animal food. involves, killing - the converse is not. Yet there are, For consider some circum- it has already been pointed out, no such appropriate species-wide stances (assuming you can find them) where killing of person x is differences. justifie d, e.g. in war, in retribution, in self-defence, in r e ducin g g reat A fresh start can be made on the issue from a cannibalistic perspective. evil. Since it is not eating human f l e s h ~ that is Th e n killing x for these reasons is not killing for food, even if x is in fact subsequently eaten. There is an important intensional wrong, what is it that is wrong, if anything, with raising humans difference, so that being justified in killing x for some crime say , or other creatures for food? does not justify killing him for food, much as thinking of killing him or is it both? both. Is it the raising, or is it the killing, The answer is, of course, that trouble lies with for the one reason is very different from thinking of killing him for Raising of creatures frequently has one or both of two dama ging features accompanying it: first, the other purpose. deprivation of the What can be argued given the permissibility of- eating dead rai s ed creatures, and secondly, treatment of the raised animal humans, is that where killing of z is permissible, cannibalism of z merely as a means (not as an end). is also IN FACT permissible. The second, attitudinal, difference may have little or no impact beyond the first. For example, if infanticide i s alri ght under certain conditions (as Tooley contends, and others have hinted), And the first may be avoided, e.g. whe re the creatures stay by choice but then in fact cannibalism of infants is alright also under the given could depart if they wished. conditions (but the issues as regards the raising of infants for fo od Kept geese, for instance, may be in that position; they are seemingly not deprived, but may live in rather are, of course, not thereby resolved). natural conditions (except that migration and much that goes with it is permissible can, to this limited extent, be bypassed. II has been lost). Thus the issue of when killing It is worth elaborating these points, since important Killing involves something different again: extensions - not the only extensions - of cannibalism beyond the base all that goes with removing of a life, the termination of projects, purposes, cases depend upon them, and since - very differently - they furnish associations of value, etc. (and also the definitive end of con- clear cases of inadmissible cannibalism. sciousness, etc.). of situations to distinguish:- With the predation issue also, a central issue ls as to when killing an animal for food is permissible. It may be thought indeed that the killing for food issue just is, or is t a ntamount to, the general issue of killing, and that accordingly • There are several clas se s 21 survive themselves, the survivors of an aircrash in a remote area, 20 people on a life raft, etc. Such examples, where defensible, as they sometimes are, provide a further class of examples of admissible la. Killing , causing to die, is impermissible. cannibalism - what might be called exceptional cannibalism, since the lb. Letting die (passive killing, as it is sometimes misleadingly , but conveniently , called) is circumstances are, at present anyway, among higher mammals, rather impermissible . exceptional . Then, in either case , killing or letting die for eating or followed by An important and often times questionable practice, which eating is also impermissible, by preceding principles (essentially can in principle at any rate, deliver exceptional examples 20 , is ~Pp ➔ ~P (p & q)), hunting (in the intransitive form, which involves capture or killing So in particular it is where the creature is of the same species. That is, cannibalism is in these cases inadmissible . But some of these cases are clear; for instance, where creature (or if the object sought is duly located). Men continue to hunt in the French fields, and sometimes still their own species 21 , not at present human) x is leading a worthwhile nonaggressive independent and pro- in the shape of enemy soldiers , but those cast as outlaws (manhunts) . ductive life in a peaceful countryside. (Intransitive) Hunting divides into several types, according to its 2a. Killing is permissible. 2b. Letting die is permissible. end purpose, for sport , for food, for extermination, for capture. Hunting humans for sport (hunting for "sport " , so called, typically In common reckoning there are many examples of both second classes, involves killing) is a practice that has persisted well into this "passive" infanticide, suicide and gambling with life, euthanasia, century, in Australia for example . killing or allowing to die to maximise community values where there though it can be given philosophical support by chauvinistic theories are large numbers of people or choices between them, execution and such as a limited and racially prejudiced group-utilitarianism or by assassination, self-defence , killing in war (the list follows roughly appeal to the "ideal" of pure subspecies (the stud ideal). t he later chapter headings in Glover, where these well-known types such hunting is impermissible, so, for the same sorts of reasons, is of examp les are set out in some detail). the hunting of many animals for sport . In all these types of cases, It has nothing to recommend it, But if Hunting otherwise, except for death can be followed by eating, provided the base class conditions capture, is a restricted form of killing, and to what extent it is are satisfied . permissible turns on when that sort of killing is permissible . In such cases, henceforth called de facto extensions, cannibalism is also in fact admissible . The position arrived at thus far is pulled together in rhe Almost always the killing or letting die in 2a and 2b is not spec ifically for eating. conjoined: Eating the resulting dead is simply th e source of food is adventitious. Sometimes, however, in unusual circumstances some members of a party of the one species kill certain members of the party or allow them to die in order to fo ll owing diagram, which subsequent sections (and parts) endeavol1r to fil l out and render more precise:- 23 §3. 22 Unavoidable detours: when is killing a creature wrong, and when is letting a creature die wrong? It is not necessary, nor is it easy or desirable, to avoid entirely the issues of when killing Diagram 2: TYPES OF ADMISSIBLE AND INADMISSIBLE CANNIBALISM is wrong and when killing for food is wrong, and when such kinds of l( ,- killing are not wrong . Type 1 cases (exemplified e.g. in hunting for sport) - - -- ___ _] Base case I ,< conditions fail I X other than rather weak or circular principles. had seemed to be clear turn out on further reflection to be much l ess ,< obvious. \ ESSENTIAL / ,-...__ _ _ _ _ _'-! \ PREDATION..,, For example, it had seemed evident that the onus of jus tification (where this makes sense) characteristically lay with the WATERSHED J(. XCEPTIONAL EXTENSIONS Worse, things chat INADMISSIBLE ADMISSIBLE BASE CASES But it is not so easy to elicit or to defend action-taking party; \t 'I,( that it is the killing or removal of life that muse be justified, not the letting live. Some things, however, are clearer . 'J{ NONLIVE EXTENSIONS First and foremost, a satisfacto ry (nonchauvinistic) a c count K -J KILLING BOUNDARY of when and why killing a creature is wrong won't make exceptions for REARING FOR SLAUGHTER BOUNDARY humans and, more generally, won't contain the term 'human' or logical So far, in considering examples of killing, issue has not equivalents. This important requirement disposes of much of the been taken with enlightened conventional wisdom, with the result chat philosophical literature. a serious , and perhaps unwarranted, discrepancy between the treatment (9p. 135-9), which refer to the (contractual) conditions for human dished out to animals and that accorded humans is beginning to emerge. social life (the mixed account given should be faulted on several other So the judgements made tend to follow conventional practice: grounds as well). killing It wipes out, for example, Ewin's attempts Similarly it removes the main condition eventually humans for food is admitted but happens only in exceptional circumstances, achieved in Glover (a whole text devoted to moral issues concerning killing killing, which fails to present, or seriously address, the matter of animals for food is a pervasive practice. More generally, killing animals for food is considered permissible in a wide range of circumstances where killing humans is not , yet on what solid grounds? . As regards killing, even enlightened conventional moral wisdom returns us to the heartlands of human chauvinism. necessary and sufficient conditions for when killing is wrong) . The first main condition Glover arrives at is that ' taking human life is normally directly wrong: that most acts of killing people would be J/ To avoid it, the matter of wrong in the absence of harmful side-effects' (Gp . 42), i.e . so long killing and letting die will have (like most moral issues) to be as 'the best total outcome' does not involve killing (cf. p . 286), to reconsidered, nonchauvinistically. set down the underlying utilitarian recipe . Other conditions Glover outlines - similarly unacceptable even to their author when 'animal' replaces 'human' - are likewise faulted as damagingly cha,·vinistic, 25 24 for instance that it is wrong to kill a human whose life is worth l iv i ng (Gp . 53) , whenever that is. e . g. burning a collection of seeds (er seedlings) is one thing, burning Secondly , unremarkably, most of the recipes suggested in the a forest is another, slicing up or eating a raw egg is one thing, slicing literature are defective, first among them utili t arian proposals , which, as is well-known can sanction unjust killing. 22 up or eating an eagle is another, etc. Other (non- utilitarian) potential ys me rit the same consideration as ys, as if th ey we r e ys. recipes are also problematic, as a proposal by Young, wh i ch will he l p Call the r.esult of making the required deletio n, th e us on our way, serves to indicate: modified proposal . . . . what makes killing another person [more genera lly a considered . realisation either of the victim's life purposes or of such life- purposes as the victim may reasonably have been narrower utilitarian frameworks and induces a decided circularity, The proposa l requires some brief explanation. The term ' unjust ' , which takes the proposal outside is qualified in the final proposal (p.519) by 'maximally' , the point expected to resume or to come to have (Yp.518; repeated p.519 with 'maximally ' included). of which (though it is not fully explained) is to permit killing or The qualifying term sacrificing of one person in order to save others . 'irrevocable' is inserted to separate killing from life imprisonment I It is the modified proposal that will be chiefly creature] wrong on occasions is its characte r as an irrevocable, [maximally] unjust preventing of their I It is a popular fallacy that which may, as a matter of fact , defeat the prisoner ' s purposes . The long some members of a group (on a lifeboat or from a remote airplane crash) final disjunction is designed to delegitimize killing of sometime comatose are sacrificed for, or by, others of the group . persons (it also would include people undergoing reform programs) - -,hat is ac counled [maximally] unjust. an additional clause is required - and killing of potential future in way, and almost (but not) captial punishment. debatable judgements , such as that in the common case (on Young ' s ified' (p . 528) , ified. 23 from which it follows that abortion is commonly unjust- The disjunct should, it certainly seems, be deleted - especially since what justifies the main part of Young ' s proposal, considerations of what has value, does not justify the final disjunct, because merely potential persons do not appear to have requisite value, though they might (or might not) come to have such. Generally, potential ys do not have the same range of features (including acquired value, etc.) ll Similarly what one is entitled t o do , or feels like doing with r espect to them may differ; If , however, there are no just wars then most killing in war is wrong; and if punishment by death is sometimes just , capital punishment is sometimes not wr.ong. If, for instance, a person's life purposes are sufficiently evil~ e.g. they include genocide, then their fulfilment is certainly pro1, ~ rJ y , justly, thwarted. 0 1· Thus some proviso as to the chara c t e r or qua lit y of life purposes , such as the term 'unjustly ' obliquely supplies , is essential (but often omitted in ethical discussions) . It is not evident however that killing such a person (as distinct, e.g. from imprisonment , re-education, etc.) is permissible, exc ept perhaps in worst cases. ~ • what they become if their potential is realised . For example, Young claims (Ypp.520-1) that the proposal lets through various types of killing persons such as infants and foetl1ses - thereby writing in some very has only 'morally trivial or no moral support abortion will be unjust- But generally what the proposal permits and what it excludes depends critically upon cases already apparently covered, so that it is not obvious that such construal of 'moral') where the expressed wish of the pregnant woman The qualification makes way for certain cases of cannibalism, for instance those where I 26 Ther e is no good r eason to restrict the proposal to persons , and Young does not intend to. 27 Many killings of animals constitute , he t ells us (Yp.526), maximally unjust prevention of their realisation of life purposes, and accordingl y are wrong. ' Killing such animals for food is only justifiable when no adequate of other crea tures). acts are avoided. food supply is available and food i s needful' (Yp . 526), in which event, presumably, justice prevails. A characteris tic remnant of Further it is simply assumed - though it could no doubt be argued (rather as below) - that requisite unjust Young's proposal as applied has bite; human chauvinism also intrudes , with Young a ppealing to the ' greater eschewing killing of creatures for food. 25 range of life-purpose s normally human beings have' (Yp.527, italics that the modified proposal has bite: amended) ; 24 and thereby smuggling in a greater value assumptio n as regards humans. Here, as elsewl1ere also , the account of when killin g is wrong is progressive ly l oaded , almost manipulated , to yield the sought r esults : in particular , what is unjust - including which killings are unjust and which class of life-purpos es are more valuable relevant to det e rmining maximal injustice - are bot h open to rigging. These points help to bring out too how back of Young's accoun t and application s of his proposal lie more basic consideratio ns of justice and value (and it is to such considera tions that we should no doubt eventually turn). Consider, for instance, the route to the permissibil ity of systematic cullings of a herd. Wants , now substituting for li fe -purpose s , are simply supposed to be summed up utilitarian- fashion, except th at (somewhat as with Mill ' s utilitariani sm) a weighting is imposed to reflect the respective values of different wants (those of humans, e . g ., as opposed to those It is an illusion however the bite all turns on Young's cunning application , since the modified proposal itself reduces to near tautologous ness. purposes occur? taken. For when does irrevocable prevention of a life's When, and only when (since it is irrevocable) that life is So the modified proposal reduces effectively to AP. Killing x is wrong iff taking x's life is maximally unjust. But killing x is, according to OED, causing the death of x, which is tantamount, in terms of sense, to taking the life of x. And what is wrong is, according to OED again, what is unjust, and would be, if the OED were sharpened 1,1p a little, what is maximally unjust. Whence the adjusted proposal, AP. The proposal does not rule out killings which have the effect overall of fostering th e wants of the largest subset of some group like a wild herd where otherwise the wants of an even larger subset will be thwarted. Systematic cullings in the absence of feasible alternative s, therefore, may be morally pe rmissible. (Yp.527) for example, it would oblige most of us to adopt a largely vegetarian life-style We have come round a circle, but much was glimpsed on the way, so the circuitous route was not without its rewards. By working through other l ess chauvinistic accounts of the wrongness of killing (e.g. the nonchauvin istic base of Ewin's account) we can come a similar circular way and arrive at the same fairly stable result. Moveover, in the adjusted proposal we do have an account, not yet a hi ghly usable account, since circular, but an account nonetheless . In terms of this account clear cases where cannibalism is morally inadmissable can be distinguishe d, for example as follows: Cannibalism of x is wrong wherever it involves maximally unjust taking of x's life. Conversely, there are many cases where 28 the killing of one creature by another creature is, because not maximally unjust, quite permissible; 29 e.g. certain instances of killing in self-defenc e, exceptional cannibalism , abortion, etc . But if the creature is killed, then it is dead, so by the earli er Now let x and y be of the same species, say Homo Sapiens: argument it is permissible to eat it (under certain conditions) . CAP provides exact conditions for when cannibalism is wrong, in So there are many cases where killing a creature and then eating it, cases where cannibalism involves killing. or its then being eaten, are permissible . conditions are satisfied; If some of the many cases of permissible killing are, as they seem to be, cases of killing a then Sometimes these often they are not. Sorting out when they are, and when they are not, will occupy many a controversi al creature of the same species, then active cannibalism involving killing is, in such cases, permissible . The argument needs of course filling out in crucial respects, especially by some enumeration of types of cases where killing is permissible , and a sub-listing of cases where these are intra-specie s killings. Would this suffice? However, it of the) distinction between killing and letting die, by blurring or rejecting the distinction on which it is based~ that betweem omission and One question is whether the account determines (even in its circular way) the precise conditions under which killing for food can permissibly occur. Letting die is not the same as (active) killing . has recently become fashionable to try to remove the (moral significance The question reduces commission (or else it is pretended that it is frightfully difficl1lt to make this distinction s out, etc.). Rejection of the omission/ commission distinction appears to rest on a mix of fallacious moves:- to the logical issue of whether AP as a strong logical equivalence FMl. A some to all argument, warrants intersubsti tutivity in more highly intensional frames such FM2. A confusion of the thesis that the distinction is morally as those declaring purposes. Though I've tended to vacillate on this issue, my feeling increasingly is that substitutiv ity is warranted, important with the quite different thesis that only commi.ssions can be morally blameworthy and that omissions are morally guiltless (the the reason being that the equivalence of AP is of virtually synonymity position reportedly held by some religious groups in the past). strength, which legitimates replacement in all but quotational (type) FM3. An extensional approach to nonextensio nal differences . sentence contexts. But purpose sentence contexts, such as' ... for eating' are not quotational . FAP. Hence it follows using AP that Killing x for food purposes is wrong iff taking x's life for food is maximally unjust, heavily upon the fact that there are some cases where it is morally difficult to distinguish between certain commissions and certain and that CAP. These points are considered briefly in turn:- ad FMl. Those attempting to discredit the distinction usually rely y's killing x for (and followed by) eating is wrong iff y's taking x's life for eating is maximally unjust. omissions, e.g. that in appropriate circumstanc es exposing the baby may be little different morally from directly smothering it. (The Greeks believed it wasn't but that was because exposure gave the gods a chance to intervene and save from death those who were fated to perform especially important tasks). r JO But the fact that there a r c ~ cases where the JI distinctio n is not of great moral significan ce does not show that it is dispensabl e. In order to show that lt is dispensabl e it is extension ality assumption which removes scope. The principle necessa ry to show that there are no cases where it is needed, that appears to be that failing to provide a condition which would have for all cases failing to provide a condition which would prevent been causally responsibl e for preventing x is morally equivalent to ~x is (morally) equivalent to providing a condition for x. providing a condition which is causally responsibl e for x . But Moral it is easy to produce some cases where the distinctio n seems to be equivalenc e requires interchang eability witin deonitic contexts, essential if we are to account for what we wish intuitivel y to say. indeed it could be characteri sed in terms of such substituti bility . For example, to take a case those who wish to abolish the distinctio n The equivalenc e yielded is of the form -F-x are fnnd nf appealing to, we may wish to say that the people who did commonly falls, especially where Fis not extensiona l. not attempt to help in the Kitty Genovese case were morally culpable, moveover that the causal responsib ility functor is not extension al, perhaps to a high degree, but few of us would wish to say that their and that such a principle fails for it. moral culpabilit y was exactly the same or of exactly the same kind as that of the murderer, and that they should equally be brought to trial on murder ch~rges. Or, to take another case, placing poison in your husband ' s tea is not the moral equivalent of failing to give him the antidote when he has placed it in himself. In order to say +-> Fx. But such a principle It is clear Though letting die differs significan tly, then, from killing, conditions upon when it is wrong may be reached in similar ways. How the condition for letting die correspond ing to AP should go becomes rather more obvious if the righthand side of AP is expanded to: taking (the) action which terminates x's life is maximally unjust. what is evident in such cases, some equivalent of the omission/c ommission The parallel passive condition can th en presumably be formulated distinctio n is needed . thus:- ad FM2. But the thesis that the distinctio n is needed and is morally DP. significan t in many, or at l e a s t ~ , cases must be clearly dis- which continues x ' s life is maximally unjust. 26 tinguished from the very much stronger thesis that all omissions are blameless, and that any commission s are morally open ~o blame - or praisewort hy. This thesis is, rather plainly, indefensib le, yet has been responsibl e for much of the bad light in which appeal to distinctio n appears . ad FMJ. Then in turn, substituti on principles again yield clauses EDP and CDP, correspond ing to EAP and CAP, special cases of which yield conditions under which cannibalism is wrong where it involves letting die. Principle CDP which supplies this condition, where x and y are of the same species, runs as follows:- The principle of moral symmetry between omissions and commission s is in fact refutable. Letting x die is wrong iff refraining from taking (the) action It appears to be based on an CDP. y ' s letting x die for eating purposes is wrong iff y's refraining from taking (the) action which continues x's life, for purposes of eating x, is maximally unjust. Since letting die is, for the most 32 part, less heinous than killing, cannibalism involving letting die 33 i s more widely permissible than cannibalism involving killing . 27 §4 . The matter of predation, and important cases of l egit imat e killing and letting die for food. One tempting model that underlies the conflict picture of Paradigmatic examples of legitimate predation, of predation as basically undesirable but an unavoidable killing are provided by predation, where bis prey of a and a depen ds fact, a model that leads to human vegetarianism, is the following (essentially) for its livelihood, indeed for its survival, on eating kind of atomistic axiological theory (or utilitarianism):- bs.28 Such predat ion i s a n essential part of any su ffici e ntl y rich ecosystem . Essential pr eda tio n i s pre dation which is essent i a l to according to the initial positive value thesis, every living creature (every sentient creature , every higher animal , etc .) has an initial positive the nor,~11 livelihood of tl1e predat or , and where the prcd alor takes non-instrumental value which it retains unless it does something to for itself no more than it requires for it s livelihood. forf eit that value. carn.ivores , such as the big cats , but some humans, such traditional Eskimos, are essential predators. Not only ilS some (On the even simpler position of biospheric egalitarianism, discussed below, all living things have equal worth, The fact that humans ar e part of the natural predatory food chains should not be lost s i g ht o[ . Observe that the argument to permissibility of essential pre- in some nontrivial sense.) These positive values just sum ; and maximisation of value (or suitably averaged value) is, of course , the (or an) ethical objective . Then killing is generally undesirable , dation does ~ take the invalid form: such predation is a fact (a fact because it results in a reduction in net value, and survival is generally of life), therefore it is permissible. That arguments of this type , desirable. 29 The exceptions occur when a creature has forfeited its selectively relied upon by Diamond and (earlier) Hegel, are inval id is value, e . g . it per sists in value-reducing behaviour, so that killing well-enough known (they commit a prescriptive fallacy), and is evident it would prevent a further decline in net value or lead to increase in from such fallacious arguments as the diplomacists' argument, e.g. it is total value . a fact of life that Indonesia has occupied (absorbed) East Timar; when it leads to an overall reduction in value . the re- The underlying theme is that killing is unjustifiable The onus of proof, fore it is pe rfectly alright that Indonesia occupied (absorbed) East Timar. when it can be assigned, lies with those who make the exceptions, who Naturally it would be decidedly awkward if the fact of essential predation do or license the killing . turned out to be impermissible: since, with one item of value consuming another item of value, it trouble. the whole natural order would be in moral This brings us to another defect of the argument from· "facts", Predation now appears as an awkward fact , leads to an overall reduction in value. Since inessential preda tion that it suggests that essential predation is really, at base, something is inessential, it is ruled out as inadmissible. pretty undesirable, but nonetheless something we have to live with - in (nonindigenous) humans for whom predation is, it is plausibl~ argu ed , Thus in particular, contrast with predation, in its associated meaning, as plunder, which we iness en tial, are not entitled to kill for f ood : do n't, or rather oughtn 't to, have to live with morally, and which is usual rai si ng of animals for food, etc . are all excluded in one st r oke , commonly reprehensible. and a l eading feature of vegetarianism imposed . therewith hunting, 34 35 Essential predation is not so satisfactorily dispos ed o f, but introduces conflict. For either one creature, the prey, is sacrificed or another creature, the predator, is: value de c lines . Similar objections apply against biological egalitarianism, either way tot 8 1 In the interim, while vegetarian scientists work even when it is qualified as in Drengson and Naess by an in principle 30 on new diets and new lifestyles for predators, there is an obvious clause. recipe to be applied, which while not eliminating conflict, minimises that predation is rather suboptimal: its effe c t: is strictly ruled out as a general practice. just as steam gives way to sail, so the less valuable gives way to t h e ~ valuable. Thus if humans are reckoned to be It is not (or not only) that it is taken for granted the trouble is that predation Since each lion and each antelope is assigned one unit of whatever is assigned equally, mo re valuable than polar bears - the usual human evaluation - then there is no way of justifying the lifestyle of a lion that consumes polar bea rs are not going to be entitled to prey on humans, in the sens e several antelopes. at least that their predation is not justified. Any equalitarian approach that is E££ atomistic is liable Application of the recip e 31 presupposes a value ranking on creatures under which some are more valuabl e to further incoherence, as Drengson's holism reveals. than others: some living system of living things, e.g . the Earth as on the Gaia otherwise if all are equal, predation is never admissible, and Lets be essential predators just die out - at least that is the simple ethical pic t - hypothesis (p. 233). ure. least of the living things that comprise it, has the same value as This points up one of the many problems for biological egaltarianism. But the picture presented so far is too simple, and tl1e recipes suggested dubious. Then s, which should(?) have the value at each of them (in effect 1 = n, for n>l). Some of t~e ecological consequences of implementing the For if the matter is properly considered not at a given time, but over a time interval, dynamically and not suggested recipes, and reform of essential predators, can now be just statically, it is not so simple, and a rather different result gauged. emerges . the chains of predation are long and complex; One predator takes, over a typical lifetime, rather a lot of prey . Unless the predator ranks very much more highly than Massive environmental interference would be required, since distortions especially in lower-level prey would occur, with resulting the prey, the value of the sum of the prey will exceed that of the ecological instability and often catastrophe. predator. that is, are ecologically highly undesirable. These considerations, in combination with a positive and gross population The consequences, What this and the value thesis, suggest a very different result, that predators should summation problems begin to reveal is that the initial atomistic be allowed to, or encouraged to, die out - unless they are somehow, value distribution picture is inadequate because it leaves out systems what seems improbable for predators that remain wild, converted to and systemic connections such as a more ecological approach would vegetarianism, include, The dynamic picture resorted to is still too simple in one important respect, that over a time interval, prey, which would often exceed natural (and sometimes reasonable) population levels without predation, are replaced. Where population of a preyed-upon species of creature is at an ecological limit, and minor culling of the sort 36 natural predation induces does not, owing to replacement, reduce 37 population levels significantly below that limit, predation has no significant effect on total value, So results yet another, different, recipe, one which is a little nearer the ecologica l mark. 32 farm animals (all of them) can be appropriately filled out, to Some utilitarians, Singer in particular, have recognised exclude replacement of animals with unusual or special properties, the role of replacement a·,1d made some allowance for it (at a serious cost to Singer ' s vegetarianism , it should be added), e.g. those carrying valuable genes, and to allow slaughter, without Singer now allows for killing and replacement of nonselfconscious life, but advances a nonreplaceabllity thesis for self-conscious life. Furthermore, even if a replacement thesis for free-range shorter-term replacement, of those carrying damaging diseases or genes - as it no doubt can, in a modified replacement thesis - still For the basic division Singer appeals to 'Tooley 's distinction' between a nonreplacement thesis fails to allow even for essential predation of selfconscious creatures, and accordingly should be scrapped, beings that are merely conscious and ••• those that Since this pronouncement is likely to be disputed, at least are also self -conscious, in the sense of being able to conceive of themselves as distinct entities, existing by some vegetarians, it is worth trying to indicate why essential over time with a past and a future (Sp.151), At the same time it can be In fact most of the sorts of free-range farmyard animals that Singer predation is perfectly admissible, seems to be envisaging as nonselfconscious, and accordingly replaceable, explained what is still wrong with the tempting dynamic picture and creatures, for instance geese and hens, appear to satisfy Tooley's the initial positive value thesis. tests for selfconsciousness. what is put in as what is left out, Geese are certainly aware of themselves they value members of their own community ; trees, and inanimate such as rocks and buildings,~ have initial and they remember value, but that complexes and wholes, in particular ecosystems, may elements of their past and, in things like nest building (practice), anticipate the future. More important, what has selfconsciousness (reflex- ive consciousness), or consciousness to do with the moral dimension? Until well have initial value, The reduction assumptions underlying value decomposition thereof, itself, because by no means all consciousness of conscious life is _ 32 a to atoms fail , Singer's theses lack foundation and look, while perhaps convenient for that it cannot be duly explained; There are grounds for anticipating for instance, being too valuable to be Such wholes may have value furthermore which is not dissolvable into values of component parts, or atoms this is duly explained - it is not satisfactorily explained as valuable in some traditional farmers, rather ad hoe, What is left out is not just that objects other than living creatures, both animate such as plants and as distinct entities, and of geese as distinct from (and superior to) hens; What is wrong is not So much In terms of the value of wholes such as ecosystems, one of the arguments for essential predation is disarmingly elementary . It takes the form: (sufficiently) rich (natural) ecosystems are Predation is an essential part of these systems . simply replaced, in the sense of having irreplaceable experiences, worth- very valuable, while projects, etc., does not have the requisite linkage with self- What is an essential part of what is very valuable is admissible. consc iousness. Therefore, predation is admissible. Such predation, which may be argued for in other ways , admits of extension by the following principle : 38 EP. If something is entitled to kill for food under certain 39 conditions, e.g. respectfully and when in need, then so are others under the same conditions. §5. The argument for EP is of the same type as that for other Postscript . The paper is very incomplete . It fails to address several issues intimately connected with cannibalism, such as hunting similar indifference, or interchangeability, principles in ethics. of humans and other animals, in particular for food, and as raising It follows from EP and essential predation that, since a tiger may humans and other animals, especially defective infants, for food. when in need kill a cow to eat, then so may humans in need. If Worse, it is evasive on some fundamental issues, and it fails to penetrate very taking the cow's life is not maximally unjust in the one case, nor deeply into some of the issues it does begin to consider, such as is it in the other, since the circumstances are similar. predation, or as the necessary and/or sufficient conditions for admiss- The results reached may be alternatively argued for using principle CP. 33 Perhaps Singer is also on the right track, though he has latched onto the wrong distinction. Perhaps there is a (descriptive) condition q (or a condition qs for each sorts of agent), appropriately ible killing. position. It is little consolation that others are in the same Hopefully some of these deficiencies will be compensated for in subsequent parts. At the same time several themes will be developed that may tied with causing to die, such that while killing creatures without q not have been evident so far, e.g. that in under suitable conditions is permissible, killing creatures with q is far too much killing taken much too lightly, but far too little is not, except under special conditions . 34 general experience of killing and death when it does occur, that is Given that q is 11 modern 11 societies there appropriately morally connected such a procedure would fit into the except usually among small groups mostly of inured professionals, annular picture (given earlier: q would mark out the interior of the which "shield" most humans from the phenomena involved. dotted elipse). Nor need the distinction be chauvinistic, because it cuts across species in a morally defensible way. anything, is q? located? made good? But, what, if Can a suitable morally-unloaded category-based distinction And how disconcerting would it be if some such distinction could no Wait for the next exciting episode . 35 ' 40 FOOTNOTES 41 It was singularly appropriate that this paper should have otained its first (and only) public presentation at the Alfred E. Packer Memorial Center, University of Colorado. I am indepted to several members of the audience for comments and references, and in particular for the first extension of the base case . It is noticeable how people who have never been cannibals despise the horrible thing; and how quickly it disappears when a cannibal tribe comes into contact with a wider world than that Directly merely of their own bush village. daylight falls on the habit, it Withers away . This is remarkable when we remember the sanctity The cannibal of it in primitive man's eyes . is not necessarily a hopelessly degraded brute, but-;-man who has not yet lived out of the dark obscurity of bush tribalism, and so had bli~dly_ followed a practice deep-rooted in the sacrificial These themes are defended, and the annular model explained, in The themes are also defended in HC, p. 103ff., and in AHC. other recent work, e.g. by Tooley and Singer. As the schematic diagram shows, humans do not occupy a central ring. Thus adoption of the model does not imply, what Pickering assumes (p. 374), that 'humans are more~ntral ' or, for that matter, that 'humans are owed more extensive moral consideration Nothing in the model itself depends on humans . than plants'. The model is not species based, or biologically based, but category basect";-and designed to reflect the different sorts of things there are, e . g. things capable of entering into contracts conferring obligations, and things not so capable, things that can have preferences and make choices as opposed to things that cannot (truly, or significantly), things, including systems and Nor, therefore, organisations, with a telos and things without. does the model write in a new type of chauvinism, or confer privilege or moral advantage on things in more central rings. Indeed, things in central rings will have obligations and commitments, and be subject to limitations on what they do, in ways that things further out cannot be; so there will be some As this moral disadvantages in occupying a more central place. indicates, the categories selected are intended to have moral And different sorts of behaviour are morally linkages . appropriate with respect to the different categories of objects. 2. 3. 4. The popular view that dialectics and adoption fraction of assumption themes are dangerous is partly based on a modal fallacy, For the fallacy e.g. that what can be believed is believed . in operation in more intellectually respectable quarters see WW. the Epilogue of Harris Some dialectics are accordingly recommended for anyone convinced that cannibalism must be wrong. The investigations undertaken in this paper alwshare other features with (classic) dialectics: there are many loose ends, and in several crucial areas firm conclusions are not reached. Later parts of the paper will take care of some of these things. Thus Hogg (p. 188), Cannibalism . .. can hardly be said to exist in There may be isolated the world of today. pockets of survival in the heart of New Guinea and among some of the tribes in the remotest corner of South America or African jungles; but they will be no more than the rarest of phenomena. 5. Hopkins, given the last word by Hogg, p. 192. quote from Hopkins is of passing interest: The whole ideas common to man the world over from his earliest days. 6. Some of the advantages of institutionalisation of certain cannibalistic practices are evident, e.g. a_much enh~nced Various disadvantages if not evident should supply of protein. become so in the course of the text. 7. See again in HC and similar. Although the human/nonhuman distinction is not, so it is argued, one of moral significance, not all Other distinctions of moral importance distinctions vanish. - those of the annular model - naturally remain. 8. Of coures, this practice is (still) controversial, and But a offensive to various religious and other groups. great advantage of a pluralistic society is t~at it can acconnnodate (better than alternatives) such differences Issues such as human_ . over the morality of practices . burial and restricted cannibalism, however, make the limits of present pluralism evident . 9. Or else did not incur official establishment disapproval, though the acts strictly appeared to infringe the Every s~~ond_ra~onteur has prevailing law of the land. examples of cannibals not brought to Justice . 10. . This clearly anticipates an initial argument of this My thanks to W. Berryman for drawing my attention paper. to the attitude of the Catholic Church, as presented in Read. 11. Consent in principle will carry the requisited load, and for this it is normally enough that the person would consent. This indicates one logical route to the liberalisation, and removal, of the consent clause. 12. There would (so far) be no trophies, e.g. Z's head ~n the hall, Y's skull on a stand, because trophies involve hunting and killing (for which see below). 13. As some vegetarians would freely admit; other 11 vegetar i ans II f rther and regard the killing of certain (nonself) an1•mals for food as admissible provided no suffering u, go i conscious is incurred and that the animals are replaced. . But it s true that usually 'vegeta;ians do not touch the issue of our attitudes to the dead (D., p.9) . 42 14. 15. In a like vein it is suggested that Singer and Regan do not see that 'a cow is not something to eat; (for them) it is only that one must not help the process along' (D., p. 468). The latter incidentally would not exclude the use of dead creatures for food, leather goods, etc.; things that animal liberationists like Singer definitely exclude. 43 21. Diamond recognizes this objection, p. 471, but does not meet Pace K. Bell, according to whom, Men have always hunted in the fields around Potigny and Falaise . They still do, but no longer their it. own species. 16. 17. 18. In similar ways we are said to gain the concept of an animal; s~~ p. 476. -Diamond introduces this piece of serious confusion in the course of emphasizing why the 'assumption that we all agree that it is morally wrong to raise people for meat ... is not, or not merely, ... too weak' (D.• p . 469). Diogenes Laertius, vol. 11, p. 297. Some of the complex issues concerning hunting will be considered in subsequent parts, others elsewhere. 22. See, e.g., Henson, and also Ewin and RKU . 23. A notable piece of male chauvinism also slides through, in the suggestion that, in Lhe absence of more weighty moral backing, the expressed wish of a pregnant woman is morally trivial. And Sayre reports (p. 25), Cannibalism (uv0pwno~ayCa) is alleged to have been a practice of the Cynics by Philodemus and by Theophilus Antiochenus; but, if so, it must have been confined to their early history, for they had a number of critics during the Christian era who would have mentioned it if they had known of it. Both Philodemus and Theophilus were biassed and we must remember that similar stories were told of the early Christians. However, cannibalism is said to have been authorized by the Republic and Thyestes (or Atreus) attributed to Diogenes and also by the Republic of Zeno and by Cleanthes and Chrysippus (Philodemus, On the Stoics; Theophilus Antiochenus, Ad. Autolycum 3, 5; D.L. 6, 73; Ibid. 7, 188; cf. 28th Letter of Diogenes; Dio Chrysostom 8, 14). As Diogenes Laertius goes on to explain, that 'Chrysippus did countenance the eating of dead humans was one of the points brought against him by those who 'ran him down as having written much in a tone that was gross and indecent'. As regards such attitudes to the dead, times have not changed that much. The (idea of) eating "the dead" (dead humans, of course), under ~ circumstances, is still widely regarded as scandalous, and highly newsworthy (see Read, p . 296 ff). 19. Cannibalism which involves explicit killing for food is a kind of reflexive predation, but generally (cases of) cannibalism and predation only properly overlap. 20. An example would be where some of the survivors of a crash or wreck hunt other "survivors" in order to survive; cf. W. Golding, Lord of the Flies. 24. But one's life-purposes are diminished lhow can this be on Young's picture?) if they jeopDrdise those of others. Hence Young's preparedness to let Amin be killed by the stampeding horses, Yp. 527. 25 . Indeed it leads, as Young interprets it, to a more sensible vegetarianism than Singer's initial position (in Animal Liberation, not as significantly modified in Sp.153). neither culling nor predation are simply ruled out. 26. For Action and taking action should be construed in a wide, but common enough fashion, e.g. the action taken may amount to doing nothing or getting-the-hell-out-of-it. 27. It is tempting to try to prove this on the basis of a proper inclusion assumption, that where letting die is wrong so is killing, but not conversely. The assumption may, however, need qualification; e . g. killing may sometimes be preferable to letting died in a lingering way . 28. 'Predation" is a singularly unfortunate word to be stuck with to describe this universal phenomenon. It is unfortunate both because of its etymology, and because of its other meaning . At to the first, ' predation' derives from praedari, 'to plunder', which derives in turn from praedo, 'booty', As to the second, 'predation' also means a 'practice or addiction to plunder or robbery'. Both carry strong negative connotations. There is a similar damaging duality in the expressions 'prey' and 'prey upon'. 29. These defective considerations also lead to a maximisati~n of population of creatures of the base class assigned values, up to the limit - if any (on frontier philosophers there are none) where declining returns set in . Where, further, humans are typically, but erroneously, assigned greater value than other creatures, the considerations support the rapid biassing of terrestial fauna! population in favour of humans that we are witnessing. The second point does not apply, in that form, . against biol0gical egalitarianism, and the first objection fails where total value is replaced, as under some utilitarianisms (with what justification is less clear, since surely we want to maximise value so far as constraints permit: see RKU), by average value, average value per (base class) life lived, etc. 44 The argument in the text is not affected materially by switching from value analogues of total utilitarianism to analogues of some form of average utilitarianism. On some of the serious problems with these utilitarianisms, see Jamieson. 30. Drengson, following Naess and others, espouses 'biospheric egalitarianism and the intrinsic value of all life' (p. 222). According to the theory, each (living) being has intrinsic value (pp.233-4), and hence each presumably has equal worth (and is entitled, in Singer's terms, to equal consideration , if not equal treatment). In Naess and Drengson this biospheric egalitarianism is qualified by an in principle clause. According to Naess, 'The 'in principle' clause is inserted because any realistic praxis necessitates some killing, exploitation and suppression' (p.95), and according to Drengson, 'This qualification is made with the simple recognition that we cannot live without affecting the world to some degree' (the latter claim is inadequate, because it is not just 'we' who are involved). 31. Axiological approaches that are atomistic have other problems, some reminiscent of those Wittgenstein discusses for logical atomism. In particular, how do we locate the atoms to which value is supposed to adhere fundamentally. A first bad feature of this approach is invariance failure: it matters for final summations how the atoms are chosen, for different choices will assign complexes quite different values. Secondly (Wittgenstein's question), why are some things said to be atoms not complexes, and vice versa. A third group of problems, brought out in HC, concerns the choice of a base class. 32. An environmental ethic s:1oul.:l. also be an ccologic:1 I et!dc, sense of an ecologically realistic ethic. facts are certainly relevant. 32a. A detailed case for this claim 33. j:1 t lH· In this resepct too the appears in Routley and Griffin. Thus rp can be made to yield a good deal more than Young's application of his proposal (for which he offers no proper justification): A creature is entitled to kill another creature of lesser value when its life (and so all its functions, prospects, etc.) depends on it and when it does not kill more creatures than it needs for these purposes. And the dubious business of imposing such order rankings on creatures can be bypassed. 34. The qualifications are necessary. If the latter exceptional conditions clause were not adjoined, the prospe ct of finding a condition q would be wiped out by such cases of essential predation as exceptional human cannibalism. The qualifications, although they enhance the prospects of locating such a q, do not appear to make it analytic or near analytic that such a descriptive q can be found. 45 35. Not only are there many proposals for q to sift through - most of which however seem to fail for reasons already indicated in the text - but also there are apparent options to finding such a distinction, such as resetting the problem, in a less individualistic way, in the framework of (ecological) communities. REFERENCES K. Bell, Not in Vain, University of Toronto Press, 1973, REFERENCES CONTINUED P.E, Devine, 'The moral basis of vegetarianism ', Philosophy 53 (1978) · 481-505 . (all references prefixed with 'V' are to this article) , C. Diamond, ' Eating meat and eating people', Philosophy (references hereto are prefixed by 'D'). 53 (1978) 465-77, Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers (edited, with English translation, by R. D. Hicks), Heinemann , London, 1925, A.R . Drengson, ' Shifting paradigms: from the Technocratic to the PersonPlanetary', Environmental Ethics 2 (1980) 221-40, R. E. Ewin, ' What is wrong with killing people? ' Philosophical Quarterly tl..<. (197;t) 126-39. M, Harris, Cows, Pigs, Wars and Witches, Fontana, London , 1977 (hereafter prefixed by 'W.W.'). M, Harris, Cannibals and Kings , Collins , London, 1978 (hereafter prefixed by ' CK '), R. Henson, ' Utilitarianism and the wrongness of killing', Philosophical Review 80 (1971) :1.u,- n7. D. Jamieson,'Utilitarianis m and the value of life', typescript, University of Colorado, 1981. J, Glover, Causing Death and Saving Lives, Penguin, Middlesex, England, 1977 . L.P. Pickering, Review of ' Ethics and Problems of the 21st Century ', Environmental£.£,.~-~ 2 (1980) 373-78 . G. Hogg , Cannibalism and Human Sacrifice, Robert Hale, London, 1958. (references hereto are prefixed by 'H'), R. and V. Routley, 'Against the inevitability of human chauvinism ' in Ethics and Problems of the 21st Century, eds , K, E. Goodpaster and K. M. Sayre, University of Notre Dame Press, 1979, (Hereafter prefixed by ' AHC') . J. Langton, Cannibal Feast, Herbert Joseph, London, 1937. L, Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, Blackwell, Oxford, 1953. A. Naess, 'Self-realisation in a mixed community of humans ·, bears, sheep and wolves', Inquiry 22 (1971) 231-41 , A. Naess, ' The shallow and the deep . long-range ecology movement. Inquiry A s11mmr1ry'~ 16 (1':173) 95-100. P.P, Read, Alive, Avon, New York, 1974. R. and V. Routley, 'An expensive repair kit for utilitarianism', typescript 1976 (hereafter referred to as ' RKU ' ). R. and V, Routley, ' Human chauvinism and environmental ethics' in Environmental Philos~ (ed. D. Mannison, M. McRobbie and R. Routley), RSSS , Australian National University , 1980 (the article is referred to as ' HC' , the book as ' EP ' ), F. Sayre, Diogenes of Sinope , A study of Greek Cynicism, Johns Hopkins University , Baltimore, 1938. P. Singer, 'Killing humans and killing animals', Inquiry 22 (1979) 146- 56, (references hereto are prefixed by ' S '). R. Tannahill, Flesh and Blood. A History of the Cannibal Complex , Hamilton , London, 1975 . Hamish M. Tooley , Abortion and Infanticide, typescript, Australian National University, 1980, R. Young, ' What is so wrong with killing people?' Philosophy 5¥ (1979) (all references prefixed with ' Y' are to this article) , 515-528 R. Routley and N. Griffin, 'Unravelling the meanings of life', available in this series , 1982. ) /.o,..,.,,,, l. ~ / , . ~ tA-- ~ <'"'1 ---- 3/ }o/t/v/~}~4--( ~~ ·~~O·\o ~ --..., \0~'203.l\. <;c..c.tt.,. ~ ~ a.I) . ~~ ~✓:. ,;,,tf ~ .r. ..... ---,(7> o-,.J /' ,,,((; 11 / c, ~ I ( _ ///,;.,/ /c/ (',.,./// 1' ,. ~ L: 1 -=y' 1/ ,/L ~ -=~ t<..,(' •.r<-- <-r-? ,r"'t, 7 ; /4... 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't ,.,. ... ~;: .. t.t..4 r~ c~ /~J I~ ~~ ,H" ._ ~t/ ~l-d_ I (' rt-lrC , I ,,I, /.,_,.. .,.,.____ /4-..- C- ,,,,_ ~ , /4,L._ '-- . ,.__,_ te(A~ / 4 ~ , , fc. ~,;,,d~ t;, ~~7Y24~ h /c r n.., ,W·r ht<I I t!l"--vv-t_. t : - ;{ c.--<- u....., ( , It ~'-? I 1 ,JKc} ~ ~-✓f ;,z.. M~ / tkl-· .:I- / 1 t.~ ,.,e1 ;,-,:. ~ ~"7 f cjrl; ~ I_;.,_ 1 L,,3:-:r;-,1 •-v->-1- • 4, pS,.,(£-.,-. . ftr~ J/4. /red-,~ , _;, ~·~/~<l ' /""= cd/7 ;/ ~<¥<- J,r 7""° 1,/,,:,A -z/1.,/h/7 /,(~ • t:i.C.1 / /d'tr 7 ;:. rJ- ~:,,1 "l j 1 ( ,"'p> '(. f (,~ 0 11/'- 1 t<~ ~ ~ 4-7/J t /2-c. ) 7 /~ ?'~J 1/)):-/. ( / ~r,,.,,__,, ~,:,,..,,...,~ . l)';•.:Z:~-e-M-;I /fa ! ") ;; ,' ~ ~~ L ' A-7~ J~j 1/ ~ ~£" v:_._i eye- ,c. y),6 7 ) \ d,; ~ 1 a,___ r/ d't .ru), Cl»,~ ' ~L The following has been redacted from access file (PDF) due to copyright restrictions. Cutting, Scholfield B (17 August 1988) 'A human role for the pig', The Weekly Times, 14. (1 leaf) - / / / . -7 / <et ? -·- -·-- C:; /~ ~, u / f l ~ Jc,._ '? ~ (,, ?0_/~ c c:i--l 7 ,5'<.. / 17 -~ ,..-tt'!' . : . - - - ---- ·-- - · · - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- ~oc-. r-c- a., r..,_,/- t .)I~ , ) / ~ ?! / . / c..rc.v ~~ //._ J OAJ 77/c /~/?t:J/f??pvc~ c:>~ 77rr" , I /}(,ifth('i/l'J7lt>p)( ;T//VC/73 ,v - cJ,,,C ~E ./,PH/6:-J ,,f/t;I~ I The following have been redacted from access file (PDF) due to copyright restrictions. • • Typescript, with handwritten emendations and annotation. Two reference reports on Cannibalism I. (2 leaves) Cutting (photocopy) of 'Necessity as a common law doctrine? [6.40] R v Dudley and Systems', The system of criminal law: cases and materials, 544-551. (4 leaves) The following have been redacted from access file (PDF) due to copyright restrictions. • • • Cutting (photocopy) of 20 pages from unidentified publication on Pioneers-Donner Party-The Mormons, 526-545. (10 leaves) Letter, Bill to Richard, 7 Oct 1981 re feedback on Richard Sylvan's paper on cannibalism. (2 leaves) Letter, Robert to Richard, 7 Oct 1981 re feedback on Richard Sylvan’s paper on cannibalism. (2 leaves) I I - I :/.,, f. - - - -- ----------------- - - - - - ----- ---- ----- ___________, --------- ----------·------------- - - ----- - - -- - - -- - - - - - - - -- ------ - - - - - - - - --- $ ~ /~ .2Z- - - - --- - _ _L __ /4 r<./ ...---a~ l 2, ck?- _.:., t';_.~ ~ o_ _s_ ,,. .,/:,_ ~ , {- ~ M7-e;:__ /4?-l, _:., /.: ~ / ; ~ / /--/ ,a-~~ ,4d - - ~ c 1 /dLC4'--=·- - C4--~ _,t:?~7 ,-4,-,/4._ / - /2.; ~<"F' §5 . Raising humans and other animals for food. Humans have lit tle compuncti on, for the most part, in rearing other animals for food . Since healthy animals that are raised for food often excell humans, especially humans that are "defective " in one way or another , little , except considera tions of species , seems to stand in the way of raising such humans for food . We are in the region of Swift ' s modest proposal again . What distinguis hes creatures humans (and other creatures capable of animal husbandry) are entitled to raise for food from creatures that they are not? It is not difficult to state some constrain ts on t he solution of this problem, which also rule out usual solutions . First , the distinctio n should be independe nt of reference to particula r species , especially of reference to the human species , and also indirect reference thereto, by way of phrases such as ' standard ... ' , ' normal ... . ' 'potential ... ' . Secondly - and this furnishes the ground of the first requireme nt the basis of the distinctio n should be morally relevant i n the way that mere zoologica l distinctio ns are not: otherwise chauvinism is not avoided . ' The replaceme nt principle Singer adopts for benign farmyard husbandry fails on this score , among others (the others being that many farmyard animals seem to satisfy the requireme nts for being selfconsci ous beings) . Not being selfconsc ious , which is supposed to justify replaceme nt, under ideal farming condition s , lacks requisite moral linkage . Singer ' s move does however emphasi ze ' 31. two important things . First , the familiar objections to animal husbandry, e.g. on grounds of cruelty or deprivation to animals, are remove.e\ by considering only (ideal) free-range individualised farmyard husbandry . Secondly, some distinction (fit to take its place in the annular picture) with requisite moral linkage is what is sought . Any distinction that is going to work will have to involve the capacities of the creatures concerned , in such a way that the capacities tie with moral features . The capacities concerned are, obviously, capacities connected with being aware of being raised for food . But this is not sufficiently general, being raised for killing or for cartage or for skin or fur or feathers would be similar, and similarly bad or whatever; lacks moral connection . and it still What all the cases have in common which is general, one which has (as already noted) moral connections , is being used as a means . The sought distinction is accordingly made in terms of creatures that are capable of being aware of their case primarily as means for other, for their food , etc. U-creatures, say, as opposed to A-creatures . 21 no means all, are A-creatures: infants are not . Many humans, but Why this distinction? 21 There are probably other requir e ments as we ll: e . g. that not in midst of present worthwhile projects; e.g. Mrs. Goose is not raising young, etc. The following have been redacted from access file (PDF) due to copyright restrictions. • • • • • Photocopy of Young R (1979) 'What is so wrong with killing people?', Philosophy, 54(21):515-528, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0031819100063531. (8 leaves) Cutting, Ewin R (1972) 'What is so wrong with killing people?', The Philosophical Quarterly, 22(87): 126-139, https://doi.org/10.2307/2217540. (14 leaves) Typescript (carbon copy) of untitled paper attached to Ewin cutting. (18 leaves) Photocopy of Singer P (1979) 'Killing humans and killing animals', Inquiry, 22:1-4, 145156, https://doi.org/10.1080/00201747908601869. (6 leaves) Photocopy of one page (157) from Lockwood M (1979) 'Singer on killing and the preference for Life', Inquiry, 22:1-4, 157-170, https://doi.org/10.1080/00201747908601870. (1 leaf) t . • ~ /,o.R-,4-.. ~t ~,, ,,_,;L ~ C~"'1 /C'.tt---? ,.... ,._._ ~ e.-;- __ jf1~ ~ rur 6 ""efc7'/ ~ ,,,<e,,,.,;z,r4? ~ c,,__,,,- .1 ------~ ,,-v-9"' ~ "'-<- r = c:e/4 /4--,- ~/~~-~ P.f.?4 ,..,.,,PE' r e ~ 7~~ y?f /2 ~c;k__/"7'/~ 7 ~ / 7~ / /,..,;,, ~ ,?£ / ~J" r-tr= / t:t_ ~7, /9-7 r~ o-/4-~ ,.ve- / _,/~,/ ;:7'/ /re-v -~ (~ ,,{~9 C'l<-,r /4 ~vr,, 1~ /c{. rL r ,' ~ ,~ 7-£ ~ - - ~ ~ . , , ~; / " ' - - /c~V-- ~ ~ -~ ~ L <r7J\ _0 / ~ ~~ 0 - ~ 7L 7 C-£-..,/,4c,.~~ ~~ ~ ~ ~ ~ /.? ~ ~ =,/---6-- ~ . ~(' ~ ~ cv;·n! ' To -J~ > /~&:, -6-,e> ~ ~ ~7f 7~ ~ /~~ ~,,,_7 ,;,_~ 4/ ~/ C ~~ o/· //4- ~ / ~ /~ 7~ ~ ?¼_ 11 ~ M,- '--+-€- /~1) / ~ ,~ --/?~/ 4:- ..,,.,,,, ,,./" &-"'7/<" c, /4 Ye-/ U.:.... ~ ;/ / 7'~L. . ~ ~,, i 7,2 ~ ~ .,/4 /< ; e-.,, ' ~ ;,I'£ .Y CJ/-?!' , ,_, ·/,,.r.,.-........-,. , ,,__ s « ~ ?< 0~ /~L,, ,4_._ / Cb- i,_,.__1 c-.r r~ /2 re:_ ~ h'L 7 '---71J r-"-"- 3-.. d..-. ~~:; d:....-../ ~ ~_/~ The following have been redacted from access file (PDF) due to copyright restrictions. • • • • • • Photocopy of Diamond C (1978). 'Eating meat and eating people', Philosophy, 53(206): 465-479, http://www.jstor.org/stable/3749876. (8 leaves) Photocopy from The Encyclopedia Americana (1978) 'Cannibalism', The Encyclopedia Americana, 2: 543-544. (2 leaves) Photocopy from Britannica Encyclopedia (1969) 'Cannibalism', Britannica Encyclopedia, 4: 785. (1 leaf) Photocopy from Chambers's Encyclopaedia (1966) 'Cannibalism', Chambers's Encyclopaedia, 3: 50. (1 leaf) Photocopy of Naess A (1979) 'Self‐realization in mixed communities of humans, bears, Sheep, and Wolves', Inquiry, 22:1-4, 231-241, https://doi.org/10.1080/00201747908601874. (6 leaves). Photocopy of one page (2273) from unidentified dictionary, Pre-collection to Predecree. (1 leaf) r)I':, t; 1 ·-et I r o-f 6 ?\/ih'i I Jet ~t·.?t'cc If33 •• 11t1;,.,_4,, ;; w ; ~ ) ~,,c._! / //,,,,.---: J:~w ~ J/4 ~"~t New- f'-w1r- > ~:/~4-;-, L 1/75 /I ~-~erY /, • ,I J Lcz ~ ' d cc c e::es ,f c::::e.. ~ .. . -1~ ~~ ;/w,;.,L;:;,',,,._ ,;/ a,~}:z;:__ dL-0~ " 7 1 f,t} 0 ~ ~ A. ~~ - 7'~ - . ' -f ~i,t;i,:___ ~✓~ ~~ . - - /z;j/M?!, ,<4 n/41"? r - / ·~ ·7 - Jo - ~ C:~~ - ~..,;t,J;j,,. - ... c.-C~1/~ - 7"1(~ /'<d~ ..£.... ,;:_~ 74::,,,'~ /k,,. ~~ ~ -4- . ~/17 '_ ~ 1IIE !1i l/lL/7? . ··• .,. Men have always hunted in the fields around They still do, but no • longer their own species. (K. Bell, Not in Vain, University of ~oronto Press, 1973) .,, Petigny and Falaise .  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Box 59, Item 681: Notes and cuttings on predation (for Cannibalism II) Subject The topic of the resource Typescripts and handwritten notes. Includes copies of published works by other authors and letters. Description An account of the resource Published works and letters redacted from access file (PDF) due to copyright restrictions. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/browse?search=Richard+Routley&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bjoiner%5D=and&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=&amp;range=&amp;collection=&amp;type=&amp;user=&amp;tags=&amp;public=&amp;featured=&amp;exhibit=&amp;geolocation-mapped=&amp;geolocation-address=&amp;geolocation-latitude=&amp;geolocation-longitude=&amp;geolocation-radius=10&amp;submit_search=Search+for+items">Richard Routley</a> Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived <span class="MuiTypography-root-125 MuiTypography-body2-126">The University of Queensland's <a data-testid="rek-series" href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/records/search?page=1&amp;pageSize=20&amp;sortBy=score&amp;sortDirection=Desc&amp;searchQueryParams%5Brek_series%5D%5Bvalue%5D=Richard+Sylvan+Papers%2C+UQFL291&amp;searchMode=advanced">Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291</a></span>, Box 59, Item 681 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org">Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy</a> Contributor An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, <a href="https://najtaylor.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Dr. N.A.J. 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Type The nature or genre of the resource Notes and cuttings Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context <a href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:de64185">https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:de64185</a> Box 59: Nuclear Como House Como House > Cupboard > Pile 3 https://www.antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/581b87e4d67a33473f084886196c0964.pdf 9c80f2dae98c9b0e7076149ee0387602 PDF Text Text ON THE ALLEGED INCONSISTENCY AND MORAL INSENSITIVITY OF PACIFISM Pacifism , despite its.revival lit the nonviolent action movement A respectable philooophieg-1 press. another, the within tradition Catholic church , It is commonly portrayed characteristically as as inconsistent. as a continues to have a bad incoherent in one way or Even philosophical defences of pacifism are liable to be extremely defensive, conceding only that consistent, and pacifism is but insisting otherwise that^is as false as a moral position can be 2 and morally insensitive . What follows challenges the prevailing wisdom put out in the philosophical press, but using its approved analytic methods. §1. Slide arguments to inconsistency;and arguments from irresponsibili ty and from rights. In an influential and widely disseminated series of articles attacking . pacficism3 , Narveson says that the pacifist's position is not only that [Tl] violence is evil but also that [T2] it is morally wrong to use force [violence] to resist, punish, or prevent violence. This further step makes pacifism a radical moral doctrine. What I shall try to establish below is that it is in fact, more than merely radical - it is actually incoherent because self-contradictory (p.408, italics added). Subsequently (p.414) he characterises pacifism by way of T2, though it would better characterised by P2. be A It is morally wrong to use violence. However T2 captures the cases that orthodox opposition. The separate comprehensive pacifism from the main form of pacifism under investigation is called 'comprehensive' to distinguish it from standard pacifism, in the usual 1 narrower �sense which is restricted to certain theses concerning (state) order, notably opposition to (violence in) war, and does not rule necessarily out violence elsewhere. Narveson's location of incoherence in pacifism depends on several connected slides, all of which the pacifist should resist - without force. The initial slide is from the theme T2 italicised above to what results by deletion the of crucial phase 'to use force', or as it should be 'to use violence', namely R2. It is morally wrong to resist, punish, or prevent violence - and similarly from special and related cases of T2 to special and related of R2 (e.g. from T2S, It is forbidden to use force to resist violence, to R2S, forbidden It is cases to violence). resist The slide is illegitimate because commitment to T2 does not entail commitment to the rejected proposition R2; for one thing there are many ways of confronting, reducing and controlling violence, worked out by pacifists and others, which do not involve use of violence (or perhaps force). The initial slide is however that assault on pacifism (after clearing Narveson several exploits confusions, explain the popularity of pacifism, out of the way). irresponsibility of pacifism, in This his first main which he takes to argument, from the does not actually lead to contradiction, but it does suggest that there is a serious tension between pacifism and any method maintaining social order, so serious that pacifism is socially irresponsible: ... to hold the pacifist position as a genuine full-blooded moral principle is to hold nobody has a right to fight back when attacked ... It means that we are all mistaken in supposing that we have the right of self-protection ... It appears to mean, for instance, that we have no right to punish criminals, that all our machinery of criminal justice is, in fact, unjust. Robbers, murderers, rapists, and miscellaneous delinquents ought, on 2 of �this [irresponsible] theory, to be let loose (pp.415-6). Since one can protect oneself and avoid and resist aggression back violence), (with pacifism unless a slide is made. (tentatively) by Nor does T1 and theses does without fighting not mean what Narveson claims it means, comprehensive .pacifism, T2 , imply that we as characterised have no right to punish criminals, but simply that such punishment will not apply violent methods. Nor does it imply that all the conventional machinery of criminal justice therefore is unjust, but only that some - perhaps a good deal - of that machinery is. One hardly needs to be a comprehensive pacifist to coherently think the latter. All this provides some confirmation for the key point, which is that far at there is, so least, no inconsistency evident in maintaining that those who hold that violent methods are morally legitimate are mistaken. The next slide is closely connected with, and really generalises upon, initial slide. The stunt is to imbue a range of more neutral terms with the connotation of -------------------------------------violence, or at least of -----------------------force which Narveson proceeds to with violence. Thus from among admissible pacifist methods. of force is taken to by implied in R2. resist cannot excluded be Hence the conflation of T2 and R2; Hence too Narveson’s assumption Hence (p.415). also Narveson’s that against attack' (pp.417-8). use a unwarranted "recharacterisation" of pacifism as the position that 'no one ought ever defended equate such activities as resisting, punishing, preventing, and defending are taken to imply (use of) force or violence, and so to pacifist the to be If the stunt were got away with, it would deprive pacifism of, for instance, the general methods of nonviolent action and defensible position. But resistance, and so render pacifism a much less positions can be defended, as in this paper or on the field, 3 without violence. �Things be can resisted, even things like arrest, without violence (e.g. sliding out of handcuffs and running away). by Force can be applied, as in opening Violence implies force, but not vice versa; and it is violence, not all applications of force, that.comprehensive pacifists are a jam jar, without violence. bound to exclude. The attempt nonviolent castrate to depriving It enjoys some popularity even any case indefensible. and by it of among those of advocating expansion of nonviolent methods, who no doubt want: to distance themselves from older standard pacifism, whose methods they see as confined to mediation, negotiation, and including the granting of concessions . compromise, But nothing in standard, range the is not confined to those who (want to) think pacifism in practices, development pacifism, so the characterisation its limits of pacifism, admissible methods: whether comprehensive or nothing exclude^ uncompromising methods and imposition of sanctions which offer no concessions. ? It is simply that standard pacifism has not yet developed its fuller potential, especially in conflict resolution. Subsequent slides in the elaboration of the argument against just variations qualifier. in those pacifism are given, writing violence-involving in as an internal Thus the measure of a person’s opposition to something in terms of ’the amount of effort he is willing to put forth against it’ is taken - somewhat perversely - to be violence-involving effort or opposition in the pacifist’s ’opposition to violence'. If this slide were pacifist would be caught in an elementary inconsistency since in case of the permissible any being opposed to violence, by definition, he is prepared to use violence and so is not opposed �Even Narveson ’cannot make too much* of this inconsistency, though to violence. it not so far removed from the alleged inconsistencies he does want to make is much of in his main inconsistency argument. A similar slide, together with a further slide, Is made in the argument based inconsistency the on to notion of rights, especially as it figures in the pacifist’s thesis as transformed to the claim that no one has a right to indulge in violence (p.418). Narveson violence in the notion of right. tries to incorporate the right to indulge in The initial move is to work in assumptions of defence from breaches of a right and of preventative action against infringement Because ’a right just is a status of it. preventative action ... does follow logically is that one has a right to whatever may be necessary what to justifying prevent necessary’ infringements of right' his (p.419). That 'whatever may be out to include force, now very generously construed - here is turns the further slide - to incorporate such things as social pressure. Moreover ’it is a logical truth, not merely a contingent one, that what might be necessary is force’ (p.421). of preventative For the presupposed logical transformations to work, the notion action must have the notion of violence built into it. argument accordingly begs the question against pacifism. it enough is for preventative To block the The argument action associated with rights to be, or to be limited to, nonviolent action. How the argument from rights leads to inconsistency is summed up thus (p.421): SAI. ’If we have any rights at all then we have a right to use force to prevent the deprivation of the thing to which we are said to have a right’. �SA2. We have, according to the pacifist ’the right not to have violence done to us’, as have the a consequence of the obligation to avoid violence. right self-contradictory, to use both violence, granting so the pacifist’s position Narveson is that 'our standard concept of rights' yields SAI (cf. right can be sustained by right-supporting or right-defending require that that action is violent. is and not granting the right to use violence. The argument fails because SAI is readily rejected. claiming But, therefore, we mistaken p.423). action in That a does not Pacifists can provide an adequate analysis of rights - essentially the usual one - without letting themselves in for SAI by 6 simply rejecting the Narveson slide . What appears in place of SAI is something like SAI#. If we have any rights at all then we have a right to uphold them. But the right to uphold them, defend them, protect them, etc., give facto, an entitlement to the use of violence. no dilemma for the pacifist. does not, ipso Without the slide there is The "pacifist's dilemma" and Narveson’s slide are two aspects of the one thing. The arguments from lesser §2. argument violence and evil. lesser In outline the - which is independent of the notion of rights - is that the pacifists must admit, in terms of their own principles, that there are cases where the use of violence those where Inconsistency would be morally permissible and morally justified. some is use of immediate violence by T2. would prevent evil, some greater violence. More explicitly, and in Narveson’s terms which also import the notion of evil, pacifists have lesser much The cases are to admit both that the use of evil, is admissible, in preventing greater evil, and that it is not admissible, because it involves violence. 6 Narveson summarizes an �argument like this as follows It seems to me logically true, in any moral theory whatever, that [LI] the lesser evil must be preferred to the greater. If the use of force by me, now, is necessary to avoid the use of more physical force (by others, perhaps) later, then to say that physical force is the supreme (kind of) evil is precisely to say that under these circumstances I am committed to the use of physical force'7. Now there are several somewhat different arguments snarled up in these sketches, p It is important to get them unsnagged , especially if a clearer view of the ethical role pacifism can assume is to result. lesser The basic argument, from violence, goes as follows Cl. There are cases where use of violence would prevent greater violence. C2. One ought to minimize violence. Therefore C3. There are cases where one ought to use violence, since in this way, in any arbitrary one of the cases indicated, violence is minimized. Therefore ~P2. It is not (always) morally wrong to use violence, contradicting the pacifist principle, P2, according which to it is morally wrong, always, to resort to violence. All the ingredients premisses, can be of argument, this together with pulled together from Narveson’s work. support for He not only expouses C2, but suggests two distinct arguments for it, the first of which connects argument with the lesser evil argument El. (Use of) violence is an evil. E2. Evil should be minimized. 9 The second argument to C2 is simply from the pacifist premiss, varying P2, 7 the the �E3. One ought not to undertake violence - period; that the is, level of violence ought to be zero. Neither argument is decisive; of that reference both in fact begin easing.pacifists into a should they resist, where moral absolutes are warped into moral relatives, where obligations give, way to obligations all, and says nothing about minimizing it when one compatible being does it. into got has E3 is directives quite different from minimization where violence is with involved, e.g. E3 things other In any event E3 only directs one not to get involved in violence at equal, etc. Thus frame rooting it out which may involve strategies. non-minimization not entail E2, and commitment to E3 does not commit pacifists to C2. Nor do El and E2 entail C2; so neither does commitment, by to El and E2 oblige them to accept C2. instance, 10 , e.g. evil-perpetrating but argument Narveson's well-known Such nonviolent fails for similar some as cases hypothetical dictators. for For in particular violence is not the only evil and (so) evil may sometimes be reduced by violence pacifists Regan’s increases in slaying of the reconstruction of Regan argues from premisses reasons. concerning the ranking of evil and a premiss like E2, specifically 3. 4. The use of force is a substantive evil. Therefore, a lesser quuantity of force must great quantity of force (Rp.79). The argument is invalid: ordering of an ordering of evils force, even though force is an evil. increasing force may still reduce evil, and so, on be preferrable \ 8 does be preferred not induce to a a similar It is enough to observe that Regan-Narveson assumptions, �Resort to the theme that Elt, Violence is an irredeemable evil in (proposed by Regan by investigated his Narveson, Np.118) irredeemable evil is figuratively (lesser or evils) whites pacifism, of "defence" promises so black Rp.80, and subsequently a way around the difficulty. that no combination (goods) will lighten its hue; with An grays it always dominates. Elt together with E2 will yield C2, but now the problem with Che argument shifts to What are the grounds for that? Elt. not widely acceptable, most people being amount of As Narveson points out (Np.119), it is prepared to countenance violence in exchange for considerable goods. some (But then, not so long ago, most people were tolerant of cruelty to animals so long as it was gross.) small /not too Moreover, so Narveson implies, appeal to Elt does not get. pacifists out of the argument from lesser violence; underwriting C2. indeed it seems to get them in deeper, by for it removes Cl and, more importantly, It does not however; the corresponding premiss of the more difficult argument from lesser evil, which starts from DI. There are cases where the use of violence would avoid greater evil. For given, by Elt, that use of greater evil than that cases such as DI requires. Rp.80ff.), which however violence is irredeemably with violence; tainted evil, there is no and there are accordingly no This is the core of Regan's defence in pacifism (see he sees as converting pacifism into a 'bizarre and vaguely ludicrous’ position (Rp.86), extreme pacifism, some of the 12 which he outlines 9 features of �The approach through violence as an irredeemable evil is mistaken a (utilitarian inspired) attempt to get at moral absolutes, which is what pacifism is, like other deontological positions, grounded upon. But such absolutes expressed in such commandments as, One ought not to commit violence, adequately meaning thereby, as it says, ought not, not just for the time being, or so as reasons prima are facie, otherwise don’t arise, or other things being equal, or acting for ought but long come not what may, period. old-fashioned Such deontological, moral absolutist positions such as pacifism is at bottom, collide head-on with utilitarianism both that pacifism'. For the moral ’utilitarianism 'that utility will be ... who is incompatible brought out by doing some violence may be greater than that produced by any alternative' he like positions and Regan (at the time) were working from. Narveson The reason for collision is simply that with malleable highly fashionable, more (Np.121) 13 . So acccording to the utilitarian-commandment to maximize utility may acts sometimes commit violence, contravening pacifist principles. On its own inconsistency with a false doctrine such as utilitarianism shows little: position every suffers inconsistency with very many false doctrines. Narveson does have another (small) argument to the effect that pacifism is at odds with contractarianism. correct, if other the the ethical positions he presents, libertarianism and But this argument would only carry weight, were it. positions were suitably exhaustive; including no deeper ecological position for instance. is more also otherwise however they are not, What has happened which insidious, however, is that utilitarian thinking has permeated much of the rest of ethical thought, thus helping to establish a climate unfavourable to incompatible ethical positions such as pacifism. 10 There are two more specific �features. damaging consequentalist Firstly, as more approaches have we of consequentialist Secondly, facie prima principles positions out utilitarianism, of This is entirely mistaken. The is a theory-saving device, designed to get difficulties such dilemmas. moral as consequentialist positions tend to suggest that only consequentialist reasons carry argumentative weight, and so try to ease rival positions, such pacifism, and generally, have made it seem as if no deontic principle were firm, but all are provisional. theory seen, into as sometimes incongruous consequential support for their offering themes. Narveson takes such procedures a assumptions upon violence is that it These (p.425). thus pacifists: produces stage further, and foists utilitarian says that the pacifist's 'objection to he suffering, unwanted pain, in the recipients' incongrous utilitarian grounds are something of a travesty of pacifists' reasons for objecting to violence, which concern rather the action involved and what it does, not astonishing such of only or always at all in the way of suffering, to the perpetrators as well as those in whom it is more type inflicted. Even utilitarian-style considerations are supposed to commit the pacifist to the follow three statements, one of which however he must deny (!): [N]l. To will the end (as mostly good) is to will the means to it (at least pjotTce prima facie). [N]2. Other things being equal, the lesser evil is to be preferred to the greater. [N]3. There are no "privileged" moral persons ... (p.425^ ' . 'These three principles' which appear in Narveson's 'sum up [of] the problem', 11 pacifist's �among them imply, as far as I can see, both the commitment to force when it is necessary to prevent more violence and also the conception of a right as an entitlement to defense. And they therefore leave pacifism, as a moral doctrine, in a logically untenable position (p.425). consequences out of the substantive terms such as implicans; otherwise but logic, It would take not merely statements ’violence’ the deal good a of magic, coax to given. For implications to hold the , /''I <</<<-</ ,■/" < F^ and ’right’ must also figure , in the just fail implications on formal grounds. intended argument to the "commitment to force” conclusion appears however to some for e.g. The be of variant, on the lesser violence argument, with N2 replacing, as it sort may C2. such (N3 and N1 then have oblique roles, N3 to stop exceptions being made oneself, N1 to ensure that violence adopted as a means has its full import, in as reflected in Cl, construction work the ethical an end). But, without need not worry pacifists; arguments much further they hardly leave pacifism as untenable. Much more threatening is the argument from lesser evil, which has yet to be This countered. is argument from DI (cases of violence to avoid greater the evil) and N2 or E2 (minimization of evil) to C3 (admissibility of violence) inconsistency in comprehensive stock examples concern murder, What are these cases^? pacifism. one of them being the Narveson’s situation where (Narveson in fact) must kill the (potential) mass-murderer B (Np.119). is the moral situation here? Narveson ought to prevent but mass-murder, that of a paradigmatic moral In fact the example is dilemma, that of very similar also The to Pedro and Jim, where Pedro volunteers to call off his firing squad about to shoot several captives 12 one But what Narveson ought not to kill B, because that is murder and involves violence. situation is that of a moral dilemma. and if Jim �one shoots Now almost everything turns on what account is given of What a comprehensive pacifist does moral dilemmas. trouble, coherence . of them is to take do, not inadequate utilitarian line of trying to the explain moral dilemmas away, as if they didn’t ever, occur an than initial intuitive negotiable, etc., etc. is as level), wants he unless if (at at least other all obligations were prime facie, The conflicting obligations stand. What is to done be however a very consequentialist thing, to try to determine the best thing to do in the circumstances. action In trying to determine what circumstances is a satisfied. violent sense this the best e.g. Narveson had better a fix. Narveson dilemma, but no B. shoot (not a deontic one) evil should be minimized; not ought circumstances, he had better do so moral of 17 . to the in course Granted, it is preferable to minimize follow that Narveson ought to resort to violence. remains course best that Suppose one, inconsistency in pacifism follows. in the principles like N2 and its mate, N2M, that it is preferrable to minimize evil, will presumably be and is evil, it does not On the contrary the situation shoot B, but in the appalling There is the real-life complication of inconsistency No a through arguments like that from lesser evil. Narveson’s jackpot question, entangled in his discussion from rights, can now be met. of the argument The question presents a dilemma: If force is the only way to prevent violence in a given case, use justified in that case? (p.420) is its Narveson is thinking of cases where one is about to be murdered, Regan where one is to be raped. qualified No: Given that force again entails violence, the pacifist answer is No, it is not deontically 13 justified 18 . It is certainly not �morally it is not justified in the sense of ’justified* which and obligatory, reflects its deontic origin in ’making right*. may and because just some might force in solution, a making to amount dilemma be out But justification is The response is qualified then a case. consequentially situation. ambiguous, as justified, a second-best Narveson, proposes on the contrary, that enough violence for the given occasion is morally justified - it can go at least as as killing another person - but he presents no back-up argument, taking far his proposal as evident. jackpot the question As it is not - the pacifist can simply does not dispute it to a decisive a^rument against pacifism lead (though Narveson gives the impression that it does, e.g. , p.423). What it can lead to is the argument from lesser evil over again. The charge of moral insensitivity. §3. This is less argument an than a damaging charge: A person committed to an extreme pacifism, though he need make no logical mistake, yet lacks a fully developed moral sensitivity to the vagaries and complexities of human existence (Rp.86). The smear is not without basis. is applied avert to greater Regan is envisaging situations evil; where violence and he points to what he takes to be the evident moral permissibility of a woman's using ’what physical power she has free herself from an Interestingly, Regan has not aspiring rapist* (Rp.86). described the situation in a way which is incompatible with there is violence, which implies What is at issue the intentional, non-negligible damage, including pain, injury or (cf. a pacifist stand: nothing in that to prevent a woman wriggling free (even in a way that involves some force) and fleeing. using to is (or death, the permissibility of infliction of wilful) by forceful means / Np.110), that is, which involves much more than mere use of physical force �And it is by no means so or power. violence inflict upon evident A rapist. aspiring the the that woman is entitled to can hardly now be pacifist accused, in a way that can be made to stick, of crass moral insensitivity. More generally, arguments pacifism, the on like Regan’s the to insensitivity moral of basis of pacifists' not taking obvious steps to prevent evil I occurrences, depend upon a confusion of passivity and pacifity. Narveson p.425) (e.g. Both Regan and assume that pacifism is a passive do-nothing position. 20 This is far from true, as the variety of nonviolent action methods groups has made plain. comprehend the real possibilities of considered or adopted by Neither Regan nor Narveson correctly nonviolent action. Otherwise, Narveson would hardly be able to assert, in the automatic (but carping) way he does, that the pacifist is Narveson's standing negative later 'not by doing assessment does not change the situation: anything about’ violence (p.425). of what he calls 'poslLlve nonviolence' for this positive approach is simply nonviolence practised in an exemplary way, as by Christ, in the hope that others will follow suit, and fails to recognise the potential of nonviolent training and the and effectiveness when assembled 21 , of nonviolent practices. much reduce the impact scope Fuller details of these practices, of the argument from social irresponsiblity, which is part of what lies behind the change of insensitivity. Pacifism, however, like most positions, has them 22 its weaknesses, one of undoubtedly derives from the fact that violence is a quantitative matter and there is no sharp cut-off point at the bottom end of the amounts and of violence greater than zero. Yet scale with minute (non-foot-in-the-door ) amounts do not seem to matter all that much morally, at least compared with 15 small the �that evils gross us confront on most sides when we look. Morally sensitive pacifists will not focus or fixate on small quantities of violence to the of exclusion larger moral They problems. give certainly will understood that by ’violence' in principles such as. P2 mean they it undue to be 'non-trivial violence'. §4. and The argument from radical political corollaries The corollaries. out war by definition. so clear. Although War situations? normally would Standard war always would be what excluded, be morally counted brought progressively then second dilemma the impermissible, best but in thing to closer to Comprehensive pacifism can of course extreme principles emphasizing the evil of violence. weighing of Comprehensive pacifism thus does not include standard A strange pacifism! pacifism, in contrast to extreme pacifism. be pacifism But the position of comprehensive pacifism is not exceptional extenuating circumstances it might be the (second-) do. awkward of extreme pacifism would certainly eliminate war. practice For war involves violence, typically on an extensive scale. takes other from best choices will pacifism, in practice, through If evil is given a suitably yield the large same results as extreme A pacifism does (deontically), and entirely exclude war. Now it can hardly be cogently argued that it tells against pacifism that it would eliminate wars, since wars are exchanges that should certainly be avoided at all reasonable costs; nor therefore can an argument Wz/Acuf desirability fHur/l of war as an institution against pacifism,! mounted from the or Cldc. However wars are by no be means the only social arrangements or institutions which dispense^ or rely u violence extensively. The state and many of its institutions, most obviously �police inadmissibility of characteriscally are contraposition do. also forces, coercive 23 institutions and hence ; pacifism Comprehensive it as such implies police anarchism provides no refutation of pacifism.. the implies 24 moral forces and states But once again For anarchism itself is (to 25 stick with a bold claim) irrefutable Pacifism as an ideal brought not is .down by its political corollaries. Pacifism yields not only a qualified anarchism but qualified vegetarianism. While does it not eating of meat, it does morally forbid violence to forbid animals. At least it does this so long as what normally counts as violence, animals, continues to rank as valence, and is not removed from the category by restriction of the application of violence to humans little good for however basis corollaries naturally spread suicide, capt^al euthenasia, (or such a chauvinistic restriction. several into punishment, controversial indeed There persons). is The radical moral, wherever to e.g. areas, violence plays a significant role in many cases'1. The sheer moral power of pacifism is one reason /7j Qc4> for giving it some pause. And there are others. / One is that, like vegetarianism, it runs counter to "natural" behaviour of creatures to which the principles are supposed to apply. Aggression is a fairly S' X common feature of animal and human behavioZur, and it sometimes (though by no means so often is as made out) involves violence. /Ze /cVXC o/1 //>£ Ao'jje.tjw enable ct/ony Ac /Aggression is assumed to be an evolutionary adaption /ZeSG- creatures offspring) in their artificial h to be better natural environments fitted environment. substantially 17 developed to for survival (of themselves and their most humans removed from now live situations in for rather which �there is no way they are evolution gradually adapted their features: adapt in time to absorb massive doses of radiation for instance. have substantially living their adjusted adjust environment, along so with ^oing to Much as humans should they it their social practices - including aggressive and violent practices, now ill-adapted to their situation and mostly counter productive. There is a residual problem, practices of living creatures like in that confronting natural (relatively) vegetarianism. conditions, such as predators and tribal people, to be condemned as morally wrong when they Sometimes, violence? involve when the violence grossly exceeds what is required yes, Though a way can be beaten around the given the end to be attained; but always? edge of this problem Are 26 it is an unsatisfactory way. What this suggests is that <u t be^t nonviolence is not an absolute but^an ideal. The arguments for nonviolence which are mostly violence and do not strictly suggest a to apply since it in creatures natural surroundings opens door the a approaches would categorically exclude. chink to other options The further suggestion that emerges is that moral thinking and associated principles in this area are pretty primitive aimed, among principles state; other than P2. and what - But the suggestion is a dangerous one, sort of conclusion. similar practically at least, nonviolent arguments which do not exclude occasional uses of practical is things, at sharper, This is to in a called for is much more investigation more concede an sensitive, attentuated and less charge insensitivity against comprehensive pacifism so long as P2 remains blanket of moral unqualified. There is no reason however why a genuine pacifism (making for real peace) should not be built on a modified version of P2 which permits such natural phenomena as predation. Nothing logically rules 18 out such a genuine and more sensitive �pacifism 27 There are other requiriments the position to be worked out should meet. in should, particular, be integrated into a Larger framework of nondestructive practices, which are involve violence, e.g. a of a practices metaphorically, damaging wild nonviolent* practices. are practices But, except destructive to the environment, for instance, do not such river, with piece things dumping vandalism. wastes toxic But mining strip as extended sense, which gets beyond the confines these It of in a valley, fertile in streams and oceans. the property In an picture, all even metaphorically, vandalism does not such cover violence against persons (and certainly not nonphysical violence as I "psychological violence"). What is sought /is an appropriate synthesis of these notions covering destructive practices - and better than 'vandolence'. an Then P2 is superseded accompanying synthetic term, 4/Z2°. It is morally wrong to use vandolence./ It remains to characterise the cluster of destructive practices (/V that count as vandolence and to try to justify the principle - no easy tasks. FOOTNOTES 1. ’a valid Christian According to the US Catholic Bishops, pacifism is to Christ and the early long tradition going back position’, with a lifestyle: see Origins Christians who were committed to a nonviolent pp.310-311. 2. Thus, in particular, T. Regan ’A defence of pacifism', Canadian Journal of Philosophy 11 (1972) 73-86. Page references to this article are prefixed by _ 3. J. Narveson 'Pacifism: a philosophical analysis’, Ethics 75 (1968) and ’Is pacifism consistent’, Ethics 78 (1868). The first article is reprinted in War and Morality (ed. R. Wasserstrom) Wadsworth, Belmont, California, T97O7 pp.63-77. The first article is also rewritten and combined with part of the second in 'Pacifism: a philosophical analysis’, Moral Problems (ed. 19 77ju / /A ZAC A IZ(M2 �J. Rachels), Third Edition, Harper .Row, New York, 1979, pp.408-425. Page references without further citation are to this latter article. Narveson's theme that pacifism is incoherent is headlined and further elaborated in his ’Violence and war’, Matters of Life and Death (ed. T. Regan), Temple University Press, Philadelphia, 1980, pp.109-147. Page references prefixed by 'N' are to this article. 4. Pacifism, as involving the active use of defensive methods, can be traced back as far as the Mohist philosophers of ancient China. On modern methods see especially G. Sharp, Exploring Nonviolent Alternatives, Boston, 1971. As will emerge, it is important to distinguish fas Narveson does not in his earlier work) force from violence; they not equivalent. /\ 5. Thus, e.g., G. Sharp in several works: see for instance the unduly narrow definition of pacifism given in Social Power and Political Freedom, Porter Sargent Publishers, Boston, 1980, p.198. 6. Narveson, in responding to a suggestion of Armour (pp.423-4) sees nothing between (0) defence of rights, with the slide to violence in, and (1) nothing really answering to rights at all, where words like 'rights’ occur without stuffing. This shows a serious blindspot. What lies in between are a range of notions which do not guarantee the slide to violence. An account of rights which will serve is that given in R. and V. Routley ’Human chauvinism and environment ethics' in Environmental Philosophy (ed. D. Mannison and others) Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University, 1980; see especially p. Narveson 'Is pacifism inconsistent' Ethics 78 (1968) p.148. 7. J. 8. Without getting into the level of complication, not to say epicycling, that Regan lands himself in: he is obliged to distinguish three mirage-like senses of 'lesser evil': quantitative, qualitative, and resultant (Rp.78). 9. See Np.127 where it is asserted that violence as a source of evil should be minimized, and Np.119> where the point is put in terms of absolute evil. That way of putting it already starts to give the game away, since Narveson is all too evidently interested in negotiable evil which can be traded off against other evils. 10. An argument like the argument from lesser violence itself would appear to undercut the argument for El and E2 to premiss 02 for the argument for lesser violence. 11. That is by no means the onlyelement in Regan's torturous reformulation of Narveson's argument that can be faulted. Consider, for example, premiss '5. If any given action, A, is necessary to bring about a lesser rather than a greater quantity of qualitatively equivalent evil, then one's obligation is to do A.' While the premiss has considerable appeal as a principle of supererogation, there is little reason to accept it as one supplying obligations. 20 �12. Extreme pacifism can be seen as taking the rule that one ought never to use violence as having priority over all other moral rules - which Is indeed an extreme position even if a consistent one. Such a priority rule is an unsatisfactory way to deal with moral dilemmas. 13. To show what Narveson goes on to claim that people are sometimes justified in using force rather more is required, as Regan points out, Rp 85, n.18. It has also to be shown that there are cases of these types (as in Cl) and that agents can know that use of force will increase utility, reduce evil, etc. A pacifist, rightly sceptical of utilitarian tracing of consequences, and fond of noting that violence begets violence, could, with a small dose of scepticism also, dig in at this point and claim that because no one can be sure that use of force will reduce evil, so no one is justified in using force. This is sceptically-based pacifism. 14. Narveson also wants to contend that ’all of these may be defended on purely logical or "meta-ethical" grounds’. This is likely false, especially the claim as to logical status, since some of the principles are rejected in substantive ethical theories. 15. A surprising feature of Narveson’s argument, also Regan’s "reconstruction", is that these cases are nowhere in sight, as if again one got to conclusions logically out of the air, without any of the hard work the cases involve. 16. The example was first discussed in B. 17. This terminology matches the account of moral dilemma, given in much more technical detail in R. Routley and V. Plumwood ’Moral dilemmas and the logic of deontic notions’ in Paraconsistent Logic (ed. G. Priest and others) 1983, to appear. 18. An extreme pacifist would answer with an unqualified No. 19. Directed against other creatures and more generally against ecological systems such as ecosystems which can be hurt. There is a difference here between live(go al-direct ed")~systerns and property, and comprehensive pacifism does not necessarily exclude wilful damage to property. Thus eco-pacifists may destroy, or at least disable, bulldozers but not harm those who use bulldozers to destroy habitat. However sensitive eco-pacifists will not condone "violent" destruction of property either: disab^ling of equipment is different. 20. The methods also include anticipatory action, e.g., the policemen going off to enact violence find their vehicles won’t start, e.g. because components have been removed 21 the peace movement should be preparing for B. Martin ’How See e.g of Peace Proposals 13 (1982) 149-159, and references Bulletin war ’ nuclear cited therein pp.152-3. Williams, //.( Zc (V, /, ( 1 J n l »' /? o C-, / / /' /\ <. ? / < / / i ’'i *7 z* //4 ’Conflict: of values’. �22. Another comes from the necessary circumscription of permissible nonviolent action, to ensure that it does not include actions worse than nontrivial violent action. 23. These organisations may be ruled out directly as violence-dispensing or else because they have individuals, delegates, who effect violence on their behalf. 24. In the sufficiently comprehensive form that the coercive state is without moral basis or legitimacy. Of course the "state" may have nonviolent methods available to it; it may not be a purely voluntary arrangement. 25. See R. Routley and V. Alternatives, (1982). 26. As Singer has in the analogous case of vegetarianism. 27. The position has been called 'pacificism*. Plumwood 'The irrefutability of 22 anarchism’, Social �On the alleged impracticality of pacifism in the real world. Appendix §5. Even if it is conceded that pacifism is a viable moral ideal, that it does not fall down as incoherent or ludicrous, still the feasibility of pacifism as a sensible practice to live by will bo contested - despite, or perhaps because of, major examples such as Christ and Gandhi. And it has to be admitted that the real world, with all its horror and squalor, does put pacifism to severe tests. Nowhere is the practice of nonviolence than in replacing war \ succeed usually been given a dress rehearsal. defence of a region can vary convention observed is or less likely to Yet nonviolent defence methods, to replace the 2 detail , usual violent methods, have been described in some never thought though they have The prospects for success of nonviolent significantly, depending upon whether the war If the convention Is observed then pacifism not. stands reasonable prospects of success. The difficult cases are where the war convention unleashed, perhaps broken, is in massive ways, on noncombatants. his superficially sympathetic sketch and assessment of resistance, 'success ... may all sorts of this: According to Walzer, in nonviolent defence and This is presumably false. that The invaders may give up and depart reasons, some of them irrelevant, e.g., they needed a quick decisive victory, they got homesick. like is attained - there is never any guarantee of it, without or with be war - even if some conventions are flouted. for violence is possible only if the invaders are committed to the 3 war convention - and they won’t always be’ (Wp.331~). Success and sufficiently What Walzer no doubt ruthless invaders sufficient time and sufficient support lines, etc. 23 means is something in sufficient numbers with can eventually succeed. But �sort of thing is also true even if the defending side resorts to violence. that The difference lies in the pattern of events; is more difficult and costly for if the defence is invaders the to well-armed it with and easier start afterwards than with well-prepared civil resistance-. Walzer is thinking, however, like many who jump to the that conclusion nonviolent defence cannot succeed when the war convention is abandoned, in terms of inappropriate examples. command, total in the He is thinking of an extreme totalitarian state, way the Nazis were in Germany, the Jews of Germany The providing the model of the enslaved population, the ’‘resistance". is highly misleading. picture The Nazis, who never invaded Germany, were in control of all the infrastructure and had the cooperation (at least) of the bulk of the For Walzer‘s comparison to work, there would have to be an enormous population. occupying army which took over and managed all key infrastructure. island With such as Australia it is not even so clear that this is logistically territories feasible against a largely united and actively resisting of impression in the acquiscence (e.g. resistance Walzer's population. fragmenting and the populace moving into dulled Wp.332) might have got things the wrong way around, the test with 4 disbelieving and frustrated soldiers ready to leave . Nonviolent resistance is however unlikely to be put adequate way in present state-determined prepared to risk training its populace (civil defence the police: is different). in to any No state would be circumstances. full in action nonviolent techniques It would then be. all to easy for them to "rout" civil obedience, for example, could no longer customary violent means. 24 be ensured by the �FOOTNOTES The replacement of the state is considered op.cit. For example, in Sharp, op.cit. given there. See also in Routley Martin, All page references prefixed by ’W’ are to M. Allen Lane, London, 1977. and op.cit., Plumwood, and 82, references Walzer, Just and Unjust: Wars, The argument suggested in Walzer (e.g. p.333) that nonviolent methods would increase evil, or at least its distribution, is weak. It is countered by Sharp’s observation that the suffering likely to be induced is less than in comparable wars. �§6. On the positive case for pacifism. defensive, meeting itself is revealing. deviations enough: a The argument thus far has been largely That in of objections to comprehensive pacifism. range Pacifism is the rest position from it are what require explanation. and state) (inertial -The reason for this is simple violence is, on most ethical systems, at least a prima facie evil, so use of it has to be justified. Positive arguments for pacifdism position and merely try supposed to be justified. violent opponent: to can advantage take of privileged dispose of "exceptional cases" where violence is The favourite exception is self-defence against a the case is curious in that the defender (person or nation) is already in a morally-excluded situation, since the attacker moral bounds. its has overstepped Still the defender is not normally committed to violence whatever he does - as in a dilemma situation. And since it is at least facie prima wrong, and he does not have to use it, he should not resort to it. An elementary syllogistic argument, given by Narveson (Np.117), can be adapted to give a similar result:Violence is (intrinsically) wrong Violence in any excepted cases (e.g. self-defence) is still violence Violence in any excepted cases is still (intrinsically) wrong. Naturally those opposed to pacifism will challenge the first premiss, and a dialectic already glimpsed will begin. None of the arguments are arguments for pacifism are conclusive, since even where deductively tight assumptions can be challenged (as above). are all the arguments for pacificism particularly good ones. 26 One of the Nor poorer �positive arguments for pacifism, for example, makes similar assumptions to those of the classic theory of war, namely that once war is embarked upon it cannot be limited, the e.g. that hope or nuclear selectively and restrictively is an illusion, (moral) limits in Although the chances overstated. war - of whatever they eXcalation are exchanges Limited escalation are be used inevitable. The weapons chemical is will - are bound to be overstepped. often real enough, and confrontation are possible. more social arrangements and much more conventional than the the case is Wars are much theory classical Wars can, for example, be started and stopped in midstream should more allows. important things intervene (e.g. pollution a crisis affecting other neighbouring states). The main reasons for pacifism are, inevitably, those for nonviolence. They include (as support for the first premiss above) a range of consequentialist and practical reasons, e.g. suffering of modern industrial societies, the broader popular avoidance and anguish of support base obtained None of these well-known types are separately decisive, but their cumulative effect is considerable. ' Cz/ // Z'1 1 Is Ct' i L> ) s' *4 / / 27 — > A by of violence, the desirable social consequences of nonviolence such as a more open, less furtive, society. ) violent futility and counterproductiveness of violence within the setting the methods, the cost in pain, ? . z.. z . of reason � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Draft Papers Description An account of the resource Sylvan's literary executor encountered an archive in which “all his projects were current", since manuscripts were undated and unattributed. Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document ON THE ALLEGED INCONSISTENCY AND MORAL INSENSITIVITY OF PACIFISM Pacifism , despite its.revival lit the nonviolent action movement A respectable philooophieg-1 press. another, the within tradition Catholic church , It is commonly portrayed characteristically as as inconsistent. as a continues to have a bad incoherent in one way or Even philosophical defences of pacifism are liable to be extremely defensive, conceding only that consistent, and pacifism is but insisting otherwise that^is as false as a moral position can be 2 and morally insensitive . What follows challenges the prevailing wisdom put out in the philosophical press, but using its approved analytic methods. §1. Slide arguments to inconsistency;and arguments from irresponsibili ty and from rights. In an influential and widely disseminated series of articles attacking . pacficism3 , Narveson says that the pacifist's position is not only that [Tl] violence is evil but also that [T2] it is morally wrong to use force [violence] to resist, punish, or prevent violence. This further step makes pacifism a radical moral doctrine. What I shall try to establish below is that it is in fact, more than merely radical - it is actually incoherent because self-contradictory (p.408, italics added). Subsequently (p.414) he characterises pacifism by way of T2, though it would better characterised by P2. be A It is morally wrong to use violence. However T2 captures the cases that orthodox opposition. The separate comprehensive pacifism from the main form of pacifism under investigation is called 'comprehensive' to distinguish it from standard pacifism, in the usual 1 narrower sense which is restricted to certain theses concerning (state) order, notably opposition to (violence in) war, and does not rule necessarily out violence elsewhere. Narveson's location of incoherence in pacifism depends on several connected slides, all of which the pacifist should resist - without force. The initial slide is from the theme T2 italicised above to what results by deletion the of crucial phase 'to use force', or as it should be 'to use violence', namely R2. It is morally wrong to resist, punish, or prevent violence - and similarly from special and related cases of T2 to special and related of R2 (e.g. from T2S, It is forbidden to use force to resist violence, to R2S, forbidden It is cases to violence). resist The slide is illegitimate because commitment to T2 does not entail commitment to the rejected proposition R2; for one thing there are many ways of confronting, reducing and controlling violence, worked out by pacifists and others, which do not involve use of violence (or perhaps force). The initial slide is however that assault on pacifism (after clearing Narveson several exploits confusions, explain the popularity of pacifism, out of the way). irresponsibility of pacifism, in This his first main which he takes to argument, from the does not actually lead to contradiction, but it does suggest that there is a serious tension between pacifism and any method maintaining social order, so serious that pacifism is socially irresponsible: ... to hold the pacifist position as a genuine full-blooded moral principle is to hold nobody has a right to fight back when attacked ... It means that we are all mistaken in supposing that we have the right of self-protection ... It appears to mean, for instance, that we have no right to punish criminals, that all our machinery of criminal justice is, in fact, unjust. Robbers, murderers, rapists, and miscellaneous delinquents ought, on 2 of this [irresponsible] theory, to be let loose (pp.415-6). Since one can protect oneself and avoid and resist aggression back violence), (with pacifism unless a slide is made. (tentatively) by Nor does T1 and theses does without fighting not mean what Narveson claims it means, comprehensive .pacifism, T2 , imply that we as characterised have no right to punish criminals, but simply that such punishment will not apply violent methods. Nor does it imply that all the conventional machinery of criminal justice therefore is unjust, but only that some - perhaps a good deal - of that machinery is. One hardly needs to be a comprehensive pacifist to coherently think the latter. All this provides some confirmation for the key point, which is that far at there is, so least, no inconsistency evident in maintaining that those who hold that violent methods are morally legitimate are mistaken. The next slide is closely connected with, and really generalises upon, initial slide. The stunt is to imbue a range of more neutral terms with the connotation of -------------------------------------violence, or at least of -----------------------force which Narveson proceeds to with violence. Thus from among admissible pacifist methods. of force is taken to by implied in R2. resist cannot excluded be Hence the conflation of T2 and R2; Hence too Narveson’s assumption Hence (p.415). also Narveson’s that against attack' (pp.417-8). use a unwarranted "recharacterisation" of pacifism as the position that 'no one ought ever defended equate such activities as resisting, punishing, preventing, and defending are taken to imply (use of) force or violence, and so to pacifist the to be If the stunt were got away with, it would deprive pacifism of, for instance, the general methods of nonviolent action and defensible position. But resistance, and so render pacifism a much less positions can be defended, as in this paper or on the field, 3 without violence. Things be can resisted, even things like arrest, without violence (e.g. sliding out of handcuffs and running away). by Force can be applied, as in opening Violence implies force, but not vice versa; and it is violence, not all applications of force, that.comprehensive pacifists are a jam jar, without violence. bound to exclude. The attempt nonviolent castrate to depriving It enjoys some popularity even any case indefensible. and by it of among those of advocating expansion of nonviolent methods, who no doubt want: to distance themselves from older standard pacifism, whose methods they see as confined to mediation, negotiation, and including the granting of concessions . compromise, But nothing in standard, range the is not confined to those who (want to) think pacifism in practices, development pacifism, so the characterisation its limits of pacifism, admissible methods: whether comprehensive or nothing exclude^ uncompromising methods and imposition of sanctions which offer no concessions. ? It is simply that standard pacifism has not yet developed its fuller potential, especially in conflict resolution. Subsequent slides in the elaboration of the argument against just variations qualifier. in those pacifism are given, writing violence-involving in as an internal Thus the measure of a person’s opposition to something in terms of ’the amount of effort he is willing to put forth against it’ is taken - somewhat perversely - to be violence-involving effort or opposition in the pacifist’s ’opposition to violence'. If this slide were pacifist would be caught in an elementary inconsistency since in case of the permissible any being opposed to violence, by definition, he is prepared to use violence and so is not opposed Even Narveson ’cannot make too much* of this inconsistency, though to violence. it not so far removed from the alleged inconsistencies he does want to make is much of in his main inconsistency argument. A similar slide, together with a further slide, Is made in the argument based inconsistency the on to notion of rights, especially as it figures in the pacifist’s thesis as transformed to the claim that no one has a right to indulge in violence (p.418). Narveson violence in the notion of right. tries to incorporate the right to indulge in The initial move is to work in assumptions of defence from breaches of a right and of preventative action against infringement Because ’a right just is a status of it. preventative action ... does follow logically is that one has a right to whatever may be necessary what to justifying prevent necessary’ infringements of right' his (p.419). That 'whatever may be out to include force, now very generously construed - here is turns the further slide - to incorporate such things as social pressure. Moreover ’it is a logical truth, not merely a contingent one, that what might be necessary is force’ (p.421). of preventative For the presupposed logical transformations to work, the notion action must have the notion of violence built into it. argument accordingly begs the question against pacifism. it enough is for preventative To block the The argument action associated with rights to be, or to be limited to, nonviolent action. How the argument from rights leads to inconsistency is summed up thus (p.421): SAI. ’If we have any rights at all then we have a right to use force to prevent the deprivation of the thing to which we are said to have a right’. SA2. We have, according to the pacifist ’the right not to have violence done to us’, as have the a consequence of the obligation to avoid violence. right self-contradictory, to use both violence, granting so the pacifist’s position Narveson is that 'our standard concept of rights' yields SAI (cf. right can be sustained by right-supporting or right-defending require that that action is violent. is and not granting the right to use violence. The argument fails because SAI is readily rejected. claiming But, therefore, we mistaken p.423). action in That a does not Pacifists can provide an adequate analysis of rights - essentially the usual one - without letting themselves in for SAI by 6 simply rejecting the Narveson slide . What appears in place of SAI is something like SAI#. If we have any rights at all then we have a right to uphold them. But the right to uphold them, defend them, protect them, etc., give facto, an entitlement to the use of violence. no dilemma for the pacifist. does not, ipso Without the slide there is The "pacifist's dilemma" and Narveson’s slide are two aspects of the one thing. The arguments from lesser §2. argument violence and evil. lesser In outline the - which is independent of the notion of rights - is that the pacifists must admit, in terms of their own principles, that there are cases where the use of violence those where Inconsistency would be morally permissible and morally justified. some is use of immediate violence by T2. would prevent evil, some greater violence. More explicitly, and in Narveson’s terms which also import the notion of evil, pacifists have lesser much The cases are to admit both that the use of evil, is admissible, in preventing greater evil, and that it is not admissible, because it involves violence. 6 Narveson summarizes an argument like this as follows It seems to me logically true, in any moral theory whatever, that [LI] the lesser evil must be preferred to the greater. If the use of force by me, now, is necessary to avoid the use of more physical force (by others, perhaps) later, then to say that physical force is the supreme (kind of) evil is precisely to say that under these circumstances I am committed to the use of physical force'7. Now there are several somewhat different arguments snarled up in these sketches, p It is important to get them unsnagged , especially if a clearer view of the ethical role pacifism can assume is to result. lesser The basic argument, from violence, goes as follows Cl. There are cases where use of violence would prevent greater violence. C2. One ought to minimize violence. Therefore C3. There are cases where one ought to use violence, since in this way, in any arbitrary one of the cases indicated, violence is minimized. Therefore ~P2. It is not (always) morally wrong to use violence, contradicting the pacifist principle, P2, according which to it is morally wrong, always, to resort to violence. All the ingredients premisses, can be of argument, this together with pulled together from Narveson’s work. support for He not only expouses C2, but suggests two distinct arguments for it, the first of which connects argument with the lesser evil argument El. (Use of) violence is an evil. E2. Evil should be minimized. 9 The second argument to C2 is simply from the pacifist premiss, varying P2, 7 the the E3. One ought not to undertake violence - period; that the is, level of violence ought to be zero. Neither argument is decisive; of that reference both in fact begin easing.pacifists into a should they resist, where moral absolutes are warped into moral relatives, where obligations give, way to obligations all, and says nothing about minimizing it when one compatible being does it. into got has E3 is directives quite different from minimization where violence is with involved, e.g. E3 things other In any event E3 only directs one not to get involved in violence at equal, etc. Thus frame rooting it out which may involve strategies. non-minimization not entail E2, and commitment to E3 does not commit pacifists to C2. Nor do El and E2 entail C2; so neither does commitment, by to El and E2 oblige them to accept C2. instance, 10 , e.g. evil-perpetrating but argument Narveson's well-known Such nonviolent fails for similar some as cases hypothetical dictators. for For in particular violence is not the only evil and (so) evil may sometimes be reduced by violence pacifists Regan’s increases in slaying of the reconstruction of Regan argues from premisses reasons. concerning the ranking of evil and a premiss like E2, specifically 3. 4. The use of force is a substantive evil. Therefore, a lesser quuantity of force must great quantity of force (Rp.79). The argument is invalid: ordering of an ordering of evils force, even though force is an evil. increasing force may still reduce evil, and so, on be preferrable \ 8 does be preferred not induce to a a similar It is enough to observe that Regan-Narveson assumptions, Resort to the theme that Elt, Violence is an irredeemable evil in (proposed by Regan by investigated his Narveson, Np.118) irredeemable evil is figuratively (lesser or evils) whites pacifism, of "defence" promises so black Rp.80, and subsequently a way around the difficulty. that no combination (goods) will lighten its hue; with An grays it always dominates. Elt together with E2 will yield C2, but now the problem with Che argument shifts to What are the grounds for that? Elt. not widely acceptable, most people being amount of As Narveson points out (Np.119), it is prepared to countenance violence in exchange for considerable goods. some (But then, not so long ago, most people were tolerant of cruelty to animals so long as it was gross.) small /not too Moreover, so Narveson implies, appeal to Elt does not get. pacifists out of the argument from lesser violence; underwriting C2. indeed it seems to get them in deeper, by for it removes Cl and, more importantly, It does not however; the corresponding premiss of the more difficult argument from lesser evil, which starts from DI. There are cases where the use of violence would avoid greater evil. For given, by Elt, that use of greater evil than that cases such as DI requires. Rp.80ff.), which however violence is irredeemably with violence; tainted evil, there is no and there are accordingly no This is the core of Regan's defence in pacifism (see he sees as converting pacifism into a 'bizarre and vaguely ludicrous’ position (Rp.86), extreme pacifism, some of the 12 which he outlines 9 features of The approach through violence as an irredeemable evil is mistaken a (utilitarian inspired) attempt to get at moral absolutes, which is what pacifism is, like other deontological positions, grounded upon. But such absolutes expressed in such commandments as, One ought not to commit violence, adequately meaning thereby, as it says, ought not, not just for the time being, or so as reasons prima are facie, otherwise don’t arise, or other things being equal, or acting for ought but long come not what may, period. old-fashioned Such deontological, moral absolutist positions such as pacifism is at bottom, collide head-on with utilitarianism both that pacifism'. For the moral ’utilitarianism 'that utility will be ... who is incompatible brought out by doing some violence may be greater than that produced by any alternative' he like positions and Regan (at the time) were working from. Narveson The reason for collision is simply that with malleable highly fashionable, more (Np.121) 13 . So acccording to the utilitarian-commandment to maximize utility may acts sometimes commit violence, contravening pacifist principles. On its own inconsistency with a false doctrine such as utilitarianism shows little: position every suffers inconsistency with very many false doctrines. Narveson does have another (small) argument to the effect that pacifism is at odds with contractarianism. correct, if other the the ethical positions he presents, libertarianism and But this argument would only carry weight, were it. positions were suitably exhaustive; including no deeper ecological position for instance. is more also otherwise however they are not, What has happened which insidious, however, is that utilitarian thinking has permeated much of the rest of ethical thought, thus helping to establish a climate unfavourable to incompatible ethical positions such as pacifism. 10 There are two more specific features. damaging consequentalist Firstly, as more approaches have we of consequentialist Secondly, facie prima principles positions out utilitarianism, of This is entirely mistaken. The is a theory-saving device, designed to get difficulties such dilemmas. moral as consequentialist positions tend to suggest that only consequentialist reasons carry argumentative weight, and so try to ease rival positions, such pacifism, and generally, have made it seem as if no deontic principle were firm, but all are provisional. theory seen, into as sometimes incongruous consequential support for their offering themes. Narveson takes such procedures a assumptions upon violence is that it These (p.425). thus pacifists: produces stage further, and foists utilitarian says that the pacifist's 'objection to he suffering, unwanted pain, in the recipients' incongrous utilitarian grounds are something of a travesty of pacifists' reasons for objecting to violence, which concern rather the action involved and what it does, not astonishing such of only or always at all in the way of suffering, to the perpetrators as well as those in whom it is more type inflicted. Even utilitarian-style considerations are supposed to commit the pacifist to the follow three statements, one of which however he must deny (!): [N]l. To will the end (as mostly good) is to will the means to it (at least pjotTce prima facie). [N]2. Other things being equal, the lesser evil is to be preferred to the greater. [N]3. There are no "privileged" moral persons ... (p.425^ ' . 'These three principles' which appear in Narveson's 'sum up [of] the problem', 11 pacifist's among them imply, as far as I can see, both the commitment to force when it is necessary to prevent more violence and also the conception of a right as an entitlement to defense. And they therefore leave pacifism, as a moral doctrine, in a logically untenable position (p.425). consequences out of the substantive terms such as implicans; otherwise but logic, It would take not merely statements ’violence’ the deal good a of magic, coax to given. For implications to hold the , /''I <</<<-</ ,■/" < F^ and ’right’ must also figure , in the just fail implications on formal grounds. intended argument to the "commitment to force” conclusion appears however to some for e.g. The be of variant, on the lesser violence argument, with N2 replacing, as it sort may C2. such (N3 and N1 then have oblique roles, N3 to stop exceptions being made oneself, N1 to ensure that violence adopted as a means has its full import, in as reflected in Cl, construction work the ethical an end). But, without need not worry pacifists; arguments much further they hardly leave pacifism as untenable. Much more threatening is the argument from lesser evil, which has yet to be This countered. is argument from DI (cases of violence to avoid greater the evil) and N2 or E2 (minimization of evil) to C3 (admissibility of violence) inconsistency in comprehensive stock examples concern murder, What are these cases^? pacifism. one of them being the Narveson’s situation where (Narveson in fact) must kill the (potential) mass-murderer B (Np.119). is the moral situation here? Narveson ought to prevent but mass-murder, that of a paradigmatic moral In fact the example is dilemma, that of very similar also The to Pedro and Jim, where Pedro volunteers to call off his firing squad about to shoot several captives 12 one But what Narveson ought not to kill B, because that is murder and involves violence. situation is that of a moral dilemma. and if Jim one shoots Now almost everything turns on what account is given of What a comprehensive pacifist does moral dilemmas. trouble, coherence . of them is to take do, not inadequate utilitarian line of trying to the explain moral dilemmas away, as if they didn’t ever, occur an than initial intuitive negotiable, etc., etc. is as level), wants he unless if (at at least other all obligations were prime facie, The conflicting obligations stand. What is to done be however a very consequentialist thing, to try to determine the best thing to do in the circumstances. action In trying to determine what circumstances is a satisfied. violent sense this the best e.g. Narveson had better a fix. Narveson dilemma, but no B. shoot (not a deontic one) evil should be minimized; not ought circumstances, he had better do so moral of 17 . to the in course Granted, it is preferable to minimize follow that Narveson ought to resort to violence. remains course best that Suppose one, inconsistency in pacifism follows. in the principles like N2 and its mate, N2M, that it is preferrable to minimize evil, will presumably be and is evil, it does not On the contrary the situation shoot B, but in the appalling There is the real-life complication of inconsistency No a through arguments like that from lesser evil. Narveson’s jackpot question, entangled in his discussion from rights, can now be met. of the argument The question presents a dilemma: If force is the only way to prevent violence in a given case, use justified in that case? (p.420) is its Narveson is thinking of cases where one is about to be murdered, Regan where one is to be raped. qualified No: Given that force again entails violence, the pacifist answer is No, it is not deontically 13 justified 18 . It is certainly not morally it is not justified in the sense of ’justified* which and obligatory, reflects its deontic origin in ’making right*. may and because just some might force in solution, a making to amount dilemma be out But justification is The response is qualified then a case. consequentially situation. ambiguous, as justified, a second-best Narveson, proposes on the contrary, that enough violence for the given occasion is morally justified - it can go at least as as killing another person - but he presents no back-up argument, taking far his proposal as evident. jackpot the question As it is not - the pacifist can simply does not dispute it to a decisive a^rument against pacifism lead (though Narveson gives the impression that it does, e.g. , p.423). What it can lead to is the argument from lesser evil over again. The charge of moral insensitivity. §3. This is less argument an than a damaging charge: A person committed to an extreme pacifism, though he need make no logical mistake, yet lacks a fully developed moral sensitivity to the vagaries and complexities of human existence (Rp.86). The smear is not without basis. is applied avert to greater Regan is envisaging situations evil; where violence and he points to what he takes to be the evident moral permissibility of a woman's using ’what physical power she has free herself from an Interestingly, Regan has not aspiring rapist* (Rp.86). described the situation in a way which is incompatible with there is violence, which implies What is at issue the intentional, non-negligible damage, including pain, injury or (cf. a pacifist stand: nothing in that to prevent a woman wriggling free (even in a way that involves some force) and fleeing. using to is (or death, the permissibility of infliction of wilful) by forceful means / Np.110), that is, which involves much more than mere use of physical force And it is by no means so or power. violence inflict upon evident A rapist. aspiring the the that woman is entitled to can hardly now be pacifist accused, in a way that can be made to stick, of crass moral insensitivity. More generally, arguments pacifism, the on like Regan’s the to insensitivity moral of basis of pacifists' not taking obvious steps to prevent evil I occurrences, depend upon a confusion of passivity and pacifity. Narveson p.425) (e.g. Both Regan and assume that pacifism is a passive do-nothing position. 20 This is far from true, as the variety of nonviolent action methods groups has made plain. comprehend the real possibilities of considered or adopted by Neither Regan nor Narveson correctly nonviolent action. Otherwise, Narveson would hardly be able to assert, in the automatic (but carping) way he does, that the pacifist is Narveson's standing negative later 'not by doing assessment does not change the situation: anything about’ violence (p.425). of what he calls 'poslLlve nonviolence' for this positive approach is simply nonviolence practised in an exemplary way, as by Christ, in the hope that others will follow suit, and fails to recognise the potential of nonviolent training and the and effectiveness when assembled 21 , of nonviolent practices. much reduce the impact scope Fuller details of these practices, of the argument from social irresponsiblity, which is part of what lies behind the change of insensitivity. Pacifism, however, like most positions, has them 22 its weaknesses, one of undoubtedly derives from the fact that violence is a quantitative matter and there is no sharp cut-off point at the bottom end of the amounts and of violence greater than zero. Yet scale with minute (non-foot-in-the-door ) amounts do not seem to matter all that much morally, at least compared with 15 small the that evils gross us confront on most sides when we look. Morally sensitive pacifists will not focus or fixate on small quantities of violence to the of exclusion larger moral They problems. give certainly will understood that by ’violence' in principles such as. P2 mean they it undue to be 'non-trivial violence'. §4. and The argument from radical political corollaries The corollaries. out war by definition. so clear. Although War situations? normally would Standard war always would be what excluded, be morally counted brought progressively then second dilemma the impermissible, best but in thing to closer to Comprehensive pacifism can of course extreme principles emphasizing the evil of violence. weighing of Comprehensive pacifism thus does not include standard A strange pacifism! pacifism, in contrast to extreme pacifism. be pacifism But the position of comprehensive pacifism is not exceptional extenuating circumstances it might be the (second-) do. awkward of extreme pacifism would certainly eliminate war. practice For war involves violence, typically on an extensive scale. takes other from best choices will pacifism, in practice, through If evil is given a suitably yield the large same results as extreme A pacifism does (deontically), and entirely exclude war. Now it can hardly be cogently argued that it tells against pacifism that it would eliminate wars, since wars are exchanges that should certainly be avoided at all reasonable costs; nor therefore can an argument Wz/Acuf desirability fHur/l of war as an institution against pacifism,! mounted from the or Cldc. However wars are by no be means the only social arrangements or institutions which dispense^ or rely u violence extensively. The state and many of its institutions, most obviously police inadmissibility of characteriscally are contraposition do. also forces, coercive 23 institutions and hence ; pacifism Comprehensive it as such implies police anarchism provides no refutation of pacifism.. the implies 24 moral forces and states But once again For anarchism itself is (to 25 stick with a bold claim) irrefutable Pacifism as an ideal brought not is .down by its political corollaries. Pacifism yields not only a qualified anarchism but qualified vegetarianism. While does it not eating of meat, it does morally forbid violence to forbid animals. At least it does this so long as what normally counts as violence, animals, continues to rank as valence, and is not removed from the category by restriction of the application of violence to humans little good for however basis corollaries naturally spread suicide, capt^al euthenasia, (or such a chauvinistic restriction. several into punishment, controversial indeed There persons). is The radical moral, wherever to e.g. areas, violence plays a significant role in many cases'1. The sheer moral power of pacifism is one reason /7j Qc4> for giving it some pause. And there are others. / One is that, like vegetarianism, it runs counter to "natural" behaviour of creatures to which the principles are supposed to apply. Aggression is a fairly S' X common feature of animal and human behavioZur, and it sometimes (though by no means so often is as made out) involves violence. /Ze /cVXC o/1 //>£ Ao'jje.tjw enable ct/ony Ac /Aggression is assumed to be an evolutionary adaption /ZeSG- creatures offspring) in their artificial h to be better natural environments fitted environment. substantially 17 developed to for survival (of themselves and their most humans removed from now live situations in for rather which there is no way they are evolution gradually adapted their features: adapt in time to absorb massive doses of radiation for instance. have substantially living their adjusted adjust environment, along so with ^oing to Much as humans should they it their social practices - including aggressive and violent practices, now ill-adapted to their situation and mostly counter productive. There is a residual problem, practices of living creatures like in that confronting natural (relatively) vegetarianism. conditions, such as predators and tribal people, to be condemned as morally wrong when they Sometimes, violence? involve when the violence grossly exceeds what is required yes, Though a way can be beaten around the given the end to be attained; but always? edge of this problem Are 26 it is an unsatisfactory way. What this suggests is that <u t be^t nonviolence is not an absolute but^an ideal. The arguments for nonviolence which are mostly violence and do not strictly suggest a to apply since it in creatures natural surroundings opens door the a approaches would categorically exclude. chink to other options The further suggestion that emerges is that moral thinking and associated principles in this area are pretty primitive aimed, among principles state; other than P2. and what - But the suggestion is a dangerous one, sort of conclusion. similar practically at least, nonviolent arguments which do not exclude occasional uses of practical is things, at sharper, This is to in a called for is much more investigation more concede an sensitive, attentuated and less charge insensitivity against comprehensive pacifism so long as P2 remains blanket of moral unqualified. There is no reason however why a genuine pacifism (making for real peace) should not be built on a modified version of P2 which permits such natural phenomena as predation. Nothing logically rules 18 out such a genuine and more sensitive pacifism 27 There are other requiriments the position to be worked out should meet. in should, particular, be integrated into a Larger framework of nondestructive practices, which are involve violence, e.g. a of a practices metaphorically, damaging wild nonviolent* practices. are practices But, except destructive to the environment, for instance, do not such river, with piece things dumping vandalism. wastes toxic But mining strip as extended sense, which gets beyond the confines these It of in a valley, fertile in streams and oceans. the property In an picture, all even metaphorically, vandalism does not such cover violence against persons (and certainly not nonphysical violence as I "psychological violence"). What is sought /is an appropriate synthesis of these notions covering destructive practices - and better than 'vandolence'. an Then P2 is superseded accompanying synthetic term, 4/Z2°. It is morally wrong to use vandolence./ It remains to characterise the cluster of destructive practices (/V that count as vandolence and to try to justify the principle - no easy tasks. FOOTNOTES 1. ’a valid Christian According to the US Catholic Bishops, pacifism is to Christ and the early long tradition going back position’, with a lifestyle: see Origins Christians who were committed to a nonviolent pp.310-311. 2. Thus, in particular, T. Regan ’A defence of pacifism', Canadian Journal of Philosophy 11 (1972) 73-86. Page references to this article are prefixed by _ 3. J. Narveson 'Pacifism: a philosophical analysis’, Ethics 75 (1968) and ’Is pacifism consistent’, Ethics 78 (1868). The first article is reprinted in War and Morality (ed. R. Wasserstrom) Wadsworth, Belmont, California, T97O7 pp.63-77. The first article is also rewritten and combined with part of the second in 'Pacifism: a philosophical analysis’, Moral Problems (ed. 19 77ju / /A ZAC A IZ(M2 J. Rachels), Third Edition, Harper .Row, New York, 1979, pp.408-425. Page references without further citation are to this latter article. Narveson's theme that pacifism is incoherent is headlined and further elaborated in his ’Violence and war’, Matters of Life and Death (ed. T. Regan), Temple University Press, Philadelphia, 1980, pp.109-147. Page references prefixed by 'N' are to this article. 4. Pacifism, as involving the active use of defensive methods, can be traced back as far as the Mohist philosophers of ancient China. On modern methods see especially G. Sharp, Exploring Nonviolent Alternatives, Boston, 1971. As will emerge, it is important to distinguish fas Narveson does not in his earlier work) force from violence; they not equivalent. /\ 5. Thus, e.g., G. Sharp in several works: see for instance the unduly narrow definition of pacifism given in Social Power and Political Freedom, Porter Sargent Publishers, Boston, 1980, p.198. 6. Narveson, in responding to a suggestion of Armour (pp.423-4) sees nothing between (0) defence of rights, with the slide to violence in, and (1) nothing really answering to rights at all, where words like 'rights’ occur without stuffing. This shows a serious blindspot. What lies in between are a range of notions which do not guarantee the slide to violence. An account of rights which will serve is that given in R. and V. Routley ’Human chauvinism and environment ethics' in Environmental Philosophy (ed. D. Mannison and others) Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University, 1980; see especially p. Narveson 'Is pacifism inconsistent' Ethics 78 (1968) p.148. 7. J. 8. Without getting into the level of complication, not to say epicycling, that Regan lands himself in: he is obliged to distinguish three mirage-like senses of 'lesser evil': quantitative, qualitative, and resultant (Rp.78). 9. See Np.127 where it is asserted that violence as a source of evil should be minimized, and Np.119> where the point is put in terms of absolute evil. That way of putting it already starts to give the game away, since Narveson is all too evidently interested in negotiable evil which can be traded off against other evils. 10. An argument like the argument from lesser violence itself would appear to undercut the argument for El and E2 to premiss 02 for the argument for lesser violence. 11. That is by no means the onlyelement in Regan's torturous reformulation of Narveson's argument that can be faulted. Consider, for example, premiss '5. If any given action, A, is necessary to bring about a lesser rather than a greater quantity of qualitatively equivalent evil, then one's obligation is to do A.' While the premiss has considerable appeal as a principle of supererogation, there is little reason to accept it as one supplying obligations. 20 12. Extreme pacifism can be seen as taking the rule that one ought never to use violence as having priority over all other moral rules - which Is indeed an extreme position even if a consistent one. Such a priority rule is an unsatisfactory way to deal with moral dilemmas. 13. To show what Narveson goes on to claim that people are sometimes justified in using force rather more is required, as Regan points out, Rp 85, n.18. It has also to be shown that there are cases of these types (as in Cl) and that agents can know that use of force will increase utility, reduce evil, etc. A pacifist, rightly sceptical of utilitarian tracing of consequences, and fond of noting that violence begets violence, could, with a small dose of scepticism also, dig in at this point and claim that because no one can be sure that use of force will reduce evil, so no one is justified in using force. This is sceptically-based pacifism. 14. Narveson also wants to contend that ’all of these may be defended on purely logical or "meta-ethical" grounds’. This is likely false, especially the claim as to logical status, since some of the principles are rejected in substantive ethical theories. 15. A surprising feature of Narveson’s argument, also Regan’s "reconstruction", is that these cases are nowhere in sight, as if again one got to conclusions logically out of the air, without any of the hard work the cases involve. 16. The example was first discussed in B. 17. This terminology matches the account of moral dilemma, given in much more technical detail in R. Routley and V. Plumwood ’Moral dilemmas and the logic of deontic notions’ in Paraconsistent Logic (ed. G. Priest and others) 1983, to appear. 18. An extreme pacifist would answer with an unqualified No. 19. Directed against other creatures and more generally against ecological systems such as ecosystems which can be hurt. There is a difference here between live(go al-direct ed")~systerns and property, and comprehensive pacifism does not necessarily exclude wilful damage to property. Thus eco-pacifists may destroy, or at least disable, bulldozers but not harm those who use bulldozers to destroy habitat. However sensitive eco-pacifists will not condone "violent" destruction of property either: disab^ling of equipment is different. 20. The methods also include anticipatory action, e.g., the policemen going off to enact violence find their vehicles won’t start, e.g. because components have been removed 21 the peace movement should be preparing for B. Martin ’How See e.g of Peace Proposals 13 (1982) 149-159, and references Bulletin war ’ nuclear cited therein pp.152-3. Williams, //.( Zc (V, /, ( 1 J n l »' /? o C-, / / /' /\ <. ? / < / / i ’'i *7 z* //4 ’Conflict: of values’. 22. Another comes from the necessary circumscription of permissible nonviolent action, to ensure that it does not include actions worse than nontrivial violent action. 23. These organisations may be ruled out directly as violence-dispensing or else because they have individuals, delegates, who effect violence on their behalf. 24. In the sufficiently comprehensive form that the coercive state is without moral basis or legitimacy. Of course the "state" may have nonviolent methods available to it; it may not be a purely voluntary arrangement. 25. See R. Routley and V. Alternatives, (1982). 26. As Singer has in the analogous case of vegetarianism. 27. The position has been called 'pacificism*. Plumwood 'The irrefutability of 22 anarchism’, Social On the alleged impracticality of pacifism in the real world. Appendix §5. Even if it is conceded that pacifism is a viable moral ideal, that it does not fall down as incoherent or ludicrous, still the feasibility of pacifism as a sensible practice to live by will bo contested - despite, or perhaps because of, major examples such as Christ and Gandhi. And it has to be admitted that the real world, with all its horror and squalor, does put pacifism to severe tests. Nowhere is the practice of nonviolence than in replacing war \ succeed usually been given a dress rehearsal. defence of a region can vary convention observed is or less likely to Yet nonviolent defence methods, to replace the 2 detail , usual violent methods, have been described in some never thought though they have The prospects for success of nonviolent significantly, depending upon whether the war If the convention Is observed then pacifism not. stands reasonable prospects of success. The difficult cases are where the war convention unleashed, perhaps broken, is in massive ways, on noncombatants. his superficially sympathetic sketch and assessment of resistance, 'success ... may all sorts of this: According to Walzer, in nonviolent defence and This is presumably false. that The invaders may give up and depart reasons, some of them irrelevant, e.g., they needed a quick decisive victory, they got homesick. like is attained - there is never any guarantee of it, without or with be war - even if some conventions are flouted. for violence is possible only if the invaders are committed to the 3 war convention - and they won’t always be’ (Wp.331~). Success and sufficiently What Walzer no doubt ruthless invaders sufficient time and sufficient support lines, etc. 23 means is something in sufficient numbers with can eventually succeed. But sort of thing is also true even if the defending side resorts to violence. that The difference lies in the pattern of events; is more difficult and costly for if the defence is invaders the to well-armed it with and easier start afterwards than with well-prepared civil resistance-. Walzer is thinking, however, like many who jump to the that conclusion nonviolent defence cannot succeed when the war convention is abandoned, in terms of inappropriate examples. command, total in the He is thinking of an extreme totalitarian state, way the Nazis were in Germany, the Jews of Germany The providing the model of the enslaved population, the ’‘resistance". is highly misleading. picture The Nazis, who never invaded Germany, were in control of all the infrastructure and had the cooperation (at least) of the bulk of the For Walzer‘s comparison to work, there would have to be an enormous population. occupying army which took over and managed all key infrastructure. island With such as Australia it is not even so clear that this is logistically territories feasible against a largely united and actively resisting of impression in the acquiscence (e.g. resistance Walzer's population. fragmenting and the populace moving into dulled Wp.332) might have got things the wrong way around, the test with 4 disbelieving and frustrated soldiers ready to leave . Nonviolent resistance is however unlikely to be put adequate way in present state-determined prepared to risk training its populace (civil defence the police: is different). in to any No state would be circumstances. full in action nonviolent techniques It would then be. all to easy for them to "rout" civil obedience, for example, could no longer customary violent means. 24 be ensured by the FOOTNOTES The replacement of the state is considered op.cit. For example, in Sharp, op.cit. given there. See also in Routley Martin, All page references prefixed by ’W’ are to M. Allen Lane, London, 1977. and op.cit., Plumwood, and 82, references Walzer, Just and Unjust: Wars, The argument suggested in Walzer (e.g. p.333) that nonviolent methods would increase evil, or at least its distribution, is weak. It is countered by Sharp’s observation that the suffering likely to be induced is less than in comparable wars. §6. On the positive case for pacifism. defensive, meeting itself is revealing. deviations enough: a The argument thus far has been largely That in of objections to comprehensive pacifism. range Pacifism is the rest position from it are what require explanation. and state) (inertial -The reason for this is simple violence is, on most ethical systems, at least a prima facie evil, so use of it has to be justified. Positive arguments for pacifdism position and merely try supposed to be justified. violent opponent: to can advantage take of privileged dispose of "exceptional cases" where violence is The favourite exception is self-defence against a the case is curious in that the defender (person or nation) is already in a morally-excluded situation, since the attacker moral bounds. its has overstepped Still the defender is not normally committed to violence whatever he does - as in a dilemma situation. And since it is at least facie prima wrong, and he does not have to use it, he should not resort to it. An elementary syllogistic argument, given by Narveson (Np.117), can be adapted to give a similar result:Violence is (intrinsically) wrong Violence in any excepted cases (e.g. self-defence) is still violence Violence in any excepted cases is still (intrinsically) wrong. Naturally those opposed to pacifism will challenge the first premiss, and a dialectic already glimpsed will begin. None of the arguments are arguments for pacifism are conclusive, since even where deductively tight assumptions can be challenged (as above). are all the arguments for pacificism particularly good ones. 26 One of the Nor poorer positive arguments for pacifism, for example, makes similar assumptions to those of the classic theory of war, namely that once war is embarked upon it cannot be limited, the e.g. that hope or nuclear selectively and restrictively is an illusion, (moral) limits in Although the chances overstated. war - of whatever they eXcalation are exchanges Limited escalation are be used inevitable. The weapons chemical is will - are bound to be overstepped. often real enough, and confrontation are possible. more social arrangements and much more conventional than the the case is Wars are much theory classical Wars can, for example, be started and stopped in midstream should more allows. important things intervene (e.g. pollution a crisis affecting other neighbouring states). The main reasons for pacifism are, inevitably, those for nonviolence. They include (as support for the first premiss above) a range of consequentialist and practical reasons, e.g. suffering of modern industrial societies, the broader popular avoidance and anguish of support base obtained None of these well-known types are separately decisive, but their cumulative effect is considerable. ' Cz/ // Z'1 1 Is Ct' i L> ) s' *4 / / 27 — > A by of violence, the desirable social consequences of nonviolence such as a more open, less furtive, society. ) violent futility and counterproductiveness of violence within the setting the methods, the cost in pain, ? . z.. z . of reason  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Box 59, Item 680: Draft of On the alleged inconsistency and moral insensitivity of pacifism Subject The topic of the resource Computer printout (photocopy), with emendations and annotations. Paper published, Routley R (1984) 'On the alleged inconsistency, moral insensitivity and fanaticism of pacifism', Inquiry (Oslo), 27(1): 117-136. https://doi.org/10.1080/00201748408602030. Description An account of the resource Note, one of four papers digitised from item 680. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/browse?search=Richard+Routley&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bjoiner%5D=and&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=&amp;range=&amp;collection=&amp;type=&amp;user=&amp;tags=&amp;public=&amp;featured=&amp;exhibit=&amp;geolocation-mapped=&amp;geolocation-address=&amp;geolocation-latitude=&amp;geolocation-longitude=&amp;geolocation-radius=10&amp;submit_search=Search+for+items">Richard Routley</a> Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived <span class="MuiTypography-root-125 MuiTypography-body2-126">The University of Queensland's <a data-testid="rek-series" href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/records/search?page=1&amp;pageSize=20&amp;sortBy=score&amp;sortDirection=Desc&amp;searchQueryParams%5Brek_series%5D%5Bvalue%5D=Richard+Sylvan+Papers%2C+UQFL291&amp;searchMode=advanced">Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291</a></span>, Box 59, Item 680 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org">Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy</a> Contributor An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, <a href="https://najtaylor.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Dr. N.A.J. 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Type The nature or genre of the resource Manuscript Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context <a href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:6b11360">https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:6b11360</a> Coverage The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant Como - Cupboard - Pile 3 Box 59: Nuclear Como House Como House > Cupboard > Pile 3 https://www.antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/ccd54bbcfae9fe07cf40299850560203.pdf fe931fcce3b13680c46d5ca17790a70d PDF Text Text AUSTRALIA’S DEFENCE PHILOSOPHY: Further investigations of the nonexistent. ‘The opinions of philosophers, with regard to the conditions of the possibility of a public peace, shall be taken into consideration by states armed for war’ (Kant, ‘A [the only!] secret article for perpetual peace’, p.158 - a surprising article, flattering no doubt to philosophers, but neglecting their dominant bellicose tradition). A defence philosophy is much more than a defence policy, just as a philosophy of technology comprises much more than a technology policy. A policy can be given merely by a list of directives as to what do in various circumstances; even at its best it need only involve practical wisdom. By contrast, a philosophy goes deeper and requires theoretical wisdom, integration of the policy into a theoretical setting, which looks, among other things, at the central arguments and key concepts involved: here, security, stability, control, protection, defence, interests, national interests, intelligence, war, etc. Defence philosophy is thus a branch of political and social philosophy, and has long been treated as such, though under such more familiar and honest headings as “of war” and “of peace”. Like most parts of philosophy, it can be applied, for instance in shaping policies, in regional ways among others. A defence philosophy should integrate appropriate defence arrangements and approaches to war and peace, not merely or superficially into “foreign policy” or assumed “international relations”, but into the way and intended way of life of a country, both into on-going culture and into the intended or planned cultural arrangements. A defence policy typically takes prevailing socio-political arrangements and power structures for granted; a defence philosophy again penetrates deeper, questioning or rejecting features of these structures, enquiring as to the merits of things and institutions of which defence is planned, asking what sort of society should be defended by what sort of appropriate methods and at what lengths. What, for instance, is Australia, what are Australians, defending, concerned to defend, aiming to defend? Here in Australia? In the region? Abroad? How much of what others have, or what we have, is worth defending, preserving? Does Randwick Racecourse, or Pine Gap, merit defending? Would anyone stage a last stand for Oaks Estate, one of Canberra’s dreariest suburbs? If the Indonesians made a lightning strike in Australia just to remove Bjelke-Petersen,1 should we resist? Few of the necessary prerequisites have been adequately thought about in Australia, where unplanned muddling through from immediate problem to immediate problem - reactive contingency “planning”, if you want to be generous - is the main style of political life , and, along with the traditional political game of “follow the leader”, of defence planning. Australia �2 does not yet have a defence philosophy. Some of its critical philosophers could help to supply it with the rudiments of one or more, and to inject some depth into broader defence theorizing. What follows is intended as a modest beginning: much of what is attempted, unearthing arguments and assumptions, followed by analysis and criticism, and some elaboration of alternative principles, falls squarely within the domains both of applied philosophy and traditional philosophical practice. 1. Australia’s inappropriate. defence “policy”: incoherent, obsolescent Australia seems to lack even a clear and coherent defence policy. American, This is a commonplace charge (made even by friends of Defence, interested in obtaining extra public funding for defence and elements of C3I).^ The reasons concern not merely the major unsolved issues of exactly what is being defended, what things and objects and what interests, and whose, what freedoms and values, and what role American defence facilities in Australia are supposed to have in this. They concern the status of present treaty arrangements, such as the “cornerstone”/“millstone” ANZUS treaty, signed between Australia, New Zealand and the US, now in disarray (still ’‘maintained” by New Zealand, whom the US has unilaterally announced expelled), and of subsequent associated memoranda of understanding (some secret, involving the local storage of US nuclear weapons, entry of American personnel, etc.). They also concern a range of more detailed lucunae such as: lack of clearly-defined priorities on what needs defending and how it is to be accomplished; doubtful capacity of present defence forces to handle low-level contingencies in and to the north of Australia and in maritime zones; and unsatisfactory (or no) arrangements and planning for “defence-in-depth”, for civil defence and use of civil infrastructure, mobilisation, wartime administration, protection of key facilities and areas, and post-nuclear organization. And, equally damaging, if its policy makers do have a coherent policy it is nowhere satisfactorily revealed to the peoples of Australia.It is left to journalists and newspaper­ watching academics to winkle out what local defence installations may be for and to make various conjectures as to what the policy may be. Of course there are many administrators and policy makers who think that is the way it should be; the public should not be informed, but kept satisfied with some “generalised” statements.As to coherence, Australian policy makers have only recently found out that Australia has a (purely) regional defence role, not a global one. This they were told by the Americans in Washington in talks allegedly designed to clarify commitments under treaty arrangements with the USA. It thus begins to look as if Australia’s defence policy, such as it is, is still as much determined abroad, by US policy makers, as it is locally in Australia. �3 Much circumstantial evidence can be assembled to confirm the claim that Australia’s vague defence policy can now be stamped Made in USA, as it used, before the last World War (and British abandonment), to be stamped Made in UK. For one thing, Australia has had a bipartisan defence policy, so it is claimed. That “policy” has however been essentially shaped by the Liberal party, which has governed most of the time (as senior partner in a coalition). But the Liberal party simply took over US arrangements for Australia (as planned in Washington for ANZUS) and still does. For instance, the latest package® from the Liberal Party “Defence and Foreign Policy Unit” consists largely of US Defence Department material packaged under a local cover. The Strategic Basis Papers, endorsed by the Labor Government, give virtually unqualified support to US military practices and to the American view of the global strategic situation, and commit Australia to supporting, without any due reservation, American positions in world forums.' The same dependent-policy conclusion can be reached by more devious arguments. regional defence role? When, for example, did Australia find out it had a After the Americans had found that they could no longer afford to police the world on their own and would have to delegate some of that role and offload some of the heavy associated costs, on reliable dogs-bodies; and also after Labor took some faltering steps towards developing a broader foreign more independent policy with some indigenous elements (Australian Minister Hayden was promptly flattened by US heavies such as Schultz). Australian defence and foreign policy copies American policy in main respects, but lags it. The Australian defence policy presented by the Labor government, to the extend that it is visible, is conservative; it coincides with older American defence policy, and diverges from the new (post-Reagan) American war policy. For Australian Labor defence policy supports what the American administration supposedly used to support, namely DI. Multilateral nuclear disarmament (within the framework of series of treaties and agreements), and D2. Deterrence in the interim, deterrence through mutual assured destruction (i.e. MAD). The presence of American military facilities in Australia is supposed to be justified in the framework of these assumptions. For they are to assist in making deterrence under D2 effective, and to provide verification for the arms reduction arrangements under DI (both stabilizing functions). There is much evidence indicating however that American policy makers have now abandoned both Dl and D2 and any serious attempts at nuclear arms control8. Certainly they have moved on to the following highly destabilizing doctrines: Nuclear war-fighting, Limited nuclear wars, and Star-Wars (i.e. Strategic Defense Initiative). While this American war policy may well be accepted by the next Liberal coalition government, all of these military doctrines are explicitly rejected by the 1985 Labor government. Since the American “joint” facilities in Australia also facilitate the rejected �4 objectives, the problems concerning these dubious facilities are much aggravated. The Government’s approach concerning them - withholding information concerning the full range of their functions, and particularly their war-fighting roles from parliament and the public - is certainly unsatisfactory, as several of its members realise; and as a result the Government appear in not atypical disarray, further grist for the incoherence theme. If there is perhaps a coherent Australian global defence approach somewhere away from public exposure, it is most likely then an old abandoned American policy.9 But in that case it certainly lacks - what it in any case appears to lack - justification. For Australia, in supporting US defence policy and activity, for instance in world forums, is supporting present offensive American policy, not what it reputedly adheres to, deterrence (through MAD). The point holds good whether or not American global policy still includes such deterrence as a proper part10; for it certainly involves other very different and dubious strategies. The commonplace, but increasingly feeble, justification given for Australian’s tagging along after America is that Australian interests are the same as American11. American interests by no means coincide with Australian . However Consider, for instance, such matters as enriching Americans, making conditions favourable for American business, promoting Americans and things American. Consider, differently, American practices in Latin America, from undercutting Allende’s government in Chile to its practices against Nicaragua, to its extensive export of arms and violent methods, there and elsewhere in the world. Thus America, like Russia, is busy meddling in Africa, but ‘Australian security interests are not directly involved’ (SB, p.24). Consider, differently again, escalation of the nuclear arms race. Or consider American strategic planning, and all the game- and decision- theoretic models which concern just USA and its adversary USSR, perhaps occasionally adding Europe as part of the monolithic West, but rarely or never considering the Southern Hemisphere - so that either Australia is part of America as Poland may be of Russia or it is nothing. Or consider American interests not merely in Soviet and communist containment, but in containing socialism such as might (under more auspicious conditions) flourish in Australia. An American policy answering to American interests is accordingly inappropriate for Australia, inappropriate for Antipodean socialism. Australians should do their own defence thinking and work out a policy appropriate for Australia. (That applies also to Australian political representatives, who should stop parroting implausible American views and begin developing some genuinely local and original ones.) Should Australia be tagging along after the Americans in support of installation of their style of free-enterprise capitalism everywhere feasible (i.e. that the state socialists don’t already heavily control)? What they quite seriously call ‘keeping the free world free’? Of �5 course freedom has, in this sort of context, multiple meanings and associations (as well as multiple inconsistencies, appearing information” and the like). overtly in subsidized “free trade”, selective “free Significant parts of what mainstream American culture admits under the freedom umbrella, mainstream Australian culture would exclude: for instance, active opposition to and undermining of social and socialist programs and governments, bullying of small countries that impose barriers to US business or military practices (all part of “free enterprise”), etc. What of those intangible freedoms the cultures supposedly agree about, civil liberties, freedom to information, to live and work where one chooses, to travel, and so on? These are certainly important freedoms, better upheld in some parts of the unaligned West (e.g. Sweden, Switzerland) than in most parts of the Eastern Block. But such freedoms, which run counter to dependent policies, hardly require defence subservience. influenced state practices are fast reducing freedom. Moreover, military- Many of the older freedoms have vanished this century, such as freedom to travel, to work and live abroad, etc.; now one requires permits, licences, passports, ... . And many more former freedoms are being or have been eroded; soon it will be identity documents, restricted zones, ID cards, as already in parts of the “free West”. Now nuclearism in Europe ‘is devouring the very freedom it is said to protect: [the Greens] point to the new laws proposed in 1983 designed to keep citizens from assembling to protest deployment of the Pershing II and cruise missiles’ (Capra and Spretnak, pp.58-9). Further structural changes required for the security of the state, imcompatible with democratic freedoms, include ‘secrecy, lack of commentability, permanent emergency, concentration of authority, peacetime militarism, extensive apparatus of state intelligence and police’ (Falk, in Feith p.24). Nuclearism is not a smart strategy to preserve remaining freedoms. 2. Inherited other-reliance, and the populist and elitist cases for patronage and subservience. Australia’s defence policy, such as it is, is furthermore inherited rather than regularly (re)thought through. But that procedure - essentially the legal method of precedence, whatever its very limited satisfactoriness in legalistic decision making - is defective when applied in politics or to defence, especially where immediate independent action is required. For precedence methods are extraordinarily slow, as well as characteristically conservative, and as in defence exclude significant and rather urgent alternatives. The unsatisfactory decision-making practices to be revealed in the case of defence are by no means restricted to defence but are typical of the kind of advanced age capitalism Australia operates under, or rather labours under, down under. In setting down those �4. 6 features of aged capitalism (‘of the Corporate State') that the New Left and Alternative Australia movements were reacting against, Cock neatly summed up these practices: Decisions were made from the top and on the basis of vested political interests, rather than by rational goals and means that served public interests. The people were rarely consulted effectively before a decision and often only partially informed afterwards. Planning was based on a mere extension of the present. ... activists felt they were given little opportunity to choose how they lived or worked. The availability of space, time, trees and air was also determined by others ... (p.18 italics added).14 As it was and is with one’s defence, military and civil, so it is with the matter of whether one lives in a nuclear target zone or not, and so on (though immigration policy, uranium and woodchip export policies, etc.) In these areas planning remains top-down, with at best consultative elements. No real choices are offered to people. A major inherited assumption is that of other reliance, that Australia’s defence depends on other more powerful allies. That ally was firstly Britain, and since World War II America; but in any event the assumption is that to be safe Australia needs a powerful patron, a protector. A corollary is that Australia adopts a suitably submissive relation to its patron, making expected concessions. And for the most part it has; however such a defence insurance policy does not come cheap.15 It costs not only money and resources, but quality of life, freedom and independence. The assumption of other-reliance is however unsound, for several reasons. Most important, it characteristically depends upon the following themes, all of which lack solid foundation: 1. Australia is threatened - or at least 1A. Australia is likely to be threatened in the near future. 2. Australia cannot defend itself. 3. Australia can however depend upon its patron (or ally), i.e. upon the USA. These three themes in fact make up what has been called the populist case for the ANZUS alliance.16 It is very different from the elitist case for ANZUS, said to hold sway with the Australian government, which, while insisting upon premiss 3, essentially rejects 1 and 2 and claims instead 4. Australian has a vital interest in global stability. 5. Global stability is under threat (constantly) by an expansionist Soviet Union. 6. Only USA can contain the Soviet threat and hold the global balance. Some of techniques the US deploys for holding global balance operate through dependent states and a network of alliances like ANZUS. But obviously further premisses are required to reach the intended conclusions that Australia should be participating in any such �alliance, and what is more, hosting US defence facilities and exercises. A first such premise is the no-shirking theme, that Australia should be contributing its part to “holding the balance’’ (cf. Bell). Even this first further step is pretty shaky; as we shall see, one shaky step in a rather ramshackle case, since premisses 5 and 6 are decidedly dubious (and 4 may involve equivocation). For it can be plausibly argued that Australia’s vital interests are not guaranteed by US techniques, which threaten to upset the whole applecart, and can be obtained by alternative more satisfactory means outside of such soft alliances as ANZUS. In any case, it is unclear that local contributions enhance global (nuclear) stability (see e.g. Mack and Davidson). But first, there is more pernicious regionalist version of the elitist position to be considered, what might be called the offshore elitist position. This position grants 2A*. Australia can defend itself against regional threats, and can look after itself regionally. But it does not (as indeed other qualified elitist positions may not) grant 1A. What the offshore position insists upon is 1AI*. Australia’s interests could be threatened in the near future. Since these interests - perhaps concerned with trade, Australian companies or Australians abroad, or whatever - may have little or nothing to do with internal Australian security, this premiss represents an extremely important shift (a shift not unrelated to the inverse bureaucratic shift from war to defence). It goes further than what has been called forward defence. In extended form the offshore position does call for some sort of global policeman or police force ready to intervene whenever a “free port” anywhere looks like closing its doors. Part of the difficulty in getting to grips with the elitist position is that it tends to slide through to the offshore position (by way of now evident immediate positions). The arguments against both the populist and elitist cases, and indeed against virtually all of themes 1 through 7 are sufficiently familiar to justify but a fairly brief outline of some of the main points involved. Of course just a couple of defections from themes 1 through 7 would serve logically defeat both cases, but there have been some interesting repair attempts, designed to float the arguments on diminished premisses. 3. The brief against the popular populist case; the need for new directions. Contra 1 and 1A. While Australia is not at present under notice of threat, veiled threat or harassment from abroad, a majority of its population appears to believe that it is. As the popular view is not the informed, administrative, or parliamentary view, it is worth inquiring �8 why the popular view persists, as the opinion polls reveal it has. The populace has been deliberately kept in the dark (or even misinformed), because this suits bipartisan government purposes. Although both main Australian political parties are well enough aware that the main assumptions underlying the populist case are false, the reasons for which they support the American alliance (e.g. those of the elitist case) are much more difficult to sell to the public. Accordingly the parties and Government have no political interest in undermining the unsound populist case. In particular they have gone out of their way not to cast doubt upon the connected assumption that US is a reliable guarantor against all threats. Thus long-standing Australian psychological insecurity about security has been allowed to stand, and has not been assuaged by any requisite informational and educational effort. In particular, older attitudes to Asia persist not far below the surface of popular Australia: fear, mistrust and xenophobia, patched over by a pragmatic attachment to trade and tourism. This misplaced insecurity is fuelled by popular misconceptions of Australia and its place in the world: metaphorically, that Australia is a luscious plum ripe for Eastern picking, instead of the Asians view that Australia, so far as they are aware of it at all, is a remote desiccated uncouth place perhaps good for some trade and investment. Or, to get towards more concrete assumptions, Australians apparently tend to their view country as affluent but underpopulated, resource rich but largely defenceless; yet not far to the north are Asian hordes who are impoverished, resource poor, and so on . Such a view is seriously out of touch with reality. Parts of Asia are now at least as affluent (on conventional economic indicators) as Australia. They do not see themselves as overpopulated, in a way that calls for mass exodus; and in those areas which are as overpopulated as Europe, such as Java, bribes and force are required to move people on transmigration programs to relatively unoccupied parts of the Indonesian empire. So far as they require them, they can purchase Australian resources - which are not unique - much more easily and cheaply (because they even carry significant local subsidies) than they could obtain • them by seizure. 1s For these sorts of reasons, and because Australia itself poses no threat, no other state has a genuine interest in attempting to invade Australia. As it is for interests, so it is for capabilities. No regional power has the capacity to launch a successful invasion of Australia, or is likely to have such a capacity in the near future. As the joint Parliamentary Committee concluded, Currently only the United States would have the physical capacity to launch a full scale invasion of Australia, and it clearly lacks any motive to do so (TAS, p.94). �9 As the report also stated, quoting Synnot (former Chief of Defence Staff), ... to raise the sort of force which would be required for a mass invasion of Australia could not possibly be done in under five years by other than the superpowers (TAS). But neither superpower is at all likely to expend effort or resources to such an end. An obvious naive question which at once arises is: Why bother then with much defence? (A later question to entertain is: why not be a free-rider on collectively provided global security, such as it is?) Why not proceed forthwith to unilateral disarmament? Mack for one, having reassembled the now-standard telling case that Australia is not threatened ‘now or for the foreseeable future’, and so having broken the populist argument, is confronted by the awkward option of unilateral disarmament for Australia. He stages a hasty retreat, points to the dependence of premisses 1 and 1A on premiss 2, and proceeds to claim that ‘the populist case for ANZUS is sustained’ even without premisses 1 and 1A. It is however a decidedly problematic retreat. While it is true that the arguments against 1 and 1A may sometimes take it for granted that Australia can look after itself to some extend, put up some resistance, it is far from clear that they depend essentially on assumptions approximating premiss 2. Consider the no­ interests argument, which appears decisive given the (estimated) very limited invasion capabilities of potential invaders. The main consideration adduced appears to depend in no essential way, indeed in no obvious way at all, on Australia’s dynamic fighting forces. Australian mineral resources, to repeat one of the more sensitive examples involved, can be obtained more readily and cheaply by trade methods than military ones. What all this seems to show is that a rather minimal streamlined force, if any, would presently meet Australia’s military requirements. It is not as if Australia is ‘entirely defenceless’ without a conventional military force, like a babe-in-arms. The whole apparatus of nonmilitary defence is available on a continent well suited to its use, though lacking a population trained in its techniques. But even without requisite popular training in defence methods, Australia would be a difficult place to govern, Australians a difficult lot to subjugate. It was such features of the Australian character that deterred the Japanese on a previous occasion “If the invasion is attempted, the Australians, in view of their national character, would resist to the end. Also, because the geographical conditions of Australia present numerous difficulties in a military sense, it is apparent that a military venture in that country would be a difficult one” (TAS, p.62). The points still hold good, and could be strengthened. There are several parts to any such �10 program of nonmilitary defence: making it happen, and putting it abroad (ideally with dinkum Australian exaggeration) that it has happened. To the issue of alternative defence we are bound to return. For now, when Australia is not threatened, is a good occasion to reconsider, and begin to adapt, defence arrangements. For example, it looks very much as if enormous sums, which could be valuably directed elsewhere, are being spent, largely to make many Australians feel secure.But a much more effective and inexpensive way to such results would be through requisite popular education and psychological therapy - with, if it were well done, much more satisfactory results, a more secure and better informed people. Contra 2. As a result of post-War developments in weapons systems and C3I capabilities, the military defence of Australia has become much easier. It comes down to enhancing, through new robust and reliable systems, the enormous strategic advantages Australia enjoys by virtue of geographical isolation. In principle, any maritime invading force can now be detected well in advance of arrival, through modern radar warning systems, and destroyed by precision guided munitions. And any invaders that did manage to gain a foothold on Australian soil would face severe logistic problems, and be subject to disproportionate responses from local defence. Standard discussions (as in Dibb, Mack) proceed to introduce a great deal of “Boys’ Own War Games” stuff concerning contemporary weapon and C3I systems; the essential point is that these could serve to turn Australia into a pretty unvulnerable armed fortress, and into an extremely difficult territory were the oceanic moat crossed and the fortress entered (see especially D. Martin). Under such armed neutrality and (differently) fortified Australia defence scenarios, even invasion from outside the region by an inimical world power could be resisted with reasonable prospect of success. There is no power at all likely to mount such an invasion; there is apparently (as noted above) only one power that could, that good ally the USA (reckoned however a likely invader by 6-7% of the Australian population!). Nonetheless the threat of a Soviet invasion is taken seriously not only by the larger populace but by committees of their elected representatives. But the Soviet military has never undertaken such a long-range massive force projection, is ill-equipped to do so, and lacks any plausible reason to try such a stunt (for details see, e.g., D. Martin; also SS, ST). The only credible Soviet threat to Australia is in the context of a superpower war, when American facilities in Australia and perhaps Australian cities, would be struck at by intercontinental missiles. While this would be bad enough, it is highly unlikely that it would be followed or accompanied by an invasion. Soviet forces are once again not sufficient, and not thought sufficient by the Soviets for that sort of diversion; they would be required elsewhere in a superpower war; and they would be devastated, unless USA is militarily even more incompetent than sometimes depicted. �i. 11 Contra 3. What will be argued is not the negation of 3, that the Americans cannot be relied upon, but rather that 3 is dubious, and that it would be rash to place excess reliance on American protection. That being so, and other patrons being even less promising, Australia should look more to its own resources, as the American administration is kindly advising. Especially since the American “Vietnam debacle” and the fall of Saigon, things have changed in important ways which cast doubt on the reliability of American patronage. First, the relative economic and military strength of the USA has declined significantly. It no longer has such a large share of world product(ivity); as a connected matter of policy, US world warfighting aspirations have been reduced. Its ability to act as, and afford to be, global policeman has also markedly declined/ Secondly, the willingness of Americans to engage in remote foreign wars has correspondingly tumbled. Although the American administration includes more than enough hawks, to be sure, the people and Congress are not longer in a mood for gratuitous foreign adventures, especially when the fun may not appear to be in American interests. Since Vietnam, US opinion polls regularly show strong popular opposition to overseas military involvement. This “Vietnam syndrome” has served as a major constraint on US military policy and foreign involvement. An important manifestation of these changes is the Guam Doctrine, calling upon US regional allies to take primary responsibility for their own defence in regional conflicts. Another important outcome is Defense statements to the pointed effect that before US troops are committed abroad there must be reasonable assurance of Congressional and popular support (Weinberger, reported in PC p.14). As Mack comments, ‘such assurance is impossible to guarantee - especially for remote countries where no US vital national interests are at stake’. Certainly no more is assured under the ANZUS treaty which provides only that each signatory ‘act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes’ (article 4). All the treaty strictly requires is consultation; there is no undertaking or commitment. Isn’t the treaty backed up by informal verbal reassurances? None that are not undermined by others, in American administrative multiple-speak. Even the elite view is that Australia has to ‘work ... to maximize the prospect of US support’ and that the Americans cannot be counted upon. For ‘the threshold of direct US combat involvement could be quite high, and circumstances at the time could significantly limit US willingness or ability to help Australia in other ways?. ‘... we cannot rely upon US support in a defence emergency arising within our own neighbourhood’ (SB, pp.29-30). However a special case has been made for American reliability in Australia’s case - as �12 opposed to examples of American abandonment of earlier military undertakings (in Vietnam, Cambodia, Iran) - on the basis of permanent friendship, common interests, and shared values and democratic traditions. There are two difficulties with this type of special pleading: first, as to the basis, and, second, as to the adequacy of such a basis in by-passing Congress, the American people, and slow constitutional processes. Historical evidence hardly sustains the adequacy of the basis in analogous cases. And here, as already indicated, the basis is shaky. For there is not a common culture shared by Australia and America: rather values diverge significantly on quite crucial issues. Even less are interests always common, as the matter of subsidised agricultural produce reveals, and as missile testing and nuclear ships issues in the South Pacific have recently confirmed. Interests diverged, for instance, when Australia toyed with opposing Indonesia’s claim to West Papua. So it is dubious at least that American interests would coincide with Australian in disputes or confrontation with Asian nations to the North, e.g. with Indonesia or Japan. Of course if the special case argument did hold water, Australia and America really were mates, then the treaty would be otiose. There was in fact no treaty in operation in 1942; but by then American interests in countering the Japanese were independently aroused. 4. Other-reliance and regional self-reliance A major problem with other-reliance for defence is then that it cannot be deemed entirely reliable, yet precisely here unreliability can hardly be tolerated. When the Indonesians are rolling into Brisbane it won’t do for Defense to call up with a message like that from local Services, "We can’t get there till tomorrow’’, or “until after Congress meets”, or “Sorry, Mate!”. More seriously, handing defence over to others means handing control of our lives over to others; and given nuclear defence, which too many Antipodean administrations have opted for, it quite likely means literally handing our lives over for many of us. Another problem of other-reliance is thus its adequacy. A further problem is its cost. In principle, if a State hires out its defence it would no doubt look, other things being equal, for the cheaper bidder - if, that is, defence is a commodity of a sort, like national shipping, meterological services, etc. The trouble with global defence is that the market is monopolistic, with currently only one supplier of the right complexion22, who accordingly can exact a very high price, and has - making the whole country a nuclear target and demanding substantial subservience. Similar points make part of the case, well-enough appreciated, for not trying to press defence, plainly a collective good, into a marketable commodity. When a country can supply its own defence, it therefore makes very good sense for it to do so, since it normally has a stronger interest in its own proper defence than most other parties. Should it also be cheaper in costs that matter, then self-reliance not just makes good sense but pays; other-reliance does not. But in that event, it surely does not need nuclear �13 patrons, or to farm out some of its defence. Such self-reliance undermines an important part of the older case based on other-reliance for alliances such as ANZUS. However newer bipartisan approaches to defence try to combine them (thus e.g. Australian minister Beazley as reported by Davidson) - approaches which thus begin to empty ANZUS of what little content it had, and remove much of the apparent point of such older alliances. Since the ANZUS arrangements contain no clear commitments beyond consultation but are merely vague articles of understanding, a simple course is of course to allow them to be emptied of content, so that the alliance, an expensive and outdated “insurance” policy, dies a natural death. It may however be death by seizure or convulsion should American defence facilities be closed or internationalised and passage of American nuclear equipped or powered transport be excluded from Australia. That would no doubt sacrifice the deterrence and other advantages the treaty supposedly affords , while making way for the greater advantages of friendly nonalignment, of no longer being a nuclear target, or so on. But self-reliance pure and simple is insufficient. The world does not consist of separable isolated pieces, as becomes increasingly evident. Most dramatically, Australia will not escape the effects of nuclear winter. The picture is much the same as for other dynamic subjects, such as plants which are not internally self-sufficient but depend crucially on their environment - and indeed as for States themselves. The question then is what form the additional holistic component of policy should take? Put this way, it is almost obvious that the appropriate move is not taking sides (as in a kids’ war game or tug-of-war game that is already set up) and doing one’s bit for confrontation. For that will not contribute to stability, to a proper holistic approach, but rather to sectionalism and fragmentation, and to bringing nuclear winter closer. Other-reliance and self-reliance typically present a false contrast, and certainly do with pure self-reliance - a false contrast like that of holism and partism (EE, p.223), and of dependence versus isolationism. In between lie a range of positions, one of which - favoured by a long line of peacefully-disposed philosophers from Rousseau and Kant onwards - might be called integrated reliance or federated reliance. The elitist case, insofar as it were to call for such reliance (e.g. in assumption 4), could hardly be faulted. But it doesn’t; and is satisfied with much less. Integration may reach only certain inadequate levels, the level of modern alliances and alignment, which are essentially coupled with opposition to an other side, e.g. the monolithic East (or West). It is into just this trap that elitist arguments fall. �14 5. The decline and fall of elitist arguments. Premisses 4 and 5 of the elitist argument turn around the crucial notion of stability, as related arguments revolve around that of security. But stability and security are value-laden terms, which are not cultural invariants. What stability comprehends in American administrative perception is very different from what highland villages take it to include. In each case a system is stable if it returns to a given stationary state under perturbations of sufficiently small magnitude. But both the relevant states and the stationary among them are relative to given frames of reference; for instance, what is stable at a macrolevel may well not be at a microlevel. As Trudeau has said of the superpowers, ‘they share a global perception according to which even remote events can threaten their interests or their associates’ (p.10) and disturb stability. But lesser states or regional people, not counting remote business or military interests as relevant, report no instability. Bureaucrats invariably view bombs as necessary to stability, and the nuclear fix as stability; by contrast, gentle people increasingly see bombs as tools of terrorism and as characteristically antithetical to peace. ad 4: Of course Australia has a vital interest in global stability and security: what sizeable nation does not? But the determinable motherhood interpretation (of italicised terms), while no doubt diplomatically convenient, conceals crucial differences, highly material to the argument. For one global stability means something different in USA from what it means in Costa Rica and likely what it intends in Australia. Certainly vital interests are different. America is interested in containing socialism (in Australia as elsewhere), and it tends, in more popular rhetoric at least, to equate containing socialism with containing communism and both with Soviet containment. A continental swing to socialism (or Non-Soviet communism) in Latin America, or in Africa, would upset global stability, on American perception, and would indeed have significant effects on US business or investment; but it would not on its own upset or affect most Australians or directly threaten Antipodean stability, and it certainly need not affect nuclear stability. Australians generally are not opposed in principle to socialism or notably interested in containing its spread (indeed perhaps the opposite). Australia is not interested in (and oughtn’t to be charmed by the idea of) defence of the (American) “free enterprise” system, or in the defence of uglier forms of capitalism wherever they are presently initiated or opposed (cf. Chomsky and Herman). Contra 5. It can be conceded, without granting the main thrust of the premiss, that the Soviets are expansionistic, at least in that they are interested in extending their influence where they can. So also are most empires, including American and Indonesian (so for that matter are many academics and most sales-people). But the Soviets have an ideological �15 message to spread, Marxism-Leninism, an ideology they used to anticipate being installed everywhere. But the Americans also have a message, a capitalist message, Free Enterprise Inc, which they are working to sell pretty much everywhere accessible to them. And they need to be expansionistic to have it adopted, whereas the Russians and Chinese need simply wait for history to take its allegedly determined course (though a little assistance - reflecting legitimate doubt about this determinism? - would surely spread their disconcertingly different forms of “progress” without interfering). But surely the Russian message is pernicious? All these messages are pernicious (for familiar reasons: see e.g. Erlich). The proper question is whether on its own Soviet international activity threatens, in some damaging way, global stability. Undoubtedly Soviet-American confrontation, as in the Cuban missile affair, does threaten global stability; though not in a way that has any bearing on Australian defence. In fact no Russian expansionary tendency, military or otherwise, has an untoward direct effect on Australia, little of significance reaches into the Antipodes (see Dibb SS). So what is the local excitement about? In large measure the excitement has been drummed up by the political right, East European expatriates, and pork-barrelling politicians. The effect of Soviet expansionism is much exaggerated and overexploited (Mack ST). Viewed from the Antipodes it is hardly a problem, unless the Soviets should get locked into military confrontation with USA - a real problem to be addressed. With that problem however, the Antipodes can better assist as part of a third nonaligned group which helps to referee and to prize apart the heavies, not by seconding and inciting the USA. But confrontation apart, Soviet internationalism, hardly a great success story, does not seriously disturb global stability, as seen from Australia. For a proper assessment of Soviet internationalism, types of expansion should be distinguished - military, potential military, influence with military access, and mere influence. In actual military expansion and involvement since W’orld War II, the Russian record is hardly striking by comparison with the USA or several other states. The one conspicuous case involving control of new territory, that of Afghanistan, has actually had little effect on global stability. The usual Western apprehension concerns not anything the Soviets have accomplished, but what they might attempt militarily, especially in Europe. But the idea of Soviet military adventure in Europe is a Western invention and bogey, lacking in plausibility. The Soviet military lacks the force ratio needed to be assured of military success in Europe, both by their own standards of what is required and by Western strategic standards. And the Soviets have no good reasons or interests in undertaking such an exercise which would draw them into nuclear war. They already face enough economic difficulties and troubles with East European client states which they cannot control satisfactorily. �16 The extension of Soviet influence has largely been in the Third world. But it has hardly been successful, with as many failures and losses to record as Soviet “gains” - gains which add to the imperial burden since they involve countries wracked with problems, such as Vietnam. The Third World exercises are marred by Soviet inaptitude and limited by the state of their own economy. They scarcely displace the global structure enough to test its stability; and they produce no shock waves or even significant ripples in the Antipodes. Contra 6. The main current threat to world stability appears to come not from one of the dancers in the East-West dance of death, but from the escalating confrontation, easily ignited, between the lead dancers. With this US policies and practices have at least as much to do as USSR ones. Recent US practices are more destabilizing than Soviet ones, and indeed highly destabilising, because of new weapons and weapons systems, because of rejection of arms control and Soviet proposals, and because of “star wars” preparation which both accelerates the arms race on earth and begins a new one in space. A vast increase in tension and suspicion accompanies the “arms race” which is in large measure due to US intransigence and US war-fighting doctrines, new weapons systems, with built-in incentives for pre-emption, and deliberate abandonment of arms control (see PR). Such considerations, duly assembled, demolish the received (but nonetheless crazy) theme that an alliance or alignment with USA helps increase stability. American practices are to be resisted as much as Soviet. 6. The East-West balance argument: American alignment versus friendly independence The need for Australian alignment with the USA is supposed to be shown by the East-West This politically-important balance argument, which shares key premisses nr with the related elitist argument, runs as follows : balance argument. 7. Global stability is the key to world peace. 8. Stability of the international order is a matter of maintaining a global balance. But 5. The global balance is constantly threatened by an expansionist USSR. 6A. The threat is [only] checked by the USA, which (6A.1) guarantees an open and pluralistic international order. 9. Australia’s primary security concern, indeed most vital interest, is this stability. Hence 10. Australia’s role is to help America maintain the balance. The rest of Australia’s intervolvement with American military arrangements is then taken to follow. But there are many reasons for halting the argument before it reaches this stage of practical (and allegedly moral) detail. The balance argument assumes much that has already been rebutted, for instance that the Soviet threat thesis is correct (i.e. 5) and that US �17 policy is stabilizing (part of 6A). It also takes for granted, what now is at least in serious doubt, that American policy is directed at balance and deterrence, rather than what the American administration appears to be aiming at, superiority. But in that event, Australia is not really engaged in some longer term balancing feat, so much as in helping USA prevail in nuclear race, contradicting the goal of world peace of premiss 7. Contra 10. and its derivation. The derivation is inadequate: it does not follow that Australia’s role is such a lackey’s one. If the balance of strength is leaning in America’s direction, as most less-biassed evidence indicates, then Australia should surely be throwing its slight weight in with the Eastern team (that is what such images as the balanced tug-of-war would suggest). Presumably premiss 6A.1 is designed to exclude this deplorable thought, of Australia teaming up with totalitarians. Nevertheless Australia should be putting its slight weight where it is effective, given its own broader objectives, interests, principles and supposedly pluralistic ideals. There are several different roles Australia could fulfil which would enable it to make a more satisfactory, less passive, contribution to world peace, among them de-escalation through active nonalignment, appropriate aid, and so forth. Thus 10 is hardly well-supported or evident. A more direct approach would be better than throwing Australian weight unreflectively on one side of the balance. As a little reflection attests, the balance image and argument point not in the direction intended, but towards nonalignment. Contra 6A (and 6). The theme that US maintains the balance, and hence preserves the peace, is of course false. For again, it takes two to tango. While it can be granted that the USA is interlocked with and checks the USSR in this munitions dance, the history of the dance reveals that the pace-escalation has flowed from the interaction of the one partner with the other. That is, but for the USA, the USA would not be required to check the USSR (the interaction is two-way as with Hegel’s famous master-slave relation). In any case, it looks as if, on a different historical trajectory, the main states of Western Europe could match the Soviet Union militarily (for they have comparable combined GNP, technological resources, etc.; cf. note 20) Thus it is doubtful that the current Soviet build-up, produced in interaction with the USA, could only be, or have been, checked by the US. ad 6A.1. As the premiss is only of marginal relevance to the argument, it is enough to observe that the international order the USA helps maintain leaves very much to be desired. In its intervention, militarily, economically and indirectly, USA has assisted substantially in reducing plurality and openness, is well as in establishing or propping up rotten regimes, etc. The negative side of American imperialism as well-enough documented, if not widely enough read or known by Americans themselves (cf. again Chomsky and Herman). Only under scandalously low redefinitions of ‘open’ and ‘pluralistic’ is the present “free” world order �18 either open or pluralistic. ad 8, and the damaging equivocation on ‘the balance’. While balance is one way of maintaining stability in the world arrangements that have presently come to pass, the balance structure can only carry so much loading. Add too much weight (of arms tension, and so forth) to both sides and the precarious structure will fail, probably catastrophically. increasing probability of catastrophic breakdown, for a variety of reasons The (accident, miscalculation, computer error, human interference, etc.), has been argued elsewhere (e.g. WPI). While a certain neither overloaded nor overstressed balance may serve for stability, the present increasingly stressed balance will probably not. The balance argument, however, neglects this dynamical situation, illegitimately switching from a (certain post) balance in premiss 8 to the (on-going) balance in subsequent premisses. The balance argument itself breaks down through equivocation. What the dynamic picture also indicates is the importance of removing some weight from the balance, most obviously by arms limitation and tension reduction. It points too to a different role for Australasia, to a less aligned position genuinely directed at stability. It is to the emerging case for a different role for Australia, and to action for achieving this different role, that the positive argument will now begin to swing. The inadequate East-West balance argument is typically combined with attacks upon proposals for a different role for Australia than American alliance and. service. effect of these additions is to generate extra confusion and dust. The main For the additions are inessential to the argument, and do not serve to repair it or reinforce it. For example, against nonalignment or neutralism is set the alleged pervasiveness of nuclear winter. We might as well be aligned (it’s good for trade and other economic perquisites), so it is sometimes argued from up top, because if the central balance fails we are all dead. This is a conspicuous nonsequitur^, worse than ex nihilo quodlibet (because it also suggests that balance is a prerequisite for stability). But, in the main, the attack is irrelevant, because the point of nonalignment is to help remove overload and to break down confrontation and its escalation to war; it is a thing to do now, be fore winter descends, to delay or halt its descent, and most important, to reduce its extent and severity. Australia’s weight may be slight, another irrelevant addition goes, but psychologically it is important for the West. Any further spread of the “Kiwi disease” (from New Zealand) would show the weakening of Western resolve, and give the green light for Soviet expansionism. Bell, a leading exponent of the balance argument, virtually gives the impression that if Australia dropped out of American alignment, the Russians would be on the �road down through the isles to Australia tomorrow/ Much of this sort of rhetoric is reminiscent of the baseless fear-mongering of an earlier pre-Vietnam time. The Russians have no such military interests, or present capabilities. And if they were to gear up and set out, they would be met by substantial resistance along most of the route, resistance obtaining Western assistance. For America, for one, has major interests, different from Australia’s, in both Indonesia and the Philippines, as well as elsewhere in East Asia. The addition, so far from strengthening the argument, depends, in its “green light for expansion” comparison, on the previously faulted premiss 5 of Soviet expansionism. In fact most of the further case for American alignment of one sort or another - when it is argued-, often nonalignment and neutrality are simply denounced in good old-fashioned authoritarian style - turns upon already-faulted assumptions. Catley, for example, another exponent of “central balance”, presents the following ‘consideration’: ... whatever the Swedes or Swiss may think about the matter, Australia is locked by considerations of culture, economics, and political philosophy into the defence of the Western world. It has both an obligation and a duty to contribute its share to that defence if necessary by hosting facilities which cannot easily be located elsewhere (p.15). The premiss is false for reasons essentially indicated: and the premiss in no way sustains the conclusion, the argument involving among other things, the prescriptive (is-ought) fallacy. Consider the premiss. Australia is not, unless Catley has information withheld from most of the rest of us, locked into Western nuclear defence, but in principle independent and free to reconsider and rethink its options. (American use of the “facilities” is not irrevocable, and shortly comes up, in principle at least, for reconsideration.) How do culture, economics and political philosophy provide locks and chains for Australia but not for nonaligned Western European states? They do not: Australia is not a part of USA or altogether a client state; and the cultures, interests, economic frameworks and political philosophies of the two nations are significantly different (for details, see CPD). But even if the ideological frameworks were much more similar than they are, that would not entail similar defence practices (as, e.g., ANZUS in all its weakness shows), nor any such defence obligations. Most of the arguments against nonalignment are of Catley calibre - or worse. Fortunately, then, such arguments are examined in detail elsewhere, notably by D. Martin in his examination of counter-arguments to Australian armed neutrality, the legally-recognised non-belligerent form of nonalignment he favours. Virtually none of Martin’s counter-case depends for its success on features of neutrality, which is not advocated here. Virtually all of Martin’s argument is moreover couched in negative form; his positive brief is very brief. It �20 reduces to this: alignment or alliance with the USA 'cannot make us secure against such dangers as we may one day have to meet, while it needlessless exposes to other dangers, including nuclear war (p.l, italics added). While the message is correct enough, and in need of wide propagation, it does little on its own to support neutrality, and it by no means exhausts the positive case for weakening alignment. In particular, there are more positive arguments of much theoretical interest, to be drawn from systems theory and from the burgeoning theory of collective goods and action. 7. Contributions towards stability: free-riding, enlarging group size, and increasing variety. The strategic world situation we now confront can be viewed as a game with more than 100 players, counting in nation-states and leaving out (for convenience) major organisations such as the largest 100 transnational companies. These organisational players align themselves around two large poles, East and West, as indicated: NON-ALIGNED N N WEST EAST India NATO States Japan, Israel Sweden* Switzerland* NZUS: Australi I Ireland1* ^Most Latin ' American States I Tanzania Costa Rica** State capitalist Key: N: *: **: State communist Nuclear weapons states Neutral states Nonmilitary states There are various - a great many - games these state players are playing, some of which are practically important for peace and for stability. Some of these games, such as World Empire and Chicken (already played under one representation), are played essentially between the East-West superplayers. There are several problems about East-West games: for instance, what representation they have, the repeatability of the games (clearly some nuclear games �21 may, like Russian roulette, end after one round, as they will with the Big One), and the negative sum characters of some games. And the monolithic East/monolithic West dichotomy is misleading, and, as will appear, discards crucial detail (in the way simplifications may). So game-theoretical modelling will be approached differently and more obliquely. World Security, like regional and local security, is a collective good (technically, an item, quality unspecified, in joint supply and precluding exclusion). That is not of course to say that there are not conditions under which security may leave much to be desired, for instance where security is guaranteed by a narrow and intolerant despotism; but then, so it can be argued, the trouble lies with the provisioning, not the particular product. collective good G for the collection of N nation-states. It is a It is, furthermore, a collective good which permits the possibility of free-riding by nation-states. Looked at from this perspective the recent American complaint about its allies, Japan for example, and their insufficient expenditure on defence, is a complaint about their free-riding. Within the balance of power framework the conditions for free-riding are satisfied, for instance by unaligned and unilaterally disarming states. For 1. G is available to all N members of the collective if it is available to any, and the achievement (or maintenance) of G by any will make every member better off. 2. G is achieved iff some number m (no larger than that of group K) contribute towards its provision, where under the balance of power assumption Il C K C N and II = {USA, USSR}. 3. The expected value of contributing to G or its maintenance is less than the expected value of not doing so, i.e. likely costs of contribution exceed likely benefits - except perhaps for members of II given that G is largely provided by II. There is what can be called a pegged (or asymmetric) free-rider problem, pegged by members of II for whom the free-rider option is not open - within the confines of the balance of power assumption - and for whom condition 3 is only satisfied under certain ways of looking at the matter (e.g. there will be a war 10 years down the road so the expected costs each year exceed the expected benefits). For most members of N, by contrast, the benefits of G are available even should they reduce their contributions. There is a straightforward case (in narrow game-theoretical terms) for recommending Australian, and regional, free-riding on the balance of power provision of G. Some arguments, beyond or adding to those already in effect presented, are these:- Either stability breaks down catastrophically and there is a large-scale war or it does not. If it does then the region is �22 better off than it would be if (strongly) aligned because it is unlikely to be (so heavily) targetted. (Here the dreadful new argument that nuclear winter means that the Antipodes might as well be involved gets challenged and rejected: as to how see e.g. MF and B. Martin). If, alternatively, stability doesn’t break down then the region has the benefits in any case, without the costs. For there is no clear evidence that our alignment and cooperation with the USA enhances global stability, etc.; indeed, as remarked and will be further argued, the evidence points to the contrary. As regards Australasian regional weight in the Western block, do we seriously believe it is significant? That the Australian voice, though useful for propaganda purposes, makes much real difference in the halls of Northern power? We shouldn’t: and if we do we’re living in a delusional framework. Australia has been left out of the picture in virtually all major strategic planning exercises, most difference-making peace initiatives, etc.,etc. Now Eastern block countries would hardly object to Antipodean free-riding, rather than no offering support (however trifling), comfort and incitement to their opposition/ Furthermore free-riding is how the Americans, on their theoretical principles, would expect Australia to act, the rational self-interested procedure (see CPD). It is how lesser nations should act. For it is economically rational; contributing is not. But won’t the US make things economically dear for Australia? In threats and theory, yes; but in practice, no more than it has already done with subsidized wheat deals to the Soviets, no more than it threatened to do already in the case of New Zealand over the nuclear-ships issue. For except for short term aberrations, America will never give up trade or business arrangements: one gets the impressions that America would trade with the Devil Himself, if doing so would open some new markets in Hell. Despite its political stigma, free-riding need be no problem, or in any way immoral or irregular. Perhaps the buses are free; perhaps there is a voluntary payment system, to which only some need contribute, etc. With the nuclear fix, free-riding is indeed the moral course; contributing is not.29 Free-riding, though often protrayed as a problem, is only a problem in certain cases of collective provisioning, where the good involved is sufficiently desirable and will not be provided because of too many free- riders. This is not the situation with global security, which will be provided, in the curious and precarious way that it is, whether or not Australia stays on the escalating treadmill or gets off and rides free. Australia's free-riding may be a problem for America; it is not for Australia. Interests diverge again. What is more, judicious free-riding can increase stability. In pictorial terms, the stability of a structure is typically increased up to a certain point by securing it more �23 adequately; for example, if it is a wind tower or similar building, by increasing its rigid ties or supports to the ground. Then a tripod (or better still a quadrapod) tower is much less likely to topple than a bipedal one, and requires less guying to stay up. Increasing the diversity, or variety, of supports increases stability. The theme that diversity correlates with stability has been sharpened and confirmed in ecology, for instance in the theory of “spreading the risks” (see EW). The related theme, that a certain variety increases stability, has been elaborated in cybernetics. The core eco-systemic idea to be developed is that Australia’s free-riding in defence, and consequent nonalignment, could help to enhance diversity and variety, and accordingly to increase stability (especially if done in concert with other client and suppliant states). Two interlocked supports in tension, East and West, well dug in but hardly well guyed, are inadequate for the long-term stability of the precarious structure of world peace. What makes engineering sense is not however adding weight to the structure, or even strengthening the supports that are there, helping the East when the balance is disturbed by the more powerful West’s surging ahead and likely overburdening the structure. What makes more sense is increasing the variety of supports, enlarging and diversifying group size, as significant independent grouping could do. The monolithic East/monolithic West picture is much more than a convenient simplification, for instance for strategic thinking. It may force damaging mistakes in conceptualisation, mzsconceptualisation perhaps convenient for some larger players. One main reason for mistakes concerns group size. Whereas 11+ = {West, East} is a small group, the number N of nation-states is not, but is considerably larger. But the collective behaviour of large groups differs in theory from that of small groups; group size is a highly significant factor (though its precise import remains contentious). The group N of nation-states is a large group, of essentially self-interested parties, indeed of substantially economic actors. collective action applies: So we may expect that the American theory of that the groups will behave in a counterintuitive way. Though expected to act in the common interest, to obtain security in particular, the collection will not. On this account (that elaborated by Olson), the common interest can only be guaranteed by outside influence or imposition (coercion in Olson’s rapid thinking). But with the collective of nations, there is, as experience has shown, no outside mediator or influence of sufficient authority to ensure attainment of the collective good. The prognosis looks very gloomy: this most important (though far from unique) collective good will not be provided. Fortunately the reasoning, like much of the “logic” of collective action, has been too �21 swift. The group, though large, is highly privileged, in containing several actors for whom costs of war exceed benefits (note the shift in perspective from the earlier free-riding condition 3). Indeed an important economic effect of the knowledge of an ominous nuclear winter is that virtually all actors involved should now be in that position; for (subjectively) expected costs of nuclear war have become very high. To go back to basics, Olson's grand theory is based on the accountants’ tautology (defining ‘net’) net agent benefit = gross agent benefits - gross agent costs, i.e. in symbols, for each agent or o actor i (in collective N), A- = V-Cj. A group is privileged if Aj is positive for some i in N. It needs little argument to show that for vulnerable European nation-states the net benefits of global security are decidedly positive (e.g. with a nuclear war their respective future GDPs would expectedly fall to near zero). The fact that the group of nation-states is privileged does not however imply that the collective good involved, security, will be supplied, particularly in the longer term. The simple logic is not dynamic; it takes no account of mistake, error, or the like, or of stability achieved through superiority or intermediate instability. An improved modelling - which can take some account of group size and of the dynamics, through iterated games - is gained by returning to game-theoretic grounds. A free rider “problem” is tantamount to a dilemma of some sort; according to the conventional wisdom, it is a prisoners’ dilemma (cf. Pettit, but contrast Taylor and Ward). The argument can go this way:- a free rider problem or issue is defined in terms of the provisioning of a collective good; but the theory of collective goods is equivalent to that of a .QI, generalised prisoners’ dilemma. Certainly the global nuclear situation appears to present a dilemma; as much is a commonplace claim. Elsewhere (e.g. WPI) it is argued in detail that it does indeed present a moral dilemma. Here the argument - which can proceed through the theoretical route just sketched above or in the more piecemeal way to be indicated - is that it is also a prudential dilemma (for many members of N).°2 Consider first, since these have obtained some investigation (e.g. Hardin), the range of apparent two party games being played by the US and Soviet Union administration (labelled US and SU respectively) in 1985 as regards the moves of further nuclear armament, A, or nuclear disarmament, N. (It is supposed, naturally, that the game is set in some background context, e.g. nuclear disarmament is not considered in isolation from on-going French and Chinese nuclear armament). It is important here, as other places, to distinguish the administration - which for the most part calls the shots - from the society and the people. It is administrations or governments that generally take people into war; etc. The American people seem rather more inclined towards nuclear de-escalation than their administration; the German people were clearly opposed to the new nuclear missiles their administration proceeded to install. The strategy games involved are then administration games, which we �25 can suppose to be played over successive time intervals, e.g. years; so there is interaction and feedback as the games go on - until the Big Ones explode. Within this simplistic setting, the apparent games being played by US and SU are those diagrammed next: New Initial game Prisoners’ Dilemma Game SU SU D US A Revised Game D 2,2 A 4,1 1,4 3,3 D US A SU D 3,2 A 4,1 1,4 2,3 D US A D 3,3 A 4,1 1,4 2,2 According to Hardin, ‘giving evidence of [his] deformation professionelle’, the Prisoners’ Dilemma (PD) ‘represents the preference ordering of virtually all the articulate policy analysts in the United States and presumably also in the Soviet Union’ (p.248). While PD may have represented US policy, there is considerable evidence (as already indicated) that it no longer does, that the US administration has shifted to a more aggressive, war-fighting, phase. That is, the US has interchanged its rankings of (D,D) and (A,A), presumably some time between 1978 and 1984 games. The Soviets, who have been much more consistent (and no doubt better censored) in their policy pronouncements, appear not to have changed their game, but have stuck with their form of deterrence and no-first-strike. However they are bound to try to keep up with the Americans, and so are presumably pushed towards the Revised Game shown, which pleasantly restores symmetry. Stable or equilibrium outcomes for each game are circled. An outcome is said to be stable if neither player has incentive to switch strategies unilaterally on the strength of the game, i.e. to alter the outcome except by influencing the other player also to alter strategies. All these games provide dilemmas, in a broad sense, that equilibrium is achieved in an undesirable and dangerous outcome. In all the apparent games, arming is the dominant strategy for each player; yet in the PD game that is even Pareto-suboptimal, whence the economic fascination. But as the other games deliver results which are socially suboptimal (and below a satisfying threshold), all these games are dilemmas. And the same applies to suggested alternative games that might plausibly be taken to represent the superpower situation, and such as Chicken. A recognisably suboptimal outcome is guaranteed by the independent ‘‘stable” strategies. What is worse, iteration of games does not help (as it may in other political circumstances). For there are substantial political and military incentives for the superpower players not to adjust their preferences substantially in socially superior directions after repeated games, but to do what the US at least appears to have done, to make the situation worse. �26 It is important then to attempt to modify or curtail these self-interested superpower games. There are various connected ways of going about this. One is for other parties to combine to limit or discourage these games. Another alternative is for them to try to alter the games. Thus much socially preferable would be a switch to a coordination game of some sort; for instance, to the game which neutrals tend to play (and which Lackey, in contrast to other more bellicose utilitarians, sees utilitarian superpowers playing; hence Hardin’s provocative label for this game, ‘Lackey’s game’). In the coordination game diagrammed, WN represents a western-inclined neutral and EN an Eastern inclined neutral (e.g. Yugoslavia): EN WN D D 1,1 A 3,2 A 2,3 4,4 [Other coordination games, with (D,D) assigned (1,1)] Now the dilemmatic and coordination games are not played in isolation; they come together in international settings such as United Nations’ committees (and elsewhere, since coordination games are frequently peoples’ games as well). Superimposing the games, with coordination games of the first sort applied to previously given US and SU games, leads to the following augmented East (E) and West (W) games: New Game, Augmented Prisoners’ Dilemma Augmented E E A D Revised Game, Augmented A 4,1 2,2 : *4,1' \ : 3^2 ’ D 1 : W ......... 1,4: A 2/3: 2/3; D ; 1 w ........ : 1,4 3,3 ; a 4 ; E D 2/3 • • — •- : 3-3’**: D ; 1 W I 2,3 ; . • 2.3 A D 2/3 2,2 a 4 ■ 4,1* ! . ; : 2/3 J 4 Key: rh represents a sequence of ms, i.e. m, m, m ... for each coordination player; 2/3 a sequence of 2s and 3s in some order. As augmenting games reveals, to play with a superpower is to help reinforce a stable deadlock. But playing an independent coordination game increases variety and can help in breaking the deadlock, in fact in several ways. For one, enough significant players playing a coordination game can alter the overall dominant strategy towards disarmament. For another, much more pressure can be brought to bear on the superpowers. For example, with less support, unilateral action by the US administration on Star-Wars and arms build-up can be exposed. Superpower militarism and power excursions would stand naked and �27 unsupported. Australia’s impact, in particular, would be rather greater as a nonaligned free-rider pressing seriously for disarmament and regional nuclear-freedom (instead of, as at present, white-wash polemics and token ambassadors, undermined by a none-too-tacit policy of US support). The strategy suggested by game-theoretic modelling converges then with that suggested by other approaches, notably regional and ecological approaches. The strategy is that of limitation, of disengagement from escalating US/USSR war games, and progressive alteration of their likely outcomes by defusing coordination moves. In more practical terms, the approaches mean trying to limit and modify superpower games by restricting their games and supporting regional or local coordination of players, in forms of organisations both of nations and of people. Such organisations would work, as many have already been doing, to contract the regions and spheres of influence and access of US and USSR military administrations, and to diminish support for their war-fighting objectives. For example, Antipodean groups could, and should, coordinate to ease the American military out of the South Pacific region, meanwhile resisting any intrusion of Russian military. Then, while the Europeans are doing their coordinated de-escalating, denuclearising things right across Europe, the Russian and American war games are progressively excluded from the entire Southern Hemisphere. An eventual aim geographically is, to send their weapons of war back home, to restrict their (and French and other) global military enterprises to their “own” backyards, where they would not always be so enthusiastically received. Fortunately such an ambitious and optimistic project, so unlikely to come to pass given present nation-state arrangments, can be accomplished piecemeal, from small and significant beginnings, already to be seen. As a result of recent movements in the region, a South Pacific nuclear-free region is now a politically-achievable option. A first token step has already been taken. But next steps, towards genuine nuclear-freedom, require above all cooperation of a less aligned Australia, joining other disengaging “free-riders” in the region. That in turn requires, as a practical component, closure of American bases in Australia as their leases terminate, cessation of American nuclear ship visits and aircraft staging, and an end to uranium mining and sales. As Australia is the only country in the region supplying uranium, and the main location of US bases, such steps would be most significant. Even so, the Pacific regional effect would remain unduly limited, so long as France and the US are based within the region, and transit of nuclear ships is internationally sanctioned everywhere on the shrinking high seas. Plainly there are further more difficult steps on the way to southern Pacific nuclear-freedom and independence, i.e. even for one of the easier oceanic regions. But there is no good reason to �28 expect that removing the nuclear scourge, any more than eliminating other major politico­ social evils, will be easy. Permanent removal and a less dubious “peace” than we presently enjoy is not something that will be achieved by more of what we have witnessed, or even through clever diplomacy and smart technological tricks, such as new defensive weapons; it will take difficult structural and radical design change. 8. On the need for, possibility of, and prospect of appropriate structural change. There is little doubt that certain sorts of structural political change would be highly conducive to peace (e.g. democratic reorganisation of the superpowers), and that certain fundamental changes may even be sufficient for permanent peace. With that in view they have long been advocated - at least from Rousseau and Kant onwards. But it has also been supposed that some such changes are necessary for lasting peace; ‘it is also necessary to transform the structures that lead to war’ (B. Martin, p.12). To render this theme immune to obvious criticisms - for example, that straightforward authoritarian extension of certain established structures could bring an end to war - further desiderata, typically presupposed, are invoked, for instance that certain freedoms, modest material standards of life, and so on, are duly guaranteed, and also the type of necessity involved is wound back to some lower technical level (not excluded however by present practicalities). These adjustments make the necessity theme more difficult to assess, but also more difficult to sustain. There are two parts to its assessment and defence, a negative and critical part, demolishing a range of arguments from determinism, human nature, and the like, to the effect that arrangements have to be more or less the way they are, and a positive part, comprising direct arguments for the theme. The large negative part of this enterprise will simply be illustrated.34 According to deterministic and mechanistic approaches, such as that of (marxist) technological determinism, nuclear weapons, like megamachines generally, are no aberration. They are an integral part of the business of industrial and ecological conquest, a further stage in human intervention which has already involved substantial disruption through pesticides, wastes, etc. The argument tends to the fatalistic. The megamachines of conquest are made, and once made they will be used. No change in political arrangement, which would make any difference, is possible. Sometimes technological enthusiasts push their position and luck, even further, that a weapon or device once invented by humans will be used: there is no stopping progress. But in doing so they overextend themselves. While there is, sadly a fair induction from the manufacture of weapons (of any given type, for many batches are never deployed) to their use, inductions from invention of machines or the like to their manufacture are �c 29 unreliable and subject to many counterexamples (and many machines that do eventually get made have been reinvented or independently rediscovered). But even the good inductions do not show that weapons of various sorts must be used, that a change in background political organisation would not frustrate the inductions. The broader deterministic position is of course that such background changes are not possible either; political arrangements too, like the rest of social life, are technologically or economically determined. But (nonanalytical) determinism, technological and other, is false, so it is argued elsewhere (JB, CPD). Different political arrangements, which alleviate problems, are technically possible, and arrangements would be different in differently evolved worlds. Things did not and do not have to be the way they are, or the social and political sort of way they are. Many routes, none of deductive strength, lead to the conclusion that the dominant political structures of our time, fashioned (with much input from schemes of past philosophers) from feudal institutions, require extensive structural alteration. In particular, they need to be superseded by alternative structures less intricately tied to war, which do not promote or lead so readily to war. Such a theme has been argued directly from the nuclear fix itself (as e.g. WP1, p.47ff.). But suppose, improbable as it may seem, that nuclear weapons all vanished, thereby removing the current nuclear fix; for instance, they turned out to be quietly self-destructing, or a disarmament actually took place. massive thermodynamic miracle occurred, or nuclear The problem of war would not be thereby removed, and even that of nuclear war would only be given some respite. For the structural arrangements for war would remain intact.04 Conventional weapons would remain, along with weapons perhaps as dangerous as nuclear weapons, such as chemical and biological ones. Nuclear weapons, insofar as they were removed (for small caches are easily hidden away), could soon be replaced, especially if nuclear power plants remained intact; and nothing would prevent the development of (Star-Wars) weapons more diabolical than nuclear ones. War cannot be eliminated while leaving the rest of society as it is - by freezing the status quo. ... The structural conditions for war need to be removed - not reinforced as appeals to elites may do - and superseded by alternative structures which do not lead to war (B. Martin, p.12: Martin goes on to indicate the types of structures, and how to reach them). Structural adjustments can provide conditions for lasting satisfactory peace. An initial, somewhat simplistic, Kantian argument for the proposition that peace is possible (presented by Latta, introducing Permanent Peace), runs as follows:- Peace, perpetual peace, is an ideal, not merely of a speculative kind but a practical idea, a moral principle. Hence this ideal ought to be realised, i.e. there ought (morally) to be peace. But ought entails can; therefore peace is possible. �30 From Heracleit.us through Hegel there buzzes an impressive swarm of philosophers"*6 who have rejected the second premiss. Some are even captivated by such extravagant counter-claims as that with peace everything would stop, that competition, with war as one limit, is essential to motion and progress! would now be With the recent shift in philosophical fashions, the second premiss more widely conceded, though often not on Kantian grounds, but consequentialist. Such grounds to support the theme that peace is desirable and ought to be realised, but are more discriminating in that they help indicate what sort of peace. Unfortunately, however it is done, the second premiss does not sustain the conclusion, ought does not entail can, as many moral dilemmas reveal (see MD, WP1). So fortunately, there is a more satisfactory and revealing route to the conclusion that peace is possible, and indeed is feasible. That is the more elaborate method of (semantical) modelling: present in detail scenarios of societies where peace persists (for the sceptical it may be necessary to recall n-human models, with n small). This sort of thing is of course already done, in more pleasing fashion than logicians could hope to emulate, if rather less precisely, by OQ novelists and science-fiction writers, and by activists like the different Martins. What all these scenarios point to, however, are societies considerably different from our own - though not in the people involved, who have their weaknesses, their power drives, and so forth, but because of significant structural alterations in the societies depicted. By way of such modellings we can not merely argue to the feasibility of lasting peace, but push ahead with the argument, that societies of these restructured sorts are desirable alternatives to contemporary military- industrial arrangements. For those of us then who want to move towards such pacific alternatives, the practical inference, from feasibility and desirability is clear: we should begin on the real work of structural change. Peace is possible and desirable, but the prospects are poor (as Heilbroner has said of the human prospect). Present arrangements, though contingent and fashioned in large measure from the schemes of past intellectuals, are thoroughly entrenched, and enforced, both ideologically and by much physical power, often as if along with natural law they were God­ given, though they are no longer appropriate. Even small nonstructural changes look difficult to achieve in present political climates. Through climates have not changed that much, major social improvements have been gained, not instantanously, but in longer-term struggles with government. Such short-term difficulties did not deter social theorists such as Kant, who like Rousseau before him and many after him, were concerned with obtaining lasting peace. The world has changed enormously since the time of Kant’s proposals for peace (of 1795), and even since the time of Veblen’s more cynical additions (in 1917). Hard science and �31 destructive power have grown enormously; and even theoretical knowledge of collective behaviour, especially that admitting of game-theoretic treatment, though still slight, has advanced. But political arrangements and what can be accomplished politically have, in important respects, changed very little, since Rousseau complained (around 1761) that governments were probably too short-sighted to appreciate the merits of his project for perpetual peace. Governments have long been, and been seen as, main obstacles to peace. Thus Veblen rightly maintained that ‘... if the peace is to be kept it will have to come about irrespective of governmental management, - in spite of the State rather than by its good offices’ (p.7).^^ So it has been with most major social changes; for they have involved structural political change disturbing to governmental conservatism. In his search for the indispensible conditions for lasting peace, Kant claimed, as others have claimed since, that peace is not possible under present structural arrangements of an unregulated competing nation-state kind. As times have changed, so, to a limited extent, have state structural arrangements, since Kant compiled his conditions. In particular, there is now, in the shape of the United Nations, a very weak reflection of what Kant looks for, a world (or European!) federation of nations. But crucial ingredients in Kant’s resolution are still lacking:- namely, at the upper level, what is required for a standard resolution of Prisoners Dilemma type situations - some surrender of national sovereignty, especially as regards war, and, at the lower level, “republican” states. Major blockages to adequate arrangements for peace remain at two critical levels of organisation, that concentrated upon of the organisation of collectives of states and, in part by devolution, that of the internal organisation of individual states themselves. Much evidence has now accumulated that more far-reaching changes than Kant, Rousseau and Veblen envisaged are required at both international and nation-state levels if genuine peace is to be secured. Indeed significant changes are wanted even in republician states for peace movements to get their mixed message through already fixed channels to state control systems. For this sort of reason, movements on a single front, such as peace, are unlikely to succeed on their own, but should be linked into a broader plurality of movements, which seek to widen informational and democratic channels, and to alter the character and membership of state systems, and thereby render them much more controllable and accountable.40 Many longer-haul structural changes depend upon diverting nuclear war in the meantime. Thus arguing for more far-reaching changes, for an altered nonaligned Australia, �32 for a nuclear-free South Pacific, for regional structural changes, certainly does not exclude arguing and working for obvious measures for reducing risks of nuclear war. These include: a serious commitment to arms control by the superpowers (whose practices threaten our futures, though most of us lack representation in either); a move away from war-fighting strategies and associated destabilising weapons-systems; moderation of confrontational rhetoric and other tensions-inducing practices by superpower administrations, and improved efforts at mutual understanding (as well some appreciation of the elements of political pluralism); and then, remote though it may appear, significant steps towards nuclear disarmament. Richard Sylvan 41 Bungendore NSW �33 NOTES 1. Queensland premier, with destructive deep-South policies. 2. The point, which has become controversial, is argued in effect in Gilbert. 3. See especially Dibb, as reported in the ANU Reporter, and for a more guarded elaboration, his IAD (e.g. p.163 ‘At present, planning for the defence of Australia lack coherence because there is no clear definition, in priority order, of what needs defending’); see also Sharp, p.l48ff and differently Langtry and Ball, p.575ff., p.6O5ff. The much-heralded Dibb Review of mid-1986 would, if (as already seems unlikely) it were adopted, remove some of the lesser incoherence in Australian policy, that involving details of regional defensive defence (as would also Langtry and Ball, if followed through). While Dibb appears to have demolished what he refers to scathingly as the ‘largely mythical “core force” concept’, a new controversy has sprung up over whether Australia’s more self-reliant defence should be purely defensive defence, Dibb’s ill-named ‘strategy of denial’, or whether it should include an offensive component. Dibb himself has rather rapidly shifted ground on this important issue. In late 1983 he was contending that ‘Australia should have in the force-in-being significant deterrent capabilities, based on present air and naval strike assets, which can mount defensive and offensive operations against attacking forces, their staging bases and lines of resupply’ (IAP, p.166). But in the otherwise conservative Review of 1986 such offensive defence is abandoned; no such forces and equipment for offensive off-shore operations are recommended. Instead ‘the review proposes a layered strategy of defence within our area of direct military interest. Our most important defence planning concern is to ensure that an enemy would have substantial difficulty in crossing the sea and air gap’. The new offensive/defensive defence controversy puts the Review’s adoption in increasing doubt - in which event the local incoherence in strategic planning processes and militational difficulties Dibb alludes to early in his statement will presumably persist. The Review not merely fails to address significant regional issues, as to defence priorities, and as to multiple purpose roles for Australian armed forces given that they will be involved in virtually no military activity other than maintenance and a certain “preparedness” (for on Dibb’s overstatement of the prevailing view of Australia’s very favourable regional security prospects, ‘there is no conceivable prospect of any power contemplating invasion of our continent and subjugation of our population’). But further, the Review is itself vague to incoherent, concerning wider defence issues, vague as to the post-ANZUS situation, and incoherent about Australia’s role in US global “defence” activity. According the Dibb (CT, p.16), ‘there is no requirement for Australia to become involved in United States contingency planning for global war. The presence of the joint facilities, together with the access that we provide to visits by United States warships and the staging through of Australia of B-52 bombers, are a sufficient tangible contribution to the Alliance.’ These contributions are not involvement? That is not how the USSR views the matter: they are the reported sole �34 basis of USSR nuclear targetting of Australia (see Dibb. SS p.13). global stance is left essentially to the USA. And Australia's Amazingly, in the Strategic Basis Papers (SB), Australia criticizes New Zealand because ‘it has still developed no policy for national defence and tends to look to ... the US as its primary source of defence guidance’ (p.29). Note that C3I abbreviates the mouthful, Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence. 4. See Sharp, p.l46ff. An Australian policy should moreover fit with the genuine needs and shared aspirations of local people - to the extent, presumably, that these are commendable; again the presupposed value framework is critical. 5. Thus e.g. Gray (p.17) on the Reagan Administration’s ‘foolhardy brief willingness to talk publicly about nuclear strategy’, and his distain for public involvement or input. There is some concern, especially among neo-conservatives, about US defence strategies being ‘undermined by well-meaning persons who believe they are helping the cause of peace’ (Bell p.10; similarly Gray). Even those not so far right support partial information releases which maintain public confidence; e.g. Dibb on ‘the release of a generalised statement about ;the] functions of the US bases in Australia ... to give Australians more confidence about their crucial contribution to the Allied cause’ (ISA, p.166). ‘Our defence policy-making process is probably more “closed” than that of any other advanced Western democracy’ according to Langtry and Ball (p.608), who contend that ‘the public needs to be involved much more in our defence planning and operations'. For a justified critique of public exclusion and leave-it-to-the-experts approaches, see B. Martin; also Sharp. 6. The paper was drafted in mid-1985. 7. For those amassing evidence that Australia falls into the inexact class of client states, the following Australian contribution is noteworthy: ‘The US prefers to act as a member of a group, and a contribution by Australia can also assist in demonstrating to Congressional and public opinion that the objectives sought are significant enough to attract allied support’ (SB, p.28) 8. As to DI and arms control, see, e.g. Mack PR and Gray. As to D2, ‘USA has now an announced first-strike nuclear targeting policy’ technologically reinforced, Hayes, p.4; and see also Mack AC, p.111. The goal of the Reagan administration is superiority (a conveniently ambiguous term). Thus e.g. Gray (p.32): ‘it is of course essential that the United States modernize its offensive forces so as to render the Soviet Union genuinely offensive-counterforce incompetent.’ 9. On the major changes in American policy, see e.g. Gray p.118 ff. Though America is now said to have a ‘new national security concept of which SDI is the centerpiece’ it may still lack an ‘arms control policy’ (Gray, p.25,pll). Not only arms control, but American commitment to the security of allies, remain at least decidedly cloudy matters. Thus it is of little avail to contend that Australia does have a coherent secondorder global policy, namely the (discreditable) one of following prevailing American policy. For the US lacks a first-order policy which is sufficiently clear in relevant respects. The American direction of Australian policy had better be away from too much public exposure because Australians, no more than New Zealanders, mostly do not like being pushed around, even by Americans. �35 10. Thus we can avoid the important debate as to whether, and to what extent, deterrence remains part of US global “defence” policy (though it certainly remains part of the policy sold to the American public). As to the philosophical significance of the debate, see Gay, p.l29ff. and Benn. 11. The common-interest theme is often traced to (partly self-interested) American action in the Pacific in World War II. Curiously Australia’s interests are are now said also to converge with those of Japan, but to be diametrically opposed to those of the USSR (despite increasing trade). 12. Nor, though this is a longer story, does Australian culture by any means coincide with American: see CPD. Thus a uniform treatment is entirely inappropriate. Similarly, a single overarching treatment for a monolithic West is thoroughly inadequate: see further below in the text. 13. Australian planning should be looking at strategic models (game-theoretic and other) which include Australia. For, as argued below, abandoning the uniformity assumption of the monolithic West, of the West as one parish, makes significant differences to the results yielded. 14. As Cock goes on: ‘These basic issues increasingly become lost in the array of consumer choices’. 15. ‘The serf societies - more or less willingly - accept the status of “allies”, i.e. protection with rights and duties as in feudal societies. They become client countries’ (Galtung, p.169). 16. So-called by Mack PC. But the formulation presented follows G. Davidson’s more satisfactory account in Canberra Times, Wednesday, May 8, 1985, p.2. Mack considers that what amounts to the elitist case is the ‘altogether more sophisticated argument [which] holds sway ... in government’ (p.l, italics added)! 17. The “Asian hordes” derive from one of the less spoken about successors to the Yellow Peril, from the immediate past days of the Asian communist threat, the Domino theory, and White Australia. 18. As Stephenson argued, less fortunately, 20 years ago. Even when around World War II Japan, did have interest in access to strategic raw materials, the Japanese High Command decided against invading Australia because of the difficulty of dealing with the people - a point of much importance. 19. Of course, such military expenditure is also encouraged by economic forces, e.g. like much Third World hard currency expenditure it helps the American economy along a bit. 20. Heilbroner has traced some of the economic components and consequences of what, with excess exaggeration and insufficient irony, he calls ‘the rise and subsequent fall of the American imperium’ (p.52): it hasn’t fallen that far yet. ‘Empires have always been expensive and the American empire was no exception. ... The sheer military cost ... for the United States alone ... is roughly ten percent of ... GNP for the last 25 years ($2 x 10) in 1972 dollars)’. American imperial spending supplemented by other capitalist countries fueled inflation, enhanced poverty, etc., and was complements by, what it was represented as required by, counterexpenditure and efforts by the USSR. �36 ‘The establishment of an American hegemony [consisted and: resulted not just in very large military expenditures, but in the rapid build-up of American capital investments abroad. Between 1950 and 1970, the value of American-owned plant and equipment abroad leaped from $12 billion to $78 billion’ (p.54). A result of the expenditure abroad was a serious balance of payments problem (negative “capital flows” and balances), and a growing accumulation of IOUs. On this sort of basis, Heilbroner speculates that ‘the mere operations of the American imperium by itself - deemed of such critical importance to preserve the peace and security of the capitalist world - was in all likelihood a sufficient condition for the globalisation of the inflationary phenomena’ (p.57 with insert from p.56). According to Heilbroner, ‘Long before the Vietnam debacle, it was clear that American arms could not prevent the rise of revolutionary governments in the under-developed world’ (p.57). But really very little evidence of collapse is presented by Heilbroner; and seemingly there is little. What there is more substantial evidence for is the marked decline of the American imperium in the period (1973-8) concerned. One piece of evidence is the sharp decline in America’s share of World GDP, shown in the following table of select leading national economies: SHARE OF WORLD GDP (%) POPULATION SHARE COUNTRY RANK 1968 1975 1984 (1984 est) USA 1 35.0 24.3 25.0 5.2 USSR 2 11.1 11.0 13.8 6.2 JAPAN 3 5.2 8.0 9.5 2.7 GERMANY FDR 4 5.1 6.7 5.7 1.5 FRANCE 5 4.6 5.4 CHINA 6 2.9 4.8 4.3 22.6 UK 8 2.8 2.8 2.3 1.3 4.4 1.3 INDIA 12 1.3 1.5 1.1 15.1 AUSTRALIA 15 1.1 1.4 1.0 0.3 �37 The table should also make it clear that if the USA cannot sustain a grand empire, nor can the USSR. A totalitarian Pax Sovietica is even less likely than a capitalistic Pax American was. 21. Although, so the documents continue, ‘neighbourhood contingencies .... are at present assessed as impossible’! The theme that the USA affords no sure guarantee of Australian defence is reiterated in Langtry and Bell, e.g. p.608. They go on there to outline the major points that reliance upon the US has distorted Australian arrangements (with forces better equipped to fight alongside the Americans in Asia than on their own in defending Australia) and has led to neglect of the regional priorities, ‘to defence planning which at least would recently paid little attention to the direct defence of our continent and the protection of our remote communities’ (p.608). 22. The French, who operate a global network second only to the Americans and more extensive than the Russians, with many forces in the Pacific region, have never been seriously considered. Yet in certain significant respects French social and cultural arrangements are closer to Antipodean ones than American arrangements are. In these days of technological warfare, the post-Waterloo loss record of the French should not be given too much weight; we don’t after all look very hard at the American record of defeats and incompetence. Etc. 23. If Australia is not likely to be threatened there is no real deterrence advantage because nothing to deter. Other advantages of the ANZUS alliance such as access to high-level intelligence are not only dubious (see PC, D. Martin), but not always guaranteed by the alliance as the blackout of New Zealand shows. 24. Soviet activity is undoubtedly perceived rather differently by American administrations than Antipodean ones. ‘An agressive, treacherous, ruthlessly self-interested, expansionist increasingly powerful, and hence increasingly threatening state - that is the image of the Soviet Union in America. It is the image which has legitimised the strategic modernation and Star Wars programs’ (to adopt Mack ST, pl). To see that this is indeed the intellectually shoddy route by which these grand and dangerous programs are justified, it is enough to work through fundamentalist sources, such as Gray. It is almost as if Americans had projected some of their own occasionally-manifested worst features into the giant enemy. 25. After some considerable reconstruction, that is. For the argument, curiously referred as that of “central balance” in newspaper-level publications of academics (e.g. Catley, Bell), is never presented in requisite detail - which is one reason why it has proved hard to criticise and refute. 26. As well both the premiss and its usual substitutes are false (see MF). The type of argument exhibited is a good example of prevalent Australian consequentialist thinking. A parallel argument, enjoying unwarranted popularity, runs: We might as well sell uranium (e.g. to France), because if we don’t someone else will - as if motives counted morally for nothing. 27. See also the discussion of Bell’s claims in D. Martin and in Mack PC. 28. Since the New Zealand restrictions on nuclear ships, ‘the Soviet media has been full of gloating references to the prospect of the collapse of the ANZUS treaty’ according to Dibb (SS, p.14). Given the unimportance of the Antipodes to Soviet interests (as Dibb �38 himself explains), Dibb is surely exaggerating, at least, when he later claims that ‘the prospect of the breakup of the AN ZUS treaty would be of enormous benefit to the USSR’s world-wide interests’ (SS p.31). Soviet support for Antipodean independence and for ‘a real nuclear weapon-free zones' in the South Pacific has its disconcerting elements (‘with friends like that ...’); but luckily the quality of ideas does not depend essentially on their sources and supporters. 29. As WPI serves to show. In a different context, Bell objects to Australian free-loading ‘on other people’s risks and burdens. That has certainly not been our tradition, and I hope it will not become so, since it is morally quite indefensible’ (p.7). Not so: bludging, for instance, is a well-established, if disapproved of, part of the tradition; and in some cases it is morally in order. However, free-riding is not being proposed merely for self interested reasons, e.g. to remove the present risks of nuclear targetting; it is being proposed with a view to altering the two great alliance structures that at present dominate international politics. Bell’s objection to such a course is that it ‘would on the one hand tend to increase the tendency of the superpowers to unilateralism, and on the other hand tend to induce many of the minor powers in question (including Australia) to consider acquiring nuclear capacity’ (p.7). The second alternative neglects the non­ proliferation treaty, to which Australia is a signatory; the first appears to assume erroneously that friendly relations with America are foregone; both are pretty minor considerations (and both can be dealt with in other negotiated ways) compared with the major problem of nuclear war. 30. The less than perspicuous symbolism is that used in Hardin (CA, p.20, p.39), but with agents’ costs or contributions, C, duly agent relativized. Hardin misleadingly treats C as a fixed parameter, thus strictly falsifying the tautology. 31. Thus Hardin who (in CA) claims to ‘demonstrate the equivalence of the logic of collective action and the Prisoners’ Dilemma’ (p.4) The demonstration is given on p.25ff. 32. But of course the two types of dilemma interconnect. 33. Even so, significant change in USA looks unlikely. Present arrangements suit not only the American corporate-administrative power elite, which can direct public opinion through its control of the main communications media, but many other fat-cat Americans, rather well. The polarisation of the world into two camps increases US control of the larger and far wealthier camp, yet scarcely reduces US trade or markets. While it does limit the global coverage of US business and multinationals, and somewhat restricts the transfer of other regions’ surplus value to the USA, it ensures the much greater advantage of being able to maintain the US domestic political economy on a military basis. The US and the USSR not only dance together; they were made for each other. Abroad US hegemony is maintained through a series of alliances and economic control strategies. Particularly ominous for the South Pacific are the Trilateral and Pacific Rim arrangements (which, with much local assistance, are helping to send Australia on its present economic trajectory). When advice or persuasion directed at allies and client states fail, economic measures can be resorted to (capital outflows, for instance, being a highly effective mechanism, “aid” a lesser device). For the most part, the imperial war machine can remain in the background. At home updated and improved imperial measures also work well. The mass consumerist society affords a rich and diverting selection of bread (much of it again imported) for a majority of Americans; television �39 and its entertainment variants offer a constant diet of circuses. For passive middle mainstream America, the vast police and security network remains a largely background and even unnoticed phenomenon; what is seen is even welcomed as a necessary shield from that other, dangerous, minority America. American social, educational and media management of opinion is obviously successful. Of present relevance, most Americans have been convinced that unilateral disarmament would be unAmerican. Thus the American administration, being hedged in by opinion they have helped to generate, cannot move in any such directions. For, given popular opinion, it would of course be politically disastrous, as well as undemojl’cratic! In the USSR, where political control is exercised to a much greater extent through overt power, present change of substance appears even less likely. 34. More of the negative enterprise is attempted elsewhere, e.g. a critique of the supposed strait-jacket of human nature is begun in CPD. From Plato through Hegel and into contemporary times it has been erroneously supposed that war, like aggression, is part of human nature, that war is a permanent (and perhaps even desirable) condition of human and social existence. For a refutation, see e.g. Trainer and Waite. 35. As observed by B. Martin, who uses this important form of argument for institutional change to get this thick book started (pp.12-13). 36. The swarm includes some anomalies, such as that somewhat tarnished hero of deep ecology, Spinoza: see e.g. Northedge. 37. Perhaps Kant had some such scenario in view in his theme that peace is empirically possible, which he coupled with his striking claim that peace is morally and rationally imperative. The latter claim, running in direct opposition to the long line of bellicose philosophers, really relies on the correct, but controversial, assumption that states are subject to the same moral relations as individual persons. Both then have an obligation to seek peace derived from forms of the categorial morality, notably from rational autonomy, the universality of maxims, and the ultimate value of persons (or, yet more chauvinistically, of humanity). 38. Veblen argued against the State on the basis that ‘governmental establishments and ... powers ... are derived from feudal establishments of the Middle Ages; which in turn, are of a predatory origin and of an irresponsible character’ (p.9), however the Christianfeudal origin of the State provided only one - and a coersive - evolutionary pattern of organisation (pp. 12-13), a pattern much influenced moreover by schemes of intellectuals. Other patterns remain feasible. 39. There are now theoretical arguments for Kant’s claim, as well as practical arguments of an inductive sort. 40. Such is also the new message from America: for the peace movement to get through to the administration, American democracy must be overhauled and revitalised, capitalist democracy superseded by true democracy or “republicanism” (see especially Cohen and Rogers, and earlier Chomsky). 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Erlich, Population, Resources, Environment, Second edition, Freeman, San Francisco, 1976. H. Feith,‘Richard Falk, World order radical’, Peace Studies 24 (1985) 24-5. J. Galtung, There are Alternatives, Spokesman, Nottingham, 1984. W.C. Gay, ‘Myths about nuclear war: misconceptions in public beliefs and governmental plans’, Philosophy and Social Criticism, 9(1982) 117-144. A. Gilbert, ‘The state and nature in Australia’, Australian Cultural History 1981 (ed. S. Goldberg and F.B. Smith), Canberra, 1982, pp.9-28. �42 C.S. Gray, ‘The Reagan administration and arms control’, paper presented at The Future of Arms Control Conference, Canberra. August 1985. R. Hardin, Collective Action, Resources for the Future, Washington, 1982; referred to as CA. R. Hardin, ‘Unilateral versus mutual disarmament’, Philosophy and Public Affairs 12(1983) 236-254. M.D. Hayes, ‘Defending the sunburnt country’, Chain Reaction 33(August-September 1983) 11-17. R.L. Heilbroner, Beyond Boom and Bust, Norton, New York, 1978. I. Kant, Perpetual Peace (trans, and introd. M. Campbell Smith), Swan Sonnerschein, London, 1903 (first published 1795). J. O. Langtry and D Ball (eds), A Vunerable Country, Australian National University Press, Canberra, 1986. A. Mack, ‘Farewell to Arms Controls’, Peace Research 9(1984) 9ff.; referred to as PR. A. Mack, ‘The pros and cons of ANZUS’, Fabian ANZUS Conference, Lome, 4-5 May 1985; referred to as PC. A. Mack, ‘Arms control, disarmament and the concept of defensive defence’, Disarmament 8(3)(1984) 109-119; referred to as AC. A. Mack, ‘The Soviet threat thesis: perceptions, capabilities and interests’ typescript, Canberra, May 1985; referred to as ST. B. Martin, Uprooting War, Freedom Press, London, 1984. B. Martin, Armed Neutrality for Australia, Drummond Books, Melbourne, 1984. F.S. Northedge, ‘Peace, war and philosophy’, in Encyclopedia of Philosophy (ed P. Edwards), Volume 6, Macmillan, New York, 1967, 63-67. M. Olson, The Logic of Collective Action, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1965. P. Pettit, ‘Free riding and foul dealing’, Journal of Philosophy, to appear, J.J. Rousseau, A Project for Perpetual Peace (trans. E.M. Nuttal), London, 1927 (first Published 1761). R. Routley, ‘On the ethics of large-scale nuclear war and nuclear deterrence, and the political fall out’, Discussion papers in Environmental philosophy #5, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University, 1984. R. Routley, ‘Metaphysical fall-out from the nuclear predicament’, Philosophy and Social Criticism 3/4(1984) 19-34; referred to as MF. R. Routley and V. Plumwood, ‘Moral dilemmas and the logic of deontic notions’, Discussion Papers in Environmental Philosophy #6, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University, 1984; referred to as MD. �43 R. Sharp (ed.), Apocalypse No. Pluto Press, Sydney, 1984. P.R. Stephenson, The Foundations of Culture, W.J. Miles, Sydney, 1936. R. Sylvan, ‘Culture and the roots of political divergence’, typescript, Canberra, 1985; referred to as CPD. M. Taylor and H. Ward, "Chickens, whales, and bumpy goods: alternative models of public­ goods provision’, Political Studies 30(1982) 350-370. T. Trainer and H. Waite, ‘Culture and the production of aggression’, in Sharp, ep.cit, 205-226. The Strategic Basis of Australian Defence Policy, leaked extracts published in the National Times, March 30-April 5, 1984, 23-30; referred to as SB. Threats to Australian Security, Parliamentary Joint Committee for Foreign Affairs and Defence, Australian Government Printer, Canberra; referred to as TAS. T. Veblen, An Inquiry into the Nature of Peace and the Terms of its Perpetuation, Viking Press, New York, 1945 (first published 1917). � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Draft Papers Description An account of the resource Sylvan's literary executor encountered an archive in which “all his projects were current", since manuscripts were undated and unattributed. Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document AUSTRALIA’S DEFENCE PHILOSOPHY: Further investigations of the nonexistent. ‘The opinions of philosophers, with regard to the conditions of the possibility of a public peace, shall be taken into consideration by states armed for war’ (Kant, ‘A [the only!] secret article for perpetual peace’, p.158 - a surprising article, flattering no doubt to philosophers, but neglecting their dominant bellicose tradition). A defence philosophy is much more than a defence policy, just as a philosophy of technology comprises much more than a technology policy. A policy can be given merely by a list of directives as to what do in various circumstances; even at its best it need only involve practical wisdom. By contrast, a philosophy goes deeper and requires theoretical wisdom, integration of the policy into a theoretical setting, which looks, among other things, at the central arguments and key concepts involved: here, security, stability, control, protection, defence, interests, national interests, intelligence, war, etc. Defence philosophy is thus a branch of political and social philosophy, and has long been treated as such, though under such more familiar and honest headings as “of war” and “of peace”. Like most parts of philosophy, it can be applied, for instance in shaping policies, in regional ways among others. A defence philosophy should integrate appropriate defence arrangements and approaches to war and peace, not merely or superficially into “foreign policy” or assumed “international relations”, but into the way and intended way of life of a country, both into on-going culture and into the intended or planned cultural arrangements. A defence policy typically takes prevailing socio-political arrangements and power structures for granted; a defence philosophy again penetrates deeper, questioning or rejecting features of these structures, enquiring as to the merits of things and institutions of which defence is planned, asking what sort of society should be defended by what sort of appropriate methods and at what lengths. What, for instance, is Australia, what are Australians, defending, concerned to defend, aiming to defend? Here in Australia? In the region? Abroad? How much of what others have, or what we have, is worth defending, preserving? Does Randwick Racecourse, or Pine Gap, merit defending? Would anyone stage a last stand for Oaks Estate, one of Canberra’s dreariest suburbs? If the Indonesians made a lightning strike in Australia just to remove Bjelke-Petersen,1 should we resist? Few of the necessary prerequisites have been adequately thought about in Australia, where unplanned muddling through from immediate problem to immediate problem - reactive contingency “planning”, if you want to be generous - is the main style of political life , and, along with the traditional political game of “follow the leader”, of defence planning. Australia 2 does not yet have a defence philosophy. Some of its critical philosophers could help to supply it with the rudiments of one or more, and to inject some depth into broader defence theorizing. What follows is intended as a modest beginning: much of what is attempted, unearthing arguments and assumptions, followed by analysis and criticism, and some elaboration of alternative principles, falls squarely within the domains both of applied philosophy and traditional philosophical practice. 1. Australia’s inappropriate. defence “policy”: incoherent, obsolescent Australia seems to lack even a clear and coherent defence policy. American, This is a commonplace charge (made even by friends of Defence, interested in obtaining extra public funding for defence and elements of C3I).^ The reasons concern not merely the major unsolved issues of exactly what is being defended, what things and objects and what interests, and whose, what freedoms and values, and what role American defence facilities in Australia are supposed to have in this. They concern the status of present treaty arrangements, such as the “cornerstone”/“millstone” ANZUS treaty, signed between Australia, New Zealand and the US, now in disarray (still ’‘maintained” by New Zealand, whom the US has unilaterally announced expelled), and of subsequent associated memoranda of understanding (some secret, involving the local storage of US nuclear weapons, entry of American personnel, etc.). They also concern a range of more detailed lucunae such as: lack of clearly-defined priorities on what needs defending and how it is to be accomplished; doubtful capacity of present defence forces to handle low-level contingencies in and to the north of Australia and in maritime zones; and unsatisfactory (or no) arrangements and planning for “defence-in-depth”, for civil defence and use of civil infrastructure, mobilisation, wartime administration, protection of key facilities and areas, and post-nuclear organization. And, equally damaging, if its policy makers do have a coherent policy it is nowhere satisfactorily revealed to the peoples of Australia.It is left to journalists and newspaper­ watching academics to winkle out what local defence installations may be for and to make various conjectures as to what the policy may be. Of course there are many administrators and policy makers who think that is the way it should be; the public should not be informed, but kept satisfied with some “generalised” statements.As to coherence, Australian policy makers have only recently found out that Australia has a (purely) regional defence role, not a global one. This they were told by the Americans in Washington in talks allegedly designed to clarify commitments under treaty arrangements with the USA. It thus begins to look as if Australia’s defence policy, such as it is, is still as much determined abroad, by US policy makers, as it is locally in Australia. 3 Much circumstantial evidence can be assembled to confirm the claim that Australia’s vague defence policy can now be stamped Made in USA, as it used, before the last World War (and British abandonment), to be stamped Made in UK. For one thing, Australia has had a bipartisan defence policy, so it is claimed. That “policy” has however been essentially shaped by the Liberal party, which has governed most of the time (as senior partner in a coalition). But the Liberal party simply took over US arrangements for Australia (as planned in Washington for ANZUS) and still does. For instance, the latest package® from the Liberal Party “Defence and Foreign Policy Unit” consists largely of US Defence Department material packaged under a local cover. The Strategic Basis Papers, endorsed by the Labor Government, give virtually unqualified support to US military practices and to the American view of the global strategic situation, and commit Australia to supporting, without any due reservation, American positions in world forums.' The same dependent-policy conclusion can be reached by more devious arguments. regional defence role? When, for example, did Australia find out it had a After the Americans had found that they could no longer afford to police the world on their own and would have to delegate some of that role and offload some of the heavy associated costs, on reliable dogs-bodies; and also after Labor took some faltering steps towards developing a broader foreign more independent policy with some indigenous elements (Australian Minister Hayden was promptly flattened by US heavies such as Schultz). Australian defence and foreign policy copies American policy in main respects, but lags it. The Australian defence policy presented by the Labor government, to the extend that it is visible, is conservative; it coincides with older American defence policy, and diverges from the new (post-Reagan) American war policy. For Australian Labor defence policy supports what the American administration supposedly used to support, namely DI. Multilateral nuclear disarmament (within the framework of series of treaties and agreements), and D2. Deterrence in the interim, deterrence through mutual assured destruction (i.e. MAD). The presence of American military facilities in Australia is supposed to be justified in the framework of these assumptions. For they are to assist in making deterrence under D2 effective, and to provide verification for the arms reduction arrangements under DI (both stabilizing functions). There is much evidence indicating however that American policy makers have now abandoned both Dl and D2 and any serious attempts at nuclear arms control8. Certainly they have moved on to the following highly destabilizing doctrines: Nuclear war-fighting, Limited nuclear wars, and Star-Wars (i.e. Strategic Defense Initiative). While this American war policy may well be accepted by the next Liberal coalition government, all of these military doctrines are explicitly rejected by the 1985 Labor government. Since the American “joint” facilities in Australia also facilitate the rejected 4 objectives, the problems concerning these dubious facilities are much aggravated. The Government’s approach concerning them - withholding information concerning the full range of their functions, and particularly their war-fighting roles from parliament and the public - is certainly unsatisfactory, as several of its members realise; and as a result the Government appear in not atypical disarray, further grist for the incoherence theme. If there is perhaps a coherent Australian global defence approach somewhere away from public exposure, it is most likely then an old abandoned American policy.9 But in that case it certainly lacks - what it in any case appears to lack - justification. For Australia, in supporting US defence policy and activity, for instance in world forums, is supporting present offensive American policy, not what it reputedly adheres to, deterrence (through MAD). The point holds good whether or not American global policy still includes such deterrence as a proper part10; for it certainly involves other very different and dubious strategies. The commonplace, but increasingly feeble, justification given for Australian’s tagging along after America is that Australian interests are the same as American11. American interests by no means coincide with Australian . However Consider, for instance, such matters as enriching Americans, making conditions favourable for American business, promoting Americans and things American. Consider, differently, American practices in Latin America, from undercutting Allende’s government in Chile to its practices against Nicaragua, to its extensive export of arms and violent methods, there and elsewhere in the world. Thus America, like Russia, is busy meddling in Africa, but ‘Australian security interests are not directly involved’ (SB, p.24). Consider, differently again, escalation of the nuclear arms race. Or consider American strategic planning, and all the game- and decision- theoretic models which concern just USA and its adversary USSR, perhaps occasionally adding Europe as part of the monolithic West, but rarely or never considering the Southern Hemisphere - so that either Australia is part of America as Poland may be of Russia or it is nothing. Or consider American interests not merely in Soviet and communist containment, but in containing socialism such as might (under more auspicious conditions) flourish in Australia. An American policy answering to American interests is accordingly inappropriate for Australia, inappropriate for Antipodean socialism. Australians should do their own defence thinking and work out a policy appropriate for Australia. (That applies also to Australian political representatives, who should stop parroting implausible American views and begin developing some genuinely local and original ones.) Should Australia be tagging along after the Americans in support of installation of their style of free-enterprise capitalism everywhere feasible (i.e. that the state socialists don’t already heavily control)? What they quite seriously call ‘keeping the free world free’? Of 5 course freedom has, in this sort of context, multiple meanings and associations (as well as multiple inconsistencies, appearing information” and the like). overtly in subsidized “free trade”, selective “free Significant parts of what mainstream American culture admits under the freedom umbrella, mainstream Australian culture would exclude: for instance, active opposition to and undermining of social and socialist programs and governments, bullying of small countries that impose barriers to US business or military practices (all part of “free enterprise”), etc. What of those intangible freedoms the cultures supposedly agree about, civil liberties, freedom to information, to live and work where one chooses, to travel, and so on? These are certainly important freedoms, better upheld in some parts of the unaligned West (e.g. Sweden, Switzerland) than in most parts of the Eastern Block. But such freedoms, which run counter to dependent policies, hardly require defence subservience. influenced state practices are fast reducing freedom. Moreover, military- Many of the older freedoms have vanished this century, such as freedom to travel, to work and live abroad, etc.; now one requires permits, licences, passports, ... . And many more former freedoms are being or have been eroded; soon it will be identity documents, restricted zones, ID cards, as already in parts of the “free West”. Now nuclearism in Europe ‘is devouring the very freedom it is said to protect: [the Greens] point to the new laws proposed in 1983 designed to keep citizens from assembling to protest deployment of the Pershing II and cruise missiles’ (Capra and Spretnak, pp.58-9). Further structural changes required for the security of the state, imcompatible with democratic freedoms, include ‘secrecy, lack of commentability, permanent emergency, concentration of authority, peacetime militarism, extensive apparatus of state intelligence and police’ (Falk, in Feith p.24). Nuclearism is not a smart strategy to preserve remaining freedoms. 2. Inherited other-reliance, and the populist and elitist cases for patronage and subservience. Australia’s defence policy, such as it is, is furthermore inherited rather than regularly (re)thought through. But that procedure - essentially the legal method of precedence, whatever its very limited satisfactoriness in legalistic decision making - is defective when applied in politics or to defence, especially where immediate independent action is required. For precedence methods are extraordinarily slow, as well as characteristically conservative, and as in defence exclude significant and rather urgent alternatives. The unsatisfactory decision-making practices to be revealed in the case of defence are by no means restricted to defence but are typical of the kind of advanced age capitalism Australia operates under, or rather labours under, down under. In setting down those 4. 6 features of aged capitalism (‘of the Corporate State') that the New Left and Alternative Australia movements were reacting against, Cock neatly summed up these practices: Decisions were made from the top and on the basis of vested political interests, rather than by rational goals and means that served public interests. The people were rarely consulted effectively before a decision and often only partially informed afterwards. Planning was based on a mere extension of the present. ... activists felt they were given little opportunity to choose how they lived or worked. The availability of space, time, trees and air was also determined by others ... (p.18 italics added).14 As it was and is with one’s defence, military and civil, so it is with the matter of whether one lives in a nuclear target zone or not, and so on (though immigration policy, uranium and woodchip export policies, etc.) In these areas planning remains top-down, with at best consultative elements. No real choices are offered to people. A major inherited assumption is that of other reliance, that Australia’s defence depends on other more powerful allies. That ally was firstly Britain, and since World War II America; but in any event the assumption is that to be safe Australia needs a powerful patron, a protector. A corollary is that Australia adopts a suitably submissive relation to its patron, making expected concessions. And for the most part it has; however such a defence insurance policy does not come cheap.15 It costs not only money and resources, but quality of life, freedom and independence. The assumption of other-reliance is however unsound, for several reasons. Most important, it characteristically depends upon the following themes, all of which lack solid foundation: 1. Australia is threatened - or at least 1A. Australia is likely to be threatened in the near future. 2. Australia cannot defend itself. 3. Australia can however depend upon its patron (or ally), i.e. upon the USA. These three themes in fact make up what has been called the populist case for the ANZUS alliance.16 It is very different from the elitist case for ANZUS, said to hold sway with the Australian government, which, while insisting upon premiss 3, essentially rejects 1 and 2 and claims instead 4. Australian has a vital interest in global stability. 5. Global stability is under threat (constantly) by an expansionist Soviet Union. 6. Only USA can contain the Soviet threat and hold the global balance. Some of techniques the US deploys for holding global balance operate through dependent states and a network of alliances like ANZUS. But obviously further premisses are required to reach the intended conclusions that Australia should be participating in any such alliance, and what is more, hosting US defence facilities and exercises. A first such premise is the no-shirking theme, that Australia should be contributing its part to “holding the balance’’ (cf. Bell). Even this first further step is pretty shaky; as we shall see, one shaky step in a rather ramshackle case, since premisses 5 and 6 are decidedly dubious (and 4 may involve equivocation). For it can be plausibly argued that Australia’s vital interests are not guaranteed by US techniques, which threaten to upset the whole applecart, and can be obtained by alternative more satisfactory means outside of such soft alliances as ANZUS. In any case, it is unclear that local contributions enhance global (nuclear) stability (see e.g. Mack and Davidson). But first, there is more pernicious regionalist version of the elitist position to be considered, what might be called the offshore elitist position. This position grants 2A*. Australia can defend itself against regional threats, and can look after itself regionally. But it does not (as indeed other qualified elitist positions may not) grant 1A. What the offshore position insists upon is 1AI*. Australia’s interests could be threatened in the near future. Since these interests - perhaps concerned with trade, Australian companies or Australians abroad, or whatever - may have little or nothing to do with internal Australian security, this premiss represents an extremely important shift (a shift not unrelated to the inverse bureaucratic shift from war to defence). It goes further than what has been called forward defence. In extended form the offshore position does call for some sort of global policeman or police force ready to intervene whenever a “free port” anywhere looks like closing its doors. Part of the difficulty in getting to grips with the elitist position is that it tends to slide through to the offshore position (by way of now evident immediate positions). The arguments against both the populist and elitist cases, and indeed against virtually all of themes 1 through 7 are sufficiently familiar to justify but a fairly brief outline of some of the main points involved. Of course just a couple of defections from themes 1 through 7 would serve logically defeat both cases, but there have been some interesting repair attempts, designed to float the arguments on diminished premisses. 3. The brief against the popular populist case; the need for new directions. Contra 1 and 1A. While Australia is not at present under notice of threat, veiled threat or harassment from abroad, a majority of its population appears to believe that it is. As the popular view is not the informed, administrative, or parliamentary view, it is worth inquiring 8 why the popular view persists, as the opinion polls reveal it has. The populace has been deliberately kept in the dark (or even misinformed), because this suits bipartisan government purposes. Although both main Australian political parties are well enough aware that the main assumptions underlying the populist case are false, the reasons for which they support the American alliance (e.g. those of the elitist case) are much more difficult to sell to the public. Accordingly the parties and Government have no political interest in undermining the unsound populist case. In particular they have gone out of their way not to cast doubt upon the connected assumption that US is a reliable guarantor against all threats. Thus long-standing Australian psychological insecurity about security has been allowed to stand, and has not been assuaged by any requisite informational and educational effort. In particular, older attitudes to Asia persist not far below the surface of popular Australia: fear, mistrust and xenophobia, patched over by a pragmatic attachment to trade and tourism. This misplaced insecurity is fuelled by popular misconceptions of Australia and its place in the world: metaphorically, that Australia is a luscious plum ripe for Eastern picking, instead of the Asians view that Australia, so far as they are aware of it at all, is a remote desiccated uncouth place perhaps good for some trade and investment. Or, to get towards more concrete assumptions, Australians apparently tend to their view country as affluent but underpopulated, resource rich but largely defenceless; yet not far to the north are Asian hordes who are impoverished, resource poor, and so on . Such a view is seriously out of touch with reality. Parts of Asia are now at least as affluent (on conventional economic indicators) as Australia. They do not see themselves as overpopulated, in a way that calls for mass exodus; and in those areas which are as overpopulated as Europe, such as Java, bribes and force are required to move people on transmigration programs to relatively unoccupied parts of the Indonesian empire. So far as they require them, they can purchase Australian resources - which are not unique - much more easily and cheaply (because they even carry significant local subsidies) than they could obtain • them by seizure. 1s For these sorts of reasons, and because Australia itself poses no threat, no other state has a genuine interest in attempting to invade Australia. As it is for interests, so it is for capabilities. No regional power has the capacity to launch a successful invasion of Australia, or is likely to have such a capacity in the near future. As the joint Parliamentary Committee concluded, Currently only the United States would have the physical capacity to launch a full scale invasion of Australia, and it clearly lacks any motive to do so (TAS, p.94). 9 As the report also stated, quoting Synnot (former Chief of Defence Staff), ... to raise the sort of force which would be required for a mass invasion of Australia could not possibly be done in under five years by other than the superpowers (TAS). But neither superpower is at all likely to expend effort or resources to such an end. An obvious naive question which at once arises is: Why bother then with much defence? (A later question to entertain is: why not be a free-rider on collectively provided global security, such as it is?) Why not proceed forthwith to unilateral disarmament? Mack for one, having reassembled the now-standard telling case that Australia is not threatened ‘now or for the foreseeable future’, and so having broken the populist argument, is confronted by the awkward option of unilateral disarmament for Australia. He stages a hasty retreat, points to the dependence of premisses 1 and 1A on premiss 2, and proceeds to claim that ‘the populist case for ANZUS is sustained’ even without premisses 1 and 1A. It is however a decidedly problematic retreat. While it is true that the arguments against 1 and 1A may sometimes take it for granted that Australia can look after itself to some extend, put up some resistance, it is far from clear that they depend essentially on assumptions approximating premiss 2. Consider the no­ interests argument, which appears decisive given the (estimated) very limited invasion capabilities of potential invaders. The main consideration adduced appears to depend in no essential way, indeed in no obvious way at all, on Australia’s dynamic fighting forces. Australian mineral resources, to repeat one of the more sensitive examples involved, can be obtained more readily and cheaply by trade methods than military ones. What all this seems to show is that a rather minimal streamlined force, if any, would presently meet Australia’s military requirements. It is not as if Australia is ‘entirely defenceless’ without a conventional military force, like a babe-in-arms. The whole apparatus of nonmilitary defence is available on a continent well suited to its use, though lacking a population trained in its techniques. But even without requisite popular training in defence methods, Australia would be a difficult place to govern, Australians a difficult lot to subjugate. It was such features of the Australian character that deterred the Japanese on a previous occasion “If the invasion is attempted, the Australians, in view of their national character, would resist to the end. Also, because the geographical conditions of Australia present numerous difficulties in a military sense, it is apparent that a military venture in that country would be a difficult one” (TAS, p.62). The points still hold good, and could be strengthened. There are several parts to any such 10 program of nonmilitary defence: making it happen, and putting it abroad (ideally with dinkum Australian exaggeration) that it has happened. To the issue of alternative defence we are bound to return. For now, when Australia is not threatened, is a good occasion to reconsider, and begin to adapt, defence arrangements. For example, it looks very much as if enormous sums, which could be valuably directed elsewhere, are being spent, largely to make many Australians feel secure.But a much more effective and inexpensive way to such results would be through requisite popular education and psychological therapy - with, if it were well done, much more satisfactory results, a more secure and better informed people. Contra 2. As a result of post-War developments in weapons systems and C3I capabilities, the military defence of Australia has become much easier. It comes down to enhancing, through new robust and reliable systems, the enormous strategic advantages Australia enjoys by virtue of geographical isolation. In principle, any maritime invading force can now be detected well in advance of arrival, through modern radar warning systems, and destroyed by precision guided munitions. And any invaders that did manage to gain a foothold on Australian soil would face severe logistic problems, and be subject to disproportionate responses from local defence. Standard discussions (as in Dibb, Mack) proceed to introduce a great deal of “Boys’ Own War Games” stuff concerning contemporary weapon and C3I systems; the essential point is that these could serve to turn Australia into a pretty unvulnerable armed fortress, and into an extremely difficult territory were the oceanic moat crossed and the fortress entered (see especially D. Martin). Under such armed neutrality and (differently) fortified Australia defence scenarios, even invasion from outside the region by an inimical world power could be resisted with reasonable prospect of success. There is no power at all likely to mount such an invasion; there is apparently (as noted above) only one power that could, that good ally the USA (reckoned however a likely invader by 6-7% of the Australian population!). Nonetheless the threat of a Soviet invasion is taken seriously not only by the larger populace but by committees of their elected representatives. But the Soviet military has never undertaken such a long-range massive force projection, is ill-equipped to do so, and lacks any plausible reason to try such a stunt (for details see, e.g., D. Martin; also SS, ST). The only credible Soviet threat to Australia is in the context of a superpower war, when American facilities in Australia and perhaps Australian cities, would be struck at by intercontinental missiles. While this would be bad enough, it is highly unlikely that it would be followed or accompanied by an invasion. Soviet forces are once again not sufficient, and not thought sufficient by the Soviets for that sort of diversion; they would be required elsewhere in a superpower war; and they would be devastated, unless USA is militarily even more incompetent than sometimes depicted. i. 11 Contra 3. What will be argued is not the negation of 3, that the Americans cannot be relied upon, but rather that 3 is dubious, and that it would be rash to place excess reliance on American protection. That being so, and other patrons being even less promising, Australia should look more to its own resources, as the American administration is kindly advising. Especially since the American “Vietnam debacle” and the fall of Saigon, things have changed in important ways which cast doubt on the reliability of American patronage. First, the relative economic and military strength of the USA has declined significantly. It no longer has such a large share of world product(ivity); as a connected matter of policy, US world warfighting aspirations have been reduced. Its ability to act as, and afford to be, global policeman has also markedly declined/ Secondly, the willingness of Americans to engage in remote foreign wars has correspondingly tumbled. Although the American administration includes more than enough hawks, to be sure, the people and Congress are not longer in a mood for gratuitous foreign adventures, especially when the fun may not appear to be in American interests. Since Vietnam, US opinion polls regularly show strong popular opposition to overseas military involvement. This “Vietnam syndrome” has served as a major constraint on US military policy and foreign involvement. An important manifestation of these changes is the Guam Doctrine, calling upon US regional allies to take primary responsibility for their own defence in regional conflicts. Another important outcome is Defense statements to the pointed effect that before US troops are committed abroad there must be reasonable assurance of Congressional and popular support (Weinberger, reported in PC p.14). As Mack comments, ‘such assurance is impossible to guarantee - especially for remote countries where no US vital national interests are at stake’. Certainly no more is assured under the ANZUS treaty which provides only that each signatory ‘act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes’ (article 4). All the treaty strictly requires is consultation; there is no undertaking or commitment. Isn’t the treaty backed up by informal verbal reassurances? None that are not undermined by others, in American administrative multiple-speak. Even the elite view is that Australia has to ‘work ... to maximize the prospect of US support’ and that the Americans cannot be counted upon. For ‘the threshold of direct US combat involvement could be quite high, and circumstances at the time could significantly limit US willingness or ability to help Australia in other ways?. ‘... we cannot rely upon US support in a defence emergency arising within our own neighbourhood’ (SB, pp.29-30). However a special case has been made for American reliability in Australia’s case - as 12 opposed to examples of American abandonment of earlier military undertakings (in Vietnam, Cambodia, Iran) - on the basis of permanent friendship, common interests, and shared values and democratic traditions. There are two difficulties with this type of special pleading: first, as to the basis, and, second, as to the adequacy of such a basis in by-passing Congress, the American people, and slow constitutional processes. Historical evidence hardly sustains the adequacy of the basis in analogous cases. And here, as already indicated, the basis is shaky. For there is not a common culture shared by Australia and America: rather values diverge significantly on quite crucial issues. Even less are interests always common, as the matter of subsidised agricultural produce reveals, and as missile testing and nuclear ships issues in the South Pacific have recently confirmed. Interests diverged, for instance, when Australia toyed with opposing Indonesia’s claim to West Papua. So it is dubious at least that American interests would coincide with Australian in disputes or confrontation with Asian nations to the North, e.g. with Indonesia or Japan. Of course if the special case argument did hold water, Australia and America really were mates, then the treaty would be otiose. There was in fact no treaty in operation in 1942; but by then American interests in countering the Japanese were independently aroused. 4. Other-reliance and regional self-reliance A major problem with other-reliance for defence is then that it cannot be deemed entirely reliable, yet precisely here unreliability can hardly be tolerated. When the Indonesians are rolling into Brisbane it won’t do for Defense to call up with a message like that from local Services, "We can’t get there till tomorrow’’, or “until after Congress meets”, or “Sorry, Mate!”. More seriously, handing defence over to others means handing control of our lives over to others; and given nuclear defence, which too many Antipodean administrations have opted for, it quite likely means literally handing our lives over for many of us. Another problem of other-reliance is thus its adequacy. A further problem is its cost. In principle, if a State hires out its defence it would no doubt look, other things being equal, for the cheaper bidder - if, that is, defence is a commodity of a sort, like national shipping, meterological services, etc. The trouble with global defence is that the market is monopolistic, with currently only one supplier of the right complexion22, who accordingly can exact a very high price, and has - making the whole country a nuclear target and demanding substantial subservience. Similar points make part of the case, well-enough appreciated, for not trying to press defence, plainly a collective good, into a marketable commodity. When a country can supply its own defence, it therefore makes very good sense for it to do so, since it normally has a stronger interest in its own proper defence than most other parties. Should it also be cheaper in costs that matter, then self-reliance not just makes good sense but pays; other-reliance does not. But in that event, it surely does not need nuclear 13 patrons, or to farm out some of its defence. Such self-reliance undermines an important part of the older case based on other-reliance for alliances such as ANZUS. However newer bipartisan approaches to defence try to combine them (thus e.g. Australian minister Beazley as reported by Davidson) - approaches which thus begin to empty ANZUS of what little content it had, and remove much of the apparent point of such older alliances. Since the ANZUS arrangements contain no clear commitments beyond consultation but are merely vague articles of understanding, a simple course is of course to allow them to be emptied of content, so that the alliance, an expensive and outdated “insurance” policy, dies a natural death. It may however be death by seizure or convulsion should American defence facilities be closed or internationalised and passage of American nuclear equipped or powered transport be excluded from Australia. That would no doubt sacrifice the deterrence and other advantages the treaty supposedly affords , while making way for the greater advantages of friendly nonalignment, of no longer being a nuclear target, or so on. But self-reliance pure and simple is insufficient. The world does not consist of separable isolated pieces, as becomes increasingly evident. Most dramatically, Australia will not escape the effects of nuclear winter. The picture is much the same as for other dynamic subjects, such as plants which are not internally self-sufficient but depend crucially on their environment - and indeed as for States themselves. The question then is what form the additional holistic component of policy should take? Put this way, it is almost obvious that the appropriate move is not taking sides (as in a kids’ war game or tug-of-war game that is already set up) and doing one’s bit for confrontation. For that will not contribute to stability, to a proper holistic approach, but rather to sectionalism and fragmentation, and to bringing nuclear winter closer. Other-reliance and self-reliance typically present a false contrast, and certainly do with pure self-reliance - a false contrast like that of holism and partism (EE, p.223), and of dependence versus isolationism. In between lie a range of positions, one of which - favoured by a long line of peacefully-disposed philosophers from Rousseau and Kant onwards - might be called integrated reliance or federated reliance. The elitist case, insofar as it were to call for such reliance (e.g. in assumption 4), could hardly be faulted. But it doesn’t; and is satisfied with much less. Integration may reach only certain inadequate levels, the level of modern alliances and alignment, which are essentially coupled with opposition to an other side, e.g. the monolithic East (or West). It is into just this trap that elitist arguments fall. 14 5. The decline and fall of elitist arguments. Premisses 4 and 5 of the elitist argument turn around the crucial notion of stability, as related arguments revolve around that of security. But stability and security are value-laden terms, which are not cultural invariants. What stability comprehends in American administrative perception is very different from what highland villages take it to include. In each case a system is stable if it returns to a given stationary state under perturbations of sufficiently small magnitude. But both the relevant states and the stationary among them are relative to given frames of reference; for instance, what is stable at a macrolevel may well not be at a microlevel. As Trudeau has said of the superpowers, ‘they share a global perception according to which even remote events can threaten their interests or their associates’ (p.10) and disturb stability. But lesser states or regional people, not counting remote business or military interests as relevant, report no instability. Bureaucrats invariably view bombs as necessary to stability, and the nuclear fix as stability; by contrast, gentle people increasingly see bombs as tools of terrorism and as characteristically antithetical to peace. ad 4: Of course Australia has a vital interest in global stability and security: what sizeable nation does not? But the determinable motherhood interpretation (of italicised terms), while no doubt diplomatically convenient, conceals crucial differences, highly material to the argument. For one global stability means something different in USA from what it means in Costa Rica and likely what it intends in Australia. Certainly vital interests are different. America is interested in containing socialism (in Australia as elsewhere), and it tends, in more popular rhetoric at least, to equate containing socialism with containing communism and both with Soviet containment. A continental swing to socialism (or Non-Soviet communism) in Latin America, or in Africa, would upset global stability, on American perception, and would indeed have significant effects on US business or investment; but it would not on its own upset or affect most Australians or directly threaten Antipodean stability, and it certainly need not affect nuclear stability. Australians generally are not opposed in principle to socialism or notably interested in containing its spread (indeed perhaps the opposite). Australia is not interested in (and oughtn’t to be charmed by the idea of) defence of the (American) “free enterprise” system, or in the defence of uglier forms of capitalism wherever they are presently initiated or opposed (cf. Chomsky and Herman). Contra 5. It can be conceded, without granting the main thrust of the premiss, that the Soviets are expansionistic, at least in that they are interested in extending their influence where they can. So also are most empires, including American and Indonesian (so for that matter are many academics and most sales-people). But the Soviets have an ideological 15 message to spread, Marxism-Leninism, an ideology they used to anticipate being installed everywhere. But the Americans also have a message, a capitalist message, Free Enterprise Inc, which they are working to sell pretty much everywhere accessible to them. And they need to be expansionistic to have it adopted, whereas the Russians and Chinese need simply wait for history to take its allegedly determined course (though a little assistance - reflecting legitimate doubt about this determinism? - would surely spread their disconcertingly different forms of “progress” without interfering). But surely the Russian message is pernicious? All these messages are pernicious (for familiar reasons: see e.g. Erlich). The proper question is whether on its own Soviet international activity threatens, in some damaging way, global stability. Undoubtedly Soviet-American confrontation, as in the Cuban missile affair, does threaten global stability; though not in a way that has any bearing on Australian defence. In fact no Russian expansionary tendency, military or otherwise, has an untoward direct effect on Australia, little of significance reaches into the Antipodes (see Dibb SS). So what is the local excitement about? In large measure the excitement has been drummed up by the political right, East European expatriates, and pork-barrelling politicians. The effect of Soviet expansionism is much exaggerated and overexploited (Mack ST). Viewed from the Antipodes it is hardly a problem, unless the Soviets should get locked into military confrontation with USA - a real problem to be addressed. With that problem however, the Antipodes can better assist as part of a third nonaligned group which helps to referee and to prize apart the heavies, not by seconding and inciting the USA. But confrontation apart, Soviet internationalism, hardly a great success story, does not seriously disturb global stability, as seen from Australia. For a proper assessment of Soviet internationalism, types of expansion should be distinguished - military, potential military, influence with military access, and mere influence. In actual military expansion and involvement since W’orld War II, the Russian record is hardly striking by comparison with the USA or several other states. The one conspicuous case involving control of new territory, that of Afghanistan, has actually had little effect on global stability. The usual Western apprehension concerns not anything the Soviets have accomplished, but what they might attempt militarily, especially in Europe. But the idea of Soviet military adventure in Europe is a Western invention and bogey, lacking in plausibility. The Soviet military lacks the force ratio needed to be assured of military success in Europe, both by their own standards of what is required and by Western strategic standards. And the Soviets have no good reasons or interests in undertaking such an exercise which would draw them into nuclear war. They already face enough economic difficulties and troubles with East European client states which they cannot control satisfactorily. 16 The extension of Soviet influence has largely been in the Third world. But it has hardly been successful, with as many failures and losses to record as Soviet “gains” - gains which add to the imperial burden since they involve countries wracked with problems, such as Vietnam. The Third World exercises are marred by Soviet inaptitude and limited by the state of their own economy. They scarcely displace the global structure enough to test its stability; and they produce no shock waves or even significant ripples in the Antipodes. Contra 6. The main current threat to world stability appears to come not from one of the dancers in the East-West dance of death, but from the escalating confrontation, easily ignited, between the lead dancers. With this US policies and practices have at least as much to do as USSR ones. Recent US practices are more destabilizing than Soviet ones, and indeed highly destabilising, because of new weapons and weapons systems, because of rejection of arms control and Soviet proposals, and because of “star wars” preparation which both accelerates the arms race on earth and begins a new one in space. A vast increase in tension and suspicion accompanies the “arms race” which is in large measure due to US intransigence and US war-fighting doctrines, new weapons systems, with built-in incentives for pre-emption, and deliberate abandonment of arms control (see PR). Such considerations, duly assembled, demolish the received (but nonetheless crazy) theme that an alliance or alignment with USA helps increase stability. American practices are to be resisted as much as Soviet. 6. The East-West balance argument: American alignment versus friendly independence The need for Australian alignment with the USA is supposed to be shown by the East-West This politically-important balance argument, which shares key premisses nr with the related elitist argument, runs as follows : balance argument. 7. Global stability is the key to world peace. 8. Stability of the international order is a matter of maintaining a global balance. But 5. The global balance is constantly threatened by an expansionist USSR. 6A. The threat is [only] checked by the USA, which (6A.1) guarantees an open and pluralistic international order. 9. Australia’s primary security concern, indeed most vital interest, is this stability. Hence 10. Australia’s role is to help America maintain the balance. The rest of Australia’s intervolvement with American military arrangements is then taken to follow. But there are many reasons for halting the argument before it reaches this stage of practical (and allegedly moral) detail. The balance argument assumes much that has already been rebutted, for instance that the Soviet threat thesis is correct (i.e. 5) and that US 17 policy is stabilizing (part of 6A). It also takes for granted, what now is at least in serious doubt, that American policy is directed at balance and deterrence, rather than what the American administration appears to be aiming at, superiority. But in that event, Australia is not really engaged in some longer term balancing feat, so much as in helping USA prevail in nuclear race, contradicting the goal of world peace of premiss 7. Contra 10. and its derivation. The derivation is inadequate: it does not follow that Australia’s role is such a lackey’s one. If the balance of strength is leaning in America’s direction, as most less-biassed evidence indicates, then Australia should surely be throwing its slight weight in with the Eastern team (that is what such images as the balanced tug-of-war would suggest). Presumably premiss 6A.1 is designed to exclude this deplorable thought, of Australia teaming up with totalitarians. Nevertheless Australia should be putting its slight weight where it is effective, given its own broader objectives, interests, principles and supposedly pluralistic ideals. There are several different roles Australia could fulfil which would enable it to make a more satisfactory, less passive, contribution to world peace, among them de-escalation through active nonalignment, appropriate aid, and so forth. Thus 10 is hardly well-supported or evident. A more direct approach would be better than throwing Australian weight unreflectively on one side of the balance. As a little reflection attests, the balance image and argument point not in the direction intended, but towards nonalignment. Contra 6A (and 6). The theme that US maintains the balance, and hence preserves the peace, is of course false. For again, it takes two to tango. While it can be granted that the USA is interlocked with and checks the USSR in this munitions dance, the history of the dance reveals that the pace-escalation has flowed from the interaction of the one partner with the other. That is, but for the USA, the USA would not be required to check the USSR (the interaction is two-way as with Hegel’s famous master-slave relation). In any case, it looks as if, on a different historical trajectory, the main states of Western Europe could match the Soviet Union militarily (for they have comparable combined GNP, technological resources, etc.; cf. note 20) Thus it is doubtful that the current Soviet build-up, produced in interaction with the USA, could only be, or have been, checked by the US. ad 6A.1. As the premiss is only of marginal relevance to the argument, it is enough to observe that the international order the USA helps maintain leaves very much to be desired. In its intervention, militarily, economically and indirectly, USA has assisted substantially in reducing plurality and openness, is well as in establishing or propping up rotten regimes, etc. The negative side of American imperialism as well-enough documented, if not widely enough read or known by Americans themselves (cf. again Chomsky and Herman). Only under scandalously low redefinitions of ‘open’ and ‘pluralistic’ is the present “free” world order 18 either open or pluralistic. ad 8, and the damaging equivocation on ‘the balance’. While balance is one way of maintaining stability in the world arrangements that have presently come to pass, the balance structure can only carry so much loading. Add too much weight (of arms tension, and so forth) to both sides and the precarious structure will fail, probably catastrophically. increasing probability of catastrophic breakdown, for a variety of reasons The (accident, miscalculation, computer error, human interference, etc.), has been argued elsewhere (e.g. WPI). While a certain neither overloaded nor overstressed balance may serve for stability, the present increasingly stressed balance will probably not. The balance argument, however, neglects this dynamical situation, illegitimately switching from a (certain post) balance in premiss 8 to the (on-going) balance in subsequent premisses. The balance argument itself breaks down through equivocation. What the dynamic picture also indicates is the importance of removing some weight from the balance, most obviously by arms limitation and tension reduction. It points too to a different role for Australasia, to a less aligned position genuinely directed at stability. It is to the emerging case for a different role for Australia, and to action for achieving this different role, that the positive argument will now begin to swing. The inadequate East-West balance argument is typically combined with attacks upon proposals for a different role for Australia than American alliance and. service. effect of these additions is to generate extra confusion and dust. The main For the additions are inessential to the argument, and do not serve to repair it or reinforce it. For example, against nonalignment or neutralism is set the alleged pervasiveness of nuclear winter. We might as well be aligned (it’s good for trade and other economic perquisites), so it is sometimes argued from up top, because if the central balance fails we are all dead. This is a conspicuous nonsequitur^, worse than ex nihilo quodlibet (because it also suggests that balance is a prerequisite for stability). But, in the main, the attack is irrelevant, because the point of nonalignment is to help remove overload and to break down confrontation and its escalation to war; it is a thing to do now, be fore winter descends, to delay or halt its descent, and most important, to reduce its extent and severity. Australia’s weight may be slight, another irrelevant addition goes, but psychologically it is important for the West. Any further spread of the “Kiwi disease” (from New Zealand) would show the weakening of Western resolve, and give the green light for Soviet expansionism. Bell, a leading exponent of the balance argument, virtually gives the impression that if Australia dropped out of American alignment, the Russians would be on the road down through the isles to Australia tomorrow/ Much of this sort of rhetoric is reminiscent of the baseless fear-mongering of an earlier pre-Vietnam time. The Russians have no such military interests, or present capabilities. And if they were to gear up and set out, they would be met by substantial resistance along most of the route, resistance obtaining Western assistance. For America, for one, has major interests, different from Australia’s, in both Indonesia and the Philippines, as well as elsewhere in East Asia. The addition, so far from strengthening the argument, depends, in its “green light for expansion” comparison, on the previously faulted premiss 5 of Soviet expansionism. In fact most of the further case for American alignment of one sort or another - when it is argued-, often nonalignment and neutrality are simply denounced in good old-fashioned authoritarian style - turns upon already-faulted assumptions. Catley, for example, another exponent of “central balance”, presents the following ‘consideration’: ... whatever the Swedes or Swiss may think about the matter, Australia is locked by considerations of culture, economics, and political philosophy into the defence of the Western world. It has both an obligation and a duty to contribute its share to that defence if necessary by hosting facilities which cannot easily be located elsewhere (p.15). The premiss is false for reasons essentially indicated: and the premiss in no way sustains the conclusion, the argument involving among other things, the prescriptive (is-ought) fallacy. Consider the premiss. Australia is not, unless Catley has information withheld from most of the rest of us, locked into Western nuclear defence, but in principle independent and free to reconsider and rethink its options. (American use of the “facilities” is not irrevocable, and shortly comes up, in principle at least, for reconsideration.) How do culture, economics and political philosophy provide locks and chains for Australia but not for nonaligned Western European states? They do not: Australia is not a part of USA or altogether a client state; and the cultures, interests, economic frameworks and political philosophies of the two nations are significantly different (for details, see CPD). But even if the ideological frameworks were much more similar than they are, that would not entail similar defence practices (as, e.g., ANZUS in all its weakness shows), nor any such defence obligations. Most of the arguments against nonalignment are of Catley calibre - or worse. Fortunately, then, such arguments are examined in detail elsewhere, notably by D. Martin in his examination of counter-arguments to Australian armed neutrality, the legally-recognised non-belligerent form of nonalignment he favours. Virtually none of Martin’s counter-case depends for its success on features of neutrality, which is not advocated here. Virtually all of Martin’s argument is moreover couched in negative form; his positive brief is very brief. It 20 reduces to this: alignment or alliance with the USA 'cannot make us secure against such dangers as we may one day have to meet, while it needlessless exposes to other dangers, including nuclear war (p.l, italics added). While the message is correct enough, and in need of wide propagation, it does little on its own to support neutrality, and it by no means exhausts the positive case for weakening alignment. In particular, there are more positive arguments of much theoretical interest, to be drawn from systems theory and from the burgeoning theory of collective goods and action. 7. Contributions towards stability: free-riding, enlarging group size, and increasing variety. The strategic world situation we now confront can be viewed as a game with more than 100 players, counting in nation-states and leaving out (for convenience) major organisations such as the largest 100 transnational companies. These organisational players align themselves around two large poles, East and West, as indicated: NON-ALIGNED N N WEST EAST India NATO States Japan, Israel Sweden* Switzerland* NZUS: Australi I Ireland1* ^Most Latin ' American States I Tanzania Costa Rica** State capitalist Key: N: *: **: State communist Nuclear weapons states Neutral states Nonmilitary states There are various - a great many - games these state players are playing, some of which are practically important for peace and for stability. Some of these games, such as World Empire and Chicken (already played under one representation), are played essentially between the East-West superplayers. There are several problems about East-West games: for instance, what representation they have, the repeatability of the games (clearly some nuclear games 21 may, like Russian roulette, end after one round, as they will with the Big One), and the negative sum characters of some games. And the monolithic East/monolithic West dichotomy is misleading, and, as will appear, discards crucial detail (in the way simplifications may). So game-theoretical modelling will be approached differently and more obliquely. World Security, like regional and local security, is a collective good (technically, an item, quality unspecified, in joint supply and precluding exclusion). That is not of course to say that there are not conditions under which security may leave much to be desired, for instance where security is guaranteed by a narrow and intolerant despotism; but then, so it can be argued, the trouble lies with the provisioning, not the particular product. collective good G for the collection of N nation-states. It is a It is, furthermore, a collective good which permits the possibility of free-riding by nation-states. Looked at from this perspective the recent American complaint about its allies, Japan for example, and their insufficient expenditure on defence, is a complaint about their free-riding. Within the balance of power framework the conditions for free-riding are satisfied, for instance by unaligned and unilaterally disarming states. For 1. G is available to all N members of the collective if it is available to any, and the achievement (or maintenance) of G by any will make every member better off. 2. G is achieved iff some number m (no larger than that of group K) contribute towards its provision, where under the balance of power assumption Il C K C N and II = {USA, USSR}. 3. The expected value of contributing to G or its maintenance is less than the expected value of not doing so, i.e. likely costs of contribution exceed likely benefits - except perhaps for members of II given that G is largely provided by II. There is what can be called a pegged (or asymmetric) free-rider problem, pegged by members of II for whom the free-rider option is not open - within the confines of the balance of power assumption - and for whom condition 3 is only satisfied under certain ways of looking at the matter (e.g. there will be a war 10 years down the road so the expected costs each year exceed the expected benefits). For most members of N, by contrast, the benefits of G are available even should they reduce their contributions. There is a straightforward case (in narrow game-theoretical terms) for recommending Australian, and regional, free-riding on the balance of power provision of G. Some arguments, beyond or adding to those already in effect presented, are these:- Either stability breaks down catastrophically and there is a large-scale war or it does not. If it does then the region is 22 better off than it would be if (strongly) aligned because it is unlikely to be (so heavily) targetted. (Here the dreadful new argument that nuclear winter means that the Antipodes might as well be involved gets challenged and rejected: as to how see e.g. MF and B. Martin). If, alternatively, stability doesn’t break down then the region has the benefits in any case, without the costs. For there is no clear evidence that our alignment and cooperation with the USA enhances global stability, etc.; indeed, as remarked and will be further argued, the evidence points to the contrary. As regards Australasian regional weight in the Western block, do we seriously believe it is significant? That the Australian voice, though useful for propaganda purposes, makes much real difference in the halls of Northern power? We shouldn’t: and if we do we’re living in a delusional framework. Australia has been left out of the picture in virtually all major strategic planning exercises, most difference-making peace initiatives, etc.,etc. Now Eastern block countries would hardly object to Antipodean free-riding, rather than no offering support (however trifling), comfort and incitement to their opposition/ Furthermore free-riding is how the Americans, on their theoretical principles, would expect Australia to act, the rational self-interested procedure (see CPD). It is how lesser nations should act. For it is economically rational; contributing is not. But won’t the US make things economically dear for Australia? In threats and theory, yes; but in practice, no more than it has already done with subsidized wheat deals to the Soviets, no more than it threatened to do already in the case of New Zealand over the nuclear-ships issue. For except for short term aberrations, America will never give up trade or business arrangements: one gets the impressions that America would trade with the Devil Himself, if doing so would open some new markets in Hell. Despite its political stigma, free-riding need be no problem, or in any way immoral or irregular. Perhaps the buses are free; perhaps there is a voluntary payment system, to which only some need contribute, etc. With the nuclear fix, free-riding is indeed the moral course; contributing is not.29 Free-riding, though often protrayed as a problem, is only a problem in certain cases of collective provisioning, where the good involved is sufficiently desirable and will not be provided because of too many free- riders. This is not the situation with global security, which will be provided, in the curious and precarious way that it is, whether or not Australia stays on the escalating treadmill or gets off and rides free. Australia's free-riding may be a problem for America; it is not for Australia. Interests diverge again. What is more, judicious free-riding can increase stability. In pictorial terms, the stability of a structure is typically increased up to a certain point by securing it more 23 adequately; for example, if it is a wind tower or similar building, by increasing its rigid ties or supports to the ground. Then a tripod (or better still a quadrapod) tower is much less likely to topple than a bipedal one, and requires less guying to stay up. Increasing the diversity, or variety, of supports increases stability. The theme that diversity correlates with stability has been sharpened and confirmed in ecology, for instance in the theory of “spreading the risks” (see EW). The related theme, that a certain variety increases stability, has been elaborated in cybernetics. The core eco-systemic idea to be developed is that Australia’s free-riding in defence, and consequent nonalignment, could help to enhance diversity and variety, and accordingly to increase stability (especially if done in concert with other client and suppliant states). Two interlocked supports in tension, East and West, well dug in but hardly well guyed, are inadequate for the long-term stability of the precarious structure of world peace. What makes engineering sense is not however adding weight to the structure, or even strengthening the supports that are there, helping the East when the balance is disturbed by the more powerful West’s surging ahead and likely overburdening the structure. What makes more sense is increasing the variety of supports, enlarging and diversifying group size, as significant independent grouping could do. The monolithic East/monolithic West picture is much more than a convenient simplification, for instance for strategic thinking. It may force damaging mistakes in conceptualisation, mzsconceptualisation perhaps convenient for some larger players. One main reason for mistakes concerns group size. Whereas 11+ = {West, East} is a small group, the number N of nation-states is not, but is considerably larger. But the collective behaviour of large groups differs in theory from that of small groups; group size is a highly significant factor (though its precise import remains contentious). The group N of nation-states is a large group, of essentially self-interested parties, indeed of substantially economic actors. collective action applies: So we may expect that the American theory of that the groups will behave in a counterintuitive way. Though expected to act in the common interest, to obtain security in particular, the collection will not. On this account (that elaborated by Olson), the common interest can only be guaranteed by outside influence or imposition (coercion in Olson’s rapid thinking). But with the collective of nations, there is, as experience has shown, no outside mediator or influence of sufficient authority to ensure attainment of the collective good. The prognosis looks very gloomy: this most important (though far from unique) collective good will not be provided. Fortunately the reasoning, like much of the “logic” of collective action, has been too 21 swift. The group, though large, is highly privileged, in containing several actors for whom costs of war exceed benefits (note the shift in perspective from the earlier free-riding condition 3). Indeed an important economic effect of the knowledge of an ominous nuclear winter is that virtually all actors involved should now be in that position; for (subjectively) expected costs of nuclear war have become very high. To go back to basics, Olson's grand theory is based on the accountants’ tautology (defining ‘net’) net agent benefit = gross agent benefits - gross agent costs, i.e. in symbols, for each agent or o actor i (in collective N), A- = V-Cj. A group is privileged if Aj is positive for some i in N. It needs little argument to show that for vulnerable European nation-states the net benefits of global security are decidedly positive (e.g. with a nuclear war their respective future GDPs would expectedly fall to near zero). The fact that the group of nation-states is privileged does not however imply that the collective good involved, security, will be supplied, particularly in the longer term. The simple logic is not dynamic; it takes no account of mistake, error, or the like, or of stability achieved through superiority or intermediate instability. An improved modelling - which can take some account of group size and of the dynamics, through iterated games - is gained by returning to game-theoretic grounds. A free rider “problem” is tantamount to a dilemma of some sort; according to the conventional wisdom, it is a prisoners’ dilemma (cf. Pettit, but contrast Taylor and Ward). The argument can go this way:- a free rider problem or issue is defined in terms of the provisioning of a collective good; but the theory of collective goods is equivalent to that of a .QI, generalised prisoners’ dilemma. Certainly the global nuclear situation appears to present a dilemma; as much is a commonplace claim. Elsewhere (e.g. WPI) it is argued in detail that it does indeed present a moral dilemma. Here the argument - which can proceed through the theoretical route just sketched above or in the more piecemeal way to be indicated - is that it is also a prudential dilemma (for many members of N).°2 Consider first, since these have obtained some investigation (e.g. Hardin), the range of apparent two party games being played by the US and Soviet Union administration (labelled US and SU respectively) in 1985 as regards the moves of further nuclear armament, A, or nuclear disarmament, N. (It is supposed, naturally, that the game is set in some background context, e.g. nuclear disarmament is not considered in isolation from on-going French and Chinese nuclear armament). It is important here, as other places, to distinguish the administration - which for the most part calls the shots - from the society and the people. It is administrations or governments that generally take people into war; etc. The American people seem rather more inclined towards nuclear de-escalation than their administration; the German people were clearly opposed to the new nuclear missiles their administration proceeded to install. The strategy games involved are then administration games, which we 25 can suppose to be played over successive time intervals, e.g. years; so there is interaction and feedback as the games go on - until the Big Ones explode. Within this simplistic setting, the apparent games being played by US and SU are those diagrammed next: New Initial game Prisoners’ Dilemma Game SU SU D US A Revised Game D 2,2 A 4,1 1,4 3,3 D US A SU D 3,2 A 4,1 1,4 2,3 D US A D 3,3 A 4,1 1,4 2,2 According to Hardin, ‘giving evidence of [his] deformation professionelle’, the Prisoners’ Dilemma (PD) ‘represents the preference ordering of virtually all the articulate policy analysts in the United States and presumably also in the Soviet Union’ (p.248). While PD may have represented US policy, there is considerable evidence (as already indicated) that it no longer does, that the US administration has shifted to a more aggressive, war-fighting, phase. That is, the US has interchanged its rankings of (D,D) and (A,A), presumably some time between 1978 and 1984 games. The Soviets, who have been much more consistent (and no doubt better censored) in their policy pronouncements, appear not to have changed their game, but have stuck with their form of deterrence and no-first-strike. However they are bound to try to keep up with the Americans, and so are presumably pushed towards the Revised Game shown, which pleasantly restores symmetry. Stable or equilibrium outcomes for each game are circled. An outcome is said to be stable if neither player has incentive to switch strategies unilaterally on the strength of the game, i.e. to alter the outcome except by influencing the other player also to alter strategies. All these games provide dilemmas, in a broad sense, that equilibrium is achieved in an undesirable and dangerous outcome. In all the apparent games, arming is the dominant strategy for each player; yet in the PD game that is even Pareto-suboptimal, whence the economic fascination. But as the other games deliver results which are socially suboptimal (and below a satisfying threshold), all these games are dilemmas. And the same applies to suggested alternative games that might plausibly be taken to represent the superpower situation, and such as Chicken. A recognisably suboptimal outcome is guaranteed by the independent ‘‘stable” strategies. What is worse, iteration of games does not help (as it may in other political circumstances). For there are substantial political and military incentives for the superpower players not to adjust their preferences substantially in socially superior directions after repeated games, but to do what the US at least appears to have done, to make the situation worse. 26 It is important then to attempt to modify or curtail these self-interested superpower games. There are various connected ways of going about this. One is for other parties to combine to limit or discourage these games. Another alternative is for them to try to alter the games. Thus much socially preferable would be a switch to a coordination game of some sort; for instance, to the game which neutrals tend to play (and which Lackey, in contrast to other more bellicose utilitarians, sees utilitarian superpowers playing; hence Hardin’s provocative label for this game, ‘Lackey’s game’). In the coordination game diagrammed, WN represents a western-inclined neutral and EN an Eastern inclined neutral (e.g. Yugoslavia): EN WN D D 1,1 A 3,2 A 2,3 4,4 [Other coordination games, with (D,D) assigned (1,1)] Now the dilemmatic and coordination games are not played in isolation; they come together in international settings such as United Nations’ committees (and elsewhere, since coordination games are frequently peoples’ games as well). Superimposing the games, with coordination games of the first sort applied to previously given US and SU games, leads to the following augmented East (E) and West (W) games: New Game, Augmented Prisoners’ Dilemma Augmented E E A D Revised Game, Augmented A 4,1 2,2 : *4,1' \ : 3^2 ’ D 1 : W ......... 1,4: A 2/3: 2/3; D ; 1 w ........ : 1,4 3,3 ; a 4 ; E D 2/3 • • — •- : 3-3’**: D ; 1 W I 2,3 ; . • 2.3 A D 2/3 2,2 a 4 ■ 4,1* ! . ; : 2/3 J 4 Key: rh represents a sequence of ms, i.e. m, m, m ... for each coordination player; 2/3 a sequence of 2s and 3s in some order. As augmenting games reveals, to play with a superpower is to help reinforce a stable deadlock. But playing an independent coordination game increases variety and can help in breaking the deadlock, in fact in several ways. For one, enough significant players playing a coordination game can alter the overall dominant strategy towards disarmament. For another, much more pressure can be brought to bear on the superpowers. For example, with less support, unilateral action by the US administration on Star-Wars and arms build-up can be exposed. Superpower militarism and power excursions would stand naked and 27 unsupported. Australia’s impact, in particular, would be rather greater as a nonaligned free-rider pressing seriously for disarmament and regional nuclear-freedom (instead of, as at present, white-wash polemics and token ambassadors, undermined by a none-too-tacit policy of US support). The strategy suggested by game-theoretic modelling converges then with that suggested by other approaches, notably regional and ecological approaches. The strategy is that of limitation, of disengagement from escalating US/USSR war games, and progressive alteration of their likely outcomes by defusing coordination moves. In more practical terms, the approaches mean trying to limit and modify superpower games by restricting their games and supporting regional or local coordination of players, in forms of organisations both of nations and of people. Such organisations would work, as many have already been doing, to contract the regions and spheres of influence and access of US and USSR military administrations, and to diminish support for their war-fighting objectives. For example, Antipodean groups could, and should, coordinate to ease the American military out of the South Pacific region, meanwhile resisting any intrusion of Russian military. Then, while the Europeans are doing their coordinated de-escalating, denuclearising things right across Europe, the Russian and American war games are progressively excluded from the entire Southern Hemisphere. An eventual aim geographically is, to send their weapons of war back home, to restrict their (and French and other) global military enterprises to their “own” backyards, where they would not always be so enthusiastically received. Fortunately such an ambitious and optimistic project, so unlikely to come to pass given present nation-state arrangments, can be accomplished piecemeal, from small and significant beginnings, already to be seen. As a result of recent movements in the region, a South Pacific nuclear-free region is now a politically-achievable option. A first token step has already been taken. But next steps, towards genuine nuclear-freedom, require above all cooperation of a less aligned Australia, joining other disengaging “free-riders” in the region. That in turn requires, as a practical component, closure of American bases in Australia as their leases terminate, cessation of American nuclear ship visits and aircraft staging, and an end to uranium mining and sales. As Australia is the only country in the region supplying uranium, and the main location of US bases, such steps would be most significant. Even so, the Pacific regional effect would remain unduly limited, so long as France and the US are based within the region, and transit of nuclear ships is internationally sanctioned everywhere on the shrinking high seas. Plainly there are further more difficult steps on the way to southern Pacific nuclear-freedom and independence, i.e. even for one of the easier oceanic regions. But there is no good reason to 28 expect that removing the nuclear scourge, any more than eliminating other major politico­ social evils, will be easy. Permanent removal and a less dubious “peace” than we presently enjoy is not something that will be achieved by more of what we have witnessed, or even through clever diplomacy and smart technological tricks, such as new defensive weapons; it will take difficult structural and radical design change. 8. On the need for, possibility of, and prospect of appropriate structural change. There is little doubt that certain sorts of structural political change would be highly conducive to peace (e.g. democratic reorganisation of the superpowers), and that certain fundamental changes may even be sufficient for permanent peace. With that in view they have long been advocated - at least from Rousseau and Kant onwards. But it has also been supposed that some such changes are necessary for lasting peace; ‘it is also necessary to transform the structures that lead to war’ (B. Martin, p.12). To render this theme immune to obvious criticisms - for example, that straightforward authoritarian extension of certain established structures could bring an end to war - further desiderata, typically presupposed, are invoked, for instance that certain freedoms, modest material standards of life, and so on, are duly guaranteed, and also the type of necessity involved is wound back to some lower technical level (not excluded however by present practicalities). These adjustments make the necessity theme more difficult to assess, but also more difficult to sustain. There are two parts to its assessment and defence, a negative and critical part, demolishing a range of arguments from determinism, human nature, and the like, to the effect that arrangements have to be more or less the way they are, and a positive part, comprising direct arguments for the theme. The large negative part of this enterprise will simply be illustrated.34 According to deterministic and mechanistic approaches, such as that of (marxist) technological determinism, nuclear weapons, like megamachines generally, are no aberration. They are an integral part of the business of industrial and ecological conquest, a further stage in human intervention which has already involved substantial disruption through pesticides, wastes, etc. The argument tends to the fatalistic. The megamachines of conquest are made, and once made they will be used. No change in political arrangement, which would make any difference, is possible. Sometimes technological enthusiasts push their position and luck, even further, that a weapon or device once invented by humans will be used: there is no stopping progress. But in doing so they overextend themselves. While there is, sadly a fair induction from the manufacture of weapons (of any given type, for many batches are never deployed) to their use, inductions from invention of machines or the like to their manufacture are c 29 unreliable and subject to many counterexamples (and many machines that do eventually get made have been reinvented or independently rediscovered). But even the good inductions do not show that weapons of various sorts must be used, that a change in background political organisation would not frustrate the inductions. The broader deterministic position is of course that such background changes are not possible either; political arrangements too, like the rest of social life, are technologically or economically determined. But (nonanalytical) determinism, technological and other, is false, so it is argued elsewhere (JB, CPD). Different political arrangements, which alleviate problems, are technically possible, and arrangements would be different in differently evolved worlds. Things did not and do not have to be the way they are, or the social and political sort of way they are. Many routes, none of deductive strength, lead to the conclusion that the dominant political structures of our time, fashioned (with much input from schemes of past philosophers) from feudal institutions, require extensive structural alteration. In particular, they need to be superseded by alternative structures less intricately tied to war, which do not promote or lead so readily to war. Such a theme has been argued directly from the nuclear fix itself (as e.g. WP1, p.47ff.). But suppose, improbable as it may seem, that nuclear weapons all vanished, thereby removing the current nuclear fix; for instance, they turned out to be quietly self-destructing, or a disarmament actually took place. massive thermodynamic miracle occurred, or nuclear The problem of war would not be thereby removed, and even that of nuclear war would only be given some respite. For the structural arrangements for war would remain intact.04 Conventional weapons would remain, along with weapons perhaps as dangerous as nuclear weapons, such as chemical and biological ones. Nuclear weapons, insofar as they were removed (for small caches are easily hidden away), could soon be replaced, especially if nuclear power plants remained intact; and nothing would prevent the development of (Star-Wars) weapons more diabolical than nuclear ones. War cannot be eliminated while leaving the rest of society as it is - by freezing the status quo. ... The structural conditions for war need to be removed - not reinforced as appeals to elites may do - and superseded by alternative structures which do not lead to war (B. Martin, p.12: Martin goes on to indicate the types of structures, and how to reach them). Structural adjustments can provide conditions for lasting satisfactory peace. An initial, somewhat simplistic, Kantian argument for the proposition that peace is possible (presented by Latta, introducing Permanent Peace), runs as follows:- Peace, perpetual peace, is an ideal, not merely of a speculative kind but a practical idea, a moral principle. Hence this ideal ought to be realised, i.e. there ought (morally) to be peace. But ought entails can; therefore peace is possible. 30 From Heracleit.us through Hegel there buzzes an impressive swarm of philosophers"*6 who have rejected the second premiss. Some are even captivated by such extravagant counter-claims as that with peace everything would stop, that competition, with war as one limit, is essential to motion and progress! would now be With the recent shift in philosophical fashions, the second premiss more widely conceded, though often not on Kantian grounds, but consequentialist. Such grounds to support the theme that peace is desirable and ought to be realised, but are more discriminating in that they help indicate what sort of peace. Unfortunately, however it is done, the second premiss does not sustain the conclusion, ought does not entail can, as many moral dilemmas reveal (see MD, WP1). So fortunately, there is a more satisfactory and revealing route to the conclusion that peace is possible, and indeed is feasible. That is the more elaborate method of (semantical) modelling: present in detail scenarios of societies where peace persists (for the sceptical it may be necessary to recall n-human models, with n small). This sort of thing is of course already done, in more pleasing fashion than logicians could hope to emulate, if rather less precisely, by OQ novelists and science-fiction writers, and by activists like the different Martins. What all these scenarios point to, however, are societies considerably different from our own - though not in the people involved, who have their weaknesses, their power drives, and so forth, but because of significant structural alterations in the societies depicted. By way of such modellings we can not merely argue to the feasibility of lasting peace, but push ahead with the argument, that societies of these restructured sorts are desirable alternatives to contemporary military- industrial arrangements. For those of us then who want to move towards such pacific alternatives, the practical inference, from feasibility and desirability is clear: we should begin on the real work of structural change. Peace is possible and desirable, but the prospects are poor (as Heilbroner has said of the human prospect). Present arrangements, though contingent and fashioned in large measure from the schemes of past intellectuals, are thoroughly entrenched, and enforced, both ideologically and by much physical power, often as if along with natural law they were God­ given, though they are no longer appropriate. Even small nonstructural changes look difficult to achieve in present political climates. Through climates have not changed that much, major social improvements have been gained, not instantanously, but in longer-term struggles with government. Such short-term difficulties did not deter social theorists such as Kant, who like Rousseau before him and many after him, were concerned with obtaining lasting peace. The world has changed enormously since the time of Kant’s proposals for peace (of 1795), and even since the time of Veblen’s more cynical additions (in 1917). Hard science and 31 destructive power have grown enormously; and even theoretical knowledge of collective behaviour, especially that admitting of game-theoretic treatment, though still slight, has advanced. But political arrangements and what can be accomplished politically have, in important respects, changed very little, since Rousseau complained (around 1761) that governments were probably too short-sighted to appreciate the merits of his project for perpetual peace. Governments have long been, and been seen as, main obstacles to peace. Thus Veblen rightly maintained that ‘... if the peace is to be kept it will have to come about irrespective of governmental management, - in spite of the State rather than by its good offices’ (p.7).^^ So it has been with most major social changes; for they have involved structural political change disturbing to governmental conservatism. In his search for the indispensible conditions for lasting peace, Kant claimed, as others have claimed since, that peace is not possible under present structural arrangements of an unregulated competing nation-state kind. As times have changed, so, to a limited extent, have state structural arrangements, since Kant compiled his conditions. In particular, there is now, in the shape of the United Nations, a very weak reflection of what Kant looks for, a world (or European!) federation of nations. But crucial ingredients in Kant’s resolution are still lacking:- namely, at the upper level, what is required for a standard resolution of Prisoners Dilemma type situations - some surrender of national sovereignty, especially as regards war, and, at the lower level, “republican” states. Major blockages to adequate arrangements for peace remain at two critical levels of organisation, that concentrated upon of the organisation of collectives of states and, in part by devolution, that of the internal organisation of individual states themselves. Much evidence has now accumulated that more far-reaching changes than Kant, Rousseau and Veblen envisaged are required at both international and nation-state levels if genuine peace is to be secured. Indeed significant changes are wanted even in republician states for peace movements to get their mixed message through already fixed channels to state control systems. For this sort of reason, movements on a single front, such as peace, are unlikely to succeed on their own, but should be linked into a broader plurality of movements, which seek to widen informational and democratic channels, and to alter the character and membership of state systems, and thereby render them much more controllable and accountable.40 Many longer-haul structural changes depend upon diverting nuclear war in the meantime. Thus arguing for more far-reaching changes, for an altered nonaligned Australia, 32 for a nuclear-free South Pacific, for regional structural changes, certainly does not exclude arguing and working for obvious measures for reducing risks of nuclear war. These include: a serious commitment to arms control by the superpowers (whose practices threaten our futures, though most of us lack representation in either); a move away from war-fighting strategies and associated destabilising weapons-systems; moderation of confrontational rhetoric and other tensions-inducing practices by superpower administrations, and improved efforts at mutual understanding (as well some appreciation of the elements of political pluralism); and then, remote though it may appear, significant steps towards nuclear disarmament. Richard Sylvan 41 Bungendore NSW 33 NOTES 1. Queensland premier, with destructive deep-South policies. 2. The point, which has become controversial, is argued in effect in Gilbert. 3. See especially Dibb, as reported in the ANU Reporter, and for a more guarded elaboration, his IAD (e.g. p.163 ‘At present, planning for the defence of Australia lack coherence because there is no clear definition, in priority order, of what needs defending’); see also Sharp, p.l48ff and differently Langtry and Ball, p.575ff., p.6O5ff. The much-heralded Dibb Review of mid-1986 would, if (as already seems unlikely) it were adopted, remove some of the lesser incoherence in Australian policy, that involving details of regional defensive defence (as would also Langtry and Ball, if followed through). While Dibb appears to have demolished what he refers to scathingly as the ‘largely mythical “core force” concept’, a new controversy has sprung up over whether Australia’s more self-reliant defence should be purely defensive defence, Dibb’s ill-named ‘strategy of denial’, or whether it should include an offensive component. Dibb himself has rather rapidly shifted ground on this important issue. In late 1983 he was contending that ‘Australia should have in the force-in-being significant deterrent capabilities, based on present air and naval strike assets, which can mount defensive and offensive operations against attacking forces, their staging bases and lines of resupply’ (IAP, p.166). But in the otherwise conservative Review of 1986 such offensive defence is abandoned; no such forces and equipment for offensive off-shore operations are recommended. Instead ‘the review proposes a layered strategy of defence within our area of direct military interest. Our most important defence planning concern is to ensure that an enemy would have substantial difficulty in crossing the sea and air gap’. The new offensive/defensive defence controversy puts the Review’s adoption in increasing doubt - in which event the local incoherence in strategic planning processes and militational difficulties Dibb alludes to early in his statement will presumably persist. The Review not merely fails to address significant regional issues, as to defence priorities, and as to multiple purpose roles for Australian armed forces given that they will be involved in virtually no military activity other than maintenance and a certain “preparedness” (for on Dibb’s overstatement of the prevailing view of Australia’s very favourable regional security prospects, ‘there is no conceivable prospect of any power contemplating invasion of our continent and subjugation of our population’). But further, the Review is itself vague to incoherent, concerning wider defence issues, vague as to the post-ANZUS situation, and incoherent about Australia’s role in US global “defence” activity. According the Dibb (CT, p.16), ‘there is no requirement for Australia to become involved in United States contingency planning for global war. The presence of the joint facilities, together with the access that we provide to visits by United States warships and the staging through of Australia of B-52 bombers, are a sufficient tangible contribution to the Alliance.’ These contributions are not involvement? That is not how the USSR views the matter: they are the reported sole 34 basis of USSR nuclear targetting of Australia (see Dibb. SS p.13). global stance is left essentially to the USA. And Australia's Amazingly, in the Strategic Basis Papers (SB), Australia criticizes New Zealand because ‘it has still developed no policy for national defence and tends to look to ... the US as its primary source of defence guidance’ (p.29). Note that C3I abbreviates the mouthful, Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence. 4. See Sharp, p.l46ff. An Australian policy should moreover fit with the genuine needs and shared aspirations of local people - to the extent, presumably, that these are commendable; again the presupposed value framework is critical. 5. Thus e.g. Gray (p.17) on the Reagan Administration’s ‘foolhardy brief willingness to talk publicly about nuclear strategy’, and his distain for public involvement or input. There is some concern, especially among neo-conservatives, about US defence strategies being ‘undermined by well-meaning persons who believe they are helping the cause of peace’ (Bell p.10; similarly Gray). Even those not so far right support partial information releases which maintain public confidence; e.g. Dibb on ‘the release of a generalised statement about ;the] functions of the US bases in Australia ... to give Australians more confidence about their crucial contribution to the Allied cause’ (ISA, p.166). ‘Our defence policy-making process is probably more “closed” than that of any other advanced Western democracy’ according to Langtry and Ball (p.608), who contend that ‘the public needs to be involved much more in our defence planning and operations'. For a justified critique of public exclusion and leave-it-to-the-experts approaches, see B. Martin; also Sharp. 6. The paper was drafted in mid-1985. 7. For those amassing evidence that Australia falls into the inexact class of client states, the following Australian contribution is noteworthy: ‘The US prefers to act as a member of a group, and a contribution by Australia can also assist in demonstrating to Congressional and public opinion that the objectives sought are significant enough to attract allied support’ (SB, p.28) 8. As to DI and arms control, see, e.g. Mack PR and Gray. As to D2, ‘USA has now an announced first-strike nuclear targeting policy’ technologically reinforced, Hayes, p.4; and see also Mack AC, p.111. The goal of the Reagan administration is superiority (a conveniently ambiguous term). Thus e.g. Gray (p.32): ‘it is of course essential that the United States modernize its offensive forces so as to render the Soviet Union genuinely offensive-counterforce incompetent.’ 9. On the major changes in American policy, see e.g. Gray p.118 ff. Though America is now said to have a ‘new national security concept of which SDI is the centerpiece’ it may still lack an ‘arms control policy’ (Gray, p.25,pll). Not only arms control, but American commitment to the security of allies, remain at least decidedly cloudy matters. Thus it is of little avail to contend that Australia does have a coherent secondorder global policy, namely the (discreditable) one of following prevailing American policy. For the US lacks a first-order policy which is sufficiently clear in relevant respects. The American direction of Australian policy had better be away from too much public exposure because Australians, no more than New Zealanders, mostly do not like being pushed around, even by Americans. 35 10. Thus we can avoid the important debate as to whether, and to what extent, deterrence remains part of US global “defence” policy (though it certainly remains part of the policy sold to the American public). As to the philosophical significance of the debate, see Gay, p.l29ff. and Benn. 11. The common-interest theme is often traced to (partly self-interested) American action in the Pacific in World War II. Curiously Australia’s interests are are now said also to converge with those of Japan, but to be diametrically opposed to those of the USSR (despite increasing trade). 12. Nor, though this is a longer story, does Australian culture by any means coincide with American: see CPD. Thus a uniform treatment is entirely inappropriate. Similarly, a single overarching treatment for a monolithic West is thoroughly inadequate: see further below in the text. 13. Australian planning should be looking at strategic models (game-theoretic and other) which include Australia. For, as argued below, abandoning the uniformity assumption of the monolithic West, of the West as one parish, makes significant differences to the results yielded. 14. As Cock goes on: ‘These basic issues increasingly become lost in the array of consumer choices’. 15. ‘The serf societies - more or less willingly - accept the status of “allies”, i.e. protection with rights and duties as in feudal societies. They become client countries’ (Galtung, p.169). 16. So-called by Mack PC. But the formulation presented follows G. Davidson’s more satisfactory account in Canberra Times, Wednesday, May 8, 1985, p.2. Mack considers that what amounts to the elitist case is the ‘altogether more sophisticated argument [which] holds sway ... in government’ (p.l, italics added)! 17. The “Asian hordes” derive from one of the less spoken about successors to the Yellow Peril, from the immediate past days of the Asian communist threat, the Domino theory, and White Australia. 18. As Stephenson argued, less fortunately, 20 years ago. Even when around World War II Japan, did have interest in access to strategic raw materials, the Japanese High Command decided against invading Australia because of the difficulty of dealing with the people - a point of much importance. 19. Of course, such military expenditure is also encouraged by economic forces, e.g. like much Third World hard currency expenditure it helps the American economy along a bit. 20. Heilbroner has traced some of the economic components and consequences of what, with excess exaggeration and insufficient irony, he calls ‘the rise and subsequent fall of the American imperium’ (p.52): it hasn’t fallen that far yet. ‘Empires have always been expensive and the American empire was no exception. ... The sheer military cost ... for the United States alone ... is roughly ten percent of ... GNP for the last 25 years ($2 x 10) in 1972 dollars)’. American imperial spending supplemented by other capitalist countries fueled inflation, enhanced poverty, etc., and was complements by, what it was represented as required by, counterexpenditure and efforts by the USSR. 36 ‘The establishment of an American hegemony [consisted and: resulted not just in very large military expenditures, but in the rapid build-up of American capital investments abroad. Between 1950 and 1970, the value of American-owned plant and equipment abroad leaped from $12 billion to $78 billion’ (p.54). A result of the expenditure abroad was a serious balance of payments problem (negative “capital flows” and balances), and a growing accumulation of IOUs. On this sort of basis, Heilbroner speculates that ‘the mere operations of the American imperium by itself - deemed of such critical importance to preserve the peace and security of the capitalist world - was in all likelihood a sufficient condition for the globalisation of the inflationary phenomena’ (p.57 with insert from p.56). According to Heilbroner, ‘Long before the Vietnam debacle, it was clear that American arms could not prevent the rise of revolutionary governments in the under-developed world’ (p.57). But really very little evidence of collapse is presented by Heilbroner; and seemingly there is little. What there is more substantial evidence for is the marked decline of the American imperium in the period (1973-8) concerned. One piece of evidence is the sharp decline in America’s share of World GDP, shown in the following table of select leading national economies: SHARE OF WORLD GDP (%) POPULATION SHARE COUNTRY RANK 1968 1975 1984 (1984 est) USA 1 35.0 24.3 25.0 5.2 USSR 2 11.1 11.0 13.8 6.2 JAPAN 3 5.2 8.0 9.5 2.7 GERMANY FDR 4 5.1 6.7 5.7 1.5 FRANCE 5 4.6 5.4 CHINA 6 2.9 4.8 4.3 22.6 UK 8 2.8 2.8 2.3 1.3 4.4 1.3 INDIA 12 1.3 1.5 1.1 15.1 AUSTRALIA 15 1.1 1.4 1.0 0.3 37 The table should also make it clear that if the USA cannot sustain a grand empire, nor can the USSR. A totalitarian Pax Sovietica is even less likely than a capitalistic Pax American was. 21. Although, so the documents continue, ‘neighbourhood contingencies .... are at present assessed as impossible’! The theme that the USA affords no sure guarantee of Australian defence is reiterated in Langtry and Bell, e.g. p.608. They go on there to outline the major points that reliance upon the US has distorted Australian arrangements (with forces better equipped to fight alongside the Americans in Asia than on their own in defending Australia) and has led to neglect of the regional priorities, ‘to defence planning which at least would recently paid little attention to the direct defence of our continent and the protection of our remote communities’ (p.608). 22. The French, who operate a global network second only to the Americans and more extensive than the Russians, with many forces in the Pacific region, have never been seriously considered. Yet in certain significant respects French social and cultural arrangements are closer to Antipodean ones than American arrangements are. In these days of technological warfare, the post-Waterloo loss record of the French should not be given too much weight; we don’t after all look very hard at the American record of defeats and incompetence. Etc. 23. If Australia is not likely to be threatened there is no real deterrence advantage because nothing to deter. Other advantages of the ANZUS alliance such as access to high-level intelligence are not only dubious (see PC, D. Martin), but not always guaranteed by the alliance as the blackout of New Zealand shows. 24. Soviet activity is undoubtedly perceived rather differently by American administrations than Antipodean ones. ‘An agressive, treacherous, ruthlessly self-interested, expansionist increasingly powerful, and hence increasingly threatening state - that is the image of the Soviet Union in America. It is the image which has legitimised the strategic modernation and Star Wars programs’ (to adopt Mack ST, pl). To see that this is indeed the intellectually shoddy route by which these grand and dangerous programs are justified, it is enough to work through fundamentalist sources, such as Gray. It is almost as if Americans had projected some of their own occasionally-manifested worst features into the giant enemy. 25. After some considerable reconstruction, that is. For the argument, curiously referred as that of “central balance” in newspaper-level publications of academics (e.g. Catley, Bell), is never presented in requisite detail - which is one reason why it has proved hard to criticise and refute. 26. As well both the premiss and its usual substitutes are false (see MF). The type of argument exhibited is a good example of prevalent Australian consequentialist thinking. A parallel argument, enjoying unwarranted popularity, runs: We might as well sell uranium (e.g. to France), because if we don’t someone else will - as if motives counted morally for nothing. 27. See also the discussion of Bell’s claims in D. Martin and in Mack PC. 28. Since the New Zealand restrictions on nuclear ships, ‘the Soviet media has been full of gloating references to the prospect of the collapse of the ANZUS treaty’ according to Dibb (SS, p.14). Given the unimportance of the Antipodes to Soviet interests (as Dibb 38 himself explains), Dibb is surely exaggerating, at least, when he later claims that ‘the prospect of the breakup of the AN ZUS treaty would be of enormous benefit to the USSR’s world-wide interests’ (SS p.31). Soviet support for Antipodean independence and for ‘a real nuclear weapon-free zones' in the South Pacific has its disconcerting elements (‘with friends like that ...’); but luckily the quality of ideas does not depend essentially on their sources and supporters. 29. As WPI serves to show. In a different context, Bell objects to Australian free-loading ‘on other people’s risks and burdens. That has certainly not been our tradition, and I hope it will not become so, since it is morally quite indefensible’ (p.7). Not so: bludging, for instance, is a well-established, if disapproved of, part of the tradition; and in some cases it is morally in order. However, free-riding is not being proposed merely for self interested reasons, e.g. to remove the present risks of nuclear targetting; it is being proposed with a view to altering the two great alliance structures that at present dominate international politics. Bell’s objection to such a course is that it ‘would on the one hand tend to increase the tendency of the superpowers to unilateralism, and on the other hand tend to induce many of the minor powers in question (including Australia) to consider acquiring nuclear capacity’ (p.7). The second alternative neglects the non­ proliferation treaty, to which Australia is a signatory; the first appears to assume erroneously that friendly relations with America are foregone; both are pretty minor considerations (and both can be dealt with in other negotiated ways) compared with the major problem of nuclear war. 30. The less than perspicuous symbolism is that used in Hardin (CA, p.20, p.39), but with agents’ costs or contributions, C, duly agent relativized. Hardin misleadingly treats C as a fixed parameter, thus strictly falsifying the tautology. 31. Thus Hardin who (in CA) claims to ‘demonstrate the equivalence of the logic of collective action and the Prisoners’ Dilemma’ (p.4) The demonstration is given on p.25ff. 32. But of course the two types of dilemma interconnect. 33. Even so, significant change in USA looks unlikely. Present arrangements suit not only the American corporate-administrative power elite, which can direct public opinion through its control of the main communications media, but many other fat-cat Americans, rather well. The polarisation of the world into two camps increases US control of the larger and far wealthier camp, yet scarcely reduces US trade or markets. While it does limit the global coverage of US business and multinationals, and somewhat restricts the transfer of other regions’ surplus value to the USA, it ensures the much greater advantage of being able to maintain the US domestic political economy on a military basis. The US and the USSR not only dance together; they were made for each other. Abroad US hegemony is maintained through a series of alliances and economic control strategies. Particularly ominous for the South Pacific are the Trilateral and Pacific Rim arrangements (which, with much local assistance, are helping to send Australia on its present economic trajectory). When advice or persuasion directed at allies and client states fail, economic measures can be resorted to (capital outflows, for instance, being a highly effective mechanism, “aid” a lesser device). For the most part, the imperial war machine can remain in the background. At home updated and improved imperial measures also work well. The mass consumerist society affords a rich and diverting selection of bread (much of it again imported) for a majority of Americans; television 39 and its entertainment variants offer a constant diet of circuses. For passive middle mainstream America, the vast police and security network remains a largely background and even unnoticed phenomenon; what is seen is even welcomed as a necessary shield from that other, dangerous, minority America. American social, educational and media management of opinion is obviously successful. Of present relevance, most Americans have been convinced that unilateral disarmament would be unAmerican. Thus the American administration, being hedged in by opinion they have helped to generate, cannot move in any such directions. For, given popular opinion, it would of course be politically disastrous, as well as undemojl’cratic! In the USSR, where political control is exercised to a much greater extent through overt power, present change of substance appears even less likely. 34. More of the negative enterprise is attempted elsewhere, e.g. a critique of the supposed strait-jacket of human nature is begun in CPD. From Plato through Hegel and into contemporary times it has been erroneously supposed that war, like aggression, is part of human nature, that war is a permanent (and perhaps even desirable) condition of human and social existence. For a refutation, see e.g. Trainer and Waite. 35. As observed by B. Martin, who uses this important form of argument for institutional change to get this thick book started (pp.12-13). 36. The swarm includes some anomalies, such as that somewhat tarnished hero of deep ecology, Spinoza: see e.g. Northedge. 37. Perhaps Kant had some such scenario in view in his theme that peace is empirically possible, which he coupled with his striking claim that peace is morally and rationally imperative. The latter claim, running in direct opposition to the long line of bellicose philosophers, really relies on the correct, but controversial, assumption that states are subject to the same moral relations as individual persons. Both then have an obligation to seek peace derived from forms of the categorial morality, notably from rational autonomy, the universality of maxims, and the ultimate value of persons (or, yet more chauvinistically, of humanity). 38. Veblen argued against the State on the basis that ‘governmental establishments and ... powers ... are derived from feudal establishments of the Middle Ages; which in turn, are of a predatory origin and of an irresponsible character’ (p.9), however the Christianfeudal origin of the State provided only one - and a coersive - evolutionary pattern of organisation (pp. 12-13), a pattern much influenced moreover by schemes of intellectuals. Other patterns remain feasible. 39. There are now theoretical arguments for Kant’s claim, as well as practical arguments of an inductive sort. 40. Such is also the new message from America: for the peace movement to get through to the administration, American democracy must be overhauled and revitalised, capitalist democracy superseded by true democracy or “republicanism” (see especially Cohen and Rogers, and earlier Chomsky). But the message, like the US peace movements’ very limited demands for peace, leaves the State, as the bringer of wars, and main source of violence essentially intact; the structural changes suggested, which will be slow to achieve, are much too narrowly conceived. 41. My thanks for information to Andrew Mack and David Bennett, and for comments to Grover Foley and Russell Hardin. REFERENCES G. H. Andrewartha and L.C. Birch, The Ecological Web, University of Chicago Press, 1984. W.R. Ashby, Design for a Brain, Second edition, Wiley, New York, 1960. S.Beer, Designing Freedom, Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, Toronto, 1974. C. Bell, ‘The case against neutrality’, Current Affairs Bulletin 61(4) (1984) 4-10. S.I. Benn, ‘Deterrence or appeasement? or, On trying to be rational about nuclear war’, Journal of Applied Philosophy 1(1984) 5-19. F. Capra and C. Spretnak, Green Politics, Hutchinson, London, 1984. R. Catley, ‘Along with the Bomb ...’ (Review of D. Martin), The Weekend Australian Magazine, 7-8 April, 1984. N. Chomsky and E.S. Herman, The Political Economy of Human Rights, Black Rose Books, Montreal, 1979. P. Cock, Alternative Australia, Quartet Books, Melbourne, 1979. J. Cohen and J. Rogers, On Democracy, Penguin, New York, 1984. P. Dibb (as reported) ‘Defence Planning “lacks coherence” - researcher’, ANU Reporter, 1983. P. Dibb, ‘Issues in Australian defence’, Australian Outlook 37 (1983) 160-166; referred to as IAD. P. Dibb, ‘Soviet strategy towards Australia, New Zealand and Oceania’ paper prepared for Soviet Strategy Against Asia converence, Tokyo, November 1984; referred to as SS. P. Dibb, Review of Australia's Defence Capabilities, Report to the Minister of Defence, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1986; edited text also published in The Canberra Times, 4 June 1986, pp.16-18; referred to as the Dibb Review. P. and A. Erlich, Population, Resources, Environment, Second edition, Freeman, San Francisco, 1976. H. Feith,‘Richard Falk, World order radical’, Peace Studies 24 (1985) 24-5. J. Galtung, There are Alternatives, Spokesman, Nottingham, 1984. W.C. Gay, ‘Myths about nuclear war: misconceptions in public beliefs and governmental plans’, Philosophy and Social Criticism, 9(1982) 117-144. A. Gilbert, ‘The state and nature in Australia’, Australian Cultural History 1981 (ed. S. Goldberg and F.B. Smith), Canberra, 1982, pp.9-28. 42 C.S. Gray, ‘The Reagan administration and arms control’, paper presented at The Future of Arms Control Conference, Canberra. August 1985. R. Hardin, Collective Action, Resources for the Future, Washington, 1982; referred to as CA. R. Hardin, ‘Unilateral versus mutual disarmament’, Philosophy and Public Affairs 12(1983) 236-254. M.D. Hayes, ‘Defending the sunburnt country’, Chain Reaction 33(August-September 1983) 11-17. R.L. Heilbroner, Beyond Boom and Bust, Norton, New York, 1978. I. Kant, Perpetual Peace (trans, and introd. M. Campbell Smith), Swan Sonnerschein, London, 1903 (first published 1795). J. O. Langtry and D Ball (eds), A Vunerable Country, Australian National University Press, Canberra, 1986. A. Mack, ‘Farewell to Arms Controls’, Peace Research 9(1984) 9ff.; referred to as PR. A. Mack, ‘The pros and cons of ANZUS’, Fabian ANZUS Conference, Lome, 4-5 May 1985; referred to as PC. A. Mack, ‘Arms control, disarmament and the concept of defensive defence’, Disarmament 8(3)(1984) 109-119; referred to as AC. A. Mack, ‘The Soviet threat thesis: perceptions, capabilities and interests’ typescript, Canberra, May 1985; referred to as ST. B. Martin, Uprooting War, Freedom Press, London, 1984. B. Martin, Armed Neutrality for Australia, Drummond Books, Melbourne, 1984. F.S. Northedge, ‘Peace, war and philosophy’, in Encyclopedia of Philosophy (ed P. Edwards), Volume 6, Macmillan, New York, 1967, 63-67. M. Olson, The Logic of Collective Action, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1965. P. Pettit, ‘Free riding and foul dealing’, Journal of Philosophy, to appear, J.J. Rousseau, A Project for Perpetual Peace (trans. E.M. Nuttal), London, 1927 (first Published 1761). R. Routley, ‘On the ethics of large-scale nuclear war and nuclear deterrence, and the political fall out’, Discussion papers in Environmental philosophy #5, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University, 1984. R. Routley, ‘Metaphysical fall-out from the nuclear predicament’, Philosophy and Social Criticism 3/4(1984) 19-34; referred to as MF. R. Routley and V. Plumwood, ‘Moral dilemmas and the logic of deontic notions’, Discussion Papers in Environmental Philosophy #6, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University, 1984; referred to as MD. 43 R. Sharp (ed.), Apocalypse No. Pluto Press, Sydney, 1984. P.R. Stephenson, The Foundations of Culture, W.J. Miles, Sydney, 1936. R. Sylvan, ‘Culture and the roots of political divergence’, typescript, Canberra, 1985; referred to as CPD. M. Taylor and H. Ward, "Chickens, whales, and bumpy goods: alternative models of public­ goods provision’, Political Studies 30(1982) 350-370. T. Trainer and H. Waite, ‘Culture and the production of aggression’, in Sharp, ep.cit, 205-226. The Strategic Basis of Australian Defence Policy, leaked extracts published in the National Times, March 30-April 5, 1984, 23-30; referred to as SB. Threats to Australian Security, Parliamentary Joint Committee for Foreign Affairs and Defence, Australian Government Printer, Canberra; referred to as TAS. T. Veblen, An Inquiry into the Nature of Peace and the Terms of its Perpetuation, Viking Press, New York, 1945 (first published 1917).  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Box 59, Item 680: Draft of Australia's defence philosophy: further investigation of the nonexistent Subject The topic of the resource Computer printout. Handwritten annotation on page 1: War & Peace III. Description An account of the resource Note, one of four papers digitised from item 680. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/browse?search=Richard+Sylvan&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bjoiner%5D=and&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=&amp;range=&amp;collection=&amp;type=&amp;user=&amp;tags=&amp;public=&amp;featured=&amp;exhibit=&amp;geolocation-mapped=&amp;geolocation-address=&amp;geolocation-latitude=&amp;geolocation-longitude=&amp;geolocation-radius=10&amp;submit_search=Search+for+items">Richard Sylvan</a> Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived <span class="MuiTypography-root-125 MuiTypography-body2-126">The University of Queensland's <a data-testid="rek-series" href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/records/search?page=1&amp;pageSize=20&amp;sortBy=score&amp;sortDirection=Desc&amp;searchQueryParams%5Brek_series%5D%5Bvalue%5D=Richard+Sylvan+Papers%2C+UQFL291&amp;searchMode=advanced">Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291</a></span>, Box 59, Item 680 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org">Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy</a> Contributor An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, <a href="https://najtaylor.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Dr. N.A.J. 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Type The nature or genre of the resource Manuscript Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context <a href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:23d96cf">https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:23d96cf</a> Coverage The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant Como - Cupboard - Pile 3 Box 59: Nuclear Como House Como House > Cupboard > Pile 3 https://www.antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/df8ea475ec2b745964d399c943fb6566.pdf e7cd3be667c873fe9f41ed27b4a5ce46 PDF Text Text WAR AND PEACE IV: TAO AND DEEP-GREEN Taoism and deep-green environmental theory, although closely aligned on very many issues, diverge over war. For Taoism, by contrast for instance with Buddhism, is not a pacific doctrine, but is committed to skilful defensive militarism. While it does not espouse a fortress mentality, Taoism certainly condones limited defensive military operations for specific purposes, a sort of guerilla warfare. By contrast, deep-green theory, while acknowledging the role of organised social defence, stands opposed to professional militarism, and thereby to military defence, and is committed to a principled pacifism. Conveniently a route through Taoism, philosophically fascinating in its own right, will lead us to problems of pacifism and towards deep-green theory. 