2 20 90 https://www.antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/b08be37f733215f4391cf73d1099d47f.pdf c97a08e871aaec69f2c5b022a3b51edf PDF Text Text Richard and Vai Routley 1. » NUCLEAR POWER - SOME ETHICAL AND SOCIAL DIMENSIONS1 One hardly needs initiation into the dark mysteries of nuclear physics to contribute usefully to the debate now widely ranging over nuclear power. While many important empirical questions are still unresolved, these do not really lie at the centre of the controversy. Instead, it is a debate about values... many of the questions which arise are social and ethical ones.2 I. THE TRAIN PARABLE AND THE NUCLEAR WASTE PROBLEM. train has just pulled out. passengers and freight. The train which is A long distance country crowded carries both At an early stop in the journey someone consigns as freight, to a far distant destination, a package which contains a highly toxic and explosive gas. This is packed in a very thin container which, as the consigner is aware, may well not contain the gas for the full distance for which it is consigned, and certainly will not do so if the train should strike any real trouble, for example, if the train should be derailed or involved in a collision, or if some passenger should interfere inadvertently or deliberately with the freight, perhaps trying to steal some of it. of these sorts of things have happened on some previous journeys. All If the container should break the resulting disaster would probably kill at least some of the people on the train in adjacent carriages, while others could be maimed or poisoned or sooner or later incur serious diseases. Most of us would roundly condemn such an action. of the parcel say to try to justify it? What might the consigner He might say that it is not certain that the gas will escape, or that the world needs his product and it is his duty to supply it, or that in any case he is not or the people on it. responsible for the train These sorts of excuses however would normally be seen as ludicrous when set in this context. Unfortunately, similar excuses are not also seen when the consigner, again a (responsible) businessman,puts his workers' health or other peoples’ welfare at risk. Suppose he says that it is his own and others’p ressing needs which justify his action. The company he controls, which produces the material as a by-product, is in bad financial straits, and could not afford to produce a better container even if it knew how to make one. If the company fails, he and his family will suffer, his employees will lose their jobs and have to look for others, and the whole company town, through loss of spending, will be worse off. The poor and unemployed of the town, whom he would otherwise have been able to help, will suffer especially. Few people would accept such grounds as justification. �2. Even where there are serious risks and costs to oneself or some group for whom one is concerned one is usually considered not to be entitled to simply transfer the heavy burden of those risks and costs onto other uninvolved parties, especially where they arise from one’s own, or one’s group’s chosen life-style. The matter of nuclear waste has many moral features which resemble the train case. How fitting the analogy is will become apparent as the argument progresses. There is no known proven safe way to package the highly toxic wastes generated by the nuclear plants that will be spread around the world as large-scale nuclear development goes ahead. The waste problem will be much more serious than that generated by the 50 or so reactors in use at present, with each one of the 2000 or so reactors envisaged by the end of the century producing, on average, annual wastes containing 1000 times the radioactivity of the Hiroshima bomb. Much of this waste is extremely toxic. For example, a millionth of a gramme of plutonium is enough to induce a lung cancer. A leak of even a part of the waste material could involve much loss of life, widespread disease and genetic damage, and contamination of immense areas of land. Wastes will include the reactors themselves, which will have to be abandoned after their expected life times of perhaps 40 years, and which, some have estimated, may require 1^ million years to reach safe levels of radioactivity. Nuclear wastes must be kept suitably isolated from the environment for their entire active lifetime. For fission products the required storage period averages a thousand years or so, and for transuranic elements, which include plutonium, there is a half million to a million year storage problem. Serious problems have arisen with both short-term and proposed long-term methods of storage, even with the comparatively small quantities of waste produced over the last twenty years. Short-term methods of storage require continued human intervention, while proposed longer term methods are subject to both human inter­ ference and risk of leakage through non-human factors. No one with even a slight knowledge of the geological and climatic history of the earth over the last million years, a period whose fluctuations in climate we are only just beginning to guage and which has seen four Ice Ages, could be confident that a rigorous guarantee of safe storage could be provided for the vast period of time involved. Nor does the history of human affairs over the last 3000 years give ground for confidence in safe storage by methods requiring human intervention over perhaps a million years. Proposed long-term storage methods such as storage in granite formations or in salt mines, are largely speculative and relatively untested, and have already proved to involve difficulties with attempts made to put them into practice. Even as regards expensive recent proposals for first embedding concentrated wastes in glass and encapsulating the result in multilayered metal containers before rock deposit, simulation models �3. reveal that radioactive material may not remain suitably isolated from human environments.1^ In short, the best present storage proposals carry very real 3 possibilities of irradiating future people and damaging their environment. Given the heavy costs which could be involved for the future, and given the known limits of technology, it is methodologically unsound to bet, as nuclear nations have, on the discovery of safe procedures for storage of wastes. Any new procedures (required before 2000) will probably be but variations on not only have I present proposals, and subject to the same inadequacies. For instance,^none of the proposed methods for safe storage has been properly tested, but they may well prove to involve unforeseen difficulties and risks when an attempt is made to put them into practice on a commercial scale. Only a method that could provide a rigorous guarantee of safety over the storage period, that placed safety beyond reasonable doubt, would be acceptable. It is difficult to see how such rigorous guarantees could be given concerning either the geological or future human factors. But even if an economically viable, rigorously safe long term storage method could be devised, there is the problem of guaranteeing that it would be universally and invariably used. The assumption that it would be (especially if, as appears likely, such a method proved expensive economically and politically) seems to presuppose a level of efficiency, perfection, and concern for the future which has not previously been encountered in human affairs, and has certainly not been conspicuous in the nuclear industry. The risks imposed on the future by proceeding with nuclear development are, then, significant. to bear Perhaps 40,000 generations of future people could be forced significant risks resulting from the provision of the (extravagant) energy use of only a small proportion of the people of 10 generations. Nor is the risk of direct harm from the escape or misuse of radioactive materials the only burden the nuclear solution imposes on the future. Because the energy provided by nuclear fission is merely a stop gap, it seems probable that in due course the same problem, that of making a transition to renewable sources of energy, will have to be faced again by a future population which will probably, again as a result of our actions, be very much worse placed to cope with it. Their world will most likely be a world which is seriously depleted of non-renewable resources, and in which such renewable resources as forests and soils as remain, resources which inevitably form an important part of the basis of life, are run-down or destroyed. Such points tell against the idea that future people must be, if not direct beneficiaries of energy from nuclear fission, at least indirect beneficiaries. �4. The "solution” then is to buy time for contemporary society at a price which not only creates serious problems for future people but which reduces their ability to cope with these problems. Like the consigner in the train parable, contemporary industrial society proposes, in order to get itself out of a mess arising from its own life-style - the creation of economies dependent on an abundance of non-re newable energy, which is limited in supply - to pass on costs and risks of serious harm to others who will obtain no corresponding benefits. The "solution” may enable the avoidance of some uncomfortable changes in the lifetime of those now living and their immediate descendants, just as the consigner's action avoids uncomfortable changes for him and those in his immediate surroundings, but at the expense of passing heavy burdens to other uninvolved parties whose opportunity to lead decent lives may be seriously jeopardised. If we apply to the nuclear situation the standards of behaviour and moral principles generally acknowledged (in principle, if not so often in fact) in the contemporary world, it is not easy to avoid the conclusion that nuclear development involves injustice with respect to the future on a grand scale. There appear to be only two plausible ways of trying to avoid such a conclusion. First, it might be argued that the moral principles and obligations which we acknowledge for the contemporary world and perhaps the immediate future do not apply to those in the non-immediate future. Secondly, an attempt might be made to appeal to overriding circumstances; for to reject the consigner's action in the circumstances outlined is not to imply that there are no circumstances in which such an action might be justifiable. As in the case of the consigner of the package there is a need to consider what these justifying circumstances might be, and whether they apply in the present case. We consider these possible escape routes for the proponent of nuclear development in turn. II.OBLIGATIONS TO THE (DISTANT) FUTURE. A The especially problematic area is that of the distant (i.e. non-immediate) future, the future with which people alive today will have no direct contact; by comparison, the immediate future gives fewer problems for most ethical theories. In fact the question of obligations to future people presents tests which a number of ethical theories fail to pass, and also has serious repercussions in political philosophy as regards the adequacy of accepted (democratic and other) institutions which do not take due account of the interests of future creatures. �5. Moral philosophers have, predictably, differed on questions of obligations to distant future creatures. A good many of the philosophers who have explicitly considered the question have come down in favour of the same consideration being given to the rights and interests of future people as to those of contemporary or immediately future people. Others fall into three categories: those who acknowledge obligations to the future but who do not take them seriously or who assign them a lesser weight, those who deny, or who are committed by their general moral position to denying, that there are moral obligations beyond the immediate future, and those who come down, with admirable philosophical caution, on both sides of the issue, but with the weight of the argument favouring the view underlying prevailing economic and political institutions, that there are no moral obligations to the future beyond those perhaps to the next generation. According to the most extreme of these positions against moral obligations to the future, our behaviour with respect to the future is morally unconstrained', there are no moral restrictions on acting or failing to act deriving effect of our actions on future people. from the Of those philosophers who say, or whose views imply that we do not have obligations to the (non-immediate) future, many have based this view on accounts of moral obligation which are built on relations which presuppose some degree of temporal or spatial contiguity. Thus, moral obligation is seen as presupposing various relations which could not hold between people widely separated in time (or sometimes in space). Let us call the position that we have no obligations to (distant) future people the No­ constraints position. Among suggested bases or grounds of moral obligation for the position, which would rule out obligations to the non-immediate future, are these. Firstly, there are those accounts which require that someone to whom a moral obligation is held be able to claim his rights or entitlement. People in the distant future will not be able to claim rights and entitlements against us, and of course they can do nothing to enforce any claims they might have against us. Secondly, there are those accounts which base moral obligations on social or legal convention, for example a convention which would require punishment of offenders or at least some kind of social enforcement. But plainly these and other conventions will not be invariant over change in society and amendment of legal conventions; hence they will not be invariant over time. Also future people have no way of enforcing their interests or punishing offending predecessors. �6. The No-constraints view is a very difficult one to sustain. Consider, for example, a scientific group which, for no particular reason other than to test a particular piece of technology, places in orbit a cobalt bomb set off by a triggering device designed to go off several hundred years from the time of its despatch. No presently living person and none of their immediate descendants would be affected, but the population of the earth in the distant future would be wiped out as a direct and predictable result of the action. The no-constraints position clearly implies that this is an acceptable moral enterprise, that whatever else we might legitimately criticize in the scientists’ experiment (perhaps its being over-expensive or badly designed) we cannot lodge a moral protest about the damage it will do to future people. The no-constraints position also endorses as morally acceptable the following sorts of policy:- A firm discovers it can make a handsome profit from mining, processing and manufacturing a new type of material which, although it causes no problem for present people or their immediate descendants, will over a period of hundreds of years decay into a substance which will cause an enormous epidemic of cancer among the inhabitants of the earth at that time. According to the no-constraints view the firm is free to act in its own interests, without any consideration for the harm it does remote future people. Such counterexamples to the No-constraints position, which are easily varied and multiplied, might seem childlishly obvious. Yet this view is far from being a straw man; not only have several philosophers endorsed this position, but it is a clear implication of many currently popular views of the basis of moral obligation, as well as of prevailing economic theory. It seems that those who opt for the No-constraints position have not considered such examples, despite their being clearly implied by their position. We suspect that (we certainly hope that) when it is brought out that their position admits such counterexamples, that without any constraints we are free to cause pointless harm for example, most of those who opted for this position would want to assert that it was not what they intended. What many of those who have put forward the No-constraints position seem to have had in mind (in denying moral obligation) is rather that future people can look after themselves, that we are not responsible for their lives. The popular view that the future can take care of itself also seems to assume a future causally independent of the present. But it is not. It is not as if, in the counterexample cases or in the nuclear case, the future is simply being left alone to take care of itself. Present people are influencing it, and in doing so thereby acquire many of the same sorts of moral responsibilities as they do in causally affecting the present and immediate future, most notably the obligation to take account in �7. what they do of people affected and their interests, to be careful in their actions, to take account of the genuine probability of their actions causing harm, and to see that they do not act so as to rob future people, of the chance of a good life. Furthermore, to say that we are not resposible for the lives of future people does not amount to the same thing as saying that we are free to do as we like with respect to them. In just the same way, the fact that one does not have or has not acquired an obligation to some stranger with whom one has never been involved does not imply that one is free to do what one likes with respect to him, for example to rob him or to seriously harm him when this could be avoided. These difficulties for the No-constraints position result in part because of a failure to make an important distinction. Some of our obligations to others arise because we have voluntarily entered into some agreement with them - for example, we have made a promise. Other obligations, however, such as our duty not to damage or harm someone, do not assume that an agreement has been struck between us. former kind acquired obligations Let us call obligations of the and those of the latter unacquired obligations. There is a considerable difference in the type of responsibility associated with each. In the case of acquired obligations responsibility arises because one should do something which one can fail to do, e.g. keep a promise. In the case of unacquired duties responsibility arises as a result of being a causal agent who is aware of the consequences or consequences of his action, a responsibility that is not dependent on one’s having performed some act in the past (e.g., made a promise). Our obligations to future people clearly are of unacquired, not acquired obligations, a fact the No-constraints position simply fails to take into account. These obligations arise as a result of our ability to produce causal effects of a reasonably predictable nature, whether on our contemporaries or on those in the distant future. Thus, to return to the train parable, the consigner cannot argue in justification of his action that he has, for example, never assumed or acquired responsibility for the passengers, that he does not know them and therefore has no love or sympathy for them and that they are not part of his moral community; in short, that he has acquired no obligation, and has no special obligations to help them. All that �8. one needs to argue concerning the train, and in the nuclear case, is that there z are moral obligations against imposing harm for instance which are not specially o thQ distant acquired. Nor can this claim be rebutted by the pretence ure involve heroic self sacrifice, something ’’above and beyond” what is normally required. One is no more engaging in heroic self sacrifice by not forcing future people into an unviable life position or by refraining from causing them direct harm than the consigner is resorting to heroic self sacrifice in refraining from shipping the dangerous package on the train. III. ATTEMPTS TO REDUCE OBLIGATIONS TO THE FUTURE. In evading these difficulties the No—constraints position may be qualified rather than wholly abandoned. According to the Qualified position we are not entirely unconstrained There are obligations, even to distant future with respect to the distant future. people, but these are not so important as those to the present, and the interests of distant future people cannot weigh very much in the scale against those of the present and immediate future. The interests of future people then, except in unusual cases, count for very much less than the interests of present people. Hence such things as nuclear development and various exploitative activities which benefit present people should proceed, even if people of the distant future are (somewhat) disadvantaged by them. The Qualified position appears to be widely held and is implicit in prevailing economic theories, where the position of a decrease in weight of future costs and benefits (and so of future interests) is obtained by application over time of a discount rate, so discounting costs and risks to future people. The attempt to apply economics as a moral theory, something that is becoming increasingly common, can lead thei to the Qualified position. What is objectionable in such an approach is that economics must operate within the bounds of acknowledged non-acquired moral constraints, just as in practice it operates within legal constraints. What economics cannot legitimately do is determine what these constraints are. There are, moreover, alternative economic theories and simply to adopt, without further ado, one which discounts the future, giving much less importance to the interests of future people, is to beg all the questions at issue. Among the arguments that economists offer for generally discounting the future, the most threadbare is based on the Rosy-future assumption, that future generations will be better off than present ones (and so better placed to handle the waste problem). generations may well not Since there is mounting evidence that future be better off then present ones, especially in things that matter, no argument for discounting the interests of future generations on this basis can carry much weight. For the waste problem to be handed �9. to the future generations, it would have to be shown, what recent economic progress hardly justifies, that future generations will be not just better off but so much better off that they can (easily) carry and control the nuclear freight. A more plausible argument for discounting, the Opportunity-cost argument, ^builds directly on the notion of opportunity cost. It is argued from the fact that a dollar gained now is worth much more than a dollar received in the nonimmediate future (because the first dollar could meanwhile be invested at compound interest), that discounting is required to obtain equivalent monetary values. This same line of reasoning is then applied to the allocation of resources. Thus, compensation - which is what the waste problem is taken to come _ to economically - costs much less now than later, e.g. a few pennies set aside /(e.g. in a trust fund) in the future, if need be, will suffice to compensate eventually for any victims of remote radioactive waste leakage. beset this approach. Two problems First, there are, presently at least, insurmountable practical difficulties about applying such discounting. how to determine appropriate future discount rates. that the argument depends on a false assumption. We simply do not know A more serious objection is It is not true that value, or damages, can always be converted into monetary equivalents. There is no clear ’’monetary compensation" for a variety of damages, including cancer, loss of life, a lost species. The discounting theme, however argued for, is inadequate, because it leads back in practice to the No-constraints position. discounting imposes an ” economic horizon" The reason is that beyond which nothing need be considered, since any costs or benefit which might arise are, when discounted back to the present, negligible. A different argument for the Qualified position, the Probabilities argument, avoids the objections from cases of certain damage through appeal to probability considerations. The distant future, it is argued, is much more uncertain than the present and immediate future, so that probabilities are consequently lower, perhaps even approaching or coinciding with zero for any hypothesis concerning the distant future. Thus, the argument continues, the interests of future people must (apart from exceptional cases where there is an unusually high degree of certainty) count for (very much) less than those of present and neighbouring people where (much) higher probabilities are attached. So in the case of conflict between the present and the future, where it is a question of weighing certain benefits to the people of the present and the immediate future against a much lower probability of indeterminate costs to an indeterminate number of �iisfcsrs”'.... . • 10. distant future people, the issue would normally be decided in favour of the present assuming anything like similar costs and benefits were involved. is however The argument Firstly, probabilities involving distant badly flawed. future situations are not always less than those concerning the immediate future in the way the argument supposes. problems often Moreover the outcomes of some moral do not depend on a high level of probability. In many cases it is enough, as the train parable reveals, that a significant risk is created; such cases do not depend critically on high probability assignments. Nor, /of course, VitTcar) be assumed that anything like similarly weighted costs and benefits are involved in the nuclear case, especially if it is a question of risking poisoning some of the earth for half a million or so years, with consequent risk of serious harm to thousands of generations of future people, i»n e>rd^f -Lt? 'fc-C I in the shape of the opportunity to continue (unnecessarily) high energy use. z the costs and benefits were comparable or evenly weighted, such And even, if an argument would be defective, since an analogous argument would show that the consigner’s action in the train parable, is acceptable provided the benefit (e.g. the profit the company stood to gain from imposing significant risks on other people) was sufficiently large. Such a cost-benefit approach to moral and decision problems, with or is quite inadequate when different parties without the probability frills, are involved or when cases of conflict of interest involving moral obligations are at issue. permissible 5 For example, such a cost-benefit approach would imply that it is for a company to injure, or very likely injure, some innocent party provided only that the company stands to make a sufficiently large gain from it, that costs to some group are more than larger benefits to another group. transferred in any morally compensated for by But costs or benefits are not legitimately simple way from one group to another. The often appealed to maxim "If you (or your group) want the benefits you have to accept the costs" is one thing, but the maxim "If I (or my group) want the benefits then you have to accept the costs (or some of them at least)" is another and �very different thing. It is a widely accepted moral principle that one is not, in general, entitled to simply transfer costs of a significant kind arising from an activity which benefits oneself onto other parties who are not involved in the activity and are not beneficiaries.This Transfer-limiting principle is especially clear in cases of which a thalidomide manufacturing and marketing company is one, where the significant costs include an effect on life or health or a risk thereof, and where the benefit to the benefitting party is of a noncrucial or dispensible nature. The principle is of fundamental importance in the nuclear debate, and appears again and again : it applies not merely to the waste problem but as regards several other liabilities of nuclear development, e.g. the risk of nuclear war, the matter / 9 'of reactor meltdown. In particular, the principle invalidates the comparison, heavily relied on in building a case for the acceptability of the nuclear risks, between nuclear risks and those from such activities as airplane travel or cigarette smoking. In the latter case those who supposedly benefit from the activity are also, to an overwhelming extent, those who bear the serious health costs and risks involved. In contrast the users and supposed beneficiearies of nuclear energy will be risking not only, or even primarily, their own lives and health, but also that of others who may not be beneficiaries at all who may be just the opposite! More generally, the distribution of costs and damage in such a fashion, i.e. on to non-beneficiaries, is a characteristic of certain serious forms of pollution, and is among its morally objectionable features. / j Large-scale energy y»ss// /production, from nuclear or foe-itc fuel sources, can cause or lead to serious !pollution. Thus from the Transfer-limiting t>fe principle emerges an important necessary condition for energy options: To be morally acceptable k -era, OE£12^ should not involve the transfer of s.igif leant costs or risks of harm onto parties who are not involved, who do not use or do not benefit correspondingly from the energy source. Included in the scope of �12. this condition, which nuclear development violates , are future people, i.e. not merely people living at the present time but also future generations (those Principle, that we should not hand the world we have so exploited on to our successors in substantially worse shape than we ’'received” it. For if we did then that would be a significant transfer of costs. The Transfer-limiting principle can be derived from certain ethical theories (e.g. those of a deontic cast such as Kant's and Ra and from common precepts (such as the Golden Rule), where one seriously considers putting oneself in another’s position. But the principle is perhaps best defended, on a broader basis, inductively, by way of examples. embroider the train parable, the company town decides to Suppose, to solve its disposal problem by shipping its noxious waste to another town down the line, which (like future towns) lacks the means to ship it back or to register due protest. The inhabitants of this town are then forced to face the problem either of undertaking the expensive and difficult disposal process or of sus­ taining risks to their own lives and health. Most of us would regard this kind of transfer of costs as morally unacceptable, however much the consigner’s company town flourishes. / /IV. c UNCERTAINTY AND INDETERMINACY ARGUMENTS FOR REDUCED RESPONSIBILITY. 7 /Many of the arguments designed to show that we cannot be ed to take too much account of the effects of our actions on the distant future appeal to uncertain/y. There are two main components to the argument, capable of separation, but frequently tangled up. Both arguments are mistaken, the first, an argument from ignorance, on a priori second on a posteriori grounds. follows:- grounds, the The Argument from ignorance concerned runs as In contrast to the exact information we can obtain about the present, the information we can obtain about the effects of our actions on the distant future is unreliable, woolly and highly speculative. But we cannot base assessments of how we should act on information of this kind, especially when �accurate information is obtainable about the present which would indicate Therefore we must regretfully ignore the different action. our actions on the distant future. ignorance uncertain effects of A striking example of the argument from at work is afforded by official US analyses favouring nuclear development, which ignore (the extensive) costs of waste control on the 7 grounds of uncertainty. the argument concerned is this: More formally and crudely (%)£/only has obligations to the future if these obligations are based on reliable information. distant future. There is no reliable information at present as regards the Therefore one has no obligations to the distant future. This argument is essentially a variant on a sceptical argument concerning * our knowledge of the future (formally, replace ’obligations in the crude statement of the argument above). by ’knowledge’ The main ploy is to considerably overestimate and overstate the degree of certainty available with respect to the present and immediate future, and the degree of certainty which is required as the basis for moral consideration both with respect to the present and with respect to the future. Associated with this is the attempt to suggest a sharp division as regards certainty between the present and immediate future on the one hand and the distant future on the other. We shall not find, we suggest, that there is any such sharp or simple division between the distant future and the adjacent future and the present, at least with respect to those things in the present which are normally subject to moral constraints. We can and constantly , such do act on the basis of^"unreliable" information, which the sceptic as regards the future conveniently labels "uncertainty". In moral situations in the present, assessments of what to do often take account of risk and probability, even quite low probabilities. Consider again the train parable. We do not need to know for certain that the container will break and the lethal gas escape. In fact it does not even have to be probable, in the relevant sense of more probable than not, in order for us to condemn the consigner’s action. that there is a significant risk of harm It is enough in this sort of case. It does not matter if the decreased well-being of the consigner is certain and that the �14. prospects of the passengers quite uncertain. It is wrong to ship the gas. But if we do not require certainty of action to apply moral constraints in contemporary affairs, why should we require a much higher standard of certainty in the future? The unwarranted insistence on certainty as a necessary condition before moral consideration can be given to the distant future, then, amounts to a flagrant double standard. According to the second argument, the Practical-uncertainty argument, even if in theory we have obligations to the future, we cannot in practice take the interests of future people into account because uncertainty about the distant future is so gross that we cannot determine what the likely consequences of actions on it will be. Therefore, however good our intentions to the people of the distant future are, in practice we have no choice but to ignore their interests. Given that moral principles are characteristically of universal implicational form, e.g. of forms such as "if x has character then x is wrong, for every (action) sharply thus: x", h the argument may be stated more We can never obtain the information about future actions which would enable us to detach the antecedent of the implication. Therefore, even if in theory moral principles do extend to future people, in practice they cannot be applied to obtain clear conclusions. It is true that if the distant future really were so grossly uncertain . that in every case it was impossible to determine in any way better than chance what the effects of present action would be, and whether any given action would help or hinder future people, then moral principles, although applicable in theory to the future, would not in practice yield any clear conclusions about how to act. In this event the distant future would impose no practical moral constraints on action. However, the argument is factually incorrect in assuming that the future always is so grossly uncertain or indeterminate. Admittedly there is often a high degree of uncertainty concerning the distant future, but as a matter of (contingent) fact it is not always so gross or sweeping as the argument has to assume. There are some areas where uncertainty is �15. not so great as to exclude constraints on action. For example, we may have little idea what the fashions will be in a hundred years or, to take another morally^irrelevant^factor, what brands of ice cream people will be eating, if any, but we do have excellent reason to believe, especially if we consider 3000 years of history, that what people there are in a hundred years are likely to have material and psychic needs not entirely unlike our own, that they will need a healthy biosphere for a good life; that like us they will not be immune to radiation; that their welfare will not be enhanced by a high incidence of ^cancer genetic defects, by the destruction of resources, or the elimination from the face of the earth of that wonderful variety of non-human life which at present makes it such a rich and interesting place. The case of nuclear waste storage, and of uncertainty of the effects of it on future people, is one area where uncertainty in morally relevant respects is not so great as to preclude moral constraints on action. For this sort of reason, the practical uncertainty argument should be rejected. Through the defects of the preceding arguments, we can see the defects in a number of widely employed uncertainty arguments used to write off probably harm to future people as outside the scope of proper consideration. Most of these popular moves employ both of the uncertainty arguments as suits the case, switching from one to the other. For example, we may be told that we cannot really take account of future people because we cannot be sure that they will exist or that their tastes and wants will not be completely different from our own, to the point where they will not suffer from our exhaustion of resources or from the things that would affect us. But this is to insist upon complete certainty of a sort beyond what is required for the present and immediate future, where there is also commonly no guarantee that some disaster will not overtake those to whom we are morally committed. Again we may be told that there is no guarantee that future people will be worthy of any efforts on our part, because they may be morons of forever plugged into enjoyment of other machines. Even if one is prepared to accept the elitist approach presupposed - according to which only those who meet certain properly civilized or intellectual standards are eligible for moral consideration - what we are being handed in such arguments �16. is again a mere outside possibility. Neither the contemporary nor the historical situation gives any positive reason for supposing that a lapse into universal moronity or universal-pleasure-machine escapism is a serious possibility. We can contrast with these mere logical possibilities the very real historically supportable risks of escape of nuclear waste or decline of a civilisation through destruction of its resource base. Closely related to uncertainty arguments are arguments premissed on the indeterminacy of the future. For example, according to the Indeterminacy argument, the indeterminacy of the number and exact character of people at future times will prevent the interest of future people being taken into account where there is a conflict with the present. Since their numbers are indeterminate and their interests unknown how, it is asked, can we weigh their competing claims against those of the present and immediate future, where this information is available in a more or less accurate form? The question is raised particularly by problems of sharing fixed quantities of resources among present and future people, for example oil, when the numbers of the latter are indeterminate. Such problems are indeed difficult, but they are not resolved by ignoring the claims of the future. Nor are distributional problems involving non-renewable resources as large and representative a class of moral problems concerning the future as the tendency to focus on them would suggest. It can be freely admitted, that there will be cases where the indeterminacy of aspects of the future will make conflicts very difficult to resolve or indeed irresoluble - no realistic ethical theory can give a precise answer to every ethical question. But, as the train parable again illustrates, /there are cases where such difficulties do not hinder resolution, and .anci cases of conflict which are not properly approached by weighing numbers, numbers of interests, or whatever, cases for which one needs to know only the most general probable characteristics of future people. The case of nuclear power is like that. The failure of these various arguments reveals, what c^e^| ^^^men^does nc argued from the universalisability features of moral principles, that/ disqualify future people from full moral consideration or reduce their claims below the claims of present people. That is, we have the same general obligations �to future people as to the present; thus there is the same obligation to take account of them and their interests in what we do, to be careful in our actions, to take account of the probability (and not just the certainty) of our actions causing harm or damage, and to see, other things being equal, that we do not act so as to rob them of what is necessary for the chance of a good life. Uncertainty and indeterminacy do not relieve us of these obligations. V. PROBLEMS OF SAFE NUCLEAR OPERATION : REACTOR EMISSIONS AND CORE MELTDOWN. The ethical problems with nuclear power are by no means confined to waste storage and future creatures. entitlement Just as remoteness in time does not erode obligations or to just treatment, neither does location in space, or a particular and arguments like those already arrived at in considering the waste problem ^apply. For example, if one group (social uriit^ or state) decides to dump its radioactive wastes in the territory or region of another group, or not to prevent its (radioactive) pollution entering the territory of another group, then it imposes risks and costs on presently existing people of the second group, in much the way that present nuclear developments impose costs and risks on future people. There are differences however : spatially distant people cannot be discounted in quite the way that future people can be, though their interests and objectives can be ignored or overridden. People living in the vicinity of a nuclear reactor are subject to special costs and risks. One is radioactive pollution, because reactors routinely discharj radioactive materials into the air and Emission problem. water near the plant : hence the Such ’’normal" emission during plant operation of low level radiation carries carcinogenic and mutagenic costs. While there are undoubtedly costs, the number of cancers and the precise extent of genetic damage induced by exposure to such radiation are both uncertain. If our permitted free transfer of costs and risks from one person to another, the ethical issue directly raised by nuclear emissions would be : what extent of �18. cancer and genetic damage, if any, is permissibly traded for the advantages of nuclear power, and under what conditions? Since, however, risks and benefits are NOT (morally) transferable this way - recall the Transfer-limiting I principle - such a cost-benefit approach to the risks nuclear emission poses for those who live near a reactor cannot with justice be approached in this fashio, these risks are In the USA, people who live within 50 miles oMmclear real! power plant bear a risk of cancer and genetic damage of as much as 50 times that borne by the population at large. And children living in this region are even more vulnerable, since they and several times more likely to contract cancer through exposure than normal adults. The serious costs to these people cannot be J us tit led by the alleged benefits for others, expecially when these benefits could be obtained without these costs. a pity about Thus it is not just complacent to say 'It’s Aunt Ethel dying of cancer, but the new make life comfortable’. airconditioners For such benefits to some as airconditioners provide, which can be alternatively obtained, for example by modification of buildings, can in no way compensate for what others suffer. Among the other strategies used in trying to persuade us that the imposition of radiation on minorities - most of whom have no genuine voice in the. location of reactors in their environment and cannot move away without serious losses - is really quite alright is the Doubling argument. Accord to the US Atomic Energy Commission, who deployed this trick, it is permissable to double, through nuclear technology, the level of (natural) radiation that a population have received with apparently negligible consequences, the argument being that the additional amount (being equivalent to the "natural” level) is also likely to have negligible consequences. The increased amounts of radiation - with their large man-made component - are then accounted normal, and, it is claimed, what is normal is morally acceptable. in this argument is sound. None of the steps Drinking one bottle of wine a day may have no ill-effects, whereas drinking two a day certainly may affect a person’s well-being; and while the smaller intake may have become normal for the person, the larger one will, under such conditions, not be. Finally, what is or has become normal, �19. e.g. two murders or twenty cancers a day in a given city, may be far from acceptable. In fact, even the USA, which has very strict standards by comparison with most other countries with planned nuclear reactors, permits radiation emissions very substantially in excess of the standards laid down; so the emission situation is much worse than what consideration of the standards would disclose. Furthermore, the monitoring of the standards ’’imposed'’ is entrusted to the nuclear operators themselves, scarcely disinterested parties. Thus public policy is determined not so as to guarantee public health, but rather to serve as a public pacifier” while publicly-subsidized private nuclear operations proceed relatively unhampered? While radioactive emissions are an ordinary feature of reactor operation, reactor breakdown is, hopefully, not: official reports even try to make an accident of magnitude, as a matter of definition, an ’extraordinary nuclear occurrence . But "definitions” notwithstanding, such accidents can happen, and almost have on several occasions (the most notorious being Three Mile Island): hence the Core-meltdown problem. If the cooling and emergency core cooling systems fail in American (light water) reactors, then the core melts and ’containment failure’ is likely, the result that an area of 40,000 square miles could be radioactively 10 contaminated. In the event of the worst type of accident in a very small reactor, a steam explosion in the reactor vessel, about 45,000 people would be killed instantly and at least 100,000 would die as a result of the accident, property damages would exceed $17 billion and an area the size of Pennsylvania would be destroyed. Modern nuclear reactors are about five times the size of the reactor for which these conservative US (still the best available from official sources) are given : the consequences of a similar accident with a modern reactor would accordingly be much greater. The consigner who risks the lives and well-being of passengers on the O ^train acts in^admissibly. A government or government-endorsed utility appears to act in a way that does not differ in morally significant respects in �20. siting a nuclear reactor in a community, in planting such a dangerous package on the ’’community train”. More directly, the location of a nuclear reactor in a community, even if it should happen to receive a favourable benefit-cost as the Transfer-limiting principle. The advocates of nuclear power have, in effect, endeavoured to avoid questions of cost-transfer and equity, by shifting the dispute out of the extraordinary reactor malfunction. They have argued, in particular, what contrasts with the train parable, that there is no real possibility of a catastrophic nuclear accident. Indeed in the influential Rassmussen report - which was extensively used to support public confidence in US nuclear fission technology - an even stronger, an incredibly strong, improbability claim was stated: namely, the likelihood of a catastrophic nuclear accident is so remote as to be (almost) impossible. However, the mathematical models relied upon in this report, variously called "fault tree analysis” and "reliability estimating techniques", are unsound, because, among other things, they exclude as "not credible" possibilities that may well happen in the real world. that the It is not surprising, then i methodology and data of the report have been soundly and decisively criticised, or that official support for the report has now been withdrawn. 12 Moreover, use of alternative methods and data indicates that there is a real possibility, a non-negligible probability of a serious accident. In response it is contended that, even if there is a non-negligible probability of a reactor accident, still that is acceptable, being of no greater order than risks of accidents that are already socially accepted. Here we encounter again that insidious engineering approach to morality built into decision models of an economic cast, e.g. benefit-cost balance sheets, risk­ assessment models, etc. Risk assessment, a sophistication of transaction or trade-off models, purports to provide a comparison between the relative risks attached to different options, e.g. energy otpions, which settles their �21. ethical status. The following assumptions are encountered in risk assessment as applied to energy options: Ai. If option a imposes (comparable) costs on fewer people than option b then option a is preferable to option Aii. b ; Option a involves a total net cost in terms of cost to people (e.g. deaths, injuries, etc.) which is less than that of option b, which is alreay^ accepted; therefore option a is acceptable. 3 These assumptions are then applied as follows. be killed Since the number likely to eventuall by nuclear power station catastrophe is less than the likely number killed by cigarette smoking, and since the risks of cigarette smoking are accepted; it follows that the risks of huclear power are acceptable. A little reflection reveals that this sort of risk assessment argument grossly violates the Transfer­ limiting principle. In order to obtain a proper ethical assessment we need a much fuller picture, and we need to know at least these things:- costs and benefits go to the same parties; Do the and is the person who voluntarily the risks also the person who primarily receives the benefits, as in undertakes driving or cigarette smoking, or are the costs imposed not benefit? on other parties who do It is only if the parties are the same in the case of the options compared, and there are no such distributional problems, a basis would be soundly based. that a comparison on such This is rarely the case, and it is not so in the case of risk assessments of energy options. VI. OTHER SOCIAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL RISKS AND COSTS OF NUCLEAR DEVELOPMENT, ESPECIALLY NUCLEAR WAR. The problems already discussed by no means exhaust the environmental, health and safety risks and costs in, or arising from, the nuclear fuel cycle. The full fuel cycle includes many stages both before and after reactor operation, apart from waste disposal, namely^ mining, milling, conversion, enrichment and preparation, reprocessing spent fuel, and transportation of materials. Several of these stages involve hazards. risks in the nuclear cycle Unlike the special - of sabotage of plants, of theft of fissionable material, and of the further proliferation of nuclear armaments - these hazards �22. have parallels, if not exact equivalents, in other highly polluting methods of generating power, e.g. ’workers in the uranium mining industry sustain ’’the same u 14 risk" of fatal and nonfatal injury as workers in the coal industry’. The problems are not really produced by nuclear development. Other social and environmental problems endemic where dangerous large-scale industry operates in societies that are highly inegalitarian and include sectors that are far from affluent - are more intimately linked with the J nuclear power cycle. Though pollution is a common and generally undesirable component of large-scale industrial operation, radioactive pollution ,such as uranium mining for instance produces, is especially a legacy of nuclear development, and a specially undesirable one, as rectification costs for dead radioactive lands and waterways reveal. Though sabotage is a threat to many large industries, sabotage of a nuclear reactor can have dire consequences, of a different order of magnitude from most industrial sabotage (where core meltdown is not a possibility). Though theft of material from more dubious enterprises such as munitions works can pose threats to populations at large and can assist terrorism, no thefts for allegedly peaceful enterprises pose problems of the same order as theft of fissionable material. No other industry produces materials which so readily permit fabrication into such massive explosives. No other industry is, to sum it up, so vulnerable on so many fronts. In part to reduce its vulnerability, in part because of its long and continuing association with military activities, the nuclear industry is subject to, and encourages, several practices which (given their scale) run counter to basic features of free and open societies, crucial features such as personal These practices include secrecy, restriction of information, formation of special police and guard forces, espionage, curtailment of civil liberties. Already operators of nuclear installations are given extraordinary powers, in vetting employees, to investigate the background and activities not only of employees but also of their families and sometimes even of their friends. The installations themselves become armed camps, which especially offends British sensibilities. The U.K. Atomic Energy (Special Constables) Act of 1976 created a special armed force to guard nuclear installations and- made it answerable ... to the U.K. Atomic Energy Authority. �..iwu- 23. These developments, and worse ones in West Germany and elsewhere,presage along with nuclear development increasingly authoritarian and anti-democratic societies. That nuclear development appears to force such political <— i ' (consequences tells heavily against it. Nuclear development is further indicated politically by the direct connection of nuclear power with nuclear war. It is true that ethical questions concerning nuclear war - for example, whether a nuclear war is justified, or just, under any circumstances, and if so what circumstances - are distinguishable from those concerning nuclear power. Undoubtedly, however, the spread of nuclear power is substantially increasing the technical means for engaging in nuclear war and so, to that extent, the opportunity for, and chances of, nuclear engagement. \ /jL Since nuclear wars are /nevei/ accountable- positive goods, but are at best the lesser of major evils, nuclear wars are always highly ethically undesirable. The spread of nuclear power accordingly expands the opportunity for, and chances of, highly undesirable consequences. 0^!/\ Finally the latter, so increasing these chances and opportunities, is itself undesirable, and therefore what le^jtds to it, nuclear development^ is undesirable. This is, in outline, the argument from nuclear wa£ against large-scale nuclear development. VII. CONFLICT ARGUMENTS, AND BEGINNING ON NUCLEAR DEVELOPMENT. UNCOVERING THE IDEOLOGICAL BASES OF Much as with nuclear war, so given the cumulative case against nuclear development, only one justificatory that of appeal to overriding circumstances. route remains open, That appeal, to be ethically acceptable, must go beyond merely economic considerations. For, as observed, the consigner’s action, in the train parable, cannot be justified by purely I ^conomistic arguments, such as that his profits would rise, the company or the town would be more prosperous, or by appealing to the fact that some possibly uncomfortable changes would otherwise be needed. case: a Transfer-limiting principle applies. So it is also in the nuclear But suppose now the consigner argues that his action is justified because unless it is taken the town will die. It is �24. by no means clear that even such a justification as this would be sufficient, especially where the risk to the passengers is high, since the case still /amount s^one of transfer of costs and risks onto others. But such a conflict situation, where a given course of action, though normally undesirable, is alleged to be the lesser of two evils in a given case, is morally more problemthan cases atical/frhere Transfer-limiting principle is clearly violated. Nuclear develop­ ment is often defended in this way, through Conflict arguments, to the effect that even though nuclear development does have undesirable features, nevertheless the alternatives are worse. Some of the arguments advanced to demonstrate conflict are based on competing commitments to present people, and others on competing obligations to future people, both of which are taken to override the obligations not to impose on the future significant risk of serious harm. The success of such /conflict arguments require^the presentation of a genuine and exhaustive set of alternatives (or at least practical alternatives) and showing that the only alternatives to admittedly morally undesirable actions are even more undesirable ones. If some practical alternative which is not morally worse than the action to be justified is overlooked, suppressed, or neglected in the argument (for example, if in the train parable it turns out that the town has another option to starving or to shipping the parcel, namely earning a living in some other way), then the argument is defective and cannot readily be patched. Just such a suppression of practicable alternatives, we shall argue, has occurred in the argument designed to show that the alternatives to the nuclear option are even worse than the option itself. A first argument, the Poverty argument, is that there is an overriding obligation to the poor, both the poor of the third world and the poor of indus­ trialised countries. Failure to develop nuclear energy, it is often claimed, would amount to denying them the opportunity to reach the standard of affluence we currently enjoy and would create unemployment and poverty in the industrialisec nations. And this would be worse - a greater evil - than such things as violating the Transfer-limiting principle through nuclear development. The Poverty argument does not stand up to examination, either for the poor of the industrial countries or for those of the. third world. There is good evidence that large-scale nuclear energy will help increase unemployment and poverty in the industrial world, through the diversion of very much available capital into an industry which is not only an exceptionally poor provider of direct employment, but also tends to reduce available jobs through encouraging substitution of energy use for labour use. The argument that nuclear energy is needed for the third world is even less convincing. Nuclear energy is both politically and economically inappropriate for the third world, since it requires massive amounts of capital, requires numbers of imported scientists and engineers, �25. WT creates negligible local employment, and depends for its feasibility upon largely non-existent utility systems - e.g. established electricity transmission systems and back-up facilities, and sufficient electrical appliances to plug into the system. Politically it increases foreign dependence, adds to centralised entrenched power and reduces the chance for change in the oppressive political structures which are a large part of the problem. The fact that nuclear energy is not in the interests of the people of the third world does not of course mean that it is not in the interests of, and wanted (often for military purposes) by, their rulers, the westernised and often military elites in whose interests the economies of these countries are usually organised. than what it is: But that does not make the poverty argument anything other a fraud. There are well-known energy-conserving alternatives and the practical option of developing further alternative energy sources, alternatives some of which offer far better prospects for helping the poor, both in the third world and in industrial countries: coal and other fossil fuels, geothermal, and a range of solar options (including as well as narrowly solar sources, wind, water and tidal power). Another major argument advanced to show conflict, the Lights-goingout argument, pppeals to a set of supposedly overriding and competing obligations to future people. We have, it is said, a duty to pass on the immensely valuable things and institutions which our culture has developed. Unless our high-technology, high-energy industrial society is continued and fostered, our valuable institutions and traditions will fall into decay or be swept away. The argument is essentially that without nuclear power, without the continued level of material wealth it alone is assumed to make possible, the lights of our civilization will go out. Future people will be the losers. The argument does raise important questions about what is valuable in But for our society and what characteristics are necessary for a good society. the most part these large questions can be by-passed. The reason is that the argument adopts an extremely uncritical attitude to present high-technology societies, apparently assuming that they are uniformly and uniquely valuable. $I I it assuine</ that technological society is unmodifiable, that^cannot be changed in ' the direction of energy conservation or alternative (perhaps high technology) energy sources without collapse. These assumptions are all hard to accept. The assumption that technological society’s energy patterns are unmodifiable is especially so; after all, it has survived events such as world wars which required major social and technological restructuring and consumption modification. If western society’s demands for energy were (contrary to the evidence) totally unmodifiable without collapse, not only would it be committed to a program of increasing destruction, but much of its culture would be of dubious value to �26. future people, who would very likely, as a consequence of this destruction, lack the resource base which the argument assumes to be essential in the case of contemporary society. The uniformity assumption should certainly be challenged. Since high- technology societies appear not to be uniformly valuable, the central question is, what is necessary to maintain what is valuable in such a society? While it may be easy to argue that high energy consumption centrally controlled is necessary to maintain the political and economic status quo of such a society, it is not so easy to argue that it is essential to maintain what is valuable, and it is what is valuable, presumably that we have a duty to pass on to the future. The evidence from history is that no very high level of material affluence or energy consumption is needed to maintain what is valuable. There is good reason in fact to believe that a society with much lower energy and resource^ consumption would better foster what is valuable than our own. But even if a radical change in these directions is independently desirable, it is unnecessary to presuppose such a change in order to see that the assumptions of the Lights-going-out argument are wrong. The consumption of less energy than at present/ need involve no reduction of well-being; and certainly a large increase over present levels of consumption assumed trr the usual economic case for nuclear energy, is quite unnecessary. then What the nuclear strategy is really designed to do is not to prevent the lights going out in western civilisation, but to enable the lights to go on burning all the time - to maintain and even increase the wattage output of the Energy Extravaganza . In fact there is good reason to think that, far from the high energy consumption society fostering what is valuable, it will, especially if energy is obtained by means of nuclear fission, be positively inimical to it. A society which has become heavily dependent upon a^ highly centralised, controlled and garrisoned md expertise-intensive energy source, must be one which is highly susceptible to entrenchment of power, and one in which the forces which control this energy source, whether capitalist or bureaucratic, can exert enormous power over the political system and over people’s lives, even more then they do at present. Such a society would/' almost inevitably tend to become authoritatian and increasingly anti-democratic, as an outcome, among other things, of its response to the threat posed by dissident groups in the nuclear situation. Nuclear development may thus help in passing on to future generations some of the worst aspects of our society - the consumerism, alienation, destruction of nature, and latent authoritarianism - while many valuable aspects, such as the degree of political freedom and those opportunities for personal and collective autonomy which exist, would be lost or diminished: political freedom �27. for example, is a high price to pay for consumerism and and energy extravagence. Again, as in the case of the poverty arguments, clear alternatives, alternative social and political choices, which do not involve such unacceptable consequences, are available. The alternative to the high technology-nuclear option is not a return to the cave, the loss of all that is valuable, but either the adoption of an available alternative such as coal for power or, better, the development of alternative technologies and lifestyles which offer far greater scope for the maintenance and further development of what is valuable in our society than the highly centralised nuclear option. The Lights-going-out argument, as a moral conflict argument, accordingly fails. Thus the further escape route, the appeal to conflict, is, like the appeal to futurity, closed. If then we apply, as we have argued we should, the same standards of morality to the future as we ought to acknowledge for the present, the conclusion that large-scale nuclear development is a crime against the future is inevitable. Closed also, in the much same way, are the escape routes to other arguments (from reactor meltdown, radiation emissions, etc.) for concluding that nuclear development is unacceptable. Tn sum, nuclear development is morally unacceptable on several grounds. VIII. SOCIAL OPTIONS : SHALLOW AND DEEP ALTERNATIVES. The future energy option that is most often contrasted with nuclear power, namely coal power, while no doubt preferable to nuclear power, is hardly acceptable. For it carries with it the likelihood of serious (air) pollution, and associated phenomena such as acid rain and atmospheric heating, not to mention the despoliation caused by extensive strip mining, all of which will result from its use in meeting very Such an option would, moreover, also violate high projected consumption figures. the Transfer-limiting principle : for it would impose widespread costs on nonbeneficiaries for some concentrated benefits to some profit takers and to some users who do not pay the full costs of production and replacement. To these main conventional options a third is often added which emphasizes softer and more benign technologies, such as those of solar energy and hydroelectricity. Such softer options — if suitably combined with energy conservation measures (for there are solar ways, as well as nuclear ways, of energy extravagance and of producing unnecessary trivia which answer to no genuine needs) - can avoid the ethical objectives to nuclear power. choice is not however technological, The deeper nor merely^individual^ 1 bUL Social, and involves the restructuring of production away from energy intensive uses and, at a more basic level, a change to nonconsumeristic, less consumptive life­ styles and social arrangements’!:6 These more fundamental choices between social alternatives, conventional technologically-oriented discussion of energy options tends to obscure. It is not just a matter of deciding in which way to meet the �unexamined goals nuclear development aspires to meet, but also a matter of examining the goals themselves. That is, we are not merely faced with the question of comparing different technologies for meeting some fixed or given demand or level of consumption, and of trying to see how best to meet these; we are also faced, and primarily, with the matter of examining those alleged needs and the cost of a society that creates them. It is doubtful that any technology, however benign in principle, will be likely to leave a tolerable world for the future if it is expected to meet unbounded and uncontrolled energy consumption and demands. Even more benign technologies may well be used in a way which creates costs for future people and ^are?which^ /them. ^likely to result in a deteriorated world being handed on to In short, even more benign technologies may le/id to violation of the Transmission JjteQu^-remen^• Consider, to illustrate, the effect on the world s forests, commonly counted as a solar resource, should they be extensively used for production of methanol or of electricity by woodchipping. While few would object to the use of genuine waste material for energy production, the unrestricted exploitation of forests - whether it goes under the name of ’’solar energy” or not - to meet ever increasing energy demands could well be the final indignity for the world’s already hard-pressed natural forests. The effects of such additional demands on the maintenance of the forests are often dismissed by the simple expedient of waving around the label "renewable resources”. Many forests are in principle renewable, it is a true, given a certain (low) rate and kind of exploitation, but in fact there are now very few forestry operations anywhere in the world where the forests are treated as completely renewable in the sense of the renewal of all their values, In many regions too the rate of exploitation which would enable renewal has already been exceeded, so that a total decline is widely thought to be imminent, It certainly has begun in many regions, and many forest types, especially rain17 ^/forest types^ are now, and rapidly, being lost for the future. The addition of y/a maj^r further and not readily limitable demand pressure for energy on top /of /the present demands is one which anyone with both a realistic appreciation of the conduct of forestry operations and a concern for the long-term conservation of the forests and remaining natural communities must regard with alarm. The result of massive deforestation for energy purposes, resembling the deforestation of much of Europe at the beginning of the Industrial Revolution, again for energy purposes, could be extensive and devastating erosion in steeper lands and tropical areas, desertification in more arid regions, possible climatic change, and massive impoverishment of natural ecosystems, including enormous loss of natural species. Some of us do not want to pass on, and by the Transmission principles we are not entitled to pass on, a deforested world to the future, any more than we want to pass on one poisoned by nuclear �29. products or polluted by coal products. illustrates, a mere switch to In short, as the forest situation more benign technologies - important though this is - without any more basic structural and social change,is inadequate. The deeper social option involves challenging and beginning to alter a social structure which promotes consumerism, consumption far beyond genuine needs and an economic structure which encourages increasing use of highly energy-intensi modes of production. The social change option tends to be obscured in most discussions of energy options and of how to meet energy needs, in part because it does question underlying values of current social arrangements. The conventional discussion proceeds by taking alleged demand (often conflated with wants or needs) as unchallengeable, and the issue to be one of which technology can be most profitably employed to meet them. This effectively presents a false choice, and is the result of taking needs and demand as lacking a social context so that the social structure which produces the needs is similarly taken as unchallengeable and unchangeable. The point is readily illustrated. It is commonly argued by representatives of such industries as transportation and petroleum, as for example by McGrowth of the XS Consumption Co., that people want deep freezers, air conditions, power gadgets, .... authoritarian to prevent them from satisfying these wants. from created wants It would be Such an argument conveniently ignores the social framework in which such needs and wants arise or are produced. To point to the determination of many such wants at the framework level is not however to assume that they are entirely determined at the framework level (e.g. by industrial organisation) and there is no such thing as individual choice or determination at all. It is to see the social framework as a major factor in determining certain kinds of choices, such as those for travel, and kinds of infrastructure, and to see apparently individual choices made in such matters as being channelled and directed by a social framework determined largely in the interests of corporate and private profit and advantage. The social change option is a hard option, insofar as it will be difficult to implement politically; but it is ultimately the only way of avoiding the passing on of serious costs to future people. reasons than such ethical ones for taking it: And there are other sorts of it is the main, indeed the only sort of option,open to those who adopt what is now called a deep ecological perspective, as contrasted with a shallow ecological outlook which regards the natural world and its nonhuman denizens as not worthwhile in themselves but only of value in as much as they answer back to human interests. The deep ecological perspective is an integral part of the Alternative Ecological Paradigm and is incompatible with central theses of the Dominant Social Paradigm (which is essentially the ideology of classical and neoclassical economics) �30. and its variants (roughly, what are called State Socialism, and Democratic 18 Socialism). It is incompatible with such assumptions as that the natural environment is of value only as a resource, is by and large hostile, but is controllable in human interests,and with the further domination over nature themes of the Dominant Paradigm and its variants. The conflict between Alternative and Dominant Paradigms, which is fast increasing, extends of course far beyond attitudes to the natural world, since core values of the Dominant Paradigm such as the merits of unimpeded economic growth and material progress are at stake; the conflict involves fundamental differences over the whole front of economical, political and social arrangements. The conflict underlies much of the nuclear debate, insofar as it is not specifically limited to questions of technological fixes, but takes up the 19 basic ethical issues and the social questions to which they lead. The ethical requirements already defended and applied bring us out, when followed through, on the Alternative side of the paradigm conflict, and accordingly lead to the difficult social change option. The social changes that the deep alternative requires will be strongly resisted because they mean changes in current social organisation and power 'structure. To the extenj? that the option represents some kind of threat to parts of present political and economic arrangements, it is not surprising that official energy option discussion proceeds by misrepresenting and often obscuring it. But difficult as it is to suitably alter "the system,” especially one with such far-reaching effects on the prevailing power structure, it is imperative to try: we are all on the nuclear train. �FOOTNOTES This paper is a condensation of an early version of our ’Nuclear 1. power - ethical, social, and political dimensions * (ESP for short, available from the authors), which in turn grew out of Routley (i.e. the work so referred to in the reference list). For help with the condensation we are very considerably indebted to the editors. In the condensation, we simplify the structure of the argument and suppress underlying political and ideological dimensions (for example, the large measure of responsibility of the USA for spreading nuclear reactors around the world, and thereby in enhancing the chances of nuclear disasters, including nuclear war). We also considerably reduce a heavy load of footnotes and references designed and needed to help make good many of our claims. Further, in order to contain references to a modest length, reference to primary sources has often been replaced by reference through secondary sources. Little difficulty should be encountered however in tracing fuller references through secondary sources or in filling out much Important background material from work cited herein. For example, virtually all the data cited in sections, and VII is referenced in Routley. At worst ESP can always be consulted. All but the last line of the quote is drawn from Goodin, p. 417; 2. the last line is from the Fox Report, p. 6. While it is unnecessary to know much about the nuclear fuel cycle in order to consider ethical and social dimensions of nuclear power, it helps to know a little. & Abbotts, Gyorgy. The basics are presented in many texts, e.g. Nader Of course in order to assess fully reports as to such important background and stage-setting matters as the likelihood of a core meltdown of # (lightwater) reactors, much more information is required. For many assessment purposes however, some knowledge of economic fallacies and decision theory is at least as important as knowledge of nuclear technology. 3. Naturally the effect on humans is not the only factor that has to be taken into account in arriving at moral assessments. Nuclear radiation, unlike most ethical theories, does not confine its scope to human life and welfare. But since the harm ' ~ nuclear development may afflict on non­ human life, for example, can hardly improve its case, it suffices if the case against it can be made out solely in terms of its effects on human life in the conventional way. �For reference to and a brief discussion of (human-oriented) ^simulation models see Gooding, 428. The Opportunity-cost 4. respects. argument is also defective in other It presupposes not merely the (mistaken) reductions involved in the contraction of the ethical domain to the economic; it also presupposes that the /proper methods for decision which ^ffect the choice, apply discounting. future, such as that of energy But, as Goodin argues, more appropriate decision rules do not allow discounting. This is one of the reasons why expected utility theory, 5. roughly cost-benefit analysis with probability frills, is inadequate as a decision method in such contexts. Apparent exceptions to the principle such as taxation (and 6. redistribution of income generally) vanish when wealth is construed (as it has to be if taxation is to be properly justified) as at least partly a social asset unfairly monopolised by a minority of the population. Examples such as that of motoring dangerously do not constitute counterexamples to the principle; for one is not morally entitled to so motor. / 7. For details, and as to how the official analyses become arguments against nuclear development when some attempt is made to take the ignored costs into account, see Shrader-Frechette, p. 55 ff. See Routley, p. 160. /\ the preceding two para£ I graphs, see Shrader-Frechette, p. 35 ff.; and also Nader and Abbotts. For much further discussion of the points of [10. Most of the reactors^Ln the world are of this type; see Gyorgy. 11. See Shrader-Frechette, chapter 4. 12. See Shrader-Frechette. / shortcomings A worthwhile initial view of the of the Rass^ftussen report may be reached by combining ' /the critique in Shrader-Frechette with that in Nader and Abbotts. 13. There are variations on Ai against numbers such as probabilities. and Aii which multiply costs In this way risks, construed as probable costs, can be taken into account in the assessment. risks may be assessed (Alternatively, through such familiar methods as insurance). �A principle varying Aii’. a Aii, and formulated as follows: is ethically acceptable if (for some b) a includes no more risks than b and b is socially accepted. Aii’. was the basic ethical principle in terms of which the Cluff Lake Board of Inquiry recently decided that nuclear power development see Cluff Lake Board of Inquiry in Saskatchewan is ethically acceptable: Department of Environment, Government of Saskatchewan, 1978, Final Report, p. 305 and p. 288. In this report, a is nuclear power and b is either activities clearly accepted by society as alternative power sources. other applications b In has been taken as cigarette smoking, motoring, mining and even the Vietnam war (!). The points made in the text do not exhaust the objections to principles Ai - Aii’. The principles are certainly ethically substantive, since an ethical consequence cannot be deduced from nonethical premisses, but they have an inadmissible conventional origin of b ; b character. For look at the may be socially accepted though it is no longer socially acceptable, or though its social acceptibility is no longer so clearcut and it would not have been socially accepted if as much as is now known had been known when it was introduced. What is required in Aii’, for instance, for the argument to begin to look convincing is that ’ethically acceptable’ rather than ’socially accepted’. b is But even with the amendments the principles are invalid, for the reasons given in the text, and others. It is not disconcerting that principles of this type do not work. It would be sad to see yet another area lost to the experts, ethics to actuaries. 14. See Shrader-Frechette, p. 15. 15. Goodin 16. The argument is elaborated in ESP. 17. For some of the more philosophically important material p. 433. 'alternative Mannlaon ~ Asocial arrangements and lifestyles, see work cited in V. and R. Routley, ’Social theories, self management and environmental problems’ in al, where a beginning is made on working out one set of alternatives, those of a pluralistic anarchism. �The parlous 18. situation of the world’s tropical rainforests is explained in, for instance, Myers; the reasons are untangled in R. and V. Routley ’World rainforest destruction - the social causes’ (available from the authors). 19. > rival, For a fuller account of the Dominant Social Paradigm and its Paradigm, see Cot^royfe and Duff, especially the Alternative Environmental the assumptions the table on p. 341 which /of the paradigms; compare also Cotton and Dunljzfp, especially p. 34. Contemporary varients in the Dominant Social Paradigm were considered in ESP. The shallow/deep contrast as applied to ecological positions, which A s /is an important component of the paradigm conflict, was introduced by Naess. // S /For further explanation of the contract and of the larger array of ecological positions into which it fits, see R. and V. Routley, ’ in Mannison environmental ethics ___ ’Human chauvinism and et al, and the references there cited, ^especially to R^d man’s work. 20. The more elaborate argument of ESP sets the nuclear debate in the context of paradigm conflict. But it is also argued that, even within assumptions framework of the Dominant Social Paradigm and its variants, Ti. Nuclear development is not the rational choice among energy options. The main argument put up for nuclear development within the framework of the dominant paradigm is an Economic growth argument. It is the following version of the Lights-going-out argument (with economic growth duly standing Nuclear power is in for material wealth, and for what is valuable!^ necessary to sustain economic growth. Economic growth is desirable (for all the usual reasons, e.g. to increase the size of the pie, to postpone redistribution problems, etc.). k Therefore nuclear power is desirable. / /The first premiss is part of US energy policy (see Shrader-Frechette, p.lll), and the second premiss is supplied by standard economics textbooks. But both premisses are defective, the second because what is valuable in economic growth can be achieved by (not without growth but) selective X //"growth, which economic the heavy social and environmental costs carried by unqualified economic growth. More to the point, since the second premiss is an assumption of the Dominant Paradigm, the first premiss (or rather an appropriate and less vulnerable restatement of it) Paradigm standards. fails even by Dominant For of course nuclear power is not necessary that there are other, perhaps costlier alternatives. defended is some elaboration of the premiss : given The premiss usually Nuclear power is the economically best way to sustain economic growth, ’economically best’ �being filled out as ’most efficient’, ’cheapest’, benefit-cost ratio’, etc. ’having the most favourable Unfortunately for the argument, and for nuclear development schemes, nuclear power is none of these things decisively (unless a good deal of economic cheating - easy to do - is done). Tii. On proper Dominant Paradigjfi accounting, nuclear choices should generally be rejected, both as private utility investments and as public choices. Nuclear development is not economically viable but has been kept going, not by clear economic viability, but by massive subsidization of several types Gyorgy and Nader alrd Abbotts). discussed in Shrader-Frechette, ZU Even on variants of the Dominant Paradigm, nuclear development is //not justified, oi consideration of decision theory methods will reveal: Tiii. Whatever reasonable decision rule is adopted, the nuclear choice is rejected^Jas the arguments op Goodin on alternative decision rules help to show. |l*^ What sustains the nuclear juggernaut is not the Dominant Paradigm or its variants, but contemporary corporate capitalism (or its state enterprise image) and associated third world imperialism, as the historical details of nuclear X ^development both in developed countries and in less developed countries (for main details, see Gyorgy p. 307 ff.). Are the practices of contemporary corporate capitalism and associated imperialism are not acceptable by the standards of either of the Paradigms or their variants : not ethically acceptable. they are certainly � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Draft Papers Description An account of the resource Sylvan's literary executor encountered an archive in which “all his projects were current", since manuscripts were undated and unattributed. Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document Richard and Vai Routley 1. » NUCLEAR POWER - SOME ETHICAL AND SOCIAL DIMENSIONS1 One hardly needs initiation into the dark mysteries of nuclear physics to contribute usefully to the debate now widely ranging over nuclear power. While many important empirical questions are still unresolved, these do not really lie at the centre of the controversy. Instead, it is a debate about values... many of the questions which arise are social and ethical ones.2 I. THE TRAIN PARABLE AND THE NUCLEAR WASTE PROBLEM. train has just pulled out. passengers and freight. The train which is A long distance country crowded carries both At an early stop in the journey someone consigns as freight, to a far distant destination, a package which contains a highly toxic and explosive gas. This is packed in a very thin container which, as the consigner is aware, may well not contain the gas for the full distance for which it is consigned, and certainly will not do so if the train should strike any real trouble, for example, if the train should be derailed or involved in a collision, or if some passenger should interfere inadvertently or deliberately with the freight, perhaps trying to steal some of it. of these sorts of things have happened on some previous journeys. All If the container should break the resulting disaster would probably kill at least some of the people on the train in adjacent carriages, while others could be maimed or poisoned or sooner or later incur serious diseases. Most of us would roundly condemn such an action. of the parcel say to try to justify it? What might the consigner He might say that it is not certain that the gas will escape, or that the world needs his product and it is his duty to supply it, or that in any case he is not or the people on it. responsible for the train These sorts of excuses however would normally be seen as ludicrous when set in this context. Unfortunately, similar excuses are not also seen when the consigner, again a (responsible) businessman,puts his workers' health or other peoples’ welfare at risk. Suppose he says that it is his own and others’p ressing needs which justify his action. The company he controls, which produces the material as a by-product, is in bad financial straits, and could not afford to produce a better container even if it knew how to make one. If the company fails, he and his family will suffer, his employees will lose their jobs and have to look for others, and the whole company town, through loss of spending, will be worse off. The poor and unemployed of the town, whom he would otherwise have been able to help, will suffer especially. Few people would accept such grounds as justification. 2. Even where there are serious risks and costs to oneself or some group for whom one is concerned one is usually considered not to be entitled to simply transfer the heavy burden of those risks and costs onto other uninvolved parties, especially where they arise from one’s own, or one’s group’s chosen life-style. The matter of nuclear waste has many moral features which resemble the train case. How fitting the analogy is will become apparent as the argument progresses. There is no known proven safe way to package the highly toxic wastes generated by the nuclear plants that will be spread around the world as large-scale nuclear development goes ahead. The waste problem will be much more serious than that generated by the 50 or so reactors in use at present, with each one of the 2000 or so reactors envisaged by the end of the century producing, on average, annual wastes containing 1000 times the radioactivity of the Hiroshima bomb. Much of this waste is extremely toxic. For example, a millionth of a gramme of plutonium is enough to induce a lung cancer. A leak of even a part of the waste material could involve much loss of life, widespread disease and genetic damage, and contamination of immense areas of land. Wastes will include the reactors themselves, which will have to be abandoned after their expected life times of perhaps 40 years, and which, some have estimated, may require 1^ million years to reach safe levels of radioactivity. Nuclear wastes must be kept suitably isolated from the environment for their entire active lifetime. For fission products the required storage period averages a thousand years or so, and for transuranic elements, which include plutonium, there is a half million to a million year storage problem. Serious problems have arisen with both short-term and proposed long-term methods of storage, even with the comparatively small quantities of waste produced over the last twenty years. Short-term methods of storage require continued human intervention, while proposed longer term methods are subject to both human inter­ ference and risk of leakage through non-human factors. No one with even a slight knowledge of the geological and climatic history of the earth over the last million years, a period whose fluctuations in climate we are only just beginning to guage and which has seen four Ice Ages, could be confident that a rigorous guarantee of safe storage could be provided for the vast period of time involved. Nor does the history of human affairs over the last 3000 years give ground for confidence in safe storage by methods requiring human intervention over perhaps a million years. Proposed long-term storage methods such as storage in granite formations or in salt mines, are largely speculative and relatively untested, and have already proved to involve difficulties with attempts made to put them into practice. Even as regards expensive recent proposals for first embedding concentrated wastes in glass and encapsulating the result in multilayered metal containers before rock deposit, simulation models 3. reveal that radioactive material may not remain suitably isolated from human environments.1^ In short, the best present storage proposals carry very real 3 possibilities of irradiating future people and damaging their environment. Given the heavy costs which could be involved for the future, and given the known limits of technology, it is methodologically unsound to bet, as nuclear nations have, on the discovery of safe procedures for storage of wastes. Any new procedures (required before 2000) will probably be but variations on not only have I present proposals, and subject to the same inadequacies. For instance,^none of the proposed methods for safe storage has been properly tested, but they may well prove to involve unforeseen difficulties and risks when an attempt is made to put them into practice on a commercial scale. Only a method that could provide a rigorous guarantee of safety over the storage period, that placed safety beyond reasonable doubt, would be acceptable. It is difficult to see how such rigorous guarantees could be given concerning either the geological or future human factors. But even if an economically viable, rigorously safe long term storage method could be devised, there is the problem of guaranteeing that it would be universally and invariably used. The assumption that it would be (especially if, as appears likely, such a method proved expensive economically and politically) seems to presuppose a level of efficiency, perfection, and concern for the future which has not previously been encountered in human affairs, and has certainly not been conspicuous in the nuclear industry. The risks imposed on the future by proceeding with nuclear development are, then, significant. to bear Perhaps 40,000 generations of future people could be forced significant risks resulting from the provision of the (extravagant) energy use of only a small proportion of the people of 10 generations. Nor is the risk of direct harm from the escape or misuse of radioactive materials the only burden the nuclear solution imposes on the future. Because the energy provided by nuclear fission is merely a stop gap, it seems probable that in due course the same problem, that of making a transition to renewable sources of energy, will have to be faced again by a future population which will probably, again as a result of our actions, be very much worse placed to cope with it. Their world will most likely be a world which is seriously depleted of non-renewable resources, and in which such renewable resources as forests and soils as remain, resources which inevitably form an important part of the basis of life, are run-down or destroyed. Such points tell against the idea that future people must be, if not direct beneficiaries of energy from nuclear fission, at least indirect beneficiaries. 4. The "solution” then is to buy time for contemporary society at a price which not only creates serious problems for future people but which reduces their ability to cope with these problems. Like the consigner in the train parable, contemporary industrial society proposes, in order to get itself out of a mess arising from its own life-style - the creation of economies dependent on an abundance of non-re newable energy, which is limited in supply - to pass on costs and risks of serious harm to others who will obtain no corresponding benefits. The "solution” may enable the avoidance of some uncomfortable changes in the lifetime of those now living and their immediate descendants, just as the consigner's action avoids uncomfortable changes for him and those in his immediate surroundings, but at the expense of passing heavy burdens to other uninvolved parties whose opportunity to lead decent lives may be seriously jeopardised. If we apply to the nuclear situation the standards of behaviour and moral principles generally acknowledged (in principle, if not so often in fact) in the contemporary world, it is not easy to avoid the conclusion that nuclear development involves injustice with respect to the future on a grand scale. There appear to be only two plausible ways of trying to avoid such a conclusion. First, it might be argued that the moral principles and obligations which we acknowledge for the contemporary world and perhaps the immediate future do not apply to those in the non-immediate future. Secondly, an attempt might be made to appeal to overriding circumstances; for to reject the consigner's action in the circumstances outlined is not to imply that there are no circumstances in which such an action might be justifiable. As in the case of the consigner of the package there is a need to consider what these justifying circumstances might be, and whether they apply in the present case. We consider these possible escape routes for the proponent of nuclear development in turn. II.OBLIGATIONS TO THE (DISTANT) FUTURE. A The especially problematic area is that of the distant (i.e. non-immediate) future, the future with which people alive today will have no direct contact; by comparison, the immediate future gives fewer problems for most ethical theories. In fact the question of obligations to future people presents tests which a number of ethical theories fail to pass, and also has serious repercussions in political philosophy as regards the adequacy of accepted (democratic and other) institutions which do not take due account of the interests of future creatures. 5. Moral philosophers have, predictably, differed on questions of obligations to distant future creatures. A good many of the philosophers who have explicitly considered the question have come down in favour of the same consideration being given to the rights and interests of future people as to those of contemporary or immediately future people. Others fall into three categories: those who acknowledge obligations to the future but who do not take them seriously or who assign them a lesser weight, those who deny, or who are committed by their general moral position to denying, that there are moral obligations beyond the immediate future, and those who come down, with admirable philosophical caution, on both sides of the issue, but with the weight of the argument favouring the view underlying prevailing economic and political institutions, that there are no moral obligations to the future beyond those perhaps to the next generation. According to the most extreme of these positions against moral obligations to the future, our behaviour with respect to the future is morally unconstrained', there are no moral restrictions on acting or failing to act deriving effect of our actions on future people. from the Of those philosophers who say, or whose views imply that we do not have obligations to the (non-immediate) future, many have based this view on accounts of moral obligation which are built on relations which presuppose some degree of temporal or spatial contiguity. Thus, moral obligation is seen as presupposing various relations which could not hold between people widely separated in time (or sometimes in space). Let us call the position that we have no obligations to (distant) future people the No­ constraints position. Among suggested bases or grounds of moral obligation for the position, which would rule out obligations to the non-immediate future, are these. Firstly, there are those accounts which require that someone to whom a moral obligation is held be able to claim his rights or entitlement. People in the distant future will not be able to claim rights and entitlements against us, and of course they can do nothing to enforce any claims they might have against us. Secondly, there are those accounts which base moral obligations on social or legal convention, for example a convention which would require punishment of offenders or at least some kind of social enforcement. But plainly these and other conventions will not be invariant over change in society and amendment of legal conventions; hence they will not be invariant over time. Also future people have no way of enforcing their interests or punishing offending predecessors. 6. The No-constraints view is a very difficult one to sustain. Consider, for example, a scientific group which, for no particular reason other than to test a particular piece of technology, places in orbit a cobalt bomb set off by a triggering device designed to go off several hundred years from the time of its despatch. No presently living person and none of their immediate descendants would be affected, but the population of the earth in the distant future would be wiped out as a direct and predictable result of the action. The no-constraints position clearly implies that this is an acceptable moral enterprise, that whatever else we might legitimately criticize in the scientists’ experiment (perhaps its being over-expensive or badly designed) we cannot lodge a moral protest about the damage it will do to future people. The no-constraints position also endorses as morally acceptable the following sorts of policy:- A firm discovers it can make a handsome profit from mining, processing and manufacturing a new type of material which, although it causes no problem for present people or their immediate descendants, will over a period of hundreds of years decay into a substance which will cause an enormous epidemic of cancer among the inhabitants of the earth at that time. According to the no-constraints view the firm is free to act in its own interests, without any consideration for the harm it does remote future people. Such counterexamples to the No-constraints position, which are easily varied and multiplied, might seem childlishly obvious. Yet this view is far from being a straw man; not only have several philosophers endorsed this position, but it is a clear implication of many currently popular views of the basis of moral obligation, as well as of prevailing economic theory. It seems that those who opt for the No-constraints position have not considered such examples, despite their being clearly implied by their position. We suspect that (we certainly hope that) when it is brought out that their position admits such counterexamples, that without any constraints we are free to cause pointless harm for example, most of those who opted for this position would want to assert that it was not what they intended. What many of those who have put forward the No-constraints position seem to have had in mind (in denying moral obligation) is rather that future people can look after themselves, that we are not responsible for their lives. The popular view that the future can take care of itself also seems to assume a future causally independent of the present. But it is not. It is not as if, in the counterexample cases or in the nuclear case, the future is simply being left alone to take care of itself. Present people are influencing it, and in doing so thereby acquire many of the same sorts of moral responsibilities as they do in causally affecting the present and immediate future, most notably the obligation to take account in 7. what they do of people affected and their interests, to be careful in their actions, to take account of the genuine probability of their actions causing harm, and to see that they do not act so as to rob future people, of the chance of a good life. Furthermore, to say that we are not resposible for the lives of future people does not amount to the same thing as saying that we are free to do as we like with respect to them. In just the same way, the fact that one does not have or has not acquired an obligation to some stranger with whom one has never been involved does not imply that one is free to do what one likes with respect to him, for example to rob him or to seriously harm him when this could be avoided. These difficulties for the No-constraints position result in part because of a failure to make an important distinction. Some of our obligations to others arise because we have voluntarily entered into some agreement with them - for example, we have made a promise. Other obligations, however, such as our duty not to damage or harm someone, do not assume that an agreement has been struck between us. former kind acquired obligations Let us call obligations of the and those of the latter unacquired obligations. There is a considerable difference in the type of responsibility associated with each. In the case of acquired obligations responsibility arises because one should do something which one can fail to do, e.g. keep a promise. In the case of unacquired duties responsibility arises as a result of being a causal agent who is aware of the consequences or consequences of his action, a responsibility that is not dependent on one’s having performed some act in the past (e.g., made a promise). Our obligations to future people clearly are of unacquired, not acquired obligations, a fact the No-constraints position simply fails to take into account. These obligations arise as a result of our ability to produce causal effects of a reasonably predictable nature, whether on our contemporaries or on those in the distant future. Thus, to return to the train parable, the consigner cannot argue in justification of his action that he has, for example, never assumed or acquired responsibility for the passengers, that he does not know them and therefore has no love or sympathy for them and that they are not part of his moral community; in short, that he has acquired no obligation, and has no special obligations to help them. All that 8. one needs to argue concerning the train, and in the nuclear case, is that there z are moral obligations against imposing harm for instance which are not specially o thQ distant acquired. Nor can this claim be rebutted by the pretence ure involve heroic self sacrifice, something ’’above and beyond” what is normally required. One is no more engaging in heroic self sacrifice by not forcing future people into an unviable life position or by refraining from causing them direct harm than the consigner is resorting to heroic self sacrifice in refraining from shipping the dangerous package on the train. III. ATTEMPTS TO REDUCE OBLIGATIONS TO THE FUTURE. In evading these difficulties the No—constraints position may be qualified rather than wholly abandoned. According to the Qualified position we are not entirely unconstrained There are obligations, even to distant future with respect to the distant future. people, but these are not so important as those to the present, and the interests of distant future people cannot weigh very much in the scale against those of the present and immediate future. The interests of future people then, except in unusual cases, count for very much less than the interests of present people. Hence such things as nuclear development and various exploitative activities which benefit present people should proceed, even if people of the distant future are (somewhat) disadvantaged by them. The Qualified position appears to be widely held and is implicit in prevailing economic theories, where the position of a decrease in weight of future costs and benefits (and so of future interests) is obtained by application over time of a discount rate, so discounting costs and risks to future people. The attempt to apply economics as a moral theory, something that is becoming increasingly common, can lead thei to the Qualified position. What is objectionable in such an approach is that economics must operate within the bounds of acknowledged non-acquired moral constraints, just as in practice it operates within legal constraints. What economics cannot legitimately do is determine what these constraints are. There are, moreover, alternative economic theories and simply to adopt, without further ado, one which discounts the future, giving much less importance to the interests of future people, is to beg all the questions at issue. Among the arguments that economists offer for generally discounting the future, the most threadbare is based on the Rosy-future assumption, that future generations will be better off than present ones (and so better placed to handle the waste problem). generations may well not Since there is mounting evidence that future be better off then present ones, especially in things that matter, no argument for discounting the interests of future generations on this basis can carry much weight. For the waste problem to be handed 9. to the future generations, it would have to be shown, what recent economic progress hardly justifies, that future generations will be not just better off but so much better off that they can (easily) carry and control the nuclear freight. A more plausible argument for discounting, the Opportunity-cost argument, ^builds directly on the notion of opportunity cost. It is argued from the fact that a dollar gained now is worth much more than a dollar received in the nonimmediate future (because the first dollar could meanwhile be invested at compound interest), that discounting is required to obtain equivalent monetary values. This same line of reasoning is then applied to the allocation of resources. Thus, compensation - which is what the waste problem is taken to come _ to economically - costs much less now than later, e.g. a few pennies set aside /(e.g. in a trust fund) in the future, if need be, will suffice to compensate eventually for any victims of remote radioactive waste leakage. beset this approach. Two problems First, there are, presently at least, insurmountable practical difficulties about applying such discounting. how to determine appropriate future discount rates. that the argument depends on a false assumption. We simply do not know A more serious objection is It is not true that value, or damages, can always be converted into monetary equivalents. There is no clear ’’monetary compensation" for a variety of damages, including cancer, loss of life, a lost species. The discounting theme, however argued for, is inadequate, because it leads back in practice to the No-constraints position. discounting imposes an ” economic horizon" The reason is that beyond which nothing need be considered, since any costs or benefit which might arise are, when discounted back to the present, negligible. A different argument for the Qualified position, the Probabilities argument, avoids the objections from cases of certain damage through appeal to probability considerations. The distant future, it is argued, is much more uncertain than the present and immediate future, so that probabilities are consequently lower, perhaps even approaching or coinciding with zero for any hypothesis concerning the distant future. Thus, the argument continues, the interests of future people must (apart from exceptional cases where there is an unusually high degree of certainty) count for (very much) less than those of present and neighbouring people where (much) higher probabilities are attached. So in the case of conflict between the present and the future, where it is a question of weighing certain benefits to the people of the present and the immediate future against a much lower probability of indeterminate costs to an indeterminate number of iisfcsrs”'.... . • 10. distant future people, the issue would normally be decided in favour of the present assuming anything like similar costs and benefits were involved. is however The argument Firstly, probabilities involving distant badly flawed. future situations are not always less than those concerning the immediate future in the way the argument supposes. problems often Moreover the outcomes of some moral do not depend on a high level of probability. In many cases it is enough, as the train parable reveals, that a significant risk is created; such cases do not depend critically on high probability assignments. Nor, /of course, VitTcar) be assumed that anything like similarly weighted costs and benefits are involved in the nuclear case, especially if it is a question of risking poisoning some of the earth for half a million or so years, with consequent risk of serious harm to thousands of generations of future people, i»n e>rd^f -Lt? 'fc-C I in the shape of the opportunity to continue (unnecessarily) high energy use. z the costs and benefits were comparable or evenly weighted, such And even, if an argument would be defective, since an analogous argument would show that the consigner’s action in the train parable, is acceptable provided the benefit (e.g. the profit the company stood to gain from imposing significant risks on other people) was sufficiently large. Such a cost-benefit approach to moral and decision problems, with or is quite inadequate when different parties without the probability frills, are involved or when cases of conflict of interest involving moral obligations are at issue. permissible 5 For example, such a cost-benefit approach would imply that it is for a company to injure, or very likely injure, some innocent party provided only that the company stands to make a sufficiently large gain from it, that costs to some group are more than larger benefits to another group. transferred in any morally compensated for by But costs or benefits are not legitimately simple way from one group to another. The often appealed to maxim "If you (or your group) want the benefits you have to accept the costs" is one thing, but the maxim "If I (or my group) want the benefits then you have to accept the costs (or some of them at least)" is another and very different thing. It is a widely accepted moral principle that one is not, in general, entitled to simply transfer costs of a significant kind arising from an activity which benefits oneself onto other parties who are not involved in the activity and are not beneficiaries.This Transfer-limiting principle is especially clear in cases of which a thalidomide manufacturing and marketing company is one, where the significant costs include an effect on life or health or a risk thereof, and where the benefit to the benefitting party is of a noncrucial or dispensible nature. The principle is of fundamental importance in the nuclear debate, and appears again and again : it applies not merely to the waste problem but as regards several other liabilities of nuclear development, e.g. the risk of nuclear war, the matter / 9 'of reactor meltdown. In particular, the principle invalidates the comparison, heavily relied on in building a case for the acceptability of the nuclear risks, between nuclear risks and those from such activities as airplane travel or cigarette smoking. In the latter case those who supposedly benefit from the activity are also, to an overwhelming extent, those who bear the serious health costs and risks involved. In contrast the users and supposed beneficiearies of nuclear energy will be risking not only, or even primarily, their own lives and health, but also that of others who may not be beneficiaries at all who may be just the opposite! More generally, the distribution of costs and damage in such a fashion, i.e. on to non-beneficiaries, is a characteristic of certain serious forms of pollution, and is among its morally objectionable features. / j Large-scale energy y»ss// /production, from nuclear or foe-itc fuel sources, can cause or lead to serious !pollution. Thus from the Transfer-limiting t>fe principle emerges an important necessary condition for energy options: To be morally acceptable k -era, OE£12^ should not involve the transfer of s.igif leant costs or risks of harm onto parties who are not involved, who do not use or do not benefit correspondingly from the energy source. Included in the scope of 12. this condition, which nuclear development violates , are future people, i.e. not merely people living at the present time but also future generations (those Principle, that we should not hand the world we have so exploited on to our successors in substantially worse shape than we ’'received” it. For if we did then that would be a significant transfer of costs. The Transfer-limiting principle can be derived from certain ethical theories (e.g. those of a deontic cast such as Kant's and Ra and from common precepts (such as the Golden Rule), where one seriously considers putting oneself in another’s position. But the principle is perhaps best defended, on a broader basis, inductively, by way of examples. embroider the train parable, the company town decides to Suppose, to solve its disposal problem by shipping its noxious waste to another town down the line, which (like future towns) lacks the means to ship it back or to register due protest. The inhabitants of this town are then forced to face the problem either of undertaking the expensive and difficult disposal process or of sus­ taining risks to their own lives and health. Most of us would regard this kind of transfer of costs as morally unacceptable, however much the consigner’s company town flourishes. / /IV. c UNCERTAINTY AND INDETERMINACY ARGUMENTS FOR REDUCED RESPONSIBILITY. 7 /Many of the arguments designed to show that we cannot be ed to take too much account of the effects of our actions on the distant future appeal to uncertain/y. There are two main components to the argument, capable of separation, but frequently tangled up. Both arguments are mistaken, the first, an argument from ignorance, on a priori second on a posteriori grounds. follows:- grounds, the The Argument from ignorance concerned runs as In contrast to the exact information we can obtain about the present, the information we can obtain about the effects of our actions on the distant future is unreliable, woolly and highly speculative. But we cannot base assessments of how we should act on information of this kind, especially when accurate information is obtainable about the present which would indicate Therefore we must regretfully ignore the different action. our actions on the distant future. ignorance uncertain effects of A striking example of the argument from at work is afforded by official US analyses favouring nuclear development, which ignore (the extensive) costs of waste control on the 7 grounds of uncertainty. the argument concerned is this: More formally and crudely (%)£/only has obligations to the future if these obligations are based on reliable information. distant future. There is no reliable information at present as regards the Therefore one has no obligations to the distant future. This argument is essentially a variant on a sceptical argument concerning * our knowledge of the future (formally, replace ’obligations in the crude statement of the argument above). by ’knowledge’ The main ploy is to considerably overestimate and overstate the degree of certainty available with respect to the present and immediate future, and the degree of certainty which is required as the basis for moral consideration both with respect to the present and with respect to the future. Associated with this is the attempt to suggest a sharp division as regards certainty between the present and immediate future on the one hand and the distant future on the other. We shall not find, we suggest, that there is any such sharp or simple division between the distant future and the adjacent future and the present, at least with respect to those things in the present which are normally subject to moral constraints. We can and constantly , such do act on the basis of^"unreliable" information, which the sceptic as regards the future conveniently labels "uncertainty". In moral situations in the present, assessments of what to do often take account of risk and probability, even quite low probabilities. Consider again the train parable. We do not need to know for certain that the container will break and the lethal gas escape. In fact it does not even have to be probable, in the relevant sense of more probable than not, in order for us to condemn the consigner’s action. that there is a significant risk of harm It is enough in this sort of case. It does not matter if the decreased well-being of the consigner is certain and that the 14. prospects of the passengers quite uncertain. It is wrong to ship the gas. But if we do not require certainty of action to apply moral constraints in contemporary affairs, why should we require a much higher standard of certainty in the future? The unwarranted insistence on certainty as a necessary condition before moral consideration can be given to the distant future, then, amounts to a flagrant double standard. According to the second argument, the Practical-uncertainty argument, even if in theory we have obligations to the future, we cannot in practice take the interests of future people into account because uncertainty about the distant future is so gross that we cannot determine what the likely consequences of actions on it will be. Therefore, however good our intentions to the people of the distant future are, in practice we have no choice but to ignore their interests. Given that moral principles are characteristically of universal implicational form, e.g. of forms such as "if x has character then x is wrong, for every (action) sharply thus: x", h the argument may be stated more We can never obtain the information about future actions which would enable us to detach the antecedent of the implication. Therefore, even if in theory moral principles do extend to future people, in practice they cannot be applied to obtain clear conclusions. It is true that if the distant future really were so grossly uncertain . that in every case it was impossible to determine in any way better than chance what the effects of present action would be, and whether any given action would help or hinder future people, then moral principles, although applicable in theory to the future, would not in practice yield any clear conclusions about how to act. In this event the distant future would impose no practical moral constraints on action. However, the argument is factually incorrect in assuming that the future always is so grossly uncertain or indeterminate. Admittedly there is often a high degree of uncertainty concerning the distant future, but as a matter of (contingent) fact it is not always so gross or sweeping as the argument has to assume. There are some areas where uncertainty is 15. not so great as to exclude constraints on action. For example, we may have little idea what the fashions will be in a hundred years or, to take another morally^irrelevant^factor, what brands of ice cream people will be eating, if any, but we do have excellent reason to believe, especially if we consider 3000 years of history, that what people there are in a hundred years are likely to have material and psychic needs not entirely unlike our own, that they will need a healthy biosphere for a good life; that like us they will not be immune to radiation; that their welfare will not be enhanced by a high incidence of ^cancer genetic defects, by the destruction of resources, or the elimination from the face of the earth of that wonderful variety of non-human life which at present makes it such a rich and interesting place. The case of nuclear waste storage, and of uncertainty of the effects of it on future people, is one area where uncertainty in morally relevant respects is not so great as to preclude moral constraints on action. For this sort of reason, the practical uncertainty argument should be rejected. Through the defects of the preceding arguments, we can see the defects in a number of widely employed uncertainty arguments used to write off probably harm to future people as outside the scope of proper consideration. Most of these popular moves employ both of the uncertainty arguments as suits the case, switching from one to the other. For example, we may be told that we cannot really take account of future people because we cannot be sure that they will exist or that their tastes and wants will not be completely different from our own, to the point where they will not suffer from our exhaustion of resources or from the things that would affect us. But this is to insist upon complete certainty of a sort beyond what is required for the present and immediate future, where there is also commonly no guarantee that some disaster will not overtake those to whom we are morally committed. Again we may be told that there is no guarantee that future people will be worthy of any efforts on our part, because they may be morons of forever plugged into enjoyment of other machines. Even if one is prepared to accept the elitist approach presupposed - according to which only those who meet certain properly civilized or intellectual standards are eligible for moral consideration - what we are being handed in such arguments 16. is again a mere outside possibility. Neither the contemporary nor the historical situation gives any positive reason for supposing that a lapse into universal moronity or universal-pleasure-machine escapism is a serious possibility. We can contrast with these mere logical possibilities the very real historically supportable risks of escape of nuclear waste or decline of a civilisation through destruction of its resource base. Closely related to uncertainty arguments are arguments premissed on the indeterminacy of the future. For example, according to the Indeterminacy argument, the indeterminacy of the number and exact character of people at future times will prevent the interest of future people being taken into account where there is a conflict with the present. Since their numbers are indeterminate and their interests unknown how, it is asked, can we weigh their competing claims against those of the present and immediate future, where this information is available in a more or less accurate form? The question is raised particularly by problems of sharing fixed quantities of resources among present and future people, for example oil, when the numbers of the latter are indeterminate. Such problems are indeed difficult, but they are not resolved by ignoring the claims of the future. Nor are distributional problems involving non-renewable resources as large and representative a class of moral problems concerning the future as the tendency to focus on them would suggest. It can be freely admitted, that there will be cases where the indeterminacy of aspects of the future will make conflicts very difficult to resolve or indeed irresoluble - no realistic ethical theory can give a precise answer to every ethical question. But, as the train parable again illustrates, /there are cases where such difficulties do not hinder resolution, and .anci cases of conflict which are not properly approached by weighing numbers, numbers of interests, or whatever, cases for which one needs to know only the most general probable characteristics of future people. The case of nuclear power is like that. The failure of these various arguments reveals, what c^e^| ^^^men^does nc argued from the universalisability features of moral principles, that/ disqualify future people from full moral consideration or reduce their claims below the claims of present people. That is, we have the same general obligations to future people as to the present; thus there is the same obligation to take account of them and their interests in what we do, to be careful in our actions, to take account of the probability (and not just the certainty) of our actions causing harm or damage, and to see, other things being equal, that we do not act so as to rob them of what is necessary for the chance of a good life. Uncertainty and indeterminacy do not relieve us of these obligations. V. PROBLEMS OF SAFE NUCLEAR OPERATION : REACTOR EMISSIONS AND CORE MELTDOWN. The ethical problems with nuclear power are by no means confined to waste storage and future creatures. entitlement Just as remoteness in time does not erode obligations or to just treatment, neither does location in space, or a particular and arguments like those already arrived at in considering the waste problem ^apply. For example, if one group (social uriit^ or state) decides to dump its radioactive wastes in the territory or region of another group, or not to prevent its (radioactive) pollution entering the territory of another group, then it imposes risks and costs on presently existing people of the second group, in much the way that present nuclear developments impose costs and risks on future people. There are differences however : spatially distant people cannot be discounted in quite the way that future people can be, though their interests and objectives can be ignored or overridden. People living in the vicinity of a nuclear reactor are subject to special costs and risks. One is radioactive pollution, because reactors routinely discharj radioactive materials into the air and Emission problem. water near the plant : hence the Such ’’normal" emission during plant operation of low level radiation carries carcinogenic and mutagenic costs. While there are undoubtedly costs, the number of cancers and the precise extent of genetic damage induced by exposure to such radiation are both uncertain. If our permitted free transfer of costs and risks from one person to another, the ethical issue directly raised by nuclear emissions would be : what extent of 18. cancer and genetic damage, if any, is permissibly traded for the advantages of nuclear power, and under what conditions? Since, however, risks and benefits are NOT (morally) transferable this way - recall the Transfer-limiting I principle - such a cost-benefit approach to the risks nuclear emission poses for those who live near a reactor cannot with justice be approached in this fashio, these risks are In the USA, people who live within 50 miles oMmclear real! power plant bear a risk of cancer and genetic damage of as much as 50 times that borne by the population at large. And children living in this region are even more vulnerable, since they and several times more likely to contract cancer through exposure than normal adults. The serious costs to these people cannot be J us tit led by the alleged benefits for others, expecially when these benefits could be obtained without these costs. a pity about Thus it is not just complacent to say 'It’s Aunt Ethel dying of cancer, but the new make life comfortable’. airconditioners For such benefits to some as airconditioners provide, which can be alternatively obtained, for example by modification of buildings, can in no way compensate for what others suffer. Among the other strategies used in trying to persuade us that the imposition of radiation on minorities - most of whom have no genuine voice in the. location of reactors in their environment and cannot move away without serious losses - is really quite alright is the Doubling argument. Accord to the US Atomic Energy Commission, who deployed this trick, it is permissable to double, through nuclear technology, the level of (natural) radiation that a population have received with apparently negligible consequences, the argument being that the additional amount (being equivalent to the "natural” level) is also likely to have negligible consequences. The increased amounts of radiation - with their large man-made component - are then accounted normal, and, it is claimed, what is normal is morally acceptable. in this argument is sound. None of the steps Drinking one bottle of wine a day may have no ill-effects, whereas drinking two a day certainly may affect a person’s well-being; and while the smaller intake may have become normal for the person, the larger one will, under such conditions, not be. Finally, what is or has become normal, 19. e.g. two murders or twenty cancers a day in a given city, may be far from acceptable. In fact, even the USA, which has very strict standards by comparison with most other countries with planned nuclear reactors, permits radiation emissions very substantially in excess of the standards laid down; so the emission situation is much worse than what consideration of the standards would disclose. Furthermore, the monitoring of the standards ’’imposed'’ is entrusted to the nuclear operators themselves, scarcely disinterested parties. Thus public policy is determined not so as to guarantee public health, but rather to serve as a public pacifier” while publicly-subsidized private nuclear operations proceed relatively unhampered? While radioactive emissions are an ordinary feature of reactor operation, reactor breakdown is, hopefully, not: official reports even try to make an accident of magnitude, as a matter of definition, an ’extraordinary nuclear occurrence . But "definitions” notwithstanding, such accidents can happen, and almost have on several occasions (the most notorious being Three Mile Island): hence the Core-meltdown problem. If the cooling and emergency core cooling systems fail in American (light water) reactors, then the core melts and ’containment failure’ is likely, the result that an area of 40,000 square miles could be radioactively 10 contaminated. In the event of the worst type of accident in a very small reactor, a steam explosion in the reactor vessel, about 45,000 people would be killed instantly and at least 100,000 would die as a result of the accident, property damages would exceed $17 billion and an area the size of Pennsylvania would be destroyed. Modern nuclear reactors are about five times the size of the reactor for which these conservative US (still the best available from official sources) are given : the consequences of a similar accident with a modern reactor would accordingly be much greater. The consigner who risks the lives and well-being of passengers on the O ^train acts in^admissibly. A government or government-endorsed utility appears to act in a way that does not differ in morally significant respects in 20. siting a nuclear reactor in a community, in planting such a dangerous package on the ’’community train”. More directly, the location of a nuclear reactor in a community, even if it should happen to receive a favourable benefit-cost as the Transfer-limiting principle. The advocates of nuclear power have, in effect, endeavoured to avoid questions of cost-transfer and equity, by shifting the dispute out of the extraordinary reactor malfunction. They have argued, in particular, what contrasts with the train parable, that there is no real possibility of a catastrophic nuclear accident. Indeed in the influential Rassmussen report - which was extensively used to support public confidence in US nuclear fission technology - an even stronger, an incredibly strong, improbability claim was stated: namely, the likelihood of a catastrophic nuclear accident is so remote as to be (almost) impossible. However, the mathematical models relied upon in this report, variously called "fault tree analysis” and "reliability estimating techniques", are unsound, because, among other things, they exclude as "not credible" possibilities that may well happen in the real world. that the It is not surprising, then i methodology and data of the report have been soundly and decisively criticised, or that official support for the report has now been withdrawn. 12 Moreover, use of alternative methods and data indicates that there is a real possibility, a non-negligible probability of a serious accident. In response it is contended that, even if there is a non-negligible probability of a reactor accident, still that is acceptable, being of no greater order than risks of accidents that are already socially accepted. Here we encounter again that insidious engineering approach to morality built into decision models of an economic cast, e.g. benefit-cost balance sheets, risk­ assessment models, etc. Risk assessment, a sophistication of transaction or trade-off models, purports to provide a comparison between the relative risks attached to different options, e.g. energy otpions, which settles their 21. ethical status. The following assumptions are encountered in risk assessment as applied to energy options: Ai. If option a imposes (comparable) costs on fewer people than option b then option a is preferable to option Aii. b ; Option a involves a total net cost in terms of cost to people (e.g. deaths, injuries, etc.) which is less than that of option b, which is alreay^ accepted; therefore option a is acceptable. 3 These assumptions are then applied as follows. be killed Since the number likely to eventuall by nuclear power station catastrophe is less than the likely number killed by cigarette smoking, and since the risks of cigarette smoking are accepted; it follows that the risks of huclear power are acceptable. A little reflection reveals that this sort of risk assessment argument grossly violates the Transfer­ limiting principle. In order to obtain a proper ethical assessment we need a much fuller picture, and we need to know at least these things:- costs and benefits go to the same parties; Do the and is the person who voluntarily the risks also the person who primarily receives the benefits, as in undertakes driving or cigarette smoking, or are the costs imposed not benefit? on other parties who do It is only if the parties are the same in the case of the options compared, and there are no such distributional problems, a basis would be soundly based. that a comparison on such This is rarely the case, and it is not so in the case of risk assessments of energy options. VI. OTHER SOCIAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL RISKS AND COSTS OF NUCLEAR DEVELOPMENT, ESPECIALLY NUCLEAR WAR. The problems already discussed by no means exhaust the environmental, health and safety risks and costs in, or arising from, the nuclear fuel cycle. The full fuel cycle includes many stages both before and after reactor operation, apart from waste disposal, namely^ mining, milling, conversion, enrichment and preparation, reprocessing spent fuel, and transportation of materials. Several of these stages involve hazards. risks in the nuclear cycle Unlike the special - of sabotage of plants, of theft of fissionable material, and of the further proliferation of nuclear armaments - these hazards 22. have parallels, if not exact equivalents, in other highly polluting methods of generating power, e.g. ’workers in the uranium mining industry sustain ’’the same u 14 risk" of fatal and nonfatal injury as workers in the coal industry’. The problems are not really produced by nuclear development. Other social and environmental problems endemic where dangerous large-scale industry operates in societies that are highly inegalitarian and include sectors that are far from affluent - are more intimately linked with the J nuclear power cycle. Though pollution is a common and generally undesirable component of large-scale industrial operation, radioactive pollution ,such as uranium mining for instance produces, is especially a legacy of nuclear development, and a specially undesirable one, as rectification costs for dead radioactive lands and waterways reveal. Though sabotage is a threat to many large industries, sabotage of a nuclear reactor can have dire consequences, of a different order of magnitude from most industrial sabotage (where core meltdown is not a possibility). Though theft of material from more dubious enterprises such as munitions works can pose threats to populations at large and can assist terrorism, no thefts for allegedly peaceful enterprises pose problems of the same order as theft of fissionable material. No other industry produces materials which so readily permit fabrication into such massive explosives. No other industry is, to sum it up, so vulnerable on so many fronts. In part to reduce its vulnerability, in part because of its long and continuing association with military activities, the nuclear industry is subject to, and encourages, several practices which (given their scale) run counter to basic features of free and open societies, crucial features such as personal These practices include secrecy, restriction of information, formation of special police and guard forces, espionage, curtailment of civil liberties. Already operators of nuclear installations are given extraordinary powers, in vetting employees, to investigate the background and activities not only of employees but also of their families and sometimes even of their friends. The installations themselves become armed camps, which especially offends British sensibilities. The U.K. Atomic Energy (Special Constables) Act of 1976 created a special armed force to guard nuclear installations and- made it answerable ... to the U.K. Atomic Energy Authority. ..iwu- 23. These developments, and worse ones in West Germany and elsewhere,presage along with nuclear development increasingly authoritarian and anti-democratic societies. That nuclear development appears to force such political <— i ' (consequences tells heavily against it. Nuclear development is further indicated politically by the direct connection of nuclear power with nuclear war. It is true that ethical questions concerning nuclear war - for example, whether a nuclear war is justified, or just, under any circumstances, and if so what circumstances - are distinguishable from those concerning nuclear power. Undoubtedly, however, the spread of nuclear power is substantially increasing the technical means for engaging in nuclear war and so, to that extent, the opportunity for, and chances of, nuclear engagement. \ /jL Since nuclear wars are /nevei/ accountable- positive goods, but are at best the lesser of major evils, nuclear wars are always highly ethically undesirable. The spread of nuclear power accordingly expands the opportunity for, and chances of, highly undesirable consequences. 0^!/\ Finally the latter, so increasing these chances and opportunities, is itself undesirable, and therefore what le^jtds to it, nuclear development^ is undesirable. This is, in outline, the argument from nuclear wa£ against large-scale nuclear development. VII. CONFLICT ARGUMENTS, AND BEGINNING ON NUCLEAR DEVELOPMENT. UNCOVERING THE IDEOLOGICAL BASES OF Much as with nuclear war, so given the cumulative case against nuclear development, only one justificatory that of appeal to overriding circumstances. route remains open, That appeal, to be ethically acceptable, must go beyond merely economic considerations. For, as observed, the consigner’s action, in the train parable, cannot be justified by purely I ^conomistic arguments, such as that his profits would rise, the company or the town would be more prosperous, or by appealing to the fact that some possibly uncomfortable changes would otherwise be needed. case: a Transfer-limiting principle applies. So it is also in the nuclear But suppose now the consigner argues that his action is justified because unless it is taken the town will die. It is 24. by no means clear that even such a justification as this would be sufficient, especially where the risk to the passengers is high, since the case still /amount s^one of transfer of costs and risks onto others. But such a conflict situation, where a given course of action, though normally undesirable, is alleged to be the lesser of two evils in a given case, is morally more problemthan cases atical/frhere Transfer-limiting principle is clearly violated. Nuclear develop­ ment is often defended in this way, through Conflict arguments, to the effect that even though nuclear development does have undesirable features, nevertheless the alternatives are worse. Some of the arguments advanced to demonstrate conflict are based on competing commitments to present people, and others on competing obligations to future people, both of which are taken to override the obligations not to impose on the future significant risk of serious harm. The success of such /conflict arguments require^the presentation of a genuine and exhaustive set of alternatives (or at least practical alternatives) and showing that the only alternatives to admittedly morally undesirable actions are even more undesirable ones. If some practical alternative which is not morally worse than the action to be justified is overlooked, suppressed, or neglected in the argument (for example, if in the train parable it turns out that the town has another option to starving or to shipping the parcel, namely earning a living in some other way), then the argument is defective and cannot readily be patched. Just such a suppression of practicable alternatives, we shall argue, has occurred in the argument designed to show that the alternatives to the nuclear option are even worse than the option itself. A first argument, the Poverty argument, is that there is an overriding obligation to the poor, both the poor of the third world and the poor of indus­ trialised countries. Failure to develop nuclear energy, it is often claimed, would amount to denying them the opportunity to reach the standard of affluence we currently enjoy and would create unemployment and poverty in the industrialisec nations. And this would be worse - a greater evil - than such things as violating the Transfer-limiting principle through nuclear development. The Poverty argument does not stand up to examination, either for the poor of the industrial countries or for those of the. third world. There is good evidence that large-scale nuclear energy will help increase unemployment and poverty in the industrial world, through the diversion of very much available capital into an industry which is not only an exceptionally poor provider of direct employment, but also tends to reduce available jobs through encouraging substitution of energy use for labour use. The argument that nuclear energy is needed for the third world is even less convincing. Nuclear energy is both politically and economically inappropriate for the third world, since it requires massive amounts of capital, requires numbers of imported scientists and engineers, 25. WT creates negligible local employment, and depends for its feasibility upon largely non-existent utility systems - e.g. established electricity transmission systems and back-up facilities, and sufficient electrical appliances to plug into the system. Politically it increases foreign dependence, adds to centralised entrenched power and reduces the chance for change in the oppressive political structures which are a large part of the problem. The fact that nuclear energy is not in the interests of the people of the third world does not of course mean that it is not in the interests of, and wanted (often for military purposes) by, their rulers, the westernised and often military elites in whose interests the economies of these countries are usually organised. than what it is: But that does not make the poverty argument anything other a fraud. There are well-known energy-conserving alternatives and the practical option of developing further alternative energy sources, alternatives some of which offer far better prospects for helping the poor, both in the third world and in industrial countries: coal and other fossil fuels, geothermal, and a range of solar options (including as well as narrowly solar sources, wind, water and tidal power). Another major argument advanced to show conflict, the Lights-goingout argument, pppeals to a set of supposedly overriding and competing obligations to future people. We have, it is said, a duty to pass on the immensely valuable things and institutions which our culture has developed. Unless our high-technology, high-energy industrial society is continued and fostered, our valuable institutions and traditions will fall into decay or be swept away. The argument is essentially that without nuclear power, without the continued level of material wealth it alone is assumed to make possible, the lights of our civilization will go out. Future people will be the losers. The argument does raise important questions about what is valuable in But for our society and what characteristics are necessary for a good society. the most part these large questions can be by-passed. The reason is that the argument adopts an extremely uncritical attitude to present high-technology societies, apparently assuming that they are uniformly and uniquely valuable. $I I it assuine</ that technological society is unmodifiable, that^cannot be changed in ' the direction of energy conservation or alternative (perhaps high technology) energy sources without collapse. These assumptions are all hard to accept. The assumption that technological society’s energy patterns are unmodifiable is especially so; after all, it has survived events such as world wars which required major social and technological restructuring and consumption modification. If western society’s demands for energy were (contrary to the evidence) totally unmodifiable without collapse, not only would it be committed to a program of increasing destruction, but much of its culture would be of dubious value to 26. future people, who would very likely, as a consequence of this destruction, lack the resource base which the argument assumes to be essential in the case of contemporary society. The uniformity assumption should certainly be challenged. Since high- technology societies appear not to be uniformly valuable, the central question is, what is necessary to maintain what is valuable in such a society? While it may be easy to argue that high energy consumption centrally controlled is necessary to maintain the political and economic status quo of such a society, it is not so easy to argue that it is essential to maintain what is valuable, and it is what is valuable, presumably that we have a duty to pass on to the future. The evidence from history is that no very high level of material affluence or energy consumption is needed to maintain what is valuable. There is good reason in fact to believe that a society with much lower energy and resource^ consumption would better foster what is valuable than our own. But even if a radical change in these directions is independently desirable, it is unnecessary to presuppose such a change in order to see that the assumptions of the Lights-going-out argument are wrong. The consumption of less energy than at present/ need involve no reduction of well-being; and certainly a large increase over present levels of consumption assumed trr the usual economic case for nuclear energy, is quite unnecessary. then What the nuclear strategy is really designed to do is not to prevent the lights going out in western civilisation, but to enable the lights to go on burning all the time - to maintain and even increase the wattage output of the Energy Extravaganza . In fact there is good reason to think that, far from the high energy consumption society fostering what is valuable, it will, especially if energy is obtained by means of nuclear fission, be positively inimical to it. A society which has become heavily dependent upon a^ highly centralised, controlled and garrisoned md expertise-intensive energy source, must be one which is highly susceptible to entrenchment of power, and one in which the forces which control this energy source, whether capitalist or bureaucratic, can exert enormous power over the political system and over people’s lives, even more then they do at present. Such a society would/' almost inevitably tend to become authoritatian and increasingly anti-democratic, as an outcome, among other things, of its response to the threat posed by dissident groups in the nuclear situation. Nuclear development may thus help in passing on to future generations some of the worst aspects of our society - the consumerism, alienation, destruction of nature, and latent authoritarianism - while many valuable aspects, such as the degree of political freedom and those opportunities for personal and collective autonomy which exist, would be lost or diminished: political freedom 27. for example, is a high price to pay for consumerism and and energy extravagence. Again, as in the case of the poverty arguments, clear alternatives, alternative social and political choices, which do not involve such unacceptable consequences, are available. The alternative to the high technology-nuclear option is not a return to the cave, the loss of all that is valuable, but either the adoption of an available alternative such as coal for power or, better, the development of alternative technologies and lifestyles which offer far greater scope for the maintenance and further development of what is valuable in our society than the highly centralised nuclear option. The Lights-going-out argument, as a moral conflict argument, accordingly fails. Thus the further escape route, the appeal to conflict, is, like the appeal to futurity, closed. If then we apply, as we have argued we should, the same standards of morality to the future as we ought to acknowledge for the present, the conclusion that large-scale nuclear development is a crime against the future is inevitable. Closed also, in the much same way, are the escape routes to other arguments (from reactor meltdown, radiation emissions, etc.) for concluding that nuclear development is unacceptable. Tn sum, nuclear development is morally unacceptable on several grounds. VIII. SOCIAL OPTIONS : SHALLOW AND DEEP ALTERNATIVES. The future energy option that is most often contrasted with nuclear power, namely coal power, while no doubt preferable to nuclear power, is hardly acceptable. For it carries with it the likelihood of serious (air) pollution, and associated phenomena such as acid rain and atmospheric heating, not to mention the despoliation caused by extensive strip mining, all of which will result from its use in meeting very Such an option would, moreover, also violate high projected consumption figures. the Transfer-limiting principle : for it would impose widespread costs on nonbeneficiaries for some concentrated benefits to some profit takers and to some users who do not pay the full costs of production and replacement. To these main conventional options a third is often added which emphasizes softer and more benign technologies, such as those of solar energy and hydroelectricity. Such softer options — if suitably combined with energy conservation measures (for there are solar ways, as well as nuclear ways, of energy extravagance and of producing unnecessary trivia which answer to no genuine needs) - can avoid the ethical objectives to nuclear power. choice is not however technological, The deeper nor merely^individual^ 1 bUL Social, and involves the restructuring of production away from energy intensive uses and, at a more basic level, a change to nonconsumeristic, less consumptive life­ styles and social arrangements’!:6 These more fundamental choices between social alternatives, conventional technologically-oriented discussion of energy options tends to obscure. It is not just a matter of deciding in which way to meet the unexamined goals nuclear development aspires to meet, but also a matter of examining the goals themselves. That is, we are not merely faced with the question of comparing different technologies for meeting some fixed or given demand or level of consumption, and of trying to see how best to meet these; we are also faced, and primarily, with the matter of examining those alleged needs and the cost of a society that creates them. It is doubtful that any technology, however benign in principle, will be likely to leave a tolerable world for the future if it is expected to meet unbounded and uncontrolled energy consumption and demands. Even more benign technologies may well be used in a way which creates costs for future people and ^are?which^ /them. ^likely to result in a deteriorated world being handed on to In short, even more benign technologies may le/id to violation of the Transmission JjteQu^-remen^• Consider, to illustrate, the effect on the world s forests, commonly counted as a solar resource, should they be extensively used for production of methanol or of electricity by woodchipping. While few would object to the use of genuine waste material for energy production, the unrestricted exploitation of forests - whether it goes under the name of ’’solar energy” or not - to meet ever increasing energy demands could well be the final indignity for the world’s already hard-pressed natural forests. The effects of such additional demands on the maintenance of the forests are often dismissed by the simple expedient of waving around the label "renewable resources”. Many forests are in principle renewable, it is a true, given a certain (low) rate and kind of exploitation, but in fact there are now very few forestry operations anywhere in the world where the forests are treated as completely renewable in the sense of the renewal of all their values, In many regions too the rate of exploitation which would enable renewal has already been exceeded, so that a total decline is widely thought to be imminent, It certainly has begun in many regions, and many forest types, especially rain17 ^/forest types^ are now, and rapidly, being lost for the future. The addition of y/a maj^r further and not readily limitable demand pressure for energy on top /of /the present demands is one which anyone with both a realistic appreciation of the conduct of forestry operations and a concern for the long-term conservation of the forests and remaining natural communities must regard with alarm. The result of massive deforestation for energy purposes, resembling the deforestation of much of Europe at the beginning of the Industrial Revolution, again for energy purposes, could be extensive and devastating erosion in steeper lands and tropical areas, desertification in more arid regions, possible climatic change, and massive impoverishment of natural ecosystems, including enormous loss of natural species. Some of us do not want to pass on, and by the Transmission principles we are not entitled to pass on, a deforested world to the future, any more than we want to pass on one poisoned by nuclear 29. products or polluted by coal products. illustrates, a mere switch to In short, as the forest situation more benign technologies - important though this is - without any more basic structural and social change,is inadequate. The deeper social option involves challenging and beginning to alter a social structure which promotes consumerism, consumption far beyond genuine needs and an economic structure which encourages increasing use of highly energy-intensi modes of production. The social change option tends to be obscured in most discussions of energy options and of how to meet energy needs, in part because it does question underlying values of current social arrangements. The conventional discussion proceeds by taking alleged demand (often conflated with wants or needs) as unchallengeable, and the issue to be one of which technology can be most profitably employed to meet them. This effectively presents a false choice, and is the result of taking needs and demand as lacking a social context so that the social structure which produces the needs is similarly taken as unchallengeable and unchangeable. The point is readily illustrated. It is commonly argued by representatives of such industries as transportation and petroleum, as for example by McGrowth of the XS Consumption Co., that people want deep freezers, air conditions, power gadgets, .... authoritarian to prevent them from satisfying these wants. from created wants It would be Such an argument conveniently ignores the social framework in which such needs and wants arise or are produced. To point to the determination of many such wants at the framework level is not however to assume that they are entirely determined at the framework level (e.g. by industrial organisation) and there is no such thing as individual choice or determination at all. It is to see the social framework as a major factor in determining certain kinds of choices, such as those for travel, and kinds of infrastructure, and to see apparently individual choices made in such matters as being channelled and directed by a social framework determined largely in the interests of corporate and private profit and advantage. The social change option is a hard option, insofar as it will be difficult to implement politically; but it is ultimately the only way of avoiding the passing on of serious costs to future people. reasons than such ethical ones for taking it: And there are other sorts of it is the main, indeed the only sort of option,open to those who adopt what is now called a deep ecological perspective, as contrasted with a shallow ecological outlook which regards the natural world and its nonhuman denizens as not worthwhile in themselves but only of value in as much as they answer back to human interests. The deep ecological perspective is an integral part of the Alternative Ecological Paradigm and is incompatible with central theses of the Dominant Social Paradigm (which is essentially the ideology of classical and neoclassical economics) 30. and its variants (roughly, what are called State Socialism, and Democratic 18 Socialism). It is incompatible with such assumptions as that the natural environment is of value only as a resource, is by and large hostile, but is controllable in human interests,and with the further domination over nature themes of the Dominant Paradigm and its variants. The conflict between Alternative and Dominant Paradigms, which is fast increasing, extends of course far beyond attitudes to the natural world, since core values of the Dominant Paradigm such as the merits of unimpeded economic growth and material progress are at stake; the conflict involves fundamental differences over the whole front of economical, political and social arrangements. The conflict underlies much of the nuclear debate, insofar as it is not specifically limited to questions of technological fixes, but takes up the 19 basic ethical issues and the social questions to which they lead. The ethical requirements already defended and applied bring us out, when followed through, on the Alternative side of the paradigm conflict, and accordingly lead to the difficult social change option. The social changes that the deep alternative requires will be strongly resisted because they mean changes in current social organisation and power 'structure. To the extenj? that the option represents some kind of threat to parts of present political and economic arrangements, it is not surprising that official energy option discussion proceeds by misrepresenting and often obscuring it. But difficult as it is to suitably alter "the system,” especially one with such far-reaching effects on the prevailing power structure, it is imperative to try: we are all on the nuclear train. FOOTNOTES This paper is a condensation of an early version of our ’Nuclear 1. power - ethical, social, and political dimensions * (ESP for short, available from the authors), which in turn grew out of Routley (i.e. the work so referred to in the reference list). For help with the condensation we are very considerably indebted to the editors. In the condensation, we simplify the structure of the argument and suppress underlying political and ideological dimensions (for example, the large measure of responsibility of the USA for spreading nuclear reactors around the world, and thereby in enhancing the chances of nuclear disasters, including nuclear war). We also considerably reduce a heavy load of footnotes and references designed and needed to help make good many of our claims. Further, in order to contain references to a modest length, reference to primary sources has often been replaced by reference through secondary sources. Little difficulty should be encountered however in tracing fuller references through secondary sources or in filling out much Important background material from work cited herein. For example, virtually all the data cited in sections, and VII is referenced in Routley. At worst ESP can always be consulted. All but the last line of the quote is drawn from Goodin, p. 417; 2. the last line is from the Fox Report, p. 6. While it is unnecessary to know much about the nuclear fuel cycle in order to consider ethical and social dimensions of nuclear power, it helps to know a little. & Abbotts, Gyorgy. The basics are presented in many texts, e.g. Nader Of course in order to assess fully reports as to such important background and stage-setting matters as the likelihood of a core meltdown of # (lightwater) reactors, much more information is required. For many assessment purposes however, some knowledge of economic fallacies and decision theory is at least as important as knowledge of nuclear technology. 