1. Features of a Taoist critique of war and militarism. War did not receive a favourable press in ancient Chinese philosophy. Generally aggression and war were to be avoided. Even Confucius imposed very demanding conditions: for example, ‘when good men have instructed the people [in morals, agriculture, military tactics] for seven years, they may be allowed to bear arms,’ ‘If a ruler ... does not set himself right, even his commands will not be obeyed’ (SB p.41, italics added). Mo Tzu went much further than Confucius, roundly condemning war - on utilitarian grounds, that war yields no net benefit at any level (SB p.227). What is more, he backed his heavy condemnation practically (unlike some conspicuous contemporary theoretical utilitarians); ‘he did not hesitate to walk for ten days and ten nights in an effort to dissuade a ruler from making war’ (SB P-212). But none, it is said, went as far, in a detailed and sophisticated criticism of war, as Lao Tzu; ‘none has condemned war more strongly than Lao Tzu’. ‘[T]he opposition of Taoism to the use of force is well-known, and the most bitter attack on militarism if found in the Lao Tzu' (Chan, p.154, p.17.) But, after that splendid build-up, the text is slightly disappointing. Lao Tzu does not assert outright that war is an abomination, or even roundly condemn it. His critique of war, militarism, and military technology, is subtle and oblique, and, on the surface, far distanced from pacifism. For he does not recommend an end to war - in that genuine Taoists, those who possess Tao, will never participate in them - but expects wars to continue as unavoidable evils. Worse, he even goes so far as to outline proper attitudes to war and conduct in war, and indeed to suggest military techniques and strategies, some of which look decidedly devious. Among the classical works of Taoism, we focus on the Lao Tzu because, by contrast with other works, a remarkable component of that book is devoted to war and militarism. The apparent deviousness of the tactics Lao Tzu allocates serves to highlight what has been seen as ‘the most troublesome element’ in his philosophy (Chan p.17) - not so much however because they concern military operations, but because they are taken to apply much �2 more widely, ‘to life in general’ (p. 17). But why should military activity obtain some special dispensation? Why should what is not tolerated more generally be exonerated there? But given that Taoism has here the virtue of consistency (i.e. uniformity on principles) and of universalizability, that simply leaves more explaining to be done. • Puzzles for Taoism, and wars as unavoidable evils There are two puzzles here in Taoism rather than one. There is the military-practices paradox, and, varying and generalising on that, there are life-practices paradoxes. The special paradox is generated by the following incompatible elements: on the one side, ‘the most bitter attack on militarism’, the well-known opposition of Taoism to the use of force (p. 17) and to the possession and use of smart military weapons and technology - implying that war is far from all right - and on the other, advocacy of certain (devious) military tactics, outlines of (deceitful) conduct in war, and so on - implying that war is all right after all. A straightforward generalisation of this paradox would look at other morally-sensitive parts of life, where some practice was strongly condemned yet engaged in (for many examples, see the dilemmas assembled in MD). But the variation of concern to Chan and the neo-Confucians concerns the conjunction of upright with devious practices in life, in particular in the life of the sage. For a Taoist sage is presumed to lead an upright straightforward life, yet appears to engage in devious and even deceitful practices incompatible with such a life-style. Call this the Taoist-lifestyle paradox. Evidently a good deal of explaining is required, as to how Taoism can coherently take the positions it appears to presume, both on war and peace, and on life more generally. A desirable preliminary would seem to be a little investigation of what position is taken, especially on war and militarism. One key pasage runs: Fine weapons are instruments of evil They are hated by creatures Therefore those who possess the Tao turn away from them. ... Weapons are instruments of evil, not the instruments of a good ruler. When he uses them unavoidably, he regards calm restraint as the best principle Even when he is victorious, he does not regard it as praiseworthy, For to praise victory is to delight in the slaughter of men. He who delights in the slaughter of men will not succeed in the empire. ... For a victory, let us observe the occasion with funeral-ceremonies (LT p.154). Wars, which involve the use of weapons, instruments of evil, are accordingly themselves evil. They are also evil because they involve the slaughter of men. But they are also sometimes unavoidable (also p.152). Therefore such wars are unavoidable evils. Such discourse, obtained by almost immediate inference from the passage, is within the standard orbit of dilemma talk. But Taoism lacks, through deliberately eschewing deontic talk, the discourse which enables direct expression of such dilemmas, or even direct condemnation of wars or of clever weapons. Instead the points are made by circumlocution, what the possesser of Tao �3 does, how the good ruler conducts himself, or by analogy, of victory in war with death. Unavoidable evils are the very stuff of deontic dilemmas (though many theories, underpinned by shonky logic, lack the resources for representing this stuff properly). Where something is unavoidably evil, it is both bad, because evil, and also not bad, doing it is excusable, because it is unavoidable. So, given such an argument (which has its weaknesses), an unavoidable evil is a genuinely dilemmatic object with inconsistent features. Certain wars have looked, since ancient times, like such dilemmatic objects. Revealingly, Chan tries to explain that ‘most troublesome element’ in Taoism, the military-practice paradox, through the following exercise in lateral thinking: It can ... be argued that Lao Tzu uses warfare to illustrate his principles of taking no action and weakness because warfare is among the most dynamic and critical of human experiences, just as the Indian classic, the Bhagavadgita chooses fighting as the theme on which to discuss the terrible dilemma whether one should fulfil his duty, as in the case of a soldier, and kill, or should fail in his duty and refrain from killing (p.17). ‘Just as’? The Indian classic prevents a classic moral dilemma, a dilemma represented in contemporary philosophy (following its rediscovery by Sartre), where there are incompatible duties: the duty to kill, because of one's role as a soldier, and the duty not to kill, because of one's human condition, and the supervenient dilemma of failing in and fulfilling one's duties. These dilemmas for an individual (male, as it then was) are replicated in dilemmas regarding war for group institutions: at bottom, the obligation to engage in war (for one set of compelling reasons) as contraposed with the obligation not to engage in war (for another, perhaps overlapping, set of reasons). A theory of moral dilemmas (as worked out for example in MD) is crucial for an adequate treatment of major issues in war and peace, especially (as will become evident) for a viable strong pacifism. But Taoism, eschewing deontic discourse, lacks the apparatus to state or develop moral dilemmas. Hence it is logically excluded from giving a full or adequate account of what is going on conceptually. One of the philosophically fascinating feature of Taoism is the fashion in which ij manages to avoid deontic discourse, and to substitute for direct deontic discourse or improvise circumlocutions when deontic discourse would otherwise appear inevitable (cf. UT for examples). But there are costs. One is inability to display the mechanism of deontic dilemmas, or to show what reasons and argument lie behind Taoist prounouncements and conclusions (the shortage of Taoism on argument is another philosophically conspicious feature, also observed in UT). As conceptual apparatus for analysizing moral dilemmas is missing, most of the machinery involved has to be passed over. Only the outcomes, as Taoism sees them, are presented, as if from a black box. Taoism blacks out the story on deontic dilemmas that deep-green theory can tell, as the following diagram tries to show: �4 Diagrams . Charting the processing of deontic dilemmas that are “resolved,”. Deep-green chart: Arguments to Processing of dilemma, directive dilemma incompatible situational procedures output input prescriptions Corresponding Taoist chart: Black directive Box output It is evident that Taoism can be extended; information can be put into the Black Box rendering it less opaque. That extension can be made so as to conform to deep-green theory, e. so that the extended Taoist chart, a neo-Daoist chart, looks like the deep-green one. That is i. indeed essentially how neo-Daoism get characterised, in terms of conformity of the extension to deep ecological theory (see UT). We are now placed to explain how to dissolve, or at least neutralize, the paradoxes deriving from repudiation of militarism, an awkwardly qualified repudiation in the case of Taoism. In a significant sense there is no resolving of genuine deontic dilemmas. The principles delineating the fix may stand, incompatible, signalling the persisting suboptimality (or better, sublimenality) of the dilemmatic situation. Where there is a dilemma, involved parties should try to do well enough in the sublimenal circumstances (for a much fuller account, see MD). Thus where there is a war, itself a non-Taoist process, engaged or caught up Taoists will not abandon Taoism. Taoist methods will be applied, Taoist strategies pursued. So much for theoretical representation and (non-)resolution of life-practices and other dilemmas, details of which are readily elaborated in deep-green extensions of Taoism. A prior substantive issue is whether dilemmas always are generated: not whether wars are evil (typically they are, an issue we shall come to), but whether wars are unavoidable. Analysis of wars does not bear that familiar claim out decisively. Many wars could have been avoided, through conciliation, negotiation, restraint, etc., and no worse results apparently obtained, through sanctions, exchange, trade, etc. Through a typology of wars (coming up) that conjecture can be given some substance. Consider, for instance, what would be walk-overs. Then there is little point in making a military response. So war can be avoided. Certainly an occupation, to be met in a different way, may still occur. And so on, perhaps, for various other types of war. But, more generally, try this:- �5 Every war involves an aggressor, who makes an aggressive move. Such an aggressor could always avoid that move, taking a different (or a do-nothing) course of action. Therefore, every war can be avoided. No war is entirely unavoidable. Setting aside determinism (which renders all actual wars along with all other events unavoidable), it could be argued that a war sometimes simply boils up, without an aggressor, an intensification of a conflagatory situation. There are grounds for scepticism regarding such examples; for such intensification can only occur if provocative military moves are made, for instance troops are stationed in provocative or risky positions. The presumption that certain wars are unavoidable typically derives from a one-sided perspective on war, a defender's perspective. A defender has no option, so it is routinely averred, but to respond to a determined aggressor. Even if that should be so sometimes, when there is no running away or going underground, it does not establish that such a war is unavoidable; for it neglects the role of the aggressor. By a smarter formulation, relevant features of unavoidability can be captured. Although wars may not be unavoidable, defensive action in wars that have been initiated may be unavoidable. At least such action may be unavoidable if unacceptably high costs (death, enslavement, etc.) are not to be avoided. Thereupon another highly relevant feature emerges: the linkage of avoidability to costs. For whether an action is unavoidable then depends upon what costs a party is prepared to incur before and when insisting on action: but this appears entirely unacceptable. How can what is “unavoidable” cease to be so when some further costs are absorbed? However with basics like survival, a certain liberty, and so on, we do reach such bounds. An important type of unavoidability. We also reach scenarios, unavailable to Lao Tzu but kindly brought within range by modem technology, which may appear to justify aggressive strikes. State Z, while not an aggressor, is carrying out practices which will impose unacceptably high costs upon peoples of other states and implacably refuses to desist. It could, for example, be poisoning air or water flowing to other states. But ,to make the case vivid, let us suppose that state Z is constructing, for reasons Zeders find convincing (they are committed to a faith which depicts all hunqpns as incorrigible sinners and unworthy of life), an effective doomsday machine. Would an (aggressive) preemptory strike designed to disable or destroy the machine be unavoidable?1 In a sense, No; in another Yes. For different modalities can operate. Physically outsiders need to do nothing, but watch Zeders go about their zealous work. But deontically they are under heavy moral pressure, because of the costs of standing by idly: if the human race is worth anything very substantial, then they are obliged to act, action is deontically* 1 Whether it would be justifiable, or just, are separate issues. But it is evident enought that such scenarios further damage the obsolescent idea of just war. For, according to received doctrine, a just war is defensive. (How such a war can be fought at all is another matter; coherence requires relativization to ‘just wax for party d’.) �6 unavoidable. Here is a situation where a proposed reduction of deontic logic proves illuminating. Obligation is explicated through not implying, or necessitating, the sanction, i.e. excessive ethical costs such as extermination. Let us explain deontic unavoidability analogously: an action is so unavoidable if not undertaking it would result in excessive ethical costs. Then z/it can be established that there is no other way than a military strike, an act of war, to ensure that the Zeders desist (and certainly we can envisage scenarios like that), then that is deontically unavoidable. It is also dilemmatic for those committed to, or inclined towards pacifism; and it is, for them at least, but paradoxically justifiable, as the negation is also justifiable, on pacific grounds. Scenarios like that sketched, that appear to render certain wars deontically unavoidable require but little or no elaboration to render them evil. Evil indeed is such a standard feature of standard wars that at least its great presence call for little supporting evidence. But it has taken to vast stretch of human history to reach this general point of recognition. The manifold evils of war Lao Tzu very early recognised and emphasized: Wherever armies are stationed, briars and thorns grow. Great wars are always followed by famines (p. 152). And nowadays followed by great tides of refugees. This passage includes not only recognition of the widely-observed socio-environmental consequences of war, but, more striking, very early recognition of the severe environmental impact of military forces. That critique is not however developed in Taoism.2 Only recently has it been pushed substantially further. And only recently could a new, most significant twist occur, the merging of resource security, long a military objective, with environmental security. The appalling idea has recently been floated that the military, in need of new work and roles with the apparent warming of West-East relations and cooling of the Cold War, should exchange usual military idleness for meddling in environmental matters: regulation and policing of environmental resources, ensurance of environmental security of powerful states, and similar. This is a bit like reassigning those imprisoned for child abuse to managing kindergartens; for consider the impressive military record of environmental vandalism. What the military is alleged to offer is a structure appropriate and available for handling such matters. But, to the contrary, it is precisely the sort of hierarchical, authoritarian expensive structure that should be wound down and up as soon as the opportunity appears, as (briefly) now, rather than being retained and shockingly reoriented (as a state-serving “Greenwar”). 2 But a bridge to deep-green theory can be made through neo-Daoism, an updating of Taoism in confirmity with deep ecology (which however is somewhat thin and threadbare on war; for what there is so far, see Naess p.160). On neo-Daoism, see UT. �7 2. On the divergence of deep-green from Taoism. Having arrived, by better or worse arguments, at the conclusion that wars, though generally evil, may be sometimes unavoidable, it is evidently important to say something about how they - those of the theoretical residue - are to be conducted. By appropriate conduct the damage they do may be reduced; also the conduct should be appropriate to the funereal nature of wars (to exceed Taoist resources for stating this sort of point). It is at this stage that deep­ green theory begins to diverge from Taoism. In further explaining the Taoist and deep-green critiques of war, and diverting objections to them, a rough and preliminary typology of wars is important. It is also of passing interest in its own philosophical right. War, according to English Dictionaries, is a ‘contest carried on by force of arms, typically between nations or states’. More exactly, war is a game — in the generous technical sense of game-theory, with players, rules, goals, strategies, and so on carried on in significant part by military means, normally between states or substates. Call the contestants, (warnng) parties. They typically represent of course larger populations. The set­ up between parties resembles the arrangements of players in game theory. There are several analogical extensions of the term war to cover games where one of the parties is an object, construed as hostile (an enemy of the state), such as Crime, Drugs, Poverty or Nature. These we can set aside as analogical wars. Of course wars form only a part of military activities. Military interests and objectives have always stretched significantly further than war, to include surveillence and security, easily extended to resource security, environmental security and life­ style security, and beyond that to political stability and other political matters. Evidently military ambitions have far over-extended themselves in bagging such democratic concerns. An anarchist solution to the whole problem of war, which some have seen Taoism as reaching towards, is immediate: eliminate the source of war, states. Unfortunately it is not quite that simple (and that's not simple). For wars can also occur between nations, cultures, races or tribes (which are not such artifices as states, and not always so readily or desirably abolished), between inhabited regions, and between factions within states (thus civil wars) or, perhaps by extension,.between factions within other social structures (thus, for instance, gang wars). But undoubtedly eliminating states and aspiring states would abolish most wars and virtually all the worst wars. While “nonviolent wars” are excluded by definition, by virtue of ‘force of arms’, token wars, limited wars, and so on, are not: for instance, wars fought by small armed teams representing competing sides (cf. medieval and science fiction war games). As wars are hemmed in by conventions and agreed rules, there is no reason in principle why they should not be reduced to two person contests, fought under strict rules like boxing or gladiatorial contests. But in modem times wars have never taken such sensible forms, but have been much larger affairs, making heavy (though fortunately restricted) use of latest technology. Let us distinguish such wars as techno-powered wars. They have, directly or indirectly (for the �8 technology may be bought or bartered), a heavy research and development support structure (indeed the bulk of contemporary science is devoted - misdirected - in one way or another to this effort). Among wars, an important distinction is that between offensive and defensive wars. An offensive war is one which ventures off a given party’s territory or recognised pad, “invading” that of another party or parties; correlatively defensive parties, if they have not also invaded. Force projection typifies offensive practice. Plainly, offensiveness and defensiveness are not strictly features of a war, but of parties to a war. In a two-party war, while both parties can easily act offensively, the possibility of both parties proceeding defensively is excluded, unless they share territory. (Even then issues may arise as to which party, if any, was the aggressor, which started it, was responsible for starting it, and so on.) Thus mutually defensive wars between contemporary states are impossible (but would be possible if states shared territory, e.g. if Eire and Britain shared the territory of Northern Ireland). Tao-accredited wars were defensive wars, never wars aiming at domination: last-resort wars, in which no pride was taken (LT p.152).3 The pretence that offensive wars are defensive is widespread, and reflected in the subterfuge that departments or ministries of war are those of defence, security or whatever. (If they really were what they purport to be, we should be well on the way to an end to war.) Offensive practices are rendered defensive ones by shabby redefinitional strategems, such as redefining ‘defensive’ to include defence of ideals like democracy or liberty, infringed (or allegedly infringed) on territories abroad, or to include “defence” of a third party or place (whence every offensive war is “defensive”). In the present war in which part of Arabia is engulfed (February 1991), one party claims to be defending what really was (or should be) part of its territory, namely Kuwait, another party to be defending (what Kuwait did not enjoy) democracy. It is a doubly offensive war presented in this guise as jointly defensive. Aggressive wars are waged for a variety of reasons, but usually for resources or access to resources or markets, a matter often disguised by appeal to ideology (thus a war for oil is represented as a war qf liberation). But there are other reasons than narrowly economic ones, such as religion (as with crusades), power and aggrandisement (as in building an empire), and so on. Nor are those reasons necessarily far separated; ideologies like Marxism and market 3 There is one line in LT that may suggest that attack was sometimes justifiable, namely ‘For deep love helps one to win in the case of attack’ (p.219). But how can compassion be appropriate unless this attack is within a defensive setting, a larger context of unavoidability or such like. A passage shortly below confirms this interpretation: I dare not take the offensive but I take the defensive: I dare not advance an inch but I retreat a foot (p.222). These are advances and attacks within a defensive setting. �9 capitalism, for example, exhibit many of the features of religion. The economic reasons for war appear to have become much more complex with the advent of an integrated world economy. At the same time many of the independent reasons for economic wars are now obsolete. For to powerful states accrue the advantages of war without war. At least most of the former economic advantages of war can be obtained without expensive wars, through trade, institution of economic dependence, etc. Small medieval wars were sometimes instituted for the collection of neighbouring riches and booty, a kind of piracy meeting conditions of war. “Small” contemporary wars can be waged for a remarkable mix of political-economy ends: to establish a regime favourable to economic penetration and profit repatriation, to subjugate markets and to remove competition, to boost a sagging weapons economy by using up old stocks and also testing new equipment, to restart a depressed economy, and so on. Such wars, along with the economic aims which motivate them, are in effect heavily castigated by Lao Tzu: When Tao prevails in the world, galloping horses are turned back to fertilize (the fields ...). When Tao does not prevail in the world, war horses thrive in the suburbs. There is no calamity greater than lavish desires. (LT p.181). But it does exceed evidential warrant to claim that Tao is not only sufficient, but necessary, for cessation of such practices. The practice of regularly stimulating complex military-saturated economies through war is reminiscent of older, much ridiculed practices in simpler societies. They now ridicule the Tsembaga, who proceeded to destroy much of their surplus product by going to war every 5-15 years (cf Rapaport). But they do not similarly ridicule the most powerful nation on the Earth, the USA, which proceeds to write off a colossal amount of surplus in war every 10-20 years (the Gulf war liquidated some $1.7 billion per day). Taoists would. For ridicule was a favoured method, an important rhetorical strategem, and war and its idiocy were favourite targets. Some classification of defensive wars is also important, for various reasons: reducing and abolishing wars, their costs and damage, restructuring societies away from war and military practices, and, not least, for appreciating Taoism. A main distinction is between • conventional defence, maintained by armies of armed soldiers, many of them professionals, and • social defence, where there are no such armies or but fragments of them, and defence is carried out through social networks of a significant part of society.4 4 Details of social defence are presented in Sharp and in Martin. �10 It is here that Taoism and deep-green theory part company. Under Taoism, the state will have a standing army, but a defensive army operating by strange, surprise tactics (p.201). No doubt defensive wars are to remain last resort action. Nonetheless the state will operate in secrecy, in a way incompatible with decentralised social defence; people will be kept in the dark about smart weapons of the state; and they too will be surprised, along with presumed enemies of the state. By contrast, under deep-green theory, there should be no hidden smart weapons of state; information would flow more freely and not be hidden from the people (who should retain influence in informed decision making). Under deep-green, standing armies, and more generally military organisation, will be wound down altogether. Taoism should have pushed its searching criticism further. For military objectives, easily acquired by standing armies with time on their hands, are frequently incompatible with Taoism. For example, Taoism is opposed to domination (LT p.152), whereas military operations frequently seek or involve domination; and military structure is invariably hierarchical and authoritarian. Taoism aims for self-regulation, wherever feasible (cf. p.201); so does deep­ green theory, which is one reasons why it aims to dispose of standing armies, as an important preliminary to the withering away of states themselves (military forces being major props of state control and power, and often maintained primarily for internal state security). Taoism has no project for ending the era of wars; deep-green theory does. That project involves an elimination of standing armies, too often poised for fighting or political interference. A recommended route to end war consists in progressive scaling down: reduction of the means and manpower. The initial stages are well-known, and include • elimination of nuclear, biological and chemical weaponry, and • force reduction. It can hardly be pretended that the Earth's states have managed to proceed very far on even this complex of stages. The next stage consists in • contraction to defensive capacities only, and the final stage consists in • elimination of remaining military defensive forces, and adoption, so far as required, of social defence practices. The complete route thus involves complete demilitarisation. Reasons why deep-green aims to proceed the full distance are readily grasped by considering the environmental shallowness of an otherwise cogent traditional case for the sharp curtailment of wars and militarism. The traditional Western case against wars has been primarily along two dimensions: social and moral. Wars are highly disruptive of the social fabric; wars may be unjust. From these joint features, it was argued that wars should be a matter of last resort, to be fought to ensure peace. It was argued further that only just wars should be fought. Just wars were rare objects. But as there was little evidence of the decline and fall of wars, much effort was expended, more practically and unsuccessfully, upon endeavouring to improve the calibre of wars, and more theoretically, upon trying to characterize just war satisfactorily, or rather to bend the notion in an effort to approximate the gory unjust facts. �11 Progress was long hindered, furthermore, because there was always a rival positive perspective on wars, which encouraged the exaltation of wars and military feats. It also facilitated the transfer of the favourable image of war to other problem areas, whence the long and apparently successful war against Nature (but the short-term successes are turning into long-term problems), the short and unsuccessful war against Poverty, and so on. Behind all this is the complex idea of war as rejuvenating, even cleansing, like fire; of war as heroic, and glorious, of war as the supreme testing ground of men. These pictures of war - finally shattered by the first World War (where even the poets began to tell of horrors and atrocities) and subsequent technological wars - though no longer in ascendency, have by no means vanished. The notion of war as rejuvenating a flagging economy persists, along with the practice of keeping capitalism running smoothly by integrating substantial military components into the industrial engine. With the development of highly technological wars - the celebrated development of the dirty industrial age is substantially military - the traditional negative case has grown in strength. Wars have become much more damaging, with the potential for much more that is significantly worse, and the possibility of a just war has correspondingly contracted, virtually to zero. The opposition to war has likewise grown, but more than correspondingly with the rise of women in social and political influence. Wars have almost always and everywhere been Men's affairs; likewise conquest. Deep-green theory accepts much of the traditional negative case, but would further strengthen it. For example, the stricture against unjust wars, as out and out immoral, can be strengthened, through the following syllogism: All wars should be fully just wars. Modem wars cannot be fully just wars. Therefore, there should be no modern wars. A fully just war is not merely a just war, but a war those just character can be reliably forecast in advance. A modern war is of course a war that deploys modern technology, at least that available this century. The evidential basis for the second premiss derives from much information that collateral damage, damage to innocent bystanders and involved citizens is always likely and cannot be excluded. Such wars are always liable to violate uncontroversial requirements for a just war, even if they are purely “conventional” wars, not throwing radiation or chemical or biological weapons around. From a contemporary viewpoint the traditional doctrine of a just war, really of a just defensive war, is seriously out of date. The reasons for this reach wider than the new features introduced by modem technological wars and the character of modem civilization, with its giant cities littered with dangerous and vulnerable military targets. They have also to do with the chauvinism of the justice proposed, which is shallow human justice, not natural or environmental justice. There is no consideration of justice to other creatures or to the Earth (cf �12 Naess p.160). Two troubles are really intertwined here: conceptual difficulties with too narrow a notion of justice, and ideological difficulties with too narrow a vision of what is an object of value, of what counts. The deep-green case against war adds to the traditional case a further dimension, neglected until very recently: the environmental dimension. It has suddenly been seen that wars are typically environmental atrocities. Earlier, of course, “environments” were simply backgrounds, backdrops in paintings and plays, to the real drama. Contemporary technological wars tend to be not merely social tragedies but environmental ones as well. There is a doctrine of just war, but it is a human chauvinistic affair. There is no similarly developed doctrine of an ecologically sound war, a deep ecological war. Unless any such war were literally different from modern wars, that is from contemporary technological wars, it would overstep permitted bounds. For such wars are characteristically ecological disasters. Hardened military people, desensitized by a rigorous unethical training, feel even less compunction about degrading or destroying environments or members of other species than they do of maiming or killing civilians through “collateral” activity. Matching the no-just-war syllogism is a no-sound-war syllogism: All wars should be environmentally sound wars. Modem wars cannot be environmentally sound. Therefore, there should be no modern wars. The argument for the second premiss has of course to be different. It looks to the information accumulating on what wars do to natural and built environments. The Vietnam and Gulf wars both inflicted immense damage on natural environments or what was left of them. The environmental effects of war are not confined to direct and collateral damage. There are indirect effects also. Thus, for instance, war also supplied the mechanism of, and the technology for, modem environmental destruction: explosives, bulldozers from tanks, etc. As well, training for war and engagement in war have much fostered, along with attitudes that make for social callousness or ruthlessness, those that contribute to environmental insensitivity and cruelty. 3. Puzzles about Taoist strategy and its critiques of technology and violence ‘It is surprising how much of the Lao Tzu is devoted to military strategy’. Which strategies? Surprise, above all. But why such strategies? ‘Do they not contradict the Taoists’ strong opposition to the use of force’ (Chan p.222), the implied commitment to quietism? Briefly, Taoism is not committed to quietism, and while certainly antagonistic to violence, does not oppose certain uses of force (only really ///-forcing, as will be explained). Even so, the emphasis on military strategy remains puzzling. The strategies, many of them relevant to social defence, include • seriousness, not ‘making light of the enemy’ (p.222) �13 • surprise, and nonvisibility (p.201). The defensive strategy involves guerilla tactics: marching without formation, holding weapons without seeming to have them, confronting enemies without seeming to meet them (p.222). But even in times of peace, ‘smart weapons of the state should not be displayed to the people’ (p.164). Such recommendations helped to fuel the charge of deviousness lodged against Lao Tzu. But look at part of the reason for concealing smart weapons: ‘The more smart weapons the people have, the more troubled the state will be’ (p.201). Smart weapons are carried in corrupt states, where the rich engage in conspicuous consumption and the people are suppressed, not where Tao is practiced (LT p. 194). • advance from weakness, flexibility but firmness. Weakness is the principle of life and will overcome strength (LT p.164, p.233). • coolness and non-competition (LT p.233, p.164). Like these, most of the general strategies are standard Taoist practices simply applied to military conduct. For these standard practices the charge of deviousness looks feeble. The response applies more generally to other allegedly devious political strategies. For the strategies are but application of Taoist principles and techniques to warfare, politics and elsewhere. Nothing excludes application of these techniques to what are accounted, in general, unnecessary evils (which must sometimes, on other Taoist grounds, be countered). Nor, to meet the main criticism, need any deceit or deviousness be involved; nor is it. In particular, the legalist tactic, Tn order to grasp, it is necessary first to give’ (LT p.164), is cited as involving ‘an element of deceit’ ‘undeniably’, and ‘worse’ it is ‘morally questionable’ (Chan p.17). But in order for me to grasp your hand in a normal handshake, it is necessary first for me to give my hand. There is no deceit here, nothing morally questionable. All the tactics permit of benign construals, of a Taoist kind. Consider, for instance, Tn order to contract, it is necessary first to expand’ (LT p.164). In order to bend a copper pipe to the intended angle, it is better to bend it first a little further than required. The transformation of water to ice (both favoured natural items for symbolic purposes: natural processes which may look devious!) neatly illustrates the Taoist principle (which is however hardly necessary), and shows softness and weakness turned hardness and strength. The Taoist critique of militarism is as much a critique of technology as of war. Sharp weapons, ‘smart weapons’ as we might now say, come in for much critical attention, as we have already noticed. Only in corrupt and degenerate states are they displayed or flaunted (p.194, p.164); in deep-green regions smart weapons of state’ would not be retained unexhibited. The people will not have them for they mean trouble (p.201); for similar reasons deep-green regions will be free of them. So, it seems, will ideal Taoist regions: ‘Even if there are arrows and weapons, none will display them’ (LT p.238). Much technology, military and other, is excluded under the Taoist edict against violence (a further facet of the military-practices �14 paradox).5 The powerful critique of militarism in the Tao-te Ching is coupled with strong opposition to violence. Some of the linkage is evident enough. Militarism as practised represents an ultimate form of state (or party) violence. A basic theme is that violent practices will come to an unnatural end, and accordingly to a non-Taoist end (generalising LT p.176). While force may occur in spectacular, but satisfactory, natural forms, force is duly distinguished from violence. To force the growth of life means ill omen. For the mind to employ the vital force without restraint means violence (LT p. 197). One who follows Tao does not apply dominating force, which usually has had results bringing requital (p.152). Dominating force, like power, is in general castigated, under doctrine of wwwei, no forced actions, no violence. To force natural growth is deviant, destroying harmony. To stop natural growth is deviant. But there is a significant difference between force and violence. To intentionally employ destructive force is to do violence. To so force things is condemned. To remain in harmony with things one does not so force things or practice violence. There is a non-interference principle at work, which also indicates types of non­ interference that are excluded. However Taoism does not always get the distinction between force and violence quite 5 Under contemporary technology and technological arrangements, such as the storage of quantities of oil and nuclear and chemical materials in great cities, wars have assumed new and very destructive dimensions, to the point of being utterly irresponsible. A different approach to technology, as to war, is now mandatory. These are no longer things that can in principle be nicely confined and need not touch parties outside the fray. An important part of ending wars, “winning the war against wars”, is removing the technology of war, above all from irresponsible state power. As for which technology to try to jettison and which to try to retain or improve, it is not so difficult to indicate, provided evaluative terminology is not outlawed. What is wanted is technology that is good in its place, what should be excluded is technology that is indifferent or bad or potentially so. Technology to be justified has to do something worthwhile, it has to address identifiable respectable needs. That is why merely indifferent technology is out; there is no virtue in technology for technology's sake, as it is a mere means technique. It is because of the crucial evaluative component in choice of technology that appropriateness, itself evaluative, comes closer to encapsulating the criterion than other recent efforts. Size, such as smallness, or intermediateness, are not what matter, though modest and not excessive technologies are likely to fare better in satisfying appropriateness. In simpler societies, small technology is of course more appropriate; for that is what is good there. From known criteria for what is good these other features for locally appropriate technology can be read off: reliability, esp. in maintenance, functioning well and safely under the expected range of operating conditions (which may be difficult), ease of repair, capital cheapness and repair inexpensiveness, environmental benignness, and meeting sound social needs. �15 right. ‘Vital force without restraint’, intentionally excessive force, is only part of what counts as violence, which is more generally force which violates, i.e. transgresses, descrecrates, profanes, injures, outrages, etc. It is thus a negatively connoted force, an evil force in some specified intentional respect. There is a tendency for Taoist commentators, not Taoists, to regard Taoism as condemning all uses, or even occurrences, of force, but this is not so. Rather intentional ill-forcing is what is castigated, what is deviant. Thus Taoism does not exclude a range of defensive practices, which make satisfactory use of natural forces, like letting the machines of war industry stop. Those who would abolish war and its machinery, substituting for it nonwarlike and ideally nonviolent methods, technology, and strategies, have been confronted not merely with much sub-rational abuse but with plenty of criticism and even some paradoxes. Here is a recent paradox concerning war and nonviolence: • War must be abolished. One reason is simply economic. We can no longer afford it, and the opportunity costs are enormous. Along with other extraordinarily wasteful activities, it is an anachronism. • Doing so cannot be accomplished without violence, i.e. in effect, given the types of violence involved, without what amounts to war. According to a fuller version of this premiss, the process of abolishing a war would only be achieved through a revolution so profound that it could not succeed without extensive and extreme violence, amounting to (civil) war. 0 But then war cannot be abolished without war. Therefore, war which must be abolished cannot be abolished.6 This “paradox” has been compared with the Liar paradox, but the parallel does not persist far. For this paradox does not involve self-referential features, and is easily broken, as follows. Let the “last war” be not the last standard war but the revolution abolishing war. Then, given that the revolution is successful, war will be abolished therewith, i.e. with that last war. There need be no regress, given again a successful outcome. All the premisses stand intact, but the conclusion, following the ‘therefore’ is a nonsequitur. However, while the dissolution of the argument is accordingly logically fine, the route is repugnant. Standard pacifism challenges the 6 Brian Medlin, who forcefully propounded this puzzle, set other analogous puzzles alongside it - designed to reveal deep difficulties in contemporary political, and especially alternative, thought. Another puzzle, concerning liberty and repression in the context of capitalism, revolved around the following inconsistent triad: • capitalism must be removed, but liberty retained. • capitalism cannot be removed without repression. • repression is antithetical to liberty. The puzzle is resolved as with the analogous puzzle of abolishing. Let the “last capitalist” action before the days of liberty be the repressive but liberating revolution overthrowing capitalism. �i 16 second premiss. 4. Standard and moral pacifism. Although Taoism is strongly opposed to war, and much in favour of peace - and accordingly by prevailing standards a substantially pacific position - it is not (nowhere in the central texts) committed to pacifism in usual senses, for two different reasons:• It is not, by contrast with pacifism, opposed to all types of warfare, for example smart defensive wars. • It eschews deontology in terms of which moral pacifism is commonly stated, for instance through the watershed thesis P2. It is morally wrong to use violence. By contrast with Taoism, deep environmentalism does not avoid deontic claims, and is committed in principle to nonviolent technologies and ways and to pacifistic principles. Moreover, certain forms of deep environmentalism are completely committed to pacifism, notably European forms. Is deep green? There is heavy contemporary opposition to pacifism, as there also was to Taoism in the warring times when Taoism was first being promulgated. Many of the central institutions of contemporary life are intricated in coercion, violence and war. The most prominent contemporary institutions, states, are premissed on these elements of damaging force; they claim entitlement to use them widely, and even claim a certain territorial monopoly on their use. As a result they are having constantly to engage in them in attempt to maintain that monopoly. They are certainly the main perpetrators of wars, and of violence. They are indeed inured to wars, are in constant preparation for wars, yet propound dialectial (and normally dishonest and cynical) doctrines of peace through war (for a recent example see the appendix). Unremarkably then, the extensive propagandistic machinery of state has invested heavily in “justificatory” exercises in favour of controlled use, its own use, of destructive force, and continues to inveigh against pacifism. Because a routine trick in this sophistical repetoire consists in conflating pacifism with extreme, naive and inplausible, forms, an inevitable and important early task commits in unscrambling senses of ‘pacifism’. Semantical skulduggery can be thwarted in this way. Pacifism, as explained by English dictionaries, invariably concerns wars and warfare, and contains two components, negative and, elaborating on that, positive:- The negative component is, in Amauld's word, anti-War-ism, opposition (in ways to be further specified) to all forms of warfare (see OED). The positive component supplies alternative ways of settling disputes (what it is supposed that wars with some semblance of justification involve), such as negotiation, arbitration, ... - and, adding to too narrow dictionary accounts - sanctions, substitutions (e.g. of sporting events, operatic contests, cooperative ventures),.... In brief standard pacifism is opposition to all warfare and resolution of potential wars by other nonmilitary means. �17 Plainly the opposition to warfare, like the sanctions and so on, cannot itself be military (using soldiers and other devices of war), on pain of some incoherence. But otherwise the ways of opposition can be many and various: they can certainly be active, as with nonviolent demonstrations, resistance movements, and so forth, and they may also be devious (e.g. turning the forces of war upon themselves so they are neutralised). It quickly becomes evident, then, that some of the dictionaries offer but loaded definitions which, by restricting the negative components, reduce the initial appeal and plausibility of pacifism. Consider the Concise English definition of the negative component: ‘the doctrine of non-resistance to hostilities and of total non-co-operation with any form of warfare’. Thereby excluded are forms of pacifism which offer active and plausible alternatives to warfare such as social defence. The Concise English tends to force pacifism into what the Oxford English Dictionary lists as its final item: ‘often, with depreciatory implication, the advocacy of peace at any price’, ‘in any circumstance’. Pacifism can easily resist being forced into these sorts of circumstances: it has many resources, as an extensive series of texts on alternatives to war, such as negotiation, non­ violent action and social defence, from Taoism to contemporary environmentalism attest. Academic philosophers have much advanced the semantical strategy of some dictionaries, of rendering pacifism more difficult from the very outset by narrow and biassed definitions. They have stretched the term from its restricted setting of warfare, confined to state and organised gang violence, to cover all forms of violence, from state and interstate to, what is very different, personal and interpersonal violence. Call the resulting considerably stretched notion of pacifism, according to which it is morally wrong to use violence, according to which P2 holds, stretched pacifism? While stretched pacifism certainly includes standard pacifism (unless the notions of war and warfare are tampered with), the converse is very far from being the case. A pacifist is in no way committed to stretched pacifism, which is a much more problematic and difficult position than standard pacifism. There are several, substantially different reasons for this, which will be picked up seriatim. Stretched pacifism, also misleadingly called moral pacifism, has looked a very easy critical target to moral philosophers. Many the effusive philosopher who, upon sighting such a target, has charged, whooping such rhetoric as “incoherent”, “inconsistent”, “insensitive”, “fanatical”. However, with improved logical technology now available for accommodating and treating moral dilemmas, it is no great feat to resist such attacks, in the fashion of previous investigations (see esp. Al, also MD). A main aim was to demonstrate that stretched pacifism was not so stupid as it was made out to be or appeared to be to these inured to present dominant violent ways. So far from being stupid, it is viable. In future gentler times stretched pacifism 7 In Al this notion was contrasted with standard pacifism as comprehensive pacifism: overcomprehensive might have been better. �18 could even be realised for whole communities of creatures (as some genuinely Christian sects envisaged); whence it will finally be seen to be feasible not merely for sages and supermen, and many ordinary women, but much more extensively. The method of philosophical accommodation was through moral dilemmas. The sort of moral dilemma that stretched pacifism can induce derives as follows. On the one side stands the theme P2, Wv, in convenient symbols, for Wrong V-ing, violencing. Now this implies to WB, where B presents a case of of violence. On the other side, particular circumstances develop which lead to W ~B, because ~B would produce in the circumstances considerable wrong, for instance extensive violence, mass murder, etc. One stock example from the literature concerns calling off the firing squad about to shoot several captives if the pacifist shoots one of them (it is elaborated in Al p.13). Interestingly, another stock example from the literature concerns standard pacifism (it can also be presented in terms of patriotism; for details of both see MD p. 10). Resolution of intractable moral dilemmas is, where it is required, situational. The agent decides in the situation, within the fix, what to do. There are many ways in which such decision making can proceed, less rational, such as those applying chance or involving bad faith, or more rational, such as those applying consequentialist decision theory (for details see MD, pp.32-9). A decision theory taking account of all that should be included will not however be purely consequential. It would also take account of relevant motivation. This defence and rehabilitation of moral pacifism has been challenged, in particular by Smith (hereafter JWS). JWS claims the defence offered is a ‘failure because it trivializes pacifism’ (p. 153 twice). The rehabilitation trivializes pacifism because it entails that pacifism doesn't substantially differ from a form of activism which holds that while violence is always wrong one is sometimes justified on consequentialist grounds for preferring violent acts, if these acts are lesser evils than any other real alternatives. This is the commonsense position which most people hold - yet - pacifism after all was supposed to be radical moral doctrine - (p.153 rearranged).8 Part of the criticism is, then, not so much that pacifism is trivialized - JWS “activism” is hardly trivial - as that pacifism is popularised, deflated from a radical position to the commonsense position most people hold (p.154 also). Yet not a shred of evidence is adduced that JWS activism is such a populist position. Available evidence, for example from peace movements and oppositional opinion polls, suggests the very opposite: that, for instance, most people support state-justified conventional wars with the military violence they incur, and 8 JWS now informs me that he has changed his position. Whether the move effects his criticism, I don't know. �19 accordingly do not hold that violence is always wrong. From such a commonsense angle, pacifism with its condemnation of conventional wars and the violence they involve remains a radical doctrine. As regards wars and other violence-incurring social authorities, contemporary pacificism is, as previous explained (e.g. Al p.3), a form of activism. Pacifism does not imply utter pacifity, but may actively involve social defence, resistance and so on. However a certain level of misrepresentation enters into the JWS challenge in the details of what forms of activism pacifism may include. That misrepresentation begins in the second clause concerning what is said to be sometimes justified. For the situational procedure where dilemmas arise will not generally be consequential applying a principle of lesser evil. In dilemmatic situations such principles are suspended, and such a principle is in any case unacceptable to moral pacifists. A small amount of violence may be less bad in its consequences than verbal offence, but a principled pacifist will choose the slightly greater evil where other obligations do not exclude it. A more serious distortion occurs in JWS's effort to force procedures in dilemma situations into purely consequentialist form. In fact consequential decision theory was deployed as a model only for how to proceed rationally in a situational setting where deontic procedures were suspended (see MD p.38). What was said, still misleadingly retrospective vision reveals, was this: ‘what is done is a very consequentialist thing’ (Al p.13), not ‘one acts in a consequentialist fashion to do the sufficiently good thing in the circumstances’ (JWS p.152). Situationally other procedures than those resembling orthodox rational decision making (modified from maximizing to satisizing objectives) may be adopted (MD p.38). Further the orthodox consequentialist theory is inadequate because it leaves out, or tries to reduce to consequences, nonconsequential elements, notably motives. It is not difficult, in principle (in advance of attempted consequentialization of motives), to design situations where motives, such as integrity or maintaining faith, enter to yield outcomes upsetting consequential calculations. More elaborate decision making procedures than those of consequentialism, sometimes at variance with consequentialism, are thus presupposed. A further part of JWS's criticism accordingly goes by the board, the alleged appeal ‘to “second best” consequentialist considerations,... already explicitly condemned’ (p. 154). What was condemned was stock universal consequentialism, ‘that only consequentialist considerations carry argumentative weight’ (quoted on p. 152), so undercutting other deontic principles, such as those of pacifism. It was not claimed, what is utterly different, that consequentialist considerations can nowhere enter into deliberation and decision making. The conclusion JWS arrives at is therefore substantially astray. After criticising modern moral philosophy for its reliance upon consequentialist modes of thought, it is surprising, and inconsistent, to find ... [reliance] upon such modes of thought to escape logical difficulties raised by moral dilemmas facing ... pacifis[m] (p.152) �There is no inconsistency. JWS has confused universal with particular. As well he has wrongly contracted all situational decision making to consequentialist modes. There is a third part to the criticism, that the defence is too easy; the ‘strategy will allow too much violence to be (perpetrated and) justified to suit the tastes of any real pacifist’ (p. 153). This another part of the so-called trivialization, this time however dilution rather than populatization, weakening the moral stand against violence. This third contention is premissed on a mistake: that one can ‘justify on consequentialist grounds any number of violent acts, providing that such acts are lesser evils than other real alternatives facing social agents’ (p. 153). Moral pacifism offers no such licence; allowing such consequentialism to take over was never part of the position. The slide to such consequentialism is made on the strength of a similarly erroneous example. The potential victim of an aspiring rapist ‘is supposed to flee or wriggle free if possible. But it is easy to consequentially justify the use of violence by the woman to prevent herself from being raped’ (p. 153 italics added). In the example so far described there is no dilemma, and no such easy resort to consequentially ‘justified’ violence. What allows too much violence is the lesser evil JWS assumes is easily consequentially justified; for example that the woman is entitled to inflict, and escalate, violence so long as it remains ‘a lesser evil than the violence of attempted rape’ (p. 153). Since she may thereby inflict quite unreasonable damage (esp. if she is a Kung Fu expert), the result is inconsistent with ‘the basic principle of self-defence’ which JWS earlier adduced according to which what is ‘appropriate, in response is only that level of force necessary to defend oneself against the threat’ (p. 150). There is evidence in JWS's work of some enthusiasm for levels of violence which exceed his ‘basic principle’, his appeal to ‘lesser evil’ generates some instances. The ‘basic principle’, itself fraught with difficulties (cf. the contorted discussion of what weapons are appropriate in response to what attacks, p. 150), still exceeds what stretched pacifism would enjoin; for instance, it may not be appropriate to respond with force. But in a technical sense stretched pacifism is compatible with the ‘basic principle’, since it only imposes the upper bound on level of force. As for easiness, moral pacifism is not an easy position to live by, or to justify. Removing objections to pacifism is one thing; solidifying a positive case for it is quite another, and so far hardly conclusive (as Al tried to explain, pp 29-31). Stretched pacifism was advanced, hypothesized to put it more precisely, as a still viable option. It was not presented as a morally compulsory position, or, for that matter, as one that this defender adhered to or affirmed. To reiterate, while a cumulative case can be made for stetched pacifism as principled non­ violence, that case was not conclusive, and is hard to improve. For, further, some serious difficulties standing in the way of stretched pacifism were assembled, the most important of which derives from the extent of violence apparent in transactions within the natural world. Simply consider the practices of carnivores, essential to their natural way of life. In order to meet their life needs for sustenance, these creatures do, and are often obliged to, engage �21 routinely in violent activity. While it can no doubt be argued, as some vegetarians may do, that the natural order is an immoral order, and that remaining carnivores should be converted to vegetarianism as rapidly as proves possible (in the way domestic dogs are converted to dog biscuits), the difficulties with such proposals are immense. The task envisaged is gigantic, and beyond human capacities - even if it were desirable. For there are millions of species to be somehow converted to proper vegetarianism. Then there are millions of other species to be converted to proper and well regulated contraceptive practices, else their numbers will get out of hand (uncontrollably) with predation removed. Given humans lack of success in limiting their own excessive numbers, such regulation appears entirely remote. Aside however from the practical difficulties, is such a fully vegetarian order, with evolution further derailed, a desirable improvement on the natural order? Is it morally obligatory? It is certainly not obligatory, as alternative systems of morality in harmony with the prevailing natural order are feasible. Nor is it desirable, for (to appeal to such alternative value systems) the natural order is more or less in order as it is. Full vegetarianization would only reduce its value, vastly. More generally, a defensible ethical framework should not, it would be rightly contended, be right out of step with the natural order of other creatures, decently depicted. Decent depiction is important, for some features of the natural order, such as competition, combat and predation, so far from escaping attention, have been grossly exaggerated and exploited. Thus, for instance, the ludicrous picture of nature red in truth and claw, so beloved of descendents of orthodox Victorians and of orthodox economists. However, even under decent depiction, the “natural order” is often not benign. That appears to be enough to induce a supervenient moral dilemma for any stretched pacifism which is coupled to a deep ethic (e.g. which does not separate humans out from the natural order) and which eschews the desperate vegetarian route: The natural order is not an immoral order The natural order contains (regular) instances of violence. Therefore, instances of violence are not immoral in apparent defiance of P2 Moreover, there are too many instances of violence, too regularly occurring, for them all to be plausibly shunted into the moral dilemma category (and predatory carnivores face no dilemmas). Raptors that practice violence every week are not immoral (neither are they clearly moral; the category of morality only significantly extends so far). The main trouble lies however with P2 (which needs some finer adjustment, as was alrady indicated in Al). While P2 is alright in context, within a particular, perfectly viable, ethical framework, designed for the usual human round, the conventional setting for ethical theories, it stands in need of modification outside that setting. It is time to suggest the sort of modification envisaged. Evidently P2 was addressed to moral agents. Which agents? Not to carnivores that supply their own livelihood, nor really to morally degenerate humans, but to �i 22 peace-sensitive agents. With that semi-technical form, yet to be characterised, a suitably modified P2 results: MP2. It is morally wrong, for a peace-sensitive agent, to use violence.9 To recover what amounts, in the previous discussive context, to P2, it suffices to add the proposition that every human agent ought to be peace-sensitive. Much as that proposition has to recommend it, it appears too ethically advanced for many modem humans; it sets too high a moral standard to be taken as a serious guide to practice. It seems wise to settle presently for something less demanding, such as that every advanced moral agent ought to be peace sensitive. To put essentially the same proposition alternatively: Stretched pacifism (as modified) is supererogatory. While it is perhaps too late to hope for much moral progress in humans, it is pleasant to contemplate alternative futures where what is supererogatory became obligatory, and widely practiced. Richard Sylvan* Appendix I began drafting this essay at the time (January 17, midday Australian time) of the American attacks upon Iraq. The optly named Prime Minister Hawke of Australia had just made a statement to the nation-state, announcing (the) war. In this statement there was much talk of peace. There was even - in what was effectively a declaration of war - reiteration of the modem quest for ‘a new world order of peace’. Peace through war; so it rings out again and again, through the centuries. ‘War must be for the sake of peace’ (Aristotle p.220). More than two thousand years later, we have fought those wars to end all wars. But it is no use, Hawke solemely pronounced, just talking about peace, and thinking about peace; we must work for peace, fight for it - through war. Impeccable logic? President Bush, supreme commander, convinced us with similar logic, speaking too with many tongues. Of how he ‘preferred to think of peace, not war’. But now ‘only force will prevail’, as ‘all reasonable efforts to reach a peaceful solution are exhausted’. ‘What must be done’ must be done, or will be anyway. With God on side with the US offensive (as well as on the other side), it will go well. As it was said to have, though it achieved comparatively little that other efforts may not have yielded more satisfactorily, and thought it may now have to 9 The generalization of P2, suggested in Al, to cover also the parallel situation of environmental vandalism, can be similarly modified. The anti-vandolence principle becomes MP2°. It is morally wrong, for a peace- and environmentally-sensitive agent, to use vandolence. Thank to David Bennett for joint contributions (from UT) and to JWS for opposition (in JWS) � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Draft Papers Description An account of the resource Sylvan's literary executor encountered an archive in which “all his projects were current", since manuscripts were undated and unattributed. Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document WAR AND PEACE IV: TAO AND DEEP-GREEN Taoism and deep-green environmental theory, although closely aligned on very many issues, diverge over war. For Taoism, by contrast for instance with Buddhism, is not a pacific doctrine, but is committed to skilful defensive militarism. While it does not espouse a fortress mentality, Taoism certainly condones limited defensive military operations for specific purposes, a sort of guerilla warfare. By contrast, deep-green theory, while acknowledging the role of organised social defence, stands opposed to professional militarism, and thereby to military defence, and is committed to a principled pacifism. Conveniently a route through Taoism, philosophically fascinating in its own right, will lead us to problems of pacifism and towards deep-green theory. 1. Features of a Taoist critique of war and militarism. War did not receive a favourable press in ancient Chinese philosophy. Generally aggression and war were to be avoided. Even Confucius imposed very demanding conditions: for example, ‘when good men have instructed the people [in morals, agriculture, military tactics] for seven years, they may be allowed to bear arms,’ ‘If a ruler ... does not set himself right, even his commands will not be obeyed’ (SB p.41, italics added). Mo Tzu went much further than Confucius, roundly condemning war - on utilitarian grounds, that war yields no net benefit at any level (SB p.227). What is more, he backed his heavy condemnation practically (unlike some conspicuous contemporary theoretical utilitarians); ‘he did not hesitate to walk for ten days and ten nights in an effort to dissuade a ruler from making war’ (SB P-212). But none, it is said, went as far, in a detailed and sophisticated criticism of war, as Lao Tzu; ‘none has condemned war more strongly than Lao Tzu’. ‘[T]he opposition of Taoism to the use of force is well-known, and the most bitter attack on militarism if found in the Lao Tzu' (Chan, p.154, p.17.) But, after that splendid build-up, the text is slightly disappointing. Lao Tzu does not assert outright that war is an abomination, or even roundly condemn it. His critique of war, militarism, and military technology, is subtle and oblique, and, on the surface, far distanced from pacifism. For he does not recommend an end to war - in that genuine Taoists, those who possess Tao, will never participate in them - but expects wars to continue as unavoidable evils. Worse, he even goes so far as to outline proper attitudes to war and conduct in war, and indeed to suggest military techniques and strategies, some of which look decidedly devious. Among the classical works of Taoism, we focus on the Lao Tzu because, by contrast with other works, a remarkable component of that book is devoted to war and militarism. The apparent deviousness of the tactics Lao Tzu allocates serves to highlight what has been seen as ‘the most troublesome element’ in his philosophy (Chan p.17) - not so much however because they concern military operations, but because they are taken to apply much 2 more widely, ‘to life in general’ (p. 17). But why should military activity obtain some special dispensation? Why should what is not tolerated more generally be exonerated there? But given that Taoism has here the virtue of consistency (i.e. uniformity on principles) and of universalizability, that simply leaves more explaining to be done. • Puzzles for Taoism, and wars as unavoidable evils There are two puzzles here in Taoism rather than one. There is the military-practices paradox, and, varying and generalising on that, there are life-practices paradoxes. The special paradox is generated by the following incompatible elements: on the one side, ‘the most bitter attack on militarism’, the well-known opposition of Taoism to the use of force (p. 17) and to the possession and use of smart military weapons and technology - implying that war is far from all right - and on the other, advocacy of certain (devious) military tactics, outlines of (deceitful) conduct in war, and so on - implying that war is all right after all. A straightforward generalisation of this paradox would look at other morally-sensitive parts of life, where some practice was strongly condemned yet engaged in (for many examples, see the dilemmas assembled in MD). But the variation of concern to Chan and the neo-Confucians concerns the conjunction of upright with devious practices in life, in particular in the life of the sage. For a Taoist sage is presumed to lead an upright straightforward life, yet appears to engage in devious and even deceitful practices incompatible with such a life-style. Call this the Taoist-lifestyle paradox. Evidently a good deal of explaining is required, as to how Taoism can coherently take the positions it appears to presume, both on war and peace, and on life more generally. A desirable preliminary would seem to be a little investigation of what position is taken, especially on war and militarism. One key pasage runs: Fine weapons are instruments of evil They are hated by creatures Therefore those who possess the Tao turn away from them. ... Weapons are instruments of evil, not the instruments of a good ruler. When he uses them unavoidably, he regards calm restraint as the best principle Even when he is victorious, he does not regard it as praiseworthy, For to praise victory is to delight in the slaughter of men. He who delights in the slaughter of men will not succeed in the empire. ... For a victory, let us observe the occasion with funeral-ceremonies (LT p.154). Wars, which involve the use of weapons, instruments of evil, are accordingly themselves evil. They are also evil because they involve the slaughter of men. But they are also sometimes unavoidable (also p.152). Therefore such wars are unavoidable evils. Such discourse, obtained by almost immediate inference from the passage, is within the standard orbit of dilemma talk. But Taoism lacks, through deliberately eschewing deontic talk, the discourse which enables direct expression of such dilemmas, or even direct condemnation of wars or of clever weapons. Instead the points are made by circumlocution, what the possesser of Tao 3 does, how the good ruler conducts himself, or by analogy, of victory in war with death. Unavoidable evils are the very stuff of deontic dilemmas (though many theories, underpinned by shonky logic, lack the resources for representing this stuff properly). Where something is unavoidably evil, it is both bad, because evil, and also not bad, doing it is excusable, because it is unavoidable. So, given such an argument (which has its weaknesses), an unavoidable evil is a genuinely dilemmatic object with inconsistent features. Certain wars have looked, since ancient times, like such dilemmatic objects. Revealingly, Chan tries to explain that ‘most troublesome element’ in Taoism, the military-practice paradox, through the following exercise in lateral thinking: It can ... be argued that Lao Tzu uses warfare to illustrate his principles of taking no action and weakness because warfare is among the most dynamic and critical of human experiences, just as the Indian classic, the Bhagavadgita chooses fighting as the theme on which to discuss the terrible dilemma whether one should fulfil his duty, as in the case of a soldier, and kill, or should fail in his duty and refrain from killing (p.17). ‘Just as’? The Indian classic prevents a classic moral dilemma, a dilemma represented in contemporary philosophy (following its rediscovery by Sartre), where there are incompatible duties: the duty to kill, because of one's role as a soldier, and the duty not to kill, because of one's human condition, and the supervenient dilemma of failing in and fulfilling one's duties. These dilemmas for an individual (male, as it then was) are replicated in dilemmas regarding war for group institutions: at bottom, the obligation to engage in war (for one set of compelling reasons) as contraposed with the obligation not to engage in war (for another, perhaps overlapping, set of reasons). A theory of moral dilemmas (as worked out for example in MD) is crucial for an adequate treatment of major issues in war and peace, especially (as will become evident) for a viable strong pacifism. But Taoism, eschewing deontic discourse, lacks the apparatus to state or develop moral dilemmas. Hence it is logically excluded from giving a full or adequate account of what is going on conceptually. One of the philosophically fascinating feature of Taoism is the fashion in which ij manages to avoid deontic discourse, and to substitute for direct deontic discourse or improvise circumlocutions when deontic discourse would otherwise appear inevitable (cf. UT for examples). But there are costs. One is inability to display the mechanism of deontic dilemmas, or to show what reasons and argument lie behind Taoist prounouncements and conclusions (the shortage of Taoism on argument is another philosophically conspicious feature, also observed in UT). As conceptual apparatus for analysizing moral dilemmas is missing, most of the machinery involved has to be passed over. Only the outcomes, as Taoism sees them, are presented, as if from a black box. Taoism blacks out the story on deontic dilemmas that deep-green theory can tell, as the following diagram tries to show: 4 Diagrams . Charting the processing of deontic dilemmas that are “resolved,”. Deep-green chart: Arguments to Processing of dilemma, directive dilemma incompatible situational procedures output input prescriptions Corresponding Taoist chart: Black directive Box output It is evident that Taoism can be extended; information can be put into the Black Box rendering it less opaque. That extension can be made so as to conform to deep-green theory, e. so that the extended Taoist chart, a neo-Daoist chart, looks like the deep-green one. That is i. indeed essentially how neo-Daoism get characterised, in terms of conformity of the extension to deep ecological theory (see UT). We are now placed to explain how to dissolve, or at least neutralize, the paradoxes deriving from repudiation of militarism, an awkwardly qualified repudiation in the case of Taoism. In a significant sense there is no resolving of genuine deontic dilemmas. The principles delineating the fix may stand, incompatible, signalling the persisting suboptimality (or better, sublimenality) of the dilemmatic situation. Where there is a dilemma, involved parties should try to do well enough in the sublimenal circumstances (for a much fuller account, see MD). Thus where there is a war, itself a non-Taoist process, engaged or caught up Taoists will not abandon Taoism. Taoist methods will be applied, Taoist strategies pursued. So much for theoretical representation and (non-)resolution of life-practices and other dilemmas, details of which are readily elaborated in deep-green extensions of Taoism. A prior substantive issue is whether dilemmas always are generated: not whether wars are evil (typically they are, an issue we shall come to), but whether wars are unavoidable. Analysis of wars does not bear that familiar claim out decisively. Many wars could have been avoided, through conciliation, negotiation, restraint, etc., and no worse results apparently obtained, through sanctions, exchange, trade, etc. Through a typology of wars (coming up) that conjecture can be given some substance. Consider, for instance, what would be walk-overs. Then there is little point in making a military response. So war can be avoided. Certainly an occupation, to be met in a different way, may still occur. And so on, perhaps, for various other types of war. But, more generally, try this:- 5 Every war involves an aggressor, who makes an aggressive move. Such an aggressor could always avoid that move, taking a different (or a do-nothing) course of action. Therefore, every war can be avoided. No war is entirely unavoidable. Setting aside determinism (which renders all actual wars along with all other events unavoidable), it could be argued that a war sometimes simply boils up, without an aggressor, an intensification of a conflagatory situation. There are grounds for scepticism regarding such examples; for such intensification can only occur if provocative military moves are made, for instance troops are stationed in provocative or risky positions. The presumption that certain wars are unavoidable typically derives from a one-sided perspective on war, a defender's perspective. A defender has no option, so it is routinely averred, but to respond to a determined aggressor. Even if that should be so sometimes, when there is no running away or going underground, it does not establish that such a war is unavoidable; for it neglects the role of the aggressor. By a smarter formulation, relevant features of unavoidability can be captured. Although wars may not be unavoidable, defensive action in wars that have been initiated may be unavoidable. At least such action may be unavoidable if unacceptably high costs (death, enslavement, etc.) are not to be avoided. Thereupon another highly relevant feature emerges: the linkage of avoidability to costs. For whether an action is unavoidable then depends upon what costs a party is prepared to incur before and when insisting on action: but this appears entirely unacceptable. How can what is “unavoidable” cease to be so when some further costs are absorbed? However with basics like survival, a certain liberty, and so on, we do reach such bounds. An important type of unavoidability. We also reach scenarios, unavailable to Lao Tzu but kindly brought within range by modem technology, which may appear to justify aggressive strikes. State Z, while not an aggressor, is carrying out practices which will impose unacceptably high costs upon peoples of other states and implacably refuses to desist. It could, for example, be poisoning air or water flowing to other states. But ,to make the case vivid, let us suppose that state Z is constructing, for reasons Zeders find convincing (they are committed to a faith which depicts all hunqpns as incorrigible sinners and unworthy of life), an effective doomsday machine. Would an (aggressive) preemptory strike designed to disable or destroy the machine be unavoidable?1 In a sense, No; in another Yes. For different modalities can operate. Physically outsiders need to do nothing, but watch Zeders go about their zealous work. But deontically they are under heavy moral pressure, because of the costs of standing by idly: if the human race is worth anything very substantial, then they are obliged to act, action is deontically* 1 Whether it would be justifiable, or just, are separate issues. But it is evident enought that such scenarios further damage the obsolescent idea of just war. For, according to received doctrine, a just war is defensive. (How such a war can be fought at all is another matter; coherence requires relativization to ‘just wax for party d’.) 6 unavoidable. Here is a situation where a proposed reduction of deontic logic proves illuminating. Obligation is explicated through not implying, or necessitating, the sanction, i.e. excessive ethical costs such as extermination. Let us explain deontic unavoidability analogously: an action is so unavoidable if not undertaking it would result in excessive ethical costs. Then z/it can be established that there is no other way than a military strike, an act of war, to ensure that the Zeders desist (and certainly we can envisage scenarios like that), then that is deontically unavoidable. It is also dilemmatic for those committed to, or inclined towards pacifism; and it is, for them at least, but paradoxically justifiable, as the negation is also justifiable, on pacific grounds. Scenarios like that sketched, that appear to render certain wars deontically unavoidable require but little or no elaboration to render them evil. Evil indeed is such a standard feature of standard wars that at least its great presence call for little supporting evidence. But it has taken to vast stretch of human history to reach this general point of recognition. The manifold evils of war Lao Tzu very early recognised and emphasized: Wherever armies are stationed, briars and thorns grow. Great wars are always followed by famines (p. 152). And nowadays followed by great tides of refugees. This passage includes not only recognition of the widely-observed socio-environmental consequences of war, but, more striking, very early recognition of the severe environmental impact of military forces. That critique is not however developed in Taoism.2 Only recently has it been pushed substantially further. And only recently could a new, most significant twist occur, the merging of resource security, long a military objective, with environmental security. The appalling idea has recently been floated that the military, in need of new work and roles with the apparent warming of West-East relations and cooling of the Cold War, should exchange usual military idleness for meddling in environmental matters: regulation and policing of environmental resources, ensurance of environmental security of powerful states, and similar. This is a bit like reassigning those imprisoned for child abuse to managing kindergartens; for consider the impressive military record of environmental vandalism. What the military is alleged to offer is a structure appropriate and available for handling such matters. But, to the contrary, it is precisely the sort of hierarchical, authoritarian expensive structure that should be wound down and up as soon as the opportunity appears, as (briefly) now, rather than being retained and shockingly reoriented (as a state-serving “Greenwar”). 2 But a bridge to deep-green theory can be made through neo-Daoism, an updating of Taoism in confirmity with deep ecology (which however is somewhat thin and threadbare on war; for what there is so far, see Naess p.160). On neo-Daoism, see UT. 7 2. On the divergence of deep-green from Taoism. Having arrived, by better or worse arguments, at the conclusion that wars, though generally evil, may be sometimes unavoidable, it is evidently important to say something about how they - those of the theoretical residue - are to be conducted. By appropriate conduct the damage they do may be reduced; also the conduct should be appropriate to the funereal nature of wars (to exceed Taoist resources for stating this sort of point). It is at this stage that deep­ green theory begins to diverge from Taoism. In further explaining the Taoist and deep-green critiques of war, and diverting objections to them, a rough and preliminary typology of wars is important. It is also of passing interest in its own philosophical right. War, according to English Dictionaries, is a ‘contest carried on by force of arms, typically between nations or states’. More exactly, war is a game — in the generous technical sense of game-theory, with players, rules, goals, strategies, and so on carried on in significant part by military means, normally between states or substates. Call the contestants, (warnng) parties. They typically represent of course larger populations. The set­ up between parties resembles the arrangements of players in game theory. There are several analogical extensions of the term war to cover games where one of the parties is an object, construed as hostile (an enemy of the state), such as Crime, Drugs, Poverty or Nature. These we can set aside as analogical wars. Of course wars form only a part of military activities. Military interests and objectives have always stretched significantly further than war, to include surveillence and security, easily extended to resource security, environmental security and life­ style security, and beyond that to political stability and other political matters. Evidently military ambitions have far over-extended themselves in bagging such democratic concerns. An anarchist solution to the whole problem of war, which some have seen Taoism as reaching towards, is immediate: eliminate the source of war, states. Unfortunately it is not quite that simple (and that's not simple). For wars can also occur between nations, cultures, races or tribes (which are not such artifices as states, and not always so readily or desirably abolished), between inhabited regions, and between factions within states (thus civil wars) or, perhaps by extension,.between factions within other social structures (thus, for instance, gang wars). But undoubtedly eliminating states and aspiring states would abolish most wars and virtually all the worst wars. While “nonviolent wars” are excluded by definition, by virtue of ‘force of arms’, token wars, limited wars, and so on, are not: for instance, wars fought by small armed teams representing competing sides (cf. medieval and science fiction war games). As wars are hemmed in by conventions and agreed rules, there is no reason in principle why they should not be reduced to two person contests, fought under strict rules like boxing or gladiatorial contests. But in modem times wars have never taken such sensible forms, but have been much larger affairs, making heavy (though fortunately restricted) use of latest technology. Let us distinguish such wars as techno-powered wars. They have, directly or indirectly (for the 8 technology may be bought or bartered), a heavy research and development support structure (indeed the bulk of contemporary science is devoted - misdirected - in one way or another to this effort). Among wars, an important distinction is that between offensive and defensive wars. An offensive war is one which ventures off a given party’s territory or recognised pad, “invading” that of another party or parties; correlatively defensive parties, if they have not also invaded. Force projection typifies offensive practice. Plainly, offensiveness and defensiveness are not strictly features of a war, but of parties to a war. In a two-party war, while both parties can easily act offensively, the possibility of both parties proceeding defensively is excluded, unless they share territory. (Even then issues may arise as to which party, if any, was the aggressor, which started it, was responsible for starting it, and so on.) Thus mutually defensive wars between contemporary states are impossible (but would be possible if states shared territory, e.g. if Eire and Britain shared the territory of Northern Ireland). Tao-accredited wars were defensive wars, never wars aiming at domination: last-resort wars, in which no pride was taken (LT p.152).3 The pretence that offensive wars are defensive is widespread, and reflected in the subterfuge that departments or ministries of war are those of defence, security or whatever. (If they really were what they purport to be, we should be well on the way to an end to war.) Offensive practices are rendered defensive ones by shabby redefinitional strategems, such as redefining ‘defensive’ to include defence of ideals like democracy or liberty, infringed (or allegedly infringed) on territories abroad, or to include “defence” of a third party or place (whence every offensive war is “defensive”). In the present war in which part of Arabia is engulfed (February 1991), one party claims to be defending what really was (or should be) part of its territory, namely Kuwait, another party to be defending (what Kuwait did not enjoy) democracy. It is a doubly offensive war presented in this guise as jointly defensive. Aggressive wars are waged for a variety of reasons, but usually for resources or access to resources or markets, a matter often disguised by appeal to ideology (thus a war for oil is represented as a war qf liberation). But there are other reasons than narrowly economic ones, such as religion (as with crusades), power and aggrandisement (as in building an empire), and so on. Nor are those reasons necessarily far separated; ideologies like Marxism and market 3 There is one line in LT that may suggest that attack was sometimes justifiable, namely ‘For deep love helps one to win in the case of attack’ (p.219). But how can compassion be appropriate unless this attack is within a defensive setting, a larger context of unavoidability or such like. A passage shortly below confirms this interpretation: I dare not take the offensive but I take the defensive: I dare not advance an inch but I retreat a foot (p.222). These are advances and attacks within a defensive setting. 9 capitalism, for example, exhibit many of the features of religion. The economic reasons for war appear to have become much more complex with the advent of an integrated world economy. At the same time many of the independent reasons for economic wars are now obsolete. For to powerful states accrue the advantages of war without war. At least most of the former economic advantages of war can be obtained without expensive wars, through trade, institution of economic dependence, etc. Small medieval wars were sometimes instituted for the collection of neighbouring riches and booty, a kind of piracy meeting conditions of war. “Small” contemporary wars can be waged for a remarkable mix of political-economy ends: to establish a regime favourable to economic penetration and profit repatriation, to subjugate markets and to remove competition, to boost a sagging weapons economy by using up old stocks and also testing new equipment, to restart a depressed economy, and so on. Such wars, along with the economic aims which motivate them, are in effect heavily castigated by Lao Tzu: When Tao prevails in the world, galloping horses are turned back to fertilize (the fields ...). When Tao does not prevail in the world, war horses thrive in the suburbs. There is no calamity greater than lavish desires. (LT p.181). But it does exceed evidential warrant to claim that Tao is not only sufficient, but necessary, for cessation of such practices. The practice of regularly stimulating complex military-saturated economies through war is reminiscent of older, much ridiculed practices in simpler societies. They now ridicule the Tsembaga, who proceeded to destroy much of their surplus product by going to war every 5-15 years (cf Rapaport). But they do not similarly ridicule the most powerful nation on the Earth, the USA, which proceeds to write off a colossal amount of surplus in war every 10-20 years (the Gulf war liquidated some $1.7 billion per day). Taoists would. For ridicule was a favoured method, an important rhetorical strategem, and war and its idiocy were favourite targets. Some classification of defensive wars is also important, for various reasons: reducing and abolishing wars, their costs and damage, restructuring societies away from war and military practices, and, not least, for appreciating Taoism. A main distinction is between • conventional defence, maintained by armies of armed soldiers, many of them professionals, and • social defence, where there are no such armies or but fragments of them, and defence is carried out through social networks of a significant part of society.4 4 Details of social defence are presented in Sharp and in Martin. 10 It is here that Taoism and deep-green theory part company. Under Taoism, the state will have a standing army, but a defensive army operating by strange, surprise tactics (p.201). No doubt defensive wars are to remain last resort action. Nonetheless the state will operate in secrecy, in a way incompatible with decentralised social defence; people will be kept in the dark about smart weapons of the state; and they too will be surprised, along with presumed enemies of the state. By contrast, under deep-green theory, there should be no hidden smart weapons of state; information would flow more freely and not be hidden from the people (who should retain influence in informed decision making). Under deep-green, standing armies, and more generally military organisation, will be wound down altogether. Taoism should have pushed its searching criticism further. For military objectives, easily acquired by standing armies with time on their hands, are frequently incompatible with Taoism. For example, Taoism is opposed to domination (LT p.152), whereas military operations frequently seek or involve domination; and military structure is invariably hierarchical and authoritarian. Taoism aims for self-regulation, wherever feasible (cf. p.201); so does deep­ green theory, which is one reasons why it aims to dispose of standing armies, as an important preliminary to the withering away of states themselves (military forces being major props of state control and power, and often maintained primarily for internal state security). Taoism has no project for ending the era of wars; deep-green theory does. That project involves an elimination of standing armies, too often poised for fighting or political interference. A recommended route to end war consists in progressive scaling down: reduction of the means and manpower. The initial stages are well-known, and include • elimination of nuclear, biological and chemical weaponry, and • force reduction. It can hardly be pretended that the Earth's states have managed to proceed very far on even this complex of stages. The next stage consists in • contraction to defensive capacities only, and the final stage consists in • elimination of remaining military defensive forces, and adoption, so far as required, of social defence practices. The complete route thus involves complete demilitarisation. Reasons why deep-green aims to proceed the full distance are readily grasped by considering the environmental shallowness of an otherwise cogent traditional case for the sharp curtailment of wars and militarism. The traditional Western case against wars has been primarily along two dimensions: social and moral. Wars are highly disruptive of the social fabric; wars may be unjust. From these joint features, it was argued that wars should be a matter of last resort, to be fought to ensure peace. It was argued further that only just wars should be fought. Just wars were rare objects. But as there was little evidence of the decline and fall of wars, much effort was expended, more practically and unsuccessfully, upon endeavouring to improve the calibre of wars, and more theoretically, upon trying to characterize just war satisfactorily, or rather to bend the notion in an effort to approximate the gory unjust facts. 11 Progress was long hindered, furthermore, because there was always a rival positive perspective on wars, which encouraged the exaltation of wars and military feats. It also facilitated the transfer of the favourable image of war to other problem areas, whence the long and apparently successful war against Nature (but the short-term successes are turning into long-term problems), the short and unsuccessful war against Poverty, and so on. Behind all this is the complex idea of war as rejuvenating, even cleansing, like fire; of war as heroic, and glorious, of war as the supreme testing ground of men. These pictures of war - finally shattered by the first World War (where even the poets began to tell of horrors and atrocities) and subsequent technological wars - though no longer in ascendency, have by no means vanished. The notion of war as rejuvenating a flagging economy persists, along with the practice of keeping capitalism running smoothly by integrating substantial military components into the industrial engine. With the development of highly technological wars - the celebrated development of the dirty industrial age is substantially military - the traditional negative case has grown in strength. Wars have become much more damaging, with the potential for much more that is significantly worse, and the possibility of a just war has correspondingly contracted, virtually to zero. The opposition to war has likewise grown, but more than correspondingly with the rise of women in social and political influence. Wars have almost always and everywhere been Men's affairs; likewise conquest. Deep-green theory accepts much of the traditional negative case, but would further strengthen it. For example, the stricture against unjust wars, as out and out immoral, can be strengthened, through the following syllogism: All wars should be fully just wars. Modem wars cannot be fully just wars. Therefore, there should be no modern wars. A fully just war is not merely a just war, but a war those just character can be reliably forecast in advance. A modern war is of course a war that deploys modern technology, at least that available this century. The evidential basis for the second premiss derives from much information that collateral damage, damage to innocent bystanders and involved citizens is always likely and cannot be excluded. Such wars are always liable to violate uncontroversial requirements for a just war, even if they are purely “conventional” wars, not throwing radiation or chemical or biological weapons around. From a contemporary viewpoint the traditional doctrine of a just war, really of a just defensive war, is seriously out of date. The reasons for this reach wider than the new features introduced by modem technological wars and the character of modem civilization, with its giant cities littered with dangerous and vulnerable military targets. They have also to do with the chauvinism of the justice proposed, which is shallow human justice, not natural or environmental justice. There is no consideration of justice to other creatures or to the Earth (cf 12 Naess p.160). Two troubles are really intertwined here: conceptual difficulties with too narrow a notion of justice, and ideological difficulties with too narrow a vision of what is an object of value, of what counts. The deep-green case against war adds to the traditional case a further dimension, neglected until very recently: the environmental dimension. It has suddenly been seen that wars are typically environmental atrocities. Earlier, of course, “environments” were simply backgrounds, backdrops in paintings and plays, to the real drama. Contemporary technological wars tend to be not merely social tragedies but environmental ones as well. There is a doctrine of just war, but it is a human chauvinistic affair. There is no similarly developed doctrine of an ecologically sound war, a deep ecological war. Unless any such war were literally different from modern wars, that is from contemporary technological wars, it would overstep permitted bounds. For such wars are characteristically ecological disasters. Hardened military people, desensitized by a rigorous unethical training, feel even less compunction about degrading or destroying environments or members of other species than they do of maiming or killing civilians through “collateral” activity. Matching the no-just-war syllogism is a no-sound-war syllogism: All wars should be environmentally sound wars. Modem wars cannot be environmentally sound. Therefore, there should be no modern wars. The argument for the second premiss has of course to be different. It looks to the information accumulating on what wars do to natural and built environments. The Vietnam and Gulf wars both inflicted immense damage on natural environments or what was left of them. The environmental effects of war are not confined to direct and collateral damage. There are indirect effects also. Thus, for instance, war also supplied the mechanism of, and the technology for, modem environmental destruction: explosives, bulldozers from tanks, etc. As well, training for war and engagement in war have much fostered, along with attitudes that make for social callousness or ruthlessness, those that contribute to environmental insensitivity and cruelty. 3. Puzzles about Taoist strategy and its critiques of technology and violence ‘It is surprising how much of the Lao Tzu is devoted to military strategy’. Which strategies? Surprise, above all. But why such strategies? ‘Do they not contradict the Taoists’ strong opposition to the use of force’ (Chan p.222), the implied commitment to quietism? Briefly, Taoism is not committed to quietism, and while certainly antagonistic to violence, does not oppose certain uses of force (only really ///-forcing, as will be explained). Even so, the emphasis on military strategy remains puzzling. The strategies, many of them relevant to social defence, include • seriousness, not ‘making light of the enemy’ (p.222) 13 • surprise, and nonvisibility (p.201). The defensive strategy involves guerilla tactics: marching without formation, holding weapons without seeming to have them, confronting enemies without seeming to meet them (p.222). But even in times of peace, ‘smart weapons of the state should not be displayed to the people’ (p.164). Such recommendations helped to fuel the charge of deviousness lodged against Lao Tzu. But look at part of the reason for concealing smart weapons: ‘The more smart weapons the people have, the more troubled the state will be’ (p.201). Smart weapons are carried in corrupt states, where the rich engage in conspicuous consumption and the people are suppressed, not where Tao is practiced (LT p. 194). • advance from weakness, flexibility but firmness. Weakness is the principle of life and will overcome strength (LT p.164, p.233). • coolness and non-competition (LT p.233, p.164). Like these, most of the general strategies are standard Taoist practices simply applied to military conduct. For these standard practices the charge of deviousness looks feeble. The response applies more generally to other allegedly devious political strategies. For the strategies are but application of Taoist principles and techniques to warfare, politics and elsewhere. Nothing excludes application of these techniques to what are accounted, in general, unnecessary evils (which must sometimes, on other Taoist grounds, be countered). Nor, to meet the main criticism, need any deceit or deviousness be involved; nor is it. In particular, the legalist tactic, Tn order to grasp, it is necessary first to give’ (LT p.164), is cited as involving ‘an element of deceit’ ‘undeniably’, and ‘worse’ it is ‘morally questionable’ (Chan p.17). But in order for me to grasp your hand in a normal handshake, it is necessary first for me to give my hand. There is no deceit here, nothing morally questionable. All the tactics permit of benign construals, of a Taoist kind. Consider, for instance, Tn order to contract, it is necessary first to expand’ (LT p.164). In order to bend a copper pipe to the intended angle, it is better to bend it first a little further than required. The transformation of water to ice (both favoured natural items for symbolic purposes: natural processes which may look devious!) neatly illustrates the Taoist principle (which is however hardly necessary), and shows softness and weakness turned hardness and strength. The Taoist critique of militarism is as much a critique of technology as of war. Sharp weapons, ‘smart weapons’ as we might now say, come in for much critical attention, as we have already noticed. Only in corrupt and degenerate states are they displayed or flaunted (p.194, p.164); in deep-green regions smart weapons of state’ would not be retained unexhibited. The people will not have them for they mean trouble (p.201); for similar reasons deep-green regions will be free of them. So, it seems, will ideal Taoist regions: ‘Even if there are arrows and weapons, none will display them’ (LT p.238). Much technology, military and other, is excluded under the Taoist edict against violence (a further facet of the military-practices 14 paradox).5 The powerful critique of militarism in the Tao-te Ching is coupled with strong opposition to violence. Some of the linkage is evident enough. Militarism as practised represents an ultimate form of state (or party) violence. A basic theme is that violent practices will come to an unnatural end, and accordingly to a non-Taoist end (generalising LT p.176). While force may occur in spectacular, but satisfactory, natural forms, force is duly distinguished from violence. To force the growth of life means ill omen. For the mind to employ the vital force without restraint means violence (LT p. 197). One who follows Tao does not apply dominating force, which usually has had results bringing requital (p.152). Dominating force, like power, is in general castigated, under doctrine of wwwei, no forced actions, no violence. To force natural growth is deviant, destroying harmony. To stop natural growth is deviant. But there is a significant difference between force and violence. To intentionally employ destructive force is to do violence. To so force things is condemned. To remain in harmony with things one does not so force things or practice violence. There is a non-interference principle at work, which also indicates types of non­ interference that are excluded. However Taoism does not always get the distinction between force and violence quite 5 Under contemporary technology and technological arrangements, such as the storage of quantities of oil and nuclear and chemical materials in great cities, wars have assumed new and very destructive dimensions, to the point of being utterly irresponsible. A different approach to technology, as to war, is now mandatory. These are no longer things that can in principle be nicely confined and need not touch parties outside the fray. An important part of ending wars, “winning the war against wars”, is removing the technology of war, above all from irresponsible state power. As for which technology to try to jettison and which to try to retain or improve, it is not so difficult to indicate, provided evaluative terminology is not outlawed. What is wanted is technology that is good in its place, what should be excluded is technology that is indifferent or bad or potentially so. Technology to be justified has to do something worthwhile, it has to address identifiable respectable needs. That is why merely indifferent technology is out; there is no virtue in technology for technology's sake, as it is a mere means technique. It is because of the crucial evaluative component in choice of technology that appropriateness, itself evaluative, comes closer to encapsulating the criterion than other recent efforts. Size, such as smallness, or intermediateness, are not what matter, though modest and not excessive technologies are likely to fare better in satisfying appropriateness. In simpler societies, small technology is of course more appropriate; for that is what is good there. From known criteria for what is good these other features for locally appropriate technology can be read off: reliability, esp. in maintenance, functioning well and safely under the expected range of operating conditions (which may be difficult), ease of repair, capital cheapness and repair inexpensiveness, environmental benignness, and meeting sound social needs. 15 right. ‘Vital force without restraint’, intentionally excessive force, is only part of what counts as violence, which is more generally force which violates, i.e. transgresses, descrecrates, profanes, injures, outrages, etc. It is thus a negatively connoted force, an evil force in some specified intentional respect. There is a tendency for Taoist commentators, not Taoists, to regard Taoism as condemning all uses, or even occurrences, of force, but this is not so. Rather intentional ill-forcing is what is castigated, what is deviant. Thus Taoism does not exclude a range of defensive practices, which make satisfactory use of natural forces, like letting the machines of war industry stop. Those who would abolish war and its machinery, substituting for it nonwarlike and ideally nonviolent methods, technology, and strategies, have been confronted not merely with much sub-rational abuse but with plenty of criticism and even some paradoxes. Here is a recent paradox concerning war and nonviolence: • War must be abolished. One reason is simply economic. We can no longer afford it, and the opportunity costs are enormous. Along with other extraordinarily wasteful activities, it is an anachronism. • Doing so cannot be accomplished without violence, i.e. in effect, given the types of violence involved, without what amounts to war. According to a fuller version of this premiss, the process of abolishing a war would only be achieved through a revolution so profound that it could not succeed without extensive and extreme violence, amounting to (civil) war. 0 But then war cannot be abolished without war. Therefore, war which must be abolished cannot be abolished.6 This “paradox” has been compared with the Liar paradox, but the parallel does not persist far. For this paradox does not involve self-referential features, and is easily broken, as follows. Let the “last war” be not the last standard war but the revolution abolishing war. Then, given that the revolution is successful, war will be abolished therewith, i.e. with that last war. There need be no regress, given again a successful outcome. All the premisses stand intact, but the conclusion, following the ‘therefore’ is a nonsequitur. However, while the dissolution of the argument is accordingly logically fine, the route is repugnant. Standard pacifism challenges the 6 Brian Medlin, who forcefully propounded this puzzle, set other analogous puzzles alongside it - designed to reveal deep difficulties in contemporary political, and especially alternative, thought. Another puzzle, concerning liberty and repression in the context of capitalism, revolved around the following inconsistent triad: • capitalism must be removed, but liberty retained. • capitalism cannot be removed without repression. • repression is antithetical to liberty. The puzzle is resolved as with the analogous puzzle of abolishing. Let the “last capitalist” action before the days of liberty be the repressive but liberating revolution overthrowing capitalism. i 16 second premiss. 4. Standard and moral pacifism. Although Taoism is strongly opposed to war, and much in favour of peace - and accordingly by prevailing standards a substantially pacific position - it is not (nowhere in the central texts) committed to pacifism in usual senses, for two different reasons:• It is not, by contrast with pacifism, opposed to all types of warfare, for example smart defensive wars. • It eschews deontology in terms of which moral pacifism is commonly stated, for instance through the watershed thesis P2. It is morally wrong to use violence. By contrast with Taoism, deep environmentalism does not avoid deontic claims, and is committed in principle to nonviolent technologies and ways and to pacifistic principles. Moreover, certain forms of deep environmentalism are completely committed to pacifism, notably European forms. Is deep green? There is heavy contemporary opposition to pacifism, as there also was to Taoism in the warring times when Taoism was first being promulgated. Many of the central institutions of contemporary life are intricated in coercion, violence and war. The most prominent contemporary institutions, states, are premissed on these elements of damaging force; they claim entitlement to use them widely, and even claim a certain territorial monopoly on their use. As a result they are having constantly to engage in them in attempt to maintain that monopoly. They are certainly the main perpetrators of wars, and of violence. They are indeed inured to wars, are in constant preparation for wars, yet propound dialectial (and normally dishonest and cynical) doctrines of peace through war (for a recent example see the appendix). Unremarkably then, the extensive propagandistic machinery of state has invested heavily in “justificatory” exercises in favour of controlled use, its own use, of destructive force, and continues to inveigh against pacifism. Because a routine trick in this sophistical repetoire consists in conflating pacifism with extreme, naive and inplausible, forms, an inevitable and important early task commits in unscrambling senses of ‘pacifism’. Semantical skulduggery can be thwarted in this way. Pacifism, as explained by English dictionaries, invariably concerns wars and warfare, and contains two components, negative and, elaborating on that, positive:- The negative component is, in Amauld's word, anti-War-ism, opposition (in ways to be further specified) to all forms of warfare (see OED). The positive component supplies alternative ways of settling disputes (what it is supposed that wars with some semblance of justification involve), such as negotiation, arbitration, ... - and, adding to too narrow dictionary accounts - sanctions, substitutions (e.g. of sporting events, operatic contests, cooperative ventures),.... In brief standard pacifism is opposition to all warfare and resolution of potential wars by other nonmilitary means. 17 Plainly the opposition to warfare, like the sanctions and so on, cannot itself be military (using soldiers and other devices of war), on pain of some incoherence. But otherwise the ways of opposition can be many and various: they can certainly be active, as with nonviolent demonstrations, resistance movements, and so forth, and they may also be devious (e.g. turning the forces of war upon themselves so they are neutralised). It quickly becomes evident, then, that some of the dictionaries offer but loaded definitions which, by restricting the negative components, reduce the initial appeal and plausibility of pacifism. Consider the Concise English definition of the negative component: ‘the doctrine of non-resistance to hostilities and of total non-co-operation with any form of warfare’. Thereby excluded are forms of pacifism which offer active and plausible alternatives to warfare such as social defence. The Concise English tends to force pacifism into what the Oxford English Dictionary lists as its final item: ‘often, with depreciatory implication, the advocacy of peace at any price’, ‘in any circumstance’. Pacifism can easily resist being forced into these sorts of circumstances: it has many resources, as an extensive series of texts on alternatives to war, such as negotiation, non­ violent action and social defence, from Taoism to contemporary environmentalism attest. Academic philosophers have much advanced the semantical strategy of some dictionaries, of rendering pacifism more difficult from the very outset by narrow and biassed definitions. They have stretched the term from its restricted setting of warfare, confined to state and organised gang violence, to cover all forms of violence, from state and interstate to, what is very different, personal and interpersonal violence. Call the resulting considerably stretched notion of pacifism, according to which it is morally wrong to use violence, according to which P2 holds, stretched pacifism? While stretched pacifism certainly includes standard pacifism (unless the notions of war and warfare are tampered with), the converse is very far from being the case. A pacifist is in no way committed to stretched pacifism, which is a much more problematic and difficult position than standard pacifism. There are several, substantially different reasons for this, which will be picked up seriatim. Stretched pacifism, also misleadingly called moral pacifism, has looked a very easy critical target to moral philosophers. Many the effusive philosopher who, upon sighting such a target, has charged, whooping such rhetoric as “incoherent”, “inconsistent”, “insensitive”, “fanatical”. However, with improved logical technology now available for accommodating and treating moral dilemmas, it is no great feat to resist such attacks, in the fashion of previous investigations (see esp. Al, also MD). A main aim was to demonstrate that stretched pacifism was not so stupid as it was made out to be or appeared to be to these inured to present dominant violent ways. So far from being stupid, it is viable. In future gentler times stretched pacifism 7 In Al this notion was contrasted with standard pacifism as comprehensive pacifism: overcomprehensive might have been better. 18 could even be realised for whole communities of creatures (as some genuinely Christian sects envisaged); whence it will finally be seen to be feasible not merely for sages and supermen, and many ordinary women, but much more extensively. The method of philosophical accommodation was through moral dilemmas. The sort of moral dilemma that stretched pacifism can induce derives as follows. On the one side stands the theme P2, Wv, in convenient symbols, for Wrong V-ing, violencing. Now this implies to WB, where B presents a case of of violence. On the other side, particular circumstances develop which lead to W ~B, because ~B would produce in the circumstances considerable wrong, for instance extensive violence, mass murder, etc. One stock example from the literature concerns calling off the firing squad about to shoot several captives if the pacifist shoots one of them (it is elaborated in Al p.13). Interestingly, another stock example from the literature concerns standard pacifism (it can also be presented in terms of patriotism; for details of both see MD p. 10). Resolution of intractable moral dilemmas is, where it is required, situational. The agent decides in the situation, within the fix, what to do. There are many ways in which such decision making can proceed, less rational, such as those applying chance or involving bad faith, or more rational, such as those applying consequentialist decision theory (for details see MD, pp.32-9). A decision theory taking account of all that should be included will not however be purely consequential. It would also take account of relevant motivation. This defence and rehabilitation of moral pacifism has been challenged, in particular by Smith (hereafter JWS). JWS claims the defence offered is a ‘failure because it trivializes pacifism’ (p. 153 twice). The rehabilitation trivializes pacifism because it entails that pacifism doesn't substantially differ from a form of activism which holds that while violence is always wrong one is sometimes justified on consequentialist grounds for preferring violent acts, if these acts are lesser evils than any other real alternatives. This is the commonsense position which most people hold - yet - pacifism after all was supposed to be radical moral doctrine - (p.153 rearranged).8 Part of the criticism is, then, not so much that pacifism is trivialized - JWS “activism” is hardly trivial - as that pacifism is popularised, deflated from a radical position to the commonsense position most people hold (p.154 also). Yet not a shred of evidence is adduced that JWS activism is such a populist position. Available evidence, for example from peace movements and oppositional opinion polls, suggests the very opposite: that, for instance, most people support state-justified conventional wars with the military violence they incur, and 8 JWS now informs me that he has changed his position. Whether the move effects his criticism, I don't know. 19 accordingly do not hold that violence is always wrong. From such a commonsense angle, pacifism with its condemnation of conventional wars and the violence they involve remains a radical doctrine. As regards wars and other violence-incurring social authorities, contemporary pacificism is, as previous explained (e.g. Al p.3), a form of activism. Pacifism does not imply utter pacifity, but may actively involve social defence, resistance and so on. However a certain level of misrepresentation enters into the JWS challenge in the details of what forms of activism pacifism may include. That misrepresentation begins in the second clause concerning what is said to be sometimes justified. For the situational procedure where dilemmas arise will not generally be consequential applying a principle of lesser evil. In dilemmatic situations such principles are suspended, and such a principle is in any case unacceptable to moral pacifists. A small amount of violence may be less bad in its consequences than verbal offence, but a principled pacifist will choose the slightly greater evil where other obligations do not exclude it. A more serious distortion occurs in JWS's effort to force procedures in dilemma situations into purely consequentialist form. In fact consequential decision theory was deployed as a model only for how to proceed rationally in a situational setting where deontic procedures were suspended (see MD p.38). What was said, still misleadingly retrospective vision reveals, was this: ‘what is done is a very consequentialist thing’ (Al p.13), not ‘one acts in a consequentialist fashion to do the sufficiently good thing in the circumstances’ (JWS p.152). Situationally other procedures than those resembling orthodox rational decision making (modified from maximizing to satisizing objectives) may be adopted (MD p.38). Further the orthodox consequentialist theory is inadequate because it leaves out, or tries to reduce to consequences, nonconsequential elements, notably motives. It is not difficult, in principle (in advance of attempted consequentialization of motives), to design situations where motives, such as integrity or maintaining faith, enter to yield outcomes upsetting consequential calculations. More elaborate decision making procedures than those of consequentialism, sometimes at variance with consequentialism, are thus presupposed. A further part of JWS's criticism accordingly goes by the board, the alleged appeal ‘to “second best” consequentialist considerations,... already explicitly condemned’ (p. 154). What was condemned was stock universal consequentialism, ‘that only consequentialist considerations carry argumentative weight’ (quoted on p. 152), so undercutting other deontic principles, such as those of pacifism. It was not claimed, what is utterly different, that consequentialist considerations can nowhere enter into deliberation and decision making. The conclusion JWS arrives at is therefore substantially astray. After criticising modern moral philosophy for its reliance upon consequentialist modes of thought, it is surprising, and inconsistent, to find ... [reliance] upon such modes of thought to escape logical difficulties raised by moral dilemmas facing ... pacifis[m] (p.152) There is no inconsistency. JWS has confused universal with particular. As well he has wrongly contracted all situational decision making to consequentialist modes. There is a third part to the criticism, that the defence is too easy; the ‘strategy will allow too much violence to be (perpetrated and) justified to suit the tastes of any real pacifist’ (p. 153). This another part of the so-called trivialization, this time however dilution rather than populatization, weakening the moral stand against violence. This third contention is premissed on a mistake: that one can ‘justify on consequentialist grounds any number of violent acts, providing that such acts are lesser evils than other real alternatives facing social agents’ (p. 153). Moral pacifism offers no such licence; allowing such consequentialism to take over was never part of the position. The slide to such consequentialism is made on the strength of a similarly erroneous example. The potential victim of an aspiring rapist ‘is supposed to flee or wriggle free if possible. But it is easy to consequentially justify the use of violence by the woman to prevent herself from being raped’ (p. 153 italics added). In the example so far described there is no dilemma, and no such easy resort to consequentially ‘justified’ violence. What allows too much violence is the lesser evil JWS assumes is easily consequentially justified; for example that the woman is entitled to inflict, and escalate, violence so long as it remains ‘a lesser evil than the violence of attempted rape’ (p. 153). Since she may thereby inflict quite unreasonable damage (esp. if she is a Kung Fu expert), the result is inconsistent with ‘the basic principle of self-defence’ which JWS earlier adduced according to which what is ‘appropriate, in response is only that level of force necessary to defend oneself against the threat’ (p. 150). There is evidence in JWS's work of some enthusiasm for levels of violence which exceed his ‘basic principle’, his appeal to ‘lesser evil’ generates some instances. The ‘basic principle’, itself fraught with difficulties (cf. the contorted discussion of what weapons are appropriate in response to what attacks, p. 150), still exceeds what stretched pacifism would enjoin; for instance, it may not be appropriate to respond with force. But in a technical sense stretched pacifism is compatible with the ‘basic principle’, since it only imposes the upper bound on level of force. As for easiness, moral pacifism is not an easy position to live by, or to justify. Removing objections to pacifism is one thing; solidifying a positive case for it is quite another, and so far hardly conclusive (as Al tried to explain, pp 29-31). Stretched pacifism was advanced, hypothesized to put it more precisely, as a still viable option. It was not presented as a morally compulsory position, or, for that matter, as one that this defender adhered to or affirmed. To reiterate, while a cumulative case can be made for stetched pacifism as principled non­ violence, that case was not conclusive, and is hard to improve. For, further, some serious difficulties standing in the way of stretched pacifism were assembled, the most important of which derives from the extent of violence apparent in transactions within the natural world. Simply consider the practices of carnivores, essential to their natural way of life. In order to meet their life needs for sustenance, these creatures do, and are often obliged to, engage 21 routinely in violent activity. While it can no doubt be argued, as some vegetarians may do, that the natural order is an immoral order, and that remaining carnivores should be converted to vegetarianism as rapidly as proves possible (in the way domestic dogs are converted to dog biscuits), the difficulties with such proposals are immense. The task envisaged is gigantic, and beyond human capacities - even if it were desirable. For there are millions of species to be somehow converted to proper vegetarianism. Then there are millions of other species to be converted to proper and well regulated contraceptive practices, else their numbers will get out of hand (uncontrollably) with predation removed. Given humans lack of success in limiting their own excessive numbers, such regulation appears entirely remote. Aside however from the practical difficulties, is such a fully vegetarian order, with evolution further derailed, a desirable improvement on the natural order? Is it morally obligatory? It is certainly not obligatory, as alternative systems of morality in harmony with the prevailing natural order are feasible. Nor is it desirable, for (to appeal to such alternative value systems) the natural order is more or less in order as it is. Full vegetarianization would only reduce its value, vastly. More generally, a defensible ethical framework should not, it would be rightly contended, be right out of step with the natural order of other creatures, decently depicted. Decent depiction is important, for some features of the natural order, such as competition, combat and predation, so far from escaping attention, have been grossly exaggerated and exploited. Thus, for instance, the ludicrous picture of nature red in truth and claw, so beloved of descendents of orthodox Victorians and of orthodox economists. However, even under decent depiction, the “natural order” is often not benign. That appears to be enough to induce a supervenient moral dilemma for any stretched pacifism which is coupled to a deep ethic (e.g. which does not separate humans out from the natural order) and which eschews the desperate vegetarian route: The natural order is not an immoral order The natural order contains (regular) instances of violence. Therefore, instances of violence are not immoral in apparent defiance of P2 Moreover, there are too many instances of violence, too regularly occurring, for them all to be plausibly shunted into the moral dilemma category (and predatory carnivores face no dilemmas). Raptors that practice violence every week are not immoral (neither are they clearly moral; the category of morality only significantly extends so far). The main trouble lies however with P2 (which needs some finer adjustment, as was alrady indicated in Al). While P2 is alright in context, within a particular, perfectly viable, ethical framework, designed for the usual human round, the conventional setting for ethical theories, it stands in need of modification outside that setting. It is time to suggest the sort of modification envisaged. Evidently P2 was addressed to moral agents. Which agents? Not to carnivores that supply their own livelihood, nor really to morally degenerate humans, but to i 22 peace-sensitive agents. With that semi-technical form, yet to be characterised, a suitably modified P2 results: MP2. It is morally wrong, for a peace-sensitive agent, to use violence.9 To recover what amounts, in the previous discussive context, to P2, it suffices to add the proposition that every human agent ought to be peace-sensitive. Much as that proposition has to recommend it, it appears too ethically advanced for many modem humans; it sets too high a moral standard to be taken as a serious guide to practice. It seems wise to settle presently for something less demanding, such as that every advanced moral agent ought to be peace sensitive. To put essentially the same proposition alternatively: Stretched pacifism (as modified) is supererogatory. While it is perhaps too late to hope for much moral progress in humans, it is pleasant to contemplate alternative futures where what is supererogatory became obligatory, and widely practiced. Richard Sylvan* Appendix I began drafting this essay at the time (January 17, midday Australian time) of the American attacks upon Iraq. The optly named Prime Minister Hawke of Australia had just made a statement to the nation-state, announcing (the) war. In this statement there was much talk of peace. There was even - in what was effectively a declaration of war - reiteration of the modem quest for ‘a new world order of peace’. Peace through war; so it rings out again and again, through the centuries. ‘War must be for the sake of peace’ (Aristotle p.220). More than two thousand years later, we have fought those wars to end all wars. But it is no use, Hawke solemely pronounced, just talking about peace, and thinking about peace; we must work for peace, fight for it - through war. Impeccable logic? President Bush, supreme commander, convinced us with similar logic, speaking too with many tongues. Of how he ‘preferred to think of peace, not war’. But now ‘only force will prevail’, as ‘all reasonable efforts to reach a peaceful solution are exhausted’. ‘What must be done’ must be done, or will be anyway. With God on side with the US offensive (as well as on the other side), it will go well. As it was said to have, though it achieved comparatively little that other efforts may not have yielded more satisfactorily, and thought it may now have to 9 The generalization of P2, suggested in Al, to cover also the parallel situation of environmental vandalism, can be similarly modified. The anti-vandolence principle becomes MP2°. It is morally wrong, for a peace- and environmentally-sensitive agent, to use vandolence. Thank to David Bennett for joint contributions (from UT) and to JWS for opposition (in JWS)  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Box 59, Item 680: Draft of War and peace IV: Tao and deep-green Subject The topic of the resource Computer printout. Later title: On extirpating war: Tao and deep-green pacifism. Description An account of the resource Note, one of four papers digitised from item 680. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/browse?search=Richard+Sylvan&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bjoiner%5D=and&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=&amp;range=&amp;collection=&amp;type=&amp;user=&amp;tags=&amp;public=&amp;featured=&amp;exhibit=&amp;geolocation-mapped=&amp;geolocation-address=&amp;geolocation-latitude=&amp;geolocation-longitude=&amp;geolocation-radius=10&amp;submit_search=Search+for+items">Richard Sylvan</a> Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived <span class="MuiTypography-root-125 MuiTypography-body2-126">The University of Queensland's <a data-testid="rek-series" href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/records/search?page=1&amp;pageSize=20&amp;sortBy=score&amp;sortDirection=Desc&amp;searchQueryParams%5Brek_series%5D%5Bvalue%5D=Richard+Sylvan+Papers%2C+UQFL291&amp;searchMode=advanced">Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291</a></span>, Box 59, Item 680 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org">Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy</a> Contributor An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, <a href="https://najtaylor.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Dr. N.A.J. Taylor</a>. Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library. Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource [22] leaves. 14.62 MB. Type The nature or genre of the resource Manuscript Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context <a href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:16694a5">https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:16694a5</a> Coverage The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant Como - Cupboard - Pile 3 Box 59: Nuclear Como House Como House > Cupboard > Pile 3 https://www.antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/8d68b6d2b8fc13d2658f8bcec5033f90.pdf 133736fbbf882cc36899905ee9ec3212 PDF Text Text ON EXTIRPATING WAR: TAO AND DEEP-GREEN PACIFISM Taoism and deep-green environmental theory, although closely aligned on very many issues, diverge over war. For Taoism, by contrast for instance with Buddhism, is not a pacific doctrine, but is committed to skilful defensive militarism. While it does not espouse a fortress mentality, Taoism certainly condones limited defensive military operations for specific purposes, a sort of guerilla warfare. By contrast, deep-green theory, while acknowledging the role of organised social defence, stands opposed to professional militarism, and thereby to military defence, and is committed to a principled pacifism. Conveniently a route through Taoism, philosophically fascinating in its own right, will lead us to problems of pacifism and towards deep-green theory. 1. Features of a Taoist critique of war and militarism. War did not receive a favourable press in ancient Chinese philosophy. Generally aggression and war were to be avoided. Even Confucius imposed very demanding conditions: for example, ‘when good men have instructed the people [in morals, agriculture, military tactics] for seven years, they may be allowed to bear arms,’ ‘If a ruler ... does not set himself right, even his commands will not be obeyed’ (SB p.41, italics added). Mo Tzu went much further than Confucius, roundly condemning war - on utilitarian grounds, that war yields no net benefit at any level (SB p.227). What is more, he backed his heavy condemnation practically (unlike some conspicuous contemporary theoretical utilitarians); ‘he did not hesitate to walk for ten days and ten nights in an effort to dissuade a ruler from making war’ (SB p.212). But none, it is said, went as far, in a detailed and sophisticated criticism of war, as Lao Tzu; ‘none has condemned war more strongly than Lao Tzu’. ‘[T]he opposition of Taoism to the use of force is well-known, and the most bitter attack on militarism if found in the Lao Tzu’ (Chan, p.154, p.17.) But, after that splendid build-up, the text is slightly disappointing. Lao Tzu does not assert outright that war is an abomination, or even roundly condemn it. His critique of war, militarism, and military technology, is subtle and oblique, and, on the surface, far distanced from pacifism. For he does not recommend an end to war - in that genuine Taoists, those who possess Tao, will never participate in them - but expects wars to continue as unavoidable evils. Worse, he even goes so far as to outline proper attitudes to war and conduct in war, and indeed to suggest military techniques and strategies, some of which look decidedly devious. Among the classical works of Taoism, we focus on the Lao Tzu because, by contrast with other works, a remarkable component of that book is devoted to war and militarism. The apparent deviousness of the tactics Lao Tzu allocates serves to highlight what has been seen as ‘the most troublesome element’ in his philosophy (Chan p.17) — not so much however because they concern military operations, but because they are taken to apply much more widely, ‘to life in general’ (p.17). But why should military activity obtain some special �2 more widely, ‘to life in general’ (p. 17). But why should military activity obtain some special dispensation? Why should what is not tolerated more generally be exonerated there? But given that Taoism has here the virtue of consistency (i.e. uniformity on principles) and of universalizability, that simply leaves more explaining to be done. • Puzzles for Taoism, and wars as unavoidable evils There are two puzzles here in Taoism rather than one. There is the military-practices paradox, and, varying and generalising on that, there are life-practices paradoxes. The special paradox is generated by the following incompatible elements: on the one side, ‘the most bitter attack on militarism’, the well-known opposition of Taoism to the use of force (p. 17) and to the possession and use of smart military weapons and technology - implying that war is far from all right - and on the other, advocacy of certain (devious) military tactics, outlines of (deceitful) conduct in war, and so on - implying that war is all right after all. A straightforward generalisation of this paradox would look at other morally-sensitive parts of life, where some practice was strongly condemned yet engaged in (for many examples, see the dilemmas assembled in MD). But the variation of concern to Chan and the neo-Confucians concerns thfc conjunction of upright with devious practices in life, in particular in the life of the sage. For a Taoist sage is presumed to lead an upright straightforward life, yet appears to engage in devious and even deceitful practices incompatible with such a life-style. Call this the Taoist-lifestyle paradox. Evidently a good deal of explaining is required, as to how Taoism can coherently take the positions it appears to presume, both on war and peace, and on life more generally. A desirable preliminary would seem to be a little investigation of what position is taken, especially on war and militarism. One key pasage runs: Fine weapons are instruments of evil They are hated by creatures Therefore those who possess the Tao turn away from them. ... Weapons are instruments of evil, not the instruments of a good ruler. When he uses them unavoidably, he regards calm restraint as the best principle Even when he is victorious, he does not regard it as praiseworthy, For to praise victory is to delight in the slaughter of men. He who delights in the slaughter of men will not succeed in the empire. ... For a victory, let us observe the occasion with funeral-ceremonies (LT p.154). Wars, which involve the use of weapons, instruments of evil, are accordingly themselves evil. They are also evil because they involve the slaughter of men. But they are also sometimes unavoidable (also p.152). Therefore such wars are unavoidable evils. Such discourse, obtained by almost immediate inference from the passage, is within the standard orbit of dilemma talk. But Taoism lacks, through deliberately eschewing deontic talk, the discourse which enables direct expression of such dilemmas, or even direct condemnation of wars or of clever weapons. Instead the points are made by circumlocution, what the possesser of Tao �3 does, how the good ruler conducts himself, or by analogy, of victory in war with death. Unavoidable evils are the very stuff of deontic dilemmas (though many theories, underpinned by shonky logic, lack the resources for representing this stuff properly). Where something is unavoidably evil, it is both bad, because evil, and also not bad, doing it is excusable, because it is unavoidable. So, given such an argument (which has its weaknesses), an unavoidable evil is a genuinely dilemmatic object with inconsistent features. Certain wars have looked, since ancient times, like such dilemmatic objects. Revealingly, Chan tries to explain that ‘most troublesome element’ in Taoism, the military-practice paradox, through the following exercise in lateral thinking: It can ... be argued that Lao Tzu uses warfare to illustrate his principles of taking no action and weakness because warfare is among the most dynamic and critical of human experiences, just as the Indian classic, the Bhagavadgita chooses fighting as the theme on which to discuss the terrible dilemma whether one should fulfil his duty, as in the case of a soldier, and kill, or should fail in his duty and refrain from killing (p. 17). ‘Just as’? The Indian classic prevents a classic moral dilemma, a dilemma represented in contemporary philosophy (following its rediscovery by Sartre), where there are incompatible duties: the duty to kill, because of one's role as a soldier, and the duty not to kill, because of one's human condition, and the supervenient dilemma of failing in and fulfilling one's duties. These dilemmas for an individual (male, as it then was) are replicated in dilemmas regarding war for group institutions: at bottom, the obligation to engage in war (for one set of compelling reasons) as contraposed with the obligation not to engage in war (for another, perhaps overlapping, set of reasons). A theory of moral dilemmas (as worked out for example in MD) is crucial for an adequate treatment of major issues in war and peace, especially (as will become evident) for a viable strong pacifism. But Taoism, eschewing deontic discourse, lacks the apparatus to state or develop moral dilemmas. Hence it is logically excluded from giving a full or adequate account of what is going on conceptually. One of the philosophically fascinating feature of Taoism is the fashion in which it manages to avoid deontic discourse, and to substitute for direct deontic discourse or improvise circumlocutions when deontic discourse would otherwise appear inevitable (cf. UT for examples). But there are costs. One is inability to display the mechanism of deontic dilemmas, or to show what reasons and argument lie behind Taoist prounouncements and conclusions (the shortage of Taoism on argument is another philosophically conspicious feature, also observed in UT). As conceptual apparatus for analysizing moral dilemmas is missing, most of the machinery involved has to be passed over. Only the outcomes, as Taoism sees them, are presented, as if from a black box. Taoism blacks out the story on deontic dilemmas that deep-green theory can tell, as the following diagram tries to show: �4 Diagrams . Charting the processing of deontic dilemmas that are “resolved”. Deep-green chart: Processing of dilemma, Arguments to dilemma incompatible input prescriptions situational procedures -» > directive output ■ X. Corresponding Taoist chart: Black directive Box output It is evident that Taoism can be extended', information can be put into the Black Bok rendering it less opaque. That extension can be made so as to conform to deep-green theory, i.e. so that the extended Taoist chart, a neo-Daoist chart, looks like the deep-green one. That is indeed essentially how neo-Daoism get characterised, in terms of conformity of the extension to deep ecological theory (see UT). We are now placed to explain how to dissolve, or at least neutralize, the paradoxes deriving from repudiation of militarism, an awkwardly qualified repudiation in the case of Taoism. In a significant sense there is no resolving of genuine deontic dilemmas. The principles delineating the fix may stand, incompatible, signalling the persisting suboptimality (or better, sublimenality) of the dilemmatic situation. Where there is a dilemma, involved parties should try to do well enough in the sublimenal circumstances (for a much fuller account, see MD). Thus where there is a war, itself a non-Taoist process, engaged or caught up Taoists will not abandon Taoism. Taoist methods will be applied, Taoist strategies pursued. So much for theoretical representation and (non-)resolution of life-practices and other dilemmas, details of which are readily elaborated in deep-green extensions of Taoism. A prior substantive issue is whether dilemmas always are generated: not whether wars are evil (typically they are, an issue we shall come to), but whether wars are unavoidable. Analysis of wars does not bear that familiar claim out decisively. Many wars could have been avoided, through conciliation, negotiation, restraint, etc., and no worse results apparently obtained, through sanctions, exchange, trade, etc. Through a typology of wars (coming up) that conjecture can be given some substance. Consider, for instance, what would be walk-overs. Then there is little point in making a military response. So war can be avoided. Certainly an occupation, to be met in a different way, may still occur. And so on, perhaps, for various other types of war. But, more generally, try this:- �5 Every war involves an aggressor, who makes an aggressive move. Such an aggressor could always avoid that move, taking a different (or a do-nothing) course of action. Therefore, every war can be avoided. No war is entirely unavoidable. Setting aside determinism (which renders all actual wars along with all other events unavoidable), it could be argued that a war sometimes simply boils up, without an aggressor, an intensification of a conflagatory situation. There are grounds for scepticism regarding such examples; for such intensification can only occur if provocative military moves are made, for instance troops are stationed in provocative or risky positions. The presumption that certain wars are unavoidable typically derives from a one-sided perspective on war, a defender's perspective. A defender has no option, so it is routinely averred, but to respond to a determined aggressor. Even if that should be so sometimes, when there is no running away or going underground, it does not establish that such a war is unavoidable; for it neglects the role of the aggressor. By a smarter formulation, relevant features of unavoidability can be captured. Although wars may not be unavoidable, defensive action in wars that have been initiated may be unavoidable. At least such action may b£ unavoidable z/ unacceptably high costs (death, enslavement, etc.) are not to be avoided. Thereupon another highly relevant feature emerges: the linkage of avoidability to costs. For whether an action is unavoidable then depends upon what costs a party is prepared to incur before and when insisting on action: but this appears entirely unacceptable. How can what is “unavoidable” cease to be so when some further costs are absorbed? However with basics like survival, a certain liberty, and so on, we do reach such bounds. An important type of unavoidability. We also reach scenarios, unavailable to Lao Tzu but kindly brought within range by modem technology, which may appear to justify aggressive strikes. State Z, while not an aggressor, is carrying out practices which will impose unacceptably high costs upon peoples of other states and implacably refuses to desist. It could, for example, be poisoning air or water flowing to other states. But ,to make the case vivid, let us suppose that state Z is constructing, for reasons Zeders find convincing (they are committed to a faith which depicts all humans as incorrigible sinners and unworthy of life), an effective doomsday machine. Would an (aggressive) preemptory strike designed to disable or destroy the machine be unavoidable?1 In a sense, No; in another Yes. For different modalities can operate. Physically outsiders need to do nothing, but watch Zeders go about their zealous work. But deontically they are under heavy moral pressure, because of the costs of standing by idly: if the human race is worth anything very substantial, then they are obliged to act, action is deontically 1 Whether it would be justifiable, or just, are separate issues. But it is evident enought that such scenarios further damage the obsolescent idea of just war. For, according to received doctrine, a just war is defensive. (How such a war can be fought at all is another matter; coherence requires relativization to ‘just wxfor party d’.) �6 unavoidable. Here is a situation where a proposed reduction of deontic logic proves illuminating. Obligation is explicated through not implying, or necessitating, the sanction, i.e. excessive ethical costs such as extermination. Let us explain deontic unavoidability analogously: an action is so unavoidable if not undertaking it would result in excessive ethical costs. Then if it can be established that there is no other way than a military strike, an act of war, to ensure that the Zeders desist (and certainly we can envisage scenarios like that), then that is deontically unavoidable. It is also dilemmatic for those committed to, or inclined towards pacifism; and it is, for them at least, but paradoxically justifiable, as the negation is also justifiable, on pacific grounds. Scenarios like that sketched, that appear to render certain wars deontically unavoidable require but little or no elaboration to render them evil. Evil indeed is such a standard feature of standard wars that at least its great presence call for little supporting evidence. But it has taken to vast stretch of human history to reach this general point of recognition. The manifold evils of war Lao Tzu very early recognised and emphasized: Wherever armies are stationed, briars and thorns grow. Great wars are always followed by famines (p. 152). And nowadays followed by great tides of refugees. This passage includes not only recognition of the widely-observed socio-environmental consequences of war, but, more striking, very early recognition of the severe environmental impact of military forces. That critique is not however developed in Taoism.2 Only recently has it been pushed substantially further. And only recently could a new, most significant twist occur, the merging of resource security, long a military objective, with environmental security. The appalling idea has recently been floated that the military, in need of new work and roles with the apparent warming of West-East relations and cooling of the Cold War, should exchange usual military idleness for meddling in environmental matters: regulation and policing of environmental resources, ensurance of environmental security of powerful states, and similar. This is a bit like reassigning those imprisoned for child abuse to managing kindergartens; for consider the impressive military record of environmental vandalism. What the military is alleged to offer is a structure appropriate and available for handling such matters. But, to the contrary, it is precisely the sort of hierarchical, authoritarian expensive structure that should be wound down and up as soon as the opportunity appears, as (briefly) now, rather than being retained and shockingly reoriented (as a state-serving “Greenwar”). But a bridge to deep-green theory can be made through neo-Daoism, an updating of Taoism in confirmity with deep ecology (which however is somewhat thin and threadbare on war; for what there is so far, see Naess p.160). On neo-Daoism, see UT. �7 2. On the divergence of deep-green from Taoism. Having arrived, by better or worse arguments, at the conclusion that wars, though generally evil, may be sometimes unavoidable, it is evidently important to say something about how they - those of the theoretical residue - are to be conducted. By appropriate conduct the damage they do may be reduced; also the conduct should be appropriate to the funereal nature of wars (to exceed Taoist resources for stating this sort of point). It is at this stage that deep­ green theory begins to diverge from Taoism. In further explaining the Taoist and deep-green critiques of war, and diverting objections to them, a rough and preliminary typology of wars is important. It is also of passing interest in its own philosophical right. War, according to English Dictionaries, is a ‘contest carried on by force of arms, typically between nations or states’. More exactly, war is a game - in the generous technical sense of game-theory, with players, rules, goals, strategies, and so on carried on in significant part by military means, normally between states or substates. Call the contestants, (warring) parties. They typically represent of course larger populations. The set­ up between parties resembles the arrangements of players in game theory. There are several analogical extensions of the term war to cover games where one of the parties is an object, construed as hostile (an enemy of the state), such as Crime, Drugs, Poverty or Nature. These we can set aside as analogical wars. Of course wars form only a part of military activities. Military interests and objectives have always stretched significantly further than war, to include surveillence and security, easily extended to resource security, environmental security and life­ style security, and beyond that to political stability and other political matters. Evidently military ambitions have far over-extended themselves in bagging such democratic concerns. An anarchist solution to the whole problem of war, which some have seen Taoism as reaching towards, is immediate: eliminate the source of war, states. Unfortunately it is not quite that simple (and that's not simple). For wars can also occur between nations, cultures, races or tribes (which are not such artifices as states, and not always so readily or desirably abolished), between inhabited regions, and between factions within states (thus civil wars) or, perhaps by extension, between factions within other social structures (thus, for instance, gang wars). But undoubtedly eliminating states and aspiring states would abolish most wars and virtually all the worst wars. While “nonviolent wars” are excluded by definition, by virtue of ‘force of arms’, token wars, limited wars, and so on, are not: for instance, wars fought by small armed teams representing competing sides (cf. medieval and science fiction war games). As wars are hemmed in by conventions and agreed rules, there is no reason in principle why they should not be reduced to two person contests, fought under strict rules like boxing or gladiatorial contests. But in modem times wars have never taken such sensible forms, but have been much larger affairs, making heavy (though fortunately restricted) use of latest technology. Let us distinguish such wars as techno-powered wars. They have, directly or indirectly (for the �8 technology may be bought or bartered), a heavy research and development support structure (indeed the bulk of contemporary science is devoted - misdirected - in one way or another to this effort). Among wars, an important distinction is that between offensive and defensive wars. An offensive war is one which ventures off a given party's territory or recognised pad, “invading" that of another party or parties; correlatively defensive parties, if they have not also invaded. Force projection typifies offensive practice. Plainly, offensiveness and defensiveness are not strictly features of a war, but of parties to a war. In a two-party war, while both parties can easily act offensively, the possibility of both parties proceeding defensively is excluded, unless they share territory. (Even then issues may arise as to which party, if any, was the aggressor, which started it, was responsible for starting it, and so on.) Thus mutually defensive wars between contemporary states are impossible (but would be possible if states shared territory, e.g. if Eire and Britain shared the territory of Northern Ireland). Tao-accredited wars were defensive wars, never wars aiming at domination: last-resort wars, in which no pride was taken (LTp.152).3 The pretence that offensive wars are defensive is widespread, and reflected in the subterfuge that departments or ministries of war are those of defence, security or whatever. (If they really were what they purport to be, we should be well on the way to an end to war.) Offensive practices are rendered defensive ones by shabby redefinitional strategems, such as redefining ‘defensive’ to include defence of ideals like democracy or liberty, infringed (or allegedly infringed) on territories abroad, or to include “defence" of a third party or place (whence every offensive war is “defensive”). In the present war in which part of Arabia is engulfed (February 1991), one party claims to be defending what really was (or should be) part of its territory, namely Kuwait, another party to be defending (what Kuwait did not enjoy) democracy. It is a doubly offensive war presented in this guise as jointly defensive. Aggressive wars are waged for a variety of reasons, but usually for resources or access to resources or markets, a matter often disguised by appeal to ideology (thus a war for oil is represented as a war of liberation). But there are other reasons than narrowly economic ones, such as religion (as with crusades), power and aggrandisement (as in building an empire), and so on. Nor are those reasons necessarily far separated; ideologies like Marxism and market 3 There is one line in LT that may suggest that attack was sometimes justifiable, namely ‘For deep love helps one to win in the case of attack’ (p.219). But how can compassion be appropriate unless this attack is within a defensive setting, a larger context of unavoidability or such like. A passage shortly below confirms this interpretation: I dare not take the offensive but I take the defensive: I dare not advance an inch but I retreat a foot (p.222). These are advances and attacks within a defensive setting. �9 capitalism, for example, exhibit many of the features of religion. The economic reasons for war appear to have become much more complex with the advent of an integrated world economy. At the same time many of the independent reasons for economic wars are now obsolete. For to powerful states accrue the advantages of war without war. At least most of the former economic advantages of war can be obtained without expensive wars, through trade, institution of economic dependence, etc. Small medieval wars were sometimes instituted for the collection of neighbouring riches and booty, a kind of piracy meeting conditions of war. “Small” contemporary wars can be waged for a remarkable mix of political-economy ends: to establish a regime favourable to economic penetration and profit repatriation, to subjugate markets and to remove competition, to boost a sagging weapons economy by using up old stocks and also testing new equipment, to restart a depressed economy, and so on. Such wars, along with the economic aims which motivate them, are in effect heavily castigated by Lao Tzu: When Tao prevails in the world, galloping horses are turned back to fertilize (the fields ...),. When Tao does not prevail in the world, war horses thrive in the suburbs. There is no calamity greater than lavish desires. (LT p.181). But it does exceed evidential warrant to claim that Tao is not only sufficient, but necessary, for cessation of such practices. The practice of regularly stimulating complex military-saturated economies through war is reminiscent of older, much ridiculed practices in simpler societies. They now ridicule the Tsembaga, who proceeded to destroy much of their surplus product by going to war every 5-15 years (cf Rapaport). But they do not similarly ridicule the most powerful nation on the Earth, the USA, which proceeds to write off a colossal amount of surplus in war every 10-20 years (the Gulf war liquidated some $1.7 billion per day). Taoists would. For ridicule was a favoured method, an important rhetorical strategem, and war and its idiocy were favourite targets. Some classification of defensive wars is also important, for various reasons: reducing and abolishing wars, their costs and damage, restructuring societies away from war and military practices, and, not least, for appreciating Taoism. A main distinction is between • conventional defence, maintained by armies of armed soldiers, many of them professionals, and • social defence, where there are no such armies or but fragments of them, and defence is carried out through social networks of a significant part of society.4 4 Details of social defence are presented in Sharp and in Martin. �10 It is here that Taoism and deep-green theory part company. Under Taoism, the state will have a standing army, but a defensive army operating by strange, surprise tactics (p.201). No doubt defensive wars are to remain last resort action. Nonetheless the state will operate in secrecy, in a way incompatible with decentralised social defence; people will be kept in the dark about smart weapons of the state; and they too will be surprised, along with presumed enemies of the state. By contrast, under deep-green theory, there should be no hidden smart weapons of state; information would flow more freely and not be hidden from the people (who should retain influence in informed decision making). Under deep-green, standing armies, and more generally military organisation, will be wound down altogether. Taoism should have pushed its searching criticism further. For military objectives, easily acquired by standing armies with time on their hands, are frequently incompatible with Taoism. For example, Taoism is opposed to domination (LT p.152), whereas military operations frequently seek or involve domination; and military structure is invariably hierarchical and authoritarian. Taoism aims for self-regulation, wherever feasible (cf. p.201); so does deep­ green theory, which is one reasons why it aims to dispose of standing armies, as an important preliminary to the withering away of states themselves (military forces being major props of state control and power, and often maintained primarily for internal state security). Taoism has no project for ending the era of wars; deep-green theory does. That project involves an elimination of standing armies, too often poised for fighting or political interference. A recommended route to end war consists in progressive scaling down: reduction of the means and manpower. The initial stages are well-known, and include • elimination of nuclear, biological and chemical weaponry, and • force reduction. It can hardly be pretended that the Earth's states have managed to proceed very far on even this complex of stages. The next stage consists in • contraction to defensive capacities only, and the final stage consists in • elimination of remaining military defensive forces, and adoption, so far as required, of social defence practices. The complete route thus involves complete demilitarisation. Reasons why deep-green aims to proceed the full distance are readily grasped by considering the environmental shallowness of an otherwise cogent traditional case for the sharp curtailment of wars and militarism. The traditional Western case against wars has been primarily along two dimensions: social and moral. Wars are highly disruptive of the social fabric; wars may be unjust. From these joint features, it was argued that wars should be a matter of last resort, to be fought to ensure peace. It was argued further that only just wars should be fought. Just wars were rare objects. But as there was little evidence of the decline and fall of wars, much effort was expended, more practically and unsuccessfully, upon endeavouring to improve the calibre of wars, and more theoretically, upon trying to characterize just war satisfactorily, or rather to bend the notion in an effort to approximate the gory unjust facts. �11 Progress was long hindered, furthermore, because there was always a rival positive perspective on wars, which encouraged the exaltation of wars and military feats. It also facilitated the transfer of the favourable image of war to other problem areas, whence the long and apparently successful war against Nature (but the short-term successes are turning into long-term problems), the short and unsuccessful war against Poverty, and so on. Behind all this is the complex idea of war as rejuvenating, even cleansing, like fire; of war as heroic, and glorious, of war as the supreme testing ground of men. These pictures of war - finally shattered by the first World War (where even the poets began to tell of horrors and atrocities) and subsequent technological wars - though no longer in ascendency, have by no means vanished. The notion of war as rejuvenating a flagging economy persists, along with the practice of keeping capitalism running smoothly by integrating substantial military components into the industrial engine. With the development of highly technological wars - the celebrated development of the dirty industrial age is substantially military - the traditional negative case has grown in strength. Wars have become much more damaging, with the potential for much more that is significantly worse, and the possibility of a just war has correspondingly contracted, virtually to zero. The opposition to war has likewise grown, but more than correspondingly with the rise of women in social and political influence. Wars have almost always and everywhere been Men's affairs; likewise conquest. Deep-green theory accepts much of the traditional negative case, but would further strengthen it. For example, the stricture against unjust wars, as out and out immoral, can be strengthened, through the following syllogism: All wars should be fully just wars. Modem wars cannot be fully just wars. Therefore, there should be no modern wars. A fully just war is not merely a just war, but a war those just character can be reliably forecast in advance. A modern war is of course a war that deploys modern technology, at least that available this century. The evidential basis for the second premiss derives from much information that collateral damage, damage to innocent bystanders and involved citizens is always likely and cannot be excluded. Such wars are always liable to violate uncontroversial requirements for a just war, even if they are purely “conventional” wars, not throwing radiation or chemical or biological weapons around. From a contemporary viewpoint the traditional doctrine of a just war, really of a just defensive vjsi, is seriously out of date. The reasons for this reach wider than the new features introduced by modem technological wars and the character of modem civilization, with its giant cities littered with dangerous and vulnerable military targets. They have also to do with the chauvinism of the justice proposed, which is shallow human justice, not natural or environmental justice. There is no consideration of justice to other creatures or to the Earth (cf �Naess p.160). Two troubles are really intertwined here: conceptual difficulties with too narrow a notion of justice, and ideological difficulties with too narrow a vision of what is an object of value, of what counts. The deep-green case against war adds to the traditional case a further dimension, neglected until very recently: the environmental dimension. It has suddenly been seen that wars are typically environmental atrocities. Earlier, of course, “environments” were simply backgrounds, backdrops in paintings and plays, to the real drama. Contemporary technological wars tend to be not merely social tragedies but environmental ones as well. There is a doctrine of just war, but it is a human chauvinistic affair. There is no similarly developed doctrine of an ecologically sound war, a deep ecological war. Unless any such war were literally different from modern wars, that is from contemporary technological wars, it would overstep permitted bounds. For such wars are characteristically ecological disasters. Hardened military people, desensitized by a rigorous unethical training, feel even less compunction about degrading or destroying environments or members of other species than they do of maiming or killing civilians through “collateral” activity. Matching the no-just-war syllogism is a no-sound-war syllogism: All wars should be environmentally sound wars. Modern wars cannot be environmentally sound. Therefore, there should be no modern wars. The argument for the second premiss has of course to be different. It looks to the information accumulating on what wars do to natural and built environments. The Vietnam and Gulf wars both inflicted immense damage on natural environments or what was left of them. The environmental effects of war are not confined to direct and collateral damage. There are indirect effects also. Thus, for instance, war also supplied the mechanism of, and the technology for, modern environmental destruction: explosives, bulldozers from tanks, etc. As well, training for war and engagement in war have much fostered, along with attitudes that make for social callousness or ruthlessness, those that contribute to environmental insensitivity and cruelty. 3. Puzzles about Taoist strategy and its critiques of technology and violence ‘It is surprising how much of the Lao Tzu is devoted to military strategy’. Which strategies? Surprise, above all. But why such strategies? ‘Do they not contradict the Taoists’ strong opposition to the use of force’ (Chan p.222), the implied commitment to quietism? Briefly, Taoism is not committed to quietism, and while certainly antagonistic to violence, does not oppose certain uses of force (only really ///-forcing, as will be explained). Even so, the emphasis on military strategy remains puzzling. The strategies, many of them relevant to social defence, include • seriousness, not ‘making light of the enemy’ (p.222) �13 • surprise, and nonvisibility (p.201). The defensive strategy involves guerilla tactics: marching without formation, holding weapons without seeming to have them, confronting enemies without seeming to meet them (p.222). But even in times of peace, ‘smart weapons of the state should not be displayed to the people’ (p.164). Such recommendations helped to fuel the charge of deviousness lodged against Lao Tzu. But look at part of the reason for concealing smart weapons: ‘The more smart weapons the people have, the more troubled the state will be’ (p.201). Smart weapons are carried in corrupt states, where the rich engage in conspicuous consumption and the people are suppressed, not where Tao is practiced (LT p. 194). • advance from weakness, flexibility but firmness. Weakness is the principle of life and will overcome strength (LT p.164, p.233). • coolness and non-competition (LT p.233, p.164). Like these, most of the general strategies are standard Taoist practices simply applied to military conduct. For these standard practices the charge of deviousness looks feeble. The response applies more generally to other allegedly devious political strategies. For the strategies are but application of Taoist principles and techniques to warfare, politics and elsewhere. Nothing excludes application of these techniques to what are accounted, in general, unnecessary evils (which must sometimes, on other Taoist grounds, be countered). Nor, to meet the main criticism, need any deceit or deviousness be involved; nor is it. In particular, the legalist tactic, Tn order to grasp, it is necessary first to give’ (LT p.164), is cited as involving ‘an element of deceit’ ‘undeniably’, and ‘worse’ it is ‘morally questionable’ (Chan p.17). But in order for me to grasp your hand in a normal handshake, it is necessary first for me to give my hand. There is no deceit here, nothing morally questionable. All the tactics permit of benign construals, of a Taoist kind. Consider, for instance, Tn order to contract, it is necessary first to expand’ (LT p.164). In order to bend a copper pipe to the intended angle, it is better to bend it first a little further than required. The transformation of water to ice (both favoured natural items for symbolic purposes: natural processes which may look devious!) neatly illustrates the Taoist principle (which is however hardly necessary), and shows softness and weakness turned hardness and strength. The Taoist critique of militarism is as much a critique of technology as of war. Sharp weapons, ‘smart weapons’ as we might now say, come in for much critical attention, as we have already noticed. Only in corrupt and degenerate states are they displayed or flaunted (p.194, p.164); in deep-green regions smart weapons of state’ would not be retained unexhibited. The people will not have them for they mean trouble (p.201); for similar reasons deep-green regions will be free of them. So, it seems, will ideal Taoist regions: ‘Even if there are arrows and weapons, none will display them’ (LT p.238). Much technology, military and other, is excluded under the Taoist edict against violence (a further facet of the military-practices �14 paradox).5 The powerful critique of militarism in the Tao-te Ching is coupled with strong opposition to violence. Some of the linkage is evident enough. Militarism as practised represents an ultimate form of state (or party) violence. A basic theme is that violent practices will come to an unnatural end, and accordingly to a non-Taoist end (generalising LT p.176). While force may occur in spectacular, but satisfactory, natural forms, force is duly distinguished from violence. To force the growth of life means ill omen. For the mind to employ the vital force without restraint means violence (LT p. 197). One who follows Tao does not apply dominating force, which usually has had results bringing requital (p.152). Dominating force, like power, is in general castigated, under doctrine of wu- wei, no forced actions, no violence. To force natural growth is deviant, destroying harmony. To stop natural growth is deviant. But there is a significant difference between force and violence. To intentionally employ destructive force is to do violence. To so force things is condemned. To remain in harmony with things one does not so force things or practice violence. There is a non-interference principle at work, which also indicates types of non­ interference that are excluded. However Taoism does not always get the distinction between force and violence quite Under contemporary technology and technological arrangements, such as the storage of quantities of oil and nuclear and chemical materials in great cities, wars have assumed new and very destructive dimensions, to the point of being utterly irresponsible. A different approach to technology, as to war, is now mandatory. These are no longer things that can in principle be nicely confined and need not touch parties outside the fray. An important part of ending wars, “winning the war against wars”, is removing the technology of war, above all from irresponsible state power. As for which technology to try to jettison and which to try to retain or improve, it is not so difficult to indicate, provided evaluative terminology is not outlawed. What is wanted is technology that is good in its place, what should be excluded is technology that is indifferent or bad or potentially so. Technology to be justified has to do something worthwhile, it has to address identifiable respectable needs. That is why merely indifferent technology is out; there is no virtue in technology for technology's sake, as it is a mere means technique. It is because of the crucial evaluative component in choice of technology that appropriateness, itself evaluative, comes closer to encapsulating the criterion than other recent efforts. Size, such as smallness, or intermediateness, are not what matter, though modest and not excessive technologies are likely to fare better in satisfying appropriateness. In simpler societies, small technology is of course more appropriate; for that is what is good there. From known criteria for what is good these other features for locally appropriate technology can be read off: reliability, esp. in maintenance, functioning well and safely under the expected range of operating conditions (which may be difficult), ease of repair, capital cheapness and repair inexpensiveness, environmental benignness, and meeting sound social needs. �15 right. ‘Vital force without restraint’, intentionally excessive force, is only part of what counts as violence, which is more generally force which violates, i.e. transgresses, descrecrates, profanes, injures, outrages, etc. It is thus a negatively connoted force, an evil force in some specified intentional respect. There is a tendency for Taoist commentators, not Taoists, to regard Taoism as condemning all uses, or even occurrences, of force, but this is not so. Rather intentional ill-forcing is what is castigated, what is deviant. Thus Taoism does not exclude a range of defensive practices, which make satisfactory use of natural forces, like letting the machines of war industry stop. Those who would abolish war and its machinery, substituting for it nonwarlike and ideally nonviolent methods, technology, and strategies, have been confronted not merely with much sub-rational abuse but with plenty of criticism and even some paradoxes. Here is a recent paradox concerning war and nonviolence: • War must be abolished. One reason is simply economic. We can no longer afford it, and the opportunity costs are enormous. Along with other extraordinarily wasteful activities, it is an anachronism. • Doing so cannot be accomplished without violence, i.e. in effect, given the types of violence involved, without what amounts to war. According to a fuller version of this premiss, the process of abolishing a war would only be achieved through a revolution so profound that it could not succeed without extensive and extreme violence, amounting to (civil) war. ° But then war cannot be abolished without war. Therefore, war which must be abolished cannot be abolished.6 This “paradox” has been compared with the Liar paradox, but the parallel does not persist far. For this paradox does not involve self-referential features, and is easily broken, as follows. Let the “last war” be not the last standard war but the revolution abolishing war. Then, given that the revolution is successful, war will be abolished therewith, i.e. with that last war. There need be no regress, given again a successful outcome. All the premisses stand intact, but the conclusion, following the ‘therefore’ is a nonsequitur. However, while the dissolution of the argument is accordingly logically fine, the route is repugnant. Standard pacifism challenges the 6 Brian Medlin, who forcefully propounded this puzzle, set other analogous puzzles alongside it - designed to reveal deep difficulties in contemporary political, and especially alternative, thought. Another puzzle, concerning liberty and repression in the context of capitalism, revolved around the following inconsistent triad: • capitalism must be removed, but liberty retained. • capitalism cannot be removed without repression. • repression is antithetical to liberty. The puzzle is resolved as with the analogous puzzle of abolishing. Let the “last capitalist” action before the days of liberty be the repressive but liberating revolution overthrowing capitalism. �16 second premiss. 4. Standard and moral pacifism. Although Taoism is strongly opposed to war, and much in favour of peace - and accordingly by prevailing standards a substantially pacific position - it is not (nowhere in the central texts) committed to pacifism in usual senses, for two different reasons: • It is not, by contrast with pacifism, opposed to all types of warfare, for example smart defensive wars. • It eschews deontology in terms of which moral pacifism is commonly stated, for instance through the watershed thesis P2. It is morally wrong to use violence. By contrast with Taoism, deep environmentalism does not avoid deontic claims, and is committed in principle to nonviolent technologies and ways and to pacifistic principles. Moreover, certain forms of deep environmentalism are completely committed to pacifism, notably European forms. Is deep green? There is heavy contemporary opposition to pacifism, as there also was to Taoism in the warring times when Taoism was first being promulgated. Many of the central institutions of contemporary life are intricated in coercion, violence and war. The most prominent contemporary institutions, states, are premissed on these elements of damaging force; they claim entitlement to use them widely, and even claim a certain territorial monopoly on their use. As a result they are having constantly to engage in them in attempt to maintain that monopoly. They are certainly the main perpetrators of wars, and of violence. They are indeed inured to wars, are in constant preparation for wars, yet propound dialectial (and normally dishonest and cynical) doctrines of peace through war (for a recent example see the appendix). Unremarkably then, the extensive propagandistic machinery of state has invested heavily in “justificatory” exercises in favour of controlled use, its own use, of destructive force, and continues to inveigh against pacifism. Because a routine trick in this sophistical repetoire consists in conflating pacifism with extreme, naive and inplausible, forms, an inevitable and important early task commits in unscrambling senses of ‘pacifism’. Semantical skulduggery can be thwarted in this way. Pacifism, as explained by English dictionaries, invariably concerns wars and warfare, and contains two components, negative and, elaborating on that, positive:- The negative component is, in Amauld's word, anti-War-ism, opposition (in ways to be further specified) to all forms of warfare (see OED). The positive component supplies alternative ways of settling disputes (what it is supposed that wars with some semblance of justification involve), such as negotiation, arbitration, ... - and, adding to too narrow dictionary accounts - sanctions, substitutions (e.g. of sporting events, operatic contests, cooperative ventures), ... . In brief standard pacifism is opposition to all warfare and resolution of potential wars by other nonmilitary means. �17 Plainly the opposition to warfare, like the sanctions and so on, cannot itself be military (using soldiers and other devices of war), on pain of some incoherence. But otherwise the ways of opposition can be many and various: they can certainly be active, as with nonviolent demonstrations, resistance movements, and so forth, and they may also be devious (e.g. turning the forces of war upon themselves so they are neutralised). It quickly becomes evident, then, that some of the dictionaries offer but loaded definitions which, by restricting the negative components, reduce the initial appeal and plausibility of pacifism. Consider the Concise English definition of the negative component: ‘the doctrine of non-resistance to hostilities and of total non-co-operation with any form of warfare’. Thereby excluded are forms of pacifism which offer active and plausible alternatives to warfare such as social defence. The Concise English tends to force pacifism into what the Oxford English Dictionary lists as its final item: ‘often, with depreciatory implication, the advocacy of peace at any price’, ‘in any circumstance’. Pacifism can easily resist being forced into these sorts of circumstances: it has many resources, as an extensive series of texts on alternatives to war, such as negotiation, non­ violent action and social defence, from Taoism to contemporary environmentalism attest. Academic philosophers have much advanced the semantical strategy of some dictionaries, of rendering pacifism more difficult from the very outset by narrow and biassed definitions. They have stretched the term from its restricted setting of warfare, confined to state and organised gang violence, to cover all forms of violence, from state and interstate to, what is very different, personal and interpersonal violence. Call the resulting considerably stretched notion of pacifism, according to which it is morally wrong to use violence, according to which P2 holds, stretched pacifism? While stretched pacifism certainly includes standard pacifism (unless the notions of war and warfare are tampered with), the converse is very far from being the case. A pacifist is in no way committed to stretched pacifism, which is a much more problematic and difficult position than standard pacifism. There are several, substantially different reasons for this, which will be picked up seriatim. Stretched pacifism, also misleadingly called moral pacifism, has looked a very easy critical target to moral philosophers. Many the effusive philosopher who, upon sighting such a target, has charged, whooping such rhetoric as “incoherent”, “inconsistent”, “insensitive”, “fanatical”. However, with improved logical technology now available for accommodating and treating moral dilemmas, it is no great feat to resist such attacks, in the fashion of previous investigations (see esp. Al, also MD). A main aim was to demonstrate that stretched pacifism was not so stupid as it was made out to be or appeared to be to these inured to present dominant violent ways. So far from being stupid, it is viable. In future gentler times stretched pacifism 7 In Al this notion was contrasted with standard pacifism as comprehensive pacifism: overcomprehensive might have been better. �18 could even be realised for whole communities of creatures (as some genuinely Christian sects envisaged); whence it will finally be seen to be feasible not merely for sages and supermen, and many ordinary women, but much more extensively. The method of philosophical accommodation was through moral dilemmas. The sort of moral dilemma that stretched pacifism can induce derives as follows. On the one side stands the theme P2, Wv, in convenient symbols, for Wrong V-ing, violencing. Now this implies to WB, where B presents a case of of violence. On the other side, particular circumstances develop which lead to W ~B, because ~B would produce in the circumstances considerable wrong, for instance extensive violence, mass murder, etc. One stock example from the literature concerns calling off the firing squad about to shoot several captives if the pacifist shoots one of them (it is elaborated in Al p. 13). Interestingly, another stock example from the literature concerns standard pacifism (it can also be presented in terms of patriotism; for details of both see MD p. 10). Resolution of intractable moral dilemmas is, where it is required, situational. The agent decides in the situation, within the fix, what to do. There are many ways in which such decision making can proceed, less rational, such as those applying chance or involving bad faith, or more rational, such as those applying consequentialist decision theory (for details see MD, pp.32-9). A decision theory taking account of all that should be included will not however be purely consequential. It would also take account of relevant motivation. This defence and rehabilitation of moral pacifism has been challenged, in particular by Smith (hereafter JWS). JWS claims the defence offered is a ‘failure because it trivializes pacifism’ (p. 153 twice). The rehabilitation trivializes pacifism because it entails that pacifism doesn't substantially differ from a form of activism which holds that while violence is always wrong one is sometimes justified on consequentialist grounds for preferring violent acts, if these acts are lesser evils than any other real alternatives. This is the commonsense position which most people hold - yet - pacifism after all was supposed to be radical moral doctrine - (p.153 rearranged).8 Part of the criticism is, then, not so much that pacifism is trivialized - JWS “activism” is hardly trivial - as that pacifism is popularised, deflated from a radical position to the commonsense position most people hold (p.154 also). Yet not a shred of evidence is adduced that JWS activism is such a populist position. Available evidence, for example from peace movements and oppositional opinion polls, suggests the very opposite: that, for instance, most people support state-justified conventional wars with the military violence they incur, and 8 JWS now informs me that he has changed his position. Whether the move effects his criticism, I don't know. �19 accordingly do not hold that violence is always wrong. From such a commonsense angle, pacifism with its condemnation of conventional wars and the violence they involve remains a radical doctrine. As regards wars and other violence-incurring social authorities, contemporary pacificism is, as previous explained (e.g. Al p.3), a form of activism. Pacifism does not imply utter pacifity, but may actively involve social defence, resistance and so on. However a certain level of misrepresentation enters into the JWS challenge in the details of what forms of activism pacifism may include. That misrepresentation begins in the second clause concerning what is said to be sometimes justified. For the situational procedure where dilemmas arise will not generally be consequential applying a principle of lesser evil. In dilemmatic situations such principles are suspended, and such a principle is in any case unacceptable to moral pacifists. A small amount of violence may be less bad in its consequences than verbal offence, but a principled pacifist will choose the slightly greater evil where other obligations do not exclude it. A more serious distortion occurs in JWS's effort to force procedures in dilemma situations into purely consequentialist form. In fact consequential decision theory was deployed as a model only for how to proceed rationally in a situational setting where deontic procedures were suspended (see MD p.38). What was said, still misleadingly retrospective vision reveals, was this: ‘what is done is a very consequentialist thing’ (Al p.13), not ‘one acts in a consequentialist fashion to do the sufficiently good thing in the circumstances’ (JWS p.152). Situationally other procedures than those resembling orthodox rational decision making (modified from maximizing to satisizing objectives) may be adopted (MD p.38). Further the orthodox consequentialist theory is inadequate because it leaves out, or tries to reduce to consequences, nonconsequential elements, notably motives. It is not difficult, in principle (in advance of attempted consequentialization of motives), to design situations where motives, such as integrity or maintaining faith, enter to yield outcomes upsetting consequential calculations. More elaborate decision making procedures than those of consequentialism, sometimes at variance with consequentialism, are thus presupposed. A further part of JWS's criticism accordingly goes by the board, the alleged appeal ‘to “second best” consequentialist considerations,... already explicitly condemned’ (p. 154). What was condemned was stock universal consequentialism, ‘that only consequentialist considerations carry argumentative weight’ (quoted on p. 152), so undercutting other deontic principles, such as those of pacifism. It was not claimed, what is utterly different, that consequentialist considerations can nowhere enter into deliberation and decision making. The conclusion JWS arrives at is therefore substantially astray. After criticising modern moral philosophy for its reliance upon consequentialist modes of thought, it is surprising, and inconsistent, to find ... [reliance] upon such modes of thought to escape logical difficulties raised by moral dilemmas facing ... pacifis[m] (p. 152) �20 There is no inconsistency. JWS has confused universal with particular. As well he has wrongly contracted all situational decision making to consequentialist modes. There is a third part to the criticism, that the defence is too easy; the ‘strategy will allow too much violence to be (perpetrated and) justified to suit the tastes of any real pacifist’ (p. 153). This another part of the so-called trivialization, this time however dilution rather than populatization, weakening the moral stand against violence. This third contention is premissed on a mistake: that one can ‘justify on consequentialist grounds any number of violent acts, providing that such acts are lesser evils than other real alternatives facing social agents’ (p. 153). Moral pacifism offers no such licence; allowing such consequentialism to take over was never part of the position. The slide to such consequentialism is made on the strength of a similarly erroneous example. The potential victim of an aspiring rapist ‘is supposed to flee or wriggle free if possible. But it is easy to consequentially justify the use of violence by the woman to prevent herself from being raped’ (p. 153 italics added). In the example so far described there is no dilemma, and no such easy resort to consequentially ‘justified’ violence. What allows too much violence is the lesser evil JWS assumes is easily consequentially justified; for example that the woman is entitled to inflict, and escalate, violence so long as it remains ‘a lesser evil than the violence of attempted rape’ (p. 153). Since she may thereby inflict quite unreasonable damage (esp. if she is a Kung Fu expert), the result is inconsistent with ‘the basic principle of self-defence’ which JWS earlier adduced according to which what is ‘appropriate, in response is only that level of force necessary to defend oneself against the threat’ (p. 150). There is evidence in JWS's work of some enthusiasm for levels of violence which exceed his ‘basic principle’, his appeal to ‘lesser evil’ generates some instances. The ‘basic principle’, itself fraught with difficulties (cf. the contorted discussion of what weapons are appropriate in response to what attacks, p. 150), still exceeds what stretched pacifism would enjoin; for instance, it may not be appropriate to respond with force. But in a technical sense stretched pacifism is compatible with the ‘basic principle’, since it only imposes the upper bound on level of force. As for easiness, moral pacifism is not an easy position to live by, or to justify. Removing objections to pacifism is one thing; solidifying a positive case for it is quite another, and so far hardly conclusive (as Al tried to explain, pp 29-31). Stretched pacifism was advanced, hypothesized to put it more precisely, as a still viable option. It was not presented as a morally compulsory position, or, for that matter, as one that this defender adhered to or affirmed. To reiterate, while a cumulative case can be made for stetched pacifism as principled non­ violence, that case was not conclusive, and is hard to improve. For, further, some serious difficulties standing in the way of stretched pacifism were assembled, the most important of which derives from the extent of violence apparent in transactions within the natural world. Simply consider the practices of carnivores, essential to their natural way of life. In order to meet their life needs for sustenance, these creatures do, and are often obliged to, engage �21 routinely in violent activity. While it can no doubt be argued, as some vegetarians may do, that the natural order is an immoral order, and that remaining carnivores should be converted to vegetarianism as rapidly as proves possible (in the way domestic dogs are converted to dog biscuits), the difficulties with such proposals are immense. The task envisaged is gigantic, and beyond human capacities - even if it were desirable. For there are millions of species to be somehow converted to proper vegetarianism. Then there are millions of other species to be converted to proper and well regulated contraceptive practices, else their numbers will get out of hand (uncontrollably) with predation removed. Given humans lack of success in limiting their own excessive numbers, such regulation appears entirely remote. Aside however from the practical difficulties, is such a fully vegetarian order, with evolution further derailed, a desirable improvement on the natural order? Is it morally obligatory? It is certainly not obligatory, as alternative systems of morality in harmony with the prevailing natural order are feasible. Nor is it desirable, for (to appeal to such alternative value systems) the natural order is more or less in order as it is. Full vegetarianization would only reduce its value, vastly. More generally, a defensible ethical framework should not, it would be rightly contended, be right out of step with the natural order of other creatures, decently depicted. Decent depiction is important, for some features of the natural order, such as competition, combat and predation, so far from escaping attention, have been grossly exaggerated and exploited. Thus, for instance, the ludicrous picture of nature red in truth and claw, so beloved of descendents of orthodox Victorians and of orthodox economists. However, even under decent depiction, the natural order is often not benign. That appears to be enough to induce a supervenient moral dilemma for any stretched pacifism which is coupled to a deep ethic (e.g. which does not separate humans out from the natural order) and which eschews the desperate vegetarian route: The natural order is not an immoral order The natural order contains (regular) instances of violence. Therefore, instances of violence are not immoral - in apparent defiance of P2 Moreover, there are too many instances of violence, too regularly occurring, for them all to be plausibly shunted into the moral dilemma category (and predatory carnivores face no dilemmas). Raptors that practice violence every week are not immoral (neither are they clearly moral; the category of morality only significantly extends so far). The main trouble lies however with P2 (which needs some finer adjustment, as was alrady indicated in Al). While P2 is alright in context, within a particular, perfectly viable, ethical framework, designed for the usual human round, the conventional setting for ethical theories, it stands in need of modification outside that setting. It is time to suggest the sort of modification envisaged. Evidently P2 was addressed to moral agents. Which agents? Not to carnivores that supply their own livelihood, nor really to morally degenerate humans, but to �22 peace-sensitive agents. With that semi-technical form, yet to be characterised, a suitably modified P2 results: MP2. It is morally wrong, for a peace-sensitive agent, to use violence.9 To recover what amounts, in the previous discussive context, to P2, it suffices to add the proposition that every human agent ought to be peace-sensitive. Much as that proposition has to recommend it, it appears too ethically advanced for many modern humans; it sets too high a moral standard to be taken as a serious guide to practice. It seems wise to settle presently for something less demanding, such as that every advanced moral agent ought to be peace sensitive. To put essentially the same proposition alternatively: Stretched pacifism (as modified) is supererogatory. While it is perhaps too late to hope for much moral progress in humans, it is pleasant to contemplate alternative futures where what is supererogatory became obligatory, and widely practiced. Richard Sylvan* Appendix I began drafting this essay at the time (January 17, midday Australian time) of the American attacks upon Iraq. The optly named Prime Minister Hawke of Australia had just made a statement to the nation-state, announcing (the) war. In this statement there was much talk of peace. There was even - in what was effectively a declaration of war - reiteration of the modern quest for ‘a new world order of peace’. Peace through war; so it rings out again and again, through the centuries. ‘War must be for the sake of peace’ (Aristotle p.220). More than two thousand years later, we have fought those wars to end all wars. But it is no use, Hawke solemely pronounced, just talking about peace, and thinking about peace; we must work for peace, fight for it - through war. Impeccable logic? President Bush, supreme commander, convinced us with similar logic, speaking too with many tongues. Of how he ‘preferred to think of peace, not war’. But now ‘only force will prevail’, as ‘all reasonable efforts to reach a peaceful solution are exhausted’. ‘What must be done’ must be done, or will be anyway. With God on side with the US offensive (as well as on the other side), it will go well. As it was said to have, though it achieved comparatively little that other efforts may not have yielded more satisfactorily, and thought it may now have to 9 The generalization of P2, suggested in Al, to cover also the parallel situation of environmental vandalism, can be similarly modified. The anti-vandolence principle becomes MP2°. It is morally wrong, for a peace- and environmentally-sensitive agent, to use vandolence. Thank to David Bennett for joint contributions (from UT) and to JWS for opposition (in JWS) �I 23 followed with another invasion. Nor have we ever managed to glimpse much of what is now supposed, when we are no longer engaged, to come ‘out of the horror of war’: a ‘new world order ... which governs the conflict of nations’; a ‘rule of law’, not war. How the one, enforcable law, is achieved, unless backed by the the other, is not explained (Medlin's paradox hits back). Similarly what we now hear from many militarists, as they rush to war, is that ‘peace is a great good, war a great evil’. But, for the most part, only the rhetoric has shifted; practice has scarcely changed at all. REFERENCES W.-T. Chan, A Source Book on Chinese Philosophy, Princeton University Press, 1963; referred to as ST. W.-T. Chan (ed.), The Way of Lao Tzu (Tao-te Ching), Bobbs-Merrill, New York, 1963; referred to as LT. B. Martin, Uprooting War, Freedom Press, London, 1984. A. Naess, Ecology, community and lifestyle, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge UK, 1989. R.A. Rapaport, Pigs for the Ancestors : ritual in the ecology of a New Guinea People, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1967. R. Routley, ‘War and Peace II. On the alleged inconsistency, moral insensitivity and fanaticism of pacifism’, Discussion papers in environmental philosophy #9, Research School of Social Science, Australian National University, 1983 (also in Inquiry ); referred to as Al. R. Routley and V. Plumwood, ‘Moral dilemmas and the logic of deontic notions’, Discussion papers in environmental philosophy #6, Research School of Social Science, Australian National University, 1984 (also in Paraconsistent Logic)’, referred to as MD. R. Routley, ‘War and Peace I. On the ethics of large-scale nuclear war and nuclear-deterrence and the political fall-out’, Discussion papers in environmental philosophy, #5, Research School Of Social Science, Australian National University, 1984. G. Sharp, Social Power and Political Freedom, Porter Sargent, Boston, 1980. J.W. Smith, The Worms at the Heart of Things , Public Relations Unit, Flinders University, 1989. R. Sylvan, ‘War and Peace III, Australia's defence philosophy’, Social Philosophy, for Nuclear Conference, University of Queensland, 1985. R. Sylvan and D. Bennett, ‘Of Utopias, Tao and Deep Ecology’, Discussion papers in environmental philosophy #19, Research School of Social Science, Australian National University, 1990; referred to as UT. ��2 more widely, ‘to life in general’ (p. 17). But why should military activity obtain some special dispensation? Why should what is not tolerated more generally be exonerated there? But given that Taoism has here the virtue of consistency (i.e. uniformity on principles) and of universalizability, that simply leaves more explaining to be done. • Puzzles for Taoism, and wars as unavoidable evils There are two puzzles here in Taoism rather than one. There is the military-practices paradox, and, varying and generalising on that, there are life-practices paradoxes. The special paradox is generated by the following incompatible elements: on the one side, ‘the most bitter attack on militarism’, the well-known opposition of Taoism to the use of force (p.17) and to the possession and use of smart military weapons and technology - implying that war is far from all right - and on the other, advocacy of certain (devious) military tactics, outlines of (deceitful) conduct in war, and so on - implying that war is all right after all. A straightforward generalisation of this paradox would look at other morally-sensitive parts of life, where some practice was strongly condemned yet engaged in (for many examples, see the dilemmas assembled in MD). But the variation of concern to Chan and the neo-Confucians concerns the conjunction of upright with devious practices in life, in particular in the life of the sage. For a Taoist sage is presumed to lead an upright straightforward life, yet appears to engage in devious and even deceitful practices incompatible with such a life-style. Call this the Taoist-lifestyle paradox. Evidently a good deal of explaining is required, as to how Taoism can coherently take the positions it appears to presume, both on war and peace, and on life more generally. A desirable preliminary would seem to be a little investigation of what position is taken, especially on war and militarism. One key pasage runs: Fine weapons are instruments of evil They are hated by creatures Therefore those who possess the Tao turn away from them.... Weapons are instruments of evil, not the instruments of a good ruler. When he uses them unavoidably, he regards calm restraint as the best principle Even when he is victorious, he does not regard it as praiseworthy, For to praise victory is to delight in the slaughter of men. He who delights in the slaughter of men will not succeed in the empire. ... For a victory, let us observe the occasion with funeral-ceremonies (LT p.154). Wars, which involve the use of weapons, instruments of evil, are accordingly themselves evil. They are also evil because they involve the slaughter of men. But they are also sometimes unavoidable (also p.152). Therefore such wars are unavoidable evils. Such discourse, obtained by almost immediate inference from the passage, is within the standard orbit of dilemma talk. But Taoism lacks, through deliberately eschewing deontic talk, the discourse which enables direct expression of such dilemmas, or even direct condemnation of wars or of clever weapons. Instead the points are made by circumlocution, what the possesser of Tao �3 does, how the good ruler conducts himself, or by analogy, of victory in war with death. Unavoidable evils are the very stuff of deontic dilemmas (though many theories, underpinned by shonky logic, lack the resources for representing this stuff properly). Where something is unavoidably evil, it is both bad, because evil, and also not bad, doing it is excusable, because it is unavoidable. So, given such an argument (which has its weaknesses), an unavoidable evil is a genuinely dilemmatic object with inconsistent features. Certain wars have looked, since ancient times, like such dilemmatic objects. Revealingly, Chan tries to explain that ‘most troublesome element’ in Taoism, the military-practice paradox, through the following exercise in lateral thinking: It can ... be argued that Lao Tzu uses warfare to illustrate his principles of taking no action and weakness because warfare is among the most dynamic and critical of human experiences, just as the Indian classic, the Bhagavadgita chooses fighting as the theme on which to discuss the terrible dilemma whether one should fulfil his duty, as in the case of a soldier, and kill, or should fail in his duty and refrain from killing (p. 17). ‘Just as’? The Indian classic prevents a classic moral dilemma, a dilemma represented in contemporary philosophy (following its rediscovery by Sartre), where there are incompatible duties: the duty to kill, because of one's role as a soldier, and the duty not to kill, because of one's human condition, and the supervenient dilemma of failing in and fulfilling one's duties. These dilemmas for an individual (male, as it then was) are replicated in dilemmas regarding war for group institutions: at bottom, the obligation to engage in war (for one set of compelling reasons) as contraposed with the obligation not to engage in war (for another, perhaps overlapping, set of reasons). A theory of moral dilemmas (as worked out for example in MD) is crucial for an adequate treatment of major issues in war and peace, especially (as will become evident) for a viable strong pacifism. But Taoism, eschewing deontic discourse, lacks the apparatus to state or develop moral dilemmas. Hence it is logically excluded from giving a full or adequate account of what is going on conceptually. One of the philosophically fascinating feature of Taoism is the fashion in which it manages to avoid deontic discourse, and to substitute for direct deontic discourse or improvise circumlocutions when deontic discourse would otherwise appear inevitable (cf. UT for examples). But there are costs. One is inability to display the mechanism of deontic dilemmas, or to show what reasons and argument lie behind Taoist prounouncements and conclusions (the shortage of Taoism on argument is another philosophically conspicious feature, also observed in UT). As conceptual apparatus for analysizing moral dilemmas is missing, most of the machinery involved has to be passed over. Only the outcomes, as Taoism sees them, are presented, as if from a black box. Taoism blacks out the story on deontic dilemmas that deep-green theory can tell, as the following diagram tries to show: �4 Diagrams . Charting the processing of deontic dilemmas that are “resolved”. Deep-green chart: Arguments to Processing of dilemma, directive dilemma incompatible situational procedures output input prescriptions Corresponding Taoist chart: Black directive Box output It is evident that Taoism can be extended', information can be put into the Black Box rendering it less opaque. That extension can be made so as to conform to deep-green theory, i.e. so that the extended Taoist chart, a neo-Daoist chart, looks like the deep-green one. That is indeed essentially how neo-Daoism get characterised, in terms of conformity of the extension to deep ecological theory (see UT). We are now placed to explain how to dissolve, or at least neutralize, the paradoxes deriving from repudiation of militarism, an awkwardly qualified repudiation in the case of Taoism. In a significant sense there is no resolving of genuine deontic dilemmas. The principles delineating the fix may stand, incompatible, signalling the persisting suboptimality (or better, sublimenality) of the dilemmatic situation. Where there is a dilemma, involved parties should try to do well enough in the sublimenal circumstances (for a much fuller account, see MD). Thus where there is a war, itself a non-Taoist process, engaged or caught up Taoists will not abandon Taoism. Taoist methods will be applied, Taoist strategies pursued. So much for theoretical representation and (non-)resolution of life-practices and other dilemmas, details of which are readily elaborated in deep-green extensions of Taoism. A prior substantive issue is whether dilemmas always are generated: not whether wars are evil (typically they are, an issue we shall come to), but whether wars are unavoidable. Analysis of wars does not bear that familiar claim out decisively. Many wars could have been avoided, through conciliation, negotiation, restraint, etc., and no worse results apparently obtained, through sanctions, exchange, trade, etc. Through a typology of wars (coming up) that conjecture can be given some substance. Consider, for instance, what would be walk-overs. Then there is little point in making a military response. So war can be avoided. Certainly an occupation, to be met in a different way, may still occur. And so on, perhaps, for various other types of war. But, more generally, try this:- �5 Every war involves an aggressor, who makes an aggressive move. Such an aggressor could always avoid that move, taking a different (or a do-nothing) course of action. Therefore, every war can be avoided. No war is entirely unavoidable. Setting aside determinism (which renders all actual wars along with all other events unavoidable), it could be argued that a war sometimes simply boils up, without an aggressor, an intensification of a conflagatory situation. There are grounds for scepticism regarding such examples; for such intensification can only occur if provocative military moves are made, for instance troops are stationed in provocative or risky positions. The presumption that certain wars are unavoidable typically derives from a one-sided perspective on war, a defender's perspective. A defender has no option, so it is routinely averred, but to respond to a determined aggressor. Even z/that should be so sometimes, when there is no running away or going underground, it does not establish that such a war is unavoidable; for it neglects the role of the aggressor. By a smarter formulation, relevant features of unavoidability can be captured. Although wars may not be unavoidable, defensive action in wars that have been initiated may be unavoidable. At least such action may be unavoidable if unacceptably high costs (death, enslavement, etc.) are not to be avoided. Thereupon another highly relevant feature emerges: the linkage of avoidability to costs. For whether an action is unavoidable then depends upon what costs a party is prepared to incur before and when insisting on action: but this appears entirely unacceptable. How can what is “unavoidable” cease to be so when some further costs are absorbed? However with basics like survival, a certain liberty, and so on, we do reach such bounds. An important type of unavoidability. We also reach scenarios, unavailable to Lao Tzu but kindly brought within range by modem technology, which may appear to justify aggressive strikes. State Z, while not an aggressor, is carrying out practices which will impose unacceptably high costs upon peoples of other states and implacably refuses to desist. It could, for example, be poisoning air or water flowing to other states. But ,to make the case vivid, let us suppose that state Z is constructing, for reasons Zeders find convincing (they are committed to a faith which depicts all humans as incorrigible sinners and unworthy of life), an effective doomsday machine. Would an (aggressive) preemptory strike designed to disable or destroy the machine be unavoidable?1 In a sense, No; in another Yes. For different modalities can operate. Physically outsiders need to do nothing, but watch Zeders go about their zealous work. But deontically they are under heavy moral pressure, because of the costs of standing by idly: if the human race is worth anything very substantial, then they are obliged to act, action is deontically 1 Whether it would be justifiable, or just, are separate issues. But it is evident enought that such scenarios further damage the obsolescent idea of just war. For, according to received doctrine, a just war is defensive. (How such a war can be fought at all is another matter; coherence requires relativization to ‘just vwcfor party d’.) �6 unavoidable. Here is a situation where a proposed reduction of deontic logic proves illuminating. Obligation is explicated through not implying, or necessitating, the sanction, i.e. excessive ethical costs such as extermination. Let us explain deontic unavoidability analogously: an action is so unavoidable if not undertaking it would result in excessive ethical costs. Then if it can be established that there is no other way than a military strike, an act of war, to ensure that the Zeders desist (and certainly we can envisage scenarios like that), then that is deontically unavoidable. It is also dilemmatic for those committed to, or inclined towards pacifism; and it is, for them at least, but paradoxically justifiable, as the negation is also justifiable, on pacific grounds. Scenarios like that sketched, that appear to render certain wars deontically unavoidable require but little or no elaboration to render them evil. Evil indeed is such a standard feature of standard wars that at least its great presence call for little supporting evidence. But it has taken to vast stretch of human history to reach this general point of recognition. The manifold evils of war Lao Tzu very early recognised and emphasized: Wherever armies are stationed, briars and thorns grow. Great wars are always followed by famines (p. 152). And nowadays followed by great tides of refugees. This passage includes not only recognition of the widely-observed socio-environmental consequences of war, but, more striking, very early recognition of the severe environmental impact of military forces. That critique is not however developed in Taoism.2 Only recently has it been pushed substantially further. And only recently could a new, most significant twist occur, the merging of resource security, long a military objective, with environmental security. The appalling idea has recently been floated that the military, in need of new work and roles with the apparent warming of West-East relations and cooling of the Cold War, should exchange usual military idleness for meddling in environmental matters: regulation and policing of environmental resources, ensurance of environmental security of powerful states, and similar. This is a bit like reassigning those imprisoned for child abuse to managing kindergartens; for consider the impressive military record of environmental vandalism. What the military is alleged to offer is a structure appropriate and available for handling such matters. But, to the contrary, it is precisely the sort of hierarchical, authoritarian expensive structure that should be wound down and up as soon as the opportunity appears, as (briefly) now, rather than being retained and shockingly reoriented (as a state-serving “Greenwar”). 2 But a bridge to deep-green theory can be made through neo-Daoism, an updating of Taoism in confirmity with deep ecology (which however is somewhat thin and threadbare on war; for what there is so far, see Naess p.160). On neo-Daoism, see UT. �7 2. On the divergence of deep-green from Taoism. Having arrived, by better or worse arguments, at the conclusion that wars, though generally evil, may be sometimes unavoidable, it is evidently important to say something about how they — those of the theoretical residue — are to be conducted. By appropriate conduct the damage they do may be reduced; also the conduct should be appropriate to the funereal nature of wars (to exceed Taoist resources for stating this sort of point). It is at this stage that deep­ green theory begins to diverge from Taoism. In further explaining the Taoist and deep-green critiques of war, and diverting objections to them, a rough and preliminary typology of wars is important. It is also of passing interest in its own philosophical right. War, according to English Dictionaries, is a ‘contest carried on by force of arms, typically between nations or states’. More exactly, war is a game - in the generous technical sense of game-theory, with players, rules, goals, strategies, and so on carried on in significant part by military means, normally between states or substates. Call the contestants, (warring) parties. They typically represent of course larger populations. The set­ up between parties resembles the arrangements of players in game theory. There are several analogical extensions of the term war to cover games where one of the parties is an object, construed as hostile (an enemy of the state), such as Crime, Drugs, Poverty or Nature. These we can set aside as analogical wars. Of course wars form only a part of military activities. Military interests and objectives have always stretched significantly further than war, to include surveillence and security, easily extended to resource security, environmental security and life­ style security, and beyond that to political stability and other political matters. Evidently military ambitions have far over-extended themselves in bagging such democratic concerns. An anarchist solution to the whole problem of war, which some have seen Taoism as reaching towards, is immediate: eliminate the source of war, states. Unfortunately it is not quite that simple (and that's not simple). For wars can also occur between nations, cultures, races or tribes (which are not such artifices as states, and not always so readily or desirably abolished), between inhabited regions, and between factions within states (thus civil wars) or, perhaps by extension, between factions within other social structures (thus, for instance, gang wars). But undoubtedly eliminating states and aspiring states would abolish most wars and virtually all the worst wars. While “nonviolent wars” are excluded by definition, by virtue of ‘force of arms’, token wars, limited wars, and so on, are not: for instance, wars fought by small armed teams representing competing sides (cf. medieval and science fiction war games). As wars are hemmed in by conventions and agreed rules, there is no reason in principle why they should not be reduced to two person contests, fought under strict rules like boxing or gladiatorial contests. But in modem times wars have never taken such sensible forms, but have been much larger affairs, making heavy (though fortunately restricted) use of latest technology. Let us distinguish such wars as techno-powered wars. They have, directly or indirectly (for the �8 technology may be bought or bartered), a heavy research and development support structure (indeed the bulk of contemporary science is devoted - misdirected - in one way or another to this effort). Among wars, an important distinction is that between offensive and defensive wars. An offensive war is one which ventures off a given party's territory or recognised pad, “invading” that of another party or parties; correlatively defensive parties, if they have not also invaded. Force projection typifies offensive practice. Plainly, offensiveness and defensiveness are not strictly features of a war, but of parties to a war. In a two-party war, while both parties can easily act offensively, the possibility of both parties proceeding defensively is excluded, unless they share territory. (Even then issues may arise as to which party, if any, was the aggressor, which started it, was responsible for starting it, and so on.) Thus mutually defensive wars between contemporary states are impossible (but would be possible if states shared territory, e.g. if Eire and Britain shared the territory of Northern Ireland). Tao-accredited wars were defensive wars, never wars aiming at domination: last-resort wars, in which no pride was taken (LT p.152).3 The pretence that offensive wars are defensive is widespread, and reflected in the subterfuge that departments or ministries of war are those of defence, security or whatever. (If they really were what they purport to be, we should be well on the way to an end to war.) Offensive practices are rendered defensive ones by shabby redefinition al strategems, such as redefining ‘defensive’ to include defence of ideals like democracy or liberty, infringed (or allegedly infringed) on territories abroad, or to include “defence” of a third party or place (whence every offensive war is “defensive”). In the present war in which part of Arabia is engulfed (February 1991), one party claims to be defending what really was (or should be) part of its territory, namely Kuwait, another party to be defending (what Kuwait did not enjoy) democracy. It is a doubly offensive war presented in this guise as jointly defensive. Aggressive wars are waged for a variety of reasons, but usually for resources or access to resources or markets, a matter often disguised by appeal to ideology (thus a war for oil is represented as a war of liberation). But there are other reasons than narrowly economic ones, such as religion (as with crusades), power and aggrandisement (as in building an empire), and so on. Nor are those reasons necessarily far separated; ideologies like Marxism and market There is one line in LT that may suggest that attack was sometimes justifiable, namely ‘For deep love helps one to win in the case of attack’ (p.219). But how can compassion be appropriate unless this attack is within a defensive setting, a larger context of unavoidability or such like. A passage shortly below confirms this interpretation: I dare not take the offensive but I take the defensive: I dare not advance an inch but I retreat a foot (p.222). These are advances and attacks within a defensive setting. �9 capitalism, for example, exhibit many of the features of religion. The economic reasons for war appear to have become much more complex with the advent of an integrated world economy. At the same time many of the independent reasons for economic wars are now obsolete. For to powerful states accrue the advantages of war without war. At least most of the former economic advantages of war can be obtained without expensive wars, through trade, institution of economic dependence, etc. Small medieval wars were sometimes instituted for the collection of neighbouring riches and booty, a kind of piracy meeting conditions of war. “Small” contemporary wars can be waged for a remarkable mix of political-economy ends: to establish a regime favourable to economic penetration and profit repatriation, to subjugate markets and to remove competition, to boost a sagging weapons economy by using up old stocks and also testing new equipment, to restart a depressed economy, and so on. Such wars, along with the economic aims which motivate them, are in effect heavily castigated by Lao Tzu: When Tao prevails in the world, galloping horses are turned back to fertilize (the fields ...). When Tao does not prevail in the world, war horses thrive in the suburbs. There is no calamity greater than lavish desires. (LT p. 181). But it does exceed evidential warrant to claim that Tao is not only sufficient, but necessaTy, for cessation of such practices. The practice of regularly stimulating complex military-saturated economies through war is reminiscent of older, much ridiculed practices in simpler societies. They now ridicule the Tsembaga, who proceeded to destroy much of their surplus product by going to war every 5-15 years (cf Rapaport). But they do not similarly ridicule the most powerful nation on the Earth, the USA, which proceeds to write off a colossal amount of surplus in war every 10-20 years (the Gulf war liquidated some $1.7 billion per day). Taoists would. For ridicule was a favoured method, an important rhetorical strategem, and war and its idiocy were favourite targets. Some classification of defensive wars is also important, for various reasons: reducing and abolishing wars, their costs and damage, restructuring societies away from war and military practices, and, not least, for appreciating Taoism. A main distinction is between • conventional defence, maintained by armies of armed soldiers, many of them professionals, and • social defence, where there are no such armies or but fragments of them, and defence is carried out through social networks of a significant part of society.4 4 Details of social defence are presented in Sharp and in Martin. �10 It is here that Taoism and deep-green theory part company. Under Taoism, the state will have a standing army, but a defensive army operating by strange, surprise tactics (p.201). No doubt defensive wars are to remain last resort action. Nonetheless the state will operate in secrecy, in a way incompatible with decentralised social defence; people will be kept in the dark about smart weapons of the state; and they too will be surprised, along with presumed enemies of the state. By contrast, under deep-green theory, there should be no hidden smart weapons of state; information would flow more freely and not be hidden from the people (who should retain influence in informed decision making). Under deep-green, standing armies, and more generally military organisation, will be wound down altogether. Taoism should have pushed its searching criticism further. For military objectives, easily acquired by standing armies with time on their hands, are frequently incompatible with Taoism. For example, Taoism is opposed to domination (LT p.152), whereas military operations frequently seek or involve domination; and military structure is invariably hierarchical and authoritarian. Taoism aims for self-regulation, wherever feasible (cf. p.201); so does deep­ green theory, which is one reasons why it aims to dispose of standing armies, as an important preliminary to the withering away of states themselves (military forces being major props of state control and power, and often maintained primarily for internal state security). Taoism has no project for ending the era of wars; deep-green theory does. That project involves an elimination of standing armies, too often poised for fighting or political interference. A recommended route to end war consists in progressive scaling down: reduction of the means and manpower. The initial stages are well-known, and include • elimination of nuclear, biological and chemical weaponry, and • force reduction. It can hardly be pretended that the Earth's states have managed to proceed very far on even this complex of stages. The next stage consists in • contraction to defensive capacities only, and the final stage consists in • elimination of remaining military defensive forces, and adoption, so far as required, of social defence practices. The complete route thus involves complete demilitarisation. Reasons why deep-green aims to proceed the full distance are readily grasped by considering the environmental shallowness of an otherwise cogent traditional case for the sharp curtailment of wars and militarism. The traditional Western case against wars has been primarily along two dimensions: social and moral. Wars are highly disruptive of the social fabric; wars may be unjust. From these joint features, it was argued that wars should be a matter of last resort, to be fought to ensure peace. It was argued further that only just wars should be fought. Just wars were rare objects. But as there was little evidence of the decline and fall of wars, much effort was expended, more practically and unsuccessfully, upon endeavouring to improve the calibre of wars, and more theoretically, upon trying to characterize just war satisfactorily, or rather to bend the notion in an effort to approximate the gory unjust facts. �11 Progress was long hindered, furthermore, because there was always a rival positive perspective on wars, which encouraged the exaltation of wars and military feats. It also facilitated the transfer of the favourable image of war to other problem areas, whence the long and apparently successful war against Nature (but the short-term successes are turning into long-term problems), the short and unsuccessful war against Poverty, and so on. Behind all this is the complex idea of war as rejuvenating, even cleansing, like fire; of war as heroic, and glorious, of war as the supreme testing ground of men. These pictures of war - finally shattered by the first World War (where even the poets began to tell of horrors and atrocities) and subsequent technological wars — though no longer in ascendency, have by no means vanished. The notion of war as rejuvenating a flagging economy persists, along with the practice of keeping capitalism running smoothly by integrating substantial military components into the industrial engine. With the development of highly technological wars - the celebrated development of the dirty industrial age is substantially military - the traditional negative case has grown in strength. Wars have become much more damaging, with the potential for much more that is significantly worse, and the possibility of a just war has correspondingly contracted, virtually to zero. The opposition to war has likewise grown, but more than correspondingly with the rise of women in social and political influence. Wars have almost always and everywhere been Men's affairs; likewise conquest. Deep-green theory accepts much of the traditional negative case, but would further strengthen it. For example, the stricture against unjust wars, as out and out immoral, can be strengthened, through the following syllogism: All wars should be fully just wars. Modem wars cannot be fully just wars. Therefore, there should be no modern wars. A fully just war is not merely a just war, but a war those just character can be reliably forecast in advance. A modern war is of course a war that deploys modern technology, at least that available this century. The evidential basis for the second premiss derives from much information that collateral damage, damage to innocent bystanders and involved citizens is always likely and cannot be excluded. Such wars are always liable to violate uncontroversial requirements for a just war, even if they are purely “conventional” wars, not throwing radiation or chemical or biological weapons around. From a contemporary viewpoint the traditional doctrine of a just war, really of a just defensive war, is seriously out of date. The reasons for this reach wider than the new features introduced by modem technological wars and the character of modern civilization, with its giant cities littered with dangerous and vulnerable military targets. They have also to do with the chauvinism of the justice proposed, which is shallow human justice, not natural or environmental justice. There is no consideration of justice to other creatures or to the Earth (cf �12 Naess p.160). Two troubles are really intertwined here: conceptual difficulties with too narrow a notion of justice, and ideological difficulties with too narrow a vision of what is an object of value, of what counts. The deep-green case against war adds to the traditional case a further dimension, neglected until very recently: the environmental dimension. It has suddenly been seen that wars are typically environmental atrocities. Earlier, of course, “environments” were simply backgrounds, backdrops in paintings and plays, to the real drama. Contemporary technological wars tend to be not merely social tragedies but environmental ones as well. There is a doctrine of just war, but it is a human chauvinistic affair. There is no similarly developed doctrine of an ecologically sound war, a deep ecological war. Unless any such war were literally different from modern wars, that is from contemporary technological wars, it would overstep permitted bounds. For such wars are characteristically ecological disasters. Hardened military people, desensitized by a rigorous unethical training, feel even less compunction about degrading or destroying environments or members of other species than they do of maiming or killing civilians through “collateral” activity. Matching the no-just-war syllogism is a no-sound-war syllogism: All wars should be environmentally sound wars. Modern wars cannot be environmentally sound. Therefore, there should be no modern wars. The argument for the second premiss has of course to be different. It looks to the information accumulating on what wars do to natural and built environments. The Vietnam and Gulf wars both inflicted immense damage on natural environments or what was left of them. The environmental effects of war are not confined to direct and collateral damage. There are indirect effects also. Thus, for instance, war also supplied the mechanism of, and the technology for, modern environmental destruction: explosives, bulldozers from tanks, etc. As well, training for war and engagement in war have much fostered, along with attitudes that make for social callousness or ruthlessness, those that contribute to environmental insensitivity and cruelty. 3. Puzzles about Taoist strategy and its critiques of technology and violence ‘It is surprising how much of the Lao Tzu is devoted to military strategy’. Which strategies? Surprise, above all. But why such strategies? ‘Do they not contradict the Taoists’ strong opposition to the use of force’ (Chan p.222), the implied commitment to quietism? Briefly, Taoism is not committed to quietism, and while certainly antagonistic to violence, does not oppose certain uses of force (only really ///-forcing, as will be explained). Even so, the emphasis on military strategy remains puzzling. The strategies, many of them relevant to social defence, include • seriousness, not ‘making light of the enemy’ (p.222) �13 • surprise, and nonvisibility (p.201). The defensive strategy involves guerilla tactics: marching without formation, holding weapons without seeming to have them, confronting enemies without seeming to meet them (p.222). But even in times of peace, ‘smart weapons of the state should not be displayed to the people’ (p.164). Such recommendations helped to fuel the charge of deviousness lodged against Lao Tzu. But look at part of the reason for concealing smart weapons: ‘The more smart weapons the people have, the more troubled the state will be’ (p.201). Smart weapons are carried in corrupt states, where the rich engage in conspicuous consumption and the people are suppressed, not where Tao is practiced (LT p.194). • advance from weakness, flexibility but firmness. Weakness is the principle of life and will overcome strength (LT p.164, p.233). • coolness and non-competition (LT p.233, p.164). Like these, most of the general strategies are standard Taoist practices simply applied to military conduct. For these standard practices the charge of deviousness looks feeble. The response applies more generally to other allegedly devious political strategies. For the strategies are but application of Taoist principles and techniques to warfare, politics and elsewhere. Nothing excludes application of these techniques to what are accounted, in general, unnecessary evils (which must sometimes, on other Taoist grounds, be countered). Nor, to meet the main criticism, need any deceit or deviousness be involved; nor is it. In particular, the legalist tactic, Tn order to grasp, it is necessary first to give’ (LT p.164), is cited as involving ‘an element of deceit’ ‘undeniably’, and ‘worse’ it is ‘morally questionable’ (Chan p.17). But in order for me to grasp your hand in a normal handshake, it is necessary first for me to give my hand. There is no deceit here, nothing morally questionable. All the tactics permit of benign construals, of a Taoist kind. Consider, for instance, Tn order to contract, it is necessary first to expand’ (LT p.164). In order to bend a copper pipe to the intended angle, it is better to bend it first a little further than required. The transformation of water to ice (both favoured natural items for symbolic purposes: natural processes which may look devious!) neatly illustrates the Taoist principle (which is however hardly necessary), and shows softness and weakness turned hardness and strength. The Taoist critique of militarism is as much a critique of technology as of war. Sharp weapons, ‘smart weapons’ as we might now say, come in for much critical attention, as we have already noticed. Only in corrupt and degenerate states are they displayed or flaunted (p.194, p.164); in deep-green regions smart weapons of state’ would not be retained unexhibited. The people will not have them for they mean trouble (p.201); for similar reasons deep-green regions will be free of them. So, it seems, will ideal Taoist regions: ‘Even if there are arrows and weapons, none will display them’ (LT p.238). Much technology, military and other, is excluded under the Taoist edict against violence (a further facet of the military-practices �14 paradox).5 The powerful critique of militarism in the Tao-te Ching is coupled with strong opposition to violence. Some of the linkage is evident enough. Militarism as practised represents an ultimate form of state (or party) violence. A basic theme is that violent practices will come to an unnatural end, and accordingly to a non-Taoist end (generalising LT p.176). While force may occur in spectacular, but satisfactory, natural forms, force is duly distinguished from violence. To force the growth of life means ill omen. For the mind to employ the vital force without restraint means violence (LT p. 197). One who follows Tao does not apply dominating force, which usually has had results bringing requital (p.152). Dominating force, like power, is in general castigated, under doctrine of wu- wei, no forced actions, no violence. To force natural growth is deviant, destroying harmony. To stop natural growth is deviant. But there is a significant difference between force and violence. To intentionally employ destructive force is to do violence. To so force things is condemned. To remain in harmony with things one does not so force things or practice violence. There is a non-interference principle at work, which also indicates types of non­ interference that are excluded. However Taoism does not always get the distinction between force and violence quite 5 Under contemporary technology and technological arrangements, such as the storage of quantities of oil and nuclear and chemical materials in great cities, wars have assumed new and very destructive dimensions, to the point of being utterly irresponsible. A different approach to technology, as to war, is now mandatory. These are no longer things that can in principle be nicely confined and need not touch parties outside the fray. An important part of ending wars, “winning the war against wars”, is removing the technology of war, above all from irresponsible state power. As for which technology to try to jettison and which to try to retain or improve, it is not so difficult to indicate, provided evaluative terminology is not outlawed. What is wanted is technology that is good in its place, what should be excluded is technology that is indifferent or bad or potentially so. Technology to be justified has to do something worthwhile, it has to address identifiable respectable needs. That is why merely indifferent technology is out; there is no virtue in technology for technology's sake, as it is a mere means technique. It is because of the crucial evaluative component in choice of technology that appropriateness, itself evaluative, comes closer to encapsulating the criterion than other recent efforts. Size, such as smallness, or intermediateness, are not what matter, though modest and not excessive technologies are likely to fare better in satisfying appropriateness. In simpler societies, small technology is of course more appropriate; for that is what is good there. From known criteria for what is good these other features for locally appropriate technology can be read off: reliability, esp. in maintenance, functioning well and safely under the expected range of operating conditions (which may be difficult), ease of repair, capital cheapness and repair inexpensiveness, environmental benignness, and meeting sound social needs. �15 right. ‘Vital force without restraint’, intentionally excessive force, is only part of what counts as violence, which is more generally force which violates, i.e. transgresses, descrecrates, profanes, injures, outrages, etc. It is thus a negatively connoted force, an evil force in some specified intentional respect. There is a tendency for Taoist commentators, not Taoists, to regard Taoism as condemning all uses, or even occurrences, of force, but this is not so. Rather intentional ill-forcing is what is castigated, what is deviant. Thus Taoism does not exclude a range of defensive practices, which make satisfactory use of natural forces, like letting the machines of war industry stop. Those who would abolish war and its machinery, substituting for it nonwarlike and ideally nonviolent methods, technology, and strategies, have been confronted not merely with much sub-rational abuse but with plenty of criticism and even some paradoxes. Here is a recent paradox concerning war and nonviolence: • War must be abolished. One reason is simply economic. We can no longer afford it, and the opportunity costs are enormous. Along with other extraordinarily wasteful activities, it is an anachronism. • Doing so cannot be accomplished without violence, i.e. in effect, given the types of violence involved, without what amounts to war. According to a fuller version of this premiss, the process of abolishing a war would only be achieved through a revolution so profound that it could not succeed without extensive and extreme violence, amounting to (civil) war. ° But then war cannot be abolished without war. Therefore, war which must be abolished cannot be abolished.6 This “paradox” has been compared with the Liar paradox, but the parallel does not persist far. For this paradox does not involve self-referential features, and is easily broken, as follows. Let the “last war” be not the last standard war but the revolution abolishing war. Then, given that the revolution is successful, war will be abolished therewith, i.e. with that last war. There need be no regress, given again a successful outcome. All the premisses stand intact, but the conclusion, following the ‘therefore’ is a nonsequitur. However, while the dissolution of the argument is accordingly logically fine, the route is repugnant. Standard pacifism challenges the 6 Brian Medlin, who forcefully propounded this puzzle, set other analogous puzzles alongside it - designed to reveal deep difficulties in contemporary political, and especially alternative, thought. Another puzzle, concerning liberty and repression in the context of capitalism, revolved around the following inconsistent triad: • capitalism must be removed, but liberty retained. • capitalism cannot be removed without repression. • repression is antithetical to liberty. The puzzle is resolved as with the analogous puzzle of abolishing. Let the “last capitalist” action before the days of liberty be the repressive but liberating revolution overthrowing capitalism. �16 second premiss. 4. Standard and moral pacifism. Although Taoism is strongly opposed to war, and much in favour of peace - and accordingly by prevailing standards a substantially pacific position - it is not (nowhere in the central texts) committed to pacifism in usual senses, for two different reasons:• It is not, by contrast with pacifism, opposed to all types of warfare, for example smart defensive wars. • It eschews deontology in terms of which moral pacifism is commonly stated, for instance through the watershed thesis P2. It is morally wrong to use violence. By contrast with Taoism, deep environmentalism does not avoid deontic claims, and is committed in principle to nonviolent technologies and ways and to pacifistic principles. Moreover, certain forms of deep environmentalism are completely committed to pacifism, notably European forms. Is deep green? There is heavy contemporary opposition to pacifism, as there also was to Taoism in the warring times when Taoism was first being promulgated. Many of the central institutions of contemporary life are intricated in coercion, violence and war. The most prominent contemporary institutions, states, are premissed on these elements of damaging force; they claim entitlement to use them widely, and even claim a certain territorial monopoly on their use. As a result they are having constantly to engage in them in attempt to maintain that monopoly. They are certainly the main perpetrators of wars, and of violence. They are indeed inured to wars, are in constant preparation for wars, yet propound dialectial (and normally dishonest and cynical) doctrines of peace through war (for a recent example see the appendix). Unremarkably then, the extensive propagandistic machinery of state has invested heavily in “justificatory” exercises in favour of controlled use, its own use, of destructive force, and continues to inveigh against pacifism. Because a routine trick in this sophistical repetoire consists in conflating pacifism with extreme, naive and inplausible, forms, an inevitable and important early task commits in unscrambling senses of ‘pacifism’. Semantical skulduggery can be thwarted in this way. Pacifism, as explained by English dictionaries, invariably concerns wars and warfare, and contains two components, negative and, elaborating on that, positive:- The negative component is, in Amauld's word, anti-War-ism, opposition (in ways to be further specified) to all forms of warfare (see OED). The positive component supplies alternative ways of settling disputes (what it is supposed that wars with some semblance of justification involve), such as negotiation, arbitration,... - and, adding to too narrow dictionary accounts - sanctions, substitutions (e.g. of sporting events, operatic contests, cooperative ventures),... . In brief standard pacifism is opposition to all warfare and resolution of potential wars by other nonmilitary means. �17 Plainly the opposition to warfare, like the sanctions and so on, cannot itself be military (using soldiers and other devices of war), on pain of some incoherence. But otherwise the ways of opposition can be many and various: they can certainly be active, as with nonviolent demonstrations, resistance movements, and so forth, and they may also be devious (e.g. turning the forces of war upon themselves so they are neutralised). It quickly becomes evident, then, that some of the dictionaries offer but loaded definitions which, by restricting the negative components, reduce the initial appeal and plausibility of pacifism. Consider the Concise English definition of the negative component: ‘the doctrine of non-resistance to hostilities and of total non-co-operation with any form of warfare’. Thereby excluded are forms of pacifism which offer active and plausible alternatives to warfare such as social defence. The Concise English tends to force pacifism into what the Oxford English Dictionary lists as its final item: ‘often, with depreciatory implication, the advocacy of peace at any price’, ‘in any circumstance’. Pacifism can easily resist being forced into these sorts of circumstances: it has many resources, as an extensive series of texts on alternatives to war, such as negotiation, non­ violent action and social defence, from Taoism to contemporary environmentalism attest. Academic philosophers have much advanced the semantical strategy of some dictionaries, of rendering pacifism more difficult from the very outset by narrow and biassed definitions. They have stretched the term from its restricted setting of warfare, confined to state and organised gang violence, to cover all forms of violence, from state and interstate to, what is very different, personal and interpersonal violence. Call the resulting considerably stretched notion of pacifism, according to which it is morally wrong to use violence, according to which P2 holds, stretched pacifism.^ While stretched pacifism certainly includes standard pacifism (unless the notions of war and warfare are tampered with), the converse is very far from being the case. A pacifist is in no way committed to stretched pacifism, which is a much more problematic and difficult position than standard pacifism. There are several, substantially different reasons for this, which will be picked up seriatim. Stretched pacifism, also misleadingly called moral pacifism, has looked a very easy critical target to moral philosophers. Many the effusive philosopher who, upon sighting such a target, has charged, whooping such rhetoric as “incoherent”, “inconsistent”, “insensitive”, “fanatical”. However, with improved logical technology now available for accommodating and treating moral dilemmas, it is no great feat to resist such attacks, in the fashion of previous investigations (see esp. Al, also MD). A main aim was to demonstrate that stretched pacifism was not so stupid as it was made out to be or appeared to be to these inured to present dominant violent ways. So far from being stupid, it is viable. In future gentler times stretched pacifism 7 In Al this notion was contrasted with standard pacifism as comprehensive pacifism: overcomprehensive might have been better. �18 could even be realised for whole communities of creatures (as some genuinely Christian sects envisaged); whence it will finally be seen to be feasible not merely for sages and supermen, and many ordinary women, but much more extensively. The method of philosophical accommodation was through moral dilemmas. The sort of moral dilemma that stretched pacifism can induce derives as follows. On the one side stands the theme P2, Wv, in convenient symbols, for Wrong V-ing, violencing. Now this implies to WB, where B presents a case of of violence. On the other side, particular circumstances develop which lead to W ~B, because ~B would produce in the circumstances considerable wrong, for instance extensive violence, mass murder, etc. One stock example from the literature concerns calling off the firing squad about to shoot several captives if the pacifist shoots one of them (it is elaborated in Al p.13). Interestingly, another stock example from the literature concerns standard pacifism (it can also be presented in terms of patriotism; for details of both see MD p.10). Resolution of intractable moral dilemmas is, where it is required, situational. The agent decides in the situation, within the fix, what to do. There are many ways in which such decision making can proceed, less rational, such as those applying chance or involving bad faith, or more rational, such as those applying consequentialist decision theory (for details see MD, pp.32-9). A decision theory taking account of all that should be included will not however be purely consequential. It would also take account of relevant motivation. This defence and rehabilitation of moral pacifism has been challenged, in particular by Smith (hereafter JWS). JWS claims the defence offered is a ‘failure because it trivializes pacifism’ (p. 153 twice). The rehabilitation trivializes pacifism because it entails that pacifism doesn't substantially differ from a form of activism which holds that while violence is always wrong one is sometimes justified on consequentialist grounds for preferring violent acts, if these acts are lesser evils than any other real alternatives. This is the commonsense position which most people hold - yet - pacifism after all was supposed to be radical moral doctrine - (p.153 rearranged).8 Part of the criticism is, then, not so much that pacifism is trivialized - JWS “activism” is hardly trivial - as that pacifism is popularised, deflated from a radical position to the commonsense position most people hold (p.154 also). Yet not a shred of evidence is adduced that JWS activism is such a populist position. Available evidence, for example from peace movements and oppositional opinion polls, suggests the very opposite: that, for instance, most people support state-justified conventional wars with the military violence they incur, and 8 JWS now informs me that he has changed his position. Whether the move effects his criticism, I don't know. �19 accordingly do not hold that violence is always wrong. From such a commonsense angle, pacifism with its condemnation of conventional wars and the violence they involve remains a radical doctrine. As regards wars and other violence-incurring social authorities, contemporary pacificism is, as previous explained (e.g. Al p.3), a form of activism. Pacifism does not imply utter pacifity, but may actively involve social defence, resistance and so on. However a certain level of misrepresentation enters into the JWS challenge in the details of what forms of activism pacifism may include. That misrepresentation begins in the second clause concerning what is said to be sometimes justified. For the situational procedure where dilemmas arise will not generally be consequential applying a principle of lesser evil. In dilemmatic situations such principles are suspended, and such a principle is in any case unacceptable to moral pacifists. A small amount of violence may be less bad in its consequences than verbal offence, but a principled pacifist will choose the slightly greater evil where other obligations do not exclude it. A more serious distortion occurs in JWS's effort to force procedures in dilemma situations into purely consequentialist form. In fact consequential decision theory was deployed as a model only for how to proceed rationally in a situational setting where deontic procedures were suspended (see MD p.38). What was said, still misleadingly retrospective vision reveals, was this: ‘what is done is a very consequentialist thing’ (Al p.13), not ‘one acts in a consequentialist fashion to do the sufficiently good thing in the circumstances’ (JWS P-152). Situationally other procedures than those resembling orthodox rational decision making (modified from maximizing to satisizing objectives) may be adopted (MD p.38). Further the orthodox consequentialist theory is inadequate because it leaves out, or tries to reduce to consequences, nonconsequential elements, notably motives. It is not difficult, in principle (in advance of attempted consequentialization of motives), to design situations where motives, such as integrity or maintaining faith, enter to yield outcomes upsetting consequential calculations. More elaborate decision making procedures than those of consequentialism, sometimes at variance with consequentialism, are thus presupposed. A further part of JWS's criticism accordingly goes by the board, the alleged appeal ‘to “second best” consequentialist considerations,... already explicitly condemned’ (p.154). What was condemned was stock universal consequentialism, ‘that only consequentialist considerations carry argumentative weight’ (quoted on p.152), so undercutting other deontic principles, such as those of pacifism. It was not claimed, what is utterly different, that consequentialist considerations can nowhere enter into deliberation and decision making. The conclusion JWS arrives at is therefore substantially astray. After criticising modern moral philosophy for its reliance upon consequentialist modes of thought, it is surprising, and inconsistent, to find ... [reliance] upon such modes of thought to escape logical difficulties raised by moral dilemmas facing ... pacifis[m] (p.152) �20 There is no inconsistency. JWS has confused universal with particular. As well he has wrongly contracted all situational decision making to consequentialist modes. There is a third part to the criticism, that the defence is too easy; the ‘strategy will allow too much violence to be (perpetrated and) justified to suit the tastes of any real pacifist’ (p. 153). This another part of the so-called trivialization, this time however dilution rather than populatization, weakening the moral stand against violence. This third contention is premissed on a mistake: that one can ‘justify on consequentialist grounds any number of violent acts, providing that such acts are lesser evils than other real alternatives facing social agents’ (p.153). Moral pacifism offers no such licence; allowing such consequentialism to take over was never part of the position. The slide to such consequentialism is made on the strength of a similarly erroneous example. The potential victim of an aspiring rapist ‘is supposed to flee or wriggle free if possible. But it is easy to consequentially justify the use of violence by the woman to prevent herself from being raped’ (p.153 italics added). In the example so far described there is no dilemma, and no such easy resort to consequentially ‘justified’ violence. What allows too much violence is the lesser evil JWS assumes is easily consequentially justified; for example that the woman is entitled to inflict, and escalate, violence so long as it remains ‘a lesser evil than the violence of attempted rape’ (p. 153). Since she may thereby inflict quite unreasonable damage (esp. if she is a Kung Fu expert), the result is inconsistent with ‘the basic principle of self-defence’ which JWS earlier adduced according to which what is ‘appropriate, in response is only that level of force necessary to defend oneself against the threat’ (p.150). There is evidence in JWS's work of some enthusiasm for levels of violence which exceed his ‘basic principle’, his appeal to ‘lesser evil’ generates some instances. The ‘basic principle’, itself fraught with difficulties (cf. the contorted discussion of what weapons are appropriate in response to what attacks, p.150), still exceeds what stretched pacifism would enjoin; for instance, it may not be appropriate to respond with force. But in a technical sense stretched pacifism is compatible with the ‘basic principle’, since it only imposes the upper bound on level of force. As for easiness, moral pacifism is not an easy position to live by, or to justify. Removing objections to pacifism is one thing; solidifying a positive case for it is quite another, and so far hardly conclusive (as Al tried to explain, pp 29-31). Stretched pacifism was advanced, hypothesized to put it more precisely, as a still viable option. It was not presented as a morally compulsory position, or, for that matter, as one that this defender adhered to or affirmed. To reiterate, while a cumulative case can be made for stetched pacifism as principled non­ violence, that case was not conclusive, and is hard to improve. For, further, some serious difficulties standing in the way of stretched pacifism were assembled, the most important of which derives from the extent of violence apparent in transactions within the natural world. Simply consider the practices of carnivores, essential to their natural way of life. In order to meet their life needs for sustenance, these creatures do, and are often obliged to, engage �21 routinely in violent activity. While it can no doubt be argued, as some vegetarians may do, that the natural order is an immoral order, and that remaining carnivores should be converted to vegetarianism as rapidly as proves possible (in the way domestic dogs are converted to dog biscuits), the difficulties with such proposals are immense. The task envisaged is gigantic, and beyond human capacities - even if it were desirable. For there are millions of species to be somehow converted to proper vegetarianism. Then there are millions of other species to be converted to proper and well regulated contraceptive practices, else their numbers will get out of hand (uncontrollably) with predation removed. Given humans lack of success in limiting their own excessive numbers, such regulation appears entirely remote. Aside however from the practical difficulties, is such a fully vegetarian order, with evolution further derailed, a desirable improvement on the natural order? Is it morally obligatory? It is certainly not obligatory, as alternative systems of morality in harmony with the prevailing natural order are feasible. Nor is it desirable, for (to appeal to such alternative value systems) the natural order is more or less in order as it is. Full vegetarianization would only reduce its value, vastly. More generally, a defensible ethical framework should not, it would be rightly contended, be right out of step with the natural order of other creatures, decently depicted. Decent depiction is important, for some features of the natural order, such as competition, combat and predation, so far from escaping attention, have been grossly exaggerated and exploited. Thus, for instance, the ludicrous picture of nature red in truth and claw, so beloved of descendents of orthodox Victorians and of orthodox economists. However, even under decent depiction, the “natural order” is often not benign. That appears to be enough to induce a supervenient moral dilemma for any stretched pacifism which is coupled to a deep ethic (e.g. which does not separate humans out from the natural order) and which eschews the desperate vegetarian route: The natural order is not an immoral order The natural order contains (regular) instances of violence. Therefore, instances of violence are not immoral in apparent defiance of P2 Moreover, there are too many instances of violence, too regularly occurring, for them all to be plausibly shunted into the moral dilemma category (and predatory carnivores face no dilemmas). Raptors that practice violence every week are not immoral (neither are they clearly moral; the category of morality only significantly extends so far). The main trouble lies however with P2 (which needs some finer adjustment, as was alrady indicated in Al). While P2 is alright in context, within a particular, perfectly viable, ethical framework, designed for the usual human round, the conventional setting for ethical theories, it stands in need of modification outside that setting. It is time to suggest the sort of modification envisaged. Evidently P2 was addressed to moral agents. Which agents? Not to carnivores that supply their own livelihood, nor really to morally degenerate humans, but to �22 peace-sensitive agents. With that semi-technical form, yet to be characterised, a suitably modified P2 results: MP2. It is morally wrong, for a peace-sensitive agent, to use violence.9 To recover what amounts, in the previous discussive context, to P2, it suffices to add the proposition that every human agent ought to be peace-sensitive. Much as that proposition has to recommend it, it appears too ethically advanced for many modern humans; it sets too high a moral standard to be taken as a serious guide to practice. It seems wise to settle presently for something less demanding, such as that every advanced moral agent ought to be peace sensitive. To put essentially the same proposition alternatively: Stretched pacifism (as modified) is supererogatory. While it is perhaps too late to hope for much moral progress in humans, it is pleasant to contemplate alternative futures where what is supererogatory became obligatory, and widely practiced. Richard Sylvan* Appendix I began drafting this essay at the time (January 17, midday Australian time) of the American attacks upon Iraq. The optly named Prime Minister Hawke of Australia had just made a statement to the nation-state, announcing (the) war. In this statement there was much talk of peace. There was even - in what was effectively a declaration of war - reiteration of the modern quest for ‘a new world order of peace’. Peace through war; so it rings out again and again, through the centuries. ‘War must be for the sake of peace’ (Aristotle p.220). More than two thousand years later, we have fought those wars to end all wars. But it is no use, Hawke solemely pronounced, just talking about peace, and thinking about peace; we must work for peace, fight for it - through war. Impeccable logic? President Bush, supreme commander, convinced us with similar logic, speaking too with many tongues. Of how he ‘preferred to think of peace, not war’. But now ‘only force will prevail’, as ‘all reasonable efforts to reach a peaceful solution are exhausted’. ‘What must be done’ must be done, or will be anyway. With God on side with the US offensive (as well as on the other side), it will go well. As it was said to have, though it achieved comparatively little that other efforts may not have yielded more satisfactorily, and thought it may now have to The generalization of P2, suggested in Al, to cover also the parallel situation of environmental vandalism, can be similarly modified. The anti-vandolence principle becomes MP2°. It is morally wrong, for a peace- and environmentally-sensitive agent, to use vandolence. Thank to David Bennett for joint contributions (from UT) and to JWS for opposition (in JWS) �23 followed with another invasion. Nor have we ever managed to glimpse much of what is now supposed, when we are no longer engaged, to come ‘out of the horror of war’: a ‘new world order ... which governs the conflict of nations’; a ‘rule of law’, not war. How the one, enforcable law, is achieved, unless backed by the the other, is not explained (Medlin's paradox hits back). Similarly what we now hear from many militarists, as they rush to war, is that ‘peace is a great good, war a great evil’. But, for the most part, only the rhetoric has shifted; practice has scarcely changed at all. REFERENCES W.-T. Chan, A Source Book on Chinese Philosophy, Princeton University Press, 1963; referred to as ST. W.-T. Chan (ed.), The Way of Lao Tzu (Tao-te Ching), Bobbs-Merrill, New York, 1963; referred to as LT. B. Martin, Uprooting War, Freedom Press, London, 1984. A. Naess, Ecology, community and lifestyle, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge UK, 1989. R.A. Rapaport, Pigs for the Ancestors : ritual in the ecology of a New Guinea People, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1967. R. Routley, ‘War and Peace II. On the alleged inconsistency, moral insensitivity and fanaticism of pacifism’, Discussion papers in environmental philosophy #9, Research School of Social Science, Australian National University, 1983 (also in Inquiry ); referred to as Al. R. Routley and V. Plumwood, ‘Moral dilemmas and the logic of deontic notions’, Discussion papers in environmental philosophy #6, Research School of Social Science, Australian National University, 1984 (also in Paraconsistent Logic)', referred to as MD. R. Routley, ‘War and Peace I. On the ethics of large-scale nuclear war and nuclear-deterrence and the political fall-out’, Discussion papers in environmental philosophy, #5, Research School Of Social Science, Australian National University, 1984. G. Sharp, Social Power and Political Freedom, Porter Sargent, Boston, 1980. J.W. Smith, The Worms at the Heart of Things , Public Relations Unit, Flinders University, 1989. R. Sylvan, ‘War and Peace III, Australia's defence philosophy’, SoczaZ Philosophy, for Nuclear Conference, University of Queensland, 1985. R. Sylvan and D. Bennett, ‘Of Utopias, Tao and Deep Ecology’, Discussion papers in environmental philosophy #19, Research School of Social Science, Australian National University, 1990; referred to as UT. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Draft Papers Description An account of the resource Sylvan's literary executor encountered an archive in which “all his projects were current", since manuscripts were undated and unattributed. Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document ON EXTIRPATING WAR: TAO AND DEEP-GREEN PACIFISM Taoism and deep-green environmental theory, although closely aligned on very many issues, diverge over war. For Taoism, by contrast for instance with Buddhism, is not a pacific doctrine, but is committed to skilful defensive militarism. While it does not espouse a fortress mentality, Taoism certainly condones limited defensive military operations for specific purposes, a sort of guerilla warfare. By contrast, deep-green theory, while acknowledging the role of organised social defence, stands opposed to professional militarism, and thereby to military defence, and is committed to a principled pacifism. Conveniently a route through Taoism, philosophically fascinating in its own right, will lead us to problems of pacifism and towards deep-green theory. 1. Features of a Taoist critique of war and militarism. War did not receive a favourable press in ancient Chinese philosophy. Generally aggression and war were to be avoided. Even Confucius imposed very demanding conditions: for example, ‘when good men have instructed the people [in morals, agriculture, military tactics] for seven years, they may be allowed to bear arms,’ ‘If a ruler ... does not set himself right, even his commands will not be obeyed’ (SB p.41, italics added). Mo Tzu went much further than Confucius, roundly condemning war - on utilitarian grounds, that war yields no net benefit at any level (SB p.227). What is more, he backed his heavy condemnation practically (unlike some conspicuous contemporary theoretical utilitarians); ‘he did not hesitate to walk for ten days and ten nights in an effort to dissuade a ruler from making war’ (SB p.212). But none, it is said, went as far, in a detailed and sophisticated criticism of war, as Lao Tzu; ‘none has condemned war more strongly than Lao Tzu’. ‘[T]he opposition of Taoism to the use of force is well-known, and the most bitter attack on militarism if found in the Lao Tzu’ (Chan, p.154, p.17.) But, after that splendid build-up, the text is slightly disappointing. Lao Tzu does not assert outright that war is an abomination, or even roundly condemn it. His critique of war, militarism, and military technology, is subtle and oblique, and, on the surface, far distanced from pacifism. For he does not recommend an end to war - in that genuine Taoists, those who possess Tao, will never participate in them - but expects wars to continue as unavoidable evils. Worse, he even goes so far as to outline proper attitudes to war and conduct in war, and indeed to suggest military techniques and strategies, some of which look decidedly devious. Among the classical works of Taoism, we focus on the Lao Tzu because, by contrast with other works, a remarkable component of that book is devoted to war and militarism. The apparent deviousness of the tactics Lao Tzu allocates serves to highlight what has been seen as ‘the most troublesome element’ in his philosophy (Chan p.17) — not so much however because they concern military operations, but because they are taken to apply much more widely, ‘to life in general’ (p.17). But why should military activity obtain some special 2 more widely, ‘to life in general’ (p. 17). But why should military activity obtain some special dispensation? Why should what is not tolerated more generally be exonerated there? But given that Taoism has here the virtue of consistency (i.e. uniformity on principles) and of universalizability, that simply leaves more explaining to be done. • Puzzles for Taoism, and wars as unavoidable evils There are two puzzles here in Taoism rather than one. There is the military-practices paradox, and, varying and generalising on that, there are life-practices paradoxes. The special paradox is generated by the following incompatible elements: on the one side, ‘the most bitter attack on militarism’, the well-known opposition of Taoism to the use of force (p. 17) and to the possession and use of smart military weapons and technology - implying that war is far from all right - and on the other, advocacy of certain (devious) military tactics, outlines of (deceitful) conduct in war, and so on - implying that war is all right after all. A straightforward generalisation of this paradox would look at other morally-sensitive parts of life, where some practice was strongly condemned yet engaged in (for many examples, see the dilemmas assembled in MD). But the variation of concern to Chan and the neo-Confucians concerns thfc conjunction of upright with devious practices in life, in particular in the life of the sage. For a Taoist sage is presumed to lead an upright straightforward life, yet appears to engage in devious and even deceitful practices incompatible with such a life-style. Call this the Taoist-lifestyle paradox. Evidently a good deal of explaining is required, as to how Taoism can coherently take the positions it appears to presume, both on war and peace, and on life more generally. A desirable preliminary would seem to be a little investigation of what position is taken, especially on war and militarism. One key pasage runs: Fine weapons are instruments of evil They are hated by creatures Therefore those who possess the Tao turn away from them. ... Weapons are instruments of evil, not the instruments of a good ruler. When he uses them unavoidably, he regards calm restraint as the best principle Even when he is victorious, he does not regard it as praiseworthy, For to praise victory is to delight in the slaughter of men. He who delights in the slaughter of men will not succeed in the empire. ... For a victory, let us observe the occasion with funeral-ceremonies (LT p.154). Wars, which involve the use of weapons, instruments of evil, are accordingly themselves evil. They are also evil because they involve the slaughter of men. But they are also sometimes unavoidable (also p.152). Therefore such wars are unavoidable evils. Such discourse, obtained by almost immediate inference from the passage, is within the standard orbit of dilemma talk. But Taoism lacks, through deliberately eschewing deontic talk, the discourse which enables direct expression of such dilemmas, or even direct condemnation of wars or of clever weapons. Instead the points are made by circumlocution, what the possesser of Tao 3 does, how the good ruler conducts himself, or by analogy, of victory in war with death. Unavoidable evils are the very stuff of deontic dilemmas (though many theories, underpinned by shonky logic, lack the resources for representing this stuff properly). Where something is unavoidably evil, it is both bad, because evil, and also not bad, doing it is excusable, because it is unavoidable. So, given such an argument (which has its weaknesses), an unavoidable evil is a genuinely dilemmatic object with inconsistent features. Certain wars have looked, since ancient times, like such dilemmatic objects. Revealingly, Chan tries to explain that ‘most troublesome element’ in Taoism, the military-practice paradox, through the following exercise in lateral thinking: It can ... be argued that Lao Tzu uses warfare to illustrate his principles of taking no action and weakness because warfare is among the most dynamic and critical of human experiences, just as the Indian classic, the Bhagavadgita chooses fighting as the theme on which to discuss the terrible dilemma whether one should fulfil his duty, as in the case of a soldier, and kill, or should fail in his duty and refrain from killing (p. 17). ‘Just as’? The Indian classic prevents a classic moral dilemma, a dilemma represented in contemporary philosophy (following its rediscovery by Sartre), where there are incompatible duties: the duty to kill, because of one's role as a soldier, and the duty not to kill, because of one's human condition, and the supervenient dilemma of failing in and fulfilling one's duties. These dilemmas for an individual (male, as it then was) are replicated in dilemmas regarding war for group institutions: at bottom, the obligation to engage in war (for one set of compelling reasons) as contraposed with the obligation not to engage in war (for another, perhaps overlapping, set of reasons). A theory of moral dilemmas (as worked out for example in MD) is crucial for an adequate treatment of major issues in war and peace, especially (as will become evident) for a viable strong pacifism. But Taoism, eschewing deontic discourse, lacks the apparatus to state or develop moral dilemmas. Hence it is logically excluded from giving a full or adequate account of what is going on conceptually. One of the philosophically fascinating feature of Taoism is the fashion in which it manages to avoid deontic discourse, and to substitute for direct deontic discourse or improvise circumlocutions when deontic discourse would otherwise appear inevitable (cf. UT for examples). But there are costs. One is inability to display the mechanism of deontic dilemmas, or to show what reasons and argument lie behind Taoist prounouncements and conclusions (the shortage of Taoism on argument is another philosophically conspicious feature, also observed in UT). As conceptual apparatus for analysizing moral dilemmas is missing, most of the machinery involved has to be passed over. Only the outcomes, as Taoism sees them, are presented, as if from a black box. Taoism blacks out the story on deontic dilemmas that deep-green theory can tell, as the following diagram tries to show: 4 Diagrams . Charting the processing of deontic dilemmas that are “resolved”. Deep-green chart: Processing of dilemma, Arguments to dilemma incompatible input prescriptions situational procedures -» > directive output ■ X. Corresponding Taoist chart: Black directive Box output It is evident that Taoism can be extended', information can be put into the Black Bok rendering it less opaque. That extension can be made so as to conform to deep-green theory, i.e. so that the extended Taoist chart, a neo-Daoist chart, looks like the deep-green one. That is indeed essentially how neo-Daoism get characterised, in terms of conformity of the extension to deep ecological theory (see UT). We are now placed to explain how to dissolve, or at least neutralize, the paradoxes deriving from repudiation of militarism, an awkwardly qualified repudiation in the case of Taoism. In a significant sense there is no resolving of genuine deontic dilemmas. The principles delineating the fix may stand, incompatible, signalling the persisting suboptimality (or better, sublimenality) of the dilemmatic situation. Where there is a dilemma, involved parties should try to do well enough in the sublimenal circumstances (for a much fuller account, see MD). Thus where there is a war, itself a non-Taoist process, engaged or caught up Taoists will not abandon Taoism. Taoist methods will be applied, Taoist strategies pursued. So much for theoretical representation and (non-)resolution of life-practices and other dilemmas, details of which are readily elaborated in deep-green extensions of Taoism. A prior substantive issue is whether dilemmas always are generated: not whether wars are evil (typically they are, an issue we shall come to), but whether wars are unavoidable. Analysis of wars does not bear that familiar claim out decisively. Many wars could have been avoided, through conciliation, negotiation, restraint, etc., and no worse results apparently obtained, through sanctions, exchange, trade, etc. Through a typology of wars (coming up) that conjecture can be given some substance. Consider, for instance, what would be walk-overs. Then there is little point in making a military response. So war can be avoided. Certainly an occupation, to be met in a different way, may still occur. And so on, perhaps, for various other types of war. But, more generally, try this:- 5 Every war involves an aggressor, who makes an aggressive move. Such an aggressor could always avoid that move, taking a different (or a do-nothing) course of action. Therefore, every war can be avoided. No war is entirely unavoidable. Setting aside determinism (which renders all actual wars along with all other events unavoidable), it could be argued that a war sometimes simply boils up, without an aggressor, an intensification of a conflagatory situation. There are grounds for scepticism regarding such examples; for such intensification can only occur if provocative military moves are made, for instance troops are stationed in provocative or risky positions. The presumption that certain wars are unavoidable typically derives from a one-sided perspective on war, a defender's perspective. A defender has no option, so it is routinely averred, but to respond to a determined aggressor. Even if that should be so sometimes, when there is no running away or going underground, it does not establish that such a war is unavoidable; for it neglects the role of the aggressor. By a smarter formulation, relevant features of unavoidability can be captured. Although wars may not be unavoidable, defensive action in wars that have been initiated may be unavoidable. At least such action may b£ unavoidable z/ unacceptably high costs (death, enslavement, etc.) are not to be avoided. Thereupon another highly relevant feature emerges: the linkage of avoidability to costs. For whether an action is unavoidable then depends upon what costs a party is prepared to incur before and when insisting on action: but this appears entirely unacceptable. How can what is “unavoidable” cease to be so when some further costs are absorbed? However with basics like survival, a certain liberty, and so on, we do reach such bounds. An important type of unavoidability. We also reach scenarios, unavailable to Lao Tzu but kindly brought within range by modem technology, which may appear to justify aggressive strikes. State Z, while not an aggressor, is carrying out practices which will impose unacceptably high costs upon peoples of other states and implacably refuses to desist. It could, for example, be poisoning air or water flowing to other states. But ,to make the case vivid, let us suppose that state Z is constructing, for reasons Zeders find convincing (they are committed to a faith which depicts all humans as incorrigible sinners and unworthy of life), an effective doomsday machine. Would an (aggressive) preemptory strike designed to disable or destroy the machine be unavoidable?1 In a sense, No; in another Yes. For different modalities can operate. Physically outsiders need to do nothing, but watch Zeders go about their zealous work. But deontically they are under heavy moral pressure, because of the costs of standing by idly: if the human race is worth anything very substantial, then they are obliged to act, action is deontically 1 Whether it would be justifiable, or just, are separate issues. But it is evident enought that such scenarios further damage the obsolescent idea of just war. For, according to received doctrine, a just war is defensive. (How such a war can be fought at all is another matter; coherence requires relativization to ‘just wxfor party d’.) 6 unavoidable. Here is a situation where a proposed reduction of deontic logic proves illuminating. Obligation is explicated through not implying, or necessitating, the sanction, i.e. excessive ethical costs such as extermination. Let us explain deontic unavoidability analogously: an action is so unavoidable if not undertaking it would result in excessive ethical costs. Then if it can be established that there is no other way than a military strike, an act of war, to ensure that the Zeders desist (and certainly we can envisage scenarios like that), then that is deontically unavoidable. It is also dilemmatic for those committed to, or inclined towards pacifism; and it is, for them at least, but paradoxically justifiable, as the negation is also justifiable, on pacific grounds. Scenarios like that sketched, that appear to render certain wars deontically unavoidable require but little or no elaboration to render them evil. Evil indeed is such a standard feature of standard wars that at least its great presence call for little supporting evidence. But it has taken to vast stretch of human history to reach this general point of recognition. The manifold evils of war Lao Tzu very early recognised and emphasized: Wherever armies are stationed, briars and thorns grow. Great wars are always followed by famines (p. 152). And nowadays followed by great tides of refugees. This passage includes not only recognition of the widely-observed socio-environmental consequences of war, but, more striking, very early recognition of the severe environmental impact of military forces. That critique is not however developed in Taoism.2 Only recently has it been pushed substantially further. And only recently could a new, most significant twist occur, the merging of resource security, long a military objective, with environmental security. The appalling idea has recently been floated that the military, in need of new work and roles with the apparent warming of West-East relations and cooling of the Cold War, should exchange usual military idleness for meddling in environmental matters: regulation and policing of environmental resources, ensurance of environmental security of powerful states, and similar. This is a bit like reassigning those imprisoned for child abuse to managing kindergartens; for consider the impressive military record of environmental vandalism. What the military is alleged to offer is a structure appropriate and available for handling such matters. But, to the contrary, it is precisely the sort of hierarchical, authoritarian expensive structure that should be wound down and up as soon as the opportunity appears, as (briefly) now, rather than being retained and shockingly reoriented (as a state-serving “Greenwar”). But a bridge to deep-green theory can be made through neo-Daoism, an updating of Taoism in confirmity with deep ecology (which however is somewhat thin and threadbare on war; for what there is so far, see Naess p.160). On neo-Daoism, see UT. 7 2. On the divergence of deep-green from Taoism. Having arrived, by better or worse arguments, at the conclusion that wars, though generally evil, may be sometimes unavoidable, it is evidently important to say something about how they - those of the theoretical residue - are to be conducted. By appropriate conduct the damage they do may be reduced; also the conduct should be appropriate to the funereal nature of wars (to exceed Taoist resources for stating this sort of point). It is at this stage that deep­ green theory begins to diverge from Taoism. In further explaining the Taoist and deep-green critiques of war, and diverting objections to them, a rough and preliminary typology of wars is important. It is also of passing interest in its own philosophical right. War, according to English Dictionaries, is a ‘contest carried on by force of arms, typically between nations or states’. More exactly, war is a game - in the generous technical sense of game-theory, with players, rules, goals, strategies, and so on carried on in significant part by military means, normally between states or substates. Call the contestants, (warring) parties. They typically represent of course larger populations. The set­ up between parties resembles the arrangements of players in game theory. There are several analogical extensions of the term war to cover games where one of the parties is an object, construed as hostile (an enemy of the state), such as Crime, Drugs, Poverty or Nature. These we can set aside as analogical wars. Of course wars form only a part of military activities. Military interests and objectives have always stretched significantly further than war, to include surveillence and security, easily extended to resource security, environmental security and life­ style security, and beyond that to political stability and other political matters. Evidently military ambitions have far over-extended themselves in bagging such democratic concerns. An anarchist solution to the whole problem of war, which some have seen Taoism as reaching towards, is immediate: eliminate the source of war, states. Unfortunately it is not quite that simple (and that's not simple). For wars can also occur between nations, cultures, races or tribes (which are not such artifices as states, and not always so readily or desirably abolished), between inhabited regions, and between factions within states (thus civil wars) or, perhaps by extension, between factions within other social structures (thus, for instance, gang wars). But undoubtedly eliminating states and aspiring states would abolish most wars and virtually all the worst wars. While “nonviolent wars” are excluded by definition, by virtue of ‘force of arms’, token wars, limited wars, and so on, are not: for instance, wars fought by small armed teams representing competing sides (cf. medieval and science fiction war games). As wars are hemmed in by conventions and agreed rules, there is no reason in principle why they should not be reduced to two person contests, fought under strict rules like boxing or gladiatorial contests. But in modem times wars have never taken such sensible forms, but have been much larger affairs, making heavy (though fortunately restricted) use of latest technology. Let us distinguish such wars as techno-powered wars. They have, directly or indirectly (for the 8 technology may be bought or bartered), a heavy research and development support structure (indeed the bulk of contemporary science is devoted - misdirected - in one way or another to this effort). Among wars, an important distinction is that between offensive and defensive wars. An offensive war is one which ventures off a given party's territory or recognised pad, “invading" that of another party or parties; correlatively defensive parties, if they have not also invaded. Force projection typifies offensive practice. Plainly, offensiveness and defensiveness are not strictly features of a war, but of parties to a war. In a two-party war, while both parties can easily act offensively, the possibility of both parties proceeding defensively is excluded, unless they share territory. (Even then issues may arise as to which party, if any, was the aggressor, which started it, was responsible for starting it, and so on.) Thus mutually defensive wars between contemporary states are impossible (but would be possible if states shared territory, e.g. if Eire and Britain shared the territory of Northern Ireland). Tao-accredited wars were defensive wars, never wars aiming at domination: last-resort wars, in which no pride was taken (LTp.152).3 The pretence that offensive wars are defensive is widespread, and reflected in the subterfuge that departments or ministries of war are those of defence, security or whatever. (If they really were what they purport to be, we should be well on the way to an end to war.) Offensive practices are rendered defensive ones by shabby redefinitional strategems, such as redefining ‘defensive’ to include defence of ideals like democracy or liberty, infringed (or allegedly infringed) on territories abroad, or to include “defence" of a third party or place (whence every offensive war is “defensive”). In the present war in which part of Arabia is engulfed (February 1991), one party claims to be defending what really was (or should be) part of its territory, namely Kuwait, another party to be defending (what Kuwait did not enjoy) democracy. It is a doubly offensive war presented in this guise as jointly defensive. Aggressive wars are waged for a variety of reasons, but usually for resources or access to resources or markets, a matter often disguised by appeal to ideology (thus a war for oil is represented as a war of liberation). But there are other reasons than narrowly economic ones, such as religion (as with crusades), power and aggrandisement (as in building an empire), and so on. Nor are those reasons necessarily far separated; ideologies like Marxism and market 3 There is one line in LT that may suggest that attack was sometimes justifiable, namely ‘For deep love helps one to win in the case of attack’ (p.219). But how can compassion be appropriate unless this attack is within a defensive setting, a larger context of unavoidability or such like. A passage shortly below confirms this interpretation: I dare not take the offensive but I take the defensive: I dare not advance an inch but I retreat a foot (p.222). These are advances and attacks within a defensive setting. 9 capitalism, for example, exhibit many of the features of religion. The economic reasons for war appear to have become much more complex with the advent of an integrated world economy. At the same time many of the independent reasons for economic wars are now obsolete. For to powerful states accrue the advantages of war without war. At least most of the former economic advantages of war can be obtained without expensive wars, through trade, institution of economic dependence, etc. Small medieval wars were sometimes instituted for the collection of neighbouring riches and booty, a kind of piracy meeting conditions of war. “Small” contemporary wars can be waged for a remarkable mix of political-economy ends: to establish a regime favourable to economic penetration and profit repatriation, to subjugate markets and to remove competition, to boost a sagging weapons economy by using up old stocks and also testing new equipment, to restart a depressed economy, and so on. Such wars, along with the economic aims which motivate them, are in effect heavily castigated by Lao Tzu: When Tao prevails in the world, galloping horses are turned back to fertilize (the fields ...),. When Tao does not prevail in the world, war horses thrive in the suburbs. There is no calamity greater than lavish desires. (LT p.181). But it does exceed evidential warrant to claim that Tao is not only sufficient, but necessary, for cessation of such practices. The practice of regularly stimulating complex military-saturated economies through war is reminiscent of older, much ridiculed practices in simpler societies. They now ridicule the Tsembaga, who proceeded to destroy much of their surplus product by going to war every 5-15 years (cf Rapaport). But they do not similarly ridicule the most powerful nation on the Earth, the USA, which proceeds to write off a colossal amount of surplus in war every 10-20 years (the Gulf war liquidated some $1.7 billion per day). Taoists would. For ridicule was a favoured method, an important rhetorical strategem, and war and its idiocy were favourite targets. Some classification of defensive wars is also important, for various reasons: reducing and abolishing wars, their costs and damage, restructuring societies away from war and military practices, and, not least, for appreciating Taoism. A main distinction is between • conventional defence, maintained by armies of armed soldiers, many of them professionals, and • social defence, where there are no such armies or but fragments of them, and defence is carried out through social networks of a significant part of society.4 4 Details of social defence are presented in Sharp and in Martin. 10 It is here that Taoism and deep-green theory part company. Under Taoism, the state will have a standing army, but a defensive army operating by strange, surprise tactics (p.201). No doubt defensive wars are to remain last resort action. Nonetheless the state will operate in secrecy, in a way incompatible with decentralised social defence; people will be kept in the dark about smart weapons of the state; and they too will be surprised, along with presumed enemies of the state. By contrast, under deep-green theory, there should be no hidden smart weapons of state; information would flow more freely and not be hidden from the people (who should retain influence in informed decision making). Under deep-green, standing armies, and more generally military organisation, will be wound down altogether. Taoism should have pushed its searching criticism further. For military objectives, easily acquired by standing armies with time on their hands, are frequently incompatible with Taoism. For example, Taoism is opposed to domination (LT p.152), whereas military operations frequently seek or involve domination; and military structure is invariably hierarchical and authoritarian. Taoism aims for self-regulation, wherever feasible (cf. p.201); so does deep­ green theory, which is one reasons why it aims to dispose of standing armies, as an important preliminary to the withering away of states themselves (military forces being major props of state control and power, and often maintained primarily for internal state security). Taoism has no project for ending the era of wars; deep-green theory does. That project involves an elimination of standing armies, too often poised for fighting or political interference. A recommended route to end war consists in progressive scaling down: reduction of the means and manpower. The initial stages are well-known, and include • elimination of nuclear, biological and chemical weaponry, and • force reduction. It can hardly be pretended that the Earth's states have managed to proceed very far on even this complex of stages. The next stage consists in • contraction to defensive capacities only, and the final stage consists in • elimination of remaining military defensive forces, and adoption, so far as required, of social defence practices. The complete route thus involves complete demilitarisation. Reasons why deep-green aims to proceed the full distance are readily grasped by considering the environmental shallowness of an otherwise cogent traditional case for the sharp curtailment of wars and militarism. The traditional Western case against wars has been primarily along two dimensions: social and moral. Wars are highly disruptive of the social fabric; wars may be unjust. From these joint features, it was argued that wars should be a matter of last resort, to be fought to ensure peace. It was argued further that only just wars should be fought. Just wars were rare objects. But as there was little evidence of the decline and fall of wars, much effort was expended, more practically and unsuccessfully, upon endeavouring to improve the calibre of wars, and more theoretically, upon trying to characterize just war satisfactorily, or rather to bend the notion in an effort to approximate the gory unjust facts. 11 Progress was long hindered, furthermore, because there was always a rival positive perspective on wars, which encouraged the exaltation of wars and military feats. It also facilitated the transfer of the favourable image of war to other problem areas, whence the long and apparently successful war against Nature (but the short-term successes are turning into long-term problems), the short and unsuccessful war against Poverty, and so on. Behind all this is the complex idea of war as rejuvenating, even cleansing, like fire; of war as heroic, and glorious, of war as the supreme testing ground of men. These pictures of war - finally shattered by the first World War (where even the poets began to tell of horrors and atrocities) and subsequent technological wars - though no longer in ascendency, have by no means vanished. The notion of war as rejuvenating a flagging economy persists, along with the practice of keeping capitalism running smoothly by integrating substantial military components into the industrial engine. With the development of highly technological wars - the celebrated development of the dirty industrial age is substantially military - the traditional negative case has grown in strength. Wars have become much more damaging, with the potential for much more that is significantly worse, and the possibility of a just war has correspondingly contracted, virtually to zero. The opposition to war has likewise grown, but more than correspondingly with the rise of women in social and political influence. Wars have almost always and everywhere been Men's affairs; likewise conquest. Deep-green theory accepts much of the traditional negative case, but would further strengthen it. For example, the stricture against unjust wars, as out and out immoral, can be strengthened, through the following syllogism: All wars should be fully just wars. Modem wars cannot be fully just wars. Therefore, there should be no modern wars. A fully just war is not merely a just war, but a war those just character can be reliably forecast in advance. A modern war is of course a war that deploys modern technology, at least that available this century. The evidential basis for the second premiss derives from much information that collateral damage, damage to innocent bystanders and involved citizens is always likely and cannot be excluded. Such wars are always liable to violate uncontroversial requirements for a just war, even if they are purely “conventional” wars, not throwing radiation or chemical or biological weapons around. From a contemporary viewpoint the traditional doctrine of a just war, really of a just defensive vjsi, is seriously out of date. The reasons for this reach wider than the new features introduced by modem technological wars and the character of modem civilization, with its giant cities littered with dangerous and vulnerable military targets. They have also to do with the chauvinism of the justice proposed, which is shallow human justice, not natural or environmental justice. There is no consideration of justice to other creatures or to the Earth (cf Naess p.160). Two troubles are really intertwined here: conceptual difficulties with too narrow a notion of justice, and ideological difficulties with too narrow a vision of what is an object of value, of what counts. The deep-green case against war adds to the traditional case a further dimension, neglected until very recently: the environmental dimension. It has suddenly been seen that wars are typically environmental atrocities. Earlier, of course, “environments” were simply backgrounds, backdrops in paintings and plays, to the real drama. Contemporary technological wars tend to be not merely social tragedies but environmental ones as well. There is a doctrine of just war, but it is a human chauvinistic affair. There is no similarly developed doctrine of an ecologically sound war, a deep ecological war. Unless any such war were literally different from modern wars, that is from contemporary technological wars, it would overstep permitted bounds. For such wars are characteristically ecological disasters. Hardened military people, desensitized by a rigorous unethical training, feel even less compunction about degrading or destroying environments or members of other species than they do of maiming or killing civilians through “collateral” activity. Matching the no-just-war syllogism is a no-sound-war syllogism: All wars should be environmentally sound wars. Modern wars cannot be environmentally sound. Therefore, there should be no modern wars. The argument for the second premiss has of course to be different. It looks to the information accumulating on what wars do to natural and built environments. The Vietnam and Gulf wars both inflicted immense damage on natural environments or what was left of them. The environmental effects of war are not confined to direct and collateral damage. There are indirect effects also. Thus, for instance, war also supplied the mechanism of, and the technology for, modern environmental destruction: explosives, bulldozers from tanks, etc. As well, training for war and engagement in war have much fostered, along with attitudes that make for social callousness or ruthlessness, those that contribute to environmental insensitivity and cruelty. 3. Puzzles about Taoist strategy and its critiques of technology and violence ‘It is surprising how much of the Lao Tzu is devoted to military strategy’. Which strategies? Surprise, above all. But why such strategies? ‘Do they not contradict the Taoists’ strong opposition to the use of force’ (Chan p.222), the implied commitment to quietism? Briefly, Taoism is not committed to quietism, and while certainly antagonistic to violence, does not oppose certain uses of force (only really ///-forcing, as will be explained). Even so, the emphasis on military strategy remains puzzling. The strategies, many of them relevant to social defence, include • seriousness, not ‘making light of the enemy’ (p.222) 13 • surprise, and nonvisibility (p.201). The defensive strategy involves guerilla tactics: marching without formation, holding weapons without seeming to have them, confronting enemies without seeming to meet them (p.222). But even in times of peace, ‘smart weapons of the state should not be displayed to the people’ (p.164). Such recommendations helped to fuel the charge of deviousness lodged against Lao Tzu. But look at part of the reason for concealing smart weapons: ‘The more smart weapons the people have, the more troubled the state will be’ (p.201). Smart weapons are carried in corrupt states, where the rich engage in conspicuous consumption and the people are suppressed, not where Tao is practiced (LT p. 194). • advance from weakness, flexibility but firmness. Weakness is the principle of life and will overcome strength (LT p.164, p.233). • coolness and non-competition (LT p.233, p.164). Like these, most of the general strategies are standard Taoist practices simply applied to military conduct. For these standard practices the charge of deviousness looks feeble. The response applies more generally to other allegedly devious political strategies. For the strategies are but application of Taoist principles and techniques to warfare, politics and elsewhere. Nothing excludes application of these techniques to what are accounted, in general, unnecessary evils (which must sometimes, on other Taoist grounds, be countered). Nor, to meet the main criticism, need any deceit or deviousness be involved; nor is it. In particular, the legalist tactic, Tn order to grasp, it is necessary first to give’ (LT p.164), is cited as involving ‘an element of deceit’ ‘undeniably’, and ‘worse’ it is ‘morally questionable’ (Chan p.17). But in order for me to grasp your hand in a normal handshake, it is necessary first for me to give my hand. There is no deceit here, nothing morally questionable. All the tactics permit of benign construals, of a Taoist kind. Consider, for instance, Tn order to contract, it is necessary first to expand’ (LT p.164). In order to bend a copper pipe to the intended angle, it is better to bend it first a little further than required. The transformation of water to ice (both favoured natural items for symbolic purposes: natural processes which may look devious!) neatly illustrates the Taoist principle (which is however hardly necessary), and shows softness and weakness turned hardness and strength. The Taoist critique of militarism is as much a critique of technology as of war. Sharp weapons, ‘smart weapons’ as we might now say, come in for much critical attention, as we have already noticed. Only in corrupt and degenerate states are they displayed or flaunted (p.194, p.164); in deep-green regions smart weapons of state’ would not be retained unexhibited. The people will not have them for they mean trouble (p.201); for similar reasons deep-green regions will be free of them. So, it seems, will ideal Taoist regions: ‘Even if there are arrows and weapons, none will display them’ (LT p.238). Much technology, military and other, is excluded under the Taoist edict against violence (a further facet of the military-practices 14 paradox).5 The powerful critique of militarism in the Tao-te Ching is coupled with strong opposition to violence. Some of the linkage is evident enough. Militarism as practised represents an ultimate form of state (or party) violence. A basic theme is that violent practices will come to an unnatural end, and accordingly to a non-Taoist end (generalising LT p.176). While force may occur in spectacular, but satisfactory, natural forms, force is duly distinguished from violence. To force the growth of life means ill omen. For the mind to employ the vital force without restraint means violence (LT p. 197). One who follows Tao does not apply dominating force, which usually has had results bringing requital (p.152). Dominating force, like power, is in general castigated, under doctrine of wu- wei, no forced actions, no violence. To force natural growth is deviant, destroying harmony. To stop natural growth is deviant. But there is a significant difference between force and violence. To intentionally employ destructive force is to do violence. To so force things is condemned. To remain in harmony with things one does not so force things or practice violence. There is a non-interference principle at work, which also indicates types of non­ interference that are excluded. However Taoism does not always get the distinction between force and violence quite Under contemporary technology and technological arrangements, such as the storage of quantities of oil and nuclear and chemical materials in great cities, wars have assumed new and very destructive dimensions, to the point of being utterly irresponsible. A different approach to technology, as to war, is now mandatory. These are no longer things that can in principle be nicely confined and need not touch parties outside the fray. An important part of ending wars, “winning the war against wars”, is removing the technology of war, above all from irresponsible state power. As for which technology to try to jettison and which to try to retain or improve, it is not so difficult to indicate, provided evaluative terminology is not outlawed. What is wanted is technology that is good in its place, what should be excluded is technology that is indifferent or bad or potentially so. Technology to be justified has to do something worthwhile, it has to address identifiable respectable needs. That is why merely indifferent technology is out; there is no virtue in technology for technology's sake, as it is a mere means technique. It is because of the crucial evaluative component in choice of technology that appropriateness, itself evaluative, comes closer to encapsulating the criterion than other recent efforts. Size, such as smallness, or intermediateness, are not what matter, though modest and not excessive technologies are likely to fare better in satisfying appropriateness. In simpler societies, small technology is of course more appropriate; for that is what is good there. From known criteria for what is good these other features for locally appropriate technology can be read off: reliability, esp. in maintenance, functioning well and safely under the expected range of operating conditions (which may be difficult), ease of repair, capital cheapness and repair inexpensiveness, environmental benignness, and meeting sound social needs. 15 right. ‘Vital force without restraint’, intentionally excessive force, is only part of what counts as violence, which is more generally force which violates, i.e. transgresses, descrecrates, profanes, injures, outrages, etc. It is thus a negatively connoted force, an evil force in some specified intentional respect. There is a tendency for Taoist commentators, not Taoists, to regard Taoism as condemning all uses, or even occurrences, of force, but this is not so. Rather intentional ill-forcing is what is castigated, what is deviant. Thus Taoism does not exclude a range of defensive practices, which make satisfactory use of natural forces, like letting the machines of war industry stop. Those who would abolish war and its machinery, substituting for it nonwarlike and ideally nonviolent methods, technology, and strategies, have been confronted not merely with much sub-rational abuse but with plenty of criticism and even some paradoxes. Here is a recent paradox concerning war and nonviolence: • War must be abolished. One reason is simply economic. We can no longer afford it, and the opportunity costs are enormous. Along with other extraordinarily wasteful activities, it is an anachronism. • Doing so cannot be accomplished without violence, i.e. in effect, given the types of violence involved, without what amounts to war. According to a fuller version of this premiss, the process of abolishing a war would only be achieved through a revolution so profound that it could not succeed without extensive and extreme violence, amounting to (civil) war. ° But then war cannot be abolished without war. Therefore, war which must be abolished cannot be abolished.6 This “paradox” has been compared with the Liar paradox, but the parallel does not persist far. For this paradox does not involve self-referential features, and is easily broken, as follows. Let the “last war” be not the last standard war but the revolution abolishing war. Then, given that the revolution is successful, war will be abolished therewith, i.e. with that last war. There need be no regress, given again a successful outcome. All the premisses stand intact, but the conclusion, following the ‘therefore’ is a nonsequitur. However, while the dissolution of the argument is accordingly logically fine, the route is repugnant. Standard pacifism challenges the 6 Brian Medlin, who forcefully propounded this puzzle, set other analogous puzzles alongside it - designed to reveal deep difficulties in contemporary political, and especially alternative, thought. Another puzzle, concerning liberty and repression in the context of capitalism, revolved around the following inconsistent triad: • capitalism must be removed, but liberty retained. • capitalism cannot be removed without repression. • repression is antithetical to liberty. The puzzle is resolved as with the analogous puzzle of abolishing. Let the “last capitalist” action before the days of liberty be the repressive but liberating revolution overthrowing capitalism. 16 second premiss. 4. Standard and moral pacifism. Although Taoism is strongly opposed to war, and much in favour of peace - and accordingly by prevailing standards a substantially pacific position - it is not (nowhere in the central texts) committed to pacifism in usual senses, for two different reasons: • It is not, by contrast with pacifism, opposed to all types of warfare, for example smart defensive wars. • It eschews deontology in terms of which moral pacifism is commonly stated, for instance through the watershed thesis P2. It is morally wrong to use violence. By contrast with Taoism, deep environmentalism does not avoid deontic claims, and is committed in principle to nonviolent technologies and ways and to pacifistic principles. Moreover, certain forms of deep environmentalism are completely committed to pacifism, notably European forms. Is deep green? There is heavy contemporary opposition to pacifism, as there also was to Taoism in the warring times when Taoism was first being promulgated. Many of the central institutions of contemporary life are intricated in coercion, violence and war. The most prominent contemporary institutions, states, are premissed on these elements of damaging force; they claim entitlement to use them widely, and even claim a certain territorial monopoly on their use. As a result they are having constantly to engage in them in attempt to maintain that monopoly. They are certainly the main perpetrators of wars, and of violence. They are indeed inured to wars, are in constant preparation for wars, yet propound dialectial (and normally dishonest and cynical) doctrines of peace through war (for a recent example see the appendix). Unremarkably then, the extensive propagandistic machinery of state has invested heavily in “justificatory” exercises in favour of controlled use, its own use, of destructive force, and continues to inveigh against pacifism. Because a routine trick in this sophistical repetoire consists in conflating pacifism with extreme, naive and inplausible, forms, an inevitable and important early task commits in unscrambling senses of ‘pacifism’. Semantical skulduggery can be thwarted in this way. Pacifism, as explained by English dictionaries, invariably concerns wars and warfare, and contains two components, negative and, elaborating on that, positive:- The negative component is, in Amauld's word, anti-War-ism, opposition (in ways to be further specified) to all forms of warfare (see OED). The positive component supplies alternative ways of settling disputes (what it is supposed that wars with some semblance of justification involve), such as negotiation, arbitration, ... - and, adding to too narrow dictionary accounts - sanctions, substitutions (e.g. of sporting events, operatic contests, cooperative ventures), ... . In brief standard pacifism is opposition to all warfare and resolution of potential wars by other nonmilitary means. 17 Plainly the opposition to warfare, like the sanctions and so on, cannot itself be military (using soldiers and other devices of war), on pain of some incoherence. But otherwise the ways of opposition can be many and various: they can certainly be active, as with nonviolent demonstrations, resistance movements, and so forth, and they may also be devious (e.g. turning the forces of war upon themselves so they are neutralised). It quickly becomes evident, then, that some of the dictionaries offer but loaded definitions which, by restricting the negative components, reduce the initial appeal and plausibility of pacifism. Consider the Concise English definition of the negative component: ‘the doctrine of non-resistance to hostilities and of total non-co-operation with any form of warfare’. Thereby excluded are forms of pacifism which offer active and plausible alternatives to warfare such as social defence. The Concise English tends to force pacifism into what the Oxford English Dictionary lists as its final item: ‘often, with depreciatory implication, the advocacy of peace at any price’, ‘in any circumstance’. Pacifism can easily resist being forced into these sorts of circumstances: it has many resources, as an extensive series of texts on alternatives to war, such as negotiation, non­ violent action and social defence, from Taoism to contemporary environmentalism attest. Academic philosophers have much advanced the semantical strategy of some dictionaries, of rendering pacifism more difficult from the very outset by narrow and biassed definitions. They have stretched the term from its restricted setting of warfare, confined to state and organised gang violence, to cover all forms of violence, from state and interstate to, what is very different, personal and interpersonal violence. Call the resulting considerably stretched notion of pacifism, according to which it is morally wrong to use violence, according to which P2 holds, stretched pacifism? While stretched pacifism certainly includes standard pacifism (unless the notions of war and warfare are tampered with), the converse is very far from being the case. A pacifist is in no way committed to stretched pacifism, which is a much more problematic and difficult position than standard pacifism. There are several, substantially different reasons for this, which will be picked up seriatim. Stretched pacifism, also misleadingly called moral pacifism, has looked a very easy critical target to moral philosophers. Many the effusive philosopher who, upon sighting such a target, has charged, whooping such rhetoric as “incoherent”, “inconsistent”, “insensitive”, “fanatical”. However, with improved logical technology now available for accommodating and treating moral dilemmas, it is no great feat to resist such attacks, in the fashion of previous investigations (see esp. Al, also MD). A main aim was to demonstrate that stretched pacifism was not so stupid as it was made out to be or appeared to be to these inured to present dominant violent ways. So far from being stupid, it is viable. In future gentler times stretched pacifism 7 In Al this notion was contrasted with standard pacifism as comprehensive pacifism: overcomprehensive might have been better. 18 could even be realised for whole communities of creatures (as some genuinely Christian sects envisaged); whence it will finally be seen to be feasible not merely for sages and supermen, and many ordinary women, but much more extensively. The method of philosophical accommodation was through moral dilemmas. The sort of moral dilemma that stretched pacifism can induce derives as follows. On the one side stands the theme P2, Wv, in convenient symbols, for Wrong V-ing, violencing. Now this implies to WB, where B presents a case of of violence. On the other side, particular circumstances develop which lead to W ~B, because ~B would produce in the circumstances considerable wrong, for instance extensive violence, mass murder, etc. One stock example from the literature concerns calling off the firing squad about to shoot several captives if the pacifist shoots one of them (it is elaborated in Al p. 13). Interestingly, another stock example from the literature concerns standard pacifism (it can also be presented in terms of patriotism; for details of both see MD p. 10). Resolution of intractable moral dilemmas is, where it is required, situational. The agent decides in the situation, within the fix, what to do. There are many ways in which such decision making can proceed, less rational, such as those applying chance or involving bad faith, or more rational, such as those applying consequentialist decision theory (for details see MD, pp.32-9). A decision theory taking account of all that should be included will not however be purely consequential. It would also take account of relevant motivation. This defence and rehabilitation of moral pacifism has been challenged, in particular by Smith (hereafter JWS). JWS claims the defence offered is a ‘failure because it trivializes pacifism’ (p. 153 twice). The rehabilitation trivializes pacifism because it entails that pacifism doesn't substantially differ from a form of activism which holds that while violence is always wrong one is sometimes justified on consequentialist grounds for preferring violent acts, if these acts are lesser evils than any other real alternatives. This is the commonsense position which most people hold - yet - pacifism after all was supposed to be radical moral doctrine - (p.153 rearranged).8 Part of the criticism is, then, not so much that pacifism is trivialized - JWS “activism” is hardly trivial - as that pacifism is popularised, deflated from a radical position to the commonsense position most people hold (p.154 also). Yet not a shred of evidence is adduced that JWS activism is such a populist position. Available evidence, for example from peace movements and oppositional opinion polls, suggests the very opposite: that, for instance, most people support state-justified conventional wars with the military violence they incur, and 8 JWS now informs me that he has changed his position. Whether the move effects his criticism, I don't know. 19 accordingly do not hold that violence is always wrong. From such a commonsense angle, pacifism with its condemnation of conventional wars and the violence they involve remains a radical doctrine. As regards wars and other violence-incurring social authorities, contemporary pacificism is, as previous explained (e.g. Al p.3), a form of activism. Pacifism does not imply utter pacifity, but may actively involve social defence, resistance and so on. However a certain level of misrepresentation enters into the JWS challenge in the details of what forms of activism pacifism may include. That misrepresentation begins in the second clause concerning what is said to be sometimes justified. For the situational procedure where dilemmas arise will not generally be consequential applying a principle of lesser evil. In dilemmatic situations such principles are suspended, and such a principle is in any case unacceptable to moral pacifists. A small amount of violence may be less bad in its consequences than verbal offence, but a principled pacifist will choose the slightly greater evil where other obligations do not exclude it. A more serious distortion occurs in JWS's effort to force procedures in dilemma situations into purely consequentialist form. In fact consequential decision theory was deployed as a model only for how to proceed rationally in a situational setting where deontic procedures were suspended (see MD p.38). What was said, still misleadingly retrospective vision reveals, was this: ‘what is done is a very consequentialist thing’ (Al p.13), not ‘one acts in a consequentialist fashion to do the sufficiently good thing in the circumstances’ (JWS p.152). Situationally other procedures than those resembling orthodox rational decision making (modified from maximizing to satisizing objectives) may be adopted (MD p.38). Further the orthodox consequentialist theory is inadequate because it leaves out, or tries to reduce to consequences, nonconsequential elements, notably motives. It is not difficult, in principle (in advance of attempted consequentialization of motives), to design situations where motives, such as integrity or maintaining faith, enter to yield outcomes upsetting consequential calculations. More elaborate decision making procedures than those of consequentialism, sometimes at variance with consequentialism, are thus presupposed. A further part of JWS's criticism accordingly goes by the board, the alleged appeal ‘to “second best” consequentialist considerations,... already explicitly condemned’ (p. 154). What was condemned was stock universal consequentialism, ‘that only consequentialist considerations carry argumentative weight’ (quoted on p. 152), so undercutting other deontic principles, such as those of pacifism. It was not claimed, what is utterly different, that consequentialist considerations can nowhere enter into deliberation and decision making. The conclusion JWS arrives at is therefore substantially astray. After criticising modern moral philosophy for its reliance upon consequentialist modes of thought, it is surprising, and inconsistent, to find ... [reliance] upon such modes of thought to escape logical difficulties raised by moral dilemmas facing ... pacifis[m] (p. 152) 20 There is no inconsistency. JWS has confused universal with particular. As well he has wrongly contracted all situational decision making to consequentialist modes. There is a third part to the criticism, that the defence is too easy; the ‘strategy will allow too much violence to be (perpetrated and) justified to suit the tastes of any real pacifist’ (p. 153). This another part of the so-called trivialization, this time however dilution rather than populatization, weakening the moral stand against violence. This third contention is premissed on a mistake: that one can ‘justify on consequentialist grounds any number of violent acts, providing that such acts are lesser evils than other real alternatives facing social agents’ (p. 153). Moral pacifism offers no such licence; allowing such consequentialism to take over was never part of the position. The slide to such consequentialism is made on the strength of a similarly erroneous example. The potential victim of an aspiring rapist ‘is supposed to flee or wriggle free if possible. But it is easy to consequentially justify the use of violence by the woman to prevent herself from being raped’ (p. 153 italics added). In the example so far described there is no dilemma, and no such easy resort to consequentially ‘justified’ violence. What allows too much violence is the lesser evil JWS assumes is easily consequentially justified; for example that the woman is entitled to inflict, and escalate, violence so long as it remains ‘a lesser evil than the violence of attempted rape’ (p. 153). Since she may thereby inflict quite unreasonable damage (esp. if she is a Kung Fu expert), the result is inconsistent with ‘the basic principle of self-defence’ which JWS earlier adduced according to which what is ‘appropriate, in response is only that level of force necessary to defend oneself against the threat’ (p. 150). There is evidence in JWS's work of some enthusiasm for levels of violence which exceed his ‘basic principle’, his appeal to ‘lesser evil’ generates some instances. The ‘basic principle’, itself fraught with difficulties (cf. the contorted discussion of what weapons are appropriate in response to what attacks, p. 150), still exceeds what stretched pacifism would enjoin; for instance, it may not be appropriate to respond with force. But in a technical sense stretched pacifism is compatible with the ‘basic principle’, since it only imposes the upper bound on level of force. As for easiness, moral pacifism is not an easy position to live by, or to justify. Removing objections to pacifism is one thing; solidifying a positive case for it is quite another, and so far hardly conclusive (as Al tried to explain, pp 29-31). Stretched pacifism was advanced, hypothesized to put it more precisely, as a still viable option. It was not presented as a morally compulsory position, or, for that matter, as one that this defender adhered to or affirmed. To reiterate, while a cumulative case can be made for stetched pacifism as principled non­ violence, that case was not conclusive, and is hard to improve. For, further, some serious difficulties standing in the way of stretched pacifism were assembled, the most important of which derives from the extent of violence apparent in transactions within the natural world. Simply consider the practices of carnivores, essential to their natural way of life. In order to meet their life needs for sustenance, these creatures do, and are often obliged to, engage 21 routinely in violent activity. While it can no doubt be argued, as some vegetarians may do, that the natural order is an immoral order, and that remaining carnivores should be converted to vegetarianism as rapidly as proves possible (in the way domestic dogs are converted to dog biscuits), the difficulties with such proposals are immense. The task envisaged is gigantic, and beyond human capacities - even if it were desirable. For there are millions of species to be somehow converted to proper vegetarianism. Then there are millions of other species to be converted to proper and well regulated contraceptive practices, else their numbers will get out of hand (uncontrollably) with predation removed. Given humans lack of success in limiting their own excessive numbers, such regulation appears entirely remote. Aside however from the practical difficulties, is such a fully vegetarian order, with evolution further derailed, a desirable improvement on the natural order? Is it morally obligatory? It is certainly not obligatory, as alternative systems of morality in harmony with the prevailing natural order are feasible. Nor is it desirable, for (to appeal to such alternative value systems) the natural order is more or less in order as it is. Full vegetarianization would only reduce its value, vastly. More generally, a defensible ethical framework should not, it would be rightly contended, be right out of step with the natural order of other creatures, decently depicted. Decent depiction is important, for some features of the natural order, such as competition, combat and predation, so far from escaping attention, have been grossly exaggerated and exploited. Thus, for instance, the ludicrous picture of nature red in truth and claw, so beloved of descendents of orthodox Victorians and of orthodox economists. However, even under decent depiction, the natural order is often not benign. That appears to be enough to induce a supervenient moral dilemma for any stretched pacifism which is coupled to a deep ethic (e.g. which does not separate humans out from the natural order) and which eschews the desperate vegetarian route: The natural order is not an immoral order The natural order contains (regular) instances of violence. Therefore, instances of violence are not immoral - in apparent defiance of P2 Moreover, there are too many instances of violence, too regularly occurring, for them all to be plausibly shunted into the moral dilemma category (and predatory carnivores face no dilemmas). Raptors that practice violence every week are not immoral (neither are they clearly moral; the category of morality only significantly extends so far). The main trouble lies however with P2 (which needs some finer adjustment, as was alrady indicated in Al). While P2 is alright in context, within a particular, perfectly viable, ethical framework, designed for the usual human round, the conventional setting for ethical theories, it stands in need of modification outside that setting. It is time to suggest the sort of modification envisaged. Evidently P2 was addressed to moral agents. Which agents? Not to carnivores that supply their own livelihood, nor really to morally degenerate humans, but to 22 peace-sensitive agents. With that semi-technical form, yet to be characterised, a suitably modified P2 results: MP2. It is morally wrong, for a peace-sensitive agent, to use violence.9 To recover what amounts, in the previous discussive context, to P2, it suffices to add the proposition that every human agent ought to be peace-sensitive. Much as that proposition has to recommend it, it appears too ethically advanced for many modern humans; it sets too high a moral standard to be taken as a serious guide to practice. It seems wise to settle presently for something less demanding, such as that every advanced moral agent ought to be peace sensitive. To put essentially the same proposition alternatively: Stretched pacifism (as modified) is supererogatory. While it is perhaps too late to hope for much moral progress in humans, it is pleasant to contemplate alternative futures where what is supererogatory became obligatory, and widely practiced. Richard Sylvan* Appendix I began drafting this essay at the time (January 17, midday Australian time) of the American attacks upon Iraq. The optly named Prime Minister Hawke of Australia had just made a statement to the nation-state, announcing (the) war. In this statement there was much talk of peace. There was even - in what was effectively a declaration of war - reiteration of the modern quest for ‘a new world order of peace’. Peace through war; so it rings out again and again, through the centuries. ‘War must be for the sake of peace’ (Aristotle p.220). More than two thousand years later, we have fought those wars to end all wars. But it is no use, Hawke solemely pronounced, just talking about peace, and thinking about peace; we must work for peace, fight for it - through war. Impeccable logic? President Bush, supreme commander, convinced us with similar logic, speaking too with many tongues. Of how he ‘preferred to think of peace, not war’. But now ‘only force will prevail’, as ‘all reasonable efforts to reach a peaceful solution are exhausted’. ‘What must be done’ must be done, or will be anyway. With God on side with the US offensive (as well as on the other side), it will go well. As it was said to have, though it achieved comparatively little that other efforts may not have yielded more satisfactorily, and thought it may now have to 9 The generalization of P2, suggested in Al, to cover also the parallel situation of environmental vandalism, can be similarly modified. The anti-vandolence principle becomes MP2°. It is morally wrong, for a peace- and environmentally-sensitive agent, to use vandolence. Thank to David Bennett for joint contributions (from UT) and to JWS for opposition (in JWS) I 23 followed with another invasion. Nor have we ever managed to glimpse much of what is now supposed, when we are no longer engaged, to come ‘out of the horror of war’: a ‘new world order ... which governs the conflict of nations’; a ‘rule of law’, not war. How the one, enforcable law, is achieved, unless backed by the the other, is not explained (Medlin's paradox hits back). Similarly what we now hear from many militarists, as they rush to war, is that ‘peace is a great good, war a great evil’. But, for the most part, only the rhetoric has shifted; practice has scarcely changed at all. REFERENCES W.-T. Chan, A Source Book on Chinese Philosophy, Princeton University Press, 1963; referred to as ST. W.-T. Chan (ed.), The Way of Lao Tzu (Tao-te Ching), Bobbs-Merrill, New York, 1963; referred to as LT. B. Martin, Uprooting War, Freedom Press, London, 1984. A. Naess, Ecology, community and lifestyle, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge UK, 1989. R.A. Rapaport, Pigs for the Ancestors : ritual in the ecology of a New Guinea People, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1967. R. Routley, ‘War and Peace II. On the alleged inconsistency, moral insensitivity and fanaticism of pacifism’, Discussion papers in environmental philosophy #9, Research School of Social Science, Australian National University, 1983 (also in Inquiry ); referred to as Al. R. Routley and V. Plumwood, ‘Moral dilemmas and the logic of deontic notions’, Discussion papers in environmental philosophy #6, Research School of Social Science, Australian National University, 1984 (also in Paraconsistent Logic)’, referred to as MD. R. Routley, ‘War and Peace I. On the ethics of large-scale nuclear war and nuclear-deterrence and the political fall-out’, Discussion papers in environmental philosophy, #5, Research School Of Social Science, Australian National University, 1984. G. Sharp, Social Power and Political Freedom, Porter Sargent, Boston, 1980. J.W. Smith, The Worms at the Heart of Things , Public Relations Unit, Flinders University, 1989. R. Sylvan, ‘War and Peace III, Australia's defence philosophy’, Social Philosophy, for Nuclear Conference, University of Queensland, 1985. R. Sylvan and D. Bennett, ‘Of Utopias, Tao and Deep Ecology’, Discussion papers in environmental philosophy #19, Research School of Social Science, Australian National University, 1990; referred to as UT. 2 more widely, ‘to life in general’ (p. 17). But why should military activity obtain some special dispensation? Why should what is not tolerated more generally be exonerated there? But given that Taoism has here the virtue of consistency (i.e. uniformity on principles) and of universalizability, that simply leaves more explaining to be done. • Puzzles for Taoism, and wars as unavoidable evils There are two puzzles here in Taoism rather than one. There is the military-practices paradox, and, varying and generalising on that, there are life-practices paradoxes. The special paradox is generated by the following incompatible elements: on the one side, ‘the most bitter attack on militarism’, the well-known opposition of Taoism to the use of force (p.17) and to the possession and use of smart military weapons and technology - implying that war is far from all right - and on the other, advocacy of certain (devious) military tactics, outlines of (deceitful) conduct in war, and so on - implying that war is all right after all. A straightforward generalisation of this paradox would look at other morally-sensitive parts of life, where some practice was strongly condemned yet engaged in (for many examples, see the dilemmas assembled in MD). But the variation of concern to Chan and the neo-Confucians concerns the conjunction of upright with devious practices in life, in particular in the life of the sage. For a Taoist sage is presumed to lead an upright straightforward life, yet appears to engage in devious and even deceitful practices incompatible with such a life-style. Call this the Taoist-lifestyle paradox. Evidently a good deal of explaining is required, as to how Taoism can coherently take the positions it appears to presume, both on war and peace, and on life more generally. A desirable preliminary would seem to be a little investigation of what position is taken, especially on war and militarism. One key pasage runs: Fine weapons are instruments of evil They are hated by creatures Therefore those who possess the Tao turn away from them.... Weapons are instruments of evil, not the instruments of a good ruler. When he uses them unavoidably, he regards calm restraint as the best principle Even when he is victorious, he does not regard it as praiseworthy, For to praise victory is to delight in the slaughter of men. He who delights in the slaughter of men will not succeed in the empire. ... For a victory, let us observe the occasion with funeral-ceremonies (LT p.154). Wars, which involve the use of weapons, instruments of evil, are accordingly themselves evil. They are also evil because they involve the slaughter of men. But they are also sometimes unavoidable (also p.152). Therefore such wars are unavoidable evils. Such discourse, obtained by almost immediate inference from the passage, is within the standard orbit of dilemma talk. But Taoism lacks, through deliberately eschewing deontic talk, the discourse which enables direct expression of such dilemmas, or even direct condemnation of wars or of clever weapons. Instead the points are made by circumlocution, what the possesser of Tao 3 does, how the good ruler conducts himself, or by analogy, of victory in war with death. Unavoidable evils are the very stuff of deontic dilemmas (though many theories, underpinned by shonky logic, lack the resources for representing this stuff properly). Where something is unavoidably evil, it is both bad, because evil, and also not bad, doing it is excusable, because it is unavoidable. So, given such an argument (which has its weaknesses), an unavoidable evil is a genuinely dilemmatic object with inconsistent features. Certain wars have looked, since ancient times, like such dilemmatic objects. Revealingly, Chan tries to explain that ‘most troublesome element’ in Taoism, the military-practice paradox, through the following exercise in lateral thinking: It can ... be argued that Lao Tzu uses warfare to illustrate his principles of taking no action and weakness because warfare is among the most dynamic and critical of human experiences, just as the Indian classic, the Bhagavadgita chooses fighting as the theme on which to discuss the terrible dilemma whether one should fulfil his duty, as in the case of a soldier, and kill, or should fail in his duty and refrain from killing (p. 17). ‘Just as’? The Indian classic prevents a classic moral dilemma, a dilemma represented in contemporary philosophy (following its rediscovery by Sartre), where there are incompatible duties: the duty to kill, because of one's role as a soldier, and the duty not to kill, because of one's human condition, and the supervenient dilemma of failing in and fulfilling one's duties. These dilemmas for an individual (male, as it then was) are replicated in dilemmas regarding war for group institutions: at bottom, the obligation to engage in war (for one set of compelling reasons) as contraposed with the obligation not to engage in war (for another, perhaps overlapping, set of reasons). A theory of moral dilemmas (as worked out for example in MD) is crucial for an adequate treatment of major issues in war and peace, especially (as will become evident) for a viable strong pacifism. But Taoism, eschewing deontic discourse, lacks the apparatus to state or develop moral dilemmas. Hence it is logically excluded from giving a full or adequate account of what is going on conceptually. One of the philosophically fascinating feature of Taoism is the fashion in which it manages to avoid deontic discourse, and to substitute for direct deontic discourse or improvise circumlocutions when deontic discourse would otherwise appear inevitable (cf. UT for examples). But there are costs. One is inability to display the mechanism of deontic dilemmas, or to show what reasons and argument lie behind Taoist prounouncements and conclusions (the shortage of Taoism on argument is another philosophically conspicious feature, also observed in UT). As conceptual apparatus for analysizing moral dilemmas is missing, most of the machinery involved has to be passed over. Only the outcomes, as Taoism sees them, are presented, as if from a black box. Taoism blacks out the story on deontic dilemmas that deep-green theory can tell, as the following diagram tries to show: 4 Diagrams . Charting the processing of deontic dilemmas that are “resolved”. Deep-green chart: Arguments to Processing of dilemma, directive dilemma incompatible situational procedures output input prescriptions Corresponding Taoist chart: Black directive Box output It is evident that Taoism can be extended', information can be put into the Black Box rendering it less opaque. That extension can be made so as to conform to deep-green theory, i.e. so that the extended Taoist chart, a neo-Daoist chart, looks like the deep-green one. That is indeed essentially how neo-Daoism get characterised, in terms of conformity of the extension to deep ecological theory (see UT). We are now placed to explain how to dissolve, or at least neutralize, the paradoxes deriving from repudiation of militarism, an awkwardly qualified repudiation in the case of Taoism. In a significant sense there is no resolving of genuine deontic dilemmas. The principles delineating the fix may stand, incompatible, signalling the persisting suboptimality (or better, sublimenality) of the dilemmatic situation. Where there is a dilemma, involved parties should try to do well enough in the sublimenal circumstances (for a much fuller account, see MD). Thus where there is a war, itself a non-Taoist process, engaged or caught up Taoists will not abandon Taoism. Taoist methods will be applied, Taoist strategies pursued. So much for theoretical representation and (non-)resolution of life-practices and other dilemmas, details of which are readily elaborated in deep-green extensions of Taoism. A prior substantive issue is whether dilemmas always are generated: not whether wars are evil (typically they are, an issue we shall come to), but whether wars are unavoidable. Analysis of wars does not bear that familiar claim out decisively. Many wars could have been avoided, through conciliation, negotiation, restraint, etc., and no worse results apparently obtained, through sanctions, exchange, trade, etc. Through a typology of wars (coming up) that conjecture can be given some substance. Consider, for instance, what would be walk-overs. Then there is little point in making a military response. So war can be avoided. Certainly an occupation, to be met in a different way, may still occur. And so on, perhaps, for various other types of war. But, more generally, try this:- 5 Every war involves an aggressor, who makes an aggressive move. Such an aggressor could always avoid that move, taking a different (or a do-nothing) course of action. Therefore, every war can be avoided. No war is entirely unavoidable. Setting aside determinism (which renders all actual wars along with all other events unavoidable), it could be argued that a war sometimes simply boils up, without an aggressor, an intensification of a conflagatory situation. There are grounds for scepticism regarding such examples; for such intensification can only occur if provocative military moves are made, for instance troops are stationed in provocative or risky positions. The presumption that certain wars are unavoidable typically derives from a one-sided perspective on war, a defender's perspective. A defender has no option, so it is routinely averred, but to respond to a determined aggressor. Even z/that should be so sometimes, when there is no running away or going underground, it does not establish that such a war is unavoidable; for it neglects the role of the aggressor. By a smarter formulation, relevant features of unavoidability can be captured. Although wars may not be unavoidable, defensive action in wars that have been initiated may be unavoidable. At least such action may be unavoidable if unacceptably high costs (death, enslavement, etc.) are not to be avoided. Thereupon another highly relevant feature emerges: the linkage of avoidability to costs. For whether an action is unavoidable then depends upon what costs a party is prepared to incur before and when insisting on action: but this appears entirely unacceptable. How can what is “unavoidable” cease to be so when some further costs are absorbed? However with basics like survival, a certain liberty, and so on, we do reach such bounds. An important type of unavoidability. We also reach scenarios, unavailable to Lao Tzu but kindly brought within range by modem technology, which may appear to justify aggressive strikes. State Z, while not an aggressor, is carrying out practices which will impose unacceptably high costs upon peoples of other states and implacably refuses to desist. It could, for example, be poisoning air or water flowing to other states. But ,to make the case vivid, let us suppose that state Z is constructing, for reasons Zeders find convincing (they are committed to a faith which depicts all humans as incorrigible sinners and unworthy of life), an effective doomsday machine. Would an (aggressive) preemptory strike designed to disable or destroy the machine be unavoidable?1 In a sense, No; in another Yes. For different modalities can operate. Physically outsiders need to do nothing, but watch Zeders go about their zealous work. But deontically they are under heavy moral pressure, because of the costs of standing by idly: if the human race is worth anything very substantial, then they are obliged to act, action is deontically 1 Whether it would be justifiable, or just, are separate issues. But it is evident enought that such scenarios further damage the obsolescent idea of just war. For, according to received doctrine, a just war is defensive. (How such a war can be fought at all is another matter; coherence requires relativization to ‘just vwcfor party d’.) 6 unavoidable. Here is a situation where a proposed reduction of deontic logic proves illuminating. Obligation is explicated through not implying, or necessitating, the sanction, i.e. excessive ethical costs such as extermination. Let us explain deontic unavoidability analogously: an action is so unavoidable if not undertaking it would result in excessive ethical costs. Then if it can be established that there is no other way than a military strike, an act of war, to ensure that the Zeders desist (and certainly we can envisage scenarios like that), then that is deontically unavoidable. It is also dilemmatic for those committed to, or inclined towards pacifism; and it is, for them at least, but paradoxically justifiable, as the negation is also justifiable, on pacific grounds. Scenarios like that sketched, that appear to render certain wars deontically unavoidable require but little or no elaboration to render them evil. Evil indeed is such a standard feature of standard wars that at least its great presence call for little supporting evidence. But it has taken to vast stretch of human history to reach this general point of recognition. The manifold evils of war Lao Tzu very early recognised and emphasized: Wherever armies are stationed, briars and thorns grow. Great wars are always followed by famines (p. 152). And nowadays followed by great tides of refugees. This passage includes not only recognition of the widely-observed socio-environmental consequences of war, but, more striking, very early recognition of the severe environmental impact of military forces. That critique is not however developed in Taoism.2 Only recently has it been pushed substantially further. And only recently could a new, most significant twist occur, the merging of resource security, long a military objective, with environmental security. The appalling idea has recently been floated that the military, in need of new work and roles with the apparent warming of West-East relations and cooling of the Cold War, should exchange usual military idleness for meddling in environmental matters: regulation and policing of environmental resources, ensurance of environmental security of powerful states, and similar. This is a bit like reassigning those imprisoned for child abuse to managing kindergartens; for consider the impressive military record of environmental vandalism. What the military is alleged to offer is a structure appropriate and available for handling such matters. But, to the contrary, it is precisely the sort of hierarchical, authoritarian expensive structure that should be wound down and up as soon as the opportunity appears, as (briefly) now, rather than being retained and shockingly reoriented (as a state-serving “Greenwar”). 2 But a bridge to deep-green theory can be made through neo-Daoism, an updating of Taoism in confirmity with deep ecology (which however is somewhat thin and threadbare on war; for what there is so far, see Naess p.160). On neo-Daoism, see UT. 7 2. On the divergence of deep-green from Taoism. Having arrived, by better or worse arguments, at the conclusion that wars, though generally evil, may be sometimes unavoidable, it is evidently important to say something about how they — those of the theoretical residue — are to be conducted. By appropriate conduct the damage they do may be reduced; also the conduct should be appropriate to the funereal nature of wars (to exceed Taoist resources for stating this sort of point). It is at this stage that deep­ green theory begins to diverge from Taoism. In further explaining the Taoist and deep-green critiques of war, and diverting objections to them, a rough and preliminary typology of wars is important. It is also of passing interest in its own philosophical right. War, according to English Dictionaries, is a ‘contest carried on by force of arms, typically between nations or states’. More exactly, war is a game - in the generous technical sense of game-theory, with players, rules, goals, strategies, and so on carried on in significant part by military means, normally between states or substates. Call the contestants, (warring) parties. They typically represent of course larger populations. The set­ up between parties resembles the arrangements of players in game theory. There are several analogical extensions of the term war to cover games where one of the parties is an object, construed as hostile (an enemy of the state), such as Crime, Drugs, Poverty or Nature. These we can set aside as analogical wars. Of course wars form only a part of military activities. Military interests and objectives have always stretched significantly further than war, to include surveillence and security, easily extended to resource security, environmental security and life­ style security, and beyond that to political stability and other political matters. Evidently military ambitions have far over-extended themselves in bagging such democratic concerns. An anarchist solution to the whole problem of war, which some have seen Taoism as reaching towards, is immediate: eliminate the source of war, states. Unfortunately it is not quite that simple (and that's not simple). For wars can also occur between nations, cultures, races or tribes (which are not such artifices as states, and not always so readily or desirably abolished), between inhabited regions, and between factions within states (thus civil wars) or, perhaps by extension, between factions within other social structures (thus, for instance, gang wars). But undoubtedly eliminating states and aspiring states would abolish most wars and virtually all the worst wars. While “nonviolent wars” are excluded by definition, by virtue of ‘force of arms’, token wars, limited wars, and so on, are not: for instance, wars fought by small armed teams representing competing sides (cf. medieval and science fiction war games). As wars are hemmed in by conventions and agreed rules, there is no reason in principle why they should not be reduced to two person contests, fought under strict rules like boxing or gladiatorial contests. But in modem times wars have never taken such sensible forms, but have been much larger affairs, making heavy (though fortunately restricted) use of latest technology. Let us distinguish such wars as techno-powered wars. They have, directly or indirectly (for the 8 technology may be bought or bartered), a heavy research and development support structure (indeed the bulk of contemporary science is devoted - misdirected - in one way or another to this effort). Among wars, an important distinction is that between offensive and defensive wars. An offensive war is one which ventures off a given party's territory or recognised pad, “invading” that of another party or parties; correlatively defensive parties, if they have not also invaded. Force projection typifies offensive practice. Plainly, offensiveness and defensiveness are not strictly features of a war, but of parties to a war. In a two-party war, while both parties can easily act offensively, the possibility of both parties proceeding defensively is excluded, unless they share territory. (Even then issues may arise as to which party, if any, was the aggressor, which started it, was responsible for starting it, and so on.) Thus mutually defensive wars between contemporary states are impossible (but would be possible if states shared territory, e.g. if Eire and Britain shared the territory of Northern Ireland). Tao-accredited wars were defensive wars, never wars aiming at domination: last-resort wars, in which no pride was taken (LT p.152).3 The pretence that offensive wars are defensive is widespread, and reflected in the subterfuge that departments or ministries of war are those of defence, security or whatever. (If they really were what they purport to be, we should be well on the way to an end to war.) Offensive practices are rendered defensive ones by shabby redefinition al strategems, such as redefining ‘defensive’ to include defence of ideals like democracy or liberty, infringed (or allegedly infringed) on territories abroad, or to include “defence” of a third party or place (whence every offensive war is “defensive”). In the present war in which part of Arabia is engulfed (February 1991), one party claims to be defending what really was (or should be) part of its territory, namely Kuwait, another party to be defending (what Kuwait did not enjoy) democracy. It is a doubly offensive war presented in this guise as jointly defensive. Aggressive wars are waged for a variety of reasons, but usually for resources or access to resources or markets, a matter often disguised by appeal to ideology (thus a war for oil is represented as a war of liberation). But there are other reasons than narrowly economic ones, such as religion (as with crusades), power and aggrandisement (as in building an empire), and so on. Nor are those reasons necessarily far separated; ideologies like Marxism and market There is one line in LT that may suggest that attack was sometimes justifiable, namely ‘For deep love helps one to win in the case of attack’ (p.219). But how can compassion be appropriate unless this attack is within a defensive setting, a larger context of unavoidability or such like. A passage shortly below confirms this interpretation: I dare not take the offensive but I take the defensive: I dare not advance an inch but I retreat a foot (p.222). These are advances and attacks within a defensive setting. 9 capitalism, for example, exhibit many of the features of religion. The economic reasons for war appear to have become much more complex with the advent of an integrated world economy. At the same time many of the independent reasons for economic wars are now obsolete. For to powerful states accrue the advantages of war without war. At least most of the former economic advantages of war can be obtained without expensive wars, through trade, institution of economic dependence, etc. Small medieval wars were sometimes instituted for the collection of neighbouring riches and booty, a kind of piracy meeting conditions of war. “Small” contemporary wars can be waged for a remarkable mix of political-economy ends: to establish a regime favourable to economic penetration and profit repatriation, to subjugate markets and to remove competition, to boost a sagging weapons economy by using up old stocks and also testing new equipment, to restart a depressed economy, and so on. Such wars, along with the economic aims which motivate them, are in effect heavily castigated by Lao Tzu: When Tao prevails in the world, galloping horses are turned back to fertilize (the fields ...). When Tao does not prevail in the world, war horses thrive in the suburbs. There is no calamity greater than lavish desires. (LT p. 181). But it does exceed evidential warrant to claim that Tao is not only sufficient, but necessaTy, for cessation of such practices. The practice of regularly stimulating complex military-saturated economies through war is reminiscent of older, much ridiculed practices in simpler societies. They now ridicule the Tsembaga, who proceeded to destroy much of their surplus product by going to war every 5-15 years (cf Rapaport). But they do not similarly ridicule the most powerful nation on the Earth, the USA, which proceeds to write off a colossal amount of surplus in war every 10-20 years (the Gulf war liquidated some $1.7 billion per day). Taoists would. For ridicule was a favoured method, an important rhetorical strategem, and war and its idiocy were favourite targets. Some classification of defensive wars is also important, for various reasons: reducing and abolishing wars, their costs and damage, restructuring societies away from war and military practices, and, not least, for appreciating Taoism. A main distinction is between • conventional defence, maintained by armies of armed soldiers, many of them professionals, and • social defence, where there are no such armies or but fragments of them, and defence is carried out through social networks of a significant part of society.4 4 Details of social defence are presented in Sharp and in Martin. 10 It is here that Taoism and deep-green theory part company. Under Taoism, the state will have a standing army, but a defensive army operating by strange, surprise tactics (p.201). No doubt defensive wars are to remain last resort action. Nonetheless the state will operate in secrecy, in a way incompatible with decentralised social defence; people will be kept in the dark about smart weapons of the state; and they too will be surprised, along with presumed enemies of the state. By contrast, under deep-green theory, there should be no hidden smart weapons of state; information would flow more freely and not be hidden from the people (who should retain influence in informed decision making). Under deep-green, standing armies, and more generally military organisation, will be wound down altogether. Taoism should have pushed its searching criticism further. For military objectives, easily acquired by standing armies with time on their hands, are frequently incompatible with Taoism. For example, Taoism is opposed to domination (LT p.152), whereas military operations frequently seek or involve domination; and military structure is invariably hierarchical and authoritarian. Taoism aims for self-regulation, wherever feasible (cf. p.201); so does deep­ green theory, which is one reasons why it aims to dispose of standing armies, as an important preliminary to the withering away of states themselves (military forces being major props of state control and power, and often maintained primarily for internal state security). Taoism has no project for ending the era of wars; deep-green theory does. That project involves an elimination of standing armies, too often poised for fighting or political interference. A recommended route to end war consists in progressive scaling down: reduction of the means and manpower. The initial stages are well-known, and include • elimination of nuclear, biological and chemical weaponry, and • force reduction. It can hardly be pretended that the Earth's states have managed to proceed very far on even this complex of stages. The next stage consists in • contraction to defensive capacities only, and the final stage consists in • elimination of remaining military defensive forces, and adoption, so far as required, of social defence practices. The complete route thus involves complete demilitarisation. Reasons why deep-green aims to proceed the full distance are readily grasped by considering the environmental shallowness of an otherwise cogent traditional case for the sharp curtailment of wars and militarism. The traditional Western case against wars has been primarily along two dimensions: social and moral. Wars are highly disruptive of the social fabric; wars may be unjust. From these joint features, it was argued that wars should be a matter of last resort, to be fought to ensure peace. It was argued further that only just wars should be fought. Just wars were rare objects. But as there was little evidence of the decline and fall of wars, much effort was expended, more practically and unsuccessfully, upon endeavouring to improve the calibre of wars, and more theoretically, upon trying to characterize just war satisfactorily, or rather to bend the notion in an effort to approximate the gory unjust facts. 11 Progress was long hindered, furthermore, because there was always a rival positive perspective on wars, which encouraged the exaltation of wars and military feats. It also facilitated the transfer of the favourable image of war to other problem areas, whence the long and apparently successful war against Nature (but the short-term successes are turning into long-term problems), the short and unsuccessful war against Poverty, and so on. Behind all this is the complex idea of war as rejuvenating, even cleansing, like fire; of war as heroic, and glorious, of war as the supreme testing ground of men. These pictures of war - finally shattered by the first World War (where even the poets began to tell of horrors and atrocities) and subsequent technological wars — though no longer in ascendency, have by no means vanished. The notion of war as rejuvenating a flagging economy persists, along with the practice of keeping capitalism running smoothly by integrating substantial military components into the industrial engine. With the development of highly technological wars - the celebrated development of the dirty industrial age is substantially military - the traditional negative case has grown in strength. Wars have become much more damaging, with the potential for much more that is significantly worse, and the possibility of a just war has correspondingly contracted, virtually to zero. The opposition to war has likewise grown, but more than correspondingly with the rise of women in social and political influence. Wars have almost always and everywhere been Men's affairs; likewise conquest. Deep-green theory accepts much of the traditional negative case, but would further strengthen it. For example, the stricture against unjust wars, as out and out immoral, can be strengthened, through the following syllogism: All wars should be fully just wars. Modem wars cannot be fully just wars. Therefore, there should be no modern wars. A fully just war is not merely a just war, but a war those just character can be reliably forecast in advance. A modern war is of course a war that deploys modern technology, at least that available this century. The evidential basis for the second premiss derives from much information that collateral damage, damage to innocent bystanders and involved citizens is always likely and cannot be excluded. Such wars are always liable to violate uncontroversial requirements for a just war, even if they are purely “conventional” wars, not throwing radiation or chemical or biological weapons around. From a contemporary viewpoint the traditional doctrine of a just war, really of a just defensive war, is seriously out of date. The reasons for this reach wider than the new features introduced by modem technological wars and the character of modern civilization, with its giant cities littered with dangerous and vulnerable military targets. They have also to do with the chauvinism of the justice proposed, which is shallow human justice, not natural or environmental justice. There is no consideration of justice to other creatures or to the Earth (cf 12 Naess p.160). Two troubles are really intertwined here: conceptual difficulties with too narrow a notion of justice, and ideological difficulties with too narrow a vision of what is an object of value, of what counts. The deep-green case against war adds to the traditional case a further dimension, neglected until very recently: the environmental dimension. It has suddenly been seen that wars are typically environmental atrocities. Earlier, of course, “environments” were simply backgrounds, backdrops in paintings and plays, to the real drama. Contemporary technological wars tend to be not merely social tragedies but environmental ones as well. There is a doctrine of just war, but it is a human chauvinistic affair. There is no similarly developed doctrine of an ecologically sound war, a deep ecological war. Unless any such war were literally different from modern wars, that is from contemporary technological wars, it would overstep permitted bounds. For such wars are characteristically ecological disasters. Hardened military people, desensitized by a rigorous unethical training, feel even less compunction about degrading or destroying environments or members of other species than they do of maiming or killing civilians through “collateral” activity. Matching the no-just-war syllogism is a no-sound-war syllogism: All wars should be environmentally sound wars. Modern wars cannot be environmentally sound. Therefore, there should be no modern wars. The argument for the second premiss has of course to be different. It looks to the information accumulating on what wars do to natural and built environments. The Vietnam and Gulf wars both inflicted immense damage on natural environments or what was left of them. The environmental effects of war are not confined to direct and collateral damage. There are indirect effects also. Thus, for instance, war also supplied the mechanism of, and the technology for, modern environmental destruction: explosives, bulldozers from tanks, etc. As well, training for war and engagement in war have much fostered, along with attitudes that make for social callousness or ruthlessness, those that contribute to environmental insensitivity and cruelty. 3. Puzzles about Taoist strategy and its critiques of technology and violence ‘It is surprising how much of the Lao Tzu is devoted to military strategy’. Which strategies? Surprise, above all. But why such strategies? ‘Do they not contradict the Taoists’ strong opposition to the use of force’ (Chan p.222), the implied commitment to quietism? Briefly, Taoism is not committed to quietism, and while certainly antagonistic to violence, does not oppose certain uses of force (only really ///-forcing, as will be explained). Even so, the emphasis on military strategy remains puzzling. The strategies, many of them relevant to social defence, include • seriousness, not ‘making light of the enemy’ (p.222) 13 • surprise, and nonvisibility (p.201). The defensive strategy involves guerilla tactics: marching without formation, holding weapons without seeming to have them, confronting enemies without seeming to meet them (p.222). But even in times of peace, ‘smart weapons of the state should not be displayed to the people’ (p.164). Such recommendations helped to fuel the charge of deviousness lodged against Lao Tzu. But look at part of the reason for concealing smart weapons: ‘The more smart weapons the people have, the more troubled the state will be’ (p.201). Smart weapons are carried in corrupt states, where the rich engage in conspicuous consumption and the people are suppressed, not where Tao is practiced (LT p.194). • advance from weakness, flexibility but firmness. Weakness is the principle of life and will overcome strength (LT p.164, p.233). • coolness and non-competition (LT p.233, p.164). Like these, most of the general strategies are standard Taoist practices simply applied to military conduct. For these standard practices the charge of deviousness looks feeble. The response applies more generally to other allegedly devious political strategies. For the strategies are but application of Taoist principles and techniques to warfare, politics and elsewhere. Nothing excludes application of these techniques to what are accounted, in general, unnecessary evils (which must sometimes, on other Taoist grounds, be countered). Nor, to meet the main criticism, need any deceit or deviousness be involved; nor is it. In particular, the legalist tactic, Tn order to grasp, it is necessary first to give’ (LT p.164), is cited as involving ‘an element of deceit’ ‘undeniably’, and ‘worse’ it is ‘morally questionable’ (Chan p.17). But in order for me to grasp your hand in a normal handshake, it is necessary first for me to give my hand. There is no deceit here, nothing morally questionable. All the tactics permit of benign construals, of a Taoist kind. Consider, for instance, Tn order to contract, it is necessary first to expand’ (LT p.164). In order to bend a copper pipe to the intended angle, it is better to bend it first a little further than required. The transformation of water to ice (both favoured natural items for symbolic purposes: natural processes which may look devious!) neatly illustrates the Taoist principle (which is however hardly necessary), and shows softness and weakness turned hardness and strength. The Taoist critique of militarism is as much a critique of technology as of war. Sharp weapons, ‘smart weapons’ as we might now say, come in for much critical attention, as we have already noticed. Only in corrupt and degenerate states are they displayed or flaunted (p.194, p.164); in deep-green regions smart weapons of state’ would not be retained unexhibited. The people will not have them for they mean trouble (p.201); for similar reasons deep-green regions will be free of them. So, it seems, will ideal Taoist regions: ‘Even if there are arrows and weapons, none will display them’ (LT p.238). Much technology, military and other, is excluded under the Taoist edict against violence (a further facet of the military-practices 14 paradox).5 The powerful critique of militarism in the Tao-te Ching is coupled with strong opposition to violence. Some of the linkage is evident enough. Militarism as practised represents an ultimate form of state (or party) violence. A basic theme is that violent practices will come to an unnatural end, and accordingly to a non-Taoist end (generalising LT p.176). While force may occur in spectacular, but satisfactory, natural forms, force is duly distinguished from violence. To force the growth of life means ill omen. For the mind to employ the vital force without restraint means violence (LT p. 197). One who follows Tao does not apply dominating force, which usually has had results bringing requital (p.152). Dominating force, like power, is in general castigated, under doctrine of wu- wei, no forced actions, no violence. To force natural growth is deviant, destroying harmony. To stop natural growth is deviant. But there is a significant difference between force and violence. To intentionally employ destructive force is to do violence. To so force things is condemned. To remain in harmony with things one does not so force things or practice violence. There is a non-interference principle at work, which also indicates types of non­ interference that are excluded. However Taoism does not always get the distinction between force and violence quite 5 Under contemporary technology and technological arrangements, such as the storage of quantities of oil and nuclear and chemical materials in great cities, wars have assumed new and very destructive dimensions, to the point of being utterly irresponsible. A different approach to technology, as to war, is now mandatory. These are no longer things that can in principle be nicely confined and need not touch parties outside the fray. An important part of ending wars, “winning the war against wars”, is removing the technology of war, above all from irresponsible state power. As for which technology to try to jettison and which to try to retain or improve, it is not so difficult to indicate, provided evaluative terminology is not outlawed. What is wanted is technology that is good in its place, what should be excluded is technology that is indifferent or bad or potentially so. Technology to be justified has to do something worthwhile, it has to address identifiable respectable needs. That is why merely indifferent technology is out; there is no virtue in technology for technology's sake, as it is a mere means technique. It is because of the crucial evaluative component in choice of technology that appropriateness, itself evaluative, comes closer to encapsulating the criterion than other recent efforts. Size, such as smallness, or intermediateness, are not what matter, though modest and not excessive technologies are likely to fare better in satisfying appropriateness. In simpler societies, small technology is of course more appropriate; for that is what is good there. From known criteria for what is good these other features for locally appropriate technology can be read off: reliability, esp. in maintenance, functioning well and safely under the expected range of operating conditions (which may be difficult), ease of repair, capital cheapness and repair inexpensiveness, environmental benignness, and meeting sound social needs. 15 right. ‘Vital force without restraint’, intentionally excessive force, is only part of what counts as violence, which is more generally force which violates, i.e. transgresses, descrecrates, profanes, injures, outrages, etc. It is thus a negatively connoted force, an evil force in some specified intentional respect. There is a tendency for Taoist commentators, not Taoists, to regard Taoism as condemning all uses, or even occurrences, of force, but this is not so. Rather intentional ill-forcing is what is castigated, what is deviant. Thus Taoism does not exclude a range of defensive practices, which make satisfactory use of natural forces, like letting the machines of war industry stop. Those who would abolish war and its machinery, substituting for it nonwarlike and ideally nonviolent methods, technology, and strategies, have been confronted not merely with much sub-rational abuse but with plenty of criticism and even some paradoxes. Here is a recent paradox concerning war and nonviolence: • War must be abolished. One reason is simply economic. We can no longer afford it, and the opportunity costs are enormous. Along with other extraordinarily wasteful activities, it is an anachronism. • Doing so cannot be accomplished without violence, i.e. in effect, given the types of violence involved, without what amounts to war. According to a fuller version of this premiss, the process of abolishing a war would only be achieved through a revolution so profound that it could not succeed without extensive and extreme violence, amounting to (civil) war. ° But then war cannot be abolished without war. Therefore, war which must be abolished cannot be abolished.6 This “paradox” has been compared with the Liar paradox, but the parallel does not persist far. For this paradox does not involve self-referential features, and is easily broken, as follows. Let the “last war” be not the last standard war but the revolution abolishing war. Then, given that the revolution is successful, war will be abolished therewith, i.e. with that last war. There need be no regress, given again a successful outcome. All the premisses stand intact, but the conclusion, following the ‘therefore’ is a nonsequitur. However, while the dissolution of the argument is accordingly logically fine, the route is repugnant. Standard pacifism challenges the 6 Brian Medlin, who forcefully propounded this puzzle, set other analogous puzzles alongside it - designed to reveal deep difficulties in contemporary political, and especially alternative, thought. Another puzzle, concerning liberty and repression in the context of capitalism, revolved around the following inconsistent triad: • capitalism must be removed, but liberty retained. • capitalism cannot be removed without repression. • repression is antithetical to liberty. The puzzle is resolved as with the analogous puzzle of abolishing. Let the “last capitalist” action before the days of liberty be the repressive but liberating revolution overthrowing capitalism. 16 second premiss. 4. Standard and moral pacifism. Although Taoism is strongly opposed to war, and much in favour of peace - and accordingly by prevailing standards a substantially pacific position - it is not (nowhere in the central texts) committed to pacifism in usual senses, for two different reasons:• It is not, by contrast with pacifism, opposed to all types of warfare, for example smart defensive wars. • It eschews deontology in terms of which moral pacifism is commonly stated, for instance through the watershed thesis P2. It is morally wrong to use violence. By contrast with Taoism, deep environmentalism does not avoid deontic claims, and is committed in principle to nonviolent technologies and ways and to pacifistic principles. Moreover, certain forms of deep environmentalism are completely committed to pacifism, notably European forms. Is deep green? There is heavy contemporary opposition to pacifism, as there also was to Taoism in the warring times when Taoism was first being promulgated. Many of the central institutions of contemporary life are intricated in coercion, violence and war. The most prominent contemporary institutions, states, are premissed on these elements of damaging force; they claim entitlement to use them widely, and even claim a certain territorial monopoly on their use. As a result they are having constantly to engage in them in attempt to maintain that monopoly. They are certainly the main perpetrators of wars, and of violence. They are indeed inured to wars, are in constant preparation for wars, yet propound dialectial (and normally dishonest and cynical) doctrines of peace through war (for a recent example see the appendix). Unremarkably then, the extensive propagandistic machinery of state has invested heavily in “justificatory” exercises in favour of controlled use, its own use, of destructive force, and continues to inveigh against pacifism. Because a routine trick in this sophistical repetoire consists in conflating pacifism with extreme, naive and inplausible, forms, an inevitable and important early task commits in unscrambling senses of ‘pacifism’. Semantical skulduggery can be thwarted in this way. Pacifism, as explained by English dictionaries, invariably concerns wars and warfare, and contains two components, negative and, elaborating on that, positive:- The negative component is, in Amauld's word, anti-War-ism, opposition (in ways to be further specified) to all forms of warfare (see OED). The positive component supplies alternative ways of settling disputes (what it is supposed that wars with some semblance of justification involve), such as negotiation, arbitration,... - and, adding to too narrow dictionary accounts - sanctions, substitutions (e.g. of sporting events, operatic contests, cooperative ventures),... . In brief standard pacifism is opposition to all warfare and resolution of potential wars by other nonmilitary means. 17 Plainly the opposition to warfare, like the sanctions and so on, cannot itself be military (using soldiers and other devices of war), on pain of some incoherence. But otherwise the ways of opposition can be many and various: they can certainly be active, as with nonviolent demonstrations, resistance movements, and so forth, and they may also be devious (e.g. turning the forces of war upon themselves so they are neutralised). It quickly becomes evident, then, that some of the dictionaries offer but loaded definitions which, by restricting the negative components, reduce the initial appeal and plausibility of pacifism. Consider the Concise English definition of the negative component: ‘the doctrine of non-resistance to hostilities and of total non-co-operation with any form of warfare’. Thereby excluded are forms of pacifism which offer active and plausible alternatives to warfare such as social defence. The Concise English tends to force pacifism into what the Oxford English Dictionary lists as its final item: ‘often, with depreciatory implication, the advocacy of peace at any price’, ‘in any circumstance’. Pacifism can easily resist being forced into these sorts of circumstances: it has many resources, as an extensive series of texts on alternatives to war, such as negotiation, non­ violent action and social defence, from Taoism to contemporary environmentalism attest. Academic philosophers have much advanced the semantical strategy of some dictionaries, of rendering pacifism more difficult from the very outset by narrow and biassed definitions. They have stretched the term from its restricted setting of warfare, confined to state and organised gang violence, to cover all forms of violence, from state and interstate to, what is very different, personal and interpersonal violence. Call the resulting considerably stretched notion of pacifism, according to which it is morally wrong to use violence, according to which P2 holds, stretched pacifism.^ While stretched pacifism certainly includes standard pacifism (unless the notions of war and warfare are tampered with), the converse is very far from being the case. A pacifist is in no way committed to stretched pacifism, which is a much more problematic and difficult position than standard pacifism. There are several, substantially different reasons for this, which will be picked up seriatim. Stretched pacifism, also misleadingly called moral pacifism, has looked a very easy critical target to moral philosophers. Many the effusive philosopher who, upon sighting such a target, has charged, whooping such rhetoric as “incoherent”, “inconsistent”, “insensitive”, “fanatical”. However, with improved logical technology now available for accommodating and treating moral dilemmas, it is no great feat to resist such attacks, in the fashion of previous investigations (see esp. Al, also MD). A main aim was to demonstrate that stretched pacifism was not so stupid as it was made out to be or appeared to be to these inured to present dominant violent ways. So far from being stupid, it is viable. In future gentler times stretched pacifism 7 In Al this notion was contrasted with standard pacifism as comprehensive pacifism: overcomprehensive might have been better. 18 could even be realised for whole communities of creatures (as some genuinely Christian sects envisaged); whence it will finally be seen to be feasible not merely for sages and supermen, and many ordinary women, but much more extensively. The method of philosophical accommodation was through moral dilemmas. The sort of moral dilemma that stretched pacifism can induce derives as follows. On the one side stands the theme P2, Wv, in convenient symbols, for Wrong V-ing, violencing. Now this implies to WB, where B presents a case of of violence. On the other side, particular circumstances develop which lead to W ~B, because ~B would produce in the circumstances considerable wrong, for instance extensive violence, mass murder, etc. One stock example from the literature concerns calling off the firing squad about to shoot several captives if the pacifist shoots one of them (it is elaborated in Al p.13). Interestingly, another stock example from the literature concerns standard pacifism (it can also be presented in terms of patriotism; for details of both see MD p.10). Resolution of intractable moral dilemmas is, where it is required, situational. The agent decides in the situation, within the fix, what to do. There are many ways in which such decision making can proceed, less rational, such as those applying chance or involving bad faith, or more rational, such as those applying consequentialist decision theory (for details see MD, pp.32-9). A decision theory taking account of all that should be included will not however be purely consequential. It would also take account of relevant motivation. This defence and rehabilitation of moral pacifism has been challenged, in particular by Smith (hereafter JWS). JWS claims the defence offered is a ‘failure because it trivializes pacifism’ (p. 153 twice). The rehabilitation trivializes pacifism because it entails that pacifism doesn't substantially differ from a form of activism which holds that while violence is always wrong one is sometimes justified on consequentialist grounds for preferring violent acts, if these acts are lesser evils than any other real alternatives. This is the commonsense position which most people hold - yet - pacifism after all was supposed to be radical moral doctrine - (p.153 rearranged).8 Part of the criticism is, then, not so much that pacifism is trivialized - JWS “activism” is hardly trivial - as that pacifism is popularised, deflated from a radical position to the commonsense position most people hold (p.154 also). Yet not a shred of evidence is adduced that JWS activism is such a populist position. Available evidence, for example from peace movements and oppositional opinion polls, suggests the very opposite: that, for instance, most people support state-justified conventional wars with the military violence they incur, and 8 JWS now informs me that he has changed his position. Whether the move effects his criticism, I don't know. 19 accordingly do not hold that violence is always wrong. From such a commonsense angle, pacifism with its condemnation of conventional wars and the violence they involve remains a radical doctrine. As regards wars and other violence-incurring social authorities, contemporary pacificism is, as previous explained (e.g. Al p.3), a form of activism. Pacifism does not imply utter pacifity, but may actively involve social defence, resistance and so on. However a certain level of misrepresentation enters into the JWS challenge in the details of what forms of activism pacifism may include. That misrepresentation begins in the second clause concerning what is said to be sometimes justified. For the situational procedure where dilemmas arise will not generally be consequential applying a principle of lesser evil. In dilemmatic situations such principles are suspended, and such a principle is in any case unacceptable to moral pacifists. A small amount of violence may be less bad in its consequences than verbal offence, but a principled pacifist will choose the slightly greater evil where other obligations do not exclude it. A more serious distortion occurs in JWS's effort to force procedures in dilemma situations into purely consequentialist form. In fact consequential decision theory was deployed as a model only for how to proceed rationally in a situational setting where deontic procedures were suspended (see MD p.38). What was said, still misleadingly retrospective vision reveals, was this: ‘what is done is a very consequentialist thing’ (Al p.13), not ‘one acts in a consequentialist fashion to do the sufficiently good thing in the circumstances’ (JWS P-152). Situationally other procedures than those resembling orthodox rational decision making (modified from maximizing to satisizing objectives) may be adopted (MD p.38). Further the orthodox consequentialist theory is inadequate because it leaves out, or tries to reduce to consequences, nonconsequential elements, notably motives. It is not difficult, in principle (in advance of attempted consequentialization of motives), to design situations where motives, such as integrity or maintaining faith, enter to yield outcomes upsetting consequential calculations. More elaborate decision making procedures than those of consequentialism, sometimes at variance with consequentialism, are thus presupposed. A further part of JWS's criticism accordingly goes by the board, the alleged appeal ‘to “second best” consequentialist considerations,... already explicitly condemned’ (p.154). What was condemned was stock universal consequentialism, ‘that only consequentialist considerations carry argumentative weight’ (quoted on p.152), so undercutting other deontic principles, such as those of pacifism. It was not claimed, what is utterly different, that consequentialist considerations can nowhere enter into deliberation and decision making. The conclusion JWS arrives at is therefore substantially astray. After criticising modern moral philosophy for its reliance upon consequentialist modes of thought, it is surprising, and inconsistent, to find ... [reliance] upon such modes of thought to escape logical difficulties raised by moral dilemmas facing ... pacifis[m] (p.152) 20 There is no inconsistency. JWS has confused universal with particular. As well he has wrongly contracted all situational decision making to consequentialist modes. There is a third part to the criticism, that the defence is too easy; the ‘strategy will allow too much violence to be (perpetrated and) justified to suit the tastes of any real pacifist’ (p. 153). This another part of the so-called trivialization, this time however dilution rather than populatization, weakening the moral stand against violence. This third contention is premissed on a mistake: that one can ‘justify on consequentialist grounds any number of violent acts, providing that such acts are lesser evils than other real alternatives facing social agents’ (p.153). Moral pacifism offers no such licence; allowing such consequentialism to take over was never part of the position. The slide to such consequentialism is made on the strength of a similarly erroneous example. The potential victim of an aspiring rapist ‘is supposed to flee or wriggle free if possible. But it is easy to consequentially justify the use of violence by the woman to prevent herself from being raped’ (p.153 italics added). In the example so far described there is no dilemma, and no such easy resort to consequentially ‘justified’ violence. What allows too much violence is the lesser evil JWS assumes is easily consequentially justified; for example that the woman is entitled to inflict, and escalate, violence so long as it remains ‘a lesser evil than the violence of attempted rape’ (p. 153). Since she may thereby inflict quite unreasonable damage (esp. if she is a Kung Fu expert), the result is inconsistent with ‘the basic principle of self-defence’ which JWS earlier adduced according to which what is ‘appropriate, in response is only that level of force necessary to defend oneself against the threat’ (p.150). There is evidence in JWS's work of some enthusiasm for levels of violence which exceed his ‘basic principle’, his appeal to ‘lesser evil’ generates some instances. The ‘basic principle’, itself fraught with difficulties (cf. the contorted discussion of what weapons are appropriate in response to what attacks, p.150), still exceeds what stretched pacifism would enjoin; for instance, it may not be appropriate to respond with force. But in a technical sense stretched pacifism is compatible with the ‘basic principle’, since it only imposes the upper bound on level of force. As for easiness, moral pacifism is not an easy position to live by, or to justify. Removing objections to pacifism is one thing; solidifying a positive case for it is quite another, and so far hardly conclusive (as Al tried to explain, pp 29-31). Stretched pacifism was advanced, hypothesized to put it more precisely, as a still viable option. It was not presented as a morally compulsory position, or, for that matter, as one that this defender adhered to or affirmed. To reiterate, while a cumulative case can be made for stetched pacifism as principled non­ violence, that case was not conclusive, and is hard to improve. For, further, some serious difficulties standing in the way of stretched pacifism were assembled, the most important of which derives from the extent of violence apparent in transactions within the natural world. Simply consider the practices of carnivores, essential to their natural way of life. In order to meet their life needs for sustenance, these creatures do, and are often obliged to, engage 21 routinely in violent activity. While it can no doubt be argued, as some vegetarians may do, that the natural order is an immoral order, and that remaining carnivores should be converted to vegetarianism as rapidly as proves possible (in the way domestic dogs are converted to dog biscuits), the difficulties with such proposals are immense. The task envisaged is gigantic, and beyond human capacities - even if it were desirable. For there are millions of species to be somehow converted to proper vegetarianism. Then there are millions of other species to be converted to proper and well regulated contraceptive practices, else their numbers will get out of hand (uncontrollably) with predation removed. Given humans lack of success in limiting their own excessive numbers, such regulation appears entirely remote. Aside however from the practical difficulties, is such a fully vegetarian order, with evolution further derailed, a desirable improvement on the natural order? Is it morally obligatory? It is certainly not obligatory, as alternative systems of morality in harmony with the prevailing natural order are feasible. Nor is it desirable, for (to appeal to such alternative value systems) the natural order is more or less in order as it is. Full vegetarianization would only reduce its value, vastly. More generally, a defensible ethical framework should not, it would be rightly contended, be right out of step with the natural order of other creatures, decently depicted. Decent depiction is important, for some features of the natural order, such as competition, combat and predation, so far from escaping attention, have been grossly exaggerated and exploited. Thus, for instance, the ludicrous picture of nature red in truth and claw, so beloved of descendents of orthodox Victorians and of orthodox economists. However, even under decent depiction, the “natural order” is often not benign. That appears to be enough to induce a supervenient moral dilemma for any stretched pacifism which is coupled to a deep ethic (e.g. which does not separate humans out from the natural order) and which eschews the desperate vegetarian route: The natural order is not an immoral order The natural order contains (regular) instances of violence. Therefore, instances of violence are not immoral in apparent defiance of P2 Moreover, there are too many instances of violence, too regularly occurring, for them all to be plausibly shunted into the moral dilemma category (and predatory carnivores face no dilemmas). Raptors that practice violence every week are not immoral (neither are they clearly moral; the category of morality only significantly extends so far). The main trouble lies however with P2 (which needs some finer adjustment, as was alrady indicated in Al). While P2 is alright in context, within a particular, perfectly viable, ethical framework, designed for the usual human round, the conventional setting for ethical theories, it stands in need of modification outside that setting. It is time to suggest the sort of modification envisaged. Evidently P2 was addressed to moral agents. Which agents? Not to carnivores that supply their own livelihood, nor really to morally degenerate humans, but to 22 peace-sensitive agents. With that semi-technical form, yet to be characterised, a suitably modified P2 results: MP2. It is morally wrong, for a peace-sensitive agent, to use violence.9 To recover what amounts, in the previous discussive context, to P2, it suffices to add the proposition that every human agent ought to be peace-sensitive. Much as that proposition has to recommend it, it appears too ethically advanced for many modern humans; it sets too high a moral standard to be taken as a serious guide to practice. It seems wise to settle presently for something less demanding, such as that every advanced moral agent ought to be peace sensitive. To put essentially the same proposition alternatively: Stretched pacifism (as modified) is supererogatory. While it is perhaps too late to hope for much moral progress in humans, it is pleasant to contemplate alternative futures where what is supererogatory became obligatory, and widely practiced. Richard Sylvan* Appendix I began drafting this essay at the time (January 17, midday Australian time) of the American attacks upon Iraq. The optly named Prime Minister Hawke of Australia had just made a statement to the nation-state, announcing (the) war. In this statement there was much talk of peace. There was even - in what was effectively a declaration of war - reiteration of the modern quest for ‘a new world order of peace’. Peace through war; so it rings out again and again, through the centuries. ‘War must be for the sake of peace’ (Aristotle p.220). More than two thousand years later, we have fought those wars to end all wars. But it is no use, Hawke solemely pronounced, just talking about peace, and thinking about peace; we must work for peace, fight for it - through war. Impeccable logic? President Bush, supreme commander, convinced us with similar logic, speaking too with many tongues. Of how he ‘preferred to think of peace, not war’. But now ‘only force will prevail’, as ‘all reasonable efforts to reach a peaceful solution are exhausted’. ‘What must be done’ must be done, or will be anyway. With God on side with the US offensive (as well as on the other side), it will go well. As it was said to have, though it achieved comparatively little that other efforts may not have yielded more satisfactorily, and thought it may now have to The generalization of P2, suggested in Al, to cover also the parallel situation of environmental vandalism, can be similarly modified. The anti-vandolence principle becomes MP2°. It is morally wrong, for a peace- and environmentally-sensitive agent, to use vandolence. Thank to David Bennett for joint contributions (from UT) and to JWS for opposition (in JWS) 23 followed with another invasion. Nor have we ever managed to glimpse much of what is now supposed, when we are no longer engaged, to come ‘out of the horror of war’: a ‘new world order ... which governs the conflict of nations’; a ‘rule of law’, not war. How the one, enforcable law, is achieved, unless backed by the the other, is not explained (Medlin's paradox hits back). Similarly what we now hear from many militarists, as they rush to war, is that ‘peace is a great good, war a great evil’. But, for the most part, only the rhetoric has shifted; practice has scarcely changed at all. REFERENCES W.-T. Chan, A Source Book on Chinese Philosophy, Princeton University Press, 1963; referred to as ST. W.-T. Chan (ed.), The Way of Lao Tzu (Tao-te Ching), Bobbs-Merrill, New York, 1963; referred to as LT. B. Martin, Uprooting War, Freedom Press, London, 1984. A. Naess, Ecology, community and lifestyle, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge UK, 1989. R.A. Rapaport, Pigs for the Ancestors : ritual in the ecology of a New Guinea People, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1967. R. Routley, ‘War and Peace II. On the alleged inconsistency, moral insensitivity and fanaticism of pacifism’, Discussion papers in environmental philosophy #9, Research School of Social Science, Australian National University, 1983 (also in Inquiry ); referred to as Al. R. Routley and V. Plumwood, ‘Moral dilemmas and the logic of deontic notions’, Discussion papers in environmental philosophy #6, Research School of Social Science, Australian National University, 1984 (also in Paraconsistent Logic)', referred to as MD. R. Routley, ‘War and Peace I. On the ethics of large-scale nuclear war and nuclear-deterrence and the political fall-out’, Discussion papers in environmental philosophy, #5, Research School Of Social Science, Australian National University, 1984. G. Sharp, Social Power and Political Freedom, Porter Sargent, Boston, 1980. J.W. Smith, The Worms at the Heart of Things , Public Relations Unit, Flinders University, 1989. R. Sylvan, ‘War and Peace III, Australia's defence philosophy’, SoczaZ Philosophy, for Nuclear Conference, University of Queensland, 1985. R. Sylvan and D. Bennett, ‘Of Utopias, Tao and Deep Ecology’, Discussion papers in environmental philosophy #19, Research School of Social Science, Australian National University, 1990; referred to as UT.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Box 59, Item 680: Two drafts of On extirpating on war: Tao and deep-green pacifism Subject The topic of the resource Two computer printouts of draft paper. Second copy, first page is missing and reference page has handwritten annotation. Previous title: War and peace IV: Tao and deep-green. 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Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/browse?search=Richard+Sylvan&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bjoiner%5D=and&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=&amp;range=&amp;collection=&amp;type=&amp;user=&amp;tags=&amp;public=&amp;featured=&amp;exhibit=&amp;geolocation-mapped=&amp;geolocation-address=&amp;geolocation-latitude=&amp;geolocation-longitude=&amp;geolocation-radius=10&amp;submit_search=Search+for+items">Richard Sylvan</a> Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived <span class="MuiTypography-root-125 MuiTypography-body2-126">The University of Queensland's <a data-testid="rek-series" href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/records/search?page=1&amp;pageSize=20&amp;sortBy=score&amp;sortDirection=Desc&amp;searchQueryParams%5Brek_series%5D%5Bvalue%5D=Richard+Sylvan+Papers%2C+UQFL291&amp;searchMode=advanced">Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291</a></span>, Box 59, Item 680 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org">Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy</a> Contributor An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, <a href="https://najtaylor.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Dr. N.A.J. 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Type The nature or genre of the resource Manuscript Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context <a href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:c8da24a">https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:c8da24a</a> Coverage The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant Como - Cupboard - Pile 3 Box 59: Nuclear Como House Como House > Cupboard > Pile 3 https://www.antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/bc6906f973b58155fcdff1d8fbf5c13e.pdf cdee1d9f8cd9703c694e69ab3507018e PDF Text Text IS The UNIVERSE THE argument design HRTERHUTP existence of a designer, a planner, a God, the for RN (LIKE) regularly deploys the model of the universe as an artefact, A noteworthy part of plants from universe, the planets on through naturally evolved systems, If the whole arrangement Is an artefact, contrasts with artefacts. 'artefact' has been and Its contexts, etc., and to lose both Its normal contrasts, place, much stretched, e.g. of then, firstly tools applied by external living external creatures, and secondly, the relevant features are extremely well hidden. In the face of elaboration of these points the artefact claim Is eroded or weakened to-, the universe like an artefact. Is like In having a maker. Is usually meant, 'like' some are There It s as If It were an artefact, etc. And by features curious about Wilkinson s argument In his universe Is artefact'. The usual moves to the artefact model the Intelligibility universe the of e.g. (thus premissed are Heynell). But concentrates on the limits to human knowledge and the apparent extent the universe product on Wilkinson which to not Intelligible to us and may never be. Wilkinson however Is Is Idealism: not arguing for design In the universe, but for a kind of the The nature as of the human mind! The traditional case for design In the universe Is strangely subverted Into an argument for Idealism. God's. Everything Intended by It Is our not artefact, tells against this: but redefinition Is artefact one order of the day In philosophical argument. Consider first Mrs. four arguments, none decvscve, but all with to limits to knowledge, human limits severe practical limits to etc. equipment, ascertaining larger And that limits 1. Levels of detail. There are Is. very the also, appeal, such Size small. as and spaceship cost earth, of men s lifetimes, etc. (One experiment-careers). 2. forces? Variety The (and number) of forces. How many (1) Ignorance lead us Into l> super-weak , «« super-strong ” Issue of completeness Is serious here (as with Kant s philosophy). As with forces, so with objects, NB. It major laws, etc. of an (undiscovered) moderating or compensating force could about error features world, of e.g. Into postulating granularity of space and time. (2) Classlf Icatlon of forces In sort of periodic table, and then deeper explanation. 3. Limits to human conception? Macro-objects of our dimensions can have no conceptions of very small (micro seconds) Involves a slide from or very no real personal experience large. to No?? The argument no Imagination of to no conception of . Argues for limits to conception In both tIme and space. Goes on to suggest limits to description using everyday -1- household language, but �the argument Is bad: It depends on standard (Copenhagen) quantum theory. Ideas that limits of' conception tied to limits of language. 4-. Human nature and Its essential prejudice-, limits to what we are prepared to accept or understand. Set of prejudices, etc., e.g. prejudices In of favour numbers (In a fuaay world). Our constitution prevents understanding of world. Wilkinson's further argument Is that In view of limits we humans cannot but value to resort 'in reaching his judgements as to how the natural world Is - constructed, man cannot ultimately do more than say this Is how It has to be (p.96). Value ImposItIon, has to be', lie know that whether or [whether 'should be', quarks No, (p.98): Is here like Leslie? not we This Is how It get can good' feel at quarks we shall continue to talk about them and discuss their exist] (p.97). Nature Is going to be what the mind anatomy and domestic economy It me this makes the same makes of [our] theory with the thing confusion theorised that pervades Idealistic approaches. Wilkinson also to wants (as above and especially from orthodox proceed quantum theory) to reject any theme of the closure of nature to mind. He contends (p.80) that objectivity - looking at nature from outside - dissolves to be replaced by something Involving man essentially. The natural world depends on man for Its definition: hence the universe as an artefact. But this Is In no way established. The argument depends on the fallacy of of theory nature again, find nature equating with the It makes the erroneous assumption that the only criteria for theory selection are at bottom those of value or feeling. R question Wilkinson suggests, but sets aside (In the too-hard basket) Is: How It Is that we manage to understand the universe, or It s e.g. the much of It? mostly good luck. Historically rather different answers were favoured, universe Intelligible, Is natural, the world Is Intelligible. It's Since sufficiently Intelligent creatures can come to understand It. The Intelligibility theme Is not lacking for exponents. Here, In summary. Is Heynell argues for and applies It: R. If the It would not be that we can In world were not Intelligible, principle come to know. But the world Is that which we can In principle come to know. Therefore the world Is Intelligible. B. If Very like: We don't; or, So far as we different repsonses quickly suggest themselves, do so there were not something analogous to human Intelligence In the constitution of the world? the world would not be Intelligible. Therefore there Is something analogous to human Intelligence In constitution of the world (68). -2- the how �The preMiss first of B is flat out false, but present concern is with fl. The Minor preMiss of fl is false, by virtue of llMltatlon arguments such as those Wilkinson and elsewhere take an analytical shape is suffIclently (e.g. a of Routley). find the Major preMiss, though it can distortion. For Instance, the world May be intelligible for us to come to understand what we do of It without being completely intelligible. -3- �f~. i— i— i— r—i f— k i r^. ez. r- ez. r*--. ez. i -i H. fl e g n e 11, London, The Intelligible Universe r— «~- ez. - -=• A cosMologlcal arguwent , flacwll I an, 1982. D.H. Ullklnson, The universe as an artefact Models and Han, Clarendon, Oxford, In H. 1976, 88-98. -4- Harris (ed. ) Sc tent itto �Lj / 1 -\ L/ A C'T'Zf^ £ X J -/■■».*> -K f. / (/ W7 e (/ 7^77 sy J e 4^-?'')'? ] '^7' 4~r>l*'< > & '' ( //// O ' a � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Draft Papers Description An account of the resource Sylvan's literary executor encountered an archive in which “all his projects were current", since manuscripts were undated and unattributed. Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document IS The UNIVERSE THE argument design HRTERHUTP existence of a designer, a planner, a God, the for RN (LIKE) regularly deploys the model of the universe as an artefact, A noteworthy part of plants from universe, the planets on through naturally evolved systems, If the whole arrangement Is an artefact, contrasts with artefacts. 'artefact' has been and Its contexts, etc., and to lose both Its normal contrasts, place, much stretched, e.g. of then, firstly tools applied by external living external creatures, and secondly, the relevant features are extremely well hidden. In the face of elaboration of these points the artefact claim Is eroded or weakened to-, the universe like an artefact. Is like In having a maker. Is usually meant, 'like' some are There It s as If It were an artefact, etc. And by features curious about Wilkinson s argument In his universe Is artefact'. The usual moves to the artefact model the Intelligibility universe the of e.g. (thus premissed are Heynell). But concentrates on the limits to human knowledge and the apparent extent the universe product on Wilkinson which to not Intelligible to us and may never be. Wilkinson however Is Is Idealism: not arguing for design In the universe, but for a kind of the The nature as of the human mind! The traditional case for design In the universe Is strangely subverted Into an argument for Idealism. God's. Everything Intended by It Is our not artefact, tells against this: but redefinition Is artefact one order of the day In philosophical argument. Consider first Mrs. four arguments, none decvscve, but all with to limits to knowledge, human limits severe practical limits to etc. equipment, ascertaining larger And that limits 1. Levels of detail. There are Is. very the also, appeal, such Size small. as and spaceship cost earth, of men s lifetimes, etc. (One experiment-careers). 2. forces? Variety The (and number) of forces. How many (1) Ignorance lead us Into l> super-weak , «« super-strong ” Issue of completeness Is serious here (as with Kant s philosophy). As with forces, so with objects, NB. It major laws, etc. of an (undiscovered) moderating or compensating force could about error features world, of e.g. Into postulating granularity of space and time. (2) Classlf Icatlon of forces In sort of periodic table, and then deeper explanation. 3. Limits to human conception? Macro-objects of our dimensions can have no conceptions of very small (micro seconds) Involves a slide from or very no real personal experience large. to No?? The argument no Imagination of to no conception of . Argues for limits to conception In both tIme and space. Goes on to suggest limits to description using everyday -1- household language, but the argument Is bad: It depends on standard (Copenhagen) quantum theory. Ideas that limits of' conception tied to limits of language. 4-. Human nature and Its essential prejudice-, limits to what we are prepared to accept or understand. Set of prejudices, etc., e.g. prejudices In of favour numbers (In a fuaay world). Our constitution prevents understanding of world. Wilkinson's further argument Is that In view of limits we humans cannot but value to resort 'in reaching his judgements as to how the natural world Is - constructed, man cannot ultimately do more than say this Is how It has to be (p.96). Value ImposItIon, has to be', lie know that whether or [whether 'should be', quarks No, (p.98): Is here like Leslie? not we This Is how It get can good' feel at quarks we shall continue to talk about them and discuss their exist] (p.97). Nature Is going to be what the mind anatomy and domestic economy It me this makes the same makes of [our] theory with the thing confusion theorised that pervades Idealistic approaches. Wilkinson also to wants (as above and especially from orthodox proceed quantum theory) to reject any theme of the closure of nature to mind. He contends (p.80) that objectivity - looking at nature from outside - dissolves to be replaced by something Involving man essentially. The natural world depends on man for Its definition: hence the universe as an artefact. But this Is In no way established. The argument depends on the fallacy of of theory nature again, find nature equating with the It makes the erroneous assumption that the only criteria for theory selection are at bottom those of value or feeling. R question Wilkinson suggests, but sets aside (In the too-hard basket) Is: How It Is that we manage to understand the universe, or It s e.g. the much of It? mostly good luck. Historically rather different answers were favoured, universe Intelligible, Is natural, the world Is Intelligible. It's Since sufficiently Intelligent creatures can come to understand It. The Intelligibility theme Is not lacking for exponents. Here, In summary. Is Heynell argues for and applies It: R. If the It would not be that we can In world were not Intelligible, principle come to know. But the world Is that which we can In principle come to know. Therefore the world Is Intelligible. B. If Very like: We don't; or, So far as we different repsonses quickly suggest themselves, do so there were not something analogous to human Intelligence In the constitution of the world? the world would not be Intelligible. Therefore there Is something analogous to human Intelligence In constitution of the world (68). -2- the how The preMiss first of B is flat out false, but present concern is with fl. The Minor preMiss of fl is false, by virtue of llMltatlon arguments such as those Wilkinson and elsewhere take an analytical shape is suffIclently (e.g. a of Routley). find the Major preMiss, though it can distortion. For Instance, the world May be intelligible for us to come to understand what we do of It without being completely intelligible. -3- f~. i— i— i— r—i f— k i r^. ez. r- ez. r*--. ez. i -i H. fl e g n e 11, London, The Intelligible Universe r— «~- ez. - -=• A cosMologlcal arguwent , flacwll I an, 1982. D.H. Ullklnson, The universe as an artefact Models and Han, Clarendon, Oxford, In H. 1976, 88-98. -4- Harris (ed. ) Sc tent itto Lj / 1 -\ L/ A C'T'Zf^ £ X J -/■■».*> -K f. / (/ W7 e (/ 7^77 sy J e 4^-?'')'? ] '^7' 4~r>l*'< > & '' ( //// O ' a  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Box 7, Item 792: Is the universe (like) an artefact? Subject The topic of the resource Computer printout with handwritten amendments, and handwritten notes on scrap paper. Description An account of the resource Note, one item digitised from item 792. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/browse?search=Richard+Routley&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bjoiner%5D=and&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=&amp;range=&amp;collection=&amp;type=&amp;user=&amp;tags=&amp;public=&amp;featured=&amp;exhibit=&amp;geolocation-mapped=&amp;geolocation-address=&amp;geolocation-latitude=&amp;geolocation-longitude=&amp;geolocation-radius=10&amp;submit_search=Search+for+items">Richard Routley</a> Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived <span class="MuiTypography-root-125 MuiTypography-body2-126">The University of Queensland's <a data-testid="rek-series" href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/records/search?page=1&amp;pageSize=20&amp;sortBy=score&amp;sortDirection=Desc&amp;searchQueryParams%5Brek_series%5D%5Bvalue%5D=Richard+Sylvan+Papers%2C+UQFL291&amp;searchMode=advanced">Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291</a></span>, Box 7, Item 792 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org">Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy</a> Contributor An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, <a href="https://najtaylor.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Dr. N.A.J. Taylor</a>. Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library. Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource [4] leaves + [1] leaf. 2.68 MB. Type The nature or genre of the resource Manuscript Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context <a href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:acc747a">https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:acc747a</a> Australian National University Office Box 7: Environmental Ethics Como House > Shelves > Bottom > Pile 3 https://www.antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/9d2cb1366bf43e4d6fa3297d8399ddd8.pdf 2826984189904e731ada17347bd52c28 PDF Text Text WAR AND PEACE IV: TAO AND DEEP-GREEN Taoism and deep-green environmental theory, although closely aligned on very many issues, diverge over war. For Taoism, by contrast for instance with Buddhism, is not a pacific doctrine, but is committed to skilful defensive militarism. While it does not espouse a fortress mentality, Taoism certainly condones limited defensive military operations for specific purposes, a sort of guerilla warfare. By contrast, deep-green theory, while acknowledging the role of organised social defence, stands opposed to professional militarism, and thereby to military defence, and is committed to a principled pacifism. Conveniently a route through Taoism, philosophically fascinating in its own right, will lead us to problems of pacifism and towards deep-green theory. 1. Features of a Taoist critique of war and militarism. War did not receive a favourable press in ancient Chinese philosophy. Generally aggression and war were to be avoided. Even Confucius imposed very demanding conditions: for example, ‘when good men have instructed the people [in morals, agriculture, military tactics] for seven years, they may be allowed to bear arms,’ ‘If a ruler ... does not set himself right, even his commands will not be obeyed’ ( SB p.41, italics added). Mo Tzu went much further than Confucius, roundly condemning war – on utilitarian grounds, that war yields no net benefit at any level ( SB p.227). What is more, he backed his heavy condemnation practically (unlike some conspicuous contemporary theoretical utilitarians); ‘he did not hesitate to walk for ten days and ten nights in an effort to dissuade a ruler from making war’ ( SB p.212). But none, it is said, went as far, in a detailed and sophisticated criticism of war, as Lao Tzu; ‘none has condemned war more strongly than Lao Tzu’. ‘[T]he opposition of Taoism to the use of force is well-known, and the most bitter attack on militarism if found in the Lao Tzu’ (Chan, p.154, p.17.) But, after that splendid build-up, the text is slightly disappointing. Lao Tzu does not assert outright that war is an abomination, or even roundly condemn it. His critique of war, militarism, and military technology, is subtle and oblique, and, on the surface, far distanced from pacifism. For he does not recommend an end to war - in that genuine Taoists, those who possess Tao, will never participate in them – but expects wars to continue as unavoidable evils. Worse, he even goes so far as to outline proper attitudes to war and conduct in war, and indeed to suggest military techniques and strategies, some of which look decidedly devious. Among the classical works of Taoism, we focus on the Lao Tzu because, by contrast with other works, a remarkable component of that book is devoted to war and militarism. The apparent deviousness of the tactics Lao Tzu allocates serves to highlight what has been seen as ‘the most troublesome element’ in his philosophy (Chan p.17) – not so much however because they concern military operations, but because they are taken �to apply much more widely, ‘to life in general’ (p.17). But why should military activity obtain some special �dispensation? Why should what is not tolerated more generally be exonerated there? But given that Taoism has here the virtue of consistency (i.e. uniformity on principles) and of universalizability, that simply leaves more explaining to be done. • Puzzles for Taoism, and wars as unavoidable evils There are two puzzles here in Taoism rather than one. There is the militarypractices paradox, and, varying and generalising on that, there are life-practices paradoxes. The special paradox is generated by the following incompatible elements: on the one side, ‘the most bitter attack on militarism’, the well-known opposition of Taoism to the use of force (p.17) and to the possession and use of smart military weapons and technology – implying that war is far from all right – and on the other, advocacy of certain (devious) military tactics, outlines of (deceitful) conduct in war, and so on – implying that war is all right after all. A straightforward generalisation of this paradox would look at other morally-sensitive parts of life, where some practice was strongly condemned yet engaged in (for many examples, see the dilemmas assembled in MD). But the variation of concern to Chan and the neo-Confucians concerns the conjunction of upright with devious practices in life, in particular in the life of the sage. For a Taoist sage is presumed to lead an upright straightforward life, yet appears to engage in devious and even deceitful practices incompatible with such a life-style. Call this the Taoist-lifestyle paradox. Evidently a good deal of explaining is required, as to how Taoism can coherently take the positions it appears to presume, both on war and peace, and on life more generally. A desirable preliminary would seem to be a little investigation of what position is taken, especially on war and militarism. One key pasage runs: Fine weapons are instruments of evil They are hated by creatures Therefore those who possess the Tao turn away from them. ... Weapons are instruments of evil, not the instruments of a good ruler. When he uses them unavoidably, he regards calm restraint as the best principle Even when he is victorious, he does not regard it as praiseworthy, For to praise victory is to delight in the slaughter of men. He who delights in the slaughter of men will not succeed in the empire. ... For a victory, let us observe the occasion with funeral-ceremonies (LT p.154). Wars, which involve the use of weapons, instruments of evil, are accordingly themselves evil. They are also evil because they involve the slaughter of men. But they are also sometimes unavoidable (also p.152). Therefore such wars are unavoidable evils. Such discourse, obtained by almost immediate inference from the passage, is within the standard orbit of dilemma talk. But Taoism lacks, through �deliberately eschewing deontic talk, the discourse which enables direct expression of such dilemmas, or even direct condemnation of wars or of clever weapons. Instead the points are made by circumlocution, what the possesser of Tao does, how the good ruler conducts himself, or by analogy, of victory in war with death. �Unavoidable evils are the very stuff of deontic dilemmas (though many theories, underpinned by shonky logic, lack the resources for representing this stuff properly). Where something is unavoidably evil, it is both bad, because evil, and also not bad, doing it is excusable, because it is unavoidable. So, given such an argument (which has its weaknesses), an unavoidable evil is a genuinely dilemmatic object with inconsistent features. Certain wars have looked, since ancient times, like such dilemmatic objects. Revealingly, Chan tries to explain that ‘most troublesome element’ in Taoism, the military-practice paradox, through the following exercise in lateral thinking: It can ... be argued that Lao Tzu uses warfare to illustrate his principles of taking no action and weakness because warfare is among the most dynamic and critical of human experiences, just as the Indian classic, the Bhagavadgita chooses fighting as the theme on which to discuss the terrible dilemma whether one should fulfil his duty, as in the case of a soldier, and kill, or should fail in his duty and refrain from killing (p.17). ‘Just as’? The Indian classic prevents a classic moral dilemma, a dilemma represented in contemporary philosophy (following its rediscovery by Sartre), where there are incompatible duties: the duty to kill, because of one's role as a soldier, and the duty not to kill, because of one's human condition, and the supervenient dilemma of failing in and fulfilling one's duties. These dilemmas for an individual (male, as it then was) are replicated in dilemmas regarding war for group institutions: at bottom, the obligation to engage in war (for one set of compelling reasons) as contraposed with the obligation not to engage in war (for another, perhaps overlapping, set of reasons). A theory of moral dilemmas (as worked out for example in MD) is crucial for an adequate treatment of major issues in war and peace, especially (as will become evident) for a viable strong pacifism. But Taoism, eschewing deontic discourse, lacks the apparatus to state or develop moral dilemmas. Hence it is logically excluded from giving a full or adequate account of what is going on conceptually. One of the philosophically fascinating feature of Taoism is the fashion in which it manages to avoid deontic discourse, and to substitute for direct deontic discourse or improvise circumlocutions when deontic discourse would otherwise appear inevitable (cf. UT for examples). But there are costs. One is inability to display the mechanism of deontic dilemmas, or to show what reasons and argument lie behind Taoist prounouncements and conclusions (the shortage of Taoism on argument is another philosophically conspicious feature, also observed in UT). As conceptual apparatus for analysizing moral dilemmas is missing, most of the machinery involved has to be passed over. Only the outcomes, as Taoism sees them, are presented, as if from a black box. Taoism blacks out the story on deontic dilemmas that deep-green theory can tell, as the following diagram tries to show: �Diagrams . Charting the processing of deontic dilemmas that are “resolved”. �Deep-green chart: dilemma input Arguments to incompatible prescriptions § Processing of dilemma, directive situational procedures output Corresponding Taoist chart: Black directive Box output input It is evident that Taoism can be extended; information can be put into the Black Box rendering it less opaque. That extension can be made so as to conform to deepgreen theory, i.e. so that the extended Taoist chart, a neo-Daoist chart, looks like the deep-green one. That is indeed essentially how neo-Daoism get characterised, in terms of conformity of the extension to deep ecological theory (see UT). We are now placed to explain how to dissolve, or at least neutralize, the paradoxes deriving from repudiation of militarism, an awkwardly qualified repudiation in the case of Taoism. In a significant sense there is no resolving of genuine deontic dilemmas. The principles delineating the fix may stand, incompatible, signalling the persisting suboptimality (or better, sublimenality) of the dilemmatic situation. Where there is a dilemma, involved parties should try to do well enough in the sublimenal circumstances (for a much fuller account, see MD). Thus where there is a war, itself a non-Taoist process, engaged or caught up Taoists will not abandon Taoism. Taoist methods will be applied, Taoist strategies pursued. So much for theoretical representation and (non-)resolution of life-practices and other dilemmas, details of which are readily elaborated in deep-green extensions of Taoism. A prior substantive issue is whether dilemmas always are generated: not whether wars are evil (typically they are, an issue we shall come to), but whether wars are unavoidable. Analysis of wars does not bear that familiar claim out decisively. Many wars could have been avoided, through conciliation, negotiation, restraint, etc., and no worse results apparently obtained, through sanctions, exchange, trade, etc. Through a typology of wars (coming up) that conjecture can be given some substance. Consider, for instance, what would be walk-overs. Then there is little point in making a military response. So war can be avoided. Certainly an occupation, to be met in a different way, may still occur. And so on, perhaps, for various other types of war. But, more generally, try this:Every war involves an aggressor, who makes an aggressive move. Such an aggressor could always avoid that move, taking a different (or a do-nothing) course of �action. Therefore, �every war can be avoided. No war is entirely unavoidable. Setting aside determinism (which renders all actual wars along with all other events unavoidable), it could be argued that a war sometimes simply boils up, without an aggressor, an intensification of a conflagatory situation. There are grounds for scepticism regarding such examples; for such intensification can only occur if provocative military moves are made, for instance troops are stationed in provocative or risky positions. The presumption that certain wars are unavoidable typically derives from a onesided perspective on war, a defender's perspective. A defender has no option, so it is routinely averred, but to respond to a determined aggressor. Even if that should be so sometimes, when there is no running away or going underground, it does not establish that such a war is unavoidable; for it neglects the role of the aggressor. By a smarter formulation, relevant features of unavoidability can be captured. Although wars may not be unavoidable, defensive action in wars that have been initiated may be unavoidable. At least such action may be unavoidable if unacceptably high costs (death, enslavement, etc.) are not to be avoided. Thereupon another highly relevant feature emerges: the linkage of avoidability to costs. For whether an action is unavoidable then depends upon what costs a party is prepared to incur before and when insisting on action: but this appears entirely unacceptable. How can what is “unavoidable” cease to be so when some further costs are absorbed? However with basics like survival, a certain liberty, and so on, we do reach such bounds. An important type of unavoidability. We also reach scenarios, unavailable to Lao Tzu but kindly brought within range by modern technology, which may appear to justify aggressive strikes. State Z, while not an aggressor, is carrying out practices which will impose unacceptably high costs upon peoples of other states and implacably refuses to desist. It could, for example, be poisoning air or water flowing to other states. But ,to make the case vivid, let us suppose that state Z is constructing, for reasons Zeders find convincing (they are committed to a faith which depicts all humans as incorrigible sinners and unworthy of life), an effective doomsday machine. Would an (aggressive) preemptory strike designed to disable or destroy the machine be unavoidable? 1 In a sense, No; in another Yes. For different modalities can operate. Physically outsiders need to do nothing, but watch Zeders go about their zealous work. But deontically they are under heavy moral pressure, because of the costs of standing by idly: if the human race is worth anything very substantial, then they are obliged to act, action is deontically unavoidable. Here is a situation where a proposed reduction of deontic logic proves illuminating. Obligation is explicated through not implying, or necessitating, the sanction, i.e. 1 Whether it would be justifiable, or just, are separate issues. But it is evident enought that such scenarios further damage the obsolescent idea of just war. For, according to received doctrine, a just war is defensive. (How such a war can be fought at all is another matter; coherence requires relativization to ‘just war for party d’.) �excessive ethical costs such as extermination. Let us explain deontic unavoidability analogously: an action is so unavoidable if not undertaking it would result in excessive ethical costs. Then if it can be established that there is no other way than a military strike, an act of war, to ensure that the Zeders desist (and certainly we can envisage scenarios like that), then that is deontically unavoidable. It is also dilemmatic for those committed to, or inclined towards pacifism; and it is, for them at least, but paradoxically justifiable, as the negation is also justifiable, on pacific grounds. Scenarios like that sketched, that appear to render certain wars deontically unavoidable require but little or no elaboration to render them evil. Evil indeed is such a standard feature of standard wars that at least its great presence call for little supporting evidence. But it has taken to vast stretch of human history to reach this general point of recognition. The manifold evils of war Lao Tzu very early recognised and emphasized: Wherever armies are stationed, briars and thorns grow. Great wars are always followed by famines (p.152). And nowadays followed by great tides of refugees. This passage includes not only recognition of the widely-observed socioenvironmental consequences of war, but, more striking, very early recognition of the severe environmental impact of military forces. That critique is not however developed in Taoism. 2 Only recently has it been pushed substantially further. And only recently could a new, most significant twist occur, the merging of resource security, long a military objective, with environmental security. The appalling idea has recently been floated that the military, in need of new work and roles with the apparent warming of West-East relations and cooling of the Cold War, should exchange usual military idleness for meddling in environmental matters: regulation and policing of environmental resources, ensurance of environmental security of powerful states, and similar. This is a bit like reassigning those imprisoned for child abuse to managing kindergartens; for consider the impressive military record of environmental vandalism. What the military is alleged to offer is a structure appropriate and available for handling such matters. But, to the contrary, it is precisely the sort of hierarchical, authoritarian expensive structure that should be wound down and up as soon as the opportunity appears, as (briefly) now, rather than being retained and shockingly reoriented (as a state-serving “Greenwar”). 2. On the divergence of deep-green from Taoism. Having arrived, by better or worse arguments, at the conclusion that wars, though 2 But a bridge to deep-green theory can be made through neo-Daoism, an updating of Taoism in confirmity with deep ecology (which however is somewhat thin and threadbare on war; for what there is so far, see Naess p.160). On neoDaoism, see UT. �generally evil, may be sometimes unavoidable, it is evidently important to say something about how they – those of the theoretical residue – are to be conducted. By appropriate conduct the damage they do may be reduced; also the conduct should be appropriate to the funereal nature of wars (to exceed Taoist resources for stating this sort of point). It is at this stage that deep-green theory begins to diverge from Taoism. In further explaining the Taoist and deep-green critiques of war, and diverting objections to them, a rough and preliminary typology of wars is important. It is also of passing interest in its own philosophical right. War, according to English Dictionaries, is a ‘contest carried on by force of arms, typically between nations or states’. More exactly, war is a game – in the generous technical sense of game-theory, with players, rules, goals, strategies, and so on – carried on in significant part by military means, normally between states or substates. Call the contestants, (warring) parties. They typically represent of course larger populations. The set-up between parties resembles the arrangements of players in game theory. There are several analogical extensions of the term war to cover games where one of the parties is an object, construed as hostile (an enemy of the state), such as Crime, Drugs, Poverty or Nature. These we can set aside as analogical wars. Of course wars form only a part of military activities. Military interests and objectives have always stretched significantly further than war, to include surveillence and security, easily extended to resource security, environmental security and life-style security, and beyond that to political stability and other political matters. Evidently military ambitions have far over-extended themselves in bagging such democratic concerns. An anarchist solution to the whole problem of war, which some have seen Taoism as reaching towards, is immediate: eliminate the source of war, states. Unfortunately it is not quite that simple (and that's not simple). For wars can also occur between nations, cultures, races or tribes (which are not such artifices as states, and not always so readily or desirably abolished), between inhabited regions, and between factions within states (thus civil wars) or, perhaps by extension, between factions within other social structures (thus, for instance, gang wars). But undoubtedly eliminating states and aspiring states would abolish most wars and virtually all the worst wars. While “nonviolent wars” are excluded by definition, by virtue of ‘force of arms’, token wars, limited wars, and so on, are not: for instance, wars fought by small armed teams representing competing sides (cf. medieval and science fiction war games). As wars are hemmed in by conventions and agreed rules, there is no reason in principle why they should not be reduced to two person contests, fought under strict rules like boxing or gladiatorial contests. But in modern times wars have never taken such sensible forms, but have been much larger affairs, making heavy (though fortunately restricted) use of latest technology. Let us distinguish such wars as techno-powered wars. They have, directly or indirectly (for the technology may be bought or bartered), a heavy research and development support structure (indeed the bulk of contemporary science is devoted – misdirected – in one way or another to �this effort). Among wars, an important distinction is that between offensive and defensive wars. An offensive war is one which ventures off a given party's territory or recognised pad, “invading” that of another party or parties; correlatively defensive parties, if they have not also invaded. Force projection typifies offensive practice. Plainly, offensiveness and defensiveness are not strictly features of a war, but of parties to a war. In a two-party war, while both parties can easily act offensively, the possibility of both parties proceeding defensively is excluded, unless they share territory. (Even then issues may arise as to which party, if any, was the aggressor, which started it, was responsible for starting it, and so on.) Thus mutually defensive wars between contemporary states are impossible (but would be possible if states shared territory, e.g. if Eire and Britain shared the territory of Northern Ireland). Tao-accredited wars were defensive wars, never wars aiming at domination: last-resort wars, in which no pride was taken ( LT p.152).3 The pretence that offensive wars are defensive is widespread, and reflected in the subterfuge that departments or ministries of war are those of defence, security or whatever. (If they really were what they purport to be, we should be well on the way to an end to war.) Offensive practices are rendered defensive ones by shabby redefinitional strategems, such as redefining ‘defensive’ to include defence of ideals like democracy or liberty, infringed (or allegedly infringed) on territories abroad, or to include “defence” of a third party or place (whence every offensive war is “defensive”). In the present war in which part of Arabia is engulfed (February 1991), one party claims to be defending what really was (or should be) part of its territory, namely Kuwait, another party to be defending (what Kuwait did not enjoy) democracy. It is a doubly offensive war presented in this guise as jointly defensive. Aggressive wars are waged for a variety of reasons, but usually for resources or access to resources or markets, a matter often disguised by appeal to ideology (thus a war for oil is represented as a war of liberation). But there are other reasons than narrowly economic ones, such as religion (as with crusades), power and aggrandisement (as in building an empire), and so on. Nor are those reasons necessarily far separated; ideologies like Marxism and market capitalism, for example, exhibit many of the features of religion. The economic reasons for war appear to have become much more complex with the 3 There is one line in LT that may suggest that attack was sometimes justifiable, namely ‘For deep love helps one to win in the case of attack’ (p.219). But how can compassion be appropriate unless this attack is within a defensive setting, a larger context of unavoidability or such like. A passage shortly below confirms this interpretation: I dare not take the offensive but I take the defensive: I dare not advance an inch but I retreat a foot (p.222). These are advances and attacks within a defensive setting. �advent of an integrated world economy. At the same time many of the independent reasons for economic wars are now obsolete. For to powerful states accrue the advantages of war without war. At least most of the former economic advantages of war can be obtained without expensive wars, through trade, institution of economic dependence, etc. Small medieval wars were sometimes instituted for the collection of neighbouring riches and booty, a kind of piracy meeting conditions of war. “Small” contemporary wars can be waged for a remarkable mix of political-economy ends: to establish a regime favourable to economic penetration and profit repatriation, to subjugate markets and to remove competition, to boost a sagging weapons economy by using up old stocks and also testing new equipment, to restart a depressed economy, and so on. Such wars, along with the economic aims which motivate them, are in effect heavily castigated by Lao Tzu: When Tao prevails in the world, galloping horses are turned back to fertilize When Tao does not prevail in the world, war horses (the thrive in fields ...). the suburbs. There is no calamity greater than lavish desires. ( LT p.181). But it does exceed evidential warrant to claim that Tao is not only sufficient, but necessary, for cessation of such practices. The practice of regularly stimulating complex military-saturated economies through war is reminiscent of older, much ridiculed practices in simpler societies. They now ridicule the Tsembaga, who proceeded to destroy much of their surplus product by going to war every 5-15 years (cf Rapaport). But they do not similarly ridicule the most powerful nation on the Earth, the USA, which proceeds to write off a colossal amount of surplus in war every 10-20 years (the Gulf war liquidated some $1.7 billion per day). Taoists would. For ridicule was a favoured method, an important rhetorical strategem, and war and its idiocy were favourite targets. Some classification of defensive wars is also important, for various reasons: reducing and abolishing wars, their costs and damage, restructuring societies away from war and military practices, and, not least, for appreciating Taoism. A main distinction is between • conventional defence, maintained by armies of armed soldiers, many of them professionals, and • social defence, where there are no such armies or but fragments of them, and defence is carried out through social networks of a significant part of society.4 It is here that Taoism and deep-green theory part company. Under Taoism, the state will have a standing army, but a defensive army operating by strange, surprise tactics (p.201). No 4 Details of social defence are presented in Sharp and in Martin. �doubt defensive wars are to remain last resort action. Nonetheless the state will operate in secrecy, in a way incompatible with decentralised social defence; people will be kept in the dark about smart weapons of the state; and they too will be surprised, along with presumed enemies of the state. By contrast, under deep-green theory, there should be no hidden smart weapons of state; information would flow more freely and not be hidden from the people (who should retain influence in informed decision making). Under deep-green, standing armies, and more generally military organisation, will be wound down altogether. Taoism should have pushed its searching criticism further. For military objectives, easily acquired by standing armies with time on their hands, are frequently incompatible with Taoism. For example, Taoism is opposed to domination ( LT p.152), whereas military operations frequently seek or involve domination; and military structure is invariably hierarchical and authoritarian. Taoism aims for self-regulation, wherever feasible (cf. p.201); so does deep-green theory, which is one reasons why it aims to dispose of standing armies, as an important preliminary to the withering away of states themselves (military forces being major props of state control and power, and often maintained primarily for internal state security). Taoism has no project for ending the era of wars; deepgreen theory does. That project involves an elimination of standing armies, too often poised for fighting or political interference. A recommended route to end war consists in progressive scaling down: reduction of the means and manpower. The initial stages are well-known, and include • elimination of nuclear, biological and chemical weaponry, and • force reduction. It can hardly be pretended that the Earth's states have managed to proceed very far on even this complex of stages. The next stage consists in • contraction to defensive capacities only, and the final stage consists in • elimination of remaining military defensive forces, and adoption, so far as required, of social defence practices. The complete route thus involves complete demilitarisation. Reasons why deep-green aims to proceed the full distance are readily grasped by considering the environmental shallowness of an otherwise cogent traditional case for the sharp curtailment of wars and militarism. The traditional Western case against wars has been primarily along two dimensions: social and moral. Wars are highly disruptive of the social fabric; wars may be unjust. From these joint features, it was argued that wars should be a matter of last resort, to be fought to ensure peace. It was argued further that only just wars should be fought. Just wars were rare objects. But as there was little evidence of the decline and fall of wars, much effort was expended, more practically and unsuccessfully, upon endeavouring to improve the calibre of wars, and more theoretically, upon trying to characterize just war satisfactorily, or rather to bend the notion in an effort to approximate the gory unjust facts. Progress was long hindered, furthermore, because there was always a rival positive perspective on wars, which encouraged the exaltation of wars and military feats. It also �facilitated the transfer of the favourable image of war to other problem areas, whence the long and apparently successful war against Nature (but the short-term successes are turning into long-term problems), the short and unsuccessful war against Poverty, and so on. Behind all this is the complex idea of war as rejuvenating, even cleansing, like fire; of war as heroic, and glorious, of war as the supreme testing ground of men. These pictures of war – finally shattered by the first World War (where even the poets began to tell of horrors and atrocities) and subsequent technological wars – though no longer in ascendency, have by no means vanished. The notion of war as rejuvenating a flagging economy persists, along with the practice of keeping capitalism running smoothly by integrating substantial military components into the industrial engine. With the development of highly technological wars – the celebrated development of the dirty industrial age is substantially military – the traditional negative case has grown in strength. Wars have become much more damaging, with the potential for much more that is significantly worse, and the possibility of a just war has correspondingly contracted, virtually to zero. The opposition to war has likewise grown, but more than correspondingly with the rise of women in social and political influence. Wars have almost always and everywhere been Men's affairs; likewise conquest. Deep-green theory accepts much of the traditional negative case, but would further strengthen it. For example, the stricture against unjust wars, as out and out immoral, can be strengthened, through the following syllogism: All wars should be fully just wars. Modern wars cannot be fully just wars. Therefore, there should be no modern wars. A fully just war is not merely a just war, but a war those just character can be reliably forecast in advance. A modern war is of course a war that deploys modern technology, at least that available this century. The evidential basis for the second premiss derives from much information that collateral damage, damage to innocent bystanders and involved citizens is always likely and cannot be excluded. Such wars are always liable to violate uncontroversial requirements for a just war, even if they are purely “conventional” wars, not throwing radiation or chemical or biological weapons around. From a contemporary viewpoint the traditional doctrine of a just war, really of a just defensive war, is seriously out of date. The reasons for this reach wider than the new features introduced by modern technological wars and the character of modern civilization, with its giant cities littered with dangerous and vulnerable military targets. They have also to do with the chauvinism of the justice proposed, which is shallow human justice, not natural or environmental justice. There is no consideration of justice to other creatures or to the Earth (cf Naess p.160). Two troubles are really intertwined here: conceptual difficulties with too narrow a notion of justice, and ideological difficulties with too narrow a vision of what is an object of �value, of what counts. The deep-green case against war adds to the traditional case a further dimension, neglected until very recently: the environmental dimension. It has suddenly been seen that wars are typically environmental atrocities. Earlier, of course, “environments” were simply backgrounds, backdrops in paintings and plays, to the real drama. Contemporary technological wars tend to be not merely social tragedies but environmental ones as well. There is a doctrine of just war, but it is a human chauvinistic affair. There is no similarly developed doctrine of an ecologically sound war, a deep ecological war. Unless any such war were literally different from modern wars, that is from contemporary technological wars, it would overstep permitted bounds. For such wars are characteristically ecological disasters. Hardened military people, desensitized by a rigorous unethical training, feel even less compunction about degrading or destroying environments or members of other species than they do of maiming or killing civilians through “collateral” activity. Matching the no-just-war syllogism is a no-sound-war syllogism: All wars should be environmentally sound wars. Modern wars cannot be environmentally sound. Therefore, there should be no modern wars. The argument for the second premiss has of course to be different. It looks to the information accumulating on what wars do to natural and built environments. The Vietnam and Gulf wars both inflicted immense damage on natural environments or what was left of them. The environmental effects of war are not confined to direct and collateral damage. There are indirect effects also. Thus, for instance, war also supplied the mechanism of, and the technology for, modern environmental destruction: explosives, bulldozers from tanks, etc. As well, training for war and engagement in war have much fostered, along with attitudes that make for social callousness or ruthlessness, those that contribute to environmental insensitivity and cruelty. 3. Puzzles about Taoist strategy and its critiques of technology and violence ‘It is surprising how much of the Lao Tzu is devoted to military strategy’. Which strategies? Surprise, above all. But why such strategies? ‘Do they not contradict the Taoists’ strong opposition to the use of force’ (Chan p.222), the implied commitment to quietism? Briefly, Taoism is not committed to quietism, and while certainly antagonistic to violence, does not oppose certain uses of force (only really ill-forcing, as will be explained). Even so, the emphasis on military strategy remains puzzling. The strategies, many of them relevant to social defence, include • seriousness, not ‘making light of the enemy’ (p.222) • surprise, and nonvisibility (p.201). The defensive strategy involves guerilla tactics: marching without formation, holding weapons without seeming to have them, confronting �enemies without seeming to meet them (p.222). But even in times of peace, ‘smart weapons of the state should not be displayed to the people’ (p.164). Such recommendations helped to fuel the charge of deviousness lodged against Lao Tzu. But look at part of the reason for concealing smart weapons: ‘The more smart weapons the people have, the more troubled the state will be’ (p.201). Smart weapons are carried in corrupt states, where the rich engage in conspicuous consumption and the people are suppressed, not where Tao is practiced (LT p.194). • advance from weakness, flexibility but firmness. Weakness is the principle of life and will overcome strength ( LT p.164, p.233). • coolness and non-competition (LT p.233, p.164). Like these, most of the general strategies are standard Taoist practices simply applied to military conduct. For these standard practices the charge of deviousness looks feeble. The response applies more generally to other allegedly devious political strategies. For the strategies are but application of Taoist principles and techniques to warfare, politics and elsewhere. Nothing excludes application of these techniques to what are accounted, in general, unnecessary evils (which must sometimes, on other Taoist grounds, be countered). Nor, to meet the main criticism, need any deceit or deviousness be involved; nor is it. In particular, the legalist tactic, ‘In order to grasp, it is necessary first to give’ (LT p.164), is cited as involving ‘an element of deceit’ ‘undeniably’, and ‘worse’ it is ‘morally questionable’ (Chan p.17). But in order for me to grasp your hand in a normal handshake, it is necessary first for me to give my hand. There is no deceit here, nothing morally questionable. All the tactics permit of benign construals, of a Taoist kind. Consider, for instance, ‘In order to contract, it is necessary first to expand’ (LT p.164). In order to bend a copper pipe to the intended angle, it is better to bend it first a little further than required. The transformation of water to ice (both favoured natural items for symbolic purposes: natural processes which may look devious!) neatly illustrates the Taoist principle (which is however hardly necessary), and shows softness and weakness turned hardness and strength. The Taoist critique of militarism is as much a critique of technology as of war. Sharp weapons, ‘smart weapons’ as we might now say, come in for much critical attention, as we have already noticed. Only in corrupt and degenerate states are they displayed or flaunted (p.194, p.164); in deep-green regions smart weapons of state’ would not be retained unexhibited. The people will not have them for they mean trouble (p.201); for similar reasons deep-green regions will be free of them. So, it seems, will ideal Taoist regions: ‘Even if there are arrows and weapons, none will display them’ ( LT p.238). Much technology, military and other, is excluded under the Taoist edict against violence (a further facet of the military-practices paradox). 5 5 Under contemporary technology and technological arrangements, such as the storage of quantities of oil and nuclear and chemical materials in great cities, wars have assumed new and very destructive dimensions, to the point of being utterly irresponsible. A different approach to technology, as to war, is now mandatory. These are no longer things that can in principle be nicely confined and need not touch parties outside the fray. An important part of ending wars, “winning the war against wars”, is removing the technology of war, above all from irresponsible state power. As for which technology to try to jettison and which to try to retain or improve, it is not so difficult to indicate, provided evaluative terminology is not outlawed. What is wanted is technology that is good in its place, what should be excluded is technology that is indifferent or bad or potentially so. Technology to be justified has to do something worthwhile, it has to address identifiable respectable needs. That is why �The powerful critique of militarism in the Tao-te Ching is coupled with strong opposition to violence. Some of the linkage is evident enough. Militarism as practised represents an ultimate form of state (or party) violence. A basic theme is that violent practices will come to an unnatural end, and accordingly to a non-Taoist end (generalising LT p.176). While force may occur in spectacular, but satisfactory, natural forms, force is duly distinguished from violence. To force the growth of life means ill omen. For the mind to employ the vital force without restraint means violence (LT p.197). One who follows Tao does not apply dominating force, which usually has had results bringing requital (p.152). Dominating force, like power, is in general castigated, under doctrine of wu-wei, no forced actions, no violence. To force natural growth is deviant, destroying harmony. To stop natural growth is deviant. But there is a significant difference between force and violence. To intentionally employ destructive force is to do violence. To so force things is condemned. To remain in harmony with things one does not so force things or practice violence. There is a non-interference principle at work, which also indicates types of non-interference that are excluded. However Taoism does not always get the distinction between force and violence quite right. ‘Vital force without restraint’, intentionally excessive force, is only part of what counts as violence, which is more generally force which violates, i.e. transgresses, descrecrates, merely indifferent technology is out; there is no virtue in technology for technology's sake, as it is a mere means technique. It is because of the crucial evaluative component in choice of technology that appropriateness, itself evaluative, comes closer to encapsulating the criterion than other recent efforts. Size, such as smallness, or intermediateness, are not what matter, though modest and not excessive technologies are likely to fare better in satisfying appropriateness. In simpler societies, small technology is of course more appropriate; for that is what is good there. From known criteria for what is good these other features for locally appropriate technology can be read off: reliability, esp. in maintenance, functioning well and safely under the expected range of operating conditions (which may be difficult), ease of repair, capital cheapness and repair inexpensiveness, environmental benignness, and meeting sound social needs. �profanes, injures, outrages, etc. It is thus a negatively connoted force, an evil force in some specified intentional respect. There is a tendency for Taoist commentators, not Taoists, to regard Taoism as condemning all uses, or even occurrences, of force, but this is not so. Rather intentional ill-forcing is what is castigated, what is deviant. Thus Taoism does not exclude a range of defensive practices, which make satisfactory use of natural forces, like letting the machines of war industry stop. Those who would abolish war and its machinery, substituting for it nonwarlike and ideally nonviolent methods, technology, and strategies, have been confronted not merely with much sub-rational abuse but with plenty of criticism and even some paradoxes. Here is a recent paradox concerning war and nonviolence: • War must be abolished. One reason is simply economic. We can no longer afford it, and the opportunity costs are enormous. Along with other extraordinarily wasteful activities, it is an anachronism. • Doing so cannot be accomplished without violence, i.e. in effect, given the types of violence involved, without what amounts to war. According to a fuller version of this premiss, the process of abolishing a war would only be achieved through a revolution so profound that it could not succeed without extensive and extreme violence, amounting to (civil) war. ˚ But then war cannot be abolished without war. Therefore, war which must be abolished cannot be abolished. 6 This “paradox” has been compared with the Liar paradox, but the parallel does not persist far. For this paradox does not involve selfreferential features, and is easily broken, as follows. Let the “last war” be not the last standard war but the revolution abolishing war. Then, given that the revolution is successful, war will be abolished therewith, i.e. with that last war. There need be no regress, given again a successful outcome. All the premisses stand intact, but the conclusion, following the ‘therefore’ is a nonsequitur. However, while the dissolution of the argument is accordingly logically fine, the route is repugnant. Standard pacifism challenges the second premiss. 4. Standard and moral pacifism. 6 Brian Medlin, who forcefully propounded this puzzle, set other analogous puzzles alongside it – designed to reveal deep difficulties in contemporary political, and especially alternative, thought. Another puzzle, concerning liberty and repression in the context of capitalism, revolved around the following inconsistent triad: • capitalism must be removed, but liberty retained. • capitalism cannot be removed without repression. • repression is antithetical to liberty. The puzzle is resolved as with the analogous puzzle of abolishing. Let the “last capitalist” action before the days of liberty be the repressive but liberating revolution overthrowing capitalism. �Although Taoism is strongly opposed to war, and much in favour of peace – and accordingly by prevailing standards a substantially pacific position – it is not (nowhere in the central texts) committed to pacifism in usual senses, for two different reasons:- • It is not, by contrast with pacifism, opposed to all types of warfare, for example smart defensive wars. • It eschews deontology in terms of which moral pacifism is commonly stated, for instance through the watershed thesis P2. It is morally wrong to use violence. By contrast with Taoism, deep environmentalism does not avoid deontic claims, and is committed in principle to nonviolent technologies and ways and to pacifistic principles. Moreover, certain forms of deep environmentalism are completely committed to pacifism, notably European forms. Is deep green? There is heavy contemporary opposition to pacifism, as there also was to Taoism in the warring times when Taoism was first being promulgated. Many of the central institutions of contemporary life are intricated in coercion, violence and war. The most prominent contemporary institutions, states, are premissed on these elements of damaging force; they claim entitlement to use them widely, and even claim a certain territorial monopoly on their use. As a result they are having constantly to engage in them in attempt to maintain that monopoly. They are certainly the main perpetrators of wars, and of violence. They are indeed inured to wars, are in constant preparation for wars, yet propound dialectial (and normally dishonest and cynical) doctrines of peace through war (for a recent example see the appendix). Unremarkably then, the extensive propagandistic machinery of state has invested heavily in “justificatory” exercises in favour of controlled use, its own use, of destructive force, and continues to inveigh against pacifism. Because a routine trick in this sophistical repetoire consists in conflating pacifism with extreme, naive and inplausible, forms, an inevitable and important early task commits in unscrambling senses of ‘pacifism’. Semantical skulduggery can be thwarted in this way. Pacifism, as explained by English dictionaries, invariably concerns wars and warfare, and contains two components, negative and, elaborating on that, positive:- The negative component is, in Arnauld's word, anti-War-ism, opposition (in ways to be further specified) to all forms of warfare (see OED). The positive component supplies alternative ways of settling disputes (what it is supposed that wars with some semblance of justification involve), such as negotiation, arbitration, ... – and, adding to too narrow dictionary accounts – sanctions, substitutions (e.g. of sporting events, operatic contests, cooperative ventures), ... . In brief standard pacifism is opposition to all warfare and resolution of potential wars by other nonmilitary means. Plainly the opposition to warfare, like the sanctions and so on, cannot itself be military (using soldiers and other devices of war), on pain of some incoherence. But otherwise the ways of opposition can be many and various: they can certainly be active, as with nonviolent �demonstrations, resistance movements, and so forth, and they may also be devious (e.g. turning the forces of war upon themselves so they are neutralised). It quickly becomes evident, then, that some of the dictionaries offer but loaded definitions which, by restricting the negative components, reduce the initial appeal and plausibility of pacifism. Consider the Concise English definition of the negative component: ‘the doctrine of non-resistance to hostilities and of total non-co-operation with any form of warfare’. Thereby excluded are forms of pacifism which offer active and plausible alternatives to warfare such as social defence. The Concise English tends to force pacifism into what the Oxford English Dictionary lists as its final item: ‘often, with depreciatory implication, the advocacy of peace at any price’, ‘in any circumstance’. Pacifism can easily resist being forced into these sorts of circumstances: it has many resources, as an extensive series of texts on alternatives to war, such as negotiation, non-violent action and social defence, from Taoism to contemporary environmentalism attest. Academic philosophers have much advanced the semantical strategy of some dictionaries, of rendering pacifism more difficult from the very outset by narrow and biassed definitions. They have stretched the term from its restricted setting of warfare, confined to state and organised gang violence, to cover all forms of violence, from state and interstate to, what is very different, personal and interpersonal violence. Call the resulting considerably stretched notion of pacifism, according to which it is morally wrong to use violence, according to which P2 holds, stretched pacifism.7 While stretched pacifism certainly includes standard pacifism (unless the notions of war and warfare are tampered with), the converse is very far from being the case. A pacifist is in no way committed to stretched pacifism, which is a much more problematic and difficult position than standard pacifism. There are several, substantially different reasons for this, which will be picked up seriatim. Stretched pacifism, also misleadingly called moral pacifism, has looked a very easy critical target to moral philosophers. Many the effusive philosopher who, upon sighting such a target, has charged, whooping such rhetoric as “incoherent”, “inconsistent”, “insensitive”, “fanatical”. However, with improved logical technology now available for accommodating and treating moral dilemmas, it is no great feat to resist such attacks, in the fashion of previous investigations (see esp. AI, also MD). A main aim was to demonstrate that stretched pacifism was not so stupid as it was made out to be or appeared to be to these inured to present dominant violent ways. So far from being stupid, it is viable. In future gentler times stretched pacifism could even be realised for whole communities of creatures (as some genuinely Christian sects envisaged); whence it will finally be seen to be feasible not merely for sages and supermen, and many ordinary women, but much more extensively. 7 In AI this notion was contrasted with standard pacifism as comprehensive pacifism: overcomprehensive might have been better. �The method of philosophical accommodation was through moral dilemmas. The sort of moral dilemma that stretched pacifism can induce derives as follows. On the one side stands the theme P2, Wv, in convenient symbols, for Wrong V-ing, violencing. Now this implies to WB, where B presents a case of of violence. On the other side, particular circumstances develop which lead to W ~B, because ~B would produce in the circumstances considerable wrong, for instance extensive violence, mass murder, etc. One stock example from the literature concerns calling off the firing squad about to shoot several captives if the pacifist shoots one of them (it is elaborated in AI p.13). Interestingly, another stock example from the literature concerns standard pacifism (it can also be presented in terms of patriotism; for details of both see MD p.10). Resolution of intractable moral dilemmas is, where it is required, situational. The agent decides in the situation, within the fix, what to do. There are many ways in which such decision making can proceed, less rational, such as those applying chance or involving bad faith, or more rational, such as those applying consequentialist decision theory (for details see MD, pp.32-9). A decision theory taking account of all that should be included will not however be purely consequential. It would also take account of relevant motivation. This defence and rehabilitation of moral pacifism has been challenged, in particular by Smith (hereafter JWS). JWS claims the defence offered is a ‘failure because it trivializes pacifism’ (p.153 twice). The rehabilitation trivializes pacifism because it entails that pacifism doesn't substantially differ from a form of activism which holds that while violence is always wrong one is sometimes justified on consequentialist grounds for preferring violent acts, if these acts are lesser evils than any other real alternatives. This is the commonsense position which most people hold – yet ... pacifism after all was supposed to be radical moral doctrine ... (p.153 rearranged).8 Part of the criticism is, then, not so much that pacifism is trivialized – JWS “activism” is hardly trivial – as that pacifism is popularised, deflated from a radical position to the commonsense position most people hold (p.154 also). Yet not a shred of evidence is adduced that JWS activism is such a populist position. Available evidence, for example from peace movements and oppositional opinion polls, suggests the very opposite: that, for instance, most people support state-justified conventional wars with the military violence they incur, and accordingly do not hold that violence is always wrong. From such a commonsense angle, pacifism with its condemnation of conventional wars and the violence they involve remains a radical doctrine. As regards wars and other violence-incurring social authorities, contemporary pacificism 8 JWS now informs me that he has changed his position. Whether the move effects his criticism, I don't know. �is, as previous explained (e.g. AI p.3), a form of activism. Pacifism does not imply utter pacifity, but may actively involve social defence, resistance and so on. However a certain level of misrepresentation enters into the JWS challenge in the details of what forms of activism pacifism may include. That misrepresentation begins in the second clause concerning what is said to be sometimes justified. For the situational procedure where dilemmas arise will not generally be consequential applying a principle of lesser evil. In dilemmatic situations such principles are suspended, and such a principle is in any case unacceptable to moral pacifists. A small amount of violence may be less bad in its consequences than verbal offence, but a principled pacifist will choose the slightly greater evil where other obligations do not exclude it. A more serious distortion occurs in JWS's effort to force procedures in dilemma situations into purely consequentialist form. In fact consequential decision theory was deployed as a model only for how to proceed rationally in a situational setting where deontic procedures were suspended (see MD p.38). What was said, still misleadingly retrospective vision reveals, was this: ‘what is done is a very consequentialist thing’ (AI p.13), not ‘one acts in a consequentialist fashion to do the sufficiently good thing in the circumstances’ (JWS p.152). Situationally other procedures than those resembling orthodox rational decision making (modified from maximizing to satisizing objectives) may be adopted ( MD p.38). Further the orthodox consequentialist theory is inadequate because it leaves out, or tries to reduce to consequences, nonconsequential elements, notably motives. It is not difficult, in principle (in advance of attempted consequentialization of motives), to design situations where motives, such as integrity or maintaining faith, enter to yield outcomes upsetting consequential calculations. More elaborate decision making procedures than those of consequentialism, sometimes at variance with consequentialism, are thus presupposed. A further part of JWS's criticism accordingly goes by the board, the alleged appeal ‘to “second best” consequentialist considerations, ... already explicitly condemned’ (p.154). What was condemned was stock universal consequentialism, ‘that only consequentialist considerations carry argumentative weight’ (quoted on p.152), so undercutting other deontic principles, such as those of pacifism. It was not claimed, what is utterly different, that consequentialist considerations can nowhere enter into deliberation and decision making. The conclusion JWS arrives at is therefore substantially astray. After criticising modern moral philosophy for its reliance upon consequentialist modes of thought, it is surprising, and inconsistent, to find ... [reliance] upon such modes of thought to escape logical difficulties raised by moral dilemmas facing ... pacifis[m] (p.152) There is no inconsistency. JWS has confused universal with particular. As well he has wrongly contracted all situational decision making to consequentialist modes. There is a third part to the criticism, that the defence is too easy; the ‘strategy will allow too much violence to be (perpetrated and) justified to suit the tastes of any real pacifist’ (p.153). This another part of the so-called trivialization, this time however dilution rather than �populatization, weakening the moral stand against violence. This third contention is premissed on a mistake: that one can ‘justify on consequentialist grounds any number of violent acts, providing that such acts are lesser evils than other real alternatives facing social agents’ (p.153). Moral pacifism offers no such licence; allowing such consequentialism to take over was never part of the position. The slide to such consequentialism is made on the strength of a similarly erroneous example. The potential victim of an aspiring rapist ‘is supposed to flee or wriggle free if possible. But it is easy to consequentially justify the use of violence by the woman to prevent herself from being raped’ (p.153 italics added). In the example so far described there is no dilemma, and no such easy resort to consequentially ‘justified’ violence. What allows too much violence is the lesser evil JWS assumes is easily consequentially justified; for example that the woman is entitled to inflict, and escalate, violence so long as it remains ‘a lesser evil than the violence of attempted rape’ (p.153). Since she may thereby inflict quite unreasonable damage (esp. if she is a Kung Fu expert), the result is inconsistent with ‘the basic principle of self-defence’ which JWS earlier adduced according to which what is ‘appropriate, in response is only that level of force necessary to defend oneself against the threat’ (p.150). There is evidence in JWS's work of some enthusiasm for levels of violence which exceed his ‘basic principle’, his appeal to ‘lesser evil’ generates some instances. The ‘basic principle’, itself fraught with difficulties (cf. the contorted discussion of what weapons are appropriate in response to what attacks, p.150), still exceeds what stretched pacifism would enjoin; for instance, it may not be appropriate to respond with force. But in a technical sense stretched pacifism is compatible with the ‘basic principle’, since it only imposes the upper bound on level of force. As for easiness, moral pacifism is not an easy position to live by, or to justify. Removing objections to pacifism is one thing; solidifying a positive case for it is quite another, and so far hardly conclusive (as AI tried to explain, pp 29-31). Stretched pacifism was advanced, hypothesized to put it more precisely, as a still viable option. It was not presented as a morally compulsory position, or, for that matter, as one that this defender adhered to or affirmed. To reiterate, while a cumulative case can be made for stetched pacifism as principled non-violence, that case was not conclusive, and is hard to improve. For, further, some serious difficulties standing in the way of stretched pacifism were assembled, the most important of which derives from the extent of violence apparent in transactions within the natural world. Simply consider the practices of carnivores, essential to their natural way of life. In order to meet their life needs for sustenance, these creatures do, and are often obliged to, engage routinely in violent activity. While it can no doubt be argued, as some vegetarians may do, that the natural order is an immoral order, and that remaining carnivores should be converted to vegetarianism as rapidly as proves possible (in the way domestic dogs are converted to dog biscuits), the difficulties with such proposals are immense. The task envisaged is gigantic, and beyond human capacities – even if it were desirable. For there are millions of species to be �somehow converted to proper vegetarianism. Then there are millions of other species to be converted to proper and well regulated contraceptive practices, else their numbers will get out of hand (uncontrollably) with predation removed. Given humans lack of success in limiting their own excessive numbers, such regulation appears entirely remote. Aside however from the practical difficulties, is such a fully vegetarian order, with evolution further derailed, a desirable improvement on the natural order? Is it morally obligatory? It is certainly not obligatory, as alternative systems of morality in harmony with the prevailing natural order are feasible. Nor is it desirable, for (to appeal to such alternative value systems) the natural order is more or less in order as it is. Full vegetarianization would only reduce its value, vastly. More generally, a defensible ethical framework should not, it would be rightly contended, be right out of step with the natural order of other creatures, decently depicted. Decent depiction is important, for some features of the natural order, such as competition, combat and predation, so far from escaping attention, have been grossly exaggerated and exploited. Thus, for instance, the ludicrous picture of nature red in truth and claw, so beloved of descendents of orthodox Victorians and of orthodox economists. However, even under decent depiction, the “natural order” is often not benign. That appears to be enough to induce a supervenient moral dilemma for any stretched pacifism which is coupled to a deep ethic (e.g. which does not separate humans out from the natural order ) and which eschews the desperate vegetarian route: The natural order is not an immoral order The natural order contains (regular) instances of violence. Therefore, instances of violence are not immoral – in apparent defiance of P2 Moreover, there are too many instances of violence, too regularly occurring, for them all to be plausibly shunted into the moral dilemma category (and predatory carnivores face no dilemmas). Raptors that practice violence every week are not immoral (neither are they clearly moral; the category of morality only significantly extends so far). The main trouble lies however with P2 (which needs some finer adjustment, as was alrady indicated in AI ). While P2 is alright in context, within a particular, perfectly viable, ethical framework, designed for the usual human round, the conventional setting for ethical theories, it stands in need of modification outside that setting. It is time to suggest the sort of modification envisaged. Evidently P2 was addressed to moral agents. Which agents? Not to carnivores that supply their own livelihood, nor really to morally degenerate humans, but to peace-sensitive agents. With that semi-technical form, yet to be characterised, a suitably modified P2 results: MP2. It is morally wrong, for a peace-sensitive agent, to use violence. 9 9 The generalization of P2, suggested in AI, to cover also the parallel situation of environmental vandalism, can be similarly modified. The anti-vandolence principle becomes MP2°. It is morally wrong, for a peace- and environmentally-sensitive agent, to use vandolence. �To recover what amounts, in the previous discussive context, to P2, it suffices to add the proposition that every human agent ought to be peace-sensitive. Much as that proposition has to recommend it, it appears too ethically advanced for many modern humans; it sets too high a moral standard to be taken as a serious guide to practice. It seems wise to settle presently for something less demanding, such as that every advanced moral agent ought to be peace sensitive. To put essentially the same proposition alternatively: Stretched pacifism (as modified) is supererogatory. While it is perhaps too late to hope for much moral progress in humans, it is pleasant to contemplate alternative futures where what is supererogatory became obligatory, and widely practiced. Richard Sylvan10* Appendix I began drafting this essay at the time (January 17, midday Australian time) of the American attacks upon Iraq. The aptly named Prime Minister Hawke of Australia had just made a statement to the nation-state, announcing (the) war. In this statement there was much talk of peace. There was even – in what was effectively a declaration of war – reiteration of the modern quest for ‘a new world order of peace’. Peace through war; so it rings out again and again, through the centuries. ‘War must be for the sake of peace’ (Aristotle p.220). More than two thousand years later, we have fought those wars to end all wars. But it is no use, Hawke solemely pronounced, just talking about peace, and thinking about peace; we must work for peace, fight for it – through war. Impeccable logic? President Bush, supreme commander, convinced us with similar logic, speaking too with many tongues. Of how he ‘preferred to think of peace, not war’. But now ‘only force will prevail’, as ‘all reasonable efforts to reach a peaceful solution are exhausted’. ‘What must be done’ must be done, or will be anyway. With God on side with the US offensive (as well as on the other side), it will go well. As it was said to have, though it achieved comparatively little that other efforts may not have yielded more satisfactorily, and thought it may now have to followed with another invasion. Nor have we ever managed to glimpse much of what is now supposed, when we are no longer engaged, to come ‘out of the horror of war’: a ‘new world order ... which governs the conflict of nations’; a ‘rule of law’, not war. How the one, enforcable law, is achieved, unless backed by the the other, is not explained (Medlin's paradox hits back). Similarly what we now hear from many militarists, as they rush to war, is that 10 * Thank to David Bennett for joint contributions (from UT) and to JWS for opposition (in JWS) �‘peace is a great good, war a great evil’. But, for the most part, only the rhetoric has shifted; practice has scarcely changed at all. REFERENCES W.-T. Chan, A Source Book on Chinese Philosophy, Princeton University Press, 1963; referred to as ST. W.-T. Chan (ed.), The Way of Lao Tzu (Tao-te Ching), Bobbs-Merrill, New York, 1963; referred to as LT. B. Martin, Uprooting War, Freedom Press, London, 1984. A. Naess, Ecology, community and lifestyle, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge UK, 1989. R.A. Rapaport, Pigs for the Ancestors : ritual in the ecology of a New Guinea People, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1967. R. Routley, ‘War and Peace II. On the alleged inconsistency, moral insensitivity and fanaticism of pacifism’, Discussion papers in environmental philosophy #9, Research School of Social Science, Australian National University, 1983 (also in Inquiry ); referred to as AI. R. Routley and V. Plumwood, ‘Moral dilemmas and the logic of deontic notions’, Discussion papers in environmental philosophy #6, Research School of Social Science, Australian National University, 1984 (also in Paraconsistent Logic); referred to as MD. R. Routley, ‘War and Peace I. On the ethics of large-scale nuclear war and nuclear-deterrence and the political fall-out’, Discussion papers in environmental philosophy, #5, Research School Of Social Science, Australian National University, 1984. G. Sharp, Social Power and Political Freedom, Porter Sargent, Boston, 1980. J.W. Smith, The Worms at the Heart of Things , Public Relations Unit, Flinders University, 1989. R. Sylvan, ‘War and Peace III, Australia's defence philosophy’, Social Philosophy, for Nuclear Conference, University of Queensland, 1985. R. Sylvan and D. Bennett, ‘Of Utopias, Tao and Deep Ecology’, Discussion papers in environmental philosophy #19, Research School of Social Science, Australian National University, 1990; referred to as UT. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Draft Papers Description An account of the resource Sylvan's literary executor encountered an archive in which “all his projects were current", since manuscripts were undated and unattributed. Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document WAR AND PEACE IV: TAO AND DEEP-GREEN Taoism and deep-green environmental theory, although closely aligned on very many issues, diverge over war. For Taoism, by contrast for instance with Buddhism, is not a pacific doctrine, but is committed to skilful defensive militarism. While it does not espouse a fortress mentality, Taoism certainly condones limited defensive military operations for specific purposes, a sort of guerilla warfare. By contrast, deep-green theory, while acknowledging the role of organised social defence, stands opposed to professional militarism, and thereby to military defence, and is committed to a principled pacifism. Conveniently a route through Taoism, philosophically fascinating in its own right, will lead us to problems of pacifism and towards deep-green theory. 1. Features of a Taoist critique of war and militarism. War did not receive a favourable press in ancient Chinese philosophy. Generally aggression and war were to be avoided. Even Confucius imposed very demanding conditions: for example, ‘when good men have instructed the people [in morals, agriculture, military tactics] for seven years, they may be allowed to bear arms,’ ‘If a ruler ... does not set himself right, even his commands will not be obeyed’ ( SB p.41, italics added). Mo Tzu went much further than Confucius, roundly condemning war – on utilitarian grounds, that war yields no net benefit at any level ( SB p.227). What is more, he backed his heavy condemnation practically (unlike some conspicuous contemporary theoretical utilitarians); ‘he did not hesitate to walk for ten days and ten nights in an effort to dissuade a ruler from making war’ ( SB p.212). But none, it is said, went as far, in a detailed and sophisticated criticism of war, as Lao Tzu; ‘none has condemned war more strongly than Lao Tzu’. ‘[T]he opposition of Taoism to the use of force is well-known, and the most bitter attack on militarism if found in the Lao Tzu’ (Chan, p.154, p.17.) But, after that splendid build-up, the text is slightly disappointing. Lao Tzu does not assert outright that war is an abomination, or even roundly condemn it. His critique of war, militarism, and military technology, is subtle and oblique, and, on the surface, far distanced from pacifism. For he does not recommend an end to war - in that genuine Taoists, those who possess Tao, will never participate in them – but expects wars to continue as unavoidable evils. Worse, he even goes so far as to outline proper attitudes to war and conduct in war, and indeed to suggest military techniques and strategies, some of which look decidedly devious. Among the classical works of Taoism, we focus on the Lao Tzu because, by contrast with other works, a remarkable component of that book is devoted to war and militarism. The apparent deviousness of the tactics Lao Tzu allocates serves to highlight what has been seen as ‘the most troublesome element’ in his philosophy (Chan p.17) – not so much however because they concern military operations, but because they are taken to apply much more widely, ‘to life in general’ (p.17). But why should military activity obtain some special dispensation? Why should what is not tolerated more generally be exonerated there? But given that Taoism has here the virtue of consistency (i.e. uniformity on principles) and of universalizability, that simply leaves more explaining to be done. • Puzzles for Taoism, and wars as unavoidable evils There are two puzzles here in Taoism rather than one. There is the militarypractices paradox, and, varying and generalising on that, there are life-practices paradoxes. The special paradox is generated by the following incompatible elements: on the one side, ‘the most bitter attack on militarism’, the well-known opposition of Taoism to the use of force (p.17) and to the possession and use of smart military weapons and technology – implying that war is far from all right – and on the other, advocacy of certain (devious) military tactics, outlines of (deceitful) conduct in war, and so on – implying that war is all right after all. A straightforward generalisation of this paradox would look at other morally-sensitive parts of life, where some practice was strongly condemned yet engaged in (for many examples, see the dilemmas assembled in MD). But the variation of concern to Chan and the neo-Confucians concerns the conjunction of upright with devious practices in life, in particular in the life of the sage. For a Taoist sage is presumed to lead an upright straightforward life, yet appears to engage in devious and even deceitful practices incompatible with such a life-style. Call this the Taoist-lifestyle paradox. Evidently a good deal of explaining is required, as to how Taoism can coherently take the positions it appears to presume, both on war and peace, and on life more generally. A desirable preliminary would seem to be a little investigation of what position is taken, especially on war and militarism. One key pasage runs: Fine weapons are instruments of evil They are hated by creatures Therefore those who possess the Tao turn away from them. ... Weapons are instruments of evil, not the instruments of a good ruler. When he uses them unavoidably, he regards calm restraint as the best principle Even when he is victorious, he does not regard it as praiseworthy, For to praise victory is to delight in the slaughter of men. He who delights in the slaughter of men will not succeed in the empire. ... For a victory, let us observe the occasion with funeral-ceremonies (LT p.154). Wars, which involve the use of weapons, instruments of evil, are accordingly themselves evil. They are also evil because they involve the slaughter of men. But they are also sometimes unavoidable (also p.152). Therefore such wars are unavoidable evils. Such discourse, obtained by almost immediate inference from the passage, is within the standard orbit of dilemma talk. But Taoism lacks, through deliberately eschewing deontic talk, the discourse which enables direct expression of such dilemmas, or even direct condemnation of wars or of clever weapons. Instead the points are made by circumlocution, what the possesser of Tao does, how the good ruler conducts himself, or by analogy, of victory in war with death. Unavoidable evils are the very stuff of deontic dilemmas (though many theories, underpinned by shonky logic, lack the resources for representing this stuff properly). Where something is unavoidably evil, it is both bad, because evil, and also not bad, doing it is excusable, because it is unavoidable. So, given such an argument (which has its weaknesses), an unavoidable evil is a genuinely dilemmatic object with inconsistent features. Certain wars have looked, since ancient times, like such dilemmatic objects. Revealingly, Chan tries to explain that ‘most troublesome element’ in Taoism, the military-practice paradox, through the following exercise in lateral thinking: It can ... be argued that Lao Tzu uses warfare to illustrate his principles of taking no action and weakness because warfare is among the most dynamic and critical of human experiences, just as the Indian classic, the Bhagavadgita chooses fighting as the theme on which to discuss the terrible dilemma whether one should fulfil his duty, as in the case of a soldier, and kill, or should fail in his duty and refrain from killing (p.17). ‘Just as’? The Indian classic prevents a classic moral dilemma, a dilemma represented in contemporary philosophy (following its rediscovery by Sartre), where there are incompatible duties: the duty to kill, because of one's role as a soldier, and the duty not to kill, because of one's human condition, and the supervenient dilemma of failing in and fulfilling one's duties. These dilemmas for an individual (male, as it then was) are replicated in dilemmas regarding war for group institutions: at bottom, the obligation to engage in war (for one set of compelling reasons) as contraposed with the obligation not to engage in war (for another, perhaps overlapping, set of reasons). A theory of moral dilemmas (as worked out for example in MD) is crucial for an adequate treatment of major issues in war and peace, especially (as will become evident) for a viable strong pacifism. But Taoism, eschewing deontic discourse, lacks the apparatus to state or develop moral dilemmas. Hence it is logically excluded from giving a full or adequate account of what is going on conceptually. One of the philosophically fascinating feature of Taoism is the fashion in which it manages to avoid deontic discourse, and to substitute for direct deontic discourse or improvise circumlocutions when deontic discourse would otherwise appear inevitable (cf. UT for examples). But there are costs. One is inability to display the mechanism of deontic dilemmas, or to show what reasons and argument lie behind Taoist prounouncements and conclusions (the shortage of Taoism on argument is another philosophically conspicious feature, also observed in UT). As conceptual apparatus for analysizing moral dilemmas is missing, most of the machinery involved has to be passed over. Only the outcomes, as Taoism sees them, are presented, as if from a black box. Taoism blacks out the story on deontic dilemmas that deep-green theory can tell, as the following diagram tries to show: Diagrams . Charting the processing of deontic dilemmas that are “resolved”. Deep-green chart: dilemma input Arguments to incompatible prescriptions § Processing of dilemma, directive situational procedures output Corresponding Taoist chart: Black directive Box output input It is evident that Taoism can be extended; information can be put into the Black Box rendering it less opaque. That extension can be made so as to conform to deepgreen theory, i.e. so that the extended Taoist chart, a neo-Daoist chart, looks like the deep-green one. That is indeed essentially how neo-Daoism get characterised, in terms of conformity of the extension to deep ecological theory (see UT). We are now placed to explain how to dissolve, or at least neutralize, the paradoxes deriving from repudiation of militarism, an awkwardly qualified repudiation in the case of Taoism. In a significant sense there is no resolving of genuine deontic dilemmas. The principles delineating the fix may stand, incompatible, signalling the persisting suboptimality (or better, sublimenality) of the dilemmatic situation. Where there is a dilemma, involved parties should try to do well enough in the sublimenal circumstances (for a much fuller account, see MD). Thus where there is a war, itself a non-Taoist process, engaged or caught up Taoists will not abandon Taoism. Taoist methods will be applied, Taoist strategies pursued. So much for theoretical representation and (non-)resolution of life-practices and other dilemmas, details of which are readily elaborated in deep-green extensions of Taoism. A prior substantive issue is whether dilemmas always are generated: not whether wars are evil (typically they are, an issue we shall come to), but whether wars are unavoidable. Analysis of wars does not bear that familiar claim out decisively. Many wars could have been avoided, through conciliation, negotiation, restraint, etc., and no worse results apparently obtained, through sanctions, exchange, trade, etc. Through a typology of wars (coming up) that conjecture can be given some substance. Consider, for instance, what would be walk-overs. Then there is little point in making a military response. So war can be avoided. Certainly an occupation, to be met in a different way, may still occur. And so on, perhaps, for various other types of war. But, more generally, try this:Every war involves an aggressor, who makes an aggressive move. Such an aggressor could always avoid that move, taking a different (or a do-nothing) course of action. Therefore, every war can be avoided. No war is entirely unavoidable. Setting aside determinism (which renders all actual wars along with all other events unavoidable), it could be argued that a war sometimes simply boils up, without an aggressor, an intensification of a conflagatory situation. There are grounds for scepticism regarding such examples; for such intensification can only occur if provocative military moves are made, for instance troops are stationed in provocative or risky positions. The presumption that certain wars are unavoidable typically derives from a onesided perspective on war, a defender's perspective. A defender has no option, so it is routinely averred, but to respond to a determined aggressor. Even if that should be so sometimes, when there is no running away or going underground, it does not establish that such a war is unavoidable; for it neglects the role of the aggressor. By a smarter formulation, relevant features of unavoidability can be captured. Although wars may not be unavoidable, defensive action in wars that have been initiated may be unavoidable. At least such action may be unavoidable if unacceptably high costs (death, enslavement, etc.) are not to be avoided. Thereupon another highly relevant feature emerges: the linkage of avoidability to costs. For whether an action is unavoidable then depends upon what costs a party is prepared to incur before and when insisting on action: but this appears entirely unacceptable. How can what is “unavoidable” cease to be so when some further costs are absorbed? However with basics like survival, a certain liberty, and so on, we do reach such bounds. An important type of unavoidability. We also reach scenarios, unavailable to Lao Tzu but kindly brought within range by modern technology, which may appear to justify aggressive strikes. State Z, while not an aggressor, is carrying out practices which will impose unacceptably high costs upon peoples of other states and implacably refuses to desist. It could, for example, be poisoning air or water flowing to other states. But ,to make the case vivid, let us suppose that state Z is constructing, for reasons Zeders find convincing (they are committed to a faith which depicts all humans as incorrigible sinners and unworthy of life), an effective doomsday machine. Would an (aggressive) preemptory strike designed to disable or destroy the machine be unavoidable? 1 In a sense, No; in another Yes. For different modalities can operate. Physically outsiders need to do nothing, but watch Zeders go about their zealous work. But deontically they are under heavy moral pressure, because of the costs of standing by idly: if the human race is worth anything very substantial, then they are obliged to act, action is deontically unavoidable. Here is a situation where a proposed reduction of deontic logic proves illuminating. Obligation is explicated through not implying, or necessitating, the sanction, i.e. 1 Whether it would be justifiable, or just, are separate issues. But it is evident enought that such scenarios further damage the obsolescent idea of just war. For, according to received doctrine, a just war is defensive. (How such a war can be fought at all is another matter; coherence requires relativization to ‘just war for party d’.) excessive ethical costs such as extermination. Let us explain deontic unavoidability analogously: an action is so unavoidable if not undertaking it would result in excessive ethical costs. Then if it can be established that there is no other way than a military strike, an act of war, to ensure that the Zeders desist (and certainly we can envisage scenarios like that), then that is deontically unavoidable. It is also dilemmatic for those committed to, or inclined towards pacifism; and it is, for them at least, but paradoxically justifiable, as the negation is also justifiable, on pacific grounds. Scenarios like that sketched, that appear to render certain wars deontically unavoidable require but little or no elaboration to render them evil. Evil indeed is such a standard feature of standard wars that at least its great presence call for little supporting evidence. But it has taken to vast stretch of human history to reach this general point of recognition. The manifold evils of war Lao Tzu very early recognised and emphasized: Wherever armies are stationed, briars and thorns grow. Great wars are always followed by famines (p.152). And nowadays followed by great tides of refugees. This passage includes not only recognition of the widely-observed socioenvironmental consequences of war, but, more striking, very early recognition of the severe environmental impact of military forces. That critique is not however developed in Taoism. 2 Only recently has it been pushed substantially further. And only recently could a new, most significant twist occur, the merging of resource security, long a military objective, with environmental security. The appalling idea has recently been floated that the military, in need of new work and roles with the apparent warming of West-East relations and cooling of the Cold War, should exchange usual military idleness for meddling in environmental matters: regulation and policing of environmental resources, ensurance of environmental security of powerful states, and similar. This is a bit like reassigning those imprisoned for child abuse to managing kindergartens; for consider the impressive military record of environmental vandalism. What the military is alleged to offer is a structure appropriate and available for handling such matters. But, to the contrary, it is precisely the sort of hierarchical, authoritarian expensive structure that should be wound down and up as soon as the opportunity appears, as (briefly) now, rather than being retained and shockingly reoriented (as a state-serving “Greenwar”). 2. On the divergence of deep-green from Taoism. Having arrived, by better or worse arguments, at the conclusion that wars, though 2 But a bridge to deep-green theory can be made through neo-Daoism, an updating of Taoism in confirmity with deep ecology (which however is somewhat thin and threadbare on war; for what there is so far, see Naess p.160). On neoDaoism, see UT. generally evil, may be sometimes unavoidable, it is evidently important to say something about how they – those of the theoretical residue – are to be conducted. By appropriate conduct the damage they do may be reduced; also the conduct should be appropriate to the funereal nature of wars (to exceed Taoist resources for stating this sort of point). It is at this stage that deep-green theory begins to diverge from Taoism. In further explaining the Taoist and deep-green critiques of war, and diverting objections to them, a rough and preliminary typology of wars is important. It is also of passing interest in its own philosophical right. War, according to English Dictionaries, is a ‘contest carried on by force of arms, typically between nations or states’. More exactly, war is a game – in the generous technical sense of game-theory, with players, rules, goals, strategies, and so on – carried on in significant part by military means, normally between states or substates. Call the contestants, (warring) parties. They typically represent of course larger populations. The set-up between parties resembles the arrangements of players in game theory. There are several analogical extensions of the term war to cover games where one of the parties is an object, construed as hostile (an enemy of the state), such as Crime, Drugs, Poverty or Nature. These we can set aside as analogical wars. Of course wars form only a part of military activities. Military interests and objectives have always stretched significantly further than war, to include surveillence and security, easily extended to resource security, environmental security and life-style security, and beyond that to political stability and other political matters. Evidently military ambitions have far over-extended themselves in bagging such democratic concerns. An anarchist solution to the whole problem of war, which some have seen Taoism as reaching towards, is immediate: eliminate the source of war, states. Unfortunately it is not quite that simple (and that's not simple). For wars can also occur between nations, cultures, races or tribes (which are not such artifices as states, and not always so readily or desirably abolished), between inhabited regions, and between factions within states (thus civil wars) or, perhaps by extension, between factions within other social structures (thus, for instance, gang wars). But undoubtedly eliminating states and aspiring states would abolish most wars and virtually all the worst wars. While “nonviolent wars” are excluded by definition, by virtue of ‘force of arms’, token wars, limited wars, and so on, are not: for instance, wars fought by small armed teams representing competing sides (cf. medieval and science fiction war games). As wars are hemmed in by conventions and agreed rules, there is no reason in principle why they should not be reduced to two person contests, fought under strict rules like boxing or gladiatorial contests. But in modern times wars have never taken such sensible forms, but have been much larger affairs, making heavy (though fortunately restricted) use of latest technology. Let us distinguish such wars as techno-powered wars. They have, directly or indirectly (for the technology may be bought or bartered), a heavy research and development support structure (indeed the bulk of contemporary science is devoted – misdirected – in one way or another to this effort). Among wars, an important distinction is that between offensive and defensive wars. An offensive war is one which ventures off a given party's territory or recognised pad, “invading” that of another party or parties; correlatively defensive parties, if they have not also invaded. Force projection typifies offensive practice. Plainly, offensiveness and defensiveness are not strictly features of a war, but of parties to a war. In a two-party war, while both parties can easily act offensively, the possibility of both parties proceeding defensively is excluded, unless they share territory. (Even then issues may arise as to which party, if any, was the aggressor, which started it, was responsible for starting it, and so on.) Thus mutually defensive wars between contemporary states are impossible (but would be possible if states shared territory, e.g. if Eire and Britain shared the territory of Northern Ireland). Tao-accredited wars were defensive wars, never wars aiming at domination: last-resort wars, in which no pride was taken ( LT p.152).3 The pretence that offensive wars are defensive is widespread, and reflected in the subterfuge that departments or ministries of war are those of defence, security or whatever. (If they really were what they purport to be, we should be well on the way to an end to war.) Offensive practices are rendered defensive ones by shabby redefinitional strategems, such as redefining ‘defensive’ to include defence of ideals like democracy or liberty, infringed (or allegedly infringed) on territories abroad, or to include “defence” of a third party or place (whence every offensive war is “defensive”). In the present war in which part of Arabia is engulfed (February 1991), one party claims to be defending what really was (or should be) part of its territory, namely Kuwait, another party to be defending (what Kuwait did not enjoy) democracy. It is a doubly offensive war presented in this guise as jointly defensive. Aggressive wars are waged for a variety of reasons, but usually for resources or access to resources or markets, a matter often disguised by appeal to ideology (thus a war for oil is represented as a war of liberation). But there are other reasons than narrowly economic ones, such as religion (as with crusades), power and aggrandisement (as in building an empire), and so on. Nor are those reasons necessarily far separated; ideologies like Marxism and market capitalism, for example, exhibit many of the features of religion. The economic reasons for war appear to have become much more complex with the 3 There is one line in LT that may suggest that attack was sometimes justifiable, namely ‘For deep love helps one to win in the case of attack’ (p.219). But how can compassion be appropriate unless this attack is within a defensive setting, a larger context of unavoidability or such like. A passage shortly below confirms this interpretation: I dare not take the offensive but I take the defensive: I dare not advance an inch but I retreat a foot (p.222). These are advances and attacks within a defensive setting. advent of an integrated world economy. At the same time many of the independent reasons for economic wars are now obsolete. For to powerful states accrue the advantages of war without war. At least most of the former economic advantages of war can be obtained without expensive wars, through trade, institution of economic dependence, etc. Small medieval wars were sometimes instituted for the collection of neighbouring riches and booty, a kind of piracy meeting conditions of war. “Small” contemporary wars can be waged for a remarkable mix of political-economy ends: to establish a regime favourable to economic penetration and profit repatriation, to subjugate markets and to remove competition, to boost a sagging weapons economy by using up old stocks and also testing new equipment, to restart a depressed economy, and so on. Such wars, along with the economic aims which motivate them, are in effect heavily castigated by Lao Tzu: When Tao prevails in the world, galloping horses are turned back to fertilize When Tao does not prevail in the world, war horses (the thrive in fields ...). the suburbs. There is no calamity greater than lavish desires. ( LT p.181). But it does exceed evidential warrant to claim that Tao is not only sufficient, but necessary, for cessation of such practices. The practice of regularly stimulating complex military-saturated economies through war is reminiscent of older, much ridiculed practices in simpler societies. They now ridicule the Tsembaga, who proceeded to destroy much of their surplus product by going to war every 5-15 years (cf Rapaport). But they do not similarly ridicule the most powerful nation on the Earth, the USA, which proceeds to write off a colossal amount of surplus in war every 10-20 years (the Gulf war liquidated some $1.7 billion per day). Taoists would. For ridicule was a favoured method, an important rhetorical strategem, and war and its idiocy were favourite targets. Some classification of defensive wars is also important, for various reasons: reducing and abolishing wars, their costs and damage, restructuring societies away from war and military practices, and, not least, for appreciating Taoism. A main distinction is between • conventional defence, maintained by armies of armed soldiers, many of them professionals, and • social defence, where there are no such armies or but fragments of them, and defence is carried out through social networks of a significant part of society.4 It is here that Taoism and deep-green theory part company. Under Taoism, the state will have a standing army, but a defensive army operating by strange, surprise tactics (p.201). No 4 Details of social defence are presented in Sharp and in Martin. doubt defensive wars are to remain last resort action. Nonetheless the state will operate in secrecy, in a way incompatible with decentralised social defence; people will be kept in the dark about smart weapons of the state; and they too will be surprised, along with presumed enemies of the state. By contrast, under deep-green theory, there should be no hidden smart weapons of state; information would flow more freely and not be hidden from the people (who should retain influence in informed decision making). Under deep-green, standing armies, and more generally military organisation, will be wound down altogether. Taoism should have pushed its searching criticism further. For military objectives, easily acquired by standing armies with time on their hands, are frequently incompatible with Taoism. For example, Taoism is opposed to domination ( LT p.152), whereas military operations frequently seek or involve domination; and military structure is invariably hierarchical and authoritarian. Taoism aims for self-regulation, wherever feasible (cf. p.201); so does deep-green theory, which is one reasons why it aims to dispose of standing armies, as an important preliminary to the withering away of states themselves (military forces being major props of state control and power, and often maintained primarily for internal state security). Taoism has no project for ending the era of wars; deepgreen theory does. That project involves an elimination of standing armies, too often poised for fighting or political interference. A recommended route to end war consists in progressive scaling down: reduction of the means and manpower. The initial stages are well-known, and include • elimination of nuclear, biological and chemical weaponry, and • force reduction. It can hardly be pretended that the Earth's states have managed to proceed very far on even this complex of stages. The next stage consists in • contraction to defensive capacities only, and the final stage consists in • elimination of remaining military defensive forces, and adoption, so far as required, of social defence practices. The complete route thus involves complete demilitarisation. Reasons why deep-green aims to proceed the full distance are readily grasped by considering the environmental shallowness of an otherwise cogent traditional case for the sharp curtailment of wars and militarism. The traditional Western case against wars has been primarily along two dimensions: social and moral. Wars are highly disruptive of the social fabric; wars may be unjust. From these joint features, it was argued that wars should be a matter of last resort, to be fought to ensure peace. It was argued further that only just wars should be fought. Just wars were rare objects. But as there was little evidence of the decline and fall of wars, much effort was expended, more practically and unsuccessfully, upon endeavouring to improve the calibre of wars, and more theoretically, upon trying to characterize just war satisfactorily, or rather to bend the notion in an effort to approximate the gory unjust facts. Progress was long hindered, furthermore, because there was always a rival positive perspective on wars, which encouraged the exaltation of wars and military feats. It also facilitated the transfer of the favourable image of war to other problem areas, whence the long and apparently successful war against Nature (but the short-term successes are turning into long-term problems), the short and unsuccessful war against Poverty, and so on. Behind all this is the complex idea of war as rejuvenating, even cleansing, like fire; of war as heroic, and glorious, of war as the supreme testing ground of men. These pictures of war – finally shattered by the first World War (where even the poets began to tell of horrors and atrocities) and subsequent technological wars – though no longer in ascendency, have by no means vanished. The notion of war as rejuvenating a flagging economy persists, along with the practice of keeping capitalism running smoothly by integrating substantial military components into the industrial engine. With the development of highly technological wars – the celebrated development of the dirty industrial age is substantially military – the traditional negative case has grown in strength. Wars have become much more damaging, with the potential for much more that is significantly worse, and the possibility of a just war has correspondingly contracted, virtually to zero. The opposition to war has likewise grown, but more than correspondingly with the rise of women in social and political influence. Wars have almost always and everywhere been Men's affairs; likewise conquest. Deep-green theory accepts much of the traditional negative case, but would further strengthen it. For example, the stricture against unjust wars, as out and out immoral, can be strengthened, through the following syllogism: All wars should be fully just wars. Modern wars cannot be fully just wars. Therefore, there should be no modern wars. A fully just war is not merely a just war, but a war those just character can be reliably forecast in advance. A modern war is of course a war that deploys modern technology, at least that available this century. The evidential basis for the second premiss derives from much information that collateral damage, damage to innocent bystanders and involved citizens is always likely and cannot be excluded. Such wars are always liable to violate uncontroversial requirements for a just war, even if they are purely “conventional” wars, not throwing radiation or chemical or biological weapons around. From a contemporary viewpoint the traditional doctrine of a just war, really of a just defensive war, is seriously out of date. The reasons for this reach wider than the new features introduced by modern technological wars and the character of modern civilization, with its giant cities littered with dangerous and vulnerable military targets. They have also to do with the chauvinism of the justice proposed, which is shallow human justice, not natural or environmental justice. There is no consideration of justice to other creatures or to the Earth (cf Naess p.160). Two troubles are really intertwined here: conceptual difficulties with too narrow a notion of justice, and ideological difficulties with too narrow a vision of what is an object of value, of what counts. The deep-green case against war adds to the traditional case a further dimension, neglected until very recently: the environmental dimension. It has suddenly been seen that wars are typically environmental atrocities. Earlier, of course, “environments” were simply backgrounds, backdrops in paintings and plays, to the real drama. Contemporary technological wars tend to be not merely social tragedies but environmental ones as well. There is a doctrine of just war, but it is a human chauvinistic affair. There is no similarly developed doctrine of an ecologically sound war, a deep ecological war. Unless any such war were literally different from modern wars, that is from contemporary technological wars, it would overstep permitted bounds. For such wars are characteristically ecological disasters. Hardened military people, desensitized by a rigorous unethical training, feel even less compunction about degrading or destroying environments or members of other species than they do of maiming or killing civilians through “collateral” activity. Matching the no-just-war syllogism is a no-sound-war syllogism: All wars should be environmentally sound wars. Modern wars cannot be environmentally sound. Therefore, there should be no modern wars. The argument for the second premiss has of course to be different. It looks to the information accumulating on what wars do to natural and built environments. The Vietnam and Gulf wars both inflicted immense damage on natural environments or what was left of them. The environmental effects of war are not confined to direct and collateral damage. There are indirect effects also. Thus, for instance, war also supplied the mechanism of, and the technology for, modern environmental destruction: explosives, bulldozers from tanks, etc. As well, training for war and engagement in war have much fostered, along with attitudes that make for social callousness or ruthlessness, those that contribute to environmental insensitivity and cruelty. 3. Puzzles about Taoist strategy and its critiques of technology and violence ‘It is surprising how much of the Lao Tzu is devoted to military strategy’. Which strategies? Surprise, above all. But why such strategies? ‘Do they not contradict the Taoists’ strong opposition to the use of force’ (Chan p.222), the implied commitment to quietism? Briefly, Taoism is not committed to quietism, and while certainly antagonistic to violence, does not oppose certain uses of force (only really ill-forcing, as will be explained). Even so, the emphasis on military strategy remains puzzling. The strategies, many of them relevant to social defence, include • seriousness, not ‘making light of the enemy’ (p.222) • surprise, and nonvisibility (p.201). The defensive strategy involves guerilla tactics: marching without formation, holding weapons without seeming to have them, confronting enemies without seeming to meet them (p.222). But even in times of peace, ‘smart weapons of the state should not be displayed to the people’ (p.164). Such recommendations helped to fuel the charge of deviousness lodged against Lao Tzu. But look at part of the reason for concealing smart weapons: ‘The more smart weapons the people have, the more troubled the state will be’ (p.201). Smart weapons are carried in corrupt states, where the rich engage in conspicuous consumption and the people are suppressed, not where Tao is practiced (LT p.194). • advance from weakness, flexibility but firmness. Weakness is the principle of life and will overcome strength ( LT p.164, p.233). • coolness and non-competition (LT p.233, p.164). Like these, most of the general strategies are standard Taoist practices simply applied to military conduct. For these standard practices the charge of deviousness looks feeble. The response applies more generally to other allegedly devious political strategies. For the strategies are but application of Taoist principles and techniques to warfare, politics and elsewhere. Nothing excludes application of these techniques to what are accounted, in general, unnecessary evils (which must sometimes, on other Taoist grounds, be countered). Nor, to meet the main criticism, need any deceit or deviousness be involved; nor is it. In particular, the legalist tactic, ‘In order to grasp, it is necessary first to give’ (LT p.164), is cited as involving ‘an element of deceit’ ‘undeniably’, and ‘worse’ it is ‘morally questionable’ (Chan p.17). But in order for me to grasp your hand in a normal handshake, it is necessary first for me to give my hand. There is no deceit here, nothing morally questionable. All the tactics permit of benign construals, of a Taoist kind. Consider, for instance, ‘In order to contract, it is necessary first to expand’ (LT p.164). In order to bend a copper pipe to the intended angle, it is better to bend it first a little further than required. The transformation of water to ice (both favoured natural items for symbolic purposes: natural processes which may look devious!) neatly illustrates the Taoist principle (which is however hardly necessary), and shows softness and weakness turned hardness and strength. The Taoist critique of militarism is as much a critique of technology as of war. Sharp weapons, ‘smart weapons’ as we might now say, come in for much critical attention, as we have already noticed. Only in corrupt and degenerate states are they displayed or flaunted (p.194, p.164); in deep-green regions smart weapons of state’ would not be retained unexhibited. The people will not have them for they mean trouble (p.201); for similar reasons deep-green regions will be free of them. So, it seems, will ideal Taoist regions: ‘Even if there are arrows and weapons, none will display them’ ( LT p.238). Much technology, military and other, is excluded under the Taoist edict against violence (a further facet of the military-practices paradox). 5 5 Under contemporary technology and technological arrangements, such as the storage of quantities of oil and nuclear and chemical materials in great cities, wars have assumed new and very destructive dimensions, to the point of being utterly irresponsible. A different approach to technology, as to war, is now mandatory. These are no longer things that can in principle be nicely confined and need not touch parties outside the fray. An important part of ending wars, “winning the war against wars”, is removing the technology of war, above all from irresponsible state power. As for which technology to try to jettison and which to try to retain or improve, it is not so difficult to indicate, provided evaluative terminology is not outlawed. What is wanted is technology that is good in its place, what should be excluded is technology that is indifferent or bad or potentially so. Technology to be justified has to do something worthwhile, it has to address identifiable respectable needs. That is why The powerful critique of militarism in the Tao-te Ching is coupled with strong opposition to violence. Some of the linkage is evident enough. Militarism as practised represents an ultimate form of state (or party) violence. A basic theme is that violent practices will come to an unnatural end, and accordingly to a non-Taoist end (generalising LT p.176). While force may occur in spectacular, but satisfactory, natural forms, force is duly distinguished from violence. To force the growth of life means ill omen. For the mind to employ the vital force without restraint means violence (LT p.197). One who follows Tao does not apply dominating force, which usually has had results bringing requital (p.152). Dominating force, like power, is in general castigated, under doctrine of wu-wei, no forced actions, no violence. To force natural growth is deviant, destroying harmony. To stop natural growth is deviant. But there is a significant difference between force and violence. To intentionally employ destructive force is to do violence. To so force things is condemned. To remain in harmony with things one does not so force things or practice violence. There is a non-interference principle at work, which also indicates types of non-interference that are excluded. However Taoism does not always get the distinction between force and violence quite right. ‘Vital force without restraint’, intentionally excessive force, is only part of what counts as violence, which is more generally force which violates, i.e. transgresses, descrecrates, merely indifferent technology is out; there is no virtue in technology for technology's sake, as it is a mere means technique. It is because of the crucial evaluative component in choice of technology that appropriateness, itself evaluative, comes closer to encapsulating the criterion than other recent efforts. Size, such as smallness, or intermediateness, are not what matter, though modest and not excessive technologies are likely to fare better in satisfying appropriateness. In simpler societies, small technology is of course more appropriate; for that is what is good there. From known criteria for what is good these other features for locally appropriate technology can be read off: reliability, esp. in maintenance, functioning well and safely under the expected range of operating conditions (which may be difficult), ease of repair, capital cheapness and repair inexpensiveness, environmental benignness, and meeting sound social needs. profanes, injures, outrages, etc. It is thus a negatively connoted force, an evil force in some specified intentional respect. There is a tendency for Taoist commentators, not Taoists, to regard Taoism as condemning all uses, or even occurrences, of force, but this is not so. Rather intentional ill-forcing is what is castigated, what is deviant. Thus Taoism does not exclude a range of defensive practices, which make satisfactory use of natural forces, like letting the machines of war industry stop. Those who would abolish war and its machinery, substituting for it nonwarlike and ideally nonviolent methods, technology, and strategies, have been confronted not merely with much sub-rational abuse but with plenty of criticism and even some paradoxes. Here is a recent paradox concerning war and nonviolence: • War must be abolished. One reason is simply economic. We can no longer afford it, and the opportunity costs are enormous. Along with other extraordinarily wasteful activities, it is an anachronism. • Doing so cannot be accomplished without violence, i.e. in effect, given the types of violence involved, without what amounts to war. According to a fuller version of this premiss, the process of abolishing a war would only be achieved through a revolution so profound that it could not succeed without extensive and extreme violence, amounting to (civil) war. ˚ But then war cannot be abolished without war. Therefore, war which must be abolished cannot be abolished. 6 This “paradox” has been compared with the Liar paradox, but the parallel does not persist far. For this paradox does not involve selfreferential features, and is easily broken, as follows. Let the “last war” be not the last standard war but the revolution abolishing war. Then, given that the revolution is successful, war will be abolished therewith, i.e. with that last war. There need be no regress, given again a successful outcome. All the premisses stand intact, but the conclusion, following the ‘therefore’ is a nonsequitur. However, while the dissolution of the argument is accordingly logically fine, the route is repugnant. Standard pacifism challenges the second premiss. 4. Standard and moral pacifism. 6 Brian Medlin, who forcefully propounded this puzzle, set other analogous puzzles alongside it – designed to reveal deep difficulties in contemporary political, and especially alternative, thought. Another puzzle, concerning liberty and repression in the context of capitalism, revolved around the following inconsistent triad: • capitalism must be removed, but liberty retained. • capitalism cannot be removed without repression. • repression is antithetical to liberty. The puzzle is resolved as with the analogous puzzle of abolishing. Let the “last capitalist” action before the days of liberty be the repressive but liberating revolution overthrowing capitalism. Although Taoism is strongly opposed to war, and much in favour of peace – and accordingly by prevailing standards a substantially pacific position – it is not (nowhere in the central texts) committed to pacifism in usual senses, for two different reasons:- • It is not, by contrast with pacifism, opposed to all types of warfare, for example smart defensive wars. • It eschews deontology in terms of which moral pacifism is commonly stated, for instance through the watershed thesis P2. It is morally wrong to use violence. By contrast with Taoism, deep environmentalism does not avoid deontic claims, and is committed in principle to nonviolent technologies and ways and to pacifistic principles. Moreover, certain forms of deep environmentalism are completely committed to pacifism, notably European forms. Is deep green? There is heavy contemporary opposition to pacifism, as there also was to Taoism in the warring times when Taoism was first being promulgated. Many of the central institutions of contemporary life are intricated in coercion, violence and war. The most prominent contemporary institutions, states, are premissed on these elements of damaging force; they claim entitlement to use them widely, and even claim a certain territorial monopoly on their use. As a result they are having constantly to engage in them in attempt to maintain that monopoly. They are certainly the main perpetrators of wars, and of violence. They are indeed inured to wars, are in constant preparation for wars, yet propound dialectial (and normally dishonest and cynical) doctrines of peace through war (for a recent example see the appendix). Unremarkably then, the extensive propagandistic machinery of state has invested heavily in “justificatory” exercises in favour of controlled use, its own use, of destructive force, and continues to inveigh against pacifism. Because a routine trick in this sophistical repetoire consists in conflating pacifism with extreme, naive and inplausible, forms, an inevitable and important early task commits in unscrambling senses of ‘pacifism’. Semantical skulduggery can be thwarted in this way. Pacifism, as explained by English dictionaries, invariably concerns wars and warfare, and contains two components, negative and, elaborating on that, positive:- The negative component is, in Arnauld's word, anti-War-ism, opposition (in ways to be further specified) to all forms of warfare (see OED). The positive component supplies alternative ways of settling disputes (what it is supposed that wars with some semblance of justification involve), such as negotiation, arbitration, ... – and, adding to too narrow dictionary accounts – sanctions, substitutions (e.g. of sporting events, operatic contests, cooperative ventures), ... . In brief standard pacifism is opposition to all warfare and resolution of potential wars by other nonmilitary means. Plainly the opposition to warfare, like the sanctions and so on, cannot itself be military (using soldiers and other devices of war), on pain of some incoherence. But otherwise the ways of opposition can be many and various: they can certainly be active, as with nonviolent demonstrations, resistance movements, and so forth, and they may also be devious (e.g. turning the forces of war upon themselves so they are neutralised). It quickly becomes evident, then, that some of the dictionaries offer but loaded definitions which, by restricting the negative components, reduce the initial appeal and plausibility of pacifism. Consider the Concise English definition of the negative component: ‘the doctrine of non-resistance to hostilities and of total non-co-operation with any form of warfare’. Thereby excluded are forms of pacifism which offer active and plausible alternatives to warfare such as social defence. The Concise English tends to force pacifism into what the Oxford English Dictionary lists as its final item: ‘often, with depreciatory implication, the advocacy of peace at any price’, ‘in any circumstance’. Pacifism can easily resist being forced into these sorts of circumstances: it has many resources, as an extensive series of texts on alternatives to war, such as negotiation, non-violent action and social defence, from Taoism to contemporary environmentalism attest. Academic philosophers have much advanced the semantical strategy of some dictionaries, of rendering pacifism more difficult from the very outset by narrow and biassed definitions. They have stretched the term from its restricted setting of warfare, confined to state and organised gang violence, to cover all forms of violence, from state and interstate to, what is very different, personal and interpersonal violence. Call the resulting considerably stretched notion of pacifism, according to which it is morally wrong to use violence, according to which P2 holds, stretched pacifism.7 While stretched pacifism certainly includes standard pacifism (unless the notions of war and warfare are tampered with), the converse is very far from being the case. A pacifist is in no way committed to stretched pacifism, which is a much more problematic and difficult position than standard pacifism. There are several, substantially different reasons for this, which will be picked up seriatim. Stretched pacifism, also misleadingly called moral pacifism, has looked a very easy critical target to moral philosophers. Many the effusive philosopher who, upon sighting such a target, has charged, whooping such rhetoric as “incoherent”, “inconsistent”, “insensitive”, “fanatical”. However, with improved logical technology now available for accommodating and treating moral dilemmas, it is no great feat to resist such attacks, in the fashion of previous investigations (see esp. AI, also MD). A main aim was to demonstrate that stretched pacifism was not so stupid as it was made out to be or appeared to be to these inured to present dominant violent ways. So far from being stupid, it is viable. In future gentler times stretched pacifism could even be realised for whole communities of creatures (as some genuinely Christian sects envisaged); whence it will finally be seen to be feasible not merely for sages and supermen, and many ordinary women, but much more extensively. 7 In AI this notion was contrasted with standard pacifism as comprehensive pacifism: overcomprehensive might have been better. The method of philosophical accommodation was through moral dilemmas. The sort of moral dilemma that stretched pacifism can induce derives as follows. On the one side stands the theme P2, Wv, in convenient symbols, for Wrong V-ing, violencing. Now this implies to WB, where B presents a case of of violence. On the other side, particular circumstances develop which lead to W ~B, because ~B would produce in the circumstances considerable wrong, for instance extensive violence, mass murder, etc. One stock example from the literature concerns calling off the firing squad about to shoot several captives if the pacifist shoots one of them (it is elaborated in AI p.13). Interestingly, another stock example from the literature concerns standard pacifism (it can also be presented in terms of patriotism; for details of both see MD p.10). Resolution of intractable moral dilemmas is, where it is required, situational. The agent decides in the situation, within the fix, what to do. There are many ways in which such decision making can proceed, less rational, such as those applying chance or involving bad faith, or more rational, such as those applying consequentialist decision theory (for details see MD, pp.32-9). A decision theory taking account of all that should be included will not however be purely consequential. It would also take account of relevant motivation. This defence and rehabilitation of moral pacifism has been challenged, in particular by Smith (hereafter JWS). JWS claims the defence offered is a ‘failure because it trivializes pacifism’ (p.153 twice). The rehabilitation trivializes pacifism because it entails that pacifism doesn't substantially differ from a form of activism which holds that while violence is always wrong one is sometimes justified on consequentialist grounds for preferring violent acts, if these acts are lesser evils than any other real alternatives. This is the commonsense position which most people hold – yet ... pacifism after all was supposed to be radical moral doctrine ... (p.153 rearranged).8 Part of the criticism is, then, not so much that pacifism is trivialized – JWS “activism” is hardly trivial – as that pacifism is popularised, deflated from a radical position to the commonsense position most people hold (p.154 also). Yet not a shred of evidence is adduced that JWS activism is such a populist position. Available evidence, for example from peace movements and oppositional opinion polls, suggests the very opposite: that, for instance, most people support state-justified conventional wars with the military violence they incur, and accordingly do not hold that violence is always wrong. From such a commonsense angle, pacifism with its condemnation of conventional wars and the violence they involve remains a radical doctrine. As regards wars and other violence-incurring social authorities, contemporary pacificism 8 JWS now informs me that he has changed his position. Whether the move effects his criticism, I don't know. is, as previous explained (e.g. AI p.3), a form of activism. Pacifism does not imply utter pacifity, but may actively involve social defence, resistance and so on. However a certain level of misrepresentation enters into the JWS challenge in the details of what forms of activism pacifism may include. That misrepresentation begins in the second clause concerning what is said to be sometimes justified. For the situational procedure where dilemmas arise will not generally be consequential applying a principle of lesser evil. In dilemmatic situations such principles are suspended, and such a principle is in any case unacceptable to moral pacifists. A small amount of violence may be less bad in its consequences than verbal offence, but a principled pacifist will choose the slightly greater evil where other obligations do not exclude it. A more serious distortion occurs in JWS's effort to force procedures in dilemma situations into purely consequentialist form. In fact consequential decision theory was deployed as a model only for how to proceed rationally in a situational setting where deontic procedures were suspended (see MD p.38). What was said, still misleadingly retrospective vision reveals, was this: ‘what is done is a very consequentialist thing’ (AI p.13), not ‘one acts in a consequentialist fashion to do the sufficiently good thing in the circumstances’ (JWS p.152). Situationally other procedures than those resembling orthodox rational decision making (modified from maximizing to satisizing objectives) may be adopted ( MD p.38). Further the orthodox consequentialist theory is inadequate because it leaves out, or tries to reduce to consequences, nonconsequential elements, notably motives. It is not difficult, in principle (in advance of attempted consequentialization of motives), to design situations where motives, such as integrity or maintaining faith, enter to yield outcomes upsetting consequential calculations. More elaborate decision making procedures than those of consequentialism, sometimes at variance with consequentialism, are thus presupposed. A further part of JWS's criticism accordingly goes by the board, the alleged appeal ‘to “second best” consequentialist considerations, ... already explicitly condemned’ (p.154). What was condemned was stock universal consequentialism, ‘that only consequentialist considerations carry argumentative weight’ (quoted on p.152), so undercutting other deontic principles, such as those of pacifism. It was not claimed, what is utterly different, that consequentialist considerations can nowhere enter into deliberation and decision making. The conclusion JWS arrives at is therefore substantially astray. After criticising modern moral philosophy for its reliance upon consequentialist modes of thought, it is surprising, and inconsistent, to find ... [reliance] upon such modes of thought to escape logical difficulties raised by moral dilemmas facing ... pacifis[m] (p.152) There is no inconsistency. JWS has confused universal with particular. As well he has wrongly contracted all situational decision making to consequentialist modes. There is a third part to the criticism, that the defence is too easy; the ‘strategy will allow too much violence to be (perpetrated and) justified to suit the tastes of any real pacifist’ (p.153). This another part of the so-called trivialization, this time however dilution rather than populatization, weakening the moral stand against violence. This third contention is premissed on a mistake: that one can ‘justify on consequentialist grounds any number of violent acts, providing that such acts are lesser evils than other real alternatives facing social agents’ (p.153). Moral pacifism offers no such licence; allowing such consequentialism to take over was never part of the position. The slide to such consequentialism is made on the strength of a similarly erroneous example. The potential victim of an aspiring rapist ‘is supposed to flee or wriggle free if possible. But it is easy to consequentially justify the use of violence by the woman to prevent herself from being raped’ (p.153 italics added). In the example so far described there is no dilemma, and no such easy resort to consequentially ‘justified’ violence. What allows too much violence is the lesser evil JWS assumes is easily consequentially justified; for example that the woman is entitled to inflict, and escalate, violence so long as it remains ‘a lesser evil than the violence of attempted rape’ (p.153). Since she may thereby inflict quite unreasonable damage (esp. if she is a Kung Fu expert), the result is inconsistent with ‘the basic principle of self-defence’ which JWS earlier adduced according to which what is ‘appropriate, in response is only that level of force necessary to defend oneself against the threat’ (p.150). There is evidence in JWS's work of some enthusiasm for levels of violence which exceed his ‘basic principle’, his appeal to ‘lesser evil’ generates some instances. The ‘basic principle’, itself fraught with difficulties (cf. the contorted discussion of what weapons are appropriate in response to what attacks, p.150), still exceeds what stretched pacifism would enjoin; for instance, it may not be appropriate to respond with force. But in a technical sense stretched pacifism is compatible with the ‘basic principle’, since it only imposes the upper bound on level of force. As for easiness, moral pacifism is not an easy position to live by, or to justify. Removing objections to pacifism is one thing; solidifying a positive case for it is quite another, and so far hardly conclusive (as AI tried to explain, pp 29-31). Stretched pacifism was advanced, hypothesized to put it more precisely, as a still viable option. It was not presented as a morally compulsory position, or, for that matter, as one that this defender adhered to or affirmed. To reiterate, while a cumulative case can be made for stetched pacifism as principled non-violence, that case was not conclusive, and is hard to improve. For, further, some serious difficulties standing in the way of stretched pacifism were assembled, the most important of which derives from the extent of violence apparent in transactions within the natural world. Simply consider the practices of carnivores, essential to their natural way of life. In order to meet their life needs for sustenance, these creatures do, and are often obliged to, engage routinely in violent activity. While it can no doubt be argued, as some vegetarians may do, that the natural order is an immoral order, and that remaining carnivores should be converted to vegetarianism as rapidly as proves possible (in the way domestic dogs are converted to dog biscuits), the difficulties with such proposals are immense. The task envisaged is gigantic, and beyond human capacities – even if it were desirable. For there are millions of species to be somehow converted to proper vegetarianism. Then there are millions of other species to be converted to proper and well regulated contraceptive practices, else their numbers will get out of hand (uncontrollably) with predation removed. Given humans lack of success in limiting their own excessive numbers, such regulation appears entirely remote. Aside however from the practical difficulties, is such a fully vegetarian order, with evolution further derailed, a desirable improvement on the natural order? Is it morally obligatory? It is certainly not obligatory, as alternative systems of morality in harmony with the prevailing natural order are feasible. Nor is it desirable, for (to appeal to such alternative value systems) the natural order is more or less in order as it is. Full vegetarianization would only reduce its value, vastly. More generally, a defensible ethical framework should not, it would be rightly contended, be right out of step with the natural order of other creatures, decently depicted. Decent depiction is important, for some features of the natural order, such as competition, combat and predation, so far from escaping attention, have been grossly exaggerated and exploited. Thus, for instance, the ludicrous picture of nature red in truth and claw, so beloved of descendents of orthodox Victorians and of orthodox economists. However, even under decent depiction, the “natural order” is often not benign. That appears to be enough to induce a supervenient moral dilemma for any stretched pacifism which is coupled to a deep ethic (e.g. which does not separate humans out from the natural order ) and which eschews the desperate vegetarian route: The natural order is not an immoral order The natural order contains (regular) instances of violence. Therefore, instances of violence are not immoral – in apparent defiance of P2 Moreover, there are too many instances of violence, too regularly occurring, for them all to be plausibly shunted into the moral dilemma category (and predatory carnivores face no dilemmas). Raptors that practice violence every week are not immoral (neither are they clearly moral; the category of morality only significantly extends so far). The main trouble lies however with P2 (which needs some finer adjustment, as was alrady indicated in AI ). While P2 is alright in context, within a particular, perfectly viable, ethical framework, designed for the usual human round, the conventional setting for ethical theories, it stands in need of modification outside that setting. It is time to suggest the sort of modification envisaged. Evidently P2 was addressed to moral agents. Which agents? Not to carnivores that supply their own livelihood, nor really to morally degenerate humans, but to peace-sensitive agents. With that semi-technical form, yet to be characterised, a suitably modified P2 results: MP2. It is morally wrong, for a peace-sensitive agent, to use violence. 9 9 The generalization of P2, suggested in AI, to cover also the parallel situation of environmental vandalism, can be similarly modified. The anti-vandolence principle becomes MP2°. It is morally wrong, for a peace- and environmentally-sensitive agent, to use vandolence. To recover what amounts, in the previous discussive context, to P2, it suffices to add the proposition that every human agent ought to be peace-sensitive. Much as that proposition has to recommend it, it appears too ethically advanced for many modern humans; it sets too high a moral standard to be taken as a serious guide to practice. It seems wise to settle presently for something less demanding, such as that every advanced moral agent ought to be peace sensitive. To put essentially the same proposition alternatively: Stretched pacifism (as modified) is supererogatory. While it is perhaps too late to hope for much moral progress in humans, it is pleasant to contemplate alternative futures where what is supererogatory became obligatory, and widely practiced. Richard Sylvan10* Appendix I began drafting this essay at the time (January 17, midday Australian time) of the American attacks upon Iraq. The aptly named Prime Minister Hawke of Australia had just made a statement to the nation-state, announcing (the) war. In this statement there was much talk of peace. There was even – in what was effectively a declaration of war – reiteration of the modern quest for ‘a new world order of peace’. Peace through war; so it rings out again and again, through the centuries. ‘War must be for the sake of peace’ (Aristotle p.220). More than two thousand years later, we have fought those wars to end all wars. But it is no use, Hawke solemely pronounced, just talking about peace, and thinking about peace; we must work for peace, fight for it – through war. Impeccable logic? President Bush, supreme commander, convinced us with similar logic, speaking too with many tongues. Of how he ‘preferred to think of peace, not war’. But now ‘only force will prevail’, as ‘all reasonable efforts to reach a peaceful solution are exhausted’. ‘What must be done’ must be done, or will be anyway. With God on side with the US offensive (as well as on the other side), it will go well. As it was said to have, though it achieved comparatively little that other efforts may not have yielded more satisfactorily, and thought it may now have to followed with another invasion. Nor have we ever managed to glimpse much of what is now supposed, when we are no longer engaged, to come ‘out of the horror of war’: a ‘new world order ... which governs the conflict of nations’; a ‘rule of law’, not war. How the one, enforcable law, is achieved, unless backed by the the other, is not explained (Medlin's paradox hits back). Similarly what we now hear from many militarists, as they rush to war, is that 10 * Thank to David Bennett for joint contributions (from UT) and to JWS for opposition (in JWS) ‘peace is a great good, war a great evil’. But, for the most part, only the rhetoric has shifted; practice has scarcely changed at all. REFERENCES W.-T. Chan, A Source Book on Chinese Philosophy, Princeton University Press, 1963; referred to as ST. W.-T. Chan (ed.), The Way of Lao Tzu (Tao-te Ching), Bobbs-Merrill, New York, 1963; referred to as LT. B. Martin, Uprooting War, Freedom Press, London, 1984. A. Naess, Ecology, community and lifestyle, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge UK, 1989. R.A. Rapaport, Pigs for the Ancestors : ritual in the ecology of a New Guinea People, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1967. R. Routley, ‘War and Peace II. On the alleged inconsistency, moral insensitivity and fanaticism of pacifism’, Discussion papers in environmental philosophy #9, Research School of Social Science, Australian National University, 1983 (also in Inquiry ); referred to as AI. R. Routley and V. Plumwood, ‘Moral dilemmas and the logic of deontic notions’, Discussion papers in environmental philosophy #6, Research School of Social Science, Australian National University, 1984 (also in Paraconsistent Logic); referred to as MD. R. Routley, ‘War and Peace I. On the ethics of large-scale nuclear war and nuclear-deterrence and the political fall-out’, Discussion papers in environmental philosophy, #5, Research School Of Social Science, Australian National University, 1984. G. Sharp, Social Power and Political Freedom, Porter Sargent, Boston, 1980. J.W. Smith, The Worms at the Heart of Things , Public Relations Unit, Flinders University, 1989. R. Sylvan, ‘War and Peace III, Australia's defence philosophy’, Social Philosophy, for Nuclear Conference, University of Queensland, 1985. R. Sylvan and D. Bennett, ‘Of Utopias, Tao and Deep Ecology’, Discussion papers in environmental philosophy #19, Research School of Social Science, Australian National University, 1990; referred to as UT.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Box 77, Item 3: Draft of War and peace IV: Tao and deep-green Subject The topic of the resource Later title: On extirpating war: Tao and deep-green pacifism. Description An account of the resource Paper from floppy disk containing 21 files. Directory and file name: war and peace I V\War and Peace IV.pdf Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/browse?search=Richard+Sylvan&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bjoiner%5D=and&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=&amp;range=&amp;collection=&amp;type=&amp;user=&amp;tags=&amp;public=&amp;featured=&amp;exhibit=&amp;geolocation-mapped=&amp;geolocation-address=&amp;geolocation-latitude=&amp;geolocation-longitude=&amp;geolocation-radius=10&amp;submit_search=Search+for+items">Richard Sylvan</a> Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived <span class="MuiTypography-root-125 MuiTypography-body2-126">The University of Queensland's <a data-testid="rek-series" href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/records/search?page=1&amp;pageSize=20&amp;sortBy=score&amp;sortDirection=Desc&amp;searchQueryParams%5Brek_series%5D%5Bvalue%5D=Richard+Sylvan+Papers%2C+UQFL291&amp;searchMode=advanced">Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291</a></span>, Box 77, Item 3 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org">Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy</a> Contributor An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource <span>This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, </span><a href="https://najtaylor.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Dr. N.A.J. Taylor</a><span>.</span> Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library. Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource [27] leaves. 200.82 KB. Type The nature or genre of the resource Manuscript Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context <a href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:e39d951">https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:e39d951</a> Box 77: Untitled and Unlisted Boxes https://www.antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/8b7e8d66d0e9ea5ede0b0b74abc38bfe.pdf 437b0835703278585d832d8eec97184e PDF Text Text PACIFISM P.4 Those who would abolish war, substituting for it nonwarlike and ideally nonviolent methods and strategies, have been confronted not merely with much subrational abuse but with plenty of criticism and some paradoxes. Here is a recent paradox concerning war and nonviolence: • War must be abolished. One reason is simply economic. We can no longer afford it, and the opportunity costs and enormous. Along with other extraordinarily wasteful activities, it is an anachronism. • Do so cannot be uncomplished without violence, i.e. in effect given the types of violence involved without what amounts to war. According to a fuller version of this premiss, the process of abolishing a war would only be achieved through a revolution so profound that it could not succeed without extensive and extreme violence, amounting to (civil) war. ˚ But then war cannot be abolished without war. Therefore, war which must be abolished cannot be abolished.1 This “paradox” has been compared with the Liar paradox, but the parallel does not continue far. This paradox does not involve self-referented features, and is easily broken. For let the “last war” be not the last standard war but the revolution abolishing war. Then, given that the revolution is successful, war will be abolished therewith, i.e. with that last war. There need be no regress, given again a successful outcome. All the premisses stand intact, but the conclusion, following the ‘therefore’ is a nonsequitar. However, while the outcome is accordingly logically fine, the route is repugnant. Standard pacifism challenges the second premiss. Outlining the deep-green case against war. The traditional Western case against wars has been primarily along two dimerous: social and moral. Wars are highly disruptive of the social fabric; wars may be unjust. From these joint features, it was argued that wars should be a matter of last resort, to be fought to ensure peace. It was argued further that only just wars should be fought. As there was little evidence of the decline and fall of wars, much effort was expended upon trying to characterize just war satisfactorily. But there was always a rival positive perspective in wars, which encouraged the exaltation of wars and military feats. It also facilitated the transfer of the favourable image of war to other problem areas, whence the long and apparently successful war against nature (but the short-term accesses are turning into long-term problems), the short and unsucessful war against poverty, and so on. Behind all this is the complex idea of war as rejuvenating, even cleansing, like fire; of war as heroic, and glorious, of war as 1 Brian Mullin who forcefully prpounded this puzzle, set other analogous puzzles alongside it – designed to reveal deep difficulties in contemporary political, and especially atternative, though. An other puzzle, concerning liberty and repression in the context of capitalism, revolved around the following immitent trivial: • capitalism must be removed, but liberty retained. • capitalism cannot be removed without repression. • repression is antithetrial to liberty. The puzzle is resolved as with the analogous puzzle of abolishing. Let the “last capitalist” action before the days of liberty to the repressive but liberating solvation overthrowing capitalism. �the supreme testing ground of men. These picture of war, finally shattered by the first World War (where even the poets began to tell of horrors and atrocities) and subsequent technological wars, though no larger in assendency, have by no means vanished. The notion of war as rejuvenating a flagging economy persists, along with the practice of keeping capitalism running smoothly by integrating substantial military components into the industrial engine. With the development of highly technological wars – the celebrated development of the dirty industrial age is substantially military – the traditional negative case has grown in strength. Wars have become much more damaging, with the potential for much more that is significantly worse, and the possibility of a just war has correspondingly contracted. The opposition to war has likewise grown, but more than correspondingly with the rise of women in social and political influence. Deep-green theory accepts the traditional negative case, but would further strengthen it. For example, the stricture against unjust wars, as out and out inmoral, can be strengthened, through the following syllogism: All wars should be fully just wars. Modern wars cannot be fully just wars. There should be no modern wars. A fully just war is not merely a just war but a war those just character can be reliably forecast in advance. A modern war is of course a war that deploys modern technology, at least that available this century. The evidential basis for the second premiss derives from much information that collateral damage, damage to innocent bystanders and involved citizens is always likely and cannot be excluded. Such wars are always liable to violate uncontroversial requirements for a just war, even if they are purely “conventional” wars, not throwing radiation or chemical or biological weapons around. From a contemperary viewpoint the traditional doctrine of a just war, really of a jsut defensive war, is seriously out of date. The reasons for this stretch wider than the new features introduced by modern technological wars and the character of modern civilization, with its giant cities littered with dangerous vulnerable military targets. They have also to do with the chauvinism of the justice proposed, which is shallow human justice, not natural or environmental justice. There is no consideration of justice to other creatures or to the Earth. Two troubles are really intentioned here: conceptual difficulaties with too narrow a nation of justice, and ideological difficulties with too narrow a vision of what is an object of value, what counts. The deep-green case against war adds to the traditional case a further dimension, neglected until very recently: the environmental dimension. It has suddenly been seen that wars are typically environmental atrocities. Earlier, of course, environments were simply backgrounds, backdrops in paintings and plays, to the real drama. Contemporary technological wars tend to be not merely social tragedies but environmental ones as well. There is a do-trines of just war, but it is a human chauvinistic affair. There is no similarly deeloped doctrine of an ecologically sound war, a deep ecological war. Unless any such war were literaly different from modern wars, that is contemporary technicological wars, it would overstep permitted bounds. For such wars are characteristically ecological disasters. Hardened Military people, desensitized by a rigorous unethical training, feel even less compunction about degrading or destroying environments or members of other species than they do of maiming or killing civilians through “collateral” activity. Matching the no-just-war syllogism is a no-sound-war syllogism: All wars should be environmentally sound wars. Modern wars cannot be environmentally sound. There should be no modern wars. The argument for the second premiss has of course to be different. It looks to the informative accumulating on what ward do to �natural and built environments. The Vietnam and Gulf wars both inflicted immense damage on natural environments on what was left of them. The environmental effects of war are not confined to direct and collateral damage. There are indirect effects also. Thus, for instance, war also supplied to mechanism of a technology for, modern environmental destruction: explosives, bull dozers from tanks, etc. There is little Tao linking war and ecology. (But a bridge to deep-green theory can be made using neo-Duoism, an updating Taoism in conformity with deep ecology, which however also includes but little on war: see UT.) APPENDIX I began drafting this essay at the time (January 17, midday Australian time) of the American attacks upon Iraq. Prime Minister hawke of Australia had just made a statement to the nation-state, announcing (the0 war. In this statement there was much talk of peace. There was even – in what was effectively a declaration of war – riteration of the modern quest for ‘a new world order of peace’. Peace through war; so it rings out again and again, through the centuries. ‘War must be for the sake of peace’ (Aristotle p.220). More than two thousand years later, we have fought those wars to end all wars. But it is no use, Hawke solemely pronounced, just talking about peace, and thinking about peace; we must work for peace, fight for it – through war. Impeccable logic? President Bush, supreme commander, convinced us with similar logic, speaking too with many tongues. Of how he ‘preferred to think of peace, not war’. But now ‘only force will prevail’, as ‘all reasonable efforts to reach a peaceful solution are exhausted’. ‘What must be done’ must be done, or will be anyway. With God on side with the US offensive (as well as on the other side), it will go well. As it was said to have, though it achieved comparatively little that other efforts may have have yielded, and thought it may now have to followed with another invasion. Nor have we ever managed to glimpse much of what is now supposed, when we are no longer engaged, to come ‘out of the horror of war’: a ‘new world order ... which governs the conflict of nations’; a ‘rule of law’, not war. How the one, enforcable law, is achieved unless backed by the the other is not explained. Similarly what we now hear from many militarists, as they rush to war, is that ‘peace is a great good, war a great evil’. But, for the most part, only the rhetoric has changed. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Draft Papers Description An account of the resource Sylvan's literary executor encountered an archive in which “all his projects were current", since manuscripts were undated and unattributed. Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document PACIFISM P.4 Those who would abolish war, substituting for it nonwarlike and ideally nonviolent methods and strategies, have been confronted not merely with much subrational abuse but with plenty of criticism and some paradoxes. Here is a recent paradox concerning war and nonviolence: • War must be abolished. One reason is simply economic. We can no longer afford it, and the opportunity costs and enormous. Along with other extraordinarily wasteful activities, it is an anachronism. • Do so cannot be uncomplished without violence, i.e. in effect given the types of violence involved without what amounts to war. According to a fuller version of this premiss, the process of abolishing a war would only be achieved through a revolution so profound that it could not succeed without extensive and extreme violence, amounting to (civil) war. ˚ But then war cannot be abolished without war. Therefore, war which must be abolished cannot be abolished.1 This “paradox” has been compared with the Liar paradox, but the parallel does not continue far. This paradox does not involve self-referented features, and is easily broken. For let the “last war” be not the last standard war but the revolution abolishing war. Then, given that the revolution is successful, war will be abolished therewith, i.e. with that last war. There need be no regress, given again a successful outcome. All the premisses stand intact, but the conclusion, following the ‘therefore’ is a nonsequitar. However, while the outcome is accordingly logically fine, the route is repugnant. Standard pacifism challenges the second premiss. Outlining the deep-green case against war. The traditional Western case against wars has been primarily along two dimerous: social and moral. Wars are highly disruptive of the social fabric; wars may be unjust. From these joint features, it was argued that wars should be a matter of last resort, to be fought to ensure peace. It was argued further that only just wars should be fought. As there was little evidence of the decline and fall of wars, much effort was expended upon trying to characterize just war satisfactorily. But there was always a rival positive perspective in wars, which encouraged the exaltation of wars and military feats. It also facilitated the transfer of the favourable image of war to other problem areas, whence the long and apparently successful war against nature (but the short-term accesses are turning into long-term problems), the short and unsucessful war against poverty, and so on. Behind all this is the complex idea of war as rejuvenating, even cleansing, like fire; of war as heroic, and glorious, of war as 1 Brian Mullin who forcefully prpounded this puzzle, set other analogous puzzles alongside it – designed to reveal deep difficulties in contemporary political, and especially atternative, though. An other puzzle, concerning liberty and repression in the context of capitalism, revolved around the following immitent trivial: • capitalism must be removed, but liberty retained. • capitalism cannot be removed without repression. • repression is antithetrial to liberty. The puzzle is resolved as with the analogous puzzle of abolishing. Let the “last capitalist” action before the days of liberty to the repressive but liberating solvation overthrowing capitalism. the supreme testing ground of men. These picture of war, finally shattered by the first World War (where even the poets began to tell of horrors and atrocities) and subsequent technological wars, though no larger in assendency, have by no means vanished. The notion of war as rejuvenating a flagging economy persists, along with the practice of keeping capitalism running smoothly by integrating substantial military components into the industrial engine. With the development of highly technological wars – the celebrated development of the dirty industrial age is substantially military – the traditional negative case has grown in strength. Wars have become much more damaging, with the potential for much more that is significantly worse, and the possibility of a just war has correspondingly contracted. The opposition to war has likewise grown, but more than correspondingly with the rise of women in social and political influence. Deep-green theory accepts the traditional negative case, but would further strengthen it. For example, the stricture against unjust wars, as out and out inmoral, can be strengthened, through the following syllogism: All wars should be fully just wars. Modern wars cannot be fully just wars. There should be no modern wars. A fully just war is not merely a just war but a war those just character can be reliably forecast in advance. A modern war is of course a war that deploys modern technology, at least that available this century. The evidential basis for the second premiss derives from much information that collateral damage, damage to innocent bystanders and involved citizens is always likely and cannot be excluded. Such wars are always liable to violate uncontroversial requirements for a just war, even if they are purely “conventional” wars, not throwing radiation or chemical or biological weapons around. From a contemperary viewpoint the traditional doctrine of a just war, really of a jsut defensive war, is seriously out of date. The reasons for this stretch wider than the new features introduced by modern technological wars and the character of modern civilization, with its giant cities littered with dangerous vulnerable military targets. They have also to do with the chauvinism of the justice proposed, which is shallow human justice, not natural or environmental justice. There is no consideration of justice to other creatures or to the Earth. Two troubles are really intentioned here: conceptual difficulaties with too narrow a nation of justice, and ideological difficulties with too narrow a vision of what is an object of value, what counts. The deep-green case against war adds to the traditional case a further dimension, neglected until very recently: the environmental dimension. It has suddenly been seen that wars are typically environmental atrocities. Earlier, of course, environments were simply backgrounds, backdrops in paintings and plays, to the real drama. Contemporary technological wars tend to be not merely social tragedies but environmental ones as well. There is a do-trines of just war, but it is a human chauvinistic affair. There is no similarly deeloped doctrine of an ecologically sound war, a deep ecological war. Unless any such war were literaly different from modern wars, that is contemporary technicological wars, it would overstep permitted bounds. For such wars are characteristically ecological disasters. Hardened Military people, desensitized by a rigorous unethical training, feel even less compunction about degrading or destroying environments or members of other species than they do of maiming or killing civilians through “collateral” activity. Matching the no-just-war syllogism is a no-sound-war syllogism: All wars should be environmentally sound wars. Modern wars cannot be environmentally sound. There should be no modern wars. The argument for the second premiss has of course to be different. It looks to the informative accumulating on what ward do to natural and built environments. The Vietnam and Gulf wars both inflicted immense damage on natural environments on what was left of them. The environmental effects of war are not confined to direct and collateral damage. There are indirect effects also. Thus, for instance, war also supplied to mechanism of a technology for, modern environmental destruction: explosives, bull dozers from tanks, etc. There is little Tao linking war and ecology. (But a bridge to deep-green theory can be made using neo-Duoism, an updating Taoism in conformity with deep ecology, which however also includes but little on war: see UT.) APPENDIX I began drafting this essay at the time (January 17, midday Australian time) of the American attacks upon Iraq. Prime Minister hawke of Australia had just made a statement to the nation-state, announcing (the0 war. In this statement there was much talk of peace. There was even – in what was effectively a declaration of war – riteration of the modern quest for ‘a new world order of peace’. Peace through war; so it rings out again and again, through the centuries. ‘War must be for the sake of peace’ (Aristotle p.220). More than two thousand years later, we have fought those wars to end all wars. But it is no use, Hawke solemely pronounced, just talking about peace, and thinking about peace; we must work for peace, fight for it – through war. Impeccable logic? President Bush, supreme commander, convinced us with similar logic, speaking too with many tongues. Of how he ‘preferred to think of peace, not war’. But now ‘only force will prevail’, as ‘all reasonable efforts to reach a peaceful solution are exhausted’. ‘What must be done’ must be done, or will be anyway. With God on side with the US offensive (as well as on the other side), it will go well. As it was said to have, though it achieved comparatively little that other efforts may have have yielded, and thought it may now have to followed with another invasion. Nor have we ever managed to glimpse much of what is now supposed, when we are no longer engaged, to come ‘out of the horror of war’: a ‘new world order ... which governs the conflict of nations’; a ‘rule of law’, not war. How the one, enforcable law, is achieved unless backed by the the other is not explained. Similarly what we now hear from many militarists, as they rush to war, is that ‘peace is a great good, war a great evil’. But, for the most part, only the rhetoric has changed.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Box 77, Item 2: Pacifism p.4 Description An account of the resource Paper from floppy disk containing 21 files. Directory and file name: war and peace I V\pacifism.pdf Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/browse?search=Richard+Sylvan&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bjoiner%5D=and&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=&amp;range=&amp;collection=&amp;type=&amp;user=&amp;tags=&amp;public=&amp;featured=&amp;exhibit=&amp;geolocation-mapped=&amp;geolocation-address=&amp;geolocation-latitude=&amp;geolocation-longitude=&amp;geolocation-radius=10&amp;submit_search=Search+for+items">Richard Sylvan</a> Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived <span class="MuiTypography-root-125 MuiTypography-body2-126">The University of Queensland's <a data-testid="rek-series" href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/records/search?page=1&amp;pageSize=20&amp;sortBy=score&amp;sortDirection=Desc&amp;searchQueryParams%5Brek_series%5D%5Bvalue%5D=Richard+Sylvan+Papers%2C+UQFL291&amp;searchMode=advanced">Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291</a></span>, Box 77, Item 2 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org">Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy</a> Contributor An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource <span>This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, </span><a href="https://najtaylor.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Dr. N.A.J. Taylor</a><span>.</span> Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library. Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource [3] leaves. 99.11 KB. Type The nature or genre of the resource Manuscript Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context <a href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:68b7b8f">https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:68b7b8f</a> Box 77: Untitled and Unlisted Boxes https://www.antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/5e8415bb76024d67ded6d6e3977f7eb3.pdf 96f3e6a4de450fe22ae29f31689e350e PDF Text Text ON EXTIRPATING WAR: TAO AND DEEP-GREEN PACIFISM Taoism and deep-green environmental theory, although closely aligned on very many issues, diverge over war. For Taoism, by contrast for instance with Buddhism, is not a pacific doctrine, but is committed to skilful defensive militarism. While it does not espouse a fortress mentality, Taoism certainly condones limited defensive military operations for specific purposes, a sort of guerilla warfare. By contrast, deep-green theory, while acknowledging the role of organised social defence, stands opposed to professional militarism, and thereby to military defence, and is committed to a principled pacifism. Conveniently a route through Taoism, philosophically fascinating in its own right, will lead us to problems of pacifism and towards deep-green theory. 1. Features of a Taoist critique of war and militarism. War did not receive a favourable press in ancient Chinese philosophy. Generally aggression and war were to be avoided. Even Confucius imposed very demanding conditions: for example, ‘when good men have instructed the people [in morals, agriculture, military tactics] for seven years, they may be allowed to bear arms,’ ‘If a ruler ... does not set himself right, even his commands will not be obeyed’ ( SB p.41, italics added). Mo Tzu went much further than Confucius, roundly condemning war – on utilitarian grounds, that war yields no net benefit at any level ( SB p.227). What is more, he backed his heavy condemnation practically (unlike some conspicuous contemporary theoretical utilitarians); ‘he did not hesitate to walk for ten days and ten nights in an effort to dissuade a ruler from making war’ ( SB p.212). But none, it is said, went as far, in a detailed and sophisticated criticism of war, as Lao Tzu; ‘none has condemned war more strongly than Lao Tzu’. ‘[T]he opposition of Taoism to the use of force is well-known, and the most bitter attack on militarism if found in the Lao Tzu’ (Chan, p.154, p.17.) But, after that splendid build-up, the text is slightly disappointing. Lao Tzu does not assert outright that war is an abomination, or even roundly condemn it. His critique of war, militarism, and military technology, is subtle and oblique, and, on the surface, far distanced from pacifism. For he does not recommend an end to war - in that genuine Taoists, those who possess Tao, will never participate in them – but expects wars to continue as unavoidable evils. Worse, he even goes so far as to outline proper attitudes to war and conduct in war, and indeed to suggest military techniques and strategies, some of which look decidedly devious. Among the classical works of Taoism, we focus on the Lao Tzu because, by contrast with other works, a remarkable component of that book is devoted to war and militarism. The apparent deviousness of the tactics Lao Tzu allocates serves to highlight what has been seen as ‘the most troublesome element’ in his philosophy (Chan p.17) – not so much however because they concern military operations, but because they are taken �to apply much more widely, ‘to life in general’ (p.17). But why should military activity obtain some special �dispensation? Why should what is not tolerated more generally be exonerated there? But given that Taoism has here the virtue of consistency (i.e. uniformity on principles) and of universalizability, that simply leaves more explaining to be done. • Puzzles for Taoism, and wars as unavoidable evils There are two puzzles here in Taoism rather than one. There is the militarypractices paradox, and, varying and generalising on that, there are life-practices paradoxes. The special paradox is generated by the following incompatible elements: on the one side, ‘the most bitter attack on militarism’, the well-known opposition of Taoism to the use of force (p.17) and to the possession and use of smart military weapons and technology – implying that war is far from all right – and on the other, advocacy of certain (devious) military tactics, outlines of (deceitful) conduct in war, and so on – implying that war is all right after all. A straightforward generalisation of this paradox would look at other morally-sensitive parts of life, where some practice was strongly condemned yet engaged in (for many examples, see the dilemmas assembled in MD). But the variation of concern to Chan and the neo-Confucians concerns the conjunction of upright with devious practices in life, in particular in the life of the sage. For a Taoist sage is presumed to lead an upright straightforward life, yet appears to engage in devious and even deceitful practices incompatible with such a life-style. Call this the Taoist-lifestyle paradox. Evidently a good deal of explaining is required, as to how Taoism can coherently take the positions it appears to presume, both on war and peace, and on life more generally. A desirable preliminary would seem to be a little investigation of what position is taken, especially on war and militarism. One key pasage runs: Fine weapons are instruments of evil They are hated by creatures Therefore those who possess the Tao turn away from them. ... Weapons are instruments of evil, not the instruments of a good ruler. When he uses them unavoidably, he regards calm restraint as the best principle Even when he is victorious, he does not regard it as praiseworthy, For to praise victory is to delight in the slaughter of men. He who delights in the slaughter of men will not succeed in the empire. ... For a victory, let us observe the occasion with funeral-ceremonies (LT p.154). Wars, which involve the use of weapons, instruments of evil, are accordingly themselves evil. They are also evil because they involve the slaughter of men. But they are also sometimes unavoidable (also p.152). Therefore such wars are unavoidable evils. Such discourse, obtained by almost immediate inference from the passage, is within the standard orbit of dilemma talk. But Taoism lacks, through �deliberately eschewing deontic talk, the discourse which enables direct expression of such dilemmas, or even direct condemnation of wars or of clever weapons. Instead the points are made by circumlocution, what the possesser of Tao does, how the good ruler conducts himself, or by analogy, of victory in war with death. �Unavoidable evils are the very stuff of deontic dilemmas (though many theories, underpinned by shonky logic, lack the resources for representing this stuff properly). Where something is unavoidably evil, it is both bad, because evil, and also not bad, doing it is excusable, because it is unavoidable. So, given such an argument (which has its weaknesses), an unavoidable evil is a genuinely dilemmatic object with inconsistent features. Certain wars have looked, since ancient times, like such dilemmatic objects. Revealingly, Chan tries to explain that ‘most troublesome element’ in Taoism, the military-practice paradox, through the following exercise in lateral thinking: It can ... be argued that Lao Tzu uses warfare to illustrate his principles of taking no action and weakness because warfare is among the most dynamic and critical of human experiences, just as the Indian classic, the Bhagavadgita chooses fighting as the theme on which to discuss the terrible dilemma whether one should fulfil his duty, as in the case of a soldier, and kill, or should fail in his duty and refrain from killing (p.17). ‘Just as’? The Indian classic prevents a classic moral dilemma, a dilemma represented in contemporary philosophy (following its rediscovery by Sartre), where there are incompatible duties: the duty to kill, because of one's role as a soldier, and the duty not to kill, because of one's human condition, and the supervenient dilemma of failing in and fulfilling one's duties. These dilemmas for an individual (male, as it then was) are replicated in dilemmas regarding war for group institutions: at bottom, the obligation to engage in war (for one set of compelling reasons) as contraposed with the obligation not to engage in war (for another, perhaps overlapping, set of reasons). A theory of moral dilemmas (as worked out for example in MD) is crucial for an adequate treatment of major issues in war and peace, especially (as will become evident) for a viable strong pacifism. But Taoism, eschewing deontic discourse, lacks the apparatus to state or develop moral dilemmas. Hence it is logically excluded from giving a full or adequate account of what is going on conceptually. One of the philosophically fascinating feature of Taoism is the fashion in which it manages to avoid deontic discourse, and to substitute for direct deontic discourse or improvise circumlocutions when deontic discourse would otherwise appear inevitable (cf. UT for examples). But there are costs. One is inability to display the mechanism of deontic dilemmas, or to show what reasons and argument lie behind Taoist prounouncements and conclusions (the shortage of Taoism on argument is another philosophically conspicious feature, also observed in UT). As conceptual apparatus for analysizing moral dilemmas is missing, most of the machinery involved has to be passed over. Only the outcomes, as Taoism sees them, are presented, as if from a black box. Taoism blacks out the story on deontic dilemmas that deep-green theory can tell, as the following diagram tries to show: �Diagrams . Charting the processing of deontic dilemmas that are “resolved”. �Deep-green chart: dilemma input Arguments to incompatible prescriptions § Processing of dilemma, directive situational procedures output Corresponding Taoist chart: Black directive Box output input It is evident that Taoism can be extended; information can be put into the Black Box rendering it less opaque. That extension can be made so as to conform to deepgreen theory, i.e. so that the extended Taoist chart, a neo-Daoist chart, looks like the deep-green one. That is indeed essentially how neo-Daoism get characterised, in terms of conformity of the extension to deep ecological theory (see UT). We are now placed to explain how to dissolve, or at least neutralize, the paradoxes deriving from repudiation of militarism, an awkwardly qualified repudiation in the case of Taoism. In a significant sense there is no resolving of genuine deontic dilemmas. The principles delineating the fix may stand, incompatible, signalling the persisting suboptimality (or better, sublimenality) of the dilemmatic situation. Where there is a dilemma, involved parties should try to do well enough in the sublimenal circumstances (for a much fuller account, see MD). Thus where there is a war, itself a non-Taoist process, engaged or caught up Taoists will not abandon Taoism. Taoist methods will be applied, Taoist strategies pursued. So much for theoretical representation and (non-)resolution of life-practices and other dilemmas, details of which are readily elaborated in deep-green extensions of Taoism. A prior substantive issue is whether dilemmas always are generated: not whether wars are evil (typically they are, an issue we shall come to), but whether wars are unavoidable. Analysis of wars does not bear that familiar claim out decisively. Many wars could have been avoided, through conciliation, negotiation, restraint, etc., and no worse results apparently obtained, through sanctions, exchange, trade, etc. Through a typology of wars (coming up) that conjecture can be given some substance. Consider, for instance, what would be walk-overs. Then there is little point in making a military response. So war can be avoided. Certainly an occupation, to be met in a different way, may still occur. And so on, perhaps, for various other types of war. But, more generally, try this:Every war involves an aggressor, who makes an aggressive move. Such an aggressor could always avoid that move, taking a different (or a do-nothing) course of �action. Therefore, �every war can be avoided. No war is entirely unavoidable. Setting aside determinism (which renders all actual wars along with all other events unavoidable), it could be argued that a war sometimes simply boils up, without an aggressor, an intensification of a conflagatory situation. There are grounds for scepticism regarding such examples; for such intensification can only occur if provocative military moves are made, for instance troops are stationed in provocative or risky positions. The presumption that certain wars are unavoidable typically derives from a onesided perspective on war, a defender's perspective. A defender has no option, so it is routinely averred, but to respond to a determined aggressor. Even if that should be so sometimes, when there is no running away or going underground, it does not establish that such a war is unavoidable; for it neglects the role of the aggressor. By a smarter formulation, relevant features of unavoidability can be captured. Although wars may not be unavoidable, defensive action in wars that have been initiated may be unavoidable. At least such action may be unavoidable if unacceptably high costs (death, enslavement, etc.) are not to be avoided. Thereupon another highly relevant feature emerges: the linkage of avoidability to costs. For whether an action is unavoidable then depends upon what costs a party is prepared to incur before and when insisting on action: but this appears entirely unacceptable. How can what is “unavoidable” cease to be so when some further costs are absorbed? However with basics like survival, a certain liberty, and so on, we do reach such bounds. An important type of unavoidability. We also reach scenarios, unavailable to Lao Tzu but kindly brought within range by modern technology, which may appear to justify aggressive strikes. State Z, while not an aggressor, is carrying out practices which will impose unacceptably high costs upon peoples of other states and implacably refuses to desist. It could, for example, be poisoning air or water flowing to other states. But ,to make the case vivid, let us suppose that state Z is constructing, for reasons Zeders find convincing (they are committed to a faith which depicts all humans as incorrigible sinners and unworthy of life), an effective doomsday machine. Would an (aggressive) preemptory strike designed to disable or destroy the machine be unavoidable? 1 In a sense, No; in another Yes. For different modalities can operate. Physically outsiders need to do nothing, but watch Zeders go about their zealous work. But deontically they are under heavy moral pressure, because of the costs of standing by idly: if the human race is worth anything very substantial, then they are obliged to act, action is deontically 1 Whether it would be justifiable, or just, are separate issues. But it is evident enought that such scenarios further damage the obsolescent idea of just war. For, according to received doctrine, a just war is defensive. (How such a war can be fought at all is another matter; coherence requires relativization to ‘just war for party d’.) �unavoidable. Here is a situation where a proposed reduction of deontic logic proves illuminating. Obligation is explicated through not implying, or necessitating, the sanction, i.e. excessive ethical costs such as extermination. Let us explain deontic unavoidability analogously: an action is so unavoidable if not undertaking it would result in excessive ethical costs. Then if it can be established that there is no other way than a military strike, an act of war, to ensure that the Zeders desist (and certainly we can envisage scenarios like that), then that is deontically unavoidable. It is also dilemmatic for those committed to, or inclined towards pacifism; and it is, for them at least, but paradoxically justifiable, as the negation is also justifiable, on pacific grounds. Scenarios like that sketched, that appear to render certain wars deontically unavoidable require but little or no elaboration to render them evil. Evil indeed is such a standard feature of standard wars that at least its great presence call for little supporting evidence. But it has taken to vast stretch of human history to reach this general point of recognition. The manifold evils of war Lao Tzu very early recognised and emphasized: Wherever armies are stationed, briars and thorns grow. Great wars are always followed by famines (p.152). And nowadays followed by great tides of refugees. This passage includes not only recognition of the widely-observed socioenvironmental consequences of war, but, more striking, very early recognition of the severe environmental impact of military forces. That critique is not however developed in Taoism. 2 Only recently has it been pushed substantially further. And only recently could a new, most significant twist occur, the merging of resource security, long a military objective, with environmental security. The appalling idea has recently been floated that the military, in need of new work and roles with the apparent warming of West-East relations and cooling of the Cold War, should exchange usual military idleness for meddling in environmental matters: regulation and policing of environmental resources, ensurance of environmental security of powerful states, and similar. This is a bit like reassigning those imprisoned for child abuse to managing kindergartens; for consider the impressive military record of environmental vandalism. What the military is alleged to offer is a structure appropriate and available for handling such matters. But, to the contrary, it is precisely the sort of hierarchical, authoritarian expensive structure that should be wound down and up as soon as the opportunity appears, as (briefly) now, rather than being retained and shockingly reoriented (as a state-serving “Greenwar”). 2 But a bridge to deep-green theory can be made through neo-Daoism, an updating of Taoism in confirmity with deep ecology (which however is somewhat thin and threadbare on war; for what there is so far, see Naess p.160). On neoDaoism, see UT. �2. On the divergence of deep-green from Taoism. Having arrived, by better or worse arguments, at the conclusion that wars, though generally evil, may be sometimes unavoidable, it is evidently important to say something about how they – those of the theoretical residue – are to be conducted. By appropriate conduct the damage they do may be reduced; also the conduct should be appropriate to the funereal nature of wars (to exceed Taoist resources for stating this sort of point). It is at this stage that deep-green theory begins to diverge from Taoism. In further explaining the Taoist and deep-green critiques of war, and diverting objections to them, a rough and preliminary typology of wars is important. It is also of passing interest in its own philosophical right. War, according to English Dictionaries, is a ‘contest carried on by force of arms, typically between nations or states’. More exactly, war is a game – in the generous technical sense of game-theory, with players, rules, goals, strategies, and so on – carried on in significant part by military means, normally between states or substates. Call the contestants, (warring) parties. They typically represent of course larger populations. The set-up between parties resembles the arrangements of players in game theory. There are several analogical extensions of the term war to cover games where one of the parties is an object, construed as hostile (an enemy of the state), such as Crime, Drugs, Poverty or Nature. These we can set aside as analogical wars. Of course wars form only a part of military activities. Military interests and objectives have always stretched significantly further than war, to include surveillence and security, easily extended to resource security, environmental security and life-style security, and beyond that to political stability and other political matters. Evidently military ambitions have far over-extended themselves in bagging such democratic concerns. An anarchist solution to the whole problem of war, which some have seen Taoism as reaching towards, is immediate: eliminate the source of war, states. Unfortunately it is not quite that simple (and that's not simple). For wars can also occur between nations, cultures, races or tribes (which are not such artifices as states, and not always so readily or desirably abolished), between inhabited regions, and between factions within states (thus civil wars) or, perhaps by extension, between factions within other social structures (thus, for instance, gang wars). But undoubtedly eliminating states and aspiring states would abolish most wars and virtually all the worst wars. While “nonviolent wars” are excluded by definition, by virtue of ‘force of arms’, token wars, limited wars, and so on, are not: for instance, wars fought by small armed teams representing competing sides (cf. medieval and science fiction war games). As wars are hemmed in by conventions and agreed rules, there is no reason in principle why they should not be reduced to two person contests, fought under strict rules like boxing or gladiatorial contests. But in modern times wars have never taken such sensible forms, but have been much larger affairs, making heavy (though fortunately restricted) use of latest technology. Let us distinguish such wars as techno-powered wars. They have, directly or indirectly (for the �technology may be bought or bartered), a heavy research and development support structure (indeed the bulk of contemporary science is devoted – misdirected – in one way or another to this effort). Among wars, an important distinction is that between offensive and defensive wars. An offensive war is one which ventures off a given party's territory or recognised pad, “invading” that of another party or parties; correlatively defensive parties, if they have not also invaded. Force projection typifies offensive practice. Plainly, offensiveness and defensiveness are not strictly features of a war, but of parties to a war. In a two-party war, while both parties can easily act offensively, the possibility of both parties proceeding defensively is excluded, unless they share territory. (Even then issues may arise as to which party, if any, was the aggressor, which started it, was responsible for starting it, and so on.) Thus mutually defensive wars between contemporary states are impossible (but would be possible if states shared territory, e.g. if Eire and Britain shared the territory of Northern Ireland). Tao-accredited wars were defensive wars, never wars aiming at domination: last-resort wars, in which no pride was taken ( LT p.152).3 The pretence that offensive wars are defensive is widespread, and reflected in the subterfuge that departments or ministries of war are those of defence, security or whatever. (If they really were what they purport to be, we should be well on the way to an end to war.) Offensive practices are rendered defensive ones by shabby redefinitional strategems, such as redefining ‘defensive’ to include defence of ideals like democracy or liberty, infringed (or allegedly infringed) on territories abroad, or to include “defence” of a third party or place (whence every offensive war is “defensive”). In the present war in which part of Arabia is engulfed (February 1991), one party claims to be defending what really was (or should be) part of its territory, namely Kuwait, another party to be defending (what Kuwait did not enjoy) democracy. It is a doubly offensive war presented in this guise as jointly defensive. Aggressive wars are waged for a variety of reasons, but usually for resources or access to resources or markets, a matter often disguised by appeal to ideology (thus a war for oil is represented as a war of liberation). But there are other reasons than narrowly economic ones, such as religion (as with crusades), power and aggrandisement (as in building an empire), and so on. Nor are those reasons necessarily far separated; ideologies like Marxism and market 3 There is one line in LT that may suggest that attack was sometimes justifiable, namely ‘For deep love helps one to win in the case of attack’ (p.219). But how can compassion be appropriate unless this attack is within a defensive setting, a larger context of unavoidability or such like. A passage shortly below confirms this interpretation: I dare not take the offensive but I take the defensive: I dare not advance an inch but I retreat a foot (p.222). These are advances and attacks within a defensive setting. �capitalism, for example, exhibit many of the features of religion. The economic reasons for war appear to have become much more complex with the advent of an integrated world economy. At the same time many of the independent reasons for economic wars are now obsolete. For to powerful states accrue the advantages of war without war. At least most of the former economic advantages of war can be obtained without expensive wars, through trade, institution of economic dependence, etc. Small medieval wars were sometimes instituted for the collection of neighbouring riches and booty, a kind of piracy meeting conditions of war. “Small” contemporary wars can be waged for a remarkable mix of politicaleconomy ends: to establish a regime favourable to economic penetration and profit repatriation, to subjugate markets and to remove competition, to boost a sagging weapons economy by using up old stocks and also testing new equipment, to restart a depressed economy, and so on. Such wars, along with the economic aims which motivate them, are in effect heavily castigated by Lao Tzu: When Tao prevails in the world, galloping horses are turned back to fertilize When Tao does not prevail in the world, war horses (the thrive in fields ...). the suburbs. There is no calamity greater than lavish desires. ( LT p.181). But it does exceed evidential warrant to claim that Tao is not only sufficient, but necessary, for cessation of such practices. The practice of regularly stimulating complex military-saturated economies through war is reminiscent of older, much ridiculed practices in simpler societies. They now ridicule the Tsembaga, who proceeded to destroy much of their surplus product by going to war every 5-15 years (cf Rapaport). But they do not similarly ridicule the most powerful nation on the Earth, the USA, which proceeds to write off a colossal amount of surplus in war every 10-20 years (the Gulf war liquidated some $1.7 billion per day). Taoists would. For ridicule was a favoured method, an important rhetorical strategem, and war and its idiocy were favourite targets. Some classification of defensive wars is also important, for various reasons: reducing and abolishing wars, their costs and damage, restructuring societies away from war and military practices, and, not least, for appreciating Taoism. A main distinction is between • conventional defence, maintained by armies of armed soldiers, many of them professionals, and • social defence, where there are no such armies or but fragments of them, and defence is carried out through social networks of a significant part of society.4 4 Details of social defence are presented in Sharp and in Martin. �It is here that Taoism and deep-green theory part company. Under Taoism, the state will have a standing army, but a defensive army operating by strange, surprise tactics (p.201). No doubt defensive wars are to remain last resort action. Nonetheless the state will operate in secrecy, in a way incompatible with decentralised social defence; people will be kept in the dark about smart weapons of the state; and they too will be surprised, along with presumed enemies of the state. By contrast, under deep-green theory, there should be no hidden smart weapons of state; information would flow more freely and not be hidden from the people (who should retain influence in informed decision making). Under deep-green, standing armies, and more generally military organisation, will be wound down altogether. Taoism should have pushed its searching criticism further. For military objectives, easily acquired by standing armies with time on their hands, are frequently incompatible with Taoism. For example, Taoism is opposed to domination ( LT p.152), whereas military operations frequently seek or involve domination; and military structure is invariably hierarchical and authoritarian. Taoism aims for self-regulation, wherever feasible (cf. p.201); so does deep-green theory, which is one reasons why it aims to dispose of standing armies, as an important preliminary to the withering away of states themselves (military forces being major props of state control and power, and often maintained primarily for internal state security). Taoism has no project for ending the era of wars; deepgreen theory does. That project involves an elimination of standing armies, too often poised for fighting or political interference. A recommended route to end war consists in progressive scaling down: reduction of the means and manpower. The initial stages are well-known, and include • elimination of nuclear, biological and chemical weaponry, and • force reduction. It can hardly be pretended that the Earth's states have managed to proceed very far on even this complex of stages. The next stage consists in • contraction to defensive capacities only, and the final stage consists in • elimination of remaining military defensive forces, and adoption, so far as required, of social defence practices. The complete route thus involves complete demilitarisation. Reasons why deep-green aims to proceed the full distance are readily grasped by considering the environmental shallowness of an otherwise cogent traditional case for the sharp curtailment of wars and militarism. The traditional Western case against wars has been primarily along two dimensions: social and moral. Wars are highly disruptive of the social fabric; wars may be unjust. From these joint features, it was argued that wars should be a matter of last resort, to be fought to ensure peace. It was argued further that only just wars should be fought. Just wars were rare objects. But as there was little evidence of the decline and fall of wars, much effort was expended, more practically and unsuccessfully, upon endeavouring to improve the calibre of wars, and more theoretically, upon trying to characterize just war satisfactorily, or rather to bend the notion in an effort to approximate the gory unjust facts. �Progress was long hindered, furthermore, because there was always a rival positive perspective on wars, which encouraged the exaltation of wars and military feats. It also facilitated the transfer of the favourable image of war to other problem areas, whence the long and apparently successful war against Nature (but the short-term successes are turning into long-term problems), the short and unsuccessful war against Poverty, and so on. Behind all this is the complex idea of war as rejuvenating, even cleansing, like fire; of war as heroic, and glorious, of war as the supreme testing ground of men. These pictures of war – finally shattered by the first World War (where even the poets began to tell of horrors and atrocities) and subsequent technological wars – though no longer in ascendency, have by no means vanished. The notion of war as rejuvenating a flagging economy persists, along with the practice of keeping capitalism running smoothly by integrating substantial military components into the industrial engine. With the development of highly technological wars – the celebrated development of the dirty industrial age is substantially military – the traditional negative case has grown in strength. Wars have become much more damaging, with the potential for much more that is significantly worse, and the possibility of a just war has correspondingly contracted, virtually to zero. The opposition to war has likewise grown, but more than correspondingly with the rise of women in social and political influence. Wars have almost always and everywhere been Men's affairs; likewise conquest. Deep-green theory accepts much of the traditional negative case, but would further strengthen it. For example, the stricture against unjust wars, as out and out immoral, can be strengthened, through the following syllogism: All wars should be fully just wars. Modern wars cannot be fully just wars. Therefore, there should be no modern wars. A fully just war is not merely a just war, but a war those just character can be reliably forecast in advance. A modern war is of course a war that deploys modern technology, at least that available this century. The evidential basis for the second premiss derives from much information that collateral damage, damage to innocent bystanders and involved citizens is always likely and cannot be excluded. Such wars are always liable to violate uncontroversial requirements for a just war, even if they are purely “conventional” wars, not throwing radiation or chemical or biological weapons around. From a contemporary viewpoint the traditional doctrine of a just war, really of a just defensive war, is seriously out of date. The reasons for this reach wider than the new features introduced by modern technological wars and the character of modern civilization, with its giant cities littered with dangerous and vulnerable military targets. They have also to do with the chauvinism of the justice proposed, which is shallow human justice, not natural or environmental justice. There is no consideration of justice to other creatures or to the Earth (cf �Naess p.160). Two troubles are really intertwined here: conceptual difficulties with too narrow a notion of justice, and ideological difficulties with too narrow a vision of what is an object of value, of what counts. The deep-green case against war adds to the traditional case a further dimension, neglected until very recently: the environmental dimension. It has suddenly been seen that wars are typically environmental atrocities. Earlier, of course, “environments” were simply backgrounds, backdrops in paintings and plays, to the real drama. Contemporary technological wars tend to be not merely social tragedies but environmental ones as well. There is a doctrine of just war, but it is a human chauvinistic affair. There is no similarly developed doctrine of an ecologically sound war, a deep ecological war. Unless any such war were literally different from modern wars, that is from contemporary technological wars, it would overstep permitted bounds. For such wars are characteristically ecological disasters. Hardened military people, desensitized by a rigorous unethical training, feel even less compunction about degrading or destroying environments or members of other species than they do of maiming or killing civilians through “collateral” activity. Matching the no-just-war syllogism is a no-sound-war syllogism: All wars should be environmentally sound wars. Modern wars cannot be environmentally sound. Therefore, there should be no modern wars. The argument for the second premiss has of course to be different. It looks to the information accumulating on what wars do to natural and built environments. The Vietnam and Gulf wars both inflicted immense damage on natural environments or what was left of them. The environmental effects of war are not confined to direct and collateral damage. There are indirect effects also. Thus, for instance, war also supplied the mechanism of, and the technology for, modern environmental destruction: explosives, bulldozers from tanks, etc. As well, training for war and engagement in war have much fostered, along with attitudes that make for social callousness or ruthlessness, those that contribute to environmental insensitivity and cruelty. 3. Puzzles about Taoist strategy and its critiques of technology and violence ‘It is surprising how much of the Lao Tzu is devoted to military strategy’. Which strategies? Surprise, above all. But why such strategies? ‘Do they not contradict the Taoists’ strong opposition to the use of force’ (Chan p.222), the implied commitment to quietism? Briefly, Taoism is not committed to quietism, and while certainly antagonistic to violence, does not oppose certain uses of force (only really ill-forcing, as will be explained). Even so, the emphasis on military strategy remains puzzling. The strategies, many of them relevant to social defence, include • seriousness, not ‘making light of the enemy’ (p.222) �• surprise, and nonvisibility (p.201). The defensive strategy involves guerilla tactics: marching without formation, holding weapons without seeming to have them, confronting enemies without seeming to meet them (p.222). But even in times of peace, ‘smart weapons of the state should not be displayed to the people’ (p.164). Such recommendations helped to fuel the charge of deviousness lodged against Lao Tzu. But look at part of the reason for concealing smart weapons: ‘The more smart weapons the people have, the more troubled the state will be’ (p.201). Smart weapons are carried in corrupt states, where the rich engage in conspicuous consumption and the people are suppressed, not where Tao is practiced ( LT p.194). • advance from weakness, flexibility but firmness. Weakness is the principle of life and will overcome strength ( LT p.164, p.233). • coolness and non-competition (LT p.233, p.164). Like these, most of the general strategies are standard Taoist practices simply applied to military conduct. For these standard practices the charge of deviousness looks feeble. The response applies more generally to other allegedly devious political strategies. For the strategies are but application of Taoist principles and techniques to warfare, politics and elsewhere. Nothing excludes application of these techniques to what are accounted, in general, unnecessary evils (which must sometimes, on other Taoist grounds, be countered). Nor, to meet the main criticism, need any deceit or deviousness be involved; nor is it. In particular, the legalist tactic, ‘In order to grasp, it is necessary first to give’ (LT p.164), is cited as involving ‘an element of deceit’ ‘undeniably’, and ‘worse’ it is ‘morally questionable’ (Chan p.17). But in order for me to grasp your hand in a normal handshake, it is necessary first for me to give my hand. There is no deceit here, nothing morally questionable. All the tactics permit of benign construals, of a Taoist kind. Consider, for instance, ‘In order to contract, it is necessary first to expand’ (LT p.164). In order to bend a copper pipe to the intended angle, it is better to bend it first a little further than required. The transformation of water to ice (both favoured natural items for symbolic purposes: natural processes which may look devious!) neatly illustrates the Taoist principle (which is however hardly necessary), and shows softness and weakness turned hardness and strength. The Taoist critique of militarism is as much a critique of technology as of war. Sharp weapons, ‘smart weapons’ as we might now say, come in for much critical attention, as we have already noticed. Only in corrupt and degenerate states are they displayed or flaunted (p.194, p.164); in deep-green regions smart weapons of state’ would not be retained unexhibited. The people will not have them for they mean trouble (p.201); for similar reasons deep-green regions will be free of them. So, it seems, will ideal Taoist regions: ‘Even if there are arrows and weapons, none will display them’ ( LT p.238). Much technology, military and other, is excluded under the Taoist edict against violence (a further facet of the military-practices �paradox).5 The powerful critique of militarism in the Tao-te Ching is coupled with strong opposition to violence. Some of the linkage is evident enough. Militarism as practised represents an ultimate form of state (or party) violence. A basic theme is that violent practices will come to an unnatural end, and accordingly to a non-Taoist end (generalising LT p.176). While force may occur in spectacular, but satisfactory, natural forms, force is duly distinguished from violence. To force the growth of life means ill omen. For the mind to employ the vital force without restraint means violence (LT p.197). One who follows Tao does not apply dominating force, which usually has had results bringing requital (p.152). Dominating force, like power, is in general castigated, under doctrine of wu-wei, no forced actions, no violence. To force natural growth is deviant, destroying harmony. To stop natural growth is deviant. But there is a significant difference between force and violence. To intentionally employ destructive force is to do violence. To so force things is condemned. To remain in harmony with things one does not so force things or practice violence. There is a non-interference principle at work, which also indicates types of non-interference that are excluded. However Taoism does not always get the distinction between force and violence quite 5 Under contemporary technology and technological arrangements, such as the storage of quantities of oil and nuclear and chemical materials in great cities, wars have assumed new and very destructive dimensions, to the point of being utterly irresponsible. A different approach to technology, as to war, is now mandatory. These are no longer things that can in principle be nicely confined and need not touch parties outside the fray. An important part of ending wars, “winning the war against wars”, is removing the technology of war, above all from irresponsible state power. As for which technology to try to jettison and which to try to retain or improve, it is not so difficult to indicate, provided evaluative terminology is not outlawed. What is wanted is technology that is good in its place, what should be excluded is technology that is indifferent or bad or potentially so. Technology to be justified has to do something worthwhile, it has to address identifiable respectable needs. That is why merely indifferent technology is out; there is no virtue in technology for technology's sake, as it is a mere means technique. It is because of the crucial evaluative component in choice of technology that appropriateness, itself evaluative, comes closer to encapsulating the criterion than other recent efforts. Size, such as smallness, or intermediateness, are not what matter, though modest and not excessive technologies are likely to fare better in satisfying appropriateness. In simpler societies, small technology is of course more appropriate; for that is what is good there. From known criteria for what is good these other features for locally appropriate technology can be read off: reliability, esp. in maintenance, functioning well and safely under the expected range of operating conditions (which may be difficult), ease of repair, capital cheapness and repair inexpensiveness, environmental benignness, and meeting sound social needs. �right. ‘Vital force without restraint’, intentionally excessive force, is only part of what counts as violence, which is more generally force which violates, i.e. transgresses, descrecrates, profanes, injures, outrages, etc. It is thus a negatively connoted force, an evil force in some specified intentional respect. There is a tendency for Taoist commentators, not Taoists, to regard Taoism as condemning all uses, or even occurrences, of force, but this is not so. Rather intentional ill-forcing is what is castigated, what is deviant. Thus Taoism does not exclude a range of defensive practices, which make satisfactory use of natural forces, like letting the machines of war industry stop. Those who would abolish war and its machinery, substituting for it nonwarlike and ideally nonviolent methods, technology, and strategies, have been confronted not merely with much sub-rational abuse but with plenty of criticism and even some paradoxes. Here is a recent paradox concerning war and nonviolence: • War must be abolished. One reason is simply economic. We can no longer afford it, and the opportunity costs are enormous. Along with other extraordinarily wasteful activities, it is an anachronism. • Doing so cannot be accomplished without violence, i.e. in effect, given the types of violence involved, without what amounts to war. According to a fuller version of this premiss, the process of abolishing a war would only be achieved through a revolution so profound that it could not succeed without extensive and extreme violence, amounting to (civil) war. ˚ But then war cannot be abolished without war. Therefore, war which must be abolished cannot be abolished. 6 This “paradox” has been compared with the Liar paradox, but the parallel does not persist far. For this paradox does not involve selfreferential features, and is easily broken, as follows. Let the “last war” be not the last standard war but the revolution abolishing war. Then, given that the revolution is successful, war will be abolished therewith, i.e. with that last war. There need be no regress, given again a successful outcome. All the premisses stand intact, but the conclusion, following the ‘therefore’ is a nonsequitur. However, while the dissolution of the argument is accordingly logically fine, the route is repugnant. Standard pacifism challenges the 6 Brian Medlin, who forcefully propounded this puzzle, set other analogous puzzles alongside it – designed to reveal deep difficulties in contemporary political, and especially alternative, thought. Another puzzle, concerning liberty and repression in the context of capitalism, revolved around the following inconsistent triad: • capitalism must be removed, but liberty retained. • capitalism cannot be removed without repression. • repression is antithetical to liberty. The puzzle is resolved as with the analogous puzzle of abolishing. Let the “last capitalist” action before the days of liberty be the repressive but liberating revolution overthrowing capitalism. �second premiss. 4. Standard and moral pacifism. Although Taoism is strongly opposed to war, and much in favour of peace – and accordingly by prevailing standards a substantially pacific position – it is not (nowhere in the central texts) committed to pacifism in usual senses, for two different reasons:- • It is not, by contrast with pacifism, opposed to all types of warfare, for example smart defensive wars. • It eschews deontology in terms of which moral pacifism is commonly stated, for instance through the watershed thesis P2. It is morally wrong to use violence. By contrast with Taoism, deep environmentalism does not avoid deontic claims, and is committed in principle to nonviolent technologies and ways and to pacifistic principles. Moreover, certain forms of deep environmentalism are completely committed to pacifism, notably European forms. Is deep green? There is heavy contemporary opposition to pacifism, as there also was to Taoism in the warring times when Taoism was first being promulgated. Many of the central institutions of contemporary life are intricated in coercion, violence and war. The most prominent contemporary institutions, states, are premissed on these elements of damaging force; they claim entitlement to use them widely, and even claim a certain territorial monopoly on their use. As a result they are having constantly to engage in them in attempt to maintain that monopoly. They are certainly the main perpetrators of wars, and of violence. They are indeed inured to wars, are in constant preparation for wars, yet propound dialectial (and normally dishonest and cynical) doctrines of peace through war (for a recent example see the appendix). Unremarkably then, the extensive propagandistic machinery of state has invested heavily in “justificatory” exercises in favour of controlled use, its own use, of destructive force, and continues to inveigh against pacifism. Because a routine trick in this sophistical repetoire consists in conflating pacifism with extreme, naive and inplausible, forms, an inevitable and important early task commits in unscrambling senses of ‘pacifism’. Semantical skulduggery can be thwarted in this way. Pacifism, as explained by English dictionaries, invariably concerns wars and warfare, and contains two components, negative and, elaborating on that, positive:- The negative component is, in Arnauld's word, anti-War-ism, opposition (in ways to be further specified) to all forms of warfare (see OED). The positive component supplies alternative ways of settling disputes (what it is supposed that wars with some semblance of justification involve), such as negotiation, arbitration, ... – and, adding to too narrow dictionary accounts – sanctions, substitutions (e.g. of sporting events, operatic contests, cooperative ventures), ... . In brief standard pacifism is opposition to all warfare and resolution of potential wars by other nonmilitary means. �Plainly the opposition to warfare, like the sanctions and so on, cannot itself be military (using soldiers and other devices of war), on pain of some incoherence. But otherwise the ways of opposition can be many and various: they can certainly be active, as with nonviolent demonstrations, resistance movements, and so forth, and they may also be devious (e.g. turning the forces of war upon themselves so they are neutralised). It quickly becomes evident, then, that some of the dictionaries offer but loaded definitions which, by restricting the negative components, reduce the initial appeal and plausibility of pacifism. Consider the Concise English definition of the negative component: ‘the doctrine of non-resistance to hostilities and of total non-co-operation with any form of warfare’. Thereby excluded are forms of pacifism which offer active and plausible alternatives to warfare such as social defence. The Concise English tends to force pacifism into what the Oxford English Dictionary lists as its final item: ‘often, with depreciatory implication, the advocacy of peace at any price’, ‘in any circumstance’. Pacifism can easily resist being forced into these sorts of circumstances: it has many resources, as an extensive series of texts on alternatives to war, such as negotiation, non-violent action and social defence, from Taoism to contemporary environmentalism attest. Academic philosophers have much advanced the semantical strategy of some dictionaries, of rendering pacifism more difficult from the very outset by narrow and biassed definitions. They have stretched the term from its restricted setting of warfare, confined to state and organised gang violence, to cover all forms of violence, from state and interstate to, what is very different, personal and interpersonal violence. Call the resulting considerably stretched notion of pacifism, according to which it is morally wrong to use violence, according to which P2 holds, stretched pacifism.7 While stretched pacifism certainly includes standard pacifism (unless the notions of war and warfare are tampered with), the converse is very far from being the case. A pacifist is in no way committed to stretched pacifism, which is a much more problematic and difficult position than standard pacifism. There are several, substantially different reasons for this, which will be picked up seriatim. Stretched pacifism, also misleadingly called moral pacifism, has looked a very easy critical target to moral philosophers. Many the effusive philosopher who, upon sighting such a target, has charged, whooping such rhetoric as “incoherent”, “inconsistent”, “insensitive”, “fanatical”. However, with improved logical technology now available for accommodating and treating moral dilemmas, it is no great feat to resist such attacks, in the fashion of previous investigations (see esp. AI, also MD). A main aim was to demonstrate that stretched pacifism was not so stupid as it was made out to be or appeared to be to these inured to present dominant violent ways. So far from being stupid, it is viable. In future gentler times stretched pacifism 7 In AI this notion was contrasted with standard pacifism as comprehensive pacifism: overcomprehensive might have been better. �could even be realised for whole communities of creatures (as some genuinely Christian sects envisaged); whence it will finally be seen to be feasible not merely for sages and supermen, and many ordinary women, but much more extensively. The method of philosophical accommodation was through moral dilemmas. The sort of moral dilemma that stretched pacifism can induce derives as follows. On the one side stands the theme P2, Wv, in convenient symbols, for Wrong V-ing, violencing. Now this implies to WB, where B presents a case of of violence. On the other side, particular circumstances develop which lead to W ~B, because ~B would produce in the circumstances considerable wrong, for instance extensive violence, mass murder, etc. One stock example from the literature concerns calling off the firing squad about to shoot several captives if the pacifist shoots one of them (it is elaborated in AI p.13). Interestingly, another stock example from the literature concerns standard pacifism (it can also be presented in terms of patriotism; for details of both see MD p.10). Resolution of intractable moral dilemmas is, where it is required, situational. The agent decides in the situation, within the fix, what to do. There are many ways in which such decision making can proceed, less rational, such as those applying chance or involving bad faith, or more rational, such as those applying consequentialist decision theory (for details see MD, pp.32-9). A decision theory taking account of all that should be included will not however be purely consequential. It would also take account of relevant motivation. This defence and rehabilitation of moral pacifism has been challenged, in particular by Smith (hereafter JWS). JWS claims the defence offered is a ‘failure because it trivializes pacifism’ (p.153 twice). The rehabilitation trivializes pacifism because it entails that pacifism doesn't substantially differ from a form of activism which holds that while violence is always wrong one is sometimes justified on consequentialist grounds for preferring violent acts, if these acts are lesser evils than any other real alternatives. This is the commonsense position which most people hold – yet ... pacifism after all was supposed to be radical moral doctrine ... (p.153 rearranged).8 Part of the criticism is, then, not so much that pacifism is trivialized – JWS “activism” is hardly trivial – as that pacifism is popularised, deflated from a radical position to the commonsense position most people hold (p.154 also). Yet not a shred of evidence is adduced that JWS activism is such a populist position. Available evidence, for example from peace movements and oppositional opinion polls, suggests the very opposite: that, for instance, most people support state-justified conventional wars with the military violence they incur, and 8 JWS now informs me that he has changed his position. Whether the move effects his criticism, I don't know. �accordingly do not hold that violence is always wrong. From such a commonsense angle, pacifism with its condemnation of conventional wars and the violence they involve remains a radical doctrine. As regards wars and other violence-incurring social authorities, contemporary pacificism is, as previous explained (e.g. AI p.3), a form of activism. Pacifism does not imply utter pacifity, but may actively involve social defence, resistance and so on. However a certain level of misrepresentation enters into the JWS challenge in the details of what forms of activism pacifism may include. That misrepresentation begins in the second clause concerning what is said to be sometimes justified. For the situational procedure where dilemmas arise will not generally be consequential applying a principle of lesser evil. In dilemmatic situations such principles are suspended, and such a principle is in any case unacceptable to moral pacifists. A small amount of violence may be less bad in its consequences than verbal offence, but a principled pacifist will choose the slightly greater evil where other obligations do not exclude it. A more serious distortion occurs in JWS's effort to force procedures in dilemma situations into purely consequentialist form. In fact consequential decision theory was deployed as a model only for how to proceed rationally in a situational setting where deontic procedures were suspended (see MD p.38). What was said, still misleadingly retrospective vision reveals, was this: ‘what is done is a very consequentialist thing’ (AI p.13), not ‘one acts in a consequentialist fashion to do the sufficiently good thing in the circumstances’ (JWS p.152). Situationally other procedures than those resembling orthodox rational decision making (modified from maximizing to satisizing objectives) may be adopted ( MD p.38). Further the orthodox consequentialist theory is inadequate because it leaves out, or tries to reduce to consequences, nonconsequential elements, notably motives. It is not difficult, in principle (in advance of attempted consequentialization of motives), to design situations where motives, such as integrity or maintaining faith, enter to yield outcomes upsetting consequential calculations. More elaborate decision making procedures than those of consequentialism, sometimes at variance with consequentialism, are thus presupposed. A further part of JWS's criticism accordingly goes by the board, the alleged appeal ‘to “second best” consequentialist considerations, ... already explicitly condemned’ (p.154). What was condemned was stock universal consequentialism, ‘that only consequentialist considerations carry argumentative weight’ (quoted on p.152), so undercutting other deontic principles, such as those of pacifism. It was not claimed, what is utterly different, that consequentialist considerations can nowhere enter into deliberation and decision making. The conclusion JWS arrives at is therefore substantially astray. After criticising modern moral philosophy for its reliance upon consequentialist modes of thought, it is surprising, and inconsistent, to find ... [reliance] upon such modes of thought to escape logical difficulties raised by moral dilemmas facing ... pacifis[m] (p.152) �There is no inconsistency. JWS has confused universal with particular. As well he has wrongly contracted all situational decision making to consequentialist modes. There is a third part to the criticism, that the defence is too easy; the ‘strategy will allow too much violence to be (perpetrated and) justified to suit the tastes of any real pacifist’ (p.153). This another part of the so-called trivialization, this time however dilution rather than populatization, weakening the moral stand against violence. This third contention is premissed on a mistake: that one can ‘justify on consequentialist grounds any number of violent acts, providing that such acts are lesser evils than other real alternatives facing social agents’ (p.153). Moral pacifism offers no such licence; allowing such consequentialism to take over was never part of the position. The slide to such consequentialism is made on the strength of a similarly erroneous example. The potential victim of an aspiring rapist ‘is supposed to flee or wriggle free if possible. But it is easy to consequentially justify the use of violence by the woman to prevent herself from being raped’ (p.153 italics added). In the example so far described there is no dilemma, and no such easy resort to consequentially ‘justified’ violence. What allows too much violence is the lesser evil JWS assumes is easily consequentially justified; for example that the woman is entitled to inflict, and escalate, violence so long as it remains ‘a lesser evil than the violence of attempted rape’ (p.153). Since she may thereby inflict quite unreasonable damage (esp. if she is a Kung Fu expert), the result is inconsistent with ‘the basic principle of self-defence’ which JWS earlier adduced according to which what is ‘appropriate, in response is only that level of force necessary to defend oneself against the threat’ (p.150). There is evidence in JWS's work of some enthusiasm for levels of violence which exceed his ‘basic principle’, his appeal to ‘lesser evil’ generates some instances. The ‘basic principle’, itself fraught with difficulties (cf. the contorted discussion of what weapons are appropriate in response to what attacks, p.150), still exceeds what stretched pacifism would enjoin; for instance, it may not be appropriate to respond with force. But in a technical sense stretched pacifism is compatible with the ‘basic principle’, since it only imposes the upper bound on level of force. As for easiness, moral pacifism is not an easy position to live by, or to justify. Removing objections to pacifism is one thing; solidifying a positive case for it is quite another, and so far hardly conclusive (as AI tried to explain, pp 29-31). Stretched pacifism was advanced, hypothesized to put it more precisely, as a still viable option. It was not presented as a morally compulsory position, or, for that matter, as one that this defender adhered to or affirmed. To reiterate, while a cumulative case can be made for stetched pacifism as principled non-violence, that case was not conclusive, and is hard to improve. For, further, some serious difficulties standing in the way of stretched pacifism were assembled, the most important of which derives from the extent of violence apparent in transactions within the natural world. Simply consider the practices of carnivores, essential to their natural way of life. In order to meet their life needs for sustenance, these creatures do, and are often obliged to, engage �routinely in violent activity. While it can no doubt be argued, as some vegetarians may do, that the natural order is an immoral order, and that remaining carnivores should be converted to vegetarianism as rapidly as proves possible (in the way domestic dogs are converted to dog biscuits), the difficulties with such proposals are immense. The task envisaged is gigantic, and beyond human capacities – even if it were desirable. For there are millions of species to be somehow converted to proper vegetarianism. Then there are millions of other species to be converted to proper and well regulated contraceptive practices, else their numbers will get out of hand (uncontrollably) with predation removed. Given humans lack of success in limiting their own excessive numbers, such regulation appears entirely remote. Aside however from the practical difficulties, is such a fully vegetarian order, with evolution further derailed, a desirable improvement on the natural order? Is it morally obligatory? It is certainly not obligatory, as alternative systems of morality in harmony with the prevailing natural order are feasible. Nor is it desirable, for (to appeal to such alternative value systems) the natural order is more or less in order as it is. Full vegetarianization would only reduce its value, vastly. More generally, a defensible ethical framework should not, it would be rightly contended, be right out of step with the natural order of other creatures, decently depicted. Decent depiction is important, for some features of the natural order, such as competition, combat and predation, so far from escaping attention, have been grossly exaggerated and exploited. Thus, for instance, the ludicrous picture of nature red in truth and claw, so beloved of descendents of orthodox Victorians and of orthodox economists. However, even under decent depiction, the “natural order” is often not benign. That appears to be enough to induce a supervenient moral dilemma for any stretched pacifism which is coupled to a deep ethic (e.g. which does not separate humans out from the natural order ) and which eschews the desperate vegetarian route: The natural order is not an immoral order The natural order contains (regular) instances of violence. Therefore, instances of violence are not immoral – in apparent defiance of P2 Moreover, there are too many instances of violence, too regularly occurring, for them all to be plausibly shunted into the moral dilemma category (and predatory carnivores face no dilemmas). Raptors that practice violence every week are not immoral (neither are they clearly moral; the category of morality only significantly extends so far). The main trouble lies however with P2 (which needs some finer adjustment, as was alrady indicated in AI ). While P2 is alright in context, within a particular, perfectly viable, ethical framework, designed for the usual human round, the conventional setting for ethical theories, it stands in need of modification outside that setting. It is time to suggest the sort of modification envisaged. Evidently P2 was addressed to moral agents. Which agents? Not to carnivores that supply their own livelihood, nor really to morally degenerate humans, but to �peace-sensitive agents. With that semi-technical form, yet to be characterised, a suitably modified P2 results: MP2. It is morally wrong, for a peace-sensitive agent, to use violence. 9 To recover what amounts, in the previous discussive context, to P2, it suffices to add the proposition that every human agent ought to be peace-sensitive. Much as that proposition has to recommend it, it appears too ethically advanced for many modern humans; it sets too high a moral standard to be taken as a serious guide to practice. It seems wise to settle presently for something less demanding, such as that every advanced moral agent ought to be peace sensitive. To put essentially the same proposition alternatively: Stretched pacifism (as modified) is supererogatory. While it is perhaps too late to hope for much moral progress in humans, it is pleasant to contemplate alternative futures where what is supererogatory became obligatory, and widely practiced. Richard Sylvan10* Appendix I began drafting this essay at the time (January 17, midday Australian time) of the American attacks upon Iraq. The optly named Prime Minister Hawke of Australia had just made a statement to the nation-state, announcing (the) war. In this statement there was much talk of peace. There was even – in what was effectively a declaration of war – reiteration of the modern quest for ‘a new world order of peace’. Peace through war; so it rings out again and again, through the centuries. ‘War must be for the sake of peace’ (Aristotle p.220). More than two thousand years later, we have fought those wars to end all wars. But it is no use, Hawke solemely pronounced, just talking about peace, and thinking about peace; we must work for peace, fight for it – through war. Impeccable logic? President Bush, supreme commander, convinced us with similar logic, speaking too with many tongues. Of how he ‘preferred to think of peace, not war’. But now ‘only force will prevail’, as ‘all reasonable efforts to reach a peaceful solution are exhausted’. ‘What must be done’ must be done, or will be anyway. With God on side with the US offensive (as well as on the other side), it will go well. As it was said to have, though it achieved comparatively little that other efforts may not have yielded more satisfactorily, and thought it may now have to followed with another invasion. Nor have we ever managed to glimpse much of what is now 9 The generalization of P2, suggested in AI, to cover also the parallel situation of environmental vandalism, can be similarly modified. The anti-vandolence principle becomes MP2°. It is morally wrong, for a peace- and environmentally-sensitive agent, to use vandolence. 10 * Thank to David Bennett for joint contributions (from UT) and to JWS for opposition (in JWS) �supposed, when we are no longer engaged, to come ‘out of the horror of war’: a ‘new world order ... which governs the conflict of nations’; a ‘rule of law’, not war. How the one, enforcable law, is achieved, unless backed by the the other, is not explained (Medlin's paradox hits back). Similarly what we now hear from many militarists, as they rush to war, is that ‘peace is a great good, war a great evil’. But, for the most part, only the rhetoric has shifted; practice has scarcely changed at all. REFERENCES W.-T. Chan, A Source Book on Chinese Philosophy, Princeton University Press, 1963; referred to as ST. W.-T. Chan (ed.), The Way of Lao Tzu (Tao-te Ching), Bobbs-Merrill, New York, 1963; referred to as LT. B. Martin, Uprooting War, Freedom Press, London, 1984. A. Naess, Ecology, community and lifestyle, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge UK, 1989. R.A. Rapaport, Pigs for the Ancestors : ritual in the ecology of a New Guinea People, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1967. R. Routley, ‘War and Peace II. On the alleged inconsistency, moral insensitivity and fanaticism of pacifism’, Discussion papers in environmental philosophy #9, Research School of Social Science, Australian National University, 1983 (also in Inquiry ); referred to as AI. R. Routley and V. Plumwood, ‘Moral dilemmas and the logic of deontic notions’, Discussion papers in environmental philosophy #6, Research School of Social Science, Australian National University, 1984 (also in Paraconsistent Logic); referred to as MD. R. Routley, ‘War and Peace I. On the ethics of large-scale nuclear war and nuclear-deterrence and the political fall-out’, Discussion papers in environmental philosophy, #5, Research School Of Social Science, Australian National University, 1984. G. Sharp, Social Power and Political Freedom, Porter Sargent, Boston, 1980. J.W. Smith, The Worms at the Heart of Things , Public Relations Unit, Flinders University, 1989. R. Sylvan, ‘War and Peace III, Australia's defence philosophy’, Social Philosophy, for Nuclear Conference, University of Queensland, 1985. R. Sylvan and D. Bennett, ‘Of Utopias, Tao and Deep Ecology’, Discussion papers in environmental philosophy #19, Research School of Social Science, Australian National University, 1990; referred to as UT. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Draft Papers Description An account of the resource Sylvan's literary executor encountered an archive in which “all his projects were current", since manuscripts were undated and unattributed. Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document ON EXTIRPATING WAR: TAO AND DEEP-GREEN PACIFISM Taoism and deep-green environmental theory, although closely aligned on very many issues, diverge over war. For Taoism, by contrast for instance with Buddhism, is not a pacific doctrine, but is committed to skilful defensive militarism. While it does not espouse a fortress mentality, Taoism certainly condones limited defensive military operations for specific purposes, a sort of guerilla warfare. By contrast, deep-green theory, while acknowledging the role of organised social defence, stands opposed to professional militarism, and thereby to military defence, and is committed to a principled pacifism. Conveniently a route through Taoism, philosophically fascinating in its own right, will lead us to problems of pacifism and towards deep-green theory. 1. Features of a Taoist critique of war and militarism. War did not receive a favourable press in ancient Chinese philosophy. Generally aggression and war were to be avoided. Even Confucius imposed very demanding conditions: for example, ‘when good men have instructed the people [in morals, agriculture, military tactics] for seven years, they may be allowed to bear arms,’ ‘If a ruler ... does not set himself right, even his commands will not be obeyed’ ( SB p.41, italics added). Mo Tzu went much further than Confucius, roundly condemning war – on utilitarian grounds, that war yields no net benefit at any level ( SB p.227). What is more, he backed his heavy condemnation practically (unlike some conspicuous contemporary theoretical utilitarians); ‘he did not hesitate to walk for ten days and ten nights in an effort to dissuade a ruler from making war’ ( SB p.212). But none, it is said, went as far, in a detailed and sophisticated criticism of war, as Lao Tzu; ‘none has condemned war more strongly than Lao Tzu’. ‘[T]he opposition of Taoism to the use of force is well-known, and the most bitter attack on militarism if found in the Lao Tzu’ (Chan, p.154, p.17.) But, after that splendid build-up, the text is slightly disappointing. Lao Tzu does not assert outright that war is an abomination, or even roundly condemn it. His critique of war, militarism, and military technology, is subtle and oblique, and, on the surface, far distanced from pacifism. For he does not recommend an end to war - in that genuine Taoists, those who possess Tao, will never participate in them – but expects wars to continue as unavoidable evils. Worse, he even goes so far as to outline proper attitudes to war and conduct in war, and indeed to suggest military techniques and strategies, some of which look decidedly devious. Among the classical works of Taoism, we focus on the Lao Tzu because, by contrast with other works, a remarkable component of that book is devoted to war and militarism. The apparent deviousness of the tactics Lao Tzu allocates serves to highlight what has been seen as ‘the most troublesome element’ in his philosophy (Chan p.17) – not so much however because they concern military operations, but because they are taken to apply much more widely, ‘to life in general’ (p.17). But why should military activity obtain some special dispensation? Why should what is not tolerated more generally be exonerated there? But given that Taoism has here the virtue of consistency (i.e. uniformity on principles) and of universalizability, that simply leaves more explaining to be done. • Puzzles for Taoism, and wars as unavoidable evils There are two puzzles here in Taoism rather than one. There is the militarypractices paradox, and, varying and generalising on that, there are life-practices paradoxes. The special paradox is generated by the following incompatible elements: on the one side, ‘the most bitter attack on militarism’, the well-known opposition of Taoism to the use of force (p.17) and to the possession and use of smart military weapons and technology – implying that war is far from all right – and on the other, advocacy of certain (devious) military tactics, outlines of (deceitful) conduct in war, and so on – implying that war is all right after all. A straightforward generalisation of this paradox would look at other morally-sensitive parts of life, where some practice was strongly condemned yet engaged in (for many examples, see the dilemmas assembled in MD). But the variation of concern to Chan and the neo-Confucians concerns the conjunction of upright with devious practices in life, in particular in the life of the sage. For a Taoist sage is presumed to lead an upright straightforward life, yet appears to engage in devious and even deceitful practices incompatible with such a life-style. Call this the Taoist-lifestyle paradox. Evidently a good deal of explaining is required, as to how Taoism can coherently take the positions it appears to presume, both on war and peace, and on life more generally. A desirable preliminary would seem to be a little investigation of what position is taken, especially on war and militarism. One key pasage runs: Fine weapons are instruments of evil They are hated by creatures Therefore those who possess the Tao turn away from them. ... Weapons are instruments of evil, not the instruments of a good ruler. When he uses them unavoidably, he regards calm restraint as the best principle Even when he is victorious, he does not regard it as praiseworthy, For to praise victory is to delight in the slaughter of men. He who delights in the slaughter of men will not succeed in the empire. ... For a victory, let us observe the occasion with funeral-ceremonies (LT p.154). Wars, which involve the use of weapons, instruments of evil, are accordingly themselves evil. They are also evil because they involve the slaughter of men. But they are also sometimes unavoidable (also p.152). Therefore such wars are unavoidable evils. Such discourse, obtained by almost immediate inference from the passage, is within the standard orbit of dilemma talk. But Taoism lacks, through deliberately eschewing deontic talk, the discourse which enables direct expression of such dilemmas, or even direct condemnation of wars or of clever weapons. Instead the points are made by circumlocution, what the possesser of Tao does, how the good ruler conducts himself, or by analogy, of victory in war with death. Unavoidable evils are the very stuff of deontic dilemmas (though many theories, underpinned by shonky logic, lack the resources for representing this stuff properly). Where something is unavoidably evil, it is both bad, because evil, and also not bad, doing it is excusable, because it is unavoidable. So, given such an argument (which has its weaknesses), an unavoidable evil is a genuinely dilemmatic object with inconsistent features. Certain wars have looked, since ancient times, like such dilemmatic objects. Revealingly, Chan tries to explain that ‘most troublesome element’ in Taoism, the military-practice paradox, through the following exercise in lateral thinking: It can ... be argued that Lao Tzu uses warfare to illustrate his principles of taking no action and weakness because warfare is among the most dynamic and critical of human experiences, just as the Indian classic, the Bhagavadgita chooses fighting as the theme on which to discuss the terrible dilemma whether one should fulfil his duty, as in the case of a soldier, and kill, or should fail in his duty and refrain from killing (p.17). ‘Just as’? The Indian classic prevents a classic moral dilemma, a dilemma represented in contemporary philosophy (following its rediscovery by Sartre), where there are incompatible duties: the duty to kill, because of one's role as a soldier, and the duty not to kill, because of one's human condition, and the supervenient dilemma of failing in and fulfilling one's duties. These dilemmas for an individual (male, as it then was) are replicated in dilemmas regarding war for group institutions: at bottom, the obligation to engage in war (for one set of compelling reasons) as contraposed with the obligation not to engage in war (for another, perhaps overlapping, set of reasons). A theory of moral dilemmas (as worked out for example in MD) is crucial for an adequate treatment of major issues in war and peace, especially (as will become evident) for a viable strong pacifism. But Taoism, eschewing deontic discourse, lacks the apparatus to state or develop moral dilemmas. Hence it is logically excluded from giving a full or adequate account of what is going on conceptually. One of the philosophically fascinating feature of Taoism is the fashion in which it manages to avoid deontic discourse, and to substitute for direct deontic discourse or improvise circumlocutions when deontic discourse would otherwise appear inevitable (cf. UT for examples). But there are costs. One is inability to display the mechanism of deontic dilemmas, or to show what reasons and argument lie behind Taoist prounouncements and conclusions (the shortage of Taoism on argument is another philosophically conspicious feature, also observed in UT). As conceptual apparatus for analysizing moral dilemmas is missing, most of the machinery involved has to be passed over. Only the outcomes, as Taoism sees them, are presented, as if from a black box. Taoism blacks out the story on deontic dilemmas that deep-green theory can tell, as the following diagram tries to show: Diagrams . Charting the processing of deontic dilemmas that are “resolved”. Deep-green chart: dilemma input Arguments to incompatible prescriptions § Processing of dilemma, directive situational procedures output Corresponding Taoist chart: Black directive Box output input It is evident that Taoism can be extended; information can be put into the Black Box rendering it less opaque. That extension can be made so as to conform to deepgreen theory, i.e. so that the extended Taoist chart, a neo-Daoist chart, looks like the deep-green one. That is indeed essentially how neo-Daoism get characterised, in terms of conformity of the extension to deep ecological theory (see UT). We are now placed to explain how to dissolve, or at least neutralize, the paradoxes deriving from repudiation of militarism, an awkwardly qualified repudiation in the case of Taoism. In a significant sense there is no resolving of genuine deontic dilemmas. The principles delineating the fix may stand, incompatible, signalling the persisting suboptimality (or better, sublimenality) of the dilemmatic situation. Where there is a dilemma, involved parties should try to do well enough in the sublimenal circumstances (for a much fuller account, see MD). Thus where there is a war, itself a non-Taoist process, engaged or caught up Taoists will not abandon Taoism. Taoist methods will be applied, Taoist strategies pursued. So much for theoretical representation and (non-)resolution of life-practices and other dilemmas, details of which are readily elaborated in deep-green extensions of Taoism. A prior substantive issue is whether dilemmas always are generated: not whether wars are evil (typically they are, an issue we shall come to), but whether wars are unavoidable. Analysis of wars does not bear that familiar claim out decisively. Many wars could have been avoided, through conciliation, negotiation, restraint, etc., and no worse results apparently obtained, through sanctions, exchange, trade, etc. Through a typology of wars (coming up) that conjecture can be given some substance. Consider, for instance, what would be walk-overs. Then there is little point in making a military response. So war can be avoided. Certainly an occupation, to be met in a different way, may still occur. And so on, perhaps, for various other types of war. But, more generally, try this:Every war involves an aggressor, who makes an aggressive move. Such an aggressor could always avoid that move, taking a different (or a do-nothing) course of action. Therefore, every war can be avoided. No war is entirely unavoidable. Setting aside determinism (which renders all actual wars along with all other events unavoidable), it could be argued that a war sometimes simply boils up, without an aggressor, an intensification of a conflagatory situation. There are grounds for scepticism regarding such examples; for such intensification can only occur if provocative military moves are made, for instance troops are stationed in provocative or risky positions. The presumption that certain wars are unavoidable typically derives from a onesided perspective on war, a defender's perspective. A defender has no option, so it is routinely averred, but to respond to a determined aggressor. Even if that should be so sometimes, when there is no running away or going underground, it does not establish that such a war is unavoidable; for it neglects the role of the aggressor. By a smarter formulation, relevant features of unavoidability can be captured. Although wars may not be unavoidable, defensive action in wars that have been initiated may be unavoidable. At least such action may be unavoidable if unacceptably high costs (death, enslavement, etc.) are not to be avoided. Thereupon another highly relevant feature emerges: the linkage of avoidability to costs. For whether an action is unavoidable then depends upon what costs a party is prepared to incur before and when insisting on action: but this appears entirely unacceptable. How can what is “unavoidable” cease to be so when some further costs are absorbed? However with basics like survival, a certain liberty, and so on, we do reach such bounds. An important type of unavoidability. We also reach scenarios, unavailable to Lao Tzu but kindly brought within range by modern technology, which may appear to justify aggressive strikes. State Z, while not an aggressor, is carrying out practices which will impose unacceptably high costs upon peoples of other states and implacably refuses to desist. It could, for example, be poisoning air or water flowing to other states. But ,to make the case vivid, let us suppose that state Z is constructing, for reasons Zeders find convincing (they are committed to a faith which depicts all humans as incorrigible sinners and unworthy of life), an effective doomsday machine. Would an (aggressive) preemptory strike designed to disable or destroy the machine be unavoidable? 1 In a sense, No; in another Yes. For different modalities can operate. Physically outsiders need to do nothing, but watch Zeders go about their zealous work. But deontically they are under heavy moral pressure, because of the costs of standing by idly: if the human race is worth anything very substantial, then they are obliged to act, action is deontically 1 Whether it would be justifiable, or just, are separate issues. But it is evident enought that such scenarios further damage the obsolescent idea of just war. For, according to received doctrine, a just war is defensive. (How such a war can be fought at all is another matter; coherence requires relativization to ‘just war for party d’.) unavoidable. Here is a situation where a proposed reduction of deontic logic proves illuminating. Obligation is explicated through not implying, or necessitating, the sanction, i.e. excessive ethical costs such as extermination. Let us explain deontic unavoidability analogously: an action is so unavoidable if not undertaking it would result in excessive ethical costs. Then if it can be established that there is no other way than a military strike, an act of war, to ensure that the Zeders desist (and certainly we can envisage scenarios like that), then that is deontically unavoidable. It is also dilemmatic for those committed to, or inclined towards pacifism; and it is, for them at least, but paradoxically justifiable, as the negation is also justifiable, on pacific grounds. Scenarios like that sketched, that appear to render certain wars deontically unavoidable require but little or no elaboration to render them evil. Evil indeed is such a standard feature of standard wars that at least its great presence call for little supporting evidence. But it has taken to vast stretch of human history to reach this general point of recognition. The manifold evils of war Lao Tzu very early recognised and emphasized: Wherever armies are stationed, briars and thorns grow. Great wars are always followed by famines (p.152). And nowadays followed by great tides of refugees. This passage includes not only recognition of the widely-observed socioenvironmental consequences of war, but, more striking, very early recognition of the severe environmental impact of military forces. That critique is not however developed in Taoism. 2 Only recently has it been pushed substantially further. And only recently could a new, most significant twist occur, the merging of resource security, long a military objective, with environmental security. The appalling idea has recently been floated that the military, in need of new work and roles with the apparent warming of West-East relations and cooling of the Cold War, should exchange usual military idleness for meddling in environmental matters: regulation and policing of environmental resources, ensurance of environmental security of powerful states, and similar. This is a bit like reassigning those imprisoned for child abuse to managing kindergartens; for consider the impressive military record of environmental vandalism. What the military is alleged to offer is a structure appropriate and available for handling such matters. But, to the contrary, it is precisely the sort of hierarchical, authoritarian expensive structure that should be wound down and up as soon as the opportunity appears, as (briefly) now, rather than being retained and shockingly reoriented (as a state-serving “Greenwar”). 2 But a bridge to deep-green theory can be made through neo-Daoism, an updating of Taoism in confirmity with deep ecology (which however is somewhat thin and threadbare on war; for what there is so far, see Naess p.160). On neoDaoism, see UT. 2. On the divergence of deep-green from Taoism. Having arrived, by better or worse arguments, at the conclusion that wars, though generally evil, may be sometimes unavoidable, it is evidently important to say something about how they – those of the theoretical residue – are to be conducted. By appropriate conduct the damage they do may be reduced; also the conduct should be appropriate to the funereal nature of wars (to exceed Taoist resources for stating this sort of point). It is at this stage that deep-green theory begins to diverge from Taoism. In further explaining the Taoist and deep-green critiques of war, and diverting objections to them, a rough and preliminary typology of wars is important. It is also of passing interest in its own philosophical right. War, according to English Dictionaries, is a ‘contest carried on by force of arms, typically between nations or states’. More exactly, war is a game – in the generous technical sense of game-theory, with players, rules, goals, strategies, and so on – carried on in significant part by military means, normally between states or substates. Call the contestants, (warring) parties. They typically represent of course larger populations. The set-up between parties resembles the arrangements of players in game theory. There are several analogical extensions of the term war to cover games where one of the parties is an object, construed as hostile (an enemy of the state), such as Crime, Drugs, Poverty or Nature. These we can set aside as analogical wars. Of course wars form only a part of military activities. Military interests and objectives have always stretched significantly further than war, to include surveillence and security, easily extended to resource security, environmental security and life-style security, and beyond that to political stability and other political matters. Evidently military ambitions have far over-extended themselves in bagging such democratic concerns. An anarchist solution to the whole problem of war, which some have seen Taoism as reaching towards, is immediate: eliminate the source of war, states. Unfortunately it is not quite that simple (and that's not simple). For wars can also occur between nations, cultures, races or tribes (which are not such artifices as states, and not always so readily or desirably abolished), between inhabited regions, and between factions within states (thus civil wars) or, perhaps by extension, between factions within other social structures (thus, for instance, gang wars). But undoubtedly eliminating states and aspiring states would abolish most wars and virtually all the worst wars. While “nonviolent wars” are excluded by definition, by virtue of ‘force of arms’, token wars, limited wars, and so on, are not: for instance, wars fought by small armed teams representing competing sides (cf. medieval and science fiction war games). As wars are hemmed in by conventions and agreed rules, there is no reason in principle why they should not be reduced to two person contests, fought under strict rules like boxing or gladiatorial contests. But in modern times wars have never taken such sensible forms, but have been much larger affairs, making heavy (though fortunately restricted) use of latest technology. Let us distinguish such wars as techno-powered wars. They have, directly or indirectly (for the technology may be bought or bartered), a heavy research and development support structure (indeed the bulk of contemporary science is devoted – misdirected – in one way or another to this effort). Among wars, an important distinction is that between offensive and defensive wars. An offensive war is one which ventures off a given party's territory or recognised pad, “invading” that of another party or parties; correlatively defensive parties, if they have not also invaded. Force projection typifies offensive practice. Plainly, offensiveness and defensiveness are not strictly features of a war, but of parties to a war. In a two-party war, while both parties can easily act offensively, the possibility of both parties proceeding defensively is excluded, unless they share territory. (Even then issues may arise as to which party, if any, was the aggressor, which started it, was responsible for starting it, and so on.) Thus mutually defensive wars between contemporary states are impossible (but would be possible if states shared territory, e.g. if Eire and Britain shared the territory of Northern Ireland). Tao-accredited wars were defensive wars, never wars aiming at domination: last-resort wars, in which no pride was taken ( LT p.152).3 The pretence that offensive wars are defensive is widespread, and reflected in the subterfuge that departments or ministries of war are those of defence, security or whatever. (If they really were what they purport to be, we should be well on the way to an end to war.) Offensive practices are rendered defensive ones by shabby redefinitional strategems, such as redefining ‘defensive’ to include defence of ideals like democracy or liberty, infringed (or allegedly infringed) on territories abroad, or to include “defence” of a third party or place (whence every offensive war is “defensive”). In the present war in which part of Arabia is engulfed (February 1991), one party claims to be defending what really was (or should be) part of its territory, namely Kuwait, another party to be defending (what Kuwait did not enjoy) democracy. It is a doubly offensive war presented in this guise as jointly defensive. Aggressive wars are waged for a variety of reasons, but usually for resources or access to resources or markets, a matter often disguised by appeal to ideology (thus a war for oil is represented as a war of liberation). But there are other reasons than narrowly economic ones, such as religion (as with crusades), power and aggrandisement (as in building an empire), and so on. Nor are those reasons necessarily far separated; ideologies like Marxism and market 3 There is one line in LT that may suggest that attack was sometimes justifiable, namely ‘For deep love helps one to win in the case of attack’ (p.219). But how can compassion be appropriate unless this attack is within a defensive setting, a larger context of unavoidability or such like. A passage shortly below confirms this interpretation: I dare not take the offensive but I take the defensive: I dare not advance an inch but I retreat a foot (p.222). These are advances and attacks within a defensive setting. capitalism, for example, exhibit many of the features of religion. The economic reasons for war appear to have become much more complex with the advent of an integrated world economy. At the same time many of the independent reasons for economic wars are now obsolete. For to powerful states accrue the advantages of war without war. At least most of the former economic advantages of war can be obtained without expensive wars, through trade, institution of economic dependence, etc. Small medieval wars were sometimes instituted for the collection of neighbouring riches and booty, a kind of piracy meeting conditions of war. “Small” contemporary wars can be waged for a remarkable mix of politicaleconomy ends: to establish a regime favourable to economic penetration and profit repatriation, to subjugate markets and to remove competition, to boost a sagging weapons economy by using up old stocks and also testing new equipment, to restart a depressed economy, and so on. Such wars, along with the economic aims which motivate them, are in effect heavily castigated by Lao Tzu: When Tao prevails in the world, galloping horses are turned back to fertilize When Tao does not prevail in the world, war horses (the thrive in fields ...). the suburbs. There is no calamity greater than lavish desires. ( LT p.181). But it does exceed evidential warrant to claim that Tao is not only sufficient, but necessary, for cessation of such practices. The practice of regularly stimulating complex military-saturated economies through war is reminiscent of older, much ridiculed practices in simpler societies. They now ridicule the Tsembaga, who proceeded to destroy much of their surplus product by going to war every 5-15 years (cf Rapaport). But they do not similarly ridicule the most powerful nation on the Earth, the USA, which proceeds to write off a colossal amount of surplus in war every 10-20 years (the Gulf war liquidated some $1.7 billion per day). Taoists would. For ridicule was a favoured method, an important rhetorical strategem, and war and its idiocy were favourite targets. Some classification of defensive wars is also important, for various reasons: reducing and abolishing wars, their costs and damage, restructuring societies away from war and military practices, and, not least, for appreciating Taoism. A main distinction is between • conventional defence, maintained by armies of armed soldiers, many of them professionals, and • social defence, where there are no such armies or but fragments of them, and defence is carried out through social networks of a significant part of society.4 4 Details of social defence are presented in Sharp and in Martin. It is here that Taoism and deep-green theory part company. Under Taoism, the state will have a standing army, but a defensive army operating by strange, surprise tactics (p.201). No doubt defensive wars are to remain last resort action. Nonetheless the state will operate in secrecy, in a way incompatible with decentralised social defence; people will be kept in the dark about smart weapons of the state; and they too will be surprised, along with presumed enemies of the state. By contrast, under deep-green theory, there should be no hidden smart weapons of state; information would flow more freely and not be hidden from the people (who should retain influence in informed decision making). Under deep-green, standing armies, and more generally military organisation, will be wound down altogether. Taoism should have pushed its searching criticism further. For military objectives, easily acquired by standing armies with time on their hands, are frequently incompatible with Taoism. For example, Taoism is opposed to domination ( LT p.152), whereas military operations frequently seek or involve domination; and military structure is invariably hierarchical and authoritarian. Taoism aims for self-regulation, wherever feasible (cf. p.201); so does deep-green theory, which is one reasons why it aims to dispose of standing armies, as an important preliminary to the withering away of states themselves (military forces being major props of state control and power, and often maintained primarily for internal state security). Taoism has no project for ending the era of wars; deepgreen theory does. That project involves an elimination of standing armies, too often poised for fighting or political interference. A recommended route to end war consists in progressive scaling down: reduction of the means and manpower. The initial stages are well-known, and include • elimination of nuclear, biological and chemical weaponry, and • force reduction. It can hardly be pretended that the Earth's states have managed to proceed very far on even this complex of stages. The next stage consists in • contraction to defensive capacities only, and the final stage consists in • elimination of remaining military defensive forces, and adoption, so far as required, of social defence practices. The complete route thus involves complete demilitarisation. Reasons why deep-green aims to proceed the full distance are readily grasped by considering the environmental shallowness of an otherwise cogent traditional case for the sharp curtailment of wars and militarism. The traditional Western case against wars has been primarily along two dimensions: social and moral. Wars are highly disruptive of the social fabric; wars may be unjust. From these joint features, it was argued that wars should be a matter of last resort, to be fought to ensure peace. It was argued further that only just wars should be fought. Just wars were rare objects. But as there was little evidence of the decline and fall of wars, much effort was expended, more practically and unsuccessfully, upon endeavouring to improve the calibre of wars, and more theoretically, upon trying to characterize just war satisfactorily, or rather to bend the notion in an effort to approximate the gory unjust facts. Progress was long hindered, furthermore, because there was always a rival positive perspective on wars, which encouraged the exaltation of wars and military feats. It also facilitated the transfer of the favourable image of war to other problem areas, whence the long and apparently successful war against Nature (but the short-term successes are turning into long-term problems), the short and unsuccessful war against Poverty, and so on. Behind all this is the complex idea of war as rejuvenating, even cleansing, like fire; of war as heroic, and glorious, of war as the supreme testing ground of men. These pictures of war – finally shattered by the first World War (where even the poets began to tell of horrors and atrocities) and subsequent technological wars – though no longer in ascendency, have by no means vanished. The notion of war as rejuvenating a flagging economy persists, along with the practice of keeping capitalism running smoothly by integrating substantial military components into the industrial engine. With the development of highly technological wars – the celebrated development of the dirty industrial age is substantially military – the traditional negative case has grown in strength. Wars have become much more damaging, with the potential for much more that is significantly worse, and the possibility of a just war has correspondingly contracted, virtually to zero. The opposition to war has likewise grown, but more than correspondingly with the rise of women in social and political influence. Wars have almost always and everywhere been Men's affairs; likewise conquest. Deep-green theory accepts much of the traditional negative case, but would further strengthen it. For example, the stricture against unjust wars, as out and out immoral, can be strengthened, through the following syllogism: All wars should be fully just wars. Modern wars cannot be fully just wars. Therefore, there should be no modern wars. A fully just war is not merely a just war, but a war those just character can be reliably forecast in advance. A modern war is of course a war that deploys modern technology, at least that available this century. The evidential basis for the second premiss derives from much information that collateral damage, damage to innocent bystanders and involved citizens is always likely and cannot be excluded. Such wars are always liable to violate uncontroversial requirements for a just war, even if they are purely “conventional” wars, not throwing radiation or chemical or biological weapons around. From a contemporary viewpoint the traditional doctrine of a just war, really of a just defensive war, is seriously out of date. The reasons for this reach wider than the new features introduced by modern technological wars and the character of modern civilization, with its giant cities littered with dangerous and vulnerable military targets. They have also to do with the chauvinism of the justice proposed, which is shallow human justice, not natural or environmental justice. There is no consideration of justice to other creatures or to the Earth (cf Naess p.160). Two troubles are really intertwined here: conceptual difficulties with too narrow a notion of justice, and ideological difficulties with too narrow a vision of what is an object of value, of what counts. The deep-green case against war adds to the traditional case a further dimension, neglected until very recently: the environmental dimension. It has suddenly been seen that wars are typically environmental atrocities. Earlier, of course, “environments” were simply backgrounds, backdrops in paintings and plays, to the real drama. Contemporary technological wars tend to be not merely social tragedies but environmental ones as well. There is a doctrine of just war, but it is a human chauvinistic affair. There is no similarly developed doctrine of an ecologically sound war, a deep ecological war. Unless any such war were literally different from modern wars, that is from contemporary technological wars, it would overstep permitted bounds. For such wars are characteristically ecological disasters. Hardened military people, desensitized by a rigorous unethical training, feel even less compunction about degrading or destroying environments or members of other species than they do of maiming or killing civilians through “collateral” activity. Matching the no-just-war syllogism is a no-sound-war syllogism: All wars should be environmentally sound wars. Modern wars cannot be environmentally sound. Therefore, there should be no modern wars. The argument for the second premiss has of course to be different. It looks to the information accumulating on what wars do to natural and built environments. The Vietnam and Gulf wars both inflicted immense damage on natural environments or what was left of them. The environmental effects of war are not confined to direct and collateral damage. There are indirect effects also. Thus, for instance, war also supplied the mechanism of, and the technology for, modern environmental destruction: explosives, bulldozers from tanks, etc. As well, training for war and engagement in war have much fostered, along with attitudes that make for social callousness or ruthlessness, those that contribute to environmental insensitivity and cruelty. 3. Puzzles about Taoist strategy and its critiques of technology and violence ‘It is surprising how much of the Lao Tzu is devoted to military strategy’. Which strategies? Surprise, above all. But why such strategies? ‘Do they not contradict the Taoists’ strong opposition to the use of force’ (Chan p.222), the implied commitment to quietism? Briefly, Taoism is not committed to quietism, and while certainly antagonistic to violence, does not oppose certain uses of force (only really ill-forcing, as will be explained). Even so, the emphasis on military strategy remains puzzling. The strategies, many of them relevant to social defence, include • seriousness, not ‘making light of the enemy’ (p.222) • surprise, and nonvisibility (p.201). The defensive strategy involves guerilla tactics: marching without formation, holding weapons without seeming to have them, confronting enemies without seeming to meet them (p.222). But even in times of peace, ‘smart weapons of the state should not be displayed to the people’ (p.164). Such recommendations helped to fuel the charge of deviousness lodged against Lao Tzu. But look at part of the reason for concealing smart weapons: ‘The more smart weapons the people have, the more troubled the state will be’ (p.201). Smart weapons are carried in corrupt states, where the rich engage in conspicuous consumption and the people are suppressed, not where Tao is practiced ( LT p.194). • advance from weakness, flexibility but firmness. Weakness is the principle of life and will overcome strength ( LT p.164, p.233). • coolness and non-competition (LT p.233, p.164). Like these, most of the general strategies are standard Taoist practices simply applied to military conduct. For these standard practices the charge of deviousness looks feeble. The response applies more generally to other allegedly devious political strategies. For the strategies are but application of Taoist principles and techniques to warfare, politics and elsewhere. Nothing excludes application of these techniques to what are accounted, in general, unnecessary evils (which must sometimes, on other Taoist grounds, be countered). Nor, to meet the main criticism, need any deceit or deviousness be involved; nor is it. In particular, the legalist tactic, ‘In order to grasp, it is necessary first to give’ (LT p.164), is cited as involving ‘an element of deceit’ ‘undeniably’, and ‘worse’ it is ‘morally questionable’ (Chan p.17). But in order for me to grasp your hand in a normal handshake, it is necessary first for me to give my hand. There is no deceit here, nothing morally questionable. All the tactics permit of benign construals, of a Taoist kind. Consider, for instance, ‘In order to contract, it is necessary first to expand’ (LT p.164). In order to bend a copper pipe to the intended angle, it is better to bend it first a little further than required. The transformation of water to ice (both favoured natural items for symbolic purposes: natural processes which may look devious!) neatly illustrates the Taoist principle (which is however hardly necessary), and shows softness and weakness turned hardness and strength. The Taoist critique of militarism is as much a critique of technology as of war. Sharp weapons, ‘smart weapons’ as we might now say, come in for much critical attention, as we have already noticed. Only in corrupt and degenerate states are they displayed or flaunted (p.194, p.164); in deep-green regions smart weapons of state’ would not be retained unexhibited. The people will not have them for they mean trouble (p.201); for similar reasons deep-green regions will be free of them. So, it seems, will ideal Taoist regions: ‘Even if there are arrows and weapons, none will display them’ ( LT p.238). Much technology, military and other, is excluded under the Taoist edict against violence (a further facet of the military-practices paradox).5 The powerful critique of militarism in the Tao-te Ching is coupled with strong opposition to violence. Some of the linkage is evident enough. Militarism as practised represents an ultimate form of state (or party) violence. A basic theme is that violent practices will come to an unnatural end, and accordingly to a non-Taoist end (generalising LT p.176). While force may occur in spectacular, but satisfactory, natural forms, force is duly distinguished from violence. To force the growth of life means ill omen. For the mind to employ the vital force without restraint means violence (LT p.197). One who follows Tao does not apply dominating force, which usually has had results bringing requital (p.152). Dominating force, like power, is in general castigated, under doctrine of wu-wei, no forced actions, no violence. To force natural growth is deviant, destroying harmony. To stop natural growth is deviant. But there is a significant difference between force and violence. To intentionally employ destructive force is to do violence. To so force things is condemned. To remain in harmony with things one does not so force things or practice violence. There is a non-interference principle at work, which also indicates types of non-interference that are excluded. However Taoism does not always get the distinction between force and violence quite 5 Under contemporary technology and technological arrangements, such as the storage of quantities of oil and nuclear and chemical materials in great cities, wars have assumed new and very destructive dimensions, to the point of being utterly irresponsible. A different approach to technology, as to war, is now mandatory. These are no longer things that can in principle be nicely confined and need not touch parties outside the fray. An important part of ending wars, “winning the war against wars”, is removing the technology of war, above all from irresponsible state power. As for which technology to try to jettison and which to try to retain or improve, it is not so difficult to indicate, provided evaluative terminology is not outlawed. What is wanted is technology that is good in its place, what should be excluded is technology that is indifferent or bad or potentially so. Technology to be justified has to do something worthwhile, it has to address identifiable respectable needs. That is why merely indifferent technology is out; there is no virtue in technology for technology's sake, as it is a mere means technique. It is because of the crucial evaluative component in choice of technology that appropriateness, itself evaluative, comes closer to encapsulating the criterion than other recent efforts. Size, such as smallness, or intermediateness, are not what matter, though modest and not excessive technologies are likely to fare better in satisfying appropriateness. In simpler societies, small technology is of course more appropriate; for that is what is good there. From known criteria for what is good these other features for locally appropriate technology can be read off: reliability, esp. in maintenance, functioning well and safely under the expected range of operating conditions (which may be difficult), ease of repair, capital cheapness and repair inexpensiveness, environmental benignness, and meeting sound social needs. right. ‘Vital force without restraint’, intentionally excessive force, is only part of what counts as violence, which is more generally force which violates, i.e. transgresses, descrecrates, profanes, injures, outrages, etc. It is thus a negatively connoted force, an evil force in some specified intentional respect. There is a tendency for Taoist commentators, not Taoists, to regard Taoism as condemning all uses, or even occurrences, of force, but this is not so. Rather intentional ill-forcing is what is castigated, what is deviant. Thus Taoism does not exclude a range of defensive practices, which make satisfactory use of natural forces, like letting the machines of war industry stop. Those who would abolish war and its machinery, substituting for it nonwarlike and ideally nonviolent methods, technology, and strategies, have been confronted not merely with much sub-rational abuse but with plenty of criticism and even some paradoxes. Here is a recent paradox concerning war and nonviolence: • War must be abolished. One reason is simply economic. We can no longer afford it, and the opportunity costs are enormous. Along with other extraordinarily wasteful activities, it is an anachronism. • Doing so cannot be accomplished without violence, i.e. in effect, given the types of violence involved, without what amounts to war. According to a fuller version of this premiss, the process of abolishing a war would only be achieved through a revolution so profound that it could not succeed without extensive and extreme violence, amounting to (civil) war. ˚ But then war cannot be abolished without war. Therefore, war which must be abolished cannot be abolished. 6 This “paradox” has been compared with the Liar paradox, but the parallel does not persist far. For this paradox does not involve selfreferential features, and is easily broken, as follows. Let the “last war” be not the last standard war but the revolution abolishing war. Then, given that the revolution is successful, war will be abolished therewith, i.e. with that last war. There need be no regress, given again a successful outcome. All the premisses stand intact, but the conclusion, following the ‘therefore’ is a nonsequitur. However, while the dissolution of the argument is accordingly logically fine, the route is repugnant. Standard pacifism challenges the 6 Brian Medlin, who forcefully propounded this puzzle, set other analogous puzzles alongside it – designed to reveal deep difficulties in contemporary political, and especially alternative, thought. Another puzzle, concerning liberty and repression in the context of capitalism, revolved around the following inconsistent triad: • capitalism must be removed, but liberty retained. • capitalism cannot be removed without repression. • repression is antithetical to liberty. The puzzle is resolved as with the analogous puzzle of abolishing. Let the “last capitalist” action before the days of liberty be the repressive but liberating revolution overthrowing capitalism. second premiss. 4. Standard and moral pacifism. Although Taoism is strongly opposed to war, and much in favour of peace – and accordingly by prevailing standards a substantially pacific position – it is not (nowhere in the central texts) committed to pacifism in usual senses, for two different reasons:- • It is not, by contrast with pacifism, opposed to all types of warfare, for example smart defensive wars. • It eschews deontology in terms of which moral pacifism is commonly stated, for instance through the watershed thesis P2. It is morally wrong to use violence. By contrast with Taoism, deep environmentalism does not avoid deontic claims, and is committed in principle to nonviolent technologies and ways and to pacifistic principles. Moreover, certain forms of deep environmentalism are completely committed to pacifism, notably European forms. Is deep green? There is heavy contemporary opposition to pacifism, as there also was to Taoism in the warring times when Taoism was first being promulgated. Many of the central institutions of contemporary life are intricated in coercion, violence and war. The most prominent contemporary institutions, states, are premissed on these elements of damaging force; they claim entitlement to use them widely, and even claim a certain territorial monopoly on their use. As a result they are having constantly to engage in them in attempt to maintain that monopoly. They are certainly the main perpetrators of wars, and of violence. They are indeed inured to wars, are in constant preparation for wars, yet propound dialectial (and normally dishonest and cynical) doctrines of peace through war (for a recent example see the appendix). Unremarkably then, the extensive propagandistic machinery of state has invested heavily in “justificatory” exercises in favour of controlled use, its own use, of destructive force, and continues to inveigh against pacifism. Because a routine trick in this sophistical repetoire consists in conflating pacifism with extreme, naive and inplausible, forms, an inevitable and important early task commits in unscrambling senses of ‘pacifism’. Semantical skulduggery can be thwarted in this way. Pacifism, as explained by English dictionaries, invariably concerns wars and warfare, and contains two components, negative and, elaborating on that, positive:- The negative component is, in Arnauld's word, anti-War-ism, opposition (in ways to be further specified) to all forms of warfare (see OED). The positive component supplies alternative ways of settling disputes (what it is supposed that wars with some semblance of justification involve), such as negotiation, arbitration, ... – and, adding to too narrow dictionary accounts – sanctions, substitutions (e.g. of sporting events, operatic contests, cooperative ventures), ... . In brief standard pacifism is opposition to all warfare and resolution of potential wars by other nonmilitary means. Plainly the opposition to warfare, like the sanctions and so on, cannot itself be military (using soldiers and other devices of war), on pain of some incoherence. But otherwise the ways of opposition can be many and various: they can certainly be active, as with nonviolent demonstrations, resistance movements, and so forth, and they may also be devious (e.g. turning the forces of war upon themselves so they are neutralised). It quickly becomes evident, then, that some of the dictionaries offer but loaded definitions which, by restricting the negative components, reduce the initial appeal and plausibility of pacifism. Consider the Concise English definition of the negative component: ‘the doctrine of non-resistance to hostilities and of total non-co-operation with any form of warfare’. Thereby excluded are forms of pacifism which offer active and plausible alternatives to warfare such as social defence. The Concise English tends to force pacifism into what the Oxford English Dictionary lists as its final item: ‘often, with depreciatory implication, the advocacy of peace at any price’, ‘in any circumstance’. Pacifism can easily resist being forced into these sorts of circumstances: it has many resources, as an extensive series of texts on alternatives to war, such as negotiation, non-violent action and social defence, from Taoism to contemporary environmentalism attest. Academic philosophers have much advanced the semantical strategy of some dictionaries, of rendering pacifism more difficult from the very outset by narrow and biassed definitions. They have stretched the term from its restricted setting of warfare, confined to state and organised gang violence, to cover all forms of violence, from state and interstate to, what is very different, personal and interpersonal violence. Call the resulting considerably stretched notion of pacifism, according to which it is morally wrong to use violence, according to which P2 holds, stretched pacifism.7 While stretched pacifism certainly includes standard pacifism (unless the notions of war and warfare are tampered with), the converse is very far from being the case. A pacifist is in no way committed to stretched pacifism, which is a much more problematic and difficult position than standard pacifism. There are several, substantially different reasons for this, which will be picked up seriatim. Stretched pacifism, also misleadingly called moral pacifism, has looked a very easy critical target to moral philosophers. Many the effusive philosopher who, upon sighting such a target, has charged, whooping such rhetoric as “incoherent”, “inconsistent”, “insensitive”, “fanatical”. However, with improved logical technology now available for accommodating and treating moral dilemmas, it is no great feat to resist such attacks, in the fashion of previous investigations (see esp. AI, also MD). A main aim was to demonstrate that stretched pacifism was not so stupid as it was made out to be or appeared to be to these inured to present dominant violent ways. So far from being stupid, it is viable. In future gentler times stretched pacifism 7 In AI this notion was contrasted with standard pacifism as comprehensive pacifism: overcomprehensive might have been better. could even be realised for whole communities of creatures (as some genuinely Christian sects envisaged); whence it will finally be seen to be feasible not merely for sages and supermen, and many ordinary women, but much more extensively. The method of philosophical accommodation was through moral dilemmas. The sort of moral dilemma that stretched pacifism can induce derives as follows. On the one side stands the theme P2, Wv, in convenient symbols, for Wrong V-ing, violencing. Now this implies to WB, where B presents a case of of violence. On the other side, particular circumstances develop which lead to W ~B, because ~B would produce in the circumstances considerable wrong, for instance extensive violence, mass murder, etc. One stock example from the literature concerns calling off the firing squad about to shoot several captives if the pacifist shoots one of them (it is elaborated in AI p.13). Interestingly, another stock example from the literature concerns standard pacifism (it can also be presented in terms of patriotism; for details of both see MD p.10). Resolution of intractable moral dilemmas is, where it is required, situational. The agent decides in the situation, within the fix, what to do. There are many ways in which such decision making can proceed, less rational, such as those applying chance or involving bad faith, or more rational, such as those applying consequentialist decision theory (for details see MD, pp.32-9). A decision theory taking account of all that should be included will not however be purely consequential. It would also take account of relevant motivation. This defence and rehabilitation of moral pacifism has been challenged, in particular by Smith (hereafter JWS). JWS claims the defence offered is a ‘failure because it trivializes pacifism’ (p.153 twice). The rehabilitation trivializes pacifism because it entails that pacifism doesn't substantially differ from a form of activism which holds that while violence is always wrong one is sometimes justified on consequentialist grounds for preferring violent acts, if these acts are lesser evils than any other real alternatives. This is the commonsense position which most people hold – yet ... pacifism after all was supposed to be radical moral doctrine ... (p.153 rearranged).8 Part of the criticism is, then, not so much that pacifism is trivialized – JWS “activism” is hardly trivial – as that pacifism is popularised, deflated from a radical position to the commonsense position most people hold (p.154 also). Yet not a shred of evidence is adduced that JWS activism is such a populist position. Available evidence, for example from peace movements and oppositional opinion polls, suggests the very opposite: that, for instance, most people support state-justified conventional wars with the military violence they incur, and 8 JWS now informs me that he has changed his position. Whether the move effects his criticism, I don't know. accordingly do not hold that violence is always wrong. From such a commonsense angle, pacifism with its condemnation of conventional wars and the violence they involve remains a radical doctrine. As regards wars and other violence-incurring social authorities, contemporary pacificism is, as previous explained (e.g. AI p.3), a form of activism. Pacifism does not imply utter pacifity, but may actively involve social defence, resistance and so on. However a certain level of misrepresentation enters into the JWS challenge in the details of what forms of activism pacifism may include. That misrepresentation begins in the second clause concerning what is said to be sometimes justified. For the situational procedure where dilemmas arise will not generally be consequential applying a principle of lesser evil. In dilemmatic situations such principles are suspended, and such a principle is in any case unacceptable to moral pacifists. A small amount of violence may be less bad in its consequences than verbal offence, but a principled pacifist will choose the slightly greater evil where other obligations do not exclude it. A more serious distortion occurs in JWS's effort to force procedures in dilemma situations into purely consequentialist form. In fact consequential decision theory was deployed as a model only for how to proceed rationally in a situational setting where deontic procedures were suspended (see MD p.38). What was said, still misleadingly retrospective vision reveals, was this: ‘what is done is a very consequentialist thing’ (AI p.13), not ‘one acts in a consequentialist fashion to do the sufficiently good thing in the circumstances’ (JWS p.152). Situationally other procedures than those resembling orthodox rational decision making (modified from maximizing to satisizing objectives) may be adopted ( MD p.38). Further the orthodox consequentialist theory is inadequate because it leaves out, or tries to reduce to consequences, nonconsequential elements, notably motives. It is not difficult, in principle (in advance of attempted consequentialization of motives), to design situations where motives, such as integrity or maintaining faith, enter to yield outcomes upsetting consequential calculations. More elaborate decision making procedures than those of consequentialism, sometimes at variance with consequentialism, are thus presupposed. A further part of JWS's criticism accordingly goes by the board, the alleged appeal ‘to “second best” consequentialist considerations, ... already explicitly condemned’ (p.154). What was condemned was stock universal consequentialism, ‘that only consequentialist considerations carry argumentative weight’ (quoted on p.152), so undercutting other deontic principles, such as those of pacifism. It was not claimed, what is utterly different, that consequentialist considerations can nowhere enter into deliberation and decision making. The conclusion JWS arrives at is therefore substantially astray. After criticising modern moral philosophy for its reliance upon consequentialist modes of thought, it is surprising, and inconsistent, to find ... [reliance] upon such modes of thought to escape logical difficulties raised by moral dilemmas facing ... pacifis[m] (p.152) There is no inconsistency. JWS has confused universal with particular. As well he has wrongly contracted all situational decision making to consequentialist modes. There is a third part to the criticism, that the defence is too easy; the ‘strategy will allow too much violence to be (perpetrated and) justified to suit the tastes of any real pacifist’ (p.153). This another part of the so-called trivialization, this time however dilution rather than populatization, weakening the moral stand against violence. This third contention is premissed on a mistake: that one can ‘justify on consequentialist grounds any number of violent acts, providing that such acts are lesser evils than other real alternatives facing social agents’ (p.153). Moral pacifism offers no such licence; allowing such consequentialism to take over was never part of the position. The slide to such consequentialism is made on the strength of a similarly erroneous example. The potential victim of an aspiring rapist ‘is supposed to flee or wriggle free if possible. But it is easy to consequentially justify the use of violence by the woman to prevent herself from being raped’ (p.153 italics added). In the example so far described there is no dilemma, and no such easy resort to consequentially ‘justified’ violence. What allows too much violence is the lesser evil JWS assumes is easily consequentially justified; for example that the woman is entitled to inflict, and escalate, violence so long as it remains ‘a lesser evil than the violence of attempted rape’ (p.153). Since she may thereby inflict quite unreasonable damage (esp. if she is a Kung Fu expert), the result is inconsistent with ‘the basic principle of self-defence’ which JWS earlier adduced according to which what is ‘appropriate, in response is only that level of force necessary to defend oneself against the threat’ (p.150). There is evidence in JWS's work of some enthusiasm for levels of violence which exceed his ‘basic principle’, his appeal to ‘lesser evil’ generates some instances. The ‘basic principle’, itself fraught with difficulties (cf. the contorted discussion of what weapons are appropriate in response to what attacks, p.150), still exceeds what stretched pacifism would enjoin; for instance, it may not be appropriate to respond with force. But in a technical sense stretched pacifism is compatible with the ‘basic principle’, since it only imposes the upper bound on level of force. As for easiness, moral pacifism is not an easy position to live by, or to justify. Removing objections to pacifism is one thing; solidifying a positive case for it is quite another, and so far hardly conclusive (as AI tried to explain, pp 29-31). Stretched pacifism was advanced, hypothesized to put it more precisely, as a still viable option. It was not presented as a morally compulsory position, or, for that matter, as one that this defender adhered to or affirmed. To reiterate, while a cumulative case can be made for stetched pacifism as principled non-violence, that case was not conclusive, and is hard to improve. For, further, some serious difficulties standing in the way of stretched pacifism were assembled, the most important of which derives from the extent of violence apparent in transactions within the natural world. Simply consider the practices of carnivores, essential to their natural way of life. In order to meet their life needs for sustenance, these creatures do, and are often obliged to, engage routinely in violent activity. While it can no doubt be argued, as some vegetarians may do, that the natural order is an immoral order, and that remaining carnivores should be converted to vegetarianism as rapidly as proves possible (in the way domestic dogs are converted to dog biscuits), the difficulties with such proposals are immense. The task envisaged is gigantic, and beyond human capacities – even if it were desirable. For there are millions of species to be somehow converted to proper vegetarianism. Then there are millions of other species to be converted to proper and well regulated contraceptive practices, else their numbers will get out of hand (uncontrollably) with predation removed. Given humans lack of success in limiting their own excessive numbers, such regulation appears entirely remote. Aside however from the practical difficulties, is such a fully vegetarian order, with evolution further derailed, a desirable improvement on the natural order? Is it morally obligatory? It is certainly not obligatory, as alternative systems of morality in harmony with the prevailing natural order are feasible. Nor is it desirable, for (to appeal to such alternative value systems) the natural order is more or less in order as it is. Full vegetarianization would only reduce its value, vastly. More generally, a defensible ethical framework should not, it would be rightly contended, be right out of step with the natural order of other creatures, decently depicted. Decent depiction is important, for some features of the natural order, such as competition, combat and predation, so far from escaping attention, have been grossly exaggerated and exploited. Thus, for instance, the ludicrous picture of nature red in truth and claw, so beloved of descendents of orthodox Victorians and of orthodox economists. However, even under decent depiction, the “natural order” is often not benign. That appears to be enough to induce a supervenient moral dilemma for any stretched pacifism which is coupled to a deep ethic (e.g. which does not separate humans out from the natural order ) and which eschews the desperate vegetarian route: The natural order is not an immoral order The natural order contains (regular) instances of violence. Therefore, instances of violence are not immoral – in apparent defiance of P2 Moreover, there are too many instances of violence, too regularly occurring, for them all to be plausibly shunted into the moral dilemma category (and predatory carnivores face no dilemmas). Raptors that practice violence every week are not immoral (neither are they clearly moral; the category of morality only significantly extends so far). The main trouble lies however with P2 (which needs some finer adjustment, as was alrady indicated in AI ). While P2 is alright in context, within a particular, perfectly viable, ethical framework, designed for the usual human round, the conventional setting for ethical theories, it stands in need of modification outside that setting. It is time to suggest the sort of modification envisaged. Evidently P2 was addressed to moral agents. Which agents? Not to carnivores that supply their own livelihood, nor really to morally degenerate humans, but to peace-sensitive agents. With that semi-technical form, yet to be characterised, a suitably modified P2 results: MP2. It is morally wrong, for a peace-sensitive agent, to use violence. 9 To recover what amounts, in the previous discussive context, to P2, it suffices to add the proposition that every human agent ought to be peace-sensitive. Much as that proposition has to recommend it, it appears too ethically advanced for many modern humans; it sets too high a moral standard to be taken as a serious guide to practice. It seems wise to settle presently for something less demanding, such as that every advanced moral agent ought to be peace sensitive. To put essentially the same proposition alternatively: Stretched pacifism (as modified) is supererogatory. While it is perhaps too late to hope for much moral progress in humans, it is pleasant to contemplate alternative futures where what is supererogatory became obligatory, and widely practiced. Richard Sylvan10* Appendix I began drafting this essay at the time (January 17, midday Australian time) of the American attacks upon Iraq. The optly named Prime Minister Hawke of Australia had just made a statement to the nation-state, announcing (the) war. In this statement there was much talk of peace. There was even – in what was effectively a declaration of war – reiteration of the modern quest for ‘a new world order of peace’. Peace through war; so it rings out again and again, through the centuries. ‘War must be for the sake of peace’ (Aristotle p.220). More than two thousand years later, we have fought those wars to end all wars. But it is no use, Hawke solemely pronounced, just talking about peace, and thinking about peace; we must work for peace, fight for it – through war. Impeccable logic? President Bush, supreme commander, convinced us with similar logic, speaking too with many tongues. Of how he ‘preferred to think of peace, not war’. But now ‘only force will prevail’, as ‘all reasonable efforts to reach a peaceful solution are exhausted’. ‘What must be done’ must be done, or will be anyway. With God on side with the US offensive (as well as on the other side), it will go well. As it was said to have, though it achieved comparatively little that other efforts may not have yielded more satisfactorily, and thought it may now have to followed with another invasion. Nor have we ever managed to glimpse much of what is now 9 The generalization of P2, suggested in AI, to cover also the parallel situation of environmental vandalism, can be similarly modified. The anti-vandolence principle becomes MP2°. It is morally wrong, for a peace- and environmentally-sensitive agent, to use vandolence. 10 * Thank to David Bennett for joint contributions (from UT) and to JWS for opposition (in JWS) supposed, when we are no longer engaged, to come ‘out of the horror of war’: a ‘new world order ... which governs the conflict of nations’; a ‘rule of law’, not war. How the one, enforcable law, is achieved, unless backed by the the other, is not explained (Medlin's paradox hits back). Similarly what we now hear from many militarists, as they rush to war, is that ‘peace is a great good, war a great evil’. But, for the most part, only the rhetoric has shifted; practice has scarcely changed at all. REFERENCES W.-T. Chan, A Source Book on Chinese Philosophy, Princeton University Press, 1963; referred to as ST. W.-T. Chan (ed.), The Way of Lao Tzu (Tao-te Ching), Bobbs-Merrill, New York, 1963; referred to as LT. B. Martin, Uprooting War, Freedom Press, London, 1984. A. Naess, Ecology, community and lifestyle, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge UK, 1989. R.A. Rapaport, Pigs for the Ancestors : ritual in the ecology of a New Guinea People, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1967. R. Routley, ‘War and Peace II. On the alleged inconsistency, moral insensitivity and fanaticism of pacifism’, Discussion papers in environmental philosophy #9, Research School of Social Science, Australian National University, 1983 (also in Inquiry ); referred to as AI. R. Routley and V. Plumwood, ‘Moral dilemmas and the logic of deontic notions’, Discussion papers in environmental philosophy #6, Research School of Social Science, Australian National University, 1984 (also in Paraconsistent Logic); referred to as MD. R. Routley, ‘War and Peace I. On the ethics of large-scale nuclear war and nuclear-deterrence and the political fall-out’, Discussion papers in environmental philosophy, #5, Research School Of Social Science, Australian National University, 1984. G. Sharp, Social Power and Political Freedom, Porter Sargent, Boston, 1980. J.W. Smith, The Worms at the Heart of Things , Public Relations Unit, Flinders University, 1989. R. Sylvan, ‘War and Peace III, Australia's defence philosophy’, Social Philosophy, for Nuclear Conference, University of Queensland, 1985. R. Sylvan and D. Bennett, ‘Of Utopias, Tao and Deep Ecology’, Discussion papers in environmental philosophy #19, Research School of Social Science, Australian National University, 1990; referred to as UT.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Box 77, Item 1: Draft of On extirpating war: Tao and deep-green pacifism Subject The topic of the resource Previous title of paper: War and peace IV: Tao and deep-green. Description An account of the resource Paper from floppy disk containing 21 files. Directory and file name: war and peace I V\on extirpating war tao & depgre.pdf. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/browse?search=Richard+Sylvan&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bjoiner%5D=and&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=&amp;range=&amp;collection=&amp;type=&amp;user=&amp;tags=&amp;public=&amp;featured=&amp;exhibit=&amp;geolocation-mapped=&amp;geolocation-address=&amp;geolocation-latitude=&amp;geolocation-longitude=&amp;geolocation-radius=10&amp;submit_search=Search+for+items">Richard Sylvan</a> Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived <span class="MuiTypography-root-125 MuiTypography-body2-126">The University of Queensland's <a data-testid="rek-series" href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/records/search?page=1&amp;pageSize=20&amp;sortBy=score&amp;sortDirection=Desc&amp;searchQueryParams%5Brek_series%5D%5Bvalue%5D=Richard+Sylvan+Papers%2C+UQFL291&amp;searchMode=advanced">Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291</a></span>, Box 77, Item 1 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org">Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy</a> Contributor An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource <span>This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, </span><a href="https://najtaylor.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Dr. N.A.J. 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Type The nature or genre of the resource Manuscript Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context <a href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:3c66dd9">https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:3c66dd9</a> Coverage The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant n/a - not listed in manuscript finding aid Box 77: Untitled and Unlisted Boxes https://www.antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/55fb7770f181791e005281a8636a1abd.pdf 1ed72ad17f186317bccf30e6630b50d8 PDF Text Text RBSTRRCT The proposed syntheses Ls set Mithin generat object-theorg. tde3 The undertging the sgnthesis ts that the 3tternative Mortds sewantics - arrived 3t tn of pursuit of a tnctudtng senanttes universat ones) retevant and, semantics generat (a as connectedLg, part for of att a Languages, comprehensive object-theorg - be apptted atso tn fundamentat phgstcs, Most importanttg to the natter of the ortgtn, htstorg, 3nd phgstcat features of the cosmos, but as Mett, agatn connectedtg, theorg. etseMhere, Ln particutar Ln the LnterpretatLon of quantum a The unLversat semantics Ls a mang Mortds - theorg. The poLnt of such apptgLng an mang nonexistent Mortds - LnterpretatLon Ln cosmotogg atso Ls exptained bg Mag of examp Les, concernLng the understandLng of the contLngencg of exLstence and of present arrangements. improbabititg the R resotutton of the basLc question, sketched, a as Marm-up exerctse 'Nhg does angthLng at for exLst?' att questions as to Mhg various other the prominent features of the universe are as theg are, notabtg Mhg the constants of phgstcs appear to have. have the fundamentat parttcutar surprtstngtg senstttve vatues theg Chauvinistic ansMers through anthroptc prLnctptes are crLttcattg Ln favour of resotutLon bg Mag of Mortd sgntactLcattg, status quo arguments, MhLch use setection^ and gross rejected, correspondLng features geophgsLcat thLs and neLghbourLng unLverses to exp La Ln the surprLsLng vatues of The character of the Mortd—sgnthests resotutton - reaLLg a resotutton Ls ts of constants. frameMork fLLLed out Ln the course of countering a Mide SMeep of objections, and of exp La LnLng Mhg the resotutton frameMork invotving seLeet ion satisfactorg of the main tgpes LLLustrated in the four-fotd: is the most �IMPROVED CO3MO-LOCICRL 3YMTHE3I3 TOWRRD RH There Logicai is a foundations tradition persistent - impiging simpLe and get undiscovered - for the whoLe of cosmoLogg. The as tradition, which peaked in modern rationaiism, continues strong in cosmoLogicai specuLation. unassaiiabLe Thus, contemporarg for exampLe, recent rationaiistic theories of the universe, ambitiousLg aimed at mathematico-iogicai expression and capture of nature. Thus, of MheeLer: for exampLe, the bottom Line to the mang theoreticaL enterprises LittLe astonishment shouLd there be, therefore, if the description of nature carries one in the end to Logic, the ethereat egrie at the center of mathematics. If, as one beiieves, aLL mathematics reduces to the mathematics of Logic, and aLL phgsics reduces to mathematics, what aLtemative is there but for aLL phgsics to reduce to the mathematics of Log ic ? Logic is the ontg branch of mathematics that can think about itse Lf'. Logic reassumes its ancient roLe 3S the fundamentaL science; the Mord expresses a LogicaL recipe. Even white abandoning some of the it Lus ions of grand reduct ion istic schemes, and undermining the EnLightenment power guest for the LogicaL the theoreticaL capture and can The sgnthesis outiined in setting. contribute what foLLows LiberaLised bg are semantics and to the organisation of a unified fits into this more modest It is achieved bg suitabig reLocating cosmoLogg as a part of semantics (generousig construed, for exampie, to admit contextuaL eLements). then, to controt of the universe, there is much of a more modest character that recent LogicaL theorg, as nonstandard sgstematisation, worid picture. kegs universaL So unified, semantics, re Levant semantics and cosmoLogg, as suggested in a preLiminarg wag in diagram 1. �RCTURL X L ORLD(S) GEOPHYSICRL SYSTEMS SUBSPRCE PHYSICRL SYSTEMS SUBSPRCE RELEVRHT SYSTEMS SUBSPRCE MORLD SPRCE Comment. The subspaces are Marked out by ctosure and other requirements, that of by cLosure of each worLd under deducibiLity (reLevant deriva— systems reLevant biLity), that of physicaL systems by cLosure aLso under physicaL Laws formuLated terMS Ln (suitabLy of condLtLonaLs) and perhaps factuaL constraints as weLL. actuaL (or better t3ctuai) worLd Ls a seLect coMMon worLd the to nested spaces. The underLytng Lde3 of the synthesis is siMpiy this: a subspace of is aLso a suitabLe framework for cosmoLogy, for an interpret— semantics worids neutrai *3 L Lon of the Log iceL theory of the universe as a whoLe. In Less condensed form, the ide3 is that the aLternative worids semantics arrived at in the pursuit of a semantics universaL part connectedLy, as semantics comprehensive (a theory the of aLL of for aLL be objects, Languages) and, aLso appLied physics - most importantiy to the matter of the origin, history and fundamentaL physicaL features of this cosmos, but 3S weLL eLsewhere, in interpretation theory. quantum of particuLar Ln That stripping. ontoLogicai of Load MorLd-ensembLe terms of nonexistent Mortds. Hot surprisingiy, in the recasting the in theory j^s for is, the theory can be recast in existentiaLLy neutraL terms, wcthout the originaL object ionabLe theory, the Rnd in the case of quantum theory there is aLready, most convenientiy, a many-universe or worLd-ensembLe theory, ready neutrai in (e.g. changed unobservabLe the spiitting worLd of the Everett other worids interpretation gives way to future— directed worLd branching). The setting in terms of do which objects not exist, especiaLLy, is essentiaL. For one reason, the idea grew out of investigation (with Griffin for the provisionaL but so far nonexistent book UQ) of what is normaLLy taken to be a phiLosophicaL question, indeed by some such as as the fundamentaL question of metaphysics, nameLy exist? . Reset in worLd terms this becomes a question worLd such Mhy does anything at aLL of seiection the - a contains be to taken exist. For then the oLd circLe is simpiy reentered, expiaining existence in terms of more existents. Here the circLe is metaphysics: 3 much more tractabLe question. But the recasting Loses expLanatory merit shouLd aLL the worids invoived objectionabie of that we find ourseLves in which contains something existent (us as among other existent things) as opposed to an aLternative worLd, which nothing Heidegger cf. JB broken, as it is eLsewhere (particuLarLy in chapter 2), by expiaining what exists by way of what does not. It is the faiLure to duty aLLow for and -2- acknowLedge this pattern of �expLsnatLons, though Lt represents coMMon practLce Ln the theoretLcaL sciences, that has wade Lssues LLke the Lntractab Le. In fact quest Lons Lihg Hetdeggerean the concernLng does angthLng quest Lon onLg Ls exLst? question LLke Lt so ftrst of a LattLce of the the character and nature of the cosMos Ln whLch Me happen to be, that are LLabLe to be asked , questLons ascendLng to (Just) seen Ls? ; questLons Uhg Ls thLs cosMos Mhtch MorLd ModeLLLngs wag fruLtfuLLg be to appLLed, as an Lwportant fLrst step Ln eLLcLtLng sone ansMers. (Bounded) LattLce of questLons. DIRGRRM 2. 7 Uhg does Mhg does angthLng evergthLng at aLL exLst? exLst as Lt Uhg do 7 Hhg do eLectrons Lihg does Lnte L L Lgent ex Lst? (Ln LLf e LLfe forns the nunbers exLst? (Ln the ex Lst? theg do?) forM Lt does?) In the reorLentatLon of MorLds senantLcs fron Languages to cosnoLog Les, f row Language to the MorLd, there are certaLn features that shouLd be kept fLrriLg Ln vLeM - apart fron such notorLous features as that anong the MorLds of the node L L Lngs are a range of bLzarre, absurd, LncoMpLete and MaverLck MorLds, and that each (nonexLstent) MorLd has a LncLudes donaLn of objects though Lt a subdoMatn (perhaps nuLL) of ent Lt Les, tgpLcaLLg contaLns nonexLstent objects, both posstbLe and not, phgsLcaLLg reaLLsabLe and the MhLch, feature of not. In partLcuLar, MorLd seLectLon shouLd not be Lost sLght of. For Lnstance, Ln assessing truth, a factuaL MorLd T Ls seLected - Ln one Mag or' another, but tgpLcaLLg bg a choLce functLon on a cLrcunscrLbed evaLuatLons are Morked out (recursLveLg) at I. cLass NaturaLLg and ho LdLng the assessnent of truth MLLL generaLLg Lead begond MorLd T LtseLf. For (reLevant) <deducLbLLLtg a subsgstew of dertvatLonaLLg cLosed MorLds Ls defLned; for poss Lb L L Ltg a subsgsteM coMprLsLng consLstent MorLds Ls Marked out; for naturaL LaMLLkeness a subsgsteM of phgsLcaL MorLds Ls dLstLnguLshed^; and so on for other cases of subsgstew and group seLectLon. $I- The Mang MorLds approach to the "Uhg does angthLng at aLL exLst?" quest Lon. -3- �There ere Many canvassed answers to thts questton, and stLLL More Mays of trytng to dtsMtss Lt. RLL dtsposat the atteMpts are defective, 3nd Most of the canvassed answers are unsattsfytng (so Grtfftn and I devote a good deat of space tn UQ to showtng). One approach that ts not inadequate — but perMtts however devetopMent tn severat dtfferent dtrecttons - ts the Many wortds approach. It ts true (and argued eLsewhere, e.g. JB) that R) SoMe thtngs extst. Thts truth enjoys a Modat status, that of conttngency tn fact. weaker ctatM sufftees, naMety But, to begtn, a C) It ts conttngentty true that sone thtngs extst. For the extstence that Most thtngs enjoy or regret ts conttngent. The obvious truth of the More controverstat ctatM that nothtng necessartty Left open for the present. extsts, can be NeutraL wortds ModeLLtng of theMe C) yteLds dtreetty a Many wortds picture, wtth soMe wortds, tnctudtng the actuat wortd T, contatntng extstents, and wtth soMe posstbte wortds contatntng no extstents (but perhaps soMe nonextstents). Likened to a dtsp Lay of baLLoons: DIRGRRH 3. Static pteture of a 0 : 0 : 0 Object doMatns contatn 0 ____ _________ extstents 0 0 : 0 0 worLds ModeLLtng for theMe 0). 0 : 0 0 It can be 0 00 DoMatns contatn no 0 extstents posstbte worLds Such a neutraL nodeLLLng begs no sertous onto Log teat questions, invotves no ontoLogtcaL prodtgaLLty. For tt ts not assuMed that any of these Ln worLds extst, any way. (It ts not dtfftcuLt to represent what does not extst.) Nor need Lt prejudtee Matters unduty agatnst necesstty theMes such even were Lt Lf Lnterpretatton MistakenLy Lnststed, as as agatnst God-hypotheses. the For stratghtforward of C), whtch aLLows Lt ts necessartty true (under soMe necesstty deterMtnabLe) that soMe thtngs extst, a retated Many worLds pteture woutd resuLt; the dashed LLne woutd stMpty Move down the diagraM). But Let us st Lek wtth what ts rtght, C. It ts More reveattng to take theMe C) as tensed - after aLL extstence ts existence now (JB chapter 2) - and to tntroduce, what further Lnvesttgatton wLLL require, dynaMtcat ModeLLLngs. Then, wtth soMe evtdent eMbrotdery, the foLLowtng sort of pteture eMerges: -4- �Dgnantc ptcture untverses. DIRGRRfl t*. MorLds of nodeLLLng of thene C), ML th sanpLe t 3 EXI5TEHTS (FULL CONSERVRTION) RLse and faLL of HD ] A Lt SOMET IME EXISTENTS^ R NULL LJORLD f* ExternaL ttne scats (tsLgnLfLes the Locat present) Consents. r-bjch Ls presupposed Ln the wag the pLcture Ls draMn (e.g. that sone Measure of exLstents C3n be obtained, bg Mag of partLcLe nunbers)^ but these presupposLtLons can be nodLfLed or renoved. The such as sane sort nodeLLLng serves aLso to vaLLdate thenes LLnked to C), of D) There mag have been a tLne Mhen nothLng exLsted. ConsLder seLectLon, noM (or done Ln terns of of the cructat wetter of T-seLectLon, L.e. factuat Mortd 6-seLectLon, L.e. referentLaL sub-Mortd seLectLon). ThLs Ls certaLn features these Mortds have, such as contaLnLng entttLes, LncLudLng observers, exhLbLtLng LLfe, nanLfestLng LnteLLLgence or wLnd - to antLcLpate features conLng up and sonetLnes proposed for MorLd seLectLon. Such seLectLon pLcks out thts MorLd fron the ensenbLe of MorLds (our Mortd aLso, as Lt happens). Rnd the Mortd thus seLected LncLudes exLstents. Mhg does angthLng at aLL exLst? Because thts MorLd, T, LncLudes, happens to LncLude, extstent objects. To thts extent Lt Ls -5- a natter of fortune - qood �it night be hazarded, since the worLd exhibits enough that is good 3nd fortune, enough potentiaL for good. Rs a contingent Matter, this worLd contains (in its object donain) '.tens that exist. So T-setection deLivers a worLd n3king it true objectiveLg that sone things exist.^ The answer Mag seeM trite; that but is in Measure Large because the and answer are taken in isoLation, apart froM issues as to the detaiLs question of the process, the how questions, such as H) How does it happen that soMething exists? The issue can be considered in uLtinateLg exists is question terns this of of nass-energg, since evergthing that kind (so it is argued in JB chapter 9). To the H ) How does it happen that sone Mass-energg exists? tMo sorts of answer are possibte. FirstLg, there is the conservative answer: sone atwags existed. There is an end Less ongoing sea of Mass-energg, which sinpLg fLuctuates, Moves, recgcLes, etc. There are pLentg of probLens with this answer; for instance, phgsicaL prob Lens, such as how did the Big Bang of standard cosMOLogg occur, what was happening before it? But there are aLternative MatheMaticai stories now being toLd, for instance, of a Massive singuLaritg Located in space (rather than at phgsic3t tine t = 0 as with the Big Bang), which trg to offer a phgsicaL account of a continuous universe (see e.g. G. ELLis). Rnd the singuLaritg stories offered can be enriched (aiong Lines rather Like what wiLL be ventured in the case of the second answer). RLnost aLL traditionaL phiiosophicai and theoLogicat accounts, aLL v^rtuaLLg honage paging to ontoLogicaL assunptions, shouLd be inciuded aMong the conservative, existence-aiwags answers. But the nonnateriaLLst accounts anong these characteristicaLLg invoLve LeveL shifts^^Thei is back to the existence of God or the (uLtinate) One, who, on a higher LeveL, serves as eternaL sustainer, and perhaps fashioner, of the MateriaL universe. The conceptual and other probtens of such answers are sufficientLg notorious. SecondLg, there is stage nothcng existed. The energg. the Rt More appeaiing and siMpLe radicaL answer: at sone that difficuLtg before tiMe, the that anccent Long-received probLeM orthodox of how prejudice, sonething that nchLi fct, is invariabLg reinforced bg again Bang, there was no for this picture is how Mass-energg ever appeared froM the MacroscopicaLLg tranquiL sea of nothingness. past Big can It is no great feat to get coMe froM nothing. The froM nothing nothing cones, ex nihiLo Mistaken ontoLogicaL assunptions (see JB chapter 2). Yet even when these ontoLogicaL assunptions are set aside, there is the awkward natter of C3usai nechanisn. But an unLikeig storg can be toLd, a ngth retated, expLaining how sonething -6- �a may (suddenly) emerge from nothing, jet of mass-energy the from sea of nothingness. The story borrows from the quantum theory of the vacuum (or rather, ot suitabie vacuums). There is suddeniy an avaianche of energy borrowing , 3nd mass creation of particies in a concentrated area.& This is the beginning of the Big Bang (at internaL time zero). It is unigue (in experience) because such a singuiarity is very improbabte. (Even a SmaLL Bang wouid be rather improbabie.) The net energy "borrowed" is borrowed on a very Long term (at high interest?), with a gradu3i repLayment pLan. This ties concerning the run-down eventuaL eventuaLLy (though perhaps over this of very a with principLes universe. protracted of thermodynamics, On this story, it wiLL time) subside back into From nothing everything existent originaLLy came; into nothingness everything existent wiLL uitimateLy process. nothingness. It is one thing to such devise 3 story, or rather the (or outLine scaffoLding) of a story; it is another to condense it into science. before But scorn is poured on such a story, Let it be noted that the story is Less bizarre, more and informative, than other extant phiiosophicaL stories. For exampLe, it appears more piausibie than the ideaList story of the construction of the physicaL worid from idea, or than the set-theoreticaL myth of the construction of the entire universe from the nuLL set - undoubtedLy a it as earLy encompasses existent individuaLs, construction, insofar of something existent from nothing, not since, despite orthodox cLaims to the contrary, the nuLL set certainty does exist (JB 9.9). There are reasons for much preferring the second styLe of story to the first - though it may appear to some to viotate conservation principLes such that mass-energy: of as in fact it need not. One is that the end Less mass-energy story faits to account for the presence of mass-energy. By contrast, nothingness does not reguire expLanation: it is, so to speak, the rest position. In terms of the range of possibiiities here, existence is what is unusuaL, what is atypicaL, what especiaLLy caLLs for expLanation, not nonexistence.? Hence the expLanatory superiority of the radicaL answer. Rs one might expect in varying such an obvious and ancient story, and as is easity discovered, scientific condensation and assessment has begun, especiaLLy in the Last decade. The idea that the totaL energy of the universe is zero was considered a human generation ago by Mhitrow&, refLecting on Flach s phiLosophy of motion. More recentLy, Tryon has argued the zero totaL energy theme, assuming a cLcsed universe and appeaLing the standard treatment of gravitationai to If the universe contains just enough potentiaL energy as negative energy. mass to cLose it, then the negative energy must more or Less exactLy canceL the energy (mc^) invoLved in the existence of that mass. Hence, the argument runs, even a a cosmos as impressiveLy Large and ancient as this universe couLd exist as deveLopment quantum vacuum through in borrowing fLuctuation on a a zero-energy vacuum, that is, through grand scaLe in a reiativistic setting. Such vacuum fLuctuations can occur by dispensation of the AE.At --h; when the mass-energy AE of a physicaL object -7- uncertainty principLe approaches zero, its �LLfe,tLMe At can becoMe verg targe. OnLg the Merest begLnnLng on reMOvtng certaLn object Lons and to wore scLenttfLc storg MtLL be atteMpted. FLrstLg, there are, LnevLtabLg a such obstacLes Lt seews, onto Log LeaL and verLfteat Lontst object Lons. Hang of these turn hoMever on assuMtng that a vacuuM and ewptg space Must soMehoM exLst, at Least bg Mag of sort of exLstLng contaLner or structure. Such assuMpttons are wtstaken: no (pre-) exLstence need be assuwed. Such objects 3s vacuuws and unoccupLed space sone nonexLstent are and dLstLnctLve Mtth objects assessLbLe MatheMatLcaLLg propertLes. Though theg nag not be access LbLe to observatton, and Ln thLs narroM respect are outsLde the range of experLence, then concernLng tnvesttgattons exactLng for there to LnfornatLon Ls suffLcLent be Made of theLr features. SLnLLar potnts teLL agaLnst the objection that Lt Ls Mrong to Lwpose an externat spatLaL or tewporaL Measure on (Mass-energg) cLosed space-tLMe; for exawpLe, Mhat happened before the BLg Bang, or to ewbed the curved space-ttMe of LnquLre the unLverse Ln a Larger spatLaL or tenporaL settLng. Rs a Matter of fact, cosMOLogLsts wang exh Lb Lt no unease Ln ashLng Mhat happened before the BLg Bang even Mhen assuwLng no Matter before that, though verLftcattonLsM MouLd no doubt such to ruLe guesttons out as weanLngLess or otherMtse out of order. More to the potnt, bounded Metrtcs can atMags be extended (HubbLe ttMe Ls just wtstahe though fruLtfuLLg, soMettnes bounds vertfLcatLontst one are exaMpte), exceeded. and Rnother has been to assuwe that NothLng, stnee nonexLstent, Ls entLreLg Mtthout structure or organLsatton and ungoverned. Indeed tMo dtaMetrtcaLLg opposed poLar v,eMS of Lt have prevented, and even been run together: of NothLng chaottc, as and so excessLveLg rtch, and of Nothing as entLreLg bLank, and so excessLveLg tMpovertshed. Both are Lnadequate. R More tnteresttng ontoLogtcaL objeetton (ratsed bg Rrwstrong) Ls that such an account of the ortgtn of the unLverse takes granted for exLstence the naturaL LaMS, and so does not expLaLn hoM sowethLng ex Latent cane frow objecttons Such confuse truth neo-PLaton Law. LaMS hoLd, but do not vteMs, Mhere LaMS Mtth exLstence, exLst - bg after contrast Mtth nothLng. fashLon the of of neo-PLatonLc reLatLons of unLversaLs, MhLch exLst. On object-theorg are (such as that of JB), hoMever, unLversaLs do not exLst, and so LaMS are not thus extstentLaLLg Loaded. Once truth Ls duLg separated frow exLstence, there Ls of course the further questton of Mhg the LaMS that hoLd or evoLve do hoLd. But thts Ls a separate, and vextng, questton of uLttMate expLanatton.^ SecondLg, are there More technLcaL adwLttedLg shakg phgstcaL account; for quantuM nuwbers of objeettons, instance, that dtrected But Lt the Mtth the the vacuuw MtLL constst equaLLg of Matter and antt-Matter, and qutckLg vantsh agatn, Mhereas features of the unLverse perstst tMbaLance. agaLnst fLuctuattons and suggest noM seeMs that a verg sLLght (and, so Lt Ls satd, deLLcate) tMbaLance earLg Ln the evoLutton of the unLverse after the BLg Bang Ls just Mhat Ls required for present perMLtted features of the unLverse; and such an LMbaLance, on recent (GUT) theorLes, catastrophtc fLuctuatton hardLg excLudes. R thLrd connected obstacLe used to be sertous: Lt -8- has been presupposed that a �state can be assigned to the whoLe universe.^ But that is now aLright; quantuM according for neutraL to of) (adaptation the Everett Many-universe interpretation of quantuM theory, a state function i covers the behaviour of the P worLds phgsicaL I (with P c K), which presuMabig evoLve according to a e reLativised Schrodinger equation of the fom SE(T). To soMe expLain of the recent appeaL of this sort of wortd-ensewbLe interpretation, it is worth turning to the interesting and curious business of the phgsicaL constants. The §2. of constants of phgsics and sone of their neat interreLations. natter The interesting cLaiM is that the setting or adjustMent of certain constants surprisingLg deLicate, and if the constants (and soMe of their constant that ratios) were different bg ontg sMaLL Margins, then the actuaL universe woutd very is be with the resuLt, aMong Mang other things, that we shoutdn't be different, here to observe ang of its LocaL passing show. Now the possibiLity of exp Lanation of the specific vaLues of these the in terMS of phgsicaL theory itseLf is not so far exciuded. Perhaps no constants constants in physics are uLtiMateLy fundaMentai, Various ways eiiMinating of constants though seeMS that unLikeLy. are now faMitiar, e.g. soMe represent new scaie factors and are eiiMinated by re-scaLing or choice of coordinates. Others are reMoved by More radicaL ways of reLooking at things, as in Einstein s treatMent of gravitation. But sone resist eiiMination - so far. in For, phgsicaL any theory, what case, fundaMentai is depends and soMe previousLg fundaMentat constants (such as Rvogadro s nuMber) have turned out to be derivative as theory constants on the given shape of advanced new and (deeper) were introduced. There is the reMote possibiLity, obviousLy cherished that bg soMe scientists, that in the end aLL phgsicaL constants can be reMoved, a constant-free (very grand unified) theorg in which aLL constants can be reMoved wiLL resuLt. This is not obviousLg iMpossibLe in the wag that a coMpLete eiiMination of LogicaL constants froM Log teat theorg is, that a finat triuMphant reMovat of the Scheffer stroke froM cLassicaL propositionaL Logic is iMpossibLe. However, it is too Much to expect that a "deep MatheM3tic3i anaLgsis" aLways do the job. For one thing, exp Lanations of this sort do give is an arguMent for this out. can There froM the backward proceeding character of deductive expLanations to More generaL preMisses (appLging the content-incLusion character of deduction proper). There are no MatheMaticaL anaigses without assuMptions, without a systeM of postutates. The hope (expressed by MatheMaticat Carter and others), that generaLLy deeper underlying theories can be found, wiLL not 3iwags be fuLfiLLed, of necessity. Since transforMations, such as seating, aLter or reMove constants, can transfer the Big Bang back to Minus-infinity, and so on, there is no soLid to expLain, underLying the ELLis, for one, aLLegedLy probLeMatic nuMericaL features (so data B. contends). UhiLe it is true that which constants feature, and what their vaLues are, wiLL depend on initiaL choice of units, whatever that �at Least some of the constants wiLL emerge. Thus there wiLL be features choice, and vatues which require expianation, and exptanation of the however transforming the done. is For S3me broad tgpe, the present, 3nd immediate future at Least, there is no getting rid of the constants, and white theg to continue figure their numericaL vatues and ratios set some trickg prob Lems. There is the probtem, first of aLL, of describing the reLevant phgsicat data neutraL non—prejudiciaL fashion. The facts of the matter are more or Less a Ln as foLLows:- Present phgsicat theories incLude mang (phgsicaL) constants, which occur in the formutation of Laws and principtes. R number of these constants are fundamentsL, in that theg are not derived from other constants (or deduced from deeper phgsicat theorg). Two things have been noticed concerning fundamentat constants of present phgsicat theorg, both of which caLL for expLanation:If 1) the of certain constants Lag outside a rather narrow band (sur­ vatues rounding their perhaps universe wouLd be ascertained vatue), gross features of the geophgsicaL different. this - hopefuttg without CaLL prejudice, since its contra­ position represents the substantiat core of the anthropic poss ib Le principte - the sens i t iv i tg numer teat f eature. va Lues For record, the the geophgsicaL principte resuLting from contraposition takes the foLLowing form: certain gross features of the geophgsicaL universe are onLg possibie in present form if the numericaL vatues of certain constants Lie within a narrow sensitivitg band. Examptes of such gross features are isLand gataxies, Long-Lived stars, ptanets, recognised ittustrate, water, hgdrogen, heavg carbon, metats. RLL the forces, for instance, exhibit the sensitivitg features. To phgsicat the strong nuctear force were marginattg stronger, nuctei coutd if grow much begond the present Limits and att hgdrogen woutd Long have ago been converted to heLium, with the resutt that there wouLd be no Long-Lived stars (of present tgpe) and no water. On the other side, a decrease in the strong force wouLd prevent the formation of nucLei of heavg metaLs. R dozen further and more of simitar phgsics Literature. sensitivitg mag be assembLed from the re Levant easiLg 2) The Pgthagorean feature. Large numbers arrived at in ions famous turn of Eddington s out these to coincide Large reLation, exampLes astronomicaL computat­ (to within order of magnitudes). Perhaps the most number stating coincidences', the universe is the inverse square of the number as theg are mostLg caLLed, of gravitationaL other exampLes are assembLed in Bondi.) -10- particLes coupLing in the constant. is visibLe (Mang �These two nunericaL features sensitivitg features co inc idences. are are (or can be) These nunericaL features are cited LaMs) conservation of inportanttg that in Large exptain to used nunber as evidence Justifging the introduction of various exotic theories (e.g. invoLving phgsicaL Most interconnected, departures exaMpies earLg Mhich froM accepted norMaLLg Mere the "verging G theories of Dirac and Jordan . So Mrites Carter, Mho appeais to soMe differentig exotic principies, anthropic principtes, Mithin features in order froM far opposite the phgsics Bang) thesis: (GeneraL cosMoLogg and Mhich couLd in principLe have been used to unsurprisingLg, the order of the dag in Mag and be great fun. It cosnoLogg. course Of that the is distiLLation specuLation is is Mith the conversion of this stuff to in received MisdoM, or even knoMLedge, that caveats shouLd be Mhen cLaiM froM evidentLg estabLished. But Large cLains on fLinsg foundations are, far fine, i.e. ReLativistic predict theM 3LL in advance of their observation' (p.291) - 3 Large is nuMericat evidence in favour of exotic theories these coincidences being shouLd rather be considered as confirMing "conventionat" Big the noM received cosMoiogicai setting. Mith the heLp of these the anthropic principies he canvasses, as he puts it, that expLain to prejudiciaL, in e.g. that entered, especiaLLg it points to favoured cone Lus ions such as priviLege or design (for huMans) in the universe. Much capitaL has aireadg been Made of the nuMericat features, of Mhat is referred to - gou C3n see the Loading straightaMag - as a cataLogue of extra­ ordinarg phgsicaL coincidence and apparentig accidentsL co-operation' (0 p.110). Here is a tgpicaL beat-up, bg Davies: The structure of the phgsicaL MorLd is deiicsteig dependent on a varietg of apparent nunericaL accidents. hang of the rather basic features of the universe are deternined in essence bg the vaLues that are assigned to the fundanentaL constants of nature, such as G, a, Mp and so on, and these features MouLd be drasticsLLg aLtered if the constants assuned even noderateig different vaLues. ... for nature to produce a cosnos even renoteLg resenbLing our own, Mang apparentLg unconnected branches of phgsics have to co-operate to a renarkabLe degree (D p.lll; sone of the prejudiciaL terninoLogg is under L ined). The part Last is particuiarig Meak: so our ignorance of interconnections is disclosed, ignorance Me Might have forestaLLed froM arguMent theorg integrated resist apparentLg fitting of unreLated phgsics: together. the topics' present if Carter serves is right. RLL the to reveaL is Lack of an theorg is bits and pieces, Mhich Nor do Large nunber coincidences point to ang hidden co-operation, but rather to over Looked connections Mhich can be argued toHards (as bg Dicke, Carter and others) using fairLg conventionaL phgsicaL equations.^ Rs for the hidden purpose terMinotogg, for nature to produce ...', MeLL, the Justificatorg case for its use is not Mereig not evident, but entireLg The sane appLies to other Lacking. terns Mhich Davies and others infiLtrate, such as -11- �* 'conspire' (Dp.Ill), 'fine-tuned', deiicateiy baianced', 3ii of which suggests agents with certain purposes. Re Lated happening not objections te rm ino Logy, be some against Lodged accident , it accidentaL; be shouLd of the improbab Le coincidence , etc. R contingent worLd need is not accidentaL that Griffin Lives in Troy, Ontario, though it is contingent certainty. Rn improbabLe worLd need not be accidentaL either. RccidentaL means, according to the Concise EngLish Dictionary (CED), Occurring by chance, unexpectedLy, not according to the usuaL order of non-essentiaL'. The misp Laced for the actuaL worLd; and adventitious, th ings; generaL thrust of the notion is decidedLy accidentaL universe is a misdescription.^ To be sure, there is some considerabLe sLackness in terms Like accidentaL', wh Lch can come cLose aLso, when appLied as in schoLastic theory, to meaning contingent. The term vac i L La t ion, as its of condition dictionary coinciding; concurrence nicety coincidence' a definition remarkabLe iLLustrates makes instance the The pLain: of we L L-known act, fact or apparentLy fortu itous Large-number The coincidences are of the first type; there is LittLe case for making them out as of the second type. argue, To however, that the actuaL worLd is not mereLy contingent, but improbabLe, Lt is hardLy necessary to go so far afieLd as advanced physics. Some more homeiy exampies have managed ho Les wiLL do, such as the matter of aLL the Lucky goLfers who in one. consider Or foLLowing the from argument contingencies, to the improbabiLity of the actuaL worLd. Take some contingency, e.g. that person 1 in some ordering of the audience <^s wearing a green top. She might have been wearing any other cotour. Say there are 100 shades to choose from in the cLothing coLour cards. Then the probabiLity that she is in green is no more than 1 in 100. eut the same sort of probabiLity hoids for every other person on the earth presentLy wearing 3 top, and these probabiLities are LargeLy independent, say in I(US) bit Lion cases, i.e. 10^ cases. That is, the probabiLity of the present array of tops is no more than 1 in loH. That aLready makes present arrangements exceedingiy unLikeLy, before we go into the coLours of other bits of appareL peopie are customariLy bedecked in, the coLours towards 16 improbabLe. Lead of the NonetheLess, of motor cars and so on. So even surface contingencies books, cone Lus ion that the worLd actuaL is astronomicaLLu the situation with the fundamentaL constants does differ. Rn important difference between these day-to-day improbabilities, such as have the spouses we do, and those the constants induce is things these this:- Even that if aLL (coLours, e.g.) had been different, the worLd wouLd not be a very different pLace. Contrast the constants: their significant variation wouLd the we make worLd a very different pLace. Is there a difference in kind, with 3 radicaL improbabiLity appearing as regards the constants, degree? OnLy in degree, picture wiLL serve for the bridging range exampies of cases, or tend for -12- mereLy a difference in to suggest. The same broad everyday and cosmoLogicaL �contingencg. §3- Back to mang worLds: improbabiLities and the universaL quantum theorg. Mhere that broad - Leads picture so sgnthesis sought the suggests, as does an increasing amount of cosmoLogicaL theorg - is to the mang-worLds of interpretation Quite evidentLg, worLds semantics are not the onLg semantics improbabiLitg. that can be offered for probabiLitg. few But other offer semantics simitar universaLLtg and informativeness, and some of the aLLeged competitors (not to be taken too serioustg as face damaging circuLaritg in this area, e.g. rivaLs) probabiListic semantics, urn semantics. The idea of the modeLLing naturaLLg It is improbabLe that gou have the spouse gou have , is true bg virtue of this: fact the is that in onLg a few worLds of the modeLLing, incLuding the actuaL one, do gou have gour current spouse; mostLg (insofar as gou occur) gou do not. In preciseLg the same improbabiLities, cosmic wag such particuLar as numericaL vaLues for phgsicaL constants, Lead to mang universe modeLLings. is argument to mang-universes from improbabiLities . The description of the the situation phgsicaL coincidence of probabiListic requires remarkabLe constants, notions, features', e.g. etc. extraordinarg semantics But probabiListic notions caLLs for aLternative worLds. (Thus Davies archerg Les Lie s and This goLf exampLe Of course Davies tends to see worLds used for exampLe). probabiLities as a conceptuaL device (D p.128); Everett invariabLg sees them That reaL. is, what we have emerging is repLag then do improbabiLities the as of universaLs issue! But universaLs do not exist, and nor do these expLanatorg worLds (cf. JB onLg of 8.8). Not Lead to a mang-nonexistent-worLds picture; converseLg the muLti-universe theorg expLains the improbabiLities. envisaged modeL contains ref Leet a huge coLLection of certain intervaL of accuracg); thus worLds the range of (naturaL) vaLues of the fundamentaL constants. RLL initiaL arrangements of matter and motion are refLected in worLds is The worLds. the chances of the present smaLL, exceedingig which expLains (at Least within universe a resuLting various improbabiLities. Does it than matter that we can t normaLLg quantifg these improbabiLities? Rng more we can quantifg the (Large) probabiLitg of nucLear war? No; there is something offensive about the repeated demand for quantification.^ Quantum theorg circumscribed affords situations, a the aLternative phgsicaL situations. actuaL worLd - is seLected, simiLar state mang worLds function is On measurement, one apparentLg at random picture. Least Rt for a superposition of severaL particuLar worLd - the (D p.12!*). This approach enab Les immediate resoLution of an important prob Lem in orthodox quantum theorg. R standing probLem with a compLete universe state function is that sgstem we must have some measuring apparatus that is sgstem. ... Mhen the not itseLf to measure a part of the sgstem is the entire universe, the notion of a piece of externaL measuring apparatus is meaningLess (D p.I2t+). So emerges the famiLiar conundrum for quantum theorg presented aLong orthodox (von Neumann) Lines: If there is nothing Left with which to measure [or otherwise interfere with] the -13- �state the of how universe, universe the can transition from a the make superposition of many possibLe worids to one, concrete, actu3t wortd?' (D p.12^) is, There asserts, Davies interpretation many-universes one oniy - which comprehensive however a resoLution 'accept[s] simuitaneous the reaiity of aLL the possibte atternative universes' (D p.I2i+). But, given the route we have come, it is easy to ontccaLLy atternative neutrai this, to direct that see from there an is object-theory. atternative assumes many universes atso, but onty some at any stage are This actuat. It is obvious enough is that the probabilistic spread of quantum states does not require existent states, any more than the range of atternative dress states for someone probabty attired in requires green, the existence of the person in different ctothes. Measurement now shows which wortd/state an object such as etectron or person in. actuatty is an In these terms it does not cotLapse the probabiLity wave packet, or set of worLds, but marks one out. Lihat isn't known measurement is which worLd (or narrower set of worLds) is actuaL (or the before actuat etectron is in). quantum description, Uhen nothing the entire cosmos encompassed is the within Left to coLLapse the wave' (D p,12S). Rather is nothing in the way of externat measurements is avaiLabLe to determine which is the actuaL worLd; however internaL information can be made use of in the usuaL experimentaL ways. To set interpretations many-worids Everett the quantum of theory and in the contrasting neutrai worLds perspective, here (adapting OeLJitt and Graham) are some Leading features: i) R separate cLassicaL sphere externaL to any and every is not required; quantum set-up it makes sense to consider and investigate a state vector for the whoLe universe. ii) The state vector covering the totaL system never universes) (of coLLapses, and so the totatity it describes can be deterministic. iii) LJhat is described through variabLes dynamicaL the jointLy, comprehensive is not aLL equaLLy reaL; vector and the the actuaL worLd but a system comprising many worLds. (On the Everett are state interpretation on the neutraL worLds these interpretation they are not, other worLds than actuaL ones Lacking of any sort of reaLity.) iv) Through chronoLogicaL deveLopment of the dynamicaL the state vector decomposes naturaLLy ref Leeting a progressing branching of the into system orthogonaL universe worLds) into a set of mutuaLLy unobservabLe worLds. variabLes, (and (On account this is described as a continuaL spLitting into vectors system the of Everett equaLLy reaL worLds; but not in neutraL theory which disposes of this reLativism.) v) In each worLd good" measurements yieLd definite resuLts, and in many -14- �worLds, incLuding the actuaL, famiLiar statisticaL quantum Laws hoLd, indeed C3n be derived or approximated. *- -^ince the neutraL version directLg avoids mang of the to theorg, what is the case for the Everett form? In main part it consists Everett simptg of mistaken ontoLogicaL assumptions, as such objections the what that ReaLitg overactive an principte, has phgsicaL properties must exist.The further argument that aLL branches must be equaLLg reaL, is not compeLLing. Thus DeMitt contends: Because there exists neither a mechanism within the framework of the formaiism nor, bg definition, an entitg outside of the universe that can designate which branch of the grand superposition is the reaL worLd, aLL branches must be regarded as equaLLg reaL (p.178). But we can easiLg incLude actuaL worLd seLection (as group worLd seLection) within cone Lus ion does not foLLow. the weLL and framework; other as given difficuLties the Everett specific, there is, Ln the first pLace, reaList theories such Everett's. as permissive regarding such worLds. In reaList-reLativist a demarcation SecondLg, fact, the however, interpretation theorg avoids. To be faced prob Lem not neutraL theorg the of this the intended It has been objected (e.g. bg Lewis) that the neutraL worLd encounters kinds neutraL bg is too theorg is restrictive about worLds; and few or none of worLds of contemporarg reaLists (^uch as Lewis) get into the picture, since aLL such worLds incLude as existents certain universaLs. OnLg neutraLised anaLogues of such worLds appear fn case, the theorg can be as restrictive as is appropriate about ang In 7). aLso (see which worLds are phgsLeaL, or phgsicaLLg possible. Requisite subcLasses such worLds phgsicaL can marked be out conform tig to phgsicaL Laws and through framework requirements (e.g. that the ensembLe forms a HLLbert space). it is an iLLusion that reaLism as Moreover soLves the reLevant demarcation probLem. It simpLg covers it up, in an unsatisfactorg wag. highLight To us varg a in stock of coupLe pertations, some of what is different in a neutraL iLLustrations of reaListic interpretation, the ontic mang-worLds Let inter- the famiLLar two sLit interfer­ wag. Consider first ence affair. On a straightforward the neutraL approach, we appear forced to concLude that each eLectron traverses both sLits in a wave Like form' (Les Lie LI, p.I!+6), is to the dcaLectic interpretation that the eLectron goes through that both sLits. The mang- worLds approach avoids such contradiction^, aLLowing eLectron to traverse just one sLit in the actuaL worLd - onLg in another branching from this, the the worLd, eLectron traverses the other sLit, therebg inducing probabiListic interference with the actuaL-case eLectron. The wave function provides a superposition of two such possibLe cases, not two actuaL cases. In the transition other worLds are not mang-worLds theorg). from phgsicaL (or potentiaL) worLds to the actuaL one, 'destroged' (as LesLie suggests in his criticism of Nor is the interaction of worLds causaL. There are few or -15- �no causaL effects even on the Everett reaLity version; is spiitting thus not not actuaity observed (cf. virtuai worLds, reLations, etc.). Though there seen, are transworLd interreLations on object-theory these do further criticaL point is that physicaL worLds are not probabiListicaLLy The entities. as exist not independent. But that s aLright; since probabiLity is an natter, intensionaL probabiListic interference is unprobLenatic (cf. "possibiLity" interference). scattering exanpLe where an eLectron is Consider next Davies at fired a proton. The probabiLity wave in such scattering represents a set of worLds for the eLectron. 'The quantun wave provides a Measure of the probabiLity of finding the eLectron 3t the Location: where the eLectron is Most LikeLy to be found ation, and disturbance is greatest there the wave (D p.l2i*). Fleasurenent deterMines the Loc­ so aLters the probabiLities, thus on the orthodox view reducing the wave. Recording to the Everett on however, interpretation, neasurenent the universe divides into two, ... one containing a right Moving eLectron ... Each worLd is equaLLy rest inhabiting each since it is not The observer conscious upon that MeasureMent down-right is spiitting so thus, by occurs; the for there certain a is so near­ probabiLities, anending scattering, that, possibie the because of the uncertainties physicaL states of universe, corres­ ponding to the probabiLity wave, are increased. Lihere there was one for the actuaL possibLities). worLd in possibiLity regard, now there are N Many (N Mirroring the this R nany-worids interpretation of physicaL theory provides a naturaL for neutraL a new state function resuits, appearing to coLLapse 'the wave. since RLL that happens wuth worLd branching is guaranteed copy worLds. But onLy one worLd is actuaL, and represents the (reaL) of universe. Heasurenent can deterMine which this is, and one spLits, MisLeading. There is no spiitting; rather in quantuM processes worLd-branching takes pLace, rep Licat ion atso wortd . Even on the Everett interpretation this is inaccurate, it interpretation ... principLes which aMong seLect detinit or wortds, as setting what are caLLed anthropic principLes, and aLso non-chauvinistic reptaceMents for then such as geophysicaL principLes, can serve to do.^ Rnd in this setting expLanations, of a sort and of varying adequacy, The of aLL the nunericaL features can be furnished. under Lying reason is not (siMpty) that there wiLL aLways be sone universes, which are duty seLected, where the nuMbers coMe out right, but that sone and universes conditions (for of the right sort are aLso decent physicaL universes (a Much More difficuLt requirenent to satisfy). sone such coincidences) It is as these, furtherMore, that are observed (by us), contain universes carbon and water LocaLLy, and so forth. It is then no surprise that we perceive a universe to which so Many speciaL conditions pertain, for we have seLected fron the enseMbLe onLy by our very existence' (0 p.126). But it again, taLk of our seLecting is MisLeading (though taLk of seLection, or naturaL seLection, is not). It is rather that, as a contingent natter, we happen to inhabit such universes^. Rnd such taLk negLects the iMportant point that further work is required, for satisfactory expianation - that piausibte argunents, not invoLving us, but connecting gross geophysicaL features with nuMericaL features, have aLso -16- �to be suppLLed. In thts Mag, ustng the MorLd-ensembLe hgpothests ... [but] MLth[out] the Meak anthropLc prLncLpLe, Lt Ls possLbte to discover pLausLbLe arguments to pLn doMn the vaLues of aLmost aLL of the fundamentaL parameters p.129, a centraL part of hLs cLatm). Indeed DavLes hotds out the negatLng but (D prospect of beLng abte to do much more, constraLnLng the dtmensLonaLttg of space and ttme, the number of quarks and Leptons, numbers of fundamentaL forces, That reaLLg MouLd a sgnthesLs of consLderabLe poMer. It Ls a sgnthesLs, gtve moreover, MhLch can be absorbed or sLmuLated MLth Ln a upon mang-MorLds neutraLLsLng prLncLpLes MorLd bg etc. quantum seLectLon theorg prLncLpLes. and cosmo-Log LeaL repLacLng NonetheLess sgnthesLs, the anthropLc DavLes, the LLke maLnstream phgsLcLsts he artLcuLateLg represents, Ls uncomfortabLe MLth ang such that he LndLcates, ang such grand pLcture, and rLghtLg so, as the 3S sgnthesLs anthropLc expLanattons LnvoLved are far from entLreLg satLsfactorg. HostLg he seems to hope Lnstead that contLngencLes MLLL aLL be expLaLned as necessLtLes of (proposLtLons phgsLcs grand a pLcture, necessarg grand at Least Ln foLLoMLng Log LeaLLg from another theorg). But the hope Ls mLspLaced; Ln Large unLfLed measure Lt represents 17thC ratLonaLLsm over agatn. SometLmes, hoMever, he seems to feet desLgn Ln the untverse. - Ls Mhat features: to supposed emerge, and does emerge, from the numerLcaL Mhat anthropLc prLncLpLes vs. MorLd seLectLon prLncLpLes. Uhat Ls supposed to emerge depends upon hoM the matter Ls set up, hoM the pLcture emphasLaed. Ls Mhat presented, For exampLe, DavLes and LesLLe both set thtngs up so onLg tMo optLons are supposed to be open. In hLs Preface to Da^Le^ Ls The RcctdentaL UnLverse, suggests the sgstematLc aLternatLves are eLther reLLgLon or an anthropLc prLncLpLe. R sLmLLar cLaLm appears Ln LesLLe, Mho puts the aLternatLves as (ethtcaL) necessttg or anthropLc assumptLons. Thus hLs concLusLon (to L2, p.81) The cosmotogLcaL evidence can suppLg __ forcefut grounds for vLeMLng at Least one of these thtngs ss true. (1) God Ls reaL, though presumabLg as a creattve ethtcaLrequtrement rather than as a dtvtne person Mho LLteraLLg destgned our LLfe-contaLntng cosmos. [So the unLverse extsts because Lt shouLd.J (2) There extsts a Mortd EnsembLe [so the condtttons LeadLng to Ltfe are bound to occur someMhere (L2, p.55)J - and the attempt to dertve aLL the fundamentaL charactertstLcs of our cosmos from some untfted FLeLd Theorg Ls tn error. DavLes LnsLnuates that the obvtous Lnference from the cat3Logue of numerLcaL features Ls thts: a htdden prLncLpLe seems to be at Mork, organLstng the cosmos Ln a coherent Mag (p.110). Thts runs paraLLeL to argument from desLgn, hardLg an Lmprovement. One of the prLncLpLes htdden Ls hgpothests; but another Mhtch DavLes (unLtke LesLLe) generaLLg anthropLc prLncLpLe, to LncredLbLe accuracg 3nd Ls some sort of God favours Ls the a gutdtng prLncLpLe Mhtch serves to fLne-tune the cosmos for us (humans) - or Ltfe, or Ltfe-supportLng sgstems, or __ ? Or for observers,or LnteLLLgence, or not for angthtng. The chotce offered Ls reaLLg then an oLd famLLLar one, faced bg thtnkers at Least stnee the (so-caLLed) EnLtghtenment: God or Han, or after a recent ftrst correctton and Mtth a different emphasts, Humans -17- or God. In fact burted under �duaLitg, this is aLreadg as (Science) or Hunans or God. However the a nang tenpts favoured which option, Phgsics excLuded, in error . Rnd it is we as seen: have (coMprehensive) phgsics without netaphgsics, no scientific theorg no is Much scientist and phiLosopher, is increasinqLg seen as excLuded, as forbidden fruit or even as there at Least a three-wag choice: Phgsics giinpsed, without Large assunptions - which stands on its own. But further afieLd there is get is which option, another not excLuded: option here canvassed. The ciain to be eLaborated is this: no (deep-ecoLogicaL) principies of a tgpe not aLreadg required for Low LeveL senanticaL purposes worLd seLection principies) are caLLed for in expiaining the nunericaL (naMeig, features at Least as satisfactoriig as nor huMans Neither principies, gods such be upon popuiarig aLreadg foreshadowed, doing. in More in reMoving huMans features god-Like (and, universe. the principLe cones in a varietg of anthropic verg precise (incLuding Barrow's biocentric reforMutations). SoMe exaMptes give the inpression:- The existence as observers seLection bioLogicaL (D to the own used be can existence a as constants' (ibid). This presents severaL for renoving underiging ngsterg is verg different fron nunericat of expLanation, our p.viii); effect, ... to expLain the otherwise Mgsterious nuMericat disentangie; expLat,ning wiLL idea is to reiate basic worLd features to our own vaLues of the fundanentaL phgsicaL issues as such coLourfuL for nainstreaM phgsicists, atMost none of then prettg MostLg the upon hunans, associated inteLLigence) fron a new speciaL pLace Rs succeed options other the are essenti3t. Since gods do not figure in anthropic wiLL focus the incidentaLLg, forMS, object-theoru far-out the features. sorts, various or Rnd nag these turn in have further theg Mag be siMpig contingent, refLecting seLection without specific purpose. Sone phgsicists go so far as to ciain: our existence constrains the structure of the universe, indeed it even it (0 p-112), for to us , quote froM Hawking and CoLLins. connection in this sweeping context h3s been dubbed this j^s Davies the does, have nothing specificaLLg to do inteLLigence, or with Life, etc. The Dicke argunent, for Eddington-Dirac expLain coincidence, is based of principLe : anthropic the show with what work the or hunans, with designed exanpLe, to onig on the presence of heavg eieMents, and so gives but a hint of bioLogg, if that. So reversaL Invoking the huMan forMuLaticn of the principLe (D p.112)! But quite generaLLg the argunents advanced, which do principLe seLects reaLLg there is no spirit of the Copernican revoLution' in this fashion (pace D p.115, barter, and others). The conditionaL principLe estabLished bg the Dicke arguMent is essentiaLLg J) If [because, g^ven] there exist heavg eieMents, then the universe is such that the Eddington-Dirac coincidence ho ids. The fuLL expLanatorg argunent conprises, as weLL as the detaiLed phgsics that goes toward J), the nodus ponens inference: -18- �The Eddington-Dirac coincidence hotds. There exist heavy eLements, J) More generaLiy, the anthropic way gives principie to physicatiy a argued conditionai scheme of the enthymematic form K) if F then T, or its contrapositive K ) if not-F then not-T, where F is a hard factuai ciaim or more commoniy its existentiat reiativety generaiisation , and T is a more theoretic3i ciaim concerning typicaity features of the worLd, such as numericai features. The short form of anthropic exp Lanation, or better status quo expLanation, is then the argument form F, if F then T L) . .T. famiLiar ontoLogicaL proofs, for instance of an externaL worLd from the Moore s fact that exist, hands arguments. such omit typicaLLy proofs phiLosophers just are difference The is that the soLid argumentation that goes into estabLishing the conditionai schemes of status quo expianations; for instance, makes LittLe effort in this direction, and the required entaiLment rather Moore evidentLy faiLs to hoLd (see fn 30). Other formutations of the anthropic principie in the Literature are than better those hardLy 3tready exhibited. LesLie, who at Least (Like Barrow) moves humans a LittLe off centre stage, puts it in this counterfactuaL way: if our universe had been [everywhere] hostiie to Life then nobody wouLd be observing it (L2, p.66). If the consequent simpiy contextuaLLy impiies that something a Live is doing the observing, then the principie is ana Lytic, and scarceLy up to the intended expLanatory tasks (without requisite information that the the universe contains Life, and much eLse being separateLy pumped in). MhiLe if does not require this, it appears fatse; the Latest seeing-eye robot consequent did survive the hoLocaust, or did just happen as a resuLt of the quantum fLuctuation. In such as Dicke's most purported argument. offers faces reLated difficuLties: worLd appLications of the anthropic The other version of the principie LesLie NecessariLy we conscious beings observe a which is Life-containing (LI, p.lt+1). Rs it stands, this is faLse; for we mightn t exist. Nor wiLL appropriate deLetion consciousness retain we' of fix things. the worLd is, Me might but not be observers, aLL being in vats. But repaired the version is pretty use Less. It bears onLy tangentiaLLy (through that vacuum any case the formuiation Lacks sufficient generaLity; it faiLs to connect appropriateLy with scheme, the but contingency, Life its consequent, containing) on what is at issue concerning numericaL features. The materiaL on us, on observers and the Like, is strictLy irreLevant, a hang-over again presumabLy constructions of quantum theory. -1?- from bad ideaList �* The that the Copernican principte has suffered some sort of set-b3ck idea because of the essentiai rote of anthropic principies in explaining Large-number can be traced back through Carter, who heLped popuLarise the rote coincidences, between of anthropic principies and made the (rather obscure) distinction strong weak has been exaggerated subservience to the 'Copernican principte' [which is] that we must and not assume principies. anthropic gratuitoustg that we Recording to Carter, there occupg a priviLeged centraL position in the (C p.231). The regrettabLe tendency, he sags, has been to universe extend the to a most questionable dogma to the effect that our situation cannot principte be priviLeged in ang sense ... (in extreme form ... the 'perfect cosmoLogicaL principLe ...)'. The Latter assumption is certaintg untenabLe (as Dicke pointed because the universe is bg no means spatiaLLg homogeneous on a LocaL scaLe out) and speciaL conditions (of terrestrial temperature, chemicaL environment) do prevaiL on Earth. But its removaL does nothing to undercut Life the Copernican principLe, or to boost the anthropic principLe in the wag thinks Lt For does. is Carter his bracketed comment after his first formuiation of the anthropcc principle is that Lt for requisite aLthough our situation is not necessaritg centraL, inevitabLg priviLeged to some extent' (C p.291). It is doubtfuL that our position is centraL; whether it is so priviLeged depends on the intended contrast, but whatever the privilege is, it hardlg seems inevitabLe. Carter gives severaL non-equivaLent formuLations of the anthropic principLe, the first of which takes the quasi-anaLgtic but ambiguous form, LJhat we C3n expect to observe must be restricted bg the conditions necessarg for our presence as observers' (C p.291; repeated D p.119). This is certs inLg not the same as Davies condensation of it, what he caLLs the weak principLe, that observers construaL, restrict the observed'. On the obvious (but Less charitabLe) this is but rampant verificationism, of a tgpe verg familiar however from interpretations of quantum theorg. Uhat exists is independent of observers; and observers, especiaLLg remote ones, mag have no significant impact on what iL5 observed. The condensation is accordingLg false. So also, for different reasons, is what it condenses. For one thing, our expectations mag run astrag. True, what we observe is restricted bg the conditions for our doing just that, nameLg being as observers. But this tautologg imposes no phgsical constraints, being equaLLg true for Xing as observing; and no such connection is appeaied to in ang of the derivations of coincidences that Carter sketches. Once again aqain the present arguments never have angthing in detail to do with humans, or even "observers 4-c? -20- .2-1 �(and surety animats observe). Fit best the arguments are directed to the presence of water or carbon 12 or some such - things sometimes erroneousiy equated Life, and often, rather dubiousty, said to be necessary for Life.^S The situation is of this sort with Carter's "iiiustration" of the weak better Locat) anthropic principte, which he formutates as foitows: 'we must (or be prepared to take account of the fact that our Location in observers universe is existence as the necessariLy priviLeged to the extent of being compatibLe with our p.233). In order to get to grips with this recondite formuiation (C Let us remove the initiaL intensionaL functors (which my empiricist friends to with assure are me not essentiaL in physics, despite ubiquity, and their physicists procLivities to modaLs). Now our position can hardLy be priviLeged (despite Carter s tru necessariLy since human-types just might be itaLicization), uniformLy distributed through the universe or again might not exist at aLL. LJhat necessity there is enters in a different way. LJhat we are Left de Let ion, with since misLeading, probabiListic arguments suitabLe for Life in the universe (some detaiLs justified is Like more something unique (though principte this need require of Hh3t may be met. In this humans we are Long-Lived stars Rnd stiLL much more than a weak is dragged in. It is enough, for seLeet ion, universe contains Locations, neighbourhood Sag3n). we're working at it); even on Terra much of the rest of the animat kingdom is simitarLy favoured. seLeet ion in priviLege of habitats miLLions suggest are to this: we are favoured in that the physicaL conditions for our existence, as observers, are hardLy due Our Location in the universe is priviLeged to the extent of is then: be',ng compatibLe with our existence as observers'. But this ciaim cs after in where fact heavy Like the earth, in the metaLs occur, and so on (for certain other pureLy geotogicaL features). BoLtzmann s expLanation of the present high degree of which Ls extremety improbabLe cosmic organisation (in a thermodynamicaL setting) is aiso said to appLy a weak anthropic principte ; witness this the onLy reason that we are priviLeged to exceedingLy untikeiy occurrence is that our very existence [etc.J -21- O.2.2.. �* depends upon the condition which atone can be bg estabiished remarkabte that (D p.123). But again onLg gross phgsicaL organisationat principLes fLuctuation are seLected for; and no more than a weak seLection principte is required. beveraL expLained , so Carter and Davies ci3im, be cannot coincidences simpig bg a weak principte (at Least in the muLti-universes). of is made to the strong (or better gLobaL) principte: appeaL these absence The universe ... must be such as to admit the creation of observers within it at some in barter s (p.120). formuLation exist is for manifesttg faLse. So, Cartesian paraphrase Carter gives of the strong different cogito ergo mundus taLis est . The worLd wouLd presumabtg not be principte, verg theg is this appaLLing the necessarg; the universe does. Rnd since observers mag verg easiLg never given have evotved in the universe, reasons, stage R coroLLarg of the strong principte in this heaviLg necessitated guise is that observers are conditionaLLg must For so different were the contingent premiss faLse; and certainLg the premiss mag Least be true but the cone Lus ion faLse. But at Loading, necessitg gets and principte the appropriate conctusion. For, propertg ideaLLg this the inferentiaL form, with the into formuLated, abandons paraphrase scheme the as is before, Law Like conditionaL of basic form, if F then T, where however T is a a genuinetg gLobaL cLaim that the universe is such 3nd such (e.g. the universe now contains more matter than radiation). The scheme, so then, recast is feature distinctive some theoreticaL LocaL strong the that T is hoListic assertion 3bout the universe, incLuding essentiaL reference to it, not, as it mag be on about of the weak principte, of the universe, which can readiLg be features stated or restated without reference to the universe. But the distinction is not particuiarLg important. The robust, troubie is it from 3 worLd-seLection gives Lt a misLeading most LawLike Mag requisite within consequent. For exampLe, there is stiLL no (egocentric) thought matter; to phgsicaLLg without Descartes God to puLL him out. universe the taiLor-made is for framework of idea - in essence it cLaims a wag Living organisms are subsequentig assured of existence. [So it is]... akin mankind to inhabit. products secuLar expLanations. teteoLogicaL R duLg cLaims anthropic worLd for (D p.121). Such erroneous presentations have done much to encourage both a new anthropocentrism and the idea that are unLike habitation, 3nd that both the Laws of to traditionaL retigious expLanation of the worLd: that God made the are from Hard as it is to credit, Carter is phgsics and the initiaL conditions obLigingLg arrange themseLves in such that an procLivitg to ideaiism exceLLed bg Davies, who sags of the strong principte that that in route respectabLe Carter's (exhibited in C2)), he mag weLL get stuck in the argue to bounds to the intended phgsicaL given and of satisfactorg impression antecedents for the scheme, and makes it presentLg impossibLe appropriateLg verg perspective Carter's extravagant Cartesian paraphrase of the strong with that is principte nor on a par reformuLated Davies with, strong and in schema expLanations anthropic competition supports design with, none of the makes regarding the universe. Nor, as wiLL appear, expLanations, when made presentabLe, -22- akin to retigious �features of the worLd. The expLanations take different LogicaL of explanations forms and LnvoLve quite different ingredients. To see what is reaLLy required for the strong schema to operate, it pays to Look at Then appLications. it becomes evident observercentric that considerations are strictLy irreLevant. Once again far stronger, and biocentric more dubious, conditions than are required for the estimates actuaLLy made been For introduced. instance, (BoLtamann) K, is a good exampLe of a prediction based on what strong' anthropic principLe' (C p.23^); (8) is as foLLows: K aLL f < that is 2 " Tl_ 5 have according to Carter, his condition (8), which imposes an order of magnitude upper bound on cosmoLogicaL But and constant may be termed the 3 ' "P , P invoLved in obtaining this bound, retevance, is the of assumption that ' the un iverse is not radiation dominated aLL its [finite] Life (i.e. that the matter contribution ... to the mean mass density ... becomes greater at some stage Insofar this as is than the necessary radiation (C ...)' contribution pp.233-^.). at aLL - since the estimates concern onLy very broad features, and not LocaL variations - it is 3s necessary for Lichen as for Larkspurs. DLL that is required is a sLightLy stronger worLd seLection principLe than mereLy that worLd contain heavier eLements at some stage; but stiLL the onLy a gLobaL geophysicaL principLe. Rnd this is aLL that here. The same set of points amounts to appLies to Carter's further use of the strong principLe, to estimate the Lower bound on K, which appLies the conventionaL that gaLax Les ... are formed by condensation, starting as reLativeLy hypothesis smaLL density fLuctuations in an otherwise homogeneous further The strength tendentious assumption in background (C p.2St+). this appiication is that gaiaxies are necessary for the formation of stars and hence of Life (C p.23!*). NonetheLess there are arguments for the strong anthropic principLe, though faLLacious ones obviousLy. They come firstLy from positivism. It is cLaimed that if the universe exists then it must be observabLe; so there must be observers - a modaL faLLacy. Davies (in his exposition of Barrow and not argues universe which from the faLse premiss that onLy what is observed exists, that a did then others) admit observers is meaningLess' (D p.I21). This is ideaListic garbage. They come secondLy from an aLLeged expianatory rote, in expLaining coincidences. But it is unnecessary for this purpose as initiaL worLd seLection wiLL serve. They come thirdLy from human chauvinism; thus, too human existence is said to be responsibLe for the very speciaL structure of the universe' (D p.121)! The connection is not however causaL; so what is it supposed There is be: teLeoLogicaL? thus a serious probLem as to how this responsibitity, hardLy evident, is exercised. FinaLLy a strong principLe might uniformity to - one principLe to cover be argued for on grounds of aLL cases. But better a weaker correct -23- �principLe than a strong faLse or geophgsicaL principLe wouLd suffice Rnd principLe. dubious doubt no a weaker aLL phgsicaL constants. (Of course, for there reMains the natter of this worLd seLection. This worLd does exhibit Life, incLude hunans, and so on. But these features, Like the present species of does eucaLgpts expLanations, or reLevant, cLasses of worids.)"^ and are RnusingLg, astroLogicaL and More converses hunan affairs; white under gerMane not the to extravagant anthropic principies are to astroLogg, ceiestiaL events infLuence anthropic hunan anaLogue, affairs infLuence CeiestiaL events and processes incLude those of the sun. Moon events ceiestiaL its are abstracted fron in seLecting expLanatorg Recording other. each of wonbats, grazing of whereabouts and and other pLanets (especiaLLg). Rnd these certaintg appear to have an (indirect) weak infLuence, especiaLLg through the soLar atMosphere and pLanetarg Large pLasMas, on terrestriaL phenoMena (Fegerabend, p.93). The anthropic converse, in this forM danagingtg anthropocentric and exhibiting an excess of hubris, is Much further froM the truth. Not just the anthropocentric, but the eMphasis of nuMericat features. Rnd despite the bioLogicaL anaLogies, just Lt,ke explanation seLection without vaLues, so even Rs are there there is seLection without seLectors. More, RLthough seLection is sonetiMes accoMpiished through seLectors, often takes not is naturaL seLection. It is not seLection for, for fitness, survivaL, or whatever. Nor, More iMportant is it seLection bg, bg soMe agent. vaLues MispLaced. is insistence, Life is not essent-iaL in Mang worids Le^Lie Despite biocentric seLection without seLecters, randonig or otherwise - this tiMe as in naturaL pLace seLection, which does not require a personified Nature to do the have evoLutionarg theories as/oid ageneg. In avoiding ageneg, seLection is Like that seLecting, as enphasised. Such expLanation can straightforwardig of Darwinian evoLut- ionarg theorg; and seLection contrasts with direction as incLuded in aLternative evoLutionarg Though accounts (cf. DarLington, p.l^ff). anthropic principies coMe in a varietg of forMs, depending upon how the conditionaL scheMa ^nvoLved is fitted out, none of theM, then, does what is saud, none depends essentiaLLg on the presence of huMans, or of Life. SgntacticaLLg, theg etaborate usuaLLg status quo arguMents, of forM L), with factuaL fir^t preMis^ F concerning the state of the worLd LocaLLg (weak forM) whoLe (strong seLection forM). SenanticaLLg, or as a the factuaL preMisses function as worLd principies; theg serve to Mark out the cLass of phgsicaL wortds or to narrow then down to these or those, e.g. to those where heavier eieMents such as carbon occur, those where Long-Lived stars, such as the sun, appear. It is that carbon is sonetiMes taken to provide an "order-of-Magnitude" approxiMation for Life (that is the nearest Long-Lived star is supposed to to hunans provide that the the "approxinations" get); Life as the arguMents a steadg warMth required for the evoLution of Life (but Long-Lived stars, water, and heavier objects are as to true near need get). But these additionaL, and nore dubious, detaiis are unnecessarg for the Main thrust of status quo arguMents, as distinct -24- �from their anthropic 3nd biocentric augmentations. meet Given that the worids seiected are of this and that cast - in generai geophgsicai gross Less, up the to constraints — other features of them can be derived (more or standards rough accepted in and physics) in expLained, particuLar, how and that it is that certain (fundamentaL) physicaL constants Lie in restricted ranges, narrow and unexpected ranges. These arguments, duty fitted out, do provide exp Lanations, non-causat exp Lanations, of physicaL features of a contingent, mereLy LmprobabLe universe. Much there is, however, in these most ctaims, that has been contested, from the psycho LogicaL such of inadequacy a universe to the worth of such expLanations, if expLanations they are at aLL. objections to the cosmo-LogicaL synthesis; and finding unLikety, an in comfort and with Prob Lems mereLy universe. contingent, Somehow contingent universes have acquired the reputation of being coLd, remote and uncaring - a not habitat for sensitive creatures. But the reputation is undeserved, since fit contingency does not bear on any of these things. Mhat is contingent can be just as weLL as coLd or neither; caring or not, so far as the appLication sense aLL; at and hot makes so on. One can be warm and comfortabLe in bed on a wet and wintry night. One can be at home, comfortabLe in, in tune with, a tiny part of an improbabLe universe, as some tribaL peopLes are. None of these virtues are Ln any way undermined by contingency, matter of a necessary universe. or aLways assured by the quite separate a degree of harmony between us Furthermore, there can be, or have evoLved, and our surroundings , without principLes, as that our worse, that the universe is universe such exaggerated cLaims, on based anthropic are very speciaL and tuned to us' or, surroundings made for us'. Me humans can be in with tune the without having the universe tuned to us, as we can foLLow and ornament a song on the wind or in the woods. But so far, especiaLLy recentLy, we humans coLLectiveLy are not doing too weLL in attuning oursetves to the worLd. Rs this iLLustration begins to metaphysicaL and psychoLogicaL reveaL, predeLiction^ may pLay a not inconsiderabte rote in choice of, and ornamentation of, physicaL theory, especiaLLy of controvers LaL theories such as quantum theory and cosmoLogicaL theory. In the case of such theories there is a certain bag technicaL so to say tricks, tricks, equations and so on, which are de rigeur - a theory-skeLeton - and beyond that both an interpretation and setting for the bag integrating of theM and suppLying of with some sort of meaning, and them usuaLLy aLso some further formaLism connecting the tricks together or to a wider theoreticaL background. For exampLe, even in accounts of too much in the way of interpretation theory where is commonLy frowned upon, extensive correspondence ruLes Linking the formaLism with upon quantum cLassicaL physics are retied heaviLy. Rt Least for everything beyond the theory-skeLeton, which is what is appLied in most concrete day-to-day appLications of the theory, there is much room for rivaL fLeshing out of the skeLeton - Latitude -25- such as there is in �archeological reconstructions of peoples from some scattered bones. Recasting quantum theorg, as in the mang-worlds interpretation, offers not as merelg a basis for fleshing out the theorg non-idealisticallg, but for combining it with general to subject much of the criticism, much of it directed more broadlg at most Happilg as However such recasting, when not reLativitg. largelg ignored (the common fate of nonstandard theories), is criticism. well plural world theories in general, misses the neutral modification. There are firstlg a batch of aesthetic and ontological objections. These commonlg take off from the of unattractiveness duplication or replication of profligate such worLds. LJeLL, tastes and vaLues, Like intuitions, do varg with sub-cuLture. Some of us, who escaped over-exposure to worlds the ReaLitg do PrincipLe, stories illuminating and attractive, indeed verg inviting. So, next, the whole thing is said to be unbelievable: no one can reasonabLg existence believe worLds nonetheless, especiaLLg in explanation. these in (the these unlimited numbers of universes. Granted, we do not believe of) in this either. These other worLds do not exist; but we can make of neutral find heavg Load of objections carrging on about excess use extensive In this wag we avoid a baqgage. ontic also Ue main criticisms based on Occam s razor. (RLL these objections are short-circuit met, in much detail, in JB.) Linked to such Occamist protests are a batch of objections that are pictures worlds effect the to over-engineered, both too complex 3nd including too much baggage. Thus in thermodgnamics a smalt fluctuation producing some order is more LikeLg than one producing Lots of order, one galaxg more LikeLg than Lihg do similarlg we not find ourselves in a one galaxg universe, which is far more LikeLg? The answer is in part: because Less LikeLg contingencies hold. Is the ubiquitg No, (D p.123)? mgsterg instance, the on the commenting of of numbers approaches reasons. in these unwarranted presuppositions. The that the universe was set others Like be explained. For Dicke Thus and Peebles remark, in of the universe for a few conscious individuals, overdesign revealed well one of a thing is itself verg unlikelg. Find just special can, that a single galaxg cosmos might be ruled out bg the can observed galaxies in our universe ... therefore a such evolution further there mag be mang. up Mach's Moreover, principle. questions and remarks are based on various overdesign" for idea, for example, presupposes some individuals; but the worlds picture correctLg avoids thLS assumption. The things in this world that exist happen to be there, probable or not, and often, for reasons we can sometimes explain, not. But there is tittle solid evidence that theg are arranged, for us or others. In its original form the unfocussed "overdesign" objection was mainlg directed at cruder anthropic principles, as were unverifiabilitg and unfalsifiabilitg. a batch of objections The well-worn criticism, that notorious psgchoanalgtic and Marxist principles did too much, being so designed that covered everg protested that case, was redirected from against anthropic principles. it is hard to see how the anthropic principLe can be It used theg was to make testable predictions, because ang theorg inconsistent with our existence is �4 M3nLfestLg Not faLse . such protests been weakened bg avant garde have onLg phLLosophg of science, but, as Carter has poLnted out, anthropLc arguments couLd varLous Ln prLncLpLe have been used to predLct theg Rnd notLced. were faLsLfLcatLon, e.g. where erroneous that unLLkeLg assumptLons prLncLpLes, regards Rs fLrst). under but Ls worLd-sgnthesLs, aLL that worLds the whether Ln wLth cosmoLog Les and of verLfLcatLonLst seLectLon whLch semantLcs, or phgsLcs exLst, LnvoLved of themes objectLons do have some verLfLabLLLtg vLrtue of what Ls meant bg bg bg neutraLLsed ex Lsttng. But the force of these objectLons Ls theorg. as conversLon, object-theorg Granted LnterpretatLon. of Often, Lt (though of weaker forms wouLd be abandoned, other surrendered force agaLnst mang-worLds theories, assume derLved object Lons are LargeLg mLsdLrected, because what are at Lssue are phgsLcaL semantLcs, are coLncLdences premLss factuaL be wouLd verLfLabLLLtg not the anthropLc arguments do admLt of of 3ssumptLons the before coLncLdences numerLcaL neutraL worLds objectLons, the crLtLcLsms of mang-worLd such prLncLpLes anthropLc as geophgsLcaL or prLncLpLes are LntertwLned, and dLsentangLLng the crLtLcLsms Ls enough to partLg So them. def Late aLso wLth the reLated charge th3t the neutraL worLd- Ls Lt sgnthesLs theorg Ls unscLentLfLc or at much turns Least dubLousLg scLentLfLc.PLaLnLg on what Ls admLtted Lnto that esteemed categorg, scLentLfLc. But on most accounts, use of seLectLon prLncLpLes succeeds Ln gettLng LncLuded. Rnd so, pLaLnLg enough, does mang-worLds quantum theorg. Rfter 3LL, Lt has 3pproxLmateLg as the same sorts of predLcatLve and test capabLLLtLes more That fact of narrow empLrLcaL LndLstLnguLshabLLLtg mag be the source of theorg. other compLaLnts, but Lt gtves no ground for the charge worLd Ls seLectLon prLncLpLes excLuded! are It at hand. of scLentLfLc and theorLsLng experLmentLng true that some theoretLcaL and wouLd (per prefer LmpossLbLe) and wantLng to st Lek to a uLtLmate and unLfLed expLanatLons. No doubt such semantLcaL apparatus does faLL fouL of the the substance of the charge, consLder some of the crLterLa often beLng theLr theorg narrower sLmpLg reveaLs further serLous defects Ln such vLews. But to reach that vLews: fuLLer the narrower (hgpothetLco-deducttve) methodoLogg, are uneasg wLth worLds seLectLon, sureLg But phgsLcLsts, and mang phLLosophers, LosLng sLght of what enters Lnto range quantum orthodox scLentLfLc. UnfaLsLfLabLe? SureLg set down for Ln areas where the framework Ls not pLnned down bg phgsLcaL theorg. OvercompLLcated and LnsuffLcLentLg gLven what the worLds theorg Ls Lntended to accompLLsh sLmpLe? Not (e.g. the semantLcaLLg theoretLcaL work Lt Ls aLso put to Ln areas such 3s LLnguLstLcs). Etc., etc. Perhaps the most teLLLng theorLes LLke worLd—sgntheses objectLons whLch agaLnst LncLude status quo arguments, and them, concern theLr expLsnatorg capacLtg. StrangeLg theg have been condemned both as expLaLntng too much - ang thLng at aLL can be brought out Ln some worLd - and as expLaLnLng too LLttLe and beLng trLvLaL. Not both these objectLons are LLkeLg to succeed, as theg tend to undercut one another. IndependentLg, Lt seems cLear that the arguments do provLde expLanatLons, for LnvoLved Lnstance, of the strength of the strong nucLear force. It aLso seems cLear that the expLanatLons afforded are of vargLng -27- depth, �+ depending in part on the depth of the underlying physicaL theory invoLved, this and the pLausibiLity of the further assumptions made in the arguments. Better exempiific3tions of status quo arguments in physics satisfy not oniy more ordinary requirements for expLanation; they aLso meet assembLed conditions considerable time, by HempeL, mainstream the which conditions on position demanding for represented, some what counted as a scientific expLanation. Furthermore, the chief objections to have more the HempeLian the account that emerged have been to the effect that it is too rigorous, not that it faiLs to provide jointLy sufficient conditions for expLanation. To make a prima facie case that better status quo arguments do provide exp Lanations, it is enough then show to expLanation LogicaL HempeL s that conditions on the (p.2t+7ff) have been met. By contrast conditions design with scientific of the arguments, 3re satisfied. The expLanandum T is a LogicaL adequacy of pattern basic consequence of the physicaL argument eLaborating the schemas F, if F then T; the expLanans has empiricaL content, at Least in the shape of expLanans F; which connection if F then T, provides expLanans are true, Uere a foLLows from arguments using physicaL Laws. FinaLLy, the demanding empiricaL condition of adequacy, that the premisses used in the is satisfied in better status quo arguments. the basic pattern aLso necessary for scientific expLanation, it wouLd be an easy coroLLary that many poorer status quo arguments fait to provide expianations (beginning with Carter s and Descartes is there the and contains general, Laws which are actuaLLy used in the derivation. For, in better status quo arguments, the conditionaL schema, Law Like premiss much quo status that such Cogito arguments), and that arguments cannot presentLy expLain decentLy, '^ncLuding such major puzzLes as Life and inteLLigence in the LocaL worLd. It can be independentLy argued, moreover, that poorer status quo arguments, which patentLy (or short meeting HempeLian conditions, fait to generate satisfactory of satisfying) expianations. TriviaL, dogmatic, forms, such as that things 3re the way they are because that is how they are, represent a virtuaLLy worse of sort. this But possibie. weakening to principte, that what The universe is inhabitabie, because we are here, because ask Forrest so is aLso humans inhabit The universe is suited to inteLLigent Life because there are peopLe such questions upon). focusses inferences, is sLightLy embroidered, are arguments with connecting principLes Such, the earth , case better, or more informative, are those arguments scarceLy which appLy the possibility Like faLL (exampies adapted from the sorts of anthropic arguments These short; patentLy faLL arguments, which they LnvoLve offer no aimost immediate further appropriate basic (HempeLian) argumentation making use of generaL Laws. Given that better status quo arguments do afford scientific expianations, and given further that the arguments do serve to remove and not without predictive force, why have they been genuine puzzLement fauLted as expianations, and sometimes criticised 3S not providing expianations are at aLL (e.g. Forrest)? The main reason offered, that back-to-front , these "expianations" are appears to rest on the assumption that aLL genuine expLanation -28- �shouLd be broadLg causaL, and accordingLg exhibit (time-) the direction or controi. Status quo expLanations are certainLg not causaL, and mag causation weLL run counter to causaL direction, expLaining features of the earig the through of distribution present universe of eLements. That is, however, perfectLg in order. For satisfactorg expLanation is not causaLLg restricted either ordinariLg or scientificaLLg. HempeL suppLies severaL different sorts of pattern basic of causaLLg or controL directed (pp.352-3). EspeciaLLg striking in this exampLe opticaL straightforward his of his which are not causaL expLanation or expLanation scientific exampLes regard is a particuLar event...satisfactoriLg of expLained bg reference to subsequent occurrences'; but his exampLe of two-wag where the period of a penduLum serves to expLain the Length of the expLanation, penduLum as weLL as converseLg, is aLso highLg re Levant. For it is too expiaining commonLg assumed numericaL that shouLd coincidences be the presence of water, carbon and the Like in the universe, not vice versa. But there is no iLLuminating reason quo status whg direction shouLd expLanation the instead not in run the as weLL as, vice versa. That of, iLLuminating direction is after aLL from the famiLiar to the much Less famiLiar, and more in need of expLanation. such It is true of course that more simpig means that status quo expLanations ad hominem stgLe of status quo expLanation, for are. Like expLanations, most further unreasonabLg stop deeper expLanation. The expLanation-stopping forms are and form: contraposed inquirers verg for expLanation if it weren t so gou woutdn t be here to ask the question. However such put-downs (in the envisaged persistent Legitimate the those (which Forrest discusses) where the response to a request for the Long. wouLd contexts) not more charge, damaging feature of the universe, Then PF. seLecting worLds where PF hoLds. But the theorg. the then, is that worLd-sgnthesis can expLain too much. The charge is backed up bg the foLLowing sort of consideration. puzzLing deter Theg wouLd be awag in search of further expLanations, such as better status quo arguments mag furnish (at Least for t ime be ing). The not begin in the middLe wag. Nor do theg, except in speciaL, rather theg uLtimate: takes famiLiar, the presence of water and carbon, aLso caLLs for expLanation; but that as quest the charge it Take ang can be expLained simpig bg misrepresents worLd-sgnthesis There is more to it than this. There is a cruciaL argumentative Linkage aLso invoLved, between PF and gross geophgsicaL features of the worLds (near factuaL worLd T) which are seLected. Or, put differentig, the seLection does not take pLace on basis the of PF, but (mereLg) under the constraint of gross geophgsicaL features; accordingLg if the argumentative Linkage from satisfactorg status quo arguments worLd-sgnthesis. is missing, PF is not to be expLained through In short, then, worLd-sgnthesis theorg offers expLanations when bg and then the expLanations mag varg greatLg in quaLitg depending on the depth of the phgsicaL the framework is suitabLg fLeshed out phgsicaL theorg; information invoLved in the argumentative Linkage. EssentiaLLg the same points undermine Forrest's further objection to such -2?