3. Naturally the effect on humans is not the only factor that has to be taken into account in arriving at moral assessments. Nuclear radiation, unlike most ethical theories, does not confine its scope to human life and welfare. But since the harm ' ~ nuclear development may afflict on non­ human life, for example, can hardly improve its case, it suffices if the case against it can be made out solely in terms of its effects on human life in the conventional way. For reference to and a brief discussion of (human-oriented) ^simulation models see Gooding, 428. The Opportunity-cost 4. respects. argument is also defective in other It presupposes not merely the (mistaken) reductions involved in the contraction of the ethical domain to the economic; it also presupposes that the /proper methods for decision which ^ffect the choice, apply discounting. future, such as that of energy But, as Goodin argues, more appropriate decision rules do not allow discounting. This is one of the reasons why expected utility theory, 5. roughly cost-benefit analysis with probability frills, is inadequate as a decision method in such contexts. Apparent exceptions to the principle such as taxation (and 6. redistribution of income generally) vanish when wealth is construed (as it has to be if taxation is to be properly justified) as at least partly a social asset unfairly monopolised by a minority of the population. Examples such as that of motoring dangerously do not constitute counterexamples to the principle; for one is not morally entitled to so motor. / 7. For details, and as to how the official analyses become arguments against nuclear development when some attempt is made to take the ignored costs into account, see Shrader-Frechette, p. 55 ff. See Routley, p. 160. /\ the preceding two para£ I graphs, see Shrader-Frechette, p. 35 ff.; and also Nader and Abbotts. For much further discussion of the points of [10. Most of the reactors^Ln the world are of this type; see Gyorgy. 11. See Shrader-Frechette, chapter 4. 12. See Shrader-Frechette. / shortcomings A worthwhile initial view of the of the Rass^ftussen report may be reached by combining ' /the critique in Shrader-Frechette with that in Nader and Abbotts. 13. There are variations on Ai against numbers such as probabilities. and Aii which multiply costs In this way risks, construed as probable costs, can be taken into account in the assessment. risks may be assessed (Alternatively, through such familiar methods as insurance). A principle varying Aii’. a Aii, and formulated as follows: is ethically acceptable if (for some b) a includes no more risks than b and b is socially accepted. Aii’. was the basic ethical principle in terms of which the Cluff Lake Board of Inquiry recently decided that nuclear power development see Cluff Lake Board of Inquiry in Saskatchewan is ethically acceptable: Department of Environment, Government of Saskatchewan, 1978, Final Report, p. 305 and p. 288. In this report, a is nuclear power and b is either activities clearly accepted by society as alternative power sources. other applications b In has been taken as cigarette smoking, motoring, mining and even the Vietnam war (!). The points made in the text do not exhaust the objections to principles Ai - Aii’. The principles are certainly ethically substantive, since an ethical consequence cannot be deduced from nonethical premisses, but they have an inadmissible conventional origin of b ; b character. For look at the may be socially accepted though it is no longer socially acceptable, or though its social acceptibility is no longer so clearcut and it would not have been socially accepted if as much as is now known had been known when it was introduced. What is required in Aii’, for instance, for the argument to begin to look convincing is that ’ethically acceptable’ rather than ’socially accepted’. b is But even with the amendments the principles are invalid, for the reasons given in the text, and others. It is not disconcerting that principles of this type do not work. It would be sad to see yet another area lost to the experts, ethics to actuaries. 14. See Shrader-Frechette, p. 15. 15. Goodin 16. The argument is elaborated in ESP. 17. For some of the more philosophically important material p. 433. 'alternative Mannlaon ~ Asocial arrangements and lifestyles, see work cited in V. and R. Routley, ’Social theories, self management and environmental problems’ in al, where a beginning is made on working out one set of alternatives, those of a pluralistic anarchism. The parlous 18. situation of the world’s tropical rainforests is explained in, for instance, Myers; the reasons are untangled in R. and V. Routley ’World rainforest destruction - the social causes’ (available from the authors). 19. > rival, For a fuller account of the Dominant Social Paradigm and its Paradigm, see Cot^royfe and Duff, especially the Alternative Environmental the assumptions the table on p. 341 which /of the paradigms; compare also Cotton and Dunljzfp, especially p. 34. Contemporary varients in the Dominant Social Paradigm were considered in ESP. The shallow/deep contrast as applied to ecological positions, which A s /is an important component of the paradigm conflict, was introduced by Naess. // S /For further explanation of the contract and of the larger array of ecological positions into which it fits, see R. and V. Routley, ’ in Mannison environmental ethics ___ ’Human chauvinism and et al, and the references there cited, ^especially to R^d man’s work. 20. The more elaborate argument of ESP sets the nuclear debate in the context of paradigm conflict. But it is also argued that, even within assumptions framework of the Dominant Social Paradigm and its variants, Ti. Nuclear development is not the rational choice among energy options. The main argument put up for nuclear development within the framework of the dominant paradigm is an Economic growth argument. It is the following version of the Lights-going-out argument (with economic growth duly standing Nuclear power is in for material wealth, and for what is valuable!^ necessary to sustain economic growth. Economic growth is desirable (for all the usual reasons, e.g. to increase the size of the pie, to postpone redistribution problems, etc.). k Therefore nuclear power is desirable. / /The first premiss is part of US energy policy (see Shrader-Frechette, p.lll), and the second premiss is supplied by standard economics textbooks. But both premisses are defective, the second because what is valuable in economic growth can be achieved by (not without growth but) selective X //"growth, which economic the heavy social and environmental costs carried by unqualified economic growth. More to the point, since the second premiss is an assumption of the Dominant Paradigm, the first premiss (or rather an appropriate and less vulnerable restatement of it) Paradigm standards. fails even by Dominant For of course nuclear power is not necessary that there are other, perhaps costlier alternatives. defended is some elaboration of the premiss : given The premiss usually Nuclear power is the economically best way to sustain economic growth, ’economically best’ being filled out as ’most efficient’, ’cheapest’, benefit-cost ratio’, etc. ’having the most favourable Unfortunately for the argument, and for nuclear development schemes, nuclear power is none of these things decisively (unless a good deal of economic cheating - easy to do - is done). Tii. On proper Dominant Paradigjfi accounting, nuclear choices should generally be rejected, both as private utility investments and as public choices. Nuclear development is not economically viable but has been kept going, not by clear economic viability, but by massive subsidization of several types Gyorgy and Nader alrd Abbotts). discussed in Shrader-Frechette, ZU Even on variants of the Dominant Paradigm, nuclear development is //not justified, oi consideration of decision theory methods will reveal: Tiii. Whatever reasonable decision rule is adopted, the nuclear choice is rejected^Jas the arguments op Goodin on alternative decision rules help to show. |l*^ What sustains the nuclear juggernaut is not the Dominant Paradigm or its variants, but contemporary corporate capitalism (or its state enterprise image) and associated third world imperialism, as the historical details of nuclear X ^development both in developed countries and in less developed countries (for main details, see Gyorgy p. 307 ff.). Are the practices of contemporary corporate capitalism and associated imperialism are not acceptable by the standards of either of the Paradigms or their variants : not ethically acceptable. they are certainly  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Box 97, Item 5: Draft of Nuclear power - some ethical and social dimensions Subject The topic of the resource Typescript (photocopy) of draft, with handwritten, undated. Paper published, Routley R and Routley V (1982) 'Nuclear power—some ethical and social dimensions', in Regan T and VanDeVeer D (eds) And justice for all: new introductory essays in ethics and public policy, Rowman and Littlefield. Description An account of the resource Unnumbered paper from collection, item number assigned by library staff. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/browse?search=Richard+Routley&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bjoiner%5D=and&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=&amp;range=&amp;collection=&amp;type=&amp;user=&amp;tags=&amp;public=&amp;featured=&amp;exhibit=&amp;geolocation-mapped=&amp;geolocation-address=&amp;geolocation-latitude=&amp;geolocation-longitude=&amp;geolocation-radius=10&amp;submit_search=Search+for+items">Richard Routley</a> <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/browse?search=val+routley&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bjoiner%5D=and&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=&amp;range=&amp;collection=&amp;type=&amp;user=&amp;tags=&amp;public=&amp;featured=&amp;exhibit=&amp;geolocation-mapped=&amp;geolocation-address=&amp;geolocation-latitude=&amp;geolocation-longitude=&amp;geolocation-radius=10&amp;submit_search=Search+for+items">Val Routley</a> Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived <span class="MuiTypography-root-125 MuiTypography-body2-126">The University of Queensland's <a data-testid="rek-series" href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/records/search?page=1&amp;pageSize=20&amp;sortBy=score&amp;sortDirection=Desc&amp;searchQueryParams%5Brek_series%5D%5Bvalue%5D=Richard+Sylvan+Papers%2C+UQFL291&amp;searchMode=advanced">Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291</a></span>, Box 97, Item 5 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org">Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy</a> Contributor An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, <a href="https://najtaylor.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Dr. N.A.J. Taylor</a>. Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library. Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource [35] leaves. 27.24 MB. Type The nature or genre of the resource Manuscript Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context <a href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:1f45be4">https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:1f45be4</a> Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1982-01-01 Box 97: Paper - Extracts - Articles and Chapters by Richard Sylvan https://www.antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/b1bb957eb0669c86c103b14fb224f5fb.pdf 21d1b8e5d70d2b597b1948aa633e80c2 PDF Text Text MORAL DILEMMAS AND THE LOGIC OF DEONTIC NOTIONS Richard Routley and Vai Plumwood^ The §1. paradoxes of deontic logic consistency and the and modal requirements. Especially since mid-century many systems of deontic logic have been advanced, which logic of such deontic attempt to explore the prohibition, and wrong. right all Almost which treat deontic notions as modal, notions as obligation, permission and modal not demand functors, All such systems are mistaken m a For deontic functors such as obligation and prohibition are but are more highly of degree greater a systems, i.e. as if strict or provable equivalents are intersubstitutable within them preserving truth. quite fundamental way. systems have been modal these intensional than propositional modal modal than discrimination and so functors, logics can provide. The damage caused by the mistaken treatment of deontic notions as modal shows up in various ways, but we shall be primarily concerned with only one of these, the consistency requirements and the exclusion thereby of moral dilemmas. which the modal damage appears is through a Another way in series of related paradoxes, such as, directly, the paradoxes of derived obligation, and, less directly, the paradoxes of the Robber and the Good Samaritan. The consistency requirements come out in two ways in mainstream deontic systems. consistency Firstly, a negation are requirement, - obligatory in the that usual no claim such is symbolism, Op that ~0~p, both it i.e. and its ~(0p & 0~p) — appears as a principle, frequently a postulate, in all mainstream absolute systems.21 Such absolute systems, which are variants on alethic modal systems, are characteristically obtained from corresponding alethic systems by replacing the modal axiom, that’ or ’it ought to be the case that’, or the functor ’□ ’, modal (such as logics system demands world is ’it is obligatory ’it ought to be seen to that', replaces ’it is necessary that', of alethic systems. We know of course that consistency requirement; some ~0~p - where ’O’, read Op D p, by the deontic axiom, Op the doxastic systems) the standard but it appears that the intended interpretation of deontic the consistency requirement. or encapsulates acceptable subsequently introduced, can be designed without For its semantical equivalent what is permitted (i.e. is that in symbols (Px)STx) which is surely true (for let world x be determined precisely by what is so permitted). Moreover, the second related way in which consistency escaped by a modal formulation of deontic (or doxastic) logics. figures cannot be so For it seems clear, �2 and is widely agreed, that 0 satisfies the following distribution principle: (1) Op&OqiffO(p&q). Since however 0 is modal, and p & ~p & q p&~p (i.e. - the sides are strictly equivalent), 0(p & ~p) iff 0(p & ~p & q) Thence, Op & 0~p implies 0(p & ~p), which implies 0(p & ~p & q), and (2), by (1) which implies Oq; (2) if there are cases of moral dilemmas where Op and also 0~p, i.e. then obligation spreads so that any claim is obligatory. This argument tells against all mainstream deontic logics; rock-bottom system, minimal deontic logic. for it holds in the This logic MDS, presented by von Wright and others (see e.g. Hilpinen 81, p.3 and p.5), adds to classical sentential logic CL (with rules of Material Detachment and Substitutivity duly extended) the one-place connective P, of permissibility, subject to just the conditions P(A v B) e (1’) PA v PB and Intersubstitutivity of provably equivalent CL (i.e. truth functional) wff Now define a connective - in fact the standard obligation Then, where A and B are any CL wff, 0(A & B) OA =£j£~P~A. negation and It then follows, given that (extensional) principles to De Morgan = ~(~P~A & ~P~B). follows), 0 moral claim is dilemmas obligatory, the consequence as above of the nothing functor ) * (2 - thus: OA & OB, upon applying of (1 ) * that P~(—A & —B) (or by variants thereupon that which form OA & 0~A, (extensional) i.e. any permissible. The that is OB, revealing variant argument applies the provable CL-equivalence A & -A = B & ~B to get 0(A & ~A) = 0(B & ~B). d OB & 0~B => OB. Then (in condensed notation) OA & 0~A => 0(A & ~A) => 0(B & ~B) That is, if there are any deontic moral dilemmas (of such forms as OA & 0~A) then everything is obligatory. other forms; But there are moral dilemmas, of this and and not everything is obligatory. incorrect. So too are all its extensions, and Therefore minimum deontic logic is thereby all mainstream systems. For 'most systems of deontic logic include the system’ of von Wright 'as a subsystem' (F & H, p.13). There is little appreciation of the involve in the ethical Hare, having set up a force of these arguments or of what they literature. But one prominent example will dilemma, and rejected one logical have to suffice. route out, proceeds to pronounce that 'it is not very helpful to try to sort out these difficulties by some relatively minor tinkering with the calculus of deontic logic. The linguistic and logical intuitions which give rise to them are all right so far as they go' (82, �3 intuitions behind the mainstream systems are not alright, but lead to The p.28). deontic collapse and to a heap of paradoxes; and a bit of '’tinkering" is enough to remove the worst difficulties.5 (2’) and The trouble lies we shall argue, just with the modal requirement (i.e. its usual extension to all wff). that not everything is obligatory, evident For while it is This leaves much to be defended. on no more than the strength of a few examples (such as that it is not obligatory that everyone visit the tallest eucalypt every day), none of the other assertions is so uncontroversial. Given that there are such moral dilemmas, as will be argued at length, and given that sentential logic CL is admissible when applied to consistent situations (which are all that are elsewhere (in arguments: required RLR in especially), modal the namely, the arguments there are a claim that has been argued above), two only and requirement, one fault the which to points at half of the distributivity principle, specifically r (O-adjunction). OA & OB -> 0(A & B) But it is bizarre to have to fail O-adjunction in order OA & 0~A =5 B has quite especially when OB to stand, 0(A & ~A) to be correctly foundation. And obligation. For, not it contemplated among in the things, is a irrelevant mates 7 desperate measure , systems since it intended role and mainstream against entirely other is conceded that its Faulting O-adjunction rejected. goes it to allow the paradox O-adjunction can be argued is without meaning for from of the semantics of 0, along these lines:- Roughly OA is true iff A holds in all acceptable situations. But if A holds in all such situations and B does also then so does A & B, validating O-adjunction. Accordingly, the trouble must be located in the modality requirements. This can be seen from another angle also. obligation, which also underlies O-adjunction, An important logical feature of is its transmissibility, that what is tightly entailed by what is obligatory is also obligatory; in symbolic form, A ■+ B -o OA -> OB But now, (0-transmission). if entailment is erroneously construed as strict implication, which is what the modal requirement would have us do, then 0(A & ~A) -> OB, since by a paradox of strict implication A & ~A B. If there are moral dilemmas of the form 0(A & ~A), as will be contended, then this result is sufficiently damaging on its own, and focusses the trouble on the modal requirement. properly maligned OA & 0~A ->0B. Otherwise apply O-adjunction, to obtain the �4 the Both and consistency requirements should modality be challenged then by anyone who claims that, for some p, both Op and 0~p (and that such judgements are not merely prima facie, vanishing upon further reflection). Many have argued that such cases do occur, indeed are central examples of value conflict, and are of fundamental importance in ethics.$ We want to go even further and claim, firstly, that such cases occur quite frequently, as cases of conflicting obligations, conflicting rights, and genuine moral dilemmas - so in particular there are many cases where both p and ~p ought to be the case - and secondly, that adequate logical treatment of such cases requires an underlying logic of a distinctively paraconsistent kind. we shall cases has, argue, with many important arguments and cases. many of logic rendered deontic Neglecting such incapable of dealing adequately The matter is particularly serious since fiercely debated moral cases are cases of moral dilemmas, lthe most e.g. limited resources, nuclear war, permissible war tactics. While our initial argument will overlap previous work,9 it goes beyond it by adding a semantical treatment and moral of explanation semantical dilemmas, and in setting adequate deontic logics within the framework of paraconsistent logic. simple The §2. resolution relevant epicycling. classical versus The relevant It has already been indicated. solution to the base problem is disarmingly simple. Abandon the modal assumption, that obligation, permissibility, and so on, are modal This blocks logical equivalents. functors allowing replacement of modal from OCA & ~A), or from OA & 0~A, to 0(B & ~B) and thence to OB. giving up intersubstitutivity are replacement coentailment, not simply just more in contexts; deontic rigorous than lax strict equivalence. intimately - the Spread with What ones. is permitting required is While A & ~A and B & ~B are strictly equivalent, they do not coentail one another. connected modal It does not involve conditions the the move law, That is as much of a fallacy as - one A that would have that a & ~A -> B, contradiction such as A & ~A entails any statement whatsoever. An alternative satisfactory distinctive implciation deontic way then logic of should explaining be in particular of relevant paraconsistent, feature of relevant logics, their and the is solution, simply and through why the a most rejection of the paradoxes of strict Spread. For, as remarked, one logical characteristic of deontic notions such as obligation is their transmissibility; i.e. where A entails B then OA is logically sufficient for OB.10 Then were entailment strict implication it would follow at once by Spread that 0(A & ~A) -> OB, whence by O-adjunction, OA & 0~A -> OB. basis of interpretations straightforwardly on RLR II). of Transmissibility may be independently argued for on the entailment (e.g. as content inclusion), and follows the semantical analysis of obligation to be advanced (cf. also �5 A good deal of effort has already been expended in trying to save mainstream deontic theory from the worst of the difficulties and consistency requirements. Most of through its modal it encounters, the repairs however attempted amount to epicycling: trying to tack theory-saving devices onto the initial theory, rather than questioning any fundamental features of it. Intractable exposed. problems is called What the with so-called minimal the standard system of deontic system already have been logic is in an even worse position than the minimal system, because it adds to the minimal system as an axiom 12 Then any standard system including a moral dilemma, 0(p^ & ~p ), is 13 o o simply inconsistent. For Op => Pp, hence Pp^ & ~Pp-j where p1 is pQ & ~pQ. ~p(p & ~p). Main marketed deontic logics are epicyclic variations on (i) standard deontic logic, being modal attempts to repair defects in earlier prototypes. They include (ii) reductions of systems of type (i) to alethic logics by introduction of a constant ’o’ read, for example, ’the world will be worse off’ or 'punishment ought to cr is the moral sanction or some bad state of affairs. follow’: is defined Then *0' EK-A^cr); i.e. A is obligatory iff the negation of A (non-fulfilment of A, it OA is said) necessitates the sanction. It is usually postulated: -0^. Such reductive frameworks, since they include minimal deontic logic, repeat its defects. (iii) relativistic systems which attempt axiomatise to circumstances, c', conditional of reads ’p is obligatory given, or permission and conditional obligation; thus ’0(p/c) * in notions underlying model being that of conditional the probability. These systems were designed chiefly to avoid the paradoxes of derived obligation to which systems of type really in (as and (i) probability (ii) theory) lead. to But the new operator, /, compensate for implicational connective in the modal framework assumed. so-called "logics of conditional e.g., van Fraassen, p.438 ’... obligation" still lack the is introduced of an adequate So, not surprisingly, these exclude moral dilemmas (thus, it would be more apt to say that we have here a logic of obligation that remains after obligational conflicts are resolved'). (iv) systems which conditional d, such include a modal conditional functor superior to the material­ as a Stalnaker-Lewis-style conditional, conditional deontic notions like those of (iii) can be defined. in terms of which But these systems, since modal, do not escape modal limitations and problems (see further RLR). (v) systems based on a logic of change or action. These systems turn out to be reducible to a combination of absolute systems with tense logics, i.e. 14 to multiply modal systems and so repeat the problems of modal systems. None of these modal types are satisfactory, none can be made so, they amount because of �6 What is at modal assumptions, like consistency requirements, that they all involve. fault is not merely types of systems of this sort, which confine the framework to a worlds possible defect enough, one thereby and but the write in conditions, consistency that is though sweeping consistency interpretation of deontic more logic, that ’principles of deontic logics are conditions of consistency for normative systems’.^ The consistency interpretation - which is deeply entrenched in much ethical theory (especially making no adequate allowance from Kant) deriving that for what is essential fundamentally mistaken, - is moral dilemmas and to morality, the familiar inconsistency of normative systems. Documenting moral dilemmas. Cases of moral dilemmas are, perhaps unfortunately, §3. both familiar and inevitable. perhaps not, and logic theory deontic (including is unfortunate It such for standard deontic approximations rough as utilitarianism) since they have ultimately to be dismissed as inadequate to account for the data. is also often extremely On the other dilemmas. awkward who those for such dilemmas hand, probity, and are a main source of moral change. A moral dilemma occurs when considerations, for instance cannot T situation in act (where such a of which shape cannot, or precisely as way afford real tests of moral worth and 16 is confronted with moral perhaps not directly inconsistent, factual the probably cannot, facts satisfy to principles, binding obtain); principles that is, one so as to or although be satisfied Then the situation T cannot but induce a moral fix. considerations. in moral (but not only when) one the in themselves enmeshed find It in the (probably) meet moral This can come about in two ways, either because of the logical limitations supposedly satisfied by T, in particular its consistency feature (that, whatever p, does not) or through certain contingent features if p holds in T then ~p of T. In what follows we shall concentrate on a major subclass of what are commonly accounted moral dilemmas, those of (paraconsistent) logical interest where what is given or derived are pairs such as OA and OB, WA and WB (i.e. A is wrong and so is B), or the like, where A and B are And incompatible. of particular logical importance are cases where deontically incompatible pairs such as Op and 0~p, Wp and W~p, or the like are guaranteed. The examples of moral dilemmas we consider provide only a small selection from the rich variety of such dilemmas, but hopefully they illustrate that variety. Several of the examples involve more than one moral principle: however some commonly- adopted moral principles generate dilemmas, of one sort or another, their own. pretty much on Consider for instance first principles of the following type: Situations involving the (indiscriminate) killing of numbers of (uninvolved) people should be avoided, should not happen, are wrong - principle at very first approximation of the form (p)(p satisfies condition C + Wp). Applying such a principle, a dilemma results �7 where and occurs a large number of people will be killed, if p obtains or if ~p obtains a large number of people will also be killed. War situations provide obvious examples, with the V(ietnam) dilemma typical. 17 For example, people have described the situation in Vietnam as follows (not that it really is this way): If the Americans withdraw from Vietnam, a large number of people If the Americans stay in (do not withdraw from) Vietnam, will be killed. number of people will withdraw from C. Hence under be killed. Vietnam', Hence, condition satisfies p where p is C 'the Americans withdraw from ~p and the principle both p and ~p are wrong, similar is the company commander's dilemma. of his troops will be killed. a large also i.e. satisfies condition 18 Wp and W~p. Rather If he invades the hamlet, a large number If he does not invade the hamlet the prisoners held Taking p as 'he invades the hamlet', p satisfies C and therein will be killed, etc. ~p satisfies C. Therefore, Wp & W~p. Both p and-not p are wrong; neither would occur The killing does not however have to be of large numbers in an acceptable situation. of people to induce moral dilemmas. variants on the commander's dilemma Favourite regularly wheeled out concern murdering a potential murderer to prevent him killing several other presented people and with the related constrained option killing of some choice situations smaller special person is where a group of people (or creatures) in order to avoid the certain killing of a larger or less favoured group 1Q of creatures. 7 The pacifist's (or differently seen, patriot's) dilemma, which Lemmon draws from on Sartre, concerns the proposition p^: Z goes to war. If Z does not go to war, he help his friends and fails to fellow countrymen when they are in desperate need. Thus ~p-j is wrong, W-p-j , on the principle that so failing to help one's friends and fellow countrymen is wrong. If Z goes to war, he will be involved in killing people he has nothing morally or otherwise against; whence Wp^, on the principle that things which involve such killing are wrong. Therefore again Wp^ and W~pp A different sort of example, again however involving the taking of life in one way or another is the abortion dilemma (as conceived by Anglicans, say). presented as a clash between conflicting rights. to life (i.e. (on that the one part of the should not foetus); have one's In one corner, there is the right in the other, the right to bodily integrity body used against one's detriment for someone else’s benefit) on the part of the mother. where a particular state of affairs is an instance of both so (~p) and will principles. Hence Wp. would deny the mother's right to bodily integrity. Whence adjoining, Wp & W~p. to one's A dilemma results performance of an abortion (p) would deny the foetal right to life. not doing This can be The But Hence W~p. �8 Not so far removed from these examples, particularly when omission is conflated with commission, are environmentally-oriented examples involving sacrifice (broadly construed), for resources. Suppose that we have a duly qualified principle to the effect that things which lead to the feeding of starving people should happen. example the is a dilemma of limited three cases:- First following Suppose also that we have limited resources, and have decided to distribute these as follows: If the coin comes down heads (p), then group A of starving people will be fed. But if the coin does not come down heads (~p) then group B of starving people will be fed. Plainly in an ideal situation both p and ~p will occur, that is the coin will come down heads and it will not come down heads, so that both groups of people will be fed. And if the moral principle cited is correctly applied then a case of Op and 0~p results. course minor Of involved leads to conclusions of the form adjustment of the principle W~p and W—p, whence Wp. For an analogous conservationist * s (or humanitarian * s) dilemma consider the case forest where it ought to happen that the is chopped down, the benefit of the for presently starving (or etc.), and it ought to happen that the forest is preserved by positive action and Op dilemma for the benefit of coming generations (or etc.). 0~p emerges the from of application distinct In this case the The principles. society dilemma, concerns the reform of primitive societies so that they primitive Consider the dilemma of a feminist environmentalist as conform to outside standards. regards Aboriginal On the women. other hand, suppression of women in Aboriginal society should be opposed; on the other hand major western interference in Aboriginal affairs should be avoided; but changing the position of women would constitute major interference. Different examples involving public institution) dilemma, which following:- On the one hand, the be restricted and the funds will principle being the concerns preposition p2: the University The Vice-Chancellor, or rather his advisor on logic, argues opposes the government. both separate principles are the Vice-Chancellor * s (or formulated Wp2, p2 is wrong, students and accordingly). On because the University’s learning in general will suffer the other hand, W~p2, ~p2 (the is wrong because #p# will strengthen the present iniquitous status quo (the principle being states that of affairs which strengthen the present status quo be philosophers, is iniquitous avoided). Therefore, conjoining Wp2 & W~p2» A signifi ant source of moral dilemmas, long observed by afforded by a relatively unrestricted institution of promising, and more generally by parallel institutional arrangements for entering perhaps worth distinguishing two classes of cases. situations, Z is under an obligation into (moral) Firstly, contracts. It is in purely contractual p, because of a contract or promise, and also �9 under an obligation q, because of a (likely different) contract, where q entails or In the second sort of case, Z has promised to do ~p, and hence commits one to ~p. But p also satisfies conditions C, 0~p. it emerges, and Z adheres to the principle (q)(Cq ->0q), whence Op. As an example of the second type consider Lemmon’s simple and dated example, adapted from Plato: A friend leaves me with his gun saying he will be back for it in the evening, and I promise to return it when he calls. He arrives in a distraught condition, demands his gun, and announces he is going to shoot his wife because she has been unfaithful. I ought to return the gun, since I promised to do so - a case of obligation. And yet I ought not to do so, since to do so would be to be indirectly responsible for a murder, and my moral principles are such that I regard this as wrong. I am in an extremely straightforward moral dilemma, evidently resolved by not returning the gun (62, p.148). According to Lemmon the outcome is both Op, where p is ’I return the gun’, and also The 0~p. namely, for first an inference concerning promise-keeping; every q, that q is a genuine promise entails Oq (for genuine promises follows engender obligations), from and p is a immediate genuine promise. inference of the following sort: for every q, The second follows that q really contributes to a murder implies Wq, and that p really contributes to a murder; and moreover, -> 0~q. using an for every q, Wq Even if this last principle is repudiated a dilemma remains: for both Op and Wp, i.e. I ought to return the gun and it is wrong that I return the gun. that the initial principle sustains the conclusion 0~q as well. (It may be In any case, it is not difficult to amend Lemmon’s example so that it does, or more important, so as to render the ensuing dilemma more convincing.) Other dilemmas recur in variant form with contracts and promises. For instance, limited resources dilemmas reappear as follows: we promise all our surplus to a group of poor only to have even poorer people turn up. where one's deception, employment calls or participation in for activities Similarly work and role dilemmas, which are the production of nuclear morally repugnant (such as or chemical weapons), may arise either contractually, e.g. one signed up for the position, or from duty, e.g. to provide for one's family. Some of the moral dilemmas we have made look more determinate than perhaps they should, or than they would be if the circumstances were filled out, or got filled out slightly differently. Then we should find that some of the dilemmas take the form of Lemmon's more complex class, namely those where rather than OA and 0~A, what one has is Prob OA and Prob 0~A, where Prob is the probability functor ’it is probable that'. Lemmon describes this class of "fully dilemmatic situations" in these terms: ’there �10 is some, but not conclusive, evidence that one ought to do something, and there is some, but not conclusive, evidence that one ought not to do that thing’ (pp.152-3). sort of dilemma is again drawn from Sartre: in A real-life working example of this brief, Sartre’s pupil is under some (sort of) obligation to stay with his mother, but he also probably under is an obligation, felt only ambiguously, to join the Free French in England (for a fuller description see Lemmon, pp.153-4). Lemmon suggests that this class of dilemmas is, and perhaps should stay beyond deontic formalisation: however the dilemmas are now within the scope of formalisation of a sort by multiple functor intensional logics of a type not different represent such principles as ’’ought implies can”.22 those already from needed to Though we have presented a wide variety of dilemmas, some of them in some detail - to the dispel that dilemmas common prejudice are a rare phenomena that can be safely set aside or that need not be taken seriously in an ethical theory - we have by no means exhausted the range and wealth of such dilemmas. the extent of analogues practical of these Nor have we indicated the dilemmas; fact is that similar dilemmas are frequent in economics, over budgeting, devaluation (we ought to devalue because ... and we ought not to devalue because ...), and so on. Nor have we brought out the political significance of the dilemmas; but the fact also is that some of the deeper problems in moral and political theory revolve around dilemmas. Familiar examples are issues of (permitting permissiveness interests possibly harming or licence individuals to pursue offending others) and freedom (restricting freedom as regards actions which infringe others * freedom), of paternalism and state authority versus civil liberties, and of democracy as against minority interests. A assortment varied accounts of the where sources of examples is source of moral dilemmas, for moral claims conflict, contractual obligations. Lemmon also in particular and promises, is attracted principles as those morally simplistic that they generally arise greatest (p.150). But he fact that one and the same conflicting directives requiring type, since principle may conflict with or duties, may conflict with one another principle can deliver such removing by an account of this latter underestimates the extent of conflict, and neglects the contract or in e.g. duty with principles, principles with while realising that it will not always suffice, principle important (e.g. double maximization happiness of the greatest number). As well a sufficient variety of tough examples helps remove the illusion that moral dilemmas can one and all be escaped. Admittedly, fortunately, there are ways around some of the dilemmas we have outlined, especially those we have borrowed. with perhaps further around the dilemmas), artifice in setting up the cases (to exclude But lateral moves some of the dilemmas stand: from them (as is further argued in �11 residue ’To insist that there is in every case a solution without is no escape. § 6) there false is the to moral facts’ p.132), Marcus (Barcan a theme she well illustrates with the abortion dilemma. §4. deontic Paraconsistent logic cannot be modal makes it modal treatment the relevant development. logic: An adequate deontic have to be paraconsistent. but will For a modal treatment to accommodate moral dilemmas - which are hard data impossible it makes as dilemmas treat dilemmas impossible to (§3)• A without proper catastrophic collapse (as shown in §1). The of principles standard deontic logic are, however, as added to readily various paraconsistent logics as they are to modal or classical logic - at least this (e.g. OP), in (da Costa negation-weakened namely logic and now distinguished style) logic paraconsistent and For Jaskowski-style discussive logics there are some difficulties; relevant logics. in styles of paraconsistent two of the main for is true particular, the given of rejection can principles, adjunction such logics satisfactorily include O-adjunction, OA & OB -> 0(A & B), which reflects adjunction in for the possible-worlds sentential framework It would seem not; acceptable worlds? logic offers no way of handling of Jaskowski-style the form 0(C & ~C) that result by O-adjunction. properly accommodate dilemmas, for dilemmas concerning obligation, where such as moral clearly principles difficulties; For these require impossible worlds Generally, Jaskowski-style logics are in deep trouble trying to where C & ~C holds. adjunctive full-strength moral dilemmas of logics Negation—weakened hold. they cannot deliver expected deontic also are interconnections, e.g. in the deontic ’’square of opposition”, presented shortly, which depends crucially on normal principles. negation In difficulties. Relevant brief, deontic the reasons types of paraconsistent logics logics can both avoid choosing relevant logics over for (the substantial sets these of other main reasons for which are given in OP) are accentuated still farther as soon as applications, such as to deontic logic, are Accordingly we will assume a relevant logical base, and a relevant semantical made. in what follows. framework, Even so, much of what we say and do can be adapted to other logical bases, e.g. negation-weakened or positive-plus bases. Often a combined syntactical-semantical is approach more fruitful and illuminating than either a syntactical-axiomatic or a semantical approach carried out separately. Each enriches and controls the other.23 Such is the case with relevant logical theory, logic. Even analogue of and so it is with relevant deontic logic, which builds on relevant so, a standard syntactical deontic standard superstructure, relevant logic. beginning logic we normally added can is easier. simply add For an to obtain exact a analogue relevant of the to classical logic, to (what supersedes CL) �12 For minimal relevant deontic logic, MD, the one-place functor 0 - of obligation, as usual read (e.g. ’It ought suitable some to be extending system that’ - is added (the case) B system basic the to some relevant logic of RLR conforms to the usual formation rule: where A is a wff so is OA. however are options at Functor, F read ’It is forbidden that’, is defined thus: ’It is permissible that’, is defined : PA =Df~FA. FA =Df 0~A (cf. OED); and P, read There this stage (as at e.g. stages), can morality, be argued, from directions several other F could oh introduced independently. But this leads to complications that are unnecessary. It 0 The other familiar functors of deontic logic, F and P, are defined in the usual way. ’It is wrong that’ or, less satisfactorily, Functor I). (e.g. from the rationality be of from the meaning or semantics of obligation, from the idea of commitment), that 0 satisfies at least the following requirements:[RM] A -> B -> OA -> OB, i.e. where A + B is a theorem so is OA -> OB. That is to say, where A entails B is provable so is OA entails OB, obligation transmits over provable entailment. Hence the claim that this principle (R7 of RLR II) is a transmission principle. [K] OA & OB regards the i.e. -> 0(A & B), conjunction; or, a conjunction of obligations entails obligation as to adjunction (principle G of RLR II). These two important it put 25 principles, entailment and adjunction, make 0 a a little differently 0 is closed which ensure that 0 is closed under under provable systemic functor (in the sense of RLR II), and ensure that it has a relational (i.e. first order) semantical analysis. The postulates which correspondingly minimally characterise deontic functions F and P now follow by relevant logic upon applying the definitions. They are as follows:For wrongness: A For permissibility : With the A + B -*> functor further B —f> FByFA Q, FA & FB P(A v BH, PAv PA + PB defined F(A v B) QA =Df ~0A, a reduced pb deontic square of opposition follows: 0Ax ...............FA PA^ .............. .QA The opposites are dotted peripheral opposed, as modally, relations of the modal in the way the solid lines show. But the square are bound to be the lost given the �13 the modal (on fact of deontic dilemmas square Prior 62 p.220). see is worth It observing, however, that the peripheral relations can be reinstated through adoption of the so-called consistency scheme OA -> ~FA, i.e. OA + ~0~A; [D] and that the relevant deontic logic that results still excludes the rubbish brought in along deontic standard necessary truths, Nordamericano of that course not (though paradoxes, essentially because paradoxical etc.), deontic obligatoriness the of spread principles are not whereas triviality), incorporate dilemmas. the as degenerate dilemma-permitting The problem with deontic logics which include [D] also cannot they well as logic, Antipodean form we are advocating. is deontic In short, relevant theory can deliver a clean-cut, clean-living, dilemma- available. free (e.g. logic include relevant moral dilemmas systems without without can [D] inconsistency consistently These various logical claims, as to the modal rubbish that is not brought along, can all be made good by application of the semantical theory. The semantics shows what does not hold, as well as further explaining why the principles that hold do. Semantics for MD result upon adding to modellings for relevant logic a two-place relation S, on worlds, which is subject to the following condition W. b and Sbc then Sac, Where a i.e. where world a precedes b (indeed canonically a is contained in b) and world c is accepted vis-a-vis b then c is accepted vis-a-vis a. Given that a is a subworld of b this is evident enough. Distinctive features of the underlying semantical modellings for relevant logic - consisting of structures of the form <T, K, 0, R, *, be sufficiently and, well-known any in are case, explained v> - should elsewhere. These structures differ from the best of those for modal logics, the nonnormal structures <T, K, N, R, v> for the Lewis systems S2 and S3, in the following ways:- The class K of worlds, to which the factual (base) world T belongs, is expanded to include a much more comprehensive class of inconsistent and incomplete worlds; the class N of normal worlds K is in adjusted theorems hold; relation R, to a three-place the class to v(p, sentential a) relation = parameter 1) regular worlds, i.e. worlds; on then and wff. I(A, b) = 1, where all on is subject to a constraint where I is the so that Specifically, where a < b and p holds in a p holds in b, p. Conditions v for every world a and b modelling structures are hereditariness condition extends to all wff; i.e. in symbols, where a 1 then those used in modelling implication, is relaxed from a two-place inclusion of worlds is duly reflected. (written 0 of in K and every such that this b & I(A, a) = interpretation function which extends v to all Inclusion, <, can be added as an extra component of the model structures, but in fact it can be defined thus: a < b =Df (Px 0)Rxab. Finally relevant modellings �14 add to modal modellings a new function, *, in terms of which negation is evaluated, 27 which facilitates the inclusion of inconsistent and incomplete worlds. same role and interpretation as in standard relation S has the The semantical It is employed in the semantical evaluation of obligation functor 0, deontic theory. which is given by the following rule: I(0a, a) = 1 iff, for every world b such that Sab, I(A, b) = 1, i.e. OA holds at world a iff, for each world b accepted vis-avis a, A holds at b.28 The rule is a world relativisation of the idea that what is obligatory is what holds in all accepted worlds. (morally) It is thus an evident adaption of Leibnitzian prescriptions, given the linkages between obligation or moral binding and moral "musts” or imperatives, on the one side, and morally possible and or acceptable accepted worlds, the on other. The for motivation unrelativised connections can be forged at base world T; for there A is (morally) required, I(0A, T) = 1, iff for every b for which Mb I(A, b) = 1 (where Mb =Df STb), i.e. That is, what is required is iff A holds in every (morally) accepted world. what holds in all accepted or received worlds. Other construals of the semantical apparatus are of course open. tempting ideal, temptation (a succumbed to initially) regard the accepted worlds as and Sab as ’b is ideal as seen from c’. to read Mb as 'b is ideal’ i.e. to It is a little But that is like requiring supererogation in cases where the meeting of commitments or obligations is enough: the worlds do not need to be that good but simply to pass, to meet required standards. is worlds. acceptable through A perhaps easier construal than by way of accepted worlds construal That is alright provided the term ’’acceptable” is deployed, as it often is, nonevaluatively : for it is important in the semantical assessment to prescriptions for be able to make an evaluative step—down, to give meaning evaluative expressions nonevaluative terms. in Naturally this does not imply that evaluative notions are naturalistically eliminated, any more than familiar terms, extensional reductions, semantical extensional analysis of intensional implies that intensionality is removed: both are merely pushed down into the not-further-explained apparatus of worlds. Obligation is construed by way of what goes on in acceptable or accepted worlds, not what happens in permissible or permitted directly with the construal of permissibility. one another, but in worlds, because this latter Given modal muddles the two reduce to the more subtle relevant setting star shift is involved in the transfer from accepted to permitted worlds. The (derived) semantical rule for P is this: KPA, a) = ties 1 iff for some b such that Uab I(A, b) = 1, where Uab . b * Sa �15 at base Thus, A is permissible, world T, i.e. I(PA, = 1) iff A holds at some 1, permitted world b; what is permissible is worldwise what is somewhere permitted. modal equation of relations U and S further axioms, deontic the (where namely if Sab (in effect, condition then Sa ) b * (Pb)Sab The corresponds to e.g. guaranteed, is modally by ~0(P & ~p)) by the scheme OA ^PA. Now modal-strength deontic logics typically do include an axiom scheme of the form [D’J OA -> ~PA, i.e. from (alethic) is obligatory is not that permissible, under modal is, Indeed this used to be considered what distinguished deontic ~0~A. assumptions, OA logics what modal on logics the one side, which include a stronger principle analogous to OA -*■ A, and epistemic logics on the other, which were weaker in that [D’J failed. However [D’J, like [D], is deontically incorrect because it rules out consistent inclusion of moral dilemmas; or, to turn matters around, cases where OA & 0~A, [D’]» which or OA & FA, hold counterexample [D]. may seem a little more plausible transform of it on usual deontic definitions. than Similarly these cases refute [D], but is a definitional For what is obligatory is not ipso facto permissible where the obligatory item is also wrong, as in dilemmatic cases. To distance relevant deontic logic from modal analogues, while at the same time demonstrating that relevant theory can encompass moral dilemmas unproblematically , we next assume that some moral dilemmas hold, that is that for some p, both Op and Fp. Since however propositional quantifiers much complicate the semantical apparatus we shall introduce constants into the syntax, and let p^ be the first constant for which a dilemma ensues. That is, a new axiom, extending the logic, is [DD] 0p1 & Fpp i.e. p1 is dilemmatic.3° The modelling condition for [DD], is wd. For each a in 0, for some world x, Sax and v(ppx) = 1= v(ppX ). * This condition, which does not involve T, does not impose nonclassical conditions on normal worlds. Accordingly [DD] is only a weakly paraconsistent requirement; it does not imply that inconsistency protrudes into the factual or regular worlds. Indeed one advantage of the semantics is that it enable proof that dilemmatic judgements can be included without inconsistency. By contrast, modal theories cannot include even one half of [DD] do) without automatically excluding dilemmatic judgements. consideration has a thesis 0p2 for some (either will Suppose the logic under Then for every x in 0 there is some y such that Sxy with p2 set to hold at y. But modally this is enough to guarantee that [D] holds materially, More explicitly, so ~(0A & 0~A) generally, suppose otherwise that in i.e. there can be no such dilemmas. some model the material form of [D] �failed; I(OA, then = T) 1 = I(A~O, T), which impossibility at y since I(A, y) = 1 i I(A, y). syntactical problems earlier in 1). even for Although [DD] implies Op^, very weak obligatory is conjured from the fact some for STy yields y This is a semantical analogue of the deontic logics (considered type of modal it does not say, nor does it follow, that OT for any Such modal stupidity as that every necessary and every tautology T (e.g. C v ~C). truth is since automatically removed that relevant in the relevant wash. can be This theory removes such paradoxes as p1 from which 0(A v ~A) would follow modally by 0—distribution (i.e. A v ~A, Again the [RM]). semantics can be applied to establish the point in proper detail. primitive principles of minimal relevant logic are open to challenge, Both the and [K] * Jennings has been disputed by Schotch (in Jennings and 81). The main Schotch- arguments against [K] — which induces what they call ’paradoxes of complete * aggregation essentially turn — automatically avoided on modal deontic by relevant and assumptions, Their theory. accordingly are (p.152, also main point p.154) is that [K] obliterates the distinction between [D] (i.e. Op ~0~p) and [Con] ~0 , i.e. in effect ~0(r & ~r). Their argument depends on construing implication in [D] as material-implication and on strict replacement. ~0~p iff ~(0p & 0~p), i.e. iff ~0(p & ~p) using [K] Then Op and its provable converse, i.e. iff ~0(r & ~r) using p & ~p - . r & ~r and strict According to the relevant approach the trouble is not with [K] but with replacement. the modal assumptions, which are independently objectionable (see 1). Their further argument begins from the premiss that ’we should certainly want to include among our deontic principles the law of moral consistency [Con] across cuts all different things. moral theories’ (pp.153-6). The ... because that principle premiss appears to conflate What cuts across all moral theories is the theme that some things, such as a sufficiently evil state of affairs, are not obligatory, whence ~0s. does cut across all theories is the assumption that there are no moral dilemmas of the form 0(A & ~A), which is what [Con], with not just that there What are theories like properly defined, would imply. those of Lemmon and Sartre It is which include contradictory obligations; it is also that some theorists would want to insist that there is something logically wrong with principles like [Con], e.g. that it doesn’t make sense to talk of the nonobligatoriness of absurdity. Schotch and Jennings do contend that we should allow for moral conflict of the form OA & OB where A and B are inconsistent. their assumptions there [K] stops rejection of are moral dilemmas that yielding Since then B -> ~A, of the 0(A & -A). it follows that on form OA & 0~A. Yet as they Certainly only themselves have reported, the consensus view is that there are (in the end) no dilemmas of the form �OA & O~A: insofar, all theories’, ’cuts across then, rejection of dilemmas of the form 0(A & ~[~]A) so, near enough, does rejection of those of the form OA & 0~A. What certainly does not emerge is that there can [K]. The be no deontic logic which takes as a primitive law the principle be can that best if done, subscribe to [K], we is to formalise ethical theories - namely those which do not allow moral certain particular conflicts (p. 156). logics provide decisive counterexamples to this contention. Relevant deontic They can take [K] as primitive: they allow for moral conflict; but they do so by allowing, like Lemmon, for moral inconsistency.31 disconcerting More from flowing the than fundamental difficulties deriving principles, transmission [K] from are allegedly those difficulties include which well-advertised paradoxes of deontic logic. § 5. Resultant on impact other relevant paraconsistent shift. and puzzles of paradoxes deontic theory of the Often cleaning up one logical puzzle in due technical detail has a beneficial effect on surrounding puzzles and on associated problems in the area. Light is cast on, and So it turns out also in the case of moral dilemmas. Among them sometimes solutions are delivered for, a number of other linked problems. are the following puzzles generated by theorems of (relevant) deontic logic. are, the ’’paradoxes of commitment”. Where material implciation => is in first place, defined as usual, e.g. T1. There ~A v ~B, it is a theorem that A ° B 0(B => A), whence if OA then 0(B 25 A), OA sometimes read: A if is then obligatory anything one commits to A, or: ’Doing anything commits us to doing what is obligatory’; T2. FA OCA => B), if 0~A then 0(A = B), sometimes read: if A is forbidden then doing A commits one to doing anything at all, or: ’Doing what is not permitted commits us to doing anything whatever’ readings are proceed from Prior from there interpretation of paradoxes symbols, the The claims read off are paradoxical. 62, p.224). to little justification - reading ’0(A commits one to doing B’. the in and (the quoted in logic this case B)’ as depends, always, depends crucially on - But to on the what has as a commitment relation, e.g. as ’doing A Such a reading which presupposes that material implication is a satisfactory conditional can in no way be sustained (see RLR), and that is the end of the problem. that A then paradoxical guises; and it If, ought to for example, T1 be features disappear. these commitment the case is simply read: if it ought to be the case that either not B or A, then the alleged However puzzles have a tendency to reappear in new puzzles are no exception. Even with conditional �18 terms of obligation applied to a properly defined in obligation conditional, the puzzles in reemerge new forms, example, for genuine (relevant) in is what called ’’Ross’s paradox”, and in related transmission problems. It has been claimed that the principle, OA -> 0(A v B), yielding if OA then 0(A v B) T3. is which T1, to equivalent is Ross paradox principle), - paradoxical to do either A or B, it may be More generally, given OA, obligatory to read a letter but not to read or burn it. there is an obligation example, for because, where the content of B may be totally do to established. (The comment goes beyond what T3 supplies, but that is not material). the in circumstance which obligation the to is set inappropriate A or A similar objection is made to the analogous permissibility principle PA ■> P(A v B), T4. Ross’s paradox, on the alleged grounds that there are examples where A is permissible but A For example, be. not the following it is permissible that to post a takes based on some one application of T4 is said to the paradoxical: letter false proposition the distance implies that it is permissible to post a The assumption that there is some sort of paradox here is letter or kill one’s aunt. however B may the towards that the permissibility of of permissibility killing the consequent one’s The aunt. proposition itself seems to be based on an application, never articulated and quite inadmissible, of Disjunctive Syllogism, distribution, P(~A &. A For PB. (A v b) ■+ B, and what results from P- it may certainly be permissible not to post However it is assuming more than standard deontic logics will grant to the letter. go on ) ~A & to the permissibility of not posting the letter and letter or killing disjunction. one’s aunt, especially given the also either derivation of posting the latter the Still going on remains tempting (and would presumably be warranted by a Lukasiewicz deontic logic analogous to his 4-valued modal logic). But so going on is to no avail in a duly relevant setting, where Disjunctive Syllogism fails: there is no admissible route here to the permissibility of killing aunt, one’s however desirable the act might otherwise be. main The transmission conditional obligation, strict implication, as problems in found also modally derived. an adequate deontic logic are, like those of They come from reliance on material or representation of implication. The worst manifestation of this is that already discussed, deontic trivialisation leading from Op^ and 0~p.| to OB, for any B, in virtue of the provability of p^ & ~p^ => B. But there are variety of lesser manifestations of the same underlying problem, of which the following example (adapted from recent discussion) is just one sort: p4. We have an obligation to feed the starving poor D. There exist starving poor. Therefore, since starving poor, it ought to be by O-transmission, the case it ought that we meet our obligation to feed the to be that there exist starving poor, a �19 that is far from obviously true. deontic logic, for the simple reason presupposition relation, conclusion of transmission problems of modal the that the cannot p4 Such analyses do not entailment. an to rather or implication, (material-) upgraded be plague relevant The many systems all enamate from excessive O-distribution on basis of implications will not them, support in the as following transmission principles typical of orthodox deontic logics, all of which should be rejected: OCA D B) D. OA 3 OB A D B -> OA 3 OB A => B =>. OA => OB. With their rejection a thorny tangle of modally-derived paradoxes is also rejected. There appears however to be an immense temptation to try to impose excessively strong transmission principles; and the same phenomenon to be seen at work in modal contexts can also be observed when a proper entailment is introduced.3^ This occurs, particular, in attempts in to ’’normalise” [RM], to strengthen it a from rule connection to an entailment, for instance, to (the characteristic S3 form) [OT] A + B +. OA + OB; it occurs with analogous changes thereon, and e.g. A-> B. PA PB and A FB + FA, as well with as imported forms of these principles, e.g. OA & (A and (A -> B) & FB As an example of the FA. B B) OB type of puzzles that [OT] produces consider p5. Grannie killed the vicar. Grannie repented for having killed the vicar The problem with putative entailments such as p5 is that, while we are ordinarily (with the context duly flashed out) inclined to agree that Grannie ought to repent, we don’t want to agree to have killed the vicar. that Grannie ought The problem turns essentially however on the availability of [OT] in place of [RM], for p5 is not a provable entailment of the underlying logical theory (and there is little case for it one), trying to make sc [RM] does not apply to p5, in contrast with awkwardness [OT] appears to require, of having somehow entailment, is thereby straightforwardly avoided.33 Most the of paradoxes falling paradoxes and Robber paradoxes can be paradoxes and usual forms of these resolution. one’s According helping a man under such to deny descriptions as similarly resolved or avoided. variations upon [OT]. The is that p5 Good Samaritan an The original them certainly succumb to such to the Robber’s paradox if robbing a man is forbidden then The Good Samaritan whom one has robbed is also forbidden. paradox is a further turn on this paradox: not only the robber’s helping a man he has robbed is wrong, so is someone else’s, a good Samaritan’s, helping the robbed man (see Prior 58). - be It is undoubtedly paradoxical that it should - especially as a matter of logic wrong to help a man who has been robbed: but do any fundamental deontic �20 principles commit us to such a thing, for appropriate substitutions on variables? No, These puzzles all take the following form: B, which describes something they do not. admittedly wrong, gets in or implied as part of the description of something larger, A, arising as a result of the situation in B; however A is not wrong but perhaps even Nothing required. theory; and in none of shows this the however that A B literature can examples in the the provable in is it There be. logical is another important feature, commonly neglected however, which is that A does not assert B. If it did, then A, since amounting to A & B, would appear to be wrong also, as B is. This points to a difficulty also for the usual assumption that A entails B; for then A (certainly modally) coentails A & B, whence the wrongness of A coincides with that of A & B, the wrongness of which would seem to be guaranteed by B. If however A only involves B in a weaker sense, [OT] is exonerated.3^ The paradoxes can be pushed another way, to contest this data, and bear against systems as minimal as MD. For MD yields theorems like the following: T5. FB T6. 0( F(A & B), whence if FB then F(A & B). OB, whence if 0(A & B) then OB. &B) theses, Such minimal it is now suggested, are paradoxical in the same way as the Robber. This is not so: only gross confusion of decidedly distinct syntactical forms - a practice formalisation can unfortunately encourage - could support such a suggestion. If it is wrong to rob a man then it is wrong to rob him and help him;35 but it is not thereby wrong to help him, indeed to help him who has been robbed. But the relative and the tense shift are both important; and the whole relative clause in no way reduces to a conjunction conjoining robbing the man. The positivistic objection that the paradoxes of deontic logic show that there is really no ’’logic of norms” has come even from a modern founder of deontic logic, von Wright. This he now contends that There is no such thing as an "entailment” between a norm Op and a norm 0(p q) - and Ross’s paradox makes us aware of the absurdity of talking as though it existed. ... Ross was right when he offered his paradox as a proof that, properly understood, there could not be such a thing as a logic of norms (82, p.15, rearranged, emphasis suggested in text). And he ’essentially (p.14). (also also But mistakenly) of variations given that one regards and the von Wright contains such normative tautologies Op are inevitable. Thus while ’’paradoxes’* the same, viz. wants also the of deontic so-called to supply logic as Ross’s Paradox’ a deontic logic, which 0(p q), some subtle and dubious distinctions Op & ~0(p q) is normatively inconsistent, inconsistent; while Op can be thus said to ’’normatively entail” 0(p q) it is not it does not; and while Op comes rational commitment to Op, it does not carry logical commitment to �it. the Unlike said are connections associated to and entailment (p.15). no paradoxes induce other But normative these relations, what is said go to for normative entailment can be said as well as regards entailment, that one (e.g. a law giver) is Op adopts who rationally to 0(p q) going on to endorse the entailment of 0(p q) by Op. for a oitrary addition away there is no puzzle in associations are cleared once mistaken modal q. Indeed committed The ’’paradoxes” of deontic logic are not a reflection of the illusory notion of a logic of norms but rather a product of a modal logic of norm. However von Wright has other significant reasons for insisting that (in a sense) ’norms have no logic or that normative discourse is ’’alogical”’ from noncognitivism, that symbolising norms, formulas’, ’prescriptive standard a on One derives (p.4). interpretation deontic ’do not express true and false propositions. It makes no sense to speak of relations of contradiction or entailment between formulas when thus interpreted ’ hold nontruthvalued regards as semantical This is not so: (p.4). theory relevant as such discourse, for sketched logical relations such as inconsistency logic deontic carries no commitment to the position that normative discourse is truthvalued. 0 interpreted In imperatives. fact ineradicable The values 1 and by way of holding are not intended to be tied to truth and falsity, except at the factual world T (see RLR1); and that exception is readily removed. judgements, instead normative received, logic the both (the point requirements e.g. Otherwise the etc.). adjustments the and of the form Fp, semantical can be said to be in theory its ’’semantical” is developed, For force (or is as before. With such minor theory conform to noncognitivist to meet von Wright’s argument, in Morscher, pp.97-8). Von Wright’s other reason for coming out against a logic of norms is but grist It is that ’there cannot be a logic of norms because a for the paraconsistent nill. could enjoin contradictory legislator (at ’’relative least serves" Morscher, ...) dilemmas. it but p.98). to the is normal not states of affairs. This might be irrational purpose which the institution of giving orders logically excluded, it is not alogical’ (cited in That is, a legislator can set up (usually unintentionally) deontic This is certainly not triviality, by modal-strength indictment, not of deontic deontic logic, It impossible. but logics. of a is simply excluded, Once again the on criticism certain modally-dominated pain of is an approach to it.36 §6. Upsetting the moral consensus: unrealisable obligations, and inevitable wrongs. The theme that there are moral dilemmas, like those cited, which stand, which do not dissolve upon rational reflection, philosophers, 3? and apparently runs agains the consensus among moral certainly upsets dominant positions in ethical theory, notably �22 broadly Kantian positions (built into much contemporary British moral philosophy) and utilitarian positions (which pervade Anglo-American and theory value thinking, especially outside narrowly philosophical circles). Kantian positions suppose that morality is above all a rational procedure of a certain sort (which we tentatively grant), and that rationality requires consistency. Or put differently, but for instance, must be consistent. Thus what is obligatory, equivalent given modal assumptions, ought implies can, OA -> OA, for every A and some Wherever an agent appears to be in a moral dilemma suitable possibility functor 0. this is a matter of appearance only, a moral illusion which will (and must) vanish on further rational reflection.^ This Kantian assumption should be rejected: moral dilemmas are part of the data and no illusion, and no amount of reflection need budge them. By insistence upon consistency requirements, and through failure, consequently, to recognise intractable moral dilemmas, deontological theories have been forced to jump through a variety of different hoops and to weaken considerably their positions. In particular, temporary and moral firm principles are almost invariably weakened to something much more provisional. is experience While important, some revisability of principles in the light of such wholesale weakening of principles is decidedly There is a point then in trying to undesirable, on both logical and moral grounds. expose some of the tangled assumptions on which the weakening is based, and to loosen their grip. The assumptions involved on a Kantian approach include these: H1. Moral principles - in those concerning justice, particular more fairness and the basic principles of obligation, such as like - are to be explained at bottom as principles of rationality, or rational behaviour for persons. H2. Rationality is a matter of consistency; certainly it implies it. H3. Consistency reduces to, or can be accounted for, through possibility. Put together these assumptions yield the theme H4. What is obligatory must be possible - ought-implies-can , for short. So if that gives, so do some of the assumptions. but on moral dilemmas, It does give, not just because of So also then independent grounds. should the assumptions give; and they fail not just on the grounds that they lead to themes like H4. The deeper trouble is that they are based on a super-modal view of things which combines modal assumptions with rational strong The assumptions. combination is important, for once the modal assumptions are rejected, it becomes fairly transparent that the rationality assumptions, whatever their merit, cannot such things as moral framework or system or course of action. rational case, systems: removing much more modal is required assumptions - a than rationality main present uniquely determine Rather there are rival for uniqueness. exercise - In any destroys such �rationality route to ought-implies-can. Finally consistency is neither necessary nor That it is not sufficient is indicated by a variety of sufficient for rationality. consistent worlds which do not conform to minimal rationality requirements. is converse relevant refuted which conform inconsistent worlds by meet rationality requirements (see further RLR and OP). H3 fails, paradoxes induces ~0A -> ~(A ° B), generally is not just that the Modality removed. of paradoxes with entailment, e.g. anything all. from isolated transmitted to are inconsistent is arguments Not only H2 (as a necessary assumptions parallelling proposition impossible inconsistency It modal when consistency of an fails, also is not 40 this indiscriminate way. However to rationality to sufficient reason and the like), and by dialethic theories which standards (e.g. condition) The more impossibility in collapse; ought-implies-can at there are distinct from those supplied by moral dilemmas. counterexamples to the theme, The counterexamples concern obligations (or oughts) which are impossible, in some sense, to realise, counterexamples Op & ~0p) But wrongdoings. most the of possibility Derivatively then (substituting ~p for unrealisable obligations. that wrongs are inescapable, there are many determinates of possibility examples than concern also mere involve, in their logical possibility necessitated (and necessity), and less anemic notions of correspondingly broader notions of original (and p in setting, necessity than a narrow logical necessity). perhaps strained, adaption, and, in any case, they serve to undermine the point and Nonetheless they sometimes admit of, force of the ought-implies-can dictum (which is to link obligation to freedom to do otherwise), and These examples all arise nature, circumstances, its effective use against moral dilemmas. seriously weaken thereby because agents are constrained in one way or another - by fate, the Gods, their past actions - but are not thereby released from their obligations or exonerated from wrong-doing. Consider first very down-to-earth types of counterexample to ought-implies-can, before turning to more high-flown but not altogether dissimilar examples from our barbaric past. ’Suppose that I say "I ought to go and see him, but I can’t because I don’t know where he is”. There need be nothing inconsistent in such a remark; and, yet there would be if "ought” always implied ’’can'” (Hare 63, p.52). same with situation ”’I where ought I've to return driven the this car I’ve car so far borrowed, away that returning it in time to keep a promise’ (Thomason, p.175). but I It is much the can’t”, there is said no chance in a of my Likewise the claim of the person who cannot swim that she ought to rescue the child caught in the current but can't. One traditionally important class of counterexamples derives from the Catholic doctrine of perplexity secundum quid.^ Donegan, in defending what he calls 'the 24 �Hebrew-Christian tradition’, contends that once one has sinned one May be faced with situations from which one cannot escape without further wrong-doing (77, p.152). That ♦ is, one may be so placed (through one’s own fault) that one ought not to perform any of the available actions though one cannot do otherwise. So it is necessary that one act in a way that is forbidden. Protestant thinkers, particular Luther, appear to have considered the human race involved in one grand secundum quid on account of original sin. ’God punished justly sinners who not could otherwise do Luther believed that than sin’ that God and ’provided men with a law they were unable to keep and then righteously damned them for failing to keep it’. 242 The Calvinists also were committed - but through their doctrine of predestination predestined to sin, unpalatable conclusion - to rather they cannot but by suggesting Because conclusions. similar humans are However Calvin attempted to escape this sin. that in some suitable sense are not sinners compelled, that it is somehow possible for them to do otherwise than they do. J Given however the theme of predestination this attempt to escape looks unconvincing. Any stronger determinism that does not also obliterate morality is in a similar Creatures will have obligations which they cannot fulfil because they predicament. are determined and will to do otherwise, sometimes be bound to do wrong. Plainly where this becomes a general and automatic matter, a serious erosion of moral notions such as responsibility, normally linked to obligation, is bound to set in. However isolated cases analogous to those of determinism can occur without such erosion of moral notions (as indeed with moral dilemmas themselves). rigidifying personality and ossifying character are of this gets older Cases of A person as she sort. may build up a personality so rigid that she cannot escape from it. At some point it becomes impossible (at least psychologically) for her to act other than she does, yet on some occasions she ought not to act in the way she does. outcome resembles that with original sin though the route taken Yet even if we grant that the person ought not to have got still we are entitled to our moral judgements; modern morality * The is very different. into such a position, as Pigden puts it, ’an enlightened can allow such violations of ought-implies-can. Classical Greek morality certainly seems to have allowed for such violations. In Homeric ethics a man could be blamed for failings he could not avoid, unavoidable wrong-doing. and so for Subsequently it was taken for granted that impossible moral requirements could be placed upon a hero, yet he could be blamed for failing to meet them. Thus the situation of Agamemnon and of Oedipus, both despite their struggles, despite their awareness of their predicaments and their anguish, were bound, indeed, fated, to act wrongly, and were duly blamed for their wrong-doing. 25 �There have been various attempts to salvage the ought-implies-can theme, through a residual Kantianism. presupposes-can Thus Hare proposes, but does not really work out, an ought- a with theme weaker relation presupposition logical replacing implication (53, p.54); and both Barcan Marcus and Morscher suggest a model theoretic connection: essentially that for OA to hold true A must be satisfiable in some world, and so, modally, A is consistent. But within a relevant setting, the satisfiability is hardly a requirement and does not ensure consistency. constraint, Once again, consistency is only obtained at the cost of other more important connections, such as Nor does Hare’s comparison with presupposition (on p.54) succeed. O-adjunction. the analogy such situations the worked implies-can. as practical question those and dilemmas moral But (pace Hare, p.55) as to what to do not would counterexamples affording If arise in ought- to the question most certainly does arise in many cases. §7. Resolving proceed, in moral any dilemmas, dilemma so far situation be. as can easily are Recipes for what provided, enough decidedly poor recipes have been much canvassed in the literature. how to to, indeed several Among these are deontic ranking recipes, which would have us impose some type of priority ordering on deontic principles, so that consistency is maintained and in every situation there is a dominant rule; defeasibility recipes, which would have us weaken all deontic rules to merely prima facie or other-things-being—equal principles and operate, when things look would going like have wrong, utilitarian by and assessment; pure-chance recipes, which situationally but arbitrarily by such methods as us determine outcomes coin toss. Such recipes fail to meet important conditions of adequacy upon any account of the way resolution is effected, if and when it can be, namely: A1. The account should sufficiently resemble what rational choosers do when they find themselves in a moral dilemma. Many human choosers have moral principles, have not rigorously ordered in such which, as against ranking recipes, a way as to exclude dilemma they situations, and which, as against thorough-going defeasibility recipes, they are not prepared to give Thus, in addition, away or modify when they encounter snags. A2. The principles induce which moral dilemmas are not generally abandoned or qualified, but very often stand. Naturally sometimes moral dilemmas, especially development and revision of principles. if they recur, do lead to moral But the logic of dilemma situations does not force changes or adjustment and none may be made; and typically none will be made, where dilemmas are resolved, resolve dilemmas which they may not be. The assumption that we must is probably a hangover from consistency assumptions, that deontic inconsistency must be removed - whereas all we have to do is act, or do nothing, in 26 �the face of them. Part of what is wrong with the idea of a predetermined ordering of principles, the conflict, and also the they remove is that as with utilitarianism procedures, felt tension, and often anguish, that goes with it. Even if the appeal to priority succeed in some cases, it does not in fact work, and 45 general. For with Lemmon’s complex dilemmas where ordering of principles does not could succeed, in uncertainties enter be can there preassigned no solution moral to the in dilemma virtue of higher-order principles or a given ordering of one’s duties and obligations and the like, because part of the very dilemma is just one’s uncertainty as to one’s actual situation (p.153). In any event dilemmas do not go away as they should if the conflicting obligations were merely prima facie. Very often someone in a moral dilemma is in a fix and feels it^^; and doesn’t say ”My God there isn’t a problem, I must simply look up the book principles are ranked and what’s to be done’, to see how these not having been so prepared. in which we, as it were, merely .... dilemmas in which we morally prepared, have to look up the solution in our private ethical code, are rare ... and in case any of little practical Of interest. are those importance greater dilemmas in this class where some decision of a moral character is required Our predicament is here so described that, whatever we do, even if we do ... nothing at that might mean), we are doing all (whatever something which we ought not to do, and so can be called upon to justify either our activity or our inactivity (Lemmon, p.151). The usual deontological positions, which deontic weaken principles to provisional or prima facie principles to avoid problems with dilemmas, also play into utilitarian hands. reflecting things that of in often is which only are to act overriding requirement character utilitarians want For the for such to represent most a way disguised (a sc part as to of obligation statements concerning distributed, e.g. are the taken coherent way as derivative; net utilities position from would their own the deontic make this Deontic principles such as reduce somehow distributed type of action which tends to maximize utility. accounts typically rule out moral dilemmas: both apart or to tend complex to be an action is obligatory when it maximizes (expected) utility and it is of a recognised cannot they ar . - principles as deontic maximize utility, maximisation principle so only for the most part also). those all maximise utility, and indeed 27 Such reductive for example, an action and its opposite if an action increases utility then its �opposite characteristically diminishes it. if all moral injunctions More generally, answer back ultimately to just one standard, maximum utility, then there can be no real conflict (but etc.). for these It is apparent conflict through failure to calculate correctly, sorts of reasons that the considerable data now accumulated regarding moral try to explain away, to utilitarians deny that there can be So they are in the awkward position of having to dispute, dilemmas. genuine moral and only dilemmas. But how, when stuck in moral dilemmas, do we proceed to reach a decision? For a 47 decision is called for: those in dilemma situations still often have to act. The intuitive procedure in such dilemma situations is not difficult to grasp. terminology is regularly employed, and is instructive. to those the in - dilemmas weighed assessed, are The same Alternatives - outcomes open up, the balance. put in The familiar scales picture, with the scale sensitive to evaluative weights, is helpful - except it that can suggest, weighed against another, whereas there may be as with of justice where one thing is two competing principles or just that there are several. scales the options, In the light of such a weighing up of alternatives, those in dilemmas then determine what they should do, what is best, or satisfactory, ’If ... we are to act here in good faith,we shall recognise in the circumstances . that the dilemma is what it is and make the best decision we can * There is an attempt to then intuitive apply (Lemmon 62, p.151). methods, decision consist which in assessing and weighing the alternative outcomes open, and maximizing or satisizing on these This outcomes. already very looks consequentialist decision theory, which is what, a like preanalytic account of in a qualified way, we shall reach It is in a qualified way for several reasons; not only may no best (or even towards. sufficiently good) outcome be determinable - there is nothing approaching a decision procedure here - but the further decision theory methods apply within moral dilemmas, so they supply, at best, a second best resolution, a first best result requiring removal of moral dilemma constraints and so being ruled out. Those in dilemma unworkable (and situations usually do not resort to anything as mostly arbitrary and often ineffective) utilitarian as complex and assessment procedures. Nor do they surrender to pure chance procedures. A3. The account should not give way to irrationalism, but should adhere to rational decision procedures, which are not necessarily, however, effective. This requirement rules out pure chance methods, which are only appropriate where it is a matter of indifference which way the decision, if any, Even where some resort to methods can give a worse outcome than might be obtained. tie-breaking devices is appropriate, that may dilemma, but rather to some component of the not be situation. Otherwise such goes. to the final Envisage, outcome of a for instance, a decision-tree for an issue where a tie-breaking device such as a coin toss is applied to a high branch and that proves sufficient for rational decision methods to resolve 28 �Then it would be irrational to try to resolve the whole issue the issue concerned. by coin toss. Nonetheless A4. The account should be appropriately situational. That is, the account should be applicable to each situation on its own merits, taking It should not simply be a rule­ detailed account of the features of that situation. for in dilemma cases the rules have ceased to yield a resolution and based account, into a are locked be will fix position. situational, it will not that of situational be involve resort to pure—chance methods. by situation, situational most part, by example) or example by virtue of A3 and A4, though the account Thus, procedures ethics where such ethics Nor is a situational ethics (ethics situation For the of a broader type being recommended. into operation where a moral only go dilemma is reached; in general, deontic rule-based procedures apply. The broad outlines of a satisfactory account are beginning to emerge. Before we consider apply rational decision methods to each given dilemma situation. is how this to be so as account, to be said about the needs For to meet apparent objections. insensitive those accomplished more to in switches language, both FA and A, some options, and yet that, also F~A, that it ought also be that so B, very idea of it should be that B, where B entails We do not however go on to one of A and -A, so that not both A and ~A are ruled out. claim the is both A and ~A are ruled out as moral that situations, in certain in For are we not only claiming that decision-theoretic resolution of moral dilemmas. for structure of the things, there is, to among other contradiction a It should that not both A and ~A ruled are out morally.49 What is being claimed that B, or an adequate thing, is the best thing to do in the constrained circumstances, that B should be done in that sense, net that B is lifted to status obligation enough in the circumstances, by looking at you does not the can B is In brief, <»B, "second-best obligation"). determined (though imply OB. acceptable worlds worlds where B holds which fail to be acceptable. say, if you like, that it is a the best that can be done or good is not going to be When <£>B holds where B When holds, because there are holds is not going to be settled in general by falling back on deontic rules, because in the interesting cases the rules are jammed. But such deontic rules dees not being beyond imply being beyond rational procedures, indeed procedures that may be represented by way of rules (though not controlled by deontic rules). The rational procedures in question are essentially those of decision theory. What is required is a decision as to what can be done in the circumstances; and this can be determined by relevant alternatives. be of something weighing up the expected outcomes and selecting among The selectiin may be of the best in the circumstance; satisfactory in the circumstances. The approach adopted pluralistic, allowing for both maximizing and satisizing procedures. 29 the it may can be Maximizers will �of course argue that it would be irrational to select anything but the best among the alternatives (given that it was conceded to be the best); But satisizers will resist arguments.what such elaborates is what upon we a under do decision done normally this:- Set out the relevant alternatives, action courses of alternative. to us open Select a best, i.e. way - is - merely which in outline the results that the different list to. analysis intuitive more i.e. lead will a in theory Determine the of each likely value with maximum likely value, an alternative or a The basic procedure is childishly simple, but filling sufficiently good alternative. out the details may be extremely difficult or even impossible in a satisfactory way. The in problems, normally order increasing alternatives open, establishing their probability, rankings to them. things these cases, favourable more delineating the assigning values or desirability techniques from decision theory however for doing all There are in are: difficulty, of and in less circumstances favourable guestimates can be made or resort had to fuzzy methods. To descend to concrete applications (where procedures may be clearer than at the theoretical level), consider again the Platonic dilemma discussed by Lemmon, where I ought to return my friend’s gun and also ought not to do so. The alternatives are to return the gun and have the wife shot, or to return the gun avoiding a shooting but thereby breaking an undertaking. the alternative first wife It is certain, in the circumstances, that under the will be shot, highly a undesirable outweighing the lesser undesirability of the second alternative. the value of second Since the expected first, exceeds that of the alternative considerably much outcome, the best thing in the circumstances is to return the gun. However undertaking goes Lemmon to seriously the return ’to gun suggesting that one sacrifices one’s astray in utilitarian considerations’ No doubt (p.152). utilitarian considerations would bring out (could be massaged to bring out, rather) a But the fact is that no consideration (or interpersonal comparisons) similar result. of the utilities pleasures and pains contemplated. ’’critical involves an (whoever Lemmon utilitarian ones. the everybody of (involved they confuses are), the in is made, consequentialist universe, or or even needs whatever), to considerations with be their remotely much narrower Similarly the recipe Hare suggests for resolving moral dilemmas at level”, namely illegitimate resort to assimilation act-utilitarianism of (see, consequentialist e.g. 82, considerations p.43), under utilitarianisms. In certain respects Lemmon’s Platonic dilemma is not a good example of a moral dilemma; tougher in particular, dilemmas, the it is too easily resolved, and so characteristic features of pain, emerge, moral dilemmas can anguish, indecision, get omitted. As thus begins to be divided roughly into two types, easy and hard. 30 Easy �dilemmas are those that are comparatively easy to find a way through eventually, and But hard ones are those that leave people caught in the dilemma so are resolvable. at least uncomfortable irresolvable. they whatever to choose and do, are so in a good sense Though a way-through or a way-out may be charted by decision methods, it is a way that leaves those involved morally uneasy, dissatisfied, or worse. For at the far hard end of the spectrum lie those dilemmas of tragic dimensions. Although consequential decision rationally within moral dilemma theory provides a for model how proceed to situations, by no means everyone confronted with a moral dilemma will apply such procedures in an intuitive way, even though many will. For one thing, there is plenty of scope for bad faith, irrationality and and more generally, for non-rational procedures; and severe moral dilemmas often enough induce non-rational and even paralytic or self-destructive modes in those who are caught in them. another, For there are indirect ways of obtaining the effects of decision theory, analogue decision theory so to say. Counselling, whether through a friend or a professional counsellor, is an important analogue: there the discussive mode helps to bring out eludicating of and assemble alternatives, undesirability of each. the and elements the of the advantages decision and approach, the desirability and theory drawbacks, Alternatively, or as well, these elements may be bought out by reflecting on a range of similar situations and experience there using these cases as some sort of precedent, in particular, for determining value rankings of alternatives open. Moral dilemmas have corollaries for moral ways of doing things. is that perfectibility of the moral scheme of things is impossible. One corollary Any sufficiently rich set of rules risks inconsistency, and will be inconsistent if completed. dilemmas are thus inevitable be; in the larger scheme of things. Moral This is as it should for it is in this way especially that moral development occurs and moral stature is obtained. 31 �^A much earlier version of this paper was presented by the second author at the Australian National University in 1975. Subsequently much of the paper was lost; what survived is largely incorporated in the first three sections, especially §3. However the new version takes over the leading ideas of the initial version. The authors are much indebted for comments and criticism to C. Pigden, R. Goodin and G. Priest. was ^This even true Maliy’s of pioneering system of 1926 which permitted replacement of logical equivalents within the scope of obligation function 0 (see F & Von Wright’s seminal work H p.3). (in 51), which set the pattern for mainstream deontic logic, was explicitly based on the modal comparison of deontic functors with modal functors, and built modal that break the modal systems, exceptional assumptions in at the bottom of the theory. The connection, are deontic systems based on relevant logics on such systems see RLR, chapter 8. ^These paradoxes are explained, obligation, paradoxes of derived and their see modal bases exposed, On the for some of the p.224; and Prior 62, further in §5. considerable literature on paradoxes like those of the Robber and Good Samaritan, see anthologies and the Hilpinen A detailed uniform treatment of especially Vermazen. all these and other deontic paradoxes in the framework of relevant logic is given in RLR II. 4In its equivalent form, Op => ~Fp, i.e. what is obligatory is not forbidden, it is the dubbed ’’Bentham’s Law” by von Wright 81, p.2. 5In a way, furthermore, avoids that the , problems Hare’s and complexities attempt to transfer a levels-resolution to deontic paradoxes would lead to if worked out paradoxes. the compare properly: any In counterintuitively, case, that problems of semantical if we were even ’ought’ is ambiguous levels say, to as to Hare as levels, avoid to some semantical proposes, but tinkering would still be required to fix up a deontic calculus at each level. Moreover, there are good grounds for doubting that the so far ill-characterised and artificial distinction of levels that Hare wants to impose can be satisfactorily made out. For one thing, critical hardly the holds up; level for separation intuitive of the paradoxes intuitive are from the typical of rational or act utilitarian assessments at the upper level, and we can be rational and critical, and ask for why- explanations, at both levels. ^There are various different form, OA, OB -> ^It is this principle can take, e.g. also a rule 0(A & B), and a rather useless material form, OA & OB =>. 0(A & B). tried criticised below. forms however by Schotch and Jennings, p.152; their argument is It is also suggested by Barcan Marcus, p.134., and toyed with by 32 �Williams o In particular Lemmon, taking off from Sartre, has argued this in two important papers, neglected in mere recent philosophical literature on moral dilemmas and moral conflict. earlier Recent British work, in literature that it could logical further the next note). on conflict of values has particular, profitably have taken into ignored account (see Such an uninformed approach is however not uncharacteristic of British philosophy. ^Especially Lemmon’s work 62 and 65. But although Lemmon suggests (in 62, e.g. p.150) that there are no logical problems in accommodating moral dilemmas, including those of the form 0(A & ~A), none of the systems of deontic logic he presents (e.g. in 65), not even the very weak systems, can do so without trivialising. The reasons for collapse are the modal ones already explained. Apart from the work of Lemmon and a few who follow him, work which at least suggests the need for a bridge even if it does not offer so much as good working plans for one, the literature on moral dilemmas tends to bifurcate - into purely philosophical material which does not address the logical issues, and largely logical material which characteristically avoids the crucial moral issue of dilemmas, which the logics espoused cannot handle (and maybe because of that: otherwise the logical literature On the regrettable lack of interaction between deontic logicians disputes the data). and ethicists, the latter being the worse offenders, see also Thomason’s notes. 10 In fact the latter implication of O-transmission could be much weakened for the purpose of the arguments, e.g. the form A B - > OA D OB would serve to make the point. 11 Gumanski 80 affords a good example of the complication resulting, complication readily removed by relevant logic relocation. 12 The argument thoroughtly for this fallacious. ’principle of deontic contingency’ Either an in F & H, p.13, is illegitimate quantificational conversion (from some to all) or a modal confusion (from p & ~p to q & ~q) is used to get from P(p & ~p) for some p - which is all the denial of deontic contingency gives - to Pq, that is, to ’everything is permitted’. 1^For see axiom, (D1) Op =>~0~p, of the standard systems as formulated in F & H, p.13, and use the interdefinability of P and 0, e.g. PB 4 1 ~0~B. There would be little point in presenting features of the epicycling systems of types (iii)-(v) in any detail since all will be quickly dismissed. In any event, details can be found in the Hilpinen surveys 33 (71 and 81), texts which are ir fact �restricted to epicycling positions within the dominant modal paradigm for deontic Even Schotch and Jennings, who do question some minimal principles, remain logics. staunchly the within modal sphere, their as possible worlds and semantics their substitutivity principles reveal. 15 F & H, p.8, in support p.16. This consistency interpretation appears to have extensive Scandinavia. Of course if consistency were meant in a different sense (that of regularity), it would be different. But it is not: see the development in F & H, p.l6ff. 16 Cf. Lemmon: philosophers that ’It ... does the not to seem adoption of have been new morality a associated with the confrontation of a moral dilemma. much by observed an agent ethical by is frequently Indeed, it is hard to see what else would be likely to bring about a change of moral outlook other than having to make a difficult moral decision’ (62, p155). not settled without so to speak Similarly Barcan Marcus (p.12): ’although idealistically, a source of moral motion. dilemmas are is, Moral inconsistency residue, the recognition of their reality has a dynamic force. 17 In 1975 when the paper was first drafted and presented this example was still topical. However at most times in modern human history there are many candidates to substitute for variable V. 18 In the narrow scheme of standard deontic logic, these would be recast in terms of the forbidden functor F, defined as 0~. However in relevant logic settings, it is a further question, not settled by the framework whether W reduces to 0~. * ^Williams 20 are Jim-Pedro example (in 81) is of this type. As there are other war dilemmas, and especially nuclear war dilemmas, so there other violence. pacifist dilemmas, e.g. the problem of violence to prevent greater On nuclear war dilemmas, and on the main pacifist dilemma, see the War and Peace series. 21 For many of the contractual arrangements, isomorphism, known moral dilemmas we consider, especially those there are analogous legal dilemmas. preserving very many important logical generated by For there is a wellfeatures between moral obligations and rights and wrongs and corresponding legal obligations and rights and wrongs. The complexity of legal frameworks, the relatively independent design of using �parts and divine numerous lack of design control legal of likelihood the dilemmas and sources decidedly complexity to high. analogous An is dilemmas moral for consistency, or checks argument considered in render the fjrom the McConnell, p.275ff. pp Lemmon’s final treatment, but (fifth) type of ’’moral dilemma” does so far resist more formal is that the mainly because class concerned description and lacks even clear working examples. so far These are, defies adequate roughly, situations ‘in which an agent has to make a decision of a recognisably moral character though he is completely unprepared ... by his present moral outlook’ and has somehow to fashion a new moral outlook. is There so far of here nothing especial paraconsistent concern. By no means all the types of situations falling under Lemmon’s ’classification of moral dilemmas’ (62, classifying types of first class and p.156) are dilemmas. situation’, ‘moral the classification starts out is nothing dilemmatic about there and which Lemmon about the second, little Indeed the ‘does not wish to call ... moral dilemmas, because [as with the first] in all the cases our moral situation is perfectly clear’ (p.143). The main types of moral dilemmas Lemmon discerns, the third and fourth classes, are precisely those treated in the text. The concurrence even of several different, 23()f course the control is limited. perhaps apparently independent, logical approaches is no sure guide to correctness of an explication or has to answer back satisfactorily to The matter still account. preanalytic principles. 22* In dilemmas, the initial version of this paper three into types (0, 0~; complication was based on a mistake, collapse. are F, a rather F~; and artificial classification of 0,F) was proposed. But this that equation of 0~A and FA would lead to modal And, apparently a more natural and simpler theory does emerge if 0~ and F equated. Naturally definitional than coentailment. More highly equation intensional in this context does not differences between the imply more notions, which there are, remain unaffected. What holds for F does not automatically transfer independently. ^The labels and Jennings. [RM] and [K], convenient to P. Perhaps P should be treated in what follows, are taken from Schotch Note that although symbolically virtually the same as the originals, they symbolize different determinate principles. ^See as well as RLR I, Routley 72, Routley and Meyer 73 and OP. 35 �the 2?Under four-valued American plan for relevant logic * can be semantics, avoided. But here the superior two-valued Australian plan is followed. 2&Though here we simply take the rule over from standard deontic semantics, it can be argued in several ways, explained (though usually for the analogous necessity functor) as in RLR. class of such A, b One way is this:- in situation a, where OA holds, consider the i.e. {C: I(OC, a) = 1}. This gives an initially acceptable set up with respect to a; and indeed would yield the sought rule (with S improved to a but for 1-1 relation) fail, conditions the fact that bo may not be a world because required closure conspicuously We primeness. can however extend though not ba, uniquely, so that world requirements are met. The picture looks like this: S is the composition of the function (from a to b ) and the extension (to the b-’s). The b.’s are the accepted worlds vis-a-vis a. ^The point and role of evaluative step-down is explained in Routley 83. 3°The strategy resembles that earlier in Routley and Meyer 75 in Plainly there is room for other postulates, formulating explicitly dialethic logic. e.g. exploited In virtue of the model theorem Ot, where 0p2 where p2 is not dilemmatic, etc. t is any tautology, such a postulate is guaranteed in standard deontic logic, but it is rightly left as an option in relevant deontic logic, and also in Barcan Marcus. third 31A type of argument for rejecting [KJ is implicit in Schotch and and also in Barcan Marcus, namely that without [K] both moral conflict and Jennings, the Kantian ought-implies-can principle can be retained. That supposes of course that the Kantian principle is a desirable one, worth going considerably out of one’s logical way disaster to retain. [KJ But the is not from the combination of Kantian only in principle involved theory with moral dilemmas: reaching other equally solid and respectable principles than [KJ could be considered for rejection. ^2At this logic and point we do detour analyses of moral beyond our dilemmas, to look critique of modalisation of deontic at some separate puzzles in deontic logic - which have also been used against the idea of a formal treatment of ethics. And the approach we take to these further 36 puzzles - by limiting transmission �in the fashion of weaker, and deeper logics - is largely independent of principles, the reaminder IN short, we could have taken a different approach to paper. of the these transmission puzzles, without varying the rest of the paper. 33 Of course it can be argued that one is storing up problems for (much) later on when the logical theory repenting have fuller a better developed, is much more fully developed, and predicates like those of logical role. so also will be presumably when But the logical theory is the distinctions between types of predicates and those sustaining transmission. 34 It is common practice indict deontic logic by so stating the deontic ’'paradox" that they smuggle in much more than a satisfactory entailment relation could warrant and more even than a modal relation would grant. paradoxes will be presented as arguments Here is an example. These [deontic] against Consider the Good Samaritan paradoxes formulated the "standard" as follows: deontic logics. 1) A is obligated to help an injured criminal 2) If A is obligated to do B then A is obligated to do whatever B entails. (This is a principle of the standard deontic logics.) 3) There could not be an injured criminal if someone did not commit a crime. So 4) A is obligated to bring it about that someone commit a crime. (From 1- 3 by the standard deontic logics.) The So 5) logics are standard deontic (For flawed. 4) is outrageous, though its premisses are not.) Entailment principles do not justify the importing of 'bringing about' in clause 4). 35 And wrong to rob him and not rob him, and so on. Conjunction is not here connexive with one conjunct undercutting another - though connexive deontic logic is what some seem to be seeking. ^Accordingly Morscher's retreat to "rational norms" and "rational legislating" is But unnecessary. presupposed again that a deontic Morscher the grasps key point, that von Wright has logic must contain certain consistency-type principles, and that 'this presupposition need not be fulfilled' (p.98). 37 Schotch and Jennings, community of moral philosophers' philosophy, analysis. where claim 'widespread support for (a) among the (a) is the theme 'that cases of real moral Most likely this claim, like most such sociological claims conflict cannot occur'. in (pp.152-3) is merely impressionistic, and not based on any sort of survey or But we expect further investigation would tend to confirm it. no J Thus, to take just one example: there appears to be a conflict 'One may be in a situation of course in which of principles each of which appears categorically 37 �binding - but natural reflection will ultimately show that one or other must prevail’ Benn (p.5). But examples abound. The reason reflection removes inconsistency is that obligations do not collide. We have it from Kant himself Because however duty and obligation are in general concepts that express the objective practical necessity of certian actions, ... it follows that a conflict of duties and obligations is inconceivable (obligationes non colliduntor). (Metaphysis of Morals, cited in Barcan Marcus, p.323.) But does it world the (merely) practical follow not of without action However necessity. sweeping a but the worlds concering consistency assumption picked out by function not of objective these worlds are, moral dilemmas certainly appear to show, sometimes inconcistent. There are depending what is the explanation can go, various different ways and contractual arrangements a route like that of Hobbes through Rawls will be followed. Given less, taken e.g. granted. for only grounded example, For or preferences given choice individual behaviour, interests a semantical route might be And so on. tried. 110 The inadequacy of modal accounts of inconsistency is explained in detail in RLR, chapter 5. ji -1 These examples and most of those that follow were suggested by C. Pigden, who also supplied the references. HO The first quote is from Kenny, p.75, the second from Skinner, p.7, both of which furnish additional details. 4^Cf. Kenny, p.78. 24/4 According to MacIntyre 66. The situation of Agamemnon and Oedipus are remarked upon in Williams 81, p.80. There there are is not a substantial and cannot literature be general arguing, not entirely universally applicable principles in all circumstances of their application. conclusively, rules for that ranking of Thus, for example, Ross, p.41, also discussed in Barcan Marcus, p.124, Barcan Marcus, p.135, Hare 82, pp.32-4. It seems that such a result would be proved, as regards effective rules, by methods of reversion theory. 38 �^The relevant; points Hare makes concerning anguish remorse and (82, pp.29-30) are they apply also against his own proposal to treat all principles as prima facie. But points concerning anguish and guilt are not decisive; account of how these attitudes arise can be given from for one thing, an modal a angle (cf. the discussion in Barcan Marcus, p.127). ^By no means all dilemmas require resolution, e.g. those of no practical import such as purely theoretical dilemmas of freedom, etc. liberty, These can, in principle, just stand. 48 As Lemmon explains (in 62), really following Sartre, there is considerable scope for bad faith and opting out of our responsibilities here, e.g. pretending that no decision is called for, or that another has preempted the decision, or that the decision is otherwise determined or out of our own control. 49No doubt we could tough it out dialectically, but the basis for doing so is Any lacking. adherence contradictions to calles for especially rigorous justification 500n satisizing decision theory, and the dialectic between maximizers and satisizers, see MS. Fuzzy decision theory is however only in the initial stages of development at present. 5^This is just one of several reasons why Hare’s grand synthesis (in 82) of Kant and the utilitarians, initially appealing in its two level tidiness and simplicity, goes down the philosophical drain. A main reason is that the synthesis is built upon, and incorporates, consistency and modal assumptions, and so is inadequate moral data to be accounted for theoretically (see further War and Peace II). to the �REFERENCES R. Barcan Marcus, 121-136. Journal of Philospohy 77 (1980) ’Moral dilemmas and consistency , * S. I. Benn, ’Public and private morality: clean living and dirty hands’ in Public and Private in Social Life (ed. S.I. Benn and G.F. Gaus), Croom Helm, London & Canberra, 1983, 155-182. A. Donegan, The Theory of Morality, Chigago University Press, Chicago, 1977. D. Follesdal and R. Hilpinen, ’Deontic pp.1-35; referred to as F & H. B. C. logic: van Fraassen, ’The logic of conditional Logic 1 (1972) 417-38. an introduction’ Hilpinen in obligation’. Journal 1971, of Philospohical L. Gumanski, ’On deontic logic’, Studia Logica 39 (1980) 63-75. S. Hampshire (ed), Public and Private Morality, Cambridge University Press, 1978. R.M. Hare, Freedom and Reason, Clarendon, Oxford, 1963. R.M. Hare, Moral Thinking, Conflicts’). Clarendon, Oxford, 1982 (see especially chapter 2 ’Moral R. Harrison, Rational Action, Cambridge University Press, 1979. R. Hilpinen (ed). Deontic Dordrecht, 1971. Logic: Introductory and Systematic Readings, Reide1, R. Hilpinen (ed), New Studies in Deontic Logic, Reidel, Dordrecht, 1981. A. Kenny, The God of the Philosophers, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1979. E.J. Lemmon, ’Moral dilemmas’, Philosophical Review 71 (1962) 139-58. E.J. Lemmon,’ Deontic (1965) 39-71. Logic and the T. McConnell, ’Moral dilemmas and Philosophy 8 (1978) 269-87. logic of imperatives’, consistency in ethics’, Logique et Canadian Analyse 8 Journal A. MacIntyre, A Short History of Ethics, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1966. of �39 A. A. Martino (ed.), Deotnic Logic, Computational Systems, North Holland, Amsterdam, 1982. Linguistics and Legal Information E. Morscher, ’Antinomies and incompatibilities within normative languages’ in Martino 82, pp.83-102. Oxford English Dictionary, Oxford University Press, 1971; hereafter OED. G. Priest and R. Routley, On Paraconsistency, Research Australian National University, 1983; hereafter OP. in Papers Logic, #13, A.N. Prior, Formal Logic, Second edition, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1962. A.N. Prior, ’Escapism: the logical basis of ethics' (ed. A.I. Melden), Seattle, 1958. in Essays in Moral Philosophy, W.D. Ross, The Right and the Good, Oxford University Press, New York, 1930. R. Routley, ’War and Peace I. On the ethics of large-scale nuclear war and war­ deterrence, and the political fall-out’, Discussion Papers in Environmental Philosophy, #5, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University, 1983. R. Routley, ’On the alleged inconsistency and moral insensitivity and fanaticism of pacifism’, Inquiry 26 (1984) , ; also War and Peace II. R. Routley, ’Maximizing, satisficing, satisizing: the difference in real and rational behaviour under rival paradigms’, Discussion Papers in Environmental Philosophy, #10, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University, 1984; hereafter MS. R. and V. Routley, ’The semantics of first degree entailment’, Nous 6 (1972) 335-59. R. and V. Routley, ’Semantical foundations of value theory’, Nous (1983) 441—56. R. Routley and R.k. Meyer, ’The semantics of entailment I’, in Truth, Syntax, and Modality (ed. H. Leblanc) North-Holland, Amsterdam, 1973» pp.199-243. R. Routley and R.K. Meyer, ’Dialectical logic, classical logic, and the consistency of the world’, Studies in Soviet Thought 16 (1976) 1-25. R. Routley and others, Relevant Logics and Their Rivals, Ridgeview, California, Part I (1982) and Part II (1984); referred to as RLR I and RLR II respectively. A. Ryan, The Idea of Freedom, Oxford, 1970. P. Schotch and pp.149-62. R.E. Jennings, ’Non-Kripkean deontic logic’, in Hilpinen 81, �40 Q. Skinner, The Foundations of Modern University Press, Cambridge, 1978. Political Thought, Volume 11, Cambridge R. M. Thomason, ’Deontic logic as founded on tense logic’, in Hilpinen 81, pp.165-175. B. Vermazen, 'The (1977) 1-71. logic of practical 'ought’-sentences’, Philosophical Studies 32 B. Williams, Moral Luck, Cambridge United Press, 1981. B. Williams, 'Conflict of values' in Williams 81, pp.71-82; also in Ryan 79. G.H. von Wright, An Essay in Modal Logic, North Holland, Amsterdam, 1951. G.H. von Wright, ’On the logic of norms/ and actions’, M. Hilpinen 81, pp.3-35. G.H. ven Wright, ’Norms, truth and logic’ in Martino 82, pp.3-20. �TYRANT MOPE ON NOPAL DILEMMAS 1. ethics. 2. Revolutionising Possible heading, why the failure to comprehend moral dilemmas. All these Reading force^'^^e off in other directions. Undoubtedly a great deal of ethics has been messed up by a failure to understand moral dilemmas. ' ... The failure is often reported; for instance human since justifiable claims ... and are rights claims, they be outweighed by other As in all conflicts of moral principles, human rights reasons must be weighed other moral can against one another by an as yet poorly understood and ill-defined process' (Rajfles, p.42). The failure shows up on the apparent clash between doing ethics by way of principles and doing ethics consistency reasons, principles. vor principles break down, through examples. or dilemmatic And examples. examples it is thought for air^. thought to refute A proper approach to dilemmas removes the tension between examples and principles and allows a synthesis to be achieved. 3. Moral rectitude. Now is notion this to be unpacked0 mhere are competing explanations, e.g. 1) in terms of obligation and deontics; 2) by way of consequentialist rectitude decisive. assessment. Pettit to make moral mhen it requires assessment thus 3) Method 1) unless dilemma; otherwise method 2\ rectitude so it is absolute in terms of O. 4. wants This is impossible. Mcjlly's system has no moral dilemmas, since ~fu For it proves trivial deontically. But he also wants to run 0~u^ - at least intentionally. Aquinas denies certain moral dilemmas, e.g. Np & F~p, in the doctrine concerning perplexus simpliciter F & N p.12. 5. Investigate further the connection of permitted and accepted worlds, and commission? This 'possibly permitted' does not involve discussed in NNL. the fallacy of reducing permission * 'permissible to It does tie with the suggested connection of commission and omission through the * function. ��2 6. Is problem of the individual in society, of a person in politics, an organisation or a company of this type i.e. dilemma of freedom? Of. a dilemma that can just stand, like the theoretical also Machiavellian a problem: person in public must (morally?) act evilly sometimes. 7. of PUBLIC distinction The moralities. VS MORALITIES PRIVATE implies that there are two The BASE ARGUMENT against is this: But there are not two. if we acknowledge this conception of morality as requiring some action as the thing to do, how, logically speaking, could there be two moralities0 the thing to do when they conflict? overriding reason for action?^ How could morality then What is provide an Similarly &n utilitarianism single maximisation recipe and results. (/? DOEBN'01 REQUIRE KANTIANISM.) However A can to be subject conflicting public and private claims. Seen this way ^public vs private just generates.heap of further moral dilemmas, and the 2 moralities ^is just shoddy attempt to escape these dilemmas, expedient (i.e. would become n shoves morality out as in the Hinduism resolution dilemmas. of often in a way that’s politically of the way for expediency'1. The 2 moralities * int if pursued this distinction-making attempt at / Something special about public/private case0 Or differently, why are arguments from expedience so much more acceptable in public sphere0 Be^n gives r interest some reasons, but these oughtn't to justify a difference. | public interest DIRTY HANDS PROBLEM (PARADOX) is like GOOD SAM? behalf of the statecommitting murder. Sometimes it is right get one's hands dirty. E.g. Doing such and such on OR just a straight dilemma? to try to succeed, and then it must also be right to But one's hands get dirty from doing what it is wrong to do. And how can it be wrong to do what is right? Or how can we get our hands dirty by doing what we ought to do9 Z M. Walzer, Philosophy and Public Affairs, moral 2, 10°^, dilemma. 164. Op Walzer sees this as a tragic dilemma: p-> q Oq, but 0~q. Example: but really a torturing captured terrorist to extract information to save innocent lives. The problems start from questions of relations between two different moralities. �Conclusion: 8. Conflict conscience 'that, the public to at its most liberal, loyalty, overriding moral liberalism in end. to a On between will stand the individual, tried committed concern for its collective interest, the one hand the individual as a relate this ambiguous model of the a individual and as an autonomous, citadel, on the other, the overriding perverse, wilful obstacles in the way of the general will. to with no gainsaying, and the claims of possessed of liberties that only he himself can waive, by consent; State, equipped society, not T have only to liberal conceptions of what belongs to the private and what to the public, but also to the tension between a morality of principles and one of valued outcomes, which, in my view, is very closely connected with the ambiguity of the model . * ("Renn? 9. Argument for weak paraconsistent position. Morality is a guide to action. Action is consistent. So have to r?l consistencize. ^Inconclusive"1. Like law one consistencizes (e.g. for action^ alright. But that confirms that it is inconsistent in the first place. 10. The difference. fought distinction is, it It hands the opposition its case. is objected, a Simply not so. distinction without a �The following have been redacted from access file (PDF) due to copyright restrictions. • • • • • Letter, unidentified author to Richard, 27 Jul 1984 re Moral dilemmas. (2 pages (1 leaf)) Reference card and handwritten paper, ? Alchourron and Bulygin (1 reference card + 5 leaves) Letter, Charles to Richard, undated re New Studies in Deontic Logic and Castañeda's proposed deontic logic. (2 pages) Cuttings from unidentified publication, The paradoxes of deontic by Hector-Neri Castañeda (page 46-47), and Some main problems of deontic by Jaakko Hintikka 9page 94-96. (2 leaves) Letter, unidentified author to Richard, with annotations by Sylvan?, undated, re Moral dilemmas. (7 leaves) �Ml Although the sorts of examples we have described seem familiar enough, it might well be disputed that they are correctly described as cases of Op and 0~p, or in the alternative representation as cases of Fp & F~p. The main ground for this is the belief that �19. in any such case one of the parties to the conflict is less wrong, and that this one can be claimed to be not really wrong at all. There are however several objections to this move to neutralise the dilemmas (1) First, wrong party. there is no guarantee that there always is a less Both parties may be equally wrong, no way of deciding which is less wrong. Vietnam example; To take and there may be our hypothetical if we withdraw half a million people will die; but if we do not withdraw the war will continue and half a million people will die; clearly the example may be elaborated. There may be no grounds for choice. (2) The fact that one party is less wrong than the alternative is no grounds for saying that it is not wrong at all. In fact the case would normally be described as one of choice between " two evils", two wrong aciwsese©; if one chooses the lesser of two evils, then one still chooses an evil. ing One is simply not justified in claim1 that, where p involves killing 10 people, p is not wrong simply on the grounds that ~p involves killing 15 people, any more than one is in the case of preference theory justified in saying that p, which brings a gift of $10, is not a good thing simply on the grounds that ~p brings a gift of $11. things; (3) They are both good and in our moral case, both are wrong. If we do say this, plainly it will be very difficult to find any moral principles which can be asserted with any confidence universally. In fact it will probably be possible to find hypothetical counterexamples to any statement of the form "All actions of type x are wrong", just by producing a case where p is an action of type x, but ~p is an even worse action. that p, although an action of type x, is not wrong, It will follow so we will have �However, a counterexample. it seems to be important that we should be able to assert such general principles, and doing so gives us an essential way of assessing, morally, (4) Finally, types of actions. the proposed redescription of the case as involving only one wrong element, the one which is more wrong, leaves out an essential feature of such a case, that it is a dilemma, case where one cannot but act wrongly. If we omit this element the case is not properly described, it is falsified; a we may as a result find ourselves unable to explain many resulting features of the situation which result from the conflict, e.g. human behavioural features >n such a situation involving hesitation, doubt, inaction, perhaps anguish and guilt. All these will appear quite irrational. (5) Assigning a priority to our moral rules itself does nothing to resolve the logical problem raised by the dilemmas, (although it may solve the practical problem of how best to act). % For this logical problem iX the problem of how to arrange our logic so as to be able to describe such cases adequately and without falsification or incon-sisteney. Arranging a priority, so that A one alternative can be claimed to be less wrong, does not solve the logical problem, which is that whatever happens will be wrong, that T cannot be identical with I. The consequence that whatever happens is wrong cannot be removed unless as well as a priority assignment one also adopts the principle that what is less wrong is not wrong at all. But this principle leads to inconsistency for then the less wrong action is both wrong and not wrong. To be consistent this method must introduce a new concept of wrong in addition to the old one, say "wrong2" , and the less wrong action can be said to be not "wrong2". But now the original problem is �21. still not eliminated, because the problem was not that whatever be is . happened would /'wrong2" (although this/now false), but that whatever happened would be wrong, which is still true. sort of priority - dominated concept cannot replace, may supplement, the original concept. And this although it �Sf- The problem of classifying these dilemmas. z mainly using the term ’wrong’. We have stated our dilemmas However, it may seem that this is ambiguous, and that it is possible, or desirable, to make a further distinction, between pi inciples which are obligatory and principles which are prohibitory. For wrongs can be due to two very different causes - om^iission or commission. The distinction between obligation and prohibition principles can be explained initially as follows: an obligation principle of the form Op read ’it ought to be the case that p’,Qt is �f ? L ' r jT f'.Jlz.f:? /t/tjyJ /4-< 'it ought to come about that p'. This says that something, p, ought to should happen that p'A, r, happen, an ideal situation I. that is^ that it is a member of & A situation^satisfies Op, Op if p is not in it then, if p is In it ( p eaJ;and violates p's presence satisfies Op, whereas (pZ S?) • £ ["Obligation" Z7 —:----- is ’ being used here its omission or absence violates it. in a somewhat unusual sense, 4 for Lemmon seems to be right in urging that obligations are usually contractual in nature. and contracts may be contracts to do something or to refrain from However, we doing something - hence both positive and negative. must press 'obligation' and 'obligatory' and adjective corresponding to it * into service as a noun ought to be the case that' in order to avoid clumsiness and for lack of any other suitable words. The other class of principles, hand, we shall write prohibitive principles, on the other 'Ep' and read 'it is forbidden that p'. These principles claim that p is the sort of action which should p is not a member of the ideal situation I. be avoided satisfies Fp, situation a such that p Z such that pea violates it. a situation a whereas p's omission or absence satisfies Fp, whereas pSoccurrence or presence violates it. is paralleled on the obligations) The distinction action level by the distinction between action and by that between and inaction, A 'sins of omission' and 'sins of commision' A (which violate (which violate prohibitions). 'I have done those things which I ought not to have done' violating a prohibition but also, and not equivalently, not done those things which I ought to have done', thus 'I have thus violating An obligation is satisfied by doing something, an obligation. a prohibition by failing to do something, by avoiding something. It is important not to confuse 0~p, which says that should happen' or 'that ~p 'It is wrong that p', with Fp which says ’that p should not happen', or it * should not happen that p'. This �distinction is clear, as a scope distinction, in the English reading However the two are continually confused in modal treatments of But deontic logic, since given Modal Muddle p / I = ~p g I. that to say/p should happen is not to say anything about what should not happen but leaves the issue as to whether ~p should or should And to say that p should not happen is not say and 0~p tells anything about ~p,/whether it should happen or not. not happen open. aj us that ~p is a member of I, where.Fp tells us that p is not a member of 1.^ Dilemmas then seem to fall into three classes depending upon whether the principles which lead to them are obligation or prohibition principles^or both. Fp and F~p, Thus we obtain Op and 0~p, and Op and Fp from our examples depending upon how the principles involved are construed^ a<Tprohibitory or obligatory. (A): Dilemmas obtained from prohibition principles, Fp, % F~p1. i.e. cases of We obtain cases of this sort given principles of the * form. — (1) Whenever P satisfies condition C, (Action form: (2) it shouldn't happen that p. action of type x are wrong) it shouldn't happen that p. A Whenever p satisfies condition C', The dilemma is obtained where p satisfies condition C, ~p satisfies condition C'. Jo O F and - ■L Give the semantical reading of 0 and F?and the examples with 'wrong' . Then mention the necessity for distinction between 0~p and Fp. (1) Wrongs divide into sins of omission and sins of commission. (2) These are semantically different. (3) Unless one distinguishes these concepts semantically have the consistency assumption again. Give the readings. one will �10. Examples can also be obtained from two distinct prohibitory These are cases where the state of affairs described principles. (for reasons given by the first by p is really indescribable principle) (for different reasons given by the second principle). able, * (tndesir For/(B) and the state of affairs described by ~p is m^-ally The second category of dilemmas are dilemmas obtained from obligation principles i.e. cases of Op & O~p, for some p. We obtain cases of this sort given principles of the form:(1) Whenever p satisfies condition C, (2) Whenever p satisfies condition C', it should happen that p it should happen that p. The dilemma is obtained when for a given p, p satisfies condition C and ~p satisfies condition C': (C) Finally, so Op and O~p. examples derived from conflicting but not inconsistent moral principles, which urge both that p should occur and that it should not occur i.e. and prohibited. cases of Op and Fp, where p is both enjoined These cases come about where are principles of the following sort: (1) Whenever p satisfies condition C, p should happen. (2) Whenever p satisfies condition C', p should not happen. The dilemma results because one can find cases one and the same state of affairs C and condition C'? e.g. (p) (in T) where satisfies both condition as^our example derived from Lemmon's uAcrw-tt bolew, x gives back the gun and helping a murderer. (p) is a case both of keeping a promise But promises must be kept, so Op holds. However actions which help murderers are forbidden and should not occur; examples, hence Fp also holds. unlike the previous kind, It seems that these sorts of cannot be generated by a single moral principle, but requires two principles which come into conflict. �With a certain degree of artifice we can arrange our examples into these categories, with f A) groups being prohibitions the (fe)groups obligations, and the (C) groups mixed. �It is necessary then to avoid the modal treatment and to But though 0 principles and F principles distinguish 0~ and F. are distinct, 0 and F provide alternatives bases for (semantically) The O-principles correspond semantically to deontic system. inclusion principles,the F formulated principles to exclusion Thus e.g. principles. TRfH 5® where iff iff TROH * , (UH) (TRfH oX(p,H) = f) In contrast, I(Fp,T) = t iff (UH) TROH d Kp,H) Thus the modellingswill mirror f) . one another, with R Rf For the representation of principles then we can work satisfactorily with an O-basis, or with an F-basis, but not with a mixed basis which uses both 0 and F principles. Failure to distinguish 0~p and Fp will provide a ground for the mistaken consistency assumption: iff p i H. for it will follow from evaluation rules �12. The cases described satisfy the characterisation of moral For the principles involved are not inconsistent, yet dilemmas. they are not satisfiable in T. In the case of the first set of leading to Fp and F~p, dilemmas, the principles could not be satisfied unless neither p nor ~p occurred. necessarily complete, But since T is they cannot be satisfied in T. of the second set of examples, Op and 0~p, In the case the principles could only be satisfied if both p and ~p occur, hence since T is con­ sistent, they cannot be satisfied in T. different. The third case is very Here it cannot be satisfied because one and the same proposition satisfies both conditions for occurring and conditions for not occurring? this proposition, hence our principles direct, with respect to that it should occur and that it should not occur. This also cannot be satisfied in T, since p is either a member of T, or not a member of T. The principles involved are not however inconsistent ones; for in each case a finite proposition modelling of the principles can be provided. In the third case, directives, despite the fact there are inconsistent given a contingent proposition p^, which satisfies the antecedent conditions, no inconsistency need result because such a proposition p^ may not occur. In other words, though the principles together with p^ form an inconsistent set, p-^ is essential and can be deleted from the set since contingent; and the set without p1 as the principles on their own are satisfactory is consistent, where no antecedents satisfy both, a po£S»4ta- case. ■ v r • The principles ** (a. though inconsistent in application are not inconsistent^ i In the first two cases(they are T consistent?) also it is a contingent matter that the principles come i ... into^ cannot be satisfied in T; r; for detachment of a contingent truth is made, viz that the given ? proposition satisfies the conditions. �13. since they constantly arise““without sacrificing the generality of moral principles. For unless carefully treated dilemmas will/ as we shall see, provide counterexamples to moral principles. Our moral dilemmas result from judgements which cannot be satisfied in T, so that whatever happens will be wrong. Howe is there/still quite a crucial difference between the first two classes and the third class of dilemma. In the third case the result of the dilemma on detachment of a contingent premiss that p satisfies c and c' simultaneously is an inconsistency, cannot both belong and not belong to the ideal set-up I. since p Although the principles upon which the judgement Op and Fp was based were not themselves mutually inconsistent, moral judgerent they do result in a inconsistent that p both ought to happen and ought not to happen is prohibited from happening. Given that p has both properties, the moral principles concerned are in conflict. This is brought out by the fact that if p does satisfy these conditions, cannot be any situation, T-like or not, there in which the principles are satisfied. Furthermore here we have a case where each moral judgement provides a counterexample to the other. If Op and Fp both obtained, both the principles from which they were derived would be false; principle for Op would provide a counterexample to the prohibitory (p) (if p satisfies c’ then Fp) since Op ~Fp; while Fp would provide a counterexample to the obligatory principle (if p satisfies c then Op). (p) �J \ 14. In view of these points it seems that a moral code which resulted in this sort of conflicting judgement is defective; the principles involved should either be restricted by tightening one or other of conditionsc and c', or else restated by reformulating one or other of the principles, (p) (Cp => F~p) replaced by (p) (C'p => 0~p) . or i.e. either (p) (C'p => Fp) (p) (Cp => Op) is is replaced by the case is reduced to one of the first In short, two cases. In this case the dilemma arises because the principles In the first two cases however involved come into conflict. the difficulty does not arise from conflicting principles, but is simply a case where our not v/ judgements cannot both be satisfied in T, because they are conflicting, but because of the peculiar Where Op and 0~p both hold, nature of T. (or Fp and F~p) what- ever happens will be wrong, because p & ~p cannot both hold in T, The dilemma is however simply explained nor p & ~p fail to hold. and the judg.ements accepted once it is understood that I, situation, action, is not T-like. The dilemma may produce a conflict in because given the logical structure of T and the limitations it imposes upon action, both judgements. it is impossible to act in accordance with But this does not effect the judgements themselves; as moral judgenents, assessments of the moral worth of p of affairs) conflict. (a state of ~p^jthey are quite compatible and there is no To say that p is wrong and that ~p is also wrong is in no way to be inconsistent, true. the ideal and both judgements may very well be The absence of conflict also explains the fact that such cases can be produced from single moral principles, such as 'Killing is wrong', which in no way inhibit internal conflict. �15. Judgements such as 'p is wrong of action or states of affairs; as to how to act in T. alternative in T, Hence Op does not compare p with its ~p. Such judgements are implicitly comparative, not to ~p's worth, but to the Thus if we reach situations as to moral worth of its absence. (using moral criteria for selection), if for every situation H, H+p is worse than H-p. in a situation assess types and do not simply give directions but p's worth is assessed relative, desirability & ~p is wrong' p is wrong If p's presence makes the situation morally worse than it would be if p were absent, then p is wrong. But now it is a straightforward matter to claim that p is wrong and that ~p is also wrong; one is aHL simply claiming that situations without p^orally preferable to the that (should be chosen^etc.); same situations with p * and also situations without ~p are morally preferable to that same situation with ~p in it. These judgements in no way conflict, and if we were in a position to choose a situation with neither of them in, we could satisfy both judgements simultaneously. is the choice must be regarded as a hypothetical one, As it and the judgements as representing a kind of thought experiment, rather than in giving directions as to how to behave in T. The choice embodied in such a judgement is one between two hypothetical situations and not between alternative versions of T. It is just for this reason that this type of moral judgement is adequate for assessing morally different types of actions or sorts of states of affairs. Because we are concerned with choosing between hypothetical situations, we can opine that all actions of a certain specifiable type and states of affairs satisfying a certain condition are wrong (not wrongyetc.), without risking * In the case of Op & 0~p. In the case of Fp & F~p one ismaking a slightly different claim, that a situation from which p's absent is morally better than some in which it is present. Note that the difference between 0 and F can be to the difference in directionthe rankings. �16. falsification because of the contingent features of T. Finally, in such a judgement one is concerned with assessing the action or state of affairs in itself rather than passing judgement about the best way to act in a particular situation. Dilemmas of this sort then, as opposed to dilemmas of the conflict sort first discussed, are not the result of defective moral codes or principles and do not require any readjustment or resolution (beyond psychological acceptance of the fact that it is sometimes inevitable that what happens is wrong and that perfectibility is impossible). They do not provide counterexamples to general In contrast moral principles based on contingent features of T. codes containing the conflict type of dilemma are defective. Any code containing two principles of the form 'wherever p satisfies Cl, Op' and ’Whenever p satisfies C2, Fp’ where C1 and C2 are not inconsistent, will be defective because there is a possible situation (a hypothetical case) with a p^ which satisfies both C1 Whence the inconsistent pair Fp, potentially inconsistent. & Op,. and C2. Any such code is at least This sort of defectiveness of a moral code might be excusable if it were inevitable. But it is not. can be avoided if we adopt either 0 or F as primitive, and state our judgements in terms of one or other of them, but not both. alternative, terms, conflicting is intolerable. moral It The principles stated in No principle could be asserted with any confidence, because they would hold or fail just according to whether or not a suitable proposition with conflicting properties appeared in T and provided a counterexample. And since this is contingent whether such principles hold or not would be entirely a matter of good or bad luck. Moral judgements on the other hand ought to apply beyond T to possible situations, ought to be non-empirical and apply to hypothetical cases, matter of accident. and ought not to hold just as a �4 C ‘S’ -X f * �univeralisa'blemoral principle was a judgement The general ‘ 7^' about types of action or states of affairs and compared p's presence in a situation with its absence from the same situation on a scale of moral desirability. This concept of wrongness is essential to be able to state general moral judgements. But as well as this concept we can distinguish another important concept which is designed to assess not types of action but what is the best course of action in a given situation. This is obtained by comparing p's presence in a situation not with its absence but with the presence of its rivals in a given situation, e.g. ~p in the case of T. p will be said to be ’the best course of action' ~p are both wrong) if a situation Thus (even where p and (usually T), with p in, ranks higher morally then the same one with ~p in. A more practical - concept still can be obtained by comparing p and its practical rivals, say will be the best course of action practical alternative q) f Y r if a situation (as compared with its (usually T) (morally) when p is in it than when q is in it. between alternative ways of extending will rank higher One chooses T. It is important as Lemmon points out to distinguish this concept clearly from the more general concept earlier explained. Lemmon is wrong in suggesting that this is not a moral concept at all and does not give rise to moral judgements but to judgements of expedience. The judgements involved in this case are still moral in the sense that the criteria for ranking situations are �22 specifically moral ones and not based simply, say, on aesthetic considerations or desirability considerations. clear that this distinction Yet it is (which we shall call the distinction between differential obligation and intrinsic obligation) must be ignored and eliminated if obligation is treated as a modal functor For give/} the principle of Modal Muddle (H) (p e H = ~p e H) semantical recipes we have given will be identical. p's presence in H with p's absence (p / H) comparing p in H with ~p's being in H. the To compare will be the same as It is essential however to distinguish this notion of 'best course of action' (differential basic notion we have discussed, because it has quite different properties. * It cannot replace although it can supplement, The reasons are as follows other notion. 02 does not allow for (1) the moral dilemmas. p with its practical alternative in T, e.g. For since we compare ~p, to say that Op & 0~p is to say that a situation H such p e H is morally better than a situation H such that ~p e H, and also to say that a situation H such that ~p e H is better than one such that p e H. This is a (Similar results will ensue when F is taken as a contradiction. basis). (2) 02 cannot allow for general moral judgements of the form "All actions (states of affairs) counterexample. of type x are wrong" without fear of For no matter how compelling our principle and how repugnant the type of action described, we can almost always find a case where the only alternative action is worse. however repugnant p may be, Hence, it will not in this case be wrong, a counterexample to one general judgement will be provided. new notion then cannot do the same job as the old; —----------------------------------------- . and Our it should be , We u^e such as 'the best thing in the circumstances' 'the right thing', 'the correct course all in all' to capture differential obligations . �23. regarded as parasitic, because it can be alternatively represented as admitting the wrongness of the alternatives, but going on to weigh up the alternatives to obtain a recipe for practical action. (3) implies can" slogan It is to this notion that the "ought applies. O2P o locjically possible p, because one has selected p as the best course of action from logically possible alternatives in T. Indeed ’02p’ can be made to imply ‘p is physically possible' (or even physically possible to the person being exhorted) by comparing p with its physically possible alternatives in ranked situations. In a similar way, the concept of blame attaches to failure to follow the best course of action,i.e. if p is better as a course of action than its and one fails to do it. action.* (practical) alternatives, One is not blameworthy for doing p merely only as good as, because p is no better than, i.e. alternatives, one is blameworthy its remaining it has to be worse than some alternative course of It is important to note that blame attaches to this second differential concept of obligation, rather than the first intrinsic notion, for the possibility and obvious unfairness of someone's being blamed for doing wrong where both Op and 0~p hold and he has no alternative which is not wrong would otherwise be a powerful objection to cases of moral dilemmas. (5) Finally, differential obligation makes a basically different type of judgement from the intrinsic notion. not of a type of action or state It is an assessment or of affairs, the action/state of affairs in itself, but of the situation in which it occurs, action in this situation. This is reflected in such phrases as "the best thing in the circumstances" "the right thing to do the conditions obtained at the time)", etc. * Oh well, you cannot be blamed. circumstances . the (given Hence it is not You did the best thing in the �universalisable , and does not try to be. It “results in a recipe for action, and is closely allied to advice or exhortation/orders , persuasion, recommendation or other directed activities. Intrinsic obligation however/ frafc^s no account of possible action and does not need to; it assesses action-types regardless of how they occur in a given situation. This last point is important in connection with argument about moral dilemmas. For the confusion between our two concepts has a disastrous effect on argument, particularly those hotly disputed arguments which occur in the case of moral dilemmas. The following sort of argument, due to confusion between Oi and O2 is all too common in such cases. Actions of type x are wrong (1') (if p satisfies c then Oi~p). (p) This must be Oj because it represents a general and exceptionless (2) p is an action (3) ~ 02 i.e. ~p: (state of affairs) judgement about a type. of type x. p should not be done. Therefore do not do p. The argument is plainly unsatisfactory because the fact that Oi~p holds is not sufficient to establish that 02~p To holds. do this one would have to show that the alternative, p, was not worse or even just as good. not be so. And in cases of dilemmas this may very well To establish 02~p one needs to show not merely that p is wrong but that there is some better course of action. The fallacy derives from trying to base a recipe for action on the intrinsic obligation notion, Oi. �s 25. A closely related confusion holds that it is inconsistent to claim that p is a wrong type of action, that it should be done nonetheless the best course of action. August 6 197 x (e.g. is repugnant etc., but - because it is nevertheless Canberra Times Editorial, on abortion reads as follows: "It is significant, and inconsistent with its official stand that the s ynod should have qualified its recommendation to family doctors with the words "however regrettable we feel this to be"." to be inconsistentthen, one states to be What is being claimed is that one should recommend a course of action (morally) there is no inconsistency. regrettable or repugnant. But of course One is simply saying that ~p is wrong, "Oi-p", but that it is nevertheless the best thing to do given the circumstances because the alternatives are worse?i.e. "O2P"• The distinction between differential and intrinsic obligation, then, seems to be an important factor in assessing the validity of argument where moral dilemmas are concerned. �/, �2 �ft I z^z/ / rt&jZy 7-, I � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Draft Papers Description An account of the resource Sylvan's literary executor encountered an archive in which “all his projects were current", since manuscripts were undated and unattributed. Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document MORAL DILEMMAS AND THE LOGIC OF DEONTIC NOTIONS Richard Routley and Vai Plumwood^ The §1. paradoxes of deontic logic consistency and the and modal requirements. Especially since mid-century many systems of deontic logic have been advanced, which logic of such deontic attempt to explore the prohibition, and wrong. right all Almost which treat deontic notions as modal, notions as obligation, permission and modal not demand functors, All such systems are mistaken m a For deontic functors such as obligation and prohibition are but are more highly of degree greater a systems, i.e. as if strict or provable equivalents are intersubstitutable within them preserving truth. quite fundamental way. systems have been modal these intensional than propositional modal modal than discrimination and so functors, logics can provide. The damage caused by the mistaken treatment of deontic notions as modal shows up in various ways, but we shall be primarily concerned with only one of these, the consistency requirements and the exclusion thereby of moral dilemmas. which the modal damage appears is through a Another way in series of related paradoxes, such as, directly, the paradoxes of derived obligation, and, less directly, the paradoxes of the Robber and the Good Samaritan. The consistency requirements come out in two ways in mainstream deontic systems. consistency Firstly, a negation are requirement, - obligatory in the that usual no claim such is symbolism, Op that ~0~p, both it i.e. and its ~(0p & 0~p) — appears as a principle, frequently a postulate, in all mainstream absolute systems.21 Such absolute systems, which are variants on alethic modal systems, are characteristically obtained from corresponding alethic systems by replacing the modal axiom, that’ or ’it ought to be the case that’, or the functor ’□ ’, modal (such as logics system demands world is ’it is obligatory ’it ought to be seen to that', replaces ’it is necessary that', of alethic systems. We know of course that consistency requirement; some ~0~p - where ’O’, read Op D p, by the deontic axiom, Op the doxastic systems) the standard but it appears that the intended interpretation of deontic the consistency requirement. or encapsulates acceptable subsequently introduced, can be designed without For its semantical equivalent what is permitted (i.e. is that in symbols (Px)STx) which is surely true (for let world x be determined precisely by what is so permitted). Moreover, the second related way in which consistency escaped by a modal formulation of deontic (or doxastic) logics. figures cannot be so For it seems clear, 2 and is widely agreed, that 0 satisfies the following distribution principle: (1) Op&OqiffO(p&q). Since however 0 is modal, and p & ~p & q p&~p (i.e. - the sides are strictly equivalent), 0(p & ~p) iff 0(p & ~p & q) Thence, Op & 0~p implies 0(p & ~p), which implies 0(p & ~p & q), and (2), by (1) which implies Oq; (2) if there are cases of moral dilemmas where Op and also 0~p, i.e. then obligation spreads so that any claim is obligatory. This argument tells against all mainstream deontic logics; rock-bottom system, minimal deontic logic. for it holds in the This logic MDS, presented by von Wright and others (see e.g. Hilpinen 81, p.3 and p.5), adds to classical sentential logic CL (with rules of Material Detachment and Substitutivity duly extended) the one-place connective P, of permissibility, subject to just the conditions P(A v B) e (1’) PA v PB and Intersubstitutivity of provably equivalent CL (i.e. truth functional) wff Now define a connective - in fact the standard obligation Then, where A and B are any CL wff, 0(A & B) OA =£j£~P~A. negation and It then follows, given that (extensional) principles to De Morgan = ~(~P~A & ~P~B). follows), 0 moral claim is dilemmas obligatory, the consequence as above of the nothing functor ) * (2 - thus: OA & OB, upon applying of (1 ) * that P~(—A & —B) (or by variants thereupon that which form OA & 0~A, (extensional) i.e. any permissible. The that is OB, revealing variant argument applies the provable CL-equivalence A & -A = B & ~B to get 0(A & ~A) = 0(B & ~B). d OB & 0~B => OB. Then (in condensed notation) OA & 0~A => 0(A & ~A) => 0(B & ~B) That is, if there are any deontic moral dilemmas (of such forms as OA & 0~A) then everything is obligatory. other forms; But there are moral dilemmas, of this and and not everything is obligatory. incorrect. So too are all its extensions, and Therefore minimum deontic logic is thereby all mainstream systems. For 'most systems of deontic logic include the system’ of von Wright 'as a subsystem' (F & H, p.13). There is little appreciation of the involve in the ethical Hare, having set up a force of these arguments or of what they literature. But one prominent example will dilemma, and rejected one logical have to suffice. route out, proceeds to pronounce that 'it is not very helpful to try to sort out these difficulties by some relatively minor tinkering with the calculus of deontic logic. The linguistic and logical intuitions which give rise to them are all right so far as they go' (82, 3 intuitions behind the mainstream systems are not alright, but lead to The p.28). deontic collapse and to a heap of paradoxes; and a bit of '’tinkering" is enough to remove the worst difficulties.5 (2’) and The trouble lies we shall argue, just with the modal requirement (i.e. its usual extension to all wff). that not everything is obligatory, evident For while it is This leaves much to be defended. on no more than the strength of a few examples (such as that it is not obligatory that everyone visit the tallest eucalypt every day), none of the other assertions is so uncontroversial. Given that there are such moral dilemmas, as will be argued at length, and given that sentential logic CL is admissible when applied to consistent situations (which are all that are elsewhere (in arguments: required RLR in especially), modal the namely, the arguments there are a claim that has been argued above), two only and requirement, one fault the which to points at half of the distributivity principle, specifically r (O-adjunction). OA & OB -> 0(A & B) But it is bizarre to have to fail O-adjunction in order OA & 0~A =5 B has quite especially when OB to stand, 0(A & ~A) to be correctly foundation. And obligation. For, not it contemplated among in the things, is a irrelevant mates 7 desperate measure , systems since it intended role and mainstream against entirely other is conceded that its Faulting O-adjunction rejected. goes it to allow the paradox O-adjunction can be argued is without meaning for from of the semantics of 0, along these lines:- Roughly OA is true iff A holds in all acceptable situations. But if A holds in all such situations and B does also then so does A & B, validating O-adjunction. Accordingly, the trouble must be located in the modality requirements. This can be seen from another angle also. obligation, which also underlies O-adjunction, An important logical feature of is its transmissibility, that what is tightly entailed by what is obligatory is also obligatory; in symbolic form, A ■+ B -o OA -> OB But now, (0-transmission). if entailment is erroneously construed as strict implication, which is what the modal requirement would have us do, then 0(A & ~A) -> OB, since by a paradox of strict implication A & ~A B. If there are moral dilemmas of the form 0(A & ~A), as will be contended, then this result is sufficiently damaging on its own, and focusses the trouble on the modal requirement. properly maligned OA & 0~A ->0B. Otherwise apply O-adjunction, to obtain the 4 the Both and consistency requirements should modality be challenged then by anyone who claims that, for some p, both Op and 0~p (and that such judgements are not merely prima facie, vanishing upon further reflection). Many have argued that such cases do occur, indeed are central examples of value conflict, and are of fundamental importance in ethics.$ We want to go even further and claim, firstly, that such cases occur quite frequently, as cases of conflicting obligations, conflicting rights, and genuine moral dilemmas - so in particular there are many cases where both p and ~p ought to be the case - and secondly, that adequate logical treatment of such cases requires an underlying logic of a distinctively paraconsistent kind. we shall cases has, argue, with many important arguments and cases. many of logic rendered deontic Neglecting such incapable of dealing adequately The matter is particularly serious since fiercely debated moral cases are cases of moral dilemmas, lthe most e.g. limited resources, nuclear war, permissible war tactics. While our initial argument will overlap previous work,9 it goes beyond it by adding a semantical treatment and moral of explanation semantical dilemmas, and in setting adequate deontic logics within the framework of paraconsistent logic. simple The §2. resolution relevant epicycling. classical versus The relevant It has already been indicated. solution to the base problem is disarmingly simple. Abandon the modal assumption, that obligation, permissibility, and so on, are modal This blocks logical equivalents. functors allowing replacement of modal from OCA & ~A), or from OA & 0~A, to 0(B & ~B) and thence to OB. giving up intersubstitutivity are replacement coentailment, not simply just more in contexts; deontic rigorous than lax strict equivalence. intimately - the Spread with What ones. is permitting required is While A & ~A and B & ~B are strictly equivalent, they do not coentail one another. connected modal It does not involve conditions the the move law, That is as much of a fallacy as - one A that would have that a & ~A -> B, contradiction such as A & ~A entails any statement whatsoever. An alternative satisfactory distinctive implciation deontic way then logic of should explaining be in particular of relevant paraconsistent, feature of relevant logics, their and the is solution, simply and through why the a most rejection of the paradoxes of strict Spread. For, as remarked, one logical characteristic of deontic notions such as obligation is their transmissibility; i.e. where A entails B then OA is logically sufficient for OB.10 Then were entailment strict implication it would follow at once by Spread that 0(A & ~A) -> OB, whence by O-adjunction, OA & 0~A -> OB. basis of interpretations straightforwardly on RLR II). of Transmissibility may be independently argued for on the entailment (e.g. as content inclusion), and follows the semantical analysis of obligation to be advanced (cf. also 5 A good deal of effort has already been expended in trying to save mainstream deontic theory from the worst of the difficulties and consistency requirements. Most of through its modal it encounters, the repairs however attempted amount to epicycling: trying to tack theory-saving devices onto the initial theory, rather than questioning any fundamental features of it. Intractable exposed. problems is called What the with so-called minimal the standard system of deontic system already have been logic is in an even worse position than the minimal system, because it adds to the minimal system as an axiom 12 Then any standard system including a moral dilemma, 0(p^ & ~p ), is 13 o o simply inconsistent. For Op => Pp, hence Pp^ & ~Pp-j where p1 is pQ & ~pQ. ~p(p & ~p). Main marketed deontic logics are epicyclic variations on (i) standard deontic logic, being modal attempts to repair defects in earlier prototypes. They include (ii) reductions of systems of type (i) to alethic logics by introduction of a constant ’o’ read, for example, ’the world will be worse off’ or 'punishment ought to cr is the moral sanction or some bad state of affairs. follow’: is defined Then *0' EK-A^cr); i.e. A is obligatory iff the negation of A (non-fulfilment of A, it OA is said) necessitates the sanction. It is usually postulated: -0^. Such reductive frameworks, since they include minimal deontic logic, repeat its defects. (iii) relativistic systems which attempt axiomatise to circumstances, c', conditional of reads ’p is obligatory given, or permission and conditional obligation; thus ’0(p/c) * in notions underlying model being that of conditional the probability. These systems were designed chiefly to avoid the paradoxes of derived obligation to which systems of type really in (as and (i) probability (ii) theory) lead. to But the new operator, /, compensate for implicational connective in the modal framework assumed. so-called "logics of conditional e.g., van Fraassen, p.438 ’... obligation" still lack the is introduced of an adequate So, not surprisingly, these exclude moral dilemmas (thus, it would be more apt to say that we have here a logic of obligation that remains after obligational conflicts are resolved'). (iv) systems which conditional d, such include a modal conditional functor superior to the material­ as a Stalnaker-Lewis-style conditional, conditional deontic notions like those of (iii) can be defined. in terms of which But these systems, since modal, do not escape modal limitations and problems (see further RLR). (v) systems based on a logic of change or action. These systems turn out to be reducible to a combination of absolute systems with tense logics, i.e. 14 to multiply modal systems and so repeat the problems of modal systems. None of these modal types are satisfactory, none can be made so, they amount because of 6 What is at modal assumptions, like consistency requirements, that they all involve. fault is not merely types of systems of this sort, which confine the framework to a worlds possible defect enough, one thereby and but the write in conditions, consistency that is though sweeping consistency interpretation of deontic more logic, that ’principles of deontic logics are conditions of consistency for normative systems’.^ The consistency interpretation - which is deeply entrenched in much ethical theory (especially making no adequate allowance from Kant) deriving that for what is essential fundamentally mistaken, - is moral dilemmas and to morality, the familiar inconsistency of normative systems. Documenting moral dilemmas. Cases of moral dilemmas are, perhaps unfortunately, §3. both familiar and inevitable. perhaps not, and logic theory deontic (including is unfortunate It such for standard deontic approximations rough as utilitarianism) since they have ultimately to be dismissed as inadequate to account for the data. is also often extremely On the other dilemmas. awkward who those for such dilemmas hand, probity, and are a main source of moral change. A moral dilemma occurs when considerations, for instance cannot T situation in act (where such a of which shape cannot, or precisely as way afford real tests of moral worth and 16 is confronted with moral perhaps not directly inconsistent, factual the probably cannot, facts satisfy to principles, binding obtain); principles that is, one so as to or although be satisfied Then the situation T cannot but induce a moral fix. considerations. in moral (but not only when) one the in themselves enmeshed find It in the (probably) meet moral This can come about in two ways, either because of the logical limitations supposedly satisfied by T, in particular its consistency feature (that, whatever p, does not) or through certain contingent features if p holds in T then ~p of T. In what follows we shall concentrate on a major subclass of what are commonly accounted moral dilemmas, those of (paraconsistent) logical interest where what is given or derived are pairs such as OA and OB, WA and WB (i.e. A is wrong and so is B), or the like, where A and B are And incompatible. of particular logical importance are cases where deontically incompatible pairs such as Op and 0~p, Wp and W~p, or the like are guaranteed. The examples of moral dilemmas we consider provide only a small selection from the rich variety of such dilemmas, but hopefully they illustrate that variety. Several of the examples involve more than one moral principle: however some commonly- adopted moral principles generate dilemmas, of one sort or another, their own. pretty much on Consider for instance first principles of the following type: Situations involving the (indiscriminate) killing of numbers of (uninvolved) people should be avoided, should not happen, are wrong - principle at very first approximation of the form (p)(p satisfies condition C + Wp). Applying such a principle, a dilemma results 7 where and occurs a large number of people will be killed, if p obtains or if ~p obtains a large number of people will also be killed. War situations provide obvious examples, with the V(ietnam) dilemma typical. 17 For example, people have described the situation in Vietnam as follows (not that it really is this way): If the Americans withdraw from Vietnam, a large number of people If the Americans stay in (do not withdraw from) Vietnam, will be killed. number of people will withdraw from C. Hence under be killed. Vietnam', Hence, condition satisfies p where p is C 'the Americans withdraw from ~p and the principle both p and ~p are wrong, similar is the company commander's dilemma. of his troops will be killed. a large also i.e. satisfies condition 18 Wp and W~p. Rather If he invades the hamlet, a large number If he does not invade the hamlet the prisoners held Taking p as 'he invades the hamlet', p satisfies C and therein will be killed, etc. ~p satisfies C. Therefore, Wp & W~p. Both p and-not p are wrong; neither would occur The killing does not however have to be of large numbers in an acceptable situation. of people to induce moral dilemmas. variants on the commander's dilemma Favourite regularly wheeled out concern murdering a potential murderer to prevent him killing several other presented people and with the related constrained option killing of some choice situations smaller special person is where a group of people (or creatures) in order to avoid the certain killing of a larger or less favoured group 1Q of creatures. 7 The pacifist's (or differently seen, patriot's) dilemma, which Lemmon draws from on Sartre, concerns the proposition p^: Z goes to war. If Z does not go to war, he help his friends and fails to fellow countrymen when they are in desperate need. Thus ~p-j is wrong, W-p-j , on the principle that so failing to help one's friends and fellow countrymen is wrong. If Z goes to war, he will be involved in killing people he has nothing morally or otherwise against; whence Wp^, on the principle that things which involve such killing are wrong. Therefore again Wp^ and W~pp A different sort of example, again however involving the taking of life in one way or another is the abortion dilemma (as conceived by Anglicans, say). presented as a clash between conflicting rights. to life (i.e. (on that the one part of the should not foetus); have one's In one corner, there is the right in the other, the right to bodily integrity body used against one's detriment for someone else’s benefit) on the part of the mother. where a particular state of affairs is an instance of both so (~p) and will principles. Hence Wp. would deny the mother's right to bodily integrity. Whence adjoining, Wp & W~p. to one's A dilemma results performance of an abortion (p) would deny the foetal right to life. not doing This can be The But Hence W~p. 8 Not so far removed from these examples, particularly when omission is conflated with commission, are environmentally-oriented examples involving sacrifice (broadly construed), for resources. Suppose that we have a duly qualified principle to the effect that things which lead to the feeding of starving people should happen. example the is a dilemma of limited three cases:- First following Suppose also that we have limited resources, and have decided to distribute these as follows: If the coin comes down heads (p), then group A of starving people will be fed. But if the coin does not come down heads (~p) then group B of starving people will be fed. Plainly in an ideal situation both p and ~p will occur, that is the coin will come down heads and it will not come down heads, so that both groups of people will be fed. And if the moral principle cited is correctly applied then a case of Op and 0~p results. course minor Of involved leads to conclusions of the form adjustment of the principle W~p and W—p, whence Wp. For an analogous conservationist * s (or humanitarian * s) dilemma consider the case forest where it ought to happen that the is chopped down, the benefit of the for presently starving (or etc.), and it ought to happen that the forest is preserved by positive action and Op dilemma for the benefit of coming generations (or etc.). 0~p emerges the from of application distinct In this case the The principles. society dilemma, concerns the reform of primitive societies so that they primitive Consider the dilemma of a feminist environmentalist as conform to outside standards. regards Aboriginal On the women. other hand, suppression of women in Aboriginal society should be opposed; on the other hand major western interference in Aboriginal affairs should be avoided; but changing the position of women would constitute major interference. Different examples involving public institution) dilemma, which following:- On the one hand, the be restricted and the funds will principle being the concerns preposition p2: the University The Vice-Chancellor, or rather his advisor on logic, argues opposes the government. both separate principles are the Vice-Chancellor * s (or formulated Wp2, p2 is wrong, students and accordingly). On because the University’s learning in general will suffer the other hand, W~p2, ~p2 (the is wrong because #p# will strengthen the present iniquitous status quo (the principle being states that of affairs which strengthen the present status quo be philosophers, is iniquitous avoided). Therefore, conjoining Wp2 & W~p2» A signifi ant source of moral dilemmas, long observed by afforded by a relatively unrestricted institution of promising, and more generally by parallel institutional arrangements for entering perhaps worth distinguishing two classes of cases. situations, Z is under an obligation into (moral) Firstly, contracts. It is in purely contractual p, because of a contract or promise, and also 9 under an obligation q, because of a (likely different) contract, where q entails or In the second sort of case, Z has promised to do ~p, and hence commits one to ~p. But p also satisfies conditions C, 0~p. it emerges, and Z adheres to the principle (q)(Cq ->0q), whence Op. As an example of the second type consider Lemmon’s simple and dated example, adapted from Plato: A friend leaves me with his gun saying he will be back for it in the evening, and I promise to return it when he calls. He arrives in a distraught condition, demands his gun, and announces he is going to shoot his wife because she has been unfaithful. I ought to return the gun, since I promised to do so - a case of obligation. And yet I ought not to do so, since to do so would be to be indirectly responsible for a murder, and my moral principles are such that I regard this as wrong. I am in an extremely straightforward moral dilemma, evidently resolved by not returning the gun (62, p.148). According to Lemmon the outcome is both Op, where p is ’I return the gun’, and also The 0~p. namely, for first an inference concerning promise-keeping; every q, that q is a genuine promise entails Oq (for genuine promises follows engender obligations), from and p is a immediate genuine promise. inference of the following sort: for every q, The second follows that q really contributes to a murder implies Wq, and that p really contributes to a murder; and moreover, -> 0~q. using an for every q, Wq Even if this last principle is repudiated a dilemma remains: for both Op and Wp, i.e. I ought to return the gun and it is wrong that I return the gun. that the initial principle sustains the conclusion 0~q as well. (It may be In any case, it is not difficult to amend Lemmon’s example so that it does, or more important, so as to render the ensuing dilemma more convincing.) Other dilemmas recur in variant form with contracts and promises. For instance, limited resources dilemmas reappear as follows: we promise all our surplus to a group of poor only to have even poorer people turn up. where one's deception, employment calls or participation in for activities Similarly work and role dilemmas, which are the production of nuclear morally repugnant (such as or chemical weapons), may arise either contractually, e.g. one signed up for the position, or from duty, e.g. to provide for one's family. Some of the moral dilemmas we have made look more determinate than perhaps they should, or than they would be if the circumstances were filled out, or got filled out slightly differently. Then we should find that some of the dilemmas take the form of Lemmon's more complex class, namely those where rather than OA and 0~A, what one has is Prob OA and Prob 0~A, where Prob is the probability functor ’it is probable that'. Lemmon describes this class of "fully dilemmatic situations" in these terms: ’there 10 is some, but not conclusive, evidence that one ought to do something, and there is some, but not conclusive, evidence that one ought not to do that thing’ (pp.152-3). sort of dilemma is again drawn from Sartre: in A real-life working example of this brief, Sartre’s pupil is under some (sort of) obligation to stay with his mother, but he also probably under is an obligation, felt only ambiguously, to join the Free French in England (for a fuller description see Lemmon, pp.153-4). Lemmon suggests that this class of dilemmas is, and perhaps should stay beyond deontic formalisation: however the dilemmas are now within the scope of formalisation of a sort by multiple functor intensional logics of a type not different represent such principles as ’’ought implies can”.22 those already from needed to Though we have presented a wide variety of dilemmas, some of them in some detail - to the dispel that dilemmas common prejudice are a rare phenomena that can be safely set aside or that need not be taken seriously in an ethical theory - we have by no means exhausted the range and wealth of such dilemmas. the extent of analogues practical of these Nor have we indicated the dilemmas; fact is that similar dilemmas are frequent in economics, over budgeting, devaluation (we ought to devalue because ... and we ought not to devalue because ...), and so on. Nor have we brought out the political significance of the dilemmas; but the fact also is that some of the deeper problems in moral and political theory revolve around dilemmas. Familiar examples are issues of (permitting permissiveness interests possibly harming or licence individuals to pursue offending others) and freedom (restricting freedom as regards actions which infringe others * freedom), of paternalism and state authority versus civil liberties, and of democracy as against minority interests. A assortment varied accounts of the where sources of examples is source of moral dilemmas, for moral claims conflict, contractual obligations. Lemmon also in particular and promises, is attracted principles as those morally simplistic that they generally arise greatest (p.150). But he fact that one and the same conflicting directives requiring type, since principle may conflict with or duties, may conflict with one another principle can deliver such removing by an account of this latter underestimates the extent of conflict, and neglects the contract or in e.g. duty with principles, principles with while realising that it will not always suffice, principle important (e.g. double maximization happiness of the greatest number). As well a sufficient variety of tough examples helps remove the illusion that moral dilemmas can one and all be escaped. Admittedly, fortunately, there are ways around some of the dilemmas we have outlined, especially those we have borrowed. with perhaps further around the dilemmas), artifice in setting up the cases (to exclude But lateral moves some of the dilemmas stand: from them (as is further argued in 11 residue ’To insist that there is in every case a solution without is no escape. § 6) there false is the to moral facts’ p.132), Marcus (Barcan a theme she well illustrates with the abortion dilemma. §4. deontic Paraconsistent logic cannot be modal makes it modal treatment the relevant development. logic: An adequate deontic have to be paraconsistent. but will For a modal treatment to accommodate moral dilemmas - which are hard data impossible it makes as dilemmas treat dilemmas impossible to (§3)• A without proper catastrophic collapse (as shown in §1). The of principles standard deontic logic are, however, as added to readily various paraconsistent logics as they are to modal or classical logic - at least this (e.g. OP), in (da Costa negation-weakened namely logic and now distinguished style) logic paraconsistent and For Jaskowski-style discussive logics there are some difficulties; relevant logics. in styles of paraconsistent two of the main for is true particular, the given of rejection can principles, adjunction such logics satisfactorily include O-adjunction, OA & OB -> 0(A & B), which reflects adjunction in for the possible-worlds sentential framework It would seem not; acceptable worlds? logic offers no way of handling of Jaskowski-style the form 0(C & ~C) that result by O-adjunction. properly accommodate dilemmas, for dilemmas concerning obligation, where such as moral clearly principles difficulties; For these require impossible worlds Generally, Jaskowski-style logics are in deep trouble trying to where C & ~C holds. adjunctive full-strength moral dilemmas of logics Negation—weakened hold. they cannot deliver expected deontic also are interconnections, e.g. in the deontic ’’square of opposition”, presented shortly, which depends crucially on normal principles. negation In difficulties. Relevant brief, deontic the reasons types of paraconsistent logics logics can both avoid choosing relevant logics over for (the substantial sets these of other main reasons for which are given in OP) are accentuated still farther as soon as applications, such as to deontic logic, are Accordingly we will assume a relevant logical base, and a relevant semantical made. in what follows. framework, Even so, much of what we say and do can be adapted to other logical bases, e.g. negation-weakened or positive-plus bases. Often a combined syntactical-semantical is approach more fruitful and illuminating than either a syntactical-axiomatic or a semantical approach carried out separately. Each enriches and controls the other.23 Such is the case with relevant logical theory, logic. Even analogue of and so it is with relevant deontic logic, which builds on relevant so, a standard syntactical deontic standard superstructure, relevant logic. beginning logic we normally added can is easier. simply add For an to obtain exact a analogue relevant of the to classical logic, to (what supersedes CL) 12 For minimal relevant deontic logic, MD, the one-place functor 0 - of obligation, as usual read (e.g. ’It ought suitable some to be extending system that’ - is added (the case) B system basic the to some relevant logic of RLR conforms to the usual formation rule: where A is a wff so is OA. however are options at Functor, F read ’It is forbidden that’, is defined thus: ’It is permissible that’, is defined : PA =Df~FA. FA =Df 0~A (cf. OED); and P, read There this stage (as at e.g. stages), can morality, be argued, from directions several other F could oh introduced independently. But this leads to complications that are unnecessary. It 0 The other familiar functors of deontic logic, F and P, are defined in the usual way. ’It is wrong that’ or, less satisfactorily, Functor I). (e.g. from the rationality be of from the meaning or semantics of obligation, from the idea of commitment), that 0 satisfies at least the following requirements:[RM] A -> B -> OA -> OB, i.e. where A + B is a theorem so is OA -> OB. That is to say, where A entails B is provable so is OA entails OB, obligation transmits over provable entailment. Hence the claim that this principle (R7 of RLR II) is a transmission principle. [K] OA & OB regards the i.e. -> 0(A & B), conjunction; or, a conjunction of obligations entails obligation as to adjunction (principle G of RLR II). These two important it put 25 principles, entailment and adjunction, make 0 a a little differently 0 is closed which ensure that 0 is closed under under provable systemic functor (in the sense of RLR II), and ensure that it has a relational (i.e. first order) semantical analysis. The postulates which correspondingly minimally characterise deontic functions F and P now follow by relevant logic upon applying the definitions. They are as follows:For wrongness: A For permissibility : With the A + B -*> functor further B —f> FByFA Q, FA & FB P(A v BH, PAv PA + PB defined F(A v B) QA =Df ~0A, a reduced pb deontic square of opposition follows: 0Ax ...............FA PA^ .............. .QA The opposites are dotted peripheral opposed, as modally, relations of the modal in the way the solid lines show. But the square are bound to be the lost given the 13 the modal (on fact of deontic dilemmas square Prior 62 p.220). see is worth It observing, however, that the peripheral relations can be reinstated through adoption of the so-called consistency scheme OA -> ~FA, i.e. OA + ~0~A; [D] and that the relevant deontic logic that results still excludes the rubbish brought in along deontic standard necessary truths, Nordamericano of that course not (though paradoxes, essentially because paradoxical etc.), deontic obligatoriness the of spread principles are not whereas triviality), incorporate dilemmas. the as degenerate dilemma-permitting The problem with deontic logics which include [D] also cannot they well as logic, Antipodean form we are advocating. is deontic In short, relevant theory can deliver a clean-cut, clean-living, dilemma- available. free (e.g. logic include relevant moral dilemmas systems without without can [D] inconsistency consistently These various logical claims, as to the modal rubbish that is not brought along, can all be made good by application of the semantical theory. The semantics shows what does not hold, as well as further explaining why the principles that hold do. Semantics for MD result upon adding to modellings for relevant logic a two-place relation S, on worlds, which is subject to the following condition W. b and Sbc then Sac, Where a i.e. where world a precedes b (indeed canonically a is contained in b) and world c is accepted vis-a-vis b then c is accepted vis-a-vis a. Given that a is a subworld of b this is evident enough. Distinctive features of the underlying semantical modellings for relevant logic - consisting of structures of the form <T, K, 0, R, *, be sufficiently and, well-known any in are case, explained v> - should elsewhere. These structures differ from the best of those for modal logics, the nonnormal structures <T, K, N, R, v> for the Lewis systems S2 and S3, in the following ways:- The class K of worlds, to which the factual (base) world T belongs, is expanded to include a much more comprehensive class of inconsistent and incomplete worlds; the class N of normal worlds K is in adjusted theorems hold; relation R, to a three-place the class to v(p, sentential a) relation = parameter 1) regular worlds, i.e. worlds; on then and wff. I(A, b) = 1, where all on is subject to a constraint where I is the so that Specifically, where a < b and p holds in a p holds in b, p. Conditions v for every world a and b modelling structures are hereditariness condition extends to all wff; i.e. in symbols, where a 1 then those used in modelling implication, is relaxed from a two-place inclusion of worlds is duly reflected. (written 0 of in K and every such that this b & I(A, a) = interpretation function which extends v to all Inclusion, <, can be added as an extra component of the model structures, but in fact it can be defined thus: a < b =Df (Px 0)Rxab. Finally relevant modellings 14 add to modal modellings a new function, *, in terms of which negation is evaluated, 27 which facilitates the inclusion of inconsistent and incomplete worlds. same role and interpretation as in standard relation S has the The semantical It is employed in the semantical evaluation of obligation functor 0, deontic theory. which is given by the following rule: I(0a, a) = 1 iff, for every world b such that Sab, I(A, b) = 1, i.e. OA holds at world a iff, for each world b accepted vis-avis a, A holds at b.28 The rule is a world relativisation of the idea that what is obligatory is what holds in all accepted worlds. (morally) It is thus an evident adaption of Leibnitzian prescriptions, given the linkages between obligation or moral binding and moral "musts” or imperatives, on the one side, and morally possible and or acceptable accepted worlds, the on other. The for motivation unrelativised connections can be forged at base world T; for there A is (morally) required, I(0A, T) = 1, iff for every b for which Mb I(A, b) = 1 (where Mb =Df STb), i.e. That is, what is required is iff A holds in every (morally) accepted world. what holds in all accepted or received worlds. Other construals of the semantical apparatus are of course open. tempting ideal, temptation (a succumbed to initially) regard the accepted worlds as and Sab as ’b is ideal as seen from c’. to read Mb as 'b is ideal’ i.e. to It is a little But that is like requiring supererogation in cases where the meeting of commitments or obligations is enough: the worlds do not need to be that good but simply to pass, to meet required standards. is worlds. acceptable through A perhaps easier construal than by way of accepted worlds construal That is alright provided the term ’’acceptable” is deployed, as it often is, nonevaluatively : for it is important in the semantical assessment to prescriptions for be able to make an evaluative step—down, to give meaning evaluative expressions nonevaluative terms. in Naturally this does not imply that evaluative notions are naturalistically eliminated, any more than familiar terms, extensional reductions, semantical extensional analysis of intensional implies that intensionality is removed: both are merely pushed down into the not-further-explained apparatus of worlds. Obligation is construed by way of what goes on in acceptable or accepted worlds, not what happens in permissible or permitted directly with the construal of permissibility. one another, but in worlds, because this latter Given modal muddles the two reduce to the more subtle relevant setting star shift is involved in the transfer from accepted to permitted worlds. The (derived) semantical rule for P is this: KPA, a) = ties 1 iff for some b such that Uab I(A, b) = 1, where Uab . b * Sa 15 at base Thus, A is permissible, world T, i.e. I(PA, = 1) iff A holds at some 1, permitted world b; what is permissible is worldwise what is somewhere permitted. modal equation of relations U and S further axioms, deontic the (where namely if Sab (in effect, condition then Sa ) b * (Pb)Sab The corresponds to e.g. guaranteed, is modally by ~0(P & ~p)) by the scheme OA ^PA. Now modal-strength deontic logics typically do include an axiom scheme of the form [D’J OA -> ~PA, i.e. from (alethic) is obligatory is not that permissible, under modal is, Indeed this used to be considered what distinguished deontic ~0~A. assumptions, OA logics what modal on logics the one side, which include a stronger principle analogous to OA -*■ A, and epistemic logics on the other, which were weaker in that [D’J failed. However [D’J, like [D], is deontically incorrect because it rules out consistent inclusion of moral dilemmas; or, to turn matters around, cases where OA & 0~A, [D’]» which or OA & FA, hold counterexample [D]. may seem a little more plausible transform of it on usual deontic definitions. than Similarly these cases refute [D], but is a definitional For what is obligatory is not ipso facto permissible where the obligatory item is also wrong, as in dilemmatic cases. To distance relevant deontic logic from modal analogues, while at the same time demonstrating that relevant theory can encompass moral dilemmas unproblematically , we next assume that some moral dilemmas hold, that is that for some p, both Op and Fp. Since however propositional quantifiers much complicate the semantical apparatus we shall introduce constants into the syntax, and let p^ be the first constant for which a dilemma ensues. That is, a new axiom, extending the logic, is [DD] 0p1 & Fpp i.e. p1 is dilemmatic.3° The modelling condition for [DD], is wd. For each a in 0, for some world x, Sax and v(ppx) = 1= v(ppX ). * This condition, which does not involve T, does not impose nonclassical conditions on normal worlds. Accordingly [DD] is only a weakly paraconsistent requirement; it does not imply that inconsistency protrudes into the factual or regular worlds. Indeed one advantage of the semantics is that it enable proof that dilemmatic judgements can be included without inconsistency. By contrast, modal theories cannot include even one half of [DD] do) without automatically excluding dilemmatic judgements. consideration has a thesis 0p2 for some (either will Suppose the logic under Then for every x in 0 there is some y such that Sxy with p2 set to hold at y. But modally this is enough to guarantee that [D] holds materially, More explicitly, so ~(0A & 0~A) generally, suppose otherwise that in i.e. there can be no such dilemmas. some model the material form of [D] failed; I(OA, then = T) 1 = I(A~O, T), which impossibility at y since I(A, y) = 1 i I(A, y). syntactical problems earlier in 1). even for Although [DD] implies Op^, very weak obligatory is conjured from the fact some for STy yields y This is a semantical analogue of the deontic logics (considered type of modal it does not say, nor does it follow, that OT for any Such modal stupidity as that every necessary and every tautology T (e.g. C v ~C). truth is since automatically removed that relevant in the relevant wash. can be This theory removes such paradoxes as p1 from which 0(A v ~A) would follow modally by 0—distribution (i.e. A v ~A, Again the [RM]). semantics can be applied to establish the point in proper detail. primitive principles of minimal relevant logic are open to challenge, Both the and [K] * Jennings has been disputed by Schotch (in Jennings and 81). The main Schotch- arguments against [K] — which induces what they call ’paradoxes of complete * aggregation essentially turn — automatically avoided on modal deontic by relevant and assumptions, Their theory. accordingly are (p.152, also main point p.154) is that [K] obliterates the distinction between [D] (i.e. Op ~0~p) and [Con] ~0 , i.e. in effect ~0(r & ~r). Their argument depends on construing implication in [D] as material-implication and on strict replacement. ~0~p iff ~(0p & 0~p), i.e. iff ~0(p & ~p) using [K] Then Op and its provable converse, i.e. iff ~0(r & ~r) using p & ~p - . r & ~r and strict According to the relevant approach the trouble is not with [K] but with replacement. the modal assumptions, which are independently objectionable (see 1). Their further argument begins from the premiss that ’we should certainly want to include among our deontic principles the law of moral consistency [Con] across cuts all different things. moral theories’ (pp.153-6). The ... because that principle premiss appears to conflate What cuts across all moral theories is the theme that some things, such as a sufficiently evil state of affairs, are not obligatory, whence ~0s. does cut across all theories is the assumption that there are no moral dilemmas of the form 0(A & ~A), which is what [Con], with not just that there What are theories like properly defined, would imply. those of Lemmon and Sartre It is which include contradictory obligations; it is also that some theorists would want to insist that there is something logically wrong with principles like [Con], e.g. that it doesn’t make sense to talk of the nonobligatoriness of absurdity. Schotch and Jennings do contend that we should allow for moral conflict of the form OA & OB where A and B are inconsistent. their assumptions there [K] stops rejection of are moral dilemmas that yielding Since then B -> ~A, of the 0(A & -A). it follows that on form OA & 0~A. Yet as they Certainly only themselves have reported, the consensus view is that there are (in the end) no dilemmas of the form OA & O~A: insofar, all theories’, ’cuts across then, rejection of dilemmas of the form 0(A & ~[~]A) so, near enough, does rejection of those of the form OA & 0~A. What certainly does not emerge is that there can [K]. The be no deontic logic which takes as a primitive law the principle be can that best if done, subscribe to [K], we is to formalise ethical theories - namely those which do not allow moral certain particular conflicts (p. 156). logics provide decisive counterexamples to this contention. Relevant deontic They can take [K] as primitive: they allow for moral conflict; but they do so by allowing, like Lemmon, for moral inconsistency.31 disconcerting More from flowing the than fundamental difficulties deriving principles, transmission [K] from are allegedly those difficulties include which well-advertised paradoxes of deontic logic. § 5. Resultant on impact other relevant paraconsistent shift. and puzzles of paradoxes deontic theory of the Often cleaning up one logical puzzle in due technical detail has a beneficial effect on surrounding puzzles and on associated problems in the area. Light is cast on, and So it turns out also in the case of moral dilemmas. Among them sometimes solutions are delivered for, a number of other linked problems. are the following puzzles generated by theorems of (relevant) deontic logic. are, the ’’paradoxes of commitment”. Where material implciation => is in first place, defined as usual, e.g. T1. There ~A v ~B, it is a theorem that A ° B 0(B => A), whence if OA then 0(B 25 A), OA sometimes read: A if is then obligatory anything one commits to A, or: ’Doing anything commits us to doing what is obligatory’; T2. FA OCA => B), if 0~A then 0(A = B), sometimes read: if A is forbidden then doing A commits one to doing anything at all, or: ’Doing what is not permitted commits us to doing anything whatever’ readings are proceed from Prior from there interpretation of paradoxes symbols, the The claims read off are paradoxical. 62, p.224). to little justification - reading ’0(A commits one to doing B’. the in and (the quoted in logic this case B)’ as depends, always, depends crucially on - But to on the what has as a commitment relation, e.g. as ’doing A Such a reading which presupposes that material implication is a satisfactory conditional can in no way be sustained (see RLR), and that is the end of the problem. that A then paradoxical guises; and it If, ought to for example, T1 be features disappear. these commitment the case is simply read: if it ought to be the case that either not B or A, then the alleged However puzzles have a tendency to reappear in new puzzles are no exception. Even with conditional 18 terms of obligation applied to a properly defined in obligation conditional, the puzzles in reemerge new forms, example, for genuine (relevant) in is what called ’’Ross’s paradox”, and in related transmission problems. It has been claimed that the principle, OA -> 0(A v B), yielding if OA then 0(A v B) T3. is which T1, to equivalent is Ross paradox principle), - paradoxical to do either A or B, it may be More generally, given OA, obligatory to read a letter but not to read or burn it. there is an obligation example, for because, where the content of B may be totally do to established. (The comment goes beyond what T3 supplies, but that is not material). the in circumstance which obligation the to is set inappropriate A or A similar objection is made to the analogous permissibility principle PA ■> P(A v B), T4. Ross’s paradox, on the alleged grounds that there are examples where A is permissible but A For example, be. not the following it is permissible that to post a takes based on some one application of T4 is said to the paradoxical: letter false proposition the distance implies that it is permissible to post a The assumption that there is some sort of paradox here is letter or kill one’s aunt. however B may the towards that the permissibility of of permissibility killing the consequent one’s The aunt. proposition itself seems to be based on an application, never articulated and quite inadmissible, of Disjunctive Syllogism, distribution, P(~A &. A For PB. (A v b) ■+ B, and what results from P- it may certainly be permissible not to post However it is assuming more than standard deontic logics will grant to the letter. go on ) ~A & to the permissibility of not posting the letter and letter or killing disjunction. one’s aunt, especially given the also either derivation of posting the latter the Still going on remains tempting (and would presumably be warranted by a Lukasiewicz deontic logic analogous to his 4-valued modal logic). But so going on is to no avail in a duly relevant setting, where Disjunctive Syllogism fails: there is no admissible route here to the permissibility of killing aunt, one’s however desirable the act might otherwise be. main The transmission conditional obligation, strict implication, as problems in found also modally derived. an adequate deontic logic are, like those of They come from reliance on material or representation of implication. The worst manifestation of this is that already discussed, deontic trivialisation leading from Op^ and 0~p.| to OB, for any B, in virtue of the provability of p^ & ~p^ => B. But there are variety of lesser manifestations of the same underlying problem, of which the following example (adapted from recent discussion) is just one sort: p4. We have an obligation to feed the starving poor D. There exist starving poor. Therefore, since starving poor, it ought to be by O-transmission, the case it ought that we meet our obligation to feed the to be that there exist starving poor, a 19 that is far from obviously true. deontic logic, for the simple reason presupposition relation, conclusion of transmission problems of modal the that the cannot p4 Such analyses do not entailment. an to rather or implication, (material-) upgraded be plague relevant The many systems all enamate from excessive O-distribution on basis of implications will not them, support in the as following transmission principles typical of orthodox deontic logics, all of which should be rejected: OCA D B) D. OA 3 OB A D B -> OA 3 OB A => B =>. OA => OB. With their rejection a thorny tangle of modally-derived paradoxes is also rejected. There appears however to be an immense temptation to try to impose excessively strong transmission principles; and the same phenomenon to be seen at work in modal contexts can also be observed when a proper entailment is introduced.3^ This occurs, particular, in attempts in to ’’normalise” [RM], to strengthen it a from rule connection to an entailment, for instance, to (the characteristic S3 form) [OT] A + B +. OA + OB; it occurs with analogous changes thereon, and e.g. A-> B. PA PB and A FB + FA, as well with as imported forms of these principles, e.g. OA & (A and (A -> B) & FB As an example of the FA. B B) OB type of puzzles that [OT] produces consider p5. Grannie killed the vicar. Grannie repented for having killed the vicar The problem with putative entailments such as p5 is that, while we are ordinarily (with the context duly flashed out) inclined to agree that Grannie ought to repent, we don’t want to agree to have killed the vicar. that Grannie ought The problem turns essentially however on the availability of [OT] in place of [RM], for p5 is not a provable entailment of the underlying logical theory (and there is little case for it one), trying to make sc [RM] does not apply to p5, in contrast with awkwardness [OT] appears to require, of having somehow entailment, is thereby straightforwardly avoided.33 Most the of paradoxes falling paradoxes and Robber paradoxes can be paradoxes and usual forms of these resolution. one’s According helping a man under such to deny descriptions as similarly resolved or avoided. variations upon [OT]. The is that p5 Good Samaritan an The original them certainly succumb to such to the Robber’s paradox if robbing a man is forbidden then The Good Samaritan whom one has robbed is also forbidden. paradox is a further turn on this paradox: not only the robber’s helping a man he has robbed is wrong, so is someone else’s, a good Samaritan’s, helping the robbed man (see Prior 58). - be It is undoubtedly paradoxical that it should - especially as a matter of logic wrong to help a man who has been robbed: but do any fundamental deontic 20 principles commit us to such a thing, for appropriate substitutions on variables? No, These puzzles all take the following form: B, which describes something they do not. admittedly wrong, gets in or implied as part of the description of something larger, A, arising as a result of the situation in B; however A is not wrong but perhaps even Nothing required. theory; and in none of shows this the however that A B literature can examples in the the provable in is it There be. logical is another important feature, commonly neglected however, which is that A does not assert B. If it did, then A, since amounting to A & B, would appear to be wrong also, as B is. This points to a difficulty also for the usual assumption that A entails B; for then A (certainly modally) coentails A & B, whence the wrongness of A coincides with that of A & B, the wrongness of which would seem to be guaranteed by B. If however A only involves B in a weaker sense, [OT] is exonerated.3^ The paradoxes can be pushed another way, to contest this data, and bear against systems as minimal as MD. For MD yields theorems like the following: T5. FB T6. 0( F(A & B), whence if FB then F(A & B). OB, whence if 0(A & B) then OB. &B) theses, Such minimal it is now suggested, are paradoxical in the same way as the Robber. This is not so: only gross confusion of decidedly distinct syntactical forms - a practice formalisation can unfortunately encourage - could support such a suggestion. If it is wrong to rob a man then it is wrong to rob him and help him;35 but it is not thereby wrong to help him, indeed to help him who has been robbed. But the relative and the tense shift are both important; and the whole relative clause in no way reduces to a conjunction conjoining robbing the man. The positivistic objection that the paradoxes of deontic logic show that there is really no ’’logic of norms” has come even from a modern founder of deontic logic, von Wright. This he now contends that There is no such thing as an "entailment” between a norm Op and a norm 0(p q) - and Ross’s paradox makes us aware of the absurdity of talking as though it existed. ... Ross was right when he offered his paradox as a proof that, properly understood, there could not be such a thing as a logic of norms (82, p.15, rearranged, emphasis suggested in text). And he ’essentially (p.14). (also also But mistakenly) of variations given that one regards and the von Wright contains such normative tautologies Op are inevitable. Thus while ’’paradoxes’* the same, viz. wants also the of deontic so-called to supply logic as Ross’s Paradox’ a deontic logic, which 0(p q), some subtle and dubious distinctions Op & ~0(p q) is normatively inconsistent, inconsistent; while Op can be thus said to ’’normatively entail” 0(p q) it is not it does not; and while Op comes rational commitment to Op, it does not carry logical commitment to it. the Unlike said are connections associated to and entailment (p.15). no paradoxes induce other But normative these relations, what is said go to for normative entailment can be said as well as regards entailment, that one (e.g. a law giver) is Op adopts who rationally to 0(p q) going on to endorse the entailment of 0(p q) by Op. for a oitrary addition away there is no puzzle in associations are cleared once mistaken modal q. Indeed committed The ’’paradoxes” of deontic logic are not a reflection of the illusory notion of a logic of norms but rather a product of a modal logic of norm. However von Wright has other significant reasons for insisting that (in a sense) ’norms have no logic or that normative discourse is ’’alogical”’ from noncognitivism, that symbolising norms, formulas’, ’prescriptive standard a on One derives (p.4). interpretation deontic ’do not express true and false propositions. It makes no sense to speak of relations of contradiction or entailment between formulas when thus interpreted ’ hold nontruthvalued regards as semantical This is not so: (p.4). theory relevant as such discourse, for sketched logical relations such as inconsistency logic deontic carries no commitment to the position that normative discourse is truthvalued. 0 interpreted In imperatives. fact ineradicable The values 1 and by way of holding are not intended to be tied to truth and falsity, except at the factual world T (see RLR1); and that exception is readily removed. judgements, instead normative received, logic the both (the point requirements e.g. Otherwise the etc.). adjustments the and of the form Fp, semantical can be said to be in theory its ’’semantical” is developed, For force (or is as before. With such minor theory conform to noncognitivist to meet von Wright’s argument, in Morscher, pp.97-8). Von Wright’s other reason for coming out against a logic of norms is but grist It is that ’there cannot be a logic of norms because a for the paraconsistent nill. could enjoin contradictory legislator (at ’’relative least serves" Morscher, ...) dilemmas. it but p.98). to the is normal not states of affairs. This might be irrational purpose which the institution of giving orders logically excluded, it is not alogical’ (cited in That is, a legislator can set up (usually unintentionally) deontic This is certainly not triviality, by modal-strength indictment, not of deontic deontic logic, It impossible. but logics. of a is simply excluded, Once again the on criticism certain modally-dominated pain of is an approach to it.36 §6. Upsetting the moral consensus: unrealisable obligations, and inevitable wrongs. The theme that there are moral dilemmas, like those cited, which stand, which do not dissolve upon rational reflection, philosophers, 3? and apparently runs agains the consensus among moral certainly upsets dominant positions in ethical theory, notably 22 broadly Kantian positions (built into much contemporary British moral philosophy) and utilitarian positions (which pervade Anglo-American and theory value thinking, especially outside narrowly philosophical circles). Kantian positions suppose that morality is above all a rational procedure of a certain sort (which we tentatively grant), and that rationality requires consistency. Or put differently, but for instance, must be consistent. Thus what is obligatory, equivalent given modal assumptions, ought implies can, OA -> OA, for every A and some Wherever an agent appears to be in a moral dilemma suitable possibility functor 0. this is a matter of appearance only, a moral illusion which will (and must) vanish on further rational reflection.^ This Kantian assumption should be rejected: moral dilemmas are part of the data and no illusion, and no amount of reflection need budge them. By insistence upon consistency requirements, and through failure, consequently, to recognise intractable moral dilemmas, deontological theories have been forced to jump through a variety of different hoops and to weaken considerably their positions. In particular, temporary and moral firm principles are almost invariably weakened to something much more provisional. is experience While important, some revisability of principles in the light of such wholesale weakening of principles is decidedly There is a point then in trying to undesirable, on both logical and moral grounds. expose some of the tangled assumptions on which the weakening is based, and to loosen their grip. The assumptions involved on a Kantian approach include these: H1. Moral principles - in those concerning justice, particular more fairness and the basic principles of obligation, such as like - are to be explained at bottom as principles of rationality, or rational behaviour for persons. H2. Rationality is a matter of consistency; certainly it implies it. H3. Consistency reduces to, or can be accounted for, through possibility. Put together these assumptions yield the theme H4. What is obligatory must be possible - ought-implies-can , for short. So if that gives, so do some of the assumptions. but on moral dilemmas, It does give, not just because of So also then independent grounds. should the assumptions give; and they fail not just on the grounds that they lead to themes like H4. The deeper trouble is that they are based on a super-modal view of things which combines modal assumptions with rational strong The assumptions. combination is important, for once the modal assumptions are rejected, it becomes fairly transparent that the rationality assumptions, whatever their merit, cannot such things as moral framework or system or course of action. rational case, systems: removing much more modal is required assumptions - a than rationality main present uniquely determine Rather there are rival for uniqueness. exercise - In any destroys such rationality route to ought-implies-can. Finally consistency is neither necessary nor That it is not sufficient is indicated by a variety of sufficient for rationality. consistent worlds which do not conform to minimal rationality requirements. is converse relevant refuted which conform inconsistent worlds by meet rationality requirements (see further RLR and OP). H3 fails, paradoxes induces ~0A -> ~(A ° B), generally is not just that the Modality removed. of paradoxes with entailment, e.g. anything all. from isolated transmitted to are inconsistent is arguments Not only H2 (as a necessary assumptions parallelling proposition impossible inconsistency It modal when consistency of an fails, also is not 40 this indiscriminate way. However to rationality to sufficient reason and the like), and by dialethic theories which standards (e.g. condition) The more impossibility in collapse; ought-implies-can at there are distinct from those supplied by moral dilemmas. counterexamples to the theme, The counterexamples concern obligations (or oughts) which are impossible, in some sense, to realise, counterexamples Op & ~0p) But wrongdoings. most the of possibility Derivatively then (substituting ~p for unrealisable obligations. that wrongs are inescapable, there are many determinates of possibility examples than concern also mere involve, in their logical possibility necessitated (and necessity), and less anemic notions of correspondingly broader notions of original (and p in setting, necessity than a narrow logical necessity). perhaps strained, adaption, and, in any case, they serve to undermine the point and Nonetheless they sometimes admit of, force of the ought-implies-can dictum (which is to link obligation to freedom to do otherwise), and These examples all arise nature, circumstances, its effective use against moral dilemmas. seriously weaken thereby because agents are constrained in one way or another - by fate, the Gods, their past actions - but are not thereby released from their obligations or exonerated from wrong-doing. Consider first very down-to-earth types of counterexample to ought-implies-can, before turning to more high-flown but not altogether dissimilar examples from our barbaric past. ’Suppose that I say "I ought to go and see him, but I can’t because I don’t know where he is”. There need be nothing inconsistent in such a remark; and, yet there would be if "ought” always implied ’’can'” (Hare 63, p.52). same with situation ”’I where ought I've to return driven the this car I’ve car so far borrowed, away that returning it in time to keep a promise’ (Thomason, p.175). but I It is much the can’t”, there is said no chance in a of my Likewise the claim of the person who cannot swim that she ought to rescue the child caught in the current but can't. One traditionally important class of counterexamples derives from the Catholic doctrine of perplexity secundum quid.^ Donegan, in defending what he calls 'the 24 Hebrew-Christian tradition’, contends that once one has sinned one May be faced with situations from which one cannot escape without further wrong-doing (77, p.152). That ♦ is, one may be so placed (through one’s own fault) that one ought not to perform any of the available actions though one cannot do otherwise. So it is necessary that one act in a way that is forbidden. Protestant thinkers, particular Luther, appear to have considered the human race involved in one grand secundum quid on account of original sin. ’God punished justly sinners who not could otherwise do Luther believed that than sin’ that God and ’provided men with a law they were unable to keep and then righteously damned them for failing to keep it’. 242 The Calvinists also were committed - but through their doctrine of predestination predestined to sin, unpalatable conclusion - to rather they cannot but by suggesting Because conclusions. similar humans are However Calvin attempted to escape this sin. that in some suitable sense are not sinners compelled, that it is somehow possible for them to do otherwise than they do. J Given however the theme of predestination this attempt to escape looks unconvincing. Any stronger determinism that does not also obliterate morality is in a similar Creatures will have obligations which they cannot fulfil because they predicament. are determined and will to do otherwise, sometimes be bound to do wrong. Plainly where this becomes a general and automatic matter, a serious erosion of moral notions such as responsibility, normally linked to obligation, is bound to set in. However isolated cases analogous to those of determinism can occur without such erosion of moral notions (as indeed with moral dilemmas themselves). rigidifying personality and ossifying character are of this gets older Cases of A person as she sort. may build up a personality so rigid that she cannot escape from it. At some point it becomes impossible (at least psychologically) for her to act other than she does, yet on some occasions she ought not to act in the way she does. outcome resembles that with original sin though the route taken Yet even if we grant that the person ought not to have got still we are entitled to our moral judgements; modern morality * The is very different. into such a position, as Pigden puts it, ’an enlightened can allow such violations of ought-implies-can. Classical Greek morality certainly seems to have allowed for such violations. In Homeric ethics a man could be blamed for failings he could not avoid, unavoidable wrong-doing. and so for Subsequently it was taken for granted that impossible moral requirements could be placed upon a hero, yet he could be blamed for failing to meet them. Thus the situation of Agamemnon and of Oedipus, both despite their struggles, despite their awareness of their predicaments and their anguish, were bound, indeed, fated, to act wrongly, and were duly blamed for their wrong-doing. 25 There have been various attempts to salvage the ought-implies-can theme, through a residual Kantianism. presupposes-can Thus Hare proposes, but does not really work out, an ought- a with theme weaker relation presupposition logical replacing implication (53, p.54); and both Barcan Marcus and Morscher suggest a model theoretic connection: essentially that for OA to hold true A must be satisfiable in some world, and so, modally, A is consistent. But within a relevant setting, the satisfiability is hardly a requirement and does not ensure consistency. constraint, Once again, consistency is only obtained at the cost of other more important connections, such as Nor does Hare’s comparison with presupposition (on p.54) succeed. O-adjunction. the analogy such situations the worked implies-can. as practical question those and dilemmas moral But (pace Hare, p.55) as to what to do not would counterexamples affording If arise in ought- to the question most certainly does arise in many cases. §7. Resolving proceed, in moral any dilemmas, dilemma so far situation be. as can easily are Recipes for what provided, enough decidedly poor recipes have been much canvassed in the literature. how to to, indeed several Among these are deontic ranking recipes, which would have us impose some type of priority ordering on deontic principles, so that consistency is maintained and in every situation there is a dominant rule; defeasibility recipes, which would have us weaken all deontic rules to merely prima facie or other-things-being—equal principles and operate, when things look would going like have wrong, utilitarian by and assessment; pure-chance recipes, which situationally but arbitrarily by such methods as us determine outcomes coin toss. Such recipes fail to meet important conditions of adequacy upon any account of the way resolution is effected, if and when it can be, namely: A1. The account should sufficiently resemble what rational choosers do when they find themselves in a moral dilemma. Many human choosers have moral principles, have not rigorously ordered in such which, as against ranking recipes, a way as to exclude dilemma they situations, and which, as against thorough-going defeasibility recipes, they are not prepared to give Thus, in addition, away or modify when they encounter snags. A2. The principles induce which moral dilemmas are not generally abandoned or qualified, but very often stand. Naturally sometimes moral dilemmas, especially development and revision of principles. if they recur, do lead to moral But the logic of dilemma situations does not force changes or adjustment and none may be made; and typically none will be made, where dilemmas are resolved, resolve dilemmas which they may not be. The assumption that we must is probably a hangover from consistency assumptions, that deontic inconsistency must be removed - whereas all we have to do is act, or do nothing, in 26 the face of them. Part of what is wrong with the idea of a predetermined ordering of principles, the conflict, and also the they remove is that as with utilitarianism procedures, felt tension, and often anguish, that goes with it. Even if the appeal to priority succeed in some cases, it does not in fact work, and 45 general. For with Lemmon’s complex dilemmas where ordering of principles does not could succeed, in uncertainties enter be can there preassigned no solution moral to the in dilemma virtue of higher-order principles or a given ordering of one’s duties and obligations and the like, because part of the very dilemma is just one’s uncertainty as to one’s actual situation (p.153). In any event dilemmas do not go away as they should if the conflicting obligations were merely prima facie. Very often someone in a moral dilemma is in a fix and feels it^^; and doesn’t say ”My God there isn’t a problem, I must simply look up the book principles are ranked and what’s to be done’, to see how these not having been so prepared. in which we, as it were, merely .... dilemmas in which we morally prepared, have to look up the solution in our private ethical code, are rare ... and in case any of little practical Of interest. are those importance greater dilemmas in this class where some decision of a moral character is required Our predicament is here so described that, whatever we do, even if we do ... nothing at that might mean), we are doing all (whatever something which we ought not to do, and so can be called upon to justify either our activity or our inactivity (Lemmon, p.151). The usual deontological positions, which deontic weaken principles to provisional or prima facie principles to avoid problems with dilemmas, also play into utilitarian hands. reflecting things that of in often is which only are to act overriding requirement character utilitarians want For the for such to represent most a way disguised (a sc part as to of obligation statements concerning distributed, e.g. are the taken coherent way as derivative; net utilities position from would their own the deontic make this Deontic principles such as reduce somehow distributed type of action which tends to maximize utility. accounts typically rule out moral dilemmas: both apart or to tend complex to be an action is obligatory when it maximizes (expected) utility and it is of a recognised cannot they ar . - principles as deontic maximize utility, maximisation principle so only for the most part also). those all maximise utility, and indeed 27 Such reductive for example, an action and its opposite if an action increases utility then its opposite characteristically diminishes it. if all moral injunctions More generally, answer back ultimately to just one standard, maximum utility, then there can be no real conflict (but etc.). for these It is apparent conflict through failure to calculate correctly, sorts of reasons that the considerable data now accumulated regarding moral try to explain away, to utilitarians deny that there can be So they are in the awkward position of having to dispute, dilemmas. genuine moral and only dilemmas. But how, when stuck in moral dilemmas, do we proceed to reach a decision? For a 47 decision is called for: those in dilemma situations still often have to act. The intuitive procedure in such dilemma situations is not difficult to grasp. terminology is regularly employed, and is instructive. to those the in - dilemmas weighed assessed, are The same Alternatives - outcomes open up, the balance. put in The familiar scales picture, with the scale sensitive to evaluative weights, is helpful - except it that can suggest, weighed against another, whereas there may be as with of justice where one thing is two competing principles or just that there are several. scales the options, In the light of such a weighing up of alternatives, those in dilemmas then determine what they should do, what is best, or satisfactory, ’If ... we are to act here in good faith,we shall recognise in the circumstances . that the dilemma is what it is and make the best decision we can * There is an attempt to then intuitive apply (Lemmon 62, p.151). methods, decision consist which in assessing and weighing the alternative outcomes open, and maximizing or satisizing on these This outcomes. already very looks consequentialist decision theory, which is what, a like preanalytic account of in a qualified way, we shall reach It is in a qualified way for several reasons; not only may no best (or even towards. sufficiently good) outcome be determinable - there is nothing approaching a decision procedure here - but the further decision theory methods apply within moral dilemmas, so they supply, at best, a second best resolution, a first best result requiring removal of moral dilemma constraints and so being ruled out. Those in dilemma unworkable (and situations usually do not resort to anything as mostly arbitrary and often ineffective) utilitarian as complex and assessment procedures. Nor do they surrender to pure chance procedures. A3. The account should not give way to irrationalism, but should adhere to rational decision procedures, which are not necessarily, however, effective. This requirement rules out pure chance methods, which are only appropriate where it is a matter of indifference which way the decision, if any, Even where some resort to methods can give a worse outcome than might be obtained. tie-breaking devices is appropriate, that may dilemma, but rather to some component of the not be situation. Otherwise such goes. to the final Envisage, outcome of a for instance, a decision-tree for an issue where a tie-breaking device such as a coin toss is applied to a high branch and that proves sufficient for rational decision methods to resolve 28 Then it would be irrational to try to resolve the whole issue the issue concerned. by coin toss. Nonetheless A4. The account should be appropriately situational. That is, the account should be applicable to each situation on its own merits, taking It should not simply be a rule­ detailed account of the features of that situation. for in dilemma cases the rules have ceased to yield a resolution and based account, into a are locked be will fix position. situational, it will not that of situational be involve resort to pure—chance methods. by situation, situational most part, by example) or example by virtue of A3 and A4, though the account Thus, procedures ethics where such ethics Nor is a situational ethics (ethics situation For the of a broader type being recommended. into operation where a moral only go dilemma is reached; in general, deontic rule-based procedures apply. The broad outlines of a satisfactory account are beginning to emerge. Before we consider apply rational decision methods to each given dilemma situation. is how this to be so as account, to be said about the needs For to meet apparent objections. insensitive those accomplished more to in switches language, both FA and A, some options, and yet that, also F~A, that it ought also be that so B, very idea of it should be that B, where B entails We do not however go on to one of A and -A, so that not both A and ~A are ruled out. claim the is both A and ~A are ruled out as moral that situations, in certain in For are we not only claiming that decision-theoretic resolution of moral dilemmas. for structure of the things, there is, to among other contradiction a It should that not both A and ~A ruled are out morally.49 What is being claimed that B, or an adequate thing, is the best thing to do in the constrained circumstances, that B should be done in that sense, net that B is lifted to status obligation enough in the circumstances, by looking at you does not the can B is In brief, <»B, "second-best obligation"). determined (though imply OB. acceptable worlds worlds where B holds which fail to be acceptable. say, if you like, that it is a the best that can be done or good is not going to be When <£>B holds where B When holds, because there are holds is not going to be settled in general by falling back on deontic rules, because in the interesting cases the rules are jammed. But such deontic rules dees not being beyond imply being beyond rational procedures, indeed procedures that may be represented by way of rules (though not controlled by deontic rules). The rational procedures in question are essentially those of decision theory. What is required is a decision as to what can be done in the circumstances; and this can be determined by relevant alternatives. be of something weighing up the expected outcomes and selecting among The selectiin may be of the best in the circumstance; satisfactory in the circumstances. The approach adopted pluralistic, allowing for both maximizing and satisizing procedures. 29 the it may can be Maximizers will of course argue that it would be irrational to select anything but the best among the alternatives (given that it was conceded to be the best); But satisizers will resist arguments.what such elaborates is what upon we a under do decision done normally this:- Set out the relevant alternatives, action courses of alternative. to us open Select a best, i.e. way - is - merely which in outline the results that the different list to. analysis intuitive more i.e. lead will a in theory Determine the of each likely value with maximum likely value, an alternative or a The basic procedure is childishly simple, but filling sufficiently good alternative. out the details may be extremely difficult or even impossible in a satisfactory way. The in problems, normally order increasing alternatives open, establishing their probability, rankings to them. things these cases, favourable more delineating the assigning values or desirability techniques from decision theory however for doing all There are in are: difficulty, of and in less circumstances favourable guestimates can be made or resort had to fuzzy methods. To descend to concrete applications (where procedures may be clearer than at the theoretical level), consider again the Platonic dilemma discussed by Lemmon, where I ought to return my friend’s gun and also ought not to do so. The alternatives are to return the gun and have the wife shot, or to return the gun avoiding a shooting but thereby breaking an undertaking. the alternative first wife It is certain, in the circumstances, that under the will be shot, highly a undesirable outweighing the lesser undesirability of the second alternative. the value of second Since the expected first, exceeds that of the alternative considerably much outcome, the best thing in the circumstances is to return the gun. However undertaking goes Lemmon to seriously the return ’to gun suggesting that one sacrifices one’s astray in utilitarian considerations’ No doubt (p.152). utilitarian considerations would bring out (could be massaged to bring out, rather) a But the fact is that no consideration (or interpersonal comparisons) similar result. of the utilities pleasures and pains contemplated. ’’critical involves an (whoever Lemmon utilitarian ones. the everybody of (involved they confuses are), the in is made, consequentialist universe, or or even needs whatever), to considerations with be their remotely much narrower Similarly the recipe Hare suggests for resolving moral dilemmas at level”, namely illegitimate resort to assimilation act-utilitarianism of (see, consequentialist e.g. 82, considerations p.43), under utilitarianisms. In certain respects Lemmon’s Platonic dilemma is not a good example of a moral dilemma; tougher in particular, dilemmas, the it is too easily resolved, and so characteristic features of pain, emerge, moral dilemmas can anguish, indecision, get omitted. As thus begins to be divided roughly into two types, easy and hard. 30 Easy dilemmas are those that are comparatively easy to find a way through eventually, and But hard ones are those that leave people caught in the dilemma so are resolvable. at least uncomfortable irresolvable. they whatever to choose and do, are so in a good sense Though a way-through or a way-out may be charted by decision methods, it is a way that leaves those involved morally uneasy, dissatisfied, or worse. For at the far hard end of the spectrum lie those dilemmas of tragic dimensions. Although consequential decision rationally within moral dilemma theory provides a for model how proceed to situations, by no means everyone confronted with a moral dilemma will apply such procedures in an intuitive way, even though many will. For one thing, there is plenty of scope for bad faith, irrationality and and more generally, for non-rational procedures; and severe moral dilemmas often enough induce non-rational and even paralytic or self-destructive modes in those who are caught in them. another, For there are indirect ways of obtaining the effects of decision theory, analogue decision theory so to say. Counselling, whether through a friend or a professional counsellor, is an important analogue: there the discussive mode helps to bring out eludicating of and assemble alternatives, undesirability of each. the and elements the of the advantages decision and approach, the desirability and theory drawbacks, Alternatively, or as well, these elements may be bought out by reflecting on a range of similar situations and experience there using these cases as some sort of precedent, in particular, for determining value rankings of alternatives open. Moral dilemmas have corollaries for moral ways of doing things. is that perfectibility of the moral scheme of things is impossible. One corollary Any sufficiently rich set of rules risks inconsistency, and will be inconsistent if completed. dilemmas are thus inevitable be; in the larger scheme of things. Moral This is as it should for it is in this way especially that moral development occurs and moral stature is obtained. 31 ^A much earlier version of this paper was presented by the second author at the Australian National University in 1975. Subsequently much of the paper was lost; what survived is largely incorporated in the first three sections, especially §3. However the new version takes over the leading ideas of the initial version. The authors are much indebted for comments and criticism to C. Pigden, R. Goodin and G. Priest. was ^This even true Maliy’s of pioneering system of 1926 which permitted replacement of logical equivalents within the scope of obligation function 0 (see F & Von Wright’s seminal work H p.3). (in 51), which set the pattern for mainstream deontic logic, was explicitly based on the modal comparison of deontic functors with modal functors, and built modal that break the modal systems, exceptional assumptions in at the bottom of the theory. The connection, are deontic systems based on relevant logics on such systems see RLR, chapter 8. ^These paradoxes are explained, obligation, paradoxes of derived and their see modal bases exposed, On the for some of the p.224; and Prior 62, further in §5. considerable literature on paradoxes like those of the Robber and Good Samaritan, see anthologies and the Hilpinen A detailed uniform treatment of especially Vermazen. all these and other deontic paradoxes in the framework of relevant logic is given in RLR II. 4In its equivalent form, Op => ~Fp, i.e. what is obligatory is not forbidden, it is the dubbed ’’Bentham’s Law” by von Wright 81, p.2. 5In a way, furthermore, avoids that the , problems Hare’s and complexities attempt to transfer a levels-resolution to deontic paradoxes would lead to if worked out paradoxes. the compare properly: any In counterintuitively, case, that problems of semantical if we were even ’ought’ is ambiguous levels say, to as to Hare as levels, avoid to some semantical proposes, but tinkering would still be required to fix up a deontic calculus at each level. Moreover, there are good grounds for doubting that the so far ill-characterised and artificial distinction of levels that Hare wants to impose can be satisfactorily made out. For one thing, critical hardly the holds up; level for separation intuitive of the paradoxes intuitive are from the typical of rational or act utilitarian assessments at the upper level, and we can be rational and critical, and ask for why- explanations, at both levels. ^There are various different form, OA, OB -> ^It is this principle can take, e.g. also a rule 0(A & B), and a rather useless material form, OA & OB =>. 0(A & B). tried criticised below. forms however by Schotch and Jennings, p.152; their argument is It is also suggested by Barcan Marcus, p.134., and toyed with by 32 Williams o In particular Lemmon, taking off from Sartre, has argued this in two important papers, neglected in mere recent philosophical literature on moral dilemmas and moral conflict. earlier Recent British work, in literature that it could logical further the next note). on conflict of values has particular, profitably have taken into ignored account (see Such an uninformed approach is however not uncharacteristic of British philosophy. ^Especially Lemmon’s work 62 and 65. But although Lemmon suggests (in 62, e.g. p.150) that there are no logical problems in accommodating moral dilemmas, including those of the form 0(A & ~A), none of the systems of deontic logic he presents (e.g. in 65), not even the very weak systems, can do so without trivialising. The reasons for collapse are the modal ones already explained. Apart from the work of Lemmon and a few who follow him, work which at least suggests the need for a bridge even if it does not offer so much as good working plans for one, the literature on moral dilemmas tends to bifurcate - into purely philosophical material which does not address the logical issues, and largely logical material which characteristically avoids the crucial moral issue of dilemmas, which the logics espoused cannot handle (and maybe because of that: otherwise the logical literature On the regrettable lack of interaction between deontic logicians disputes the data). and ethicists, the latter being the worse offenders, see also Thomason’s notes. 10 In fact the latter implication of O-transmission could be much weakened for the purpose of the arguments, e.g. the form A B - > OA D OB would serve to make the point. 11 Gumanski 80 affords a good example of the complication resulting, complication readily removed by relevant logic relocation. 12 The argument thoroughtly for this fallacious. ’principle of deontic contingency’ Either an in F & H, p.13, is illegitimate quantificational conversion (from some to all) or a modal confusion (from p & ~p to q & ~q) is used to get from P(p & ~p) for some p - which is all the denial of deontic contingency gives - to Pq, that is, to ’everything is permitted’. 1^For see axiom, (D1) Op =>~0~p, of the standard systems as formulated in F & H, p.13, and use the interdefinability of P and 0, e.g. PB 4 1 ~0~B. There would be little point in presenting features of the epicycling systems of types (iii)-(v) in any detail since all will be quickly dismissed. In any event, details can be found in the Hilpinen surveys 33 (71 and 81), texts which are ir fact restricted to epicycling positions within the dominant modal paradigm for deontic Even Schotch and Jennings, who do question some minimal principles, remain logics. staunchly the within modal sphere, their as possible worlds and semantics their substitutivity principles reveal. 15 F & H, p.8, in support p.16. This consistency interpretation appears to have extensive Scandinavia. Of course if consistency were meant in a different sense (that of regularity), it would be different. But it is not: see the development in F & H, p.l6ff. 16 Cf. Lemmon: philosophers that ’It ... does the not to seem adoption of have been new morality a associated with the confrontation of a moral dilemma. much by observed an agent ethical by is frequently Indeed, it is hard to see what else would be likely to bring about a change of moral outlook other than having to make a difficult moral decision’ (62, p155). not settled without so to speak Similarly Barcan Marcus (p.12): ’although idealistically, a source of moral motion. dilemmas are is, Moral inconsistency residue, the recognition of their reality has a dynamic force. 17 In 1975 when the paper was first drafted and presented this example was still topical. However at most times in modern human history there are many candidates to substitute for variable V. 18 In the narrow scheme of standard deontic logic, these would be recast in terms of the forbidden functor F, defined as 0~. However in relevant logic settings, it is a further question, not settled by the framework whether W reduces to 0~. * ^Williams 20 are Jim-Pedro example (in 81) is of this type. As there are other war dilemmas, and especially nuclear war dilemmas, so there other violence. pacifist dilemmas, e.g. the problem of violence to prevent greater On nuclear war dilemmas, and on the main pacifist dilemma, see the War and Peace series. 21 For many of the contractual arrangements, isomorphism, known moral dilemmas we consider, especially those there are analogous legal dilemmas. preserving very many important logical generated by For there is a wellfeatures between moral obligations and rights and wrongs and corresponding legal obligations and rights and wrongs. The complexity of legal frameworks, the relatively independent design of using parts and divine numerous lack of design control legal of likelihood the dilemmas and sources decidedly complexity to high. analogous An is dilemmas moral for consistency, or checks argument considered in render the fjrom the McConnell, p.275ff. pp Lemmon’s final treatment, but (fifth) type of ’’moral dilemma” does so far resist more formal is that the mainly because class concerned description and lacks even clear working examples. so far These are, defies adequate roughly, situations ‘in which an agent has to make a decision of a recognisably moral character though he is completely unprepared ... by his present moral outlook’ and has somehow to fashion a new moral outlook. is There so far of here nothing especial paraconsistent concern. By no means all the types of situations falling under Lemmon’s ’classification of moral dilemmas’ (62, classifying types of first class and p.156) are dilemmas. situation’, ‘moral the classification starts out is nothing dilemmatic about there and which Lemmon about the second, little Indeed the ‘does not wish to call ... moral dilemmas, because [as with the first] in all the cases our moral situation is perfectly clear’ (p.143). The main types of moral dilemmas Lemmon discerns, the third and fourth classes, are precisely those treated in the text. The concurrence even of several different, 23()f course the control is limited. perhaps apparently independent, logical approaches is no sure guide to correctness of an explication or has to answer back satisfactorily to The matter still account. preanalytic principles. 22* In dilemmas, the initial version of this paper three into types (0, 0~; complication was based on a mistake, collapse. are F, a rather F~; and artificial classification of 0,F) was proposed. But this that equation of 0~A and FA would lead to modal And, apparently a more natural and simpler theory does emerge if 0~ and F equated. Naturally definitional than coentailment. More highly equation intensional in this context does not differences between the imply more notions, which there are, remain unaffected. What holds for F does not automatically transfer independently. ^The labels and Jennings. [RM] and [K], convenient to P. Perhaps P should be treated in what follows, are taken from Schotch Note that although symbolically virtually the same as the originals, they symbolize different determinate principles. ^See as well as RLR I, Routley 72, Routley and Meyer 73 and OP. 35 the 2?Under four-valued American plan for relevant logic * can be semantics, avoided. But here the superior two-valued Australian plan is followed. 2&Though here we simply take the rule over from standard deontic semantics, it can be argued in several ways, explained (though usually for the analogous necessity functor) as in RLR. class of such A, b One way is this:- in situation a, where OA holds, consider the i.e. {C: I(OC, a) = 1}. This gives an initially acceptable set up with respect to a; and indeed would yield the sought rule (with S improved to a but for 1-1 relation) fail, conditions the fact that bo may not be a world because required closure conspicuously We primeness. can however extend though not ba, uniquely, so that world requirements are met. The picture looks like this: S is the composition of the function (from a to b ) and the extension (to the b-’s). The b.’s are the accepted worlds vis-a-vis a. ^The point and role of evaluative step-down is explained in Routley 83. 3°The strategy resembles that earlier in Routley and Meyer 75 in Plainly there is room for other postulates, formulating explicitly dialethic logic. e.g. exploited In virtue of the model theorem Ot, where 0p2 where p2 is not dilemmatic, etc. t is any tautology, such a postulate is guaranteed in standard deontic logic, but it is rightly left as an option in relevant deontic logic, and also in Barcan Marcus. third 31A type of argument for rejecting [KJ is implicit in Schotch and and also in Barcan Marcus, namely that without [K] both moral conflict and Jennings, the Kantian ought-implies-can principle can be retained. That supposes of course that the Kantian principle is a desirable one, worth going considerably out of one’s logical way disaster to retain. [KJ But the is not from the combination of Kantian only in principle involved theory with moral dilemmas: reaching other equally solid and respectable principles than [KJ could be considered for rejection. ^2At this logic and point we do detour analyses of moral beyond our dilemmas, to look critique of modalisation of deontic at some separate puzzles in deontic logic - which have also been used against the idea of a formal treatment of ethics. And the approach we take to these further 36 puzzles - by limiting transmission in the fashion of weaker, and deeper logics - is largely independent of principles, the reaminder IN short, we could have taken a different approach to paper. of the these transmission puzzles, without varying the rest of the paper. 33 Of course it can be argued that one is storing up problems for (much) later on when the logical theory repenting have fuller a better developed, is much more fully developed, and predicates like those of logical role. so also will be presumably when But the logical theory is the distinctions between types of predicates and those sustaining transmission. 34 It is common practice indict deontic logic by so stating the deontic ’'paradox" that they smuggle in much more than a satisfactory entailment relation could warrant and more even than a modal relation would grant. paradoxes will be presented as arguments Here is an example. These [deontic] against Consider the Good Samaritan paradoxes formulated the "standard" as follows: deontic logics. 1) A is obligated to help an injured criminal 2) If A is obligated to do B then A is obligated to do whatever B entails. (This is a principle of the standard deontic logics.) 3) There could not be an injured criminal if someone did not commit a crime. So 4) A is obligated to bring it about that someone commit a crime. (From 1- 3 by the standard deontic logics.) The So 5) logics are standard deontic (For flawed. 4) is outrageous, though its premisses are not.) Entailment principles do not justify the importing of 'bringing about' in clause 4). 35 And wrong to rob him and not rob him, and so on. Conjunction is not here connexive with one conjunct undercutting another - though connexive deontic logic is what some seem to be seeking. ^Accordingly Morscher's retreat to "rational norms" and "rational legislating" is But unnecessary. presupposed again that a deontic Morscher the grasps key point, that von Wright has logic must contain certain consistency-type principles, and that 'this presupposition need not be fulfilled' (p.98). 37 Schotch and Jennings, community of moral philosophers' philosophy, analysis. where claim 'widespread support for (a) among the (a) is the theme 'that cases of real moral Most likely this claim, like most such sociological claims conflict cannot occur'. in (pp.152-3) is merely impressionistic, and not based on any sort of survey or But we expect further investigation would tend to confirm it. no J Thus, to take just one example: there appears to be a conflict 'One may be in a situation of course in which of principles each of which appears categorically 37 binding - but natural reflection will ultimately show that one or other must prevail’ Benn (p.5). But examples abound. The reason reflection removes inconsistency is that obligations do not collide. We have it from Kant himself Because however duty and obligation are in general concepts that express the objective practical necessity of certian actions, ... it follows that a conflict of duties and obligations is inconceivable (obligationes non colliduntor). (Metaphysis of Morals, cited in Barcan Marcus, p.323.) But does it world the (merely) practical follow not of without action However necessity. sweeping a but the worlds concering consistency assumption picked out by function not of objective these worlds are, moral dilemmas certainly appear to show, sometimes inconcistent. There are depending what is the explanation can go, various different ways and contractual arrangements a route like that of Hobbes through Rawls will be followed. Given less, taken e.g. granted. for only grounded example, For or preferences given choice individual behaviour, interests a semantical route might be And so on. tried. 110 The inadequacy of modal accounts of inconsistency is explained in detail in RLR, chapter 5. ji -1 These examples and most of those that follow were suggested by C. Pigden, who also supplied the references. HO The first quote is from Kenny, p.75, the second from Skinner, p.7, both of which furnish additional details. 4^Cf. Kenny, p.78. 24/4 According to MacIntyre 66. The situation of Agamemnon and Oedipus are remarked upon in Williams 81, p.80. There there are is not a substantial and cannot literature be general arguing, not entirely universally applicable principles in all circumstances of their application. conclusively, rules for that ranking of Thus, for example, Ross, p.41, also discussed in Barcan Marcus, p.124, Barcan Marcus, p.135, Hare 82, pp.32-4. It seems that such a result would be proved, as regards effective rules, by methods of reversion theory. 38 ^The relevant; points Hare makes concerning anguish remorse and (82, pp.29-30) are they apply also against his own proposal to treat all principles as prima facie. But points concerning anguish and guilt are not decisive; account of how these attitudes arise can be given from for one thing, an modal a angle (cf. the discussion in Barcan Marcus, p.127). ^By no means all dilemmas require resolution, e.g. those of no practical import such as purely theoretical dilemmas of freedom, etc. liberty, These can, in principle, just stand. 48 As Lemmon explains (in 62), really following Sartre, there is considerable scope for bad faith and opting out of our responsibilities here, e.g. pretending that no decision is called for, or that another has preempted the decision, or that the decision is otherwise determined or out of our own control. 49No doubt we could tough it out dialectically, but the basis for doing so is Any lacking. adherence contradictions to calles for especially rigorous justification 500n satisizing decision theory, and the dialectic between maximizers and satisizers, see MS. Fuzzy decision theory is however only in the initial stages of development at present. 5^This is just one of several reasons why Hare’s grand synthesis (in 82) of Kant and the utilitarians, initially appealing in its two level tidiness and simplicity, goes down the philosophical drain. A main reason is that the synthesis is built upon, and incorporates, consistency and modal assumptions, and so is inadequate moral data to be accounted for theoretically (see further War and Peace II). to the REFERENCES R. Barcan Marcus, 121-136. Journal of Philospohy 77 (1980) ’Moral dilemmas and consistency , * S. I. Benn, ’Public and private morality: clean living and dirty hands’ in Public and Private in Social Life (ed. S.I. Benn and G.F. Gaus), Croom Helm, London & Canberra, 1983, 155-182. A. Donegan, The Theory of Morality, Chigago University Press, Chicago, 1977. D. Follesdal and R. Hilpinen, ’Deontic pp.1-35; referred to as F & H. B. C. logic: van Fraassen, ’The logic of conditional Logic 1 (1972) 417-38. an introduction’ Hilpinen in obligation’. Journal 1971, of Philospohical L. Gumanski, ’On deontic logic’, Studia Logica 39 (1980) 63-75. S. Hampshire (ed), Public and Private Morality, Cambridge University Press, 1978. R.M. Hare, Freedom and Reason, Clarendon, Oxford, 1963. R.M. Hare, Moral Thinking, Conflicts’). Clarendon, Oxford, 1982 (see especially chapter 2 ’Moral R. Harrison, Rational Action, Cambridge University Press, 1979. R. Hilpinen (ed). Deontic Dordrecht, 1971. Logic: Introductory and Systematic Readings, Reide1, R. Hilpinen (ed), New Studies in Deontic Logic, Reidel, Dordrecht, 1981. A. Kenny, The God of the Philosophers, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1979. E.J. Lemmon, ’Moral dilemmas’, Philosophical Review 71 (1962) 139-58. E.J. Lemmon,’ Deontic (1965) 39-71. Logic and the T. McConnell, ’Moral dilemmas and Philosophy 8 (1978) 269-87. logic of imperatives’, consistency in ethics’, Logique et Canadian Analyse 8 Journal A. MacIntyre, A Short History of Ethics, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1966. of 39 A. A. Martino (ed.), Deotnic Logic, Computational Systems, North Holland, Amsterdam, 1982. Linguistics and Legal Information E. Morscher, ’Antinomies and incompatibilities within normative languages’ in Martino 82, pp.83-102. Oxford English Dictionary, Oxford University Press, 1971; hereafter OED. G. Priest and R. Routley, On Paraconsistency, Research Australian National University, 1983; hereafter OP. in Papers Logic, #13, A.N. Prior, Formal Logic, Second edition, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1962. A.N. Prior, ’Escapism: the logical basis of ethics' (ed. A.I. Melden), Seattle, 1958. in Essays in Moral Philosophy, W.D. Ross, The Right and the Good, Oxford University Press, New York, 1930. R. Routley, ’War and Peace I. On the ethics of large-scale nuclear war and war­ deterrence, and the political fall-out’, Discussion Papers in Environmental Philosophy, #5, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University, 1983. R. Routley, ’On the alleged inconsistency and moral insensitivity and fanaticism of pacifism’, Inquiry 26 (1984) , ; also War and Peace II. R. Routley, ’Maximizing, satisficing, satisizing: the difference in real and rational behaviour under rival paradigms’, Discussion Papers in Environmental Philosophy, #10, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University, 1984; hereafter MS. R. and V. Routley, ’The semantics of first degree entailment’, Nous 6 (1972) 335-59. R. and V. Routley, ’Semantical foundations of value theory’, Nous (1983) 441—56. R. Routley and R.k. Meyer, ’The semantics of entailment I’, in Truth, Syntax, and Modality (ed. H. Leblanc) North-Holland, Amsterdam, 1973» pp.199-243. R. Routley and R.K. Meyer, ’Dialectical logic, classical logic, and the consistency of the world’, Studies in Soviet Thought 16 (1976) 1-25. R. Routley and others, Relevant Logics and Their Rivals, Ridgeview, California, Part I (1982) and Part II (1984); referred to as RLR I and RLR II respectively. A. Ryan, The Idea of Freedom, Oxford, 1970. P. Schotch and pp.149-62. R.E. Jennings, ’Non-Kripkean deontic logic’, in Hilpinen 81, 40 Q. Skinner, The Foundations of Modern University Press, Cambridge, 1978. Political Thought, Volume 11, Cambridge R. M. Thomason, ’Deontic logic as founded on tense logic’, in Hilpinen 81, pp.165-175. B. Vermazen, 'The (1977) 1-71. logic of practical 'ought’-sentences’, Philosophical Studies 32 B. Williams, Moral Luck, Cambridge United Press, 1981. B. Williams, 'Conflict of values' in Williams 81, pp.71-82; also in Ryan 79. G.H. von Wright, An Essay in Modal Logic, North Holland, Amsterdam, 1951. G.H. von Wright, ’On the logic of norms/ and actions’, M. Hilpinen 81, pp.3-35. G.H. ven Wright, ’Norms, truth and logic’ in Martino 82, pp.3-20. TYRANT MOPE ON NOPAL DILEMMAS 1. ethics. 2. Revolutionising Possible heading, why the failure to comprehend moral dilemmas. All these Reading force^'^^e off in other directions. Undoubtedly a great deal of ethics has been messed up by a failure to understand moral dilemmas. ' ... The failure is often reported; for instance human since justifiable claims ... and are rights claims, they be outweighed by other As in all conflicts of moral principles, human rights reasons must be weighed other moral can against one another by an as yet poorly understood and ill-defined process' (Rajfles, p.42). The failure shows up on the apparent clash between doing ethics by way of principles and doing ethics consistency reasons, principles. vor principles break down, through examples. or dilemmatic And examples. examples it is thought for air^. thought to refute A proper approach to dilemmas removes the tension between examples and principles and allows a synthesis to be achieved. 3. Moral rectitude. Now is notion this to be unpacked0 mhere are competing explanations, e.g. 1) in terms of obligation and deontics; 2) by way of consequentialist rectitude decisive. assessment. Pettit to make moral mhen it requires assessment thus 3) Method 1) unless dilemma; otherwise method 2\ rectitude so it is absolute in terms of O. 4. wants This is impossible. Mcjlly's system has no moral dilemmas, since ~fu For it proves trivial deontically. But he also wants to run 0~u^ - at least intentionally. Aquinas denies certain moral dilemmas, e.g. Np & F~p, in the doctrine concerning perplexus simpliciter F & N p.12. 5. Investigate further the connection of permitted and accepted worlds, and commission? This 'possibly permitted' does not involve discussed in NNL. the fallacy of reducing permission * 'permissible to It does tie with the suggested connection of commission and omission through the * function. 2 6. Is problem of the individual in society, of a person in politics, an organisation or a company of this type i.e. dilemma of freedom? Of. a dilemma that can just stand, like the theoretical also Machiavellian a problem: person in public must (morally?) act evilly sometimes. 7. of PUBLIC distinction The moralities. VS MORALITIES PRIVATE implies that there are two The BASE ARGUMENT against is this: But there are not two. if we acknowledge this conception of morality as requiring some action as the thing to do, how, logically speaking, could there be two moralities0 the thing to do when they conflict? overriding reason for action?^ How could morality then What is provide an Similarly &n utilitarianism single maximisation recipe and results. (/? DOEBN'01 REQUIRE KANTIANISM.) However A can to be subject conflicting public and private claims. Seen this way ^public vs private just generates.heap of further moral dilemmas, and the 2 moralities ^is just shoddy attempt to escape these dilemmas, expedient (i.e. would become n shoves morality out as in the Hinduism resolution dilemmas. of often in a way that’s politically of the way for expediency'1. The 2 moralities * int if pursued this distinction-making attempt at / Something special about public/private case0 Or differently, why are arguments from expedience so much more acceptable in public sphere0 Be^n gives r interest some reasons, but these oughtn't to justify a difference. | public interest DIRTY HANDS PROBLEM (PARADOX) is like GOOD SAM? behalf of the statecommitting murder. Sometimes it is right get one's hands dirty. E.g. Doing such and such on OR just a straight dilemma? to try to succeed, and then it must also be right to But one's hands get dirty from doing what it is wrong to do. And how can it be wrong to do what is right? Or how can we get our hands dirty by doing what we ought to do9 Z M. Walzer, Philosophy and Public Affairs, moral 2, 10°^, dilemma. 164. Op Walzer sees this as a tragic dilemma: p-> q Oq, but 0~q. Example: but really a torturing captured terrorist to extract information to save innocent lives. The problems start from questions of relations between two different moralities. Conclusion: 8. Conflict conscience 'that, the public to at its most liberal, loyalty, overriding moral liberalism in end. to a On between will stand the individual, tried committed concern for its collective interest, the one hand the individual as a relate this ambiguous model of the a individual and as an autonomous, citadel, on the other, the overriding perverse, wilful obstacles in the way of the general will. to with no gainsaying, and the claims of possessed of liberties that only he himself can waive, by consent; State, equipped society, not T have only to liberal conceptions of what belongs to the private and what to the public, but also to the tension between a morality of principles and one of valued outcomes, which, in my view, is very closely connected with the ambiguity of the model . * ("Renn? 9. Argument for weak paraconsistent position. Morality is a guide to action. Action is consistent. So have to r?l consistencize. ^Inconclusive"1. Like law one consistencizes (e.g. for action^ alright. But that confirms that it is inconsistent in the first place. 10. The difference. fought distinction is, it It hands the opposition its case. is objected, a Simply not so. distinction without a The following have been redacted from access file (PDF) due to copyright restrictions. • • • • • Letter, unidentified author to Richard, 27 Jul 1984 re Moral dilemmas. (2 pages (1 leaf)) Reference card and handwritten paper, ? Alchourron and Bulygin (1 reference card + 5 leaves) Letter, Charles to Richard, undated re New Studies in Deontic Logic and Castañeda's proposed deontic logic. (2 pages) Cuttings from unidentified publication, The paradoxes of deontic by Hector-Neri Castañeda (page 46-47), and Some main problems of deontic by Jaakko Hintikka 9page 94-96. (2 leaves) Letter, unidentified author to Richard, with annotations by Sylvan?, undated, re Moral dilemmas. (7 leaves) Ml Although the sorts of examples we have described seem familiar enough, it might well be disputed that they are correctly described as cases of Op and 0~p, or in the alternative representation as cases of Fp & F~p. The main ground for this is the belief that 19. in any such case one of the parties to the conflict is less wrong, and that this one can be claimed to be not really wrong at all. There are however several objections to this move to neutralise the dilemmas (1) First, wrong party. there is no guarantee that there always is a less Both parties may be equally wrong, no way of deciding which is less wrong. Vietnam example; To take and there may be our hypothetical if we withdraw half a million people will die; but if we do not withdraw the war will continue and half a million people will die; clearly the example may be elaborated. There may be no grounds for choice. (2) The fact that one party is less wrong than the alternative is no grounds for saying that it is not wrong at all. In fact the case would normally be described as one of choice between " two evils", two wrong aciwsese©; if one chooses the lesser of two evils, then one still chooses an evil. ing One is simply not justified in claim1 that, where p involves killing 10 people, p is not wrong simply on the grounds that ~p involves killing 15 people, any more than one is in the case of preference theory justified in saying that p, which brings a gift of $10, is not a good thing simply on the grounds that ~p brings a gift of $11. things; (3) They are both good and in our moral case, both are wrong. If we do say this, plainly it will be very difficult to find any moral principles which can be asserted with any confidence universally. In fact it will probably be possible to find hypothetical counterexamples to any statement of the form "All actions of type x are wrong", just by producing a case where p is an action of type x, but ~p is an even worse action. that p, although an action of type x, is not wrong, It will follow so we will have However, a counterexample. it seems to be important that we should be able to assert such general principles, and doing so gives us an essential way of assessing, morally, (4) Finally, types of actions. the proposed redescription of the case as involving only one wrong element, the one which is more wrong, leaves out an essential feature of such a case, that it is a dilemma, case where one cannot but act wrongly. If we omit this element the case is not properly described, it is falsified; a we may as a result find ourselves unable to explain many resulting features of the situation which result from the conflict, e.g. human behavioural features >n such a situation involving hesitation, doubt, inaction, perhaps anguish and guilt. All these will appear quite irrational. (5) Assigning a priority to our moral rules itself does nothing to resolve the logical problem raised by the dilemmas, (although it may solve the practical problem of how best to act). % For this logical problem iX the problem of how to arrange our logic so as to be able to describe such cases adequately and without falsification or incon-sisteney. Arranging a priority, so that A one alternative can be claimed to be less wrong, does not solve the logical problem, which is that whatever happens will be wrong, that T cannot be identical with I. The consequence that whatever happens is wrong cannot be removed unless as well as a priority assignment one also adopts the principle that what is less wrong is not wrong at all. But this principle leads to inconsistency for then the less wrong action is both wrong and not wrong. To be consistent this method must introduce a new concept of wrong in addition to the old one, say "wrong2" , and the less wrong action can be said to be not "wrong2". But now the original problem is 21. still not eliminated, because the problem was not that whatever be is . happened would /'wrong2" (although this/now false), but that whatever happened would be wrong, which is still true. sort of priority - dominated concept cannot replace, may supplement, the original concept. And this although it Sf- The problem of classifying these dilemmas. z mainly using the term ’wrong’. We have stated our dilemmas However, it may seem that this is ambiguous, and that it is possible, or desirable, to make a further distinction, between pi inciples which are obligatory and principles which are prohibitory. For wrongs can be due to two very different causes - om^iission or commission. The distinction between obligation and prohibition principles can be explained initially as follows: an obligation principle of the form Op read ’it ought to be the case that p’,Qt is f ? L ' r jT f'.Jlz.f:? /t/tjyJ /4-< 'it ought to come about that p'. This says that something, p, ought to should happen that p'A, r, happen, an ideal situation I. that is^ that it is a member of & A situation^satisfies Op, Op if p is not in it then, if p is In it ( p eaJ;and violates p's presence satisfies Op, whereas (pZ S?) • £ ["Obligation" Z7 —:----- is ’ being used here its omission or absence violates it. in a somewhat unusual sense, 4 for Lemmon seems to be right in urging that obligations are usually contractual in nature. and contracts may be contracts to do something or to refrain from However, we doing something - hence both positive and negative. must press 'obligation' and 'obligatory' and adjective corresponding to it * into service as a noun ought to be the case that' in order to avoid clumsiness and for lack of any other suitable words. The other class of principles, hand, we shall write prohibitive principles, on the other 'Ep' and read 'it is forbidden that p'. These principles claim that p is the sort of action which should p is not a member of the ideal situation I. be avoided satisfies Fp, situation a such that p Z such that pea violates it. a situation a whereas p's omission or absence satisfies Fp, whereas pSoccurrence or presence violates it. is paralleled on the obligations) The distinction action level by the distinction between action and by that between and inaction, A 'sins of omission' and 'sins of commision' A (which violate (which violate prohibitions). 'I have done those things which I ought not to have done' violating a prohibition but also, and not equivalently, not done those things which I ought to have done', thus 'I have thus violating An obligation is satisfied by doing something, an obligation. a prohibition by failing to do something, by avoiding something. It is important not to confuse 0~p, which says that should happen' or 'that ~p 'It is wrong that p', with Fp which says ’that p should not happen', or it * should not happen that p'. This distinction is clear, as a scope distinction, in the English reading However the two are continually confused in modal treatments of But deontic logic, since given Modal Muddle p / I = ~p g I. that to say/p should happen is not to say anything about what should not happen but leaves the issue as to whether ~p should or should And to say that p should not happen is not say and 0~p tells anything about ~p,/whether it should happen or not. not happen open. aj us that ~p is a member of I, where.Fp tells us that p is not a member of 1.^ Dilemmas then seem to fall into three classes depending upon whether the principles which lead to them are obligation or prohibition principles^or both. Fp and F~p, Thus we obtain Op and 0~p, and Op and Fp from our examples depending upon how the principles involved are construed^ a<Tprohibitory or obligatory. (A): Dilemmas obtained from prohibition principles, Fp, % F~p1. i.e. cases of We obtain cases of this sort given principles of the * form. — (1) Whenever P satisfies condition C, (Action form: (2) it shouldn't happen that p. action of type x are wrong) it shouldn't happen that p. A Whenever p satisfies condition C', The dilemma is obtained where p satisfies condition C, ~p satisfies condition C'. Jo O F and - ■L Give the semantical reading of 0 and F?and the examples with 'wrong' . Then mention the necessity for distinction between 0~p and Fp. (1) Wrongs divide into sins of omission and sins of commission. (2) These are semantically different. (3) Unless one distinguishes these concepts semantically have the consistency assumption again. Give the readings. one will 10. Examples can also be obtained from two distinct prohibitory These are cases where the state of affairs described principles. (for reasons given by the first by p is really indescribable principle) (for different reasons given by the second principle). able, * (tndesir For/(B) and the state of affairs described by ~p is m^-ally The second category of dilemmas are dilemmas obtained from obligation principles i.e. cases of Op & O~p, for some p. We obtain cases of this sort given principles of the form:(1) Whenever p satisfies condition C, (2) Whenever p satisfies condition C', it should happen that p it should happen that p. The dilemma is obtained when for a given p, p satisfies condition C and ~p satisfies condition C': (C) Finally, so Op and O~p. examples derived from conflicting but not inconsistent moral principles, which urge both that p should occur and that it should not occur i.e. and prohibited. cases of Op and Fp, where p is both enjoined These cases come about where are principles of the following sort: (1) Whenever p satisfies condition C, p should happen. (2) Whenever p satisfies condition C', p should not happen. The dilemma results because one can find cases one and the same state of affairs C and condition C'? e.g. (p) (in T) where satisfies both condition as^our example derived from Lemmon's uAcrw-tt bolew, x gives back the gun and helping a murderer. (p) is a case both of keeping a promise But promises must be kept, so Op holds. However actions which help murderers are forbidden and should not occur; examples, hence Fp also holds. unlike the previous kind, It seems that these sorts of cannot be generated by a single moral principle, but requires two principles which come into conflict. With a certain degree of artifice we can arrange our examples into these categories, with f A) groups being prohibitions the (fe)groups obligations, and the (C) groups mixed. It is necessary then to avoid the modal treatment and to But though 0 principles and F principles distinguish 0~ and F. are distinct, 0 and F provide alternatives bases for (semantically) The O-principles correspond semantically to deontic system. inclusion principles,the F formulated principles to exclusion Thus e.g. principles. TRfH 5® where iff iff TROH * , (UH) (TRfH oX(p,H) = f) In contrast, I(Fp,T) = t iff (UH) TROH d Kp,H) Thus the modellingswill mirror f) . one another, with R Rf For the representation of principles then we can work satisfactorily with an O-basis, or with an F-basis, but not with a mixed basis which uses both 0 and F principles. Failure to distinguish 0~p and Fp will provide a ground for the mistaken consistency assumption: iff p i H. for it will follow from evaluation rules 12. The cases described satisfy the characterisation of moral For the principles involved are not inconsistent, yet dilemmas. they are not satisfiable in T. In the case of the first set of leading to Fp and F~p, dilemmas, the principles could not be satisfied unless neither p nor ~p occurred. necessarily complete, But since T is they cannot be satisfied in T. of the second set of examples, Op and 0~p, In the case the principles could only be satisfied if both p and ~p occur, hence since T is con­ sistent, they cannot be satisfied in T. different. The third case is very Here it cannot be satisfied because one and the same proposition satisfies both conditions for occurring and conditions for not occurring? this proposition, hence our principles direct, with respect to that it should occur and that it should not occur. This also cannot be satisfied in T, since p is either a member of T, or not a member of T. The principles involved are not however inconsistent ones; for in each case a finite proposition modelling of the principles can be provided. In the third case, directives, despite the fact there are inconsistent given a contingent proposition p^, which satisfies the antecedent conditions, no inconsistency need result because such a proposition p^ may not occur. In other words, though the principles together with p^ form an inconsistent set, p-^ is essential and can be deleted from the set since contingent; and the set without p1 as the principles on their own are satisfactory is consistent, where no antecedents satisfy both, a po£S»4ta- case. ■ v r • The principles ** (a. though inconsistent in application are not inconsistent^ i In the first two cases(they are T consistent?) also it is a contingent matter that the principles come i ... into^ cannot be satisfied in T; r; for detachment of a contingent truth is made, viz that the given ? proposition satisfies the conditions. 13. since they constantly arise““without sacrificing the generality of moral principles. For unless carefully treated dilemmas will/ as we shall see, provide counterexamples to moral principles. Our moral dilemmas result from judgements which cannot be satisfied in T, so that whatever happens will be wrong. Howe is there/still quite a crucial difference between the first two classes and the third class of dilemma. In the third case the result of the dilemma on detachment of a contingent premiss that p satisfies c and c' simultaneously is an inconsistency, cannot both belong and not belong to the ideal set-up I. since p Although the principles upon which the judgement Op and Fp was based were not themselves mutually inconsistent, moral judgerent they do result in a inconsistent that p both ought to happen and ought not to happen is prohibited from happening. Given that p has both properties, the moral principles concerned are in conflict. This is brought out by the fact that if p does satisfy these conditions, cannot be any situation, T-like or not, there in which the principles are satisfied. Furthermore here we have a case where each moral judgement provides a counterexample to the other. If Op and Fp both obtained, both the principles from which they were derived would be false; principle for Op would provide a counterexample to the prohibitory (p) (if p satisfies c’ then Fp) since Op ~Fp; while Fp would provide a counterexample to the obligatory principle (if p satisfies c then Op). (p) J \ 14. In view of these points it seems that a moral code which resulted in this sort of conflicting judgement is defective; the principles involved should either be restricted by tightening one or other of conditionsc and c', or else restated by reformulating one or other of the principles, (p) (Cp => F~p) replaced by (p) (C'p => 0~p) . or i.e. either (p) (C'p => Fp) (p) (Cp => Op) is is replaced by the case is reduced to one of the first In short, two cases. In this case the dilemma arises because the principles In the first two cases however involved come into conflict. the difficulty does not arise from conflicting principles, but is simply a case where our not v/ judgements cannot both be satisfied in T, because they are conflicting, but because of the peculiar Where Op and 0~p both hold, nature of T. (or Fp and F~p) what- ever happens will be wrong, because p & ~p cannot both hold in T, The dilemma is however simply explained nor p & ~p fail to hold. and the judg.ements accepted once it is understood that I, situation, action, is not T-like. The dilemma may produce a conflict in because given the logical structure of T and the limitations it imposes upon action, both judgements. it is impossible to act in accordance with But this does not effect the judgements themselves; as moral judgenents, assessments of the moral worth of p of affairs) conflict. (a state of ~p^jthey are quite compatible and there is no To say that p is wrong and that ~p is also wrong is in no way to be inconsistent, true. the ideal and both judgements may very well be The absence of conflict also explains the fact that such cases can be produced from single moral principles, such as 'Killing is wrong', which in no way inhibit internal conflict. 15. Judgements such as 'p is wrong of action or states of affairs; as to how to act in T. alternative in T, Hence Op does not compare p with its ~p. Such judgements are implicitly comparative, not to ~p's worth, but to the Thus if we reach situations as to moral worth of its absence. (using moral criteria for selection), if for every situation H, H+p is worse than H-p. in a situation assess types and do not simply give directions but p's worth is assessed relative, desirability & ~p is wrong' p is wrong If p's presence makes the situation morally worse than it would be if p were absent, then p is wrong. But now it is a straightforward matter to claim that p is wrong and that ~p is also wrong; one is aHL simply claiming that situations without p^orally preferable to the that (should be chosen^etc.); same situations with p * and also situations without ~p are morally preferable to that same situation with ~p in it. These judgements in no way conflict, and if we were in a position to choose a situation with neither of them in, we could satisfy both judgements simultaneously. is the choice must be regarded as a hypothetical one, As it and the judgements as representing a kind of thought experiment, rather than in giving directions as to how to behave in T. The choice embodied in such a judgement is one between two hypothetical situations and not between alternative versions of T. It is just for this reason that this type of moral judgement is adequate for assessing morally different types of actions or sorts of states of affairs. Because we are concerned with choosing between hypothetical situations, we can opine that all actions of a certain specifiable type and states of affairs satisfying a certain condition are wrong (not wrongyetc.), without risking * In the case of Op & 0~p. In the case of Fp & F~p one ismaking a slightly different claim, that a situation from which p's absent is morally better than some in which it is present. Note that the difference between 0 and F can be to the difference in directionthe rankings. 16. falsification because of the contingent features of T. Finally, in such a judgement one is concerned with assessing the action or state of affairs in itself rather than passing judgement about the best way to act in a particular situation. Dilemmas of this sort then, as opposed to dilemmas of the conflict sort first discussed, are not the result of defective moral codes or principles and do not require any readjustment or resolution (beyond psychological acceptance of the fact that it is sometimes inevitable that what happens is wrong and that perfectibility is impossible). They do not provide counterexamples to general In contrast moral principles based on contingent features of T. codes containing the conflict type of dilemma are defective. Any code containing two principles of the form 'wherever p satisfies Cl, Op' and ’Whenever p satisfies C2, Fp’ where C1 and C2 are not inconsistent, will be defective because there is a possible situation (a hypothetical case) with a p^ which satisfies both C1 Whence the inconsistent pair Fp, potentially inconsistent. & Op,. and C2. Any such code is at least This sort of defectiveness of a moral code might be excusable if it were inevitable. But it is not. can be avoided if we adopt either 0 or F as primitive, and state our judgements in terms of one or other of them, but not both. alternative, terms, conflicting is intolerable. moral It The principles stated in No principle could be asserted with any confidence, because they would hold or fail just according to whether or not a suitable proposition with conflicting properties appeared in T and provided a counterexample. And since this is contingent whether such principles hold or not would be entirely a matter of good or bad luck. Moral judgements on the other hand ought to apply beyond T to possible situations, ought to be non-empirical and apply to hypothetical cases, matter of accident. and ought not to hold just as a 4 C ‘S’ -X f * univeralisa'blemoral principle was a judgement The general ‘ 7^' about types of action or states of affairs and compared p's presence in a situation with its absence from the same situation on a scale of moral desirability. This concept of wrongness is essential to be able to state general moral judgements. But as well as this concept we can distinguish another important concept which is designed to assess not types of action but what is the best course of action in a given situation. This is obtained by comparing p's presence in a situation not with its absence but with the presence of its rivals in a given situation, e.g. ~p in the case of T. p will be said to be ’the best course of action' ~p are both wrong) if a situation Thus (even where p and (usually T), with p in, ranks higher morally then the same one with ~p in. A more practical - concept still can be obtained by comparing p and its practical rivals, say will be the best course of action practical alternative q) f Y r if a situation (as compared with its (usually T) (morally) when p is in it than when q is in it. between alternative ways of extending will rank higher One chooses T. It is important as Lemmon points out to distinguish this concept clearly from the more general concept earlier explained. Lemmon is wrong in suggesting that this is not a moral concept at all and does not give rise to moral judgements but to judgements of expedience. The judgements involved in this case are still moral in the sense that the criteria for ranking situations are 22 specifically moral ones and not based simply, say, on aesthetic considerations or desirability considerations. clear that this distinction Yet it is (which we shall call the distinction between differential obligation and intrinsic obligation) must be ignored and eliminated if obligation is treated as a modal functor For give/} the principle of Modal Muddle (H) (p e H = ~p e H) semantical recipes we have given will be identical. p's presence in H with p's absence (p / H) comparing p in H with ~p's being in H. the To compare will be the same as It is essential however to distinguish this notion of 'best course of action' (differential basic notion we have discussed, because it has quite different properties. * It cannot replace although it can supplement, The reasons are as follows other notion. 02 does not allow for (1) the moral dilemmas. p with its practical alternative in T, e.g. For since we compare ~p, to say that Op & 0~p is to say that a situation H such p e H is morally better than a situation H such that ~p e H, and also to say that a situation H such that ~p e H is better than one such that p e H. This is a (Similar results will ensue when F is taken as a contradiction. basis). (2) 02 cannot allow for general moral judgements of the form "All actions (states of affairs) counterexample. of type x are wrong" without fear of For no matter how compelling our principle and how repugnant the type of action described, we can almost always find a case where the only alternative action is worse. however repugnant p may be, Hence, it will not in this case be wrong, a counterexample to one general judgement will be provided. new notion then cannot do the same job as the old; —----------------------------------------- . and Our it should be , We u^e such as 'the best thing in the circumstances' 'the right thing', 'the correct course all in all' to capture differential obligations . 23. regarded as parasitic, because it can be alternatively represented as admitting the wrongness of the alternatives, but going on to weigh up the alternatives to obtain a recipe for practical action. (3) implies can" slogan It is to this notion that the "ought applies. O2P o locjically possible p, because one has selected p as the best course of action from logically possible alternatives in T. Indeed ’02p’ can be made to imply ‘p is physically possible' (or even physically possible to the person being exhorted) by comparing p with its physically possible alternatives in ranked situations. In a similar way, the concept of blame attaches to failure to follow the best course of action,i.e. if p is better as a course of action than its and one fails to do it. action.* (practical) alternatives, One is not blameworthy for doing p merely only as good as, because p is no better than, i.e. alternatives, one is blameworthy its remaining it has to be worse than some alternative course of It is important to note that blame attaches to this second differential concept of obligation, rather than the first intrinsic notion, for the possibility and obvious unfairness of someone's being blamed for doing wrong where both Op and 0~p hold and he has no alternative which is not wrong would otherwise be a powerful objection to cases of moral dilemmas. (5) Finally, differential obligation makes a basically different type of judgement from the intrinsic notion. not of a type of action or state It is an assessment or of affairs, the action/state of affairs in itself, but of the situation in which it occurs, action in this situation. This is reflected in such phrases as "the best thing in the circumstances" "the right thing to do the conditions obtained at the time)", etc. * Oh well, you cannot be blamed. circumstances . the (given Hence it is not You did the best thing in the universalisable , and does not try to be. It “results in a recipe for action, and is closely allied to advice or exhortation/orders , persuasion, recommendation or other directed activities. Intrinsic obligation however/ frafc^s no account of possible action and does not need to; it assesses action-types regardless of how they occur in a given situation. This last point is important in connection with argument about moral dilemmas. For the confusion between our two concepts has a disastrous effect on argument, particularly those hotly disputed arguments which occur in the case of moral dilemmas. The following sort of argument, due to confusion between Oi and O2 is all too common in such cases. Actions of type x are wrong (1') (if p satisfies c then Oi~p). (p) This must be Oj because it represents a general and exceptionless (2) p is an action (3) ~ 02 i.e. ~p: (state of affairs) judgement about a type. of type x. p should not be done. Therefore do not do p. The argument is plainly unsatisfactory because the fact that Oi~p holds is not sufficient to establish that 02~p To holds. do this one would have to show that the alternative, p, was not worse or even just as good. not be so. And in cases of dilemmas this may very well To establish 02~p one needs to show not merely that p is wrong but that there is some better course of action. The fallacy derives from trying to base a recipe for action on the intrinsic obligation notion, Oi. s 25. A closely related confusion holds that it is inconsistent to claim that p is a wrong type of action, that it should be done nonetheless the best course of action. August 6 197 x (e.g. is repugnant etc., but - because it is nevertheless Canberra Times Editorial, on abortion reads as follows: "It is significant, and inconsistent with its official stand that the s ynod should have qualified its recommendation to family doctors with the words "however regrettable we feel this to be"." to be inconsistentthen, one states to be What is being claimed is that one should recommend a course of action (morally) there is no inconsistency. regrettable or repugnant. But of course One is simply saying that ~p is wrong, "Oi-p", but that it is nevertheless the best thing to do given the circumstances because the alternatives are worse?i.e. "O2P"• The distinction between differential and intrinsic obligation, then, seems to be an important factor in assessing the validity of argument where moral dilemmas are concerned. /, 2 ft I z^z/ / rt&jZy 7-, I  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Box 140, Item 1: Draft of Moral dilemmas and the logic of deontic notions ; Draft of Moral dilemmas ; Notes, correspondence and cutting on moral dilemmas and deontic logic Subject The topic of the resource Typescript of drafts of two papers, undated. Second paper with handwritten emendations, and first paper published, Routley R and Plumwood V (1984) 'Moral dilemmas and the logic of deontic notions', Discussion papers in environmental philosophy, 6. Dept. of Philosophy, Australian National University. Includes three letters addressed to Richard: 27 July 1984 (handwritten, 1 leaf (2 pages)), author unidentified re Moral dilemmas; Undated (handwritten, 2 pages), from Charles re New Studies in Deontic Logic and Castaneda's proposed deontic logic; Undated (handwritten, 7 leaves with annotations by Sylvan?), author unidentified re Moral dilemmas; and one letter from Richard Sylvan? to Philip, undated (handwritten (photocopy), 3 pages), re feedback on a paper. Includes incomplete draft paper, Other attempts to neutralise moral dilemmas (21 leaves), with handwritten emendations, undated. Description An account of the resource Letters and cuttings redacted from access file (PDF) due to copyright restrictions. Unnumbered paper from collection, item number assigned by library staff. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/browse?search=Richard+Routley&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bjoiner%5D=and&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=&amp;range=&amp;collection=&amp;type=&amp;user=&amp;tags=&amp;public=&amp;featured=&amp;exhibit=&amp;geolocation-mapped=&amp;geolocation-address=&amp;geolocation-latitude=&amp;geolocation-longitude=&amp;geolocation-radius=10&amp;submit_search=Search+for+items">Richard Routley</a> <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/browse?search=Val+Plumwood&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bjoiner%5D=and&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=&amp;range=&amp;collection=&amp;type=&amp;user=&amp;tags=&amp;public=&amp;featured=&amp;exhibit=&amp;geolocation-mapped=&amp;geolocation-address=&amp;geolocation-latitude=&amp;geolocation-longitude=&amp;geolocation-radius=10&amp;submit_search=Search+for+items">Val Plumwood</a> Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived <span class="MuiTypography-root-125 MuiTypography-body2-126">The University of Queensland's <a data-testid="rek-series" href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/records/search?page=1&amp;pageSize=20&amp;sortBy=score&amp;sortDirection=Desc&amp;searchQueryParams%5Brek_series%5D%5Bvalue%5D=Richard+Sylvan+Papers%2C+UQFL291&amp;searchMode=advanced">Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291</a></span>, Box 140, Item 1 Contributor An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, <a href="https://najtaylor.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Dr. N.A.J. 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Type The nature or genre of the resource Manuscript Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context <a href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:ba641e1">https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:ba641e1</a> Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy Box 140: File Cabinet 1 Draw 2 https://www.antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/ba75dba8d0f6535e9a8ad23c06661759.pdf a87f09d687c26e038cbebfae6678172f PDF Text Text 13.6.96 GREEN POLITICAL THEORY: a different account Green political theory is divided according to one of our guides1, rather like Gaul according to Caesar, into three parts: —a green theory of value, —a subordinate green theory of agency, and —a green lifestyle program, portrayed as a set of altogether dispensible lifestyle recommendations. While it is the high-handed insistent dismissal of green lifestyles by this guide, Goodin, that has captured the attention of critics and been highlighted, the brash partitioning of green political theory, and the surreptitious dismissal therewith of significant parts of it, should not pass unnoticed. To the contrary, virtually the whole of what political theory is taken to treat comes up for reassessment once green lights are played upon it, certainly under deeper green illumination. That bogus exhaustiveness taken for granted, that all there is to it amounts to value and action, no doubt derives largely from an underlying utilitarianism, according to which other theoretical matters can be subsumed under these.2 In short, partly through dispensing with lifestyle considerations, primarily by virtue of a background utilitarianism operating within a conventional state-setting, Goodin can suppose that green political theory reduces to these two parts: a theory of value and a subordinate theory of agency. Such a reduction is however much too simple, leaving out, as it does, much of ethics of political relevance, as well as a large slab of politics. For example, ethical omissions include the fields of deontology (environmental permissions, prescriptives, directives; environmental justice, rights and so on), of virtue theory, and of accountability. Among political omissions most striking is the absence of any due consideration of institutional and ideological alternatives to what now prevails. Prevailing Western political arrangements—with staged elections, urban bureaucratic control, incremental reformism (often environmentally regressive), and so on—are simply taken for granted. Above all, there is no critique of the state, an increasingly important part of radical green politics. One reason for this gross omission— f radical green theory from what is presented as green political theory—is that Goodin does not question the conventional political assumption that the appropriate objective of green political activity consists in gaining power or influence within established statist arrangements, for example at best through electoral 1 R. Goodin Green Political Theory, Polity Press, Cambridge 1992. This was undoubtedly a book worth criticizing. 2 See the appendix. �2 success enabling control of some of the administrative and executive functions of state (we shall encounter this conventional “political realism^^ again later). However significant strands of green political theory no longer accept this assumption. A related reason, reaching deeper, is that Goodin likewise does not question, as strands of green theory now do, what helps undergird the conventional political assumption and reformist utilitarianism, an Enlightenment ideology with its faith in reason and science, technologically-based progress, overall human goodness and dominance, and so on.3 The bold overstatement of claims, along with misrepresentation as to what green political theory comprises, is symptomatic of much of the book: overstatement and undersubstantiation.4 Virtually all main themes of the book are false, indeed rather patently so once exhibited unadorned, because limited truths are overextended; and they are undersupplied with cogent support. So it is with the green theory of value, which inflates what is a significant factor in green evaluation into the supposed total green theory. So it is with the green package, which is presented as having an absolutely tight integration, which it in fact lacks. And so on, as will appear. Not only are main themes seriously defective; more disappointing, a salvage operation will not yield a lode of green gold. As troubling is the anti-subversive character of the work. Goodin has wheeled another Trojan horse into green territory, a horse bringing a number of anti-green academic warriors armed with anti-green ideas and sentiments, and engaged in and advocating anti-green lifestyles, (as will emerge).5 Of course, 'Green political theory' is a clever title, which is complemented by a politically clever introduction on the crises which are not minimized or marginalised but given considerable weight—all of which suggest that the text might be of much more interest to politically inclined greens than the usual academic fare. But the title does not say how the green theory is to be treated, explained and encouraged, exposed and condemned. Neither really. The text is not written for greens (though the publishers obviously hope they may buy it,6 or be 3 For an exposition and criticism of Enlightenment Ideology, see Sylvan TM. 4 In part because these sorts of deficiencies have not been addressed in reviews of the book, I decided to persevere with this less charitable critique (a tiresome exercise bound to alienate). Regrettably most of the reviews appear to derive from a political science orientation. They trip lightly by philosophical fundamentals, where the book is noticeably weak, and vulnerable. And they tend to be very light on argument. 5 Trojan horses are in extensive use by academics, particularly in green regions. We will encounter a number of these horses. They are evident from sociology to biogeography and climatology, and particularly prominent around economic enslaves. 6 They form part of the intended audience for the book according to accompanying publishers' work and flyers. Indeed the publishers have participated in the deception, supplying a cover featuring a boss of the Green Man from the cloisters of Norwich cathedral, which sends, as they �3 tricked into buying it), but for a cohert of academic colleagues—for colleagues who form part of the prevailing system, of politics-more-or-less-as-usual and so on. Deapite its character, there are several useful and attractive features of Goodin's book, which do make it worthwhile reading for awake greens of theoretical bent (one of these features is an Appendix, putting together succinctly a green political program). It is a smoothly written book, encouraging readers to glide along, glossing over the underlying content and messages, and not grasping the enormity of some of what is presented, for instance even as green gospel. It may be just the style that is attractive (the cut of the book, the easy flow, an appealingly simple structure, and other stylish features), rather than details of the real content. If the book has a weakness from the PR angle, it may lie in its flippancy, and failure to take several green issues seriously, both of which sometimes enter irritatingly and will turn off some committed greens. But, by and large, it is a splendidly packaged work; it is what is packaged and what is pushed on greens that is the trouble. For a book purportedly on green theory, treatment of greens is extraordinary condescending. Not much notice is going to be taken of 'what self-styled greens... happen to believe', 'what positions greens actually do take' (p.vii). (How then does he justify the green attributions he proceeds to make, e.g. 'green theory of value5? Evidently his procedure is methodologically unsound). No, it is 'an attempt to saves greens from themselves5 (p.viii). To rescue them,4to tidy up' their slovenly positions—while throwing away critical features of green approaches, such as green lifestyles—Goodin is particularly concerned that green lifestyles should not be seen as part of a rectified green political package. Green lifestyle recommendations are entirely dispensible (so he and others can look and indeed be green without deffort, without making any green contribution; they are conveniently absolved from any relevant action, or lifestyle adjustment). At one stage Goodin claims that the theory is 'moderately deep'. But elsewhere he has more accurately said that it is a pale green theory, very pale green given the attitude taken to green lifestyles. Green Political Theory it may be called: deeper green political theory, at least, it certainly is not, even genuine green it but dubiously is. However Goodin's aim, he regularly informs us, is once again not 4to describe what positions greens actually do take5. His project is a normative one, aimed instead to show what positions greens should take, given their core concerns... what they have to say given their core values'?. In this attempt he should be seen to remarks, 'precisely the contrary signal concerning the nature of the author's project in there behind the Green Man's work*. 7 P. viii - p.vii, itals added. �4 fail entirely. He is astray not merely on the core concerns of many of them (which concerns are far from uniform), but also in loosely coupled resultant positions. Greens are under no such obligations as Goodin would load them with; they are not boxed in as he would suppose. The approach is not only condescending towards greens; it is a touch arrogant. The aim is said to be 'to show greens how to cast their position in the strongest possible form\8 This will turn out to be not a strong theoretical form, by any means, but merely a strong form pragmatically, given a raft of assumptions about prevailing electoral arrangements, an interests theory of voting and human behaviour, and so on. According to many a green however, thereby made are some of the assumptions that have to be turned around if humanly undesirable features are to be avoided, if social collapse of one sort or another is to be avoided. At the very outset, Goodin does something to offset such concerns, as those concerning limits of growth.9 He rolls out a familiar quasi-inductive argument, beloved of economists, that past predictions of limits have been riotously astray (e.g. Jeavons on coal, Meadows and others in Limits of Growth on tin). Granted some predictions have, those regularly offered as illustrations; though others have not, naturally such examples are not emphasized. Not only is the inductive base for the quasi-inductive argument defective, the argument itself exhibits some flaws. That it has been claimed before and shown wrong is hardly decisive evidence that it will not be right a next time. Recall not only the boy who cried "wolf' too often and was eventually consumed, but also the turkeys who every week approaching Christmas triumphantly announced that everything was proceeding just fine. [Simple enumerative induction is not reliable in such settings.] On this-here green theory of value. Much of Goodin's text, that segment that is not pleasant enough "ecopolitical fiir5 (stock descriptions of ecological problems, green movement and their platforms, and so on), is occupied in one way or another with what he is pleased call to 'a green theory of value', quickly to become 'the green theory of value'. Most of the remainder develops from a complementing 4green theory of action5.10 This green theory of value is pushed in a surprisingly deontological fashion, likely to arouse immediate suspicions: as what greens should adopt and wear, if they know what is good for them. A theory of value is just a theory of the good, so it is engagingly asserted at the outset. Not so, unless the rest of what is considered to belong to value theory (standing, 8 P.viii. 9 See the beginning of the main text p.l. 10 This theory of value is also presented in a much published paper, 'A green theory of value'. As to the definite formulation, the green theory, see many places in the text, e.g. p.87. �5 considerability, worth, rating, and so on) reduces. It does not (and Goodin makes no effort to effect a reduction). It will become plain that Goodin is rather good at presenting topics as what they are not. The practice goes beyond introductory and presentational matters to what is taken to be central, value theory. 