- �many-worLds explanation, truths; contingent have we aLL do to coaches easiLy as the pumpkins of turning numericsL coincidences. But there is no such free as seLection of phusicaL worLds - which do not incLude worLds vaLidating magicaL as faiL, can schema connecting arbitrary and practices. Status quo expianations may not be easy transformations at aLL, but physicaLLy comp Lex, they are not atways and they as is to posit suitabLy many and varied (p.9). Thus the theory is aLLeged to expLain worLds into that it "expLains" contingent faLsehoods as easiiy an when assumption invoLved easiLy avaiLabte, and the eLaboration of the in , and the argumentative schema issues in a contingent faiLs faLsehood. For a necessary condition that a status quo expianation be successfuL is that the argument be correct; but then given that the argument form is vaiid, the cone Lus ion cannot be simpiy f aLse. is It that satisfactory expianations, with conforming to such conditions of adequacy as deductive vaiidity in and quo status expianations winning in expianations differ from decisiveLy design which are sometimes seen as on an expianatory LeveL competition with status quo and expianations their piuraL-worLds setting (thus e.g. LesLie), and sometimes even confused with them. Design arguments characteristicaLLy take the deductiveLy invaLid abductive modus toLLens form: Things are (surprisingLy) so and so F If a design hypothesis heLd (e.g. the universe anticipated observers, a design-force operated), things woutd be (unsurprisingLy) so and so. If H then F Therefore, a design hypothesis (probabLy) hoLds. .. H Nor in design arguments is the connecting schema normaLLy eLaborated by appropriate scientific argument; nor, where God is invoked, i§; there any way of suitabLy confining the argument scientificaLLy. Thus support first the LesLie's of Larger cLaims is faLse:- the LiorLd EnsembLe hypothesis rather than the God hypothesis. !^e do not have...strong evidence of an EnsembLe' (LI, p.150). for Science does not their existence No branch of physics in a way commanding wide acceptance (LI, p.S3). The main reason is that the Bod hypothesis is not part of a physicaL theory that many-worLd theory is caLLs in the way of quantum theory (thus, e.g., there is no physics text corresponding to DeLiitt and Graham for the God hypothesis), [^hiie the Last cLaim is true, it does not teLL against the truth of neutraL many-worLds theory. Uhat science supports is science, not the the metaphysics it presupposes. Physics is not however aLL of science by any means, and even science doesn't do everything, onLy a rather narrow seLection of things. Richard SyLvan -30- 11 �RPPENDIX 1. Some Rncient Rntecedents The Non-Limited is the originaL materiaL of existing things; further the source] from which existing things derive their existence is a iso that to which they' return at their destruction, according to necessity [for reparation]... —----- So, in the 6th Century B.C., said Rnaximander, perhaps among the first aLso to set down a story of the evoLution of humankind.Something the same was said in text, though on the favoured taLe a Heideggerean and Taoist touch was Lent, the with Nothingness repLacing the Non-Limited. In the on beginning, there was nothing; and uLtimateLy, too, there wiLL be nothing. have been paid. The p3raLLeL with Rnaximander can be pressed further. In account origins, of of worLd the contemporary charged pairs of particLes are created in the oppositeLy 'the order, wiLL Reparation process of pair formation from the vacuum; white in Rnaximander's story formation story, this opposites the of which are present Ln the one [the Non-Limited], are separated out from it' (but 'the "opposites" are the hot, coLd, the dry the , the moist, and the rest : see Robinson p.25). There is aLso a phenomenon which corresponds to some Limited extent to the Big Bang, nameLy Vortex. the It seems cLear, however, from the materiaL Burnet assembLes, that Rnaximander's position amounted to the first Less satisfactory resoiution, matter or substance aLways. For the BoundLess or Infinite was a materiaL cause, -^*-*dstance (p. 5k<); it is eternaL and ageLess is brought about the origin of the worids. did — Further, according to SimpLicius, not ascribe the origin of things to any aLteration of matter, but said that the oppositions separated encompasses aLL worids substance". RLso there is in it eternaL motion, in which which makes it a queer he and out . If in that the substratum was which a boundLess body, were is right — and it may not be, especiaLLy given Later ontotogicaL infLuences (cf. p.61) - then the matter is cLear. Rnaximander beiieved there were innumerabLe worids (p.58). These worids were concurrent, not successive. coex istent remains uncLear, but Later in the Whether Bound Less" they tradition (biassed) took them exist, making Rnaximander's position a many-existent-wortds theory. The to Law of compensation, under which for borrowing or variation reparation must be made, becomes the Law of repayment aLL were of conservation. The reparation paraLLeLs the borrowed" mass-energy. The more generaL steering of aLL things - overarching order in naturaL processes - becomes the Laws of nature which govern (reguLate) the processes. 'The orderLiness ... is grounded in the nature of things as such . Rnaximander's account represents an immenseLy -31- important stage in the �transition from world-order is myth from science. to first to ... Last 'Hesiod's account of the origin of the anthropomorphic. account Rnaximanders represents, in principLe, a complete break with this mode of thought (Robinson p.27). From this angle the anthropic and idealistic fixes of contemporary science show marked regression. That transition, beyond anthropic creation stories, is also accomplished in the main philosophical essentials of the favoured resolution can where Taoism, be found. Something flowed from nothing, in a seemingly paradoxical way? but not through ang creation or agency. There was a the before time when beginning nothing at aLL existed. The problem of Laws (of nature) was also recognised, and resolved. did Laws not exist (independently at least of things that did) but were exhibited in in things that did exist. So it seems to follow that, stage at restricted property to duty what separated, and was mainly Lacking ascriptions Taoism Such nothing. a and deep in cosmogonic tales, then, from the ^.th C. B.C. until the 20th C., was a plausible explanatory story as to how come from together. of does exist. (Fuller details of Taoist cosmology, under this type of interpretation, are ventured in ecology', written with D. Bennett.) Mhat the which nothing existed, the taws could hold without having 3ny sort of existence, i.e. truth and existence were existence at story a few something could humans are Just beginning to piece NOTES Thi^ passage from Misner, Thorne and Uheeter, p.1212, is given an appropriately grander setting Ln the text. The passage Ls also quoted by DavLes, G p.222, who Lt to Wheeler. In Davies the idea of ascribes foundations for cosmology simple and unassailable Logical is given a different exposure, and is then linked with restrictions, to zero, on God s range of choice of universe to make. 2 Especially by those whose inquisitiveness and sense of blunted or destroyed by the mainstream culture and its wonder h3s educational not been practices, practices much mainstream philosophy reinforces and tries to justify. 3 Indolent philosophers tend to assign those of these questions that they write off (e.g. as semantically defective or as betraying philosophical uonfuslon or hang—upz?) to science. But they are not Just a matter for and scientists tend to come up with philosophically loaded, naive, theories scientists remain, insofar as they address the cannot questions and at often science; enough all. Too many Like too many RustraLian phiLosophers, in the grips of awfuL metaphysics, such as narrow empiricism and/or physicaiism. -32- �^The anaLysis semantical It of naturaL a is Law is that' Law-constrained worLds, naturaL worids. The interpretation ruLe for necessity. Terra, appLy but to Like is It shouLd be noted that geophysicaL features, appLied in seLecting worLds, are not of course confined to systems. in terns of geophysicaL pLanetary other "Rn eLaboration of this type of answer can be further expLoited to heLp why actuaL the standard ot worLd is science expLain comparativeLy so that simpLe, mathematicaLLy tractabLe, etc. HameLy, it is convenientLy so because the actuaL worLd seLection invoLved impLicitLy to render it so, by choice of a serves worLd with the compLexity of richer worLds removed and onLy tractabLe ideaL etements (such as scientific universaLs) adjoined. &RLtern3tiveLy, through quantum and borrowing positive feedback, a massive firebaLL forms. The story admits of much variation. ? The prob Lems, as the questions of the Lattice in diagram 2 indicate, what expLaining phiLosophers does exist, Lie with what does not. In a reLated way, 3LL those not papers on the prob Lems nonexistence of and nonexistents have misjudged the prob Lernatic, and misconceived the onus of proof. For commonLy the probLems concern existents and their behaviour; nonexistents, especiaLLy those functioning in expLanatory rotes as regards existentiai often behaviour, are very weLL behaved by comparison with existents. It has been suggested, by D. Lewis, that the underLying theory of items (of JB) renders everything exists. But it nonexistent, is and makes it 3 reaL probLem, how anything patentiy faLse that the theory of items render everything nonexistent. There are criteria for existence, which are often JB, chapter 9). Every thing nominaLists normaLLy take to satisfied (cf. exist satisfies the to be justified; it cannot (with any pretension to satisfactoriness) just be cLaimed, in the fashion of so many phiLosophers. In any case, Lewis can be simuLated: whatever ind iv idua Ls exist criteria. Beyond that existence has in Lewis worLds wiLL exist in worids-seLection theory. Rnd it is. a genuine phiLosophicaL probLem how anything exists. g in 19t+6; see his cosmoLogicaL text. Llhitrow aLso appLied, more than RpparentLy a quarter of a century ago, PrincipLe , in his what has now been eLevated to the Rnthropic answer to why the dimensions of space are three; nameLy, th3t this atone permits the evoLution of Nan, the formuiator of the probLem'. However 'Uhitrow's reasons concern not mankind but stabLe pLanetary orbits and compLex neurai networks' (LI, p.!^). g Compare the binding energy which keeps etectrons bound to a nucLeus, where correiativeiy energy stored up in overcoming forces of repuLsion is positive. -33- �e a story couLd be totd to bring Laws within the expLanation framework. However It wouid teLLing invoLve Laws first evoLved or happened to hoLd, the how before vacuum fLuctuations. (For some interesting specuLation, from which the ontic and anthropic commitment can be removed without totaL Loss, see Barrow pp. 151-2, where "chaotic gauge theory" is considered.) The issue of uLtimate is expLanation again up taken seLf-justifying postulate as serving refLexive, expLanation. Note that in UQ, to the resoLve the matter the especiaLLy of probLem uLtimate, PostuLate Characterisation a of of object-theory is an initiaLLy promising candidate for such a principte. issue is that, on the story as toLd, quantum phenomena assume Another serious decidedLy they course Of macro-dimensions. may, Schrodinger s cat iLLustrates, but perhaps not in the parabLe the as supposed of catastrophic form. In the absence of any approved quantization of general, reLativity, there onLy are Lax physicaL controis on what is in and what is out in specuLation here. Rnd, of course, the second story couid There are other mechanisms for the sudden be rise in eLaborsted other ways. e.g. white mass-energy, of ho Les in geometrodynamics. In his second paper, Tryon makes a rather casuaL beginning on meeting some of difficuLties the with the vacuum fLuctuation theory the cosmos, and of expLains the advantages of combining the theory with that of a (stiLL probLematic) "infLationary" universe, to boost the fLuctuation. But the theory stiLL awaits aporopriateLy detaiLed deveiopment and modeLLing. 12 There are various other issues concerning the physicaL constants, incLuding the question of the (sLow) evoLution of "constants" over time. LJeLL, do evoLve, the they if same sort of probLems arise for the parameters which repLace them (L.e. at each time t, for c(t)). There are putative arguments to the effect that there can be no very grand unified theory, and no finaL eLimination of constants, because any such theory wouid do too much in determ in ing the worLd (and things). But it is unctear at present how such an argument gets duty eLaborated. R tight argument uneLiminabiLity of some physicaL constants from physicaL principLes for the wouLd be of much interest. 13 Th',s is what is reaLLy accompLLshed in Carter. To some extent we have emerging in this area a contemporary scientific numeroLogy. 1L Convergence arguments, e.g. for such things as the Church-Turing thesis, underLying connections, but not co-operation. l^Even Less, seemingLy, is the universe an accident, 'an event proceeding from an unknown cause; something unexpected; a casuaLty, a mishap, l&If however the worLd reaLLy were necessary, such improbabiLity must be grossLy -34- �reduced. How can that be: how can these contingencies be not what theg seem? 1? How M3ng worLds? ContinuousLg mang worLds? There is no reason whg not. But the answer is: as mang at Least as required. In object-theorg numbers don t short matter though much, so difficuLties technccaL controL Ls advantage. an are There as to measures, e.g. of fewness, in infinite modeLLings. Yet the notions are Ln order, e.g. among the naturaL numbers primes are few. 18 point, ThL^, and the inestimabLLitg specific of probabLLLties Ln (e.g. Ls argued, though in insufficient detaiL, bg TouLmLn among others meteoroLogg) Bg the wag, sureLg a creator wouLd have increased probabLLitLes bg seeing to a unLverse for fit decent habitation; a variation upon the argument from evLL infiltrates itseLf Ln probabiLitg guise here. 13 worked There are in fact mang proposed soLutions, most of them not theg (because far verg out have onLg few proponents), most of them not comprehensive certainLg (but it couLd be argued that this is a faLse ideaL), severaL of them discussed bg Everett, DeMLtt, Lande and others. 20 MheeLer s sequentiaL modeL another, so satisfgLng the theorg (Like certain offers a simitar range of worLds, but one after 'reaLLtg principLe". EarLLer MheeLer had adopted cosmoLogies) Eastern with in muLtLpLLcitg a both sequent La LLg and Lnto the possibLe; but recent Lg he has abandoned dimen^Lon^,, the Latter, partig on erroneous ontoLogLcaL grounds. 21 It Ls of course not the onLg reaLLstLc-stgie LnterpretatLon whLch does thLs: envisage everu Lande s LnterpretatLon is another. 22 From a neutraL viewpoint, Lt ts entLreLg taLse that atom ... as Me must constantLg engaging in this tgpe of scattering sctLvitg, therebg spLLtting the worLd again and again Lnto a stupendous number carbon-copLes of of LtseLf. The unLverse must therefore be LLkened to a tree, whLch branches 3nd (D p.I25). Nor Ls rebranches universe. 23 To anticipate, schemas of what the form, happens "if the tree-structured sgstern of universes the is as foLLows:- The antecedents of "anthropic" there exist so and so [e.g. observers] then ang phgsLcaL worLds must be such and such", are appLLed to phgsLcaL worLds. Rs there certainLg do exist so and so, narrow ctass the phgsLcaL worLds of are restricted to those that are such and such. gL It cs stLLL reasonabLe to 3sk whg - indeed to e.g. whg do we inhabit it?, whence a Long pose' severaL whg questions, evoLutionarg storg. Mhg are the constants those theg are?, then aLternative answers, LncLudLng brute fact, are among the possibiLities. -35- �roundLg defeated Shapiro. 26 bg the sorts considerations advanced bg Feinberg and of Davies aLso suggests that mang-worLds theorg can provide a pLausibLe phgsicaL (as opposed to phiLosophicaL) justification for the strong principte (D p.122 middLe). In fact he never reaLLg shows this satisfactoriig (nor can it be so shown), and in pointing to the power of the m3ng—universe theorg he undermines the strong principte, showing it otiose. 2? arguments are presented in modat form, with the connecting quo status Often scheme set in either necessitated form, if F that) (e.g. T if exist there necessaritg then (it if possibLe modaLities are de dicto and and that invoLved cLaims the It such). if F then T. The modaLitg invoLved is not one of LogicaL contingent nomic of that strength, but can be adequateLg NecessariLg, necessitg, an The error. argument guarantee the concLusion, NecessariLg T, nor does it pretend form these or even in Lowest common denominator form. To attach the (reLative) modaLitg simpig to consequent T wouLd be second is 'it is more than mereLg rather reads that seems represented, as usuaL, through a necessitated connecting schema, one F form, (e.g. what is the case LocaLLg (what observers observe, T etc.) is onLg possibLe if phgsics is such aLwags be and so, then the universe must have, or so conform to, such and such features), or, in quasi-transcendentaL onLg must to do does not so. The is a LittLe more probLematic; but it appears to assert that F is inconsistent with not-T, and so, through obvious connections, the same as the rectified first form. 28 Mhat we have are devices, that fragments of theories, ruLes thumb, of appear to work in a range of cases. and caLcuLating It is these parts that mag generate successfuL technoiogg. The picture is Like engineering. 29 R main charge made bg LesLie against mang-worid cosmoLogies, e.g. LI, p.l^Sff. It is a surprising turn, given the popuLaritg of hgpothetico-deductive methodoLogg, to have it aLso objected that mang-worLd theorg voids induction. Putting chance in controL of inter-worLd differences erodes confidence in our sampLe of ReaLitg, on which our inductions are based' (LI, p.1^.3). this objection gets off the ground (it is transparentLg Insofar cLear as that it does), it depends on assuming the reaLitg of the entire worLd ensembLe. So Lt not Lapses against a neutraL theorg. 30 R reLated phitosophicaLLg important exampLe where the schema does so far is in Moore s proof of an externaL worLd, noted above. The reason is that the existence of arbitrarg materiaL objects, such as hands or does f3it not guarantee that the requirements (order, isoLated unitg, cabbages, coherence, mcnd-cndependence, etc.) for an externaL worLd are satisfied. 31 Rn earLier version of this paper was presented at the RustraLasian Rssociation of PhiLosophg Conference, Rugust 138^. The -36- heLpfuL comments bg David �Rrmstrong, Brian Ellis and David Lewis, unreferenced above, were the discussion. commentaries; Both several made during John Leslie and Jack Smart supplied me with worthwhile their points have been incorporated, but some have of been resisted. The initial Univerity preprint series. version W3S published in an Rustralian National 32^ See Freeman, p.IS. for fuller discussion of need for reparation, see Burnet. Rnaximander's on position; the REFERENCES J.D. Barrow, Rnthropic definitions', Quarterly Journal of Royal the Rstroncmical Society 21^ ( 1983) lt+6-153 H. Bondi, Cosmology, Second edition, Cambridge University Press, I960. R, Brout, F. Englert and F. Gunzig, The creation of the universe as a quantum phenomenon' RnnaIs of Physics 115 (1978) 78-106. J. Burnet, Early Greek Philosophy, Fourth edition, Rdam & Charles Black, London, 1930. B. Carter, Large number coincidence and the anthropcc principle is in Longair, 291-98. B. Carter, The anthropic principle and its implications cosmology', biological for evolution , Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society, London (1983) St* 7-363. C.B. Collins and S.U. Hawk eng, Uhy is the universe isotrophic?', 19310 Rstrophqsics Journal 180 (1973) 317. C.D. Darlington, Darwin's Place in History, Blackwell, Oxford, 1959. P. Davies, The Rccidental Universe, Cambridge Universitu Press, Cambridge, 1982; referred to as D. P. Davies, God and the New Physics, Dent, London,1983; B.S. DeUitt referred to as G. and N. Graham, The Many-Uorlds Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics, Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J., 1973. R.H. Dicke and P.J.E. Peebles, in S.U. Hawking and U. The big bang cosmology - enigmas and nostrums , Israel, eds, Genera 1 relativity: an Einstein centenary survey, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1979, pp. 501^-517. -37- �G.F.R. ELLis, 'is the universe expanding?', GeneraL Reiativitg and Gravitation 9(2) (L973) 87-9L. G. Feinberg and R. Shapiro, Life Beyond Earth, Morrow, New York, 1980. P. Feyerabend, Science Ln a Free Society, New Left Books, London, 1978. 'RnthropLc answers and the existence of P. Forrest, Proceedings God', of the Russet Lan Society, University of Sydney, 7 (1982) 1-13. K. Freeman, RncLLLa to the Pre-Socratic Phitosophers, BLackweLL, Oxford, 1971. N. Griffin and R. SyLvan, Provisionai Rnswers to ULtimate Questions, typescript, Canberra, 1981}.; referred to as UQ. S. Hawking and G.F. ELiis, The Large-Scaie Structure of Space-time, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1973. M. Heidegger, Introduction to Metaphysics, (trans. R. Mannheim), YaLe University Press, New Haven, 1959. C.G. HempeL, Rspects of Scientific Exp LanatLon, Free Press, New York, 1965. Lande, The Laws behLnd the quantum Laws , BrLtLsh JournaL for the PhiLosophu of Science 27 (1976) 27-^3. J. L^sLLe, RnthropLc prLncLpLe, worLd ensembLe, desLgn , RmerLcan PhLLosophLcaL QuarterLy, 19 (1982) l^l-lSl; referred to as LI. J. LesLLe, Cosmo Logy, probabLLity and the need to exp La Ln LLfe', Ln ScLentLfLc ExpLanatLon and UnderstandLng (ed. N. Rescher), UnLversLty Press of RmerLea, MaryLand, M.S. LongaLr 1983, 53-82; referred to as L2. (ed.), Confrontat Lon of Cosmo Log LeaL Theories wLth ObsservatLonaL Data, ReLdeL, Dordrecht, 1971}.. C.U. MLsner, K.S. Thorne and J.R. UheeLer, GravLtatLon, Freeman, San 1973. G.E. Moore, PhLLosophLcaL Papers, RLLen and UnwLn, London, FrancLsco, 1959. R. RobLnson, Essays Ln Greek PhLLosophg, CLarendon Press, Oxford, 1969. R. RoutLey, ExpLorLng MeLnong's JungLe and Beyond, Research SchooL ScLences, RustraLLan NatLonaL UnLversity, 1980; referred to as JB. -38- of SociaL �Sagan Broca's Brain: Ref Leet ions on the Romance of Science, New York, Random House, 1973. S.Tou Lm in, The Return to CosmoLogy: Postmodern Nature, University of CaLifornia Press, BerkeLey Ca., 1982. Is the universe a vacuum fLuctuation?', Nature 2^6 (1973) 396-7 E.P. Tryon, E.P. Tryon, Science and the Theo Logy of *Mhat made the worLd?', New Scientist 101 (198!+) It+00, 1!+-16 FLN. Mhitehead, Process and ReaLity, Cambridge University Press, 1929. 6.H. Uhitrow, The Structure and Evo Lution of the Universe, Harper, New York, 1959. Second edition, � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Draft Papers Description An account of the resource Sylvan's literary executor encountered an archive in which “all his projects were current", since manuscripts were undated and unattributed. Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document RBSTRRCT The proposed syntheses Ls set Mithin generat object-theorg. tde3 The undertging the sgnthesis ts that the 3tternative Mortds sewantics - arrived 3t tn of pursuit of a tnctudtng senanttes universat ones) retevant and, semantics generat (a as connectedLg, part for of att a Languages, comprehensive object-theorg - be apptted atso tn fundamentat phgstcs, Most importanttg to the natter of the ortgtn, htstorg, 3nd phgstcat features of the cosmos, but as Mett, agatn connectedtg, theorg. etseMhere, Ln particutar Ln the LnterpretatLon of quantum a The unLversat semantics Ls a mang Mortds - theorg. The poLnt of such apptgLng an mang nonexistent Mortds - LnterpretatLon Ln cosmotogg atso Ls exptained bg Mag of examp Les, concernLng the understandLng of the contLngencg of exLstence and of present arrangements. improbabititg the R resotutton of the basLc question, sketched, a as Marm-up exerctse 'Nhg does angthLng at for exLst?' att questions as to Mhg various other the prominent features of the universe are as theg are, notabtg Mhg the constants of phgstcs appear to have. have the fundamentat parttcutar surprtstngtg senstttve vatues theg Chauvinistic ansMers through anthroptc prLnctptes are crLttcattg Ln favour of resotutLon bg Mag of Mortd sgntactLcattg, status quo arguments, MhLch use setection^ and gross rejected, correspondLng features geophgsLcat thLs and neLghbourLng unLverses to exp La Ln the surprLsLng vatues of The character of the Mortd—sgnthests resotutton - reaLLg a resotutton Ls ts of constants. frameMork fLLLed out Ln the course of countering a Mide SMeep of objections, and of exp La LnLng Mhg the resotutton frameMork invotving seLeet ion satisfactorg of the main tgpes LLLustrated in the four-fotd: is the most IMPROVED CO3MO-LOCICRL 3YMTHE3I3 TOWRRD RH There Logicai is a foundations tradition persistent - impiging simpLe and get undiscovered - for the whoLe of cosmoLogg. The as tradition, which peaked in modern rationaiism, continues strong in cosmoLogicai specuLation. unassaiiabLe Thus, contemporarg for exampLe, recent rationaiistic theories of the universe, ambitiousLg aimed at mathematico-iogicai expression and capture of nature. Thus, of MheeLer: for exampLe, the bottom Line to the mang theoreticaL enterprises LittLe astonishment shouLd there be, therefore, if the description of nature carries one in the end to Logic, the ethereat egrie at the center of mathematics. If, as one beiieves, aLL mathematics reduces to the mathematics of Logic, and aLL phgsics reduces to mathematics, what aLtemative is there but for aLL phgsics to reduce to the mathematics of Log ic ? Logic is the ontg branch of mathematics that can think about itse Lf'. Logic reassumes its ancient roLe 3S the fundamentaL science; the Mord expresses a LogicaL recipe. Even white abandoning some of the it Lus ions of grand reduct ion istic schemes, and undermining the EnLightenment power guest for the LogicaL the theoreticaL capture and can The sgnthesis outiined in setting. contribute what foLLows LiberaLised bg are semantics and to the organisation of a unified fits into this more modest It is achieved bg suitabig reLocating cosmoLogg as a part of semantics (generousig construed, for exampie, to admit contextuaL eLements). then, to controt of the universe, there is much of a more modest character that recent LogicaL theorg, as nonstandard sgstematisation, worid picture. kegs universaL So unified, semantics, re Levant semantics and cosmoLogg, as suggested in a preLiminarg wag in diagram 1. RCTURL X L ORLD(S) GEOPHYSICRL SYSTEMS SUBSPRCE PHYSICRL SYSTEMS SUBSPRCE RELEVRHT SYSTEMS SUBSPRCE MORLD SPRCE Comment. The subspaces are Marked out by ctosure and other requirements, that of by cLosure of each worLd under deducibiLity (reLevant deriva— systems reLevant biLity), that of physicaL systems by cLosure aLso under physicaL Laws formuLated terMS Ln (suitabLy of condLtLonaLs) and perhaps factuaL constraints as weLL. actuaL (or better t3ctuai) worLd Ls a seLect coMMon worLd the to nested spaces. The underLytng Lde3 of the synthesis is siMpiy this: a subspace of is aLso a suitabLe framework for cosmoLogy, for an interpret— semantics worids neutrai *3 L Lon of the Log iceL theory of the universe as a whoLe. In Less condensed form, the ide3 is that the aLternative worids semantics arrived at in the pursuit of a semantics universaL part connectedLy, as semantics comprehensive (a theory the of aLL of for aLL be objects, Languages) and, aLso appLied physics - most importantiy to the matter of the origin, history and fundamentaL physicaL features of this cosmos, but 3S weLL eLsewhere, in interpretation theory. quantum of particuLar Ln That stripping. ontoLogicai of Load MorLd-ensembLe terms of nonexistent Mortds. Hot surprisingiy, in the recasting the in theory j^s for is, the theory can be recast in existentiaLLy neutraL terms, wcthout the originaL object ionabLe theory, the Rnd in the case of quantum theory there is aLready, most convenientiy, a many-universe or worLd-ensembLe theory, ready neutrai in (e.g. changed unobservabLe the spiitting worLd of the Everett other worids interpretation gives way to future— directed worLd branching). The setting in terms of do which objects not exist, especiaLLy, is essentiaL. For one reason, the idea grew out of investigation (with Griffin for the provisionaL but so far nonexistent book UQ) of what is normaLLy taken to be a phiLosophicaL question, indeed by some such as as the fundamentaL question of metaphysics, nameLy exist? . Reset in worLd terms this becomes a question worLd such Mhy does anything at aLL of seiection the - a contains be to taken exist. For then the oLd circLe is simpiy reentered, expiaining existence in terms of more existents. Here the circLe is metaphysics: 3 much more tractabLe question. But the recasting Loses expLanatory merit shouLd aLL the worids invoived objectionabie of that we find ourseLves in which contains something existent (us as among other existent things) as opposed to an aLternative worLd, which nothing Heidegger cf. JB broken, as it is eLsewhere (particuLarLy in chapter 2), by expiaining what exists by way of what does not. It is the faiLure to duty aLLow for and -2- acknowLedge this pattern of expLsnatLons, though Lt represents coMMon practLce Ln the theoretLcaL sciences, that has wade Lssues LLke the Lntractab Le. In fact quest Lons Lihg Hetdeggerean the concernLng does angthLng quest Lon onLg Ls exLst? question LLke Lt so ftrst of a LattLce of the the character and nature of the cosMos Ln whLch Me happen to be, that are LLabLe to be asked , questLons ascendLng to (Just) seen Ls? ; questLons Uhg Ls thLs cosMos Mhtch MorLd ModeLLLngs wag fruLtfuLLg be to appLLed, as an Lwportant fLrst step Ln eLLcLtLng sone ansMers. (Bounded) LattLce of questLons. DIRGRRM 2. 7 Uhg does Mhg does angthLng evergthLng at aLL exLst? exLst as Lt Uhg do 7 Hhg do eLectrons Lihg does Lnte L L Lgent ex Lst? (Ln LLf e LLfe forns the nunbers exLst? (Ln the ex Lst? theg do?) forM Lt does?) In the reorLentatLon of MorLds senantLcs fron Languages to cosnoLog Les, f row Language to the MorLd, there are certaLn features that shouLd be kept fLrriLg Ln vLeM - apart fron such notorLous features as that anong the MorLds of the node L L Lngs are a range of bLzarre, absurd, LncoMpLete and MaverLck MorLds, and that each (nonexLstent) MorLd has a LncLudes donaLn of objects though Lt a subdoMatn (perhaps nuLL) of ent Lt Les, tgpLcaLLg contaLns nonexLstent objects, both posstbLe and not, phgsLcaLLg reaLLsabLe and the MhLch, feature of not. In partLcuLar, MorLd seLectLon shouLd not be Lost sLght of. For Lnstance, Ln assessing truth, a factuaL MorLd T Ls seLected - Ln one Mag or' another, but tgpLcaLLg bg a choLce functLon on a cLrcunscrLbed evaLuatLons are Morked out (recursLveLg) at I. cLass NaturaLLg and ho LdLng the assessnent of truth MLLL generaLLg Lead begond MorLd T LtseLf. For (reLevant) <deducLbLLLtg a subsgstew of dertvatLonaLLg cLosed MorLds Ls defLned; for poss Lb L L Ltg a subsgsteM coMprLsLng consLstent MorLds Ls Marked out; for naturaL LaMLLkeness a subsgsteM of phgsLcaL MorLds Ls dLstLnguLshed^; and so on for other cases of subsgstew and group seLectLon. $I- The Mang MorLds approach to the "Uhg does angthLng at aLL exLst?" quest Lon. -3- There ere Many canvassed answers to thts questton, and stLLL More Mays of trytng to dtsMtss Lt. RLL dtsposat the atteMpts are defective, 3nd Most of the canvassed answers are unsattsfytng (so Grtfftn and I devote a good deat of space tn UQ to showtng). One approach that ts not inadequate — but perMtts however devetopMent tn severat dtfferent dtrecttons - ts the Many wortds approach. It ts true (and argued eLsewhere, e.g. JB) that R) SoMe thtngs extst. Thts truth enjoys a Modat status, that of conttngency tn fact. weaker ctatM sufftees, naMety But, to begtn, a C) It ts conttngentty true that sone thtngs extst. For the extstence that Most thtngs enjoy or regret ts conttngent. The obvious truth of the More controverstat ctatM that nothtng necessartty Left open for the present. extsts, can be NeutraL wortds ModeLLtng of theMe C) yteLds dtreetty a Many wortds picture, wtth soMe wortds, tnctudtng the actuat wortd T, contatntng extstents, and wtth soMe posstbte wortds contatntng no extstents (but perhaps soMe nonextstents). Likened to a dtsp Lay of baLLoons: DIRGRRH 3. Static pteture of a 0 : 0 : 0 Object doMatns contatn 0 ____ _________ extstents 0 0 : 0 0 worLds ModeLLtng for theMe 0). 0 : 0 0 It can be 0 00 DoMatns contatn no 0 extstents posstbte worLds Such a neutraL nodeLLLng begs no sertous onto Log teat questions, invotves no ontoLogtcaL prodtgaLLty. For tt ts not assuMed that any of these Ln worLds extst, any way. (It ts not dtfftcuLt to represent what does not extst.) Nor need Lt prejudtee Matters unduty agatnst necesstty theMes such even were Lt Lf Lnterpretatton MistakenLy Lnststed, as as agatnst God-hypotheses. the For stratghtforward of C), whtch aLLows Lt ts necessartty true (under soMe necesstty deterMtnabLe) that soMe thtngs extst, a retated Many worLds pteture woutd resuLt; the dashed LLne woutd stMpty Move down the diagraM). But Let us st Lek wtth what ts rtght, C. It ts More reveattng to take theMe C) as tensed - after aLL extstence ts existence now (JB chapter 2) - and to tntroduce, what further Lnvesttgatton wLLL require, dynaMtcat ModeLLLngs. Then, wtth soMe evtdent eMbrotdery, the foLLowtng sort of pteture eMerges: -4- Dgnantc ptcture untverses. DIRGRRfl t*. MorLds of nodeLLLng of thene C), ML th sanpLe t 3 EXI5TEHTS (FULL CONSERVRTION) RLse and faLL of HD ] A Lt SOMET IME EXISTENTS^ R NULL LJORLD f* ExternaL ttne scats (tsLgnLfLes the Locat present) Consents. r-bjch Ls presupposed Ln the wag the pLcture Ls draMn (e.g. that sone Measure of exLstents C3n be obtained, bg Mag of partLcLe nunbers)^ but these presupposLtLons can be nodLfLed or renoved. The such as sane sort nodeLLLng serves aLso to vaLLdate thenes LLnked to C), of D) There mag have been a tLne Mhen nothLng exLsted. ConsLder seLectLon, noM (or done Ln terns of of the cructat wetter of T-seLectLon, L.e. factuat Mortd 6-seLectLon, L.e. referentLaL sub-Mortd seLectLon). ThLs Ls certaLn features these Mortds have, such as contaLnLng entttLes, LncLudLng observers, exhLbLtLng LLfe, nanLfestLng LnteLLLgence or wLnd - to antLcLpate features conLng up and sonetLnes proposed for MorLd seLectLon. Such seLectLon pLcks out thts MorLd fron the ensenbLe of MorLds (our Mortd aLso, as Lt happens). Rnd the Mortd thus seLected LncLudes exLstents. Mhg does angthLng at aLL exLst? Because thts MorLd, T, LncLudes, happens to LncLude, extstent objects. To thts extent Lt Ls -5- a natter of fortune - qood it night be hazarded, since the worLd exhibits enough that is good 3nd fortune, enough potentiaL for good. Rs a contingent Matter, this worLd contains (in its object donain) '.tens that exist. So T-setection deLivers a worLd n3king it true objectiveLg that sone things exist.^ The answer Mag seeM trite; that but is in Measure Large because the and answer are taken in isoLation, apart froM issues as to the detaiLs question of the process, the how questions, such as H) How does it happen that soMething exists? The issue can be considered in uLtinateLg exists is question terns this of of nass-energg, since evergthing that kind (so it is argued in JB chapter 9). To the H ) How does it happen that sone Mass-energg exists? tMo sorts of answer are possibte. FirstLg, there is the conservative answer: sone atwags existed. There is an end Less ongoing sea of Mass-energg, which sinpLg fLuctuates, Moves, recgcLes, etc. There are pLentg of probLens with this answer; for instance, phgsicaL prob Lens, such as how did the Big Bang of standard cosMOLogg occur, what was happening before it? But there are aLternative MatheMaticai stories now being toLd, for instance, of a Massive singuLaritg Located in space (rather than at phgsic3t tine t = 0 as with the Big Bang), which trg to offer a phgsicaL account of a continuous universe (see e.g. G. ELLis). Rnd the singuLaritg stories offered can be enriched (aiong Lines rather Like what wiLL be ventured in the case of the second answer). RLnost aLL traditionaL phiiosophicai and theoLogicat accounts, aLL v^rtuaLLg honage paging to ontoLogicaL assunptions, shouLd be inciuded aMong the conservative, existence-aiwags answers. But the nonnateriaLLst accounts anong these characteristicaLLg invoLve LeveL shifts^^Thei is back to the existence of God or the (uLtinate) One, who, on a higher LeveL, serves as eternaL sustainer, and perhaps fashioner, of the MateriaL universe. The conceptual and other probtens of such answers are sufficientLg notorious. SecondLg, there is stage nothcng existed. The energg. the Rt More appeaiing and siMpLe radicaL answer: at sone that difficuLtg before tiMe, the that anccent Long-received probLeM orthodox of how prejudice, sonething that nchLi fct, is invariabLg reinforced bg again Bang, there was no for this picture is how Mass-energg ever appeared froM the MacroscopicaLLg tranquiL sea of nothingness. past Big can It is no great feat to get coMe froM nothing. The froM nothing nothing cones, ex nihiLo Mistaken ontoLogicaL assunptions (see JB chapter 2). Yet even when these ontoLogicaL assunptions are set aside, there is the awkward natter of C3usai nechanisn. But an unLikeig storg can be toLd, a ngth retated, expLaining how sonething -6- a may (suddenly) emerge from nothing, jet of mass-energy the from sea of nothingness. The story borrows from the quantum theory of the vacuum (or rather, ot suitabie vacuums). There is suddeniy an avaianche of energy borrowing , 3nd mass creation of particies in a concentrated area.& This is the beginning of the Big Bang (at internaL time zero). It is unigue (in experience) because such a singuiarity is very improbabte. (Even a SmaLL Bang wouid be rather improbabie.) The net energy "borrowed" is borrowed on a very Long term (at high interest?), with a gradu3i repLayment pLan. This ties concerning the run-down eventuaL eventuaLLy (though perhaps over this of very a with principLes universe. protracted of thermodynamics, On this story, it wiLL time) subside back into From nothing everything existent originaLLy came; into nothingness everything existent wiLL uitimateLy process. nothingness. It is one thing to such devise 3 story, or rather the (or outLine scaffoLding) of a story; it is another to condense it into science. before But scorn is poured on such a story, Let it be noted that the story is Less bizarre, more and informative, than other extant phiiosophicaL stories. For exampLe, it appears more piausibie than the ideaList story of the construction of the physicaL worid from idea, or than the set-theoreticaL myth of the construction of the entire universe from the nuLL set - undoubtedLy a it as earLy encompasses existent individuaLs, construction, insofar of something existent from nothing, not since, despite orthodox cLaims to the contrary, the nuLL set certainty does exist (JB 9.9). There are reasons for much preferring the second styLe of story to the first - though it may appear to some to viotate conservation principLes such that mass-energy: of as in fact it need not. One is that the end Less mass-energy story faits to account for the presence of mass-energy. By contrast, nothingness does not reguire expLanation: it is, so to speak, the rest position. In terms of the range of possibiiities here, existence is what is unusuaL, what is atypicaL, what especiaLLy caLLs for expLanation, not nonexistence.? Hence the expLanatory superiority of the radicaL answer. Rs one might expect in varying such an obvious and ancient story, and as is easity discovered, scientific condensation and assessment has begun, especiaLLy in the Last decade. The idea that the totaL energy of the universe is zero was considered a human generation ago by Mhitrow&, refLecting on Flach s phiLosophy of motion. More recentLy, Tryon has argued the zero totaL energy theme, assuming a cLcsed universe and appeaLing the standard treatment of gravitationai to If the universe contains just enough potentiaL energy as negative energy. mass to cLose it, then the negative energy must more or Less exactLy canceL the energy (mc^) invoLved in the existence of that mass. Hence, the argument runs, even a a cosmos as impressiveLy Large and ancient as this universe couLd exist as deveLopment quantum vacuum through in borrowing fLuctuation on a a zero-energy vacuum, that is, through grand scaLe in a reiativistic setting. Such vacuum fLuctuations can occur by dispensation of the AE.At --h; when the mass-energy AE of a physicaL object -7- uncertainty principLe approaches zero, its LLfe,tLMe At can becoMe verg targe. OnLg the Merest begLnnLng on reMOvtng certaLn object Lons and to wore scLenttfLc storg MtLL be atteMpted. FLrstLg, there are, LnevLtabLg a such obstacLes Lt seews, onto Log LeaL and verLfteat Lontst object Lons. Hang of these turn hoMever on assuMtng that a vacuuM and ewptg space Must soMehoM exLst, at Least bg Mag of sort of exLstLng contaLner or structure. Such assuMpttons are wtstaken: no (pre-) exLstence need be assuwed. Such objects 3s vacuuws and unoccupLed space sone nonexLstent are and dLstLnctLve Mtth objects assessLbLe MatheMatLcaLLg propertLes. Though theg nag not be access LbLe to observatton, and Ln thLs narroM respect are outsLde the range of experLence, then concernLng tnvesttgattons exactLng for there to LnfornatLon Ls suffLcLent be Made of theLr features. SLnLLar potnts teLL agaLnst the objection that Lt Ls Mrong to Lwpose an externat spatLaL or tewporaL Measure on (Mass-energg) cLosed space-tLMe; for exawpLe, Mhat happened before the BLg Bang, or to ewbed the curved space-ttMe of LnquLre the unLverse Ln a Larger spatLaL or tenporaL settLng. Rs a Matter of fact, cosMOLogLsts wang exh Lb Lt no unease Ln ashLng Mhat happened before the BLg Bang even Mhen assuwLng no Matter before that, though verLftcattonLsM MouLd no doubt such to ruLe guesttons out as weanLngLess or otherMtse out of order. More to the potnt, bounded Metrtcs can atMags be extended (HubbLe ttMe Ls just wtstahe though fruLtfuLLg, soMettnes bounds vertfLcatLontst one are exaMpte), exceeded. and Rnother has been to assuwe that NothLng, stnee nonexLstent, Ls entLreLg Mtthout structure or organLsatton and ungoverned. Indeed tMo dtaMetrtcaLLg opposed poLar v,eMS of Lt have prevented, and even been run together: of NothLng chaottc, as and so excessLveLg rtch, and of Nothing as entLreLg bLank, and so excessLveLg tMpovertshed. Both are Lnadequate. R More tnteresttng ontoLogtcaL objeetton (ratsed bg Rrwstrong) Ls that such an account of the ortgtn of the unLverse takes granted for exLstence the naturaL LaMS, and so does not expLaLn hoM sowethLng ex Latent cane frow objecttons Such confuse truth neo-PLaton Law. LaMS hoLd, but do not vteMs, Mhere LaMS Mtth exLstence, exLst - bg after contrast Mtth nothLng. fashLon the of of neo-PLatonLc reLatLons of unLversaLs, MhLch exLst. On object-theorg are (such as that of JB), hoMever, unLversaLs do not exLst, and so LaMS are not thus extstentLaLLg Loaded. Once truth Ls duLg separated frow exLstence, there Ls of course the further questton of Mhg the LaMS that hoLd or evoLve do hoLd. But thts Ls a separate, and vextng, questton of uLttMate expLanatton.^ SecondLg, are there More technLcaL adwLttedLg shakg phgstcaL account; for quantuM nuwbers of objeettons, instance, that dtrected But Lt the Mtth the the vacuuw MtLL constst equaLLg of Matter and antt-Matter, and qutckLg vantsh agatn, Mhereas features of the unLverse perstst tMbaLance. agaLnst fLuctuattons and suggest noM seeMs that a verg sLLght (and, so Lt Ls satd, deLLcate) tMbaLance earLg Ln the evoLutton of the unLverse after the BLg Bang Ls just Mhat Ls required for present perMLtted features of the unLverse; and such an LMbaLance, on recent (GUT) theorLes, catastrophtc fLuctuatton hardLg excLudes. R thLrd connected obstacLe used to be sertous: Lt -8- has been presupposed that a state can be assigned to the whoLe universe.^ But that is now aLright; quantuM according for neutraL to of) (adaptation the Everett Many-universe interpretation of quantuM theory, a state function i covers the behaviour of the P worLds phgsicaL I (with P c K), which presuMabig evoLve according to a e reLativised Schrodinger equation of the fom SE(T). To soMe expLain of the recent appeaL of this sort of wortd-ensewbLe interpretation, it is worth turning to the interesting and curious business of the phgsicaL constants. The §2. of constants of phgsics and sone of their neat interreLations. natter The interesting cLaiM is that the setting or adjustMent of certain constants surprisingLg deLicate, and if the constants (and soMe of their constant that ratios) were different bg ontg sMaLL Margins, then the actuaL universe woutd very is be with the resuLt, aMong Mang other things, that we shoutdn't be different, here to observe ang of its LocaL passing show. Now the possibiLity of exp Lanation of the specific vaLues of these the in terMS of phgsicaL theory itseLf is not so far exciuded. Perhaps no constants constants in physics are uLtiMateLy fundaMentai, Various ways eiiMinating of constants though seeMS that unLikeLy. are now faMitiar, e.g. soMe represent new scaie factors and are eiiMinated by re-scaLing or choice of coordinates. Others are reMoved by More radicaL ways of reLooking at things, as in Einstein s treatMent of gravitation. But sone resist eiiMination - so far. in For, phgsicaL any theory, what case, fundaMentai is depends and soMe previousLg fundaMentat constants (such as Rvogadro s nuMber) have turned out to be derivative as theory constants on the given shape of advanced new and (deeper) were introduced. There is the reMote possibiLity, obviousLy cherished that bg soMe scientists, that in the end aLL phgsicaL constants can be reMoved, a constant-free (very grand unified) theorg in which aLL constants can be reMoved wiLL resuLt. This is not obviousLg iMpossibLe in the wag that a coMpLete eiiMination of LogicaL constants froM Log teat theorg is, that a finat triuMphant reMovat of the Scheffer stroke froM cLassicaL propositionaL Logic is iMpossibLe. However, it is too Much to expect that a "deep MatheM3tic3i anaLgsis" aLways do the job. For one thing, exp Lanations of this sort do give is an arguMent for this out. can There froM the backward proceeding character of deductive expLanations to More generaL preMisses (appLging the content-incLusion character of deduction proper). There are no MatheMaticaL anaigses without assuMptions, without a systeM of postutates. The hope (expressed by MatheMaticat Carter and others), that generaLLy deeper underlying theories can be found, wiLL not 3iwags be fuLfiLLed, of necessity. Since transforMations, such as seating, aLter or reMove constants, can transfer the Big Bang back to Minus-infinity, and so on, there is no soLid to expLain, underLying the ELLis, for one, aLLegedLy probLeMatic nuMericaL features (so data B. contends). UhiLe it is true that which constants feature, and what their vaLues are, wiLL depend on initiaL choice of units, whatever that at Least some of the constants wiLL emerge. Thus there wiLL be features choice, and vatues which require expianation, and exptanation of the however transforming the done. is For S3me broad tgpe, the present, 3nd immediate future at Least, there is no getting rid of the constants, and white theg to continue figure their numericaL vatues and ratios set some trickg prob Lems. There is the probtem, first of aLL, of describing the reLevant phgsicat data neutraL non—prejudiciaL fashion. The facts of the matter are more or Less a Ln as foLLows:- Present phgsicat theories incLude mang (phgsicaL) constants, which occur in the formutation of Laws and principtes. R number of these constants are fundamentsL, in that theg are not derived from other constants (or deduced from deeper phgsicat theorg). Two things have been noticed concerning fundamentat constants of present phgsicat theorg, both of which caLL for expLanation:If 1) the of certain constants Lag outside a rather narrow band (sur­ vatues rounding their perhaps universe wouLd be ascertained vatue), gross features of the geophgsicaL different. this - hopefuttg without CaLL prejudice, since its contra­ position represents the substantiat core of the anthropic poss ib Le principte - the sens i t iv i tg numer teat f eature. va Lues For record, the the geophgsicaL principte resuLting from contraposition takes the foLLowing form: certain gross features of the geophgsicaL universe are onLg possibie in present form if the numericaL vatues of certain constants Lie within a narrow sensitivitg band. Examptes of such gross features are isLand gataxies, Long-Lived stars, ptanets, recognised ittustrate, water, hgdrogen, heavg carbon, metats. RLL the forces, for instance, exhibit the sensitivitg features. To phgsicat the strong nuctear force were marginattg stronger, nuctei coutd if grow much begond the present Limits and att hgdrogen woutd Long have ago been converted to heLium, with the resutt that there wouLd be no Long-Lived stars (of present tgpe) and no water. On the other side, a decrease in the strong force wouLd prevent the formation of nucLei of heavg metaLs. R dozen further and more of simitar phgsics Literature. sensitivitg mag be assembLed from the re Levant easiLg 2) The Pgthagorean feature. Large numbers arrived at in ions famous turn of Eddington s out these to coincide Large reLation, exampLes astronomicaL computat­ (to within order of magnitudes). Perhaps the most number stating coincidences', the universe is the inverse square of the number as theg are mostLg caLLed, of gravitationaL other exampLes are assembLed in Bondi.) -10- particLes coupLing in the constant. is visibLe (Mang These two nunericaL features sensitivitg features co inc idences. are are (or can be) These nunericaL features are cited LaMs) conservation of inportanttg that in Large exptain to used nunber as evidence Justifging the introduction of various exotic theories (e.g. invoLving phgsicaL Most interconnected, departures exaMpies earLg Mhich froM accepted norMaLLg Mere the "verging G theories of Dirac and Jordan . So Mrites Carter, Mho appeais to soMe differentig exotic principies, anthropic principtes, Mithin features in order froM far opposite the phgsics Bang) thesis: (GeneraL cosMoLogg and Mhich couLd in principLe have been used to unsurprisingLg, the order of the dag in Mag and be great fun. It cosnoLogg. course Of that the is distiLLation specuLation is is Mith the conversion of this stuff to in received MisdoM, or even knoMLedge, that caveats shouLd be Mhen cLaiM froM evidentLg estabLished. But Large cLains on fLinsg foundations are, far fine, i.e. ReLativistic predict theM 3LL in advance of their observation' (p.291) - 3 Large is nuMericat evidence in favour of exotic theories these coincidences being shouLd rather be considered as confirMing "conventionat" Big the noM received cosMoiogicai setting. Mith the heLp of these the anthropic principies he canvasses, as he puts it, that expLain to prejudiciaL, in e.g. that entered, especiaLLg it points to favoured cone Lus ions such as priviLege or design (for huMans) in the universe. Much capitaL has aireadg been Made of the nuMericat features, of Mhat is referred to - gou C3n see the Loading straightaMag - as a cataLogue of extra­ ordinarg phgsicaL coincidence and apparentig accidentsL co-operation' (0 p.110). Here is a tgpicaL beat-up, bg Davies: The structure of the phgsicaL MorLd is deiicsteig dependent on a varietg of apparent nunericaL accidents. hang of the rather basic features of the universe are deternined in essence bg the vaLues that are assigned to the fundanentaL constants of nature, such as G, a, Mp and so on, and these features MouLd be drasticsLLg aLtered if the constants assuned even noderateig different vaLues. ... for nature to produce a cosnos even renoteLg resenbLing our own, Mang apparentLg unconnected branches of phgsics have to co-operate to a renarkabLe degree (D p.lll; sone of the prejudiciaL terninoLogg is under L ined). The part Last is particuiarig Meak: so our ignorance of interconnections is disclosed, ignorance Me Might have forestaLLed froM arguMent theorg integrated resist apparentLg fitting of unreLated phgsics: together. the topics' present if Carter serves is right. RLL the to reveaL is Lack of an theorg is bits and pieces, Mhich Nor do Large nunber coincidences point to ang hidden co-operation, but rather to over Looked connections Mhich can be argued toHards (as bg Dicke, Carter and others) using fairLg conventionaL phgsicaL equations.^ Rs for the hidden purpose terMinotogg, for nature to produce ...', MeLL, the Justificatorg case for its use is not Mereig not evident, but entireLg The sane appLies to other Lacking. terns Mhich Davies and others infiLtrate, such as -11- * 'conspire' (Dp.Ill), 'fine-tuned', deiicateiy baianced', 3ii of which suggests agents with certain purposes. Re Lated happening not objections te rm ino Logy, be some against Lodged accident , it accidentaL; be shouLd of the improbab Le coincidence , etc. R contingent worLd need is not accidentaL that Griffin Lives in Troy, Ontario, though it is contingent certainty. Rn improbabLe worLd need not be accidentaL either. RccidentaL means, according to the Concise EngLish Dictionary (CED), Occurring by chance, unexpectedLy, not according to the usuaL order of non-essentiaL'. The misp Laced for the actuaL worLd; and adventitious, th ings; generaL thrust of the notion is decidedLy accidentaL universe is a misdescription.^ To be sure, there is some considerabLe sLackness in terms Like accidentaL', wh Lch can come cLose aLso, when appLied as in schoLastic theory, to meaning contingent. The term vac i L La t ion, as its of condition dictionary coinciding; concurrence nicety coincidence' a definition remarkabLe iLLustrates makes instance the The pLain: of we L L-known act, fact or apparentLy fortu itous Large-number The coincidences are of the first type; there is LittLe case for making them out as of the second type. argue, To however, that the actuaL worLd is not mereLy contingent, but improbabLe, Lt is hardLy necessary to go so far afieLd as advanced physics. Some more homeiy exampies have managed ho Les wiLL do, such as the matter of aLL the Lucky goLfers who in one. consider Or foLLowing the from argument contingencies, to the improbabiLity of the actuaL worLd. Take some contingency, e.g. that person 1 in some ordering of the audience <^s wearing a green top. She might have been wearing any other cotour. Say there are 100 shades to choose from in the cLothing coLour cards. Then the probabiLity that she is in green is no more than 1 in 100. eut the same sort of probabiLity hoids for every other person on the earth presentLy wearing 3 top, and these probabiLities are LargeLy independent, say in I(US) bit Lion cases, i.e. 10^ cases. That is, the probabiLity of the present array of tops is no more than 1 in loH. That aLready makes present arrangements exceedingiy unLikeLy, before we go into the coLours of other bits of appareL peopie are customariLy bedecked in, the coLours towards 16 improbabLe. Lead of the NonetheLess, of motor cars and so on. So even surface contingencies books, cone Lus ion that the worLd actuaL is astronomicaLLu the situation with the fundamentaL constants does differ. Rn important difference between these day-to-day improbabilities, such as have the spouses we do, and those the constants induce is things these this:- Even that if aLL (coLours, e.g.) had been different, the worLd wouLd not be a very different pLace. Contrast the constants: their significant variation wouLd the we make worLd a very different pLace. Is there a difference in kind, with 3 radicaL improbabiLity appearing as regards the constants, degree? OnLy in degree, picture wiLL serve for the bridging range exampies of cases, or tend for -12- mereLy a difference in to suggest. The same broad everyday and cosmoLogicaL contingencg. §3- Back to mang worLds: improbabiLities and the universaL quantum theorg. Mhere that broad - Leads picture so sgnthesis sought the suggests, as does an increasing amount of cosmoLogicaL theorg - is to the mang-worLds of interpretation Quite evidentLg, worLds semantics are not the onLg semantics improbabiLitg. that can be offered for probabiLitg. few But other offer semantics simitar universaLLtg and informativeness, and some of the aLLeged competitors (not to be taken too serioustg as face damaging circuLaritg in this area, e.g. rivaLs) probabiListic semantics, urn semantics. The idea of the modeLLing naturaLLg It is improbabLe that gou have the spouse gou have , is true bg virtue of this: fact the is that in onLg a few worLds of the modeLLing, incLuding the actuaL one, do gou have gour current spouse; mostLg (insofar as gou occur) gou do not. In preciseLg the same improbabiLities, cosmic wag such particuLar as numericaL vaLues for phgsicaL constants, Lead to mang universe modeLLings. is argument to mang-universes from improbabiLities . The description of the the situation phgsicaL coincidence of probabiListic requires remarkabLe constants, notions, features', e.g. etc. extraordinarg semantics But probabiListic notions caLLs for aLternative worLds. (Thus Davies archerg Les Lie s and This goLf exampLe Of course Davies tends to see worLds used for exampLe). probabiLities as a conceptuaL device (D p.128); Everett invariabLg sees them That reaL. is, what we have emerging is repLag then do improbabiLities the as of universaLs issue! But universaLs do not exist, and nor do these expLanatorg worLds (cf. JB onLg of 8.8). Not Lead to a mang-nonexistent-worLds picture; converseLg the muLti-universe theorg expLains the improbabiLities. envisaged modeL contains ref Leet a huge coLLection of certain intervaL of accuracg); thus worLds the range of (naturaL) vaLues of the fundamentaL constants. RLL initiaL arrangements of matter and motion are refLected in worLds is The worLds. the chances of the present smaLL, exceedingig which expLains (at Least within universe a resuLting various improbabiLities. Does it than matter that we can t normaLLg quantifg these improbabiLities? Rng more we can quantifg the (Large) probabiLitg of nucLear war? No; there is something offensive about the repeated demand for quantification.^ Quantum theorg circumscribed affords situations, a the aLternative phgsicaL situations. actuaL worLd - is seLected, simiLar state mang worLds function is On measurement, one apparentLg at random picture. Least Rt for a superposition of severaL particuLar worLd - the (D p.12!*). This approach enab Les immediate resoLution of an important prob Lem in orthodox quantum theorg. R standing probLem with a compLete universe state function is that sgstem we must have some measuring apparatus that is sgstem. ... Mhen the not itseLf to measure a part of the sgstem is the entire universe, the notion of a piece of externaL measuring apparatus is meaningLess (D p.I2t+). So emerges the famiLiar conundrum for quantum theorg presented aLong orthodox (von Neumann) Lines: If there is nothing Left with which to measure [or otherwise interfere with] the -13- state the of how universe, universe the can transition from a the make superposition of many possibLe worids to one, concrete, actu3t wortd?' (D p.12^) is, There asserts, Davies interpretation many-universes one oniy - which comprehensive however a resoLution 'accept[s] simuitaneous the reaiity of aLL the possibte atternative universes' (D p.I2i+). But, given the route we have come, it is easy to ontccaLLy atternative neutrai this, to direct that see from there an is object-theory. atternative assumes many universes atso, but onty some at any stage are This actuat. It is obvious enough is that the probabilistic spread of quantum states does not require existent states, any more than the range of atternative dress states for someone probabty attired in requires green, the existence of the person in different ctothes. Measurement now shows which wortd/state an object such as etectron or person in. actuatty is an In these terms it does not cotLapse the probabiLity wave packet, or set of worLds, but marks one out. Lihat isn't known measurement is which worLd (or narrower set of worLds) is actuaL (or the before actuat etectron is in). quantum description, Uhen nothing the entire cosmos encompassed is the within Left to coLLapse the wave' (D p,12S). Rather is nothing in the way of externat measurements is avaiLabLe to determine which is the actuaL worLd; however internaL information can be made use of in the usuaL experimentaL ways. To set interpretations many-worids Everett the quantum of theory and in the contrasting neutrai worLds perspective, here (adapting OeLJitt and Graham) are some Leading features: i) R separate cLassicaL sphere externaL to any and every is not required; quantum set-up it makes sense to consider and investigate a state vector for the whoLe universe. ii) The state vector covering the totaL system never universes) (of coLLapses, and so the totatity it describes can be deterministic. iii) LJhat is described through variabLes dynamicaL the jointLy, comprehensive is not aLL equaLLy reaL; vector and the the actuaL worLd but a system comprising many worLds. (On the Everett are state interpretation on the neutraL worLds these interpretation they are not, other worLds than actuaL ones Lacking of any sort of reaLity.) iv) Through chronoLogicaL deveLopment of the dynamicaL the state vector decomposes naturaLLy ref Leeting a progressing branching of the into system orthogonaL universe worLds) into a set of mutuaLLy unobservabLe worLds. variabLes, (and (On account this is described as a continuaL spLitting into vectors system the of Everett equaLLy reaL worLds; but not in neutraL theory which disposes of this reLativism.) v) In each worLd good" measurements yieLd definite resuLts, and in many -14- worLds, incLuding the actuaL, famiLiar statisticaL quantum Laws hoLd, indeed C3n be derived or approximated. *- -^ince the neutraL version directLg avoids mang of the to theorg, what is the case for the Everett form? In main part it consists Everett simptg of mistaken ontoLogicaL assumptions, as such objections the what that ReaLitg overactive an principte, has phgsicaL properties must exist.The further argument that aLL branches must be equaLLg reaL, is not compeLLing. Thus DeMitt contends: Because there exists neither a mechanism within the framework of the formaiism nor, bg definition, an entitg outside of the universe that can designate which branch of the grand superposition is the reaL worLd, aLL branches must be regarded as equaLLg reaL (p.178). But we can easiLg incLude actuaL worLd seLection (as group worLd seLection) within cone Lus ion does not foLLow. the weLL and framework; other as given difficuLties the Everett specific, there is, Ln the first pLace, reaList theories such Everett's. as permissive regarding such worLds. In reaList-reLativist a demarcation SecondLg, fact, the however, interpretation theorg avoids. To be faced prob Lem not neutraL theorg the of this the intended It has been objected (e.g. bg Lewis) that the neutraL worLd encounters kinds neutraL bg is too theorg is restrictive about worLds; and few or none of worLds of contemporarg reaLists (^uch as Lewis) get into the picture, since aLL such worLds incLude as existents certain universaLs. OnLg neutraLised anaLogues of such worLds appear fn case, the theorg can be as restrictive as is appropriate about ang In 7). aLso (see which worLds are phgsLeaL, or phgsicaLLg possible. Requisite subcLasses such worLds phgsicaL can marked be out conform tig to phgsicaL Laws and through framework requirements (e.g. that the ensembLe forms a HLLbert space). it is an iLLusion that reaLism as Moreover soLves the reLevant demarcation probLem. It simpLg covers it up, in an unsatisfactorg wag. highLight To us varg a in stock of coupLe pertations, some of what is different in a neutraL iLLustrations of reaListic interpretation, the ontic mang-worLds Let inter- the famiLLar two sLit interfer­ wag. Consider first ence affair. On a straightforward the neutraL approach, we appear forced to concLude that each eLectron traverses both sLits in a wave Like form' (Les Lie LI, p.I!+6), is to the dcaLectic interpretation that the eLectron goes through that both sLits. The mang- worLds approach avoids such contradiction^, aLLowing eLectron to traverse just one sLit in the actuaL worLd - onLg in another branching from this, the the worLd, eLectron traverses the other sLit, therebg inducing probabiListic interference with the actuaL-case eLectron. The wave function provides a superposition of two such possibLe cases, not two actuaL cases. In the transition other worLds are not mang-worLds theorg). from phgsicaL (or potentiaL) worLds to the actuaL one, 'destroged' (as LesLie suggests in his criticism of Nor is the interaction of worLds causaL. There are few or -15- no causaL effects even on the Everett reaLity version; is spiitting thus not not actuaity observed (cf. virtuai worLds, reLations, etc.). Though there seen, are transworLd interreLations on object-theory these do further criticaL point is that physicaL worLds are not probabiListicaLLy The entities. as exist not independent. But that s aLright; since probabiLity is an natter, intensionaL probabiListic interference is unprobLenatic (cf. "possibiLity" interference). scattering exanpLe where an eLectron is Consider next Davies at fired a proton. The probabiLity wave in such scattering represents a set of worLds for the eLectron. 'The quantun wave provides a Measure of the probabiLity of finding the eLectron 3t the Location: where the eLectron is Most LikeLy to be found ation, and disturbance is greatest there the wave (D p.l2i*). Fleasurenent deterMines the Loc­ so aLters the probabiLities, thus on the orthodox view reducing the wave. Recording to the Everett on however, interpretation, neasurenent the universe divides into two, ... one containing a right Moving eLectron ... Each worLd is equaLLy rest inhabiting each since it is not The observer conscious upon that MeasureMent down-right is spiitting so thus, by occurs; the for there certain a is so near­ probabiLities, anending scattering, that, possibie the because of the uncertainties physicaL states of universe, corres­ ponding to the probabiLity wave, are increased. Lihere there was one for the actuaL possibLities). worLd in possibiLity regard, now there are N Many (N Mirroring the this R nany-worids interpretation of physicaL theory provides a naturaL for neutraL a new state function resuits, appearing to coLLapse 'the wave. since RLL that happens wuth worLd branching is guaranteed copy worLds. But onLy one worLd is actuaL, and represents the (reaL) of universe. Heasurenent can deterMine which this is, and one spLits, MisLeading. There is no spiitting; rather in quantuM processes worLd-branching takes pLace, rep Licat ion atso wortd . Even on the Everett interpretation this is inaccurate, it interpretation ... principLes which aMong seLect detinit or wortds, as setting what are caLLed anthropic principLes, and aLso non-chauvinistic reptaceMents for then such as geophysicaL principLes, can serve to do.^ Rnd in this setting expLanations, of a sort and of varying adequacy, The of aLL the nunericaL features can be furnished. under Lying reason is not (siMpty) that there wiLL aLways be sone universes, which are duty seLected, where the nuMbers coMe out right, but that sone and universes conditions (for of the right sort are aLso decent physicaL universes (a Much More difficuLt requirenent to satisfy). sone such coincidences) It is as these, furtherMore, that are observed (by us), contain universes carbon and water LocaLLy, and so forth. It is then no surprise that we perceive a universe to which so Many speciaL conditions pertain, for we have seLected fron the enseMbLe onLy by our very existence' (0 p.126). But it again, taLk of our seLecting is MisLeading (though taLk of seLection, or naturaL seLection, is not). It is rather that, as a contingent natter, we happen to inhabit such universes^. Rnd such taLk negLects the iMportant point that further work is required, for satisfactory expianation - that piausibte argunents, not invoLving us, but connecting gross geophysicaL features with nuMericaL features, have aLso -16- to be suppLLed. In thts Mag, ustng the MorLd-ensembLe hgpothests ... [but] MLth[out] the Meak anthropLc prLncLpLe, Lt Ls possLbte to discover pLausLbLe arguments to pLn doMn the vaLues of aLmost aLL of the fundamentaL parameters p.129, a centraL part of hLs cLatm). Indeed DavLes hotds out the negatLng but (D prospect of beLng abte to do much more, constraLnLng the dtmensLonaLttg of space and ttme, the number of quarks and Leptons, numbers of fundamentaL forces, That reaLLg MouLd a sgnthesLs of consLderabLe poMer. It Ls a sgnthesLs, gtve moreover, MhLch can be absorbed or sLmuLated MLth Ln a upon mang-MorLds neutraLLsLng prLncLpLes MorLd bg etc. quantum seLectLon theorg prLncLpLes. and cosmo-Log LeaL repLacLng NonetheLess sgnthesLs, the anthropLc DavLes, the LLke maLnstream phgsLcLsts he artLcuLateLg represents, Ls uncomfortabLe MLth ang such that he LndLcates, ang such grand pLcture, and rLghtLg so, as the 3S sgnthesLs anthropLc expLanattons LnvoLved are far from entLreLg satLsfactorg. HostLg he seems to hope Lnstead that contLngencLes MLLL aLL be expLaLned as necessLtLes of (proposLtLons phgsLcs grand a pLcture, necessarg grand at Least Ln foLLoMLng Log LeaLLg from another theorg). But the hope Ls mLspLaced; Ln Large unLfLed measure Lt represents 17thC ratLonaLLsm over agatn. SometLmes, hoMever, he seems to feet desLgn Ln the untverse. - Ls Mhat features: to supposed emerge, and does emerge, from the numerLcaL Mhat anthropLc prLncLpLes vs. MorLd seLectLon prLncLpLes. Uhat Ls supposed to emerge depends upon hoM the matter Ls set up, hoM the pLcture emphasLaed. Ls Mhat presented, For exampLe, DavLes and LesLLe both set thtngs up so onLg tMo optLons are supposed to be open. In hLs Preface to Da^Le^ Ls The RcctdentaL UnLverse, suggests the sgstematLc aLternatLves are eLther reLLgLon or an anthropLc prLncLpLe. R sLmLLar cLaLm appears Ln LesLLe, Mho puts the aLternatLves as (ethtcaL) necessttg or anthropLc assumptLons. Thus hLs concLusLon (to L2, p.81) The cosmotogLcaL evidence can suppLg __ forcefut grounds for vLeMLng at Least one of these thtngs ss true. (1) God Ls reaL, though presumabLg as a creattve ethtcaLrequtrement rather than as a dtvtne person Mho LLteraLLg destgned our LLfe-contaLntng cosmos. [So the unLverse extsts because Lt shouLd.J (2) There extsts a Mortd EnsembLe [so the condtttons LeadLng to Ltfe are bound to occur someMhere (L2, p.55)J - and the attempt to dertve aLL the fundamentaL charactertstLcs of our cosmos from some untfted FLeLd Theorg Ls tn error. DavLes LnsLnuates that the obvtous Lnference from the cat3Logue of numerLcaL features Ls thts: a htdden prLncLpLe seems to be at Mork, organLstng the cosmos Ln a coherent Mag (p.110). Thts runs paraLLeL to argument from desLgn, hardLg an Lmprovement. One of the prLncLpLes htdden Ls hgpothests; but another Mhtch DavLes (unLtke LesLLe) generaLLg anthropLc prLncLpLe, to LncredLbLe accuracg 3nd Ls some sort of God favours Ls the a gutdtng prLncLpLe Mhtch serves to fLne-tune the cosmos for us (humans) - or Ltfe, or Ltfe-supportLng sgstems, or __ ? Or for observers,or LnteLLLgence, or not for angthtng. The chotce offered Ls reaLLg then an oLd famLLLar one, faced bg thtnkers at Least stnee the (so-caLLed) EnLtghtenment: God or Han, or after a recent ftrst correctton and Mtth a different emphasts, Humans -17- or God. In fact burted under duaLitg, this is aLreadg as (Science) or Hunans or God. However the a nang tenpts favoured which option, Phgsics excLuded, in error . Rnd it is we as seen: have (coMprehensive) phgsics without netaphgsics, no scientific theorg no is Much scientist and phiLosopher, is increasinqLg seen as excLuded, as forbidden fruit or even as there at Least a three-wag choice: Phgsics giinpsed, without Large assunptions - which stands on its own. But further afieLd there is get is which option, another not excLuded: option here canvassed. The ciain to be eLaborated is this: no (deep-ecoLogicaL) principies of a tgpe not aLreadg required for Low LeveL senanticaL purposes worLd seLection principies) are caLLed for in expiaining the nunericaL (naMeig, features at Least as satisfactoriig as nor huMans Neither principies, gods such be upon popuiarig aLreadg foreshadowed, doing. in More in reMoving huMans features god-Like (and, universe. the principLe cones in a varietg of anthropic verg precise (incLuding Barrow's biocentric reforMutations). SoMe exaMptes give the inpression:- The existence as observers seLection bioLogicaL (D to the own used be can existence a as constants' (ibid). This presents severaL for renoving underiging ngsterg is verg different fron nunericat of expLanation, our p.viii); effect, ... to expLain the otherwise Mgsterious nuMericat disentangie; expLat,ning wiLL idea is to reiate basic worLd features to our own vaLues of the fundanentaL phgsicaL issues as such coLourfuL for nainstreaM phgsicists, atMost none of then prettg MostLg the upon hunans, associated inteLLigence) fron a new speciaL pLace Rs succeed options other the are essenti3t. Since gods do not figure in anthropic wiLL focus the incidentaLLg, forMS, object-theoru far-out the features. sorts, various or Rnd nag these turn in have further theg Mag be siMpig contingent, refLecting seLection without specific purpose. Sone phgsicists go so far as to ciain: our existence constrains the structure of the universe, indeed it even it (0 p-112), for to us , quote froM Hawking and CoLLins. connection in this sweeping context h3s been dubbed this j^s Davies the does, have nothing specificaLLg to do inteLLigence, or with Life, etc. The Dicke argunent, for Eddington-Dirac expLain coincidence, is based of principLe : anthropic the show with what work the or hunans, with designed exanpLe, to onig on the presence of heavg eieMents, and so gives but a hint of bioLogg, if that. So reversaL Invoking the huMan forMuLaticn of the principLe (D p.112)! But quite generaLLg the argunents advanced, which do principLe seLects reaLLg there is no spirit of the Copernican revoLution' in this fashion (pace D p.115, barter, and others). The conditionaL principLe estabLished bg the Dicke arguMent is essentiaLLg J) If [because, g^ven] there exist heavg eieMents, then the universe is such that the Eddington-Dirac coincidence ho ids. The fuLL expLanatorg argunent conprises, as weLL as the detaiLed phgsics that goes toward J), the nodus ponens inference: -18- The Eddington-Dirac coincidence hotds. There exist heavy eLements, J) More generaLiy, the anthropic way gives principie to physicatiy a argued conditionai scheme of the enthymematic form K) if F then T, or its contrapositive K ) if not-F then not-T, where F is a hard factuai ciaim or more commoniy its existentiat reiativety generaiisation , and T is a more theoretic3i ciaim concerning typicaity features of the worLd, such as numericai features. The short form of anthropic exp Lanation, or better status quo expLanation, is then the argument form F, if F then T L) . .T. famiLiar ontoLogicaL proofs, for instance of an externaL worLd from the Moore s fact that exist, hands arguments. such omit typicaLLy proofs phiLosophers just are difference The is that the soLid argumentation that goes into estabLishing the conditionai schemes of status quo expianations; for instance, makes LittLe effort in this direction, and the required entaiLment rather Moore evidentLy faiLs to hoLd (see fn 30). Other formutations of the anthropic principie in the Literature are than better those hardLy 3tready exhibited. LesLie, who at Least (Like Barrow) moves humans a LittLe off centre stage, puts it in this counterfactuaL way: if our universe had been [everywhere] hostiie to Life then nobody wouLd be observing it (L2, p.66). If the consequent simpiy contextuaLLy impiies that something a Live is doing the observing, then the principie is ana Lytic, and scarceLy up to the intended expLanatory tasks (without requisite information that the the universe contains Life, and much eLse being separateLy pumped in). MhiLe if does not require this, it appears fatse; the Latest seeing-eye robot consequent did survive the hoLocaust, or did just happen as a resuLt of the quantum fLuctuation. In such as Dicke's most purported argument. offers faces reLated difficuLties: worLd appLications of the anthropic The other version of the principie LesLie NecessariLy we conscious beings observe a which is Life-containing (LI, p.lt+1). Rs it stands, this is faLse; for we mightn t exist. Nor wiLL appropriate deLetion consciousness retain we' of fix things. the worLd is, Me might but not be observers, aLL being in vats. But repaired the version is pretty use Less. It bears onLy tangentiaLLy (through that vacuum any case the formuiation Lacks sufficient generaLity; it faiLs to connect appropriateLy with scheme, the but contingency, Life its consequent, containing) on what is at issue concerning numericaL features. The materiaL on us, on observers and the Like, is strictLy irreLevant, a hang-over again presumabLy constructions of quantum theory. -1?- from bad ideaList * The that the Copernican principte has suffered some sort of set-b3ck idea because of the essentiai rote of anthropic principies in explaining Large-number can be traced back through Carter, who heLped popuLarise the rote coincidences, between of anthropic principies and made the (rather obscure) distinction strong weak has been exaggerated subservience to the 'Copernican principte' [which is] that we must and not assume principies. anthropic gratuitoustg that we Recording to Carter, there occupg a priviLeged centraL position in the (C p.231). The regrettabLe tendency, he sags, has been to universe extend the to a most questionable dogma to the effect that our situation cannot principte be priviLeged in ang sense ... (in extreme form ... the 'perfect cosmoLogicaL principLe ...)'. The Latter assumption is certaintg untenabLe (as Dicke pointed because the universe is bg no means spatiaLLg homogeneous on a LocaL scaLe out) and speciaL conditions (of terrestrial temperature, chemicaL environment) do prevaiL on Earth. But its removaL does nothing to undercut Life the Copernican principLe, or to boost the anthropic principLe in the wag thinks Lt For does. is Carter his bracketed comment after his first formuiation of the anthropcc principle is that Lt for requisite aLthough our situation is not necessaritg centraL, inevitabLg priviLeged to some extent' (C p.291). It is doubtfuL that our position is centraL; whether it is so priviLeged depends on the intended contrast, but whatever the privilege is, it hardlg seems inevitabLe. Carter gives severaL non-equivaLent formuLations of the anthropic principLe, the first of which takes the quasi-anaLgtic but ambiguous form, LJhat we C3n expect to observe must be restricted bg the conditions necessarg for our presence as observers' (C p.291; repeated D p.119). This is certs inLg not the same as Davies condensation of it, what he caLLs the weak principLe, that observers construaL, restrict the observed'. On the obvious (but Less charitabLe) this is but rampant verificationism, of a tgpe verg familiar however from interpretations of quantum theorg. Uhat exists is independent of observers; and observers, especiaLLg remote ones, mag have no significant impact on what iL5 observed. The condensation is accordingLg false. So also, for different reasons, is what it condenses. For one thing, our expectations mag run astrag. True, what we observe is restricted bg the conditions for our doing just that, nameLg being as observers. But this tautologg imposes no phgsical constraints, being equaLLg true for Xing as observing; and no such connection is appeaied to in ang of the derivations of coincidences that Carter sketches. Once again aqain the present arguments never have angthing in detail to do with humans, or even "observers 4-c? -20- .2-1 (and surety animats observe). Fit best the arguments are directed to the presence of water or carbon 12 or some such - things sometimes erroneousiy equated Life, and often, rather dubiousty, said to be necessary for Life.^S The situation is of this sort with Carter's "iiiustration" of the weak better Locat) anthropic principte, which he formutates as foitows: 'we must (or be prepared to take account of the fact that our Location in observers universe is existence as the necessariLy priviLeged to the extent of being compatibLe with our p.233). In order to get to grips with this recondite formuiation (C Let us remove the initiaL intensionaL functors (which my empiricist friends to with assure are me not essentiaL in physics, despite ubiquity, and their physicists procLivities to modaLs). Now our position can hardLy be priviLeged (despite Carter s tru necessariLy since human-types just might be itaLicization), uniformLy distributed through the universe or again might not exist at aLL. LJhat necessity there is enters in a different way. LJhat we are Left de Let ion, with since misLeading, probabiListic arguments suitabLe for Life in the universe (some detaiLs justified is Like more something unique (though principte this need require of Hh3t may be met. In this humans we are Long-Lived stars Rnd stiLL much more than a weak is dragged in. It is enough, for seLeet ion, universe contains Locations, neighbourhood Sag3n). we're working at it); even on Terra much of the rest of the animat kingdom is simitarLy favoured. seLeet ion in priviLege of habitats miLLions suggest are to this: we are favoured in that the physicaL conditions for our existence, as observers, are hardLy due Our Location in the universe is priviLeged to the extent of is then: be',ng compatibLe with our existence as observers'. But this ciaim cs after in where fact heavy Like the earth, in the metaLs occur, and so on (for certain other pureLy geotogicaL features). BoLtzmann s expLanation of the present high degree of which Ls extremety improbabLe cosmic organisation (in a thermodynamicaL setting) is aiso said to appLy a weak anthropic principte ; witness this the onLy reason that we are priviLeged to exceedingLy untikeiy occurrence is that our very existence [etc.J -21- O.2.2.. * depends upon the condition which atone can be bg estabiished remarkabte that (D p.123). But again onLg gross phgsicaL organisationat principLes fLuctuation are seLected for; and no more than a weak seLection principte is required. beveraL expLained , so Carter and Davies ci3im, be cannot coincidences simpig bg a weak principte (at Least in the muLti-universes). of is made to the strong (or better gLobaL) principte: appeaL these absence The universe ... must be such as to admit the creation of observers within it at some in barter s (p.120). formuLation exist is for manifesttg faLse. So, Cartesian paraphrase Carter gives of the strong different cogito ergo mundus taLis est . The worLd wouLd presumabtg not be principte, verg theg is this appaLLing the necessarg; the universe does. Rnd since observers mag verg easiLg never given have evotved in the universe, reasons, stage R coroLLarg of the strong principte in this heaviLg necessitated guise is that observers are conditionaLLg must For so different were the contingent premiss faLse; and certainLg the premiss mag Least be true but the cone Lus ion faLse. But at Loading, necessitg gets and principte the appropriate conctusion. For, propertg ideaLLg this the inferentiaL form, with the into formuLated, abandons paraphrase scheme the as is before, Law Like conditionaL of basic form, if F then T, where however T is a a genuinetg gLobaL cLaim that the universe is such 3nd such (e.g. the universe now contains more matter than radiation). The scheme, so then, recast is feature distinctive some theoreticaL LocaL strong the that T is hoListic assertion 3bout the universe, incLuding essentiaL reference to it, not, as it mag be on about of the weak principte, of the universe, which can readiLg be features stated or restated without reference to the universe. But the distinction is not particuiarLg important. The robust, troubie is it from 3 worLd-seLection gives Lt a misLeading most LawLike Mag requisite within consequent. For exampLe, there is stiLL no (egocentric) thought matter; to phgsicaLLg without Descartes God to puLL him out. universe the taiLor-made is for framework of idea - in essence it cLaims a wag Living organisms are subsequentig assured of existence. [So it is]... akin mankind to inhabit. products secuLar expLanations. teteoLogicaL R duLg cLaims anthropic worLd for (D p.121). Such erroneous presentations have done much to encourage both a new anthropocentrism and the idea that are unLike habitation, 3nd that both the Laws of to traditionaL retigious expLanation of the worLd: that God made the are from Hard as it is to credit, Carter is phgsics and the initiaL conditions obLigingLg arrange themseLves in such that an procLivitg to ideaiism exceLLed bg Davies, who sags of the strong principte that that in route respectabLe Carter's (exhibited in C2)), he mag weLL get stuck in the argue to bounds to the intended phgsicaL given and of satisfactorg impression antecedents for the scheme, and makes it presentLg impossibLe appropriateLg verg perspective Carter's extravagant Cartesian paraphrase of the strong with that is principte nor on a par reformuLated Davies with, strong and in schema expLanations anthropic competition supports design with, none of the makes regarding the universe. Nor, as wiLL appear, expLanations, when made presentabLe, -22- akin to retigious features of the worLd. The expLanations take different LogicaL of explanations forms and LnvoLve quite different ingredients. To see what is reaLLy required for the strong schema to operate, it pays to Look at Then appLications. it becomes evident observercentric that considerations are strictLy irreLevant. Once again far stronger, and biocentric more dubious, conditions than are required for the estimates actuaLLy made been For introduced. instance, (BoLtamann) K, is a good exampLe of a prediction based on what strong' anthropic principLe' (C p.23^); (8) is as foLLows: K aLL f < that is 2 " Tl_ 5 have according to Carter, his condition (8), which imposes an order of magnitude upper bound on cosmoLogicaL But and constant may be termed the 3 ' "P , P invoLved in obtaining this bound, retevance, is the of assumption that ' the un iverse is not radiation dominated aLL its [finite] Life (i.e. that the matter contribution ... to the mean mass density ... becomes greater at some stage Insofar this as is than the necessary radiation (C ...)' contribution pp.233-^.). at aLL - since the estimates concern onLy very broad features, and not LocaL variations - it is 3s necessary for Lichen as for Larkspurs. DLL that is required is a sLightLy stronger worLd seLection principLe than mereLy that worLd contain heavier eLements at some stage; but stiLL the onLy a gLobaL geophysicaL principLe. Rnd this is aLL that here. The same set of points amounts to appLies to Carter's further use of the strong principLe, to estimate the Lower bound on K, which appLies the conventionaL that gaLax Les ... are formed by condensation, starting as reLativeLy hypothesis smaLL density fLuctuations in an otherwise homogeneous further The strength tendentious assumption in background (C p.2St+). this appiication is that gaiaxies are necessary for the formation of stars and hence of Life (C p.23!*). NonetheLess there are arguments for the strong anthropic principLe, though faLLacious ones obviousLy. They come firstLy from positivism. It is cLaimed that if the universe exists then it must be observabLe; so there must be observers - a modaL faLLacy. Davies (in his exposition of Barrow and not argues universe which from the faLse premiss that onLy what is observed exists, that a did then others) admit observers is meaningLess' (D p.I21). This is ideaListic garbage. They come secondLy from an aLLeged expianatory rote, in expLaining coincidences. But it is unnecessary for this purpose as initiaL worLd seLection wiLL serve. They come thirdLy from human chauvinism; thus, too human existence is said to be responsibLe for the very speciaL structure of the universe' (D p.121)! The connection is not however causaL; so what is it supposed There is be: teLeoLogicaL? thus a serious probLem as to how this responsibitity, hardLy evident, is exercised. FinaLLy a strong principLe might uniformity to - one principLe to cover be argued for on grounds of aLL cases. But better a weaker correct -23- principLe than a strong faLse or geophgsicaL principLe wouLd suffice Rnd principLe. dubious doubt no a weaker aLL phgsicaL constants. (Of course, for there reMains the natter of this worLd seLection. This worLd does exhibit Life, incLude hunans, and so on. But these features, Like the present species of does eucaLgpts expLanations, or reLevant, cLasses of worids.)"^ and are RnusingLg, astroLogicaL and More converses hunan affairs; white under gerMane not the to extravagant anthropic principies are to astroLogg, ceiestiaL events infLuence anthropic hunan anaLogue, affairs infLuence CeiestiaL events and processes incLude those of the sun. Moon events ceiestiaL its are abstracted fron in seLecting expLanatorg Recording other. each of wonbats, grazing of whereabouts and and other pLanets (especiaLLg). Rnd these certaintg appear to have an (indirect) weak infLuence, especiaLLg through the soLar atMosphere and pLanetarg Large pLasMas, on terrestriaL phenoMena (Fegerabend, p.93). The anthropic converse, in this forM danagingtg anthropocentric and exhibiting an excess of hubris, is Much further froM the truth. Not just the anthropocentric, but the eMphasis of nuMericat features. Rnd despite the bioLogicaL anaLogies, just Lt,ke explanation seLection without vaLues, so even Rs are there there is seLection without seLectors. More, RLthough seLection is sonetiMes accoMpiished through seLectors, often takes not is naturaL seLection. It is not seLection for, for fitness, survivaL, or whatever. Nor, More iMportant is it seLection bg, bg soMe agent. vaLues MispLaced. is insistence, Life is not essent-iaL in Mang worids Le^Lie Despite biocentric seLection without seLecters, randonig or otherwise - this tiMe as in naturaL pLace seLection, which does not require a personified Nature to do the have evoLutionarg theories as/oid ageneg. In avoiding ageneg, seLection is Like that seLecting, as enphasised. Such expLanation can straightforwardig of Darwinian evoLut- ionarg theorg; and seLection contrasts with direction as incLuded in aLternative evoLutionarg Though accounts (cf. DarLington, p.l^ff). anthropic principies coMe in a varietg of forMs, depending upon how the conditionaL scheMa ^nvoLved is fitted out, none of theM, then, does what is saud, none depends essentiaLLg on the presence of huMans, or of Life. SgntacticaLLg, theg etaborate usuaLLg status quo arguMents, of forM L), with factuaL fir^t preMis^ F concerning the state of the worLd LocaLLg (weak forM) whoLe (strong seLection forM). SenanticaLLg, or as a the factuaL preMisses function as worLd principies; theg serve to Mark out the cLass of phgsicaL wortds or to narrow then down to these or those, e.g. to those where heavier eieMents such as carbon occur, those where Long-Lived stars, such as the sun, appear. It is that carbon is sonetiMes taken to provide an "order-of-Magnitude" approxiMation for Life (that is the nearest Long-Lived star is supposed to to hunans provide that the the "approxinations" get); Life as the arguMents a steadg warMth required for the evoLution of Life (but Long-Lived stars, water, and heavier objects are as to true near need get). But these additionaL, and nore dubious, detaiis are unnecessarg for the Main thrust of status quo arguMents, as distinct -24- from their anthropic 3nd biocentric augmentations. meet Given that the worids seiected are of this and that cast - in generai geophgsicai gross Less, up the to constraints — other features of them can be derived (more or standards rough accepted in and physics) in expLained, particuLar, how and that it is that certain (fundamentaL) physicaL constants Lie in restricted ranges, narrow and unexpected ranges. These arguments, duty fitted out, do provide exp Lanations, non-causat exp Lanations, of physicaL features of a contingent, mereLy LmprobabLe universe. Much there is, however, in these most ctaims, that has been contested, from the psycho LogicaL such of inadequacy a universe to the worth of such expLanations, if expLanations they are at aLL. objections to the cosmo-LogicaL synthesis; and finding unLikety, an in comfort and with Prob Lems mereLy universe. contingent, Somehow contingent universes have acquired the reputation of being coLd, remote and uncaring - a not habitat for sensitive creatures. But the reputation is undeserved, since fit contingency does not bear on any of these things. Mhat is contingent can be just as weLL as coLd or neither; caring or not, so far as the appLication sense aLL; at and hot makes so on. One can be warm and comfortabLe in bed on a wet and wintry night. One can be at home, comfortabLe in, in tune with, a tiny part of an improbabLe universe, as some tribaL peopLes are. None of these virtues are Ln any way undermined by contingency, matter of a necessary universe. or aLways assured by the quite separate a degree of harmony between us Furthermore, there can be, or have evoLved, and our surroundings , without principLes, as that our worse, that the universe is universe such exaggerated cLaims, on based anthropic are very speciaL and tuned to us' or, surroundings made for us'. Me humans can be in with tune the without having the universe tuned to us, as we can foLLow and ornament a song on the wind or in the woods. But so far, especiaLLy recentLy, we humans coLLectiveLy are not doing too weLL in attuning oursetves to the worLd. Rs this iLLustration begins to metaphysicaL and psychoLogicaL reveaL, predeLiction^ may pLay a not inconsiderabte rote in choice of, and ornamentation of, physicaL theory, especiaLLy of controvers LaL theories such as quantum theory and cosmoLogicaL theory. In the case of such theories there is a certain bag technicaL so to say tricks, tricks, equations and so on, which are de rigeur - a theory-skeLeton - and beyond that both an interpretation and setting for the bag integrating of theM and suppLying of with some sort of meaning, and them usuaLLy aLso some further formaLism connecting the tricks together or to a wider theoreticaL background. For exampLe, even in accounts of too much in the way of interpretation theory where is commonLy frowned upon, extensive correspondence ruLes Linking the formaLism with upon quantum cLassicaL physics are retied heaviLy. Rt Least for everything beyond the theory-skeLeton, which is what is appLied in most concrete day-to-day appLications of the theory, there is much room for rivaL fLeshing out of the skeLeton - Latitude -25- such as there is in archeological reconstructions of peoples from some scattered bones. Recasting quantum theorg, as in the mang-worlds interpretation, offers not as merelg a basis for fleshing out the theorg non-idealisticallg, but for combining it with general to subject much of the criticism, much of it directed more broadlg at most Happilg as However such recasting, when not reLativitg. largelg ignored (the common fate of nonstandard theories), is criticism. well plural world theories in general, misses the neutral modification. There are firstlg a batch of aesthetic and ontological objections. These commonlg take off from the of unattractiveness duplication or replication of profligate such worLds. LJeLL, tastes and vaLues, Like intuitions, do varg with sub-cuLture. Some of us, who escaped over-exposure to worlds the ReaLitg do PrincipLe, stories illuminating and attractive, indeed verg inviting. So, next, the whole thing is said to be unbelievable: no one can reasonabLg existence believe worLds nonetheless, especiaLLg in explanation. these in (the these unlimited numbers of universes. Granted, we do not believe of) in this either. These other worLds do not exist; but we can make of neutral find heavg Load of objections carrging on about excess use extensive In this wag we avoid a baqgage. ontic also Ue main criticisms based on Occam s razor. (RLL these objections are short-circuit met, in much detail, in JB.) Linked to such Occamist protests are a batch of objections that are pictures worlds effect the to over-engineered, both too complex 3nd including too much baggage. Thus in thermodgnamics a smalt fluctuation producing some order is more LikeLg than one producing Lots of order, one galaxg more LikeLg than Lihg do similarlg we not find ourselves in a one galaxg universe, which is far more LikeLg? The answer is in part: because Less LikeLg contingencies hold. Is the ubiquitg No, (D p.123)? mgsterg instance, the on the commenting of of numbers approaches reasons. in these unwarranted presuppositions. The that the universe was set others Like be explained. For Dicke Thus and Peebles remark, in of the universe for a few conscious individuals, overdesign revealed well one of a thing is itself verg unlikelg. Find just special can, that a single galaxg cosmos might be ruled out bg the can observed galaxies in our universe ... therefore a such evolution further there mag be mang. up Mach's Moreover, principle. questions and remarks are based on various overdesign" for idea, for example, presupposes some individuals; but the worlds picture correctLg avoids thLS assumption. The things in this world that exist happen to be there, probable or not, and often, for reasons we can sometimes explain, not. But there is tittle solid evidence that theg are arranged, for us or others. In its original form the unfocussed "overdesign" objection was mainlg directed at cruder anthropic principles, as were unverifiabilitg and unfalsifiabilitg. a batch of objections The well-worn criticism, that notorious psgchoanalgtic and Marxist principles did too much, being so designed that covered everg protested that case, was redirected from against anthropic principles. it is hard to see how the anthropic principLe can be It used theg was to make testable predictions, because ang theorg inconsistent with our existence is 4 M3nLfestLg Not faLse . such protests been weakened bg avant garde have onLg phLLosophg of science, but, as Carter has poLnted out, anthropLc arguments couLd varLous Ln prLncLpLe have been used to predLct theg Rnd notLced. were faLsLfLcatLon, e.g. where erroneous that unLLkeLg assumptLons prLncLpLes, regards Rs fLrst). under but Ls worLd-sgnthesLs, aLL that worLds the whether Ln wLth cosmoLog Les and of verLfLcatLonLst seLectLon whLch semantLcs, or phgsLcs exLst, LnvoLved of themes objectLons do have some verLfLabLLLtg vLrtue of what Ls meant bg bg bg neutraLLsed ex Lsttng. But the force of these objectLons Ls theorg. as conversLon, object-theorg Granted LnterpretatLon. of Often, Lt (though of weaker forms wouLd be abandoned, other surrendered force agaLnst mang-worLds theories, assume derLved object Lons are LargeLg mLsdLrected, because what are at Lssue are phgsLcaL semantLcs, are coLncLdences premLss factuaL be wouLd verLfLabLLLtg not the anthropLc arguments do admLt of of 3ssumptLons the before coLncLdences numerLcaL neutraL worLds objectLons, the crLtLcLsms of mang-worLd such prLncLpLes anthropLc as geophgsLcaL or prLncLpLes are LntertwLned, and dLsentangLLng the crLtLcLsms Ls enough to partLg So them. def Late aLso wLth the reLated charge th3t the neutraL worLd- Ls Lt sgnthesLs theorg Ls unscLentLfLc or at much turns Least dubLousLg scLentLfLc.PLaLnLg on what Ls admLtted Lnto that esteemed categorg, scLentLfLc. But on most accounts, use of seLectLon prLncLpLes succeeds Ln gettLng LncLuded. Rnd so, pLaLnLg enough, does mang-worLds quantum theorg. Rfter 3LL, Lt has 3pproxLmateLg as the same sorts of predLcatLve and test capabLLLtLes more That fact of narrow empLrLcaL LndLstLnguLshabLLLtg mag be the source of theorg. other compLaLnts, but Lt gtves no ground for the charge worLd Ls seLectLon prLncLpLes excLuded! are It at hand. of scLentLfLc and theorLsLng experLmentLng true that some theoretLcaL and wouLd (per prefer LmpossLbLe) and wantLng to st Lek to a uLtLmate and unLfLed expLanatLons. No doubt such semantLcaL apparatus does faLL fouL of the the substance of the charge, consLder some of the crLterLa often beLng theLr theorg narrower sLmpLg reveaLs further serLous defects Ln such vLews. But to reach that vLews: fuLLer the narrower (hgpothetLco-deducttve) methodoLogg, are uneasg wLth worLds seLectLon, sureLg But phgsLcLsts, and mang phLLosophers, LosLng sLght of what enters Lnto range quantum orthodox scLentLfLc. UnfaLsLfLabLe? SureLg set down for Ln areas where the framework Ls not pLnned down bg phgsLcaL theorg. OvercompLLcated and LnsuffLcLentLg gLven what the worLds theorg Ls Lntended to accompLLsh sLmpLe? Not (e.g. the semantLcaLLg theoretLcaL work Lt Ls aLso put to Ln areas such 3s LLnguLstLcs). Etc., etc. Perhaps the most teLLLng theorLes LLke worLd—sgntheses objectLons whLch agaLnst LncLude status quo arguments, and them, concern theLr expLsnatorg capacLtg. StrangeLg theg have been condemned both as expLaLntng too much - ang thLng at aLL can be brought out Ln some worLd - and as expLaLnLng too LLttLe and beLng trLvLaL. Not both these objectLons are LLkeLg to succeed, as theg tend to undercut one another. IndependentLg, Lt seems cLear that the arguments do provLde expLanatLons, for LnvoLved Lnstance, of the strength of the strong nucLear force. It aLso seems cLear that the expLanatLons afforded are of vargLng -27- depth, + depending in part on the depth of the underlying physicaL theory invoLved, this and the pLausibiLity of the further assumptions made in the arguments. Better exempiific3tions of status quo arguments in physics satisfy not oniy more ordinary requirements for expLanation; they aLso meet assembLed conditions considerable time, by HempeL, mainstream the which conditions on position demanding for represented, some what counted as a scientific expLanation. Furthermore, the chief objections to have more the HempeLian the account that emerged have been to the effect that it is too rigorous, not that it faiLs to provide jointLy sufficient conditions for expLanation. To make a prima facie case that better status quo arguments do provide exp Lanations, it is enough then show to expLanation LogicaL HempeL s that conditions on the (p.2t+7ff) have been met. By contrast conditions design with scientific of the arguments, 3re satisfied. The expLanandum T is a LogicaL adequacy of pattern basic consequence of the physicaL argument eLaborating the schemas F, if F then T; the expLanans has empiricaL content, at Least in the shape of expLanans F; which connection if F then T, provides expLanans are true, Uere a foLLows from arguments using physicaL Laws. FinaLLy, the demanding empiricaL condition of adequacy, that the premisses used in the is satisfied in better status quo arguments. the basic pattern aLso necessary for scientific expLanation, it wouLd be an easy coroLLary that many poorer status quo arguments fait to provide expianations (beginning with Carter s and Descartes is there the and contains general, Laws which are actuaLLy used in the derivation. For, in better status quo arguments, the conditionaL schema, Law Like premiss much quo status that such Cogito arguments), and that arguments cannot presentLy expLain decentLy, '^ncLuding such major puzzLes as Life and inteLLigence in the LocaL worLd. It can be independentLy argued, moreover, that poorer status quo arguments, which patentLy (or short meeting HempeLian conditions, fait to generate satisfactory of satisfying) expianations. TriviaL, dogmatic, forms, such as that things 3re the way they are because that is how they are, represent a virtuaLLy worse of sort. this But possibie. weakening to principte, that what The universe is inhabitabie, because we are here, because ask Forrest so is aLso humans inhabit The universe is suited to inteLLigent Life because there are peopLe such questions upon). focusses inferences, is sLightLy embroidered, are arguments with connecting principLes Such, the earth , case better, or more informative, are those arguments scarceLy which appLy the possibility Like faLL (exampies adapted from the sorts of anthropic arguments These short; patentLy faLL arguments, which they LnvoLve offer no aimost immediate further appropriate basic (HempeLian) argumentation making use of generaL Laws. Given that better status quo arguments do afford scientific expianations, and given further that the arguments do serve to remove and not without predictive force, why have they been genuine puzzLement fauLted as expianations, and sometimes criticised 3S not providing expianations are at aLL (e.g. Forrest)? The main reason offered, that back-to-front , these "expianations" are appears to rest on the assumption that aLL genuine expLanation -28- shouLd be broadLg causaL, and accordingLg exhibit (time-) the direction or controi. Status quo expLanations are certainLg not causaL, and mag causation weLL run counter to causaL direction, expLaining features of the earig the through of distribution present universe of eLements. That is, however, perfectLg in order. For satisfactorg expLanation is not causaLLg restricted either ordinariLg or scientificaLLg. HempeL suppLies severaL different sorts of pattern basic of causaLLg or controL directed (pp.352-3). EspeciaLLg striking in this exampLe opticaL straightforward his of his which are not causaL expLanation or expLanation scientific exampLes regard is a particuLar event...satisfactoriLg of expLained bg reference to subsequent occurrences'; but his exampLe of two-wag where the period of a penduLum serves to expLain the Length of the expLanation, penduLum as weLL as converseLg, is aLso highLg re Levant. For it is too expiaining commonLg assumed numericaL that shouLd coincidences be the presence of water, carbon and the Like in the universe, not vice versa. But there is no iLLuminating reason quo status whg direction shouLd expLanation the instead not in run the as weLL as, vice versa. That of, iLLuminating direction is after aLL from the famiLiar to the much Less famiLiar, and more in need of expLanation. such It is true of course that more simpig means that status quo expLanations ad hominem stgLe of status quo expLanation, for are. Like expLanations, most further unreasonabLg stop deeper expLanation. The expLanation-stopping forms are and form: contraposed inquirers verg for expLanation if it weren t so gou woutdn t be here to ask the question. However such put-downs (in the envisaged persistent Legitimate the those (which Forrest discusses) where the response to a request for the Long. wouLd contexts) not more charge, damaging feature of the universe, Then PF. seLecting worLds where PF hoLds. But the theorg. the then, is that worLd-sgnthesis can expLain too much. The charge is backed up bg the foLLowing sort of consideration. puzzLing deter Theg wouLd be awag in search of further expLanations, such as better status quo arguments mag furnish (at Least for t ime be ing). The not begin in the middLe wag. Nor do theg, except in speciaL, rather theg uLtimate: takes famiLiar, the presence of water and carbon, aLso caLLs for expLanation; but that as quest the charge it Take ang can be expLained simpig bg misrepresents worLd-sgnthesis There is more to it than this. There is a cruciaL argumentative Linkage aLso invoLved, between PF and gross geophgsicaL features of the worLds (near factuaL worLd T) which are seLected. Or, put differentig, the seLection does not take pLace on basis the of PF, but (mereLg) under the constraint of gross geophgsicaL features; accordingLg if the argumentative Linkage from satisfactorg status quo arguments worLd-sgnthesis. is missing, PF is not to be expLained through In short, then, worLd-sgnthesis theorg offers expLanations when bg and then the expLanations mag varg greatLg in quaLitg depending on the depth of the phgsicaL the framework is suitabLg fLeshed out phgsicaL theorg; information invoLved in the argumentative Linkage. EssentiaLLg the same points undermine Forrest's further objection to such -2?- many-worLds explanation, truths; contingent have we aLL do to coaches easiLy as the pumpkins of turning numericsL coincidences. But there is no such free as seLection of phusicaL worLds - which do not incLude worLds vaLidating magicaL as faiL, can schema connecting arbitrary and practices. Status quo expianations may not be easy transformations at aLL, but physicaLLy comp Lex, they are not atways and they as is to posit suitabLy many and varied (p.9). Thus the theory is aLLeged to expLain worLds into that it "expLains" contingent faLsehoods as easiiy an when assumption invoLved easiLy avaiLabte, and the eLaboration of the in , and the argumentative schema issues in a contingent faiLs faLsehood. For a necessary condition that a status quo expianation be successfuL is that the argument be correct; but then given that the argument form is vaiid, the cone Lus ion cannot be simpiy f aLse. is It that satisfactory expianations, with conforming to such conditions of adequacy as deductive vaiidity in and quo status expianations winning in expianations differ from decisiveLy design which are sometimes seen as on an expianatory LeveL competition with status quo and expianations their piuraL-worLds setting (thus e.g. LesLie), and sometimes even confused with them. Design arguments characteristicaLLy take the deductiveLy invaLid abductive modus toLLens form: Things are (surprisingLy) so and so F If a design hypothesis heLd (e.g. the universe anticipated observers, a design-force operated), things woutd be (unsurprisingLy) so and so. If H then F Therefore, a design hypothesis (probabLy) hoLds. .. H Nor in design arguments is the connecting schema normaLLy eLaborated by appropriate scientific argument; nor, where God is invoked, i§; there any way of suitabLy confining the argument scientificaLLy. Thus support first the LesLie's of Larger cLaims is faLse:- the LiorLd EnsembLe hypothesis rather than the God hypothesis. !^e do not have...strong evidence of an EnsembLe' (LI, p.150). for Science does not their existence No branch of physics in a way commanding wide acceptance (LI, p.S3). The main reason is that the Bod hypothesis is not part of a physicaL theory that many-worLd theory is caLLs in the way of quantum theory (thus, e.g., there is no physics text corresponding to DeLiitt and Graham for the God hypothesis), [^hiie the Last cLaim is true, it does not teLL against the truth of neutraL many-worLds theory. Uhat science supports is science, not the the metaphysics it presupposes. Physics is not however aLL of science by any means, and even science doesn't do everything, onLy a rather narrow seLection of things. Richard SyLvan -30- 11 RPPENDIX 1. Some Rncient Rntecedents The Non-Limited is the originaL materiaL of existing things; further the source] from which existing things derive their existence is a iso that to which they' return at their destruction, according to necessity [for reparation]... —----- So, in the 6th Century B.C., said Rnaximander, perhaps among the first aLso to set down a story of the evoLution of humankind.Something the same was said in text, though on the favoured taLe a Heideggerean and Taoist touch was Lent, the with Nothingness repLacing the Non-Limited. In the on beginning, there was nothing; and uLtimateLy, too, there wiLL be nothing. have been paid. The p3raLLeL with Rnaximander can be pressed further. In account origins, of of worLd the contemporary charged pairs of particLes are created in the oppositeLy 'the order, wiLL Reparation process of pair formation from the vacuum; white in Rnaximander's story formation story, this opposites the of which are present Ln the one [the Non-Limited], are separated out from it' (but 'the "opposites" are the hot, coLd, the dry the , the moist, and the rest : see Robinson p.25). There is aLso a phenomenon which corresponds to some Limited extent to the Big Bang, nameLy Vortex. the It seems cLear, however, from the materiaL Burnet assembLes, that Rnaximander's position amounted to the first Less satisfactory resoiution, matter or substance aLways. For the BoundLess or Infinite was a materiaL cause, -^*-*dstance (p. 5k<); it is eternaL and ageLess is brought about the origin of the worids. did — Further, according to SimpLicius, not ascribe the origin of things to any aLteration of matter, but said that the oppositions separated encompasses aLL worids substance". RLso there is in it eternaL motion, in which which makes it a queer he and out . If in that the substratum was which a boundLess body, were is right — and it may not be, especiaLLy given Later ontotogicaL infLuences (cf. p.61) - then the matter is cLear. Rnaximander beiieved there were innumerabLe worids (p.58). These worids were concurrent, not successive. coex istent remains uncLear, but Later in the Whether Bound Less" they tradition (biassed) took them exist, making Rnaximander's position a many-existent-wortds theory. The to Law of compensation, under which for borrowing or variation reparation must be made, becomes the Law of repayment aLL were of conservation. The reparation paraLLeLs the borrowed" mass-energy. The more generaL steering of aLL things - overarching order in naturaL processes - becomes the Laws of nature which govern (reguLate) the processes. 'The orderLiness ... is grounded in the nature of things as such . Rnaximander's account represents an immenseLy -31- important stage in the transition from world-order is myth from science. to first to ... Last 'Hesiod's account of the origin of the anthropomorphic. account Rnaximanders represents, in principLe, a complete break with this mode of thought (Robinson p.27). From this angle the anthropic and idealistic fixes of contemporary science show marked regression. That transition, beyond anthropic creation stories, is also accomplished in the main philosophical essentials of the favoured resolution can where Taoism, be found. Something flowed from nothing, in a seemingly paradoxical way? but not through ang creation or agency. There was a the before time when beginning nothing at aLL existed. The problem of Laws (of nature) was also recognised, and resolved. did Laws not exist (independently at least of things that did) but were exhibited in in things that did exist. So it seems to follow that, stage at restricted property to duty what separated, and was mainly Lacking ascriptions Taoism Such nothing. a and deep in cosmogonic tales, then, from the ^.th C. B.C. until the 20th C., was a plausible explanatory story as to how come from together. of does exist. (Fuller details of Taoist cosmology, under this type of interpretation, are ventured in ecology', written with D. Bennett.) Mhat the which nothing existed, the taws could hold without having 3ny sort of existence, i.e. truth and existence were existence at story a few something could humans are Just beginning to piece NOTES Thi^ passage from Misner, Thorne and Uheeter, p.1212, is given an appropriately grander setting Ln the text. The passage Ls also quoted by DavLes, G p.222, who Lt to Wheeler. In Davies the idea of ascribes foundations for cosmology simple and unassailable Logical is given a different exposure, and is then linked with restrictions, to zero, on God s range of choice of universe to make. 2 Especially by those whose inquisitiveness and sense of blunted or destroyed by the mainstream culture and its wonder h3s educational not been practices, practices much mainstream philosophy reinforces and tries to justify. 3 Indolent philosophers tend to assign those of these questions that they write off (e.g. as semantically defective or as betraying philosophical uonfuslon or hang—upz?) to science. But they are not Just a matter for and scientists tend to come up with philosophically loaded, naive, theories scientists remain, insofar as they address the cannot questions and at often science; enough all. Too many Like too many RustraLian phiLosophers, in the grips of awfuL metaphysics, such as narrow empiricism and/or physicaiism. -32- ^The anaLysis semantical It of naturaL a is Law is that' Law-constrained worLds, naturaL worids. The interpretation ruLe for necessity. Terra, appLy but to Like is It shouLd be noted that geophysicaL features, appLied in seLecting worLds, are not of course confined to systems. in terns of geophysicaL pLanetary other "Rn eLaboration of this type of answer can be further expLoited to heLp why actuaL the standard ot worLd is science expLain comparativeLy so that simpLe, mathematicaLLy tractabLe, etc. HameLy, it is convenientLy so because the actuaL worLd seLection invoLved impLicitLy to render it so, by choice of a serves worLd with the compLexity of richer worLds removed and onLy tractabLe ideaL etements (such as scientific universaLs) adjoined. &RLtern3tiveLy, through quantum and borrowing positive feedback, a massive firebaLL forms. The story admits of much variation. ? The prob Lems, as the questions of the Lattice in diagram 2 indicate, what expLaining phiLosophers does exist, Lie with what does not. In a reLated way, 3LL those not papers on the prob Lems nonexistence of and nonexistents have misjudged the prob Lernatic, and misconceived the onus of proof. For commonLy the probLems concern existents and their behaviour; nonexistents, especiaLLy those functioning in expLanatory rotes as regards existentiai often behaviour, are very weLL behaved by comparison with existents. It has been suggested, by D. Lewis, that the underLying theory of items (of JB) renders everything exists. But it nonexistent, is and makes it 3 reaL probLem, how anything patentiy faLse that the theory of items render everything nonexistent. There are criteria for existence, which are often JB, chapter 9). Every thing nominaLists normaLLy take to satisfied (cf. exist satisfies the to be justified; it cannot (with any pretension to satisfactoriness) just be cLaimed, in the fashion of so many phiLosophers. In any case, Lewis can be simuLated: whatever ind iv idua Ls exist criteria. Beyond that existence has in Lewis worLds wiLL exist in worids-seLection theory. Rnd it is. a genuine phiLosophicaL probLem how anything exists. g in 19t+6; see his cosmoLogicaL text. Llhitrow aLso appLied, more than RpparentLy a quarter of a century ago, PrincipLe , in his what has now been eLevated to the Rnthropic answer to why the dimensions of space are three; nameLy, th3t this atone permits the evoLution of Nan, the formuiator of the probLem'. However 'Uhitrow's reasons concern not mankind but stabLe pLanetary orbits and compLex neurai networks' (LI, p.!^). g Compare the binding energy which keeps etectrons bound to a nucLeus, where correiativeiy energy stored up in overcoming forces of repuLsion is positive. -33- e a story couLd be totd to bring Laws within the expLanation framework. However It wouid teLLing invoLve Laws first evoLved or happened to hoLd, the how before vacuum fLuctuations. (For some interesting specuLation, from which the ontic and anthropic commitment can be removed without totaL Loss, see Barrow pp. 151-2, where "chaotic gauge theory" is considered.) The issue of uLtimate is expLanation again up taken seLf-justifying postulate as serving refLexive, expLanation. Note that in UQ, to the resoLve the matter the especiaLLy of probLem uLtimate, PostuLate Characterisation a of of object-theory is an initiaLLy promising candidate for such a principte. issue is that, on the story as toLd, quantum phenomena assume Another serious decidedLy they course Of macro-dimensions. may, Schrodinger s cat iLLustrates, but perhaps not in the parabLe the as supposed of catastrophic form. In the absence of any approved quantization of general, reLativity, there onLy are Lax physicaL controis on what is in and what is out in specuLation here. Rnd, of course, the second story couid There are other mechanisms for the sudden be rise in eLaborsted other ways. e.g. white mass-energy, of ho Les in geometrodynamics. In his second paper, Tryon makes a rather casuaL beginning on meeting some of difficuLties the with the vacuum fLuctuation theory the cosmos, and of expLains the advantages of combining the theory with that of a (stiLL probLematic) "infLationary" universe, to boost the fLuctuation. But the theory stiLL awaits aporopriateLy detaiLed deveiopment and modeLLing. 12 There are various other issues concerning the physicaL constants, incLuding the question of the (sLow) evoLution of "constants" over time. LJeLL, do evoLve, the they if same sort of probLems arise for the parameters which repLace them (L.e. at each time t, for c(t)). There are putative arguments to the effect that there can be no very grand unified theory, and no finaL eLimination of constants, because any such theory wouid do too much in determ in ing the worLd (and things). But it is unctear at present how such an argument gets duty eLaborated. R tight argument uneLiminabiLity of some physicaL constants from physicaL principLes for the wouLd be of much interest. 13 Th',s is what is reaLLy accompLLshed in Carter. To some extent we have emerging in this area a contemporary scientific numeroLogy. 1L Convergence arguments, e.g. for such things as the Church-Turing thesis, underLying connections, but not co-operation. l^Even Less, seemingLy, is the universe an accident, 'an event proceeding from an unknown cause; something unexpected; a casuaLty, a mishap, l&If however the worLd reaLLy were necessary, such improbabiLity must be grossLy -34- reduced. How can that be: how can these contingencies be not what theg seem? 1? How M3ng worLds? ContinuousLg mang worLds? There is no reason whg not. But the answer is: as mang at Least as required. In object-theorg numbers don t short matter though much, so difficuLties technccaL controL Ls advantage. an are There as to measures, e.g. of fewness, in infinite modeLLings. Yet the notions are Ln order, e.g. among the naturaL numbers primes are few. 18 point, ThL^, and the inestimabLLitg specific of probabLLLties Ln (e.g. Ls argued, though in insufficient detaiL, bg TouLmLn among others meteoroLogg) Bg the wag, sureLg a creator wouLd have increased probabLLitLes bg seeing to a unLverse for fit decent habitation; a variation upon the argument from evLL infiltrates itseLf Ln probabiLitg guise here. 13 worked There are in fact mang proposed soLutions, most of them not theg (because far verg out have onLg few proponents), most of them not comprehensive certainLg (but it couLd be argued that this is a faLse ideaL), severaL of them discussed bg Everett, DeMLtt, Lande and others. 20 MheeLer s sequentiaL modeL another, so satisfgLng the theorg (Like certain offers a simitar range of worLds, but one after 'reaLLtg principLe". EarLLer MheeLer had adopted cosmoLogies) Eastern with in muLtLpLLcitg a both sequent La LLg and Lnto the possibLe; but recent Lg he has abandoned dimen^Lon^,, the Latter, partig on erroneous ontoLogLcaL grounds. 21 It Ls of course not the onLg reaLLstLc-stgie LnterpretatLon whLch does thLs: envisage everu Lande s LnterpretatLon is another. 22 From a neutraL viewpoint, Lt ts entLreLg taLse that atom ... as Me must constantLg engaging in this tgpe of scattering sctLvitg, therebg spLLtting the worLd again and again Lnto a stupendous number carbon-copLes of of LtseLf. The unLverse must therefore be LLkened to a tree, whLch branches 3nd (D p.I25). Nor Ls rebranches universe. 23 To anticipate, schemas of what the form, happens "if the tree-structured sgstern of universes the is as foLLows:- The antecedents of "anthropic" there exist so and so [e.g. observers] then ang phgsLcaL worLds must be such and such", are appLLed to phgsLcaL worLds. Rs there certainLg do exist so and so, narrow ctass the phgsLcaL worLds of are restricted to those that are such and such. gL It cs stLLL reasonabLe to 3sk whg - indeed to e.g. whg do we inhabit it?, whence a Long pose' severaL whg questions, evoLutionarg storg. Mhg are the constants those theg are?, then aLternative answers, LncLudLng brute fact, are among the possibiLities. -35- roundLg defeated Shapiro. 26 bg the sorts considerations advanced bg Feinberg and of Davies aLso suggests that mang-worLds theorg can provide a pLausibLe phgsicaL (as opposed to phiLosophicaL) justification for the strong principte (D p.122 middLe). In fact he never reaLLg shows this satisfactoriig (nor can it be so shown), and in pointing to the power of the m3ng—universe theorg he undermines the strong principte, showing it otiose. 2? arguments are presented in modat form, with the connecting quo status Often scheme set in either necessitated form, if F that) (e.g. T if exist there necessaritg then (it if possibLe modaLities are de dicto and and that invoLved cLaims the It such). if F then T. The modaLitg invoLved is not one of LogicaL contingent nomic of that strength, but can be adequateLg NecessariLg, necessitg, an The error. argument guarantee the concLusion, NecessariLg T, nor does it pretend form these or even in Lowest common denominator form. To attach the (reLative) modaLitg simpig to consequent T wouLd be second is 'it is more than mereLg rather reads that seems represented, as usuaL, through a necessitated connecting schema, one F form, (e.g. what is the case LocaLLg (what observers observe, T etc.) is onLg possibLe if phgsics is such aLwags be and so, then the universe must have, or so conform to, such and such features), or, in quasi-transcendentaL onLg must to do does not so. The is a LittLe more probLematic; but it appears to assert that F is inconsistent with not-T, and so, through obvious connections, the same as the rectified first form. 28 Mhat we have are devices, that fragments of theories, ruLes thumb, of appear to work in a range of cases. and caLcuLating It is these parts that mag generate successfuL technoiogg. The picture is Like engineering. 29 R main charge made bg LesLie against mang-worid cosmoLogies, e.g. LI, p.l^Sff. It is a surprising turn, given the popuLaritg of hgpothetico-deductive methodoLogg, to have it aLso objected that mang-worLd theorg voids induction. Putting chance in controL of inter-worLd differences erodes confidence in our sampLe of ReaLitg, on which our inductions are based' (LI, p.1^.3). this objection gets off the ground (it is transparentLg Insofar cLear as that it does), it depends on assuming the reaLitg of the entire worLd ensembLe. So Lt not Lapses against a neutraL theorg. 30 R reLated phitosophicaLLg important exampLe where the schema does so far is in Moore s proof of an externaL worLd, noted above. The reason is that the existence of arbitrarg materiaL objects, such as hands or does f3it not guarantee that the requirements (order, isoLated unitg, cabbages, coherence, mcnd-cndependence, etc.) for an externaL worLd are satisfied. 31 Rn earLier version of this paper was presented at the RustraLasian Rssociation of PhiLosophg Conference, Rugust 138^. The -36- heLpfuL comments bg David Rrmstrong, Brian Ellis and David Lewis, unreferenced above, were the discussion. commentaries; Both several made during John Leslie and Jack Smart supplied me with worthwhile their points have been incorporated, but some have of been resisted. The initial Univerity preprint series. version W3S published in an Rustralian National 32^ See Freeman, p.IS. for fuller discussion of need for reparation, see Burnet. Rnaximander's on position; the REFERENCES J.D. Barrow, Rnthropic definitions', Quarterly Journal of Royal the Rstroncmical Society 21^ ( 1983) lt+6-153 H. Bondi, Cosmology, Second edition, Cambridge University Press, I960. R, Brout, F. Englert and F. Gunzig, The creation of the universe as a quantum phenomenon' RnnaIs of Physics 115 (1978) 78-106. J. Burnet, Early Greek Philosophy, Fourth edition, Rdam & Charles Black, London, 1930. B. Carter, Large number coincidence and the anthropcc principle is in Longair, 291-98. B. Carter, The anthropic principle and its implications cosmology', biological for evolution , Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society, London (1983) St* 7-363. C.B. Collins and S.U. Hawk eng, Uhy is the universe isotrophic?', 19310 Rstrophqsics Journal 180 (1973) 317. C.D. Darlington, Darwin's Place in History, Blackwell, Oxford, 1959. P. Davies, The Rccidental Universe, Cambridge Universitu Press, Cambridge, 1982; referred to as D. P. Davies, God and the New Physics, Dent, London,1983; B.S. DeUitt referred to as G. and N. Graham, The Many-Uorlds Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics, Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J., 1973. R.H. Dicke and P.J.E. Peebles, in S.U. Hawking and U. The big bang cosmology - enigmas and nostrums , Israel, eds, Genera 1 relativity: an Einstein centenary survey, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1979, pp. 501^-517. -37- G.F.R. ELLis, 'is the universe expanding?', GeneraL Reiativitg and Gravitation 9(2) (L973) 87-9L. G. Feinberg and R. Shapiro, Life Beyond Earth, Morrow, New York, 1980. P. Feyerabend, Science Ln a Free Society, New Left Books, London, 1978. 'RnthropLc answers and the existence of P. Forrest, Proceedings God', of the Russet Lan Society, University of Sydney, 7 (1982) 1-13. K. Freeman, RncLLLa to the Pre-Socratic Phitosophers, BLackweLL, Oxford, 1971. N. Griffin and R. SyLvan, Provisionai Rnswers to ULtimate Questions, typescript, Canberra, 1981}.; referred to as UQ. S. Hawking and G.F. ELiis, The Large-Scaie Structure of Space-time, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1973. M. Heidegger, Introduction to Metaphysics, (trans. R. Mannheim), YaLe University Press, New Haven, 1959. C.G. HempeL, Rspects of Scientific Exp LanatLon, Free Press, New York, 1965. Lande, The Laws behLnd the quantum Laws , BrLtLsh JournaL for the PhiLosophu of Science 27 (1976) 27-^3. J. L^sLLe, RnthropLc prLncLpLe, worLd ensembLe, desLgn , RmerLcan PhLLosophLcaL QuarterLy, 19 (1982) l^l-lSl; referred to as LI. J. LesLLe, Cosmo Logy, probabLLity and the need to exp La Ln LLfe', Ln ScLentLfLc ExpLanatLon and UnderstandLng (ed. N. Rescher), UnLversLty Press of RmerLea, MaryLand, M.S. LongaLr 1983, 53-82; referred to as L2. (ed.), Confrontat Lon of Cosmo Log LeaL Theories wLth ObsservatLonaL Data, ReLdeL, Dordrecht, 1971}.. C.U. MLsner, K.S. Thorne and J.R. UheeLer, GravLtatLon, Freeman, San 1973. G.E. Moore, PhLLosophLcaL Papers, RLLen and UnwLn, London, FrancLsco, 1959. R. RobLnson, Essays Ln Greek PhLLosophg, CLarendon Press, Oxford, 1969. R. RoutLey, ExpLorLng MeLnong's JungLe and Beyond, Research SchooL ScLences, RustraLLan NatLonaL UnLversity, 1980; referred to as JB. -38- of SociaL Sagan Broca's Brain: Ref Leet ions on the Romance of Science, New York, Random House, 1973. S.Tou Lm in, The Return to CosmoLogy: Postmodern Nature, University of CaLifornia Press, BerkeLey Ca., 1982. Is the universe a vacuum fLuctuation?', Nature 2^6 (1973) 396-7 E.P. Tryon, E.P. Tryon, Science and the Theo Logy of *Mhat made the worLd?', New Scientist 101 (198!+) It+00, 1!+-16 FLN. Mhitehead, Process and ReaLity, Cambridge University Press, 1929. 6.H. Uhitrow, The Structure and Evo Lution of the Universe, Harper, New York, 1959. Second edition,  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Box 57, Item 2: Draft of Toward an improved cosmo-logical synthesis Subject The topic of the resource Typescript draft, correction version. Paper published, Sylvan R (1985) 'Toward an improved cosmo-logical synthesis', Grazer philosophische Studien, 25:135-179. Description An account of the resource Unnumbered paper from collection, item number assigned by library staff. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/browse?search=Richard+Routley&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bjoiner%5D=and&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=&amp;range=&amp;collection=&amp;type=&amp;user=&amp;tags=&amp;public=&amp;featured=&amp;exhibit=&amp;geolocation-mapped=&amp;geolocation-address=&amp;geolocation-latitude=&amp;geolocation-longitude=&amp;geolocation-radius=10&amp;submit_search=Search+for+items">Richard Routley</a> Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived <span class="MuiTypography-root-125 MuiTypography-body2-126">The University of Queensland's <a data-testid="rek-series" href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/records/search?page=1&amp;pageSize=20&amp;sortBy=score&amp;sortDirection=Desc&amp;searchQueryParams%5Brek_series%5D%5Bvalue%5D=Richard+Sylvan+Papers%2C+UQFL291&amp;searchMode=advanced">Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291</a></span>, Box 57, Item 2 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org">Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy</a> Contributor An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource <span>This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, </span><a href="https://najtaylor.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Dr. N.A.J. Taylor</a><span>.</span> Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library. Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource [40] leaves. 33.04 MB. Type The nature or genre of the resource Manuscript Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context <a href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:991d123">https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:991d123</a> Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1983 Coverage The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant n/a - location not listed in manuscript finding aid Box 57: Miscellaneous Logic https://www.antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/cee3998747324ca8cfafd9916c99b05c.pdf 694d7c85ceace8f227cc36d1f9729f33 PDF Text Text �J ��SHORT CONTENTS OF TOWARDS GREEN ANARKISM: EUCRATIC POLITICAL INVESTIGATION? ? 0. PROLOGUE 1. EXPLICATIONS 2. ELABORATIONS 3. ARGUMENTS I 4. ARGUMENTS II 5. VARIETIES AND OPTIONS TAKEN 6. ECONOMIC ELEMENTS: PROPERTY, CAPITAL, MARKETS, TAX 7. POLITICAL ELEMENTS: ORGANISATION, DEMOCRACY, BUREAUCRACY 8. SOCIAL THEORY ELEMENTS: NATURE, CULTURE 8A LEGAL ELEMENTS 9. ECOREGIONAL STRUCTURES, EUTOPIAN MODELLING 10. ROUTES, TRANSITION 11. FURTHER CRITICISMS FOILED 12. PROBLEM RESOLUTION 13. EPILOGUE. BIBLIOGRAPHY (INCLUDING RESOURCES) by a minor marginaZi-s^J p/iiZo-yop/^r writing in 7. ? Richard Sylvan, Za^ At^nri^f/i c^nfary. ��PROLOGUE WHY GREEN ANARKISM? Green anarchism is not merely an intellectually attractive intersection of anarchism with genuine environmentalism; it is also a rational imperative. Modem states are not merely without justification; they are a major force driving and facilitating degradation and destruction of global environments, to points of no return for many natural species and environments, and even seriously threatening future human viability. Anarchism would, with full justification, remove these major problem sources. Green anarchism derives from anarchism coloured by a deeper environmentalism. Anarchism itself is said to be essentially a modem ideology, arising after, and in opposition to, the modem state. Though there may be significant anticipations of anarchism in earlier philosophy, and though there are many worthwhile examples of early anarchistic societies, the main intellectual work begins only in the late eighteenth century (with the eruption of the French Revolution). Since then there have been waves of anarchistic output of varying strength, the most recent initiated in Paris again in 1968^(immediately following a series of academic texts pronouncing that anarchism was dead)L In important respects this received picture, ever so lightly sketched, is misleading. Anarchist ideas were already advanced in those similar ancient ideologies, Taoism and Stoicism,** in opposition to ancient empires. Lao Tzu, shadowy founder of Taoism, was not merely a trenchant critic of the Empire, but advocated a society in which the ruler, the Prince, disappeared into a do-nothing exemplary and merely legendary figure. What Taoism asserted is virtually tantamount to Thoreau's small but crucial anarchist amendment to Jefferson, that the best government is the one that does not govern at all. In a similar vein, "Zeno, the founder of Stoicism, advocated a society without government. Laws should be abolished[!], since virtue and morality would only be achieved in liberty'.2 That common ancient tradition, spanning East and West, though often submerged, has never been lost. The Taoist tradition persisted (if often in degenerate form) in China, and heavily influenced west Asian adaptations of Buddhism. Stoicism survived, as (often degenerate) internal critic, for the duration of the western Roman Empire, and was directly incorporated into early Christianity. Although anti­ authoritarian features were subsequently suppressed in the Stoic-Christian tradition, elements survived even in the increasingly authoritarian climate of that religion, and the positive ideas have resurfaced again and again in religious freer-thinkers. 1 For details see Marshall pxi. Amusingly anarchism in Australia has more recently also been * Taoism and Stoicism can almost be seen as variants upon one another, back to the very names. It is tempting to conjecture that they may have both arisen from a proto-Toi-ism. Lehner, H of I, p.71. On Taoism as anarchist, see Clark, ch7, Marchall, ch4, and UT. 2 �2 The term * anarchism' was however introduced into English in a highly perjorative sense, signifying disorder, chaos, lawlessness and the likeA It is regularly displayed in this negative connotation, in politically unstable times in England, long before much theoretical work on anarchism began (nonetheless there were tracts, like that of Winstanley). As a result, the term 'anarchy' got away to a very bad start in English. It was used, from the early 16th century onwards, to mean confusion, disorder, lawlessness, licence, and absence or nonrecognition of authority. Similarly for most of its cognates 'anarch', 'anarchal', 'anarchial', 'anarchic', 'anarchical', 'anarchially', 'anarchism', 'anarchist' and 'anarchize', (see OED entries). 'Anarchism' itself had also acquired its re/evanf modem sense of 'the principles and practice of anarchy or anarchists', namely 'the Doctrine Position or Art of those that teach anarchy; also the being itself of people without a Prince or Ruler' by 1656 (in Blount GZo^^gr). As a political theory anarchism is standardly said, however, to have emerged much later (and there are stock, 'inconsistent' presentations: a state without a state, government without government, theory without doctrine, order without order, etc.) It is the interaction between popular longer-standing usage and later serious ideological use that helps account for the astonishing folkloric history of the term aKarc/n-yTK. It also reflects one facet of the pervading amateurism of anarchism, its lack of industrious research. Consider what certain encyclopaedias say, beginning with one that is not so much wrong as sloppy. Historically the word "anarchist", which derives from the Greek an arc/io-y, meaning "no government", appears first to have been used pejoratively to indicate one who denies all law and wishes to promote chaos. It was used in this sense against the Levelers during the English Civil War and during the French Revolution by most parties in criticizing those who stood to the left of them along the political spectrum. The first use of the world as an approbatory description of a positive philosophy appears to have been by Pierre Joseph Proudhon when, in his (W%<3/ Af property?, Paris, 1840), he described himself as an anarchist because he believed that political organization based on authority should be replaced by social and economic organisation based on voluntary contractual agreement (Woodcock p. 111). According to a rival encyclopaedia, however, The word "anarchy" describing a stateless society was used[?J for the first time by Louis Armand de Labortan in his voyage Z' (1703), describing the Indians living in a society without state, laws, prisons, priests, private property, in short "in anarchy" (Lehning p.71). A glance at the OED, such as we took above, along with a comparison of the stories, reveals the falsity of many of these interesting contentions. Much historical detail remains to be sorted out satisfactorily. Though there are many histories of anarchism, until very recently a 3 The pejorative sense was not contrived or imposed following some significant political incident, such as the pivotal Chicago events of 1886, which is what Jp^ies 86 implies. No doubt, however, following the Chicago events, stigmatisation and denigration of anarchism, and its automatically assumed association with violence and disorder, were deliberately orchestrated and propagated in USA. Such an outcome contributed further to development of an already established anti-anarchist mythology. �3 reasonably satisfactory one had yet to be written. Fortunately that has now changed (during the drafting of this text). Conveniently we are now absolved from lamenting the absence of such work and likewise from attempting more historical detail.^ For Marshall's massive text, has now appeared, it can be deferred to (by no means always uncritically) on many historical issues and for mad detail, to which it affords fine access. The concentrate on systematic and theoretical matters. Most of the seminal and interesting work on anarchism has come from outside present text can now universities and standard intellectual circles, and often from political amateurs. Academics have contributed histories, surveys and (usually not so sympathetic) criticisms, but, with a very few exceptions, little original thought. $ For typically they are ideologically stuck with the state, be it a pathetically minimal one. Intellectuals are so inured to the state that they are inclined to such pronouncements as that the idea of abolishing the state entirely must strike us as utopian .6 Yes, as eutopian. 'Most political philosophers in the past few generations have been unable to escape what the psychoanalysts might call a "state fixation". Even those those temper and reason caused them to distrust a nationalist philosophy could not deal with the state except as a rigid entity. They wished it large or small, isolated or cosmopolitan, but in any case a rounded unit which had to be taken as it was and maintained as such in any reconstruction of... society'7 It is easy to speculate on reasons for this, connected with academics being part of the expensive state scene. While anarchism has vanished from the mainstream academic scene, it is again becoming visible, if hardly prominent, in alternative (especially green) scenes and in work of disaffected academics associated with them. A surprising amount of the adventurous anarchist literature now appears, like the earlier utopian literature, in fiction, especially science fiction (and so, under prevailing division of labour, tends to become a subject for literary criticism, not political philosophy). But the ideas and plans appear there in quite insufficient detail. There, moreover, it can easily be dismissed as fantasy, as unrealistic, not a serious and proper contribution to political dialectic. The entire range of political discussion concerns whether there should be marginally more government intervention, or marginally less; marginally more public expenditure on welfare services is marginally less. Nobody [much] challenges the whole system, still less the existence of the state itself. The state's own socialisation processes see to that (Luard p.52). While virtually all political discussion undoubtedly traffics in such marginalia, powerful and warranted challenges there certainly have been: It is plain that on general principles of law and reason ... the Constitution is no contract; that it binds nobody, and never did bind anybody; and that all those who pretend to act by its authority, are really acting without any legitimate authority at all: that, on general principles of law and reason, 4 5 6 7 In contrast thus to James 186 who reiterates the familiar lament. Even the very occasional (here deliberately unspecified) exceptions are exceedingly cautious. Miller p.182. Mitrany p.98. �4 they are mere usurpers, and that everyone ... has the right... to treat them as such.s Given the United States is not contractually legitimated, what other state is? None appears to have superior credentials! None is rationally legitimated, so it will be argued in detail. The State in general and in abstract is not justified. So, whether it can be exploited for environmental and social purposes or not, its use is not justified. Environmentalism is still more modem than anarchism. Though it has ancient roots, and though the movement grew substantially in the 19th century, fusing there with an earlier romantic movement, environmentalism is an archetypically 20th century ideology. The more widely diffused green movement is essentially a contemporary phenomena, no doubt the most distinctive new political force of the late 20th century (the feminism movement is older). Green anarchism draws together elements from environmentalism and anarchism. While it can be seen as continuous with environmentally sensitive later 19th century social anarchism (of Morris, Kroprotkin, and others), environmental problems now appear in a new light and take on a new urgency. For we are now confronted by what is not inaccurately referred to as the envzronmenfa/ crAyZy, combining the cumulative efforts of rapid human population growth, rapid concomitant growth of vast industrial and human pollution threatening and undermining biological life support systems, rapid depletion of habitats species and nonrenewable resources, and very extensive and worsening environmental deterioration. In the present parlous environmental predicament those concerned to take some requisite action, active environmentalists, have two opposently diametrically opposed courses open;9 * Supporting, and working through, strengthened states to try to avert the crisis. Central to 'most environmental justifications of [expanded] state power", according to social individualists, is the argument that people will not voluntarily r&yfram themselves from doing those things of which the environmental crisis is the aggregate effect. They will not voluntarily refrain from hunting whales and other species threatened with extinction, from having "too many children"", from discharging untreated wastes into rivers and lakes, and so on (Taylor pp 1-2, quoted in Grofman p.108). As in collective action theory (advanced typically by individualists), it is concluded (invalidly as will be seen) that state power is required to compel restraint and to undertake compulsory rectification. * Working outside states in more direct efforts to avert elements of the crisis. The alternative, that is, is to abandon the state. Here lies the main chance, and the only genuine long term alternative for a deep, as opposed to merely reformist, environmentalism. For under state regimes, more and more of remaining environments are degraded or destroyed, in the march of 8 9 Spooner (M? Treason) pp 27-8. The omitted phrase asserts that everyone has not only the right but is wtoraZZy to treat them thus. But here Spooner goes further than data seems to warrant, converting supererogation to obligation. (The phrase following the quotation echoes Miller p.38). These choices are differently presented and explained in SM, a main intellectual ancestor of the present work. The approaches complement one another. �5 state growth and economic progress. In fact, there are several reasons for the extra-state anti­ state course. There are serious limits to what states can accomplish, especially in international issues in the interstrices of states, but also as regards individual environmentally-hostile action. Moreover, even when it appears that states can a^t, or contribute, there are sharp limits to what they are prepared to do or attempt. States of course explain their tardiness or reluctance to move in various ways: prior higher commitments (e.g. endless economic ones such as creating jobs, containing inflation, etc.), the need for balance (with a constituency after unparaxeded of any environmental crisis, or wanting, like comments operating with anarchist discount rates, to party now), etc. Concerned environmentalists should take both courses: use the state and exploit state power where opportunities offer (without thereby endorsing the state and its standard practices), but also, more important, they should work outside states and against states. For mam co/ifn&Mfmg coarse o/The anJ ov^ra/Z o/?^rafmg fa worsen if. Given this (no doubt jaundiced) sfa^-mfrz'car^ thesis, surely it is hypocritical also to work through them and use them. Not at all; for states acquire and hold, have expropriated to themselves, considerable social wealth, which arguably should be directed to social concerns, including environmental amelioration. However, while states may properly be used so long as they persist, still ultimately halting the new ubiquitous environmental rot, salvaging or conserving some of what remain of viable environments, will involve, if it can be done, dissolution of states. There are powerful environmental reasons for trying to terminate / the present era of states. States are ineluctably committed to economic growth, of almost any sort; indeed they are main proponents of such growth. This commitment, certainly highly conspicuous, is not merely accidental, and is bound to impact negatively on environments. Australia, for example, needs a growth rate (in GDP) of at least 3% just to provide employment for its school-leavers, more to cater for immigrants, more to allow for some politically acceptable redistribution, more to meet rising aspirations. More, more, more .... States cannot step off the growth treadmill. That growth in turn requires, to deliver essential exports, expanded raids on resources and biological capital (if not that held by the state, that of other states). These exercises in tum inevitably mean, given present technologies and cost structures, pollution in many dismaying forms and environmental degradation.^ So growth implies environmental degradation. Therefore, with contemporary states degradation is inevitable. Such states are inevitably environmental vandals, n 10 11 A prominent recent attempt to block this sort of argument features economic growth subject to con train ts of environmental sustainability. While such constrained economic growth is a feasible (and old) idea, contemporary states, given their commitments, cannot and cannot afford to deliver it. A recent example concerns Australian production of greenhouse gases, where Australia cannot, officials now say, meet the costs involved in attaining expected reduction targets. Sustainable development itself is critically examined in r The kind of practical necessity operating here will concern us in later chapters. Logically there could be benign "states"; but these would be far removed from contemporary state arrangements. ( �6 There is exceedingly little evidence that social and environmental prospects will ever improve under the contemporary regime of states; instead much evidence to contrary has accumulated. "... Reliance on the state or a global superstate for change will lead to a continuation of many of the patterns of domination that the state has done so much to develop and reinforce in the past" the anarchist strategy of change "from below" ... [and "from above" is] much more promising'. Indeed the claim is made that The anarchist vision ... of a fusion between a universal confederation and organic societal forms of a communal character lies at the very centre of the on/y hopeful prospect for the future world order'. 12 Some of the pressures to continued exponential growth, and their environmental and social consequences, themselves positively feeding back to fuel demands for more growth, are colourfully observed in the following passage: One of the most widely pursued common goals of recent times has been economic growth, which is generally regarded as the most important ambition of states. These pressures to high rate of growth not only endanger the world's resources but do not even procure the material satisfactions they are intended to provide. For the effect of competition is that high rates of growth can be achieved only by high rates of investment designed to secure higher productivity. This secures equivalent production with more equipment but less labour. Thus more and more people are displaced from their jobs who cannot necessarily find alternative employment in service industries or elsewhere. All over the Western world, in shipbuilding, in steel, in motor manufacture, in textiles, in fishing, in agriculture and other industries, employment rapidly declines. So the total number of those unemployed increases in all industrial countries and remains high even in those where a relatively high rate of growth is being achieved. And the very fact of high unemployment, by reducing total demand, lowers the level of investment and growth for the future. Periods of growth become shorter and those of recession become longer. The relatively simple devices for stimulating growth in earlier times - lower interest rates, budgetary deficits, fiscal expansion and public works — are either not attempted through fear of inflation, or if attempted do not achieve their effect. Despite persistent recession inflation remains strong, partly because of excessive increases in income obtained by those still at work, partly because of the large sections of the economy which are in public hands and are unaffected by antiinflationary measures. Modern industrial societies, therefore, in appearance so advanced, are yet characterised by the bizarre spectacle of large sections of the population being without work, while ever higher levels of investment are undertaken to reduce employment still further in the future, so ensuring that the benefits of high growth are enjoyed by fewer and fewer people (Laurd p.147). A main dynamic involved can be summarised: Both the State and those major corporations which set much of its agenda aim to increase productivity (for reasons of profit, profile, firm or party growth and survival, etc.). But productivity increase characteristically sheds labour. Restoration of employment requires growth. Hence one heavy pressure to growth: sustaining employment. That pressure is, furthermore, one of many. Another derives from internal dynamics of corporations and bureaucracies. Like the state and capitalism, they all must, as Marx argued, 12 Clark, also quoting Falk from 'Anarchism of world order* in FVo/noj, p.160). �7 grow or die. There are many reasons for the growth imperative, both broad ideological and business specific.^ For satisfactory survival, satisfaction of its executives and employees, its stock holders, and so on, a modem corporation has to grow. Cpntr^l here are such matters as laws of profit decline otherwise, and more general principles of organisational aging and decline. If any serious ecological conclusion is to be drawn from Vol I, it is from Marx's compelling demonstration that the very law of life of capitalist competition, of the fully developed market economy, is based on the maxim, "grow or die". Translated into ecological terms, this clearly means that a fully developed market economy must unrelentingly exploit nature to a point ... that is literally regressive geologically and biologically. Capitalism, in effect, is not only polluting the world on a historically unprecedented scale; it is simplifying all the ecosystems of the planet, turning soil into sand, the oceans into lifeless sewers, indeed, threatening the very integrity of our sources of atmospheric oxygen. If one were to follow the logic of this tendency to its very end, capitalist— and hierarchical— society are utterly incompatible with a viable biosphere. What limits the ecological validity of Marx's view is obviously not his revelation of capitalism's "law of life" but rather the "progressive" role he imparts to capitalism's "success" in supposedly achieving the technical domination of nature. This Janus-faced aspect of Marx's writings is what throw them into conflict with an authentic ecological sensibility. Gorz, by contrast, sides-steps exacfZy what we must learn in the contradictory position of Marx, namely, that the very technical achievements of capitalism, fat^ from a-y-MmzZafing "ecological necessities as technical restraints", are governed by a "law of life" that technologically lacks any TES p.293) form of "restraint' Prevailing political arrangements 'no longer offer us a hopeful prospect of resolving the vast social and ecological crises which now confront humanity ... these systems, with their deep commitment to such values as industrialism, high technology, centralism, urbanization and the state, have been instrumental in creating the social atomization and ecological imbalance which are at the core of these crises' (Clark pp. 141-2). Indeed these systems are bound to exacerbate the problems. While these statements should by now be motherhood statements, they are not. Hope springs eternal: more naive environmentalists regularly appeal to a state that sometimes makes appropriate responsive noises and puts out appealing propaganda, but meanwhile is thoroughly committed to economic growth of environmentally damaging forms. The normal dynamic of th^ "advanced" state is extremely environmentally hazardous. Centralised states support environmentally and socially damaging methods of production, in order to benefit from the surplus and exploitable technology thereby produced - which are important for purposes of state, in particular for spending to remain in power (job generation, pork barrelling, subsidization of large business), for positional enrichment of the bureaucracy, and for development of the forces of coercion, propaganda and authority which matter both for internal social objectives and in order to remain militarily competitive in the region and spheres of influence. Details of the dynamic at work have become familiar from socio-environmental studies of state operation. For example, technologies that facilitate centralized authoritarian 13 The broad and ancient ideological reasons are investigated elsewhere, e.g. MSS. �8 control are favoured (such as nuclear power, which also supplies material for nuclear weapons). Such technologies serve the interests of state actors and those who benefit particularly therefrom, namely economically dominant social strata. This dynamic, which does not require any arms race, only kinds of inter-state competition, encourages ever-increasing productivity, entailing high consumption of resources, high output of pollution, substantial environmental degeneration and destru( tion, and so on. Active aware environmentalists have, in the end, little choice but to attempt to ;abotage this dynamic. 14 Opposition to anarchism from gi een directions, and especially from green infiltrators, often derives from the assumption that under anarchism all environmental regulation would lapse, that it would be an open-go, fret -for-all for anti-environmental forces—the very ones that are already running rampant over the Earth, and perhaps others besides. It needs to be stressed that this opposition rests on a misconception of what green anarchism ^is all about. With a caring anarchism there may be a complete of the usually conceived situations of states and stateless societies, as regards environment regulation and social support. It should not have escaped notice that often states are the prime enemies of environmental regulation, improved environment practices, and the like. Even when there is very extensive community support for regulation, the state acts to block it, and aids and abets damaging practices! A central reason for this is that the state typically reflects a rather narrow range of vested interests, increasingJhese days those of dominant business, not community interests except very secondarily. Contrary then to received conceptions, the state is frequently not a means to, but an obstacle to, satisfactory regulation. Satisfactory green regulation can occur, can only occur, without the modern state. It will be argued that not only are there no intellectual or theoretical problems in dispensing with the state, but fuller there are no serious losses in disposing of it. There is no case for the state, and no need for it. But it is worse than that: it is predominantly bad in its impacts. Accordingly, it ought not to be in place. The practical upshot is that that we should endeavour to remove it. Among the incidental practical difficulties arising as a result, are that for complex societies there is a need for some structure to replace the state (not a intractable theoretical problem any longer). As well there is a need for a strategy to displace the state. That is where radical environmentalism enters again. A thoroughgoing environmentalism accordingly forces a significant type of anarchism, a social non-capitalist anarchism. The basic reason it forces anarchism is that the state, a prime anarchist enemy, not only fails to supply or retain environmental goods, but is frequently actively involved in their degradation or removal. The state is a major facilitator and powerful source of environmental degradation and destruction. Genuine greenness further substantially constrains the directions anarchism can take, the variety of admissible anarchisms. It serves to eliminate as a serious option total reliance on 14 This argument is adapted from A. Carter, Towards a green political theory*. While Carter's way out is not endorsed, his elaboration of the dynamic is, more or less. LL �market methods, as proposed for instance under anarcho-capitalism and libertarianism. While excessive reHance upon capitalist markets is rejected, primarily because of heavy externalities, more traditional markets are given a rather free role. The problems with market-capitalism is not so much markets, except as distorted in a capitalist setting, but capitalism.^ Capitalism, both in theory and as normally practised, is a major enemy of environmentalism, and a main source of environmental problems. Capitalism also encourages, what conspicuous capitalists conspicuously exhibit, environmentally unacceptable lifestyles. Greenness also sharply constrains meta-politics. For example, it counts heavily against standard game-theoretic approaches of analytic political philosophy, because these entirely discount environmental effects (except as reflected through human actors' self interests). This work concentrates upon the anarchist components of green anarchism (the green part is attempted in a companion text on green ideology). It is primarily a theoretical work; it concentrates upon what is sometimes usefully called "theoretical anarchism". Because the work does focus on anarchism, little will be said about present green politics (and what thin associated theory there is), because that generally involves politics within conventional state settings. Where this differs from past anarchism is not only its environmental depth, but in the level of detail of arguments, criticism, and organisational structure. The latter especially,jwhere IT- 1 a; thin and threadbare historical anarchism is particularly weak. It is not enough to gesture towards some federation of communities. Details of organisations at each level need to be provided, for a more convincing story. Most of the disappointingly slight contemporary academic literature on anarchism will not be addressed or, if it is, criticised in much detail. Life is too short for that sort of indulgence. However much will have been criticised obliquely or in passing; and enough critical detail is supplied for direct critiques to be produced (as exercises by energetic readers). While there is mMc/z scope for theoretical improvement of anarchism, there is little room for reinventing anarchism. There is a long and distinguished Hne of amateur anarchist thought form virtually every significant idea that will be which contains in seminal (if developed herein. Thus, like most of the academic literature^this text is not particularly original. Unlike much of that literature it does not pretend to be. Virtually everything in this book has been said before, if not in anarchist theory then elsewhere; scarcely anything is original. But it has never been put together quite like this before. Moreover, some of it needed and needs saying again, with a little new information and arguments a bit differently ordered. But no means all is repeated. Where something, perhaps important for the dialectic, is said at least as well I can reiterate it, I simply cross-refer. That has the effect of making the work visibly less contained (self-containment is ^bmething of an illusion), but it saves on labour and materials. For other purposes too, repetition, despite its extravagance, may be important. Significant 15 On the deliberately neglected, or papered over, major differences between marketism and capitalism, �10 ideas and books often get neglected, because for instance they were not published at the right times, in the right places, by the right authors; they did not get duly circulated, and so forth. I judge the time at least is more propitious for green anarchism than it has been, perhaps ever before. As well, there are many things that this book, which is pitched in a theoretical, rationalistic way, does not aim or attempt to do. It does not attempt to supply much background, historical or other information, a lot of which is easily found in better equipped libraries. Relevant background can all be tracked, however, through references in work referred to in this book. 16 It does not attempt a full account of substitutes for important current institutions and arrangements such as those connected with property, markets, law, and so on; nor does it offer, what is warranted, a sustained critique of prevailing arrangements, for which opposite substitutes are sought and indicated. Fortunately again, some of the critique, if not positive detail of substitutes, has been well accomplished in other texts. 17 What is attempted is however a scholarly and systematic work (though, as indicated, a far from exhaustive work), on theoretical anarchism. Accordingly the book is littered with notes, some of which merely cite references, but many of which elaborate points in the text, especially details hat lead off in different directions from the thrust of the text. I should like to thank Frances Redrup for processing reams of inelegant scribble, from which this text grew, and to acknowledge the continuing support the Australian National University gave during slow production. I want to thank Debbie Trew for proofing the typescript (no straightforward business) and organizing a bibliography. I should record my gratitude to Bob Goodin for a continuing supply of background books, and to him and to the publishers and editor of Anarc/iAyf 16 17 for encouraging me to work upon anarkism again. A major recent source, for history of Northern Hemispheric anarchism, is, as observed, Marshall, While Marshall concentrates, no doubt correctly upon Northern hemispheric activity, and within that heavily upon Anglo-American work, there is room for a supplementary production taking due account of anarchism elsewhere, Australia for one example. Although an anarchist club was formed in Melbourne only a century ago (and then upon an American model), an extraordinarily sustained period of "original anarchism" (coupled often with "original (or primitive) affluence") flourished in Australia before European settlement two centuries ago, with more than 500 centuries perhaps more than 10000 centuries, of continuous Aboriginal anarchist arrangements. Much of the story of post-settlement Australian anarchism (which included remarkable Queensland activity and a Paraguayan expedition organised by Lane, as well as extensive Victorian agitation) is recounted by James, in a series of local publication, add Burgmann and by Souter. The story of Australian Aboriginal anarchism has yet to be told. The story for the rest of the Southern Hemisphere, both before and after European conquests and political imposition, remains to be satisfactorily told. Thus, for instance, Carter on property, Bumheim on bureaurcracy, othe^on democracy. A �// 1. EXPLICATIONS OF ANARCHISM CHAPTER and of green subforms G 1. Initial explanation: fud and dilute forms, and corollaries. Anarchism is the theory, principles or practice of anarchy. As practised by engaged anarchists, who are naturally adherents, authors or promotors of anarchy, it includes the assertion of anarchy and rejection of nonanarchy, i.e. rejection of archy. Anarchy itself, in its norma/ political form, applies to societies or communities, territories or countries. It is, according to the dictionaries, the following sort of condition or state: lack of coercive government, absence of a political state, want of authoritarian political heads or leaders, institutions or organisations. Politically there are evidently fhr^ j^racrara/ aa^ar/(y, ca^rciaa, and normally comprehending both, the political .yraf^.i The anchoring notion of anarchy has recently been extended beyond political arrangements to apply to other institutional forms such as the Church, Science, and Law, to mean alternative forms lacking authoritarian structure and coercive methods. Thus appear, under transference, such varieties as epistemological anarchism and philosophical anarchism, instead of po/zfzcn/ anarchism upon which this text focuses. However the far-reaching analogies should not lost sight of; they matter. Anarchism is to political authority, as atheism is to religious authority, and rather as scepticism is to scientific authority. Although the conditions specified for anarchy are normally taken as conjoined, it is possible to construe them disjointly, yielding what could be called anarchisms. One diluted form which has obtained a little exposure is a /zzzzz^J anarchism appropriately opposed to the state but prepared to endorse carefully-controlled coercive authorities.^ A differently diluted form is a anarchism which is opposed to all prevailing states, because of some serious but in principle removable defect or other of each and every one of these states, but is not opposed to the very idea of an ideal state, or to a new wonderful order of states; that is it is, not, so to say, a principled anarchism. It is sometimes difficult to ascertain whether historic anarchists are j?rznczp/^r/ anarchists or merely de facto ones. There are limits to how far definitional dilution should be allowed to proceed: a theory (such as libertarianism) postulating a minimal coercive centralised state presumably exceeds acceptable diluted bounds, as n^key element is retained. Within such bounds, we shall operate both with full and dilute forms, accounting all anarchism (in a bro^d sense, qualifying as need be). Routes to full anarchism may well lead through dilute forms. Indeed these offer main paths towards anarchism proper. -t These three key elements are duly signposted in many, though not all, serious on anarchism. J- �12 It is evident that anarchy, and therewith anarchism, can be better characterised, negatively, through what it rejects, namely to sharpen the characterisation, centralised coercive forms, than in assertive formulation obtained through awkward locutions like 'absence' 'lack' 'want'. The simpler negative formulation (supplying the of anarchy), rejection of archy, makes it immediately evident that much of what vulgarly pass for meaning conditions upon or essential features of anarchism are not. Firstly, a variety of political arrangements and organisation, including of government, are entirely compatible with anarchy. It is enough for these arrangements not to include anarchy-violating features such as authoritarian or coercive elements. For example, a government without such elements, a government nonetheless in the dictionary sense of 'administration of public affairs', satisfies the principle of anarchy, and so is anarchistic. Such an anarchistic government can include normal components of organisation, regulation and control, so long as they conform to the principle. Certainly a territory without government, since therefore lacking an archist government, is anarchistic. But the popular converse fails. An anarchistic system may well, like several societies substantially destroyed by European conquest, have a small smooth-running public administration, free of authoritarian elements. Thus it would have a government, but not an authoritarian government. No doubt it would also be in a predominant modem, but narrow, use of 'government'. The term 'government', which is variably determinable, vacillates in particular between * administration of public affairs (including control, regulation, what it once meant) and its important and now dominant restriction, the enarchistically unacceptable determinate, * authoritative administration of public affairs (i.e. that exercising authority, and characteristically backed by coercion). Much confusion concerning anarchism has resulted through failure to separate the wider and narrower determinates^ It may well be true that, as dictionaries assert, an anarchist would 'oppose all existing systems of government'; but this is not a matter of meaning, it is contingent upon the character of prevailing state systems. Nor therefore are prevailing political forms everywhere so far removed from anarchistic alternatives: they may even overlap them. Make the following kind of thought-experiment concerning the government and operation of some modem freer, less violent, more peaceful society: the coercive and authoritarian elements are blacked out (both operational components and what they typically operate upon). For instance, there is a strike of relevant groups, judges �and accused, police and criminals, prison warders and prisoners, etc. (perhaps because the broad society had reduced the opportunities for crime and accordingly threatened their contra­ operative livelihoods). What may well happen, what we shall imagine happening, is that governmental affairs simply keep running for some time. Things work well enough. Partial examples of just this sort of phenomenon are not uncommon, as when police forces go slow or strike. For example, when traffic police stop work traffic keeps on going, much as before. It may be irrelevantly objected that such anarchistic periods are mere interludes, presupposing surrounding authoritarian structures (somewhat as anarchistic end-states of marxism are premissed on preceding super-productive authoritarian states). Such thought experiments were designed to remove a different intellectual blockage: the common assumption that anarchism is utterly remote from the political practice of complex modem states and impossible to realise at all. As a theory, anarchism tends to advance a stronger theme than the progressive particular claims that anarchistic systems are possible, realisable, and sometimes realised. After all, these arrangements may be realisable—as more than an interlude—only in restricted or anomalous circumstances (e.g. a few people on an isolated tropical island). The stronger theme, linked with the anarchist principle, is that there is no need at all for authoritarian or coercive regulation. So rejection can succeed universally. Universal anarchism encounters many problems which do not trouble less ambitious parfict/Zar anarchisms, such as those to be advanced here. For example, how to rectify especially degenerate or evil societies? An attempt is sometimes made to render all anarchism universal, through the connecting thesis that for anarchism to succeed anywhere it must succeed everywhere (else be destroyed by ruthless, expansionist or greedy states, or similar). Fortunately the fallacious connecting thesis, though popular with critics, is implausible.^ Although anarchism proper does exclude certain kinds of government, coercive and authoritarian forms, it does not automatically include, certainly not as a matter of semantics, specific positive kinds. Anarchism is not necessarily "a theory of government based on the free agreement of individuals rather than on submission to law and authority", despite what dictionaries assert (incompatibly incidentally with their definitions of 'anarchy'). Such positive accounts of anarchism, as offering a certain theory of government, both try to convert a particular variety, individualistic anarchism, into the more general object, and try to import a certain motivation for, or differently explanation of, or justification of, anarchism into the very essence of the object (this is the general fallacy of verificationism in operation). Anarchism, or at least its assertion, may well be regularly motivated by ideals of free arrangements, not imposed by narrow or incompetent authoritarian forces, but motivation is one thing, meaning �14 another, verification a third. Not only is the assumption that anarchism is incompatible with government, wellregulated government, mistaken. So also therefore are the assumptions that anarchism is incompatible with organisation, with regulation, with a positive noncoercive "law", with order. So mistaken therefore are the widespread assumptions that anarchism entails disorganisation, disorder, confusion, lawlessness, chaos. Yet all these negative associations have been incorporated into degenerate popular meanings of anarchism. It is similar with related assumptions that anarchism implies violence, paramilitary activity, or terrorism. A popular picture of the anarchist, encouraged by authors like Conrad and Dostoevsky, is the excitable fictional character with a bomb in his pocket (not a Tolstoy or a Thoreau).5 These too are assumptions and pictures, with little basis either in semantics or in general anarchist theory or practice, promulgated by an unsympathetic opposition generally comfortable in present poor to appalling political systems or unaware of alternatives. With anarchy, as with many other valuable terms, a concerted confusion or destruction effort has been made, part of an extensive terminological vandalism in human intellectual affairs. Rather than reconciling ourselves to sacrifice of the damaged term anorc/ug/n, let us salvage the term explicitly for the pristine notion, and isolate the conventional associations under the term anarchi-pm, shortened, if a single term is sought, to Most fictional anarchists of system-supportative authors are degenarchists; but they are far from representative of anarchists. There are many anarchists who are not terrorists, few who are; there are many who are not dangerous troublemakers bent upon violently upsetting local settled order; increasingly there are many anarchists within environmental and peace movements, many of them anarchists. Gentler anarchisms tend to be all of more pacific, more social and more rational than tougher or hardened anarchisms. 2. Rival, typically defective, definitions, and beyond. Much of what is taken as typical or even characteristic of anarchism, especially popularly and journalistically, consist of optional extras, not even typical of anarchism. They represent, like what gets written into degenarchism, attempts at easy smearing or dismissal of anarchism, for instance as an ideology unworthy of serious consideration. As regards violence, terrorism, disorder, disorganisation, confusion, these sorts of point ought to be well enough known. But they apply also to other more benign features widely taken to characterize anarchism, such as attempts to tie anarchism variously to individualism, capitalism, voluntarism, primitivism, spontaneity, or socialism. Thus such erroneous characterisations of anarchism as those of the selection that follows:- 5 �15 * One utterly appalling characterisation comes from a Russian DzcZzozzrzzy of PAz/o^op/zy. ^ "Azz^zrc/zz^zzz, a petty-bourgeois socio-political trend that is hostile to all authority and the state, and counterposes the interests of petty private ownership and small peasart economy to the progress of society based on large-scale production" * Another dismal, indeed wild, characterisation comes from an American political scientist, who audaciously asserts that "anarchism ... is anti-political—that is, it does not really offer political solutions" (p.l), rather "the primitive core of anarchism is not so very different from Christianity. That is, it rests on the notion that man has a need, not just a preference, to love" While this is wild, there are convergences and congruences between types of anarchism and early Christianity.? * It is "a political doctrine based on the value of individual freedom"? While this is not wild, it does erroneously convert what is a frequent powerful motive, and reason, for anarchism into part of it, confusing motivation and justification with essence. For it is by no means an invariant feature. A socialist or monastic community, placing no great emphasis upon or even discouraging individuality, can be organised anarchistically. * It is "a theory of government based on the free agreement of individuals rather than submission to law and authority" (Concz-y^ Eng/zj/z Dzcfzozzazy). But it also asserts that the same %7z#rc/zz.yAy "... are opposed to all forms of government". That inconsistent information should, as already seen, be discounted. Furthermore, there may be no free agreement; an anarchistic situation can, as already also seen, just happen. More likely, a sustained anarchism may emerge under favourable historical opportunities, again without any sort of contract or general agreement; it is then only zf there were free agreement. Certainly, there would no longer be "submission to authority", but there would likely be systems of rules, which people normally followed. * The very short characterisation of rzzzrzrc/zMzzz (and rendition of zzzMrc/zz?^) as "no government" is defective because of the elasticity, slippiness and determinability, of "government"? For example, to increase documentation, according to one dictionary ((/zzzv^r^zz/ Ezz^/z^/z), gove?7Z7?zenf means "... system of polity in a state; territory ruled by a governor ..." in which case it incompatible with anarchism; but it also means "... control; administration of public affairs" in which case it is certainly no? incompatible. Granted there have been attempts to represent anarchism as if it entailed no organisation or administration at all (state-of-nature arguments regular rely on this fallacy of false dichotomy), but it does not, and if it did there would be a gap for a near-identical relative (a/za&yrz^ for instance) to All. One of the rather better brief characterisations is the following: "a social philosophy that rejects authoritarian 6 7 8 9 Ed I. Frolov, 2nd revised ed, Progress, Moscow, 1989. Apter p.3. HI p.70. For such proposals see e.g. Carter,Websters' Dictionary (?), Marshall p.3. �16 government and maintains that voluntary institutions are best suited to express man's natural social tendencies'/ (Woodcock, Ency Phil, p.lll). While the first negative conjunct, which n governmental' right, might rate a pass (though anarchism is not always a philosophy, it is sometimes a practice), the second positive conjunct calls the whole account into doubt. Many humans naturally thrive in authoritarian settings. Defective definitions of anarchism abound, many regrettably supplied by high profile anarchists or well-regarded commentators (whereupon they assume a certain air of authority, a bogus air). A few examples will be considered, mostly drawn from a large list of similarly defective definitions included in Clark, who is out to show that any definition which attempts to do justice to anarchism through an essentialistic definition deploying one simple idea is bound to fail, abysmally, to does not 'mean literally "without government'" contrary to Carter, for one. It does however imply systems without governments of prevailing sorts, which is what she immediately proceeds to: 'and the lowest common demominator of anarchist thought is the conviction that existing forms of government are productive of wars, internal violence, repression and misery' (p.14). Right on! Kropotkin, for another, defines 'anarchism' in terms of 'society ... without government'. Like most of the brief definitions to be cited, this is neither necessary #)r sufficient. For 'government' has to be narrowed to its coercive and authoritarian determinate, and other archie arrangements also excluded. Many, Runkle for one, maintain that anarchism 'opposes authority in all its forms'; but elsewhere Runkle holds that its essence is individual liberty'. Others, Goodman for one, suggest anarchism is defined in terms of decentralization, still others, Bakunin for one, suggest characterisation in terms of 'organization from below upwards, by means of federation'. Again this is neither necessary nor sufficient. It is not so easy to And an adequate characterisation of anarchism. (I have found none in the literature, despite some searching. That is reason why a certain amount of work has gone into such basics). There is a tendency to leap from the inadequate to the excessive—a tendency exemplified by Clark, who also cites Woodcock approvingly. Anarchism is first contracted to a rather elaborate doctrine, or political theory, thereby excluding practice. Then requirements are sharply inflated: For a political theory to be called "anarchism" it must contain: 1) a view of an ideal, non-coercive, non-authoritarian society; 2) a criticism of existing society and its institutions, based on this anti-authoritarian ideal; 3) a view of human nature that justifies the hope for significant progress towards the ideal; and 4) a strategy for change, involving immediate institution of non-coercive, non­ authoritarian, and decentralist alternatives (p.127). As Clark indicates, this "minimum" "definition" is an elaboration of another account, briefer and 10 See Clark p. 118ff. Clark's attack on essentialistic definitions is in the style of Wittgenstein. �17 better, that Woodcock also offers: 'historically, anarchism is a doctrine which passes a criticism of existing society; a view of a desirable future society; and a means of passing from one to another" (cf. p.120). There is nothing here about human nature, which anarchism need have no particular views about, perhaps rejecting the notion altogether as part of archist propaganda or similar, n There is nothing about the ideal society, or any commitment to one. Anarchists are not seeking societies; that is an illusory, Enlightenment goal, have transformed to get another excessive condition of adequacy for anarchist societies. It would be quite enough to achieve satisfactory societies. 12 Realistic anarchists may even come to appreciate that there are no ideal societies, perhaps just various less unsatifactory and better justified societies than virtually all of the extraordinarily narrow range of modem societies presently exhibited or on offer. However Clark's discussion of "the ideal"" reveals that he does not really intend an ideal, but only one or other of the plurality of societies meeting certain adequacy conditions. It certainly does not intend a unique one, ideal. 'Some adequate" or similar should substitute" for 'an (the) ideal", and the definition should be duly pluralised. Outside explications of anarchism which answer back to dictionary accounts, there are various high redefinitions (e.g. Clark) and some weird redefinitions. One such weird redefinition is that proferred by Taylor, who—rightly enough contrasting anarchism with the presence of the state where there is a concentration of the means of deploying force—defines a as where 'force is perfectly dispersed, not concentrated at all" (82 p.6). But Taylor does advance from pure anarchy, of which there are no examples, to an illuminating discussion of the exercise of concentrated force in societies. In recognisably anarchistic societies there is but limited concentration of force (based on physical inequalities), which 'is /10c in use. There is no standing specialist group or organisation or centralised system of groups...' No doubt a /MZ/er anarchist f/t^ory has to accomplish much of what excessive characterisations of anarchism,^ list, and more. Any reasonably full theory should * include a critique of authoritarian and coercive features of present and past societies and their institutions; 11 12 13 The important matter of such "nature" is discussed later.. Presently we are very far removed from such societies, except for small communities mainly in rich countries. States have done extremely poorly in this regard. There is not one satisfactory state in all of Africa or the Americas. Even small European states that at least have avoided extensive poverty, homelessness, and violence are in doubt because of * virtually entire destruction of their natural environments * reliance for wealth on impoverished Third World countries * justified dissatisfaction of many of their inhabitants. those of Woodcock and Clark p.120, p.126. r �18 * outline features of noncoercive nonauthoritarian societies as alternatives to, and improvements upon present dominant social arrangements, for some regions at least; * suggest strategies for attempting to change from defective forms to improved alternatives. Clarke also tries to insist, what we shall subsequently reject, that for a 'theory to called "anarchism" it justifies the hope for significant progress towards the ideal' (p.127). As well as theory, there is practice. (Clarke also goes astray in excluding anarchism as a , "anarchism without doctrine", and so on.) The pracfice of anarchism, generously construed, naturally includes the state of being in anarchist conditions, of living under anarchism (though perhaps unaware of doing so). There is scope for wfr/toM? Many primitive societies thus qualify as anarchistic; they practice, or practiced, anarchism though unaware (somewhat as wild animals practice hygiene, knowing without knowing ;%af). Further, no doubt now stretching 'practice' beyond its assumed anthropic context, many animal communities practice anarchism, very successfully. Many attracted to anarchism, an anarchism without name even, long for analogous pure practice, many practicing environmentalists for instance. They hope that whatever it is will operate, perhaps even materialize, without any heavy-duty theory, without excess or even any intellectualizing, perhaps without even thought or much effort on their part. In contemporary circumstances they would have to be extraordinary lucky; a paternal state with caring elements, such as safe jobs and spoon-fed indoctrinal education for all citizens, does not relinquish its control voluntarily. While definitions can be defective or otherwise unsatisfactory, in m^y ways, one thing they are not is dogmatic (as suggested by Marshall, none too subtlely trying to evade critical details in delimiting his massive study, p.3). Though insisting upon^themes definitions yield upon substitution can be dogmatic, having or offering definitions is not. Significant criticism of definitions is logically different, belonging to different categories. As well as decking anarchism out with defective definitions, with all the scope for argumental malpractice that affords, there is a coupled practice of boxing anarchism in, by narrow and confining constraints, jf iZZ/czf/y ctrcMWMcri&ing (Whereas definitions characteristically yield necessary and sufficient, conditions, such circumscription concerns necessary, or possibly sufficient conditions). Many of the restrictions imposed are, however, quite inessential, and have rather the effect of excluding viable alternatives. Simple examples concern waAmg, which is sometimes taken as having always to be case by case, and elsewhere is seen as necessarily involving all parties, large assemblies, or even complete social participation. None of this is essential, often the restrictions would prove undesirable. Often the circumscription technique proceeds by presenting features of, or said to be of, �19 historic anarchism, then tacticly assuming that all anarchism must conform to those features.*4 That is one reason why definition and characterisation are important; so anarchism is not set in riged past forms, unable to adapt to new circumstances and ideas. Another example concerns the character of the anarchist revolution, onto which many restrictions are loaded, often resulting in gratuitous puzzles, which are removed with the impositions. For example, it is said that 'the revolution had to be a mass affair" (M p.94). But nothing in anarchism, or its general development, requires this. (As a result the dilemma Miller finds .p.99 ff., simply falls over.) A revolution could be carried out by an elite anarchist band, or, in some states, through a single governor or president. Again, it said that the revolution is bound to be authoritarian (which renders an anarchist revolution contradictory), violent, and so on. This we have on authority from Engels: 'a revolution is certainly the most authoritarian thing there is; it is the act whereby one part of the population imposes its will upon the other by means of rifles [etc.] authoritarian means, if such there be at all', to which Miller adds approvingly that to say in power the party must rely on military means and 'terror of arms' (M p.92). None of this is so. A revolution could lag rapid change through mass conversion; for instance, there is a sign or appearance that is widely recognised, a new social movement which spreads like "wild fire", etc. 3. Anarchism and the state. While organisation and government are entirely compatible with anarchism, that most conspicuous modem institution, the state, is not: it is the paradigmatic archist form. Nor are ancient power formations such as the empire and the kingdom really compatible with anarchism. A prime reason is their authoritarian character and their extensive use of coercion and violence, but reasons als<4 includd^hein centralized organisation (such as power and hierarchical structure). Let us focus upon the state, against which a major and often virulent part of anarchistic political critique is directed; indeed such is the opposition to the state and its features that anarchism is sometimes distinguished in that way, in terms of 'hostility to the state ... [which] should be abolished and replaced by a new form of social organisation' (thus Miller p.5). But again these may be consequential, not characterising features of anarchism, which are derived from characterising features together with a standard theoretical characterisation of Under one such standard (though fairly strong^) characterisation, the state is a and 14 15 This is a much favoured tactic with critics of anarchism. For many examples, some only Quoted in the main text, see Miller. Although strong, in certain respects the characterisation is not strong enough. A state must not only be able to c/ai/n all these sorts of power, but sometimes to exercise them. Cf. Taylor's criticism of Weber's definition of the state (p.5). A �body ... it claims complete authority to define the rights of its subjects .... Second, the state is a body, in the sense that everyone bom into a given society is forced to recognise obligations to the state that govern that society. Third, the state is a body: it claims a monopoly of force in its territorial area, allowing no competitor to exist alongside it (Miller p.5). It also normally claims other monopolies, such as on legal tender. It is virtually immediate, powers. So it is that anarchism is often epitomized as directed at the dissolution of, what is widely seen then, that the state is a comprehensive as major political problem, the state. As to why it is such a problem, anarchist critiques of the state, sketched below, will reveal. With anarchism implemented in a place there is then an end there to any institution that is recognisably a state. The subsequent argument for anarchism does not depend upon a strong characterisation of .yfafe, such as that so far offered. Even fairly weak characterisations will serve. But inadequate characterisations, such as the following, will not: 'a collective object with territorial boundaries and political organisation throughout that territory". For that omits essential features of the state, such as sovereignty, authority, coercive control; it describes a possible anarchist society. 16 Arguments/or the state (which anarchism is normally concerned to fault) are however sensitive to characterisation. Mostly these arguments reach little further than, justify no more than, some sort of "minimal state"", very different from anything the Earth has had on offer (e.g. a nice state guaranteeing basic rights rather than removing rights: but anarchism need hardly oppose such arrangements). So it will matter just how ^<2^ is characterized. But this is easier said than done: is a ^k cluster ( muqti-criterial) notion, explications of which are controversial and typically contested.i? In seeking a satisfactory working characterisation, a useful starting point is the following short definition: 'a collective item with territorial boundaries and political organisation exercising sovereign power".is As anarchism can comfortably accommodate the first parts, political organisation within a region, it is the last part, sovereign power (as spelt out, e.g., in Miller's account) that is the problematic distinguishing factor. In a way, the term ruling sui^ipreme, derived from la&Ctptein which reflects the Greek reigning or says it all, why anarchism is bound to oppose a state so empowered. Improved detailing will exhibit a similar division between acceptable and unacceptable. A state, which comprises a 16 A' 17 18 q/ Virtually all the key political terms that we shall encounter have a disconcerting multiplicity of meanings: so it is with state, sovereignty, democracy (422 senses in Naess p.30), ideology, and so on. Fortunately these terms are dealt with^ elsewhere in this work. For a useful attempt at a multi-criterial characterization,and discussion of controversies over characterisations see Dun^eary "The state * (in Goodin & Pettit). Reese, with 'item * substituted for 'entity * to evade reificative issues. �21 interconnected (their level of cohesion justifying a definite description), has domains consisting of a and of who form an associated society. The territory of a state consists of spatial regions, over which it normally exercises control. Subjects are generally those humans who regularly reside in the territory (citizens form a of subjects, singled out by possession of certain duties and rights). The state is not the only authoritarian body to be repudiated. Lesser authoritarian organisation, such as those proposed under terms of functionalism (military barracks, prisons, reform schools, etc.) are to be similarly repudiated. No doubt on occasion the ability to coerce makes an institution more "effective", much as childrens learning of uninviting material is sometimes rendered more effective by coercive means, e.g. heavy cannings, floggings. But the repugnant means, and their common chase outw^eight the gains, if any, in effectiveness achieved. Now, having thus arrived at regular anarchism, reputiating the state, we confess to the evident, to the refinement of the notion of anarchy away from widespread common usage where it functions primarily as a powerful directive away from disapproved anti-statist life. Given that anarchism is thereby rendered (as in many dictionaries which of course reflect usage) a contradictory notion, encompassing both disorder without the state and order alternative to the state, some refinement and some diversion of disorder is no doubt desirable. The trouble with this easy resolution is that the early uses of 'anarchism' in English operated precisely with the corrupt drunk-and-disorderly side of the contradiction—disorder as contrasted with spendid state order. That was what (in defiance of the original Greek meaning) 'anarchy' and 'anarchism' were introduced to mean (see OED citations from 16-17th C). Thus the early usage, which persists, contradicts the refined and now regular usage. In technical presentations this problem is easily sliced through, by coining a term to mean what anarchy as refined means (anaRyri'2 and anacracy are such terms). Here however we shall simply persist with the refinement of the prevailing term, and in the course of giving it etymological justification over the early corrupt uses, further refine. 19 But the justification for refinement is not only 19 Tempting as it may be to switch, alternatively to new, freeing terminology, that temptation has here been largely resisted. Anarchism is a term, and idea, worth retaining. Not that there is anything amiss with new terminology: quite the contrary, provided that it is well-indroduced and pointful. In the course of drafting this book, a variety of new terminology has been toyed with—including such nice terms as (signifying non-domination)—because, as is regularly emphasized, anarchism is now such a turn­ off for most people. No doubt in more pdular versions (written by someone else), anarchism will disappear from headings, displaced by new terminology with a hint of old such as ^ada^waacra^y, or, less scrupulously, its place usurped by ^car-vacuous terms in high popular favour such as d^/nocracy. In this less popular version, anarchism stays; but, in pa^t compensation, some pleasant absolute terms, and senses, have been revised. They offer acceptable alternatives. A more powerful consideration than negative connotations is perhaps this: The present text, though strictly / �22 etymological. Do we need yet another term for lawlessness, or for disorder? Don't we rather need a term to help break the false dichotomy between: the state or political disorder? As if there are no further alternatives, like stateless order of various kinds? Or (as much ill-informed literature suggests), no political theory without the state, merely untheorizable confusion? 4. A refined explication of anarchism. derives from the ancient Greek Etymologically meaning: without a chief or head, or without a top authority. Of course what the form derives from, though often indicative, does not determine what it now means. (Anarchism was not, after an ancient political theory, but is in fact, under familiar classifications, the most recent and novel of major political ideologies.) However it M worth drawing out the etymological meaning, because it is revealing. What it appears to exclude are political arrangements structured with a top element of any of the following authoritarian sorts: a monarch, a prince, a ruler, a leader, a president, a prime minister, and shifting from individual to group form, a party, a clique, a ruling elite, a central power such as a state, etc. There are, analysis reveals, two interacting foci: one, a top or centre, and two, control or dominance flowing from this top by what are adjudged inadmissible means, authoritarian or coercive means in particular. A chief both stands at the top of a power hierarchy and exercises authoritarian control from there. Under this anarchy entails double foci structure or organisation without inadmissible top-down or centralized means. Let us look at the foci in turn, beginning with the more independent one, the top. Topologically, wif/tonf % fop amounts to wzt/zoMt % cenfre, because by topological transformations (roughly&^nJzKg and stretching as what rubber objects will permit) what is a top transforms to a centre, and vice versa. Diagrams illustrate the transformations: top (of tree, semi lattice) o centre o investigating is so far removed from what normally enters under that denomination that different terminology is warranted, terminology which then has the advantage of shaking off all those negative associations of anarchy. The salient differences from run-of-the-mill anarchism will appear when preferred forms are detailed subsequently. �23 Volcano from top from sides * peak * peak Given such transformations, which will be taken for granted, anarchism also excludes arrangements structured with a controlling centre, such as a ruling central government. It implies decentralization in a precise sense. It does not thereby also remove all structure: it leaves intact a rich variety of structure including network arrangements with no centres (or with multiple "centres"), federation structures or similar. Yet another example is afforded by lateral structuring with central "centres" dispersed via function, as ilustrated;^ service "centres" The skeleton or scaffolding of organisation is structure; it is the frame on which organisation is hung, which organisation fills or fleshes out. The sense of explicating the underlying organic image, implies as much. According, for instance, to the Conci-ye Dzcfiofiuiy, 'structure: manner in which a building or organism or other complete whole is constructed, supporting framework or whole of the essential parts of something *. Structure itself is primarily, though not entirely, a matter of of elements and parts, among which order relations figure prominently, though not exclusively. That is, structure involves order, as a critical component. Remarkably, the same sort of <y%n/c%r&y occur in a range of seemingly diverse theoretical areas, not just social and political theory, to be displaced in each case by a similar sort of problem-dissipating structure. To illustrate, consider an order on a type (or set) of items Q given by one order relation R, 20 Insofar as there is a single centre, it is the bottom, the people. Major condinating issues are referred to people, for instance through referenda. So there a will be a referenda organising office, but it will be independent cooperative. �24 on item c in Q, i.e. R = Re- For example, where Q is a system of where R may itself worlds including your world the ordering R of worlds may depend on your world (and my world could supply a different order). Differently, where Qis a system of values or valued items, R may depend upon your values; and so on. As an orJer, R is at least transitive, and perhaps either (if like <) reflexive or (if like <) symmetric, on its ranged The system <Q, R> is a simple ordered structure, or ay%w%^. (The latter is the term now used in modal logic, where such structures are the bases of models for the logic.) A or top t of such a system is an element such that all items of Q bear R to t but which does not itself bear R to any element of Q. (The notion, that of -yMpreyniow, and likewise woxiwMw, may be similarly defined relative to subsets or types within Q.22) 77^oreTH. There are order structures without tops. Examples are provided by systems (often with much more structure) with no supremum. Here is a simple 6 element example drawn from relevant logical theory. +1 +2 „ = {=2,-l,-0, +0, +l,+2} +0 R - — is as shown by arrows. -0 -1 T = {+0, +1, +2} is a frufh component -2 Topologically, several notions of prime political and philosophical cast are tantamount to tops in order structures, including chiefs (top persons in power rankings) hierarchs, grand leaders, centres, absolutes, and objective items. Consider, a pertinent issue, the matter of control or authority, where as in the next diagram all elements to t. trans^ity required of order. 21 There are various cases, depending upon conditions 22 A supremum t of R (in type T) is an (that) element (of T) such that all elements (of T) bear R to t but which does not itself bear R to anything (in T). �Looked at from above t is centre of a network. In the diagram shown, it remains a structure, a flattened hierarchy, when t and relations leading to it are deleted, under so to say. What this shows in a simple fashion is that there can be ordered structures without central control (and ranging further there can be statelessness, absence of central control, anarchy without "anarchy" or chaos, because there is order), structures. afford numerous examples. Order, including good order of a range of sorts, does not require central controls, leaders, absolute rulers or arrangements, or similar. Order does not require hierarchy, such hierarchy. 23 As immediate corollary is that inferences from anarchy (without a top or centre) to absence of order to disorder are fatally flawed. What lacks a top or centre may nonetheless enjy satisfactory order. Structures induced in anarchic arrangements can be far from chaotic (and may be modest and stable equivaien&s8i conditions). It is worth alluding to a much wider philosophical sweep. Related order structural considerations to those that tell against central states, absolute rulers, monarchs, patriarchs, top authorities as required for satisfactory order, also count against <2^x9/%^ of other sorts, such as absolute truth (there need be none, as the first diagram above indicates), absolute order (thus R 23 Part of what seems correct in Bookchin's vendetta against hierarchy can be captured in this way. More on this subsequently. �26 itself is relative to c), and of various sorts, such as objective fact (another supposed absolute), objective value (supplied under an absolute order), and so on. On this broad sweep the following sorts contrast sets emerged centralism elitism statism absolutism realism objectivism in rough contrast respectively with maximizing rationalism decentralism egalitarianism anarchism pluralism nonrealism nonjectivism satisizing rationalism Naturally, these simple structural considerations are only indicative, not decisive. For we might find, as more and more constraints are imposed on structures, as account is taken of actual conditions, that freedom contracts, that structural arrangements are forced towards centralism or absolutism. While such forcing may now look, in the light of a little logic, implausible, it requires further argument that it need not in general eventuate. The to be developed agam-yf takes these lines: that there is ready design of institutional arrangements for decentralised communities which does not lead back to a central state. The state is organisationally otiose. Organisation is delivered anencephaletically. For an added or infiltrated top or the centre to be troublesome, something anarchism need bother removing or shun where it figures, it has to have an role. Politically that presumably means exercising power in some way. That is, the head (the head that is lacking in %7i#rc%(?.y) is an operative head, not a mere figurehead. Anarchism need not exclude princes, monarchs, emperors, or "governors", such as some countries now maintain. If the people really like having such relics, royalty or "aristocracy", as is often said they do, then they can presumably have them if they are prepared to afford them. Indeed this figurehead role is just what is presumed for the prince under more plausible anarchist construals of Taoism.25 The ideal prince is a Taoist who takes no action, a sage who is rarely or never seen, whose existence may merely be known to the populace or even simply rumoured (that is almost to say, though Lao Tzu could not tactfully assert it, the ideal prince is a nonexistent inoperative sage). 24 For a fuller picture see Sylvan 93/4, chapter 10. 25 See Clark 84 p.165. Also UTD. �27 As indicated, the main features adduced are mirrored in logic, which can serve as a structural guide. It is striking, as well as technically advantageous, that logical and political predelictions converge. Mainstream irrelevant logics have algebraic structures with top elements, Boolean algebras in the case of classical logics. By contrast relevant logics, which now challenge the classical logical paradigm, do not. Their corresponding algebras, De Morgan monoids and such like need include no top element. The top element, T, is directly responsible for positive paradoxes, of the basic form A -* T (anything at all implies the True), of mainstream logics, paradoxes infecting much theory which relevant logic avoids.^ The logical structure shows that sub "centres" need not have such damaging effects; a plurality of local "centres", regional nodes, induces no paradox. The figurehead analogy also operates analogically, in logic. It does not matter if a semi­ lattice structure is extended to include a top element, so long as that addition provides only a conservative extension. (If T is added to top a relevant lattice, it has in stronger logics to be kept out of implication relations, else it will induce a non-conservative relevant extension with theses like A -* T.) But otherwise, as an inoperative top-piece it is admissible. Technical comparisons now reach much further than logic alone, as we leam more and more about decentralised structures, about decentralised cerebral organisation, decentralised Al and topless connectionism, and decentralised intelligent structure. Intelligent organisation without top or central elements may abound both in nature, for instance in insect cerebral organisation and in vertebrate brain structure, and in many future artificial intelligence applications. Logic and computing technology demonstrate, what is widely appreciated outside political theory, that topless is feasible.2? There is scope, and need, for twenty-first century anarchism to be highly techno-logically sophisticated. There is more to anarchism than political structure without an operative top, head or centre, than a lateral structuring. That more, the residue of the rejection of archy, is more difficult to characterize in a way non-prejudicial to types of anarchism. It is bound up with the operation of the active top, with the confroZ for example it exercises, the potter it exerts, or the like: non-prejudicially, it cannot operate As to what are unacceptable means, however there are different specifications. These many include—what can be summarized, under a single rubric, as —force, coercion, authoritarianism (and what implies any of those, such as totalitarianism); and, much more controversial, nonvoluntary, nonindividualistic, socialist and communist, means. As in dictionariess entries for "anarchism", only coercive and authoritarian elements will be ruled unacceptable (for 26 See WR. 27 The subsequently preferred variety of anarchism, while not at all opposed to slates losing their heads, is powerfully opposed to people literally loosing their heads (figuratively again, it may be alright). ��34 A Gramsci, 'The intellectuals * and 'The modem prison * in gcZccfzony /row ?7zc Prz'yon M?fc&ooRy (ed. Q. Hoare and G.N. Smith), International Publishers, New York, 1971. D. Mannison and others (eds.), Environment?/ P/zz/oyopAy, Research School of Social Science, Australian National University, 1980; referred to as EP. D. Miller, Aaarc/zzym, J.M. Dent and Sons, London, 1984; referred to as M. D. Mitrany, 7%c Ennctona/ 77zcory o/PoEr/cy, Martm Robertson, London, 1975. A. Naess and associates, Democracy, /Jeo/ogy aaJ D/?/eciiviiy, Oslo University Press, Norway, 1956. R. and V. Routley, 'The irrefutability of anarchism *, &?cza/AZfcrnaEvcy, R. and V. Routley, 'Social theories, self-management and environmental problems *, in EP; referred to as SM. R. Sylvan, and D. Bennett, 'On Utopias, Tao and Deep Ecology *, D/ycayyzoa Papery in EavzrozzmczzZaZ P/zz/oypp/zy, #19, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University, 1990. R.P. Wolff, 7a De/ence o/Aaarc/zzym, Harper & Row, New York, 1970. ADDITIONAL SOURCES P. Nursey-Bray, an Aaaa/arcJ EzEZzagrap/zy a/Aaarc/zzym , Greenwood Press, 1992. END NOTES 2 Cf Clark p.ll8ff. The general methodological issue of multiple determinates of key political terms and their archist confinement is taken up in a later chapter. �*J^A /TrT^^<Z7 (y/^cA e.ncrcicj/ ^ A A' '< -' z? y // /yr *-^. C r^O V. J * /X o J* ,<^A<_ . ) *4 C^c/^ / /Xot^z &J> f A-w^ t^i^L to n > etA A jt? cj C rZ-?/T^T <*C Zt , <^<!"// , cx^d /7^/^'Cx �^9 /?. 3* f,. /A^t / TL^i- c— ^^4—UT^-? ^-7y47 /^" <-/ f' z' ^^L-J 7 �1 CHAPTER 2. ELABORATIONS OF ANARCHISMS There are wany anarchist theories. For an anarchist theory is any laterally structured theory which duly conforms to the anarchy principle, of rejecting political authority and coercion. While received anarchist theories restrict anarchism to certain more specific forms (the standard options of considered below), p/ara/ijtic anarchism does not; plural anarchism not only admits the plurality, but takes advantage of it any may revel in it. Not all of this variety, not all anarchisms in the sheaf of systems, are of equal merit. Some forms are decidedly undesirable — like anarchisms expanding on the violent or chaotic varieties of popular imagination — in much the way that the nasty states of modem history, that anarchism opposes, are undesirable. Such undesirability may devolve from external rather than internal political characters. Thus, for instance, regions committed to global power projection to retain their privileged way of life (most unlikely under anarchistic arrangements) or committed to transnational terrorist practices. While standard anarchisms have been located in the more desirable, or even eutopian, end-range of anarchist systems, they by no means exhaust the satisfactory forms or even the most promising forms (as explained in chapter 5). Indeed in important respects the desirable range is significantly open for further elaboration of newer (and greener) forms. As varieties of anarchy may diverge, widely, so correspondingly do motivations and justifications for various divergent forms. The motivations, for instance, range from entirely theoretical (conceding to the warranted force of political scepticism) to practical (changing the local world); from personal and perhaps selfish (getting the state off one's back, or out of one's business and one's till) to other directed (eliminating a state oppressing its people) to environmental (disestablishing another vandalistic state). Common motivations trace back to the common character of anarchism: repulsion by, or opposition to, oppression, perhaps generalised from the state to all analogous political and bureaucratic structures, or expanding on that again, to all gross power relations. Indeed it is appealingly suggested that what anarchy is really all about is gross power relations, their reduction and removal; state coercive and authoritarian power are but paradigmatic of such power and domination relations. But while such opposition to gross power does characterizer gentler anarchism, heavy power methods are acceptable to tougher anarchisms; gentler anarchisms tend, so it will be argued, to be all of more pacific, more liberal and more rational than tougher or hardened anarchism. There are other expansionary liberal democratic motives for anarchism, further varying this theme: a yearning for removal of constraints, and for more extensive freedom; or a desire for more extensive equality, which would of course diminish those inequalities power delivers. Such motivations too have illicitly worked their way into variant characterisations of anarchism. ? �2 While a popular image of anarchists remains that of hardened terrorists, exercising authority over hostages using state-manufactured guns, many anarchists are joined by opposition to all such naked authority or coercion. Indeed 'behind the anarchist attack on the state and other coercive institutions, there has often stood a fundamental critique of the idea of authority itself (M p.15). An important, though certainly not invariant, mofivafmg and r^<?n for anarchism derives from a more sweeping anti-authoritarianism: the theme that no person or organisation can ever rightfully exercise authority of (political cast) over another. Picturesquely it is the theme that no authority is justified, no one, state or other, has a right to push another around. Too briefly it is sloganised to assert, no bosses, no leaders, or similar. Such general opposition to the principle of authority has even been dubbed "philosophical anarchism". It is an unfortunate choice of terminology given Feyerabend's different anarchistic challenge to much in philosophical theory and practice. * But some further classification and labelling undoubtedly helps. A princZp/^J anarchism takes exception on principled, characteristically ethical, grounds to objectionable authority or to coercion, that is to prime target elements undiluted anarchism directly rejects. But irrespective of type of anarchism intricated, much in anarchist theory, including a fuller characterisation, turns upon the twin notions of anf/ion/y and coercion, what these terms mean and cash out to, and why it is considered important to avoid damaging features of this sort? Both authority and coercion fall into the general category of power relations, a category that has rightly featured large not merely in anarchist theory but in social theory more comprehensively. As Aristotelian definitions of 'authority and coercion , by gunus and differentia, will be offered, an essential preliminary consists in pinning down the genus, power. * Power gm/ reZevan? serfs. Defective definitions of power, authority and coercion abound. Despite the importance of the notions for political theory, not just for anarchism, it is rare to encounter satisfactory formulations. A defective formulation from recent relevant anarchist theory defines power as 'the ability to compel compliance, either through the use of force or the threat of force (Wolff p.4), a conspicuously high redefinition. Rather, a power reZofion is a relation where one of the relata, that having the power, can normally get the other relata to do something (down to entertaining a belief, considering an idea). Power is a can-do; it may not be exercised. But there need be no compulsion or compelling compliance; nor need its exercise always succeed. Further its exercise need not involve force or threat thereof; it may be effected by a range of other means. 1 By Wolff, and following him, Miler and others. Feyerabend's philosophical anarchism, his is sometimes better labelled anarc/h-yiH, a type of nihilism. But it stops short, excluding logical methods (irrationally scorned however) from variation^ .In fact without a sharp—unavailable—distinction between logical and other (empirical or pwidivist) methods, this methodological anarchism is incoherent. �3 on the one side, bribery, seduction, blackmail, and so on, and on the other, knowledge, prowess, charisma, and so on. It is no secret that major problems in human social and political affairs devolve upon power, its excessive or evil use, misuse, regulation and control. But by no means all power, not even all political power, is bad. Distangling the undesirable, negative forms is an essential exercise, often neglected. After observing the failure of radical social theory to provide an adequate investigation of power, Clark embarks on a critique of the "classical model"2 According to the received conception, power is depicted as a relation of domination in which the powerful subject the powerless to control in order to exploit the latter. In both classical Marxism and anarchism this exploitation is conceived as being essentially economic. Thus, for Marx, "political power, properly so called, is merely the organised power of one class for oppressing another (p.231). It is evident that what we see here is an attempt to explain power through, and then reduce power to, certain of its determinate forms: domination, then control, exploitation, oppression, and then organised and economic forms of these. These determinates are all, though important, rather special and rather negative, black forms of power. Power may be short-term, just for a day for instance or once only (a creature requires power only for a short period, because of what it is, because it loses power thereafter, because it has access to short-term drugs, magic, hypnosis, contracts, etc.). Domination is a longer-term relation, a disposition, between recognised parties, with a decided bias in favour of one party the power-holder; exploitation and oppression increase that bias, in specifiable ways, control however removes it. Power may, furthermore, be applied for positive and libertary, purposes, to help powerless to achieve something or other, to survive, prosper, and so on. Briefly, the concerning power is not power itself, but certain of its forms, its negative forms, and its excessive use. This last can be assimilated, by taking excess as a negative form. The negative forms are, of course, though they can be independently specified, the bad, or undesirable forms, forms as was earlier said.3 These include, among other forms, closed authority and coercion. They also include such overlapping forms as oppression, exploitation, domination, and so on. Privilege goes with these latter forms; it is held by the power-holders and their circle. It is held moreover exclusively by this circle; others, at the other end of the power relation, the power-less, are excluded from its possession. That is, the domain and range of a given power relation are exclusive: no one is both an exploiter and exploited (though of course someone, a husband day labourer for example, may be both exploited in his labour and domineering over his wife). 2 3 A critique, p.231 ff. too quickly petering out in an inconclusive, discussion of Foucault on power, where power turns into what is not, something mystical and all-pervasive. In these respects, power is like other notions, of green political significance, for one, for another. �4 There are two separable kinds of undesirable power: excessive and malselective or illdirected. The two kinds are more or less replicated in other significant phenomena that have been, like power, too sweepingly condemned: economic growth and material consumption. The problematic concerning human consumption is not consumption itself, some level of which is essential to human societies and indeed survival. The problems derive basically from excessive consumption and from poorly selected consumption. Conspicuous consumption, insofar as it delivers a negative form, derives from these: it is either excessive and wasteful or malselective or a mix of these. But the kinds are distinctive. For example, a poor family that buys expensive junk food may spend its limited income poorly, but its consumption may well not be excessive. Similarly with power: the limited power an individual or group possesses, whether exercisable for evil or not, may be better or worse directed. In term of power and its gross exercise, much in more gentle anarchisms can be / synthesized, namely all that is otherwise packed into the rubric: unacceptable means. What is unacceptable is gross exercise of power, including types of political power exploited by tougher anarchisms, terrorist power, crude fire power from the barrels of guns, and so on. What correspondingly gentler anarchisms oppose are all institutions and arrangements, not just the state and those tied to it, that can exert gross power. The state mightly concentrates, and centralizes, such power/ Even so the state is merely paradigmatic among undesirable and excessive power structures — a power hungry one at that, since it looks for a surplus product in power, along with a monopolistic position. But militia posts, torture shops, and pirate ships are other more localized structures. Coercive and closed authoritarian arrangements (opposition to which helps define anarchism) are distinctive marks of such grossness. Dilute anarchisms tone down opposition certain types of power (typically authority); they admit exercise of power that gentler anarchism would regard as gross. From the problematicness and undesirability of excessive power, main objectives of ( anarchism for ameliorative change flow: decentralisation, division and separation of powers. Centralised powers are to be separated and decentralised; aggregated powers to be broken down into functional components; and so on. Tougher anarchism proposes more, rival power play, resisting and undermining power through power, to break down its excesses and reveal its limitations, fighting fire with fire. One trouble with this tough and morally dubious strategy, which can be spectacular, is that it easily overreaches, producing for instance inadmissible coercion of others. 4 Not all state power is undesirable. Some of state regulation and redistribution, effected through power is certainly desirable. The argument will be that these elements are completely outweighted by the undesirable components of state power, and that they can be independently effected without the state. �5 Gentler anarchism travels in the vanguard of the long retreat from barbarism in human practices and institutions. In more enlightened parts of the world we have witnessed the progressive removal of physical punishment, such as: maiming, blinding, executing, stoning, torturing, transporting, flogging, corporal punishing, starving, chaining, incarcerating, imprisoning, infecting, ...and extensions, such as: serious threats thereof and assistance or encouragement of these practices elsewhere. Such enlightenment has not penetrated many parts of the world to any extent, and has far to reach yet even in the most civilized regions. TTyugh the gentler anarchist theme of curtailment of power, we can tap into several rich connections. The excessive drive to power and strength, the "will to power", is a conspicuous feature of modernity. Interestingly Nietzsche went so far as to claim that the will to power was basic motive in human affairs. Fortunately such a socio-psychological claim, about prevailing human nature and institutions, has little to substantiate it. But undoubtedly power motivates much, much too much, in modernity; otherwise anarchism would lose much of its more sweeping point. It was not always so; the quest for power at all costs, the flaunting of power, was at least highly problematic (as drama revealed); it did not always gain the adulation it now widely commands. It did not win respect from early anarchism, as manifested in Stoicism and Taoism. It would not have won endorsement from Aristotelibnism; for power, of both institutions and individuals, like so many other attributes, is evidently similarly constrained to a While the rough bounds are evident enough for an instrumental object such as a vehicle, which wastes fuel and becomes dangerous when excessively powered, but cannot perform its tasks if underpowered, the bounds, especially ^e lower, may not be so conspicuous elsewhere (e.g. with military hardware, intelligence reserves, etc.). Organisations and institutions, which should be vehicles to serve social ends, enjoy once again a striking analogy with logical systems. Logical systems, when excessively strong in the fashion of modem mainstream systems, ensnarl users in a tangle of paradoxes and other troubles (for detailed discussion see RLR, p.240 ff.). On the other hand, if they are excessively weak they fail to meet reasonable conditions of adequacy, to afford satisfactory vehicles of inference and reasoning. Two species of gross power feature particularly in the definitional elaboration of anarchism: authority and coercion. While undesirable authority is characteristically tied into excessive power, coercion is different, is often once-off, and is malselective power. �6 * Authority, and warranted repugnance of closed forms. Authority is a type of power relation, a relation with the power or influence conferred or supported by other features of one of the relata, the bearer of authority, namely character, station, recognised control of coercive means, or the like. itself is the abstract of the relation : a has authority over or with respect to b. Authority is a proper subrelation of power. For evidently many power relations — those exerted by bullies, bandits, etc — are not authority relations, since the relation is not supported by suitable station. Again the following definition of authority (upon which Wolff founds his philosophical defence of anarchism) is far too narrow: "the right to command, and correlatively, the right to be obeyed" (p.4). Only some who hold authority may be (conventionally) conceded a right to command, or more broadly, to exercise their power. For evidently their power may be exercised in a variety of other ways than through command structures, such as blockages, delays, vetoes, withholdings, and so on, and on the other side, concessions, gifts, rewards, and so on. There are many types of authority relations, many inadmissibly excluded under narrow definitions, not all of which are objectionable, or objected to by anarchists. For an example of an unobjectionable sort, consider the relation of a student to an authority in some field of knowledge, who can in turn back up expert judgements by appeal to a further range of assessible evidence. Such an authority might be called frampar^if (or open), because those with time and some skill can proceed through the authority to assess claims made. Among op%n authorities are contemporary teachers, by contrast with old fashioned disciplinarians, and advanced parents, who can back up their orders with satisfactory reasons. Contrasted with such authorities are op&q%^ (or cZo<y^%f) authorities, who simply stand on their position or station, such authority is objectionable in part because of its dogmatic character.^ Closely allied to op^M^ authorities who can appeal to a conventional rule or procedure (that is how things are done, have been done) without being able to or prepared to opaque authorities are step beyond some rule book. Rule-book authorities are commonplace in bureaucracies, which often encourage such practice in lower level officials. In opaqM^ authorities the justificatory procedure stops a step further out; there is a set of rules, which has been enacted (for reasons not open to, or bearing, examination) by a further substantially opaque authority. Other authority relations are objectionable because of the way in which or the means by which they are backed. Unobjectionable is the authority figure which is exemplary, where what it exemplifies is in its tum satisfactory. Not so relations backed by coercive means, by violence or threats of violence: Big-stick authority relations. Such relations are condemned on moral 5 The impression is widely promoted that science reliably furnishes examples of transparent authorities, in the shape of experts. That impression is astray. Dominant Science frequently functions as a substantially closed authority, rather as the universal Church did, standing on received theory as gospel (for elaboration see DP, chapter 12). �7 grounds, for example by moral pacifists opposed to violence, who do not object to the carrot methods such as sanctions, boycotts, civil disobedience, etc. A diagram will summarise the position so far attained. o/'gMf/tonfy Confine##.? Methods carrot <- stick possibly benign Pacifist Back-up transparent T opposition A opaque Enlightenment Liberal opposition opposition It will be evident that the objections to nonbenign authoritarian relations—to what in clear cases may be presented as to — can be of significantly different sorts. To more opaque authority relations there are objections of enlightenment cast, that reason is lacking for what an authority requires, proposes or asserts, as it was lacking in authoritarian religious and political practice against which the Enlightenment was primarily targeted. (A significant strand of anarchism, more theoretical anarchism, is a descendant: undisclosed reasons of State are not adequate reasons.) To more coercive authority relations there are objections from non-violence devotees. To there may be a kind of liberal opposition, that the party subject to authority is being denied, in one way or another, for unacceptable reasons, a certain freedom, namely ' autonomy. Naturally, movements have been directed at breaking down authoritarian power relations: masters over slaves, humans over animals, men over women, adults over children, etc. States over citizens. A comprehensive civil liberties movement would merge with anarchist movements. Plainly then, these three convergences are linked to three interconnected forms of opposition to authoritarianism: namely * convergence of anarchism with an Enlightenment opposition to opaque authority, which anarchism takes to include state authority. (A response will contend, as religious groups did against Enlightenment charges, that State authority is justified, e.g. it represents the people's will, or some similar fairy tale. But that is what is at issue.) * convergence of anarchism with moral pacifism in opposition to violence and coercion as unmitigated evils which should always be avoided. Of course only some forms of anarchism are �8 involved. Some anarchists are not averse at all to the exercise of heavy power relations, for instance of violence or terror against others (no matter how this violates their free personal space). But observe that such uses of power are not supported by recognised authority but normally directed agnm-sf such authority; so they might be dubbed relations. * convergence of anarchism with forms of liberalism, deriving from solid commitment of normal forms of anarchism, particularly individual varieties to personal liberty. Libertarian ideals have served as a major motivation in historical anarchism. There is a vision of a free society, a 'vision of a society in which social fetters are replaced by social bonds and labour is freely undertaken'.6 ( There are of course other convergences as well, some of them much discussed, such as with marxism. When opposition to authority is broadened to opposition to domination, no doubt there are further convergences, with feminism, with deep environmentalism. A recent convergence, of initial promise, is with ecofeminism, which ought to highly sympathetic to environmentally sensitive anarchism. For both are opposed to domination in all its forms, to downward control lines and power hierarchies. There is an important argument against the state based on its authoritarian character. This argument, to be found is Proudhon and in embryonic form in Rousseau, is developed and given a Kantian tum in Wolff? What Proudhon portrayed as a conflict between the authority of the state and freedom, Wolff represents as 'the conflict between authority and autonomy' (p.18). In this conflict, where the state represents authority, autonomy takes precedence; anarchism is consistent with the supreme virtue of authonomy, but archist doctrines supporting the state are not, because of authoritarian character of the state. Because Wolffs argument has been subject to much criticism which an improved formulation would shed, because too Wolffs formulation leaves something to be desired (it is not sufficiently sharp or tight), the argument will be revamped. A crucial difference is this: whereas Wolff asserts that 'all authority is equally illegitimate', a judgement already rejected, it is now said that all authority is illegitimate, meaning thereby wtoraZ/y illegitimate, not 'having a binding moral force ? 6 7 8 Chomsky, in Guerin p.xii, As to Proudhon see Ritter p.13, pp. 15-16. According to Rousseau such undesirable restrictive features need not pertain for all forms of government; naturally they do not obtain for his favoured arrangements. Wolff tries to repeat this sort of point, less than successfully for unanimous direct democracy. Of course a state may proclaim, even legislate, that its authority is legitimate, and even have other states do the same. But that will not achieve moral, a de jt/re, legitimacy. It is similar when the state endeavours to enforce its authority; /noraf legitimacy is not thereby obtained. Nonetheless these sorts of features go far towards explaining why people acknowledge, rarely questioning, closed authorities like the state. There are other elements which enter into explaining this popular sheepishness, such as: The force of tradition, that is the way things have always been done, the �9 Nor is all closed authority equally objectionable. The unquestionable directives of a benevolent dictator (one whose authoritarian directives and regulations prove inductively to be well directed) can be seen as less objectionable than those of a malevolent dictator. Similarly for a dictatorial group, a junta, or a majority. That the dictator said so, or that the majority said so, does not offer a reason rendering the state less than a closed authority. A core theme, to be embroided and defended, is W1. An autonomous person does not recognise a closed authority as legitimate. But W2. The state is a closed authority, of a certain of course. Hence WC1. An autonomous person does not recognise the state as legitimate. The core theme depends crucially on the notion of aMfonowy, on characterising features of the autonomous person. But before that task is addressed, observe that autonomy can be eliminated. First, the rafiona/ person, or a little less satisfactorily, the person, can carry the argument instead, using for instance W3. A rational person is autonomous. So results Wl' with 'rational' displacing 'autonomous', W1'. A rational person does not recognise a closed authority as legitimate. That premiss at once suggests a direct argument devoid of the circuit through persons (or through agents). For what a rational, still more an enlightened, person does not recognise as legitimate presumably is not, and certainly vice versa. In any case, U1. A closed authority is not legitimate. Hence, by W2, UC1. The state is not legitimate. Since this conclusion is equivalent to UC2. The concept of a legitimate state is null, the result sharpens the tentative conclusion Wolff reaches: 'Hence, the concept of a jure legitimate state would appear to be vacuous', to which he adds, thereby presuming other links already made explicit, 'and philosophical anarchism would seem to be the only reasonable political belief for an enlightened man' (p.19). As observed, not too much hangs upon the notion of moral legitimacy deployed, thus far following Wolffs lead, throughout. Simple variations replace 'morally legitimate' or 'legitimate' by 'morally warranted', 'morally justified', 'justifiable', 'rightful' (the last, though a trifle old-fashioned, captures what is intended well). force of character of leaders; their occupation of official positions, which have heavy bureaucratic backing. �10 These arguments permit of much other interesting variation. Wolff s original argument, for instance, precedes from authority as The defining mark of the state', with authority defectively explicated as 'the right to rule' (p.18). Evidently then the middle term, authority, can drop out, and the argument can be formulated along the following lines: VI. The state has the right to rule (without question, its citizens, more or less as it pleases). V2. An autonomous person rejects any (sweeping) right to rule. Therefore VC1. An automonous person rejects the state. Further variations may be obtained by amending the middle term, "right to rule without question" (which effectively replaced "exercise of close authority") to reflect other features of the state, for instance that it can simply tell its citizens what to do, that is has a right to coerce its citizens, rights to institute state monopolies, and so on. Under some variations "autonomous person" should be correspondingly replaced. For instance, if VI is specialized from a right to command and control to the right to send citizens to war, then V2 may be adjusted to apply to the person of conscience, of peace, or similar. As Wolff seeks a grander conclusion than VC1, which might be merely taken to reveal that there are but few autonomous actors about, he invokes a further premiss V3. Autonomy is a (even the) primary obligation. From there, it is an analytic shuffle to the more impressive conclusion VC2. The state ought to be rejected. The arguments are as vulnerable as their premisses. What gets especially contested in the first argument is Wl, concerning the autonomous person. For all the surface reasonableness and even open-door aspects of a more liberal state, W2 holds; it swings into effect as soon as the going gets tough. As Dahl puts it, To obey the authority of the state ... means doing what the you do it'? While there may be a little scope for light and reson as regards more flexible minor officials, that scope is officials of the state tell you to do simply and soley ( t/z^y small; the wall of closed authority can be quickly encountered, particularly with judges and law enforcement officers. If W2 did not hold the state would risk sliding into a voluntary organisation, out of which citizens could opt. In the end citizens are expected to act in a variety of ways (fill in form, take out licences, pay taxes, etc.) because the state tells them to, just because, or else face punitive action. The argument to Wl depends heavily on the meaning of gMfono/ny. Here is one way it can be presented (following Dahl): An autonomous person is self determining. Such a person is not under the direction or choices of another item. While the person may do what another tells him 9 See p.92..Dahl's reconstruction of Wolff effectively applies W2, using Wolffs definition of HMf%<?r#y, to obtain VI. This produces a more complex, and defective, argument. G �11 or her, she does not she has been told to do it. Thus the autonomous person does not conform to closed authorities, and does not acknowledge them or assign them recognition (more than recognition that is). While autonomy is one thing, responsibility is quite another; still a critical reason for arriving at autonomy intricates responsibility. ... so long as we recognise our responsibility for our actions, and acknowledge the power to reason within us, we must acknowledge as well the continuing obligation to make ourselves authors of such commands as we may obey (Wolff p.17), i.e. to make ourselves autonomous. A primary moral demand, central to the moral condition, is, according to Kant and Wolff, to 'acknowledge responsibility and achieve autonomy whenever and whenever possible" (p.17). Assuming responsibility in a life is by means the only reason for striving for autonomy: achieving a certain personal freedom (within natural bounds) and operating a life rationally are other crifica/ reasons. A main argument to V3 indicated by Wolff does proceed from responsibility. It is simply that in order to take full responsibility (for one's actions, choices, etc.), which one should, one has to be autonomous. So one should be autonomous. At least as important philosophically as the argument from W1 and W2 is that from Wl' and W2. While the argument to Wl' may proceed through autonomy it may short-circuit it. The philosophical argument for Wl' is well-known, having been repeatedly emphasized from Socrates through to Russell: that a rational person does not accept anything for which there are not independent investigatible reasons and evidence. The pronouncements of a closed authority do not fall into this class. By revamping the arguments especially that from autonomy as directed against authority, many objections to Wolffs arguments are fairly autonomically voided. Firstly (contrary to Dahl p.47), the arguments are not (any longer, if they ever were) arguments against 'authority of any kind". Not merely was Wolff concerned with the authority of the state; further as Dahl points out next page, the type of authority concerned is that of 'doing what someone tells you to do fo ^Zo if, that is a closed form. A rational person can of course acknowledge an open authority who can offer reason and evidence for prono^cements. For similar reasons, experts, guides and guardians, of open character, are not excluded. Accordingly the arguments does not cut "too broad a swath""; while it properly cuts out closed authorities like absolute rulers, states and similar, it does not mow down open authorities. In like fashion, much of Miller's parallell criticism of philosophical anarchism is voided. Things go astray (in Miller's chapter 2) from the very outset, from the slack formulation of "the principle of authority"", which is chauvinistically formulated, 'no man can ever rightfully exercise political authority over another, that is have a right to issue directions which the other has an obligation to obey' (p.15), and which is then intended to apply to the relation of a state �12 and its officials to its citizens. The formulation has both to be expanded to include persons and organisations as subjects of the relation, and sharply contracted to delimit the kinds of authority and rights concerned. For the explanatory (that is) clause offered reaches far beyond (closed) political authority; it would wrongly rule out contractual relations such as those of freely arranged employment, parental relations, and so on. The counterexamples Miller designs to Wolffs arguments also depend upon shifting ground from closed authority like the state to more open arrangements, such as contracts an autonomous person may have entered into freely. Plainly there will be a limited range of such contracts that a rational person will enter into; long-term future bondage or slavery will not be among them, and Miller's examples may border on the rationality dubious. In any case, in one, an agent morally concerned to relieve poverty enters into authoritarian arrangements, imagined unavoidable for successful action, in which it becomes obligatory for the agent to act under authoritative instruction (p.28). Firstly, the authorities are not closed, they have to be pursuing means directed to poverty relief, else an autonomous agent will not enter into such ". * arrangements Secondly, while contractual obligations, and therewith certain directives of open authoritarian cast, may constitute reasons for action, the situation with the state is very different. There is no contract, and no reasons of contract (also lacking are spotless reasons justifying entering into such a contract). Examples like Miller's arrangements and contracts can be inflated into stock flawed arguments, from consent to the state. Unremarably, Dahl attempts to patch up again these well- worn arguments, but in two mutually inconsistent ways. Second, he proposes that To opt for a democratic state' is The most responsible way of exercising our moral autonomy', and reasonable and rational as ways of maximizing our autonomy (p.49). Insofar as there are any arguments for such wishful conclusions, they depend upon familiar fantasy-world assumptions about the blackness of nonstate arrangements presumed to impact utterly unfavourably on autonomy and the contrasting whiteness of democratic states. That those states are at best a pretty dirty gray, Dahl's first more honest considerations suggest. There he asks, What is so great about autonomy? 'Why not sacrifice some moral autonomy?' As 'unlimited autonomy is impossible', why not settle for autonomy within reasonable state limits? (cf p.48). Compare: why not sacrifice some resistance to homocide and settle for reasonable killing of humans for reasons of state? The moral importance of autonomy Wolff has already explained nicely (pp 14- 17). Autonomy is a primary oM/ganon of rational persons, a constraint, not what Dahl converts it utilitarian-fashion into, a supreme value, to be questioned then traded off against other values. Because of its importance for rational practice the obligation should not be weakened; nor is there good reason to do so. There appear no grounds for forfeiting autonomy to closed 10 Compare Wolffs discussion (on p.15) of relations with one's doctor. �13 authorities, such as the state. It is doubtful that there are even grounds for what Wolff allows, forfeiture of some autonomy to one s doctor, hopefully no longer a closed authority, rather than retaining autonomy and freely following the doctor's advice. Autonomy is not like freedom in limitations; it can in principle always be exercised by a rational person. Submission to the state is a gross forfeiture of that autonomy. While an autonomous agent may place itself under guidance of leadership of another for limited purposes, and may indeed enter into certain sorts of contracts, it will not surrender its whole future life or extensive parts of it to a directorate that may well proceed in suboptimal, subliminal or even irrational ways. Yet that latter is what expected acceptance of the state implies. Accordingly an autonomous person cannot recognise the state; nor can a fully rational one, as it is irrational to place oneself indefinitely under a closed authority. It may be objected that it is unfair to treat Dahl, Miller and others in the preceding fashion, which changes the dialectical playing field. They were attacking Wolff and his over-extended arguments, not a refinement of Wolff which singles out the philosophical nasty elements in authority, and accordingly destroys their counter-examples which operated at the rational open end of authority relations. But that was not all that they were doing. They were using Wolff as a vehicle to draw quite conclusions about the unviability of principled anarchism (e.g. Dahl p.50, Miller p.29), and accordingly should have taken account of simple revampings of arguments like those of Wolff. Nor is this the only respect in which their practice is methodologically unsound. A principle—like that of closed authority, that such authority is legitimate—does not stand because someone's attack (e.g. Wolff s) against it is unsuccessful. Yet this is Miller's methodological procedure against philosophical anarchism (p.26, p.29). This is Popperian falsificationism gone rampant and badly astray. For Popper at least required sustained and strenuous testing and adequate variation; not a few select and easy examples. But of course a Popperian approach by archists is unsatisfactory; the onus of argument is the other way around. An archist has to establish that political authority, such as that the claims and exercises, is rightful. That Wolff intended to work with something like closed authority should have emerged both from Wolffs emphasis on the place of 'grounds and sources' in legitimate authority (p.9), and his flirtation with unanimous direct democracy. What Wolff is exercised about is not compliance with a authority or obedience where there are good or independent reasons for it, but blind, or closed obedience: doing what you are told because you are told to do it (p.9). (Yours not to reason why, yours but to do ....) While these points exonerate Wolff from some overzealous criticisms, they immerse him in others, namely his attempt to combine authority with autonomy under unanimous direct democracy. A major problem is that this combination, �14 so far as it is workable^, appeals not to the closed authority of the state, but to open autonomous arrangements which do not conform to requirements of the state (as Dahl remarks on p.48, the "authority" here is not the "authority" of his earlier definition'; and as Miller observes on p.27, *it is ... arguable whether this state of affairs [under unaminous direct democracy] involves the recognition of Autonomy and freedom tell not merely against the exercise of opaque authority, but against use of coercion. This connection affords the basis for a parallel argument to that against closed authority, to the desirability of a sharp decline in deployment of coercive methods. But parallels between coercion and closed authority do not proceed very far. * Coercion, an impermissible activity. Coercion is very different from exercise of authority. All four places, 1 to 4, in a cross­ classificatory matrix are regularly occu Died: actions coercive authoritative 1 non-authoritive 2 non 4 coercive 3 Place 1 is well occupied given the State, and is widely exemplified in not only state-citizen relations, but also in authorized domination relations. Place 2 is illustrated in a range of operations which the state often tries to repress such as banditry, piracy, protection rackets, but also in a variety of interpersonal relations. Place 4, that clear indicator of unqualified anarchism, is well exemplified through voluntary cooperation and mutual aid. Place 3, characteristic of many work-place and educational situations, can be easily illustrated through advanced ( education. Coercion, unlike authority, is action. That is why comparisons are with .... of authority; authority may sit, like power, unused, but coercion cannot. Like all action it is a process, a state to state transition, but actively changing or maintaining state. It is a transitive action relation having both a doer, a coercer, and done-tos, coerced, all normally creatures. The transitions include a wide range of more determinate actions such as constraining, restraining, securing, moving, pushing, pulling and so on; and thus coercion (the abstract) includes forcible constraint and compulsion. An essential feature of coercion is that state transitions are effected A/<Z or attempted by coercers through force or genuine threats of force. No such force, no coercion. NY- Defective definitions of coercion are liable particularly to neglect this feature. Thus e.g. Fridman 11 Wolff himself concludes it is not except under highly improbable conditions. Indeed the conditions are more onerous those Wolff allows: required are humans who having consented do not change their minds, etc. _________ /e �/6 L < s _ _ z^<^4^-f ___' / ^ry^- /i, <^___ . �15 p.xviii, according to whom being coerced is 'not being left alone'. Perhaps in one special sense, but a person who chooses to have a constant companion is not being thereby coerced. Pressuring someone to do something without attempts or threats to apply force is not coercion. Similarly persuasion is not coercion; censuring, withholding support, applying peaceable sanctions, are so on, are not. All this proves important in meeting objections to anarchist methods. Coercion is not a success notion; a coercer may well not succeed in obtaining what was sought through coercion. This will prove important in explaining why appeal to the state does not automatically resolve political dilemmas. To coerce is maintain or change states, normally of another creature, by implied force (i.e. force or accepted threat thereof). The state transition or statis includes the full range of relevant actions such as constraining, restraining, securing, moving, pushing, pulling aa so on, and thus coercion (the abstract) includes forcible constraint and compulsion. Coercion, by contrast with * exercise of authority, entails potential use of force, force furthermore which will characteristically tum into violence if resistance is attempted. Therein lies a main reason why coercion is so objectionable; its intrication with force and immediate potential for violence. For violence is generally undesirable.^. It follows therefrom that coercive arrangements are generally undesirable and, devolving therefrom, If social organisation can be achieved without them, usually so much the better, certainly the more ethical. A main onus to show that coercive arrangements, such as the state characteristically incorporates, are inevitable, unavoidable or the like, thereupon falls upon archists. 'Since coercive power is self-defeating' and worse, a general theory of 'non-coercive authority' is presented as a 'pressing problem of this stage of history'.13 Unfortunately, the general theory has obtained but little development. But functionalism, in such forms as demarchy (to be transformed below), has gained some elaboration, by some in the peace movement. 14 Worse, Merrifield arrives at the "pressing problem" on the strength of the need for Rt/M? of solution to the authority problem': thesources, methods, and ends of authority (p.724). This "problem" is presumed by way of the following large (anarchist) assumptions: Authority is a requisite of all social life, since in its absence it is both psychologically and physically impossible to coordinate human behaviours so that the ordinary social processes can continue to operate and flourish (p.729). The main claim is an important part of what is at issue between anarchists and archists and is at best highly dubious. Moreover the reason offered in its support is false and should be rejected (a range of counter models and counter examples have been indicated or will be). Furthermore, Merrifield goes on (on the next page) to adduce information on organisations of a sort which 12 13 14 Sec wp in. Merrifield p.724 alluding to the wording Notably B. Martin A/Z&) -sy-Mezn of political functionalism. �16 serve to cast severe doubt upon his claim and its supporting reason. There are various nongovernmental organisation (NGOs), and some intergovernmental organisation (IGOs), which rely upon voluntary, permissive or non-coercive motivations ... to accomplish their functional purposes. ... They may explain, demonstrate, justify and argue, but they cannot usually coerce. The role of functional NGO's is even more pronounced. Lacking any coercive power, they must rely on the validity and demonstrability (p.725). Some of the organisation rely, or need rely, not at all on closed authority. Like the voluntary support and participation basis, so too the organisational structure is voluntarily maintained. There is no hard authority, and no conspicuous authority problem. Coercion, in this respect authority, is also open to objection on rational grounds. Namely, ways of controlling, governing, or getting rational creatures coercive methods are not to do things. Rationality—not the undesirability and demeanment of force not, or not just, freedom—is the ground of this objection. The analysis of coercion admits of immediate fruitful application to (internal) criticisms of anarchism. In the first place, it has been argued that anarchism does not avoid coercion but incorporates coercive elements—which would render it inconsistent (as normally characterised). Further, because of these coercive elements anarchism is incompatible with liberty, thereby multiplying inconsistency, as liberty constitutes one of its main goals. These alleged problems derive from the reliance of anarchism on public censure, and like methods, to control social behaviour. According to Ritter, for example, who makes much of the second problem^, anarchists have the following goals: an (admirable) commitment to liberty, and a heavy reliance on public censure. But these goals are incompatible. For such a 'social scheme relies so much on coercive public * censure (p.10, also p.l). However, the argument to incompatibility is invalid; it makes an illicit insertion of 'coercive * * 'coercive (as the quote above illustrates; in fact the prejudicial slipping in of and 'coercion * occurs right through Ritter's discussions; see e.g. p.25 top and bottom). The social scheme as described involves only public censure in a free setting; such censure does not imply coercion, as no use of force need be involved or even contemplated. Secondly, connectedly, there is a widely exploited false dichotomy between voluntary and coerced activity, under which it supposed that all activity which is not purely voluntary is coerced. To the contrary, the range of actions is more satisfactorily diagrammed as follows: Voluntary vs coerced activity In a first chapter short-tided 'Liberty and pubiic censure', particularly on a muddled p.2. ,u„ ZL.. �17 hard pressured ! soft pressured ) ! (entirely) free ) influenced encouraged (fully) coerced <Actions -* In most standard arguments for the state only the outer bounds are considered.^ But noncoercive methods can include a wide range of influenced or pressured actions, which are less than entirely free. The interesting argument that Dahl draws from anarchism, directed against the state, turns upon on the undesirability, indeed the intrinsic badness, of coercion. In essence (leaving out support offered for the premiss as) the argument is as follows: Pl. M? one Zs obZZg#R?6? to -report or o&ey a sfafe. P2. A// sfafes ore coercive. P3. Coercion Zs intrin-nca/Zy bnJ. P4. A society wit/iont a state is a yeasi&Ze aitemative to a society with a state. This conclusion derives fiom these premisses ('assumptions' as he calls them) Dahl draws Ave conclusions' (p.41). As these are not the most direct or pointed conclusions, let us sharpen the conclusions: Cl. AZZ states are necessariiy &aJ. ^rom P2 and P3 (equivalently recast as: all coercive items are intrinsically bad items), given that intrinsicaZZy so implies necessariZy so. Dahl prefixes Cl by the conjunct, 'because all states are necessarily coercive'. Not only does Cl not require that support; we do not have it (e.g. in P2). While coercion may be taken as defining of the state, or an essential characteristic of it, as Dahl does, however states are defined it is continently true that all of them are coercive. C2 No one has an o&ZZgahon fo, Zs o&ZZgafed to, to support or obey any state. From Pl and Cl. Again Dahl unnecessarily prefixes his analogue of C2 (as for Cl above). Insofar as political obligation is obligation to the state, C2'. 77iere Zs no poZZtZcaZ obZZgatZon; political obligation lapses. Conclusions Cl and C2 specialize, because democratic states are states, to democratic states (that is effectively Dahl's fourth conclusion, p42). Dahl, like Wolff, senses a democratic escape through unaminity procedures, and reaches towards a fifth conclusion, which we will subvert. P5. Unanimity decision practices (can) escape coercion. 16 See for instance Taylor's presentation of game-theoretic arguments. 2^ �18 P6. Democracy can operate through unanimity procedures. These procedures and democracy are presumed to apply to some society, community or association. C51. prac/zc&y (can) escape -yfafcF. C52. Democracy can operate wif/zoaf any .sfafe. This last conclusion is interesting because Dahl regularly assumes, as against anarchism, that democracy must operate through the state, and that democracy is therefore in compatible with anarchism. As conclusion C52 reveals, these assumptions are astray, on grounds Dahl himself supplies (the inadequacy of these assumptions will be independently investigated subsequently). It is worth noting that, irrespective of the merit of premisses P5 and P6 (e.g. because unanimity wears off, because of the rareness of unanimity), the conclusions do not follow without other lesser presumptions. For C52 the transitivity of opcrafc wifAoMf (doubtfully a universal linkage) is presumed, and perhaps some modal shuffles as well. For derivation of C51 from P5 what is presumed is that what escapes coercion escapes the state, which requires a strengthened P2 (already encountered), that states necessitate coercion (as well as a little of the logic of escapism). Dahl's third conclusion, after detachment of (three) because-clauses, is C3D. A// PMg/tf a? A minimal inference scheme enabling derivation of C3D from previously derived statements is this: P3D. where an item is necessarily bad and there is a feasible (less bad) alternative to that item, the bad item ought to be abolished. Then C3D follow from (strengthened) P3D. These are important arguments, both for principled anarchists and for archists, and Dahl rightly invests detailed study to certain of the premisses, those he imagines he can dispose of, most notably P2 concerning the coerciveness of states. It is not that other premisses and steps are not highly controversial; they are. The very first, Pl, yields at least the stock debate as to whether one is obliged to support or obey a bad law; for a state can be viewed as a structure of laws. Instead of an argument for Pl, Dahl offers a thumbnail history of its status, a genetic '^justification". Other justifications there are, rendered easier if P2 is strengthened (as it may be without upsetting the arguments dependent upon it) by replacing 'bad' by 'evil' or 'immoral'. Then initial support for strengthened Pl is that political obligation, likewise legal obligation, is a type of obligation, justified by considerations of obligation generally, and accordinging triumphed by ethical obligation. The detailed arguments for these themes gets down to fundamentals, to the justification of obligations through values. Briefly, obligations obtain only towards items which normally exhibit a sufficient level of positive value. An item like an evil state that condition. So no obligation obtains towards such a state. �19 To escape such an outcome, archists contend that certain states are not evil, for instance Dahl will claim that 'a democratic state is not an evil state" (p.40). Anarchists will by contrast assemble a great deal of evidence that democratic states, like others, are evil (see next chapter). The immediate issue is, however, whether states are evil in principle, by virtue of their coercive features. Now Dahl does not contest 'so elementary a proposition" as P2, the universal coerciveness of states. 'Like any state, a democratic state would use coercion to enforce democratically enacted laws ..." Accordingly, to make his escape, Dahl is bound to dispute P3, and does; coercion is instrumentally justified as a means 'essential to a good purpose , a democratic state (p.40). * As to supposed (second-rate) justifiability of coercion. A conionplace claim, which Dahl advances, is DI. Even though coercion is intrinsically bad, its use is sometimes (reasonably) justified (p.44). Which times?, on which occasions? will turn out to be a critical issue. As against Dahl, it will be contended that its use is never woraZZy justified. However in moral dilemma situations, where all other feasible alternatives have been exhausted, its use can be given a "secondary"" secondrate justification. Such a secondary justification, in very limited circumstances, gives no succour to the state, which depends upon and makes widespread use of much more coercion. That is, DI itself does not justify the sfaR?'.? use of coercion. The first argument Dahl offers is overtly dilemmatic. There is a 'recalcitrant wrongdoer , ( who simply will not refrain from doing serious harm to others. Despite the best efforts of his associates, neither reason, argument, persuasion, public opinion, nor the final sanction of social octricism dissuades him from doing harm. His associates finally conclude that he will persist in harming others unless he is forcibly restrained or threatened with severe harm (that is, coerced) (p.44). Why should that stop him, threats in particular (it does not deter young alienated men in contemporary states)? With ali due respect^the gentle best efforts cited by no means exhaust nocoercive methods available. But let us grant not merely that there are situations where coercion occurs (plainly it is presently a frequent occurrence), but that there are dilemmatic situations where a person may have no alternative in preventing violence but to resort to coercion, for instance in preventing or limiting assault upon another, in self-defence, and so on. In such circumstances, 'coercion would be employed—either by the wrongdoers or by those who restrained them" (p.44). Granted, it is employed. The issues however are whether it is morally permissible, and who may be justified. Certainly the wrongdoers are not justified, and what they do is impermissible. More controversially, what the restrainers do is also morally impermissible; even so their actions may be justified. Given the fixes they were in, where all alternatives were forbidden, still what �20 they did may be situationally justified, as a satisfactory actions in the dilemmatic circumstances.*7 Such situational justification is not what Dahl and other consequentialists are seeking; they want coercion justified without impermissibility strings attached. There is no reason, or need, to accede to their desires. Such a reasonable, and practiced, approach to moral dilemmas (which Dahl himself subsequently takes in his discussion of whether to always obey laws of a democratic state p.4950) here escapes notice. And Dahl introduces two difficulties he incorrectly presumes fatal to 'alternative position ... [that] violence and coercion are absolutely forbidden" (p.45). Firstly, given that coercion is employed, 'the position in self-contradictory". Wrong. For that coercion occurs, whether perpetrated by wrongdoers or by those trying to prevent wrongdoers, does no? imply that coercion is morally permissible (i.e. p -f Pp). Nor does the impermissibility of incompatibles imply self-contradiction, for the covering deontic functors cannot be deleted (i.e. -Pp & -P-p is no contradiction; of course given, what gets rejected, -Pq -* -q, contradiction would ensure). Also wrong, then, is what Dahl takes to emerge from such self-contradiction, no 'guidance for the most elementary choices", said to be an 'indefensible" position (p.95). For coupled with the story concerning moral dilemmas are suggested procedures for making choices (often far from elementary choices) from within the dilemmas. Secondly, Dahl wrongly supposes that so rendering coercion absolute makes it 'a supreme value that eliminates all other ends" including justice, freedom, etc. It does not. No hierarchy of principles (or values), this or another, is adopted, which is one reason why dilemmas occur. As in ordinary ethical practice, ^he principles stand, they are not simply prima they are not ranked, there are no 'trade-offs". It may have become apparent, what requires only a little between-lines interpretation, that Dahl is playing a rather familiar utilitarian game underneath the surface moral concern. Render 'the objection to coercion as a means ... not absolute but contingent on consequences". So weaken absolutist prohibitions on coercion and violence that generous room can be made for an institution which routinely practices them, and to which we can trade up with consequential advantage. Given that coercion occurs without the state, indeed may be quite widespread in the absence of the state, then there might be gains in installing a coercive imitation 'to restrict [!] and regulate coercion". Moreover, if 'on balance the gains from creating a state are likely to exceed the costs, then from a utilitarian perspective it would be reasonable to opt for a state" (p.45). There are two critical gaps in this utilitarian state-pleading. Firstly, impressive evidence for the conditional antecedent that the gains from the state exceed the costs has never been assembled, but rather evidence points in the opposite direction (as we shall see in the next 17 This controversial story has been told before, that for coercion resembles that already related for violence. The general theory of moral dilemmas (in MD) is applied to the issue of violence, control of pacifism (in WP TV). �21 chapter), so detachment from the antecedent is not warranted. Secondly, the performance even of better states in coercion is utterly unimpressive; these states foo amplify coercive practices, do not regulate basic cases, and so on. The state appears to exacerbate the levels, both in extent and intensity, of coercion, over the low levels genuine moral dilemmas would yield. It is unnecessary to contend, however, as Dahl asserts anarchists contend, "that if states did not exist coercion would soon disappear or decline to a tolerable level' (p.45). That judgement, which is not exactly an 'empirical' one, depends very much on the character of alternative societies. An individualistic society might enjoy high levels of coercion owing to the activities of its public-like protective agencies. By contrast, a well-organised society may be afflicted with comparatively little coercive behaviour, rendering Dahl's uncompleted utilitarian argument extremely difficult to complete, ever. Interlarded with the dulcet utilitarian approach, under which they beneficent, ^states will provide us with all those promised superior values many millions are still awaiting — freedom, justice, equality, and so on — lies a more sinister argument; that to the gangster state. That evil state is not so far removed, some may think, from many states that are presently recognised. Without the strong state, the gangster state looms, so Dahl insinuates. So adopt the state, or worse will eventuate. That sort of decision theory argument (itself unpleasantly coercive and out of the same big stable as utilitarianism) depends on some (derived) principle such as choose a least bad alternative, and accordingly fails unless another independent argument to the state succeeds. For otherwise superior stateless choices remain on offer. Yet nothing more than the po&H&iZi/y that a small gang of wrongdoers may pool resources, andwhat results may evolve into a "gangster state" is floated (similarly for claim 2, p47, that some group wng/tf manage to create a highly oppressive state, which is as true in many a state as in stateless conditions). There is a complex evolutionary path, with many obstacles and hitches, from a small gang, through growing rival gangs and protection rackets, to a single one, and thence to a state. It is moreover a path that is rather easily blocked at early stages in an organised society, as simple counter examples show (one such example, that of the Inuit, Dahl introduces on the very next page). Apart from the inconclusive utilitarian considerations, Dahl offers a further page, under the boldface heading 'On the Need for the State' (a strikingly minimal effort in a book of about 400 pages most of which are premised on the assumption that the state is a needed item). He concedes, what seems to put a large dent in his bold claim, that preliterate societies, like those of the Inuit, have subsisted, over long periods, without the state. But that is past history, the world has advanced, the state is here, there, and everywhere. Granted it is; that does not show it is needed. Many gadgets that are now produced are not needed. Consider Dahl s reasons why a return to societies without states is 'if not impossible, highly undesirable (p.46). First, the world is already too densely populated to provide much space for autonomy (p.46, less than a �22 page after the utilitarian promise of a satisfactory state maximizing 'freedom and justice'; similarly p.51 etc.) But there are many regions where autonomy could undoubtedly be increased by expansionary or imperial states backing off (not merely in East Timor, on the West Bank, etc., but in the lands of the Inuit, the Micronesians, etc.). Further, the denseness of human population, hardly affords a reason. For one thing, the excessive human population is highly concentrated; most parts of the Earth carry, by comparison, sparse populations. For another, autonomy does not depend, so directly, on available space. 'Thirdly, virtually the entire globe is now already occupied by states'. Similar points apply: for instance, such an accomplished fact does not establish a need, or the impossibility of change. While not true 'throughout recorded history', but a very modem phenomenon, it is no doubt recently confingenfZy true that 'small autonomous groups of people have been extraordinarily vulnerable to conquest and absorption by larger states', and that it is presently doubtful that 'states would permit any small, independent group to exist anywhere [much] on earth'. Such present yizcfo political power relations do not demonstrate a need, still less impossibility of alternative, still less undesirability of changes. Consciousness change could come very rapidly, furthermore, with a welcome change in popular attitudes in large democratic states to oppression of minorities elsewhere (in Europe this seems to be happening). These points also serve to destroy Dahl's second reason, that 'a multiplicity of interdependencies cannot be snapped apart without enormous costs that few people would accept.' The break-up of states in Eastern Europe shows that substantial changes can occur very rapidly; the costs involved were much higher than they should have been because of the attitudes of states, not attitudes of their peoples by and large. In sum, then, all Dahl has accumulated is evidence of the repressive grip of the present regime of states, rendering local change pragmatically very difficult. Such evidence does nothing to establish a need for states, nothing at all to establish the undesirability of stateless societies. Accordingly the main assumptions fail with which Dahl claims support his 'conclusion that if woM/J &^ff^r fo fry fo cr^afg a mfz^/acfory jfafe f/ian f/y io ^xAff in a .soci^fy wif%OMf o sfaf^' (p.47). As it happens, the failed assumptions also fail to support such a conclusion—without suppressed material, of the utilitarian cast already criticised. All the assumptions would indicate, werf they granted, is the practical undesirability of trying to set up small stateless associations in a regime of states like mot prevailing today exc^pf that the states are satisfactory. But the assumptions should be scuttled. * Aggfnsf Jowfnaffon Domination is an important type of power relation. It is a comprehensive relation: persistent over a period, not simply once-off or occasional, pervasive, extending over a range of action and behaviour. It offers confro/ in a spread of cases. In such cases, if the dominator exercises control (e.g. adjusts the appropriate controls, pulls requisite levers) then the dominated normally responds. A significant form of control within extended human affairs is that of A �23 command or ability to command. Of course the creature commanded, the servant, the domesticated animal, the subdued or subjugated person, has to be able to understand what is commanded. But domination operates in significant spheres where such conditions for commanding do not obtain: in particular, but not only, in the domination of nature, its parts and elements, such as animals that do not understand commands, biota that do not recognise manipulation, and so on. Domination originated with (what the etymology of the term reflects) lord-subjects and master-servant relations, which remain paradigmatic for this power relation. It was soon and easily extended to cover owner-slave relations, where control was much more extensive, God­ human relations, human-working animal relations, and so on. It has long covered parent­ children and husband-wife relations, as well as certain class relations; and as classes have changed with political restructuring, industralisation and the rise of cities, so have domination relations. Those of higher classes or castes tend to dominate those of lower ranking, similarly for those higher in new hierarchies. Domination of nature and its parts is a relatively recent addition to the varieties of domination, since the acclaimed success of "the war against Nature" (still going on last century) before which technological humans (lacked the considerable level of power they have now acquired over natural systems.^ An aim of softening or removing forms of domination links social and environmental objectiv&with anarchism. These aims are united in green social anarchism. Opposition to all forms of domination, is yet another extension of certain types of anarchism, perhaps incompatible with other types of anarchism (e.g. communal anarchisms which assume that affairs should be organised along strict patriarchal lines, which accordingly not altogether coherently oppose social archy only to retain or even reinforce a tribal or familial archy). There may by now be some confusion concerning the variety of extensions of anarchism encountered. More exactly these "extensions" are subextensions, which isolate the principle of some type or ( key feature of anarchism and generalize it. generalisation of principled subtype with distinguishing principle. 18 Intellectual vandals have been at work on dondnahon also, stretching it from a relation from ensembles of actors, the dominators, to whole structures, systems or institutions (what might be called by partial analogy with the vandalism worked on .sTrHctund domination). Stretched dominators include the capitalist economy, market forces, the economy, the state, and so on. Under the stretching, /to (structural) dondnadon is said to imply, what straightforwardly is right enough, no subordination of the people to market forces, or even, what is impossible to avoid in a sophisticated society, no influences on members through the operation of its economy. A �� Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Draft Papers Description An account of the resource Sylvan's literary executor encountered an archive in which “all his projects were current", since manuscripts were undated and unattributed. Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document J SHORT CONTENTS OF TOWARDS GREEN ANARKISM: EUCRATIC POLITICAL INVESTIGATION? ? 0. PROLOGUE 1. EXPLICATIONS 2. ELABORATIONS 3. ARGUMENTS I 4. ARGUMENTS II 5. VARIETIES AND OPTIONS TAKEN 6. ECONOMIC ELEMENTS: PROPERTY, CAPITAL, MARKETS, TAX 7. POLITICAL ELEMENTS: ORGANISATION, DEMOCRACY, BUREAUCRACY 8. SOCIAL THEORY ELEMENTS: NATURE, CULTURE 8A LEGAL ELEMENTS 9. ECOREGIONAL STRUCTURES, EUTOPIAN MODELLING 10. ROUTES, TRANSITION 11. FURTHER CRITICISMS FOILED 12. PROBLEM RESOLUTION 13. EPILOGUE. BIBLIOGRAPHY (INCLUDING RESOURCES) by a minor marginaZi-s^J p/iiZo-yop/^r writing in 7. ? Richard Sylvan, Za^ At^nri^f/i c^nfary. PROLOGUE WHY GREEN ANARKISM? Green anarchism is not merely an intellectually attractive intersection of anarchism with genuine environmentalism; it is also a rational imperative. Modem states are not merely without justification; they are a major force driving and facilitating degradation and destruction of global environments, to points of no return for many natural species and environments, and even seriously threatening future human viability. Anarchism would, with full justification, remove these major problem sources. Green anarchism derives from anarchism coloured by a deeper environmentalism. Anarchism itself is said to be essentially a modem ideology, arising after, and in opposition to, the modem state. Though there may be significant anticipations of anarchism in earlier philosophy, and though there are many worthwhile examples of early anarchistic societies, the main intellectual work begins only in the late eighteenth century (with the eruption of the French Revolution). Since then there have been waves of anarchistic output of varying strength, the most recent initiated in Paris again in 1968^(immediately following a series of academic texts pronouncing that anarchism was dead)L In important respects this received picture, ever so lightly sketched, is misleading. Anarchist ideas were already advanced in those similar ancient ideologies, Taoism and Stoicism,** in opposition to ancient empires. Lao Tzu, shadowy founder of Taoism, was not merely a trenchant critic of the Empire, but advocated a society in which the ruler, the Prince, disappeared into a do-nothing exemplary and merely legendary figure. What Taoism asserted is virtually tantamount to Thoreau's small but crucial anarchist amendment to Jefferson, that the best government is the one that does not govern at all. In a similar vein, "Zeno, the founder of Stoicism, advocated a society without government. Laws should be abolished[!], since virtue and morality would only be achieved in liberty'.2 That common ancient tradition, spanning East and West, though often submerged, has never been lost. The Taoist tradition persisted (if often in degenerate form) in China, and heavily influenced west Asian adaptations of Buddhism. Stoicism survived, as (often degenerate) internal critic, for the duration of the western Roman Empire, and was directly incorporated into early Christianity. Although anti­ authoritarian features were subsequently suppressed in the Stoic-Christian tradition, elements survived even in the increasingly authoritarian climate of that religion, and the positive ideas have resurfaced again and again in religious freer-thinkers. 1 For details see Marshall pxi. Amusingly anarchism in Australia has more recently also been * Taoism and Stoicism can almost be seen as variants upon one another, back to the very names. It is tempting to conjecture that they may have both arisen from a proto-Toi-ism. Lehner, H of I, p.71. On Taoism as anarchist, see Clark, ch7, Marchall, ch4, and UT. 2 2 The term * anarchism' was however introduced into English in a highly perjorative sense, signifying disorder, chaos, lawlessness and the likeA It is regularly displayed in this negative connotation, in politically unstable times in England, long before much theoretical work on anarchism began (nonetheless there were tracts, like that of Winstanley). As a result, the term 'anarchy' got away to a very bad start in English. It was used, from the early 16th century onwards, to mean confusion, disorder, lawlessness, licence, and absence or nonrecognition of authority. Similarly for most of its cognates 'anarch', 'anarchal', 'anarchial', 'anarchic', 'anarchical', 'anarchially', 'anarchism', 'anarchist' and 'anarchize', (see OED entries). 'Anarchism' itself had also acquired its re/evanf modem sense of 'the principles and practice of anarchy or anarchists', namely 'the Doctrine Position or Art of those that teach anarchy; also the being itself of people without a Prince or Ruler' by 1656 (in Blount GZo^^gr). As a political theory anarchism is standardly said, however, to have emerged much later (and there are stock, 'inconsistent' presentations: a state without a state, government without government, theory without doctrine, order without order, etc.) It is the interaction between popular longer-standing usage and later serious ideological use that helps account for the astonishing folkloric history of the term aKarc/n-yTK. It also reflects one facet of the pervading amateurism of anarchism, its lack of industrious research. Consider what certain encyclopaedias say, beginning with one that is not so much wrong as sloppy. Historically the word "anarchist", which derives from the Greek an arc/io-y, meaning "no government", appears first to have been used pejoratively to indicate one who denies all law and wishes to promote chaos. It was used in this sense against the Levelers during the English Civil War and during the French Revolution by most parties in criticizing those who stood to the left of them along the political spectrum. The first use of the world as an approbatory description of a positive philosophy appears to have been by Pierre Joseph Proudhon when, in his (W%<3/ Af property?, Paris, 1840), he described himself as an anarchist because he believed that political organization based on authority should be replaced by social and economic organisation based on voluntary contractual agreement (Woodcock p. 111). According to a rival encyclopaedia, however, The word "anarchy" describing a stateless society was used[?J for the first time by Louis Armand de Labortan in his voyage Z' (1703), describing the Indians living in a society without state, laws, prisons, priests, private property, in short "in anarchy" (Lehning p.71). A glance at the OED, such as we took above, along with a comparison of the stories, reveals the falsity of many of these interesting contentions. Much historical detail remains to be sorted out satisfactorily. Though there are many histories of anarchism, until very recently a 3 The pejorative sense was not contrived or imposed following some significant political incident, such as the pivotal Chicago events of 1886, which is what Jp^ies 86 implies. No doubt, however, following the Chicago events, stigmatisation and denigration of anarchism, and its automatically assumed association with violence and disorder, were deliberately orchestrated and propagated in USA. Such an outcome contributed further to development of an already established anti-anarchist mythology. 3 reasonably satisfactory one had yet to be written. Fortunately that has now changed (during the drafting of this text). Conveniently we are now absolved from lamenting the absence of such work and likewise from attempting more historical detail.^ For Marshall's massive text, has now appeared, it can be deferred to (by no means always uncritically) on many historical issues and for mad detail, to which it affords fine access. The concentrate on systematic and theoretical matters. Most of the seminal and interesting work on anarchism has come from outside present text can now universities and standard intellectual circles, and often from political amateurs. Academics have contributed histories, surveys and (usually not so sympathetic) criticisms, but, with a very few exceptions, little original thought. $ For typically they are ideologically stuck with the state, be it a pathetically minimal one. Intellectuals are so inured to the state that they are inclined to such pronouncements as that the idea of abolishing the state entirely must strike us as utopian .6 Yes, as eutopian. 'Most political philosophers in the past few generations have been unable to escape what the psychoanalysts might call a "state fixation". Even those those temper and reason caused them to distrust a nationalist philosophy could not deal with the state except as a rigid entity. They wished it large or small, isolated or cosmopolitan, but in any case a rounded unit which had to be taken as it was and maintained as such in any reconstruction of... society'7 It is easy to speculate on reasons for this, connected with academics being part of the expensive state scene. While anarchism has vanished from the mainstream academic scene, it is again becoming visible, if hardly prominent, in alternative (especially green) scenes and in work of disaffected academics associated with them. A surprising amount of the adventurous anarchist literature now appears, like the earlier utopian literature, in fiction, especially science fiction (and so, under prevailing division of labour, tends to become a subject for literary criticism, not political philosophy). But the ideas and plans appear there in quite insufficient detail. There, moreover, it can easily be dismissed as fantasy, as unrealistic, not a serious and proper contribution to political dialectic. The entire range of political discussion concerns whether there should be marginally more government intervention, or marginally less; marginally more public expenditure on welfare services is marginally less. Nobody [much] challenges the whole system, still less the existence of the state itself. The state's own socialisation processes see to that (Luard p.52). While virtually all political discussion undoubtedly traffics in such marginalia, powerful and warranted challenges there certainly have been: It is plain that on general principles of law and reason ... the Constitution is no contract; that it binds nobody, and never did bind anybody; and that all those who pretend to act by its authority, are really acting without any legitimate authority at all: that, on general principles of law and reason, 4 5 6 7 In contrast thus to James 186 who reiterates the familiar lament. Even the very occasional (here deliberately unspecified) exceptions are exceedingly cautious. Miller p.182. Mitrany p.98. 4 they are mere usurpers, and that everyone ... has the right... to treat them as such.s Given the United States is not contractually legitimated, what other state is? None appears to have superior credentials! None is rationally legitimated, so it will be argued in detail. The State in general and in abstract is not justified. So, whether it can be exploited for environmental and social purposes or not, its use is not justified. Environmentalism is still more modem than anarchism. Though it has ancient roots, and though the movement grew substantially in the 19th century, fusing there with an earlier romantic movement, environmentalism is an archetypically 20th century ideology. The more widely diffused green movement is essentially a contemporary phenomena, no doubt the most distinctive new political force of the late 20th century (the feminism movement is older). Green anarchism draws together elements from environmentalism and anarchism. While it can be seen as continuous with environmentally sensitive later 19th century social anarchism (of Morris, Kroprotkin, and others), environmental problems now appear in a new light and take on a new urgency. For we are now confronted by what is not inaccurately referred to as the envzronmenfa/ crAyZy, combining the cumulative efforts of rapid human population growth, rapid concomitant growth of vast industrial and human pollution threatening and undermining biological life support systems, rapid depletion of habitats species and nonrenewable resources, and very extensive and worsening environmental deterioration. In the present parlous environmental predicament those concerned to take some requisite action, active environmentalists, have two opposently diametrically opposed courses open;9 * Supporting, and working through, strengthened states to try to avert the crisis. Central to 'most environmental justifications of [expanded] state power", according to social individualists, is the argument that people will not voluntarily r&yfram themselves from doing those things of which the environmental crisis is the aggregate effect. They will not voluntarily refrain from hunting whales and other species threatened with extinction, from having "too many children"", from discharging untreated wastes into rivers and lakes, and so on (Taylor pp 1-2, quoted in Grofman p.108). As in collective action theory (advanced typically by individualists), it is concluded (invalidly as will be seen) that state power is required to compel restraint and to undertake compulsory rectification. * Working outside states in more direct efforts to avert elements of the crisis. The alternative, that is, is to abandon the state. Here lies the main chance, and the only genuine long term alternative for a deep, as opposed to merely reformist, environmentalism. For under state regimes, more and more of remaining environments are degraded or destroyed, in the march of 8 9 Spooner (M? Treason) pp 27-8. The omitted phrase asserts that everyone has not only the right but is wtoraZZy to treat them thus. But here Spooner goes further than data seems to warrant, converting supererogation to obligation. (The phrase following the quotation echoes Miller p.38). These choices are differently presented and explained in SM, a main intellectual ancestor of the present work. The approaches complement one another. 5 state growth and economic progress. In fact, there are several reasons for the extra-state anti­ state course. There are serious limits to what states can accomplish, especially in international issues in the interstrices of states, but also as regards individual environmentally-hostile action. Moreover, even when it appears that states can a^t, or contribute, there are sharp limits to what they are prepared to do or attempt. States of course explain their tardiness or reluctance to move in various ways: prior higher commitments (e.g. endless economic ones such as creating jobs, containing inflation, etc.), the need for balance (with a constituency after unparaxeded of any environmental crisis, or wanting, like comments operating with anarchist discount rates, to party now), etc. Concerned environmentalists should take both courses: use the state and exploit state power where opportunities offer (without thereby endorsing the state and its standard practices), but also, more important, they should work outside states and against states. For mam co/ifn&Mfmg coarse o/The anJ ov^ra/Z o/?^rafmg fa worsen if. Given this (no doubt jaundiced) sfa^-mfrz'car^ thesis, surely it is hypocritical also to work through them and use them. Not at all; for states acquire and hold, have expropriated to themselves, considerable social wealth, which arguably should be directed to social concerns, including environmental amelioration. However, while states may properly be used so long as they persist, still ultimately halting the new ubiquitous environmental rot, salvaging or conserving some of what remain of viable environments, will involve, if it can be done, dissolution of states. There are powerful environmental reasons for trying to terminate / the present era of states. States are ineluctably committed to economic growth, of almost any sort; indeed they are main proponents of such growth. This commitment, certainly highly conspicuous, is not merely accidental, and is bound to impact negatively on environments. Australia, for example, needs a growth rate (in GDP) of at least 3% just to provide employment for its school-leavers, more to cater for immigrants, more to allow for some politically acceptable redistribution, more to meet rising aspirations. More, more, more .... States cannot step off the growth treadmill. That growth in turn requires, to deliver essential exports, expanded raids on resources and biological capital (if not that held by the state, that of other states). These exercises in tum inevitably mean, given present technologies and cost structures, pollution in many dismaying forms and environmental degradation.^ So growth implies environmental degradation. Therefore, with contemporary states degradation is inevitable. Such states are inevitably environmental vandals, n 10 11 A prominent recent attempt to block this sort of argument features economic growth subject to con train ts of environmental sustainability. While such constrained economic growth is a feasible (and old) idea, contemporary states, given their commitments, cannot and cannot afford to deliver it. A recent example concerns Australian production of greenhouse gases, where Australia cannot, officials now say, meet the costs involved in attaining expected reduction targets. Sustainable development itself is critically examined in r The kind of practical necessity operating here will concern us in later chapters. Logically there could be benign "states"; but these would be far removed from contemporary state arrangements. ( 6 There is exceedingly little evidence that social and environmental prospects will ever improve under the contemporary regime of states; instead much evidence to contrary has accumulated. "... Reliance on the state or a global superstate for change will lead to a continuation of many of the patterns of domination that the state has done so much to develop and reinforce in the past" the anarchist strategy of change "from below" ... [and "from above" is] much more promising'. Indeed the claim is made that The anarchist vision ... of a fusion between a universal confederation and organic societal forms of a communal character lies at the very centre of the on/y hopeful prospect for the future world order'. 12 Some of the pressures to continued exponential growth, and their environmental and social consequences, themselves positively feeding back to fuel demands for more growth, are colourfully observed in the following passage: One of the most widely pursued common goals of recent times has been economic growth, which is generally regarded as the most important ambition of states. These pressures to high rate of growth not only endanger the world's resources but do not even procure the material satisfactions they are intended to provide. For the effect of competition is that high rates of growth can be achieved only by high rates of investment designed to secure higher productivity. This secures equivalent production with more equipment but less labour. Thus more and more people are displaced from their jobs who cannot necessarily find alternative employment in service industries or elsewhere. All over the Western world, in shipbuilding, in steel, in motor manufacture, in textiles, in fishing, in agriculture and other industries, employment rapidly declines. So the total number of those unemployed increases in all industrial countries and remains high even in those where a relatively high rate of growth is being achieved. And the very fact of high unemployment, by reducing total demand, lowers the level of investment and growth for the future. Periods of growth become shorter and those of recession become longer. The relatively simple devices for stimulating growth in earlier times - lower interest rates, budgetary deficits, fiscal expansion and public works — are either not attempted through fear of inflation, or if attempted do not achieve their effect. Despite persistent recession inflation remains strong, partly because of excessive increases in income obtained by those still at work, partly because of the large sections of the economy which are in public hands and are unaffected by antiinflationary measures. Modern industrial societies, therefore, in appearance so advanced, are yet characterised by the bizarre spectacle of large sections of the population being without work, while ever higher levels of investment are undertaken to reduce employment still further in the future, so ensuring that the benefits of high growth are enjoyed by fewer and fewer people (Laurd p.147). A main dynamic involved can be summarised: Both the State and those major corporations which set much of its agenda aim to increase productivity (for reasons of profit, profile, firm or party growth and survival, etc.). But productivity increase characteristically sheds labour. Restoration of employment requires growth. Hence one heavy pressure to growth: sustaining employment. That pressure is, furthermore, one of many. Another derives from internal dynamics of corporations and bureaucracies. Like the state and capitalism, they all must, as Marx argued, 12 Clark, also quoting Falk from 'Anarchism of world order* in FVo/noj, p.160). 7 grow or die. There are many reasons for the growth imperative, both broad ideological and business specific.^ For satisfactory survival, satisfaction of its executives and employees, its stock holders, and so on, a modem corporation has to grow. Cpntr^l here are such matters as laws of profit decline otherwise, and more general principles of organisational aging and decline. If any serious ecological conclusion is to be drawn from Vol I, it is from Marx's compelling demonstration that the very law of life of capitalist competition, of the fully developed market economy, is based on the maxim, "grow or die". Translated into ecological terms, this clearly means that a fully developed market economy must unrelentingly exploit nature to a point ... that is literally regressive geologically and biologically. Capitalism, in effect, is not only polluting the world on a historically unprecedented scale; it is simplifying all the ecosystems of the planet, turning soil into sand, the oceans into lifeless sewers, indeed, threatening the very integrity of our sources of atmospheric oxygen. If one were to follow the logic of this tendency to its very end, capitalist— and hierarchical— society are utterly incompatible with a viable biosphere. What limits the ecological validity of Marx's view is obviously not his revelation of capitalism's "law of life" but rather the "progressive" role he imparts to capitalism's "success" in supposedly achieving the technical domination of nature. This Janus-faced aspect of Marx's writings is what throw them into conflict with an authentic ecological sensibility. Gorz, by contrast, sides-steps exacfZy what we must learn in the contradictory position of Marx, namely, that the very technical achievements of capitalism, fat^ from a-y-MmzZafing "ecological necessities as technical restraints", are governed by a "law of life" that technologically lacks any TES p.293) form of "restraint' Prevailing political arrangements 'no longer offer us a hopeful prospect of resolving the vast social and ecological crises which now confront humanity ... these systems, with their deep commitment to such values as industrialism, high technology, centralism, urbanization and the state, have been instrumental in creating the social atomization and ecological imbalance which are at the core of these crises' (Clark pp. 141-2). Indeed these systems are bound to exacerbate the problems. While these statements should by now be motherhood statements, they are not. Hope springs eternal: more naive environmentalists regularly appeal to a state that sometimes makes appropriate responsive noises and puts out appealing propaganda, but meanwhile is thoroughly committed to economic growth of environmentally damaging forms. The normal dynamic of th^ "advanced" state is extremely environmentally hazardous. Centralised states support environmentally and socially damaging methods of production, in order to benefit from the surplus and exploitable technology thereby produced - which are important for purposes of state, in particular for spending to remain in power (job generation, pork barrelling, subsidization of large business), for positional enrichment of the bureaucracy, and for development of the forces of coercion, propaganda and authority which matter both for internal social objectives and in order to remain militarily competitive in the region and spheres of influence. Details of the dynamic at work have become familiar from socio-environmental studies of state operation. For example, technologies that facilitate centralized authoritarian 13 The broad and ancient ideological reasons are investigated elsewhere, e.g. MSS. 8 control are favoured (such as nuclear power, which also supplies material for nuclear weapons). Such technologies serve the interests of state actors and those who benefit particularly therefrom, namely economically dominant social strata. This dynamic, which does not require any arms race, only kinds of inter-state competition, encourages ever-increasing productivity, entailing high consumption of resources, high output of pollution, substantial environmental degeneration and destru( tion, and so on. Active aware environmentalists have, in the end, little choice but to attempt to ;abotage this dynamic. 14 Opposition to anarchism from gi een directions, and especially from green infiltrators, often derives from the assumption that under anarchism all environmental regulation would lapse, that it would be an open-go, fret -for-all for anti-environmental forces—the very ones that are already running rampant over the Earth, and perhaps others besides. It needs to be stressed that this opposition rests on a misconception of what green anarchism ^is all about. With a caring anarchism there may be a complete of the usually conceived situations of states and stateless societies, as regards environment regulation and social support. It should not have escaped notice that often states are the prime enemies of environmental regulation, improved environment practices, and the like. Even when there is very extensive community support for regulation, the state acts to block it, and aids and abets damaging practices! A central reason for this is that the state typically reflects a rather narrow range of vested interests, increasingJhese days those of dominant business, not community interests except very secondarily. Contrary then to received conceptions, the state is frequently not a means to, but an obstacle to, satisfactory regulation. Satisfactory green regulation can occur, can only occur, without the modern state. It will be argued that not only are there no intellectual or theoretical problems in dispensing with the state, but fuller there are no serious losses in disposing of it. There is no case for the state, and no need for it. But it is worse than that: it is predominantly bad in its impacts. Accordingly, it ought not to be in place. The practical upshot is that that we should endeavour to remove it. Among the incidental practical difficulties arising as a result, are that for complex societies there is a need for some structure to replace the state (not a intractable theoretical problem any longer). As well there is a need for a strategy to displace the state. That is where radical environmentalism enters again. A thoroughgoing environmentalism accordingly forces a significant type of anarchism, a social non-capitalist anarchism. The basic reason it forces anarchism is that the state, a prime anarchist enemy, not only fails to supply or retain environmental goods, but is frequently actively involved in their degradation or removal. The state is a major facilitator and powerful source of environmental degradation and destruction. Genuine greenness further substantially constrains the directions anarchism can take, the variety of admissible anarchisms. It serves to eliminate as a serious option total reliance on 14 This argument is adapted from A. Carter, Towards a green political theory*. While Carter's way out is not endorsed, his elaboration of the dynamic is, more or less. LL market methods, as proposed for instance under anarcho-capitalism and libertarianism. While excessive reHance upon capitalist markets is rejected, primarily because of heavy externalities, more traditional markets are given a rather free role. The problems with market-capitalism is not so much markets, except as distorted in a capitalist setting, but capitalism.^ Capitalism, both in theory and as normally practised, is a major enemy of environmentalism, and a main source of environmental problems. Capitalism also encourages, what conspicuous capitalists conspicuously exhibit, environmentally unacceptable lifestyles. Greenness also sharply constrains meta-politics. For example, it counts heavily against standard game-theoretic approaches of analytic political philosophy, because these entirely discount environmental effects (except as reflected through human actors' self interests). This work concentrates upon the anarchist components of green anarchism (the green part is attempted in a companion text on green ideology). It is primarily a theoretical work; it concentrates upon what is sometimes usefully called "theoretical anarchism". Because the work does focus on anarchism, little will be said about present green politics (and what thin associated theory there is), because that generally involves politics within conventional state settings. Where this differs from past anarchism is not only its environmental depth, but in the level of detail of arguments, criticism, and organisational structure. The latter especially,jwhere IT- 1 a; thin and threadbare historical anarchism is particularly weak. It is not enough to gesture towards some federation of communities. Details of organisations at each level need to be provided, for a more convincing story. Most of the disappointingly slight contemporary academic literature on anarchism will not be addressed or, if it is, criticised in much detail. Life is too short for that sort of indulgence. However much will have been criticised obliquely or in passing; and enough critical detail is supplied for direct critiques to be produced (as exercises by energetic readers). While there is mMc/z scope for theoretical improvement of anarchism, there is little room for reinventing anarchism. There is a long and distinguished Hne of amateur anarchist thought form virtually every significant idea that will be which contains in seminal (if developed herein. Thus, like most of the academic literature^this text is not particularly original. Unlike much of that literature it does not pretend to be. Virtually everything in this book has been said before, if not in anarchist theory then elsewhere; scarcely anything is original. But it has never been put together quite like this before. Moreover, some of it needed and needs saying again, with a little new information and arguments a bit differently ordered. But no means all is repeated. Where something, perhaps important for the dialectic, is said at least as well I can reiterate it, I simply cross-refer. That has the effect of making the work visibly less contained (self-containment is ^bmething of an illusion), but it saves on labour and materials. For other purposes too, repetition, despite its extravagance, may be important. Significant 15 On the deliberately neglected, or papered over, major differences between marketism and capitalism, 10 ideas and books often get neglected, because for instance they were not published at the right times, in the right places, by the right authors; they did not get duly circulated, and so forth. I judge the time at least is more propitious for green anarchism than it has been, perhaps ever before. As well, there are many things that this book, which is pitched in a theoretical, rationalistic way, does not aim or attempt to do. It does not attempt to supply much background, historical or other information, a lot of which is easily found in better equipped libraries. Relevant background can all be tracked, however, through references in work referred to in this book. 16 It does not attempt a full account of substitutes for important current institutions and arrangements such as those connected with property, markets, law, and so on; nor does it offer, what is warranted, a sustained critique of prevailing arrangements, for which opposite substitutes are sought and indicated. Fortunately again, some of the critique, if not positive detail of substitutes, has been well accomplished in other texts. 17 What is attempted is however a scholarly and systematic work (though, as indicated, a far from exhaustive work), on theoretical anarchism. Accordingly the book is littered with notes, some of which merely cite references, but many of which elaborate points in the text, especially details hat lead off in different directions from the thrust of the text. I should like to thank Frances Redrup for processing reams of inelegant scribble, from which this text grew, and to acknowledge the continuing support the Australian National University gave during slow production. I want to thank Debbie Trew for proofing the typescript (no straightforward business) and organizing a bibliography. I should record my gratitude to Bob Goodin for a continuing supply of background books, and to him and to the publishers and editor of Anarc/iAyf 16 17 for encouraging me to work upon anarkism again. A major recent source, for history of Northern Hemispheric anarchism, is, as observed, Marshall, While Marshall concentrates, no doubt correctly upon Northern hemispheric activity, and within that heavily upon Anglo-American work, there is room for a supplementary production taking due account of anarchism elsewhere, Australia for one example. Although an anarchist club was formed in Melbourne only a century ago (and then upon an American model), an extraordinarily sustained period of "original anarchism" (coupled often with "original (or primitive) affluence") flourished in Australia before European settlement two centuries ago, with more than 500 centuries perhaps more than 10000 centuries, of continuous Aboriginal anarchist arrangements. Much of the story of post-settlement Australian anarchism (which included remarkable Queensland activity and a Paraguayan expedition organised by Lane, as well as extensive Victorian agitation) is recounted by James, in a series of local publication, add Burgmann and by Souter. The story of Australian Aboriginal anarchism has yet to be told. The story for the rest of the Southern Hemisphere, both before and after European conquests and political imposition, remains to be satisfactorily told. Thus, for instance, Carter on property, Bumheim on bureaurcracy, othe^on democracy. A // 1. EXPLICATIONS OF ANARCHISM CHAPTER and of green subforms G 1. Initial explanation: fud and dilute forms, and corollaries. Anarchism is the theory, principles or practice of anarchy. As practised by engaged anarchists, who are naturally adherents, authors or promotors of anarchy, it includes the assertion of anarchy and rejection of nonanarchy, i.e. rejection of archy. Anarchy itself, in its norma/ political form, applies to societies or communities, territories or countries. It is, according to the dictionaries, the following sort of condition or state: lack of coercive government, absence of a political state, want of authoritarian political heads or leaders, institutions or organisations. Politically there are evidently fhr^ j^racrara/ aa^ar/(y, ca^rciaa, and normally comprehending both, the political .yraf^.i The anchoring notion of anarchy has recently been extended beyond political arrangements to apply to other institutional forms such as the Church, Science, and Law, to mean alternative forms lacking authoritarian structure and coercive methods. Thus appear, under transference, such varieties as epistemological anarchism and philosophical anarchism, instead of po/zfzcn/ anarchism upon which this text focuses. However the far-reaching analogies should not lost sight of; they matter. Anarchism is to political authority, as atheism is to religious authority, and rather as scepticism is to scientific authority. Although the conditions specified for anarchy are normally taken as conjoined, it is possible to construe them disjointly, yielding what could be called anarchisms. One diluted form which has obtained a little exposure is a /zzzzz^J anarchism appropriately opposed to the state but prepared to endorse carefully-controlled coercive authorities.^ A differently diluted form is a anarchism which is opposed to all prevailing states, because of some serious but in principle removable defect or other of each and every one of these states, but is not opposed to the very idea of an ideal state, or to a new wonderful order of states; that is it is, not, so to say, a principled anarchism. It is sometimes difficult to ascertain whether historic anarchists are j?rznczp/^r/ anarchists or merely de facto ones. There are limits to how far definitional dilution should be allowed to proceed: a theory (such as libertarianism) postulating a minimal coercive centralised state presumably exceeds acceptable diluted bounds, as n^key element is retained. Within such bounds, we shall operate both with full and dilute forms, accounting all anarchism (in a bro^d sense, qualifying as need be). Routes to full anarchism may well lead through dilute forms. Indeed these offer main paths towards anarchism proper. -t These three key elements are duly signposted in many, though not all, serious on anarchism. J- 12 It is evident that anarchy, and therewith anarchism, can be better characterised, negatively, through what it rejects, namely to sharpen the characterisation, centralised coercive forms, than in assertive formulation obtained through awkward locutions like 'absence' 'lack' 'want'. The simpler negative formulation (supplying the of anarchy), rejection of archy, makes it immediately evident that much of what vulgarly pass for meaning conditions upon or essential features of anarchism are not. Firstly, a variety of political arrangements and organisation, including of government, are entirely compatible with anarchy. It is enough for these arrangements not to include anarchy-violating features such as authoritarian or coercive elements. For example, a government without such elements, a government nonetheless in the dictionary sense of 'administration of public affairs', satisfies the principle of anarchy, and so is anarchistic. Such an anarchistic government can include normal components of organisation, regulation and control, so long as they conform to the principle. Certainly a territory without government, since therefore lacking an archist government, is anarchistic. But the popular converse fails. An anarchistic system may well, like several societies substantially destroyed by European conquest, have a small smooth-running public administration, free of authoritarian elements. Thus it would have a government, but not an authoritarian government. No doubt it would also be in a predominant modem, but narrow, use of 'government'. The term 'government', which is variably determinable, vacillates in particular between * administration of public affairs (including control, regulation, what it once meant) and its important and now dominant restriction, the enarchistically unacceptable determinate, * authoritative administration of public affairs (i.e. that exercising authority, and characteristically backed by coercion). Much confusion concerning anarchism has resulted through failure to separate the wider and narrower determinates^ It may well be true that, as dictionaries assert, an anarchist would 'oppose all existing systems of government'; but this is not a matter of meaning, it is contingent upon the character of prevailing state systems. Nor therefore are prevailing political forms everywhere so far removed from anarchistic alternatives: they may even overlap them. Make the following kind of thought-experiment concerning the government and operation of some modem freer, less violent, more peaceful society: the coercive and authoritarian elements are blacked out (both operational components and what they typically operate upon). For instance, there is a strike of relevant groups, judges and accused, police and criminals, prison warders and prisoners, etc. (perhaps because the broad society had reduced the opportunities for crime and accordingly threatened their contra­ operative livelihoods). What may well happen, what we shall imagine happening, is that governmental affairs simply keep running for some time. Things work well enough. Partial examples of just this sort of phenomenon are not uncommon, as when police forces go slow or strike. For example, when traffic police stop work traffic keeps on going, much as before. It may be irrelevantly objected that such anarchistic periods are mere interludes, presupposing surrounding authoritarian structures (somewhat as anarchistic end-states of marxism are premissed on preceding super-productive authoritarian states). Such thought experiments were designed to remove a different intellectual blockage: the common assumption that anarchism is utterly remote from the political practice of complex modem states and impossible to realise at all. As a theory, anarchism tends to advance a stronger theme than the progressive particular claims that anarchistic systems are possible, realisable, and sometimes realised. After all, these arrangements may be realisable—as more than an interlude—only in restricted or anomalous circumstances (e.g. a few people on an isolated tropical island). The stronger theme, linked with the anarchist principle, is that there is no need at all for authoritarian or coercive regulation. So rejection can succeed universally. Universal anarchism encounters many problems which do not trouble less ambitious parfict/Zar anarchisms, such as those to be advanced here. For example, how to rectify especially degenerate or evil societies? An attempt is sometimes made to render all anarchism universal, through the connecting thesis that for anarchism to succeed anywhere it must succeed everywhere (else be destroyed by ruthless, expansionist or greedy states, or similar). Fortunately the fallacious connecting thesis, though popular with critics, is implausible.^ Although anarchism proper does exclude certain kinds of government, coercive and authoritarian forms, it does not automatically include, certainly not as a matter of semantics, specific positive kinds. Anarchism is not necessarily "a theory of government based on the free agreement of individuals rather than on submission to law and authority", despite what dictionaries assert (incompatibly incidentally with their definitions of 'anarchy'). Such positive accounts of anarchism, as offering a certain theory of government, both try to convert a particular variety, individualistic anarchism, into the more general object, and try to import a certain motivation for, or differently explanation of, or justification of, anarchism into the very essence of the object (this is the general fallacy of verificationism in operation). Anarchism, or at least its assertion, may well be regularly motivated by ideals of free arrangements, not imposed by narrow or incompetent authoritarian forces, but motivation is one thing, meaning 14 another, verification a third. Not only is the assumption that anarchism is incompatible with government, wellregulated government, mistaken. So also therefore are the assumptions that anarchism is incompatible with organisation, with regulation, with a positive noncoercive "law", with order. So mistaken therefore are the widespread assumptions that anarchism entails disorganisation, disorder, confusion, lawlessness, chaos. Yet all these negative associations have been incorporated into degenerate popular meanings of anarchism. It is similar with related assumptions that anarchism implies violence, paramilitary activity, or terrorism. A popular picture of the anarchist, encouraged by authors like Conrad and Dostoevsky, is the excitable fictional character with a bomb in his pocket (not a Tolstoy or a Thoreau).5 These too are assumptions and pictures, with little basis either in semantics or in general anarchist theory or practice, promulgated by an unsympathetic opposition generally comfortable in present poor to appalling political systems or unaware of alternatives. With anarchy, as with many other valuable terms, a concerted confusion or destruction effort has been made, part of an extensive terminological vandalism in human intellectual affairs. Rather than reconciling ourselves to sacrifice of the damaged term anorc/ug/n, let us salvage the term explicitly for the pristine notion, and isolate the conventional associations under the term anarchi-pm, shortened, if a single term is sought, to Most fictional anarchists of system-supportative authors are degenarchists; but they are far from representative of anarchists. There are many anarchists who are not terrorists, few who are; there are many who are not dangerous troublemakers bent upon violently upsetting local settled order; increasingly there are many anarchists within environmental and peace movements, many of them anarchists. Gentler anarchisms tend to be all of more pacific, more social and more rational than tougher or hardened anarchisms. 2. Rival, typically defective, definitions, and beyond. Much of what is taken as typical or even characteristic of anarchism, especially popularly and journalistically, consist of optional extras, not even typical of anarchism. They represent, like what gets written into degenarchism, attempts at easy smearing or dismissal of anarchism, for instance as an ideology unworthy of serious consideration. As regards violence, terrorism, disorder, disorganisation, confusion, these sorts of point ought to be well enough known. But they apply also to other more benign features widely taken to characterize anarchism, such as attempts to tie anarchism variously to individualism, capitalism, voluntarism, primitivism, spontaneity, or socialism. Thus such erroneous characterisations of anarchism as those of the selection that follows:- 5 15 * One utterly appalling characterisation comes from a Russian DzcZzozzrzzy of PAz/o^op/zy. ^ "Azz^zrc/zz^zzz, a petty-bourgeois socio-political trend that is hostile to all authority and the state, and counterposes the interests of petty private ownership and small peasart economy to the progress of society based on large-scale production" * Another dismal, indeed wild, characterisation comes from an American political scientist, who audaciously asserts that "anarchism ... is anti-political—that is, it does not really offer political solutions" (p.l), rather "the primitive core of anarchism is not so very different from Christianity. That is, it rests on the notion that man has a need, not just a preference, to love" While this is wild, there are convergences and congruences between types of anarchism and early Christianity.? * It is "a political doctrine based on the value of individual freedom"? While this is not wild, it does erroneously convert what is a frequent powerful motive, and reason, for anarchism into part of it, confusing motivation and justification with essence. For it is by no means an invariant feature. A socialist or monastic community, placing no great emphasis upon or even discouraging individuality, can be organised anarchistically. * It is "a theory of government based on the free agreement of individuals rather than submission to law and authority" (Concz-y^ Eng/zj/z Dzcfzozzazy). But it also asserts that the same %7z#rc/zz.yAy "... are opposed to all forms of government". That inconsistent information should, as already seen, be discounted. Furthermore, there may be no free agreement; an anarchistic situation can, as already also seen, just happen. More likely, a sustained anarchism may emerge under favourable historical opportunities, again without any sort of contract or general agreement; it is then only zf there were free agreement. Certainly, there would no longer be "submission to authority", but there would likely be systems of rules, which people normally followed. * The very short characterisation of rzzzrzrc/zMzzz (and rendition of zzzMrc/zz?^) as "no government" is defective because of the elasticity, slippiness and determinability, of "government"? For example, to increase documentation, according to one dictionary ((/zzzv^r^zz/ Ezz^/z^/z), gove?7Z7?zenf means "... system of polity in a state; territory ruled by a governor ..." in which case it incompatible with anarchism; but it also means "... control; administration of public affairs" in which case it is certainly no? incompatible. Granted there have been attempts to represent anarchism as if it entailed no organisation or administration at all (state-of-nature arguments regular rely on this fallacy of false dichotomy), but it does not, and if it did there would be a gap for a near-identical relative (a/za&yrz^ for instance) to All. One of the rather better brief characterisations is the following: "a social philosophy that rejects authoritarian 6 7 8 9 Ed I. Frolov, 2nd revised ed, Progress, Moscow, 1989. Apter p.3. HI p.70. For such proposals see e.g. Carter,Websters' Dictionary (?), Marshall p.3. 16 government and maintains that voluntary institutions are best suited to express man's natural social tendencies'/ (Woodcock, Ency Phil, p.lll). While the first negative conjunct, which n governmental' right, might rate a pass (though anarchism is not always a philosophy, it is sometimes a practice), the second positive conjunct calls the whole account into doubt. Many humans naturally thrive in authoritarian settings. Defective definitions of anarchism abound, many regrettably supplied by high profile anarchists or well-regarded commentators (whereupon they assume a certain air of authority, a bogus air). A few examples will be considered, mostly drawn from a large list of similarly defective definitions included in Clark, who is out to show that any definition which attempts to do justice to anarchism through an essentialistic definition deploying one simple idea is bound to fail, abysmally, to does not 'mean literally "without government'" contrary to Carter, for one. It does however imply systems without governments of prevailing sorts, which is what she immediately proceeds to: 'and the lowest common demominator of anarchist thought is the conviction that existing forms of government are productive of wars, internal violence, repression and misery' (p.14). Right on! Kropotkin, for another, defines 'anarchism' in terms of 'society ... without government'. Like most of the brief definitions to be cited, this is neither necessary #)r sufficient. For 'government' has to be narrowed to its coercive and authoritarian determinate, and other archie arrangements also excluded. Many, Runkle for one, maintain that anarchism 'opposes authority in all its forms'; but elsewhere Runkle holds that its essence is individual liberty'. Others, Goodman for one, suggest anarchism is defined in terms of decentralization, still others, Bakunin for one, suggest characterisation in terms of 'organization from below upwards, by means of federation'. Again this is neither necessary nor sufficient. It is not so easy to And an adequate characterisation of anarchism. (I have found none in the literature, despite some searching. That is reason why a certain amount of work has gone into such basics). There is a tendency to leap from the inadequate to the excessive—a tendency exemplified by Clark, who also cites Woodcock approvingly. Anarchism is first contracted to a rather elaborate doctrine, or political theory, thereby excluding practice. Then requirements are sharply inflated: For a political theory to be called "anarchism" it must contain: 1) a view of an ideal, non-coercive, non-authoritarian society; 2) a criticism of existing society and its institutions, based on this anti-authoritarian ideal; 3) a view of human nature that justifies the hope for significant progress towards the ideal; and 4) a strategy for change, involving immediate institution of non-coercive, non­ authoritarian, and decentralist alternatives (p.127). As Clark indicates, this "minimum" "definition" is an elaboration of another account, briefer and 10 See Clark p. 118ff. Clark's attack on essentialistic definitions is in the style of Wittgenstein. 17 better, that Woodcock also offers: 'historically, anarchism is a doctrine which passes a criticism of existing society; a view of a desirable future society; and a means of passing from one to another" (cf. p.120). There is nothing here about human nature, which anarchism need have no particular views about, perhaps rejecting the notion altogether as part of archist propaganda or similar, n There is nothing about the ideal society, or any commitment to one. Anarchists are not seeking societies; that is an illusory, Enlightenment goal, have transformed to get another excessive condition of adequacy for anarchist societies. It would be quite enough to achieve satisfactory societies. 12 Realistic anarchists may even come to appreciate that there are no ideal societies, perhaps just various less unsatifactory and better justified societies than virtually all of the extraordinarily narrow range of modem societies presently exhibited or on offer. However Clark's discussion of "the ideal"" reveals that he does not really intend an ideal, but only one or other of the plurality of societies meeting certain adequacy conditions. It certainly does not intend a unique one, ideal. 'Some adequate" or similar should substitute" for 'an (the) ideal", and the definition should be duly pluralised. Outside explications of anarchism which answer back to dictionary accounts, there are various high redefinitions (e.g. Clark) and some weird redefinitions. One such weird redefinition is that proferred by Taylor, who—rightly enough contrasting anarchism with the presence of the state where there is a concentration of the means of deploying force—defines a as where 'force is perfectly dispersed, not concentrated at all" (82 p.6). But Taylor does advance from pure anarchy, of which there are no examples, to an illuminating discussion of the exercise of concentrated force in societies. In recognisably anarchistic societies there is but limited concentration of force (based on physical inequalities), which 'is /10c in use. There is no standing specialist group or organisation or centralised system of groups...' No doubt a /MZ/er anarchist f/t^ory has to accomplish much of what excessive characterisations of anarchism,^ list, and more. Any reasonably full theory should * include a critique of authoritarian and coercive features of present and past societies and their institutions; 11 12 13 The important matter of such "nature" is discussed later.. Presently we are very far removed from such societies, except for small communities mainly in rich countries. States have done extremely poorly in this regard. There is not one satisfactory state in all of Africa or the Americas. Even small European states that at least have avoided extensive poverty, homelessness, and violence are in doubt because of * virtually entire destruction of their natural environments * reliance for wealth on impoverished Third World countries * justified dissatisfaction of many of their inhabitants. those of Woodcock and Clark p.120, p.126. r 18 * outline features of noncoercive nonauthoritarian societies as alternatives to, and improvements upon present dominant social arrangements, for some regions at least; * suggest strategies for attempting to change from defective forms to improved alternatives. Clarke also tries to insist, what we shall subsequently reject, that for a 'theory to called "anarchism" it justifies the hope for significant progress towards the ideal' (p.127). As well as theory, there is practice. (Clarke also goes astray in excluding anarchism as a , "anarchism without doctrine", and so on.) The pracfice of anarchism, generously construed, naturally includes the state of being in anarchist conditions, of living under anarchism (though perhaps unaware of doing so). There is scope for wfr/toM? Many primitive societies thus qualify as anarchistic; they practice, or practiced, anarchism though unaware (somewhat as wild animals practice hygiene, knowing without knowing ;%af). Further, no doubt now stretching 'practice' beyond its assumed anthropic context, many animal communities practice anarchism, very successfully. Many attracted to anarchism, an anarchism without name even, long for analogous pure practice, many practicing environmentalists for instance. They hope that whatever it is will operate, perhaps even materialize, without any heavy-duty theory, without excess or even any intellectualizing, perhaps without even thought or much effort on their part. In contemporary circumstances they would have to be extraordinary lucky; a paternal state with caring elements, such as safe jobs and spoon-fed indoctrinal education for all citizens, does not relinquish its control voluntarily. While definitions can be defective or otherwise unsatisfactory, in m^y ways, one thing they are not is dogmatic (as suggested by Marshall, none too subtlely trying to evade critical details in delimiting his massive study, p.3). Though insisting upon^themes definitions yield upon substitution can be dogmatic, having or offering definitions is not. Significant criticism of definitions is logically different, belonging to different categories. As well as decking anarchism out with defective definitions, with all the scope for argumental malpractice that affords, there is a coupled practice of boxing anarchism in, by narrow and confining constraints, jf iZZ/czf/y ctrcMWMcri&ing (Whereas definitions characteristically yield necessary and sufficient, conditions, such circumscription concerns necessary, or possibly sufficient conditions). Many of the restrictions imposed are, however, quite inessential, and have rather the effect of excluding viable alternatives. Simple examples concern waAmg, which is sometimes taken as having always to be case by case, and elsewhere is seen as necessarily involving all parties, large assemblies, or even complete social participation. None of this is essential, often the restrictions would prove undesirable. Often the circumscription technique proceeds by presenting features of, or said to be of, 19 historic anarchism, then tacticly assuming that all anarchism must conform to those features.*4 That is one reason why definition and characterisation are important; so anarchism is not set in riged past forms, unable to adapt to new circumstances and ideas. Another example concerns the character of the anarchist revolution, onto which many restrictions are loaded, often resulting in gratuitous puzzles, which are removed with the impositions. For example, it is said that 'the revolution had to be a mass affair" (M p.94). But nothing in anarchism, or its general development, requires this. (As a result the dilemma Miller finds .p.99 ff., simply falls over.) A revolution could be carried out by an elite anarchist band, or, in some states, through a single governor or president. Again, it said that the revolution is bound to be authoritarian (which renders an anarchist revolution contradictory), violent, and so on. This we have on authority from Engels: 'a revolution is certainly the most authoritarian thing there is; it is the act whereby one part of the population imposes its will upon the other by means of rifles [etc.] authoritarian means, if such there be at all', to which Miller adds approvingly that to say in power the party must rely on military means and 'terror of arms' (M p.92). None of this is so. A revolution could lag rapid change through mass conversion; for instance, there is a sign or appearance that is widely recognised, a new social movement which spreads like "wild fire", etc. 3. Anarchism and the state. While organisation and government are entirely compatible with anarchism, that most conspicuous modem institution, the state, is not: it is the paradigmatic archist form. Nor are ancient power formations such as the empire and the kingdom really compatible with anarchism. A prime reason is their authoritarian character and their extensive use of coercion and violence, but reasons als<4 includd^hein centralized organisation (such as power and hierarchical structure). Let us focus upon the state, against which a major and often virulent part of anarchistic political critique is directed; indeed such is the opposition to the state and its features that anarchism is sometimes distinguished in that way, in terms of 'hostility to the state ... [which] should be abolished and replaced by a new form of social organisation' (thus Miller p.5). But again these may be consequential, not characterising features of anarchism, which are derived from characterising features together with a standard theoretical characterisation of Under one such standard (though fairly strong^) characterisation, the state is a and 14 15 This is a much favoured tactic with critics of anarchism. For many examples, some only Quoted in the main text, see Miller. Although strong, in certain respects the characterisation is not strong enough. A state must not only be able to c/ai/n all these sorts of power, but sometimes to exercise them. Cf. Taylor's criticism of Weber's definition of the state (p.5). A body ... it claims complete authority to define the rights of its subjects .... Second, the state is a body, in the sense that everyone bom into a given society is forced to recognise obligations to the state that govern that society. Third, the state is a body: it claims a monopoly of force in its territorial area, allowing no competitor to exist alongside it (Miller p.5). It also normally claims other monopolies, such as on legal tender. It is virtually immediate, powers. So it is that anarchism is often epitomized as directed at the dissolution of, what is widely seen then, that the state is a comprehensive as major political problem, the state. As to why it is such a problem, anarchist critiques of the state, sketched below, will reveal. With anarchism implemented in a place there is then an end there to any institution that is recognisably a state. The subsequent argument for anarchism does not depend upon a strong characterisation of .yfafe, such as that so far offered. Even fairly weak characterisations will serve. But inadequate characterisations, such as the following, will not: 'a collective object with territorial boundaries and political organisation throughout that territory". For that omits essential features of the state, such as sovereignty, authority, coercive control; it describes a possible anarchist society. 16 Arguments/or the state (which anarchism is normally concerned to fault) are however sensitive to characterisation. Mostly these arguments reach little further than, justify no more than, some sort of "minimal state"", very different from anything the Earth has had on offer (e.g. a nice state guaranteeing basic rights rather than removing rights: but anarchism need hardly oppose such arrangements). So it will matter just how ^<2^ is characterized. But this is easier said than done: is a ^k cluster ( muqti-criterial) notion, explications of which are controversial and typically contested.i? In seeking a satisfactory working characterisation, a useful starting point is the following short definition: 'a collective item with territorial boundaries and political organisation exercising sovereign power".is As anarchism can comfortably accommodate the first parts, political organisation within a region, it is the last part, sovereign power (as spelt out, e.g., in Miller's account) that is the problematic distinguishing factor. In a way, the term ruling sui^ipreme, derived from la&Ctptein which reflects the Greek reigning or says it all, why anarchism is bound to oppose a state so empowered. Improved detailing will exhibit a similar division between acceptable and unacceptable. A state, which comprises a 16 A' 17 18 q/ Virtually all the key political terms that we shall encounter have a disconcerting multiplicity of meanings: so it is with state, sovereignty, democracy (422 senses in Naess p.30), ideology, and so on. Fortunately these terms are dealt with^ elsewhere in this work. For a useful attempt at a multi-criterial characterization,and discussion of controversies over characterisations see Dun^eary "The state * (in Goodin & Pettit). Reese, with 'item * substituted for 'entity * to evade reificative issues. 21 interconnected (their level of cohesion justifying a definite description), has domains consisting of a and of who form an associated society. The territory of a state consists of spatial regions, over which it normally exercises control. Subjects are generally those humans who regularly reside in the territory (citizens form a of subjects, singled out by possession of certain duties and rights). The state is not the only authoritarian body to be repudiated. Lesser authoritarian organisation, such as those proposed under terms of functionalism (military barracks, prisons, reform schools, etc.) are to be similarly repudiated. No doubt on occasion the ability to coerce makes an institution more "effective", much as childrens learning of uninviting material is sometimes rendered more effective by coercive means, e.g. heavy cannings, floggings. But the repugnant means, and their common chase outw^eight the gains, if any, in effectiveness achieved. Now, having thus arrived at regular anarchism, reputiating the state, we confess to the evident, to the refinement of the notion of anarchy away from widespread common usage where it functions primarily as a powerful directive away from disapproved anti-statist life. Given that anarchism is thereby rendered (as in many dictionaries which of course reflect usage) a contradictory notion, encompassing both disorder without the state and order alternative to the state, some refinement and some diversion of disorder is no doubt desirable. The trouble with this easy resolution is that the early uses of 'anarchism' in English operated precisely with the corrupt drunk-and-disorderly side of the contradiction—disorder as contrasted with spendid state order. That was what (in defiance of the original Greek meaning) 'anarchy' and 'anarchism' were introduced to mean (see OED citations from 16-17th C). Thus the early usage, which persists, contradicts the refined and now regular usage. In technical presentations this problem is easily sliced through, by coining a term to mean what anarchy as refined means (anaRyri'2 and anacracy are such terms). Here however we shall simply persist with the refinement of the prevailing term, and in the course of giving it etymological justification over the early corrupt uses, further refine. 19 But the justification for refinement is not only 19 Tempting as it may be to switch, alternatively to new, freeing terminology, that temptation has here been largely resisted. Anarchism is a term, and idea, worth retaining. Not that there is anything amiss with new terminology: quite the contrary, provided that it is well-indroduced and pointful. In the course of drafting this book, a variety of new terminology has been toyed with—including such nice terms as (signifying non-domination)—because, as is regularly emphasized, anarchism is now such a turn­ off for most people. No doubt in more pdular versions (written by someone else), anarchism will disappear from headings, displaced by new terminology with a hint of old such as ^ada^waacra^y, or, less scrupulously, its place usurped by ^car-vacuous terms in high popular favour such as d^/nocracy. In this less popular version, anarchism stays; but, in pa^t compensation, some pleasant absolute terms, and senses, have been revised. They offer acceptable alternatives. A more powerful consideration than negative connotations is perhaps this: The present text, though strictly / 22 etymological. Do we need yet another term for lawlessness, or for disorder? Don't we rather need a term to help break the false dichotomy between: the state or political disorder? As if there are no further alternatives, like stateless order of various kinds? Or (as much ill-informed literature suggests), no political theory without the state, merely untheorizable confusion? 4. A refined explication of anarchism. derives from the ancient Greek Etymologically meaning: without a chief or head, or without a top authority. Of course what the form derives from, though often indicative, does not determine what it now means. (Anarchism was not, after an ancient political theory, but is in fact, under familiar classifications, the most recent and novel of major political ideologies.) However it M worth drawing out the etymological meaning, because it is revealing. What it appears to exclude are political arrangements structured with a top element of any of the following authoritarian sorts: a monarch, a prince, a ruler, a leader, a president, a prime minister, and shifting from individual to group form, a party, a clique, a ruling elite, a central power such as a state, etc. There are, analysis reveals, two interacting foci: one, a top or centre, and two, control or dominance flowing from this top by what are adjudged inadmissible means, authoritarian or coercive means in particular. A chief both stands at the top of a power hierarchy and exercises authoritarian control from there. Under this anarchy entails double foci structure or organisation without inadmissible top-down or centralized means. Let us look at the foci in turn, beginning with the more independent one, the top. Topologically, wif/tonf % fop amounts to wzt/zoMt % cenfre, because by topological transformations (roughly&^nJzKg and stretching as what rubber objects will permit) what is a top transforms to a centre, and vice versa. Diagrams illustrate the transformations: top (of tree, semi lattice) o centre o investigating is so far removed from what normally enters under that denomination that different terminology is warranted, terminology which then has the advantage of shaking off all those negative associations of anarchy. The salient differences from run-of-the-mill anarchism will appear when preferred forms are detailed subsequently. 23 Volcano from top from sides * peak * peak Given such transformations, which will be taken for granted, anarchism also excludes arrangements structured with a controlling centre, such as a ruling central government. It implies decentralization in a precise sense. It does not thereby also remove all structure: it leaves intact a rich variety of structure including network arrangements with no centres (or with multiple "centres"), federation structures or similar. Yet another example is afforded by lateral structuring with central "centres" dispersed via function, as ilustrated;^ service "centres" The skeleton or scaffolding of organisation is structure; it is the frame on which organisation is hung, which organisation fills or fleshes out. The sense of explicating the underlying organic image, implies as much. According, for instance, to the Conci-ye Dzcfiofiuiy, 'structure: manner in which a building or organism or other complete whole is constructed, supporting framework or whole of the essential parts of something *. Structure itself is primarily, though not entirely, a matter of of elements and parts, among which order relations figure prominently, though not exclusively. That is, structure involves order, as a critical component. Remarkably, the same sort of <y%n/c%r&y occur in a range of seemingly diverse theoretical areas, not just social and political theory, to be displaced in each case by a similar sort of problem-dissipating structure. To illustrate, consider an order on a type (or set) of items Q given by one order relation R, 20 Insofar as there is a single centre, it is the bottom, the people. Major condinating issues are referred to people, for instance through referenda. So there a will be a referenda organising office, but it will be independent cooperative. 24 on item c in Q, i.e. R = Re- For example, where Q is a system of where R may itself worlds including your world the ordering R of worlds may depend on your world (and my world could supply a different order). Differently, where Qis a system of values or valued items, R may depend upon your values; and so on. As an orJer, R is at least transitive, and perhaps either (if like <) reflexive or (if like <) symmetric, on its ranged The system <Q, R> is a simple ordered structure, or ay%w%^. (The latter is the term now used in modal logic, where such structures are the bases of models for the logic.) A or top t of such a system is an element such that all items of Q bear R to t but which does not itself bear R to any element of Q. (The notion, that of -yMpreyniow, and likewise woxiwMw, may be similarly defined relative to subsets or types within Q.22) 77^oreTH. There are order structures without tops. Examples are provided by systems (often with much more structure) with no supremum. Here is a simple 6 element example drawn from relevant logical theory. +1 +2 „ = {=2,-l,-0, +0, +l,+2} +0 R - — is as shown by arrows. -0 -1 T = {+0, +1, +2} is a frufh component -2 Topologically, several notions of prime political and philosophical cast are tantamount to tops in order structures, including chiefs (top persons in power rankings) hierarchs, grand leaders, centres, absolutes, and objective items. Consider, a pertinent issue, the matter of control or authority, where as in the next diagram all elements to t. trans^ity required of order. 21 There are various cases, depending upon conditions 22 A supremum t of R (in type T) is an (that) element (of T) such that all elements (of T) bear R to t but which does not itself bear R to anything (in T). Looked at from above t is centre of a network. In the diagram shown, it remains a structure, a flattened hierarchy, when t and relations leading to it are deleted, under so to say. What this shows in a simple fashion is that there can be ordered structures without central control (and ranging further there can be statelessness, absence of central control, anarchy without "anarchy" or chaos, because there is order), structures. afford numerous examples. Order, including good order of a range of sorts, does not require central controls, leaders, absolute rulers or arrangements, or similar. Order does not require hierarchy, such hierarchy. 23 As immediate corollary is that inferences from anarchy (without a top or centre) to absence of order to disorder are fatally flawed. What lacks a top or centre may nonetheless enjy satisfactory order. Structures induced in anarchic arrangements can be far from chaotic (and may be modest and stable equivaien&s8i conditions). It is worth alluding to a much wider philosophical sweep. Related order structural considerations to those that tell against central states, absolute rulers, monarchs, patriarchs, top authorities as required for satisfactory order, also count against <2^x9/%^ of other sorts, such as absolute truth (there need be none, as the first diagram above indicates), absolute order (thus R 23 Part of what seems correct in Bookchin's vendetta against hierarchy can be captured in this way. More on this subsequently. 26 itself is relative to c), and of various sorts, such as objective fact (another supposed absolute), objective value (supplied under an absolute order), and so on. On this broad sweep the following sorts contrast sets emerged centralism elitism statism absolutism realism objectivism in rough contrast respectively with maximizing rationalism decentralism egalitarianism anarchism pluralism nonrealism nonjectivism satisizing rationalism Naturally, these simple structural considerations are only indicative, not decisive. For we might find, as more and more constraints are imposed on structures, as account is taken of actual conditions, that freedom contracts, that structural arrangements are forced towards centralism or absolutism. While such forcing may now look, in the light of a little logic, implausible, it requires further argument that it need not in general eventuate. The to be developed agam-yf takes these lines: that there is ready design of institutional arrangements for decentralised communities which does not lead back to a central state. The state is organisationally otiose. Organisation is delivered anencephaletically. For an added or infiltrated top or the centre to be troublesome, something anarchism need bother removing or shun where it figures, it has to have an role. Politically that presumably means exercising power in some way. That is, the head (the head that is lacking in %7i#rc%(?.y) is an operative head, not a mere figurehead. Anarchism need not exclude princes, monarchs, emperors, or "governors", such as some countries now maintain. If the people really like having such relics, royalty or "aristocracy", as is often said they do, then they can presumably have them if they are prepared to afford them. Indeed this figurehead role is just what is presumed for the prince under more plausible anarchist construals of Taoism.25 The ideal prince is a Taoist who takes no action, a sage who is rarely or never seen, whose existence may merely be known to the populace or even simply rumoured (that is almost to say, though Lao Tzu could not tactfully assert it, the ideal prince is a nonexistent inoperative sage). 24 For a fuller picture see Sylvan 93/4, chapter 10. 25 See Clark 84 p.165. Also UTD. 27 As indicated, the main features adduced are mirrored in logic, which can serve as a structural guide. It is striking, as well as technically advantageous, that logical and political predelictions converge. Mainstream irrelevant logics have algebraic structures with top elements, Boolean algebras in the case of classical logics. By contrast relevant logics, which now challenge the classical logical paradigm, do not. Their corresponding algebras, De Morgan monoids and such like need include no top element. The top element, T, is directly responsible for positive paradoxes, of the basic form A -* T (anything at all implies the True), of mainstream logics, paradoxes infecting much theory which relevant logic avoids.^ The logical structure shows that sub "centres" need not have such damaging effects; a plurality of local "centres", regional nodes, induces no paradox. The figurehead analogy also operates analogically, in logic. It does not matter if a semi­ lattice structure is extended to include a top element, so long as that addition provides only a conservative extension. (If T is added to top a relevant lattice, it has in stronger logics to be kept out of implication relations, else it will induce a non-conservative relevant extension with theses like A -* T.) But otherwise, as an inoperative top-piece it is admissible. Technical comparisons now reach much further than logic alone, as we leam more and more about decentralised structures, about decentralised cerebral organisation, decentralised Al and topless connectionism, and decentralised intelligent structure. Intelligent organisation without top or central elements may abound both in nature, for instance in insect cerebral organisation and in vertebrate brain structure, and in many future artificial intelligence applications. Logic and computing technology demonstrate, what is widely appreciated outside political theory, that topless is feasible.2? There is scope, and need, for twenty-first century anarchism to be highly techno-logically sophisticated. There is more to anarchism than political structure without an operative top, head or centre, than a lateral structuring. That more, the residue of the rejection of archy, is more difficult to characterize in a way non-prejudicial to types of anarchism. It is bound up with the operation of the active top, with the confroZ for example it exercises, the potter it exerts, or the like: non-prejudicially, it cannot operate As to what are unacceptable means, however there are different specifications. These many include—what can be summarized, under a single rubric, as —force, coercion, authoritarianism (and what implies any of those, such as totalitarianism); and, much more controversial, nonvoluntary, nonindividualistic, socialist and communist, means. As in dictionariess entries for "anarchism", only coercive and authoritarian elements will be ruled unacceptable (for 26 See WR. 27 The subsequently preferred variety of anarchism, while not at all opposed to slates losing their heads, is powerfully opposed to people literally loosing their heads (figuratively again, it may be alright). 34 A Gramsci, 'The intellectuals * and 'The modem prison * in gcZccfzony /row ?7zc Prz'yon M?fc&ooRy (ed. Q. Hoare and G.N. Smith), International Publishers, New York, 1971. D. Mannison and others (eds.), Environment?/ P/zz/oyopAy, Research School of Social Science, Australian National University, 1980; referred to as EP. D. Miller, Aaarc/zzym, J.M. Dent and Sons, London, 1984; referred to as M. D. Mitrany, 7%c Ennctona/ 77zcory o/PoEr/cy, Martm Robertson, London, 1975. A. Naess and associates, Democracy, /Jeo/ogy aaJ D/?/eciiviiy, Oslo University Press, Norway, 1956. R. and V. Routley, 'The irrefutability of anarchism *, &?cza/AZfcrnaEvcy, R. and V. Routley, 'Social theories, self-management and environmental problems *, in EP; referred to as SM. R. Sylvan, and D. Bennett, 'On Utopias, Tao and Deep Ecology *, D/ycayyzoa Papery in EavzrozzmczzZaZ P/zz/oypp/zy, #19, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University, 1990. R.P. Wolff, 7a De/ence o/Aaarc/zzym, Harper & Row, New York, 1970. ADDITIONAL SOURCES P. Nursey-Bray, an Aaaa/arcJ EzEZzagrap/zy a/Aaarc/zzym , Greenwood Press, 1992. END NOTES 2 Cf Clark p.ll8ff. The general methodological issue of multiple determinates of key political terms and their archist confinement is taken up in a later chapter. *J^A /TrT^^<Z7 (y/^cA e.ncrcicj/ ^ A A' '< -' z? y // /yr *-^. C r^O V. J * /X o J* ,<^A<_ . ) *4 C^c/^ / /Xot^z &J> f A-w^ t^i^L to n > etA A jt? cj C rZ-?/T^T <*C Zt , <^<!"// , cx^d /7^/^'Cx ^9 /?. 3* f,. /A^t / TL^i- c— ^^4—UT^-? ^-7y47 /^" <-/ f' z' ^^L-J 7 1 CHAPTER 2. ELABORATIONS OF ANARCHISMS There are wany anarchist theories. For an anarchist theory is any laterally structured theory which duly conforms to the anarchy principle, of rejecting political authority and coercion. While received anarchist theories restrict anarchism to certain more specific forms (the standard options of considered below), p/ara/ijtic anarchism does not; plural anarchism not only admits the plurality, but takes advantage of it any may revel in it. Not all of this variety, not all anarchisms in the sheaf of systems, are of equal merit. Some forms are decidedly undesirable — like anarchisms expanding on the violent or chaotic varieties of popular imagination — in much the way that the nasty states of modem history, that anarchism opposes, are undesirable. Such undesirability may devolve from external rather than internal political characters. Thus, for instance, regions committed to global power projection to retain their privileged way of life (most unlikely under anarchistic arrangements) or committed to transnational terrorist practices. While standard anarchisms have been located in the more desirable, or even eutopian, end-range of anarchist systems, they by no means exhaust the satisfactory forms or even the most promising forms (as explained in chapter 5). Indeed in important respects the desirable range is significantly open for further elaboration of newer (and greener) forms. As varieties of anarchy may diverge, widely, so correspondingly do motivations and justifications for various divergent forms. The motivations, for instance, range from entirely theoretical (conceding to the warranted force of political scepticism) to practical (changing the local world); from personal and perhaps selfish (getting the state off one's back, or out of one's business and one's till) to other directed (eliminating a state oppressing its people) to environmental (disestablishing another vandalistic state). Common motivations trace back to the common character of anarchism: repulsion by, or opposition to, oppression, perhaps generalised from the state to all analogous political and bureaucratic structures, or expanding on that again, to all gross power relations. Indeed it is appealingly suggested that what anarchy is really all about is gross power relations, their reduction and removal; state coercive and authoritarian power are but paradigmatic of such power and domination relations. But while such opposition to gross power does characterizer gentler anarchism, heavy power methods are acceptable to tougher anarchisms; gentler anarchisms tend, so it will be argued, to be all of more pacific, more liberal and more rational than tougher or hardened anarchism. There are other expansionary liberal democratic motives for anarchism, further varying this theme: a yearning for removal of constraints, and for more extensive freedom; or a desire for more extensive equality, which would of course diminish those inequalities power delivers. Such motivations too have illicitly worked their way into variant characterisations of anarchism. ? 2 While a popular image of anarchists remains that of hardened terrorists, exercising authority over hostages using state-manufactured guns, many anarchists are joined by opposition to all such naked authority or coercion. Indeed 'behind the anarchist attack on the state and other coercive institutions, there has often stood a fundamental critique of the idea of authority itself (M p.15). An important, though certainly not invariant, mofivafmg and r^<?n for anarchism derives from a more sweeping anti-authoritarianism: the theme that no person or organisation can ever rightfully exercise authority of (political cast) over another. Picturesquely it is the theme that no authority is justified, no one, state or other, has a right to push another around. Too briefly it is sloganised to assert, no bosses, no leaders, or similar. Such general opposition to the principle of authority has even been dubbed "philosophical anarchism". It is an unfortunate choice of terminology given Feyerabend's different anarchistic challenge to much in philosophical theory and practice. * But some further classification and labelling undoubtedly helps. A princZp/^J anarchism takes exception on principled, characteristically ethical, grounds to objectionable authority or to coercion, that is to prime target elements undiluted anarchism directly rejects. But irrespective of type of anarchism intricated, much in anarchist theory, including a fuller characterisation, turns upon the twin notions of anf/ion/y and coercion, what these terms mean and cash out to, and why it is considered important to avoid damaging features of this sort? Both authority and coercion fall into the general category of power relations, a category that has rightly featured large not merely in anarchist theory but in social theory more comprehensively. As Aristotelian definitions of 'authority and coercion , by gunus and differentia, will be offered, an essential preliminary consists in pinning down the genus, power. * Power gm/ reZevan? serfs. Defective definitions of power, authority and coercion abound. Despite the importance of the notions for political theory, not just for anarchism, it is rare to encounter satisfactory formulations. A defective formulation from recent relevant anarchist theory defines power as 'the ability to compel compliance, either through the use of force or the threat of force (Wolff p.4), a conspicuously high redefinition. Rather, a power reZofion is a relation where one of the relata, that having the power, can normally get the other relata to do something (down to entertaining a belief, considering an idea). Power is a can-do; it may not be exercised. But there need be no compulsion or compelling compliance; nor need its exercise always succeed. Further its exercise need not involve force or threat thereof; it may be effected by a range of other means. 1 By Wolff, and following him, Miler and others. Feyerabend's philosophical anarchism, his is sometimes better labelled anarc/h-yiH, a type of nihilism. But it stops short, excluding logical methods (irrationally scorned however) from variation^ .In fact without a sharp—unavailable—distinction between logical and other (empirical or pwidivist) methods, this methodological anarchism is incoherent. 3 on the one side, bribery, seduction, blackmail, and so on, and on the other, knowledge, prowess, charisma, and so on. It is no secret that major problems in human social and political affairs devolve upon power, its excessive or evil use, misuse, regulation and control. But by no means all power, not even all political power, is bad. Distangling the undesirable, negative forms is an essential exercise, often neglected. After observing the failure of radical social theory to provide an adequate investigation of power, Clark embarks on a critique of the "classical model"2 According to the received conception, power is depicted as a relation of domination in which the powerful subject the powerless to control in order to exploit the latter. In both classical Marxism and anarchism this exploitation is conceived as being essentially economic. Thus, for Marx, "political power, properly so called, is merely the organised power of one class for oppressing another (p.231). It is evident that what we see here is an attempt to explain power through, and then reduce power to, certain of its determinate forms: domination, then control, exploitation, oppression, and then organised and economic forms of these. These determinates are all, though important, rather special and rather negative, black forms of power. Power may be short-term, just for a day for instance or once only (a creature requires power only for a short period, because of what it is, because it loses power thereafter, because it has access to short-term drugs, magic, hypnosis, contracts, etc.). Domination is a longer-term relation, a disposition, between recognised parties, with a decided bias in favour of one party the power-holder; exploitation and oppression increase that bias, in specifiable ways, control however removes it. Power may, furthermore, be applied for positive and libertary, purposes, to help powerless to achieve something or other, to survive, prosper, and so on. Briefly, the concerning power is not power itself, but certain of its forms, its negative forms, and its excessive use. This last can be assimilated, by taking excess as a negative form. The negative forms are, of course, though they can be independently specified, the bad, or undesirable forms, forms as was earlier said.3 These include, among other forms, closed authority and coercion. They also include such overlapping forms as oppression, exploitation, domination, and so on. Privilege goes with these latter forms; it is held by the power-holders and their circle. It is held moreover exclusively by this circle; others, at the other end of the power relation, the power-less, are excluded from its possession. That is, the domain and range of a given power relation are exclusive: no one is both an exploiter and exploited (though of course someone, a husband day labourer for example, may be both exploited in his labour and domineering over his wife). 2 3 A critique, p.231 ff. too quickly petering out in an inconclusive, discussion of Foucault on power, where power turns into what is not, something mystical and all-pervasive. In these respects, power is like other notions, of green political significance, for one, for another. 4 There are two separable kinds of undesirable power: excessive and malselective or illdirected. The two kinds are more or less replicated in other significant phenomena that have been, like power, too sweepingly condemned: economic growth and material consumption. The problematic concerning human consumption is not consumption itself, some level of which is essential to human societies and indeed survival. The problems derive basically from excessive consumption and from poorly selected consumption. Conspicuous consumption, insofar as it delivers a negative form, derives from these: it is either excessive and wasteful or malselective or a mix of these. But the kinds are distinctive. For example, a poor family that buys expensive junk food may spend its limited income poorly, but its consumption may well not be excessive. Similarly with power: the limited power an individual or group possesses, whether exercisable for evil or not, may be better or worse directed. In term of power and its gross exercise, much in more gentle anarchisms can be / synthesized, namely all that is otherwise packed into the rubric: unacceptable means. What is unacceptable is gross exercise of power, including types of political power exploited by tougher anarchisms, terrorist power, crude fire power from the barrels of guns, and so on. What correspondingly gentler anarchisms oppose are all institutions and arrangements, not just the state and those tied to it, that can exert gross power. The state mightly concentrates, and centralizes, such power/ Even so the state is merely paradigmatic among undesirable and excessive power structures — a power hungry one at that, since it looks for a surplus product in power, along with a monopolistic position. But militia posts, torture shops, and pirate ships are other more localized structures. Coercive and closed authoritarian arrangements (opposition to which helps define anarchism) are distinctive marks of such grossness. Dilute anarchisms tone down opposition certain types of power (typically authority); they admit exercise of power that gentler anarchism would regard as gross. From the problematicness and undesirability of excessive power, main objectives of ( anarchism for ameliorative change flow: decentralisation, division and separation of powers. Centralised powers are to be separated and decentralised; aggregated powers to be broken down into functional components; and so on. Tougher anarchism proposes more, rival power play, resisting and undermining power through power, to break down its excesses and reveal its limitations, fighting fire with fire. One trouble with this tough and morally dubious strategy, which can be spectacular, is that it easily overreaches, producing for instance inadmissible coercion of others. 4 Not all state power is undesirable. Some of state regulation and redistribution, effected through power is certainly desirable. The argument will be that these elements are completely outweighted by the undesirable components of state power, and that they can be independently effected without the state. 5 Gentler anarchism travels in the vanguard of the long retreat from barbarism in human practices and institutions. In more enlightened parts of the world we have witnessed the progressive removal of physical punishment, such as: maiming, blinding, executing, stoning, torturing, transporting, flogging, corporal punishing, starving, chaining, incarcerating, imprisoning, infecting, ...and extensions, such as: serious threats thereof and assistance or encouragement of these practices elsewhere. Such enlightenment has not penetrated many parts of the world to any extent, and has far to reach yet even in the most civilized regions. TTyugh the gentler anarchist theme of curtailment of power, we can tap into several rich connections. The excessive drive to power and strength, the "will to power", is a conspicuous feature of modernity. Interestingly Nietzsche went so far as to claim that the will to power was basic motive in human affairs. Fortunately such a socio-psychological claim, about prevailing human nature and institutions, has little to substantiate it. But undoubtedly power motivates much, much too much, in modernity; otherwise anarchism would lose much of its more sweeping point. It was not always so; the quest for power at all costs, the flaunting of power, was at least highly problematic (as drama revealed); it did not always gain the adulation it now widely commands. It did not win respect from early anarchism, as manifested in Stoicism and Taoism. It would not have won endorsement from Aristotelibnism; for power, of both institutions and individuals, like so many other attributes, is evidently similarly constrained to a While the rough bounds are evident enough for an instrumental object such as a vehicle, which wastes fuel and becomes dangerous when excessively powered, but cannot perform its tasks if underpowered, the bounds, especially ^e lower, may not be so conspicuous elsewhere (e.g. with military hardware, intelligence reserves, etc.). Organisations and institutions, which should be vehicles to serve social ends, enjoy once again a striking analogy with logical systems. Logical systems, when excessively strong in the fashion of modem mainstream systems, ensnarl users in a tangle of paradoxes and other troubles (for detailed discussion see RLR, p.240 ff.). On the other hand, if they are excessively weak they fail to meet reasonable conditions of adequacy, to afford satisfactory vehicles of inference and reasoning. Two species of gross power feature particularly in the definitional elaboration of anarchism: authority and coercion. While undesirable authority is characteristically tied into excessive power, coercion is different, is often once-off, and is malselective power. 6 * Authority, and warranted repugnance of closed forms. Authority is a type of power relation, a relation with the power or influence conferred or supported by other features of one of the relata, the bearer of authority, namely character, station, recognised control of coercive means, or the like. itself is the abstract of the relation : a has authority over or with respect to b. Authority is a proper subrelation of power. For evidently many power relations — those exerted by bullies, bandits, etc — are not authority relations, since the relation is not supported by suitable station. Again the following definition of authority (upon which Wolff founds his philosophical defence of anarchism) is far too narrow: "the right to command, and correlatively, the right to be obeyed" (p.4). Only some who hold authority may be (conventionally) conceded a right to command, or more broadly, to exercise their power. For evidently their power may be exercised in a variety of other ways than through command structures, such as blockages, delays, vetoes, withholdings, and so on, and on the other side, concessions, gifts, rewards, and so on. There are many types of authority relations, many inadmissibly excluded under narrow definitions, not all of which are objectionable, or objected to by anarchists. For an example of an unobjectionable sort, consider the relation of a student to an authority in some field of knowledge, who can in turn back up expert judgements by appeal to a further range of assessible evidence. Such an authority might be called frampar^if (or open), because those with time and some skill can proceed through the authority to assess claims made. Among op%n authorities are contemporary teachers, by contrast with old fashioned disciplinarians, and advanced parents, who can back up their orders with satisfactory reasons. Contrasted with such authorities are op&q%^ (or cZo<y^%f) authorities, who simply stand on their position or station, such authority is objectionable in part because of its dogmatic character.^ Closely allied to op^M^ authorities who can appeal to a conventional rule or procedure (that is how things are done, have been done) without being able to or prepared to opaque authorities are step beyond some rule book. Rule-book authorities are commonplace in bureaucracies, which often encourage such practice in lower level officials. In opaqM^ authorities the justificatory procedure stops a step further out; there is a set of rules, which has been enacted (for reasons not open to, or bearing, examination) by a further substantially opaque authority. Other authority relations are objectionable because of the way in which or the means by which they are backed. Unobjectionable is the authority figure which is exemplary, where what it exemplifies is in its tum satisfactory. Not so relations backed by coercive means, by violence or threats of violence: Big-stick authority relations. Such relations are condemned on moral 5 The impression is widely promoted that science reliably furnishes examples of transparent authorities, in the shape of experts. That impression is astray. Dominant Science frequently functions as a substantially closed authority, rather as the universal Church did, standing on received theory as gospel (for elaboration see DP, chapter 12). 7 grounds, for example by moral pacifists opposed to violence, who do not object to the carrot methods such as sanctions, boycotts, civil disobedience, etc. A diagram will summarise the position so far attained. o/'gMf/tonfy Confine##.? Methods carrot <- stick possibly benign Pacifist Back-up transparent T opposition A opaque Enlightenment Liberal opposition opposition It will be evident that the objections to nonbenign authoritarian relations—to what in clear cases may be presented as to — can be of significantly different sorts. To more opaque authority relations there are objections of enlightenment cast, that reason is lacking for what an authority requires, proposes or asserts, as it was lacking in authoritarian religious and political practice against which the Enlightenment was primarily targeted. (A significant strand of anarchism, more theoretical anarchism, is a descendant: undisclosed reasons of State are not adequate reasons.) To more coercive authority relations there are objections from non-violence devotees. To there may be a kind of liberal opposition, that the party subject to authority is being denied, in one way or another, for unacceptable reasons, a certain freedom, namely ' autonomy. Naturally, movements have been directed at breaking down authoritarian power relations: masters over slaves, humans over animals, men over women, adults over children, etc. States over citizens. A comprehensive civil liberties movement would merge with anarchist movements. Plainly then, these three convergences are linked to three interconnected forms of opposition to authoritarianism: namely * convergence of anarchism with an Enlightenment opposition to opaque authority, which anarchism takes to include state authority. (A response will contend, as religious groups did against Enlightenment charges, that State authority is justified, e.g. it represents the people's will, or some similar fairy tale. But that is what is at issue.) * convergence of anarchism with moral pacifism in opposition to violence and coercion as unmitigated evils which should always be avoided. Of course only some forms of anarchism are 8 involved. Some anarchists are not averse at all to the exercise of heavy power relations, for instance of violence or terror against others (no matter how this violates their free personal space). But observe that such uses of power are not supported by recognised authority but normally directed agnm-sf such authority; so they might be dubbed relations. * convergence of anarchism with forms of liberalism, deriving from solid commitment of normal forms of anarchism, particularly individual varieties to personal liberty. Libertarian ideals have served as a major motivation in historical anarchism. There is a vision of a free society, a 'vision of a society in which social fetters are replaced by social bonds and labour is freely undertaken'.6 ( There are of course other convergences as well, some of them much discussed, such as with marxism. When opposition to authority is broadened to opposition to domination, no doubt there are further convergences, with feminism, with deep environmentalism. A recent convergence, of initial promise, is with ecofeminism, which ought to highly sympathetic to environmentally sensitive anarchism. For both are opposed to domination in all its forms, to downward control lines and power hierarchies. There is an important argument against the state based on its authoritarian character. This argument, to be found is Proudhon and in embryonic form in Rousseau, is developed and given a Kantian tum in Wolff? What Proudhon portrayed as a conflict between the authority of the state and freedom, Wolff represents as 'the conflict between authority and autonomy' (p.18). In this conflict, where the state represents authority, autonomy takes precedence; anarchism is consistent with the supreme virtue of authonomy, but archist doctrines supporting the state are not, because of authoritarian character of the state. Because Wolffs argument has been subject to much criticism which an improved formulation would shed, because too Wolffs formulation leaves something to be desired (it is not sufficiently sharp or tight), the argument will be revamped. A crucial difference is this: whereas Wolff asserts that 'all authority is equally illegitimate', a judgement already rejected, it is now said that all authority is illegitimate, meaning thereby wtoraZ/y illegitimate, not 'having a binding moral force ? 6 7 8 Chomsky, in Guerin p.xii, As to Proudhon see Ritter p.13, pp. 15-16. According to Rousseau such undesirable restrictive features need not pertain for all forms of government; naturally they do not obtain for his favoured arrangements. Wolff tries to repeat this sort of point, less than successfully for unanimous direct democracy. Of course a state may proclaim, even legislate, that its authority is legitimate, and even have other states do the same. But that will not achieve moral, a de jt/re, legitimacy. It is similar when the state endeavours to enforce its authority; /noraf legitimacy is not thereby obtained. Nonetheless these sorts of features go far towards explaining why people acknowledge, rarely questioning, closed authorities like the state. There are other elements which enter into explaining this popular sheepishness, such as: The force of tradition, that is the way things have always been done, the 9 Nor is all closed authority equally objectionable. The unquestionable directives of a benevolent dictator (one whose authoritarian directives and regulations prove inductively to be well directed) can be seen as less objectionable than those of a malevolent dictator. Similarly for a dictatorial group, a junta, or a majority. That the dictator said so, or that the majority said so, does not offer a reason rendering the state less than a closed authority. A core theme, to be embroided and defended, is W1. An autonomous person does not recognise a closed authority as legitimate. But W2. The state is a closed authority, of a certain of course. Hence WC1. An autonomous person does not recognise the state as legitimate. The core theme depends crucially on the notion of aMfonowy, on characterising features of the autonomous person. But before that task is addressed, observe that autonomy can be eliminated. First, the rafiona/ person, or a little less satisfactorily, the person, can carry the argument instead, using for instance W3. A rational person is autonomous. So results Wl' with 'rational' displacing 'autonomous', W1'. A rational person does not recognise a closed authority as legitimate. That premiss at once suggests a direct argument devoid of the circuit through persons (or through agents). For what a rational, still more an enlightened, person does not recognise as legitimate presumably is not, and certainly vice versa. In any case, U1. A closed authority is not legitimate. Hence, by W2, UC1. The state is not legitimate. Since this conclusion is equivalent to UC2. The concept of a legitimate state is null, the result sharpens the tentative conclusion Wolff reaches: 'Hence, the concept of a jure legitimate state would appear to be vacuous', to which he adds, thereby presuming other links already made explicit, 'and philosophical anarchism would seem to be the only reasonable political belief for an enlightened man' (p.19). As observed, not too much hangs upon the notion of moral legitimacy deployed, thus far following Wolffs lead, throughout. Simple variations replace 'morally legitimate' or 'legitimate' by 'morally warranted', 'morally justified', 'justifiable', 'rightful' (the last, though a trifle old-fashioned, captures what is intended well). force of character of leaders; their occupation of official positions, which have heavy bureaucratic backing. 10 These arguments permit of much other interesting variation. Wolff s original argument, for instance, precedes from authority as The defining mark of the state', with authority defectively explicated as 'the right to rule' (p.18). Evidently then the middle term, authority, can drop out, and the argument can be formulated along the following lines: VI. The state has the right to rule (without question, its citizens, more or less as it pleases). V2. An autonomous person rejects any (sweeping) right to rule. Therefore VC1. An automonous person rejects the state. Further variations may be obtained by amending the middle term, "right to rule without question" (which effectively replaced "exercise of close authority") to reflect other features of the state, for instance that it can simply tell its citizens what to do, that is has a right to coerce its citizens, rights to institute state monopolies, and so on. Under some variations "autonomous person" should be correspondingly replaced. For instance, if VI is specialized from a right to command and control to the right to send citizens to war, then V2 may be adjusted to apply to the person of conscience, of peace, or similar. As Wolff seeks a grander conclusion than VC1, which might be merely taken to reveal that there are but few autonomous actors about, he invokes a further premiss V3. Autonomy is a (even the) primary obligation. From there, it is an analytic shuffle to the more impressive conclusion VC2. The state ought to be rejected. The arguments are as vulnerable as their premisses. What gets especially contested in the first argument is Wl, concerning the autonomous person. For all the surface reasonableness and even open-door aspects of a more liberal state, W2 holds; it swings into effect as soon as the going gets tough. As Dahl puts it, To obey the authority of the state ... means doing what the you do it'? While there may be a little scope for light and reson as regards more flexible minor officials, that scope is officials of the state tell you to do simply and soley ( t/z^y small; the wall of closed authority can be quickly encountered, particularly with judges and law enforcement officers. If W2 did not hold the state would risk sliding into a voluntary organisation, out of which citizens could opt. In the end citizens are expected to act in a variety of ways (fill in form, take out licences, pay taxes, etc.) because the state tells them to, just because, or else face punitive action. The argument to Wl depends heavily on the meaning of gMfono/ny. Here is one way it can be presented (following Dahl): An autonomous person is self determining. Such a person is not under the direction or choices of another item. While the person may do what another tells him 9 See p.92..Dahl's reconstruction of Wolff effectively applies W2, using Wolffs definition of HMf%<?r#y, to obtain VI. This produces a more complex, and defective, argument. G 11 or her, she does not she has been told to do it. Thus the autonomous person does not conform to closed authorities, and does not acknowledge them or assign them recognition (more than recognition that is). While autonomy is one thing, responsibility is quite another; still a critical reason for arriving at autonomy intricates responsibility. ... so long as we recognise our responsibility for our actions, and acknowledge the power to reason within us, we must acknowledge as well the continuing obligation to make ourselves authors of such commands as we may obey (Wolff p.17), i.e. to make ourselves autonomous. A primary moral demand, central to the moral condition, is, according to Kant and Wolff, to 'acknowledge responsibility and achieve autonomy whenever and whenever possible" (p.17). Assuming responsibility in a life is by means the only reason for striving for autonomy: achieving a certain personal freedom (within natural bounds) and operating a life rationally are other crifica/ reasons. A main argument to V3 indicated by Wolff does proceed from responsibility. It is simply that in order to take full responsibility (for one's actions, choices, etc.), which one should, one has to be autonomous. So one should be autonomous. At least as important philosophically as the argument from W1 and W2 is that from Wl' and W2. While the argument to Wl' may proceed through autonomy it may short-circuit it. The philosophical argument for Wl' is well-known, having been repeatedly emphasized from Socrates through to Russell: that a rational person does not accept anything for which there are not independent investigatible reasons and evidence. The pronouncements of a closed authority do not fall into this class. By revamping the arguments especially that from autonomy as directed against authority, many objections to Wolffs arguments are fairly autonomically voided. Firstly (contrary to Dahl p.47), the arguments are not (any longer, if they ever were) arguments against 'authority of any kind". Not merely was Wolff concerned with the authority of the state; further as Dahl points out next page, the type of authority concerned is that of 'doing what someone tells you to do fo ^Zo if, that is a closed form. A rational person can of course acknowledge an open authority who can offer reason and evidence for prono^cements. For similar reasons, experts, guides and guardians, of open character, are not excluded. Accordingly the arguments does not cut "too broad a swath""; while it properly cuts out closed authorities like absolute rulers, states and similar, it does not mow down open authorities. In like fashion, much of Miller's parallell criticism of philosophical anarchism is voided. Things go astray (in Miller's chapter 2) from the very outset, from the slack formulation of "the principle of authority"", which is chauvinistically formulated, 'no man can ever rightfully exercise political authority over another, that is have a right to issue directions which the other has an obligation to obey' (p.15), and which is then intended to apply to the relation of a state 12 and its officials to its citizens. The formulation has both to be expanded to include persons and organisations as subjects of the relation, and sharply contracted to delimit the kinds of authority and rights concerned. For the explanatory (that is) clause offered reaches far beyond (closed) political authority; it would wrongly rule out contractual relations such as those of freely arranged employment, parental relations, and so on. The counterexamples Miller designs to Wolffs arguments also depend upon shifting ground from closed authority like the state to more open arrangements, such as contracts an autonomous person may have entered into freely. Plainly there will be a limited range of such contracts that a rational person will enter into; long-term future bondage or slavery will not be among them, and Miller's examples may border on the rationality dubious. In any case, in one, an agent morally concerned to relieve poverty enters into authoritarian arrangements, imagined unavoidable for successful action, in which it becomes obligatory for the agent to act under authoritative instruction (p.28). Firstly, the authorities are not closed, they have to be pursuing means directed to poverty relief, else an autonomous agent will not enter into such ". * arrangements Secondly, while contractual obligations, and therewith certain directives of open authoritarian cast, may constitute reasons for action, the situation with the state is very different. There is no contract, and no reasons of contract (also lacking are spotless reasons justifying entering into such a contract). Examples like Miller's arrangements and contracts can be inflated into stock flawed arguments, from consent to the state. Unremarably, Dahl attempts to patch up again these well- worn arguments, but in two mutually inconsistent ways. Second, he proposes that To opt for a democratic state' is The most responsible way of exercising our moral autonomy', and reasonable and rational as ways of maximizing our autonomy (p.49). Insofar as there are any arguments for such wishful conclusions, they depend upon familiar fantasy-world assumptions about the blackness of nonstate arrangements presumed to impact utterly unfavourably on autonomy and the contrasting whiteness of democratic states. That those states are at best a pretty dirty gray, Dahl's first more honest considerations suggest. There he asks, What is so great about autonomy? 