'A theory of value is, quite simply, a theory of the good', so we are engagingly informed.11 A theory of value is much more comprehensive than a theory of the good (as a perusal of Austrian value theory will quickly confirm), and does not contract, without extensive and dubious reductions (there is the 'quite simply5), to a theory of the good. Do not anticipate then what is promised: a green theory of value. As it turns out, not only are greens short­ changed on value, they get a very small serve of theory, and again a very pale green offering at that. There are certain peripheral obstacles to this purported green theory of value. In particular, does it even measure up to admittedly lax standards for a theory as to value? As is readily ascertained, the "theory” does not even say what a value is like and is, what kind of object, what identity criteria it satisfies, what postulates it conforms to. Let us call what is presented a pseudo-theory. Perhaps it can be upgraded to a theory, but requisite work is so far lacking. Is this "green pseudo-theory" green? This sort of challenge Goodin is aware of and aims to deflect. Granted the pseudo-theory is admittedly shallow, all politically acceptable theories have to be, he suggests, for instance to seize wide common ground, etc. But this too is astray, because of pluralistic alternatives. According to this green pseudo-theory, not only is naturalness a source of green value, naturalness is the source of value (i.e. goodness). How does Goodin arrive at this identification? By various unsound moves. Most simply, he invalidly concludes, from a consideration of 'naturalness as a source of (green) value', that it is the source of value.12 Such an inference from an indefinite to a definite description is invalid unless uniqueness conditions are independently ensured. Less simply, there is a simplistic derivation of "theories of value" from the three conventional factors of economic production: land (or resources), labour, and capital, each of which is schematically linked to corresponding theories of value. No doubt the land ethic and the labour theory of value just could suggest as much, but it is dubious that anyone much, green or otherwise disposed, would rest content for long with such a “pure" theory, as the factors operate together, not separately. Moreover, the economic “derivations" of these theories should be enough to raise serious green doubts about them. 11 P.19. This claim is also made in several other overlapping Goodin productions. 12 Ibid. p.30. �6 The core theme resulting from the identification is that natural objects are valuable, i.e. good, because they are the result of natural processes and not artificial or human ones. What gives natural objects their value is precisely their naturalness.13 In support of his green theory, Goodin produces a rather nauseating sociological argument, along the following lines: 'humans' have a deeply felt need to find meaning in their lives, i.e. to see their lives as set within a larger context with which they can feel linked. Such a context is provided by nature. In fuller presentation, it is claimed that people want coherence 'between their inner worlds and the external world'; that 'whatever makes people strive for harmony within their own lives would also lead them to strive to lead their lives in harmony with the external world'; and that 'natural processes provide just such a larger context... within which we can set out our own life plans and projects5.14 The argument is entirely shallow, appealing to what some humans want (if they do, not even to what might be good for them); it is utterly instrumental, with nature an instrument for human wants and needs; it is extraordinarily weak, each step being highly contestable; and it does not lead to the intended conclusion, uniqueness of naturalness not being shown. Moreover, for what it is worth, the argument also commits the naturalistic fallacy, purportedly arriving at an identification of value, as what is natural, on the basis of "natural" human wants and needs.15 Observe that this is Goodin's theory as to green theory, an ultimately shallow theory, reached in a shallow economic way, defended in a shallow sociological way, hardly likely to be reflective of deeper green thought. However, it is made to look in some places as if it were some sort of descriptive account; while at other places it appears as a normative account, as if it 13 find quote 14 Ibid p.3& 15 An identification of that Moorean nonnatural feature as natural furthermore. It is worth appending a relevant point from Brennan (pp.805-6): For theorists like Goodin, the status of environmental systems, species and non-human animals appears to be problematic. Although he regards them as proivind a large, independent context within which human life makes sense, it seems that he at the same time regards them as akin to consumer goods, to be displayed, consumed or prozed according to our informed preferences. For those influenced by the resource economists, it can be hard to understand the challenge posed by environmental ethics»>. Once nature is thought of as a resource, a standing reserve, a set of processes and objects that have the potential to satisfy human desires, it is easy to think of it as a nothing more than that. And the challenge posed by any ethic which is properly called 'environmental' is to find a way of articulating the attitude that nature is indeed a great deal more than that. �7 were a very reasonable thing for greens to expouse. But really it is of neither sort; it is neither descriptive of green positions, nor something they should, or would reasonably, adopt; rather it is a theory foisted on greens. It might be pretended that Goodin has offered a "reconstruction”， a rational reconstruction even, of green theory; but such a pretence fails as the construction fails, to meet even basic adequacy conditions, as will appear. As regards descriptive elements, no solid evidence is assembled that most, or even some, greens adopt this green theory, with naturalness as the sole source. Indeed Goodin offers no evidence that any do, and perhaps none of any standing do.16 Furthermore, as but little investigation reveals, there is not a single green "theory" of value, but various different, sometimes competing, positions. Nor could a single essence be satisfactorily distilled from those positions, and even what could be distilled would not resemble Goodin's construction. For some conspicuous green positions, such as ecofeminism or deep ecology, would in no way underwrite naturalness as the source of value, or for that matter a single source of value. More generally, the principles and arguments advanced within green critiques of reductionist science—including that central lesson of ecology, that meaning is to be found in connections, in patterns, in relations—similarly militate against any reductionist grounding of value. Conveniently Goodin appears to absolve us from more detailed fieldwork on green positions. His intention, he boldly announces, is to make it clear to greens and others not what greens in fact think, but what they should think. Indeed he pushes this normative tack to amazing length; only if greens change in the direction he indicates will they be able to make any practical difference to public policies! That rash claim has already been resoundingly falsified. But as regards prescriptive aspects, no intellectually alert greens would adopt Goodin's theory, either. It is not simply because they have other objectives on their agendas, than directly influencing party politics. It is because the theory is seriously defective, and open to evident, damaging objections. So it should not be sought by greens. A central reason why no aware greens should adopt the theory, and why it should be rejected is that it is open to a range of fairly decisive counterexamples. There are many natural items, natural objects or processes, that are not, either on the face of it or after reflection, valuable, as they are or were or where they are. Much that is natural is at least very problematic, some is downright bad. A first class of problematic examples, not involving life in a direct way, 16 It is suggested, by Achtenberg, that McKibben may, but a reading of The End of Nature does not support such a suggestion. As it happens, the situation with McKibben is more than a little curious. For what McKibben want to insist upon—adopting an inadmissibly high redefinition of natural—is that realy nothing is natural any more (hence The End) whence courtesy of Goodin, nothing is valuable any more. But that is not what McKibben wants to say, or says. �8 are those occurrences clustered together as natural disasters, catastrophes, and the like. Included therewith are earthquakes, landslides, soil erosion, meteorite collisions, volcanic eruptions, tidal waves, cyclones, ice ages, and so on. These examples include dramatic and damaging (natural) variations in the natural more stable course of events, variations with climatic or geophysical origins. Consider the devastating Lisbon earthquake of 1775 which so shocked European intellectuals (and was construed by Voltaire as evidence that Gthe natural world is farm from the best of all possible). By contrast, Goodin would be obliged to maintain that it was a good event, because natural (just as good as the new arrival of a passenger pigeon on a splendid autumnal morning) and presumably not at all shocking because of the natural beneficence of the whole disaster. No doubt the problems with global warming, ozone depletion, and so forth, that so exercise Goodin at the outset of his text, are that these are not natural (being induced by human activity which falls outside what is natural, under one conventional ruling); no doubt these would be valuable, and unproblematic, processes were they to proceed naturally without human intervention or assistance. So it was with the volcanic eruptions that demolished the splendid pink and white terraces and laid waste much beautiful New Zealand forest last century; so it was with the earlier ice-age which much reduced the richness of New Zealand flora, eliminating 3 of 4 groups of palms; these were good, even admirable, events. Similar ridiculous outcomes issue when we turn to life (life forms somehow still achieve a privileged role in Goodin, though they are no more natural). Consider the wide range of monsters, cripples, sports, freaks, and so on that natural processes, such as birth, regularly deliver: deformities, malignant mutations, and so on, outcomes that are still generally hidden away, put out of general sight, or quietly removed, at least in the case of more hideous outputs. It is very difficult to see that all these objects are good, even just as good as the most splendid products of nature.17 Roughly Goodin has landed in a similar awkward position to the theist 17 It seems admissible to record that I put several such counterexamples to Goodin well before he undertook final revision of his working typescript. Here is his response on these and connected issues (Goodin, personal communication, numbered and reordered with [1] now proceeding [2]): [1] [2] A somatic organism in a natural environment is a (nonmoral) normative system. Whatever has that much complexity, richness, self-organization, telos has (presumptively) value. I think I still incline to say (despite your chastening) that a sponaneous biological life is always of prima facie value (intrinsic). Though I recognize at once that such value can sometimes be overridden and become in some environmental contexts a new disvalue. And here I just hold in abeyance what the overlay of moral agency with the moral (past biological) life in humans does to the presumption. �9 who announces that all the natural works of God are good, and is then confronted by awful work such as monstrosities or catastrophes. He can try, like the theist, to fall back to some larger valuable setting of which these prima facie nonvaluable components are an integral part; in Goodin's case there is a wider encompassing theory available, namely evolutionary theory (with variation required for natural selection).18 But already this means significant qualification and modification of Goodin's original theory, and shift to a different and so far undeveloped theory. Better to abandon the original theory, given that superior alternatives are on offer namely multiple factor theories, with naturalness one factor in the mix.19 There remain many other lesser difficulties for theories like Goodin's which try to reduce value-making factors to one, such as naturalness (or biological life, richness, or whatever). For naturalness, difficulties arise with pests and weeds, which may be quite natural objects, but objects which are located in the wrong places, notably outside their natural range. No doubt Goodin's theory can be elaborated to take account of such exceptions, but elaborated it needs to be. Other difficulties arise with natural objects which are in natural places, but which are in some way out of balance with their natural environment, for instance through excess numbers, excessive predation (leading to population collapses, etc.). Consider, for example, members of a natural herd of elephants, grown too large for their natural environment, who become destroyers, demolishing significant forests in their range. Again this is natural enough in the circumstances, but the outcomes are certainly not good, nor praiseworthy or the like. The deficiencies of the approach as offering a “theory” of value are accentuated by the specific narrow recipe Goodin tries to impose on greens. In particular, it appears to supply only an on-off qualitative assessment. An item is either good or not according as it is natural, and that [3] I will have to interpet monstrosities, mutation, deformities as struggling life, somehow a necessary part of the process, even though they are in some respects failures. Anyway, more on that some other time. [4] I also hold that (geo) physical nature can sometimes have intrinsic value, so that life, while sufficient for value prima facie, is not necessary for it. A few comments:- Paragraph [1] already points to a more satisfactory, sophisticated theory than greens are saddled with, with a mix of factors (of which naturalness is surely one) yielding presumptive value. Paragraphs [2] and [3] also indicate elements of a more sensitive theory, again at substantial odds with that presented in the book. Paragraph [3] suggest the sort of theological or evolutionary escape discussed in the text below; it does nothing to counter the counterexamples. 18 Also the theist's problems concerning maximization are perhaps reduced in this setting. 19 See e.g. EE or FF. �10 is all. But not all items are of the same value, which is all this allows: valuable because natural. Some, while not being “more natural”，are much more valuable than others. It is well known that comparative assessments, such as bettemess, and likewise quantitative assessments cannot be directly defined in terms of mere quantitative assessments, and it is sufficiently appreciated that a satisfactory axiological theory should account at least for comparative assessments. In this respect too, Goodin's pseudo-theory falls far short of adequacy. On the other side of the qualitative divide, even the best art museums and the best painings within them are not valuable, not good, because not natural. Even if Goodin should say, what his text sometimes suggests, that his green "theory" applies only to natural objects, artifacts are left out, then the theory is at best seriously incomplete. Greens will have some more comprehensive theory of value which covers all items, and integrates a range of assessments of artifacts with natural objects: naturalness will properly disappear as sole criterion, becoming but one factor. It is noteworthy that much of the subsequent development of green political theory in Goodin's text does not depend upon the excessively strong value theory he tries to load upon greens; it does not require—r always, for that matter, use—naturalness as sole criterion. Much of what comes later, all that appears right enough, will "go through" will naturalness as a critical factor. Where appropriate call this the alternate scheme, according to which naturalness is only one critical, but not always decisive, factor in a mix. The alternate scheme is an integral part of that different green account alluded to above. On the touted tightly-integrated Green package, and strong holism. Certain extraordinarily bold claims are advanced, under the banner of 'a unified moral vision5 in the chapter advertised as 4the unity of the green programme\ Notably the green theory of value...[as] elaborated... is what underlies and unifies the entire green political programme .... It is what makes it illogical and inconsistent for other, more established parties to try picking and choosing some bits off that agenda, without accepting all the rest of its demands as well.20 The claims are never established, would not be established by what is suggested, and indeed cannot be satisfactorily established, because the claims do not stand up. The arguments outlined are seriously wanting. Even what is said would make good the claims would not (traces are not enough for "making good^^); but in any case Goodin does not attempt these things, opting to proceed 'more impressionistically *. 20 p.87. The same sort of theme is reiterated (with but minor variations) subsequently, e.g. p.92. Note the ascent from an everyday theory of the good to a unified moral vision. �11 Even impressionistically little works satisfactorily. For 'the green theory of value' of Goodin is not 'uniquely able to account for the coherence of the green public-policy proposals\2122Apart from the critical features, to be considered below, that green proposals do not enjoy the sort of coherence alleged, and that established parties can, and do, pick over green programs selectively, the uniqueness claim, the special position of Goodin's theory, is quietly dropped in the impressionistic "argument". All that is used is the alternate scheme, that a concern for nature informs, directly or indirectly, all the connected 'plants in the green programme'.22 Evidently a variety of concerns for nature can motivate and justify attitudes and procedures regarding pollution, waste, environmental destruction, and so forth. Uniqueness lapses. Worse, the more remote, less directly environmental parts of the green agenda do not fall out eith of Goodin's theory or from the alternate scheme. In a note, Goodin concedes as much; but these (decentralization, grass roots democracy, nonviolence, and much else) derive so he claims, from the subsidiary, but logically separate, green theory of agency.23 Whether they do so derive or not (they do not), they do not derive indirectly from a green theory of value, because of the separation of agency from value. For similar reasons, the "integrated" green programme (outlined in an Appendix) begins to unravel. All that Goodin tries to make out, then only suggestively, is that the alternative scheme helps in explaining certain green attitudes that appear anomalous or otherwise problematic. Even should this exercise succeed (and its success is at best mixed), it would not achieve what is required. Interestingly, the Appendix, 'The Green Political Programme5—far from demonstrating that the narrow green theory of value runs through all green policy, not just the overly 'environmental5 parts—helps in revealing what a patchwork the presented programme is really, a patchwork from which separate patches can be unsewn. A basic problem with the whole approach is this: that there is not a single green program, different green groups have different programms. Witness the many internal disputes, the very public conflicts between social and deep ecology, between animal liberationists and nature greens, between luddites and smart new- age technologists, between spiritual and secular greens, and son. Granted various loose conalitions may be stitched together; but they are various, not unique, and the stitching is very loose, and may easily be undone, for different repackaging. In short, there are many green packages, corresponding to different green theories of value and agency and so on. As there is 21 Ibid p.87. 22 Ibid. p.87. Goodin himself slides back to the indefinite, to a green theory of value, e.g. p.88. 23 Note & p.8& �12 no single green theory, so there is no such tightly unified single package, which is what empirical evidence also seems to show. Moreover, established parties have drawn very selectively upon these sorts of packages, and filched elements selectively. Witness the fate of the early Values party in New Zealand. 'The prima facie wrongness of ... piecemeal borrowing from the greens is easily explicated. It derives straight forwardly from the logic of consistency. It would be simply wrong to embrace a theory of value... for some purposes while shunning it for others. The truth status of value theories just does not flicker on and off like that/2425Embedded therein, in this strong holism, is one basic confusion that pervades the book, a confusion between a theory and what derives from it, between a source and its outputs. Nothing in logic stops selective borrowing from what derives from a program, however tightly integrated. Strong holism is far too strong; it would imply that we cannot adopt, or even toy with, one part of some value theory, or ethical theory on Goodin's account of the matter, without embracing the lot. We cannot accept some on Moore's claims, some of Spinoza's analyses, part of Aristotle without being stuck with the whole. Eclecticism, at least as regards a theory of value, is impossible. Which is absurd, and a reductio thereto of a seriously defective argument. The conclusion has to be that yet another of Goodin's main themes is seriously astray and should be rejected: that 'greens make (radical) demands on an all-or-nothing basis525, that greens 'might reasonably demand that we implement their political program on an all-or-nothing basis5.26 On the misadvertised green theory of agency: green collective organization・ The title 'The Green Theory of Agency5 is something of a misnomer. Most of the chapter consemed (chapter 4) is taken up with what is inaccurately headed 'Principles of green political structures*, which treats not agency but certain elements of macro-political organisation, notably decentralization and policy coordination (itself headed, misleadingly, 'think globally, act locally5). Most of the remainder of the chapter is occupied with what is headed, generally, 'Principles of green political action', but reduces to 'democratic participation5 and 'nonviolence5, and with 'Principles of green party organisation', cut down to 'grassroots democracy5 and 'nrotation in office*, both something of travesties, given the indicated sweep and generality. The theory of "agency" is itself rather a part of a theory of collective action. Virtually nothing on agency in the usual sense of individual action theory enters, except a footnote 24 p.92, partly reiterating the integrated package theme. 25 p.168? [check, locate] 26 Back cover. �13 referring to some work on the topic, and no theory at all of green individual agents (their lifestyles, etc.). The relevant part of collective action theory looks not so much at the roles of operative agents and their individual instrumentality, as at the character and corodinating mechanisms of collective action, namely that needed or designed to realize green values. And really, what is considered is green collective organization, which comprises not only action and practices, but also associated political procedures and structures. Into this expanded account, furthermore, some large assumptions are written, assumptions not accepted by many greens: roughly, reduction of the political to the collective, and of the collective to aggregated individuals, i.e. themes of individualism.2728These reductive assumptions, which are inserted and infiltrated unargued, come to matter in the material on policy coordination, which adopts a standard game-theory approach drawn from the received reductive theory of collective action, a theory unlikely to gain much green applause, for all its academic fashionability. The case for green engagement in coalitions is less straightforward than depicted. No doubt greens who opt for this course of action—what Goodin tries to insist upon, involvement in the politics of the established system—do not then have the option of spuming power-sharing opportunities when those opportunities present themselves. Our guide is, however, too optimistic about how often such opportunies are like to occur, and too sanguine about how they are likely to operate to green advantage. For one thing, greens are not the only political forces within conventional politics who have a theory of value. Furthermore, just as greens seeking to enter into a coalition with a party of the electoral left (at present the only plausible option) must look askance at the likely ttincohe^ence^^ of the compromise reached, so too must the other coalescing party. If, under such circumstances, 'the blame for the logical incoherence would lie with the parties that insisted on adulterating the green programme528, so too, from the perspective of the party of the left, must *the blame for the logical incoherence lie with the greens who insisted on adulterating the pink programme'. It should come as little surprise then, that the evidence suggests that parties of the moderate left are every bit as reluctant to enter into coalitions with the greens as the greens are with them.29 Green agents: their lifestyles, their commitments, their changed consciousness. These matters feature large in American deep ecology; they are neglected or dismissed in Goodin. His rejection of green personal lifestyles is indicative, in these terms, of personal green consciousness and commitment, and of but subdued or diminished green values. It seems fair to remark that only weak environmental commitments are displayed in the book (however 27 See e.g. p.l 14 top. 28 To cite Goodin p.179. 29 Hay op.cit., where various examples confirming the final claim are assembled. �14 even weak commitments, typical of much academic literature, are better than none, typical of former academic literature); or, more provocatively, to infer that Goodin has not really absorbed genuine green values (else he would act personally). What does come through from the book is that Goodin remains something of an outsider to green activism. That he is not together at the cutting edge of things green is betrayed by occasional telling slips, as with what greens worry about in different places (esp. pp. 180-1). It is not that what he asserts is wrong; it is that emphases and contrasts are different. Reasons offered for rejection of green lifestyles are, where clear, extraordinarily weak. Consider what is offered: • living too close to nature, too much in harmony with it, might cause it to lose its valued role for us30一which is (remember) to provide us with a larger context in which we can see our lives as being set! Test the force of the argument by comparing living in the vicinity of other valued items: worthy lives, art, music, intellectual accomplishments. Moreover, there are counter­ arguments and considerations: that closeness brings respect and awe, and can enhance appreciation of value. Consider the idea of Christians distancing themselves from Cathedrals and Churches, ritual and practice. • to achieve political change, greens should make every effort to minimise the perceived distance between themselves and the “orthodox” community一whereas the association of 'alternative lifestyling5 with 'green' has exactly the opposite effect. Such a claim reveals much as regards subcontests, such as: claimants commitments and seriousness, type and extent of change envisaged, and so on. Christians, feminists, revolutionaries and others would not be too impressed. As in other reaches where orthodoxy may be morally or otherwise amiss, so with regard to green lifestyles: There is a case for a politics of “exemplary practice”； for whilst some people will treat those who so engage as objects of scorn and ridicule, it is evident that many people have been recruited to green values through positive contact with experiments in "right living”，or with elements of green lifestyles. It is important too that at least some people endeavour to demonstrate how green principles might be put into practice at the level of daily living. • Bizarre examples, selective unfavourable examples, advanced under the heading 'green heresies5.31 Granted 'some of this “exemplary practice” might be so outlandish that it reflects negatively on larger green projects. But the influence of this can be overstated; this sort of game can be played with many things that have features to recommend parts of them. After all, every social movement and every tradition of political philosophy, has its fringe-dwellers, even its 30 Thus p.81ff. 31 pp.78-81. �15 practitioners of a particular reductio ad absurdum extracted from a larger coherency.32 • local lifestyle set the focus astray. It should be on grander issues, on global environmental problems, fate of earth, etc. But plainly more regional and local problems also matter, esp. for preservation of habitats, creatures, etc. And here personal and local things can be very important. Finally, there are other reasons for green lifestyles. For example, for the structural changes necessary for environmentally satisfactory societies of one sort or another, something like internalization of green values and adoption of a green lifestyle proves highly advantageous. To this end and others, committed green subcultures and inspiring individual examples are extremely valuable. APPENDIX: a defective setting. Many productions that may look new and interesting in fact prove conservative, brushing off and wheeling out old ideas as if they would accomplish all requisite work. That is, it is implicitly claimed, under conservative approaches, that prevailing paradigms offer all necessary resources for capturing what has (wrongly) been presented as radically new.33 In environmental philosophy a classical exercise of this sort, well received by an environmentally conservative or reactionary establishment, was Passmore's text. Passmore's (and was followed, in a slightly expanded and apparently more liberal setting by Attfield, in a series of broadly consequentialist productions. Now the exercise repeated in environmental political theory by Goodin, who simply imports utilitarianism as supplying a unique and unquestionable rationality, in place of Passmore's vague utilitarianism of humans interests. It does not bode well for a genuinely green theory that its presentation lies virtually entirely within a shallow utilitarian setting, the setting of the dominant economic and public policy paradigm. For just such a setting is what has assisted significantly in getting the Earth into the present environmental mess. Consider what Goodin tries to insist upon in his section (s.1.3) on the arguments (and also elsewhere):- He assumes, in so trying to preempt the range of arguments, both that —the case for environmental protection has to be made in utilitarian terms if it is to prove effective —the most telling arguments concern the ways environmental protection measures are required to further human interests (and intertwined items: people, profits, property, resources, etc.). It is worth commencing erosion of these commonplace assumptions immediately. As for what arguments "work”，are telling or effective, that depends heavily on the context, who is engaged 32 This paragraph borrows heavily from Hay. 33 Brennan's third reductive trend(p.800. �16 in a dialogue, and so on. Those with deep green sympathies are not going to be vastly impressed by a sheaf of utilitarian and human interests (first and only) arguments, any more than by other privileged class arguments. Goodin seems to have rather assumed that, in effect, we are always paired with our political masters, who are and will remain shallow utilitarians. Even now this is by no means uniformly so, and there are grounds for hope that things could be much ameliorated in the future. Accordingly there is little reason to accept Goodin's further excessive claim that the 'essence' of the arguments (all satisfactory arguments he really wants to have us concede) remains the same: 'inadequate protection of the human environment, seriously compromised human interests\34 Pretty much the same problematic ethos is likewise taken for granted for proposed remedies: a standard economic public policy framework, with the essence of the remedy consisting in correcting market failure. From deeper green perspectives this is extraordinarily tired stuff, with "remedies" that have been tried and tried and continue to fail. As part of his case, he tries the stock shallow strategy of rubbishing the idea of admitting interests beyond humans (to grant animals interests is hardly to ''widen'' or ttextend^^ interests). The arguments are all very cheap, and the counter-case is not properly addressed. Regrettably, a shallow utilitarianism raises its ugly head all over the place. A few examples: 'it is more important that the right things be done than that they be done in any particular way or through any particular agency * (p.120). But it is unnecessary to document utilitarian imput as Goodin himself has provided it in susequent work. A main orientation of Goodin's work一which help explain several of its features一 is towards policy-makers or would-be policy-makers. Among such audiences utilitarian and economic rationales contue to be greeted enthusistically. For one reason, such rationales seem made to order when policy makers, or "bureaucratic rationality,5, require 'a means of justifying decisions that may be unpopular with large members of people5. For through these rationales they have seemed able to give principled reasons for action. The policy-maker can claim to have weighed up all the relevant considerations for and against a course of action; each consideration was in some way commensurable with every other—perhaps because each had a dollar value associated with it—and so it was possible to reach a determinate conclusion, by fair and objective means. The appearance of determinacy, fairness and objectivity is an important tool for those who wield and manipulate power in business, government, and even universities. But this rationalizing use of economic approaches should be resisted by everyone, including economists themselves.35 34 Ibid p.8 (check). 35 Brennan p.807. �17 The reasons are now entirely familiar ones. References Achtenberg, W., Review of Goodin, Environmental Values, (1994). Foucault, M., 'What is Enlightenment5 Goodin, R., Green political Theory, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1992. Habermus, J., 'Modernity—an incomplete project*, in Postmodern Culture (ed. H. Foster), Pluto Press, London, 1987. Hay, P., Review of Goodin typescript, University of Tasmania, 1994. McGowan, J., Postmodernism and Its Critics, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 199x. Osborne, P, 'Modernity is a qualitative, not a stromological, category: notes on the dialectics of differential historical time', in Postmodernism and the re-reading of modernity (ed. F. Barker and others) Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1991/2. Priest, G., 'On alternative geometries, arithmetics, and logics; a tribute to Lukasiewicz5, typsescript, 1996. Routley, R. and V., “Human chauvinism and environmental ethics' referred to as EE Routley, R. and V., The Fight for the Forests，referred to as FF. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Draft Papers Description An account of the resource Sylvan's literary executor encountered an archive in which “all his projects were current", since manuscripts were undated and unattributed. Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document 13.6.96 GREEN POLITICAL THEORY: a different account Green political theory is divided according to one of our guides1, rather like Gaul according to Caesar, into three parts: —a green theory of value, —a subordinate green theory of agency, and —a green lifestyle program, portrayed as a set of altogether dispensible lifestyle recommendations. While it is the high-handed insistent dismissal of green lifestyles by this guide, Goodin, that has captured the attention of critics and been highlighted, the brash partitioning of green political theory, and the surreptitious dismissal therewith of significant parts of it, should not pass unnoticed. To the contrary, virtually the whole of what political theory is taken to treat comes up for reassessment once green lights are played upon it, certainly under deeper green illumination. That bogus exhaustiveness taken for granted, that all there is to it amounts to value and action, no doubt derives largely from an underlying utilitarianism, according to which other theoretical matters can be subsumed under these.2 In short, partly through dispensing with lifestyle considerations, primarily by virtue of a background utilitarianism operating within a conventional state-setting, Goodin can suppose that green political theory reduces to these two parts: a theory of value and a subordinate theory of agency. Such a reduction is however much too simple, leaving out, as it does, much of ethics of political relevance, as well as a large slab of politics. For example, ethical omissions include the fields of deontology (environmental permissions, prescriptives, directives; environmental justice, rights and so on), of virtue theory, and of accountability. Among political omissions most striking is the absence of any due consideration of institutional and ideological alternatives to what now prevails. Prevailing Western political arrangements—with staged elections, urban bureaucratic control, incremental reformism (often environmentally regressive), and so on—are simply taken for granted. Above all, there is no critique of the state, an increasingly important part of radical green politics. One reason for this gross omission— f radical green theory from what is presented as green political theory—is that Goodin does not question the conventional political assumption that the appropriate objective of green political activity consists in gaining power or influence within established statist arrangements, for example at best through electoral 1 R. Goodin Green Political Theory, Polity Press, Cambridge 1992. This was undoubtedly a book worth criticizing. 2 See the appendix. 2 success enabling control of some of the administrative and executive functions of state (we shall encounter this conventional “political realism^^ again later). However significant strands of green political theory no longer accept this assumption. A related reason, reaching deeper, is that Goodin likewise does not question, as strands of green theory now do, what helps undergird the conventional political assumption and reformist utilitarianism, an Enlightenment ideology with its faith in reason and science, technologically-based progress, overall human goodness and dominance, and so on.3 The bold overstatement of claims, along with misrepresentation as to what green political theory comprises, is symptomatic of much of the book: overstatement and undersubstantiation.4 Virtually all main themes of the book are false, indeed rather patently so once exhibited unadorned, because limited truths are overextended; and they are undersupplied with cogent support. So it is with the green theory of value, which inflates what is a significant factor in green evaluation into the supposed total green theory. So it is with the green package, which is presented as having an absolutely tight integration, which it in fact lacks. And so on, as will appear. Not only are main themes seriously defective; more disappointing, a salvage operation will not yield a lode of green gold. As troubling is the anti-subversive character of the work. Goodin has wheeled another Trojan horse into green territory, a horse bringing a number of anti-green academic warriors armed with anti-green ideas and sentiments, and engaged in and advocating anti-green lifestyles, (as will emerge).5 Of course, 'Green political theory' is a clever title, which is complemented by a politically clever introduction on the crises which are not minimized or marginalised but given considerable weight—all of which suggest that the text might be of much more interest to politically inclined greens than the usual academic fare. But the title does not say how the green theory is to be treated, explained and encouraged, exposed and condemned. Neither really. The text is not written for greens (though the publishers obviously hope they may buy it,6 or be 3 For an exposition and criticism of Enlightenment Ideology, see Sylvan TM. 4 In part because these sorts of deficiencies have not been addressed in reviews of the book, I decided to persevere with this less charitable critique (a tiresome exercise bound to alienate). Regrettably most of the reviews appear to derive from a political science orientation. They trip lightly by philosophical fundamentals, where the book is noticeably weak, and vulnerable. And they tend to be very light on argument. 5 Trojan horses are in extensive use by academics, particularly in green regions. We will encounter a number of these horses. They are evident from sociology to biogeography and climatology, and particularly prominent around economic enslaves. 6 They form part of the intended audience for the book according to accompanying publishers' work and flyers. Indeed the publishers have participated in the deception, supplying a cover featuring a boss of the Green Man from the cloisters of Norwich cathedral, which sends, as they 3 tricked into buying it), but for a cohert of academic colleagues—for colleagues who form part of the prevailing system, of politics-more-or-less-as-usual and so on. Deapite its character, there are several useful and attractive features of Goodin's book, which do make it worthwhile reading for awake greens of theoretical bent (one of these features is an Appendix, putting together succinctly a green political program). It is a smoothly written book, encouraging readers to glide along, glossing over the underlying content and messages, and not grasping the enormity of some of what is presented, for instance even as green gospel. It may be just the style that is attractive (the cut of the book, the easy flow, an appealingly simple structure, and other stylish features), rather than details of the real content. If the book has a weakness from the PR angle, it may lie in its flippancy, and failure to take several green issues seriously, both of which sometimes enter irritatingly and will turn off some committed greens. But, by and large, it is a splendidly packaged work; it is what is packaged and what is pushed on greens that is the trouble. For a book purportedly on green theory, treatment of greens is extraordinary condescending. Not much notice is going to be taken of 'what self-styled greens... happen to believe', 'what positions greens actually do take' (p.vii). (How then does he justify the green attributions he proceeds to make, e.g. 'green theory of value5? Evidently his procedure is methodologically unsound). No, it is 'an attempt to saves greens from themselves5 (p.viii). To rescue them,4to tidy up' their slovenly positions—while throwing away critical features of green approaches, such as green lifestyles—Goodin is particularly concerned that green lifestyles should not be seen as part of a rectified green political package. Green lifestyle recommendations are entirely dispensible (so he and others can look and indeed be green without deffort, without making any green contribution; they are conveniently absolved from any relevant action, or lifestyle adjustment). At one stage Goodin claims that the theory is 'moderately deep'. But elsewhere he has more accurately said that it is a pale green theory, very pale green given the attitude taken to green lifestyles. Green Political Theory it may be called: deeper green political theory, at least, it certainly is not, even genuine green it but dubiously is. However Goodin's aim, he regularly informs us, is once again not 4to describe what positions greens actually do take5. His project is a normative one, aimed instead to show what positions greens should take, given their core concerns... what they have to say given their core values'?. In this attempt he should be seen to remarks, 'precisely the contrary signal concerning the nature of the author's project in there behind the Green Man's work*. 7 P. viii - p.vii, itals added. 4 fail entirely. He is astray not merely on the core concerns of many of them (which concerns are far from uniform), but also in loosely coupled resultant positions. Greens are under no such obligations as Goodin would load them with; they are not boxed in as he would suppose. The approach is not only condescending towards greens; it is a touch arrogant. The aim is said to be 'to show greens how to cast their position in the strongest possible form\8 This will turn out to be not a strong theoretical form, by any means, but merely a strong form pragmatically, given a raft of assumptions about prevailing electoral arrangements, an interests theory of voting and human behaviour, and so on. According to many a green however, thereby made are some of the assumptions that have to be turned around if humanly undesirable features are to be avoided, if social collapse of one sort or another is to be avoided. At the very outset, Goodin does something to offset such concerns, as those concerning limits of growth.9 He rolls out a familiar quasi-inductive argument, beloved of economists, that past predictions of limits have been riotously astray (e.g. Jeavons on coal, Meadows and others in Limits of Growth on tin). Granted some predictions have, those regularly offered as illustrations; though others have not, naturally such examples are not emphasized. Not only is the inductive base for the quasi-inductive argument defective, the argument itself exhibits some flaws. That it has been claimed before and shown wrong is hardly decisive evidence that it will not be right a next time. Recall not only the boy who cried "wolf' too often and was eventually consumed, but also the turkeys who every week approaching Christmas triumphantly announced that everything was proceeding just fine. [Simple enumerative induction is not reliable in such settings.] On this-here green theory of value. Much of Goodin's text, that segment that is not pleasant enough "ecopolitical fiir5 (stock descriptions of ecological problems, green movement and their platforms, and so on), is occupied in one way or another with what he is pleased call to 'a green theory of value', quickly to become 'the green theory of value'. Most of the remainder develops from a complementing 4green theory of action5.10 This green theory of value is pushed in a surprisingly deontological fashion, likely to arouse immediate suspicions: as what greens should adopt and wear, if they know what is good for them. A theory of value is just a theory of the good, so it is engagingly asserted at the outset. Not so, unless the rest of what is considered to belong to value theory (standing, 8 P.viii. 9 See the beginning of the main text p.l. 10 This theory of value is also presented in a much published paper, 'A green theory of value'. As to the definite formulation, the green theory, see many places in the text, e.g. p.87. 5 considerability, worth, rating, and so on) reduces. It does not (and Goodin makes no effort to effect a reduction). It will become plain that Goodin is rather good at presenting topics as what they are not. The practice goes beyond introductory and presentational matters to what is taken to be central, value theory. 'A theory of value is, quite simply, a theory of the good', so we are engagingly informed.11 A theory of value is much more comprehensive than a theory of the good (as a perusal of Austrian value theory will quickly confirm), and does not contract, without extensive and dubious reductions (there is the 'quite simply5), to a theory of the good. Do not anticipate then what is promised: a green theory of value. As it turns out, not only are greens short­ changed on value, they get a very small serve of theory, and again a very pale green offering at that. There are certain peripheral obstacles to this purported green theory of value. In particular, does it even measure up to admittedly lax standards for a theory as to value? As is readily ascertained, the "theory” does not even say what a value is like and is, what kind of object, what identity criteria it satisfies, what postulates it conforms to. Let us call what is presented a pseudo-theory. Perhaps it can be upgraded to a theory, but requisite work is so far lacking. Is this "green pseudo-theory" green? This sort of challenge Goodin is aware of and aims to deflect. Granted the pseudo-theory is admittedly shallow, all politically acceptable theories have to be, he suggests, for instance to seize wide common ground, etc. But this too is astray, because of pluralistic alternatives. According to this green pseudo-theory, not only is naturalness a source of green value, naturalness is the source of value (i.e. goodness). How does Goodin arrive at this identification? By various unsound moves. Most simply, he invalidly concludes, from a consideration of 'naturalness as a source of (green) value', that it is the source of value.12 Such an inference from an indefinite to a definite description is invalid unless uniqueness conditions are independently ensured. Less simply, there is a simplistic derivation of "theories of value" from the three conventional factors of economic production: land (or resources), labour, and capital, each of which is schematically linked to corresponding theories of value. No doubt the land ethic and the labour theory of value just could suggest as much, but it is dubious that anyone much, green or otherwise disposed, would rest content for long with such a “pure" theory, as the factors operate together, not separately. Moreover, the economic “derivations" of these theories should be enough to raise serious green doubts about them. 11 P.19. This claim is also made in several other overlapping Goodin productions. 12 Ibid. p.30. 6 The core theme resulting from the identification is that natural objects are valuable, i.e. good, because they are the result of natural processes and not artificial or human ones. What gives natural objects their value is precisely their naturalness.13 In support of his green theory, Goodin produces a rather nauseating sociological argument, along the following lines: 'humans' have a deeply felt need to find meaning in their lives, i.e. to see their lives as set within a larger context with which they can feel linked. Such a context is provided by nature. In fuller presentation, it is claimed that people want coherence 'between their inner worlds and the external world'; that 'whatever makes people strive for harmony within their own lives would also lead them to strive to lead their lives in harmony with the external world'; and that 'natural processes provide just such a larger context... within which we can set out our own life plans and projects5.14 The argument is entirely shallow, appealing to what some humans want (if they do, not even to what might be good for them); it is utterly instrumental, with nature an instrument for human wants and needs; it is extraordinarily weak, each step being highly contestable; and it does not lead to the intended conclusion, uniqueness of naturalness not being shown. Moreover, for what it is worth, the argument also commits the naturalistic fallacy, purportedly arriving at an identification of value, as what is natural, on the basis of "natural" human wants and needs.15 Observe that this is Goodin's theory as to green theory, an ultimately shallow theory, reached in a shallow economic way, defended in a shallow sociological way, hardly likely to be reflective of deeper green thought. However, it is made to look in some places as if it were some sort of descriptive account; while at other places it appears as a normative account, as if it 13 find quote 14 Ibid p.3& 15 An identification of that Moorean nonnatural feature as natural furthermore. It is worth appending a relevant point from Brennan (pp.805-6): For theorists like Goodin, the status of environmental systems, species and non-human animals appears to be problematic. Although he regards them as proivind a large, independent context within which human life makes sense, it seems that he at the same time regards them as akin to consumer goods, to be displayed, consumed or prozed according to our informed preferences. For those influenced by the resource economists, it can be hard to understand the challenge posed by environmental ethics»>. Once nature is thought of as a resource, a standing reserve, a set of processes and objects that have the potential to satisfy human desires, it is easy to think of it as a nothing more than that. And the challenge posed by any ethic which is properly called 'environmental' is to find a way of articulating the attitude that nature is indeed a great deal more than that. 7 were a very reasonable thing for greens to expouse. But really it is of neither sort; it is neither descriptive of green positions, nor something they should, or would reasonably, adopt; rather it is a theory foisted on greens. It might be pretended that Goodin has offered a "reconstruction”， a rational reconstruction even, of green theory; but such a pretence fails as the construction fails, to meet even basic adequacy conditions, as will appear. As regards descriptive elements, no solid evidence is assembled that most, or even some, greens adopt this green theory, with naturalness as the sole source. Indeed Goodin offers no evidence that any do, and perhaps none of any standing do.16 Furthermore, as but little investigation reveals, there is not a single green "theory" of value, but various different, sometimes competing, positions. Nor could a single essence be satisfactorily distilled from those positions, and even what could be distilled would not resemble Goodin's construction. For some conspicuous green positions, such as ecofeminism or deep ecology, would in no way underwrite naturalness as the source of value, or for that matter a single source of value. More generally, the principles and arguments advanced within green critiques of reductionist science—including that central lesson of ecology, that meaning is to be found in connections, in patterns, in relations—similarly militate against any reductionist grounding of value. Conveniently Goodin appears to absolve us from more detailed fieldwork on green positions. His intention, he boldly announces, is to make it clear to greens and others not what greens in fact think, but what they should think. Indeed he pushes this normative tack to amazing length; only if greens change in the direction he indicates will they be able to make any practical difference to public policies! That rash claim has already been resoundingly falsified. But as regards prescriptive aspects, no intellectually alert greens would adopt Goodin's theory, either. It is not simply because they have other objectives on their agendas, than directly influencing party politics. It is because the theory is seriously defective, and open to evident, damaging objections. So it should not be sought by greens. A central reason why no aware greens should adopt the theory, and why it should be rejected is that it is open to a range of fairly decisive counterexamples. There are many natural items, natural objects or processes, that are not, either on the face of it or after reflection, valuable, as they are or were or where they are. Much that is natural is at least very problematic, some is downright bad. A first class of problematic examples, not involving life in a direct way, 16 It is suggested, by Achtenberg, that McKibben may, but a reading of The End of Nature does not support such a suggestion. As it happens, the situation with McKibben is more than a little curious. For what McKibben want to insist upon—adopting an inadmissibly high redefinition of natural—is that realy nothing is natural any more (hence The End) whence courtesy of Goodin, nothing is valuable any more. But that is not what McKibben wants to say, or says. 8 are those occurrences clustered together as natural disasters, catastrophes, and the like. Included therewith are earthquakes, landslides, soil erosion, meteorite collisions, volcanic eruptions, tidal waves, cyclones, ice ages, and so on. These examples include dramatic and damaging (natural) variations in the natural more stable course of events, variations with climatic or geophysical origins. Consider the devastating Lisbon earthquake of 1775 which so shocked European intellectuals (and was construed by Voltaire as evidence that Gthe natural world is farm from the best of all possible). By contrast, Goodin would be obliged to maintain that it was a good event, because natural (just as good as the new arrival of a passenger pigeon on a splendid autumnal morning) and presumably not at all shocking because of the natural beneficence of the whole disaster. No doubt the problems with global warming, ozone depletion, and so forth, that so exercise Goodin at the outset of his text, are that these are not natural (being induced by human activity which falls outside what is natural, under one conventional ruling); no doubt these would be valuable, and unproblematic, processes were they to proceed naturally without human intervention or assistance. So it was with the volcanic eruptions that demolished the splendid pink and white terraces and laid waste much beautiful New Zealand forest last century; so it was with the earlier ice-age which much reduced the richness of New Zealand flora, eliminating 3 of 4 groups of palms; these were good, even admirable, events. Similar ridiculous outcomes issue when we turn to life (life forms somehow still achieve a privileged role in Goodin, though they are no more natural). Consider the wide range of monsters, cripples, sports, freaks, and so on that natural processes, such as birth, regularly deliver: deformities, malignant mutations, and so on, outcomes that are still generally hidden away, put out of general sight, or quietly removed, at least in the case of more hideous outputs. It is very difficult to see that all these objects are good, even just as good as the most splendid products of nature.17 Roughly Goodin has landed in a similar awkward position to the theist 17 It seems admissible to record that I put several such counterexamples to Goodin well before he undertook final revision of his working typescript. Here is his response on these and connected issues (Goodin, personal communication, numbered and reordered with [1] now proceeding [2]): [1] [2] A somatic organism in a natural environment is a (nonmoral) normative system. Whatever has that much complexity, richness, self-organization, telos has (presumptively) value. I think I still incline to say (despite your chastening) that a sponaneous biological life is always of prima facie value (intrinsic). Though I recognize at once that such value can sometimes be overridden and become in some environmental contexts a new disvalue. And here I just hold in abeyance what the overlay of moral agency with the moral (past biological) life in humans does to the presumption. 9 who announces that all the natural works of God are good, and is then confronted by awful work such as monstrosities or catastrophes. He can try, like the theist, to fall back to some larger valuable setting of which these prima facie nonvaluable components are an integral part; in Goodin's case there is a wider encompassing theory available, namely evolutionary theory (with variation required for natural selection).18 But already this means significant qualification and modification of Goodin's original theory, and shift to a different and so far undeveloped theory. Better to abandon the original theory, given that superior alternatives are on offer namely multiple factor theories, with naturalness one factor in the mix.19 There remain many other lesser difficulties for theories like Goodin's which try to reduce value-making factors to one, such as naturalness (or biological life, richness, or whatever). For naturalness, difficulties arise with pests and weeds, which may be quite natural objects, but objects which are located in the wrong places, notably outside their natural range. No doubt Goodin's theory can be elaborated to take account of such exceptions, but elaborated it needs to be. Other difficulties arise with natural objects which are in natural places, but which are in some way out of balance with their natural environment, for instance through excess numbers, excessive predation (leading to population collapses, etc.). Consider, for example, members of a natural herd of elephants, grown too large for their natural environment, who become destroyers, demolishing significant forests in their range. Again this is natural enough in the circumstances, but the outcomes are certainly not good, nor praiseworthy or the like. The deficiencies of the approach as offering a “theory” of value are accentuated by the specific narrow recipe Goodin tries to impose on greens. In particular, it appears to supply only an on-off qualitative assessment. An item is either good or not according as it is natural, and that [3] I will have to interpet monstrosities, mutation, deformities as struggling life, somehow a necessary part of the process, even though they are in some respects failures. Anyway, more on that some other time. [4] I also hold that (geo) physical nature can sometimes have intrinsic value, so that life, while sufficient for value prima facie, is not necessary for it. A few comments:- Paragraph [1] already points to a more satisfactory, sophisticated theory than greens are saddled with, with a mix of factors (of which naturalness is surely one) yielding presumptive value. Paragraphs [2] and [3] also indicate elements of a more sensitive theory, again at substantial odds with that presented in the book. Paragraph [3] suggest the sort of theological or evolutionary escape discussed in the text below; it does nothing to counter the counterexamples. 18 Also the theist's problems concerning maximization are perhaps reduced in this setting. 19 See e.g. EE or FF. 10 is all. But not all items are of the same value, which is all this allows: valuable because natural. Some, while not being “more natural”，are much more valuable than others. It is well known that comparative assessments, such as bettemess, and likewise quantitative assessments cannot be directly defined in terms of mere quantitative assessments, and it is sufficiently appreciated that a satisfactory axiological theory should account at least for comparative assessments. In this respect too, Goodin's pseudo-theory falls far short of adequacy. On the other side of the qualitative divide, even the best art museums and the best painings within them are not valuable, not good, because not natural. Even if Goodin should say, what his text sometimes suggests, that his green "theory" applies only to natural objects, artifacts are left out, then the theory is at best seriously incomplete. Greens will have some more comprehensive theory of value which covers all items, and integrates a range of assessments of artifacts with natural objects: naturalness will properly disappear as sole criterion, becoming but one factor. It is noteworthy that much of the subsequent development of green political theory in Goodin's text does not depend upon the excessively strong value theory he tries to load upon greens; it does not require—r always, for that matter, use—naturalness as sole criterion. Much of what comes later, all that appears right enough, will "go through" will naturalness as a critical factor. Where appropriate call this the alternate scheme, according to which naturalness is only one critical, but not always decisive, factor in a mix. The alternate scheme is an integral part of that different green account alluded to above. On the touted tightly-integrated Green package, and strong holism. Certain extraordinarily bold claims are advanced, under the banner of 'a unified moral vision5 in the chapter advertised as 4the unity of the green programme\ Notably the green theory of value...[as] elaborated... is what underlies and unifies the entire green political programme .... It is what makes it illogical and inconsistent for other, more established parties to try picking and choosing some bits off that agenda, without accepting all the rest of its demands as well.20 The claims are never established, would not be established by what is suggested, and indeed cannot be satisfactorily established, because the claims do not stand up. The arguments outlined are seriously wanting. Even what is said would make good the claims would not (traces are not enough for "making good^^); but in any case Goodin does not attempt these things, opting to proceed 'more impressionistically *. 20 p.87. The same sort of theme is reiterated (with but minor variations) subsequently, e.g. p.92. Note the ascent from an everyday theory of the good to a unified moral vision. 11 Even impressionistically little works satisfactorily. For 'the green theory of value' of Goodin is not 'uniquely able to account for the coherence of the green public-policy proposals\2122Apart from the critical features, to be considered below, that green proposals do not enjoy the sort of coherence alleged, and that established parties can, and do, pick over green programs selectively, the uniqueness claim, the special position of Goodin's theory, is quietly dropped in the impressionistic "argument". All that is used is the alternate scheme, that a concern for nature informs, directly or indirectly, all the connected 'plants in the green programme'.22 Evidently a variety of concerns for nature can motivate and justify attitudes and procedures regarding pollution, waste, environmental destruction, and so forth. Uniqueness lapses. Worse, the more remote, less directly environmental parts of the green agenda do not fall out eith of Goodin's theory or from the alternate scheme. In a note, Goodin concedes as much; but these (decentralization, grass roots democracy, nonviolence, and much else) derive so he claims, from the subsidiary, but logically separate, green theory of agency.23 Whether they do so derive or not (they do not), they do not derive indirectly from a green theory of value, because of the separation of agency from value. For similar reasons, the "integrated" green programme (outlined in an Appendix) begins to unravel. All that Goodin tries to make out, then only suggestively, is that the alternative scheme helps in explaining certain green attitudes that appear anomalous or otherwise problematic. Even should this exercise succeed (and its success is at best mixed), it would not achieve what is required. Interestingly, the Appendix, 'The Green Political Programme5—far from demonstrating that the narrow green theory of value runs through all green policy, not just the overly 'environmental5 parts—helps in revealing what a patchwork the presented programme is really, a patchwork from which separate patches can be unsewn. A basic problem with the whole approach is this: that there is not a single green program, different green groups have different programms. Witness the many internal disputes, the very public conflicts between social and deep ecology, between animal liberationists and nature greens, between luddites and smart new- age technologists, between spiritual and secular greens, and son. Granted various loose conalitions may be stitched together; but they are various, not unique, and the stitching is very loose, and may easily be undone, for different repackaging. In short, there are many green packages, corresponding to different green theories of value and agency and so on. As there is 21 Ibid p.87. 22 Ibid. p.87. Goodin himself slides back to the indefinite, to a green theory of value, e.g. p.88. 23 Note & p.8& 12 no single green theory, so there is no such tightly unified single package, which is what empirical evidence also seems to show. Moreover, established parties have drawn very selectively upon these sorts of packages, and filched elements selectively. Witness the fate of the early Values party in New Zealand. 'The prima facie wrongness of ... piecemeal borrowing from the greens is easily explicated. It derives straight forwardly from the logic of consistency. It would be simply wrong to embrace a theory of value... for some purposes while shunning it for others. The truth status of value theories just does not flicker on and off like that/2425Embedded therein, in this strong holism, is one basic confusion that pervades the book, a confusion between a theory and what derives from it, between a source and its outputs. Nothing in logic stops selective borrowing from what derives from a program, however tightly integrated. Strong holism is far too strong; it would imply that we cannot adopt, or even toy with, one part of some value theory, or ethical theory on Goodin's account of the matter, without embracing the lot. We cannot accept some on Moore's claims, some of Spinoza's analyses, part of Aristotle without being stuck with the whole. Eclecticism, at least as regards a theory of value, is impossible. Which is absurd, and a reductio thereto of a seriously defective argument. The conclusion has to be that yet another of Goodin's main themes is seriously astray and should be rejected: that 'greens make (radical) demands on an all-or-nothing basis525, that greens 'might reasonably demand that we implement their political program on an all-or-nothing basis5.26 On the misadvertised green theory of agency: green collective organization・ The title 'The Green Theory of Agency5 is something of a misnomer. Most of the chapter consemed (chapter 4) is taken up with what is inaccurately headed 'Principles of green political structures*, which treats not agency but certain elements of macro-political organisation, notably decentralization and policy coordination (itself headed, misleadingly, 'think globally, act locally5). Most of the remainder of the chapter is occupied with what is headed, generally, 'Principles of green political action', but reduces to 'democratic participation5 and 'nonviolence5, and with 'Principles of green party organisation', cut down to 'grassroots democracy5 and 'nrotation in office*, both something of travesties, given the indicated sweep and generality. The theory of "agency" is itself rather a part of a theory of collective action. Virtually nothing on agency in the usual sense of individual action theory enters, except a footnote 24 p.92, partly reiterating the integrated package theme. 25 p.168? [check, locate] 26 Back cover. 13 referring to some work on the topic, and no theory at all of green individual agents (their lifestyles, etc.). The relevant part of collective action theory looks not so much at the roles of operative agents and their individual instrumentality, as at the character and corodinating mechanisms of collective action, namely that needed or designed to realize green values. And really, what is considered is green collective organization, which comprises not only action and practices, but also associated political procedures and structures. Into this expanded account, furthermore, some large assumptions are written, assumptions not accepted by many greens: roughly, reduction of the political to the collective, and of the collective to aggregated individuals, i.e. themes of individualism.2728These reductive assumptions, which are inserted and infiltrated unargued, come to matter in the material on policy coordination, which adopts a standard game-theory approach drawn from the received reductive theory of collective action, a theory unlikely to gain much green applause, for all its academic fashionability. The case for green engagement in coalitions is less straightforward than depicted. No doubt greens who opt for this course of action—what Goodin tries to insist upon, involvement in the politics of the established system—do not then have the option of spuming power-sharing opportunities when those opportunities present themselves. Our guide is, however, too optimistic about how often such opportunies are like to occur, and too sanguine about how they are likely to operate to green advantage. For one thing, greens are not the only political forces within conventional politics who have a theory of value. Furthermore, just as greens seeking to enter into a coalition with a party of the electoral left (at present the only plausible option) must look askance at the likely ttincohe^ence^^ of the compromise reached, so too must the other coalescing party. If, under such circumstances, 'the blame for the logical incoherence would lie with the parties that insisted on adulterating the green programme528, so too, from the perspective of the party of the left, must *the blame for the logical incoherence lie with the greens who insisted on adulterating the pink programme'. It should come as little surprise then, that the evidence suggests that parties of the moderate left are every bit as reluctant to enter into coalitions with the greens as the greens are with them.29 Green agents: their lifestyles, their commitments, their changed consciousness. These matters feature large in American deep ecology; they are neglected or dismissed in Goodin. His rejection of green personal lifestyles is indicative, in these terms, of personal green consciousness and commitment, and of but subdued or diminished green values. It seems fair to remark that only weak environmental commitments are displayed in the book (however 27 See e.g. p.l 14 top. 28 To cite Goodin p.179. 29 Hay op.cit., where various examples confirming the final claim are assembled. 14 even weak commitments, typical of much academic literature, are better than none, typical of former academic literature); or, more provocatively, to infer that Goodin has not really absorbed genuine green values (else he would act personally). What does come through from the book is that Goodin remains something of an outsider to green activism. That he is not together at the cutting edge of things green is betrayed by occasional telling slips, as with what greens worry about in different places (esp. pp. 180-1). It is not that what he asserts is wrong; it is that emphases and contrasts are different. Reasons offered for rejection of green lifestyles are, where clear, extraordinarily weak. Consider what is offered: • living too close to nature, too much in harmony with it, might cause it to lose its valued role for us30一which is (remember) to provide us with a larger context in which we can see our lives as being set! Test the force of the argument by comparing living in the vicinity of other valued items: worthy lives, art, music, intellectual accomplishments. Moreover, there are counter­ arguments and considerations: that closeness brings respect and awe, and can enhance appreciation of value. Consider the idea of Christians distancing themselves from Cathedrals and Churches, ritual and practice. • to achieve political change, greens should make every effort to minimise the perceived distance between themselves and the “orthodox” community一whereas the association of 'alternative lifestyling5 with 'green' has exactly the opposite effect. Such a claim reveals much as regards subcontests, such as: claimants commitments and seriousness, type and extent of change envisaged, and so on. Christians, feminists, revolutionaries and others would not be too impressed. As in other reaches where orthodoxy may be morally or otherwise amiss, so with regard to green lifestyles: There is a case for a politics of “exemplary practice”； for whilst some people will treat those who so engage as objects of scorn and ridicule, it is evident that many people have been recruited to green values through positive contact with experiments in "right living”，or with elements of green lifestyles. It is important too that at least some people endeavour to demonstrate how green principles might be put into practice at the level of daily living. • Bizarre examples, selective unfavourable examples, advanced under the heading 'green heresies5.31 Granted 'some of this “exemplary practice” might be so outlandish that it reflects negatively on larger green projects. But the influence of this can be overstated; this sort of game can be played with many things that have features to recommend parts of them. After all, every social movement and every tradition of political philosophy, has its fringe-dwellers, even its 30 Thus p.81ff. 31 pp.78-81. 15 practitioners of a particular reductio ad absurdum extracted from a larger coherency.32 • local lifestyle set the focus astray. It should be on grander issues, on global environmental problems, fate of earth, etc. But plainly more regional and local problems also matter, esp. for preservation of habitats, creatures, etc. And here personal and local things can be very important. Finally, there are other reasons for green lifestyles. For example, for the structural changes necessary for environmentally satisfactory societies of one sort or another, something like internalization of green values and adoption of a green lifestyle proves highly advantageous. To this end and others, committed green subcultures and inspiring individual examples are extremely valuable. APPENDIX: a defective setting. Many productions that may look new and interesting in fact prove conservative, brushing off and wheeling out old ideas as if they would accomplish all requisite work. That is, it is implicitly claimed, under conservative approaches, that prevailing paradigms offer all necessary resources for capturing what has (wrongly) been presented as radically new.33 In environmental philosophy a classical exercise of this sort, well received by an environmentally conservative or reactionary establishment, was Passmore's text. Passmore's (and was followed, in a slightly expanded and apparently more liberal setting by Attfield, in a series of broadly consequentialist productions. Now the exercise repeated in environmental political theory by Goodin, who simply imports utilitarianism as supplying a unique and unquestionable rationality, in place of Passmore's vague utilitarianism of humans interests. It does not bode well for a genuinely green theory that its presentation lies virtually entirely within a shallow utilitarian setting, the setting of the dominant economic and public policy paradigm. For just such a setting is what has assisted significantly in getting the Earth into the present environmental mess. Consider what Goodin tries to insist upon in his section (s.1.3) on the arguments (and also elsewhere):- He assumes, in so trying to preempt the range of arguments, both that —the case for environmental protection has to be made in utilitarian terms if it is to prove effective —the most telling arguments concern the ways environmental protection measures are required to further human interests (and intertwined items: people, profits, property, resources, etc.). It is worth commencing erosion of these commonplace assumptions immediately. As for what arguments "work”，are telling or effective, that depends heavily on the context, who is engaged 32 This paragraph borrows heavily from Hay. 33 Brennan's third reductive trend(p.800. 16 in a dialogue, and so on. Those with deep green sympathies are not going to be vastly impressed by a sheaf of utilitarian and human interests (first and only) arguments, any more than by other privileged class arguments. Goodin seems to have rather assumed that, in effect, we are always paired with our political masters, who are and will remain shallow utilitarians. Even now this is by no means uniformly so, and there are grounds for hope that things could be much ameliorated in the future. Accordingly there is little reason to accept Goodin's further excessive claim that the 'essence' of the arguments (all satisfactory arguments he really wants to have us concede) remains the same: 'inadequate protection of the human environment, seriously compromised human interests\34 Pretty much the same problematic ethos is likewise taken for granted for proposed remedies: a standard economic public policy framework, with the essence of the remedy consisting in correcting market failure. From deeper green perspectives this is extraordinarily tired stuff, with "remedies" that have been tried and tried and continue to fail. As part of his case, he tries the stock shallow strategy of rubbishing the idea of admitting interests beyond humans (to grant animals interests is hardly to ''widen'' or ttextend^^ interests). The arguments are all very cheap, and the counter-case is not properly addressed. Regrettably, a shallow utilitarianism raises its ugly head all over the place. A few examples: 'it is more important that the right things be done than that they be done in any particular way or through any particular agency * (p.120). But it is unnecessary to document utilitarian imput as Goodin himself has provided it in susequent work. A main orientation of Goodin's work一which help explain several of its features一 is towards policy-makers or would-be policy-makers. Among such audiences utilitarian and economic rationales contue to be greeted enthusistically. For one reason, such rationales seem made to order when policy makers, or "bureaucratic rationality,5, require 'a means of justifying decisions that may be unpopular with large members of people5. For through these rationales they have seemed able to give principled reasons for action. The policy-maker can claim to have weighed up all the relevant considerations for and against a course of action; each consideration was in some way commensurable with every other—perhaps because each had a dollar value associated with it—and so it was possible to reach a determinate conclusion, by fair and objective means. The appearance of determinacy, fairness and objectivity is an important tool for those who wield and manipulate power in business, government, and even universities. But this rationalizing use of economic approaches should be resisted by everyone, including economists themselves.35 34 Ibid p.8 (check). 35 Brennan p.807. 17 The reasons are now entirely familiar ones. References Achtenberg, W., Review of Goodin, Environmental Values, (1994). Foucault, M., 'What is Enlightenment5 Goodin, R., Green political Theory, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1992. Habermus, J., 'Modernity—an incomplete project*, in Postmodern Culture (ed. H. Foster), Pluto Press, London, 1987. Hay, P., Review of Goodin typescript, University of Tasmania, 1994. McGowan, J., Postmodernism and Its Critics, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 199x. Osborne, P, 'Modernity is a qualitative, not a stromological, category: notes on the dialectics of differential historical time', in Postmodernism and the re-reading of modernity (ed. F. Barker and others) Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1991/2. Priest, G., 'On alternative geometries, arithmetics, and logics; a tribute to Lukasiewicz5, typsescript, 1996. Routley, R. and V., “Human chauvinism and environmental ethics' referred to as EE Routley, R. and V., The Fight for the Forests，referred to as FF.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Box 18, Item 1225: Draft of Green political theory: a different account Subject The topic of the resource Printout of draft, dated 13 Jun 1996. Description An account of the resource One of seven papers digitised from item 1225. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/browse?search=Richard+Sylvan&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bjoiner%5D=and&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=&amp;range=&amp;collection=&amp;type=&amp;user=&amp;tags=&amp;public=&amp;featured=&amp;exhibit=&amp;geolocation-mapped=&amp;geolocation-address=&amp;geolocation-latitude=&amp;geolocation-longitude=&amp;geolocation-radius=10&amp;submit_search=Search+for+items">Richard Sylvan</a> Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived <span class="MuiTypography-root-125 MuiTypography-body2-126">The University of Queensland's <a data-testid="rek-series" href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/records/search?page=1&amp;pageSize=20&amp;sortBy=score&amp;sortDirection=Desc&amp;searchQueryParams%5Brek_series%5D%5Bvalue%5D=Richard+Sylvan+Papers%2C+UQFL291&amp;searchMode=advanced">Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291</a></span>, Box 18, Item 1225 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org">Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy</a> Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1996-06-13 Contributor An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, <a href="https://najtaylor.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Dr. N.A.J. Taylor</a>. Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library. Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource [17] leaves. 11.63 MB. Type The nature or genre of the resource Manuscript Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context <a href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:960c201">https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:960c201</a> https://www.antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/d75844da363477e0a040dc1548e6e077.pdf 6e902a860ae1f5d903cbe328de2a2e37 PDF Text Text A dialethic approach to paradoxes of social and political theory Conspectus: The rough working idea is this: These paradoxes get treated in the same way as moral dilemmas in deontic theory. Namely they are accepted, so theory and assumptions do not require revision and excision. Rather is required is elaboration, additions to say what do when a dilemma is encounter (e.g. proceed to fall back on rational decision theory, as modified). Thus it is with voters paradoxes, inconsistent preferences, Arrow’s theorem, and so on: STET! let them stand. If they are encountered head-on, then work through them using alternative methods. It is an important point that methods do not give out, as things do not go haywire when consistency is encountered. Let us start with desires and preferences, which are the basic items in much theory (eg. stock economics). Although standard theory smooths out—removes—inconsistencies in agents’ desires and preferences, it is widely appreciated that they can both be inconsistent. A person can both want something for one set of reasons or urges and not want it perhaps for another (e.g. because moral constraints enter). The so-called empirical “problem” of nontransitive preferences is, turned around, simply a case of inconsistency. A simple case (like that of voting paradoxes) is where an agent has circular preferences. Over some loop, which may be quite large an agent prefers a to bi, bi to b2, ... bn-i to bn and bn to a. So by transitivity this agent prefers a to bi and bi to a, and similar, which preferences are inconsistent. Given the usual assumption that a Pb implies ~bPa, these circular preferences are explicitly inconsistent. Yet such preference ordering are frequently observed, especially in children (who are often keen to exhibit preferences). A theory admitting explictly inconsistent preferences has to be paraconsistent, on pain of triviality otherwise. Certainly a theory where inconsistency was not exposed, but is to say locked up in preference relations need not be paraconsistent, but such a theory would be only partial, not a sufficiently full theory revealing what was transpiring. A normal modal theory would, for instance, be worthless in the presence of inconsistent preferences or desires, because it would yield such results as that any such agent desires everything. (For instance, by virtue of systematic requirements for D, desire, it follows that Dp & D~p -» DB. The system requirements are A -* B/DA -» DB and DA & DB -> D(A & B).) The state of an agent with inconsistent preferences or desires need not run out of control. Consistency is not the only constraint, the only limit on logical licence, but a special, often excessively powerful one. In these cases control can be provided by agents not processing trivial preferences or desiresi, by some, sufficiently many, things not being preferred or desired. More comprehensively, a rather minimally adequate agent will have both a logically organised set of inclusions, preferences that obtain or are held, etc., and of exclusions, items that are not desired etc. Thus a more satisfactory logic for this sort of area will exhibit both acceptances and rejections. For example: i- DA & DB -> D(A & B) usual coounterexamples to �which assume inconsistent desire cannot obtain explicitly. Normally where h DA then i- D(A& B); but of course an agent may not desire something on its own, which would be differently formulated. Most important, h Dp. That is necessary, though far from sufficient for a coherent agent (and it as with coherents agents, as distinct from consistent agents, that we are now primarily concerned). Now it is not difficult to show that there are paraconsistent logical theories that can combine all these sorts of features with inconsistency in desires or preferences, e.g. with i- D (qo & ~qo) for some qo (for some agent). If individual agents can have inconsistent motivational states, so, still more, can groups of agents. Broadly, many sorts of pooling induce inconsistency: of information, knowledge, and so on, as is now well appreciated. But if of beliefs why not of desires, if of information why not of preferences, which, for one thing, are based on information? Such inconsistency induced by aggregation is what manifests itself in voting paradoxes. Now we can adapt an argument from what do in case of individual agent situation to apply to what do in group case. Namely, not revise and elide, but proceed on through an inconsistency; proceed by further available methods, e.g. further voting differently arranged. (Compare perhaps a football match which results in a draw or stalemate. Do not go back and try to start over. Play on into extra time, with new rules to give a more rapid outcome.) To the extent that it can be carried out on the basis of received preference theory, standard economic theory can be simulated on the basis of paraconsistent preference theory. For there are, in general, simply more preferences to start with, for instance in extending to utility functions, expanding typically in complete preference orderings. Indifference curves can be constructed in the standard way, the only difference being that there will be some singularities, as regards where items are both preferred and not. A conundrum for green theory over democracy, which it typically supports, is put in a sharp form as follows1: Democracy concerns procedures, environmentalism certain outcomes. What guarantee can there be that the procedures will deliver the outcomes? That democracy will yield a way of protesting environments? First greens are not seeking guarantees, which they could not in general expect. 1 Goodin under way So-wind p.168. �a ABSTRACT OF PROBLEMS and SOLUTIONS in DEEP ECOPOLITICAL THEORY A reshaping of social and political institutions, which are often outmoded or suboptimal and certainly commonly anti-environmental, is now prominent on theoretical agendas, at least in Australia. One such project is the multi-million dollar “Reshaping Australian Institutions” project at the Australian National University. At the same time there is widespread disenchantment with prevailing politics in Australia. Accordingly there is an opportunity to put radical green themes on agendas for real political and institutional change. A deep change, however, which is what deep green theories require, encounters several problems. For one, there appears to be a contradiction between demands for, on the one side, increasing environmental regulations and welfare arrangements, characteristically dependent upon bureaurcratic centralisation and economic growth, and on the other, decentralized lower impact organisation, which halts anti-environmentally industry and economic growth. A functional resolution, partially dissolving a central state, is outlined, along with a theory of encephaletic organisation. Further problems to surmount include human chauvinism and present-time bias, even in present “best practice” democratic institutions. Deep demarchoidal resolutions of these problems are sketched and defended. R. Sylvan RMB683 Bungendore Australia 2621 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Draft Papers Description An account of the resource Sylvan's literary executor encountered an archive in which “all his projects were current", since manuscripts were undated and unattributed. Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document A dialethic approach to paradoxes of social and political theory Conspectus: The rough working idea is this: These paradoxes get treated in the same way as moral dilemmas in deontic theory. Namely they are accepted, so theory and assumptions do not require revision and excision. Rather is required is elaboration, additions to say what do when a dilemma is encounter (e.g. proceed to fall back on rational decision theory, as modified). Thus it is with voters paradoxes, inconsistent preferences, Arrow’s theorem, and so on: STET! let them stand. If they are encountered head-on, then work through them using alternative methods. It is an important point that methods do not give out, as things do not go haywire when consistency is encountered. Let us start with desires and preferences, which are the basic items in much theory (eg. stock economics). Although standard theory smooths out—removes—inconsistencies in agents’ desires and preferences, it is widely appreciated that they can both be inconsistent. A person can both want something for one set of reasons or urges and not want it perhaps for another (e.g. because moral constraints enter). The so-called empirical “problem” of nontransitive preferences is, turned around, simply a case of inconsistency. A simple case (like that of voting paradoxes) is where an agent has circular preferences. Over some loop, which may be quite large an agent prefers a to bi, bi to b2, ... bn-i to bn and bn to a. So by transitivity this agent prefers a to bi and bi to a, and similar, which preferences are inconsistent. Given the usual assumption that a Pb implies ~bPa, these circular preferences are explicitly inconsistent. Yet such preference ordering are frequently observed, especially in children (who are often keen to exhibit preferences). A theory admitting explictly inconsistent preferences has to be paraconsistent, on pain of triviality otherwise. Certainly a theory where inconsistency was not exposed, but is to say locked up in preference relations need not be paraconsistent, but such a theory would be only partial, not a sufficiently full theory revealing what was transpiring. A normal modal theory would, for instance, be worthless in the presence of inconsistent preferences or desires, because it would yield such results as that any such agent desires everything. (For instance, by virtue of systematic requirements for D, desire, it follows that Dp & D~p -» DB. The system requirements are A -* B/DA -» DB and DA & DB -> D(A & B).) The state of an agent with inconsistent preferences or desires need not run out of control. Consistency is not the only constraint, the only limit on logical licence, but a special, often excessively powerful one. In these cases control can be provided by agents not processing trivial preferences or desiresi, by some, sufficiently many, things not being preferred or desired. More comprehensively, a rather minimally adequate agent will have both a logically organised set of inclusions, preferences that obtain or are held, etc., and of exclusions, items that are not desired etc. Thus a more satisfactory logic for this sort of area will exhibit both acceptances and rejections. For example: i- DA & DB -> D(A & B) usual coounterexamples to which assume inconsistent desire cannot obtain explicitly. Normally where h DA then i- D(A& B); but of course an agent may not desire something on its own, which would be differently formulated. Most important, h Dp. That is necessary, though far from sufficient for a coherent agent (and it as with coherents agents, as distinct from consistent agents, that we are now primarily concerned). Now it is not difficult to show that there are paraconsistent logical theories that can combine all these sorts of features with inconsistency in desires or preferences, e.g. with i- D (qo & ~qo) for some qo (for some agent). If individual agents can have inconsistent motivational states, so, still more, can groups of agents. Broadly, many sorts of pooling induce inconsistency: of information, knowledge, and so on, as is now well appreciated. But if of beliefs why not of desires, if of information why not of preferences, which, for one thing, are based on information? Such inconsistency induced by aggregation is what manifests itself in voting paradoxes. Now we can adapt an argument from what do in case of individual agent situation to apply to what do in group case. Namely, not revise and elide, but proceed on through an inconsistency; proceed by further available methods, e.g. further voting differently arranged. (Compare perhaps a football match which results in a draw or stalemate. Do not go back and try to start over. Play on into extra time, with new rules to give a more rapid outcome.) To the extent that it can be carried out on the basis of received preference theory, standard economic theory can be simulated on the basis of paraconsistent preference theory. For there are, in general, simply more preferences to start with, for instance in extending to utility functions, expanding typically in complete preference orderings. Indifference curves can be constructed in the standard way, the only difference being that there will be some singularities, as regards where items are both preferred and not. A conundrum for green theory over democracy, which it typically supports, is put in a sharp form as follows1: Democracy concerns procedures, environmentalism certain outcomes. What guarantee can there be that the procedures will deliver the outcomes? That democracy will yield a way of protesting environments? First greens are not seeking guarantees, which they could not in general expect. 1 Goodin under way So-wind p.168. a ABSTRACT OF PROBLEMS and SOLUTIONS in DEEP ECOPOLITICAL THEORY A reshaping of social and political institutions, which are often outmoded or suboptimal and certainly commonly anti-environmental, is now prominent on theoretical agendas, at least in Australia. One such project is the multi-million dollar “Reshaping Australian Institutions” project at the Australian National University. At the same time there is widespread disenchantment with prevailing politics in Australia. Accordingly there is an opportunity to put radical green themes on agendas for real political and institutional change. A deep change, however, which is what deep green theories require, encounters several problems. For one, there appears to be a contradiction between demands for, on the one side, increasing environmental regulations and welfare arrangements, characteristically dependent upon bureaurcratic centralisation and economic growth, and on the other, decentralized lower impact organisation, which halts anti-environmentally industry and economic growth. A functional resolution, partially dissolving a central state, is outlined, along with a theory of encephaletic organisation. Further problems to surmount include human chauvinism and present-time bias, even in present “best practice” democratic institutions. Deep demarchoidal resolutions of these problems are sketched and defended. R. Sylvan RMB683 Bungendore Australia 2621  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Box 18, Item 1225: Draft of A dialethic approach to paradoxes of social and political theory ; Abstract of Problems in deep ecopolitical theory Subject The topic of the resource Printouts of draft paper and abstract, undated. Description An account of the resource Papers original housed together with a paper clip. One of seven papers digitised from item 1225. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/browse?search=Richard+Sylvan&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bjoiner%5D=and&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=&amp;range=&amp;collection=&amp;type=&amp;user=&amp;tags=&amp;public=&amp;featured=&amp;exhibit=&amp;geolocation-mapped=&amp;geolocation-address=&amp;geolocation-latitude=&amp;geolocation-longitude=&amp;geolocation-radius=10&amp;submit_search=Search+for+items">Richard Sylvan</a> Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived <span class="MuiTypography-root-125 MuiTypography-body2-126">The University of Queensland's <a data-testid="rek-series" href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/records/search?page=1&amp;pageSize=20&amp;sortBy=score&amp;sortDirection=Desc&amp;searchQueryParams%5Brek_series%5D%5Bvalue%5D=Richard+Sylvan+Papers%2C+UQFL291&amp;searchMode=advanced">Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291</a></span>, Box 18, Item 1225 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org">Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy</a> Contributor An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, <a href="https://najtaylor.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Dr. N.A.J. Taylor</a>. Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library. Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource [3] leaves. 2.02 MB. Type The nature or genre of the resource Manuscript Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context <a href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:f3409b4">https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:f3409b4</a> Australian National University Office Australian National University Office > Typing Table at End of Desk Box 18: Green Projects in Progress https://www.antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/2f6dabd2b76b0e39c93150be86c837bf.pdf 3b6452d1e3793a5073876a489e21484a PDF Text Text 29.5.95 PROBLEMS IN DEEPER GREEN POLITICAL ORGANIZATION: an Australian perspective on radical institutional change. ... people are ready for change and the impending debate will result in constitutional change. We should, therefore, explore all options ... J As elsewhere, there is growing dissatisfaction with Australia's political institutions, and increasing demand to change them. This demand, hiding co-optative elements, has been initiated and fostered in a conspicuously top-down fashion, by politicians and by academics. There is so far little surge of political enterprise at grass-roots levels, little pressure for the usually very limited changes proposed. Nonetheless, along with apathy, there is widespread popular disenchantment with present political arrangements. There is now an opportunity (although still only a small window no doubt) to put green and radical themes on the agenda for real political change in Australia. That opportunity should not be missed, within Australia, or elsewhere. While the exposition that follows concentrates upon Australia, as a convenient advanced example, much of what is argued and urged applies or adapts elsewhere. 1. Disenchantment with politics, and political proposals for change. There is now evident in Australia, what is variously described as disillusionment and anxiety, cynicism and pessimism about the state of politics—a loss of confidence in it, and a retreat from commitment. As much and more, Mackay has nicely exposed in a survey of the Australian situation: anxiety about the nature and quality of Australian politics [has] increased. ... Widespread anxiety about the state of politics is based [in part] on an uneasy feeling that, if the parties are not going to stand for some identifiable philosophy, and the leaders are going to be chosen on the basis of their potential as television performers or even as head-kickers, then the only appropriate response is cynicism. That cynicism is reflected in a turning away from support for the major parties ... and revealed in the attitudes of young Australians ...12 who often cannot be bothered registering to vote, or voting (though voting is legally compulsory). 1 Hon. Ian Macphee, ‘A new constitution?’. Of course Macphee did not really mean all options, nor even all constitutional options. Furthermore, his claim about preparedness of people for change is incompatible with Mackey’s data (mentioned below) on exhaustion with change. 2 Mackay pp. 174-177. For all the Australian casualness of Mackay's presentation, his sociological findings are nonetheless fairly solidly survey and interview based (if occasionally stretching the data). Main findings are replicated by other sociologists. �2 ♦> Lack of confidence is beginning to show not only as cynicism about politicians, but also as doubt about the integrity of Australia's political institutions.3 In a recent survey, ‘62 percent of [Australians] expressed either little or no confidence in the political system. Such a figure accurately reflects the mood of the Australian community’.4 Australian loss offaith in conventional politics is attributed to a mix of factors. A first explanatory factor as regards this disenchantment comes from the changes in politics already remarked (ranging from policy issues to media performers) and from resultant uncertainty. ‘... the Australian electorate is confused about which party stands for what, and about whether any party has a long-term commitment to any particular point of view’ .5 A complex ‘second factor ... concerns the adversarial nature of two-party politics’.6 How can this ‘two party, adversarial approach ... continue to be appropriate when the distinctions between the two parties themselves are so hard to define’? But ‘redefinition of party politics implies the possibility of a redefinition of the whole parliamentary process itself’. Why ‘when parties seem quite capable of stealing each other's policies or of invading each other's traditional philosophical territory, [can not] politicians work together in a more co­ operative and harmonious spirit’?7 ‘Adversarial politics may have made sense ... when ... distinctions between the parties were stark and when arguments about principle could be justified; today, the idea that politicians would be arguing over a point of principle or philosophy is almost unthinkable.... [They] are much more likely to be arguing over matters of personality, prejudice and power than over issues which effect the long-term health of the body politic’.8 ‘The quality of parliamentary debate is regarded not only as a symptom of the adversarial nature of the institution, but also as a symptom either of the poor quality of politicians ..., or of the effect of the system on those who are enmeshed in it’.9 Unless there is 3 Ibid, p.178 4 Ibid. The figure is the more surprising inasmuch as such disillusioning factors as corruption and graft are not features of overt political life in Austral-asia by comparison with elsewhere in the hemispherical region. 5 Ibid. pp. 178-179. 6 Ibid. The adversarial character of dominant State legal systems is also becoming subject to more and more criticism. It appears likely that significant movement towards different inquiratorial systems will occur, not least because of the huge expense and growing unaffordability of adversarial systems. 7 Ibid. 8 Ibid, p.180. 9 Ibid, p.179. It is a symptom of both, the latter especially. �3 marked improvement in party philosophies, programs and performance, ‘the call to re-examine the nature of the parliamentary process will gather momentum’.1011 A third relevant factor contributing to loss of faith is the impression of Australians that ‘they are overgoverned ’H, with too many expensive bureaucracies and too many houses of parliament. Conflicts between State and Federal parliaments — and between the various State parliaments themselves — are regarded as a particularly unproductive expenditure of political energy, and Australians question whether 15 houses of parliament may be too many for the efficient government of 18 million people. The sheer number of parliaments is often blamed for the problem of too many bureaucracies and for many duplications of bureaucratic and political activity between State and Federal governments. ... Whilst there is little love felt in the Australian community for Canberra and for the idea of more centralised government even that is beginning to appear preferable .... The widespread support for the idea of a republic which emerged during 1992 is closely related to the underlying sense that Australia is overdue for some kind of reexamination of its political institutions, and even the notion of Federation itself. ... As debate about the idea of a republic proceeds ... it has begun to incorporate the idea that Australian's political structures and systems might be quite significantly reformed.12 Such disaffection reflects too a growing awareness that Australia’s political arrangements owe more to historical accident than to rational design. Even though the main proposals for change no doubt remain reformist in character and could lead in unfortunate directions, some of them are far-reaching by normal standards. Both the extensive disenchantment with present political arrangements and the felt need for significant change further suggest political times are not altogether normal. Elements underpinning a political paradigm shift are already present, as are features supporting rational redesign, to which radical additions are now feasible. So far there have been, along with normal inertial resistance to change, two main responses to growing pressure for change: political, from politicians, ex-politicians and political commentators, and academic from intellectuals, academic entrepreneurs and academic journalists. By and large, political responses have been grander, more sweeping and vaguer; 10 Ibid, p.181. 11 Ibid, p.181, itals added. The problem has now surfaced strikingly in the heavily indebted Australian Capital Territory (“toy town” as its is facetiously called locally) which is swamped by bureaucracy, where it has been discovered that there is one expensive bureaucrat for every fifteen persons. 12 Ibid. p. 181-2. Republican proposals have been circulating for some time. But the cause was finally taken up by prominent politicians, who made it their own, after which it became a popular issue. Mackay's accurate presentation of popular support for political change contrasts drolly with the first part of his book which depicts an Australian populace exhausted by change and longing for the old ease and somnolence. �4 academic responses more theoretical and cautious, piecemeal and detailed. But there are no grand detailed plans. Under the leading proposal so far for political change, Australia's constitutional monarchy will be displaced by a constitutional republic with its own head of state displacing the monarch, but with perhaps minimal adjustments otherwise. Nonetheless, as a result, republicanism is in the air. Politicians have begun to contemplate other practical reforms, while academics have begun to embroider theories around republicanism and institutional reform. What happens to the Australian federation of states is one of the many unresolved issues presently being debated. The main reason for reform offered by the political camp can be summed up simply as changing geopolitical circumstances. The camp tends not to acknowledge what would reflect adversely upon it, the poorness of federal political practice. Rather it tends to attribute popular dissatisfaction to economic circumstances and uncertainties: declining real standards of living, extensive unemployment, persistent recession until recently, problems to be surmounted by full-steam ahead untrammelled economic growth, to be attained by recoupling Australia to the Asian economic express. Meanwhile an orchestrated republican movement can help divert popular political attention from poor political management and a gloomy economic predicament. Much has changed in the century since present antiquated political arrangements were hammered out, arrangements making the newly-fashioned Commonwealth of Australia, politically a federation of states, into a constitutional monarchy coupled to Britain, arrangements of convenience fashioned for very different circumstances. Most non-symbolic linkages with Britain, which has been inching towards a place in a united Europe, have already been severed. Australia has gradually begun to appreciate its geo-political position in the Indian-Pacific region (and the money-making opportunities for a sagging resource-based economy in allegedly booming parts of Asia). Whence the main idealistic proposal: for an independent republic, decoupled from Europe, assuming its own (prominent) place in its geo-political regions. In principle at least, place and region begin to assume, or resume, some of their neglected, but historic, significance (however that is not how it is yet seen). Most proposals for constitutional and federal reform fit within that limited idealistic conception. One important proposal, advanced by established political players, their most radical proposal so far, includes abolition of the present states. Such a proposal would clearly represent a welcome step in anarchist directions, were it not regularly offset by the idea of a strengthened central state.13 Supposing this latter unfortunate idea is bracketed for the moment, 13 Anarchists can even rest (if uneasily) with a constitution, so long as it provides for an organisation, Australia Inc. even, sufficiently different from a state and its authoritarian trappings. �5 ♦> then what is being seriously considered already starts to look like a much more rational regionalism than what presently prevails. The present states of Australia are undoubtedly an anachronism, based on accidental boundaries of a contingent colonial history. They are ecologically irrational management units, utterly failing to reflect ecological regions. Yet the states possess extensive environmental and other management powers, inappropriate ‘powers which derive from what was largely a political bargaining process conducted a century ago.’ Another effect of inapposite state-federal arrangements, especially ‘funding arrangements, has been to lock out local government and, more importantly, local communities. ... local communities must be given greater control over those decisions of government which effect their lives ...’; the opportunity ‘to design and provide the services which are needed locally.’14 At this stage of the dialectic McPhee slides easily and naturally from localism to regionalism. A glance at the map reveals natural regions for local government on a viable scale [an optimistic contention]. Some cross State boundaries, and I would envisage that State governments would be replaced with regional governments. These would be more akin to larger local governments and would certainly not have the trappings of the States. They should not have parliaments and the expensive, unwieldy and inefficient bureaucracies which characterise our States. They should have a small number of full-time councillors ... Regional governments should be solely accountable to their ratepayers ...15 . So far so good: however McPhee thereupon begins to infiltrate stock (small Z) liberal management assumptions. Nonetheless the basic idea to retain is simple: that of ecologicallyrational local and regional rearrangement of anachronistic state partitions. regionalization should be greened, as reform should be radicalized. But that More generally, opportunites now present themselves to insert more radical ideas throughout the debate about Australia’s future directions. For much has been left off political agendas for change, not merely environments and habitats of their less prominent or noisy inhabitants, but also such issues as rights and liberties, transformation of antiquated legal and executive frameworks, and so on. Omission of (human) rights is especially remarkable in states such as Australia, whose constitutions astonishingly do not mention at all (what is however often supposed to justify states) individual rights, such rights only being ensured, so far as they are, assumptions from uncodified common law, by 14 All quotes in this paragraph are drawn from McPhee. An address along similar lines to the Hon. Ian McPhee, also proposing abolition of the states, was delivered by the former Prime Minister R.G. Hawke. Hawke's speech, by contrast with McPhee's, attracted much media attention, and though facilely dismissed as “unrealistic” by some practicing politicians, appeared to gain a good deal of support. 15 McPhee ibid. �6 indirect routes (statutes regarding treatment of minorities and the like). Nor do the political camps pushing limited change speak of rights or liberties; a very limited conception of adjustments required prevails (though without rights and liberties and a generous public sphere there is little, and little prospect of, justification for a state at all). Accordingly political agendas for change need to be conspicuously broadened, to accommodate a decidedly more ambitious range of constitutional and institutional redesign. 2. A project within a project: radically reshaping Australian institutions. Academic entrepreneurs have also responded quickly to proposals for constitutional and institutional changes. Early to scramble on the bandwagon was the institution to which I am affiliated, the Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University, with its ambitious decade-long project, Reshaping Australian Institutions: Towards and Beyond 2001.16 One small part of this project does connect with the republican push, which no doubt helped inspire it and gain its funding. The academic version of republicanism furnishes an institutional and historic setting, tracing its roots back to ancient Rome, and thereby linking in, what admits much modem adaptation, notions of citizenship and civic virtues. But most of the project is independent of any republican reorganisation. The Reshaping Australian Institutions project is presented in predominantly reformist fashion, unsurprisingly. It is supposed, for instance, to ‘provide major input into evaluation and reform of Australia's institutions’; indeed it is explicitly ‘aimed at contributing to Australian constitutional reform’.17 Nothing however precludes consideration of reshaping or transforming Australian institutions — those of the whole ecological region — in a unreformist and possibly unconstitutional way, in a radical way. Admittedly, the rough boundary between reformist and radical routes becomes even more blurred when the constitution of a country is open for possible major reconsideration and much political infrastructure may be altered. Nonetheless, from the perspective of a strong central state, the stock boundary stands intact. For reformist changes would amount to comparatively small adjustments leaving the state substantially intact. For example, a minimal transformation, 16 A recent brief description of this two million dollar project, now outlined in several places, is given in Tynan, pp.17-19. Fuller descriptions are available from a main coordinator of the project, J. Braithwaite, Law, RSSS, ANU. One of the many strands (17 at last count) of this project is an environmental (or green) strand. The immediate predecessor of this article was presented in a workshop at RSSS on green political theory, arranged under the project. That accounts for some of the otherwise puzzling structure of what has eventuated. Another earlier version was tried out at Ecopolitics VIII, Pacific Visions, held at Lincoln University, Christchurch, New Zealand, in July 1994. 17 ‘Reshaping Australian institutions: towards and beyond 2001’ in Tynan , p.17, italics added. �7 of the sort presently much favoured, from constitutional monarchy to Australian republic, though entailing non-negligible constitutional redrafting, need only amend the roles of a few elite power- and position-holders. By contrast, radical changes would substantially alter that strong central state, perhaps (as will be proposed) eliminating it altogether. There are appealing reasons for attempting wider, more radical investigations. For, firstly, there may be more satisfactory institutional structures not accessible, or even visible, along normal constitutional reform routes. Secondly, there is a demand, a small but growing demand from green directions for instance, for radical institutional change. It would be prudent, then, to make some investigation of the options, to assess their prospects. Thirdly, reflection on such structures would certainly be part of a more comprehensive study of and theory of institutional design, which the Reshaping project also presents as an objective. Fourthly, much more controversially, major environmental problems cannot be satisfactorily solved along merely reformist paths. For states, what are reformed, states themselves are ecologically dysfunctional. In practice this appears obvious enough. Simply reflect upon their environmental records; these are even worse than those abysmal records compiled for human rights. But the practical case can be argued in detail in a state by state way, or less laboriously, through the familiar rough classification of states into first, second and third world states. In main third world regions, the rise of the state has seen the serious decline of environments. Those third world states that have not largely destroyed their natural environments are in rapid process of doing so. The activities involved are, furthermore, not merely tolerated by these states but are usually actively encouraged (e.g. with state participation or by state concessions, as through taxation advantages, subsidies, export incentives, etc.). Further, the role of exploitation and plunder of remaining natural “resources”, and depletion of “biological capital”, by third world states, most of which are now trapped in debt and structural adjustment, has increased many-fold in the last two decades. How destructively second world states of eastern Europe treated their own (and also other regions’) environment, how they over-expoited and polluted them, has recently been much publicized. While the recent record in first world states is no doubt marginally better, many of these states dominated their natural environments and their wild inhabitants in the past, and have heavily polluted and congested their urban and industrial regions. Nor does their present record gain an environmental pass. For example, those that have any natural forests (similarly fisheries) left are in the process of eliminating or degrading most of what remains; most are failing seriously in meeting (their own) targets on greenhouse emissions, and so on. More theoretically, it is unlikely that states, increasingly focussed narrowly upon shallow and short-term economic agendas, will or can deliver satisfactorily environmentally. A prime reason is this: states are ineluctably committed, more and more as their populations expand, to high levels of economic activity characteristically to �0 economic growth of sorts which impact heavily environmentally, inducing inevitable degradation.18 Accordingly, there are then, or should be, two bands to any green (or environmental) strand of a restructuring Australian institutions project: not merely an important reformist side, but as well a radical spread. It is part of this underfunded and undersupported radical spread which forms the main object of investigation in what follows, that part that relinquishes present state structures, in favour of more environmentally benign institutions - which no doubt can be designed, even if not so readily brought into practical operation.19 In order to reach radical redesign ideas quickly, let us touch only lightly upon some of the more distinctively green reasons for this anarchoid quest (familiar anarchist reasons stand: the illegitimacy of present states, the undesirability and severe disutility of states, which typically are highly destructive and corrosive institutions based on concentration of power, hierarchical authority, massive coercion, manipulation by economic elites, technobureaucracy, utilitarian rationality, and sundry other evils.20) As indicated, present states are incompatible with stock ecologically sustainable practices, because of their heavy unrelenting commitments to shallow economic growth. More generally, standard states and their practices comprise very significant parts of environmental problems, but quite insufficient parts of any solutions. Moreover, states constitute an enormous and destructive drain on regional environments, a feature particularly evident in smaller states which are always looking out for revenue-raising expedients for their own expensive running. Apart from those greens who have recognised the excessive environmental costs of states and their heavy demands on environments, and thus or otherwise have come to recognise the desirability of their withering away, there are many more who have become ambivalent about states, who appreciate their very problematic character and very questionable legitimacy, but do not see yet how to get along altogether without them, or more exactly (to indicate thereby a partial resolution) without certain functions that they serve. Indeed to point immediately towards a resolution of this crucial problem, the functional dissolution idea advocated is this: that the functioning parts may be separately utilized without the colossal whole. The state is not 18 This theme, that states are normally ecologically dysfunctional, is documented and argued in detail elsewhere; see e.g. Carter and especially Sylvan 96. On the dismal environmental records of particular states see Ponting. For shocking figures and illustrations as regards environmental exploitation in third world states, see Bello, pp. 57-65. 19 Nonetheless practical revolutionary displacement of the state is not so remote, or difficult, as is generally supposed. 20 To adapt a referee’s trenchant summary. For detail on some familiar anarchist reasons, see Burnheim and above all Marshall. �9 an organism the functioning parts of which must fail without the whole. So it may well be the enormous fat of state can simply be shed, to great advantage. In any event, ‘the State is a social institution’, always ‘within’, Marxists continue, ‘a concrete historic setting’.21 Granted, it is an institution. For an institution in the relevant sense is ‘a society or association for the organisation or promotion of some particular object or function’.22 Institutions include therefore the state, the central state. So it too is up for reshaping, radical slimming, and possible removal in a concrete historical setting, such as late twentieth century Australia. Whittling away the state means in turn dismantling corporate capitalism, which now dwells in symbiosis with the bureaucratic state, and also much else, often environmentally undesirable, that the state affords a supportive framework for and enables to flourish. Ideas and schemes for radical redesign are already available from rich anarchist and socialist sources, those for green design and reshaping from growing and diverse environmental sources. In main part, then, radical ecoredesign is a matter of convivially meeting (not joining) the two, an intersection that favours anarchist inputs. Something of the sort has already been attempted, in an environmentally shallower way, in eco-anarchism, alias social ecology, and in a deeper way, in deep-green social theory.23 Moreover, it could be attempted in other kinds of deeper green theory—itself really a plurality of theories, which however does not itself force radical ecoredesign, though most variants would support it. Thus Naess's “deep ecology” for example, which is not so far politically radical, only strongly reformist, could (and should) be given a radical turn.24 Concentrating upon the radical spread of deeper green theory does not preclude concomitant reformist investigation and activity. Both sides of the green street should be played. Reformist opportunities should of course be pursued—incremental change, social engineering, “ecologizing” economics, greening bureaucrats, lobbying politicians, and like activity (but better really to cut through much such pleading and obiesance and be rid of politicians and bureaucrats). There are many reformist proposals being advanced for the greening of Australian federal institutions—with but few so far having much impact on 21 Thus, Green p.61, who adds quite wrongly that Proudhon and his disciples do not see it that way ‘but as an abstraction and aberration’. 22 Adaptation of the Oxford English Dictionary. An institution is, so to say, an organitution. 23 On social ecology, see Bookchin 90, and for information on deep-green social theory, see Sylvan and Bennett 94 and Routleys 80. 24 As to the political character of deep ecology, and why it should be turned, see Sylvan and Bennett 94, where an expose of the political theory of Naess's ecosophy is presented. �practice.25 Nonetheless, more limited, more constrained, proposals of this sort certainly have a better chance, within the prevailing paradigm, of making a difference than radical redesigns, too smartly dismissed as “unrealistic” or “utopian”. No doubt the normal “reshaping institutions” investigations are rightly focussed then upon institutional reform, not upon revolutionary reshaping, where much freer scope for redesign is offered. However the real possibility of radical change should not be excluded; green radicals should be prepared. There have been various opportunities for revolutionary change in Australian history, the last occurring, according to some historians, with the ignominious fall of the Whitlam government. There may well be opportunities again both in the near and intermediate future, especially should some solid work be put into propagating the prospect. In the near term there is economic disarray, social fragmentation, and constitutional destabilization; in the longer term increasing ecological problems and expanding eco-catastrophes loom. Under present incremental reform and regression, for all the spasmodic environmental rhetoric, comparatively little in the way of radical green change occurs or can be expected. Witness, for comparison, the snail pace of the establishment movement towards a rather minimal grey republicanism in Australia, or differently away from meeting carbon-reduction commitments. It is increasingly doubtful, given prevailing responses to economic and other difficulties, that present structural and systematic problems confronting Australia, for example, will be satisfactorily addressed, environmental problems such as extensive and expanding land and water degradation not least. Furthermore, under more incremental reform, the sorts of problems concerning reorganising society in deeper green ways, problems that provide subsequent topics, would likely not arise. So in getting beyond more muddling along, do imagine fairly free scope for institutional eco-redesign is somehow dispensed. One nice corollary is that once it is worked out where to go organisationally, it is much easier to ascertain how to arrive there. 3. A basic problem of structure: central or decentralised organisation? There are large and immediate advantages in pursuing a problem-oriented approach to redesign. That approach, which will tend towards anarchoid outcomes, will be anarchistically guided in this respect: Unless there is a genuine problem, already causing difficulties or developing, nothing need be done; otherwise let things alone, let Being be.26 On this non­ 25 There are many many narrower economic and technological proposals. One of the more interesting wider proposals comes from an Opposition not noted for its green initiatives and commitments, for an overseeing Department of Sustainable Development, a Department that could see to the greening of all federal institutions. 26 To echo also Heideggerian wisdom. The non-prejudicial term ‘anarchoid’ is deployed, not because what emerges will not be anarchistic (as characterized in Marshall and in Sylvan 94), but because it �11 managerial low-work approach a good deal of structure presently inoperational, and of idle regulation presently enacted, can be removed; organisational arrangements can be very significantly down-sized. The leading methodological idea is that enough relevant (biodegradable) structure is introduced to resolve organisational problems, but not substantially more. Organisational oversupply and waste is thus avoided. Moreover, much structure that keeps so much environmentally destructive industry in business is likewise shed. Among basic problems for deeper green theory are those of political reorganisation and so of organisation. Evidently institutions, and their types, are critical to such organisation. And a major organisational problem for any putative green society concerns structure', to take a critical case, whether society is centrally organised (concentrated, bureaucratised, hierarchical, large- scale and so on) or decentralised (dispersed, non-hierarchical, small-scale and supposedly beautiful, and so on). This focal problem, to centralise or not to centralise, is sometimes presented as a serious dilemma for concerned green theorists.27 The binary horns of this dilemma are respectively: on the one hom, the pull (or push) to localisation and regionalisation, to non-anonymous smallscale low-impacting environmentally-friendly arrangements, to diffusion of power and dismantling of the incubus of a central state with its crippling costs and unfriendly practices; and on the other horn, the need for continuing and further central income generation and welfare (re)distribution, central regulation and control, and the pressures to environmental reliance upon and use of the central state.28 The dilemma has been trenchantly posed as follows: ... the demands of the Greens sometimes appear contradictory, in seeking increasing environmental regulation and welfare measures... alongside a halt to industrial expansion, the very source of income for the welfare state. Yet the expansion and further centralization of the bureaucratic state apparatus is neither their overt goal nor covert motivation. Quite the contrary. Their genuine long term vision is of a decentralized, steady state society of self-sufficient, relationally autonomous (albeit interlinked) regions.29 departs from standard forms of anarchism in significant respects, not least in planned political organization. In this exercise organization is of the essence. 27 As by Jacobs of The Green Economy, who has posed the problem sharply, as part of an argument however for retaining the central state (and much of present status quo arrangements). 28 Environmental reasons for favouring small-scale bioregional organisation are nicely gathered in McLaughlin, chapter 10. 29 Unknown source. �12 As it happens, not only does the theoretical and utopian literature run both ways, towards and away from centralisation, but so does practice and experience. As to theory, anarchisticallyinclined presentations tend to favour decentralisation, perhaps with some central compensation through federation (thus recent Blueprints, ecotopias, and so on), whereas socialisticallyinclined presentations invariably opt for powerful central states (to control and redistribute grander social programs, etc.). As to practice, there are local councils, community organisations, residents' groups aiming to keep out, or to remove, the state-sponsored nuclear plants, toxic waste incinerators, waste dumps or super-highways, on the one horn; and, on the other, central states blocking, modifying, or regulating local or regionally promoted schemes for large dams (e.g. Tasmania's Franklin), forest exploitation, pulp mills, strip mining, and so on.30 To some extent, the way the problem has often been re-presented, in terms of a dilemma between top-down and bottom-up structure and power transmission, already points towards a theoretical resolution: namely, both, or rather enough of both. But how is this combination to be achieved? An answer does not fall out by pure reason, operating in isolation from other problems. By taking advantage of information gathered from other connected problems, a promising answer can be teased out. Neither standard socialism nor anarchism afford answers, socialism because it leaves the central institution of state intact. But standard anarchism, much more promising, does not resolve the problem either, because federation, as usually explained, does not leave enough structure; it may not even concede sufficient power to delegates to constrain exploitative local communities. A solution to such dilemma lies through a combinational strategy, which includes partial dissolution of the central state, into its actual organisational functions in each region. While removing the state, itself source of several environmental and social problems, and its concentration of power, invariably under environmentally unfriendly control, functional dissolution nonetheless retains its apparently essential services, including (where necessary) those of environmental regulation. Relevant continent-wide functions would persist or be introduced: for example, services controlling inflow into Australia of damaging forms and materials such as toxic wastes and exotic pest species, or regulating outflow from Australia of native wildlife and flora. In part, ecoregional functionalism offers a radical continuation of the separation ofpowers of recent historical process, of church and state, legislature and executive, and so forth. As these functions come to operate separately while remaining coordinated, so would those functional arrangements and institutions dissolving the state. 30 Much turns on the exploitative character of certain local and regional communities, their get-richquick schemes, what they are prepared to do to survive in old or superficially affluent ways, and so on. �13 It is a major illusion of modem political theory that a central state, ceded monopolies on coercion, currency, taxation and so on, is necessary in order to secure adequate supply of public goods, including public order and environmental regulation. To the contrary, the most that appears required, the most that arguments would support, is some network of specific organisations functioning to look after specific kinds of goods and services, those necessary for this or that, that are not otherwise supplied. There is no inherent reason why communities should not institute and regulate specialised bodies coordinated among themselves (by negotiations or, failing that, through recognised arbitrators) to ensure the adequate maintenance or production of various types of public goods, including control of damaging crime. Each such institution could gain community standing from its support base, for instance through achieving democratically-generated recognition. Such an institution would aim to secure execution of its recommendations and decisions by sanctions and like admissible means, and in doing this it could mobilize in co-operation with communities and with other recognised institutions. There are many examples of such institutions operating successfully both regionally and internationally; for instance, those for postal and communicational arrangements, international sporting bodies, international academies and clubs, environmental and consumer organizations.31 4. Selecting satisfactory political arrangements within the span of anarchoid options. Anarchoid options come in a wide variety of forms, including, among others, both right­ leaning individualistic or capitalistic varieties, and left-leaning social or communitarian varieties.32 A suitably generous political pluralism will allow for all these forms, while not encouraging all, as they are of very different merit. For example, some may be neglectful or repressive of some of their inhabitants, or destructive of their environments; others, superior in 31 This passage borrows from the summary in Burnheim 86 p.221 of Burnheim 85. For much fuller elaboration see Burnheim 85 and Sylvan 94. The critical issue of funding administration, without a coercive taxation system, is also broached in these places (and developed in Sylvan 96). The broad proposal is that low-cost administration, much of which would be volunteer, could be funded by rents (there would be no property in land and resources), use charges, and fines. 32 There are many more varieties of political systems than much recent theory has cared to concede. For example, to take right-leaning dimensions, all of individualism, market-organization and capitalism function substantially independently. There can be markets without capitalism (characterised through opportunities to accumulate capital), and conversely, capitalism without free market arrangements. And so on. Most historic and modern systems, upon which political theory has tended inadmissibly to concentrate almost exclusively, are hybrid arrangements with mixes of different elements drawn from both “left” and “right”. �14 these socio-environmental regards, may not be. Dismantling or deconstructing a state does not, on its own, make a sharp selection between alternatives. No doubt the hope is, what can be striven for, that adequate designs are sought and adequate selections made, that inadmissible forms rapidly perish. Those remaining forms that are admissible can be ranked; for instance, they might be graded according to defeasible criteria based upon “pillars” of German green movement such as environmental sensitivity, democratic institutions, and nonviolent practices. While right-leaning anarchoid arrangements could work in theory (e.g. under what is improbable, benevolent capitalism), they are unlikely to succeed in practice, for several reasons. Consider, to illustrate in outline, why that much promoted rightist form, market (or “liberal”) capitalism is unlikely to serve. For one reason, an intrusive state is likely to emerge, with state controlled and state funded standing military and police forces, needed to defend capitalist interests and accumulation, to protect private property, to uphold endemic social inequalities, and to enforce particular market and trade structures, with a substantial and heavy taxation system to fund these forces and a corresponding bureaucracy needed to administer and regulate these and other institutions, such as those required to guarantee that capitalist liabilities are strictly limited and to keep markets (far from self-regulating) unclogged, “free” and competitive. Not only are anarchoid conditions thus violated, so are those for benign green societies. In normal practice, market capitalism tends to be highly environmental exploitative, as modern history demonstrates all too plainly (plainly too it is not alone in this propensity, so are other modem statist systems). Furthermore, given the sorts of humans these systems tend to elevate, and exalt, and the sorts of practices (including extravagant consumption for all that can afford it) they encourage and sometimes even enforce, extensive exploitation is to be expected and liable to persist. At least that is so without, what is thereupon required in a self-reinforcing spiral, further state intervention to distort “natural” capitalistic incentives and institutions, to limit practices on private property (thereby effectively altering the institution), to establish new instruments and commodities such as pollution licences, green investments and futures, and so forth.33 Even though a shallow greenness can also be sprayed upon parts of market capitalism (factories in fields, forest reserves retained for tourists, and so on), and some green showcase exhibits tacked on, environmental depth cannot. Shallowness is both an inevitable consequence of the justifying socio-economic theory, and also an expected best outcome of practice. Accordingly in institutional design it is much more promising to look in democratic left­ leaning directions. For, as argued, it would be rash to gamble upon any bright new dawn of environmentally and socially benign market capitalism, which in any event could easily revert back towards dark industrial times. However, very similar arguments to those sketched could 33 Infiltrated, along with propaganda on behalf of such instruments, is much mythology, including acclaimed environmental virtues of private property and privatization generally. �15 be developed as regards centralised socialism, especially as untempered by democratic procedures. While island communities of a wide range of varieties are naturally not excluded under anarchoidal pluralism, brighter continental prospects lie through modifications of democratic sociality, which appears to permit much of what is sought in design. Under duly decentralized social organization, each requisite function would be carried out by some association of agents comprising operative and support staff (that is, as regards bare formal structure, more or less as now, in institutions like departments and corporations). For direct accountability downwards, and also to ensure desirable separation and dilution of power, upper operatives, those of a directing or steering committee (the nervous system of the organisation), would be democratically selected (from a relevant lower level constituency, and from the whole people of an ecoregion in case of a typical bottom level institution). Note well that selection is not election: election is but one method of democratic selection, and often enough not an altogether satisfactory method. The point of some sort of democratic selection, as a guiding though not invariant rule, is manifold: it is in part to ensure due accountability, in part to prevent unethical accumulation of power in special classes, and in part for reasons that devolve from the very notion of democracy itself. In brief, certain forms of democracy offer promising prospects for green reorganisation, particularly within complementing left-leaning settings where those forms can function in favour of sustainability. However even with an informed democracy in place, there are few guarantees. Some structure, such as limited executive power separated from judicial and administrative functions, needs to be set in place to block or retard worse eventualities (such as mob actions, selection of tyrants, mistreatment of noncitizens and so on). Even then several thorny problems remain for any deeper green political reorganization. 5. Problems of chauvinism and present-time bias in democratic political institutions. In modem usage of the motherhood term democracy, two main lines are visible: included are not only forms of political organisation where ‘power [is presumed to] reside in the people as a whole, and is exercised either directly by them ... or by officers [selected] by them’, but ‘often more vaguely denoting a social state in which all have equal rights, without hereditary or arbitrary differences of rank or privilege’34. It is on the basis of this second line that the call for democracy has operated to remove chauvinism and discrimination of a range of forms: against unpropertied minorities, nonconformists, women, blacks, tribals, and so on. Even so pursuit 34 Oxford English Dictionary entry 1, main entry. These two lines are by no means the only distinctive lines now visible: increasingly conspicuous in calls for “democracy”, notably in Asia, are calls to freedom and rights: not merely for basic legal freedoms such as free assembly, fair process and so on, but for freedom to access information (the “right to know”). �16 of the line, where successful, has not generally conferred adequate representation and rights on several of these groups; but, more important, pursuit has stopped short in its inclusions at certain humans, such as those granted citizenship—though relevant interests of many other creatures and welfare of many of other items may be affected by what those citizens elect to do. While democratic voters can perhaps be entrusted to take some account of those near and dear (within remarkably sharp limits, as the situation of women in many regions still shows), such as those deemed incompetent to vote: the young, deranged, and so on, much evidence reveals that they cannot be relied for what is less near or dear (and indeed are easily herded into casting their votes in accord with a shallow mercantilism). Consider what gets left out, outcasts of even perfect democratic control:• spatially distant agents. For example, the interests of many humans outside USA are much affected by practices of the US government, which however is outside their democratic reach. • temporally distant agents. Since the past is past, it is future agents who would be affected, often drastically affected, by present practices, that matter. Some way of taking due account of future agents, their interests and welfare, is required, even under shallow long-term ecology, that is under lighter green positions. Sustainable development has been regularly diverted into—what is part of what it is about—such a way, an indirect and so far utterly ineffectual way. Much more of importance is also excluded according to deep-green theory: • creatures with interests, other than present human citizens, and • items with welfare, but perhaps lacking interests. The category includes items with intrinsic value, whose value can be effected, made to fare worse or better. A major problem, little addressed, is how to take due account of such democratically excludeds. It is a problem especially for deeper green theories: that deep problem is, so to say, how to obtain satisfactory representation of all that is of value in the natural world? That way of putting it, while a little misleading, does point to a particular type of resolution. Problems special to deep ecopolitical theory, include, that is, issues as to adequacy of representation of items of value outside those humans that are represented, representation of their interests, where they have them, of their welfare otherwise, of favourable conditions for their sustenance, continuation and retention of value. Democracy of discussed modem sorts, whether representative or participative, will not serve these purposes at all satisfactorily. For instance, insofar as party-political representative democracies represent anything (even human “bottom lines” as is sometimes erroneously supposed), they appear to represent primarily interests of certain business-allied elites. Among the issues are of course those as to adequacy of retention and protection of nonhuman items of intrinsic value, tropical forests and their inhabitants and elements for instance. �17 As observed, there is really no organisational alternative to proceeding with and through agents, preferably well-disposed and quality agents. It is hard to guarantee either politically. As agents are but a subclass of what requires democratic representation and what should have its welfare or interests considered, how are the rest to be taken care of satisfactorily? There are significant older responses to like problems, through totems and taboos, guardians and constraints. Looked at one way the problem repeats, more or less, a familiar problem: namely, how in larger constituencies do decision-making agents represent the whole mass of agents and others in the constituency? A main democratic answer, designed to avoid many shortcomings of alternatives, was: by representative means—only “representation” was almost never taken seriously or literally enough. The sorts of considerations that made representation a promising resolution make what is to be proposed—where representation has, in any case, to be expanded —also promising. A key principle is this: all relevant items are to be represented. Relevance criteria enter importantly. Steering committees of lower level institutions among the main decision-making bodies should be appropriately representative of all items whose welfare is affected by their decisions (principle of deepened demanarchy). Under more equitable arrangements, then, some decision-engaged agents will have to be selected as representative of relevant classes of excludeds. Electoral arrangements do not so readily allow for such; sortition, well-designed selection by lot, does.35 Of course, however good the selection processes, however disinterested and well-intentioned the agents selected, some bias may remain. Nonetheless prejudice and maltreatment can be much reduced. As already hinted, deepened representation is not the only promising resolution of the present problem that might be tried. Another, which could be attempted either separately or concurrently, operates through the directive of ecologically sustainable development, requiring as a constraint, not only intergenerational equity but also preservation of items of ecological value.36 It might be suggested that such a directive be made mandatory, applying to all relevant steering committees. But, as already evident, there are severe obstacles to getting such a directive properly implemented. (In prevailing oligarchical circumstances, even very dilute versions are worth pressing for however, as they would offer definite improvements upon what presently happens.) 6. A fundamental dilemma for deeper green organization: democratic or authoritarian procedures? 35 No doubt there are electoral approximations; e.g. candidates in separate classes for each category to be represented. 36 For elaboration of this option, see Sylvan and Bennett 94 and its sequel. �18 There is strictly no logical space for a deeper green democracy, according to Saward for one. For there is a clash, an essential tension, between democratic procedures and deeper green values and commitments, notably to intrinsic values in nature. The main drift of the argument is that green values, which are mandatory for deeper greens, require for their implementation anti­ democratic, indeed authoritarian procedures; otherwise they cannot be guaranteed. This nasty conundrum for green theory over democracy, which the theory typically sponsors, is put in sharper form as follows:37 Democracy concerns procedures, environmentalism certain outcomes. What guarantee can there be that the procedures will deliver the outcomes? What guarantee that democracy would yield a way of protecting environments? However the type of situation is worse than a matter of guarantees, which greens are not really seeking and could not in general expect. (For here as almost everywhere else, things can go wrong. Anarchism especially supplies few absolutes and little certainty.) It is a type of situation, moreover, which effects not only environmentalism but any sort of social and other amelioration, and even democracy itself. For democratic procedures may yield unsatisfactory and even anti-democratic outcomes. Unfortunately there are few or no guarantees that meritorious forms will eventuate or persist. Political history itself copiously illustrates that. But it can be argued theoretically. For example, succession of regimes must occur (owing to finite lifetimes of power-holders, etc.), and in successional transitions deterioration can occur; nor are there effective mechanisms that can exclude decline absolutely. Democratic procedures of certain sorts offer better controls, and better prospects of satisfactory transition than most others available, but even they afford no cast-iron guarantees of adequacy, and they are beset by paradoxes of their own. With inadequate democratic structures plausible scenarios are easily designed where just such outcomes occur, for instance as in what has been called a “paradox of democracy” where a constituency elects an anti-democratic tyrant.38 A concerned attempt is made by Saward to mount a destructive version of such a paradox against deep-green political theory (which he darkly calls ‘dark green’). The version is based upon holism and intrinsic value requirements, coupled with democratic demands, of deeper green theory. In clearest form, the version runs as follows: Holism implies consistency or compatibility. But intrinsic value maintenance and democracy are not compatible, under evident conditions (e.g. democratic procedures result in diminution or destruction of intrinsic value). Firstly, partial confirmation for this explication: 37 Goodin, condensing Saward, p. 168. 38 Such paradoxes of democracy, and variants thereupon, are presented trenchantly by Popper, and presumed nullified in Sylvan and Bennett 90. Improved structures can undoubtedly much reduce the likelihood and problematicness of paradoxical overthrows. �19 [The green imperative] usually contains a number of elements, variously economic, political, social, geographical, religious, and so on. Its force comes partly from the holism it embodies, and partly from its basis in the idea of the ‘intrinsic value’ of nature. Holism implies that the various elements which make up the imperative are compatible. The elements of the imperative gain their importance, and their links with each other, by being referable back to a common, intrinsic value of nature. It is at this point that we can pick up the position of democracy or ‘direct democracy’ in lists of basic values set out by greens. [These goals are the elements of the overall green imperative, and gain their importance from both the holistic nature and intrinsic merit of the values which the imperative represents]39 * As should now be plain, and is becoming plainer, consistency is not an invariant desideratum, and not to be insisted upon; coherence is what is “implied” and what supersedes consistency.40 As more than a century of Hegelian theory should have revealed, there can be inconsistent wholes. A further key assumption in the argument is that guaranteeing that intrinsic value is protected (or like absolutes sustained) will require undemocratic procedures, such as authoritarian ones. An underlying assumption (soon to be rejected, for instance as incorporating an offensive false dichotomy) is that only undemocratic, authoritarian procedures fit with deeper green imperatives or givens.41 Several illustrations are offered of inconsistency of green imperatives with types of democratic procedures—none of which tell, without testing adaptation, specifically against deeper green positions. A first illustration is directed against Porritt: A direct democratic procedure (is not) compatible with imperative goals like ‘local production for local need’, ‘low consumption’, ‘labour-intensive production’, and ‘voluntary simplicity’ (other items from Porritt’s list).42 Against this and other illustrations, it is worth emphasizing goals resemble objectives and targets; goals are goals which are not mandatory and by no means always achieved, especially if the achievers, like present humans, fall short (e.g. in ecological sensitivity) or their organisational means and opportunities are inadequate. Observe too the oppositional attempt to convert or to twist (since it is an up-grading by high redefinition) goals and programs and principles—through ‘imperative goals’ and the like—into ‘imperatives’, ‘prescribed outcomes’, undeniable principles, ultimates. That attempt should be resisted. A second example looks at an alleged 39 G. Saward, p.65; square bracketed sections are taken from an earlier circulated version of this article. 40 See Priest and others. 41 G. Saward, p.63 42 Saward, p.66. �20 contradiction in the programme of the German Green Party. ‘Grassroots democracy’ is one of the four ‘basic principles’ of the party’s ‘global conception’. Another is the ‘ecological’: ‘Proceeding from the laws of nature, and especially from the knowledge that unlimited growth is impossible in a limited system, and ecological policy means understanding ourselves and our environment as part of nature’. In effect, this means that certain outcomes are proscribed from decision-making procedures. Such proscribed outcomes must surely go well beyond any plausible list of outcomes which must be proscribed in the interests of defending a direct democratic decision procedure. Therefore, there is a clear contradiction between elements of the value-set, whereas given the holism the green imperative is based on we would have the right to expect these goals and values to be thoroughly compatible.43 The last charge repeats the critical point already rejected, that holism implies consistency. A further critical point should also be rejected: the flawed inference that ‘certain outcomes are proscribed’. A political party in a democratic system has to be prepared to see its principles, however spendid, overridden, certainly by other parties if they gain or hold political power. There is a misconception too about principles (especially higher level principles) and their roles: ‘principles [too] can only be akin to [givens and] “laws of nature”, against which democratic procedures must inevitably be traded off the board’. Sets of principles, which may themselves turn out to be inconsistent, are hardly akin to natural laws; consider for instance reasons for their revision, procedures for rechecking and revision, and so on. In any case, democratic procedures are not traded away against laws of nature, which they may try to upset or suppress. (Rather effort should be directed at informing the electorate and the like.) To reinforce his case, Saward appeals to other authors who have advanced similar claims (it is like appealing for confirmation of a newspaper report to other newspapers). Boris Frankel accuses Rudolf Bahro of an ‘anti-democratic ’ vision of an ecological society, given that politics as conflict will have no place in a sea of ‘givens’. He sees the dilemma as being similar to that of socialists—deeming certain things as desirable in an ultimate sense, but proclaiming attachment to democracy and the diversity it implies. Ophuls has stated the matter especially clearly. The basic question about politics, he writes, is ‘Is the way we organize our communal life and rule ourselves compatible with ecological imperatives and other natural laws? ... how we run our lives will be increasingly determined by ecological imperatives’44 In an ecological society, enough of the demos (members of democratic constituency) will hold ecological attitudes and vote or select accordingly, almost by definition. Problems of effecting change lie with unecological communities, which may not support ecological principles under instituted democratic procedures (as presently in many places). Principles, and ecological “givens”, stand, they remain ‘desirable in an ultimate sense’, but they are not followed and 43 Saward, p.66. 44 Saward, p.67. Note that only a very streamlined version of Saward’s case is being presented. �21 implemented, while revealed democratic preferences go unchanged. There need be no ‘anti­ democratic vision’, but rather an unecological praxis, which principled greens will work to change. The route is accordingly barred to Say ward’s important conclusions...: that at best direct democracy[, and for that matter indirect forms of democracy,] can only be at or near the bottom of value-lists of greens. A commitment to democracy must clash with core green values which, if taken on board, limit the range of acceptable policy outcomes beyond these self-binding constraints that democracy logically requires.45 What Saward proposes instead is depressingly familiar: pragmatism, jettison intrinsic value. Out therewith go deep-green positions. ... greens should not think in terms of overriding principles or [green] imperatives. Indeed, it suggests that to think in terms of imperatives based on arguments about intrinsic merit is unjustifiable.46 Fortunately the argument developed does not sustain the proposals. There is, to iterate a central point, no internal or latent contradiction between (deep-)green policy objectives and democratic procedures. Rather, green objectives would fail to be achieved without well- disposed decision makers, who may not straightforwardly reflect any “will” of the demos. A logical requirement on a realistic set of political objectives is that there are accessible circumstances where they are realisable, where all elements of the whole would obtain. It should not be required that there are are no situations where they may conflict, become inconsistent. It is certainly not required that they are realised, by whatever means. A community, as variously represented, can choose better or worse. There are many means available, which it may shun (again there are no absolute guarantees), enabling it to choose better, including improved structures, attitudinal change and consciousness raising, and so on. In the end Saward too recognises the popular power of attitudinal change, thereby himself removing his previous imposition of authoritarian means upon greens. There 45 Saward, p.68. The lead-in to Saward’s proposal was clearer in the earlier circulated version, which ended in more precise (and dubious) form: A commitment to democracy must clash with values that are inherent to ecologism—and ecologism is about inherency, intrinsic values, laws of nature and holism. Things—like democracy—that can only have instrumental value must lose out to imperatives backed by inescapable canonical force. 46 Saward, p.75. Of course it is now put in terms of “imperatives”; it would be better expressed simply in terms of (what did not figure in the earlier version) principles, policy objectives or the like. Opposition to deeper green political approaches often derives, as in Saward and in Goodin, from a underlying shallow utilitarianism. The differences concern not only depth; they also concern the rejection of individual interest bases, in favour of welfare bases and holism of deeper approaches. �22 * needs, from a green perspective [and others], to be a change in political culture such that it will be compatible with sustainability. This, of course, is a familiar theme from green writing. How[?] ... It can only be the case that ‘political change will ony occur once people think differently or, more particularly, that sustainable living must be prefaced by sustainable thinking’. By abandoning foundationalist myths of intrinsic merit, greens abandon the implicit arrogance that have made democracy such a tenuous part of green political theory.47 But he overstates the attitudinal point, with ‘only...the case’. People can be politically led (retardation, however, as distinct from genuine advancement, is more familiar); they could just elect a green government which instituted, under permissible democratic methods, sustainable living or the like. Worse still, his final ungrammatical sentence is a complete non-sequitur. Attitudinal change may include coming to appreciate intrinsic merit in natural things other than humans, and seeing through pragmatic utilitarianism. 7. Ecoregional demanarchoid reshaping of Australian political institutions: one beginning. Is such a radical restructuring as that suggested feasible? Initial investigations hold out the hope that major problems for deeper green theory can be solved, at least in theory. Investigations accordingly suggest that the project within the Reshaping Australian Institutions project is viable and worth pursuing. A logical next stage offers sketches for a radical political reorganisation of Australia.48 Evidently there would be many designs (thereby removing facile jeers against “the blueprint”, a part of co-optative strategy for persistence with prevailing statist arrangements). Among the many designs, some few, conforming to favoured principles, would be selected for detailed study. If the study were attempted, most appropriately through systems modellings, then flexibility could be built into modellings, so that even though only a few basic designs were examined, many variations would be feasible. Not only .is systems modelling particularly well suited to modelling network designs; it also further offers prospects for computing simulation and implementation, and even some simulated political experimentation. Furthermore, such modellings begin to give some grasp on the size and 47 Saward, p.77. There are further defects in this passage than those noted in the text. For one, admission of intrinsic merit does not entail foundationalism. For another, such recognition of merit—which is less liable to disturb democracy, or render it tenuous, than adherence to Christianity—need carry no tinges of arrogance; to the contrary, by contrast with humanism it may yield a certain humbleness. 48 Such design, well accomplished, would help considerably in revealing what is possible, thereby providing a seriously neglected contribution to politics, itself sometimes presented, with undue licence, as the art of the possible. �23 complexity of the task (a useful comparison is with World 3 modelling of the on-going “Limits to Growth” project49, or, better, with a regionalized version of it). To get started on such ecoregional design, for Australia, two broad classifications and associated maps and charts are required: • 1. an ecoregional classification, with partitions and overlays, for Australia and its continental shelf. Observe that this classification would be hierarchical, as smaller regions merge into larger regions; but it is a benign hierarchy of levels (it facilitates no accumulation of power or wealth). Observe too that any such classification is far from unique. Plurality has already set in, and a choice of classification (or a few choices) would have to be made, taking due account of political organisational principles and objectives. Fortunately some of the preliminary classificatory work has already been accomplished in Environmental Regionalisations of Australia, where 3 broad classifications are presented and procedures for generating many more given.50 For political purposes further classification attributes (e.g. demographic features) need to be included. Ecoregions provide the basis for spatially linked administrative and community units. (Not all units need be of this sort; many contemporary arrangements are spatially unlinked). At this stage a basic principle of decentralization and distributed and smaller-scale organization can be invoked, namely • subsidiarization: organisational functions should be allowed to fall down to (or to be pushed down to) the lowest level compatible with their satisfactory performance. Thus, for instance, most matters concerning such things as sewerage and primary education would be localized. This subsidiarization principle, drawn from classical anarchism, has been widely adopted in green planning proposals. (It is said to have been applied by the Catholic Church in administration of the Holy Roman Empire, whence the not altogether apt title derives. It is presently being reassessed for use in that successor organisation, united Europe.) No doubt the principle is open to challenge, for instance on grounds of efficiency, that larger size may prove more efficient, of duplication, and so on. But, the objective is not maximization of technological values such as efficiency factors; instead it aims to satisize on a wider framework of values, including holistic social arrangements. Presumably, however, undue duplication of expensive administrative bodies is to be avoided. Coupled with subsidiarization is another principle, • direct accountability downwards: units should answer directly to regional constituencies. This 49 See e.g. Meadows. 50 See Thackway and Cresswell. Rudiments of a politically useful classification begin to emerge on their 30 Group Regionalisation. �* 24 .contrasts with prevailing accountability (such as it is) upwards, through some indirect and tenuous, centralized circuiting chain. Naturally much more gets comprehended under accountability, for instance openness of environmental accounting. There are also principles interrelating smaller with larger regions, both bottom-up and topdown (or centre-down) principles. Among these will be • representation of smaller regions in relevant planning institutions of more comprehensive regions. Representation, appropriately regulated, would often replace anarchistic federation, which as observed appears too weak for requisite environmental control. The point needs no labouring that the classifications and principles are open to challenge at every step; for instance, there is nothing rock-hard about the type of ecoregional classification preferred, nor about social functions to be addressed. At a theoretical stage that is unproblematic: there are other (less preferable) models; elaborate your own if you want to and can. In any case, it is to be hoped that a diversity in theory might be to some extent reflected in some diversity in practice—with different regions and continents trying different arrangements, with much less of the sort of cosmopolitan political monoculture that we are presently being harassed toward, with much more resilient political biodiversity. Of course, not all political forms (including stateless types) are equally desirable or satisfactory, and some (including present state examples) are unacceptable. So there are bounds upon diversity. Moreover, what suits one community or region well may not suit another to be satisfactory for it. So too there are limits upon successful transfer of organisational structure; what works in one region may require much modification in another, or may substantially resist transfer. • 2 a social function classification, of those community matters that require explicit organisation at some level. An initial listing can be compiled by consulting Australian metropolitan telephone directories, especially the government sections that used to feature in the front (until a year ago). What results under redesign and reorganisation would, of course, look very different from what is listed. Parliaments, parties and all their supporting apparatus would vanish; the Australian Bureau of Statistics will assume a new significance and independent role, and so on. But which institutions are retained, which adapted, and so on, would depend on further social organisational features, not yet considered here. The result would be a levelled pyramidal structure, a flat-untopped network as depicted in the structural diagram below, not a power hierarchy. �25 Structural diagram: a schematic depiction of organisational structure (with some sample components indicated, but not all their network interlinkages displayed). statistics bureau upper levels: administrative, executive, research ground level: functional selectoral college Australian region (federal) immigration control of materials inflow super­ regions (a to k) interregional transport (local) regions (1 to n) arbitration bureau upper levels rental entitlements office resources income office ground level water systems sewer systems hospital systems region 1 region n While some requisite research has been undertaken upon how the various functional bodies and decision-making committees can be selected and can operate51, insufficient investigation has been made of the interrelations and adequate funding of the bodies and institutions involved — whichever they are! For little such detailed anarchoid modelling has apparently been attempted for any region anywhere. Evidently there is much to be done 51 Thus e.g. Burnheim 85. The present article is not only heavily indebted to Burnheim's work, but overlaps on-going investigations on his part. �26 theoretically. Detailed modellings could bring issues down to earth, without setting things in concrete; no doubt too they would disclose many further problems hidden in the detailing, problems to which anarchoid solutions can however reasonably be expected. Nonetheless comparatively little is likely to be done, unless requisite support is forthcoming, support in the shape of researchers (research volunteers and students) and research infrastructure (from research gifts, donations and the like). For such support, support for investigating its own demise, a state is hardly likely knowingly to supply; nor are its established research institutions. Insofar then as it is done visibly, it will probably have to be accomplished largely outside state-supported and state-supporting infrastructure, such as prominent university projects (like Reshaping Australian Institutions). Fortunately there are now other structures, such as internet and radio communicational channels, that can facilitate interconnections and interchanges of researchers, both regionally and internationally. On these sorts of anarchoid communicational bases, networks of groups interested in elaborating such alternative political modellings, both in theory and in practice, could be formed. Given the dismal state of present political arrangements, almost everywhere terrestial, there is a great need, as a very minimum, for networks of innovative researchers who share such goals.52 Richard Sylvan References. Bello, W., Dark Victory, Pluto Press, London, 1994. Bookchin, M., Remaking Society: Pathways to a Green Future, South End Press, Boston, 1990. Burnheim, J., Is Democracy Possible?, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1985. Burnheim, J., ‘Democracy, nation states and the world system’, New Forms of Democracy, (ed. D. Held and C. Pollitt) London, Sage, 1986, pp.218-239. Carter, A., ‘Towards a green political theory’, in The Politics of Nature. Explorations in green political theory (ed. A. Dobson and P. Lucardie), Routledge, London, 1993, pp.39-62. Goodin, R., Green Political Theory, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1992. Green, G., The New Radicalism: Anarchist or Marxist?, International Publishers, New York, 1971. 52 To echo one referee. My sincere thanks to demanding referees for several helpful suggestions and many improvements. �27 Jacobs, M., The Green Economy: environment, sustainable development, and the politics of the future., Pluto Press, Concord, Mass, 1991. Mackay, H., Reinventing Australia: the mind and mood of Australia in the 90s, Hugh Mackay, Pymble, NSW, Angus & Robertson, 1993. Macphee, I., A new constitution?’ (excerpts from an opening address) NILEFA Newsletter, Griffith University School of Law, June 1993. Marshall, P., Demanding the Impossible: a history of anarchism, London, Harper Collins 1992. Me Laughlin, A., Regarding Nature, SUNY Press, Albany NY., 1993. Meadows D., and others, Beyond the Limits, Chesley Green, Vermont, 1992. Naess, A., Ecology, community and lifestyle (trans, and ed. D. Rothenberg), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1989. Ponting, C., A Green History of the World, Sinclair-Stevenson, London, 1991. Priest, G., Routley, R. and Norman, J. (eds), Paraconsistent Logic, Philosophia Verlag, Munich, 1989. Routley, V. and R., ‘Social theories, self management and environmental problems’, in Environmental Philosophy (ed. D Mannison and others), RSSS, Australian National University, 1980. Saward, M., ‘Green Democracy’, in The Politics of Nature: Explorations in green political theory (ed. A. Dobson and P. Lucardie) Routledge, London, 1993 pp. 63-80. Sylvan, R. and Bennett, D., Utopias, Tao and Deep Ecology, Green Series , RSSS, Australian National University, 1990. Sylvan, R. and Bennett, D., The Greening of Ethics, White Horse Press, Cambridge, 1994. Sylvan, R., ‘Anarchism’, in Contemporary Political Theory (ed. R. Goodin and P.Pettit) Blackwell, Oxford, 1993. Sylvan, R., Green Anarchism, to appear, 1996. Thackway, R. and Cresswell, I.D., Environmental Regionalisations of Australia, Environmental Resources Information Network, Australian National Parks and Wildlife Service, 1992. Tynan, L., The Institute of Advanced Studies, The Australian National University, May 1993. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Draft Papers Description An account of the resource Sylvan's literary executor encountered an archive in which “all his projects were current", since manuscripts were undated and unattributed. Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document 29.5.95 PROBLEMS IN DEEPER GREEN POLITICAL ORGANIZATION: an Australian perspective on radical institutional change. ... people are ready for change and the impending debate will result in constitutional change. We should, therefore, explore all options ... J As elsewhere, there is growing dissatisfaction with Australia's political institutions, and increasing demand to change them. This demand, hiding co-optative elements, has been initiated and fostered in a conspicuously top-down fashion, by politicians and by academics. There is so far little surge of political enterprise at grass-roots levels, little pressure for the usually very limited changes proposed. Nonetheless, along with apathy, there is widespread popular disenchantment with present political arrangements. There is now an opportunity (although still only a small window no doubt) to put green and radical themes on the agenda for real political change in Australia. That opportunity should not be missed, within Australia, or elsewhere. While the exposition that follows concentrates upon Australia, as a convenient advanced example, much of what is argued and urged applies or adapts elsewhere. 1. Disenchantment with politics, and political proposals for change. There is now evident in Australia, what is variously described as disillusionment and anxiety, cynicism and pessimism about the state of politics—a loss of confidence in it, and a retreat from commitment. As much and more, Mackay has nicely exposed in a survey of the Australian situation: anxiety about the nature and quality of Australian politics [has] increased. ... Widespread anxiety about the state of politics is based [in part] on an uneasy feeling that, if the parties are not going to stand for some identifiable philosophy, and the leaders are going to be chosen on the basis of their potential as television performers or even as head-kickers, then the only appropriate response is cynicism. That cynicism is reflected in a turning away from support for the major parties ... and revealed in the attitudes of young Australians ...12 who often cannot be bothered registering to vote, or voting (though voting is legally compulsory). 1 Hon. Ian Macphee, ‘A new constitution?’. Of course Macphee did not really mean all options, nor even all constitutional options. Furthermore, his claim about preparedness of people for change is incompatible with Mackey’s data (mentioned below) on exhaustion with change. 2 Mackay pp. 174-177. For all the Australian casualness of Mackay's presentation, his sociological findings are nonetheless fairly solidly survey and interview based (if occasionally stretching the data). Main findings are replicated by other sociologists. 2 ♦> Lack of confidence is beginning to show not only as cynicism about politicians, but also as doubt about the integrity of Australia's political institutions.3 In a recent survey, ‘62 percent of [Australians] expressed either little or no confidence in the political system. Such a figure accurately reflects the mood of the Australian community’.4 Australian loss offaith in conventional politics is attributed to a mix of factors. A first explanatory factor as regards this disenchantment comes from the changes in politics already remarked (ranging from policy issues to media performers) and from resultant uncertainty. ‘... the Australian electorate is confused about which party stands for what, and about whether any party has a long-term commitment to any particular point of view’ .5 A complex ‘second factor ... concerns the adversarial nature of two-party politics’.6 How can this ‘two party, adversarial approach ... continue to be appropriate when the distinctions between the two parties themselves are so hard to define’? But ‘redefinition of party politics implies the possibility of a redefinition of the whole parliamentary process itself’. Why ‘when parties seem quite capable of stealing each other's policies or of invading each other's traditional philosophical territory, [can not] politicians work together in a more co­ operative and harmonious spirit’?7 ‘Adversarial politics may have made sense ... when ... distinctions between the parties were stark and when arguments about principle could be justified; today, the idea that politicians would be arguing over a point of principle or philosophy is almost unthinkable.... [They] are much more likely to be arguing over matters of personality, prejudice and power than over issues which effect the long-term health of the body politic’.8 ‘The quality of parliamentary debate is regarded not only as a symptom of the adversarial nature of the institution, but also as a symptom either of the poor quality of politicians ..., or of the effect of the system on those who are enmeshed in it’.9 Unless there is 3 Ibid, p.178 4 Ibid. The figure is the more surprising inasmuch as such disillusioning factors as corruption and graft are not features of overt political life in Austral-asia by comparison with elsewhere in the hemispherical region. 5 Ibid. pp. 178-179. 6 Ibid. The adversarial character of dominant State legal systems is also becoming subject to more and more criticism. It appears likely that significant movement towards different inquiratorial systems will occur, not least because of the huge expense and growing unaffordability of adversarial systems. 7 Ibid. 8 Ibid, p.180. 9 Ibid, p.179. It is a symptom of both, the latter especially. 3 marked improvement in party philosophies, programs and performance, ‘the call to re-examine the nature of the parliamentary process will gather momentum’.1011 A third relevant factor contributing to loss of faith is the impression of Australians that ‘they are overgoverned ’H, with too many expensive bureaucracies and too many houses of parliament. Conflicts between State and Federal parliaments — and between the various State parliaments themselves — are regarded as a particularly unproductive expenditure of political energy, and Australians question whether 15 houses of parliament may be too many for the efficient government of 18 million people. The sheer number of parliaments is often blamed for the problem of too many bureaucracies and for many duplications of bureaucratic and political activity between State and Federal governments. ... Whilst there is little love felt in the Australian community for Canberra and for the idea of more centralised government even that is beginning to appear preferable .... The widespread support for the idea of a republic which emerged during 1992 is closely related to the underlying sense that Australia is overdue for some kind of reexamination of its political institutions, and even the notion of Federation itself. ... As debate about the idea of a republic proceeds ... it has begun to incorporate the idea that Australian's political structures and systems might be quite significantly reformed.12 Such disaffection reflects too a growing awareness that Australia’s political arrangements owe more to historical accident than to rational design. Even though the main proposals for change no doubt remain reformist in character and could lead in unfortunate directions, some of them are far-reaching by normal standards. Both the extensive disenchantment with present political arrangements and the felt need for significant change further suggest political times are not altogether normal. Elements underpinning a political paradigm shift are already present, as are features supporting rational redesign, to which radical additions are now feasible. So far there have been, along with normal inertial resistance to change, two main responses to growing pressure for change: political, from politicians, ex-politicians and political commentators, and academic from intellectuals, academic entrepreneurs and academic journalists. By and large, political responses have been grander, more sweeping and vaguer; 10 Ibid, p.181. 11 Ibid, p.181, itals added. The problem has now surfaced strikingly in the heavily indebted Australian Capital Territory (“toy town” as its is facetiously called locally) which is swamped by bureaucracy, where it has been discovered that there is one expensive bureaucrat for every fifteen persons. 12 Ibid. p. 181-2. Republican proposals have been circulating for some time. But the cause was finally taken up by prominent politicians, who made it their own, after which it became a popular issue. Mackay's accurate presentation of popular support for political change contrasts drolly with the first part of his book which depicts an Australian populace exhausted by change and longing for the old ease and somnolence. 4 academic responses more theoretical and cautious, piecemeal and detailed. But there are no grand detailed plans. Under the leading proposal so far for political change, Australia's constitutional monarchy will be displaced by a constitutional republic with its own head of state displacing the monarch, but with perhaps minimal adjustments otherwise. Nonetheless, as a result, republicanism is in the air. Politicians have begun to contemplate other practical reforms, while academics have begun to embroider theories around republicanism and institutional reform. What happens to the Australian federation of states is one of the many unresolved issues presently being debated. The main reason for reform offered by the political camp can be summed up simply as changing geopolitical circumstances. The camp tends not to acknowledge what would reflect adversely upon it, the poorness of federal political practice. Rather it tends to attribute popular dissatisfaction to economic circumstances and uncertainties: declining real standards of living, extensive unemployment, persistent recession until recently, problems to be surmounted by full-steam ahead untrammelled economic growth, to be attained by recoupling Australia to the Asian economic express. Meanwhile an orchestrated republican movement can help divert popular political attention from poor political management and a gloomy economic predicament. Much has changed in the century since present antiquated political arrangements were hammered out, arrangements making the newly-fashioned Commonwealth of Australia, politically a federation of states, into a constitutional monarchy coupled to Britain, arrangements of convenience fashioned for very different circumstances. Most non-symbolic linkages with Britain, which has been inching towards a place in a united Europe, have already been severed. Australia has gradually begun to appreciate its geo-political position in the Indian-Pacific region (and the money-making opportunities for a sagging resource-based economy in allegedly booming parts of Asia). Whence the main idealistic proposal: for an independent republic, decoupled from Europe, assuming its own (prominent) place in its geo-political regions. In principle at least, place and region begin to assume, or resume, some of their neglected, but historic, significance (however that is not how it is yet seen). Most proposals for constitutional and federal reform fit within that limited idealistic conception. One important proposal, advanced by established political players, their most radical proposal so far, includes abolition of the present states. Such a proposal would clearly represent a welcome step in anarchist directions, were it not regularly offset by the idea of a strengthened central state.13 Supposing this latter unfortunate idea is bracketed for the moment, 13 Anarchists can even rest (if uneasily) with a constitution, so long as it provides for an organisation, Australia Inc. even, sufficiently different from a state and its authoritarian trappings. 5 ♦> then what is being seriously considered already starts to look like a much more rational regionalism than what presently prevails. The present states of Australia are undoubtedly an anachronism, based on accidental boundaries of a contingent colonial history. They are ecologically irrational management units, utterly failing to reflect ecological regions. Yet the states possess extensive environmental and other management powers, inappropriate ‘powers which derive from what was largely a political bargaining process conducted a century ago.’ Another effect of inapposite state-federal arrangements, especially ‘funding arrangements, has been to lock out local government and, more importantly, local communities. ... local communities must be given greater control over those decisions of government which effect their lives ...’; the opportunity ‘to design and provide the services which are needed locally.’14 At this stage of the dialectic McPhee slides easily and naturally from localism to regionalism. A glance at the map reveals natural regions for local government on a viable scale [an optimistic contention]. Some cross State boundaries, and I would envisage that State governments would be replaced with regional governments. These would be more akin to larger local governments and would certainly not have the trappings of the States. They should not have parliaments and the expensive, unwieldy and inefficient bureaucracies which characterise our States. They should have a small number of full-time councillors ... Regional governments should be solely accountable to their ratepayers ...15 . So far so good: however McPhee thereupon begins to infiltrate stock (small Z) liberal management assumptions. Nonetheless the basic idea to retain is simple: that of ecologicallyrational local and regional rearrangement of anachronistic state partitions. regionalization should be greened, as reform should be radicalized. But that More generally, opportunites now present themselves to insert more radical ideas throughout the debate about Australia’s future directions. For much has been left off political agendas for change, not merely environments and habitats of their less prominent or noisy inhabitants, but also such issues as rights and liberties, transformation of antiquated legal and executive frameworks, and so on. Omission of (human) rights is especially remarkable in states such as Australia, whose constitutions astonishingly do not mention at all (what is however often supposed to justify states) individual rights, such rights only being ensured, so far as they are, assumptions from uncodified common law, by 14 All quotes in this paragraph are drawn from McPhee. An address along similar lines to the Hon. Ian McPhee, also proposing abolition of the states, was delivered by the former Prime Minister R.G. Hawke. Hawke's speech, by contrast with McPhee's, attracted much media attention, and though facilely dismissed as “unrealistic” by some practicing politicians, appeared to gain a good deal of support. 15 McPhee ibid. 6 indirect routes (statutes regarding treatment of minorities and the like). Nor do the political camps pushing limited change speak of rights or liberties; a very limited conception of adjustments required prevails (though without rights and liberties and a generous public sphere there is little, and little prospect of, justification for a state at all). Accordingly political agendas for change need to be conspicuously broadened, to accommodate a decidedly more ambitious range of constitutional and institutional redesign. 2. A project within a project: radically reshaping Australian institutions. Academic entrepreneurs have also responded quickly to proposals for constitutional and institutional changes. Early to scramble on the bandwagon was the institution to which I am affiliated, the Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University, with its ambitious decade-long project, Reshaping Australian Institutions: Towards and Beyond 2001.16 One small part of this project does connect with the republican push, which no doubt helped inspire it and gain its funding. The academic version of republicanism furnishes an institutional and historic setting, tracing its roots back to ancient Rome, and thereby linking in, what admits much modem adaptation, notions of citizenship and civic virtues. But most of the project is independent of any republican reorganisation. The Reshaping Australian Institutions project is presented in predominantly reformist fashion, unsurprisingly. It is supposed, for instance, to ‘provide major input into evaluation and reform of Australia's institutions’; indeed it is explicitly ‘aimed at contributing to Australian constitutional reform’.17 Nothing however precludes consideration of reshaping or transforming Australian institutions — those of the whole ecological region — in a unreformist and possibly unconstitutional way, in a radical way. Admittedly, the rough boundary between reformist and radical routes becomes even more blurred when the constitution of a country is open for possible major reconsideration and much political infrastructure may be altered. Nonetheless, from the perspective of a strong central state, the stock boundary stands intact. For reformist changes would amount to comparatively small adjustments leaving the state substantially intact. For example, a minimal transformation, 16 A recent brief description of this two million dollar project, now outlined in several places, is given in Tynan, pp.17-19. Fuller descriptions are available from a main coordinator of the project, J. Braithwaite, Law, RSSS, ANU. One of the many strands (17 at last count) of this project is an environmental (or green) strand. The immediate predecessor of this article was presented in a workshop at RSSS on green political theory, arranged under the project. That accounts for some of the otherwise puzzling structure of what has eventuated. Another earlier version was tried out at Ecopolitics VIII, Pacific Visions, held at Lincoln University, Christchurch, New Zealand, in July 1994. 17 ‘Reshaping Australian institutions: towards and beyond 2001’ in Tynan , p.17, italics added. 7 of the sort presently much favoured, from constitutional monarchy to Australian republic, though entailing non-negligible constitutional redrafting, need only amend the roles of a few elite power- and position-holders. By contrast, radical changes would substantially alter that strong central state, perhaps (as will be proposed) eliminating it altogether. There are appealing reasons for attempting wider, more radical investigations. For, firstly, there may be more satisfactory institutional structures not accessible, or even visible, along normal constitutional reform routes. Secondly, there is a demand, a small but growing demand from green directions for instance, for radical institutional change. It would be prudent, then, to make some investigation of the options, to assess their prospects. Thirdly, reflection on such structures would certainly be part of a more comprehensive study of and theory of institutional design, which the Reshaping project also presents as an objective. Fourthly, much more controversially, major environmental problems cannot be satisfactorily solved along merely reformist paths. For states, what are reformed, states themselves are ecologically dysfunctional. In practice this appears obvious enough. Simply reflect upon their environmental records; these are even worse than those abysmal records compiled for human rights. But the practical case can be argued in detail in a state by state way, or less laboriously, through the familiar rough classification of states into first, second and third world states. In main third world regions, the rise of the state has seen the serious decline of environments. Those third world states that have not largely destroyed their natural environments are in rapid process of doing so. The activities involved are, furthermore, not merely tolerated by these states but are usually actively encouraged (e.g. with state participation or by state concessions, as through taxation advantages, subsidies, export incentives, etc.). Further, the role of exploitation and plunder of remaining natural “resources”, and depletion of “biological capital”, by third world states, most of which are now trapped in debt and structural adjustment, has increased many-fold in the last two decades. How destructively second world states of eastern Europe treated their own (and also other regions’) environment, how they over-expoited and polluted them, has recently been much publicized. While the recent record in first world states is no doubt marginally better, many of these states dominated their natural environments and their wild inhabitants in the past, and have heavily polluted and congested their urban and industrial regions. Nor does their present record gain an environmental pass. For example, those that have any natural forests (similarly fisheries) left are in the process of eliminating or degrading most of what remains; most are failing seriously in meeting (their own) targets on greenhouse emissions, and so on. More theoretically, it is unlikely that states, increasingly focussed narrowly upon shallow and short-term economic agendas, will or can deliver satisfactorily environmentally. A prime reason is this: states are ineluctably committed, more and more as their populations expand, to high levels of economic activity characteristically to 0 economic growth of sorts which impact heavily environmentally, inducing inevitable degradation.18 Accordingly, there are then, or should be, two bands to any green (or environmental) strand of a restructuring Australian institutions project: not merely an important reformist side, but as well a radical spread. It is part of this underfunded and undersupported radical spread which forms the main object of investigation in what follows, that part that relinquishes present state structures, in favour of more environmentally benign institutions - which no doubt can be designed, even if not so readily brought into practical operation.19 In order to reach radical redesign ideas quickly, let us touch only lightly upon some of the more distinctively green reasons for this anarchoid quest (familiar anarchist reasons stand: the illegitimacy of present states, the undesirability and severe disutility of states, which typically are highly destructive and corrosive institutions based on concentration of power, hierarchical authority, massive coercion, manipulation by economic elites, technobureaucracy, utilitarian rationality, and sundry other evils.20) As indicated, present states are incompatible with stock ecologically sustainable practices, because of their heavy unrelenting commitments to shallow economic growth. More generally, standard states and their practices comprise very significant parts of environmental problems, but quite insufficient parts of any solutions. Moreover, states constitute an enormous and destructive drain on regional environments, a feature particularly evident in smaller states which are always looking out for revenue-raising expedients for their own expensive running. Apart from those greens who have recognised the excessive environmental costs of states and their heavy demands on environments, and thus or otherwise have come to recognise the desirability of their withering away, there are many more who have become ambivalent about states, who appreciate their very problematic character and very questionable legitimacy, but do not see yet how to get along altogether without them, or more exactly (to indicate thereby a partial resolution) without certain functions that they serve. Indeed to point immediately towards a resolution of this crucial problem, the functional dissolution idea advocated is this: that the functioning parts may be separately utilized without the colossal whole. The state is not 18 This theme, that states are normally ecologically dysfunctional, is documented and argued in detail elsewhere; see e.g. Carter and especially Sylvan 96. On the dismal environmental records of particular states see Ponting. For shocking figures and illustrations as regards environmental exploitation in third world states, see Bello, pp. 57-65. 19 Nonetheless practical revolutionary displacement of the state is not so remote, or difficult, as is generally supposed. 20 To adapt a referee’s trenchant summary. For detail on some familiar anarchist reasons, see Burnheim and above all Marshall. 9 an organism the functioning parts of which must fail without the whole. So it may well be the enormous fat of state can simply be shed, to great advantage. In any event, ‘the State is a social institution’, always ‘within’, Marxists continue, ‘a concrete historic setting’.21 Granted, it is an institution. For an institution in the relevant sense is ‘a society or association for the organisation or promotion of some particular object or function’.22 Institutions include therefore the state, the central state. So it too is up for reshaping, radical slimming, and possible removal in a concrete historical setting, such as late twentieth century Australia. Whittling away the state means in turn dismantling corporate capitalism, which now dwells in symbiosis with the bureaucratic state, and also much else, often environmentally undesirable, that the state affords a supportive framework for and enables to flourish. Ideas and schemes for radical redesign are already available from rich anarchist and socialist sources, those for green design and reshaping from growing and diverse environmental sources. In main part, then, radical ecoredesign is a matter of convivially meeting (not joining) the two, an intersection that favours anarchist inputs. Something of the sort has already been attempted, in an environmentally shallower way, in eco-anarchism, alias social ecology, and in a deeper way, in deep-green social theory.23 Moreover, it could be attempted in other kinds of deeper green theory—itself really a plurality of theories, which however does not itself force radical ecoredesign, though most variants would support it. Thus Naess's “deep ecology” for example, which is not so far politically radical, only strongly reformist, could (and should) be given a radical turn.24 Concentrating upon the radical spread of deeper green theory does not preclude concomitant reformist investigation and activity. Both sides of the green street should be played. Reformist opportunities should of course be pursued—incremental change, social engineering, “ecologizing” economics, greening bureaucrats, lobbying politicians, and like activity (but better really to cut through much such pleading and obiesance and be rid of politicians and bureaucrats). There are many reformist proposals being advanced for the greening of Australian federal institutions—with but few so far having much impact on 21 Thus, Green p.61, who adds quite wrongly that Proudhon and his disciples do not see it that way ‘but as an abstraction and aberration’. 22 Adaptation of the Oxford English Dictionary. An institution is, so to say, an organitution. 23 On social ecology, see Bookchin 90, and for information on deep-green social theory, see Sylvan and Bennett 94 and Routleys 80. 24 As to the political character of deep ecology, and why it should be turned, see Sylvan and Bennett 94, where an expose of the political theory of Naess's ecosophy is presented. practice.25 Nonetheless, more limited, more constrained, proposals of this sort certainly have a better chance, within the prevailing paradigm, of making a difference than radical redesigns, too smartly dismissed as “unrealistic” or “utopian”. No doubt the normal “reshaping institutions” investigations are rightly focussed then upon institutional reform, not upon revolutionary reshaping, where much freer scope for redesign is offered. However the real possibility of radical change should not be excluded; green radicals should be prepared. There have been various opportunities for revolutionary change in Australian history, the last occurring, according to some historians, with the ignominious fall of the Whitlam government. There may well be opportunities again both in the near and intermediate future, especially should some solid work be put into propagating the prospect. In the near term there is economic disarray, social fragmentation, and constitutional destabilization; in the longer term increasing ecological problems and expanding eco-catastrophes loom. Under present incremental reform and regression, for all the spasmodic environmental rhetoric, comparatively little in the way of radical green change occurs or can be expected. Witness, for comparison, the snail pace of the establishment movement towards a rather minimal grey republicanism in Australia, or differently away from meeting carbon-reduction commitments. It is increasingly doubtful, given prevailing responses to economic and other difficulties, that present structural and systematic problems confronting Australia, for example, will be satisfactorily addressed, environmental problems such as extensive and expanding land and water degradation not least. Furthermore, under more incremental reform, the sorts of problems concerning reorganising society in deeper green ways, problems that provide subsequent topics, would likely not arise. So in getting beyond more muddling along, do imagine fairly free scope for institutional eco-redesign is somehow dispensed. One nice corollary is that once it is worked out where to go organisationally, it is much easier to ascertain how to arrive there. 3. A basic problem of structure: central or decentralised organisation? There are large and immediate advantages in pursuing a problem-oriented approach to redesign. That approach, which will tend towards anarchoid outcomes, will be anarchistically guided in this respect: Unless there is a genuine problem, already causing difficulties or developing, nothing need be done; otherwise let things alone, let Being be.26 On this non­ 25 There are many many narrower economic and technological proposals. One of the more interesting wider proposals comes from an Opposition not noted for its green initiatives and commitments, for an overseeing Department of Sustainable Development, a Department that could see to the greening of all federal institutions. 26 To echo also Heideggerian wisdom. The non-prejudicial term ‘anarchoid’ is deployed, not because what emerges will not be anarchistic (as characterized in Marshall and in Sylvan 94), but because it 11 managerial low-work approach a good deal of structure presently inoperational, and of idle regulation presently enacted, can be removed; organisational arrangements can be very significantly down-sized. The leading methodological idea is that enough relevant (biodegradable) structure is introduced to resolve organisational problems, but not substantially more. Organisational oversupply and waste is thus avoided. Moreover, much structure that keeps so much environmentally destructive industry in business is likewise shed. Among basic problems for deeper green theory are those of political reorganisation and so of organisation. Evidently institutions, and their types, are critical to such organisation. And a major organisational problem for any putative green society concerns structure', to take a critical case, whether society is centrally organised (concentrated, bureaucratised, hierarchical, large- scale and so on) or decentralised (dispersed, non-hierarchical, small-scale and supposedly beautiful, and so on). This focal problem, to centralise or not to centralise, is sometimes presented as a serious dilemma for concerned green theorists.27 The binary horns of this dilemma are respectively: on the one hom, the pull (or push) to localisation and regionalisation, to non-anonymous smallscale low-impacting environmentally-friendly arrangements, to diffusion of power and dismantling of the incubus of a central state with its crippling costs and unfriendly practices; and on the other horn, the need for continuing and further central income generation and welfare (re)distribution, central regulation and control, and the pressures to environmental reliance upon and use of the central state.28 The dilemma has been trenchantly posed as follows: ... the demands of the Greens sometimes appear contradictory, in seeking increasing environmental regulation and welfare measures... alongside a halt to industrial expansion, the very source of income for the welfare state. Yet the expansion and further centralization of the bureaucratic state apparatus is neither their overt goal nor covert motivation. Quite the contrary. Their genuine long term vision is of a decentralized, steady state society of self-sufficient, relationally autonomous (albeit interlinked) regions.29 departs from standard forms of anarchism in significant respects, not least in planned political organization. In this exercise organization is of the essence. 27 As by Jacobs of The Green Economy, who has posed the problem sharply, as part of an argument however for retaining the central state (and much of present status quo arrangements). 28 Environmental reasons for favouring small-scale bioregional organisation are nicely gathered in McLaughlin, chapter 10. 29 Unknown source. 12 As it happens, not only does the theoretical and utopian literature run both ways, towards and away from centralisation, but so does practice and experience. As to theory, anarchisticallyinclined presentations tend to favour decentralisation, perhaps with some central compensation through federation (thus recent Blueprints, ecotopias, and so on), whereas socialisticallyinclined presentations invariably opt for powerful central states (to control and redistribute grander social programs, etc.). As to practice, there are local councils, community organisations, residents' groups aiming to keep out, or to remove, the state-sponsored nuclear plants, toxic waste incinerators, waste dumps or super-highways, on the one horn; and, on the other, central states blocking, modifying, or regulating local or regionally promoted schemes for large dams (e.g. Tasmania's Franklin), forest exploitation, pulp mills, strip mining, and so on.30 To some extent, the way the problem has often been re-presented, in terms of a dilemma between top-down and bottom-up structure and power transmission, already points towards a theoretical resolution: namely, both, or rather enough of both. But how is this combination to be achieved? An answer does not fall out by pure reason, operating in isolation from other problems. By taking advantage of information gathered from other connected problems, a promising answer can be teased out. Neither standard socialism nor anarchism afford answers, socialism because it leaves the central institution of state intact. But standard anarchism, much more promising, does not resolve the problem either, because federation, as usually explained, does not leave enough structure; it may not even concede sufficient power to delegates to constrain exploitative local communities. A solution to such dilemma lies through a combinational strategy, which includes partial dissolution of the central state, into its actual organisational functions in each region. While removing the state, itself source of several environmental and social problems, and its concentration of power, invariably under environmentally unfriendly control, functional dissolution nonetheless retains its apparently essential services, including (where necessary) those of environmental regulation. Relevant continent-wide functions would persist or be introduced: for example, services controlling inflow into Australia of damaging forms and materials such as toxic wastes and exotic pest species, or regulating outflow from Australia of native wildlife and flora. In part, ecoregional functionalism offers a radical continuation of the separation ofpowers of recent historical process, of church and state, legislature and executive, and so forth. As these functions come to operate separately while remaining coordinated, so would those functional arrangements and institutions dissolving the state. 30 Much turns on the exploitative character of certain local and regional communities, their get-richquick schemes, what they are prepared to do to survive in old or superficially affluent ways, and so on. 13 It is a major illusion of modem political theory that a central state, ceded monopolies on coercion, currency, taxation and so on, is necessary in order to secure adequate supply of public goods, including public order and environmental regulation. To the contrary, the most that appears required, the most that arguments would support, is some network of specific organisations functioning to look after specific kinds of goods and services, those necessary for this or that, that are not otherwise supplied. There is no inherent reason why communities should not institute and regulate specialised bodies coordinated among themselves (by negotiations or, failing that, through recognised arbitrators) to ensure the adequate maintenance or production of various types of public goods, including control of damaging crime. Each such institution could gain community standing from its support base, for instance through achieving democratically-generated recognition. Such an institution would aim to secure execution of its recommendations and decisions by sanctions and like admissible means, and in doing this it could mobilize in co-operation with communities and with other recognised institutions. There are many examples of such institutions operating successfully both regionally and internationally; for instance, those for postal and communicational arrangements, international sporting bodies, international academies and clubs, environmental and consumer organizations.31 4. Selecting satisfactory political arrangements within the span of anarchoid options. Anarchoid options come in a wide variety of forms, including, among others, both right­ leaning individualistic or capitalistic varieties, and left-leaning social or communitarian varieties.32 A suitably generous political pluralism will allow for all these forms, while not encouraging all, as they are of very different merit. For example, some may be neglectful or repressive of some of their inhabitants, or destructive of their environments; others, superior in 31 This passage borrows from the summary in Burnheim 86 p.221 of Burnheim 85. For much fuller elaboration see Burnheim 85 and Sylvan 94. The critical issue of funding administration, without a coercive taxation system, is also broached in these places (and developed in Sylvan 96). The broad proposal is that low-cost administration, much of which would be volunteer, could be funded by rents (there would be no property in land and resources), use charges, and fines. 32 There are many more varieties of political systems than much recent theory has cared to concede. For example, to take right-leaning dimensions, all of individualism, market-organization and capitalism function substantially independently. There can be markets without capitalism (characterised through opportunities to accumulate capital), and conversely, capitalism without free market arrangements. And so on. Most historic and modern systems, upon which political theory has tended inadmissibly to concentrate almost exclusively, are hybrid arrangements with mixes of different elements drawn from both “left” and “right”. 14 these socio-environmental regards, may not be. Dismantling or deconstructing a state does not, on its own, make a sharp selection between alternatives. No doubt the hope is, what can be striven for, that adequate designs are sought and adequate selections made, that inadmissible forms rapidly perish. Those remaining forms that are admissible can be ranked; for instance, they might be graded according to defeasible criteria based upon “pillars” of German green movement such as environmental sensitivity, democratic institutions, and nonviolent practices. While right-leaning anarchoid arrangements could work in theory (e.g. under what is improbable, benevolent capitalism), they are unlikely to succeed in practice, for several reasons. Consider, to illustrate in outline, why that much promoted rightist form, market (or “liberal”) capitalism is unlikely to serve. For one reason, an intrusive state is likely to emerge, with state controlled and state funded standing military and police forces, needed to defend capitalist interests and accumulation, to protect private property, to uphold endemic social inequalities, and to enforce particular market and trade structures, with a substantial and heavy taxation system to fund these forces and a corresponding bureaucracy needed to administer and regulate these and other institutions, such as those required to guarantee that capitalist liabilities are strictly limited and to keep markets (far from self-regulating) unclogged, “free” and competitive. Not only are anarchoid conditions thus violated, so are those for benign green societies. In normal practice, market capitalism tends to be highly environmental exploitative, as modern history demonstrates all too plainly (plainly too it is not alone in this propensity, so are other modem statist systems). Furthermore, given the sorts of humans these systems tend to elevate, and exalt, and the sorts of practices (including extravagant consumption for all that can afford it) they encourage and sometimes even enforce, extensive exploitation is to be expected and liable to persist. At least that is so without, what is thereupon required in a self-reinforcing spiral, further state intervention to distort “natural” capitalistic incentives and institutions, to limit practices on private property (thereby effectively altering the institution), to establish new instruments and commodities such as pollution licences, green investments and futures, and so forth.33 Even though a shallow greenness can also be sprayed upon parts of market capitalism (factories in fields, forest reserves retained for tourists, and so on), and some green showcase exhibits tacked on, environmental depth cannot. Shallowness is both an inevitable consequence of the justifying socio-economic theory, and also an expected best outcome of practice. Accordingly in institutional design it is much more promising to look in democratic left­ leaning directions. For, as argued, it would be rash to gamble upon any bright new dawn of environmentally and socially benign market capitalism, which in any event could easily revert back towards dark industrial times. However, very similar arguments to those sketched could 33 Infiltrated, along with propaganda on behalf of such instruments, is much mythology, including acclaimed environmental virtues of private property and privatization generally. 15 be developed as regards centralised socialism, especially as untempered by democratic procedures. While island communities of a wide range of varieties are naturally not excluded under anarchoidal pluralism, brighter continental prospects lie through modifications of democratic sociality, which appears to permit much of what is sought in design. Under duly decentralized social organization, each requisite function would be carried out by some association of agents comprising operative and support staff (that is, as regards bare formal structure, more or less as now, in institutions like departments and corporations). For direct accountability downwards, and also to ensure desirable separation and dilution of power, upper operatives, those of a directing or steering committee (the nervous system of the organisation), would be democratically selected (from a relevant lower level constituency, and from the whole people of an ecoregion in case of a typical bottom level institution). Note well that selection is not election: election is but one method of democratic selection, and often enough not an altogether satisfactory method. The point of some sort of democratic selection, as a guiding though not invariant rule, is manifold: it is in part to ensure due accountability, in part to prevent unethical accumulation of power in special classes, and in part for reasons that devolve from the very notion of democracy itself. In brief, certain forms of democracy offer promising prospects for green reorganisation, particularly within complementing left-leaning settings where those forms can function in favour of sustainability. However even with an informed democracy in place, there are few guarantees. Some structure, such as limited executive power separated from judicial and administrative functions, needs to be set in place to block or retard worse eventualities (such as mob actions, selection of tyrants, mistreatment of noncitizens and so on). Even then several thorny problems remain for any deeper green political reorganization. 5. Problems of chauvinism and present-time bias in democratic political institutions. In modem usage of the motherhood term democracy, two main lines are visible: included are not only forms of political organisation where ‘power [is presumed to] reside in the people as a whole, and is exercised either directly by them ... or by officers [selected] by them’, but ‘often more vaguely denoting a social state in which all have equal rights, without hereditary or arbitrary differences of rank or privilege’34. It is on the basis of this second line that the call for democracy has operated to remove chauvinism and discrimination of a range of forms: against unpropertied minorities, nonconformists, women, blacks, tribals, and so on. Even so pursuit 34 Oxford English Dictionary entry 1, main entry. These two lines are by no means the only distinctive lines now visible: increasingly conspicuous in calls for “democracy”, notably in Asia, are calls to freedom and rights: not merely for basic legal freedoms such as free assembly, fair process and so on, but for freedom to access information (the “right to know”). 16 of the line, where successful, has not generally conferred adequate representation and rights on several of these groups; but, more important, pursuit has stopped short in its inclusions at certain humans, such as those granted citizenship—though relevant interests of many other creatures and welfare of many of other items may be affected by what those citizens elect to do. While democratic voters can perhaps be entrusted to take some account of those near and dear (within remarkably sharp limits, as the situation of women in many regions still shows), such as those deemed incompetent to vote: the young, deranged, and so on, much evidence reveals that they cannot be relied for what is less near or dear (and indeed are easily herded into casting their votes in accord with a shallow mercantilism). Consider what gets left out, outcasts of even perfect democratic control:• spatially distant agents. For example, the interests of many humans outside USA are much affected by practices of the US government, which however is outside their democratic reach. • temporally distant agents. Since the past is past, it is future agents who would be affected, often drastically affected, by present practices, that matter. Some way of taking due account of future agents, their interests and welfare, is required, even under shallow long-term ecology, that is under lighter green positions. Sustainable development has been regularly diverted into—what is part of what it is about—such a way, an indirect and so far utterly ineffectual way. Much more of importance is also excluded according to deep-green theory: • creatures with interests, other than present human citizens, and • items with welfare, but perhaps lacking interests. The category includes items with intrinsic value, whose value can be effected, made to fare worse or better. A major problem, little addressed, is how to take due account of such democratically excludeds. It is a problem especially for deeper green theories: that deep problem is, so to say, how to obtain satisfactory representation of all that is of value in the natural world? That way of putting it, while a little misleading, does point to a particular type of resolution. Problems special to deep ecopolitical theory, include, that is, issues as to adequacy of representation of items of value outside those humans that are represented, representation of their interests, where they have them, of their welfare otherwise, of favourable conditions for their sustenance, continuation and retention of value. Democracy of discussed modem sorts, whether representative or participative, will not serve these purposes at all satisfactorily. For instance, insofar as party-political representative democracies represent anything (even human “bottom lines” as is sometimes erroneously supposed), they appear to represent primarily interests of certain business-allied elites. Among the issues are of course those as to adequacy of retention and protection of nonhuman items of intrinsic value, tropical forests and their inhabitants and elements for instance. 17 As observed, there is really no organisational alternative to proceeding with and through agents, preferably well-disposed and quality agents. It is hard to guarantee either politically. As agents are but a subclass of what requires democratic representation and what should have its welfare or interests considered, how are the rest to be taken care of satisfactorily? There are significant older responses to like problems, through totems and taboos, guardians and constraints. Looked at one way the problem repeats, more or less, a familiar problem: namely, how in larger constituencies do decision-making agents represent the whole mass of agents and others in the constituency? A main democratic answer, designed to avoid many shortcomings of alternatives, was: by representative means—only “representation” was almost never taken seriously or literally enough. The sorts of considerations that made representation a promising resolution make what is to be proposed—where representation has, in any case, to be expanded —also promising. A key principle is this: all relevant items are to be represented. Relevance criteria enter importantly. Steering committees of lower level institutions among the main decision-making bodies should be appropriately representative of all items whose welfare is affected by their decisions (principle of deepened demanarchy). Under more equitable arrangements, then, some decision-engaged agents will have to be selected as representative of relevant classes of excludeds. Electoral arrangements do not so readily allow for such; sortition, well-designed selection by lot, does.35 Of course, however good the selection processes, however disinterested and well-intentioned the agents selected, some bias may remain. Nonetheless prejudice and maltreatment can be much reduced. As already hinted, deepened representation is not the only promising resolution of the present problem that might be tried. Another, which could be attempted either separately or concurrently, operates through the directive of ecologically sustainable development, requiring as a constraint, not only intergenerational equity but also preservation of items of ecological value.36 It might be suggested that such a directive be made mandatory, applying to all relevant steering committees. But, as already evident, there are severe obstacles to getting such a directive properly implemented. (In prevailing oligarchical circumstances, even very dilute versions are worth pressing for however, as they would offer definite improvements upon what presently happens.) 6. A fundamental dilemma for deeper green organization: democratic or authoritarian procedures? 35 No doubt there are electoral approximations; e.g. candidates in separate classes for each category to be represented. 36 For elaboration of this option, see Sylvan and Bennett 94 and its sequel. 18 There is strictly no logical space for a deeper green democracy, according to Saward for one. For there is a clash, an essential tension, between democratic procedures and deeper green values and commitments, notably to intrinsic values in nature. The main drift of the argument is that green values, which are mandatory for deeper greens, require for their implementation anti­ democratic, indeed authoritarian procedures; otherwise they cannot be guaranteed. This nasty conundrum for green theory over democracy, which the theory typically sponsors, is put in sharper form as follows:37 Democracy concerns procedures, environmentalism certain outcomes. What guarantee can there be that the procedures will deliver the outcomes? What guarantee that democracy would yield a way of protecting environments? However the type of situation is worse than a matter of guarantees, which greens are not really seeking and could not in general expect. (For here as almost everywhere else, things can go wrong. Anarchism especially supplies few absolutes and little certainty.) It is a type of situation, moreover, which effects not only environmentalism but any sort of social and other amelioration, and even democracy itself. For democratic procedures may yield unsatisfactory and even anti-democratic outcomes. Unfortunately there are few or no guarantees that meritorious forms will eventuate or persist. Political history itself copiously illustrates that. But it can be argued theoretically. For example, succession of regimes must occur (owing to finite lifetimes of power-holders, etc.), and in successional transitions deterioration can occur; nor are there effective mechanisms that can exclude decline absolutely. Democratic procedures of certain sorts offer better controls, and better prospects of satisfactory transition than most others available, but even they afford no cast-iron guarantees of adequacy, and they are beset by paradoxes of their own. With inadequate democratic structures plausible scenarios are easily designed where just such outcomes occur, for instance as in what has been called a “paradox of democracy” where a constituency elects an anti-democratic tyrant.38 A concerned attempt is made by Saward to mount a destructive version of such a paradox against deep-green political theory (which he darkly calls ‘dark green’). The version is based upon holism and intrinsic value requirements, coupled with democratic demands, of deeper green theory. In clearest form, the version runs as follows: Holism implies consistency or compatibility. But intrinsic value maintenance and democracy are not compatible, under evident conditions (e.g. democratic procedures result in diminution or destruction of intrinsic value). Firstly, partial confirmation for this explication: 37 Goodin, condensing Saward, p. 168. 38 Such paradoxes of democracy, and variants thereupon, are presented trenchantly by Popper, and presumed nullified in Sylvan and Bennett 90. Improved structures can undoubtedly much reduce the likelihood and problematicness of paradoxical overthrows. 19 [The green imperative] usually contains a number of elements, variously economic, political, social, geographical, religious, and so on. Its force comes partly from the holism it embodies, and partly from its basis in the idea of the ‘intrinsic value’ of nature. Holism implies that the various elements which make up the imperative are compatible. The elements of the imperative gain their importance, and their links with each other, by being referable back to a common, intrinsic value of nature. It is at this point that we can pick up the position of democracy or ‘direct democracy’ in lists of basic values set out by greens. [These goals are the elements of the overall green imperative, and gain their importance from both the holistic nature and intrinsic merit of the values which the imperative represents]39 * As should now be plain, and is becoming plainer, consistency is not an invariant desideratum, and not to be insisted upon; coherence is what is “implied” and what supersedes consistency.40 As more than a century of Hegelian theory should have revealed, there can be inconsistent wholes. A further key assumption in the argument is that guaranteeing that intrinsic value is protected (or like absolutes sustained) will require undemocratic procedures, such as authoritarian ones. An underlying assumption (soon to be rejected, for instance as incorporating an offensive false dichotomy) is that only undemocratic, authoritarian procedures fit with deeper green imperatives or givens.41 Several illustrations are offered of inconsistency of green imperatives with types of democratic procedures—none of which tell, without testing adaptation, specifically against deeper green positions. A first illustration is directed against Porritt: A direct democratic procedure (is not) compatible with imperative goals like ‘local production for local need’, ‘low consumption’, ‘labour-intensive production’, and ‘voluntary simplicity’ (other items from Porritt’s list).42 Against this and other illustrations, it is worth emphasizing goals resemble objectives and targets; goals are goals which are not mandatory and by no means always achieved, especially if the achievers, like present humans, fall short (e.g. in ecological sensitivity) or their organisational means and opportunities are inadequate. Observe too the oppositional attempt to convert or to twist (since it is an up-grading by high redefinition) goals and programs and principles—through ‘imperative goals’ and the like—into ‘imperatives’, ‘prescribed outcomes’, undeniable principles, ultimates. That attempt should be resisted. A second example looks at an alleged 39 G. Saward, p.65; square bracketed sections are taken from an earlier circulated version of this article. 40 See Priest and others. 41 G. Saward, p.63 42 Saward, p.66. 20 contradiction in the programme of the German Green Party. ‘Grassroots democracy’ is one of the four ‘basic principles’ of the party’s ‘global conception’. Another is the ‘ecological’: ‘Proceeding from the laws of nature, and especially from the knowledge that unlimited growth is impossible in a limited system, and ecological policy means understanding ourselves and our environment as part of nature’. In effect, this means that certain outcomes are proscribed from decision-making procedures. Such proscribed outcomes must surely go well beyond any plausible list of outcomes which must be proscribed in the interests of defending a direct democratic decision procedure. Therefore, there is a clear contradiction between elements of the value-set, whereas given the holism the green imperative is based on we would have the right to expect these goals and values to be thoroughly compatible.43 The last charge repeats the critical point already rejected, that holism implies consistency. A further critical point should also be rejected: the flawed inference that ‘certain outcomes are proscribed’. A political party in a democratic system has to be prepared to see its principles, however spendid, overridden, certainly by other parties if they gain or hold political power. There is a misconception too about principles (especially higher level principles) and their roles: ‘principles [too] can only be akin to [givens and] “laws of nature”, against which democratic procedures must inevitably be traded off the board’. Sets of principles, which may themselves turn out to be inconsistent, are hardly akin to natural laws; consider for instance reasons for their revision, procedures for rechecking and revision, and so on. In any case, democratic procedures are not traded away against laws of nature, which they may try to upset or suppress. (Rather effort should be directed at informing the electorate and the like.) To reinforce his case, Saward appeals to other authors who have advanced similar claims (it is like appealing for confirmation of a newspaper report to other newspapers). Boris Frankel accuses Rudolf Bahro of an ‘anti-democratic ’ vision of an ecological society, given that politics as conflict will have no place in a sea of ‘givens’. He sees the dilemma as being similar to that of socialists—deeming certain things as desirable in an ultimate sense, but proclaiming attachment to democracy and the diversity it implies. Ophuls has stated the matter especially clearly. The basic question about politics, he writes, is ‘Is the way we organize our communal life and rule ourselves compatible with ecological imperatives and other natural laws? ... how we run our lives will be increasingly determined by ecological imperatives’44 In an ecological society, enough of the demos (members of democratic constituency) will hold ecological attitudes and vote or select accordingly, almost by definition. Problems of effecting change lie with unecological communities, which may not support ecological principles under instituted democratic procedures (as presently in many places). Principles, and ecological “givens”, stand, they remain ‘desirable in an ultimate sense’, but they are not followed and 43 Saward, p.66. 44 Saward, p.67. Note that only a very streamlined version of Saward’s case is being presented. 21 implemented, while revealed democratic preferences go unchanged. There need be no ‘anti­ democratic vision’, but rather an unecological praxis, which principled greens will work to change. The route is accordingly barred to Say ward’s important conclusions...: that at best direct democracy[, and for that matter indirect forms of democracy,] can only be at or near the bottom of value-lists of greens. A commitment to democracy must clash with core green values which, if taken on board, limit the range of acceptable policy outcomes beyond these self-binding constraints that democracy logically requires.45 What Saward proposes instead is depressingly familiar: pragmatism, jettison intrinsic value. Out therewith go deep-green positions. ... greens should not think in terms of overriding principles or [green] imperatives. Indeed, it suggests that to think in terms of imperatives based on arguments about intrinsic merit is unjustifiable.46 Fortunately the argument developed does not sustain the proposals. There is, to iterate a central point, no internal or latent contradiction between (deep-)green policy objectives and democratic procedures. Rather, green objectives would fail to be achieved without well- disposed decision makers, who may not straightforwardly reflect any “will” of the demos. A logical requirement on a realistic set of political objectives is that there are accessible circumstances where they are realisable, where all elements of the whole would obtain. It should not be required that there are are no situations where they may conflict, become inconsistent. It is certainly not required that they are realised, by whatever means. A community, as variously represented, can choose better or worse. There are many means available, which it may shun (again there are no absolute guarantees), enabling it to choose better, including improved structures, attitudinal change and consciousness raising, and so on. In the end Saward too recognises the popular power of attitudinal change, thereby himself removing his previous imposition of authoritarian means upon greens. There 45 Saward, p.68. The lead-in to Saward’s proposal was clearer in the earlier circulated version, which ended in more precise (and dubious) form: A commitment to democracy must clash with values that are inherent to ecologism—and ecologism is about inherency, intrinsic values, laws of nature and holism. Things—like democracy—that can only have instrumental value must lose out to imperatives backed by inescapable canonical force. 46 Saward, p.75. Of course it is now put in terms of “imperatives”; it would be better expressed simply in terms of (what did not figure in the earlier version) principles, policy objectives or the like. Opposition to deeper green political approaches often derives, as in Saward and in Goodin, from a underlying shallow utilitarianism. The differences concern not only depth; they also concern the rejection of individual interest bases, in favour of welfare bases and holism of deeper approaches. 22 * needs, from a green perspective [and others], to be a change in political culture such that it will be compatible with sustainability. This, of course, is a familiar theme from green writing. How[?] ... It can only be the case that ‘political change will ony occur once people think differently or, more particularly, that sustainable living must be prefaced by sustainable thinking’. By abandoning foundationalist myths of intrinsic merit, greens abandon the implicit arrogance that have made democracy such a tenuous part of green political theory.47 But he overstates the attitudinal point, with ‘only...the case’. People can be politically led (retardation, however, as distinct from genuine advancement, is more familiar); they could just elect a green government which instituted, under permissible democratic methods, sustainable living or the like. Worse still, his final ungrammatical sentence is a complete non-sequitur. Attitudinal change may include coming to appreciate intrinsic merit in natural things other than humans, and seeing through pragmatic utilitarianism. 7. Ecoregional demanarchoid reshaping of Australian political institutions: one beginning. Is such a radical restructuring as that suggested feasible? Initial investigations hold out the hope that major problems for deeper green theory can be solved, at least in theory. Investigations accordingly suggest that the project within the Reshaping Australian Institutions project is viable and worth pursuing. A logical next stage offers sketches for a radical political reorganisation of Australia.48 Evidently there would be many designs (thereby removing facile jeers against “the blueprint”, a part of co-optative strategy for persistence with prevailing statist arrangements). Among the many designs, some few, conforming to favoured principles, would be selected for detailed study. If the study were attempted, most appropriately through systems modellings, then flexibility could be built into modellings, so that even though only a few basic designs were examined, many variations would be feasible. Not only .is systems modelling particularly well suited to modelling network designs; it also further offers prospects for computing simulation and implementation, and even some simulated political experimentation. Furthermore, such modellings begin to give some grasp on the size and 47 Saward, p.77. There are further defects in this passage than those noted in the text. For one, admission of intrinsic merit does not entail foundationalism. For another, such recognition of merit—which is less liable to disturb democracy, or render it tenuous, than adherence to Christianity—need carry no tinges of arrogance; to the contrary, by contrast with humanism it may yield a certain humbleness. 48 Such design, well accomplished, would help considerably in revealing what is possible, thereby providing a seriously neglected contribution to politics, itself sometimes presented, with undue licence, as the art of the possible. 23 complexity of the task (a useful comparison is with World 3 modelling of the on-going “Limits to Growth” project49, or, better, with a regionalized version of it). To get started on such ecoregional design, for Australia, two broad classifications and associated maps and charts are required: • 1. an ecoregional classification, with partitions and overlays, for Australia and its continental shelf. Observe that this classification would be hierarchical, as smaller regions merge into larger regions; but it is a benign hierarchy of levels (it facilitates no accumulation of power or wealth). Observe too that any such classification is far from unique. Plurality has already set in, and a choice of classification (or a few choices) would have to be made, taking due account of political organisational principles and objectives. Fortunately some of the preliminary classificatory work has already been accomplished in Environmental Regionalisations of Australia, where 3 broad classifications are presented and procedures for generating many more given.50 For political purposes further classification attributes (e.g. demographic features) need to be included. Ecoregions provide the basis for spatially linked administrative and community units. (Not all units need be of this sort; many contemporary arrangements are spatially unlinked). At this stage a basic principle of decentralization and distributed and smaller-scale organization can be invoked, namely • subsidiarization: organisational functions should be allowed to fall down to (or to be pushed down to) the lowest level compatible with their satisfactory performance. Thus, for instance, most matters concerning such things as sewerage and primary education would be localized. This subsidiarization principle, drawn from classical anarchism, has been widely adopted in green planning proposals. (It is said to have been applied by the Catholic Church in administration of the Holy Roman Empire, whence the not altogether apt title derives. It is presently being reassessed for use in that successor organisation, united Europe.) No doubt the principle is open to challenge, for instance on grounds of efficiency, that larger size may prove more efficient, of duplication, and so on. But, the objective is not maximization of technological values such as efficiency factors; instead it aims to satisize on a wider framework of values, including holistic social arrangements. Presumably, however, undue duplication of expensive administrative bodies is to be avoided. Coupled with subsidiarization is another principle, • direct accountability downwards: units should answer directly to regional constituencies. This 49 See e.g. Meadows. 50 See Thackway and Cresswell. Rudiments of a politically useful classification begin to emerge on their 30 Group Regionalisation. * 24 .contrasts with prevailing accountability (such as it is) upwards, through some indirect and tenuous, centralized circuiting chain. Naturally much more gets comprehended under accountability, for instance openness of environmental accounting. There are also principles interrelating smaller with larger regions, both bottom-up and topdown (or centre-down) principles. Among these will be • representation of smaller regions in relevant planning institutions of more comprehensive regions. Representation, appropriately regulated, would often replace anarchistic federation, which as observed appears too weak for requisite environmental control. The point needs no labouring that the classifications and principles are open to challenge at every step; for instance, there is nothing rock-hard about the type of ecoregional classification preferred, nor about social functions to be addressed. At a theoretical stage that is unproblematic: there are other (less preferable) models; elaborate your own if you want to and can. In any case, it is to be hoped that a diversity in theory might be to some extent reflected in some diversity in practice—with different regions and continents trying different arrangements, with much less of the sort of cosmopolitan political monoculture that we are presently being harassed toward, with much more resilient political biodiversity. Of course, not all political forms (including stateless types) are equally desirable or satisfactory, and some (including present state examples) are unacceptable. So there are bounds upon diversity. Moreover, what suits one community or region well may not suit another to be satisfactory for it. So too there are limits upon successful transfer of organisational structure; what works in one region may require much modification in another, or may substantially resist transfer. • 2 a social function classification, of those community matters that require explicit organisation at some level. An initial listing can be compiled by consulting Australian metropolitan telephone directories, especially the government sections that used to feature in the front (until a year ago). What results under redesign and reorganisation would, of course, look very different from what is listed. Parliaments, parties and all their supporting apparatus would vanish; the Australian Bureau of Statistics will assume a new significance and independent role, and so on. But which institutions are retained, which adapted, and so on, would depend on further social organisational features, not yet considered here. The result would be a levelled pyramidal structure, a flat-untopped network as depicted in the structural diagram below, not a power hierarchy. 25 Structural diagram: a schematic depiction of organisational structure (with some sample components indicated, but not all their network interlinkages displayed). statistics bureau upper levels: administrative, executive, research ground level: functional selectoral college Australian region (federal) immigration control of materials inflow super­ regions (a to k) interregional transport (local) regions (1 to n) arbitration bureau upper levels rental entitlements office resources income office ground level water systems sewer systems hospital systems region 1 region n While some requisite research has been undertaken upon how the various functional bodies and decision-making committees can be selected and can operate51, insufficient investigation has been made of the interrelations and adequate funding of the bodies and institutions involved — whichever they are! For little such detailed anarchoid modelling has apparently been attempted for any region anywhere. Evidently there is much to be done 51 Thus e.g. Burnheim 85. The present article is not only heavily indebted to Burnheim's work, but overlaps on-going investigations on his part. 26 theoretically. Detailed modellings could bring issues down to earth, without setting things in concrete; no doubt too they would disclose many further problems hidden in the detailing, problems to which anarchoid solutions can however reasonably be expected. Nonetheless comparatively little is likely to be done, unless requisite support is forthcoming, support in the shape of researchers (research volunteers and students) and research infrastructure (from research gifts, donations and the like). For such support, support for investigating its own demise, a state is hardly likely knowingly to supply; nor are its established research institutions. Insofar then as it is done visibly, it will probably have to be accomplished largely outside state-supported and state-supporting infrastructure, such as prominent university projects (like Reshaping Australian Institutions). Fortunately there are now other structures, such as internet and radio communicational channels, that can facilitate interconnections and interchanges of researchers, both regionally and internationally. On these sorts of anarchoid communicational bases, networks of groups interested in elaborating such alternative political modellings, both in theory and in practice, could be formed. Given the dismal state of present political arrangements, almost everywhere terrestial, there is a great need, as a very minimum, for networks of innovative researchers who share such goals.52 Richard Sylvan References. Bello, W., Dark Victory, Pluto Press, London, 1994. Bookchin, M., Remaking Society: Pathways to a Green Future, South End Press, Boston, 1990. Burnheim, J., Is Democracy Possible?, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1985. Burnheim, J., ‘Democracy, nation states and the world system’, New Forms of Democracy, (ed. D. Held and C. Pollitt) London, Sage, 1986, pp.218-239. Carter, A., ‘Towards a green political theory’, in The Politics of Nature. Explorations in green political theory (ed. A. Dobson and P. Lucardie), Routledge, London, 1993, pp.39-62. Goodin, R., Green Political Theory, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1992. Green, G., The New Radicalism: Anarchist or Marxist?, International Publishers, New York, 1971. 52 To echo one referee. My sincere thanks to demanding referees for several helpful suggestions and many improvements. 27 Jacobs, M., The Green Economy: environment, sustainable development, and the politics of the future., Pluto Press, Concord, Mass, 1991. Mackay, H., Reinventing Australia: the mind and mood of Australia in the 90s, Hugh Mackay, Pymble, NSW, Angus & Robertson, 1993. Macphee, I., A new constitution?’ (excerpts from an opening address) NILEFA Newsletter, Griffith University School of Law, June 1993. Marshall, P., Demanding the Impossible: a history of anarchism, London, Harper Collins 1992. Me Laughlin, A., Regarding Nature, SUNY Press, Albany NY., 1993. Meadows D., and others, Beyond the Limits, Chesley Green, Vermont, 1992. Naess, A., Ecology, community and lifestyle (trans, and ed. D. Rothenberg), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1989. Ponting, C., A Green History of the World, Sinclair-Stevenson, London, 1991. Priest, G., Routley, R. and Norman, J. (eds), Paraconsistent Logic, Philosophia Verlag, Munich, 1989. Routley, V. and R., ‘Social theories, self management and environmental problems’, in Environmental Philosophy (ed. D Mannison and others), RSSS, Australian National University, 1980. Saward, M., ‘Green Democracy’, in The Politics of Nature: Explorations in green political theory (ed. A. Dobson and P. Lucardie) Routledge, London, 1993 pp. 63-80. Sylvan, R. and Bennett, D., Utopias, Tao and Deep Ecology, Green Series , RSSS, Australian National University, 1990. Sylvan, R. and Bennett, D., The Greening of Ethics, White Horse Press, Cambridge, 1994. Sylvan, R., ‘Anarchism’, in Contemporary Political Theory (ed. R. Goodin and P.Pettit) Blackwell, Oxford, 1993. Sylvan, R., Green Anarchism, to appear, 1996. Thackway, R. and Cresswell, I.D., Environmental Regionalisations of Australia, Environmental Resources Information Network, Australian National Parks and Wildlife Service, 1992. Tynan, L., The Institute of Advanced Studies, The Australian National University, May 1993.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Box 18, Item 1225: Draft of Problems in deeper green political organization: an Australian perspective on radical institutional change Subject The topic of the resource Printout of draft, dated 29 May 1995. Description An account of the resource One of seven papers digitised from item 1225. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/browse?search=Richard+Sylvan&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bjoiner%5D=and&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=&amp;range=&amp;collection=&amp;type=&amp;user=&amp;tags=&amp;public=&amp;featured=&amp;exhibit=&amp;geolocation-mapped=&amp;geolocation-address=&amp;geolocation-latitude=&amp;geolocation-longitude=&amp;geolocation-radius=10&amp;submit_search=Search+for+items">Richard Sylvan</a> Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived <span class="MuiTypography-root-125 MuiTypography-body2-126">The University of Queensland's <a data-testid="rek-series" href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/records/search?page=1&amp;pageSize=20&amp;sortBy=score&amp;sortDirection=Desc&amp;searchQueryParams%5Brek_series%5D%5Bvalue%5D=Richard+Sylvan+Papers%2C+UQFL291&amp;searchMode=advanced">Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291</a></span>, Box 18, Item 1225 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org">Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy</a> Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1995-05-29 Contributor An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, <a href="https://najtaylor.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Dr. N.A.J. Taylor</a>. Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library. Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource [27] leaves. 20.03 MB. Type The nature or genre of the resource Manuscript Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context <a href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:49579da">https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:49579da</a> Australian National University Office Australian National University Office > Typing Table at End of Desk Box 18: Green Projects in Progress https://www.antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/e1a2873a54fce7557cfbc89ada6c8b1c.pdf cf6cba564af11d9dbcc31c7e0159ae37 PDF Text Text MOVEMENTS New social movements along with, and in partial contrast with, new politics and past­ materialism as a quasi-technical term in political science and sociology. Like the others, it is an ill-defined term. Among the problems is the extreme slackness of identity criteria, so it is too often impossible to know when one has one.1 The terms are regularly introduced as if it was known what was meant (this is a widespread intellectual sin; the legitimate end of Wittgenstein's campaign against technical terms in philosophy). A major problem with the political social science investigations so far is that the classification of movements is too coarse-grained, and that when subclassifications are made there are not in terms of movements. For example, the broad environmental movement, the level movements is sifted down to, jets analysed in a typology, of shades of green, not into submovements. A movement involves action and/ or a diseration to action in a concerted direction by a group of engaged members type of intensional set-like objects OED. ‘series of actions and endevours of a body of persons for special object’ WRONG CATEGORY, otherwise Not bad. What is the movement though? Extent of doctrine socialism/ anarchism without doctrine knowing how without knowing that or theory practice without theory e.g. golf, most stickingls language. Deep ecology attempt to shed doctrine; empasis on movement. Doctrine involved that of sub­ social paradigm (model). Further features of a movement: • a certain duration. An action group that form for a short time purpose, holds a single parade, achieves its objective and dissolves, it not a movement. These are numerous short-lived action groups that do not rate as movement, and which need not be categorised or listed. • a certain integration. of members. Although there is now a widespread push for sustainable development (and attempts by many governments to coopt and neutralise environmental activity in this way), there is no sustainable development movement. That is not just because of the multiplicity of objectives subsumed under the smooth synthesized “objective”, but because there is no due integration, no appropriate organisation of adherents. Deep ecology is now a movement; it was it when Naess first presented it as one. 1 A hyporduct is that post-materialism, usually taken as a single stock-of-affairs, splits into several. �2 Environmental movements in Australia. The Australia-wide environmental organisations are not movements, but there are movements within or associated with them. The big four organisations, of which ACF is still the largest are ACF range of objects Greenpeace branches local Wilderness Society specific object WWOrganisation Friends of the Earth which used to be a significant organisations, and still runs a national journal Chain Reaction, for fullen into decline. All these organisations are presently under pressure from declining membership and declining funding. Advocacy groups • Regionally - linked “advocacy” groups: Some of these groups are spread (e.g. over a whole state); perhaps zeroing in on local issues in campaigns, some are local, sare are in between. Examples include: National Parks, Wilderness Societies, Heritage Groups, Forestry coalitions (e.g. SE forestry coalition which is composed of smaller local movements). Anti­ freeway and public transport groups,... • Non-rigionally-linked groups. These are of course contingently tied to actiosn and campaigns at various locations. Important examples include animal-concerned groups: animal preservation and conservations groups, animal liberation. Practice groups • Lifestyle groups. There are several strands within the broad commune movement, which is alive and for the most part thriving in Australia (by contrast with other countries where is was initiated). • Issue groups, include ^forestry, forest restoration and tree planting groups, such as nationally Greening Australia regionally bush regeneration groups and independently many local planting and restoration schemes from local councils down to ornamental rainforest gardens. Earlier there was a native garden movement, fostered by organisations for growing native plants. • sustainable and organic agriculture groups. There are several different groups, depending on the (production) methods allowed*. Prominent among these is the permaculture (abbreviating “permanent agriculture”) movement, which plans an integrated agrucultural system perannual food producing plants rather than annuals. • alternative energy groups • ‘Spiritual’ with ritual and ceremony, worship of the Earth, including Council of AllBeing, Re Earthly Homage to Gaia. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Draft Papers Description An account of the resource Sylvan's literary executor encountered an archive in which “all his projects were current", since manuscripts were undated and unattributed. Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document MOVEMENTS New social movements along with, and in partial contrast with, new politics and past­ materialism as a quasi-technical term in political science and sociology. Like the others, it is an ill-defined term. Among the problems is the extreme slackness of identity criteria, so it is too often impossible to know when one has one.1 The terms are regularly introduced as if it was known what was meant (this is a widespread intellectual sin; the legitimate end of Wittgenstein's campaign against technical terms in philosophy). A major problem with the political social science investigations so far is that the classification of movements is too coarse-grained, and that when subclassifications are made there are not in terms of movements. For example, the broad environmental movement, the level movements is sifted down to, jets analysed in a typology, of shades of green, not into submovements. A movement involves action and/ or a diseration to action in a concerted direction by a group of engaged members type of intensional set-like objects OED. ‘series of actions and endevours of a body of persons for special object’ WRONG CATEGORY, otherwise Not bad. What is the movement though? Extent of doctrine socialism/ anarchism without doctrine knowing how without knowing that or theory practice without theory e.g. golf, most stickingls language. Deep ecology attempt to shed doctrine; empasis on movement. Doctrine involved that of sub­ social paradigm (model). Further features of a movement: • a certain duration. An action group that form for a short time purpose, holds a single parade, achieves its objective and dissolves, it not a movement. These are numerous short-lived action groups that do not rate as movement, and which need not be categorised or listed. • a certain integration. of members. Although there is now a widespread push for sustainable development (and attempts by many governments to coopt and neutralise environmental activity in this way), there is no sustainable development movement. That is not just because of the multiplicity of objectives subsumed under the smooth synthesized “objective”, but because there is no due integration, no appropriate organisation of adherents. Deep ecology is now a movement; it was it when Naess first presented it as one. 1 A hyporduct is that post-materialism, usually taken as a single stock-of-affairs, splits into several. 2 Environmental movements in Australia. The Australia-wide environmental organisations are not movements, but there are movements within or associated with them. The big four organisations, of which ACF is still the largest are ACF range of objects Greenpeace branches local Wilderness Society specific object WWOrganisation Friends of the Earth which used to be a significant organisations, and still runs a national journal Chain Reaction, for fullen into decline. All these organisations are presently under pressure from declining membership and declining funding. Advocacy groups • Regionally - linked “advocacy” groups: Some of these groups are spread (e.g. over a whole state); perhaps zeroing in on local issues in campaigns, some are local, sare are in between. Examples include: National Parks, Wilderness Societies, Heritage Groups, Forestry coalitions (e.g. SE forestry coalition which is composed of smaller local movements). Anti­ freeway and public transport groups,... • Non-rigionally-linked groups. These are of course contingently tied to actiosn and campaigns at various locations. Important examples include animal-concerned groups: animal preservation and conservations groups, animal liberation. Practice groups • Lifestyle groups. There are several strands within the broad commune movement, which is alive and for the most part thriving in Australia (by contrast with other countries where is was initiated). • Issue groups, include ^forestry, forest restoration and tree planting groups, such as nationally Greening Australia regionally bush regeneration groups and independently many local planting and restoration schemes from local councils down to ornamental rainforest gardens. Earlier there was a native garden movement, fostered by organisations for growing native plants. • sustainable and organic agriculture groups. There are several different groups, depending on the (production) methods allowed*. Prominent among these is the permaculture (abbreviating “permanent agriculture”) movement, which plans an integrated agrucultural system perannual food producing plants rather than annuals. • alternative energy groups • ‘Spiritual’ with ritual and ceremony, worship of the Earth, including Council of AllBeing, Re Earthly Homage to Gaia.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Box 18, Item 1225: Movements Subject The topic of the resource Printout, undated. Description An account of the resource One of seven papers digitised from item 1225. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/browse?search=Richard+Sylvan&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bjoiner%5D=and&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=&amp;range=&amp;collection=&amp;type=&amp;user=&amp;tags=&amp;public=&amp;featured=&amp;exhibit=&amp;geolocation-mapped=&amp;geolocation-address=&amp;geolocation-latitude=&amp;geolocation-longitude=&amp;geolocation-radius=10&amp;submit_search=Search+for+items">Richard Sylvan</a> Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived <span class="MuiTypography-root-125 MuiTypography-body2-126">The University of Queensland's <a data-testid="rek-series" href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/records/search?page=1&amp;pageSize=20&amp;sortBy=score&amp;sortDirection=Desc&amp;searchQueryParams%5Brek_series%5D%5Bvalue%5D=Richard+Sylvan+Papers%2C+UQFL291&amp;searchMode=advanced">Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291</a></span>, Box 18, Item 1225 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org">Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy</a> Contributor An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, <a href="https://najtaylor.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Dr. N.A.J. Taylor</a>. Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library. Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource [2] leaves. 1.37 MB. Type The nature or genre of the resource Manuscript Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context <a href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:3f37666">https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:3f37666</a> Australian National University Office Australian National University Office > Typing Table at End of Desk Box 18: Green Projects in Progress https://www.antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/7ae32c51780962eac9b5d1373ff2ba05.pdf c78446efbe931846b95a3997f6c0e659 PDF Text Text PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS IN DEEP ECOPOLITICAL THEORY: an Australian perspective. ... people are ready for change and the impending debate will result in constitutional change. We should, therefore, explore all options ...T There is growing dissatisfaction with Australia's political institutions, and increasing demand to change them. This demand, hiding co-optative elements, has been initiated and fostered in a conspicuously top-down fashion, by politicians and by academics. There is so far little surge of political enterprise at grass-roots levels, little pressure for the usually very limited changes proposed. Nonetheless, along with apathy, there is widespread popular disenchantment with present political arrangements. There is now an opportunity (although still only a small window therefore no doubt) to put green and radical themes on the agenda for real political change in Australia. That opportunity should not be missed, within Australia, or elsewhere. While the exposition that follows concentrates upon Australia, as a convenient advanced example, much of what is argued and urged applies or adapts elsewhere. 1. Disenchantment with politics, and political proposals for change. There is now evident in Australia, what is variously described as disillusionment and anxiety, cynicism and pessimism about the state of politics—a loss of confidence in it, and a retreat from commitment. Recently anxiety about the nature and quality of Australian politics [has] increased.... Widespread anxiety about the state of politics is based [in part] on an uneasy feeling that, if the parties are not going to stand for some identifiable philosophy, and the leaders are going to be chosen on the basis of their potential as television performers or even as head­ kickers, then the only appropriate response is cynicism. That cynicism is reflected in a turning away from support for the major parties ... and revealed in the attitudes of young Australians ...2 who often cannot be bothered registering to vote, or voting. Lack of confidence is beginning to show not only as cynicism about politicians, but also as doubt about the integrity of Australia's political institutions.3 In a recent survey, ‘62 percent of [Australians] expressed either little or no confidence in the political system. Such a figure accurately reflects the mood of the Australian community’.4 Australian loss offaith in conventional politics is attributed to a mix of factors. A first explanatory factor as regards this disenchantment comes from the changes in politics already remarked (ranging from policy issues to media performers) and from resultant uncertainty. ‘... Hon. Ian Macphee, ‘A new constitution?’. Of course Macphee did not really mean all options, nor even all constitutional options. Furthermore, his claim about preparedness of people for change is incompatible with Mackey’s data (mentioned below) on exhaustion with change. Mackay pp. 174-177. For all the Australian casualness of Mackay's presentation, his sociological findings are nonetheless fairly solidly survey and interview based (if occasionally stretching the data). Ibid, p.178 ZbztZ. �2 the Australian electorate is confused about which party stands for what, and about whether any party has a long-term commitment to any particular point of view’.5 A complex ‘second factor ... concerns the adversarial nature of two-party politics’.6 How can this ‘two party, adversarial approach ... continue to be appropriate when the distinctions between the two parties themselves are so hard to define’? But ‘redefinition of party politics implies the possibility of a redefinition of the whole parliamentary process itself’. Why ‘when parties seem quite capable of stealing each other's policies or of invading each other's traditional philosophical territory, [can not] politicians work together in a more co-operative and harmonious spirit’?7 ‘Adversarial politics may have made sense ... when ... distinctions between the parties were stark and when arguments about principle could be justified; today, the idea that politicians would be arguing over a point of principle or philosophy is almost unthinkable. ... [They] are much more likely to be arguing over matters of personality, prejudice and power than over issues which effect the long-term health of the body politic’.8 ‘The quality of parliamentary debate is regarded not only as a symptom of the adversarial nature of the institution, but also as a symptom either of the poor quality of politicians ..., or of the effect of the system on those who are enmeshed in it’ .9 Unless there is marked improvement in party philosophies, programs and performance, ‘the call to re-examine the nature of the parliamentary process will gather momentum’.1011 A third relevant factor contributing to loss of faith is the impression of Australians that ‘they are overgovemed ’n, with too many expensive bureaucracies and too many houses of parliament. Conflicts between State and Federal parliaments — and between the various State parliaments themselves — are regarded as a particularly unproductive expenditure of political energy, and Australians question whether 15 houses of parliament may be too many for the efficient government of 18 million people. The sheer number of parliaments is often blamed for the problem of too many bureaucracies and for many duplications of bureaucratic and political activity between State and Federal governments. ... Whilst there is little love felt in the Australian community for Canberra and for the idea of more centralised government even that is beginning to appear preferable .... The widespread support for the idea of a republic which emerged during 1992 is closely related to the underlying sense that Australia is overdue for some kind of reexamination of its political institutions, and even the notion of Federation itself. ... As debate about the idea of a republic proceeds ... it has begun to incorporate the idea that 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 Ibid. pp. 178-179. Ibid. The adversarial character of dominant State legal systems is also becoming subject to more and more criticism. It appears likely that significant movement towards different inquiratorial systems will occur, not least because of the huge expense and growing unaffordability of adversarial systems. Ibid. Ibid, p.180. Ibid. p. 179. It is a symptom of both, the latter especially. Ibid. p. 181. lbid. p. 181, itals added. �3 Australian's political structures and systems might be quite significantly reformed.12 Even though the main proposals for change no doubt remain reformist in character, some of them are far-reaching by normal standards. Both the extensive disenchantment with present political arrangements and the felt need for significant change further suggest political times are not normal. Elements for a political paradigm shift are already present, to which radical additions are now feasible. So far there have been, along with normal inertial resistance to change, two main responses to growing pressure for change: political, from politicians, ex-politicians and political commentators, and academic from intellectuals, academic entrepreneurs and academic journalists. By and large, political responses have been grander, more sweeping and vaguer; academic responses more theoretical and cautious, piecemeal and detailed. But there are no grand detailed plans. Under the leading proposal so far for political change, Australia's constitutional monarchy will be displaced by a constitutional republic with its own head of state displacing the monarch, but with perhaps minimal adjustments otherwise. Nonetheless, as a result, republicanism is in the air. Politicians have begun to contemplate other practical reforms, while academics have begun to embroider theories around republicanism and institutional reform. What happens to the Australian federation of states is one of the many unresolved issues presently being debated. The main reason for reform offered by the political camp can be summed up as: changing geopolitical circumstances. The camp tends not to acknowledge what would reflect adversely upon it, the poorness of federal political practice. Rather it tends to attribute popular dissatisfaction to economic circumstances and uncertainties: declining real standards of living, extensive unemployment, persistent recession until recently, problems to be surmounted by full-steam ahead untrammelled economic growth, to be attained by recoupling Australia to the Asian economic express. Meanwhile an orchestrated republican movement can help divert popular political attention from poor political management and a gloomy economic predicament. Much has changed in the century since present antiquated political arrangements were hammered out, arrangements making the newly-fashioned Commonwealth of Australia, politically a federation of states, into a constitutional monarchy coupled to Britain, arrangements of convenience fashioned for very different circumstances. Most non-symbolic linkages with Britain, which has been inching towards a place in a united Europe, have already been severed. Australia has gradually begun to appreciate its geo-political position in the Ibid. p. 181-2. Republican proposals have been circulating for some time. But the cause was finally taken up by prominent politicians, who made it their own, after which it became a popular issue. Mackay's accurate presentation of popular support for political change contrasts drolly with the first part of his book which depicts an Australian populace exhausted by change and longing for the old ease and somnolence. �4 Indian-Pacific region (and the money-making opportunities for a sagging resource-based economy in booming parts of Asia). Whence the main idealistic proposal: for an independent republic, decoupled from Europe, assuming its own (prominent) place in its geo-political regions. In principle at least, place and region begin to assume, or resume, some of their neglected, but historic, significance (however that is not how it is yet seen). Most proposals for constitutional and federal reform fit within that limited idealistic conception. One important proposal, advanced by established political players, their most radical proposal so far, includes abolition of the present states. Such a proposal would clearly represent a welcome step in anarchist directions, were it not regularly offset by the idea of a strengthened central state.13 Supposing this latter unfortunate idea is bracketed for the moment, then what is being seriously considered already starts to look like a much more rational regionalism than what presently prevails. The present states of Australia are undoubtedly an anachronism, based on accidental boundaries of a contingent colonial history. They are ecologically irrational management units, utterly failing to reflect ecological regions. Yet the states possess extensive environmental and other management powers, inappropriate ‘powers which derive from what was largely a political bargaining process conducted a century ago.’ Another effect of inapposite statefederal arrangements, especially ‘funding arrangements, has been to lock out local government and, more importantly, local communities. ... local communities must be given greater control over those decisions of government which effect their lives ...’; the opportunity ‘to design and provide the services which are needed locally.’14 At this stage of the dialectic McPhee slides easily and naturally from localism to regionalism. A glance at the map reveals natural regions for local government on a viable scale [an optimistic idea]. Some cross State boundaries, and I would envisage that State governments would be replaced with regional governments. These would be more akin to larger local governments and would certainly not have the trappings of the States. They should not have parliaments and the expensive, unwieldy and inefficient bureaucracies which characterise our States. They should have a small number of full-time councillors ... Regional governments should be solely accountable to their ratepayers ...15 . So far so good: however McPhee thereupon begins to infiltrate stock (small /) liberal management assumptions. The basic idea to retain is simple: that of ecologically-rational local and regional rearrangement of anachronistic state partitions. But that regionalization should be Anarchists can even rest (if uneasily) with a constitution, so long as it provides for an organisation, Australia Inc. even, sufficiently different from a state and its authoritarian trappings. All quotes in this paragraph are drawn from McPhee. An address along similar lines to the Hon. Ian McPhee, also proposing abolition of the states, was delivered by the former Prime Minister R.G. Hawke. Hawke's speech, by contrast with McPhee's, attracted much media attention, and though facilely dismissed as “unrealistic” by some practicing politicians, appeared to gain a good deal of support. McPhee ibid. �5 greened, as reform should be radicalized. Much has been left off these political agendas for change, not merely environments and habitats of their less prominent or noisy inhabitants, but also such issues as rights and liberties, transformation of antiquated legal and executive frameworks, and so on. Omission of (human) rights is especially remarkable in states such as Australia, whose consititutions astonishingly do not mention at all (what is however often supposed to justify states) individual rights, such rights only being ensured, so far as they are, by indirect routes (statutes regarding treatment of minorities and the like). Nor do the political camps pushing limited change speak of rights or liberties; a very limited conception of adjustments required prevails (though without rights and liberties and a generous public sphere there is little, and little prospect of, justification for a state at all). Accordingly political agendas for change need to be conspicuously broadened, to accommodate a decidedly more ambitious range of constitutional and institutional redesign. 2. A project within a project: radically reshaping Australian institutions. Academic entrepreneurs have also responded quickly to proposals for constitutional and institutional changes. Early to scramble on the bandwagon was the institution to which I am affiliated, the Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University, with its ambitious decade-long project, Reshaping Australian Institutions: Towards and Beyond 2001.16 One small part of this project does connect with the republican push, which no doubt helped inspire it and gain its funding. The academic version of republicanism furnishes an institutional and historic setting, tracing its roots back to ancient Rome, and thereby linking in, what admits much modern adaptation, notions of citizenship and civic virtues. But most of the project is independent of any republican reorganisation. The Reshaping Australian Institutions project is presented in predominantly reformist fashion, unsurprisingly. It is supposed, for instance, to ‘provide major input into evaluation and reform of Australia's institutions’; indeed it is explicitly ‘aimed at contributing to Australian constitutional reform’.17 Nothing however precludes consideration of reshaping or transforming Australian institutions — those of the whole ecological region — in a unreformist and possibly unconstitutional way, in a radical way Admittedly, the rough boundary between reformist and radical routes becomes even more blurred when the constitution of a country is open for possible major reconsideration and much political infrastructure may be altered. Nonetheless, from the perspective of a strong central state, the stock boundary stands intact. For reformist changes would amount to comparative small adjustments leaving it substantially intact. For example, a minimal transformation, of the 16 17 A recent brief description of this two million dollar project, now outlined in several places, is given in Tynan, pp.17-19. Fuller descriptions are available from a main coordinator of the project, J. Braithwaite, Law, RSSS, ANU. One of the many strands (17 at last count) of this project is an environmental (or green) strand. The immediate predecessor of this article was presented in a workshop at RSSS on green political theory, arranged under the project. That accounts for some of the otherwise puzzling structure of what has eventuated. ‘Reshaping Australian institutions: towards and beyond 2001’ in Tynan , p.17, italics added. �6 sort presently much favoured, from constitutional monarchy to Australian republic, though entailing non-negligible constitutional redrafting, need only amend the roles of a few elite power- and position-holders. By contrast, radical changes would substantially alter that strong central state, perhaps (as will be suggested) eliminating it altogether. There are appealing reasons for attempting wider, more radical investigations. For, firstly, there may be more satisfactory institutional structures not accessible, or even visible, along normal constitutional reform routes. Secondly, there is a demand, a small but growing demand from green direction for instance, for radical institutional change. It would be prudent, then, to make some investigation of the options, to assess their prospects. Thirdly, reflection on such structures would certainly be part of a more comprehensive study of and theory of institutional design, which the Reshaping project also presents as an objective. Fourthly, much more controversially, major environmental problems cannot be satisfactorily solved along merely reformist paths.18 A prime reason is this: a central state is ineluctably committed to high levels of economic activity which impact heavily environmentally, characteristically to economic growth of sorts which impact very adversely environmentally, inducing inevitable degradation. Accordingly, there are then, or should be, two bands to the green (or environmental) strand of the restructuring Australian institutions project: not merely an important reformist side, but as well a radical spread. It is part of this underfunded and undersupported radical spread which forms the main object of investigation in what follows, that part that relinquishes present state structures, in favour of more environmentally benign institutions - which no doubt can be designed, even if not readily brought to practical use. In order to reach radical redesign ideas quickly, let us touch only lightly upon some of the more distinctively green reasons for this anarchoid quest (familiar anarchist reasons stand: the illegitimacy of present states; the undesirability and severe disutility of states, and so on.19) As indicated, present states are incompatible with ecologically sustainable practices, because of their heavy unrelenting commitments to shallow economic growth. More generally, standard states and their practices comprise very significant parts of environmental problems, but quite insufficient parts of any solutions. Moreover, states constitute an enormous and destructive drain on regional environments, a feature particularly evident in smaller states which are always looking out for revenue-raising expedients for their own expensive running. Apart from those greens who have recognised the excessive environmental costs of states and their heavy demands on environments, and thus or otherwise have come to recognise the desirability of their withering away, there are many more who have become ambivalent about states, who appreciate their very problematic character and very questionable legitimacy, but do not see yet how to get along altogether without them, or more exactly (to point towards a 18 19 This theme, merely stated here, is argued in detail elsewhere; see esp. Sylvan 95. For a summary of these familiar reasons, see Sylvan 93, and for detail on some, see Burnheim 85 and above all Marshall. �7 resolution) without certain functions that they serve. To point immediately towards a resolution of this crucial problem, the functional dissolution idea advocated is this: that the functioning parts may be separately utilized without the colossal whole. The state is not an organism the functioning parts of which must fail without the whole. So the enormous fat of state can simply be shed, to great advantage. In any event, ‘the State is a social institution’, always ‘within’, Marxists continue, ‘a concrete historic setting’.20 Granted, it is an institution. For an institution in the relevant sense is ‘a society or association for the [organisation or] promotion of some particular object [or function]’.21 Institutions include therefore the state, the central state. So it too is up for reshaping, radical slimming, and possible removal in a concrete historical setting, such as late twentieth century Australia. Ideas and schemes for radical redesign are already available from rich anarchist and socialist sources, those for green design and reshaping from growing and diverse environmental sources. In main part, then, radical ecoredesign is a matter of convivially meeting (not joining) the two, an intersection that favours anarchist inputs. Something of the sort has already been attempted, in an environmentally shallower way, in eco-anarchism, alias social ecology, and in a deeper way, in deep-green social theory.22 Moreover, it could be attempted in other kinds of deeper green theory — itself really a plurality of theories, which however does not itself force radical ecoredesign, though most variants would support it. Thus Naess's “deep ecology” for example, which is not so far politically radical, only strongly reformist, could (and should) be given a radical turn.23 Concentrating upon the radical spread of deeper green theory does not preclude concomitant reformist investigation and activity. Both sides of the green street should be played. Reformist opportunities should of course be pursued - incremental change, social engineering, greening bureaucrats, lobbying politicians, and like activity (but better to cut through all such pleading and obiesance and be rid of politicians and bureaucrats). There are many reformist proposals being advanced for the greening of Australian federal institutions — with but few so far having much impact on practice.24 Nonetheless, more limited, more constrained, proposals of this sort certainly have a better chance of making a difference than radical redesigns, regularly smartly dismissed as “unrealistic” or “utopian”.25 No doubt the Thus, Green p.61, who adds quite wrongly that Proudhon and his disciples do not see it that way ‘but as an abstraction and aberration’. Oxford English Dictionary, adapted. An institution is an organitution. On social ecology, see Bookchin 90, and for information on deep-green social theory, see Sylvan and Bennett 94 and Routley 80. As to the political character of deep ecology, and why it should be turned, see Sylvan and Bennett 94, where an expose of the political theory of Naess's ecosophy is presented. There are many many narrower economic and technological proposals. One of the more interesting wider proposals comes from an Opposition not noted for its green initiatives and commitments, for an overseeing Department of Sustainable Development, a Department that could see to the greening of all federal institutions. Too smartly, as we argue elsewhere (e.g. Sylvan and Bennett 90). �8 normal “reshaping institutions” investigations are rightly focussed upon institutional reform, not upon revolutionary reshaping, where much freer scope for redesign is offered. However the real possibility of radical change should not be excluded; green radicals should be prepared. There have been various opportunities for revolutionary change in Australian history, the last occurring, according to some historians, with the ignominious fall of the Whitlam government. There may well be opportunities again both in the near and intermediate future, especially should some solid work be put into propagating the prospect. In the near term there is economic disarray, social fragmentation, and constitutional destabilization; in the longer term increasing ecological problems and expanding eco-catastrophes loom. For all the spasmodic environmental rhetoric, under present incremental reform comparatively little in the way of radical green change occurs or can be expected. Witness, for comparison, the snail pace of the establishment movement towards a rather minimal grey republicanism in Australia, or differently towards meeting carbon-reduction commitments. It is increasingly doubtful, given prevailing responses to economic difficulties, that present systematic problems confronting Australia will be satisfactorily addressed, environmental problems not least. Furthermore, the sorts of problems concerning reorganising society in deep green ways, problems that provide subsequent topics, would likely not arise. So do imagine that a rather free hand for institutional eco-redesign is somehow dispensed. Also, once it is seen where to go organisationally, it is much easier to discover how to arrive there. 3. A basic problem of structure: central or decentralised organisation. There are large and immediate advantages in taking a problem-oriented way. That way, which will tend towards anarchoid outcomes, will be anarchistically guided in this respect: Unless there is a genuine problem, already causing difficulties or developing, nothing need be done, let things alone let Being be.26 On this non-managerial low-work approach a good deal of structure presently inoperational, and of idle regulation presently enacted, can be removed; organisational arrangements can be very significantly down-sized. The leading methodological idea is that enough relevant (biodegradable) structure is introduced to resolve organisational problems, but not substantially more. Organisational oversupply and waste is thus avoided. Moreover, much structure that keeps so much environmental destructive industry in business is likewise shed. Among basic problems for deep ecopolitical theory are those of political reorganisation and so of organisation. Evidently institutions, and their types, are critical to such organisation. And a major organisational problem for putative green society concerns structure: to take a critical case, whether society is centrally organised (concentrated, bureaucratised, hierarchical, large-scale and so on) or decentralised (dispersed, non-hierarchical, small-scale and supposedly beautiful, and so on). This focal problem, to centralise or not to centralise, is sometimes presented as a serious 26 In vulgar parlance: if it doesn't itch don't scratch (and even if it does, resist). �9 dilemma for concerned green theorists.27 The binary horns of this dilemma are respectively: on the one horn, the pull (or push) to localisation and regionalisation, to non-anonymous smallscale low-impacting environmentally-friendly arrangements, to diffusion of power and dismantling of the incubus of a central state with its crippling costs and unfriendly practices; and on the other horn, the need for continuing and further central income generation and welfare (re-)distribution, central regulation and control, and the pressures to environmental reliance upon and use of the central state.28 The dilemma has been trenchantly posed as follows: ... the demands of the Greens sometimes appear contradictory, in seeking increasing environmental regulation and welfare measures... alongside a halt to industrial expansion, the very source of income for the welfare state. Yet the expansion and further centralization of the bureaucratic state apparatus is neither their overt goal nor covert motivation. Quite the contrary. Their genuine long term vision is of a decentralized, steady state society of self-sufficient, relationally autonomous (albeit interlinked) regions.29 As it happens, not only does the theoretical and utopian literature run both ways, towards and away from centralisation, but so does practice and experience. As to theory, anarchistically-inclined presentations tend to favour decentralisation, perhaps with some central compensation through federation (thus recent Blueprints, ecotopias, and so on), whereas socialistically-inclined presentations invariably opt for powerful central states (to control and redistribute grander social programs, etc.). As to practice, there are local councils, community organisations, residents' groups aiming to keep out, or to remove, the state-sponsored nuclear plants, toxic waste incinerators, waste dumps or super-highways, on the one horn; and, on the other, central states blocking, modifying, or regulating local or regionally promoted schemes for large dams (e.g. Tasmania’s Franklin), forest exploitation, pulp mills, strip mining, and so on.30 To some extent, the way the problem has often been re-presented, in terms of a dilemma between top-down and bottom-up structure and power transmission, already points towards a theoretical resolution: namely, both, or rather enough of both. 31 But how is this combination to be achieved? An answer does not fall out by pure reason, operating in isolation from other 27 28 29 30 31 As by Michael Jacobs of The Green Economy, who has posed the problem sharply, as part of an argument however for retaining the central state (and much of present status quo arrangements). Environmental reasons for favouring small-scale bioregional organisation are nicely gathered in McLaughlin, chapter 10. Fox, Ecopolitics III. Much turns on the exploitative character of certain local and regional communities, their getrich-quick schemes, what they are prepared to do to survive in old or affluent ways, and so on. In the immediately generated simple picture there are four options (familiar from relevant logic): predominantly top-down T both B N neither (e.g. populist anarchy) 1 predominantly bottom-up �10 problems. By taking advantage of information gathered from other connected problems, a promising answer can be teased out. Neither standard socialism nor anarchism afford answers, socialism because it leaves the central institution of state intact. Standard anarchism, much more promising, does not resolve the problem either, because federation, as standardly explained, does not concede sufficient power to representatives, for instance to constrain exploitative local communities. A solution to the dilemma lies through a combinational stragegy, which includes partial dissolution of the central state, into its actual organisational functions in each region. While removing the state, itself source of several environmental and social problems, and its concentration of power, invariably under environmentally unfriendly control, functional dissolution nonetheless retains its apparently essential services, including (where necessary) those of environmental regulation. Relevant continent-wide functions would persist or be introduced: for example, services controlling inflow into Australia of damaging forms and materials such as toxic wastes and exotic pest species, or regulating outflow from Australia of native wildlife and flora. In part, ecoregional functionalism offers a radical continuation of the separation ofpowers of recent historical process, of church and state, legislature and executive, and so forth. As these functions come to operate separately while remaining coordinated, so would those functional arrangements and institutions dissolving the state. It is a major illusion of modern political theory that a central state, ceded monopolies on coercion, currency, taxation and so on, is necessary in order to secure adequate supply of public goods, including public order and environmental regulation. To the contrary, the most that appears required, the most that arguments would support, is some network of specific organisations functioning to look after specific kinds of goods and services, those necessary for this or that, that are not otherwise supplied. There is no inherent reason why communities should not institute and regulate specialised bodies coordinated among themselves (by negotiations or, failing that, through recognised arbitrators) to ensure the adequate maintenance or production of various types of public goods, including control of damaging crime. Each such institution could gain community standing from its support base, for instance through achieving democratically-generated recognition. Such an institution would aim to secure execution of its recommendations and decisions by sanctions and like admissible means, and in doing this it could mobilize in co-operation with communities and with other recognised institutions. There are many examples of such institutions operating successfully both regionally and internationally; for instance, those for postal and communicational arrangements, international sporting bodies and international academies and clubs.32 32 This passage borrows from the summary in Bumheim 86 p.221 of Burnheim 85. For much fuller elaboration see Burnheim 85 and Sylvan 94. �11 4. Technical interlude: Strong family resemblances of ubiquitous problem-generating structures. The skeleton or scaffolding of organisation is structure; it is the frame on which organisation is hung, which organisation fills or fleshes out. The sense of structure, explicating the underlying organic image, implies as much. According, for instance, to the Concise Oxford Dictionary, ‘structure: manner in which a building or organism or other complete whole is constructed, supporting framework or whole of the essential parts of something’. Structure itself is primarily, though not entirely, a matter of relations of elements and parts. Remarkably, the same sort of problem-generating structures occur in a range of seemingly diverse theoretical areas, to be displaced in each case by a similar sort of problem­ dissipating structure. To illustrate, consider an order on a type (or set) of items £1 given by one order relation R, where R may itself depend on item c in Q, i.e. R = Rc. For example, where Q is a system of worlds including your world the ordering R of worlds may depend on your world (and my world could supply a different order). Differently, where Q is a system of values or valued items, R may depend upon your values; and so on. As an order, R is at least transitive, and perhaps either (if like <) reflexive or (if like <) symmetric, on its range. The system <Q, R> is a simple ordered structure, or aframe. (The latter is the term now used in modal logic, where such structures are the bases of models for the logic.) A cap or top t of such a system is an element such that all items of Q bear R to t but which does not itself bear R to any element of Q. (The notion, that of supremum, and likewise maximum, may be similarly defined relative to subsets or types within Q.33) Simple Theorem. There are order structures without tops. Examples are provided by systems (often with much more structure) with no supremum. Here is a simple 6 element example drawn from relevant logical theory. +1 +2 „ - {-2, -1, -0, +0, +1, +2} +0 R = — is as shown by arrows. -0 T = {+0, +1, +2} is a truth component -1 -2 Topologically, several notions of prime political and philosophical cast are tantamount to tops in order structures, including chiefs (top persons in power rankings) hierarchs, grand leaders, centres, absolutes, and objective items. 33 Consider, a pertinent issue, the matter of A supremum t of R (in type T) is an (that) element (of T) such that all elements (of T) bear R to t but which does not itself bear R to anything (in T). �12 central control or authority, where as in the next diagram all elements answer to t. t c Cl C4 a C2 c3 b a3 ai b2 a2 bi Looked at from above t is centre of a network. In the diagram shown, it remains a structure, a flattened hierarchy, when t and relations leading to it are deleted, under decapitation so to say. What this shows in a simple fashion is that there can be ordered structures without central control (and ranging further there can be statelessness, absence of central control, anarchy without “anarchy” or chaos, because there is order), anencephaletic structures. Order, including good order of a range of sorts, does not require central controls, leaders, absolute rulers or arrangements, or similar. Order does not require hierarchy, such hierarchy.34 Let us briefly allude to a much wider philosophical sweep. Related order structural considerations to those that tell against central states, absolute rulers, top authorities as required for satisfactory order, also count against absolutes of other sorts, such as absolute truth (there need be none, as the first diagram above indicates), absolute order (thus R itself is relative to c), and objectives of various sorts, such as objective fact (another supposed absolute), objective value (supplied under an absolute order), and so on. On this broad sweep the following sorts contrast sets emerge:35 centralism elitism statism absolutism realism objectivism in rough contrast respectively with maximizing rationalism decentralism egalitarianism anarchism pluralism nonrealism nonjectivism satisizing rationalism Naturally, these simple structural considerations are only indicative, not decisive. For we might find, as more and more constraints are imposed on structures, as account is taken of 34 35 Part of what seems correct in Bookchin's vendetta against hierarchy can be captured in this way. For a fuller picture see Sylvan 94, chapter 10. �13 actual conditions, that freedom contracts, that structural arrangements are forced towards centralism or absolutism. While such forcing may now look, in the light of a little logic, implausible, it requires further argument that it need not in general eventuate. The argument here against centralism and statism takes these lines: that there is ready design of institutional arrangements for decentralised communities which does not lead back to a central state. The state is organisationally otiose. Organisation is delivered anencephaletically, more specifically through a decentralised functional ecoregionalism. As to how this can be accomplished, a sweep of anarchoidal work discloses.36 5. Problems of chauvinism and present-time bias in democratic political institutions. Under decentralized social organization, each requisite function will be carried out by some association of agents comprising operative and support staff (that is, as regards bare formal structure, more or less as now, in institutions like departments and corporations). For direct accountability downwards, and to ensure separation of power, upper operatives, those of a directing or steering committee (the nervous system of the organisation), will be democratically selected (from a relevant lower level constituency, and from the whole people of an ecoregion in case of a typical bottom level institution). Note well that selection is not election: election is but one method of democratic selection, and often enough not an altogether satisfactory method. The point of some sort of democratic selection, as a guiding not invariant rule, is manifold: it is in part to ensure due accountability, in part to prevent unethical accumulation of power in special classes, and in part for reasons that devolve from the very notion of democracy itself. In modem usage of the motherhood term democracy, two lines are visible: included are not only forms of political organisation where ‘power [is presumed to] reside in the people as a whole, and is exercised either directly by them ... or by officers [selected] by them’, but ‘often more vaguely denoting a social state in which all have equal rights, without hereditary or arbitrary differences of rank or privilege’37. It is on the basis of this second line that the call for democracy has operated to remove chauvinism and discrimination of a range of forms: against unpropertied minorities, nonconformists, women, blacks, tribals, and so on. Even so pursuit of the line, where successful, has not generally conferred adequate representation and rights on several of these groups; but, more important, pursuit has stopped short at certain humans, such as those granted citizenship — though relevant interests of many other creatures and welfare of many of other items may be affected by what those citizens elect to do. While democratic Most of the key elements are already available from political theory relevant to anarchism. As to putting them together see e.g. Burnheim 85 (where demarchy and much else of relevance is explained) and Sylvan 95. Oxford English Dictionary entry 1, main entry. These two lines are not the only distinctive lines now visible: increasingly conspicuous in calls for “democracy” are Asian calls to freedom and rights: not merely for basic legal freedoms such as free assembly, fair process and so on, but for freedom to access information (the “right to know”). �14 voters can perhaps be entrusted to take some account of those near and dear (within remarkably sharp limits, as the situation of women in many regions still shows), such as those deemed incompetent to vote: the young, deranged, and so on, much evidence reveals that they cannot be relied for what is less near or dear (and indeed are easily herded into casting their votes in accord with a shallow mercantilism). Consider what get left out , outcasts of even perfect democratic control:• spatially distant agents. For example, the interests of many humans outside USA are much affected by practices of the US government, which however is outside their democratic reach. • temporally distant agents. Since the past is past, it is future agents who will be affected, often drastically affected, by present practices, that matter. Some way of taking due account of future agents, their interests and welfare, is required, even under shallow long-term ecology, that is under lighter green positions. Sustainable development has been regularly diverted into - what is part of what it is about - such a way, an indirect and so far utterly ineffectual way.38 Much more of importance is also excluded according to deep-green theory: • creatures with interests, other than present human citizens, and • items with welfare, but perhaps lacking interests. The category includes items with intrinsic value, whose value can be effected, made to fare worse or better. A major problem, little addressed, is how to take due account of such democratically excludes. It is a problem especially for deeper green theories: that deep problem is, so to say, how to obtain satisfactory representation of all that is of value in the natural world? That way of putting it, while a little misleading, does point to a particular type of resolution. Problems special to deep ecopolitical theory, include, that is, issues as to adequacy of representation of items of value outside those humans that are represented, representation of their interests, where they have them, of their welfare otherwise, of favourable conditions for their sustenance, continuation and retention of value. Democracy of discussed modern sorts, whether representative or participative, will not serve these purposes at all satisfactorily. For instance, insofar as party-political representative democracies represent anything (even human “bottom lines” as is sometimes erroneously supposed), they appear to represent primarily interests of certain business-allied elites. Among the issues are of course those as to adequacy of retention and protection of nonhuman items of intrinsic value, tropical forests and their inhabitants and elements for instance. There is no organisational alternative to proceeding with and through agents, preferably well-disposed and quality agents. It is hard to guarantee either politically. As agents are but a subclass of what requires democratic representation and what should have its welfare or interests considered, how are the rest to be taken care of satisfactorily? There are significant older responses to like problems, through totems and taboos, guardians and constraints. Looked at one way the problem repeats, more or less, a familiar problem: namely, how in larger 38 See Sylvan and Bennett 93. �15 <r constituencies do decision-making agents represent the whole mass of agents and others in the constituency? A main democratic answer, designed to avoid many shortcomings of alternatives, was: by representative means—only “representation” was almost never taken seriously or literally enough. The sorts of considerations that made representation a promising resolution make what is to be proposed—where representation has, in any case, to be expanded —also promising. A key principle is this: all relevant items are to be represented. Relevance criteria enter importantly. Steering committees of lower level institutions among the main decision-making bodies should be appropriately representative of all items whose welfare is affected by their decisions (principle of deepened demanarchy). Under more equitable arrangements, then, some decision-engaged agents will have to be selected as representative of relevant classes of excludeds. Electoral arrangements do not so readily allow for such; sortition, well-designed selection by lot, does.39 As already hinted, deepened representation is not the only promising resolution of the problem that might be tried. Another, which could be attempted either separately or concurrently, operates through the directive of ecologically sustainable development, requiring as a constraint, not only intergenerational equity but also preservation of items of ecological value.40 It might be suggested that such a directive be made mandatory, applying to all relevant steering committees. But, as already evident, there are severe obstacles to getting such a directive properly implemented. (In present oligarchical circumstances, even very dilute versions are worth pressing for, as they would offer definite improvements upon what presently happens.) 