'Why not sacrifice some moral autonomy?' As 'unlimited autonomy is impossible', why not settle for autonomy within reasonable state limits? (cf p.48). Compare: why not sacrifice some resistance to homocide and settle for reasonable killing of humans for reasons of state? The moral importance of autonomy Wolff has already explained nicely (pp 14- 17). Autonomy is a primary oM/ganon of rational persons, a constraint, not what Dahl converts it utilitarian-fashion into, a supreme value, to be questioned then traded off against other values. Because of its importance for rational practice the obligation should not be weakened; nor is there good reason to do so. There appear no grounds for forfeiting autonomy to closed 10 Compare Wolffs discussion (on p.15) of relations with one's doctor. 13 authorities, such as the state. It is doubtful that there are even grounds for what Wolff allows, forfeiture of some autonomy to one s doctor, hopefully no longer a closed authority, rather than retaining autonomy and freely following the doctor's advice. Autonomy is not like freedom in limitations; it can in principle always be exercised by a rational person. Submission to the state is a gross forfeiture of that autonomy. While an autonomous agent may place itself under guidance of leadership of another for limited purposes, and may indeed enter into certain sorts of contracts, it will not surrender its whole future life or extensive parts of it to a directorate that may well proceed in suboptimal, subliminal or even irrational ways. Yet that latter is what expected acceptance of the state implies. Accordingly an autonomous person cannot recognise the state; nor can a fully rational one, as it is irrational to place oneself indefinitely under a closed authority. It may be objected that it is unfair to treat Dahl, Miller and others in the preceding fashion, which changes the dialectical playing field. They were attacking Wolff and his over-extended arguments, not a refinement of Wolff which singles out the philosophical nasty elements in authority, and accordingly destroys their counter-examples which operated at the rational open end of authority relations. But that was not all that they were doing. They were using Wolff as a vehicle to draw quite conclusions about the unviability of principled anarchism (e.g. Dahl p.50, Miller p.29), and accordingly should have taken account of simple revampings of arguments like those of Wolff. Nor is this the only respect in which their practice is methodologically unsound. A principle—like that of closed authority, that such authority is legitimate—does not stand because someone's attack (e.g. Wolff s) against it is unsuccessful. Yet this is Miller's methodological procedure against philosophical anarchism (p.26, p.29). This is Popperian falsificationism gone rampant and badly astray. For Popper at least required sustained and strenuous testing and adequate variation; not a few select and easy examples. But of course a Popperian approach by archists is unsatisfactory; the onus of argument is the other way around. An archist has to establish that political authority, such as that the claims and exercises, is rightful. That Wolff intended to work with something like closed authority should have emerged both from Wolffs emphasis on the place of 'grounds and sources' in legitimate authority (p.9), and his flirtation with unanimous direct democracy. What Wolff is exercised about is not compliance with a authority or obedience where there are good or independent reasons for it, but blind, or closed obedience: doing what you are told because you are told to do it (p.9). (Yours not to reason why, yours but to do ....) While these points exonerate Wolff from some overzealous criticisms, they immerse him in others, namely his attempt to combine authority with autonomy under unanimous direct democracy. A major problem is that this combination, 14 so far as it is workable^, appeals not to the closed authority of the state, but to open autonomous arrangements which do not conform to requirements of the state (as Dahl remarks on p.48, the "authority" here is not the "authority" of his earlier definition'; and as Miller observes on p.27, *it is ... arguable whether this state of affairs [under unaminous direct democracy] involves the recognition of Autonomy and freedom tell not merely against the exercise of opaque authority, but against use of coercion. This connection affords the basis for a parallel argument to that against closed authority, to the desirability of a sharp decline in deployment of coercive methods. But parallels between coercion and closed authority do not proceed very far. * Coercion, an impermissible activity. Coercion is very different from exercise of authority. All four places, 1 to 4, in a cross­ classificatory matrix are regularly occu Died: actions coercive authoritative 1 non-authoritive 2 non 4 coercive 3 Place 1 is well occupied given the State, and is widely exemplified in not only state-citizen relations, but also in authorized domination relations. Place 2 is illustrated in a range of operations which the state often tries to repress such as banditry, piracy, protection rackets, but also in a variety of interpersonal relations. Place 4, that clear indicator of unqualified anarchism, is well exemplified through voluntary cooperation and mutual aid. Place 3, characteristic of many work-place and educational situations, can be easily illustrated through advanced ( education. Coercion, unlike authority, is action. That is why comparisons are with .... of authority; authority may sit, like power, unused, but coercion cannot. Like all action it is a process, a state to state transition, but actively changing or maintaining state. It is a transitive action relation having both a doer, a coercer, and done-tos, coerced, all normally creatures. The transitions include a wide range of more determinate actions such as constraining, restraining, securing, moving, pushing, pulling and so on; and thus coercion (the abstract) includes forcible constraint and compulsion. An essential feature of coercion is that state transitions are effected A/<Z or attempted by coercers through force or genuine threats of force. No such force, no coercion. NY- Defective definitions of coercion are liable particularly to neglect this feature. Thus e.g. Fridman 11 Wolff himself concludes it is not except under highly improbable conditions. Indeed the conditions are more onerous those Wolff allows: required are humans who having consented do not change their minds, etc. _________ /e /6 L < s _ _ z^<^4^-f ___' / ^ry^- /i, <^___ . 15 p.xviii, according to whom being coerced is 'not being left alone'. Perhaps in one special sense, but a person who chooses to have a constant companion is not being thereby coerced. Pressuring someone to do something without attempts or threats to apply force is not coercion. Similarly persuasion is not coercion; censuring, withholding support, applying peaceable sanctions, are so on, are not. All this proves important in meeting objections to anarchist methods. Coercion is not a success notion; a coercer may well not succeed in obtaining what was sought through coercion. This will prove important in explaining why appeal to the state does not automatically resolve political dilemmas. To coerce is maintain or change states, normally of another creature, by implied force (i.e. force or accepted threat thereof). The state transition or statis includes the full range of relevant actions such as constraining, restraining, securing, moving, pushing, pulling aa so on, and thus coercion (the abstract) includes forcible constraint and compulsion. Coercion, by contrast with * exercise of authority, entails potential use of force, force furthermore which will characteristically tum into violence if resistance is attempted. Therein lies a main reason why coercion is so objectionable; its intrication with force and immediate potential for violence. For violence is generally undesirable.^. It follows therefrom that coercive arrangements are generally undesirable and, devolving therefrom, If social organisation can be achieved without them, usually so much the better, certainly the more ethical. A main onus to show that coercive arrangements, such as the state characteristically incorporates, are inevitable, unavoidable or the like, thereupon falls upon archists. 'Since coercive power is self-defeating' and worse, a general theory of 'non-coercive authority' is presented as a 'pressing problem of this stage of history'.13 Unfortunately, the general theory has obtained but little development. But functionalism, in such forms as demarchy (to be transformed below), has gained some elaboration, by some in the peace movement. 14 Worse, Merrifield arrives at the "pressing problem" on the strength of the need for Rt/M? of solution to the authority problem': thesources, methods, and ends of authority (p.724). This "problem" is presumed by way of the following large (anarchist) assumptions: Authority is a requisite of all social life, since in its absence it is both psychologically and physically impossible to coordinate human behaviours so that the ordinary social processes can continue to operate and flourish (p.729). The main claim is an important part of what is at issue between anarchists and archists and is at best highly dubious. Moreover the reason offered in its support is false and should be rejected (a range of counter models and counter examples have been indicated or will be). Furthermore, Merrifield goes on (on the next page) to adduce information on organisations of a sort which 12 13 14 Sec wp in. Merrifield p.724 alluding to the wording Notably B. Martin A/Z&) -sy-Mezn of political functionalism. 16 serve to cast severe doubt upon his claim and its supporting reason. There are various nongovernmental organisation (NGOs), and some intergovernmental organisation (IGOs), which rely upon voluntary, permissive or non-coercive motivations ... to accomplish their functional purposes. ... They may explain, demonstrate, justify and argue, but they cannot usually coerce. The role of functional NGO's is even more pronounced. Lacking any coercive power, they must rely on the validity and demonstrability (p.725). Some of the organisation rely, or need rely, not at all on closed authority. Like the voluntary support and participation basis, so too the organisational structure is voluntarily maintained. There is no hard authority, and no conspicuous authority problem. Coercion, in this respect authority, is also open to objection on rational grounds. Namely, ways of controlling, governing, or getting rational creatures coercive methods are not to do things. Rationality—not the undesirability and demeanment of force not, or not just, freedom—is the ground of this objection. The analysis of coercion admits of immediate fruitful application to (internal) criticisms of anarchism. In the first place, it has been argued that anarchism does not avoid coercion but incorporates coercive elements—which would render it inconsistent (as normally characterised). Further, because of these coercive elements anarchism is incompatible with liberty, thereby multiplying inconsistency, as liberty constitutes one of its main goals. These alleged problems derive from the reliance of anarchism on public censure, and like methods, to control social behaviour. According to Ritter, for example, who makes much of the second problem^, anarchists have the following goals: an (admirable) commitment to liberty, and a heavy reliance on public censure. But these goals are incompatible. For such a 'social scheme relies so much on coercive public * censure (p.10, also p.l). However, the argument to incompatibility is invalid; it makes an illicit insertion of 'coercive * * 'coercive (as the quote above illustrates; in fact the prejudicial slipping in of and 'coercion * occurs right through Ritter's discussions; see e.g. p.25 top and bottom). The social scheme as described involves only public censure in a free setting; such censure does not imply coercion, as no use of force need be involved or even contemplated. Secondly, connectedly, there is a widely exploited false dichotomy between voluntary and coerced activity, under which it supposed that all activity which is not purely voluntary is coerced. To the contrary, the range of actions is more satisfactorily diagrammed as follows: Voluntary vs coerced activity In a first chapter short-tided 'Liberty and pubiic censure', particularly on a muddled p.2. ,u„ ZL.. 17 hard pressured ! soft pressured ) ! (entirely) free ) influenced encouraged (fully) coerced <Actions -* In most standard arguments for the state only the outer bounds are considered.^ But noncoercive methods can include a wide range of influenced or pressured actions, which are less than entirely free. The interesting argument that Dahl draws from anarchism, directed against the state, turns upon on the undesirability, indeed the intrinsic badness, of coercion. In essence (leaving out support offered for the premiss as) the argument is as follows: Pl. M? one Zs obZZg#R?6? to -report or o&ey a sfafe. P2. A// sfafes ore coercive. P3. Coercion Zs intrin-nca/Zy bnJ. P4. A society wit/iont a state is a yeasi&Ze aitemative to a society with a state. This conclusion derives fiom these premisses ('assumptions' as he calls them) Dahl draws Ave conclusions' (p.41). As these are not the most direct or pointed conclusions, let us sharpen the conclusions: Cl. AZZ states are necessariiy &aJ. ^rom P2 and P3 (equivalently recast as: all coercive items are intrinsically bad items), given that intrinsicaZZy so implies necessariZy so. Dahl prefixes Cl by the conjunct, 'because all states are necessarily coercive'. Not only does Cl not require that support; we do not have it (e.g. in P2). While coercion may be taken as defining of the state, or an essential characteristic of it, as Dahl does, however states are defined it is continently true that all of them are coercive. C2 No one has an o&ZZgahon fo, Zs o&ZZgafed to, to support or obey any state. From Pl and Cl. Again Dahl unnecessarily prefixes his analogue of C2 (as for Cl above). Insofar as political obligation is obligation to the state, C2'. 77iere Zs no poZZtZcaZ obZZgatZon; political obligation lapses. Conclusions Cl and C2 specialize, because democratic states are states, to democratic states (that is effectively Dahl's fourth conclusion, p42). Dahl, like Wolff, senses a democratic escape through unaminity procedures, and reaches towards a fifth conclusion, which we will subvert. P5. Unanimity decision practices (can) escape coercion. 16 See for instance Taylor's presentation of game-theoretic arguments. 2^ 18 P6. Democracy can operate through unanimity procedures. These procedures and democracy are presumed to apply to some society, community or association. C51. prac/zc&y (can) escape -yfafcF. C52. Democracy can operate wif/zoaf any .sfafe. This last conclusion is interesting because Dahl regularly assumes, as against anarchism, that democracy must operate through the state, and that democracy is therefore in compatible with anarchism. As conclusion C52 reveals, these assumptions are astray, on grounds Dahl himself supplies (the inadequacy of these assumptions will be independently investigated subsequently). It is worth noting that, irrespective of the merit of premisses P5 and P6 (e.g. because unanimity wears off, because of the rareness of unanimity), the conclusions do not follow without other lesser presumptions. For C52 the transitivity of opcrafc wifAoMf (doubtfully a universal linkage) is presumed, and perhaps some modal shuffles as well. For derivation of C51 from P5 what is presumed is that what escapes coercion escapes the state, which requires a strengthened P2 (already encountered), that states necessitate coercion (as well as a little of the logic of escapism). Dahl's third conclusion, after detachment of (three) because-clauses, is C3D. A// PMg/tf a? A minimal inference scheme enabling derivation of C3D from previously derived statements is this: P3D. where an item is necessarily bad and there is a feasible (less bad) alternative to that item, the bad item ought to be abolished. Then C3D follow from (strengthened) P3D. These are important arguments, both for principled anarchists and for archists, and Dahl rightly invests detailed study to certain of the premisses, those he imagines he can dispose of, most notably P2 concerning the coerciveness of states. It is not that other premisses and steps are not highly controversial; they are. The very first, Pl, yields at least the stock debate as to whether one is obliged to support or obey a bad law; for a state can be viewed as a structure of laws. Instead of an argument for Pl, Dahl offers a thumbnail history of its status, a genetic '^justification". Other justifications there are, rendered easier if P2 is strengthened (as it may be without upsetting the arguments dependent upon it) by replacing 'bad' by 'evil' or 'immoral'. Then initial support for strengthened Pl is that political obligation, likewise legal obligation, is a type of obligation, justified by considerations of obligation generally, and accordinging triumphed by ethical obligation. The detailed arguments for these themes gets down to fundamentals, to the justification of obligations through values. Briefly, obligations obtain only towards items which normally exhibit a sufficient level of positive value. An item like an evil state that condition. So no obligation obtains towards such a state. 19 To escape such an outcome, archists contend that certain states are not evil, for instance Dahl will claim that 'a democratic state is not an evil state" (p.40). Anarchists will by contrast assemble a great deal of evidence that democratic states, like others, are evil (see next chapter). The immediate issue is, however, whether states are evil in principle, by virtue of their coercive features. Now Dahl does not contest 'so elementary a proposition" as P2, the universal coerciveness of states. 'Like any state, a democratic state would use coercion to enforce democratically enacted laws ..." Accordingly, to make his escape, Dahl is bound to dispute P3, and does; coercion is instrumentally justified as a means 'essential to a good purpose , a democratic state (p.40). * As to supposed (second-rate) justifiability of coercion. A conionplace claim, which Dahl advances, is DI. Even though coercion is intrinsically bad, its use is sometimes (reasonably) justified (p.44). Which times?, on which occasions? will turn out to be a critical issue. As against Dahl, it will be contended that its use is never woraZZy justified. However in moral dilemma situations, where all other feasible alternatives have been exhausted, its use can be given a "secondary"" secondrate justification. Such a secondary justification, in very limited circumstances, gives no succour to the state, which depends upon and makes widespread use of much more coercion. That is, DI itself does not justify the sfaR?'.? use of coercion. The first argument Dahl offers is overtly dilemmatic. There is a 'recalcitrant wrongdoer , ( who simply will not refrain from doing serious harm to others. Despite the best efforts of his associates, neither reason, argument, persuasion, public opinion, nor the final sanction of social octricism dissuades him from doing harm. His associates finally conclude that he will persist in harming others unless he is forcibly restrained or threatened with severe harm (that is, coerced) (p.44). Why should that stop him, threats in particular (it does not deter young alienated men in contemporary states)? With ali due respect^the gentle best efforts cited by no means exhaust nocoercive methods available. But let us grant not merely that there are situations where coercion occurs (plainly it is presently a frequent occurrence), but that there are dilemmatic situations where a person may have no alternative in preventing violence but to resort to coercion, for instance in preventing or limiting assault upon another, in self-defence, and so on. In such circumstances, 'coercion would be employed—either by the wrongdoers or by those who restrained them" (p.44). Granted, it is employed. The issues however are whether it is morally permissible, and who may be justified. Certainly the wrongdoers are not justified, and what they do is impermissible. More controversially, what the restrainers do is also morally impermissible; even so their actions may be justified. Given the fixes they were in, where all alternatives were forbidden, still what 20 they did may be situationally justified, as a satisfactory actions in the dilemmatic circumstances.*7 Such situational justification is not what Dahl and other consequentialists are seeking; they want coercion justified without impermissibility strings attached. There is no reason, or need, to accede to their desires. Such a reasonable, and practiced, approach to moral dilemmas (which Dahl himself subsequently takes in his discussion of whether to always obey laws of a democratic state p.4950) here escapes notice. And Dahl introduces two difficulties he incorrectly presumes fatal to 'alternative position ... [that] violence and coercion are absolutely forbidden" (p.45). Firstly, given that coercion is employed, 'the position in self-contradictory". Wrong. For that coercion occurs, whether perpetrated by wrongdoers or by those trying to prevent wrongdoers, does no? imply that coercion is morally permissible (i.e. p -f Pp). Nor does the impermissibility of incompatibles imply self-contradiction, for the covering deontic functors cannot be deleted (i.e. -Pp & -P-p is no contradiction; of course given, what gets rejected, -Pq -* -q, contradiction would ensure). Also wrong, then, is what Dahl takes to emerge from such self-contradiction, no 'guidance for the most elementary choices", said to be an 'indefensible" position (p.95). For coupled with the story concerning moral dilemmas are suggested procedures for making choices (often far from elementary choices) from within the dilemmas. Secondly, Dahl wrongly supposes that so rendering coercion absolute makes it 'a supreme value that eliminates all other ends" including justice, freedom, etc. It does not. No hierarchy of principles (or values), this or another, is adopted, which is one reason why dilemmas occur. As in ordinary ethical practice, ^he principles stand, they are not simply prima they are not ranked, there are no 'trade-offs". It may have become apparent, what requires only a little between-lines interpretation, that Dahl is playing a rather familiar utilitarian game underneath the surface moral concern. Render 'the objection to coercion as a means ... not absolute but contingent on consequences". So weaken absolutist prohibitions on coercion and violence that generous room can be made for an institution which routinely practices them, and to which we can trade up with consequential advantage. Given that coercion occurs without the state, indeed may be quite widespread in the absence of the state, then there might be gains in installing a coercive imitation 'to restrict [!] and regulate coercion". Moreover, if 'on balance the gains from creating a state are likely to exceed the costs, then from a utilitarian perspective it would be reasonable to opt for a state" (p.45). There are two critical gaps in this utilitarian state-pleading. Firstly, impressive evidence for the conditional antecedent that the gains from the state exceed the costs has never been assembled, but rather evidence points in the opposite direction (as we shall see in the next 17 This controversial story has been told before, that for coercion resembles that already related for violence. The general theory of moral dilemmas (in MD) is applied to the issue of violence, control of pacifism (in WP TV). 21 chapter), so detachment from the antecedent is not warranted. Secondly, the performance even of better states in coercion is utterly unimpressive; these states foo amplify coercive practices, do not regulate basic cases, and so on. The state appears to exacerbate the levels, both in extent and intensity, of coercion, over the low levels genuine moral dilemmas would yield. It is unnecessary to contend, however, as Dahl asserts anarchists contend, "that if states did not exist coercion would soon disappear or decline to a tolerable level' (p.45). That judgement, which is not exactly an 'empirical' one, depends very much on the character of alternative societies. An individualistic society might enjoy high levels of coercion owing to the activities of its public-like protective agencies. By contrast, a well-organised society may be afflicted with comparatively little coercive behaviour, rendering Dahl's uncompleted utilitarian argument extremely difficult to complete, ever. Interlarded with the dulcet utilitarian approach, under which they beneficent, ^states will provide us with all those promised superior values many millions are still awaiting — freedom, justice, equality, and so on — lies a more sinister argument; that to the gangster state. That evil state is not so far removed, some may think, from many states that are presently recognised. Without the strong state, the gangster state looms, so Dahl insinuates. So adopt the state, or worse will eventuate. That sort of decision theory argument (itself unpleasantly coercive and out of the same big stable as utilitarianism) depends on some (derived) principle such as choose a least bad alternative, and accordingly fails unless another independent argument to the state succeeds. For otherwise superior stateless choices remain on offer. Yet nothing more than the po&H&iZi/y that a small gang of wrongdoers may pool resources, andwhat results may evolve into a "gangster state" is floated (similarly for claim 2, p47, that some group wng/tf manage to create a highly oppressive state, which is as true in many a state as in stateless conditions). There is a complex evolutionary path, with many obstacles and hitches, from a small gang, through growing rival gangs and protection rackets, to a single one, and thence to a state. It is moreover a path that is rather easily blocked at early stages in an organised society, as simple counter examples show (one such example, that of the Inuit, Dahl introduces on the very next page). Apart from the inconclusive utilitarian considerations, Dahl offers a further page, under the boldface heading 'On the Need for the State' (a strikingly minimal effort in a book of about 400 pages most of which are premised on the assumption that the state is a needed item). He concedes, what seems to put a large dent in his bold claim, that preliterate societies, like those of the Inuit, have subsisted, over long periods, without the state. But that is past history, the world has advanced, the state is here, there, and everywhere. Granted it is; that does not show it is needed. Many gadgets that are now produced are not needed. Consider Dahl s reasons why a return to societies without states is 'if not impossible, highly undesirable (p.46). First, the world is already too densely populated to provide much space for autonomy (p.46, less than a 22 page after the utilitarian promise of a satisfactory state maximizing 'freedom and justice'; similarly p.51 etc.) But there are many regions where autonomy could undoubtedly be increased by expansionary or imperial states backing off (not merely in East Timor, on the West Bank, etc., but in the lands of the Inuit, the Micronesians, etc.). Further, the denseness of human population, hardly affords a reason. For one thing, the excessive human population is highly concentrated; most parts of the Earth carry, by comparison, sparse populations. For another, autonomy does not depend, so directly, on available space. 'Thirdly, virtually the entire globe is now already occupied by states'. Similar points apply: for instance, such an accomplished fact does not establish a need, or the impossibility of change. While not true 'throughout recorded history', but a very modem phenomenon, it is no doubt recently confingenfZy true that 'small autonomous groups of people have been extraordinarily vulnerable to conquest and absorption by larger states', and that it is presently doubtful that 'states would permit any small, independent group to exist anywhere [much] on earth'. Such present yizcfo political power relations do not demonstrate a need, still less impossibility of alternative, still less undesirability of changes. Consciousness change could come very rapidly, furthermore, with a welcome change in popular attitudes in large democratic states to oppression of minorities elsewhere (in Europe this seems to be happening). These points also serve to destroy Dahl's second reason, that 'a multiplicity of interdependencies cannot be snapped apart without enormous costs that few people would accept.' The break-up of states in Eastern Europe shows that substantial changes can occur very rapidly; the costs involved were much higher than they should have been because of the attitudes of states, not attitudes of their peoples by and large. In sum, then, all Dahl has accumulated is evidence of the repressive grip of the present regime of states, rendering local change pragmatically very difficult. Such evidence does nothing to establish a need for states, nothing at all to establish the undesirability of stateless societies. Accordingly the main assumptions fail with which Dahl claims support his 'conclusion that if woM/J &^ff^r fo fry fo cr^afg a mfz^/acfory jfafe f/ian f/y io ^xAff in a .soci^fy wif%OMf o sfaf^' (p.47). As it happens, the failed assumptions also fail to support such a conclusion—without suppressed material, of the utilitarian cast already criticised. All the assumptions would indicate, werf they granted, is the practical undesirability of trying to set up small stateless associations in a regime of states like mot prevailing today exc^pf that the states are satisfactory. But the assumptions should be scuttled. * Aggfnsf Jowfnaffon Domination is an important type of power relation. It is a comprehensive relation: persistent over a period, not simply once-off or occasional, pervasive, extending over a range of action and behaviour. It offers confro/ in a spread of cases. In such cases, if the dominator exercises control (e.g. adjusts the appropriate controls, pulls requisite levers) then the dominated normally responds. A significant form of control within extended human affairs is that of A 23 command or ability to command. Of course the creature commanded, the servant, the domesticated animal, the subdued or subjugated person, has to be able to understand what is commanded. But domination operates in significant spheres where such conditions for commanding do not obtain: in particular, but not only, in the domination of nature, its parts and elements, such as animals that do not understand commands, biota that do not recognise manipulation, and so on. Domination originated with (what the etymology of the term reflects) lord-subjects and master-servant relations, which remain paradigmatic for this power relation. It was soon and easily extended to cover owner-slave relations, where control was much more extensive, God­ human relations, human-working animal relations, and so on. It has long covered parent­ children and husband-wife relations, as well as certain class relations; and as classes have changed with political restructuring, industralisation and the rise of cities, so have domination relations. Those of higher classes or castes tend to dominate those of lower ranking, similarly for those higher in new hierarchies. Domination of nature and its parts is a relatively recent addition to the varieties of domination, since the acclaimed success of "the war against Nature" (still going on last century) before which technological humans (lacked the considerable level of power they have now acquired over natural systems.^ An aim of softening or removing forms of domination links social and environmental objectiv&with anarchism. These aims are united in green social anarchism. Opposition to all forms of domination, is yet another extension of certain types of anarchism, perhaps incompatible with other types of anarchism (e.g. communal anarchisms which assume that affairs should be organised along strict patriarchal lines, which accordingly not altogether coherently oppose social archy only to retain or even reinforce a tribal or familial archy). There may by now be some confusion concerning the variety of extensions of anarchism encountered. More exactly these "extensions" are subextensions, which isolate the principle of some type or ( key feature of anarchism and generalize it. generalisation of principled subtype with distinguishing principle. 18 Intellectual vandals have been at work on dondnahon also, stretching it from a relation from ensembles of actors, the dominators, to whole structures, systems or institutions (what might be called by partial analogy with the vandalism worked on .sTrHctund domination). Stretched dominators include the capitalist economy, market forces, the economy, the state, and so on. Under the stretching, /to (structural) dondnadon is said to imply, what straightforwardly is right enough, no subordination of the people to market forces, or even, what is impossible to avoid in a sophisticated society, no influences on members through the operation of its economy. A  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Box 17, Item 1005: Draft chapters of Towards green anakism: eucratic political investigations Subject The topic of the resource Typescript draft, with handwritten emendations and annotations, and handwritten notes. Description An account of the resource For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/browse?search=Richard+Sylvan&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bjoiner%5D=and&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=&amp;range=&amp;collection=&amp;type=&amp;user=&amp;tags=&amp;public=&amp;featured=&amp;exhibit=&amp;geolocation-mapped=&amp;geolocation-address=&amp;geolocation-latitude=&amp;geolocation-longitude=&amp;geolocation-radius=10&amp;submit_search=Search+for+items">Richard Sylvan</a> Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived <span class="MuiTypography-root-125 MuiTypography-body2-126">The University of Queensland's <a data-testid="rek-series" href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/records/search?page=1&amp;pageSize=20&amp;sortBy=score&amp;sortDirection=Desc&amp;searchQueryParams%5Brek_series%5D%5Bvalue%5D=Richard+Sylvan+Papers%2C+UQFL291&amp;searchMode=advanced">Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291</a></span>, Box 17, Item 1005 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org">Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy</a> Contributor An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource <span>This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, </span><a href="https://najtaylor.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Dr. N.A.J. 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Type The nature or genre of the resource Manuscript Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context <a href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:818a421">https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:818a421</a> Coverage The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant Lake George - Floor - Pile 8 Box 17: Green Projects in Progress Lake George House Lake George House > Floor > Pile 8 https://www.antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/11628f2bcbc3662efac3cdfbd36f91f2.pdf 14d16e4188eb5909aab1b95fe48f8953 PDF Text Text ,x» REMARKS ON ‘COMMUNITARIAN ANARCHISM AND HUMAN NATURE’. This article makes a worthwhile historial contribution concerning communitarian anarchism, in helping to remove a familiar criticism. It needs considerable redrafting, in my opinion, before it is published. Necessary redrafting concerns both structure and several points of detail. In what follows some points are sketched and some suggestions made, in no particular order of importance. (It should not be simply assumed that what I have not commented upon, e.g. historical interpretation, I generally find more or less satisfactory.) • The naivety thesis is not satisfactorily specified. (It is said to be an inference, and then what is offered is a poorly structured argument, not strictly a thesis). In fact, most of the argument and discursion concerns thesis (i), better restated (cf. pl7) as the following target thesis (ti) Anarchists believe that egoism is a product of (contemporary) social organisation, not an inherent part of human nature. The main work is devo ted to trying to rebut such a thesis, at least as regards three classical anarchists. (The success of this main work is partially assessed below.) Part of the trouble with the “naivety thesis” arises because of apparent errors concerning the interrelations of propositions (i) and (ii) on the one side and propositions (iii) and (iv) on the other (as also as to (v) and its consequent). Showing (i) and (ii) are false does not show (iii) and (iv) and the back of (v) are all false (contrary to p.3 middle, and to p.20 end also). For the most part, as here, a believes that p is independent of p. (Note too that (iii) and (iv) look rather more plausible than what (ii) and (ti) cover.) As it happens, I suspect our author intended to cover all propositions, not just (iii) and (ti), by ‘anarchists believe that’. However such covering will not effect a repair. In sum, the naivety thesis should be better characterised, the associated argument should be clarified and rectified, and the interrelation of theses should be worked out properly. This affects the total structure of the article. • It may seem to be a minor matter that feature f is innate says something different from feature fis an inherent part of human nature, for features such as egoism, sociability, etc.. (E.g. the feature may be bom in, but fade out or be educated out, or it may not be “innate” but invariably develop.) However this comes to assume a larger role because of the emphasis put upon nativism (from p.4 on), nativism getting linked to innateness, when it is inherentness that matters. There is also an historical problem, that nativism is characterised in late 20th century terms, not in terms that automatically apply in a 19th century setting. A less metaphorical explication is required, which connects nativism with apparatus of the target thesis. • As regards elaborating and establishing the main thesis of the article, namely (ci) communitarian anarchism, as manifested in three major espositors, is not dependent upon a �2 naive account of human nature (that of (ti)), much in the article is strictly irrelevant. The article could be substantially cut in length and sharpened. Much space is devoted to trying to show that (li) ‘only in their later writings’ do ‘Proudhon and Bakunin adopt a clearly defined nativism’— ‘subsequent to their repudiation of Hegelian metaphysics’. This involves considerable perusal of their early writings, material that does not assist in supporting (ci). If historical exegesis directed towards (li) is to take up such a large part of the article, then the early part (e.g. p.l) should be reoriented to indicate what much of it is really about. Otherwise much of pp.5-9, for instance, can be chopped. Without such restructuring, but a. fraction of what appears on pp.5-19 is needed (a few critical points). A much sharper less circuitous defence of (ci) could be provided. And even with radical restructuring much diffuse material on “the intellectual voyages” of the expositors could be profitably deleted. • There is a serious difficulty as regards Proudhon; so much so that there is real doubt that he can be regarded as furnishing positive support for (ci). The problem is that, by the time Proudhon abandons ‘too ideal a conception of man’, he appears also prepared to abandon (or at least indirectly erode) communiitarian anarchism: for instance ‘it is unlikely... that all trace of government and authority will disappear—’ (both quotes from p.l 1). • The historical argument developed is not entirely decisive in shoring up communitarian anarchism (contrary to the impression given). For a critic could contend that the historical figures were either deluded about their continuing commitment to communitarian anarchism or else mistaken about the coherence and viability of their theory in this regard. In short, the historical examples are not genuine counter-examples to the naivety of such anarchism. Something should be added to offset this sort of objection. Richard Sylvan � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Draft Papers Description An account of the resource Sylvan's literary executor encountered an archive in which “all his projects were current", since manuscripts were undated and unattributed. Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document ,x» REMARKS ON ‘COMMUNITARIAN ANARCHISM AND HUMAN NATURE’. This article makes a worthwhile historial contribution concerning communitarian anarchism, in helping to remove a familiar criticism. It needs considerable redrafting, in my opinion, before it is published. Necessary redrafting concerns both structure and several points of detail. In what follows some points are sketched and some suggestions made, in no particular order of importance. (It should not be simply assumed that what I have not commented upon, e.g. historical interpretation, I generally find more or less satisfactory.) • The naivety thesis is not satisfactorily specified. (It is said to be an inference, and then what is offered is a poorly structured argument, not strictly a thesis). In fact, most of the argument and discursion concerns thesis (i), better restated (cf. pl7) as the following target thesis (ti) Anarchists believe that egoism is a product of (contemporary) social organisation, not an inherent part of human nature. The main work is devo ted to trying to rebut such a thesis, at least as regards three classical anarchists. (The success of this main work is partially assessed below.) Part of the trouble with the “naivety thesis” arises because of apparent errors concerning the interrelations of propositions (i) and (ii) on the one side and propositions (iii) and (iv) on the other (as also as to (v) and its consequent). Showing (i) and (ii) are false does not show (iii) and (iv) and the back of (v) are all false (contrary to p.3 middle, and to p.20 end also). For the most part, as here, a believes that p is independent of p. (Note too that (iii) and (iv) look rather more plausible than what (ii) and (ti) cover.) As it happens, I suspect our author intended to cover all propositions, not just (iii) and (ti), by ‘anarchists believe that’. However such covering will not effect a repair. In sum, the naivety thesis should be better characterised, the associated argument should be clarified and rectified, and the interrelation of theses should be worked out properly. This affects the total structure of the article. • It may seem to be a minor matter that feature f is innate says something different from feature fis an inherent part of human nature, for features such as egoism, sociability, etc.. (E.g. the feature may be bom in, but fade out or be educated out, or it may not be “innate” but invariably develop.) However this comes to assume a larger role because of the emphasis put upon nativism (from p.4 on), nativism getting linked to innateness, when it is inherentness that matters. There is also an historical problem, that nativism is characterised in late 20th century terms, not in terms that automatically apply in a 19th century setting. A less metaphorical explication is required, which connects nativism with apparatus of the target thesis. • As regards elaborating and establishing the main thesis of the article, namely (ci) communitarian anarchism, as manifested in three major espositors, is not dependent upon a 2 naive account of human nature (that of (ti)), much in the article is strictly irrelevant. The article could be substantially cut in length and sharpened. Much space is devoted to trying to show that (li) ‘only in their later writings’ do ‘Proudhon and Bakunin adopt a clearly defined nativism’— ‘subsequent to their repudiation of Hegelian metaphysics’. This involves considerable perusal of their early writings, material that does not assist in supporting (ci). If historical exegesis directed towards (li) is to take up such a large part of the article, then the early part (e.g. p.l) should be reoriented to indicate what much of it is really about. Otherwise much of pp.5-9, for instance, can be chopped. Without such restructuring, but a. fraction of what appears on pp.5-19 is needed (a few critical points). A much sharper less circuitous defence of (ci) could be provided. And even with radical restructuring much diffuse material on “the intellectual voyages” of the expositors could be profitably deleted. • There is a serious difficulty as regards Proudhon; so much so that there is real doubt that he can be regarded as furnishing positive support for (ci). The problem is that, by the time Proudhon abandons ‘too ideal a conception of man’, he appears also prepared to abandon (or at least indirectly erode) communiitarian anarchism: for instance ‘it is unlikely... that all trace of government and authority will disappear—’ (both quotes from p.l 1). • The historical argument developed is not entirely decisive in shoring up communitarian anarchism (contrary to the impression given). For a critic could contend that the historical figures were either deluded about their continuing commitment to communitarian anarchism or else mistaken about the coherence and viability of their theory in this regard. In short, the historical examples are not genuine counter-examples to the naivety of such anarchism. Something should be added to offset this sort of objection. Richard Sylvan  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Box 17, Item 984: Remarks on 'Communitarian anarchism and human nature' Subject The topic of the resource Typescript. Description An account of the resource Note, one item digitised from item 984. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/browse?search=Richard+Sylvan&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bjoiner%5D=and&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=&amp;range=&amp;collection=&amp;type=&amp;user=&amp;tags=&amp;public=&amp;featured=&amp;exhibit=&amp;geolocation-mapped=&amp;geolocation-address=&amp;geolocation-latitude=&amp;geolocation-longitude=&amp;geolocation-radius=10&amp;submit_search=Search+for+items">Richard Sylvan</a> Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived <span class="MuiTypography-root-125 MuiTypography-body2-126">The University of Queensland's <a data-testid="rek-series" href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/records/search?page=1&amp;pageSize=20&amp;sortBy=score&amp;sortDirection=Desc&amp;searchQueryParams%5Brek_series%5D%5Bvalue%5D=Richard+Sylvan+Papers%2C+UQFL291&amp;searchMode=advanced">Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291</a></span>, Box 17, Item 984 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org">Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy</a> Contributor An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource <span>This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, </span><a href="https://najtaylor.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Dr. N.A.J. Taylor</a><span>.</span> Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library. Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource [2] leaves. 1.53 MB. Type The nature or genre of the resource Manuscript Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context <a href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:fa8761a">https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:fa8761a</a> Coverage The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant Lake George - Floor - Pile 7 Box 17: Green Projects in Progress Lake George House Lake George House > Floor > Pile 7 https://www.antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/b1f4840cd64571bcf1bf92d1568e0c8d.pdf 1b39fb24b6986433a2d2ec7d4699c241 PDF Text Text ·*' . ~":'" mw 10.4.95 PROBLEMS IN DEEPER GREEN POLITICAL ORGANIZATION THEORY: an Australi an perspective on radical institutio nal change . .. . people are ready for change and the impending debate will result m constitutional change. We should, therefore, explore all options .... 1 As elsewhere, there is growing dissatisfaction with Australia's political institutions, and increasing demand to change them. This demand, hiding co-optative elements, has been initiated and fostered in a conspicuously top-down fashion, by politicians and by academics. There is so far little surge of political enterprise at grass-roots levels, little pressure for the usually very limited changes proposed. Nonetheless, along with apathy, there is widespread popular disenchant ment with present political arrangements. There is now an opportunity (although still only a small window therefore no doubt) to put green and radical themes on the agenda for real political change in Australia. That opportunity should not be missed, within Australia, or elsewhere. While the exposition that follows concentrates upon Australia, as a convenient advanced example, much of what is argued and urged applies or adapts elsewhere. Disenchan tment with politics, and political proposals for change. There is now evident in Australia, what is variously described as disillusionment and anxiety, cynicism and pessimism about the state of politics-a loss of confidence in it, and a retreat from commitment. As much and more, Mackay has nicely exposed in a survey of the Australian situation: . anxiety about the nature and quality of Australian politics [has] increased. . .. Widesprea d anxiety about the state of politics is based [in part] on an uneasy feeling that, if the parties are not going to stand for some identifiable philosophy, and the leaders are going to be chosen on the basis of their potential as television performers or even as head-kickers, then the only appropriate response is cynicism. That cynicism is reflected in a turning away from support for the major parties ... and revealed in the attitudes of young Australians ... 2 who often cannot be bothered registering to vote, or voting. (though voting is legally compulsory). Lack of confidence is beginning to show not only as cynicism about politicians, but also as doubt about the integrity of Australia's political institutions .3 1. Hon . Ian Macphee, ' A new constitution? '. Of course Macphee did not really mean all options, nor even all constitutiona l options. Furthermore, his claim about preparedness of people for change is incompatible with Mackey's data (mentioned below) on exhaustion with change. 2 Mackay pp.174-177. For all the Australian casualness of Mackay's presentation, his sociological findings are nonetheless fairly solidly survey and interview based (if occasionally stretching the data). Plain findings are replicated by other socialogists. 3 Ibid. p.178 �2 In a recent survey, '62 percent of [Australians] expressed either little or no confidence in the political system. Such a figure accurately reflects the mood of the Australian community' .4 Australian loss of faith in conventional politics is attributed to a mix of factors. A first explanator y factor as regards this disenchantment comes from the changes in politics already remarked (ranging from policy issues to media performers) and from resultant uncertainty. ' ... the Australian electorate is confused about which party stands for what, and about whether any party has a long-term commitment to any particular point of view' .5 A complex 'second factor ... concerns the adversaria l nature of two-party politics' .6 How can this 'two party, adversarial approach ... continue to be appropriate when the distinctions between the two parties themselves are so hard to define'? But 'reµefinition of party politics implies the possibility of a redefinition of the whole parliamentary process itself . Why 'when parties seem quite capable of stealing each other's policies or of invading each other's traditional philosophical territory, [can not] politicians work together in a more cooperative and harmonious spirit' ?7 'Adversarial politics may have made sense ... when .. . distinction s between the parties were stark and when arguments about principle could be justified; today, the idea that politicians would be arguing over a point of principle or philosophy is almost unthinkable .... [They] are much more likely to be arguing over matters of personality, prejudice and power than over issues which effect the long-term health of the body politic' .8 'The quality of parliamentary debate is regarded not only as a symptom of the adversarial nature of the institution, but also as a symptom either of the poor quality of politicians ... , or of the effect of the system on those who are enmeshed in it' .9 Unless there is marked improvement in party philosophies, programs and performance, 'the call to re-examine the nature of the parliamentary process will gather momentum ' .10 4 Ibid. 5 Ibid. pp.178-179. 6 Ibid. The adversarial character of dominant State legal systems is also becoming subject to more and more criticism. It appears likely that significant movement towards different inquiratorial systems will occur, not least because of the huge expense and growing unaffordabili ty of adversarial systems. 7 Ibid. 8 Ibid. p. 180. 9 Ibid. p.179. It is a symptom of both, the latter especially. lO Ibid . p. 181 . �3 A third relevant factor contributing to loss of faith is the impression of Australians that 'they are overgoverned ' 11 , with too many expensive bureaucracies and too many houses of parliament. Conflicts between State and Federal parliaments - and between the various State parliaments themselves - are regarded as a particularly unproductive expenditure of political energy, and Australians question whether 15 houses of parliament may be too many for the efficient government of 18 million people. The sheer number of parliaments is often blamed for the problem of too many bureaucracies and for many duplications of bureaucratic and political activity between State and Federal · governments. ... Whilst there is little love felt in the Australian community for Canberra and for the idea of more centralised government even that is beginning to appear preferable ... . The widespread support for the idea of a republic which emerged during 1992 is closely related to the underlying sense that Australia is overdue for _some kind of reexamination of its political institutions, and even the notion of Federation itself. ... As debate about the idea of a republic proceeds ... it has begun to incorporate the idea that Australian's political structures and systems might be quite significantly reformed. 12 Such diseffection reflects too a growing awareness that Australia's political arrangements owe more to historical accident than to rational design. Even though the main proposals for change no doubt remain reformist in character and could lead in unfortunate directions, some of them are far-reaching by normal standards. Both the extensive disenchantme nt with present political arrangements and the felt need for significant change further suggest political times are not altogether normal. Elements underpinning a political paradigm shift are already present, as are features supporting rational redesign, to which radical additions are now feasible. So far there have been, along with normal inertial resistance to change, two main responses to growing pressure for change: political, from politicians, ex-politicians and political commentator s , and academic from intellectuals, academic entrepreneurs and academic journalists. By and large, political responses have been grander, more sweeping and vaguer; academic responses more theoretical and cautious, piecemeal and detailed. But there are no grand detailed plans. Under the leading proposal so far for political change, Australia's constitutiona l monarchy will be displaced by a constitutional republic with its own head of state displacing the monarch, but with perhaps minimal adjustments otherwise. Nonetheless , as a result , republicanism is in the air. Politicians have begun to contemplate other practical reforms, while 11 Ibid. p. 181 , itals added. 12 Ibid. p.181 -2. Republican proposals have been circulating for some time . But the cause was finally taken up by prominent politicians, who made it their own, after which it became a popular issue. Mackay's accurate presentation of popular support for political change contrasts drolly with the first part of his book which depicts an Australian populace exhausted by change and longing for the old ease and somnolence. �4 academics have begun to embroider theories around republicanism and institutional reform. What happens to the Australian federation of states is one of the many unresolved issues presently being debated. The main reason for reform offered by the political camp can be summed up simply as changing geopolitica l circumstances. The camp tends not to acknowledge what would reflect adversely upon it, the poorness of federal political practice. Rather it tends to attribute popular dissatisfaction to economic circumstances and uncertainties: declining real standards of living, extensive unemploym ent, persistent recession until recently, problems to be surmounted by full-steam ahead untrammelled economic growth, to be attained by recoupling Australia to the Asian economic express. Meanwhile an orchestrated republican movement can help divert popular political attention from poor political management and a gloomy economic predicament. Much has changed in the century since present antiquated political arrangements were hammered out, arrangeme nts making the newly-fashioned .Commonw ealth of Australia, politically a federation of states, into a constitutional monarchy coupled to Britain, arrangements of convenience fashioned for very different circumstances. Most non-symbolic linkages with Britain, which has been inching towards a place in a united Europe, have already been severed. Australia has gradually begun to appreciate its geo-political position in the Indian-Pacific region (and the money-ma king opportunities for a sagging resource-based economy in allegedly booming parts of Asia). Whence the main idealistic proposal: for an independent republic, decoupled from Europe, assuming its own (prominent) place in its geo-political regions. In principle at least, place and region begin to assume, or resume, some of their neglected, but historic, significance (however that is not how it is yet seen). Most proposals for constitutional and federal reform fit within that limited idealistic conception. One important proposal, advanced by established political players, their most radical proposal so far, includes abolition of the present states. Such a proposal would clearly represent a welcome step in anarchist directi<;ms, were it not regularly offset by the idea of a strengthened central state.13 Supposing this latter unfortunate idea is bracketed for the moment, then what is being seriously considered already starts to look like a much more rational regionalism than what presently prevails. The present states of Australia are undoubtedly an anachronis m, based on accidental boundaries of a contingent colonial history. They are ecologically irrational management units, utterly failing to reflect ecological regions. Yet the states possess extensive environmental and other manageme nt powers, inappropriate 'powers which derive from what was largely a political bargaining process conducted a century ago.' Another effect of inapposite state-federal 13 Anarchists can even rest (if uneasily) with a con stitution , so long as it provides for an organisation, Australia Inc . even, sufficiently different from a state and its authoritarian trappings. �5 arrangements, especially 'funding arrangements, has been to lock out local government and, more importantly, local communities . ... local communities must be given greater control over those decisions of government which effect their lives ... '; the opportunity 'to design and provide the services which are needed locally.' 14 At this stage of the dialectic McPhee slides easily and naturally from localism to regionalism. A glance at the map reveals natural regions for local government on a viable scale [an optimistic contention]. Some cross State boundaries, and I would envisage that State governments would be replaced with regional governments. These would be more akin to larger local governments and would certainly not have the trappings of the States. They should not have parliaments and the expensive, unwieldy and inefficient bureaucracies which characterise our States. They should have a small number of full-time councillors. .. Regional governments should be solely accountable to their ratepayers ... 15 . So far so good: however McPhee thereupon begins to infiltrate stock (small /) ·liberal management assumptions. Nonetheless the basic idea to retain is simple: that of ecologicallyrational local and regional rearrangemen t of anachronistic state partitions. But that regionalizatio n should be greened, as reform should be radicalized. More generally, opportunites now present themselves to inset more radical ideas throughout the debate about Australia's future directions. For much has been left off political agendas for change, not merely environments and habitats of their less prominent or noisy inhabitants, but also such issues as rights and liberties, transformation of antiquated legal and executive frameworks, and so on. Omission of (human) rights is especially remarkable in states such as Australia, whose constitutions astonishingly do not mention at all (what is however often supposed to justify states) individual rights, such rights only being ensured, so far as they are, assumptions from uncodified common law, by indirect routes (statutes regarding treatment of minorities and the like). Nor do the political camps pushing limited change speak of rights or liberties; a very limited conception of adjustments required prevails (though without rights and liberties and a generous public sphere there is little, and little prospect of,justificatio n for a state at all). Accordingly political agendas for change need to be conspicuously broadened, to accommodate a decidedly more ambitious range of constitutional and institutional redesign. 2. A project within a project: radically reshaping Australian institutions. 14 All quotes in this paragraph are drawn from McPhee. An address along similar lines to the Hon. Ian McPhee, also proposing abolition of the states, was delivered by the former Prime Minister R.G. Hawke. Hawke's speech, by contrast with McPhee's, attracted much media attention, and though facilely dismissed as "unrealistic" by some practicing politicians , appeared to gain a good deal of support. I5 McPhee ibid. �6 Academic entrepreneurs have also responded quickly to proposals for constitutional and institutional changes. Early to scramble on the bandwagon was the institution to which I am affiliated, the Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University, with its ambitious decade-lon g project, Reshaping Australian Institutions: Towards and Beyond 2001. 16 One. small part of this project does connect with the republican push, which no doubt helped inspire it and gain its funding. The academic version of republicanism furnishes an institutional and historic setting, tracing its roots back to ancient Rome, and thereby linking in, what admits much modem adaptation, notions of citizenship and civic virtues. But most of the project is independent of any republican reorganisation. The Reshaping Australian Institutions project is presented in predominantly reformist fashion, unsurprisingly. It is supposed, for instance, to 'provide major input into evaluation and refonn of Australia's institutions'; indeed it is explicitly 'aimed at contributing to Australian constitutio nal reform'. 17 Nothing however precludes considerat ion of reshaping or transforming Australian institutions - those of the whole ecological region - in a unreformist and possibly unconstitutional way, in a radical way. Admittedly, the rough boundary between reformist and radical routes becomes even more blurred when the constitution of a country is open for possible major reconsideration and much political infrastructure may be altered. Nonetheless, from the perspective of a strong central state, the stock. boundary stands intact. For reformist changes would amount to comparative small adjustments leaving it substantially intact. For example, a minimal transformation, of the sort presently much favoured, from constitutional monarchy to Australian republic, though entailing non-negligible constitutional redrafting, need only amend the roles of a few elite power- and position-holders. By contrast, radical changes would substantially alter that strong central state, perhaps (as will be proposed) eliminating it altogether. There are appealing reasons for attempting wider, more radical investigations. For, firstly, there may be more satisfactory institutional structures not accessible, or even visible, along normal constitutional reform routes. Secondly, there is a demand, a small but growing 16 A recent brief description of this two million dollar project, now outlined in several places, is given in Tynan, pp.17-19. Fuller descriptions are available from a main coordinator of the project, J. Braithwaite, Law, RSSS, ANU. One of the many strands (17 at last count) of this project is an environmental (or green) strand. The immediate predecessor of this article was presented in a workshop at RSSS on green political theory , arranged under the project. That accounts for some of the otherwise puzzling structure of what has eventuated. Another earlier version was tried out at Ecopolitics VIII, Pacific Visions, held at Lincoln University, Christchurch, New Zealand, in July 1994. 17 ' Reshaping Australian institutions : towards and beyond 200 l' in Tynan , p.17, italics added. �7 demand from green directions for instance, for radical institutional change. It would be prudent, then, to make some investigation of the options, to assess their prospects. Thirdly, reflection on such structures would certainly be part of a more comprehensive study of and theory of institutional design, which the Reshaping project also presents as an objective. Fourthly, much more controversially, major environmental problems cannot be satisfactorily solved along merely reformist paths. For states, what are reformed, states themselves are ecologically dysfunctional. In practice this appears obvious enough. Simply reflect upon their environmental records; these are even worse than those abysmal records compiled for human rights. But the practical case can be argued in detail in a state by state way, or less laboriously, through the familiar rough classification of states into first, second and third world states. In main third world regions, the rise of the state has seen the serious decline of environments. Those third world states that have not largely destroyed their natural environments are in rapid process of doing so. The activities involved are, furthermore, not merely tolerated by these states but are usually actively encouraged (e.g. with state participation or by state concessions, as through taxation advantages, subsidies, expert incentives, etc.). Further, the role of exploitation and plunder of remaining natural "resources'', and depletion of "biological capital", by third world states, most of which are now trapped in debt and structural adjustment, has increased many-fold in the last two decades. How destructively second world states of eastern Europe treated their own (and also other regions') environment, how they over-expoited and polluted them, has recently been much publicized. While the recent record in first world states is no doubt marginally better, many of these states dominated their natural environments and their wild inhabitants in the past and have heavily polluted and exported their urban and industrial regions. Nor does their present record gain an environmental pass. For example, those that have any natural forests (similarly fisheries) left are in the process of eliminating or degrading most what remains; most are failing seriously in meeting (their own) targets on greenhouse emissions, and so on. More theoretically, it is unlikely that states, increasingly focussed narrowly upon shallow economic agendas, will or can deliver satisfactorily environmentally. A prime reason is this: states are ineluctably committed, more and more as their populations expand, to high levels of economic activity characteristically to economic growth of sorts which impact heavily environmentally, inducing inevitable degradation.18 Accordingly, there are then, or should be, two bands to any green (or environmental) strand of a restructuring Australian institutions project: not merely an important reformist side, 18 This theme, that states are normally ecologically dysfunctional, is documented and argued in detail elsewhere; see e.g. Carter and especially . Sylvan 96 . On the dismal environmental records of particular states see Punting. For shocking figures and illustrations as regards environmental exploitation of third world states, see Bolla, pp57-65 . �8 but as well a radical spread. It is part of this underfunded and undersupported radical spread which forms the main object of investigation in what follows, that part that relinquishes present state structures, in favour of more environmentally benign institutions - which no doubt can be designed, even if not so readily brought to practical use. 19 In order to reach radical redesign ideas quickly, let us touch only lightly upon some of the more distinctively green reasons for this anarchoid quest (familiar anarchist reasons stand: the illegitimacy of present states, the undesirability and severe disutility of states, which typically are highly destructive and corrosive institutions based on concetration of power, hierarchical authority, massive coercion, manipulation by economic elites, technobureaucracy, utilitarian rationality, and sundry other evils. 20) As 1ndicated, present states are incompatible with stock ecologically sustainable practices, because of their heavy unrelenting commitments to shallow economic growth. More generally, standard states and their practices comprise very significant parts of environmental problems, but quite insufficient parts of any solutions. Moreover, states constitute an enormous and destructive drain on regional environments, a feature particularly evident in smaller states which are always looking out for revenue-raising expedients for their . . own expensive runnmg. Apart from those greens who have recognised the excessive environmental costs of states and their heavy demands on environments, and thus or otherwise have come to recognise the desirability of their withering away, there are many more who have become ambivalent about states, who appreciate their very problematic character and very questionable legitimacy, but do not see yet how to get along altogether without them, or more exactly (to point towards a partial resolution) without certain functions that they serve. To point immediately towards a resolution of this crucial problem, the functional dissolution idea advocated is this: that the functioning parts may be separately utilized without the colossal whole. The state is not an organism the functioning parts of which must fail without the whole. So it may well be the enormous fat of state can simply be shed, to great advantage. In any event, 'the State is a social institution', always 'within', Marxists continue, 'a ,concrete historic setting' .21 Granted, it is an institution. For an institution in the relevant sense is 'a society or association for the [organisation or] promotion of some particular object [or 19 To adapt a referee's trenchant summary . For detail on some familiar anarchist reasons , see Bumheim and above all Marshall. 20 Nonetheless practical revolutionary displacement of the state is not so remote as is generally supposed. 21 Thus, Green p.61, who adds quite wrongly that Proudhon and his disciples do not see it that way 'but as an abstraction and aberration'. �9 function]'. 22 Institutions include therefore the state, the central state. So it too is up for reshaping, radical slimming, and possible removal in a concrete historical setting, such as late twentieth century Australia. Whittling away the state means in tum dismantling corporate capitalism, which now dwells in symbiosis with the bureaucratic state, and also much else, often environmentally undesirable, that the state affords a supportive framework for and enables to flourish. Ideas and schemes for radical redesign are already available from rich anarchist and socialist sources, those for g_reen design and reshaping from growing and diverse environmental sources. In main part, then, radical ecoredesign is a matter of convivially meeting (not joining) the two, an intersection that favours anarchist inputs. Something ofthe sort has already been attempted, in an environmentally shallower way, in eco-anarchism, alias social ecology, and in a deeper way, in deep-green social theory. 23 Moreover, it could be attempted in other kinds of deeper green theory-itself really a plurality of theories, which however does not itself force radical ecoredesign, though most variants would support it. Thus Naess's "deep ecology" for example, which is not so far politically radical, only strongly reformist, could (and should) be given a radical tum. 24 Concentrating upon the radical spread of deeper green theory does not preclude concomitant reformist investigation and activity. Both sides of the green street should be played. Reformist opportunities should of course be pursued-increme ntal change, social engineering, greening bureaucrats, lobbying politicians, and like activity (but better really to cut through much such pleading and obiesance and be rid of politicians and bureaucrats). There are many reformist proposals being advanced for the greening of Australian federal institutionswith but few so far having much impact on practice. 25 Nonetheless, more limited, more constrained, proposals of this sort certainly have a better chance of making a difference than radical redesigns, regularly smartly dismissed as "unrealistic" or "utopian".26 No doubt the 22 Oxford English Dictionary, adapted. An institution is an organitution. 23 On social ecology, see Bookchin 90, and for information on deep-green social theory , see Sylvan and Bennett 94 and Routleys 80. 24 As to the political character of deep ecology, and why it should be turned, see Sylvan and Bennett 94, where an expose of the political theory of Naess's ecosophy is presented. 25 There are many many narrower economic and technological proposals. One of the more interesting wider proposals comes from an Opposition not noted for its green initiatives and commitments, for an overseeing Department of Sustainable Development, a Department that could see to the greening of all federal institutions. 26 Too smartly, as we argue elsewhere (e.g. Sylvan and Bennett 90). �normal "reshaping institutions" investigations are rightly focussed upon institutional reform, not upon revolutionary reshaping, where much freer scope for redesign is offered. However the real possibility of radical change should not be excluded; green radicals should be prepared. There have been various opportunities for revolutionary change in Australian history, the last occurring, according to some historians, with the ignominious fall of the Whitlam government. There may well be opportunities again both in the near and intermediate future, especially should some solid work be put into propagating the prospect. In the near term there is economic disarray, social fragmentation, and constitutional destabilization; in the longer term increasing ecological problems and expanding eco-catastrophes loom. Under present incremental reform and regression, for all th_e spasmodic environmental rhetoric, comparatively little in the way of radical green change occurs or can be expected. Witness, for comparison, the snail pace of the establishment movement towards a rather minimal grey republicanism in Australia, or differently away from meeting carbon-reduction commitments. It is increasingly doubtful, given prevailing responses to economic and other difficulties, that present structural and systematic problems confronting Australia, for example, will be satisfactorily addressed, environmental problems such as extensive and expanding land and water degradation not least. Furthermore, under more incremental reform, the sorts of problems concerning reorganising society in deeper green ways, problems that provide subsequent topics, would likely noi arise. So in getting beyond more muddling along, do imagine fairly free scope for institutional eco-redesign is somehow dispensed. One nice corollary is that once it is worked out where to go organisationally, it is much easier to ascertain how to arrive there. 3. A basic problem of structure: central or decentralised organisation. There are large and immediate advantages in pursuing a problem-oriented approach to redesign. That approach, which will tend towards anarchoid outcomes, will be anarchistically guided in this respect: Unless there is a genuine problem, already causing difficulties or developing, nothing need be done; otherewise let things alone, let Being be. 27 On this non.:. managerial low-work approach a good deal of structure presently inoperational, and of idle regulation presently enacted, can be removed; organisational arrangements can be very significantly down-sized. The leading methodological idea is that enough relevant (biodegradable) structure is introduced to resolve organisational problems, but not substantially 27 The non -prejudical term 'anarchoid' is deployed, not because what emerges will not be anarchistic (as characterized in Marshall and in Sylvan 94), but because it departs from standard forms of anarchism in significant respects, not least in planned political organization. In this exercise organization is of the essence .. �11 more. Organisationa l oversupply and waste is thus avoided. Moreover, much structure that keeps so much environmenta lly destructive industry in business is likewise shed. Among basic problems for deeper green theory are those of political reorganisation and so of organisatior,,. Evidently institutions, and their types, are critical to such organisation. And a major organisational problem for any putative green society concerns structure: to take a critical case, whether society is centrally organised (concentrated, bureaucratised , hierarchical, largescale and so on) or decentralised (dispersed, non-hierarchic al, small-scale and supposedly beautiful, and so on). This focal problem, to centralise or not to centralise, is sometimes presented as a serious dilemma for concerned green theorists. 28 The binary horns of this dilemma are respectively: on the one horn, the pull ( or push) to localisation and regionalisatio n, to non-anonymo us smallscale low-impactin g environmenta lly-friendly arrangements , to diffusion of power and dismantling of the incubus of a central state with its crippling costs and unfriendly practices; and on the other horn, the need for continuing and further central income generation and welfare (re)distribution, central regulation and control, and the pressures to environmenta l reliance upon and use of the central state. 29 The dilemma has been trenchantly posed as follows: ... the demands of the Greens sometimes appear contradictory, in seeking increasing environmenta l regulation and welfare measures ... alongside a halt to industrial expansion, the very source of income for the welfare state. Yet the expansion and further centralization of the bureaucratic state apparatus is neither their overt goal nor covert motivation. Quite the contrary. Their genuine long term vision is of a decentralized , steady state society of self-sufficient, relationally autonomous (albeit interlinked) regions. 30 As it happens, not only does the theoretical and utopian literature run both ways, towards and away from centralisation , but so does practice and experience. As to theory, anarchistically -inclined presentations tend to favour decentralisation, perhaps with some central compensation through federation (thus recent Blueprints, ecotopias, and so on), whereas socialistically -inclined presentations invariably opt for powerful central states (to control and redistribute grander social programs, etc.). As to practice, there are local councils, community organisations, residents' groups aiming to keep out, or to remove, the state-sponsore d nuclear plants, toxic waste incinerators, waste dumps or super-highway s, on the one horn; and, on the 28 As by Michael Jacobs of The Green Economy, who has posed the problem sharply, as part of an argument however for retaining the central state (and much of present status quo arrangements). 29 Environmental reasons for favouring small-scale bioregional organisation are nicely gathered in McLaughlin, chapter I 0. 30 Fox, Ecopolitics III. �12 other, central states blocking, modifying, or regulating local or regionally promoted schemes for large dams (e.g. Tasmania's Franklin), forest exploitation, pulp mills, strip mining, and so on .31 To some extent, the way the problem has often been re-presented, in terms of a dilemma between top-down and bottom-up structure and power transmission, already points towards a theoretical resolution: namely, both, or rather enough of both. But how is this combination to be achieved? An answer does not fall out by pure reason, operating in isolation from other problems. By taking advantage of information gathered from other connected problems, a promising answer can be teased out. Neither standard socialism nor anarchism afford answers, socialism because it leaves the central institution of state intact. But standard anarchism, much more promising, does not resolve the problem either, because federation , as usually explained, does not leave enough structure; it may not even concede sufficient power to delegates to constrain exploitative local communities. A solution to such dilemma lies through a combinational strategy, which includes partial dissolution of the central state, into its actual organisational functions in each region. While removing the state, itself source of several environmenta l and social problems, and its concentration of power, invariably under environmenta lly unfriendly control, functional dissolution nonetheless retains its apparently essential services, including (where necessary) those of environmenta l regulation. Relevant continent-wid e functions would persist or be introduced: for example, services controlling inflow into Australia of damaging forms and materials such as toxic wastes and exotic pest species, or regulating outflow from Australia of native wildlife and flora. In part, ecoregional functionalism offers a radical continuation of the separation of powers of recent historical process, of church and state, legislature and executive, and so forth. As these functions come to operate separately while remaining coordinated, so would those functional arrangements and institutions dissolving the state. It is a major illusion of modem political theory that a central state, ceded monopolies on coercion, currency, taxation and so on, is necessary in order to secure adequate supply of public goods, including public order and environmenta l regulation. To the contrary, the most that appears required, the most that arguments would support, is some network of specific organisations functioning to look after specific kinds of goods and services, those necessary for this or that, that are not otherwise supplied. There is no inherent reason why communities should not institute and regulate specialised bodies coordinated among themselves (by negotiations or, failing that, through recognised arbitrators) to ensure the adequate maintenance or production of various types of public goods, including control of damaging crime. Each 3I Much turns on the exploitative character of certain local and regional communities, their get-richquick schemes, what they are prepared to do to survive in old or affluent ways, and so on . �13 such institution could gain community standing from its support base, for instance through achieving democraticall y-generated recognition. Such an institution would aim to secure execution of its recommendat ions and decisions by sanctions and like admissible means, and in doing this it could mobilize in co-operation with communities and with other recognised institutions . There are many examples of such institutions operating successfully both regionally and internationally; for instance, those for postal and communicational arrangements, international sporting bodies, international academies and clubs, environmenta l and consumer organizations.32 4. Selecting satisfactory political arrangemen ts within the span of anarchoid options. Anarchoid options come in a wide variety of forms, including, among others, both right leaning individualisti c or capitalistic varieties, and lef-leaning social or communitaria n varieties.33 A suitably generous political pluralism will allow for all these form, while not encouraging all, <:lS they are of very different merit. For example, some may be neglectful or repressive of some of their inhabitants, or destructive of their environments; others, superior in these coino-environmental regards, may not be. Dismantling or deconstructing a state does not, on its own, make a sharp selection between alternatives. No doubt the hope is, what can be striven for, that adequate design are sought and adequate selections inadmissible forms rapidly perish. Those forms that are admissible can be ranked, for instance according to defeasible criteria based upon "pillars" of German green movement such as environmenta l sensitivity, democratic institutions, and nonviolent practices. While right leaning anarchoid arrangements could in theory work (e.g. under what is improbable, benevolent capitalists), they are unlikey to succeed in practice, for several reasons. Consider to illustrate in outline, why that much promoted rightist form, market (or "liberal" 32 This passage borrows from the summary in Burnheim 86 p.221 of Burnheim 85. For much fuller elaboration see Burnheim 85 and Sylvan 94. The critical issue of funding administration, without a coercive location system, is also breached in these places (and developed in Sylvan 96). The broad proposal is that low-cost administration , much of which would be volunteer, could be funded by rents (there would be no property in land and resources), use charges, and fines . 33 There are many more varieties of political systems than much recent theory has cared to concede . For example, to take right-leaning dimensions, all of individualism , market-organiza tion and capitalism function substantially independently. There can be markets without capitalism (characterised through opportunities to accumulate capital), and conversely, capitalism with free mar1cet arrangements. And so on . Most historic and modern systems, upon which political theory has tended inadmissilby to concentrate almost exclusively, are hybrid arrangements with mixes of different elements drawn from both "left" and "right". �14 capitalism is unlikely to serve. For one reasons an intrusive state is likely to emerge, with standing state controlled and funded military and police forces to defend capitalist interests and accommod ation, to protect private property, to uphold social in equalities, and to enforce particular market and trade structures, with a substantial and heavy taxation system to fund these forces and a correspond ing bureaucracy needed to administer and regulate these and other institutions, such as those required to guarantee that capitalist liabilites are limited and to keep markets (far from self-regulating) free and competitive. Not only are anarchoid conditions thus violated, so are those for benign green socities. In normal practice, market capitalism tends to be highly environmental exploitative, as modem history demonstrates all too plainly (plainly too it is not alone in this propensity, so are other modern statist systems). Furthermor e, given the sorts of humans and practices (including extravagen t consumptio n for all that can afford it) these systems tend to elevate, exalt, encourage and some times even enforce, extensive exploitation is to be expected, and liable to persist-wi thout further state interventio n to distort "natural" capitalistic incentives and institutions, to limit practices on private property (thereby altering the institution 34 ), to establish new mitoument s and commoditi es such as pollution licences, green investment s and futures, and so forth. Even though a shallow greenness could be sprayed upon parts of market capitalism (factoiries in fields, forest reserves retained for tourists, etc.) and some green chowcase exhibits tacked on, environme ntal depth cannot. Shallownes s is both an inevitable consequenc e of the justifying socio-econ omic theory, and also an expected best outcome of practice. Accordingl y in institutional design it is much more promising to look in democratic leftleaning directions. It would be rash to gamble upon any bright new clause of environme ntally and socially benign market capitalism, which could in any event easily revert back to dark industrial ages. Similar arguments to those sketched could be developed as regards centralised socialism, especially as untempered by democratic procedures. While island communiti es of a wide range of varieties are naturally not excluded under anarchoida l pluralism, brighter continental prospects lie through modifications of democratic sociality, which appears to permit much of what is sought in design. Under duly decentralized social organization, each requisite function would be carried out by some association of agents comprising operative and support staff (that is, as regards bare formal structure, more or less as now, in institutions like department s and corporation s). For direct accountability downwards , and also to ensure desirable separation and dilution of power, upper operatives, those of a directing or steering committee (the nervous system of the organisation), would be democratic ally selected (from a relevant lower level constituenc y, and 34 Infiltrated too is much mythology, including acclaimed environmenta l virtues of private property and privatization generally . �15 from the whole people of an ecoregion in case of a typical bottom level institution). Note well that selection is not election: election is but one method of democratic selection, and often enough not an altogether satisfactory method. The point of some sort of democratic selection, as a guiding though not invariant rule, is manifold: it is in part to ensure due accountability, in part to prevent unethical accumulation of power in special classes, and in part for reasons that devolve from the very notion of democracy itself. In brief, certain forms of democracy offer promising prospects for green reorganisation, particularly within complementing left-leaning settings where those froms can function in favour of sustainability. However even with an informed democracy in place, there are few guarantees. Some structure, such as limited executive power separated from judicial and administrative functions, needs to be set in place to block or retard worse eventualities (such as mob actions, selection of tryants, mistreatment of noncitizens and so on). Even then several thorny problems remain for any deeper green political theory. 5. Problems of chauvinism and present-time bias in democratic political institutions. In modem usage of the motherhood term democracy, two main lines are visible: included are not only forms of political organisation where 'power [is presumed to] reside in the people as a whole, and is exercised either directly by them ... or by officers [selected] by them\ but 'often more vaguely denoting a social state in which all have equal rights, without hereditary or arbitrary differences of rank or privilege' 35 . It is on the basis of this second line that the call for democracy has operated to remove chauvinism and discrimination of a range of forms: against unpropertied minorities, nonconformists, women, blacks, tribals, and so on. Even so pursuit of the line, where successful, has not generally conferred adequate representation and rights on several of these groups; but, more important, pursuit has stopped short in its inclusions at certain humans, such as those granted citizenship-though relevant interests of many other creatures and welfare of many of other items may be affected by what those citizens elect to do. While democratic voters can perhaps be entrusted to take some account of those near and dear (within remarkably sharp limits, as the situation of women in many regions still shows), such as those deemed incompetent to vote: the young, deranged, and so on, much evidence reveals that they cannot be relied for what is less near or dear (and indeed are easily herded into casting their votes in accord with a shallow mercantilism). Consider what get left out , outcasts of even perfect democratic control:- 35 Oxford English Dictionary entry 1, main entry. These two lines are by no means the only distinctive lines now visible: increasingly conspicuous in calls for "democracy", notably in Asia, are calls to freedom and rights: not merely for basic legal freedoms such as free assembly, fair process and so on, but for freedom to access information (the "right to know" ). �16 • spatially distant agents. For example, the interests of many humans outside USA are much affected by practices of the US government, which however is outside their democratic reach. • temporally distant agents. Since the past is past, it is future agents who would be affected, often drastically affected, by present practices, that matter. Some way of taking due account of future agents, their interests and welfare, is required, even under shallow long-term ecology, that is under lighter green positions. Sustainable development has been regularly diverted into--what is part of what it is about-such a way, an indirect and so far utterly ineffectual way.36 Much more of importance is also excluded according to deep-green theory: • creatures with interests, other than present human citizens, and • items with welfare, but perhaps lacking interests. The category includes items with intrinsic value, whose value can be effected, made to fare worse or better. A major problem, little addressed, is how to take due account of such democraticall y excludes. It is a problem especially for deeper green theories: that deep problem is, so to say, how to obtain satisfactory representation of all that is of value in the natural world? That way of putting it, while a little misleading, does point to a particular type of resolution. Problems special to deep ecopolitical theory, include, that is, issues as to adequacy of representation of items of value outside those humans that are represented, representation of their interests, where they have them, of their welfare otherwise, of favourable conditions for their sustenance, continuation and retention of value. Democracy of discussed modem sorts, whether representative or participative, will not serve these purposes at all satisfactorily. For instance, insofar as party-political representative democracies represent anything (even human "bottom lines" as is sometimes erroneously supposed), they appear to represent primarily interests of certain business-allied elites. Among the issues are of course those as to adequacy of retention and protection of nonhuman items of intrinsic value, tropical forests and their inhabitants and elements for instance. As observed, there is really no organisationa l alternative to proceeding with and through agents, preferably well-disposed and quality agents. It is hard to guarantee either politically. As agents are but a subclass of what requires democratic representation and what should have its welfare or interests considered, how are the rest to be taken care of satisfactorily? There are significant older responses to like problems, through totems and taboos, guardians and constraints. Looked at one way the problem repeats, more or less, a familiar problem: namely, how in larger constituencies do decision-mak ing agents represent the whole mass of agents and others in the constituency? A main democratic answer, designed to avoid many shortcomings 36 See Sylvan and Bennett 93. �17 of alternatives, was: by representative means-only "representation" was almost never taken seriously or literally enough. The sorts of considerations that made representation a promising resolution make what is to be proposed-wh ere representation has, in any case, to be expanded -also promising. A key principle is this: all relevant items are to be represented. Relevance criteria enter importantly. Steering committees of lower level institutions among the main decision-mak ing bodies should be appropriately representative of all items whose welfare is affected by their decisions (principle of deepened demanarchy). Under more equitable arrangements, then, some decision-engaged agents will have to be selected as representative of relevant classes of excludeds. Electoral arrangements do not so readily allow for such; sortition, well-designed selection by lot, does. 37 Of course, however good the selection processes, however disinterested and well-intentioned the agents selected, some bias may remain. Nonetheless prejudice and mal-treatment may be much reduced. As already hinted, deepened representation is not the only promising resolution of the present problem that might be tried. Another, which could be attempted either separately or concurrently, operates through the directive of ecologically sustainable development, requiring as a constraint, not only intergenerational equity but also preservation of items of ecological value. 38 It might be suggested that such a directive be made mandatory, applying to all relevant steering committees. But, as already evident, there <;1re severe obstacles to getting such a directive properly implemented. (In present oligarchical circumstance s, even very dilute versions are worth pressing for however, as they would offer definite improvements upon what presently happens.) 6. A fundamenta l dilemma for (deeper)-gre en organization democratic or authoritaria n procedures? There is strictly no logical space for a deeper green democracy, according to Saward for one. For there is a clash, an essential tension, between democratic procedures and deeper green values and commitments, notably to intrinsic values in nature. The main drift of the argument is that green values, which are mandatory for deeper greens, require for their implementation antidemocratic, indeed authoritarian procedures; otherwise they cannot be guaranteed. This nasty conundrum for green theory over democracy, which the theory typically sponsors, is put in sharper form as follows :39 Democracy concerns procedures, environmentalism certain outcomes. What guarantee can 37 No doubt there are electoral approximations; e.g. candidates in separate classes for each category to be represented. 38 For elaboration of this option, see Sylvan and Bennett 93 and its sequel. 39 Goodin, condensing Saward, p.168 . �18 there be that the procedures will deliver the outcomes? What guarantee that democracy would yield a way of protecting environments? However the type of situation is worse than a matter of guarantess, which greens are not really seeking and could not in general expect. (For here as almost everywhere else, things can go wrong. Philosophy especially supplies few absolutes and little certainty.) It is a type of situation, moreover, which effects not only environmentalism but any sort of social and other amelioration, and even democracy itself. For democratic procedures may yield unsatisfactory and even anti-democratic outcomes. Unfortunately there are few or no guarantees that masitonous forms will eventuate or persist. Political history itself capiously illustrates that. But ti can be argued theoretically. For example, succession of regimes must view (owing to finite lifetimes, etc.), and in occasional transitions deterioration can occur; there are no effective mechanisms that an exclude decline absolutely. Democratic procedures of certain sorts offer better controls, and better prospects of satisfactory transition than most other available, but even they afford no cast as on guantees of adequacy, and are beset by paradoxes of their own. In inadequate democratic structure plausible scenarios are easily designed where just such outcomes occur, for instance as in what has been called a "paradox of democracy" where a constituency elects an anti-democratic tyrant. 40 A concerned attempt is made by Saward to mount a destructive version of such a paradox against deep-green political theory (which he darkly calls 'dark green'). The version is based upon holism and intrinsic value requirements, coupled with democratic demands, of deep green theory . In clearest form, the version runs as follows: Holism implies consistency or compatibility. But intrinsic value maintenance and democracy are not compatible, under evident conditions (e.g. democratic procedures result in diminution or destruction of intrinsic value). Firstly, partial confirmation for this explication: The green imperative contains a number of elements, variously economic, political, social, geographical, religious, and so on. Its force comes partly from the holism it embodies, and partly from its basis in the idea of the 'intrinsic value' of nature. Holism implies that the various elements which make up the imperative are compatible. The elements of the imperative gain their importance, and their links with each other, by being referable back to a common, intrinsic value. It is at this point that we can pick up the position of democracy or 'direct democracy' in lists of basic values set out by greens. These goals are the elements of the overall green imperative, and gain their importance from both the holistic nature and intrinsic merit of the values which the imperative represents. 41 40 Such paradoxes of democracy, and variants thereupon, are presented trenchantly by Popper, and nullified in Sylvan and Bennett 90. Improved structures can much reduce the likelihood and problematicness of paradoxical overturns. 41 Saward, paper version p.3 .; repeated p.5 . �19 As should now be plain, and is becoming plainer, consistency is not an invariant desideratum, and is not insisted upon; coherence is what is "implied" and what supersedes consistency .42 As more than a century of Hegelian theory should have revealed, there can be inconsistent wholes. A further key assumption in the argument is that guaranteeing that intrinsic value is protected (or like absolutes sustained) will require undemocratic procedures, such as authoritarian ones. An underlying assumption (soon to be rejected, e.g. as incorporating an offensive false dichotomy) is that only undemocratic, authoritarian procedures fit with deeper green imperatives or givens. 43 Several illustrations are offered of inconsistency of green imperative_s with types of democratic procedures-none of which tell, without testing adaptation, specifically against deeper green positions. A first illustration is directed against Porritt: A direct democratic procedure (is not) compatible with imperative goals like ' local production for local need', 'low consumption', 'labour-intensive production' , and ' voluntary simplicity' (other items from Porritt's list). 44 Against this and other illustrations, it is worth emphasizing goals resemble objectives and ~argets; goals are goals which are not mandatory and by no means always achieved, especially if the achievers, like present humans, fall short (e.g . irt ecological sensitivity) or their organisational means and opportunities are inadequate. Observe the oppositional attempt, to convert or to twist (since it is an up-grading by high redefinition), goals, programs , and principles-through 'imperative goals' and the like-into 'imperatives', 'prescribed outcomes' , undeniable principles, ultimates. That attempt should be resisted. A second example looks at an alleged contradiction in the programme of the German Green Party. ' Grassroots democracy' is one of the four 'basic principles' of the party's 'global conception' . Another is the 'ecological': 'Proceeding from the laws of nature, and especially from the knowledge that unlimited growth is impossible in a limited system, and ecological policy means understanding ourselves and our environment as part of nature'. In effect, this means that certain outcomes are proscribed from decision-making procedures. Proscribed outcomes go well beyond any plausible list of outcomes which must be proscribed in the interests of defending a direct democratic decision procedure. Therefore, there is a clear contradiction between elements of the value-set, whereas given the holism the green imperative is based on we would have the right to expect these goals and values to be_thoroughly compatible.4 5 42 See Priest and others. 43 Cf.p.12 essay. 44 [Reference] 45 [Reference] �20 The last charge repeats the critical point already rejected, that holism implies consistency. A further critical point should also be rejected: the flawed inference that 'certain outcomes are proscribed' . A political party in a democratic system has to be prepared to see its principles, however spendid, overridden, certainly by other parties if they gain or hold political power. There is a misconception too about principles (especially higher level principles) and their roles: ' principles [too] can only be akin to [givens and] "laws of nature", against which democratic procedures must inevitably be traded off the board'. Sets of principles, which may themselves turn out to be inconsistent, are hardly akin to natural laws; consider for instance reasons for their revision, procedures for rechecking and revision, and so on. In any case, democratic procedures are not traded away against laws of nature, which they may try to upset or suppress. (Rather effort should be directed at informing the electorate and the like). To reinforce his case, Saward appeals to other authors who have advanced similar claims (it is like appealing for confirmation of a newspaper report to other newspapers). Frankel accuses Bahro of an 'anti-democratic' vision of an ecological society, given that politics as conflict will have no place in a sea of 'givens'. He sees the dilemma as being similar to that of socialists-de eming certain things as desirable in an ultimate sense, but proclaiming attachment to democracy and the diversity it implies. Ophuls has stated the matter especially clearly. · The basic question about politics, he writes, is 'Is the way we organize our communal life and rule ourselves compatible with ecological imperatives and other natural laws? ... how we run our lives will be increasingly determined by ecological imperatives' 46 In an ecological society, enough of the demos (members of democratic constituency) will hold ecological attitudes and vote or select accordingly, almost by definition. Problems of effecting change lie with unecological communities, which may not support ecological principles under instituted democratic procedures (as presently in many places) . Principles, and ecological "givens", stand, they remain 'desirable in an ultimate sense', but they are not followed and implemented, while revealed democratic preferences go unchanged. There need be no 'antidemocratic vision', but rather an unecological praxis, which principled greens will work to change. The route is accordingly barred to Sayward's important conclusions ... : that at best direct democracy, and for that matter indirect forms of democracy, can only be at or near the bottom of value-lists of greens. A commitment to democracy must clash with values that are inherent to ecologism-a nd ecologism is about inherency, intrinsic values, laws of nature and holism. Things-like democracy-t hat can only have instrumental value must lose out to imperatives backed by inescapable canonical force.47 · 46 47 �.. ·- ·----------- ------ - - - - - - - - - - - -- ------ 21 What Saward proposes instead is depressing ly familiar: pragmatism , jettison intrinsic value. Out therewith go deep-green positions . ... greens should not think in terms of green imperatives . Indeed, it suggests that to think in terms of imperative s based on arguments about intrinsic merit is unjustifiabl e.48 Fortunately the argument developed does not sustain the proposals. There is, to iterate a central point, no internal or latent contradicti on between (deep-)gree n policy objectives and democratic procedures . Rather, green objectives would fail to be achieved without welldisposed decision makers, who may not straightforwardly reflect any "will" of the demos. A logical requiremen t on a realistic set of political objectives is that there are accessible circumstan ces where they are realisable, where all elements of the whole would obtain. It should not be required that there are are no situations where they may conflict, become inconsisten t. It is certainly not required that they are realised, by whatever means. A community , as variously represented , can choose better or worse. There are many means available, which it may shun (again there are no absolute guarantees) , enabling it to choose better, including improved structures, attitudinal change and consciousn ess raising; and so on. In the end Saward too recognises the popular power of attitudinal change, thereby removing himself his previous loading of authoritarian means upon greens. There needs, from a green perspectiv e [and others], to be a change in political culture such that it will be compatible with sustainability. This, of course, is a familiar theme from green writing. How[?] ... It can only be the case that 'political change will ony occur once people think differently or, more particularly, that sustainable living must be prefaced by sustainable thinking' . By abandoning foundation alist myths of intrinsic merit, greens abandon the implicit arrogance that have made democracy such a tenuous part of green political theory. 49 But he overstates the attitudinal point, with 'only ... the case'. People can be politically led (retardation , however, as distinct from genuine advancement, is a familiar phenomena ); they could just elect a green governmen t which instituted, under permissible democratic methods, sustainable living or the like. Worse still, his final ungrammatical sentence is a complete non48 Of course it is now put in terms of "imperatives "; it would be better expressed in terms of principles, policy objectives or the like. Opposition to deeper green political approaches often derives, as in Saward and in Goodin, from a underlying shallow utilitarianism . The differences concern not only depth, but the rejection of individual interest bases, in favour of welfare bases and holism in deeper approaches. 49 [Ref. and page] There are further defects in this passage than those noted in the text. For one, admission of intrinsic merit does not entail foundationalism. For another, such recognition of merit, which is less liable to disturb democracy, or render it tenuous, than adherence to Christianity, need caary no tinges of arrogance; to the contrary, by contrast with humanism it may yield a certain humbleness. �22 sequitur. Attitudinal change may including coming to appreciate intrinsic merit in natural things other than humans. 7. Ecoregio nal demanar choid reshaping of Australi an political institutio ns: one beginni ng. Is such a radical restructur ing as that suggested feasible? Initial investiga tions hold out the hope that major problems for deeper green theory can be solved, at least in theory. Investigations according ly suggest that the project within the Reshaping Australia n Institutions project is viable and worth pursuing. A logical next stage offers sketches for a radical political reorganisation of Australia. 50 Evidently there would be many designs (thereby removing facile jeers against "the blueprint ", a part of co-optative strategy for persistence with prevailing statist arrangem ents). Among the many designs, some few, conformi ng to favoured principles, would be selected for detailed study. If the study were attempted, most appropria tely through systems modelling s, then flexibility could be built into modellings, so that even though only a few basic designs were examined , many variations would be feasible. Not only is systems modelling particular ly well suited to modelling network designs; it also further offers prospects for computin g simulatio n and impleme ntation, and even some simulate d political experime ntation. Furtherm ore, such modelling s begin to give some grasp on the size and complexi ty of the task (a useful comparison is with World 3 modelling of the on-going "Limits to Growth" project 51 , or, better, with a regionalized version of it). To get started on such ecoregional design, for Australia, two broad classifica tions and associated maps and charts are required: • 1. an ecoregional classification, with partitions and overlays, for Australia and its continental shelf. Observe that this classifica tion would be hierarchi cal, as smaller regions merge into larger regions; but it is a benign hierarchy of levels (it facilitates no accumula tion of power or wealth) . Observe too that any such classification is far from unique. Plurality has already set in, and a choice of classifica tion (or a few choices) would have to be made, taking due account of political organisat ional principle s and objective s. Fortunate ly some of the prelimina ry classifica tory work has already been accompli shed in Environm ental Regional isations of Australia, where 3 broad classifications are presented and procedures for generatin g many more 50 Such design, well accomplish ed, would help considerab ly in revealing what is possible, thereby providing a seriously neglected contribution to politics, itself sometimes presented, with undue licence, as the art of the possible. 5I See e.g. Meadows. �23 given. 52 For political purposes further classification attributes (e.g. demog raphic features) need to be included. Ecoregions provide the basis for spatially linked admin istrativ e and comm unity units. (Not all units need be of this sort; many contemporary arrangements are spatially unlinked). At this stage a basic principle of decentralization and distributed and smalle r-scale organization can be invoked, namely • subsidiarization: organisational functions should be allowed to fall down to (or to be pushed down to) the lowest level compatible with their satisfactory performance . Thus, for instance, most matters concerning such things as sewerage and primar y educat ion would be localized. This subsidiarization principle, drawn from classical anarchism, has been widely adopted in green planni ng propo sals. (It is said to have been applie d by the Catho lic Churc h in admin istratio n of the Holy Roman Empire, whenc e the not altoge ther apt title derives. It is presently being reassessed for use in that successor organisation , united Europe.) No doubt the principle is open to challenge, for instance on grounds of efficiency, that larger size may prove more efficie nt, of duplic ation, and so on. But, the object ive is not maxim ization of technological values such as efficiency factors; instead it aims to satisiz e on a wider framework of values , including holistic social arrangements. Presum ably, howev er, undue duplication of expensive administrative bodies is to be avoided. Coupled with subidiarization is another principle, • direct accountability downwards: units should answer directly to region al constituencies. This contra sts with prevailing accountability (such as it is) upwar ds, throug h some indirect and tenuou s , centra lized circui ting chain. Natura lly much more gets compr ehend ed under accountability , for instance openness of environmental accounting. There are also principles interrelating smaller with larger regions, both bottom-up and topdown (or centre down) principles. Among these will be • repres entatio n of smalle r regions in relevant planni ng institutions of more compr ehensi ve region s . Representation, appropriately regulated, would often replac e anarchistic federation, which as observed appears too weak for requisite environmental contro l. The point needs no labouring that the classifications and principles are open to challenge at every step; for instance, there is nothing rock-hard about the type of ecoregional classification prefer red, nor about social functio ns to be addres sed. At a theore tical stage that is unproblematic: there are other (less preferable) models; elaborate your own if you want to and can. In any case, it is to be hoped that a diversity in theory might be to some extent reflected in some diversity in practi ce-wi th different regions and continents trying different arrangements, 52 See Thackway and Cresswell. Rudiments of a politically useful classific ation begin to emerge on their 30 Group Regionalisation . �24 with much less of the sort of cosmopo litan political monocult ure that we are presently being harassed toward, with much more resilient political biodiversity. Of course, not all political forms (includin g stateless types) are equally desirable or satisfactory, and some (includin g present state examples) are inaccepta ble. So there are bounds open diversity. Moreove r, what suits one communi ty or region well may not suit another to be satisfactory for it. So too there are limits open successful transfer of organisational structure; what works .in one region may require much modification in another, or may substantially resist transfer. Structural diagram : Schematic diagram of organisation structur e (with some sample components indicated, but not all their network interlinkages displayed) statistics bureau upper levels: administrative, executive, research ground level: functional inflow control materials selectoral college Australian region (federal) immigratio n sup_erreg10ns (a to k) interregional transport, etc. upper levels arbitration bureau resources income office ground level (local) regions (1 ton) water systems rental entitlements office hospital systems region 1 sewer systems reg10n n �25 • 2 a social function classification, of those community matters that require explicit organisa tion at some level. An initial listing can be compiled by consulting Australian metropolitan telephon e directories, especially the government sections that used to feature in the front (until a year ago). What results under redesign and reorganisation would, of course, look very different from what is listed. Parliaments, parties and all their supporting apparatus would vanish; the Australi an Bureau of Statistic s will assume a new significance and indepen dent role, and so on. But which instituti ons are retained, which adapted, and so on, would depend on further social organisa tional features, not yet considered here. The result would be a levelled pyramid al structure, a flat-untopped network as depicted in the structural diagram below, not a power hierarchy. While some requisite research has been undertaken .upon how the various functional bodies and decision -making committees can be selected and can operate 53, insuffic ient investig ation has been made of the interrelations and adequate fundings of the bodies and institutions involve d - whichever they are! For little such detailed anarchoid modellin g has apparen tly been attempt ed for any region anywhere. Evident ly there is much to be done theoretically. Detailed modellings could bring issues down to earth, without setting things in concrete; no doubt too they would disclose many further problems hidden in the detailing , problems to which anarchoid solutions can however reasonably be expected. Noneth eless compar atively little is likely to be done, unless requisit e support is forthcom ing, support in the shape of researchers (researc h volunte ers and students ) and research infrastr ucture (from research, donatio ns and the like). For such support, for investigating its own demise, a state is hardly likely knowingly to supply; nor are its establish ed research institutions. Insofar then as it is done visibly, it will probably have to be accompl ished largely outside state-supported and state-supporting infrastructure, such as prominent universi ty projects. (like Reshaping Australian Institutions). Fortunately there are now other structure s, such as internet and radio channels, that can facilitate interconnections and interchanges of researches, both regionally and internationally. On these sorts anarcho id communicationa l bases, networks of groups interested in elaborating such alternative political modellings, both in theory and in practice , could be formed. Given the dismal state of present politica l arrange ments, almost everywhere terrestial, there is a great need, as a very minimu m, for networks of innovative researchers who chose such goals. 54 53 Thus e.g. Burnheim 85. The present article is not only heavily indebted to Burnheim 's work, but overlaps on-going investigations on his part. 54 To echo one referee. My sincere thanks to demandin g referees for several helpful suggestio ns and many improvem ents. �26 Richard Sylvan* Refer ences . Bello, W., Dark Victory, Pluto Press, Londo n, 1994. Bookc hin, M., Remaking Society: Pathw ays to a Green Futur e, South End Press, Boston , 1990. Bumh eim, J., Is Democracy Possible?, Polity Press, Cambr idge, 1985. Burnh eim, J., 'Demo cracy, nation states and the world system Democracy. (ed. D. Held and C. Pollit t) Londo n, Sage, 1986, pp.218 ', New Form s of -239. Ul.rh2r) A Fox, W. , in Ecopolitics III, Hamil ton, New Zealan d. Goodi n, R., Green Political Theory, Polity Press, Cambr idge, 1992. Green , G., The New Radicalism: Anarchist or Marxist?, Intern ationa l Publis hers, New York, 1971. Jacobs , M., The Green Economy: enviro nmen t, sustainable development, and the politics of the future., Pluto Press, Conco rd, Mass, 1991. Macka y, H., Reinventing Australia: the mind and mood of Australia in the 90s, Hugh Macka y, Pymbl e, NSW, Angus & Rober tson, 1993. Macph ee, I., 'A new constitution?' (excer pts from an openin g addres s) NILEFA Newsletter, Griffith Unive rsity Schoo l of Law, June 1993. Marsh all, P., Dema nding the Impossible: a history of anarc hism, Londo n, Harpe r Collins 1992. Mc Laugh lin, A., Regarding Nature, SUNY Press, Alban y NY., 1993. Meado ws D., and others , Beyond the Limits, Chesle y Green, Vermo nt, 1992. Naess , A., Ecolo gy, comm unity and lifesty le (trans. and ed. D. Rothe nberg ), Cambr idge Unive rsity Press, Cambridge, 1989. Pontin g, C., A Green History of the World, Sincla ir-Stev enson, Londo n, 1991. Priest, G., Routle y, R. and Norma n, J. (eds), Paraconsistent Logic , Philos ophia Verlag , Munic h, 1989. Routle y, V. and R., 'Socia l theorie s, self manag ement and enviro nment al proble ms', in Environmental Philosophy (ed. D Mann ison and others ), RSSS, Austra lian Nation al University, 1980. * where is it �" . \)ot:;::,o 27 ~\)--:, \\-' Saward, M., 'Green. Democ racy', in Politics f Natur~ op cit, pp. ~~~ J..-.'->~f\, l(; ~ '5:> r 1\J ' ' . b3 - 'S/J L , £_? ~ J?_ \._\J.. cfr \~~ 2 ~"\,o (')roN CrlL~ rv fbltf ~~L, H-iof2 v- Sylvan, R. and Bennet t, D., Utopias, Tao and Deep Ecology, Green Series , RSSS, Australian National University, 1990. Sylvan, R. and Bennet t, D., The Greening of Ethics, White Horse Press, Cambridge, 1994. Sylvan, R., 'Anarc hism\ in Contemporary Political Theory (ed. R. Goodin and P.Pettit) Blackwell, Oxford, 1993. Sylvan, R., Deep Plurallism, University of Edinburgh Press, 1994. Sylvan, R., Green Anarchism, to appear, 1996. Thackw ay, R. and Cressw ell, I.D., Enviro nment al Regionalisations of Austra lia, Enviro nmenta l Resour ces Information Network, Australian Nation al Parks and Wildlife Service, 1992. Tynan, L., The Institute of Advanced Studies, The Australian National Univer sity, May 1993. �The following has been redacted from access file (PDF) due to copyright restrictions. Letter, Thomas V. Cahill, Editor, Department of Politics and International Relations, Lancaster University to Richard Sylvan, 18 May 1994 re feedback from referees on paper by Sylvan for Anarchist Studies (1 page) �ABSTRACT OF PROBLEMS and SOLUTIONS in DEEP ECOPOLITICAL THEORY A reshaping of social and political institutions, which are often outmoded or suboptimal and certainly commonly anti-environmental, is now prominent on theoretical agendas, at least in Australia. One such project is the multi-million dollar "Reshaping Australian Institutions" project at the Australian National University. At the same time there is widespread disenchantment with prevailing politics in Australia. Accordingly there is an opportunity to put radical green themes on agendas for real political and institutional change. A deep change, however, which is what deep green theories require, encounters several problems. For one, there appears to be a contradiction between demands for, on the one side, increasing environmental regulations and welfare arrangements, characteristically dependent upon bureaurcratic centralisation and economic growth, and on the other, decentralized lower impact organisation, which halts anti-environmentally industry and economic growth. A functional resolution, partially dissolving a central state, is outlined, along with a theory of encephaletic organisation. Further problems to surmount include human chauvinism and present-time bias, even in present "best practice" democratic institutions. Deep demarchoidal resolutions of these problems are sketched and defended. R. Sylvan RMB 683 Bungendore Australia 2621 f0J.._/ ,C. #--0/'...__~,_,k_J ver.r~ ~ -;- I c}~J ,h,,z'7 -?< �ABSTRACT OF PROBLEMS and SOLUTIONS in DEEP ECOPOLITICAL THEORY A reshaping of social and political institutions, which are often outmoded or suboptimal and certainly commonly anti-environmental, is now prominent on theoretical agendas, at least in Australia. One such project is the multi-million dollar "Reshaping Australian Institutions" project at the Australian National University. At the same time there is widespread disenchantment with prevailing politics in Australia. Accordingly there is an opportunity to put radical green themes on agendas for real political and institutional change. A deep change, however, which is what deep green theories require, encounters several problems. For one, there appears to be a contradiction between demands for, on the one side, increasing environmental regulations and welfare arrangements, characteristically dependent upon bureaurcratic centralisation and economic growth, and on the other, decentralized lower impact organisation, which halts anti-environmentally industry and economic growth. A functional resolution, partially dissolving a central state, is outlined, along with a theory of encephaletic organisation. Further problems to surmount include human chauvinism and present-time bias, even in present ."best practice" democratic institutions. Deep demarchoidal resolutions of these problems are sketched and defended. R. Sylvan RMB 683 Bungendore Australia 2621 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Draft Papers Description An account of the resource Sylvan's literary executor encountered an archive in which “all his projects were current", since manuscripts were undated and unattributed. Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document ·*' . ~":'" mw 10.4.95 PROBLEMS IN DEEPER GREEN POLITICAL ORGANIZATION THEORY: an Australi an perspective on radical institutio nal change . .. . people are ready for change and the impending debate will result m constitutional change. We should, therefore, explore all options .... 1 As elsewhere, there is growing dissatisfaction with Australia's political institutions, and increasing demand to change them. This demand, hiding co-optative elements, has been initiated and fostered in a conspicuously top-down fashion, by politicians and by academics. There is so far little surge of political enterprise at grass-roots levels, little pressure for the usually very limited changes proposed. Nonetheless, along with apathy, there is widespread popular disenchant ment with present political arrangements. There is now an opportunity (although still only a small window therefore no doubt) to put green and radical themes on the agenda for real political change in Australia. That opportunity should not be missed, within Australia, or elsewhere. While the exposition that follows concentrates upon Australia, as a convenient advanced example, much of what is argued and urged applies or adapts elsewhere. Disenchan tment with politics, and political proposals for change. There is now evident in Australia, what is variously described as disillusionment and anxiety, cynicism and pessimism about the state of politics-a loss of confidence in it, and a retreat from commitment. As much and more, Mackay has nicely exposed in a survey of the Australian situation: . anxiety about the nature and quality of Australian politics [has] increased. . .. Widesprea d anxiety about the state of politics is based [in part] on an uneasy feeling that, if the parties are not going to stand for some identifiable philosophy, and the leaders are going to be chosen on the basis of their potential as television performers or even as head-kickers, then the only appropriate response is cynicism. That cynicism is reflected in a turning away from support for the major parties ... and revealed in the attitudes of young Australians ... 2 who often cannot be bothered registering to vote, or voting. (though voting is legally compulsory). Lack of confidence is beginning to show not only as cynicism about politicians, but also as doubt about the integrity of Australia's political institutions .3 1. Hon . Ian Macphee, ' A new constitution? '. Of course Macphee did not really mean all options, nor even all constitutiona l options. Furthermore, his claim about preparedness of people for change is incompatible with Mackey's data (mentioned below) on exhaustion with change. 2 Mackay pp.174-177. For all the Australian casualness of Mackay's presentation, his sociological findings are nonetheless fairly solidly survey and interview based (if occasionally stretching the data). Plain findings are replicated by other socialogists. 3 Ibid. p.178 2 In a recent survey, '62 percent of [Australians] expressed either little or no confidence in the political system. Such a figure accurately reflects the mood of the Australian community' .4 Australian loss of faith in conventional politics is attributed to a mix of factors. A first explanator y factor as regards this disenchantment comes from the changes in politics already remarked (ranging from policy issues to media performers) and from resultant uncertainty. ' ... the Australian electorate is confused about which party stands for what, and about whether any party has a long-term commitment to any particular point of view' .5 A complex 'second factor ... concerns the adversaria l nature of two-party politics' .6 How can this 'two party, adversarial approach ... continue to be appropriate when the distinctions between the two parties themselves are so hard to define'? But 'reµefinition of party politics implies the possibility of a redefinition of the whole parliamentary process itself . Why 'when parties seem quite capable of stealing each other's policies or of invading each other's traditional philosophical territory, [can not] politicians work together in a more cooperative and harmonious spirit' ?7 'Adversarial politics may have made sense ... when .. . distinction s between the parties were stark and when arguments about principle could be justified; today, the idea that politicians would be arguing over a point of principle or philosophy is almost unthinkable .... [They] are much more likely to be arguing over matters of personality, prejudice and power than over issues which effect the long-term health of the body politic' .8 'The quality of parliamentary debate is regarded not only as a symptom of the adversarial nature of the institution, but also as a symptom either of the poor quality of politicians ... , or of the effect of the system on those who are enmeshed in it' .9 Unless there is marked improvement in party philosophies, programs and performance, 'the call to re-examine the nature of the parliamentary process will gather momentum ' .10 4 Ibid. 5 Ibid. pp.178-179. 6 Ibid. The adversarial character of dominant State legal systems is also becoming subject to more and more criticism. It appears likely that significant movement towards different inquiratorial systems will occur, not least because of the huge expense and growing unaffordabili ty of adversarial systems. 7 Ibid. 8 Ibid. p. 180. 9 Ibid. p.179. It is a symptom of both, the latter especially. lO Ibid . p. 181 . 3 A third relevant factor contributing to loss of faith is the impression of Australians that 'they are overgoverned ' 11 , with too many expensive bureaucracies and too many houses of parliament. Conflicts between State and Federal parliaments - and between the various State parliaments themselves - are regarded as a particularly unproductive expenditure of political energy, and Australians question whether 15 houses of parliament may be too many for the efficient government of 18 million people. The sheer number of parliaments is often blamed for the problem of too many bureaucracies and for many duplications of bureaucratic and political activity between State and Federal · governments. ... Whilst there is little love felt in the Australian community for Canberra and for the idea of more centralised government even that is beginning to appear preferable ... . The widespread support for the idea of a republic which emerged during 1992 is closely related to the underlying sense that Australia is overdue for _some kind of reexamination of its political institutions, and even the notion of Federation itself. ... As debate about the idea of a republic proceeds ... it has begun to incorporate the idea that Australian's political structures and systems might be quite significantly reformed. 12 Such diseffection reflects too a growing awareness that Australia's political arrangements owe more to historical accident than to rational design. Even though the main proposals for change no doubt remain reformist in character and could lead in unfortunate directions, some of them are far-reaching by normal standards. Both the extensive disenchantme nt with present political arrangements and the felt need for significant change further suggest political times are not altogether normal. Elements underpinning a political paradigm shift are already present, as are features supporting rational redesign, to which radical additions are now feasible. So far there have been, along with normal inertial resistance to change, two main responses to growing pressure for change: political, from politicians, ex-politicians and political commentator s , and academic from intellectuals, academic entrepreneurs and academic journalists. By and large, political responses have been grander, more sweeping and vaguer; academic responses more theoretical and cautious, piecemeal and detailed. But there are no grand detailed plans. Under the leading proposal so far for political change, Australia's constitutiona l monarchy will be displaced by a constitutional republic with its own head of state displacing the monarch, but with perhaps minimal adjustments otherwise. Nonetheless , as a result , republicanism is in the air. Politicians have begun to contemplate other practical reforms, while 11 Ibid. p. 181 , itals added. 12 Ibid. p.181 -2. Republican proposals have been circulating for some time . But the cause was finally taken up by prominent politicians, who made it their own, after which it became a popular issue. Mackay's accurate presentation of popular support for political change contrasts drolly with the first part of his book which depicts an Australian populace exhausted by change and longing for the old ease and somnolence. 4 academics have begun to embroider theories around republicanism and institutional reform. What happens to the Australian federation of states is one of the many unresolved issues presently being debated. The main reason for reform offered by the political camp can be summed up simply as changing geopolitica l circumstances. The camp tends not to acknowledge what would reflect adversely upon it, the poorness of federal political practice. Rather it tends to attribute popular dissatisfaction to economic circumstances and uncertainties: declining real standards of living, extensive unemploym ent, persistent recession until recently, problems to be surmounted by full-steam ahead untrammelled economic growth, to be attained by recoupling Australia to the Asian economic express. Meanwhile an orchestrated republican movement can help divert popular political attention from poor political management and a gloomy economic predicament. Much has changed in the century since present antiquated political arrangements were hammered out, arrangeme nts making the newly-fashioned .Commonw ealth of Australia, politically a federation of states, into a constitutional monarchy coupled to Britain, arrangements of convenience fashioned for very different circumstances. Most non-symbolic linkages with Britain, which has been inching towards a place in a united Europe, have already been severed. Australia has gradually begun to appreciate its geo-political position in the Indian-Pacific region (and the money-ma king opportunities for a sagging resource-based economy in allegedly booming parts of Asia). Whence the main idealistic proposal: for an independent republic, decoupled from Europe, assuming its own (prominent) place in its geo-political regions. In principle at least, place and region begin to assume, or resume, some of their neglected, but historic, significance (however that is not how it is yet seen). Most proposals for constitutional and federal reform fit within that limited idealistic conception. One important proposal, advanced by established political players, their most radical proposal so far, includes abolition of the present states. Such a proposal would clearly represent a welcome step in anarchist directi<;ms, were it not regularly offset by the idea of a strengthened central state.13 Supposing this latter unfortunate idea is bracketed for the moment, then what is being seriously considered already starts to look like a much more rational regionalism than what presently prevails. The present states of Australia are undoubtedly an anachronis m, based on accidental boundaries of a contingent colonial history. They are ecologically irrational management units, utterly failing to reflect ecological regions. Yet the states possess extensive environmental and other manageme nt powers, inappropriate 'powers which derive from what was largely a political bargaining process conducted a century ago.' Another effect of inapposite state-federal 13 Anarchists can even rest (if uneasily) with a con stitution , so long as it provides for an organisation, Australia Inc . even, sufficiently different from a state and its authoritarian trappings. 5 arrangements, especially 'funding arrangements, has been to lock out local government and, more importantly, local communities . ... local communities must be given greater control over those decisions of government which effect their lives ... '; the opportunity 'to design and provide the services which are needed locally.' 14 At this stage of the dialectic McPhee slides easily and naturally from localism to regionalism. A glance at the map reveals natural regions for local government on a viable scale [an optimistic contention]. Some cross State boundaries, and I would envisage that State governments would be replaced with regional governments. These would be more akin to larger local governments and would certainly not have the trappings of the States. They should not have parliaments and the expensive, unwieldy and inefficient bureaucracies which characterise our States. They should have a small number of full-time councillors. .. Regional governments should be solely accountable to their ratepayers ... 15 . So far so good: however McPhee thereupon begins to infiltrate stock (small /) ·liberal management assumptions. Nonetheless the basic idea to retain is simple: that of ecologicallyrational local and regional rearrangemen t of anachronistic state partitions. But that regionalizatio n should be greened, as reform should be radicalized. More generally, opportunites now present themselves to inset more radical ideas throughout the debate about Australia's future directions. For much has been left off political agendas for change, not merely environments and habitats of their less prominent or noisy inhabitants, but also such issues as rights and liberties, transformation of antiquated legal and executive frameworks, and so on. Omission of (human) rights is especially remarkable in states such as Australia, whose constitutions astonishingly do not mention at all (what is however often supposed to justify states) individual rights, such rights only being ensured, so far as they are, assumptions from uncodified common law, by indirect routes (statutes regarding treatment of minorities and the like). Nor do the political camps pushing limited change speak of rights or liberties; a very limited conception of adjustments required prevails (though without rights and liberties and a generous public sphere there is little, and little prospect of,justificatio n for a state at all). Accordingly political agendas for change need to be conspicuously broadened, to accommodate a decidedly more ambitious range of constitutional and institutional redesign. 2. A project within a project: radically reshaping Australian institutions. 14 All quotes in this paragraph are drawn from McPhee. An address along similar lines to the Hon. Ian McPhee, also proposing abolition of the states, was delivered by the former Prime Minister R.G. Hawke. Hawke's speech, by contrast with McPhee's, attracted much media attention, and though facilely dismissed as "unrealistic" by some practicing politicians , appeared to gain a good deal of support. I5 McPhee ibid. 6 Academic entrepreneurs have also responded quickly to proposals for constitutional and institutional changes. Early to scramble on the bandwagon was the institution to which I am affiliated, the Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University, with its ambitious decade-lon g project, Reshaping Australian Institutions: Towards and Beyond 2001. 16 One. small part of this project does connect with the republican push, which no doubt helped inspire it and gain its funding. The academic version of republicanism furnishes an institutional and historic setting, tracing its roots back to ancient Rome, and thereby linking in, what admits much modem adaptation, notions of citizenship and civic virtues. But most of the project is independent of any republican reorganisation. The Reshaping Australian Institutions project is presented in predominantly reformist fashion, unsurprisingly. It is supposed, for instance, to 'provide major input into evaluation and refonn of Australia's institutions'; indeed it is explicitly 'aimed at contributing to Australian constitutio nal reform'. 17 Nothing however precludes considerat ion of reshaping or transforming Australian institutions - those of the whole ecological region - in a unreformist and possibly unconstitutional way, in a radical way. Admittedly, the rough boundary between reformist and radical routes becomes even more blurred when the constitution of a country is open for possible major reconsideration and much political infrastructure may be altered. Nonetheless, from the perspective of a strong central state, the stock. boundary stands intact. For reformist changes would amount to comparative small adjustments leaving it substantially intact. For example, a minimal transformation, of the sort presently much favoured, from constitutional monarchy to Australian republic, though entailing non-negligible constitutional redrafting, need only amend the roles of a few elite power- and position-holders. By contrast, radical changes would substantially alter that strong central state, perhaps (as will be proposed) eliminating it altogether. There are appealing reasons for attempting wider, more radical investigations. For, firstly, there may be more satisfactory institutional structures not accessible, or even visible, along normal constitutional reform routes. Secondly, there is a demand, a small but growing 16 A recent brief description of this two million dollar project, now outlined in several places, is given in Tynan, pp.17-19. Fuller descriptions are available from a main coordinator of the project, J. Braithwaite, Law, RSSS, ANU. One of the many strands (17 at last count) of this project is an environmental (or green) strand. The immediate predecessor of this article was presented in a workshop at RSSS on green political theory , arranged under the project. That accounts for some of the otherwise puzzling structure of what has eventuated. Another earlier version was tried out at Ecopolitics VIII, Pacific Visions, held at Lincoln University, Christchurch, New Zealand, in July 1994. 17 ' Reshaping Australian institutions : towards and beyond 200 l' in Tynan , p.17, italics added. 7 demand from green directions for instance, for radical institutional change. It would be prudent, then, to make some investigation of the options, to assess their prospects. Thirdly, reflection on such structures would certainly be part of a more comprehensive study of and theory of institutional design, which the Reshaping project also presents as an objective. Fourthly, much more controversially, major environmental problems cannot be satisfactorily solved along merely reformist paths. For states, what are reformed, states themselves are ecologically dysfunctional. In practice this appears obvious enough. Simply reflect upon their environmental records; these are even worse than those abysmal records compiled for human rights. But the practical case can be argued in detail in a state by state way, or less laboriously, through the familiar rough classification of states into first, second and third world states. In main third world regions, the rise of the state has seen the serious decline of environments. Those third world states that have not largely destroyed their natural environments are in rapid process of doing so. The activities involved are, furthermore, not merely tolerated by these states but are usually actively encouraged (e.g. with state participation or by state concessions, as through taxation advantages, subsidies, expert incentives, etc.). Further, the role of exploitation and plunder of remaining natural "resources'', and depletion of "biological capital", by third world states, most of which are now trapped in debt and structural adjustment, has increased many-fold in the last two decades. How destructively second world states of eastern Europe treated their own (and also other regions') environment, how they over-expoited and polluted them, has recently been much publicized. While the recent record in first world states is no doubt marginally better, many of these states dominated their natural environments and their wild inhabitants in the past and have heavily polluted and exported their urban and industrial regions. Nor does their present record gain an environmental pass. For example, those that have any natural forests (similarly fisheries) left are in the process of eliminating or degrading most what remains; most are failing seriously in meeting (their own) targets on greenhouse emissions, and so on. More theoretically, it is unlikely that states, increasingly focussed narrowly upon shallow economic agendas, will or can deliver satisfactorily environmentally. A prime reason is this: states are ineluctably committed, more and more as their populations expand, to high levels of economic activity characteristically to economic growth of sorts which impact heavily environmentally, inducing inevitable degradation.18 Accordingly, there are then, or should be, two bands to any green (or environmental) strand of a restructuring Australian institutions project: not merely an important reformist side, 18 This theme, that states are normally ecologically dysfunctional, is documented and argued in detail elsewhere; see e.g. Carter and especially . Sylvan 96 . On the dismal environmental records of particular states see Punting. For shocking figures and illustrations as regards environmental exploitation of third world states, see Bolla, pp57-65 . 8 but as well a radical spread. It is part of this underfunded and undersupported radical spread which forms the main object of investigation in what follows, that part that relinquishes present state structures, in favour of more environmentally benign institutions - which no doubt can be designed, even if not so readily brought to practical use. 19 In order to reach radical redesign ideas quickly, let us touch only lightly upon some of the more distinctively green reasons for this anarchoid quest (familiar anarchist reasons stand: the illegitimacy of present states, the undesirability and severe disutility of states, which typically are highly destructive and corrosive institutions based on concetration of power, hierarchical authority, massive coercion, manipulation by economic elites, technobureaucracy, utilitarian rationality, and sundry other evils. 20) As 1ndicated, present states are incompatible with stock ecologically sustainable practices, because of their heavy unrelenting commitments to shallow economic growth. More generally, standard states and their practices comprise very significant parts of environmental problems, but quite insufficient parts of any solutions. Moreover, states constitute an enormous and destructive drain on regional environments, a feature particularly evident in smaller states which are always looking out for revenue-raising expedients for their . . own expensive runnmg. Apart from those greens who have recognised the excessive environmental costs of states and their heavy demands on environments, and thus or otherwise have come to recognise the desirability of their withering away, there are many more who have become ambivalent about states, who appreciate their very problematic character and very questionable legitimacy, but do not see yet how to get along altogether without them, or more exactly (to point towards a partial resolution) without certain functions that they serve. To point immediately towards a resolution of this crucial problem, the functional dissolution idea advocated is this: that the functioning parts may be separately utilized without the colossal whole. The state is not an organism the functioning parts of which must fail without the whole. So it may well be the enormous fat of state can simply be shed, to great advantage. In any event, 'the State is a social institution', always 'within', Marxists continue, 'a ,concrete historic setting' .21 Granted, it is an institution. For an institution in the relevant sense is 'a society or association for the [organisation or] promotion of some particular object [or 19 To adapt a referee's trenchant summary . For detail on some familiar anarchist reasons , see Bumheim and above all Marshall. 20 Nonetheless practical revolutionary displacement of the state is not so remote as is generally supposed. 21 Thus, Green p.61, who adds quite wrongly that Proudhon and his disciples do not see it that way 'but as an abstraction and aberration'. 9 function]'. 22 Institutions include therefore the state, the central state. So it too is up for reshaping, radical slimming, and possible removal in a concrete historical setting, such as late twentieth century Australia. Whittling away the state means in tum dismantling corporate capitalism, which now dwells in symbiosis with the bureaucratic state, and also much else, often environmentally undesirable, that the state affords a supportive framework for and enables to flourish. Ideas and schemes for radical redesign are already available from rich anarchist and socialist sources, those for g_reen design and reshaping from growing and diverse environmental sources. In main part, then, radical ecoredesign is a matter of convivially meeting (not joining) the two, an intersection that favours anarchist inputs. Something ofthe sort has already been attempted, in an environmentally shallower way, in eco-anarchism, alias social ecology, and in a deeper way, in deep-green social theory. 23 Moreover, it could be attempted in other kinds of deeper green theory-itself really a plurality of theories, which however does not itself force radical ecoredesign, though most variants would support it. Thus Naess's "deep ecology" for example, which is not so far politically radical, only strongly reformist, could (and should) be given a radical tum. 24 Concentrating upon the radical spread of deeper green theory does not preclude concomitant reformist investigation and activity. Both sides of the green street should be played. Reformist opportunities should of course be pursued-increme ntal change, social engineering, greening bureaucrats, lobbying politicians, and like activity (but better really to cut through much such pleading and obiesance and be rid of politicians and bureaucrats). There are many reformist proposals being advanced for the greening of Australian federal institutionswith but few so far having much impact on practice. 25 Nonetheless, more limited, more constrained, proposals of this sort certainly have a better chance of making a difference than radical redesigns, regularly smartly dismissed as "unrealistic" or "utopian".26 No doubt the 22 Oxford English Dictionary, adapted. An institution is an organitution. 23 On social ecology, see Bookchin 90, and for information on deep-green social theory , see Sylvan and Bennett 94 and Routleys 80. 24 As to the political character of deep ecology, and why it should be turned, see Sylvan and Bennett 94, where an expose of the political theory of Naess's ecosophy is presented. 25 There are many many narrower economic and technological proposals. One of the more interesting wider proposals comes from an Opposition not noted for its green initiatives and commitments, for an overseeing Department of Sustainable Development, a Department that could see to the greening of all federal institutions. 26 Too smartly, as we argue elsewhere (e.g. Sylvan and Bennett 90). normal "reshaping institutions" investigations are rightly focussed upon institutional reform, not upon revolutionary reshaping, where much freer scope for redesign is offered. However the real possibility of radical change should not be excluded; green radicals should be prepared. There have been various opportunities for revolutionary change in Australian history, the last occurring, according to some historians, with the ignominious fall of the Whitlam government. There may well be opportunities again both in the near and intermediate future, especially should some solid work be put into propagating the prospect. In the near term there is economic disarray, social fragmentation, and constitutional destabilization; in the longer term increasing ecological problems and expanding eco-catastrophes loom. Under present incremental reform and regression, for all th_e spasmodic environmental rhetoric, comparatively little in the way of radical green change occurs or can be expected. Witness, for comparison, the snail pace of the establishment movement towards a rather minimal grey republicanism in Australia, or differently away from meeting carbon-reduction commitments. It is increasingly doubtful, given prevailing responses to economic and other difficulties, that present structural and systematic problems confronting Australia, for example, will be satisfactorily addressed, environmental problems such as extensive and expanding land and water degradation not least. Furthermore, under more incremental reform, the sorts of problems concerning reorganising society in deeper green ways, problems that provide subsequent topics, would likely noi arise. So in getting beyond more muddling along, do imagine fairly free scope for institutional eco-redesign is somehow dispensed. One nice corollary is that once it is worked out where to go organisationally, it is much easier to ascertain how to arrive there. 3. A basic problem of structure: central or decentralised organisation. There are large and immediate advantages in pursuing a problem-oriented approach to redesign. That approach, which will tend towards anarchoid outcomes, will be anarchistically guided in this respect: Unless there is a genuine problem, already causing difficulties or developing, nothing need be done; otherewise let things alone, let Being be. 27 On this non.:. managerial low-work approach a good deal of structure presently inoperational, and of idle regulation presently enacted, can be removed; organisational arrangements can be very significantly down-sized. The leading methodological idea is that enough relevant (biodegradable) structure is introduced to resolve organisational problems, but not substantially 27 The non -prejudical term 'anarchoid' is deployed, not because what emerges will not be anarchistic (as characterized in Marshall and in Sylvan 94), but because it departs from standard forms of anarchism in significant respects, not least in planned political organization. In this exercise organization is of the essence .. 11 more. Organisationa l oversupply and waste is thus avoided. Moreover, much structure that keeps so much environmenta lly destructive industry in business is likewise shed. Among basic problems for deeper green theory are those of political reorganisation and so of organisatior,,. Evidently institutions, and their types, are critical to such organisation. And a major organisational problem for any putative green society concerns structure: to take a critical case, whether society is centrally organised (concentrated, bureaucratised , hierarchical, largescale and so on) or decentralised (dispersed, non-hierarchic al, small-scale and supposedly beautiful, and so on). This focal problem, to centralise or not to centralise, is sometimes presented as a serious dilemma for concerned green theorists. 28 The binary horns of this dilemma are respectively: on the one horn, the pull ( or push) to localisation and regionalisatio n, to non-anonymo us smallscale low-impactin g environmenta lly-friendly arrangements , to diffusion of power and dismantling of the incubus of a central state with its crippling costs and unfriendly practices; and on the other horn, the need for continuing and further central income generation and welfare (re)distribution, central regulation and control, and the pressures to environmenta l reliance upon and use of the central state. 29 The dilemma has been trenchantly posed as follows: ... the demands of the Greens sometimes appear contradictory, in seeking increasing environmenta l regulation and welfare measures ... alongside a halt to industrial expansion, the very source of income for the welfare state. Yet the expansion and further centralization of the bureaucratic state apparatus is neither their overt goal nor covert motivation. Quite the contrary. Their genuine long term vision is of a decentralized , steady state society of self-sufficient, relationally autonomous (albeit interlinked) regions. 30 As it happens, not only does the theoretical and utopian literature run both ways, towards and away from centralisation , but so does practice and experience. As to theory, anarchistically -inclined presentations tend to favour decentralisation, perhaps with some central compensation through federation (thus recent Blueprints, ecotopias, and so on), whereas socialistically -inclined presentations invariably opt for powerful central states (to control and redistribute grander social programs, etc.). As to practice, there are local councils, community organisations, residents' groups aiming to keep out, or to remove, the state-sponsore d nuclear plants, toxic waste incinerators, waste dumps or super-highway s, on the one horn; and, on the 28 As by Michael Jacobs of The Green Economy, who has posed the problem sharply, as part of an argument however for retaining the central state (and much of present status quo arrangements). 29 Environmental reasons for favouring small-scale bioregional organisation are nicely gathered in McLaughlin, chapter I 0. 30 Fox, Ecopolitics III. 12 other, central states blocking, modifying, or regulating local or regionally promoted schemes for large dams (e.g. Tasmania's Franklin), forest exploitation, pulp mills, strip mining, and so on .31 To some extent, the way the problem has often been re-presented, in terms of a dilemma between top-down and bottom-up structure and power transmission, already points towards a theoretical resolution: namely, both, or rather enough of both. But how is this combination to be achieved? An answer does not fall out by pure reason, operating in isolation from other problems. By taking advantage of information gathered from other connected problems, a promising answer can be teased out. Neither standard socialism nor anarchism afford answers, socialism because it leaves the central institution of state intact. But standard anarchism, much more promising, does not resolve the problem either, because federation , as usually explained, does not leave enough structure; it may not even concede sufficient power to delegates to constrain exploitative local communities. A solution to such dilemma lies through a combinational strategy, which includes partial dissolution of the central state, into its actual organisational functions in each region. While removing the state, itself source of several environmenta l and social problems, and its concentration of power, invariably under environmenta lly unfriendly control, functional dissolution nonetheless retains its apparently essential services, including (where necessary) those of environmenta l regulation. Relevant continent-wid e functions would persist or be introduced: for example, services controlling inflow into Australia of damaging forms and materials such as toxic wastes and exotic pest species, or regulating outflow from Australia of native wildlife and flora. In part, ecoregional functionalism offers a radical continuation of the separation of powers of recent historical process, of church and state, legislature and executive, and so forth. As these functions come to operate separately while remaining coordinated, so would those functional arrangements and institutions dissolving the state. It is a major illusion of modem political theory that a central state, ceded monopolies on coercion, currency, taxation and so on, is necessary in order to secure adequate supply of public goods, including public order and environmenta l regulation. To the contrary, the most that appears required, the most that arguments would support, is some network of specific organisations functioning to look after specific kinds of goods and services, those necessary for this or that, that are not otherwise supplied. There is no inherent reason why communities should not institute and regulate specialised bodies coordinated among themselves (by negotiations or, failing that, through recognised arbitrators) to ensure the adequate maintenance or production of various types of public goods, including control of damaging crime. Each 3I Much turns on the exploitative character of certain local and regional communities, their get-richquick schemes, what they are prepared to do to survive in old or affluent ways, and so on . 13 such institution could gain community standing from its support base, for instance through achieving democraticall y-generated recognition. Such an institution would aim to secure execution of its recommendat ions and decisions by sanctions and like admissible means, and in doing this it could mobilize in co-operation with communities and with other recognised institutions . There are many examples of such institutions operating successfully both regionally and internationally; for instance, those for postal and communicational arrangements, international sporting bodies, international academies and clubs, environmenta l and consumer organizations.32 4. Selecting satisfactory political arrangemen ts within the span of anarchoid options. Anarchoid options come in a wide variety of forms, including, among others, both right leaning individualisti c or capitalistic varieties, and lef-leaning social or communitaria n varieties.33 A suitably generous political pluralism will allow for all these form, while not encouraging all, <:lS they are of very different merit. For example, some may be neglectful or repressive of some of their inhabitants, or destructive of their environments; others, superior in these coino-environmental regards, may not be. Dismantling or deconstructing a state does not, on its own, make a sharp selection between alternatives. No doubt the hope is, what can be striven for, that adequate design are sought and adequate selections inadmissible forms rapidly perish. Those forms that are admissible can be ranked, for instance according to defeasible criteria based upon "pillars" of German green movement such as environmenta l sensitivity, democratic institutions, and nonviolent practices. While right leaning anarchoid arrangements could in theory work (e.g. under what is improbable, benevolent capitalists), they are unlikey to succeed in practice, for several reasons. Consider to illustrate in outline, why that much promoted rightist form, market (or "liberal" 32 This passage borrows from the summary in Burnheim 86 p.221 of Burnheim 85. For much fuller elaboration see Burnheim 85 and Sylvan 94. The critical issue of funding administration, without a coercive location system, is also breached in these places (and developed in Sylvan 96). The broad proposal is that low-cost administration , much of which would be volunteer, could be funded by rents (there would be no property in land and resources), use charges, and fines . 33 There are many more varieties of political systems than much recent theory has cared to concede . For example, to take right-leaning dimensions, all of individualism , market-organiza tion and capitalism function substantially independently. There can be markets without capitalism (characterised through opportunities to accumulate capital), and conversely, capitalism with free mar1cet arrangements. And so on . Most historic and modern systems, upon which political theory has tended inadmissilby to concentrate almost exclusively, are hybrid arrangements with mixes of different elements drawn from both "left" and "right". 14 capitalism is unlikely to serve. For one reasons an intrusive state is likely to emerge, with standing state controlled and funded military and police forces to defend capitalist interests and accommod ation, to protect private property, to uphold social in equalities, and to enforce particular market and trade structures, with a substantial and heavy taxation system to fund these forces and a correspond ing bureaucracy needed to administer and regulate these and other institutions, such as those required to guarantee that capitalist liabilites are limited and to keep markets (far from self-regulating) free and competitive. Not only are anarchoid conditions thus violated, so are those for benign green socities. In normal practice, market capitalism tends to be highly environmental exploitative, as modem history demonstrates all too plainly (plainly too it is not alone in this propensity, so are other modern statist systems). Furthermor e, given the sorts of humans and practices (including extravagen t consumptio n for all that can afford it) these systems tend to elevate, exalt, encourage and some times even enforce, extensive exploitation is to be expected, and liable to persist-wi thout further state interventio n to distort "natural" capitalistic incentives and institutions, to limit practices on private property (thereby altering the institution 34 ), to establish new mitoument s and commoditi es such as pollution licences, green investment s and futures, and so forth. Even though a shallow greenness could be sprayed upon parts of market capitalism (factoiries in fields, forest reserves retained for tourists, etc.) and some green chowcase exhibits tacked on, environme ntal depth cannot. Shallownes s is both an inevitable consequenc e of the justifying socio-econ omic theory, and also an expected best outcome of practice. Accordingl y in institutional design it is much more promising to look in democratic leftleaning directions. It would be rash to gamble upon any bright new clause of environme ntally and socially benign market capitalism, which could in any event easily revert back to dark industrial ages. Similar arguments to those sketched could be developed as regards centralised socialism, especially as untempered by democratic procedures. While island communiti es of a wide range of varieties are naturally not excluded under anarchoida l pluralism, brighter continental prospects lie through modifications of democratic sociality, which appears to permit much of what is sought in design. Under duly decentralized social organization, each requisite function would be carried out by some association of agents comprising operative and support staff (that is, as regards bare formal structure, more or less as now, in institutions like department s and corporation s). For direct accountability downwards , and also to ensure desirable separation and dilution of power, upper operatives, those of a directing or steering committee (the nervous system of the organisation), would be democratic ally selected (from a relevant lower level constituenc y, and 34 Infiltrated too is much mythology, including acclaimed environmenta l virtues of private property and privatization generally . 15 from the whole people of an ecoregion in case of a typical bottom level institution). Note well that selection is not election: election is but one method of democratic selection, and often enough not an altogether satisfactory method. The point of some sort of democratic selection, as a guiding though not invariant rule, is manifold: it is in part to ensure due accountability, in part to prevent unethical accumulation of power in special classes, and in part for reasons that devolve from the very notion of democracy itself. In brief, certain forms of democracy offer promising prospects for green reorganisation, particularly within complementing left-leaning settings where those froms can function in favour of sustainability. However even with an informed democracy in place, there are few guarantees. Some structure, such as limited executive power separated from judicial and administrative functions, needs to be set in place to block or retard worse eventualities (such as mob actions, selection of tryants, mistreatment of noncitizens and so on). Even then several thorny problems remain for any deeper green political theory. 5. Problems of chauvinism and present-time bias in democratic political institutions. In modem usage of the motherhood term democracy, two main lines are visible: included are not only forms of political organisation where 'power [is presumed to] reside in the people as a whole, and is exercised either directly by them ... or by officers [selected] by them\ but 'often more vaguely denoting a social state in which all have equal rights, without hereditary or arbitrary differences of rank or privilege' 35 . It is on the basis of this second line that the call for democracy has operated to remove chauvinism and discrimination of a range of forms: against unpropertied minorities, nonconformists, women, blacks, tribals, and so on. Even so pursuit of the line, where successful, has not generally conferred adequate representation and rights on several of these groups; but, more important, pursuit has stopped short in its inclusions at certain humans, such as those granted citizenship-though relevant interests of many other creatures and welfare of many of other items may be affected by what those citizens elect to do. While democratic voters can perhaps be entrusted to take some account of those near and dear (within remarkably sharp limits, as the situation of women in many regions still shows), such as those deemed incompetent to vote: the young, deranged, and so on, much evidence reveals that they cannot be relied for what is less near or dear (and indeed are easily herded into casting their votes in accord with a shallow mercantilism). Consider what get left out , outcasts of even perfect democratic control:- 35 Oxford English Dictionary entry 1, main entry. These two lines are by no means the only distinctive lines now visible: increasingly conspicuous in calls for "democracy", notably in Asia, are calls to freedom and rights: not merely for basic legal freedoms such as free assembly, fair process and so on, but for freedom to access information (the "right to know" ). 16 • spatially distant agents. For example, the interests of many humans outside USA are much affected by practices of the US government, which however is outside their democratic reach. • temporally distant agents. Since the past is past, it is future agents who would be affected, often drastically affected, by present practices, that matter. Some way of taking due account of future agents, their interests and welfare, is required, even under shallow long-term ecology, that is under lighter green positions. Sustainable development has been regularly diverted into--what is part of what it is about-such a way, an indirect and so far utterly ineffectual way.36 Much more of importance is also excluded according to deep-green theory: • creatures with interests, other than present human citizens, and • items with welfare, but perhaps lacking interests. The category includes items with intrinsic value, whose value can be effected, made to fare worse or better. A major problem, little addressed, is how to take due account of such democraticall y excludes. It is a problem especially for deeper green theories: that deep problem is, so to say, how to obtain satisfactory representation of all that is of value in the natural world? That way of putting it, while a little misleading, does point to a particular type of resolution. Problems special to deep ecopolitical theory, include, that is, issues as to adequacy of representation of items of value outside those humans that are represented, representation of their interests, where they have them, of their welfare otherwise, of favourable conditions for their sustenance, continuation and retention of value. Democracy of discussed modem sorts, whether representative or participative, will not serve these purposes at all satisfactorily. For instance, insofar as party-political representative democracies represent anything (even human "bottom lines" as is sometimes erroneously supposed), they appear to represent primarily interests of certain business-allied elites. Among the issues are of course those as to adequacy of retention and protection of nonhuman items of intrinsic value, tropical forests and their inhabitants and elements for instance. As observed, there is really no organisationa l alternative to proceeding with and through agents, preferably well-disposed and quality agents. It is hard to guarantee either politically. As agents are but a subclass of what requires democratic representation and what should have its welfare or interests considered, how are the rest to be taken care of satisfactorily? There are significant older responses to like problems, through totems and taboos, guardians and constraints. Looked at one way the problem repeats, more or less, a familiar problem: namely, how in larger constituencies do decision-mak ing agents represent the whole mass of agents and others in the constituency? A main democratic answer, designed to avoid many shortcomings 36 See Sylvan and Bennett 93. 17 of alternatives, was: by representative means-only "representation" was almost never taken seriously or literally enough. The sorts of considerations that made representation a promising resolution make what is to be proposed-wh ere representation has, in any case, to be expanded -also promising. A key principle is this: all relevant items are to be represented. Relevance criteria enter importantly. Steering committees of lower level institutions among the main decision-mak ing bodies should be appropriately representative of all items whose welfare is affected by their decisions (principle of deepened demanarchy). Under more equitable arrangements, then, some decision-engaged agents will have to be selected as representative of relevant classes of excludeds. Electoral arrangements do not so readily allow for such; sortition, well-designed selection by lot, does. 37 Of course, however good the selection processes, however disinterested and well-intentioned the agents selected, some bias may remain. Nonetheless prejudice and mal-treatment may be much reduced. As already hinted, deepened representation is not the only promising resolution of the present problem that might be tried. Another, which could be attempted either separately or concurrently, operates through the directive of ecologically sustainable development, requiring as a constraint, not only intergenerational equity but also preservation of items of ecological value. 38 It might be suggested that such a directive be made mandatory, applying to all relevant steering committees. But, as already evident, there <;1re severe obstacles to getting such a directive properly implemented. (In present oligarchical circumstance s, even very dilute versions are worth pressing for however, as they would offer definite improvements upon what presently happens.) 6. A fundamenta l dilemma for (deeper)-gre en organization democratic or authoritaria n procedures? There is strictly no logical space for a deeper green democracy, according to Saward for one. For there is a clash, an essential tension, between democratic procedures and deeper green values and commitments, notably to intrinsic values in nature. The main drift of the argument is that green values, which are mandatory for deeper greens, require for their implementation antidemocratic, indeed authoritarian procedures; otherwise they cannot be guaranteed. This nasty conundrum for green theory over democracy, which the theory typically sponsors, is put in sharper form as follows :39 Democracy concerns procedures, environmentalism certain outcomes. What guarantee can 37 No doubt there are electoral approximations; e.g. candidates in separate classes for each category to be represented. 38 For elaboration of this option, see Sylvan and Bennett 93 and its sequel. 39 Goodin, condensing Saward, p.168 . 18 there be that the procedures will deliver the outcomes? What guarantee that democracy would yield a way of protecting environments? However the type of situation is worse than a matter of guarantess, which greens are not really seeking and could not in general expect. (For here as almost everywhere else, things can go wrong. Philosophy especially supplies few absolutes and little certainty.) It is a type of situation, moreover, which effects not only environmentalism but any sort of social and other amelioration, and even democracy itself. For democratic procedures may yield unsatisfactory and even anti-democratic outcomes. Unfortunately there are few or no guarantees that masitonous forms will eventuate or persist. Political history itself capiously illustrates that. But ti can be argued theoretically. For example, succession of regimes must view (owing to finite lifetimes, etc.), and in occasional transitions deterioration can occur; there are no effective mechanisms that an exclude decline absolutely. Democratic procedures of certain sorts offer better controls, and better prospects of satisfactory transition than most other available, but even they afford no cast as on guantees of adequacy, and are beset by paradoxes of their own. In inadequate democratic structure plausible scenarios are easily designed where just such outcomes occur, for instance as in what has been called a "paradox of democracy" where a constituency elects an anti-democratic tyrant. 40 A concerned attempt is made by Saward to mount a destructive version of such a paradox against deep-green political theory (which he darkly calls 'dark green'). The version is based upon holism and intrinsic value requirements, coupled with democratic demands, of deep green theory . In clearest form, the version runs as follows: Holism implies consistency or compatibility. But intrinsic value maintenance and democracy are not compatible, under evident conditions (e.g. democratic procedures result in diminution or destruction of intrinsic value). Firstly, partial confirmation for this explication: The green imperative contains a number of elements, variously economic, political, social, geographical, religious, and so on. Its force comes partly from the holism it embodies, and partly from its basis in the idea of the 'intrinsic value' of nature. Holism implies that the various elements which make up the imperative are compatible. The elements of the imperative gain their importance, and their links with each other, by being referable back to a common, intrinsic value. It is at this point that we can pick up the position of democracy or 'direct democracy' in lists of basic values set out by greens. These goals are the elements of the overall green imperative, and gain their importance from both the holistic nature and intrinsic merit of the values which the imperative represents. 41 40 Such paradoxes of democracy, and variants thereupon, are presented trenchantly by Popper, and nullified in Sylvan and Bennett 90. Improved structures can much reduce the likelihood and problematicness of paradoxical overturns. 41 Saward, paper version p.3 .; repeated p.5 . 19 As should now be plain, and is becoming plainer, consistency is not an invariant desideratum, and is not insisted upon; coherence is what is "implied" and what supersedes consistency .42 As more than a century of Hegelian theory should have revealed, there can be inconsistent wholes. A further key assumption in the argument is that guaranteeing that intrinsic value is protected (or like absolutes sustained) will require undemocratic procedures, such as authoritarian ones. An underlying assumption (soon to be rejected, e.g. as incorporating an offensive false dichotomy) is that only undemocratic, authoritarian procedures fit with deeper green imperatives or givens. 43 Several illustrations are offered of inconsistency of green imperative_s with types of democratic procedures-none of which tell, without testing adaptation, specifically against deeper green positions. A first illustration is directed against Porritt: A direct democratic procedure (is not) compatible with imperative goals like ' local production for local need', 'low consumption', 'labour-intensive production' , and ' voluntary simplicity' (other items from Porritt's list). 44 Against this and other illustrations, it is worth emphasizing goals resemble objectives and ~argets; goals are goals which are not mandatory and by no means always achieved, especially if the achievers, like present humans, fall short (e.g . irt ecological sensitivity) or their organisational means and opportunities are inadequate. Observe the oppositional attempt, to convert or to twist (since it is an up-grading by high redefinition), goals, programs , and principles-through 'imperative goals' and the like-into 'imperatives', 'prescribed outcomes' , undeniable principles, ultimates. That attempt should be resisted. A second example looks at an alleged contradiction in the programme of the German Green Party. ' Grassroots democracy' is one of the four 'basic principles' of the party's 'global conception' . Another is the 'ecological': 'Proceeding from the laws of nature, and especially from the knowledge that unlimited growth is impossible in a limited system, and ecological policy means understanding ourselves and our environment as part of nature'. In effect, this means that certain outcomes are proscribed from decision-making procedures. Proscribed outcomes go well beyond any plausible list of outcomes which must be proscribed in the interests of defending a direct democratic decision procedure. Therefore, there is a clear contradiction between elements of the value-set, whereas given the holism the green imperative is based on we would have the right to expect these goals and values to be_thoroughly compatible.4 5 42 See Priest and others. 43 Cf.p.12 essay. 44 [Reference] 45 [Reference] 20 The last charge repeats the critical point already rejected, that holism implies consistency. A further critical point should also be rejected: the flawed inference that 'certain outcomes are proscribed' . A political party in a democratic system has to be prepared to see its principles, however spendid, overridden, certainly by other parties if they gain or hold political power. There is a misconception too about principles (especially higher level principles) and their roles: ' principles [too] can only be akin to [givens and] "laws of nature", against which democratic procedures must inevitably be traded off the board'. Sets of principles, which may themselves turn out to be inconsistent, are hardly akin to natural laws; consider for instance reasons for their revision, procedures for rechecking and revision, and so on. In any case, democratic procedures are not traded away against laws of nature, which they may try to upset or suppress. (Rather effort should be directed at informing the electorate and the like). To reinforce his case, Saward appeals to other authors who have advanced similar claims (it is like appealing for confirmation of a newspaper report to other newspapers). Frankel accuses Bahro of an 'anti-democratic' vision of an ecological society, given that politics as conflict will have no place in a sea of 'givens'. He sees the dilemma as being similar to that of socialists-de eming certain things as desirable in an ultimate sense, but proclaiming attachment to democracy and the diversity it implies. Ophuls has stated the matter especially clearly. · The basic question about politics, he writes, is 'Is the way we organize our communal life and rule ourselves compatible with ecological imperatives and other natural laws? ... how we run our lives will be increasingly determined by ecological imperatives' 46 In an ecological society, enough of the demos (members of democratic constituency) will hold ecological attitudes and vote or select accordingly, almost by definition. Problems of effecting change lie with unecological communities, which may not support ecological principles under instituted democratic procedures (as presently in many places) . Principles, and ecological "givens", stand, they remain 'desirable in an ultimate sense', but they are not followed and implemented, while revealed democratic preferences go unchanged. There need be no 'antidemocratic vision', but rather an unecological praxis, which principled greens will work to change. The route is accordingly barred to Sayward's important conclusions ... : that at best direct democracy, and for that matter indirect forms of democracy, can only be at or near the bottom of value-lists of greens. A commitment to democracy must clash with values that are inherent to ecologism-a nd ecologism is about inherency, intrinsic values, laws of nature and holism. Things-like democracy-t hat can only have instrumental value must lose out to imperatives backed by inescapable canonical force.47 · 46 47 .. ·- ·----------- ------ - - - - - - - - - - - -- ------ 21 What Saward proposes instead is depressing ly familiar: pragmatism , jettison intrinsic value. Out therewith go deep-green positions . ... greens should not think in terms of green imperatives . Indeed, it suggests that to think in terms of imperative s based on arguments about intrinsic merit is unjustifiabl e.48 Fortunately the argument developed does not sustain the proposals. There is, to iterate a central point, no internal or latent contradicti on between (deep-)gree n policy objectives and democratic procedures . Rather, green objectives would fail to be achieved without welldisposed decision makers, who may not straightforwardly reflect any "will" of the demos. A logical requiremen t on a realistic set of political objectives is that there are accessible circumstan ces where they are realisable, where all elements of the whole would obtain. It should not be required that there are are no situations where they may conflict, become inconsisten t. It is certainly not required that they are realised, by whatever means. A community , as variously represented , can choose better or worse. There are many means available, which it may shun (again there are no absolute guarantees) , enabling it to choose better, including improved structures, attitudinal change and consciousn ess raising; and so on. In the end Saward too recognises the popular power of attitudinal change, thereby removing himself his previous loading of authoritarian means upon greens. There needs, from a green perspectiv e [and others], to be a change in political culture such that it will be compatible with sustainability. This, of course, is a familiar theme from green writing. How[?] ... It can only be the case that 'political change will ony occur once people think differently or, more particularly, that sustainable living must be prefaced by sustainable thinking' . By abandoning foundation alist myths of intrinsic merit, greens abandon the implicit arrogance that have made democracy such a tenuous part of green political theory. 49 But he overstates the attitudinal point, with 'only ... the case'. People can be politically led (retardation , however, as distinct from genuine advancement, is a familiar phenomena ); they could just elect a green governmen t which instituted, under permissible democratic methods, sustainable living or the like. Worse still, his final ungrammatical sentence is a complete non48 Of course it is now put in terms of "imperatives "; it would be better expressed in terms of principles, policy objectives or the like. Opposition to deeper green political approaches often derives, as in Saward and in Goodin, from a underlying shallow utilitarianism . The differences concern not only depth, but the rejection of individual interest bases, in favour of welfare bases and holism in deeper approaches. 49 [Ref. and page] There are further defects in this passage than those noted in the text. For one, admission of intrinsic merit does not entail foundationalism. For another, such recognition of merit, which is less liable to disturb democracy, or render it tenuous, than adherence to Christianity, need caary no tinges of arrogance; to the contrary, by contrast with humanism it may yield a certain humbleness. 22 sequitur. Attitudinal change may including coming to appreciate intrinsic merit in natural things other than humans. 7. Ecoregio nal demanar choid reshaping of Australi an political institutio ns: one beginni ng. Is such a radical restructur ing as that suggested feasible? Initial investiga tions hold out the hope that major problems for deeper green theory can be solved, at least in theory. Investigations according ly suggest that the project within the Reshaping Australia n Institutions project is viable and worth pursuing. A logical next stage offers sketches for a radical political reorganisation of Australia. 50 Evidently there would be many designs (thereby removing facile jeers against "the blueprint ", a part of co-optative strategy for persistence with prevailing statist arrangem ents). Among the many designs, some few, conformi ng to favoured principles, would be selected for detailed study. If the study were attempted, most appropria tely through systems modelling s, then flexibility could be built into modellings, so that even though only a few basic designs were examined , many variations would be feasible. Not only is systems modelling particular ly well suited to modelling network designs; it also further offers prospects for computin g simulatio n and impleme ntation, and even some simulate d political experime ntation. Furtherm ore, such modelling s begin to give some grasp on the size and complexi ty of the task (a useful comparison is with World 3 modelling of the on-going "Limits to Growth" project 51 , or, better, with a regionalized version of it). To get started on such ecoregional design, for Australia, two broad classifica tions and associated maps and charts are required: • 1. an ecoregional classification, with partitions and overlays, for Australia and its continental shelf. Observe that this classifica tion would be hierarchi cal, as smaller regions merge into larger regions; but it is a benign hierarchy of levels (it facilitates no accumula tion of power or wealth) . Observe too that any such classification is far from unique. Plurality has already set in, and a choice of classifica tion (or a few choices) would have to be made, taking due account of political organisat ional principle s and objective s. Fortunate ly some of the prelimina ry classifica tory work has already been accompli shed in Environm ental Regional isations of Australia, where 3 broad classifications are presented and procedures for generatin g many more 50 Such design, well accomplish ed, would help considerab ly in revealing what is possible, thereby providing a seriously neglected contribution to politics, itself sometimes presented, with undue licence, as the art of the possible. 5I See e.g. Meadows. 23 given. 52 For political purposes further classification attributes (e.g. demog raphic features) need to be included. Ecoregions provide the basis for spatially linked admin istrativ e and comm unity units. (Not all units need be of this sort; many contemporary arrangements are spatially unlinked). At this stage a basic principle of decentralization and distributed and smalle r-scale organization can be invoked, namely • subsidiarization: organisational functions should be allowed to fall down to (or to be pushed down to) the lowest level compatible with their satisfactory performance . Thus, for instance, most matters concerning such things as sewerage and primar y educat ion would be localized. This subsidiarization principle, drawn from classical anarchism, has been widely adopted in green planni ng propo sals. (It is said to have been applie d by the Catho lic Churc h in admin istratio n of the Holy Roman Empire, whenc e the not altoge ther apt title derives. It is presently being reassessed for use in that successor organisation , united Europe.) No doubt the principle is open to challenge, for instance on grounds of efficiency, that larger size may prove more efficie nt, of duplic ation, and so on. But, the object ive is not maxim ization of technological values such as efficiency factors; instead it aims to satisiz e on a wider framework of values , including holistic social arrangements. Presum ably, howev er, undue duplication of expensive administrative bodies is to be avoided. Coupled with subidiarization is another principle, • direct accountability downwards: units should answer directly to region al constituencies. This contra sts with prevailing accountability (such as it is) upwar ds, throug h some indirect and tenuou s , centra lized circui ting chain. Natura lly much more gets compr ehend ed under accountability , for instance openness of environmental accounting. There are also principles interrelating smaller with larger regions, both bottom-up and topdown (or centre down) principles. Among these will be • repres entatio n of smalle r regions in relevant planni ng institutions of more compr ehensi ve region s . Representation, appropriately regulated, would often replac e anarchistic federation, which as observed appears too weak for requisite environmental contro l. The point needs no labouring that the classifications and principles are open to challenge at every step; for instance, there is nothing rock-hard about the type of ecoregional classification prefer red, nor about social functio ns to be addres sed. At a theore tical stage that is unproblematic: there are other (less preferable) models; elaborate your own if you want to and can. In any case, it is to be hoped that a diversity in theory might be to some extent reflected in some diversity in practi ce-wi th different regions and continents trying different arrangements, 52 See Thackway and Cresswell. Rudiments of a politically useful classific ation begin to emerge on their 30 Group Regionalisation . 24 with much less of the sort of cosmopo litan political monocult ure that we are presently being harassed toward, with much more resilient political biodiversity. Of course, not all political forms (includin g stateless types) are equally desirable or satisfactory, and some (includin g present state examples) are inaccepta ble. So there are bounds open diversity. Moreove r, what suits one communi ty or region well may not suit another to be satisfactory for it. So too there are limits open successful transfer of organisational structure; what works .in one region may require much modification in another, or may substantially resist transfer. Structural diagram : Schematic diagram of organisation structur e (with some sample components indicated, but not all their network interlinkages displayed) statistics bureau upper levels: administrative, executive, research ground level: functional inflow control materials selectoral college Australian region (federal) immigratio n sup_erreg10ns (a to k) interregional transport, etc. upper levels arbitration bureau resources income office ground level (local) regions (1 ton) water systems rental entitlements office hospital systems region 1 sewer systems reg10n n 25 • 2 a social function classification, of those community matters that require explicit organisa tion at some level. An initial listing can be compiled by consulting Australian metropolitan telephon e directories, especially the government sections that used to feature in the front (until a year ago). What results under redesign and reorganisation would, of course, look very different from what is listed. Parliaments, parties and all their supporting apparatus would vanish; the Australi an Bureau of Statistic s will assume a new significance and indepen dent role, and so on. But which instituti ons are retained, which adapted, and so on, would depend on further social organisa tional features, not yet considered here. The result would be a levelled pyramid al structure, a flat-untopped network as depicted in the structural diagram below, not a power hierarchy. While some requisite research has been undertaken .upon how the various functional bodies and decision -making committees can be selected and can operate 53, insuffic ient investig ation has been made of the interrelations and adequate fundings of the bodies and institutions involve d - whichever they are! For little such detailed anarchoid modellin g has apparen tly been attempt ed for any region anywhere. Evident ly there is much to be done theoretically. Detailed modellings could bring issues down to earth, without setting things in concrete; no doubt too they would disclose many further problems hidden in the detailing , problems to which anarchoid solutions can however reasonably be expected. Noneth eless compar atively little is likely to be done, unless requisit e support is forthcom ing, support in the shape of researchers (researc h volunte ers and students ) and research infrastr ucture (from research, donatio ns and the like). For such support, for investigating its own demise, a state is hardly likely knowingly to supply; nor are its establish ed research institutions. Insofar then as it is done visibly, it will probably have to be accompl ished largely outside state-supported and state-supporting infrastructure, such as prominent universi ty projects. (like Reshaping Australian Institutions). Fortunately there are now other structure s, such as internet and radio channels, that can facilitate interconnections and interchanges of researches, both regionally and internationally. On these sorts anarcho id communicationa l bases, networks of groups interested in elaborating such alternative political modellings, both in theory and in practice , could be formed. Given the dismal state of present politica l arrange ments, almost everywhere terrestial, there is a great need, as a very minimu m, for networks of innovative researchers who chose such goals. 54 53 Thus e.g. Burnheim 85. The present article is not only heavily indebted to Burnheim 's work, but overlaps on-going investigations on his part. 54 To echo one referee. My sincere thanks to demandin g referees for several helpful suggestio ns and many improvem ents. 26 Richard Sylvan* Refer ences . Bello, W., Dark Victory, Pluto Press, Londo n, 1994. Bookc hin, M., Remaking Society: Pathw ays to a Green Futur e, South End Press, Boston , 1990. Bumh eim, J., Is Democracy Possible?, Polity Press, Cambr idge, 1985. Burnh eim, J., 'Demo cracy, nation states and the world system Democracy. (ed. D. Held and C. Pollit t) Londo n, Sage, 1986, pp.218 ', New Form s of -239. Ul.rh2r) A Fox, W. , in Ecopolitics III, Hamil ton, New Zealan d. Goodi n, R., Green Political Theory, Polity Press, Cambr idge, 1992. Green , G., The New Radicalism: Anarchist or Marxist?, Intern ationa l Publis hers, New York, 1971. Jacobs , M., The Green Economy: enviro nmen t, sustainable development, and the politics of the future., Pluto Press, Conco rd, Mass, 1991. Macka y, H., Reinventing Australia: the mind and mood of Australia in the 90s, Hugh Macka y, Pymbl e, NSW, Angus & Rober tson, 1993. Macph ee, I., 'A new constitution?' (excer pts from an openin g addres s) NILEFA Newsletter, Griffith Unive rsity Schoo l of Law, June 1993. Marsh all, P., Dema nding the Impossible: a history of anarc hism, Londo n, Harpe r Collins 1992. Mc Laugh lin, A., Regarding Nature, SUNY Press, Alban y NY., 1993. Meado ws D., and others , Beyond the Limits, Chesle y Green, Vermo nt, 1992. Naess , A., Ecolo gy, comm unity and lifesty le (trans. and ed. D. Rothe nberg ), Cambr idge Unive rsity Press, Cambridge, 1989. Pontin g, C., A Green History of the World, Sincla ir-Stev enson, Londo n, 1991. Priest, G., Routle y, R. and Norma n, J. (eds), Paraconsistent Logic , Philos ophia Verlag , Munic h, 1989. Routle y, V. and R., 'Socia l theorie s, self manag ement and enviro nment al proble ms', in Environmental Philosophy (ed. D Mann ison and others ), RSSS, Austra lian Nation al University, 1980. * where is it " . \)ot:;::,o 27 ~\)--:, \\-' Saward, M., 'Green. Democ racy', in Politics f Natur~ op cit, pp. ~~~ J..-.'->~f\, l(; ~ '5:> r 1\J ' ' . b3 - 'S/J L , £_? ~ J?_ \._\J.. cfr \~~ 2 ~"\,o (')roN CrlL~ rv fbltf ~~L, H-iof2 v- Sylvan, R. and Bennet t, D., Utopias, Tao and Deep Ecology, Green Series , RSSS, Australian National University, 1990. Sylvan, R. and Bennet t, D., The Greening of Ethics, White Horse Press, Cambridge, 1994. Sylvan, R., 'Anarc hism\ in Contemporary Political Theory (ed. R. Goodin and P.Pettit) Blackwell, Oxford, 1993. Sylvan, R., Deep Plurallism, University of Edinburgh Press, 1994. Sylvan, R., Green Anarchism, to appear, 1996. Thackw ay, R. and Cressw ell, I.D., Enviro nment al Regionalisations of Austra lia, Enviro nmenta l Resour ces Information Network, Australian Nation al Parks and Wildlife Service, 1992. Tynan, L., The Institute of Advanced Studies, The Australian National Univer sity, May 1993. The following has been redacted from access file (PDF) due to copyright restrictions. Letter, Thomas V. Cahill, Editor, Department of Politics and International Relations, Lancaster University to Richard Sylvan, 18 May 1994 re feedback from referees on paper by Sylvan for Anarchist Studies (1 page) ABSTRACT OF PROBLEMS and SOLUTIONS in DEEP ECOPOLITICAL THEORY A reshaping of social and political institutions, which are often outmoded or suboptimal and certainly commonly anti-environmental, is now prominent on theoretical agendas, at least in Australia. One such project is the multi-million dollar "Reshaping Australian Institutions" project at the Australian National University. At the same time there is widespread disenchantment with prevailing politics in Australia. Accordingly there is an opportunity to put radical green themes on agendas for real political and institutional change. A deep change, however, which is what deep green theories require, encounters several problems. For one, there appears to be a contradiction between demands for, on the one side, increasing environmental regulations and welfare arrangements, characteristically dependent upon bureaurcratic centralisation and economic growth, and on the other, decentralized lower impact organisation, which halts anti-environmentally industry and economic growth. A functional resolution, partially dissolving a central state, is outlined, along with a theory of encephaletic organisation. Further problems to surmount include human chauvinism and present-time bias, even in present "best practice" democratic institutions. Deep demarchoidal resolutions of these problems are sketched and defended. R. Sylvan RMB 683 Bungendore Australia 2621 f0J.._/ ,C. #--0/'...__~,_,k_J ver.r~ ~ -;- I c}~J ,h,,z'7 -?< ABSTRACT OF PROBLEMS and SOLUTIONS in DEEP ECOPOLITICAL THEORY A reshaping of social and political institutions, which are often outmoded or suboptimal and certainly commonly anti-environmental, is now prominent on theoretical agendas, at least in Australia. One such project is the multi-million dollar "Reshaping Australian Institutions" project at the Australian National University. At the same time there is widespread disenchantment with prevailing politics in Australia. Accordingly there is an opportunity to put radical green themes on agendas for real political and institutional change. A deep change, however, which is what deep green theories require, encounters several problems. For one, there appears to be a contradiction between demands for, on the one side, increasing environmental regulations and welfare arrangements, characteristically dependent upon bureaurcratic centralisation and economic growth, and on the other, decentralized lower impact organisation, which halts anti-environmentally industry and economic growth. A functional resolution, partially dissolving a central state, is outlined, along with a theory of encephaletic organisation. Further problems to surmount include human chauvinism and present-time bias, even in present ."best practice" democratic institutions. Deep demarchoidal resolutions of these problems are sketched and defended. R. Sylvan RMB 683 Bungendore Australia 2621  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. 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Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/browse?search=Richard+Sylvan&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bjoiner%5D=and&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=&amp;range=&amp;collection=&amp;type=&amp;user=&amp;tags=&amp;public=&amp;featured=&amp;exhibit=&amp;geolocation-mapped=&amp;geolocation-address=&amp;geolocation-latitude=&amp;geolocation-longitude=&amp;geolocation-radius=10&amp;submit_search=Search+for+items">Richard Sylvan</a> Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived <span class="MuiTypography-root-125 MuiTypography-body2-126">The University of Queensland's <a data-testid="rek-series" href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/records/search?page=1&amp;pageSize=20&amp;sortBy=score&amp;sortDirection=Desc&amp;searchQueryParams%5Brek_series%5D%5Bvalue%5D=Richard+Sylvan+Papers%2C+UQFL291&amp;searchMode=advanced">Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291</a></span>, Box 17, Item 971 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org">Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy</a> Contributor An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource <span>This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, </span><a href="https://najtaylor.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Dr. N.A.J. 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Type The nature or genre of the resource Manuscript Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context <a href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:14e81ee">https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:14e81ee</a> Coverage The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant Lake George - Floor - Pile 7 Box 17: Green Projects in Progress Lake George House Lake George House > Floor > Pile 7 https://www.antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/a603a32bcffb437ca1dd4fad4f934d13.pdf 7072bb701d0ea4422e4c861df9571694 PDF Text Text page PREFACE Part 1 ill ECOLOGICA L ETHICS & ECOLOGICA L POLITICS: TURNING JOHN MCCLOSKE Y'S CHALLENGE i Conservative, reformative and radical responses to the impacts of ecology on ethics 1 ii A confused and confusing response: supplemented intuitionism 3 iii On the supposedly dim prospects for new environmental ethics especially that deep-green upstart 8 iv Extending ecological ethics, inadequately, to ecological politics 12 V Structuring ecological ethics and politics: towards an improved classification of environmental problems 19 vi Population impact: the fact of human consumption 21 vii On limiting human populations: some neglected considerations 24 viii On animal rights and supposed political implications thereof ix Part 2 Two other critical features of dominant political ways: the shibboleths of extensive private property and high technology 26 31 A CRITIQUE OF (WILD) WEST DEEP ECOLOGY: A RESPONSE TO w ARWICK Fox's RESPONSE TO AN EARLIER CRITIQUE. i Approaching deep ecology and understanding plurallism 39 ii Value in deep ecology 42 iii The extent of values-in-nature 46 iv A biocentric ethic? 49 V Biospheric egalitarianism revisted 51 vi The uneasy position of value theory, or axiology within deep ecology and the condemned environmental axiological route 53 vii The 'case' against environmental axiology: 'the inadequacies or repugnant conclusions that attend the environmental axiological approach viii Fox's 'Deep Ecological Territory': transpersonal identification ix Problems of Self and Self-realisation: the intrusion of value and the issue of evil 57 62 65 �11 X Deconstruction and reselection of self 68 xi More troubles with Self as foundation 73 xii Liquidating Fox's 'deep ecological territory 75 xiii Justifying 'extreme interpretations' of and 'extreme reactions' to wild West deep ecology 77 xiv Transpersonal logic and methodology 82 xv More rubbish removal, especially that borrowed from pop science 86 Part 3 ANOTHER 'REFUTATION' OF ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS: JANNA THOMPSON'S CRITICISMS i The newer destructive phase: overtaxing requirements for (environmental) ethics 94 ii Satisfying duly modified requirements, environmentally 98 iii The former constructive phase: a new anthropocentric environmental ethic? 105 �PART 1. CRITICAL EXPOSITION Chapter 1. AT THE PYRAMIDS' JUNCTION. THE BASICS AND CREED OF DEEP ECOLOGY Deep ecology in both a movement and an ideological position. Thus in significant respects it resembles a new religion, which has a creed as well as an organisational structure, practices and so on; a political party, which has a platform as well as organisation, objective and so forth; and an intellectual school, which aim to propagate a philosophy, gain converts and adherents, etc. Like a religion in a literate society, there is a set of texts, DE texts as we shall call them, which present elements of the faith: doctrine, themes, parables, heroic figures, warnings, and so on. The DE texts have not so far been arranged into any authoritative form. Although the movement may have come first, and the theory been but gradually extracted (the historical and pseudo-sociological impression given by the DE texts), it makes for neater characterisation and easier exposition to consider the theoretical structure J first. The very looselyknit movement, subsequently considered, essentially the genuine environment movement (excluding those just in it for human ends), is in any case clustered around this structure - as older cities are around their centre. The theoretical structure is itself conveniently organised in the following (double) pyramidal diagram (now called by Naess, who devised it, "the Apron"):- �Diagram 1. Basic Double Pyramid LEVELS UPPER (INVERTED) PYRAMID C B p 1. Sources, or ultimate bases 2.Core Principles DE PLATFORM R E E D REGULAR PRACTICE PARTICULAR PRACTICES POLICIES LIFESTYLES 3. General themes & norms 4. Particular norms and concrete decisions LOWER (COMPLEX) PYRAMID The theoretical centre of DE is to be found at level 2, where the upper and lower pyramid join. The various sources of the central part, such doctrines as those of Buddhism (B) and Christianity (C) and of philosophic cast (P) at level 1, are not usually a part of DE at all. But there is a preferred philosophical source, ecosophy - another theory elaborated by N aess, who again coined the term which does enjoy a closer connection with DE, and is sometimes considered almost part of it. Levels 3 and 4, which are supposed to derive from the central creed, and in turn inductively inform it, are parts of DE, but less central parts, parts of the varying practice. It is level 2 then that is crucial for �understanding DE. While the upper pyramid givgs the theoretical or intellectual content and sources of DE, the lower pyramid supplies working DE, and core principles and the practice. 1. The Central level, level 2, and the standard DE platforms Deep Ecology is structured around level 2, the central operational level. The main distinctive principles of DE are set on level 2, the platform level. These principles may be grouped as shown in the following diagram:CREED LEVEL2 BASIC CREED wider platform 8 point platform further and more peripheral principles The reason for distinguishing the 8-point platform from the wider platform is simple this:- The 8point platform, as variously presented in DE texts, omits some of the standard articles of the core DE position, and fails to develop others. 1 There is accordingly a real point in distinguishing "the" platform from the more comprehensive and better rounded core or creed. DE is a decidedly vague object, with vague parts. Perhaps the most definite things about it are its 8-point platform and its diametric opposition to features of the mainstream Western ideology, and dominant social paradigm as it otherwise known. The core position is something discerned from the DE texts, in much the way the platform is. But whereas the 8 point platform is explicitly presented, though in different and incompatible terms, the core has to be winnowed and from an array of more peripheral material (as is shown in part II). �Box 1 The 8-point platform, in capsule form. 2 I. Both non-human and human life have intrinsic value: The well-being and flourishing of human and non-human life on earth have intrinsic value, inherent value, etc. These value are independent of the usefulness of the non-human world for human purposes. 2. Richness and diversity intrinsic virtues: Richness and diversity of lifeforms contribute to a realisation themselves these values and are also values in of 3. Humans unjustified in reducing such natural virtues: Humans have no right to reduce this richness and diversity except to satisfy vital needs. 4. Human interference with natural world excessive: Present human interference with the and the situation is rapidly worsening. non-human world is excessive 5. Policies and basic structures must be changed: Policies must therefore be changed. These policies will affect our basic economic, technological and ideological structures. 6. Human (values compatible with) population decrease: The flourishing of human life and culture is compatible with a substantial population. Flourishing of nonhuman life requires such a decrease. decrease of the human 7. Quality of life should supplant economic standard of living: The change in our attitudes will bring an appreciation of the quality of life rather than adhering to an increasingly higher standard of living. There will be a profound awareness of the difference between big and great. We will have a great society with no bigness. 8. Obligation to attempt implementation: Those who subscribe to the foregoing points have an obligation directly or indirectly to try to implement necessary changes. 2 The 8-point platform is perhaps the most repeated exhibit in the DE texts. The present formulation adopts the presentation of Naess in Resorg ; the brief formulation on the left does not occur in Naess. A slightly different formulation of the platform under heading 'Basic Principles' is given in DS p.70. �The principles have been rendered, and grJuped, to make their structure and interconnections a little clearer. Principles / and 2 concern intrinsic values; principles 3-7 concern human practices and policies. Principle 5 elaborates in principle 3; principle 6 draws the policy consequence of this. The most important of the general policy changes is listed in principle 4; but another crucial policy change is indicated in principle 7: decreased production and consumption. The prime terrestrial policy objectives (that should have obtained separate listing) can in fact be derived from the impact formula: roughly, human environmental impact = human population x personal consumption x available technology. Reducing excessive interference thus requires at least some of, and no doubt all of, human population reduction, consumption reduction, and appropriate technology improvements. Finally, principle 8 supplies a commitment principle. Observe that some of the principles of this 8-point platform, 8-point principles as we may conveniently call them, provide linkages with other levels of the DE pyramid. For example most of the principles, principles 3-7 especially, have implication for policy at level 3, and thence for day-to-day practice at level 4. 8-point principle 8 has direct application to level 4, individual lifestyles. Before the incomplete 8-point platform was devised (as part of a political conciliation and unification attempt), DE was rather differently characterised: primarily through listing of principles countering assumptions of the conventional socioeconomic wisdom, resistance principles. Indeed, in many respects DE is marked out through reaction and resistance: by its opposition the prevailing ideology of industrial society, especially by those elements of it that have lead to the assault on the natural environment, but also by elements that have led to breakdown of connected features of the social fabric. It gives a clearer picture of what DE is about if we tabulate are principles in opposition to those of the dominant Western ideology (or social paradigm), and as compared with those of shallow or reform environmentalism: �TABLE 2 DE PRINCIPLES AS CONTRASTED, ON THE ONE SIDE, WITH THOSE OF THE DOMINANT PARADIGM AND SHALLOW ECOLOGY, ON OTHER, WITH ONE OF ITS SOURCES, TAOISM. DOMINANT SHALLOW (WESTERN) ECOLOGY DEEP ECOLOGY TAOISM (DE) PARADIGM (DE) Domination over nature Stewardship of Nature Nature an exploitable resource: intrinsic value confined to As for, but with nature a manager resource Natural environment valued for itself Human supremacy Human ascendency Biocentric egalitarianism Harmony with Nature Elaboration of DE Much as for DE; ''humanism'' rejected Differs from DE; wide impartiality Ample resources substitutes Some resource limitations Earth supplies limited Supplies Material economic growth a predominant goal Sustainable development Non-material goods especially self-realization Following Tao-te Consumerism Optimised consumerism Doing with enough/ recycling Doing with enough (recycling inappropriate) Competitive lifestyle As for DP Cooperative lifeway Much as for DE: voluntary simplicity Centralised/urbancentred/national focus As for DP Decentralized/ bioregional/ neighborhood focus As for DE Largely as for DP Non-hierarchical/ Grassroots democracy Hierarchy without structure More careful high technology Appropriate technology Limited technology Power structure hierarchical High technology ample Power �7 Shallow ecology, or reform environmentalism as it can to be called3 , differs from the dominant paradigm primarily in its emphasis on stewardship, on long-term management, on sustainable development. DE, while it reacts against the dominant paradigm primarily on environmental grounds, stands opposed to shallow ecology, which it correctly sees as not going nearly far enough, in particular to satisfy genuine environmental values. Of course the dominant paradigm resisted is not itself a uniform or static position; some of the in determining of DE flows from this very feature. For example, until very recently DP used to support dominance as a throughgoing feature: not just over Nature, but of the male, white, Western, Protestant, rich, powerful, free, adult, etc., over their opposites. Domination of the latter sorts, within the human species, is, for the most part, no longer a part of the progressive ideology, having been gradually shed over the last century; but such domination still remains part of much practice (as well as of cultural ideologies). Some of the most distinctive, and most controversial, principles of DE, are omitted from the 8-point platform, as is evident from the opposition/resistance principles. These include the principles regularly, and pontifically, claimed to distinguish deep ecology. Moreover without these further principles, DE amount to nothing more than a slightly less shallow environmental position (indeed apart from principle 1 and perhaps 2, all the principles of the 8-point platform can be adopted by reform environmentalism and in fact often are enough espoused therefor). These additional principles, part of the wider platform (and the creed) include these:9. Biospheric egalitarianism [in principle]: 'all things in the biosphere have an equal right to live and blossom'. The principle is presented in this unqualified form (in DS) as one of the two ultimate norms, the other being self-realisation. Fir fact Devall and Sessions proceed to tack on a self-realisation component to this principle, of biocentric equality as they call it: namely 'and to reach their own individual forms of unfolding and self-realisation with the larger Selfrealisation' (DS p.67). But, they immediately add, the 'basic intuition is that all organisms and entities in the ecosphere, as parts of the interrelated whole, are equal in intrinsic worth' (p.67, continuing, italics added). This italicised value-formulation is straightforward, and has the advantage of moving rights out of the formulation (No doubt, if equal intrinsic value guarantees an equal right to live and blossom, it yields the "equal rights to" formulation.) But it encounters immediate difficulties, because in the process of continuing to live and blossom some organisms interfere with others, for instance through basic demands for food and shelter, most conspicuously in predation. To try to escape these difficulties, Naess at least regularly adds the rider: in principle . 'Naess suggests that biocentric equality as an intuition is true in principle, 3 For example in D & S. The alternative, shallow ecology, was set aside because of the negative conditions of the word 'shallow'. �8 although in the process of living, all species use each other as food, shelter, etc.' (DS p.67). 10. Self-realisation . This involves the realisation - growth, development and maturity - of the self, becoming a whole and full person, but not merely in isolation or in a social setting as in older models of self-realisation, but within a biospheric setting, taking due account of other forms of life. It 'can be summarised symbolically as the realisation of "self-in-Self' where "Self' stands for organic wholeness' (DS p.67). Intimately linked with self-realisation in this wider ecological sense is the next principle. 11 Biospheric identification . The procedure, again a personal one, consists in suitably identifying with parts or wholes of the larger surrounding biosphere. The underlying notion here is one of partial identity, sharing certain salient features with, which permits a qualified substitutivity of an imaginative person into the position of another creature, ecoobject or ecosystem. Such "identification" is a significant method of heightening 12. Ecological consciousness . Less grandiosely this covers environmental awareness, appreciation, and concern, and thus responsiveness to environmental depredation. Engendering ecological consciousness is regarded as a crucial part of spreading the deep ecological message. 13. Holism. On DE precepts, this amounts to more than the modem holism according to which there are nonadditive wholes, wholes or objects which amount to more than the sums of their parts. But as to what else holism demands, there is some disagreement within deep ecological circles. 2. Further principles of the DE creed and important optional extras Beyond the standard platform there are further principles, not enunciated at all, or until very recently, or else more peripheral. Some of the further themes help in deciding what clarity DE had; that is one reason why they presumably do not feature in the 8-point platform. Among the principles not enunciated are these:• Non violence. The new themes, several of them periphical to the main concerns of DE include the following:• Deep ecology offers a green synthesis. It 'combines the "Social Greens" with the "Natural Greens" avoiding the extremes of both' (Naess R p.6). This is a surprising theme for a position that has itself been regularly castigated as extreme. What N aess means, above all, is that DE does not neglect humans, and their legalerate social concerns and aspirations, in the way that the �9 Natural-greens have been (generally erroneously) accused of doing; nor does it neglect or devalue nature and its features in the way that many social-greens are inclined to do. Among the important optional extras that may be coupled with DE are principles of a more through-going animal liberation, such as:• a severe reduction oforend to the enclavement, confinement and slaughter of animals. • vegetarianism (of some form). Some deep ecologists are vegetarians (e.g. Bennett), some are not (e.g. Drengson), and some are in between (e.g. Naess). Unless they undergo a conversion, Northerness brought up in the hunting-fishing-shooting tradition eschew these optimal principles. But evidently there is a tension here; there is pressure coming from other principles, especially nonviolence, to limit sharply slaughter of other creatures. 3. The creed, the basic creed, and the movement. Like many a religious creed, the DE creed is an elaborate concoction (as well as a dubious and rather arbitrary one). Adoption of it, knowledge of it even, cannot be expected of all adherents, especially given its features: its vagueness, its inaccessibility, and so on. It is not surprising that, again like many another creed or ideology, many of the faithful do not know too well what it comprises, still less do many of the fellow-travellers (and DE has many). The most that can perhaps be expected of adherents is adoption of some simpler creed, a basic creed more or less in the vicinity of the 8-point platform. But it is apparent from DE texts that not even all of that platform is demanded: enough will do, especially if other DE principles are adopted. The platform represents 'what most supporters have in common at a deep level' 4 No doubt supporters who eschew part of the platform compensate by adherence instead of other DE principles or practice. Hence the depiction of the basic creed in diagram 2. A basic creed comprises enough of the 8-point platform plus enough other principles at least to compensate for omissions. But not even a basic creed is always demanded. At its most generous and laxest, the DE movement includes everyone who professes a concern for some part of the natural environment and does not demolish a manifestation of concern or interest by blatantly anti-environmental activity or involvement therewith. Inclusion in the movement does not even require strict adoption of, or adherence to the DE platform, though it involves some vague recognition of parts of it. Talk of membership of the movement would be somewhat inapposite; there is no paid-up or recorded membership (or even rewarding as would be done in a voting system). 4 Naess R p.3, italics added. �10 It is sometimes said that the DE movement was born in Europe and adopted elsewhere, US and Australia especially. But such a claim confuses the movement with quasi-sociological extraction of the principles involved and the platform assembling them. The movement itself emerged as a late 1960's affair, substantially under way before it was reported upon and labelled (as usual, academics, like politicians, reacted to, rather than led, more popular movements). Such a movement involves some "mass" of people; it must therefore be anticipated by some smaller groups and likely some initiating individuals. So it was with the DE movement. There were prominent individuals in several countries where environmental groups with deep leanings formed or operated, in the 60s and before; and before that there were many isolated individuals. In USA, where the DE movement no doubt grew to substance first, before that in Europe or Australia, there is a significant chain of deep ecologists, or rather deep ecological thinkers, reaching back to the beginning of the century and perhaps into the previous century; for instance, in reverse temporal order, Carson, Leopold, Muir, perhaps Thoreau. 5 Muir is regularly alluded to as an early deep ecologist by Americans. 6 There are deeper-seated motives for vagueness about the basic creed and uncertainty about the basic requirements to be deep ecologist and who makes the hororific status. One is a dislike of criticism, and resulting vacillation among the high bishops of DE as to what extent critics, and those who declare themselves not to be deep ecologists, should be included in the fold, and consequently as to who exactly is a deep ecologist. (From outside the issue can look rather trivial, but gangs are gangs whether ecological or more generally not..) A main reason for the omission of central doctrines of DE from the 8-point platform is of course related: the desire to increase the flock, to turn away no-one who might be decently admitted. 7 Another motive, linked also with trying to enlist support, in order to mobilize democratic forces and like people power, concerns the pluralistic drive that is an important aspect of authentric DE. It concerns the insertion of pluralistic elements within level 2 itself (rather than confining these elements to other levels, where there are conspicuous, as later exposition will show). As Naess explains the idea 5 6 7 In Australia there were, in reverse order, Dunply, Griffin, Stead; there were of course many others with very considerable environmental concerns (e.g. Ratcliffe), who apparently lacked however the requisite feature of depth, and world count only as reform environmentalistser conservationists. But, quite evidently, there are serious problems in discerning whether some environmentalist or other is deep (there is generally only indirect evidence, as the category was not clearly recognised). The issue as to whether some deep environmentalist is a (prota)-deep ecologist is even more vexed because of the muddiness of DE. It is important to observe that little reliance can be placed, in such issues, on standard and applauded histories, such as Nash's Wilderness and the America Mind, because these are written from a shallow perspective and fail to realise the significance of depth; See further Devall's report on Nash's third edition, Ecorotes, pp23-9. See, for instance, Devall Ecorates. Devall also suggests that St. Francis is a deep ecologist, but given what is now known about St. Francis there is room for considerable doubt. Or othersie admitted. But may be excluded by ignored or incompetance, or deterred by qualms about significent propositions (human populations restraint esp.). �11 is avoid the 'devastating' 'tendency to dogmatism': 'there is not one, definite, deep ecology philosophy, not one definite one kind of green society'. Likewise there is no definite or definitive basic creed. For many purposes this does not matter; we can still normally assert such and such, so and so, definitely deep ecological, such and such, so and so, is definitely not. In an attempt to evade criticism, DE is nowadays sometimes represented as a grass-roots movement, one but loosely associated with philosophical views 8 But such movements have intellectually-shaped objectives, offer at least a set of slogans and elementary principles. And DE is this and more; it verges on the dishonest to try to portray DE as such a movement, when in large measure it is the work of intellectuals, initiated by reporting, rather inaccurately it seems, on the supposed attitudes of field ecologists and like workers - hardly typical grass-roots people. 8 In a different respect, in term of moral of ideas and change of themes, DE is no doubt a movement. It has moved (and with Fox shedding critical principles, it continues moving). Such movement is not good for the types of virtues that stable positions may acquire, such a replenity, reliability, assessibility etc; but it does make life difficult for critics. �PART II CRITIQUE OF DEEP ECOLOGY Chapter 5. THE INITIAL PROBLEM: WHAT ON EARTH IS DEEP ECOLOGY? WHO IS AND ISN'T A DEEP ECOLOGIST? Deep ecology appears , on a preliminary reading, to be some elaboration of the position that natural things other than humans have value in themselves, value sometimes exceeding that of or had by humans. So much appears to follow from the first part of the 8-point platform. But even this much is denied by some of the never philosophers (e.g. Fox). Moreover which elaboration is quite another matter, and decidedly controversial. Indeed DE has not just been rapidly converted (in part through overuse) into a conceptual bog, but is well on the way to becoming all things to all interested parties. This is undoubtedly a drawback; it makes communication, and theoretical and persuasive use of the notion, that much more difficult though it does not condemn an afflicted notion, such as deep ecology undoubtedly is, out of hand. For several important and fruitful notions, which have survived, have encountered very much of this sort of problem - force, mind, energy, differential, infinitesimal, to take some older examples, paradigm and culture to take relevant recent examples.O On the other hand, many notions no more afflicted than deep ecology, such as societism, timocracy and ungrund, have been assigned to the historical scrap-heap. These include the sort of neo-Hegelian panpsychism which deep ecology of the American texts will tum out to resemble. What is evidence of conceptual murkiness and degeneration? The trouble begins with the very introduction of the terminology. Naess, - when first setting down in one preliminary codification what was already in the air,* wrote only of the 'Deep Ecology movement' and set down what he has subsequently described as a 'Deep Ecology platform'. The suggested notion of deep ecology, the underlying notion that informed the loosely-knit and open-ended movement and platform, was not extracted; that subtraction task fell primarily to West Coast American intellectuals, and it was done differently by different proponents of deep ecology. The trouble was accentuated through rapid evolution of the notion. Thus Naess's account of the movement in 0 * In case it is supposed this sort of conceptual muddiness is limited to less exact science, consider such recent notions as anthropic principle, from physics, and nonmonotonic logic, from computer science. See Naess 73, p.98ff. While slogans and preliminary formulations are fine, particularly in campaigns, philosophy cannot rest at the level of slogans or platforms, as too much of DE continues to do. �2 1983 is significantly different from the account he outlined in 1973; seven principles are replaced by six different themes, only two or so of which have much in common with the original principles. t Although DE is introduced in the 8-point platform as a value theory, basically concerned with environmental values 1 , it has been presented as a metaphysics, as a consciousness movement (and as primarily psychological), and even as a sort of (pantheistic) religion. Popular Australian sources will begin to indicate some of the spread. The Deep Ecologist , a network newsletter, sees deep ecology as metaphysical at base, as part of a natural philosophy of humans' place in nature (though many of its correspondents see it as a matter of deep experiences , often of a religious cast, too often decidedly anthropocentric, obtained in or through Nature). According to its manifesto, carried in each issue on its title page, Deep ecology is the search for a sustaining metaphysics of the environment; it represents "a deep understanding of our unity with other beings and livings processes" (Drengson); it is biocentric, not anthropocentric. Though we shall come to modify or reject this manifesto phrase by phrase (deep ecology is not a search, but on one level a position or theory, on another a movement; sustaining should concern the environment, not the metaphysics; depth lies elsewhere than understanding; unity too is a metaphor for integration; biocentric is misleadingly restrictive), the present enterprise, illustrating the degenerative spread of deep ecology, is different. Let us hasten on to the strikingly different explanation John Seed prefers in introducing and advertising his anthology Deep Ecology 2 , a person - and consciousness-oriented souffle (drawn from Devall): "What I call deep ecology ... is premised on a gestalt of person-in-nature [an image Naess had rejected at the very outset of the enterprise 3]. The person is not above or outside of nature. The person is part of creation on-going. The person cares for and about nature, shows reverence towards and respect for nonhuman nature, loves, and lives with nonhuman nature, is a person in the "earth household" and "lets beings be", lets nonhuman nature follow separate evolutionary destinies. Deep ecology, unlike reform environmentalism, is not just a pragmatic, short-term social movement with a goal like stopping nuclear power or cleaning up the waterways. Deep ecology first attempts to question and present alternatives to conventional ways of thinking in the modern West. Deep ecology understands that some of the "solutions" of reform environmentalism are counter-productive. Deep ecology seeks transformation of values and social organisation. t 2 3 The claim is documented in the Appendix to this chapter. Thus according to Naess (73, p.99), ' ... the significant tenets of the Deep Ecology movement are clearly and forcefully normative . They express a value priority system ... '. But even this core claim is now challenged, by Fox, who sees the primary focus of deep ecology as ontological and not evaluative. This is one of three different collections with this title which have been circulated or announced recently: see references. See Naess 73, p.95; but Naess's rejection is rejected below. �• 3 Deep ecology is liberating ecological consciousness ... Consciousness is knowing. From the perspective of deep ecology, ecological resistance will naturally flow from and with a developing ecological consciousness (Devall, 'The Deep Ecology Movement'). Again, while informative, much of this will have to be rejected or rectified (for example, the gesalt theme is problematic, and the deep person need do part only of what is specified; shallow or reform ecology need not be short-term, insofar as it may take account of many future generations of humans; it may well not be pragmatic; shallow ecology is better pluralistically combined with deep ecology, as in Naess's original platform, than denigrated; etc.) It is to Bill Devall, more than anyone, that we are indebted for a confusing myriad of formulations of the driving notion, several of them however extending Naess; for instance, deep ecology is first of all deep questioning, deep ecology is ultimately self-realisation and biocentrism, in deep ecology the most important ideas are 'the wholeness and integrity of person/planet together with biological egalitarianism'; it is also however much else - that again we shall come to modify or reject including a new psychology and new philosophical anthropology. 4 But Devall has been much encouraged by George Sessions, and it is Sessions especially who has tried to convert deep ecology into a new religion, with main texts drawn from pantheism, Spinoza and Buddhism. Thus according to Sessions, If the promise of American pantheism and nature mysticism is to be fulfilled, it will occur in the deep ecology social paradigm which is based upon pantheism and the idea of ecological egalitarianism in principle (Ecophilosophy ill). But although Sessions refers immediately to Naess, there is nothing in Naess about American pantheism and nature mysticism. At most Naess would allow that pantheism, along with other comprehensive positions, like Christianity or ecosophy, can be an underlying base for the deep ecology platform. Small wonder that John Passmore (hardly one to be philosophically baffled given his immense experience in comprehending Continental philosophy) goes astray in yet another account, in which he conveniently pushes the shallow-deep contrast into the unsatisfactory conservation/preservation boxes (of his 74): Deep ecophilosophers ... are mainly interested in the preservation of species and wilderness even when preserving them is not immediately and advantageous to human interest. In order to provide intellectual support for such preservation they are prepared to break with traditional Western ethical principles and metaphysical beliefs (Passmore 83). 4 Devall 79, 83; for a synopsis, see Appendix 1, figure 7B. �4 Again, most of this will have to be rectified, since the presentation is decidedly misleading, not to say biassed. As initial explanations of the deep ecological movement straightaway show, and applications reveal, deep ecology has always concerned, and deep ecophilosophers have always been interested in, much else as well, especially in human population levels and human interference, and in quality of life and technological and organisational structures. While this of course requires breaking with some Western traditions - which are in no way sacrosanct Wes tern tradition is far from uniform, and there are other tradition: deep ecology can remain, and is, rooted in tradition, though much about it is as new and fresh as anything of this sort can be. As a broad label for something rather environmentally different, and no doubt better, than most vague ideologies that preceded it, 'deep ecology' is no doubt rather fine. That is broad vague way is how the label often functions, honorific ally. That is, for instance how it functions in the collection under that label edited by Tobias, which gives deep ecology none but a nebulous content, and which indeed contains many articles (such as the interview with Soleri) in diametrical opposition to the more detailed platform promulgated by the intellectual "leaders" of the deep ecology movements. In fact, a good deal of the more popular appeal of deep ecology has been obtained by vacillation between the more discerning authentic forms and the slack or nebulous forms. The nebulous use of the label has also given cover to some of those who calls themselves 'deep ecologists', enabling them to shed awkward but crucial themes from the more detailed platform (thus e.g. Fox, as explained below). Many are those who are now pleased to march under the rather fashionable nebulous banner. 5 Many are not deep, in theory or practice, deeply committed, or deeply changed by the march. Attending a consciousness - raising weekend, purchasing or growing organic vegetables, having spiritual experiences in a special natural place, or practising some oriental art or exercise routine, does not ensure a deepened environmental position, though it can be a step on the way. While nebulous deep ecology is compatible with much that is neither deep nor even significantly ecologically oriented, such as minor lifestyle adjustments within the industrial paradigm, authentic deep ecology, which is not so slack, remains a defective doctrine, itself oscillating between an overpermissive environmental assembly point, fast growing its radical potential, on the one side, and an impermissive, unduly narrow doctrine, dubious or defective in 5 I too am happy to march under the nebulous banner, though since my first critique I am no longer particularly welcome. Initially I was cut by about half those individuals and institutions loosely associated with deep ecology, since my critique began circulating. While I am become accustomed to this sort of phenomenon in intellectual areas (criticism induces cool and long at least, even in logic), I didn't expect so much of this given the Christian character of DE.; and such isolation does seriously reduce information sources. �5 several of its leading themes, on the other side. Some of the worst of these themes, such as biological egalitarianism, have already been subject to much criticism, deserved criticism as will soon appear. But other features of authentic deep ecology have hitherto been left largely untouched, and new features have emerged. So an ongoing critique is needed. Recently 6 , it has been become more difficult, if anything, to grasp what DE is all about. New themes are introduced, older ones withdrawn or whittled away. Even Naess, the finder of the movement, who now tends to adhere much more closely to the (nonetheless adjustible) platform than other self-proclaimed deep ecologists, is inclined to make apparently large concessions to opposition charges, which however he subsequently more surreptitiously withdraws (of course this is familiar philosophical practice). At other times, he withdraws with one hand what he is offering, some sort of olive branch, with the other. The oscillation can be partly ascribed to conflicting motivation. On the one side, there is the desire, stronger in the finder-founder, Naess, than in his American and Australian prophets, to create a wide constituency, to tum no one away if doing so can in any way be avoided. But, on the other, there is an evident desire, among the prophers, to make deep ecology a very select position, a place for a chosen few, a place to be achieved only after a journey crossing some arduous terrain and involving some difficult life adjustments i.e. after an appropriate testing pilgrimage. Deep ecology, however, lacks the other-worldly and after-life resources which, in some of its religious sources, appear to make for an easy resolution of this type of conflict. There is a considerable lack of discrimination among the pace-setters of the movement over, and marked differences between them as to, who and what is accounted within deep ecology, and some unwarranted discrimination from this exclusive club (e.g. of Rodman). Many of the people classed as within or associated with deep ecology are shallow. And some who are excluded are not. For example, Naess (in 75) presents a long list of people he associates with the movement, many of whom are rather or even entirely shallow in their environmental orientation. Elsewhere (in 83) Naess proceeds to identify with deep ecology several other positions or movements which only overlap it, and which may be substantially shallow (such as green politics and new natural philosophies). Some of the predominantly American lists Devall and Sessions assemble are not so artless. To some extent, this combined discrimination and lack of discrimination again reflects the conceptual murkiness of deep ecology; to some extent it is symptomatic of other oldconsciousness malignancies, both within the notion and as regards its use. 6 Since the first critique was produced �6 Still more damaging to the movement is that several of the advertised prophets of deep ecology verge on the shallow, and some of these have denied DE.7 A striking example is Bookchin who has recently denounced DE, and written ranging declamations much of Bookchin's main, windy, bringin-it-together book, The Ecology of Freedom, said to be a "book of deep ecology" is very far from that; it is yet another, is a celebration of humans in very much the old (enlightenment) style. Insofar as it gets to grips with deeper environmental issues, Bookchin's material amounts to an extension of shallow ecology. 8 Ecologically Bookchin, like other of the prophets, buys into vitalism by way of extended consciousness. Ecological ethics is said to render nature self-conscious; the mechanistic alternative is presented as deadness, thus making an entirely false contrast. Indeed, part of the problem with the selection of prophets, is that mechanism is seen as the main bogy - when it is only one of the forms metaphysically underpinning shallower positions, Cartesian dualism being another - with the result that work that simply attacks mechanism and its variants and also advocates some sort of environmental way, gets accounted deep. N aess has cast the net of deep ecology too wide, catching therewith not only many remote "supporters", but a number of hostile critics as well, such as latterly the antagonistic Bockchin (RS p.6). Naess now considers the 8-point platform, formulated by himself and Sessions and published in several slightly different forms, as tentatively setting down the 'basic principles of Deep Ecology' - though it leaves out what Devall and Sessions assert are the two essential features of DE, biospheric egalitorionism and self-realisation, and though it does not require depth (immediate positions conforming to the platform). Even so Naess 'look[s] upon the formulations as tentatively expressing the most general and basic views which almost all supporters of the movement have in common ' (letter 23.6.88). Thus the 8-point platform provides, in a still vague and tentative sort of way, the distinguishing platform, of DE. To get around a small obstacle, let us call those who would adhere to an approved minimum of the principles of the distinguished platform (in some approved formulation) adherents of DE. They are adherents in (simply and literally) holding to that much of the platform. They may not be members of the movement in any ordinary sense, in any but the set-theoretical sense, because appropriate intentionality is lacking, for instance they may never have heard of the movement, let alone made any effort to join. Nor need adherents be supporters in the usual sense; support is neither necessary nor sufficient for adherence. A critic such as Bockchin, or Routley, can be an 7 8 See, e.g., B. Devall and G. Sessions, 'The books of deep ecology', Earth First! 4(8) (1984). Several of these books do not penetrate very deep ecologically or otherwise. See especially p.344, with remarks like 'and wherever possible the wildlife they may support on their fringes'. The paragraph portrays a very human-centered (and conquered-land) picture. See also p.342, middle. �7 adherent without being a supporter, without being supportive. Conversely, a supporter may not be an adherent. The Salvation Army has many supporters, including atheists, who are not adherents. The DE movement has many supporters, some of whom call themselves 'deep ecologists', who do not adhere to the platform, even "more or less". Many of these supporters are shallow environmentalists, who do not accept the key first point, of intrinsic value outside humans, or else try to evade it (e.g. by redefinition, or by wrapping up value inextricably in relations to valuers). Since there are, in my experience, many supporters and indeed enthusiasts who tum out to be of this shallow sort, Naess's view is a little puzzling: what does he mean here 'almost all supporters'? Also which isolated exceptions does he have in view? With the rise of environmentism, most of the distinguishing platform is no longer demanding; indeed it is deliberately lax with a view to increasing the following. Moreover, none of it, except for the last point, specifying an obligation to attempted implementation, requires any commitment in the past of adherents. Plainly adherence to DE, as well as support for DE, could be very considerably increased were this requirement evaded. A neat strategy, common to ecomonical practice and sociological research, readily presents itself. Let us speak of silent adherents as those who adhere to the platform, more or less, except that they make no requisite effort to implement it (they may of course have some vague feeling of obligation, should they ever reflect on the matter). Even without the benefit of scholarly survey work, it is evident that DE would now have a large number of silent adherents, many of whom are not however adherents, being either oblimovish, situated in repressive regions or social situations, or simply uninformed (like indigenous peoples who think here are excessively many excessively interferring humans of Caucasian stock). The core platform represents a surprisingly incomplete and rather ill-organised collocation of principles. The incompleteness is most conspicuous in point 6, which advances no details as to envisaged structural changes. In extenuation N aess pleads that he has 'not has courage to go into detail and define what these different structures will be, because we are going to have a lot of different Green varieties. We shouldn't have one set of structures imposed' 9 • The reasoning does not hold up. A range of structures, rather than a unique structure, can easily be defined by constraints well-known ones as it happens. Naess should certainly be encouraged to go on and delimit the structural and policy changes. It is easy to give him a start, drawing upon DE and neighbouring environmental positions. For instance, 6a. The policy objective of maximizing state economic growth should be abandoned in favour of 9 RS p.7. But elsewhere. Naess did go into some detail (e.g. Book). Furthermore, if Naess - old, famous, unorthodox, courageous enough on difficult mountains - doesn't get down to requisite details of structural change, who will? Well, even some rather shallow theorists do. �8 a highly selective approach to such growth. Evidently, there are many different ways such a change in policy can be implemented. Some such change may be suggested by, but is not implied by, point 7. 6b. Technology selection should be reoriented to appropriate technology, and away from risky and polluting technology. 6c. Population policies should be directed at decreasing human populations in overpopulated regions. Principle 6c complements point 4, which does not actually enjoin any decrease in human population. And so on, through a well-known list of constraints, with several of them regularly included in principles of alternative social paradigms. Point 5 requires similar elaboration. Another surprising feature is how mild most of these elaborations are, like the lax distinguishing platform itself, which is pretty wishy-washy when contrasted with what is happening out there environmentally. Many environmentalists now wish to proceed much further, and to witness some real curtailment of heavy broad-acre assaults upon environments, such as extensive clear-cutting of forests, over-fishing of shelves, and over-grazing of rangelands, extensive strip and beach mining, broad-acre pollution, and so on. Even deindustrialization is not explicitly part of the DE creed, though some of the text enjoin it (e.g. DS); but the issue is (no doubt wisely) avoided by leading prophets of DE familiar with the demands of socialism. Yet deindustrialization - a considerable reduction in the levels of industrial activity, particularly the undesirable dangerous destructive polluting types of industry that conspicuously contributed to the first industrial revolution - would emerge from all the alternative futures deep ecologists prefer to imagine, along with a much smaller, less consumption-oriented, terrestrial human population. In any case, deindustrialization is an important environmental objective, for both shallower and deeper ecology. It would assist, most materially, in obtaining some better control on major environmental risks and problems, notably such matters as greenhouse effects, atmospheric ozone destruction, and acid rain and its fall-out. The idea of progress is, like that of more industrialisation, also under a cloud. It is now naive to assume that progress per se is automatically to be applauded, and that a telling criticism of something is that it would block progress. People are these days a little more discriminating (in some respects); there is progress and progress, growth and growth, coke and coke. Much that was progress, and still is in many quarters, is no longer universally regarded as such, as, for instance, elimination of wetlands, pollution growth, assimilation of indigenous peoples. The 'previously ... dominant [assumption], that non-industrial society would and should progress towards the industrial state and the scientific world view' was challenged, and is increasingly rejected (cf. Naess, on the "status of mythology"). �9 So wishy-washy is the core characterisation of deep ecology that it lets in as deep ecologists all sorts of environmental philosophers who would not previously have made that select band, philosophers whom main disciples of deep ecology previously did or would have excluded, philosophers whose positions are not deep. If DE is to be more exclusive, it will require more careful, tighter formulation. Only clearly ruled out among environmental philosophers, i.e. those who philosophize about environments and environmental problems, are hard-line human chauvinists, led in the textbook stakes by Australians, Passmore (in his main conservative persona) and McCloskey, but recently joined by some Americans Many of these excluded philosophers would, moreover, subscribe to most of the points in the core platform, as weakly interpreted. It is nowadays a rare thinking person who does not consider that there are severe environmental problems, local and global, about which something, fairly far-reaching by conservative political standards, should be done. It is a rare philosopher, who becomes immersed in some spread of these problems (though it is still a rather rare professional philosopher that does), and who does not develop some environmental commitments - even if a liberalish social agenda still continues to dominate an environmental one (even so it is fast becoming hard to avoid observing the interprenetration of social with broadly environmental problems). While environmental philosophy has, by contrast with economics 10 , tended to become progressively more accommodating to what was only a short time ago radical environmental throught, as the magnitude of environmental problems is revealed, deep ecology has moved in the opposite direction, has tried be excessively conciliatory, confusing pluralism with broad consensualism, and has lost much of its radical flare. A wide environmental pluralism is just fine; but it does not have to be achieved through consensus, or at the cost of a deep or an ecological platform. A pluralism can be achieved by the linking of different positions, not their mergence. Among the diverse and motley groups of philosophers who now gain entry as adherents of deep ecology, too generously construed, are apparently included those examples:Example 1. Moral extensionists, both utilitarians and rationalists 11 . Among utilitarians are Singer, and perhaps even Smart on some days. Most turns on how point 1 is construed. Utilitarians in the Benthamite tradition assign intrinsic value to all creatures with preferences, sentience or the like, and are concerned with the well-being and flourishing of such creatures. Accordingly they satisfy point 1 if it is read, as it may well be, 'much human and much nonhuman life'. It all depends upon how the terms 'human' and 'non-human' are quantified. If both are quantified with 'all', the theses becomes implausible (admitting e.g. lab-manufactured 10 11 Now benchmark of reaction rareness, but itself beginning to exhibit some restlessness and unpass and signs of change. The useful category of moral extensionism derives from Rodman. It is critically examined also in EE. �10 abominations as intrinsically valuable), and would exclude some acknowledged deep ecologists. If the terms are more weakly quantified, then environmentally aware and active Benthamites are admitted. An evident dividing line, provided by particular quantification, with 'some', is enough to exclude shallow philosophers. But no quantification will serve to exclude either intermediate positions which do not adopt a deep value theory, or individualism, such as moral extension positions, almost invariably a spouse. Extensionists more patently included are those of rationalistic persuasion, grouped loosely around Regan in the American South, who have gradually move away from utilitarian prescriptions, to the view that ethical principles, including those of vegetarianism, can be reached by rational means, by clear, consistent and coherent thinking (thus, the broad position is really a coherence theory of morality). Example 2. More far-reaching intermediate positions, which do assign intrinsic value less stingily throughout nature, to some non-preference-havers, such as trees, and to some nonindividuals, such as forests, but which still adopt a greater value assumption, according to which human values always take precedence over non-human assignments. Positions of this sort are delineated (so far in insufficient theoretical detail) by Rolston and Attfield. In fact the positions so far elaborated of this type typically, but hardly inevitably, draw on an enlightened Christian backdrop heavily laced with science (a religious American naturalism, so to say, in Ralston's case). They amount to nonsecular moral extensionisms, by contrast with the secular moral extensionisms of example 1 (to try to squeeze these positions into Rodman's nonexhaustive classification of positions). Example 3. Deep-green theorists reject the biocentric restriction sometimes built into point 1, though not in big formulation given above. This formulation certainly admits Sylvan as an adherent of DE, despite what some deep ecologists have said. According to strict biocentrism however, only what has life (in some sense) can have value. Deep-green theorist see this restriction as very like that imposed by utilitarians, to sentience as unwarranted, unnecessary, unenforceable and arbitrary. Deep-green theorists, like environmental resisters, ecodefenders and Earth-Firsters, now see the DE platform as much too moderate and quite insufficiently radical. The earlier radicalism of DE has been excessively pruned back, on a mix of dubious grounds: the drive for an environmental consensus (in place of a genuine pluralism), the religio-political quest for a large support base (which could however be environmentalism broadly, with DE in the vanguard), and the input of conservatizing academic thought and the aim of intellectual respectability. In fact DE which has not gained much ground or good grades academically, as compared with its success outside academia, especially with book-reading environmentalists, would better forget academic success, where it has made progress only among outsiders, not power-players, and return to its �11 more radical mission. Academics, after all, form only a tiny minority, though one dangerously and influentially supportive, on the whole, of most past environmental excesses and assaults. We have proceeded to cut through the problem of what DE is or may be by formulating a specific version, authentic deep ecology, and by taking explicit account of main alternatives proposed. Authentic deep ecology follows, for the most part, Naess's account of deep ecology. But insistence on authentic deep ecology leaves several casualties, nebulous deep ecologists who prove not to be authentically deep. An important test is offorded through the greater value assumption, and the associated special place reserved for humans in the scheme of things, assent to which serves to expose the inadequate depth of more nebulous 'followers of deep ecology'. For (after proper preparation) they make the wrong responses on the crucial tests of depth. A conspicuous casualty who fails to negotiate 'these tricky slopes' is Drengson, behind whose genuine ecological sensibility lies a human supremacist position with humans occupying 'a unique position ... in the scheme of things', at the summit of that old-consciousness hierarchy, "the great chain of being" .12 According to Drengson, circumstances Might force us, sometimes, to choose between the life of a fish or a cow and that of a human child. We do not hesitate to choose the child. Our priorities are a result of our position in the scheme of things, with a spectrum of species (p.7). Not even followers of medium-depth ecology need respond in this reflex fashion, for instance where the child is seriously defective. Certainly, faced with a range of duly-elaborated imagined circumstances of difficult or forced choice, deeper thinkers would hesitate - since such situations tend to pose moral dilemmas. And sometimes at least their priorities would be different from Drengson's; for example, the fish is rare and the child ordinary, the cow occupies a unique place in an important ecosystem.13 Even Naess himself, who vacillates considerably in what he has to say and occasionally lapses badly from the authentic way. 14 It is worth examining some of Naess's logics, not for nonphilosophical reasons (or even to reveal N aess as a further flaws doyen, typical of the heroes 12 13 14 See The Trumpeter 1(4) (1984), 6-7. Drengson is not the only casualty; Berry, whose criticism Drengson is trying to meet, is another. Differently, the child is Hitler or the President who chooses to press the nuclear button. Such cases, which in some settings permit of a traditional treatment, were considered from a deeper perspective in Routley 2 79. A most striking example is Naess's Rescequence article, 'The basis of deep ecology', which departs considerably from the spirit and themes of DE. Even Naess, who is not significantly hang-up in doctrinal purity and doctrinal divergence, felt obliged to circulate a note correcting, "reformulating", what he had said and written (the article was originally a Sub ...... lecture). 'Some ... may find some of its sentences not quite in forming with what I usually tend to say. Therefore I offer some reformulations ... I still stick to my views recently expressed in various articles and books' (Nute, italics added). �12 of DE), but because these show committing about DE, they are indicative of its doctrical instability, lack of clarity, and scope for improvement. • Any society worthy of the name Green is a deep ecological one. 15 Given that there are a range of ........... societies that are green but not deep green, such a claim must fail. Even if 'deep green' were substituted for 'green' it could not be contained, because DE policies exclude some deep green alternatives. Accordingly, it is false that explication of DE is 'articulation of the fundamental positions that are presupposed in Green societies' (p.4); DE societies are but part of that rich and variety plurality. What does Naess say by way of rectification? Frankly, not nearly enough. He proceeds to assert that in his opinion, a 'society that does not operate in harmony with [the 8-point platform of DE ... is not] worthy of being called Green! But a genuinely Green society may well reject or violate several of the points emanciated, e.g. the wide intrinsic value assumption (of point 1), the obligation to action (of point 8). • 'We should never engage in any discussion on technicalities without asking, "What do we basically need in life?" Always ask the basic question. This is what I mean by the term Deep Ecology Movement' (p.5). Naess does nothing whatever to complenish for presentation of the basic technical question in this (biospherically) chauvinistic way. Do we need a DE which tells us that the bottom line is "What's in it for us?"! Doesn't part of deep environmentalism consist in seeing through and explaining what is wrong with this pernicious bottom line. As regard the 'This is what I mean by ... ' blunder, Naess tries to exonerate himself by use of the well-worn criterion/definition distinction.1 6 But on its own it hardly helps; such bottom line inquiry is not a criterion for DE either. Nor is following inquiry through to ultimate ends a distinctive feature of DE; the shallowest sorts of hedonism, for example, may adopt similar procedures. In fact N aess lands himself in further trouble in trying to extricate himself. To try to make the criterion offer look tempting (a comprehensive test for depth), he claims that 'when supporters of the shallow ecology movement are seriously asked about ultimate ends they tend to affirm the same ones as supporters of the deep movement'. Not only would this be a most unlikely outcome of a satisfactory questionaire; but worse, if it were the outcome, it would render shallow ecology supporters deep; so the criterion would eliminate a fundamental contrast for, and for making out, DE. In any event, too many humans, especially powerholders, remain outside the orbit of 15 16 This follows from what Naess asserts given on that a society that adapts 'policies characteristic of Deep Ecology' is a deep ecological one. There is at least a touch of arrogance (or is it part Naess's disdain for conceptual nicety?) in Naess's introduction of this shabby exoneration attempt: The damaging sentences, - those quoted - 'might be reformulated (in honor of my conceptually interested friends) in the follow way:'. Maybe Naess was serious in his (otherwise ab sure) opening remarks in the R ......... article about looking forward to hobnobbing with the aristocracy. �13 shallow ecology, often attached to the pernicious bottom line (it is doubtful that 'most people dwell in shallow ecology', p.5 heading). • Articulation of DE principles gives a total view. (An amazing contrast with the ....... . juxtaposed doctrine of ignorance which suggest we can never obtain a total view.) By contrast with 'shallow ecology which (avoids) the basic questions ... the Deep Ecology Movement concerns itself with basic beliefs and assumptions about the universe. If you articulate the principles of the Deep Ecology Movement you get a total view . The term "total view" is essential. The Deep Ecology Movement is a total view. It covers our basic assumptions, our life philosophy and our decisions in everyday life' (Res ,p.6.italics added). In first place, the alleged contrast with shallow ecology do not stand up to much examination. A dedicated shallow Christian or capitalist may practice the same depth of questioning and reflection or a deep ecologist, or rather more; such a person may have a well-integrated lifestyle, with a fairly comprehensive philosophy (as these thing go) covering it. Secondly, N aess takes what seems to be asserted back in commentary. 'If we articulate the principles of the deep ecology movement, -- you do not get a total view' (p.3); but that apparently directly contradicts the above italicized passage. There is an escape from contradiction offered - distinguish the principles, by filling in the dashes by "in the sense of principles of the DE platform" - but it leads a severe problem - what are the principles of DE? What is DE? Naess's commentary implies that the principles of DE required for a total view are those of all levels of the double pyramid. Such an idea lands the articulation of DE in hopeless difficulties. Firstly, we do not, and cannot, know what the principles are, because they now include principles applied and decisions taken at the bottom level which refers to particular situations, including 'particular direct actions at a particular date'; but these will vary, in ......... ways, over-future times. Secondly, since there are various different, and compating, principles at the top level, DE will either be damagingly inconsistently characterised, or else it will be far from uniquely characterised. For DE will include Christianity of this and that sect, Buddinism of this and that form, and so on. In fact Naess accepts such an outcome (but in his misdirect attempt to avoid dogmatism): 'There is not one, definite, deep ecology philosophy, not one definite "ecosophy", no definite set of green policies' (p.3) and, he should have added on this line of thinking no definite deep ecology or set of DE principles. But there is a set of central principles, those at level 2. They do not present a total view. But nor in general do those of all four levels of deep ecology. There is much, a mass of opinion (for instance, concerning scientific speculation) which would form part of a more comprehensive (world) view that is not reflected at any of the four levels. It is indeed entirely unclear what would present a total view? Spiniza's philosophy perhaps? But it is easy to ...... of topics it does not cover, such as city architecture and factory farming, on which a total view could have an angle. It is certainly doubtful that lesser mentals than Spinaza, such as typical supporters of DE, �14 operate in a total view. N aess claims that they do, but adduces no evidence; testing is much more likely to reveal how pragmentory the ecological view of most deep ecologists are. Not only is the noton of a "total view", drawn from Naess's earlier philosophizing muddy; the desirability of the notion is open to (damaging) questioning. "Total view" comprehends too much, fixes too much that perhaps should be left open; it sails too close to "totaliterian view" for real pluralistic comfort. There is, then, quite evidently, a serious problem with deep ecology, and in finding out exactly what it is, that even the clearer accounts offered differ in significant subjects face similar difficulties, philosophy for one. With movements, which is what deep ecology is often presented as, the situation is normally much worse. Consider the difficulties in saying, with much precision, what some political movement (such as green politics) represents, what some party stands for and against. And despite the accelerating diversity of accounts there appears to be substance to the deep ecology notion. Several important interconnected distinctions, which look to be worth disentangling, are marked out, and an important group of ideas is assembled. Rather than being simply junked (something my conservative inclinations rise against with notions, as with the premature discarding of material "goods"), the notions involved should at least be disentangled and, if feasible, renovated or recycled. More generally, it is not merely valuabe, but quite essential in senous intellectul assignments, to indicate what deep ecology is and isn't - for lots of purposes, including explaining it, arguing from it, and applying it. What can be done? One resolution can be obtained along the lines of critical rationalism. The fuller formulations of deep ecology, after reorganisation into more tractable form, are subject to severe criticism, with a view to obtaining thereby an improved, more satisfactory, thinner and fitter formulation, which at the same time meets other desirable criteria. Among these is a desideratum often lost sight of in the ferment of environmental action, the need for environmental pluralism. A start on this rather analytic approach involves separating out the different components of the deep ecology messages, and isolating core themes of deep and shallow ecology from wider positions and paradigms which they inform. The core is (as Naess indicated) essentially normative. Fortunately the core themes have already been isolated, in a previous application of deep ecology to population theory 17 , and this work can be taken over largely intact. For the extensive remainder, the following pretty complicated sort of picture starts to emerge (upon organising themes and claims of several supporters of deep ecology, in a way explained in the Appendix to this chapter):- 17 In Routley 84. �Figure 5.1. SHALLOWER AND DEEPER POSITIONS, AND THEIR ACCLAIMED ASSUMPTIONS, PARTLY SCHEMATIZED. SHALLOW VALUE CORE ENVIRONMENT AL SUBJECT SOLE (INTRINSIC) K,' ALUE ASSUMPTION VALUES-IN-NATURE GREATER VALUE ASSUMPTION BIOSPECIES IMPARTIALITY FURTHER PHILOSOPHICAL BASES GROUNDOF VALUE DEEP (separable theoretical underpinning) FEATURES OF HUMANS DIVERSITY, RICHNESS OF NATURAL(LIFE)FORMS ii. METAPHYSICAL INDIVIDUAL REDUCTION. NATURE AS BACKDROP IRREDUCIBLE SYSTEMS. NATUREAS IN1EGRAL m EPISTEMIC REDUCTIONIST/ANALYTIC SUBJECT-OBJECT ACCOUNT HOLISTIC/GESTALT /FIELD ACCOUNT LARGER ENCOMPASSING AND INFORMING THEORY EMPIRICISM,IDEALISM, ECOSOPHY, PANTHEISM, POSITIVISM AMERICAN NATURALISM +- DIFFERENT FACETS ➔ OF CHRISTIANITY, BUDDHISM, ... VALUE (DEONTIC AND ACTION) COLLARIES EXTENSIVE INTERFERENCE FOR HUMAN INTERESTS AND PURPOSES 1. ACTION (META-) PRINCIPLE APPLICATIONS (AS COROLLARIES) LIMITED INTERFERENCE AND RIGHTS THEREfO ETHICS ASETHETICS METAPHYSICS EPISTEMOLOGY IDEOLOGY/ RELIGION LIFESTYLE +-OBLIGATION TO IMPLEMENT COMMITMENTS➔ To population, (individual) consumption, (individual) impact, resources, technology, pollution, economic growth and quality-of-life, culture, organisation, science, education; and to the variety of natural (and some artifical) forms, such as land, oceans, atmosphere, arctic regions, swamps, forests, soils, ... POLICY ECONOMICS POLITICS Given the picture some major and serious sets of problems with deep ecology begin to appear at once. First, the value core arrived at already substantially transforms that suggested by the literature, with, for instance, biospecies impartiality improving on biospheric egalitarianism. Secondly, both the bases and the encompassing theories usually indicated (those diagrammed) are not just highly problematic but are detachable from the core and can be avoided. For example, the various, rather different, epistemic and metaphysical theories that have been proposed as �16 supporting, or even essential to, deeper positions are, to say the least, very dubious. So it is fortunate that the deeper value core is independent of them all - though that is not to say that it is independent of every account, since some (plausible) story of value qualities in the natural world, and our perception and knowledge of them, has to be told, sooner or later. But one weaker parts of the larger deep ecological story as usually told concerns the embedding of deep ecology in a broader philosophical theory, such as Naess's system ecosophy T, or Buddhism, or nature mysticism, or whatever. This much is true: as it is with shallow positions, which can be supported by most of the mainstream, more comprehensive, philosophical theories (for what they are worth), so it is with deeper positions, which can be supported by very different, though unorthodox, philosophical theories, for instance, by (a modification of) Whitehead's process theory or by (an adaption of) Meinong's object theory. But, for reasons we shall come to, such theoretical frameworks as ecosophy, pantheism, Christianity and Buddhism do not include thorough-going deep positions, but sustain only shallower positions, and a properly deep picture is not derivable from them. This suggests that the proposed derivation of deep ecology from ecosophy is substantially astray (and that so, more sweepingly, is the whole derivational pyramid regularly presented by Naess in his four-level picture). So it will prove to be: the success of these derivations would depend upon importing analogues of shallowness into deep ecology. APPENDIX 1. Survey methods as a way of pinning down deep ecology. How does the sort of picture shown in figure 5.1 - which is worth persevering with, elaborating and applying - fit in with the burgeoning deep ecological literature? It is surely not just tangential to that, so that we should look elsewhere to grasp the deeper features of deep ecology? In fact the core themes, and philosophical basis, and extension themes, were assembled in a quite impressionistic fashion, namely working through much of the literature, and all the more basic work, and setting down the themes which on reflection seemed to be presented or emerge. Something like this is still a main method of research in the humanities, e.g. in history, history of ideas, and philosophy. �Figure 7a Schematic picture of elementary procedures Source 1 T H Source 2 Source n i INTERSECTION (COMMON CORE) E M E s UNION t DISCOUNTED But here, with deep ecology, there were prospects of doing better than such impressionistic methods, or so one might have thought. Empirical, or at least quasi-empirical, methods (of the sort favoured by Naess in his earlier days) could be employed. The main idea is that the set of relevant sources is assembled, and then some statistical and set-theoretic work is done on the themes extracted from these sources; so the method is an elaboration of the sort of technique larger dictionaries such as the Oxford adopt in pinning down the standard senses of a term. The hope was that analysis of the serious philosophical literature (pretty rough selection criteria these, to be sure) on deep ecology would lead, not to despair, but in particular in two directions:Firstly, to what is more or less common to the positions presented - the intersection of theories, giving the substantial core or basic theory. And secondly, to what results when all the theories are put together - the union of themes, giving an approximation, after some sifting, to a deep ecological paradigm. As you might have anticipated by now, this thematic method hardly worked to perfection. Still it is worth explaining the method in a little more detail since, despite its limited success, it �18 reveals much. First a set of sources is assembled. Here there is scope for sampling and statistical methods, so beloved of social scientists; but in the case of deep ecology it seemed feasible, back in 1984, to gather for winnowing all more serious texts accessible in Australia. That latter limitation (all too familiar in environmental research) imposes a perhaps unfortunate parochial geographical constraint; but it induces no violation of such adequacy requirements as that sources introducing the notion be included in the bundle, as are all sources referred back to in several other sources. With the rise of networking magazines concerned with deep ecology, there are many references to deep ecological thinking and experience which get discounted, as not appropriately serious. Increasingly often, any sort of deeper experience or thought gets assigned under the "deep" heading, no matter how anthropocentric. This is one of the many problems with the depth notion and deep terminology, rather counteracting the valuable idea of penetrating below the conventional surface of received environmental assumptions, that it is important to think deeper than the assumption of Environment Z-land, for instance, that the environment should be managed for present and future generations of humans - a typical governmental surface assumption, often announced, but much less often put into practice. Once the sources are assembled, a beginning can be made on unscrambling themes, something that calls for a good deal of judgement also, especially in such matters as deciding whether themes from different sources come to the same or not. Here and elsewhere care is required not to penetrate too deeply, to expose only so much of surface themes as is necessary (a well-known principle in logical analysis). When the themes are duly marked out, there is some smoothing of the thematic data; for instance, evidently remote and irrelevant themes in one source may be deleted. (It is like the judging of a diving contest or the massaging of statistics, where isolated wild elements are removed from the sample used for assessment.) Then the elementary set operations of union and intersection are applied, again subject to some qualification. In particular, if a very prominent theme in some formulations is omitted from, or only approximated in, one formulation, then that theme will be put, initially at least, in the intersection. (Logicians and mathematicians, for example, sometimes omit intended or assumed axioms; e.g. Parry in analytic implication, Maclean in category theory.) A striking example concerns the very introduction of the notion of deep ecology into the philosophical literature (Naess 73), which fails to present the fundamental value thesis, that intrinsic value is not confined solely to humans or human features. While it can be argued that rejection of the sole and greater value assumptions is implied by what is said concerning biospheric egalitarianism (the equal right to live and blossom), the argument is not decisive, since value is only involved indirectly and perhaps only instrumentally (as Naess's appeal to effects on the 'life quality of humans' and to our ecological dependence might suggest). �19 The results are tabulated, as follows: Figure 7b. Actual results, in not form, of a survey of some main sources. Naess 73 Naess 83 Naess-Sessions 84 Intrinsic value Intrinsic value of life (1) (1) Biological egalitarianism (2) Diversity/richness(3) Complexity not complication (6) Diversity/ richness (2) Diversity/ richness ( 1) Total field holism (1) No negative interference rights, excepting vital needs (3) No negative interference, etc. (3) Devall 79 ROUGH CLASSIFICATIONS VALUE CORE Diversity (10 GROUNDSAND BASES New person/planet metaphysics (1) Objective approach to nature 2 Earth wisdom, VALUEAND limited interference ACTION COROLLARIES More leisure (13) Action obligation 6 Present interference excessive (4) Policy adjustments to economic and ideological structures (5) Anti-pollution/ resource depletion (5) Local autonomy/ decentralisation (7) Anti-class posture 4 Action obligation 8 Present human interference excessive (5) Policy adjustments, etc. [Also to technological structures (6) Objective life quality rather than higher living standard (7) World population reduction (4) POLICY AND LIFESTYLE APPLICATIONS Interim policy steady state (15),(18) Soft Technology ( 11) Life quality rather than quantity of products (6) Reduction of population to optimum (7) Emphasis on pollution and like topics counterproductive (8) Local autonomy/ decentralisation (11),(14) New psychology (3) DISCOUNTED AREAS: with rejection of NEW SUBJECTS dualisms: man/nature, subject/object, etc New philosophical anthropology (9) New objective �20 Embedding in ecosophy NOTES: science (4) New education (12) ? Embedding in updated Spinoza (2) EMBEDDJNG PHrr,OSOPHY/RELIGION 1. Bracketed numerals indicate theses numbers in the sources. 2. The disappointing absence of core themes can to some extent be compensated for by appeal to statements of them or implying them elsewhere in accompanying texts and commentaries. 3. Naess-Sessions 84, also Naess 84, became the 8-point platform, now widely reintensted. Naturally one does not attempt this sort of analysis entirely in the dark, but in the partial expectation that certain kinds of results will emerge, these three especially: • The substantial core represents a significant deviation from mainstream assumptions, a deviation which has been encountered before. • The total theory, or union, is not simply a jumble of theses, but has some reasonable coherence. • There are ways of getting from the substantial core toward the total theory. In the case of deep ecology it would have been pleasant to report triumphantly that these expectations, and more, are fulfilled; indeed the theory is so well integrated it represents a (sub)cultural paradigm. Unfortunately it did not work out that way, as is evident. What is more, the situation has become markedly worse, as presentations of deep ecology have burgeoned since 1984. Partly the thematic enterprise did not succeed because of the poor calibre of the leading presentations of "the" deep ecology intuition, and because exponents had and have different intuitions, messages and objectives. Partly, however it did not work because the idea of obtaining a substantial core and a coherent union was misconceived. Taking the union, in particular, assumed that there was much wider common ground - something that could be called the deeper ecological paradigm which could be approached in this sort of way - rather than as a plurality of positions. Pluralism is fine and feasible, and worth encouraging much more widely; but taking the union of themes of some pluralistic system of positions is likely to lead only to intractable inconsistent sets, and perhaps to trouble. Consider, to illustrate, the United Religion, about to sweep California, a pluralist grouping made up of representations of the World's great religions. While the refined common core of these positions is likely to be interesting, the union is not: it will contain, for example, all of the following inconsistent triad: Many gods exist (from e.g. Hinduism); Exactly one god exists (e.g. Islam); no gods exist (from e.g. Buddhism). There is analogous trouble in combining deep ecological sources with such results as that stones and mountains both do and do not have inherent value; there both are and are not detachable intrinsic values; and so on. The picture is then as shown:- �21 putative substantial core inconsistent elements of putative union What all this emphicizes once again is that deep ecology has to be treated differently, not as a coherent position but as a loose pluralistic grouping of position. To obtain a clearer authentic starting position, we shall have to discount since of what paradox as deep ecology. It is for this sort of reason of course that we chose to follow Naess before other prophets. Once an authentic position has been made out other prositions can be clustered around it. Such a pluralistic outcome does not show that the notion of a deeper ecological paradigm is illusory. It only reveals some of the pluralistic features, mostly not duly recognised at the deeper ends of ecological movements. And it only indicates that a different route should be taken in getting to a deeper paradigm. For the alternative environmental, and deep ecological, paradigm covers a spread of positions, much as the contrasting dominant social paradigm does. �A CRITIQUE OF (WILD) WESTERN DEEP ECOLOGY: a response to Warwick Fox's Response to an earlier Critique. Western deep ecology differs in important respects from the deep ecology originated and pursued by Naess, what I now call authentic deep ecology, at which my Critique of Deep Ecology was mainly, but by no means entirely, directed. Western deep ecology, also known as transpersonal ecology (though the ecology has largely dropped out), is very roughly a doctrine of the west of those new world continents where environmental philosophy functions; it has been advanced primarily by West Coast Americans (Devall, Drengson, Sessions and others) and associated West Australians (Fox, now of Tasmania, also Hallem and others). Unlike authentic deep ecology, Western deep ecology is hostile to environmental ethics, which it tends to dismiss as mere axiology; and it is excessively enthusiastic about trans personal experience, spiritual "paths" and "ways", and unitarian metaphysics - in which there are no ontological divides, no dualisms (of subject/object, subjective/objective), and no separation of things. Consider what Drengson 'take[s] to be at the heart of deep ecology as Devall and Sessions present it', and which he enthusiastically endorses: What deep ecology directs us towards ... is neither an environmental axiology or a theory of environmental ethics nor a minor reform of existing practices. It directs us to develop our own sense of self until it becomes Self, that is, until we realise through deepening ecological sensibilities that each of us forms a union with the natural world, and that protection of the natural world is the protection of ourselves .... reality lies not in the imaginative, subjective dualism of the dominant outlook, with its self-destructive exploitation of nature and overkill nuclear weapons. Reality is to be found in a quite different way: by a path that is nonaggressive, humble, compassionate, and knows itself as ultimately embedded in the Self of nature. The sacred is immanent in the profane, the spirit pervades and is the world, the cosmos. It is the formed and formless as a unity. This ecosophy is at hand for each of us [ecosophical salvation]. Its realisation is always personal, firsthand experiential understanding. It is an I-Thou, not an I-it relationship (Review pp.87-8). Fox's Response to my Critique develops similar themes, in considerably more detail, so they become rather more open to assessment. That is why my further critique will concentrate on his Responses. (On its own, I doubt that his Response would have sufficient intrinsic interest to warrant an extensive reply.) In Western deep ecology, the focus is upon, or even (as in Fox 89) contracts to, that of self and Self (or what it might almost as well be, soul and Soul/Anima sive Natura, or spirit and World Spirit). For example, Drengson pontificates upon �• 38 the crux of the issues raised by deep ecology [as follows]. We are challenged to move to genuinely ecological modes of perception, conception, and practice. If we do this, we will do it to the degree that we realise that our self is part of a larger Self for which we must care. This is part of the ecology of self-Self in the cosmology of deep ecology' (p.89). Fox goes further, making this type of stuff coextensive with "deep ecology": Stated rather formally ... the deep ecological framework ... proceed[s] from two basic hypotheses and one ultimate norm [all concerning self and Self]. The hypotheses are (i) that "the self is as comprehensive as the totality of our identifications. Or, more succinctly: Our Self is that with which we identify" ... ; and (ii) that the self can and does grow/develop/mature (i.e. widen its sphere and intensity of identification over time). The norm is that the ideal state of being is one that sustains the widest (and deepest) possible identification and, hence, sense of Self.... this ideal state of being is referred to as "Selfrealisation" by N aess and as "ecological consciousness" by Devall and Sessions" and its cultivation - effective a spiritual discipline - is considered to be the "real work" of deep ecology (pp. 86-7). This self-Self cultivation of Western deep ecology, which will be severely criticised, is far removed from the deep ecology platform upon which authentic deep ecology is centred, a mundane, secular platform concerned with real environmental issues, which is not a predominantly human psychological exercise and which does not mention 'self' or 'Self'. On the strength of the variant presentation of "deep ecology", of this elaboration of Western deep ecology, Fox feels entitled to assert that 'Sylvan has seriously misunderstood what deep ecology is about. ... Sylvan's criticisms miss their mark ... Sylvan's critique leaves deep ecology ... largely untouched' (p.5). Drengson feels entitled to enlarge this unfounded assertion: 'the critiques of deep ecology that have appeared so far have been based on misconceptions of what deep ecology is all about, and they have therefore been off the mark, or at best superficial' (p.89). The critiques that are substantial, not substantially tirades or shallow, have been substantially directed at authentic deep ecology, not at its different Western analogue. There has been no misconception or misunderstanding by such critics; they have aimed at a different target in the same broad field. On a personal level, I am quite attracted by authentic deep ecology; but I am substantially repelled by Western deep ecology. I subscribe, more or less, to the 8-point platform of deep ecology, and accordingly should be accounted a supporter of deep ecology (for all that critics are not very welcome). Though I do not care for some features of Naess's system Ecosophy T, which does provide a rickety bridge ·to Western deep ecology, N aess has always insisted that this was but one of several optional background ideological frameworks. Western deep ecology is another matter. Too much of it strikes me as like an evangelic cult, much too incidentally coupled to deep environmentalism; too much is a �39 celebration of self, human self, an expanded egoism; too much is essentially a good oldfashioned celebration of things human, a comparatively shallow celebration disguised in new environmental and avant-gard attire. Drengson has the ability to lay on these obnoxious, chauvinistic features disagreeably thick. Consider a bit of his poetic outpouring on that jumbled text, Deep Ecology: Sessions and Devall see humans as beings who are an expression of a nature deeper, more mysterious, and creative than any of our abstract theories appreciate .... it is hoped that [our] experiential encounter with the otherness of Nature transformed as Self will help us to live in such a harmonious way as to continually discover ever new wonders and value inherent in wild nature and in the natural human self. ... The book, thus is dedicated to ... presenting a philosophy of life that resolves some of our most fundamental questions, the central one of this is: how can we live truly in authentic, harmonious relationships with all beings so as to realise a maximum of intrinsic goodness? This is a question, ultimately, of what it means to become a complete, mature, fully Selfrealised human being (pp.94-5 rearranged). The statement could almost have come straight out of modem romanticism; all the same elements are there down to the maximization of human self-realisation. So presented, the new environmental paradigm of Western deep ecology is the old anti-Enlightenment movement in contemporary gear. Though I am substantially turned off by some of Western deep ecology, though I am disappointed by its apparent shallowness, by its reversion to human chauvinism, though I try to take cover when its heavy evangelism blows through, I am far from suggesting that more than critical intellectual action be taken against it. It is, after all, generally for the right sorts of things environmentally, even if it has invested too heavily in dominant notions, such as the exalted human self that a radical environmentalism should be escaping; and it is no worse intellectually than predominant creeds that are far less kind to natural environments, such as Vatican christianity and American pragmatism. Live and let live. 1. Approaching deep ecology and understanding plurallism. Well is Fox's response to Sylvan's critique of deep ecology entitled 'Approaching Deep Ecology'; for it does no more than approach deep ecology, it does not reach the authentic article. Instead Fox converts deep ecology into a related concoction, largely of his own (now called transpersonal ecology*). Having thus commandeered deep ecology for * Transpersonal ecology is an extreme variant of Western deep ecology, which tries, for instance, to jettison what Drengson and others retain: intrinsic goodness, intrinsic value, and the like. �40 his own purposes, it is easy for Fox to feel confident in his charge that 'Sylvan has seriously understood what deep ecology is about' (p.5). Fox's main accusation is indeed that I have seriously misunderstood what deep ecology is about, that my criticism is misdirected, and that deep ecology emerges largely unscathed. We shall see about that. But first, I want to lodge a counter-charge: Fox appears to have misunderstood a good deal of what I was about. My critique was not concerned with his position, except - in so far as it purported to be deep ecology - in passing; it was addressed to the mainstream of deep ecology. Fox's own transpersonal ecology does not belong to the mainstream of deep ecology; indeed it is doubtful that it is deep ecology at all. It tries to throw away central parts of deep ecology, the value theory in particular, and to revert to what appears, to all intents and purposes, to be a rather shallow position. But, most remarkable, it has very little to do with the natural environment; much of it is but expanded self adulation. Both Fox and N aess, in their responses to my critique, try to make some easy initial capital by pointing to the different ending of a working draft of the critique from the pluralist ending of the published version. 1 Naess uses the different endings to ground his allegation that Sylvan is uncertain what he is about, an ad hominem strategy which he presumably hopes will help to defuse substantial criticisms of deep ecology which he does not address (see his 84 and 85). Fox makes much of the different endings (almost 5 pages worth) in order to reveal an uncharitable interpretation: that already indicated, of misunderstanding, and that my 'critique leaves deep ecology .... largely untouched' (p.5). Naess and Fox seem to think that it counts against a critique that it may enjoy more than one ending, that it can leave room for doubt as to whether something should be restored or abandoned. Yet these are very much the sort of outcome a more tolerant and careful assessment may yield. Consider an old building seriously defective in main structural detail, yet with many worthwhile period features. It may be a hard question, over which there is room for uncertainty, whether it should be restored or demolished. So it is often with intellectual systems, such as deep ecology and ecosophy. By and large I am in favour of rehabilitation (see e.g. Routley 74), though from a favoured nonpluralistic 1 Though I feel a bit used, I'm not going to make anything of incomplete working drafts I naively handed out not being a fair target for commentary (it is obvious that one can be even more stupid and so forth in drafts than in more considered final versions). Much of the interesting work in and around deep ecology appears only in working draft form or in what academic snobs describe as semi-published form. �41 stance such systems as ecosophy include material destined for the intellectual scrap heap. But, in any event, I am in favour of recycling of rubbish wherever this is feasible. For anyone who adheres to a select position within an also conceded pluralistic setting, there is always more than one presentation, and more than one ending: a monistic, or singular, ending deriving from the select position, and a pluralistic ending from the setting. There is nothing particularly remarkable about this, for all that it baffles Fox. On the singular ending (of the limited edition "penultimate version" of my critique) many major themes of deep ecology go down, not because they are ' insubstantial or vacuous' (what Fox finds it convenient to infer p.2ff.), but because they are all defective, all substantially astray. So much had already been argued in the main body of the work; for instance, one sustained development aimed to demonstrate the substantial falsity of the principle of biospheric egalitarianism and its inconsistency with other principles of deep ecology. What of the last words, drawn from Eliot's Four Quartets, 'there is no one to bury'? By this, I meant: no correct doctrine, not: nothing substantial. It is true that from the singular position I did look upon several main 'ideas of deep ecology ... not even as if they were once useful ... but rather that upon closer scrutiny there is ... nothing ... [correct in] them in the first place' (p.3); from that stance I still look upon them in that way. On the final pluralistic ending what remains 2 are not the trumpeted major themes, which still go down, but a good many of the less heralded points and themes, such as departure principles in the 8-point platform of deep ecology. What can be added, furthermore, are significant variations upon some of the major themes; for instance ecospheric impartiality in place of biospheric egalitarianism. Now both Naess and Fox assume that a pluralistic ending diminishes, or ought to weaken, the force of the criticism. Not so. Naess ends his response to the critique with a relativistic complaint: 'if you have your own philosophy from which you generate the [core] position of deep ecology, ... why object to ecosophy T?' (Naess pp.3-4 reordered, also quoted in Fox). The short answer is because system T is seriously intellectually flawed. A pluralist may let such material stand, but, unlike a relativist, doesn't have to let it alone; its weaknesses can be exposed, its inferiority exhibited. Fox goes on to claim that under pluralism, which he also confuses with relativism, my 'critique loses much of its original sting and no longer constitutes the challenge to deep ecology that was formerly intended' (p.5). Again, not so; the challenge and sting remain as before. But now deep ecology is regarded more benignly; and more future work will be directed at restoration, etc. As you might now anticipate, Fox finds 'a 2 Fox's surprise about this (p.3) can be attributed to his failure to appreciate the force of 'acclaimed major themes' in the theories to be put to rest. �42 strong tension between such a pluralistic position' and the singular position which he regards as 'essentially argumentative' (p.5). But there is no tension; the singular position slots neatly into the pluralistic array. Further, both are argumentative, though neither essentially so. 3 2. Value in deep ecology Fox's 'most fundamental objection to [my] critique' is that it offers, is based upon, an 'environmental axiological interpretation of deep ecology' (p.29, p.53). Given what Fox intends by 'environmental axiological interpretation' (his never properly explained terminology, not mine), which involves axiological reductionism and a certain axiological priority and hegemony throughout environmental philosophy (p.52) 4 , I deny this. My critique neither offers nor is based upon such an interpretation; and, as inspection will confirm, my other work will not bear such an interpretation 5 , I do not 'pursue environmental philosophical discussion almost entirely at the level of environmental axiology'. What I do ascribe to deep ecology is "a value core", features of which I explain in some detail (and to which we shall have to return). But a large transformer (or similar item) does not reduce to its cores, there is much to such an item besides the core; nor do the cores pervade, dominate or guide all the rest. The core, which was introduced primarily as part of an organising structure, does not support what Fox tries to read out of it, namely an axiological reduction (back in 84, Naess thought 'core' was a 'good expression' for a quite proper part of deep ecology). In fact, I am not hooked on the term 'core'; substitution of 'value part' for 'value core' would make very little difference to the substance of my critique of deep ecology, but it would quite adversely effect Fox's response. An early example of the feebleness of Fox's reconstruction is his attempt to make my treatment of deep ecological theory outside the value core look as if it too was part of an axiological interpretation. He proceeds to argue from a title of a later section, 'Beyond the value core: metaphysical and epistemological "intuitions" of deep ecology', thus: 'as this title suggests, it is Sylvan's environmental axiological interpretation of deep ecology that underpins his criticisms there (as elsewhere)' (p.29). The title was not intended to suggest, and would not normally suggest, such an interpretation; it indicated a separation of parts and 3 For much more detail on all these pluralistic matters, see my Deep Plurallism. 4 For fuller illustration of such undesirable phenomena at work in philosophy, see Edwards, Ethics without Philosophy. 5 For one example, see the jointly authored The Fight for the Forests. �43 the upcoming contents. As an argument (to be slack with this term), Fox's move is a nonsequitur. 6 Now to get down to the real adjudicational business (of this section), I claim to have been verballed by Fox.7 While I am becoming pretty accustomed to serious misrepresentation, I see Fox as ascending to new heights in this regard. For he proceeds to attribute to me major derivative theses which I nowhere presented, which do not derive from what I did present, and to which I should not, in any case, accede. Let's look straight away at some of what Fox proceeds to foist upon me. 'Sylvan assumes from the outset and proceeds upon the basis that deep ecology is ... primarily a value-in-nature position' (p.30), that is the 'primary claim' (p.31). I do not assume that deep ecology is primarily that, but that it is that among other things; 8 I do not proceed on that basis, and I never did suppose that deep ecology was primarily or only a values-in-nature position. As I say, in a clause Fox left out in the selective quotation of his indictment, deep ecology 'has been presented as a metaphysics, as a consciousness movement (and a primarily psychological), and even as a sort of (Pantheist) religion' (and in an accompanying note I mention Fox's alternative ontological focus). I am not committed to such a primacy claim (what Fox refers to as 6 As the text reveals, Fox is rather fond of making passages suggest not what they were intended to suggest or prima facie do suggest, but what he would have them "suggest" conveniently for his own unscrupulous purposes (we might even label this the suggestive fallacy). He is not averse either to considerable distortion. For example (also on p.29) he makes it look, by a clever use of sectional divisions, as if the bulk of my critique was concerned with the value part of deep ecology, when in fact I get beyond that part on p.26 in a critique of 60 pages. Of course it would not show that much even if I had devoted virtually the whole critique to the value part rather than less than a third; it could just mean that that was the part of deep ecology that interested me most, or that I ran out of energy and patience thereabouts, etc. In the present critique I ran out of these commodities and time before I had finalized a section on fallacious methodological practices in deep ecology, perhaps to be called 'fallacies of transpersonal ecology'. Next edition, perhaps. 7 Verbal is an Australian verb, alluding to fabricated evidence made up by police or official prosecutioners. Verballing was a common practice in Queensland, and is certainly used by police gangs in some other states. 8 I do begin the first "problem" section of the critique 'Deep ecology appears to be some elaboration of the position that natural things other than humans have value in themselves .. .' (Cp.1 ). But that says nothing more offensive than what can be inferred from point 1 of the 8-point platform of deep ecology, and nothing about primacy. Moreover I go on to say that the elaboration is extensive (e.g. Cp.4), a claim well illustrated by Figure 1 (Cp.5), where the "value core" comprises but a small part of the deep position. �44 'Sylvan's primary claim', p.31, p.33, p.34, p.47, p.48, p.57, p.70 and many other pages, sometimes obliquely as 'Sylvan's claims' and the like, e.g. 'Sylvan says', p.86). 'Moreover', Fox continues (p.30), 'for Sylvan, it is an objective position since its "core theme" of "values-in-nature suggests ... that natural items have value qualities independently of perceivers"'. Firstly there is a misquotation; I refer to 'core themes', which furthermore extend beyond the value part. 9 Secondly, no objectivist claim is made or follows for Sylvan. 10 On the basis of the primacy claim, in conjunction with the objectivist claim (in the case of D2 at least), Fox proceeds to foist upon me 'two derivative claims': Dl. 'deep ecology does not proceed from a general vision of reality or "underlying perception of the way things are" ' 11 , and D2. 'deep ecology is not at all concerned with the way in which we experience the world' (p.31, Fox's italics). Firstly, I do not present such claims; indeed I present a substantial amount of material incompatible with such claims, for instance in the discussion of the theme of extreme holism as regards D 1, and of cosmic identity as regards D2. Secondly, I did not and do not adhere to such claims; indeed I have put a good deal of effort into exposing the metaphysical and epistemological parts of deep ecology. Thirdly, as should be thus evident, they do not derive from what I did present in the critique. Fourthly, in particular, they do not derive from the primacy and objectivist claims. Indeed readily available counter-models will show as much. Consider a values-in-nature objectivist position such as that of Holmes Rolston, which we can conveniently call 'R(olston)'s deep ecology' (there is not even any cheating here, as Ralston's position has a better claim to be accounted deep ecology than some of the positions admitted to the club). Now simply substitute 'R's deep ecology' for 'deep ecology' throughout the "derivation" of the claims. The premiss or grounds hold, as R's deep ecology satisfies both primacy and objectivist claims; but the claims supposed to be derived do not hold, both RD 1 and RD2 fail. For example, Ralston's deep ecology is very 9 It seems to be on the basis of efforts like this misquotation that Fox feels himself justified in writing of 'Sylvan's "core claim" that deep ecology is primarily a valuesin-nature position ' (p.34). That is remote from what I do. For example, I am in trouble for dismissing a sizeable chunk of core deep ecology as rubbish; but a valuesin-nature position is not rubbish. 10 The point was explained in considerable detail in EE p.154ff, where the ugly term nonjective was deliberately introduced to remove illusions as to objectivity or subjectivity. 11 The context makes it look as if the internal quotation is drawn from me, but it is not as perusal of fn.44 will show. DI gains no support from anything I assert. �45 much concerned with the way we experience the world, as a reading of Rolston quickly discloses. Or if a clearer deep example than Rolston is demanded, there is N aess himself. Finally, unsurprisingly now, Fox has made elementary mistakes in his alleged derivations. Consider D2 first. 'This follows', Fox says, 'since value-in-nature are held to exist "out there" independently of perceivers' (p.31). But again it just does not follow, as a topic can be deeply concerned with something that enjoys some independence. You might almost as well try to say that epistemology is not at all concerned with the way in which we experience the world since primary properties are "out there" independent of perceivers. Consider next D1, where there is considerably more distortion to be exposed. Fox's "derivation" really consists of two separable parts. In the first part, Fox's thoroughly fallacious strategy is to replace 'concerned with' by 'only concerned with' and 'because' by 'simply because', as textual comparisons, of my text with what Fox draws from it, make plain. His strategy certainly makes for terrific derivations. For example, from "the Prime Minister is concerned with his sex life" we obtain the startling result that the Prime Minister is only concerned with his sex life. From the premiss that a man likes his wife because of her body we obtain without any further ado the familiar worry that he likes her simply because of her body. 'Beyond this', in a second part, there is an argument based on independence (apparently involving some misunderstanding of the notion). The argument appears to be of the form: A is independent of B, therefore A does not proceed from B. The defectiveness of such an argument is obvious enough once its form is exposed. And the defectiveness of the case in hand should have been evident to Fox. For Naess has explained many times how a person can be a deep ecologist (e.g. can adhere to the platform) without adopting (or even being aware of) the general metaphysical vision from which it proceeds. The felling of Fox's derivations brings down, like trees felled in a rainforest, a good part of the rest of the structure. For instance, there cease to be the problems Fox supposes he has found (p.32 ff.), such as difficulties of consistency in accounting for the metaphysical 'sources that supporters of deep ecology draws upon' (p.33). With that small exercise in logic, the remainder of Fox's "response" to my critique (pages 31-89 of text and miles of footnotes) is disposed of in main essentials. For pages 53-84 constitute a largely separate essay on wider identification, an essay which only bears obliquely on my critique; and most of the rest turns upon lumbering me with the claims just off loaded, the claims which 'constitute [my] very poor understanding of deep ecology' (p.31). Thus, for example, Fox expends a good deal of space upon citing authorities from deep ecology (who too often supply extremely dubious statements) directed at contradicting D 1 and D2. Obviously that is beside the point. But while my main work on Fox's dismal response is done, and I could stop here, I don't intend to, as there is a lot more heavily �46 polluting rubbish to be despatched, or recycled. One's rubbish may be another's input (therein for Moore lay the whole challenge of philosophy). 3 The extent of values-in-nature. Even a casual reader of Fox's Response will have observed the following: that Fox is very quick off the mark with (largely unsubstantiated) accusations like 'so and so has failed to grasp', 'has misunderstood', 'has ignored', 'has missed the point'; that the evidence for these ad hominem claims is often quite insubstantial; and that that 'so and so' often happens to be Sylvan. One of the many things Sylvan allegedly 'fails to grasp' is 'that (a position) deep ecology can be normative (i.e. offer prescriptive proposals) without that necessarily meaning that it is prescriptive [of this or that,] of a values-in-nature position'. Well, I thought I had a reasonable grasp upon, and had made use in print of, the distinction between prescription and evaluation (likewise deontology and axiology), and had in the critique sufficiently emphasized that shallow positions were normative but decidedly not prescriptive of values-in-nature. So what evidence does Fox present for his charge? Well, none really. True he begins his next sentence with a 'Thus', but he then rambles on with quotations of material (he has previously tried to flog to death) concerning deep ecology and value theory. But, as nearly everyone appreciates, a position may include a value theory without that theory being a values-in-nature position; shallow positions are such. Now 'Sylvan takes Naess's statement that deep ecology is normative as direct support ... the only support that Sylvan provides ... for his own ... "claim" that deep ecology is ... a value-in-nature position' (p.36 rearranged, prejudicial terms deleted). Well, he didn't take that as direct support; what he did take as support is Naess's oft-repeated assertion (quoted by Fox on the very page) that 'the significant tenets of ... Deep Ecology ... express a value priority system' (many places, e.g. 73 p.99, my italics). So it includes a value framework. Furthermore further evidence is adduced or alluded to both for the claim that deep ecology involves a value framework and that it includes a values-in-nature tenet (e.g. 'deep ecology seeks a transformation of values' Cp.29, quoting Devall; an 'egalitarian principle of equal value of all life, is "an intuitively clear and obvious value axiom"' Cp.13 quoting N aess; the restriction of this axiom to cases 'when genuine conflicts of value are absent 'Cp.14 quoting Fox; etc). Fox issues the challenge: 'where is the (objectivist) values-in-nature "core claim"?' (p.36). Of course it is right there in the platform, in the very first point which duly �47 distributes intrinsic value much more widely than humans and human features; it is also implied by the biocentric egalitarian principle; and so on. 12 What is more, although I have at long last (late 1989) read Fox's tactless Response, I am sticking to my claim that deep ecology has a value core. As it happens, I think as much is evident from Naess's recent publications (esp. 89 chapters 2 and 3). But the claim can be argued, for example as follows:- Firstly, Deep ecology has a value part. Secondly, that part is a core part. As to the first, I should begin by appealing to the value themes of the deep ecology platform, particularly points 1 and 2 which amounts values-in-nature points. Curiously, when several of the points in the platform are value themes, Fox proceeds to assert that 'biocentric ... egalitarianism ... is the deep ecological notion that most lends itself to interpretation as a value-in-nature position' (pp.31-33). Perhaps this is a diversionary tactic. It seems that it would be most convenient for Fox's anti-axiology and unauthentic view of deep ecology if critics forgot about the platform of deep ecology. The value part of deep ecology is reasonably taken as a core, i.e. as a central or inner part (to use dictionary accounts of 'core'). A number of arguments can be advanced for adopting it as a core, of which I'll indicate one 13 . The 8-point platform is a central part of deep ecology, what more or less distinguishes deep ecologists; value themes comprise a central part of this platform (the first three points as well as others such as point 7); what is a central part of a central part is indeed central. It is no doubt 'somewhat unfortunate that the 8-principles start with ethical terms ... ' (quoting Sessions p.49). Fox tries to wriggle out of that unfortunate predicament, that the 8-point platform of deep ecology - one of the few hitherto stable parts of the whole jerrybuilt structure - begins with value themes and a values-in-nature claim, by an expansion of the same shabby tactic he has already tried to use to defuse biological egalitarianism and displace apparently ethical principles of deep ecology (such as the important obligation to implement environmental commitments): Namely, the formal-axiological waste-disposal is replaced by an even grander formal-philosophical disposal - down which goes my criticism. 'Sylvan ... takes the "neutral"' (i.e. variously: literal, nontechnical, 12 It is only anomalous that the intrinsic value theme is missing Naess's early paper because it features so prominently in the platform and in parts of Naess's later work, both characterising deep ecology. Fox tries to twist the anomaly into a contradiction in my evidence (pp.36-7), but it is a shabby effort, entirely neglecting the evidence I assemble in Appendix 1 (which he quotes from however) for Figure 1 of the Critique which indicates the value core. 13 Thereby doing in, by example, another of Fox's unpleasant shotgun accusations, p.6. �48 understandable to most persons) 'formulation of basic principles as a formal philosophical position .... Thus, even such limited support for his "core claim" as Sylvan is able to find turns out to be due to mistaking an everyday language 8-point list for an ultimate expression of deep ecology in formal philosophical terms' (p.51) That I find, I confess, a ridiculous accusation and defence. I wasn't taking the basic principles at other than face value, as other than principles in a "neutral" formulation; I was, and am, 'using the word "value" in a metaphorical or everyday sense' (p.49), namely in the literal everyday non-metaphorical sense where it signifies worth. I frankly don't really know what it would be like to take deep ecology in the way Fox alleges I do, as a 'formal philosophical position' (p.49, p.51). It is not just that we are far removed from 'the ultimate expression of deep ecology in formal philosophical terms'; deep ecology is not, in the hands of Fox and friends, the sort of position that looks at all likely to obtain such formulation ever. Until it is properly made out, then, Fox's "defence" lapses. He owes us an account of what a 'formal philosophical expression' would be, by contrast with what we have, and to provide requisite evidence that Sylvan (whatever his actual intentions) was "taking" the platform in that "mistaken" way. I'm not surprised that Fox has not attempted the requisite philosophical work; I am surprised he got Session to go along with him in the intellectually disreputable ploy. I freely confess, then, my astonishment that Sessions states that he and N aess would not agree philosophically to the principles of the deep ecology platform (p.50,p.51 ). What on earth does he mean? In his own book (with Devall), these principles are presented as 'basic principles of deep ecology' (in boldface capitals, p.69), they are supplemented by a detailed commentary of a type appropriate for serious philosophical principles, and they are introduced as having 'summarized fifteen years of thinking on the principles of deep ecology' (p.69). If that doesn't make them philosophical, what in the deep ecological scheme of things would? In any case, Sessions has elsewhere been prepared, in highly philosophical contexts to ascribe intrinsic values to parts of nonhuman Nature (e.g. p.236). For Naess too there is no easy escape. Firstly, the platform is said to derive from his Ecosophy T; secondly Ecosophy T itself assigns 'intrinsic value to every life form' (89 p.164ff). But I should make an admission; deep ecology is bound to be a values-in-nature position, at least as I characterised those things. It follows from the way I explained depth and what is meant by 'values-in-nature'. That is one reason why I claim Fox's �49 transpersonal ecology is not deep ecology, because it is explicitly not a values-in-nature position. 14 Fox himself has tried various ways of avoiding values-in-nature; but, needless to say, value expressions of "in-nature" cast creep into much of his discourse. For example, the shallow/deep distinction is now "explained" (in 89 p.33), not directly in terms of value, but, to begin with, through an anthropocentric/ecocentric distinction. The trouble is that, in explaining the intended senses of contrasting terms, value slips back again (as in 'use value for humans (e.g. its scientific, recreational, or aesthetic value)'). But Fox's main chance is the "value constellation" idea, which tries to lock values away in a complex involving a valuer and a valuing relation. But nothing stops analyses of this complex, examination of components of the constellation; and for many logical purposes (such as quantification of the value end of the complex) some separation is required. 4 A biocentric ethic? It has been widely thought that deep ecology supplies 'a biocentric ethic as opposed to an anthropocentric one' 15 , that it includes at least rudiments of a value theory and leading features of an environmental ethics. But now whether deep ecology is, among other things, an environmental ethic is in increasing doubt. There are now many, not merely on the margins of deep ecology, who would question the role or significance of ethics or even dispense with it altogether. On these issues, as on others, deep ecology speaks not just with many tongues, but forked tongues as well. Fox does something to assemble the diverse voices from the deep ecology multitude (p.42ff.). Let us classify - in a preliminary way: A. Getting rid of ethics altogether. This appears to be a position taken by Livingston and by Shepard, at least in the quotes Fox supplies. There is nothing new and exciting, still less of new paradigmatic cast, about this. It is as old as ethical nihilism and scepticism, which is to say, very old, reaching back to classical Greek thought. 16 Nor are the entirely dubious supporting considerations adduced in any way new: 'ethics and morals were ... invented by one species to meet the needs of that species' p.42, or, more cynically, for the advantage of certain classes or pressure groups within that species; ethics are at best mischievous, more 14 See e.g. p.85. The matter is further discussed below. 15 Thus Bradford 89,p.10. The authentic deep ecology (of. Naess, on reliable days) certainly does. 16 For preliminary notes on the history of moral nihilism, see Hinckfuss p.17. �50 likely damaging; ethics are unsuccessful and even counterproductive in their effects (p.43); 'ethics and morals are unknown in nature' (p.42); and similar. A*. Retaining ethics, hardly intellectually revolutionary either, but B. Downgrading the whole enterprise. Such appears to be one of Naess's newer tactics, where ethics, now of minor importance, becomes an experiential epiphenomenon. 'I'm not much interested in ethics or morals. I'm interested in how we experience the world .... Ethic follows from how we experience the world' (p.46, also Naess 89 p.20 and elsewhere). Naess is doing more in this much quoted passage (which involves clear commission of the prescriptive fallacy 17 ) than expressing personal idiosyncracies; he is saying, he is taken as saying, by those who quote him, how things now stand for deep ecology (of which he is still, though losing ground, the chief guru). B*. While ethical enterprise is perhaps not downgraded, C. Ethics as usually conceived is displaced or superseded. According to Fox, "conventional ethics", which combines a code of conduct with a set of values, is displaced by an 'experientially grounded state of being' (p.41). 18 That state of being is none other than ecological consciousness, which 'precedes and preempts the search for an "environmental ethic"' (Devall quoted p.45, similarly Sessions, who also goes further, suggesting we should abandon the search for an environmental ethics' p.44). But surely it is foolish to discard useful tools (if admittedly due for repair) because something that may look brighter and shinier and does something for some agents, attracts attention; in these critical times everything that works at all is needed. A bit differently, Rodman suggests superfessions of conventional ethics (though perhaps not of a more expansive ethics), because it is an integral part of the former moral/legal stage of consciousness, conventional ethics - if not actually in the process of being superseded (in the dominant culture it is not) by a later and higher stage, of appropriate new experience - ought to be superseded, since the moral/legal stage is 'now more part of the problem than its solution' (p.43). Again all 17 Elsewhere however (e.g. Naess 89 p.24) explains how values go beyond "facts". 18 Later Fox proceeds differently, with 'deep ecology ... described as ... a position within ... "foundational ethics'" (p.86). "Foundational ethics", another exceedingly illexplained notion, is ethics as 'concerned with "understanding ourselves"' (p.86, p.113), and so part of the egocentric self nexus; it is also said to be ethics as 'concerned with development of a state of being' (p.113), the being of selves no doubt. Does "foundational ethics" supply principles and some values? If not, how does it manage to be an ethic? If so, how does it escape Fox's objections to environmental ethics? In any case, "foundational ethics" which we are supposed to search for (along with "understanding ourselves"), is intended to be an environmental ethic! �51 decidedly questionable, both historically and systematically, particularly given the prospect of a plurality of integrated techniques. C*. Instead, a radically new ethic is designed. This is of course part of what deepgreen and other radical, not merely reformist, alternatives to prevailing ethics and nature philosophies are about. It was, once upon a time, an objective of deep ecology also; it apparently no longer invariably is. But just as there is no definite position offered by deep ecology on several critical issues (esp. in ecological politics), so there is now no definite position on the place of ethics (pace p.41), as the tentative classification serves to reveal. No doubt Fox had a particular message that he wanted to be drawn from the quotations and needed for his arguments - explicit rejection of an ethical approach in favour of experience in the shape of ecological consciousness (p.47) - but what he has supplied is an entertaining pot pourri of positions, countering or jamming the message. It is ironic that Western deep ecology should have tried to opt out of ethics, at exactly the time that ethics is making a major come back, when ethics are becoming again a significant force in business and the world. Or in terms of a different image, at the very time when the ship of ethics is returning to harbour after a long period on high rough seas, Fox and friends decide to jump overboard; we hope they are strong swimmers. With ethics returned, a renewed force, what we need is not no ethics but new ethics, not to concede the power of renewed ethics over to conservative power-holders or restrictive do-gooders, but to put ethics to expansive tolerant good environmental and social works. 5. Biospheric egalitarianism revisited. The notion is terminally ill, but I fear we shall keep revisiting it until it is buried under heavy concrete. So far, for all its problems, it lives on (with apologists, Fox included, shifting ground accordingly; similarly N aess, e.g. 85 p.6). It just keeps reappearing in strong unqualified form, for instance in Sessions (recently): 'one of the first clear statements' of ecosophy 'that all individuals, species (including humans), and ecosystems have EQUAL inherent value (the ecocentric position) was made by Arne Naess when he proposed the principle of BIOSPHERICAL (ECOLOGICAL) EGALITARIANISM ... ' (89, p.11). So represented it simply succumbs to all the previous criticism (in my Critique and indirectly in EE p.139 ff.). Interestingly then both Fox and Naess appeal to 'Sessions' interpretation of biocentric egalitarianism as "a statement of non-anthropocent ricism"' (p.39), to which Fox adds, in all seriousness, 'rather than as a formal environmental axiological position'. In a revealing passage, Sessions puts it rather differently, 'Biocentric egalitarianism is essentially a rejection of human chauvinistic ethical theory and the criteria �52 used to ascribe rights and value; it is a reductio ad absurdum of conventional ethics. Biocentric egalitarianism is essentially a statement of non-anthropocentricism' 19 . This statement does not hang together. For instance, non-anthropocentricism is weaker than rejection of human chauvinism, which on its own is not a reductio ad absurdum of all conventional ethics (because, first off, not an argument, and because, second, of the character of some "conventional" ethics such as intuitionism). Without the logically inadmissible loop through anti-human chauvinism (the deep-green position) the situation is worse still; for, on the contrary, rather conventional British utilitarianisms such as Smart's and Singer's are robustly nonanthropocentric. By so excessively eroding its egalitarian principles, deep ecology loses much depth. In a passage which Fox says 'greatly clarifies the confusion that has surrounded Naess's notion', Naess too, again over-influenced by his minders, takes a similar pathetic course. The principle had previously 'suggest[ed] a positive doctrine, and that is too much'! 'The importance of the intuition' contracts to 'its capacity to counteract' certain chauvinistic hubris. What Fox manages to draw out of these counteracting principles are, however, not principles at all, but an orientation to or general attitude of non-interference, "Letting be", etc. This is not just considerably removed from what N aess offers; it is pretty remote from egalitarianisms. For one can let inferiors, and what is of no inherent value, be, spare and preserve them, perhaps for later exploitation. But what Fox is really concerned to draw from his authorities is the concession (they do not make, nor did he himself formerly) that the principle of biospherical egalitarianism is not a principle, not a position at all (a curious thing to think it was), but something much less definite, less positive, less specific, less open to criticism, a more general attitude, no doubt underlying ethical practice, but definitely not part of an environmental axiology. Poor deluded critics like Sylvan who supposed that a principle is a principle have 'missed' 'the extremely important point' that for supporters of deep ecology a "principle" is but a general attitude. These supporters indeed feel that treating a principle as a principle can do more harm than good, 'and so have deliberately chosen not to take the environmental axiological route' (p.41). There ends Fox's diversion on biospheric egalitarianism. What it comes to is this:- Had the principle been a principle, within environmental axiology, the criticism made of the principle would at 19 Quoted by Fox in a quote that never ends (p.39). In this mismash, Session proceeds to draw upon our material against human chauvinism and conventional ethics, having first dismissed us, referring to EE p.139, as 'mistak[ing] what Naess is up to. Naess's position is not ... "an extension of conventional Western ethics"'. As it happens, we don't mention Naess at all either on p.139 or in our discussion of extensionalism: how do we mistake what Naess is up there to when we don't consider what he is up to? Back in the 70s deep ecology was, after all, not a significant position. �53 the very least constitute a powerful challenge (p.38); but fortunately it is not, "positive doctrines" are too open to criticism! It is only a general attitude concerning reluctance to harm other living beings (p.40). 20 Egalitarianism, of value as well as principle, has dropped out in this rather shallow evasion. 6. The uneasy position of value theory, or axiology within deep ecology and the condemned "environmental axiological route". Fox wants to distance deep ecology from value theory but is also aware, from time to time, that this is not really possible. As a result his position on the relation of deep ecology to value theory is decidedly ambiguous at best, and at worst inconsistent. The tensions appear within the space of a single page (e.g. p.85). We are told both that 'deep ecology is not [a] position within environmental axiology' and that 'it could be quite mistaken to think' that deep ecology 'stands outside ... value theory'. Whence inconsistency results, given that axiology has its normal technical sense. 21 But there is evidence that Fox intends significantly more by 'axiology' than normal - as well as adopting the normal sense: so that behind the initial inconsistency stands another inconsistency. What precisely Fox does intend remains however obscure, scandalously obscure. For one of Fox's main accusations against critics of deep ecology 22 , is that critics are committed to 'environmental axiological reductionism', they 'pursue environmental philosophical discussion almost entirely at the level of environmental axiology', so they are blind to what 'deep ecology thinkers are really on about', which (negatively) consists in 'rejection of the "environmental axiological route"' (pp.51-53). Among these critics, mired in "ethical reductionism", blind to the new paradigmatic character of deep ecology which 20 Or presumably otherwise negatively interfere with other natural things - otherwise the reformulation, though apparently platitudinous, is too narrow, discriminating against some parts of nature. The harm reformulation is borrowed from Devall and Session, who try to make biospherical egalitarian and Self-realisation interpenetrate: 'Biocentric equality is intimately related to the all inclusive Self-realisation in the sense that if we harm the rest of Nature then we are harming ourselves' (p.56). Unfortunately in the ordinary sense of 'harm' the latter claim is entirely false; as I previously remarked, it is all too easy to harm parts of Nature without harming ourselves, with but negligible impact on ourselves. 21 The word 'axiology' does not appear in the Oxford English Dictionary. But no doubt it means the investigation, study and theory of value or worth, and is thus tantamount to value theory, as contrasted however with deontology. What it means will soon become an issue: see below. 22 Yes, it remains an unduly adversial intellectual game, part of the long Britishscholastic history of philosophy. �54 has taken as a guiding star precisely avoidance of the "axiological route", is the hapless Sylvan; the tenacity with which he sticks to his indefensible account of deep ecology is largely explained through these features (p.52). For explanation of some of the operative abusive terminology we are referred elsewhere, to other writings of Fox. But the source is scarcely more informative, and indeed relevant parts of it have, in any case, been lifted for Fox's Response. 23 The promise of explanation is not fulfilled. 'Ethical reductionism' is, like its successor 'environmental axiological reductionism', explained by Fox on the run, which is to say it is not explained. Nor is the reductionist charge sustained. For what is offered, what 'the vast majority of environmental philosophers' are alleged to do, the pursuit of 'environmental philosophical discussion almost entirely at the level of environmental ethics/axiology', may well reflect undue concentration, but it is not reductionism. Fox is decidedly adept in the fallacious business of sliding terms around (otherwise known as Humpty Dumptyism). 'Reductionism' and 'axiology' are not the only terms that suffer at his hands; so, relevant to our purposes, does 'ontology'. At least in the context of his "guiding stars" paper, parts of which are shunted into his Response, Fox uses 'ontology' to mean, not what it does mean, roughly 'the general study of what exists', but very differently, the 'underlying perception of the way things are', which, among other things, epistemologizes what was part of metaphysics. In those terms, 'deep ecology's guiding star ... [which] is (and should be) ... this attempt to shift the primary focus of environmental philosophical concern from ethics to ontology' becomes an epistemological diversion: a regressive attempt to move environmental philosophy to anthropic experiential concerns (Fox 84 p.204 rearranged). It is evident, by the way, who is attempting to do this shifting. If epistemologists focus their efforts on a tiny number of tiny epistemological problems, if logicians discuss only quantificational logic, they cannot be significantly accused of reductionism; they would have 23 While many sorts of recycling are of course commendable, reservations should be held about academic recycling of earlier papers, especially when no improvements are attempted. Fox does at least attempt some "improvements" to get around the obvious objection that deep ecology is itself a normative and hence ethical route; but the adjustments he infiltrates actually make other matters worse. For they consist of the replacement of 'ethical' by 'axiological' or 'environmental axiological' or similar. So now, for instance, the journal Environmental Ethics is charged with reflecting environmental axiological reductionism (p.106); but as examination quickly shows the journal carries much ethical material which is not axiological (e.g. on rights and obligations) - evidently it also carries much that is not reductionistic and even some that concerns philosophy of nature rather than ethics. Fox's charges are without proper foundation. �55 also to claim that is all there is to their enterprise, and to make some attempt to show how the apparent remainder comes down to that. These further necessary conditions are not fulfilled in the case of 'the vast majority of environmental philosophers'; apart from a small minority of philosophers associated with the "ethics without philosophy" idea here is nothing approaching a requisite reduction framework. No doubt there is an axiological reduction program, pursued by consequentalists of various brands, but that is predominantly a program within ethics. As well the long-running naturalistic reduction program grinds on unsuccessfully. But there is no recognisable environmental philosophy reduction program; nor could such a program hope to succeed. There are suitably many counter-instances to Fox's large accusations; among them, conveniently, is that main target, Sylvan, who does not take an "environmental axiological route". In print I have come out against reduction of deontic notions and normative discourse generally to axiological terms; and have, in any case, made it perfectly plain that environmental philosophy comprises much more than ethics, certainly including parts of politics, philosophy of nature, metaphysics and so on. 24 Thus Sylvan, so far from 'criticis[ing] deep ecology on the erroneous basis of it being a position or approach within environmental axiology' (p.101), does not himself take the alleged "environmental axiological route", as the record shows. Rather than rely on my record (a political expedient that should engender but little philosophical enthusiasm), I'm tempted to issue a countercharge: insofar as Sylvan is committed to an "environmental axiological route" so also is (authentic) deep ecology, as elaborated by Naess. Consider, for instance, Naess's elaboration of the deep ecological platform. But in sustaining this counter-charge (the detailed support involves a comparison, made in Bennett and Sylvan, of deep-green theory with authentic deep ecology), we come up once again against the problem of what is meant here by 'axiology'. Unremarkably Fox deploys the fallacious method of redefinition. By 'axiology' and its compounds, Fox both means what is normally meant and also means significantly more. Hardly necessary by now to add, he manages to slide from one to the other. In the normal way, axiology, or value theory, is the philosophical study of virtue and values, 'their meaning, characteristics, origins, types, criteria and epistemological status (p.100, quoting Angeles). 24 So far so good. But now for the first twist and slide. 'In the area of See EP, e.g . p.188, p.222, and several works in the Green series. In the early 70s when there was briefly some glimmer of hope that the Australian National University might interest itself in environmental philosophy, I sketched out a perspective of what it might comprise, which I reproduce as an Appendix (if I can find it!). �56 environmental ethics, the axiological concept of intrinsic value plays a fundamental role. 25 . . . On this understanding, environmental ethics is more accurately described as environmental axiology ... ' (p.100). This is a major non-sequitur. It would almost as well be said that because induction plays a fundamental role in philosophy of science, philosophy of science is more accurately described as induction-theory, and even amounts to induction-theory! Plainly it is quite inaccurately described as induction-theory, since there is much else to philosophy of science; what makes matters still worse is that there are schools which contend that induction drops out as a method and so as a problem. Rather similarly environmental ethics is much more inaccurately redescribed as environmental axiology because, but not only because, there is much more to ethics than axiology, the whole matter of proper conduct for example. For value only impacts on action and proper conduct by way of further principles which are not themselves part of value theory. It is obvious that value theory does not in general exclude what is not (without further ado) a part of it, such as deontic theory, moral epistemology, and so on; but the obvious gets lost sight of, as when Fox assumes that environmental axiology rules out experiential and empathetic procedures. Fox attempts rather more than adjustment and exclusion in his "redescription" of normal environmental ethics as environmental axiology; he has to if his charges against environmental axiology (on the face of it a harmless enough study), and the importance of avoiding it, are to begin to stand up. 25 Fox backs up this claim with themes drawn from Callicott and Regan, with which it is said 'most environmental philosophers would agree', (p.100). Maybe others do; but I doubt that they should, not without significant qualification. Regan states that 'the development of what can properly be called an environmental ethic requires that we postulate inherent value in nature'. Firstly, that is only one way to try to develop an environmental ethic (which may not be deep). There are other feasible starting points and primitives: rights, justice, respects, fairness, empathy, identification, utility, vandalism, evil, and so on, in terms of which value may (or may not) be subsequently be defined (e.g. along lines that tempted former philosophers: what it is fitting/right, for any rational being to prefer/desire). Secondly, the term 'postulate' at best grates, at worst gets the picture seriously wrong: value may not be self-evident, assumed without proof, imposed as a demand, ... . Callicott describes 'the problem of intrinsic value in nature ... as the most critical and most recalitrant theoretical problem of environmental ethics'. That already presupposes that an ethics starts out in Regan's sort of way. Even if a deep ethics does take value as primitive, that is but one problem among several, a problem blown up to critical exaggerated size, primarily by opponents of environmental ethics and infiltrators of the ranks. For other major problems for any ethics, and a more balanced view, see Broad's final chapter. �57 We can glean further information as to what is loaded into the terminology from what Fox tries to do. An environmental axiology is the same as a (formal) environmental axiological position, and that as a formal value theory (pp.40-41; the word 'formal' can be inserted or left out, in Fox it appears to function primarily as a con-term). Such theories, which are "theoretical" and "definite", contain as well as • a value theory, and perhaps also a rights theory (e.g. p.35), both • exact principles, offering specific positional guidance, which are • positively formulated • which apply to all situations, and • a code of conduct, no doubt made up from the principles. 26 Some of Fox's criticisms of environmental axiology turn on these further, and excessively exacting, features he has tried illegitimately to incorporate into axiology. At this stage, there are two main confusions:- first, as to the extent of ethics and moral theory that axiology comprehends, and secondly as to the character of the principles axiology (and, for that matter, deontology and praxis) is supposed to include. A value theory on it own yields neither a rights' theory nor a code of conduct. Even a highly and objectionably reductive theory such as consequentialism requires principles drawn from outside value theory, such as that one ought to act so as to maximize value or utility, in order to arrive at principles of conduct and actionable rights. A value theory may include principles but these are principles concerning value. Like other principles, like those of deontology, they may well not measure up to the excessive standards Fox tries to impose. In particular, the principles may be defeasible, may include or presuppose unspecified and unlistable exceptions; they may include ceteris paribus clauses; and so they may well not apply in all situations. They may fall far short of supplying necessary and/or sufficient conditions; they may not be positively formulated (prohibitions in such forms as 'Don't ... ' are commonplace in ethics); and so on. 26 As well, it seems to be assumed that an axiology, and indeed an Anglo-American ethics, must be atomistic and individualistic; they are but 'means of structuring the interactions of atomistic individuals' (p.112). Not so. It is worth remarking that deep-green theory assumes neither atomism nor individualism (see EP). Nor does it pursue or assume any of the following reductive practices: deontic to axiological, or vice versa; environmental philosophy to environmental ethics, or vice versa; axiological notions to a unique set of primitives, or the single primitive value. As there are several ways to disable a bulldozer, so there are many ways to enable an environmental philosophy: value is but one starting point. �58 7. The "case" against environmental axiology: 'the inadequacies or repugnant conclusions that attend the environmental axiological approach' (p.82). Among the 'serious problems' encountered are said to be those, now hoary, issues concerning intrinsic value, which Fox tosses up in a substantially shallow way. For most environmental ethicists, it is difficult to see how something can have value in itself (i.e. intrinsic value) if it isn't valuable to itself, and to be valuable to itself it must be able to matter to itself or, in other words, be sentient, by which is meant that it must possess the capacity to suffer (p.73)27_ This contention is at least dubious clause by clause, and overall profoundly mistaken. The critical transformation, for deep environmentalism, is centred on that of value in to valuable to (or of value to). It is difficult to see why any environmental thinker would accede to such a transformation, in itself and to itself being so very different in meaning (e.g. consider them coupled respectively with such terms as conspicuous, unusual, etc.) But, in any event, there are several sorts of evident counter-examples to such transformations. Firstly, there are examples from outside environmental territory such as works of art, intellectual theories, and transcendental metaphysical gems. A beautiful theory or a resplendent form can be intrinsically valuable without being of value to itself, without being able to matter to itself, etc. Secondly, there are examples like rare seed, embryonic valuables, and the like. Thirdly, there are sentient or conscious items of intrinsic value that are not valuable to themselves, and do not matter to themselves, such as great but utterly modest people. There is much else wrong in the connections Fox delivers up 28 , but we can bypass most of them (e.g. sentience does not mean a capacity to suffer, as shown by perceptually aware creatures who do not suffer because they have no pain receptors and the like; nor is sentience required, as consciousness will serve for mattering; and so on). 27 It is hard to credit that someone fronting up as a deep environmental thinker could present such stuff, but of course various reasons can be found. While the argument is very bad, there is no doubt, what is no excuse, that worse can be found. For instance, what is intrinsically valuable is valuable in itself, so it must have a self, so it must be sentient, etc. 28 Fox subsequently announces the 'link between something not mattering to itself ... and the conclusion that we can do as we will with it ... sacred in the Environmental Axiological Orthodox Church of Intrinsic Value' (p.80). It is a Church of his own fabrication, at which no respectable deep environmentalist would worship or even be found. �59 Fox runs straight on to an old paradigm assertion by Frankena, from whom he borrowed the argument, which he again proceeds to ascribe (without any evidence offered or, I suspect, any research basis)to most environmental ethicists 29 : 'I do not see, however, how anything can have intrinsic value except the activities, experiences, and lives of conscious sentient beings (persons, etc.)' (Frankena, quoted p.73). Frankena's assertion, as it stands utterly unsupported, 'is a powerful one', according to Fox, again displaying his shallow proclivities: 'What difference does it make how I treat something if it cannot matter to itself?' (p.78) Big differences, not merely to those in a region for whom it may matter, but in the region, if Fox dams the last wild river in the region, cuts down the last lowland rainforest. Fox tops his astounding move by dignifying this shallow rubbish by the title 'powerful argument'. Its power 'is evidenced by the fact that those who want to say rocks or trees have intrinsic value often do so by pure assertion rather than providing an argument for their view (140)' (p.78). That's no evidence, it's irrelevant; and I wouldn't pursue it, were not such a familiar utterly shallow complaint built into the alleged evidence, and were Sylvan not roped in again in a footnote as 'another case in point' (p.112 note 140). It may come as news to Fox (who seems to have read little of what I have written before he rushed out his Response), but I do provide arguments, including those built on examples like the Last Person and the Last Sentient Creatures, examples which have obtained a fair bit of exposure (for some of these, see e.g. EP pp.121-132; and in fact a general argument can be developed from the semantical analysis of value). The certainties of Frankena's dogmatic assertion can be whittled away, first by separating conscious from sentient (after all many people can now see that animals that are not conscious persons can have intrinsic value), second by assembling marginal cases and analogies in a now familiar way, then by counter-arguments, and so on. But, in any case, insofar as environmental ethicists (as distinct from conventional ethicists) continue to side with Frankena that reveals them as a rather reactionary lot, significantly lagging popular thinking. 30 As Naess and others report, many non-philosophers have no difficulty in recognising value-in-itself outside persons, in living creatures and natural objects. 29 There is evidence that these ascriptions are mere desk-chair speculation, in fact of little value; e.g. at the bottom of p.78 where Fox says, of Frankena's position, 'I think it represents the dominant position within ... environmental axiology'. I suspect that, once again, Fox is not duly separating environmental axiology from conventional axiology. 30 The chauvinism of traditional ethical systems is enough to explain the comparative lack of intellectual interest in such moribund systems, and the resulting much wider search for roots, ideas, etc. There is accordingly no serious puzzle as to the sources of deep environmentalism (pace Fox p.74). �60 In the course of trying to get his attack on the environmental axiological framework airborne Fox resorts to some extraordinary distortion and falsification. The looseleaf insert (page 79), where some disenchanted thinkers make an abrupt unexplained entry, affords a good illustration. First we are told that what those in the business (except no doubt some enlightened deep ecologists) 'typically fail to realise is that the environmental axiological framework of discourse so dominates the discussion of our relationship with the natural world that it is mistakenly taken to be the only possible approach' (p.79). This claim is, it seems to me, roundly refuted by the history of the discussion and some of the literature it encompasses. Among other approaches there are, for instance, extended rights (e.g. Stone), environmental justice (e.g. Wenz), extended interests (e.g. Johnson), and negatively ethical nihilism (e.g. Hinckfuss). Fox continues unabashed: 'In other words [!], the hegemony of the environmental axiological framework is such that it has led almost everybody involved in the ecophilosophical debate to think that we have an obligation to care for something if and only if it "has" intrinsic value' (p.79). There's some prime rubbish for you. The charge is manifestly false, seriously flawed, plucked from thin air, and unnecessary except for Fox's misguided mission. Even if an axiological approach were the only approach, no such obligation-to-care principles would follow, and certainly not principles as dubious or refutable as those given. The if -half of the unabashed claim is at, the very, least dubious and would be rejected on some popular positions: suppose, for instance that the intrinsic value of the thing is small, or that it is overridden by the intrinsic value of some competitor for our attention. The only-if-half (which wins Fox's italics, he is going to make much of it) would be rejected by almost everyone who thought about the matter, because of course obligations apply to what has merely instrumental value. If I have borrowed a friend's tools then I have an obligation to care for them though these tools have no intrinsic value. Differently, I am under obligations to behave generally in certain sorts of ways whether the things encountered have intrinsic value or not; accordingly I'm not entitled to treat them any old way (e.g. to vandalise them) or even as I will or, more ambiguously, as I 'see fit'. Combining the pernicious principles Fox has unearthed yields the following ridiculous result: if a thing has no value to itself, for instance has ceased to be of value to itself, then we have no obligation to care for it, we can do what we like with it. The applications of this result are remarkable. There is no doubt that Fox has thereby provided a simple - if appalling - solutions to such major social problems as those of drug and alcohol abuse; victims who are so far down the track that they have ceased to be of value to themselves, can simply be vanished, or dealt with in whatever other way we find convenient. Then too human slavery and sacrifice, never entirely vanquished, could be widely reinstated: Oh brave new world that Fox has lead us into! �61 Fox tries to make a lot out of these odious obligation-to-care principles he has attempted to foist upon environmental axiology. He suggests they indicate the need to abandon rather than broaden the notion of intrinsic value; he suggests they may 'reflect the inherent limitations of the environmental axiological approach' (p.79); he suggests that we need to find instead 'another framework of discourse that can articulate' our feelings about what we ought to care about. This alternative framework - from the many and various that might have been selected - is none other than the wider self identification framework. The obvious course, which should be pursued anyway, of seeking an obligation-to-care principle that does measure up better to our emotional presentations, does not seem to have occurred to Fox, so preoccupied is he with attacking what he sees as "the environmental axiological route" and getting to self immersion. Finally, Fox runs out some examples which are supposed to show the repugnant conclusions to which the axiological approach leads. Unfortunately for Fox's case, the arguments involved do not succeed without further assumptions beyond those Fox enumerates, assumptions smarter adherents of an axiological approach do not make. The examples involve comparisons of groups of individuals, which, it is alleged, exponents of intrinsic value cannot discriminate, though the group situations are very different. One example runs as follows: ' ... the loss, by human interference at least, of the last members of a species ... is somehow "worse" than the loss by human interference of an equivalent number from an abundant species ... . Yet, in terms of intrinsic value, those losses are equivalent since the same "amount" is lost in both cases' (p.80). Fox then argues against more holistic assignments of value on the basis of another dogmatic pronouncement from 'Frankena that communities (such as species ... ) do not "have intrinsic value over and above that contained in ... [their] members"' .31 But he goes on to assert that, irrespective of Frankena's position, 'the point ... applies generally to any atomistic environmental axiological position i.e. to any position that sees intrinsic value as exclusively adhering in or attaching to individual entities' (p.81). Fox is dead wrong. The case assumes, without warrant or mention, equality of the value adhering or assigned to individuals. Plainly the loss of the last members of the species is worse (where it is, e.g. the species is not a diabolical laboratory concoction) because the members of the species are individually more valuable than those of the abundant species. Consider, for comparison, the razing by fire of 31 Fox's second example actually contains the elements of an interesting argument (perhaps, to be uncharitable, the only example in his whole Response). This example, of monoculture vs diversity (p.81), does introduce, if not much of holism, at least relational features of the individuals assembled. There is no reason, of course, why axiology should not take account of those features. Contrary to Fox, there is no need to 'separately posit' that the principle of diversity is 'valuable in and of itself' (p.82). �62 two art galleries containing the same numbers of individual art works, one containing rare art works, the other containing selections from the abundant works of relatively indifferent crafters. The amount, assessed in monetary value even, lost in the first fire is much greater, and so the loss much worse, than in the second fire. Fox not only proceeds to state what his examples would show without due qualification. But he goes on, quite inadmissibly, to general claims which leave off even the qualifications he had earlier introduced (thus later on, p.82, he drops the essential restriction to atomistic positions). Environmental axiology accordingly emerges substantially unscathed; it does not need to be replaced by something else, such as wider identification, only rendered smarter, and supplemented or merged into a fuller environmental philosophy. 8. Fox's 'Deep Ecological Territory': transpersonal identification. But Wes tern deep ecology is now bent upon replacement. Devall, for example, now maintains that 'the unique contribution that deep ecology makes to ecophilosophy is its emphasis on ecological self and affirmation. Subscribing to similar ideas Fox has suggested changing the label "deep ecology" to "transpersonal ecology".' Devall (in 89 again) has deep ecology as, above all, discovering 'an aspect of our self' which has been culturally neglected. Such a reorientation is significantly at variance with Naess's introduction and initial elaboration of deep ecology; for his original summary (in 73) of deep ecology, which is ecologically focussed, contains no allusion to self, ecological or other. It is also at variance with Devall and Sessions of but three years earlier, where nature, ecology and biological systems still appeared fundamental to deep ecology, these entering through the other ultimate norm (besides Self-realisation) of deep ecology, that of biocentric equality (see their p.66). As it happens, Devall, by contrast with Fox, vacillates between a more authentic deep ecology in the style ofNaess (chapter 1 of Devall 89) and the Western variant of transparent ecology (e.g. pp.39-57), which would displace the original theory. There is much speaking with many tongues, much inconsistency, in deep ecology. We have already witnessed such deep ecology doubletalk in the matter of value and the status of ethics. We see it again with transpersonal or expanded-self identification. We only enter 'the real territory of deep ecology' according to Fox (p.53ff.) with such expanded identification. Yet one can be a deep ecologist, much literature explains, without any identification efforts at all (for example by adopting the platform which does not mention identification). So one can be a deep ecologist without ever 'entering deep ecological territory'. Deep ecology without deep ecology - another wonder, or just more double talk? Like Fox's parting flourish: there are sketch maps for deep ecological territory (p.89), yet it is 'ultimately mapless' (see Devall 89 p.39). �63 Fox tries to explain "the search" of deep ecology 'for such things as "ecological consciousness" (Devall and Sessions) and "Self-realisation" (Naess)' through expanded identification. Most conveniently he can take ready-made from Devall and Sessions reductive explications:- 'Ecological consciousness is the result of a psychological expansion of the narrowly encapsulated sense of self as isolated ego, through identification with all humans (species chauvinism), to finally an awareness of the identification and interpenetration of self with ecosystem and biosphere' (Sessions, quoted pp.53-4). 'The essence of ecological consciousness ... [is] to overcome this illusory dichotomy [between Humans and N ature 32 ]' for which 'the important task is ... the psychological development from narrow egotistical "self' to identification with the whole' (Devall as quoted p.53). But, once again, it is one thing to have on authority such explication; it is quite another thing whether such reductions work. I submit that they do not, for the simple reason that ecological consciousness may be had or attained without any such self expansion developments. Consider, first, Professor Flatpan who is a devoted but unimaginative ecological field worker. All his practice, behaviour and so on, shows him as utterly committed to ecological causes, preservation of wilderness and so on, and fully conscious of its importance. But he makes no identification of himself with what he works with or for. It may be that he is some sort of empirical separatist; or it may not. Perhaps he even rejects identification suggestions when they are put to him, e.g. on grounds of hubris, nonsense, ... , or he simply doesn't identify, etc. In Professor Flatpan and his variants we seem to have a tribe of people with strong ecological consciousness and affiliations but without identification. Consider next, the interesting Wombat tribe, superb in their tribal treatment of their environment, who have not developed the notion of self or, for that matter, that of identification. The tribe exhibits a high ecological consciousness (in our ordinary understanding of that non-technical notion, in terms of a strong perception or awareness of environmental matters) but lacks even the conceptual apparatus for self expansion developments. Expanded identity or self developments may serve as useful or powerful tactics for raising ecological consciousness in people raised and hooked on a narrow self-interested self, but they are neither necessary nor sufficient for explaining or understanding ecological consc10usness. Analogous points apply against the attempt to drag Self-realisation into the picture. 32 Naess, in a regressive move, now asserts that humans are unique (e.g. in 89), whence the dichotomy ceases to be illusory. More inconsistency. �64 There are in fact at least three separable notions which deep ecology has tended to fuse: ecological consciousness, widened identification and wider Self-realisation. Confusion is made so much the easier because those notions are, for the most part, not decently introduced. The whole deep ecological theory of expanded identification and Self remains exceedingly poorly explained (thus e.g. identification in Fox, esp. p.60; dimensions of Self, p.83). As ecological consciousness has already been distinguished, it remains to begin on unscrambling identification and self-realisation, and therewith the many senses of self In the first place, identification is independent of self, its manifestation or "realisation", at least to this extent: that discourse concerning identification can be explained and can proceed satisfactorily without any introduction of or notion of selves. A theory may well include identification, and even expanded identification with remote items, without selves or expanded selves. Early Taoism appears to illustrate the point well. Differently, an ontologically modest account of acting can afford a good example of how identification can operate without persona or selves. In fact, a case can be argued that such theories proceed better in this fashion, because they avoid problematic commitments to selves. It may look as if Fox, following Naess and Wilber, can escape these problems, and separation, simply by defining 'self' through identification (and perhaps conversely): 'succinctly: Our Self is that with which we identify' (p.54). There are serious obstacles to such a stratagem. d Elsewhere Fox makes quite a fuss about ontological commitments; on the matter of cluttering up the universe with Selves he is strangely silent. Yet there are rather a lot of these strange selves. Assuming selves do not reproduce themselves, in a universe where there are n objects, and so 2n -1 complexes, and m individuals with selves (with m << n), there are, at first estimate, m x (2n -1) larger selves. Of course some of these larger selves may be the same, nonetheless the number of selves is huge where n is large. Moreover, if a person can identify with nonexistent, with Sherlock Holmes or Pegasus or Satan if not with the form of the Good and the set of all sets, then the numbers shoot right up, into the big infinities. Yet nothing is more common in this arena than for people to identify with fictional objects, of books, TV and so on. Indeed the art of acting depends heavily upon it. A character actor works to identify with the character being portrayed; a good actor enjoys more success in this identification enterprise. d It does not in any case evade ontic issues, because the definition requires that which abstraction which a modest theory would not have generally available. d There are questions as to the adequacy of such an explicative definition of self: whether, for example, it answers duly to prevailing senses of 'self'. The proposal does not. Consider, to bring out just one deficiency, two different but closely integrated creatures, �65 Arthur and Martha say, who identify with the same class of items including themselves and each other. Then on the Naess-Fox definition, it follows, counter-intuitively, that Arthur's Self = Martha's Self, though Arthur @ Martha. Part of what has gone wrong is evident from recent philosophical investigations, namely that the first person point of view, crucial to such items as a self or a spirit or a soul or an ego, has got omitted; a widened self involves some sort of (concentric) expansion from, or focused upon, a first-person self. 33 Normally in religious settings, it is furthermore expansion outwards from an inner personal locus by restrictive identification or selective identification (as Wilber has it), not arbitrary identification. 9. Problems of Self and Self-realisation: the intrusion of value and the issue of evil. Restrictive practices can remove a serious problem for identification theory, the problem of evil identifications, but they raise an equally serious problem, how the re intrusion of value is to be avoided. Fox is vaguely aware that 'the concept of intrinsic worth' may intrude in discussions of Self-realisation. But he assumes, much too facilely, that it can be simply removed (p.56). Devall's later writings should have alerted him to the problems of those who identify with anti-environmental objects or causes, such as beach buggies, symbols of power like bulldozers or tanks , or sand mining opportunities. Identification is not always with the good, with good guys or good causes, as selective deep ecology examples invariably suggest (e.g. p.60, with sea turtles, tigers and gibbons). Spinoza, one of the progenitors of the theory, avoided the problem of evil attachments and causes by envisaging primarily identification with Nature or God, assumed ipso facto to be good. But Naess and Sessions allow for a much wider range of identifications, with the whole human race, which may overall be evil (for all that conventional ethics assert), or with undoubtedly evil human groups or organisations (e.g. the German S.S. or the Mafia). Such expanded identification is hardly to be recommended or encouraged. 33 The person touch is too narrow, unless animals are persons. For there appear to be no serious difficulties in ascribing selves to animals. Of course, if consciousness (or circularly self-consciousness) is written into the notion of self, as with some of the dictionary senses, then selves will be restricted to those animals that enjoy consciousness, a quite extensive class overlapping humans. In a different sense, tied to an original meaning of 'self as same, or one and the same used esp. prepositionally in referring back, there is no difficulty in ascribing selves much more widely. Thus we naturally say of a forest, 'It looks after itself', of an automata or even boomerang, 'It came back itself'. The broad philosophical sense (first part of sense 3 in OED) in terms of individual essences, what a thing really and intrinsically is, haecceity, certainly admits selves for forests! �66 There are criticisms, yet to be answered (though initiated in my Critique), that the "widened identification route" introduces virtually as many problems as it would resolve, and that it cannot proceed independently of what it is supposed to offer an alternative to (p.53), the pernicious "environmental axiological route". In a passage quoted from Seed part of the problem is glimpsed, though Fox who emphasizes the relevant passage fails to observe it: 'It is only by identification with the whole process that correct values will emerge' (p.63). Why? Because, as in Spinoza, "the whole process" is assumed Good, while anything less may not be; a distribution of value is presupposed. How furthermore does a disciple ensure that a proper totalising identification is made? By confirming that correct values do emerge. In brief, then, identification theory is no substitute for valuation theory, but an addition to it. Moreover, it is not an entirely essential addition, however psychologically useful. With the reintrusion of value or the like, the acclaimed superiority of the wider identification approach over the environmental axiological approach lapses. The claim, for which Fox offers initial but unpersuasive defence (p.77 on), is based on another mistake: the mistake, already observed, of thinking that value theory excludes identification. But it need not: selective identification can complement intrinsic value. Very selective identification reveals as well how a theory of heightened Self can be substantially independent of widened (unrestrictive) identification. In showing independence Hinduism, as sometimes presented (e.g. by Smith), affords an admirable example. Hinduism supposes a diminution or deepening of the self to the underlying Self, a route of self-abnegation; but that is taken to be equivalent, by inversion, to a unique expansion of self to approximate a God's eye viewpoint (of things sub specie aeternitas ). 34 34 Whereas Western approaches aim to enlarge the self - as with stock aggrandizement, or Western deep ecology expansion - Indian approaches are concerned primarily with contracting upon the self, to reduce individual expectations, aspirations, wants (to nothing on some accounts). For a resolution of life with disappointments, the (negative) suggestion is: 'if the ego were to have no expectations, there would then be nothing to disappoint' (Smith p.26). But interestingly, there is supposed to be a positive inversion of self abnegation which turns it into self expansion. Expand 'the interests of the self ... to the point of approximating a God's-eye view .. . . Seeing, thus, all things "under the aspect of eternity", would not one become completely objective towards oneself, accepting failure as being as natural an occurrence as success ... . How can defeat disappoint if one feels the joy of the victor as if it were one's own?' (p.26). 'Detachment from the finite self or attachment to reality as a whole ... positive or negative ... ' (p.27). One path to God, to oneness with the Godhead (Brahman), that through knowledge, jnana yoga, strikingly resembles Western deep ecology in some of its features and terminology. The 'Yoga of knowledge is said to be the shortest path to divine realisation (to God). It is also the steepest' (p.35). For intellectuals, introverts and the like 'Hinduism proposes a series of meditations and logical demonstrations �67 While Hinduism does also make room for expansions of selves through time, so as to 'rise above the present and even above present lifespans' (p.28) these expansions are tied to lifelines of single creatures (perhaps as reincarnated). There is no technical provision for unlimited wider identification, for instance identification with inanimate items, with a motorcycle or nuclear reactor. Thus Hinduism can serve to show the independence of unrestrictive expanded identification from self-Self theories. Evidently, too, variations on self-Self (e.g. with more ascetic theories of big Self) can strengthen this result. designed to convince the thinker that there is more to him than his finite self; ... [to] shift his central concern to the deeper reaches of his being ... the larger self that lies behind ... ' (p.33). One 'must pierce and dissolve the innumerable layers of manifest personality until all strata of the mask [all roles of the persona] are at length cut through, [to] arrive finally at the anonymous and strangely unconcerned actor [Atman] who stands beneath. The distinction between self and Self can come through another image' (p.34) however than that of the removal of roles and personae; thus there is the image of the game of life upon a chess-board and the image of the charioteer. Through exercise with such images and such practices it is claimed that a practitioner can 'build up a lively sense of an abiding Self that underlies his phenomenal personality' (p.34). The further 'step consists in shifting his self-identification from the passing to the eternal part of his being. The most direct way of doing this ... is simply to [contemplate] one's identity with the Eternal Spirit ... ' (p.35). Of course analogous self-improvement, self-abnegation and self-expansive elements feature in other religions than Indian, where they were especially early and conspicuous. In Zen, for instance, 'the dualisms of self and object, of self and other, are transcended' (p.134). In Christianity too, the circle of self can be broken, and release experienced from the cramping confines of ego (Smith again, p.280). Analogous elements made their way into Western philosophies, such as that of Spinoza, early romanticism (e.g. Schegel), German idealism and T.H. Green, and directly or indirectly into Western deep ecology (Fox, p.57). As Marxism is sometimes seen, crudely, as obtained by upending Hegelianism and replacing God by Man, so transpersonal ecology can be regarded as similarly varying elements of Hinduism, replacing God by Nature (rather than identifying them as in Spinoza). Ideological tradition does not however point uniformly in one direction, with self elevation as invariant. According to Buddhism, here too more enlightened than alternatives, that is a wrong direction. 'Strong emotions, however lofty [including those of ecological consciousness], tend to emphasize and strengthen the fatal illusion of the ego, which it is the whole aim and purpose of religion to transcend'. For the 'idea of a Self is at the root of every evil passion (and through its action Salvation becomes impossible)' (both quoted in Perrett, p.72). Instead Buddhism offers the tantalizing doctrine of "no self', which at least denies the existence of a substantial self. Further there is allusion to "'the two kinds of non-self': that means there is no ego in humans and no Self in Nature'. �68 Features of Hinduism also show up deficiencies in the Western Enlightenmentsponsored objective of Self-realisation. These include the already remarked problem of evil, which afflicts unrestricted Self-realisation in much the way it plagues closely related hedonism (often a main goal of Self-realisation, and out of an adjacent intellectual stable). To avoid promotion of evil and the like, ethical or similar controls need to be inserted. It should be realisation of an ethical Self, just as elsewhere it should be ethical happiness and ethical profit, not happiness and profit at the expense of other creatures or the Earth. There is worse to come. For there is a scurrilous bigger-is-better element to big Self expansion and realisation, and to often announced, but thoroughly dubious, goals of maximization. Without ethical constraints, the supreme goal of ecosophy, of maximizing Self-realisation, can be decidedly anti-environmental, as too many maximizers proceed to aggrandize themselves, maximize their consumption, or their identification with false chauvinistic Gods, or their dominance, and so on. Such maximal Self-realisation is evidently antithetical to deep environmentalism, which like high-path Hinduism and Taoism, is opposed to selfelevation and self-aggrandizement, especially in material consumption, and favours some self-restraint, self-effacement, self-domination, even selflessness and self-abnegation. But such unconstrained maximization is also in conflict with other features of ecosophy, such as simplicity of, and restraint in, material means, implying a certain Self-contraction. In brief, unrefined ecosophy is liable to be inconsistent. 10. Deconstruction and reselection of self. The problems run deeper however. The theory of expanded self and Self-realisation has ecologically defective starting points: it takes as given what should be investigated and rejected. For instance, Naess simply assumes that the process of heightened Self-realisation starts with the 'development of the narrow ego of the small [Western] child into the comprehensive structure of a Self which comprises all human beings' (quoted p.55; egoism is also assumed p.64 ). Of course deep ecology aims to induce a further development, beyond the anthropic limitations of standard trans personal psychology, 'a deep identification of individuals with all of life' (p.55 again). 35 While it is plain enough that ego is a theoretical notion, elaborated especially by Freud, it is less plain that self too is a folk-theoretic term of certain folk cultures, and it is quite insufficiently appreciated that narrow egos and individual selves are not culturally independent items (artifacts some would now say), but are acquired concepts, 35 Both developments parallel ascents in Hinduism, of upward path of "renunciation", to third (service to human communities) and fourth life-objectives. �69 chauvinistically learnt early in civilised life. Perhaps because individual selves are so deeply entrenched, especially in Westerners' impressions of themselves, a clever practical and ideological course is no doubt the encouragement of expanded egoism, self stretching exercises and empathy. But a deeper philosophical approach would investigate the notions of ego and selftheir history, development, entrenchment, arbitrariness, and dispensibility - rather than take them substantially for granted. In dissolving egoism, it is wise not to concede it at the outset. It, and the intertwined notions of self-interest, and self-ish-ness, should be taken apart to begin with, both analytically and historically. There are of course two parts to the unmasking and dethroning of self-interest: dealing with interest and dealing with self A historical investigation of the rise of the modern theory of self, done in the style of Foucault, might serve to show how arbitrary in crucial respects the notion now rigorously adhered to in social theory happens to be, and how developments could have been different. But even if such an investigation should run aground (e.g. because the notion, although not present in all tribal peoples, reaches back to prehistory), a systematic investigation need not get stuck. The notion of self-interest, and also expanded self interest in the form of group or class interest, has already been taken apart, from the angle of interest, and found wanting as an ethical starting point (see esp. our 79). A complementary investigation of self, standard theories of which should certainly not be conceded, is now required. 36 Some realisation of the problematic character of the notion of self is in fact disclosed in Naess's much earlier investigations, but he does not apply it to the familiar Enlightenment ideal of self-realisation which he takes over as foundation of his own ecosophy, and so of deep ecology as he conceives it. Instead of requisite critical and de( con)structive investigation of the notion of self, resulting in its demotion, what we are witnessing in too much deeper environmental philosophy, is an elevation of the notion and an attempt to focus and found much theory upon it (as esp. in Fox). It is reminiscent of, and related to, the earlier failed attempt to found much theory, including ethics (or a replacement for it), on the notion of person.3 7 36 My impression is that several such investigations are now under way. For discussion and elaboration of earlier investigations, which glimpse some of the requisite points, see Perrett. Our own previous investigations, particularly of the interests and needs of oneself and their interrelations and overlap with those of others (and accordingly the falseness of the egoism-altruism contrast) in 79 and EP, go some small way along the requisite path. 37 Thus, for instance, Strawson in metaphysics, and Benn in moral sciences, both elaborating on Kantian illusions. �70 Indeed those routes are significantly interlinked and offer similar beginnings; for instance, a personality comprises certain roles into which a self, oneself, is cast. In important respects, self amounts to person somewhat deanthropocized. It also suffers similar defects. Neither is sufficiently explained (e.g. what are the existence conditions, the identity conditions, the distinctive properties); neither is up to carrying the heavy theoretical load aficionados have attempted to impose upon them. In particular, neither enables an independent characterisation of central axiologic or deontic notions or other notions bound up with the regulation of conduct which they would somehow displace and to some extent provide new foundations for. Furthermore it appears that the notion of self is not, and cannot be, sufficiently deanthropicized, short of distributing selves around in woods, springs and mountains in the way pagan religions did with spirits (and then letting them be good and evil, and so forth). Undue concentration upon selves has the unfortunate and retrograde effect of swinging environmental philosophy away from deepened ecology and back to agents and actors, the live active subcomponents within ecologies. unacknowledged return to shallower waters. It signals an Because self, however dispensible in environmental philosophy, is integral to Wes tern deep ecology, it behoves us to say something about it, something more than deep ecology has said. Self is a folk-theoretic object of philosophical cast, though no doubt an item with experiential linkage, for instance as a permanent substratum of a certain range of successive (internal) states and experiences, or, without a substance, as a bundle or stringing together of a succession of 'personal' experiences. 38 It is an item, almost an objectification, whose features (which may vary with underlying theory) are primarily supplied through a culturally-dependent theory or the like (e.g. a religious or cult theory). In this regard it is like other typically psychological items of philosophical importance, such as soul (with which it is sometimes identified), spirit, mental substance, mind, psyche, person, personal essence, ego, life force, conatus, etc. In due course a now standard range of philosophical theories gets invoked to account for, or discount, such items: realisms, constructivisms, nominalisms, etc., with dominant scientific ideology committed to a dismissive nominalism. A fashionable humanist opposition has, by contrast, become enamoured of a flamboyant constructivism: selves are made, fabricated, and the like. By contrast again Western deep ecology appears committed to realism, and therewith an 38 While the experiences, such as surges of desire or apprehension, are subjectively empirical enough, the substratum or self-substance may not be. To put it in Humean terms, when I look within I don't find a self just like that (how a sceptical Hume managed to still eludes me). Self itself, like cause, though empirically grounded, is not an "empirical" concept. �71 incredible ontology of selves (already castigated). None of these standard mass-produced positions impresses as at all satisfactory (for reasons elaborated in JB ). For example, scientific nominalism inexcusably leaves out lots of experience, life-forms, and much richness (whereas for its own "legitimate" theoretical purposes it is prepared to introduce all sorts of strange objects). For constructivism there are so far unsurmounted difficulties in getting beyond the analogy: exhibiting the materials and explaining just how they are assembled. While not averse to phrases like 'the fabrication of self', it needs to be remembered that the fabrications are more like those of fiction. Insensitive realism is different; there is sound reason to remain entirely sceptical about an intuitive ontology of selves, especially when a good empathesizer may have numerous different existent selves. I can see little excuse for (being taken in by) such ontological blow outs. Item-theory offers an appealing alternative to these standard positions generally, and therewith very different prospects for self. An item-theoretic account of self will resemble that already offered for mind (in MX); analogous item-theoretic accounts can no doubt be given for spirit, psyche and ego (and also spook, shade, spectre, ghost, etc.). Minds are fairly satisfactory folk-theoretic items which do not exist; ghosts, whether in machines or not, are decidedly less satisfactory inexistential items. Selves are different inexistential items again, with different features; many subjects which do not have minds may have selves. The difficult part of the business consists in explaining whic~ items selves are, a business that is complicated because there are several somewhat different but interconnected notions of self in circulation. Fortunately these can all be accounted for as restrictions in one way or another- temporal, cultural, subject-discipline - of a total self. The total self of a subject abstracts from the total set of features which contribute to the self or personality of that subject, from everything that makes it selfwise what it is (whether supplied by local cultures or not, both supplied internally and not), over the life-span of the subject. For some subjects with richer psychic lives, these features will include states of consciousness (and then the total self will properly include ego, the conscious self). Thus a total self is, if you like, what distinguishes a subject, makes it what it is and so gives its abiding essence (and id-entity), and so resolves issues of personal identity over times. 39 What the relevant features are will become clearer as we come to the usual restrictions. A first set of restrictions are temporal restrictions, a second set aspect restrictions. These are combined in the OED sense 39 This account sharpens and much elaborates the senses which the dictionaries list as philosophical, e.g. OED sense 3. The inexistential account offered shares common ground with the Buddhist "no self' theory when presented as denying the real existence of a self. �72 '4.a. What one is at a particular time or in a particular aspect or relation; one's nature, character, or (sometimes) physical constitution or appearance, considered as different at different times. Chiefly with qualifying adj.' So, for example, Dobbin's total self restricted to time period t1 differs from his total self restricted to t2 at which period he is old and mentally decrepit. A main aspect restriction, very commonly imposed, is to psychically-relevant features, excluding merely bodily features. Differently, a total self, especially a total psychic self, of a subject may be partitioned into such selves, whence sense 4 b of OED. '4. b. An assemblage of characteristics and dispositions which may be conceived as constituting one of various conflicting personalities within a human being. Better self: the better part of one's nature.' Among the topic, or subject-discipline, restricted selves those of economics and social sciences are nowadays particularly prominent. A broad economic self, for instance, is a psychic self confined to an individual and restricted to its locus of wants, preferences, desires, interests, needs, aspirations, goals, etc. (Of course some of the volitional features can be explained in terms of others; in older faculty discourse, it coincides with the individual will.) With a narrow economic self, that of mainstream economics, the broad economic self is narrowed considerably to remove all volitional features stretching beyond those of a present human. Thus interests, for instance, are restricted to selfish interests, those of the human concerned, to exclude both altruistic interests (those of relevance to other items and typically against a creature's own selfish interests) and, more important, other-directed and higher-order interests (such as a's interest is that Ws interest be fulfilled, a's concern for~' etc.) 40 This narrow self tightens up a further dictionary sense, namely OED '5. One's personal welfare and interests as an object of concern; chiefly in a bad sense, selfish or self-interested motives ... '. The tightened-up restrictive notion lies at the base of most modern social science. It is characteristically coupled with the Hobbesian theme, according to which all motivation reduces to that of narrow economic selves, effectively self-interest. Such psychological egoism, that nothing can move a creature to action or decision except interests and like experiences of its own self, was assumed by Spinoza, who proposed absorbing this 40 These points are much further explained in 79 and EP. Other selves, such as altruistic selves and self-effacing selves, deploy quite different obverse restrictions, eliminating local selfish interests. �73 excessively narrow self in a generous Nature (p.57). Deep ecology has attempted to expand this sorry route (p.54), which starts out from a dominant paradigm mistake. 