6. Ecoregional demanarchoid reshaping of Australian political institutions: one beginning. Is such a radical restructuring feasible? Initial investigations hold out the hope that major problems for deep ecopolitical theory can be solved, at least in theory. Investigations accordingly suggest that the project within the Reshaping Australian Institutions project is viable and worth pursuing. A logical next stage offers sketches for a radical political reorganisation of Australia.41 Evidently there would be many designs (thereby removing facile jeers against “the blueprint”, a part of co-optative strategy for persistence with prevailing statist arrangements). Among the many designs, some few, conforming to favoured principles, would be selected for detailed study. If the study were attempted, most appropriately through systems modellings, then flexibility could be built into modellings, so that even though only a few basic designs were examined, many variations would be feasible. Not only is systems modelling particularly well suited to modelling network designs; it also further offers prospects for No doubt there are electoral approximations; e.g. candidates in separate classes for each category to be represented. For elaboration of this option, see Sylvan and Bennett 93. Such design, well accomplished, would help considerably in revealing what is possible, thereby providing a seriously neglected contribution to politics, itself sometimes presented, with undue licence, as the art of the possible. �16 computing simulation and implementation, and even some simulated political experimentation. Furthermore, such modellings begin to give some grasp on the size and complexity of the task (a useful comparison is with World 3 modelling of the on-going “Limits to Growth” project42, or, better, with a regionalized version of it). To get started on such ecoregional design, for Australia, two broad classifications and associated maps and charts are required: • 1. an ecoregional classification, with partitions and overlays, for Australia and its continental shelf. Observe that this classification will be hierarchical, as smaller regions merge into larger regions; but it is a benign hierarchy of levels (it facilitates no accumulation of power or wealth). Observe too that any such classification is far from unique. Plurality has already set in, and a choice of classification (or a few choices) will have to be made, taking due account of political organisational principles and objectives. Fortunately some of the preliminary classificatory work has already been accomplished in Environmental Regionalisations of Australia, where 3 broad classifications are presented and procedures for generating many more given.43 For political purposes further classification attributes (e.g. demographic features) need to be included. Ecoregions provide the basis for spatially linked administrative and community units. (Not all units need be of this sort; many contemporary arrangements are spatially unlinked). At this stage a basic principle of decentralization and distributed and smaller-scale organization can be invoked, namely • subsidiarization: organisational functions should be allowed to fall down to (or to be pushed down to) the lowest level compatible with their satisfactory performance. Thus, for instance, most matters concerning such things as sewerage and primary education would be localized. This subsidiarization principle, drawn from classical anarchism, has been widely adopted in green planning proposals. (It is said to have been applied by the Catholic Church in administration of the Holy Roman Empire, whence the not altogether apt title derives. It is presently being reassessed for use in that successor organisation, united Europe.) No doubt the principle is open to challenge, for instance on grounds of efficiency, that larger size may prove more efficient, of duplication, and so on. But, the objective is not maximization of technological values such as efficiency factors; instead it aims to satisize on a wider framework of values, including holistic social arrangements. Presumably, however, undue duplication of expensive administrative bodies is to be avoided. Coupled with subidiarization is another principle, • direct accountability downwards: units should answer directly to regional constituencies. This contrasts with prevailing accountability (such as it is) upwards, through some indirect and tenuous, centralized circuiting chain. 42 43 Naturally much more gets comprehended under See e.g. Meadows. See Thackway and Cresswell. Rudiments of a politically useful classification begin to emerge on their 30 Group Regionalisation. �17 accountability, for instance openness of environmental accounting. Schematic diagram of organisation structure Structural diagram: (with some sample components indicated, but not all their network interlinkages displayed) statistics bureau upper levels: administrative, executive, research ground level: functional selectoral college Australian region (federal) immigration inflow control materials super­ regions (a to k) interregional transport, etc. (local) regions (1 to n) upper levels arbitration bureau rental entitlements office resources income office ground level water systems sewer systems hospital systems region 1 region n There are also principles interrelating smaller with larger regions, both bottom-up and top-down (or centre down) principles. Among these will be • representation of smaller regions in relevant planning institutions of more comprehensive regions. Representation, appropriately regulated, will often replace anarchistic federation, which as observed appears too weak for requisite environmental control. The point needs no labouring that the classifications and principles are open to challenge at every step; for instance, there is nothing rock-hard about the type of ecoregional classification preferred, nor about social functions to be addressed. At a theoretical stage that is unproblematic: there are other (less preferable) models; elaborate your own if you want to and �18 can. In any case, it is to be hoped that a diversity in theory might be to some extent reflected in some diversity in practice—with different regions and continents trying different arrangements, with much less of the sort of cosmopolitan political monoculture that we are presently being harassed toward, with much more resilient political biodiversity. • 2 a social function classification, of those community matters that require explicit organisation at some level. An initial listing can be compiled by consulting Australian metropolitan telephone directories, especially the government sections that used to feature in the front (until a year ago). What results under redesign and reorganisation will, of course, look very different from what is listed. Parliaments, parties and all their supporting apparatus will vanish; the Australian Bureau of Statistics will assume a new significance and independent role, and so on. But which institutions are retained, which adapted, and so on, will depend on further social organisational features, not yet considered here. The result will be a levelled pyramidal structure, a flat-untopped network, not a power hierarchy. While some requisite research has been undertaken upon how the various functional bodies and decision-making committees can be selected and can operate44, insufficient investigation has been made of the interrelations and adequate fundings of the bodies and institutions involved — whichever they are! For little such detailed anarchoid modelling has apparently been attempted for any region anywhere. Evidently there is much to be done theoretically. Detailed modellings would bring issues down to earth, without concretizing them; no doubt too they would disclose many further problems hidden in the detailing, problems to which anarchoid solutions can reasonably be expected. But comparatively little is likely to be done, unless requisite support is forthcoming, support in the shape of researchers (research volunteers) and research infrastructure (from research gifts). For such support, for investigating its own demise, a state is hardly likely knowingly to supply; nor are its established research institutions. Insofar then as it is done visibly, it will probably have to be accomplished largely outside state-supported and state-supporting infrastructure, such as prominent university projects. Richard Sylvan References. Bookchin, M., Remaking Society: Pathways to a Green Future, South End Press, Boston, 1990. Burnheim, J., Is Democracy Possible?, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1985. Burnheim, J., ‘Democracy, nation states and the world system’, New Forms of Democracy, (ed. D. Held and C. Pollitt) London, Sage, 1986, pp.218-239. 44 Thus e.g. Burnheim 85. The present article is not only heavily indebted to Burnheim's work, but overlaps on-going investigations on his part. �19 Fox, W., in Ecopolitics III, Hamilton, New Zealand. Green, G., The New Radicalism: Anarchist or Marxist?, International Publishers, New York, 1971. Jacobs, M., The Green Economy: environment, sustainable development, and the politics of the future., Pluto Press, Concord, Mass, 1991. Mackay, H., Reinventing Australia: the mind and mood of Australia in the 90s, Hugh Mackay, Pymble, NSW, Angus & Robertson, 1993. Macphee, I., ‘A new constitution?' (excerpts from an opening address) NILEFA Newsletter, Griffith University School of Law, June 1993. Marshall, P., Demanding the Impossible: a history of anarchism, London, Harper Collins 1992. Me Laughlin, A., Regarding Nature, SUNY Press, Albany NY., 1993. Meadows D., and others, Beyond the Limits, Chesley Green, Vermont, 1992. Naess, A., Ecology, community and lifestyle (trans, and ed. D. Rothenberg), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1989. Routley, V. and R., ‘Social theories, self management and environmental problems’, in Environmental Philosophy (ed. D Mannison and others), RSSS, Australian National University, 1980. Sylvan, R. and Bennett, D., Utopias, Tao and Deep Ecology, Green Series , RSSS, Australian National University, 1990. Sylvan, R. and Bennett, D., The Greening of Ethics, White Horse Press, Cambridge, 1994. Sylvan, R., ‘Anarchism’, in Contemporary Political Theory (ed. R. Goodin and P.Pettit) Blackwell, Oxford, 1993. Sylvan, R., Green Anarchism, to appear, 1995. Sylvan, R., Deep Plurallism, University of Edinburgh Press, 1994. Thackway, R. and Cresswell, I.D., Environmental Regionalisations of Australia, Environmental Resources Information Network, Australian National Parks and Wildlife Service, 1992. Tynan, L., The Institute of Advanced Studies, The Australian National University, May 1993. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Draft Papers Description An account of the resource Sylvan's literary executor encountered an archive in which “all his projects were current", since manuscripts were undated and unattributed. Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS IN DEEP ECOPOLITICAL THEORY: an Australian perspective. ... people are ready for change and the impending debate will result in constitutional change. We should, therefore, explore all options ...T There is growing dissatisfaction with Australia's political institutions, and increasing demand to change them. This demand, hiding co-optative elements, has been initiated and fostered in a conspicuously top-down fashion, by politicians and by academics. There is so far little surge of political enterprise at grass-roots levels, little pressure for the usually very limited changes proposed. Nonetheless, along with apathy, there is widespread popular disenchantment with present political arrangements. There is now an opportunity (although still only a small window therefore no doubt) to put green and radical themes on the agenda for real political change in Australia. That opportunity should not be missed, within Australia, or elsewhere. While the exposition that follows concentrates upon Australia, as a convenient advanced example, much of what is argued and urged applies or adapts elsewhere. 1. Disenchantment with politics, and political proposals for change. There is now evident in Australia, what is variously described as disillusionment and anxiety, cynicism and pessimism about the state of politics—a loss of confidence in it, and a retreat from commitment. Recently anxiety about the nature and quality of Australian politics [has] increased.... Widespread anxiety about the state of politics is based [in part] on an uneasy feeling that, if the parties are not going to stand for some identifiable philosophy, and the leaders are going to be chosen on the basis of their potential as television performers or even as head­ kickers, then the only appropriate response is cynicism. That cynicism is reflected in a turning away from support for the major parties ... and revealed in the attitudes of young Australians ...2 who often cannot be bothered registering to vote, or voting. Lack of confidence is beginning to show not only as cynicism about politicians, but also as doubt about the integrity of Australia's political institutions.3 In a recent survey, ‘62 percent of [Australians] expressed either little or no confidence in the political system. Such a figure accurately reflects the mood of the Australian community’.4 Australian loss offaith in conventional politics is attributed to a mix of factors. A first explanatory factor as regards this disenchantment comes from the changes in politics already remarked (ranging from policy issues to media performers) and from resultant uncertainty. ‘... Hon. Ian Macphee, ‘A new constitution?’. Of course Macphee did not really mean all options, nor even all constitutional options. Furthermore, his claim about preparedness of people for change is incompatible with Mackey’s data (mentioned below) on exhaustion with change. Mackay pp. 174-177. For all the Australian casualness of Mackay's presentation, his sociological findings are nonetheless fairly solidly survey and interview based (if occasionally stretching the data). Ibid, p.178 ZbztZ. 2 the Australian electorate is confused about which party stands for what, and about whether any party has a long-term commitment to any particular point of view’.5 A complex ‘second factor ... concerns the adversarial nature of two-party politics’.6 How can this ‘two party, adversarial approach ... continue to be appropriate when the distinctions between the two parties themselves are so hard to define’? But ‘redefinition of party politics implies the possibility of a redefinition of the whole parliamentary process itself’. Why ‘when parties seem quite capable of stealing each other's policies or of invading each other's traditional philosophical territory, [can not] politicians work together in a more co-operative and harmonious spirit’?7 ‘Adversarial politics may have made sense ... when ... distinctions between the parties were stark and when arguments about principle could be justified; today, the idea that politicians would be arguing over a point of principle or philosophy is almost unthinkable. ... [They] are much more likely to be arguing over matters of personality, prejudice and power than over issues which effect the long-term health of the body politic’.8 ‘The quality of parliamentary debate is regarded not only as a symptom of the adversarial nature of the institution, but also as a symptom either of the poor quality of politicians ..., or of the effect of the system on those who are enmeshed in it’ .9 Unless there is marked improvement in party philosophies, programs and performance, ‘the call to re-examine the nature of the parliamentary process will gather momentum’.1011 A third relevant factor contributing to loss of faith is the impression of Australians that ‘they are overgovemed ’n, with too many expensive bureaucracies and too many houses of parliament. Conflicts between State and Federal parliaments — and between the various State parliaments themselves — are regarded as a particularly unproductive expenditure of political energy, and Australians question whether 15 houses of parliament may be too many for the efficient government of 18 million people. The sheer number of parliaments is often blamed for the problem of too many bureaucracies and for many duplications of bureaucratic and political activity between State and Federal governments. ... Whilst there is little love felt in the Australian community for Canberra and for the idea of more centralised government even that is beginning to appear preferable .... The widespread support for the idea of a republic which emerged during 1992 is closely related to the underlying sense that Australia is overdue for some kind of reexamination of its political institutions, and even the notion of Federation itself. ... As debate about the idea of a republic proceeds ... it has begun to incorporate the idea that 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 Ibid. pp. 178-179. Ibid. The adversarial character of dominant State legal systems is also becoming subject to more and more criticism. It appears likely that significant movement towards different inquiratorial systems will occur, not least because of the huge expense and growing unaffordability of adversarial systems. Ibid. Ibid, p.180. Ibid. p. 179. It is a symptom of both, the latter especially. Ibid. p. 181. lbid. p. 181, itals added. 3 Australian's political structures and systems might be quite significantly reformed.12 Even though the main proposals for change no doubt remain reformist in character, some of them are far-reaching by normal standards. Both the extensive disenchantment with present political arrangements and the felt need for significant change further suggest political times are not normal. Elements for a political paradigm shift are already present, to which radical additions are now feasible. So far there have been, along with normal inertial resistance to change, two main responses to growing pressure for change: political, from politicians, ex-politicians and political commentators, and academic from intellectuals, academic entrepreneurs and academic journalists. By and large, political responses have been grander, more sweeping and vaguer; academic responses more theoretical and cautious, piecemeal and detailed. But there are no grand detailed plans. Under the leading proposal so far for political change, Australia's constitutional monarchy will be displaced by a constitutional republic with its own head of state displacing the monarch, but with perhaps minimal adjustments otherwise. Nonetheless, as a result, republicanism is in the air. Politicians have begun to contemplate other practical reforms, while academics have begun to embroider theories around republicanism and institutional reform. What happens to the Australian federation of states is one of the many unresolved issues presently being debated. The main reason for reform offered by the political camp can be summed up as: changing geopolitical circumstances. The camp tends not to acknowledge what would reflect adversely upon it, the poorness of federal political practice. Rather it tends to attribute popular dissatisfaction to economic circumstances and uncertainties: declining real standards of living, extensive unemployment, persistent recession until recently, problems to be surmounted by full-steam ahead untrammelled economic growth, to be attained by recoupling Australia to the Asian economic express. Meanwhile an orchestrated republican movement can help divert popular political attention from poor political management and a gloomy economic predicament. Much has changed in the century since present antiquated political arrangements were hammered out, arrangements making the newly-fashioned Commonwealth of Australia, politically a federation of states, into a constitutional monarchy coupled to Britain, arrangements of convenience fashioned for very different circumstances. Most non-symbolic linkages with Britain, which has been inching towards a place in a united Europe, have already been severed. Australia has gradually begun to appreciate its geo-political position in the Ibid. p. 181-2. Republican proposals have been circulating for some time. But the cause was finally taken up by prominent politicians, who made it their own, after which it became a popular issue. Mackay's accurate presentation of popular support for political change contrasts drolly with the first part of his book which depicts an Australian populace exhausted by change and longing for the old ease and somnolence. 4 Indian-Pacific region (and the money-making opportunities for a sagging resource-based economy in booming parts of Asia). Whence the main idealistic proposal: for an independent republic, decoupled from Europe, assuming its own (prominent) place in its geo-political regions. In principle at least, place and region begin to assume, or resume, some of their neglected, but historic, significance (however that is not how it is yet seen). Most proposals for constitutional and federal reform fit within that limited idealistic conception. One important proposal, advanced by established political players, their most radical proposal so far, includes abolition of the present states. Such a proposal would clearly represent a welcome step in anarchist directions, were it not regularly offset by the idea of a strengthened central state.13 Supposing this latter unfortunate idea is bracketed for the moment, then what is being seriously considered already starts to look like a much more rational regionalism than what presently prevails. The present states of Australia are undoubtedly an anachronism, based on accidental boundaries of a contingent colonial history. They are ecologically irrational management units, utterly failing to reflect ecological regions. Yet the states possess extensive environmental and other management powers, inappropriate ‘powers which derive from what was largely a political bargaining process conducted a century ago.’ Another effect of inapposite statefederal arrangements, especially ‘funding arrangements, has been to lock out local government and, more importantly, local communities. ... local communities must be given greater control over those decisions of government which effect their lives ...’; the opportunity ‘to design and provide the services which are needed locally.’14 At this stage of the dialectic McPhee slides easily and naturally from localism to regionalism. A glance at the map reveals natural regions for local government on a viable scale [an optimistic idea]. Some cross State boundaries, and I would envisage that State governments would be replaced with regional governments. These would be more akin to larger local governments and would certainly not have the trappings of the States. They should not have parliaments and the expensive, unwieldy and inefficient bureaucracies which characterise our States. They should have a small number of full-time councillors ... Regional governments should be solely accountable to their ratepayers ...15 . So far so good: however McPhee thereupon begins to infiltrate stock (small /) liberal management assumptions. The basic idea to retain is simple: that of ecologically-rational local and regional rearrangement of anachronistic state partitions. But that regionalization should be Anarchists can even rest (if uneasily) with a constitution, so long as it provides for an organisation, Australia Inc. even, sufficiently different from a state and its authoritarian trappings. All quotes in this paragraph are drawn from McPhee. An address along similar lines to the Hon. Ian McPhee, also proposing abolition of the states, was delivered by the former Prime Minister R.G. Hawke. Hawke's speech, by contrast with McPhee's, attracted much media attention, and though facilely dismissed as “unrealistic” by some practicing politicians, appeared to gain a good deal of support. McPhee ibid. 5 greened, as reform should be radicalized. Much has been left off these political agendas for change, not merely environments and habitats of their less prominent or noisy inhabitants, but also such issues as rights and liberties, transformation of antiquated legal and executive frameworks, and so on. Omission of (human) rights is especially remarkable in states such as Australia, whose consititutions astonishingly do not mention at all (what is however often supposed to justify states) individual rights, such rights only being ensured, so far as they are, by indirect routes (statutes regarding treatment of minorities and the like). Nor do the political camps pushing limited change speak of rights or liberties; a very limited conception of adjustments required prevails (though without rights and liberties and a generous public sphere there is little, and little prospect of, justification for a state at all). Accordingly political agendas for change need to be conspicuously broadened, to accommodate a decidedly more ambitious range of constitutional and institutional redesign. 2. A project within a project: radically reshaping Australian institutions. Academic entrepreneurs have also responded quickly to proposals for constitutional and institutional changes. Early to scramble on the bandwagon was the institution to which I am affiliated, the Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University, with its ambitious decade-long project, Reshaping Australian Institutions: Towards and Beyond 2001.16 One small part of this project does connect with the republican push, which no doubt helped inspire it and gain its funding. The academic version of republicanism furnishes an institutional and historic setting, tracing its roots back to ancient Rome, and thereby linking in, what admits much modern adaptation, notions of citizenship and civic virtues. But most of the project is independent of any republican reorganisation. The Reshaping Australian Institutions project is presented in predominantly reformist fashion, unsurprisingly. It is supposed, for instance, to ‘provide major input into evaluation and reform of Australia's institutions’; indeed it is explicitly ‘aimed at contributing to Australian constitutional reform’.17 Nothing however precludes consideration of reshaping or transforming Australian institutions — those of the whole ecological region — in a unreformist and possibly unconstitutional way, in a radical way Admittedly, the rough boundary between reformist and radical routes becomes even more blurred when the constitution of a country is open for possible major reconsideration and much political infrastructure may be altered. Nonetheless, from the perspective of a strong central state, the stock boundary stands intact. For reformist changes would amount to comparative small adjustments leaving it substantially intact. For example, a minimal transformation, of the 16 17 A recent brief description of this two million dollar project, now outlined in several places, is given in Tynan, pp.17-19. Fuller descriptions are available from a main coordinator of the project, J. Braithwaite, Law, RSSS, ANU. One of the many strands (17 at last count) of this project is an environmental (or green) strand. The immediate predecessor of this article was presented in a workshop at RSSS on green political theory, arranged under the project. That accounts for some of the otherwise puzzling structure of what has eventuated. ‘Reshaping Australian institutions: towards and beyond 2001’ in Tynan , p.17, italics added. 6 sort presently much favoured, from constitutional monarchy to Australian republic, though entailing non-negligible constitutional redrafting, need only amend the roles of a few elite power- and position-holders. By contrast, radical changes would substantially alter that strong central state, perhaps (as will be suggested) eliminating it altogether. There are appealing reasons for attempting wider, more radical investigations. For, firstly, there may be more satisfactory institutional structures not accessible, or even visible, along normal constitutional reform routes. Secondly, there is a demand, a small but growing demand from green direction for instance, for radical institutional change. It would be prudent, then, to make some investigation of the options, to assess their prospects. Thirdly, reflection on such structures would certainly be part of a more comprehensive study of and theory of institutional design, which the Reshaping project also presents as an objective. Fourthly, much more controversially, major environmental problems cannot be satisfactorily solved along merely reformist paths.18 A prime reason is this: a central state is ineluctably committed to high levels of economic activity which impact heavily environmentally, characteristically to economic growth of sorts which impact very adversely environmentally, inducing inevitable degradation. Accordingly, there are then, or should be, two bands to the green (or environmental) strand of the restructuring Australian institutions project: not merely an important reformist side, but as well a radical spread. It is part of this underfunded and undersupported radical spread which forms the main object of investigation in what follows, that part that relinquishes present state structures, in favour of more environmentally benign institutions - which no doubt can be designed, even if not readily brought to practical use. In order to reach radical redesign ideas quickly, let us touch only lightly upon some of the more distinctively green reasons for this anarchoid quest (familiar anarchist reasons stand: the illegitimacy of present states; the undesirability and severe disutility of states, and so on.19) As indicated, present states are incompatible with ecologically sustainable practices, because of their heavy unrelenting commitments to shallow economic growth. More generally, standard states and their practices comprise very significant parts of environmental problems, but quite insufficient parts of any solutions. Moreover, states constitute an enormous and destructive drain on regional environments, a feature particularly evident in smaller states which are always looking out for revenue-raising expedients for their own expensive running. Apart from those greens who have recognised the excessive environmental costs of states and their heavy demands on environments, and thus or otherwise have come to recognise the desirability of their withering away, there are many more who have become ambivalent about states, who appreciate their very problematic character and very questionable legitimacy, but do not see yet how to get along altogether without them, or more exactly (to point towards a 18 19 This theme, merely stated here, is argued in detail elsewhere; see esp. Sylvan 95. For a summary of these familiar reasons, see Sylvan 93, and for detail on some, see Burnheim 85 and above all Marshall. 7 resolution) without certain functions that they serve. To point immediately towards a resolution of this crucial problem, the functional dissolution idea advocated is this: that the functioning parts may be separately utilized without the colossal whole. The state is not an organism the functioning parts of which must fail without the whole. So the enormous fat of state can simply be shed, to great advantage. In any event, ‘the State is a social institution’, always ‘within’, Marxists continue, ‘a concrete historic setting’.20 Granted, it is an institution. For an institution in the relevant sense is ‘a society or association for the [organisation or] promotion of some particular object [or function]’.21 Institutions include therefore the state, the central state. So it too is up for reshaping, radical slimming, and possible removal in a concrete historical setting, such as late twentieth century Australia. Ideas and schemes for radical redesign are already available from rich anarchist and socialist sources, those for green design and reshaping from growing and diverse environmental sources. In main part, then, radical ecoredesign is a matter of convivially meeting (not joining) the two, an intersection that favours anarchist inputs. Something of the sort has already been attempted, in an environmentally shallower way, in eco-anarchism, alias social ecology, and in a deeper way, in deep-green social theory.22 Moreover, it could be attempted in other kinds of deeper green theory — itself really a plurality of theories, which however does not itself force radical ecoredesign, though most variants would support it. Thus Naess's “deep ecology” for example, which is not so far politically radical, only strongly reformist, could (and should) be given a radical turn.23 Concentrating upon the radical spread of deeper green theory does not preclude concomitant reformist investigation and activity. Both sides of the green street should be played. Reformist opportunities should of course be pursued - incremental change, social engineering, greening bureaucrats, lobbying politicians, and like activity (but better to cut through all such pleading and obiesance and be rid of politicians and bureaucrats). There are many reformist proposals being advanced for the greening of Australian federal institutions — with but few so far having much impact on practice.24 Nonetheless, more limited, more constrained, proposals of this sort certainly have a better chance of making a difference than radical redesigns, regularly smartly dismissed as “unrealistic” or “utopian”.25 No doubt the Thus, Green p.61, who adds quite wrongly that Proudhon and his disciples do not see it that way ‘but as an abstraction and aberration’. Oxford English Dictionary, adapted. An institution is an organitution. On social ecology, see Bookchin 90, and for information on deep-green social theory, see Sylvan and Bennett 94 and Routley 80. As to the political character of deep ecology, and why it should be turned, see Sylvan and Bennett 94, where an expose of the political theory of Naess's ecosophy is presented. There are many many narrower economic and technological proposals. One of the more interesting wider proposals comes from an Opposition not noted for its green initiatives and commitments, for an overseeing Department of Sustainable Development, a Department that could see to the greening of all federal institutions. Too smartly, as we argue elsewhere (e.g. Sylvan and Bennett 90). 8 normal “reshaping institutions” investigations are rightly focussed upon institutional reform, not upon revolutionary reshaping, where much freer scope for redesign is offered. However the real possibility of radical change should not be excluded; green radicals should be prepared. There have been various opportunities for revolutionary change in Australian history, the last occurring, according to some historians, with the ignominious fall of the Whitlam government. There may well be opportunities again both in the near and intermediate future, especially should some solid work be put into propagating the prospect. In the near term there is economic disarray, social fragmentation, and constitutional destabilization; in the longer term increasing ecological problems and expanding eco-catastrophes loom. For all the spasmodic environmental rhetoric, under present incremental reform comparatively little in the way of radical green change occurs or can be expected. Witness, for comparison, the snail pace of the establishment movement towards a rather minimal grey republicanism in Australia, or differently towards meeting carbon-reduction commitments. It is increasingly doubtful, given prevailing responses to economic difficulties, that present systematic problems confronting Australia will be satisfactorily addressed, environmental problems not least. Furthermore, the sorts of problems concerning reorganising society in deep green ways, problems that provide subsequent topics, would likely not arise. So do imagine that a rather free hand for institutional eco-redesign is somehow dispensed. Also, once it is seen where to go organisationally, it is much easier to discover how to arrive there. 3. A basic problem of structure: central or decentralised organisation. There are large and immediate advantages in taking a problem-oriented way. That way, which will tend towards anarchoid outcomes, will be anarchistically guided in this respect: Unless there is a genuine problem, already causing difficulties or developing, nothing need be done, let things alone let Being be.26 On this non-managerial low-work approach a good deal of structure presently inoperational, and of idle regulation presently enacted, can be removed; organisational arrangements can be very significantly down-sized. The leading methodological idea is that enough relevant (biodegradable) structure is introduced to resolve organisational problems, but not substantially more. Organisational oversupply and waste is thus avoided. Moreover, much structure that keeps so much environmental destructive industry in business is likewise shed. Among basic problems for deep ecopolitical theory are those of political reorganisation and so of organisation. Evidently institutions, and their types, are critical to such organisation. And a major organisational problem for putative green society concerns structure: to take a critical case, whether society is centrally organised (concentrated, bureaucratised, hierarchical, large-scale and so on) or decentralised (dispersed, non-hierarchical, small-scale and supposedly beautiful, and so on). This focal problem, to centralise or not to centralise, is sometimes presented as a serious 26 In vulgar parlance: if it doesn't itch don't scratch (and even if it does, resist). 9 dilemma for concerned green theorists.27 The binary horns of this dilemma are respectively: on the one horn, the pull (or push) to localisation and regionalisation, to non-anonymous smallscale low-impacting environmentally-friendly arrangements, to diffusion of power and dismantling of the incubus of a central state with its crippling costs and unfriendly practices; and on the other horn, the need for continuing and further central income generation and welfare (re-)distribution, central regulation and control, and the pressures to environmental reliance upon and use of the central state.28 The dilemma has been trenchantly posed as follows: ... the demands of the Greens sometimes appear contradictory, in seeking increasing environmental regulation and welfare measures... alongside a halt to industrial expansion, the very source of income for the welfare state. Yet the expansion and further centralization of the bureaucratic state apparatus is neither their overt goal nor covert motivation. Quite the contrary. Their genuine long term vision is of a decentralized, steady state society of self-sufficient, relationally autonomous (albeit interlinked) regions.29 As it happens, not only does the theoretical and utopian literature run both ways, towards and away from centralisation, but so does practice and experience. As to theory, anarchistically-inclined presentations tend to favour decentralisation, perhaps with some central compensation through federation (thus recent Blueprints, ecotopias, and so on), whereas socialistically-inclined presentations invariably opt for powerful central states (to control and redistribute grander social programs, etc.). As to practice, there are local councils, community organisations, residents' groups aiming to keep out, or to remove, the state-sponsored nuclear plants, toxic waste incinerators, waste dumps or super-highways, on the one horn; and, on the other, central states blocking, modifying, or regulating local or regionally promoted schemes for large dams (e.g. Tasmania’s Franklin), forest exploitation, pulp mills, strip mining, and so on.30 To some extent, the way the problem has often been re-presented, in terms of a dilemma between top-down and bottom-up structure and power transmission, already points towards a theoretical resolution: namely, both, or rather enough of both. 31 But how is this combination to be achieved? An answer does not fall out by pure reason, operating in isolation from other 27 28 29 30 31 As by Michael Jacobs of The Green Economy, who has posed the problem sharply, as part of an argument however for retaining the central state (and much of present status quo arrangements). Environmental reasons for favouring small-scale bioregional organisation are nicely gathered in McLaughlin, chapter 10. Fox, Ecopolitics III. Much turns on the exploitative character of certain local and regional communities, their getrich-quick schemes, what they are prepared to do to survive in old or affluent ways, and so on. In the immediately generated simple picture there are four options (familiar from relevant logic): predominantly top-down T both B N neither (e.g. populist anarchy) 1 predominantly bottom-up 10 problems. By taking advantage of information gathered from other connected problems, a promising answer can be teased out. Neither standard socialism nor anarchism afford answers, socialism because it leaves the central institution of state intact. Standard anarchism, much more promising, does not resolve the problem either, because federation, as standardly explained, does not concede sufficient power to representatives, for instance to constrain exploitative local communities. A solution to the dilemma lies through a combinational stragegy, which includes partial dissolution of the central state, into its actual organisational functions in each region. While removing the state, itself source of several environmental and social problems, and its concentration of power, invariably under environmentally unfriendly control, functional dissolution nonetheless retains its apparently essential services, including (where necessary) those of environmental regulation. Relevant continent-wide functions would persist or be introduced: for example, services controlling inflow into Australia of damaging forms and materials such as toxic wastes and exotic pest species, or regulating outflow from Australia of native wildlife and flora. In part, ecoregional functionalism offers a radical continuation of the separation ofpowers of recent historical process, of church and state, legislature and executive, and so forth. As these functions come to operate separately while remaining coordinated, so would those functional arrangements and institutions dissolving the state. It is a major illusion of modern political theory that a central state, ceded monopolies on coercion, currency, taxation and so on, is necessary in order to secure adequate supply of public goods, including public order and environmental regulation. To the contrary, the most that appears required, the most that arguments would support, is some network of specific organisations functioning to look after specific kinds of goods and services, those necessary for this or that, that are not otherwise supplied. There is no inherent reason why communities should not institute and regulate specialised bodies coordinated among themselves (by negotiations or, failing that, through recognised arbitrators) to ensure the adequate maintenance or production of various types of public goods, including control of damaging crime. Each such institution could gain community standing from its support base, for instance through achieving democratically-generated recognition. Such an institution would aim to secure execution of its recommendations and decisions by sanctions and like admissible means, and in doing this it could mobilize in co-operation with communities and with other recognised institutions. There are many examples of such institutions operating successfully both regionally and internationally; for instance, those for postal and communicational arrangements, international sporting bodies and international academies and clubs.32 32 This passage borrows from the summary in Bumheim 86 p.221 of Burnheim 85. For much fuller elaboration see Burnheim 85 and Sylvan 94. 11 4. Technical interlude: Strong family resemblances of ubiquitous problem-generating structures. The skeleton or scaffolding of organisation is structure; it is the frame on which organisation is hung, which organisation fills or fleshes out. The sense of structure, explicating the underlying organic image, implies as much. According, for instance, to the Concise Oxford Dictionary, ‘structure: manner in which a building or organism or other complete whole is constructed, supporting framework or whole of the essential parts of something’. Structure itself is primarily, though not entirely, a matter of relations of elements and parts. Remarkably, the same sort of problem-generating structures occur in a range of seemingly diverse theoretical areas, to be displaced in each case by a similar sort of problem­ dissipating structure. To illustrate, consider an order on a type (or set) of items £1 given by one order relation R, where R may itself depend on item c in Q, i.e. R = Rc. For example, where Q is a system of worlds including your world the ordering R of worlds may depend on your world (and my world could supply a different order). Differently, where Q is a system of values or valued items, R may depend upon your values; and so on. As an order, R is at least transitive, and perhaps either (if like <) reflexive or (if like <) symmetric, on its range. The system <Q, R> is a simple ordered structure, or aframe. (The latter is the term now used in modal logic, where such structures are the bases of models for the logic.) A cap or top t of such a system is an element such that all items of Q bear R to t but which does not itself bear R to any element of Q. (The notion, that of supremum, and likewise maximum, may be similarly defined relative to subsets or types within Q.33) Simple Theorem. There are order structures without tops. Examples are provided by systems (often with much more structure) with no supremum. Here is a simple 6 element example drawn from relevant logical theory. +1 +2 „ - {-2, -1, -0, +0, +1, +2} +0 R = — is as shown by arrows. -0 T = {+0, +1, +2} is a truth component -1 -2 Topologically, several notions of prime political and philosophical cast are tantamount to tops in order structures, including chiefs (top persons in power rankings) hierarchs, grand leaders, centres, absolutes, and objective items. 33 Consider, a pertinent issue, the matter of A supremum t of R (in type T) is an (that) element (of T) such that all elements (of T) bear R to t but which does not itself bear R to anything (in T). 12 central control or authority, where as in the next diagram all elements answer to t. t c Cl C4 a C2 c3 b a3 ai b2 a2 bi Looked at from above t is centre of a network. In the diagram shown, it remains a structure, a flattened hierarchy, when t and relations leading to it are deleted, under decapitation so to say. What this shows in a simple fashion is that there can be ordered structures without central control (and ranging further there can be statelessness, absence of central control, anarchy without “anarchy” or chaos, because there is order), anencephaletic structures. Order, including good order of a range of sorts, does not require central controls, leaders, absolute rulers or arrangements, or similar. Order does not require hierarchy, such hierarchy.34 Let us briefly allude to a much wider philosophical sweep. Related order structural considerations to those that tell against central states, absolute rulers, top authorities as required for satisfactory order, also count against absolutes of other sorts, such as absolute truth (there need be none, as the first diagram above indicates), absolute order (thus R itself is relative to c), and objectives of various sorts, such as objective fact (another supposed absolute), objective value (supplied under an absolute order), and so on. On this broad sweep the following sorts contrast sets emerge:35 centralism elitism statism absolutism realism objectivism in rough contrast respectively with maximizing rationalism decentralism egalitarianism anarchism pluralism nonrealism nonjectivism satisizing rationalism Naturally, these simple structural considerations are only indicative, not decisive. For we might find, as more and more constraints are imposed on structures, as account is taken of 34 35 Part of what seems correct in Bookchin's vendetta against hierarchy can be captured in this way. For a fuller picture see Sylvan 94, chapter 10. 13 actual conditions, that freedom contracts, that structural arrangements are forced towards centralism or absolutism. While such forcing may now look, in the light of a little logic, implausible, it requires further argument that it need not in general eventuate. The argument here against centralism and statism takes these lines: that there is ready design of institutional arrangements for decentralised communities which does not lead back to a central state. The state is organisationally otiose. Organisation is delivered anencephaletically, more specifically through a decentralised functional ecoregionalism. As to how this can be accomplished, a sweep of anarchoidal work discloses.36 5. Problems of chauvinism and present-time bias in democratic political institutions. Under decentralized social organization, each requisite function will be carried out by some association of agents comprising operative and support staff (that is, as regards bare formal structure, more or less as now, in institutions like departments and corporations). For direct accountability downwards, and to ensure separation of power, upper operatives, those of a directing or steering committee (the nervous system of the organisation), will be democratically selected (from a relevant lower level constituency, and from the whole people of an ecoregion in case of a typical bottom level institution). Note well that selection is not election: election is but one method of democratic selection, and often enough not an altogether satisfactory method. The point of some sort of democratic selection, as a guiding not invariant rule, is manifold: it is in part to ensure due accountability, in part to prevent unethical accumulation of power in special classes, and in part for reasons that devolve from the very notion of democracy itself. In modem usage of the motherhood term democracy, two lines are visible: included are not only forms of political organisation where ‘power [is presumed to] reside in the people as a whole, and is exercised either directly by them ... or by officers [selected] by them’, but ‘often more vaguely denoting a social state in which all have equal rights, without hereditary or arbitrary differences of rank or privilege’37. It is on the basis of this second line that the call for democracy has operated to remove chauvinism and discrimination of a range of forms: against unpropertied minorities, nonconformists, women, blacks, tribals, and so on. Even so pursuit of the line, where successful, has not generally conferred adequate representation and rights on several of these groups; but, more important, pursuit has stopped short at certain humans, such as those granted citizenship — though relevant interests of many other creatures and welfare of many of other items may be affected by what those citizens elect to do. While democratic Most of the key elements are already available from political theory relevant to anarchism. As to putting them together see e.g. Burnheim 85 (where demarchy and much else of relevance is explained) and Sylvan 95. Oxford English Dictionary entry 1, main entry. These two lines are not the only distinctive lines now visible: increasingly conspicuous in calls for “democracy” are Asian calls to freedom and rights: not merely for basic legal freedoms such as free assembly, fair process and so on, but for freedom to access information (the “right to know”). 14 voters can perhaps be entrusted to take some account of those near and dear (within remarkably sharp limits, as the situation of women in many regions still shows), such as those deemed incompetent to vote: the young, deranged, and so on, much evidence reveals that they cannot be relied for what is less near or dear (and indeed are easily herded into casting their votes in accord with a shallow mercantilism). Consider what get left out , outcasts of even perfect democratic control:• spatially distant agents. For example, the interests of many humans outside USA are much affected by practices of the US government, which however is outside their democratic reach. • temporally distant agents. Since the past is past, it is future agents who will be affected, often drastically affected, by present practices, that matter. Some way of taking due account of future agents, their interests and welfare, is required, even under shallow long-term ecology, that is under lighter green positions. Sustainable development has been regularly diverted into - what is part of what it is about - such a way, an indirect and so far utterly ineffectual way.38 Much more of importance is also excluded according to deep-green theory: • creatures with interests, other than present human citizens, and • items with welfare, but perhaps lacking interests. The category includes items with intrinsic value, whose value can be effected, made to fare worse or better. A major problem, little addressed, is how to take due account of such democratically excludes. It is a problem especially for deeper green theories: that deep problem is, so to say, how to obtain satisfactory representation of all that is of value in the natural world? That way of putting it, while a little misleading, does point to a particular type of resolution. Problems special to deep ecopolitical theory, include, that is, issues as to adequacy of representation of items of value outside those humans that are represented, representation of their interests, where they have them, of their welfare otherwise, of favourable conditions for their sustenance, continuation and retention of value. Democracy of discussed modern sorts, whether representative or participative, will not serve these purposes at all satisfactorily. For instance, insofar as party-political representative democracies represent anything (even human “bottom lines” as is sometimes erroneously supposed), they appear to represent primarily interests of certain business-allied elites. Among the issues are of course those as to adequacy of retention and protection of nonhuman items of intrinsic value, tropical forests and their inhabitants and elements for instance. There is no organisational alternative to proceeding with and through agents, preferably well-disposed and quality agents. It is hard to guarantee either politically. As agents are but a subclass of what requires democratic representation and what should have its welfare or interests considered, how are the rest to be taken care of satisfactorily? There are significant older responses to like problems, through totems and taboos, guardians and constraints. Looked at one way the problem repeats, more or less, a familiar problem: namely, how in larger 38 See Sylvan and Bennett 93. 15 <r constituencies do decision-making agents represent the whole mass of agents and others in the constituency? A main democratic answer, designed to avoid many shortcomings of alternatives, was: by representative means—only “representation” was almost never taken seriously or literally enough. The sorts of considerations that made representation a promising resolution make what is to be proposed—where representation has, in any case, to be expanded —also promising. A key principle is this: all relevant items are to be represented. Relevance criteria enter importantly. Steering committees of lower level institutions among the main decision-making bodies should be appropriately representative of all items whose welfare is affected by their decisions (principle of deepened demanarchy). Under more equitable arrangements, then, some decision-engaged agents will have to be selected as representative of relevant classes of excludeds. Electoral arrangements do not so readily allow for such; sortition, well-designed selection by lot, does.39 As already hinted, deepened representation is not the only promising resolution of the problem that might be tried. Another, which could be attempted either separately or concurrently, operates through the directive of ecologically sustainable development, requiring as a constraint, not only intergenerational equity but also preservation of items of ecological value.40 It might be suggested that such a directive be made mandatory, applying to all relevant steering committees. But, as already evident, there are severe obstacles to getting such a directive properly implemented. (In present oligarchical circumstances, even very dilute versions are worth pressing for, as they would offer definite improvements upon what presently happens.) 6. Ecoregional demanarchoid reshaping of Australian political institutions: one beginning. Is such a radical restructuring feasible? Initial investigations hold out the hope that major problems for deep ecopolitical theory can be solved, at least in theory. Investigations accordingly suggest that the project within the Reshaping Australian Institutions project is viable and worth pursuing. A logical next stage offers sketches for a radical political reorganisation of Australia.41 Evidently there would be many designs (thereby removing facile jeers against “the blueprint”, a part of co-optative strategy for persistence with prevailing statist arrangements). Among the many designs, some few, conforming to favoured principles, would be selected for detailed study. If the study were attempted, most appropriately through systems modellings, then flexibility could be built into modellings, so that even though only a few basic designs were examined, many variations would be feasible. Not only is systems modelling particularly well suited to modelling network designs; it also further offers prospects for No doubt there are electoral approximations; e.g. candidates in separate classes for each category to be represented. For elaboration of this option, see Sylvan and Bennett 93. Such design, well accomplished, would help considerably in revealing what is possible, thereby providing a seriously neglected contribution to politics, itself sometimes presented, with undue licence, as the art of the possible. 16 computing simulation and implementation, and even some simulated political experimentation. Furthermore, such modellings begin to give some grasp on the size and complexity of the task (a useful comparison is with World 3 modelling of the on-going “Limits to Growth” project42, or, better, with a regionalized version of it). To get started on such ecoregional design, for Australia, two broad classifications and associated maps and charts are required: • 1. an ecoregional classification, with partitions and overlays, for Australia and its continental shelf. Observe that this classification will be hierarchical, as smaller regions merge into larger regions; but it is a benign hierarchy of levels (it facilitates no accumulation of power or wealth). Observe too that any such classification is far from unique. Plurality has already set in, and a choice of classification (or a few choices) will have to be made, taking due account of political organisational principles and objectives. Fortunately some of the preliminary classificatory work has already been accomplished in Environmental Regionalisations of Australia, where 3 broad classifications are presented and procedures for generating many more given.43 For political purposes further classification attributes (e.g. demographic features) need to be included. Ecoregions provide the basis for spatially linked administrative and community units. (Not all units need be of this sort; many contemporary arrangements are spatially unlinked). At this stage a basic principle of decentralization and distributed and smaller-scale organization can be invoked, namely • subsidiarization: organisational functions should be allowed to fall down to (or to be pushed down to) the lowest level compatible with their satisfactory performance. Thus, for instance, most matters concerning such things as sewerage and primary education would be localized. This subsidiarization principle, drawn from classical anarchism, has been widely adopted in green planning proposals. (It is said to have been applied by the Catholic Church in administration of the Holy Roman Empire, whence the not altogether apt title derives. It is presently being reassessed for use in that successor organisation, united Europe.) No doubt the principle is open to challenge, for instance on grounds of efficiency, that larger size may prove more efficient, of duplication, and so on. But, the objective is not maximization of technological values such as efficiency factors; instead it aims to satisize on a wider framework of values, including holistic social arrangements. Presumably, however, undue duplication of expensive administrative bodies is to be avoided. Coupled with subidiarization is another principle, • direct accountability downwards: units should answer directly to regional constituencies. This contrasts with prevailing accountability (such as it is) upwards, through some indirect and tenuous, centralized circuiting chain. 42 43 Naturally much more gets comprehended under See e.g. Meadows. See Thackway and Cresswell. Rudiments of a politically useful classification begin to emerge on their 30 Group Regionalisation. 17 accountability, for instance openness of environmental accounting. Schematic diagram of organisation structure Structural diagram: (with some sample components indicated, but not all their network interlinkages displayed) statistics bureau upper levels: administrative, executive, research ground level: functional selectoral college Australian region (federal) immigration inflow control materials super­ regions (a to k) interregional transport, etc. (local) regions (1 to n) upper levels arbitration bureau rental entitlements office resources income office ground level water systems sewer systems hospital systems region 1 region n There are also principles interrelating smaller with larger regions, both bottom-up and top-down (or centre down) principles. Among these will be • representation of smaller regions in relevant planning institutions of more comprehensive regions. Representation, appropriately regulated, will often replace anarchistic federation, which as observed appears too weak for requisite environmental control. The point needs no labouring that the classifications and principles are open to challenge at every step; for instance, there is nothing rock-hard about the type of ecoregional classification preferred, nor about social functions to be addressed. At a theoretical stage that is unproblematic: there are other (less preferable) models; elaborate your own if you want to and 18 can. In any case, it is to be hoped that a diversity in theory might be to some extent reflected in some diversity in practice—with different regions and continents trying different arrangements, with much less of the sort of cosmopolitan political monoculture that we are presently being harassed toward, with much more resilient political biodiversity. • 2 a social function classification, of those community matters that require explicit organisation at some level. An initial listing can be compiled by consulting Australian metropolitan telephone directories, especially the government sections that used to feature in the front (until a year ago). What results under redesign and reorganisation will, of course, look very different from what is listed. Parliaments, parties and all their supporting apparatus will vanish; the Australian Bureau of Statistics will assume a new significance and independent role, and so on. But which institutions are retained, which adapted, and so on, will depend on further social organisational features, not yet considered here. The result will be a levelled pyramidal structure, a flat-untopped network, not a power hierarchy. While some requisite research has been undertaken upon how the various functional bodies and decision-making committees can be selected and can operate44, insufficient investigation has been made of the interrelations and adequate fundings of the bodies and institutions involved — whichever they are! For little such detailed anarchoid modelling has apparently been attempted for any region anywhere. Evidently there is much to be done theoretically. Detailed modellings would bring issues down to earth, without concretizing them; no doubt too they would disclose many further problems hidden in the detailing, problems to which anarchoid solutions can reasonably be expected. But comparatively little is likely to be done, unless requisite support is forthcoming, support in the shape of researchers (research volunteers) and research infrastructure (from research gifts). For such support, for investigating its own demise, a state is hardly likely knowingly to supply; nor are its established research institutions. Insofar then as it is done visibly, it will probably have to be accomplished largely outside state-supported and state-supporting infrastructure, such as prominent university projects. Richard Sylvan References. Bookchin, M., Remaking Society: Pathways to a Green Future, South End Press, Boston, 1990. Burnheim, J., Is Democracy Possible?, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1985. Burnheim, J., ‘Democracy, nation states and the world system’, New Forms of Democracy, (ed. D. Held and C. Pollitt) London, Sage, 1986, pp.218-239. 44 Thus e.g. Burnheim 85. The present article is not only heavily indebted to Burnheim's work, but overlaps on-going investigations on his part. 19 Fox, W., in Ecopolitics III, Hamilton, New Zealand. Green, G., The New Radicalism: Anarchist or Marxist?, International Publishers, New York, 1971. Jacobs, M., The Green Economy: environment, sustainable development, and the politics of the future., Pluto Press, Concord, Mass, 1991. Mackay, H., Reinventing Australia: the mind and mood of Australia in the 90s, Hugh Mackay, Pymble, NSW, Angus & Robertson, 1993. Macphee, I., ‘A new constitution?' (excerpts from an opening address) NILEFA Newsletter, Griffith University School of Law, June 1993. Marshall, P., Demanding the Impossible: a history of anarchism, London, Harper Collins 1992. Me Laughlin, A., Regarding Nature, SUNY Press, Albany NY., 1993. Meadows D., and others, Beyond the Limits, Chesley Green, Vermont, 1992. Naess, A., Ecology, community and lifestyle (trans, and ed. D. Rothenberg), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1989. Routley, V. and R., ‘Social theories, self management and environmental problems’, in Environmental Philosophy (ed. D Mannison and others), RSSS, Australian National University, 1980. Sylvan, R. and Bennett, D., Utopias, Tao and Deep Ecology, Green Series , RSSS, Australian National University, 1990. Sylvan, R. and Bennett, D., The Greening of Ethics, White Horse Press, Cambridge, 1994. Sylvan, R., ‘Anarchism’, in Contemporary Political Theory (ed. R. Goodin and P.Pettit) Blackwell, Oxford, 1993. Sylvan, R., Green Anarchism, to appear, 1995. Sylvan, R., Deep Plurallism, University of Edinburgh Press, 1994. Thackway, R. and Cresswell, I.D., Environmental Regionalisations of Australia, Environmental Resources Information Network, Australian National Parks and Wildlife Service, 1992. Tynan, L., The Institute of Advanced Studies, The Australian National University, May 1993.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Box 18, Item 1225: Draft of Problems in deeper green political organization: an Australian perspective on radical institutional change Subject The topic of the resource Printout of draft, undated. Description An account of the resource One of seven papers digitised from item 1225. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/browse?search=Richard+Sylvan&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bjoiner%5D=and&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=&amp;range=&amp;collection=&amp;type=&amp;user=&amp;tags=&amp;public=&amp;featured=&amp;exhibit=&amp;geolocation-mapped=&amp;geolocation-address=&amp;geolocation-latitude=&amp;geolocation-longitude=&amp;geolocation-radius=10&amp;submit_search=Search+for+items">Richard Sylvan</a> Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived <span class="MuiTypography-root-125 MuiTypography-body2-126">The University of Queensland's <a data-testid="rek-series" href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/records/search?page=1&amp;pageSize=20&amp;sortBy=score&amp;sortDirection=Desc&amp;searchQueryParams%5Brek_series%5D%5Bvalue%5D=Richard+Sylvan+Papers%2C+UQFL291&amp;searchMode=advanced">Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291</a></span>, Box 18, Item 1225 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org">Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy</a> Contributor An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, <a href="https://najtaylor.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Dr. N.A.J. Taylor</a>. Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library. Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource [19] leaves. 15.08 MB. Type The nature or genre of the resource Manuscript Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context <a href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:aacfac4">https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:aacfac4</a> https://www.antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/0676c48af777c619b101988ff9a41178.pdf 53eba82362d3d0a5d4703f83b8621f45 PDF Text Text RATIONAL DECISION THEORY WITHOUT PARADOXES The uniform strategy applied to remove paradoxes in several other arenas - implication, confirmation, conditionality, explanation, logic itself — will be adapted to defuse all the usual paradoxes vexing supposedly rational decision theory. That strategy comprises, essentially, changing the underlying logic (which is the source of central rationality principles of logical— type) to a modest relevant logic. It yields two important components: removal of irrelevance, particularly in derivatives of the logical theory, for instance in this case probability and preference theory; and reduction of excessive strength, not merely in the logical theory and its derivatives, but especially in this case in maximization principles. Decision theory hitherto has been, virtually without exception, classical: it has unquestioningly assumed classical principles of consistency and maximality. Well it might be claimed that these principles - which derive from the very classical Great Chain of Being - serve, with but few further impeccable principles, to deliver classical logic, its derivatives such as standard probability theory, and much else. The universality of these formative principles is however a myth, one of the pervasive myths of modem rationality (see MR). 1. Common (i.e. equivalent) consequences arguments, and Allais' paradox. Common consequences arguments depend upon the substitution of common, i.e. equivalent, consequences. It is evident that what substitutions are permitted will depend not merely upon admissible logical substitution principles, but above all upon the underlying notion of equivalence. A basic substitution principle takes the form A<-*B, F(A) / F(B) (S<->). It yields, as derived cases, such further inference principles as A<->B f(A) = n / f(B) = n and A~B / G(A) = G(B), given requisite vocabulary. But critical features of the resulting logics and theories depend upon what the co-implication relation, <-», permits; its strength. Over dinner at a Paris cafe one evening during an international colloquium on risky choice, Allais asked Savage a pair of now very famous questions. First Allais asked Savage to choose between prospects A and B: A complete certainty of a good outcome $lm B 0.10 probability of a very good outcome $5m 0.89 probability of a good outcome 0.01 probability of a bad outcome $lm $0. Savage preferred A to B. Allais next asked him to choose between prospects C and D: C 0.89 probability of bad outcome $0 �D 2 0.11 probability of good outcome $lm 0.90 probability of bad outcome $0 0.10 probability of very good outcome $5m. Savage preferred D to C. Subsequent researchers quickly discovered that most of their seemingly rational subjects responded initially to Allais' pair of questions as Savage had.1 The problem with these responses is that they violate classical expected utility theory, and are accordingly classically irrational, that theory affording necessary conditions for “rationality”. Therein too lies the Allais' paradox, that seemingly rational responses by seemingly rational subjects are ruled irrational by the theory. For conjoint preferences of A over B and D over C contradict the deliverance of the dominant theory, which specifies what is rational here, according to which C over D is equivalent to A over B, and so the conjoint preferences are inconsistent. The situation certainly supplies a paradox in the standard sense, that preanalytic claims (that so and so definitely does not imply, does not confirm, such and such) are contradicted by results of the dominant theory covering those claims. The (too) brief argument to inconsistency of the seemingly rational preference rankings under the dominant theory runs as follows:- Where U symbolizes the relevant utility function (to which probabilities are immaterial in the present context), the preference for A over B can be represented as (1) U($lm) > 0.10U(%5m) + 0.89U($lm) + 0.01U($0), Now it is assumed that an equivalent ranking - sometimes said to be the same ranking - results by either adding common consequences to each side of the inequality (introduction or combination rule) or by deleting common consequences from either side of the inequality (elimination or deletion rule). These procedures are after all distinguishing features of dominant expected utility theory.2 Let us then add the common consequences of a 0.89 probability of receiving $0, and delete the common consequences of a 0.89 probability of receiving $lm. That is, putting these operations together, let us add to each side of (1) the combination 1 The presentation follows Pope's adjustment of Allais' original account (in his 79 p.354). For detail of subsequent research on initial responses, see also Pope 89. (Note however that Pope tends to conflate acting rationally with acting consistently.) 2 The names given to these features of the expected utility procedure - with the different names linked with their various axiomatic derivations - include Neumann and Morgenstern's rule for equivalent classes, presented in their 47, p.24 and Malinvaud 52, Samuleson's independence axiom, presented in his 53, Luce and Raiffa's substitution principle, presented in their 52, p.26, the “combination” and “cancellation” property in Tversky and Kahneman 86 and the joint result of “ordering” and the “reduction principle” in Fishburn 87. These critical principles, especially their negative (reduction) forms or outputs, will come in for close scrutiny in what follows. �(2) + 0.89U($0) 0.89U($lm). Then the preference for A over B can be equivalently represented by the result of this (monotonic) addition, namely, U($lm) + 0.89 U($0) - 0.89U($lm) > 0.10U($5m) + 0.89U($lm) + 0.01U($0) + 0.89U($0) - 0.89U($lm), whence follows by utility arithmetic, (3) 0.11U($lm) + 0.89U($0m) > 0.10U($5m) + 0.9U($0). But (3) represents nothing but the preference of C over D. Hence, given adherence to the dominant theory and its procedures, preference for (or choice of) A over B is equivalent to preference for C over D, not D over C. So whoever prefers one and adheres to the procedures is rationally obliged to prefer the other, and is rationally inconsistent in preferring its converse. Short of postponement (Savage's immediate move, in asking for time to think, in response to Allais), these are two main strategies: A. Dominant options, which involve explaining away pre-analytic responses. Savage's further moves went this this theory-saving way, through the “sure-thing” principle. From a logical perspective, the sure-thing principle is applied in transforming cases like assessment of D vis a vis C, which are put out of intuitive bounds, into equivalent canonical forms, which are (intuiively) decidable. The dominant theory is sho3red up, in a typical way, by psychological work; those who do try to assess complex non-canonical cases like C vs. D are subject to “framing illusions”.3 A*. Subversive options, which accept the pre-analytic responses, at more or less face value, and modify the dominant theory. There are various ways modification can take place: B. Reject the formalisation of the argument offered as too simple, because omitting decisive information. Such an approach is taken by Pope, who contends that an occasionally glimpsed but generally omitted time dimension is crucial. On that approach, which certainly does not rule out fuller formalisation, a dynamic theory is regarded as essential. B*. Accept the style of formalisation, as not overly simplistic, but reject specific principles used in establishing equivalence of preferences. Such an approach, though of a fully systematic kind, is of course that course pursued here. A rival relevant static theory is elaborated. Although a static theory is adequate, so it is claimed, to remove paradox, dynamic implementation naturally is not excluded. While it is not essential in the present setting, in other settings it may well be required. We now proceed to what breaks down on the B* approach, namely subtraction principles fail. The result is that we can have both A over B and C over D. To establish the point 3 For one fuller account of those dominant strategies, see Pope. �4 convincingly, we should supply a requisite model, [do model]. The relevant resolution sits very happily with significant empirical material which Kahneman and Tyersky (K & T hereafter) have adduced contrasting combinative or additive procedures with eliminative or substractive procedures, [detail and reference]. Such differences are strikingly exhibited not only in empirical practice (including the arithmetic without zero of earlier human societies), but in logical theory. Two logical examples are these: Gentzen methods, where there may be significant differences between introduction and eliminative procedures, and, nearer to the present issue, relevant arithmetic, where negative operations such as subtraction and division induce difficulties not encountered with corresponding positive operatives. K & T's positive assistance in distinguishing positive and negative diverences at work in choice procedures is however utterly overwhelmed by their predominant (classical theory saving) contentions. These attempt to remove all differences between ways of rectifying classical decision theory. All are equally based on framing illusions, [work through examples, detail this epistemological escape-chute]. Framing is a theory-solving device par excellence. A highly favoured strategy for distancing rational decision theory from empirical information consists in presentation of inconsistent preferences alleged to violate transitivity. The argument runs like this: there can be no rational theory without transitivity, but actual preferences, empirically recorded, may violate transitivity; so rational theory must discount such empirical information. Such information is set aside, for instance as involving “framing” distictions. There have been heroic attempts to slip around the first premiss, to design nontransitive preference theories. No doubt something of this sort can be done; but in order to gain a theory of some strength postulates much less pausible than transitivity are infiltrated. (In any event, the major project of founding economic on aggregated preference theory depends heavily, and approvently essentially on transitivity.) What should have been questioned, however, is the second premiss, that transitivity is violated. Experimenters and other who arrive at such a result have typically assumed consistency of subjects. Without consistency nothing stops both the preferences empiricially found and transitivity. Such subjects have inconsistent preferences. But, to exaggerate a little, nothing is more common than inconsistent preferences or devises. Often, at least, preference sets are overdetermined, rather than, what has highterto been supposed must be the case, logically underdetermined. To allow properly for inconsistent preferences, as it is proposed to do, the underlying logic must be paraconsistent. Otherwise, as with a classical base, the theory will trivialize preferences. But the most satisfactory types of paraconsistent logics are relevant ones. 2. Rational decision theory and rational belief revision. Consider the classical expansion principle - A (A & B) V (A & ~B) and its extensions to further parameters. - This principle is at the core of standard Bayesianism: �5 • Jeffrey's derivability axiom requires it for its generality • causal decision theories require it for building ultimate partitions of outcomes • standard conditional expected utility requires it, e.g. U(A) = U(A & B) + U(A & ~ B), leading to U(A / B) = U(A & B) (on which see Malinas). The same expansion principle is critical in Lewis's triviality proof. Likewise belief revision theory, there are negative results where similar expansion principles play a major part. But expansion is intricated in implicational paradox, indeed it plays a crucial part in C.I. Lewis's “independent” proof of the inevitability of positive paradox in entailment theory. That simple argument proceeds as follows: A-». (A & B) V (A & ~B) (A & B) V (A & ~B) A&(B V ~B) A->. A & (B V ~B) A & (B V ~B) B V ~B A->.B V ~B Expansion Distribution by Rule Transitivity Simplification by Transitivity again That is, positive paradox, and irrelevance since B may have nothing to do with A. For this reason among other, Expansion is rejected in relevant logic (see further RLR). With its rejection a mass of established theory, implausible theory, crumbles. 3. Conditional preference theory (Bayesian style). Therewith much relevant relocationis required. Relevant relocation enables the wholesale removal of much of the surrounding belt of idealisations which shield standard theory from criticism but at the same time prevents its practical application to real-life agents and situations. Examples of idealisation in belief and theory revision normative theory, sharing their disabling extents are as follows: It is assumed that • agents are perfect (classical) reasoners • agents have determinate (real) degrees of belief • agents have determinate conditional degrees of beliefs for every pair of propositions expressible in their language [ - maintenance of probabilistic coherence]. References Allais,M., ‘The so-called Allais paradox and rational decision under uncertainty’, in M. Allais and O. Mazen (eds), Expected Utility and the Alluis Paradox, Reidal, Dordrecht 1979, 437681. Fishbum, P., ‘Reconsiderations in the foundations of decision under uncertainty’, Economic Journal 97(1987) 825-841. Lace, R., and Ruiffa, H. Games and Decisions, John Wiley, New York, 1957. Malinvaud, E., ‘A note on von Neumann - Morgenstern's strong independence axiom’, Econometrica 20(1952) 679. von Neumann, J., and Morgenstern, O., Theory of Games and Economic Behaviour, Princeton University press, New Jersey, 1947. �Pope, R., ‘The delusion of certainty in Savage's some-thing principle’ typescript Duntroon, 1989. Routley, R., and others, Relevant Logics and Their Rivals, Ridgeview, California, 1982; referred to as RLR. Samuelson, P., ‘Probability, utility and the independence axiom’, Econometrica 20(1952) 670678. Sylvan, R., ‘Modem myths concerning rationality’, ; referred to as MR. Tversky, A., and Kahneman, D., ‘Rational choice and the framing of decisions’, Journal of Business 59(1986) s251-s278. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Draft Papers Description An account of the resource Sylvan's literary executor encountered an archive in which “all his projects were current", since manuscripts were undated and unattributed. Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document RATIONAL DECISION THEORY WITHOUT PARADOXES The uniform strategy applied to remove paradoxes in several other arenas - implication, confirmation, conditionality, explanation, logic itself — will be adapted to defuse all the usual paradoxes vexing supposedly rational decision theory. That strategy comprises, essentially, changing the underlying logic (which is the source of central rationality principles of logical— type) to a modest relevant logic. It yields two important components: removal of irrelevance, particularly in derivatives of the logical theory, for instance in this case probability and preference theory; and reduction of excessive strength, not merely in the logical theory and its derivatives, but especially in this case in maximization principles. Decision theory hitherto has been, virtually without exception, classical: it has unquestioningly assumed classical principles of consistency and maximality. Well it might be claimed that these principles - which derive from the very classical Great Chain of Being - serve, with but few further impeccable principles, to deliver classical logic, its derivatives such as standard probability theory, and much else. The universality of these formative principles is however a myth, one of the pervasive myths of modem rationality (see MR). 1. Common (i.e. equivalent) consequences arguments, and Allais' paradox. Common consequences arguments depend upon the substitution of common, i.e. equivalent, consequences. It is evident that what substitutions are permitted will depend not merely upon admissible logical substitution principles, but above all upon the underlying notion of equivalence. A basic substitution principle takes the form A<-*B, F(A) / F(B) (S<->). It yields, as derived cases, such further inference principles as A<->B f(A) = n / f(B) = n and A~B / G(A) = G(B), given requisite vocabulary. But critical features of the resulting logics and theories depend upon what the co-implication relation, <-», permits; its strength. Over dinner at a Paris cafe one evening during an international colloquium on risky choice, Allais asked Savage a pair of now very famous questions. First Allais asked Savage to choose between prospects A and B: A complete certainty of a good outcome $lm B 0.10 probability of a very good outcome $5m 0.89 probability of a good outcome 0.01 probability of a bad outcome $lm $0. Savage preferred A to B. Allais next asked him to choose between prospects C and D: C 0.89 probability of bad outcome $0 D 2 0.11 probability of good outcome $lm 0.90 probability of bad outcome $0 0.10 probability of very good outcome $5m. Savage preferred D to C. Subsequent researchers quickly discovered that most of their seemingly rational subjects responded initially to Allais' pair of questions as Savage had.1 The problem with these responses is that they violate classical expected utility theory, and are accordingly classically irrational, that theory affording necessary conditions for “rationality”. Therein too lies the Allais' paradox, that seemingly rational responses by seemingly rational subjects are ruled irrational by the theory. For conjoint preferences of A over B and D over C contradict the deliverance of the dominant theory, which specifies what is rational here, according to which C over D is equivalent to A over B, and so the conjoint preferences are inconsistent. The situation certainly supplies a paradox in the standard sense, that preanalytic claims (that so and so definitely does not imply, does not confirm, such and such) are contradicted by results of the dominant theory covering those claims. The (too) brief argument to inconsistency of the seemingly rational preference rankings under the dominant theory runs as follows:- Where U symbolizes the relevant utility function (to which probabilities are immaterial in the present context), the preference for A over B can be represented as (1) U($lm) > 0.10U(%5m) + 0.89U($lm) + 0.01U($0), Now it is assumed that an equivalent ranking - sometimes said to be the same ranking - results by either adding common consequences to each side of the inequality (introduction or combination rule) or by deleting common consequences from either side of the inequality (elimination or deletion rule). These procedures are after all distinguishing features of dominant expected utility theory.2 Let us then add the common consequences of a 0.89 probability of receiving $0, and delete the common consequences of a 0.89 probability of receiving $lm. That is, putting these operations together, let us add to each side of (1) the combination 1 The presentation follows Pope's adjustment of Allais' original account (in his 79 p.354). For detail of subsequent research on initial responses, see also Pope 89. (Note however that Pope tends to conflate acting rationally with acting consistently.) 2 The names given to these features of the expected utility procedure - with the different names linked with their various axiomatic derivations - include Neumann and Morgenstern's rule for equivalent classes, presented in their 47, p.24 and Malinvaud 52, Samuleson's independence axiom, presented in his 53, Luce and Raiffa's substitution principle, presented in their 52, p.26, the “combination” and “cancellation” property in Tversky and Kahneman 86 and the joint result of “ordering” and the “reduction principle” in Fishburn 87. These critical principles, especially their negative (reduction) forms or outputs, will come in for close scrutiny in what follows. (2) + 0.89U($0) 0.89U($lm). Then the preference for A over B can be equivalently represented by the result of this (monotonic) addition, namely, U($lm) + 0.89 U($0) - 0.89U($lm) > 0.10U($5m) + 0.89U($lm) + 0.01U($0) + 0.89U($0) - 0.89U($lm), whence follows by utility arithmetic, (3) 0.11U($lm) + 0.89U($0m) > 0.10U($5m) + 0.9U($0). But (3) represents nothing but the preference of C over D. Hence, given adherence to the dominant theory and its procedures, preference for (or choice of) A over B is equivalent to preference for C over D, not D over C. So whoever prefers one and adheres to the procedures is rationally obliged to prefer the other, and is rationally inconsistent in preferring its converse. Short of postponement (Savage's immediate move, in asking for time to think, in response to Allais), these are two main strategies: A. Dominant options, which involve explaining away pre-analytic responses. Savage's further moves went this this theory-saving way, through the “sure-thing” principle. From a logical perspective, the sure-thing principle is applied in transforming cases like assessment of D vis a vis C, which are put out of intuitive bounds, into equivalent canonical forms, which are (intuiively) decidable. The dominant theory is sho3red up, in a typical way, by psychological work; those who do try to assess complex non-canonical cases like C vs. D are subject to “framing illusions”.3 A*. Subversive options, which accept the pre-analytic responses, at more or less face value, and modify the dominant theory. There are various ways modification can take place: B. Reject the formalisation of the argument offered as too simple, because omitting decisive information. Such an approach is taken by Pope, who contends that an occasionally glimpsed but generally omitted time dimension is crucial. On that approach, which certainly does not rule out fuller formalisation, a dynamic theory is regarded as essential. B*. Accept the style of formalisation, as not overly simplistic, but reject specific principles used in establishing equivalence of preferences. Such an approach, though of a fully systematic kind, is of course that course pursued here. A rival relevant static theory is elaborated. Although a static theory is adequate, so it is claimed, to remove paradox, dynamic implementation naturally is not excluded. While it is not essential in the present setting, in other settings it may well be required. We now proceed to what breaks down on the B* approach, namely subtraction principles fail. The result is that we can have both A over B and C over D. To establish the point 3 For one fuller account of those dominant strategies, see Pope. 4 convincingly, we should supply a requisite model, [do model]. The relevant resolution sits very happily with significant empirical material which Kahneman and Tyersky (K & T hereafter) have adduced contrasting combinative or additive procedures with eliminative or substractive procedures, [detail and reference]. Such differences are strikingly exhibited not only in empirical practice (including the arithmetic without zero of earlier human societies), but in logical theory. Two logical examples are these: Gentzen methods, where there may be significant differences between introduction and eliminative procedures, and, nearer to the present issue, relevant arithmetic, where negative operations such as subtraction and division induce difficulties not encountered with corresponding positive operatives. K & T's positive assistance in distinguishing positive and negative diverences at work in choice procedures is however utterly overwhelmed by their predominant (classical theory saving) contentions. These attempt to remove all differences between ways of rectifying classical decision theory. All are equally based on framing illusions, [work through examples, detail this epistemological escape-chute]. Framing is a theory-solving device par excellence. A highly favoured strategy for distancing rational decision theory from empirical information consists in presentation of inconsistent preferences alleged to violate transitivity. The argument runs like this: there can be no rational theory without transitivity, but actual preferences, empirically recorded, may violate transitivity; so rational theory must discount such empirical information. Such information is set aside, for instance as involving “framing” distictions. There have been heroic attempts to slip around the first premiss, to design nontransitive preference theories. No doubt something of this sort can be done; but in order to gain a theory of some strength postulates much less pausible than transitivity are infiltrated. (In any event, the major project of founding economic on aggregated preference theory depends heavily, and approvently essentially on transitivity.) What should have been questioned, however, is the second premiss, that transitivity is violated. Experimenters and other who arrive at such a result have typically assumed consistency of subjects. Without consistency nothing stops both the preferences empiricially found and transitivity. Such subjects have inconsistent preferences. But, to exaggerate a little, nothing is more common than inconsistent preferences or devises. Often, at least, preference sets are overdetermined, rather than, what has highterto been supposed must be the case, logically underdetermined. To allow properly for inconsistent preferences, as it is proposed to do, the underlying logic must be paraconsistent. Otherwise, as with a classical base, the theory will trivialize preferences. But the most satisfactory types of paraconsistent logics are relevant ones. 2. Rational decision theory and rational belief revision. Consider the classical expansion principle - A (A & B) V (A & ~B) and its extensions to further parameters. - This principle is at the core of standard Bayesianism: 5 • Jeffrey's derivability axiom requires it for its generality • causal decision theories require it for building ultimate partitions of outcomes • standard conditional expected utility requires it, e.g. U(A) = U(A & B) + U(A & ~ B), leading to U(A / B) = U(A & B) (on which see Malinas). The same expansion principle is critical in Lewis's triviality proof. Likewise belief revision theory, there are negative results where similar expansion principles play a major part. But expansion is intricated in implicational paradox, indeed it plays a crucial part in C.I. Lewis's “independent” proof of the inevitability of positive paradox in entailment theory. That simple argument proceeds as follows: A-». (A & B) V (A & ~B) (A & B) V (A & ~B) A&(B V ~B) A->. A & (B V ~B) A & (B V ~B) B V ~B A->.B V ~B Expansion Distribution by Rule Transitivity Simplification by Transitivity again That is, positive paradox, and irrelevance since B may have nothing to do with A. For this reason among other, Expansion is rejected in relevant logic (see further RLR). With its rejection a mass of established theory, implausible theory, crumbles. 3. Conditional preference theory (Bayesian style). Therewith much relevant relocationis required. Relevant relocation enables the wholesale removal of much of the surrounding belt of idealisations which shield standard theory from criticism but at the same time prevents its practical application to real-life agents and situations. Examples of idealisation in belief and theory revision normative theory, sharing their disabling extents are as follows: It is assumed that • agents are perfect (classical) reasoners • agents have determinate (real) degrees of belief • agents have determinate conditional degrees of beliefs for every pair of propositions expressible in their language [ - maintenance of probabilistic coherence]. References Allais,M., ‘The so-called Allais paradox and rational decision under uncertainty’, in M. Allais and O. Mazen (eds), Expected Utility and the Alluis Paradox, Reidal, Dordrecht 1979, 437681. Fishbum, P., ‘Reconsiderations in the foundations of decision under uncertainty’, Economic Journal 97(1987) 825-841. Lace, R., and Ruiffa, H. Games and Decisions, John Wiley, New York, 1957. Malinvaud, E., ‘A note on von Neumann - Morgenstern's strong independence axiom’, Econometrica 20(1952) 679. von Neumann, J., and Morgenstern, O., Theory of Games and Economic Behaviour, Princeton University press, New Jersey, 1947. Pope, R., ‘The delusion of certainty in Savage's some-thing principle’ typescript Duntroon, 1989. Routley, R., and others, Relevant Logics and Their Rivals, Ridgeview, California, 1982; referred to as RLR. Samuelson, P., ‘Probability, utility and the independence axiom’, Econometrica 20(1952) 670678. Sylvan, R., ‘Modem myths concerning rationality’, ; referred to as MR. Tversky, A., and Kahneman, D., ‘Rational choice and the framing of decisions’, Journal of Business 59(1986) s251-s278.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Box 18, Item 1225: Draft of Rational decision theory without paradoxes Subject The topic of the resource Printout of draft, undated. Description An account of the resource One of seven papers digitised from item 1225. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/browse?search=Richard+Sylvan&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bjoiner%5D=and&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=&amp;range=&amp;collection=&amp;type=&amp;user=&amp;tags=&amp;public=&amp;featured=&amp;exhibit=&amp;geolocation-mapped=&amp;geolocation-address=&amp;geolocation-latitude=&amp;geolocation-longitude=&amp;geolocation-radius=10&amp;submit_search=Search+for+items">Richard Sylvan</a> Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived <span class="MuiTypography-root-125 MuiTypography-body2-126">The University of Queensland's <a data-testid="rek-series" href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/records/search?page=1&amp;pageSize=20&amp;sortBy=score&amp;sortDirection=Desc&amp;searchQueryParams%5Brek_series%5D%5Bvalue%5D=Richard+Sylvan+Papers%2C+UQFL291&amp;searchMode=advanced">Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291</a></span>, Box 18, Item 1225 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org">Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy</a> Contributor An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, <a href="https://najtaylor.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Dr. N.A.J. Taylor</a>. Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library. Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource [6] leaves. 4.2 MB. Type The nature or genre of the resource Manuscript Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context <a href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:338ec22">https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:338ec22</a> Australian National University Office Australian National University Office > Typing Table at End of Desk Box 18: Green Projects in Progress https://www.antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/475beee1c933c2e15191dcd1524477cf.pdf 53eba82362d3d0a5d4703f83b8621f45 PDF Text Text RATIONAL DECISION THEORY WITHOUT PARADOXES The uniform strategy applied to remove paradoxes in several other arenas - implication, confirmation, conditionality, explanation, logic itself — will be adapted to defuse all the usual paradoxes vexing supposedly rational decision theory. That strategy comprises, essentially, changing the underlying logic (which is the source of central rationality principles of logical— type) to a modest relevant logic. It yields two important components: removal of irrelevance, particularly in derivatives of the logical theory, for instance in this case probability and preference theory; and reduction of excessive strength, not merely in the logical theory and its derivatives, but especially in this case in maximization principles. Decision theory hitherto has been, virtually without exception, classical: it has unquestioningly assumed classical principles of consistency and maximality. Well it might be claimed that these principles - which derive from the very classical Great Chain of Being - serve, with but few further impeccable principles, to deliver classical logic, its derivatives such as standard probability theory, and much else. The universality of these formative principles is however a myth, one of the pervasive myths of modem rationality (see MR). 1. Common (i.e. equivalent) consequences arguments, and Allais' paradox. Common consequences arguments depend upon the substitution of common, i.e. equivalent, consequences. It is evident that what substitutions are permitted will depend not merely upon admissible logical substitution principles, but above all upon the underlying notion of equivalence. A basic substitution principle takes the form A<-*B, F(A) / F(B) (S<->). It yields, as derived cases, such further inference principles as A<->B f(A) = n / f(B) = n and A~B / G(A) = G(B), given requisite vocabulary. But critical features of the resulting logics and theories depend upon what the co-implication relation, <-», permits; its strength. Over dinner at a Paris cafe one evening during an international colloquium on risky choice, Allais asked Savage a pair of now very famous questions. First Allais asked Savage to choose between prospects A and B: A complete certainty of a good outcome $lm B 0.10 probability of a very good outcome $5m 0.89 probability of a good outcome 0.01 probability of a bad outcome $lm $0. Savage preferred A to B. Allais next asked him to choose between prospects C and D: C 0.89 probability of bad outcome $0 �D 2 0.11 probability of good outcome $lm 0.90 probability of bad outcome $0 0.10 probability of very good outcome $5m. Savage preferred D to C. Subsequent researchers quickly discovered that most of their seemingly rational subjects responded initially to Allais' pair of questions as Savage had.1 The problem with these responses is that they violate classical expected utility theory, and are accordingly classically irrational, that theory affording necessary conditions for “rationality”. Therein too lies the Allais' paradox, that seemingly rational responses by seemingly rational subjects are ruled irrational by the theory. For conjoint preferences of A over B and D over C contradict the deliverance of the dominant theory, which specifies what is rational here, according to which C over D is equivalent to A over B, and so the conjoint preferences are inconsistent. The situation certainly supplies a paradox in the standard sense, that preanalytic claims (that so and so definitely does not imply, does not confirm, such and such) are contradicted by results of the dominant theory covering those claims. The (too) brief argument to inconsistency of the seemingly rational preference rankings under the dominant theory runs as follows:- Where U symbolizes the relevant utility function (to which probabilities are immaterial in the present context), the preference for A over B can be represented as (1) U($lm) > 0.10U(%5m) + 0.89U($lm) + 0.01U($0), Now it is assumed that an equivalent ranking - sometimes said to be the same ranking - results by either adding common consequences to each side of the inequality (introduction or combination rule) or by deleting common consequences from either side of the inequality (elimination or deletion rule). These procedures are after all distinguishing features of dominant expected utility theory.2 Let us then add the common consequences of a 0.89 probability of receiving $0, and delete the common consequences of a 0.89 probability of receiving $lm. That is, putting these operations together, let us add to each side of (1) the combination 1 The presentation follows Pope's adjustment of Allais' original account (in his 79 p.354). For detail of subsequent research on initial responses, see also Pope 89. (Note however that Pope tends to conflate acting rationally with acting consistently.) 2 The names given to these features of the expected utility procedure - with the different names linked with their various axiomatic derivations - include Neumann and Morgenstern's rule for equivalent classes, presented in their 47, p.24 and Malinvaud 52, Samuleson's independence axiom, presented in his 53, Luce and Raiffa's substitution principle, presented in their 52, p.26, the “combination” and “cancellation” property in Tversky and Kahneman 86 and the joint result of “ordering” and the “reduction principle” in Fishburn 87. These critical principles, especially their negative (reduction) forms or outputs, will come in for close scrutiny in what follows. �(2) + 0.89U($0) 0.89U($lm). Then the preference for A over B can be equivalently represented by the result of this (monotonic) addition, namely, U($lm) + 0.89 U($0) - 0.89U($lm) > 0.10U($5m) + 0.89U($lm) + 0.01U($0) + 0.89U($0) - 0.89U($lm), whence follows by utility arithmetic, (3) 0.11U($lm) + 0.89U($0m) > 0.10U($5m) + 0.9U($0). But (3) represents nothing but the preference of C over D. Hence, given adherence to the dominant theory and its procedures, preference for (or choice of) A over B is equivalent to preference for C over D, not D over C. So whoever prefers one and adheres to the procedures is rationally obliged to prefer the other, and is rationally inconsistent in preferring its converse. Short of postponement (Savage's immediate move, in asking for time to think, in response to Allais), these are two main strategies: A. Dominant options, which involve explaining away pre-analytic responses. Savage's further moves went this this theory-saving way, through the “sure-thing” principle. From a logical perspective, the sure-thing principle is applied in transforming cases like assessment of D vis a vis C, which are put out of intuitive bounds, into equivalent canonical forms, which are (intuiively) decidable. The dominant theory is sho3red up, in a typical way, by psychological work; those who do try to assess complex non-canonical cases like C vs. D are subject to “framing illusions”.3 A*. Subversive options, which accept the pre-analytic responses, at more or less face value, and modify the dominant theory. There are various ways modification can take place: B. Reject the formalisation of the argument offered as too simple, because omitting decisive information. Such an approach is taken by Pope, who contends that an occasionally glimpsed but generally omitted time dimension is crucial. On that approach, which certainly does not rule out fuller formalisation, a dynamic theory is regarded as essential. B*. Accept the style of formalisation, as not overly simplistic, but reject specific principles used in establishing equivalence of preferences. Such an approach, though of a fully systematic kind, is of course that course pursued here. A rival relevant static theory is elaborated. Although a static theory is adequate, so it is claimed, to remove paradox, dynamic implementation naturally is not excluded. While it is not essential in the present setting, in other settings it may well be required. We now proceed to what breaks down on the B* approach, namely subtraction principles fail. The result is that we can have both A over B and C over D. To establish the point 3 For one fuller account of those dominant strategies, see Pope. �4 convincingly, we should supply a requisite model, [do model]. The relevant resolution sits very happily with significant empirical material which Kahneman and Tyersky (K & T hereafter) have adduced contrasting combinative or additive procedures with eliminative or substractive procedures, [detail and reference]. Such differences are strikingly exhibited not only in empirical practice (including the arithmetic without zero of earlier human societies), but in logical theory. Two logical examples are these: Gentzen methods, where there may be significant differences between introduction and eliminative procedures, and, nearer to the present issue, relevant arithmetic, where negative operations such as subtraction and division induce difficulties not encountered with corresponding positive operatives. K & T's positive assistance in distinguishing positive and negative diverences at work in choice procedures is however utterly overwhelmed by their predominant (classical theory saving) contentions. These attempt to remove all differences between ways of rectifying classical decision theory. All are equally based on framing illusions, [work through examples, detail this epistemological escape-chute]. Framing is a theory-solving device par excellence. A highly favoured strategy for distancing rational decision theory from empirical information consists in presentation of inconsistent preferences alleged to violate transitivity. The argument runs like this: there can be no rational theory without transitivity, but actual preferences, empirically recorded, may violate transitivity; so rational theory must discount such empirical information. Such information is set aside, for instance as involving “framing” distictions. There have been heroic attempts to slip around the first premiss, to design nontransitive preference theories. No doubt something of this sort can be done; but in order to gain a theory of some strength postulates much less pausible than transitivity are infiltrated. (In any event, the major project of founding economic on aggregated preference theory depends heavily, and approvently essentially on transitivity.) What should have been questioned, however, is the second premiss, that transitivity is violated. Experimenters and other who arrive at such a result have typically assumed consistency of subjects. Without consistency nothing stops both the preferences empiricially found and transitivity. Such subjects have inconsistent preferences. But, to exaggerate a little, nothing is more common than inconsistent preferences or devises. Often, at least, preference sets are overdetermined, rather than, what has highterto been supposed must be the case, logically underdetermined. To allow properly for inconsistent preferences, as it is proposed to do, the underlying logic must be paraconsistent. Otherwise, as with a classical base, the theory will trivialize preferences. But the most satisfactory types of paraconsistent logics are relevant ones. 2. Rational decision theory and rational belief revision. Consider the classical expansion principle - A (A & B) V (A & ~B) and its extensions to further parameters. - This principle is at the core of standard Bayesianism: �5 • Jeffrey's derivability axiom requires it for its generality • causal decision theories require it for building ultimate partitions of outcomes • standard conditional expected utility requires it, e.g. U(A) = U(A & B) + U(A & ~ B), leading to U(A / B) = U(A & B) (on which see Malinas). The same expansion principle is critical in Lewis's triviality proof. Likewise belief revision theory, there are negative results where similar expansion principles play a major part. But expansion is intricated in implicational paradox, indeed it plays a crucial part in C.I. Lewis's “independent” proof of the inevitability of positive paradox in entailment theory. That simple argument proceeds as follows: A-». (A & B) V (A & ~B) (A & B) V (A & ~B) A&(B V ~B) A->. A & (B V ~B) A & (B V ~B) B V ~B A->.B V ~B Expansion Distribution by Rule Transitivity Simplification by Transitivity again That is, positive paradox, and irrelevance since B may have nothing to do with A. For this reason among other, Expansion is rejected in relevant logic (see further RLR). With its rejection a mass of established theory, implausible theory, crumbles. 3. Conditional preference theory (Bayesian style). Therewith much relevant relocationis required. Relevant relocation enables the wholesale removal of much of the surrounding belt of idealisations which shield standard theory from criticism but at the same time prevents its practical application to real-life agents and situations. Examples of idealisation in belief and theory revision normative theory, sharing their disabling extents are as follows: It is assumed that • agents are perfect (classical) reasoners • agents have determinate (real) degrees of belief • agents have determinate conditional degrees of beliefs for every pair of propositions expressible in their language [ - maintenance of probabilistic coherence]. References Allais,M., ‘The so-called Allais paradox and rational decision under uncertainty’, in M. Allais and O. Mazen (eds), Expected Utility and the Alluis Paradox, Reidal, Dordrecht 1979, 437681. Fishbum, P., ‘Reconsiderations in the foundations of decision under uncertainty’, Economic Journal 97(1987) 825-841. Lace, R., and Ruiffa, H. Games and Decisions, John Wiley, New York, 1957. Malinvaud, E., ‘A note on von Neumann - Morgenstern's strong independence axiom’, Econometrica 20(1952) 679. von Neumann, J., and Morgenstern, O., Theory of Games and Economic Behaviour, Princeton University press, New Jersey, 1947. �Pope, R., ‘The delusion of certainty in Savage's some-thing principle’ typescript Duntroon, 1989. Routley, R., and others, Relevant Logics and Their Rivals, Ridgeview, California, 1982; referred to as RLR. Samuelson, P., ‘Probability, utility and the independence axiom’, Econometrica 20(1952) 670678. Sylvan, R., ‘Modem myths concerning rationality’, ; referred to as MR. Tversky, A., and Kahneman, D., ‘Rational choice and the framing of decisions’, Journal of Business 59(1986) s251-s278. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Draft Papers Description An account of the resource Sylvan's literary executor encountered an archive in which “all his projects were current", since manuscripts were undated and unattributed. Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document RATIONAL DECISION THEORY WITHOUT PARADOXES The uniform strategy applied to remove paradoxes in several other arenas - implication, confirmation, conditionality, explanation, logic itself — will be adapted to defuse all the usual paradoxes vexing supposedly rational decision theory. That strategy comprises, essentially, changing the underlying logic (which is the source of central rationality principles of logical— type) to a modest relevant logic. It yields two important components: removal of irrelevance, particularly in derivatives of the logical theory, for instance in this case probability and preference theory; and reduction of excessive strength, not merely in the logical theory and its derivatives, but especially in this case in maximization principles. Decision theory hitherto has been, virtually without exception, classical: it has unquestioningly assumed classical principles of consistency and maximality. Well it might be claimed that these principles - which derive from the very classical Great Chain of Being - serve, with but few further impeccable principles, to deliver classical logic, its derivatives such as standard probability theory, and much else. The universality of these formative principles is however a myth, one of the pervasive myths of modem rationality (see MR). 1. Common (i.e. equivalent) consequences arguments, and Allais' paradox. Common consequences arguments depend upon the substitution of common, i.e. equivalent, consequences. It is evident that what substitutions are permitted will depend not merely upon admissible logical substitution principles, but above all upon the underlying notion of equivalence. A basic substitution principle takes the form A<-*B, F(A) / F(B) (S<->). It yields, as derived cases, such further inference principles as A<->B f(A) = n / f(B) = n and A~B / G(A) = G(B), given requisite vocabulary. But critical features of the resulting logics and theories depend upon what the co-implication relation, <-», permits; its strength. Over dinner at a Paris cafe one evening during an international colloquium on risky choice, Allais asked Savage a pair of now very famous questions. First Allais asked Savage to choose between prospects A and B: A complete certainty of a good outcome $lm B 0.10 probability of a very good outcome $5m 0.89 probability of a good outcome 0.01 probability of a bad outcome $lm $0. Savage preferred A to B. Allais next asked him to choose between prospects C and D: C 0.89 probability of bad outcome $0 D 2 0.11 probability of good outcome $lm 0.90 probability of bad outcome $0 0.10 probability of very good outcome $5m. Savage preferred D to C. Subsequent researchers quickly discovered that most of their seemingly rational subjects responded initially to Allais' pair of questions as Savage had.1 The problem with these responses is that they violate classical expected utility theory, and are accordingly classically irrational, that theory affording necessary conditions for “rationality”. Therein too lies the Allais' paradox, that seemingly rational responses by seemingly rational subjects are ruled irrational by the theory. For conjoint preferences of A over B and D over C contradict the deliverance of the dominant theory, which specifies what is rational here, according to which C over D is equivalent to A over B, and so the conjoint preferences are inconsistent. The situation certainly supplies a paradox in the standard sense, that preanalytic claims (that so and so definitely does not imply, does not confirm, such and such) are contradicted by results of the dominant theory covering those claims. The (too) brief argument to inconsistency of the seemingly rational preference rankings under the dominant theory runs as follows:- Where U symbolizes the relevant utility function (to which probabilities are immaterial in the present context), the preference for A over B can be represented as (1) U($lm) > 0.10U(%5m) + 0.89U($lm) + 0.01U($0), Now it is assumed that an equivalent ranking - sometimes said to be the same ranking - results by either adding common consequences to each side of the inequality (introduction or combination rule) or by deleting common consequences from either side of the inequality (elimination or deletion rule). These procedures are after all distinguishing features of dominant expected utility theory.2 Let us then add the common consequences of a 0.89 probability of receiving $0, and delete the common consequences of a 0.89 probability of receiving $lm. That is, putting these operations together, let us add to each side of (1) the combination 1 The presentation follows Pope's adjustment of Allais' original account (in his 79 p.354). For detail of subsequent research on initial responses, see also Pope 89. (Note however that Pope tends to conflate acting rationally with acting consistently.) 2 The names given to these features of the expected utility procedure - with the different names linked with their various axiomatic derivations - include Neumann and Morgenstern's rule for equivalent classes, presented in their 47, p.24 and Malinvaud 52, Samuleson's independence axiom, presented in his 53, Luce and Raiffa's substitution principle, presented in their 52, p.26, the “combination” and “cancellation” property in Tversky and Kahneman 86 and the joint result of “ordering” and the “reduction principle” in Fishburn 87. These critical principles, especially their negative (reduction) forms or outputs, will come in for close scrutiny in what follows. (2) + 0.89U($0) 0.89U($lm). Then the preference for A over B can be equivalently represented by the result of this (monotonic) addition, namely, U($lm) + 0.89 U($0) - 0.89U($lm) > 0.10U($5m) + 0.89U($lm) + 0.01U($0) + 0.89U($0) - 0.89U($lm), whence follows by utility arithmetic, (3) 0.11U($lm) + 0.89U($0m) > 0.10U($5m) + 0.9U($0). But (3) represents nothing but the preference of C over D. Hence, given adherence to the dominant theory and its procedures, preference for (or choice of) A over B is equivalent to preference for C over D, not D over C. So whoever prefers one and adheres to the procedures is rationally obliged to prefer the other, and is rationally inconsistent in preferring its converse. Short of postponement (Savage's immediate move, in asking for time to think, in response to Allais), these are two main strategies: A. Dominant options, which involve explaining away pre-analytic responses. Savage's further moves went this this theory-saving way, through the “sure-thing” principle. From a logical perspective, the sure-thing principle is applied in transforming cases like assessment of D vis a vis C, which are put out of intuitive bounds, into equivalent canonical forms, which are (intuiively) decidable. The dominant theory is sho3red up, in a typical way, by psychological work; those who do try to assess complex non-canonical cases like C vs. D are subject to “framing illusions”.3 A*. Subversive options, which accept the pre-analytic responses, at more or less face value, and modify the dominant theory. There are various ways modification can take place: B. Reject the formalisation of the argument offered as too simple, because omitting decisive information. Such an approach is taken by Pope, who contends that an occasionally glimpsed but generally omitted time dimension is crucial. On that approach, which certainly does not rule out fuller formalisation, a dynamic theory is regarded as essential. B*. Accept the style of formalisation, as not overly simplistic, but reject specific principles used in establishing equivalence of preferences. Such an approach, though of a fully systematic kind, is of course that course pursued here. A rival relevant static theory is elaborated. Although a static theory is adequate, so it is claimed, to remove paradox, dynamic implementation naturally is not excluded. While it is not essential in the present setting, in other settings it may well be required. We now proceed to what breaks down on the B* approach, namely subtraction principles fail. The result is that we can have both A over B and C over D. To establish the point 3 For one fuller account of those dominant strategies, see Pope. 4 convincingly, we should supply a requisite model, [do model]. The relevant resolution sits very happily with significant empirical material which Kahneman and Tyersky (K & T hereafter) have adduced contrasting combinative or additive procedures with eliminative or substractive procedures, [detail and reference]. Such differences are strikingly exhibited not only in empirical practice (including the arithmetic without zero of earlier human societies), but in logical theory. Two logical examples are these: Gentzen methods, where there may be significant differences between introduction and eliminative procedures, and, nearer to the present issue, relevant arithmetic, where negative operations such as subtraction and division induce difficulties not encountered with corresponding positive operatives. K & T's positive assistance in distinguishing positive and negative diverences at work in choice procedures is however utterly overwhelmed by their predominant (classical theory saving) contentions. These attempt to remove all differences between ways of rectifying classical decision theory. All are equally based on framing illusions, [work through examples, detail this epistemological escape-chute]. Framing is a theory-solving device par excellence. A highly favoured strategy for distancing rational decision theory from empirical information consists in presentation of inconsistent preferences alleged to violate transitivity. The argument runs like this: there can be no rational theory without transitivity, but actual preferences, empirically recorded, may violate transitivity; so rational theory must discount such empirical information. Such information is set aside, for instance as involving “framing” distictions. There have been heroic attempts to slip around the first premiss, to design nontransitive preference theories. No doubt something of this sort can be done; but in order to gain a theory of some strength postulates much less pausible than transitivity are infiltrated. (In any event, the major project of founding economic on aggregated preference theory depends heavily, and approvently essentially on transitivity.) What should have been questioned, however, is the second premiss, that transitivity is violated. Experimenters and other who arrive at such a result have typically assumed consistency of subjects. Without consistency nothing stops both the preferences empiricially found and transitivity. Such subjects have inconsistent preferences. But, to exaggerate a little, nothing is more common than inconsistent preferences or devises. Often, at least, preference sets are overdetermined, rather than, what has highterto been supposed must be the case, logically underdetermined. To allow properly for inconsistent preferences, as it is proposed to do, the underlying logic must be paraconsistent. Otherwise, as with a classical base, the theory will trivialize preferences. But the most satisfactory types of paraconsistent logics are relevant ones. 2. Rational decision theory and rational belief revision. Consider the classical expansion principle - A (A & B) V (A & ~B) and its extensions to further parameters. - This principle is at the core of standard Bayesianism: 5 • Jeffrey's derivability axiom requires it for its generality • causal decision theories require it for building ultimate partitions of outcomes • standard conditional expected utility requires it, e.g. U(A) = U(A & B) + U(A & ~ B), leading to U(A / B) = U(A & B) (on which see Malinas). The same expansion principle is critical in Lewis's triviality proof. Likewise belief revision theory, there are negative results where similar expansion principles play a major part. But expansion is intricated in implicational paradox, indeed it plays a crucial part in C.I. Lewis's “independent” proof of the inevitability of positive paradox in entailment theory. That simple argument proceeds as follows: A-». (A & B) V (A & ~B) (A & B) V (A & ~B) A&(B V ~B) A->. A & (B V ~B) A & (B V ~B) B V ~B A->.B V ~B Expansion Distribution by Rule Transitivity Simplification by Transitivity again That is, positive paradox, and irrelevance since B may have nothing to do with A. For this reason among other, Expansion is rejected in relevant logic (see further RLR). With its rejection a mass of established theory, implausible theory, crumbles. 3. Conditional preference theory (Bayesian style). Therewith much relevant relocationis required. Relevant relocation enables the wholesale removal of much of the surrounding belt of idealisations which shield standard theory from criticism but at the same time prevents its practical application to real-life agents and situations. Examples of idealisation in belief and theory revision normative theory, sharing their disabling extents are as follows: It is assumed that • agents are perfect (classical) reasoners • agents have determinate (real) degrees of belief • agents have determinate conditional degrees of beliefs for every pair of propositions expressible in their language [ - maintenance of probabilistic coherence]. References Allais,M., ‘The so-called Allais paradox and rational decision under uncertainty’, in M. Allais and O. Mazen (eds), Expected Utility and the Alluis Paradox, Reidal, Dordrecht 1979, 437681. Fishbum, P., ‘Reconsiderations in the foundations of decision under uncertainty’, Economic Journal 97(1987) 825-841. Lace, R., and Ruiffa, H. Games and Decisions, John Wiley, New York, 1957. Malinvaud, E., ‘A note on von Neumann - Morgenstern's strong independence axiom’, Econometrica 20(1952) 679. von Neumann, J., and Morgenstern, O., Theory of Games and Economic Behaviour, Princeton University press, New Jersey, 1947. Pope, R., ‘The delusion of certainty in Savage's some-thing principle’ typescript Duntroon, 1989. Routley, R., and others, Relevant Logics and Their Rivals, Ridgeview, California, 1982; referred to as RLR. Samuelson, P., ‘Probability, utility and the independence axiom’, Econometrica 20(1952) 670678. Sylvan, R., ‘Modem myths concerning rationality’, ; referred to as MR. Tversky, A., and Kahneman, D., ‘Rational choice and the framing of decisions’, Journal of Business 59(1986) s251-s278.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Box 18, Item 1235: Draft of Towards green anakrism: eucratic political investigation Subject The topic of the resource Printout of draft, undated. See also item 948 in collection, Early drafts and finished papers of Anarkism. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/browse?search=Richard+Sylvan&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bjoiner%5D=and&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=&amp;range=&amp;collection=&amp;type=&amp;user=&amp;tags=&amp;public=&amp;featured=&amp;exhibit=&amp;geolocation-mapped=&amp;geolocation-address=&amp;geolocation-latitude=&amp;geolocation-longitude=&amp;geolocation-radius=10&amp;submit_search=Search+for+items">Richard Sylvan</a> Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived <span class="MuiTypography-root-125 MuiTypography-body2-126">The University of Queensland's <a data-testid="rek-series" href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/records/search?page=1&amp;pageSize=20&amp;sortBy=score&amp;sortDirection=Desc&amp;searchQueryParams%5Brek_series%5D%5Bvalue%5D=Richard+Sylvan+Papers%2C+UQFL291&amp;searchMode=advanced">Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291</a></span>, Box 18, Item 1235 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org">Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy</a> Contributor An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, <a href="https://najtaylor.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Dr. N.A.J. Taylor</a>. Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library. Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource [165] leaves. 129.65 MB. Type The nature or genre of the resource Manuscript Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context <a href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:72b2588">https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:72b2588</a> Coverage The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant Australian National University - Typing Table at End of Desk Australian National University Office Australian National University Office > Typing Table at End of Desk Box 18: Green Projects in Progress https://www.antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/2eda98db09164dd828449f4feb143531.pdf 4bd02eb1ecb56a9392c4cdbd4272e853 PDF Text Text PARADIGMATIC ROOTS OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS Abstract. Virtually all diagnoses of the roots, and sources, of environmental problems are defective. While defective diagnoses persist, problems will not be adequately addressed. Focal questions ask why human communities so frequently degrade, impoverish or even destroy their own environments, and more generally why the whole earth is now in jeopardy through human enterprise. More immediate answers, sometimes correct so far as they go (which is not deep enough), look to components of environmental impact equations. More thorough-going answers fall into two classes: first those that do not question entrenched paradigms, but seek (unsuccessfully) to explain widespread problems simply through defective practice, and secondly those that, rightly recognising that defective practice is no adequate answer, look to deeper paradigmatic sources of problems. A fatal flaw in most of the latter answers lies in their monistic concentration on a single paradigm, or single narrow band of paradigms. These flaws are exposed, whence a wider, more satisfactory answer can be broached. Background busy work includes firstly, explaining problems and relevant paradigms and how paradigms operate regarding environmental problems, and secondly, detailed disentangling of proposed and alleged sources of the problems. With this done, it is argued that none of these answers, fashionable or other, to the focal questions is satisfactory. Here lies the important hard, but very negative and decidedly incomplete, work of the present investigation. A different more complex investigation is accordingly instigated. An initial answer is located through broader classes of paradigms : environmentally friendly and unfriendly. Further effort is expended, profitably, in trying to characterize these classes. Among significant corollaries, one is striking: philosophy as portrayed through its standard history is dismal environmental news. —— --------- ------------------ 1------ CL .A. — Tgqg-- / ----- L—------------------------------------- cr/ 1 z/ � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Draft Papers Description An account of the resource Sylvan's literary executor encountered an archive in which “all his projects were current", since manuscripts were undated and unattributed. Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document PARADIGMATIC ROOTS OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS Abstract. Virtually all diagnoses of the roots, and sources, of environmental problems are defective. While defective diagnoses persist, problems will not be adequately addressed. Focal questions ask why human communities so frequently degrade, impoverish or even destroy their own environments, and more generally why the whole earth is now in jeopardy through human enterprise. More immediate answers, sometimes correct so far as they go (which is not deep enough), look to components of environmental impact equations. More thorough-going answers fall into two classes: first those that do not question entrenched paradigms, but seek (unsuccessfully) to explain widespread problems simply through defective practice, and secondly those that, rightly recognising that defective practice is no adequate answer, look to deeper paradigmatic sources of problems. A fatal flaw in most of the latter answers lies in their monistic concentration on a single paradigm, or single narrow band of paradigms. These flaws are exposed, whence a wider, more satisfactory answer can be broached. Background busy work includes firstly, explaining problems and relevant paradigms and how paradigms operate regarding environmental problems, and secondly, detailed disentangling of proposed and alleged sources of the problems. With this done, it is argued that none of these answers, fashionable or other, to the focal questions is satisfactory. Here lies the important hard, but very negative and decidedly incomplete, work of the present investigation. A different more complex investigation is accordingly instigated. An initial answer is located through broader classes of paradigms : environmentally friendly and unfriendly. Further effort is expended, profitably, in trying to characterize these classes. Among significant corollaries, one is striking: philosophy as portrayed through its standard history is dismal environmental news. —— --------- ------------------ 1------ CL .A. — Tgqg-- / ----- L—------------------------------------- cr/ 1 z/  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Box 21, Item 705: Draft abstract of Paradigmatic roots of environmental problems Subject The topic of the resource Printout of draft, dated 24 May 1995. Trimmed paper pasted on leaf with annotations. Handwritten top of printout: Run new copy. Description An account of the resource One of ten papers digitised from item 705. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/browse?search=Richard+Sylvan&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bjoiner%5D=and&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=&amp;range=&amp;collection=&amp;type=&amp;user=&amp;tags=&amp;public=&amp;featured=&amp;exhibit=&amp;geolocation-mapped=&amp;geolocation-address=&amp;geolocation-latitude=&amp;geolocation-longitude=&amp;geolocation-radius=10&amp;submit_search=Search+for+items">Richard Sylvan</a> Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived <span class="MuiTypography-root-125 MuiTypography-body2-126">The University of Queensland's <a data-testid="rek-series" href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/records/search?page=1&amp;pageSize=20&amp;sortBy=score&amp;sortDirection=Desc&amp;searchQueryParams%5Brek_series%5D%5Bvalue%5D=Richard+Sylvan+Papers%2C+UQFL291&amp;searchMode=advanced">Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291</a></span>, Box 21, Item 705 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org">Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy</a> Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1995-05-24 Contributor An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, <a href="https://najtaylor.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Dr. N.A.J. Taylor</a>. Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library. Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource [1] leaf. 2.6 MB. Type The nature or genre of the resource Manuscript Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context <a href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:7a8f99b">https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:7a8f99b</a> Coverage The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant Como - Shelves - Top - Pile 3 Box 21: More Green Como House Como House > Shelves > Top > Pile 3 https://www.antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/c6afa206de867f56284fb042bf1e4d96.pdf 560deaadb6ccc8955f96eb21f7a78881 PDF Text Text 9/5/95 IMPACT OF ALTERNATIVE SYSTEMS ON THE ENLIGHTENMENT PROJECT There is a recent debate, arising out of older debates, concerning logic, rationality, truth, science and, more sweepingly, the Enlightenment Project. It is a debate where the concentrated intellectual superpower formed from those substantially committed to the Project is matched against dispersed anti- or counter-Enlightenment forces, and so confronted with protracted guerilla activity. Historically furthermore, the scattered and diverse counter-movement has taken various different forms at different times. In the main respects the recent debate has crystallised into one between definite realism and an egalitarian relativism (as revealed in a useful working example, the debate in Z Papery Oct-Dec 1992). Let's call these sides rea/^m and re/af/VLym for short, though the divisions are more complex than that (for one reason, because "realism" comprehends an idealist "anti-realism", and "relativism" includes "constructive" forms). The contrast is invariably presented (as in the debate in Z Papery) as between f/te ane correct theory, that ultimately delivered by Science, on the one side, and many stories, many points of view perhaps equally good, on the other.i But, presented thus, it is almost obvious that what is offered affords a/a/.ye contrast. For omitted are alternatives with more than one correct account (some of these accounts perhaps better than others), but with many other stories faulted. For instance, neglected is my own preferred /mJiPe way, which recognises many correct accounts, none absolute, and many defective stories.2 Such further plurallistic alternatives are not glimpsed for several reasons: one is a false underlying absolute (one) verytAy relative (many) dichotomy^; another is a false (also absolute) character accredited to received 1 See Albert's Editorial, p.2, and the clearly stated position of 'the three defendents', namely Albert, Chomsky and Ehrenreich. It is both curious and revealing that the debate should have taken f/?A polarized course, given the question addressed to 'the six critics' (of the Enlightenment Project). Namely, 'Do we need to reject/transcend/escape an old way of thinking variously called Western Rationality/Science/Logic if we are to attain a better world? (quoted p.17). Put differently, what is role of received "enlightenment" in a/! Amelioration Project? Because of these <%/erenf issues there is much (loose) arguing at cross-purposes in Z Papers 2 Such a way is elaborated in DP. �2 logic and scientific methodology. Thus a longer subtitle for the present exercise might well run: the concerning logic, rationality, science, truth and all that: the Enlightenment Project and its Enemies, a pluralistic resolution. Realists take their stand on the basis of received logic and scientific methodology, typically as if that were an indisputable given, in great intellectual shape. A couple of statements will confirm this: ... we do not have to transcend science or rationality as a prerequisite to developing worthy vision and strategy... logic and the roles of evidence are here to stay. Moreover, they're on our side.4 Even some small criticism of science is justified; for instance 'science is sometimes narrow, mechanical, colonizing or hypocritical'.$ What lie beyond such critical reach are rationality, reason and logic; '... to critique reason or logic as being at the root of sciences many ills is wrong' 'and has no role in making the world better'. Despite extensive left political activity, 'I have not once criticized rationality or logic, and anti-intellectualism has always been anathema to me'.6 Others appear fractionally more cautious about reason and logic (not Science!): ...in a discussion...there are certain familiar ground rules: those of rational inquiry, ... what seems to be under discussion here is whether we should abide by these ground rules at all (trying to improve them as we proceed?). If the answer is that we are to abide by them, then the discussion is over: we've implicitly accepted the legitimacy of rational inquiry. If they are to be abandoned, then we cannot proceed until we learn what replaces the commitment to consistency, responsibility to fact, and other out-dated notions.^ Before a final quoted sentence rounding off this passage notice the equations made: procedures in a discussion (ground rules) = methods of rational inquiry = commitment to consistency, responsibility to fact, etc. 3 Conspicuous in Albert's own efforts. Albert attempts to recast the multi-faceted debate in these elementary white and black terms: rationality and science 'real science' which is one and unified) versus anti-rationalism, which is utterly relativist. Anti-rationalism he can then jammer as abandoning truth as well as science, as giving away rational and intelligent (and effective) methods, and as accordingly self-defeating in arguing for ameliorating social change (see p.51). 4 Albert, Z Papery, p.51. 5 One sample from half a page of 'balancing criticism' in Albert, p.50. 6 Albert, p.56. 7 Like Neurath in his boat, a favourite image of the American intellectual establishment. 8 Chomsky, Z papery. �3 The last are variants upon (Albert's) methods of standard logic (consistency-based) and rules of evidence. Discussion or debate has accordingly been narrowed (in broad form): 1. by a rationality constraint 2. by explication of rationality through a standard system (by consistency, maximum expected utility, etc.). Pictorially: rational inquiry standard rational inquiry discussion/ inquiry Short of some instruction on this matter... new procedures or ideas to replace the old...we are reduced to primal screams.^ That is hardly so. Almost everyone is familiar with inquiries, debates, arguments and generally procedures that do not proceed rationally, by any means or standards, but which do not reduce to screams (though some no doubt do). Regrettably few, by contrast, are familiar with aZ^rnaf/ve systems of rationality and logic by which inquiry and so forth can proceed, quite rationally. These alternatives confound and upset realism and the Enlightenment Project.^ That impact of alternatives on the Enlightenment Project—an impact not recognised or acknowledged by realists—is a main topic to be pursued. But first the uniform, definite realist Project. The Project itself which persists. The Enlightenment Project can be drawn out of standard accounts of the Enlightenment and the world discerned under it. The Project involved proceeding in accord with Enlightenment practices and in bringing its vision to fruition. First, then, a revealing picture ot 9 Chomsky continuing Z Papery, p.52. 10 The useful term Project coalesces in the course of the debate. In the course of trying to shame and chastise left intellectuals and left counterparts for their neglect of human concerns, of emancipation, removal of oppresion and similar, Chomsky assigns a central place to the "project of the Enlightenment" in serving emancipation, in displacing oppressors, removing monopolies of the powerful, and supplying liberating information and technology. That expression which he has drawn from essays he is commenting upon, quickly contracts to "the Enlightenment project (same page, p.57). My own opinion is that Chomsky has grossly overestimated the positive role of the Enlightenment Project in achieving emancipation and social amelioration. Patently too, he similarly underrates environmental negativities and externalities of implementations of the Project. �4 the world discerned by the Enlightenment and the associated ideology (drawn from Berlin), and secondly the sort of accompanying Project which that yields. The world discerned was a rational scientific world conforming to 'materialism, utilitarianism, ethical naturalism and atheism': Whatever the differences that divided the French /z/zzZagop/z^g and their disciples in other countries...there existed nevertheless a wide ca/zg^zzgzzg: it rested on an acceptance of what was in effect, a secular version of the old natural law doctrine according to which the nature of things possessed a permanent unalterable structure, differences and changes in the world being subject to universal and immutable laws. These laws were discoverable in principle by the use of r^agozz and controlled observation, of which the methods of the natural gcz^zzc^g constituted the most successful application. The most powerful instrument in the acquisition of knowledge was held to be mathematics... f/ze /zaf/z fo ^nawZ^g^ wag f/zaf q/V/z^ na/araZ gcz^zzc^g; that is to say, all statements with claims to truth must be public, communicable, testable—capable of verification or falsification by methods open to and accepted by any rational investigator. From this it followed that aZZ ar/z^r %?^g q/aza/zarzZy w^re R? and in particular such foundations of faith as sacred texts, divine revelation and the dogmatic pronouncements of its authorised interpreters, tradition, prescription, immemorial wisdom, private intuition and all other forms of non-rational or transcendent sources of putative knowledge. This principle was held to apply to both the human and the non-human world: to abstract disciplines, such as logic or mathematics, to the applied sciences which established the laws of the behaviour of inanimate bodies, plants, animals and human beings, and to the normative disciplines which revealed the true nature of ultimate human goals, and the correct rules of conduct, public and private, social and political, moral and aesthetic. According to this doctrine, aZZ g^KZ/z/ig qz/^gaozzg were zzz qrznczqZe azzgweraZzZe.* rraf/z wag one, error multiple; the true answers must of necessity be universal and immutable, that is, true everywhere, at all times, for all men, and discoverable by the appropriate use of reason, by relevant experience, observation and the methods of experiment, logic, calculation. A logically connected structure of rules, laws, generalisations, susceptible of demonstration or, at least in practice, of a high degree of confirmation (and, where required, of application appropriate to differing circumstances) could, at least in principle, be constructed, and could replace the chaotic amalgam of ignorance, laziness, guesswork, superstition, prejudice, dogma, fantasy, and, above all, what Helvetius called 'interested error', which enabled the cunning and the strong to dominate and exploit the stupid, ignorant and weak, and had throughout human history been largely responsible for the vices, follies and miseries of mankind. Only knowledge, that is, the growth of the sciences, could rescue mankind from these largely self-induced evils. Some believed that certainty in empirical matters was attainable, others that no more than high probability could be achieved; some were pessimistic about progress towards virtue or happiness, others were more sanguine. But the majority of the q/zzZagaq/z^g were agreed that if irrational passions could be controlled, and ignorance, prejudice, fear and greed diminished, an end could be made to the worst confusions in �5 human thought and feelings, which led to blind fanaticism in thought and savage barbarism in practice. ** Though we should contest very many of those claims, it would be foolish to deny that there was that was enlightened, by comparison with what had gone before, in Enlightenment proposals. 12 In many respects, the proposals were socially and otherwise enlightened, though definitely not environmentally so. Proper affords a brief convenient way of alluding to the prime aims and objectives of the Enlightenment, which largely coincide with those of modern secular science broadly construed. Central among emphasized objectives were: pursuit of the truth; exact deployment of rational methods, including logical argumentation; reliance on science and especially rigorous empirical procedures. A suitable mnemonic would be TRASH, (short for truth and reason, and science and (atheistic) humanism). The Project also included these components: * as regards of rational and scientific practice and methods, and of other methods, such as those depending upon closed authority, private or organisational revelation, magic and so on. * bringing to^h/mon.* the intelligent inhabitants of the Earth (humans) in particular in their practice; corollaries are extensive, and include and programs (e.g. humans have to be in a position to use their intelligence, and not ill, disabled, enslaved, etc.); o&raMimg that accessible correct information. For all its apparent merits, the project had, and has, a large downside. For example, the Project underwrites monopolies and elites, namely those who held control of the correct methods, the right procedures. It brings in its train all those strait-jacketing features now so familiar in scientific and intellectual life: experts, technocracy, the peer group process, procedural correctness, scientific accountability, and so on. (Plurallistic criticism will pull the blocks from under all this familiar rigmarole.) What looks even worse (from outside), main oppositional groups assume a similar set of assumptions. Present monopolies and elites are simply mistaken about the truth, which they have no monopoly upon and do not even hold. Nonetheless truth will out (e.g. with enough publicity or disguised propaganda, when the public wake up or become informed, or whatever). Then that opposition, in possession of truth and rationality (or its relevant variants, 11 Berlin pp. 162-4. 12 See DP, final chapter. A critique of both the Enlightenment project and its Anti-Enlightenment alternatives is offered in this work. �6 facts and consistency, etc.) will triumph. These oppositional groups have premissed their opposition upon similar monistic illusions (but nor is pluralistic truth hidden away in the background). 13 Criticism of the Project: trashing TRASH. As a sidelight, the Project was in principle. It implied that there was a set of methods by which any sought piece of knowledge could be obtained. But given the logical systematization the Project presumed (with its consistency requirements, etc.), there are no such methods; there are inevitable limitations to knowledge.^ The problems with the Project are not restricted to knowledge and information. The idea that all genuine questions are in principle answerable is similarly flawed. As there are unknowable truths, so there are unanswerable questions. As a result, the Project has to withdraw, to retract some of its sweeping claims—else it fragments, admitting different logical theories which skirt the limitations, in different ways. Much as with naive set theory, where consistencizing repairs yield many competing alternatives, none intellectually decisive, so it is elsewhere. Paradoxes and puzzles produce a plurality or "solutions". Likewise, and in any case, the Project fragments, or rather plurallizes, so it can be argued. But, most important for present purposes the Project fragmented, and was to fragment. The Project breaks up into a plurality—of projects, frameworks, ideologies, and so forth— because of of one sort or another. Fundamental among these are alternative systems of logic, alternative correct systems, and therewith of alternative frameworks of reason and rationality. As von Wright has contended, "there is not one logic which is But from such a plurality of logics derives a plurality of reasoning and rational procedures, and therewith of all theoretical domains deploying logical methods. From 13 Most of my own experience confirms the contention (defended at the beginning of JB) that truth, even in fairly degenerate forms, win not out. Certainly not on its own; but I grant that we should be working and agitating to force truth (plural) out. Even then truth may not emerge and be recognised in time, before people are hanged, or species or cultures lost. The traditional tag is itself infected with falsity. The erroneous assumption that truth (similarly reason) will win out on its own, without agitation or political activity is also a prime reason, or excuse, for much academic and scientific inactivity and complacency. An associated illusion in that f/7^y have grasped the truth or, if not, have a better grasp upon it (now singular) than any others. It is an illusion shared with—what enjoys significantly less respectable evidence—monistic religion. 14 Details are given in NL. 15 Havas, agreeing with von Wright's thesis (presented in his 'Logic unified ), p.149. �7 these flow, directly or by analogous arguments, alternatives elsewhere, indeed everywhere in sciences and arts.*6 Alternative is intended to take in a wide sweep of alternatives: alternative logics, alternative mathematical systems, alternative theories or theoretical systems more generally, alternative cultural arrangements, and shifting definitely down to a semantical level, alternative actual worlds, alternative realities, and so on. An obvious reaction—had all the alternatives now (beginning to be) appreciated been systematically assembled at once, in an appropriate show of alternative strength—should have been pluralization of the Enlightenment Project. Each viable system of alternatives would have its own project or set of projects. There would be enlightenmenty.