41 11. More troubles with Self as foundation. The big trouble is that an expanded Hobbesian picture, with expanded-self interest as the only fundamental motive, presupposes the essential correctness of Hobbes' crude theme - all that Hobbes really got wrong was the 'size' of one's self - but that is a fundamental mistake. It is a mistake as fundamental as the conflicting crude motivational theme that the only basic motive of business enterpreneurs is [self-]profit. It is a mistake of the same cast as the pervasive idea that conventional ethics can be rendered environmentally adequate just by expansion of those it applies to (expansion of the "community", or of a suitable base class of parties with interests, sentience, etc.) - what is often now called 'moral extensionism' 42 . As empirical evidence tells, prima facie decisively, against intertwined Hobbesian and entrepreneurial economic motivational theory - an extraordinarily convenient, and not "rationally" abandoned, theory for contemporary power elites - two substantially successful theory-saving strategies swing into action: • a sustained propaganda campaign to align people's motives with the theory, conducted through advertising, education and other mass channels of persuasion; • a sustained reduction campaign by subservient intellectuals to show that all apparently exceptional motives actually conform to the motivational theory. At the same time, minorities (such as pre-industrial peoples) whose motives do not conform to the established/ment theory are of course discounted. This seriously flawed anti-environmental theory should be resisted and replaced, not just extended. For the only basic and legitimate motives and interests are not merely those of self (whether expanded in a futile attempt to encapture other or not). One distinct motive is, to put it in old-fashioned Kantian terms though the example is not Kantian, that of duty, duty for instance to this Earth, duty which is neither self-regarding or necessarily Self-regarding or, in any ordinary sense, otherregarding. 41 The chauvinistic expansion of self and person is sometimes carried to remarkable lengths, as revealed by Shepard: 'we must affirm that the world is being a part of our own body'. 42 For further explanation and criticism of this expansion, see EP. At least Fox does Sylvan the "favour" of distancing him from the most famous exponent of such extensionism, Leopold, whom he tries to push into the wider identification and wider Self fold (p.64). �74 A third complementary strategy renders the theory normative: while agents may act, or appear to act, on non-self-interested motives, it is only rational to act according to one's ongoing self-interest. (While we shall focus upon a strong version of the normative egoistic theme, that it is only rational to act in one's own self-interest, including one's future self, much of what is said counts against weaker forms of the theme according to which it is in some way preeminently reasonable to act in one's own on-going self-interest.) This normative assumption depends crucially however upon a specially-tailored theory of self- a substantial underlying self that suitably integrates all one's interests and concerns, past, present and future. Without such an account the peculiar self-evidence normative egoism is presented as enjoying, and upon which it depends as an unargued rest position, begins to fall away. Suppose instead a self or person is represented as a sequence of causally connected experiential moments (e.g. momentary selves, of a person). Unfortunately then, for normative egoism, it ceases to be evident to many presently placed selves that there are special specially-valid reasons for only being concerned with future elements of one particular sequence rather than another, to which one's present self may not belong; for promoting the interests of this future momentary self rather than some other more congenial one, perhaps in another sequence. 43 Indeed it is evident that reasons for action are not confined to those intermalised to the interests of one future self rather than another, one my or thou or it (say) rather than another; that reasons can and do operate beyond interests, as when directed at the futures of forests or fens, and beyond selves and their extensions and variants such as I's and Thou's and You's, as when arguing for deep environmental action. Nor is there cogent reason for trying to curtail reasons to what answers to a bad, if deeply incalcated, theory, a pernicious and damaging, if widely promoted, theory and sense of self joined to chauvinistic bodily consumption and advancement. A more generous itemtheoretic theory of total self can expose this theoretical fraud, allowing for a full flowering of reasons for action; it thus diffuses the narrow greedy self of Hobbesian theory. Expanded Hobbesian is assumed in deep ecological Ego-tripping (pp. 65-66) and in 'the theme of ecological resistance as Self-defence', that resisting ecological depredation is defending oneSelf, because the whales or forests are me; it is me that is being injured (p.61). Such expanded Hobbesian is even less plausible than Hobbesianism itself - among other things because you can go on, to become other You's even after You as the forest has been destroyed. Be sure I do not deplore, but welcome worthwhile ecological resistance 43 On all these points see further Perrett, esp. p.72. Perrett explains how the regularly assumed opposition between egoism and altruism depends on particular assumptions about the nature of self, and breaks down when, as in buddhist ethics with its doctrine of no-self, these assumptions get removed. �75 whether conducted as Self-defence, or not; good works, even if undertaken for self-ish or distorted or ridiculous motives, are not to be disparaged. Nor similarly should the help of campaigners whose motives have been distorted by propaganda systems be disparaged because those campaigners are engaged on dubious or bizarre bases, such as that they are defending themselves rather than something else that deserves their care, concern and respect. What should be resisted are the twin ideas that these are the wholesome motives or the only [rational] motives, and that quality of motivation does not affect goodness of act. The main trouble then with the wild Western approach so advanced under Self-interest is that, like Hobbesianism but on an expanded scale, it would reduce or suppress all other motivation. In many ways, it has not really got beyond bad "old paradigm" thinking, but merely bizarrely extended it. 12. Liquidating Fox's "deep ecological territory". The success Fox imagines expanded-Self is going to have in the environmental struggle arena, a success far surpassing that environmental ethics is likely to have (p.84), is premissed on this faulty expanded Hobbesianism theory. It is not based on monitored field experience. In the action field, where some Western deep ecologists are seldom seen, identification techniques, far from admirably shifting the onus of proof (a dubious claim also advanced on p.84 ), are likely to be greeted with amazement and disbelief: what is this crap? It is not very long ago that people who thought they were tigers or trees were locked away, or else regarded, like the man who identified his wife as a hat, as figures of fun not to be taken seriously. Such motivation is likely to be taken, and presented, by a hostile and backwards opposition as crazy. Furthermore, such defences can back-fire. Identification with a rainforest, for instance, because symmetrical, does not guarantee defence of its needs as one's own, as against one's own needs as its. A powerful bunch of developers and bureaucrats who identify with the forest may take their needs, for timber profits and tourist revenues, as its, and interfere with it accordingly. Identification, on its own, admits disastrous reversal. Expanded Selves can be dubious allies in environmental struggles. It is fortunate then that for almost all environmental purposes, including those of deep environmental philosophy, the notion of self can drop out; selves are inessential. While �76 decent theories of self and self-Self can presumably be worked out44 , and Self tried out as sole primitive, the theory so far, and with it (Western) deep ecological theory in present form remains both a shambles and an embarrassment. It is bad news then, given the abysmal shape of the deep ecological theory of self, that deep ecology should contract, at least on Fox's continuing vision, to a theory of self (see also 89). On this presentation much of authentic deep ecology is thrown away. The deep ecological framework comes down to 'two basic hypotheses and on ultimate norm', all of which revolve around Self (pp.86-7): it is Self, Self and Self, nothing but Self. And it has nothing essentially to do with the environment. For Self does not provide the great new (or shabby old) starting point to environmental philosophy that Fox imagines. To elaborate:One "hypothesis", already criticised, is that 'Our Self is that with which we identify' (p.86, the pluralisation is interesting, e.g. a vintage car club has a group Self which includes their cars and perhaps others they covet); the other, not previously encountered, is that 'the self can and does grow/develop/mature ... over time' (p.17). That hypothesis is presumably false; for selves, like plants, may decline, wither or die. Or don't ecological selves wither and die? 'The norm is that the ideal state of being is one that sustains the evident (and deepest) possible identification and, hence, sense of Self'. It seems to be assumed that the ideal state, identified in the "norm", ought to be striven for (though it is hard to see why: it involves much unpleasant, embarrassing or boring identification work, etc.). There are accordingly covert principles of conduct, such as striving towards the norm and undertaking the "real spiritual work" of deep ecology, and covert values, such as that of the (so-called) ideal state, lurking at the bottom of Wes tern deep ecology; it too hides, even in its reduced form, a condemned "axiology" and ethics. But not environmental ones; the norm could have issued from a deviant Hinduism, without environmental commitments, concerned above all with introverted cultivation of self. Although Fox says the 'ideal state of being is referred to ... as "ecological consciousness" by Devall and Sessions' (p.87), such reference does not make it so; ecological consciousness involves rather awareness of and commitment to certain things and matters ecological, not widest identification, which involves much that is unecological, such 44 Perhaps following through suggestions sketched earlier, perhaps elaborating, in less anthropocentric style, T.H. Green, whose theory appears to anticipate much of wild Western deep ecology. Green took self-awareness as a guide to the nature of things and self-realisation as each person's goal. He held that the developed self is the end which defines the good, and that all ethical terms may be formed, so far as required, to that end. Of course he also spoke against atomism and individualism, and in favour of holism and organicism. �77 as traffic with occult and transfinite, or antiecological, such as identification with developers ripping down rainforest and heritage works. While Fox does claim that consequences for the natural (not the built) environment do follow from his framework, the claim is mistaken. According to him, 'it follows ... that when we harm or limit the flow of nature then we are harming or limiting that with which we ... identify and so diminishing our ... Self' (p.87). No such consequence follows as regards widest possible identification; all that destruction of an ecosystem does is to put the ecosystem in a possible world, with which identification is sustained, and bring up a different and perhaps humanly improved world (e.g. a wild river is dammed to save villages). The remote Self is unperturbed by such commerce of actuality. Even if Fox should try to save the show by again restricting awkward or uncomfortable identification feats, his intended consequences do not follow. For we may well increase that with which we identify by "limiting the flow of nature", for instance by varying or enriching parts of extensive monotonous natural systems. 45 Fox's deep ecological-framew ork, Self-indulgence of a deep spiritual cast, is no framework for an environmental anything. Luckily it is not needed, but can be despatched with other deep ecological rubbish. 13. Justifying "extreme interpretations" of and "extreme reactions" to wild West deep ecology. Fox exhibits full dominant paradigm outrage at what he refers to as my 'extreme interpretations' and 'extreme reactions' (boldface headings for sections 3 and 4, p.13 and p.19). While I am quite accustomed to being called or accounted an extremist, it is generally done by those far on the shallow side of the environmental divide. I trust such terms as 'extreme' carry no more weight with readers than they do with me. It is a fashionable, but methodologically quite unsound, ploy to try to dismiss those who depart far from some lately received position as extremists. Nowadays even 'Thomas Aquinas, for example, is depicted as an 'extremist' (by Hart) and dismissed because the views he expressed do not accord with what "all lawyers think" (Dworkin)' ;46 one is in good company. The Earth will in the longer term be helped by deep environmental extremists 45 That Fox's theory (already epicycling, into dimensions) admits such cases is evident from "the extinction example" (pp. 82-3). Because they are sufficiently evident, I have not recorded difficulties regarding this example, which attempts to discriminate different sorts of environmental losses by their differential effects on Selves (if there are any ecological ones left that is: Last Self arguments retain their bite and smile). 46 According to H. Miles in a curious letter to the ANU Reporter 1989. �78 who serve to shift various balances in environmental directions - the balances to be achieved, for example, in discussions, in time allowed in decision making, and so on. But what Fox also says he means, under the emotive overlay, is that 'Sylvan's arguments show a tendency to push the claims of those he criticises to extremes' through application of the following reduction-of-relations principles: S 1. 'if two concepts/ideas are linked, then they must be completely similar (equivalent [identical])'; S2. 'if they are contrasted then they must be completely different (i.e. non-intersecting) as well as completely exhaustive (i.e. covering all cases/examples of the set in question)' (p.13 and earlier). All these principles (S2 breaks down into a pair straightaway) are evidently fallacious, and only hold in very special cases. Now I claim to be well aware of this, and to have illustrated this awareness sufficiently in my work (esp. investigation of the history of the attempt to remove or suppress relations, investigation of very special cases, such as "classical relevant logics", where a connections of the form, "where Rab then a = b" does hold; see JB and RLR respectively). Indeed I discuss an example of this 'crude fallacy' in one of the sectors that particularly excites Fox (Cp.27). But in any case, the principles are substantially irrelevant to Fox's discussion of 'extreme interpretations' and 'extreme reactions' (in his sections 3 and 4)! For, as we shall see, what really bothers Fox, and also N aess, has little that is not superficial (merely terminological) to do with extremes; what troubles them rather is that I take their claims seriously, and not as forever 'preliminary', or at 'a superficial level', or 'metaphorical' or the like (see e.g. p.13, p.49). 47 Firstly, I introduced the quasi-technical term 'extreme holism' ('extreme' was italicised to indicate its introduction and quasi-technical character, not to emphasize my extremism) as contrasted with 'moderate holism' .48 That is obviously not an extreme claim, it is not pressing a claim to extremes; it is simply using a piece of terminology, and does nothing for Fox's cause. I take seriously Naess's holistic claim, repeated by incautious deep ecologists, that his conception 'dissolves ... the very notion of the world as composed of discrete, compact, separate "things"', which I describe as 'extreme holism'. 47 One day I should really like some non-preliminary formulations from Naess. Quite separately from that standing request, I do regard it as pretty ridiculous to insist that ordinary discourse about chairs and desks, fems and wombats is 'talking at a superficial or preliminary level of communication'. Perhaps we have to expect this sort of twaddle from hard-wired physicalists, not from deep thinkers. 48 It is a contrast previously discussed, in more detail but in different terms, in EP, p.222ff. �79 Fox's response to my reporting of Naess's claim, in the style of Dr. Johnson (no separate things, so no wildernesses!, no forests!), his only response it seems, is '(Does Sylvan) sincerely think that anybody could be that silly?' (p.14). The answer is of course: Yes, damned right he does; for example, too many influenced by Hegelianism. It 1s unremarkable that Fox and Naess are trying to backtrack without appearing to do so. 49 Where, then, is the (non-quotational) extreme interpretation? Fox makes two connected moves, neither of which duly involve principles Sl and S2. Firstly, he introduces a distinction, not previously in the ballpark, between relative and absolute autonomy of "things in the world" (p.14). As commonplace in Fox's practice, the apparent distinction is introduced and put to work without proper explanation. Then Fox announces that 'it is clear from his interpretation that he [Sylvan] takes Naess and myself to be denying even relative autonomy ... whereas it should be clear ... that what is being denied is absolute autonomy'; and he has the audacity to go on, ' ... there is really no excuse for Sylvan's extreme interpretation' (p.14). Well, you can take my word for it that Sylvan did not take N aess and Fox that way; the distinction in question had not been introduced in the literature under discussion. For similar reasons, that there is no basis for it, there is no extreme interpretation, and nothing to underwrite Fox's captious moralising. Secondly, Fox proceeds quite scurrilously to make it look as if I am attributing certain themes I nowhere allude to him and Naess (but in fact attacked in Wilber's book). ' ... Sylvan's extreme interpretation ... would have Naess and myself reduce all diversity and multiplicity to something like "uniform, homogeneous, and unchanging mush" or to "uniform, all-prevading, featureless but divine goo"'. The quotations, which may well look as if they were drawn from my criticism, bear no resemblance to anything I attributed to Naess or Fox; they are in fact drawn from Wilber's fashionable Eye to Eye. Similarly that 'extreme interpretation' is not to be found in Sylvan; it is a fabrication on the part of Fox. Nothing I made critical use of tells against Naess's total-field exhibiting various features, such as some internal differentiation. The Flux of late nineteenth century philosophy was both non-uniform and non-homogeneous, with 'eddies, ripples and whirlpools in a stream ("unity in process")' (p.15), without being composed of separate individuals. The other example Fox includes in his section in extreme interpretations, the matter of internal relations, will also require, to begin with, some grimy textual exegesis, including further inspection of Fox's practice of tactical misquotation (or quotation out of context), 49 Their behaviour is reminiscent of Parmenides and Zeno at the races, as delightfully related by Bouwsma. �80 rather than real philosophical work. 50 But here no attempt is made to exhibit an 'extreme interpretation' (nor again do principles Sl and S2 enter). Fox's first (and final) point is that subscription to a doctrine of internal relations 'does not necessarily render one an idealist' (p.17). Whereupon, by way of counterexample, Fox trots out his own admirable philosophical pedigree, and reveals a doctrine of internal relations inherited from the neutral monism of Spinoza and the process philosophy of Whitehead, both well known for their doctrines of internal relations. N aess does at least make it evident that he is adopting or adapting the received theory of internal relations. As it happens, I did not commit myself to the proposition that a doctrine of internal relations (however characteristic of idealism) entails idealism; naturally there appears to be more to idealism than that (such as a total-field doctrine). Only by a misreading or misquotation does Fox obtain his necessarily linkage to idealism. Firstly he represents me as ascribing to him 'this "idealist theory of internal relations"' (p.15), when what I actually wrote was that a certain 'form of argument ... commandeers elements of the idealist theory of internal relations' (p.27 emphasis added). Later he congratulates himself upon 'discrediting Sylvan's claims that deep ecology subscribes ... to his characterisation of the theory of internal relations, which he describes (p.28) as "a terminal form of idealism newly warmed up"' (p.18). To credit to me 'a characterisation of the theory of internal relations' is certainly a gross overstatement, though it may be convenient in trying to exonerate the doctrine of deep ecology from evident criticism. But the immediate salient point is that what I say 'looks like a terminal form of idealism ... ' (C p.28 emphasis added) is not the theory of internal relations but 'what Fox describes as "the central intuition of deep ecology"'. The second, of Fox's three points as to my comments on the deep ecological doctrine of internal relations, is a bit more philosophically substantive, and concerns the character of the necessity ascribed to connections. But textual exegesis is again unavoidable. Fox contends that 'Naess's definition of internal relations ... flatly contradicts Sylvan's claim that this view point renders "all connections necessary" in the ... sense Sy Ivan intends' (p.16; Fox has the term 'strong' where dots are inserted; we'll look at what Fox is trying to hang on me shortly). 51 On Naess's explanation, an internal 'relation between two things A and B is such that the relation belongs to the definitions or basic constituents of A and B, so that without the relation, A and Bare no longer the same things' (see p.15). Consider any 50 By and large, deep ecology involves disturbingly little real philosophical work. So much of it is name dropping, rank pulling, unacknowledged borrowing - all the old stuff some of us hoped to be rid of with a "new environmental paradigm". 51 In fact I had been arguing from Fox's theme that "all entities are constituted by their relations" (see C pp.27-8), but Fox diverts the issue to Naess. �81 internal connection R between A and B (indeed on the standard theory where all relations of objects are internal, any connection). Then ARB holds by virtue of definitional or constitutional features of A and B. But what so holds, holds as a matter of necessity (is 'necessarily constitutive' in Fox's lingo, Fox trying again for a resolving distinction); whence the connection holds of necessity. A flat contradiction? Now to the 'strong sense' Fox has located and is spreading abroad that I intend (once again he did not consult me as to what I intended). 'Sylvan is claiming', according to him (though I have never advanced such a claim, and am still not clear what it means, 'exact nature of' being Fox's terminology), 'that the exact nature of all those relationships is also necessary' (p.16). Now in trying to show that Naess's story conflicts with this claim he has hung on me, Fox proceeds to run Naess into deep trouble (though Naess is blithely oblivious; see note (22)). For, so Fox says,5 2 'Naess explicitly acknowledges that A and B can exist "without" the relation"', meaning "'in a different relationship" or "in the absence of that specific relation"' (p.16). Suppose such a different relation is S (at worst S is the absence of R). So apparently ASB and not-ARB; whence A, for instance, has inconsistent properties, namely both ... RB which is constitutive and not- ... RB by acknowledgement . To be sure, the difficulty can be avoided, by insisting (as N aess did and as Fox also has him say) that 'without the relationship, A and B are no longer the same things', so what we have is A'SB' and not- A'RB' for some counterparts A' and B' of A and B. Some such line is taken by the standard theory. But Fox seeks a connection between A and B for Naess which is in some respects contingent. Certainly that is possible, but it goes beyond the bounds of the standard theory by admitting external relations, for which it is not required that A and B are no longer the same without the relation. And, in a straightforward sense, it fails the constituting claim: entities have relations, external ones, which are not constituting (to deal with Fox-past), or alternatively (to refute Fox-present, p.17) it is false that 'all relationships are necessarily constitutive' because some, external ones, are not. My wombat example, to come to Fox's third point, was designed to indicate just that, that a wombat stands in various relationships which are not (necessarily) constitutive and which are merely contingent. Suppose wombat A passed by hollow stringbark B on its foraging route (say once only, and accidentally, because it had wandered out of its territory). Then "A passed by B" is a relation between A and B, a true relation, which furthermore is merely contingent, because it might not have transpired. Moreover, the relation is not constitutive, for instance of A, because it makes no difference to the nature or 52 The claim attributed to Naess does not appear in his original 1973 paper where the relational total field image was presented, and from which the other Naess' quotes were drawn. �82 constitution of wombat A. What I mean by term 'constitute' (and likewise 'constitutive') Fox professes unclarity about this (p.17) - is what is ordinarily meant by the term in such contexts, namely what makes a thing what it is, what determines it (see OED), what gives a definite nature or character to (see Concise English). 53 Wombat A, one and the same A, a creature with exactly the same make-up as A, not some counterpart or surrogate A', might not have passed by B. So "passed by B" is not constitutive of A; and again not all relations are constitutive. Despite the general paucity and poorness of argument in much revealed deep ecology literature, the general downgrading of rational and analytic methods 54 , and the emphasis on experiential and empathetic approaches, the status of argument turns out to be a sensitive issue too. Fox beats up an issue on this topic, on route to the grander issue of intellectual rubbish, by his standard practice of misattribution. He proceeds stealthily to amend my aside, '(argument often not being considered in the proper style of such a nonanalytical enterprise as deep ecology)', which I believe I can sustain, to the assertion 'that argument is not in the "proper style" of deep ecology' (p.20), which I did not make (for all Fox's kind attribution) and would not want to defend. I wish decent argument and careful reasoning were more often considered in the proper sty le of deep ecology, and more often practised. Then I should be more enthusiastic about it, writing much less critical of it, and castigating less as rubbish. Fox, I am afraid, has done little to convince me that 'closely measured intellectual argument is thoroughly in keeping with the style of deep ecology' (p.20) or that it is much of a priority. He offers but two examples: he stands on his own record as attested in his Response (how can I say anything unfavourable about that), and he appeals, forgetting I said 'often ... considered', to an exceedingly loose talk by Devall on the Stone/Sky path, which mentions 'logical analyses of ideas, premises, systems of thought' and 'formal statements of definitions of key terms, explication of relationships', but deliberately avoids any such work, preferring instead, in characteristic deep ecological style, 'a steeper ... path that requires ... the "real work"', consciousness elevation, jnana yoga or psychedelic drugs maybe (pp.21-2). 14. Transpersonal logic and methodology. 53 It is proponents of the dubious doctrine of internal relations - a doctrine quite inessential to and external to deep environmentalism - who are forced into assigning an extraordinary meaning to constitute. 54 The Counter-Enlightenment antipathy to analytic and rational methods resurfaces in Western deep ecology. For an example in Fox's Response, consider his remarks on the 'blunt tools of logical analysis' when applied to the 'real world of communication' (p.11), which could almost have come from the late eighteenth century. �83 The quaint relation-reduc tion principles, S 1 and S2, do show up with the first premisses of what Fox dignifies with the misleading titles of "false equivalence argument" and "false contrast argument". The second title is particularly misleading, because there is a recognised traditional fallacy of "false contrast" or "false dichotomy" (arising as regards classifications), which differs from Fox's defective "false contrast argument". Fox has proceeded to latch onto my legitimate use of traditional logic, as when I say (rightly or wrongly) that Devall and Sessions are operating with a false contrast (p.11), in order to saddle me with a defective argument of his own concoction which I do not apply. But to show that these defective arguments, which Fox accuses me of heavily and repeatedly applying (p.6, p.11 ), are not deployed by me in the way Fox alleges, we shall need to look at the arguments. To avoid further confusion with tradition, let us relabel the arguments, replacing 'false' by 'foxy'. Let A and B be terms (Fox has 'concept/idea'); let a be a person or group whose views are under criticism. Then the foxy equivalence argument, set down pretty much in Fox's way, runs as follows Key Premiss. When a links A with B (i.e. maintains that ARB for some relation R), claim a holds that A=B. Subargument. Show there are cases where A without B or B without A, whence A;;:: B. Conclusion according to Fox: ' the "argument" (i.e. the claim that A = B) is "false" or that it "fails"' (p.6). An immediate observation is that Fox has not succeeded in setting down what he is after with much success. The conclusion, which does not make use of the key premiss, is a mess. As he hasn't located an argument, in 'the claim that A = B', he has perhaps felt obliged to put critical terms in italics, or perhaps he imagines he is quoting me - what is going on is unclear. He might have concluded, though a level up, that the "false equivalence argument" itself fails, a conclusion he doesn't explicitly draw, but then he would be left without a conclusion at all for the foxy equivalence argument. There is a valid traditional argument, filling out the subargument that is buried in the foxy argument as intended. In a standard logical format, with A( c) symbolising that c is or has A or that A applies to c, it runs as follows:!. A= B hypothesized claim (imposed on a) 2. A( c) iff B(c) for every case c 3. A(c) & ~B(c) for some case c standard case expansion of 1 further data 4. ~2 from 3 5. ~(A= B) from 4 6. ~(A= B) reductio, discharging the hypothetical argument �84 Thus the claim, that A= B, is indeed false, as its negation is categorically established, given the data. But again the argument, now valid, makes no use of the key premiss. A proper fuller version of the argument would replace 3 by the disjunction, A(ci) & -B(ci) V. -A(c2) & B(c2) for some cases ci and c2, and consider each disjunct. But the result would be the same, namely 6 categorically. The preceding represents the valid core of the foxy equivalence argument. What of the key premiss however? That part also can be rendered correct, but upon assumption of the quite defective S 1. To convert this part of the argument into available logical form, let us replace holding or maintaining functors by a correspondin g asserting or (more satisfactorily) commitment to asserting functor. (Should you imagine a fast one is being pulled just read 't-a' as 'a holds that'). Then the key dubious premiss becomes, at first approximation. KP. from a is committed to asserting A is related to B, i.e. ARB, infer that a is committed to asserting that A= B (or A= B). Expressed in symbols in implicational form it looks as follows: KP➔ . .,_a ARB ➔ . t-a A= B. This form makes it easy to see how the key premiss derives from relation-reduction S 1, i.e. ARB ➔ A = B, namely by a standard distribution of the committed-to -asserting functor, .,_a, or specifically by the rule x ➔ y / t-a x ➔ t-a y. S1 is the way to arrive at KP. Moreover without S 1, there is little basis for KP. Now the arguments can be put together. We argue to KP➔, e.g. from Sl. We run out the subargument to ~(A= B), from which we conclude a is wrong or mistaken in asserting A = B. Then we proceed back across KP➔ (using what results from it by distribution of the mistake functor W, namely W t-a A= B ➔. W t-a ARB), to conclude that our friends a were wrong in maintaining, as they did, that A is linked to B. Exposure of that part of the argument involving KP➔ is enough to at least suggest that I am unlikely to rely on it heavily, since it is manifestly defective when so exposed, relying upon the already jettisoned S 1. Fox, for all his assertions, does nothing to show that I do rely on it heavily; indeed he does not show that I rely upon it at all. For all his effort in eliciting these arguments (shoddy though his work may be), he fails entirely to follow through and show how they apply. Consider his "example" of the foxy argument at work, and supposedly scrutinized, where the terms involved are life and value (p.7). Fox's conclusion does not appear, no conclusion is reached. Moreover the key premiss is not instantiated, nor is any evidence of its use advanced; it is knocked down to the claim, deriving from certain deeper positions, that life= value. Whence the sort of argument that I am alleged to be employing 'in a totally �85 fallacious manner' comes down to the valid traditional subargument. Fox's complaint is not about an argument at all, it is about the premiss. As Fox concedes 'this argument is fine, it's just that the original claim is false' (p.7)! Let's take time out from the argument to consider the original claim. What Fox reports that 'Sylvan ... claims, [namely] that (U.S.) "West Coast deep ecology" equates life (A) and value (B)', differs significantly from what Sylvan did write, namely 'the impression comes through from much West Coast deep ecology (from certain insufficiently penetrating intermediate positions) that what is important is ... life and nothing but life' (Cp.16). No universal claim, no equation, no falsehood. Naturally there are some commitments, but Fox hasn't taken much care with those, or got them right either. For example, Sylvan does not offer a definition (of his own or of any sort) of 'biospherical' (which does not mean 'earth-centered') or of 'biocentric', but relies on standard meanings (accordingly, too, he cannot 'refute his own ... definition'). The position with the foxy contrast argument is very similar to that already dealt with, a similar shambles. The argument is exactly the same except that equality or (strong) equivalence,= , is replaced throughout by a dual notion, exclusive disjunction, symbolised V. But Fox does not dualise properly; instead of the dual conclusion, "the argument (i.e. the claim that A V B) is "false" or that it fails", he misleadingly introduces the traditional fallacy terms, as if they were new terms without a predetermined sense. He has it that we 'conclude that the contrast in question is a "false contrast" or a "false dichotomy'" (p.8). Once again, a properly developed illustration of the argument is not offered, and in the very sketchy "example" given the argument drops out. It turns into a question - an interesting question - of the use, point, and merit of the shallow/deep distinction. Let's take time out to consider the issues raised, as some are important. But first some trivia. Fox, in effect, charges me with presenting a straw-person, as no one (but me) takes the shallow/deep distinction as exhaustive of environmental positions. Well, he has led a sheltered life; I've met too many activists who do. Fox implies that I 'want to assign the shallow/deep terminology to the "historical scrap-heap"' (p.9). Here, and elsewhere, Fox apparently joins the activists who conflate the shallow/deep distinction with the shallow ecology/deep ecology distinction. It is only deep ecology that I have contemplated for the scrap heap, not the shallow/deep distinction. More important is the status of such illdefined items as deep ecology. Fox now assumes that shallow and deep ecology, however imperfect, are "ideal types", the merit of which is to be assessed pragmatically, through their usefulness, heuristic roles, etc. Some scepticism is warranted. Ideal types such as protestant and middle class might be defensible in sociological investigations where there are plenty of protestants or middle class people to survey, but what is supposed to correspond with deep ecology? The comparison has serious problems. Western deep �86 ecologists have yet to get their theoretical slum in order, to rectify their classifications, clean up the objects of these, and so forth. 15. More rubbish removal, especially that borrowed from pop science. Along with a substantial upgrading of the calibre of argumentation in deep ecology should go extensive removal of rubbish, such as the unnecessary doctrine of internal relations. The image of philosophers removing the rubbish, which comes from Locke, is much favoured in Australia, and has been deployed by both Armstrong and Passmore. 55 It tends to accompany the picture of real philosophy 'as tough, practical, rational and secular', which Sessions deplores, in the case of environmental ethics, as 'neither desirable nor necessary, and perhaps not possible'. 56 While such an approach is hardly necessary it is certainly possible: it is a divisive issue whether it is desirable. As is increasingly appreciated these days, there are various sorts of rubbish, which can be separated; so too in philosophy there is more than one sort of rubbish. Not all of it is nonsense or quite unintelligible (pace p.23). Considerable parts of prevailing religions have been dismissed as rubbish (see OED examples); but while some parts, such as the doctrine of Trinity, may be accounted unintelligible, most parts would not. They are regarded rather as substantially false as well as seriously flawed in important respects, and perhaps also as pernicious or largely worthless (and likely as unnecessary). Evidently, then, there are several distinguishable components to rubbish; and, as dictionary senses reveal (e.g. OED: 'worthless, ridiculous, nonsensical ideas, discourse, or writing'), there may be quite a variety of ideological and intellectual rubbish. Rubbish, of all sorts, is hard to escape these days; unfortunately it is easily encountered in both deep ecology and popular science. Many environmental philosophers, Fox is one, do seem to be highly attracted by a very fashionable cutting edge, along with a semi-respectable crank end, of recent diverting popular science. It is almost enough to look at the cast of witnesses Fox pulls in for defence of his unstated theme that there is no 55 According to Locke, 'it is ambition enough to be employed as an under-labourer in clearing the ground a little and removing some of the rubbish that lies in the way of knowledge'. Contrary to the impression Fox tries to convey, here and elsewhere, it wasn't so much a matter of 'following Passmore' (except in a dilute temporal sense, in which I always follow Aquinas when I agree with him), as of following a larger tradition. 56 This part of Session's essay is quoted approvingly in Fox's Response, p.44. Sessions should be rapped over the knuckles for his sexist citations (which Fox too does little to rectify). �87 rubbish in deep or transpersonal ecology (the theme is enthymematically Self-refuting, so to say). The cast includes Capra, Davies, Bohm, Wilber, Gribbin, Pegals, Zukav, Prigogine, d'Espagnat, Sheldrake, Pribram, Comfort and Walsh. There is ample rubbish littering the works of some of these authors, some of which finds its way into Western deep ecology (e.g. Fox's Section 4, and also e.g. pp. 58-9). It is instructive to look at a couple of examples of prime rubbish early in the work of Gribbin cited:- First 'Isaac Newton invented physics, and all of science depends on physics' (p.7). Observe that this conjoint claim, which luckily does not drift into deep ecology, is intelligible, but it is ridiculous 57 ; and observe, furthermore, that there is no straightforward way of recycling such intellectual rubbish. Second, 'what quantum mechanics says is that nothing is real and that we cannot say anything about what things are doing when we are not looking at them' (p.2). As Gribbin presents quantum mechanics as true, we can detach to achieve his shocking headlines and like assertions; so for instance, 'Nothing is real unless it is observed' (p.3), naive phenomenalism. Remarkably, Gribbin is hardly obliged to generate the amount of striking rubbish he does (but then he is a scientific journalist), because of his later proclivity towards a "many worlds" interpretation of quantum mechanics, which affords one neat way of halting production of this type of idealist rubbish. Fox, eager to retain an idealistic Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics for his nefarious metaphysical purposes, fails to take account of Gribbin's later turnabout which effectively repeals the earlier headlines, and actually appeals to Gribbin's "authority" (in note 41) in trying to dispose of the many worlds interpretation! Fortunately we do not have to put up philosophically with the rubbish produced by popular elaborations of the Copenhagen interpretation, which Fox and other avant-garde thinkers would foist upon us. One reason is that micro-features of quantum behaviour very rarely impinge upon macro-phenomena. They thus make little or no real difference to issues of environmental philosophy (only problems tangential to it, such as determinism). Another and major reason is that there are significant alternatives to the Copenhagen interpretation, which at least shed most of the rubbish. And the 'range of choice' is far more extensive than Fox would allow 'if Sylvan did follow his appeal through' (p.27) - yet another example of "false choice". It happens that Sylvan had followed through on some of the further options Fox does not consider, namely 57 If physics and science are the sorts of things that can significantly be invented, then there are plenty of candidates for the claims both before and after Newton, e.g. Einstein if we wish to be really extravagant. As for the extravagant reduction claim, well it is refuted along with physicalism and associated Australian primitivism; see e.g. J.W. Smith and JB . �88 • alternative logic approaches. There are many interesting possibilities here, but few of which physicists have had time or inclination to investigate. My own, rather preliminary, investigations have concerned a uniform relevant logic approach (see uu § 13, on ultramodal quantum logic) and, differently, paraconsistent approaches (see OP p.157ff.) • a neutral worlds interpretation (see my 85). What this amounts to is an ontic neutralisation of many-worlds interpretation. Because of the neutralisation, the 'metaphysical baggage' and unparsimoniousness that Fox complains about are removed. Of course too, since the interpretation corresponds, through the mathematical formalism deployed, to other standard interpretations, it as just as falsifiable (pace note 41 ), and accordingly hardly 'desperate', a mere "just-so" story. These observations, duly elaborated (as attempted, in part, in work alluded to), indicate 'how Sylvan would describe the ontological implications of the "new (ie. post-1920s) physics?"' (p.23 reordered). Briefly, there are many hitherto unknown physical objects at the sub-atomic level whose behaviour is classically anomalous, being partly wavelike and partly particlelike, for which a new and interpretationally difficult theory has been devised. But the positivism and related idealism of early interpretations can be removed by a warranted change of interpretation. And then the ontic implications for ecology and most of environmental philosophy are much less remarkable than Wes tern deep ecology has imagined. Given apparently viable options as to interpretation, all the rubbish Walsh and Fox add to the already problematic Copenhagen interpretation can be packed off (if you can find a way to recycle it, good luck to you). For those who like picking through rubbish (I occasionally collect stuff from the local dump myself), Fox's page 26 is particularly rewarding. But two examples only :- 'What can be known is ... never the independent properties of the observed alone'. So it cannot be known that the wounded wombat (somehow) observed is female, pregnant, and so on. Such astonishing epistemological results are not delivered by the Copenhagen interpretation, which only tells us that knowledge as to quantum happenings is limited by exclusion principles. Similarly for 'the known universe is inextricably linked with consciousness rather than being separable into consciousness and objects of consciousness'. The standard formalism of quantum theory discloses nothing about observers; and while observers do feature in the Copenhagen interpretation these can be simply more measuring or witnessing devices: consciousness does not figure. Even if it did, that would only apply to quantum objects, and would scarcely warrant the grand extrapolations Fox and Walsh wish to make. Furthermore, the Copenhagen interpretation as elaborated is obliged to set quantum domains within wider classical settings always (by contrast with multiple-world interpretations there is no wave function for the universe, etc.); so in the larger setting classical assumptions concerning independence, separability, and so on, are not overthrown, but confirmed. �89 In fact my passing reference to rubbish in Fox's presentations was directed not at Walsh, who was not pretending to tell us what deep ecology is about, but at Fox's reproduction of this material 'in advancing the "unity of process" metaphysics of deep ecology' (p.19). Fox's presentation of the issues (in section 4), with himself as some sort of interested third party in a dispute between Sylvan and Walsh, is substantially misleading; I was not attempting (what is overdue) a critique of transpersonal psychology. What is taken to be known, furthermore, affords little comfort or support for the list of 'ontological implications' that Fox and Walsh wish to draw from the "new physics". Consider some representative exhibits, mostly compressed one-worders, from 'the fundamental ontology now being revealed', with which Fox tells us deep ecology is not merely 'in accord with' but 'throws its full weight behind' (see p.18):- Impermanen t? Some of the newly discovered sub-atomic objects are extraordinarily durable and have experimentally assessed lifetimes of millions of years. Fluid? This attribute of macrosystems does not extend significantly even down to the molecular level; it makes no sense to say that wavicles (or even atoms) flow, they are the wrong sorts of things. Whereas the attribution of impermanence makes straightforward sense (but is substantially false), that of fluidity does not. Empty? Some of the newly located astrophysical objects are extraordinarily dense, packed with matter. Infinitely over-determined? How does this sit with quantum indeterminacy and under-determination? Or with another speculative exhibit from the list: Self-consistent? At least questions of the consistency of the "new physics" and its parts are proper and reasonable. But we are far from being in a position to assert that the theory is consistent. On the contrary, inconsistencies keep emerging in the developing theory, to which often ad hoc repairs are proposed (e.g. with the Dirac o function, renormalization etc.; cf OP). Given the inadequate ramshackle character of the present quantum theory, it is a fair bet that it remains inconsistent. It is a widespread opinion among researchers that the present theory is something of a mess and in much need of improvement. Even so practicing scientists are not hoping for foundations, which tend to be frowned upon these days. However, foundations, such as an extension of von Neumann's axiomatisatio n of part of quantum theory, would help in effecting improvements, and something of the sort is a prerequisite for establishing consistency, if it can be done. Foundationless? What is meant is, apparently, not foundations for the theory, such as axiomatic foundations, nor really basic (atomic) components for what the theory is about. In this sense, Newtonian physics had as foundational elements corpuscles, or particles of certain sorts. It is sometimes said that quantum physics afford no such ultimate building blocks, each apparent stopping point fragmenting into new substructures, most recently quarks. But this idea, which so far appears to lack a satisfactory physical modelling, diverges from the still entrenched paradigm of particle physics which, for all the talk about "new paradigms" in physics, still consists in analytical reduction to ultimates. �90 Such objectual foundations leave open, of course, the question as to whether, and to what extent, new phenomena may emerge, at "higher levels", as the building blocks are variously put together and structured. As with elements, so with microphysical particles, while the zoo of known items has expanded apace, the hope remains that there is a simple underlying explanation in terms of very small ultimates, such as contemporary quarks. Those who looked forward to a quite new outlook emerging from particle physics are bound - if they look at what really goes on nowadays (esp. all the hightech dominant social paradigm aspects) as distinct from what some popular science entrepreneurs say - to be very disappointed. Walsh's "explanation" of what 'foundationle ss' means is something else: 'the universe appears to be ... foundationless and self-consistent in that, since all components and mechanisms are interconnected and interdependent, none are ultimately more fundamental than any other- hence the universe is inexplicable in terms of a limited number of fundamental mechanisms' (p.23, quoting Walsh p.180). This is Fox's example of how 'Walsh provides clear and intelligible meanings to each and every one of the items on the list'! The truth is that Walsh offers nothing of substance on some terms in his list (e.g. 'self-consistent'), and much of what he does offer is like that quoted, garbage. Granted we can make something of some of it, something extravagantly false. Even on Newtonian physics everything is connected, through forces such as gravitation 58 , but some objects are fundamental building blocks. So it is too on the 'new physics', protons for instance are more fundamental than molecules, quarks (if recent theory succeeds and proves consistent) than protons. Some objects are certainly more fundamental than others. And in the "new physics" it is widely assumed that the universe is explicable in terms of a very few principles of mechanist character (e.g. the rashly promised single equation T-shirt). But Walsh's hence clause would not follow, as simple models indicate, even if his premiss had requisite physical cogency. It does deep ecology no credit to include conspicuous rubbish. Nor is there any good reason why it should; the rubbish is not essential to deep ecology. It is not part of the platform for instance, and it is relatively easily removed from (authentic) deep ecology. So much should be evident from my original Critique (as published), and the accompanying 58 Such forces as gravitation offer, of course, nonlocal connections, and delineate fields what are said to be at 'the nub of what these emerging ideas ... of cross-disciplinary parallels ... have in common' (p.23, insert from p.23 and p.21). This confirms the impression that Fox lacks a solid grasp on what is new in the "new physics" and other "new sciences" such as they are, and thereby contributes towards answers to further of Fox's questions (p.23), by undermining their presuppositions. �I 91 sketch of deep green theory, intended to function as a relatively rubbish-free relative of deep ecology. It is some measure of the intellectual sloppiness of some of these engaged in presenting and promoting deep ecology that in a recent major text from Naess (Naess 89), the editor and translator, Rothenberg, asserts that my 'critique of deep ecological philosophy ... labels all of deep ecology literature "inconsistent rubbish"' (p.19), somehow achieving a fallacious transition from some to all. But apparently Rothenberg's acquaintance with my Critique was extraordinarily casual, since I didn't use the label 'inconsistent rubbish' (and wouldn't as anyone who had read much of my work, esp. OP, would realise), and since I certainly did not make a universal claim (and wouldn't for reasons already given, which should have been evident). 'The interpretation of the whole thing as rubbish', Rothenberg continues (p.19), 'comes only if you concentrate too much on rereading some of the sketchy formulations of deep ecology philosophies ... '. While endorsing the point about sketchy formulations, no rereading of many deep ecological productions is required to produce rubbish, no projection; several offerings - such as items lifted from trans personal psychology, idealist physics and other esoteric deep ecological sources, and such as Fox's 'sketch map of deep ecological territory' (p.89) - contain notable rubbish of themselves. Unfortunately Rothenberg proceeds, without even a pause, to repeat Fox's regressive conclusion, which would return deep ecology to human psychology, the very fate of earlier establishment-cha llenging ethics, such as (group) egoism and utilitarianism. 'One should steer clear of "environmental axiology" - that is, looking for values in nature', indeed one almost feels, from looking directly at nature at all. Instead, one should seek to change one's whole way of sensing oneself and the world in the direction of identification and Self-realisation .... Fox summarises [this debacle]: The appropriate framework of discourse for describing and presenting deep ecology is not one that is fundamentally to do with the value of the non-human world, but rather one that is fundamentally to do with the nature and possibilities of the Self, or, we might say, the question of who we are, can become, and should become in the larger scheme of things (Rothenberg p.19, quoting Fox p.85). It is a sad fate for a promising philosophy of nature; degeneration into human psychology. While that can no doubt be edifying enough, in the style of uplifting anthropocentric religions, it is hardly the sought new ecological paradigm (p. 71) and only a warped fragment of the sort of philosophy the whole Earth needs. REFERENCES Bennett, D and Sylvan, R., Damn Greenies: Australian perspectives on environmental ethics, a UNESCO project, typescript, Canberra 1989; revised text 1990. �f I 92 Bouwsma, O.K., 'Philosophical essays', University Nebraska, Lincoln, 1965, 24-25. Bradford, G. 1987 'How deep is deep ecology?', Fifth Estate 22(3)(1987) 3-30. Broad, C.D., Five Types of Ethical Theory, Kegan Paul & Others, London, 1944. Devall, B. and Sessions G, Deep Ecology, Peregrine Smith Books, Salt Lake City, 1985. Devall, B., Simple in Means, Rich in Ends. Practicing Deep Ecology, Peregrine Smith Books, Salt Lake City, 1988. Drengson, A. "Review of Devall and Sessions, Deep Ecology", Environmental Ethics vol 10, nl, 1988. Edwards, J.C., Ethics without Philosophy, University Presses of Florida, Tampa, 1982. Fox, W., Approaching Deep Ecology: A Response to Richard Sylvan's Critique of Deep Ecology, Environmental Studies Occasional Paper 20, University of Tasmania, 1986: unless otherwise indicated all references to Fox are to this study. Fox, W., 'The meanings of "deep ecology"', Island Magazine 32(1989) 32-5; reprinted in The Trumpeter 7(1990) 48-50. Hinckfuss, I., The Moral Society: its structure and effects, Discussion Papers in Environmental Philosophy #16, RSSS, Australian National University, 1987. Johnson,L.E., A Morally Deep World, Discussion Papers in Environmental Philosophy #17, RSSS, Australian National University, 1987. Mannison, D. and others (eds.), Environmental Philosophy, RSSS Australian National University, 1979; referred to as EP. Naess, A., 'The shallow and the deep, long-range ecology movement. A summary', Inquiry, 16(1973) 95-100. Naess, A., 'Deep ecology disentangled?', typescript, Canberra, 1984. Naess, A., 'Notes on Professor's Sylvan's Critique of the Deep Ecology Movement', typescript, Canberra, 1985. Naess, A. and Rothenberg, D., Ecology, community and lifestyle, Cambridge University Press, 1989. Nettleship, R.L. (ed.) Work of Thomas Hill Green, three volumes, Longman, Green & Co, London, 1889. Oxford English Dictionary, Oxford University Press, 1971; referred to as OED. Perrett, R.W., 'Egoism, altruism and intentionalism in Buddhist Ethics', Journal of Indian Philosophy 15(1987) 71-85. Priest, G. and Routley, R., On Paraconsistency, Research Series in logic and Metaphysics #1, RSSS, Australian National University, 1984; referred to as OP. Rolston, H. R. IV, Philosophy Gone Wild: Essays in Environmental Ethics, Prometheus Books, Buffalo, 1986. �93 Routley, R., 'The semantical metamorphosis of metaphysics', Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 1974. Routley, Rand V., The Fight for the Forests, Third edition, RSSS, Australian National University, 1975. Routley, R. and V., 'Against the inevitability of human chauvinism', Ethics and Problems of the 21 st Century , (ed. K.E. Goodpaster and K.M. Sayre), University of Notre Dame Press, 1979, 36-59. Routley, Rand V., 'Human chauvinism and environmental ethics' in EP; referred to EE. Routley, R., 'Ultralogic as universal?', represented in JB; referred to as uu. Routley, R, Exploring Meinong's Jungle and Beyond, RSSS, Australian National University, 1980; referred to as JB. Routley, R. and Others, Relevant Logics and Their Rivals, Ridgeview, California, 1982. Session, G., 'Ecocentrism, wilderness, and global ecosystem protection', in The Wilderness Condition (ed. M. Oelschlaeger), 1989; to appear. Shepard, P., 'Introduction - ecology and man - a viewpoint' in The Subversive Science (ed. P. Shepard & D McKinley), Houghton Mifflin, Boston, 1969, 1-10. Smith, H., The Religions of Man, Harper, New York, 1958. Smith, J.W., Reductionism and Cultural Being, Nijhoff, The Hague, 1984. Stone, C.D., Should Trees Have Standing? - Towards Legal Rights for Natural Objects, revised edition, Avon Books, New York, 1975. Sylvan, R., 'Windows on Science III, Towards a cosmo-logical synthesis', Research Series in Unfashionable Philosophy, #2, RSSS Australian National University, 1985. Sylvan, R., A Critique of Deep Ecology, Discussion Papers in Environmental Philosophy #12, RSSS 1985; referred to as c. Sylvan, R., 'Mind and its misplacement in nature', typescript, Canberra, 1988; referred to asMX. Sylvan, R., Deep Plurallism, completed typescript 1990. Walsh, R.N., 'Emerging cross-disciplinary parallels: suggestions from the neurosciences', Journal of Transpersonal Psychology, 11(1979) 175-184. Wenz, P.W., Environmental Justice, State University of New York Press, Albany N.Y., 1988. Wilber, K., Eye to Eye: The quest for the new paradigm, Anchor Press/Doubleday, Garden City N.Y., 1983. �ECOLOGICAL ETHICS and ECOLOGICAL POLITICS: turning John MCCioskey's challenge This essay comes first because it offers an advanced introduction to parts of environmental ethics, and to certain significant issues in environmental politics. It is hung, not altogether incidentally, on MCCloskey's little text on the topics, because that is a convenient vehicle for organising the material (it is also a text, written in haste, that deserves more criticism than it has received). Fortunately no one need attempt the onerous business of reading MCCioskey in order to follow the essay, should it succeed. Rather, for the purposes of this essay, MCCioskey and likewise his little work can both be regarded as characters in this piece of intellectual fiction; neither need ever have existed. 1. Conservative, reformative, and radical responses to the impacts of ecology on ethics. There are three broad kinds of responses to the impact of ecology on ethics according to MCCloskey's account, which adapts a standard political classification: radical or revolutionary, reformist, and conservative. Of course there are responses which lie outside this classification, not by disputing the impacts of escalating environmental problems (or the new awareness of nature and its fragility), but by questioning the relevance of the other end of the relation: ethics. Those responses target ethics, its role in evaluating and regulating conduct, or differently, its place in environmental philosophy (see other essays herein). As we too aspire to MCCloskey's elevated view of the importance, potential power, and effective ineliminability of ethics in rational evaluation and conduct, we set aside these gutter responses (which we have argued against elsewhere). Otherwise, the responses are these: Radical. A fundamentally new ethic is required, a non-human-centred nature-centred (or nonanthropocentric ecocentric) ethic and morality, a deeper environmental ethic, what MCCioskey and others call an ecological ethic. According to MCCioskey - who adopts the usual double standard, requiring conspicuously higher standards for new challenging theories than entrenched ones - no one 'has yet succeeded in stating or defending [an ecological ethic] in a systematic way' (p.29). Nonetheless it will turn out, quite remarkably, that MCCioskey himself, if he is at all successful, does, given but a small twist to what he does. �2 There are two standard components to any such ethic: meta-ethical and normative. According to Mccloskey, both components are 'more commonly alluded to than set out and defended in a developed, worked-out form' (p.29). There are, accordingly, two broad problems for an ecological ethics: devising a new meta-ethic, and furnishing a new normative ethic (p.30). Meta-ethics, as well as comprising the study of ethics or ethical systems, includes the logic and analysis of key ethical terms. For the new ethics a critical meta-ethical task is to 'explain valuation, and hence values, without reference to human beings, their preferences, pro-attitudes, and the like' (p.30). Normative ethics involves the organisation, design and structure of systems themselves, their values, principles, constraints and the like. For the new ethics critical normative tasks include explaining and justifying the assignments of value made, especially to natural items independently of species Homo sapiens, and the principles adopted, especially concerning treatment of more natural environments, wilderness, and endangered species of plants and animals. Since all these requirements have been met, to some considerable extent (e.g. in works such as EE), the issue becomes one of adequacy. How adequately have these things been done, in particular in what is now called deep-green theory, and what of significance has been left undone? These are central questions in the on-going dialogue with MCCioskey; they will direct the questions discussed when shortly we get down to the real business of MCCloskey's more substantive objections. Reformist. Instead of a "new" ethic, standard ethical theories are reformed, modifying them or adjusting them at the periphery, 'so as to acknowledge new, specifically ecological values and duties' (p.30). Characteristically the adjustment is to the margins of normative theory, with standard meta-ethics left substantially intact. Animal rights theories which simply adjust utilitarianism to take account of the suffering of other sentient creatures than humanoids, afford a stock example of significant reformism. By contrast, differently designed and defended theories of animal rights may be radical in character. The classification is thus pretty rough and ready; given the comparative vagueness of "newness" and "standardness" as regards ethical theories, the divisions between responses is likewise blunt. Evidently too, the classification only overlaps other classifications of ethics with some vogue, for instance that into shallow, intermediate, and deep (used elsewhere e.g. TE). Thus while reformist utilitarianisms are typically intermediate, a reformist ethic (or even a revolutionary one, such as Nietzsche's has been taken to be) may be substantially shallow. The converse linkages are tighter: only an ethic which merely purports to be conservative can really be intermediate, as MCCloskey's intuitionism is, or deep, as "supplementation" of such intuitionism could �3 be. Conservative. No input from ecology warrants even so much as reform, let alone revolution, in standard ethical theory; all that is required is 'a more informed, more accurate thinking out of our moral obligations and moral rights' (p.29). MCCioskey claims to defend the stock conservative view that ecological considerations and 'findings ... do not necessitate a basic revolution in ethics but supply a more informed, more accurate thinking out, of our moral obligations and moral rights' (p.29, similarly p.31). Rather than looking hard at the conspicuous difficulties and inadequacies of prevailing ethics, unresolved after thousands of years of investigation, MCCioskey proceeds immediately to try to shift the onus of proof: ' ... no moral philosopher has yet succeeded in either stating or defending it ... a new ecological ethic ... in a systemic way' (p.29, insertion from same page). He alleges, to elaborate on a previous charge, that 'the problem of [a radical] ecological ethics is that of devising a a new meta-ethics, one that explains valuation, and hence values, without reference to human beings, their preferences, pro-attitudes, and the like, and a a new normative ethics that explains both • the value of natural phenomena prior to man's existence and after the extinction of the species Homo sapiens and • why it is morally wrong for man to damage wilderness and endanger or render extinct natural species of plants and animals' (p.30, display inserted). As it happens, all these things have been attempted, as was said and as will become evident - though perhaps in too sketchy and too technical a way so far (it is still early days). For example, why it is wrong to damage pristine wilderness is, at bottom, because such wilderness possesses high intrinsic value - something MCCioskey does not really dispute. How then does he sustain his allegations? For the most part, despite the repeated rhetoric about "arguing" this and that, he doesn't. He simply assumes that 'concern for human well-being' must dominate, that it always has, well almost always has, priority (e.g. p.52). 2. A confused and confusing response: supplemented intuitionism. Furthermore, MCCioskey, although he claims to be defending this conservative 'third view', does not state matters as clearly as he should: he only rules out the 'need for a specifically ecological ethic', not reformism. This constitutes one part of what amounts �4 to substantial cheating in MCCloskey's "conservatism" . 1 A further part consists in adopting an extremely unfashionable ethical theory, an intuitionism supplementing a now little known theory of the kind developed by Ross, as his "standard" ethical theory. Like the rare "ideal utilitarianism", such intuitionism can be much closer to proposed new ecological ethics, given appropriate ideals and intuitions, than standard "standard" ethics (indeed, given a deep tum, they can be tantamount to ecological ethics). But the most important dodge is incorporated in the "supplementation" MCCioskey makes of his "standard" ethic, which far exceeds what it is said to be: Ross 'supplemented by an account of the moral rights of persons' (p.31). For he also concedes himself such objectives as an open-ended 'promotion of good' and coupled 'prima facie obligations to ... promote good' (p.33 and p.31). Moreover, such promotion of good elsewhere expands to a promotion of good, beauty and knowledge (p.36), and to include promotion and preservation of what is intrinsically valuable (p.36); among 'recognised ethical values' is 'the securing of the intrinsically valuable' (p.8). Moreover, among what is intrinsically valuable are some (but not all) natural species, some wilderness (p.36), and other valuable natural items such as 'forests, lakes, rivers, seas' (p.31). Such critical "supplementations" mean that MCCioskey can proceed to argue for the preservation of wilderness or natural species in just the ways that most deep environmentalists do; for example, along the lines that an area of wilderness has not merely instrumental value, but evident intrinsic value, which can be felt or intuited (e.g. p.61 bottom). Such supplementations thus lift MCCioskey right out of the normal conservative camp in which he has misleadingly located himself: for that shallow camp does not recognise irreducible values in nature. What he is covertly assuming, in his considerable supplementation of an unusual noncognitive ethic, is at least a significant reform of standard ethics. MCCloskey's ethic is not 'perfectly familiar' historically; more, his insistence (ascribable not to modesty but to political purposes) that it is not 1 There is analogous, if less outrageous, covert cheating in another leading Australian conservative, with whom McCloskey aligns himself: Passmore. For example, Passmore helps himself to a notion of vandalism (deep vandalism involving depreciation or destruction of what has intrinsic value) to which his theory does not entitle him. It has not been much appreciated that Passmore, too, for all his apparently tough conservatism (early on) on ethics, also (characteristically) hedges his claims. A much-quoted passage, endorsed by McCloskey (p.37 italics added), begins: 'what it [the West] needs,for the most part, is not so much a "new ethic" as a more general adherence to a perfectly familiar ethic'. What that familiar ethic is, and how it is to be reformed, Passmore never really tells us. In any case the main conservative theme looks less and less plausible. It is increasingly dubious that better adherence to established ethical and political forms will prove adequate, especially to environmental problems unforeseen by these chauvinistic theories. �5 new is nowhere demonstrated, simply asserted. (In fact the claim is somewhat empty in the absence of sharpened criteria for newness.) How far removed MCCloskey's supplemented intuitionism is from its 'perfectly familiar' source is readily shown by a comparison of MCCioskey with Ross on intrinsic goodness. Ross contends (on the basis of reflection and using an interesting little argument from a then 'widely accepted classification of elements in the life of the soul') that four things, and basically only four things, 'seem to be intrinsically good', all of which are 'ideal states of the mind' (p.140). How far things ethical have moved since the nineteen thirties is also shown by the little argument Ross runs out, as if it was quite decisive, to refute people like MCCioskey who imagine they find intrinsic value beyond states of mind - in wilderness, forests and other material items. 'It might of course be objected that there are or may be intrinsic goods that are not states of mind or relations between states of mind at all, but in this suggestion I find no plausibility. Contemplate any imaginary universe from which you suppose mind entirely absent, and you will fail to find anything in it that you can call good in itself' (p.140). Ross no doubt reflects the conventional ethical wisdom, a narrow wisdom, of his time and place (essentially British ethics of the first half of the twentieth century). But many before Ross, and many more since, have not so failed in finding items of intrinsic worth in the absence of states of mind, in the Earth itself and its natural features for example. Such comparatively successful arguments as those concerning the Last Sentient (in EE), and the world before the rise of mental life, were designed to expose and reinforce such common findings. So much Mccloskey is sufficiently clear about (thereby shortening subsequent argument for a new ethics): 'The negative part of the Routley's argument, that traditional [Western] ethics and contemporary morality are human-centered, is substantially well based. The ecological moral intuitions they seek to explain and justify find no justification in terms of such ethics' (p.58). But in MCCloskey's ethics they do find some confirmation, or rather conformation, in the intrinsic ecological values discerned. Moreover, with but a turn in the intuitions admitted that intuitionistic ethics itself becomes properly deep - just allow the (over-malleable) intuitions to coincide with those of deep ecological consciousness: then deepened MCCioskey is deep ecology. MCCioskey even puts effort into explaining how conventional theories are 'heavily human centered', without appreciating how far it removes him from the 'perfectly familiar' ethic of Ross, and from his own professed conservatism. As a result too, those making too superficial a survey of MCCloskey's complex ethical position, especially if they came at it with preconceptions of what it amounted to, have been seriously misled. Goodin is one reviewer who is undone. By quoting MCCloskey's effort on conventional ethics right out of context, Goodin manages to �6 attribute to Mccloskey the very negation of what he advances, namely 'that all talk of intrinsic value must nevertheless be human-centered' (Goodin p.345). The same applies to what Goodin takes to be 'the punchline' of MCCloskey's position, 'that the environment per se has no independent moral claims upon it. All our duties to protect it must be derived from human-centered concerns' (p.344). Nor does such a punch line emerge from the admittedly convoluted passage quoted in support; for the passage makes the promotion of goodness, which includes promotion of intrinsic value independent of humans, a prima f acie obligation. But Goodin does have excuses. For not merely is MCCloskey's position hard to fathom, but it exhibits confusion and is internally inconsistent. For example, Mccloskey typically presents himself as having, and frequently operates as if he had, an entirely conservative position, when his position is in important respects at least reformist, making allowance for intrinsic values of natural items including wilderness, plants and animals (pp. 52-3); his position is both different, with new elements, and not different, with no new elements. Part of the problem can be traced back to a confusion about intrinsic value (likewise intrinsic goodness), which is both intrinsic, valuable in itself, and not intrinsic, because valuable for something else, typically beauty or human knowledge in the case of natural items. The confusion is manifest in the many intuitive judgements of intrinsic value of natural items advanced simply on the strength of judgements of beauty or ugliness, and appears in such themes as that 'a moral duty to preserve species and wilderness ... is ... based on ... the securing of the intrinsically valuable objects of knowledge and the beautiful' (p.110). It is no longer just 'the securing of the intrinsically valuable' as is earlier said (e.g. p.8); those "intrinsic values" somehow now reduce or answer instrumentally to supposedly human evaluations, i.e. are not "intrinsic" after all, whereupon MCCloskey's seriously damaged position reverts to the shallow conservative position it is often been taken to be. The main features brought out make MCCloskey's ethic, confusions apart, at least a reformist one, not a conservative one. Briefly, MCCloskey's "supplementation " of Ross's theory is so great as to make for a difference of kind. The features also render it what is called an intermediate position. For it admits values in nature, it assigns intrinsic value to some natural objects, while not however allowing values of natural things to sometimes override those of humans. The point is fundamental. 'However, as the theory developed here implies, ultimately, when there is a clear clash between human welfare and human rights on the one hand and the preservation of wilderness and of plant and animal species on the other, human welfare and respect for human rights must prevail ... ' (p.36). Why so? Why preserve this ancient ethical prejudice? Despite the assertion the theory sketched out, the supplemented Ross ethic, does not imply human �7 ethical supremacy. But even if the theory did imply this greater value assumption, the appeal to it in defence of the assumption would be indecently circular. It is no proper defence of proposition p that Shifty's theory implies p, unless Shifty's theory is shown to have independent merit, such as correctness, robustness (i.e. continuing to yield p under reasonable variations), etc. None of the requisite demonstration is attempted. The radically reformed Ross ethic is just assumed. In fact MCCioskey has adduced no decent case for this crucial assumption, which colours much of his text. For it is his repeated insistence on the supreme importance of things human, of Man over the rest of nature, that gives his work its undoubted antienvironmental appearance, which is obnoxiously exhibited at many places in the text. One revolting example concerns venomous snakes: 'today they are a nuisance and a danger to human life and health, concern for which dictates that individuals be accorded the freedom to kill such snakes, to rid their properties of these pests even at the risk of rendering them endangered species. (Sufficient specimens could be retained in zoos throughout the world, where they survive well ... )', perhaps along with dangerous subspecies of humans (p.116). MCCioskey is particularly concerned to put down arguments 'for the preservation of species and wilderness at the cost of human interests, human concerns .. ', even though these arguments 'appear to be correct about the intuitive insights of those who live in different countries in affluence. 2 Nonetheless it will be my concern in this work to reject this approach and the moral intuitions on which it rests' (p.36, italics added). Unfortunately the strongly proclaimed rejection is not backed up with requisite argument. MCCioskey, in a familiar intuitionistic predicament, is stranded without argument. Nor, in this case, could the rejection be so easily supported. For one thing MCCioskey feels obliged, almost immediately, to qualify his human supremacy claim: human interest 'must prevail, unless what it is proposed to preserve has great intrinsic value' (p.36 italics added). For another reason, the human interests involved often cannot justify preeminence; they are too often trivial, or unworthy, or just plain ordinary. So the ancient (unethical) prejudice in favour of humans can, and should be relinquished (as argued in much more detail in other places, e.g. EE). But then there is nothing to stop MCCloskey's intuitionism sliding to real depth, the ethic moving from reformist to radical. Call the resulting theory, MCCloskey's stripped 2 But the impression of McCloskey as a fighter for the under-privileged among humans, one who of course along with developers and colonizers makes human interests paramount, is deceptive. �8 of anthropic prejudice so to say, deepened intuitionism, intuitionism informed, again if you like, by deep ecological consciousness. The beauty of deepened intuitionism is that it answers, in MCCloskey's own terms, MCCloskey's challenge to radically new ecological ethics. A now evident "adjustment" to MCCloskey's own theory will serve. The trouble, of course, with this answer is the trouble with intuitionism in ethics generally; that, for instance, it is built on the shifting sands of intuition. That is why a direct response to Mccloskey will be offered, in terms of deep-green theory. 3. On the supposedly dim prospects for new environmental ethics, esp. that deep-green upstart. Part of MCCloskey's complaint is that the new environmental ethics demanded back in the early seventies, have not been presented sufficiently 'clearly and fully' as to admit proper examination and assessment (p.60). It is easy to level such charges at new proposals; and such charges did carry some force, and still do, though less as the new theories develop, among other things, to meet criticism. But MCCioskey would like to make a much grander charge, the sort of charge (discussed below) that Thompson recently did level: that such 'a new ethic ... is logically impossible to set out' (p.59 reordered). But Mccloskey, by contrast with Thompson who can slip into still fashionable noncognitivism, is poorly placed to press such a charge. For he considers that noncognitivism, which would logically tie all valuation to aspects of human (or creature) cognition and so would be bad news for deep environmentalism, is bound to fail. MCCioskey tries instead to push through an eliminative argument, relying upon the limited range of cognitivist (meta-)ethics 'developed to date'. He claims to eliminate all but intuitionism: 'Of the known, plausible, meta-ethical theories, the only one available to such ecologist ethicists is the ethical realism of intuitionism' (p.59), which regrettably they decline. But the elimination argument is radically defective, as MCCioskey is very far from exhausting the initially plausible options open to environmentalism. In addition, more satisfactory options will aim to discard not merely intuitionism but also both the ethical realism and objectivism that regularly (and to its intellectual cost) accompany it, but need not. While it would hardly be surprising should the quite limited range of ethical theories that have achieved much development to date prove inadequate to new environmental objectives, the situation is by no means as desperate as MCCioskey implies. Firstly, the options MCCioskey does offer, deviously pruned down (not 'ideal observer ethic' but 'Humean ideal observer ethic', not 'natural law ethic' but 'Thomistic natural law ethic'), are not all restricted in the way portrayed: 'All make human nature or personhood or features thereof basic to ethics' (p.59). Not so; the contention certainly does not hold for all the types of theory listed, e.g. naturalism or relativism, and insofar �9 as it does, it is sometimes easily avoided, as with natural law (e.g. set within pantheism). Secondly, there is a range of recognised ethical types, such as those distinguished by Broad, which affords scope for the elaboration of ecological ethics. Obvious candidates within naturalism include biological and evolutionary naturalism - typical examples of which 'are the following: "To be virtuous means to perform the specific activities of the species to which you belong efficiently" (Spinoza). "Better conduct means conduct that comes later in the course of evolution and is more complex than earlier conduct of the same kind" (Herbert Spencer)' (Broad p.259). No doubt such proposals exhibit deficiencies, but not per se of a human chauvinistic sort; and they admit of improvement, which they are beginning to obtain within the tradition of American naturalism (thus e.g. Rolston's work). More promising, however, are "non-naturalistic" theories, of which objectivistic realistic intuitionism such as Mccloskey is keen to offer and promote is but one kind. For there are other less demanding types of intuitionism (see, e.g. Broad p.270), including various "deep intuitionisms", which may be neither objectivistic nor realistic (in the sense of labouring under heavy ontological commitments). In particular, as Elliot explains (p.502), what entirely escapes MCCloskey is the feasibility of a meta-ethic which is nonjective, that is, not objective, like transcendental intuitionism, but not implausibly subjective either. Then there are moral sense theories and their more plausible variations including mixtures with rationalism. Further, there are analogous mixtures coherently building upon emotional presentation. Such a rational reconstuction, varying the Austrian theory of values as elaborated empirically and logically by Meinong, is in fact the ethical way taken by deep-green theory (for detail see TE and DG). And so on. There is logical scope, then, for quite a variety of ecological meta-ethics, and definitely scope for significant improvements upon those 'developed to date'. As much to the point, there have already been significant developments of some forms of ecological meta-ethics, notably of that theory in effect under criticism, deepgreen theory, which is already better articulated than most conventional ethics. There are several connected parts to this elaboration because it brings into meta-ethics new logical technology, especially world-semantics. The parts, furthermore, have not been duly separated because of a pervasive verificationism living on in Anglo-American ethical theory, which proceeds to equate semantic with epistemic, meaning with method of coming to know, and the like. A first step then in meta-ethical analysis is some proper separation of the parts, such as meaning, epistemic confirmation, and rational justification. Naturally the parts fit together into a larger whole, into the meta-ethical edifice, but simplistic positivistic equations do not satisfactorily explain the integration. �10 As to meaning, deep-green theory can already stand on its record of proferred semantical analyses. 3 Semantics both for axiological terms such as value and bettemess and for deontic terms such as obligation and wrongness have been provided through world semantics (see sv, MD). The deontic theory developed in the process (in MD) offers a considerable improvement over Ross's theory (which supplies no semantics), because it enables the theory-saving artifice of prima facie obligations to be removed and natural language discourse concerning obligations to be recovered. While such semantical advances do not pretend to offer a full account of meaning, as much more remains to be done within pragmatics, they do offer straightforward resolutions both of long-standing ethical puzzles and paradoxes and of several complaints about environmentally deep ethics. A major early problem for a genuinely nonchauvinistic ethics was to give a satisfactory account of ethical terms without reference to favoured biological species, above all to humans. On deep-green theory this was accomplished by a combination of an "annular theory", offering an ethically relevant typology of doers and receivers, with the semantical analyses (see EE and AP for details). By these means, deep-green theory proceeded to remove humans from an essential role in ethics. Humans enter importantly, of course, but only contingently, as certain sorts of valuers and agents, which sorts depending upon their relevant capacities. For example, humans do not inevitably enter, as too many had previously supposed, into every ethical picture, because there were no value judgements without valuers, and all valuers were humans. Both parts of this linkage fail. Most important, values are not tied to valuers or actual valuing. But possible valuers and therewith their valuing can always be dummied in logically. The reason is at bottom that any coherent distribution of values can be regarded as the values of certain possible valuers. Furthermore, contrary to MCCloskey's unsupported charge against such semantical analyses, this does not expose the theory 'to difficulties parallel to those encountered by phenomenalism ... ' (p.60). For phenomenalism attempts a reduction; the semantical theory makes no such attempt. The meta-ethic is non-reductionist; nor is it obliged to rely upon tricks like supervenience. Deep-green theory already had more up on the meta-ethical scoreboard in the early eighties than Ross's theory upon which MCCioskey purportedly proposed to reply. MCCloskey's criticism of ecological ethics as meta-ethically inadequate lapses. As to normative theory, the other prong of his attack, his demands are excessive. Few ethical theories have been stated 'fully and clearly' and 'developed in a systematic, detailed 3 Standing on records is hardly a practice I embrace with much enthusiasm, but sometimes it is inevitable if excess repetition is to be avoided. �11 form' such as Mccloskey appears to expect (e.g. p.60). To take some grand comparisons: Those that are detailed such as Confusianism are not particular systematic, those that are detailed and systematic such as Spinoza's ethic are hardly clear and are likely inconsistent, those that are fairly full and moderately clear such as Sidgwick's utilitarianism are also rather clearly defective; and in the twentieth century, nothing much, ecological or not, matches these grand examples. But to indicate a few details of what is accomplished normatively in deep-green theory:- Non-interference and like principles are defended (cf EE p.174); these afford a basis for integrating standard social justice principles (including obligations to the future), duly amended, with environmental principles. In this way, making use of the annular theory, much of prevailing social ethics, of a radical kind, can be subsumed. In an attempt to be helpful, Mccloskey quite erroneously suggests that 'the normative ethic appears to be base[d] on ... intuitive insights into what is intrinsically valuable and what is intrinsically obligatory, where what is intrinsically obligatory need not be tied to intrinsic value' (p.60, rearranged). What is obligatory, like what is right, does answer back to what is intrinsically valuable, though in more complex fashion than elementary ethical courses care to contemplate (see TE and MD). But what is intrinsically valuable is often not discerned through intuitive insights. The idea that is is part of what lies at the back of the expectation that instant answers can and should be given to any question as to what is intrinsically valuable or the like. Rather what is intrinsically valuable is arrived at through a process of reasoning and coherence-assessment, based at bottom on emotional presentation (for more detail see TE). We offered, furthermore, many examples of items - not only individuals, but species, such as the blue whale, complexes, and ecosystems - that are intrinsically valuable, valuable in and for themselves and not on other counts (such as some of MCCloskey's "intrinsic values" which vanish into economic or aesthetic values). Accordingly, the charge (p.60), 'Nor are the relevant values or principles explained or discussed', loses its force. As to the specific difficulties for an ecological ethic of deep-green kind that MCCioskey alleges, many of these are only encountered upon importing assumptions that the ethics do not include and should not supply. So it is with the assumption that an ecological ethic should assign intrinsic value to all species, even equally to each species, given that it does to some. MCCloskey's own intermediate ethic does not do this, why should an ecological ethic? Some-to-all arguments do not suddenly become valid in deep space. Deep-green theory, in particular, unlike deep ecology, makes no assumptions as to biospecies equality; rather it requires a certain interspecies impartiality. The extent of intrinsic value of a species is assessed in principle, through a multiple factor procedure incorporating value-making features of the species (cf. EE p.168). Mccloskey wheels �12 out the already exhausted examples of disease organisms and parasites, and offers his intuition, a strong human prejudice, that 'there seems to be no intrinsic value in the existence of such species and organisms' (p.61). No doubt such species and organisms do not exhibit intrinsic value in the way or to the extent that conspicuous species near the tops of food chains do. Their biological role and value is different. Their importance, consists, in part, in control, in regulation of the character and the numbers of more valuable species; their biological value is, to stretch a term, primarily facilitative, but often nonetheless, under present ecological arrangements, apparently essential. One reason why MCCioskey fails to observe how easy it is to shift the difficulties he finds so pressing is, of course, that he is trying to make a case against deep positions. Another reason is that he is operating with far too coarse a mesh, both ecologically and socially. Intrinsic value does not come in big indiscriminable unsieved lumps: all species if any, all pleasure if any, all knowledge if any. The need for discrimination becomes evident if added to MCCloskey's list of intrinsic valuables (e.g. p.108) are such standard goals as wealth and power (itself often linked to knowledge). Like wealth and power, human pleasure and knowledge4, for example, are far from invariable goods. Often, like much entrepreneurial information transmitted through expensive systems, they are trivial; sometimes they are positively evil, as pleasure in extensive torture, or practical knowledge of the means of excruciating torture. 5 A finer mesh is needed, and available, a mesh that can be usefully applied in the ecological domain to remove standard "difficulties", as it was applied by Mill, though in a failed attempt to repair utilitarianism. 4. Extending ecological ethics, inadequately, to ecological politics. Ecological politics is a structure grafted onto ecological ethics, in much the way that political theory more generally is supposedly built upon (or alongside) ethics. Politics is essentially concerned with groups, societies and certain social institutions; ethics, so it is said, with individuals. But the distinction is not quite so simple; ethics too concerns groups and interrelations of individuals, normatively. In fact, the exact 4 For these often shoddy goals McCloskey indecently contemplates destruction of the Rottnest quokka, a species McCloskey provocatively presents as 'useless' and 'ugly' (p.61). Judgements of aesthetic and utility are notoriously ideological systemdependent, and here McCloskey flouts his commitment to an old, damaging, and fortunately disappearing, ideology. 5 In any event, Western ethics and ideology much overrate knowledge and information; largely defunct Eastern theories, such as Taoism, have a better appreciation of the importance, and nonimportance, of different kinds of knowledge (cf. Sylvan and Bennett on Taoism). �13 interrelation of politics with ethics, though an issue under investigation since Aristotle sought to settle the matter, remains unclear. Judicious borrowing from logic can help a bit in clarification, in both the general and the ecologically restricted cases. With ethics and politics, or ecological ethics and ecological politics (of given sorts, e.g. utilitarian, deep-green), both considered as theories, the relation is that of extension: the latter extends the former, in fact extends it substantially. For comparison, logical examples of extensions are afforded by the relation of quantification logic to sentential logic, or set theory to quantification logic, or, a little nearer the mark in terms of complexity, classical mathematics to set theory. Ecological politics is not merely - or as regards the pure theory at all - an application of ecological ethics. It requires a considerable amount of further apparatus (typically primitives and defined terms in the extended theory) that does not enter into ethics proper, such as states, leaders, corporations, unions, organisers, and moreover (what correspond to axiomatic constraints) the manifold interconnections of these political items. What kind of extension politics is, or ought to be, of ethics is a more vexed question. In particular (depending on the matching of the politics to the presumed ethics it extends) the extension may not be conservative. For example, theoretical allowance has to be made for the Machiavellian idea that certain political components may be exempt from given ethical constraints, an idea that has proved unacceptable to most philosophers from Aristotle through Mccloskey. The prevailing conservative extension theme is forcefully presented, if in too shallow and individualistic form, by Nozick: Moral philosophy sets the background for, and the boundaries of, political philosophy. What persons may and may not do to one another limits what they may do [politically] through the apparatus of a state, or do to establish such an apparatus. The moral prohibitions it is permissible to enforce are the source of whatever legitimacy the state's fundamental coercive power has (Nagel p.199, endorsing Nozick). In short, should conservative extension be abandoned, rational justification becomes a serious, indeed insuperable, problem. As it happens, the way in which ecological politics proceeds to extend ecological politics (when done conservatively) is admirably illustrated by MCCloskey's practice and development of issues. In virtually every case, the approach adopted as regards the politics of the issue builds directly upon the results reached in the ethical investigation of that issue. However, in the political theory advanced, Mccloskey does not take full and proper advantage of his supplemented ethics, but lapses back into an old-fashioned chauvinism. (He thus resembles a logician, actual exemplars shall go unnamed, who �14 with all the underlying logical technology available to avoid the paradoxes and anomalies of classical set theory, lapses back into these when he makes the extension to set theory.) Once again this abysmal outcome is primarily a result of his tenacious adherence to that ancient greater value prejudice, which vastly overrates humans, their attitudes, freedoms and products, and undervalues natural things, even to the extent of undercutting previously granted intrinsic value (cf. p.111). Mccloskey proceeds to play humans off against environments, assuming of course that humans ought to win hands-down. The resulting theory is ecological only in addressing - in a decidedly unsympathetical way ecologically - ecological problems. Ecologically then, the proferred ecological politics proves exceedingly disappointing; politically, things are little better. A political theory is bound to add to an ethical theory further organisational structure, comprising further structural units (corporations, states, etc.), institutional arrangements (property, markets, etc.), and so on. There are a great many, still illclassified and largely untried, types of options here: options as to what gets added, and how it is adjoined. Among the enormous range of choice McCloskey opts, without much argument, for unimaginative arrangements like those prevailing in the West and North, for a statist and developmental status quo (for which he serves very much as an apologist). He opts for what he is pleased to call 'liberal democratic states' - though the veneer of democracy is thin (control typically being vested with a ruling minority) and liberality is sharply hedged (true-blue liberalism conflicting with statism, in ways thorough-going libertarianism has exposed). Practically, as we know from experience, it is a jerry-built structure; theoretically, as is insufficiently realised, it remains a house of cards. The status quo choice of "liberal democracy" gets confirmed, so Mccloskey imagines, by disposing of but two sorts of alternatives: primitivism, which he regards as substantially self-refuting in presently highly civilized highly warlike times; and totalitarianism, which he regards as the main and menacing alternative. It is a simplistic scheme, leaving out significant alternatives; but such a picture is remarkably widespread, even among academics. While, like most urbanised intellectuals, Mccloskey cannot resist sounding off about any proposed 'return to primitivism', to 'rural communities of the political imagination' (p.109), he does in fact confine his consideration of alternative political arrangements to totalitarian alternatives which would sharply increase the restrictiveness of present statist arrangements. Against totalitarian alternatives, even present inadequate arrangements no doubt look good; but against certain other political alternatives (e.g. decentralised organisation using advanced technology as appropriate), these arrangements look more like a recipe for on-going ecological trouble. Such other alternatives, Mccloskey does not really consider. He has sighted the far ecological right, �15 ecofascism as it is sometimes dubbed, and fires almost all his guns at it. However there is an ecological left, with a longer tradition than the right, which passes unnoticed; yet it offers a vision of new ecological communities in which liberal principles, on the face of it MCCloskey's main concern, are maintained or even enhanced. But, for all its shortcomings, MCCloskey's attempt to get to grips with ecological politics deserves a somewhat fuller discussion than indicated by Goodin's cavalier dismissal: 'The politics discussion just amounts to a bash at the authoritarianism of some of the more rabid ecological doomsayers, propositions which are quite sufficient reductios in and of themselves' (p.344). For one thing, that was how much of the field looked when MCCioskey was helping to put ecological politics on the philosophical agenda. Ecological politics still remained an unfashionable, and in some places dangerous, field at the time MCCioskey was writing. Liberal philosophers with respectable academic positions in North America tended to keep out of the field, which accordingly got left to practical environmentalists, over-enthusiastic in their appeals to the state for tough control and regulation, and to authoritarian academics keen to strengthen totalitarian and isolationist tendencies of states. As MCCioskey emphasizes, Much ecological political writing exhibits two disturbing features that undermine its value. The one feature relates to the readiness of many political theorists on the basis of the flimsiest evidence to waive lightly man's claim to recognition of his human rights on the ground that the ecological crisis is so grave and critical that only the most drastic, desperate measures will succeed. The other feature is the very great confidence in the capacity of states to take whatever action is necessary to avoid the ecological crisis. In fact, the states of the world today greatly contribute to various of the ecologically based problems that confront mankind. They are unworthy of the great faith and trust that many ecological reformers appear to have in them or in the state in the abstract.(p.108). Bravo! But rather than considering carefully dismantling states, in favour of alternative organisational arrangements, MCCioskey leaps immediately in the opposite direction, to the orthodox position that 'a major part of the ecological political problem is that of ensuring that states carry out their ecological responsibilities' - whatever those may be (states do not regard themselves as morally bound, and typically their constitutions are incredibly weak and unspecific, and sometimes evasive on such matters). Indeed he goes further: 'The nation-state needs to be not superseded but complimented by a world political authority' (p .107). Again there is little argument, and no due concern that such an Authority would be yet a further developmental agency operating with tanks and bulldozers. �16 For another, MCCioskey tried to open up or advance several issues in ecological politics (and would have, if his book had existentially impacted and had not been largely bypassed or dismissed). These issues include not merely the standard issues of overpopulation, pollution and unethical technology; more notably, they also include the issue, which has recently received much airing, as to whether environmental demands and regulations interfere damagingly with individual freedoms and other aspects of liberal principles. There are other facets to this that deserve further examination (do it decently, someone!): the extent to which liberal states do and can deliver on environmental matters, as well as the extent of interference with liberties (much turns then on how it is all done). MCCioskey has overestimated the abilities of states to deliver liberal ideals and guarantee liberal principles, such as individual freedom (in fact, to note some lesser infringements, they characteristically coerce citizens in many respects, forcing them into a money economy, to pay taxes and obtain licences, even to serve on juries, to vote, to fight, etc.). If the state promises liberties with one hand, it is busy actually taking liberties away with the other. While we may be stuck with states for the present, as an unpleasant political reality, it is not too difficult to see that there are better unrealised alternatives even from a traditional liberal angle, alternatives that pass unconsidered. And MCCioskey has grossly underestimated the severity of ecological problems states should be trying to solve. In some of his findings, MCCioskey is so wildly astray that his judgement on factual issues and his credibility has to fall under real suspicion. For example: ' ... it is evident that over the whole period of his existence man has only been one relatively minor factor bearing on species survival rates' (p.47)! ' ... man is simply adding more hazards to those created by nature itself for some species' (p.47 continuing). For the next example, by contrast with the previous, MCCioskey might seek refuge in the fact that he was writing back in 1982: 'Few suggest that man can or will destroy the ecosystem of the earth' (p.49). Even so, the news on nuclear winter had broken, and the Greenhouse effect was already worrying some scientists. "Man" appears able to do little that is very wrong; MCCioskey can only bring himself to engage in the mildest of censure: ' ... man could have used DDT to better effect' (p.50). No doubt he could have refrained from using it to significantly better effect. A due adaptation of that Old Testament idea that humans are characteristically radically flawed, regularly and perhaps inevitably sinning in their treatment of the Earth, does not break through in MCCloskey's approach. In fact anti-ecological themes strongly pushed by MCCioskey will break through again and again in what follows. �17 Nor did Mccloskey anticipate the rapid march of ecological history at all well. With his operational assumption that ecological reforms 'would not be popular' (e.g. p.156), he appears to have been swiftly refuted by history. There has been much popular movement in favour of ecological causes. The main resistance to far-reaching reforms has not been popular, but establishment resistance, together with that from business, wealth and privilege, and their hired economic men and thugs. Similarly with his assumptions that reform, or change, would not occur unless the ecological problems were believed 'to be real problems' (p.157) - which of course MCCloskey himself believed they were not by and large, something he deluded himself that he had shown. But popular beliefs have changed rapidly, taking MCCloskey's assumptions under along with old beliefs. In any case, MCCloskey's argument to unpopularity lacks cogency. It is that ecological measures 'may necessitate less convenient, changed lifestyles, many controls and restrictions, increased costs, additional taxes, basic interference with what now are seen as being matters of basic rights .... democratic legislators [cannot] hope to bring about the reforms ... and still retain office' (p.157). Whence, again ecological reformers may look to totalitarian political solutions. So far as I am aware, there have been no such proposals by ecological groups in Australasia. In small measure too, Mccloskey begins to meet his own argument. For measures of the type Mccloskey rightly finds distasteful, have already been run through in contemporary representative democracies; consider security and surveillance, foreign control and surveillance, nuclear power and surveillance, urban restructuring and surveillance opportunities, and so on. Secondly, there are important trade-offs; if these often minor inconveniences are not experienced now, much more drastic and dislocating changes will probably have to be undertaken subsequently. Thirdly, of course, if they are not undertaken now much of immense value will be lost. More direct democracies than we have today, where peoplegovernance and control of established elites is tenuous, would stand a better chance of limiting these losses; properly pluralistic systems would presumably manage better still. But Mccloskey does not address such issues as ecologically improved democracies. Instead he assumes, quite wrongly, that solutions to ecological difficulties will require strong and authoritarian central governments (perhaps both of states and of the world), but that such institutions run directly counter to liberal concerns: 'the enjoyments of many rights and liberties and opportunities to rectify grave injustices' (p.25). So he tears off to address the difficulties of ecological totalitarianism (pp.158-9), well-known difficulties (as Goodin observed) confronting Antipodean non-starters among political alternatives. �18 Without examining other alternatives than certain totalitarian ones, Mccloskey manages to conclude (to his own satisfaction) that 'the only realistic, feasible avenue to ecological political reform is through the political institutions of an open society that respects human rights', what he appears to think is offered by contemporary 'liberal democratic states' (p.159). Naturally deep environmentalists seek open societies that respect rights, including decently discerned human rights. The big trouble is that on these matters, as with environmental matters, contemporary liberal democratic states have performed decidedly sublimenally, i.e. well below adequacy threshold. 6 It is not unreasonable to contemplate alternative political arrangements that perform more satisfactorily. But it is perhaps unrealistic to expect such improved organisational structure to be got into place at all easily or at all. For liberal democratic states retain regional monopolies on violence and other critical control, which, for all the palavering about respecting rights, they do not hesitate to deploy when their power and security are threatened. Nor is Mccloskey, by contrast with libertarians, at all averse to regulations and restrictions and limitations on liberty - except when these put environmental things ahead of humans. For humans, if not animals, things material are supposed to be pretty good in MCCloskey's liberal democratic mixed capitalistic setting. Environmental constraints are not to impose upon or reduce human living 'standards or levels of enjoyment' (p.134) - unless that enjoyment should be profligate, for instance involving conspicuous consumption and waste. Certainly such constraints are not to interfere with morally acceptable human freedoms: such is one side of the proferred dilute liberalism. But unnecessary waste is another thing, and should be curbed, through state guidance and regulation; liberalism here parts company with libertarianism. 'The switch from a resource-profligate society to a resource-liberal one would involve an acceptance of much more state action, more state interference by way of incentives, disincentives, regulations, restrictive laws, and over all planning than now prevails. However, it would not require the loss of basic freedom ... ' (p.134)! Such double-talk certainly makes the heavy liberal case MCCloskey tries to mount against decent environmental concerns - as against decent human concerns - look thin and flawed. Because such regulation does make serious inroads upon capitalistic freedoms, much hangs on the term 'basic', which is not however explained in this context. If, being freedom-loving Europeans, we burn down an empty freeway at speeds in excess of wasteful consumption limitations and we are accordingly locked away for months, then the effect 6 Sublimenal is a satisizing analogue of the maximization ideology's suboptimal. �19 on our basic freedom to life at large is serious. The paternalistic states MCCioskey offers, in significant respects more paternal than those we already have in the West, do not sit so easily with liberalism; patently they are incompatible with libertarianism, which does not brook such restrictive regulation. The critical point is however this: what is permissible in rectifying a resource-profligate society is similarly permissible in reorganising an environmentally-profligate society. Again there need be no loss of basic freedom, where basic is now characterised in terms of whats ethically acceptable. Only the ethics is now a deep environmental ethics. 5. Structuring ecological ethics and politics: towards an improved classification of environmental problems. Environmental ethics and politics are regularly said to be engendered by environmental problems, increasingly severe and encroaching problems. Yet in MCCloskey's text, as in that of his main model, Passmore's establishment text, there is no well-organised classification of environmental problems, only a rather ramshackle list. We can however reach towards an improved classification by considering environmental impact in a dynamic setting (cf. the beginning of section 1). An impact of something is something which comes from somewhere, sources, into something, sinks, parts of environments. In a process diagram, it looks like this: impacts processes sources sinks types of environments participants distinguished agents of impacts recipients of impacts Expanding upon the elements of this process diagram will deliver the sought after improved classification. Firstly, given distinguished background experience, especially with environmental impact equations, a further two-way classification is suggested: in terms of • sorts of impacts, and • types of environments. The latter framework is wide enough (in obvious respects too wide for a tight classification) to include both special concentrated sources such as mines, power stations, factories, and the like, and special sinks such as rubbish dumps, sewerage outflows, and the like. But the framework is not quite wide enough; it is important to factor into types of environments, expected inhabitants of those environments, which are the recipients of impacts (impactees). These will include not only present inhabitants of �20 environments: animals, plants, native humans, for land-surface environments, but also expected future inhabitants, whose likelihood or very existence may be impaired. There are two ways of incorporating these sorts of elements in the general scheme: either expanding environmental components, by having zones and habitats with kinds of expected inhabitants; or distinguishing participants in the impacts, givers and receivers. Here the latter course is preferred; we distinguish also then • kinds of recipients, and as well of course • kinds of impactors. While the kinds of impactors is diverse, including such superagents and nonagents as Nature, Chance, God (as in "acts of God"), and so forth, as well as animals, the main impactors of interest are, presently, humans. Accordingly let us run out the standard environmental impact equation for humans in a region, though it applies to any class of impactors through any kind of impact: EI. Environmental impact (of ... through ... ) = Population size (of ... ) X Resource use per member (of ... ) x Impact (through ... ) per unit of resource use e.g. of humans in USA through atmospheric pollution. Such an impact breakdown leads directly to three major categories of environmental problems, namely a Population a Consumption and use a Technology and waste. Those components act in concert, and, despite well-publicized attempts to load problems onto just one component, evidently all are sometimes important. A more sophisticated environmental impact equation would reduce the aggregation of the equation, EI = P x C x T (in brief, and functional, form), by introducing distributional features, which indicated where and when impact really mattered. Suppose, for example, there are n sufficiently independent regions, as in the following regionalized impact equation: n EI = Pi X Ci X Ti i=l Suppose, for instance, we are investigating the environmental impact of present humans l through industrialization, i.e. EI (present humans through industrialization). Then, on an obvious regional breakdown, the impact is overwhelmingly dominated by three regions: North America, Europe, and North Asia (primarily Japan). If it were not that the rest of the world were locked into this system (and its humans encouraged to applaud �21 and emulate it), supplying much of the raw materials, taking too much of the expensive products and waste, and suffering the pollution effects that spill outside the offending regions, main problems of industrialisation could be isolated in the high latitude N orthem hemisphere. The regionalized environmental impact equation will also serve to better organise widespread assumptions as to how those impacts that are taken seriously can be eroded. Not only is there the illusory prospect of reducing impact to "acceptable levels" by variation of just one parameter - Ci is that invariably favoured by socially-oriented shallower environmentalists; Ti, in the shape of wizard technology, by economists and technocrats (but such technology is likely to have its own impact and thereby to add to environmental problems). There is also the possibility of moving further afield to new regions, where impacts are lower. There are familiar frontier practices ( and a corresponding frontier ethics), which can be seen as reapplied to elements such as industrialisation and its components, pollution and waste. Of course such frontier practices are impoverishing, and too often destructive of further environments and many of their inhabitants; but in any case they are now seriously limited by biospheric limitations of the whole Earth. Many significant types of environment obtain little or no consideration in MCCloskey's survey; e.g. deserts (too many the product of past human activity), urban regions, polar regions, atmospheric zones, and so on. To stay within reasonable bounds, however, not even all the areas of concern that Mccloskey does look at will be examined in what follows. For to try to track Mccloskey in all the areas he does delve into would require an extensive treatise, as he raises many fundamental issues in political theory: to mention two remarkable examples, a brief discussion of 'the right to private property' is tucked away under 'Family Rights and Rights to Reproduce', and of the 'right for education' under 'The Right to Respect as a Person' (p.75ff.) Instead a more detailed treatment of a few of the areas he addresses will be offered (in fact some of the other areas have been investigated elsewhere, in Green Series discussions, or will be). 6. Population impact: the fact of human overpopulation. A major and very conspicuous impact of humans upon the Earth comes through their sheer numbers, which, though already huge, are still growing rapidly, and are overwhelming environmental and social bases for reasonable support in many parts of the globe. MCCloskey's first thesis, which sets the agenda for his entire population discussion, is this (pp 146-7,p.97): that there is no world population crisis, indeed further, NP. The world is not threatened by a population crisis in the foreseeable future. �22 But instead of coming out directly and cleanly with this preposterous thesis, MCCioskey approaches the business in a typical oblique way, designed to shift the onus of proof, claiming that he has 'argued that a tenable, plausible case had not been made out for believing that the world is threatened by a population crisis in the foreseeable future' (p.146). It is fair to wonder about his experiential basis, whether, for instance, he has travelled through India or visited the vast urban slums of many third-world countries. It is fair to wonder what would make a "tenable plausible case" - proper theoretical business for philosophers, which philosophers have generally steadfastly avoided - or, of immediate relevance, what would constitute a "population crisis", and what counts as "overpopulation". On the last at least we do have a proposal from MCCioskey, 'to use overpopulation to refer to population sizes that exceed a country's or the world's capacity to feed adequately and to make it possible for all to enjoy their basic rights' (p.97). While the proposal is no doubt very convenient for the argumentative route MCCioskey will try to take, a route it already signposts, it is a decidedly chauvinistic and exceedingly shallow suggestion, which is ecologically entirely unacceptable. First, it takes no due account of future humans, or other creatures. But present capacity is achieved, so far as it is, too often through running down present biological and other systems, thereby jeopardising future capacity; decent sustainability is required even by shallow ecological positions. Secondly, the proposal is indecently chauvinistic; it takes account of naught but humans, their basic rights and their feeding. It thus violates the framework MCCioskey elsewhere professes to have adopted. For instance, high populations, which are not MCCioskey overpopulations, may lead, and are leading, to promotion of evil and to gross reductions in intrinsic value, including types of value MCCioskey earlier (somewhat reluctantly) acknowledged. But like all the political applications of the potentially generous ethical basis, that on population takes an ugly anti-ecological tum. It is all humans and humans, humans first, last and only, though humans at brute food subsistence levels or less as it turns out, and is turning out in many regions. Now really the proposal should be relativised, to 'overpopulation of a region', as the awkward disjunction, between country or world, makes evident. Many regions and countries are already seriously overpopulated (even by MCCloskey's slack standards), as he goes on to say. However, so he immediately asserts, 'the world as a whole is not overpopulated' (p.97). Whatever the case for this claim - a defective and disreputable case as will soon appear - plainly some large assumptions go into the proposition that a whole or summation can enjoy certain distribution properties when many of its parts do not: assumptions about the role of international trade, regionalism and self-sustainability on the one side and about summative features on the other. If clothes, for example, are �23 dirty or shabby in many parts, so are they as a whole. Suppose some parts are overpopulated because of constant infringements of basic human rights, infringements presumably traceable back to excess population sizes (though the connection is not made clear enough). Then the whole can hardly but be overpopulated, as it stands, whatever the future prospects for redistribution, reorganisation, and so forth. To evade such problems and to scramble to his conclusion Mccloskey firstly weakens 'basic rights' to 'basic needs' (but rights normally demand more than need satisfaction), and then drops 'basic needs' out altogether. Thus what he finally gets down to is the bare food issue, all else set aside: of whether 'if the food actually produced were distributed and used to the best advantage of all persons in the world' every human could be fed. But, so he claims, 'it is widely accepted' that all can be amply fed (pp 97-8). It is evident that, even if what is so "widely accepted" were true, the outcome would be insufficient to show no Mccloskey overpopulation. Suppose the world has the capacity (and will) to redistribute food to the most advantage. Still, basic food is no assurance of basic rights. Further argument, not supplied, is essential; argument to showing that regional overpopulation, stayed however by bread (but not circuses), does not lead to basic rights infringement, through such media as unemployment, poverty, inequity and so on. Furthermore it is very doubtful that this can be established, for the simple reason that there are connections between these human conditions (however difficult they may be to push into quantifiable or law-like form). Humans do not survive or depend upon food alone. To keep many of them even partly contented, so inflated have their wants and needs become under ideological pressures, will require a very large and very environmentally destructive pie. Humans are now an extraordinarily greedy and destructive species. Though one animal species among thousands, and one biological species among tens of millions, they have taken over most of the Earth and most of its products, so far as they can, for their own uses and purposes. More than 80% of the fruits of photosynthesis, for example, now flow to this one species. Yet perhaps 10% of the world's human population are malnourished, and many millions at least lack other subsistence needs. Even the bare food claim, upon which MCCloskey's whole case depends at bottom, is no longer so widely accepted, since the shock of the North American and other droughts; it was being questioned as MCCloskey wrote. Now however we have available the Brown University study of world food supply in relation to human �24 population. 7 The study is based on the 1986 harvest, which was a world record. The findings were that, with this supply, assuming perfect and equal redistribution, 6 billion humans would be fed a vegetarian diet. Thus by the end of the century, present record supplies will not be able to sustain the world's human population even at vegetarian levels. If the somewhat better South American style diet, with 15% meat, is considered, then only 4 billion humans can be fed; that is, less than the present world population. While if a rather better Australian style diet is contemplated, the number that can be fed declines to 2.5 billion, that is half the present world population. So much for ample feeding. It might reasonably be anticipated that the rest of the argument to NP, no foreseeable population crisis, is hopeless. And it is. All we are offered are, firstly, some reasons, of very variable quality, 'to suspect the most confident, brash predictions' (p.99) - suspicions which seem to include NP within their scope, along with MCCloskey's next speculative thesis. Secondly we are offered the speculative thesis that world food production will grow at least sufficiently to match world population growth. It is a thesis floated largely on technological optimism, a thesis that should be regarded with heavy suspicion given recent serious declines in biological capital: fisheries, soils, forests, and so on, and given apparently increasing climatic instability. To give him his small due, MCCioskey does assert, repeatedly, that there is little ground 'for complacency and inaction in respect of the world's population growth' (e.g. p.99 ); and as well as firing moral shots at 'alarmist predictions ... based on the flimsiest premisses' countering NP (for no problem), he makes heavy moral noises about morally assessing the situation. In any case, he needs to say something like this in order to pull off convincingly his big discussion of the ins and outs of, ethics and politics of, human sexuality and population control. 7. On limiting human populations: some neglected considerations. Hitherto received opinion, in modem Wes tern civilization, has taken the line that culling animal species is perfectly alright, but that culling humans is not, because humans have an unalienable right to life (a right regularly neglected however in times of war, in regressive criminal justice systems, and now questioned as regards poachers of significant animals). Received opinion, which MCCioskey tries to shore up, is now being challenged. Alternative methods of controlling populations of wild animals, to 7 The study is regularly cited by Ehrlich in his talks, lectures and works: see reference. �25 previous technologically primitive ones, are being seriously considered. Another gulf between humans and other sizeable intelligent animals is beginning to close. Unlike some dangerous Christian thinkers, Mccloskey does not cede to humans an unlimited right to procreation. As he says, 'there is no recognised moral, social or legal right for consenting parties to reproduce at will', but 'few philosophers today would seek philosophically to justify prevailing recognised ... restrictions on procreation' (p.150). Mccloskey wishes to impose a restriction as regards adequate provision for offspring; there is no right to reproduction where a requirement of reasonable prospects of adequate provision is not met. This bears heavily, as he realises, and perhaps also inequitably, on impoverished parents in poor communities; the issue is not really resolved (see p.101). But otherwise, in richer countries, the duties of those who would undertake human parenthood are presented as slight. Individuals, acting on their own, have otherwise no duties to restrict the size of their families (for the unMCCloskeyian consequentialist reason that it will have limited practical significance and achieve little). Where overpopulation is an issue, political, not individual, action is what is required. Where overpopulation threatens, individuals 'adequately fulfil their duty if they have only that number of children for which they can adequately care and [very differently, and with major political implications] if they foster and support world action to stabilize the world population and [confirming a right previously hedged] to ensure that all persons enjoy the right, equally with themselves, to have offspring if they so choose' (p.104 ). Otherwise the issue is dumped in the (too hard) political basket, for states and world organisations to try to handle. All this is decidedly unsatisfactory. Most important, there is no right to production of children without limit, even given that they can be "provided for". One reason is that new children produce impacts, and children in quantity seriously interfere with others; so result in significant violations of liberal principles regarding noninterference with others. In rough analogical terms, as the Macs' new building interferes with their neighbours' views, so their new children interfere with the neighbours' freedom and lifestyles and environments, beginning with local noise and crowding and continuing, much further, through taxes for family allowances, for schools and so on, through crowded and polluted parks and beaches and so on. Those assuming (conditional) rights, to reproduce for instance, tend to forget that rights require justifications (they cannot just be pulled out of thin air). But here any straightforward justificatory pattern is upset, because of a very familiar neglect of relations: namely, impacts of new people on environments, and interference of new people with in-place people. A change in attitudes and practices is accordingly warranted. Parties producing larger numbers of children should be regarded as socially and ecologically irresponsible; they should no longer gain special financial support, but �26 perhaps should, on the contrary, be duly penalized. These themes run counter to the main thrust of MCCloskey's discourse on population control, an extensive discussion premised on what he takes to be the improbable hypothesis that a world population crisis eventuates (pp.147-155). It ought to be enough to pull the plug on that discussion, sending intellectual babies with soiled bath water. That voluntary methods of limiting human births 'will not succeed' is MCCloskey's prime thesis (p.147). The support offered for it is characteristic and characteristically inadequate. First the thesis is weakened, and then some restricted and contestable empirical evidence is advanced as suggestive. 'That voluntary methods of checking birth rates are unlikely to be adequate is suggested by the relatively limited success of family planning projects even where [well] backed ... ' (p.147). On the contrary, voluntary methods of checking birth rates, mostly independent of family planning projects, have been substantially successful in many better educated, less impoverished communities. Some of these might even count as spectacularly successful, and more would be if they achieved some real, and sensitive, state support. But there are many powerful interests, especially those emanating from organised religions, operating against delivery of support designed for success. There is a conspicuous difference, again connected with ancient prejudices, between the attitude shown to human populations and the approach MCCloskeyians take to animal populations. Humans have the right, but socially constrained, to continue on their expansive and environmentally degrading course; animals have no such right, because, among other things, they have no rights. 8. On animal rights and supposed political implications thereof. The argument to the conservative result, that animals cannot enjoy (moral) rights, attempts to trade off an argument on which great emphasis is put, that 'there is a vast gap between rights and interests' (p.66). But that attempt depends on a confusion between what rights are - certainly not interests - and what can hold rights significantly - perhaps only items with interests. With that confusion out of the way, MCCioskey still has two main arguments to his shrill conclusion, that 'animals do not, cannot possess moral rights' (p.66 and several other places): a tight redefinition argument, and an environmental chaos otherwise argument. The tight redefinition argument proceeds, by appealing to special features of rights, to tighten up the notion of right so that unwanted (if commonly recognised) classes of right-holders are excluded. Such an argument, widely deployed against animal liberation, takes two main forms: less plausibly, that rights require interests, which �27 animals are alleged to lack, and, more plausibly, that rights have to be suitably exercisable and claimable, feats beyond animals abilities and capacities to perform. Though formerly among the ageing afficiandos of the less plausible Cartesian nointerests approach, MCCioskey now pursues the more plausible form. He appeals first to typical features of rights (though really some combination of these must form an invariant cluster for a decisive argument), such as their being 'foregone, insisted upon, exercised in or contrary to one's interests. For possession of a moral right to be meaningful, the possessor or his/her representative must be able to claim it, exercise it, or the like' (p.66, italics added). Unfortunately for his argument, MCCioskey proceeds, at crucial points, to leave out the representative alternative. Thus while an animal may not be able to claim its rights, a representative can; whereupon talk of claiming a right is not empty (pace p.66). Thus the argument so far is broken-backed. Having recanted on his earlier contention that animals cannot have interests (see p.65), MCCioskey is no longer in a position to preclude the attribution of rights on that ground, that interests are a necessary condition. 8 'We can plausibly claim to have some idea of what is in the interests of an animal. We can have no knowledge concerning how it would exercise its moral rights, if it had any' (p.66). Surely we can. A wombat can exercise its right to proceed along a way in the same way that a human can, namely by proceeding along it, setting aside obstructions, and so on. But MCCioskey proceeds, in a way characteristic of high redefinition strategies, to heighten the requirements. He appeals to features of what he takes to be 'paradigm cases of the possessors of rights, persons, rational, morally autonomous beings' which he couples with the characteristic exercise of rights (p.66). There are, however, other paradigm examples of right holders, such as small children, senile humans, imbeciles, etc. Despite the suggestions, rationality and a high level of autonomy are not required for the possession or exercise of rights. MCCioskey asserts that 'it is capacity for moral autonomy, for moral selfdirection and self-determination, that is basic to the possibility of possessing a right' (p.66). That is a high redefinition, substantially exceeding the requirements normally expected, especially where guardians or representatives are appointed or envisaged. MCCioskey-rights are a quite proper subclass of rights as ordinarily conceived. Even so it may well be that animals can hold them; it all depends upon how much gets pumped into the elusive term 'moral'. Wombats, for example, are not human, do not read and write, are not much given to calculus, do not enter into contracts, and so on; nor do 8 Elliot is quite mistaken in saying that McCloskey's views have not changed since those espoused in 1979 (p.503). Admitting animal interests represents a major change. That animals do, of course, have interests is argued in detail in my 81. �28 many primitive peoples, though humans, engage in any of these activities (though some of them perhaps could with education). But wombats are, by and large, decidedly autonomous, self-determining and self-directed; they exhibit much more independence than most modern humans. Similarly with whales. Despite such familiar findings, MCCioskey takes the following proposition as decisive: 'Consider how we should respond if it were to be determined that a whale or dolphin possessed moral autonomy' (p.66). He does not address the issues raised in this queer pronouncement, but immediately leaps to his sought conclusion against animal rights. Given that moral autonomy is not to the point, except for MCCioskey-rights, the proposition is irrelevant to and not supportive of the conclusion. Without the elusive term 'moral', the proposition is, furthermore, decidedly not a discussion stopper. Most dolphins exhibit a high degree of autonomy, the exceptions being primarily those (improperly) held in captivity, injured in fishing activities, sickened by pollution, and so on. The trouble with the infiltration of morality is that it normally (if wrongly) suggests human activities and human communities - whence what small force MCCloskey's proposition enjoys, as whales as agents fall outside that setting. The argument to environmental chaos, to entirely untoward environmental implications, if rights were ceded to animals, comprises several facets. They are facets that have been seen before, with every legitimate struggle for extensions of rights, such as, most memorably, allocation of rights to enslaved humans. That latter certainly brought some desirable dislocation to social arrangements; so will legitimating animal rights. But it need bring nothing like the complication and aggravations of social and environmental problems that MCCioskey fearfully envisages (p.69, p.122). A first facet concerns conflict of rights. There are of course conflicts of rights between humans and groups of humans, but MCCioskey fears the situation with animals would not merely be more complicated (as it would with much greater numbers) but that 'the difficulty and complexity of this rights calculus' would make it unworkable (p.67). But again he fails to show anything like this. Indeed he immediately weakens his position of apparent strength by looking to an 'easier calculus' where 'man simply protects animals from human violations of animal rights' (p.67). That would be a fine start, though politically virtually all nations and peoples would have to advance a long way to achieve it (Sweden less than most others). While the "easier calculus" does not mean that animals have lesser rights than humans, as MCCioskey implies, what is suggested is important in escaping from difficulties MCCioskey tries to amass. For not all right-holders are on a par, much as not all types of creatures are equal in abilities or capacities. In particular, to get to critical and divisive issues straightaway: it does not follow then from the fact that animals have �29 rights that some of them, domestic ones, cannot be kept, or used - any more than it follows from the fact that humans have rights that some cannot be kept, or employed, for instance as servants. Nor does it follow that dead animals (or humans) cannot be eaten. Nor, most controversially, is it incompatible with animals having rights, that some are killed. For not all rights stand or fall together; a right for continued existence is very different from a right to a decent life or treatment while alive. Furthermore, MCCloskey's invalid arguments to ecological chaos succeed in turning animal liberation into animal libertinism. They do this by familiar slide strategies from some to more to all, from some rights, to many other rights, to the same rights as fully-competent persons. The strategy is coupled with that of assigning to humans more rights than they have, or should hold. Examples include the right to be absolutely where they like or to breed at will. But one human does not have the right to be in any other human's house or bed or space.9 No more do animals, like feral animals or 'disease-carrying pests such as rats and mice'. So, for example, the major conflict MCCioskey alleges with human rights to health dissolves; it depends upon granting excessive rights to rats and mice. With a sensible calculus of rights humans need not be overwhelmed by either animals or other humans; given due constraints on human populations (more than any other animal populations), interference by others could be stabilized at a low level. A further large facet of MCCloskey's argument to chaos doggedly pursues practical and ecological costs of vegetarianism, costs which he considerably exaggerates. But whether he is right about these costs, or not, is a separate issue - irrelevant to the main issue of animal rights. For admitting or stressing animal rights most emphatically does not 'dictate acceptance of vegetarianism as a moral position or practice' (p.68). There is no valid route from rights for animals to vegetarianism, for reasons that have already been very briefly indicated above. 10 MCCioskey has linked the question of animal rights much too closely with positions like that of Singer (an evident target on pp.68-9 of the text). But many more ordinary people and even some philosophers, 11 both before and after Singer, have assigned rights to animals, without commitment thereby to vegetarianism, and without evident (or any) fallacy. As a result or this flawed linkage, 9 While writing this I heard a local airforce contingent claiming its right-to the freedom of Canberra. Plainly it only has a right-to the freedom of only certain cities, and to quite limited things within those cities. 10 A much more detailed case, along with counter-models, can be extracted from my previous work, esp. the Green Series, number 13, i.e.TE (essay 3), and number 2. 11 A neglected early philosopher is Maclver; see esp. his remarks on p.69. �30 MCCioskey makes another interesting mistake: namely 'that the two movements, animal rights on the one hand (the view that some animals possess moral rights) and conservation and preservation on the other', so far from being 'complementary, mutually supportive positions', 'in fact are fundamentally opposed and are such as to be calculated to lead to many major clashes' (p.69, rearranged). While there are major clashes, for example, between moral extensionisms, such as the expanded utilitarianisms of Bentham, Sidgwick and Singer on the one side, and deep environmentalism on the other, there are no clashes of an animal rights position with deep environmentalism . For, very simply, such deep positions accord animals rights. As elsewhere, so with animal rights, errors in the ethical treatment intrude into the supposed political implications. Unremarkably then MCCioskey sees 'the ecological state' as committed to ecological chaos, all of which 'would very seriously curtail human liberty in many ways' and 'create massive theoretical and practical political problems' (p.122). No doubt decent treatment for animals, codified in rights, would restrict human liberty somewhat, as abolition of public spectacles such as hangings, floggings or throwing Christians to hungry lions, curtailed spectator opportunities and freedoms. But the desirable elimination of factory-farmed fast foods and animal-tested cosmetics, or the curtailment of circuses and reformation of zoos, are hardly very serious restrictions on human liberty, or what MCCioskey is thinking of really. He is again thinking of his house full of rats and his garden full of copulating animals, of vegetarianism and protection of rabbits made legally obligatory, and so on (for many such fantasies see p.122). But no such consequences, ensue, without repetition of the errors already exposed in the ethical treatment: inferences from some rights to excessive rights, and so on. Because side-tracked by his own production, by this pantomime of absolutely unconstrained, rampaging, warring and rapidly-multiplyin g animals (i.e. like some humans when ideological controls are lifted, not like most animals), MCCioskey does not address at all the very serious abuses in prevailing present treatment of animals, abuses on farms and in laboratories, at home and in the wild, abuses that should be politically addressed from ethical bases, issues well addressed through rights. An institutionalisation of animal rights would not produce the big problems MCCioskey envisages; after all most people are now represented by professionals in many of their dealings concerning legal rights, a professional paternalism increasingly operates, which �31 subsumes many professionals themselves. On the contrary, such institutionalisation of animal rights, properly done could make for very desirable changes. 12 9. Two other critical features of dominant political ways: the shibboleths of extensive private property and high technology. The orthodox assumption, which McCloskey makes, is that a liberal democratic state will have a mixed (or marginally socially constrained) market capitalist economy. Under the simplistic equations that tend to distort much modem political discussion, even the inadequate qualifications occasionally inserted are forgotten: a liberal democratic state is often equated with institution of market capitalism, indeed too often market arrangements get equated with capitalism. Evidently, however, these equations fall apart under but slight disturbance. Logically they come apart entirely. There are severe logical problems with the very idea of a liberal democracy, which is a dialectical union of individual liberal with social welfare and democratic ideals. For a democratic state, especially should it take popular majoritarian form, can seriously curtail the freedom of minorities (the well-known "tyranny of the majority"). Liberal ends may be better served by a benign dictatorship than by democratic arrangements. Liberality and democracy part company. Similarly individual liberty and statist social welfare. And so on. Certainly liberality, which is the most free ranging of the five big political league players being disentangled, 13 does imply some significant limitations on arrangements, but they may not favour democracy, or capitalism. Fully liberal arrangements should enable a community to opt for democratic organisation, should it wish; but similarly these arrangements should allow the community to choose otherwise, should it want. Also liberal arrangements of a social cast (with decent freedom of the servants) would mean winding back of capitalism. Despite the immense damage illregulated capitalism and market structures can, and do, separately inflict upon ecological and social systems, there is practically no discussion of such matters in MCCloskey, and again little investigation of improved structures or regulation. 14 12 For one thing, it challenges factory farming, as infringing animal rights, in an obvious way. McCloskey avoids the issue when it arises (p.140). 13 In fact four of the five substantially independent players we are reflecting upon market, social welfare, capitalistic, democratic, and liberal arrangements - do not receive an index listing in Mccloskey, while the fifth, liberal, collects many citations and much discussion. 14 A major contemporary myth is that markets and capitalism can flourish without regulation, indeed that they flourish best in a fully deregulated setting. Both �32 As with liberal democracy, so with market capitalism, the components separate. Markets can flourish without capitalism, where for instance agents have sharply limited and bounded budgets and capitalistic accumulation cannot operate. Markets require no liberty in other parts of social life than those involving exchange of certain material goods; they certainly do not require a democratic framework. Capitalism can function without a vibrant free market system; indeed in advanced capitalist states it increasingly does so, with oligopolistic arrangements in place of competitive output markets, vertical integration and contract delivery replacing former input markets, and so on. Capitalism too requires neither democracy nor liberty, indeed too much of either could seriously undermine it. It does however depend upon property, for control and as a store for capital accumulated. In principle, of course, a very limited capitalism could work without private ownership of land and resources, so long as some exchangeable stable form of wealth, such as a sound currency or gold, was available for accumulation and payment of labour. But smart capitalists would rightly feel excessively vulnerable under such arrangements; for they could be wiped out by an outside devaluation of the currency or outside increases in rents on resources and land. In any case, many capitalists (virtually all people of substantial wealth in Australia), and a large array of parasitic middle parties, agents and hangers-on, would be duly despatched along with free-for-all property markets. Having glimpsed MCCloskey's unquestioned commitment to mixed capitalism, it is piquant to behold him begining upon undermining an institution fundamental to historic capitalism, namely private property. Most of MCCloskey's brief discussion of rights to private property (pp. 78-80) focusses upon the labour theory of property, descended from Locke and others, upon which he effects a full demolition job. In fact he severely weakens the case for a substantially unfettered ("free") institution of private property, upon which however the type of liberalism he advances depends. For strong property rights and guarantees are basic to present liberal democratic arrangements, as they are to proposed libertarian alternatives. MCCioskey even tries to close off discussion of the 'political desirability of allowing property rights by way of patent rights to discoveries' in plant and animal breeding, particularly through genetic engineering, on the pretext that these 'cannot reasonably be objected to without the whole private-property system of institutions depend for their operation and for their very survival on regulation, on an appropriate enforceable legal setting. Otherwise, in communities where a certain egalitarianism counted for something for instance, a capitalist would be rash to bank upon holding onto substantial surplus wealth for long. �33 liberal democratic states being questioned' (p.139). Now peripheral cases do not generally threaten the centre, unless, perchance, it is already in some doubt. The extent and character of property is a quite critical, indeed a watershed, issue for environmental politics. For excessive propertarian rights and powers constitute a very serious impediment to sound environmental practice. The reason is simple: the proprietor may be less than well disposed to the environment, and may well permit or enact unsound practices. Yet propertarians often now appeal to a purported need to strengthen and expand the institution of private property - rather that to let it naturally contract - in order to combat environmental problems. Thus such dubious proposals as saleable rights to pollute environments, dump wastes, etc. - licences which look even to the uninitiated like ways of extending, not contracting, pollution and like environmental problems, and which look to the more cynical as ways of circumventing costs and limits environmental constraints impose upon economic activity. 15 The liberal democratic structure to which MCCioskey commits himself to, with its uncritical approach to population and consumption - like market capitalism, with its commitments to expanding populations to ensure growth and profit, expanding markets, enhanced consumption, and cheap labour resources - forces an unduly heavy dependence on technological wizardry. In particular, it requires a technology that will facilitate greatly increased cheap food supplies, without however too rapidly depleting "biological capital". Given recent experience it demands a faith in technology, and the smart science that underwrites it, that is increasingly difficult to justify. Like all too many academics, MCCioskey has that faith. Science should be given entirely free reign, and technology pushed to the hilt. There is a naive optimism in MCCloskey's attitude to science. 'It is not improbable that ultimately, through the investigations of the sciences, we will come ... to have a full understanding of the earth's weather and climatic patterns. Man will be able to use this 15 Such saleable rights also appear to get another foot-in-the-door for bargaining utilitarians, who claim to want no absolute prohibitions, but want to put the whole environment up for negotiation - and ultimately for sale. What are not up for negotiation are the underlying propertarian and utility maximization principles, the insufficiently examined sources of many of the problems. In any case, the evidence now coming in shows that market approaches to pollution, such as saleable rights and pricing controls (like company fines), do not work at all well. Making directors of polluting firms directly responsible, and putting offenders in jail, apparently does. �34 knowledge for his and the earth's best advantage' (p.137). We, the total managers, will know what is "best" for the earth! Despite the 'dangers of misuse', major disasters, global warfare, climatic destablisation, and so on, 'this fact constitutes no reason for holding back the pursuit of knowledge ... ' (p.137). Maximum speed ahead in the glorious pursuit of science, with full anarchistic enthusiasm there. There is, as well, 'no reason ... for entrusting rulers with the control of science' (p.137); science at least is utterly free in MCCloskey's liberal democracy. While Mccloskey wants the state kept out of science (except as a money pump presumably), he wants it actively intervening in technology, not to limit it, but 'acting to ensure that new technologies be developed and used and their benefits widely enjoyed' (p.138). The liberal state is to be actively and heavily involved in technology promotion and delivery - which puts into serious question its presumed neutral regulatory function. Also espoused is a quite insufficiently discriminating attitude to technology. Like most apologists, Mccloskey emphasizes the possible - but generally unrealised - benefits of technology, that technology 'can release persons from much mindless, degrading work. Hence some, even many persons may never need to work' (p.138). For all the talk about the possible benefits of technology, many alleged benefits seldom or never accrue, for instance to shorten substantially people's working hours and give them more worthwhile leisure; and benefits that do accrue are often not well used. Rather technology is primarily funded to maintain or increase market share and profits (which too often end up in conspicuous consumption and waste), thereby inducing cycles of production and waste, more technology to help control the waste, and so on and up. Technology itself is merely of instrumental worth, with many of its instruments and techniques defective, destructive or dangerous, either directly or through eventual side-effects. While some technology is no doubt instrumentally good, much is not. And the balance of good over bad has been systematically exaggerated in Wes tern culture, where more technology is now looked to or required to rectify gross economic and social mismanagement in liberal democratic states. Technology is however no universal panancea. Both on its record, and in terms of its theoretical prospects, the faith being put in it, to "deliver us from evil", is misplaced But, as remarked, MCCloskey has the faith (such episodes as the Green Revolution are seen as unmitigated successes), and enthusiastically expects great things from technology ('genetic engineering ... constitutes a dramatic, exciting breakthrough of major proportions, one that opens up vastly wider possibilities for developing new plant and animal organisms', p.139). Naturally he concentrates on the sunny side of technology, scarcely touching upon the darker aspects. We merely glimpse one darker side of genetic engineering (for which perhaps no further engineering is needed), the edifying spectacle of mass-production of human drones for �35 industrial slavery (p. 139). As to the big problems with this engineering, we are fobbed off with an evasive throw-away, of the kind more typical of politicians, as to 'the need for relevant controls and checks', and no doubt balances, presumably determined by state masters behind closed doors. Instead Mccloskey tries to divert attention by yet another attack on the hypothetical totalitarian ecological state, and the threat of its coercive methods, not those of your normal corrupt intimidatory democratic state, to human liberties. But the smokescreen quickly subsides, our factional text degenerates into notes: 'Relevant point here include ... ' (p.139). Mccloskey would have us locked into state systems that are delivering increasingly negative results for increasing numbers of humans and disastrous outputs for nonhumans and natural environments. By changing political directions significantly, environmental and human affairs could again have an opportunity to flourish. But for much of the environment at least, there is not a lot of time left. REFERENCES D. Bennett and R. Sylvan, Damn Greenies: Australian Perspectives on Environmental Ethics, typescript, Canberra, 1989; referred to as AP. C.D. Broad, Five Types of Ethical Theory, Kegan Paul and Others, London, 1944. R. Elliott, Critical Notice of MCCloskey's Ecological Ethics and Politics, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 63(1985) 499-504. P.R. and A.H. Ehrlich, The Population Explosion, Simon & Schuster, New York, 1990. R. E. Goodin, Review of MCCloskey's Ecological Ethics and Politics, Ethics 94(1984) 344-5. A.M. Maciver, 'Ethics and the beetle', Analysis 8(1948) 65-70. H.J. MCCioskey, Ecological Ethics and Politics, Rowman and Littlefield, Totowa N.J., 1983; all page references not otherwise indicated are to this work. T. Nagel, 'Libertarianism without foundations', in Reading Nozick (ed. J.Paul), Blackwell, Oxford, 1981. W.D. Ross, The Right and the Good, Clarendon, Oxford, 1930. H. Rolston III, Environmental Ethics: Duties to and Values in the Natural World, Temple University Press, Philadelphia, 1988. R. Routley, 'Alleged problems in attributing beliefs and intentionality to animals', Inquiry 24(1981) 387-417. R. Routley and V. Plumwood, 'Moral dilemmas, and the logic of deontic notions', now in Paraconsistent Logic (ed. G. Priest and others), Philosophia Verlag, Munich, 1989; referred to as MD. �36 R. and V. Routley, 'Semantical foundations for value theory', Nous 17(1973) 441-456; referred to as sv. R. and V. Routley, 'Human chauvinism and environmental ethics', in Environmental Philosophy (ed. D. Mannison and others), RSSS, Australian National University, 1979; referred to as EE. R. Sylvan and D. Bennett, 'Tao and deep ecology', The Ecologist 18(4/5) (1988) 148159. R. Sylvan, Three essayes upon deeper environmental ethics, Discussion Papers in Environmental Philosophy, (Green Series) #13, Australian National University 1987; referred to as TE. R. Sylvan, 'On the value core of deep-green theory', typescript, Canberra, 1988; referred to as DG. �DEEP ECOLOGY AND DEEP-GREEN THEORY. Deep-green theory is a deep pluralistic environmental position, underwritten by a deep metaphysical theory. It is intended as an alternative, less fraught with problems, to deep ecology. Deep-green theory has developed, in significant part, through fruitful interreaction with deep ecology. Many of its leading ideas can thus be more rapidly introduced by contructing and comparing them with ideas of deep ecology which are already widely diffused (if often in a muddy or muddled way). As a spin-off then, this outline will offer a simple exposition of central ideas of deep ecology, and further criticism of many of them. In any practical showdown, however, deep ecology and deep-green theory are not antagenistic positions but close allies, both deep positions within a wider environmental alliance. Though the rudiments of deep-green theory go back about as far as deep ecology (to around 1973), it remained unnamed until the early 80's (and only achieved initial investigation in Bennett 86). Moreover, it has not hitherto attained in any fuller platform and slogan formulation, such as deep ecology has benefitted (and suffered) from almost since its inception. The term 'deep ecology' was coined by the Norwegian intellectual, Ame Naess, to label an emerging environmental movement. But, despite Naess's commitment to pluralism, it was from the outset constrained to a certain style of environmental position. The notion has since been elaborated and further delimited not only by Naess but, in the first place, by several Northamericans, particularly Bill Devall and George Sessions, who have on occasion collaborated with Naess (their main work on deep ecology is cited in the reference list at the end). The notion has caught on outside narrow academic circles, especially in North America and Australia, where, in contrast to Wes tern Europe, significant areas of natural environment remain and are becoming of increasing public concern. Deep ecology is a radical environmenta l position, which goes far beyond resource conservation positions (which are typically concerned with the management and stewardship of resources in long-term human interests); and it offers a much deeper challenge to prevailing attitudes and practices (of the dominent social paradigm), especially those which concern more or less natural environments. (Leading features of Resource Conservation are explained in several sources; e.g. Rodman.) �2 Deep ecology takes off from value theory themes which stand in diametrical opposition to mainstream Western ethical and social theory.1 The first of these themes, the wide values theme, is that what is valuable in or for itself is not confined to human beings or their features (such as their interests, concerns, pleasures, consciousness, etc.), but extends much more widely to other beings. The value of these other systems or creatures of their features is not merely instrumental, aluable as a means to human objectives, but is independent of human concerns; it is in brief nonanthropic. Indeed deep ecology goes further, rejecting the greater value assumption, according to which anthropic values always take precedence over such natural values. How then is value distributed, in particular across the things of the world? It is here that deep ecology and deepgreen theory part company. Deep ecology takes value to be restricted to things that are alive (in some attentuated sense, so it turns out); this is the theme of biocentrism, life-centredness. And it assumes that these things with life are all of equal value; this is the controversial theme of biospheric egalitarianism. A unique assignment of value results. Deep-green theory rejects both these themes. For reason to be given, Deep-green theory is much less specific as to how value is distributed. But it is spread on to things - wholes, collectives, systems as well as individuals which are not alive, and it does not cover all things that are living. Nor is it distributed onto those things that have the quality in an equal fashion, except in the trivial sense that all have or partake of value. Some things that have value are much more valuable than others; there is some weak (and partial) ordering of things with value. It is these things that are worth conserving, preserving, and so on, the more the more valuable they are. Thus Deep-green theory is axiocentric, value-centered. Value in nature is regular coupled with some mix of value-making characteristics, including such defeasible ecological universals as richness, rarity stability, resilience, diversity, and so forth. But there are considerable constraints on how values are derived from any such "objective function". One over or thing constraint, that of impartiality, substitutes for that of egalitarianism. According to the requirement of biospecies impartiality, which excludes certain types of class chauvinism, a thing cannot be ranked as valuable or ahead or another simply in virtue of belonging to some species (e.g. being human); such features are not in themselves value-making characteristics. 1 There are some who account themselves deep ecologists who would repudiate such an approach through value theory, most notably Warrick Fox. �3 Figure 1. A compariso n of Deep Ecology and Deep-gree n theory, in capsule form. 2 Deep ecology biospheric egalitarianism Shared themes or goals I I I I I Deep-gree n. theory wider value theme rejection of greater value assumption, +through ➔ biocentrism ecological universals as defeasible value-making biospecies impartiality , and rejection of class chauvinism axiocentrism characteristics extreme holism natural systems as integral, irreducible cosmic identity moderate holism ultraperson al identificati on maximal satisizing on value self-realisation determinates limited interference only with natural systems; restricted rights thereto commitment to implement principles applications to economics, politics and policy, especially in bioregional ism ➔ environmen tal areas; e.g. regionalism and federalism +- ecoregionalism human population reduction A major difference between the theories lies in the distribution of value (from which much else of ethical consequenc e arises: rights, obligations , and so forth). Deep ecology, like simpler utilitarianism, proposes a unique initial distribution (over a given atomistic base class): each living individual is assigned equal intrinsic value, and nothing else has intrinsic value. Values of other things, complexes, systems and so on, are then in principle open to determinate s by a calculation. It is a type of recipe to which intellectual s bent on numeration and calculation are regularly attracted; pseudo-obj ective variations are to be found not only in utilitarianis m but in economics and in democtrati c political theory, and also in probability theory, where elements of suitable 2 Most of the capsule theses of deep ecology are explained in detail in the critique, CD; many of those of Deep-green theory are explained in FE. �4 initial esembles are assigned equal probability, through a principle of indifference. The practice is also as problematic as indifference principles (cf. CD on deep ecological egalitarianism). Deep-green theory rejects the assumptions upon which the deep ecological distribution depends. It rejects the latent atomism, the idea of ultimates upon which value devolves. More dangerously these days, it rejects the equality assumption. Much as some humans are more valuable than others (on most moral and other counts), so some creatures, some systems, are more valuable than others. DG theory is, quite deliberately, much less specific as to how value is distributed. Often enough, especially in difficult cases, assessment of value is a complex matter which may call for much reflection (for some details see TE, first essay). But certainly value is an unevenly distributed feature of a variety of things, not just at bottom altimates. It is a quality of many items - wholes, collectives, systems as well as individuals - which are not alive; and it does not extend to all things that are living, e.g. malignant virases engineered in biochemical laboratories. Nor is it distributed onto those things that have the quality in an equal fashion, except in the trivial sense that all have or partake of value. Some things that have value are much more valuable than others; there is some weak (and partial) ordering of things with value. It is these things that are worth conserving, preserving, and so on, the more the more valuable they are. Thus the theory is at least weakly axiocentric, value-centered. In fact it is more strongly axiocentric, in two important respects. Firstly, deontic notions such as those of obligation, rights and duties, answer back to axiologic ones (see TE, essay 3). Secondly, more difficult to explain, value penetrates the metaphysics, including what is accounted fact; most strikingly, the choice of actual world itself depends upon value (see DP). �AUTHENTIC DEEP ECOLOGY: expositio n, critique, alternati ves PREFAC E No longer is there so much need to chronicle and document the major and serious environmental problems confonting the Earth and its ecosystems. Much of the relevant information - details of the damage, difficulties, devastation, disasters, and dire threats of more - now appears in later chapters of biology and geography textbooks, often in striking pictorial or diagramatic form; and the information is regularly updated by articles, too often environmental horror stories, in popular perodicals or newspapers. While many of the problems are abundantly and glaringly evident, others are more subtle, sometimes more insidious, hidden from view, but bound to emerge in not so long term. So we can take the problems, and further problems, "for granted", though with little comfort or ease. Many were, and are, foreseeable; many were, or could be, avoided or mitigated. Serious though these problems are they are still not being taken with full or due seriousness by those who exercise some control over how relevant things happen. 1 Most states are busy attempting more of what has landed us in some of the worst of these problems: more growth, of economic products, of people, of consumption2 , of energy; more or "better" militarisation; more productivity, of agriculture, with environmental cost-cutting and short-cutting, more development and more consumption thereby of biological capital. Growth remains at the top of most national agendas; it is seen as a panacea for all other problems, economic and security problems of course. Serious environmental problems are still mostly treated as economic "externalities", peripheral but growing nuisances, that we shall have to learn to live with3, but not the "real" problems. We have lived under this dominant destructive ideology for much too long already. It has already led to the devastation of much of the planet Earth, to the loss of much of value, many species, While there is a power structure, and a power elite, in all states (virtually as a corollary of features of the state, such as its monopolies on coercion, currency, etc), it cannot be pretended that there are any impressive control systems. So some of the problems are unintended. Given the propensity for human-developed control systems to function in undesirable ways, e.g. to tend towards militarism and totilitarianism, the lack of satisfactory system is no doubt to the good. 2 So, for example, the USA is pressuring Japan to consume more, internally, to ease American balance-ofpayments problems, and soak up excessive production; there is no pressure to produce less. 3 So, for example, prestigious scientific organisations are preparing to teach us how to live with and love the Greenhouse effect. Many communities have learned to live with damaging and noxious pollution; no doubt they would miss it if it were gone. �2 much irreplaceable wilderness, and has left us with an immense, and sometimes hopeless, clean-up and restoration task. Moreover things will rapidly get worse environmentally if we are not rid of it and its variants. Plainly we need several strategies: a strategy for fundamental change, a strategy (needed first) for what comes after the change, and so on. Deep ecology offers a strategy and an initial structure for addressing these environmental problems, along with proposals for addressing the menacing array of other problems confronting modern industrial societies. It is a strategy which goes much deeper than the pathetic patch-up the damage after it's largely done (pollute, then cleanup or pay a bit) approaches that prevail. For this reason alone, deep ecology deserves to be much more widely known. But there is still no satisfactory text on the topic. This book, while hardly an easy introduction to the subject4 , aims to fill a part of the gap. Perhaps too, it can help serve as a basis for that introductory text that still needs to be written. This text tries to do what the title promises. It begins with a sympathetic exposition of deep ecology. That is necessary. It remains hard to find out what deep ecology (DE) is, as it means so many different things to different expositors and exponents. The matter of different visions and elaborations of DE is taken up in the second part, which provides a detailed critique of DE in its main versions. In the final part, other criticisms of DE, from its rival social ecology in particular, are (negatively) assessed; an alternative to DE, deep-green theory is outlined; and some of the political connections of deeper environmentalism are investigated, including strategies for appropriate revolutionary change. Deep ecology is the most exciting deep environmentalism on the present intellectual market; for all its sortcomings, it is still the most thoroughly worked out widely accessible position. That is one reason why its worth a fair bit of time, my time, in struggling with it and trying to improve it, and your time, in getting to know it. This text grew from a critique of DE along with an unpublished expansion of that critique (called 'Continuin g the critique of deep ecology') and sundry associated articles on deep environmentalism. As an expanded version of critique5 remains the centre of the text, some of what I wrote in prefacing the critique should be repeated. I think, I hope, it merits repetition, as amended. 4 There is a need also, as will be explained in subsequent chapters, for a text that measures up to recognised academic standards, sufficiently complex and full of (bad) argument, in order to put deep ecology firmly on academic agenda, to try to ensure that it is not merely a crude popular movement that can be intellectually ignored. 5 'A critique of deep ecology' Radical Philosophy. �3 It was with considerable ambivalence and some serious misgiving that I first undertook a critique of DE, as it risked offending many friends in the deep ecology movement. It succeeded. The trouble was that when I got down to trying to explain what deep ecology was all about (for a seminar, at which N aess and Devell were present, some years ago), I found myself confronted by the following predicament :- While I applauded much about the deep ecology movement, and what it stood for, I could not find my way to accept deep ecology as formulated by any of its main proponents. The reason was not merely that deep ecology is less than a fully coherent body of doctrine, with, furthermore, many problematic sub-themes, but worse, that much of it departed from the ideals I felt it should be expressing, and that some of it was rubbish. Yet I had no doubt that deep ecology was a worthwhile enterprise (carried on by dedicated and good people), and that something along the lines of a replacement for deep ecology - revamped deep ecology if it is simply a matter of repairs, deep-green theory for more - was very much on the right track. Or to put it slightly differently, while rejecting every formulation of deep ecology, I agreed with the general drift of much of deeper ecology, and with virtually all the careful applications of deep ecology. My attempted resolution went along the lines of critical rationalism (for which I have been criticised). The method was to subject deep ecology to severe criticism, with a view to obtaining thereby an improved, more acceptable formulation, which at the same time met other desirable criteria. However to resort to such critical methods was already to type oneself, as old consciousness and old paradigm still, and to risk alienating part of the deep movement. The risks have been taken: but there are some concessions. In the end, when it comes to applications, to lifestyles and policies, the rational ladder has to be enlarged and also supplemented; for it offers only one distinctive way among many. Though the applications of deep ecology to real-world problems are very important, as already indicated, we shall only reach them and not attempt to develop them very far. However a detailed listing of various important applications that have been made will be given.6 Naess and others have complained, with some justification, that I have not gone out my way to find generous interpretation s of deep ecology, which remove apparent rubbish from it (see Naess RS p.3). It is true that, following the prevailing philosophical mode (by no means always to be applauded), I have not been very charatable (here or in other philosophical critiques). I have treated DE as a find it, hopefully in an expositionally straightforwar d and honest way. I do, however, try to 6 The final part of the background paper on population (Routley 84) provides one application in detail, an application expanding on some remarks of Naess (in 83). And several other examples which Naess has outlined (also in 83) can be similarly elaborated. Gare has attempted a major elaboration applying to science. �4 offer alternatives to DE and improvements upon it when I discover them. Deep-greep theory can be seen as a fairly comprehensive alternative. �/ ON SOCIAL ECOLOGY A heavy attack on DE, a tirade really, was launched recently by Bookchin. It caught leading deep ecologists - who had rather foolistly seen Bookchim as one of them, though it was obvious enough that he wasn't - off-guard, entirely stunning some of them 1 . Bookchin furthermore went about his frontal attack in a most ungentlemanly and less than American way, using practices and methods that Americans do not use as regards decent fellow countrymen, but reserve for communism and its representatives and others engaged in un-American activities. 2 Intellectual exchanges are supposed, otherwise, to proceed in a nice, collegial way (the knives come out in the back rooms, not on the front pages). Bookchin broke American cultural conventions (which is a main reason why several people, e.g. Sale, failed to comprehend what was going on). There is heaps of straight mudslinging in Bookchin, name-calling, attributions of guilt by very thin associations, ad hominen moves. We shall bypass this unworthy material, much of what there is in the attack, because anyone with decent basic training in logic can document it for themselves, if they can obtain copies of the work (not at all easy in the peripheral world). We shall try to isolate the much slimmer intellectual content of Bookchin's criticism. Should we dig under all the dirt, we find there are some core criticisms of DE, which are for the most part defective, but as well some interesting suggestions, which are worth fossicking out and displaying. There are two key issues. In both Bookchin's criticism repacts, but focusses upon DE, the old-fashioned erroneous socialist condemnation of environmentalism of all types - as not only getting priorities wrong in not putting human societies absolutely first, but worse failing to appreciate that environmental problems are the product of social problems and removed with them. • Ecological problems are at bottom nothing but social problems. This rival reduction theme, which is what justfies the social ecology terminology and approach, also gets stated in various, often weaker or slacker forms: For instance, ecological problems have their 1 The phrase 'off-guard' is from Naess. As to the extent of Bookchin's depth see the Critique. 2 This nasty face of American intellectual activity is well exposed in Chomsky's political writings. For the most part American philosophical periodicals permit only the nice face to be exhibited. For my part I enjoyed some of this outrageous stuff of Bookchin's, which was livily and refreshing after the flatness and dullness of much in Naess's notes, and also by contrast with Bookchin's earlier papers, which are mostly repetitive and often rather vacuous diatribes. �2 roots in social problems, ecological problems have their ultimate roots in society and social problems, etc. But DE, 'despite all its social rhetoric, has virtually no real sense of' this; that is a major (disgusting) trouble with it. The correctness and tellingness of social reduction themes vary more or less inversely, depending in particular upon how far the operative term 'social' is stretched. If all problems concerning "groups" (including single member groups) of "individuals" of any sort (including volcanoes, hurricanes, seiges, etc.) are "social" problems, then evidently all ecological problems become social problems, as these are all concerned in some way with individuals and their relations with their surroundings. But such a misleading adjustment to the theme, rendered near-tautologous by a low redefinition of 'social', is not what Bookchin and other socialists have intended. They characteristically intend by 'social' 'human social', and what they intend to convey by 'the social roots of the ecological crisis' is that it is 'the gross inequities in [human] society' - which should be attended to first- 'that underpin the disequilibrium between [human] society and nature'. 3 Now this strong social bias thesis is interestingly false. Consider counterexamples of the following sort:Imagine mixed capitalistic and welfare socio-economic arrangements had worked and succeeded in eliminating the gross inequities in society, at least in some relatively independent regions of the world, and perhaps even globally. There were, it still seems, real prospects that this could have happened in the 60s, had energy and funds been redirected from military-industrial enterprise to social-industrial activity. A welfare safety net is stretched right across the regions concerned so that no longer is any human homeless or without sufficient nourishment or basic eductional opportunities and so on, so that poverty and all other grosser inequities are eliminated. 4 It is sufficiently evident that even if all this is achieved, many ecological problems will not be addressed, but may be aggravated by the increased industrialisation and economic development involved. The lot of factory farmed animals or of threatened wild species would not be removed, but, if touched at all, 3 Bookchin 87 p.10 where the thesis is inaccurately associated with Kropotkin. 4 Naturally, finer inequities, such as unsatisfactory job relativities, race relativities, etc., will not thereby be eliminated and are perhaps part of "the human condition", some of which many societies will be prepared to live with or ignore. The relatively easy opportunities of the 60s for societies free of grosser inequities (for good or even great societies) may have passed, as certain new social problems have much complicated matters. �3 likely worsened. There is no guarantee that the position of wild and natural regions would thereby be improved, that these regions would be freed from constant inroads by human developmental activity, that the Antartcic would not be citified, and so on. In general, no environmental damage and degradation that did not rebound upon the relevant human social situation would be halted or resolved. Furthermore, not only is the strong social bias thesis false, as well human social concerns do not always come first where ecological depth is attained. Bookchin suggests an historical basis for the strong social bias thesis, that the notion of the domination of nature arose in the first place out of social domination of people by people, women by men, and so on. But that is pseudo-history; for the domination of nature and some appreciation of its operation, reaches as far back, so far as we can see, so far as our records go, as other forms of domination. What is more, even if a real history were like Bookchin's it would offer little support for strong social bias thesis. All it would reveal is that some ecological problems were glimpsed by anology with social problems, not that ecological problems are at bottom social problems and so resolved with them. • • "Second nature", constituted by human society, is uniquely different from first nature, and so naturally and justifiably interferes substantially with the processes of first nature. The unexploited play on "second nature" does nothing to support such intervention; or the contrary, second nature follows nature rather effortlessly without specific reflection. However, the two "natures" distinction, inadequately introduced and incapable of bearing much weight, is applied, in social ecology, to support much human interferenc e and substantial separateness. 'Natural evolution has not only provided humans with ability but also the necessity to be purposive interveners into "first nature", to conscously change "first nature" by means of highly institutionalized forms of community we call "society".' 5 Given the highly artificial and rather accidental social forms now in place, that many humans now suffer or swear under, this is very far from obvious. This second nature vs. first nature division would re-erect the old division and separation , Man vs. Nature, in old-fashio ned football-m ilitary terms, that deeper environmentalism has been concerned to remove. It is human chauvinistic; it ignores the continuity between humans and other creatures, the overlap in incapacities and skills (remembering all the capable animals able to live skilfully off the land and all the incapable humans). As regards relevant skills and capabilities, there is no uniqueness, or singularity, of humans as a whole. It would chauvinistically try to convert being human into a 5 Bockchin 87 p.21. �4 significant moral category, when it is not. 6 It would induce an inverse, obnoxious ranking among biological kinds; first class, matching second nature, and second class, matching first or primitive nature. The division would accordingly offer a springboard to a range of further interference of the sorts of which we have already witnessed much too much. The main thrust of Bookchin's attack is thus an old-fashioned socialist criticism, which fails any longer to impress because of its excess anthropocentrism. Social problems, which are of course often but not always intertangled with environmental problems, are no longer top of action, political, or other agendas; nor are their standard modern rivals, similarly entangled with environmental problems, namely economic problems. There is a third set of problems, neither exactly left nor right, neither exactly social nor economic nor reducing in approved fashion to those would-be universal categories, nor yet forming an entirely independent dimension: namely, environmental problems. Bookchin faithfully rolls out other elements of routine socialist criticism, against deep ecology. Some of these are telling enough, but mostly not new. They include:• a seriously flawed pantheon of heroic figures. Bookchin gets stuck into DEs favourable mention of Heidegger, of course, but he also tries to convey quite by association with Woody Guthrie (p.6), Malthus (p.15) Ehrlich (p.17) and others. Problems with the heroic figures and historical pedigree of DE had already been observed by others, e.g. Sholomowski. • a thin and inadequate historical genesis and setting. In this regard Naess's work is, of course, primarily in the perfectly admissible tradition and company of systematic philosophy and of most science. Deep environmental has, no more than science, to supply at the outset a full historical context in which its ideas are placed (pace. p.5 bottom). 6 So it is argued at length in EP. �INTRODUCTION Deep ecology is a major environmental position and movement, one of the most important of contemporary times. In name and in assemblage of themes it is a recently elaborated position, dating back only to about 1973; but most of the themes are older, some of them much older. It is the assemblage, package and the way that has been put to environmental work that is newer and different. The initial assemblage and the name are due to Naess, a principal character (in all senses) in what follows 1. 1. On the deep ecology movement and ideology: their intellectual standing. The expression 'deep long-range ecological movement', of which 'deep ecology' 1s a subsequent abbreviation, was minted by N aess to label an emerging environmental movement . Naess was then (sociological) finder ather than founder of this emerging movement, a movement concerned primarily with the natural environment. In explaining ideological features of the movement Naess set down a number of what he took to be characteristic themes. It is from these themes, with much elaboration and considerable variation, that deep ecology, as a doctrine, has grown. It is with the evolving body of doctrine, the position, that we shall primarily be concerned. Control such as it was, of the doctrine did not long remain with Naess. Like many good promising ideas it was quickly imported into California, where it was modified, and to some extent converted into a further individual consciousness-elevating exercise. Thus the doctrine has been elaborated and further delimited not only by Naess but, in the first place, by several North-Americans, particularly Devall and Sessions, who have on occasion collaborated with N aess, and more recently by various Australians, most notably Fox and Seed.NI Deep ecology has caught on largely outside No attempt will be made to give an account of Naess's philosophy, except insofar as it bears directly on deep ecology, though such an attempt would be worth making. We commend the work (which could simply be entitled Naess ) to others; a smell beginning is made in Naess and Rothenberg. Naess was already a significant, influential, but maverick, figure on the European intellectual scene well before deep ecology was discerned. Naess had been professor of philosophy at Oslo since 1939, a chair he obtained when 27. In early days he was a Norwegian Ayer, likwise basking in reflected glory of a disinfecting logical positivism; but how much Naess subsequently diverged from empiricism can be gauged from his 1971 debate with Ayer (recorded in Reflexive Water). In fact Naess had already began to move out of an empiricist set as a result of his early interesting attempt to carry it towards its logical conclusion, and to do philosophy itself empirically, recorded in Truth as Conceived by those who are not Professional Philosophers. Subsequently Naess traversed a wide and unusual range of philosophical enterprise: scepticism naturally; many of the then fashionable areas, such as communication, semantics and interpretation; and several others that were much less philosophically fashionable, but politically significant, such as Gandhi and pacifism, ideology and failure of objectivity, and of course pluralism. These investigations form the complex backdrop to deep ecology. Unfortunately, despite Naess's longstanding commitment to pluralism, deep ecology was from the outset constrained to a certain unduly narrow style of environmentalismm as will appear. �5 narrower academic circles, especially in North America and Australia, where, in contrast to Western Europe, significant areas of natural environment still remain; these are rapidly becoming of increasing public concern. Deep ecology is a radical environmental pos1t10n, which goes far beyond resource conservation positions (which are typically concerned at best with the management, husbandry and stewardship of resources in long-term human interests); and it offers a much deeper challenge to prevailing attitudes and practices (of the dominant social paradigm), especially those which concern more or less natural environments.N 2 Deep ecology (hereafter is an ideology in the respectible older sense, a system of belief and ideas. It is not an ideology in the post Marxion sense, of such a system characterised by an inflexibility and an unwillingness to listen to other points of view. Quite the contrary. Radical DE may still be, though its radicalness is in decline as it ages and as informed opinion on environmental issues advances; respectable, it is not. In particularly DE is not a respectable academic subject. Though it is arguably the most important movement in environmental philosophy in recent times, it is fl:Ot even mentioned in several recent texts on the topic. There are several reasons for this, ranging from the conservation and close-mindedness, snobbery and bigotry almost, of much contemporary philosophy, to evident presentational deficiencies in DE, its mouldeness, its lack of discriptive and argument, its popular appeal. DE is particularly weak weaker than environmental ethics, which do poorly on these academic indicators - on a run of things that are taken to matter in contemporary ethics; analyses of meanings of key ethical terms, reductions of ethical terms to few primitives, smart arguments, utilitarian-style justifications, etc. That is one reason why it is not part of Anglo-American analytic philosophy; another is that it challenges so much of what analytic philosophy represents and (politically) presupposes. DE scarcely represents, then, many of you will be relieved to learn analytic philosophers' philosophy. N aess believes has been through and seen through that sort of philosophy early in life; and seen that it does not contribute very much to the real features of life and living that philosophy should make significant contributions towards, but mostly does not. As a result you will find very little analysis in DE. Also there is remarkedly little argument, though argument is often taken to be what is distinctive in philosophy. (But that is an Anglo American idea of what philosophy is all about; you find comparatively little argument in much Continental European philosophy - what you do find, even in authors like Kant and Hegel who look superficially as if they are arguing, is mostly patently bad argument, poor at best. DE is much more like European philosophy in tone and style, which helps explain why it is neglected and denigrated in American schools; by contrast, in British philosophy curricula the environment is only just beginning to win any satisfactory attention at all.) �6 These are some of the reasons why, despite its importance, DE goes largely unmentioned in most texts on environmental philosophy and ethics. This says a good deal about the texts, which are mostly not offering satisfactory coverage of their fields (see further chapter 2). But it indicates something too about DE, which is not as intellectually accessible as it could or should be. Moreover, presentation of DE often go out of their way to violate (questionable) academic standards, expecially those for clarity of statement, extent of analysis, and level of argumentation. Deep ecology is an amophous doctrine, as anyone who tries to set down from its sources in a clear and crisp way what its themes are, will readily enough discover. Of course compared with much French philosophy, it is clarity itself; but French philosophy does not provide an acceptable benchmark. A good deal of the obscurity concerning DE results from its varying and different presentations by different expositors. To avoid this problem, we shall, for the most part, follow Naess's elaboration of DE, taking that as fairly authoritative. But the problem is not thereby resolved. Naess's views on deep ecology, its place and importance, and its themes, have changed over the years. Nor are the themes always, sufficiently clear though many of them are succinctly stated. Some of them are said, by disciples or by N aess himself, to be metaphorical. Furthermore, as some important matters go largely unelaborated, for instance the issues of satisfactory methods for achieving ecopolitical change. To surmount these kinds of difficulties, we shall (somewhat presumptuously no doubt) offer our own exposition and elaboration of DE, what we call authentic deep ecology. At least under Naess's conception of DE we are entitled to do this. In part II however, which offers a critique of DE as it has been variously presented, we shall look at the genuine article in its various formulations. Rather than becoming easier with the passage of time, DE has become more and more difficult, and less intellectually tractable as it picks up or toys with environmental fashions, often zanier environmental fads. It is complicated by New themes, often muddy themes, and its solidity is removed by modification or erosion of old themes. Among the new themes picked up, several to be examined critically (in part II), are the Gaia hypothesis, according to which the Earth itself some sort of organic living system. DE is thus an irremedially vague object. Its vagueness has increased with its popularity with its becoming on the green fringe a fashionable, not to say vogue, item (a Foucaultian object). Vague and vogue, a common concotenation. 2. Types of environmental positions: deep environmentalism. �7 What distinguishes an environmental position is a certain level of constraint with respect to the environment, the natural environment especially: not anything goes with respect to nature. In this regard environmental positions contrast with a dominant theme of Western cultural heritage; namely, provided it does not interfere with acknowledged people such as property holders, that people can do more or less what they like with the land, and with what grows and lives there. It is even therefor humans to exploit or manage. This unrestrained position imposes few or no constraints upon treatment of the environment itself. Under it there would, for example, be little compunction about using up material resources, forests, fisheries and so on, immediately or even destroying them. But, because it grants such entitlements to exploitation, the unrestrained position can be excluded from properly moral positions. 2 For it fails to meet the basic universality requirement on moral principles, of independence of person, place or time, a requirement which implies that persons of different races, colours, sexes or ages, or at different places or times are not treated unfairly or seriously disadvantaged. Insofar as the unrestrained position would permit the exploitation, degradation and even destruction, of all present resources and environments, it places future humans at a very serious disadvantage. The position is thus one of expediency, not morality, typically yielding, like economics, evaluative assessments based on short-term narrow local (or national) interests, rather than assessments appropriately based on long-range transnational values. Opposed to the unrestrained position are various environmental positions (what Leopold saw as the land ethic is just one of these). Such positions can be classified - conveniently for subsequent development but in a way that already refines and extends Naess's classification - into three groups: shallow, intermediate and deep. Unlike the unrestrained position, all these positions would conserve and maintain things - materials, creatures, forests, etc. The shallow (conservation) position differs from the unrestrained position primarily in taking a longer-term view and taking account of future humans, their welfare and so forth. It is more enlightened than the unrestrained position in taking a longer-term perspective: hence its alternative description in the literture as resource conservation (thus, e.g., soil conservation organisations). Though this conservation position is only a step away from the unrestrained position, it does pass the test of morality in that future people are not treated unfairly; so it is a very significant step. 2 This is a substantial and controversial claim, especially since it accounts much economic activity unethical in the narrow or semse, as involving practices of expediency, not morality. For the fuller case for obligations and commitment to future humans, see e.g. Routley 81, and other essays collected with it in Partridge 81. This section is drawn from my People vs the Land (84). �8 The shallow and unrestricted positions are closely related by an important feature they share and which justifies lumping them together as shallower positions. They are both highly anthropocentric; they do not move outside a human-centred framework, which construes nature and the environment instrumentally, that is, simply as a means to human ends and values. Thus they take account ultimately only of human interests and concerns; all environmental values reduce to these. It is in this respect especially that these shallower positions differ from deeper, less resource and management and exploitation oriented, positions. According to deeper positions, humans are not the sole items of value or bestowing value in the world, and not all things of value are valuable because they answer back in some way to human concerns. But deeper positions differ in the weight or relative importance they assign to human concerns. According to an intermediate position serious human concerns always come first; and while other things, such as higher animals, have value or utility in their own right, their value is outranked by that of humans. The deep position rejects this assumption, and maintains that even serious human concerns should sometimes lose out to environmental values. Figure 1. The positions separated, and separating principles SHALLOWER UNRESTRAINED DEEPER SHALLOW IMMEDIAIB DEEP MORALITY SOLE VALUE GREATER VALUE REQUIREMENT ASSUMPTION ASSUMPTION (of human apartheid) (of human supremacy) The watershed principle which divides the shallow from the deeper positions is the sole value assumption . According to this major assumption, which underlies prevailing Western social theory, humans are the only things of irreducible (or intrinsic) value in the universe, the value of all other things reducing to or answering back to that of humans in one way or another. This assumption is build into most present political and economic arrangements; for example, only aggregated preferences or interests of certain (present) humans are considered in democratic political choice, and likewise in economic decision making; other creatures and natural items are presented at best through the preference or votes of interested humans. 3 3 The points are explained in more detail in EP, where too, account is taken of the shift from humans to persons (which would be important were it taken seriously and adhered to) and also of the inclusion of �9 Similar assumptions are made in mainstream ethical theories. Typical are reductive theories which endeavour to derive ethical judgements from features of closed systems of humans. Examples are provided by presently fashionable ethical theories, such as standard utilitarianism. 4 According to utilitarianism what ought to be done, as well as what is best, is determined through what affords maximum satisfaction (preference-fulfilment, pleasure, absence of pain, and so on, for other satisfaction determinates) to the greatest number of individual humans. In theories like utilitarianism, the outside world of nature does not enter through direct inputs or outputs, but only insofar as it is reflected in the psychological states of individuals. Such ethical theories are appropriately described as those of apartness or human apartheid. Man is, or is treated as, apart from Nature; there is virtually total segregation. Nature or the land enters only as a remote experiential backdrop, and onstage is the drama of human affairs and interests. However, humans cannot be entirely insulated from their environment; for example, volcanoes affect temperatures thus affecting climate thus affecting crop yield and food supplies. At least limited intercourse with the environment has to be admitted as a result. So, in economics, ethics, and political theory, secondary theories, dealing with linkages to the environment, have been appended (thus, for example, externality theory in economics, some allowances for "side" constraints in more sophisticated utilitarianism, and so on). But the environment remains treated as an awkward or tiresome afterthought or backdrop, a (re-)source and sink, when it is considered at all. There is, however, another approach also with historical standing, vying with (and indeed often confused with) human apartheid, which can accommodate secondary theories a little more satisfactorily. That is the position of superiority or human supremacy, according to which Man, though included in Nature, is above the rest of Nature, meaning ethically superior to it.N While human supremacist positions can incorporate the sole value assumption and thus remain in the shallow ethical area, they have the option of rejecting it in favour of the less objectionable greater value assumption; other things being equal, the value of humans is greater than other things; the value of humans surpasses that of all other things in the universe. This assumption allows that other objects, such as some higher animals, may have irreducible value; what it insists upon is that, at least for "normal" members of respective species, this value never exceeds that of humans. What super-humans. With value for natural items goes, of course, concern, respect, and sensitivity, towards them; but the reverie connection may exhibit occasional failures. 4 But the same holds for other fashionable theories on the American-dominated ethical scene, namely contractualism and libertarianism. More broadly based historical utilitarianisms, which allow for some input from other sentient creatures, are considered below. �10 is generally presupposed is that other objects - animals, plants and their communities - are never of very much importance compared with humans. Though human supremacy has appeared in variants upon utilitarianism (from Hutcheson and Bentham on) where animal pain is taken into consideration along with human, Wes tern ethics and associated social sciences such as demography, economics and political theory, remain predominantly apartheid in form. So in practice does most utilitarianism. 5 It is the repudiation of the greater value assumption that separates deep from intermediate positions. Perhaps the most familiar example of an intermediate position 6 is that of Animal Liberation, in the form in which individual animals (but not plants, forests, ecosystems, etc.) are taken to have value in their own right, though in any play-off with humans, humans win. Under the deep position such an outcome is by no means inevitable and not alway assured; in cases of conflict of animals with humans or natural systems with humans, humans sometimes lose. There are various arguments designed to show that the deep assessment is right, that humans do not always matter7 and, more pertinently, that humans should sometimes lose out. A typical one takes the following form:- Some humans voluntarily lead worthless or negative lives, lives without net value. The point, though not uncontroversial, 8 can be argued even from a shallow utilitarianism. Take for instance a life of pain and suffering and little or no happiness: it has a substantial net negative utility. However, some small natural systems do have net value; one example would be an uninhabited undisturbed island (a live example might be a tropical island before Club Mediterranee depradation). Now consider the situation where the considerable value of a small natural system is to be sacrificed (in a way that shallowly affords no ethical impropriety) on behalf of a set of humans whose lives each have no positive net value. For instance, the system is to be exploited, just for the continued maintenance of these humans, or for their addition (as new settlers) to an established population. Then in such circumstances, these humans lose out; the natural system takes precedence. Similarly, trivial satisfactions of humans do not dominate over the 5 There practice contrasts with what the theory allows or requires. Utilitarianism is like much pollution control, where regulations are on the books or are part of the law, but are or never only very occasionally applied. Utilitarian double standards are further discussed and referenced in DEP #7. 6 Other examples are considered below. Two of the four form of ecological consciousness considered by Rodman fit here (as Rodman has remarked). For instance, falling into the intermediate range are the types of environmental positions adopted by Birch and Cobb, and by Attfield and by many other consequentialists. 7 See the argument of EP, beginning the Last Man argument, p .... ff. See also the initial example of Routley 2 79 .. 8 The point is argued in detail in DEP #3. �11 integrity of rich natural environments. This simple result cuts deeply into (standard shallow) consumer theory, to take just one example of the impact of deep environmentalism. Authentic deep ecology is a type of deep environmentalism. A genuinely ecospheric egalitarianism, such as deep ecology offers, is bound to reject the Greater Value assumption. For under egalitarianism, larger collarations of significant eco-objects outweight smaller groupings of undistinguished humans. Notes 1. All their main work on deep ecology is cited in the reference list at the end. 2. Leading features of Resource Conservation are explained in several sources; e.g. Rodman. 3. Here authenticity is important. As will become evident in part II, certain proclaimed deep ecologists are not prepared to scuttle the Greater Value assumption. As will also become evident, the egalitarian arguments upsetting the Greater Value assumption are build on defective foundations. �CONTINUING THE CRITIQUE OF DEEP ECOLOGY As a broad label for something rather environmentally different, and no doubt better, than most ideologies that preceded it, 'deep ecology' is no doubt rather fine. That is how the label often functions, honorifically, for instance in the collection under that label edited by Tobias, which gives deep ecology none but a nebulous content, and which indeed contains many articles (such as the interview with Soleri) in diametrical opposition to the more detailed platform promulgated by the intellectual "leaders" of the deep ecology movements. In fact, a good deal of the more popular appeal of deep ecology has been obtained by vacillation between the more discerning authentic forms and the slack or nebulous forms. The nebulous use of the label has also given cover to some of those who calls themselves 'deep ecologists', enabling them to shed awkward but crucial themes from the more detailed platform (thus e.g. Fox). Many are those who are now pleased to march under the rather fashionable nebulous banner. 1 Many are not deep, in theory or practice, deeply committed, or deeply changed by the march. Purchasing or growing organic vegetables, having spiritual experiences in a special natural place, or practising some oriental art or exercise routine, does not ensure a deepened environmental position, though it can be a step on the way. While nebulous deep ecology is compatible with much that is neither deep nor even significantly ecologically oriented, such as minor lifestyle adjustments within the industrial paradigm, authentic deep ecology, which is not so slack, remains a defective doctrine, itself oscillating between an overpermissive environmental assembly point, fast growing its radical potential, on the one side, and an impermissive, unduly narrow doctrine, dubious or defective in several of its leading themes, on the other side. Some of the worst of these themes, such as biological egalitarianism, have already been criticised in sufficient detail in the original critique. But other features of authentic deep ecology (hereafter mainly DE) were left largely untouched in the original critique, and new features have emerged. The critique thus needs continuing. Since the critique was produced, it has been become more difficult, if anything, to grasp what DE is all about. Even Naess, the founder of the movement, who now tends to adhere much more closely to the platform than other self-proclaimed deep ecologists, is inclined to make I too am happy to march under the nebulous banner, though since my first critique I am no longer particularly welcome. Initially I was cut by about half those individuals and institutions loosely associated with deep ecology, since my critique began circulating. While I am become accustomed to this sort of phenomenon in intellectual areas (criticism induces cool and long at least, even in logic), I didn't expect so much of this given the Christian character of DE.; and such isolation does seriously reduce information sources. �2 apparently large concessions to opposition changes, which however he subsequently more surreptitiously withdraws (of course this is familiar philosophical practice). At other times, he withdraws with one hand what he is offering, some sort of olive branch, with the other. The oscillation can be partly ascribed to conflicting motivation. On the one side, there is the desire, stronger in the founder of DE, Naess, than in his American and Australian prophels, to create a wide constituency, to tum no one away if it can in any way be avoided. But, on the other there is an evident desire to make deep ecology a very select position, for a chosen few, a place to be achieved only after a journey crossing some arduous terrain and involving some difficult life adjustments. Deep ecology lacks the other-worldly and after-life resources which, in some of its religious sources, appear to make for an easy resolution of this type of conflict. I.Further problems with the platform and core platform of deep ecology. It is the platform (at level 2 of the organising "double pyramid" of DE depicted below) that constrains, delimits and defines deep ecology, so far as it is well-characterised. For even this level is not very precisely characterised to put it mildly. Some exponents or practitioners of deep ecology (some of them self-nominated or self-proclaimed) appear to repudiate even the core themes at level 2 (e.g. Fox on axiocentrism). In the face of criticism, Naess himself backtracks as far as he plausibly can, and sometime further. Not only does he considerably muddy the clear waters of doctrine of occasional prosentations, but the doctrine itself begins to disappear, to be qualified away (see e.g. Naess's performance in Resurgance , discussed below). The response to intellectual criticism, which DE has been increasingly encountering as it spreads, has not been an appropriate one of clarifying, and where requisite expounding, the core theory; it has rather been one of retreat and digging in, of trying to hold the temple under seige, through diversionary activity (or by broken-record techniques: simply reiterating parts of the messge not under heavy criticism over and over again). When the critical raid has passed, the priests (and very occassional priestess) of deep ecology reemerge, bearing the original doctrine essentially unchanged. The practice resembles christianity (and too much of the practice of dominant science, the rival Western church). Dealing with deep ecologists is very like dealing with devout christians; some of them one feels sure have only recently changed positional hats, from evangelism to deep ecology (correspondingly, my own position has become that of a black sheep). A good deal of the argumentative practice of deep ecology appears to be explained by its evangelical, and even messianic, character. There is genuine effort to tum no-one, except the most incorrigible moneylenders, away from the temple. Everyone else (except perhaps philosophic critics) is welcome, and encouraged to join in worship. Much like the churches, the founder of the �3 De movement seeks as large a flock as possible. In these democratic days, numbers count (at least under the "right" polling conditions); earlier numbers overted for taxing or tithing purposes. Other high priests are not so sure: there are some critics of the movement, who may be beyond the poles; and surely it should be a little more exclusive. But, in any event, DE is a much more liberal doctrine than one of its sources, christianity, has ever been; it admits coupling not just (so it is said) with all the great religions, but with all the more benign positions and practices that achieve fashionability in California. All not ill-disposed to the natural world and duly acknowledging its value can march under the banner of deep ecology, whose main citadel is Nature. N aess casts the net of deep ecology wide, catching therewith not only many remote supporters, but a number of hostile critics as well, such as latterly Bockshim (p.6). Naess now considers the 8 point platform, formulated by himself and Susians and published in several slightly different forms, as tentatively setting down the 'basic principles of Deep Ecology'. Naess 'look[s] upon the formulations as tentatively expressing the most general and basic views which almost all supporters of the movement have in common' (23.6.88). Thus the 8 point platform (condensed in box 1) provides, in a still vague and tentative sort of way, the core, the core platform, of DE. To get around a small obstacle, let us call those who would adhere to the principles of the core (in some approved formulation) adherents of DE. They are adherents in (simply and literally) holding to the core, the common (intersection of the) platform. They may not be members of the movement in any ordinary sense, in any but the set-theoretical sense, because appropriate intentionality is lacking, for instance they may never have heard of the movement, let alone made any effort to join. Nor need adherents be supporters in the usual sense; support is neither necessary nor sufficient for adherence. A critic such as Bockshim, or myself, can be an adherent without being a supporter, without being supportive. Conversely, a supporter may not be an adherent. The Salvation Army has many supporters, including atheists, who are not adherents. The De movement has many supporters, some of whom call themselves 'deep ecologists', who do not adhere to the core, even more or less. Many of these supporters are shallow environmentalists, who do not accept the key first point, of intrinsic value outside humans, or try to evade it (e.g. by redefinition, or by wrapping up value inextrically in relations to valuers). Since there are, in my experience, many supporters and indeed enthusiasts who turn out to be of this shallow sort, Naess's view is a little puzzling: what does he mean here 'almost all supporters'? Which isolated exceptions does he have in view? Box 1. The core 8 point plat/orm, in capsule form. l. Non-human and human life have intrinsic value: The well-being and flourishing of human and non-human life on earth have intinsic value, inherent �4 value, etc. These values are independent of the usefulness of the non-human world for human purposes. 2. Richness and diversity intrinsic virtues : Richness and diversity of lifeforms contribute to a realisation of these values and are also values in themselves. 3.Humans unjustified in reducing such natural virtues: Humans have no right to reduce this richness and diversity except to satisfy vital needs. 4.Human (values compatible with) population decrease: The flourishing of human life and culture is compatible with a substantial decrease of the human population. Flourishing of nonhuman life requires such a decrease. 5. Human inte,ference with natural world excessive: Present human interference with the non-human world is excessive and the situation is rapidly worsening. 6. Policies and basic structures must be changed: Policies must therefore be changed. These policies will affect our basic economic, technological and ideological structures. 7.Quality of life should supplant economic standard of living: The change in our attitudes will bring an appreciation of the quality of life rather than adhering to an increasingly higher standard of living. There will be a profound awareness of the difference between big and great. We will have a great society with no bigness. 8. Obligation to attempted implementation: Those who subscribe to the foregoing points have an obligation directly or indirectly to try to implement necessary changes. Most of the core platform is no longer demanding; none of it, except for the last point, specifying an obligation to attempted implementation, requires any commitment in the past of adherents. Mainly adherence to DE, and support of DE, would be very considerably increased were this requirement evaded. A strategy common to econonical practice and sociological research �5 readily presents itself. Let us speak of silent adherents as those who adhere to the core platform, more or less, except that they make no requisite effort to implement it (they may of course have some vague failing of obligation, should they ever reflect on the matter). Even without the benefit of scholarly survey work, it is evident that De would now have a large number of silent adherents, many of whom are not however adherents, being either oblimovish, situated in repressive regions or social situations, or simply uninformed (like indigenous peoples who think here are excessively many excessively interferring humans of Caucasian stock). The core platform represents a surprisingly incomplete and rather ill-organised collocation of principles. The incompleteness is most conspicuous in point 6, which advances no details as to envisaged structural changes. In extenuation N aess pleads that he has 'not has courage to go into detail and define what these different structures will be, because we are going to have a lot of different Green varieties. We shouldn't have one set of structures imposed' (R p.7). The reasoning does not hold up; a range of structures, rather than a unique structure, can easily be defined by constraints well-known ones as it happened. Naess should be encouraged to go on and delimit the structural and policy changes. It is easy to give him a start, drawing upon DE and neighbouring environmental positions. For instance, 6a. The policy objective of maximizing state economic growth should be abandoned in favour of a highly selective approach to such growth. Evidently, there are many different ways such a change in policy can be implemented. Some such change may be suggested by, but is not implied by point 7. 6b. Technology selection should be reoriented to appropriate technology, and away from risky and polluting technology. 6c. Population policies should be directed at decreasing human populations in overpopulated regions. Principle 6c complements point 4, which does not actually enjoin any decrease in human population. And so on, through a well-known list of constraints, with several of them regularly included in principle of alternative social paradigms. Point 5 requires similar elaboration. Another surprising feature is how mild most of these elaborations are, like the core platform itself, which is pretty wishy-wasy when contrasted with what is happening out there environmentally. Many environmentalists now wish to proceed much further, and to witness some real curtailment of heavy broad-acre assaults upon environments, such as extensive clearcutting of forests, over-fishing of shelves, and over-grazing of range-lands, extensive strip and beach mining, broad-acre pollution, and so on. �6 Deindustrialization is not explicitly part of the DE program, and the issue is (perhaps wisely) avoided by some leading proponents of DE. But deindustrialization - a considerable reduction in the levels of industrial activity, particularly the undesirable dangerous destructive prolluting types of industry that conspiciuosly contributed to the first industrial revolution - would emerge from the alternative futures deep ecologists prefer to imagine, with a much smaller, less consumption-oriented,terrestial human population. In any case, deindustrialization is an important environmental objective, for both shallower and deeper ecology. It would assist, most materially, in obtaining some better control on major environmental risks and problems, notably such matters as the greenhouse affect, atmospheric ozone destruction, and acid rain and its fall-out. The idea of progress is, like industry, also under a cloud. It is now naive to assume that progress per se is automatically to be applauded, and that a telling criticism of something is that it would block progress. People are these days a little more discriminating (in some respects); there is progress and progress, growth and growth, coke and coke. Much that was progress, and still is in many quarters, is no longer universally regarded as such, as, for instance, elimination of wetlands, pollution growth, assimilation of indigenous peoples. The 'previously ... dominant [assumption], that non-industrial society would and should progress towards the industrial state and the scientific world view' was challenged, and is increasingly rejected (cf. Naess, on the "status of mythology"). So wishy-washy is the core characterisation of deep ecology that it lets in as deep ecologists all sorts of environmental philosophers who would not previously have made that select hand, philosophers whom main disciples of deep ecology previously did or would have excluded, philosophers whose positions are not deep. If DE is to be more exclusive, it will require more careful, tighter formulation. Only clearly ruled out among environmental philosophers, i.e. those who philosophize about environments and environmental problems, are hard-line human chauvinists, led by Australians, Passmore (in his main conservative persona) and McCloskey. Many of these excluded philosophers would, moreover, subscribe to most of the points in the core platform, as weakly interpreted. It is nowadays a rare thinking person who does not consider that there are severe environmental problems, local and global, about which something, fairly farreaching by conservative political standards, should be done. It is a rare philosopher, who becomes inmersed in a spread of these problems, and who does not develop some environmental commitments, even if a liberalish social agenda continues to dominate an environmental one (and it is fast becoming hard to avoid observing the interpretation of social with broadly environmental problems). While environmental philosophy has, by contrast with economics (now ......... of reaction crises), tended to become progressively more accomodating to what was only a short time ago radical environmental drought, as the magnitude of environmental problems is revealed, deep �7 ecology has moved in the opposite direction, has tried be excessively conciliatory, confusing pluralism with broad consensualism, and lost much of its radical flare. A wide environmental pluralism is just fine; but it does not have to be achieved through consensus, or at the cost of a deep or an ecological platform. A pluralism can be achieved by the joining of different positions. Among the diverse and motley groups of philosophers who now gain entry as adherents of deep ecology, too generously construed, are apparently included those examples:- Example 1. Among extensionists, both utilitarians and ratonalists. Among utilitarians are Singer, and perhaps even Smart on some days. Most turns on how point 1 is construed. Utilitarians in the Benthamite tradition assign intrinsic value to all creatures with preferences, sometimes a or the like, and are concerned with the well-being and flourishing of such creatures. Accordingly they satisfy point 1 if it is read, as it may well be, 'much human and much non-human life'. It all depends upon how the terms 'human' and 'non-human' are quantified. If both are quantified with 'all', the theses becomes implausible (admitting e.g. lab-manufactured abominations as intrinsically valuable), and would exclude some acknowledged deep ecologists. If the terms are more weakly quantified, then environmentally aware and active Benthamites are admitted. An evident dividing line, provided by particular quantification, with 'some', is enough to exclude shallow philosophers. But no quantification will serve to exclude either intermediate positions, which do not adopt a deep value theory, or individualism, such as moral extension positions, almost invariably a spouse. Extensionists more patently included are those of rationalistic persuasion, grouped loosely around Regan in the American South, who have gradually move away from a utilitarian prescriptions, to the view that ethical principles, including those of vegetarianism, can be reached by rational means, by clear, consistent and coherent thinking (thus, it is really a coherence theory of morality). Example 2. More far-reaching informediate positions, which do assign intrinic value less stingily throughout nature, to some non-preference-havers, such as trees, and to some non-individuals, such as forests, but which still adopt a greater value assumption, according to which human values always take precedence over non-human assignments. Examples of this sort the postions deliminated (so far in insufficient theoretical details) by Rolston and Attfield. In fact the positions so far elaborated of this type typically, but hardly inevitably, draw on an enlightened Christian backdrop heavily laced with science (a religious American naturalism, so to say, in Rolston's case). They amount to nonsecular moral extensionisms, by contrast with the secular moral extenionisms of example 1 (to try to squeeze these positions into Rodman's nonexhaustive classificaton of positions). Example 3. Deep-green theorists reject the biocentric restriction sometimes built into point 1, though not in this formulation. This formulation certainly admits Sylvan as an adherent of DE, �8 despite what some deep ecologists have said. According to strict biocentrism however, only what has life (in some sense) can have value. Deep-green theorist see this restriction as very like that imposed by ulitarians, to sentience, or unwarranted, unnecessary and arbitrary. Deep-green theorists, like enviromental resisters, ecodefenders and Earth-Facters, now see the DE platform as much too moderate and quite insufficiently radical. The earlier radicalism of DE has been excessively pruned back, on a mix of dubious grounds: the drive for an environmental consensus (in place of a genuine pluralism), the religo-political quest for a large support Base (which could however be environmentalism broadly, with DE in the vanguard), and the input of conservatizing academic thought and aim of intellectual respectability. In fact DE which does not make much ground academically, as compared with its success outside academia, especially with book-reading environmentalists, would better forget academic success, where it has made progress only among outsiders, not power-players and return to its more radical mission (academics form only a small minority, though one dangerously and influentially supportive, one the whole, of most past environmental excesses and assaults). 2. Variability, antiquity or dubiquity of main themes of deep ecology omitted from the core platform. Some themes have been retained by letting them undergo extensive change. Nowhere is this more conspicuous than with the difficult principle of "biospherical egalitarianism in principle", central to earle DE, which has taken on some remarkable new guises. In Naess, it becomes a curiously qualified principle of rights: that every being has a right to live - unless the basic needs of other beings overrides its rights. In Devall, who prefers to avoid the term 'rights' (the use of which he asserts is metaphorical in Naess, not at all what Naess, who appeals to childrens" usage, asserts), the principle is emptied of main egalitarian content: 'Properly understood, the principle of biocentric equality means that humans are members of the biotic community, not its masters' (p.58). So understood, the principle can be accepted by many shallow thinkers; it is not incompatible with chauvinism, nor with conciderable inequality, nor with greater value invariably assigned to humans, only with a certain domination. It is a sell-out. Few of the supporters of deep ecology (DE) appear to realise how old-fashionedly defective and sometimes inappropriate some of the elements, and most of the methodology, of deep ecology really is. 2 The organic and organistic image, for instance - heavily deployed by one of the heroes of deep ecology, Whitehead - is as old as Aristotle (for some of the history see Berlin). Despite much valiant effort, no one has so far got the image (now redeployed in the extravagent Gaia 2 Recently, Sholomowski has re-emphasized some of these features. �9 hypothesis) - valuable as it may be, chauvinistic as it characteristically is -to work in a very fruitful way. Likewise the drive for self-realisation, is both old-fashioned - it was fostered by the Enlightenment and had its heyday in the 19thC, was decidedly human chauvinistic in its emphases. But perhaps the heaviest residue of old-fashioned inappropriate material is to be found in the methodology of deep ecology, which is mainly transferred from positivism with little alteration. The hypothetico-deductive methodology, for example, appears essentially intact in the double pyramidal diagram (now called 'the apron' by Naess), which one is supposed to shuffle around and descend by deduction. Having descended so, the way back to the top is by intuition of hypotheses, by the hypothetical part of the method. First principles at the top admit of no proof or derivation - because of the character of the one inferential relation admitted, deduction. In other respects, the double pyramid strait-jacket, which is Naess's way of trying to infuse a certain pluralism (a pluralism of fundamental positions at first principles) into deep ecology, is insufficiently specific. It does not explain, for example, how at a practical lower level, either an environmental directive or environmental action is forthcoming. Indeed given restriction to deduction, it cannot explain how these things come about. DE lacks any requisite theory of environmental action. 3 The double pyramid gets stylized in the way on the left; an alternative representation is that on the right (and Naess now has a representation awkwardly superimposed on a mandala):Needless to say, there are problems lacking within DE's easy pluralism. Noone has ever explained how to get the unretracted DE platform derivationally out of - what looks incompatible Christianity. For that matter no-one has shown how to deduce the platform from any of the other, sometimes more congenial, great religions or philosophies. The nearest we seem to get is Naess's sketch of how we derive parts of the platform from his own specially concocted ecosophy. 3. Further flowing of the DE gospel: its heroes, its arguments, .... Deep ecology is a seriously flawed gospel, not only as regards its doctrines and their coherence, but in other surrounding evangelic respects as well. Virtually all the patron saints of DE, the past philosophical heroes (all male) are deeply flawed. Spinoza's views on the place and treatment of animals, for instance, should be entirely disowned by any deeper environmentalist. Even the later "reformed" Heidegger is conspicuously human chauvinistic, too complacent in a human-dominated and tamed landscape, and, (apart from some new-fangled technology and 3 Various old-fashioned, and again defective, models are available to DE, and could be tacked onto the theory, e.g. the belief (or information) and desire (or value) account of intention and action conventionally attributed to Hume. �10 industrialisation) with the established rural way of things in Germany, including significantly racist and sexist ways. The pervasive background four-fold, fitting the cosmological scheme of things in, includes only divinities and humans; wilderness and its creatures are not part of the fundamentals. Whitehead, despite the apparent bounteousness of his philosophical scheme, was a practising christian, committed to a great chain of being with humans at the top of the chain (and thus to a greater value assumption antithetical to DE); he took no significant interest in nature or nonhuman creatures at all, and was very comfortable in the ways of a socio-political order which directly produced present environmental impasses. 4 No doubt the heroes should be differently viewed. Not as patrons, not even as forerunners; but as deep thinkers, from whom certain elements can be drawn in elaborating an environmental philosophy (e.g. parts of a theory of nature, features of process theory, elements of a critique of technology), while much else is discarded. Most of this theoretical work remains to be done. Regrettably the calibre of the arguments for proceeding to a DE position has not improved. N aess has now resorted to making his case in a very conventionalistic populist fashion. People are inclined to respond in such and such a way (favourable to environmental concerns) to so and so questions. Thus, for instance 'there is reasonably widespread agreement that animals, and even plants, have rights' (EIJ p.3). But surely it is largely as a result of environmentalism, which must (and should) be based on something else that people have began to respond thus and so. Naess also argues from the the concern of many people about nature and natural phenomena for their own sakes (the data is however not all that clearcut) to several other conclusions, for instance that political and stilist approaches to the environmental crisis (etc) should be less anthropocentric (EIJ p.5). The arguments are thus close in character to those widely used in arguments in economics and democratic theory; they are none the better for that. The fact that people used to respond favourably to damming up every nearby river and draining all the swamps is not a solid recommendation for such practices. Moreover, such populist considerations hardly win out, as Naess himself explains (p.4). Pressure groups pedalling narrow and sometimes destructive economic ambitions often succeed against democratic opinion. 4. But much criticism of DE is even more seriously flawed. Despite the growing constituency for core princles. De, which Naess will correctly have alluded to here, DE has been portrayed as extremism - especially from the US political right (which tends towards extreme right). What is extreme depends, of course, on where a carping critic is 4 He appears to have owed his appointment to a philosophy chair at Harvard in significient part to the fact that he was in no way a radical, but suited to the conservative scene established there. �11 situated. Gung-ho growth economists are extremists from a deeper environmental situation. No doubt such GG economists would claim that they have reason, not emotion, on their side; but it is a narrow flawed reason, tailored and biassed to their cause, reflecting a different class of emotions, primarily preferences of business communities of humans. In present deteriorating environmental circumstances, clever "extremism" is sometimes exactly what is required - ideas and action that upset, disturb, interfere with, subvert, and eventually overturn, the dominant military-industrial social ethos. Extremism presumably amounts to being isolated on the outer margins of some politically or socially sensitive (more useless) normal distribution, without respectable companions. On many environmentally important issues, DE is no longer in such a position (often instead the power elite would be if it were not so entrenched). Where it is in such a position, then generally it needs to be, and needs to try to swing the norm in its direction or else to gather respectability for that position. What, if anything, supports the charge of extremism, levelled against DE? Such emotionallycharged criticisms from the right tend to be particularly vague. Sometimes DE itself, portrayed as radical environmentalism, and compared with radical feminism, is dismissed as extremist, without indicating where it is considered extreme. In fact, while better developed, less accommodating DE is radical, at least literally in going, as one aspect of its depth, to root issues and assumptions, it is not very politically radical; it does not seriously challenge present political arrangements in the way that ecoanovehism, or even ecosocialism, does. What has infuriated some critics is undoubtedly the DE removal of humans from absolute centre stage, and above all the cavalier or callous way in which some environmentalists have portrayed the demise of unfortunate humans, from the God-given position to having to share the world-stage. There are many different issues tangled up here, and the charges of extremism depends on retaining the confusion, as well as ascribing to DE claims it does not make. DE asserts that irreducible value is not confined to humans, that life other than humans has intrinsic value. Although such a claim is indeed incompatible with the dominant social paradigm, it represents an old challenge, going back in utilitarianism at least to Bentham. As some of those who held or now hold such a position were not, by any means extremists or even radicals (e.g. Sidgwick) the charge against this part of the DE platform, lapses. Similar points apply against any charge of extremism based on the DE assertion (carefully avoided in the core platform) that a substantial decrease in human population is desirable, especially for conservation of the biosphere. Such a theme is increasingly widely maintained, by many respectable figures, far from any fringes. Nor need any extreme, threatening or dangerous, action result from such DE themes. Human population reduction can occur (and is envisaged by Naess to occur) by such unthreatening means as a �12 reduction in birth rates, a demographic transition brought about for instance through improved education and contraception. Yet some coupling to "extreme" action, and adoption or preparedness to adopt such, has to be established if a proper charge of extremism is to sustained (cf. also the OED definition of 'extremism'). Deep ecologists propose no extreme action to reduce human population, no wars, no genecide, nothing macho. Indeed the idea is ludicrous. Deep ecologists tend to be gentle people, who are opposed to violence; they care about humans, who are part of nature (even if too many of them are trying to set themselves above and apart from it). There are individuals and groups, more evident in America than elsewhere, who do adopt an uncaring, and sometimes brutal attitude to other humans, especially those outside America. Ecofascists, like Hardin, to the right of environmental thought, who think that the time for triage has already arrived, and that starving humans in third world countries should be left to fend for themselfes, offer a striking example. But eco-fascism is far from deep ecology, and has been severely criticised by those close to DE (e.g. Bennett and Griffin). It is no doubt troublesome for deep ecology, and convenient for opportunistic critics, if environmentalists with eco-fascist prodivities present themselves as deep ecologists (as has happened, a prominent example being the present editor of Earth First). It is no doubt troublesome for a charitable organisation if members of a mafia present themselves as agents of it and collect on its behalf; it has long been a problem for democracy that fascists can present themselves as democrats, and even put an end to democracy through seemingly democratic methods. Political movements admits of much infiltration, by both well- and evil-intentioned. ANNEX 1. Interesting proposals continue to emerge from the deep literature. One is for an environmental organisation, which might could be called Environment International, parallelling Amesty International , and adopting a similar role with regard to the environment that Amesty does with respect to human rights and political processes (Naess p.4). 2. There are many false "virtues " in contemporary political life that green politics, such as DE is coupled with, will eventually help remove. These include:- • Unity, united front. All that has merit is a certain limited unity in diversity. • Balance. Balance is achieved by resolution of many forces. To shift �13 the balance, then, environmentalists should be as far out as they can (while still being counted in the resolution, not written off). For end political purposes, citing especially credibility doesn't matter, by contrast with countability. Advice to offer more balanced statements and work should be courteously ignored: it is oppositional, political advice. • Two party ideal REFERENCES A. Naess, 'Environmental ethics and international justice', Ecospirit Quarterly IV (1) (198.) 1-7; referred to as EIJ. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Draft Papers Description An account of the resource Sylvan's literary executor encountered an archive in which “all his projects were current", since manuscripts were undated and unattributed. Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document page PREFACE Part 1 ill ECOLOGICA L ETHICS & ECOLOGICA L POLITICS: TURNING JOHN MCCLOSKE Y'S CHALLENGE i Conservative, reformative and radical responses to the impacts of ecology on ethics 1 ii A confused and confusing response: supplemented intuitionism 3 iii On the supposedly dim prospects for new environmental ethics especially that deep-green upstart 8 iv Extending ecological ethics, inadequately, to ecological politics 12 V Structuring ecological ethics and politics: towards an improved classification of environmental problems 19 vi Population impact: the fact of human consumption 21 vii On limiting human populations: some neglected considerations 24 viii On animal rights and supposed political implications thereof ix Part 2 Two other critical features of dominant political ways: the shibboleths of extensive private property and high technology 26 31 A CRITIQUE OF (WILD) WEST DEEP ECOLOGY: A RESPONSE TO w ARWICK Fox's RESPONSE TO AN EARLIER CRITIQUE. i Approaching deep ecology and understanding plurallism 39 ii Value in deep ecology 42 iii The extent of values-in-nature 46 iv A biocentric ethic? 49 V Biospheric egalitarianism revisted 51 vi The uneasy position of value theory, or axiology within deep ecology and the condemned environmental axiological route 53 vii The 'case' against environmental axiology: 'the inadequacies or repugnant conclusions that attend the environmental axiological approach viii Fox's 'Deep Ecological Territory': transpersonal identification ix Problems of Self and Self-realisation: the intrusion of value and the issue of evil 57 62 65 11 X Deconstruction and reselection of self 68 xi More troubles with Self as foundation 73 xii Liquidating Fox's 'deep ecological territory 75 xiii Justifying 'extreme interpretations' of and 'extreme reactions' to wild West deep ecology 77 xiv Transpersonal logic and methodology 82 xv More rubbish removal, especially that borrowed from pop science 86 Part 3 ANOTHER 'REFUTATION' OF ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS: JANNA THOMPSON'S CRITICISMS i The newer destructive phase: overtaxing requirements for (environmental) ethics 94 ii Satisfying duly modified requirements, environmentally 98 iii The former constructive phase: a new anthropocentric environmental ethic? 105 PART 1. CRITICAL EXPOSITION Chapter 1. AT THE PYRAMIDS' JUNCTION. THE BASICS AND CREED OF DEEP ECOLOGY Deep ecology in both a movement and an ideological position. Thus in significant respects it resembles a new religion, which has a creed as well as an organisational structure, practices and so on; a political party, which has a platform as well as organisation, objective and so forth; and an intellectual school, which aim to propagate a philosophy, gain converts and adherents, etc. Like a religion in a literate society, there is a set of texts, DE texts as we shall call them, which present elements of the faith: doctrine, themes, parables, heroic figures, warnings, and so on. The DE texts have not so far been arranged into any authoritative form. Although the movement may have come first, and the theory been but gradually extracted (the historical and pseudo-sociological impression given by the DE texts), it makes for neater characterisation and easier exposition to consider the theoretical structure J first. The very looselyknit movement, subsequently considered, essentially the genuine environment movement (excluding those just in it for human ends), is in any case clustered around this structure - as older cities are around their centre. The theoretical structure is itself conveniently organised in the following (double) pyramidal diagram (now called by Naess, who devised it, "the Apron"):- Diagram 1. Basic Double Pyramid LEVELS UPPER (INVERTED) PYRAMID C B p 1. Sources, or ultimate bases 2.Core Principles DE PLATFORM R E E D REGULAR PRACTICE PARTICULAR PRACTICES POLICIES LIFESTYLES 3. General themes & norms 4. Particular norms and concrete decisions LOWER (COMPLEX) PYRAMID The theoretical centre of DE is to be found at level 2, where the upper and lower pyramid join. The various sources of the central part, such doctrines as those of Buddhism (B) and Christianity (C) and of philosophic cast (P) at level 1, are not usually a part of DE at all. But there is a preferred philosophical source, ecosophy - another theory elaborated by N aess, who again coined the term which does enjoy a closer connection with DE, and is sometimes considered almost part of it. Levels 3 and 4, which are supposed to derive from the central creed, and in turn inductively inform it, are parts of DE, but less central parts, parts of the varying practice. It is level 2 then that is crucial for understanding DE. While the upper pyramid givgs the theoretical or intellectual content and sources of DE, the lower pyramid supplies working DE, and core principles and the practice. 1. The Central level, level 2, and the standard DE platforms Deep Ecology is structured around level 2, the central operational level. The main distinctive principles of DE are set on level 2, the platform level. These principles may be grouped as shown in the following diagram:CREED LEVEL2 BASIC CREED wider platform 8 point platform further and more peripheral principles The reason for distinguishing the 8-point platform from the wider platform is simple this:- The 8point platform, as variously presented in DE texts, omits some of the standard articles of the core DE position, and fails to develop others. 1 There is accordingly a real point in distinguishing "the" platform from the more comprehensive and better rounded core or creed. DE is a decidedly vague object, with vague parts. Perhaps the most definite things about it are its 8-point platform and its diametric opposition to features of the mainstream Western ideology, and dominant social paradigm as it otherwise known. The core position is something discerned from the DE texts, in much the way the platform is. But whereas the 8 point platform is explicitly presented, though in different and incompatible terms, the core has to be winnowed and from an array of more peripheral material (as is shown in part II). Box 1 The 8-point platform, in capsule form. 2 I. Both non-human and human life have intrinsic value: The well-being and flourishing of human and non-human life on earth have intrinsic value, inherent value, etc. These value are independent of the usefulness of the non-human world for human purposes. 2. Richness and diversity intrinsic virtues: Richness and diversity of lifeforms contribute to a realisation themselves these values and are also values in of 3. Humans unjustified in reducing such natural virtues: Humans have no right to reduce this richness and diversity except to satisfy vital needs. 4. Human interference with natural world excessive: Present human interference with the and the situation is rapidly worsening. non-human world is excessive 5. Policies and basic structures must be changed: Policies must therefore be changed. These policies will affect our basic economic, technological and ideological structures. 6. Human (values compatible with) population decrease: The flourishing of human life and culture is compatible with a substantial population. Flourishing of nonhuman life requires such a decrease. decrease of the human 7. Quality of life should supplant economic standard of living: The change in our attitudes will bring an appreciation of the quality of life rather than adhering to an increasingly higher standard of living. There will be a profound awareness of the difference between big and great. We will have a great society with no bigness. 8. Obligation to attempt implementation: Those who subscribe to the foregoing points have an obligation directly or indirectly to try to implement necessary changes. 2 The 8-point platform is perhaps the most repeated exhibit in the DE texts. The present formulation adopts the presentation of Naess in Resorg ; the brief formulation on the left does not occur in Naess. A slightly different formulation of the platform under heading 'Basic Principles' is given in DS p.70. The principles have been rendered, and grJuped, to make their structure and interconnections a little clearer. Principles / and 2 concern intrinsic values; principles 3-7 concern human practices and policies. Principle 5 elaborates in principle 3; principle 6 draws the policy consequence of this. The most important of the general policy changes is listed in principle 4; but another crucial policy change is indicated in principle 7: decreased production and consumption. The prime terrestrial policy objectives (that should have obtained separate listing) can in fact be derived from the impact formula: roughly, human environmental impact = human population x personal consumption x available technology. Reducing excessive interference thus requires at least some of, and no doubt all of, human population reduction, consumption reduction, and appropriate technology improvements. Finally, principle 8 supplies a commitment principle. Observe that some of the principles of this 8-point platform, 8-point principles as we may conveniently call them, provide linkages with other levels of the DE pyramid. For example most of the principles, principles 3-7 especially, have implication for policy at level 3, and thence for day-to-day practice at level 4. 8-point principle 8 has direct application to level 4, individual lifestyles. Before the incomplete 8-point platform was devised (as part of a political conciliation and unification attempt), DE was rather differently characterised: primarily through listing of principles countering assumptions of the conventional socioeconomic wisdom, resistance principles. Indeed, in many respects DE is marked out through reaction and resistance: by its opposition the prevailing ideology of industrial society, especially by those elements of it that have lead to the assault on the natural environment, but also by elements that have led to breakdown of connected features of the social fabric. It gives a clearer picture of what DE is about if we tabulate are principles in opposition to those of the dominant Western ideology (or social paradigm), and as compared with those of shallow or reform environmentalism: TABLE 2 DE PRINCIPLES AS CONTRASTED, ON THE ONE SIDE, WITH THOSE OF THE DOMINANT PARADIGM AND SHALLOW ECOLOGY, ON OTHER, WITH ONE OF ITS SOURCES, TAOISM. DOMINANT SHALLOW (WESTERN) ECOLOGY DEEP ECOLOGY TAOISM (DE) PARADIGM (DE) Domination over nature Stewardship of Nature Nature an exploitable resource: intrinsic value confined to As for, but with nature a manager resource Natural environment valued for itself Human supremacy Human ascendency Biocentric egalitarianism Harmony with Nature Elaboration of DE Much as for DE; ''humanism'' rejected Differs from DE; wide impartiality Ample resources substitutes Some resource limitations Earth supplies limited Supplies Material economic growth a predominant goal Sustainable development Non-material goods especially self-realization Following Tao-te Consumerism Optimised consumerism Doing with enough/ recycling Doing with enough (recycling inappropriate) Competitive lifestyle As for DP Cooperative lifeway Much as for DE: voluntary simplicity Centralised/urbancentred/national focus As for DP Decentralized/ bioregional/ neighborhood focus As for DE Largely as for DP Non-hierarchical/ Grassroots democracy Hierarchy without structure More careful high technology Appropriate technology Limited technology Power structure hierarchical High technology ample Power 7 Shallow ecology, or reform environmentalism as it can to be called3 , differs from the dominant paradigm primarily in its emphasis on stewardship, on long-term management, on sustainable development. DE, while it reacts against the dominant paradigm primarily on environmental grounds, stands opposed to shallow ecology, which it correctly sees as not going nearly far enough, in particular to satisfy genuine environmental values. Of course the dominant paradigm resisted is not itself a uniform or static position; some of the in determining of DE flows from this very feature. For example, until very recently DP used to support dominance as a throughgoing feature: not just over Nature, but of the male, white, Western, Protestant, rich, powerful, free, adult, etc., over their opposites. Domination of the latter sorts, within the human species, is, for the most part, no longer a part of the progressive ideology, having been gradually shed over the last century; but such domination still remains part of much practice (as well as of cultural ideologies). Some of the most distinctive, and most controversial, principles of DE, are omitted from the 8-point platform, as is evident from the opposition/resistance principles. These include the principles regularly, and pontifically, claimed to distinguish deep ecology. Moreover without these further principles, DE amount to nothing more than a slightly less shallow environmental position (indeed apart from principle 1 and perhaps 2, all the principles of the 8-point platform can be adopted by reform environmentalism and in fact often are enough espoused therefor). These additional principles, part of the wider platform (and the creed) include these:9. Biospheric egalitarianism [in principle]: 'all things in the biosphere have an equal right to live and blossom'. The principle is presented in this unqualified form (in DS) as one of the two ultimate norms, the other being self-realisation. Fir fact Devall and Sessions proceed to tack on a self-realisation component to this principle, of biocentric equality as they call it: namely 'and to reach their own individual forms of unfolding and self-realisation with the larger Selfrealisation' (DS p.67). But, they immediately add, the 'basic intuition is that all organisms and entities in the ecosphere, as parts of the interrelated whole, are equal in intrinsic worth' (p.67, continuing, italics added). This italicised value-formulation is straightforward, and has the advantage of moving rights out of the formulation (No doubt, if equal intrinsic value guarantees an equal right to live and blossom, it yields the "equal rights to" formulation.) But it encounters immediate difficulties, because in the process of continuing to live and blossom some organisms interfere with others, for instance through basic demands for food and shelter, most conspicuously in predation. To try to escape these difficulties, Naess at least regularly adds the rider: in principle . 'Naess suggests that biocentric equality as an intuition is true in principle, 3 For example in D & S. The alternative, shallow ecology, was set aside because of the negative conditions of the word 'shallow'. 8 although in the process of living, all species use each other as food, shelter, etc.' (DS p.67). 10. Self-realisation . This involves the realisation - growth, development and maturity - of the self, becoming a whole and full person, but not merely in isolation or in a social setting as in older models of self-realisation, but within a biospheric setting, taking due account of other forms of life. It 'can be summarised symbolically as the realisation of "self-in-Self' where "Self' stands for organic wholeness' (DS p.67). Intimately linked with self-realisation in this wider ecological sense is the next principle. 11 Biospheric identification . The procedure, again a personal one, consists in suitably identifying with parts or wholes of the larger surrounding biosphere. The underlying notion here is one of partial identity, sharing certain salient features with, which permits a qualified substitutivity of an imaginative person into the position of another creature, ecoobject or ecosystem. Such "identification" is a significant method of heightening 12. Ecological consciousness . Less grandiosely this covers environmental awareness, appreciation, and concern, and thus responsiveness to environmental depredation. Engendering ecological consciousness is regarded as a crucial part of spreading the deep ecological message. 13. Holism. On DE precepts, this amounts to more than the modem holism according to which there are nonadditive wholes, wholes or objects which amount to more than the sums of their parts. But as to what else holism demands, there is some disagreement within deep ecological circles. 2. Further principles of the DE creed and important optional extras Beyond the standard platform there are further principles, not enunciated at all, or until very recently, or else more peripheral. Some of the further themes help in deciding what clarity DE had; that is one reason why they presumably do not feature in the 8-point platform. Among the principles not enunciated are these:• Non violence. The new themes, several of them periphical to the main concerns of DE include the following:• Deep ecology offers a green synthesis. It 'combines the "Social Greens" with the "Natural Greens" avoiding the extremes of both' (Naess R p.6). This is a surprising theme for a position that has itself been regularly castigated as extreme. What N aess means, above all, is that DE does not neglect humans, and their legalerate social concerns and aspirations, in the way that the 9 Natural-greens have been (generally erroneously) accused of doing; nor does it neglect or devalue nature and its features in the way that many social-greens are inclined to do. Among the important optional extras that may be coupled with DE are principles of a more through-going animal liberation, such as:• a severe reduction oforend to the enclavement, confinement and slaughter of animals. • vegetarianism (of some form). Some deep ecologists are vegetarians (e.g. Bennett), some are not (e.g. Drengson), and some are in between (e.g. Naess). Unless they undergo a conversion, Northerness brought up in the hunting-fishing-shooting tradition eschew these optimal principles. But evidently there is a tension here; there is pressure coming from other principles, especially nonviolence, to limit sharply slaughter of other creatures. 3. The creed, the basic creed, and the movement. Like many a religious creed, the DE creed is an elaborate concoction (as well as a dubious and rather arbitrary one). Adoption of it, knowledge of it even, cannot be expected of all adherents, especially given its features: its vagueness, its inaccessibility, and so on. It is not surprising that, again like many another creed or ideology, many of the faithful do not know too well what it comprises, still less do many of the fellow-travellers (and DE has many). The most that can perhaps be expected of adherents is adoption of some simpler creed, a basic creed more or less in the vicinity of the 8-point platform. But it is apparent from DE texts that not even all of that platform is demanded: enough will do, especially if other DE principles are adopted. The platform represents 'what most supporters have in common at a deep level' 4 No doubt supporters who eschew part of the platform compensate by adherence instead of other DE principles or practice. Hence the depiction of the basic creed in diagram 2. A basic creed comprises enough of the 8-point platform plus enough other principles at least to compensate for omissions. But not even a basic creed is always demanded. At its most generous and laxest, the DE movement includes everyone who professes a concern for some part of the natural environment and does not demolish a manifestation of concern or interest by blatantly anti-environmental activity or involvement therewith. Inclusion in the movement does not even require strict adoption of, or adherence to the DE platform, though it involves some vague recognition of parts of it. Talk of membership of the movement would be somewhat inapposite; there is no paid-up or recorded membership (or even rewarding as would be done in a voting system). 4 Naess R p.3, italics added. 10 It is sometimes said that the DE movement was born in Europe and adopted elsewhere, US and Australia especially. But such a claim confuses the movement with quasi-sociological extraction of the principles involved and the platform assembling them. The movement itself emerged as a late 1960's affair, substantially under way before it was reported upon and labelled (as usual, academics, like politicians, reacted to, rather than led, more popular movements). Such a movement involves some "mass" of people; it must therefore be anticipated by some smaller groups and likely some initiating individuals. So it was with the DE movement. There were prominent individuals in several countries where environmental groups with deep leanings formed or operated, in the 60s and before; and before that there were many isolated individuals. In USA, where the DE movement no doubt grew to substance first, before that in Europe or Australia, there is a significant chain of deep ecologists, or rather deep ecological thinkers, reaching back to the beginning of the century and perhaps into the previous century; for instance, in reverse temporal order, Carson, Leopold, Muir, perhaps Thoreau. 5 Muir is regularly alluded to as an early deep ecologist by Americans. 6 There are deeper-seated motives for vagueness about the basic creed and uncertainty about the basic requirements to be deep ecologist and who makes the hororific status. One is a dislike of criticism, and resulting vacillation among the high bishops of DE as to what extent critics, and those who declare themselves not to be deep ecologists, should be included in the fold, and consequently as to who exactly is a deep ecologist. (From outside the issue can look rather trivial, but gangs are gangs whether ecological or more generally not..) A main reason for the omission of central doctrines of DE from the 8-point platform is of course related: the desire to increase the flock, to turn away no-one who might be decently admitted. 7 Another motive, linked also with trying to enlist support, in order to mobilize democratic forces and like people power, concerns the pluralistic drive that is an important aspect of authentric DE. It concerns the insertion of pluralistic elements within level 2 itself (rather than confining these elements to other levels, where there are conspicuous, as later exposition will show). As Naess explains the idea 5 6 7 In Australia there were, in reverse order, Dunply, Griffin, Stead; there were of course many others with very considerable environmental concerns (e.g. Ratcliffe), who apparently lacked however the requisite feature of depth, and world count only as reform environmentalistser conservationists. But, quite evidently, there are serious problems in discerning whether some environmentalist or other is deep (there is generally only indirect evidence, as the category was not clearly recognised). The issue as to whether some deep environmentalist is a (prota)-deep ecologist is even more vexed because of the muddiness of DE. It is important to observe that little reliance can be placed, in such issues, on standard and applauded histories, such as Nash's Wilderness and the America Mind, because these are written from a shallow perspective and fail to realise the significance of depth; See further Devall's report on Nash's third edition, Ecorotes, pp23-9. See, for instance, Devall Ecorates. Devall also suggests that St. Francis is a deep ecologist, but given what is now known about St. Francis there is room for considerable doubt. Or othersie admitted. But may be excluded by ignored or incompetance, or deterred by qualms about significent propositions (human populations restraint esp.). 11 is avoid the 'devastating' 'tendency to dogmatism': 'there is not one, definite, deep ecology philosophy, not one definite one kind of green society'. Likewise there is no definite or definitive basic creed. For many purposes this does not matter; we can still normally assert such and such, so and so, definitely deep ecological, such and such, so and so, is definitely not. In an attempt to evade criticism, DE is nowadays sometimes represented as a grass-roots movement, one but loosely associated with philosophical views 8 But such movements have intellectually-shaped objectives, offer at least a set of slogans and elementary principles. And DE is this and more; it verges on the dishonest to try to portray DE as such a movement, when in large measure it is the work of intellectuals, initiated by reporting, rather inaccurately it seems, on the supposed attitudes of field ecologists and like workers - hardly typical grass-roots people. 8 In a different respect, in term of moral of ideas and change of themes, DE is no doubt a movement. It has moved (and with Fox shedding critical principles, it continues moving). Such movement is not good for the types of virtues that stable positions may acquire, such a replenity, reliability, assessibility etc; but it does make life difficult for critics. PART II CRITIQUE OF DEEP ECOLOGY Chapter 5. THE INITIAL PROBLEM: WHAT ON EARTH IS DEEP ECOLOGY? WHO IS AND ISN'T A DEEP ECOLOGIST? Deep ecology appears , on a preliminary reading, to be some elaboration of the position that natural things other than humans have value in themselves, value sometimes exceeding that of or had by humans. So much appears to follow from the first part of the 8-point platform. But even this much is denied by some of the never philosophers (e.g. Fox). Moreover which elaboration is quite another matter, and decidedly controversial. Indeed DE has not just been rapidly converted (in part through overuse) into a conceptual bog, but is well on the way to becoming all things to all interested parties. This is undoubtedly a drawback; it makes communication, and theoretical and persuasive use of the notion, that much more difficult though it does not condemn an afflicted notion, such as deep ecology undoubtedly is, out of hand. For several important and fruitful notions, which have survived, have encountered very much of this sort of problem - force, mind, energy, differential, infinitesimal, to take some older examples, paradigm and culture to take relevant recent examples.O On the other hand, many notions no more afflicted than deep ecology, such as societism, timocracy and ungrund, have been assigned to the historical scrap-heap. These include the sort of neo-Hegelian panpsychism which deep ecology of the American texts will tum out to resemble. What is evidence of conceptual murkiness and degeneration? The trouble begins with the very introduction of the terminology. Naess, - when first setting down in one preliminary codification what was already in the air,* wrote only of the 'Deep Ecology movement' and set down what he has subsequently described as a 'Deep Ecology platform'. The suggested notion of deep ecology, the underlying notion that informed the loosely-knit and open-ended movement and platform, was not extracted; that subtraction task fell primarily to West Coast American intellectuals, and it was done differently by different proponents of deep ecology. The trouble was accentuated through rapid evolution of the notion. Thus Naess's account of the movement in 0 * In case it is supposed this sort of conceptual muddiness is limited to less exact science, consider such recent notions as anthropic principle, from physics, and nonmonotonic logic, from computer science. See Naess 73, p.98ff. While slogans and preliminary formulations are fine, particularly in campaigns, philosophy cannot rest at the level of slogans or platforms, as too much of DE continues to do. 2 1983 is significantly different from the account he outlined in 1973; seven principles are replaced by six different themes, only two or so of which have much in common with the original principles. t Although DE is introduced in the 8-point platform as a value theory, basically concerned with environmental values 1 , it has been presented as a metaphysics, as a consciousness movement (and as primarily psychological), and even as a sort of (pantheistic) religion. Popular Australian sources will begin to indicate some of the spread. The Deep Ecologist , a network newsletter, sees deep ecology as metaphysical at base, as part of a natural philosophy of humans' place in nature (though many of its correspondents see it as a matter of deep experiences , often of a religious cast, too often decidedly anthropocentric, obtained in or through Nature). According to its manifesto, carried in each issue on its title page, Deep ecology is the search for a sustaining metaphysics of the environment; it represents "a deep understanding of our unity with other beings and livings processes" (Drengson); it is biocentric, not anthropocentric. Though we shall come to modify or reject this manifesto phrase by phrase (deep ecology is not a search, but on one level a position or theory, on another a movement; sustaining should concern the environment, not the metaphysics; depth lies elsewhere than understanding; unity too is a metaphor for integration; biocentric is misleadingly restrictive), the present enterprise, illustrating the degenerative spread of deep ecology, is different. Let us hasten on to the strikingly different explanation John Seed prefers in introducing and advertising his anthology Deep Ecology 2 , a person - and consciousness-oriented souffle (drawn from Devall): "What I call deep ecology ... is premised on a gestalt of person-in-nature [an image Naess had rejected at the very outset of the enterprise 3]. The person is not above or outside of nature. The person is part of creation on-going. The person cares for and about nature, shows reverence towards and respect for nonhuman nature, loves, and lives with nonhuman nature, is a person in the "earth household" and "lets beings be", lets nonhuman nature follow separate evolutionary destinies. Deep ecology, unlike reform environmentalism, is not just a pragmatic, short-term social movement with a goal like stopping nuclear power or cleaning up the waterways. Deep ecology first attempts to question and present alternatives to conventional ways of thinking in the modern West. Deep ecology understands that some of the "solutions" of reform environmentalism are counter-productive. Deep ecology seeks transformation of values and social organisation. t 2 3 The claim is documented in the Appendix to this chapter. Thus according to Naess (73, p.99), ' ... the significant tenets of the Deep Ecology movement are clearly and forcefully normative . They express a value priority system ... '. But even this core claim is now challenged, by Fox, who sees the primary focus of deep ecology as ontological and not evaluative. This is one of three different collections with this title which have been circulated or announced recently: see references. See Naess 73, p.95; but Naess's rejection is rejected below. • 3 Deep ecology is liberating ecological consciousness ... Consciousness is knowing. From the perspective of deep ecology, ecological resistance will naturally flow from and with a developing ecological consciousness (Devall, 'The Deep Ecology Movement'). Again, while informative, much of this will have to be rejected or rectified (for example, the gesalt theme is problematic, and the deep person need do part only of what is specified; shallow or reform ecology need not be short-term, insofar as it may take account of many future generations of humans; it may well not be pragmatic; shallow ecology is better pluralistically combined with deep ecology, as in Naess's original platform, than denigrated; etc.) It is to Bill Devall, more than anyone, that we are indebted for a confusing myriad of formulations of the driving notion, several of them however extending Naess; for instance, deep ecology is first of all deep questioning, deep ecology is ultimately self-realisation and biocentrism, in deep ecology the most important ideas are 'the wholeness and integrity of person/planet together with biological egalitarianism'; it is also however much else - that again we shall come to modify or reject including a new psychology and new philosophical anthropology. 4 But Devall has been much encouraged by George Sessions, and it is Sessions especially who has tried to convert deep ecology into a new religion, with main texts drawn from pantheism, Spinoza and Buddhism. Thus according to Sessions, If the promise of American pantheism and nature mysticism is to be fulfilled, it will occur in the deep ecology social paradigm which is based upon pantheism and the idea of ecological egalitarianism in principle (Ecophilosophy ill). But although Sessions refers immediately to Naess, there is nothing in Naess about American pantheism and nature mysticism. At most Naess would allow that pantheism, along with other comprehensive positions, like Christianity or ecosophy, can be an underlying base for the deep ecology platform. Small wonder that John Passmore (hardly one to be philosophically baffled given his immense experience in comprehending Continental philosophy) goes astray in yet another account, in which he conveniently pushes the shallow-deep contrast into the unsatisfactory conservation/preservation boxes (of his 74): Deep ecophilosophers ... are mainly interested in the preservation of species and wilderness even when preserving them is not immediately and advantageous to human interest. In order to provide intellectual support for such preservation they are prepared to break with traditional Western ethical principles and metaphysical beliefs (Passmore 83). 4 Devall 79, 83; for a synopsis, see Appendix 1, figure 7B. 4 Again, most of this will have to be rectified, since the presentation is decidedly misleading, not to say biassed. As initial explanations of the deep ecological movement straightaway show, and applications reveal, deep ecology has always concerned, and deep ecophilosophers have always been interested in, much else as well, especially in human population levels and human interference, and in quality of life and technological and organisational structures. While this of course requires breaking with some Western traditions - which are in no way sacrosanct Wes tern tradition is far from uniform, and there are other tradition: deep ecology can remain, and is, rooted in tradition, though much about it is as new and fresh as anything of this sort can be. As a broad label for something rather environmentally different, and no doubt better, than most vague ideologies that preceded it, 'deep ecology' is no doubt rather fine. That is broad vague way is how the label often functions, honorific ally. That is, for instance how it functions in the collection under that label edited by Tobias, which gives deep ecology none but a nebulous content, and which indeed contains many articles (such as the interview with Soleri) in diametrical opposition to the more detailed platform promulgated by the intellectual "leaders" of the deep ecology movements. In fact, a good deal of the more popular appeal of deep ecology has been obtained by vacillation between the more discerning authentic forms and the slack or nebulous forms. The nebulous use of the label has also given cover to some of those who calls themselves 'deep ecologists', enabling them to shed awkward but crucial themes from the more detailed platform (thus e.g. Fox, as explained below). Many are those who are now pleased to march under the rather fashionable nebulous banner. 5 Many are not deep, in theory or practice, deeply committed, or deeply changed by the march. Attending a consciousness - raising weekend, purchasing or growing organic vegetables, having spiritual experiences in a special natural place, or practising some oriental art or exercise routine, does not ensure a deepened environmental position, though it can be a step on the way. While nebulous deep ecology is compatible with much that is neither deep nor even significantly ecologically oriented, such as minor lifestyle adjustments within the industrial paradigm, authentic deep ecology, which is not so slack, remains a defective doctrine, itself oscillating between an overpermissive environmental assembly point, fast growing its radical potential, on the one side, and an impermissive, unduly narrow doctrine, dubious or defective in 5 I too am happy to march under the nebulous banner, though since my first critique I am no longer particularly welcome. Initially I was cut by about half those individuals and institutions loosely associated with deep ecology, since my critique began circulating. While I am become accustomed to this sort of phenomenon in intellectual areas (criticism induces cool and long at least, even in logic), I didn't expect so much of this given the Christian character of DE.; and such isolation does seriously reduce information sources. 5 several of its leading themes, on the other side. Some of the worst of these themes, such as biological egalitarianism, have already been subject to much criticism, deserved criticism as will soon appear. But other features of authentic deep ecology have hitherto been left largely untouched, and new features have emerged. So an ongoing critique is needed. Recently 6 , it has been become more difficult, if anything, to grasp what DE is all about. New themes are introduced, older ones withdrawn or whittled away. Even Naess, the finder of the movement, who now tends to adhere much more closely to the (nonetheless adjustible) platform than other self-proclaimed deep ecologists, is inclined to make apparently large concessions to opposition charges, which however he subsequently more surreptitiously withdraws (of course this is familiar philosophical practice). At other times, he withdraws with one hand what he is offering, some sort of olive branch, with the other. The oscillation can be partly ascribed to conflicting motivation. On the one side, there is the desire, stronger in the finder-founder, Naess, than in his American and Australian prophets, to create a wide constituency, to tum no one away if doing so can in any way be avoided. But, on the other, there is an evident desire, among the prophers, to make deep ecology a very select position, a place for a chosen few, a place to be achieved only after a journey crossing some arduous terrain and involving some difficult life adjustments i.e. after an appropriate testing pilgrimage. Deep ecology, however, lacks the other-worldly and after-life resources which, in some of its religious sources, appear to make for an easy resolution of this type of conflict. There is a considerable lack of discrimination among the pace-setters of the movement over, and marked differences between them as to, who and what is accounted within deep ecology, and some unwarranted discrimination from this exclusive club (e.g. of Rodman). Many of the people classed as within or associated with deep ecology are shallow. And some who are excluded are not. For example, Naess (in 75) presents a long list of people he associates with the movement, many of whom are rather or even entirely shallow in their environmental orientation. Elsewhere (in 83) Naess proceeds to identify with deep ecology several other positions or movements which only overlap it, and which may be substantially shallow (such as green politics and new natural philosophies). Some of the predominantly American lists Devall and Sessions assemble are not so artless. To some extent, this combined discrimination and lack of discrimination again reflects the conceptual murkiness of deep ecology; to some extent it is symptomatic of other oldconsciousness malignancies, both within the notion and as regards its use. 6 Since the first critique was produced 6 Still more damaging to the movement is that several of the advertised prophets of deep ecology verge on the shallow, and some of these have denied DE.7 A striking example is Bookchin who has recently denounced DE, and written ranging declamations much of Bookchin's main, windy, bringin-it-together book, The Ecology of Freedom, said to be a "book of deep ecology" is very far from that; it is yet another, is a celebration of humans in very much the old (enlightenment) style. Insofar as it gets to grips with deeper environmental issues, Bookchin's material amounts to an extension of shallow ecology. 8 Ecologically Bookchin, like other of the prophets, buys into vitalism by way of extended consciousness. Ecological ethics is said to render nature self-conscious; the mechanistic alternative is presented as deadness, thus making an entirely false contrast. Indeed, part of the problem with the selection of prophets, is that mechanism is seen as the main bogy - when it is only one of the forms metaphysically underpinning shallower positions, Cartesian dualism being another - with the result that work that simply attacks mechanism and its variants and also advocates some sort of environmental way, gets accounted deep. N aess has cast the net of deep ecology too wide, catching therewith not only many remote "supporters", but a number of hostile critics as well, such as latterly the antagonistic Bockchin (RS p.6). Naess now considers the 8-point platform, formulated by himself and Sessions and published in several slightly different forms, as tentatively setting down the 'basic principles of Deep Ecology' - though it leaves out what Devall and Sessions assert are the two essential features of DE, biospheric egalitorionism and self-realisation, and though it does not require depth (immediate positions conforming to the platform). Even so Naess 'look[s] upon the formulations as tentatively expressing the most general and basic views which almost all supporters of the movement have in common ' (letter 23.6.88). Thus the 8-point platform provides, in a still vague and tentative sort of way, the distinguishing platform, of DE. To get around a small obstacle, let us call those who would adhere to an approved minimum of the principles of the distinguished platform (in some approved formulation) adherents of DE. They are adherents in (simply and literally) holding to that much of the platform. They may not be members of the movement in any ordinary sense, in any but the set-theoretical sense, because appropriate intentionality is lacking, for instance they may never have heard of the movement, let alone made any effort to join. Nor need adherents be supporters in the usual sense; support is neither necessary nor sufficient for adherence. A critic such as Bockchin, or Routley, can be an 7 8 See, e.g., B. Devall and G. Sessions, 'The books of deep ecology', Earth First! 4(8) (1984). Several of these books do not penetrate very deep ecologically or otherwise. See especially p.344, with remarks like 'and wherever possible the wildlife they may support on their fringes'. The paragraph portrays a very human-centered (and conquered-land) picture. See also p.342, middle. 7 adherent without being a supporter, without being supportive. Conversely, a supporter may not be an adherent. The Salvation Army has many supporters, including atheists, who are not adherents. The DE movement has many supporters, some of whom call themselves 'deep ecologists', who do not adhere to the platform, even "more or less". Many of these supporters are shallow environmentalists, who do not accept the key first point, of intrinsic value outside humans, or else try to evade it (e.g. by redefinition, or by wrapping up value inextricably in relations to valuers). Since there are, in my experience, many supporters and indeed enthusiasts who tum out to be of this shallow sort, Naess's view is a little puzzling: what does he mean here 'almost all supporters'? Also which isolated exceptions does he have in view? With the rise of environmentism, most of the distinguishing platform is no longer demanding; indeed it is deliberately lax with a view to increasing the following. Moreover, none of it, except for the last point, specifying an obligation to attempted implementation, requires any commitment in the past of adherents. Plainly adherence to DE, as well as support for DE, could be very considerably increased were this requirement evaded. A neat strategy, common to ecomonical practice and sociological research, readily presents itself. Let us speak of silent adherents as those who adhere to the platform, more or less, except that they make no requisite effort to implement it (they may of course have some vague feeling of obligation, should they ever reflect on the matter). Even without the benefit of scholarly survey work, it is evident that DE would now have a large number of silent adherents, many of whom are not however adherents, being either oblimovish, situated in repressive regions or social situations, or simply uninformed (like indigenous peoples who think here are excessively many excessively interferring humans of Caucasian stock). The core platform represents a surprisingly incomplete and rather ill-organised collocation of principles. The incompleteness is most conspicuous in point 6, which advances no details as to envisaged structural changes. In extenuation N aess pleads that he has 'not has courage to go into detail and define what these different structures will be, because we are going to have a lot of different Green varieties. We shouldn't have one set of structures imposed' 9 • The reasoning does not hold up. A range of structures, rather than a unique structure, can easily be defined by constraints well-known ones as it happens. Naess should certainly be encouraged to go on and delimit the structural and policy changes. It is easy to give him a start, drawing upon DE and neighbouring environmental positions. For instance, 6a. The policy objective of maximizing state economic growth should be abandoned in favour of 9 RS p.7. But elsewhere. Naess did go into some detail (e.g. Book). Furthermore, if Naess - old, famous, unorthodox, courageous enough on difficult mountains - doesn't get down to requisite details of structural change, who will? Well, even some rather shallow theorists do. 8 a highly selective approach to such growth. Evidently, there are many different ways such a change in policy can be implemented. Some such change may be suggested by, but is not implied by, point 7. 6b. Technology selection should be reoriented to appropriate technology, and away from risky and polluting technology. 6c. Population policies should be directed at decreasing human populations in overpopulated regions. Principle 6c complements point 4, which does not actually enjoin any decrease in human population. And so on, through a well-known list of constraints, with several of them regularly included in principles of alternative social paradigms. Point 5 requires similar elaboration. Another surprising feature is how mild most of these elaborations are, like the lax distinguishing platform itself, which is pretty wishy-washy when contrasted with what is happening out there environmentally. Many environmentalists now wish to proceed much further, and to witness some real curtailment of heavy broad-acre assaults upon environments, such as extensive clear-cutting of forests, over-fishing of shelves, and over-grazing of rangelands, extensive strip and beach mining, broad-acre pollution, and so on. Even deindustrialization is not explicitly part of the DE creed, though some of the text enjoin it (e.g. DS); but the issue is (no doubt wisely) avoided by leading prophets of DE familiar with the demands of socialism. Yet deindustrialization - a considerable reduction in the levels of industrial activity, particularly the undesirable dangerous destructive polluting types of industry that conspicuously contributed to the first industrial revolution - would emerge from all the alternative futures deep ecologists prefer to imagine, along with a much smaller, less consumption-oriented, terrestrial human population. In any case, deindustrialization is an important environmental objective, for both shallower and deeper ecology. It would assist, most materially, in obtaining some better control on major environmental risks and problems, notably such matters as greenhouse effects, atmospheric ozone destruction, and acid rain and its fall-out. The idea of progress is, like that of more industrialisation, also under a cloud. It is now naive to assume that progress per se is automatically to be applauded, and that a telling criticism of something is that it would block progress. People are these days a little more discriminating (in some respects); there is progress and progress, growth and growth, coke and coke. Much that was progress, and still is in many quarters, is no longer universally regarded as such, as, for instance, elimination of wetlands, pollution growth, assimilation of indigenous peoples. The 'previously ... dominant [assumption], that non-industrial society would and should progress towards the industrial state and the scientific world view' was challenged, and is increasingly rejected (cf. Naess, on the "status of mythology"). 9 So wishy-washy is the core characterisation of deep ecology that it lets in as deep ecologists all sorts of environmental philosophers who would not previously have made that select band, philosophers whom main disciples of deep ecology previously did or would have excluded, philosophers whose positions are not deep. If DE is to be more exclusive, it will require more careful, tighter formulation. Only clearly ruled out among environmental philosophers, i.e. those who philosophize about environments and environmental problems, are hard-line human chauvinists, led in the textbook stakes by Australians, Passmore (in his main conservative persona) and McCloskey, but recently joined by some Americans Many of these excluded philosophers would, moreover, subscribe to most of the points in the core platform, as weakly interpreted. It is nowadays a rare thinking person who does not consider that there are severe environmental problems, local and global, about which something, fairly far-reaching by conservative political standards, should be done. It is a rare philosopher, who becomes immersed in some spread of these problems (though it is still a rather rare professional philosopher that does), and who does not develop some environmental commitments - even if a liberalish social agenda still continues to dominate an environmental one (even so it is fast becoming hard to avoid observing the interprenetration of social with broadly environmental problems). While environmental philosophy has, by contrast with economics 10 , tended to become progressively more accommodating to what was only a short time ago radical environmental throught, as the magnitude of environmental problems is revealed, deep ecology has moved in the opposite direction, has tried be excessively conciliatory, confusing pluralism with broad consensualism, and has lost much of its radical flare. A wide environmental pluralism is just fine; but it does not have to be achieved through consensus, or at the cost of a deep or an ecological platform. A pluralism can be achieved by the linking of different positions, not their mergence. Among the diverse and motley groups of philosophers who now gain entry as adherents of deep ecology, too generously construed, are apparently included those examples:Example 1. Moral extensionists, both utilitarians and rationalists 11 . Among utilitarians are Singer, and perhaps even Smart on some days. Most turns on how point 1 is construed. Utilitarians in the Benthamite tradition assign intrinsic value to all creatures with preferences, sentience or the like, and are concerned with the well-being and flourishing of such creatures. Accordingly they satisfy point 1 if it is read, as it may well be, 'much human and much nonhuman life'. It all depends upon how the terms 'human' and 'non-human' are quantified. If both are quantified with 'all', the theses becomes implausible (admitting e.g. lab-manufactured 10 11 Now benchmark of reaction rareness, but itself beginning to exhibit some restlessness and unpass and signs of change. The useful category of moral extensionism derives from Rodman. It is critically examined also in EE. 10 abominations as intrinsically valuable), and would exclude some acknowledged deep ecologists. If the terms are more weakly quantified, then environmentally aware and active Benthamites are admitted. An evident dividing line, provided by particular quantification, with 'some', is enough to exclude shallow philosophers. But no quantification will serve to exclude either intermediate positions which do not adopt a deep value theory, or individualism, such as moral extension positions, almost invariably a spouse. Extensionists more patently included are those of rationalistic persuasion, grouped loosely around Regan in the American South, who have gradually move away from utilitarian prescriptions, to the view that ethical principles, including those of vegetarianism, can be reached by rational means, by clear, consistent and coherent thinking (thus, the broad position is really a coherence theory of morality). Example 2. More far-reaching intermediate positions, which do assign intrinsic value less stingily throughout nature, to some non-preference-havers, such as trees, and to some nonindividuals, such as forests, but which still adopt a greater value assumption, according to which human values always take precedence over non-human assignments. Positions of this sort are delineated (so far in insufficient theoretical detail) by Rolston and Attfield. In fact the positions so far elaborated of this type typically, but hardly inevitably, draw on an enlightened Christian backdrop heavily laced with science (a religious American naturalism, so to say, in Ralston's case). They amount to nonsecular moral extensionisms, by contrast with the secular moral extensionisms of example 1 (to try to squeeze these positions into Rodman's nonexhaustive classification of positions). Example 3. Deep-green theorists reject the biocentric restriction sometimes built into point 1, though not in big formulation given above. This formulation certainly admits Sylvan as an adherent of DE, despite what some deep ecologists have said. According to strict biocentrism however, only what has life (in some sense) can have value. Deep-green theorist see this restriction as very like that imposed by utilitarians, to sentience as unwarranted, unnecessary, unenforceable and arbitrary. Deep-green theorists, like environmental resisters, ecodefenders and Earth-Firsters, now see the DE platform as much too moderate and quite insufficiently radical. The earlier radicalism of DE has been excessively pruned back, on a mix of dubious grounds: the drive for an environmental consensus (in place of a genuine pluralism), the religio-political quest for a large support base (which could however be environmentalism broadly, with DE in the vanguard), and the input of conservatizing academic thought and the aim of intellectual respectability. In fact DE which has not gained much ground or good grades academically, as compared with its success outside academia, especially with book-reading environmentalists, would better forget academic success, where it has made progress only among outsiders, not power-players, and return to its 11 more radical mission. Academics, after all, form only a tiny minority, though one dangerously and influentially supportive, on the whole, of most past environmental excesses and assaults. We have proceeded to cut through the problem of what DE is or may be by formulating a specific version, authentic deep ecology, and by taking explicit account of main alternatives proposed. Authentic deep ecology follows, for the most part, Naess's account of deep ecology. But insistence on authentic deep ecology leaves several casualties, nebulous deep ecologists who prove not to be authentically deep. An important test is offorded through the greater value assumption, and the associated special place reserved for humans in the scheme of things, assent to which serves to expose the inadequate depth of more nebulous 'followers of deep ecology'. For (after proper preparation) they make the wrong responses on the crucial tests of depth. A conspicuous casualty who fails to negotiate 'these tricky slopes' is Drengson, behind whose genuine ecological sensibility lies a human supremacist position with humans occupying 'a unique position ... in the scheme of things', at the summit of that old-consciousness hierarchy, "the great chain of being" .12 According to Drengson, circumstances Might force us, sometimes, to choose between the life of a fish or a cow and that of a human child. We do not hesitate to choose the child. Our priorities are a result of our position in the scheme of things, with a spectrum of species (p.7). Not even followers of medium-depth ecology need respond in this reflex fashion, for instance where the child is seriously defective. Certainly, faced with a range of duly-elaborated imagined circumstances of difficult or forced choice, deeper thinkers would hesitate - since such situations tend to pose moral dilemmas. And sometimes at least their priorities would be different from Drengson's; for example, the fish is rare and the child ordinary, the cow occupies a unique place in an important ecosystem.13 Even Naess himself, who vacillates considerably in what he has to say and occasionally lapses badly from the authentic way. 14 It is worth examining some of Naess's logics, not for nonphilosophical reasons (or even to reveal N aess as a further flaws doyen, typical of the heroes 12 13 14 See The Trumpeter 1(4) (1984), 6-7. Drengson is not the only casualty; Berry, whose criticism Drengson is trying to meet, is another. Differently, the child is Hitler or the President who chooses to press the nuclear button. Such cases, which in some settings permit of a traditional treatment, were considered from a deeper perspective in Routley 2 79. A most striking example is Naess's Rescequence article, 'The basis of deep ecology', which departs considerably from the spirit and themes of DE. Even Naess, who is not significantly hang-up in doctrinal purity and doctrinal divergence, felt obliged to circulate a note correcting, "reformulating", what he had said and written (the article was originally a Sub ...... lecture). 'Some ... may find some of its sentences not quite in forming with what I usually tend to say. Therefore I offer some reformulations ... I still stick to my views recently expressed in various articles and books' (Nute, italics added). 12 of DE), but because these show committing about DE, they are indicative of its doctrical instability, lack of clarity, and scope for improvement. • Any society worthy of the name Green is a deep ecological one. 15 Given that there are a range of ........... societies that are green but not deep green, such a claim must fail. Even if 'deep green' were substituted for 'green' it could not be contained, because DE policies exclude some deep green alternatives. Accordingly, it is false that explication of DE is 'articulation of the fundamental positions that are presupposed in Green societies' (p.4); DE societies are but part of that rich and variety plurality. What does Naess say by way of rectification? Frankly, not nearly enough. He proceeds to assert that in his opinion, a 'society that does not operate in harmony with [the 8-point platform of DE ... is not] worthy of being called Green! But a genuinely Green society may well reject or violate several of the points emanciated, e.g. the wide intrinsic value assumption (of point 1), the obligation to action (of point 8). • 'We should never engage in any discussion on technicalities without asking, "What do we basically need in life?" Always ask the basic question. This is what I mean by the term Deep Ecology Movement' (p.5). Naess does nothing whatever to complenish for presentation of the basic technical question in this (biospherically) chauvinistic way. Do we need a DE which tells us that the bottom line is "What's in it for us?"! Doesn't part of deep environmentalism consist in seeing through and explaining what is wrong with this pernicious bottom line. As regard the 'This is what I mean by ... ' blunder, Naess tries to exonerate himself by use of the well-worn criterion/definition distinction.1 6 But on its own it hardly helps; such bottom line inquiry is not a criterion for DE either. Nor is following inquiry through to ultimate ends a distinctive feature of DE; the shallowest sorts of hedonism, for example, may adopt similar procedures. In fact N aess lands himself in further trouble in trying to extricate himself. To try to make the criterion offer look tempting (a comprehensive test for depth), he claims that 'when supporters of the shallow ecology movement are seriously asked about ultimate ends they tend to affirm the same ones as supporters of the deep movement'. Not only would this be a most unlikely outcome of a satisfactory questionaire; but worse, if it were the outcome, it would render shallow ecology supporters deep; so the criterion would eliminate a fundamental contrast for, and for making out, DE. In any event, too many humans, especially powerholders, remain outside the orbit of 15 16 This follows from what Naess asserts given on that a society that adapts 'policies characteristic of Deep Ecology' is a deep ecological one. There is at least a touch of arrogance (or is it part Naess's disdain for conceptual nicety?) in Naess's introduction of this shabby exoneration attempt: The damaging sentences, - those quoted - 'might be reformulated (in honor of my conceptually interested friends) in the follow way:'. Maybe Naess was serious in his (otherwise ab sure) opening remarks in the R ......... article about looking forward to hobnobbing with the aristocracy. 13 shallow ecology, often attached to the pernicious bottom line (it is doubtful that 'most people dwell in shallow ecology', p.5 heading). • Articulation of DE principles gives a total view. (An amazing contrast with the ....... . juxtaposed doctrine of ignorance which suggest we can never obtain a total view.) By contrast with 'shallow ecology which (avoids) the basic questions ... the Deep Ecology Movement concerns itself with basic beliefs and assumptions about the universe. If you articulate the principles of the Deep Ecology Movement you get a total view . The term "total view" is essential. The Deep Ecology Movement is a total view. It covers our basic assumptions, our life philosophy and our decisions in everyday life' (Res ,p.6.italics added). In first place, the alleged contrast with shallow ecology do not stand up to much examination. A dedicated shallow Christian or capitalist may practice the same depth of questioning and reflection or a deep ecologist, or rather more; such a person may have a well-integrated lifestyle, with a fairly comprehensive philosophy (as these thing go) covering it. Secondly, N aess takes what seems to be asserted back in commentary. 'If we articulate the principles of the deep ecology movement, -- you do not get a total view' (p.3); but that apparently directly contradicts the above italicized passage. There is an escape from contradiction offered - distinguish the principles, by filling in the dashes by "in the sense of principles of the DE platform" - but it leads a severe problem - what are the principles of DE? What is DE? Naess's commentary implies that the principles of DE required for a total view are those of all levels of the double pyramid. Such an idea lands the articulation of DE in hopeless difficulties. Firstly, we do not, and cannot, know what the principles are, because they now include principles applied and decisions taken at the bottom level which refers to particular situations, including 'particular direct actions at a particular date'; but these will vary, in ......... ways, over-future times. Secondly, since there are various different, and compating, principles at the top level, DE will either be damagingly inconsistently characterised, or else it will be far from uniquely characterised. For DE will include Christianity of this and that sect, Buddinism of this and that form, and so on. In fact Naess accepts such an outcome (but in his misdirect attempt to avoid dogmatism): 'There is not one, definite, deep ecology philosophy, not one definite "ecosophy", no definite set of green policies' (p.3) and, he should have added on this line of thinking no definite deep ecology or set of DE principles. But there is a set of central principles, those at level 2. They do not present a total view. But nor in general do those of all four levels of deep ecology. There is much, a mass of opinion (for instance, concerning scientific speculation) which would form part of a more comprehensive (world) view that is not reflected at any of the four levels. It is indeed entirely unclear what would present a total view? Spiniza's philosophy perhaps? But it is easy to ...... of topics it does not cover, such as city architecture and factory farming, on which a total view could have an angle. It is certainly doubtful that lesser mentals than Spinaza, such as typical supporters of DE, 14 operate in a total view. N aess claims that they do, but adduces no evidence; testing is much more likely to reveal how pragmentory the ecological view of most deep ecologists are. Not only is the noton of a "total view", drawn from Naess's earlier philosophizing muddy; the desirability of the notion is open to (damaging) questioning. "Total view" comprehends too much, fixes too much that perhaps should be left open; it sails too close to "totaliterian view" for real pluralistic comfort. There is, then, quite evidently, a serious problem with deep ecology, and in finding out exactly what it is, that even the clearer accounts offered differ in significant subjects face similar difficulties, philosophy for one. With movements, which is what deep ecology is often presented as, the situation is normally much worse. Consider the difficulties in saying, with much precision, what some political movement (such as green politics) represents, what some party stands for and against. And despite the accelerating diversity of accounts there appears to be substance to the deep ecology notion. Several important interconnected distinctions, which look to be worth disentangling, are marked out, and an important group of ideas is assembled. Rather than being simply junked (something my conservative inclinations rise against with notions, as with the premature discarding of material "goods"), the notions involved should at least be disentangled and, if feasible, renovated or recycled. More generally, it is not merely valuabe, but quite essential in senous intellectul assignments, to indicate what deep ecology is and isn't - for lots of purposes, including explaining it, arguing from it, and applying it. What can be done? One resolution can be obtained along the lines of critical rationalism. The fuller formulations of deep ecology, after reorganisation into more tractable form, are subject to severe criticism, with a view to obtaining thereby an improved, more satisfactory, thinner and fitter formulation, which at the same time meets other desirable criteria. Among these is a desideratum often lost sight of in the ferment of environmental action, the need for environmental pluralism. A start on this rather analytic approach involves separating out the different components of the deep ecology messages, and isolating core themes of deep and shallow ecology from wider positions and paradigms which they inform. The core is (as Naess indicated) essentially normative. Fortunately the core themes have already been isolated, in a previous application of deep ecology to population theory 17 , and this work can be taken over largely intact. For the extensive remainder, the following pretty complicated sort of picture starts to emerge (upon organising themes and claims of several supporters of deep ecology, in a way explained in the Appendix to this chapter):- 17 In Routley 84. Figure 5.1. SHALLOWER AND DEEPER POSITIONS, AND THEIR ACCLAIMED ASSUMPTIONS, PARTLY SCHEMATIZED. SHALLOW VALUE CORE ENVIRONMENT AL SUBJECT SOLE (INTRINSIC) K,' ALUE ASSUMPTION VALUES-IN-NATURE GREATER VALUE ASSUMPTION BIOSPECIES IMPARTIALITY FURTHER PHILOSOPHICAL BASES GROUNDOF VALUE DEEP (separable theoretical underpinning) FEATURES OF HUMANS DIVERSITY, RICHNESS OF NATURAL(LIFE)FORMS ii. METAPHYSICAL INDIVIDUAL REDUCTION. NATURE AS BACKDROP IRREDUCIBLE SYSTEMS. NATUREAS IN1EGRAL m EPISTEMIC REDUCTIONIST/ANALYTIC SUBJECT-OBJECT ACCOUNT HOLISTIC/GESTALT /FIELD ACCOUNT LARGER ENCOMPASSING AND INFORMING THEORY EMPIRICISM,IDEALISM, ECOSOPHY, PANTHEISM, POSITIVISM AMERICAN NATURALISM +- DIFFERENT FACETS ➔ OF CHRISTIANITY, BUDDHISM, ... VALUE (DEONTIC AND ACTION) COLLARIES EXTENSIVE INTERFERENCE FOR HUMAN INTERESTS AND PURPOSES 1. ACTION (META-) PRINCIPLE APPLICATIONS (AS COROLLARIES) LIMITED INTERFERENCE AND RIGHTS THEREfO ETHICS ASETHETICS METAPHYSICS EPISTEMOLOGY IDEOLOGY/ RELIGION LIFESTYLE +-OBLIGATION TO IMPLEMENT COMMITMENTS➔ To population, (individual) consumption, (individual) impact, resources, technology, pollution, economic growth and quality-of-life, culture, organisation, science, education; and to the variety of natural (and some artifical) forms, such as land, oceans, atmosphere, arctic regions, swamps, forests, soils, ... POLICY ECONOMICS POLITICS Given the picture some major and serious sets of problems with deep ecology begin to appear at once. First, the value core arrived at already substantially transforms that suggested by the literature, with, for instance, biospecies impartiality improving on biospheric egalitarianism. Secondly, both the bases and the encompassing theories usually indicated (those diagrammed) are not just highly problematic but are detachable from the core and can be avoided. For example, the various, rather different, epistemic and metaphysical theories that have been proposed as 16 supporting, or even essential to, deeper positions are, to say the least, very dubious. So it is fortunate that the deeper value core is independent of them all - though that is not to say that it is independent of every account, since some (plausible) story of value qualities in the natural world, and our perception and knowledge of them, has to be told, sooner or later. But one weaker parts of the larger deep ecological story as usually told concerns the embedding of deep ecology in a broader philosophical theory, such as Naess's system ecosophy T, or Buddhism, or nature mysticism, or whatever. This much is true: as it is with shallow positions, which can be supported by most of the mainstream, more comprehensive, philosophical theories (for what they are worth), so it is with deeper positions, which can be supported by very different, though unorthodox, philosophical theories, for instance, by (a modification of) Whitehead's process theory or by (an adaption of) Meinong's object theory. But, for reasons we shall come to, such theoretical frameworks as ecosophy, pantheism, Christianity and Buddhism do not include thorough-going deep positions, but sustain only shallower positions, and a properly deep picture is not derivable from them. This suggests that the proposed derivation of deep ecology from ecosophy is substantially astray (and that so, more sweepingly, is the whole derivational pyramid regularly presented by Naess in his four-level picture). So it will prove to be: the success of these derivations would depend upon importing analogues of shallowness into deep ecology. APPENDIX 1. Survey methods as a way of pinning down deep ecology. How does the sort of picture shown in figure 5.1 - which is worth persevering with, elaborating and applying - fit in with the burgeoning deep ecological literature? It is surely not just tangential to that, so that we should look elsewhere to grasp the deeper features of deep ecology? In fact the core themes, and philosophical basis, and extension themes, were assembled in a quite impressionistic fashion, namely working through much of the literature, and all the more basic work, and setting down the themes which on reflection seemed to be presented or emerge. Something like this is still a main method of research in the humanities, e.g. in history, history of ideas, and philosophy. Figure 7a Schematic picture of elementary procedures Source 1 T H Source 2 Source n i INTERSECTION (COMMON CORE) E M E s UNION t DISCOUNTED But here, with deep ecology, there were prospects of doing better than such impressionistic methods, or so one might have thought. Empirical, or at least quasi-empirical, methods (of the sort favoured by Naess in his earlier days) could be employed. The main idea is that the set of relevant sources is assembled, and then some statistical and set-theoretic work is done on the themes extracted from these sources; so the method is an elaboration of the sort of technique larger dictionaries such as the Oxford adopt in pinning down the standard senses of a term. The hope was that analysis of the serious philosophical literature (pretty rough selection criteria these, to be sure) on deep ecology would lead, not to despair, but in particular in two directions:Firstly, to what is more or less common to the positions presented - the intersection of theories, giving the substantial core or basic theory. And secondly, to what results when all the theories are put together - the union of themes, giving an approximation, after some sifting, to a deep ecological paradigm. As you might have anticipated by now, this thematic method hardly worked to perfection. Still it is worth explaining the method in a little more detail since, despite its limited success, it 18 reveals much. First a set of sources is assembled. Here there is scope for sampling and statistical methods, so beloved of social scientists; but in the case of deep ecology it seemed feasible, back in 1984, to gather for winnowing all more serious texts accessible in Australia. That latter limitation (all too familiar in environmental research) imposes a perhaps unfortunate parochial geographical constraint; but it induces no violation of such adequacy requirements as that sources introducing the notion be included in the bundle, as are all sources referred back to in several other sources. With the rise of networking magazines concerned with deep ecology, there are many references to deep ecological thinking and experience which get discounted, as not appropriately serious. Increasingly often, any sort of deeper experience or thought gets assigned under the "deep" heading, no matter how anthropocentric. This is one of the many problems with the depth notion and deep terminology, rather counteracting the valuable idea of penetrating below the conventional surface of received environmental assumptions, that it is important to think deeper than the assumption of Environment Z-land, for instance, that the environment should be managed for present and future generations of humans - a typical governmental surface assumption, often announced, but much less often put into practice. Once the sources are assembled, a beginning can be made on unscrambling themes, something that calls for a good deal of judgement also, especially in such matters as deciding whether themes from different sources come to the same or not. Here and elsewhere care is required not to penetrate too deeply, to expose only so much of surface themes as is necessary (a well-known principle in logical analysis). When the themes are duly marked out, there is some smoothing of the thematic data; for instance, evidently remote and irrelevant themes in one source may be deleted. (It is like the judging of a diving contest or the massaging of statistics, where isolated wild elements are removed from the sample used for assessment.) Then the elementary set operations of union and intersection are applied, again subject to some qualification. In particular, if a very prominent theme in some formulations is omitted from, or only approximated in, one formulation, then that theme will be put, initially at least, in the intersection. (Logicians and mathematicians, for example, sometimes omit intended or assumed axioms; e.g. Parry in analytic implication, Maclean in category theory.) A striking example concerns the very introduction of the notion of deep ecology into the philosophical literature (Naess 73), which fails to present the fundamental value thesis, that intrinsic value is not confined solely to humans or human features. While it can be argued that rejection of the sole and greater value assumptions is implied by what is said concerning biospheric egalitarianism (the equal right to live and blossom), the argument is not decisive, since value is only involved indirectly and perhaps only instrumentally (as Naess's appeal to effects on the 'life quality of humans' and to our ecological dependence might suggest). 19 The results are tabulated, as follows: Figure 7b. Actual results, in not form, of a survey of some main sources. Naess 73 Naess 83 Naess-Sessions 84 Intrinsic value Intrinsic value of life (1) (1) Biological egalitarianism (2) Diversity/richness(3) Complexity not complication (6) Diversity/ richness (2) Diversity/ richness ( 1) Total field holism (1) No negative interference rights, excepting vital needs (3) No negative interference, etc. (3) Devall 79 ROUGH CLASSIFICATIONS VALUE CORE Diversity (10 GROUNDSAND BASES New person/planet metaphysics (1) Objective approach to nature 2 Earth wisdom, VALUEAND limited interference ACTION COROLLARIES More leisure (13) Action obligation 6 Present interference excessive (4) Policy adjustments to economic and ideological structures (5) Anti-pollution/ resource depletion (5) Local autonomy/ decentralisation (7) Anti-class posture 4 Action obligation 8 Present human interference excessive (5) Policy adjustments, etc. [Also to technological structures (6) Objective life quality rather than higher living standard (7) World population reduction (4) POLICY AND LIFESTYLE APPLICATIONS Interim policy steady state (15),(18) Soft Technology ( 11) Life quality rather than quantity of products (6) Reduction of population to optimum (7) Emphasis on pollution and like topics counterproductive (8) Local autonomy/ decentralisation (11),(14) New psychology (3) DISCOUNTED AREAS: with rejection of NEW SUBJECTS dualisms: man/nature, subject/object, etc New philosophical anthropology (9) New objective 20 Embedding in ecosophy NOTES: science (4) New education (12) ? Embedding in updated Spinoza (2) EMBEDDJNG PHrr,OSOPHY/RELIGION 1. Bracketed numerals indicate theses numbers in the sources. 2. The disappointing absence of core themes can to some extent be compensated for by appeal to statements of them or implying them elsewhere in accompanying texts and commentaries. 3. Naess-Sessions 84, also Naess 84, became the 8-point platform, now widely reintensted. Naturally one does not attempt this sort of analysis entirely in the dark, but in the partial expectation that certain kinds of results will emerge, these three especially: • The substantial core represents a significant deviation from mainstream assumptions, a deviation which has been encountered before. • The total theory, or union, is not simply a jumble of theses, but has some reasonable coherence. • There are ways of getting from the substantial core toward the total theory. In the case of deep ecology it would have been pleasant to report triumphantly that these expectations, and more, are fulfilled; indeed the theory is so well integrated it represents a (sub)cultural paradigm. Unfortunately it did not work out that way, as is evident. What is more, the situation has become markedly worse, as presentations of deep ecology have burgeoned since 1984. Partly the thematic enterprise did not succeed because of the poor calibre of the leading presentations of "the" deep ecology intuition, and because exponents had and have different intuitions, messages and objectives. Partly, however it did not work because the idea of obtaining a substantial core and a coherent union was misconceived. Taking the union, in particular, assumed that there was much wider common ground - something that could be called the deeper ecological paradigm which could be approached in this sort of way - rather than as a plurality of positions. Pluralism is fine and feasible, and worth encouraging much more widely; but taking the union of themes of some pluralistic system of positions is likely to lead only to intractable inconsistent sets, and perhaps to trouble. Consider, to illustrate, the United Religion, about to sweep California, a pluralist grouping made up of representations of the World's great religions. While the refined common core of these positions is likely to be interesting, the union is not: it will contain, for example, all of the following inconsistent triad: Many gods exist (from e.g. Hinduism); Exactly one god exists (e.g. Islam); no gods exist (from e.g. Buddhism). There is analogous trouble in combining deep ecological sources with such results as that stones and mountains both do and do not have inherent value; there both are and are not detachable intrinsic values; and so on. The picture is then as shown:- 21 putative substantial core inconsistent elements of putative union What all this emphicizes once again is that deep ecology has to be treated differently, not as a coherent position but as a loose pluralistic grouping of position. To obtain a clearer authentic starting position, we shall have to discount since of what paradox as deep ecology. It is for this sort of reason of course that we chose to follow Naess before other prophets. Once an authentic position has been made out other prositions can be clustered around it. Such a pluralistic outcome does not show that the notion of a deeper ecological paradigm is illusory. It only reveals some of the pluralistic features, mostly not duly recognised at the deeper ends of ecological movements. And it only indicates that a different route should be taken in getting to a deeper paradigm. For the alternative environmental, and deep ecological, paradigm covers a spread of positions, much as the contrasting dominant social paradigm does. A CRITIQUE OF (WILD) WESTERN DEEP ECOLOGY: a response to Warwick Fox's Response to an earlier Critique. Western deep ecology differs in important respects from the deep ecology originated and pursued by Naess, what I now call authentic deep ecology, at which my Critique of Deep Ecology was mainly, but by no means entirely, directed. Western deep ecology, also known as transpersonal ecology (though the ecology has largely dropped out), is very roughly a doctrine of the west of those new world continents where environmental philosophy functions; it has been advanced primarily by West Coast Americans (Devall, Drengson, Sessions and others) and associated West Australians (Fox, now of Tasmania, also Hallem and others). Unlike authentic deep ecology, Western deep ecology is hostile to environmental ethics, which it tends to dismiss as mere axiology; and it is excessively enthusiastic about trans personal experience, spiritual "paths" and "ways", and unitarian metaphysics - in which there are no ontological divides, no dualisms (of subject/object, subjective/objective), and no separation of things. Consider what Drengson 'take[s] to be at the heart of deep ecology as Devall and Sessions present it', and which he enthusiastically endorses: What deep ecology directs us towards ... is neither an environmental axiology or a theory of environmental ethics nor a minor reform of existing practices. It directs us to develop our own sense of self until it becomes Self, that is, until we realise through deepening ecological sensibilities that each of us forms a union with the natural world, and that protection of the natural world is the protection of ourselves .... reality lies not in the imaginative, subjective dualism of the dominant outlook, with its self-destructive exploitation of nature and overkill nuclear weapons. Reality is to be found in a quite different way: by a path that is nonaggressive, humble, compassionate, and knows itself as ultimately embedded in the Self of nature. The sacred is immanent in the profane, the spirit pervades and is the world, the cosmos. It is the formed and formless as a unity. This ecosophy is at hand for each of us [ecosophical salvation]. Its realisation is always personal, firsthand experiential understanding. It is an I-Thou, not an I-it relationship (Review pp.87-8). Fox's Response to my Critique develops similar themes, in considerably more detail, so they become rather more open to assessment. That is why my further critique will concentrate on his Responses. (On its own, I doubt that his Response would have sufficient intrinsic interest to warrant an extensive reply.) In Western deep ecology, the focus is upon, or even (as in Fox 89) contracts to, that of self and Self (or what it might almost as well be, soul and Soul/Anima sive Natura, or spirit and World Spirit). For example, Drengson pontificates upon • 38 the crux of the issues raised by deep ecology [as follows]. We are challenged to move to genuinely ecological modes of perception, conception, and practice. If we do this, we will do it to the degree that we realise that our self is part of a larger Self for which we must care. This is part of the ecology of self-Self in the cosmology of deep ecology' (p.89). Fox goes further, making this type of stuff coextensive with "deep ecology": Stated rather formally ... the deep ecological framework ... proceed[s] from two basic hypotheses and one ultimate norm [all concerning self and Self]. The hypotheses are (i) that "the self is as comprehensive as the totality of our identifications. Or, more succinctly: Our Self is that with which we identify" ... ; and (ii) that the self can and does grow/develop/mature (i.e. widen its sphere and intensity of identification over time). The norm is that the ideal state of being is one that sustains the widest (and deepest) possible identification and, hence, sense of Self.... this ideal state of being is referred to as "Selfrealisation" by N aess and as "ecological consciousness" by Devall and Sessions" and its cultivation - effective a spiritual discipline - is considered to be the "real work" of deep ecology (pp. 86-7). This self-Self cultivation of Western deep ecology, which will be severely criticised, is far removed from the deep ecology platform upon which authentic deep ecology is centred, a mundane, secular platform concerned with real environmental issues, which is not a predominantly human psychological exercise and which does not mention 'self' or 'Self'. On the strength of the variant presentation of "deep ecology", of this elaboration of Western deep ecology, Fox feels entitled to assert that 'Sylvan has seriously misunderstood what deep ecology is about. ... Sylvan's criticisms miss their mark ... Sylvan's critique leaves deep ecology ... largely untouched' (p.5). Drengson feels entitled to enlarge this unfounded assertion: 'the critiques of deep ecology that have appeared so far have been based on misconceptions of what deep ecology is all about, and they have therefore been off the mark, or at best superficial' (p.89). The critiques that are substantial, not substantially tirades or shallow, have been substantially directed at authentic deep ecology, not at its different Western analogue. There has been no misconception or misunderstanding by such critics; they have aimed at a different target in the same broad field. On a personal level, I am quite attracted by authentic deep ecology; but I am substantially repelled by Western deep ecology. I subscribe, more or less, to the 8-point platform of deep ecology, and accordingly should be accounted a supporter of deep ecology (for all that critics are not very welcome). Though I do not care for some features of Naess's system Ecosophy T, which does provide a rickety bridge ·to Western deep ecology, N aess has always insisted that this was but one of several optional background ideological frameworks. Western deep ecology is another matter. Too much of it strikes me as like an evangelic cult, much too incidentally coupled to deep environmentalism; too much is a 39 celebration of self, human self, an expanded egoism; too much is essentially a good oldfashioned celebration of things human, a comparatively shallow celebration disguised in new environmental and avant-gard attire. Drengson has the ability to lay on these obnoxious, chauvinistic features disagreeably thick. Consider a bit of his poetic outpouring on that jumbled text, Deep Ecology: Sessions and Devall see humans as beings who are an expression of a nature deeper, more mysterious, and creative than any of our abstract theories appreciate .... it is hoped that [our] experiential encounter with the otherness of Nature transformed as Self will help us to live in such a harmonious way as to continually discover ever new wonders and value inherent in wild nature and in the natural human self. ... The book, thus is dedicated to ... presenting a philosophy of life that resolves some of our most fundamental questions, the central one of this is: how can we live truly in authentic, harmonious relationships with all beings so as to realise a maximum of intrinsic goodness? This is a question, ultimately, of what it means to become a complete, mature, fully Selfrealised human being (pp.94-5 rearranged). The statement could almost have come straight out of modem romanticism; all the same elements are there down to the maximization of human self-realisation. So presented, the new environmental paradigm of Western deep ecology is the old anti-Enlightenment movement in contemporary gear. Though I am substantially turned off by some of Western deep ecology, though I am disappointed by its apparent shallowness, by its reversion to human chauvinism, though I try to take cover when its heavy evangelism blows through, I am far from suggesting that more than critical intellectual action be taken against it. It is, after all, generally for the right sorts of things environmentally, even if it has invested too heavily in dominant notions, such as the exalted human self that a radical environmentalism should be escaping; and it is no worse intellectually than predominant creeds that are far less kind to natural environments, such as Vatican christianity and American pragmatism. Live and let live. 1. Approaching deep ecology and understanding plurallism. Well is Fox's response to Sylvan's critique of deep ecology entitled 'Approaching Deep Ecology'; for it does no more than approach deep ecology, it does not reach the authentic article. Instead Fox converts deep ecology into a related concoction, largely of his own (now called transpersonal ecology*). Having thus commandeered deep ecology for * Transpersonal ecology is an extreme variant of Western deep ecology, which tries, for instance, to jettison what Drengson and others retain: intrinsic goodness, intrinsic value, and the like. 40 his own purposes, it is easy for Fox to feel confident in his charge that 'Sylvan has seriously understood what deep ecology is about' (p.5). Fox's main accusation is indeed that I have seriously misunderstood what deep ecology is about, that my criticism is misdirected, and that deep ecology emerges largely unscathed. We shall see about that. But first, I want to lodge a counter-charge: Fox appears to have misunderstood a good deal of what I was about. My critique was not concerned with his position, except - in so far as it purported to be deep ecology - in passing; it was addressed to the mainstream of deep ecology. Fox's own transpersonal ecology does not belong to the mainstream of deep ecology; indeed it is doubtful that it is deep ecology at all. It tries to throw away central parts of deep ecology, the value theory in particular, and to revert to what appears, to all intents and purposes, to be a rather shallow position. But, most remarkable, it has very little to do with the natural environment; much of it is but expanded self adulation. Both Fox and N aess, in their responses to my critique, try to make some easy initial capital by pointing to the different ending of a working draft of the critique from the pluralist ending of the published version. 1 Naess uses the different endings to ground his allegation that Sylvan is uncertain what he is about, an ad hominem strategy which he presumably hopes will help to defuse substantial criticisms of deep ecology which he does not address (see his 84 and 85). Fox makes much of the different endings (almost 5 pages worth) in order to reveal an uncharitable interpretation: that already indicated, of misunderstanding, and that my 'critique leaves deep ecology .... largely untouched' (p.5). Naess and Fox seem to think that it counts against a critique that it may enjoy more than one ending, that it can leave room for doubt as to whether something should be restored or abandoned. Yet these are very much the sort of outcome a more tolerant and careful assessment may yield. Consider an old building seriously defective in main structural detail, yet with many worthwhile period features. It may be a hard question, over which there is room for uncertainty, whether it should be restored or demolished. So it is often with intellectual systems, such as deep ecology and ecosophy. By and large I am in favour of rehabilitation (see e.g. Routley 74), though from a favoured nonpluralistic 1 Though I feel a bit used, I'm not going to make anything of incomplete working drafts I naively handed out not being a fair target for commentary (it is obvious that one can be even more stupid and so forth in drafts than in more considered final versions). Much of the interesting work in and around deep ecology appears only in working draft form or in what academic snobs describe as semi-published form. 41 stance such systems as ecosophy include material destined for the intellectual scrap heap. But, in any event, I am in favour of recycling of rubbish wherever this is feasible. For anyone who adheres to a select position within an also conceded pluralistic setting, there is always more than one presentation, and more than one ending: a monistic, or singular, ending deriving from the select position, and a pluralistic ending from the setting. There is nothing particularly remarkable about this, for all that it baffles Fox. On the singular ending (of the limited edition "penultimate version" of my critique) many major themes of deep ecology go down, not because they are ' insubstantial or vacuous' (what Fox finds it convenient to infer p.2ff.), but because they are all defective, all substantially astray. So much had already been argued in the main body of the work; for instance, one sustained development aimed to demonstrate the substantial falsity of the principle of biospheric egalitarianism and its inconsistency with other principles of deep ecology. What of the last words, drawn from Eliot's Four Quartets, 'there is no one to bury'? By this, I meant: no correct doctrine, not: nothing substantial. It is true that from the singular position I did look upon several main 'ideas of deep ecology ... not even as if they were once useful ... but rather that upon closer scrutiny there is ... nothing ... [correct in] them in the first place' (p.3); from that stance I still look upon them in that way. On the final pluralistic ending what remains 2 are not the trumpeted major themes, which still go down, but a good many of the less heralded points and themes, such as departure principles in the 8-point platform of deep ecology. What can be added, furthermore, are significant variations upon some of the major themes; for instance ecospheric impartiality in place of biospheric egalitarianism. Now both Naess and Fox assume that a pluralistic ending diminishes, or ought to weaken, the force of the criticism. Not so. Naess ends his response to the critique with a relativistic complaint: 'if you have your own philosophy from which you generate the [core] position of deep ecology, ... why object to ecosophy T?' (Naess pp.3-4 reordered, also quoted in Fox). The short answer is because system T is seriously intellectually flawed. A pluralist may let such material stand, but, unlike a relativist, doesn't have to let it alone; its weaknesses can be exposed, its inferiority exhibited. Fox goes on to claim that under pluralism, which he also confuses with relativism, my 'critique loses much of its original sting and no longer constitutes the challenge to deep ecology that was formerly intended' (p.5). Again, not so; the challenge and sting remain as before. But now deep ecology is regarded more benignly; and more future work will be directed at restoration, etc. As you might now anticipate, Fox finds 'a 2 Fox's surprise about this (p.3) can be attributed to his failure to appreciate the force of 'acclaimed major themes' in the theories to be put to rest. 42 strong tension between such a pluralistic position' and the singular position which he regards as 'essentially argumentative' (p.5). But there is no tension; the singular position slots neatly into the pluralistic array. Further, both are argumentative, though neither essentially so. 3 2. Value in deep ecology Fox's 'most fundamental objection to [my] critique' is that it offers, is based upon, an 'environmental axiological interpretation of deep ecology' (p.29, p.53). Given what Fox intends by 'environmental axiological interpretation' (his never properly explained terminology, not mine), which involves axiological reductionism and a certain axiological priority and hegemony throughout environmental philosophy (p.52) 4 , I deny this. My critique neither offers nor is based upon such an interpretation; and, as inspection will confirm, my other work will not bear such an interpretation 5 , I do not 'pursue environmental philosophical discussion almost entirely at the level of environmental axiology'. What I do ascribe to deep ecology is "a value core", features of which I explain in some detail (and to which we shall have to return). But a large transformer (or similar item) does not reduce to its cores, there is much to such an item besides the core; nor do the cores pervade, dominate or guide all the rest. The core, which was introduced primarily as part of an organising structure, does not support what Fox tries to read out of it, namely an axiological reduction (back in 84, Naess thought 'core' was a 'good expression' for a quite proper part of deep ecology). In fact, I am not hooked on the term 'core'; substitution of 'value part' for 'value core' would make very little difference to the substance of my critique of deep ecology, but it would quite adversely effect Fox's response. An early example of the feebleness of Fox's reconstruction is his attempt to make my treatment of deep ecological theory outside the value core look as if it too was part of an axiological interpretation. He proceeds to argue from a title of a later section, 'Beyond the value core: metaphysical and epistemological "intuitions" of deep ecology', thus: 'as this title suggests, it is Sylvan's environmental axiological interpretation of deep ecology that underpins his criticisms there (as elsewhere)' (p.29). The title was not intended to suggest, and would not normally suggest, such an interpretation; it indicated a separation of parts and 3 For much more detail on all these pluralistic matters, see my Deep Plurallism. 4 For fuller illustration of such undesirable phenomena at work in philosophy, see Edwards, Ethics without Philosophy. 5 For one example, see the jointly authored The Fight for the Forests. 43 the upcoming contents. As an argument (to be slack with this term), Fox's move is a nonsequitur. 6 Now to get down to the real adjudicational business (of this section), I claim to have been verballed by Fox.7 While I am becoming pretty accustomed to serious misrepresentation, I see Fox as ascending to new heights in this regard. For he proceeds to attribute to me major derivative theses which I nowhere presented, which do not derive from what I did present, and to which I should not, in any case, accede. Let's look straight away at some of what Fox proceeds to foist upon me. 'Sylvan assumes from the outset and proceeds upon the basis that deep ecology is ... primarily a value-in-nature position' (p.30), that is the 'primary claim' (p.31). I do not assume that deep ecology is primarily that, but that it is that among other things; 8 I do not proceed on that basis, and I never did suppose that deep ecology was primarily or only a values-in-nature position. As I say, in a clause Fox left out in the selective quotation of his indictment, deep ecology 'has been presented as a metaphysics, as a consciousness movement (and a primarily psychological), and even as a sort of (Pantheist) religion' (and in an accompanying note I mention Fox's alternative ontological focus). I am not committed to such a primacy claim (what Fox refers to as 6 As the text reveals, Fox is rather fond of making passages suggest not what they were intended to suggest or prima facie do suggest, but what he would have them "suggest" conveniently for his own unscrupulous purposes (we might even label this the suggestive fallacy). He is not averse either to considerable distortion. For example (also on p.29) he makes it look, by a clever use of sectional divisions, as if the bulk of my critique was concerned with the value part of deep ecology, when in fact I get beyond that part on p.26 in a critique of 60 pages. Of course it would not show that much even if I had devoted virtually the whole critique to the value part rather than less than a third; it could just mean that that was the part of deep ecology that interested me most, or that I ran out of energy and patience thereabouts, etc. In the present critique I ran out of these commodities and time before I had finalized a section on fallacious methodological practices in deep ecology, perhaps to be called 'fallacies of transpersonal ecology'. Next edition, perhaps. 7 Verbal is an Australian verb, alluding to fabricated evidence made up by police or official prosecutioners. Verballing was a common practice in Queensland, and is certainly used by police gangs in some other states. 8 I do begin the first "problem" section of the critique 'Deep ecology appears to be some elaboration of the position that natural things other than humans have value in themselves .. .' (Cp.1 ). But that says nothing more offensive than what can be inferred from point 1 of the 8-point platform of deep ecology, and nothing about primacy. Moreover I go on to say that the elaboration is extensive (e.g. Cp.4), a claim well illustrated by Figure 1 (Cp.5), where the "value core" comprises but a small part of the deep position. 44 'Sylvan's primary claim', p.31, p.33, p.34, p.47, p.48, p.57, p.70 and many other pages, sometimes obliquely as 'Sylvan's claims' and the like, e.g. 'Sylvan says', p.86). 'Moreover', Fox continues (p.30), 'for Sylvan, it is an objective position since its "core theme" of "values-in-nature suggests ... that natural items have value qualities independently of perceivers"'. Firstly there is a misquotation; I refer to 'core themes', which furthermore extend beyond the value part. 9 Secondly, no objectivist claim is made or follows for Sylvan. 10 On the basis of the primacy claim, in conjunction with the objectivist claim (in the case of D2 at least), Fox proceeds to foist upon me 'two derivative claims': Dl. 'deep ecology does not proceed from a general vision of reality or "underlying perception of the way things are" ' 11 , and D2. 'deep ecology is not at all concerned with the way in which we experience the world' (p.31, Fox's italics). Firstly, I do not present such claims; indeed I present a substantial amount of material incompatible with such claims, for instance in the discussion of the theme of extreme holism as regards D 1, and of cosmic identity as regards D2. Secondly, I did not and do not adhere to such claims; indeed I have put a good deal of effort into exposing the metaphysical and epistemological parts of deep ecology. Thirdly, as should be thus evident, they do not derive from what I did present in the critique. Fourthly, in particular, they do not derive from the primacy and objectivist claims. Indeed readily available counter-models will show as much. Consider a values-in-nature objectivist position such as that of Holmes Rolston, which we can conveniently call 'R(olston)'s deep ecology' (there is not even any cheating here, as Ralston's position has a better claim to be accounted deep ecology than some of the positions admitted to the club). Now simply substitute 'R's deep ecology' for 'deep ecology' throughout the "derivation" of the claims. The premiss or grounds hold, as R's deep ecology satisfies both primacy and objectivist claims; but the claims supposed to be derived do not hold, both RD 1 and RD2 fail. For example, Ralston's deep ecology is very 9 It seems to be on the basis of efforts like this misquotation that Fox feels himself justified in writing of 'Sylvan's "core claim" that deep ecology is primarily a valuesin-nature position ' (p.34). That is remote from what I do. For example, I am in trouble for dismissing a sizeable chunk of core deep ecology as rubbish; but a valuesin-nature position is not rubbish. 10 The point was explained in considerable detail in EE p.154ff, where the ugly term nonjective was deliberately introduced to remove illusions as to objectivity or subjectivity. 11 The context makes it look as if the internal quotation is drawn from me, but it is not as perusal of fn.44 will show. DI gains no support from anything I assert. 45 much concerned with the way we experience the world, as a reading of Rolston quickly discloses. Or if a clearer deep example than Rolston is demanded, there is N aess himself. Finally, unsurprisingly now, Fox has made elementary mistakes in his alleged derivations. Consider D2 first. 'This follows', Fox says, 'since value-in-nature are held to exist "out there" independently of perceivers' (p.31). But again it just does not follow, as a topic can be deeply concerned with something that enjoys some independence. You might almost as well try to say that epistemology is not at all concerned with the way in which we experience the world since primary properties are "out there" independent of perceivers. Consider next D1, where there is considerably more distortion to be exposed. Fox's "derivation" really consists of two separable parts. In the first part, Fox's thoroughly fallacious strategy is to replace 'concerned with' by 'only concerned with' and 'because' by 'simply because', as textual comparisons, of my text with what Fox draws from it, make plain. His strategy certainly makes for terrific derivations. For example, from "the Prime Minister is concerned with his sex life" we obtain the startling result that the Prime Minister is only concerned with his sex life. From the premiss that a man likes his wife because of her body we obtain without any further ado the familiar worry that he likes her simply because of her body. 'Beyond this', in a second part, there is an argument based on independence (apparently involving some misunderstanding of the notion). The argument appears to be of the form: A is independent of B, therefore A does not proceed from B. The defectiveness of such an argument is obvious enough once its form is exposed. And the defectiveness of the case in hand should have been evident to Fox. For Naess has explained many times how a person can be a deep ecologist (e.g. can adhere to the platform) without adopting (or even being aware of) the general metaphysical vision from which it proceeds. The felling of Fox's derivations brings down, like trees felled in a rainforest, a good part of the rest of the structure. For instance, there cease to be the problems Fox supposes he has found (p.32 ff.), such as difficulties of consistency in accounting for the metaphysical 'sources that supporters of deep ecology draws upon' (p.33). With that small exercise in logic, the remainder of Fox's "response" to my critique (pages 31-89 of text and miles of footnotes) is disposed of in main essentials. For pages 53-84 constitute a largely separate essay on wider identification, an essay which only bears obliquely on my critique; and most of the rest turns upon lumbering me with the claims just off loaded, the claims which 'constitute [my] very poor understanding of deep ecology' (p.31). Thus, for example, Fox expends a good deal of space upon citing authorities from deep ecology (who too often supply extremely dubious statements) directed at contradicting D 1 and D2. Obviously that is beside the point. But while my main work on Fox's dismal response is done, and I could stop here, I don't intend to, as there is a lot more heavily 46 polluting rubbish to be despatched, or recycled. One's rubbish may be another's input (therein for Moore lay the whole challenge of philosophy). 3 The extent of values-in-nature. Even a casual reader of Fox's Response will have observed the following: that Fox is very quick off the mark with (largely unsubstantiated) accusations like 'so and so has failed to grasp', 'has misunderstood', 'has ignored', 'has missed the point'; that the evidence for these ad hominem claims is often quite insubstantial; and that that 'so and so' often happens to be Sylvan. One of the many things Sylvan allegedly 'fails to grasp' is 'that (a position) deep ecology can be normative (i.e. offer prescriptive proposals) without that necessarily meaning that it is prescriptive [of this or that,] of a values-in-nature position'. Well, I thought I had a reasonable grasp upon, and had made use in print of, the distinction between prescription and evaluation (likewise deontology and axiology), and had in the critique sufficiently emphasized that shallow positions were normative but decidedly not prescriptive of values-in-nature. So what evidence does Fox present for his charge? Well, none really. True he begins his next sentence with a 'Thus', but he then rambles on with quotations of material (he has previously tried to flog to death) concerning deep ecology and value theory. But, as nearly everyone appreciates, a position may include a value theory without that theory being a values-in-nature position; shallow positions are such. Now 'Sylvan takes Naess's statement that deep ecology is normative as direct support ... the only support that Sylvan provides ... for his own ... "claim" that deep ecology is ... a value-in-nature position' (p.36 rearranged, prejudicial terms deleted). Well, he didn't take that as direct support; what he did take as support is Naess's oft-repeated assertion (quoted by Fox on the very page) that 'the significant tenets of ... Deep Ecology ... express a value priority system' (many places, e.g. 73 p.99, my italics). So it includes a value framework. Furthermore further evidence is adduced or alluded to both for the claim that deep ecology involves a value framework and that it includes a values-in-nature tenet (e.g. 'deep ecology seeks a transformation of values' Cp.29, quoting Devall; an 'egalitarian principle of equal value of all life, is "an intuitively clear and obvious value axiom"' Cp.13 quoting N aess; the restriction of this axiom to cases 'when genuine conflicts of value are absent 'Cp.14 quoting Fox; etc). Fox issues the challenge: 'where is the (objectivist) values-in-nature "core claim"?' (p.36). Of course it is right there in the platform, in the very first point which duly 47 distributes intrinsic value much more widely than humans and human features; it is also implied by the biocentric egalitarian principle; and so on. 12 What is more, although I have at long last (late 1989) read Fox's tactless Response, I am sticking to my claim that deep ecology has a value core. As it happens, I think as much is evident from Naess's recent publications (esp. 89 chapters 2 and 3). But the claim can be argued, for example as follows:- Firstly, Deep ecology has a value part. Secondly, that part is a core part. As to the first, I should begin by appealing to the value themes of the deep ecology platform, particularly points 1 and 2 which amounts values-in-nature points. Curiously, when several of the points in the platform are value themes, Fox proceeds to assert that 'biocentric ... egalitarianism ... is the deep ecological notion that most lends itself to interpretation as a value-in-nature position' (pp.31-33). Perhaps this is a diversionary tactic. It seems that it would be most convenient for Fox's anti-axiology and unauthentic view of deep ecology if critics forgot about the platform of deep ecology. The value part of deep ecology is reasonably taken as a core, i.e. as a central or inner part (to use dictionary accounts of 'core'). A number of arguments can be advanced for adopting it as a core, of which I'll indicate one 13 . The 8-point platform is a central part of deep ecology, what more or less distinguishes deep ecologists; value themes comprise a central part of this platform (the first three points as well as others such as point 7); what is a central part of a central part is indeed central. It is no doubt 'somewhat unfortunate that the 8-principles start with ethical terms ... ' (quoting Sessions p.49). Fox tries to wriggle out of that unfortunate predicament, that the 8-point platform of deep ecology - one of the few hitherto stable parts of the whole jerrybuilt structure - begins with value themes and a values-in-nature claim, by an expansion of the same shabby tactic he has already tried to use to defuse biological egalitarianism and displace apparently ethical principles of deep ecology (such as the important obligation to implement environmental commitments): Namely, the formal-axiological waste-disposal is replaced by an even grander formal-philosophical disposal - down which goes my criticism. 'Sylvan ... takes the "neutral"' (i.e. variously: literal, nontechnical, 12 It is only anomalous that the intrinsic value theme is missing Naess's early paper because it features so prominently in the platform and in parts of Naess's later work, both characterising deep ecology. Fox tries to twist the anomaly into a contradiction in my evidence (pp.36-7), but it is a shabby effort, entirely neglecting the evidence I assemble in Appendix 1 (which he quotes from however) for Figure 1 of the Critique which indicates the value core. 13 Thereby doing in, by example, another of Fox's unpleasant shotgun accusations, p.6. 48 understandable to most persons) 'formulation of basic principles as a formal philosophical position .... Thus, even such limited support for his "core claim" as Sylvan is able to find turns out to be due to mistaking an everyday language 8-point list for an ultimate expression of deep ecology in formal philosophical terms' (p.51) That I find, I confess, a ridiculous accusation and defence. I wasn't taking the basic principles at other than face value, as other than principles in a "neutral" formulation; I was, and am, 'using the word "value" in a metaphorical or everyday sense' (p.49), namely in the literal everyday non-metaphorical sense where it signifies worth. I frankly don't really know what it would be like to take deep ecology in the way Fox alleges I do, as a 'formal philosophical position' (p.49, p.51). It is not just that we are far removed from 'the ultimate expression of deep ecology in formal philosophical terms'; deep ecology is not, in the hands of Fox and friends, the sort of position that looks at all likely to obtain such formulation ever. Until it is properly made out, then, Fox's "defence" lapses. He owes us an account of what a 'formal philosophical expression' would be, by contrast with what we have, and to provide requisite evidence that Sylvan (whatever his actual intentions) was "taking" the platform in that "mistaken" way. I'm not surprised that Fox has not attempted the requisite philosophical work; I am surprised he got Session to go along with him in the intellectually disreputable ploy. I freely confess, then, my astonishment that Sessions states that he and N aess would not agree philosophically to the principles of the deep ecology platform (p.50,p.51 ). What on earth does he mean? In his own book (with Devall), these principles are presented as 'basic principles of deep ecology' (in boldface capitals, p.69), they are supplemented by a detailed commentary of a type appropriate for serious philosophical principles, and they are introduced as having 'summarized fifteen years of thinking on the principles of deep ecology' (p.69). If that doesn't make them philosophical, what in the deep ecological scheme of things would? In any case, Sessions has elsewhere been prepared, in highly philosophical contexts to ascribe intrinsic values to parts of nonhuman Nature (e.g. p.236). For Naess too there is no easy escape. Firstly, the platform is said to derive from his Ecosophy T; secondly Ecosophy T itself assigns 'intrinsic value to every life form' (89 p.164ff). But I should make an admission; deep ecology is bound to be a values-in-nature position, at least as I characterised those things. It follows from the way I explained depth and what is meant by 'values-in-nature'. That is one reason why I claim Fox's 49 transpersonal ecology is not deep ecology, because it is explicitly not a values-in-nature position. 14 Fox himself has tried various ways of avoiding values-in-nature; but, needless to say, value expressions of "in-nature" cast creep into much of his discourse. For example, the shallow/deep distinction is now "explained" (in 89 p.33), not directly in terms of value, but, to begin with, through an anthropocentric/ecocentric distinction. The trouble is that, in explaining the intended senses of contrasting terms, value slips back again (as in 'use value for humans (e.g. its scientific, recreational, or aesthetic value)'). But Fox's main chance is the "value constellation" idea, which tries to lock values away in a complex involving a valuer and a valuing relation. But nothing stops analyses of this complex, examination of components of the constellation; and for many logical purposes (such as quantification of the value end of the complex) some separation is required. 4 A biocentric ethic? It has been widely thought that deep ecology supplies 'a biocentric ethic as opposed to an anthropocentric one' 15 , that it includes at least rudiments of a value theory and leading features of an environmental ethics. But now whether deep ecology is, among other things, an environmental ethic is in increasing doubt. There are now many, not merely on the margins of deep ecology, who would question the role or significance of ethics or even dispense with it altogether. On these issues, as on others, deep ecology speaks not just with many tongues, but forked tongues as well. Fox does something to assemble the diverse voices from the deep ecology multitude (p.42ff.). Let us classify - in a preliminary way: A. Getting rid of ethics altogether. This appears to be a position taken by Livingston and by Shepard, at least in the quotes Fox supplies. There is nothing new and exciting, still less of new paradigmatic cast, about this. It is as old as ethical nihilism and scepticism, which is to say, very old, reaching back to classical Greek thought. 16 Nor are the entirely dubious supporting considerations adduced in any way new: 'ethics and morals were ... invented by one species to meet the needs of that species' p.42, or, more cynically, for the advantage of certain classes or pressure groups within that species; ethics are at best mischievous, more 14 See e.g. p.85. The matter is further discussed below. 15 Thus Bradford 89,p.10. The authentic deep ecology (of. Naess, on reliable days) certainly does. 16 For preliminary notes on the history of moral nihilism, see Hinckfuss p.17. 50 likely damaging; ethics are unsuccessful and even counterproductive in their effects (p.43); 'ethics and morals are unknown in nature' (p.42); and similar. A*. Retaining ethics, hardly intellectually revolutionary either, but B. Downgrading the whole enterprise. Such appears to be one of Naess's newer tactics, where ethics, now of minor importance, becomes an experiential epiphenomenon. 'I'm not much interested in ethics or morals. I'm interested in how we experience the world .... Ethic follows from how we experience the world' (p.46, also Naess 89 p.20 and elsewhere). Naess is doing more in this much quoted passage (which involves clear commission of the prescriptive fallacy 17 ) than expressing personal idiosyncracies; he is saying, he is taken as saying, by those who quote him, how things now stand for deep ecology (of which he is still, though losing ground, the chief guru). B*. While ethical enterprise is perhaps not downgraded, C. Ethics as usually conceived is displaced or superseded. According to Fox, "conventional ethics", which combines a code of conduct with a set of values, is displaced by an 'experientially grounded state of being' (p.41). 18 That state of being is none other than ecological consciousness, which 'precedes and preempts the search for an "environmental ethic"' (Devall quoted p.45, similarly Sessions, who also goes further, suggesting we should abandon the search for an environmental ethics' p.44). But surely it is foolish to discard useful tools (if admittedly due for repair) because something that may look brighter and shinier and does something for some agents, attracts attention; in these critical times everything that works at all is needed. A bit differently, Rodman suggests superfessions of conventional ethics (though perhaps not of a more expansive ethics), because it is an integral part of the former moral/legal stage of consciousness, conventional ethics - if not actually in the process of being superseded (in the dominant culture it is not) by a later and higher stage, of appropriate new experience - ought to be superseded, since the moral/legal stage is 'now more part of the problem than its solution' (p.43). Again all 17 Elsewhere however (e.g. Naess 89 p.24) explains how values go beyond "facts". 18 Later Fox proceeds differently, with 'deep ecology ... described as ... a position within ... "foundational ethics'" (p.86). "Foundational ethics", another exceedingly illexplained notion, is ethics as 'concerned with "understanding ourselves"' (p.86, p.113), and so part of the egocentric self nexus; it is also said to be ethics as 'concerned with development of a state of being' (p.113), the being of selves no doubt. Does "foundational ethics" supply principles and some values? If not, how does it manage to be an ethic? If so, how does it escape Fox's objections to environmental ethics? In any case, "foundational ethics" which we are supposed to search for (along with "understanding ourselves"), is intended to be an environmental ethic! 51 decidedly questionable, both historically and systematically, particularly given the prospect of a plurality of integrated techniques. C*. Instead, a radically new ethic is designed. This is of course part of what deepgreen and other radical, not merely reformist, alternatives to prevailing ethics and nature philosophies are about. It was, once upon a time, an objective of deep ecology also; it apparently no longer invariably is. But just as there is no definite position offered by deep ecology on several critical issues (esp. in ecological politics), so there is now no definite position on the place of ethics (pace p.41), as the tentative classification serves to reveal. No doubt Fox had a particular message that he wanted to be drawn from the quotations and needed for his arguments - explicit rejection of an ethical approach in favour of experience in the shape of ecological consciousness (p.47) - but what he has supplied is an entertaining pot pourri of positions, countering or jamming the message. It is ironic that Western deep ecology should have tried to opt out of ethics, at exactly the time that ethics is making a major come back, when ethics are becoming again a significant force in business and the world. Or in terms of a different image, at the very time when the ship of ethics is returning to harbour after a long period on high rough seas, Fox and friends decide to jump overboard; we hope they are strong swimmers. With ethics returned, a renewed force, what we need is not no ethics but new ethics, not to concede the power of renewed ethics over to conservative power-holders or restrictive do-gooders, but to put ethics to expansive tolerant good environmental and social works. 5. Biospheric egalitarianism revisited. The notion is terminally ill, but I fear we shall keep revisiting it until it is buried under heavy concrete. So far, for all its problems, it lives on (with apologists, Fox included, shifting ground accordingly; similarly N aess, e.g. 85 p.6). It just keeps reappearing in strong unqualified form, for instance in Sessions (recently): 'one of the first clear statements' of ecosophy 'that all individuals, species (including humans), and ecosystems have EQUAL inherent value (the ecocentric position) was made by Arne Naess when he proposed the principle of BIOSPHERICAL (ECOLOGICAL) EGALITARIANISM ... ' (89, p.11). So represented it simply succumbs to all the previous criticism (in my Critique and indirectly in EE p.139 ff.). Interestingly then both Fox and Naess appeal to 'Sessions' interpretation of biocentric egalitarianism as "a statement of non-anthropocent ricism"' (p.39), to which Fox adds, in all seriousness, 'rather than as a formal environmental axiological position'. In a revealing passage, Sessions puts it rather differently, 'Biocentric egalitarianism is essentially a rejection of human chauvinistic ethical theory and the criteria 52 used to ascribe rights and value; it is a reductio ad absurdum of conventional ethics. Biocentric egalitarianism is essentially a statement of non-anthropocentricism' 19 . This statement does not hang together. For instance, non-anthropocentricism is weaker than rejection of human chauvinism, which on its own is not a reductio ad absurdum of all conventional ethics (because, first off, not an argument, and because, second, of the character of some "conventional" ethics such as intuitionism). Without the logically inadmissible loop through anti-human chauvinism (the deep-green position) the situation is worse still; for, on the contrary, rather conventional British utilitarianisms such as Smart's and Singer's are robustly nonanthropocentric. By so excessively eroding its egalitarian principles, deep ecology loses much depth. In a passage which Fox says 'greatly clarifies the confusion that has surrounded Naess's notion', Naess too, again over-influenced by his minders, takes a similar pathetic course. The principle had previously 'suggest[ed] a positive doctrine, and that is too much'! 'The importance of the intuition' contracts to 'its capacity to counteract' certain chauvinistic hubris. What Fox manages to draw out of these counteracting principles are, however, not principles at all, but an orientation to or general attitude of non-interference, "Letting be", etc. This is not just considerably removed from what N aess offers; it is pretty remote from egalitarianisms. For one can let inferiors, and what is of no inherent value, be, spare and preserve them, perhaps for later exploitation. But what Fox is really concerned to draw from his authorities is the concession (they do not make, nor did he himself formerly) that the principle of biospherical egalitarianism is not a principle, not a position at all (a curious thing to think it was), but something much less definite, less positive, less specific, less open to criticism, a more general attitude, no doubt underlying ethical practice, but definitely not part of an environmental axiology. Poor deluded critics like Sylvan who supposed that a principle is a principle have 'missed' 'the extremely important point' that for supporters of deep ecology a "principle" is but a general attitude. These supporters indeed feel that treating a principle as a principle can do more harm than good, 'and so have deliberately chosen not to take the environmental axiological route' (p.41). There ends Fox's diversion on biospheric egalitarianism. What it comes to is this:- Had the principle been a principle, within environmental axiology, the criticism made of the principle would at 19 Quoted by Fox in a quote that never ends (p.39). In this mismash, Session proceeds to draw upon our material against human chauvinism and conventional ethics, having first dismissed us, referring to EE p.139, as 'mistak[ing] what Naess is up to. Naess's position is not ... "an extension of conventional Western ethics"'. As it happens, we don't mention Naess at all either on p.139 or in our discussion of extensionalism: how do we mistake what Naess is up there to when we don't consider what he is up to? Back in the 70s deep ecology was, after all, not a significant position. 53 the very least constitute a powerful challenge (p.38); but fortunately it is not, "positive doctrines" are too open to criticism! It is only a general attitude concerning reluctance to harm other living beings (p.40). 20 Egalitarianism, of value as well as principle, has dropped out in this rather shallow evasion. 6. The uneasy position of value theory, or axiology within deep ecology and the condemned "environmental axiological route". Fox wants to distance deep ecology from value theory but is also aware, from time to time, that this is not really possible. As a result his position on the relation of deep ecology to value theory is decidedly ambiguous at best, and at worst inconsistent. The tensions appear within the space of a single page (e.g. p.85). We are told both that 'deep ecology is not [a] position within environmental axiology' and that 'it could be quite mistaken to think' that deep ecology 'stands outside ... value theory'. Whence inconsistency results, given that axiology has its normal technical sense. 21 But there is evidence that Fox intends significantly more by 'axiology' than normal - as well as adopting the normal sense: so that behind the initial inconsistency stands another inconsistency. What precisely Fox does intend remains however obscure, scandalously obscure. For one of Fox's main accusations against critics of deep ecology 22 , is that critics are committed to 'environmental axiological reductionism', they 'pursue environmental philosophical discussion almost entirely at the level of environmental axiology', so they are blind to what 'deep ecology thinkers are really on about', which (negatively) consists in 'rejection of the "environmental axiological route"' (pp.51-53). Among these critics, mired in "ethical reductionism", blind to the new paradigmatic character of deep ecology which 20 Or presumably otherwise negatively interfere with other natural things - otherwise the reformulation, though apparently platitudinous, is too narrow, discriminating against some parts of nature. The harm reformulation is borrowed from Devall and Session, who try to make biospherical egalitarian and Self-realisation interpenetrate: 'Biocentric equality is intimately related to the all inclusive Self-realisation in the sense that if we harm the rest of Nature then we are harming ourselves' (p.56). Unfortunately in the ordinary sense of 'harm' the latter claim is entirely false; as I previously remarked, it is all too easy to harm parts of Nature without harming ourselves, with but negligible impact on ourselves. 21 The word 'axiology' does not appear in the Oxford English Dictionary. But no doubt it means the investigation, study and theory of value or worth, and is thus tantamount to value theory, as contrasted however with deontology. What it means will soon become an issue: see below. 22 Yes, it remains an unduly adversial intellectual game, part of the long Britishscholastic history of philosophy. 54 has taken as a guiding star precisely avoidance of the "axiological route", is the hapless Sylvan; the tenacity with which he sticks to his indefensible account of deep ecology is largely explained through these features (p.52). For explanation of some of the operative abusive terminology we are referred elsewhere, to other writings of Fox. But the source is scarcely more informative, and indeed relevant parts of it have, in any case, been lifted for Fox's Response. 23 The promise of explanation is not fulfilled. 'Ethical reductionism' is, like its successor 'environmental axiological reductionism', explained by Fox on the run, which is to say it is not explained. Nor is the reductionist charge sustained. For what is offered, what 'the vast majority of environmental philosophers' are alleged to do, the pursuit of 'environmental philosophical discussion almost entirely at the level of environmental ethics/axiology', may well reflect undue concentration, but it is not reductionism. Fox is decidedly adept in the fallacious business of sliding terms around (otherwise known as Humpty Dumptyism). 'Reductionism' and 'axiology' are not the only terms that suffer at his hands; so, relevant to our purposes, does 'ontology'. At least in the context of his "guiding stars" paper, parts of which are shunted into his Response, Fox uses 'ontology' to mean, not what it does mean, roughly 'the general study of what exists', but very differently, the 'underlying perception of the way things are', which, among other things, epistemologizes what was part of metaphysics. In those terms, 'deep ecology's guiding star ... [which] is (and should be) ... this attempt to shift the primary focus of environmental philosophical concern from ethics to ontology' becomes an epistemological diversion: a regressive attempt to move environmental philosophy to anthropic experiential concerns (Fox 84 p.204 rearranged). It is evident, by the way, who is attempting to do this shifting. If epistemologists focus their efforts on a tiny number of tiny epistemological problems, if logicians discuss only quantificational logic, they cannot be significantly accused of reductionism; they would have 23 While many sorts of recycling are of course commendable, reservations should be held about academic recycling of earlier papers, especially when no improvements are attempted. Fox does at least attempt some "improvements" to get around the obvious objection that deep ecology is itself a normative and hence ethical route; but the adjustments he infiltrates actually make other matters worse. For they consist of the replacement of 'ethical' by 'axiological' or 'environmental axiological' or similar. So now, for instance, the journal Environmental Ethics is charged with reflecting environmental axiological reductionism (p.106); but as examination quickly shows the journal carries much ethical material which is not axiological (e.g. on rights and obligations) - evidently it also carries much that is not reductionistic and even some that concerns philosophy of nature rather than ethics. Fox's charges are without proper foundation. 55 also to claim that is all there is to their enterprise, and to make some attempt to show how the apparent remainder comes down to that. These further necessary conditions are not fulfilled in the case of 'the vast majority of environmental philosophers'; apart from a small minority of philosophers associated with the "ethics without philosophy" idea here is nothing approaching a requisite reduction framework. No doubt there is an axiological reduction program, pursued by consequentalists of various brands, but that is predominantly a program within ethics. As well the long-running naturalistic reduction program grinds on unsuccessfully. But there is no recognisable environmental philosophy reduction program; nor could such a program hope to succeed. There are suitably many counter-instances to Fox's large accusations; among them, conveniently, is that main target, Sylvan, who does not take an "environmental axiological route". In print I have come out against reduction of deontic notions and normative discourse generally to axiological terms; and have, in any case, made it perfectly plain that environmental philosophy comprises much more than ethics, certainly including parts of politics, philosophy of nature, metaphysics and so on. 24 Thus Sylvan, so far from 'criticis[ing] deep ecology on the erroneous basis of it being a position or approach within environmental axiology' (p.101), does not himself take the alleged "environmental axiological route", as the record shows. Rather than rely on my record (a political expedient that should engender but little philosophical enthusiasm), I'm tempted to issue a countercharge: insofar as Sylvan is committed to an "environmental axiological route" so also is (authentic) deep ecology, as elaborated by Naess. Consider, for instance, Naess's elaboration of the deep ecological platform. But in sustaining this counter-charge (the detailed support involves a comparison, made in Bennett and Sylvan, of deep-green theory with authentic deep ecology), we come up once again against the problem of what is meant here by 'axiology'. Unremarkably Fox deploys the fallacious method of redefinition. By 'axiology' and its compounds, Fox both means what is normally meant and also means significantly more. Hardly necessary by now to add, he manages to slide from one to the other. In the normal way, axiology, or value theory, is the philosophical study of virtue and values, 'their meaning, characteristics, origins, types, criteria and epistemological status (p.100, quoting Angeles). 24 So far so good. But now for the first twist and slide. 'In the area of See EP, e.g . p.188, p.222, and several works in the Green series. In the early 70s when there was briefly some glimmer of hope that the Australian National University might interest itself in environmental philosophy, I sketched out a perspective of what it might comprise, which I reproduce as an Appendix (if I can find it!). 56 environmental ethics, the axiological concept of intrinsic value plays a fundamental role. 25 . . . On this understanding, environmental ethics is more accurately described as environmental axiology ... ' (p.100). This is a major non-sequitur. It would almost as well be said that because induction plays a fundamental role in philosophy of science, philosophy of science is more accurately described as induction-theory, and even amounts to induction-theory! Plainly it is quite inaccurately described as induction-theory, since there is much else to philosophy of science; what makes matters still worse is that there are schools which contend that induction drops out as a method and so as a problem. Rather similarly environmental ethics is much more inaccurately redescribed as environmental axiology because, but not only because, there is much more to ethics than axiology, the whole matter of proper conduct for example. For value only impacts on action and proper conduct by way of further principles which are not themselves part of value theory. It is obvious that value theory does not in general exclude what is not (without further ado) a part of it, such as deontic theory, moral epistemology, and so on; but the obvious gets lost sight of, as when Fox assumes that environmental axiology rules out experiential and empathetic procedures. Fox attempts rather more than adjustment and exclusion in his "redescription" of normal environmental ethics as environmental axiology; he has to if his charges against environmental axiology (on the face of it a harmless enough study), and the importance of avoiding it, are to begin to stand up. 25 Fox backs up this claim with themes drawn from Callicott and Regan, with which it is said 'most environmental philosophers would agree', (p.100). Maybe others do; but I doubt that they should, not without significant qualification. Regan states that 'the development of what can properly be called an environmental ethic requires that we postulate inherent value in nature'. Firstly, that is only one way to try to develop an environmental ethic (which may not be deep). There are other feasible starting points and primitives: rights, justice, respects, fairness, empathy, identification, utility, vandalism, evil, and so on, in terms of which value may (or may not) be subsequently be defined (e.g. along lines that tempted former philosophers: what it is fitting/right, for any rational being to prefer/desire). Secondly, the term 'postulate' at best grates, at worst gets the picture seriously wrong: value may not be self-evident, assumed without proof, imposed as a demand, ... . Callicott describes 'the problem of intrinsic value in nature ... as the most critical and most recalitrant theoretical problem of environmental ethics'. That already presupposes that an ethics starts out in Regan's sort of way. Even if a deep ethics does take value as primitive, that is but one problem among several, a problem blown up to critical exaggerated size, primarily by opponents of environmental ethics and infiltrators of the ranks. For other major problems for any ethics, and a more balanced view, see Broad's final chapter. 57 We can glean further information as to what is loaded into the terminology from what Fox tries to do. An environmental axiology is the same as a (formal) environmental axiological position, and that as a formal value theory (pp.40-41; the word 'formal' can be inserted or left out, in Fox it appears to function primarily as a con-term). Such theories, which are "theoretical" and "definite", contain as well as • a value theory, and perhaps also a rights theory (e.g. p.35), both • exact principles, offering specific positional guidance, which are • positively formulated • which apply to all situations, and • a code of conduct, no doubt made up from the principles. 26 Some of Fox's criticisms of environmental axiology turn on these further, and excessively exacting, features he has tried illegitimately to incorporate into axiology. At this stage, there are two main confusions:- first, as to the extent of ethics and moral theory that axiology comprehends, and secondly as to the character of the principles axiology (and, for that matter, deontology and praxis) is supposed to include. A value theory on it own yields neither a rights' theory nor a code of conduct. Even a highly and objectionably reductive theory such as consequentialism requires principles drawn from outside value theory, such as that one ought to act so as to maximize value or utility, in order to arrive at principles of conduct and actionable rights. A value theory may include principles but these are principles concerning value. Like other principles, like those of deontology, they may well not measure up to the excessive standards Fox tries to impose. In particular, the principles may be defeasible, may include or presuppose unspecified and unlistable exceptions; they may include ceteris paribus clauses; and so they may well not apply in all situations. They may fall far short of supplying necessary and/or sufficient conditions; they may not be positively formulated (prohibitions in such forms as 'Don't ... ' are commonplace in ethics); and so on. 26 As well, it seems to be assumed that an axiology, and indeed an Anglo-American ethics, must be atomistic and individualistic; they are but 'means of structuring the interactions of atomistic individuals' (p.112). Not so. It is worth remarking that deep-green theory assumes neither atomism nor individualism (see EP). Nor does it pursue or assume any of the following reductive practices: deontic to axiological, or vice versa; environmental philosophy to environmental ethics, or vice versa; axiological notions to a unique set of primitives, or the single primitive value. As there are several ways to disable a bulldozer, so there are many ways to enable an environmental philosophy: value is but one starting point. 58 7. The "case" against environmental axiology: 'the inadequacies or repugnant conclusions that attend the environmental axiological approach' (p.82). Among the 'serious problems' encountered are said to be those, now hoary, issues concerning intrinsic value, which Fox tosses up in a substantially shallow way. For most environmental ethicists, it is difficult to see how something can have value in itself (i.e. intrinsic value) if it isn't valuable to itself, and to be valuable to itself it must be able to matter to itself or, in other words, be sentient, by which is meant that it must possess the capacity to suffer (p.73)27_ This contention is at least dubious clause by clause, and overall profoundly mistaken. The critical transformation, for deep environmentalism, is centred on that of value in to valuable to (or of value to). It is difficult to see why any environmental thinker would accede to such a transformation, in itself and to itself being so very different in meaning (e.g. consider them coupled respectively with such terms as conspicuous, unusual, etc.) But, in any event, there are several sorts of evident counter-examples to such transformations. Firstly, there are examples from outside environmental territory such as works of art, intellectual theories, and transcendental metaphysical gems. A beautiful theory or a resplendent form can be intrinsically valuable without being of value to itself, without being able to matter to itself, etc. Secondly, there are examples like rare seed, embryonic valuables, and the like. Thirdly, there are sentient or conscious items of intrinsic value that are not valuable to themselves, and do not matter to themselves, such as great but utterly modest people. There is much else wrong in the connections Fox delivers up 28 , but we can bypass most of them (e.g. sentience does not mean a capacity to suffer, as shown by perceptually aware creatures who do not suffer because they have no pain receptors and the like; nor is sentience required, as consciousness will serve for mattering; and so on). 27 It is hard to credit that someone fronting up as a deep environmental thinker could present such stuff, but of course various reasons can be found. While the argument is very bad, there is no doubt, what is no excuse, that worse can be found. For instance, what is intrinsically valuable is valuable in itself, so it must have a self, so it must be sentient, etc. 28 Fox subsequently announces the 'link between something not mattering to itself ... and the conclusion that we can do as we will with it ... sacred in the Environmental Axiological Orthodox Church of Intrinsic Value' (p.80). It is a Church of his own fabrication, at which no respectable deep environmentalist would worship or even be found. 59 Fox runs straight on to an old paradigm assertion by Frankena, from whom he borrowed the argument, which he again proceeds to ascribe (without any evidence offered or, I suspect, any research basis)to most environmental ethicists 29 : 'I do not see, however, how anything can have intrinsic value except the activities, experiences, and lives of conscious sentient beings (persons, etc.)' (Frankena, quoted p.73). Frankena's assertion, as it stands utterly unsupported, 'is a powerful one', according to Fox, again displaying his shallow proclivities: 'What difference does it make how I treat something if it cannot matter to itself?' (p.78) Big differences, not merely to those in a region for whom it may matter, but in the region, if Fox dams the last wild river in the region, cuts down the last lowland rainforest. Fox tops his astounding move by dignifying this shallow rubbish by the title 'powerful argument'. Its power 'is evidenced by the fact that those who want to say rocks or trees have intrinsic value often do so by pure assertion rather than providing an argument for their view (140)' (p.78). That's no evidence, it's irrelevant; and I wouldn't pursue it, were not such a familiar utterly shallow complaint built into the alleged evidence, and were Sylvan not roped in again in a footnote as 'another case in point' (p.112 note 140). It may come as news to Fox (who seems to have read little of what I have written before he rushed out his Response), but I do provide arguments, including those built on examples like the Last Person and the Last Sentient Creatures, examples which have obtained a fair bit of exposure (for some of these, see e.g. EP pp.121-132; and in fact a general argument can be developed from the semantical analysis of value). The certainties of Frankena's dogmatic assertion can be whittled away, first by separating conscious from sentient (after all many people can now see that animals that are not conscious persons can have intrinsic value), second by assembling marginal cases and analogies in a now familiar way, then by counter-arguments, and so on. But, in any case, insofar as environmental ethicists (as distinct from conventional ethicists) continue to side with Frankena that reveals them as a rather reactionary lot, significantly lagging popular thinking. 30 As Naess and others report, many non-philosophers have no difficulty in recognising value-in-itself outside persons, in living creatures and natural objects. 29 There is evidence that these ascriptions are mere desk-chair speculation, in fact of little value; e.g. at the bottom of p.78 where Fox says, of Frankena's position, 'I think it represents the dominant position within ... environmental axiology'. I suspect that, once again, Fox is not duly separating environmental axiology from conventional axiology. 30 The chauvinism of traditional ethical systems is enough to explain the comparative lack of intellectual interest in such moribund systems, and the resulting much wider search for roots, ideas, etc. There is accordingly no serious puzzle as to the sources of deep environmentalism (pace Fox p.74). 60 In the course of trying to get his attack on the environmental axiological framework airborne Fox resorts to some extraordinary distortion and falsification. The looseleaf insert (page 79), where some disenchanted thinkers make an abrupt unexplained entry, affords a good illustration. First we are told that what those in the business (except no doubt some enlightened deep ecologists) 'typically fail to realise is that the environmental axiological framework of discourse so dominates the discussion of our relationship with the natural world that it is mistakenly taken to be the only possible approach' (p.79). This claim is, it seems to me, roundly refuted by the history of the discussion and some of the literature it encompasses. Among other approaches there are, for instance, extended rights (e.g. Stone), environmental justice (e.g. Wenz), extended interests (e.g. Johnson), and negatively ethical nihilism (e.g. Hinckfuss). Fox continues unabashed: 'In other words [!], the hegemony of the environmental axiological framework is such that it has led almost everybody involved in the ecophilosophical debate to think that we have an obligation to care for something if and only if it "has" intrinsic value' (p.79). There's some prime rubbish for you. The charge is manifestly false, seriously flawed, plucked from thin air, and unnecessary except for Fox's misguided mission. Even if an axiological approach were the only approach, no such obligation-to-care principles would follow, and certainly not principles as dubious or refutable as those given. The if -half of the unabashed claim is at, the very, least dubious and would be rejected on some popular positions: suppose, for instance that the intrinsic value of the thing is small, or that it is overridden by the intrinsic value of some competitor for our attention. The only-if-half (which wins Fox's italics, he is going to make much of it) would be rejected by almost everyone who thought about the matter, because of course obligations apply to what has merely instrumental value. If I have borrowed a friend's tools then I have an obligation to care for them though these tools have no intrinsic value. Differently, I am under obligations to behave generally in certain sorts of ways whether the things encountered have intrinsic value or not; accordingly I'm not entitled to treat them any old way (e.g. to vandalise them) or even as I will or, more ambiguously, as I 'see fit'. Combining the pernicious principles Fox has unearthed yields the following ridiculous result: if a thing has no value to itself, for instance has ceased to be of value to itself, then we have no obligation to care for it, we can do what we like with it. The applications of this result are remarkable. There is no doubt that Fox has thereby provided a simple - if appalling - solutions to such major social problems as those of drug and alcohol abuse; victims who are so far down the track that they have ceased to be of value to themselves, can simply be vanished, or dealt with in whatever other way we find convenient. Then too human slavery and sacrifice, never entirely vanquished, could be widely reinstated: Oh brave new world that Fox has lead us into! 61 Fox tries to make a lot out of these odious obligation-to-care principles he has attempted to foist upon environmental axiology. He suggests they indicate the need to abandon rather than broaden the notion of intrinsic value; he suggests they may 'reflect the inherent limitations of the environmental axiological approach' (p.79); he suggests that we need to find instead 'another framework of discourse that can articulate' our feelings about what we ought to care about. This alternative framework - from the many and various that might have been selected - is none other than the wider self identification framework. The obvious course, which should be pursued anyway, of seeking an obligation-to-care principle that does measure up better to our emotional presentations, does not seem to have occurred to Fox, so preoccupied is he with attacking what he sees as "the environmental axiological route" and getting to self immersion. Finally, Fox runs out some examples which are supposed to show the repugnant conclusions to which the axiological approach leads. Unfortunately for Fox's case, the arguments involved do not succeed without further assumptions beyond those Fox enumerates, assumptions smarter adherents of an axiological approach do not make. The examples involve comparisons of groups of individuals, which, it is alleged, exponents of intrinsic value cannot discriminate, though the group situations are very different. One example runs as follows: ' ... the loss, by human interference at least, of the last members of a species ... is somehow "worse" than the loss by human interference of an equivalent number from an abundant species ... . Yet, in terms of intrinsic value, those losses are equivalent since the same "amount" is lost in both cases' (p.80). Fox then argues against more holistic assignments of value on the basis of another dogmatic pronouncement from 'Frankena that communities (such as species ... ) do not "have intrinsic value over and above that contained in ... [their] members"' .31 But he goes on to assert that, irrespective of Frankena's position, 'the point ... applies generally to any atomistic environmental axiological position i.e. to any position that sees intrinsic value as exclusively adhering in or attaching to individual entities' (p.81). Fox is dead wrong. The case assumes, without warrant or mention, equality of the value adhering or assigned to individuals. Plainly the loss of the last members of the species is worse (where it is, e.g. the species is not a diabolical laboratory concoction) because the members of the species are individually more valuable than those of the abundant species. Consider, for comparison, the razing by fire of 31 Fox's second example actually contains the elements of an interesting argument (perhaps, to be uncharitable, the only example in his whole Response). This example, of monoculture vs diversity (p.81), does introduce, if not much of holism, at least relational features of the individuals assembled. There is no reason, of course, why axiology should not take account of those features. Contrary to Fox, there is no need to 'separately posit' that the principle of diversity is 'valuable in and of itself' (p.82). 