^ But, for one thing, the alternatives did not appear historically all at once, but in dribs and drabs; for another, some have not yet been widely appreciated at all (e.g. alternative logics, alternative rules of evidence, alternative rational methods). So alternatives and diversity could be fought off or assimilated.is For yet another, some unwarranted reactions occurred, which both neglected and further information did little to justify These included for instance, outright rejection of the Project, and debilitating relativisation.^ Most philosophers, indeed most intellectuals of scientific disposition, are still caught up in the Enlightenment Project, in what should be a defunct Project. References M. Albert (ed.), I. Berlin, A. Gare, AWZAw?i 1(4), Oct-Dec 1992. , Hogarth Press, London, 1979. , Eco-Logical Press, Bungendore, 1994. K. Havas, "Differences in the unity", AnaZy^ 14(1986) 149-150. R. Routley, "Necessary limits to knowledge: unknowable truths"; referred to as NL. R. Routley, ExpZormg Jt/ngZ^ #7izZ RryonJ, Australian National University 1980; referred to as JB. R. Sylvan, PZ^raZZ/^w, Bungendore, 1994; referred to as DP. 16 Detailed arguments are assembled in DP. 17 It seems a similar plural development should have occurred with oriental religions, such as Buddhism, advocating enlightenment. But religions tend to fossilize. 18 Consider? for instance the search for uniformity and commonality which is often implausible, as at more than a superficial level, in ethics or aesthetics. 19 Rival forms have evolved and developed. Thus what was Anti-Enlightenment became Post­ modernism, including both Nihilism and Egalitarian Relativism (see Gare). [Also "middle way" needs further explanations ] � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Draft Papers Description An account of the resource Sylvan's literary executor encountered an archive in which “all his projects were current", since manuscripts were undated and unattributed. Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document 9/5/95 IMPACT OF ALTERNATIVE SYSTEMS ON THE ENLIGHTENMENT PROJECT There is a recent debate, arising out of older debates, concerning logic, rationality, truth, science and, more sweepingly, the Enlightenment Project. It is a debate where the concentrated intellectual superpower formed from those substantially committed to the Project is matched against dispersed anti- or counter-Enlightenment forces, and so confronted with protracted guerilla activity. Historically furthermore, the scattered and diverse counter-movement has taken various different forms at different times. In the main respects the recent debate has crystallised into one between definite realism and an egalitarian relativism (as revealed in a useful working example, the debate in Z Papery Oct-Dec 1992). Let's call these sides rea/^m and re/af/VLym for short, though the divisions are more complex than that (for one reason, because "realism" comprehends an idealist "anti-realism", and "relativism" includes "constructive" forms). The contrast is invariably presented (as in the debate in Z Papery) as between f/te ane correct theory, that ultimately delivered by Science, on the one side, and many stories, many points of view perhaps equally good, on the other.i But, presented thus, it is almost obvious that what is offered affords a/a/.ye contrast. For omitted are alternatives with more than one correct account (some of these accounts perhaps better than others), but with many other stories faulted. For instance, neglected is my own preferred /mJiPe way, which recognises many correct accounts, none absolute, and many defective stories.2 Such further plurallistic alternatives are not glimpsed for several reasons: one is a false underlying absolute (one) verytAy relative (many) dichotomy^; another is a false (also absolute) character accredited to received 1 See Albert's Editorial, p.2, and the clearly stated position of 'the three defendents', namely Albert, Chomsky and Ehrenreich. It is both curious and revealing that the debate should have taken f/?A polarized course, given the question addressed to 'the six critics' (of the Enlightenment Project). Namely, 'Do we need to reject/transcend/escape an old way of thinking variously called Western Rationality/Science/Logic if we are to attain a better world? (quoted p.17). Put differently, what is role of received "enlightenment" in a/! Amelioration Project? Because of these <%/erenf issues there is much (loose) arguing at cross-purposes in Z Papers 2 Such a way is elaborated in DP. 2 logic and scientific methodology. Thus a longer subtitle for the present exercise might well run: the concerning logic, rationality, science, truth and all that: the Enlightenment Project and its Enemies, a pluralistic resolution. Realists take their stand on the basis of received logic and scientific methodology, typically as if that were an indisputable given, in great intellectual shape. A couple of statements will confirm this: ... we do not have to transcend science or rationality as a prerequisite to developing worthy vision and strategy... logic and the roles of evidence are here to stay. Moreover, they're on our side.4 Even some small criticism of science is justified; for instance 'science is sometimes narrow, mechanical, colonizing or hypocritical'.$ What lie beyond such critical reach are rationality, reason and logic; '... to critique reason or logic as being at the root of sciences many ills is wrong' 'and has no role in making the world better'. Despite extensive left political activity, 'I have not once criticized rationality or logic, and anti-intellectualism has always been anathema to me'.6 Others appear fractionally more cautious about reason and logic (not Science!): ...in a discussion...there are certain familiar ground rules: those of rational inquiry, ... what seems to be under discussion here is whether we should abide by these ground rules at all (trying to improve them as we proceed?). If the answer is that we are to abide by them, then the discussion is over: we've implicitly accepted the legitimacy of rational inquiry. If they are to be abandoned, then we cannot proceed until we learn what replaces the commitment to consistency, responsibility to fact, and other out-dated notions.^ Before a final quoted sentence rounding off this passage notice the equations made: procedures in a discussion (ground rules) = methods of rational inquiry = commitment to consistency, responsibility to fact, etc. 3 Conspicuous in Albert's own efforts. Albert attempts to recast the multi-faceted debate in these elementary white and black terms: rationality and science 'real science' which is one and unified) versus anti-rationalism, which is utterly relativist. Anti-rationalism he can then jammer as abandoning truth as well as science, as giving away rational and intelligent (and effective) methods, and as accordingly self-defeating in arguing for ameliorating social change (see p.51). 4 Albert, Z Papery, p.51. 5 One sample from half a page of 'balancing criticism' in Albert, p.50. 6 Albert, p.56. 7 Like Neurath in his boat, a favourite image of the American intellectual establishment. 8 Chomsky, Z papery. 3 The last are variants upon (Albert's) methods of standard logic (consistency-based) and rules of evidence. Discussion or debate has accordingly been narrowed (in broad form): 1. by a rationality constraint 2. by explication of rationality through a standard system (by consistency, maximum expected utility, etc.). Pictorially: rational inquiry standard rational inquiry discussion/ inquiry Short of some instruction on this matter... new procedures or ideas to replace the old...we are reduced to primal screams.^ That is hardly so. Almost everyone is familiar with inquiries, debates, arguments and generally procedures that do not proceed rationally, by any means or standards, but which do not reduce to screams (though some no doubt do). Regrettably few, by contrast, are familiar with aZ^rnaf/ve systems of rationality and logic by which inquiry and so forth can proceed, quite rationally. These alternatives confound and upset realism and the Enlightenment Project.^ That impact of alternatives on the Enlightenment Project—an impact not recognised or acknowledged by realists—is a main topic to be pursued. But first the uniform, definite realist Project. The Project itself which persists. The Enlightenment Project can be drawn out of standard accounts of the Enlightenment and the world discerned under it. The Project involved proceeding in accord with Enlightenment practices and in bringing its vision to fruition. First, then, a revealing picture ot 9 Chomsky continuing Z Papery, p.52. 10 The useful term Project coalesces in the course of the debate. In the course of trying to shame and chastise left intellectuals and left counterparts for their neglect of human concerns, of emancipation, removal of oppresion and similar, Chomsky assigns a central place to the "project of the Enlightenment" in serving emancipation, in displacing oppressors, removing monopolies of the powerful, and supplying liberating information and technology. That expression which he has drawn from essays he is commenting upon, quickly contracts to "the Enlightenment project (same page, p.57). My own opinion is that Chomsky has grossly overestimated the positive role of the Enlightenment Project in achieving emancipation and social amelioration. Patently too, he similarly underrates environmental negativities and externalities of implementations of the Project. 4 the world discerned by the Enlightenment and the associated ideology (drawn from Berlin), and secondly the sort of accompanying Project which that yields. The world discerned was a rational scientific world conforming to 'materialism, utilitarianism, ethical naturalism and atheism': Whatever the differences that divided the French /z/zzZagop/z^g and their disciples in other countries...there existed nevertheless a wide ca/zg^zzgzzg: it rested on an acceptance of what was in effect, a secular version of the old natural law doctrine according to which the nature of things possessed a permanent unalterable structure, differences and changes in the world being subject to universal and immutable laws. These laws were discoverable in principle by the use of r^agozz and controlled observation, of which the methods of the natural gcz^zzc^g constituted the most successful application. The most powerful instrument in the acquisition of knowledge was held to be mathematics... f/ze /zaf/z fo ^nawZ^g^ wag f/zaf q/V/z^ na/araZ gcz^zzc^g; that is to say, all statements with claims to truth must be public, communicable, testable—capable of verification or falsification by methods open to and accepted by any rational investigator. From this it followed that aZZ ar/z^r %?^g q/aza/zarzZy w^re R? and in particular such foundations of faith as sacred texts, divine revelation and the dogmatic pronouncements of its authorised interpreters, tradition, prescription, immemorial wisdom, private intuition and all other forms of non-rational or transcendent sources of putative knowledge. This principle was held to apply to both the human and the non-human world: to abstract disciplines, such as logic or mathematics, to the applied sciences which established the laws of the behaviour of inanimate bodies, plants, animals and human beings, and to the normative disciplines which revealed the true nature of ultimate human goals, and the correct rules of conduct, public and private, social and political, moral and aesthetic. According to this doctrine, aZZ g^KZ/z/ig qz/^gaozzg were zzz qrznczqZe azzgweraZzZe.* rraf/z wag one, error multiple; the true answers must of necessity be universal and immutable, that is, true everywhere, at all times, for all men, and discoverable by the appropriate use of reason, by relevant experience, observation and the methods of experiment, logic, calculation. A logically connected structure of rules, laws, generalisations, susceptible of demonstration or, at least in practice, of a high degree of confirmation (and, where required, of application appropriate to differing circumstances) could, at least in principle, be constructed, and could replace the chaotic amalgam of ignorance, laziness, guesswork, superstition, prejudice, dogma, fantasy, and, above all, what Helvetius called 'interested error', which enabled the cunning and the strong to dominate and exploit the stupid, ignorant and weak, and had throughout human history been largely responsible for the vices, follies and miseries of mankind. Only knowledge, that is, the growth of the sciences, could rescue mankind from these largely self-induced evils. Some believed that certainty in empirical matters was attainable, others that no more than high probability could be achieved; some were pessimistic about progress towards virtue or happiness, others were more sanguine. But the majority of the q/zzZagaq/z^g were agreed that if irrational passions could be controlled, and ignorance, prejudice, fear and greed diminished, an end could be made to the worst confusions in 5 human thought and feelings, which led to blind fanaticism in thought and savage barbarism in practice. ** Though we should contest very many of those claims, it would be foolish to deny that there was that was enlightened, by comparison with what had gone before, in Enlightenment proposals. 12 In many respects, the proposals were socially and otherwise enlightened, though definitely not environmentally so. Proper affords a brief convenient way of alluding to the prime aims and objectives of the Enlightenment, which largely coincide with those of modern secular science broadly construed. Central among emphasized objectives were: pursuit of the truth; exact deployment of rational methods, including logical argumentation; reliance on science and especially rigorous empirical procedures. A suitable mnemonic would be TRASH, (short for truth and reason, and science and (atheistic) humanism). The Project also included these components: * as regards of rational and scientific practice and methods, and of other methods, such as those depending upon closed authority, private or organisational revelation, magic and so on. * bringing to^h/mon.* the intelligent inhabitants of the Earth (humans) in particular in their practice; corollaries are extensive, and include and programs (e.g. humans have to be in a position to use their intelligence, and not ill, disabled, enslaved, etc.); o&raMimg that accessible correct information. For all its apparent merits, the project had, and has, a large downside. For example, the Project underwrites monopolies and elites, namely those who held control of the correct methods, the right procedures. It brings in its train all those strait-jacketing features now so familiar in scientific and intellectual life: experts, technocracy, the peer group process, procedural correctness, scientific accountability, and so on. (Plurallistic criticism will pull the blocks from under all this familiar rigmarole.) What looks even worse (from outside), main oppositional groups assume a similar set of assumptions. Present monopolies and elites are simply mistaken about the truth, which they have no monopoly upon and do not even hold. Nonetheless truth will out (e.g. with enough publicity or disguised propaganda, when the public wake up or become informed, or whatever). Then that opposition, in possession of truth and rationality (or its relevant variants, 11 Berlin pp. 162-4. 12 See DP, final chapter. A critique of both the Enlightenment project and its Anti-Enlightenment alternatives is offered in this work. 6 facts and consistency, etc.) will triumph. These oppositional groups have premissed their opposition upon similar monistic illusions (but nor is pluralistic truth hidden away in the background). 13 Criticism of the Project: trashing TRASH. As a sidelight, the Project was in principle. It implied that there was a set of methods by which any sought piece of knowledge could be obtained. But given the logical systematization the Project presumed (with its consistency requirements, etc.), there are no such methods; there are inevitable limitations to knowledge.^ The problems with the Project are not restricted to knowledge and information. The idea that all genuine questions are in principle answerable is similarly flawed. As there are unknowable truths, so there are unanswerable questions. As a result, the Project has to withdraw, to retract some of its sweeping claims—else it fragments, admitting different logical theories which skirt the limitations, in different ways. Much as with naive set theory, where consistencizing repairs yield many competing alternatives, none intellectually decisive, so it is elsewhere. Paradoxes and puzzles produce a plurality or "solutions". Likewise, and in any case, the Project fragments, or rather plurallizes, so it can be argued. But, most important for present purposes the Project fragmented, and was to fragment. The Project breaks up into a plurality—of projects, frameworks, ideologies, and so forth— because of of one sort or another. Fundamental among these are alternative systems of logic, alternative correct systems, and therewith of alternative frameworks of reason and rationality. As von Wright has contended, "there is not one logic which is But from such a plurality of logics derives a plurality of reasoning and rational procedures, and therewith of all theoretical domains deploying logical methods. From 13 Most of my own experience confirms the contention (defended at the beginning of JB) that truth, even in fairly degenerate forms, win not out. Certainly not on its own; but I grant that we should be working and agitating to force truth (plural) out. Even then truth may not emerge and be recognised in time, before people are hanged, or species or cultures lost. The traditional tag is itself infected with falsity. The erroneous assumption that truth (similarly reason) will win out on its own, without agitation or political activity is also a prime reason, or excuse, for much academic and scientific inactivity and complacency. An associated illusion in that f/7^y have grasped the truth or, if not, have a better grasp upon it (now singular) than any others. It is an illusion shared with—what enjoys significantly less respectable evidence—monistic religion. 14 Details are given in NL. 15 Havas, agreeing with von Wright's thesis (presented in his 'Logic unified ), p.149. 7 these flow, directly or by analogous arguments, alternatives elsewhere, indeed everywhere in sciences and arts.*6 Alternative is intended to take in a wide sweep of alternatives: alternative logics, alternative mathematical systems, alternative theories or theoretical systems more generally, alternative cultural arrangements, and shifting definitely down to a semantical level, alternative actual worlds, alternative realities, and so on. An obvious reaction—had all the alternatives now (beginning to be) appreciated been systematically assembled at once, in an appropriate show of alternative strength—should have been pluralization of the Enlightenment Project. Each viable system of alternatives would have its own project or set of projects. There would be enlightenmenty.^ But, for one thing, the alternatives did not appear historically all at once, but in dribs and drabs; for another, some have not yet been widely appreciated at all (e.g. alternative logics, alternative rules of evidence, alternative rational methods). So alternatives and diversity could be fought off or assimilated.is For yet another, some unwarranted reactions occurred, which both neglected and further information did little to justify These included for instance, outright rejection of the Project, and debilitating relativisation.^ Most philosophers, indeed most intellectuals of scientific disposition, are still caught up in the Enlightenment Project, in what should be a defunct Project. References M. Albert (ed.), I. Berlin, A. Gare, AWZAw?i 1(4), Oct-Dec 1992. , Hogarth Press, London, 1979. , Eco-Logical Press, Bungendore, 1994. K. Havas, "Differences in the unity", AnaZy^ 14(1986) 149-150. R. Routley, "Necessary limits to knowledge: unknowable truths"; referred to as NL. R. Routley, ExpZormg Jt/ngZ^ #7izZ RryonJ, Australian National University 1980; referred to as JB. R. Sylvan, PZ^raZZ/^w, Bungendore, 1994; referred to as DP. 16 Detailed arguments are assembled in DP. 17 It seems a similar plural development should have occurred with oriental religions, such as Buddhism, advocating enlightenment. But religions tend to fossilize. 18 Consider? for instance the search for uniformity and commonality which is often implausible, as at more than a superficial level, in ethics or aesthetics. 19 Rival forms have evolved and developed. Thus what was Anti-Enlightenment became Post­ modernism, including both Nihilism and Egalitarian Relativism (see Gare). [Also "middle way" needs further explanations ]  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Box 21, Item 705: Draft of Impact of alternative systems on Enlightenment Project Subject The topic of the resource Printout of draft, dated 9 May 1995. Description An account of the resource One of ten papers digitised from item 705. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/browse?search=Richard+Sylvan&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bjoiner%5D=and&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=&amp;range=&amp;collection=&amp;type=&amp;user=&amp;tags=&amp;public=&amp;featured=&amp;exhibit=&amp;geolocation-mapped=&amp;geolocation-address=&amp;geolocation-latitude=&amp;geolocation-longitude=&amp;geolocation-radius=10&amp;submit_search=Search+for+items">Richard Sylvan</a> Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived <span class="MuiTypography-root-125 MuiTypography-body2-126">The University of Queensland's <a data-testid="rek-series" href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/records/search?page=1&amp;pageSize=20&amp;sortBy=score&amp;sortDirection=Desc&amp;searchQueryParams%5Brek_series%5D%5Bvalue%5D=Richard+Sylvan+Papers%2C+UQFL291&amp;searchMode=advanced">Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291</a></span>, Box 21, Item 705 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org">Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy</a> Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1995-05-09 Contributor An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, <a href="https://najtaylor.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Dr. N.A.J. Taylor</a>. Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library. Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource [7] leaves. 19.4 MB. Type The nature or genre of the resource Manuscript Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context <a href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:103a4b1">https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:103a4b1</a> Box 21: More Green Como House Como House > Shelves > Top > Pile 3 https://www.antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/b9fca5817f01bde715e15d193d55a5e6.pdf e836ad9123330e9aedfdc0894abba404 PDF Text Text 3.7.95 GRAND PHILOSOPHIES AND ENVIRONMENTAL CRISES: an initial reports Much of what follows is organised around the following thesis, which it aims to further, to sharpen and to support: mainstream Western philosophy is dismal environmental news, or still more colloquially and generally, mainstream philosophy continues to be bad socio- environmental news. Presumably that expands, in tum, to something like: grander mainstream Western philosophy continues to be a significant factor in the ideologies (or paradigms) that inform destructive social and environmental practices. There are some striking corollaries, among them that, like dialectical material in Eastern Europe, such Western philosophy should be substantially abandoned, its furthering and frequent celebration in the schools and universities discontinued, its place taken by more benign humble alternatives. Sharpening the anti-mainstream thesis. All the qualifications prove to be important. because there are lesser or recessive traditions that are comparatively benign. because small-scale analytic philosophy for example, while likely operating within a damaging paradigm, may have little or no impact on its own (consider the impact of a philosopher who spends all research time on the unexpected examination problem). because classical Taoism affords a counter­ example to the anti-mainstream thesis, virtually however it is sharpened.^ However the qualification is decidedly narrower than need be, and moreover gives a misleading impression. For conspicuous non-Western philosophy, such as Confucianism and Islam, is also dismal news. Other major philosophies can, and do, drive environmental destruction as well. Accordingly too what uniqueness there is to the Western role has to be differently made out, in terms of its special (though perhaps inessential) linkage to industrialization. Although it is expositionally advantageous to highlight present serious predicaments in terms of one thing should be clarified at the outset. It is not essential, or even crm'ca/, to the main arguments outlined that there should be environmental or other crises. It is enough that severe or the like is occurring. Some sort of responsibility for this will afford a solid basis for criticism of a doctrine or practice. 1 The main title evolved from that of Caidera, P/n/o-yo/y/iy C7in.y, who was searching (rather unsuccessfuiiy) for a Latin-American phiiosophy. Some of this report was thought through in Brasi!, under the partial support of FASPEC. 2 See, for instance, the expiication of Taoism in UTD. �2 But, as it happens, conditions for crises are satisfied.^ There are crises conditions in in wany (some of which we will simply allude to, as there is copious documentation). Elsewhere, where crises have not yet broken, there are often near crises conditions. Many there are, of course, conspicuously politicians and economists, still labouring under the impression that the current dominant ideology and its development model is not obsolete, that all is more or less well. They imagine That we are passing through an unusually severe but still cyclical crisis. That all we have to do is stimulate demand through public investment and build up enough business confidence so that there is a recovery of private investment and production. Then we can afford to resume efforts to control environmental and social problems.^ They have misread the signs. The problems are not merely cyclic or temporary; they are intensifying (if in a wavelike pattern, with deterioration surging in, then ebbing somewhat before the next bigger wave). Nor are larger ideological cycles quite the same, though much of the rhetoric is similar from cycle to cycle. No longer is it imagined that social or environmental problems can be substantially resolved next times around business cycles (though the illusion that most of us will be 'better off persists, conveniently buttressed by loaded statistics). Comparisons, features and pedigree. Of course European civilization has more to answer for than its environmental practice, and its extraordinarily destructive impact on natural systems, especially non-European systems. It has to answer also for its impact upon humans, in particular classes, cultures or races marked out as inferior (persisting prominently into this century, emanating from sources of high Western culture). But for many of these human impacts Western philosophy does aat have to answer, by contrast with other impacts. Indicative of dominant environmental attitudes are attitudes towards and treatment of what were, and often still are, seen as lesser humans: slaves, blacks, women, yokels, children, or so on. Take women. Among significant philosophers, virtually the only exception before contemporary times is J.S. Mill, who, under feminine influence, deplored the subjection of women. Unfortunately, for all the brilliant and oft-quoted Millean anti-mainstream passages, Mill himself did not swim far out of the mainstream. Most notably he did not amend his utilitarianism in the direction already contemplated by Bentham, to take passing account of the 3 For definitional details, see GE. For one of numerous summaries of present dire circumstances, see Paleocrassas. 4 Paleocrassas p. 12: one among many voices. �3 interests and sufferings of other animals. Human chauvinism survived, relatively unscathed, for all that Mill deplored loss of flowers and habitats, throughout his works. Features of the anti-mainstream thesis, its justification and relevant qualifications, can be brought out by considering its pedigree. Partial versions of, or variations upon, an anti­ mainstream thesis can be found in several sources; for instance in the deeper-environmental and rival-paradigms productions of the 70s. Consider the following examples: * the contrast of the Cartesian technocratic paradigm with the person planetary paradigm, where destructive environmental attitudes and practices are ascribed to adherence to the CartesianEnlightenment analytic-reductionist mind-set.^ Similar related clusters of contrasts appeared across social sciences, in political science, sociology and economics. For example * the dominant modern paradigm, essentially the same as the Cartesian technocratic paradigm was contrasted, by Rodman, with a benign classical paradigm. * the dominant social paradigm, another version of the same environmentally oppressive schema, was contrasted, by Cotgrove and Duff, with the alternative environmental paradigm. All these and other similar examples were duly elaborated in work on the roles (and limits) of paradigms in environmental thought and action.6 A critical point is that what social scientists were digging up (and reditching) was pretty much what mainstream philosophy was espousing or assuming (and, despite the new global wave of environmentalism, not that much has changed philosophically). It is worth recording that restricted versions of these contrasts (which do not touch basic shallow utilitarian assumptions) are now being presented and considered not only by academic theorists but by bureaucrats and working politicians and economists. Thus for example * a new development model, as contrasted with the current development model, outlined by a member of the European Commission (I. Paleocrassus)—who incidently devotes much space to documenting the present environmental crises (environment construed in a wide sense, to encompass decaying and dangerous urban environments often unfit for human habitation). Many features of the crisis are attributed to a faulty development model, portrayed as once perhaps appropriate, but no longer so? But there is more, much more to it than that. 5 Just such a contrast was elaborated by Drengson, drawing heavily upon Roszak. documentation then, see their work. 6 Thus Routley in an exercise with just that title. Needless to add, paradigms are rough and uneven. Some components of them have much more to answer for than others. For example, possessive individualism with its self-interest hypothesis, has been a particularly damaging part of dominant social ideology. 7 Curiously, though his entire discussion circulates around 'the current development model', what went wrong with it and what might replace it, Paleocrassus never bothers to explain that model or For �4 The current ubiquitous development model did not derive from nothing, but is, in main, an Enlightenment parcel, fuelled by ideals of material progress and the like, which is duly underpinned by the dominant social paradigm.s It is not enough to simply change the development model; what drives it has also to be changed, namely the supporting philosophy. Development of anti-mainstreamism in recent critical philosophy. Differently, impacts of thorough-going (deep) environmental ethics, and of deep ecology, on philosophy and social theory were being assessed. It was observed that very much in mainstream philosophy would have to be jettisoned or substantially modified.^ Heavily targetted were forms of idealism, including phenomenalism and existentialism, and forms of empiricism. But the criticism swept much further, to prevailing metaphysics and 'the limiting ideological principles of both the Renaissance and the Enlightenment". In effect the criticisms extended to mainstream Western civilization. But no doubt claims here are technically different, because, for all the merits of deep positions, it is not usually being suggested that environmental storms could not be weathered to some extent under shallow cover, 10 or that duly environmental but shallow philosophies are in some way responsible for gathering environmental crises. More sweeping anti-mainstream theses have been stated however by Hargrove, by Gare, and by others, including famous philosophers in their latter days.n To the late Heidegger we appear to owe a rather interesting (if abominable) argument, which runs as follows: Western philosophy -> technological mastery (supremacy, dominance) -* environmental destruction — or some such, with ' symbolising leads to, or yields (granted faces a validity issue). to supply its components. But what can be gleaned indicates that it is a submodel of the dominant social paradigm. For instance, we are informed that natural resources are treated as "expendable raw materials or even worse as free goods' (p.24), in effect as without initial value. 8 For details see DP, and in condensed form Sylvan 95. 9 Notably at the end of EE, pp. 188-9. 10 Deep positions significantly on this issue. For it is now widely argued that shallow environmentalism heavy technofix— a common position among scientists—is not going to succeed. 11 See Hargrove and Gare, and the ensuing discussion below in the text. It is a little tempting to suggest that Hargrove presents his thesis as it were by accident, given how little he actually does to defend it. In the main, Hargrove looks as if he is repeating Roszak and Drengson rather than proceeding to a larger sounder claim. �5 If something like this enjoyed plausibility, it would support a philosophy end. 12 That argument is by contraposition, and then thesis: Western transmission from an evident premiss. (Thatcherites and Wittgensteinians and others of a decidedly mixed company, reached a similar conclusion, that philosophy should end, by entirely different, very dubious by-roads.) There are several problems with the Heidegger schema. For one thing, the argument leaves out other critical components of an important environmental impact equation: notably excess human population and excess human consumption. In any event, Heidegger certainly thought that philosophy—as distinct from a quasi- mystical "thought"—should end. But he exaggerated the importance of such an outcome by exaggerating, in characteristic German style, the importance of philosophy, the importance of German philosophy above all. For example he supposed that modern German philosophy influenced the rise of industrialism and all it brought in train. It can be plausibly contended, however, in characteristic disparaging British style, that philosophy had comparatively little influence in such ultimately damaging development as European agricultural and industrial revolutions (for example, technology, but not philosophy, played a role in the invention of artificial dyes, a development which can be seen as setting European industrialization in train:) But such examples do not penetrate deep enough to the conditions of and preparation for change. There are myriad ways in which philosophy has shaped historical developments: through its major input into (other) ideologies such as religions, through its place in politics and law. With Protestant philosophy, in particular, basic ground for industrialism was prepared: the further development of highly exploitative Christian attitudes to nature (and to pagans) and of appropriate attitudes to technology, disciplined education and inculcation of a work ethic, and so on. Or consider, for instance, the fairly direct role of philosophy in the formulation of modern appropriation theories of property (notably by Locke), which enabled dispossession and displacement of native peoples in colonized lands, and are now ceding undue power to exploitative corporations. Consider its less direct role in the preparing ground for industrialization, the presumption that the earth, its habitats and other inhabitants, its natural landforms and its matter were and are of no value, but of value only as transformed by industrial activity, that entrepreneurs were free to do whatever they liked with them. No doubt 12 The form of the argument is extracted from Passmore's end-of-philosophy address (thanks to Passmore too for further comments). The argument is much harder to find in Heidegger's later work. But rudiments are present. The first linkage of philosophy and technology is managed by an extraordinary redefinition of technology (see p.17?). For the second linkage, Heidegger was presumably reflecting upon high destructive technology of war, nuclear weapons and so on. Note however that the middle term has changed; so the argument fails, courtesy of the ancient fallacy of equivocation. �6 many untoward things would have happened without much philosophy, where for instance philosophy had little influence (as with habitat destruction by excessive populations of animals). Unfortunately such examples are exceptions; as a rule, noticed philosophy appears to have helped in underwriting, shaping and even fostering dominant practices. It could regularly have been different: wherever theory operated to influence practice, philosophy could have served negatively, as a prime element of That too could be a significant role for philosophy today. Whatever the extent—arguably, then, very substantial—to which they actually impinge, main philosophical traditions and ideologies do have very negative implications for environmental theory and practice. So much has been argued or alleged, in one fashion or another, in several contemporary sources. 14 For example, Hargrove has recently investigated, in uneven detail, negative implications of mainstream philosophy for three environmental reaches: environmental attitudes concerned with nature and creature preservation, with nature appreciation, and with development of a proper ecological perspective. However Hargrove has ventured some of his particularly challenging themes in insufficiently careful form, thereby leaving himself unnecessarily vulnerable to criticism and counter-claims. These include the criticisms assembled by Attfield, who, though not unsympathetic to Hargrove's case, has excessively weakened the themes. For example, what Attfield presents as 'substantially correct* is Hargrove's 'verdict that the history of philosophy has discouraged preservationist attitudes', vastly less than Hargrove's actual negative verdict which comprehended considerably more than just "preservationist attitudes", and recorded a situation conspicuously worse than mere "discouragement" of nature and creature preservation, as well as much else. Indeed it is worse than Hargrove has charged; Hargrove's indictment of mainstream philosophy is itself weaker than that here ventured, which takes mainstream philosophy as thoroughly implicated in the present escalating environmental mess, through its roles as a major source and supplier of operative ideas and paradigms. There is a single qualification, invoked incidentally by Attfield himself, that would remove much of Attfield's criticism: a restriction to philosophy (or differently, to dominant philosophy in a region). Consider Attfield's exceptions to 'the adverse impacts of Western philosophy', those alleged 'philosophical traditions that have encouraged taking nature seriously':FiryfZy, insofar as the Church Fathers, medieval Christians and others that Attfield alludes to are 13 On the place in philosophy, and in environmental thought in particular, of resistance, see the discussion of Rodman's preferred fourth ideal type, Ecological Resistance, in EE, p.!46ff. 14 For example, see Hargrove, p.21. �7 philosophers at all, they are entirely minor figures, unlikely to be known to many philosophers, and but rarely or never referred to in regular philosophy courses; they do not form part of mainstream philosophy. Consider the sorts of exceptions: * minor philosophers, many of whom we know very little about, outside gossip and speculation, such as Theophrastus, early Stoics, and lesser Epicureans. * figures who are only secondarily or marginally philosophers, such as Hooke, Boyle, Ray and Evelyn. * medieval and early modem Christians, who typically are not significant philosophers, and in fact were usually not committed to nature preservation and the like, but to nature management or perfection. 5<?C(?K(7Zy, these minor figures do not afford the clear support for his claims that Attfield has regularly assumed.^ Many of the statements supposed to offer support are ambivalent, or environmentally dubious, supporting some form of managerialism (e.g. perfectionism or stewardship). And in any case they have to be set against the remainder of what a figure says and does (so far as that can be ascertained), often telling against substantial environmental sensitivity and concern. As regards the latter matter, there are, inversely, isolated claims in major philosophers (Plato is regularly cited in this regard) which may make them appear environmentally aware and even sympathetic. Although Plato's philosophy generally suggests that he neither knew or cared about environmental problems, one passage in the shows that he was very much aware of at least one problem: the effect of deforestation on soil quality in Greece during his own lifetime.^ Unfortunately Hargrove does but a comparatively poor job in accounting for what he alleges, Plato's indifference and lack of ecological concern. 17 The reasons for Plato's indifference to serious ecological degradation of forests and soils in Greece can be ascribed to a combination of several elements of Plato's philosophy (a natural­ world-dismissive ideology) including: elevation of transcendental forms as what was truly real and really of value; denigration and dismissal of the everyday natural world as utterly inferior, of entirely lower existence or even illusory, and certainly not of rational concern. This dualistic 15 In work referred to on p. 127. The main historical claims, many of them based on secondary sources, are stated in his 77:c EtAZcj of EnvZronwcnto/ Concern. A more detailed criticism of these claims will be attempted elsewhere. 16 Hargrove, p.29. 17 This sort of problem arises not merely in regard to Plato, as Attfield observes, with decided relish. There is little doubt but that what Attfield pronounces as Hargrove's historical "excess" needs to be sharpened and much elaborated, and, in some critical areas, rectified. �8 ontology and axiology—a wonderfully valuable world of forms standing in complete contrast with the illusory material world of perception—was supplemented and reinforced by a corresponding epistemology. Under a tripartite theory of mind, the higher rational part, which gave epistemic access to the forms, a part exhibited only by humans and more elevated beings, was sharply separated from the two lower animal parts. Thus under Plato's conception of the human, humans and especially the important rational component of the human, stood in opposition to nature; the distinctively human task is completely separate from nature and concerned with control of it and its unruly elements. It is because what really has value— rational selves cavorting among the forms—is separate from nature, transcending it, with nature at best comprising very inferior copies, of lower existence, that it does not matter what happens to the earth and earthly things, to mere matter. That is a matter of indifference. A significantly better critical exercise, as regards not merely Plato, but the extensive and important neo-Platonic tradition, is effected by Gare, who also advances however an insufficiently specified version of the anti-mainstream thesis. In fact Gare tends to slide back and forth from Western civilization and metaphysics, both of which are too wide, to mechanistic materialism (and social Darwinism), which is much too narrow, particularly if social Darwinism is included (about which Gare vacillates). The latter leaves out such damaging sources as Cartesianism and contemporary idealism; the former would include the recessive Western metaphysical tradition Gare wants to refurbish, what has grown into process" philosophy. So while there is a great deal of worthwhile historical documentation to be found in Gare, the target thesis has so far eluded his critical exercise. While the restriction of the anti-mainstream thesis to Western doctrine is both somewhat misleading and more confining than need be, that to mainstream is different. Something of the sort is essential. But it itself raises other difficulties, beginning with: what counts as How is the image cashed out? A contextual explication is conveniently straightforward, an abstract definition of 'mainstream' in terms of the principal course or flow less helpful. By mainstream Western Philosophy—Western philosophy providing the context—is meant the principal movements in that philosophy, the chief philosophers and schools and their relevant philosophical interrelations. And who and what these are gets shown, nearly ostensively in some cases (with portraits and diagrams), in histories of Western philosophy. 19 Shorter and less encyclopaedia histories in fact tend to portray just the sought 18 On this classical polarisation of nature and higher humanity, see Plumwood. elaboration, see Gare. 19 One admirable example in this regard is B. Russell's of r/ic a popular work with a title that should be viewed henceforth, given that Russell was serious, with some incredulity. For requisite �9 mainstream (that they differ somewhat in coverage does not matter, but emphasizes, in a super- valuational fashion, the blurred edges of this typically vague mainstream). Long histories usually indicate the mainstream both by the way they apportion their space, and also in their judgements as to what is important, which were principal movements, and so on. The essential qualification, to mainstream or similar, is independently grasped by Singer . in his account of the dominant Western paradigm and his brief but pointed criticism of Aristotelianism and mainstream Hebrew and Christian philosophy. The biblical story of creation, in Genesis, makes clear the Hebrew view of the special place of human beings in the divine plan: And God said, Let us make man in our image, after our likeness: and let them have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the fowl of the air, and over the earth, and over every creeping thing that creepeth upon the earth. And God blessed them, and God said upon them, Be fruitful, and multiply, and replenish the earth, and subdue it; and have dominion over the fish of the sea and over the fowl of the air, and over every living thing that moveth upon the earth. Today Christians debate the meaning of this grant of 'dominion'; and those concerned about the environment claim that it should be regarded not as a license to do as we will with other living things, but rather as a directive to look after them on God's behalf, and be answerable to God for the way in which we treat them. There is, however, little justification in the text itself for such an interpretation; and given the example God set when he drowned almost every animal on earth in order to punish human beings for their wickedness, it is no wonder that people should think the flooding of a single river valley is nothing worth worrying about. After the flood there is a repetition of the grant of dominion in more ominous language: And the fear of you and the dread of you shall be upon every beast of the earth, and upon every fowl of the air, upon all that moveth upon the earth, and upon all the fishes of the sea; into your hand are they delivered. The implication is clear: to act in a way that causes fear and dread to everything that moves on the earth is not improper; it is, in fact, in accordance with a God­ given decree. The most influential early Christian thinkers had no doubts about how man's dominion was to be understood. 'Doth God care for oxen?' asked Paul, in the course of a discussion of an Old Testament command to rest one's ox on the sabbath, but it was only a rhetorical question—he took it for granted that the answer must be negative, and the command was to be explained in terms of some benefit to humans. Augustine shared this line of thought; referring to stories in the New Testament in which Jesus destroyed a fig tree and caused a herd of pigs to drown, Augustine explained these puzzling incidents as intended to teach us that 'to refrain from the killing of animals and the destroying of plants is the height of superstition'. It is a little surprising, too, that the usual uncritical apriorism about the natural world and its other inhabitants, should pervade Russell's work. But consider, to take just one example, the inaccurate and demeaning comparison of animals with humans that fires up his neglected analysis �10 When Christianity prevailed in the Roman Empire, it also absorbed elements of the ancient Greek attitude to the natural world. The Greek influence was entrenched in Christian philosophy by the greatest of the medieval scholastics, Thomas Aquinas, whose life work was the melding of Christian theology with the thought of Aristotle. Aristotle regarded nature as a hierarchy in which those with less reasoning ability exist for the sake of those with more: Plants exist for the sake of animals, and brute beasts for the sake of man—domestic animals for his use and food, wild ones (or at any rate most of them) for food and other accessories of life, such as clothing and various tools. Since nature makes nothing purposeless or in vain, it is undeniably true that she has made all animals for sake of man. In his own major work, the -Sr/Twym Aquinas followed this passage from Aristotle almost word for word, adding that the position accords with God's command, as given in Genesis. In his classification of sins, Aquinas has room only for sins against God, ourselves, or our neighbours. There is no possibility of sinning against non-human animals, or against the natural world. This was the thinking of CArz-sTzamry for at least its Erst eighteen centuries. There were gentler spirits, certainly, like Basil, John Chrysostom, and Francis of Assisi, but for most of Christian history they have had no significant impact on the dominant tradition. It is therefore worth emphasising ... major features of this because these features can serve as a point of comparison when we discuss different views of the natural environment. According to the dominant Western tradition, the natural world exists for the benefit of human beings. God gave human beings dominion over the natural world, and God does not care how we treat it. Human beings are the only morally important members of this world. Nature itself is of no intrinsic value, and the destruction of plants and animals cannot be sinful, unless by this destruction we harm humans beings.^ Singer goes on to labour the familiar point that anthropocentrism of this harsh tradition need not exclude some concern for the preservation of nature. But for most of recorded history it has not included much concern. Moreover, lesser Christian alternatives, notably stewardship and perfectionism, whiie they lessen some of the brutal impact of domination upon the natural world, offer little improvement upon longer term invidious environmental erosion, or as regards retention of now emphasized desiderata: retention of wilderness, and maintenance and enhancement of biodiversity. As disturbingly, the rival humanist paradigm of modem times, running from the French enlightenment through 20th century Anglo-American empiricism, as exemplified in Russell, Ayer and Quine among many other luminaries, differs from mainstream Christianity only in leaving God out of the account (as He does not exist, He is utterly impotent, so to illicitly say). Exceptional human features themselves, naturalistically achieved, justify dominion and domination. 20 Singer pp.265-8, itals added. Singer prefers (historical linkage diminished) discourse. discourse to the substantially equivalent �11 Outline of a main argument Detailed argument for the anti-mainstream thesis, as refined, is, so to say, case by case, through cases in the mainstream history, considering main philosophers and main schools. Some of this hard piecemeal work, some already illustrated, has been carried out, in more or less detail by others: Drengson, Gare, Hargrove, Heidegger and Passmore, among many others. But, within that uneven treatment, there remain conspicuous gaps. For example, among the principal 17th century rationalists, while there is much material upon Descartes (along now with a conservative back-lash defending Descartes), and some increasingly divisive material upon Spinoza, there is little at all on Leibnitz. As there is no prospect here of reworking the dismal history of Western philosophy, case by case, let us consider a few illustrative examples, which help plug some obvious gaps. Take again the distinguished early modern rationalists—Descartes, Leibnitz and Spinoza— as examples. Descartes' significant negative contribution is now well-known, so much so that Descartes is sometimes represented as the main villain of the environmental pieced Owing to the premature enthusiasm of various deep ecologists for Spinoza's contribution, the blacker environmental feature of Spinoza's theory have been enthusiastically exposed to view by a jubilant opposition. As a result, some deep ecologists have back-tracked, but only a little: Some Spinoza scholars have recently claimed that an ecological interpretation of Spinozism is not justified. There are notes in the where Spinoza says that we can treat other animals in any way which best suits us. [These authors] have argued that although the metaphysics is nonanthropocentric, the ethics is rightfully anthropocentric. Schopenhauer, who was steeped in Eastern philosophy, was quick to pick up on the anomolous attitude of Spinoza toward other animals: "Spinoza's contempt for animals, as mere things for our use, and declared by him to be without right, is thoroughly Jewish, and in conjunction with pantheism is at the same time absurd and abominable." Ame Naess and I agree that Schopenhauer was correct in his criticism of Spinoza. Naess admits that although Spinoza himself was what we would now call a "speciesist", his system is not speciesist.^ If Spinoza's system includes his anthropocentric ethics (and is not illegitimately restricted to an ecologically convenient selection from his holistic metaphysics), then it seems Naess is astray. The negative character of Spinoza's contribution was rediscovered by Bookchin (unversed in basic deep ecological texts), who applies this finding to lambast deep ecology regarding "double standards' in its one-sided treatment of philosophers and philosophical traditions. Spinoza, for example is cast frequently as a nouveau Taoist and is interpreted more in the romantic tradition than in the scholastic one to which he has more affinities, despite his many differences with medieval thinkers. That this great thinker was militantly anthropocentric is consistently ignored by deep 21 Thus for example by Drengson. 22 Session, in Appendix D to Devall and Sessions, p.240. �12 ecologists, as far as I have been able to ascertain. I have yet to encounter any attempt to explain Spinoza's extraordinary statement: "Besides man, we know of no particular thing in nature in whose mind we may rejoice, and whom we can associate with ourselves in friendship or any sort of fellowship; therefore, whatsoever there be in nature besides man, a regard for our advantage does not call on us to preserve, but to preserve or destroy according to its various capabilities, and to adapt to our use as best we may."23 So much for sensitive treatment of natural environments and their other inhabitants! Spinoza appears to have irreparably damaged any claim to exceptional positive standing. So far the third of the great rationalist trio, Leibnitz, appears to have escaped critical re­ appraisal (in an overdue history of philosophy). Yet, as it happens, Leibnitz's position can be applied to illustrate features of considerable green generality. In brief, any philosophy is liable to be environmentally unfriendly that guarantees satisfaction of all or enough elements of the consumption impact equation, and so would generate excessive impacts. Leibnitz's overall position does just that. Consider what might be called in honour of Leibnitz (though Leibnitz's fragmentary work did not initiate any genuine historic school). Leibnitz was heavily committed to all of human population growth, unfettered technological advance, and human lifestyles of consumption, in short, to precisely those factors that combine in the familiar impact recipe to produce excessive human impacts upon environments. There is fair evidence for these contentions. First, Leibnitz was an early exponent of utilitarianism, indeed he was all­ round an enthusiastic maximizer. From his formulation of utilitarianism, he drew an immediate obvious corollary: the directive to increase human population (maximizing on aggregate human pleasure is most obviously achieved by production of more happy humans, other aspects of which technology and affluence can assure).24 Secondly, Leibnitz was a technology enthusiast: he was heavily committed to the development and use of scientific technology, for which he had all sorts of schemes (e.g. not only the intended to encapsulate all of knowledge in an accessible useable form, a complete calculus duly mechanised, but as well numerous technological projects.25). Thirdly, he was committed to an affluent lifestyle for himself and (through symmetry and basic assumptions of utilitarianism) for others. For his own part, he abandoned an academic career at an obscure German university 'in favour of the 23 Bookchin, p.261. The quotation from Spinoza's 24 For Leibnitz's anticipation of utilitarianism, see Hruschka. For Leibnitz's immediate application of the principle, to support human population increase, see p. 172. 25 'Leibnitz's interest in machinery is illustrated by his complicated plan to drain the Harz mines, which involved the construction of a new type of windmill, and a virtually friction-free pump', Cottingham p. 193. For a detailed account of Leibnitz's extensive entrepreneurial and technological activities, see Aiton. is fully cited in Bookchin. �13 more active and lucrative pursuits of the courtier and diplomat and, so it turned out, the bright lights of major European cities and grand tours of Europe.26 No doubt Leibnitz's lifestyle commitments need not (and may not) be reflected in his philosophy, which may have independent environmental merit, for example as stimulation or input for later developments. There is unfortunately little evidence that that is so. Nonetheless, substantial fragments of Leibnitz's philosophy—of a different unauthentic subphilosophy—do admit environmental bending and adaptation, in a way that Descartes' philosophy does not at all easily. Leibnitz has sometimes been accounted environmentally friendly. Some of that apparent friendliness appears due rather to scholastic conservativism. Thus he was opposed to mechanism; he was sympathetic to the organic and teleological, which did not contract to isolated human and superhuman loci. His metaphysical theory of monads, which are centres of living energy, effectively distributed life everywhere, though not equally. Harmony and order too prevailed throughout the universe, though under God's maximizing management, the presence of which they duly established! But even this life-expanding harmonious order, variants of which are now familiar from Whiteheadian and deep ecological quarters, was not as benign as it has superficially appeared. Leibnitz supposed that, by virtue of pre-established harmony and final causes governing inevitable progress, humans would not go wrong in the longer term in their environmental activities, that they could not make undesirable changes in nature'.27 Leibnitz joyfully foresaw more and more of the Earth coming under cultivation, and its long-term advancement to a complete intensive garden, even if there were occasional relapses where parts deteriorated back temporarily towards wild state. Leibnitz even criticised Cartesianism, now widely regarded as prime villain of the environmental piece, as/^'Zing 'to provide the modal stimulus ... to the control of nature' ... 'to scientific advance'. The idea of control, advancing to total control, total management, is prophesized in Leibnitz (in a sort of chauvinistic Gaia hypothesis). He saw 'order as progressively increasing, with the help of man [as] a finisher of nature. He boldly applauded the idea of progress to the earth as a unit, assuming both an orderliness on earth and an orderliness in the changes it had undergone by man'.28 An important corollary does emerge: that a promising new partial metaphysics is no panacea for improved environmental performance or paradigms. Not merely neutral 26 Cottingham p.24, p.26. 27 Glacken p.478. As he remarks, these bold assumptions made by Leibnitz have proved wrong. The preposterous infallibility-in-practice assumption has resurfaced recently in a less attractive aspect of the Gaia hypothesis as peddled by Lovelock. 28 Glacken p.506. �14 metaphysics, but even positive metaphysics, such as certain organic and process theories, are compatible with, and can be coupled with, damaging philosophies, social theories and life­ styles. It is almost enough to consider the theories and practices, commitments and lifestyles of Aristotle, Leibnitz and Whitehead.29 Things even deteriorated on many fronts under the main philosophical movements that succeeded Leibnitz in Germany, and overwhelmed European and much of Western philosophy for more than a century, namely Kantianism and subsequent German idealism. Virtually all the prominent positions in this philosophical galaxy, in the main strongly supportive of a supposedly enlightened Protestantism, presumed and imposed a blanketing human chauvinism and associated social reductionism. For example, the universal universe of Kantian ethics comprosed the circle of humans (and perhaps super humans) only; nothing else counted, and even the proper treatment of animals (which was at least not entirely neglected) was supposed reduced to that of interhuman relations. Regrettably human chauvinistic assumptions also underlay and handicapped more benign reccessive alternatives in Germany, such as those afforded by Herder and through the much heralded nature romanticism movement. As is widely appreciated now, later parts of the broad German mainstream flowing on from Kant were much more deleterious, neglecting Enlightenment advances and sponsoring elements of Aryan or super-race chauvinism. Things were certainly rather different off the Continent in modern England, but in most environmental respects hardly better. But no doubt a different example is furnished by mainstream British philosophy, a philosophy which has influenced most of the English speaking world for the worse, environmentally and also otherwise. This philosophy is highly empiricist in orientation, a reductionistic ideas, impressions or sense-data empiricism characteristically sharing the anthropocentrism of idealism,. Worse, this empiricism normally expands through ethics and social theory in the form of utilitarianism, typically a possessive individualistic human chauvinistic utilitarianism.30 Despite appearances and propaganda, there has been comparatively little improvement in recent times. For positivism and its irrationalist successors, all ecologically shallow, all committed to technofix and for the most part to social engineering, have been prime 29 Leibnitz's standing in the history of philosophy is somewhat curious. His main achievement, setting aside his reputation as an intellectual wizard with /otj of ideas, appears to be spasmodic work upon a beautiful ruin, an incomplete (and incompletable) metaphysics, of which only tantalizing fragmentary structures were ever available. It is not even as if there is a surviving supply of challenging bad arguments that can be put before baffled students, as with Descartes and Berkeley for instance. 30 For elaboration and defence of these stark claims, see Sylvan 94. �15 philosophical inputs into the physical sciences and also into mainstream economics. Shallow utilitarianism persists as the main philosophical informant of and input into social sciences, including fashionable new areas such as ecological economics, public choice theory, and so on. Incidentally, not much is to be expected in the way of deeper change from contemporary universities and research institutions from where these new fashions emanate. For these places are, by and large, part of the advanced industrial problematic; they are, almost without exception, urbanocentric conjectural-information factories. Unfortunately, the other main movements in Anglo-American philosophy are even more conservative, for example analytic philosophy and its variants, such as conceptual analysis, and Wittgensteinianism. For they leave almost everything as it is, as environmentally unsatisfactory as it is.31 Nor is recent Continental philosophy, a main contrast class, any better, but in many respects worse. Anthropocentric emphases remain heavy in both French and German philosophy, which are the predominant forms. Both existentialism and phenomenalism, as well as passe-isms such as Marxism, are mired in human chauvinism. Social criticism, which has at least seriously addressed wider environmental problems, remains shallow. For example, the communicational theory of Habermas is heavily biassed in favour of articulate humans, and excludes other animals and the rest of creation from any but very secondary roles. Modest out-faH. No doubt the anti-mainstream thesis is not the sort of proposition that most philosophers care to encounter. For one reason, it may seem like offering free ammunition to those who would like to put an end to philosophy, for political or ideological purposes. But it does not: not without a serious confusion of —or end m present dominant form—with end period. Similarly, it may appear to give reinforcement to those who, with scant justification, have prematurely pronounced the end of philosophy.32 But this makes a similar confusion. Spectacular conclusions such as those that have sometimes been drawn from considerations like those assembled—such as, again, the end of philosophy, the demise of grand philosophy, the deconstruction of metaphysics— do not then emerge. For one reason, it is not philosophy that leads to disaster, but only certain sorts of grand philosophy, gray and brown sorts, which accordingly are liable to critical rejection. No end is implied to less grand and greener regional philosophies, recessive metaphysics, or the like. 31 Such a theme is developed, though poorly and in a social setting, by Gellner. His case applies, with even more force, to environmental matters. 32 Later authors tend to appeal back to earlier false prophets, notably Heidegger, who really had no viable arguments for his floated claims. There are other, quite different, equally poor, arguments to an end to philosophy, for instance those to an end of ideology, from the fall of one awful alternative, soviet "communism". And so on; see also above. �16 Development of some recessive alternative or other—different ones—is now a favoured alternative idea (thus Gare and others advocating elaboration of process philosophy, environmentalists favouring ecological paradigms, etc.). But a more effective course, duly pluralistic, looks to locally and regionally based philosophies, with worthwhile linkages with local aspirations and regional cultures.33 Once again, there are philosophies and philosophies—and appalling regional philosophies (e.g. business philosophies, as promoted by local chambers of commerce; fundamentalist philosophies stoked by organised religions). Ways out, if they can be found, lie not through reproduction of dominant destructive ideologies at local levels, but through less damaging alternatives, fitted to ecoregional circumstances. Some broad corollaries of the anti-mainstream thesis are accordingly evident. Philosophy teaching and practice should be drastically reorganised, almost everywhere. Many features of historical approaches would be transformed. "Great thinker" and like series would vanish. Celebratory aspects of philosophy approached through its history would be abandoned: both the mainstream historic emphasis and the celebration. Grand but invariably flawed figures from history would no longer be revered, or celebrated in the same way, even if some of their arguments are retained for exhibition or criticism. There would be new histories of philosophy, different in different regions, with their own pantheons of prominent philosophers, pantheons not set in stone. Nor would systematic philosophy remain unscathed. For its usual operational framework is that of the dominant social paradigm. It would be relocated and reoriented. There woM/J be an end to the transfer of inappropriate models, technology (including logical) and practices (as of temperate agriculture to tropical regions). There would be a reduction in borrowing and unseemly imitations. Borrowed philosophy is inappropriate for Latin America, or elsewhere in the South. Consider French philosophy, which along with Catholicism and Marxism, still tends to swamp what little happens in Latin America. The mileau in which French philosophy occurs is not established, the infrastucture is not in place, namely a variety of literary criticism and like mags, an active cafe society, and so on. French philosophy does not export that well and, by and large, should not be imported, for all its flashy fashionability. Regions should try to do their own appropriate intellectual things, importing only what they really need. Regional philosophies do not, after all, have to start from nothing or nowhere; they can draw upon and adapt what already has some local basis, perhaps a strong base. What is more, they can be directly applied to prevent or delay outside destructive incursions. For illustration, consider the place of tribally recognised values of forests in delaying grand pulpwood and integrated forestry [integrated destruction] projects. Through a 33 No doubt this is an intended idea in Caldera, for all that it is scarcely articulated or developed. Similarly in other productions on Latin-American philosophy. �17 regional network, a mesh of constraints can be introduced, controlling intrusions of unregulated or prejudically regulated international capitalism. Compare a promising strategy for trying to achieve a nuclear free world, building up by free or freed regions. Nor does a c<x.s^ for ideological regionalism have to start from nothing. Some of the arguments for regionalism in organisation also support or suggest regionalization in reaches of ideas, including philosophy. For example, many of the advantages of subsidizarization transfer. Naturalism regionalism does not preclude global linkages; what it should resist are forms of imperialism.^ None of this will be easy, or achieved without effort. Change is generally hard to achieve against inertia. And most intellectuals, for all their craving to be first in little approved ideas, are resistant to extensive change. Moreover the changes modestly proposed will not be simple; there is not, and cannot be, a simple uniform alternative. What is needed is fragmentation, pluralisation, regionalisation—unpopular, unfashionable ideas. References Aiton, E.J., Leibnitz A Biography, Adam Hilger, Bristol, 1985. Attfield, R., TiTyfory env/ronwenf? , Environmental Ethics 13(1991) 127-137. Attfield, R., The Ethics of Environmental Concern, Second edition, University of Georgia Press, Athens, 1991. Bookchin, M., evo/Mf/on', Environmental Ethics 12(1990) c.261. Caldera, A.J., Filosofia e Crise, Pela filosofia latino-americana, Editora Vozes, Petropolis, Brasil, 1984. Devall, B., and Sessions G., Deep Ecology, Salt Lake City, Utah 1985. Drengson, A, Beyond Environmental Crisis: from Techocratic to Planetary Person, Peter Lang, New York, 1989. Gare, A., Nihilism Incorporated, Eco-logical Press, Bungendore N.S.W., 1993. Gellner, E., Words & Things: a critical account of linguistic philosophy and a study of ideology, V. Gollancz, London, 1959. Glacken, C.J., Traces on the Rhodian Shore, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1967. Hargrove, E., Foundations of Environmental Ethics, Prentice Hall, New Jersey, 1989. Heidegger, M., The End of Philosophy, Harper & Row, New York, 1973. 34 Fortunately we have not yet ascended to an edified world philosophy, any more than the worfd car (despite American efforts at globalization, including Solomon and Higgins), but the number of mainstream models is now rather small, and almost all so far are noisy and polluting. �18 Hruschka, J., '77z^ /z^z/z/zzzz^^ /zrzzzcz/?/^ z2zzz7 or/z^r ^z*Zy G^z*z7z#zz azz^zczparzozzj o/ zzrz/z^z*z^zzz r/z^ozy\ UtiHtas 3(2)(1991) 165-177. Passmore, J., '77z^ ^zzz7 o/ ^/zzZojz?/?/zy\ address on the occasion of his 80th birthday, Australian National University, 1994. Paleocrassas, Y., Environmental crime and punishment. Towards a new development model, Austemb, Brussells, 1994. Plumwood, V., Feminism and the Mastery of Nature, Routledge, London, 1993. Roszak, T., Where the Wasteland Ends, Doubleday, Garden City New York, 1972. Russell, B., Wisdom of the West: a historical survey of western philosophy in its social and political setting, Ed. P. Foulkes, MacDonald, London, 1959. Routley, R., azzzZ Zzzzzzt^ o/^r^zgzzz^ zzz ^zzvzrozzzzz^zzrzz/ r/zozzg/zr <xzz<7 acfzozz',Green Series #1, Research School of Social Science, Australian National University, 1982. Solomon, R., and Higgins, K., (eds ), From Africa to Zen, An Invitation to World Philosophy, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Maryland, 1993. Sylvan, R., 'Dozzzzzzazzf 2?rzz7s7z z^o/ogy, wzlTz r^Z^v<azzZ gzzvzrozzzzz^zz^Z coroZZz7z*z^\ typescript, Canberra, 1994. Sylvan, R., 7zzz/?a!cr o/^ZfezTzarzve ^ys't^zzz^ ozz z/z^ EzzZzg/zr^zzzzz^zzy Pro/^cf', typescript, Canberra, 1995. Sylvan, R., Deep Plurallism, typescript, Canberra, 1992: referred to as DP. Sylvan, R. and Bennett, D., The Greening of Ethics, White Horse, Cambridge, 1994: referred to as GE. Sylvan, R. and Bennett, D., Uropzzzj, 7ho azz<7 Eco/ogy', Green Series #19, Research School of Social Science Australian National University, 1990; referred to as UTD. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Draft Papers Description An account of the resource Sylvan's literary executor encountered an archive in which “all his projects were current", since manuscripts were undated and unattributed. Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document 3.7.95 GRAND PHILOSOPHIES AND ENVIRONMENTAL CRISES: an initial reports Much of what follows is organised around the following thesis, which it aims to further, to sharpen and to support: mainstream Western philosophy is dismal environmental news, or still more colloquially and generally, mainstream philosophy continues to be bad socio- environmental news. Presumably that expands, in tum, to something like: grander mainstream Western philosophy continues to be a significant factor in the ideologies (or paradigms) that inform destructive social and environmental practices. There are some striking corollaries, among them that, like dialectical material in Eastern Europe, such Western philosophy should be substantially abandoned, its furthering and frequent celebration in the schools and universities discontinued, its place taken by more benign humble alternatives. Sharpening the anti-mainstream thesis. All the qualifications prove to be important. because there are lesser or recessive traditions that are comparatively benign. because small-scale analytic philosophy for example, while likely operating within a damaging paradigm, may have little or no impact on its own (consider the impact of a philosopher who spends all research time on the unexpected examination problem). because classical Taoism affords a counter­ example to the anti-mainstream thesis, virtually however it is sharpened.^ However the qualification is decidedly narrower than need be, and moreover gives a misleading impression. For conspicuous non-Western philosophy, such as Confucianism and Islam, is also dismal news. Other major philosophies can, and do, drive environmental destruction as well. Accordingly too what uniqueness there is to the Western role has to be differently made out, in terms of its special (though perhaps inessential) linkage to industrialization. Although it is expositionally advantageous to highlight present serious predicaments in terms of one thing should be clarified at the outset. It is not essential, or even crm'ca/, to the main arguments outlined that there should be environmental or other crises. It is enough that severe or the like is occurring. Some sort of responsibility for this will afford a solid basis for criticism of a doctrine or practice. 1 The main title evolved from that of Caidera, P/n/o-yo/y/iy C7in.y, who was searching (rather unsuccessfuiiy) for a Latin-American phiiosophy. Some of this report was thought through in Brasi!, under the partial support of FASPEC. 2 See, for instance, the expiication of Taoism in UTD. 2 But, as it happens, conditions for crises are satisfied.^ There are crises conditions in in wany (some of which we will simply allude to, as there is copious documentation). Elsewhere, where crises have not yet broken, there are often near crises conditions. Many there are, of course, conspicuously politicians and economists, still labouring under the impression that the current dominant ideology and its development model is not obsolete, that all is more or less well. They imagine That we are passing through an unusually severe but still cyclical crisis. That all we have to do is stimulate demand through public investment and build up enough business confidence so that there is a recovery of private investment and production. Then we can afford to resume efforts to control environmental and social problems.^ They have misread the signs. The problems are not merely cyclic or temporary; they are intensifying (if in a wavelike pattern, with deterioration surging in, then ebbing somewhat before the next bigger wave). Nor are larger ideological cycles quite the same, though much of the rhetoric is similar from cycle to cycle. No longer is it imagined that social or environmental problems can be substantially resolved next times around business cycles (though the illusion that most of us will be 'better off persists, conveniently buttressed by loaded statistics). Comparisons, features and pedigree. Of course European civilization has more to answer for than its environmental practice, and its extraordinarily destructive impact on natural systems, especially non-European systems. It has to answer also for its impact upon humans, in particular classes, cultures or races marked out as inferior (persisting prominently into this century, emanating from sources of high Western culture). But for many of these human impacts Western philosophy does aat have to answer, by contrast with other impacts. Indicative of dominant environmental attitudes are attitudes towards and treatment of what were, and often still are, seen as lesser humans: slaves, blacks, women, yokels, children, or so on. Take women. Among significant philosophers, virtually the only exception before contemporary times is J.S. Mill, who, under feminine influence, deplored the subjection of women. Unfortunately, for all the brilliant and oft-quoted Millean anti-mainstream passages, Mill himself did not swim far out of the mainstream. Most notably he did not amend his utilitarianism in the direction already contemplated by Bentham, to take passing account of the 3 For definitional details, see GE. For one of numerous summaries of present dire circumstances, see Paleocrassas. 4 Paleocrassas p. 12: one among many voices. 3 interests and sufferings of other animals. Human chauvinism survived, relatively unscathed, for all that Mill deplored loss of flowers and habitats, throughout his works. Features of the anti-mainstream thesis, its justification and relevant qualifications, can be brought out by considering its pedigree. Partial versions of, or variations upon, an anti­ mainstream thesis can be found in several sources; for instance in the deeper-environmental and rival-paradigms productions of the 70s. Consider the following examples: * the contrast of the Cartesian technocratic paradigm with the person planetary paradigm, where destructive environmental attitudes and practices are ascribed to adherence to the CartesianEnlightenment analytic-reductionist mind-set.^ Similar related clusters of contrasts appeared across social sciences, in political science, sociology and economics. For example * the dominant modern paradigm, essentially the same as the Cartesian technocratic paradigm was contrasted, by Rodman, with a benign classical paradigm. * the dominant social paradigm, another version of the same environmentally oppressive schema, was contrasted, by Cotgrove and Duff, with the alternative environmental paradigm. All these and other similar examples were duly elaborated in work on the roles (and limits) of paradigms in environmental thought and action.6 A critical point is that what social scientists were digging up (and reditching) was pretty much what mainstream philosophy was espousing or assuming (and, despite the new global wave of environmentalism, not that much has changed philosophically). It is worth recording that restricted versions of these contrasts (which do not touch basic shallow utilitarian assumptions) are now being presented and considered not only by academic theorists but by bureaucrats and working politicians and economists. Thus for example * a new development model, as contrasted with the current development model, outlined by a member of the European Commission (I. Paleocrassus)—who incidently devotes much space to documenting the present environmental crises (environment construed in a wide sense, to encompass decaying and dangerous urban environments often unfit for human habitation). Many features of the crisis are attributed to a faulty development model, portrayed as once perhaps appropriate, but no longer so? But there is more, much more to it than that. 5 Just such a contrast was elaborated by Drengson, drawing heavily upon Roszak. documentation then, see their work. 6 Thus Routley in an exercise with just that title. Needless to add, paradigms are rough and uneven. Some components of them have much more to answer for than others. For example, possessive individualism with its self-interest hypothesis, has been a particularly damaging part of dominant social ideology. 7 Curiously, though his entire discussion circulates around 'the current development model', what went wrong with it and what might replace it, Paleocrassus never bothers to explain that model or For 4 The current ubiquitous development model did not derive from nothing, but is, in main, an Enlightenment parcel, fuelled by ideals of material progress and the like, which is duly underpinned by the dominant social paradigm.s It is not enough to simply change the development model; what drives it has also to be changed, namely the supporting philosophy. Development of anti-mainstreamism in recent critical philosophy. Differently, impacts of thorough-going (deep) environmental ethics, and of deep ecology, on philosophy and social theory were being assessed. It was observed that very much in mainstream philosophy would have to be jettisoned or substantially modified.^ Heavily targetted were forms of idealism, including phenomenalism and existentialism, and forms of empiricism. But the criticism swept much further, to prevailing metaphysics and 'the limiting ideological principles of both the Renaissance and the Enlightenment". In effect the criticisms extended to mainstream Western civilization. But no doubt claims here are technically different, because, for all the merits of deep positions, it is not usually being suggested that environmental storms could not be weathered to some extent under shallow cover, 10 or that duly environmental but shallow philosophies are in some way responsible for gathering environmental crises. More sweeping anti-mainstream theses have been stated however by Hargrove, by Gare, and by others, including famous philosophers in their latter days.n To the late Heidegger we appear to owe a rather interesting (if abominable) argument, which runs as follows: Western philosophy -> technological mastery (supremacy, dominance) -* environmental destruction — or some such, with ' symbolising leads to, or yields (granted faces a validity issue). to supply its components. But what can be gleaned indicates that it is a submodel of the dominant social paradigm. For instance, we are informed that natural resources are treated as "expendable raw materials or even worse as free goods' (p.24), in effect as without initial value. 8 For details see DP, and in condensed form Sylvan 95. 9 Notably at the end of EE, pp. 188-9. 10 Deep positions significantly on this issue. For it is now widely argued that shallow environmentalism heavy technofix— a common position among scientists—is not going to succeed. 11 See Hargrove and Gare, and the ensuing discussion below in the text. It is a little tempting to suggest that Hargrove presents his thesis as it were by accident, given how little he actually does to defend it. In the main, Hargrove looks as if he is repeating Roszak and Drengson rather than proceeding to a larger sounder claim. 5 If something like this enjoyed plausibility, it would support a philosophy end. 12 That argument is by contraposition, and then thesis: Western transmission from an evident premiss. (Thatcherites and Wittgensteinians and others of a decidedly mixed company, reached a similar conclusion, that philosophy should end, by entirely different, very dubious by-roads.) There are several problems with the Heidegger schema. For one thing, the argument leaves out other critical components of an important environmental impact equation: notably excess human population and excess human consumption. In any event, Heidegger certainly thought that philosophy—as distinct from a quasi- mystical "thought"—should end. But he exaggerated the importance of such an outcome by exaggerating, in characteristic German style, the importance of philosophy, the importance of German philosophy above all. For example he supposed that modern German philosophy influenced the rise of industrialism and all it brought in train. It can be plausibly contended, however, in characteristic disparaging British style, that philosophy had comparatively little influence in such ultimately damaging development as European agricultural and industrial revolutions (for example, technology, but not philosophy, played a role in the invention of artificial dyes, a development which can be seen as setting European industrialization in train:) But such examples do not penetrate deep enough to the conditions of and preparation for change. There are myriad ways in which philosophy has shaped historical developments: through its major input into (other) ideologies such as religions, through its place in politics and law. With Protestant philosophy, in particular, basic ground for industrialism was prepared: the further development of highly exploitative Christian attitudes to nature (and to pagans) and of appropriate attitudes to technology, disciplined education and inculcation of a work ethic, and so on. Or consider, for instance, the fairly direct role of philosophy in the formulation of modern appropriation theories of property (notably by Locke), which enabled dispossession and displacement of native peoples in colonized lands, and are now ceding undue power to exploitative corporations. Consider its less direct role in the preparing ground for industrialization, the presumption that the earth, its habitats and other inhabitants, its natural landforms and its matter were and are of no value, but of value only as transformed by industrial activity, that entrepreneurs were free to do whatever they liked with them. No doubt 12 The form of the argument is extracted from Passmore's end-of-philosophy address (thanks to Passmore too for further comments). The argument is much harder to find in Heidegger's later work. But rudiments are present. The first linkage of philosophy and technology is managed by an extraordinary redefinition of technology (see p.17?). For the second linkage, Heidegger was presumably reflecting upon high destructive technology of war, nuclear weapons and so on. Note however that the middle term has changed; so the argument fails, courtesy of the ancient fallacy of equivocation. 6 many untoward things would have happened without much philosophy, where for instance philosophy had little influence (as with habitat destruction by excessive populations of animals). Unfortunately such examples are exceptions; as a rule, noticed philosophy appears to have helped in underwriting, shaping and even fostering dominant practices. It could regularly have been different: wherever theory operated to influence practice, philosophy could have served negatively, as a prime element of That too could be a significant role for philosophy today. Whatever the extent—arguably, then, very substantial—to which they actually impinge, main philosophical traditions and ideologies do have very negative implications for environmental theory and practice. So much has been argued or alleged, in one fashion or another, in several contemporary sources. 14 For example, Hargrove has recently investigated, in uneven detail, negative implications of mainstream philosophy for three environmental reaches: environmental attitudes concerned with nature and creature preservation, with nature appreciation, and with development of a proper ecological perspective. However Hargrove has ventured some of his particularly challenging themes in insufficiently careful form, thereby leaving himself unnecessarily vulnerable to criticism and counter-claims. These include the criticisms assembled by Attfield, who, though not unsympathetic to Hargrove's case, has excessively weakened the themes. For example, what Attfield presents as 'substantially correct* is Hargrove's 'verdict that the history of philosophy has discouraged preservationist attitudes', vastly less than Hargrove's actual negative verdict which comprehended considerably more than just "preservationist attitudes", and recorded a situation conspicuously worse than mere "discouragement" of nature and creature preservation, as well as much else. Indeed it is worse than Hargrove has charged; Hargrove's indictment of mainstream philosophy is itself weaker than that here ventured, which takes mainstream philosophy as thoroughly implicated in the present escalating environmental mess, through its roles as a major source and supplier of operative ideas and paradigms. There is a single qualification, invoked incidentally by Attfield himself, that would remove much of Attfield's criticism: a restriction to philosophy (or differently, to dominant philosophy in a region). Consider Attfield's exceptions to 'the adverse impacts of Western philosophy', those alleged 'philosophical traditions that have encouraged taking nature seriously':FiryfZy, insofar as the Church Fathers, medieval Christians and others that Attfield alludes to are 13 On the place in philosophy, and in environmental thought in particular, of resistance, see the discussion of Rodman's preferred fourth ideal type, Ecological Resistance, in EE, p.!46ff. 14 For example, see Hargrove, p.21. 7 philosophers at all, they are entirely minor figures, unlikely to be known to many philosophers, and but rarely or never referred to in regular philosophy courses; they do not form part of mainstream philosophy. Consider the sorts of exceptions: * minor philosophers, many of whom we know very little about, outside gossip and speculation, such as Theophrastus, early Stoics, and lesser Epicureans. * figures who are only secondarily or marginally philosophers, such as Hooke, Boyle, Ray and Evelyn. * medieval and early modem Christians, who typically are not significant philosophers, and in fact were usually not committed to nature preservation and the like, but to nature management or perfection. 5<?C(?K(7Zy, these minor figures do not afford the clear support for his claims that Attfield has regularly assumed.^ Many of the statements supposed to offer support are ambivalent, or environmentally dubious, supporting some form of managerialism (e.g. perfectionism or stewardship). And in any case they have to be set against the remainder of what a figure says and does (so far as that can be ascertained), often telling against substantial environmental sensitivity and concern. As regards the latter matter, there are, inversely, isolated claims in major philosophers (Plato is regularly cited in this regard) which may make them appear environmentally aware and even sympathetic. Although Plato's philosophy generally suggests that he neither knew or cared about environmental problems, one passage in the shows that he was very much aware of at least one problem: the effect of deforestation on soil quality in Greece during his own lifetime.^ Unfortunately Hargrove does but a comparatively poor job in accounting for what he alleges, Plato's indifference and lack of ecological concern. 17 The reasons for Plato's indifference to serious ecological degradation of forests and soils in Greece can be ascribed to a combination of several elements of Plato's philosophy (a natural­ world-dismissive ideology) including: elevation of transcendental forms as what was truly real and really of value; denigration and dismissal of the everyday natural world as utterly inferior, of entirely lower existence or even illusory, and certainly not of rational concern. This dualistic 15 In work referred to on p. 127. The main historical claims, many of them based on secondary sources, are stated in his 77:c EtAZcj of EnvZronwcnto/ Concern. A more detailed criticism of these claims will be attempted elsewhere. 16 Hargrove, p.29. 17 This sort of problem arises not merely in regard to Plato, as Attfield observes, with decided relish. There is little doubt but that what Attfield pronounces as Hargrove's historical "excess" needs to be sharpened and much elaborated, and, in some critical areas, rectified. 8 ontology and axiology—a wonderfully valuable world of forms standing in complete contrast with the illusory material world of perception—was supplemented and reinforced by a corresponding epistemology. Under a tripartite theory of mind, the higher rational part, which gave epistemic access to the forms, a part exhibited only by humans and more elevated beings, was sharply separated from the two lower animal parts. Thus under Plato's conception of the human, humans and especially the important rational component of the human, stood in opposition to nature; the distinctively human task is completely separate from nature and concerned with control of it and its unruly elements. It is because what really has value— rational selves cavorting among the forms—is separate from nature, transcending it, with nature at best comprising very inferior copies, of lower existence, that it does not matter what happens to the earth and earthly things, to mere matter. That is a matter of indifference. A significantly better critical exercise, as regards not merely Plato, but the extensive and important neo-Platonic tradition, is effected by Gare, who also advances however an insufficiently specified version of the anti-mainstream thesis. In fact Gare tends to slide back and forth from Western civilization and metaphysics, both of which are too wide, to mechanistic materialism (and social Darwinism), which is much too narrow, particularly if social Darwinism is included (about which Gare vacillates). The latter leaves out such damaging sources as Cartesianism and contemporary idealism; the former would include the recessive Western metaphysical tradition Gare wants to refurbish, what has grown into process" philosophy. So while there is a great deal of worthwhile historical documentation to be found in Gare, the target thesis has so far eluded his critical exercise. While the restriction of the anti-mainstream thesis to Western doctrine is both somewhat misleading and more confining than need be, that to mainstream is different. Something of the sort is essential. But it itself raises other difficulties, beginning with: what counts as How is the image cashed out? A contextual explication is conveniently straightforward, an abstract definition of 'mainstream' in terms of the principal course or flow less helpful. By mainstream Western Philosophy—Western philosophy providing the context—is meant the principal movements in that philosophy, the chief philosophers and schools and their relevant philosophical interrelations. And who and what these are gets shown, nearly ostensively in some cases (with portraits and diagrams), in histories of Western philosophy. 19 Shorter and less encyclopaedia histories in fact tend to portray just the sought 18 On this classical polarisation of nature and higher humanity, see Plumwood. elaboration, see Gare. 19 One admirable example in this regard is B. Russell's of r/ic a popular work with a title that should be viewed henceforth, given that Russell was serious, with some incredulity. For requisite 9 mainstream (that they differ somewhat in coverage does not matter, but emphasizes, in a super- valuational fashion, the blurred edges of this typically vague mainstream). Long histories usually indicate the mainstream both by the way they apportion their space, and also in their judgements as to what is important, which were principal movements, and so on. The essential qualification, to mainstream or similar, is independently grasped by Singer . in his account of the dominant Western paradigm and his brief but pointed criticism of Aristotelianism and mainstream Hebrew and Christian philosophy. The biblical story of creation, in Genesis, makes clear the Hebrew view of the special place of human beings in the divine plan: And God said, Let us make man in our image, after our likeness: and let them have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the fowl of the air, and over the earth, and over every creeping thing that creepeth upon the earth. And God blessed them, and God said upon them, Be fruitful, and multiply, and replenish the earth, and subdue it; and have dominion over the fish of the sea and over the fowl of the air, and over every living thing that moveth upon the earth. Today Christians debate the meaning of this grant of 'dominion'; and those concerned about the environment claim that it should be regarded not as a license to do as we will with other living things, but rather as a directive to look after them on God's behalf, and be answerable to God for the way in which we treat them. There is, however, little justification in the text itself for such an interpretation; and given the example God set when he drowned almost every animal on earth in order to punish human beings for their wickedness, it is no wonder that people should think the flooding of a single river valley is nothing worth worrying about. After the flood there is a repetition of the grant of dominion in more ominous language: And the fear of you and the dread of you shall be upon every beast of the earth, and upon every fowl of the air, upon all that moveth upon the earth, and upon all the fishes of the sea; into your hand are they delivered. The implication is clear: to act in a way that causes fear and dread to everything that moves on the earth is not improper; it is, in fact, in accordance with a God­ given decree. The most influential early Christian thinkers had no doubts about how man's dominion was to be understood. 'Doth God care for oxen?' asked Paul, in the course of a discussion of an Old Testament command to rest one's ox on the sabbath, but it was only a rhetorical question—he took it for granted that the answer must be negative, and the command was to be explained in terms of some benefit to humans. Augustine shared this line of thought; referring to stories in the New Testament in which Jesus destroyed a fig tree and caused a herd of pigs to drown, Augustine explained these puzzling incidents as intended to teach us that 'to refrain from the killing of animals and the destroying of plants is the height of superstition'. It is a little surprising, too, that the usual uncritical apriorism about the natural world and its other inhabitants, should pervade Russell's work. But consider, to take just one example, the inaccurate and demeaning comparison of animals with humans that fires up his neglected analysis 10 When Christianity prevailed in the Roman Empire, it also absorbed elements of the ancient Greek attitude to the natural world. The Greek influence was entrenched in Christian philosophy by the greatest of the medieval scholastics, Thomas Aquinas, whose life work was the melding of Christian theology with the thought of Aristotle. Aristotle regarded nature as a hierarchy in which those with less reasoning ability exist for the sake of those with more: Plants exist for the sake of animals, and brute beasts for the sake of man—domestic animals for his use and food, wild ones (or at any rate most of them) for food and other accessories of life, such as clothing and various tools. Since nature makes nothing purposeless or in vain, it is undeniably true that she has made all animals for sake of man. In his own major work, the -Sr/Twym Aquinas followed this passage from Aristotle almost word for word, adding that the position accords with God's command, as given in Genesis. In his classification of sins, Aquinas has room only for sins against God, ourselves, or our neighbours. There is no possibility of sinning against non-human animals, or against the natural world. This was the thinking of CArz-sTzamry for at least its Erst eighteen centuries. There were gentler spirits, certainly, like Basil, John Chrysostom, and Francis of Assisi, but for most of Christian history they have had no significant impact on the dominant tradition. It is therefore worth emphasising ... major features of this because these features can serve as a point of comparison when we discuss different views of the natural environment. According to the dominant Western tradition, the natural world exists for the benefit of human beings. God gave human beings dominion over the natural world, and God does not care how we treat it. Human beings are the only morally important members of this world. Nature itself is of no intrinsic value, and the destruction of plants and animals cannot be sinful, unless by this destruction we harm humans beings.^ Singer goes on to labour the familiar point that anthropocentrism of this harsh tradition need not exclude some concern for the preservation of nature. But for most of recorded history it has not included much concern. Moreover, lesser Christian alternatives, notably stewardship and perfectionism, whiie they lessen some of the brutal impact of domination upon the natural world, offer little improvement upon longer term invidious environmental erosion, or as regards retention of now emphasized desiderata: retention of wilderness, and maintenance and enhancement of biodiversity. As disturbingly, the rival humanist paradigm of modem times, running from the French enlightenment through 20th century Anglo-American empiricism, as exemplified in Russell, Ayer and Quine among many other luminaries, differs from mainstream Christianity only in leaving God out of the account (as He does not exist, He is utterly impotent, so to illicitly say). Exceptional human features themselves, naturalistically achieved, justify dominion and domination. 20 Singer pp.265-8, itals added. Singer prefers (historical linkage diminished) discourse. discourse to the substantially equivalent 11 Outline of a main argument Detailed argument for the anti-mainstream thesis, as refined, is, so to say, case by case, through cases in the mainstream history, considering main philosophers and main schools. Some of this hard piecemeal work, some already illustrated, has been carried out, in more or less detail by others: Drengson, Gare, Hargrove, Heidegger and Passmore, among many others. But, within that uneven treatment, there remain conspicuous gaps. For example, among the principal 17th century rationalists, while there is much material upon Descartes (along now with a conservative back-lash defending Descartes), and some increasingly divisive material upon Spinoza, there is little at all on Leibnitz. As there is no prospect here of reworking the dismal history of Western philosophy, case by case, let us consider a few illustrative examples, which help plug some obvious gaps. Take again the distinguished early modern rationalists—Descartes, Leibnitz and Spinoza— as examples. Descartes' significant negative contribution is now well-known, so much so that Descartes is sometimes represented as the main villain of the environmental pieced Owing to the premature enthusiasm of various deep ecologists for Spinoza's contribution, the blacker environmental feature of Spinoza's theory have been enthusiastically exposed to view by a jubilant opposition. As a result, some deep ecologists have back-tracked, but only a little: Some Spinoza scholars have recently claimed that an ecological interpretation of Spinozism is not justified. There are notes in the where Spinoza says that we can treat other animals in any way which best suits us. [These authors] have argued that although the metaphysics is nonanthropocentric, the ethics is rightfully anthropocentric. Schopenhauer, who was steeped in Eastern philosophy, was quick to pick up on the anomolous attitude of Spinoza toward other animals: "Spinoza's contempt for animals, as mere things for our use, and declared by him to be without right, is thoroughly Jewish, and in conjunction with pantheism is at the same time absurd and abominable." Ame Naess and I agree that Schopenhauer was correct in his criticism of Spinoza. Naess admits that although Spinoza himself was what we would now call a "speciesist", his system is not speciesist.^ If Spinoza's system includes his anthropocentric ethics (and is not illegitimately restricted to an ecologically convenient selection from his holistic metaphysics), then it seems Naess is astray. The negative character of Spinoza's contribution was rediscovered by Bookchin (unversed in basic deep ecological texts), who applies this finding to lambast deep ecology regarding "double standards' in its one-sided treatment of philosophers and philosophical traditions. Spinoza, for example is cast frequently as a nouveau Taoist and is interpreted more in the romantic tradition than in the scholastic one to which he has more affinities, despite his many differences with medieval thinkers. That this great thinker was militantly anthropocentric is consistently ignored by deep 21 Thus for example by Drengson. 22 Session, in Appendix D to Devall and Sessions, p.240. 12 ecologists, as far as I have been able to ascertain. I have yet to encounter any attempt to explain Spinoza's extraordinary statement: "Besides man, we know of no particular thing in nature in whose mind we may rejoice, and whom we can associate with ourselves in friendship or any sort of fellowship; therefore, whatsoever there be in nature besides man, a regard for our advantage does not call on us to preserve, but to preserve or destroy according to its various capabilities, and to adapt to our use as best we may."23 So much for sensitive treatment of natural environments and their other inhabitants! Spinoza appears to have irreparably damaged any claim to exceptional positive standing. So far the third of the great rationalist trio, Leibnitz, appears to have escaped critical re­ appraisal (in an overdue history of philosophy). Yet, as it happens, Leibnitz's position can be applied to illustrate features of considerable green generality. In brief, any philosophy is liable to be environmentally unfriendly that guarantees satisfaction of all or enough elements of the consumption impact equation, and so would generate excessive impacts. Leibnitz's overall position does just that. Consider what might be called in honour of Leibnitz (though Leibnitz's fragmentary work did not initiate any genuine historic school). Leibnitz was heavily committed to all of human population growth, unfettered technological advance, and human lifestyles of consumption, in short, to precisely those factors that combine in the familiar impact recipe to produce excessive human impacts upon environments. There is fair evidence for these contentions. First, Leibnitz was an early exponent of utilitarianism, indeed he was all­ round an enthusiastic maximizer. From his formulation of utilitarianism, he drew an immediate obvious corollary: the directive to increase human population (maximizing on aggregate human pleasure is most obviously achieved by production of more happy humans, other aspects of which technology and affluence can assure).24 Secondly, Leibnitz was a technology enthusiast: he was heavily committed to the development and use of scientific technology, for which he had all sorts of schemes (e.g. not only the intended to encapsulate all of knowledge in an accessible useable form, a complete calculus duly mechanised, but as well numerous technological projects.25). Thirdly, he was committed to an affluent lifestyle for himself and (through symmetry and basic assumptions of utilitarianism) for others. For his own part, he abandoned an academic career at an obscure German university 'in favour of the 23 Bookchin, p.261. The quotation from Spinoza's 24 For Leibnitz's anticipation of utilitarianism, see Hruschka. For Leibnitz's immediate application of the principle, to support human population increase, see p. 172. 25 'Leibnitz's interest in machinery is illustrated by his complicated plan to drain the Harz mines, which involved the construction of a new type of windmill, and a virtually friction-free pump', Cottingham p. 193. For a detailed account of Leibnitz's extensive entrepreneurial and technological activities, see Aiton. is fully cited in Bookchin. 13 more active and lucrative pursuits of the courtier and diplomat and, so it turned out, the bright lights of major European cities and grand tours of Europe.26 No doubt Leibnitz's lifestyle commitments need not (and may not) be reflected in his philosophy, which may have independent environmental merit, for example as stimulation or input for later developments. There is unfortunately little evidence that that is so. Nonetheless, substantial fragments of Leibnitz's philosophy—of a different unauthentic subphilosophy—do admit environmental bending and adaptation, in a way that Descartes' philosophy does not at all easily. Leibnitz has sometimes been accounted environmentally friendly. Some of that apparent friendliness appears due rather to scholastic conservativism. Thus he was opposed to mechanism; he was sympathetic to the organic and teleological, which did not contract to isolated human and superhuman loci. His metaphysical theory of monads, which are centres of living energy, effectively distributed life everywhere, though not equally. Harmony and order too prevailed throughout the universe, though under God's maximizing management, the presence of which they duly established! But even this life-expanding harmonious order, variants of which are now familiar from Whiteheadian and deep ecological quarters, was not as benign as it has superficially appeared. Leibnitz supposed that, by virtue of pre-established harmony and final causes governing inevitable progress, humans would not go wrong in the longer term in their environmental activities, that they could not make undesirable changes in nature'.27 Leibnitz joyfully foresaw more and more of the Earth coming under cultivation, and its long-term advancement to a complete intensive garden, even if there were occasional relapses where parts deteriorated back temporarily towards wild state. Leibnitz even criticised Cartesianism, now widely regarded as prime villain of the environmental piece, as/^'Zing 'to provide the modal stimulus ... to the control of nature' ... 'to scientific advance'. The idea of control, advancing to total control, total management, is prophesized in Leibnitz (in a sort of chauvinistic Gaia hypothesis). He saw 'order as progressively increasing, with the help of man [as] a finisher of nature. He boldly applauded the idea of progress to the earth as a unit, assuming both an orderliness on earth and an orderliness in the changes it had undergone by man'.28 An important corollary does emerge: that a promising new partial metaphysics is no panacea for improved environmental performance or paradigms. Not merely neutral 26 Cottingham p.24, p.26. 27 Glacken p.478. As he remarks, these bold assumptions made by Leibnitz have proved wrong. The preposterous infallibility-in-practice assumption has resurfaced recently in a less attractive aspect of the Gaia hypothesis as peddled by Lovelock. 28 Glacken p.506. 14 metaphysics, but even positive metaphysics, such as certain organic and process theories, are compatible with, and can be coupled with, damaging philosophies, social theories and life­ styles. It is almost enough to consider the theories and practices, commitments and lifestyles of Aristotle, Leibnitz and Whitehead.29 Things even deteriorated on many fronts under the main philosophical movements that succeeded Leibnitz in Germany, and overwhelmed European and much of Western philosophy for more than a century, namely Kantianism and subsequent German idealism. Virtually all the prominent positions in this philosophical galaxy, in the main strongly supportive of a supposedly enlightened Protestantism, presumed and imposed a blanketing human chauvinism and associated social reductionism. For example, the universal universe of Kantian ethics comprosed the circle of humans (and perhaps super humans) only; nothing else counted, and even the proper treatment of animals (which was at least not entirely neglected) was supposed reduced to that of interhuman relations. Regrettably human chauvinistic assumptions also underlay and handicapped more benign reccessive alternatives in Germany, such as those afforded by Herder and through the much heralded nature romanticism movement. As is widely appreciated now, later parts of the broad German mainstream flowing on from Kant were much more deleterious, neglecting Enlightenment advances and sponsoring elements of Aryan or super-race chauvinism. Things were certainly rather different off the Continent in modern England, but in most environmental respects hardly better. But no doubt a different example is furnished by mainstream British philosophy, a philosophy which has influenced most of the English speaking world for the worse, environmentally and also otherwise. This philosophy is highly empiricist in orientation, a reductionistic ideas, impressions or sense-data empiricism characteristically sharing the anthropocentrism of idealism,. Worse, this empiricism normally expands through ethics and social theory in the form of utilitarianism, typically a possessive individualistic human chauvinistic utilitarianism.30 Despite appearances and propaganda, there has been comparatively little improvement in recent times. For positivism and its irrationalist successors, all ecologically shallow, all committed to technofix and for the most part to social engineering, have been prime 29 Leibnitz's standing in the history of philosophy is somewhat curious. His main achievement, setting aside his reputation as an intellectual wizard with /otj of ideas, appears to be spasmodic work upon a beautiful ruin, an incomplete (and incompletable) metaphysics, of which only tantalizing fragmentary structures were ever available. It is not even as if there is a surviving supply of challenging bad arguments that can be put before baffled students, as with Descartes and Berkeley for instance. 30 For elaboration and defence of these stark claims, see Sylvan 94. 15 philosophical inputs into the physical sciences and also into mainstream economics. Shallow utilitarianism persists as the main philosophical informant of and input into social sciences, including fashionable new areas such as ecological economics, public choice theory, and so on. Incidentally, not much is to be expected in the way of deeper change from contemporary universities and research institutions from where these new fashions emanate. For these places are, by and large, part of the advanced industrial problematic; they are, almost without exception, urbanocentric conjectural-information factories. Unfortunately, the other main movements in Anglo-American philosophy are even more conservative, for example analytic philosophy and its variants, such as conceptual analysis, and Wittgensteinianism. For they leave almost everything as it is, as environmentally unsatisfactory as it is.31 Nor is recent Continental philosophy, a main contrast class, any better, but in many respects worse. Anthropocentric emphases remain heavy in both French and German philosophy, which are the predominant forms. Both existentialism and phenomenalism, as well as passe-isms such as Marxism, are mired in human chauvinism. Social criticism, which has at least seriously addressed wider environmental problems, remains shallow. For example, the communicational theory of Habermas is heavily biassed in favour of articulate humans, and excludes other animals and the rest of creation from any but very secondary roles. Modest out-faH. No doubt the anti-mainstream thesis is not the sort of proposition that most philosophers care to encounter. For one reason, it may seem like offering free ammunition to those who would like to put an end to philosophy, for political or ideological purposes. But it does not: not without a serious confusion of —or end m present dominant form—with end period. Similarly, it may appear to give reinforcement to those who, with scant justification, have prematurely pronounced the end of philosophy.32 But this makes a similar confusion. Spectacular conclusions such as those that have sometimes been drawn from considerations like those assembled—such as, again, the end of philosophy, the demise of grand philosophy, the deconstruction of metaphysics— do not then emerge. For one reason, it is not philosophy that leads to disaster, but only certain sorts of grand philosophy, gray and brown sorts, which accordingly are liable to critical rejection. No end is implied to less grand and greener regional philosophies, recessive metaphysics, or the like. 31 Such a theme is developed, though poorly and in a social setting, by Gellner. His case applies, with even more force, to environmental matters. 32 Later authors tend to appeal back to earlier false prophets, notably Heidegger, who really had no viable arguments for his floated claims. There are other, quite different, equally poor, arguments to an end to philosophy, for instance those to an end of ideology, from the fall of one awful alternative, soviet "communism". And so on; see also above. 16 Development of some recessive alternative or other—different ones—is now a favoured alternative idea (thus Gare and others advocating elaboration of process philosophy, environmentalists favouring ecological paradigms, etc.). But a more effective course, duly pluralistic, looks to locally and regionally based philosophies, with worthwhile linkages with local aspirations and regional cultures.33 Once again, there are philosophies and philosophies—and appalling regional philosophies (e.g. business philosophies, as promoted by local chambers of commerce; fundamentalist philosophies stoked by organised religions). Ways out, if they can be found, lie not through reproduction of dominant destructive ideologies at local levels, but through less damaging alternatives, fitted to ecoregional circumstances. Some broad corollaries of the anti-mainstream thesis are accordingly evident. Philosophy teaching and practice should be drastically reorganised, almost everywhere. Many features of historical approaches would be transformed. "Great thinker" and like series would vanish. Celebratory aspects of philosophy approached through its history would be abandoned: both the mainstream historic emphasis and the celebration. Grand but invariably flawed figures from history would no longer be revered, or celebrated in the same way, even if some of their arguments are retained for exhibition or criticism. There would be new histories of philosophy, different in different regions, with their own pantheons of prominent philosophers, pantheons not set in stone. Nor would systematic philosophy remain unscathed. For its usual operational framework is that of the dominant social paradigm. It would be relocated and reoriented. There woM/J be an end to the transfer of inappropriate models, technology (including logical) and practices (as of temperate agriculture to tropical regions). There would be a reduction in borrowing and unseemly imitations. Borrowed philosophy is inappropriate for Latin America, or elsewhere in the South. Consider French philosophy, which along with Catholicism and Marxism, still tends to swamp what little happens in Latin America. The mileau in which French philosophy occurs is not established, the infrastucture is not in place, namely a variety of literary criticism and like mags, an active cafe society, and so on. French philosophy does not export that well and, by and large, should not be imported, for all its flashy fashionability. Regions should try to do their own appropriate intellectual things, importing only what they really need. Regional philosophies do not, after all, have to start from nothing or nowhere; they can draw upon and adapt what already has some local basis, perhaps a strong base. What is more, they can be directly applied to prevent or delay outside destructive incursions. For illustration, consider the place of tribally recognised values of forests in delaying grand pulpwood and integrated forestry [integrated destruction] projects. Through a 33 No doubt this is an intended idea in Caldera, for all that it is scarcely articulated or developed. Similarly in other productions on Latin-American philosophy. 17 regional network, a mesh of constraints can be introduced, controlling intrusions of unregulated or prejudically regulated international capitalism. Compare a promising strategy for trying to achieve a nuclear free world, building up by free or freed regions. Nor does a c<x.s^ for ideological regionalism have to start from nothing. Some of the arguments for regionalism in organisation also support or suggest regionalization in reaches of ideas, including philosophy. For example, many of the advantages of subsidizarization transfer. Naturalism regionalism does not preclude global linkages; what it should resist are forms of imperialism.^ None of this will be easy, or achieved without effort. Change is generally hard to achieve against inertia. And most intellectuals, for all their craving to be first in little approved ideas, are resistant to extensive change. Moreover the changes modestly proposed will not be simple; there is not, and cannot be, a simple uniform alternative. What is needed is fragmentation, pluralisation, regionalisation—unpopular, unfashionable ideas. References Aiton, E.J., Leibnitz A Biography, Adam Hilger, Bristol, 1985. Attfield, R., TiTyfory env/ronwenf? , Environmental Ethics 13(1991) 127-137. Attfield, R., The Ethics of Environmental Concern, Second edition, University of Georgia Press, Athens, 1991. Bookchin, M., evo/Mf/on', Environmental Ethics 12(1990) c.261. Caldera, A.J., Filosofia e Crise, Pela filosofia latino-americana, Editora Vozes, Petropolis, Brasil, 1984. Devall, B., and Sessions G., Deep Ecology, Salt Lake City, Utah 1985. Drengson, A, Beyond Environmental Crisis: from Techocratic to Planetary Person, Peter Lang, New York, 1989. Gare, A., Nihilism Incorporated, Eco-logical Press, Bungendore N.S.W., 1993. Gellner, E., Words & Things: a critical account of linguistic philosophy and a study of ideology, V. Gollancz, London, 1959. Glacken, C.J., Traces on the Rhodian Shore, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1967. Hargrove, E., Foundations of Environmental Ethics, Prentice Hall, New Jersey, 1989. Heidegger, M., The End of Philosophy, Harper & Row, New York, 1973. 34 Fortunately we have not yet ascended to an edified world philosophy, any more than the worfd car (despite American efforts at globalization, including Solomon and Higgins), but the number of mainstream models is now rather small, and almost all so far are noisy and polluting. 18 Hruschka, J., '77z^ /z^z/z/zzzz^^ /zrzzzcz/?/^ z2zzz7 or/z^r ^z*Zy G^z*z7z#zz azz^zczparzozzj o/ zzrz/z^z*z^zzz r/z^ozy\ UtiHtas 3(2)(1991) 165-177. Passmore, J., '77z^ ^zzz7 o/ ^/zzZojz?/?/zy\ address on the occasion of his 80th birthday, Australian National University, 1994. Paleocrassas, Y., Environmental crime and punishment. Towards a new development model, Austemb, Brussells, 1994. Plumwood, V., Feminism and the Mastery of Nature, Routledge, London, 1993. Roszak, T., Where the Wasteland Ends, Doubleday, Garden City New York, 1972. Russell, B., Wisdom of the West: a historical survey of western philosophy in its social and political setting, Ed. P. Foulkes, MacDonald, London, 1959. Routley, R., azzzZ Zzzzzzt^ o/^r^zgzzz^ zzz ^zzvzrozzzzz^zzrzz/ r/zozzg/zr <xzz<7 acfzozz',Green Series #1, Research School of Social Science, Australian National University, 1982. Solomon, R., and Higgins, K., (eds ), From Africa to Zen, An Invitation to World Philosophy, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Maryland, 1993. Sylvan, R., 'Dozzzzzzazzf 2?rzz7s7z z^o/ogy, wzlTz r^Z^v<azzZ gzzvzrozzzzz^zz^Z coroZZz7z*z^\ typescript, Canberra, 1994. Sylvan, R., 7zzz/?a!cr o/^ZfezTzarzve ^ys't^zzz^ ozz z/z^ EzzZzg/zr^zzzzz^zzy Pro/^cf', typescript, Canberra, 1995. Sylvan, R., Deep Plurallism, typescript, Canberra, 1992: referred to as DP. Sylvan, R. and Bennett, D., The Greening of Ethics, White Horse, Cambridge, 1994: referred to as GE. Sylvan, R. and Bennett, D., Uropzzzj, 7ho azz<7 Eco/ogy', Green Series #19, Research School of Social Science Australian National University, 1990; referred to as UTD.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Box 21, Item 705: Draft of Grand philosophies and environmental crises: an initial report Subject The topic of the resource Printout (photocopy) of draft, dated 7 June 1995. Description An account of the resource One of ten papers digitised from item 705. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/browse?search=Richard+Sylvan&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bjoiner%5D=and&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=&amp;range=&amp;collection=&amp;type=&amp;user=&amp;tags=&amp;public=&amp;featured=&amp;exhibit=&amp;geolocation-mapped=&amp;geolocation-address=&amp;geolocation-latitude=&amp;geolocation-longitude=&amp;geolocation-radius=10&amp;submit_search=Search+for+items">Richard Sylvan</a> Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived <span class="MuiTypography-root-125 MuiTypography-body2-126">The University of Queensland's <a data-testid="rek-series" href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/records/search?page=1&amp;pageSize=20&amp;sortBy=score&amp;sortDirection=Desc&amp;searchQueryParams%5Brek_series%5D%5Bvalue%5D=Richard+Sylvan+Papers%2C+UQFL291&amp;searchMode=advanced">Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291</a></span>, Box 21, Item 705 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org">Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy</a> Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1995-07-03 Contributor An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, <a href="https://najtaylor.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Dr. N.A.J. Taylor</a>. Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library. Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource [18] leaves. 51.12 MB. Type The nature or genre of the resource Manuscript Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context <a href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:1cbefab">https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:1cbefab</a> https://www.antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/d95c8ba51440c590d49d8f2a4673afe9.pdf fb19d1d026a9b5d22a65104fa1b83d67 PDF Text Text 23.5.95 GRAND PHILOSOPHIES AND ENVIRONMENTAL CRISES: many problems and a few solutions, i Much of what follows is organised around the following thesis, which it aims to further, to sharpen and support: mainstream Western philosophy is dismal environmental news, or still more colloquially and generally, mainstream philosophy continues to be bad socioenvironmental news. Presumably that expands, in turn, to something like: grander mainstream Western philosophy continues to be a significant factor in the ideologies (or paradigms) that inform destructive social and environmental practices. There are some striking corollaries, among them that, like dialectical material in Eastern Europe, such Western philosophy should be substantially abandoned, its furthering and frequent celebration in the schools and universities discontinued, its place taken by more benign humble alternatives. Sharpening the anti-mainstream thesis. All the qualifications prove to be important. recessive traditions that are comparatively benign. because there are lesser or because small-scale analytic philosophy for example, while likely operating within a damaging paradigm, may have little or no impact on its own (consider the impact of a philosopher who spends all research time on the unexpected examination problem). Weyarn, because classical Taoism affords a counter­ example to the anti-mainstream thesis, virtually however it is sharpened.^ However the qualification is decidedly narrower than need be, and moreover gives a misleading impression. For conspicuous non-Westem philosophy, such as Confucianism and Islam, is also dismal news. Other major philosophies can, and do, drive environmental destruction as well. Accordingly too what uniqueness there is to the Western role has to be differently made out, in terms of its special (though perhaps inessential) linkage to industrialization. Although it is expositionally advantageous to highlight present serious predicaments in terms of crz'y<?y, one thing should be clarified at the outset. It is not essential, or even crmca/, to the main arguments outlined that there should be environmental or other crises. It is enough that severe or the like is occurring. Some sort of responsibility for this will afford a solid basis for criticism of a doctrine or practice. 1 The main tide evolved from that of Caldera, unsuccessfully) for a Latin-American philosophy. 2 See, for instance, the explication of Taoism in UTD. anJ CrAyAy, who was searching (rather �2 But, as it happens, conditions for crises are satisfied.^ There are crises conditions in wany in wany (some of which we will simply allude to, as there is copious documentation). Elsewhere, where crises have not yet broken, there are often near crises conditions. Many there are, of course, conspicuously politicians and economists, still labouring under the impression that the current dominant ideology and its development model is not obsolete, that all is more or less well. They imagine 'that we are passing through an unusually severe but still cyclical crisis. That all we have to do is stimulate demand through public investment and build up enough business confidence so that there is a recovery of private investment and production. Then we can afford to resume 1 efforts to control environmental and social problems.4 They have misread the signs. The problems are not merely cyclic or temporary; they are intensifying (if in a wavelike pattern, with deterioration surging in, then ebbing somewhat before the next bigger wave). Nor are larger ideological cycles quite the same, though much of the rhetoric is similar from cycle to cycle. No longer is it imagined that social or environmental problems can be substantially resolved next times around business cycles (though the illusion that most of us will be 'better off persists, conveniently propped by loaded statistics). Comparisons, features and pedigree. Of course European civilization has more to answer for than its environmental practice, and its extraordinarily destructive impact on natural systems, especially non European systems. It has to answer also for its impact upon humans, in particular classes, cultures or races marked out as inferior (persisting prominently into this century, emanating from sources of high Western culture). But for many of these human impacts Western philosophy does nor have to answer, by contrast with other impacts. Indicative of dominant environmental attitudes are attitudes towards and treatment of what were, and often still are, seen as lesser humans: slaves, blacks^women, yokels, children, or so on. Take women. Among significant philosophers, virtually the only exception before contemporary times is J.S. Mill, who, under feminine influence, deplored the subjection of women. Unfortunately, for all the brilliant and oft-quoted Millean anti-mainstream passages, Mill himself did not swim far out of the mainstream. Most notably he did not amend his utilitarianism in the direction already contemplated by Bentham, to take passing account of the 3 For definitional details, see GE. For one of numerous summaries of present dire circumstances, see Paleocrassas. 4 Paleocrassas p. 12: one among many voices. �3 interests and sufferings of other animals. Human chauvinism survived, relatively unscathed, for all that Mill deplored loss of flowers and habitats, throughout his works. Features of the anti-mainstream thesis, its justification and relevant qualifications, can be brought out by considering its pedigree. Partial versions of, or variations upon, an anti­ mainstream thesis can be found in several sources; for instance in the deeper-environmental and rival-paradigms productions of the 70s. Consider the following examples: * the contrast of the Cartesian technocratic paradigm with the person planetary paradigm, where destructive environmental attitudes and practices are ascribed to adherence to the CartesianEnlightenment analytic-reductionist mind-set? Similar related clusters of contrasts appeared across social sciences, in political science, sociology and economics. For example * the dominant modem paradigm, essentially the same as the Cartesian technocratic paradigm was contrasted, by Rodman, with a benign classical paradigm. * the dominant social paradigm, another version of the same environmentally oppressive schemata, was contrasted, by Colgrove and Duff, with the alternative environmental paradigm. All these and other similar examples were duly elaborated in work on the roles (and limits) of paradigms in environmental thought and action.6 A critical point is that what social scientists were digging up (and reditching) was pretty much what mainstream philosophy was espousing or assuming (and, despite the new global wave of environmentalism, not that much has changed philosophically). It is worth recording that restricted versions of these contrasts (which do not touch basic shallow utilitarian assumptions) are now being presented and considered not only by academic theorists but by bureaucrats and working politicians and economists. Thus for example * a new development model, as contrasted with the current development model, outlined by a member of the European Commission (I. Paleocrassus)—who incidently devotes much space to documenting the present environmental crises (environs?!; construed in a wide sense, to encompass decaying and dangerous urban environments often unfit for human habitation). Many features of the crisis are attributed to a faulty development model, portrayed as once perhaps appropriate, but no longer so? But there is more, much more to it than that. 5 Just such a contrast was elaborated by Drengson, drawing heavily upon Roszak. documentation then, see their work. 6 Thus Routley in an exercise with just that title. Needless to add, paradigms are rough and uneven. Some components of them have much more to answer for than others. For example, possessive individualism with its self-interest hypothesis, has been a particularly damaging part of dominant social ideology. 7 Curiously, though his entire discussion circulates aroun^ 'the current For model', what �4 The current ubiquitous development model did not derive from nothing, but is, in main, an Enlightenment parcel, fuelled by ideals of material progress and the like, which is duly underpinned by the dominant social paradigm.a It is not enough to simply change the development model; what drives it has also to be changed, namely the supporting philosophy. Development of pf anti-mainstreamism in recent critical philosophy. Differently, impacts of thorough-going (deep) environmental ethics, and of deep ecology, on philosophy and social theory were being assessed. It was observed that very much in mainstream philosophy would have to be jettisoned or substantially modified.^ Heavily targetted were forms of idealism, including phenomenalism and existentialism, and forms of empiricism. But the criticism swept much further, to prevailing metaphysics and 'the limiting ideological principles of both the Renaissance and the Enlightenment". In effect the criticisms extended to mainstream Western civilization. But no doubt claims here are technically different, because, for all the merits of deep positions, it is not usually being suggested that environmental storms could not be weathered to some extent under shallow cover, *o or that duly environmental but shallow philosophies are in some way responsible for gathering environmental crises. More sweeping anti-mainstream theses have been stated however by Hargrove, by Gare, and by others, including famous philosophers in their latter days.n To the late Heidegger we appear to owe a rather interesting (if abominable) argument, which runs as follows: Western philosophy — or some such, with -* technological mastery (supremacy dominance) -> environmental destruction ' symbolising leads to, or yields (granted fo faces a validity issue). supply its components. But what can be gleamed indicates that it is a submodel of the dominant social paradigm. For instance, we are informed that natural resources are treated as 'expendable raw materials or even worse as free goods' (p.24), in effect as without initial value. 8 For details see DP, and in condensed form Sylvan 95. 9 Notably at the end of EE, pp. 188-9. 10 Deep positions divide significantly on this issue. For it is now widely argued that shallow environmentalism coMp/gJ heavy technofix— a common position among scientists—is not going to succeed. 11 See Hargrove and Gare, and the ensuing discussion below in the text. It is a little tempting to suggest that Hargrove presents his thesis as it were by accident, given how little he actually does to defend it. In the main, Hargrove looks as if he is repeating Roszak and Drengson rather than proceeding to a larger sounder claim. �5 If something like this enjoyed plausibility, it would support a philosophy end. an evident premiss. That argument is by contraposition, and thesis: Western transmission from (Thatherites and Wittgensteinians and others of a decidedly mixed company, reached a similar conclusion, that philosophy should end, by entirely different, very dubious by-roads.) There are several problems with the Heidegger schema. For one thing, the argument leaves out other critical components of an important environmental impact equation: notably excess human population and excess human consumption. In any event, Heidegger certainly thought that philosophy—as distinct from a quasi- mstical "thought"—should end. But he exaggerated the importance of such an outcome by exaggerating, in characteristic German style, the importance of philosophy, the importance of German philosophy above all. For example he supposes that modem German philosophy influenced the rise of industrialism and all it brought in train. It can be plausibly contended, however in characteristic disparaging British style, that philosophy had comparatively little influence in such ultimately damaging development as European agricultural and industrial revolutions (for example, technology, but not philosophy, played a role in the invention of artifical dyes, a development which can be seen as setting European industrialization in train:) But such examples do not penetrate deep enough to the conditions of an^preparation for change. There are myriad ways in which philosophy has shaped historical developments: through its major input into (other) ideologies such as religions, through its place in politics and law. With Protestan philosophy in ^particular, basic ground for industrialism was prepared, the further development of highly exploitative Christen attitudes to nature (and to programs) and of appropriate attitudes to technology, disciplined education and inculcation of a work ethic, and so on. Or consider, for instance, the fairly direct role of philosophy in the formulation of modem theories of property (notably by Locke) which enabled dispossession and displacement of native peoples in coroized lands. Consider its less direct role in the- preparing ground for (^^(industrialization, the presumption that the earth, its habitats and other inhabitants and its matter were of no value, but of value only as transformed by industrial activity, that entrepreneurs were free to do whatever they liked with them. No doubt many untoward things would have happened without much philosophy, where philosophy had little influence (as with habitat destruction by excessive populations of animals). But wherever theory operated to influence 12 The form of the argument is extracted from Passmore's end-of-philosophy address (thanks to Passmore too for further comments). The argument is much harder to find in Heidegger's later work. But rudiments are present. The first linkage of philosophy and technology is managed by an extraordinary redefinition of technology (see p.17?)^/For the second linkage Heidegger was presumably reflecting upon high destructiv&-teehnology of war, nuclear weapons and so on. Note however that the middle term has changed; so the argument fails, courtesy the ancient fallacy of equivocation. "7 ? . �6 practice, philosophy would have served negatively, as a prime element of That could be a significant rubber philosophy today. Whatever the extend (arguably, substantial) to which they actually impinge, main philosophical traditions and ideologies do have very negative implications for environmental theory and practice. So much has been argued or alleged, in one fashion or another, in several contemporary sources.^ For example, Hargrove has recently investigated, in greater detail, negative implications of mainstream philosophy for three environmental reaches: environmental attitudes concerned with nature and creature preservation, with nature appreciation, and with development of a proper ecological perspective. However Hargrove has ventured some of his particularly challenging themes in insufficiently careful form, thereby leaving himself unnecessarily vulnerable to criticism and counter-claims. These include the criticisms assembled by Attfield, who, though not unsympathetic to Hargrove's case, has excessively weakened the themes. For example, what Attfield presents as 'substantially correct' is Hargrove's 'verdict that the history of philosophy has discouraged preservationist attitudes', vastly less than Hargrove's actual negative verdict which comprehended considerably more than just "preservationist attitudes", and recorded a situation conspicuously worse than mere "discouragement" of nature and creature preservation, as well as much else. Indeed it is worse than Hargrove has charged; Hargrove's indictment of mainstream philosophy is itself weaker than that here ventured, which takes mainstream philosophy as thoroughly implicated in the present escalating environmental mess, through its roles as a major source and supplier of operative ideas and paradigms. There is a single qualification, invoked incidentally by Attfield himself, that would remove much of Attfield's criticism: a restriction to philosophy (or differently, to dominant philosophy). Consider Attfield's exceptions to 'the adverse impacts of Western philosophy', those alleged 'philosophical traditions that have encouraged taking nature seriously':- Firsf/y, insofar as the Church Fathers, medieval Christians and others that Attfield alludes to are philosophers at all, they are entirely minor figures, unlikely to be known to many philosophers, and but rarely or never referred to in regular philosophy courses; they do not form part of mainstream philosophy. Consider the sorts of exceptions: * minor philosophers, many of whom we know very little about, outside gossip and speculation, such as Theophrastus, early Stoics, and lesser Epicureans. 13 On the rule in philosophy, and in environmental thought in particular, of resistance, see the discussion of Rodman's preferred fourth ideal type, Ecological Resistance, REE, p.l46ff. 14 For example, see Hargrove, p.21. �7 * figures who are only secondarily or marginally philosophers, such as Hooke, Boyle, Ray and Evelyn. * medieval and early modem Christians, who typically are not significant philosophers, and in fact were usually not committed to nature preservation and the like, but to nature management or perfection. these minor figures do not afford the clear support for his claims that Attfield has regularly assumed.15 Many of the statements supposed to offer support are ambivalent, or environmentally dubious, supporting some form of managerialism (e.g. perfectionism or stewardship). And in any case they have to be set against the remainder of what a figure says and does (so far as that can be ascertained), often telling against substantial environmental sensitivity and concern. As regards the latter matter, there are, inversely, isolated claims in major philosophers (Plato is regularly cited in this regard) which may make them appear environmentally aware and even sympathetic. Although Plato's philosophy generally suggests that he neither knew or cared about environmental problems, one passage in the shows that he was very much aware of at least one problem: the effect of deforestation on soil quality in Greece during his own lifetime.^ Unfortunately Hargrove does but a comparatively poor job in accounting for what he alleges, Plato's indifference and lack of ecological concern. 1? The reasons for Plato's indifference to serious ecological degradation of forests and soils in Greece can be ascribed to a combination of several elements of Plato's philosophy (a natural­ world-dismissive ideology) including: elevation of transcendental forms as what was truly real and really of value; denigration and dismissal of the everyday natural world as utterly inferior, of entirely lower existence or even illusory and certainly not of rational concern. This dualistic ontology and axiology—a wonderfully valuable world of forms standing in complete contrast with the illusory material world of perception—was supplemented and reinforced by a corresponding epistemology. Under a tripartite theory of mind, the higher rational part, which gave epistemic access to the forms, a part exhibited only by humans and more elevated beings, was sharply separated from the two lower animal parts. Thus under Plato's conception of the 15 In work referred to on p. 127. The main historical claims, many of them based on secondary sources, are stated in his of Fnvironwgnro/ Concern. A more detailed criticism of these claims will be attempted elsewhere. 16 Hargrove, p.29. 17 This sort of problem arises not merely in regard to Plato, as Attfield observes, with decided relish. There is little doubt but that Hargrove's historical "excess" needs to be sharpened and much elaborated, and, in some critical areas, rectified. �8 human, humans and especially the important rational component of the human, stood in opposition to nature; the distinctively human task is completely separate from nature and concerned with control of it and its unruly elements. It is because what really has value— rational selves cavorting among the forms—is separate from nature, transcending it, with nature at best comprising very inferior copies, of lower existence, that it does not matter what happens to the earth and earthly things, to mere matter. That is a matter of indifference.^ A significantly better critical exercise, as regards not merely Plato, but the extensive and important neo-Platonic tradition, is effected by Gare, who also advances however an insufficiently specified version of the anti-mainstream thesis. In fact Gare tends to slide back and forth from Western civilization and metaphysics, both of which are too wide, to mechanistic materialism (and social Darwinism), which is much too narrow, particularly if social Darwinism is included (about which Gare vacillates). The latter leaves out such damaging sources as Cartesianism and contemporary idealism; the former would include the recessive Western metaphysical tradition Gare wants to refurbish, what has grown into "process" philosophy. So while there is a great deal of worthwhile historical documentation to be found in Gare, the target thesis has so far eluded his critical exercise. While the restriction of the anti-mainstream thesis to Western doctrine is both somewhat misleading and more confining than need be, that to mainstream is different. Something of the sort is essential. But it itself raises other difficulties, beginning with: what counts as 7K<2m.yfr<?<27?i? How is the image cashed out? A contextual explication is conveniently straightforward, an abstract definition of 'mainstream' in terms of the principal course or flow less helpful. By mainstream Western Philosophy —Western philosophy providing the context—is meant the principal movements in that philosophy, the chief philosophers and schools and their relevant philosophical interrelations. And who and what these are gets shown, nearly ostensively in some cases (with portraits and diagrams), in histories of Western philosophy. 19 Shorter and less encyclopaedia histories in fact tend to portray just the sought ' mainstream (that they differ somewhat in coverage does not matter, but emphasizes, in a superb valuational fashion the blurred edges of this typically vague mainstream). Long histories 18 On this classical polarisation of nature and higher humanity, see Plumwood. elaboration, see Gare. 19 One admirable example in this regard is B. Russell's Wiy^fow of the Wejr, a popular work with a title that should be viewed henceforth, given that Russell was serious, with some incredulity. For requisite It is a little surprising, too, that the usual ameritical apriorism about the natural world and its other inhabitants, should pervade Russell's work. But consider, to take just one example, the inaccurate and demeaning comparison of animals with humans that fires up his neglected analysis Power. �9 usually indicate the mainstream both by the way they apportion their space, and also in their judgements as to what is important, which were principal movements, and so on. The essential qualification, to mainstream or similar, is ^Independently grasped by Singer in his account of the dominant western paradigm and his brief but pointed criticism of Aristotlianism and mainstream Hebrew and Christian philosophy. The biblical story of creations, in Genesis, makes clear the Hebrew view of the special place of human beings in the divine plan: And God said, Let us make man in our image, after our likeness: and let them have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the fowl of the air, and over the earth, and over every creeping thing that creepeth upon the earth. And God blessed them, and God said upon them, Be fruitful, and multiply, and replenish the earth, and subdue it; and have dominion over the fish of the sea and over the fowl of the air, and over every living thing that moveth upon the earth. Today Christians debate the meaning of this grant of 'dominion'; and those , concerned about the environment claim that it should be regarded not as a license to do as we will with other living things, but rather as a directive to look after them on God's behalf, and be answerable to God for the way in which we treat them. There is, however, little justification in the text itself for such an interpretation; and given the example God set when he drowned almost every animal on earth in order to punish human beings for their wickedness, it is no wonder that people should think the flooding of a single river valley is nothing worth worrying about. After the flood there is a repetition of the grant ofj^\^v dominion in more onimous language: And the fear of you and the dread of you shall be upon every beast of the earth, and upon every fowl of the air, upon all the^ moveth upon the earth, and upon all the fishes of the sea; into your hand are they delivered. The implication is clear: to act in a way that causes fear and dread to everything that moves on the earth is not improper it is, in fact, in accordance with a God­ given decree. The most influential early Christian thinkers had no doubts about how man's dominion was to be understood. 'Doth God care for oxen?' asked Paul, in the course of a discussion of an Old Testament command to rest one's ox on the sabbath, but it was only a rhetorical question—he took it for granted that the answer must be negative, and the command was to be explained in terms of some benefit to humans. Augustine shared this line of thought; referring to stories in the New Testament in which Jesus destroyed a fig tree and caused a herd of pigs to drown, Augustine explained these puzzling incidents as intended to teach us that 'to refrain from the killing of animals and the destroying of plants is the height of superstition'. When Christianity prevailed in the Roman Empire, it also absorbed elements of the ancient Greek attitude to the natural world. The Greek influence was entrenched in Christian philosophy by the greatest of the medieval scholastics, Thomas Aquinas, whose life work was the melding of Christian theology with the thought of Aristotle. Aristotle regarded nature as a hierarchy in which those with less reasoning ability exist for the sake of those with more: Plants exist for the sake of animals, and brute beasts for the sake of man—domestic animals for his use and food, wild on^ (or at any rate most of them) for food and other accessories of life, such as clothing and various tools. �10 Since nature makes nothing purposeless or in vain, it is undeniably true that she has made all animals for sake of man. In his own major work, the Si/wima Aquinas followed this passage from Aristotle almost word for word, adding that the position accords with God's command, as given in Genesis. In his classification of sins, Aquinas has room only for sins against God, ourselves, or our neighbours. There is no possibility of sinning against non-human animals, or against the natural world. This was the thinking of C/irfyham/y for at least its first eighteen j centuries. There were gentler spirits, certainly, like Basil, John Chrysostom^ And Francis of Assisi, but for most of Christian history they have had no significant impact on the dominant tradition. It is therefore worth emphasising ... major features of this Weyarn because these features can serve as a point of comparison when we discuss different views of the natural environment. According to the dominant Western tradition, the natural world exists for the benefit of human beings. God J^fave human beings dominion over the natural world, and God does not care how we treat it. Human beings are the only morally important members of this world. Nature itself is of no intrinsic value, and the destruction of plants and animals cannot be sinful, unless by this destruction we harm humans beings.20 / Singer goes on to labour the familiar point that anthropocentrism of this harsh tradition need not exclude some concern for the preservation of nature. But for most of recorded history is has not include^much concern. However, lesser Christian, notably stewardship and perfectionism, while they lessen some of the brutal impact of domination upon the natural workd, offer little improvement upon longer term insidious environmental erosion, or as regards retention of emphasized and enhancement of biodiversity. As distinctively, the rival humanist paradigm of modem times, running from the French enlightenment through 20th century Anglo-American empiricism, as exemplified in Russell, Ayer and Quine among many other luminaries, differs from mainstream Christianity only in leaving God out of the account (as He does not exist, He is utterly impotent, so to illicitly say). Exceptional human features themselves, naturalistically achieved, justify dominion and domination. Outline of a main argument Detailed argument for the anti-mainstream thesis, as refined, is, so to say, case by case, through cases in the mainstream history, considering main philosophers and main schools. Some of this hard detailed work, some already illustrated, has been carried out, in more or less detail^ by others: Drengson, Gare, Hargrove, Heidegger and Passmore, among many others. But, within that uneven treatment, there remain conspicuous gaps. For example, among the principal 17th century rationalists, while there is much material upon Descartes (along now with 20 Singer pp.265-8, itals added. Singer prefers fracton discourse to the substantially equivalent (historical linkage diminished) paroJfgm discourse. �11 a conservative back-lash defending Descartes), and some increasingly divisive material upon Spinoza, there is little at all on Leibnitz. As there is no prospect here of reworking the dismal history of Western philosophy, case by case, let us consider a few illustrative examples, which help plug some obvious gaps. Take again the distinguished early modem rationalists—Descartes, Leibnitz and Spinoza— as examples. Descartes' significant negative contribution is now well-known, so much so that Descartes is sometimes represented as the main villain of the environmental pieced Owing to the premature enthusiasm of various deep ecologists for Spinoza's contribution, the blacker environmental feature of Spinoza's theory have been enthusiastically exposed to view by a jubilant opposition. As a result, some deep ecologists have back-tracked, but only a little: Some Spinoza scholars have recently claimed that an ecological interpretation of Spinozism is not justified. There are notes in the where Spinoza says that we can treat other animals in any way which best suits us. [These authors] have argued and although the metaphysics is nonanthropocentric, the ethics is rightfully anthropocentric. Schopenhauer, who was steeped in Eastern philosophy, was quick to pick up on the anomolous attitude of Spinoza toward other animals: "Spinoza's contempt for animals, as mere things for our use, and declared by him to be without right, is thoroughly Jewish, and in conjunction with pantheism is at the same time absurd and abominable." Ame Naess and I agree that Schopenhauer was correct in his criticism of Spinoza. Naess admits that although Spinoza himself was what we would now call a "speciesist", his system is not speciesist.