62 two art galleries containing the same numbers of individual art works, one containing rare art works, the other containing selections from the abundant works of relatively indifferent crafters. The amount, assessed in monetary value even, lost in the first fire is much greater, and so the loss much worse, than in the second fire. Fox not only proceeds to state what his examples would show without due qualification. But he goes on, quite inadmissibly, to general claims which leave off even the qualifications he had earlier introduced (thus later on, p.82, he drops the essential restriction to atomistic positions). Environmental axiology accordingly emerges substantially unscathed; it does not need to be replaced by something else, such as wider identification, only rendered smarter, and supplemented or merged into a fuller environmental philosophy. 8. Fox's 'Deep Ecological Territory': transpersonal identification. But Wes tern deep ecology is now bent upon replacement. Devall, for example, now maintains that 'the unique contribution that deep ecology makes to ecophilosophy is its emphasis on ecological self and affirmation. Subscribing to similar ideas Fox has suggested changing the label "deep ecology" to "transpersonal ecology".' Devall (in 89 again) has deep ecology as, above all, discovering 'an aspect of our self' which has been culturally neglected. Such a reorientation is significantly at variance with Naess's introduction and initial elaboration of deep ecology; for his original summary (in 73) of deep ecology, which is ecologically focussed, contains no allusion to self, ecological or other. It is also at variance with Devall and Sessions of but three years earlier, where nature, ecology and biological systems still appeared fundamental to deep ecology, these entering through the other ultimate norm (besides Self-realisation) of deep ecology, that of biocentric equality (see their p.66). As it happens, Devall, by contrast with Fox, vacillates between a more authentic deep ecology in the style ofNaess (chapter 1 of Devall 89) and the Western variant of transparent ecology (e.g. pp.39-57), which would displace the original theory. There is much speaking with many tongues, much inconsistency, in deep ecology. We have already witnessed such deep ecology doubletalk in the matter of value and the status of ethics. We see it again with transpersonal or expanded-self identification. We only enter 'the real territory of deep ecology' according to Fox (p.53ff.) with such expanded identification. Yet one can be a deep ecologist, much literature explains, without any identification efforts at all (for example by adopting the platform which does not mention identification). So one can be a deep ecologist without ever 'entering deep ecological territory'. Deep ecology without deep ecology - another wonder, or just more double talk? Like Fox's parting flourish: there are sketch maps for deep ecological territory (p.89), yet it is 'ultimately mapless' (see Devall 89 p.39). 63 Fox tries to explain "the search" of deep ecology 'for such things as "ecological consciousness" (Devall and Sessions) and "Self-realisation" (Naess)' through expanded identification. Most conveniently he can take ready-made from Devall and Sessions reductive explications:- 'Ecological consciousness is the result of a psychological expansion of the narrowly encapsulated sense of self as isolated ego, through identification with all humans (species chauvinism), to finally an awareness of the identification and interpenetration of self with ecosystem and biosphere' (Sessions, quoted pp.53-4). 'The essence of ecological consciousness ... [is] to overcome this illusory dichotomy [between Humans and N ature 32 ]' for which 'the important task is ... the psychological development from narrow egotistical "self' to identification with the whole' (Devall as quoted p.53). But, once again, it is one thing to have on authority such explication; it is quite another thing whether such reductions work. I submit that they do not, for the simple reason that ecological consciousness may be had or attained without any such self expansion developments. Consider, first, Professor Flatpan who is a devoted but unimaginative ecological field worker. All his practice, behaviour and so on, shows him as utterly committed to ecological causes, preservation of wilderness and so on, and fully conscious of its importance. But he makes no identification of himself with what he works with or for. It may be that he is some sort of empirical separatist; or it may not. Perhaps he even rejects identification suggestions when they are put to him, e.g. on grounds of hubris, nonsense, ... , or he simply doesn't identify, etc. In Professor Flatpan and his variants we seem to have a tribe of people with strong ecological consciousness and affiliations but without identification. Consider next, the interesting Wombat tribe, superb in their tribal treatment of their environment, who have not developed the notion of self or, for that matter, that of identification. The tribe exhibits a high ecological consciousness (in our ordinary understanding of that non-technical notion, in terms of a strong perception or awareness of environmental matters) but lacks even the conceptual apparatus for self expansion developments. Expanded identity or self developments may serve as useful or powerful tactics for raising ecological consciousness in people raised and hooked on a narrow self-interested self, but they are neither necessary nor sufficient for explaining or understanding ecological consc10usness. Analogous points apply against the attempt to drag Self-realisation into the picture. 32 Naess, in a regressive move, now asserts that humans are unique (e.g. in 89), whence the dichotomy ceases to be illusory. More inconsistency. 64 There are in fact at least three separable notions which deep ecology has tended to fuse: ecological consciousness, widened identification and wider Self-realisation. Confusion is made so much the easier because those notions are, for the most part, not decently introduced. The whole deep ecological theory of expanded identification and Self remains exceedingly poorly explained (thus e.g. identification in Fox, esp. p.60; dimensions of Self, p.83). As ecological consciousness has already been distinguished, it remains to begin on unscrambling identification and self-realisation, and therewith the many senses of self In the first place, identification is independent of self, its manifestation or "realisation", at least to this extent: that discourse concerning identification can be explained and can proceed satisfactorily without any introduction of or notion of selves. A theory may well include identification, and even expanded identification with remote items, without selves or expanded selves. Early Taoism appears to illustrate the point well. Differently, an ontologically modest account of acting can afford a good example of how identification can operate without persona or selves. In fact, a case can be argued that such theories proceed better in this fashion, because they avoid problematic commitments to selves. It may look as if Fox, following Naess and Wilber, can escape these problems, and separation, simply by defining 'self' through identification (and perhaps conversely): 'succinctly: Our Self is that with which we identify' (p.54). There are serious obstacles to such a stratagem. d Elsewhere Fox makes quite a fuss about ontological commitments; on the matter of cluttering up the universe with Selves he is strangely silent. Yet there are rather a lot of these strange selves. Assuming selves do not reproduce themselves, in a universe where there are n objects, and so 2n -1 complexes, and m individuals with selves (with m << n), there are, at first estimate, m x (2n -1) larger selves. Of course some of these larger selves may be the same, nonetheless the number of selves is huge where n is large. Moreover, if a person can identify with nonexistent, with Sherlock Holmes or Pegasus or Satan if not with the form of the Good and the set of all sets, then the numbers shoot right up, into the big infinities. Yet nothing is more common in this arena than for people to identify with fictional objects, of books, TV and so on. Indeed the art of acting depends heavily upon it. A character actor works to identify with the character being portrayed; a good actor enjoys more success in this identification enterprise. d It does not in any case evade ontic issues, because the definition requires that which abstraction which a modest theory would not have generally available. d There are questions as to the adequacy of such an explicative definition of self: whether, for example, it answers duly to prevailing senses of 'self'. The proposal does not. Consider, to bring out just one deficiency, two different but closely integrated creatures, 65 Arthur and Martha say, who identify with the same class of items including themselves and each other. Then on the Naess-Fox definition, it follows, counter-intuitively, that Arthur's Self = Martha's Self, though Arthur @ Martha. Part of what has gone wrong is evident from recent philosophical investigations, namely that the first person point of view, crucial to such items as a self or a spirit or a soul or an ego, has got omitted; a widened self involves some sort of (concentric) expansion from, or focused upon, a first-person self. 33 Normally in religious settings, it is furthermore expansion outwards from an inner personal locus by restrictive identification or selective identification (as Wilber has it), not arbitrary identification. 9. Problems of Self and Self-realisation: the intrusion of value and the issue of evil. Restrictive practices can remove a serious problem for identification theory, the problem of evil identifications, but they raise an equally serious problem, how the re intrusion of value is to be avoided. Fox is vaguely aware that 'the concept of intrinsic worth' may intrude in discussions of Self-realisation. But he assumes, much too facilely, that it can be simply removed (p.56). Devall's later writings should have alerted him to the problems of those who identify with anti-environmental objects or causes, such as beach buggies, symbols of power like bulldozers or tanks , or sand mining opportunities. Identification is not always with the good, with good guys or good causes, as selective deep ecology examples invariably suggest (e.g. p.60, with sea turtles, tigers and gibbons). Spinoza, one of the progenitors of the theory, avoided the problem of evil attachments and causes by envisaging primarily identification with Nature or God, assumed ipso facto to be good. But Naess and Sessions allow for a much wider range of identifications, with the whole human race, which may overall be evil (for all that conventional ethics assert), or with undoubtedly evil human groups or organisations (e.g. the German S.S. or the Mafia). Such expanded identification is hardly to be recommended or encouraged. 33 The person touch is too narrow, unless animals are persons. For there appear to be no serious difficulties in ascribing selves to animals. Of course, if consciousness (or circularly self-consciousness) is written into the notion of self, as with some of the dictionary senses, then selves will be restricted to those animals that enjoy consciousness, a quite extensive class overlapping humans. In a different sense, tied to an original meaning of 'self as same, or one and the same used esp. prepositionally in referring back, there is no difficulty in ascribing selves much more widely. Thus we naturally say of a forest, 'It looks after itself', of an automata or even boomerang, 'It came back itself'. The broad philosophical sense (first part of sense 3 in OED) in terms of individual essences, what a thing really and intrinsically is, haecceity, certainly admits selves for forests! 66 There are criticisms, yet to be answered (though initiated in my Critique), that the "widened identification route" introduces virtually as many problems as it would resolve, and that it cannot proceed independently of what it is supposed to offer an alternative to (p.53), the pernicious "environmental axiological route". In a passage quoted from Seed part of the problem is glimpsed, though Fox who emphasizes the relevant passage fails to observe it: 'It is only by identification with the whole process that correct values will emerge' (p.63). Why? Because, as in Spinoza, "the whole process" is assumed Good, while anything less may not be; a distribution of value is presupposed. How furthermore does a disciple ensure that a proper totalising identification is made? By confirming that correct values do emerge. In brief, then, identification theory is no substitute for valuation theory, but an addition to it. Moreover, it is not an entirely essential addition, however psychologically useful. With the reintrusion of value or the like, the acclaimed superiority of the wider identification approach over the environmental axiological approach lapses. The claim, for which Fox offers initial but unpersuasive defence (p.77 on), is based on another mistake: the mistake, already observed, of thinking that value theory excludes identification. But it need not: selective identification can complement intrinsic value. Very selective identification reveals as well how a theory of heightened Self can be substantially independent of widened (unrestrictive) identification. In showing independence Hinduism, as sometimes presented (e.g. by Smith), affords an admirable example. Hinduism supposes a diminution or deepening of the self to the underlying Self, a route of self-abnegation; but that is taken to be equivalent, by inversion, to a unique expansion of self to approximate a God's eye viewpoint (of things sub specie aeternitas ). 34 34 Whereas Western approaches aim to enlarge the self - as with stock aggrandizement, or Western deep ecology expansion - Indian approaches are concerned primarily with contracting upon the self, to reduce individual expectations, aspirations, wants (to nothing on some accounts). For a resolution of life with disappointments, the (negative) suggestion is: 'if the ego were to have no expectations, there would then be nothing to disappoint' (Smith p.26). But interestingly, there is supposed to be a positive inversion of self abnegation which turns it into self expansion. Expand 'the interests of the self ... to the point of approximating a God's-eye view .. . . Seeing, thus, all things "under the aspect of eternity", would not one become completely objective towards oneself, accepting failure as being as natural an occurrence as success ... . How can defeat disappoint if one feels the joy of the victor as if it were one's own?' (p.26). 'Detachment from the finite self or attachment to reality as a whole ... positive or negative ... ' (p.27). One path to God, to oneness with the Godhead (Brahman), that through knowledge, jnana yoga, strikingly resembles Western deep ecology in some of its features and terminology. The 'Yoga of knowledge is said to be the shortest path to divine realisation (to God). It is also the steepest' (p.35). For intellectuals, introverts and the like 'Hinduism proposes a series of meditations and logical demonstrations 67 While Hinduism does also make room for expansions of selves through time, so as to 'rise above the present and even above present lifespans' (p.28) these expansions are tied to lifelines of single creatures (perhaps as reincarnated). There is no technical provision for unlimited wider identification, for instance identification with inanimate items, with a motorcycle or nuclear reactor. Thus Hinduism can serve to show the independence of unrestrictive expanded identification from self-Self theories. Evidently, too, variations on self-Self (e.g. with more ascetic theories of big Self) can strengthen this result. designed to convince the thinker that there is more to him than his finite self; ... [to] shift his central concern to the deeper reaches of his being ... the larger self that lies behind ... ' (p.33). One 'must pierce and dissolve the innumerable layers of manifest personality until all strata of the mask [all roles of the persona] are at length cut through, [to] arrive finally at the anonymous and strangely unconcerned actor [Atman] who stands beneath. The distinction between self and Self can come through another image' (p.34) however than that of the removal of roles and personae; thus there is the image of the game of life upon a chess-board and the image of the charioteer. Through exercise with such images and such practices it is claimed that a practitioner can 'build up a lively sense of an abiding Self that underlies his phenomenal personality' (p.34). The further 'step consists in shifting his self-identification from the passing to the eternal part of his being. The most direct way of doing this ... is simply to [contemplate] one's identity with the Eternal Spirit ... ' (p.35). Of course analogous self-improvement, self-abnegation and self-expansive elements feature in other religions than Indian, where they were especially early and conspicuous. In Zen, for instance, 'the dualisms of self and object, of self and other, are transcended' (p.134). In Christianity too, the circle of self can be broken, and release experienced from the cramping confines of ego (Smith again, p.280). Analogous elements made their way into Western philosophies, such as that of Spinoza, early romanticism (e.g. Schegel), German idealism and T.H. Green, and directly or indirectly into Western deep ecology (Fox, p.57). As Marxism is sometimes seen, crudely, as obtained by upending Hegelianism and replacing God by Man, so transpersonal ecology can be regarded as similarly varying elements of Hinduism, replacing God by Nature (rather than identifying them as in Spinoza). Ideological tradition does not however point uniformly in one direction, with self elevation as invariant. According to Buddhism, here too more enlightened than alternatives, that is a wrong direction. 'Strong emotions, however lofty [including those of ecological consciousness], tend to emphasize and strengthen the fatal illusion of the ego, which it is the whole aim and purpose of religion to transcend'. For the 'idea of a Self is at the root of every evil passion (and through its action Salvation becomes impossible)' (both quoted in Perrett, p.72). Instead Buddhism offers the tantalizing doctrine of "no self', which at least denies the existence of a substantial self. Further there is allusion to "'the two kinds of non-self': that means there is no ego in humans and no Self in Nature'. 68 Features of Hinduism also show up deficiencies in the Western Enlightenmentsponsored objective of Self-realisation. These include the already remarked problem of evil, which afflicts unrestricted Self-realisation in much the way it plagues closely related hedonism (often a main goal of Self-realisation, and out of an adjacent intellectual stable). To avoid promotion of evil and the like, ethical or similar controls need to be inserted. It should be realisation of an ethical Self, just as elsewhere it should be ethical happiness and ethical profit, not happiness and profit at the expense of other creatures or the Earth. There is worse to come. For there is a scurrilous bigger-is-better element to big Self expansion and realisation, and to often announced, but thoroughly dubious, goals of maximization. Without ethical constraints, the supreme goal of ecosophy, of maximizing Self-realisation, can be decidedly anti-environmental, as too many maximizers proceed to aggrandize themselves, maximize their consumption, or their identification with false chauvinistic Gods, or their dominance, and so on. Such maximal Self-realisation is evidently antithetical to deep environmentalism, which like high-path Hinduism and Taoism, is opposed to selfelevation and self-aggrandizement, especially in material consumption, and favours some self-restraint, self-effacement, self-domination, even selflessness and self-abnegation. But such unconstrained maximization is also in conflict with other features of ecosophy, such as simplicity of, and restraint in, material means, implying a certain Self-contraction. In brief, unrefined ecosophy is liable to be inconsistent. 10. Deconstruction and reselection of self. The problems run deeper however. The theory of expanded self and Self-realisation has ecologically defective starting points: it takes as given what should be investigated and rejected. For instance, Naess simply assumes that the process of heightened Self-realisation starts with the 'development of the narrow ego of the small [Western] child into the comprehensive structure of a Self which comprises all human beings' (quoted p.55; egoism is also assumed p.64 ). Of course deep ecology aims to induce a further development, beyond the anthropic limitations of standard trans personal psychology, 'a deep identification of individuals with all of life' (p.55 again). 35 While it is plain enough that ego is a theoretical notion, elaborated especially by Freud, it is less plain that self too is a folk-theoretic term of certain folk cultures, and it is quite insufficiently appreciated that narrow egos and individual selves are not culturally independent items (artifacts some would now say), but are acquired concepts, 35 Both developments parallel ascents in Hinduism, of upward path of "renunciation", to third (service to human communities) and fourth life-objectives. 69 chauvinistically learnt early in civilised life. Perhaps because individual selves are so deeply entrenched, especially in Westerners' impressions of themselves, a clever practical and ideological course is no doubt the encouragement of expanded egoism, self stretching exercises and empathy. But a deeper philosophical approach would investigate the notions of ego and selftheir history, development, entrenchment, arbitrariness, and dispensibility - rather than take them substantially for granted. In dissolving egoism, it is wise not to concede it at the outset. It, and the intertwined notions of self-interest, and self-ish-ness, should be taken apart to begin with, both analytically and historically. There are of course two parts to the unmasking and dethroning of self-interest: dealing with interest and dealing with self A historical investigation of the rise of the modern theory of self, done in the style of Foucault, might serve to show how arbitrary in crucial respects the notion now rigorously adhered to in social theory happens to be, and how developments could have been different. But even if such an investigation should run aground (e.g. because the notion, although not present in all tribal peoples, reaches back to prehistory), a systematic investigation need not get stuck. The notion of self-interest, and also expanded self interest in the form of group or class interest, has already been taken apart, from the angle of interest, and found wanting as an ethical starting point (see esp. our 79). A complementary investigation of self, standard theories of which should certainly not be conceded, is now required. 36 Some realisation of the problematic character of the notion of self is in fact disclosed in Naess's much earlier investigations, but he does not apply it to the familiar Enlightenment ideal of self-realisation which he takes over as foundation of his own ecosophy, and so of deep ecology as he conceives it. Instead of requisite critical and de( con)structive investigation of the notion of self, resulting in its demotion, what we are witnessing in too much deeper environmental philosophy, is an elevation of the notion and an attempt to focus and found much theory upon it (as esp. in Fox). It is reminiscent of, and related to, the earlier failed attempt to found much theory, including ethics (or a replacement for it), on the notion of person.3 7 36 My impression is that several such investigations are now under way. For discussion and elaboration of earlier investigations, which glimpse some of the requisite points, see Perrett. Our own previous investigations, particularly of the interests and needs of oneself and their interrelations and overlap with those of others (and accordingly the falseness of the egoism-altruism contrast) in 79 and EP, go some small way along the requisite path. 37 Thus, for instance, Strawson in metaphysics, and Benn in moral sciences, both elaborating on Kantian illusions. 70 Indeed those routes are significantly interlinked and offer similar beginnings; for instance, a personality comprises certain roles into which a self, oneself, is cast. In important respects, self amounts to person somewhat deanthropocized. It also suffers similar defects. Neither is sufficiently explained (e.g. what are the existence conditions, the identity conditions, the distinctive properties); neither is up to carrying the heavy theoretical load aficionados have attempted to impose upon them. In particular, neither enables an independent characterisation of central axiologic or deontic notions or other notions bound up with the regulation of conduct which they would somehow displace and to some extent provide new foundations for. Furthermore it appears that the notion of self is not, and cannot be, sufficiently deanthropicized, short of distributing selves around in woods, springs and mountains in the way pagan religions did with spirits (and then letting them be good and evil, and so forth). Undue concentration upon selves has the unfortunate and retrograde effect of swinging environmental philosophy away from deepened ecology and back to agents and actors, the live active subcomponents within ecologies. unacknowledged return to shallower waters. It signals an Because self, however dispensible in environmental philosophy, is integral to Wes tern deep ecology, it behoves us to say something about it, something more than deep ecology has said. Self is a folk-theoretic object of philosophical cast, though no doubt an item with experiential linkage, for instance as a permanent substratum of a certain range of successive (internal) states and experiences, or, without a substance, as a bundle or stringing together of a succession of 'personal' experiences. 38 It is an item, almost an objectification, whose features (which may vary with underlying theory) are primarily supplied through a culturally-dependent theory or the like (e.g. a religious or cult theory). In this regard it is like other typically psychological items of philosophical importance, such as soul (with which it is sometimes identified), spirit, mental substance, mind, psyche, person, personal essence, ego, life force, conatus, etc. In due course a now standard range of philosophical theories gets invoked to account for, or discount, such items: realisms, constructivisms, nominalisms, etc., with dominant scientific ideology committed to a dismissive nominalism. A fashionable humanist opposition has, by contrast, become enamoured of a flamboyant constructivism: selves are made, fabricated, and the like. By contrast again Western deep ecology appears committed to realism, and therewith an 38 While the experiences, such as surges of desire or apprehension, are subjectively empirical enough, the substratum or self-substance may not be. To put it in Humean terms, when I look within I don't find a self just like that (how a sceptical Hume managed to still eludes me). Self itself, like cause, though empirically grounded, is not an "empirical" concept. 71 incredible ontology of selves (already castigated). None of these standard mass-produced positions impresses as at all satisfactory (for reasons elaborated in JB ). For example, scientific nominalism inexcusably leaves out lots of experience, life-forms, and much richness (whereas for its own "legitimate" theoretical purposes it is prepared to introduce all sorts of strange objects). For constructivism there are so far unsurmounted difficulties in getting beyond the analogy: exhibiting the materials and explaining just how they are assembled. While not averse to phrases like 'the fabrication of self', it needs to be remembered that the fabrications are more like those of fiction. Insensitive realism is different; there is sound reason to remain entirely sceptical about an intuitive ontology of selves, especially when a good empathesizer may have numerous different existent selves. I can see little excuse for (being taken in by) such ontological blow outs. Item-theory offers an appealing alternative to these standard positions generally, and therewith very different prospects for self. An item-theoretic account of self will resemble that already offered for mind (in MX); analogous item-theoretic accounts can no doubt be given for spirit, psyche and ego (and also spook, shade, spectre, ghost, etc.). Minds are fairly satisfactory folk-theoretic items which do not exist; ghosts, whether in machines or not, are decidedly less satisfactory inexistential items. Selves are different inexistential items again, with different features; many subjects which do not have minds may have selves. The difficult part of the business consists in explaining whic~ items selves are, a business that is complicated because there are several somewhat different but interconnected notions of self in circulation. Fortunately these can all be accounted for as restrictions in one way or another- temporal, cultural, subject-discipline - of a total self. The total self of a subject abstracts from the total set of features which contribute to the self or personality of that subject, from everything that makes it selfwise what it is (whether supplied by local cultures or not, both supplied internally and not), over the life-span of the subject. For some subjects with richer psychic lives, these features will include states of consciousness (and then the total self will properly include ego, the conscious self). Thus a total self is, if you like, what distinguishes a subject, makes it what it is and so gives its abiding essence (and id-entity), and so resolves issues of personal identity over times. 39 What the relevant features are will become clearer as we come to the usual restrictions. A first set of restrictions are temporal restrictions, a second set aspect restrictions. These are combined in the OED sense 39 This account sharpens and much elaborates the senses which the dictionaries list as philosophical, e.g. OED sense 3. The inexistential account offered shares common ground with the Buddhist "no self' theory when presented as denying the real existence of a self. 72 '4.a. What one is at a particular time or in a particular aspect or relation; one's nature, character, or (sometimes) physical constitution or appearance, considered as different at different times. Chiefly with qualifying adj.' So, for example, Dobbin's total self restricted to time period t1 differs from his total self restricted to t2 at which period he is old and mentally decrepit. A main aspect restriction, very commonly imposed, is to psychically-relevant features, excluding merely bodily features. Differently, a total self, especially a total psychic self, of a subject may be partitioned into such selves, whence sense 4 b of OED. '4. b. An assemblage of characteristics and dispositions which may be conceived as constituting one of various conflicting personalities within a human being. Better self: the better part of one's nature.' Among the topic, or subject-discipline, restricted selves those of economics and social sciences are nowadays particularly prominent. A broad economic self, for instance, is a psychic self confined to an individual and restricted to its locus of wants, preferences, desires, interests, needs, aspirations, goals, etc. (Of course some of the volitional features can be explained in terms of others; in older faculty discourse, it coincides with the individual will.) With a narrow economic self, that of mainstream economics, the broad economic self is narrowed considerably to remove all volitional features stretching beyond those of a present human. Thus interests, for instance, are restricted to selfish interests, those of the human concerned, to exclude both altruistic interests (those of relevance to other items and typically against a creature's own selfish interests) and, more important, other-directed and higher-order interests (such as a's interest is that Ws interest be fulfilled, a's concern for~' etc.) 40 This narrow self tightens up a further dictionary sense, namely OED '5. One's personal welfare and interests as an object of concern; chiefly in a bad sense, selfish or self-interested motives ... '. The tightened-up restrictive notion lies at the base of most modern social science. It is characteristically coupled with the Hobbesian theme, according to which all motivation reduces to that of narrow economic selves, effectively self-interest. Such psychological egoism, that nothing can move a creature to action or decision except interests and like experiences of its own self, was assumed by Spinoza, who proposed absorbing this 40 These points are much further explained in 79 and EP. Other selves, such as altruistic selves and self-effacing selves, deploy quite different obverse restrictions, eliminating local selfish interests. 73 excessively narrow self in a generous Nature (p.57). Deep ecology has attempted to expand this sorry route (p.54), which starts out from a dominant paradigm mistake. 41 11. More troubles with Self as foundation. The big trouble is that an expanded Hobbesian picture, with expanded-self interest as the only fundamental motive, presupposes the essential correctness of Hobbes' crude theme - all that Hobbes really got wrong was the 'size' of one's self - but that is a fundamental mistake. It is a mistake as fundamental as the conflicting crude motivational theme that the only basic motive of business enterpreneurs is [self-]profit. It is a mistake of the same cast as the pervasive idea that conventional ethics can be rendered environmentally adequate just by expansion of those it applies to (expansion of the "community", or of a suitable base class of parties with interests, sentience, etc.) - what is often now called 'moral extensionism' 42 . As empirical evidence tells, prima facie decisively, against intertwined Hobbesian and entrepreneurial economic motivational theory - an extraordinarily convenient, and not "rationally" abandoned, theory for contemporary power elites - two substantially successful theory-saving strategies swing into action: • a sustained propaganda campaign to align people's motives with the theory, conducted through advertising, education and other mass channels of persuasion; • a sustained reduction campaign by subservient intellectuals to show that all apparently exceptional motives actually conform to the motivational theory. At the same time, minorities (such as pre-industrial peoples) whose motives do not conform to the established/ment theory are of course discounted. This seriously flawed anti-environmental theory should be resisted and replaced, not just extended. For the only basic and legitimate motives and interests are not merely those of self (whether expanded in a futile attempt to encapture other or not). One distinct motive is, to put it in old-fashioned Kantian terms though the example is not Kantian, that of duty, duty for instance to this Earth, duty which is neither self-regarding or necessarily Self-regarding or, in any ordinary sense, otherregarding. 41 The chauvinistic expansion of self and person is sometimes carried to remarkable lengths, as revealed by Shepard: 'we must affirm that the world is being a part of our own body'. 42 For further explanation and criticism of this expansion, see EP. At least Fox does Sylvan the "favour" of distancing him from the most famous exponent of such extensionism, Leopold, whom he tries to push into the wider identification and wider Self fold (p.64). 74 A third complementary strategy renders the theory normative: while agents may act, or appear to act, on non-self-interested motives, it is only rational to act according to one's ongoing self-interest. (While we shall focus upon a strong version of the normative egoistic theme, that it is only rational to act in one's own self-interest, including one's future self, much of what is said counts against weaker forms of the theme according to which it is in some way preeminently reasonable to act in one's own on-going self-interest.) This normative assumption depends crucially however upon a specially-tailored theory of self- a substantial underlying self that suitably integrates all one's interests and concerns, past, present and future. Without such an account the peculiar self-evidence normative egoism is presented as enjoying, and upon which it depends as an unargued rest position, begins to fall away. Suppose instead a self or person is represented as a sequence of causally connected experiential moments (e.g. momentary selves, of a person). Unfortunately then, for normative egoism, it ceases to be evident to many presently placed selves that there are special specially-valid reasons for only being concerned with future elements of one particular sequence rather than another, to which one's present self may not belong; for promoting the interests of this future momentary self rather than some other more congenial one, perhaps in another sequence. 43 Indeed it is evident that reasons for action are not confined to those intermalised to the interests of one future self rather than another, one my or thou or it (say) rather than another; that reasons can and do operate beyond interests, as when directed at the futures of forests or fens, and beyond selves and their extensions and variants such as I's and Thou's and You's, as when arguing for deep environmental action. Nor is there cogent reason for trying to curtail reasons to what answers to a bad, if deeply incalcated, theory, a pernicious and damaging, if widely promoted, theory and sense of self joined to chauvinistic bodily consumption and advancement. A more generous itemtheoretic theory of total self can expose this theoretical fraud, allowing for a full flowering of reasons for action; it thus diffuses the narrow greedy self of Hobbesian theory. Expanded Hobbesian is assumed in deep ecological Ego-tripping (pp. 65-66) and in 'the theme of ecological resistance as Self-defence', that resisting ecological depredation is defending oneSelf, because the whales or forests are me; it is me that is being injured (p.61). Such expanded Hobbesian is even less plausible than Hobbesianism itself - among other things because you can go on, to become other You's even after You as the forest has been destroyed. Be sure I do not deplore, but welcome worthwhile ecological resistance 43 On all these points see further Perrett, esp. p.72. Perrett explains how the regularly assumed opposition between egoism and altruism depends on particular assumptions about the nature of self, and breaks down when, as in buddhist ethics with its doctrine of no-self, these assumptions get removed. 75 whether conducted as Self-defence, or not; good works, even if undertaken for self-ish or distorted or ridiculous motives, are not to be disparaged. Nor similarly should the help of campaigners whose motives have been distorted by propaganda systems be disparaged because those campaigners are engaged on dubious or bizarre bases, such as that they are defending themselves rather than something else that deserves their care, concern and respect. What should be resisted are the twin ideas that these are the wholesome motives or the only [rational] motives, and that quality of motivation does not affect goodness of act. The main trouble then with the wild Western approach so advanced under Self-interest is that, like Hobbesianism but on an expanded scale, it would reduce or suppress all other motivation. In many ways, it has not really got beyond bad "old paradigm" thinking, but merely bizarrely extended it. 12. Liquidating Fox's "deep ecological territory". The success Fox imagines expanded-Self is going to have in the environmental struggle arena, a success far surpassing that environmental ethics is likely to have (p.84), is premissed on this faulty expanded Hobbesianism theory. It is not based on monitored field experience. In the action field, where some Western deep ecologists are seldom seen, identification techniques, far from admirably shifting the onus of proof (a dubious claim also advanced on p.84 ), are likely to be greeted with amazement and disbelief: what is this crap? It is not very long ago that people who thought they were tigers or trees were locked away, or else regarded, like the man who identified his wife as a hat, as figures of fun not to be taken seriously. Such motivation is likely to be taken, and presented, by a hostile and backwards opposition as crazy. Furthermore, such defences can back-fire. Identification with a rainforest, for instance, because symmetrical, does not guarantee defence of its needs as one's own, as against one's own needs as its. A powerful bunch of developers and bureaucrats who identify with the forest may take their needs, for timber profits and tourist revenues, as its, and interfere with it accordingly. Identification, on its own, admits disastrous reversal. Expanded Selves can be dubious allies in environmental struggles. It is fortunate then that for almost all environmental purposes, including those of deep environmental philosophy, the notion of self can drop out; selves are inessential. While 76 decent theories of self and self-Self can presumably be worked out44 , and Self tried out as sole primitive, the theory so far, and with it (Western) deep ecological theory in present form remains both a shambles and an embarrassment. It is bad news then, given the abysmal shape of the deep ecological theory of self, that deep ecology should contract, at least on Fox's continuing vision, to a theory of self (see also 89). On this presentation much of authentic deep ecology is thrown away. The deep ecological framework comes down to 'two basic hypotheses and on ultimate norm', all of which revolve around Self (pp.86-7): it is Self, Self and Self, nothing but Self. And it has nothing essentially to do with the environment. For Self does not provide the great new (or shabby old) starting point to environmental philosophy that Fox imagines. To elaborate:One "hypothesis", already criticised, is that 'Our Self is that with which we identify' (p.86, the pluralisation is interesting, e.g. a vintage car club has a group Self which includes their cars and perhaps others they covet); the other, not previously encountered, is that 'the self can and does grow/develop/mature ... over time' (p.17). That hypothesis is presumably false; for selves, like plants, may decline, wither or die. Or don't ecological selves wither and die? 'The norm is that the ideal state of being is one that sustains the evident (and deepest) possible identification and, hence, sense of Self'. It seems to be assumed that the ideal state, identified in the "norm", ought to be striven for (though it is hard to see why: it involves much unpleasant, embarrassing or boring identification work, etc.). There are accordingly covert principles of conduct, such as striving towards the norm and undertaking the "real spiritual work" of deep ecology, and covert values, such as that of the (so-called) ideal state, lurking at the bottom of Wes tern deep ecology; it too hides, even in its reduced form, a condemned "axiology" and ethics. But not environmental ones; the norm could have issued from a deviant Hinduism, without environmental commitments, concerned above all with introverted cultivation of self. Although Fox says the 'ideal state of being is referred to ... as "ecological consciousness" by Devall and Sessions' (p.87), such reference does not make it so; ecological consciousness involves rather awareness of and commitment to certain things and matters ecological, not widest identification, which involves much that is unecological, such 44 Perhaps following through suggestions sketched earlier, perhaps elaborating, in less anthropocentric style, T.H. Green, whose theory appears to anticipate much of wild Western deep ecology. Green took self-awareness as a guide to the nature of things and self-realisation as each person's goal. He held that the developed self is the end which defines the good, and that all ethical terms may be formed, so far as required, to that end. Of course he also spoke against atomism and individualism, and in favour of holism and organicism. 77 as traffic with occult and transfinite, or antiecological, such as identification with developers ripping down rainforest and heritage works. While Fox does claim that consequences for the natural (not the built) environment do follow from his framework, the claim is mistaken. According to him, 'it follows ... that when we harm or limit the flow of nature then we are harming or limiting that with which we ... identify and so diminishing our ... Self' (p.87). No such consequence follows as regards widest possible identification; all that destruction of an ecosystem does is to put the ecosystem in a possible world, with which identification is sustained, and bring up a different and perhaps humanly improved world (e.g. a wild river is dammed to save villages). The remote Self is unperturbed by such commerce of actuality. Even if Fox should try to save the show by again restricting awkward or uncomfortable identification feats, his intended consequences do not follow. For we may well increase that with which we identify by "limiting the flow of nature", for instance by varying or enriching parts of extensive monotonous natural systems. 45 Fox's deep ecological-framew ork, Self-indulgence of a deep spiritual cast, is no framework for an environmental anything. Luckily it is not needed, but can be despatched with other deep ecological rubbish. 13. Justifying "extreme interpretations" of and "extreme reactions" to wild West deep ecology. Fox exhibits full dominant paradigm outrage at what he refers to as my 'extreme interpretations' and 'extreme reactions' (boldface headings for sections 3 and 4, p.13 and p.19). While I am quite accustomed to being called or accounted an extremist, it is generally done by those far on the shallow side of the environmental divide. I trust such terms as 'extreme' carry no more weight with readers than they do with me. It is a fashionable, but methodologically quite unsound, ploy to try to dismiss those who depart far from some lately received position as extremists. Nowadays even 'Thomas Aquinas, for example, is depicted as an 'extremist' (by Hart) and dismissed because the views he expressed do not accord with what "all lawyers think" (Dworkin)' ;46 one is in good company. The Earth will in the longer term be helped by deep environmental extremists 45 That Fox's theory (already epicycling, into dimensions) admits such cases is evident from "the extinction example" (pp. 82-3). Because they are sufficiently evident, I have not recorded difficulties regarding this example, which attempts to discriminate different sorts of environmental losses by their differential effects on Selves (if there are any ecological ones left that is: Last Self arguments retain their bite and smile). 46 According to H. Miles in a curious letter to the ANU Reporter 1989. 78 who serve to shift various balances in environmental directions - the balances to be achieved, for example, in discussions, in time allowed in decision making, and so on. But what Fox also says he means, under the emotive overlay, is that 'Sylvan's arguments show a tendency to push the claims of those he criticises to extremes' through application of the following reduction-of-relations principles: S 1. 'if two concepts/ideas are linked, then they must be completely similar (equivalent [identical])'; S2. 'if they are contrasted then they must be completely different (i.e. non-intersecting) as well as completely exhaustive (i.e. covering all cases/examples of the set in question)' (p.13 and earlier). All these principles (S2 breaks down into a pair straightaway) are evidently fallacious, and only hold in very special cases. Now I claim to be well aware of this, and to have illustrated this awareness sufficiently in my work (esp. investigation of the history of the attempt to remove or suppress relations, investigation of very special cases, such as "classical relevant logics", where a connections of the form, "where Rab then a = b" does hold; see JB and RLR respectively). Indeed I discuss an example of this 'crude fallacy' in one of the sectors that particularly excites Fox (Cp.27). But in any case, the principles are substantially irrelevant to Fox's discussion of 'extreme interpretations' and 'extreme reactions' (in his sections 3 and 4)! For, as we shall see, what really bothers Fox, and also N aess, has little that is not superficial (merely terminological) to do with extremes; what troubles them rather is that I take their claims seriously, and not as forever 'preliminary', or at 'a superficial level', or 'metaphorical' or the like (see e.g. p.13, p.49). 47 Firstly, I introduced the quasi-technical term 'extreme holism' ('extreme' was italicised to indicate its introduction and quasi-technical character, not to emphasize my extremism) as contrasted with 'moderate holism' .48 That is obviously not an extreme claim, it is not pressing a claim to extremes; it is simply using a piece of terminology, and does nothing for Fox's cause. I take seriously Naess's holistic claim, repeated by incautious deep ecologists, that his conception 'dissolves ... the very notion of the world as composed of discrete, compact, separate "things"', which I describe as 'extreme holism'. 47 One day I should really like some non-preliminary formulations from Naess. Quite separately from that standing request, I do regard it as pretty ridiculous to insist that ordinary discourse about chairs and desks, fems and wombats is 'talking at a superficial or preliminary level of communication'. Perhaps we have to expect this sort of twaddle from hard-wired physicalists, not from deep thinkers. 48 It is a contrast previously discussed, in more detail but in different terms, in EP, p.222ff. 79 Fox's response to my reporting of Naess's claim, in the style of Dr. Johnson (no separate things, so no wildernesses!, no forests!), his only response it seems, is '(Does Sylvan) sincerely think that anybody could be that silly?' (p.14). The answer is of course: Yes, damned right he does; for example, too many influenced by Hegelianism. It 1s unremarkable that Fox and Naess are trying to backtrack without appearing to do so. 49 Where, then, is the (non-quotational) extreme interpretation? Fox makes two connected moves, neither of which duly involve principles Sl and S2. Firstly, he introduces a distinction, not previously in the ballpark, between relative and absolute autonomy of "things in the world" (p.14). As commonplace in Fox's practice, the apparent distinction is introduced and put to work without proper explanation. Then Fox announces that 'it is clear from his interpretation that he [Sylvan] takes Naess and myself to be denying even relative autonomy ... whereas it should be clear ... that what is being denied is absolute autonomy'; and he has the audacity to go on, ' ... there is really no excuse for Sylvan's extreme interpretation' (p.14). Well, you can take my word for it that Sylvan did not take N aess and Fox that way; the distinction in question had not been introduced in the literature under discussion. For similar reasons, that there is no basis for it, there is no extreme interpretation, and nothing to underwrite Fox's captious moralising. Secondly, Fox proceeds quite scurrilously to make it look as if I am attributing certain themes I nowhere allude to him and Naess (but in fact attacked in Wilber's book). ' ... Sylvan's extreme interpretation ... would have Naess and myself reduce all diversity and multiplicity to something like "uniform, homogeneous, and unchanging mush" or to "uniform, all-prevading, featureless but divine goo"'. The quotations, which may well look as if they were drawn from my criticism, bear no resemblance to anything I attributed to Naess or Fox; they are in fact drawn from Wilber's fashionable Eye to Eye. Similarly that 'extreme interpretation' is not to be found in Sylvan; it is a fabrication on the part of Fox. Nothing I made critical use of tells against Naess's total-field exhibiting various features, such as some internal differentiation. The Flux of late nineteenth century philosophy was both non-uniform and non-homogeneous, with 'eddies, ripples and whirlpools in a stream ("unity in process")' (p.15), without being composed of separate individuals. The other example Fox includes in his section in extreme interpretations, the matter of internal relations, will also require, to begin with, some grimy textual exegesis, including further inspection of Fox's practice of tactical misquotation (or quotation out of context), 49 Their behaviour is reminiscent of Parmenides and Zeno at the races, as delightfully related by Bouwsma. 80 rather than real philosophical work. 50 But here no attempt is made to exhibit an 'extreme interpretation' (nor again do principles Sl and S2 enter). Fox's first (and final) point is that subscription to a doctrine of internal relations 'does not necessarily render one an idealist' (p.17). Whereupon, by way of counterexample, Fox trots out his own admirable philosophical pedigree, and reveals a doctrine of internal relations inherited from the neutral monism of Spinoza and the process philosophy of Whitehead, both well known for their doctrines of internal relations. N aess does at least make it evident that he is adopting or adapting the received theory of internal relations. As it happens, I did not commit myself to the proposition that a doctrine of internal relations (however characteristic of idealism) entails idealism; naturally there appears to be more to idealism than that (such as a total-field doctrine). Only by a misreading or misquotation does Fox obtain his necessarily linkage to idealism. Firstly he represents me as ascribing to him 'this "idealist theory of internal relations"' (p.15), when what I actually wrote was that a certain 'form of argument ... commandeers elements of the idealist theory of internal relations' (p.27 emphasis added). Later he congratulates himself upon 'discrediting Sylvan's claims that deep ecology subscribes ... to his characterisation of the theory of internal relations, which he describes (p.28) as "a terminal form of idealism newly warmed up"' (p.18). To credit to me 'a characterisation of the theory of internal relations' is certainly a gross overstatement, though it may be convenient in trying to exonerate the doctrine of deep ecology from evident criticism. But the immediate salient point is that what I say 'looks like a terminal form of idealism ... ' (C p.28 emphasis added) is not the theory of internal relations but 'what Fox describes as "the central intuition of deep ecology"'. The second, of Fox's three points as to my comments on the deep ecological doctrine of internal relations, is a bit more philosophically substantive, and concerns the character of the necessity ascribed to connections. But textual exegesis is again unavoidable. Fox contends that 'Naess's definition of internal relations ... flatly contradicts Sylvan's claim that this view point renders "all connections necessary" in the ... sense Sy Ivan intends' (p.16; Fox has the term 'strong' where dots are inserted; we'll look at what Fox is trying to hang on me shortly). 51 On Naess's explanation, an internal 'relation between two things A and B is such that the relation belongs to the definitions or basic constituents of A and B, so that without the relation, A and Bare no longer the same things' (see p.15). Consider any 50 By and large, deep ecology involves disturbingly little real philosophical work. So much of it is name dropping, rank pulling, unacknowledged borrowing - all the old stuff some of us hoped to be rid of with a "new environmental paradigm". 51 In fact I had been arguing from Fox's theme that "all entities are constituted by their relations" (see C pp.27-8), but Fox diverts the issue to Naess. 81 internal connection R between A and B (indeed on the standard theory where all relations of objects are internal, any connection). Then ARB holds by virtue of definitional or constitutional features of A and B. But what so holds, holds as a matter of necessity (is 'necessarily constitutive' in Fox's lingo, Fox trying again for a resolving distinction); whence the connection holds of necessity. A flat contradiction? Now to the 'strong sense' Fox has located and is spreading abroad that I intend (once again he did not consult me as to what I intended). 'Sylvan is claiming', according to him (though I have never advanced such a claim, and am still not clear what it means, 'exact nature of' being Fox's terminology), 'that the exact nature of all those relationships is also necessary' (p.16). Now in trying to show that Naess's story conflicts with this claim he has hung on me, Fox proceeds to run Naess into deep trouble (though Naess is blithely oblivious; see note (22)). For, so Fox says,5 2 'Naess explicitly acknowledges that A and B can exist "without" the relation"', meaning "'in a different relationship" or "in the absence of that specific relation"' (p.16). Suppose such a different relation is S (at worst S is the absence of R). So apparently ASB and not-ARB; whence A, for instance, has inconsistent properties, namely both ... RB which is constitutive and not- ... RB by acknowledgement . To be sure, the difficulty can be avoided, by insisting (as N aess did and as Fox also has him say) that 'without the relationship, A and B are no longer the same things', so what we have is A'SB' and not- A'RB' for some counterparts A' and B' of A and B. Some such line is taken by the standard theory. But Fox seeks a connection between A and B for Naess which is in some respects contingent. Certainly that is possible, but it goes beyond the bounds of the standard theory by admitting external relations, for which it is not required that A and B are no longer the same without the relation. And, in a straightforward sense, it fails the constituting claim: entities have relations, external ones, which are not constituting (to deal with Fox-past), or alternatively (to refute Fox-present, p.17) it is false that 'all relationships are necessarily constitutive' because some, external ones, are not. My wombat example, to come to Fox's third point, was designed to indicate just that, that a wombat stands in various relationships which are not (necessarily) constitutive and which are merely contingent. Suppose wombat A passed by hollow stringbark B on its foraging route (say once only, and accidentally, because it had wandered out of its territory). Then "A passed by B" is a relation between A and B, a true relation, which furthermore is merely contingent, because it might not have transpired. Moreover, the relation is not constitutive, for instance of A, because it makes no difference to the nature or 52 The claim attributed to Naess does not appear in his original 1973 paper where the relational total field image was presented, and from which the other Naess' quotes were drawn. 82 constitution of wombat A. What I mean by term 'constitute' (and likewise 'constitutive') Fox professes unclarity about this (p.17) - is what is ordinarily meant by the term in such contexts, namely what makes a thing what it is, what determines it (see OED), what gives a definite nature or character to (see Concise English). 53 Wombat A, one and the same A, a creature with exactly the same make-up as A, not some counterpart or surrogate A', might not have passed by B. So "passed by B" is not constitutive of A; and again not all relations are constitutive. Despite the general paucity and poorness of argument in much revealed deep ecology literature, the general downgrading of rational and analytic methods 54 , and the emphasis on experiential and empathetic approaches, the status of argument turns out to be a sensitive issue too. Fox beats up an issue on this topic, on route to the grander issue of intellectual rubbish, by his standard practice of misattribution. He proceeds stealthily to amend my aside, '(argument often not being considered in the proper style of such a nonanalytical enterprise as deep ecology)', which I believe I can sustain, to the assertion 'that argument is not in the "proper style" of deep ecology' (p.20), which I did not make (for all Fox's kind attribution) and would not want to defend. I wish decent argument and careful reasoning were more often considered in the proper sty le of deep ecology, and more often practised. Then I should be more enthusiastic about it, writing much less critical of it, and castigating less as rubbish. Fox, I am afraid, has done little to convince me that 'closely measured intellectual argument is thoroughly in keeping with the style of deep ecology' (p.20) or that it is much of a priority. He offers but two examples: he stands on his own record as attested in his Response (how can I say anything unfavourable about that), and he appeals, forgetting I said 'often ... considered', to an exceedingly loose talk by Devall on the Stone/Sky path, which mentions 'logical analyses of ideas, premises, systems of thought' and 'formal statements of definitions of key terms, explication of relationships', but deliberately avoids any such work, preferring instead, in characteristic deep ecological style, 'a steeper ... path that requires ... the "real work"', consciousness elevation, jnana yoga or psychedelic drugs maybe (pp.21-2). 14. Transpersonal logic and methodology. 53 It is proponents of the dubious doctrine of internal relations - a doctrine quite inessential to and external to deep environmentalism - who are forced into assigning an extraordinary meaning to constitute. 54 The Counter-Enlightenment antipathy to analytic and rational methods resurfaces in Western deep ecology. For an example in Fox's Response, consider his remarks on the 'blunt tools of logical analysis' when applied to the 'real world of communication' (p.11), which could almost have come from the late eighteenth century. 83 The quaint relation-reduc tion principles, S 1 and S2, do show up with the first premisses of what Fox dignifies with the misleading titles of "false equivalence argument" and "false contrast argument". The second title is particularly misleading, because there is a recognised traditional fallacy of "false contrast" or "false dichotomy" (arising as regards classifications), which differs from Fox's defective "false contrast argument". Fox has proceeded to latch onto my legitimate use of traditional logic, as when I say (rightly or wrongly) that Devall and Sessions are operating with a false contrast (p.11), in order to saddle me with a defective argument of his own concoction which I do not apply. But to show that these defective arguments, which Fox accuses me of heavily and repeatedly applying (p.6, p.11 ), are not deployed by me in the way Fox alleges, we shall need to look at the arguments. To avoid further confusion with tradition, let us relabel the arguments, replacing 'false' by 'foxy'. Let A and B be terms (Fox has 'concept/idea'); let a be a person or group whose views are under criticism. Then the foxy equivalence argument, set down pretty much in Fox's way, runs as follows Key Premiss. When a links A with B (i.e. maintains that ARB for some relation R), claim a holds that A=B. Subargument. Show there are cases where A without B or B without A, whence A;;:: B. Conclusion according to Fox: ' the "argument" (i.e. the claim that A = B) is "false" or that it "fails"' (p.6). An immediate observation is that Fox has not succeeded in setting down what he is after with much success. The conclusion, which does not make use of the key premiss, is a mess. As he hasn't located an argument, in 'the claim that A = B', he has perhaps felt obliged to put critical terms in italics, or perhaps he imagines he is quoting me - what is going on is unclear. He might have concluded, though a level up, that the "false equivalence argument" itself fails, a conclusion he doesn't explicitly draw, but then he would be left without a conclusion at all for the foxy equivalence argument. There is a valid traditional argument, filling out the subargument that is buried in the foxy argument as intended. In a standard logical format, with A( c) symbolising that c is or has A or that A applies to c, it runs as follows:!. A= B hypothesized claim (imposed on a) 2. A( c) iff B(c) for every case c 3. A(c) & ~B(c) for some case c standard case expansion of 1 further data 4. ~2 from 3 5. ~(A= B) from 4 6. ~(A= B) reductio, discharging the hypothetical argument 84 Thus the claim, that A= B, is indeed false, as its negation is categorically established, given the data. But again the argument, now valid, makes no use of the key premiss. A proper fuller version of the argument would replace 3 by the disjunction, A(ci) & -B(ci) V. -A(c2) & B(c2) for some cases ci and c2, and consider each disjunct. But the result would be the same, namely 6 categorically. The preceding represents the valid core of the foxy equivalence argument. What of the key premiss however? That part also can be rendered correct, but upon assumption of the quite defective S 1. To convert this part of the argument into available logical form, let us replace holding or maintaining functors by a correspondin g asserting or (more satisfactorily) commitment to asserting functor. (Should you imagine a fast one is being pulled just read 't-a' as 'a holds that'). Then the key dubious premiss becomes, at first approximation. KP. from a is committed to asserting A is related to B, i.e. ARB, infer that a is committed to asserting that A= B (or A= B). Expressed in symbols in implicational form it looks as follows: KP➔ . .,_a ARB ➔ . t-a A= B. This form makes it easy to see how the key premiss derives from relation-reduction S 1, i.e. ARB ➔ A = B, namely by a standard distribution of the committed-to -asserting functor, .,_a, or specifically by the rule x ➔ y / t-a x ➔ t-a y. S1 is the way to arrive at KP. Moreover without S 1, there is little basis for KP. Now the arguments can be put together. We argue to KP➔, e.g. from Sl. We run out the subargument to ~(A= B), from which we conclude a is wrong or mistaken in asserting A = B. Then we proceed back across KP➔ (using what results from it by distribution of the mistake functor W, namely W t-a A= B ➔. W t-a ARB), to conclude that our friends a were wrong in maintaining, as they did, that A is linked to B. Exposure of that part of the argument involving KP➔ is enough to at least suggest that I am unlikely to rely on it heavily, since it is manifestly defective when so exposed, relying upon the already jettisoned S 1. Fox, for all his assertions, does nothing to show that I do rely on it heavily; indeed he does not show that I rely upon it at all. For all his effort in eliciting these arguments (shoddy though his work may be), he fails entirely to follow through and show how they apply. Consider his "example" of the foxy argument at work, and supposedly scrutinized, where the terms involved are life and value (p.7). Fox's conclusion does not appear, no conclusion is reached. Moreover the key premiss is not instantiated, nor is any evidence of its use advanced; it is knocked down to the claim, deriving from certain deeper positions, that life= value. Whence the sort of argument that I am alleged to be employing 'in a totally 85 fallacious manner' comes down to the valid traditional subargument. Fox's complaint is not about an argument at all, it is about the premiss. As Fox concedes 'this argument is fine, it's just that the original claim is false' (p.7)! Let's take time out from the argument to consider the original claim. What Fox reports that 'Sylvan ... claims, [namely] that (U.S.) "West Coast deep ecology" equates life (A) and value (B)', differs significantly from what Sylvan did write, namely 'the impression comes through from much West Coast deep ecology (from certain insufficiently penetrating intermediate positions) that what is important is ... life and nothing but life' (Cp.16). No universal claim, no equation, no falsehood. Naturally there are some commitments, but Fox hasn't taken much care with those, or got them right either. For example, Sylvan does not offer a definition (of his own or of any sort) of 'biospherical' (which does not mean 'earth-centered') or of 'biocentric', but relies on standard meanings (accordingly, too, he cannot 'refute his own ... definition'). The position with the foxy contrast argument is very similar to that already dealt with, a similar shambles. The argument is exactly the same except that equality or (strong) equivalence,= , is replaced throughout by a dual notion, exclusive disjunction, symbolised V. But Fox does not dualise properly; instead of the dual conclusion, "the argument (i.e. the claim that A V B) is "false" or that it fails", he misleadingly introduces the traditional fallacy terms, as if they were new terms without a predetermined sense. He has it that we 'conclude that the contrast in question is a "false contrast" or a "false dichotomy'" (p.8). Once again, a properly developed illustration of the argument is not offered, and in the very sketchy "example" given the argument drops out. It turns into a question - an interesting question - of the use, point, and merit of the shallow/deep distinction. Let's take time out to consider the issues raised, as some are important. But first some trivia. Fox, in effect, charges me with presenting a straw-person, as no one (but me) takes the shallow/deep distinction as exhaustive of environmental positions. Well, he has led a sheltered life; I've met too many activists who do. Fox implies that I 'want to assign the shallow/deep terminology to the "historical scrap-heap"' (p.9). Here, and elsewhere, Fox apparently joins the activists who conflate the shallow/deep distinction with the shallow ecology/deep ecology distinction. It is only deep ecology that I have contemplated for the scrap heap, not the shallow/deep distinction. More important is the status of such illdefined items as deep ecology. Fox now assumes that shallow and deep ecology, however imperfect, are "ideal types", the merit of which is to be assessed pragmatically, through their usefulness, heuristic roles, etc. Some scepticism is warranted. Ideal types such as protestant and middle class might be defensible in sociological investigations where there are plenty of protestants or middle class people to survey, but what is supposed to correspond with deep ecology? The comparison has serious problems. Western deep 86 ecologists have yet to get their theoretical slum in order, to rectify their classifications, clean up the objects of these, and so forth. 15. More rubbish removal, especially that borrowed from pop science. Along with a substantial upgrading of the calibre of argumentation in deep ecology should go extensive removal of rubbish, such as the unnecessary doctrine of internal relations. The image of philosophers removing the rubbish, which comes from Locke, is much favoured in Australia, and has been deployed by both Armstrong and Passmore. 55 It tends to accompany the picture of real philosophy 'as tough, practical, rational and secular', which Sessions deplores, in the case of environmental ethics, as 'neither desirable nor necessary, and perhaps not possible'. 56 While such an approach is hardly necessary it is certainly possible: it is a divisive issue whether it is desirable. As is increasingly appreciated these days, there are various sorts of rubbish, which can be separated; so too in philosophy there is more than one sort of rubbish. Not all of it is nonsense or quite unintelligible (pace p.23). Considerable parts of prevailing religions have been dismissed as rubbish (see OED examples); but while some parts, such as the doctrine of Trinity, may be accounted unintelligible, most parts would not. They are regarded rather as substantially false as well as seriously flawed in important respects, and perhaps also as pernicious or largely worthless (and likely as unnecessary). Evidently, then, there are several distinguishable components to rubbish; and, as dictionary senses reveal (e.g. OED: 'worthless, ridiculous, nonsensical ideas, discourse, or writing'), there may be quite a variety of ideological and intellectual rubbish. Rubbish, of all sorts, is hard to escape these days; unfortunately it is easily encountered in both deep ecology and popular science. Many environmental philosophers, Fox is one, do seem to be highly attracted by a very fashionable cutting edge, along with a semi-respectable crank end, of recent diverting popular science. It is almost enough to look at the cast of witnesses Fox pulls in for defence of his unstated theme that there is no 55 According to Locke, 'it is ambition enough to be employed as an under-labourer in clearing the ground a little and removing some of the rubbish that lies in the way of knowledge'. Contrary to the impression Fox tries to convey, here and elsewhere, it wasn't so much a matter of 'following Passmore' (except in a dilute temporal sense, in which I always follow Aquinas when I agree with him), as of following a larger tradition. 56 This part of Session's essay is quoted approvingly in Fox's Response, p.44. Sessions should be rapped over the knuckles for his sexist citations (which Fox too does little to rectify). 87 rubbish in deep or transpersonal ecology (the theme is enthymematically Self-refuting, so to say). The cast includes Capra, Davies, Bohm, Wilber, Gribbin, Pegals, Zukav, Prigogine, d'Espagnat, Sheldrake, Pribram, Comfort and Walsh. There is ample rubbish littering the works of some of these authors, some of which finds its way into Western deep ecology (e.g. Fox's Section 4, and also e.g. pp. 58-9). It is instructive to look at a couple of examples of prime rubbish early in the work of Gribbin cited:- First 'Isaac Newton invented physics, and all of science depends on physics' (p.7). Observe that this conjoint claim, which luckily does not drift into deep ecology, is intelligible, but it is ridiculous 57 ; and observe, furthermore, that there is no straightforward way of recycling such intellectual rubbish. Second, 'what quantum mechanics says is that nothing is real and that we cannot say anything about what things are doing when we are not looking at them' (p.2). As Gribbin presents quantum mechanics as true, we can detach to achieve his shocking headlines and like assertions; so for instance, 'Nothing is real unless it is observed' (p.3), naive phenomenalism. Remarkably, Gribbin is hardly obliged to generate the amount of striking rubbish he does (but then he is a scientific journalist), because of his later proclivity towards a "many worlds" interpretation of quantum mechanics, which affords one neat way of halting production of this type of idealist rubbish. Fox, eager to retain an idealistic Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics for his nefarious metaphysical purposes, fails to take account of Gribbin's later turnabout which effectively repeals the earlier headlines, and actually appeals to Gribbin's "authority" (in note 41) in trying to dispose of the many worlds interpretation! Fortunately we do not have to put up philosophically with the rubbish produced by popular elaborations of the Copenhagen interpretation, which Fox and other avant-garde thinkers would foist upon us. One reason is that micro-features of quantum behaviour very rarely impinge upon macro-phenomena. They thus make little or no real difference to issues of environmental philosophy (only problems tangential to it, such as determinism). Another and major reason is that there are significant alternatives to the Copenhagen interpretation, which at least shed most of the rubbish. And the 'range of choice' is far more extensive than Fox would allow 'if Sylvan did follow his appeal through' (p.27) - yet another example of "false choice". It happens that Sylvan had followed through on some of the further options Fox does not consider, namely 57 If physics and science are the sorts of things that can significantly be invented, then there are plenty of candidates for the claims both before and after Newton, e.g. Einstein if we wish to be really extravagant. As for the extravagant reduction claim, well it is refuted along with physicalism and associated Australian primitivism; see e.g. J.W. Smith and JB . 88 • alternative logic approaches. There are many interesting possibilities here, but few of which physicists have had time or inclination to investigate. My own, rather preliminary, investigations have concerned a uniform relevant logic approach (see uu § 13, on ultramodal quantum logic) and, differently, paraconsistent approaches (see OP p.157ff.) • a neutral worlds interpretation (see my 85). What this amounts to is an ontic neutralisation of many-worlds interpretation. Because of the neutralisation, the 'metaphysical baggage' and unparsimoniousness that Fox complains about are removed. Of course too, since the interpretation corresponds, through the mathematical formalism deployed, to other standard interpretations, it as just as falsifiable (pace note 41 ), and accordingly hardly 'desperate', a mere "just-so" story. These observations, duly elaborated (as attempted, in part, in work alluded to), indicate 'how Sylvan would describe the ontological implications of the "new (ie. post-1920s) physics?"' (p.23 reordered). Briefly, there are many hitherto unknown physical objects at the sub-atomic level whose behaviour is classically anomalous, being partly wavelike and partly particlelike, for which a new and interpretationally difficult theory has been devised. But the positivism and related idealism of early interpretations can be removed by a warranted change of interpretation. And then the ontic implications for ecology and most of environmental philosophy are much less remarkable than Wes tern deep ecology has imagined. Given apparently viable options as to interpretation, all the rubbish Walsh and Fox add to the already problematic Copenhagen interpretation can be packed off (if you can find a way to recycle it, good luck to you). For those who like picking through rubbish (I occasionally collect stuff from the local dump myself), Fox's page 26 is particularly rewarding. But two examples only :- 'What can be known is ... never the independent properties of the observed alone'. So it cannot be known that the wounded wombat (somehow) observed is female, pregnant, and so on. Such astonishing epistemological results are not delivered by the Copenhagen interpretation, which only tells us that knowledge as to quantum happenings is limited by exclusion principles. Similarly for 'the known universe is inextricably linked with consciousness rather than being separable into consciousness and objects of consciousness'. The standard formalism of quantum theory discloses nothing about observers; and while observers do feature in the Copenhagen interpretation these can be simply more measuring or witnessing devices: consciousness does not figure. Even if it did, that would only apply to quantum objects, and would scarcely warrant the grand extrapolations Fox and Walsh wish to make. Furthermore, the Copenhagen interpretation as elaborated is obliged to set quantum domains within wider classical settings always (by contrast with multiple-world interpretations there is no wave function for the universe, etc.); so in the larger setting classical assumptions concerning independence, separability, and so on, are not overthrown, but confirmed. 89 In fact my passing reference to rubbish in Fox's presentations was directed not at Walsh, who was not pretending to tell us what deep ecology is about, but at Fox's reproduction of this material 'in advancing the "unity of process" metaphysics of deep ecology' (p.19). Fox's presentation of the issues (in section 4), with himself as some sort of interested third party in a dispute between Sylvan and Walsh, is substantially misleading; I was not attempting (what is overdue) a critique of transpersonal psychology. What is taken to be known, furthermore, affords little comfort or support for the list of 'ontological implications' that Fox and Walsh wish to draw from the "new physics". Consider some representative exhibits, mostly compressed one-worders, from 'the fundamental ontology now being revealed', with which Fox tells us deep ecology is not merely 'in accord with' but 'throws its full weight behind' (see p.18):- Impermanen t? Some of the newly discovered sub-atomic objects are extraordinarily durable and have experimentally assessed lifetimes of millions of years. Fluid? This attribute of macrosystems does not extend significantly even down to the molecular level; it makes no sense to say that wavicles (or even atoms) flow, they are the wrong sorts of things. Whereas the attribution of impermanence makes straightforward sense (but is substantially false), that of fluidity does not. Empty? Some of the newly located astrophysical objects are extraordinarily dense, packed with matter. Infinitely over-determined? How does this sit with quantum indeterminacy and under-determination? Or with another speculative exhibit from the list: Self-consistent? At least questions of the consistency of the "new physics" and its parts are proper and reasonable. But we are far from being in a position to assert that the theory is consistent. On the contrary, inconsistencies keep emerging in the developing theory, to which often ad hoc repairs are proposed (e.g. with the Dirac o function, renormalization etc.; cf OP). Given the inadequate ramshackle character of the present quantum theory, it is a fair bet that it remains inconsistent. It is a widespread opinion among researchers that the present theory is something of a mess and in much need of improvement. Even so practicing scientists are not hoping for foundations, which tend to be frowned upon these days. However, foundations, such as an extension of von Neumann's axiomatisatio n of part of quantum theory, would help in effecting improvements, and something of the sort is a prerequisite for establishing consistency, if it can be done. Foundationless? What is meant is, apparently, not foundations for the theory, such as axiomatic foundations, nor really basic (atomic) components for what the theory is about. In this sense, Newtonian physics had as foundational elements corpuscles, or particles of certain sorts. It is sometimes said that quantum physics afford no such ultimate building blocks, each apparent stopping point fragmenting into new substructures, most recently quarks. But this idea, which so far appears to lack a satisfactory physical modelling, diverges from the still entrenched paradigm of particle physics which, for all the talk about "new paradigms" in physics, still consists in analytical reduction to ultimates. 90 Such objectual foundations leave open, of course, the question as to whether, and to what extent, new phenomena may emerge, at "higher levels", as the building blocks are variously put together and structured. As with elements, so with microphysical particles, while the zoo of known items has expanded apace, the hope remains that there is a simple underlying explanation in terms of very small ultimates, such as contemporary quarks. Those who looked forward to a quite new outlook emerging from particle physics are bound - if they look at what really goes on nowadays (esp. all the hightech dominant social paradigm aspects) as distinct from what some popular science entrepreneurs say - to be very disappointed. Walsh's "explanation" of what 'foundationle ss' means is something else: 'the universe appears to be ... foundationless and self-consistent in that, since all components and mechanisms are interconnected and interdependent, none are ultimately more fundamental than any other- hence the universe is inexplicable in terms of a limited number of fundamental mechanisms' (p.23, quoting Walsh p.180). This is Fox's example of how 'Walsh provides clear and intelligible meanings to each and every one of the items on the list'! The truth is that Walsh offers nothing of substance on some terms in his list (e.g. 'self-consistent'), and much of what he does offer is like that quoted, garbage. Granted we can make something of some of it, something extravagantly false. Even on Newtonian physics everything is connected, through forces such as gravitation 58 , but some objects are fundamental building blocks. So it is too on the 'new physics', protons for instance are more fundamental than molecules, quarks (if recent theory succeeds and proves consistent) than protons. Some objects are certainly more fundamental than others. And in the "new physics" it is widely assumed that the universe is explicable in terms of a very few principles of mechanist character (e.g. the rashly promised single equation T-shirt). But Walsh's hence clause would not follow, as simple models indicate, even if his premiss had requisite physical cogency. It does deep ecology no credit to include conspicuous rubbish. Nor is there any good reason why it should; the rubbish is not essential to deep ecology. It is not part of the platform for instance, and it is relatively easily removed from (authentic) deep ecology. So much should be evident from my original Critique (as published), and the accompanying 58 Such forces as gravitation offer, of course, nonlocal connections, and delineate fields what are said to be at 'the nub of what these emerging ideas ... of cross-disciplinary parallels ... have in common' (p.23, insert from p.23 and p.21). This confirms the impression that Fox lacks a solid grasp on what is new in the "new physics" and other "new sciences" such as they are, and thereby contributes towards answers to further of Fox's questions (p.23), by undermining their presuppositions. I 91 sketch of deep green theory, intended to function as a relatively rubbish-free relative of deep ecology. It is some measure of the intellectual sloppiness of some of these engaged in presenting and promoting deep ecology that in a recent major text from Naess (Naess 89), the editor and translator, Rothenberg, asserts that my 'critique of deep ecological philosophy ... labels all of deep ecology literature "inconsistent rubbish"' (p.19), somehow achieving a fallacious transition from some to all. But apparently Rothenberg's acquaintance with my Critique was extraordinarily casual, since I didn't use the label 'inconsistent rubbish' (and wouldn't as anyone who had read much of my work, esp. OP, would realise), and since I certainly did not make a universal claim (and wouldn't for reasons already given, which should have been evident). 'The interpretation of the whole thing as rubbish', Rothenberg continues (p.19), 'comes only if you concentrate too much on rereading some of the sketchy formulations of deep ecology philosophies ... '. While endorsing the point about sketchy formulations, no rereading of many deep ecological productions is required to produce rubbish, no projection; several offerings - such as items lifted from trans personal psychology, idealist physics and other esoteric deep ecological sources, and such as Fox's 'sketch map of deep ecological territory' (p.89) - contain notable rubbish of themselves. Unfortunately Rothenberg proceeds, without even a pause, to repeat Fox's regressive conclusion, which would return deep ecology to human psychology, the very fate of earlier establishment-cha llenging ethics, such as (group) egoism and utilitarianism. 'One should steer clear of "environmental axiology" - that is, looking for values in nature', indeed one almost feels, from looking directly at nature at all. Instead, one should seek to change one's whole way of sensing oneself and the world in the direction of identification and Self-realisation .... Fox summarises [this debacle]: The appropriate framework of discourse for describing and presenting deep ecology is not one that is fundamentally to do with the value of the non-human world, but rather one that is fundamentally to do with the nature and possibilities of the Self, or, we might say, the question of who we are, can become, and should become in the larger scheme of things (Rothenberg p.19, quoting Fox p.85). It is a sad fate for a promising philosophy of nature; degeneration into human psychology. While that can no doubt be edifying enough, in the style of uplifting anthropocentric religions, it is hardly the sought new ecological paradigm (p. 71) and only a warped fragment of the sort of philosophy the whole Earth needs. REFERENCES Bennett, D and Sylvan, R., Damn Greenies: Australian perspectives on environmental ethics, a UNESCO project, typescript, Canberra 1989; revised text 1990. f I 92 Bouwsma, O.K., 'Philosophical essays', University Nebraska, Lincoln, 1965, 24-25. Bradford, G. 1987 'How deep is deep ecology?', Fifth Estate 22(3)(1987) 3-30. Broad, C.D., Five Types of Ethical Theory, Kegan Paul & Others, London, 1944. Devall, B. and Sessions G, Deep Ecology, Peregrine Smith Books, Salt Lake City, 1985. Devall, B., Simple in Means, Rich in Ends. Practicing Deep Ecology, Peregrine Smith Books, Salt Lake City, 1988. Drengson, A. "Review of Devall and Sessions, Deep Ecology", Environmental Ethics vol 10, nl, 1988. Edwards, J.C., Ethics without Philosophy, University Presses of Florida, Tampa, 1982. Fox, W., Approaching Deep Ecology: A Response to Richard Sylvan's Critique of Deep Ecology, Environmental Studies Occasional Paper 20, University of Tasmania, 1986: unless otherwise indicated all references to Fox are to this study. Fox, W., 'The meanings of "deep ecology"', Island Magazine 32(1989) 32-5; reprinted in The Trumpeter 7(1990) 48-50. Hinckfuss, I., The Moral Society: its structure and effects, Discussion Papers in Environmental Philosophy #16, RSSS, Australian National University, 1987. Johnson,L.E., A Morally Deep World, Discussion Papers in Environmental Philosophy #17, RSSS, Australian National University, 1987. Mannison, D. and others (eds.), Environmental Philosophy, RSSS Australian National University, 1979; referred to as EP. Naess, A., 'The shallow and the deep, long-range ecology movement. A summary', Inquiry, 16(1973) 95-100. Naess, A., 'Deep ecology disentangled?', typescript, Canberra, 1984. Naess, A., 'Notes on Professor's Sylvan's Critique of the Deep Ecology Movement', typescript, Canberra, 1985. Naess, A. and Rothenberg, D., Ecology, community and lifestyle, Cambridge University Press, 1989. Nettleship, R.L. (ed.) Work of Thomas Hill Green, three volumes, Longman, Green & Co, London, 1889. Oxford English Dictionary, Oxford University Press, 1971; referred to as OED. Perrett, R.W., 'Egoism, altruism and intentionalism in Buddhist Ethics', Journal of Indian Philosophy 15(1987) 71-85. Priest, G. and Routley, R., On Paraconsistency, Research Series in logic and Metaphysics #1, RSSS, Australian National University, 1984; referred to as OP. Rolston, H. R. IV, Philosophy Gone Wild: Essays in Environmental Ethics, Prometheus Books, Buffalo, 1986. 93 Routley, R., 'The semantical metamorphosis of metaphysics', Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 1974. Routley, Rand V., The Fight for the Forests, Third edition, RSSS, Australian National University, 1975. Routley, R. and V., 'Against the inevitability of human chauvinism', Ethics and Problems of the 21 st Century , (ed. K.E. Goodpaster and K.M. Sayre), University of Notre Dame Press, 1979, 36-59. Routley, Rand V., 'Human chauvinism and environmental ethics' in EP; referred to EE. Routley, R., 'Ultralogic as universal?', represented in JB; referred to as uu. Routley, R, Exploring Meinong's Jungle and Beyond, RSSS, Australian National University, 1980; referred to as JB. Routley, R. and Others, Relevant Logics and Their Rivals, Ridgeview, California, 1982. Session, G., 'Ecocentrism, wilderness, and global ecosystem protection', in The Wilderness Condition (ed. M. Oelschlaeger), 1989; to appear. Shepard, P., 'Introduction - ecology and man - a viewpoint' in The Subversive Science (ed. P. Shepard & D McKinley), Houghton Mifflin, Boston, 1969, 1-10. Smith, H., The Religions of Man, Harper, New York, 1958. Smith, J.W., Reductionism and Cultural Being, Nijhoff, The Hague, 1984. Stone, C.D., Should Trees Have Standing? - Towards Legal Rights for Natural Objects, revised edition, Avon Books, New York, 1975. Sylvan, R., 'Windows on Science III, Towards a cosmo-logical synthesis', Research Series in Unfashionable Philosophy, #2, RSSS Australian National University, 1985. Sylvan, R., A Critique of Deep Ecology, Discussion Papers in Environmental Philosophy #12, RSSS 1985; referred to as c. Sylvan, R., 'Mind and its misplacement in nature', typescript, Canberra, 1988; referred to asMX. Sylvan, R., Deep Plurallism, completed typescript 1990. Walsh, R.N., 'Emerging cross-disciplinary parallels: suggestions from the neurosciences', Journal of Transpersonal Psychology, 11(1979) 175-184. Wenz, P.W., Environmental Justice, State University of New York Press, Albany N.Y., 1988. Wilber, K., Eye to Eye: The quest for the new paradigm, Anchor Press/Doubleday, Garden City N.Y., 1983. ECOLOGICAL ETHICS and ECOLOGICAL POLITICS: turning John MCCioskey's challenge This essay comes first because it offers an advanced introduction to parts of environmental ethics, and to certain significant issues in environmental politics. It is hung, not altogether incidentally, on MCCloskey's little text on the topics, because that is a convenient vehicle for organising the material (it is also a text, written in haste, that deserves more criticism than it has received). Fortunately no one need attempt the onerous business of reading MCCioskey in order to follow the essay, should it succeed. Rather, for the purposes of this essay, MCCioskey and likewise his little work can both be regarded as characters in this piece of intellectual fiction; neither need ever have existed. 1. Conservative, reformative, and radical responses to the impacts of ecology on ethics. There are three broad kinds of responses to the impact of ecology on ethics according to MCCloskey's account, which adapts a standard political classification: radical or revolutionary, reformist, and conservative. Of course there are responses which lie outside this classification, not by disputing the impacts of escalating environmental problems (or the new awareness of nature and its fragility), but by questioning the relevance of the other end of the relation: ethics. Those responses target ethics, its role in evaluating and regulating conduct, or differently, its place in environmental philosophy (see other essays herein). As we too aspire to MCCloskey's elevated view of the importance, potential power, and effective ineliminability of ethics in rational evaluation and conduct, we set aside these gutter responses (which we have argued against elsewhere). Otherwise, the responses are these: Radical. A fundamentally new ethic is required, a non-human-centred nature-centred (or nonanthropocentric ecocentric) ethic and morality, a deeper environmental ethic, what MCCioskey and others call an ecological ethic. According to MCCioskey - who adopts the usual double standard, requiring conspicuously higher standards for new challenging theories than entrenched ones - no one 'has yet succeeded in stating or defending [an ecological ethic] in a systematic way' (p.29). Nonetheless it will turn out, quite remarkably, that MCCioskey himself, if he is at all successful, does, given but a small twist to what he does. 2 There are two standard components to any such ethic: meta-ethical and normative. According to Mccloskey, both components are 'more commonly alluded to than set out and defended in a developed, worked-out form' (p.29). There are, accordingly, two broad problems for an ecological ethics: devising a new meta-ethic, and furnishing a new normative ethic (p.30). Meta-ethics, as well as comprising the study of ethics or ethical systems, includes the logic and analysis of key ethical terms. For the new ethics a critical meta-ethical task is to 'explain valuation, and hence values, without reference to human beings, their preferences, pro-attitudes, and the like' (p.30). Normative ethics involves the organisation, design and structure of systems themselves, their values, principles, constraints and the like. For the new ethics critical normative tasks include explaining and justifying the assignments of value made, especially to natural items independently of species Homo sapiens, and the principles adopted, especially concerning treatment of more natural environments, wilderness, and endangered species of plants and animals. Since all these requirements have been met, to some considerable extent (e.g. in works such as EE), the issue becomes one of adequacy. How adequately have these things been done, in particular in what is now called deep-green theory, and what of significance has been left undone? These are central questions in the on-going dialogue with MCCioskey; they will direct the questions discussed when shortly we get down to the real business of MCCloskey's more substantive objections. Reformist. Instead of a "new" ethic, standard ethical theories are reformed, modifying them or adjusting them at the periphery, 'so as to acknowledge new, specifically ecological values and duties' (p.30). Characteristically the adjustment is to the margins of normative theory, with standard meta-ethics left substantially intact. Animal rights theories which simply adjust utilitarianism to take account of the suffering of other sentient creatures than humanoids, afford a stock example of significant reformism. By contrast, differently designed and defended theories of animal rights may be radical in character. The classification is thus pretty rough and ready; given the comparative vagueness of "newness" and "standardness" as regards ethical theories, the divisions between responses is likewise blunt. Evidently too, the classification only overlaps other classifications of ethics with some vogue, for instance that into shallow, intermediate, and deep (used elsewhere e.g. TE). Thus while reformist utilitarianisms are typically intermediate, a reformist ethic (or even a revolutionary one, such as Nietzsche's has been taken to be) may be substantially shallow. The converse linkages are tighter: only an ethic which merely purports to be conservative can really be intermediate, as MCCloskey's intuitionism is, or deep, as "supplementation" of such intuitionism could 3 be. Conservative. No input from ecology warrants even so much as reform, let alone revolution, in standard ethical theory; all that is required is 'a more informed, more accurate thinking out of our moral obligations and moral rights' (p.29). MCCioskey claims to defend the stock conservative view that ecological considerations and 'findings ... do not necessitate a basic revolution in ethics but supply a more informed, more accurate thinking out, of our moral obligations and moral rights' (p.29, similarly p.31). Rather than looking hard at the conspicuous difficulties and inadequacies of prevailing ethics, unresolved after thousands of years of investigation, MCCioskey proceeds immediately to try to shift the onus of proof: ' ... no moral philosopher has yet succeeded in either stating or defending it ... a new ecological ethic ... in a systemic way' (p.29, insertion from same page). He alleges, to elaborate on a previous charge, that 'the problem of [a radical] ecological ethics is that of devising a a new meta-ethics, one that explains valuation, and hence values, without reference to human beings, their preferences, pro-attitudes, and the like, and a a new normative ethics that explains both • the value of natural phenomena prior to man's existence and after the extinction of the species Homo sapiens and • why it is morally wrong for man to damage wilderness and endanger or render extinct natural species of plants and animals' (p.30, display inserted). As it happens, all these things have been attempted, as was said and as will become evident - though perhaps in too sketchy and too technical a way so far (it is still early days). For example, why it is wrong to damage pristine wilderness is, at bottom, because such wilderness possesses high intrinsic value - something MCCioskey does not really dispute. How then does he sustain his allegations? For the most part, despite the repeated rhetoric about "arguing" this and that, he doesn't. He simply assumes that 'concern for human well-being' must dominate, that it always has, well almost always has, priority (e.g. p.52). 2. A confused and confusing response: supplemented intuitionism. Furthermore, MCCioskey, although he claims to be defending this conservative 'third view', does not state matters as clearly as he should: he only rules out the 'need for a specifically ecological ethic', not reformism. This constitutes one part of what amounts 4 to substantial cheating in MCCloskey's "conservatism" . 1 A further part consists in adopting an extremely unfashionable ethical theory, an intuitionism supplementing a now little known theory of the kind developed by Ross, as his "standard" ethical theory. Like the rare "ideal utilitarianism", such intuitionism can be much closer to proposed new ecological ethics, given appropriate ideals and intuitions, than standard "standard" ethics (indeed, given a deep tum, they can be tantamount to ecological ethics). But the most important dodge is incorporated in the "supplementation" MCCioskey makes of his "standard" ethic, which far exceeds what it is said to be: Ross 'supplemented by an account of the moral rights of persons' (p.31). For he also concedes himself such objectives as an open-ended 'promotion of good' and coupled 'prima facie obligations to ... promote good' (p.33 and p.31). Moreover, such promotion of good elsewhere expands to a promotion of good, beauty and knowledge (p.36), and to include promotion and preservation of what is intrinsically valuable (p.36); among 'recognised ethical values' is 'the securing of the intrinsically valuable' (p.8). Moreover, among what is intrinsically valuable are some (but not all) natural species, some wilderness (p.36), and other valuable natural items such as 'forests, lakes, rivers, seas' (p.31). Such critical "supplementations" mean that MCCioskey can proceed to argue for the preservation of wilderness or natural species in just the ways that most deep environmentalists do; for example, along the lines that an area of wilderness has not merely instrumental value, but evident intrinsic value, which can be felt or intuited (e.g. p.61 bottom). Such supplementations thus lift MCCioskey right out of the normal conservative camp in which he has misleadingly located himself: for that shallow camp does not recognise irreducible values in nature. What he is covertly assuming, in his considerable supplementation of an unusual noncognitive ethic, is at least a significant reform of standard ethics. MCCloskey's ethic is not 'perfectly familiar' historically; more, his insistence (ascribable not to modesty but to political purposes) that it is not 1 There is analogous, if less outrageous, covert cheating in another leading Australian conservative, with whom McCloskey aligns himself: Passmore. For example, Passmore helps himself to a notion of vandalism (deep vandalism involving depreciation or destruction of what has intrinsic value) to which his theory does not entitle him. It has not been much appreciated that Passmore, too, for all his apparently tough conservatism (early on) on ethics, also (characteristically) hedges his claims. A much-quoted passage, endorsed by McCloskey (p.37 italics added), begins: 'what it [the West] needs,for the most part, is not so much a "new ethic" as a more general adherence to a perfectly familiar ethic'. What that familiar ethic is, and how it is to be reformed, Passmore never really tells us. In any case the main conservative theme looks less and less plausible. It is increasingly dubious that better adherence to established ethical and political forms will prove adequate, especially to environmental problems unforeseen by these chauvinistic theories. 5 new is nowhere demonstrated, simply asserted. (In fact the claim is somewhat empty in the absence of sharpened criteria for newness.) How far removed MCCloskey's supplemented intuitionism is from its 'perfectly familiar' source is readily shown by a comparison of MCCioskey with Ross on intrinsic goodness. Ross contends (on the basis of reflection and using an interesting little argument from a then 'widely accepted classification of elements in the life of the soul') that four things, and basically only four things, 'seem to be intrinsically good', all of which are 'ideal states of the mind' (p.140). How far things ethical have moved since the nineteen thirties is also shown by the little argument Ross runs out, as if it was quite decisive, to refute people like MCCioskey who imagine they find intrinsic value beyond states of mind - in wilderness, forests and other material items. 'It might of course be objected that there are or may be intrinsic goods that are not states of mind or relations between states of mind at all, but in this suggestion I find no plausibility. Contemplate any imaginary universe from which you suppose mind entirely absent, and you will fail to find anything in it that you can call good in itself' (p.140). Ross no doubt reflects the conventional ethical wisdom, a narrow wisdom, of his time and place (essentially British ethics of the first half of the twentieth century). But many before Ross, and many more since, have not so failed in finding items of intrinsic worth in the absence of states of mind, in the Earth itself and its natural features for example. Such comparatively successful arguments as those concerning the Last Sentient (in EE), and the world before the rise of mental life, were designed to expose and reinforce such common findings. So much Mccloskey is sufficiently clear about (thereby shortening subsequent argument for a new ethics): 'The negative part of the Routley's argument, that traditional [Western] ethics and contemporary morality are human-centered, is substantially well based. The ecological moral intuitions they seek to explain and justify find no justification in terms of such ethics' (p.58). But in MCCloskey's ethics they do find some confirmation, or rather conformation, in the intrinsic ecological values discerned. Moreover, with but a turn in the intuitions admitted that intuitionistic ethics itself becomes properly deep - just allow the (over-malleable) intuitions to coincide with those of deep ecological consciousness: then deepened MCCioskey is deep ecology. MCCioskey even puts effort into explaining how conventional theories are 'heavily human centered', without appreciating how far it removes him from the 'perfectly familiar' ethic of Ross, and from his own professed conservatism. As a result too, those making too superficial a survey of MCCloskey's complex ethical position, especially if they came at it with preconceptions of what it amounted to, have been seriously misled. Goodin is one reviewer who is undone. By quoting MCCloskey's effort on conventional ethics right out of context, Goodin manages to 6 attribute to Mccloskey the very negation of what he advances, namely 'that all talk of intrinsic value must nevertheless be human-centered' (Goodin p.345). The same applies to what Goodin takes to be 'the punchline' of MCCloskey's position, 'that the environment per se has no independent moral claims upon it. All our duties to protect it must be derived from human-centered concerns' (p.344). Nor does such a punch line emerge from the admittedly convoluted passage quoted in support; for the passage makes the promotion of goodness, which includes promotion of intrinsic value independent of humans, a prima f acie obligation. But Goodin does have excuses. For not merely is MCCloskey's position hard to fathom, but it exhibits confusion and is internally inconsistent. For example, Mccloskey typically presents himself as having, and frequently operates as if he had, an entirely conservative position, when his position is in important respects at least reformist, making allowance for intrinsic values of natural items including wilderness, plants and animals (pp. 52-3); his position is both different, with new elements, and not different, with no new elements. Part of the problem can be traced back to a confusion about intrinsic value (likewise intrinsic goodness), which is both intrinsic, valuable in itself, and not intrinsic, because valuable for something else, typically beauty or human knowledge in the case of natural items. The confusion is manifest in the many intuitive judgements of intrinsic value of natural items advanced simply on the strength of judgements of beauty or ugliness, and appears in such themes as that 'a moral duty to preserve species and wilderness ... is ... based on ... the securing of the intrinsically valuable objects of knowledge and the beautiful' (p.110). It is no longer just 'the securing of the intrinsically valuable' as is earlier said (e.g. p.8); those "intrinsic values" somehow now reduce or answer instrumentally to supposedly human evaluations, i.e. are not "intrinsic" after all, whereupon MCCloskey's seriously damaged position reverts to the shallow conservative position it is often been taken to be. The main features brought out make MCCloskey's ethic, confusions apart, at least a reformist one, not a conservative one. Briefly, MCCloskey's "supplementation " of Ross's theory is so great as to make for a difference of kind. The features also render it what is called an intermediate position. For it admits values in nature, it assigns intrinsic value to some natural objects, while not however allowing values of natural things to sometimes override those of humans. The point is fundamental. 'However, as the theory developed here implies, ultimately, when there is a clear clash between human welfare and human rights on the one hand and the preservation of wilderness and of plant and animal species on the other, human welfare and respect for human rights must prevail ... ' (p.36). Why so? Why preserve this ancient ethical prejudice? Despite the assertion the theory sketched out, the supplemented Ross ethic, does not imply human 7 ethical supremacy. But even if the theory did imply this greater value assumption, the appeal to it in defence of the assumption would be indecently circular. It is no proper defence of proposition p that Shifty's theory implies p, unless Shifty's theory is shown to have independent merit, such as correctness, robustness (i.e. continuing to yield p under reasonable variations), etc. None of the requisite demonstration is attempted. The radically reformed Ross ethic is just assumed. In fact MCCioskey has adduced no decent case for this crucial assumption, which colours much of his text. For it is his repeated insistence on the supreme importance of things human, of Man over the rest of nature, that gives his work its undoubted antienvironmental appearance, which is obnoxiously exhibited at many places in the text. One revolting example concerns venomous snakes: 'today they are a nuisance and a danger to human life and health, concern for which dictates that individuals be accorded the freedom to kill such snakes, to rid their properties of these pests even at the risk of rendering them endangered species. (Sufficient specimens could be retained in zoos throughout the world, where they survive well ... )', perhaps along with dangerous subspecies of humans (p.116). MCCioskey is particularly concerned to put down arguments 'for the preservation of species and wilderness at the cost of human interests, human concerns .. ', even though these arguments 'appear to be correct about the intuitive insights of those who live in different countries in affluence. 2 Nonetheless it will be my concern in this work to reject this approach and the moral intuitions on which it rests' (p.36, italics added). Unfortunately the strongly proclaimed rejection is not backed up with requisite argument. MCCioskey, in a familiar intuitionistic predicament, is stranded without argument. Nor, in this case, could the rejection be so easily supported. For one thing MCCioskey feels obliged, almost immediately, to qualify his human supremacy claim: human interest 'must prevail, unless what it is proposed to preserve has great intrinsic value' (p.36 italics added). For another reason, the human interests involved often cannot justify preeminence; they are too often trivial, or unworthy, or just plain ordinary. So the ancient (unethical) prejudice in favour of humans can, and should be relinquished (as argued in much more detail in other places, e.g. EE). But then there is nothing to stop MCCloskey's intuitionism sliding to real depth, the ethic moving from reformist to radical. Call the resulting theory, MCCloskey's stripped 2 But the impression of McCloskey as a fighter for the under-privileged among humans, one who of course along with developers and colonizers makes human interests paramount, is deceptive. 8 of anthropic prejudice so to say, deepened intuitionism, intuitionism informed, again if you like, by deep ecological consciousness. The beauty of deepened intuitionism is that it answers, in MCCloskey's own terms, MCCloskey's challenge to radically new ecological ethics. A now evident "adjustment" to MCCloskey's own theory will serve. The trouble, of course, with this answer is the trouble with intuitionism in ethics generally; that, for instance, it is built on the shifting sands of intuition. That is why a direct response to Mccloskey will be offered, in terms of deep-green theory. 3. On the supposedly dim prospects for new environmental ethics, esp. that deep-green upstart. Part of MCCloskey's complaint is that the new environmental ethics demanded back in the early seventies, have not been presented sufficiently 'clearly and fully' as to admit proper examination and assessment (p.60). It is easy to level such charges at new proposals; and such charges did carry some force, and still do, though less as the new theories develop, among other things, to meet criticism. But MCCioskey would like to make a much grander charge, the sort of charge (discussed below) that Thompson recently did level: that such 'a new ethic ... is logically impossible to set out' (p.59 reordered). But Mccloskey, by contrast with Thompson who can slip into still fashionable noncognitivism, is poorly placed to press such a charge. For he considers that noncognitivism, which would logically tie all valuation to aspects of human (or creature) cognition and so would be bad news for deep environmentalism, is bound to fail. MCCioskey tries instead to push through an eliminative argument, relying upon the limited range of cognitivist (meta-)ethics 'developed to date'. He claims to eliminate all but intuitionism: 'Of the known, plausible, meta-ethical theories, the only one available to such ecologist ethicists is the ethical realism of intuitionism' (p.59), which regrettably they decline. But the elimination argument is radically defective, as MCCioskey is very far from exhausting the initially plausible options open to environmentalism. In addition, more satisfactory options will aim to discard not merely intuitionism but also both the ethical realism and objectivism that regularly (and to its intellectual cost) accompany it, but need not. While it would hardly be surprising should the quite limited range of ethical theories that have achieved much development to date prove inadequate to new environmental objectives, the situation is by no means as desperate as MCCioskey implies. Firstly, the options MCCioskey does offer, deviously pruned down (not 'ideal observer ethic' but 'Humean ideal observer ethic', not 'natural law ethic' but 'Thomistic natural law ethic'), are not all restricted in the way portrayed: 'All make human nature or personhood or features thereof basic to ethics' (p.59). Not so; the contention certainly does not hold for all the types of theory listed, e.g. naturalism or relativism, and insofar 9 as it does, it is sometimes easily avoided, as with natural law (e.g. set within pantheism). Secondly, there is a range of recognised ethical types, such as those distinguished by Broad, which affords scope for the elaboration of ecological ethics. Obvious candidates within naturalism include biological and evolutionary naturalism - typical examples of which 'are the following: "To be virtuous means to perform the specific activities of the species to which you belong efficiently" (Spinoza). "Better conduct means conduct that comes later in the course of evolution and is more complex than earlier conduct of the same kind" (Herbert Spencer)' (Broad p.259). No doubt such proposals exhibit deficiencies, but not per se of a human chauvinistic sort; and they admit of improvement, which they are beginning to obtain within the tradition of American naturalism (thus e.g. Rolston's work). More promising, however, are "non-naturalistic" theories, of which objectivistic realistic intuitionism such as Mccloskey is keen to offer and promote is but one kind. For there are other less demanding types of intuitionism (see, e.g. Broad p.270), including various "deep intuitionisms", which may be neither objectivistic nor realistic (in the sense of labouring under heavy ontological commitments). In particular, as Elliot explains (p.502), what entirely escapes MCCloskey is the feasibility of a meta-ethic which is nonjective, that is, not objective, like transcendental intuitionism, but not implausibly subjective either. Then there are moral sense theories and their more plausible variations including mixtures with rationalism. Further, there are analogous mixtures coherently building upon emotional presentation. Such a rational reconstuction, varying the Austrian theory of values as elaborated empirically and logically by Meinong, is in fact the ethical way taken by deep-green theory (for detail see TE and DG). And so on. There is logical scope, then, for quite a variety of ecological meta-ethics, and definitely scope for significant improvements upon those 'developed to date'. As much to the point, there have already been significant developments of some forms of ecological meta-ethics, notably of that theory in effect under criticism, deepgreen theory, which is already better articulated than most conventional ethics. There are several connected parts to this elaboration because it brings into meta-ethics new logical technology, especially world-semantics. The parts, furthermore, have not been duly separated because of a pervasive verificationism living on in Anglo-American ethical theory, which proceeds to equate semantic with epistemic, meaning with method of coming to know, and the like. A first step then in meta-ethical analysis is some proper separation of the parts, such as meaning, epistemic confirmation, and rational justification. Naturally the parts fit together into a larger whole, into the meta-ethical edifice, but simplistic positivistic equations do not satisfactorily explain the integration. 10 As to meaning, deep-green theory can already stand on its record of proferred semantical analyses. 3 Semantics both for axiological terms such as value and bettemess and for deontic terms such as obligation and wrongness have been provided through world semantics (see sv, MD). The deontic theory developed in the process (in MD) offers a considerable improvement over Ross's theory (which supplies no semantics), because it enables the theory-saving artifice of prima facie obligations to be removed and natural language discourse concerning obligations to be recovered. While such semantical advances do not pretend to offer a full account of meaning, as much more remains to be done within pragmatics, they do offer straightforward resolutions both of long-standing ethical puzzles and paradoxes and of several complaints about environmentally deep ethics. A major early problem for a genuinely nonchauvinistic ethics was to give a satisfactory account of ethical terms without reference to favoured biological species, above all to humans. On deep-green theory this was accomplished by a combination of an "annular theory", offering an ethically relevant typology of doers and receivers, with the semantical analyses (see EE and AP for details). By these means, deep-green theory proceeded to remove humans from an essential role in ethics. Humans enter importantly, of course, but only contingently, as certain sorts of valuers and agents, which sorts depending upon their relevant capacities. For example, humans do not inevitably enter, as too many had previously supposed, into every ethical picture, because there were no value judgements without valuers, and all valuers were humans. Both parts of this linkage fail. Most important, values are not tied to valuers or actual valuing. But possible valuers and therewith their valuing can always be dummied in logically. The reason is at bottom that any coherent distribution of values can be regarded as the values of certain possible valuers. Furthermore, contrary to MCCloskey's unsupported charge against such semantical analyses, this does not expose the theory 'to difficulties parallel to those encountered by phenomenalism ... ' (p.60). For phenomenalism attempts a reduction; the semantical theory makes no such attempt. The meta-ethic is non-reductionist; nor is it obliged to rely upon tricks like supervenience. Deep-green theory already had more up on the meta-ethical scoreboard in the early eighties than Ross's theory upon which MCCioskey purportedly proposed to reply. MCCloskey's criticism of ecological ethics as meta-ethically inadequate lapses. As to normative theory, the other prong of his attack, his demands are excessive. Few ethical theories have been stated 'fully and clearly' and 'developed in a systematic, detailed 3 Standing on records is hardly a practice I embrace with much enthusiasm, but sometimes it is inevitable if excess repetition is to be avoided. 11 form' such as Mccloskey appears to expect (e.g. p.60). To take some grand comparisons: Those that are detailed such as Confusianism are not particular systematic, those that are detailed and systematic such as Spinoza's ethic are hardly clear and are likely inconsistent, those that are fairly full and moderately clear such as Sidgwick's utilitarianism are also rather clearly defective; and in the twentieth century, nothing much, ecological or not, matches these grand examples. But to indicate a few details of what is accomplished normatively in deep-green theory:- Non-interference and like principles are defended (cf EE p.174); these afford a basis for integrating standard social justice principles (including obligations to the future), duly amended, with environmental principles. In this way, making use of the annular theory, much of prevailing social ethics, of a radical kind, can be subsumed. In an attempt to be helpful, Mccloskey quite erroneously suggests that 'the normative ethic appears to be base[d] on ... intuitive insights into what is intrinsically valuable and what is intrinsically obligatory, where what is intrinsically obligatory need not be tied to intrinsic value' (p.60, rearranged). What is obligatory, like what is right, does answer back to what is intrinsically valuable, though in more complex fashion than elementary ethical courses care to contemplate (see TE and MD). But what is intrinsically valuable is often not discerned through intuitive insights. The idea that is is part of what lies at the back of the expectation that instant answers can and should be given to any question as to what is intrinsically valuable or the like. Rather what is intrinsically valuable is arrived at through a process of reasoning and coherence-assessment, based at bottom on emotional presentation (for more detail see TE). We offered, furthermore, many examples of items - not only individuals, but species, such as the blue whale, complexes, and ecosystems - that are intrinsically valuable, valuable in and for themselves and not on other counts (such as some of MCCloskey's "intrinsic values" which vanish into economic or aesthetic values). Accordingly, the charge (p.60), 'Nor are the relevant values or principles explained or discussed', loses its force. As to the specific difficulties for an ecological ethic of deep-green kind that MCCioskey alleges, many of these are only encountered upon importing assumptions that the ethics do not include and should not supply. So it is with the assumption that an ecological ethic should assign intrinsic value to all species, even equally to each species, given that it does to some. MCCloskey's own intermediate ethic does not do this, why should an ecological ethic? Some-to-all arguments do not suddenly become valid in deep space. Deep-green theory, in particular, unlike deep ecology, makes no assumptions as to biospecies equality; rather it requires a certain interspecies impartiality. The extent of intrinsic value of a species is assessed in principle, through a multiple factor procedure incorporating value-making features of the species (cf. EE p.168). Mccloskey wheels 12 out the already exhausted examples of disease organisms and parasites, and offers his intuition, a strong human prejudice, that 'there seems to be no intrinsic value in the existence of such species and organisms' (p.61). No doubt such species and organisms do not exhibit intrinsic value in the way or to the extent that conspicuous species near the tops of food chains do. Their biological role and value is different. Their importance, consists, in part, in control, in regulation of the character and the numbers of more valuable species; their biological value is, to stretch a term, primarily facilitative, but often nonetheless, under present ecological arrangements, apparently essential. One reason why MCCioskey fails to observe how easy it is to shift the difficulties he finds so pressing is, of course, that he is trying to make a case against deep positions. Another reason is that he is operating with far too coarse a mesh, both ecologically and socially. Intrinsic value does not come in big indiscriminable unsieved lumps: all species if any, all pleasure if any, all knowledge if any. The need for discrimination becomes evident if added to MCCloskey's list of intrinsic valuables (e.g. p.108) are such standard goals as wealth and power (itself often linked to knowledge). Like wealth and power, human pleasure and knowledge4, for example, are far from invariable goods. Often, like much entrepreneurial information transmitted through expensive systems, they are trivial; sometimes they are positively evil, as pleasure in extensive torture, or practical knowledge of the means of excruciating torture. 5 A finer mesh is needed, and available, a mesh that can be usefully applied in the ecological domain to remove standard "difficulties", as it was applied by Mill, though in a failed attempt to repair utilitarianism. 4. Extending ecological ethics, inadequately, to ecological politics. Ecological politics is a structure grafted onto ecological ethics, in much the way that political theory more generally is supposedly built upon (or alongside) ethics. Politics is essentially concerned with groups, societies and certain social institutions; ethics, so it is said, with individuals. But the distinction is not quite so simple; ethics too concerns groups and interrelations of individuals, normatively. In fact, the exact 4 For these often shoddy goals McCloskey indecently contemplates destruction of the Rottnest quokka, a species McCloskey provocatively presents as 'useless' and 'ugly' (p.61). Judgements of aesthetic and utility are notoriously ideological systemdependent, and here McCloskey flouts his commitment to an old, damaging, and fortunately disappearing, ideology. 5 In any event, Western ethics and ideology much overrate knowledge and information; largely defunct Eastern theories, such as Taoism, have a better appreciation of the importance, and nonimportance, of different kinds of knowledge (cf. Sylvan and Bennett on Taoism). 13 interrelation of politics with ethics, though an issue under investigation since Aristotle sought to settle the matter, remains unclear. Judicious borrowing from logic can help a bit in clarification, in both the general and the ecologically restricted cases. With ethics and politics, or ecological ethics and ecological politics (of given sorts, e.g. utilitarian, deep-green), both considered as theories, the relation is that of extension: the latter extends the former, in fact extends it substantially. For comparison, logical examples of extensions are afforded by the relation of quantification logic to sentential logic, or set theory to quantification logic, or, a little nearer the mark in terms of complexity, classical mathematics to set theory. Ecological politics is not merely - or as regards the pure theory at all - an application of ecological ethics. It requires a considerable amount of further apparatus (typically primitives and defined terms in the extended theory) that does not enter into ethics proper, such as states, leaders, corporations, unions, organisers, and moreover (what correspond to axiomatic constraints) the manifold interconnections of these political items. What kind of extension politics is, or ought to be, of ethics is a more vexed question. In particular (depending on the matching of the politics to the presumed ethics it extends) the extension may not be conservative. For example, theoretical allowance has to be made for the Machiavellian idea that certain political components may be exempt from given ethical constraints, an idea that has proved unacceptable to most philosophers from Aristotle through Mccloskey. The prevailing conservative extension theme is forcefully presented, if in too shallow and individualistic form, by Nozick: Moral philosophy sets the background for, and the boundaries of, political philosophy. What persons may and may not do to one another limits what they may do [politically] through the apparatus of a state, or do to establish such an apparatus. The moral prohibitions it is permissible to enforce are the source of whatever legitimacy the state's fundamental coercive power has (Nagel p.199, endorsing Nozick). In short, should conservative extension be abandoned, rational justification becomes a serious, indeed insuperable, problem. As it happens, the way in which ecological politics proceeds to extend ecological politics (when done conservatively) is admirably illustrated by MCCloskey's practice and development of issues. In virtually every case, the approach adopted as regards the politics of the issue builds directly upon the results reached in the ethical investigation of that issue. However, in the political theory advanced, Mccloskey does not take full and proper advantage of his supplemented ethics, but lapses back into an old-fashioned chauvinism. (He thus resembles a logician, actual exemplars shall go unnamed, who 14 with all the underlying logical technology available to avoid the paradoxes and anomalies of classical set theory, lapses back into these when he makes the extension to set theory.) Once again this abysmal outcome is primarily a result of his tenacious adherence to that ancient greater value prejudice, which vastly overrates humans, their attitudes, freedoms and products, and undervalues natural things, even to the extent of undercutting previously granted intrinsic value (cf. p.111). Mccloskey proceeds to play humans off against environments, assuming of course that humans ought to win hands-down. The resulting theory is ecological only in addressing - in a decidedly unsympathetical way ecologically - ecological problems. Ecologically then, the proferred ecological politics proves exceedingly disappointing; politically, things are little better. A political theory is bound to add to an ethical theory further organisational structure, comprising further structural units (corporations, states, etc.), institutional arrangements (property, markets, etc.), and so on. There are a great many, still illclassified and largely untried, types of options here: options as to what gets added, and how it is adjoined. Among the enormous range of choice McCloskey opts, without much argument, for unimaginative arrangements like those prevailing in the West and North, for a statist and developmental status quo (for which he serves very much as an apologist). He opts for what he is pleased to call 'liberal democratic states' - though the veneer of democracy is thin (control typically being vested with a ruling minority) and liberality is sharply hedged (true-blue liberalism conflicting with statism, in ways thorough-going libertarianism has exposed). Practically, as we know from experience, it is a jerry-built structure; theoretically, as is insufficiently realised, it remains a house of cards. The status quo choice of "liberal democracy" gets confirmed, so Mccloskey imagines, by disposing of but two sorts of alternatives: primitivism, which he regards as substantially self-refuting in presently highly civilized highly warlike times; and totalitarianism, which he regards as the main and menacing alternative. It is a simplistic scheme, leaving out significant alternatives; but such a picture is remarkably widespread, even among academics. While, like most urbanised intellectuals, Mccloskey cannot resist sounding off about any proposed 'return to primitivism', to 'rural communities of the political imagination' (p.109), he does in fact confine his consideration of alternative political arrangements to totalitarian alternatives which would sharply increase the restrictiveness of present statist arrangements. Against totalitarian alternatives, even present inadequate arrangements no doubt look good; but against certain other political alternatives (e.g. decentralised organisation using advanced technology as appropriate), these arrangements look more like a recipe for on-going ecological trouble. Such other alternatives, Mccloskey does not really consider. He has sighted the far ecological right, 15 ecofascism as it is sometimes dubbed, and fires almost all his guns at it. However there is an ecological left, with a longer tradition than the right, which passes unnoticed; yet it offers a vision of new ecological communities in which liberal principles, on the face of it MCCloskey's main concern, are maintained or even enhanced. But, for all its shortcomings, MCCloskey's attempt to get to grips with ecological politics deserves a somewhat fuller discussion than indicated by Goodin's cavalier dismissal: 'The politics discussion just amounts to a bash at the authoritarianism of some of the more rabid ecological doomsayers, propositions which are quite sufficient reductios in and of themselves' (p.344). For one thing, that was how much of the field looked when MCCioskey was helping to put ecological politics on the philosophical agenda. Ecological politics still remained an unfashionable, and in some places dangerous, field at the time MCCioskey was writing. Liberal philosophers with respectable academic positions in North America tended to keep out of the field, which accordingly got left to practical environmentalists, over-enthusiastic in their appeals to the state for tough control and regulation, and to authoritarian academics keen to strengthen totalitarian and isolationist tendencies of states. As MCCioskey emphasizes, Much ecological political writing exhibits two disturbing features that undermine its value. The one feature relates to the readiness of many political theorists on the basis of the flimsiest evidence to waive lightly man's claim to recognition of his human rights on the ground that the ecological crisis is so grave and critical that only the most drastic, desperate measures will succeed. The other feature is the very great confidence in the capacity of states to take whatever action is necessary to avoid the ecological crisis. In fact, the states of the world today greatly contribute to various of the ecologically based problems that confront mankind. They are unworthy of the great faith and trust that many ecological reformers appear to have in them or in the state in the abstract.(p.108). Bravo! But rather than considering carefully dismantling states, in favour of alternative organisational arrangements, MCCioskey leaps immediately in the opposite direction, to the orthodox position that 'a major part of the ecological political problem is that of ensuring that states carry out their ecological responsibilities' - whatever those may be (states do not regard themselves as morally bound, and typically their constitutions are incredibly weak and unspecific, and sometimes evasive on such matters). Indeed he goes further: 'The nation-state needs to be not superseded but complimented by a world political authority' (p .107). Again there is little argument, and no due concern that such an Authority would be yet a further developmental agency operating with tanks and bulldozers. 16 For another, MCCioskey tried to open up or advance several issues in ecological politics (and would have, if his book had existentially impacted and had not been largely bypassed or dismissed). These issues include not merely the standard issues of overpopulation, pollution and unethical technology; more notably, they also include the issue, which has recently received much airing, as to whether environmental demands and regulations interfere damagingly with individual freedoms and other aspects of liberal principles. There are other facets to this that deserve further examination (do it decently, someone!): the extent to which liberal states do and can deliver on environmental matters, as well as the extent of interference with liberties (much turns then on how it is all done). MCCioskey has overestimated the abilities of states to deliver liberal ideals and guarantee liberal principles, such as individual freedom (in fact, to note some lesser infringements, they characteristically coerce citizens in many respects, forcing them into a money economy, to pay taxes and obtain licences, even to serve on juries, to vote, to fight, etc.). If the state promises liberties with one hand, it is busy actually taking liberties away with the other. While we may be stuck with states for the present, as an unpleasant political reality, it is not too difficult to see that there are better unrealised alternatives even from a traditional liberal angle, alternatives that pass unconsidered. And MCCioskey has grossly underestimated the severity of ecological problems states should be trying to solve. In some of his findings, MCCioskey is so wildly astray that his judgement on factual issues and his credibility has to fall under real suspicion. For example: ' ... it is evident that over the whole period of his existence man has only been one relatively minor factor bearing on species survival rates' (p.47)! ' ... man is simply adding more hazards to those created by nature itself for some species' (p.47 continuing). For the next example, by contrast with the previous, MCCioskey might seek refuge in the fact that he was writing back in 1982: 'Few suggest that man can or will destroy the ecosystem of the earth' (p.49). Even so, the news on nuclear winter had broken, and the Greenhouse effect was already worrying some scientists. "Man" appears able to do little that is very wrong; MCCioskey can only bring himself to engage in the mildest of censure: ' ... man could have used DDT to better effect' (p.50). No doubt he could have refrained from using it to significantly better effect. A due adaptation of that Old Testament idea that humans are characteristically radically flawed, regularly and perhaps inevitably sinning in their treatment of the Earth, does not break through in MCCloskey's approach. In fact anti-ecological themes strongly pushed by MCCioskey will break through again and again in what follows. 17 Nor did Mccloskey anticipate the rapid march of ecological history at all well. With his operational assumption that ecological reforms 'would not be popular' (e.g. p.156), he appears to have been swiftly refuted by history. There has been much popular movement in favour of ecological causes. The main resistance to far-reaching reforms has not been popular, but establishment resistance, together with that from business, wealth and privilege, and their hired economic men and thugs. Similarly with his assumptions that reform, or change, would not occur unless the ecological problems were believed 'to be real problems' (p.157) - which of course MCCloskey himself believed they were not by and large, something he deluded himself that he had shown. But popular beliefs have changed rapidly, taking MCCloskey's assumptions under along with old beliefs. In any case, MCCloskey's argument to unpopularity lacks cogency. It is that ecological measures 'may necessitate less convenient, changed lifestyles, many controls and restrictions, increased costs, additional taxes, basic interference with what now are seen as being matters of basic rights .... democratic legislators [cannot] hope to bring about the reforms ... and still retain office' (p.157). Whence, again ecological reformers may look to totalitarian political solutions. So far as I am aware, there have been no such proposals by ecological groups in Australasia. In small measure too, Mccloskey begins to meet his own argument. For measures of the type Mccloskey rightly finds distasteful, have already been run through in contemporary representative democracies; consider security and surveillance, foreign control and surveillance, nuclear power and surveillance, urban restructuring and surveillance opportunities, and so on. Secondly, there are important trade-offs; if these often minor inconveniences are not experienced now, much more drastic and dislocating changes will probably have to be undertaken subsequently. Thirdly, of course, if they are not undertaken now much of immense value will be lost. More direct democracies than we have today, where peoplegovernance and control of established elites is tenuous, would stand a better chance of limiting these losses; properly pluralistic systems would presumably manage better still. But Mccloskey does not address such issues as ecologically improved democracies. Instead he assumes, quite wrongly, that solutions to ecological difficulties will require strong and authoritarian central governments (perhaps both of states and of the world), but that such institutions run directly counter to liberal concerns: 'the enjoyments of many rights and liberties and opportunities to rectify grave injustices' (p.25). So he tears off to address the difficulties of ecological totalitarianism (pp.158-9), well-known difficulties (as Goodin observed) confronting Antipodean non-starters among political alternatives. 18 Without examining other alternatives than certain totalitarian ones, Mccloskey manages to conclude (to his own satisfaction) that 'the only realistic, feasible avenue to ecological political reform is through the political institutions of an open society that respects human rights', what he appears to think is offered by contemporary 'liberal democratic states' (p.159). Naturally deep environmentalists seek open societies that respect rights, including decently discerned human rights. The big trouble is that on these matters, as with environmental matters, contemporary liberal democratic states have performed decidedly sublimenally, i.e. well below adequacy threshold. 6 It is not unreasonable to contemplate alternative political arrangements that perform more satisfactorily. But it is perhaps unrealistic to expect such improved organisational structure to be got into place at all easily or at all. For liberal democratic states retain regional monopolies on violence and other critical control, which, for all the palavering about respecting rights, they do not hesitate to deploy when their power and security are threatened. Nor is Mccloskey, by contrast with libertarians, at all averse to regulations and restrictions and limitations on liberty - except when these put environmental things ahead of humans. For humans, if not animals, things material are supposed to be pretty good in MCCloskey's liberal democratic mixed capitalistic setting. Environmental constraints are not to impose upon or reduce human living 'standards or levels of enjoyment' (p.134) - unless that enjoyment should be profligate, for instance involving conspicuous consumption and waste. Certainly such constraints are not to interfere with morally acceptable human freedoms: such is one side of the proferred dilute liberalism. But unnecessary waste is another thing, and should be curbed, through state guidance and regulation; liberalism here parts company with libertarianism. 'The switch from a resource-profligate society to a resource-liberal one would involve an acceptance of much more state action, more state interference by way of incentives, disincentives, regulations, restrictive laws, and over all planning than now prevails. However, it would not require the loss of basic freedom ... ' (p.134)! Such double-talk certainly makes the heavy liberal case MCCloskey tries to mount against decent environmental concerns - as against decent human concerns - look thin and flawed. Because such regulation does make serious inroads upon capitalistic freedoms, much hangs on the term 'basic', which is not however explained in this context. If, being freedom-loving Europeans, we burn down an empty freeway at speeds in excess of wasteful consumption limitations and we are accordingly locked away for months, then the effect 6 Sublimenal is a satisizing analogue of the maximization ideology's suboptimal. 19 on our basic freedom to life at large is serious. The paternalistic states MCCioskey offers, in significant respects more paternal than those we already have in the West, do not sit so easily with liberalism; patently they are incompatible with libertarianism, which does not brook such restrictive regulation. The critical point is however this: what is permissible in rectifying a resource-profligate society is similarly permissible in reorganising an environmentally-profligate society. Again there need be no loss of basic freedom, where basic is now characterised in terms of whats ethically acceptable. Only the ethics is now a deep environmental ethics. 5. Structuring ecological ethics and politics: towards an improved classification of environmental problems. Environmental ethics and politics are regularly said to be engendered by environmental problems, increasingly severe and encroaching problems. Yet in MCCloskey's text, as in that of his main model, Passmore's establishment text, there is no well-organised classification of environmental problems, only a rather ramshackle list. We can however reach towards an improved classification by considering environmental impact in a dynamic setting (cf. the beginning of section 1). An impact of something is something which comes from somewhere, sources, into something, sinks, parts of environments. In a process diagram, it looks like this: impacts processes sources sinks types of environments participants distinguished agents of impacts recipients of impacts Expanding upon the elements of this process diagram will deliver the sought after improved classification. Firstly, given distinguished background experience, especially with environmental impact equations, a further two-way classification is suggested: in terms of • sorts of impacts, and • types of environments. The latter framework is wide enough (in obvious respects too wide for a tight classification) to include both special concentrated sources such as mines, power stations, factories, and the like, and special sinks such as rubbish dumps, sewerage outflows, and the like. But the framework is not quite wide enough; it is important to factor into types of environments, expected inhabitants of those environments, which are the recipients of impacts (impactees). These will include not only present inhabitants of 20 environments: animals, plants, native humans, for land-surface environments, but also expected future inhabitants, whose likelihood or very existence may be impaired. There are two ways of incorporating these sorts of elements in the general scheme: either expanding environmental components, by having zones and habitats with kinds of expected inhabitants; or distinguishing participants in the impacts, givers and receivers. Here the latter course is preferred; we distinguish also then • kinds of recipients, and as well of course • kinds of impactors. While the kinds of impactors is diverse, including such superagents and nonagents as Nature, Chance, God (as in "acts of God"), and so forth, as well as animals, the main impactors of interest are, presently, humans. Accordingly let us run out the standard environmental impact equation for humans in a region, though it applies to any class of impactors through any kind of impact: EI. Environmental impact (of ... through ... ) = Population size (of ... ) X Resource use per member (of ... ) x Impact (through ... ) per unit of resource use e.g. of humans in USA through atmospheric pollution. Such an impact breakdown leads directly to three major categories of environmental problems, namely a Population a Consumption and use a Technology and waste. Those components act in concert, and, despite well-publicized attempts to load problems onto just one component, evidently all are sometimes important. A more sophisticated environmental impact equation would reduce the aggregation of the equation, EI = P x C x T (in brief, and functional, form), by introducing distributional features, which indicated where and when impact really mattered. Suppose, for example, there are n sufficiently independent regions, as in the following regionalized impact equation: n EI = Pi X Ci X Ti i=l Suppose, for instance, we are investigating the environmental impact of present humans l through industrialization, i.e. EI (present humans through industrialization). Then, on an obvious regional breakdown, the impact is overwhelmingly dominated by three regions: North America, Europe, and North Asia (primarily Japan). If it were not that the rest of the world were locked into this system (and its humans encouraged to applaud 21 and emulate it), supplying much of the raw materials, taking too much of the expensive products and waste, and suffering the pollution effects that spill outside the offending regions, main problems of industrialisation could be isolated in the high latitude N orthem hemisphere. The regionalized environmental impact equation will also serve to better organise widespread assumptions as to how those impacts that are taken seriously can be eroded. Not only is there the illusory prospect of reducing impact to "acceptable levels" by variation of just one parameter - Ci is that invariably favoured by socially-oriented shallower environmentalists; Ti, in the shape of wizard technology, by economists and technocrats (but such technology is likely to have its own impact and thereby to add to environmental problems). There is also the possibility of moving further afield to new regions, where impacts are lower. There are familiar frontier practices ( and a corresponding frontier ethics), which can be seen as reapplied to elements such as industrialisation and its components, pollution and waste. Of course such frontier practices are impoverishing, and too often destructive of further environments and many of their inhabitants; but in any case they are now seriously limited by biospheric limitations of the whole Earth. Many significant types of environment obtain little or no consideration in MCCloskey's survey; e.g. deserts (too many the product of past human activity), urban regions, polar regions, atmospheric zones, and so on. To stay within reasonable bounds, however, not even all the areas of concern that Mccloskey does look at will be examined in what follows. For to try to track Mccloskey in all the areas he does delve into would require an extensive treatise, as he raises many fundamental issues in political theory: to mention two remarkable examples, a brief discussion of 'the right to private property' is tucked away under 'Family Rights and Rights to Reproduce', and of the 'right for education' under 'The Right to Respect as a Person' (p.75ff.) Instead a more detailed treatment of a few of the areas he addresses will be offered (in fact some of the other areas have been investigated elsewhere, in Green Series discussions, or will be). 6. Population impact: the fact of human overpopulation. A major and very conspicuous impact of humans upon the Earth comes through their sheer numbers, which, though already huge, are still growing rapidly, and are overwhelming environmental and social bases for reasonable support in many parts of the globe. MCCloskey's first thesis, which sets the agenda for his entire population discussion, is this (pp 146-7,p.97): that there is no world population crisis, indeed further, NP. The world is not threatened by a population crisis in the foreseeable future. 22 But instead of coming out directly and cleanly with this preposterous thesis, MCCioskey approaches the business in a typical oblique way, designed to shift the onus of proof, claiming that he has 'argued that a tenable, plausible case had not been made out for believing that the world is threatened by a population crisis in the foreseeable future' (p.146). It is fair to wonder about his experiential basis, whether, for instance, he has travelled through India or visited the vast urban slums of many third-world countries. It is fair to wonder what would make a "tenable plausible case" - proper theoretical business for philosophers, which philosophers have generally steadfastly avoided - or, of immediate relevance, what would constitute a "population crisis", and what counts as "overpopulation". On the last at least we do have a proposal from MCCioskey, 'to use overpopulation to refer to population sizes that exceed a country's or the world's capacity to feed adequately and to make it possible for all to enjoy their basic rights' (p.97). While the proposal is no doubt very convenient for the argumentative route MCCioskey will try to take, a route it already signposts, it is a decidedly chauvinistic and exceedingly shallow suggestion, which is ecologically entirely unacceptable. First, it takes no due account of future humans, or other creatures. But present capacity is achieved, so far as it is, too often through running down present biological and other systems, thereby jeopardising future capacity; decent sustainability is required even by shallow ecological positions. Secondly, the proposal is indecently chauvinistic; it takes account of naught but humans, their basic rights and their feeding. It thus violates the framework MCCioskey elsewhere professes to have adopted. For instance, high populations, which are not MCCioskey overpopulations, may lead, and are leading, to promotion of evil and to gross reductions in intrinsic value, including types of value MCCioskey earlier (somewhat reluctantly) acknowledged. But like all the political applications of the potentially generous ethical basis, that on population takes an ugly anti-ecological tum. It is all humans and humans, humans first, last and only, though humans at brute food subsistence levels or less as it turns out, and is turning out in many regions. Now really the proposal should be relativised, to 'overpopulation of a region', as the awkward disjunction, between country or world, makes evident. Many regions and countries are already seriously overpopulated (even by MCCloskey's slack standards), as he goes on to say. However, so he immediately asserts, 'the world as a whole is not overpopulated' (p.97). Whatever the case for this claim - a defective and disreputable case as will soon appear - plainly some large assumptions go into the proposition that a whole or summation can enjoy certain distribution properties when many of its parts do not: assumptions about the role of international trade, regionalism and self-sustainability on the one side and about summative features on the other. If clothes, for example, are 23 dirty or shabby in many parts, so are they as a whole. Suppose some parts are overpopulated because of constant infringements of basic human rights, infringements presumably traceable back to excess population sizes (though the connection is not made clear enough). Then the whole can hardly but be overpopulated, as it stands, whatever the future prospects for redistribution, reorganisation, and so forth. To evade such problems and to scramble to his conclusion Mccloskey firstly weakens 'basic rights' to 'basic needs' (but rights normally demand more than need satisfaction), and then drops 'basic needs' out altogether. Thus what he finally gets down to is the bare food issue, all else set aside: of whether 'if the food actually produced were distributed and used to the best advantage of all persons in the world' every human could be fed. But, so he claims, 'it is widely accepted' that all can be amply fed (pp 97-8). It is evident that, even if what is so "widely accepted" were true, the outcome would be insufficient to show no Mccloskey overpopulation. Suppose the world has the capacity (and will) to redistribute food to the most advantage. Still, basic food is no assurance of basic rights. Further argument, not supplied, is essential; argument to showing that regional overpopulation, stayed however by bread (but not circuses), does not lead to basic rights infringement, through such media as unemployment, poverty, inequity and so on. Furthermore it is very doubtful that this can be established, for the simple reason that there are connections between these human conditions (however difficult they may be to push into quantifiable or law-like form). Humans do not survive or depend upon food alone. To keep many of them even partly contented, so inflated have their wants and needs become under ideological pressures, will require a very large and very environmentally destructive pie. Humans are now an extraordinarily greedy and destructive species. Though one animal species among thousands, and one biological species among tens of millions, they have taken over most of the Earth and most of its products, so far as they can, for their own uses and purposes. More than 80% of the fruits of photosynthesis, for example, now flow to this one species. Yet perhaps 10% of the world's human population are malnourished, and many millions at least lack other subsistence needs. Even the bare food claim, upon which MCCloskey's whole case depends at bottom, is no longer so widely accepted, since the shock of the North American and other droughts; it was being questioned as MCCloskey wrote. Now however we have available the Brown University study of world food supply in relation to human 24 population. 7 The study is based on the 1986 harvest, which was a world record. The findings were that, with this supply, assuming perfect and equal redistribution, 6 billion humans would be fed a vegetarian diet. Thus by the end of the century, present record supplies will not be able to sustain the world's human population even at vegetarian levels. If the somewhat better South American style diet, with 15% meat, is considered, then only 4 billion humans can be fed; that is, less than the present world population. While if a rather better Australian style diet is contemplated, the number that can be fed declines to 2.5 billion, that is half the present world population. So much for ample feeding. It might reasonably be anticipated that the rest of the argument to NP, no foreseeable population crisis, is hopeless. And it is. All we are offered are, firstly, some reasons, of very variable quality, 'to suspect the most confident, brash predictions' (p.99) - suspicions which seem to include NP within their scope, along with MCCloskey's next speculative thesis. Secondly we are offered the speculative thesis that world food production will grow at least sufficiently to match world population growth. It is a thesis floated largely on technological optimism, a thesis that should be regarded with heavy suspicion given recent serious declines in biological capital: fisheries, soils, forests, and so on, and given apparently increasing climatic instability. To give him his small due, MCCioskey does assert, repeatedly, that there is little ground 'for complacency and inaction in respect of the world's population growth' (e.g. p.99 ); and as well as firing moral shots at 'alarmist predictions ... based on the flimsiest premisses' countering NP (for no problem), he makes heavy moral noises about morally assessing the situation. In any case, he needs to say something like this in order to pull off convincingly his big discussion of the ins and outs of, ethics and politics of, human sexuality and population control. 7. On limiting human populations: some neglected considerations. Hitherto received opinion, in modem Wes tern civilization, has taken the line that culling animal species is perfectly alright, but that culling humans is not, because humans have an unalienable right to life (a right regularly neglected however in times of war, in regressive criminal justice systems, and now questioned as regards poachers of significant animals). Received opinion, which MCCioskey tries to shore up, is now being challenged. Alternative methods of controlling populations of wild animals, to 7 The study is regularly cited by Ehrlich in his talks, lectures and works: see reference. 25 previous technologically primitive ones, are being seriously considered. Another gulf between humans and other sizeable intelligent animals is beginning to close. Unlike some dangerous Christian thinkers, Mccloskey does not cede to humans an unlimited right to procreation. As he says, 'there is no recognised moral, social or legal right for consenting parties to reproduce at will', but 'few philosophers today would seek philosophically to justify prevailing recognised ... restrictions on procreation' (p.150). Mccloskey wishes to impose a restriction as regards adequate provision for offspring; there is no right to reproduction where a requirement of reasonable prospects of adequate provision is not met. This bears heavily, as he realises, and perhaps also inequitably, on impoverished parents in poor communities; the issue is not really resolved (see p.101). But otherwise, in richer countries, the duties of those who would undertake human parenthood are presented as slight. Individuals, acting on their own, have otherwise no duties to restrict the size of their families (for the unMCCloskeyian consequentialist reason that it will have limited practical significance and achieve little). Where overpopulation is an issue, political, not individual, action is what is required. Where overpopulation threatens, individuals 'adequately fulfil their duty if they have only that number of children for which they can adequately care and [very differently, and with major political implications] if they foster and support world action to stabilize the world population and [confirming a right previously hedged] to ensure that all persons enjoy the right, equally with themselves, to have offspring if they so choose' (p.104 ). Otherwise the issue is dumped in the (too hard) political basket, for states and world organisations to try to handle. All this is decidedly unsatisfactory. Most important, there is no right to production of children without limit, even given that they can be "provided for". One reason is that new children produce impacts, and children in quantity seriously interfere with others; so result in significant violations of liberal principles regarding noninterference with others. In rough analogical terms, as the Macs' new building interferes with their neighbours' views, so their new children interfere with the neighbours' freedom and lifestyles and environments, beginning with local noise and crowding and continuing, much further, through taxes for family allowances, for schools and so on, through crowded and polluted parks and beaches and so on. Those assuming (conditional) rights, to reproduce for instance, tend to forget that rights require justifications (they cannot just be pulled out of thin air). But here any straightforward justificatory pattern is upset, because of a very familiar neglect of relations: namely, impacts of new people on environments, and interference of new people with in-place people. A change in attitudes and practices is accordingly warranted. Parties producing larger numbers of children should be regarded as socially and ecologically irresponsible; they should no longer gain special financial support, but 26 perhaps should, on the contrary, be duly penalized. These themes run counter to the main thrust of MCCloskey's discourse on population control, an extensive discussion premised on what he takes to be the improbable hypothesis that a world population crisis eventuates (pp.147-155). It ought to be enough to pull the plug on that discussion, sending intellectual babies with soiled bath water. That voluntary methods of limiting human births 'will not succeed' is MCCloskey's prime thesis (p.147). The support offered for it is characteristic and characteristically inadequate. First the thesis is weakened, and then some restricted and contestable empirical evidence is advanced as suggestive. 'That voluntary methods of checking birth rates are unlikely to be adequate is suggested by the relatively limited success of family planning projects even where [well] backed ... ' (p.147). On the contrary, voluntary methods of checking birth rates, mostly independent of family planning projects, have been substantially successful in many better educated, less impoverished communities. Some of these might even count as spectacularly successful, and more would be if they achieved some real, and sensitive, state support. But there are many powerful interests, especially those emanating from organised religions, operating against delivery of support designed for success. There is a conspicuous difference, again connected with ancient prejudices, between the attitude shown to human populations and the approach MCCloskeyians take to animal populations. Humans have the right, but socially constrained, to continue on their expansive and environmentally degrading course; animals have no such right, because, among other things, they have no rights. 8. On animal rights and supposed political implications thereof. The argument to the conservative result, that animals cannot enjoy (moral) rights, attempts to trade off an argument on which great emphasis is put, that 'there is a vast gap between rights and interests' (p.66). But that attempt depends on a confusion between what rights are - certainly not interests - and what can hold rights significantly - perhaps only items with interests. With that confusion out of the way, MCCioskey still has two main arguments to his shrill conclusion, that 'animals do not, cannot possess moral rights' (p.66 and several other places): a tight redefinition argument, and an environmental chaos otherwise argument. The tight redefinition argument proceeds, by appealing to special features of rights, to tighten up the notion of right so that unwanted (if commonly recognised) classes of right-holders are excluded. Such an argument, widely deployed against animal liberation, takes two main forms: less plausibly, that rights require interests, which 27 animals are alleged to lack, and, more plausibly, that rights have to be suitably exercisable and claimable, feats beyond animals abilities and capacities to perform. Though formerly among the ageing afficiandos of the less plausible Cartesian nointerests approach, MCCioskey now pursues the more plausible form. He appeals first to typical features of rights (though really some combination of these must form an invariant cluster for a decisive argument), such as their being 'foregone, insisted upon, exercised in or contrary to one's interests. For possession of a moral right to be meaningful, the possessor or his/her representative must be able to claim it, exercise it, or the like' (p.66, italics added). Unfortunately for his argument, MCCioskey proceeds, at crucial points, to leave out the representative alternative. Thus while an animal may not be able to claim its rights, a representative can; whereupon talk of claiming a right is not empty (pace p.66). Thus the argument so far is broken-backed. Having recanted on his earlier contention that animals cannot have interests (see p.65), MCCioskey is no longer in a position to preclude the attribution of rights on that ground, that interests are a necessary condition. 8 'We can plausibly claim to have some idea of what is in the interests of an animal. We can have no knowledge concerning how it would exercise its moral rights, if it had any' (p.66). Surely we can. A wombat can exercise its right to proceed along a way in the same way that a human can, namely by proceeding along it, setting aside obstructions, and so on. But MCCioskey proceeds, in a way characteristic of high redefinition strategies, to heighten the requirements. He appeals to features of what he takes to be 'paradigm cases of the possessors of rights, persons, rational, morally autonomous beings' which he couples with the characteristic exercise of rights (p.66). There are, however, other paradigm examples of right holders, such as small children, senile humans, imbeciles, etc. Despite the suggestions, rationality and a high level of autonomy are not required for the possession or exercise of rights. MCCioskey asserts that 'it is capacity for moral autonomy, for moral selfdirection and self-determination, that is basic to the possibility of possessing a right' (p.66). That is a high redefinition, substantially exceeding the requirements normally expected, especially where guardians or representatives are appointed or envisaged. MCCioskey-rights are a quite proper subclass of rights as ordinarily conceived. Even so it may well be that animals can hold them; it all depends upon how much gets pumped into the elusive term 'moral'. Wombats, for example, are not human, do not read and write, are not much given to calculus, do not enter into contracts, and so on; nor do 8 Elliot is quite mistaken in saying that McCloskey's views have not changed since those espoused in 1979 (p.503). Admitting animal interests represents a major change. That animals do, of course, have interests is argued in detail in my 81. 28 many primitive peoples, though humans, engage in any of these activities (though some of them perhaps could with education). But wombats are, by and large, decidedly autonomous, self-determining and self-directed; they exhibit much more independence than most modern humans. Similarly with whales. Despite such familiar findings, MCCioskey takes the following proposition as decisive: 'Consider how we should respond if it were to be determined that a whale or dolphin possessed moral autonomy' (p.66). He does not address the issues raised in this queer pronouncement, but immediately leaps to his sought conclusion against animal rights. Given that moral autonomy is not to the point, except for MCCioskey-rights, the proposition is irrelevant to and not supportive of the conclusion. Without the elusive term 'moral', the proposition is, furthermore, decidedly not a discussion stopper. Most dolphins exhibit a high degree of autonomy, the exceptions being primarily those (improperly) held in captivity, injured in fishing activities, sickened by pollution, and so on. The trouble with the infiltration of morality is that it normally (if wrongly) suggests human activities and human communities - whence what small force MCCloskey's proposition enjoys, as whales as agents fall outside that setting. The argument to environmental chaos, to entirely untoward environmental implications, if rights were ceded to animals, comprises several facets. They are facets that have been seen before, with every legitimate struggle for extensions of rights, such as, most memorably, allocation of rights to enslaved humans. That latter certainly brought some desirable dislocation to social arrangements; so will legitimating animal rights. But it need bring nothing like the complication and aggravations of social and environmental problems that MCCioskey fearfully envisages (p.69, p.122). A first facet concerns conflict of rights. There are of course conflicts of rights between humans and groups of humans, but MCCioskey fears the situation with animals would not merely be more complicated (as it would with much greater numbers) but that 'the difficulty and complexity of this rights calculus' would make it unworkable (p.67). But again he fails to show anything like this. Indeed he immediately weakens his position of apparent strength by looking to an 'easier calculus' where 'man simply protects animals from human violations of animal rights' (p.67). That would be a fine start, though politically virtually all nations and peoples would have to advance a long way to achieve it (Sweden less than most others). While the "easier calculus" does not mean that animals have lesser rights than humans, as MCCioskey implies, what is suggested is important in escaping from difficulties MCCioskey tries to amass. For not all right-holders are on a par, much as not all types of creatures are equal in abilities or capacities. In particular, to get to critical and divisive issues straightaway: it does not follow then from the fact that animals have 29 rights that some of them, domestic ones, cannot be kept, or used - any more than it follows from the fact that humans have rights that some cannot be kept, or employed, for instance as servants. Nor does it follow that dead animals (or humans) cannot be eaten. Nor, most controversially, is it incompatible with animals having rights, that some are killed. For not all rights stand or fall together; a right for continued existence is very different from a right to a decent life or treatment while alive. Furthermore, MCCloskey's invalid arguments to ecological chaos succeed in turning animal liberation into animal libertinism. They do this by familiar slide strategies from some to more to all, from some rights, to many other rights, to the same rights as fully-competent persons. The strategy is coupled with that of assigning to humans more rights than they have, or should hold. Examples include the right to be absolutely where they like or to breed at will. But one human does not have the right to be in any other human's house or bed or space.9 No more do animals, like feral animals or 'disease-carrying pests such as rats and mice'. So, for example, the major conflict MCCioskey alleges with human rights to health dissolves; it depends upon granting excessive rights to rats and mice. With a sensible calculus of rights humans need not be overwhelmed by either animals or other humans; given due constraints on human populations (more than any other animal populations), interference by others could be stabilized at a low level. A further large facet of MCCloskey's argument to chaos doggedly pursues practical and ecological costs of vegetarianism, costs which he considerably exaggerates. But whether he is right about these costs, or not, is a separate issue - irrelevant to the main issue of animal rights. For admitting or stressing animal rights most emphatically does not 'dictate acceptance of vegetarianism as a moral position or practice' (p.68). There is no valid route from rights for animals to vegetarianism, for reasons that have already been very briefly indicated above. 10 MCCioskey has linked the question of animal rights much too closely with positions like that of Singer (an evident target on pp.68-9 of the text). But many more ordinary people and even some philosophers, 11 both before and after Singer, have assigned rights to animals, without commitment thereby to vegetarianism, and without evident (or any) fallacy. As a result or this flawed linkage, 9 While writing this I heard a local airforce contingent claiming its right-to the freedom of Canberra. Plainly it only has a right-to the freedom of only certain cities, and to quite limited things within those cities. 10 A much more detailed case, along with counter-models, can be extracted from my previous work, esp. the Green Series, number 13, i.e.TE (essay 3), and number 2. 11 A neglected early philosopher is Maclver; see esp. his remarks on p.69. 30 MCCioskey makes another interesting mistake: namely 'that the two movements, animal rights on the one hand (the view that some animals possess moral rights) and conservation and preservation on the other', so far from being 'complementary, mutually supportive positions', 'in fact are fundamentally opposed and are such as to be calculated to lead to many major clashes' (p.69, rearranged). While there are major clashes, for example, between moral extensionisms, such as the expanded utilitarianisms of Bentham, Sidgwick and Singer on the one side, and deep environmentalism on the other, there are no clashes of an animal rights position with deep environmentalism . For, very simply, such deep positions accord animals rights. As elsewhere, so with animal rights, errors in the ethical treatment intrude into the supposed political implications. Unremarkably then MCCioskey sees 'the ecological state' as committed to ecological chaos, all of which 'would very seriously curtail human liberty in many ways' and 'create massive theoretical and practical political problems' (p.122). No doubt decent treatment for animals, codified in rights, would restrict human liberty somewhat, as abolition of public spectacles such as hangings, floggings or throwing Christians to hungry lions, curtailed spectator opportunities and freedoms. But the desirable elimination of factory-farmed fast foods and animal-tested cosmetics, or the curtailment of circuses and reformation of zoos, are hardly very serious restrictions on human liberty, or what MCCioskey is thinking of really. He is again thinking of his house full of rats and his garden full of copulating animals, of vegetarianism and protection of rabbits made legally obligatory, and so on (for many such fantasies see p.122). But no such consequences, ensue, without repetition of the errors already exposed in the ethical treatment: inferences from some rights to excessive rights, and so on. Because side-tracked by his own production, by this pantomime of absolutely unconstrained, rampaging, warring and rapidly-multiplyin g animals (i.e. like some humans when ideological controls are lifted, not like most animals), MCCioskey does not address at all the very serious abuses in prevailing present treatment of animals, abuses on farms and in laboratories, at home and in the wild, abuses that should be politically addressed from ethical bases, issues well addressed through rights. An institutionalisation of animal rights would not produce the big problems MCCioskey envisages; after all most people are now represented by professionals in many of their dealings concerning legal rights, a professional paternalism increasingly operates, which 31 subsumes many professionals themselves. On the contrary, such institutionalisation of animal rights, properly done could make for very desirable changes. 12 9. Two other critical features of dominant political ways: the shibboleths of extensive private property and high technology. The orthodox assumption, which McCloskey makes, is that a liberal democratic state will have a mixed (or marginally socially constrained) market capitalist economy. Under the simplistic equations that tend to distort much modem political discussion, even the inadequate qualifications occasionally inserted are forgotten: a liberal democratic state is often equated with institution of market capitalism, indeed too often market arrangements get equated with capitalism. Evidently, however, these equations fall apart under but slight disturbance. Logically they come apart entirely. There are severe logical problems with the very idea of a liberal democracy, which is a dialectical union of individual liberal with social welfare and democratic ideals. For a democratic state, especially should it take popular majoritarian form, can seriously curtail the freedom of minorities (the well-known "tyranny of the majority"). Liberal ends may be better served by a benign dictatorship than by democratic arrangements. Liberality and democracy part company. Similarly individual liberty and statist social welfare. And so on. Certainly liberality, which is the most free ranging of the five big political league players being disentangled, 13 does imply some significant limitations on arrangements, but they may not favour democracy, or capitalism. Fully liberal arrangements should enable a community to opt for democratic organisation, should it wish; but similarly these arrangements should allow the community to choose otherwise, should it want. Also liberal arrangements of a social cast (with decent freedom of the servants) would mean winding back of capitalism. Despite the immense damage illregulated capitalism and market structures can, and do, separately inflict upon ecological and social systems, there is practically no discussion of such matters in MCCloskey, and again little investigation of improved structures or regulation. 14 12 For one thing, it challenges factory farming, as infringing animal rights, in an obvious way. McCloskey avoids the issue when it arises (p.140). 13 In fact four of the five substantially independent players we are reflecting upon market, social welfare, capitalistic, democratic, and liberal arrangements - do not receive an index listing in Mccloskey, while the fifth, liberal, collects many citations and much discussion. 14 A major contemporary myth is that markets and capitalism can flourish without regulation, indeed that they flourish best in a fully deregulated setting. Both 32 As with liberal democracy, so with market capitalism, the components separate. Markets can flourish without capitalism, where for instance agents have sharply limited and bounded budgets and capitalistic accumulation cannot operate. Markets require no liberty in other parts of social life than those involving exchange of certain material goods; they certainly do not require a democratic framework. Capitalism can function without a vibrant free market system; indeed in advanced capitalist states it increasingly does so, with oligopolistic arrangements in place of competitive output markets, vertical integration and contract delivery replacing former input markets, and so on. Capitalism too requires neither democracy nor liberty, indeed too much of either could seriously undermine it. It does however depend upon property, for control and as a store for capital accumulated. In principle, of course, a very limited capitalism could work without private ownership of land and resources, so long as some exchangeable stable form of wealth, such as a sound currency or gold, was available for accumulation and payment of labour. But smart capitalists would rightly feel excessively vulnerable under such arrangements; for they could be wiped out by an outside devaluation of the currency or outside increases in rents on resources and land. In any case, many capitalists (virtually all people of substantial wealth in Australia), and a large array of parasitic middle parties, agents and hangers-on, would be duly despatched along with free-for-all property markets. Having glimpsed MCCloskey's unquestioned commitment to mixed capitalism, it is piquant to behold him begining upon undermining an institution fundamental to historic capitalism, namely private property. Most of MCCloskey's brief discussion of rights to private property (pp. 78-80) focusses upon the labour theory of property, descended from Locke and others, upon which he effects a full demolition job. In fact he severely weakens the case for a substantially unfettered ("free") institution of private property, upon which however the type of liberalism he advances depends. For strong property rights and guarantees are basic to present liberal democratic arrangements, as they are to proposed libertarian alternatives. MCCioskey even tries to close off discussion of the 'political desirability of allowing property rights by way of patent rights to discoveries' in plant and animal breeding, particularly through genetic engineering, on the pretext that these 'cannot reasonably be objected to without the whole private-property system of institutions depend for their operation and for their very survival on regulation, on an appropriate enforceable legal setting. Otherwise, in communities where a certain egalitarianism counted for something for instance, a capitalist would be rash to bank upon holding onto substantial surplus wealth for long. 33 liberal democratic states being questioned' (p.139). Now peripheral cases do not generally threaten the centre, unless, perchance, it is already in some doubt. The extent and character of property is a quite critical, indeed a watershed, issue for environmental politics. For excessive propertarian rights and powers constitute a very serious impediment to sound environmental practice. The reason is simple: the proprietor may be less than well disposed to the environment, and may well permit or enact unsound practices. Yet propertarians often now appeal to a purported need to strengthen and expand the institution of private property - rather that to let it naturally contract - in order to combat environmental problems. Thus such dubious proposals as saleable rights to pollute environments, dump wastes, etc. - licences which look even to the uninitiated like ways of extending, not contracting, pollution and like environmental problems, and which look to the more cynical as ways of circumventing costs and limits environmental constraints impose upon economic activity. 15 The liberal democratic structure to which MCCioskey commits himself to, with its uncritical approach to population and consumption - like market capitalism, with its commitments to expanding populations to ensure growth and profit, expanding markets, enhanced consumption, and cheap labour resources - forces an unduly heavy dependence on technological wizardry. In particular, it requires a technology that will facilitate greatly increased cheap food supplies, without however too rapidly depleting "biological capital". Given recent experience it demands a faith in technology, and the smart science that underwrites it, that is increasingly difficult to justify. Like all too many academics, MCCioskey has that faith. Science should be given entirely free reign, and technology pushed to the hilt. There is a naive optimism in MCCloskey's attitude to science. 'It is not improbable that ultimately, through the investigations of the sciences, we will come ... to have a full understanding of the earth's weather and climatic patterns. Man will be able to use this 15 Such saleable rights also appear to get another foot-in-the-door for bargaining utilitarians, who claim to want no absolute prohibitions, but want to put the whole environment up for negotiation - and ultimately for sale. What are not up for negotiation are the underlying propertarian and utility maximization principles, the insufficiently examined sources of many of the problems. In any case, the evidence now coming in shows that market approaches to pollution, such as saleable rights and pricing controls (like company fines), do not work at all well. Making directors of polluting firms directly responsible, and putting offenders in jail, apparently does. 34 knowledge for his and the earth's best advantage' (p.137). We, the total managers, will know what is "best" for the earth! Despite the 'dangers of misuse', major disasters, global warfare, climatic destablisation, and so on, 'this fact constitutes no reason for holding back the pursuit of knowledge ... ' (p.137). Maximum speed ahead in the glorious pursuit of science, with full anarchistic enthusiasm there. There is, as well, 'no reason ... for entrusting rulers with the control of science' (p.137); science at least is utterly free in MCCloskey's liberal democracy. While Mccloskey wants the state kept out of science (except as a money pump presumably), he wants it actively intervening in technology, not to limit it, but 'acting to ensure that new technologies be developed and used and their benefits widely enjoyed' (p.138). The liberal state is to be actively and heavily involved in technology promotion and delivery - which puts into serious question its presumed neutral regulatory function. Also espoused is a quite insufficiently discriminating attitude to technology. Like most apologists, Mccloskey emphasizes the possible - but generally unrealised - benefits of technology, that technology 'can release persons from much mindless, degrading work. Hence some, even many persons may never need to work' (p.138). For all the talk about the possible benefits of technology, many alleged benefits seldom or never accrue, for instance to shorten substantially people's working hours and give them more worthwhile leisure; and benefits that do accrue are often not well used. Rather technology is primarily funded to maintain or increase market share and profits (which too often end up in conspicuous consumption and waste), thereby inducing cycles of production and waste, more technology to help control the waste, and so on and up. Technology itself is merely of instrumental worth, with many of its instruments and techniques defective, destructive or dangerous, either directly or through eventual side-effects. While some technology is no doubt instrumentally good, much is not. And the balance of good over bad has been systematically exaggerated in Wes tern culture, where more technology is now looked to or required to rectify gross economic and social mismanagement in liberal democratic states. Technology is however no universal panancea. Both on its record, and in terms of its theoretical prospects, the faith being put in it, to "deliver us from evil", is misplaced But, as remarked, MCCloskey has the faith (such episodes as the Green Revolution are seen as unmitigated successes), and enthusiastically expects great things from technology ('genetic engineering ... constitutes a dramatic, exciting breakthrough of major proportions, one that opens up vastly wider possibilities for developing new plant and animal organisms', p.139). Naturally he concentrates on the sunny side of technology, scarcely touching upon the darker aspects. We merely glimpse one darker side of genetic engineering (for which perhaps no further engineering is needed), the edifying spectacle of mass-production of human drones for 35 industrial slavery (p. 139). As to the big problems with this engineering, we are fobbed off with an evasive throw-away, of the kind more typical of politicians, as to 'the need for relevant controls and checks', and no doubt balances, presumably determined by state masters behind closed doors. Instead Mccloskey tries to divert attention by yet another attack on the hypothetical totalitarian ecological state, and the threat of its coercive methods, not those of your normal corrupt intimidatory democratic state, to human liberties. But the smokescreen quickly subsides, our factional text degenerates into notes: 'Relevant point here include ... ' (p.139). Mccloskey would have us locked into state systems that are delivering increasingly negative results for increasing numbers of humans and disastrous outputs for nonhumans and natural environments. By changing political directions significantly, environmental and human affairs could again have an opportunity to flourish. But for much of the environment at least, there is not a lot of time left. REFERENCES D. Bennett and R. Sylvan, Damn Greenies: Australian Perspectives on Environmental Ethics, typescript, Canberra, 1989; referred to as AP. C.D. Broad, Five Types of Ethical Theory, Kegan Paul and Others, London, 1944. R. Elliott, Critical Notice of MCCloskey's Ecological Ethics and Politics, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 63(1985) 499-504. P.R. and A.H. Ehrlich, The Population Explosion, Simon & Schuster, New York, 1990. R. E. Goodin, Review of MCCloskey's Ecological Ethics and Politics, Ethics 94(1984) 344-5. A.M. Maciver, 'Ethics and the beetle', Analysis 8(1948) 65-70. H.J. MCCioskey, Ecological Ethics and Politics, Rowman and Littlefield, Totowa N.J., 1983; all page references not otherwise indicated are to this work. T. Nagel, 'Libertarianism without foundations', in Reading Nozick (ed. J.Paul), Blackwell, Oxford, 1981. W.D. Ross, The Right and the Good, Clarendon, Oxford, 1930. H. Rolston III, Environmental Ethics: Duties to and Values in the Natural World, Temple University Press, Philadelphia, 1988. R. Routley, 'Alleged problems in attributing beliefs and intentionality to animals', Inquiry 24(1981) 387-417. R. Routley and V. Plumwood, 'Moral dilemmas, and the logic of deontic notions', now in Paraconsistent Logic (ed. G. Priest and others), Philosophia Verlag, Munich, 1989; referred to as MD. 36 R. and V. Routley, 'Semantical foundations for value theory', Nous 17(1973) 441-456; referred to as sv. R. and V. Routley, 'Human chauvinism and environmental ethics', in Environmental Philosophy (ed. D. Mannison and others), RSSS, Australian National University, 1979; referred to as EE. R. Sylvan and D. Bennett, 'Tao and deep ecology', The Ecologist 18(4/5) (1988) 148159. R. Sylvan, Three essayes upon deeper environmental ethics, Discussion Papers in Environmental Philosophy, (Green Series) #13, Australian National University 1987; referred to as TE. R. Sylvan, 'On the value core of deep-green theory', typescript, Canberra, 1988; referred to as DG. DEEP ECOLOGY AND DEEP-GREEN THEORY. Deep-green theory is a deep pluralistic environmental position, underwritten by a deep metaphysical theory. It is intended as an alternative, less fraught with problems, to deep ecology. Deep-green theory has developed, in significant part, through fruitful interreaction with deep ecology. Many of its leading ideas can thus be more rapidly introduced by contructing and comparing them with ideas of deep ecology which are already widely diffused (if often in a muddy or muddled way). As a spin-off then, this outline will offer a simple exposition of central ideas of deep ecology, and further criticism of many of them. In any practical showdown, however, deep ecology and deep-green theory are not antagenistic positions but close allies, both deep positions within a wider environmental alliance. Though the rudiments of deep-green theory go back about as far as deep ecology (to around 1973), it remained unnamed until the early 80's (and only achieved initial investigation in Bennett 86). Moreover, it has not hitherto attained in any fuller platform and slogan formulation, such as deep ecology has benefitted (and suffered) from almost since its inception. The term 'deep ecology' was coined by the Norwegian intellectual, Ame Naess, to label an emerging environmental movement. But, despite Naess's commitment to pluralism, it was from the outset constrained to a certain style of environmental position. The notion has since been elaborated and further delimited not only by Naess but, in the first place, by several Northamericans, particularly Bill Devall and George Sessions, who have on occasion collaborated with Naess (their main work on deep ecology is cited in the reference list at the end). The notion has caught on outside narrow academic circles, especially in North America and Australia, where, in contrast to Wes tern Europe, significant areas of natural environment remain and are becoming of increasing public concern. Deep ecology is a radical environmenta l position, which goes far beyond resource conservation positions (which are typically concerned with the management and stewardship of resources in long-term human interests); and it offers a much deeper challenge to prevailing attitudes and practices (of the dominent social paradigm), especially those which concern more or less natural environments. (Leading features of Resource Conservation are explained in several sources; e.g. Rodman.) 2 Deep ecology takes off from value theory themes which stand in diametrical opposition to mainstream Western ethical and social theory.1 The first of these themes, the wide values theme, is that what is valuable in or for itself is not confined to human beings or their features (such as their interests, concerns, pleasures, consciousness, etc.), but extends much more widely to other beings. The value of these other systems or creatures of their features is not merely instrumental, aluable as a means to human objectives, but is independent of human concerns; it is in brief nonanthropic. Indeed deep ecology goes further, rejecting the greater value assumption, according to which anthropic values always take precedence over such natural values. How then is value distributed, in particular across the things of the world? It is here that deep ecology and deepgreen theory part company. Deep ecology takes value to be restricted to things that are alive (in some attentuated sense, so it turns out); this is the theme of biocentrism, life-centredness. And it assumes that these things with life are all of equal value; this is the controversial theme of biospheric egalitarianism. A unique assignment of value results. Deep-green theory rejects both these themes. For reason to be given, Deep-green theory is much less specific as to how value is distributed. But it is spread on to things - wholes, collectives, systems as well as individuals which are not alive, and it does not cover all things that are living. Nor is it distributed onto those things that have the quality in an equal fashion, except in the trivial sense that all have or partake of value. Some things that have value are much more valuable than others; there is some weak (and partial) ordering of things with value. It is these things that are worth conserving, preserving, and so on, the more the more valuable they are. Thus Deep-green theory is axiocentric, value-centered. Value in nature is regular coupled with some mix of value-making characteristics, including such defeasible ecological universals as richness, rarity stability, resilience, diversity, and so forth. But there are considerable constraints on how values are derived from any such "objective function". One over or thing constraint, that of impartiality, substitutes for that of egalitarianism. According to the requirement of biospecies impartiality, which excludes certain types of class chauvinism, a thing cannot be ranked as valuable or ahead or another simply in virtue of belonging to some species (e.g. being human); such features are not in themselves value-making characteristics. 1 There are some who account themselves deep ecologists who would repudiate such an approach through value theory, most notably Warrick Fox. 3 Figure 1. A compariso n of Deep Ecology and Deep-gree n theory, in capsule form. 2 Deep ecology biospheric egalitarianism Shared themes or goals I I I I I Deep-gree n. theory wider value theme rejection of greater value assumption, +through ➔ biocentrism ecological universals as defeasible value-making biospecies impartiality , and rejection of class chauvinism axiocentrism characteristics extreme holism natural systems as integral, irreducible cosmic identity moderate holism ultraperson al identificati on maximal satisizing on value self-realisation determinates limited interference only with natural systems; restricted rights thereto commitment to implement principles applications to economics, politics and policy, especially in bioregional ism ➔ environmen tal areas; e.g. regionalism and federalism +- ecoregionalism human population reduction A major difference between the theories lies in the distribution of value (from which much else of ethical consequenc e arises: rights, obligations , and so forth). Deep ecology, like simpler utilitarianism, proposes a unique initial distribution (over a given atomistic base class): each living individual is assigned equal intrinsic value, and nothing else has intrinsic value. Values of other things, complexes, systems and so on, are then in principle open to determinate s by a calculation. It is a type of recipe to which intellectual s bent on numeration and calculation are regularly attracted; pseudo-obj ective variations are to be found not only in utilitarianis m but in economics and in democtrati c political theory, and also in probability theory, where elements of suitable 2 Most of the capsule theses of deep ecology are explained in detail in the critique, CD; many of those of Deep-green theory are explained in FE. 4 initial esembles are assigned equal probability, through a principle of indifference. The practice is also as problematic as indifference principles (cf. CD on deep ecological egalitarianism). Deep-green theory rejects the assumptions upon which the deep ecological distribution depends. It rejects the latent atomism, the idea of ultimates upon which value devolves. More dangerously these days, it rejects the equality assumption. Much as some humans are more valuable than others (on most moral and other counts), so some creatures, some systems, are more valuable than others. DG theory is, quite deliberately, much less specific as to how value is distributed. Often enough, especially in difficult cases, assessment of value is a complex matter which may call for much reflection (for some details see TE, first essay). But certainly value is an unevenly distributed feature of a variety of things, not just at bottom altimates. It is a quality of many items - wholes, collectives, systems as well as individuals - which are not alive; and it does not extend to all things that are living, e.g. malignant virases engineered in biochemical laboratories. Nor is it distributed onto those things that have the quality in an equal fashion, except in the trivial sense that all have or partake of value. Some things that have value are much more valuable than others; there is some weak (and partial) ordering of things with value. It is these things that are worth conserving, preserving, and so on, the more the more valuable they are. Thus the theory is at least weakly axiocentric, value-centered. In fact it is more strongly axiocentric, in two important respects. Firstly, deontic notions such as those of obligation, rights and duties, answer back to axiologic ones (see TE, essay 3). Secondly, more difficult to explain, value penetrates the metaphysics, including what is accounted fact; most strikingly, the choice of actual world itself depends upon value (see DP). AUTHENTIC DEEP ECOLOGY: expositio n, critique, alternati ves PREFAC E No longer is there so much need to chronicle and document the major and serious environmental problems confonting the Earth and its ecosystems. Much of the relevant information - details of the damage, difficulties, devastation, disasters, and dire threats of more - now appears in later chapters of biology and geography textbooks, often in striking pictorial or diagramatic form; and the information is regularly updated by articles, too often environmental horror stories, in popular perodicals or newspapers. While many of the problems are abundantly and glaringly evident, others are more subtle, sometimes more insidious, hidden from view, but bound to emerge in not so long term. So we can take the problems, and further problems, "for granted", though with little comfort or ease. Many were, and are, foreseeable; many were, or could be, avoided or mitigated. Serious though these problems are they are still not being taken with full or due seriousness by those who exercise some control over how relevant things happen. 1 Most states are busy attempting more of what has landed us in some of the worst of these problems: more growth, of economic products, of people, of consumption2 , of energy; more or "better" militarisation; more productivity, of agriculture, with environmental cost-cutting and short-cutting, more development and more consumption thereby of biological capital. Growth remains at the top of most national agendas; it is seen as a panacea for all other problems, economic and security problems of course. Serious environmental problems are still mostly treated as economic "externalities", peripheral but growing nuisances, that we shall have to learn to live with3, but not the "real" problems. We have lived under this dominant destructive ideology for much too long already. It has already led to the devastation of much of the planet Earth, to the loss of much of value, many species, While there is a power structure, and a power elite, in all states (virtually as a corollary of features of the state, such as its monopolies on coercion, currency, etc), it cannot be pretended that there are any impressive control systems. So some of the problems are unintended. Given the propensity for human-developed control systems to function in undesirable ways, e.g. to tend towards militarism and totilitarianism, the lack of satisfactory system is no doubt to the good. 2 So, for example, the USA is pressuring Japan to consume more, internally, to ease American balance-ofpayments problems, and soak up excessive production; there is no pressure to produce less. 3 So, for example, prestigious scientific organisations are preparing to teach us how to live with and love the Greenhouse effect. Many communities have learned to live with damaging and noxious pollution; no doubt they would miss it if it were gone. 2 much irreplaceable wilderness, and has left us with an immense, and sometimes hopeless, clean-up and restoration task. Moreover things will rapidly get worse environmentally if we are not rid of it and its variants. Plainly we need several strategies: a strategy for fundamental change, a strategy (needed first) for what comes after the change, and so on. Deep ecology offers a strategy and an initial structure for addressing these environmental problems, along with proposals for addressing the menacing array of other problems confronting modern industrial societies. It is a strategy which goes much deeper than the pathetic patch-up the damage after it's largely done (pollute, then cleanup or pay a bit) approaches that prevail. For this reason alone, deep ecology deserves to be much more widely known. But there is still no satisfactory text on the topic. This book, while hardly an easy introduction to the subject4 , aims to fill a part of the gap. Perhaps too, it can help serve as a basis for that introductory text that still needs to be written. This text tries to do what the title promises. It begins with a sympathetic exposition of deep ecology. That is necessary. It remains hard to find out what deep ecology (DE) is, as it means so many different things to different expositors and exponents. The matter of different visions and elaborations of DE is taken up in the second part, which provides a detailed critique of DE in its main versions. In the final part, other criticisms of DE, from its rival social ecology in particular, are (negatively) assessed; an alternative to DE, deep-green theory is outlined; and some of the political connections of deeper environmentalism are investigated, including strategies for appropriate revolutionary change. Deep ecology is the most exciting deep environmentalism on the present intellectual market; for all its sortcomings, it is still the most thoroughly worked out widely accessible position. That is one reason why its worth a fair bit of time, my time, in struggling with it and trying to improve it, and your time, in getting to know it. This text grew from a critique of DE along with an unpublished expansion of that critique (called 'Continuin g the critique of deep ecology') and sundry associated articles on deep environmentalism. As an expanded version of critique5 remains the centre of the text, some of what I wrote in prefacing the critique should be repeated. I think, I hope, it merits repetition, as amended. 4 There is a need also, as will be explained in subsequent chapters, for a text that measures up to recognised academic standards, sufficiently complex and full of (bad) argument, in order to put deep ecology firmly on academic agenda, to try to ensure that it is not merely a crude popular movement that can be intellectually ignored. 5 'A critique of deep ecology' Radical Philosophy. 3 It was with considerable ambivalence and some serious misgiving that I first undertook a critique of DE, as it risked offending many friends in the deep ecology movement. It succeeded. The trouble was that when I got down to trying to explain what deep ecology was all about (for a seminar, at which N aess and Devell were present, some years ago), I found myself confronted by the following predicament :- While I applauded much about the deep ecology movement, and what it stood for, I could not find my way to accept deep ecology as formulated by any of its main proponents. The reason was not merely that deep ecology is less than a fully coherent body of doctrine, with, furthermore, many problematic sub-themes, but worse, that much of it departed from the ideals I felt it should be expressing, and that some of it was rubbish. Yet I had no doubt that deep ecology was a worthwhile enterprise (carried on by dedicated and good people), and that something along the lines of a replacement for deep ecology - revamped deep ecology if it is simply a matter of repairs, deep-green theory for more - was very much on the right track. Or to put it slightly differently, while rejecting every formulation of deep ecology, I agreed with the general drift of much of deeper ecology, and with virtually all the careful applications of deep ecology. My attempted resolution went along the lines of critical rationalism (for which I have been criticised). The method was to subject deep ecology to severe criticism, with a view to obtaining thereby an improved, more acceptable formulation, which at the same time met other desirable criteria. However to resort to such critical methods was already to type oneself, as old consciousness and old paradigm still, and to risk alienating part of the deep movement. The risks have been taken: but there are some concessions. In the end, when it comes to applications, to lifestyles and policies, the rational ladder has to be enlarged and also supplemented; for it offers only one distinctive way among many. Though the applications of deep ecology to real-world problems are very important, as already indicated, we shall only reach them and not attempt to develop them very far. However a detailed listing of various important applications that have been made will be given.6 Naess and others have complained, with some justification, that I have not gone out my way to find generous interpretation s of deep ecology, which remove apparent rubbish from it (see Naess RS p.3). It is true that, following the prevailing philosophical mode (by no means always to be applauded), I have not been very charatable (here or in other philosophical critiques). I have treated DE as a find it, hopefully in an expositionally straightforwar d and honest way. I do, however, try to 6 The final part of the background paper on population (Routley 84) provides one application in detail, an application expanding on some remarks of Naess (in 83). And several other examples which Naess has outlined (also in 83) can be similarly elaborated. Gare has attempted a major elaboration applying to science. 4 offer alternatives to DE and improvements upon it when I discover them. Deep-greep theory can be seen as a fairly comprehensive alternative. / ON SOCIAL ECOLOGY A heavy attack on DE, a tirade really, was launched recently by Bookchin. It caught leading deep ecologists - who had rather foolistly seen Bookchim as one of them, though it was obvious enough that he wasn't - off-guard, entirely stunning some of them 1 . Bookchin furthermore went about his frontal attack in a most ungentlemanly and less than American way, using practices and methods that Americans do not use as regards decent fellow countrymen, but reserve for communism and its representatives and others engaged in un-American activities. 2 Intellectual exchanges are supposed, otherwise, to proceed in a nice, collegial way (the knives come out in the back rooms, not on the front pages). Bookchin broke American cultural conventions (which is a main reason why several people, e.g. Sale, failed to comprehend what was going on). There is heaps of straight mudslinging in Bookchin, name-calling, attributions of guilt by very thin associations, ad hominen moves. We shall bypass this unworthy material, much of what there is in the attack, because anyone with decent basic training in logic can document it for themselves, if they can obtain copies of the work (not at all easy in the peripheral world). We shall try to isolate the much slimmer intellectual content of Bookchin's criticism. Should we dig under all the dirt, we find there are some core criticisms of DE, which are for the most part defective, but as well some interesting suggestions, which are worth fossicking out and displaying. There are two key issues. In both Bookchin's criticism repacts, but focusses upon DE, the old-fashioned erroneous socialist condemnation of environmentalism of all types - as not only getting priorities wrong in not putting human societies absolutely first, but worse failing to appreciate that environmental problems are the product of social problems and removed with them. • Ecological problems are at bottom nothing but social problems. This rival reduction theme, which is what justfies the social ecology terminology and approach, also gets stated in various, often weaker or slacker forms: For instance, ecological problems have their 1 The phrase 'off-guard' is from Naess. As to the extent of Bookchin's depth see the Critique. 2 This nasty face of American intellectual activity is well exposed in Chomsky's political writings. For the most part American philosophical periodicals permit only the nice face to be exhibited. For my part I enjoyed some of this outrageous stuff of Bookchin's, which was livily and refreshing after the flatness and dullness of much in Naess's notes, and also by contrast with Bookchin's earlier papers, which are mostly repetitive and often rather vacuous diatribes. 2 roots in social problems, ecological problems have their ultimate roots in society and social problems, etc. But DE, 'despite all its social rhetoric, has virtually no real sense of' this; that is a major (disgusting) trouble with it. The correctness and tellingness of social reduction themes vary more or less inversely, depending in particular upon how far the operative term 'social' is stretched. If all problems concerning "groups" (including single member groups) of "individuals" of any sort (including volcanoes, hurricanes, seiges, etc.) are "social" problems, then evidently all ecological problems become social problems, as these are all concerned in some way with individuals and their relations with their surroundings. But such a misleading adjustment to the theme, rendered near-tautologous by a low redefinition of 'social', is not what Bookchin and other socialists have intended. They characteristically intend by 'social' 'human social', and what they intend to convey by 'the social roots of the ecological crisis' is that it is 'the gross inequities in [human] society' - which should be attended to first- 'that underpin the disequilibrium between [human] society and nature'. 3 Now this strong social bias thesis is interestingly false. Consider counterexamples of the following sort:Imagine mixed capitalistic and welfare socio-economic arrangements had worked and succeeded in eliminating the gross inequities in society, at least in some relatively independent regions of the world, and perhaps even globally. There were, it still seems, real prospects that this could have happened in the 60s, had energy and funds been redirected from military-industrial enterprise to social-industrial activity. A welfare safety net is stretched right across the regions concerned so that no longer is any human homeless or without sufficient nourishment or basic eductional opportunities and so on, so that poverty and all other grosser inequities are eliminated. 4 It is sufficiently evident that even if all this is achieved, many ecological problems will not be addressed, but may be aggravated by the increased industrialisation and economic development involved. The lot of factory farmed animals or of threatened wild species would not be removed, but, if touched at all, 3 Bookchin 87 p.10 where the thesis is inaccurately associated with Kropotkin. 4 Naturally, finer inequities, such as unsatisfactory job relativities, race relativities, etc., will not thereby be eliminated and are perhaps part of "the human condition", some of which many societies will be prepared to live with or ignore. The relatively easy opportunities of the 60s for societies free of grosser inequities (for good or even great societies) may have passed, as certain new social problems have much complicated matters. 3 likely worsened. There is no guarantee that the position of wild and natural regions would thereby be improved, that these regions would be freed from constant inroads by human developmental activity, that the Antartcic would not be citified, and so on. In general, no environmental damage and degradation that did not rebound upon the relevant human social situation would be halted or resolved. Furthermore, not only is the strong social bias thesis false, as well human social concerns do not always come first where ecological depth is attained. Bookchin suggests an historical basis for the strong social bias thesis, that the notion of the domination of nature arose in the first place out of social domination of people by people, women by men, and so on. But that is pseudo-history; for the domination of nature and some appreciation of its operation, reaches as far back, so far as we can see, so far as our records go, as other forms of domination. What is more, even if a real history were like Bookchin's it would offer little support for strong social bias thesis. All it would reveal is that some ecological problems were glimpsed by anology with social problems, not that ecological problems are at bottom social problems and so resolved with them. • • "Second nature", constituted by human society, is uniquely different from first nature, and so naturally and justifiably interferes substantially with the processes of first nature. The unexploited play on "second nature" does nothing to support such intervention; or the contrary, second nature follows nature rather effortlessly without specific reflection. However, the two "natures" distinction, inadequately introduced and incapable of bearing much weight, is applied, in social ecology, to support much human interferenc e and substantial separateness. 'Natural evolution has not only provided humans with ability but also the necessity to be purposive interveners into "first nature", to conscously change "first nature" by means of highly institutionalized forms of community we call "society".' 5 Given the highly artificial and rather accidental social forms now in place, that many humans now suffer or swear under, this is very far from obvious. This second nature vs. first nature division would re-erect the old division and separation , Man vs. Nature, in old-fashio ned football-m ilitary terms, that deeper environmentalism has been concerned to remove. It is human chauvinistic; it ignores the continuity between humans and other creatures, the overlap in incapacities and skills (remembering all the capable animals able to live skilfully off the land and all the incapable humans). As regards relevant skills and capabilities, there is no uniqueness, or singularity, of humans as a whole. It would chauvinistically try to convert being human into a 5 Bockchin 87 p.21. 4 significant moral category, when it is not. 6 It would induce an inverse, obnoxious ranking among biological kinds; first class, matching second nature, and second class, matching first or primitive nature. The division would accordingly offer a springboard to a range of further interference of the sorts of which we have already witnessed much too much. The main thrust of Bookchin's attack is thus an old-fashioned socialist criticism, which fails any longer to impress because of its excess anthropocentrism. Social problems, which are of course often but not always intertangled with environmental problems, are no longer top of action, political, or other agendas; nor are their standard modern rivals, similarly entangled with environmental problems, namely economic problems. There is a third set of problems, neither exactly left nor right, neither exactly social nor economic nor reducing in approved fashion to those would-be universal categories, nor yet forming an entirely independent dimension: namely, environmental problems. Bookchin faithfully rolls out other elements of routine socialist criticism, against deep ecology. Some of these are telling enough, but mostly not new. They include:• a seriously flawed pantheon of heroic figures. Bookchin gets stuck into DEs favourable mention of Heidegger, of course, but he also tries to convey quite by association with Woody Guthrie (p.6), Malthus (p.15) Ehrlich (p.17) and others. Problems with the heroic figures and historical pedigree of DE had already been observed by others, e.g. Sholomowski. • a thin and inadequate historical genesis and setting. In this regard Naess's work is, of course, primarily in the perfectly admissible tradition and company of systematic philosophy and of most science. Deep environmental has, no more than science, to supply at the outset a full historical context in which its ideas are placed (pace. p.5 bottom). 6 So it is argued at length in EP. INTRODUCTION Deep ecology is a major environmental position and movement, one of the most important of contemporary times. In name and in assemblage of themes it is a recently elaborated position, dating back only to about 1973; but most of the themes are older, some of them much older. It is the assemblage, package and the way that has been put to environmental work that is newer and different. The initial assemblage and the name are due to Naess, a principal character (in all senses) in what follows 1. 1. On the deep ecology movement and ideology: their intellectual standing. The expression 'deep long-range ecological movement', of which 'deep ecology' 1s a subsequent abbreviation, was minted by N aess to label an emerging environmental movement . Naess was then (sociological) finder ather than founder of this emerging movement, a movement concerned primarily with the natural environment. In explaining ideological features of the movement Naess set down a number of what he took to be characteristic themes. It is from these themes, with much elaboration and considerable variation, that deep ecology, as a doctrine, has grown. It is with the evolving body of doctrine, the position, that we shall primarily be concerned. Control such as it was, of the doctrine did not long remain with Naess. Like many good promising ideas it was quickly imported into California, where it was modified, and to some extent converted into a further individual consciousness-elevating exercise. Thus the doctrine has been elaborated and further delimited not only by Naess but, in the first place, by several North-Americans, particularly Devall and Sessions, who have on occasion collaborated with N aess, and more recently by various Australians, most notably Fox and Seed.NI Deep ecology has caught on largely outside No attempt will be made to give an account of Naess's philosophy, except insofar as it bears directly on deep ecology, though such an attempt would be worth making. We commend the work (which could simply be entitled Naess ) to others; a smell beginning is made in Naess and Rothenberg. Naess was already a significant, influential, but maverick, figure on the European intellectual scene well before deep ecology was discerned. Naess had been professor of philosophy at Oslo since 1939, a chair he obtained when 27. In early days he was a Norwegian Ayer, likwise basking in reflected glory of a disinfecting logical positivism; but how much Naess subsequently diverged from empiricism can be gauged from his 1971 debate with Ayer (recorded in Reflexive Water). In fact Naess had already began to move out of an empiricist set as a result of his early interesting attempt to carry it towards its logical conclusion, and to do philosophy itself empirically, recorded in Truth as Conceived by those who are not Professional Philosophers. Subsequently Naess traversed a wide and unusual range of philosophical enterprise: scepticism naturally; many of the then fashionable areas, such as communication, semantics and interpretation; and several others that were much less philosophically fashionable, but politically significant, such as Gandhi and pacifism, ideology and failure of objectivity, and of course pluralism. These investigations form the complex backdrop to deep ecology. Unfortunately, despite Naess's longstanding commitment to pluralism, deep ecology was from the outset constrained to a certain unduly narrow style of environmentalismm as will appear. 5 narrower academic circles, especially in North America and Australia, where, in contrast to Western Europe, significant areas of natural environment still remain; these are rapidly becoming of increasing public concern. Deep ecology is a radical environmental pos1t10n, which goes far beyond resource conservation positions (which are typically concerned at best with the management, husbandry and stewardship of resources in long-term human interests); and it offers a much deeper challenge to prevailing attitudes and practices (of the dominant social paradigm), especially those which concern more or less natural environments.N 2 Deep ecology (hereafter is an ideology in the respectible older sense, a system of belief and ideas. It is not an ideology in the post Marxion sense, of such a system characterised by an inflexibility and an unwillingness to listen to other points of view. Quite the contrary. Radical DE may still be, though its radicalness is in decline as it ages and as informed opinion on environmental issues advances; respectable, it is not. In particularly DE is not a respectable academic subject. Though it is arguably the most important movement in environmental philosophy in recent times, it is fl:Ot even mentioned in several recent texts on the topic. There are several reasons for this, ranging from the conservation and close-mindedness, snobbery and bigotry almost, of much contemporary philosophy, to evident presentational deficiencies in DE, its mouldeness, its lack of discriptive and argument, its popular appeal. DE is particularly weak weaker than environmental ethics, which do poorly on these academic indicators - on a run of things that are taken to matter in contemporary ethics; analyses of meanings of key ethical terms, reductions of ethical terms to few primitives, smart arguments, utilitarian-style justifications, etc. That is one reason why it is not part of Anglo-American analytic philosophy; another is that it challenges so much of what analytic philosophy represents and (politically) presupposes. DE scarcely represents, then, many of you will be relieved to learn analytic philosophers' philosophy. N aess believes has been through and seen through that sort of philosophy early in life; and seen that it does not contribute very much to the real features of life and living that philosophy should make significant contributions towards, but mostly does not. As a result you will find very little analysis in DE. Also there is remarkedly little argument, though argument is often taken to be what is distinctive in philosophy. (But that is an Anglo American idea of what philosophy is all about; you find comparatively little argument in much Continental European philosophy - what you do find, even in authors like Kant and Hegel who look superficially as if they are arguing, is mostly patently bad argument, poor at best. DE is much more like European philosophy in tone and style, which helps explain why it is neglected and denigrated in American schools; by contrast, in British philosophy curricula the environment is only just beginning to win any satisfactory attention at all.) 6 These are some of the reasons why, despite its importance, DE goes largely unmentioned in most texts on environmental philosophy and ethics. This says a good deal about the texts, which are mostly not offering satisfactory coverage of their fields (see further chapter 2). But it indicates something too about DE, which is not as intellectually accessible as it could or should be. Moreover, presentation of DE often go out of their way to violate (questionable) academic standards, expecially those for clarity of statement, extent of analysis, and level of argumentation. Deep ecology is an amophous doctrine, as anyone who tries to set down from its sources in a clear and crisp way what its themes are, will readily enough discover. Of course compared with much French philosophy, it is clarity itself; but French philosophy does not provide an acceptable benchmark. A good deal of the obscurity concerning DE results from its varying and different presentations by different expositors. To avoid this problem, we shall, for the most part, follow Naess's elaboration of DE, taking that as fairly authoritative. But the problem is not thereby resolved. Naess's views on deep ecology, its place and importance, and its themes, have changed over the years. Nor are the themes always, sufficiently clear though many of them are succinctly stated. Some of them are said, by disciples or by N aess himself, to be metaphorical. Furthermore, as some important matters go largely unelaborated, for instance the issues of satisfactory methods for achieving ecopolitical change. To surmount these kinds of difficulties, we shall (somewhat presumptuously no doubt) offer our own exposition and elaboration of DE, what we call authentic deep ecology. At least under Naess's conception of DE we are entitled to do this. In part II however, which offers a critique of DE as it has been variously presented, we shall look at the genuine article in its various formulations. Rather than becoming easier with the passage of time, DE has become more and more difficult, and less intellectually tractable as it picks up or toys with environmental fashions, often zanier environmental fads. It is complicated by New themes, often muddy themes, and its solidity is removed by modification or erosion of old themes. Among the new themes picked up, several to be examined critically (in part II), are the Gaia hypothesis, according to which the Earth itself some sort of organic living system. DE is thus an irremedially vague object. Its vagueness has increased with its popularity with its becoming on the green fringe a fashionable, not to say vogue, item (a Foucaultian object). Vague and vogue, a common concotenation. 2. Types of environmental positions: deep environmentalism. 7 What distinguishes an environmental position is a certain level of constraint with respect to the environment, the natural environment especially: not anything goes with respect to nature. In this regard environmental positions contrast with a dominant theme of Western cultural heritage; namely, provided it does not interfere with acknowledged people such as property holders, that people can do more or less what they like with the land, and with what grows and lives there. It is even therefor humans to exploit or manage. This unrestrained position imposes few or no constraints upon treatment of the environment itself. Under it there would, for example, be little compunction about using up material resources, forests, fisheries and so on, immediately or even destroying them. But, because it grants such entitlements to exploitation, the unrestrained position can be excluded from properly moral positions. 2 For it fails to meet the basic universality requirement on moral principles, of independence of person, place or time, a requirement which implies that persons of different races, colours, sexes or ages, or at different places or times are not treated unfairly or seriously disadvantaged. Insofar as the unrestrained position would permit the exploitation, degradation and even destruction, of all present resources and environments, it places future humans at a very serious disadvantage. The position is thus one of expediency, not morality, typically yielding, like economics, evaluative assessments based on short-term narrow local (or national) interests, rather than assessments appropriately based on long-range transnational values. Opposed to the unrestrained position are various environmental positions (what Leopold saw as the land ethic is just one of these). Such positions can be classified - conveniently for subsequent development but in a way that already refines and extends Naess's classification - into three groups: shallow, intermediate and deep. Unlike the unrestrained position, all these positions would conserve and maintain things - materials, creatures, forests, etc. The shallow (conservation) position differs from the unrestrained position primarily in taking a longer-term view and taking account of future humans, their welfare and so forth. It is more enlightened than the unrestrained position in taking a longer-term perspective: hence its alternative description in the literture as resource conservation (thus, e.g., soil conservation organisations). Though this conservation position is only a step away from the unrestrained position, it does pass the test of morality in that future people are not treated unfairly; so it is a very significant step. 2 This is a substantial and controversial claim, especially since it accounts much economic activity unethical in the narrow or semse, as involving practices of expediency, not morality. For the fuller case for obligations and commitment to future humans, see e.g. Routley 81, and other essays collected with it in Partridge 81. This section is drawn from my People vs the Land (84). 8 The shallow and unrestricted positions are closely related by an important feature they share and which justifies lumping them together as shallower positions. They are both highly anthropocentric; they do not move outside a human-centred framework, which construes nature and the environment instrumentally, that is, simply as a means to human ends and values. Thus they take account ultimately only of human interests and concerns; all environmental values reduce to these. It is in this respect especially that these shallower positions differ from deeper, less resource and management and exploitation oriented, positions. According to deeper positions, humans are not the sole items of value or bestowing value in the world, and not all things of value are valuable because they answer back in some way to human concerns. But deeper positions differ in the weight or relative importance they assign to human concerns. According to an intermediate position serious human concerns always come first; and while other things, such as higher animals, have value or utility in their own right, their value is outranked by that of humans. The deep position rejects this assumption, and maintains that even serious human concerns should sometimes lose out to environmental values. Figure 1. The positions separated, and separating principles SHALLOWER UNRESTRAINED DEEPER SHALLOW IMMEDIAIB DEEP MORALITY SOLE VALUE GREATER VALUE REQUIREMENT ASSUMPTION ASSUMPTION (of human apartheid) (of human supremacy) The watershed principle which divides the shallow from the deeper positions is the sole value assumption . According to this major assumption, which underlies prevailing Western social theory, humans are the only things of irreducible (or intrinsic) value in the universe, the value of all other things reducing to or answering back to that of humans in one way or another. This assumption is build into most present political and economic arrangements; for example, only aggregated preferences or interests of certain (present) humans are considered in democratic political choice, and likewise in economic decision making; other creatures and natural items are presented at best through the preference or votes of interested humans. 3 3 The points are explained in more detail in EP, where too, account is taken of the shift from humans to persons (which would be important were it taken seriously and adhered to) and also of the inclusion of 9 Similar assumptions are made in mainstream ethical theories. Typical are reductive theories which endeavour to derive ethical judgements from features of closed systems of humans. Examples are provided by presently fashionable ethical theories, such as standard utilitarianism. 4 According to utilitarianism what ought to be done, as well as what is best, is determined through what affords maximum satisfaction (preference-fulfilment, pleasure, absence of pain, and so on, for other satisfaction determinates) to the greatest number of individual humans. In theories like utilitarianism, the outside world of nature does not enter through direct inputs or outputs, but only insofar as it is reflected in the psychological states of individuals. Such ethical theories are appropriately described as those of apartness or human apartheid. Man is, or is treated as, apart from Nature; there is virtually total segregation. Nature or the land enters only as a remote experiential backdrop, and onstage is the drama of human affairs and interests. However, humans cannot be entirely insulated from their environment; for example, volcanoes affect temperatures thus affecting climate thus affecting crop yield and food supplies. At least limited intercourse with the environment has to be admitted as a result. So, in economics, ethics, and political theory, secondary theories, dealing with linkages to the environment, have been appended (thus, for example, externality theory in economics, some allowances for "side" constraints in more sophisticated utilitarianism, and so on). But the environment remains treated as an awkward or tiresome afterthought or backdrop, a (re-)source and sink, when it is considered at all. There is, however, another approach also with historical standing, vying with (and indeed often confused with) human apartheid, which can accommodate secondary theories a little more satisfactorily. That is the position of superiority or human supremacy, according to which Man, though included in Nature, is above the rest of Nature, meaning ethically superior to it.N While human supremacist positions can incorporate the sole value assumption and thus remain in the shallow ethical area, they have the option of rejecting it in favour of the less objectionable greater value assumption; other things being equal, the value of humans is greater than other things; the value of humans surpasses that of all other things in the universe. This assumption allows that other objects, such as some higher animals, may have irreducible value; what it insists upon is that, at least for "normal" members of respective species, this value never exceeds that of humans. What super-humans. With value for natural items goes, of course, concern, respect, and sensitivity, towards them; but the reverie connection may exhibit occasional failures. 4 But the same holds for other fashionable theories on the American-dominated ethical scene, namely contractualism and libertarianism. More broadly based historical utilitarianisms, which allow for some input from other sentient creatures, are considered below. 10 is generally presupposed is that other objects - animals, plants and their communities - are never of very much importance compared with humans. Though human supremacy has appeared in variants upon utilitarianism (from Hutcheson and Bentham on) where animal pain is taken into consideration along with human, Wes tern ethics and associated social sciences such as demography, economics and political theory, remain predominantly apartheid in form. So in practice does most utilitarianism. 5 It is the repudiation of the greater value assumption that separates deep from intermediate positions. Perhaps the most familiar example of an intermediate position 6 is that of Animal Liberation, in the form in which individual animals (but not plants, forests, ecosystems, etc.) are taken to have value in their own right, though in any play-off with humans, humans win. Under the deep position such an outcome is by no means inevitable and not alway assured; in cases of conflict of animals with humans or natural systems with humans, humans sometimes lose. There are various arguments designed to show that the deep assessment is right, that humans do not always matter7 and, more pertinently, that humans should sometimes lose out. A typical one takes the following form:- Some humans voluntarily lead worthless or negative lives, lives without net value. The point, though not uncontroversial, 8 can be argued even from a shallow utilitarianism. Take for instance a life of pain and suffering and little or no happiness: it has a substantial net negative utility. However, some small natural systems do have net value; one example would be an uninhabited undisturbed island (a live example might be a tropical island before Club Mediterranee depradation). Now consider the situation where the considerable value of a small natural system is to be sacrificed (in a way that shallowly affords no ethical impropriety) on behalf of a set of humans whose lives each have no positive net value. For instance, the system is to be exploited, just for the continued maintenance of these humans, or for their addition (as new settlers) to an established population. Then in such circumstances, these humans lose out; the natural system takes precedence. Similarly, trivial satisfactions of humans do not dominate over the 5 There practice contrasts with what the theory allows or requires. Utilitarianism is like much pollution control, where regulations are on the books or are part of the law, but are or never only very occasionally applied. Utilitarian double standards are further discussed and referenced in DEP #7. 6 Other examples are considered below. Two of the four form of ecological consciousness considered by Rodman fit here (as Rodman has remarked). For instance, falling into the intermediate range are the types of environmental positions adopted by Birch and Cobb, and by Attfield and by many other consequentialists. 7 See the argument of EP, beginning the Last Man argument, p .... ff. See also the initial example of Routley 2 79 .. 8 The point is argued in detail in DEP #3. 11 integrity of rich natural environments. This simple result cuts deeply into (standard shallow) consumer theory, to take just one example of the impact of deep environmentalism. Authentic deep ecology is a type of deep environmentalism. A genuinely ecospheric egalitarianism, such as deep ecology offers, is bound to reject the Greater Value assumption. For under egalitarianism, larger collarations of significant eco-objects outweight smaller groupings of undistinguished humans. Notes 1. All their main work on deep ecology is cited in the reference list at the end. 2. Leading features of Resource Conservation are explained in several sources; e.g. Rodman. 3. Here authenticity is important. As will become evident in part II, certain proclaimed deep ecologists are not prepared to scuttle the Greater Value assumption. As will also become evident, the egalitarian arguments upsetting the Greater Value assumption are build on defective foundations. CONTINUING THE CRITIQUE OF DEEP ECOLOGY As a broad label for something rather environmentally different, and no doubt better, than most ideologies that preceded it, 'deep ecology' is no doubt rather fine. That is how the label often functions, honorifically, for instance in the collection under that label edited by Tobias, which gives deep ecology none but a nebulous content, and which indeed contains many articles (such as the interview with Soleri) in diametrical opposition to the more detailed platform promulgated by the intellectual "leaders" of the deep ecology movements. In fact, a good deal of the more popular appeal of deep ecology has been obtained by vacillation between the more discerning authentic forms and the slack or nebulous forms. The nebulous use of the label has also given cover to some of those who calls themselves 'deep ecologists', enabling them to shed awkward but crucial themes from the more detailed platform (thus e.g. Fox). Many are those who are now pleased to march under the rather fashionable nebulous banner. 1 Many are not deep, in theory or practice, deeply committed, or deeply changed by the march. Purchasing or growing organic vegetables, having spiritual experiences in a special natural place, or practising some oriental art or exercise routine, does not ensure a deepened environmental position, though it can be a step on the way. While nebulous deep ecology is compatible with much that is neither deep nor even significantly ecologically oriented, such as minor lifestyle adjustments within the industrial paradigm, authentic deep ecology, which is not so slack, remains a defective doctrine, itself oscillating between an overpermissive environmental assembly point, fast growing its radical potential, on the one side, and an impermissive, unduly narrow doctrine, dubious or defective in several of its leading themes, on the other side. Some of the worst of these themes, such as biological egalitarianism, have already been criticised in sufficient detail in the original critique. But other features of authentic deep ecology (hereafter mainly DE) were left largely untouched in the original critique, and new features have emerged. The critique thus needs continuing. Since the critique was produced, it has been become more difficult, if anything, to grasp what DE is all about. Even Naess, the founder of the movement, who now tends to adhere much more closely to the platform than other self-proclaimed deep ecologists, is inclined to make I too am happy to march under the nebulous banner, though since my first critique I am no longer particularly welcome. Initially I was cut by about half those individuals and institutions loosely associated with deep ecology, since my critique began circulating. While I am become accustomed to this sort of phenomenon in intellectual areas (criticism induces cool and long at least, even in logic), I didn't expect so much of this given the Christian character of DE.; and such isolation does seriously reduce information sources. 2 apparently large concessions to opposition changes, which however he subsequently more surreptitiously withdraws (of course this is familiar philosophical practice). At other times, he withdraws with one hand what he is offering, some sort of olive branch, with the other. The oscillation can be partly ascribed to conflicting motivation. On the one side, there is the desire, stronger in the founder of DE, Naess, than in his American and Australian prophels, to create a wide constituency, to tum no one away if it can in any way be avoided. But, on the other there is an evident desire to make deep ecology a very select position, for a chosen few, a place to be achieved only after a journey crossing some arduous terrain and involving some difficult life adjustments. Deep ecology lacks the other-worldly and after-life resources which, in some of its religious sources, appear to make for an easy resolution of this type of conflict. I.Further problems with the platform and core platform of deep ecology. It is the platform (at level 2 of the organising "double pyramid" of DE depicted below) that constrains, delimits and defines deep ecology, so far as it is well-characterised. For even this level is not very precisely characterised to put it mildly. Some exponents or practitioners of deep ecology (some of them self-nominated or self-proclaimed) appear to repudiate even the core themes at level 2 (e.g. Fox on axiocentrism). In the face of criticism, Naess himself backtracks as far as he plausibly can, and sometime further. Not only does he considerably muddy the clear waters of doctrine of occasional prosentations, but the doctrine itself begins to disappear, to be qualified away (see e.g. Naess's performance in Resurgance , discussed below). The response to intellectual criticism, which DE has been increasingly encountering as it spreads, has not been an appropriate one of clarifying, and where requisite expounding, the core theory; it has rather been one of retreat and digging in, of trying to hold the temple under seige, through diversionary activity (or by broken-record techniques: simply reiterating parts of the messge not under heavy criticism over and over again). When the critical raid has passed, the priests (and very occassional priestess) of deep ecology reemerge, bearing the original doctrine essentially unchanged. The practice resembles christianity (and too much of the practice of dominant science, the rival Western church). Dealing with deep ecologists is very like dealing with devout christians; some of them one feels sure have only recently changed positional hats, from evangelism to deep ecology (correspondingly, my own position has become that of a black sheep). A good deal of the argumentative practice of deep ecology appears to be explained by its evangelical, and even messianic, character. There is genuine effort to tum no-one, except the most incorrigible moneylenders, away from the temple. Everyone else (except perhaps philosophic critics) is welcome, and encouraged to join in worship. Much like the churches, the founder of the 3 De movement seeks as large a flock as possible. In these democratic days, numbers count (at least under the "right" polling conditions); earlier numbers overted for taxing or tithing purposes. Other high priests are not so sure: there are some critics of the movement, who may be beyond the poles; and surely it should be a little more exclusive. But, in any event, DE is a much more liberal doctrine than one of its sources, christianity, has ever been; it admits coupling not just (so it is said) with all the great religions, but with all the more benign positions and practices that achieve fashionability in California. All not ill-disposed to the natural world and duly acknowledging its value can march under the banner of deep ecology, whose main citadel is Nature. N aess casts the net of deep ecology wide, catching therewith not only many remote supporters, but a number of hostile critics as well, such as latterly Bockshim (p.6). Naess now considers the 8 point platform, formulated by himself and Susians and published in several slightly different forms, as tentatively setting down the 'basic principles of Deep Ecology'. Naess 'look[s] upon the formulations as tentatively expressing the most general and basic views which almost all supporters of the movement have in common' (23.6.88). Thus the 8 point platform (condensed in box 1) provides, in a still vague and tentative sort of way, the core, the core platform, of DE. To get around a small obstacle, let us call those who would adhere to the principles of the core (in some approved formulation) adherents of DE. They are adherents in (simply and literally) holding to the core, the common (intersection of the) platform. They may not be members of the movement in any ordinary sense, in any but the set-theoretical sense, because appropriate intentionality is lacking, for instance they may never have heard of the movement, let alone made any effort to join. Nor need adherents be supporters in the usual sense; support is neither necessary nor sufficient for adherence. A critic such as Bockshim, or myself, can be an adherent without being a supporter, without being supportive. Conversely, a supporter may not be an adherent. The Salvation Army has many supporters, including atheists, who are not adherents. The De movement has many supporters, some of whom call themselves 'deep ecologists', who do not adhere to the core, even more or less. Many of these supporters are shallow environmentalists, who do not accept the key first point, of intrinsic value outside humans, or try to evade it (e.g. by redefinition, or by wrapping up value inextrically in relations to valuers). Since there are, in my experience, many supporters and indeed enthusiasts who turn out to be of this shallow sort, Naess's view is a little puzzling: what does he mean here 'almost all supporters'? Which isolated exceptions does he have in view? Box 1. The core 8 point plat/orm, in capsule form. l. Non-human and human life have intrinsic value: The well-being and flourishing of human and non-human life on earth have intinsic value, inherent 4 value, etc. These values are independent of the usefulness of the non-human world for human purposes. 2. Richness and diversity intrinsic virtues : Richness and diversity of lifeforms contribute to a realisation of these values and are also values in themselves. 3.Humans unjustified in reducing such natural virtues: Humans have no right to reduce this richness and diversity except to satisfy vital needs. 4.Human (values compatible with) population decrease: The flourishing of human life and culture is compatible with a substantial decrease of the human population. Flourishing of nonhuman life requires such a decrease. 5. Human inte,ference with natural world excessive: Present human interference with the non-human world is excessive and the situation is rapidly worsening. 6. Policies and basic structures must be changed: Policies must therefore be changed. These policies will affect our basic economic, technological and ideological structures. 7.Quality of life should supplant economic standard of living: The change in our attitudes will bring an appreciation of the quality of life rather than adhering to an increasingly higher standard of living. There will be a profound awareness of the difference between big and great. We will have a great society with no bigness. 8. Obligation to attempted implementation: Those who subscribe to the foregoing points have an obligation directly or indirectly to try to implement necessary changes. Most of the core platform is no longer demanding; none of it, except for the last point, specifying an obligation to attempted implementation, requires any commitment in the past of adherents. Mainly adherence to DE, and support of DE, would be very considerably increased were this requirement evaded. A strategy common to econonical practice and sociological research 5 readily presents itself. Let us speak of silent adherents as those who adhere to the core platform, more or less, except that they make no requisite effort to implement it (they may of course have some vague failing of obligation, should they ever reflect on the matter). Even without the benefit of scholarly survey work, it is evident that De would now have a large number of silent adherents, many of whom are not however adherents, being either oblimovish, situated in repressive regions or social situations, or simply uninformed (like indigenous peoples who think here are excessively many excessively interferring humans of Caucasian stock). The core platform represents a surprisingly incomplete and rather ill-organised collocation of principles. The incompleteness is most conspicuous in point 6, which advances no details as to envisaged structural changes. In extenuation N aess pleads that he has 'not has courage to go into detail and define what these different structures will be, because we are going to have a lot of different Green varieties. We shouldn't have one set of structures imposed' (R p.7). The reasoning does not hold up; a range of structures, rather than a unique structure, can easily be defined by constraints well-known ones as it happened. Naess should be encouraged to go on and delimit the structural and policy changes. It is easy to give him a start, drawing upon DE and neighbouring environmental positions. For instance, 6a. The policy objective of maximizing state economic growth should be abandoned in favour of a highly selective approach to such growth. Evidently, there are many different ways such a change in policy can be implemented. Some such change may be suggested by, but is not implied by point 7. 6b. Technology selection should be reoriented to appropriate technology, and away from risky and polluting technology. 6c. Population policies should be directed at decreasing human populations in overpopulated regions. Principle 6c complements point 4, which does not actually enjoin any decrease in human population. And so on, through a well-known list of constraints, with several of them regularly included in principle of alternative social paradigms. Point 5 requires similar elaboration. Another surprising feature is how mild most of these elaborations are, like the core platform itself, which is pretty wishy-wasy when contrasted with what is happening out there environmentally. Many environmentalists now wish to proceed much further, and to witness some real curtailment of heavy broad-acre assaults upon environments, such as extensive clearcutting of forests, over-fishing of shelves, and over-grazing of range-lands, extensive strip and beach mining, broad-acre pollution, and so on. 6 Deindustrialization is not explicitly part of the DE program, and the issue is (perhaps wisely) avoided by some leading proponents of DE. But deindustrialization - a considerable reduction in the levels of industrial activity, particularly the undesirable dangerous destructive prolluting types of industry that conspiciuosly contributed to the first industrial revolution - would emerge from the alternative futures deep ecologists prefer to imagine, with a much smaller, less consumption-oriented,terrestial human population. In any case, deindustrialization is an important environmental objective, for both shallower and deeper ecology. It would assist, most materially, in obtaining some better control on major environmental risks and problems, notably such matters as the greenhouse affect, atmospheric ozone destruction, and acid rain and its fall-out. The idea of progress is, like industry, also under a cloud. It is now naive to assume that progress per se is automatically to be applauded, and that a telling criticism of something is that it would block progress. People are these days a little more discriminating (in some respects); there is progress and progress, growth and growth, coke and coke. Much that was progress, and still is in many quarters, is no longer universally regarded as such, as, for instance, elimination of wetlands, pollution growth, assimilation of indigenous peoples. The 'previously ... dominant [assumption], that non-industrial society would and should progress towards the industrial state and the scientific world view' was challenged, and is increasingly rejected (cf. Naess, on the "status of mythology"). So wishy-washy is the core characterisation of deep ecology that it lets in as deep ecologists all sorts of environmental philosophers who would not previously have made that select hand, philosophers whom main disciples of deep ecology previously did or would have excluded, philosophers whose positions are not deep. If DE is to be more exclusive, it will require more careful, tighter formulation. Only clearly ruled out among environmental philosophers, i.e. those who philosophize about environments and environmental problems, are hard-line human chauvinists, led by Australians, Passmore (in his main conservative persona) and McCloskey. Many of these excluded philosophers would, moreover, subscribe to most of the points in the core platform, as weakly interpreted. It is nowadays a rare thinking person who does not consider that there are severe environmental problems, local and global, about which something, fairly farreaching by conservative political standards, should be done. It is a rare philosopher, who becomes inmersed in a spread of these problems, and who does not develop some environmental commitments, even if a liberalish social agenda continues to dominate an environmental one (and it is fast becoming hard to avoid observing the interpretation of social with broadly environmental problems). While environmental philosophy has, by contrast with economics (now ......... of reaction crises), tended to become progressively more accomodating to what was only a short time ago radical environmental drought, as the magnitude of environmental problems is revealed, deep 7 ecology has moved in the opposite direction, has tried be excessively conciliatory, confusing pluralism with broad consensualism, and lost much of its radical flare. A wide environmental pluralism is just fine; but it does not have to be achieved through consensus, or at the cost of a deep or an ecological platform. A pluralism can be achieved by the joining of different positions. Among the diverse and motley groups of philosophers who now gain entry as adherents of deep ecology, too generously construed, are apparently included those examples:- Example 1. Among extensionists, both utilitarians and ratonalists. Among utilitarians are Singer, and perhaps even Smart on some days. Most turns on how point 1 is construed. Utilitarians in the Benthamite tradition assign intrinsic value to all creatures with preferences, sometimes a or the like, and are concerned with the well-being and flourishing of such creatures. Accordingly they satisfy point 1 if it is read, as it may well be, 'much human and much non-human life'. It all depends upon how the terms 'human' and 'non-human' are quantified. If both are quantified with 'all', the theses becomes implausible (admitting e.g. lab-manufactured abominations as intrinsically valuable), and would exclude some acknowledged deep ecologists. If the terms are more weakly quantified, then environmentally aware and active Benthamites are admitted. An evident dividing line, provided by particular quantification, with 'some', is enough to exclude shallow philosophers. But no quantification will serve to exclude either intermediate positions, which do not adopt a deep value theory, or individualism, such as moral extension positions, almost invariably a spouse. Extensionists more patently included are those of rationalistic persuasion, grouped loosely around Regan in the American South, who have gradually move away from a utilitarian prescriptions, to the view that ethical principles, including those of vegetarianism, can be reached by rational means, by clear, consistent and coherent thinking (thus, it is really a coherence theory of morality). Example 2. More far-reaching informediate positions, which do assign intrinic value less stingily throughout nature, to some non-preference-havers, such as trees, and to some non-individuals, such as forests, but which still adopt a greater value assumption, according to which human values always take precedence over non-human assignments. Examples of this sort the postions deliminated (so far in insufficient theoretical details) by Rolston and Attfield. In fact the positions so far elaborated of this type typically, but hardly inevitably, draw on an enlightened Christian backdrop heavily laced with science (a religious American naturalism, so to say, in Rolston's case). They amount to nonsecular moral extensionisms, by contrast with the secular moral extenionisms of example 1 (to try to squeeze these positions into Rodman's nonexhaustive classificaton of positions). Example 3. Deep-green theorists reject the biocentric restriction sometimes built into point 1, though not in this formulation. This formulation certainly admits Sylvan as an adherent of DE, 8 despite what some deep ecologists have said. According to strict biocentrism however, only what has life (in some sense) can have value. Deep-green theorist see this restriction as very like that imposed by ulitarians, to sentience, or unwarranted, unnecessary and arbitrary. Deep-green theorists, like enviromental resisters, ecodefenders and Earth-Facters, now see the DE platform as much too moderate and quite insufficiently radical. The earlier radicalism of DE has been excessively pruned back, on a mix of dubious grounds: the drive for an environmental consensus (in place of a genuine pluralism), the religo-political quest for a large support Base (which could however be environmentalism broadly, with DE in the vanguard), and the input of conservatizing academic thought and aim of intellectual respectability. In fact DE which does not make much ground academically, as compared with its success outside academia, especially with book-reading environmentalists, would better forget academic success, where it has made progress only among outsiders, not power-players and return to its more radical mission (academics form only a small minority, though one dangerously and influentially supportive, one the whole, of most past environmental excesses and assaults). 2. Variability, antiquity or dubiquity of main themes of deep ecology omitted from the core platform. Some themes have been retained by letting them undergo extensive change. Nowhere is this more conspicuous than with the difficult principle of "biospherical egalitarianism in principle", central to earle DE, which has taken on some remarkable new guises. In Naess, it becomes a curiously qualified principle of rights: that every being has a right to live - unless the basic needs of other beings overrides its rights. In Devall, who prefers to avoid the term 'rights' (the use of which he asserts is metaphorical in Naess, not at all what Naess, who appeals to childrens" usage, asserts), the principle is emptied of main egalitarian content: 'Properly understood, the principle of biocentric equality means that humans are members of the biotic community, not its masters' (p.58). So understood, the principle can be accepted by many shallow thinkers; it is not incompatible with chauvinism, nor with conciderable inequality, nor with greater value invariably assigned to humans, only with a certain domination. It is a sell-out. Few of the supporters of deep ecology (DE) appear to realise how old-fashionedly defective and sometimes inappropriate some of the elements, and most of the methodology, of deep ecology really is. 2 The organic and organistic image, for instance - heavily deployed by one of the heroes of deep ecology, Whitehead - is as old as Aristotle (for some of the history see Berlin). Despite much valiant effort, no one has so far got the image (now redeployed in the extravagent Gaia 2 Recently, Sholomowski has re-emphasized some of these features. 9 hypothesis) - valuable as it may be, chauvinistic as it characteristically is -to work in a very fruitful way. Likewise the drive for self-realisation, is both old-fashioned - it was fostered by the Enlightenment and had its heyday in the 19thC, was decidedly human chauvinistic in its emphases. But perhaps the heaviest residue of old-fashioned inappropriate material is to be found in the methodology of deep ecology, which is mainly transferred from positivism with little alteration. The hypothetico-deductive methodology, for example, appears essentially intact in the double pyramidal diagram (now called 'the apron' by Naess), which one is supposed to shuffle around and descend by deduction. Having descended so, the way back to the top is by intuition of hypotheses, by the hypothetical part of the method. First principles at the top admit of no proof or derivation - because of the character of the one inferential relation admitted, deduction. In other respects, the double pyramid strait-jacket, which is Naess's way of trying to infuse a certain pluralism (a pluralism of fundamental positions at first principles) into deep ecology, is insufficiently specific. It does not explain, for example, how at a practical lower level, either an environmental directive or environmental action is forthcoming. Indeed given restriction to deduction, it cannot explain how these things come about. DE lacks any requisite theory of environmental action. 3 The double pyramid gets stylized in the way on the left; an alternative representation is that on the right (and Naess now has a representation awkwardly superimposed on a mandala):Needless to say, there are problems lacking within DE's easy pluralism. Noone has ever explained how to get the unretracted DE platform derivationally out of - what looks incompatible Christianity. For that matter no-one has shown how to deduce the platform from any of the other, sometimes more congenial, great religions or philosophies. The nearest we seem to get is Naess's sketch of how we derive parts of the platform from his own specially concocted ecosophy. 3. Further flowing of the DE gospel: its heroes, its arguments, .... Deep ecology is a seriously flawed gospel, not only as regards its doctrines and their coherence, but in other surrounding evangelic respects as well. Virtually all the patron saints of DE, the past philosophical heroes (all male) are deeply flawed. Spinoza's views on the place and treatment of animals, for instance, should be entirely disowned by any deeper environmentalist. Even the later "reformed" Heidegger is conspicuously human chauvinistic, too complacent in a human-dominated and tamed landscape, and, (apart from some new-fangled technology and 3 Various old-fashioned, and again defective, models are available to DE, and could be tacked onto the theory, e.g. the belief (or information) and desire (or value) account of intention and action conventionally attributed to Hume. 10 industrialisation) with the established rural way of things in Germany, including significantly racist and sexist ways. The pervasive background four-fold, fitting the cosmological scheme of things in, includes only divinities and humans; wilderness and its creatures are not part of the fundamentals. Whitehead, despite the apparent bounteousness of his philosophical scheme, was a practising christian, committed to a great chain of being with humans at the top of the chain (and thus to a greater value assumption antithetical to DE); he took no significant interest in nature or nonhuman creatures at all, and was very comfortable in the ways of a socio-political order which directly produced present environmental impasses. 4 No doubt the heroes should be differently viewed. Not as patrons, not even as forerunners; but as deep thinkers, from whom certain elements can be drawn in elaborating an environmental philosophy (e.g. parts of a theory of nature, features of process theory, elements of a critique of technology), while much else is discarded. Most of this theoretical work remains to be done. Regrettably the calibre of the arguments for proceeding to a DE position has not improved. N aess has now resorted to making his case in a very conventionalistic populist fashion. People are inclined to respond in such and such a way (favourable to environmental concerns) to so and so questions. Thus, for instance 'there is reasonably widespread agreement that animals, and even plants, have rights' (EIJ p.3). But surely it is largely as a result of environmentalism, which must (and should) be based on something else that people have began to respond thus and so. Naess also argues from the the concern of many people about nature and natural phenomena for their own sakes (the data is however not all that clearcut) to several other conclusions, for instance that political and stilist approaches to the environmental crisis (etc) should be less anthropocentric (EIJ p.5). The arguments are thus close in character to those widely used in arguments in economics and democratic theory; they are none the better for that. The fact that people used to respond favourably to damming up every nearby river and draining all the swamps is not a solid recommendation for such practices. Moreover, such populist considerations hardly win out, as Naess himself explains (p.4). Pressure groups pedalling narrow and sometimes destructive economic ambitions often succeed against democratic opinion. 4. But much criticism of DE is even more seriously flawed. Despite the growing constituency for core princles. De, which Naess will correctly have alluded to here, DE has been portrayed as extremism - especially from the US political right (which tends towards extreme right). What is extreme depends, of course, on where a carping critic is 4 He appears to have owed his appointment to a philosophy chair at Harvard in significient part to the fact that he was in no way a radical, but suited to the conservative scene established there. 11 situated. Gung-ho growth economists are extremists from a deeper environmental situation. No doubt such GG economists would claim that they have reason, not emotion, on their side; but it is a narrow flawed reason, tailored and biassed to their cause, reflecting a different class of emotions, primarily preferences of business communities of humans. In present deteriorating environmental circumstances, clever "extremism" is sometimes exactly what is required - ideas and action that upset, disturb, interfere with, subvert, and eventually overturn, the dominant military-industrial social ethos. Extremism presumably amounts to being isolated on the outer margins of some politically or socially sensitive (more useless) normal distribution, without respectable companions. On many environmentally important issues, DE is no longer in such a position (often instead the power elite would be if it were not so entrenched). Where it is in such a position, then generally it needs to be, and needs to try to swing the norm in its direction or else to gather respectability for that position. What, if anything, supports the charge of extremism, levelled against DE? Such emotionallycharged criticisms from the right tend to be particularly vague. Sometimes DE itself, portrayed as radical environmentalism, and compared with radical feminism, is dismissed as extremist, without indicating where it is considered extreme. In fact, while better developed, less accommodating DE is radical, at least literally in going, as one aspect of its depth, to root issues and assumptions, it is not very politically radical; it does not seriously challenge present political arrangements in the way that ecoanovehism, or even ecosocialism, does. What has infuriated some critics is undoubtedly the DE removal of humans from absolute centre stage, and above all the cavalier or callous way in which some environmentalists have portrayed the demise of unfortunate humans, from the God-given position to having to share the world-stage. There are many different issues tangled up here, and the charges of extremism depends on retaining the confusion, as well as ascribing to DE claims it does not make. DE asserts that irreducible value is not confined to humans, that life other than humans has intrinsic value. Although such a claim is indeed incompatible with the dominant social paradigm, it represents an old challenge, going back in utilitarianism at least to Bentham. As some of those who held or now hold such a position were not, by any means extremists or even radicals (e.g. Sidgwick) the charge against this part of the DE platform, lapses. Similar points apply against any charge of extremism based on the DE assertion (carefully avoided in the core platform) that a substantial decrease in human population is desirable, especially for conservation of the biosphere. Such a theme is increasingly widely maintained, by many respectable figures, far from any fringes. Nor need any extreme, threatening or dangerous, action result from such DE themes. Human population reduction can occur (and is envisaged by Naess to occur) by such unthreatening means as a 12 reduction in birth rates, a demographic transition brought about for instance through improved education and contraception. Yet some coupling to "extreme" action, and adoption or preparedness to adopt such, has to be established if a proper charge of extremism is to sustained (cf. also the OED definition of 'extremism'). Deep ecologists propose no extreme action to reduce human population, no wars, no genecide, nothing macho. Indeed the idea is ludicrous. Deep ecologists tend to be gentle people, who are opposed to violence; they care about humans, who are part of nature (even if too many of them are trying to set themselves above and apart from it). There are individuals and groups, more evident in America than elsewhere, who do adopt an uncaring, and sometimes brutal attitude to other humans, especially those outside America. Ecofascists, like Hardin, to the right of environmental thought, who think that the time for triage has already arrived, and that starving humans in third world countries should be left to fend for themselfes, offer a striking example. But eco-fascism is far from deep ecology, and has been severely criticised by those close to DE (e.g. Bennett and Griffin). It is no doubt troublesome for deep ecology, and convenient for opportunistic critics, if environmentalists with eco-fascist prodivities present themselves as deep ecologists (as has happened, a prominent example being the present editor of Earth First). It is no doubt troublesome for a charitable organisation if members of a mafia present themselves as agents of it and collect on its behalf; it has long been a problem for democracy that fascists can present themselves as democrats, and even put an end to democracy through seemingly democratic methods. Political movements admits of much infiltration, by both well- and evil-intentioned. ANNEX 1. Interesting proposals continue to emerge from the deep literature. One is for an environmental organisation, which might could be called Environment International, parallelling Amesty International , and adopting a similar role with regard to the environment that Amesty does with respect to human rights and political processes (Naess p.4). 2. There are many false "virtues " in contemporary political life that green politics, such as DE is coupled with, will eventually help remove. These include:- • Unity, united front. All that has merit is a certain limited unity in diversity. • Balance. Balance is achieved by resolution of many forces. To shift 13 the balance, then, environmentalists should be as far out as they can (while still being counted in the resolution, not written off). For end political purposes, citing especially credibility doesn't matter, by contrast with countability. Advice to offer more balanced statements and work should be courteously ignored: it is oppositional, political advice. • Two party ideal REFERENCES A. Naess, 'Environmental ethics and international justice', Ecospirit Quarterly IV (1) (198.) 1-7; referred to as EIJ.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Box 16, Item 1224: Draft chapters and papers on deep ecology Subject The topic of the resource Typescripts draft of contents (2 pages) ; Part 1 Critical exposition, Chapter 1 At the pyramid’s junction: the basics and creed of deep ecology (11 pages) ; Part II Critique of deep ecology, Chapter 5 The initial problem: what on earth is deep ecology? Who is and isn't a deep ecologist? (21 pages) ; A critique of (wild) western deep ecology: a response to Warwick Fox's response to an earlier critique (56 pages) ; Ecological ethics and ecological politics: turning John McCloskey's challenge (36 pages); Deep ecology and deep-green theory (4 pages) ; Authentic deep ecology: exposition, critique, alternatives: preface (4 pages) ; On social ecology (4 pages) ; Introduction (11 pages) ; Continuing the critique of deep ecology (13 pages). Description An account of the resource Papers housed in folder marked "Deep Ecology". Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/browse?search=Richard+Sylvan&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bjoiner%5D=and&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=&amp;range=&amp;collection=&amp;type=&amp;user=&amp;tags=&amp;public=&amp;featured=&amp;exhibit=&amp;geolocation-mapped=&amp;geolocation-address=&amp;geolocation-latitude=&amp;geolocation-longitude=&amp;geolocation-radius=10&amp;submit_search=Search+for+items">Richard Sylvan</a> Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived <span class="MuiTypography-root-125 MuiTypography-body2-126">The University of Queensland's <a data-testid="rek-series" href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/records/search?page=1&amp;pageSize=20&amp;sortBy=score&amp;sortDirection=Desc&amp;searchQueryParams%5Brek_series%5D%5Bvalue%5D=Richard+Sylvan+Papers%2C+UQFL291&amp;searchMode=advanced">Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291</a></span>, Box 16, Item 1224 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org">Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy</a> Contributor An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource <span>This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, </span><a href="https://najtaylor.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Dr. N.A.J. Taylor</a><span>.</span> Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library. Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource [160] leaves. 157.42 MB. Type The nature or genre of the resource Manuscript Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context <a href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:20027f1">https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:20027f1</a> Coverage The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant Australian National University Office - Typing Table at End of Desk Australian National University Office Australian National University Office > Typing Table at End of Desk Box 16: Green Projects in Progress https://www.antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/a5431730967f5a55642e84ae70be7f65.pdf 8572c81a727a336ad42efcebe6b136f5 PDF Text Text DEEP-GREEN ETHICS Contents PARTS CHAPTERS 0 I II III IV Prologue DEEP, GREEN, ETHICS, and PHILOSOPHICAL BACKGROUND 1 Deep [and] green fundamentals 2 Ethics without humans; philosophy without humans 3 Philosophical setting: deep-green plurallisms 4 Inhibiting presumptions and myths AXIOLOGY: value core 5 Value and its varieities: basic theory and its development 6 Alternative primitives and theoretical beginnings DEONTOLOGY: necessary moral structure 7 Obligation and its deontic circle, and moral dilemmas 8 Rights, and justice VIRTUE and INACTION 9 Environmental virtues: what they are and something of their theory 10 V Environmental ethical practice NATURE of ETHICS 11 Ethics, its new character and revised foundations 12 Principal questions of reoriented ethics, and proposed answers 13 Epilogue �17 .5.96 DEEP-GREEN ETHICS PROLOGUE Philosophy and its branches, ethics especially, are among the last places where prejudice would be found, found alive and thriving, so it might be imagined. Wrong. In the first place, prevailing ethics all exhibit heavy prejudice in favour of humans, human chauvinism. So they are one and all defective, wrong in a deep way. An adequate ethic will remove the prejudices involved. That means, in turn, a radical transformation of prevailing ethics, from the bottom up. Such a transformation constitutes a main objective of this book. Deep-green ethics aims not simply to reform present arrangements and systematizations, but to replace them. Abolition of prejudice has early priority. Prejudice in philosophy, privelege in prevailing ethics. There are only about two and half millenia of recorded philosophy on Earth. To a disconcerting extent, those millenia represent two and half thousand years of prejudice-partial exceptions occurring and prejudice subsiding somewhat only when ideological empires were fractured (e.g. fruitful periods of "warring states" in ancient China and Greece). Ethics is far from alone within philosophy in exhibiting serious deficiencies, in incorporating prejudices that should not figure so prominently in what is ideally an impartial subject. Much the same holds for other branches: politics obviously (partly through its interdependence with ethics), metaphysics and logic perhaps less obviously. Yet prevailing metaphysics display a deep prejudice in favour of the actual, against what does not exist. In logic the prejudical situation has in fact been accentuated through the rise of modern symbolic logic. Regrettably mainstream symbolic logic is wrong. All its forms validate incorrect principles (such as implicational paradoxes), these results flowing primarily from an underlying prejudice in favour of the consistent, against the impossible. 1 Several of the systematic prejudices embedded elsewhere in philosophy impact upon ethics. The prejudice in favour of the actual has served to distort, very seriously, the issue of obligations to future creatures for example, in this fashion:- Remoter future creatures do not exist, and therefore, according to prevailing prejudice, cannot have any relevant features, any preferences or desires, self-traits or satisfactions, to be taken into ethical account. Therefore All the themes are presented and defended in detail elsewhere. As regards metaphysics, see JB; as regards logic, see e.g. BGB and generally in philosophy , see TM. There are several coupled prejudices and prejudical drives, as will appear; for instance the drives to power and to maximization, strongly manifested in logic, see e.g. RLR. Prejudice in ethics was explicitly recognised by Bentham, almost two centuries ago; unfortunately however he imported his own very influential prejudical framework. �2 "they" can be discounted entirely. The same prejudice also enters in a very different way. All the standard positions concerning universals, all of which reflect the metaphysical presupposition that discourse concerns existent objects, show up in ethics. They appear in vexing issues as to the ontological status of values, such as the good, and of deontic notions, such as obligations and the right. These are not only difficult items to discover in the world, but they do not seem adequately housed in conceptual or linguistic apparatus: where are they located? Whence derives immediate pressure for many mostly bizarre reduction exercises; for instance of values to human constructs, contructs from social preferences or from sociobiological drives, and of obligations from veiled contracts. The initial question of location makes, however, the defective metaphysical presupposition, and lapses therewith. Values, though significant items, do not exist; so they are not located, anywhere. Prejudice rooted in established logic has impacted differently, upon a variety of issues in ethics. The absolute requirement of consistency upsets a straightforward treatment of obligations, general sets of which are typically inconsistent, thereby leading for instance to awkward theories of hierarchies of obligation or of merely prima facie obligations. Running parallel with this, the requirement utterly distorted an initially straightforward theory of ethical dilemmas, treatment of which is a significant part of any comprehensive ethical theory. Established logic has also impacted heavily on such different issues as fact-value inferences (e.g. the prescriptive fallacy) and regarding the extent of pluralism in ethics. The assumption behind the rationalistic critique of relativism is that there is a single correct logic, governed by requirements of consistency, namely standard logical theory, which (when combined with the facts) will eliminate various ethical stances as incorrect, indeed which may, given sufficient critical thought, lead to a single correct ethics. 2 But the assumption fails; for it too depends on ancient prejudice. Pluralism is one most important component in removing prejudice generally, certainly in reducing it generally, by admitting alternatives, and allowing some to flourish. 3 Elaboration of deep-green theory is another important direction in removing prejudice, in favour of humans, persons, or like agents from ethics especially but not only. The main development that follows will take both these directions, though focussed upon ethics: it will track and investigate pluralistic deep-green ethics. Human chauvinism is not the only major prejudice damaging ethics. An extraordinarily privileged position given to egoistical considerations is another. Western ethics in particular has 2 3 The approach involved, that of traditional rationalistic ethics, is regularly deployed by Singer (e.g. his Encyclopedia conclusion to Companion to Ethics); the strengthened version features in Regan. Of course how it is supposed to proceed, the details of how reason works this miracle, is never revealed. See esp. TM, epilogue. �3 recently been deformed through a substantially unquestioned axiom of self concern, that agents are interested in and motivated by their own (self) concerns and only by them. (Of course an agent's self, or extended self, may be grander than the agent's soul or person or body or whatever; it may include the agent's family or even the agent's tribe, or differently it may comprehend the agent's land or environment. But under such extensions the axiom is already beginning to disintegrate.) Such an ubiquitous, but largely unquestioned, presumption has lain behind reductionistic exercises that have distorted much of modem ethical (and political) theory. The leading idea is simple enough: given that action is justified through human self-interest, and only thus, if ethical theory (and likewise political superstructure) can be justified through some construction or modelling on that basis (bringing in only indifference and like neutral assumptions) , then justification will be transmitted, it too will be justified. Thus those contractual and utilitarian exercises which have loomed so large in recent theory. 4 The same dubious presumption also features large elsewhere, for instance in the acclaimed derivation of Deep Ecology from the ultimate norm of Self-realization! It is not just prejudice and allied presumption that have damaged and distorted ethics. Narrow ethics, parading as universal or absolute in defiance of pluralism, ethics often underwritten by religious or papal presumption, have severely disadvantage d ethics. Furthermore, connected therewith, ethics has been destabilized, and cast in an unfavourable light, by • a quest for absolute foundations, and in tum connected therewith • an invidious comparison with science, which is supposed to have such foundations. The quest is quixote: there are no such foundations. Nor does science have such foundations, so the comparison is misplaced. Not only is absoluteness for science increasingly disputed, but it is becoming apparent that science is in the same sort of pluralistic situation-pre dicament some, still questing for the old false certainties, would say-as ethics. 5 Through the assumption, or pretence, that it can deliver (whether from religious, rational or other resources) certainties of a type that it cannot deliver, ethics has become discredited. But that is only part among reasons why on the contemporary scene ethics is not the force that it has mostly been in bygone times. At least as important as such intellectual reasons are matters like removal of social and political pressures to conform, redirection of indoctrination practices (into consumerism, etc.), and so on, some welcome and some definitely not. 4 5 Roughly, ethics, knocked down to what's in it for everyone (some aggregated base class), is justified through what's in it for each me. Prima facie the grand construction is based on a simpler fallacy of aggregation: an invalid each to all inference. The theme is argued in detail in TM chapter 10. The quixote quest is strikingly engaged in by Williams, for a entertaining criticism of which see 'Bernard Williams and the Absolute Conception of the World' in Putnam 92. �4 Aspects of the discreditation have in turn been exaggerated. Ethics, it is said, makes no difference, even can never make a difference; it never effects change. Such claims are seriously astray, as examination of elementary examples like human slavery and treatment of animals quickly reveals. Environmental ethics too can make a difference (perhaps, when coupled with other practices, a major difference), and they are beginning to do so. But naturally they cannot compel change; nor should they be capable of doing so, as that would exceed proper roles of ethics (and other proper practices). 6 Rectification of ethics requires, then, not merely removal of now conspicuous prejudice and presumptions, but deflation of pretensions. What results-hardly unique naturally, but one selected for good reasons among many, hardly entirely exclusive but overlapping and admitting others-is an ethics which differs from standard ethics in the following respects at least: Such an ethics is: • deep-green, removing prejudice in favour of humans, and in favour of certain (egoistic) agents, in an affirmative fashion; and • Pluralistic in a thorough-going way, accordingly not pretending to absolute or objective status. The run of prevailing ethics, including so-called "applied ethics" and "environmental ethics" are chauvinistic; a satisfactory (environmental) ethic is not. The run of prevailing ethics are absolutist, or otherwise relativist; a satisfactory ethic is neither. However the conditions so far presented are but necessary conditions; they are not jointly sufficient for adequacy. Even among theories that are nonchauvinistic and duly pluralistic, reductionism may persist. Such reductionisms come in striking variety; thus, on just one dimension, individualisms, sentientisms, vitalisms, (i.e. all that has value is alive, somehow), and so on. To avoid such reductionisms, another blanket condition of adequacy is: • non-reductionistic. The main task consists in elaborating in detail an ethic, with other preferred features, that meets these conditions of adequacy. Regrettably, removal of prejudice cannot be accomplished in ethics alone, as a separate pollution-free zone. Prejudice in ethics flows through from other regions, religion especially, but also from psychology (which in the past made little gods of humans with sacred souls of their own, justifying very differential treatment for them in the world), and from elsewhere. Removal of these latter sorts of prejudices requires a severe erosion of belief, in regions strictly outside ethics, but heavily exporting into it; of beliefs fostering intellectual prejudice. Nonetheless ethics has a role in removal of prejudices elsewhere, because, very simply, these prejudices ought to be removed. The basic principle, which can also be presented as one 6 These points are developed at some decent length in GE part IL �5 of rationality, runs as follows: belief ought not to exceed warranting evidence, but should be appropriate to it. None of this is as clean and clear-cut as it may initially appear, because source waters have become very muddied. Sources for instance take a range of forms (this is part of the ancient issue of the criterion reput in more contemporary terms). Sources include not merely empirical evidence, perception especially, the favoured, or even exclusive, source of empiricism. They also include such sources as: emotional presentation, or emotion; postulation or presumption; reason; authority; a range of psychic and extra sensory perception (ESP) forms; and, differently, a range of intuitions. Some of these sources overlap; consider for instance divine relevation. Plainly those sources are very different kinds, quality and calibre. Some such as reason, which includes itself a disputed variety of forms, are more processing of information kinds than sources (thought reason becomes a source, of sorts, in pure rationalism, and a degenerate source of necessary truths in classical logical theory where theorems are proved, by paradoxical means, from nothing so to say). While some of these kind of sources are not important or at issue in ethics, for instance controversial kinds of ESP giving information on remote (spatially distant or past or future) items, several are. It is not going too far to say that ethics is severely vexed as regards sources, and many distortions such as naturalism can be seen as coming about as ways of trying to secure reliable sources (if some naturalistic reduction were correct then ethics would be brought within the orbit of science and even empirical perceptual bases could be adopted, as in science). But ethics does not resemble science; its sources are not (except incidentally) primarily perceptual, thus breaking any very close analogy between epistemology and ethics. A major source in ethics is emotion, by contrast with epistemology where the major source is perception. From there already derives a major difference between the fields, as perception tends to be less variable, more intersubjective, less culturally dependent across the range of subjects usually taken into account. Accordingly, in any quest for a more objective ethics, more has to be drawn out, out of the processing substructure, whence the emphasis on coherence, good reasons, ethical on coherence, good reasons, ethical argumentation. Ethical inputs, sources, and processing are assessed in detail in the text. Although this work is focussed upon ethics, it does not, and evidently cannot, merely concern ethics. Since the ethical theory is itself approached primarily (though not exclusively) by way of value, it bears upon other areas, such as normative-infected social sciences, where value theory features. For another example, it also impacts upon aesthetics, heavily. For, according to the theory advanced, there is no sharp boundary, indeed really no division at all, between what has been dubbed "aesthetic value" and "ethical value". Value is value, without these artificial divides. Evidently too, as will appear, the work intrudes in normative reaches �6 merging into ethics, in particular, wherever normative or deontic dilemmas are encountered, such as reaches of social choice theory and legal theory. Differently, the work includes much, though indirectly, upon philosophy of nature. For it is especially concerned to supersede an old defective philosophy of nature, which included a heavy devaluation of nature, and aided and abetted a manifestly chauvinistic ethics. The ethical theory to be elaborated fits with, and in significant respects presupposes, a·different theory of nature. 7 Although investigations in this text are primarily theoretical, they have significant practical implications. Putting the theory to work in various environmental fields is something that happens elsewhere (see further in the Epilogue). Some of this has already occurred, in essays in the Green Series, and some is reserved for other texts on field ethics. 8 Notes on terminology In this text several familiar terms, such as 'green' and 'deep', are converted into quasi-technical terms. That is to say, special uses of the terms already in currency, such as the use of 'green' to mean environmentally committed, are further refined. The result could be signalled by deloyment of appropriate new terminology. Something like that is assumed done, except that the familiar terms will be retained-onl y now they are to be read in the quasi-technical way. To put the point differently. Let 'grene' (Olde English) or 'gre-een, (Newe English), for example, be the quasi-technical explication of 'green' in the relevant sense. Then in the subsequent text, 'green' will normally signify gre-een, or equivalently 'green' operates as (effectively abbreviates) 'gre-een. Why such a strategem? One reason is that people are now rather conservative regarding terminology. Indeed they are often turned off by new terminology (despite regular ruination of established terminology). As a result, established terminology gets revised for all sorts of new purposes (witness the bizarre high-school reuses in advanced physics), with a resultant overloading of senses. By contrast, recycling of old terminology (words or spellings), that has fallen into disuse would be rather more commendable. Here, rather than pressing our luck with explicit recyclings like diep and chalowe, we resort to the fiction that the terms 'deep' and 'shallow' deployed throughout the text stand in for the technical recyclings. As a result 'deep', as figuring in deep approaches, deep green, deep theory and so on, has no connection with profundity, or 'shallow' with superficiality. As several have said, in several respects deep/shallow terminology is unsatisfactory, execrable it is sometimes said. Founder N aess did a disservice introducing it, and subsequently 7 8 Such an appropriate underlying theory of nature is advanced in the companion work on metaphysics, namely TM. Green Series is a popular label for discussion papers in environmental philosophy, published from Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University. One of the other texts is tentatively entitled Green Ethical Fields .. �7 in explaining it, so slackly. While it is too late to easily change the terminology, some undesirable associations may be shaken off by resorting to older or variant spellings, and simultaneous ly refining senses intended. That we do. But then we concede to the general intellectual will, by the substitution or "abbreviations" strategem. Even so, we have risked a few neologisms, and we shall chance, just here, one or two more. One we risk, is euthics, for universalizab le ethics, that is an ethics meeting universalizability requirements (in some appropriate fashion). This bit of terminology helps in resolving a significant ambiguity in philosophical usage of 'ethics', and making an improved start on the vexed issue of why an agent should adhere to an ethics, or differently to an euthics? One we chance is viridology (from Latin virides, green, and Greek logos, study of, in modern palance) for: theory, principles and practices of deep-green; that is, a single classical word for diep-grene theory. A purer alternative we contemplated, from among many, was prasinology (or should it be prasinomics) from Greek (and Latin) prasinus, dark green, leek green. Acknowledg ements and antecendents: personal development and conceit. The production of this work owes much to other humans, with of whom I have little or no acquaintance. The debts are both intellectual and practical. On the heavily practical side, I am most grateful to Frances Redrup for the processing of reems of rough scribble. On the broad practical front I am pleased to acknowledge the continuing support of my research endeavours by the Australian National University. That academic support, while generous by often niggardly world standards, has recently declined, through contraction of research support and expansion of alleged accountability practices. In this little respect, there has regettably been interference in my research, dur the earlier stages of work on this book, by no doubt wellintentioned academics occupying supervisary roles who have deemed by performance less than satisfactory. It is with regret too that I record that, in part owing to biassed appointment practices within the University, there has been negligible imput to the present work from any of my academic colleagues there. But outside imput there has been of course, of two main sorts: from recent activity in environmental philosophy and from past exercises in value theory. While environmental issues have operated as a main stimulus in my recent work in ethics, my own interest in and investigations in ethics reach back to my graduate work in Wellington, New Zealand, where I produced a characteristic ally initative work on ethics, entitled Moral Scepticism (I do not suggest that anyone read that work, which it is far too late to suppress). In New Zealand, I was educated in the 20th century British type and style of ethical theory, primarily Oxbridge material, with not antipodean influence of any significance what cover, except in the obscure background Prior' s quocit little book Logic and the Basis of Ethics (although my professor at Wellington, George Styles, had ethics as a manfield, I learnt only a �8 certain technigue from him; I do not recall one position, little theorem argument or there I must attribute to him, for the very simple reason, (suspect, that he never advanced very much). Among Oxbridge characters, Moore revoided the dominant influence though much of Hume and his near contemporaries-N eurall-Smith Tomlesia and others-was scround up to a tiny circle of ethical enthusiants and fellow academic travellers. Moore is still an influence in this book; in my occasional more conceited moments, I like to envisage the book as an appropriately greenish update of Principia Ethica. At least it may be as near as I ever come to producing such a work: Principa Ethica Virida. What on excessively ambitious idea, sheer hubris! Yet, for all the fuss, Principia Ethica is not really such a good book; rather it enjoys other advantageous features. A few companions with Principa Ethica will be ventured. But, by and large, other ethical theories will not be investigated in much detail. For one reason, that has been done, to a sufficient extent elsewhere (in others' work more than my own). For another, in the wake of accumulating evidence, notably from environmental awakenings, revealing their narrowness and prejudice, they scarcely justify further post mortems. More than Moore and Priest, the present work is indebted to Meinong, and through him to the tradition of Austrian value theory. The theory elaborated in fact fits, more or less, into what has been called critical cognitivism .. The evil of ingratitude, for example, ... Here and there, the present text draws, heavily sometimes, on my own past work, especially concerning environmental ethics. As much of the work, for example in the local Green Series in Canberra, is rather inaccessible, such borrowing may not matter much. There remains a small overlap-ideally vanishingly small as revision proceeds-betwee n this text and better circulated complementary works, notably essays in Environmental Philosophy and parts of The Greening of Ethics. �INTRODU CING DEEP-GR EEN THEORY Deep-green theory aims eventually to supply a comprehensive alternative environmental philosophy. While it stands on its own, it is alternative because it stands in radical ideological opposition to dominant ways, nowadays predominantly industrial. It offers a philosophy both in the contemporary narrower sense, and in the older sense of an intellectually informed and critical way of life. That philosophy is centred on an ethical theory (upon which this issue concentrates), which is in form centred upon a value theory. But the ethic issues, in a fashion broadly associated since Aristotle, in a politics and political economy. But the output of the value theory in fact reaches much further, into practical decision making in a range of environmentally impacting areas such as fishing, forestry and agriculture. The value theory is also intertwined with philosophical issues which are often considered more fundamental, those of astophyism and epistemology. Indeed there is no part of philosophy that remains untouched. Therein lies part of the claim to comprehensiveness. The particular form of deep-green theory elaborated is by no means independent of (acclaimed) advances recently made elsewhere in philosophy (those in object-theory, and relevant and paraconsistent logics especially). But though the theory given is influenced and sometimes in fact shaped through these developments, deep-green theory more generally can avoid them (The type of theory given could easily enough be recast in a more classical Platonistic form - undoubtedly a much less plausible form. Nor will these background advances intrude, it is hoped, in the given elaboration of deep-green theory; the background will remain, fairly directly in the background, and not come to dominate proceedings or know proceedings depend upon special new controversial features of it. Where more technical agreements are required, they will be relegated to appendices. 1. As to deep theory. Deep-green theory is the environmental branch of a much larger affair, deep theory. There is a point, in fact a real expository need, to place deep-green theory in the larger setting of deep theory. For deep theory influences several of the choices made in deciding upon the way deepgreen theory goes, the shape it takes. Although the influence will become evident, particularly with the intertwining of truth and value that .... , it is worth giving an example. Too much of the Anglo-American discussion of intrinsic value and of obligations to future generations is taken up with - hung up upon - ontological questions, about universal items in the first case, and as how there can be obligations regarding future items which do not (yet) exist in "suitable" determinate �2 form in the second. Deep object-theo ry slices straight through these issues, removing the problem generating ontological assumptions. Deep-theor y is a grander theory lying in the background , which significantl y influences the philosophic al approach taken in deep-green theory, as well as being influenced by it. There is no reason why that grand backdrop should remain hidden; there is no hidden agenda. The backgroun d theory, of which deep-green theory is a part, is called simply deep theory. For it represents the confluence of several deep positions with deep-green theory: deep pluralism, depth relevant theory, deep item-theory, and so on. As a theoretical endeavor, deep theory aims to pull together, into a unified coherent theory these various deep positions. It thus draws together and integrates as well, several other interrelated efforts (on dialethism, process theory, anakyrie, etc. With deep theory I aim to supply eventually a fairly comprehen sive philosophical package. I used to imagine that with moderate comprehen siveness as regards present philosophic al problems would come a certain completene ss; but I've come to think that a total philosophy is an illusion, like pots of gold at the ends of rainbows, and rainboweri a themselves. Deep theory is no doubt a presumptu ous title (there are worse about, e.g. 'total philosophy ', 'ecosophy' ), not it is altogether satisfactory given the problems and obscurities, to be encountere d, lacking in the notion of depth. My main excuse is that I did no exactly choose the title myself, but had it thrust upon me: problemati c, presumptuo us, it looks to good to refuse. It emerged from a terminolog ical confluence of several areas in which I'd been struggling to assemble ac. capirred theory - deep-green theory (itself a union of green thought, or environmen tal philosophy with a revised deep ecology), deep relevant theory, deep pluralism (which deepened radical pluralism), and deep item-theory (which deepens object-theory). To give a picture of deep theory, it suffices for present purposes to indicate some main features of deep positions, some of their integrating interrelatio ns, and some of their revolutiona ry potential. Deep theory overturns or subverts very much of what has been assumed or presuppos ed in Western philosophy , and particularl y in Enlightenm ented contempora ry philosophy. For example, it overturns the following widespread assumptions:• the Ontologica l Assumptio n, that truth, and also, meaning, are functions of reference, and thereby presuppose existence. On the contrary according to (deep) item theory, we can perfectly well talk and think truly about items that do not exist, and also about items that are not individual but are complex but perhaps indetermin ate wholes, and finally what items are impossible . Therewith repudiated also then is an occasionall y favoured full-back from onticalism, namely possibilism , which assumes �3 • the Possibilist Reduction, of everything that counts in discourse to possible individuals; there are no other genuine subjects, all else can be analysed (or thrown) away. Bound up with possibilism are • the assumptions of modalism, of the correctness of classical logic, and of the absolute requirement of consistency. Under more throughgoing transconsistency (or paraconsistency) these connected assumptions are one and all repudiated. The transconsistent connection assumes an important role in the straightforward treatment of moral and other dilemmas, in showing for example how an agent may coherently operate under inconsistent obligations or with incompatible needs. Important special cases of modalism are such theories as that • entailment is strict implication (or its metalinguistic analogical) and that conditionality amounts to a modal function of material implication 1. The rejection of such themes and their courses is part of what motivates deep relevant logic. While the parts of deep theory are integrated and are intended to be materially reinforcing, nothing prevents their fairly independent elaborations. The holism conceded does not exclude separation or analysis. In particular, deep-green theory is amenable to independent development and analysis. Material implication is the implication defined in terms of truth-functions thus: A materially implies B iff not last A and not B, or equivalently, iff either not A or B. Strict implication is the necessitation of material obligatory i.e. A strictly implies B iff necessarily A materially implies B, or equivalently, iff it is not possible that not A and not B. �ON THE VALUE CORE OF DEEP-GR EEN THEORY This essay aims to uncover the value theory of deep-green theory, exposing thereby a central area of that theory. Though the value theory is (inevitably) abstract, it issues in what is more concrete, such as an applicable system and practical ecological directives, potentially destabilizing for prevailing policies and institutions. Deep-green theory which stands in significant ideological opposition to dominant industrial ways, is intended to supply a comprehensive alternative environmental philosophy. At the core of deep-green theory lies a value theory. A fundamental theme thereof, part of what makes the structure deep, is that a range of environmental items are valuable in themselves, directly and irreducibly so, so that their value does not somehow reduce to or emerge from something else, such as features of certain valuers or what matters for them. Thus value does not answer back in some way to humans, or sentient creatures (or other value-responsive classes), their interests, uses, preferences, or such like. Many natural items, such as forests and rivers, mountains and seashores, are intrinsically valuable. They are valuable in their own right - irrespective of whether they are interesting or useful (to any intentional operators, themselves interesting or useful or not), indeed whether or not there exist any valuers. Value spreads through and reaches across the natural domain; it is not bounded by mind, or linkages with subjective states; nor does it stop with sentience, or associated pyschological features like satisfaction; nor does it end at life; it observes no such compromising bounds. Although value is distributed richly if irregularly throughout nature, it is not then encapsulated in some isolable natural feature, such as life or sentience, or even in defeasible ecological values such as richness, diversity and variety (and so open to a different, naturalistic, reduction). But of course such ecologically important features afford criteria for value, and should be represented in recipes (such as "objective functions") for assessing overall value. From the presence of natural things of value, and accordingly of natural values, it is a short, though controversial, step to the important conclusion that there can be values without valuers. For valuers are sentient creatures with appropriate capacities, but things of value may precede and succeed all such valuers; that is, these things can persist, their values intact, without any valuers. As there can be shapes without any shape-perceivers, so there can be values without valuers. (The theme, like others advanced, can be backed up by more detailed argument and by formal proof, neither attempted here.) In valuational relations then, which relate valuers as subjects with values as objects, both ends of relations have independent standing; though interrelated, as the descriptions are deliberately chosen to suggest, either can stand without the other. It is a fashionable mistake to try to collapse this relation - usually to endeavour to soak up values into a modification of valuing subjects (e.g. as a predicate �'relation-to-values', in which inconvenielt values are locked away). The mistaken procedure is in fact just one important example of an archetypal modern reduction of relations to functions; other examples, locking undesired objects away within functions, are those rendering wholes (such as ecosystems and organised structures) functions of their parts, and, under functionalism, minds and types of intentionality, including value-direction, as functions of bodies or their parts such as brains. Values are not, and do not disappear into, functions of valuers. A connected corollary is that values are not apart from the actual world, something "projected" or imposed on it by a favoured class of valuers, something colouring (and even emotionall y clouding) the otherwise valueless physical world, in rather the way that reductionistic materialism tries (erroneously) to construe colour itself as projected onto a colourless physical world. Of course this projection effort, never adequately explicated, does not succeed, on its own, in removing values. For they remain, left as some function of the valuers. To try to bulldoze through this difficulty, a second reduction is invoked, of evaluative features of valuers to "natural" features, commonly preferences, consumer desires or such like. The second reduction runs into obstacles that halt even the naturalistic bulldozers (e.g. naturalistic and related fallacies), but the first reduction is the critical one in removing key environmental values, such as those of wilderness and wild things, which become valuable only in the focus of certain sentient beholders, and not in and for themselves. This reduction too is blocked by insuperable difficulties. On the one side, like the parallel proposed phenomenalist reduction of material objects to sensations, the reduction never achieves satisfactory support or even a satisfactory statement. On the other, it is counterexampled by various modellings or thought-experiments revealing intuitively-assessed value in situations devoid of valuers (as e.g. in the well-known Last Person argument). Values remain then part of the still rich actual world; they are objects in the domain of actual and other worlds. But they are not of course material objects; creatures will not fall over them any more than they will trip over shadows or mere shapes. Value, like shape, is an attribute, which things have or may lack, and which furthermore creatures can recognise or may fail to discern. Thus value is, like shape and colour and their determinate forms (round, red, etc), a universal , distributed across things, individuals and wholes. The comparison of value with shape is decidedly more helpful than the regular, but exhausted, comparison of value with colour, or of goodness with colour determinates such as yellow. For example, shape is not bound by a set of determinates as colour is in the specific colours, but comes in a spectacular variety of forms, not totally or linearly ordered (as in a rainbow), or contracted to some primary set (as in colour triangles); shape which pertains to wholes as well as particulars, links with gestalts better than colour; shape discrimination is more culture dependent and sensitive; yet shape is, or was, a primary property, and thereby �3 more immune to reductionist strategies than secondary properties such as colour. Again shapes like values, can be vague, indeterminate; that does not prevent things, perhaps unique things, exemplifying them. But naturally the analogy can only be extended so far. Shapes can be approxima ted by polygons, values cannot; shapes are regularly perceived through sense perception, by vision or touch especially, values are not, but are differently apprised. Value is its own thing, not something else; it is what it is and does what is does; it is not something else, like some quantitative mathematical or economic function. Nor does it contract into some mark of value, or to what it comes down to in highly restricted settings; most important, it does not disappear in the style of modern economics into (expected) utility, or into just two economic forms, value-in-use monetarily and value-in-exchange (price), neither of which may reflect worth. Value means what it means, and has meant: worth ; and it ties with general assessments of merit and demerit, goodness or badness, not an economic or other truncation thereof. The powerful drive to reduce or deny values has several sources. Part of the motivation for reduction of value springs from epistemological worries, concerning how values can be ascertained and known, so far as they are (subjective translation proposals are then a direct evaluative counterpart of phenomenalism). Part derives from supposedly problematic cultural relativity (whence the attempt to impose values by identification of value with some favoured assessible feature, and with it cultural or economic imperialism). Part of the motivation comes from more sweeping ideological commitments, such as varieties of materialism or scientism, which leave no space for immaterial values. As already apparent, attempted reductions of value come in a dazzling variety of forms • subjective, which make use of psychological features, such as desires, interests, emotions, and the like; or more objective aggregations of these, such as community preferences or utility; or objectively naturalistic, which enrol single track value-making characteristics such as richness or evolutionary development as value; • consequential, which consider only outcomes; or purely motivational, which consider only attitudes and ignore leads and outcomes; • straightforward, as in translation proposals for translating value judgement s into reducing statements; or oblique, as in supervenience propositions (no variations in value without underwriting variations in reducing features); or obscure, as in unarticulated projection claims. Values are not well accommodated within these reductionistic schemes, or accommodated at all. Deep-green value theory, which is thoroughly nonreductive, repudiates all these reductionistic options. They are not so difficult to avoid, as the options are neither exhaustive nor exclusive. In particular, value reduces neither in subjective nor objective fashion; it does not reduce. Evaluative judgements are nonjective, that is, neither subjective nor objective (in any absolutist �4 fashion). Obversely, evaluation of an act does not reduce to assessing consequences; nor does it come down to an assessment of motives; both may matter. The virulent idea is abroad however that science can offer a reduction, can sweep up value along with all other information, where philosophy has conspicuou sly failed. Unfortunately for such optimistic ideas, fortunately perhaps for deeper thought, current basic science does not have much to say at all, or of merit, about values, and if it did reductions through it would be circular. But, to the contrary, there is a long-standing pretence that science gets along "well" without values, in appropriate value-free fashion. Nowadays it is increasingly realised that the positivistic assumption of such value-freedom is a myth, that much of what passes as science is heavily value-penetrated. While the residual ideal of pure engagement in pure science may offer the illusion of an escape from value, there is no escape. For, in any case, reductions do not succeed, as a copious literature, littered with failed attempts, meanderingly establishes. Nor are they generally desirable, since mostly shallow, aiming at a reduction to features of some privileged class presented as ideal (i.e. core value is covertly assumed, so there is no real reduction). Nor are they needed; explanation and assessment do not require reduction. Evaluations may be arrived at, and value frameworks expanded, by enhancement methods, which organise and expand emotional presentation by coherence methods. The enhancement methodology in fact resembles that sometimes proposed for further acquisition of scientific information. As accumulated empirical information can be further extended through presentational input and assessment for overall coherence, so further evaluations may be arrived at and assessed through a combination of presentational and coherence procedures. At the (marginal) stage where the next round of evaluations is undertaken, the following active ingredients figure, in an idealised breakdown:- Firstly, a background stock of judgements and value experience will have been accumulated or inherited; in principle all of this is revisable, and some may be up for reassessment. Apart from the background, which enters in assessing overall coherence of system, what is involved is, secondly, emotional presentation, which corresponds to further perceptional and sense data input, and, thirdly and not independe nt, coherence processing , which supplies the interpretational and rationalisational components. At bottom, parallelling perception in the case of empirical information, is emotional presentation, gut or visceral reaction in starker forms of acceptance or rejection, but more generally comprehending a variety of sentiments, including overall well-being, and also relational impressions, such as empathy, identification, and so on. As a perceiver perceives shapes, so a valuer feels raw value and disvalue. The basis of perception is sensation, the basis of valuation is emotion. Apprehension of value is seated in emotional, and especially visceral, presentation; but what is apprehended is not to be confused with its apprehension any more than what is perceived. All the warnings about sensation as an �information source have to be repeat~d, with heavy emphasis, as regards emotional presentation; for example, reliability cannot be guaranteed, interference with presentation through drugs, alcohol, temporary excitement or other inputs may render it dubious or unacceptable, conditioning may have occurred, including substantial cultural conditioning (so that a person is terrified by harmless spiders but not sickened by bloody massacres of dolphins or seals). As with perception, there are checks on emotional presentation, such as constancy over time and after reflection. Emotional presentation, supplying primarily inclusions and exclusions or prohibitions, is but the basis of reflective evaluation and value apprehension. The further critical part, coherence processing, builds on the basis taking account of other inputs or controls including background (which supplies relevant components of already adopted judgements, assimilated subculture and so forth) and constraints (such as moral substitutional requirements like impartiality, e.g. whether considered judgements hold for substitute valuers, and uniformity, e.g. whether similar acts are judged in similar ways). Essentially, the coherence procedure consists in asking whether the next or a relevant judgement fits together with what has been accepted, while meeting constraints, without leading to what has been rejected or excluded. If it does fit it is added to the included side, otherwise it is sent to the excluded side. Because an aim of this rationalisation procedure is achievement of some sort of equilibrium such coherence procedures have gained currency under the rubric "reflective equilibrium". Observe, however, that equilibrium reached at some stage may be lost as new types of problems arise and further information enters. No doubt the whole methodology (like the parallel methodology of an empirically-based coherence theory of truth) is highly idealised, and only practicably applicable in rudimentary parts. It does however surmount a major theoretical obstacle for environmental value theory; it reveals how in principle a nonreductionistic value theory can function, and deliver a tenable value system. Whether what results is however an appropriate deep environmental system will depend above all on the presentational input, the extent to which environmental sensitivity enters and is not suppressed. Enhancement methods reveal too that value systems are not uniquely determined, any more than other comprehensive theoretical frameworks. There evidently are rival value systems measuring up to rigorous rationality requirements, much as there are rival logics and rival physical and biological systems. In particular chauvinistic systems, narrow or shallow value systems, which are unresponsive to and take no account of environmental items and values, cannot be excluded on rational or straight logical grounds. Unfortunately such systems remain in ascendancy, and tend to dominate social and political practice; in recent times economism, a narrow type of utilitarianism, has all too obviously dominated much terrestial practice. While such value frameworks are open to severe criticism, for instance as chauvinistic, as violating universality requirements of morality in the case of economism, they �do not succumb to definitive refutatiog (for the reason that requirements of morality, universalizability of principle, impartiality and so on, can simply be repudiated; immoral or amoral frameworks are still value systems). Even so, much can be done to shift or alter values, though as usual effectiveness cannot be guaranteed. A range of argumentative, educational and persuasive techniques, of varying quality, can be put to work to move valuers indoctrinated in old damaging structures, often enough successfully. Important among these are positive presentations of environments, their habitats and creatures, by way of new information and experience. The availability of rival value systems, while it implies a certain desirable (and also troublesome) pluralism, does not mean relativism. From a deep-green viewpoint, rival narrower and shallower systems are definitely inferior, and criticised accordingly, while economism is an anathema which does not even make the moral grade (e.g. too many principles stop at class or state boundaries). However a critical pluralism does acknowledge and offer a place in the wider scheme of things for other systems, even if as less favoured or satisfactory. One political upshot is evident; deep-green theory promotes, what matters in these irrational times of numbers, alliances - in particular, a green alliance, organising green positions, against prevailing forces of environmental degradation. The systematic pluralism of deep-green value theory interpenetrates not only social and political domains above, but also metaphysics traditionally placed below. In the underlying metaphysical pluralism of deep-green theory, value runs very deep - so deep that even truth depends in part upon it. For not merely selection of a correct comprehensive theory or worldview is a value dependent choice, but choice of associated actual world is also. That choice, insofar as it is consciously made, of world structure and conceptualisation, is a constrained choice, constrained by informational inputs, such as those of refined perception. But inasmuch as it is rationally accomplished, that choice, like other choices of structure, proceeds according to a standard value-information analysis (regularly oversimplified however to a preferenceinformation or even desire-belief modelling); that is, to extract the salient point, it involves value essentially. Truth and value are then intertwined; truth, though naturally different from value, is value dependent. Both are plural, and differently so. So, unremarkably deep-green metaphysics resembles the value theory in significant respects. For example, as the value theory is nonreductionistic, so also is the metaphysics; in particular, there is a no-reduction theme that neither parts nor wholes reduce eliminably to one another, as opposed to atomistic and holistic views of environmental interrelations. As the value theory is pluralistic, so also is the metaphysics; in place of established absolutism, a plurality of worlds, with associated truth definitions is discerned. Indeed a main aim of deep-green theory is to dislodge dominant �7 destructive ideologies, which (each of them) assume an absolute truth, from their positions thereby providing intellectual living-space for natural environments. Much of deep-green theory devolves then from the abstract value theory. As with the metaphysical way sketched, so it is with the fuller ethical theory, which includes as well as a specific axiological system, elaborating deep environmental values and virtues, a deontic framework, supplying obligations, rights, taboos, and similar. For example, given that a certain wild river is intrinsically valuable, as we can verify by on-site experience and enhancement methods, and given that we duly respect that value, as deontic principles will tell us we should, then we are not free to do as we like with that river, to dam it with concrete, to channel it within concrete, stripping it of its riverine ecosystems. But that does not preclude respectful use of the river, swimming or sailing quietly in its waters, and the like. Value thus guides action, practice, and use; it is the ground also upon which principles are formulated, principles that are assessed and validated by way of enhancement methods. Important among these are non-interference principles, which exclude unwarranted interference with other preference-havers and unwarranted damage, ill-treatment, or devaluation of items of value. Such deontic principles circumscribe environmentally-limited freedom of action. Given noninterference principles, a major shift in onus of proof from homocentricethics takes place. What is required now is that reasons be givenfor interfering with the environment, rather than reasons for not doing so. Also direct responsibility for environmental interference or modification falls upon those who would seriously interfere or significantly modify, who would tread heavily on the land. Non-interference does not preclude use - only too much use and use of too much. What it does lead to is the theme that, where use occurs, it should be careful and respectful use. An important respect thesis regarding environmental items is founded on such non-interference principles and the no-reduction theme: namely, • not to put others (other preference havers) into a dispreferred state for no good reason; • not to jeopardise the well-being of natural objects or systems without good reason; • not to damage or destroy items which, while they cannot literally be put into a dispreferred state, can be damaged or destroyed or have their value eroded or impaired. These apply to ecosystems, their surrounds, their parts, and so on. The mere making of further excess profits, or similar economic excuses, are not good reasons. Such a respect thesis forms part of the ecological outlook of deep-green theory. Deep-green ethical theory amounts to much more than just another non-reductionist ethical theory, which highlights ecological values and virtues, and so forth. It changes the character and shape of ethical enterprise. Perhaps most strikingly, it removes humans as such �from the centre of the ethical stage (or ~xclusive occupation of the stage). The biological concept of being human ceases to be a significant ethical category. To elevate it to such is to fall into human chauvinism, a type of class chauvinism which unwarrantedly discriminates in favour of the human species. The prevailing chauvinism is not inevitable; it is very logically avoided by directly connecting ethical characteristics with the categories of items that can have them. Relevant categories include those marked out by features like: having well-being, preference-having, rights-holding, contractual-capability, and so on, categories not necessarily connected with any particular species. Hitherto virtually all Wes tern ethical theories, and the institutional arrangements they help support, have not merely limited ethical matters to interhuman affairs, but have been blatantly chauvinistic, exhibiting substantial and unjustifiable discrimination in favour of humans (or certain privileged humans). Deep-green theory thus implies the inadequacy of prevailing social, political and economic arrangements and institutions. These structures are the defective products of inferior value frameworks which take quite insufficient account of environmental desiderata and values. Richard Sylvan* RMB 683 Bungendore NSW 2621 * Thanks to David Bennett for comments on an earlier draft. For more on deep-green theory, see essays in and work referred to in the Green Series, i.e. Discussion Papers in Environmental Philosophy, RSSS, Australian National University, Canberra. This compressed essay was solicited by and written for Island Magazine (Tasmania). Upon receiving it however, the editors decided that it was too dense, and insufficiently journalistic and popular (not features they had at any time requested), for their magazine. �I \. '1 11.10.95 CHAPTER 1 DEEP AND GREEN AND PRESUPPOSED FUNDAMENTALS It soon emerges from preliminary exploration that, under natural characterisations, relevant notion of both ethics and green presuppose the notion of agency. So with something on agency, enough to get started, we shall begin. In terms of agency and proclivities to environments, green can be characterized, and in turn green approaches. Then, within green approaches, three relevantly different types can be distinguished: shallow, intermediate, and deep. It is the last, and really only the last, that matters for the ethical theory that follows. 1. Action, agency and agents: a summary . 1 Action theory is grounded in process theory. For actions are types of processes, agentascribed processes. processes are directed functions, ordinarily time-directed functions, 2 ? framing of certain functional sorts. All the ordinary sorts of processes-ec lipses, transits, removals, reflections, and so on and on-are processes (and ordinary processes can be separated out logically, such as by applicability and inapplicability of certain predicates, e.g. they take place, they are not facts, etc.) Processes themselves in no way require agents. Actions, however, as distinguished within goings-ons and taking-places, do require agency, and so agents. There is no reason at all why these agents should be humans. Many agents are not humans, some humans are not agents. But it is often quite erroneously assumed agents are humans, or persons. Excess requirements on agency are partly to blame, the mistaken idea that agents have to be purposeful, responsible, rational-feat ures that can be added to distinguish subtypes of agents. Rather, actions can be roughly delineated through answers to questions like What is so and so (the relevant agent) doing? How is so and so acting? The result reached following through this route is this: process a is an action iff for some agent x, a is properly ascribed to x, it is x' s doing. To break residual circularity, it remains to define agency. Agency is defined, such is the proposal, in terms of exercising a causal role (which may be misdirected or similar), through the following circuit. First, x is and agent as agents a iff, for some p directly partinent to a, x causes Pbut x is not caused to cause p. In terms of agency-regarding, other notions can be defined as follows: x is a sometime-agent, someties an agent, iff for some a, x is an agent as 2 As full an account of processes as so far worked up from notes appears in 'Process and actions', which does provide detailed background for this section. �'2 regards a. Agency is a characterizing attribute of sometime-agents. An agent is a sometimesagent that establishes a history of agency (a small reputation therefore). 2. Explaining Green. In characterizing green we start with agency. Such relevant features, of greens (or environmentalists), as being positively concerned about nature of natural things, supporting environmental causes and similar, are closely tied to practice and action; they are features of agents. In an original central sense of 'green' so redeployed, an agent was green if that agent firstly believed that some parts of the natural environment should be protected, and secondly took some relevant action. 3 In short, a belief-action analysis emerges, which can be recast as a standard belief-desire-resultant action account. For instance, the agent believes that some natural environment is worth protection, desires that it should be, and acts (in some way, perhaps feebly) accordingly. All the parts of this sort of account call, however, for some elaboration. To remove a certain circularity, resulting from characterising "green" through terms like "environmen t", 'natural environment' can be replaced by 'parts (surface configurations) of the Earth substantially uninterfered with by humans'. To specify protection satisfactorily, protection/ra m what should be indicated. And so on. But there is a little point in elaborating this already weak characterisation, which can be satisfied by an agent interested in saving a few square metres of the Earth's surface from exploitation. For the notion has been further weakened, almost from its inception. To characterise this laxer, but ubiquitous notion, let us insert the intermediary notion of an environmental cause. Such causes include not merely protecting natural environments, but limiting impacts on environments, which may not be pristine, for instance by pouring less sewage or detergents, CFCS or Greenhouse gases, into them, or conserving items, which could be exploited or consumed now for future use or for future human generations (to use or conserve, etc.). The first of these further causes beyond protection, original green, is a largely consumerist notion of green, the second, an economistic notion (it takes in such beloved constraints as intergerational equity). There are other related causes of importance also, such as restoration of something that has been over-exploited or damaged, such as agricultural lands, waterways, urban air, soils (soil conservation), or even human artefacts such as monuments or buildings. The shallow green cause of fighting pollution, for human health reasons, can fit in here. Needless to add the restoration may not be to pristine conditions, but to quite low 3 Although we are explicating terms that are now in widespread usage, in a way substantially faithful to that usage (but not some of its dilute or corrupt expansions), we shall regard the terms as quasi-technical. We see these terms, as the discerning reader also may, as spelt not with a double 'e' but a triple 'e', as 'greeen' and 'greeening' (insert hyphens as need be for appropriate pronunciation, e.g. 'gre-een' _. The effect is to peel off dilution and corruption of 'green' (e.g. so to include every politician, at least when any confronts concerned constituents) and to discard all those unwanted and often undesirable senses the colour term green has accumulated. �standards. In sum, causes include as well as protection, such matters as nondestruction, conservation, maintenance, restoration, and so on. Now substitute supporting an environmental cause for protecting a natural environment. Then an agent is green in this expanded laxer sense if the agent believes in supporting an environmental cause and takes some relevant action in that direction. Such an action component is essential: green does imply some practical, if utterly token, involvement. The lax account connects in the right ways with testable sociological criteria. For instance, believing in supporting a cause can be cashed out in terms of joining an organisation working for that cause, or even, reducing the slight action component still further, considering joining such an organisation. 4 The appellation green applies not only to individual agents, but also to groups, coalitions, institutions, even corporations and governments. As a green government can, meet similar lax conditions, it is evident that there really are very few requirements, even weak sponsorship may serve. Many there are now trying to take advantage of green movements-adve rtisers, vendors, politicians, professors, merchants, even generals (with "defence forces" retooling as environmental defence forces). Cashing i in on the movement by producing a goods or services presented as environmentally friendly does not thereby make parties doing so green, especially if what is supplied adds to overall environmental impacts (as do "environmental markets" delivering environmental junk, sometimes portrayed as "green goods"). The requirement of serving environmental causes has been lost. The excessive generosity of the account arrived at, which allows agents with only passing or slight active beliefs in some cause to count as green, does not matter. For firstly, it corresponds moderately well to current lax usage, which allows almost any sort of concern for environments, coupled with an action component as slight as paying a token subscription, to serve. Secondly, it still exercises quite enough exclusive power. Many agents are not green. For instance all those exclusively tuned into possessive individualism, mainstream economics, or similar creeds are not green (i.e. not even lax green). Thirdly, needed discriminations can be made within the class of (lax) green. An important subclass of green comprises ecological green, where the causes include maintenance and protection of natural ecosystems (including wilderness) and these causes enjoy some primacy. "Ecological green" is by no means a tautology. 4 In a study entitled 'GREEN PACKAGES IN AUSTRALIA', greens were picked out from the whole sample of respondents to the Australian Election Study of 1990 in terms of answer to question: How likely are you to join groups campaigning to protect the environment, or are you alrady a member? Permitted answers: (1) I am a member, (2) I am not a member but I have considered joining (3) I am not a member and I haven't considered joining, and (4) I certainly would not consider joining. Those giving answer (2), perhaps token greens, were accounted green. �4 To be green in more than a token fashion is to have some commitment to containing or reducing the environmental impact of humans on the Earth or regions of it. By virtue of the environmental impact equation (for a given region) that means commitment in the immediate future term to either • human population reduction, or • less impacting lifestyles for many humans, or • improvements in technology to reduce overall impact. Most humans in a region can do little to implement the third requirement, except to hope. Accordingly they cannot satisfactorily demonstrate their commitment in this way. A genuine green will meet both the other conditions. But since as big coalition as feasible is sought for a green coalition, marginal greens who meet only one of the requirements, perhaps in weak form, will not usually be excluded (from almost any green church). Issues of population afford a simple test (a necessary condition) for a genuine green in Australia; for that agent fails who suppoes that while efforts (including the agent's contribution) to effect human population reduction should be invested elsewhere, as in parts of Asia or Africa, Australia can keep on growmg. From filling out the conditions delimiting green commitments, a green platform can be derived. Specifically it will include, along with the action clause, derivative directives as regards curtailing population, refining and limiting consumption, adjusting technologies, and consequent thereupon altering administrative, political and economic arrangements and institutions accordingly. What so results is a proper subplatform of the Deep Ecology platform. A fair approximation to the full Deep Ecology platform can be derived by adjoining requirements for depth to those for genine greenness of the action platform; so result themes concerning intrinsic value in nature, and commitments deriving therefrom. In short, the wellknown Deep Ecology platform accounts (as a fair approximation) to a deep green platformwhich can accordingly supplant it. As genuine green and green platform can be characterized given the initial notion of green, that is lax green, so similarly can other green compounds and modified forms be explained (in a preliminary way). For example, a green ideosystem is an ideosystem (an ideology, in the unbiassed sense) that coheres with green commitments, and typically organizes and guides them. As genuinely green, it is a system that includes a green platform, and it could be defined in that way, as an ideo-system coherently extending a green platform. Similarly for green ethics, and for green philosophy (and also for other green notions that could be defined but are not presently needed, e.g. green goods, green consumers, green parties, green ideas and so forth). A green ethical system is a green ideosystem which is an ethic. Green ethics comprises �5 such green ethical systems and their theory. 5 Green ethics thus comprise a decidedly restricted subset of environmental ethics. For an environmental ethic in the broad usage, an ethics that addresses environmental issues, among others, may well contain themes that could not be adopted by a green agent, that may even operate against environmental causes. In consequence, a green ethics is an ethic that could be coherently adopted by a green agent, that does not run counter to environmental causes. 3. Different approaches to the environment: shallower and deeper. People can do more or less what they like with the environment, with the land and the sea, and with what grows and lives there-such was and, in only slightly modified form, remains a dominant theme of Wes tern cultural heritage. It was not the view of other cultures, such as some of the American Indians or Australian Aborigines; nor was it the only view included in the Western cultural package. But it has dominated, especially in colonial and imperial expansion. It is only recently, for example, that some social or governmental restrictions with teeth have been imposed upon what Australians can do with the land they occupy or claim, and these lag far behind advanced green thinking as to what is required. For the most part there has been little weakening in the Wes tern assumption that people own the land, that it is their possession, to mould to their purposes and whims. 6 This unrestrained approach proved damaging enough while the land was wide and humans comparatively few; now that human populations are expanding more rapidly, perhaps to critical limits, now that much land is damaged and less fragile land is in increasingly short supply, it is time to re-examine older attitudes and the accompanying practices. Any deeper reassessment has to look at the presupposed land ethic, and more generally at the underlying ethical and ideological assumptions. A land ethic, according to Leopold, who introduced the term, is 'an ethic dealing with man's relation to land and to the animals and plants which grow upon it' .7 Thus a land ethic amounts to a nature (or environmental) ethic, with land a symbol for the whole of nature (or the more comprehensive environment), and man a symbol for all relevant agents. The unrestrained position, which imposes few or no constraints upon treatment of the environment, affords a land ethic of only a degenerate sort. The unrestrained position would, for example, have little 5 6 7 Although we are anticipating here-as ethics and ethical systems are explained essentially reportively however, in the next chapter, there is no circularity. For ethics is separately and independently characterised. Indeed, with the renewed libertarian movement emanating from industrial north-eastern America, this assumption has gained in strength. Foreign "resources" are not to be hoarded but should be saleable to the highest bidders for "free" economic use. And sometimes it is broadly hinted: or else! A. Leopold, A Sand Country Almanac with other essays on Conversation, New York, 1966, p.238. �6 compunction about using up materials, forests, pristine environments and so on, immediately or even destroying them. In the end the unrestrained position can be excluded from properly ethical positions. 8 For it fails to meet the basic universality requirement on moral principles, of independence of person, place or time, a requirement which iplies that persons of different races, colours, sexes or ages, or at different places or times are not treated unfairly or seriously disadvantaged. Insofar as the unrestrained position would permit the exploitation, degradation and even destruction, of all present resources and environments, it places future humans at a very serious disadvantage. The position is thus one of expediency, not morality, typically yielding, like economics, evaluative assessments based on short-term narrow local interets, rather than appropriately based on long-range values. Opposed to the unrestrained position are various conservation ethics; what Leopold saw as the land ethic is just one of these. Conservation ethics can be classified, conveniently for subsequent development, into three groups: shallow, intermediate and deep. 9 Unlike the unrestrained position, all these politions would conserve and maintain certain things-materials, creatures, forests, etc. The shallow conservation position differs from the unrestrained position primarily in taking a longer-term view and taking account of future humans, their welfare and so forth. It is more enlightened than the unrestrained position in taking a longer-term perspective: hence its alternative description as resource conservation. Though this conservation position is only a small step away from the unrestrained position, it does pass one test for morality proper in that future people are not treated unfairly. Most of the big rush into fashionable environmentalism does not get beyond shallowness. The shallow and unrestricted positions are closely related by an important feature they share-and which justifies lumping them together as shallower positions. They are both highly anthropocentric; they do not move outside a human-centred framework, which construes nature and the environment instrumentally, that is, simply as a means to human ends and values. Thus they take account ultimately only of human interests and concerns; all environmental values reduce to these or similar human on closed notions. It is in this respect especially that these shallower positions differ from deeper, less resource and exploitation oriented, positions. 8 9 This is a substantial, and controversial claim, especially since it accounts much economic activity unethical, as involving practices of expediency, not morality. For the fuller case for obligations and commitments to future humans, see e.g. R. and V. Routley, 'Nuclear energy and obligations to the future' in Responsibilities to Future Generations: Environmental ethics, (ed. E. Partridge), Prometheus Books, Buffalo, 1981, and other essays in this book. This classification refines Naess's non-exhaustive distinction of shallow and deep ecology, and extends it to render it exhaustive. For the original distinction, see A. Naess, 'The shallow and the deep, long-range ecology movement' Inquiry 16 (1973) 95-100. An elaboration on Aess's position, to which this discussion has some debts, may be found in his 'Philosophical aspects of the deep ecological momvement', Environmental Ethics, to appear. �According to deeper positions humans are not the sole items of value or bestowing value in the world, and not all things of value are valuable because they answer back in some way to human concerns. But deeper positions differ in the weight or relative importance they assign to human concerns. According to the intermediate position serious human concerns always come first; and while other things, such as higher animals, have value or utility in their own right, their value is outranked by that of humans. The deep position rejects this assumption, and maintains that even serious human concerns should sometimes lose out to environmental values. FIGURE 1. THE POSITIONS SEPARATED, AND SEPARATING PRINCIPLES SHALLOWER UNRESTRAINED DEEPER SHALLOW INTERMEDIATE I I I I J, J, J, DEEP MORALITY SOLE VALUE GREATER VALUE REQUIREMENT ASSUMPTION ASSUMPTION (of human apartheid) (of human supremacy) The watershed principle which divides the shallower from deeper positions is the sole value assumption. According to this major assumption, which underlies prevailing Western social theory, humans are the only things of irreducible (or intrinsic) value in the universe, the value of all other things reducing to or answering back to that of humans in one way or another. This assumption is built into most present political and economic arrangements; for example, only aggregated preferences or interests of certain (present) humans are considered in democratic political choice, and likewise in economic decision making; other creatures and natural items are represented at best through the preferences or votes of interested humans. Similar assumptions are made in mainstream ethical theories. Typical are reductive theories which endeavour to derive ethical judgements from features of closed systems of humans. Examples are provided by presently fashionable ethical theories, such as utilitarianism. 10 According to utilitarianism what ought to be done, as well as what is best, is determined through what affords maximum satisfaction to the greatest number of individual humans. In theories like utilitarianism, the outside world of nature does not enter through direct inputs or outputs, but only insofar as it is reflected in the psychological states of individuals. Such ethical theories are appropriately described as those of apartness or human apartheid. Man 10 But the same holds for other fashionable theories on the American-dominated ethical scene, namely contractualism and libertarianism. These theories, along with utilitarianism, are explained in most modern American introductions to ethical theories or moral problems. �is, or is treated as, apart from Nature; there is virtually total segregation. Nature or the land enters only as a remote experiential backdrop, and onstage is the drama of human affairs and interests. However, humans cannot be entirely insulated from their environment; for example, volcanoes affect temperatures thus affecting climate thus affecting crop yield and food supplies. At least limited intercourse with the environment has to be admitted as a result. So, in economics, ethics, and political theory, secondary theories, dealing with linkages to the environment, have been appended (thus, for example, extemality theory in economics, some allowance for "side" constraints in more sophisticated utilitarianism, and so on). But the land remains treated as an awkward or tiresome afterthought, when it is considered at all. There is, however, another approach, also with historical standing, vying with (and indeed often confused with) human apartheid which can accommodate secondary theories a little more satisfactorily. That is the position of superiority or human supremacy, according to which Man, though included in Nature, is above the rest of Nature, meaning ethically superior to it. While human supremacist positions can incorporate the sole value assumption and thus remain in the shallow ethical area, they have the option of rejecting it in favour of the less objectionable greater value assumption:: other things being equal, the value of humans is greater than that of other things; the value of humans surpasses that of all other things in the universe. This assumption allows that other objects, such as some higher animals, may have irreducible value; what it insists upon is that, at least for "normal" members of respective species, this value never exceeds that of humans. What is generally presupposed is that other objects-animals, plants and their communities-are never of much importance compared with humans. Though human supremacy has appeared in versions of utilitarianism where animal pain is taken into consideration along with human, Western ethics and associated social sciences such as demography, economics and political theory, remain predominantly apartheid in form. It is the repudiation of the greater value assumption that separates deep from intermediate positions. Perhaps the most familiar example of an intermediate position is that of Animal Liberation, in the form in which animals are taken to have value in their own right, though in any playoff with humans, humans win. Under the deep position such an outcome is by no means inevitable; in cases of conflict of animal or natural systems with humans, humans sometimes lose. I I There are various arguments designed to show that the deep assessment is right, that humans should sometimes lose out. A typical one takes the following form:- Some humans lead worthless or negative lives, lives without net value. The point, though not uncontroversial, 11 So too for some men and some sparrow. So we should reject the intermediate ...... : A man is worth more than a sparrow! (Drungson/ Ralston etc.) �9 can be argued even from a shallow utilitarianism.1 2 Take for instance a life of pain and suffering and little or no happiness: it has a substantial net negative utility. But some small natural systems do have net value; one example would be an uninhabited undisturbed island (a live example might be a tropical island before Club Mediterranee depredation). Now consider the situation where the considerable value of a small natural system is to be sacrificed (in a way that shallowly affords no ethical impropriety) on behalf of a set of humans whose lives each have no positive net value. For instance, the system is to be exploited, just for the continued maintena nce of these humans, or for their addition (as new settlers) to an establish ed population. Then in such circumstances, these humans lose out; the natural system takes precedence. Similarly, trivial satisfactions of humans do not dominate over the integrity of rich natural environments.13 Let us look ahead to glimpse paradimatic expansions of the positions indicated (in figure 1). For the positions soon expand, when applied to real life issues, to more comprehensive positions; indeed they have expanded all the way to what are now called social paradigms, that is to full social perspectives. For example, the deep position has expanded from the two core theses-a s initially reformulated, values in nature, which is a positive counterpart of the sole value assumption, and biospecies impartiality, which is a positive elaboration of greater value assumption 14-to fuller deep ecological positions which involve as well many other themes. 12 13 The point is argued in detail in R. Routley and N. Griffin, 'Unravelling the meanings of life?' Discussion Papers in Environme ntal Philosophy #3, Research School of social Sciences, Australian National University, 1982. There are significant cross-classifications of environmental positions. Some further dimensions are included in the following diagram. Environment not taken I Environments is taken into account I into account p 14 --------- --------- --------- --------- --------- --- shallow intermediate I dogs I ////// I I E I individual I I H I holistic I I Another dimension is the static/dynamic. But no one want to be just stauc, really. According to the values in nature theme natural items other than humans and human artefacts have intrinsic value; while according to biospecies impartiality members of one species, humans in particular, are not favoured or valued over members of another simply on the basis of species. The danger of favouring one species is encouraged by the species fallacy, commonly invoked in favouring humans. This is the mistake of concluding that because a few members of the species have accomplish ed something of (immense) value, all members of the species therefore are (highly) valuable; all members of the species manage to free-load for the ride, obtained by a few members, so to say. The assumption, once challenged, usually falls back on an argument that goes by way of capacities: the remaining members of the species have the capacity to achieve these sorts of things also. But, firstly, that isn't true: intelligence, skills, and the like, vary somewhat within species, and from our narrow perspective, very considerably among humans, some of whom have no capacity for advanced mathematics or music. Secondly, it requires more than capacity: it requires circumstances, a favourable environment to exercise them, (hence, in part, the folly of �lU The expansion is not uniquely determined; there can be various different deeper paradigms. However it characteristically includes a fuller statement of themes recognised as in the spirit of "deep ecology", in particular ecological themes, but also interconnected economic and political themes. In a similar way shallower positions are subsumed in shallower perspectives, and principally in what is called the dominant social paradigm, some relevant themes of which are indicated in figure 2.1s FIGURE 2. RELEVANT COMPONENTS OF THE ENCOMPASSING PARADIGMS. DOMINANT SOCIAL PARADIGM DEEP ECOLOGICAL ALTERNATIVE Dominance over nature Natural environment a resource Harmony with nature Values in nature/biospecies impartiality Less material goals/less growth orientation Earth supplies limited AJ?propriate technology/limits to science Doing with enough/recycling Regional/decentralised/small-scale Material/economic growth Ample reserves/perfect substitutes High technological progress/ scientific solutions Consumerism National/centralised/large-scale SHALLOW f----------------------------- ➔ DEEP 4. Criticisms of these beginnings and other beginnings A main challenge we shall have to meet is that there can be no deep ethics, ethics and axiology are inevitably shallow, because they must answer back to human valuers. This challenge we presently set aside (until the next chapter). But it should already be apparent how we can start to upset the challenge (already taken up by deeper utilitarianism), namely by displacing humans by relevant agents. Other challenges grant that something might answer to deeper ethics, but contend that nothing should-objectio ns of substance-or that making anything much out of it is unwarranted, for example because preliminaries in making out the distinctions have not been 15 more humans in decidedly suboptimal cities), together with a will and drive actually to follow through appropriately on capacities. Much fuller accounts of the dominant social paradigm and environmental alternatives are given in S. Cotgrove, Catastrophe or Cornucopia, Wiley, New York, 1982, and in R. Routley 'Roles and limits of paradigms in environmental thought and action' in Environmental Philosophy (ed. R. Elliot and A. Gare), University of Queensland Press, 1983. The linkage of the dominant paradigm with maximizing, and the deep alternative with sufficing, is elaborated in R. Routley, 'Maximizing, satisficing, satisizing: the difference in real and rational behaviour under rival paradigms', Discussion Papers in Environmental Philosophy #10, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University, 1984. �11 properly accomplished-objections of form and from technicalities (cf. challenges to the analytic/synthetic distinction). We consider examples of both sorts of challenge. The misanthropy charge. Deep environmentalism has been criticised for what it does, so it is alleged, to ethical treatment of other humans; it leads, it has been alleged, to neglectful, negligent, or downright callous treatment of other humans, to inhumanity. The actual impact of deep environmentalism affords but little ground for such allegations. Nor does the theory. Deep environmentalism could leave intrahuman ethics, standard morality virtually entirely intact. If it did so, deep environmental ethics would provide a conservative extension (in the familiar technical sense) of standard intrahuman ethics. In this event the allegations would fall; for the ethical treatment of humans would be in principle just the same as before. But it is unlikely that any deeper environmentalism will leave standard morality entirely intact in its own prime sphere of operations, that restricted to humans. For instance the evolution of humans, and attributions of virtues or vices to them, is bound to be influenced by how they act or respond towards nonhumans and the environment. A virtuous puritanical oldstyle industrialist who makes his affluent living through environmentally damaging practices will no longer obtain the virtuous ranking that would have been accorded to him on the older prevailing morality. (Of course that morality too is changing, but it hardly changes rapidly enough to keep pace with a deeper ethic). The change in the evaluation of and moral standing accorded to hard-working but environmentally exploitative business people, technologists and engineers reflects a more far-reaching adjustment; that of removal of special privilege for humans (or persons). Even in the more austere of standard ethical positions, such as duty ethics in the Kantian mould, it is very easy to gain the impression of persons (usually males on traditional ethics) as kings. There will be a club of kings, that was where more egalitarian industrialism was proceeding also, to make us all kings - with the rest of nature as subjects. While the unwarranted privilege accorded to humans under conventional ethical wisdom will topple then, the treatment of humans by humans need not. To the contrary, if people develop a more respectful and careful attitude to the environment, then they may well develop a better, different and more careful, approach to other people as well. Here the awful Kantianstyle theme that decent treatment of animals will trickle down from a decent treatment of other humans is partially reversed; a better treatment of other humans (a decent treatment is already ethically required) will percolate up from a more gently and respectful treatment of natural environments. Nor finally then need a deeper environmentalism abandon the quest for social justice. 16 Deep-green theory certainly does not; the ethical-change agenda is much wider than social 16 There are two American groups where the quest for terrestial social justice appears to have been abandoned or comprised: eco-fascists and nature greens, as they are sometimes called from outside. �12 change alone, but social and human concerns do not thereby fall off the agenda. They remain, but no longer in such isolations. What they do lose their unchallenged preeminence, and they may also lose priority. Problems with the Greater Value assumption (after Attfield). A prime alternative to a shallow/deep distinction is (what is sometimes considered no alternative, but a variant on it) the anthropocentric/ecologic distinction. Notes: 1. Not the same distinction. While shallow positions are normally anthropocentr ic, converse does not obtain. 2. Distinction never made out properly (really degree issues), and leads to typical 4-fold outcome. 5. Domination and chauvininism. The greater or sole value accorded to humans, as compared with (other) valuations, justify the domination of nature by humans. The main argument is simply that what has lesser or no value should give away to what has greater value, the conventional assumption being that what has greater value is better (analytic) than what has less, and should prevail over it (substantive assumptions of conventional ethical themes such as utilitarianism). Domination and associated class chauvinism are justified not only directly through consideration s of greater or supreme value, but also less directly by pointing to highly valued features possessed by the favoured class. Similar appeals to prized features are of course likewise used to justify class chauvinism. Appendices : 1. Deep ethics are not automatically acceptable as satisfactory. Consider e.g.whole chauvinism, where Wholes are intrinsically valuable, each and every one, and their value much exceeds that of everything else, humans included. So wholes come first. (This is a doctrical some superwholes may hold). Two rough comparisions: cows in India, humans on earth. Other unsatisfactory deep ethics, apart from those that aberate one species, are those that focus exclusively on certain elements. Those e.g. individualisms, strong holisms, etc. 2. Arguments to shallowness. 1. Simplistic (from one James O'Connor of Canada). ' ... the word "value" is a human word, with human meanings, in this case transposed to non-human nature. Hence to say that nature is inherently valuable means that it is inherently valuable to humans'. Ecofascists, who follow a route pioneered by Hardin, call for a triage of nations on lifeboat earth and abandonment of those nations, such as Bangladesh, seen without prospect of recovery. But the position is not deep, it is certainly not a properly moral position; for due criticism see Griffin and Bennett. �u 2. Problem with shallow/deep terminology, e.g. acquired too many associations for comfort. Intellectual offensiveness shallow, etc. 3. Shallowness involves a reductionist exercise. Making (trying to make) environmental issues in all that matter environmentally-answer back to shallow concerns. Series of arguments advanced to try to establish ..... . Counter argument. These do not succeed and can be counter-evolelled. 3. Cross-classifications reformism/revolation is, like anthropocentrism, a poor classification. It can be shallow without reformism and unethical economism with reformism. DE itself is largely reformist in character (and excessively personal).: Anthropo-/ecocentric. No doubt 'anthropocentricsm' meaning what its etymology implies 'centring in man' (OED), is a useful term. Theories such as Coperican and Copenhagen quantum theory can be criticised (or praised) as anthropocentric. What is in doubt is the new contrast of antropocentric with ecocentric. While the vague anthropocentric-ecocentric distinction is alright, so far as it goes, as a starting stage, it is no place to stop. For there is a need for a value specific distinction, antrhopocentr can be any sort of human centredness. 'Anthropocentric' is a poor choice of contrasting terminology, for several reasons. One, which may be convenient to some, lies in its vagueness. There is no sharp cut-off in what is human centred. Similarly for its supposed contrast term 'ecocentric', which presumably expandents to 'ecologically centred'. Second, it becomes apparent that no proper contrast is made in many cases. University textbooks on natural ecology, for instance are both ecocentric because about ecology and anthropocentric because set and supplied for humans. Human ecology, a subject increasingly encountered in universities, is directly both (not both under different aspects). Were the classification satisfactory, it would provide a nice contradiction. But the classification is far from satisfactory. It is not exclusive: nor is it exhaustive, but the remainder obscure. But worse, any practical ethics, no matter how deep, is bound to be anthropocentric, not ecocentric, even though duly concerned with ecology. The reason comes to this: any adequate ethics is bound to be heavily concerned with agents, their obligations and responsibilities, and for all practical purposes (on earth) these agents are generally certain humans. This is, an adequate practical ethics is, as a contingent matter, anthropocentric. Of course such an ethic, by contrast with main traditional ethics, may also be presented as an ecocentric ethic, inasmuch as it may be focussed upon ethical agents' relations to ecological items, human treatment of nature. �14 Problems with the anthropocentric/ecocentric contrast do not mean that something like the contrast cannot be made good. But it would involve redefinition of the critical terms, and could accordingly be better accomplished with adjusted terminology. Anthropocentrism is implausible, once a modern pict "of universe" becomes available. (Scuh a sufficiently modern picture was already available to Descartes.) The sun is a medium sized star of very common sort even within its galaxy. The probability of planets like the Earth within this university is extraordinarly high. The probability of other agents is also very high. Even the probability of other ..... ./competent agents is high. But even if it were not, or even if there were other agents, the discourse to be embarked upon would be significant. It is also pointful, for instance in disposeing of much philosophy. If anthropocentrism is so implausible as regards "main place in nature", why is it not implausible as regards intuitionality, value, etc. Ironically, the swing away from anthropocentrism in the sciences in modern times (with the advert of Copenhagen quantum theory and anthropic principles) was overpinged by increasing anthropocentrism in what are misleadingly distinguished as the humanities. Above all intentionality and value were emptied out of the wider universe and concentrated in the exclusive focus of humanities, humans. To adopt Freud: Humanity has in the course of time had to endure from the hands of science two great humiliations to its chauvinism .17 The first was when it was realised that our earth was not the centre of the universe, but only a speck in the world system of a magnitude hardly conceivible ... . The second was when his logical science robbed man of his particular privilege of having been specially created and relegated him to a descent from the animal world' (puoted in Unozco Ev ..... May 1982 p.3) There are further shocks in store for humans-poor old humans! 3. Explaining depth [contrasts pale/pallid]. For a good sort of depth, what is needed a deep structure, extraction or format that lies (partially) hidden from the surface. E.G. plate ponites in geology, strata in archasology, logical form in grammar. Deep = penetrating to fundamentals in several ways and nonchauvinistic, not shallow. [Mention also pluralism-so only a framework aimed for, on which grew various detailled positions.] Part of depth of Deep Green theory lies in its penetration below the surface of classrestricted or interested humanism to a genuine nonchauvinistic ethical structure: the (ill-named) annular structure, which ties moral principles to nonhumanistic categorestion. Annular structure 17 Freud says: to great outrages upon it naive serif love. �15 is a deep structure. A deep structure. Maybe can produce one for deep green theory (see Critiq p.93, bottom halt) Start as above other measures of depth (pp.44-5) misconceived. 1'. Extent of searching of perception of value; depth of (value) perception. 1. Extent to which humanism (h.ch) abandoned for econvisonmental perspective. 2. Extent to which conventional moral and value judgements put op for reassessment. (Naess's depth of questioning conventional wisdom) 2 is tied to 1; for abandoning heh involves much reassessment. Note differs from usual reflective equilibrium, which takes many generally accepted judgements for granted. More on what depth means (pragmetinally): Many environmental outcomes sought in deep grounds can be supported in shallow ways (of course). But there are differences, as examples show: • pesticides (in forestry) should not be used, despite insect damage. For pesticides violate natural succession and healing processes. Toxicity questions, though important, are secondary. On shallow view: the main problem becomes not the use of pesticides, but whether they are safe. • natural world appears as a resource. Life forms which interfere with uses are pests. 2. Reformist/Transformist Variations upon Shallow/Deep Ecology Unhappy with the derogatory implications of "shallow", Devall and Sessions tried to convert shallow ecology in ecological reformism. While there was certainly a basis for this conversion in Naess's original brief account of shallow ecology (which almost invited such reconstrual), the result has been that something different has emerged, notably in green politics. For what such conversions, along with associated imagery accompanying reformism, achieve is not elucidation, but introduction of new contrasts, and therewith political crossclassification of the shallow-deep ecology contrasts. There are various contrasts with (mere) reformist adjustment on political theory, for instance revolutionary change and radical change. A revolutionary direction appears inappropriate as regards deep ecology (as revealed both by the literature and political stances of leading members of the movement), but a politically radical direction on environmental issues does emerge from later developments in N aess' s work. Accordingly a rough contrast, which admits sharpening, can be made out between green reformism and green radicalism. A machine image, which often operates not far from view in such contrasts, is initially helpful in indicating the differences. Reformism does not interfere with the main operation of the machine, its motor, though it may alter the adjustments, retune or fine tune it, add filters or mufflers or converters, alter its appearance cosmetically, and so on. By contrast radicalism would alter the machine, would interfere with its motor to some extent, depending on the level of radicalism. �16 In political terms reformism is exemplified in such measures as limiting pollution by emission devices, further treatment of sewerage, small reserves and roadside veneers of trees amid clear-cutting operations, tidying up of litter, and so on. The main motor of liberal democratic market capitalism, the economic engine designed to deliver maximum economic growth, and its main institutions, remain untouched and uncriticised; no change is proposed for them. For radicals such measures and like reforms do not proceed far enough, towards the sources of the problems. To tackle the range of environmental problems more radical change in economic, social and perhaps political machinery is required. But evidently the extent of change envisaged can vary, very considerably. For example, a frugal conservation program, directed at limiting economic growth through removing conspicuous and excessive consumption, need carry no accompanying program for radical social and political change. Again, deep ecology, which offers no well worked out, or even well signposted, radical program or radical restructuring, does not appear to be politically radical. Alternatives to liberal democratic arrangements are not really advanced or investigated. By contrast some anarchist and marxist influenced ecological positions are politically radical, for instance, social ecology. In short, there is room for a classification of green radicalism, as shown by a preliminary grouping according to whether the radicalism affects which of separate (though overlapping) economic, social, or political matters. The reformist-radical distinction is a vague one, without a sharp boundary. Reforms can so accumulate that what was a difference in degree becomes a difference in kind, what was extensive reformism turns out to be radicalism. In such an incremental fashion, positions which were reformist can find themselves radical, without having undergone any conspicuus radicalisation. The contrast between reformism and radicalism can be sharpened somewhat within a (an improved) theory of social paradigms. Then reformism is intra-paradigmatic, whereas radicalism is not (but is extra-paradigmatic). That is a reformist works, like a normal scientist, within the operational paradigm (the given political motor) and does not seek to change it, whereas the radical does; success of radicalism resembles abnormal (even revolutionary) periods in science. As there are many ways of deviating from a paradigm, which typically involves a complex set of presumptions, so there are many sorts of radicalism. The extent to which the political conversion of the shallow-deep contrast into green reformism-radical contrast affords not a restatement, but a different classification, may now be evident though perhaps not to its full extent. The most notable further feature is that green radicalism may be utterly shallow, entirely anthropocentric. 18 Green Marxism affords a useful 18 In these terms Naess conflated two contrasts in his original 1973 article; shallow-deep and reformist-radical. Different followers have latched onto different contrasts. �l'/ example; it is socially and politically radical while shallow (of course it can be argued that it is environmentally incoherent, though not in the mentioned features, but in its plan to supercharge the economic motor and make it run even faster, with evident environmental fall-out). Social ecology offers another example; for while more radical than deep ecology, it is certainy not deep. Something of the rich variety we have come upon can be glimpsed from the following table. All the positions enumerated, except 9, are occupied, we suspect (though positions are often so poorly or incompletely presented that is difficult to be sure ). 19 Positions 9 is practically excluded for committed deep parties who duly care about the demise of what is of intrinsic value under mere reformism. Position 5 is however occupied, by those who want (or believe they have achieved) improved arrangements for and treatment of animals (e.g., no circuses, no ordinary zoos, no cruel contests, etc.) but are not committed to a radical animal liberation agenda. Green party territory is usually shallow, but some of the proposals presented may extend to position 4, for instance in demands for participatory democratic restructuring. Of course, many supporters of green parties may adhere to deeper positions. 19 It is worth noting that such positions will in principle supply their own forms of sustainability, sustainable societies, and so on. �24.10.95 Chapter 2 ETHICS WITHOUT HUMANS, PHILOSOPHY WITHOUT HUMANS, and COROLLARIES It is a commonplace that ethics has proceeded not merely as if humans were on centre stage, but as if humans really were all there is, all that mattered in ethics, as if nothing else enters into morals and ethics, or does through only through them. That commonplace is moreover commonly strengthened to a claim of necessity, that this must be so, that nothing else can enter, except indirectly by way of humans. Ethics has to be thus anthropocentric. Since environmental ethics began to shift humans, if ever so little, off centre stage, there has been a heavy philosophical reaction, a sometimes bitter blacklash against greener ethics that would background humans, or dare sometimes to remove humans, from the scene altogether. Among many other things, it has been contended that by the very meaning of ethics and morals, these subjects must be human-centred. A crucial argument for necessary anthropocentricism of ethics makes human centrality a matter of definition. This crucial argument will be broken, in the first of several stages, through a detailed characterisation of morals and ethics in a way that is independent of humans. The characterizations adopted depart in only minor and justified (though highly consequential) ways from received dictionary definitions; that is the characterisations are substantially reportive, as they have to be if they are to serve their iconoclastic purposes. The matter of characterising ethics is in any case part of our business. Where would deep-green ethics be left, as a subject of investigation, without an appropriate account of ethics? 1. On inadeqacies of what prevails: a sheaf of defective accounts. It takes but little effort to discover severe shortcomings in most preceding investigations, and that most accounts, many of them far too casual, are inappropriate for what they are intended to cover, still less for environmental ends. There is no end to bad and defective definitions to dissect and discard. Even textbooks and guidebooks on ethics often make no attempt at a definition, and often have little or nothing of due generality to offer on what ethics is about. 1 Unremarkably then, many of those presenting or teaching ethics, perhaps well enough, have no adequate idea of what ethics is about. This is revealed by the sorts of definitions they slop down and by what they say ethics is about. The slop presented indicates they did not even bother to consult their dictionaries with any care. It is an elementary exercise to show deficiencies in most proposals. A striking recent example is Singer (ed.) Companion to Ethics, supposedly an encyclopaedic work on ethics. �2 A few sample definitions recently encountered will help confirm our claims. Utterly defective is the account of ethics as 'the relation between you and other people' .2 Such connections as the spatial relations between people, for instance where they sit at a seminar, do not belong to ethics. Narrowing relations to those of treatment, as in 'how you treat other people' improves the account a bit, but not enough. Decent treatment of relevant kinds no doubt comprises part of ethics, but a small part. Nor is such treatment confined, especially as regards receivers, to people; animals, nature and more, all matter. A more interesting account, presumably designed to encompass applied ethics, takes this remarkable form: "'ethics" [is] defined as disciplined reflection by persons in all walks of life on moral ideas and ideals'. 3 As a definition, this too fails entirely, appearing circular, and converting ethics away from, what is essential, practice into head stuff, into something like meditation, a kind of widely practiced theorizing, though practised on certain parts of ethics! There are too some unfortunate side-effects of the insertion, aimed at making ethics applicable to all walks of (human) life: namely, as there are walks of life which have no room for disciplined reflection, so there is in fact no ethics. Back again to the drawing board. Similarly for Russell's fuller attempt: The study of Ethics is perhaps most commonly conceived as being concerned with the questions "What sort of actions ought men to perform?" and "What sort of actions ought men to avoid?" It is conceived, that is to say[!], as dealing with human conduct, and as dividing what is virtuous and what is vicious among the kinds of conduct between which, in practice, people are called upon to choose. 4 Owing to feminist criticism of male chauvinism, many now wince at Russell's; piquant use of term like 'men' (in fact throughout his numerous works). Environmental criticism of human chauvinism has not been so (terminologically) successful, sad to report. Back to the board. It takes little effort to assemble a sheaf of inadequate definitions and accounts of ethics. Many include too little, for example the popular account of ethics as "how we should live", which as well as being too narrow is parochial. 5 Similarly, though fractionally better; a coherent set of values to live by is enough for an ethic. For that appears to omit a deontic component, obligations and permissions, and certainly leaves out ethical virtues. A major shortcoming, even in fuller characterisations, concerns the concentration on humans and their parochial affairs. For, as will soon appear, ethics does not essentially concern humans. An adequate ethics says nothing about humans, members of species Homo sapiens, their obligations and rights, values or virtues. It applies but contingently to humans; it applies similarly to hominids, humanoids, and to persons generally, and functions in the absence of persons altogether. As a result, the following familiar sorts of pronouncements on what ethics amount 2 3 4 5 John Langford, on ABC radio, 22 February 1993. Engels, 6. Russell p.1, F & S, from Elements of Ethics 1910. For such an account see e.g. Single [Encyl. Brit.] �3 to are seriously defective: 'An ethic may be thought of as an ideal of human behaviour, an environmental ethics as ideal human behaviour with respect to the environment, natural and built" _6 Not everyone got it quite so wrong. For instance, Brandt gets away to a nice neutral start, even if he does not cover the spread of ethics. Consider his opening: Moral philosophy has traditionally been a systematic attempt to answer some questions of apparently universal interest [!] about: what is worth wanting or working for (what is worthwhile, of worth); what is the best thing for an agent to do from his own point of view; what is morally right, and what is morally just). [Also what is rational in these regards.]7 The nice start does not last. Agents turn out to be humans; utilitarianism soon begins to effect an ugly intrusion, and so on. 2. On how to define ethics and morals more satisfactorily. It is not difficult to do noticeably better than ethics teachers and writers have managed, simply by consulting better dictionaries. But it is also not so difficult to re-organize and improve upon what dictionaries offer. It is significant that dictionary definitions of moral and ethic contain no essential allusion to humans, nothing essential concerning humans, man, or we, us and co. (andwhere 'human' does enter, as in 'principles of human duty', it can simply be elided, it is inessential). But the dictionary accounts do harbour some problems. For one thing, like some of the preceding definitions, the dictionaries seem mired in a common and damaging circularity: ethics is defined in terms of morality (and its adjuncts, decent treatment, and similar); but then morality is itself defined through ethics. Fortunately the loop back to ethics can be broken. A particularly satisfactory way to workable definitions of notions in the ethics orbitethic, ethical, ethics, to take direct cases-is through those in the presupposed moral orbitdirectly, moral, morality, morals. For all these ethical notions are regularly defined, in better dictionaries, through moral notions. This approach reverses the difficult and so far unsuccessful strategy, sometimes tried in ethical theory, of attempting to define morality (e.g. through universalizability conditions) inside a somehow independently characterized ethics. 8 The bases, upon which moral notions are carried, lie in turn in the action orbit, in features of actions and their agents. 9 As agents are entailed by actions-beca use actions just 6 7 8 9 See 'A universal environmental ethics' Connect, UNESCO-UNE P Environmental Education Newsletter XVI(2)(June 1991). pl. Brandt p.l. Long ago I used to think this was now it had to be done, through some singling out of morals within ethics by way of a combination features of humans and requirements of morality (such as, variously, consideration of others, universalizability). Not recognising the virtues of agency, I too erroneously supposed that morality had to pertain to humanity. No doubt the main definitional enterprise can be carried out, more or less, the other way around, beginning with ethics, then cutting down to morals within, through agency. Moreover, such an alternative route (starting out easily enough from the notion of ethics as the theory and systematization of the good and the right, valuable and permissible, the virtuous and responsible, and so on) should arrive at the same place, at a similar end result. These action basics can in turn be explained, as before, within process theory, see Sylvan 1993. A classification of agents can be drawn from there. It is not claimed that this is how we have to start or that action nexus affords unique starting point. But its features have to be included sooner or �4 are agent-ascribed processe s-actions , more generally processes, form bedrock here. Neither processes nor actions have any essential connection with humans. Relevant elements of action nexus, upon which moral actions are carried, are now indicated: Single action snapshot, capturing agent-acts -in-environment nexus: AGENT has motives emotions volitions objectives and goals of prior causes ACTION has subsequent consequences impacts upon (relevant items within) environment The breakdown of actions, into types, will straightaway yield much that has long been taken as central in moral theory, such as agonising (as Socrates did) over choices. Choice-making is a morally critical type of action. Plural actions expose further relevant features, including conduct, dispositions and character of agents, and suggest typologies (or moral relevance) of actions and of impacts. Virtue ethics, but part of moral theory, fit here. Whereas morality -the new ecologically sensitive morality that is-begin s from certain features of an agent in its environment, ecology begins from investigation of an organism in its environment. 'From the outset ecology was clearly understood to be the appreciation of the organism (any organism, note) in and as part of its environment' . 10 'Something along the lines of "the study of organisms in relation to their environment" is the basis of most ... attempts ... [at] working definition of ecology ... over [which] there has been little dispute' . 11 Despite initial appearances, the upshot is not (the perhaps appealing one) that morality is a branch of ecology. For the features investigated are very different (and a satisfactory definition of 'ecology ' has to be sharpened to indicate what features of organism-inenvironments are studied). Whereas in morality there is much interest in the virtues and vices of agents for instance, a parallel interest is outside the scope of ecology (and indeed not a significant question for most organism or for many agents). Interestingly, the ethical theory being advanced begins in precisely the way Deep Ecology, in its pristine formulation, implies that no theory should operate, with an agent-inenvironment image. Under the total-field approach of Deep Ecology all such images dividing up fields should be rejected, in particula r any man-in-e nvironme nt image, a special chauvinistic case of what our theory operates with. Similarly no doubt for organism-inenvironment images of ecology. Unremarkably no arguments are offered for these rejections; 10 11 later, and it has virtues as a start, including familarity and naturalness. R. Kitching [New Education], p.39 Ibid p.40 rearranged. �5 cogent arguments would be hard to find, or articulate. In any case, Deep Ecology strictures do not prevent preliminary or limited uses of field analysis. As it will soon turn out, for more general purposes, what is needed is removal of agents, not dissolving the image. These action-theoretic preliminaries admit of much elaboration and variation, both expansion and contraction most of which however we can pick up as we proceed. For example, an illuminating expansion would expose the setting, of constraints and incentives, within which an agents acts; no doubt some of these features, incentives for instance, can be absorbed into what is already depicted, such as motives, and the remainder could be included in under a prior-influences category. Striking contractions are those afforded by prevailing ethical theories, consequentialism and Kantianism, which would erase, respectively, all but consequences or all but motives. The parable of the Blindman and the Elephant is not only a clever analogy for a implausible perspectivism; it can serve as a telling indictment of much analytic philosophical practice. Moral philosophical practice, especially that of analytic philosophy, consists in only sensing part of a whole (constellation) and failing to see the rest. 12 Moral and action theory afford good examples of such skimping; for instance, consequentialism fails to see anything but consequences. The term moral, generously construed, covers the assessment of agent-intricated elements of the action nexus depicted, in all the following sorts of respects (as applicable): excellent, good, indifferent, bad, evil; approved, disapproved; valuable, of value, or not axiological right or wrong (or alright), fair or unfair, proper or improper obligatory, forbidden, permissible deontic responsible, irresponsible; it also covers principles concerning such assessments. Morality concerns both appreciation and assessment of agents-acting-in-environments as regards those sorts of features and resulting systematization. Parallels with ecology should be evident. X's conduct or the like is moral, broadly so, iff it is a matter for moral appraisal. In short, what is moral is marked out by classes of functors in an action nexus. Plainly some of the features, which perform the distinguishin g work, are not significantly applicable to all elements in the nexus; for instance, impacts of frogs are not significantly responsible. Responsibility applies primarily to certain agents, their conduct and character. The sorts of respects cited are, furthermore, more general forms. But many more specific evaluations are thereby encompassed; for instance, honourable, dishonourable; decent, indecent, again as applicable. In terms of the sorts of respects, certain important subtypes can be distinguished. The first group (given by the first two lines) covers axiological. The second group (given by the next two lines) covers deontic. The third group (not usually distinguished in "the logic of 12 For a detailed treatment of skimping in philosophy, see DP, chapter 11. �6 ethics") comprises accountability notions. Such, formerly important, terms as virtuous and vicious-regu larly, but wrongly included in dictionary listings of respects defining moral (e.g., "of or pertaining to character or disposition considered as ... virtuous or vicious")-ar e axiological. They can be characterized in terms of what is already available, thereby avoiding further circularity vexing dictionary definitions (which define 'moral' using 'virtuous', and 'virtuous' deploying 'moral'). 13 For example, to adjust the dictionaries, virtuous [action] is [that] exhibiting moral excellence or quality, vicious that distinguished as morally evil. Much the same supervenient story gets told for duty in the deontic class. For while a duty just amounts to a certain sort, a rigorous sort, of moral obligation, duty is not among the respects listed in defining the term moral. There are several, loosely consequential , attachments often made to what counts as moral(s), notably: issues of punishments and rewards, with a view to altering proper conduct; of freedom and determinism, as the latter may appear to place moral enterprise in jeopardy; of justification of moral principles, which do not stand on its own without moral justification; and so on, for other theoretical topics that consequently arise. While these further issues do not form part of dictionary definitions of moral, they are stock textbook fare in moral philosophy. But that, moral philosophy and moral theory, is where they can comfortably stay. While the issues that result could be called moral, or distinguished as textbook moral, they might as well simply be accommodate d more accurately, within philosophy of morality (metamorals). Morality is, at base, the attribute of being moral. 14 Thus, basically, an item exhibits morality if and only if that item is moral. In wider compass, morality comprehends a larger package concerning what is moral; it consists in the theory and appreciation, practice and principles of what is moral. It follows, from the account of moral given, that morality is all about certain features of agency, features of theory and practice of agency, namely evaluative and assessment features and principles concerning these, such as conduct and choice. Several other significant corollaries also emerge. Firstly morality has nothing essentially to do with humans. A similar but still more striking result will follow for ethics, which is characterised, also in a human independent way, by way of morality. Ethics too has nothing essentially to do with humans (or even with humanoids). Morality turns on features of agency. Humans, some of them, simply happen to supply, presently, prime terrestrial examples of full moral agents, those actors who do not merely conduct themselves well or badly (a kangaroo can be a good or poor mother, a dog can behave badly and know it) but who make promises, recognise obligations, accept responsibilities, and so forth. Humans were almost certainly not the only full terrestrial agents; other humanoid 13 14 Thus too much of "virtue ethics" can be absorbed, see further, later chapters. In logical terms it is defined through attribute abstraction. �7 species that have become extinct (perhaps with human assistance) very likely were also. Certain humans are probably not the only full moral agents even now in this universe. It is unlikely that humans will exemplify the only moral agents, perhaps even terrestrially. 15 The prominen t role of competen t humans in morality, and so as regards ethics, is utterly contingent. It follows, now quite generally, that those familiar definitions of morality and ethics in terms of humans and their features are one and all defective. For all the (green) ethical theory to be developed, humans can drop out altogether. But competent humans are useful for illustrative purposes; it helps to have some demonstrably actual examples. Moreove r, in such practical terms as terrestrial ethical impact, they are now almost unavoidable. Before explaining how to escape damaging agent centredness, or actocentricity, in ethics that would result from equating ethics with morals (i.e. morality in this sense), there are loose ends to be tied up and certain advantages, worth recording, accruing from having actocentrism as a staging post. One advantage is that unwanted senses of evaluative notions are peeled off automatically, because they do not apply regards agency. For example, so removed are not only merely "aesthetic" uses but all those quasi-descriptive uses of commendatory terms such as good (e.g. 'good car' 'good sort', 'good sox', 'good ox'). Aesthetic uses of evaluative terms, as in 'fine painting' or 'good book', do not concern, except in oblique ways, action or conduct of agents. It may well be objected that even so not enough non-moral uses are peeled off, as various uses like those of mere expediency or practicality are left standing. A countercase will be developed that these should be left standing. For a smarter strategy than attempting exclusion, includes moralities of expedience, of practicality, egoism and the like within the moral orbit-so enabling a straightforward answer to such otherwise vexing questions as Why be moral?- whilst subsequently differentiating within morals a distinuished subclass (to be called meurals) which does function exclusively through meeting more exacting requirements of morality. There is a subsense that should be picked up immediately. Though a vicious or evil agent is certainly a matter for morality, and within its compass, such an agent would not normally be accounted moral (as a naive reading of the dictionaries would suggest), but immoral. What is moral, morality, concerns the span of moral, immoral and indifferent procedures. Plainly moral in the narrower sense comprehends the definitely positive part of the span, as good does of the wide value span. Generally, an item (such as an agent, practice, conduct, or whatever) is strictly moral, moral in this stricter sense, if it is moral, a matter of 15 There are arguments to other moral agents, other full agents even, from evolusionary theory. According to an expanded theory, every niche is eventually occupied. (In a way, this interesting theme carries over from the earlier doctrine of a great chain of being, which similarly onto every position in the chain as potentially occupied.) By a statistical argument (copying those for intelligent life elswhere in this vast universe), there are, or will be, niches for agents, with requisite capabilities, wlsewhere in the universe. Therefore, by the theory, these niches will eventually be occupied. �8 moral concern, and its appraisal is decidedly positive. Naturally for a full account, positive within the moral span, has also to be defined. However here the strict sense is picked up only to be set aside. Focussing upon morality would be unduly limiting from the perspective of environment al ethics. For although anthropocent ricism has been avoided, easily circumvented through agency, though humans play no essential role, still morality is undoubtedly agent-centred. Morality foregrounds agents and assessments of them and their actions, and backgrounds environments of agents, and environments more generally (those without agents in them do not even enter into consideration). The environment remains, so to say, mere backdrop to actions of agents. Escape is through an intermediary, which is substituted in place of morality in the account proposed of ethics. That intermediary is an expanded morality, in convenient shorthand ectomorality. 16 ('Ectomoralit y' is close enough for the present to 'ecomorality' , which is of course part of the main focus.) Expanded morality takes into account also evaluative settings, perhaps devoid of agents; whatever of value that agents, or agent-like subjects, agentoids, might in principle impact upon, interfere with, disturb, effect, change, dislodge, or similar. That is, to say, it encompasses all items of relevant value, of worth, significant items, including many wholes, such as habitats, ecosystems, the Earth itself; and so also whatever applies morally with respect to these, for instance permission to disturb or to improve, principles of letting be, and so on. Such ecosignificant items are also called, in the literature, morally considerable items (a nicely ambiguous term, both sides of which have unfortunate features, one because a considerable item may not have large significance, the other because what it is supposed to respond to is some restricting class of considerers). In yet other and more satisfactory terms, they have ethical standing. Naturally items of significance other than agentoids may have other ethically relevant features (which they perhaps accrue through their significance). For instance they may hold entitlements of various sorts, such as to be left alone, to be represented, and so on. In order to characterize core notions in the ethics orbit, the basic strategy consists in plugging in "expanded morality" where the dictionaries give "morality"; similarly substitute "ectomoral" for "moral". For the adjectival forms 'ethical' , and (equivalently) 'ethic', that is all that is required. For the form concerned means: pertaining to ectomorality, or (equivalently) treating of or relating to ectomorals. For the noun forms it is not so simple, because there are problems with the dictionary accounts (for instance in 'the science of morality' owing to misplaced definiteness, and dated uses of the term 'science'). Always ethics(s) is an abstract, signifying features of being ethical; more exactly, always concerning ectomoral theories or systems. More specifically, ethic( s) signifies firstly, in both singular or plural though usually plural, the whole field of ectomoral theory 16 Greek ektos, outside. We include the inside with the expansion which incorporates the outside. �9 (the "science" of ectomorals), or derivatively, the department of (philosophical) study concerned therewith; secondly, in the singular but pluralising, a system or schematization of ectomorality, that is, at least rudiments of a system, or of a theory, comprising values, ectomoral principles, and rules of proper conduct.17 Like stock textbook ethics, most environmental ethics so far are in fact truncated; they are very rudimentar y schemes, leaving out much that would be expected in a fatter systematization. Hence in part the vagueness of characterization. So far the vagueness (which does not exceed that of dictionaries or of ordinary usage), is immaterial, as the characterisation is workable. But further exactness could be obtained through a technical upgrade of system and a more detailed specification of what such a proposition system contains. 18 What are sometimes cited as further restricted senses of 'ethic' are not further senses. Rather they are restrictions, or designations, of what is already presented. Thus for instance, the 'moral principles of a particular leader or school of thought' as in Buddhist ethics or Kantian ethics. Similarly for field indications or application restrictions, as in medical ethics or bioethics. So much for "senses" of 'ethics'. In order to reach an adequate definition of ethics, not merely for intended environmental purposes, but for historical purposes as well (so as to include Stoic ethics, Taoist ethics, romantic nature ethics and the like as ethics) we have been obliged to adjust (if in an inconspicuous way) dictionary definitions of ethics. That adjustment was made through "expanded morality", but could have been accomplished in other equivalent ways (Leopold's expansion of 'community' is another, though less satisfactory, way of achieving the same sort of thing). Granted that we have adjusted dictionary definitions, have we changed the very notion of ethics, or did the dictionaries, not for the first item, get it wrong, getting caught with chauvinistic definitions? We claim that we have not changed the notion. Rather we captured what some meant, more or less, by ethics all along-fro m Stoics, Epicureans and others on. It has never been a very precise notion. In this case (by contrast with terms like right) not too much hangs on the term, and we could simply divide ethics up, for instance, into wide and narrow. However, we intend to keep the nice term ethics but to give the dictionaries and modem opposition the expressions, standard ethics, or conventional ethics. Our inconspicuous but all important adjustment is both good and bad news. It is bad news, insofar as it appears to assist the charge that [deeper] environmental philosophy is doing something different from ethics, that it is guilty of changing the subject (i.e., effectively committing ignoratio elenchi). However we can freely grant, without incurring damage, that 17 18 Thus ethics include what it has to include, as expanded environment ally: philosophy of ecomorality, and therewith of morality. A system is a relational structure of a certain sort. An ethic is a propositional system, since it has to include principles and the like; thus it involves a theory of strict logical sort. For an illustration of the use of systems formulations in ethics, see e.g. Routley 1973. �10 standard ethics was, as a matter of definition, at least actocentric, and that, insofar as agents were identified with humans, it was, therefore, anthropocentric. Even so ethics, as redefined, includes standard ethics, so it is more satisfactorily seen not a different but a larger subject, expanded through an expanded morality. It is good news, not merely because it facilitates environmental ethics and accords with more satisfactory (greener) accounts of the subject, but because it helps in getting around a snarl of objections to the effect that ethics has to be homocentric, or at least actocentric. Removing these objections will recur throughout what follows. Among corollaries of note, a first one is that plurality of ethics falls out of the characterisation. An ethic is not unique. Nor (through such a result does not follow as environmental ethics form a subclass of ethics) are environmental ethics. Nor are military or professional ethics. Failure of uniqueness is not a deficiency, but a virtue. For, one thing, it gives places to go in cases of breakdown of an ethic, namely to other nearby ethics. Plurality is tied up with nonuniqueness and other features of merit: noncomprehensiveness, openness, flexibility, and so on.19 Secondly, there is more news on what an ethics is; and what an environmental one is. It is widely claimed that an ethics requires a communit y, in an environme ntal ethic the community (of concern etc.) is a wide environmental one. Ethics enlarges the community, a scope of values. Ethics (partaking of ethos ~ the evaluative frame(or spirit) of a community. While these ideas are popular they are astray. Environmental ethics shifts the frame of reference for ethical consideration from purely human concerns to ecological communities. 1-B Human beings as moral agents are not ethically privileged. An environmental ethic must be compatible with ecological principles and with life, i.e. be livable. 3. Within ethics and morals, as so far generously constured: decent and dud distinctions. Something like the division between the first and second specifics above has been quasi-technicalized within ethics, and distorted through merger with a theory-metatheory distinction borrowed from outside ethics. Engagement with the second (as in systematisation, constructing and working within systems, etc.) has been dubbed normative ethics, or sometimes to increase the confusion just ethics, or condescendingly, casuistry. Metaethics has been taken however to be not what the logical analogy, and borrowing, would suggest metanormative ethics, the (positivistically correct) study of such systems, but instead a brand of analytic philosophy, analysing the meanings and uses of key ethical terms. Taken as exhaustive, there is much of importance, that the normative-metaethical distinction leaves out. Nor is the distinction exhaustive. As well, the labels are misleading. In short, the distinction is ill-made out and rather unsatisfactory, a handicap, not an asset; it can be abandoned without 19 See EEHC p.57. �11 loss and to advantage. Let us do so (so forget this paragraph, if you prefer). Many other distinctions from standard ethics are also defective, in one way or another. It will be advisable to resurvey and rechart ethical terrain. Among other standard, but often dud, distinctions from ethical theory that have to reexamined after environmental impact, to be duly salvaged or scrapped, are all the following: • objective/subjective. That the objective/subjective distinction provides a false dichotomy is easily seen from usual explanations of the terms: 'either objective, standing for a real factor in things, or subjective, simply standing for a human proposal' 20 • Cognitive/non-cognitive. 2 1 To be retained are some distinctions which certain forces have worked hard to eliminate, such as that of • Fact/value (and earlier demise). • Expedient/moral. There is an elasticity in the notion of ethics, and a neglected distinction, that it is important to take into account.. In contemporary ethical theory there is a concerted attempt to build a universalizability requirement or some sort of equivalent into the very notion of ethics. The evident result is that selfish systems of evaluation and conduct, systematic egoisms for instance, are refused the title of ethics, and as an important corollary questions like Why be ethical? become vexed. 22 Given, in particular, that any such "universality" requirement is problematic in its formulation, and typically limited, chauvinistically to persons, a superior course proceeds to distinguish: between ethics as already characterised (reportively) and its subclass, universalizable ethics. As impartial ethics do have much to recommend them, let us coin a convenient portmanteau term condensing the clumsy "universalizable ethics", namely euthics. (Conveniently then un-euthical suggests unethical, which is what from a properly ethical stance it is!) There is undoubtedly some pressure to have ethics and morality extend beyond a single or isolated individual 23 ( even so, a Crusoe ethics is intelligible and feasible, as regrettably is egoistic morality). But that pressure does not extend very far; and such notions as those of a tribal morality and an upper-class ethics are not defective on significance or semantic grounds, even if they are wide open to objections on substantive grounds. Such restricted ethics are not however immediately ruled out, as ethics, by such requirements as that like cases be assessed alike, and that differences of assessment be based on relevant differences. 24 For a tribalist or racist can respond that a foreigner is not like a 20 21 22 23 24 Reese p.157. See also Reese. On both, narrowing and vexing, see Singer Impractical ethics (Singer equates moral with ethical). Singer does not really have an answer to the question Why be moral? though he thinks it not a bad idea; mainly he tries to put down shuffles that have been presented as decisive. Pettit reworking a rough route hacked out by Wittgenstein, tries to expand this across into a philosophical forest denominated "holism", no-dwelling place for an isolated individual. These requirements are presented by Attfield as basic formal requirements of reason (p.6). No �12 Greek, or that there are relevant differences between whites and blacks (intelligence has been proposed as such a difference, when skin pigmentation appeared a merely superficial difference). These sorts of responses, which were long accepted, are no longer acceptable, because the differences put up are not considered ethically relevant differences (correctly enough, though ethical relevance itself lacks an adequate explanation). Egoism, for instance, exhibits rationality failure, as it does not treat likes alike. There are no relevant differences justifying different treatment. Singer's main argument for a much wider point of view,for universality, rests upon an extensive appeal to authority (p.11). What else is offered is but an appeal to usage. the notion of ethics carries with it the idea of something bigger than the individual'. [It often does, but it may not.] 'If I am to defend my conduct on ethical grounds, I cannot point only to the benefits it brings me. I must address myself to a larger audience'(p.10). That depends on the conduct concerned. More important, the audience does not need to be so large, certainly not universal: my family or clan will suffice often enough. Nonetheless there is this of use 'ethics', especially in such criticisms as 'unethical'. • due consideration of others, all others; Parallel to the distinction of euthics within ethics is a distinction of neurals within morals, neurality within morality. Again the subclass, reflecting widespread philosophical usage of the term morality, is separated through some requirement of morality, such as • universalizability, which is a strong way of ensuring the first (do unto others etc.). Insofar as these principles all allude to others, they often admit easy extension (to other others). 25 4. Environmental and greener ethics. As prevailing accounts of ethics are for the most part defective, so are what builds upon them, recent accounts of environmental ethics. But there are also other grounds for dissatisfaction with these. Issues in the characterizat ion of ethics, especially removal of actocentrism and homocentrism, naturally get transmitted to critical types, such as environmental ethics. But it might be imagined, rashly, that disagreement ends there. After all, all decent environmental ethics make the non-human world a proper object of concern, either directly or indirectly. Differences between explications offered can be ascribed to ordinary philosophica l incompleteness. "An environmental ethic, broadly, is a set of values to live by which takes due account of the value of the non-human world". 26 Stated differently, the aim of environmental ethics 'is to understand and act appropriately in relation of our ecological-i n 25 26 doubt they are, though they appear to figure in no logic of ethics yet formulated. The distinctions can be filled out (and made to work-verify!) by a strategy like the earlier. Again the list of moral predicates is deliberately wide. But once again we can later separate off certain uses e.g. instrumenal, aesthetic uses of good. Gunn 1987, 3. �13 the broad sense-circum stances". 27 Differently again, " ... sets of principles, which would guide our treatment of wild nature, constitute an environmental ethic in the most general sense". 28 The first of these slack explanations leaves out what is essential for an ethics, principles; the second is unduly actocentric, leaving out what is not, as well as main paraphernalia of ethics; the third not only neglects values, but excessively narrows scope so that such an ethics is inapplicable in places devoid of wild nature or to other issues. A better explication, which avoids these obvious pitfalls runs: An environmental ethics is an ethics, as defined, which, among other concerns, takes specific account, through its values and principles, of (significant) environmental items, of parts of nonhuman nature. But obviously it too leaves much to be explained. How the non-human world is made the object of concern, how it is moral concern, to what degree it is made the object of moral concern, what forms of moral concern are applicable to what elements of the environment, and how to achieve the aim of acting appropriately - all are matters that make environmental ethics one of the most controversial areas of philosophy and also one of the most exciting, although many professional philosophers still regard it as a peripheral area. Yet there now is broad agreement among most of those active in the area that some change is needed and that environmental matters need much more attention and action. An environmental ethics is an ethics concerned, usually among other ethical things, with parts of the environment. Coal-face or factory-floor environmenta l ethics bears on environmental issues, problems and causes, and can be expected to say something about environment s or some of their nonhuman components. Academic or board-room environmental ethics is frequently, however, a remove from direct ethical work, comprising discussion of environmental ethics, its features, its methods, its variability, its presumed merely derived and applied character, and so on. Much of this academic environmental ethics is directed against coal-face environmental ethics, especially that of a genuinely committed sort aimed at advancing environmental sources. It is almost immediate that there is an important elasticity -ambiguity, in a slack sense -in the notion of environmental ethics, between an ethics which considers environmental matters, whether positively or negatively, and an ethics which is positive about some environmental elements, which evinces concern about environmental items (as 18th century sympathy ethics did about other humans). A superficial environmental ethics need not say anything particularly positive or sympathetic about environments; indeed productions on the topic may try to dismiss or defeat environmenta l causes and to defuse or dissolve environmental problems, for instance as not worth bothering about. 29 It may be argued that 27 28 29 Drengson 1989, 15. Elliot, in Singer, 284. That is, fashionable contemporary practice with respect to philosophy is transferred to parts of enviromental philosophy (e.g. by Eco Wittgenstein and AppliedQuine). Environmental philosophy may in no way interfere with industry and business. To an astonishing extent American academic environmental ethics tends to conform to such ridiculous strictures (often encouraged by a fawning �14 natural environme nts should serve highest economic causes, which means in practice becoming reserves for city folks, city corporations and consumers. Under such environmental ethics ("environmental ethics" it is tempting to say, contravening usage) many an environme nt should be razed, levelled, and paved over, to become a grand parking lot, shopping mall or urban escarpmen t of a concrete jungle. What rural environment remains will, also serve those "high" purposes, be tamed and managed, like much of Western Europe. Witness the enthusiasm in productions on environmental ethics for landscapes like that of Tuscany, where virtually everything is under tight human control and no bird moves (else it is shot). Environm ental ethics and environme ntal philosophy may well prove to be disappointm ents for enthusiastic environmentalists. For there may be little that is materially green about them, no commitme nt to changes in old attitudes and practices, no offers of improved standing and ethical treatment for environme ntal items. As an environme ntal economics may be no green economics , but (very likely) some part or application of mainstream economics , some sweep of resource or land economics , so an environme ntal ethics or environme ntal ethic may not be particularly or at all green, but, for instance, simply part of establishm ent ethics or an "application" of it to environmental items. Fortunately not all environmental ethics is like this; beyond environmental is genuinely green ethics. The elasticity in environmental ethics between superficial and material forms, parallels that of the term concern (and rather similarly of matter), and can be substantially constricted to that: an environme ntal ethics is one concerned with environmental items or matter. Thus, on the one construal, such an ethics may be simply about such topics, it may be a standard ethics "applied" to such topics, in which case environmental ethics does become just so-called applied ethics. Alternatively, however, such an ethic may be one evincing concern, worry, about the treatment of some environmental items on other, and directed at obtaining improved treatment. Such an ethic is not negative or indifferent towards environme ntal matters, but is advancing environme ntal causes. They matter. With such ethics, environme ntal ethics cannot possibly be an applied ethics, for the framework of standard ethics and their application s, is exceeded. (At best such ethics can be approxima ted by standard ethics by assuming enlightened agents holding appropriate sorts of values. 30) 5. Human chauvinism and its detailed removal. Deep-green theory is, unambiguously, a green ethical theory, of deep kind: that is, there is intrinsic value in nature, natural items have intrinsic value, which may predomina te over human-bas ed value. In short, the theory rejects both the 'Sole Value Assumptio n' and the 'Greater Value Assumptio n'. The theory finds all standard ethics mired in heavy prejudice, in 30 pragmatism). Compare also Naess (in Engel 1990) on utilitarian approximation to Deep Ecology, made by assuming availability of enough agents holding deep ecological values or, more or less equivalently, having deep ecological consciousness. �15 favour of things human and against things non-human. The distinctive, still pervasive, prejudice concerned is that encapsulated as human chauvinism, which is itself a special case of class chauvinism (for the class, human 31 ). Removal of human chauvinism dovetails with displacement of humans. Class chauvinism consists in substantia lly differentia l treatment, typically discriminatory and inferior treatment, of items outside the class, by sufficiently many members of the class concerned, for which there is no sufficient justification. Human chauvinism is a feature, a cardinal weakness, of virtually all ethical systems hitherto, so deepgreen theory contends. The main argument takes the following form: there is no characteristic, such as those tendered in ethical theories as justifying differential treatment in favour of humans (characteristics such as rationality, language possession, tool making abilities, needs, preferences, sentience, etc.) which first is held by all and only humans, as distinct from not all humans and some non-humans, and which second does justify differential treatment.3 2 Signs and manifestations of chauvinism are many and various, some conspicuous, some subtle, and so on. For instance, a dead giveaway is any allusion to all outside certain human concerns that may have a value as resources. For that assigns to the items so referred to mere instrumental value. A little less obvious is the discriminative mode when individual humans are counted, but only species of other living things (or a step down, individual sentients but only species of others). The thorough-going rejection of human chauvinism itself sets a program: that of reworking ethics, and indeed much of philosophy, in a way free of chauvinism and humanism, without any specially privileged place for humans. A first part of such a program has already been outlined, that of suitably characterising ethics in a way that does not make essential appeal to humans or their features, or to other favoured groups such as sentients. A further important part of the program, formulation of ethical theory in a way which avoids entirely group chauvinism. Such a desirable outcome can be achieved simply through formulation of ethical theory in terms of ethically relevant categories, assembled in what is called an annular theory. 33 31 32 33 Insofar as an account of human is required, it can be some improvement on the biological species definitions, a reworking to remove past biasses (superioristic, rationalistic, masceulinist, etc.) and to dislodge appeals to aspects of human nature. But, despite the preponderance of human agents hereabouts, on planet Earth, such an account is not required for ethics, or for philosophy. Theorizing in these and many other areas can proceed perfectly well without allusion to humans. The detailed argument for this proposition is presented in Routley and Routley 1980a 97-108, where chauvinism is spelled out a bit further. A truncated version of this argument appears in Fox 1990, 16-17. Though the theory is so labelled in several publications, the label, which presumably should stay, is misleading, because some ethical relevant categories may overlap one another. The concentric theory (developed in Wenz 1988 and others, perhaps in steps of Leopold), which incorporates a similar mistake, can be seen as a subversion of the annular model. �16 The annular picture helps show how to redo ethics and philosophy with ideal types, or with some equivalent thereof. No simple species or subspecies , such as humans or superhumans, no single feature, such as sentience or life, serves as a reference benchmark, a base class, for determinin g moral relevance and other ethical dimensions . 34 No ethical irrelevant distinctions and classes, such as those of humans or base class, are required. What is required instead is a major shift in perspective , a new focus upon morally relevant categorical distinctions: it is not possible to provide criteria which would justify distinguishing, in the sharp way standard Western ethics do, between humans and certain nonhuman creatures, and particularly those creatures which have preferences or preferred states. For such criteria appear to depend upon the mistaken assumption that moral respect for other creatures is due only when they can be shown to measure up to some rather arbitrarily -determine d and loaded tests for membershi p of a privileged class (essentially an elitist view), instead of upon, say, respect for the preference s of other creatures. According ly the sharp moral distinction, commonly accepted in ethics by philosophe rs and other alike, between all humans and all other animal species, lacks a satisfactory coherent basis (Routley and Routley 80a, 103). The categorical distinctions thereby proposed do not reject traditional ethical notions such as rationality, self-awaren ess, having interests; but they do reject the automatic use of the characteristics of one species, or some base class as the model upon which the characteristics of all other species or classes are judged. They also reject as unjustified distinctions that are not "categorical distinctions which tie analytically with ethical notions". 35 For instance, they hold that the human/nonhuman distinction is not ethically significant. Humans enter only in a contingent way into general ethical theory, as holders of these or those features, which 34 35 Another common mistake which annular theory helps dispel and avoid is that of trying to stretch community (or moral commuity) to include webs, mountains, Earth, land etc.-a trend Leopold started with his land ethic. An agent can have an obligation to care for earth, and soil without there being part of community. (The Land ethic is misguided). What ethics covers diverges from any moral community. (Contra Dobson's suggestion p.47). Routley and Routley 1980a, 108. �17 depending upon their respective capabilities and competence. It is also desirable to have available some more positive principles corresponding to the negative rejection of class chauvinism, principles so to say, of anti-chauvinism. Principles like the biospherical egalitarianism of Deep Ecology represent an unsatisfactory attempt in this direction. The deep-green improvement on this principle is the powerful principle of ecoimpartiality, according to which there should be no substantially differential treatment of items outside any favoured class or species of discriminatory sort that lacks sufficient justification. The appropriate impartial treatment is substantially independent of the comparative value of the item treated. Most important, impartial treatment does not entail equal treatment, or equal consideration, and does not require equal intrinsic or other value. Other distinctive principles of deep-green theory will emerge as the ethical theory accumulates. One major conclusion is that human is not a significant ethical category. The outcome is not anti-human; humans enter to the extent that they respectively deserve to enter. It is not being claimed that humans lack value, that none of them have much or any value. Quite the contrary, some humans have great value, some have established themselves as having great propensity for evil, many lead quite indifferent lives. What is being rejected is the elevated, often exaggerated, frequently exclusive, value assigned to humans, too often uniform value. What are being contested are received distributions of values, and the heavy concentration of value in humans and things and features human, the relative importance of which has been grossly exaggerated. 36 Be in no doubt: many humans have positive value, some remarkable value. That is one reason why it matters that humans should not vanish off the planet (for all that many of they have sinned against it), to leave an impoverished earth, for instance a microbe planet. For that would involve a huge reduction in value. Nor is it enough, adequate compensation, that something like humans would evolve again at some remote future time. For, even if it happened (in fact the probability of such replacement looks rather small), there would still be a huge and extended dip in value. Similar points tell against a range of similar arguments to the effect that it does not matter what happens to, or is done to, the Earth, because evolution will eventually restore richness. 37 Even if richness were to return (much evidence indicates 36 37 Moral consideration and intrinsic value are not limited to humans; similarly these are not confined to any other favoured or "improved" class closely overlapping humans, such as (it is supposed) persons or rational creatures. Moral principles can be applied to all species and to the natural environment in general. (A corollary concerns the characterisation of morality. ) Evolutionary space is thereby afforded for other species, other systems other things. An associated feature is stereotyping. Stereotyping is characteristic of speciesism/chauvinism as it is in exploitation. To stereotype an item is to see it purely as a member of a class and as having conventional feature of the class as a whole. Recently there have been some attempts to have things ethical both ways: a special role for humans without privilege or prejudice. There is a latent incoherence in Rachel's text, between his initial and final proposals regarding ethics and morals-which are essentially human intricatedand regarding morals without hubris (MWH)-where human hubris is supposed to be removed. Such an argument has been advanced by, among others, William Grey in 'Anthropocentrism and �18 that extinction and destruction is for ever, permanent), there would still be serious loss of value. So it does matter. 6. Philosophy without humans. It is hard to move and operate philosophically without encountering humans and human chauvinism. Chauvinism is written deep into all prevailing Western (and Eastern) ideological forms, common to what, at a more superficial level, are rival positions. But while human chauvinism transcends parochial differences, it is more conspicuous and brazen in some philosophical locales than others, notably idealism and empiricism, existentialism and phenomenology. In short, it is particularly prominent where matters answer back to subjects, those who have the ideas, do the observing, assemble the phenomena, do the living, and so on-back to subjects that are invariably assumed to be human. Thus it is human existence, human Being, human ideas and impressions, that count, those and none others. Such chauvinism, nauseatingly strong, pervades not only Continental philosophy (esp. French and German varieties)-but also Anglo-American empiricism and pragmatism (esp. anti-realist varieties). 38 Once the main strategies of ethics-without-humans have been grasped, it is easy to see how analogous moves can be made the deanthropize other reaches of philosophy, notably some of the more chauvinistic enterprises. In general there are two stages: Firstly, as with morality, replacing humans and human subjects by agents and ideal subjects. And secondly, as with ethics, delineating significant reaches-philosop hical wildernesses-wh ere agents are removed, not just off-stage but altogether. While a few examples of each stage only will be given, it will become evident that the procedures are general. Consider as an example of the first stage, existentialism, a philosophy celebrating humans, and their exclusive freedom, and shot through with human chauvinism. Existentialism is (to quote a convenient caricature) a philosophy which emphasises man's freedom to act independently of any laws, natural or otherwise, and according to his own choice. It is a free will philosophy which can be seen as 'a protest against views of the world and policies ... in which humans are regarded as the helpless playthings of historical forces, or as wholly determined by the regular operation of natural 38 Deep Ecology', Australasian Journal of Philosophy vol.71, No 4: December 1993. There is a residual serious problem here, as to why existence is so important. Why do actual humans and existent tigers matter, not merely virtual ones or possible ones. What is it about existence? There are many items which it would be better did not exist, such as devils, helicopters (for the most part), pollution, erosion and so on. Existence, of favoured sorts, makes for richness, which is a high (if defeasible) virtue. Sartre's philosophy is rendolent with human chauvinism: e.g. Critique of Dialectical Reason p.8. as regards destruction and destroy, is an amazing piece of human chauvinism. While humans may have a greater potentiality for production of value than most other animals, many humans also have a far greater potentiality for evil than most other animals. Historically, the evil producing capacity has dominated. Another example of Sartre's anthropocentism is his "philosophy of the present". Marx's philosophy is similarly rendolent. Productivity is human productivity... . For almost random examples from anti-realism, see DP. �19 processes' (Encyclopaedia Britannica 1978). This anti-determinist perspective is, again, connected with the question of objectivity. Existentialists hold that the only objective external fact independent of the control of human beings is the fact of their being brought into existence, and that death will one day come to terminate that existence. In all other respects it is they who are in control. There are no outside independent laws, of economics, history, nature or whatever, which they cannot deny or shape for themselves. Thus we are all free to choose how we will behave and develop and how we will shape society and nature. It follows that the consequences of our actions are down to us, and therefore if they are unpleasant that is our fault-not the fault of outside forces or external laws. There are no excuses for our not thinking and acting for ourselves and we are 'condemned' to be free because everything is theoretically permitted to us and we therefore carry a heavy burden of responsibility for what we do. As Sartre put it, 'Man is responsible for what he is. The first effect of existentialism is that it puts every man in possession of himself as he is, and places the entire responsibility for existence squarely on his shoulders' .... We have a duty to face up to this, and not to base our actions thoughtlessly on what is said to be prescribed/or us ('laws' of society, of economics, of nature). That is abdicating responsibility.39 Note the heavy concentration throughout on humans, variously appearing as human beings, we, us, they, and (in singular musculine form) man and he. But, as before 40 , on the one boundary, many humans are incapable of what is presumed, the heavy burden of responsibility and so forth; and, on the other, other agents are, in principle at least, capable of achieving those relevant sorts of freedom that humans can obtain. It is already apparent that once the synthetic setting of highly competent humans is exceeded, notions invoked by existentialism begin to fall apart. For instance, some "wild" animals may enjoy considerable levels of unreflective unagonised freedom while lacking capacity to bear much responsibility. Conversely, there are fairly responsible agents, such as some trapped in determined or deterministic situations, who have no opportunity to exercise freedom. Accordingly too, though human should be replaced by agent of appropriate sort in dechauvinized existentialism, it would hardly suffice to substitute for 'human' any of 'responsible agent', 'freedom exercising agent' or similar-though these substitutions effect some of what was intended, such as exclusion of children, many animals, dementeds and so on. What sort of agent is appropriate? That existentialism can be seen as trying to explain. And for the present we can leave it at that, replacing human throughout by the dummy term, existential agent. This is existentialism partly rectified. At the same primary stage of dechauvinizing existentialism, connected improvements could well be sought in existentialism, such as reducing the driven and elitist ethos. In part this ethos is encouraged by the response of existentialism to what motivates and shapes it, deterministic arguments; for it sees only such "strong" agents as evading deterministic forces. The whole business is rather ironic, as the first driven feature is incompatible with full 39 40 Pepper (Roots) pp.118-9; itals in original. Pepper refers to Sartre 1943 and 1946. As at the beginning of EE, where standard privileged treatment for humans is reviewed and found wanting. �20 freedom, while the second elitist feature is incompatible with the stress on things human, as (like elitist religions) only exceptional agents escape. A promising alternative tries direct confrontation with deterministic arguments, undercutting their scope and grip, and thereby making room for free action in a range of situations (not everywhere between birth and death!) for a wide variety of agents, including lesser, less elite, less stressed and sensitive agents. For the arguments prove vulnerable to selective undermining by careful logical and analytic procedures, 41 methods existentialism itself is loath to deploy (for all that its approach rests upon past entrenched argumentation). Insofar as a main motivation for existentialism in its prevailing ironic form is undiscriminating antideterminism, that motivation too is thereby collapsed, and room is made for a less demanding more relaxed dechauvinized existentialism. As for existentialism, so for a range of other subjects inclined to intrude humans as central to world functioning or intelligibility, a range as apparently diverse as phenomenology and quantum theory, empiricism and theology, pragmatism and cosmology. Quantum theory fits into this range because of its received Copenhagen interpretation, cosmology because of its return to anthropocentrism through adoption of anthropic principles. Both are however readily freed of human shackles, first by replacing humans by "observers" (which for the most part can simply be recording devices), and better, secondly to deagentize completely, by amending interpretation s to dislodge both Copenhagen phenomenolo gy and anthropic principles. 42 For a larger illustration, consider a popular mixture of versions of phenomenology (a fuller elaboration again would disentangle versions, all of which however require similar detoxification). Phenomenol ogy to which existentialism is related .. .is summed up by Nietzsche, who said, 'Objectivity is the main enemy of understanding. It means the myth that there are hard observable facts ... but all the concepts we employ in describing the world and predicting its behaviour are imposed on it by ourselves. We have a choice about what view of the world we adopt.' ... Phenomenology is not just a philosophy which implies that we are not subject to external laws, imposed by and through forces independent of ourselves. It holds that there actually is no world external to and separate from ourselves. There is no 'reality' in the sense of there being an external 'real world' divorced from our own consciousness and capable of existing if we did not exist. Nature cannot exist without ourselves also existing-if we ceased to be, so would it cease, and vice-versa. Therefore what 'the environment' is, and is like, is a function of our own subjective construction of it. The very use of such terms as 'ourselves' and 'human consciousness' in opposition to terms like 'nature' and 'the environment' is inappropriate and shows the extent to which we are immersed in positivist science as our way of seeing the world. For the phenomenologists these terms are meaningless because there is no separation between ourselves and a 'nature' or a 'reality'. We and the world are one-a single united entity. Phenomenology is thus anti-positivist science, opposing ... Cartesian dualism. It does not deal in laws, or in cause-effect relationships consequent on the dualism and neither can it be concerned with analysis-brea king the world into parts ... If we want to know and understand nature we must, as Hume 41 42 For technical details, see Sylvan FWD. On satisfactory ways of accomplishing this second stage see Sylvan (Cosm. Syn). �21 { said in his Treatise on Human Nature in 1737, come to full comprehension of man. For if there is no nature except as structured through human consciousness, knowledge and truth cannot exist independently of man. 43 As with existentialism, there is a similar enormous exorbitant emphases on humans and things humans; humans carry everything. But insofar as humans can perform those feats, so better can a class a appropriate agents, phenomenolo gical agents, who include no incompetents (who might let this world flicker out of existence, or worse). Phenomenolo gy is a full immersion human chauvinism. Fashionable contemporary empiricisms, normally taken as rivals to phenomenolo gy, are incomplete immersion analogues. While a few properties, primary properties of basic physics, are separated out as human independent, the rest, the phenomenolo gical mass, are categorised as responsedependent, and treated phenomenologically. 44 Take, for example, aesthetic features, which include certain ecological features. Nowadays humans can grow up with the assumption that aesthetic qualities, indeed all "response dependent" qualities, are features of humans, not in any way objective. So it can be seriously, if ridiculously, hypothesized that what is (considered) beautiful, for instance of depends on how the human gene-pool is composed. As before, humans are readily displaced in favour of appropriate agents. But, for the most part, these agents too are otiose. While the first stage 1s the main stage with agentocentric philosophies like extistentialism, there is a second stage, which comprises significantly more than pointing out how much, how much of importance, such philosophies leave out by their narrow concentration. What is left out includes, to begin, all those times and places where there are no agents, rich worlds, devoid of relevant agents, and the like. But that is only the beginning of the business. For agents have been infiltrated or inserted in all sorts of settings where they have no business to be or to transact. Against the ancient and formerly honorable practice of agent invocation, pushed primarily for explanatory purposes, 45 agent detachment and agent elimination campaigns have periodically been mounted (e.g. conspicuously , but not only, in classic Greece, when it became clearly appreciated that there could be causes without agents, during the Enlightenmen t, and in Frege' s propositional ization program). Deagentizatio n, typically coupled with deanthropization, can be, and should be, pushed much further. Agents, often evidence of immature, even primitive, philosophy, still lurk everywhere in philosophy. Agent-detach ment themes, still struggling against an unenlightened opposition, include: objects, including worlds, without perceivers or sensors, nonexistent items without conceivers, propositions without proposers, assumptions without assumers, values without 43 44 45 Pepper p.199 (where references are supplied). We shall not stop off for expository adjustment or for any critique of this material. For main elements of such a critique, see however DP chapter 11 and JB. Thus thesis that all properties are response dependent merges empiricism with European phenomenology. Deluded explanatory purposes, for agents themselves have in turn to be explained. �I 22 t valuers, causation without causers (or intentional agents), organisation without organisers, wilderness without wilderness managers, land (or property) without owners or stewards, regulation without regulators, selection without selectors, and purposes without purposers. 46 But without humans who does philosophy? Well, in the old days, God of course, most gods, the Devil, demiurges, gifted spirits and so on. At any time duly accomplished agents. While it is easy to see how ethics and philosophy could in principle flourish given only suitably accomplished agents, and no humans, namely the agents do something like what a few humans hereabouts do, still it may be less easy for many to see how these subjects can function without agents. But it is straightforward, is it not? A philosophy stands as a system of propositions. And propositions do not need agents, proposers, or whatever. Nor do systems. It is here that blockage may occur, for two reasons: First, because of the idealistic idea that there are no statements without staters. Second, because of the mistaken assumption that a system of propositions standing on its own involves an obnoxious platonism. No such assumption is made. Third, part of the struggle has been conducted before, in the tussle between psychologism and its opposite in logic and associated regions (e.g. mathematics, philosophy of mathematics etc.), in the tussle between Husserl and Frege (to name two prominent parties). Although the issues have been rejoined more recently, it is still widely supposed that anti-psychologism triumphed. Its success is, to some extent, mere appearance. For all that, anti-psychologism is here extended much further, right across philosophy. Appendix. 1. Examples showing divergence of utilitarianism from consequentialism. Consider two different actions with some set of consequence s, one (A) done deliberately, one (B) unintended. Then suppose, for one sort of case, the outcome is disastrous. Not only is A normally regarded as much worse than B, e.g. arson than a naturally occurring fire such as lightening strike, but further fuller utility assessments should give analogous results, e.g. the satisfaction of the arsonist could be given a high negative rating. Utilitarianism itself is but a well-tempered egoism: egoism extended to substituting others. That cannot so plausibly be charged of consequentialism. Utilitarianism has been associated with the "greed is good" ideology of the 1980s. The association has point (so Singer tries, desperately, to disassociate utilitarianism). Suppose it is said that the 80s, were a decade of greed (as so depicted in many movies) but the 90s is a decade of ethics (despite counterevidence). But nothing has changed in underlying ideologies, in ethics or economics! Appendix 2. Inadequacy of standard ethics. The inadequacy of standard ethics for green purposes has been recognised, if obliquely and perversely, by many critics of the idea of (deep) green ethics (e.g. McCloskey). They 46 The very controversial tlast theme is argued in Sylvan 90 [purpose], where most of these various detachment themes are assembled. Obviously there are many more such themes. �23 l have proceeded to argue that there couldn't be such an ethics because none of the standard ethics would serve. But the argument fails because standard ethics does not exhaust ethics. There are some prospects of a general proof of inadequacy from what has been developed so far. Standard forms are restricted to proper subsets of agents, whereas ethics in full flower applies to all agents. Standard ethics leaves out much of the subject, all the deep part. References William Grey in 'Anthropocentrism and Deep Ecology', Australasian Journal of Philosophy vol.71, No 4: December 1993. �ON THE VALUE CORE OF DEEP-GREEN THEORY Deep-green theory is a deep environmental theory, with much in common with deep ecology. Like deep ecology, it stands in significant ideological opposition to the dominant technocratic-industrial way. But, even more than deep ecology, deep-green theory aims to supply a comprehensive alternative environmental philosophy (in the full senses of those atrophied terms, esp philosophy ). It seeks to accomplish this, furthermore, without accumulating the amount of philosophical rubbish deep ecology regularly attracts. For, to insert a key difference between these ecocentric theories in a deliberately prejudical way: deepgreen theory resembles a deep ecology with the pseudo-scientific garbage removed, reorganised into a tight, coherent and more comprehensive theory. Deep-green theory, which has roots that stretch back about as far as its much publicized neighbour, accordingly merits elaboration separate from deep ecology, which in any case lacks a well-thought-through valuational and ethical basis. This essay aims to uncover the value theory of deep-green theory, exposing thereby one central area of deep-green theory. Though the value theory is (inevitably) abstract, it issues in what is more concrete, such as practical ecological directives, potentially destabilizing prevailing policies and institutions. At the core of deep-green theory, as of authentic deep ecology, lies a value theory. A fundamental theme thereof, part of what makes these positions deep, is that a range of environmental items are valuable in themselves, directly and irreducibly so, so that their value does not somehow reduce to or emerge from something else, such as features of certain valuers or what counts for them. Value then does not answer back in some way to humans, or sentient creatures (or other value-responsive classes), their interests, uses, preferences, or such like. Many natural items such as forests and rivers, mountains and seashores, are, as it is often put (without however any commitment thereby to dubious essentialist or absolute objectivist positions), intrinsically valuable. They are valuable in their own right - irrespective of whether they are interesting or useful (to any intentional operators, themselves interesting or useful or not), indeed whether or not there exist any valuers. Value spreads through and reaches across the natural domain; it is not bounded by mind or linkages with subjective states; nor does it stop with sentience, or associated pyschological features like satisfaction; nor (pace deep ecology) does it end at life; it observes no such compromising bounds. Although value is distributed richly if irregularly throughout nature, and accordingly may be found in nature, it is not encapsulated in some isolable natural feature, such as life or sentience, or even in defeasible ecological values such as richness, diversity and variety (and so subject to a different, naturalistic, reduction). But of course such ecological features afford criteria for value, and should be represented in recipes (such as "objective functions") for assessing total value. From the presence of natural things of value, and accordingly of natural values, it is a short, though controversial, step to the important conclusion that there can be values without valuers. For valuers are sentient creatures with appropriate capacities, but things of value may �precede and succeed all such valuers; tfiat is, these things can persist, their values intact, without any valuers. As there can be shapes without any shape-perceivers, and concepts with conceivers, so there can be values without valuers. (The theme, like others advanced, can be backed up by more detailed argument and by formal proof, neither attempted here.) In valuational relations then, relating valuers as subjects with values as objects, both ends of relations have independent standing; though interrelated, as the descriptions deliberately chosen suggest, either can stand without the other. It is a fashionable mistake, which cannot however be got away with, to try to collapse this relation - usually to endeavour to soak up values into a modification of valuing subjects (e.g. as a predicate 'relation-to-values', in which inconvenient values are locked away), not to remove valuers, considered unproblematic, from view. The mistaken procedure is in fact just one important example of an archetypal reduction of mainstream modern philosophy, of relations to functions; other examples, locking undesired objects away within functions, are those rendering wholes (such as ecosystems and organised structures) functions of their parts, and, under functionalism, minds and types of intentionality, including value direction, as functions of bodies or their parts such as brains. Values are not, and do not disappear into, functions of valuers. A connected corollary is that values are not apart from the actual world, something "projected" or imposed on it by a favoured class of valuers, something colouring (and even emotionall y clouding) the otherwise valueless physical world, in rather the way that reductionistic materialism tries (erroneously) to construe colour itself as projected onto a colourless physical world. Of course this projection effort, never adequately explicated, does not succeed, on its own, in removing values. For they remain, left as some function of the valuers. To try to bulldoze through this difficulty, a second reduction is invoked, of evaluative features of valuers to "natural" features, commonly preferences, desires or such like. The second reduction runs into obstacles that halt even the naturalistic bulldozers (e.g. naturalistic and related fallacies), but the first reduction is the critical one in removing key environmental values, such as those of wilderness and wild things, which become valuable only in the focus of certain sentient beholders, and not in and for them self. This reduction too is blocked by insuperable difficulties. On the one side, like the parallel proposed phenomonalist reduction of material objects to sensations, the reduction never achievers satisfactory support or even a satisfactory statement. On the other, it is counterexampled by various modellings or thoughtexperiments revealing intuitively-assessed value in situations devoid of valuers (as e.g. in the well-known Last Person argument). Values are not apart from the actual world, then, merely projected onto it by valuers, or else locked up in certain valuers (in the fashion of Carterian intensions ). Values are part of the world; they are objects in the domain of actual and other worlds. But they are not of course material objects; creatures will not fall over them any more than they will trip over shadows or shapes. �Value like the shape and taste, is an3attribute, which things have or may lack, and which furthermore creatures can recognise or may fail to discern. Thus value is, like colour and taste and their determinate forms (red, acidic, etc), a universa l , distributed across things, individuals and wholes. Like shape and colour, value is a high-level universal. The comparison of value with shape is decidedly more helpful than the standard, but exhausted, comparison of value with colour, or of goodness with colour determinates such as redness or yellow. For example, shape is not bound by a set of determinates as colour is in the specific colours, but comes in a spectacular variety of forms, not totally or linearly ordered (as in a rainbow), or contracted to some primary set (as in colour traingles); shapes like value pertain to wholes as well as particulars, and links with gestalts rather better than colour; shape discrimination is more culture dependent and sensitive; shape is, or was, a primary property, and thereby more immune to reductionist strategies than secondary properties such as colour, which is, under physicalism, prized off objects and allegedly relocated in creatures or in their interrelation with colourless physical things. Shapes like values, can be vague, indeterminate; that does not prevent things, perhaps unique things, exemplifying them. But naturally the anology can only be extended so far. Shapes can be approximated by polygons, values cannot; shapes are regularly perceived through sense perception, by vision or touch especially, values are not, but are differently apprised. Value is its own thing, not something else; it is what it is and does what is does, and not something else, like some specialised mathematical or economic thing. It does not contract to some mark of value or to what it comes down to in highly restricted settings; most important, it does not disappear in the style of modem economics into (expected) utility or into just two economic forms, value-in-use monetarily and value-inexchange (price). Value means what it means, and has meant: worth; and it ties with general assessments of merit and demerit, goodness or badness, not an economic or other cut-down thereof. Price, for example, may fail entirely to reflect worth, it may have little to do with goodness of product. The powerful drive to reduce or deny values has several sources. part of the motivation for reduction of value springs from epistemological worries, concerning how values can be ascertained and known, so far as they are (subjective translation proposals are than a direct evaluative counterpart of phenomenalism). Part derives from supposedly problematic cultural and subcultural relativity (whence the attempt to impose values by identification of value with some favoured feature, and cultural or economic imperialism). Part of the motivation comes from more sweeping ideologic al commitments, such as the varieties of materiali sm (physicalism esp.) or scientism. As has become apparent, attempted reductions of value come too in a variety of forms subjective, which made use of psychological features, such as desires, interests, emotions, and the like or subjective aggregations, such as community preferences or utility; or objectiviely naturalistic, which enrol value-making characteristics such as richness or evolutionary �development as value - consequential, w~ch consider only outcomes, or purely motivational, which consider only attitudes and ignore leads and outcomes - straightforward, as in translation proposals for translating value judgements into reducing statements; or oblique, as in supervenience propositions (no variations in value without underwriting variations in reducing features), or obscure, as in unarticulated projection claims. Values are not well accommodated within theses schemes, or accommodated at all. The idea is abroad however that science can offer a reduction, can sweep up value along with all other knowledge, where philosophy has conspicuously failed. Unfortunately for such optimistic ideas, fortunately perhaps for deeper thought, current science, physics especially, does not have much to say at all, or of merit, about values, and if it did reductions through it would be circular. But, to the contrary, there is a long-standing pretence that science gets along "well" without values, in appropriate value-free fashion. Nowadays it is increasingly realised that such value-freedom is a myth, that much of what passes as science is heavily value-penetrated. While those engaged purely in purer science may have the illusion of an escape from value, there is no escape. Though deep-green value theory is thoroughly nonreductive, it does not sacrifice warranted claims to scientific and logical adequacy thereby. The reductionistic dichotomies are avoided and repudiated. Value reduces neither in subjective nor objective fashion; it does not reduce. Evaluative judgements are certainly not subjective; but nor are they objection in an absolutist sense; they are nonjective, that is, neither. Somewhat similarly, evaluation of an act does not reduce to assessing consequences; nor does it come down to an assessment of motives; both may matter. In any case, reductions do not succeed, as a copious literature, littered with failed attempts, meanderingly establishes. Nor are they generally desirable, since mostly shallow, aiming at a reduction to features of some privileged class presented as ideal (i.e. core value is covertly assumed). Nor are they needed; explanation and assessment do not require reduction. Evaluations may be arrived at, and value systems expanded, by enhancement methods, which consists in emotional presentation (as under Meinong's phenomenological account) organised by coherence methods. The methodology in fact resembles that sometimes proposed for acquisition of scientific information. As with accumulated empirial information, which can be extended through presentational input and assessment for overall coherence, so further evaluations may be arrived at and assessed through a combination of presentational and coherence procedures. At the (marginal) stage where the next round of evaluations is undertaken, the following active ingredients figure, in an idealised breakdown:- Firstly, a background stock of judgements and experience will have been accumulated or inherited; in principle all of this is revisable, and some may be up for reassessment. Apart from the background, which enters in assessing overall coherence of system, what is involved is, secondly, emotional presentation, which corresponds to further perceptional and sense data input, and, thirdly and not independent, coherence processing , which supplies the �interpretational and rationalisational comp~nents. At bottom, parallelling perception in the case of empirical information, is emotional presentation, gut or visceral reaction in starker forms of acceptance or rejection, but more generally comprehending a variety of sentiments, including overall well-being, and also relational impressions, such as empathy, identification, and so on. As a perceiver perceives shapes and taster tastes and goodness, so a valuer feels value and disvalue. The basis of perceptio n is sensation , the basis of valuation is emotion. Apprehension of value is seated in emotional, and especially visceral, presentation; but what is apprehended is not to be confused with its apprehension any more than what is perceived. All the warnings about sensation as an information source have to be repeated with heavy emphasis as regards emotional presentation; for example, reliability cannot be guaranteed, interference with presentation through drugs, alcohol, temporary excitement or other inputs may render it dubious or unacceptable, conditioning may have occurred, including substantial cultural conditioning (so that a person is terrified by huntsmen spiders but not sickened by bloody massacres of dolphins or seals). As with perception, there are checks on emotional presentation, such as constancy over time and after reflection. Emotional presentation, supplying in particular inclusions and exclusions or prohibitions, is but the basis of reflective evaluation and value apprehension. The further critical part, coherence processing, builds on the basis taking account of other inputs or controls including background (which supplies relevant components of already adopted judgements, assimilated subculture and so forth) and constraints (such as substitutional requirements like impartiality, e.g. whether considered judgements hold for substitute valuers, and uniformity, e.g. whether similar acts are judged in similar ways). The coherence procedure consists, in essence, of asking whether the next or a relevant judgemen t fits together with what has been accepted, while meeting constraints, without leading to what has been rejected or excluded. If it does fit it is added to the included side, otherwise it is sent to the excluded side. (The familiar ethical practice of devising cases and comparing them with the cases in hand can be worked in under this procedure.) Because an aim of this rationalisation procedure is achievement of some sort of equilibrium - admitting what is included, while excluding what is unsupported, fails to gain support, is emotionally spoken against - such coherence procedures have gained currency in North America under the rubric "reflectiv e equilibrium". Observe, however, that any equilibriu m gained at some stage may be quickly lost, as new types of problems arise and further information enters. To be sure, the whole methodology (like the parallel methodology of a coherence theory of truth) is highly idealised, and only practicably usable in rudimentary parts. It does however surmount a major obstacle for value theory; it reveals how in principle a nonreduc tionistic value theory can function. Whether that theory is an appropria te environmental one or not will depend however above all on the presentational input, the extent to which environmental sensitivity enters and is not dismissed. �Enhancement methods reveal too tRat value systems are not uniquely determined, any more than other comprehensive theoretical frameworks, such as those intended to reflect truth. There can be, there evidently are, rival value systems, measuring up to rigorous rationality requirements, much as there are rival logics, rival physical and biological theories, and rival coherent religions. Chauvinistic systems, narrow or shallow value systems, which take no requisite account of many environmental items, likewise cannot be excluded on rational or straight logical grounds. Unfortunately such systems remain in ascendancy, and tend to dominate social practices; in recent times economism, a narrow type of utilitarianism, has all too obviously dominated much terrestial practice. While such value frameworks are open to severe criticism, for instance as chauvinistic, as violating universality requirements of morality in the case of economism, they do not succumb to definitive refutation (for the reason that requirements of morality, of universalizability of principle, impartiality and so on, can be repudiated; immoral or amoral frameworks are still value systems). Of course a range of argumentative, educational and persuasive techniques, of varying equality, can be put to work to move valuers who adhere to other structures, often enough successfully. Emotional presentation of environmental items, by way of new experience and information, is important among these. In short, much can be done to shift or alter values, though as usual effectiveness cannot be guaranteed. The availability of rival value systems and prospect of yet others, while it implies a certain desirable (and also troublesome) pluralism, does not mean relativism. Neither deep green theory nor authentic deep ecology espouse any superficially easy relativism. From their viewpoint, rival narrower and shallower systems are definitely inferior , and marked down accordingly, while economism is an onathema which does not even make the moral grade (e.g. too many principles stop at state boundaries). However a critical pluralism does acknowledge, and offer a place, in the wider scheme of things for other positions, even if as less favoured or satisfactory. Politically then, deep positions can allow for, what makes good sense in these times of numbers, alliances. Hence the point of a green alliance, combining green positions, against still prevailing anti-environmentalism and economism. The value system pluralism of deep-green theory interpenetrates not only social and political domains above, but also metaphysics traditionally placed below. In the underlying metaphysical pluralism of deep-green theory, value runs very deep - so deep that even truth depends in part upon it. For not merely selection of a correct comprehensive theory or worldview, but choice of associated actual world, is a value dependent choice. That choice, insofar as it is consciously made, of world conceptualisation and structure, is a constrained choice, constrained by informational inputs, such as those of refined perception. But in as much as it is rationally accomplished, that choice, like other choices of structure, proceeds according to a standard value-information analysis (regularly oversimplified however to a preference- �information or even desire-belief modellin1); that is, to get to the salient point, it involves value essentially. Truth and value are then intertwined. Their relation, not one of identity (for contrary to idealism, there are many relations not identical with identity), can now be stated more accurately than the poets have managed. Neither is one; both are plural, and differently so. In certain significant respects the metaphysics resembles the value theory. For example, as the value theory is nonreductionistic, so also is the metaphysics; in particular, there is a noreduction theme that neither parts nor wholes reduce eliminably to one another, as opposed to atomistic and holistic views of environmental interrelations. As the value theory is pluralistic so also is the metaphysics; what needs to be discerned, in place of absolutism, is a plurality of worlds and of associated truth characterisations. A main aim of a thoroughgoing environmental theory is to displace very destructive dominant ideasystems, regularly presented as absolute, which incorporate both value and truth themes concerning the environment and its organisation. Much of deep-green theory devolves then from the abstract value theory, beginning (to take a more accessible route than the metaphysical way) with a more comprehensive ethical theory, which includes as well as a specific axiological theory, elaborating environmental values and virtues, a deontic theory, supplying obligations, rights, taboos, and similar. For example, given that a certain wild river is intrinsically valuable, as we can verify by on-site experience and enhancement methods, and given that we duly respect that value, as deontic principles will tell us we should, then we are not free to do as we like with that river, to dam it with concrete, to channel it within concrete, stripping it of its riverine ecosystems. But that does not preclude respectful use of the river, swimming or sailing quitely in its waters, and so on. Value thus guides action, practice, and use; it is the ground also upon which principles are formulated, principles that are assessed and validated by way of enhancement methods. Important among these are non-interference principles, which exclude unwarranted interference with other preference-havers and unwarranted damage, ill-treatment, or devaluation of items of value. Such deontic principles circumscribe environmentally-limited freedom of action. Given non-interference principles, a major shift in onus of proof from homocentricthics takes place. What is required now is that reasons be givenfor interfering with the environment, rather than reasons for not doing so. Also direct responsibility for environmental interference or modification falls upon those who would interfere or significantly modify, who would tread heavily on the land. Non-interference does not preclude use, only too much use and use of too much. What it does lead to is the theme that, where use occurs, it should be careful and respectful use. An important respect thesis regarding environmental items is founded on such interference principles and the no-reduction theme: namely �• • 8 not to put others (other preference havers) into a dispreferred state for no good reason; not to jeopardis e the well being of natural objects or systems without good reason; • not to damage or destroy items which, while they cannot literally be put into a dispreferred state, can be damaged or destroyed or have their value eroded or impaired. These apply to ecosystem s, their surrounds, their parts, and so on. The mere making of further excess profits, or similar economic excuses, are not good reasons. Such a respect thesis form part of the ecological outlook of deep-green theory. As permissib ility, obligatio n and respect principles can be explained through the valuations reached on the theory, so too can rights and other significant components of morality be explained and justified through, but again not reduced to, values. For example, a creature has a right to something if it has a valid title thereto established from correct moral principles. Candidates for the parameter "something" provide a familiar list: freedom from unnecessary suffering, respectful treatment, satisfaction of basic needs, and so on. Such rights accordingly derive from and reinforce corresponding deontic principles. Deep-gre en ethical theory is much more than just another non-redu ctionist ethical theory, which highlights ecological values and virtues, and so forth. It changes the character and shape of ethical enterprise. Perhaps most strikingly, it removes humans as such from the centre of the ethical stage (or exclusive occupation of the stage). The biological concept of being human is not, contrary to prevailing humanism, a highly significant ethical category. To elevate it to such is to fall into human chauvinis m, a type of class chauvini sm which unwarrantedly discriminates in favour of the human species. The prevailing chauvinis m is avoided through a natural annular model, which connects ethical characteristics directly with the categorie s of items that can have them. Relevant categories include those marked out by features like: having well-being, preference-having, rights-holding, contractual-capability, and so on, categories not necessarily connected with any particular species. Hitherto virtually all Western ethical theories have not merely so limited ethical matters predominately to inter-human affairs, but have been blantantly chauvinistic, exhibiting a substantial, discrimin ately and unjustifiably bias in favour of humans (of certain privileged humans). These sorts of systems should be superseded; it is not a matter of simple adjustments or extensions. Deep-gre en value theory, as developed, implies the inadequacy of prevailing social, political and economic arrangements and institutions, both those of a mixed capitalistic kind and those of a more state socialistic cast. They are the (devious) product of inferior value frameworks which take quite insufficient account of environmental considerations and values. But explainin g their deficiencies, and indicating more satisfactory green alternatives and replacements, is another chapter in the elaboration of deep-green theory. �9 * Richard Sylvan* RMB 683 B ungendore NSW 2621 For more on deep-green theory and deep ecology, see for instance essays in and work referred to in the Green Series, i.e. Discussion Papers in Environme ntal Philosophy, RSSS, Australian National University, Canberra. �Annex 1. Most people inherit their value framework along with their culture. Many never do any substantial overhaul. Many indeed are not active or responsible valuers. But in these respects, values are not so different from other things. Some people are poor judges of shape; many never learn to distinguish plants, or to discriminate among wines. Likewise for other choices, options, major changes, metaphysical and even political. Mostly that a choice has been made or inherited and is incorporated in the subculture is not noticed, along with its not been observed how arbitrary many of the choices and resulting structures are (in Foucault has emphasized). Of course it is often not in the interests of the power elite, who control media outlets, etc., that this sort of arbitrariness should be widely known, and alternative structures considered and perhaps experimented with. Choices occur where distinctive circumstance prevail. For instance, there is serious scarcity; food supplies in particular are threatened (e.g. with being out of reach is price, with pollution, etc.). Differently, circumstances lead to conversions, as when a new ideology sweeps through, enthusiam generated by some charismatic figures. �/ bits from chapter 2 There is another important elasticity. In contemporary ethical theory there is a concerted attempt to build on universalizability requirement or the equivalent into the very motion of ethics. The evident result is that selfish systems of induction and conduct, systematic egoisms for instance are refused the title of ethics, and as an important corollary questions like Why be ethical? become vexed. 1 Given, in particular, that any such "universality" requirement is problematic in this formulation, and typically limited, chauvinistically to persons, a superior course proceeds to distinguish: between ethics as already characterised (reportively) and its subclass, universalizable ethics. As impartial ethical do have much to recommend them, let us coin a convenient portmonteau term condensing the chancy "universalerable ethics", namely euthics. (Conveniently then an euthical supports unethical, which is what from a properly ethical stance it is!) There is undoubtedly some pressure to have ethics and morality extend beyond a single or isolated individual (even so, a Causal ethics is understood, as is egoisticmorality). But that pressure does not extend very far; and such notions as those of a tribal morality and an upperclass ethics are not defective on significance grounds, even if they are objectional on substantive grounds. Such restricted ethics are not however immediately ruled out by such requirements as that like cases be assessed alike, and that differences of assessment be based on relevant differences. 2 For a tribalist or racist can respond that a foreigner is not like a Greek, or that there are relevant differences between whites and blacks (intelligence has been proposed as such a difference, when skin pigmentation appeared a merely superficial difference). These sorts of responses, which were longer accepted, are no longer acceptable, because the differences put up are not considered ethically relevant differences (correctly enough, though ethical relevance itself lacks an adequate explanation). Singer's main argument for a much wider point of view, universality, commits in a extensive appel to authority (p.11). What is offered: an appeal to usage. 'the notion of ethics carries with it the idea of something bigger than the individual'. [It often does, but it may not.] 'If I am to defend my conduct in ethical grounds, I cannot point only to the benefits it brings me. I wont address myself to a larger audience' (p.10). That On both, narrowing and vexing, see Singer lmpractual ethics (Singer aquates moral with ethical). Singer does not really have an answer to Why be moral? though he thinks it not a bad idea; mainly he tries to put down shuffles that have been presented or decisive. 2 These requirements are presented byu Attfield as basic formal requirements of reason (p.6). No doubt they are, though they appear to figure in no logic of ethics yet formulated. �depends on the conduct concerned. More important the audience does not need to be much larger, certainly not universal: my family or law will suffice often enough. �J. From Chap 4 Evaluations may be arrived at, and value systems expanded, by enhancement methods, which consists in emotional presentation (as under Meinong's phenomenological account) organised by coherence methods. The methodology in fact resembles that sometimes proposed for acquisition of scientific information. As with accumulated empirial information, which can be extended through presentational input and assessment for overall coherence, so further evaluations may be arrived at and assessed through a combination of presentational and coherence procedures. At the (marginal) stage where the next round of evaluations is undertaken, the following active ingredients figure, in an idealised breakdown:- Firstly, a background stock of judgements and experience will have been accumulated or inherited; in principle all of this is revisable, and some may be up for reassessment. Apart from the background, which enters in assessing overall coherence of system, what is involved is, secondly, emotional presentation, which corresponds to further perceptional and sense data input, and, thirdly and not independent, coherence processing, which supplies the interpretational and rationalisational components. At bottom, parallelling perception in the case of empirical information, is emotional presentation, gut or visceral reaction in starker forms of acceptance or rejection, but more generally comprehending a variety of sentiments, including overall well-being, and also relational impressions, such as empathy, identification, and so on. As a perceiver perceives shapes and taster tastes and goodness, so a valuer feels value and disvalue. The basis of perception is sensation, the basis of valuation is emotion. Apprehension of value is seated in emotional, and especially visceral, presentation; but what is apprehended is not to be confused with its apprehension any more than what is perceived. All the warnings about sensation as an information source have to be repeated with heavy emphasis as regards emotional presentation; for example, reliability cannot be guaranteed, interference with presentation through drugs, alcohol, temporary excitement or other inputs may render it dubious or unacceptable, conditioning may have occurred, including substantial cultural conditioning (so that a person is terrified by huntsmen spiders but not sickened by bloody massacres of dolphins or seals). As with perception, there are checks on emotional presentation, such as constancy over time and after reflection. Emotional presentation, supplying in particular inclusions and exclusions or prohibitions, is but the basis of reflective evaluation and value apprehension. The further critical part, coherence processing, builds on the basis taking account of other inputs or controls including background (which supplies relevant components of already adopted judgements, assimilated subculture and so forth) and constraints (such as substitutional requirements like impartiality, e.g. whether considered judgements hold for substitute valuers, and uniformity, e.g. whether similar acts are judged in similar ways). The coherence procedure consists, in essence, of asking whether the next or a relevant judgement fits together with what has been accepted, while �meeting constraints, without leading to what has been rejected or excluded. If it does fit it is added to the included side, otherwise it is sent to the excluded side. (The familiar ethical practice of devising cases and compari ng them with the cases in hand can be worked in under this procedure.) Because an aim of this rationalisation procedure is achievement of some sort of equilibr ium - admitting what is included, while excluding what is unsupported, fails to gain support, is emotionally spoken against - such coherence procedures have gained currency in North Americ a under the rubric "reflect ive equilibr ium". Observe , howeve r, that any equilibr ium gained at some stage may be quickly lost, as new types of problem s arise and further information enters. To be sure, the whole methodology (like the parallel methodo logy of a coherence theory of truth) is highly idealised, and only practicably usable in rudimentary parts. It does howeve r surmou nt a major obstacle for value theory; it reveals how in principl e a nonredu ctionist ic value theory can function . Whethe r that theory is an appropr iate environmental one or not will depend however above all on the presentational input, the extent to which environmental sensitivity enters and is not dismissed. end The availability of rival value systems and prospect of yet others, while it implies a certain desirabl e (and also troublesome) pluralism, does not mean relativism. Neither deep green theory nor authenti c deep ecology espouse any superficially easy relativism. From their viewpoint, rival narrowe r and shallow er systems are definitely inferior , and marked down accordingly, while econom ism is an onathema which does not even make the moral grade (e.g. too many principles stop at state bo':lndaries). However a critical pluralism does acknow ledge, and offer a place, in the wider scheme of things for other positions, even if as less favoured or satisfactory. Politically then, deep positions can allow for, what makes good sense in these times of numbers, alliances. Hence the point of a green alliance, combining green position s, against still prevailing anti-environmentalism and economism. The value system pluralis m of deep-green theory interpenetrates not only social and political domains above, but also metaphysics traditionally placed below. In the underly ing metaphysical pluralis m of deep-green theory, value runs very deep - so deep that even truth depends in part upon it. For not merely selection of a correct comprehensive theory or worldview, but choice of associated actual world, is a value dependent choice. That choice, insofar as it is conscio usly made, of world conceptualisation and structure, is a constrai ned choice, constrained by informational inputs, such as those of refined perception. But in as much as it is rationally accomplished, that choice, like other choices of structure, proceeds accordin g to a standard value-in formati on analysis (regular ly oversim plified howeve r to a preferen ceinformation or even desire-belief modelling); that is, to get to the salient point, it involves value essentially. �Truth and value are then intertwined. Their relation, not one of identity (for contrary to idealism, there are many relations not identical with identity), can now be stated more accurately than the poets have managed. Neither is one; both are plural, and differently so. In certain significant respects the metaphysics resembles the value theory. For example, as the value theory is nonreductionistic, so also is the metaphysics; in particular, there is a no-reduction theme that neither parts nor wholes reduce eliminably to one another, as opposed to atomistic and holistic views of environmental interrelations. As the value theory is pluralistic so also is the metaphysics; what needs to be discerned, in place of absolutism, is a plurality of worlds and of associated truth characterisations. A main aim of a thoroughgoing environmental theory is to displace very destructive dominant ideasystems, regularly presented as absolute, which incorporate both value and truth themes concerning the environment and its organisation. Much of deep-green theory devolves then from the abstract value theory, beginning (to take a more accessible route than the metaphysical way) with a more comprehensive ethical theory, which includes as well as a specific axiological theory, elaborating environmental values and virtues, a deontic theory, supplying· obligations, rights, taboos, and similar. For example, given that a certain wild river is intrinsically valuable, as we can verify by on-site experience and enhancement methods, and given that we duly respect that value, as deontic principles will tell us we should, then we are not free to do as we like with that river, to dam it with concrete, to channel it within concrete, stripping it of its riverine ecosystems. But that does not preclude respectful use of the river, swimming or sailing quitely in its waters, and so on. Value thus guides action, practice, and use; it is the ground also upon which principles are formulated, principles that are assessed and validated by way of enhancement methods. Important among these are non-interference principles, which exclude unwarranted interference with other preference-havers and unwarranted damage, ill-treatment, or devaluation of items of value. Such deontic principles circumscribe environmentally-limited freedom of action. Given noninterference principles, a major shift in onus of proof from homocentricthics takes place. What is required now is that reasons be given for interfering with the environment, rather than reasons for not doing so. Also direct responsibility for environme ntal interferenc e or modification falls upon those who would interfere or significantly modify, who would tread heavily on the land. Non-interference does not preclude use, only too much use and use of too much. What it does lead to is the theme that, where use occurs, it should be careful and respectful use. An important respect thesis regarding environme ntal items is founded on such interference principles and the no-reduction theme: namely • not to put others (other preference havers) into a dis preferred state for no good reason; • not to jeopardise the well being of natural objects or systems without good reason; �• not to damage or destroy items which, while they cannot literally be put into a dispreferred state, can be damaged or destroyed or have their value eroded or impaired. These apply to ecosystems, their surrounds, their parts, and so on. The mere making of further excess profits, or similar economic excuses, are not good reasons. Such a respect thesis form part of the ecological outlook of deep-green theory. As permissibility, obligation and respect principles can be explained through the valuations reached on the theory, so too can rights and other significant components of morality be explained and justified through, but again not reduced to, values. For example, a creature has a right to something if it has a valid title thereto established from correct moral principles. Candidates for the parameter "something" provide a familiar list: freedom from unnecessary suffering, respectful treatment, satisfaction of basic needs, and so on. Such rights accordingly derive from and reinforce corresponding deontic principles. Deep-green ethical theory is much more than just another non-reductionist ethical theory, which highlights ecological values and virtues, and so forth. It changes the character and shape of ethical enterprise. Perhaps most strikingly, it removes humans as such from the centre of the ethical stage (or exclusive occupation of the stage). The biological concept of being human is not, contrary to prevailing humanism, a highly significant ethical category. To elevate it to such is to fall into human chauvinism, a type of class chauvinism which unwarrantedly discriminates in favour of the human species. The prevailing chauvinism is avoided through a natural annular model, which connects ethical characteristics directly with the categories of items that can have them. Relevant categories include those marked out by features like: having well-being, preference-having, rights-holding, contractual-capability, and so on, categories not necessarily connected with any particular species. Hitherto virtually all Wes tern ethical theories have not merely so limited ethical matters predominately to inter-human affairs, but have been blantantly chauvinistic, exhibiting a substantial, discriminately and unjustifiably bias in favour of humans (of certain privileged humans). These sorts of systems should be superseded; it is not a matter of simple adjustments or extensions. Deep-green value theory, as developed, implies the inadequacy of prevailing social, political and economic arrangements and institutions, both those of a mixed capitalistic kind and those of a more state socialistic cast. They are the (devious) product of inferior value frameworks which take quite insufficient account of environmental considerations and values. But explaining their deficiencies, and indicating more satisfactory green alternatives and replacements, is another chapter in the elaboration of deep-green theory. Deep-green theory is a deep environmental theory, with much in common with deep ecology. Like deep ecology, it stands in significant ideological opposition to the dominant technocratic-industrial way. But, even more than deep ecology, deep-green theory aims to supply a comprehensive alternative environmental philosophy (in the full senses of those �atrophied terms, esp philosophy ). It seeks to accomplish this, furthermore, without accumulating the amount of philosophical rubbish deep ecology regularly attracts. For, to insert a key difference between these ecocentric theories in a deliberately prejudical way: deep-green theory resembles a deep ecology with the pseudo-scientific garbage removed, reorganised into a tight, coherent and more comprehensive theory. Deep-green theory, which has roots that stretch back about as far as its much publicized neighbour, accordingly merits elaboration separate from deep ecology, which in any case lacks a well-thought-through valuational and ethical basis. This essay aims to uncover the value theory of deep-green theory, exposing thereby one central area of deep-green theory. Though the value theory is (inevitably) abstract, it issues in what is more concrete, such as practical ecological directives, potentially destabilizing prevailing policies and institutions. �ETHICS AND METAPHYSICS: their relevance to one another There is rich range of incompatible claims about the mutual interelations of the two ancient subjects. Most of these claims appear mistaken. Sorting out something of what looks right is a daunting task, a small beginning on which is attempted here. Initial severe difficulties derive from the vagueness, in determinacy and problematicality of the relata, both of which are ill-understood by philosophers metaphysics especially. Many there are who think that metaphyscis coincides with ontology, the study (description, explanation and understanding) of what exists. 1 The general study of what there is, sistology, which includes ontology as a very proper part, is only one facet of metaphysics (unless it is presumed that items somehow supply also all propositions concerning them). For sistology is the totality of things side of metaphysics, there is also the totality of true propositions side (propositionology, for a nice term). Metaphysics also comprises the study of the very general attributes of this and other universe and of what accounts for these attributes (or propositional functions). In technical terms, then, a metaphysics amount to a very general and comprehensi ve constrained model; and metaphysics to the plural assembly of these metaphysics. 2 Each metaphysics will be constrained (as will become clear through examples given below) through modelling conditions or postulates (which delimit how "altimate reality" is according to that system). Metaphysics is sometimes construed more comprehencisvely to include some or all of epistemology (knowledge of "ultimate reality" for instance), some of or all of other branches of philosophy, perhaps all of philosophy. Plainly, if metaphysics, so expansively construed, includes ethics, then their relation is straightforward, metaphysics includes ethics. But we shall not adopt such construals. Whereas metaphysics concerns features of universes, ethics is a study of moral values and principles, and of rules and practices of conduct. A case can be made out that an ethic is outlined through its distributions of values, in terms of which both deontic features (rights, obligations, etc) and axiological features (goodness, etc) can be discerned. (Utilitarian can afford a crude exemplar). So, without loss of generality, I can concentrate on the relation of value theory to metaphysics. Now a value theory does not derive from a purely naturalistic metaphysic, by virtue of a rectified naturalistic fallacy. But, firstly even is a value theory may be influenced or even construed by such a metaphysics. For example if the theory rules out all but primary qualities 2 What there is according to most Western philosophers, still labouring under the probleminducing Ontological Assumption. For such a confusion of ontology with metaphysics see Forrest p.3. For the bsis of this large (and estrageous) technical leap, see DP. �2 as some sort of constructs, the value qualities will have to be explained as constructs, projections or similar. Secondly, a metaphysics is unlikely to be purely naturalistic. Metaphysics is not a value-free enterprise; a metaphysics typically presumes a range of presumptions, including archivative ones (deeper examples include assumptions of primary, e.g. of certain sorts of objects, of importance, e.g. of what exists, of implicit world selection, e.g. the world is Newtonian, Copenhagen quantum, or obitives). An ethics does not determine a meta-ethics or therefore a metaphysics. Nor does the converse hold. A metaphysics does not in general determine an ethics, but is compatible with many. Against the stock determination and priority claims, I want to oppose interaction and no priority themes. Determination claims are commonplace in philosophers who wish to wield the big stock of dominant science to settle ethics (or mataethics). For instance Collicott asserts that "intrinsic value in nature ... remains ... painfully inconsistent with the ... modern scientific world-view' (Celbration of Robton p.14, similarly p.22, whence CD 1. Modern scientific metaphysics entails there are no intrinsic values in nature. This is not a lapse (though soon Collicott will weaken his determination claims) because almost immediately Collicott goes on to assert CD2. 'A value neutral nature is ... an immediate inference from the institutionalised metaphysical foundations of modern science' (p.15). Given some large assumptions, most conspiciously that the metaphysics involved is that of British empiricism, the claim CD2 become incontestable. For under that empiricism, as elaborated by Locke and Hurve, non primary qualities like value and colour are not part of or in nature, but substantially subjective in character. However insitutionalized those foundations an important issue - it has since become apparent that there are at least several parts of operative sciences, such a classical and quantum; namely a core calculus or formalism; operational rules for connecting the formalism with testable data and making in ..... applications; and layers of interpretation. It is in these separable, and variable, larger of interpretation that metaphysical and elaborative princi;es begin to enter conspicuously. The "institutionalized" interpretation is but one among the interpretations that can be fitted to classical formalism. It is an interpretation incorperating some major and controverisial philosophical theories, such as the reference theory and verificationism. Rival interpretations are feasible and were developed, for instance by the Scottish comon-sense school. Such rival foundations do not yield a value-free value neutral nature. Collicott calls upon Rolston 'to provide a persuasive alternative to the integral set of Carterian-Gohblein-Humean assumptions that render the subjective provenance of value so fundamental to the modern scientific outlook' (p.16). But Rolston hardly needs to do any such thing 3 : it has already been done, in various 3 Rolston makes giving an appropriate interpretation for more difficult than he need by conceeding "seconddoary" qualities to the reductionistic opposition. Thus, regressively: 'the greenness of the tree is in my hand, but it looks as though the tree is �3 ways, and, in any case, as Collicott soon observes, 'the modern scientific worldview is obsolete' (p.19). The property for a full value-in-nature theory are little better under postmodern quantum theory, Collicott however insinuates, then they were before. Under a Copenhagen interpretations, which he adopts, prospects look worse. Abruptly too Collicott switches from a determination thesis, such as CD, to a slacker and more plausible if vaguer linkage. The linkage appears in different nonequivalent forms: CL 1. A science, such as 'the new physics might play an architectonic role in our eventual thinking about nature (and human society)' (p.23 itals added). Subsequently, 'architectonic role' is replaced through the as vague 'inspired by' and more specific 'mapped out'. CL2. 'A value thoery [may be] inspired by, and mapped on, ... quantum physics (p.25, where reduction and derviation are now explicitly repudiated!). Such a value theory is, it is claimed, 'particularly congenial to an ecologically informed environmental ethics' (p.25). Whether it is, or not, depends on other-things, such as the sort of interpretation of quantum theory, the congeniality of that with ecology. No doubt values in nature without values is excluded under the Copenhagen interpretation, so is much else that makes good sense. Fortunately there are congenial alternatives. REFERENCES P.R.H. Forrest, Speculation and Experience the New Metaphysics, Inaugural Public Lecture, University of New England, N.S.W., 1987. J.B. Callicott, 'Ralston's Environmental Ethics: A critical celbration', critical response at APA, Oakland, March 1989. R. Sylvan, Deep Plurallism, Australian National University, Research School of Social Science, 1993. green. OUt there are only ....... waves... . The greenness is projected, more factural in my head and apparently hung on the tree'. What a ridiculous idea. �' ,,. ON THE VALUE CORE OF DEEP-GREEN THEORY This essay aims to uncover the value theory of deep-green theory, exposing thereby a central area of that theory. Though the value theory is (inevitably) abstract, it issues in what is more concrete, such as an applicable system and practical ecological directives, potentially destabilizing for prevailing policies and institutions. Deep-green theory which stands in significant ideological opposition to dominant industrial ways, is intended to supply a comprehensive alternative environmental philosophy. At the core of deep-green theory lies a value theory. A fundamental theme thereof, part of what makes the structure deep, is that a range of environmental items are valuable in themselves, directly and irreducibly so, so that their value does not somehow reduce to or emerge from something else, such as features of certain valuers or what matters for them. Thus value does not answer back in some way to humans, or sentient creatures (or other value-responsive classes), their interests, uses, preferences, or such like. Many natural items, such as forests and rivers, mountains and seashores, are intrinsically valuable. They are valuable in their own right - irrespective of whether they are interesting or useful (to any intentional operators, themselves interesting or useful or not), indeed whether or not there exist any valuers. Value spreads through and reaches across the natural domain; it is not bounded by mind, or linkages with subjective states; nor does it stop with sentience, or associated pyschological features like satisfaction; nor does it end at life; it observes no such compromising bounds. Although value is distributed richly if irregularly throughout nature, it is not then encapsulated in some isolable natural feature, such as life or sentience, or even in defeasible ecological values such as richness, diversity and variety (and so open to a different, naturalistic, reduction). But of course such ecologically important features afford criteria for value, and should be represented in recipes (such as "objective functions") for assessing overall value. From the presence of natural things of value, and accordingly of natural values, it is a short, though controversial, step to the important conclusion that there can be values without valuers. For valuers are sentient creatures with appropriate capacities, but things of value may precede and succeed all such valuers; that is, these things can persist, their values intact, without any valuers. As there can be shapes without any shape.:.perceivers, so there can be values without valuers. (The theme, like others advanced, can be backed up by more detailed argument and by formal proof, neither attempted here.) In valuational relations then, which relate valuers as subjects with values as objects, both ends of relations have independent standing; though interrelated, as the descriptions are deliberately chosen to suggest, either can stand without the other. It is a fashionable mistake to try to collapse this relation - usually to endeavour to soak up values into a modification of valuing subjects (e.g. as a predicate �'relation-to-values', in which inconvenierZt values are locked away). The mistaken procedure is in fact just one important example of an archetypal modern reduction of relations to functions; other examples, locking undesired objects away within functions, are those rendering wholes (such as ecosystems and organised structures) functions of their parts, and, under functionalism, minds and types of intentionality, including value-direction, as functions of bodies or their parts such as brains. Values are not, and do not disappear into, functions of valuers. A connected corollary is that values are not apart from the actual world, something "projected" or imposed on it by a favoured class of valuers, something colouring (and even emotionally clouding) the otherwise valueless physical world, in rather the way that reductionistic materialism tries (erroneously) to construe colour itself as projected onto a colourless physical world. Of course this projection effort, never adequately explicated, does not succeed, on its own, in removing values. For they remain, left as some function of the valuers. To try to bulldoze through this difficulty, a second reduction is invoked, of evaluative features of valuers to "natural" features, commonly preferences, consumer desires or such like. The second reduction runs into obstacles that halt even the naturalistic bulldozers (e.g. naturalistic and related fallacies), but the first reduction is the critical one in removing key environmental values, such as those of wilderness and wild things, which become valuable only in the focus of certain sentient beholders, and not in and for themselves. This reduction too is blocked by insuperable difficulties. On the one side, like the parallel proposed phenomenalist reduction of material objects to sensations, the reduction never achieves satisfactory support or even a satisfactory statement. On the other, it is counterexampled by various modellings or thought-experiments revealing intuitively-assessed value in situations devoid of valuers (as e.g. in the well-known Last Person argument). Values remain then part of the still rich actual world; they are objects in the domain of actual and other worlds. But they are not of course material objects; creatures will not fall over them any more than they will trip over shadows or mere shapes. Value, like shape, is an attribute, which things have or may lack, and which furthermore creatures can recognise or may fail to discern. Thus value is, like shape and colour and their determinate forms (round, red, etc), a universal , distributed across things, individuals and wholes. The comparison of value with shape is decidedly more helpful than the regular, but exhausted, comparison of value with colour, or of goodness with colour determinates such as yellow. For example, shape is not bound by a set of determinates as colour is in the specific colours, but comes in a spectacular variety of forms, not totally or linearly ordered (as in a rainbow), or contracted to some primary set (as in colour triangles); shape which pertains to wholes as well as particulars, links with gestalts better than colour; shape discrimination is more culture dependent and sensitive; yet shape is, or was, a primary property, and thereby �more immune to reductionist strategies thJn secondary properties such as colour. Again shapes like values, can be vague, indeterminate; that does not prevent things, perhaps unique things, exemplifying them. But naturally the analogy can only be extended so far. Shapes can be approximated by polygons, values cannot; shapes are regularly perceived through sense perception, by vision or touch especially, values are not, but are differently apprised. Value is its own thing, not something else; it is what it is and does what is does; it is not something else, like some quantitative mathematical or economic function. Nor does it contract into some mark of value, or to what it comes down to in highly restricted settings; most important, it does not disappear in the style of modern economics into (expected) utility, or into just two economic forms, value-in-use monetarily and value-in-exchange (price), neither of which may reflect worth. Value means what it means, and has meant: worth ; and it ties with general assessments of merit and demerit, goodness or badness, not an economic or other truncation thereof. The powerful drive to reduce or deny values has several sources. Part of the motivation for reduction of value springs from epistemological worries, concerning how values can be ascertained and known, so far as they are (subjective translation proposals are then a direct evaluative counterpart of phenomenalism). Part derives from supposedly problematic cultural relativity (whence the attempt to impose values by identification of value with some favoured assessible feature, and with it cultural or economic imperialism). Part of the motivation comes from more sweeping ideological commitments, such as varieties of materialism or scientism, which leave no space for immaterial values. As already apparent, attempted reductions of value come in a dazzling variety of forms • subjective, which make use of psychological features, such as desires, interests, emotions, and the like; or more objective aggregations of these, such as community preferences or utility; or objectively naturalistic, which enrol single track value-making characteristics such as richness or evolutionary development as value; • consequential, which consider only outcomes; or purely motivational, which consider only attitudes and ignore leads and outcomes; • straightforward, as in translation proposals for translating value judgements into reducing statements; or oblique, as in supervenience propositions (no variations in value without underwriting variations in reducing features); or obscure, as in unarticulated projection claims. Values are not well accommodated within these reductionistic schemes, or accommodated at all. Deep-green value theory, which is thoroughly nonreductive, repudiates all these reductionistic options. They are not so difficult to avoid, as the options are neither exhaustive nor exclusive. In particular, value reduces neither in subjective nor objective fashion; it does not reduce. Evaluative judgements are nonjective, that is, neither subjective nor objective (in any absolutist �4 fashion). Obversely, evaluation of an act does not reduce to assessing consequences; nor does it come down to an assessment of motives; both may matter. The virulent idea is abroad however that science can offer a reduction, can sweep up value along with all other information, where philosophy has conspicuously failed. Unfortunately for such optimistic ideas, fortunately perhaps for deeper thought, current basic science does not have much to say at all, or of merit, about values, and if it did reductions through it would be circular. But, to the contrary, there is a long-standing pretence that science gets along "well" without values, in appropriate value-free fashion. Nowadays it is increasingly realised that the positivistic assumption of such value-freedom is a myth, that much of what passes as science is heavily value-penetrated. While the residual ideal of pure engagement in pure science may offer the illusion of an escape from value, there is no escape. For, in any case, reductions do not succeed, as a copious literature, littered with failed attempts, meanderingly establishes. Nor are they generally desirable, since mostly shallow, aiming at a reduction to features of some privileged class presented as ideal (i.e. core value is covertly assumed, so there is no real reduction). Nor are they needed; explanation and assessment do not require reduction. Evaluations may be arrived at, and value frameworks expanded, by enhancement methods, which organise and expand emotional presentation by coherence methods. The enhancement methodology in fact resembles that sometimes proposed for further acquisition of scientific information. As accumulated empirical information can be further extended through presentational input and assessment for overall coherence, so further evaluations may be arrived at and assessed through a combination of presentational and coherence procedures. At the (marginal) stage where the next round of evaluations is undertaken, the following active ingredients figure, in an idealised breakdown:- Firstly, a background stock of judgements and value experience will have been accumulated or inherited; in principle all of this is revisable, and some may be up for reassessment. Apart from the background, which enters in assessing overall coherence of system, what is involved is, secondly, emotional presentation, which corresponds to further perceptional and sense data input, and, thirdly and not independent, coherence processing, which supplies the interpretational and rationalisational components. At bottom, parallelling perception in the case of empirical information, is emotional presentation, gut or visceral reaction in starker forms of acceptance or rejection, but more generally comprehending a variety of sentiments, including overall well-being, and also relational impressions, such as empathy, identification, and so on. As a perceiver perceives shapes, so a valuer feels raw value and disvalue. The basis of perception is sensation, the basis of valuation is emotion. Apprehension of value is seated in emotional, and especially visceral, presentation; but what is apprehended is not to be confused with its apprehension any more than what is perceived. All the warnings about sensation as an �information source have to be repeat~d, with heavy emphasis, as regards emotional presentation; for example, reliability cannot be guaranteed, interference with presentation through drugs, alcohol, temporary excitement or other inputs may render it dubious or unacceptable, conditioning may have occurred, including substantial cultural conditioning (so that a person is terrified by harmless spiders but not sickened by bloody massacres of dolphins or seals). As with perception, there are checks on emotional presentation, such as constancy over time and after reflection. Emotional presentation, supplying primarily inclusions and exclusions or prohibitions, is but the basis of reflective evaluation and value apprehension. The further critical part, coherence processing, builds on the basis taking account of other inputs or controls including background (which supplies relevant components of already adopted judgements, assimilated subculture and so forth) and constraints (such as moral substitutional requirements like impartiality, e.g. whether considered judgements hold for substitute valuers, and uniformity, e.g. whether similar acts are judged in similar ways). Essentially, the coherence procedure consists in asking whether the next or a relevant judgement fits together with what has been accepted, while meeting constraints, without leading to what has been rejected or excluded. If it does fit it is added to the included side, otherwise it is sent to the excluded side. Because an aim of this rationalisation procedure is achievement of some sort of equilibrium such coherence procedures have gained currency under the rubric "reflective equilibrium". Observe, however, that equilibrium reached at some stage may be lost as new types of problems arise and further information enters. No doubt the whole methodology (like the parallel methodology of an empirically-based coherence theory of truth) is highly idealised, and only practicably applicable in rudimentary parts. It does however surmount a major theoretical obstacle for environmental value theory; it reveals how in principle a nonreductionistic value theory can function, and deliver a tenable value system. Whether what results is however an appropriate deep environmental system will depend above all on the presentational input, the extent to which environmental sensitivity enters and is not suppressed. Enhancement methods reveal too that value systems are not uniquely determined, any more than other comprehensive theoretical frameworks. There evidently are rival value systems measuring up to rigorous rationality requirements, much as there are rival logics and rival physical and biological systems. In particular chauvinistic systems, narrow or shallow value systems, which are unresponsive to and take no account of environmental items and values, cannot be excluded on rational or straight logical grounds. Unfortunately such systems remain in ascendancy, and tend to dominate social and political practice; in recent times economism, a narrow type of utilitarianism, has all too obviously dominated much terrestial practice. While such value frameworks are open to severe criticism, for instance as chauvinistic, as violating universality requirements of morality in the case of economism, they �do not succumb to definitive refutatiog (for the reason that requirements of morality, universalizability of principle, impartiality and so on, can simply be repudiated; immoral or amoral frameworks are still value systems). Even so, much can be done to shift or alter values, though as usual effectiveness cannot be guaranteed. A range of argumentative, educational and persuasive techniques, of varying quality, can be put to work to move valuers indoctrinated in old damaging structures, often enough successfully. Important among these are positive presentations of environments, their habitats and creatures, by way of new information and experience. The availability of rival value systems, while it implies a certain desirable (and also troublesome) pluralism, does not mean relativism. From a deep-green viewpoint, rival narrower and shallower systems are definitely inferior, and criticised accordingly, while economism is an anathema which does not even make the moral grade (e.g. too many principles stop at class or state boundaries). However a critical pluralism does acknowledge and offer a place in the wider scheme of things for other systems, even if as less favoured or satisfactory. One political upshot is evident; deep-green theory promotes, what matters in these irrational times of numbers, alliances - in particular, a green alliance, organising green positions, against prevailing forces of environmental degradation. The systematic pluralism of deep-green value theory interpenetrates not only social and political domains above, but also metaphysics traditionally placed below. In the underlying metaphysical pluralism of deep-green theory, value runs very deep - so deep that even truth depends in part upon it. For not merely selection of a correct comprehensive theory or worldview is a value dependent choice, but choice of associated actual world is also. That choice, insofar as it is consciously made, of world structure and conceptualisation, is a constrained choice, constrained by informational inputs, such as those of refined perception. But inasmuch as it is rationally accomplished, that choice, like other choices of structure, proceeds according to a standard value-information analysis (regularly oversimplified however to a preferenceinformation or even desire-belief modelling); that is, to extract the salient point, it involves value essentially. Truth and value are then intertwined; truth, though naturally different from value, is value dependent. Both are plural, and differently so. So, unremarkably deep-green metaphysics resembles the value theory in significant respects. For example, as the value theory is nonreductionistic, so also is the metaphysics; in particular, there is a no-reduction theme that neither parts nor wholes reduce eliminably to one another, as opposed to atomistic and holistic views of environmental interrelations. As the value theory is pluralistic, so also is the metaphysics; in place of established absolutism, a plurality of worlds, with associated truth definitions is discerned. Indeed a main aim of deep-green theory is to dislodge dominant �destructive ideologies, which (each of th]m) assume an absolute truth, from their positions thereby providing intellectual living-space for natural environments. Much of deep-green theory devolves then from the abstract value theory. As with the metaphysical way sketched, so it is with the fuller ethical theory, which includes as well as a specific axiological system, elaborating deep environmental values and virtues, a deontic framework, supplying obligations, rights, taboos, and similar. For example, given that a certain wild river is intrinsically valuable, as we can verify by on-site experience and enhancement methods, and given that we duly respect that value, as deontic principles will tell us we should, then we are not free to do as we like with that river, to dam it with concrete, to channel it within concrete, stripping it of its riverine ecosystems. But that does not preclude respectful use of the river, swimming or sailing quietly in its waters, and the like. Value thus guides action, practice, and use; it is the ground also upon which principles are formulated, principles that are assessed and validated by way of enhancement methods. Important among these are non-interference principles, which exclude unwarranted interference with other preference-havers and unwarranted damage, ill-treatment, or devaluation of items of value. Such deontic principles circumscribe environmentally-limited freedom of action. Given noninterference principles, a major shift in onus of proof from homocentricethics takes place. What is required now is that reasons be givenfor interfering with the environment, rather than reasons for not doing so. Also direct responsibility for environmental interference or modification falls upon those who would seriously interfere or significantly modify, who would tread heavily on the land. Non-interference does not preclude use - only too much use and use of too much. What it does lead to is the theme that, where use occurs, it should be careful and respectful use. An important respect thesis regarding environmental items is founded on such non-interference principles and the no-reduction theme: namely, • not to put others (other preference havers) into a dispreferred state for no good reason; • not to jeopardise the well-being of natural objects or systems without good reason; • not to damage or destroy items which, while they cannot literally be put into a dispreferred state, can be damaged or destroyed or have their value eroded or impaired. These apply to ecosystems, their surrounds, their parts, and so on. The mere making of further excess profits, or similar economic excuses, are not good reasons. Such a respect thesis forms part of the ecological outlook of deep-green theory. Deep-green ethical theory amounts to much more than just another non-reductionist ethical theory, which highlights ecological values and virtues, and so forth. It changes the character and shape of ethical enterprise. Perhaps most strikingly, it removes humans as such �from the centre of the ethical stage (or :xclusive occupation of the stage). The biological concept of being human ceases to be a significant ethical category. To elevate it to such is to fall into human chauvinism, a type of class chauvinism which unwarrantedly discriminates in favour of the human species. The prevailing chauvinism is not inevitable; it is very logically avoided by directly connecting ethical characteristics with the categories of items that can have them. Relevant categories include those marked out by features like: having well-being, preference-having, rights-holding, contractual-capability, and so on, categories not necessarily connected with any particular species. Hitherto virtually all Western ethical theories, and the institutional arrangements they help support, have not merely limited ethical matters to interhuman affairs, but have been blatantly chauvinistic, exhibiting substantial and unjustifiable discrimination in favour of humans (or certain privileged humans). Deep-green theory thus implies the inadequacy of prevailing social, political and economic arrangements and institutions. These structures are the defective products of inferior value frameworks which take quite insufficient account of environmental desiderata and values. Richard Sylvan* RMB 683 Bungendore NSW 2621 * Thanks to David Bennett for comments on an earlier draft. For more on deep-green theory, see essays in and work referred to in the Green Series, i.e. Discussion Papers in Environmental Philosophy, RSSS, Australian National University, Canberra. This compressed essay was solicited by and written for Island Magazine (Tasmania). Upon receiving it however, the editors decided that it was too dense, and insufficiently journalistic and popular (not features they had at any time requested), for their magazine. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Draft Papers Description An account of the resource Sylvan's literary executor encountered an archive in which “all his projects were current", since manuscripts were undated and unattributed. Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document DEEP-GREEN ETHICS Contents PARTS CHAPTERS 0 I II III IV Prologue DEEP, GREEN, ETHICS, and PHILOSOPHICAL BACKGROUND 1 Deep [and] green fundamentals 2 Ethics without humans; philosophy without humans 3 Philosophical setting: deep-green plurallisms 4 Inhibiting presumptions and myths AXIOLOGY: value core 5 Value and its varieities: basic theory and its development 6 Alternative primitives and theoretical beginnings DEONTOLOGY: necessary moral structure 7 Obligation and its deontic circle, and moral dilemmas 8 Rights, and justice VIRTUE and INACTION 9 Environmental virtues: what they are and something of their theory 10 V Environmental ethical practice NATURE of ETHICS 11 Ethics, its new character and revised foundations 12 Principal questions of reoriented ethics, and proposed answers 13 Epilogue 17 .5.96 DEEP-GREEN ETHICS PROLOGUE Philosophy and its branches, ethics especially, are among the last places where prejudice would be found, found alive and thriving, so it might be imagined. Wrong. In the first place, prevailing ethics all exhibit heavy prejudice in favour of humans, human chauvinism. So they are one and all defective, wrong in a deep way. An adequate ethic will remove the prejudices involved. That means, in turn, a radical transformation of prevailing ethics, from the bottom up. Such a transformation constitutes a main objective of this book. Deep-green ethics aims not simply to reform present arrangements and systematizations, but to replace them. Abolition of prejudice has early priority. Prejudice in philosophy, privelege in prevailing ethics. There are only about two and half millenia of recorded philosophy on Earth. To a disconcerting extent, those millenia represent two and half thousand years of prejudice-partial exceptions occurring and prejudice subsiding somewhat only when ideological empires were fractured (e.g. fruitful periods of "warring states" in ancient China and Greece). Ethics is far from alone within philosophy in exhibiting serious deficiencies, in incorporating prejudices that should not figure so prominently in what is ideally an impartial subject. Much the same holds for other branches: politics obviously (partly through its interdependence with ethics), metaphysics and logic perhaps less obviously. Yet prevailing metaphysics display a deep prejudice in favour of the actual, against what does not exist. In logic the prejudical situation has in fact been accentuated through the rise of modern symbolic logic. Regrettably mainstream symbolic logic is wrong. All its forms validate incorrect principles (such as implicational paradoxes), these results flowing primarily from an underlying prejudice in favour of the consistent, against the impossible. 1 Several of the systematic prejudices embedded elsewhere in philosophy impact upon ethics. The prejudice in favour of the actual has served to distort, very seriously, the issue of obligations to future creatures for example, in this fashion:- Remoter future creatures do not exist, and therefore, according to prevailing prejudice, cannot have any relevant features, any preferences or desires, self-traits or satisfactions, to be taken into ethical account. Therefore All the themes are presented and defended in detail elsewhere. As regards metaphysics, see JB; as regards logic, see e.g. BGB and generally in philosophy , see TM. There are several coupled prejudices and prejudical drives, as will appear; for instance the drives to power and to maximization, strongly manifested in logic, see e.g. RLR. Prejudice in ethics was explicitly recognised by Bentham, almost two centuries ago; unfortunately however he imported his own very influential prejudical framework. 2 "they" can be discounted entirely. The same prejudice also enters in a very different way. All the standard positions concerning universals, all of which reflect the metaphysical presupposition that discourse concerns existent objects, show up in ethics. They appear in vexing issues as to the ontological status of values, such as the good, and of deontic notions, such as obligations and the right. These are not only difficult items to discover in the world, but they do not seem adequately housed in conceptual or linguistic apparatus: where are they located? Whence derives immediate pressure for many mostly bizarre reduction exercises; for instance of values to human constructs, contructs from social preferences or from sociobiological drives, and of obligations from veiled contracts. The initial question of location makes, however, the defective metaphysical presupposition, and lapses therewith. Values, though significant items, do not exist; so they are not located, anywhere. Prejudice rooted in established logic has impacted differently, upon a variety of issues in ethics. The absolute requirement of consistency upsets a straightforward treatment of obligations, general sets of which are typically inconsistent, thereby leading for instance to awkward theories of hierarchies of obligation or of merely prima facie obligations. Running parallel with this, the requirement utterly distorted an initially straightforward theory of ethical dilemmas, treatment of which is a significant part of any comprehensive ethical theory. Established logic has also impacted heavily on such different issues as fact-value inferences (e.g. the prescriptive fallacy) and regarding the extent of pluralism in ethics. The assumption behind the rationalistic critique of relativism is that there is a single correct logic, governed by requirements of consistency, namely standard logical theory, which (when combined with the facts) will eliminate various ethical stances as incorrect, indeed which may, given sufficient critical thought, lead to a single correct ethics. 2 But the assumption fails; for it too depends on ancient prejudice. Pluralism is one most important component in removing prejudice generally, certainly in reducing it generally, by admitting alternatives, and allowing some to flourish. 3 Elaboration of deep-green theory is another important direction in removing prejudice, in favour of humans, persons, or like agents from ethics especially but not only. The main development that follows will take both these directions, though focussed upon ethics: it will track and investigate pluralistic deep-green ethics. Human chauvinism is not the only major prejudice damaging ethics. An extraordinarily privileged position given to egoistical considerations is another. Western ethics in particular has 2 3 The approach involved, that of traditional rationalistic ethics, is regularly deployed by Singer (e.g. his Encyclopedia conclusion to Companion to Ethics); the strengthened version features in Regan. Of course how it is supposed to proceed, the details of how reason works this miracle, is never revealed. See esp. TM, epilogue. 3 recently been deformed through a substantially unquestioned axiom of self concern, that agents are interested in and motivated by their own (self) concerns and only by them. (Of course an agent's self, or extended self, may be grander than the agent's soul or person or body or whatever; it may include the agent's family or even the agent's tribe, or differently it may comprehend the agent's land or environment. But under such extensions the axiom is already beginning to disintegrate.) Such an ubiquitous, but largely unquestioned, presumption has lain behind reductionistic exercises that have distorted much of modem ethical (and political) theory. The leading idea is simple enough: given that action is justified through human self-interest, and only thus, if ethical theory (and likewise political superstructure) can be justified through some construction or modelling on that basis (bringing in only indifference and like neutral assumptions) , then justification will be transmitted, it too will be justified. Thus those contractual and utilitarian exercises which have loomed so large in recent theory. 4 The same dubious presumption also features large elsewhere, for instance in the acclaimed derivation of Deep Ecology from the ultimate norm of Self-realization! It is not just prejudice and allied presumption that have damaged and distorted ethics. Narrow ethics, parading as universal or absolute in defiance of pluralism, ethics often underwritten by religious or papal presumption, have severely disadvantage d ethics. Furthermore, connected therewith, ethics has been destabilized, and cast in an unfavourable light, by • a quest for absolute foundations, and in tum connected therewith • an invidious comparison with science, which is supposed to have such foundations. The quest is quixote: there are no such foundations. Nor does science have such foundations, so the comparison is misplaced. Not only is absoluteness for science increasingly disputed, but it is becoming apparent that science is in the same sort of pluralistic situation-pre dicament some, still questing for the old false certainties, would say-as ethics. 5 Through the assumption, or pretence, that it can deliver (whether from religious, rational or other resources) certainties of a type that it cannot deliver, ethics has become discredited. But that is only part among reasons why on the contemporary scene ethics is not the force that it has mostly been in bygone times. At least as important as such intellectual reasons are matters like removal of social and political pressures to conform, redirection of indoctrination practices (into consumerism, etc.), and so on, some welcome and some definitely not. 4 5 Roughly, ethics, knocked down to what's in it for everyone (some aggregated base class), is justified through what's in it for each me. Prima facie the grand construction is based on a simpler fallacy of aggregation: an invalid each to all inference. The theme is argued in detail in TM chapter 10. The quixote quest is strikingly engaged in by Williams, for a entertaining criticism of which see 'Bernard Williams and the Absolute Conception of the World' in Putnam 92. 4 Aspects of the discreditation have in turn been exaggerated. Ethics, it is said, makes no difference, even can never make a difference; it never effects change. Such claims are seriously astray, as examination of elementary examples like human slavery and treatment of animals quickly reveals. Environmental ethics too can make a difference (perhaps, when coupled with other practices, a major difference), and they are beginning to do so. But naturally they cannot compel change; nor should they be capable of doing so, as that would exceed proper roles of ethics (and other proper practices). 6 Rectification of ethics requires, then, not merely removal of now conspicuous prejudice and presumptions, but deflation of pretensions. What results-hardly unique naturally, but one selected for good reasons among many, hardly entirely exclusive but overlapping and admitting others-is an ethics which differs from standard ethics in the following respects at least: Such an ethics is: • deep-green, removing prejudice in favour of humans, and in favour of certain (egoistic) agents, in an affirmative fashion; and • Pluralistic in a thorough-going way, accordingly not pretending to absolute or objective status. The run of prevailing ethics, including so-called "applied ethics" and "environmental ethics" are chauvinistic; a satisfactory (environmental) ethic is not. The run of prevailing ethics are absolutist, or otherwise relativist; a satisfactory ethic is neither. However the conditions so far presented are but necessary conditions; they are not jointly sufficient for adequacy. Even among theories that are nonchauvinistic and duly pluralistic, reductionism may persist. Such reductionisms come in striking variety; thus, on just one dimension, individualisms, sentientisms, vitalisms, (i.e. all that has value is alive, somehow), and so on. To avoid such reductionisms, another blanket condition of adequacy is: • non-reductionistic. The main task consists in elaborating in detail an ethic, with other preferred features, that meets these conditions of adequacy. Regrettably, removal of prejudice cannot be accomplished in ethics alone, as a separate pollution-free zone. Prejudice in ethics flows through from other regions, religion especially, but also from psychology (which in the past made little gods of humans with sacred souls of their own, justifying very differential treatment for them in the world), and from elsewhere. Removal of these latter sorts of prejudices requires a severe erosion of belief, in regions strictly outside ethics, but heavily exporting into it; of beliefs fostering intellectual prejudice. Nonetheless ethics has a role in removal of prejudices elsewhere, because, very simply, these prejudices ought to be removed. The basic principle, which can also be presented as one 6 These points are developed at some decent length in GE part IL 5 of rationality, runs as follows: belief ought not to exceed warranting evidence, but should be appropriate to it. None of this is as clean and clear-cut as it may initially appear, because source waters have become very muddied. Sources for instance take a range of forms (this is part of the ancient issue of the criterion reput in more contemporary terms). Sources include not merely empirical evidence, perception especially, the favoured, or even exclusive, source of empiricism. They also include such sources as: emotional presentation, or emotion; postulation or presumption; reason; authority; a range of psychic and extra sensory perception (ESP) forms; and, differently, a range of intuitions. Some of these sources overlap; consider for instance divine relevation. Plainly those sources are very different kinds, quality and calibre. Some such as reason, which includes itself a disputed variety of forms, are more processing of information kinds than sources (thought reason becomes a source, of sorts, in pure rationalism, and a degenerate source of necessary truths in classical logical theory where theorems are proved, by paradoxical means, from nothing so to say). While some of these kind of sources are not important or at issue in ethics, for instance controversial kinds of ESP giving information on remote (spatially distant or past or future) items, several are. It is not going too far to say that ethics is severely vexed as regards sources, and many distortions such as naturalism can be seen as coming about as ways of trying to secure reliable sources (if some naturalistic reduction were correct then ethics would be brought within the orbit of science and even empirical perceptual bases could be adopted, as in science). But ethics does not resemble science; its sources are not (except incidentally) primarily perceptual, thus breaking any very close analogy between epistemology and ethics. A major source in ethics is emotion, by contrast with epistemology where the major source is perception. From there already derives a major difference between the fields, as perception tends to be less variable, more intersubjective, less culturally dependent across the range of subjects usually taken into account. Accordingly, in any quest for a more objective ethics, more has to be drawn out, out of the processing substructure, whence the emphasis on coherence, good reasons, ethical on coherence, good reasons, ethical argumentation. Ethical inputs, sources, and processing are assessed in detail in the text. Although this work is focussed upon ethics, it does not, and evidently cannot, merely concern ethics. Since the ethical theory is itself approached primarily (though not exclusively) by way of value, it bears upon other areas, such as normative-infected social sciences, where value theory features. For another example, it also impacts upon aesthetics, heavily. For, according to the theory advanced, there is no sharp boundary, indeed really no division at all, between what has been dubbed "aesthetic value" and "ethical value". Value is value, without these artificial divides. Evidently too, as will appear, the work intrudes in normative reaches 6 merging into ethics, in particular, wherever normative or deontic dilemmas are encountered, such as reaches of social choice theory and legal theory. Differently, the work includes much, though indirectly, upon philosophy of nature. For it is especially concerned to supersede an old defective philosophy of nature, which included a heavy devaluation of nature, and aided and abetted a manifestly chauvinistic ethics. The ethical theory to be elaborated fits with, and in significant respects presupposes, a·different theory of nature. 7 Although investigations in this text are primarily theoretical, they have significant practical implications. Putting the theory to work in various environmental fields is something that happens elsewhere (see further in the Epilogue). Some of this has already occurred, in essays in the Green Series, and some is reserved for other texts on field ethics. 8 Notes on terminology In this text several familiar terms, such as 'green' and 'deep', are converted into quasi-technical terms. That is to say, special uses of the terms already in currency, such as the use of 'green' to mean environmentally committed, are further refined. The result could be signalled by deloyment of appropriate new terminology. Something like that is assumed done, except that the familiar terms will be retained-onl y now they are to be read in the quasi-technical way. To put the point differently. Let 'grene' (Olde English) or 'gre-een, (Newe English), for example, be the quasi-technical explication of 'green' in the relevant sense. Then in the subsequent text, 'green' will normally signify gre-een, or equivalently 'green' operates as (effectively abbreviates) 'gre-een. Why such a strategem? One reason is that people are now rather conservative regarding terminology. Indeed they are often turned off by new terminology (despite regular ruination of established terminology). As a result, established terminology gets revised for all sorts of new purposes (witness the bizarre high-school reuses in advanced physics), with a resultant overloading of senses. By contrast, recycling of old terminology (words or spellings), that has fallen into disuse would be rather more commendable. Here, rather than pressing our luck with explicit recyclings like diep and chalowe, we resort to the fiction that the terms 'deep' and 'shallow' deployed throughout the text stand in for the technical recyclings. As a result 'deep', as figuring in deep approaches, deep green, deep theory and so on, has no connection with profundity, or 'shallow' with superficiality. As several have said, in several respects deep/shallow terminology is unsatisfactory, execrable it is sometimes said. Founder N aess did a disservice introducing it, and subsequently 7 8 Such an appropriate underlying theory of nature is advanced in the companion work on metaphysics, namely TM. Green Series is a popular label for discussion papers in environmental philosophy, published from Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University. One of the other texts is tentatively entitled Green Ethical Fields .. 7 in explaining it, so slackly. While it is too late to easily change the terminology, some undesirable associations may be shaken off by resorting to older or variant spellings, and simultaneous ly refining senses intended. That we do. But then we concede to the general intellectual will, by the substitution or "abbreviations" strategem. Even so, we have risked a few neologisms, and we shall chance, just here, one or two more. One we risk, is euthics, for universalizab le ethics, that is an ethics meeting universalizability requirements (in some appropriate fashion). This bit of terminology helps in resolving a significant ambiguity in philosophical usage of 'ethics', and making an improved start on the vexed issue of why an agent should adhere to an ethics, or differently to an euthics? One we chance is viridology (from Latin virides, green, and Greek logos, study of, in modern palance) for: theory, principles and practices of deep-green; that is, a single classical word for diep-grene theory. A purer alternative we contemplated, from among many, was prasinology (or should it be prasinomics) from Greek (and Latin) prasinus, dark green, leek green. Acknowledg ements and antecendents: personal development and conceit. The production of this work owes much to other humans, with of whom I have little or no acquaintance. The debts are both intellectual and practical. On the heavily practical side, I am most grateful to Frances Redrup for the processing of reems of rough scribble. On the broad practical front I am pleased to acknowledge the continuing support of my research endeavours by the Australian National University. That academic support, while generous by often niggardly world standards, has recently declined, through contraction of research support and expansion of alleged accountability practices. In this little respect, there has regettably been interference in my research, dur the earlier stages of work on this book, by no doubt wellintentioned academics occupying supervisary roles who have deemed by performance less than satisfactory. It is with regret too that I record that, in part owing to biassed appointment practices within the University, there has been negligible imput to the present work from any of my academic colleagues there. But outside imput there has been of course, of two main sorts: from recent activity in environmental philosophy and from past exercises in value theory. While environmental issues have operated as a main stimulus in my recent work in ethics, my own interest in and investigations in ethics reach back to my graduate work in Wellington, New Zealand, where I produced a characteristic ally initative work on ethics, entitled Moral Scepticism (I do not suggest that anyone read that work, which it is far too late to suppress). In New Zealand, I was educated in the 20th century British type and style of ethical theory, primarily Oxbridge material, with not antipodean influence of any significance what cover, except in the obscure background Prior' s quocit little book Logic and the Basis of Ethics (although my professor at Wellington, George Styles, had ethics as a manfield, I learnt only a 8 certain technigue from him; I do not recall one position, little theorem argument or there I must attribute to him, for the very simple reason, (suspect, that he never advanced very much). Among Oxbridge characters, Moore revoided the dominant influence though much of Hume and his near contemporaries-N eurall-Smith Tomlesia and others-was scround up to a tiny circle of ethical enthusiants and fellow academic travellers. Moore is still an influence in this book; in my occasional more conceited moments, I like to envisage the book as an appropriately greenish update of Principia Ethica. At least it may be as near as I ever come to producing such a work: Principa Ethica Virida. What on excessively ambitious idea, sheer hubris! Yet, for all the fuss, Principia Ethica is not really such a good book; rather it enjoys other advantageous features. A few companions with Principa Ethica will be ventured. But, by and large, other ethical theories will not be investigated in much detail. For one reason, that has been done, to a sufficient extent elsewhere (in others' work more than my own). For another, in the wake of accumulating evidence, notably from environmental awakenings, revealing their narrowness and prejudice, they scarcely justify further post mortems. More than Moore and Priest, the present work is indebted to Meinong, and through him to the tradition of Austrian value theory. The theory elaborated in fact fits, more or less, into what has been called critical cognitivism .. The evil of ingratitude, for example, ... Here and there, the present text draws, heavily sometimes, on my own past work, especially concerning environmental ethics. As much of the work, for example in the local Green Series in Canberra, is rather inaccessible, such borrowing may not matter much. There remains a small overlap-ideally vanishingly small as revision proceeds-betwee n this text and better circulated complementary works, notably essays in Environmental Philosophy and parts of The Greening of Ethics. INTRODU CING DEEP-GR EEN THEORY Deep-green theory aims eventually to supply a comprehensive alternative environmental philosophy. While it stands on its own, it is alternative because it stands in radical ideological opposition to dominant ways, nowadays predominantly industrial. It offers a philosophy both in the contemporary narrower sense, and in the older sense of an intellectually informed and critical way of life. That philosophy is centred on an ethical theory (upon which this issue concentrates), which is in form centred upon a value theory. But the ethic issues, in a fashion broadly associated since Aristotle, in a politics and political economy. But the output of the value theory in fact reaches much further, into practical decision making in a range of environmentally impacting areas such as fishing, forestry and agriculture. The value theory is also intertwined with philosophical issues which are often considered more fundamental, those of astophyism and epistemology. Indeed there is no part of philosophy that remains untouched. Therein lies part of the claim to comprehensiveness. The particular form of deep-green theory elaborated is by no means independent of (acclaimed) advances recently made elsewhere in philosophy (those in object-theory, and relevant and paraconsistent logics especially). But though the theory given is influenced and sometimes in fact shaped through these developments, deep-green theory more generally can avoid them (The type of theory given could easily enough be recast in a more classical Platonistic form - undoubtedly a much less plausible form. Nor will these background advances intrude, it is hoped, in the given elaboration of deep-green theory; the background will remain, fairly directly in the background, and not come to dominate proceedings or know proceedings depend upon special new controversial features of it. Where more technical agreements are required, they will be relegated to appendices. 1. As to deep theory. Deep-green theory is the environmental branch of a much larger affair, deep theory. There is a point, in fact a real expository need, to place deep-green theory in the larger setting of deep theory. For deep theory influences several of the choices made in deciding upon the way deepgreen theory goes, the shape it takes. Although the influence will become evident, particularly with the intertwining of truth and value that .... , it is worth giving an example. Too much of the Anglo-American discussion of intrinsic value and of obligations to future generations is taken up with - hung up upon - ontological questions, about universal items in the first case, and as how there can be obligations regarding future items which do not (yet) exist in "suitable" determinate 2 form in the second. Deep object-theo ry slices straight through these issues, removing the problem generating ontological assumptions. Deep-theor y is a grander theory lying in the background , which significantl y influences the philosophic al approach taken in deep-green theory, as well as being influenced by it. There is no reason why that grand backdrop should remain hidden; there is no hidden agenda. The backgroun d theory, of which deep-green theory is a part, is called simply deep theory. For it represents the confluence of several deep positions with deep-green theory: deep pluralism, depth relevant theory, deep item-theory, and so on. As a theoretical endeavor, deep theory aims to pull together, into a unified coherent theory these various deep positions. It thus draws together and integrates as well, several other interrelated efforts (on dialethism, process theory, anakyrie, etc. With deep theory I aim to supply eventually a fairly comprehen sive philosophical package. I used to imagine that with moderate comprehen siveness as regards present philosophic al problems would come a certain completene ss; but I've come to think that a total philosophy is an illusion, like pots of gold at the ends of rainbows, and rainboweri a themselves. Deep theory is no doubt a presumptu ous title (there are worse about, e.g. 'total philosophy ', 'ecosophy' ), not it is altogether satisfactory given the problems and obscurities, to be encountere d, lacking in the notion of depth. My main excuse is that I did no exactly choose the title myself, but had it thrust upon me: problemati c, presumptuo us, it looks to good to refuse. It emerged from a terminolog ical confluence of several areas in which I'd been struggling to assemble ac. capirred theory - deep-green theory (itself a union of green thought, or environmen tal philosophy with a revised deep ecology), deep relevant theory, deep pluralism (which deepened radical pluralism), and deep item-theory (which deepens object-theory). To give a picture of deep theory, it suffices for present purposes to indicate some main features of deep positions, some of their integrating interrelatio ns, and some of their revolutiona ry potential. Deep theory overturns or subverts very much of what has been assumed or presuppos ed in Western philosophy , and particularl y in Enlightenm ented contempora ry philosophy. For example, it overturns the following widespread assumptions:• the Ontologica l Assumptio n, that truth, and also, meaning, are functions of reference, and thereby presuppose existence. On the contrary according to (deep) item theory, we can perfectly well talk and think truly about items that do not exist, and also about items that are not individual but are complex but perhaps indetermin ate wholes, and finally what items are impossible . Therewith repudiated also then is an occasionall y favoured full-back from onticalism, namely possibilism , which assumes 3 • the Possibilist Reduction, of everything that counts in discourse to possible individuals; there are no other genuine subjects, all else can be analysed (or thrown) away. Bound up with possibilism are • the assumptions of modalism, of the correctness of classical logic, and of the absolute requirement of consistency. Under more throughgoing transconsistency (or paraconsistency) these connected assumptions are one and all repudiated. The transconsistent connection assumes an important role in the straightforward treatment of moral and other dilemmas, in showing for example how an agent may coherently operate under inconsistent obligations or with incompatible needs. Important special cases of modalism are such theories as that • entailment is strict implication (or its metalinguistic analogical) and that conditionality amounts to a modal function of material implication 1. The rejection of such themes and their courses is part of what motivates deep relevant logic. While the parts of deep theory are integrated and are intended to be materially reinforcing, nothing prevents their fairly independent elaborations. The holism conceded does not exclude separation or analysis. In particular, deep-green theory is amenable to independent development and analysis. Material implication is the implication defined in terms of truth-functions thus: A materially implies B iff not last A and not B, or equivalently, iff either not A or B. Strict implication is the necessitation of material obligatory i.e. A strictly implies B iff necessarily A materially implies B, or equivalently, iff it is not possible that not A and not B. ON THE VALUE CORE OF DEEP-GR EEN THEORY This essay aims to uncover the value theory of deep-green theory, exposing thereby a central area of that theory. Though the value theory is (inevitably) abstract, it issues in what is more concrete, such as an applicable system and practical ecological directives, potentially destabilizing for prevailing policies and institutions. Deep-green theory which stands in significant ideological opposition to dominant industrial ways, is intended to supply a comprehensive alternative environmental philosophy. At the core of deep-green theory lies a value theory. A fundamental theme thereof, part of what makes the structure deep, is that a range of environmental items are valuable in themselves, directly and irreducibly so, so that their value does not somehow reduce to or emerge from something else, such as features of certain valuers or what matters for them. Thus value does not answer back in some way to humans, or sentient creatures (or other value-responsive classes), their interests, uses, preferences, or such like. Many natural items, such as forests and rivers, mountains and seashores, are intrinsically valuable. They are valuable in their own right - irrespective of whether they are interesting or useful (to any intentional operators, themselves interesting or useful or not), indeed whether or not there exist any valuers. Value spreads through and reaches across the natural domain; it is not bounded by mind, or linkages with subjective states; nor does it stop with sentience, or associated pyschological features like satisfaction; nor does it end at life; it observes no such compromising bounds. Although value is distributed richly if irregularly throughout nature, it is not then encapsulated in some isolable natural feature, such as life or sentience, or even in defeasible ecological values such as richness, diversity and variety (and so open to a different, naturalistic, reduction). But of course such ecologically important features afford criteria for value, and should be represented in recipes (such as "objective functions") for assessing overall value. From the presence of natural things of value, and accordingly of natural values, it is a short, though controversial, step to the important conclusion that there can be values without valuers. For valuers are sentient creatures with appropriate capacities, but things of value may precede and succeed all such valuers; that is, these things can persist, their values intact, without any valuers. As there can be shapes without any shape-perceivers, so there can be values without valuers. (The theme, like others advanced, can be backed up by more detailed argument and by formal proof, neither attempted here.) In valuational relations then, which relate valuers as subjects with values as objects, both ends of relations have independent standing; though interrelated, as the descriptions are deliberately chosen to suggest, either can stand without the other. It is a fashionable mistake to try to collapse this relation - usually to endeavour to soak up values into a modification of valuing subjects (e.g. as a predicate 'relation-to-values', in which inconvenielt values are locked away). The mistaken procedure is in fact just one important example of an archetypal modern reduction of relations to functions; other examples, locking undesired objects away within functions, are those rendering wholes (such as ecosystems and organised structures) functions of their parts, and, under functionalism, minds and types of intentionality, including value-direction, as functions of bodies or their parts such as brains. Values are not, and do not disappear into, functions of valuers. A connected corollary is that values are not apart from the actual world, something "projected" or imposed on it by a favoured class of valuers, something colouring (and even emotionall y clouding) the otherwise valueless physical world, in rather the way that reductionistic materialism tries (erroneously) to construe colour itself as projected onto a colourless physical world. Of course this projection effort, never adequately explicated, does not succeed, on its own, in removing values. For they remain, left as some function of the valuers. To try to bulldoze through this difficulty, a second reduction is invoked, of evaluative features of valuers to "natural" features, commonly preferences, consumer desires or such like. The second reduction runs into obstacles that halt even the naturalistic bulldozers (e.g. naturalistic and related fallacies), but the first reduction is the critical one in removing key environmental values, such as those of wilderness and wild things, which become valuable only in the focus of certain sentient beholders, and not in and for themselves. This reduction too is blocked by insuperable difficulties. On the one side, like the parallel proposed phenomenalist reduction of material objects to sensations, the reduction never achieves satisfactory support or even a satisfactory statement. On the other, it is counterexampled by various modellings or thought-experiments revealing intuitively-assessed value in situations devoid of valuers (as e.g. in the well-known Last Person argument). Values remain then part of the still rich actual world; they are objects in the domain of actual and other worlds. But they are not of course material objects; creatures will not fall over them any more than they will trip over shadows or mere shapes. Value, like shape, is an attribute, which things have or may lack, and which furthermore creatures can recognise or may fail to discern. Thus value is, like shape and colour and their determinate forms (round, red, etc), a universal , distributed across things, individuals and wholes. The comparison of value with shape is decidedly more helpful than the regular, but exhausted, comparison of value with colour, or of goodness with colour determinates such as yellow. For example, shape is not bound by a set of determinates as colour is in the specific colours, but comes in a spectacular variety of forms, not totally or linearly ordered (as in a rainbow), or contracted to some primary set (as in colour triangles); shape which pertains to wholes as well as particulars, links with gestalts better than colour; shape discrimination is more culture dependent and sensitive; yet shape is, or was, a primary property, and thereby 3 more immune to reductionist strategies than secondary properties such as colour. Again shapes like values, can be vague, indeterminate; that does not prevent things, perhaps unique things, exemplifying them. But naturally the analogy can only be extended so far. Shapes can be approxima ted by polygons, values cannot; shapes are regularly perceived through sense perception, by vision or touch especially, values are not, but are differently apprised. Value is its own thing, not something else; it is what it is and does what is does; it is not something else, like some quantitative mathematical or economic function. Nor does it contract into some mark of value, or to what it comes down to in highly restricted settings; most important, it does not disappear in the style of modern economics into (expected) utility, or into just two economic forms, value-in-use monetarily and value-in-exchange (price), neither of which may reflect worth. Value means what it means, and has meant: worth ; and it ties with general assessments of merit and demerit, goodness or badness, not an economic or other truncation thereof. The powerful drive to reduce or deny values has several sources. Part of the motivation for reduction of value springs from epistemological worries, concerning how values can be ascertained and known, so far as they are (subjective translation proposals are then a direct evaluative counterpart of phenomenalism). Part derives from supposedly problematic cultural relativity (whence the attempt to impose values by identification of value with some favoured assessible feature, and with it cultural or economic imperialism). Part of the motivation comes from more sweeping ideological commitments, such as varieties of materialism or scientism, which leave no space for immaterial values. As already apparent, attempted reductions of value come in a dazzling variety of forms • subjective, which make use of psychological features, such as desires, interests, emotions, and the like; or more objective aggregations of these, such as community preferences or utility; or objectively naturalistic, which enrol single track value-making characteristics such as richness or evolutionary development as value; • consequential, which consider only outcomes; or purely motivational, which consider only attitudes and ignore leads and outcomes; • straightforward, as in translation proposals for translating value judgement s into reducing statements; or oblique, as in supervenience propositions (no variations in value without underwriting variations in reducing features); or obscure, as in unarticulated projection claims. Values are not well accommodated within these reductionistic schemes, or accommodated at all. Deep-green value theory, which is thoroughly nonreductive, repudiates all these reductionistic options. They are not so difficult to avoid, as the options are neither exhaustive nor exclusive. In particular, value reduces neither in subjective nor objective fashion; it does not reduce. Evaluative judgements are nonjective, that is, neither subjective nor objective (in any absolutist 4 fashion). Obversely, evaluation of an act does not reduce to assessing consequences; nor does it come down to an assessment of motives; both may matter. The virulent idea is abroad however that science can offer a reduction, can sweep up value along with all other information, where philosophy has conspicuou sly failed. Unfortunately for such optimistic ideas, fortunately perhaps for deeper thought, current basic science does not have much to say at all, or of merit, about values, and if it did reductions through it would be circular. But, to the contrary, there is a long-standing pretence that science gets along "well" without values, in appropriate value-free fashion. Nowadays it is increasingly realised that the positivistic assumption of such value-freedom is a myth, that much of what passes as science is heavily value-penetrated. While the residual ideal of pure engagement in pure science may offer the illusion of an escape from value, there is no escape. For, in any case, reductions do not succeed, as a copious literature, littered with failed attempts, meanderingly establishes. Nor are they generally desirable, since mostly shallow, aiming at a reduction to features of some privileged class presented as ideal (i.e. core value is covertly assumed, so there is no real reduction). Nor are they needed; explanation and assessment do not require reduction. Evaluations may be arrived at, and value frameworks expanded, by enhancement methods, which organise and expand emotional presentation by coherence methods. The enhancement methodology in fact resembles that sometimes proposed for further acquisition of scientific information. As accumulated empirical information can be further extended through presentational input and assessment for overall coherence, so further evaluations may be arrived at and assessed through a combination of presentational and coherence procedures. At the (marginal) stage where the next round of evaluations is undertaken, the following active ingredients figure, in an idealised breakdown:- Firstly, a background stock of judgements and value experience will have been accumulated or inherited; in principle all of this is revisable, and some may be up for reassessment. Apart from the background, which enters in assessing overall coherence of system, what is involved is, secondly, emotional presentation, which corresponds to further perceptional and sense data input, and, thirdly and not independe nt, coherence processing , which supplies the interpretational and rationalisational components. At bottom, parallelling perception in the case of empirical information, is emotional presentation, gut or visceral reaction in starker forms of acceptance or rejection, but more generally comprehending a variety of sentiments, including overall well-being, and also relational impressions, such as empathy, identification, and so on. As a perceiver perceives shapes, so a valuer feels raw value and disvalue. The basis of perception is sensation, the basis of valuation is emotion. Apprehension of value is seated in emotional, and especially visceral, presentation; but what is apprehended is not to be confused with its apprehension any more than what is perceived. All the warnings about sensation as an information source have to be repeat~d, with heavy emphasis, as regards emotional presentation; for example, reliability cannot be guaranteed, interference with presentation through drugs, alcohol, temporary excitement or other inputs may render it dubious or unacceptable, conditioning may have occurred, including substantial cultural conditioning (so that a person is terrified by harmless spiders but not sickened by bloody massacres of dolphins or seals). As with perception, there are checks on emotional presentation, such as constancy over time and after reflection. Emotional presentation, supplying primarily inclusions and exclusions or prohibitions, is but the basis of reflective evaluation and value apprehension. The further critical part, coherence processing, builds on the basis taking account of other inputs or controls including background (which supplies relevant components of already adopted judgements, assimilated subculture and so forth) and constraints (such as moral substitutional requirements like impartiality, e.g. whether considered judgements hold for substitute valuers, and uniformity, e.g. whether similar acts are judged in similar ways). Essentially, the coherence procedure consists in asking whether the next or a relevant judgement fits together with what has been accepted, while meeting constraints, without leading to what has been rejected or excluded. If it does fit it is added to the included side, otherwise it is sent to the excluded side. Because an aim of this rationalisation procedure is achievement of some sort of equilibrium such coherence procedures have gained currency under the rubric "reflective equilibrium". Observe, however, that equilibrium reached at some stage may be lost as new types of problems arise and further information enters. No doubt the whole methodology (like the parallel methodology of an empirically-based coherence theory of truth) is highly idealised, and only practicably applicable in rudimentary parts. It does however surmount a major theoretical obstacle for environmental value theory; it reveals how in principle a nonreductionistic value theory can function, and deliver a tenable value system. Whether what results is however an appropriate deep environmental system will depend above all on the presentational input, the extent to which environmental sensitivity enters and is not suppressed. Enhancement methods reveal too that value systems are not uniquely determined, any more than other comprehensive theoretical frameworks. There evidently are rival value systems measuring up to rigorous rationality requirements, much as there are rival logics and rival physical and biological systems. In particular chauvinistic systems, narrow or shallow value systems, which are unresponsive to and take no account of environmental items and values, cannot be excluded on rational or straight logical grounds. Unfortunately such systems remain in ascendancy, and tend to dominate social and political practice; in recent times economism, a narrow type of utilitarianism, has all too obviously dominated much terrestial practice. While such value frameworks are open to severe criticism, for instance as chauvinistic, as violating universality requirements of morality in the case of economism, they do not succumb to definitive refutatiog (for the reason that requirements of morality, universalizability of principle, impartiality and so on, can simply be repudiated; immoral or amoral frameworks are still value systems). Even so, much can be done to shift or alter values, though as usual effectiveness cannot be guaranteed. A range of argumentative, educational and persuasive techniques, of varying quality, can be put to work to move valuers indoctrinated in old damaging structures, often enough successfully. Important among these are positive presentations of environments, their habitats and creatures, by way of new information and experience. The availability of rival value systems, while it implies a certain desirable (and also troublesome) pluralism, does not mean relativism. From a deep-green viewpoint, rival narrower and shallower systems are definitely inferior, and criticised accordingly, while economism is an anathema which does not even make the moral grade (e.g. too many principles stop at class or state boundaries). However a critical pluralism does acknowledge and offer a place in the wider scheme of things for other systems, even if as less favoured or satisfactory. One political upshot is evident; deep-green theory promotes, what matters in these irrational times of numbers, alliances - in particular, a green alliance, organising green positions, against prevailing forces of environmental degradation. The systematic pluralism of deep-green value theory interpenetrates not only social and political domains above, but also metaphysics traditionally placed below. In the underlying metaphysical pluralism of deep-green theory, value runs very deep - so deep that even truth depends in part upon it. For not merely selection of a correct comprehensive theory or worldview is a value dependent choice, but choice of associated actual world is also. That choice, insofar as it is consciously made, of world structure and conceptualisation, is a constrained choice, constrained by informational inputs, such as those of refined perception. But inasmuch as it is rationally accomplished, that choice, like other choices of structure, proceeds according to a standard value-information analysis (regularly oversimplified however to a preferenceinformation or even desire-belief modelling); that is, to extract the salient point, it involves value essentially. Truth and value are then intertwined; truth, though naturally different from value, is value dependent. Both are plural, and differently so. So, unremarkably deep-green metaphysics resembles the value theory in significant respects. For example, as the value theory is nonreductionistic, so also is the metaphysics; in particular, there is a no-reduction theme that neither parts nor wholes reduce eliminably to one another, as opposed to atomistic and holistic views of environmental interrelations. As the value theory is pluralistic, so also is the metaphysics; in place of established absolutism, a plurality of worlds, with associated truth definitions is discerned. Indeed a main aim of deep-green theory is to dislodge dominant 7 destructive ideologies, which (each of them) assume an absolute truth, from their positions thereby providing intellectual living-space for natural environments. Much of deep-green theory devolves then from the abstract value theory. As with the metaphysical way sketched, so it is with the fuller ethical theory, which includes as well as a specific axiological system, elaborating deep environmental values and virtues, a deontic framework, supplying obligations, rights, taboos, and similar. For example, given that a certain wild river is intrinsically valuable, as we can verify by on-site experience and enhancement methods, and given that we duly respect that value, as deontic principles will tell us we should, then we are not free to do as we like with that river, to dam it with concrete, to channel it within concrete, stripping it of its riverine ecosystems. But that does not preclude respectful use of the river, swimming or sailing quietly in its waters, and the like. Value thus guides action, practice, and use; it is the ground also upon which principles are formulated, principles that are assessed and validated by way of enhancement methods. Important among these are non-interference principles, which exclude unwarranted interference with other preference-havers and unwarranted damage, ill-treatment, or devaluation of items of value. Such deontic principles circumscribe environmentally-limited freedom of action. Given noninterference principles, a major shift in onus of proof from homocentricethics takes place. What is required now is that reasons be givenfor interfering with the environment, rather than reasons for not doing so. Also direct responsibility for environmental interference or modification falls upon those who would seriously interfere or significantly modify, who would tread heavily on the land. Non-interference does not preclude use - only too much use and use of too much. What it does lead to is the theme that, where use occurs, it should be careful and respectful use. An important respect thesis regarding environmental items is founded on such non-interference principles and the no-reduction theme: namely, • not to put others (other preference havers) into a dispreferred state for no good reason; • not to jeopardise the well-being of natural objects or systems without good reason; • not to damage or destroy items which, while they cannot literally be put into a dispreferred state, can be damaged or destroyed or have their value eroded or impaired. These apply to ecosystems, their surrounds, their parts, and so on. The mere making of further excess profits, or similar economic excuses, are not good reasons. Such a respect thesis forms part of the ecological outlook of deep-green theory. Deep-green ethical theory amounts to much more than just another non-reductionist ethical theory, which highlights ecological values and virtues, and so forth. It changes the character and shape of ethical enterprise. Perhaps most strikingly, it removes humans as such from the centre of the ethical stage (or ~xclusive occupation of the stage). The biological concept of being human ceases to be a significant ethical category. To elevate it to such is to fall into human chauvinism, a type of class chauvinism which unwarrantedly discriminates in favour of the human species. The prevailing chauvinism is not inevitable; it is very logically avoided by directly connecting ethical characteristics with the categories of items that can have them. Relevant categories include those marked out by features like: having well-being, preference-having, rights-holding, contractual-capability, and so on, categories not necessarily connected with any particular species. Hitherto virtually all Wes tern ethical theories, and the institutional arrangements they help support, have not merely limited ethical matters to interhuman affairs, but have been blatantly chauvinistic, exhibiting substantial and unjustifiable discrimination in favour of humans (or certain privileged humans). Deep-green theory thus implies the inadequacy of prevailing social, political and economic arrangements and institutions. These structures are the defective products of inferior value frameworks which take quite insufficient account of environmental desiderata and values. Richard Sylvan* RMB 683 Bungendore NSW 2621 * Thanks to David Bennett for comments on an earlier draft. For more on deep-green theory, see essays in and work referred to in the Green Series, i.e. Discussion Papers in Environmental Philosophy, RSSS, Australian National University, Canberra. This compressed essay was solicited by and written for Island Magazine (Tasmania). Upon receiving it however, the editors decided that it was too dense, and insufficiently journalistic and popular (not features they had at any time requested), for their magazine. I \. '1 11.10.95 CHAPTER 1 DEEP AND GREEN AND PRESUPPOSED FUNDAMENTALS It soon emerges from preliminary exploration that, under natural characterisations, relevant notion of both ethics and green presuppose the notion of agency. So with something on agency, enough to get started, we shall begin. In terms of agency and proclivities to environments, green can be characterized, and in turn green approaches. Then, within green approaches, three relevantly different types can be distinguished: shallow, intermediate, and deep. It is the last, and really only the last, that matters for the ethical theory that follows. 1. Action, agency and agents: a summary . 1 Action theory is grounded in process theory. For actions are types of processes, agentascribed processes. processes are directed functions, ordinarily time-directed functions, 2 ? framing of certain functional sorts. All the ordinary sorts of processes-ec lipses, transits, removals, reflections, and so on and on-are processes (and ordinary processes can be separated out logically, such as by applicability and inapplicability of certain predicates, e.g. they take place, they are not facts, etc.) Processes themselves in no way require agents. Actions, however, as distinguished within goings-ons and taking-places, do require agency, and so agents. There is no reason at all why these agents should be humans. Many agents are not humans, some humans are not agents. But it is often quite erroneously assumed agents are humans, or persons. Excess requirements on agency are partly to blame, the mistaken idea that agents have to be purposeful, responsible, rational-feat ures that can be added to distinguish subtypes of agents. Rather, actions can be roughly delineated through answers to questions like What is so and so (the relevant agent) doing? How is so and so acting? The result reached following through this route is this: process a is an action iff for some agent x, a is properly ascribed to x, it is x' s doing. To break residual circularity, it remains to define agency. Agency is defined, such is the proposal, in terms of exercising a causal role (which may be misdirected or similar), through the following circuit. First, x is and agent as agents a iff, for some p directly partinent to a, x causes Pbut x is not caused to cause p. In terms of agency-regarding, other notions can be defined as follows: x is a sometime-agent, someties an agent, iff for some a, x is an agent as 2 As full an account of processes as so far worked up from notes appears in 'Process and actions', which does provide detailed background for this section. '2 regards a. Agency is a characterizing attribute of sometime-agents. An agent is a sometimesagent that establishes a history of agency (a small reputation therefore). 2. Explaining Green. In characterizing green we start with agency. Such relevant features, of greens (or environmentalists), as being positively concerned about nature of natural things, supporting environmental causes and similar, are closely tied to practice and action; they are features of agents. In an original central sense of 'green' so redeployed, an agent was green if that agent firstly believed that some parts of the natural environment should be protected, and secondly took some relevant action. 3 In short, a belief-action analysis emerges, which can be recast as a standard belief-desire-resultant action account. For instance, the agent believes that some natural environment is worth protection, desires that it should be, and acts (in some way, perhaps feebly) accordingly. All the parts of this sort of account call, however, for some elaboration. To remove a certain circularity, resulting from characterising "green" through terms like "environmen t", 'natural environment' can be replaced by 'parts (surface configurations) of the Earth substantially uninterfered with by humans'. To specify protection satisfactorily, protection/ra m what should be indicated. And so on. But there is a little point in elaborating this already weak characterisation, which can be satisfied by an agent interested in saving a few square metres of the Earth's surface from exploitation. For the notion has been further weakened, almost from its inception. To characterise this laxer, but ubiquitous notion, let us insert the intermediary notion of an environmental cause. Such causes include not merely protecting natural environments, but limiting impacts on environments, which may not be pristine, for instance by pouring less sewage or detergents, CFCS or Greenhouse gases, into them, or conserving items, which could be exploited or consumed now for future use or for future human generations (to use or conserve, etc.). The first of these further causes beyond protection, original green, is a largely consumerist notion of green, the second, an economistic notion (it takes in such beloved constraints as intergerational equity). There are other related causes of importance also, such as restoration of something that has been over-exploited or damaged, such as agricultural lands, waterways, urban air, soils (soil conservation), or even human artefacts such as monuments or buildings. The shallow green cause of fighting pollution, for human health reasons, can fit in here. Needless to add the restoration may not be to pristine conditions, but to quite low 3 Although we are explicating terms that are now in widespread usage, in a way substantially faithful to that usage (but not some of its dilute or corrupt expansions), we shall regard the terms as quasi-technical. We see these terms, as the discerning reader also may, as spelt not with a double 'e' but a triple 'e', as 'greeen' and 'greeening' (insert hyphens as need be for appropriate pronunciation, e.g. 'gre-een' _. The effect is to peel off dilution and corruption of 'green' (e.g. so to include every politician, at least when any confronts concerned constituents) and to discard all those unwanted and often undesirable senses the colour term green has accumulated. standards. In sum, causes include as well as protection, such matters as nondestruction, conservation, maintenance, restoration, and so on. Now substitute supporting an environmental cause for protecting a natural environment. Then an agent is green in this expanded laxer sense if the agent believes in supporting an environmental cause and takes some relevant action in that direction. Such an action component is essential: green does imply some practical, if utterly token, involvement. The lax account connects in the right ways with testable sociological criteria. For instance, believing in supporting a cause can be cashed out in terms of joining an organisation working for that cause, or even, reducing the slight action component still further, considering joining such an organisation. 4 The appellation green applies not only to individual agents, but also to groups, coalitions, institutions, even corporations and governments. As a green government can, meet similar lax conditions, it is evident that there really are very few requirements, even weak sponsorship may serve. Many there are now trying to take advantage of green movements-adve rtisers, vendors, politicians, professors, merchants, even generals (with "defence forces" retooling as environmental defence forces). Cashing i in on the movement by producing a goods or services presented as environmentally friendly does not thereby make parties doing so green, especially if what is supplied adds to overall environmental impacts (as do "environmental markets" delivering environmental junk, sometimes portrayed as "green goods"). The requirement of serving environmental causes has been lost. The excessive generosity of the account arrived at, which allows agents with only passing or slight active beliefs in some cause to count as green, does not matter. For firstly, it corresponds moderately well to current lax usage, which allows almost any sort of concern for environments, coupled with an action component as slight as paying a token subscription, to serve. Secondly, it still exercises quite enough exclusive power. Many agents are not green. For instance all those exclusively tuned into possessive individualism, mainstream economics, or similar creeds are not green (i.e. not even lax green). Thirdly, needed discriminations can be made within the class of (lax) green. An important subclass of green comprises ecological green, where the causes include maintenance and protection of natural ecosystems (including wilderness) and these causes enjoy some primacy. "Ecological green" is by no means a tautology. 4 In a study entitled 'GREEN PACKAGES IN AUSTRALIA', greens were picked out from the whole sample of respondents to the Australian Election Study of 1990 in terms of answer to question: How likely are you to join groups campaigning to protect the environment, or are you alrady a member? Permitted answers: (1) I am a member, (2) I am not a member but I have considered joining (3) I am not a member and I haven't considered joining, and (4) I certainly would not consider joining. Those giving answer (2), perhaps token greens, were accounted green. 4 To be green in more than a token fashion is to have some commitment to containing or reducing the environmental impact of humans on the Earth or regions of it. By virtue of the environmental impact equation (for a given region) that means commitment in the immediate future term to either • human population reduction, or • less impacting lifestyles for many humans, or • improvements in technology to reduce overall impact. Most humans in a region can do little to implement the third requirement, except to hope. Accordingly they cannot satisfactorily demonstrate their commitment in this way. A genuine green will meet both the other conditions. But since as big coalition as feasible is sought for a green coalition, marginal greens who meet only one of the requirements, perhaps in weak form, will not usually be excluded (from almost any green church). Issues of population afford a simple test (a necessary condition) for a genuine green in Australia; for that agent fails who suppoes that while efforts (including the agent's contribution) to effect human population reduction should be invested elsewhere, as in parts of Asia or Africa, Australia can keep on growmg. From filling out the conditions delimiting green commitments, a green platform can be derived. Specifically it will include, along with the action clause, derivative directives as regards curtailing population, refining and limiting consumption, adjusting technologies, and consequent thereupon altering administrative, political and economic arrangements and institutions accordingly. What so results is a proper subplatform of the Deep Ecology platform. A fair approximation to the full Deep Ecology platform can be derived by adjoining requirements for depth to those for genine greenness of the action platform; so result themes concerning intrinsic value in nature, and commitments deriving therefrom. In short, the wellknown Deep Ecology platform accounts (as a fair approximation) to a deep green platformwhich can accordingly supplant it. As genuine green and green platform can be characterized given the initial notion of green, that is lax green, so similarly can other green compounds and modified forms be explained (in a preliminary way). For example, a green ideosystem is an ideosystem (an ideology, in the unbiassed sense) that coheres with green commitments, and typically organizes and guides them. As genuinely green, it is a system that includes a green platform, and it could be defined in that way, as an ideo-system coherently extending a green platform. Similarly for green ethics, and for green philosophy (and also for other green notions that could be defined but are not presently needed, e.g. green goods, green consumers, green parties, green ideas and so forth). A green ethical system is a green ideosystem which is an ethic. Green ethics comprises 5 such green ethical systems and their theory. 5 Green ethics thus comprise a decidedly restricted subset of environmental ethics. For an environmental ethic in the broad usage, an ethics that addresses environmental issues, among others, may well contain themes that could not be adopted by a green agent, that may even operate against environmental causes. In consequence, a green ethics is an ethic that could be coherently adopted by a green agent, that does not run counter to environmental causes. 3. Different approaches to the environment: shallower and deeper. People can do more or less what they like with the environment, with the land and the sea, and with what grows and lives there-such was and, in only slightly modified form, remains a dominant theme of Wes tern cultural heritage. It was not the view of other cultures, such as some of the American Indians or Australian Aborigines; nor was it the only view included in the Western cultural package. But it has dominated, especially in colonial and imperial expansion. It is only recently, for example, that some social or governmental restrictions with teeth have been imposed upon what Australians can do with the land they occupy or claim, and these lag far behind advanced green thinking as to what is required. For the most part there has been little weakening in the Wes tern assumption that people own the land, that it is their possession, to mould to their purposes and whims. 6 This unrestrained approach proved damaging enough while the land was wide and humans comparatively few; now that human populations are expanding more rapidly, perhaps to critical limits, now that much land is damaged and less fragile land is in increasingly short supply, it is time to re-examine older attitudes and the accompanying practices. Any deeper reassessment has to look at the presupposed land ethic, and more generally at the underlying ethical and ideological assumptions. A land ethic, according to Leopold, who introduced the term, is 'an ethic dealing with man's relation to land and to the animals and plants which grow upon it' .7 Thus a land ethic amounts to a nature (or environmental) ethic, with land a symbol for the whole of nature (or the more comprehensive environment), and man a symbol for all relevant agents. The unrestrained position, which imposes few or no constraints upon treatment of the environment, affords a land ethic of only a degenerate sort. The unrestrained position would, for example, have little 5 6 7 Although we are anticipating here-as ethics and ethical systems are explained essentially reportively however, in the next chapter, there is no circularity. For ethics is separately and independently characterised. Indeed, with the renewed libertarian movement emanating from industrial north-eastern America, this assumption has gained in strength. Foreign "resources" are not to be hoarded but should be saleable to the highest bidders for "free" economic use. And sometimes it is broadly hinted: or else! A. Leopold, A Sand Country Almanac with other essays on Conversation, New York, 1966, p.238. 6 compunction about using up materials, forests, pristine environments and so on, immediately or even destroying them. In the end the unrestrained position can be excluded from properly ethical positions. 8 For it fails to meet the basic universality requirement on moral principles, of independence of person, place or time, a requirement which iplies that persons of different races, colours, sexes or ages, or at different places or times are not treated unfairly or seriously disadvantaged. Insofar as the unrestrained position would permit the exploitation, degradation and even destruction, of all present resources and environments, it places future humans at a very serious disadvantage. The position is thus one of expediency, not morality, typically yielding, like economics, evaluative assessments based on short-term narrow local interets, rather than appropriately based on long-range values. Opposed to the unrestrained position are various conservation ethics; what Leopold saw as the land ethic is just one of these. Conservation ethics can be classified, conveniently for subsequent development, into three groups: shallow, intermediate and deep. 9 Unlike the unrestrained position, all these politions would conserve and maintain certain things-materials, creatures, forests, etc. The shallow conservation position differs from the unrestrained position primarily in taking a longer-term view and taking account of future humans, their welfare and so forth. It is more enlightened than the unrestrained position in taking a longer-term perspective: hence its alternative description as resource conservation. Though this conservation position is only a small step away from the unrestrained position, it does pass one test for morality proper in that future people are not treated unfairly. Most of the big rush into fashionable environmentalism does not get beyond shallowness. The shallow and unrestricted positions are closely related by an important feature they share-and which justifies lumping them together as shallower positions. They are both highly anthropocentric; they do not move outside a human-centred framework, which construes nature and the environment instrumentally, that is, simply as a means to human ends and values. Thus they take account ultimately only of human interests and concerns; all environmental values reduce to these or similar human on closed notions. It is in this respect especially that these shallower positions differ from deeper, less resource and exploitation oriented, positions. 8 9 This is a substantial, and controversial claim, especially since it accounts much economic activity unethical, as involving practices of expediency, not morality. For the fuller case for obligations and commitments to future humans, see e.g. R. and V. Routley, 'Nuclear energy and obligations to the future' in Responsibilities to Future Generations: Environmental ethics, (ed. E. Partridge), Prometheus Books, Buffalo, 1981, and other essays in this book. This classification refines Naess's non-exhaustive distinction of shallow and deep ecology, and extends it to render it exhaustive. For the original distinction, see A. Naess, 'The shallow and the deep, long-range ecology movement' Inquiry 16 (1973) 95-100. An elaboration on Aess's position, to which this discussion has some debts, may be found in his 'Philosophical aspects of the deep ecological momvement', Environmental Ethics, to appear. According to deeper positions humans are not the sole items of value or bestowing value in the world, and not all things of value are valuable because they answer back in some way to human concerns. But deeper positions differ in the weight or relative importance they assign to human concerns. According to the intermediate position serious human concerns always come first; and while other things, such as higher animals, have value or utility in their own right, their value is outranked by that of humans. The deep position rejects this assumption, and maintains that even serious human concerns should sometimes lose out to environmental values. FIGURE 1. THE POSITIONS SEPARATED, AND SEPARATING PRINCIPLES SHALLOWER UNRESTRAINED DEEPER SHALLOW INTERMEDIATE I I I I J, J, J, DEEP MORALITY SOLE VALUE GREATER VALUE REQUIREMENT ASSUMPTION ASSUMPTION (of human apartheid) (of human supremacy) The watershed principle which divides the shallower from deeper positions is the sole value assumption. According to this major assumption, which underlies prevailing Western social theory, humans are the only things of irreducible (or intrinsic) value in the universe, the value of all other things reducing to or answering back to that of humans in one way or another. This assumption is built into most present political and economic arrangements; for example, only aggregated preferences or interests of certain (present) humans are considered in democratic political choice, and likewise in economic decision making; other creatures and natural items are represented at best through the preferences or votes of interested humans. Similar assumptions are made in mainstream ethical theories. Typical are reductive theories which endeavour to derive ethical judgements from features of closed systems of humans. Examples are provided by presently fashionable ethical theories, such as utilitarianism. 10 According to utilitarianism what ought to be done, as well as what is best, is determined through what affords maximum satisfaction to the greatest number of individual humans. In theories like utilitarianism, the outside world of nature does not enter through direct inputs or outputs, but only insofar as it is reflected in the psychological states of individuals. Such ethical theories are appropriately described as those of apartness or human apartheid. Man 10 But the same holds for other fashionable theories on the American-dominated ethical scene, namely contractualism and libertarianism. These theories, along with utilitarianism, are explained in most modern American introductions to ethical theories or moral problems. is, or is treated as, apart from Nature; there is virtually total segregation. Nature or the land enters only as a remote experiential backdrop, and onstage is the drama of human affairs and interests. However, humans cannot be entirely insulated from their environment; for example, volcanoes affect temperatures thus affecting climate thus affecting crop yield and food supplies. At least limited intercourse with the environment has to be admitted as a result. So, in economics, ethics, and political theory, secondary theories, dealing with linkages to the environment, have been appended (thus, for example, extemality theory in economics, some allowance for "side" constraints in more sophisticated utilitarianism, and so on). But the land remains treated as an awkward or tiresome afterthought, when it is considered at all. There is, however, another approach, also with historical standing, vying with (and indeed often confused with) human apartheid which can accommodate secondary theories a little more satisfactorily. That is the position of superiority or human supremacy, according to which Man, though included in Nature, is above the rest of Nature, meaning ethically superior to it. While human supremacist positions can incorporate the sole value assumption and thus remain in the shallow ethical area, they have the option of rejecting it in favour of the less objectionable greater value assumption:: other things being equal, the value of humans is greater than that of other things; the value of humans surpasses that of all other things in the universe. This assumption allows that other objects, such as some higher animals, may have irreducible value; what it insists upon is that, at least for "normal" members of respective species, this value never exceeds that of humans. What is generally presupposed is that other objects-animals, plants and their communities-are never of much importance compared with humans. Though human supremacy has appeared in versions of utilitarianism where animal pain is taken into consideration along with human, Western ethics and associated social sciences such as demography, economics and political theory, remain predominantly apartheid in form. It is the repudiation of the greater value assumption that separates deep from intermediate positions. Perhaps the most familiar example of an intermediate position is that of Animal Liberation, in the form in which animals are taken to have value in their own right, though in any playoff with humans, humans win. Under the deep position such an outcome is by no means inevitable; in cases of conflict of animal or natural systems with humans, humans sometimes lose. I I There are various arguments designed to show that the deep assessment is right, that humans should sometimes lose out. A typical one takes the following form:- Some humans lead worthless or negative lives, lives without net value. The point, though not uncontroversial, 11 So too for some men and some sparrow. So we should reject the intermediate ...... : A man is worth more than a sparrow! (Drungson/ Ralston etc.) 9 can be argued even from a shallow utilitarianism.1 2 Take for instance a life of pain and suffering and little or no happiness: it has a substantial net negative utility. But some small natural systems do have net value; one example would be an uninhabited undisturbed island (a live example might be a tropical island before Club Mediterranee depredation). Now consider the situation where the considerable value of a small natural system is to be sacrificed (in a way that shallowly affords no ethical impropriety) on behalf of a set of humans whose lives each have no positive net value. For instance, the system is to be exploited, just for the continued maintena nce of these humans, or for their addition (as new settlers) to an establish ed population. Then in such circumstances, these humans lose out; the natural system takes precedence. Similarly, trivial satisfactions of humans do not dominate over the integrity of rich natural environments.13 Let us look ahead to glimpse paradimatic expansions of the positions indicated (in figure 1). For the positions soon expand, when applied to real life issues, to more comprehensive positions; indeed they have expanded all the way to what are now called social paradigms, that is to full social perspectives. For example, the deep position has expanded from the two core theses-a s initially reformulated, values in nature, which is a positive counterpart of the sole value assumption, and biospecies impartiality, which is a positive elaboration of greater value assumption 14-to fuller deep ecological positions which involve as well many other themes. 12 13 The point is argued in detail in R. Routley and N. Griffin, 'Unravelling the meanings of life?' Discussion Papers in Environme ntal Philosophy #3, Research School of social Sciences, Australian National University, 1982. There are significant cross-classifications of environmental positions. Some further dimensions are included in the following diagram. Environment not taken I Environments is taken into account I into account p 14 --------- --------- --------- --------- --------- --- shallow intermediate I dogs I ////// I I E I individual I I H I holistic I I Another dimension is the static/dynamic. But no one want to be just stauc, really. According to the values in nature theme natural items other than humans and human artefacts have intrinsic value; while according to biospecies impartiality members of one species, humans in particular, are not favoured or valued over members of another simply on the basis of species. The danger of favouring one species is encouraged by the species fallacy, commonly invoked in favouring humans. This is the mistake of concluding that because a few members of the species have accomplish ed something of (immense) value, all members of the species therefore are (highly) valuable; all members of the species manage to free-load for the ride, obtained by a few members, so to say. The assumption, once challenged, usually falls back on an argument that goes by way of capacities: the remaining members of the species have the capacity to achieve these sorts of things also. But, firstly, that isn't true: intelligence, skills, and the like, vary somewhat within species, and from our narrow perspective, very considerably among humans, some of whom have no capacity for advanced mathematics or music. Secondly, it requires more than capacity: it requires circumstances, a favourable environment to exercise them, (hence, in part, the folly of lU The expansion is not uniquely determined; there can be various different deeper paradigms. However it characteristically includes a fuller statement of themes recognised as in the spirit of "deep ecology", in particular ecological themes, but also interconnected economic and political themes. In a similar way shallower positions are subsumed in shallower perspectives, and principally in what is called the dominant social paradigm, some relevant themes of which are indicated in figure 2.1s FIGURE 2. RELEVANT COMPONENTS OF THE ENCOMPASSING PARADIGMS. DOMINANT SOCIAL PARADIGM DEEP ECOLOGICAL ALTERNATIVE Dominance over nature Natural environment a resource Harmony with nature Values in nature/biospecies impartiality Less material goals/less growth orientation Earth supplies limited AJ?propriate technology/limits to science Doing with enough/recycling Regional/decentralised/small-scale Material/economic growth Ample reserves/perfect substitutes High technological progress/ scientific solutions Consumerism National/centralised/large-scale SHALLOW f----------------------------- ➔ DEEP 4. Criticisms of these beginnings and other beginnings A main challenge we shall have to meet is that there can be no deep ethics, ethics and axiology are inevitably shallow, because they must answer back to human valuers. This challenge we presently set aside (until the next chapter). But it should already be apparent how we can start to upset the challenge (already taken up by deeper utilitarianism), namely by displacing humans by relevant agents. Other challenges grant that something might answer to deeper ethics, but contend that nothing should-objectio ns of substance-or that making anything much out of it is unwarranted, for example because preliminaries in making out the distinctions have not been 15 more humans in decidedly suboptimal cities), together with a will and drive actually to follow through appropriately on capacities. Much fuller accounts of the dominant social paradigm and environmental alternatives are given in S. Cotgrove, Catastrophe or Cornucopia, Wiley, New York, 1982, and in R. Routley 'Roles and limits of paradigms in environmental thought and action' in Environmental Philosophy (ed. R. Elliot and A. Gare), University of Queensland Press, 1983. The linkage of the dominant paradigm with maximizing, and the deep alternative with sufficing, is elaborated in R. Routley, 'Maximizing, satisficing, satisizing: the difference in real and rational behaviour under rival paradigms', Discussion Papers in Environmental Philosophy #10, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University, 1984. 11 properly accomplished-objections of form and from technicalities (cf. challenges to the analytic/synthetic distinction). We consider examples of both sorts of challenge. The misanthropy charge. Deep environmentalism has been criticised for what it does, so it is alleged, to ethical treatment of other humans; it leads, it has been alleged, to neglectful, negligent, or downright callous treatment of other humans, to inhumanity. The actual impact of deep environmentalism affords but little ground for such allegations. Nor does the theory. Deep environmentalism could leave intrahuman ethics, standard morality virtually entirely intact. If it did so, deep environmental ethics would provide a conservative extension (in the familiar technical sense) of standard intrahuman ethics. In this event the allegations would fall; for the ethical treatment of humans would be in principle just the same as before. But it is unlikely that any deeper environmentalism will leave standard morality entirely intact in its own prime sphere of operations, that restricted to humans. For instance the evolution of humans, and attributions of virtues or vices to them, is bound to be influenced by how they act or respond towards nonhumans and the environment. A virtuous puritanical oldstyle industrialist who makes his affluent living through environmentally damaging practices will no longer obtain the virtuous ranking that would have been accorded to him on the older prevailing morality. (Of course that morality too is changing, but it hardly changes rapidly enough to keep pace with a deeper ethic). The change in the evaluation of and moral standing accorded to hard-working but environmentally exploitative business people, technologists and engineers reflects a more far-reaching adjustment; that of removal of special privilege for humans (or persons). Even in the more austere of standard ethical positions, such as duty ethics in the Kantian mould, it is very easy to gain the impression of persons (usually males on traditional ethics) as kings. There will be a club of kings, that was where more egalitarian industrialism was proceeding also, to make us all kings - with the rest of nature as subjects. While the unwarranted privilege accorded to humans under conventional ethical wisdom will topple then, the treatment of humans by humans need not. To the contrary, if people develop a more respectful and careful attitude to the environment, then they may well develop a better, different and more careful, approach to other people as well. Here the awful Kantianstyle theme that decent treatment of animals will trickle down from a decent treatment of other humans is partially reversed; a better treatment of other humans (a decent treatment is already ethically required) will percolate up from a more gently and respectful treatment of natural environments. Nor finally then need a deeper environmentalism abandon the quest for social justice. 16 Deep-green theory certainly does not; the ethical-change agenda is much wider than social 16 There are two American groups where the quest for terrestial social justice appears to have been abandoned or comprised: eco-fascists and nature greens, as they are sometimes called from outside. 12 change alone, but social and human concerns do not thereby fall off the agenda. They remain, but no longer in such isolations. What they do lose their unchallenged preeminence, and they may also lose priority. Problems with the Greater Value assumption (after Attfield). A prime alternative to a shallow/deep distinction is (what is sometimes considered no alternative, but a variant on it) the anthropocentric/ecologic distinction. Notes: 1. Not the same distinction. While shallow positions are normally anthropocentr ic, converse does not obtain. 2. Distinction never made out properly (really degree issues), and leads to typical 4-fold outcome. 5. Domination and chauvininism. The greater or sole value accorded to humans, as compared with (other) valuations, justify the domination of nature by humans. The main argument is simply that what has lesser or no value should give away to what has greater value, the conventional assumption being that what has greater value is better (analytic) than what has less, and should prevail over it (substantive assumptions of conventional ethical themes such as utilitarianism). Domination and associated class chauvinism are justified not only directly through consideration s of greater or supreme value, but also less directly by pointing to highly valued features possessed by the favoured class. Similar appeals to prized features are of course likewise used to justify class chauvinism. Appendices : 1. Deep ethics are not automatically acceptable as satisfactory. Consider e.g.whole chauvinism, where Wholes are intrinsically valuable, each and every one, and their value much exceeds that of everything else, humans included. So wholes come first. (This is a doctrical some superwholes may hold). Two rough comparisions: cows in India, humans on earth. Other unsatisfactory deep ethics, apart from those that aberate one species, are those that focus exclusively on certain elements. Those e.g. individualisms, strong holisms, etc. 2. Arguments to shallowness. 1. Simplistic (from one James O'Connor of Canada). ' ... the word "value" is a human word, with human meanings, in this case transposed to non-human nature. Hence to say that nature is inherently valuable means that it is inherently valuable to humans'. Ecofascists, who follow a route pioneered by Hardin, call for a triage of nations on lifeboat earth and abandonment of those nations, such as Bangladesh, seen without prospect of recovery. But the position is not deep, it is certainly not a properly moral position; for due criticism see Griffin and Bennett. u 2. Problem with shallow/deep terminology, e.g. acquired too many associations for comfort. Intellectual offensiveness shallow, etc. 3. Shallowness involves a reductionist exercise. Making (trying to make) environmental issues in all that matter environmentally-answer back to shallow concerns. Series of arguments advanced to try to establish ..... . Counter argument. These do not succeed and can be counter-evolelled. 3. Cross-classifications reformism/revolation is, like anthropocentrism, a poor classification. It can be shallow without reformism and unethical economism with reformism. DE itself is largely reformist in character (and excessively personal).: Anthropo-/ecocentric. No doubt 'anthropocentricsm' meaning what its etymology implies 'centring in man' (OED), is a useful term. Theories such as Coperican and Copenhagen quantum theory can be criticised (or praised) as anthropocentric. What is in doubt is the new contrast of antropocentric with ecocentric. While the vague anthropocentric-ecocentric distinction is alright, so far as it goes, as a starting stage, it is no place to stop. For there is a need for a value specific distinction, antrhopocentr can be any sort of human centredness. 'Anthropocentric' is a poor choice of contrasting terminology, for several reasons. One, which may be convenient to some, lies in its vagueness. There is no sharp cut-off in what is human centred. Similarly for its supposed contrast term 'ecocentric', which presumably expandents to 'ecologically centred'. Second, it becomes apparent that no proper contrast is made in many cases. University textbooks on natural ecology, for instance are both ecocentric because about ecology and anthropocentric because set and supplied for humans. Human ecology, a subject increasingly encountered in universities, is directly both (not both under different aspects). Were the classification satisfactory, it would provide a nice contradiction. But the classification is far from satisfactory. It is not exclusive: nor is it exhaustive, but the remainder obscure. But worse, any practical ethics, no matter how deep, is bound to be anthropocentric, not ecocentric, even though duly concerned with ecology. The reason comes to this: any adequate ethics is bound to be heavily concerned with agents, their obligations and responsibilities, and for all practical purposes (on earth) these agents are generally certain humans. This is, an adequate practical ethics is, as a contingent matter, anthropocentric. Of course such an ethic, by contrast with main traditional ethics, may also be presented as an ecocentric ethic, inasmuch as it may be focussed upon ethical agents' relations to ecological items, human treatment of nature. 14 Problems with the anthropocentric/ecocentric contrast do not mean that something like the contrast cannot be made good. But it would involve redefinition of the critical terms, and could accordingly be better accomplished with adjusted terminology. Anthropocentrism is implausible, once a modern pict "of universe" becomes available. (Scuh a sufficiently modern picture was already available to Descartes.) The sun is a medium sized star of very common sort even within its galaxy. The probability of planets like the Earth within this university is extraordinarly high. The probability of other agents is also very high. Even the probability of other ..... ./competent agents is high. But even if it were not, or even if there were other agents, the discourse to be embarked upon would be significant. It is also pointful, for instance in disposeing of much philosophy. If anthropocentrism is so implausible as regards "main place in nature", why is it not implausible as regards intuitionality, value, etc. Ironically, the swing away from anthropocentrism in the sciences in modern times (with the advert of Copenhagen quantum theory and anthropic principles) was overpinged by increasing anthropocentrism in what are misleadingly distinguished as the humanities. Above all intentionality and value were emptied out of the wider universe and concentrated in the exclusive focus of humanities, humans. To adopt Freud: Humanity has in the course of time had to endure from the hands of science two great humiliations to its chauvinism .17 The first was when it was realised that our earth was not the centre of the universe, but only a speck in the world system of a magnitude hardly conceivible ... . The second was when his logical science robbed man of his particular privilege of having been specially created and relegated him to a descent from the animal world' (puoted in Unozco Ev ..... May 1982 p.3) There are further shocks in store for humans-poor old humans! 3. Explaining depth [contrasts pale/pallid]. For a good sort of depth, what is needed a deep structure, extraction or format that lies (partially) hidden from the surface. E.G. plate ponites in geology, strata in archasology, logical form in grammar. Deep = penetrating to fundamentals in several ways and nonchauvinistic, not shallow. [Mention also pluralism-so only a framework aimed for, on which grew various detailled positions.] Part of depth of Deep Green theory lies in its penetration below the surface of classrestricted or interested humanism to a genuine nonchauvinistic ethical structure: the (ill-named) annular structure, which ties moral principles to nonhumanistic categorestion. Annular structure 17 Freud says: to great outrages upon it naive serif love. 15 is a deep structure. A deep structure. Maybe can produce one for deep green theory (see Critiq p.93, bottom halt) Start as above other measures of depth (pp.44-5) misconceived. 1'. Extent of searching of perception of value; depth of (value) perception. 1. Extent to which humanism (h.ch) abandoned for econvisonmental perspective. 2. Extent to which conventional moral and value judgements put op for reassessment. (Naess's depth of questioning conventional wisdom) 2 is tied to 1; for abandoning heh involves much reassessment. Note differs from usual reflective equilibrium, which takes many generally accepted judgements for granted. More on what depth means (pragmetinally): Many environmental outcomes sought in deep grounds can be supported in shallow ways (of course). But there are differences, as examples show: • pesticides (in forestry) should not be used, despite insect damage. For pesticides violate natural succession and healing processes. Toxicity questions, though important, are secondary. On shallow view: the main problem becomes not the use of pesticides, but whether they are safe. • natural world appears as a resource. Life forms which interfere with uses are pests. 2. Reformist/Transformist Variations upon Shallow/Deep Ecology Unhappy with the derogatory implications of "shallow", Devall and Sessions tried to convert shallow ecology in ecological reformism. While there was certainly a basis for this conversion in Naess's original brief account of shallow ecology (which almost invited such reconstrual), the result has been that something different has emerged, notably in green politics. For what such conversions, along with associated imagery accompanying reformism, achieve is not elucidation, but introduction of new contrasts, and therewith political crossclassification of the shallow-deep ecology contrasts. There are various contrasts with (mere) reformist adjustment on political theory, for instance revolutionary change and radical change. A revolutionary direction appears inappropriate as regards deep ecology (as revealed both by the literature and political stances of leading members of the movement), but a politically radical direction on environmental issues does emerge from later developments in N aess' s work. Accordingly a rough contrast, which admits sharpening, can be made out between green reformism and green radicalism. A machine image, which often operates not far from view in such contrasts, is initially helpful in indicating the differences. Reformism does not interfere with the main operation of the machine, its motor, though it may alter the adjustments, retune or fine tune it, add filters or mufflers or converters, alter its appearance cosmetically, and so on. By contrast radicalism would alter the machine, would interfere with its motor to some extent, depending on the level of radicalism. 16 In political terms reformism is exemplified in such measures as limiting pollution by emission devices, further treatment of sewerage, small reserves and roadside veneers of trees amid clear-cutting operations, tidying up of litter, and so on. The main motor of liberal democratic market capitalism, the economic engine designed to deliver maximum economic growth, and its main institutions, remain untouched and uncriticised; no change is proposed for them. For radicals such measures and like reforms do not proceed far enough, towards the sources of the problems. To tackle the range of environmental problems more radical change in economic, social and perhaps political machinery is required. But evidently the extent of change envisaged can vary, very considerably. For example, a frugal conservation program, directed at limiting economic growth through removing conspicuous and excessive consumption, need carry no accompanying program for radical social and political change. Again, deep ecology, which offers no well worked out, or even well signposted, radical program or radical restructuring, does not appear to be politically radical. Alternatives to liberal democratic arrangements are not really advanced or investigated. By contrast some anarchist and marxist influenced ecological positions are politically radical, for instance, social ecology. In short, there is room for a classification of green radicalism, as shown by a preliminary grouping according to whether the radicalism affects which of separate (though overlapping) economic, social, or political matters. The reformist-radical distinction is a vague one, without a sharp boundary. Reforms can so accumulate that what was a difference in degree becomes a difference in kind, what was extensive reformism turns out to be radicalism. In such an incremental fashion, positions which were reformist can find themselves radical, without having undergone any conspicuus radicalisation. The contrast between reformism and radicalism can be sharpened somewhat within a (an improved) theory of social paradigms. Then reformism is intra-paradigmatic, whereas radicalism is not (but is extra-paradigmatic). That is a reformist works, like a normal scientist, within the operational paradigm (the given political motor) and does not seek to change it, whereas the radical does; success of radicalism resembles abnormal (even revolutionary) periods in science. As there are many ways of deviating from a paradigm, which typically involves a complex set of presumptions, so there are many sorts of radicalism. The extent to which the political conversion of the shallow-deep contrast into green reformism-radical contrast affords not a restatement, but a different classification, may now be evident though perhaps not to its full extent. The most notable further feature is that green radicalism may be utterly shallow, entirely anthropocentric. 18 Green Marxism affords a useful 18 In these terms Naess conflated two contrasts in his original 1973 article; shallow-deep and reformist-radical. Different followers have latched onto different contrasts. l'/ example; it is socially and politically radical while shallow (of course it can be argued that it is environmentally incoherent, though not in the mentioned features, but in its plan to supercharge the economic motor and make it run even faster, with evident environmental fall-out). Social ecology offers another example; for while more radical than deep ecology, it is certainy not deep. Something of the rich variety we have come upon can be glimpsed from the following table. All the positions enumerated, except 9, are occupied, we suspect (though positions are often so poorly or incompletely presented that is difficult to be sure ). 19 Positions 9 is practically excluded for committed deep parties who duly care about the demise of what is of intrinsic value under mere reformism. Position 5 is however occupied, by those who want (or believe they have achieved) improved arrangements for and treatment of animals (e.g., no circuses, no ordinary zoos, no cruel contests, etc.) but are not committed to a radical animal liberation agenda. Green party territory is usually shallow, but some of the proposals presented may extend to position 4, for instance in demands for participatory democratic restructuring. Of course, many supporters of green parties may adhere to deeper positions. 19 It is worth noting that such positions will in principle supply their own forms of sustainability, sustainable societies, and so on. 24.10.95 Chapter 2 ETHICS WITHOUT HUMANS, PHILOSOPHY WITHOUT HUMANS, and COROLLARIES It is a commonplace that ethics has proceeded not merely as if humans were on centre stage, but as if humans really were all there is, all that mattered in ethics, as if nothing else enters into morals and ethics, or does through only through them. That commonplace is moreover commonly strengthened to a claim of necessity, that this must be so, that nothing else can enter, except indirectly by way of humans. Ethics has to be thus anthropocentric. Since environmental ethics began to shift humans, if ever so little, off centre stage, there has been a heavy philosophical reaction, a sometimes bitter blacklash against greener ethics that would background humans, or dare sometimes to remove humans, from the scene altogether. Among many other things, it has been contended that by the very meaning of ethics and morals, these subjects must be human-centred. A crucial argument for necessary anthropocentricism of ethics makes human centrality a matter of definition. This crucial argument will be broken, in the first of several stages, through a detailed characterisation of morals and ethics in a way that is independent of humans. The characterizations adopted depart in only minor and justified (though highly consequential) ways from received dictionary definitions; that is the characterisations are substantially reportive, as they have to be if they are to serve their iconoclastic purposes. The matter of characterising ethics is in any case part of our business. Where would deep-green ethics be left, as a subject of investigation, without an appropriate account of ethics? 1. On inadeqacies of what prevails: a sheaf of defective accounts. It takes but little effort to discover severe shortcomings in most preceding investigations, and that most accounts, many of them far too casual, are inappropriate for what they are intended to cover, still less for environmental ends. There is no end to bad and defective definitions to dissect and discard. Even textbooks and guidebooks on ethics often make no attempt at a definition, and often have little or nothing of due generality to offer on what ethics is about. 1 Unremarkably then, many of those presenting or teaching ethics, perhaps well enough, have no adequate idea of what ethics is about. This is revealed by the sorts of definitions they slop down and by what they say ethics is about. The slop presented indicates they did not even bother to consult their dictionaries with any care. It is an elementary exercise to show deficiencies in most proposals. A striking recent example is Singer (ed.) Companion to Ethics, supposedly an encyclopaedic work on ethics. 2 A few sample definitions recently encountered will help confirm our claims. Utterly defective is the account of ethics as 'the relation between you and other people' .2 Such connections as the spatial relations between people, for instance where they sit at a seminar, do not belong to ethics. Narrowing relations to those of treatment, as in 'how you treat other people' improves the account a bit, but not enough. Decent treatment of relevant kinds no doubt comprises part of ethics, but a small part. Nor is such treatment confined, especially as regards receivers, to people; animals, nature and more, all matter. A more interesting account, presumably designed to encompass applied ethics, takes this remarkable form: "'ethics" [is] defined as disciplined reflection by persons in all walks of life on moral ideas and ideals'. 3 As a definition, this too fails entirely, appearing circular, and converting ethics away from, what is essential, practice into head stuff, into something like meditation, a kind of widely practiced theorizing, though practised on certain parts of ethics! There are too some unfortunate side-effects of the insertion, aimed at making ethics applicable to all walks of (human) life: namely, as there are walks of life which have no room for disciplined reflection, so there is in fact no ethics. Back again to the drawing board. Similarly for Russell's fuller attempt: The study of Ethics is perhaps most commonly conceived as being concerned with the questions "What sort of actions ought men to perform?" and "What sort of actions ought men to avoid?" It is conceived, that is to say[!], as dealing with human conduct, and as dividing what is virtuous and what is vicious among the kinds of conduct between which, in practice, people are called upon to choose. 4 Owing to feminist criticism of male chauvinism, many now wince at Russell's; piquant use of term like 'men' (in fact throughout his numerous works). Environmental criticism of human chauvinism has not been so (terminologically) successful, sad to report. Back to the board. It takes little effort to assemble a sheaf of inadequate definitions and accounts of ethics. Many include too little, for example the popular account of ethics as "how we should live", which as well as being too narrow is parochial. 5 Similarly, though fractionally better; a coherent set of values to live by is enough for an ethic. For that appears to omit a deontic component, obligations and permissions, and certainly leaves out ethical virtues. A major shortcoming, even in fuller characterisations, concerns the concentration on humans and their parochial affairs. For, as will soon appear, ethics does not essentially concern humans. An adequate ethics says nothing about humans, members of species Homo sapiens, their obligations and rights, values or virtues. It applies but contingently to humans; it applies similarly to hominids, humanoids, and to persons generally, and functions in the absence of persons altogether. As a result, the following familiar sorts of pronouncements on what ethics amount 2 3 4 5 John Langford, on ABC radio, 22 February 1993. Engels, 6. Russell p.1, F & S, from Elements of Ethics 1910. For such an account see e.g. Single [Encyl. Brit.] 3 to are seriously defective: 'An ethic may be thought of as an ideal of human behaviour, an environmental ethics as ideal human behaviour with respect to the environment, natural and built" _6 Not everyone got it quite so wrong. For instance, Brandt gets away to a nice neutral start, even if he does not cover the spread of ethics. Consider his opening: Moral philosophy has traditionally been a systematic attempt to answer some questions of apparently universal interest [!] about: what is worth wanting or working for (what is worthwhile, of worth); what is the best thing for an agent to do from his own point of view; what is morally right, and what is morally just). [Also what is rational in these regards.]7 The nice start does not last. Agents turn out to be humans; utilitarianism soon begins to effect an ugly intrusion, and so on. 2. On how to define ethics and morals more satisfactorily. It is not difficult to do noticeably better than ethics teachers and writers have managed, simply by consulting better dictionaries. But it is also not so difficult to re-organize and improve upon what dictionaries offer. It is significant that dictionary definitions of moral and ethic contain no essential allusion to humans, nothing essential concerning humans, man, or we, us and co. (andwhere 'human' does enter, as in 'principles of human duty', it can simply be elided, it is inessential). But the dictionary accounts do harbour some problems. For one thing, like some of the preceding definitions, the dictionaries seem mired in a common and damaging circularity: ethics is defined in terms of morality (and its adjuncts, decent treatment, and similar); but then morality is itself defined through ethics. Fortunately the loop back to ethics can be broken. A particularly satisfactory way to workable definitions of notions in the ethics orbitethic, ethical, ethics, to take direct cases-is through those in the presupposed moral orbitdirectly, moral, morality, morals. For all these ethical notions are regularly defined, in better dictionaries, through moral notions. This approach reverses the difficult and so far unsuccessful strategy, sometimes tried in ethical theory, of attempting to define morality (e.g. through universalizability conditions) inside a somehow independently characterized ethics. 8 The bases, upon which moral notions are carried, lie in turn in the action orbit, in features of actions and their agents. 9 As agents are entailed by actions-beca use actions just 6 7 8 9 See 'A universal environmental ethics' Connect, UNESCO-UNE P Environmental Education Newsletter XVI(2)(June 1991). pl. Brandt p.l. Long ago I used to think this was now it had to be done, through some singling out of morals within ethics by way of a combination features of humans and requirements of morality (such as, variously, consideration of others, universalizability). Not recognising the virtues of agency, I too erroneously supposed that morality had to pertain to humanity. No doubt the main definitional enterprise can be carried out, more or less, the other way around, beginning with ethics, then cutting down to morals within, through agency. Moreover, such an alternative route (starting out easily enough from the notion of ethics as the theory and systematization of the good and the right, valuable and permissible, the virtuous and responsible, and so on) should arrive at the same place, at a similar end result. These action basics can in turn be explained, as before, within process theory, see Sylvan 1993. A classification of agents can be drawn from there. It is not claimed that this is how we have to start or that action nexus affords unique starting point. But its features have to be included sooner or 4 are agent-ascribed processe s-actions , more generally processes, form bedrock here. Neither processes nor actions have any essential connection with humans. Relevant elements of action nexus, upon which moral actions are carried, are now indicated: Single action snapshot, capturing agent-acts -in-environment nexus: AGENT has motives emotions volitions objectives and goals of prior causes ACTION has subsequent consequences impacts upon (relevant items within) environment The breakdown of actions, into types, will straightaway yield much that has long been taken as central in moral theory, such as agonising (as Socrates did) over choices. Choice-making is a morally critical type of action. Plural actions expose further relevant features, including conduct, dispositions and character of agents, and suggest typologies (or moral relevance) of actions and of impacts. Virtue ethics, but part of moral theory, fit here. Whereas morality -the new ecologically sensitive morality that is-begin s from certain features of an agent in its environment, ecology begins from investigation of an organism in its environment. 'From the outset ecology was clearly understood to be the appreciation of the organism (any organism, note) in and as part of its environment' . 10 'Something along the lines of "the study of organisms in relation to their environment" is the basis of most ... attempts ... [at] working definition of ecology ... over [which] there has been little dispute' . 11 Despite initial appearances, the upshot is not (the perhaps appealing one) that morality is a branch of ecology. For the features investigated are very different (and a satisfactory definition of 'ecology ' has to be sharpened to indicate what features of organism-inenvironments are studied). Whereas in morality there is much interest in the virtues and vices of agents for instance, a parallel interest is outside the scope of ecology (and indeed not a significant question for most organism or for many agents). Interestingly, the ethical theory being advanced begins in precisely the way Deep Ecology, in its pristine formulation, implies that no theory should operate, with an agent-inenvironment image. Under the total-field approach of Deep Ecology all such images dividing up fields should be rejected, in particula r any man-in-e nvironme nt image, a special chauvinistic case of what our theory operates with. Similarly no doubt for organism-inenvironment images of ecology. Unremarkably no arguments are offered for these rejections; 10 11 later, and it has virtues as a start, including familarity and naturalness. R. Kitching [New Education], p.39 Ibid p.40 rearranged. 5 cogent arguments would be hard to find, or articulate. In any case, Deep Ecology strictures do not prevent preliminary or limited uses of field analysis. As it will soon turn out, for more general purposes, what is needed is removal of agents, not dissolving the image. These action-theoretic preliminaries admit of much elaboration and variation, both expansion and contraction most of which however we can pick up as we proceed. For example, an illuminating expansion would expose the setting, of constraints and incentives, within which an agents acts; no doubt some of these features, incentives for instance, can be absorbed into what is already depicted, such as motives, and the remainder could be included in under a prior-influences category. Striking contractions are those afforded by prevailing ethical theories, consequentialism and Kantianism, which would erase, respectively, all but consequences or all but motives. The parable of the Blindman and the Elephant is not only a clever analogy for a implausible perspectivism; it can serve as a telling indictment of much analytic philosophical practice. Moral philosophical practice, especially that of analytic philosophy, consists in only sensing part of a whole (constellation) and failing to see the rest. 12 Moral and action theory afford good examples of such skimping; for instance, consequentialism fails to see anything but consequences. The term moral, generously construed, covers the assessment of agent-intricated elements of the action nexus depicted, in all the following sorts of respects (as applicable): excellent, good, indifferent, bad, evil; approved, disapproved; valuable, of value, or not axiological right or wrong (or alright), fair or unfair, proper or improper obligatory, forbidden, permissible deontic responsible, irresponsible; it also covers principles concerning such assessments. Morality concerns both appreciation and assessment of agents-acting-in-environments as regards those sorts of features and resulting systematization. Parallels with ecology should be evident. X's conduct or the like is moral, broadly so, iff it is a matter for moral appraisal. In short, what is moral is marked out by classes of functors in an action nexus. Plainly some of the features, which perform the distinguishin g work, are not significantly applicable to all elements in the nexus; for instance, impacts of frogs are not significantly responsible. Responsibility applies primarily to certain agents, their conduct and character. The sorts of respects cited are, furthermore, more general forms. But many more specific evaluations are thereby encompassed; for instance, honourable, dishonourable; decent, indecent, again as applicable. In terms of the sorts of respects, certain important subtypes can be distinguished. The first group (given by the first two lines) covers axiological. The second group (given by the next two lines) covers deontic. The third group (not usually distinguished in "the logic of 12 For a detailed treatment of skimping in philosophy, see DP, chapter 11. 6 ethics") comprises accountability notions. Such, formerly important, terms as virtuous and vicious-regu larly, but wrongly included in dictionary listings of respects defining moral (e.g., "of or pertaining to character or disposition considered as ... virtuous or vicious")-ar e axiological. They can be characterized in terms of what is already available, thereby avoiding further circularity vexing dictionary definitions (which define 'moral' using 'virtuous', and 'virtuous' deploying 'moral'). 13 For example, to adjust the dictionaries, virtuous [action] is [that] exhibiting moral excellence or quality, vicious that distinguished as morally evil. Much the same supervenient story gets told for duty in the deontic class. For while a duty just amounts to a certain sort, a rigorous sort, of moral obligation, duty is not among the respects listed in defining the term moral. There are several, loosely consequential , attachments often made to what counts as moral(s), notably: issues of punishments and rewards, with a view to altering proper conduct; of freedom and determinism, as the latter may appear to place moral enterprise in jeopardy; of justification of moral principles, which do not stand on its own without moral justification; and so on, for other theoretical topics that consequently arise. While these further issues do not form part of dictionary definitions of moral, they are stock textbook fare in moral philosophy. But that, moral philosophy and moral theory, is where they can comfortably stay. While the issues that result could be called moral, or distinguished as textbook moral, they might as well simply be accommodate d more accurately, within philosophy of morality (metamorals). Morality is, at base, the attribute of being moral. 14 Thus, basically, an item exhibits morality if and only if that item is moral. In wider compass, morality comprehends a larger package concerning what is moral; it consists in the theory and appreciation, practice and principles of what is moral. It follows, from the account of moral given, that morality is all about certain features of agency, features of theory and practice of agency, namely evaluative and assessment features and principles concerning these, such as conduct and choice. Several other significant corollaries also emerge. Firstly morality has nothing essentially to do with humans. A similar but still more striking result will follow for ethics, which is characterised, also in a human independent way, by way of morality. Ethics too has nothing essentially to do with humans (or even with humanoids). Morality turns on features of agency. Humans, some of them, simply happen to supply, presently, prime terrestrial examples of full moral agents, those actors who do not merely conduct themselves well or badly (a kangaroo can be a good or poor mother, a dog can behave badly and know it) but who make promises, recognise obligations, accept responsibilities, and so forth. Humans were almost certainly not the only full terrestrial agents; other humanoid 13 14 Thus too much of "virtue ethics" can be absorbed, see further, later chapters. In logical terms it is defined through attribute abstraction. 7 species that have become extinct (perhaps with human assistance) very likely were also. Certain humans are probably not the only full moral agents even now in this universe. It is unlikely that humans will exemplify the only moral agents, perhaps even terrestrially. 15 The prominen t role of competen t humans in morality, and so as regards ethics, is utterly contingent. It follows, now quite generally, that those familiar definitions of morality and ethics in terms of humans and their features are one and all defective. For all the (green) ethical theory to be developed, humans can drop out altogether. But competent humans are useful for illustrative purposes; it helps to have some demonstrably actual examples. Moreove r, in such practical terms as terrestrial ethical impact, they are now almost unavoidable. Before explaining how to escape damaging agent centredness, or actocentricity, in ethics that would result from equating ethics with morals (i.e. morality in this sense), there are loose ends to be tied up and certain advantages, worth recording, accruing from having actocentrism as a staging post. One advantage is that unwanted senses of evaluative notions are peeled off automatically, because they do not apply regards agency. For example, so removed are not only merely "aesthetic" uses but all those quasi-descriptive uses of commendatory terms such as good (e.g. 'good car' 'good sort', 'good sox', 'good ox'). Aesthetic uses of evaluative terms, as in 'fine painting' or 'good book', do not concern, except in oblique ways, action or conduct of agents. It may well be objected that even so not enough non-moral uses are peeled off, as various uses like those of mere expediency or practicality are left standing. A countercase will be developed that these should be left standing. For a smarter strategy than attempting exclusion, includes moralities of expedience, of practicality, egoism and the like within the moral orbit-so enabling a straightforward answer to such otherwise vexing questions as Why be moral?- whilst subsequently differentiating within morals a distinuished subclass (to be called meurals) which does function exclusively through meeting more exacting requirements of morality. There is a subsense that should be picked up immediately. Though a vicious or evil agent is certainly a matter for morality, and within its compass, such an agent would not normally be accounted moral (as a naive reading of the dictionaries would suggest), but immoral. What is moral, morality, concerns the span of moral, immoral and indifferent procedures. Plainly moral in the narrower sense comprehends the definitely positive part of the span, as good does of the wide value span. Generally, an item (such as an agent, practice, conduct, or whatever) is strictly moral, moral in this stricter sense, if it is moral, a matter of 15 There are arguments to other moral agents, other full agents even, from evolusionary theory. According to an expanded theory, every niche is eventually occupied. (In a way, this interesting theme carries over from the earlier doctrine of a great chain of being, which similarly onto every position in the chain as potentially occupied.) By a statistical argument (copying those for intelligent life elswhere in this vast universe), there are, or will be, niches for agents, with requisite capabilities, wlsewhere in the universe. Therefore, by the theory, these niches will eventually be occupied. 8 moral concern, and its appraisal is decidedly positive. Naturally for a full account, positive within the moral span, has also to be defined. However here the strict sense is picked up only to be set aside. Focussing upon morality would be unduly limiting from the perspective of environment al ethics. For although anthropocent ricism has been avoided, easily circumvented through agency, though humans play no essential role, still morality is undoubtedly agent-centred. Morality foregrounds agents and assessments of them and their actions, and backgrounds environments of agents, and environments more generally (those without agents in them do not even enter into consideration). The environment remains, so to say, mere backdrop to actions of agents. Escape is through an intermediary, which is substituted in place of morality in the account proposed of ethics. That intermediary is an expanded morality, in convenient shorthand ectomorality. 16 ('Ectomoralit y' is close enough for the present to 'ecomorality' , which is of course part of the main focus.) Expanded morality takes into account also evaluative settings, perhaps devoid of agents; whatever of value that agents, or agent-like subjects, agentoids, might in principle impact upon, interfere with, disturb, effect, change, dislodge, or similar. That is, to say, it encompasses all items of relevant value, of worth, significant items, including many wholes, such as habitats, ecosystems, the Earth itself; and so also whatever applies morally with respect to these, for instance permission to disturb or to improve, principles of letting be, and so on. Such ecosignificant items are also called, in the literature, morally considerable items (a nicely ambiguous term, both sides of which have unfortunate features, one because a considerable item may not have large significance, the other because what it is supposed to respond to is some restricting class of considerers). In yet other and more satisfactory terms, they have ethical standing. Naturally items of significance other than agentoids may have other ethically relevant features (which they perhaps accrue through their significance). For instance they may hold entitlements of various sorts, such as to be left alone, to be represented, and so on. In order to characterize core notions in the ethics orbit, the basic strategy consists in plugging in "expanded morality" where the dictionaries give "morality"; similarly substitute "ectomoral" for "moral". For the adjectival forms 'ethical' , and (equivalently) 'ethic', that is all that is required. For the form concerned means: pertaining to ectomorality, or (equivalently) treating of or relating to ectomorals. For the noun forms it is not so simple, because there are problems with the dictionary accounts (for instance in 'the science of morality' owing to misplaced definiteness, and dated uses of the term 'science'). Always ethics(s) is an abstract, signifying features of being ethical; more exactly, always concerning ectomoral theories or systems. More specifically, ethic( s) signifies firstly, in both singular or plural though usually plural, the whole field of ectomoral theory 16 Greek ektos, outside. We include the inside with the expansion which incorporates the outside. 9 (the "science" of ectomorals), or derivatively, the department of (philosophical) study concerned therewith; secondly, in the singular but pluralising, a system or schematization of ectomorality, that is, at least rudiments of a system, or of a theory, comprising values, ectomoral principles, and rules of proper conduct.17 Like stock textbook ethics, most environmental ethics so far are in fact truncated; they are very rudimentar y schemes, leaving out much that would be expected in a fatter systematization. Hence in part the vagueness of characterization. So far the vagueness (which does not exceed that of dictionaries or of ordinary usage), is immaterial, as the characterisation is workable. But further exactness could be obtained through a technical upgrade of system and a more detailed specification of what such a proposition system contains. 18 What are sometimes cited as further restricted senses of 'ethic' are not further senses. Rather they are restrictions, or designations, of what is already presented. Thus for instance, the 'moral principles of a particular leader or school of thought' as in Buddhist ethics or Kantian ethics. Similarly for field indications or application restrictions, as in medical ethics or bioethics. So much for "senses" of 'ethics'. In order to reach an adequate definition of ethics, not merely for intended environmental purposes, but for historical purposes as well (so as to include Stoic ethics, Taoist ethics, romantic nature ethics and the like as ethics) we have been obliged to adjust (if in an inconspicuous way) dictionary definitions of ethics. That adjustment was made through "expanded morality", but could have been accomplished in other equivalent ways (Leopold's expansion of 'community' is another, though less satisfactory, way of achieving the same sort of thing). Granted that we have adjusted dictionary definitions, have we changed the very notion of ethics, or did the dictionaries, not for the first item, get it wrong, getting caught with chauvinistic definitions? We claim that we have not changed the notion. Rather we captured what some meant, more or less, by ethics all along-fro m Stoics, Epicureans and others on. It has never been a very precise notion. In this case (by contrast with terms like right) not too much hangs on the term, and we could simply divide ethics up, for instance, into wide and narrow. However, we intend to keep the nice term ethics but to give the dictionaries and modem opposition the expressions, standard ethics, or conventional ethics. Our inconspicuous but all important adjustment is both good and bad news. It is bad news, insofar as it appears to assist the charge that [deeper] environmental philosophy is doing something different from ethics, that it is guilty of changing the subject (i.e., effectively committing ignoratio elenchi). However we can freely grant, without incurring damage, that 17 18 Thus ethics include what it has to include, as expanded environment ally: philosophy of ecomorality, and therewith of morality. A system is a relational structure of a certain sort. An ethic is a propositional system, since it has to include principles and the like; thus it involves a theory of strict logical sort. For an illustration of the use of systems formulations in ethics, see e.g. Routley 1973. 10 standard ethics was, as a matter of definition, at least actocentric, and that, insofar as agents were identified with humans, it was, therefore, anthropocentric. Even so ethics, as redefined, includes standard ethics, so it is more satisfactorily seen not a different but a larger subject, expanded through an expanded morality. It is good news, not merely because it facilitates environmental ethics and accords with more satisfactory (greener) accounts of the subject, but because it helps in getting around a snarl of objections to the effect that ethics has to be homocentric, or at least actocentric. Removing these objections will recur throughout what follows. Among corollaries of note, a first one is that plurality of ethics falls out of the characterisation. An ethic is not unique. Nor (through such a result does not follow as environmental ethics form a subclass of ethics) are environmental ethics. Nor are military or professional ethics. Failure of uniqueness is not a deficiency, but a virtue. For, one thing, it gives places to go in cases of breakdown of an ethic, namely to other nearby ethics. Plurality is tied up with nonuniqueness and other features of merit: noncomprehensiveness, openness, flexibility, and so on.19 Secondly, there is more news on what an ethics is; and what an environmental one is. It is widely claimed that an ethics requires a communit y, in an environme ntal ethic the community (of concern etc.) is a wide environmental one. Ethics enlarges the community, a scope of values. Ethics (partaking of ethos ~ the evaluative frame(or spirit) of a community. While these ideas are popular they are astray. Environmental ethics shifts the frame of reference for ethical consideration from purely human concerns to ecological communities. 1-B Human beings as moral agents are not ethically privileged. An environmental ethic must be compatible with ecological principles and with life, i.e. be livable. 3. Within ethics and morals, as so far generously constured: decent and dud distinctions. Something like the division between the first and second specifics above has been quasi-technicalized within ethics, and distorted through merger with a theory-metatheory distinction borrowed from outside ethics. Engagement with the second (as in systematisation, constructing and working within systems, etc.) has been dubbed normative ethics, or sometimes to increase the confusion just ethics, or condescendingly, casuistry. Metaethics has been taken however to be not what the logical analogy, and borrowing, would suggest metanormative ethics, the (positivistically correct) study of such systems, but instead a brand of analytic philosophy, analysing the meanings and uses of key ethical terms. Taken as exhaustive, there is much of importance, that the normative-metaethical distinction leaves out. Nor is the distinction exhaustive. As well, the labels are misleading. In short, the distinction is ill-made out and rather unsatisfactory, a handicap, not an asset; it can be abandoned without 19 See EEHC p.57. 11 loss and to advantage. Let us do so (so forget this paragraph, if you prefer). Many other distinctions from standard ethics are also defective, in one way or another. It will be advisable to resurvey and rechart ethical terrain. Among other standard, but often dud, distinctions from ethical theory that have to reexamined after environmental impact, to be duly salvaged or scrapped, are all the following: • objective/subjective. That the objective/subjective distinction provides a false dichotomy is easily seen from usual explanations of the terms: 'either objective, standing for a real factor in things, or subjective, simply standing for a human proposal' 20 • Cognitive/non-cognitive. 2 1 To be retained are some distinctions which certain forces have worked hard to eliminate, such as that of • Fact/value (and earlier demise). • Expedient/moral. There is an elasticity in the notion of ethics, and a neglected distinction, that it is important to take into account.. In contemporary ethical theory there is a concerted attempt to build a universalizability requirement or some sort of equivalent into the very notion of ethics. The evident result is that selfish systems of evaluation and conduct, systematic egoisms for instance, are refused the title of ethics, and as an important corollary questions like Why be ethical? become vexed. 22 Given, in particular, that any such "universality" requirement is problematic in its formulation, and typically limited, chauvinistically to persons, a superior course proceeds to distinguish: between ethics as already characterised (reportively) and its subclass, universalizable ethics. As impartial ethics do have much to recommend them, let us coin a convenient portmanteau term condensing the clumsy "universalizable ethics", namely euthics. (Conveniently then un-euthical suggests unethical, which is what from a properly ethical stance it is!) There is undoubtedly some pressure to have ethics and morality extend beyond a single or isolated individual 23 ( even so, a Crusoe ethics is intelligible and feasible, as regrettably is egoistic morality). But that pressure does not extend very far; and such notions as those of a tribal morality and an upper-class ethics are not defective on significance or semantic grounds, even if they are wide open to objections on substantive grounds. Such restricted ethics are not however immediately ruled out, as ethics, by such requirements as that like cases be assessed alike, and that differences of assessment be based on relevant differences. 24 For a tribalist or racist can respond that a foreigner is not like a 20 21 22 23 24 Reese p.157. See also Reese. On both, narrowing and vexing, see Singer Impractical ethics (Singer equates moral with ethical). Singer does not really have an answer to the question Why be moral? though he thinks it not a bad idea; mainly he tries to put down shuffles that have been presented as decisive. Pettit reworking a rough route hacked out by Wittgenstein, tries to expand this across into a philosophical forest denominated "holism", no-dwelling place for an isolated individual. These requirements are presented by Attfield as basic formal requirements of reason (p.6). No 12 Greek, or that there are relevant differences between whites and blacks (intelligence has been proposed as such a difference, when skin pigmentation appeared a merely superficial difference). These sorts of responses, which were long accepted, are no longer acceptable, because the differences put up are not considered ethically relevant differences (correctly enough, though ethical relevance itself lacks an adequate explanation). Egoism, for instance, exhibits rationality failure, as it does not treat likes alike. There are no relevant differences justifying different treatment. Singer's main argument for a much wider point of view,for universality, rests upon an extensive appeal to authority (p.11). What else is offered is but an appeal to usage. the notion of ethics carries with it the idea of something bigger than the individual'. [It often does, but it may not.] 'If I am to defend my conduct on ethical grounds, I cannot point only to the benefits it brings me. I must address myself to a larger audience'(p.10). That depends on the conduct concerned. More important, the audience does not need to be so large, certainly not universal: my family or clan will suffice often enough. Nonetheless there is this of use 'ethics', especially in such criticisms as 'unethical'. • due consideration of others, all others; Parallel to the distinction of euthics within ethics is a distinction of neurals within morals, neurality within morality. Again the subclass, reflecting widespread philosophical usage of the term morality, is separated through some requirement of morality, such as • universalizability, which is a strong way of ensuring the first (do unto others etc.). Insofar as these principles all allude to others, they often admit easy extension (to other others). 25 4. Environmental and greener ethics. As prevailing accounts of ethics are for the most part defective, so are what builds upon them, recent accounts of environmental ethics. But there are also other grounds for dissatisfaction with these. Issues in the characterizat ion of ethics, especially removal of actocentrism and homocentrism, naturally get transmitted to critical types, such as environmental ethics. But it might be imagined, rashly, that disagreement ends there. After all, all decent environmental ethics make the non-human world a proper object of concern, either directly or indirectly. Differences between explications offered can be ascribed to ordinary philosophica l incompleteness. "An environmental ethic, broadly, is a set of values to live by which takes due account of the value of the non-human world". 26 Stated differently, the aim of environmental ethics 'is to understand and act appropriately in relation of our ecological-i n 25 26 doubt they are, though they appear to figure in no logic of ethics yet formulated. The distinctions can be filled out (and made to work-verify!) by a strategy like the earlier. Again the list of moral predicates is deliberately wide. But once again we can later separate off certain uses e.g. instrumenal, aesthetic uses of good. Gunn 1987, 3. 13 the broad sense-circum stances". 27 Differently again, " ... sets of principles, which would guide our treatment of wild nature, constitute an environmental ethic in the most general sense". 28 The first of these slack explanations leaves out what is essential for an ethics, principles; the second is unduly actocentric, leaving out what is not, as well as main paraphernalia of ethics; the third not only neglects values, but excessively narrows scope so that such an ethics is inapplicable in places devoid of wild nature or to other issues. A better explication, which avoids these obvious pitfalls runs: An environmental ethics is an ethics, as defined, which, among other concerns, takes specific account, through its values and principles, of (significant) environmental items, of parts of nonhuman nature. But obviously it too leaves much to be explained. How the non-human world is made the object of concern, how it is moral concern, to what degree it is made the object of moral concern, what forms of moral concern are applicable to what elements of the environment, and how to achieve the aim of acting appropriately - all are matters that make environmental ethics one of the most controversial areas of philosophy and also one of the most exciting, although many professional philosophers still regard it as a peripheral area. Yet there now is broad agreement among most of those active in the area that some change is needed and that environmental matters need much more attention and action. An environmental ethics is an ethics concerned, usually among other ethical things, with parts of the environment. Coal-face or factory-floor environmenta l ethics bears on environmental issues, problems and causes, and can be expected to say something about environment s or some of their nonhuman components. Academic or board-room environmental ethics is frequently, however, a remove from direct ethical work, comprising discussion of environmental ethics, its features, its methods, its variability, its presumed merely derived and applied character, and so on. Much of this academic environmental ethics is directed against coal-face environmental ethics, especially that of a genuinely committed sort aimed at advancing environmental sources. It is almost immediate that there is an important elasticity -ambiguity, in a slack sense -in the notion of environmental ethics, between an ethics which considers environmental matters, whether positively or negatively, and an ethics which is positive about some environmental elements, which evinces concern about environmental items (as 18th century sympathy ethics did about other humans). A superficial environmental ethics need not say anything particularly positive or sympathetic about environments; indeed productions on the topic may try to dismiss or defeat environmenta l causes and to defuse or dissolve environmental problems, for instance as not worth bothering about. 29 It may be argued that 27 28 29 Drengson 1989, 15. Elliot, in Singer, 284. That is, fashionable contemporary practice with respect to philosophy is transferred to parts of enviromental philosophy (e.g. by Eco Wittgenstein and AppliedQuine). Environmental philosophy may in no way interfere with industry and business. To an astonishing extent American academic environmental ethics tends to conform to such ridiculous strictures (often encouraged by a fawning 14 natural environme nts should serve highest economic causes, which means in practice becoming reserves for city folks, city corporations and consumers. Under such environmental ethics ("environmental ethics" it is tempting to say, contravening usage) many an environme nt should be razed, levelled, and paved over, to become a grand parking lot, shopping mall or urban escarpmen t of a concrete jungle. What rural environment remains will, also serve those "high" purposes, be tamed and managed, like much of Western Europe. Witness the enthusiasm in productions on environmental ethics for landscapes like that of Tuscany, where virtually everything is under tight human control and no bird moves (else it is shot). Environm ental ethics and environme ntal philosophy may well prove to be disappointm ents for enthusiastic environmentalists. For there may be little that is materially green about them, no commitme nt to changes in old attitudes and practices, no offers of improved standing and ethical treatment for environme ntal items. As an environme ntal economics may be no green economics , but (very likely) some part or application of mainstream economics , some sweep of resource or land economics , so an environme ntal ethics or environme ntal ethic may not be particularly or at all green, but, for instance, simply part of establishm ent ethics or an "application" of it to environmental items. Fortunately not all environmental ethics is like this; beyond environmental is genuinely green ethics. The elasticity in environmental ethics between superficial and material forms, parallels that of the term concern (and rather similarly of matter), and can be substantially constricted to that: an environme ntal ethics is one concerned with environmental items or matter. Thus, on the one construal, such an ethics may be simply about such topics, it may be a standard ethics "applied" to such topics, in which case environmental ethics does become just so-called applied ethics. Alternatively, however, such an ethic may be one evincing concern, worry, about the treatment of some environmental items on other, and directed at obtaining improved treatment. Such an ethic is not negative or indifferent towards environme ntal matters, but is advancing environme ntal causes. They matter. With such ethics, environme ntal ethics cannot possibly be an applied ethics, for the framework of standard ethics and their application s, is exceeded. (At best such ethics can be approxima ted by standard ethics by assuming enlightened agents holding appropriate sorts of values. 30) 5. Human chauvinism and its detailed removal. Deep-green theory is, unambiguously, a green ethical theory, of deep kind: that is, there is intrinsic value in nature, natural items have intrinsic value, which may predomina te over human-bas ed value. In short, the theory rejects both the 'Sole Value Assumptio n' and the 'Greater Value Assumptio n'. The theory finds all standard ethics mired in heavy prejudice, in 30 pragmatism). Compare also Naess (in Engel 1990) on utilitarian approximation to Deep Ecology, made by assuming availability of enough agents holding deep ecological values or, more or less equivalently, having deep ecological consciousness. 15 favour of things human and against things non-human. The distinctive, still pervasive, prejudice concerned is that encapsulated as human chauvinism, which is itself a special case of class chauvinism (for the class, human 31 ). Removal of human chauvinism dovetails with displacement of humans. Class chauvinism consists in substantia lly differentia l treatment, typically discriminatory and inferior treatment, of items outside the class, by sufficiently many members of the class concerned, for which there is no sufficient justification. Human chauvinism is a feature, a cardinal weakness, of virtually all ethical systems hitherto, so deepgreen theory contends. The main argument takes the following form: there is no characteristic, such as those tendered in ethical theories as justifying differential treatment in favour of humans (characteristics such as rationality, language possession, tool making abilities, needs, preferences, sentience, etc.) which first is held by all and only humans, as distinct from not all humans and some non-humans, and which second does justify differential treatment.3 2 Signs and manifestations of chauvinism are many and various, some conspicuous, some subtle, and so on. For instance, a dead giveaway is any allusion to all outside certain human concerns that may have a value as resources. For that assigns to the items so referred to mere instrumental value. A little less obvious is the discriminative mode when individual humans are counted, but only species of other living things (or a step down, individual sentients but only species of others). The thorough-going rejection of human chauvinism itself sets a program: that of reworking ethics, and indeed much of philosophy, in a way free of chauvinism and humanism, without any specially privileged place for humans. A first part of such a program has already been outlined, that of suitably characterising ethics in a way that does not make essential appeal to humans or their features, or to other favoured groups such as sentients. A further important part of the program, formulation of ethical theory in a way which avoids entirely group chauvinism. Such a desirable outcome can be achieved simply through formulation of ethical theory in terms of ethically relevant categories, assembled in what is called an annular theory. 33 31 32 33 Insofar as an account of human is required, it can be some improvement on the biological species definitions, a reworking to remove past biasses (superioristic, rationalistic, masceulinist, etc.) and to dislodge appeals to aspects of human nature. But, despite the preponderance of human agents hereabouts, on planet Earth, such an account is not required for ethics, or for philosophy. Theorizing in these and many other areas can proceed perfectly well without allusion to humans. The detailed argument for this proposition is presented in Routley and Routley 1980a 97-108, where chauvinism is spelled out a bit further. A truncated version of this argument appears in Fox 1990, 16-17. Though the theory is so labelled in several publications, the label, which presumably should stay, is misleading, because some ethical relevant categories may overlap one another. The concentric theory (developed in Wenz 1988 and others, perhaps in steps of Leopold), which incorporates a similar mistake, can be seen as a subversion of the annular model. 16 The annular picture helps show how to redo ethics and philosophy with ideal types, or with some equivalent thereof. No simple species or subspecies , such as humans or superhumans, no single feature, such as sentience or life, serves as a reference benchmark, a base class, for determinin g moral relevance and other ethical dimensions . 34 No ethical irrelevant distinctions and classes, such as those of humans or base class, are required. What is required instead is a major shift in perspective , a new focus upon morally relevant categorical distinctions: it is not possible to provide criteria which would justify distinguishing, in the sharp way standard Western ethics do, between humans and certain nonhuman creatures, and particularly those creatures which have preferences or preferred states. For such criteria appear to depend upon the mistaken assumption that moral respect for other creatures is due only when they can be shown to measure up to some rather arbitrarily -determine d and loaded tests for membershi p of a privileged class (essentially an elitist view), instead of upon, say, respect for the preference s of other creatures. According ly the sharp moral distinction, commonly accepted in ethics by philosophe rs and other alike, between all humans and all other animal species, lacks a satisfactory coherent basis (Routley and Routley 80a, 103). The categorical distinctions thereby proposed do not reject traditional ethical notions such as rationality, self-awaren ess, having interests; but they do reject the automatic use of the characteristics of one species, or some base class as the model upon which the characteristics of all other species or classes are judged. They also reject as unjustified distinctions that are not "categorical distinctions which tie analytically with ethical notions". 35 For instance, they hold that the human/nonhuman distinction is not ethically significant. Humans enter only in a contingent way into general ethical theory, as holders of these or those features, which 34 35 Another common mistake which annular theory helps dispel and avoid is that of trying to stretch community (or moral commuity) to include webs, mountains, Earth, land etc.-a trend Leopold started with his land ethic. An agent can have an obligation to care for earth, and soil without there being part of community. (The Land ethic is misguided). What ethics covers diverges from any moral community. (Contra Dobson's suggestion p.47). Routley and Routley 1980a, 108. 17 depending upon their respective capabilities and competence. It is also desirable to have available some more positive principles corresponding to the negative rejection of class chauvinism, principles so to say, of anti-chauvinism. Principles like the biospherical egalitarianism of Deep Ecology represent an unsatisfactory attempt in this direction. The deep-green improvement on this principle is the powerful principle of ecoimpartiality, according to which there should be no substantially differential treatment of items outside any favoured class or species of discriminatory sort that lacks sufficient justification. The appropriate impartial treatment is substantially independent of the comparative value of the item treated. Most important, impartial treatment does not entail equal treatment, or equal consideration, and does not require equal intrinsic or other value. Other distinctive principles of deep-green theory will emerge as the ethical theory accumulates. One major conclusion is that human is not a significant ethical category. The outcome is not anti-human; humans enter to the extent that they respectively deserve to enter. It is not being claimed that humans lack value, that none of them have much or any value. Quite the contrary, some humans have great value, some have established themselves as having great propensity for evil, many lead quite indifferent lives. What is being rejected is the elevated, often exaggerated, frequently exclusive, value assigned to humans, too often uniform value. What are being contested are received distributions of values, and the heavy concentration of value in humans and things and features human, the relative importance of which has been grossly exaggerated. 36 Be in no doubt: many humans have positive value, some remarkable value. That is one reason why it matters that humans should not vanish off the planet (for all that many of they have sinned against it), to leave an impoverished earth, for instance a microbe planet. For that would involve a huge reduction in value. Nor is it enough, adequate compensation, that something like humans would evolve again at some remote future time. For, even if it happened (in fact the probability of such replacement looks rather small), there would still be a huge and extended dip in value. Similar points tell against a range of similar arguments to the effect that it does not matter what happens to, or is done to, the Earth, because evolution will eventually restore richness. 37 Even if richness were to return (much evidence indicates 36 37 Moral consideration and intrinsic value are not limited to humans; similarly these are not confined to any other favoured or "improved" class closely overlapping humans, such as (it is supposed) persons or rational creatures. Moral principles can be applied to all species and to the natural environment in general. (A corollary concerns the characterisation of morality. ) Evolutionary space is thereby afforded for other species, other systems other things. An associated feature is stereotyping. Stereotyping is characteristic of speciesism/chauvinism as it is in exploitation. To stereotype an item is to see it purely as a member of a class and as having conventional feature of the class as a whole. Recently there have been some attempts to have things ethical both ways: a special role for humans without privilege or prejudice. There is a latent incoherence in Rachel's text, between his initial and final proposals regarding ethics and morals-which are essentially human intricatedand regarding morals without hubris (MWH)-where human hubris is supposed to be removed. Such an argument has been advanced by, among others, William Grey in 'Anthropocentrism and 18 that extinction and destruction is for ever, permanent), there would still be serious loss of value. So it does matter. 6. Philosophy without humans. It is hard to move and operate philosophically without encountering humans and human chauvinism. Chauvinism is written deep into all prevailing Western (and Eastern) ideological forms, common to what, at a more superficial level, are rival positions. But while human chauvinism transcends parochial differences, it is more conspicuous and brazen in some philosophical locales than others, notably idealism and empiricism, existentialism and phenomenology. In short, it is particularly prominent where matters answer back to subjects, those who have the ideas, do the observing, assemble the phenomena, do the living, and so on-back to subjects that are invariably assumed to be human. Thus it is human existence, human Being, human ideas and impressions, that count, those and none others. Such chauvinism, nauseatingly strong, pervades not only Continental philosophy (esp. French and German varieties)-but also Anglo-American empiricism and pragmatism (esp. anti-realist varieties). 38 Once the main strategies of ethics-without-humans have been grasped, it is easy to see how analogous moves can be made the deanthropize other reaches of philosophy, notably some of the more chauvinistic enterprises. In general there are two stages: Firstly, as with morality, replacing humans and human subjects by agents and ideal subjects. And secondly, as with ethics, delineating significant reaches-philosop hical wildernesses-wh ere agents are removed, not just off-stage but altogether. While a few examples of each stage only will be given, it will become evident that the procedures are general. Consider as an example of the first stage, existentialism, a philosophy celebrating humans, and their exclusive freedom, and shot through with human chauvinism. Existentialism is (to quote a convenient caricature) a philosophy which emphasises man's freedom to act independently of any laws, natural or otherwise, and according to his own choice. It is a free will philosophy which can be seen as 'a protest against views of the world and policies ... in which humans are regarded as the helpless playthings of historical forces, or as wholly determined by the regular operation of natural 38 Deep Ecology', Australasian Journal of Philosophy vol.71, No 4: December 1993. There is a residual serious problem here, as to why existence is so important. Why do actual humans and existent tigers matter, not merely virtual ones or possible ones. What is it about existence? There are many items which it would be better did not exist, such as devils, helicopters (for the most part), pollution, erosion and so on. Existence, of favoured sorts, makes for richness, which is a high (if defeasible) virtue. Sartre's philosophy is rendolent with human chauvinism: e.g. Critique of Dialectical Reason p.8. as regards destruction and destroy, is an amazing piece of human chauvinism. While humans may have a greater potentiality for production of value than most other animals, many humans also have a far greater potentiality for evil than most other animals. Historically, the evil producing capacity has dominated. Another example of Sartre's anthropocentism is his "philosophy of the present". Marx's philosophy is similarly rendolent. Productivity is human productivity... . For almost random examples from anti-realism, see DP. 19 processes' (Encyclopaedia Britannica 1978). This anti-determinist perspective is, again, connected with the question of objectivity. Existentialists hold that the only objective external fact independent of the control of human beings is the fact of their being brought into existence, and that death will one day come to terminate that existence. In all other respects it is they who are in control. There are no outside independent laws, of economics, history, nature or whatever, which they cannot deny or shape for themselves. Thus we are all free to choose how we will behave and develop and how we will shape society and nature. It follows that the consequences of our actions are down to us, and therefore if they are unpleasant that is our fault-not the fault of outside forces or external laws. There are no excuses for our not thinking and acting for ourselves and we are 'condemned' to be free because everything is theoretically permitted to us and we therefore carry a heavy burden of responsibility for what we do. As Sartre put it, 'Man is responsible for what he is. The first effect of existentialism is that it puts every man in possession of himself as he is, and places the entire responsibility for existence squarely on his shoulders' .... We have a duty to face up to this, and not to base our actions thoughtlessly on what is said to be prescribed/or us ('laws' of society, of economics, of nature). That is abdicating responsibility.39 Note the heavy concentration throughout on humans, variously appearing as human beings, we, us, they, and (in singular musculine form) man and he. But, as before 40 , on the one boundary, many humans are incapable of what is presumed, the heavy burden of responsibility and so forth; and, on the other, other agents are, in principle at least, capable of achieving those relevant sorts of freedom that humans can obtain. It is already apparent that once the synthetic setting of highly competent humans is exceeded, notions invoked by existentialism begin to fall apart. For instance, some "wild" animals may enjoy considerable levels of unreflective unagonised freedom while lacking capacity to bear much responsibility. Conversely, there are fairly responsible agents, such as some trapped in determined or deterministic situations, who have no opportunity to exercise freedom. Accordingly too, though human should be replaced by agent of appropriate sort in dechauvinized existentialism, it would hardly suffice to substitute for 'human' any of 'responsible agent', 'freedom exercising agent' or similar-though these substitutions effect some of what was intended, such as exclusion of children, many animals, dementeds and so on. What sort of agent is appropriate? That existentialism can be seen as trying to explain. And for the present we can leave it at that, replacing human throughout by the dummy term, existential agent. This is existentialism partly rectified. At the same primary stage of dechauvinizing existentialism, connected improvements could well be sought in existentialism, such as reducing the driven and elitist ethos. In part this ethos is encouraged by the response of existentialism to what motivates and shapes it, deterministic arguments; for it sees only such "strong" agents as evading deterministic forces. The whole business is rather ironic, as the first driven feature is incompatible with full 39 40 Pepper (Roots) pp.118-9; itals in original. Pepper refers to Sartre 1943 and 1946. As at the beginning of EE, where standard privileged treatment for humans is reviewed and found wanting. 20 freedom, while the second elitist feature is incompatible with the stress on things human, as (like elitist religions) only exceptional agents escape. A promising alternative tries direct confrontation with deterministic arguments, undercutting their scope and grip, and thereby making room for free action in a range of situations (not everywhere between birth and death!) for a wide variety of agents, including lesser, less elite, less stressed and sensitive agents. For the arguments prove vulnerable to selective undermining by careful logical and analytic procedures, 41 methods existentialism itself is loath to deploy (for all that its approach rests upon past entrenched argumentation). Insofar as a main motivation for existentialism in its prevailing ironic form is undiscriminating antideterminism, that motivation too is thereby collapsed, and room is made for a less demanding more relaxed dechauvinized existentialism. As for existentialism, so for a range of other subjects inclined to intrude humans as central to world functioning or intelligibility, a range as apparently diverse as phenomenology and quantum theory, empiricism and theology, pragmatism and cosmology. Quantum theory fits into this range because of its received Copenhagen interpretation, cosmology because of its return to anthropocentrism through adoption of anthropic principles. Both are however readily freed of human shackles, first by replacing humans by "observers" (which for the most part can simply be recording devices), and better, secondly to deagentize completely, by amending interpretation s to dislodge both Copenhagen phenomenolo gy and anthropic principles. 42 For a larger illustration, consider a popular mixture of versions of phenomenology (a fuller elaboration again would disentangle versions, all of which however require similar detoxification). Phenomenol ogy to which existentialism is related .. .is summed up by Nietzsche, who said, 'Objectivity is the main enemy of understanding. It means the myth that there are hard observable facts ... but all the concepts we employ in describing the world and predicting its behaviour are imposed on it by ourselves. We have a choice about what view of the world we adopt.' ... Phenomenology is not just a philosophy which implies that we are not subject to external laws, imposed by and through forces independent of ourselves. It holds that there actually is no world external to and separate from ourselves. There is no 'reality' in the sense of there being an external 'real world' divorced from our own consciousness and capable of existing if we did not exist. Nature cannot exist without ourselves also existing-if we ceased to be, so would it cease, and vice-versa. Therefore what 'the environment' is, and is like, is a function of our own subjective construction of it. The very use of such terms as 'ourselves' and 'human consciousness' in opposition to terms like 'nature' and 'the environment' is inappropriate and shows the extent to which we are immersed in positivist science as our way of seeing the world. For the phenomenologists these terms are meaningless because there is no separation between ourselves and a 'nature' or a 'reality'. We and the world are one-a single united entity. Phenomenology is thus anti-positivist science, opposing ... Cartesian dualism. It does not deal in laws, or in cause-effect relationships consequent on the dualism and neither can it be concerned with analysis-brea king the world into parts ... If we want to know and understand nature we must, as Hume 41 42 For technical details, see Sylvan FWD. On satisfactory ways of accomplishing this second stage see Sylvan (Cosm. Syn). 21 { said in his Treatise on Human Nature in 1737, come to full comprehension of man. For if there is no nature except as structured through human consciousness, knowledge and truth cannot exist independently of man. 43 As with existentialism, there is a similar enormous exorbitant emphases on humans and things humans; humans carry everything. But insofar as humans can perform those feats, so better can a class a appropriate agents, phenomenolo gical agents, who include no incompetents (who might let this world flicker out of existence, or worse). Phenomenolo gy is a full immersion human chauvinism. Fashionable contemporary empiricisms, normally taken as rivals to phenomenolo gy, are incomplete immersion analogues. While a few properties, primary properties of basic physics, are separated out as human independent, the rest, the phenomenolo gical mass, are categorised as responsedependent, and treated phenomenologically. 44 Take, for example, aesthetic features, which include certain ecological features. Nowadays humans can grow up with the assumption that aesthetic qualities, indeed all "response dependent" qualities, are features of humans, not in any way objective. So it can be seriously, if ridiculously, hypothesized that what is (considered) beautiful, for instance of depends on how the human gene-pool is composed. As before, humans are readily displaced in favour of appropriate agents. But, for the most part, these agents too are otiose. While the first stage 1s the main stage with agentocentric philosophies like extistentialism, there is a second stage, which comprises significantly more than pointing out how much, how much of importance, such philosophies leave out by their narrow concentration. What is left out includes, to begin, all those times and places where there are no agents, rich worlds, devoid of relevant agents, and the like. But that is only the beginning of the business. For agents have been infiltrated or inserted in all sorts of settings where they have no business to be or to transact. Against the ancient and formerly honorable practice of agent invocation, pushed primarily for explanatory purposes, 45 agent detachment and agent elimination campaigns have periodically been mounted (e.g. conspicuously , but not only, in classic Greece, when it became clearly appreciated that there could be causes without agents, during the Enlightenmen t, and in Frege' s propositional ization program). Deagentizatio n, typically coupled with deanthropization, can be, and should be, pushed much further. Agents, often evidence of immature, even primitive, philosophy, still lurk everywhere in philosophy. Agent-detach ment themes, still struggling against an unenlightened opposition, include: objects, including worlds, without perceivers or sensors, nonexistent items without conceivers, propositions without proposers, assumptions without assumers, values without 43 44 45 Pepper p.199 (where references are supplied). We shall not stop off for expository adjustment or for any critique of this material. For main elements of such a critique, see however DP chapter 11 and JB. Thus thesis that all properties are response dependent merges empiricism with European phenomenology. Deluded explanatory purposes, for agents themselves have in turn to be explained. I 22 t valuers, causation without causers (or intentional agents), organisation without organisers, wilderness without wilderness managers, land (or property) without owners or stewards, regulation without regulators, selection without selectors, and purposes without purposers. 46 But without humans who does philosophy? Well, in the old days, God of course, most gods, the Devil, demiurges, gifted spirits and so on. At any time duly accomplished agents. While it is easy to see how ethics and philosophy could in principle flourish given only suitably accomplished agents, and no humans, namely the agents do something like what a few humans hereabouts do, still it may be less easy for many to see how these subjects can function without agents. But it is straightforward, is it not? A philosophy stands as a system of propositions. And propositions do not need agents, proposers, or whatever. Nor do systems. It is here that blockage may occur, for two reasons: First, because of the idealistic idea that there are no statements without staters. Second, because of the mistaken assumption that a system of propositions standing on its own involves an obnoxious platonism. No such assumption is made. Third, part of the struggle has been conducted before, in the tussle between psychologism and its opposite in logic and associated regions (e.g. mathematics, philosophy of mathematics etc.), in the tussle between Husserl and Frege (to name two prominent parties). Although the issues have been rejoined more recently, it is still widely supposed that anti-psychologism triumphed. Its success is, to some extent, mere appearance. For all that, anti-psychologism is here extended much further, right across philosophy. Appendix. 1. Examples showing divergence of utilitarianism from consequentialism. Consider two different actions with some set of consequence s, one (A) done deliberately, one (B) unintended. Then suppose, for one sort of case, the outcome is disastrous. Not only is A normally regarded as much worse than B, e.g. arson than a naturally occurring fire such as lightening strike, but further fuller utility assessments should give analogous results, e.g. the satisfaction of the arsonist could be given a high negative rating. Utilitarianism itself is but a well-tempered egoism: egoism extended to substituting others. That cannot so plausibly be charged of consequentialism. Utilitarianism has been associated with the "greed is good" ideology of the 1980s. The association has point (so Singer tries, desperately, to disassociate utilitarianism). Suppose it is said that the 80s, were a decade of greed (as so depicted in many movies) but the 90s is a decade of ethics (despite counterevidence). But nothing has changed in underlying ideologies, in ethics or economics! Appendix 2. Inadequacy of standard ethics. The inadequacy of standard ethics for green purposes has been recognised, if obliquely and perversely, by many critics of the idea of (deep) green ethics (e.g. McCloskey). They 46 The very controversial tlast theme is argued in Sylvan 90 [purpose], where most of these various detachment themes are assembled. Obviously there are many more such themes. 23 l have proceeded to argue that there couldn't be such an ethics because none of the standard ethics would serve. But the argument fails because standard ethics does not exhaust ethics. There are some prospects of a general proof of inadequacy from what has been developed so far. Standard forms are restricted to proper subsets of agents, whereas ethics in full flower applies to all agents. Standard ethics leaves out much of the subject, all the deep part. References William Grey in 'Anthropocentrism and Deep Ecology', Australasian Journal of Philosophy vol.71, No 4: December 1993. ON THE VALUE CORE OF DEEP-GREEN THEORY Deep-green theory is a deep environmental theory, with much in common with deep ecology. Like deep ecology, it stands in significant ideological opposition to the dominant technocratic-industrial way. But, even more than deep ecology, deep-green theory aims to supply a comprehensive alternative environmental philosophy (in the full senses of those atrophied terms, esp philosophy ). It seeks to accomplish this, furthermore, without accumulating the amount of philosophical rubbish deep ecology regularly attracts. For, to insert a key difference between these ecocentric theories in a deliberately prejudical way: deepgreen theory resembles a deep ecology with the pseudo-scientific garbage removed, reorganised into a tight, coherent and more comprehensive theory. Deep-green theory, which has roots that stretch back about as far as its much publicized neighbour, accordingly merits elaboration separate from deep ecology, which in any case lacks a well-thought-through valuational and ethical basis. This essay aims to uncover the value theory of deep-green theory, exposing thereby one central area of deep-green theory. Though the value theory is (inevitably) abstract, it issues in what is more concrete, such as practical ecological directives, potentially destabilizing prevailing policies and institutions. At the core of deep-green theory, as of authentic deep ecology, lies a value theory. A fundamental theme thereof, part of what makes these positions deep, is that a range of environmental items are valuable in themselves, directly and irreducibly so, so that their value does not somehow reduce to or emerge from something else, such as features of certain valuers or what counts for them. Value then does not answer back in some way to humans, or sentient creatures (or other value-responsive classes), their interests, uses, preferences, or such like. Many natural items such as forests and rivers, mountains and seashores, are, as it is often put (without however any commitment thereby to dubious essentialist or absolute objectivist positions), intrinsically valuable. They are valuable in their own right - irrespective of whether they are interesting or useful (to any intentional operators, themselves interesting or useful or not), indeed whether or not there exist any valuers. Value spreads through and reaches across the natural domain; it is not bounded by mind or linkages with subjective states; nor does it stop with sentience, or associated pyschological features like satisfaction; nor (pace deep ecology) does it end at life; it observes no such compromising bounds. Although value is distributed richly if irregularly throughout nature, and accordingly may be found in nature, it is not encapsulated in some isolable natural feature, such as life or sentience, or even in defeasible ecological values such as richness, diversity and variety (and so subject to a different, naturalistic, reduction). But of course such ecological features afford criteria for value, and should be represented in recipes (such as "objective functions") for assessing total value. From the presence of natural things of value, and accordingly of natural values, it is a short, though controversial, step to the important conclusion that there can be values without valuers. For valuers are sentient creatures with appropriate capacities, but things of value may precede and succeed all such valuers; tfiat is, these things can persist, their values intact, without any valuers. As there can be shapes without any shape-perceivers, and concepts with conceivers, so there can be values without valuers. (The theme, like others advanced, can be backed up by more detailed argument and by formal proof, neither attempted here.) In valuational relations then, relating valuers as subjects with values as objects, both ends of relations have independent standing; though interrelated, as the descriptions deliberately chosen suggest, either can stand without the other. It is a fashionable mistake, which cannot however be got away with, to try to collapse this relation - usually to endeavour to soak up values into a modification of valuing subjects (e.g. as a predicate 'relation-to-values', in which inconvenient values are locked away), not to remove valuers, considered unproblematic, from view. The mistaken procedure is in fact just one important example of an archetypal reduction of mainstream modern philosophy, of relations to functions; other examples, locking undesired objects away within functions, are those rendering wholes (such as ecosystems and organised structures) functions of their parts, and, under functionalism, minds and types of intentionality, including value direction, as functions of bodies or their parts such as brains. Values are not, and do not disappear into, functions of valuers. A connected corollary is that values are not apart from the actual world, something "projected" or imposed on it by a favoured class of valuers, something colouring (and even emotionall y clouding) the otherwise valueless physical world, in rather the way that reductionistic materialism tries (erroneously) to construe colour itself as projected onto a colourless physical world. Of course this projection effort, never adequately explicated, does not succeed, on its own, in removing values. For they remain, left as some function of the valuers. To try to bulldoze through this difficulty, a second reduction is invoked, of evaluative features of valuers to "natural" features, commonly preferences, desires or such like. The second reduction runs into obstacles that halt even the naturalistic bulldozers (e.g. naturalistic and related fallacies), but the first reduction is the critical one in removing key environmental values, such as those of wilderness and wild things, which become valuable only in the focus of certain sentient beholders, and not in and for them self. This reduction too is blocked by insuperable difficulties. On the one side, like the parallel proposed phenomonalist reduction of material objects to sensations, the reduction never achievers satisfactory support or even a satisfactory statement. On the other, it is counterexampled by various modellings or thoughtexperiments revealing intuitively-assessed value in situations devoid of valuers (as e.g. in the well-known Last Person argument). Values are not apart from the actual world, then, merely projected onto it by valuers, or else locked up in certain valuers (in the fashion of Carterian intensions ). Values are part of the world; they are objects in the domain of actual and other worlds. But they are not of course material objects; creatures will not fall over them any more than they will trip over shadows or shapes. Value like the shape and taste, is an3attribute, which things have or may lack, and which furthermore creatures can recognise or may fail to discern. Thus value is, like colour and taste and their determinate forms (red, acidic, etc), a universa l , distributed across things, individuals and wholes. Like shape and colour, value is a high-level universal. The comparison of value with shape is decidedly more helpful than the standard, but exhausted, comparison of value with colour, or of goodness with colour determinates such as redness or yellow. For example, shape is not bound by a set of determinates as colour is in the specific colours, but comes in a spectacular variety of forms, not totally or linearly ordered (as in a rainbow), or contracted to some primary set (as in colour traingles); shapes like value pertain to wholes as well as particulars, and links with gestalts rather better than colour; shape discrimination is more culture dependent and sensitive; shape is, or was, a primary property, and thereby more immune to reductionist strategies than secondary properties such as colour, which is, under physicalism, prized off objects and allegedly relocated in creatures or in their interrelation with colourless physical things. Shapes like values, can be vague, indeterminate; that does not prevent things, perhaps unique things, exemplifying them. But naturally the anology can only be extended so far. Shapes can be approximated by polygons, values cannot; shapes are regularly perceived through sense perception, by vision or touch especially, values are not, but are differently apprised. Value is its own thing, not something else; it is what it is and does what is does, and not something else, like some specialised mathematical or economic thing. It does not contract to some mark of value or to what it comes down to in highly restricted settings; most important, it does not disappear in the style of modem economics into (expected) utility or into just two economic forms, value-in-use monetarily and value-inexchange (price). Value means what it means, and has meant: worth; and it ties with general assessments of merit and demerit, goodness or badness, not an economic or other cut-down thereof. Price, for example, may fail entirely to reflect worth, it may have little to do with goodness of product. The powerful drive to reduce or deny values has several sources. part of the motivation for reduction of value springs from epistemological worries, concerning how values can be ascertained and known, so far as they are (subjective translation proposals are than a direct evaluative counterpart of phenomenalism). Part derives from supposedly problematic cultural and subcultural relativity (whence the attempt to impose values by identification of value with some favoured feature, and cultural or economic imperialism). Part of the motivation comes from more sweeping ideologic al commitments, such as the varieties of materiali sm (physicalism esp.) or scientism. As has become apparent, attempted reductions of value come too in a variety of forms subjective, which made use of psychological features, such as desires, interests, emotions, and the like or subjective aggregations, such as community preferences or utility; or objectiviely naturalistic, which enrol value-making characteristics such as richness or evolutionary development as value - consequential, w~ch consider only outcomes, or purely motivational, which consider only attitudes and ignore leads and outcomes - straightforward, as in translation proposals for translating value judgements into reducing statements; or oblique, as in supervenience propositions (no variations in value without underwriting variations in reducing features), or obscure, as in unarticulated projection claims. Values are not well accommodated within theses schemes, or accommodated at all. The idea is abroad however that science can offer a reduction, can sweep up value along with all other knowledge, where philosophy has conspicuously failed. Unfortunately for such optimistic ideas, fortunately perhaps for deeper thought, current science, physics especially, does not have much to say at all, or of merit, about values, and if it did reductions through it would be circular. But, to the contrary, there is a long-standing pretence that science gets along "well" without values, in appropriate value-free fashion. Nowadays it is increasingly realised that such value-freedom is a myth, that much of what passes as science is heavily value-penetrated. While those engaged purely in purer science may have the illusion of an escape from value, there is no escape. Though deep-green value theory is thoroughly nonreductive, it does not sacrifice warranted claims to scientific and logical adequacy thereby. The reductionistic dichotomies are avoided and repudiated. Value reduces neither in subjective nor objective fashion; it does not reduce. Evaluative judgements are certainly not subjective; but nor are they objection in an absolutist sense; they are nonjective, that is, neither. Somewhat similarly, evaluation of an act does not reduce to assessing consequences; nor does it come down to an assessment of motives; both may matter. In any case, reductions do not succeed, as a copious literature, littered with failed attempts, meanderingly establishes. Nor are they generally desirable, since mostly shallow, aiming at a reduction to features of some privileged class presented as ideal (i.e. core value is covertly assumed). Nor are they needed; explanation and assessment do not require reduction. Evaluations may be arrived at, and value systems expanded, by enhancement methods, which consists in emotional presentation (as under Meinong's phenomenological account) organised by coherence methods. The methodology in fact resembles that sometimes proposed for acquisition of scientific information. As with accumulated empirial information, which can be extended through presentational input and assessment for overall coherence, so further evaluations may be arrived at and assessed through a combination of presentational and coherence procedures. At the (marginal) stage where the next round of evaluations is undertaken, the following active ingredients figure, in an idealised breakdown:- Firstly, a background stock of judgements and experience will have been accumulated or inherited; in principle all of this is revisable, and some may be up for reassessment. Apart from the background, which enters in assessing overall coherence of system, what is involved is, secondly, emotional presentation, which corresponds to further perceptional and sense data input, and, thirdly and not independent, coherence processing , which supplies the interpretational and rationalisational comp~nents. At bottom, parallelling perception in the case of empirical information, is emotional presentation, gut or visceral reaction in starker forms of acceptance or rejection, but more generally comprehending a variety of sentiments, including overall well-being, and also relational impressions, such as empathy, identification, and so on. As a perceiver perceives shapes and taster tastes and goodness, so a valuer feels value and disvalue. The basis of perceptio n is sensation , the basis of valuation is emotion. Apprehension of value is seated in emotional, and especially visceral, presentation; but what is apprehended is not to be confused with its apprehension any more than what is perceived. All the warnings about sensation as an information source have to be repeated with heavy emphasis as regards emotional presentation; for example, reliability cannot be guaranteed, interference with presentation through drugs, alcohol, temporary excitement or other inputs may render it dubious or unacceptable, conditioning may have occurred, including substantial cultural conditioning (so that a person is terrified by huntsmen spiders but not sickened by bloody massacres of dolphins or seals). As with perception, there are checks on emotional presentation, such as constancy over time and after reflection. Emotional presentation, supplying in particular inclusions and exclusions or prohibitions, is but the basis of reflective evaluation and value apprehension. The further critical part, coherence processing, builds on the basis taking account of other inputs or controls including background (which supplies relevant components of already adopted judgements, assimilated subculture and so forth) and constraints (such as substitutional requirements like impartiality, e.g. whether considered judgements hold for substitute valuers, and uniformity, e.g. whether similar acts are judged in similar ways). The coherence procedure consists, in essence, of asking whether the next or a relevant judgemen t fits together with what has been accepted, while meeting constraints, without leading to what has been rejected or excluded. If it does fit it is added to the included side, otherwise it is sent to the excluded side. (The familiar ethical practice of devising cases and comparing them with the cases in hand can be worked in under this procedure.) Because an aim of this rationalisation procedure is achievement of some sort of equilibrium - admitting what is included, while excluding what is unsupported, fails to gain support, is emotionally spoken against - such coherence procedures have gained currency in North America under the rubric "reflectiv e equilibrium". Observe, however, that any equilibriu m gained at some stage may be quickly lost, as new types of problems arise and further information enters. To be sure, the whole methodology (like the parallel methodology of a coherence theory of truth) is highly idealised, and only practicably usable in rudimentary parts. It does however surmount a major obstacle for value theory; it reveals how in principle a nonreduc tionistic value theory can function. Whether that theory is an appropria te environmental one or not will depend however above all on the presentational input, the extent to which environmental sensitivity enters and is not dismissed. Enhancement methods reveal too tRat value systems are not uniquely determined, any more than other comprehensive theoretical frameworks, such as those intended to reflect truth. There can be, there evidently are, rival value systems, measuring up to rigorous rationality requirements, much as there are rival logics, rival physical and biological theories, and rival coherent religions. Chauvinistic systems, narrow or shallow value systems, which take no requisite account of many environmental items, likewise cannot be excluded on rational or straight logical grounds. Unfortunately such systems remain in ascendancy, and tend to dominate social practices; in recent times economism, a narrow type of utilitarianism, has all too obviously dominated much terrestial practice. While such value frameworks are open to severe criticism, for instance as chauvinistic, as violating universality requirements of morality in the case of economism, they do not succumb to definitive refutation (for the reason that requirements of morality, of universalizability of principle, impartiality and so on, can be repudiated; immoral or amoral frameworks are still value systems). Of course a range of argumentative, educational and persuasive techniques, of varying equality, can be put to work to move valuers who adhere to other structures, often enough successfully. Emotional presentation of environmental items, by way of new experience and information, is important among these. In short, much can be done to shift or alter values, though as usual effectiveness cannot be guaranteed. The availability of rival value systems and prospect of yet others, while it implies a certain desirable (and also troublesome) pluralism, does not mean relativism. Neither deep green theory nor authentic deep ecology espouse any superficially easy relativism. From their viewpoint, rival narrower and shallower systems are definitely inferior , and marked down accordingly, while economism is an onathema which does not even make the moral grade (e.g. too many principles stop at state boundaries). However a critical pluralism does acknowledge, and offer a place, in the wider scheme of things for other positions, even if as less favoured or satisfactory. Politically then, deep positions can allow for, what makes good sense in these times of numbers, alliances. Hence the point of a green alliance, combining green positions, against still prevailing anti-environmentalism and economism. The value system pluralism of deep-green theory interpenetrates not only social and political domains above, but also metaphysics traditionally placed below. In the underlying metaphysical pluralism of deep-green theory, value runs very deep - so deep that even truth depends in part upon it. For not merely selection of a correct comprehensive theory or worldview, but choice of associated actual world, is a value dependent choice. That choice, insofar as it is consciously made, of world conceptualisation and structure, is a constrained choice, constrained by informational inputs, such as those of refined perception. But in as much as it is rationally accomplished, that choice, like other choices of structure, proceeds according to a standard value-information analysis (regularly oversimplified however to a preference- information or even desire-belief modellin1); that is, to get to the salient point, it involves value essentially. Truth and value are then intertwined. Their relation, not one of identity (for contrary to idealism, there are many relations not identical with identity), can now be stated more accurately than the poets have managed. Neither is one; both are plural, and differently so. In certain significant respects the metaphysics resembles the value theory. For example, as the value theory is nonreductionistic, so also is the metaphysics; in particular, there is a noreduction theme that neither parts nor wholes reduce eliminably to one another, as opposed to atomistic and holistic views of environmental interrelations. As the value theory is pluralistic so also is the metaphysics; what needs to be discerned, in place of absolutism, is a plurality of worlds and of associated truth characterisations. A main aim of a thoroughgoing environmental theory is to displace very destructive dominant ideasystems, regularly presented as absolute, which incorporate both value and truth themes concerning the environment and its organisation. Much of deep-green theory devolves then from the abstract value theory, beginning (to take a more accessible route than the metaphysical way) with a more comprehensive ethical theory, which includes as well as a specific axiological theory, elaborating environmental values and virtues, a deontic theory, supplying obligations, rights, taboos, and similar. For example, given that a certain wild river is intrinsically valuable, as we can verify by on-site experience and enhancement methods, and given that we duly respect that value, as deontic principles will tell us we should, then we are not free to do as we like with that river, to dam it with concrete, to channel it within concrete, stripping it of its riverine ecosystems. But that does not preclude respectful use of the river, swimming or sailing quitely in its waters, and so on. Value thus guides action, practice, and use; it is the ground also upon which principles are formulated, principles that are assessed and validated by way of enhancement methods. Important among these are non-interference principles, which exclude unwarranted interference with other preference-havers and unwarranted damage, ill-treatment, or devaluation of items of value. Such deontic principles circumscribe environmentally-limited freedom of action. Given non-interference principles, a major shift in onus of proof from homocentricthics takes place. What is required now is that reasons be givenfor interfering with the environment, rather than reasons for not doing so. Also direct responsibility for environmental interference or modification falls upon those who would interfere or significantly modify, who would tread heavily on the land. Non-interference does not preclude use, only too much use and use of too much. What it does lead to is the theme that, where use occurs, it should be careful and respectful use. An important respect thesis regarding environmental items is founded on such interference principles and the no-reduction theme: namely • • 8 not to put others (other preference havers) into a dispreferred state for no good reason; not to jeopardis e the well being of natural objects or systems without good reason; • not to damage or destroy items which, while they cannot literally be put into a dispreferred state, can be damaged or destroyed or have their value eroded or impaired. These apply to ecosystem s, their surrounds, their parts, and so on. The mere making of further excess profits, or similar economic excuses, are not good reasons. Such a respect thesis form part of the ecological outlook of deep-green theory. As permissib ility, obligatio n and respect principles can be explained through the valuations reached on the theory, so too can rights and other significant components of morality be explained and justified through, but again not reduced to, values. For example, a creature has a right to something if it has a valid title thereto established from correct moral principles. Candidates for the parameter "something" provide a familiar list: freedom from unnecessary suffering, respectful treatment, satisfaction of basic needs, and so on. Such rights accordingly derive from and reinforce corresponding deontic principles. Deep-gre en ethical theory is much more than just another non-redu ctionist ethical theory, which highlights ecological values and virtues, and so forth. It changes the character and shape of ethical enterprise. Perhaps most strikingly, it removes humans as such from the centre of the ethical stage (or exclusive occupation of the stage). The biological concept of being human is not, contrary to prevailing humanism, a highly significant ethical category. To elevate it to such is to fall into human chauvinis m, a type of class chauvini sm which unwarrantedly discriminates in favour of the human species. The prevailing chauvinis m is avoided through a natural annular model, which connects ethical characteristics directly with the categorie s of items that can have them. Relevant categories include those marked out by features like: having well-being, preference-having, rights-holding, contractual-capability, and so on, categories not necessarily connected with any particular species. Hitherto virtually all Western ethical theories have not merely so limited ethical matters predominately to inter-human affairs, but have been blantantly chauvinistic, exhibiting a substantial, discrimin ately and unjustifiably bias in favour of humans (of certain privileged humans). These sorts of systems should be superseded; it is not a matter of simple adjustments or extensions. Deep-gre en value theory, as developed, implies the inadequacy of prevailing social, political and economic arrangements and institutions, both those of a mixed capitalistic kind and those of a more state socialistic cast. They are the (devious) product of inferior value frameworks which take quite insufficient account of environmental considerations and values. But explainin g their deficiencies, and indicating more satisfactory green alternatives and replacements, is another chapter in the elaboration of deep-green theory. 9 * Richard Sylvan* RMB 683 B ungendore NSW 2621 For more on deep-green theory and deep ecology, see for instance essays in and work referred to in the Green Series, i.e. Discussion Papers in Environme ntal Philosophy, RSSS, Australian National University, Canberra. Annex 1. Most people inherit their value framework along with their culture. Many never do any substantial overhaul. Many indeed are not active or responsible valuers. But in these respects, values are not so different from other things. Some people are poor judges of shape; many never learn to distinguish plants, or to discriminate among wines. Likewise for other choices, options, major changes, metaphysical and even political. Mostly that a choice has been made or inherited and is incorporated in the subculture is not noticed, along with its not been observed how arbitrary many of the choices and resulting structures are (in Foucault has emphasized). Of course it is often not in the interests of the power elite, who control media outlets, etc., that this sort of arbitrariness should be widely known, and alternative structures considered and perhaps experimented with. Choices occur where distinctive circumstance prevail. For instance, there is serious scarcity; food supplies in particular are threatened (e.g. with being out of reach is price, with pollution, etc.). Differently, circumstances lead to conversions, as when a new ideology sweeps through, enthusiam generated by some charismatic figures. / bits from chapter 2 There is another important elasticity. In contemporary ethical theory there is a concerted attempt to build on universalizability requirement or the equivalent into the very motion of ethics. The evident result is that selfish systems of induction and conduct, systematic egoisms for instance are refused the title of ethics, and as an important corollary questions like Why be ethical? become vexed. 1 Given, in particular, that any such "universality" requirement is problematic in this formulation, and typically limited, chauvinistically to persons, a superior course proceeds to distinguish: between ethics as already characterised (reportively) and its subclass, universalizable ethics. As impartial ethical do have much to recommend them, let us coin a convenient portmonteau term condensing the chancy "universalerable ethics", namely euthics. (Conveniently then an euthical supports unethical, which is what from a properly ethical stance it is!) There is undoubtedly some pressure to have ethics and morality extend beyond a single or isolated individual (even so, a Causal ethics is understood, as is egoisticmorality). But that pressure does not extend very far; and such notions as those of a tribal morality and an upperclass ethics are not defective on significance grounds, even if they are objectional on substantive grounds. Such restricted ethics are not however immediately ruled out by such requirements as that like cases be assessed alike, and that differences of assessment be based on relevant differences. 2 For a tribalist or racist can respond that a foreigner is not like a Greek, or that there are relevant differences between whites and blacks (intelligence has been proposed as such a difference, when skin pigmentation appeared a merely superficial difference). These sorts of responses, which were longer accepted, are no longer acceptable, because the differences put up are not considered ethically relevant differences (correctly enough, though ethical relevance itself lacks an adequate explanation). Singer's main argument for a much wider point of view, universality, commits in a extensive appel to authority (p.11). What is offered: an appeal to usage. 'the notion of ethics carries with it the idea of something bigger than the individual'. [It often does, but it may not.] 'If I am to defend my conduct in ethical grounds, I cannot point only to the benefits it brings me. I wont address myself to a larger audience' (p.10). That On both, narrowing and vexing, see Singer lmpractual ethics (Singer aquates moral with ethical). Singer does not really have an answer to Why be moral? though he thinks it not a bad idea; mainly he tries to put down shuffles that have been presented or decisive. 2 These requirements are presented byu Attfield as basic formal requirements of reason (p.6). No doubt they are, though they appear to figure in no logic of ethics yet formulated. depends on the conduct concerned. More important the audience does not need to be much larger, certainly not universal: my family or law will suffice often enough. J. From Chap 4 Evaluations may be arrived at, and value systems expanded, by enhancement methods, which consists in emotional presentation (as under Meinong's phenomenological account) organised by coherence methods. The methodology in fact resembles that sometimes proposed for acquisition of scientific information. As with accumulated empirial information, which can be extended through presentational input and assessment for overall coherence, so further evaluations may be arrived at and assessed through a combination of presentational and coherence procedures. At the (marginal) stage where the next round of evaluations is undertaken, the following active ingredients figure, in an idealised breakdown:- Firstly, a background stock of judgements and experience will have been accumulated or inherited; in principle all of this is revisable, and some may be up for reassessment. Apart from the background, which enters in assessing overall coherence of system, what is involved is, secondly, emotional presentation, which corresponds to further perceptional and sense data input, and, thirdly and not independent, coherence processing, which supplies the interpretational and rationalisational components. At bottom, parallelling perception in the case of empirical information, is emotional presentation, gut or visceral reaction in starker forms of acceptance or rejection, but more generally comprehending a variety of sentiments, including overall well-being, and also relational impressions, such as empathy, identification, and so on. As a perceiver perceives shapes and taster tastes and goodness, so a valuer feels value and disvalue. The basis of perception is sensation, the basis of valuation is emotion. Apprehension of value is seated in emotional, and especially visceral, presentation; but what is apprehended is not to be confused with its apprehension any more than what is perceived. All the warnings about sensation as an information source have to be repeated with heavy emphasis as regards emotional presentation; for example, reliability cannot be guaranteed, interference with presentation through drugs, alcohol, temporary excitement or other inputs may render it dubious or unacceptable, conditioning may have occurred, including substantial cultural conditioning (so that a person is terrified by huntsmen spiders but not sickened by bloody massacres of dolphins or seals). As with perception, there are checks on emotional presentation, such as constancy over time and after reflection. Emotional presentation, supplying in particular inclusions and exclusions or prohibitions, is but the basis of reflective evaluation and value apprehension. The further critical part, coherence processing, builds on the basis taking account of other inputs or controls including background (which supplies relevant components of already adopted judgements, assimilated subculture and so forth) and constraints (such as substitutional requirements like impartiality, e.g. whether considered judgements hold for substitute valuers, and uniformity, e.g. whether similar acts are judged in similar ways). The coherence procedure consists, in essence, of asking whether the next or a relevant judgement fits together with what has been accepted, while meeting constraints, without leading to what has been rejected or excluded. If it does fit it is added to the included side, otherwise it is sent to the excluded side. (The familiar ethical practice of devising cases and compari ng them with the cases in hand can be worked in under this procedure.) Because an aim of this rationalisation procedure is achievement of some sort of equilibr ium - admitting what is included, while excluding what is unsupported, fails to gain support, is emotionally spoken against - such coherence procedures have gained currency in North Americ a under the rubric "reflect ive equilibr ium". Observe , howeve r, that any equilibr ium gained at some stage may be quickly lost, as new types of problem s arise and further information enters. To be sure, the whole methodology (like the parallel methodo logy of a coherence theory of truth) is highly idealised, and only practicably usable in rudimentary parts. It does howeve r surmou nt a major obstacle for value theory; it reveals how in principl e a nonredu ctionist ic value theory can function . Whethe r that theory is an appropr iate environmental one or not will depend however above all on the presentational input, the extent to which environmental sensitivity enters and is not dismissed. end The availability of rival value systems and prospect of yet others, while it implies a certain desirabl e (and also troublesome) pluralism, does not mean relativism. Neither deep green theory nor authenti c deep ecology espouse any superficially easy relativism. From their viewpoint, rival narrowe r and shallow er systems are definitely inferior , and marked down accordingly, while econom ism is an onathema which does not even make the moral grade (e.g. too many principles stop at state bo':lndaries). However a critical pluralism does acknow ledge, and offer a place, in the wider scheme of things for other positions, even if as less favoured or satisfactory. Politically then, deep positions can allow for, what makes good sense in these times of numbers, alliances. Hence the point of a green alliance, combining green position s, against still prevailing anti-environmentalism and economism. The value system pluralis m of deep-green theory interpenetrates not only social and political domains above, but also metaphysics traditionally placed below. In the underly ing metaphysical pluralis m of deep-green theory, value runs very deep - so deep that even truth depends in part upon it. For not merely selection of a correct comprehensive theory or worldview, but choice of associated actual world, is a value dependent choice. That choice, insofar as it is conscio usly made, of world conceptualisation and structure, is a constrai ned choice, constrained by informational inputs, such as those of refined perception. But in as much as it is rationally accomplished, that choice, like other choices of structure, proceeds accordin g to a standard value-in formati on analysis (regular ly oversim plified howeve r to a preferen ceinformation or even desire-belief modelling); that is, to get to the salient point, it involves value essentially. Truth and value are then intertwined. Their relation, not one of identity (for contrary to idealism, there are many relations not identical with identity), can now be stated more accurately than the poets have managed. Neither is one; both are plural, and differently so. In certain significant respects the metaphysics resembles the value theory. For example, as the value theory is nonreductionistic, so also is the metaphysics; in particular, there is a no-reduction theme that neither parts nor wholes reduce eliminably to one another, as opposed to atomistic and holistic views of environmental interrelations. As the value theory is pluralistic so also is the metaphysics; what needs to be discerned, in place of absolutism, is a plurality of worlds and of associated truth characterisations. A main aim of a thoroughgoing environmental theory is to displace very destructive dominant ideasystems, regularly presented as absolute, which incorporate both value and truth themes concerning the environment and its organisation. Much of deep-green theory devolves then from the abstract value theory, beginning (to take a more accessible route than the metaphysical way) with a more comprehensive ethical theory, which includes as well as a specific axiological theory, elaborating environmental values and virtues, a deontic theory, supplying· obligations, rights, taboos, and similar. For example, given that a certain wild river is intrinsically valuable, as we can verify by on-site experience and enhancement methods, and given that we duly respect that value, as deontic principles will tell us we should, then we are not free to do as we like with that river, to dam it with concrete, to channel it within concrete, stripping it of its riverine ecosystems. But that does not preclude respectful use of the river, swimming or sailing quitely in its waters, and so on. Value thus guides action, practice, and use; it is the ground also upon which principles are formulated, principles that are assessed and validated by way of enhancement methods. Important among these are non-interference principles, which exclude unwarranted interference with other preference-havers and unwarranted damage, ill-treatment, or devaluation of items of value. Such deontic principles circumscribe environmentally-limited freedom of action. Given noninterference principles, a major shift in onus of proof from homocentricthics takes place. What is required now is that reasons be given for interfering with the environment, rather than reasons for not doing so. Also direct responsibility for environme ntal interferenc e or modification falls upon those who would interfere or significantly modify, who would tread heavily on the land. Non-interference does not preclude use, only too much use and use of too much. What it does lead to is the theme that, where use occurs, it should be careful and respectful use. An important respect thesis regarding environme ntal items is founded on such interference principles and the no-reduction theme: namely • not to put others (other preference havers) into a dis preferred state for no good reason; • not to jeopardise the well being of natural objects or systems without good reason; • not to damage or destroy items which, while they cannot literally be put into a dispreferred state, can be damaged or destroyed or have their value eroded or impaired. These apply to ecosystems, their surrounds, their parts, and so on. The mere making of further excess profits, or similar economic excuses, are not good reasons. Such a respect thesis form part of the ecological outlook of deep-green theory. As permissibility, obligation and respect principles can be explained through the valuations reached on the theory, so too can rights and other significant components of morality be explained and justified through, but again not reduced to, values. For example, a creature has a right to something if it has a valid title thereto established from correct moral principles. Candidates for the parameter "something" provide a familiar list: freedom from unnecessary suffering, respectful treatment, satisfaction of basic needs, and so on. Such rights accordingly derive from and reinforce corresponding deontic principles. Deep-green ethical theory is much more than just another non-reductionist ethical theory, which highlights ecological values and virtues, and so forth. It changes the character and shape of ethical enterprise. Perhaps most strikingly, it removes humans as such from the centre of the ethical stage (or exclusive occupation of the stage). The biological concept of being human is not, contrary to prevailing humanism, a highly significant ethical category. To elevate it to such is to fall into human chauvinism, a type of class chauvinism which unwarrantedly discriminates in favour of the human species. The prevailing chauvinism is avoided through a natural annular model, which connects ethical characteristics directly with the categories of items that can have them. Relevant categories include those marked out by features like: having well-being, preference-having, rights-holding, contractual-capability, and so on, categories not necessarily connected with any particular species. Hitherto virtually all Wes tern ethical theories have not merely so limited ethical matters predominately to inter-human affairs, but have been blantantly chauvinistic, exhibiting a substantial, discriminately and unjustifiably bias in favour of humans (of certain privileged humans). These sorts of systems should be superseded; it is not a matter of simple adjustments or extensions. Deep-green value theory, as developed, implies the inadequacy of prevailing social, political and economic arrangements and institutions, both those of a mixed capitalistic kind and those of a more state socialistic cast. They are the (devious) product of inferior value frameworks which take quite insufficient account of environmental considerations and values. But explaining their deficiencies, and indicating more satisfactory green alternatives and replacements, is another chapter in the elaboration of deep-green theory. Deep-green theory is a deep environmental theory, with much in common with deep ecology. Like deep ecology, it stands in significant ideological opposition to the dominant technocratic-industrial way. But, even more than deep ecology, deep-green theory aims to supply a comprehensive alternative environmental philosophy (in the full senses of those atrophied terms, esp philosophy ). It seeks to accomplish this, furthermore, without accumulating the amount of philosophical rubbish deep ecology regularly attracts. For, to insert a key difference between these ecocentric theories in a deliberately prejudical way: deep-green theory resembles a deep ecology with the pseudo-scientific garbage removed, reorganised into a tight, coherent and more comprehensive theory. Deep-green theory, which has roots that stretch back about as far as its much publicized neighbour, accordingly merits elaboration separate from deep ecology, which in any case lacks a well-thought-through valuational and ethical basis. This essay aims to uncover the value theory of deep-green theory, exposing thereby one central area of deep-green theory. Though the value theory is (inevitably) abstract, it issues in what is more concrete, such as practical ecological directives, potentially destabilizing prevailing policies and institutions. ETHICS AND METAPHYSICS: their relevance to one another There is rich range of incompatible claims about the mutual interelations of the two ancient subjects. Most of these claims appear mistaken. Sorting out something of what looks right is a daunting task, a small beginning on which is attempted here. Initial severe difficulties derive from the vagueness, in determinacy and problematicality of the relata, both of which are ill-understood by philosophers metaphysics especially. Many there are who think that metaphyscis coincides with ontology, the study (description, explanation and understanding) of what exists. 1 The general study of what there is, sistology, which includes ontology as a very proper part, is only one facet of metaphysics (unless it is presumed that items somehow supply also all propositions concerning them). For sistology is the totality of things side of metaphysics, there is also the totality of true propositions side (propositionology, for a nice term). Metaphysics also comprises the study of the very general attributes of this and other universe and of what accounts for these attributes (or propositional functions). In technical terms, then, a metaphysics amount to a very general and comprehensi ve constrained model; and metaphysics to the plural assembly of these metaphysics. 2 Each metaphysics will be constrained (as will become clear through examples given below) through modelling conditions or postulates (which delimit how "altimate reality" is according to that system). Metaphysics is sometimes construed more comprehencisvely to include some or all of epistemology (knowledge of "ultimate reality" for instance), some of or all of other branches of philosophy, perhaps all of philosophy. Plainly, if metaphysics, so expansively construed, includes ethics, then their relation is straightforward, metaphysics includes ethics. But we shall not adopt such construals. Whereas metaphysics concerns features of universes, ethics is a study of moral values and principles, and of rules and practices of conduct. A case can be made out that an ethic is outlined through its distributions of values, in terms of which both deontic features (rights, obligations, etc) and axiological features (goodness, etc) can be discerned. (Utilitarian can afford a crude exemplar). So, without loss of generality, I can concentrate on the relation of value theory to metaphysics. Now a value theory does not derive from a purely naturalistic metaphysic, by virtue of a rectified naturalistic fallacy. But, firstly even is a value theory may be influenced or even construed by such a metaphysics. For example if the theory rules out all but primary qualities 2 What there is according to most Western philosophers, still labouring under the probleminducing Ontological Assumption. For such a confusion of ontology with metaphysics see Forrest p.3. For the bsis of this large (and estrageous) technical leap, see DP. 2 as some sort of constructs, the value qualities will have to be explained as constructs, projections or similar. Secondly, a metaphysics is unlikely to be purely naturalistic. Metaphysics is not a value-free enterprise; a metaphysics typically presumes a range of presumptions, including archivative ones (deeper examples include assumptions of primary, e.g. of certain sorts of objects, of importance, e.g. of what exists, of implicit world selection, e.g. the world is Newtonian, Copenhagen quantum, or obitives). An ethics does not determine a meta-ethics or therefore a metaphysics. Nor does the converse hold. A metaphysics does not in general determine an ethics, but is compatible with many. Against the stock determination and priority claims, I want to oppose interaction and no priority themes. Determination claims are commonplace in philosophers who wish to wield the big stock of dominant science to settle ethics (or mataethics). For instance Collicott asserts that "intrinsic value in nature ... remains ... painfully inconsistent with the ... modern scientific world-view' (Celbration of Robton p.14, similarly p.22, whence CD 1. Modern scientific metaphysics entails there are no intrinsic values in nature. This is not a lapse (though soon Collicott will weaken his determination claims) because almost immediately Collicott goes on to assert CD2. 'A value neutral nature is ... an immediate inference from the institutionalised metaphysical foundations of modern science' (p.15). Given some large assumptions, most conspiciously that the metaphysics involved is that of British empiricism, the claim CD2 become incontestable. For under that empiricism, as elaborated by Locke and Hurve, non primary qualities like value and colour are not part of or in nature, but substantially subjective in character. However insitutionalized those foundations an important issue - it has since become apparent that there are at least several parts of operative sciences, such a classical and quantum; namely a core calculus or formalism; operational rules for connecting the formalism with testable data and making in ..... applications; and layers of interpretation. It is in these separable, and variable, larger of interpretation that metaphysical and elaborative princi;es begin to enter conspicuously. The "institutionalized" interpretation is but one among the interpretations that can be fitted to classical formalism. It is an interpretation incorperating some major and controverisial philosophical theories, such as the reference theory and verificationism. Rival interpretations are feasible and were developed, for instance by the Scottish comon-sense school. Such rival foundations do not yield a value-free value neutral nature. Collicott calls upon Rolston 'to provide a persuasive alternative to the integral set of Carterian-Gohblein-Humean assumptions that render the subjective provenance of value so fundamental to the modern scientific outlook' (p.16). But Rolston hardly needs to do any such thing 3 : it has already been done, in various 3 Rolston makes giving an appropriate interpretation for more difficult than he need by conceeding "seconddoary" qualities to the reductionistic opposition. Thus, regressively: 'the greenness of the tree is in my hand, but it looks as though the tree is 3 ways, and, in any case, as Collicott soon observes, 'the modern scientific worldview is obsolete' (p.19). The property for a full value-in-nature theory are little better under postmodern quantum theory, Collicott however insinuates, then they were before. Under a Copenhagen interpretations, which he adopts, prospects look worse. Abruptly too Collicott switches from a determination thesis, such as CD, to a slacker and more plausible if vaguer linkage. The linkage appears in different nonequivalent forms: CL 1. A science, such as 'the new physics might play an architectonic role in our eventual thinking about nature (and human society)' (p.23 itals added). Subsequently, 'architectonic role' is replaced through the as vague 'inspired by' and more specific 'mapped out'. CL2. 'A value thoery [may be] inspired by, and mapped on, ... quantum physics (p.25, where reduction and derviation are now explicitly repudiated!). Such a value theory is, it is claimed, 'particularly congenial to an ecologically informed environmental ethics' (p.25). Whether it is, or not, depends on other-things, such as the sort of interpretation of quantum theory, the congeniality of that with ecology. No doubt values in nature without values is excluded under the Copenhagen interpretation, so is much else that makes good sense. Fortunately there are congenial alternatives. REFERENCES P.R.H. Forrest, Speculation and Experience the New Metaphysics, Inaugural Public Lecture, University of New England, N.S.W., 1987. J.B. Callicott, 'Ralston's Environmental Ethics: A critical celbration', critical response at APA, Oakland, March 1989. R. Sylvan, Deep Plurallism, Australian National University, Research School of Social Science, 1993. green. OUt there are only ....... waves... . The greenness is projected, more factural in my head and apparently hung on the tree'. What a ridiculous idea. ' ,,. ON THE VALUE CORE OF DEEP-GREEN THEORY This essay aims to uncover the value theory of deep-green theory, exposing thereby a central area of that theory. Though the value theory is (inevitably) abstract, it issues in what is more concrete, such as an applicable system and practical ecological directives, potentially destabilizing for prevailing policies and institutions. Deep-green theory which stands in significant ideological opposition to dominant industrial ways, is intended to supply a comprehensive alternative environmental philosophy. At the core of deep-green theory lies a value theory. A fundamental theme thereof, part of what makes the structure deep, is that a range of environmental items are valuable in themselves, directly and irreducibly so, so that their value does not somehow reduce to or emerge from something else, such as features of certain valuers or what matters for them. Thus value does not answer back in some way to humans, or sentient creatures (or other value-responsive classes), their interests, uses, preferences, or such like. Many natural items, such as forests and rivers, mountains and seashores, are intrinsically valuable. They are valuable in their own right - irrespective of whether they are interesting or useful (to any intentional operators, themselves interesting or useful or not), indeed whether or not there exist any valuers. Value spreads through and reaches across the natural domain; it is not bounded by mind, or linkages with subjective states; nor does it stop with sentience, or associated pyschological features like satisfaction; nor does it end at life; it observes no such compromising bounds. Although value is distributed richly if irregularly throughout nature, it is not then encapsulated in some isolable natural feature, such as life or sentience, or even in defeasible ecological values such as richness, diversity and variety (and so open to a different, naturalistic, reduction). But of course such ecologically important features afford criteria for value, and should be represented in recipes (such as "objective functions") for assessing overall value. From the presence of natural things of value, and accordingly of natural values, it is a short, though controversial, step to the important conclusion that there can be values without valuers. For valuers are sentient creatures with appropriate capacities, but things of value may precede and succeed all such valuers; that is, these things can persist, their values intact, without any valuers. As there can be shapes without any shape.:.perceivers, so there can be values without valuers. (The theme, like others advanced, can be backed up by more detailed argument and by formal proof, neither attempted here.) In valuational relations then, which relate valuers as subjects with values as objects, both ends of relations have independent standing; though interrelated, as the descriptions are deliberately chosen to suggest, either can stand without the other. It is a fashionable mistake to try to collapse this relation - usually to endeavour to soak up values into a modification of valuing subjects (e.g. as a predicate 'relation-to-values', in which inconvenierZt values are locked away). The mistaken procedure is in fact just one important example of an archetypal modern reduction of relations to functions; other examples, locking undesired objects away within functions, are those rendering wholes (such as ecosystems and organised structures) functions of their parts, and, under functionalism, minds and types of intentionality, including value-direction, as functions of bodies or their parts such as brains. Values are not, and do not disappear into, functions of valuers. A connected corollary is that values are not apart from the actual world, something "projected" or imposed on it by a favoured class of valuers, something colouring (and even emotionally clouding) the otherwise valueless physical world, in rather the way that reductionistic materialism tries (erroneously) to construe colour itself as projected onto a colourless physical world. Of course this projection effort, never adequately explicated, does not succeed, on its own, in removing values. For they remain, left as some function of the valuers. To try to bulldoze through this difficulty, a second reduction is invoked, of evaluative features of valuers to "natural" features, commonly preferences, consumer desires or such like. The second reduction runs into obstacles that halt even the naturalistic bulldozers (e.g. naturalistic and related fallacies), but the first reduction is the critical one in removing key environmental values, such as those of wilderness and wild things, which become valuable only in the focus of certain sentient beholders, and not in and for themselves. This reduction too is blocked by insuperable difficulties. On the one side, like the parallel proposed phenomenalist reduction of material objects to sensations, the reduction never achieves satisfactory support or even a satisfactory statement. On the other, it is counterexampled by various modellings or thought-experiments revealing intuitively-assessed value in situations devoid of valuers (as e.g. in the well-known Last Person argument). Values remain then part of the still rich actual world; they are objects in the domain of actual and other worlds. But they are not of course material objects; creatures will not fall over them any more than they will trip over shadows or mere shapes. Value, like shape, is an attribute, which things have or may lack, and which furthermore creatures can recognise or may fail to discern. Thus value is, like shape and colour and their determinate forms (round, red, etc), a universal , distributed across things, individuals and wholes. The comparison of value with shape is decidedly more helpful than the regular, but exhausted, comparison of value with colour, or of goodness with colour determinates such as yellow. For example, shape is not bound by a set of determinates as colour is in the specific colours, but comes in a spectacular variety of forms, not totally or linearly ordered (as in a rainbow), or contracted to some primary set (as in colour triangles); shape which pertains to wholes as well as particulars, links with gestalts better than colour; shape discrimination is more culture dependent and sensitive; yet shape is, or was, a primary property, and thereby more immune to reductionist strategies thJn secondary properties such as colour. Again shapes like values, can be vague, indeterminate; that does not prevent things, perhaps unique things, exemplifying them. But naturally the analogy can only be extended so far. Shapes can be approximated by polygons, values cannot; shapes are regularly perceived through sense perception, by vision or touch especially, values are not, but are differently apprised. Value is its own thing, not something else; it is what it is and does what is does; it is not something else, like some quantitative mathematical or economic function. Nor does it contract into some mark of value, or to what it comes down to in highly restricted settings; most important, it does not disappear in the style of modern economics into (expected) utility, or into just two economic forms, value-in-use monetarily and value-in-exchange (price), neither of which may reflect worth. Value means what it means, and has meant: worth ; and it ties with general assessments of merit and demerit, goodness or badness, not an economic or other truncation thereof. The powerful drive to reduce or deny values has several sources. Part of the motivation for reduction of value springs from epistemological worries, concerning how values can be ascertained and known, so far as they are (subjective translation proposals are then a direct evaluative counterpart of phenomenalism). Part derives from supposedly problematic cultural relativity (whence the attempt to impose values by identification of value with some favoured assessible feature, and with it cultural or economic imperialism). Part of the motivation comes from more sweeping ideological commitments, such as varieties of materialism or scientism, which leave no space for immaterial values. As already apparent, attempted reductions of value come in a dazzling variety of forms • subjective, which make use of psychological features, such as desires, interests, emotions, and the like; or more objective aggregations of these, such as community preferences or utility; or objectively naturalistic, which enrol single track value-making characteristics such as richness or evolutionary development as value; • consequential, which consider only outcomes; or purely motivational, which consider only attitudes and ignore leads and outcomes; • straightforward, as in translation proposals for translating value judgements into reducing statements; or oblique, as in supervenience propositions (no variations in value without underwriting variations in reducing features); or obscure, as in unarticulated projection claims. Values are not well accommodated within these reductionistic schemes, or accommodated at all. Deep-green value theory, which is thoroughly nonreductive, repudiates all these reductionistic options. They are not so difficult to avoid, as the options are neither exhaustive nor exclusive. In particular, value reduces neither in subjective nor objective fashion; it does not reduce. Evaluative judgements are nonjective, that is, neither subjective nor objective (in any absolutist 4 fashion). Obversely, evaluation of an act does not reduce to assessing consequences; nor does it come down to an assessment of motives; both may matter. The virulent idea is abroad however that science can offer a reduction, can sweep up value along with all other information, where philosophy has conspicuously failed. Unfortunately for such optimistic ideas, fortunately perhaps for deeper thought, current basic science does not have much to say at all, or of merit, about values, and if it did reductions through it would be circular. But, to the contrary, there is a long-standing pretence that science gets along "well" without values, in appropriate value-free fashion. Nowadays it is increasingly realised that the positivistic assumption of such value-freedom is a myth, that much of what passes as science is heavily value-penetrated. While the residual ideal of pure engagement in pure science may offer the illusion of an escape from value, there is no escape. For, in any case, reductions do not succeed, as a copious literature, littered with failed attempts, meanderingly establishes. Nor are they generally desirable, since mostly shallow, aiming at a reduction to features of some privileged class presented as ideal (i.e. core value is covertly assumed, so there is no real reduction). Nor are they needed; explanation and assessment do not require reduction. Evaluations may be arrived at, and value frameworks expanded, by enhancement methods, which organise and expand emotional presentation by coherence methods. The enhancement methodology in fact resembles that sometimes proposed for further acquisition of scientific information. As accumulated empirical information can be further extended through presentational input and assessment for overall coherence, so further evaluations may be arrived at and assessed through a combination of presentational and coherence procedures. At the (marginal) stage where the next round of evaluations is undertaken, the following active ingredients figure, in an idealised breakdown:- Firstly, a background stock of judgements and value experience will have been accumulated or inherited; in principle all of this is revisable, and some may be up for reassessment. Apart from the background, which enters in assessing overall coherence of system, what is involved is, secondly, emotional presentation, which corresponds to further perceptional and sense data input, and, thirdly and not independent, coherence processing, which supplies the interpretational and rationalisational components. At bottom, parallelling perception in the case of empirical information, is emotional presentation, gut or visceral reaction in starker forms of acceptance or rejection, but more generally comprehending a variety of sentiments, including overall well-being, and also relational impressions, such as empathy, identification, and so on. As a perceiver perceives shapes, so a valuer feels raw value and disvalue. The basis of perception is sensation, the basis of valuation is emotion. Apprehension of value is seated in emotional, and especially visceral, presentation; but what is apprehended is not to be confused with its apprehension any more than what is perceived. All the warnings about sensation as an information source have to be repeat~d, with heavy emphasis, as regards emotional presentation; for example, reliability cannot be guaranteed, interference with presentation through drugs, alcohol, temporary excitement or other inputs may render it dubious or unacceptable, conditioning may have occurred, including substantial cultural conditioning (so that a person is terrified by harmless spiders but not sickened by bloody massacres of dolphins or seals). As with perception, there are checks on emotional presentation, such as constancy over time and after reflection. Emotional presentation, supplying primarily inclusions and exclusions or prohibitions, is but the basis of reflective evaluation and value apprehension. The further critical part, coherence processing, builds on the basis taking account of other inputs or controls including background (which supplies relevant components of already adopted judgements, assimilated subculture and so forth) and constraints (such as moral substitutional requirements like impartiality, e.g. whether considered judgements hold for substitute valuers, and uniformity, e.g. whether similar acts are judged in similar ways). Essentially, the coherence procedure consists in asking whether the next or a relevant judgement fits together with what has been accepted, while meeting constraints, without leading to what has been rejected or excluded. If it does fit it is added to the included side, otherwise it is sent to the excluded side. Because an aim of this rationalisation procedure is achievement of some sort of equilibrium such coherence procedures have gained currency under the rubric "reflective equilibrium". Observe, however, that equilibrium reached at some stage may be lost as new types of problems arise and further information enters. No doubt the whole methodology (like the parallel methodology of an empirically-based coherence theory of truth) is highly idealised, and only practicably applicable in rudimentary parts. It does however surmount a major theoretical obstacle for environmental value theory; it reveals how in principle a nonreductionistic value theory can function, and deliver a tenable value system. Whether what results is however an appropriate deep environmental system will depend above all on the presentational input, the extent to which environmental sensitivity enters and is not suppressed. Enhancement methods reveal too that value systems are not uniquely determined, any more than other comprehensive theoretical frameworks. There evidently are rival value systems measuring up to rigorous rationality requirements, much as there are rival logics and rival physical and biological systems. In particular chauvinistic systems, narrow or shallow value systems, which are unresponsive to and take no account of environmental items and values, cannot be excluded on rational or straight logical grounds. Unfortunately such systems remain in ascendancy, and tend to dominate social and political practice; in recent times economism, a narrow type of utilitarianism, has all too obviously dominated much terrestial practice. While such value frameworks are open to severe criticism, for instance as chauvinistic, as violating universality requirements of morality in the case of economism, they do not succumb to definitive refutatiog (for the reason that requirements of morality, universalizability of principle, impartiality and so on, can simply be repudiated; immoral or amoral frameworks are still value systems). Even so, much can be done to shift or alter values, though as usual effectiveness cannot be guaranteed. A range of argumentative, educational and persuasive techniques, of varying quality, can be put to work to move valuers indoctrinated in old damaging structures, often enough successfully. Important among these are positive presentations of environments, their habitats and creatures, by way of new information and experience. The availability of rival value systems, while it implies a certain desirable (and also troublesome) pluralism, does not mean relativism. From a deep-green viewpoint, rival narrower and shallower systems are definitely inferior, and criticised accordingly, while economism is an anathema which does not even make the moral grade (e.g. too many principles stop at class or state boundaries). However a critical pluralism does acknowledge and offer a place in the wider scheme of things for other systems, even if as less favoured or satisfactory. One political upshot is evident; deep-green theory promotes, what matters in these irrational times of numbers, alliances - in particular, a green alliance, organising green positions, against prevailing forces of environmental degradation. The systematic pluralism of deep-green value theory interpenetrates not only social and political domains above, but also metaphysics traditionally placed below. In the underlying metaphysical pluralism of deep-green theory, value runs very deep - so deep that even truth depends in part upon it. For not merely selection of a correct comprehensive theory or worldview is a value dependent choice, but choice of associated actual world is also. That choice, insofar as it is consciously made, of world structure and conceptualisation, is a constrained choice, constrained by informational inputs, such as those of refined perception. But inasmuch as it is rationally accomplished, that choice, like other choices of structure, proceeds according to a standard value-information analysis (regularly oversimplified however to a preferenceinformation or even desire-belief modelling); that is, to extract the salient point, it involves value essentially. Truth and value are then intertwined; truth, though naturally different from value, is value dependent. Both are plural, and differently so. So, unremarkably deep-green metaphysics resembles the value theory in significant respects. For example, as the value theory is nonreductionistic, so also is the metaphysics; in particular, there is a no-reduction theme that neither parts nor wholes reduce eliminably to one another, as opposed to atomistic and holistic views of environmental interrelations. As the value theory is pluralistic, so also is the metaphysics; in place of established absolutism, a plurality of worlds, with associated truth definitions is discerned. Indeed a main aim of deep-green theory is to dislodge dominant destructive ideologies, which (each of th]m) assume an absolute truth, from their positions thereby providing intellectual living-space for natural environments. Much of deep-green theory devolves then from the abstract value theory. As with the metaphysical way sketched, so it is with the fuller ethical theory, which includes as well as a specific axiological system, elaborating deep environmental values and virtues, a deontic framework, supplying obligations, rights, taboos, and similar. For example, given that a certain wild river is intrinsically valuable, as we can verify by on-site experience and enhancement methods, and given that we duly respect that value, as deontic principles will tell us we should, then we are not free to do as we like with that river, to dam it with concrete, to channel it within concrete, stripping it of its riverine ecosystems. But that does not preclude respectful use of the river, swimming or sailing quietly in its waters, and the like. Value thus guides action, practice, and use; it is the ground also upon which principles are formulated, principles that are assessed and validated by way of enhancement methods. Important among these are non-interference principles, which exclude unwarranted interference with other preference-havers and unwarranted damage, ill-treatment, or devaluation of items of value. Such deontic principles circumscribe environmentally-limited freedom of action. Given noninterference principles, a major shift in onus of proof from homocentricethics takes place. What is required now is that reasons be givenfor interfering with the environment, rather than reasons for not doing so. Also direct responsibility for environmental interference or modification falls upon those who would seriously interfere or significantly modify, who would tread heavily on the land. Non-interference does not preclude use - only too much use and use of too much. What it does lead to is the theme that, where use occurs, it should be careful and respectful use. An important respect thesis regarding environmental items is founded on such non-interference principles and the no-reduction theme: namely, • not to put others (other preference havers) into a dispreferred state for no good reason; • not to jeopardise the well-being of natural objects or systems without good reason; • not to damage or destroy items which, while they cannot literally be put into a dispreferred state, can be damaged or destroyed or have their value eroded or impaired. These apply to ecosystems, their surrounds, their parts, and so on. The mere making of further excess profits, or similar economic excuses, are not good reasons. Such a respect thesis forms part of the ecological outlook of deep-green theory. Deep-green ethical theory amounts to much more than just another non-reductionist ethical theory, which highlights ecological values and virtues, and so forth. It changes the character and shape of ethical enterprise. Perhaps most strikingly, it removes humans as such from the centre of the ethical stage (or :xclusive occupation of the stage). The biological concept of being human ceases to be a significant ethical category. To elevate it to such is to fall into human chauvinism, a type of class chauvinism which unwarrantedly discriminates in favour of the human species. The prevailing chauvinism is not inevitable; it is very logically avoided by directly connecting ethical characteristics with the categories of items that can have them. Relevant categories include those marked out by features like: having well-being, preference-having, rights-holding, contractual-capability, and so on, categories not necessarily connected with any particular species. Hitherto virtually all Western ethical theories, and the institutional arrangements they help support, have not merely limited ethical matters to interhuman affairs, but have been blatantly chauvinistic, exhibiting substantial and unjustifiable discrimination in favour of humans (or certain privileged humans). Deep-green theory thus implies the inadequacy of prevailing social, political and economic arrangements and institutions. These structures are the defective products of inferior value frameworks which take quite insufficient account of environmental desiderata and values. Richard Sylvan* RMB 683 Bungendore NSW 2621 * Thanks to David Bennett for comments on an earlier draft. For more on deep-green theory, see essays in and work referred to in the Green Series, i.e. Discussion Papers in Environmental Philosophy, RSSS, Australian National University, Canberra. This compressed essay was solicited by and written for Island Magazine (Tasmania). Upon receiving it however, the editors decided that it was too dense, and insufficiently journalistic and popular (not features they had at any time requested), for their magazine.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Box 16, Item 1223: Drafts of Deep-green ethics chapters, and short version of On the value core of deep-green theory Subject The topic of the resource Typescript draft of chapters from Deep-green ethics and two copies of short version of On the value core of deep-green theory Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/browse?search=Richard+Sylvan&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bjoiner%5D=and&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=&amp;range=&amp;collection=&amp;type=&amp;user=&amp;tags=&amp;public=&amp;featured=&amp;exhibit=&amp;geolocation-mapped=&amp;geolocation-address=&amp;geolocation-latitude=&amp;geolocation-longitude=&amp;geolocation-radius=10&amp;submit_search=Search+for+items">Richard Sylvan</a> Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived <span class="MuiTypography-root-125 MuiTypography-body2-126">The University of Queensland's <a data-testid="rek-series" href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/records/search?page=1&amp;pageSize=20&amp;sortBy=score&amp;sortDirection=Desc&amp;searchQueryParams%5Brek_series%5D%5Bvalue%5D=Richard+Sylvan+Papers%2C+UQFL291&amp;searchMode=advanced">Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291</a></span>, Box 16, Item 1223 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org">Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy</a> Contributor An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource <span>This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, </span><a href="https://najtaylor.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Dr. N.A.J. Taylor</a><span>.</span> Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library. Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource [88] leaves. 90.34 MB. Type The nature or genre of the resource Manuscript Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context <a href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:14a9695">https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:14a9695</a> Coverage The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant Australian National University Office - Typing Table at End of Desk Australian National University Office Australian National University Office > Typing Table at End of Desk Box 16: Green Projects in Progress https://www.antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/6743128b35122b4d5ceeaa8b36929812.pdf 569009a6b472a7b1abe83ab34e8cbc4f PDF Text Text These areas were also among the most significant research programs in Australian philosophy in the 80's (see my ‘Prospects for regional philosophy in Australasia’). To set out very briefly why these programs did not flourish. Essentially the power-strati lure in philosophy decided it did not care for the developments that appeared to be occuring in parts of Australian philosophy, and in ANU philosophy in particular. Among other things, a small campaign was run against my regional themes and research project ideas. I was blocked in advancement and Australian philosophy has been in any power acquisition and appropriate support lately turning back to a subservient empiricism, concentrating again on such established topics as philosophy of mind. In the main I d-repped-out of attempwg to organise philosophy and other projects at or through ANU. 3. Chief past research accomplishments:My past research divides into two broad categories: logic and metaphysics, and other, other comprising, to begin with, environmental philosophy and issues. In the 1960s my research fell almost entirely into the first category, whence I (or Routley at any rate) have been typed ever since as a logician. As the 1970s progressed my other research broadened from environmental ethics and issues (initially mainly forestry and nuclear topics) to include relevant social theory, environmental politics and economics, and naturally enough, the point of all the activity involved, that is almost to say, ultimate questions. A. Logic and metaphysics :• Object-theory: Development of the general theory of all items, with special emphasis upon nonexistent objects and among them impossible items. From an interdisciplinary viewpoint, important kinds of nonexistent items comprehended by the theory are fictional items generally and theoretical objects; but there are many other kinds: historic objects, mental and perceptual items, vague objects, variable items, processes, and so on. This work, which established the general theory, sistology, as a viable logical enterprise, began in early 1960s; investigations up to 1980 were collected in Exploring Meinong's Jungle and Beyond. Investigations continue; an improved theory has been found, and further kinds of items better comprehended. • Relevant logics: Advances in intensional logic, especially modal logics and relevant logics, and their applications. Much of my work in the 1960s was devoted to studies of the properties of non-normal modal logics and implicational variants thereof, and their applications. This work was initiated independently of European and American work, which I only learnt about while I progressed in a somewhat different direction. More significant results include semantics and algebras for relevant logics, resolution of many open questions, as well as new ranges of systems, and interesting results concerning them. Many of the results reached up to 1982 are recorded in Relevant Logics and Their Rivals. In the 1980s more and more of my technical work went into syntheses of and applications of sociative (i.e. broadly relevant) logics, systems that matter both for critical notions in philosophy of science and for a satisfactory theory of reasoning. �• Discovery of universal semantics, for all logical systems. Corollaries include general theories of denotation and truth; applications include rehabilitation of several damaged or defunct metaphysical theories. • Paradoxes and dialethic logic: Investigation of paradoxes, and ensuing therefrom two broad lines of work: first, significance and context theories and a study of incompleteness, and second, paraconsistent and dialethic (i.e. explicitly inconsistent) theories and a study of inconsistency. Both lines lead to much work determining the extent and character of such theories, and establishing important results concerning them. Both lines of pursuit issued in large books (one with Leonard Goddard, the other with Graham Priest); but in both lines much unfinished business remains. My first research in Australia in the early 1960s focussed on paradoxes; perhaps I am at last in a position to outline main details of the theory. • Deep Plurallism: By the 1980s it had become difficult, in philosophy, to escape the fashionable issue of realism and its main rivals, anti-realism and relativism. I soon realised that I could (for object-theoretic reasons) be satisfied with none of the stock options, and so began investigation of a radical pluralism, which in due course deepened into deep plurallism. On the way I undertook investigations of limitations regarding realism, limits to knowledge, of ontological and alethic relativity, and of idealism and coherence. A* Other: from environmental ethics to ultimate questions. • Environmental ethics, and removal of human chauvinism. None of the prevailing ethical theories were satsifactory, all succumbed to environmental counter-examples (which is one reason why environmental ethics is not applied ethics); all were unduly chauvinistic. New theoretical investigation was required, and was undertaken through the 1970s (though the resulting theory has never been assembled in one source). This foundational work centered on value theory, was broadened in the 1980s to include, for instance, a new deontic theory accommodating moral dilemmas, a critique of rational decision theory and development of a satisizing alternative. • Environmental philosophy and related social topics, including nuclear energy and obligations to future generations, war and peace, population and immigration, predation and cannibilism, animal intentionality, environmental interference and management. One topic merits separate listing. • Studies concerning forests and forestry. While much of this investigatory work concentrated on plantation forestry and other intensive forestry such as clearfelling and woodchipping, it also included studies on forest practices in neighbouring countries, alternative forestry, forestry economics, forest typology, down to details of specific forests. • Environmental and philosophical metatheory. Topics, encroaching on theoretical sociology, included rival social paradigms, the bearings of culture on environmental attitudes, cultural and regional impacts on ideology, regional philosophy. The last topic led naturally into � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Draft Papers Description An account of the resource Sylvan's literary executor encountered an archive in which “all his projects were current", since manuscripts were undated and unattributed. Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document These areas were also among the most significant research programs in Australian philosophy in the 80's (see my ‘Prospects for regional philosophy in Australasia’). To set out very briefly why these programs did not flourish. Essentially the power-strati lure in philosophy decided it did not care for the developments that appeared to be occuring in parts of Australian philosophy, and in ANU philosophy in particular. Among other things, a small campaign was run against my regional themes and research project ideas. I was blocked in advancement and Australian philosophy has been in any power acquisition and appropriate support lately turning back to a subservient empiricism, concentrating again on such established topics as philosophy of mind. In the main I d-repped-out of attempwg to organise philosophy and other projects at or through ANU. 3. Chief past research accomplishments:My past research divides into two broad categories: logic and metaphysics, and other, other comprising, to begin with, environmental philosophy and issues. In the 1960s my research fell almost entirely into the first category, whence I (or Routley at any rate) have been typed ever since as a logician. As the 1970s progressed my other research broadened from environmental ethics and issues (initially mainly forestry and nuclear topics) to include relevant social theory, environmental politics and economics, and naturally enough, the point of all the activity involved, that is almost to say, ultimate questions. A. Logic and metaphysics :• Object-theory: Development of the general theory of all items, with special emphasis upon nonexistent objects and among them impossible items. From an interdisciplinary viewpoint, important kinds of nonexistent items comprehended by the theory are fictional items generally and theoretical objects; but there are many other kinds: historic objects, mental and perceptual items, vague objects, variable items, processes, and so on. This work, which established the general theory, sistology, as a viable logical enterprise, began in early 1960s; investigations up to 1980 were collected in Exploring Meinong's Jungle and Beyond. Investigations continue; an improved theory has been found, and further kinds of items better comprehended. • Relevant logics: Advances in intensional logic, especially modal logics and relevant logics, and their applications. Much of my work in the 1960s was devoted to studies of the properties of non-normal modal logics and implicational variants thereof, and their applications. This work was initiated independently of European and American work, which I only learnt about while I progressed in a somewhat different direction. More significant results include semantics and algebras for relevant logics, resolution of many open questions, as well as new ranges of systems, and interesting results concerning them. Many of the results reached up to 1982 are recorded in Relevant Logics and Their Rivals. In the 1980s more and more of my technical work went into syntheses of and applications of sociative (i.e. broadly relevant) logics, systems that matter both for critical notions in philosophy of science and for a satisfactory theory of reasoning. • Discovery of universal semantics, for all logical systems. Corollaries include general theories of denotation and truth; applications include rehabilitation of several damaged or defunct metaphysical theories. • Paradoxes and dialethic logic: Investigation of paradoxes, and ensuing therefrom two broad lines of work: first, significance and context theories and a study of incompleteness, and second, paraconsistent and dialethic (i.e. explicitly inconsistent) theories and a study of inconsistency. Both lines lead to much work determining the extent and character of such theories, and establishing important results concerning them. Both lines of pursuit issued in large books (one with Leonard Goddard, the other with Graham Priest); but in both lines much unfinished business remains. My first research in Australia in the early 1960s focussed on paradoxes; perhaps I am at last in a position to outline main details of the theory. • Deep Plurallism: By the 1980s it had become difficult, in philosophy, to escape the fashionable issue of realism and its main rivals, anti-realism and relativism. I soon realised that I could (for object-theoretic reasons) be satisfied with none of the stock options, and so began investigation of a radical pluralism, which in due course deepened into deep plurallism. On the way I undertook investigations of limitations regarding realism, limits to knowledge, of ontological and alethic relativity, and of idealism and coherence. A* Other: from environmental ethics to ultimate questions. • Environmental ethics, and removal of human chauvinism. None of the prevailing ethical theories were satsifactory, all succumbed to environmental counter-examples (which is one reason why environmental ethics is not applied ethics); all were unduly chauvinistic. New theoretical investigation was required, and was undertaken through the 1970s (though the resulting theory has never been assembled in one source). This foundational work centered on value theory, was broadened in the 1980s to include, for instance, a new deontic theory accommodating moral dilemmas, a critique of rational decision theory and development of a satisizing alternative. • Environmental philosophy and related social topics, including nuclear energy and obligations to future generations, war and peace, population and immigration, predation and cannibilism, animal intentionality, environmental interference and management. One topic merits separate listing. • Studies concerning forests and forestry. While much of this investigatory work concentrated on plantation forestry and other intensive forestry such as clearfelling and woodchipping, it also included studies on forest practices in neighbouring countries, alternative forestry, forestry economics, forest typology, down to details of specific forests. • Environmental and philosophical metatheory. Topics, encroaching on theoretical sociology, included rival social paradigms, the bearings of culture on environmental attitudes, cultural and regional impacts on ideology, regional philosophy. The last topic led naturally into  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Box 169, Item 414: Untitled document on significant research programs in Australian philosophy in the 1980s Subject The topic of the resource Typescript with handwritten emendations. Description An account of the resource Title in collection finding aid: RS: Untitled ts 2p Marked ‘Re RLR start’ Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/browse?search=Richard+Sylvan&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bjoiner%5D=and&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=&amp;range=&amp;collection=&amp;type=&amp;user=&amp;tags=&amp;public=&amp;featured=&amp;exhibit=&amp;geolocation-mapped=&amp;geolocation-address=&amp;geolocation-latitude=&amp;geolocation-longitude=&amp;geolocation-radius=10&amp;submit_search=Search+for+items">Richard Sylvan</a> Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived <span class="MuiTypography-root-125 MuiTypography-body2-126">The University of Queensland's <a data-testid="rek-series" href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/records/search?page=1&amp;pageSize=20&amp;sortBy=score&amp;sortDirection=Desc&amp;searchQueryParams%5Brek_series%5D%5Bvalue%5D=Richard+Sylvan+Papers%2C+UQFL291&amp;searchMode=advanced">Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291</a></span>, Box <span>169, Item 414</span> Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org">Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy</a> Contributor An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource <span>This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, </span><a href="https://najtaylor.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Dr. N.A.J. Taylor</a><span>.</span> Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library. Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource [2] leaves. 1.82 MB. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context <a href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:06b30f2">https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:06b30f2</a> Box 169: From Dr Ross Brady Como House Como House > Floor > Large Carton