^ If Spinoza's system includes his anthropocentric ethics (and is not illegitimately restricted to an ecologically convenient selection from his holistic metaphysics), then it seems Waess is astray. The negative character of Spinoza's contribution was rediscovered by Bookchin (unversed in basic deep ecological texts), who applies this finding to lambast deep ecology regarding 'double standards' in its one-sided treatment of philosophers and philosophical traditions. Spinoza, for example is cast frequently as a nouveau Taoist and is interpreted more in the romantic tradition than in the scholastic one to which he has more affinities, despite his many differences with medieval thinkers. That this great thinker was militantly antliopocentric is consistently ignored by deep ecologists, as far as I have been^able to ascertain. I have yet to encounter any attempt to explain Spinoza's extraordinary statement: "Besides man, we know of no particular thing in nature in whose mind we may rejoice, and whom we can associate with ourselves in friendship or any sort of fellowship; therefore, whatsoever there be in nature besides man, a regard for our advantage does not call on us to preserve, but to preserve or destroy according to its various capabilities, and to adapt to our use as best we 21 Thus for example by Dregson. 22 Session, in Appendix D to Devall and Sessions, p.240. 23 Bookchin, p.261. The quotation from Spinoza's Ethics is fully cited in Bookchin. <' �12 So much for sensitive treatment of natural environments and their other inhabitants! Spinoza appears to have irreparably damaged any claim to exceptional positive standing. So far the third of the great rationalist trio, Leibnitz, appears to have escaped critical re- ....... (in a history of philosophy). Yet, as it happens, Leibnitz's position can be applied to illustrate features of considerable green generality. In brief, any philosophy is liable to be environmentally unfriendly that guarantees satisfaction of all or enough elements of the consumption impact equation, and so would generate excessive impacts. Leibnitz s overall position does just that, consider what might be called in honour of Leibnitz (though Leibnitz's fragmentary work did not initiate any genuine historic school). Leibnitz was heavily committed to all of human population growth, unfettered technological advance, and human lifestyles of consumption, in short, to precisely those factors that combine in the familiar impact recipe to produce excessive human impacts upon environments. There is fair evidence for these contentions. First, Leibnitz was an early exponent of utilitarianism, indeed he was all­ round an enthusiastic maximizer. From his formulation of utilitarianism, he drew an immediate obvious corollary: the directive to increase human population (maximizing on aggregate human pleasure is most obviously achieved by production of more happy humans, other aspects of which technology and affluence can assure).^ Secondly, Leibnitz was a technology enthusiast; he was heavily committed to the development and use of scientific technology, for which he had all sorts of schemes (e.g. not only the intended to encapsulate all of knowledge in an accessible useable form, a complete calculus duly mechanised, but as well numerous technological projects.2$). Thirdly, he was committed to an affluent lifestyle for himself and (through symmetry and basic assumptions of utilitarianism) for others. For his own part, he abandoned an academic career at an obscure German university "in favour of the more active and lucrative pursuits of the courtier and diplomat' and, so it turned out, the bright lights of major European cities and grand tours of Europe.26 No doubt Leibnitz's lifestyle commitments need not (and may not) be reflected in his philosophy, which may have independent environmental merit, for example as stimulation or input for later developments. There is unfortunately little evidence that that is so. Nonetheless, substantial fragments of 24 For Leibnitz's anticipation of utilitarianism, see Hruschka. For Leibnitz's immediate application of the principle, to support human population increase, see p.172. 25 'Leibnitz's interest in machinery is illustrated by his complicated plan to drain the Harz mines, which involved the construction of a new type of windmill, and a virtually friction-free pump', Cottingham p.193. For a detailed account of Leibnitz's extensive entrepreneurial and technological activities, see Aiton. 26 Cottingham p.24, p.26. ��13 Leibnitz's philosophy—of a different unauthentic subphilosophy—do admit environmental bending and adaptation, in a way that Descartes' philosophy does not at all easily. Leibnitz has sometimes been accounted environmentally friendly. Some of that apparent friendliness appear due rather to scholastic conservativism. Thus he was opposed to mechanism; he was sympathetic to the organic and teleological, which did not contract to isolated human and superhuman loci. His metaphysical theory of monads, which are centres of living energy, effectively distributed life everywhere, though not equally. Harmony and order too prevailed throughout the universe, though under God's maximizing management, the presence of which they duly established! But even this life-expanding harmonious order, variants of which are now familiar from Whiteheadian and deep ecological quarters, was not as benign as it has superficially appeared. Leibnitz supposed that, by virtue of pre-established harmony and final causes governing inevitable progress, humans would not go wrong in the longer term in their environmental activities, that they could not 'cMwu/Zafive/y make undesirable changes in nature' .27 Leibnitz joyfully foresaw more and more of the Earth coming under cultivation, and its long-term advancement to a complete intensive garden, even if there were occasional relapses where parts deteriorated back temporarily towards wild state. Leibnitz even criticised Cartesianism, now widely regarded as prime villain of the environmental piece, as /hi/mg To provide the modal stimulus ... to the control of nature' ... To scientific advance'. The idea of control, advancing to total control, total management, is prophesized in Leibnitz (in a sort of chauvinistic Gaia hypothesis). He saw 'order as progressively increasing, with the help of man [as] a finisher of nature. He boldly applauded the idea of progress to the earth as a unit, assuming both an orderliness on earth and an orderliness in the changes it had undergone by man' .28 An important corollary does emerge: that a promising new partial metaphysics is no panacea for improved environmental performance or paradigms. Not merely neutral metaphysics, but even positive metaphysics, such as certain organic and process theories, are compatible with, and can be coupled with, damaging philosophies, social theories and life- 27 Glacken p.478. As he remarks, these bold assumptions made by Leibnitz have proved wrong. The preposterous infaHibihty-in-practice assumption has resurfaced recently in a less attractive aspect of the Gaia hypothesis as peddled by Lovelock. 28 Glacken p.506. �styles. It is almost enough to consider the theories and practices, commitments and lifestyles of Aristotle, Leibnitz and Whitehead.^ A different example is furnished by mainstream British philosophy, a philosophy which has influenced much of the English speaking world for the worse, environmentally and otherwise. This philosophy is highly empiricist in orientation, with this empiricism expanding through ethics and social theory in the form of utilitarianism, typically a possessive individualistic human chauvinistic utilitarianism. 30 Despite appearances and propaganda, there has been compentively little improvement in recent times. Shallow utilitarianism persists as the main cal informant of and input into social sciences, including fashionable new areas such as ecological economics, public choice theory,... . Incidentally, not much is to be expected in the way of deeper change from contemporary universities and research institutions from where these new fashions emanate. For these are, by and large, part of the advanced industrial problematic; they are, almost without exception, urbanocentric conjectural-knowledge factories. The other main movements in Anglo-American philosophy are even more conservative, for example analytic philosophy and its variants, such as cor^epttial analysis, and Wittgensteinianism. For they leave almost everything as it is, asunvisionmentally unsatisfactory as it is.31 Nor is recent Continental philosophy, a main contrast class, any better, but in many which are the predominant form. But existentialism and phenomenalism, as well as passe-isms such as Marxism, are mixed in human chauvinism. Social criticism which has at least seriously A / addressed wider environmental problems, remains shallow. For example, the communcational' theory of Habernus favours articulate humans, and includes other animals and the rest of creation from any but very secondary roles. Modest out-fall. No doubt the anti-mainstream thesis is not the sort of proposition that most philosophers care to encounter. For one reason, it may seem like offering free ammunition to those who 29 Leibnitz's standing in the history of philosophy is somewhat curious. His main achievement, setting aside his reputation as an intellectual wizard with /oty of ideas, appears to be spasmodic work upon a beautiful ruin, an incomplete (and incompletable) metaphysics, of which only tantalizing fragmentary structures were ever available. It is not even as if there is a surviving supply of challenging bad arguments that can be put before baffled students, as with Descartes and Berkeley for instance. 30 For elaboration and defence of these stark claims, see "Dominant British ideology'. 31 This theme is developed, in a social setting, by Gelher. His case applies, with over more force, to environmental matters. �15 would like to put an end to philosophy, for political or ideological purposes. But it does not: not without a serious confusion of change, or end m present dominant form, with end, end period. For another, it may appear to give reinforcement to those who, with scant justification, have prematurely pronounced the end of philosophy.32 But this makes a similar confusion. Spectacular conclusions such as those that have sometimes been drawn from considerations like those assembled—such as, again, the end of philosophy, the demise of grand philosophy, the deconstruction of metaphysics— do not then emerge. For one reason, it is not philosophy, but only certain sorts of grand philosophy, that leads to disaster, and accordingly is liable to rejection. No end is implied to less grand regional philosophies, recessive metaphysics, or the like. Development of some recessive alternative or other—different ones—is now a favoured alternative idea (thus Gare and others advocating elaboration of process philosophy, environmentalists favouring ecological paradigms, etc.). But a more effective course, duly pluralistic, looks to locally and regionally based philosophies, with worthwhile linkages with local aspirations and regional cultures.33 Once again, there are philosophies and philosophies—and appalling regional philosophies (e.g. business philosophies, as promoted by local chambers of commerce; fundamentalist philosophies stroked by organised religions). Ways out, if they can be found, lie not through reproduction of dominant destructive ideologies at local levels, but through less damaging alternatives, fitted to ecoregional circumstances. Some broad corollaries of the anti-mainstream thesis are accordingly evident. Philosophy teaching and practice should be drastically reorganised, almost everywhere. Many features of historical approaches would be transformed. "Great thinker" and like series would vanish. Celebratory aspect of philosophy approached through its history would be abandoned: both the mainstream historic emphasis and the celebration. Grand but invariably flawed figures from history would no longer be revered, or celebrated in the same way, even if some of their argument are retained for exhibition or criticism. There would be new histories of philosophy, A different in different regions, with their own pantheons of prominent philosophers, pantheons not set in stone. Nor would systematic philosophy remain unscathed. For its usual operational framework is that of the dominant social paradigm. It would be relocated and reoriented. 32 Later authors tend to appeal back to earlier false prophets, notably Heidegger, who really had no viable arguments. There are other, quite different, equally poor, arguments to an end to philosophy, for instance those to an end of ideology, from the fall of one awful alternative, soviet "communism". And so on; see also above. 33 No doubt this is an intended idea in Caldera, for all that it is scarcely articulated or developed. Similarly in other productions in Latin-American philosophy. �16 There be an end to the transfer of inappropriate models, technology (including logical) and practices (as of temperate agriculture to tropical regions). There would be a reduction in borrowing and unseemly imitations. Borrowed philosophy is inappropriate for Latin America, or elsewhere in South. Consider French philosophy, which along with A Catholicism and Marxism, still tends to swamp what little happens in Latin America. The mileau in which French philosophy occurs is n^ established, the infrastucture is not in place, namely a variety of literary criticism and like mags, an active cafe society, and so on. French philosophy does not export that well and, by and large, should not be imported, for all its flashy fashionability.34 Regions should try to do their own appropriate intellectual things, importing only what they really need. Regional philosophies do not, after all, have to start from nothing or nowhere; they can draw upon and adapt what already has some local basis, perhaps a strong base. What is more, they can be directly applied to prevent or delay outside destructive incursions. For illustration, consider the place recognised values of forests in delaying grand pulpwood and integrated forestry [abstruction] projects. Through a regional network a mesh of constraints can be introduced, controlling intrusions of unregulated or prejudically regulated international capitalism. Compare a promising strategy for trying to achieve a nuclear free world, building up by free or freed regions. Nor does a case for ideological regionalism have to start from nothing. Some of the arguments for regionalism in organisation also support or suggest regionalization in reaches of ideas, including philosophy. For example, many of the advantages of subsidizarization transfer. None of this will be easy, or achieved without effort. Change is generally hard to achieve against inertia. And most intellectuals, for all their craving to be first in little approved ideas, are resistant to extensive change. Moreover the changes modestly proposed will not be simple; there is not, and cannot be, a simple uniform alternative. What is needed is fragmentation, pluralisation, regionalisation—unpopular, unfashionable ideas. References Aiton, E.J., Leibnitz A Biography, Adam Hilger, Bristol, 1985. Attfield, R., /t&rory o/p/tf/ojop/ty Environmental Ethics 13(1991) 127-137. 34 We do not quite have world philosophy, any more than the world car (despite American efforts, including Solomin & Higgins), but the numbermnainstream Odels is now rather small, and almost all so fai/ are noisy and polluting. A �17 Attfield, R., The Ethics of Environmental Concern, Second edition, University of Georgia Press, Athens, 1991. Bookchin, M., 'R^ZZ-ycoverZng ^voZMfZoK", Environmental Ethics 12(1990) c.261. Caldera, A.J., Fiiosofia e Crise, Peia filosofia latino-americana, Editora Vozes, Petropolis, Brasil, 1984. Devall, B., and Sessions G., Deep Ecology, Salt Lake City, Utah 198 5. Drengson, A, Beyond Environmental Crisis: from Techocrat to Planetary Person, Peter Lang, New York, 1989. Gare, A., Nihilism Incorporated, Eco-logical Press, Bungendore N.S.W., 1993. Glacken, C.J., Traces on the Rhodian Shore, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1967. Hargrove, E., Foundations of Environmental Ethics, Prentice Halls, New Jersey, 1989. Heidegger, M., The End of Philosophy, Harper & Row, New York, 1973. Hruschka, J., '7%^ gr^a^-yf AappZ/z^jj prZncZpZe anJ ^arZy German anrZcZparfan^ p/ ariZ/rarZan r/z^ozy", Utilitas 3(2)(1991) 165-177. Passmore, J., '77z^ gzzz7 p/* p/zZZo.yop/zy', address on the occasion of his 80th birthday, Australian National University, 1994. Paleocrassas, Y., Environmental crime and punishment. Towards a new development model, Austemb, Brussells, 1994. Plumwood, V., Feminism and the Mastery of Nature, Routledge, London, 1993. Roszak, T., Where the Wasteland^ Ends, Doubleday, Garden City New York, 1972. Russell, B., Wisdom of the West. Solomon, R., and Higgins, K., (eds ), From Africa to Zen, An Invitation to World Philosophy, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Maryland, 1993. Sylvan, R., 'DozzzZnanf I3rZfZ.y/z ZzZ^oZogy', typescript, Canberra, 1995. Sylvan, R., 7wp<2cf p/gZ^rnafZve <yyyfe/?z.y ozz Z/z^ EzzZZg/z^zzzzz^zzr Prp/^crtypescript, Canberra, 1995. Sylvan, R., Deep Plurallism, typescript, Canberra, 1992: referred to as DP. Sylvan, R. and Bennett, D., The Greening of Ethics, White Horse, Cambridge, 1994: referred to as GE. Sylvan, R. and Bennett, D., '<y UfopZzzy, 7ho amZ D^p EcoZogyGreen Series #19, Research School of Social Science Australian National University, 1990; referred to as UTD. Routley, R., "RoZgj <2K<7 ZZzzzZ^ p/p^r^Zgmjy Zzz g7zvZrozzmg/zZ<2Z r/zozzg/zr azzJ z7crZozz",Green Series #1, Research School of Social Science, Australian National University, 1982. Russell, B., Wisdom of the West: a historicai survey of western phiiosophy in its social and political setting, Ed. P. Foulkes, MacDonald, London, 1959. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Draft Papers Description An account of the resource Sylvan's literary executor encountered an archive in which “all his projects were current", since manuscripts were undated and unattributed. Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document 23.5.95 GRAND PHILOSOPHIES AND ENVIRONMENTAL CRISES: many problems and a few solutions, i Much of what follows is organised around the following thesis, which it aims to further, to sharpen and support: mainstream Western philosophy is dismal environmental news, or still more colloquially and generally, mainstream philosophy continues to be bad socioenvironmental news. Presumably that expands, in turn, to something like: grander mainstream Western philosophy continues to be a significant factor in the ideologies (or paradigms) that inform destructive social and environmental practices. There are some striking corollaries, among them that, like dialectical material in Eastern Europe, such Western philosophy should be substantially abandoned, its furthering and frequent celebration in the schools and universities discontinued, its place taken by more benign humble alternatives. Sharpening the anti-mainstream thesis. All the qualifications prove to be important. recessive traditions that are comparatively benign. because there are lesser or because small-scale analytic philosophy for example, while likely operating within a damaging paradigm, may have little or no impact on its own (consider the impact of a philosopher who spends all research time on the unexpected examination problem). Weyarn, because classical Taoism affords a counter­ example to the anti-mainstream thesis, virtually however it is sharpened.^ However the qualification is decidedly narrower than need be, and moreover gives a misleading impression. For conspicuous non-Westem philosophy, such as Confucianism and Islam, is also dismal news. Other major philosophies can, and do, drive environmental destruction as well. Accordingly too what uniqueness there is to the Western role has to be differently made out, in terms of its special (though perhaps inessential) linkage to industrialization. Although it is expositionally advantageous to highlight present serious predicaments in terms of crz'y<?y, one thing should be clarified at the outset. It is not essential, or even crmca/, to the main arguments outlined that there should be environmental or other crises. It is enough that severe or the like is occurring. Some sort of responsibility for this will afford a solid basis for criticism of a doctrine or practice. 1 The main tide evolved from that of Caldera, unsuccessfully) for a Latin-American philosophy. 2 See, for instance, the explication of Taoism in UTD. anJ CrAyAy, who was searching (rather 2 But, as it happens, conditions for crises are satisfied.^ There are crises conditions in wany in wany (some of which we will simply allude to, as there is copious documentation). Elsewhere, where crises have not yet broken, there are often near crises conditions. Many there are, of course, conspicuously politicians and economists, still labouring under the impression that the current dominant ideology and its development model is not obsolete, that all is more or less well. They imagine 'that we are passing through an unusually severe but still cyclical crisis. That all we have to do is stimulate demand through public investment and build up enough business confidence so that there is a recovery of private investment and production. Then we can afford to resume 1 efforts to control environmental and social problems.4 They have misread the signs. The problems are not merely cyclic or temporary; they are intensifying (if in a wavelike pattern, with deterioration surging in, then ebbing somewhat before the next bigger wave). Nor are larger ideological cycles quite the same, though much of the rhetoric is similar from cycle to cycle. No longer is it imagined that social or environmental problems can be substantially resolved next times around business cycles (though the illusion that most of us will be 'better off persists, conveniently propped by loaded statistics). Comparisons, features and pedigree. Of course European civilization has more to answer for than its environmental practice, and its extraordinarily destructive impact on natural systems, especially non European systems. It has to answer also for its impact upon humans, in particular classes, cultures or races marked out as inferior (persisting prominently into this century, emanating from sources of high Western culture). But for many of these human impacts Western philosophy does nor have to answer, by contrast with other impacts. Indicative of dominant environmental attitudes are attitudes towards and treatment of what were, and often still are, seen as lesser humans: slaves, blacks^women, yokels, children, or so on. Take women. Among significant philosophers, virtually the only exception before contemporary times is J.S. Mill, who, under feminine influence, deplored the subjection of women. Unfortunately, for all the brilliant and oft-quoted Millean anti-mainstream passages, Mill himself did not swim far out of the mainstream. Most notably he did not amend his utilitarianism in the direction already contemplated by Bentham, to take passing account of the 3 For definitional details, see GE. For one of numerous summaries of present dire circumstances, see Paleocrassas. 4 Paleocrassas p. 12: one among many voices. 3 interests and sufferings of other animals. Human chauvinism survived, relatively unscathed, for all that Mill deplored loss of flowers and habitats, throughout his works. Features of the anti-mainstream thesis, its justification and relevant qualifications, can be brought out by considering its pedigree. Partial versions of, or variations upon, an anti­ mainstream thesis can be found in several sources; for instance in the deeper-environmental and rival-paradigms productions of the 70s. Consider the following examples: * the contrast of the Cartesian technocratic paradigm with the person planetary paradigm, where destructive environmental attitudes and practices are ascribed to adherence to the CartesianEnlightenment analytic-reductionist mind-set? Similar related clusters of contrasts appeared across social sciences, in political science, sociology and economics. For example * the dominant modem paradigm, essentially the same as the Cartesian technocratic paradigm was contrasted, by Rodman, with a benign classical paradigm. * the dominant social paradigm, another version of the same environmentally oppressive schemata, was contrasted, by Colgrove and Duff, with the alternative environmental paradigm. All these and other similar examples were duly elaborated in work on the roles (and limits) of paradigms in environmental thought and action.6 A critical point is that what social scientists were digging up (and reditching) was pretty much what mainstream philosophy was espousing or assuming (and, despite the new global wave of environmentalism, not that much has changed philosophically). It is worth recording that restricted versions of these contrasts (which do not touch basic shallow utilitarian assumptions) are now being presented and considered not only by academic theorists but by bureaucrats and working politicians and economists. Thus for example * a new development model, as contrasted with the current development model, outlined by a member of the European Commission (I. Paleocrassus)—who incidently devotes much space to documenting the present environmental crises (environs?!; construed in a wide sense, to encompass decaying and dangerous urban environments often unfit for human habitation). Many features of the crisis are attributed to a faulty development model, portrayed as once perhaps appropriate, but no longer so? But there is more, much more to it than that. 5 Just such a contrast was elaborated by Drengson, drawing heavily upon Roszak. documentation then, see their work. 6 Thus Routley in an exercise with just that title. Needless to add, paradigms are rough and uneven. Some components of them have much more to answer for than others. For example, possessive individualism with its self-interest hypothesis, has been a particularly damaging part of dominant social ideology. 7 Curiously, though his entire discussion circulates aroun^ 'the current For model', what 4 The current ubiquitous development model did not derive from nothing, but is, in main, an Enlightenment parcel, fuelled by ideals of material progress and the like, which is duly underpinned by the dominant social paradigm.a It is not enough to simply change the development model; what drives it has also to be changed, namely the supporting philosophy. Development of pf anti-mainstreamism in recent critical philosophy. Differently, impacts of thorough-going (deep) environmental ethics, and of deep ecology, on philosophy and social theory were being assessed. It was observed that very much in mainstream philosophy would have to be jettisoned or substantially modified.^ Heavily targetted were forms of idealism, including phenomenalism and existentialism, and forms of empiricism. But the criticism swept much further, to prevailing metaphysics and 'the limiting ideological principles of both the Renaissance and the Enlightenment". In effect the criticisms extended to mainstream Western civilization. But no doubt claims here are technically different, because, for all the merits of deep positions, it is not usually being suggested that environmental storms could not be weathered to some extent under shallow cover, *o or that duly environmental but shallow philosophies are in some way responsible for gathering environmental crises. More sweeping anti-mainstream theses have been stated however by Hargrove, by Gare, and by others, including famous philosophers in their latter days.n To the late Heidegger we appear to owe a rather interesting (if abominable) argument, which runs as follows: Western philosophy — or some such, with -* technological mastery (supremacy dominance) -> environmental destruction ' symbolising leads to, or yields (granted fo faces a validity issue). supply its components. But what can be gleamed indicates that it is a submodel of the dominant social paradigm. For instance, we are informed that natural resources are treated as 'expendable raw materials or even worse as free goods' (p.24), in effect as without initial value. 8 For details see DP, and in condensed form Sylvan 95. 9 Notably at the end of EE, pp. 188-9. 10 Deep positions divide significantly on this issue. For it is now widely argued that shallow environmentalism coMp/gJ heavy technofix— a common position among scientists—is not going to succeed. 11 See Hargrove and Gare, and the ensuing discussion below in the text. It is a little tempting to suggest that Hargrove presents his thesis as it were by accident, given how little he actually does to defend it. In the main, Hargrove looks as if he is repeating Roszak and Drengson rather than proceeding to a larger sounder claim. 5 If something like this enjoyed plausibility, it would support a philosophy end. an evident premiss. That argument is by contraposition, and thesis: Western transmission from (Thatherites and Wittgensteinians and others of a decidedly mixed company, reached a similar conclusion, that philosophy should end, by entirely different, very dubious by-roads.) There are several problems with the Heidegger schema. For one thing, the argument leaves out other critical components of an important environmental impact equation: notably excess human population and excess human consumption. In any event, Heidegger certainly thought that philosophy—as distinct from a quasi- mstical "thought"—should end. But he exaggerated the importance of such an outcome by exaggerating, in characteristic German style, the importance of philosophy, the importance of German philosophy above all. For example he supposes that modem German philosophy influenced the rise of industrialism and all it brought in train. It can be plausibly contended, however in characteristic disparaging British style, that philosophy had comparatively little influence in such ultimately damaging development as European agricultural and industrial revolutions (for example, technology, but not philosophy, played a role in the invention of artifical dyes, a development which can be seen as setting European industrialization in train:) But such examples do not penetrate deep enough to the conditions of an^preparation for change. There are myriad ways in which philosophy has shaped historical developments: through its major input into (other) ideologies such as religions, through its place in politics and law. With Protestan philosophy in ^particular, basic ground for industrialism was prepared, the further development of highly exploitative Christen attitudes to nature (and to programs) and of appropriate attitudes to technology, disciplined education and inculcation of a work ethic, and so on. Or consider, for instance, the fairly direct role of philosophy in the formulation of modem theories of property (notably by Locke) which enabled dispossession and displacement of native peoples in coroized lands. Consider its less direct role in the- preparing ground for (^^(industrialization, the presumption that the earth, its habitats and other inhabitants and its matter were of no value, but of value only as transformed by industrial activity, that entrepreneurs were free to do whatever they liked with them. No doubt many untoward things would have happened without much philosophy, where philosophy had little influence (as with habitat destruction by excessive populations of animals). But wherever theory operated to influence 12 The form of the argument is extracted from Passmore's end-of-philosophy address (thanks to Passmore too for further comments). The argument is much harder to find in Heidegger's later work. But rudiments are present. The first linkage of philosophy and technology is managed by an extraordinary redefinition of technology (see p.17?)^/For the second linkage Heidegger was presumably reflecting upon high destructiv&-teehnology of war, nuclear weapons and so on. Note however that the middle term has changed; so the argument fails, courtesy the ancient fallacy of equivocation. "7 ? . 6 practice, philosophy would have served negatively, as a prime element of That could be a significant rubber philosophy today. Whatever the extend (arguably, substantial) to which they actually impinge, main philosophical traditions and ideologies do have very negative implications for environmental theory and practice. So much has been argued or alleged, in one fashion or another, in several contemporary sources.^ For example, Hargrove has recently investigated, in greater detail, negative implications of mainstream philosophy for three environmental reaches: environmental attitudes concerned with nature and creature preservation, with nature appreciation, and with development of a proper ecological perspective. However Hargrove has ventured some of his particularly challenging themes in insufficiently careful form, thereby leaving himself unnecessarily vulnerable to criticism and counter-claims. These include the criticisms assembled by Attfield, who, though not unsympathetic to Hargrove's case, has excessively weakened the themes. For example, what Attfield presents as 'substantially correct' is Hargrove's 'verdict that the history of philosophy has discouraged preservationist attitudes', vastly less than Hargrove's actual negative verdict which comprehended considerably more than just "preservationist attitudes", and recorded a situation conspicuously worse than mere "discouragement" of nature and creature preservation, as well as much else. Indeed it is worse than Hargrove has charged; Hargrove's indictment of mainstream philosophy is itself weaker than that here ventured, which takes mainstream philosophy as thoroughly implicated in the present escalating environmental mess, through its roles as a major source and supplier of operative ideas and paradigms. There is a single qualification, invoked incidentally by Attfield himself, that would remove much of Attfield's criticism: a restriction to philosophy (or differently, to dominant philosophy). Consider Attfield's exceptions to 'the adverse impacts of Western philosophy', those alleged 'philosophical traditions that have encouraged taking nature seriously':- Firsf/y, insofar as the Church Fathers, medieval Christians and others that Attfield alludes to are philosophers at all, they are entirely minor figures, unlikely to be known to many philosophers, and but rarely or never referred to in regular philosophy courses; they do not form part of mainstream philosophy. Consider the sorts of exceptions: * minor philosophers, many of whom we know very little about, outside gossip and speculation, such as Theophrastus, early Stoics, and lesser Epicureans. 13 On the rule in philosophy, and in environmental thought in particular, of resistance, see the discussion of Rodman's preferred fourth ideal type, Ecological Resistance, REE, p.l46ff. 14 For example, see Hargrove, p.21. 7 * figures who are only secondarily or marginally philosophers, such as Hooke, Boyle, Ray and Evelyn. * medieval and early modem Christians, who typically are not significant philosophers, and in fact were usually not committed to nature preservation and the like, but to nature management or perfection. these minor figures do not afford the clear support for his claims that Attfield has regularly assumed.15 Many of the statements supposed to offer support are ambivalent, or environmentally dubious, supporting some form of managerialism (e.g. perfectionism or stewardship). And in any case they have to be set against the remainder of what a figure says and does (so far as that can be ascertained), often telling against substantial environmental sensitivity and concern. As regards the latter matter, there are, inversely, isolated claims in major philosophers (Plato is regularly cited in this regard) which may make them appear environmentally aware and even sympathetic. Although Plato's philosophy generally suggests that he neither knew or cared about environmental problems, one passage in the shows that he was very much aware of at least one problem: the effect of deforestation on soil quality in Greece during his own lifetime.^ Unfortunately Hargrove does but a comparatively poor job in accounting for what he alleges, Plato's indifference and lack of ecological concern. 1? The reasons for Plato's indifference to serious ecological degradation of forests and soils in Greece can be ascribed to a combination of several elements of Plato's philosophy (a natural­ world-dismissive ideology) including: elevation of transcendental forms as what was truly real and really of value; denigration and dismissal of the everyday natural world as utterly inferior, of entirely lower existence or even illusory and certainly not of rational concern. This dualistic ontology and axiology—a wonderfully valuable world of forms standing in complete contrast with the illusory material world of perception—was supplemented and reinforced by a corresponding epistemology. Under a tripartite theory of mind, the higher rational part, which gave epistemic access to the forms, a part exhibited only by humans and more elevated beings, was sharply separated from the two lower animal parts. Thus under Plato's conception of the 15 In work referred to on p. 127. The main historical claims, many of them based on secondary sources, are stated in his of Fnvironwgnro/ Concern. A more detailed criticism of these claims will be attempted elsewhere. 16 Hargrove, p.29. 17 This sort of problem arises not merely in regard to Plato, as Attfield observes, with decided relish. There is little doubt but that Hargrove's historical "excess" needs to be sharpened and much elaborated, and, in some critical areas, rectified. 8 human, humans and especially the important rational component of the human, stood in opposition to nature; the distinctively human task is completely separate from nature and concerned with control of it and its unruly elements. It is because what really has value— rational selves cavorting among the forms—is separate from nature, transcending it, with nature at best comprising very inferior copies, of lower existence, that it does not matter what happens to the earth and earthly things, to mere matter. That is a matter of indifference.^ A significantly better critical exercise, as regards not merely Plato, but the extensive and important neo-Platonic tradition, is effected by Gare, who also advances however an insufficiently specified version of the anti-mainstream thesis. In fact Gare tends to slide back and forth from Western civilization and metaphysics, both of which are too wide, to mechanistic materialism (and social Darwinism), which is much too narrow, particularly if social Darwinism is included (about which Gare vacillates). The latter leaves out such damaging sources as Cartesianism and contemporary idealism; the former would include the recessive Western metaphysical tradition Gare wants to refurbish, what has grown into "process" philosophy. So while there is a great deal of worthwhile historical documentation to be found in Gare, the target thesis has so far eluded his critical exercise. While the restriction of the anti-mainstream thesis to Western doctrine is both somewhat misleading and more confining than need be, that to mainstream is different. Something of the sort is essential. But it itself raises other difficulties, beginning with: what counts as 7K<2m.yfr<?<27?i? How is the image cashed out? A contextual explication is conveniently straightforward, an abstract definition of 'mainstream' in terms of the principal course or flow less helpful. By mainstream Western Philosophy —Western philosophy providing the context—is meant the principal movements in that philosophy, the chief philosophers and schools and their relevant philosophical interrelations. And who and what these are gets shown, nearly ostensively in some cases (with portraits and diagrams), in histories of Western philosophy. 19 Shorter and less encyclopaedia histories in fact tend to portray just the sought ' mainstream (that they differ somewhat in coverage does not matter, but emphasizes, in a superb valuational fashion the blurred edges of this typically vague mainstream). Long histories 18 On this classical polarisation of nature and higher humanity, see Plumwood. elaboration, see Gare. 19 One admirable example in this regard is B. Russell's Wiy^fow of the Wejr, a popular work with a title that should be viewed henceforth, given that Russell was serious, with some incredulity. For requisite It is a little surprising, too, that the usual ameritical apriorism about the natural world and its other inhabitants, should pervade Russell's work. But consider, to take just one example, the inaccurate and demeaning comparison of animals with humans that fires up his neglected analysis Power. 9 usually indicate the mainstream both by the way they apportion their space, and also in their judgements as to what is important, which were principal movements, and so on. The essential qualification, to mainstream or similar, is ^Independently grasped by Singer in his account of the dominant western paradigm and his brief but pointed criticism of Aristotlianism and mainstream Hebrew and Christian philosophy. The biblical story of creations, in Genesis, makes clear the Hebrew view of the special place of human beings in the divine plan: And God said, Let us make man in our image, after our likeness: and let them have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the fowl of the air, and over the earth, and over every creeping thing that creepeth upon the earth. And God blessed them, and God said upon them, Be fruitful, and multiply, and replenish the earth, and subdue it; and have dominion over the fish of the sea and over the fowl of the air, and over every living thing that moveth upon the earth. Today Christians debate the meaning of this grant of 'dominion'; and those , concerned about the environment claim that it should be regarded not as a license to do as we will with other living things, but rather as a directive to look after them on God's behalf, and be answerable to God for the way in which we treat them. There is, however, little justification in the text itself for such an interpretation; and given the example God set when he drowned almost every animal on earth in order to punish human beings for their wickedness, it is no wonder that people should think the flooding of a single river valley is nothing worth worrying about. After the flood there is a repetition of the grant ofj^\^v dominion in more onimous language: And the fear of you and the dread of you shall be upon every beast of the earth, and upon every fowl of the air, upon all the^ moveth upon the earth, and upon all the fishes of the sea; into your hand are they delivered. The implication is clear: to act in a way that causes fear and dread to everything that moves on the earth is not improper it is, in fact, in accordance with a God­ given decree. The most influential early Christian thinkers had no doubts about how man's dominion was to be understood. 'Doth God care for oxen?' asked Paul, in the course of a discussion of an Old Testament command to rest one's ox on the sabbath, but it was only a rhetorical question—he took it for granted that the answer must be negative, and the command was to be explained in terms of some benefit to humans. Augustine shared this line of thought; referring to stories in the New Testament in which Jesus destroyed a fig tree and caused a herd of pigs to drown, Augustine explained these puzzling incidents as intended to teach us that 'to refrain from the killing of animals and the destroying of plants is the height of superstition'. When Christianity prevailed in the Roman Empire, it also absorbed elements of the ancient Greek attitude to the natural world. The Greek influence was entrenched in Christian philosophy by the greatest of the medieval scholastics, Thomas Aquinas, whose life work was the melding of Christian theology with the thought of Aristotle. Aristotle regarded nature as a hierarchy in which those with less reasoning ability exist for the sake of those with more: Plants exist for the sake of animals, and brute beasts for the sake of man—domestic animals for his use and food, wild on^ (or at any rate most of them) for food and other accessories of life, such as clothing and various tools. 10 Since nature makes nothing purposeless or in vain, it is undeniably true that she has made all animals for sake of man. In his own major work, the Si/wima Aquinas followed this passage from Aristotle almost word for word, adding that the position accords with God's command, as given in Genesis. In his classification of sins, Aquinas has room only for sins against God, ourselves, or our neighbours. There is no possibility of sinning against non-human animals, or against the natural world. This was the thinking of C/irfyham/y for at least its first eighteen j centuries. There were gentler spirits, certainly, like Basil, John Chrysostom^ And Francis of Assisi, but for most of Christian history they have had no significant impact on the dominant tradition. It is therefore worth emphasising ... major features of this Weyarn because these features can serve as a point of comparison when we discuss different views of the natural environment. According to the dominant Western tradition, the natural world exists for the benefit of human beings. God J^fave human beings dominion over the natural world, and God does not care how we treat it. Human beings are the only morally important members of this world. Nature itself is of no intrinsic value, and the destruction of plants and animals cannot be sinful, unless by this destruction we harm humans beings.20 / Singer goes on to labour the familiar point that anthropocentrism of this harsh tradition need not exclude some concern for the preservation of nature. But for most of recorded history is has not include^much concern. However, lesser Christian, notably stewardship and perfectionism, while they lessen some of the brutal impact of domination upon the natural workd, offer little improvement upon longer term insidious environmental erosion, or as regards retention of emphasized and enhancement of biodiversity. As distinctively, the rival humanist paradigm of modem times, running from the French enlightenment through 20th century Anglo-American empiricism, as exemplified in Russell, Ayer and Quine among many other luminaries, differs from mainstream Christianity only in leaving God out of the account (as He does not exist, He is utterly impotent, so to illicitly say). Exceptional human features themselves, naturalistically achieved, justify dominion and domination. Outline of a main argument Detailed argument for the anti-mainstream thesis, as refined, is, so to say, case by case, through cases in the mainstream history, considering main philosophers and main schools. Some of this hard detailed work, some already illustrated, has been carried out, in more or less detail^ by others: Drengson, Gare, Hargrove, Heidegger and Passmore, among many others. But, within that uneven treatment, there remain conspicuous gaps. For example, among the principal 17th century rationalists, while there is much material upon Descartes (along now with 20 Singer pp.265-8, itals added. Singer prefers fracton discourse to the substantially equivalent (historical linkage diminished) paroJfgm discourse. 11 a conservative back-lash defending Descartes), and some increasingly divisive material upon Spinoza, there is little at all on Leibnitz. As there is no prospect here of reworking the dismal history of Western philosophy, case by case, let us consider a few illustrative examples, which help plug some obvious gaps. Take again the distinguished early modem rationalists—Descartes, Leibnitz and Spinoza— as examples. Descartes' significant negative contribution is now well-known, so much so that Descartes is sometimes represented as the main villain of the environmental pieced Owing to the premature enthusiasm of various deep ecologists for Spinoza's contribution, the blacker environmental feature of Spinoza's theory have been enthusiastically exposed to view by a jubilant opposition. As a result, some deep ecologists have back-tracked, but only a little: Some Spinoza scholars have recently claimed that an ecological interpretation of Spinozism is not justified. There are notes in the where Spinoza says that we can treat other animals in any way which best suits us. [These authors] have argued and although the metaphysics is nonanthropocentric, the ethics is rightfully anthropocentric. Schopenhauer, who was steeped in Eastern philosophy, was quick to pick up on the anomolous attitude of Spinoza toward other animals: "Spinoza's contempt for animals, as mere things for our use, and declared by him to be without right, is thoroughly Jewish, and in conjunction with pantheism is at the same time absurd and abominable." Ame Naess and I agree that Schopenhauer was correct in his criticism of Spinoza. Naess admits that although Spinoza himself was what we would now call a "speciesist", his system is not speciesist.^ If Spinoza's system includes his anthropocentric ethics (and is not illegitimately restricted to an ecologically convenient selection from his holistic metaphysics), then it seems Waess is astray. The negative character of Spinoza's contribution was rediscovered by Bookchin (unversed in basic deep ecological texts), who applies this finding to lambast deep ecology regarding 'double standards' in its one-sided treatment of philosophers and philosophical traditions. Spinoza, for example is cast frequently as a nouveau Taoist and is interpreted more in the romantic tradition than in the scholastic one to which he has more affinities, despite his many differences with medieval thinkers. That this great thinker was militantly antliopocentric is consistently ignored by deep ecologists, as far as I have been^able to ascertain. I have yet to encounter any attempt to explain Spinoza's extraordinary statement: "Besides man, we know of no particular thing in nature in whose mind we may rejoice, and whom we can associate with ourselves in friendship or any sort of fellowship; therefore, whatsoever there be in nature besides man, a regard for our advantage does not call on us to preserve, but to preserve or destroy according to its various capabilities, and to adapt to our use as best we 21 Thus for example by Dregson. 22 Session, in Appendix D to Devall and Sessions, p.240. 23 Bookchin, p.261. The quotation from Spinoza's Ethics is fully cited in Bookchin. <' 12 So much for sensitive treatment of natural environments and their other inhabitants! Spinoza appears to have irreparably damaged any claim to exceptional positive standing. So far the third of the great rationalist trio, Leibnitz, appears to have escaped critical re- ....... (in a history of philosophy). Yet, as it happens, Leibnitz's position can be applied to illustrate features of considerable green generality. In brief, any philosophy is liable to be environmentally unfriendly that guarantees satisfaction of all or enough elements of the consumption impact equation, and so would generate excessive impacts. Leibnitz s overall position does just that, consider what might be called in honour of Leibnitz (though Leibnitz's fragmentary work did not initiate any genuine historic school). Leibnitz was heavily committed to all of human population growth, unfettered technological advance, and human lifestyles of consumption, in short, to precisely those factors that combine in the familiar impact recipe to produce excessive human impacts upon environments. There is fair evidence for these contentions. First, Leibnitz was an early exponent of utilitarianism, indeed he was all­ round an enthusiastic maximizer. From his formulation of utilitarianism, he drew an immediate obvious corollary: the directive to increase human population (maximizing on aggregate human pleasure is most obviously achieved by production of more happy humans, other aspects of which technology and affluence can assure).^ Secondly, Leibnitz was a technology enthusiast; he was heavily committed to the development and use of scientific technology, for which he had all sorts of schemes (e.g. not only the intended to encapsulate all of knowledge in an accessible useable form, a complete calculus duly mechanised, but as well numerous technological projects.2$). Thirdly, he was committed to an affluent lifestyle for himself and (through symmetry and basic assumptions of utilitarianism) for others. For his own part, he abandoned an academic career at an obscure German university "in favour of the more active and lucrative pursuits of the courtier and diplomat' and, so it turned out, the bright lights of major European cities and grand tours of Europe.26 No doubt Leibnitz's lifestyle commitments need not (and may not) be reflected in his philosophy, which may have independent environmental merit, for example as stimulation or input for later developments. There is unfortunately little evidence that that is so. Nonetheless, substantial fragments of 24 For Leibnitz's anticipation of utilitarianism, see Hruschka. For Leibnitz's immediate application of the principle, to support human population increase, see p.172. 25 'Leibnitz's interest in machinery is illustrated by his complicated plan to drain the Harz mines, which involved the construction of a new type of windmill, and a virtually friction-free pump', Cottingham p.193. For a detailed account of Leibnitz's extensive entrepreneurial and technological activities, see Aiton. 26 Cottingham p.24, p.26. 13 Leibnitz's philosophy—of a different unauthentic subphilosophy—do admit environmental bending and adaptation, in a way that Descartes' philosophy does not at all easily. Leibnitz has sometimes been accounted environmentally friendly. Some of that apparent friendliness appear due rather to scholastic conservativism. Thus he was opposed to mechanism; he was sympathetic to the organic and teleological, which did not contract to isolated human and superhuman loci. His metaphysical theory of monads, which are centres of living energy, effectively distributed life everywhere, though not equally. Harmony and order too prevailed throughout the universe, though under God's maximizing management, the presence of which they duly established! But even this life-expanding harmonious order, variants of which are now familiar from Whiteheadian and deep ecological quarters, was not as benign as it has superficially appeared. Leibnitz supposed that, by virtue of pre-established harmony and final causes governing inevitable progress, humans would not go wrong in the longer term in their environmental activities, that they could not 'cMwu/Zafive/y make undesirable changes in nature' .27 Leibnitz joyfully foresaw more and more of the Earth coming under cultivation, and its long-term advancement to a complete intensive garden, even if there were occasional relapses where parts deteriorated back temporarily towards wild state. Leibnitz even criticised Cartesianism, now widely regarded as prime villain of the environmental piece, as /hi/mg To provide the modal stimulus ... to the control of nature' ... To scientific advance'. The idea of control, advancing to total control, total management, is prophesized in Leibnitz (in a sort of chauvinistic Gaia hypothesis). He saw 'order as progressively increasing, with the help of man [as] a finisher of nature. He boldly applauded the idea of progress to the earth as a unit, assuming both an orderliness on earth and an orderliness in the changes it had undergone by man' .28 An important corollary does emerge: that a promising new partial metaphysics is no panacea for improved environmental performance or paradigms. Not merely neutral metaphysics, but even positive metaphysics, such as certain organic and process theories, are compatible with, and can be coupled with, damaging philosophies, social theories and life- 27 Glacken p.478. As he remarks, these bold assumptions made by Leibnitz have proved wrong. The preposterous infaHibihty-in-practice assumption has resurfaced recently in a less attractive aspect of the Gaia hypothesis as peddled by Lovelock. 28 Glacken p.506. styles. It is almost enough to consider the theories and practices, commitments and lifestyles of Aristotle, Leibnitz and Whitehead.^ A different example is furnished by mainstream British philosophy, a philosophy which has influenced much of the English speaking world for the worse, environmentally and otherwise. This philosophy is highly empiricist in orientation, with this empiricism expanding through ethics and social theory in the form of utilitarianism, typically a possessive individualistic human chauvinistic utilitarianism. 30 Despite appearances and propaganda, there has been compentively little improvement in recent times. Shallow utilitarianism persists as the main cal informant of and input into social sciences, including fashionable new areas such as ecological economics, public choice theory,... . Incidentally, not much is to be expected in the way of deeper change from contemporary universities and research institutions from where these new fashions emanate. For these are, by and large, part of the advanced industrial problematic; they are, almost without exception, urbanocentric conjectural-knowledge factories. The other main movements in Anglo-American philosophy are even more conservative, for example analytic philosophy and its variants, such as cor^epttial analysis, and Wittgensteinianism. For they leave almost everything as it is, asunvisionmentally unsatisfactory as it is.31 Nor is recent Continental philosophy, a main contrast class, any better, but in many which are the predominant form. But existentialism and phenomenalism, as well as passe-isms such as Marxism, are mixed in human chauvinism. Social criticism which has at least seriously A / addressed wider environmental problems, remains shallow. For example, the communcational' theory of Habernus favours articulate humans, and includes other animals and the rest of creation from any but very secondary roles. Modest out-fall. No doubt the anti-mainstream thesis is not the sort of proposition that most philosophers care to encounter. For one reason, it may seem like offering free ammunition to those who 29 Leibnitz's standing in the history of philosophy is somewhat curious. His main achievement, setting aside his reputation as an intellectual wizard with /oty of ideas, appears to be spasmodic work upon a beautiful ruin, an incomplete (and incompletable) metaphysics, of which only tantalizing fragmentary structures were ever available. It is not even as if there is a surviving supply of challenging bad arguments that can be put before baffled students, as with Descartes and Berkeley for instance. 30 For elaboration and defence of these stark claims, see "Dominant British ideology'. 31 This theme is developed, in a social setting, by Gelher. His case applies, with over more force, to environmental matters. 15 would like to put an end to philosophy, for political or ideological purposes. But it does not: not without a serious confusion of change, or end m present dominant form, with end, end period. For another, it may appear to give reinforcement to those who, with scant justification, have prematurely pronounced the end of philosophy.32 But this makes a similar confusion. Spectacular conclusions such as those that have sometimes been drawn from considerations like those assembled—such as, again, the end of philosophy, the demise of grand philosophy, the deconstruction of metaphysics— do not then emerge. For one reason, it is not philosophy, but only certain sorts of grand philosophy, that leads to disaster, and accordingly is liable to rejection. No end is implied to less grand regional philosophies, recessive metaphysics, or the like. Development of some recessive alternative or other—different ones—is now a favoured alternative idea (thus Gare and others advocating elaboration of process philosophy, environmentalists favouring ecological paradigms, etc.). But a more effective course, duly pluralistic, looks to locally and regionally based philosophies, with worthwhile linkages with local aspirations and regional cultures.33 Once again, there are philosophies and philosophies—and appalling regional philosophies (e.g. business philosophies, as promoted by local chambers of commerce; fundamentalist philosophies stroked by organised religions). Ways out, if they can be found, lie not through reproduction of dominant destructive ideologies at local levels, but through less damaging alternatives, fitted to ecoregional circumstances. Some broad corollaries of the anti-mainstream thesis are accordingly evident. Philosophy teaching and practice should be drastically reorganised, almost everywhere. Many features of historical approaches would be transformed. "Great thinker" and like series would vanish. Celebratory aspect of philosophy approached through its history would be abandoned: both the mainstream historic emphasis and the celebration. Grand but invariably flawed figures from history would no longer be revered, or celebrated in the same way, even if some of their argument are retained for exhibition or criticism. There would be new histories of philosophy, A different in different regions, with their own pantheons of prominent philosophers, pantheons not set in stone. Nor would systematic philosophy remain unscathed. For its usual operational framework is that of the dominant social paradigm. It would be relocated and reoriented. 32 Later authors tend to appeal back to earlier false prophets, notably Heidegger, who really had no viable arguments. There are other, quite different, equally poor, arguments to an end to philosophy, for instance those to an end of ideology, from the fall of one awful alternative, soviet "communism". And so on; see also above. 33 No doubt this is an intended idea in Caldera, for all that it is scarcely articulated or developed. Similarly in other productions in Latin-American philosophy. 16 There be an end to the transfer of inappropriate models, technology (including logical) and practices (as of temperate agriculture to tropical regions). There would be a reduction in borrowing and unseemly imitations. Borrowed philosophy is inappropriate for Latin America, or elsewhere in South. Consider French philosophy, which along with A Catholicism and Marxism, still tends to swamp what little happens in Latin America. The mileau in which French philosophy occurs is n^ established, the infrastucture is not in place, namely a variety of literary criticism and like mags, an active cafe society, and so on. French philosophy does not export that well and, by and large, should not be imported, for all its flashy fashionability.34 Regions should try to do their own appropriate intellectual things, importing only what they really need. Regional philosophies do not, after all, have to start from nothing or nowhere; they can draw upon and adapt what already has some local basis, perhaps a strong base. What is more, they can be directly applied to prevent or delay outside destructive incursions. For illustration, consider the place recognised values of forests in delaying grand pulpwood and integrated forestry [abstruction] projects. Through a regional network a mesh of constraints can be introduced, controlling intrusions of unregulated or prejudically regulated international capitalism. Compare a promising strategy for trying to achieve a nuclear free world, building up by free or freed regions. Nor does a case for ideological regionalism have to start from nothing. Some of the arguments for regionalism in organisation also support or suggest regionalization in reaches of ideas, including philosophy. For example, many of the advantages of subsidizarization transfer. None of this will be easy, or achieved without effort. Change is generally hard to achieve against inertia. And most intellectuals, for all their craving to be first in little approved ideas, are resistant to extensive change. Moreover the changes modestly proposed will not be simple; there is not, and cannot be, a simple uniform alternative. What is needed is fragmentation, pluralisation, regionalisation—unpopular, unfashionable ideas. References Aiton, E.J., Leibnitz A Biography, Adam Hilger, Bristol, 1985. Attfield, R., /t&rory o/p/tf/ojop/ty Environmental Ethics 13(1991) 127-137. 34 We do not quite have world philosophy, any more than the world car (despite American efforts, including Solomin & Higgins), but the numbermnainstream Odels is now rather small, and almost all so fai/ are noisy and polluting. A 17 Attfield, R., The Ethics of Environmental Concern, Second edition, University of Georgia Press, Athens, 1991. Bookchin, M., 'R^ZZ-ycoverZng ^voZMfZoK", Environmental Ethics 12(1990) c.261. Caldera, A.J., Fiiosofia e Crise, Peia filosofia latino-americana, Editora Vozes, Petropolis, Brasil, 1984. Devall, B., and Sessions G., Deep Ecology, Salt Lake City, Utah 198 5. Drengson, A, Beyond Environmental Crisis: from Techocrat to Planetary Person, Peter Lang, New York, 1989. Gare, A., Nihilism Incorporated, Eco-logical Press, Bungendore N.S.W., 1993. Glacken, C.J., Traces on the Rhodian Shore, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1967. Hargrove, E., Foundations of Environmental Ethics, Prentice Halls, New Jersey, 1989. Heidegger, M., The End of Philosophy, Harper & Row, New York, 1973. Hruschka, J., '7%^ gr^a^-yf AappZ/z^jj prZncZpZe anJ ^arZy German anrZcZparfan^ p/ ariZ/rarZan r/z^ozy", Utilitas 3(2)(1991) 165-177. Passmore, J., '77z^ gzzz7 p/* p/zZZo.yop/zy', address on the occasion of his 80th birthday, Australian National University, 1994. Paleocrassas, Y., Environmental crime and punishment. Towards a new development model, Austemb, Brussells, 1994. Plumwood, V., Feminism and the Mastery of Nature, Routledge, London, 1993. Roszak, T., Where the Wasteland^ Ends, Doubleday, Garden City New York, 1972. Russell, B., Wisdom of the West. Solomon, R., and Higgins, K., (eds ), From Africa to Zen, An Invitation to World Philosophy, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Maryland, 1993. Sylvan, R., 'DozzzZnanf I3rZfZ.y/z ZzZ^oZogy', typescript, Canberra, 1995. Sylvan, R., 7wp<2cf p/gZ^rnafZve <yyyfe/?z.y ozz Z/z^ EzzZZg/z^zzzzz^zzr Prp/^crtypescript, Canberra, 1995. Sylvan, R., Deep Plurallism, typescript, Canberra, 1992: referred to as DP. Sylvan, R. and Bennett, D., The Greening of Ethics, White Horse, Cambridge, 1994: referred to as GE. Sylvan, R. and Bennett, D., '<y UfopZzzy, 7ho amZ D^p EcoZogyGreen Series #19, Research School of Social Science Australian National University, 1990; referred to as UTD. Routley, R., "RoZgj <2K<7 ZZzzzZ^ p/p^r^Zgmjy Zzz g7zvZrozzmg/zZ<2Z r/zozzg/zr azzJ z7crZozz",Green Series #1, Research School of Social Science, Australian National University, 1982. Russell, B., Wisdom of the West: a historicai survey of western phiiosophy in its social and political setting, Ed. P. Foulkes, MacDonald, London, 1959.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Box 21, Item 705: Draft of Grand philosophies and environmental crises: many problems and a few solutions Subject The topic of the resource Printout (photocopy) of draft, with emendations and annotations, dated 23 May 1995. Description An account of the resource One of ten papers digitised from item 705. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/browse?search=Richard+Sylvan&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bjoiner%5D=and&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=&amp;range=&amp;collection=&amp;type=&amp;user=&amp;tags=&amp;public=&amp;featured=&amp;exhibit=&amp;geolocation-mapped=&amp;geolocation-address=&amp;geolocation-latitude=&amp;geolocation-longitude=&amp;geolocation-radius=10&amp;submit_search=Search+for+items">Richard Sylvan</a> Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived <span class="MuiTypography-root-125 MuiTypography-body2-126">The University of Queensland's <a data-testid="rek-series" href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/records/search?page=1&amp;pageSize=20&amp;sortBy=score&amp;sortDirection=Desc&amp;searchQueryParams%5Brek_series%5D%5Bvalue%5D=Richard+Sylvan+Papers%2C+UQFL291&amp;searchMode=advanced">Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291</a></span>, Box 21, Item 705 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org">Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy</a> Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1995-05-23 Contributor An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, <a href="https://najtaylor.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Dr. N.A.J. Taylor</a>. Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library. Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource [18] leaves. 50.54 MB. Type The nature or genre of the resource Manuscript Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context <a href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:9a8cf49">https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:9a8cf49</a> Box 21: More Green Como House Como House > Shelves > Top > Pile 3 https://www.antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/8e5b1510f955e6e862f9f4addae6dad3.pdf ba86610d50f0253cdff1991f4702b3f3 PDF Text Text 3.7.95 PARADIGMATIC ROOTS OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS Abstract. Virtually all diagnoses of the roots, and sources, of environmental problems are defective. While defective diagnoses persist, problems will not be adequately addressed. Focal questions ask why human communities so frequently degrade, impoverish or even destroy their own environments, and more generally why the whole earth is now in jeopardy through human enterprise. More immediate answers, sometimes correct so far as they go (which is not deep enough), look to components of environmental impact equations. More thorough-going answers fall into two classes: first those that do not question entrenched paradigms, but seek (unsuccessfully) to explain widespread problems simply through defective practice, and secondly those that, rightly recognising that defective practice is no adequate answer, look to deeper paradigmatic sources of problems. A fatal flaw in most of the latter answers lies in their monistic concentration on a single paradigm, or single narrow band of paradigms. These flaws are exposed, whence a wider, more satisfactory answer can be broached. Background busywork includes firstly, explaining problems and relevant paradigms and how paradigms operate regarding environmental problems, and secondly, detailed disentangling of proposed and alleged sources of the problems. With this done, it is argued that none of these answers, fashionable or other, to the focal questions is satisfactory. Here lies the important hard, but very negative and decidedly incomplete, work of the present investigation. A different more complex investigation is accordingly instigated. An initial answer is located through broader classes of paradigms : environmentally friendly and unfriendly. Further effort is expended, profitably, in trying to characterize these classes. Among significant corollaries, one is striking: philosophy as portrayed through its standard history is dismal environmental news. �2 PARADIGMATIC ROOTS of ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS Broaching focai questions, and searching for deeper answers. Human activity is now degrading terrestrial eco-systems at an extraordinarily rapid rate (liquidation of natural forest systems affords just one striking example). In modern times humans have devised sophisticated and sophistical idea-systems which justify such system degradation. Often in the past they would not have seen such transformation as mattering; many remain so programmed, regarding transformation as increasing wealth (a presumption encouraged under mainstream economics). More recently dominant human cultures have developed social systems which induct most humans into degradation procedures (through need, tax impositions, pressure to engage in cash economies, and so on) and which weave entrapping justificatory webs (through agencies, councils, courts, educations, missions, and so on). Whence arises an increasingly broached question 1; Why is this happening? More explicitly, w/zy /zzzzzz^zzz cozzzzzzzzzzzyz^^ <27Z6^ zzzzpov^rz^/z ^zzvzwzzzzz^zzr^, their own habitats? Indeed why do they sometimes, persistently, perhaps over a long period, destroy their owzz habitats? More sweepingly, w/zy fy r/zf w/zo/e now perhaps in y^o/7or^y r/zrozzg/z /znnzon ^ni^rprfs^? For those eager to anticipate the main outcome, the unremarkable answer to be eventually found to these focal questions is in essence this, because too many humans, especially those in control of environmentally impacting enterprises, remain committed to or caught within environmentally unfriendly paradigms, diverse paradigms but all displaying quite insufficient regard for the health and well-being of relevant habitats and of the earth. Parts of any answers to such focal questions come immediately through environmental impact equations, conservation laws, and such like. For example, degradation is occurring through the impact of overpopulation, excessive pollution, damaging or faulty technologies, and so on. While such answers are important, and often correct as far as they go in combination, and while they may correctly indicate what has to be changed somehow, they are nonetheless somewhat superficial, and they leave much to be explained. For example, they do not explain why a community persisted upon a course that deliberately led to such problems, or why it is so resistant to changes that might reduce impacts and pull it out of its problem-holes. Less superficial answers look to ideologically entrenched attitudes and commitments, to 1 In sources as diverse as Shepard (first page) and Jacobs (p.23). Contrary to other sources, such as Marshall, humans are by no means the only biological species that proceed to degrade or impoverish their own environments. Introduced "pest" species, such as rabbits and mynahs in the Antipodes, also do so; perhaps some botanical species contrive to as well. �3 pervasive paradigms that underwrite anti-environmental practices, as for instance the wood production ideology does forestry practice, even so-called "new forestry", and market ideology does economic practice, even so-called "environmental economics"^ An illustrative example which reveals the power of paradigms in blocking or facilitating action will shortcut a more elaborate argument, through action theory, to the efficacy of idea­ systems. Consider an unwanted pregnancy, resulting despite due precautions or whatever. Observe that, more and more there are comparatively safe technologies available to effect termination and seemingly solve the immediate problem. Ask: why so many people are opposed to choice of abortion? A very common answer is: because they are operating under an elaborate paradigm, typically organised religion (bureaucratic Christianity in the West), themes of which, the creeds of which, prohibit such choicest Of course pro-choice considerations are also paradigmatically embedded, for instance in forms of liberalism. Picturesquely, a social paradigm imposes controls on action, a system of red and green lights on a captured agent s routing procedures. Or with a different picture, paradigms project a steeply impeding topography on action space. Paradigms not only guide, control and limit, they also correlatively give permission—as, for instance, space to play god, freedom to release a new species or variety which may or has proved a pest or noxious or has been biologically engineered, liberty to neglect or degrade or vandalize. But paradigms do even more; they facilitate explanation, above all they make understanding possible. In these regards, they may work for better as well as for worse. Thus it is not a matter of getting rid of them, were this even feasible, but of getting right paradigms. The settings in terms of which agents such as humans act and operate, even down-toearth everyday agents, invariably include, not far in the background, paradigms, cultures, creeds, ideologies, pervasive myths or the like, all idea-systems, all involving models (in a technical sense) of one sort or another. Even the most practical (and vociferously practical) of humans are governed by background ideosystems. It is in terms of these background ideosystems that a great deal concerning human practices with respect to natural environments can be explained, what would otherwise lack satisfactory explanation.^ That explanation comes not however through a single paradigm, as has too often been supposed in trying to answer focal questions, but through a bundle of somehow aligned paradigms. Compare how a person may be represented, in social science, not through a single 2 3 4 For more on this style of explanation, see further RP. It is not, going to be contended that religion—or a certain Abramic religion, such as Christianity—is the main villain of the environmental piece. It is now well enough appreciated that religions in general borrowed much in their damaging articles from ancient philosophies. What will however, be suggested is that dominant philosophies Jo have much to answer for in this regard. Further, as logical positivists observed, explanation and justification patterns tend to overlap. How people justify their practices offers an explanation, though perhaps a misleading or superficial explanation, of them. As well, positivistic theories show, though in an oversimplified way, how models, which paradigms are, serve in explanation, justification and understanding. See e.g. Hanson. �4 role or program, but by way of a set of interconnected roles. What has been regularly overlooked in seeking deeper paradigmatic sources of environmental problems is systematic plurality. In part this neglect of plurality can be explained through countervailing propensity to seek single answers, and to try to locate uniqueness, where however causes and sources are plural. So it is with paradigmatic sources and roots of environmental problems. They are plural. As to what is going on theoretically, there is a fairly complex story to be told, an easier working image for which is appropriately ecological. That image focusses upon the structure of a perhaps impenetrable thicket or tangle, such as a dense rainforest patch, or, itself simplified, a fig or bamboo thicket. Below an emergent top layer representing the problems concerned, those raised by the focal questions, there is the canopy layer, of interlinked proximate causes. Below that again stands a plurality of stems, plural supports, which can be construed as supporting sources, and below them again, ultimately sustaining the whole structure, a multiplicity of intertwined roots, representing paradigmatic basics. What is sought are ultimate sources, and roots, not immediate causes. The cause of local pollution may be a factory that an agent installed, to produce more flim-flam. That too may be the physical source of the immediate problem. But deeper questioning seeks the reasons for such production and such factories. While there may be problems with ideas and idea­ structures as causes, as causally efficacious, these problems do not transfer to reasons and sources. Nonetheless there are buried metaphors, and linkages, to be unscrambled: how are "A is source of B" and "A is a root of B" to be explicated? While there is much written on roots and sources of environmental problems or developments virtually none of it addresses the question of what is meant by the partially buried metaphors of rooA? and introductory text, 7%^ . One striking example is supplied by Pepper's useful Although this text presents itself specifically as concerning roots, there is in fact no explication offered of the crucial metaphor on which it turns. For that matter there is no direct account of what the roots of environmentalism—still less, though quite different, of environmental problems to which environmentalism answers—are supposed to be (granted there is much oblique material). It is apparent also that Pepper has become rather carried away with the roofs metaphor, throwing it into several chapter headings and applying it pretty indiscriminately to mean simply (from some earlier occurrence); thus for instance, 'the roots of the theme of reconciliation of freedom and authority' (p.193). Such usage is unsound. Because rudiments of some idea make an earlier appearance in some authority or work, later workers may not have arrived at such an idea by expanding on these rudiments; they may have arrived where they did quite independently or by a different route. The mistake is that of reading a source or (genetic) causal linkage into a mere temporal conjunction: Neither roots nor sources are mere beginnings or simply early occurrences; there have to be continuing connections, with directional relationships such as supply or sustenance. But for �5 roots and sources different connections and elaborations are to be expected. After all, the metaphors, and likewise what they give rise to, are evidently different; more literally, plants have roots, normally below them, springs and streams rise from sources, not roots, often above them, and so on. Both differ from another popular buried metaphor, that of foundations. Foundations bring in other features such as solidity, stability and comparative permanency, while severing critical transmission features (for foundations may merely passively support, not sustain supported superstructure). So foundations, for all their importance in epistemology and elsewhere f/Toundationalism is correct, can be set aside.$ So far dictionaries do better than popular and philosophical texts. For instance, a short listing for the/ig^ra/Mre use of 'root' runs: 'the basis, bottom, the fundamental part, or that which supplies origin, sustenance, means of development, etc.' (Concise English Dictionary). Such a two component account will serve nicely, for a start. However conjunctions should substantially displace disjunctions, else roots could collapse to foundations or could collapse to mere trace element supplements. Roots both give a basis and bottom binding into a substratum and supply sustenance and means of development. Roots connections are richer as well as more specific than sources, which may merely show from where an item comes or is obtained. Further that place of derivation that may not be a basis or bottom, but for instance a source­ book. With roots, like normal foundations, a basis or bottom is reached, whereas sources may have further sources (hence the search for "deeper", even ultimate, sources). Finally, root and source connections carry explanations, at least genetic explanations—concerning how items got to be what and the way they are—because roots and sources are characteristically that from which items develop. Sometimes even more information, including a whole control system, gets transmitted. As much happens where roots are paradigmatic, to return to that strange mix of buried metaphors. Reaching deeper roots is important. Without locating them, perhaps all the roots (should they resemble blackberry), problems may not get properly addressed. Should we wrongly locate roots, then proposed resolutions directed at these, cutting them off or replacing them, will also go astray, wrongly directed or whatever. Such is the fate of many proposals concerning environmental problems. There are several parts to the approach sketched, if it is to be properly elaborated— including a working classification of environmental problems and their proximate solutions, and an account of paradigms and their roles—before getting to paradigmatic answers to focal questions. But we can be brief on these necessary preliminaries, because main details are already in circulation and because they have been addressed elsewhere. 5 Despite a referee's suggestion that discussion of "roots" 'could be improved by a contrast of the "roots" metaphor with the "foundations" metaphor, the fact is that we are decidedly not concerned with foundations of environmental problems; to the contrary, we do not wish to see them supported (if shoddily), established and so on. On the growing complexity and varying interpretations ofan emergent bog, see for instance Chisholm. �6 Although these will be duly connected, with paradigms implicated in problems, they are different components, and admit and deserve separate explanation. la. ^nv/ronw^nZoZ pro/?Z^wis omZso/o^ows. Definitions of 'environmental problem', and classifications of such problems, have already been ventured? What problems emerge as environmental depends upon background value framework. What counts as a major problem on deeper environmental perceptions may be but a minor problem, or written off as not a problem at all, on shallower perspectives. Among such indicator problems, ones here taken as seri'oMS problems, are those of * sustaining biodiversity and * maintaining significant wilderness? Even if the broad impact of human enterprise were sufficiently reduced to guarantee comfortable survival of future humans, these desiderata may well not be guaranteed. There would be outstanding problems. In any event, it is not too difficult to say more or less what environmental problems are (at worst by furnishing familiar lists), and in many cases to indicate at least in principle how they might be resolved. Environmental impact equations, encountered in a more perceptive classification of problems, reveal how they can be resolved. Namely, by altering relevant impact parameters. Given this why are they proving so intractable? Why is so little done? Why is so very little despite all the talk? Proximate solutions, about as far as positive science conveys us, are not however satisfactory stopping points. How is it, given so much scientific information and expertise, that humans are continuing to sharply degrade, and risk substantially destroying, their habitats. To these, the focal questions of this exercise, there is an array of competing answers on offer or to be met in an extensive literative. As we will soon discover, most of these answers are too simple; and taken, as intended, as comprehensive, they are wrong. Correct answers to the questions are however tm/yorfoHf, because if we fail to get to the bottom of the issues, there is even less prospect of satisfactory action to turn around a difficult and deteriorating situation. That these issues do not matter, that casual human relationships, or how many devaluing dollars uncaring humans can briefly stuff in their pockets, matter more than whole islands of habitats—these sorts of value judgements (after all is a value term par excellence) derive from and are supported by particular ideologies. lb. Afo%ZeZ-ZZ%e oZyecZs. * poro^ZZgozs, Z^ZeoZogZes, CMZZMr^s ,a?MZ so on. A can be explicated, technically, as a model in precisely a generous logical sense? See for example GE, which duly details connections of the problems with impact equations and proximate solutions. As to the extent of the problem (even) in North America, and a proposed remedy, see See e.g. 77^ eHvhwwwgnta/po/icy m OECD Box 1.7, in Pearce et al, p.24. See RP, where many environmentally relevant illustrations are given and explained. �7 That is, a paradigm amounts to a structure supplied by an elaborate interpretation function on a general system, i.e. semantical and other evaluations defined on an integrated relational structure. Naturally it is required to be/hif/t/h/ to what it models, the social forms and norms, scientific research programs, or whatever. A jocz#/ in contrast to a scientific paradigm, is a paradigm where the propositional and action theory, the socio-political themes and value judgements, is that of a social group. A pure is but a comprehensive social paradigm, where by "comprehensive" is meant that it covers a sufficiently comprehensive part of the life-styles and life-forms of the community concerned. There are now many examples of formulations of the themes delivered under rival social paradigms and under different cultures, from these, mostly sketchy formulations we can work back towards the underlying models. The basic vehicle, a situations or worlds model, is a -ytwHmh'ca/ object, an item like a complex universal 10 similarly open to a range of construals and reduction attempts, e.g. metaphysical, conceptual, epistemic, linguistic and so on. Once this is realised, it can be seen that successive cohorts of philosophers and sociologists, historians and geographers have repeated one another in vaguely discerning essentially the same sorts of underlying structures under different categorisations: thus, for instance, forms of understanding (Kant), of consciousness (Marx), of life (Wittgenstein), conceptual schemes (Conant), presuppositions (Collingwood), discursive formations (Foucault), W^/to/tsc/zoMMtzgs, total views (Naess), traditions (MacIntyre), traditions of thought, cultures, perspectives, outlooks, ideologies, programs,.... An ideology, for instance, in the non-derogatory (non-Marxist) sense is an ideas - system, initially a propositional system or theory with a relevant domain of ideas operative, from which a paradigm can be discerned and elaborated. Such models are typically presented in extremely truncated form, for example through a tabulation of capsule themes. Here is a combination example: TABLE 1: Elements of Taoism as contrasted with Deep Ecology and with the dominant paradigm: an initial capsule formulation .n Taoism Deep Ecology Dominant (Western) Paradigm Harmony with nature, through Tao Harmony with nature Domination over nature Nature valuable in itself; "humanism" rejected Natural environment valued for itself Nature a resource; intrinsic value confined to humans 10 11 It resembles a universal; compare e.g. Plato's system of forms, Locke's of complex ideas. Naturally there are differences between, for instance, traditions (of thought) which are historically bound, cultures, which are geographically and otherewise connected, and conceptual schemes (where a conceptual reduction is insinuated), but all are, at logical bottom, models of paradigmatic sort. This tripartite example is adapted from UTD, where capsule elements of Taoism are duly expanded. �8 Levelling of differences; wide impartiality Biocentric egalitarianism Human supremacy Supplies ample Earth supplies limited Ample resources with substitutes Following Tao-te Spiritual goals, especially self-realisation Material economic growth a predominant goal Enlightenment Self-realisation Personal (material) enrichment Doing with enough (recycling inappropriate) Doing with enough; recycling Consumerism Non-competitive lifestyle; voluntary simplicity Cooperative lifestyle Competitive lifestyle Decentralised/neighbourhood and village focus Decentralised/bioregional /neighbourhood focus Centralised/urban centred/ national focus Hierarchy without power structure; anarchoid Non-hierarchical/ grassroots democracy Power structure hierarchical Limited technology Appropriate technology High technology Considerable caution Precautionary practice Risking taking (verging upon adventurism) Paradigms control action space by some equivalent of directives; under an earlier analogy, red and green lights duly interpreted. They may not supply direct commands, general obligations and prohibitions, but may operate more indirectly. For instance an enlightened person, a role model, a person following Tao, would act this way, not that. (Taoism, like certain modern ideologies, eschews deontic judgements.) Paradigms are absorbed and they guide practice. They commonly form part of actors' worlds; they are certainly part of actors' programs for practice and considered action in a world. In a then, they are things, programs actors carry round in their heads; so heads (or rather consciousnesses) have to be changed, nor rolled. 2. Proposed answers to focal questions: a preliminary classification of inadequate answers and suggested remedies. Most of the extraordinary range of answers proposed supply but a single source, and are accordingly defective for this reason, usually among other reasons. Indeed it is not much of an exaggeration to assert that virtually everything proposed, in a now extensive literature, is wrong. TABLE 2. Main tabulation of answers and remedies , in three stages. D. answer? �9 DI. Ignorance Relevant information Information now available D2. Unintended consequences Relevant information Information now available D2a Faulty technique, or technology Repairs Repairs already made D3 Deviation (from theory, etc.) Education (for failure to limit deviance) Adherence a. Deviation uneliminable, or b. Adherence no remedy D4. Systemic lock-in (through poverty, ensnarement in market forces, etc.) Trap removal a. Explains only certain cases, and b. Due to paradigmatic features D5. Insensitivity or insensibility Problem apprised Remedy tried; background ideological blockage D3a When pursued, objections like those noted either force defective practice out as unsatisfactory, or push it back to paradigmatic features. proposed (among others) single paradigm an.S3V^r.y Pl. Christianity (mainstream Catholicism) Pla. Protestantism and its ethic P2. P2a Cartesianism Dualism Scientific enlightenment, or alternative (Eastern) religion Monism Anti-dualism Modified holism P2b Mechanism Organicism P3. P3a P3aa Substance metaphysics Possessive individualism Personalism Process metaphysics Non-reductionism Transpersonalism P4. Capitalism Socialism P5. Industrialism Pre-industrialism (romanticism) Post-industrialism P5a Technocratic bureaucracy P5aa. Transnational business P6. Enlightenment Anti-enlightenment Anti-materialism �10 P6a Materialism Spiritualism P8. P9 Patriarchy, andocentrism Human domination of humans Feminism Anti-domination (anti-hierarchy) Observe that what some have proposed as remedies, others have seen as sources; remedies proposed tend to share defects of sources. of this paradigmatic sort (but with the paradigms often subject PS. Furfur specific or partial) include: Typical Platonism Leibnitzianism Kantianism Anglo-American philosophy^ Utilitarianism Economism (economic imperialism as suggested New metaphysics New metaphysics Consequentialism Continental philosophy Alternative ethics New social science; ethics contrasted with straight economic roots) -TO on. A very rough Contractarianism Consequentialism Domination transfer Human nature (esp. aggression) Domination removal Adolescencism Infantilism (from Freudian physchology) Maturation Maturation runs as follows: draw up a potted list of mayor movements and factors in dominant Western thought. Then many—perhaps it is not excessive to say mo^r—entries in that list will have been nominated, likely separately, by someone as the source of the problems. That list accordingly continues (even including, sometimes, entries like Taylorism, i.e. reorganisation of industry along lines popularized by Taylor), but what is included is representative of the important and more interesting answers to be encountered. There are other allegedly nonparadigmatic answers however, varying from interesting to crazy, that should also be taken into some account, for instance answers like Shepard's challenging answer. Although Shepard dismisses ideologies, what he offers is a further ideosystem, of similar dubious or false cast. Strange answers include pushing it all back to human (thus not only Shepard, but also Fox, and Ehrlich and other gurus with insistence upon 'mental maladaptation'). 12 The mainstream form, analytic philosophy, appears to comprise empiricism-cum-utilitarianism in Britain, tempered in America by pragmatism. �11 Basically, there is something wrong with a society that does that to its habitat. It is sick —in a popular sense, yes, it is sick. It is the slides that follow, however, along psychological routes, that are to be resisted. One slide begins invitingly: As it is not literally sick, well not physically usually, it must be sick; that is, sliding further and fast, insane or mad. But the sources of mental sickness lie in childhood (as Freudianism erroneously insists). The slide continues to: what we have are immature societies, frozen at an early stage of development. No doubt there is somef/nng to the theme that dominant societies, USA especially (which now influences so much in other cultures), are locked into youth culture, a sort of late consumptive adolescence. 13 No doubt, too, that maturity—but an environmental maturity—is desirable, even mandatory. Meanwhile, immaturity is fostered right through human life. Considerable effort is put into trying to induct older people, who are often marginalised, into active consumptive society, to spend their money through tourism, on new compact housing, in those most wasteful of modern institutions such as airliners and hotels, hospitals and old-age homes, and so forth. 3. Documentation as to some of the acclaimed purer sources. Like the lists of proposals and intricated paradigms, the documentation too is somewhat perfunctory, tending here and there towards notes. Of course there are excuses. While whole theses could be spun out on several of these topics, already beginning to elicit such treatment, a prime objective here is different from usual: neither to convict, nor to clear or excuse, but to partially implicate most items cited in the main tabulation above. Consider, in brief, some of the usually accredited sources: * region, above all Christianity. The theme that the source of ecological problems, The historical roots of our ecological crisis', are to be found in Western religion, and specifically in The Judaeo-Christian belief that mankind was created to have dominion over nature', was repeated in a particularly pointed and subsequently influential way by White. 14 One helpful summary of White's line of argument runs as follows: Allied with technological and scientific developments, orthodox Christianity has produced arrogant exploitation of nature, and a contemporary ecological crisis. White's thesis is that the West's successful science and technology developed between the 8th and 12th centuries — it is much older than the scientific revolution though it was not until about 1850 — following the democratic revolutions — that the science and technology were combined to produce truly immense powers to change nature. The early development, however, was paralleled by the development of exploitative attitudes to nature which seemed to be Tn harmony with larger intellectual patterns', namely the victory of Christianity over paganism. This destroyed the animistic beliefs whereby men thought twice before they plundered and destroyed natural objects. It substituted instead a faith in perpetual progress, 13 14 It interestingly matches the locking of primary production systems into pioneering stages such as preclimax formations. Shepard's dialectic is investigated in more detail in the Appendix . White's article has generated an enormous defensive literature, primarily from Christian apologists, but also from softer environmentalists and from testy historians of ideas. The whole area looks in danger of disappearing from intellectual view under a heavy blanketing snowfall, snowed. �12 a belief that God designed nature for man's benefit and rule, and that action, not contemplation, was the correct Christian behaviour. Science formed an extension of theology (for to know God you had to find out how his creation worked), and technology provided the active means to carry out God's will. Because today's attitudes are essentially inherited from Christianity, then it 'bears the burden of guilt" for contemporary ecological disruption.^ What has happened with the divisive charge, advanced by White, that Christianity was the prime source of environmental problems, is particularly instructive. In an attempt to diffuse the charge Christian apologists pointed to, what there undoubtedly were, recessive strands or isolated seeds in Christianity which were much more environmentally benign (though some such as stewardship, which has evolved toward total managerialism and sustainable development, have proved increasingly problematic). That does little or nothing to meet a more sensitive and telling criticism that mainstream (or dominant) Christianity has much to answer for as regards destruction and degradation of natural environments.^ Similar responses are apposite for attempts to exonerate their wider sources, such as Western philosophy. Against the sheeting of responsibility to religion, dominant forms of which should undoubtedly cop heavy criticism, it has been contended that philosophy ... is the primary source of most Western ideas [and] is ... for the ideas and attitudes that inhibit environmental protection today.... Religion ... though often criticized ... as the chief culprit, has played a much less fundamental role. Most of the environmentally offensive ideas in Western religion originated not in religion but in Western philosophy.^ * CZa-y-sica/ above all the peak philosophies of Plato and Aristotle. Greek philosophers approached natural phenomena in a way that (1) prevented the development of an ecological perspective, (2) discouraged the aesthetic appreciation of the natural world, and (3) promoted a conception of reality that made the idea of nature preservation conceptually difficult, if not impossible, is More sweepingly, they set Western philosophy on a ruinous environmental course, a course accentuated with the appearance of modem rationalist and empiricist philosophies. * /2/nZ(?.y6)/7/ry. The dominant modern environmental approach is sometimes Pepper pp.44-5. Pepper then embarks upon the murky story of alternative interpretations of Biblical data and the Christian tradition, dredged up by a series of White's critiques. The issue continues to be debated; for an older survey of traditions see Passmore, for a challenging recent contribution to the debate see Callicott. Each religion is multistranded. But we should look hardest at dominant operative forms: Ask, not merely what they say, but what they Jo, and woM/J do. For an outline of just such a telling criticism of mainstream Christianity, see Singer esp. pp.265-8. Hargrove p.15. Certainly the sort of message that Pentecostal missionaries even now try to preach to resistant Australian Aboriginals, that the earth is just filth, mere rubbish, can be traced back in direct line to Plato's attitude to the land, an attitude Hargrove and Plumwood help expose. Hargrove p.21. Hargrove's claims may appear to have been confuted by Attfield, but really, while they have been subject to minor qualification, they have been highlighted. There is a much fuller story still to be told about classical Greek philosophy reassessed environmentally, of the very different roles and impacts of Plato (with his unearthly philosophy), of Aristotle (with his earthier chauvinism), of Stoics and of Epicureans, and of neo-Platonists. For a modest beginning, see Plumwood on Plato, Toulmin on Stoics as contrasted with Epicureans, and Glacken on lesser or lost Greek strands. �13 denominated Cartesianism, or the Cartesian Technocratic paradigm, in honour of Descartes, upon whom (as a conveniently select individual from a swag of like-minded people) several of the leading themes and ideas can be pinned. 19 While Descartes was undoubtedly extraordinarily influential, so were others; Newton for one, Locke for another. The paradigm is accordingly better denominated the Atomist-Empiricist-Technocratic paradigm, or some such. Evidently it substantially overlaps other modern ideologies, such as that of the Enlightenment, widely implicated as major sources of environmental problems. * While some conglomeration of the preceding sources and others (some potted history of Western metaphysics, so to say) may be offered, more often what is presented is some selection of Western metaphysical elements. Here is one example, plainly exhibiting a heavy Heideggerean influence: The roots of our environmental problems lie in Western metaphysics. For metaphysics, Being is presencing; no allowance is made for any other mode (sheltering, declining, concealing). Once metaphysics has established the absolute dominion of the present over the not-present or no-longer-present, the way is paved for the scientific method, with its emphasis on replicability of results, predicability, quantification, and control. Nature becomes a "natural resource" —and people become "human resources". The sources of anthropocentricism, imperialism, colonialism, sexism and consumerism can all be traced back to metaphysics. Western metaphysics has more or less conquered the world, and there is no going back. Western metaphysics is more than simply a false consciousness overlaid on top of "authentic" experience. Being changes historically, and metaphysics is the index of that change... Metaphysics has a conquering, exclusive imperative, ... and different [former] modes now exist only as vestigial traces. They cannot be resurrected through ancient wisdom, native healing, goddess worship, or any other supposedly intact, dormant system. We cannot create a "new order". That would simply be another form of the Will to Power... We can—and must—turn away from the dominant rhythms of western metaphysics if we are to avoid the nihilism of a perpetually ensconced technocratic rationalism. 20 An alternative to turning entirely away from Western metaphysics, consists in combining rejection of standard Western metaphysics (or, less sweepingly, of dominant metaphysics, characteristically individualistic and atomistic) in favour of development of recessive traditions or mere Western seeds. Such a more sophisticated approach, also critical of Western metaphysics, with atomism a main villain, is pursued by those who promote instead process or plenum metaphysics.21 For encapsulation of the Cartesianism paradigm (a dominant dualistic form), summarising Drengson's exposition, see RP, table 5. Drengson, for one, has helped portray Descartes as the environmentally evil genius (or demiurge). That some orthodox philosophers, not merely maverick philosophers, are now rushing to the defence of Descartes should be seen as entirely in keeping with the character and roles of Western philosophy. Undisclosed source. Amusingly, I have seen myself accused of 'rejecting] in its entirety mainstream western philosophy and science, ... seen as the cause of the [environmental] problem' and instead basing my 'ecocentric values on Eastern philosophies' (thus Bellett). This charge was levelled on the strength of a peripheral exercise on classical Taoism and Deep Ecology (now included in UTD). For the first process option, see Gare; for the second, where the plenum is that of a holistic relativity theory (more exactly holistic relativistic geometrodynamics), see Mathews. �14 * The source of problems lies in The intellectual heritage of the Enlightenment' (e.g. Dobson). Of course the main doctrines of the Enlightenment substantially overlap those of modern mainstream philosophy and of Descartes' philosophy (but they shed dualistic and theistic scholastic hang-overs). * CapzfaZfym. The assumption that capitalism is responsible for environmental as well as social evils, widespread until recently in state-socialist countries (when their own records were revealed), can be traced back to Marx. According to Marx, with capZr^ZZym for the first time, nature becomes purely an object for humankind, purely a matter of utility; ceases to be recognised as a power for itself; and the theoretical discovery of its autonomous laws appears merely as a ruse so as to subject it under human needs, whether as an object of consumption or as a means of production.22 But, as observed, a main embedded theme had appeared in earlier philosophy; for instance, the idea of nature as purely an object for humankind, was advanced in Aristotle: 'Now if nature makes nothing incomplete and nothing in vain, the inference must be that she has made all animals for the sake of man'.23 Aristotle adopted a similar stance on nature as on other species. The theme was to be oft repeated in subsequent Aristotelianism, and reiterated apparently in shallower Stoicism. But the subjection of everything to MfZZZ/y, no doubt a relative of capitalism, appears to be a distinctively modem contribution. * Zn6?M.yfrZaZ jocZ^fy or Z/t^My/rZ^ZZym. Modern ZwJMyZrZ^ZZ^m ('the smooth­ superhighway of industrial progress') is the source, such is an extraordinarily popular theme: '... the root causes of the present crisis lie deep with the very foundations of the industrial paradigm'.24 Similarly 'roots [of] the environment crisis ... go deeper to the foundations of modern industrial society'.23 Again, 'the structural roots of the environmental crises [are found in] industrialism, in commoditization, in commercialism, and in competition and greed'26 The popular theme, that industrialism is the source, tends to confuse mere means— industrial technology can without any doubt at all vastly facilitate environmental degradation (as well as, It should not be overlooked that some of those who nominated meant thereby jpara^/gm or /yaraJt'gwM or an equivalent. But what they may gain thereby in verisimilitude, they tend to lose in confusion. p.409f. Aristotle, Po/Zf/cs, Book 1, ch.8. an inference, you might well exclaim. See further Hargrove p.25. M. Gabriel, 'How "attitudes and implements" have brought us to "the end of nature"', a paper presented at UNE Environment/ Poroe/igm^ Conference, April 1993. Gabriel proposes a managerial resolution: 'for us to learn to manage both our relationship to our environment, and more broadly the environment itself (quotes from abstract of paper). This amounts to the flip side of an old problematic record. For the "solution" derives from the same defective box as the evident problem. Gabriel Similarly industrialism is assumed as the source throughout McLaughlin (the theme pervades his book) and as the root of the modern problem in Marshall (p.5ff). While seriously astray as to roots and sources, those critical of industrialism have a significant case. For, as well as functioning as a major inflator of intact problems, industrialism has helped generate side problems of its own, as with new types of chemical and nuclear pollution. Editorial in 7%^ Eco/ogMt, Jan-Feb 1992, p.2. �15 less satisfactorily, subsequent clean-up and environmental repair)— with sources and causes, what directs and powers uses of industrial technique and practice. * Economic growf/t or economic JeveZopmenf. 'According to a common and currently influential diagnosis, the environmental crisis has essentially economic roots'.27 One widespread misconception is that economic growth is the source of environmental problems. The assumption is astray for several reasons. For one, growth is at best a proximate cause, itself in need of explanation. More importantly, growth may occur in sectors of an economy, such as information technology or religious or artistic services, which have little or no environmental impact. Also conversely, an economy which fails to grow, but is desperately trying to survive, may exact heavy environmental costs (e.g. the forests are clear-felled to pay for continuing employment). No doubt though, economic growth is intimately intricated with proximate causes of environmental problems (through environmental impact equations). Similar considerations tell against the familiar proposition that the source of the problems is economic development itself or, what is different, the entrenched model of economic development. While it is no doubt correct, and important to emphasize, that 'the Western model of economic development, far from being the solution to" environmental and social problems, is 'actually fuelling' them, it is not the sole or distinguished source of the problems. 28 * nafMre. '... the roots of our ecologic crisis reach beyond the variable topsoil of intellectual history, whether Eastern or Western, into the common substrata of human nature itself.'29 What such "nature" amounts to and how it functions as roots, both commonly left obscure, turns upon background hypotheses as to the nature of this nature. Different false 27 28 29 Goodin, p.573. While not contesting the theme, Goodin does continue: 'the problem is not just that there are too many people, or even that they are enjoying too high a standard of living. A// r/mf fy too, of course. More fundamentally, however, problems of environmental despoliation are said to derive from skewed incentives as they pursue their various goals' (p.573). That too will be seen to be seriously astray, though it contains large grains of truth; it presumes unchanged the prevailing economically-skewed dominant social paradigm. Both socialists and other opponents of capitalistic conspicuous consumption tend to select the living-standard component of the main environmental impact equation as the source of the crisis. Thus Cuban luminary, Castro, in a recent stunningly succinct speech: 'Less luxury, less wastage. Otherwise it will be too late'. Quoting claims of E. Goldsmith, advanced in an interview in For^f arx/ Fir;/ 273 (August 1994) pp.46-7. The need for emphasis will persist while locally prominent political figures like the present Prime Minister of Australia travel around the Earth with the hackneyed message that only economic growth will solve environmental problems. Seeing growth as the problem affords only a superficial analysis, like that of pointing to overconsumption with which growth is interconnected. As deeper inquiry reveals, underlying both issues of economic growth, employment and consumption, and alternatives taken, are models, paradigmatic models. Growth is but a means to objectives assumed in the dominant paradigm. A deeper analysis shows too why more growth will not ultimately solve relevant problems. Callicott and Ames, 'Epilogue: On the relation of idea and action' p.282 (see also p.281), in a desperate and apparently unsuccessful attempt to reconcile the claim (repeatedly advanced in their book) that Asian traditions of thought can make a significant contribution to much improved treatment for natural and built environments, with 'the deplorable environmental conditions prevailing in contemporary Asia' (p.280). �16 hypotheses, that humans are invariably driven by aggression, sexual or reproductive imperatives, economic needs, yield different defective accounts. In Catholic orthodoxy such a source, human nature, comes burdened with original sin; the source of a sweep of problems, including now environmental ones, is "man's fallen nature". That astonishing source also comes contaminated, as for instance gender biassed. * Parriarc/ty. The source is patriarchy, and androgyny; problems derive from mistreatment of women. 'Our troubles begin with the invention of male deities located off the planet'.30 'patriarchy is the source of the environmental crisis'.31 One sample linkage statement runs as follows: ... there is a huge denial ... of the violence perpetrated on women both historically and ... presently] and ... this is the same energy that, turned against the Earth, is destroying the very life-support systems and rapidly destroying the conditions that makes complex life possible. The fires that consume the Amazon are the very same fires that burned 9 million witches and I believe that there can be no solution of our ecological problems unless we simultaneously address our gender issues.32 Patriarchy, as source, is evidently a special case of long invoked themes: * 77MW6W JommarzoM q/ It is an extraordinarily widespread assumption that the impact of humans (or, until recently, of Man!) on the environment, or creatures or things in it, is a product of that of humans with each other, typically of groups or classes. In misleadingly brief form, the source is social: Man's inhumanity to Man; and the solution correspondingly is social. Unremarkably, this unlikely assumption comes in a variety of different formsrearly, concerning the mistreatment of animals as an (inevitable) spill-over from mistreatment of humans, recently concerning maltreatment of nature spilling over from, or being one with, that of women. The fashionable assumption runs, in one form or another, from Aquinas through Kant to a range of recent trend-setters, including Marcuse, Illich, Passmore, Bookchin ... and some leading feminists. In particular, it is part of the very meaning of wcz'a/ an ideology shaped and championed by Bookchin: 'ecological problems arise from deep-seated social problems'.33 On this theme among others, Bookchin simply follows a prominent trend in social anarchism set by Kropotkin and his contemporary Reclus: all see that the JornmoTzon anJ q/ man L? * q/ * man Z?y man. Thus, 'Both Kropotkin and q/ Reclus ... laid the foundations of a radical theory of human ecology. Ecological despoliation was seen to reflect imbalances in human relationships Quoted in Eckersley p.64, who develops and begins to assess patriarchical source themes. For a more critical assessment see the sequel to GE. See Seed, quoted in the sequel to GE; also Salleh (e.g. in EP3). Jo/zzr 7992, Rainforest Information Centre, Lismore, 12. 12.91. Seed's extravagant identity claims are but a dramatic extension of that popular tendency to transform comparison and similarity statements into identity claims. Indeed reductionism often reaches further, with attempted conversion of all relational statements into identity ones, along with unrelational property claims. Bookchin sometimes qualifies this central claim, with 'nearly all present', e.g. EP3 p.354. But he is not strictly entitled to any such qualification, given his invariant theme that the domination of nature always results from humans' domination of other humans (see e.g. Clark EP3, p.346). The text EP3 contains a sizeable section providing a useful introduction to social ecology. �17 —domination of nature thus following from human domination'. ... It follows that if domineering and exploitative human relationships can be avoided in small-scale decentralised societies then such societies are also best for a harmonious man-nature relationships Domination and exploitation of one division by another can in tum be seen as a case of dualism at work, between the one, the dominator or dominating class, and the other, the dominated. *A * o/ Environmental problems derive from operation of a set of connected ideologically-entrenched and defective dualismsS * of environmental problems lie in educational systems. Or if roots don't, do. However, roots of environmental or social problems do not lie in educational systems. ParAy of their solutions may however. For education is critical, for instance, in correcting to established satisfactory arrangements, such as, so it is claimed, Enlightenment ideals or traditional ethical systems.^ Therewith we are transported full circle back to defective practice answers. 4. A on, to, proposed answers A main part of this exercise consists in a detailed critical commentary on the entries in the main tabulation, and on proposals like them. Small beginnings are made on the exercise, in two stages reflecting a major division in the main tabulation. a J D. Defective practice answers tend to come from those who presume we are already in possession of adequate theories, or what approximates them or supplies main elements of them. (Such answers are also more liable to emanate from conservatives, opposed to new or radical theories, advanced on the basis of inadequacy of prevailing theories in practice.) Defective practice answers are especially popular in economic reaches. There was a time, perhaps not past yet, when all market failures in the shape of negative externalities were passed off as unintended consequences of economic activity. While "consequences" or outputs such things as pollution certainly are, unintended they mostly are not now, without 'unintended' of its normal sense. For example, industrialists, apprised of conservation laws and unsurprised by polluted wastes, who dump their waste where and when regulators and waste­ watchers are not looking, can hardly pretend that that output is an unintended consequence of their industry. That should now be a joke, itself with serious consequences. Accordingly new ecological economics insists that we dig deeper—without however exceeding economic settings or a shifting dominant paradigm—to discover why markets may Pepper p.192, with internal quotation from Breitbart. Unfortunately it is all too evident, given humans could so socially organise, that they could settle into harmonious small-scale communities which retained but little of pristine natural environments. Such a proposition obtains a much fuller elaboration within Plumwood. In an interesting way, such a proposal can hardly be wrong, given the conclusion reached below that a set of defective paradigms is at work. For evidently paradigms can be covered by dualisms, represented by a set of them in each case, somewhat as numbers can be represented in binary terms, generated from a basic two-oneness duality. Thus Passmore, Attfield, and others. For a critical assessment of education, see GE �18 foreseeably fail and why environmentally rectifying technology is not delivered.37 where they usually arrive, travelling within such unduly confined settings, is, like welfare economics before ecological, at better regulated markets, with business set as before within frameworks of plans and incentives, controls and penalties. Environmentally, however, such approaches do not reach very deep, or tap into underlying paradigmatic problem-sources. But these sorts of defective practice answers do not always derive from standard economic sources. A deviation-style answer is much favoured by Marxists to explain failure, environmental and other, of the former Soviet Union and other Eastern block countries; namely that true, or authentic, Marxism was not practiced. Unfortunately, even if it had been, environmental consequences would be little better, given the heavy industrial commitments and environmental shallowness, at best, of true Marxism.38 Differently, enlightenment liberals like Passmore try to ascribe failures in Western environmental practice, not to any deficiencies in mainstream theory, but to deviation from well established principles. Unfortunately adherence to these "well established principles" is just one way in which the Earth will lose what remains of its wilderness and remarkable diversity. Now there are no doubt cases, past especially but also present, some resulting (collectively) in extensive environmental degradation, where defective practice answers may be correct. For example, there is harrowing case after harrowing case (brought together in texts like CAz/z'Wzon and AgrzcM/fMra/ Orzgz/M <2n<7 DAp^r^/) of degradation of prime agricultural lands by imposed farming practices, where at least early on (before damage became visible) ignorance and unintended consequences could be legitimately claimed. In most historical cases we do not have enough information to be able to say with much assurance that agriculture proceeded until effective collapse because of continuing ignorance, or because practices were locked-in in one way or another, or because of sheer obduracy. But we do know more about present agricultural practices, for example in more arid parts of Australia, concerning both irrigated and dry-land agriculture. Many of these practices are undoubtedly sharply degrading lands, and the consequences of the practices, which cannot plead or pretend ignorance, are sufficiently appreciated. But the practices persist, and are encouraged by a sweep of subsidies or concessions. No doubt some of the practitioners can reasonably claim that they are locked into bad practices through circumstance, circumstances /tow beyond their control such as financial pressures, unfavourable terms-of-trade, and so on, coupled with the need to make a living. But some, such as companies controlling large tracts of land, can make no such claims or excuses, nor can claim such things as family precedence, attachment to place, and similar. Their obdurate practice has to be attributed to something else, most obviously not 37 38 Thus e.g. Jacobs, p.24. it is surprising how much of the practice of later Socialist states is prefigured in texts like Comm/mA? Thus "industrial armies" are to be set up; credit, communications and transport are to become state monopolies; "migrants and rebels" are to have their property confiscated; and so on. All this runs contrary to much Marxist apologetics (as A. Urquhart, who made those points, also observed). �19 deviation from theory, but commitment to an environmentally defective paradigm. <?(% P and PS. Dealing with defective paradigm answers is an even more complex, and vexed, business. Let us try to condense main matters to a few broad 1. Many of the (incomplete) paradigms listed are no? for environmental impasses. They may be seriously mistaken, they may have undesirable intellectual and perhaps social effects, but a society could persist sustainably with those drawbacks. Thus, for example, substance metaphysics (under modified Spinozism), dualisms, even patriarchy. The same might even hold for materialism and mechanism, (assuming these practices can be coherently made out, that depending on how differentiated ideologies and values are accommodated, and so forth). To illustrate: a metaphysics, of any sort, cannot be the whole story, because it does not, on its own, account for action, anti-environmental or other. Without special bridges, link principles, from metaphysics to value-intricating action theory, a sort of naturalistic fallacy Thus subverted, in essentially Hume's way, are all the vulgar sources of environmental problems which take them as derived from metaphysics of one sort or another. operates. Such a criticism does not however extend to more comprehensive paradigms which connect appropriately with practice. 2. While several—not just —of the paradigms listed are sufficient—in the rzg/tf (given long historical development, accumulation, and so on^9)—none are necessary. Similar impasses could arise, and locally have arisen, given significantly different paradigms; for example given, instead of main Western trouble-making paradigms, Confucianism or advanced Polynesianism. At this stage in dialectic, green history and the like—bio-history, eco-history, and related virtual histories (concerning what Ponting's have happened)—enter decisively. For instance, Hilary of f/te WorM begins with a graphic account of the rise and ecological fall of Easter Island under the impact of Polynesian projects. The work also conveniently documents many other examples, well-known to biohistorians, of ecological degradation or collapse,/hr from the influence of Western paradigms.^ An important example (much less speculative than some of the numerous other examples because of a comparative wealth of primary documentation) outlines the destruction of accessible Chinese ecosystems under Confucian dynasties. What several of these examples—Polynesian, Mayan, Sumerian and others—also reveal is that no very high level of technology is needed to inflict serious environmental damage; persistence in pursuit of an ideological project (with nothing directly to 39 40 While it is easy to imagine ineffectual or incompetent tribes which live benignly environmentally, by just muddling along, under even the worst of paradigms, that is not really to the point. A pertinent tribe needs to have developed the structure which leads to problems, to have the means, and so on. Ponting's valuable though rather simple book is but one of several bleak texts. Another is Hillel's, and there is a succession of earlier classic works by geographers: Lowdermilk, Dale, Mallory, Thorp and others. In general however, geographers and historians do not dig deep enough, to paradigmatic roots. �20 do with basic needs) will suffice. Other cultures did wreak, or would (given the technology and numbers, both of which some were gaining) have wreaked similar damage. For instance, deforestation, salination, megafaunal elimination, and so on, were well established, and expanding, before (or effectively outside) the rise of modern Western paradigms, or in extensive regions outside their influence. 3. The list of paradigms, as so far assembled, is substantially Western in orientation. Moreover environmental woes are regularly ascribed to Western sources — wrongly. For non­ Western paradigms have led, or would lead given the opportunities (including access to the technologies), to outcomes as undesirable as under dominant Western paradigm. Witness again Confucianism, for instance, and its role and influence in Asian regions. Confucianism incorporates human chauvinism par excellence (as well as, some might say, Chinese chauvinism).41 Or consider Islam, with its reach across the Middle East and beyond. The main tabulation (of table 2) should accordingly be extended to take due account of non-Westem paradigms, including for example: Other Abrahamic religions Islam Judaism Confucianism Shintoism Polynesianism, at least in advanced forms as on Easter Island. What is "Western" is tending to blur also. Is Judaism Western, how western, or Islam? There is also a tendency to suppose that more Western religions, Abrahamic religions, with their intense monotheism, are significantly ideologically worse than non-Western. But the contrasts are different and much more complex than that. A better divide is into monistic and pluralistic. Even so, many undesirable social and environmental features are incorporated in, or encouraged by, religious pluralisms from the Indian subcontinent. 4. All the single paradigm answers are inadequate, all are too simple. Even so some are less inadequate than others. It is the same, more or less, for the combined answers, often to be encountered. For generally they represent but one thin cross-section of Western paradigms. While all the single one-source one-shot paradigmatic answers, occur on their own, often they are combined. For instance, although Descartes is often cited as a villain, more often criticism of Cartesianism is combined with criticism of other concurrent ideological elements, such as Baconian empiricism (less incompatibly, Drengson, for one, regularly combines criticism of the technocratic paradigm with criticism of Cartesianism—though Descartes, for all his rich and appalling thought, contributed little to the rise of technocratic organisation.) Similarly Hargrove combines Greek philosophy, as original source, with modern rationalism and much else. 41 Its net of effects extends widely. Consider, e.g., the role of Chinese medicine in decline of large fauna worldwide. �21 5. A general method of showing the inadequacy of all the paradigmatic answers tabulated, and others, is familiar from logical theory: namely, the method of counter-models, of which the counter-examples (under head 2) provide special cases. A presently important illustration concerns /?<2frz<2rc/zy as a source of environmental woes. Counter-models reveal the substantial of mistreatment of women and mistreatment of environmental items such as animals or ecosystems. One the one hand, it is easy to envisage situations, not far from the actual in some regions, where the lot of women is significantly improved, but the lot of environmental items is not (e.g. men change their behaviour and attitudes relevantly as regards women, are forced to change, or whatever); just such an outcome would accord with persisting human chauvinism. More relevant, on the other, there are situations where the position of environmental items is much improved, for instance under much more careful husbandry, but that of women is not, for one reason or another (e.g. they remain other, different, second class, etc.). It follows from the elaboration of such counter-models that patriarchy is not the source of environmental problems, as there can be continuing patriarchy without the present range of environmental problems (problems can dry up while patriarchy continues to operate). There is no need to deny that patriarchy as (contingently) practised, with its sweeping supremacist attitudes which make no due distinctions between inferior items, may be a major contributing factor in present problems. Such slack contingent conjunctions do not convert to roots or sources. Similarly with other social roots of environmental problems, for instance with human domination of humans as the supposed source of all problems. 5. Towards a more satisfactory expianation. Not only are the paradigmatic roots seriously intertangled (because of connections of one paradigm with another, because for instance of heavy philosophical inputs into religious paradigms), but further there is not a single defective paradigm. Rather there is a/wm'/y or sheaf of paradigms, commitment to any of which, or any suitable combination of which, in requisite circumstances, appears to have yielded environmentally untoward outcomes (requisite circumstances including availability of technology, extent of social support, and so on). Within that plurality there are of course gradations—and not only gradations but major differences—in calibre, in environmental friendliness. For example, Cartesianism which regards animals as mere automata incapable of feeling genuine pain, is significantly worse as regards other life­ forms and their decent treatment than a utilitarianism which positively values animal sentience. The family is not exclusively Western, nor somewhat more plausibly Northern, even though as a result of forces like migration, colonialism and cultural imperialism, paradigms of these sorts now predominate. Paradigms and cultures of less "advanced" and of third world communities have also operated to enhance environmental vandalism and degradation locally and regionally. Nor are major infiators of environmental problems essentially Western. Industrialization and technological advance—neither intrinsically Western, both manifested in varying degrees in other cultures—are, without much doubt, what have environmental problems from �22 rather localised ones, damaging for instance islands and river catchments, to grander and even global ones. They are the engines, powerhouses, of major problems, generating thereby spin­ off problems as well. But, once again, they are not deeper sources, but only means. (For again push questioning deeper, and ask: why bother or persist with industry, the effort and dirt and mess involved?) Nor, however, did they run on their own, nor do they continue on their own. Such engines were not designed and built, fuelled and tended, independently.42 They evolved primarily in the specially favoured culture of capitalism, though parallel developments could have occurred, and later did, in other prepared and heavily controlled surroundings, such as state socialism or post-imperial Confucianism. Now however these engines have been rendered more reliable and less dependent on careful cultural support, and have been transformed to run in less favourable settings. Thus inflation can escalate from a multiplicity of prepared sources, thereby intensifying problems and spreading them to larger regions. The intensification and spread is much facilitated by the joint transfer of technology, industry and coupled problems from region to region. As a result of transfer, inflation can occur within settings of quite different paradigms. Even if the whole "West" went into a terminal decline, and its paradigms disappeared into history, serious environmental exploitation and degradation would continue, driven by other enthusiastic cultures. For instance, the West could in theory collapse through protracted war, through pollution and congestion, or climate change and agriculture failure (there are many unexcludible routes to catastrophic decline, outlined in "Limits to Growth" scenarios, that could differentially impact on the West). Degradation would now continue however; there would be only temporary respite from environmental crises. While most of the conspicuous problems, awfully aggregated in contemporary environmental crises, are accelerated by—what connects them—contemporary industrial society, not all environmental problems are or have been of this sort. However, too many of the other problems, such as destruction of rainforests by itinerant peasants, can be seen as by­ products or similar of the main generators. Thus, in the illustration, the peasants displaced by agribusiness or absentee wealth-holders, arrived there on industrially-made roads opening the forests, and often wrecked this damage using industrial machinery. An environmental friendly culture has to be much more critical concerning certain types of industrialization, and much more selective regarding technology than present dominant cultures, Western or non-Western. A friendly paradigm would not only ensure much more Lacking favourable ideological settings, earlier technological "break throughs" were not duly developed: thus early wheels, steam engines, dyes, gunpowder, etc. Western cultures did not enjoy a monopoly upon technology powerful enough, when massed, to induce global crises. The picture of development of large-scale environmental problems being sketched bears superficial resemblance to that now tendered for development of the early Universe, where, to achieve presumed size, a source event, the Big Bang, was followed by huge inflationary phenomena. Naturally the resemblance has limitations; for instance, universe inflation is not terrestrially replicable in the way industrialization now is (hired or delivered off the shelf, pollution problems and all, with a big price tag). �23 selectivity and care, but would sharply limit impacts of damaging technology and industrialization. While there are such paradigms, on the ideas market, they mostly lack sophisticated contemporary elaboration and they may be flawed in other respects. Examples of more friendly paradigms, that do not lead of themselves to massive environmental problems and crises conditions, include those now tabulated: TABLE 3: Examples, some flawed, of environmentally friendly paradigms. Oriental ideologies: Taoism (classical) recessive traditions, now with tiny followings and little political influence. Jainism Indigenous cultures: Australian Aboriginals (e.g. Aranda) Amazonian Indians. Western philosophies: under certain favourable interpretations old Stoicism new Deep-green theories, such as deep ecology. Given the remoteness of most of these examples from predominant contemporary life, and difficulties with their wide adaptability, it is a short step to a familiar conclusion that new paradigms need to be worked out soon. Much much more intellectual effort should be devoted to such enterprise. One upshot, then, is a rough classification of paradigms into two families, the second large: environmentally friendly, and unfriendly. No doubt there is a small fuzzy residue class^ lying between major unfriendly and friendly divisions. Environmental friendliness means more or less what it appears to mean, what a functional break-down into components would yield: friendliness in approaches, practices and attitudes, to environments, especially more natural environments, with friendliness including, as usual, goodwill and kindliness towards (and substantially displaceable by these). As indicated, such friendliness concerns not merely actual practices, but also attitudes held, as reflected in what would be done in certain other sorts of situations. Certainly a culture that manifests unfriendliness, as a sweep of Northern cultures do, is unfriendly. But, as well, various "primitive" cultures, whose practices are not hostile, for example because they lack means or resources, energy or health, may nonetheless be unfriendly; for instance all members of a culture hold thoroughly negative attiudes which they are in fact unable to put into practice. 43 In logical terms perhaps as well as another residue class, hot/!. �24 It is not too difficult to explain in outline which paradigms will, if duly, diligently or religiously practiced, lead to environmental problems and impasse. Certain /hmz/y c/zaracferMfi'c-y, of unfriendly paradigms are worth elaborating: * illustrated through Cartesianism and Confucianism. More generally, direct impact is illustrated by any idea-system which attributes little or no value to natural items, and typically much value to nature transforming or interfering human (or elite) projects, and whose themes are linked to practice. So it is with Confucianism, which is entirely human focussed. 'Centering his attention on man in his present life, Confucius had as his goal the achievement of a good society characterized by harmonious social relations.'44 The outside world, the natural environment, was of no moral significance. It mattered only instrumentally, to humans. Descartes went further. Human bodies too were automata, complex machinery. 'The exception is [mznJ, or specifically] and its external manifestation language: this alone cannot be explained mechanistically—a thesis which leads Descartes to assert a fundamental divide between human beings and "the beasts"'.4$ The remaining world, the natural environment—lacking humanity, thought, mind—was again of no moral significance. It possessed derivatively only what value and meaning humans, or minds, chose to confer or project upon it, typically little or none. Since, either way, any way, a natural environment devoid of humans has no thoughts, purposes or interests, no value or meaning of its own, it could hardly matter what happens to it. It could be regarded and treated, justifiably, as nothing but a reservoir of resources for humans. Cartesians drew just such conclusions; similar conclusions derive, by one route or another from Platonism and Pentecostalism, and are implicit at least in Confucianism. Descartes again went further than some others. His practices and methods, like those of Bacon, were 'aimed at making men the masters and possessors of nature'.46 Untowards effects result through linkage of ideological theory to heavy practice. Link principles, reminiscent of "correspondence rules" used in explaining applications of scientific theories and normally included in comprehensive paradigms, connect the theoretic level to practice, they also serve to activate otherwise inoperative or uncoupled paradigms. Such principles may take the form of directives; familiar examples include maximization directives, such as maximize personal fun, tribal utility, national interest, or state GNP. * com&z'nafzon illustrated through Leibnitzianism. Any which yield satisfaction of all or enough elements of the consumption impact equation, and so would generate excessive impacts. To illustrate, consider what might be called in honour of Leibnitz's fragmentary ideology. Leibnitz was substantially committed to all of human population 46 Reese p.102 For much more on the geographic impact of Confucianism, as also compared with other (Asian) paradigms, see Tuan's investigations. Cottingham p.15. The utter invalidity of Descartes' argument (reported in Cottingham) to this divide is now comparatively easy to expose, given almost 400 years of hindsight. There are no such status divides—just as flamboyant forms of deep ecology maintain. See Descartes, V7. �25 growth, unfettered technological advance, and human lifestyles of consumption,^ in short, to precisely those factors that combine in the impact recipe to produce excessive human impacts upon environments. However neutral Leibnitz's metaphysics, his monadology, may have been—by contrast with Plato's or Descartes', both of which explicitly devalued much or all of the natural world—Leibnitz's wider ideology is linked indirectly, through impact equations, to damaging effects. Some imagine that this oblique formalistic detailing, through direct and indirect classes, can be simply cut through, retaining plurality and so forth. Surely environmental friendliness is nothing but environmental depth? While the suggestion points in the right sort of direction (for the relevant sort of depth) it too is astray .48 Depth is neither necessary nor sufficient. Take the move plausible sufficiency half, plausible because depth helps, no end. Nonetheless depth can be achieved in macho ways (as ecofeminism has emphasized against deep ecology), ways which may not be altogether friendly to less favoured species, groups or habitats. For example, depth can be satisfied through due selection and support of some super species and magnificent habitats—requisite environmental impartiality (and reflected justice), critical for friendliness as intended, being neglected.49 Still less in depth necessary. For kindliness can, both in principle and in practice, extend far beyond humans, still ranked top, to much more of "creation". Such extensive kindliness, observed in some humanistic humans, appears to be exhibited in some sects and tribes not committed to depth, and it could well be considerably more widespread, under changed but not deepened ideological conditions. Naturally, however, deepening would afford an obvious, and excellent, reason for change. As friendliness is not tantamount to depth, nor similarly is a prime part of what explains depth, recognition of intrinsic value in nature outside humans. Some animal liberationists who display high regard for creatures with capacity to suffer, show little goodwill towards forests largely unpopulated by such creatures. Conversely, though shifting ground, an environmentally friendly society may hold that value is but an anthropocentric construct, merely projected onto a basically neutral world. All the same, aspects of depth are normally reliable indicators of environmental sensitivity and friendliness, and inversely, aspects of shallowness (as investigated in authentic deep ecology) marks of unfriendliness. Shallowness will work out satisfactorily environmentally only with what is now rare (given ideological dominance), a right mix of humans; and its any longer working widely is implausible. These reliable marks include such familiar features as For requisite details, see Aiton. The case against Leibnitzianism is developed in a sequel. As to the relevant sort of depth, see GE. Other accounts of depth are also proferred in deep ecology, some of which relate to the present exercise. In particular deep questioning should lead to paradigmatic roots, to Naess's "total views". Herein lies another reason why something like biospecies egalitarianism is essential in deep ecology; such a requirement needs, not dilution away (as has happened in American and transpersonal deep ecology), but rectification. �26 * short-term framework. * devaluation of natural items as against human elements or artefacts (typically exhibiting human chauvinism); and, as a corollary of heavy devaluation, * entitlement to domination, dominion over nature; * appropriation of nature, its conversion to property. * maximization assumptions concerning personal or societal aggrandizement, utility and size, coupled with grand projects. * technofix approach to environmental problems. Friendly paradigms will tend to mverf these features. An environmentally friendly paradigm can be expected to yield environmentally significant corollaries, such as the following samples: * an end to degrading primary production; instead ecological forestry and ecological agriculture will come to prevail. * a strong selectivity regarding industrialization, which weeds out damaging forms. * a calling off of grand ideologically-grounded projects, interfering with or damaging natural environments, such as major dams, river diversions, demolished islands (e.g. for airports), new mountains, terraforming, extensive rainmaking, climatic interference, and generally the sweep of "playing God" projects. A little of this sort of unfriendly technology can go a very long way. As unfriendly paradigms are decidedly plural, so likewise are answers to questions as to why agents adhere, or continue to adhere, to environmentally unfriendly paradigms. Some of the diverse answers match answers already encountered in the main tabulation. Reasons are psychological, social and cultural (with a familiar circularity here encountered), and include considerations of the following sorts and others: because that is how things are done, or have always been done; because needs can be met, perhaps only met, in that way, so it is believed; because there are no alternatives, or none seen, perhaps because none have been sought; because negative outcomes can be overcome, or do not really matter; and so on. A short answer can now be ventured to the focal questions: Because, in one way or another, most agents are bound to—locked into, committed to, captured by, or just passively go along with—environmentally unfriendly paradigms. As a result the (long-term) health of the rest of environments does not matter, or matter enough. 6. Glimpsing an entertaining corollary: an unfavourable report upon dominant philosophy. It will hardly have escaped notice that virtually all dominant philosophical roads lead to Rome, to environmentally unfriendly paradigms. Stripped of metaphor, there are environmental conditions of adequacy, which most philosophical systems fail to meet. In an environmentally friendly new world, most philosophy that is remembered, indeed most of the humanities, is destined for scrapping. Prevailing philosophy is a serious impediment to satisfactory environmental outcomes. Predominant philosophy, not just Western philosophy, has by and large been bad environmental news. �27 It may be insisted that philosophy can make no difference, for instance to environmental practice. It is not an expression of basic needs, or of any such practical matters. Exceptions to such practical bravado have however to be recognised almost immediately; philosophy soon enters for organizational, justificatory and explanatory ends. That concession still grossly under-estimates the extent to which ideas, and more generally paradigms, influence and even govern action and practice, especially reflective and rational action. The substantial point is not therefore removed through any alleged practical impotence of philosophy. Mainstream philosophy has supplied, or mightily assisted in supplying, dominant unfriendly paradigms under which environments labour. Of course not everything has to be trashed, as even defective enterprises or evil projects may include decent part or worthwhile features; much can be salvaged, arguments, subtheories and so on (and with intellectual tipping there need be little material waste). Nor therefore is it as if an entirely fresh start has to be made. As well as salvaged bits and pieces (which need to be carefully tested for soundness), there are brash new alternatives such as authentic deep ecology, and there are recessive paradigms and neglected traditions to peruse for suggestions, for inspiration, and perhaps to rehabilitate. Richard Sylvan * APPENDIX. On Shepard's approach to focal questions. A remarkably sustained investigation of the focal questions is found in Shepard s intriguing books. In his TVafi/re anJ he considers and quickly dismisses many of the stock responses to focal questions suggested by contemporary luminaries (or by himself in earlier work), such as lack of information, faulty technique, insensibility, greed, political inertia, change to agriculture and settlement,^... . He would (and should, for his eliminative argument) have also dismissed industrialization, state and corporate control, and so on. More disconcertingly, for present purposes, Shepard claims that 'a history of ideas' similarly no doubt a story of paradigms—will not serve; for it 'is not enough to explain human behaviour' (p.3), it 'seems too easy and academic' (p.3), itself an easy and superficial criticism. But if, for instance, the 'dictum that nature should serve man' and 'insistence that animals feel no pain' should become widely entrenched, then they may well impact heavily on practice, as accordingly appears to be the case. His slight further argument appears to miss the intended * ^0 An earlier, even rougher version of this article was presented at the Environmental Paradigms Conference, University of New England, Armidale, April 1993. It would not have been written without its solicitation for the Conference; also it might well not been thought through in fashionable but confining and perhaps misleading paradigmatic terms. A subsequent working draft has benefitted, slightly, from comments from very unimpressed reviewers. Thanks certainly to Holmes Rolston for helpful comments. No doubt a popular picture of human social changes with agriculture and settlement is simplistic: that before societies lived in harmony, afterwards they did not. But it is also too simple to go on to claim, as Shepard does, that 'the economic and material demands of growing villages and towns are ... not causes but results of this change' (p.3). Some demands appear to derive from factors, such as population pressures, which were among causes of the changes. �28 target: 'The meticulous analysis of these philosophies and the discovery that they articulate an ethos beg the question' (p.3). it can reasonably be inquired? What is offered is but the facile, false, 'ideas are impotent' consideration, fostered by thinking and operating in terms of (e.g. lower p.3), rather than reasons and (rational) explanation, and encouraged through an attempted move to (what is explanatorily inadequate) pure behaviour. For a simple example of the familiar explanatory roles of ideas and paradigms, consider an alternative explanation through them. The admittedly bizarre ("crazy") 'turning everything into something man-made and [or] man-used' (p.5) is readily explained through dominant paradigms: is the way it acquires value, otherwise it is worthless. There is no need at all for psychopathology here. Correspondingly Shepard briefly reviews and rejects several of the very partial, and often hopeless, solutions suggested under stock responses to focal questions such as making information, or better information, more widely available, bringing people from all walks of life together, encouraging conviviality, hitting problems with smart technology, practicing conservation, and so on. Shepard's own resolution is more readily reached from a further (meta-focal) question that he proceeds to ask: why do humans per-yfyf in degrading their habitats once sources and solutions are made He effectively argues by elimination: other sources (read as causes) do not succeed in providing an answer; but 'the idea of a sick society (which he leaps to, without argument, p.4) does. Wrong on both counts: On the first because a non-causal explanation in terms of ideological wiring can provide answers (listen to politicians, representative of the people, again, just a little time). On the second because some industrial societies are not sick in a normal sense (though .yome may be), rather sickness has to be yo redefined (such low redefinitions are among underlying subplots^) that having certain ideological commitments that are carried into practice counts as "sickness". So it is that Shepard arrives at his of 'general, culturally-ratified distortions of childhood, of massive disablement of ontogeny as the basis of irrational and self-destructive attitudes towards the natural environment' (p.ix). Succinctly, 'there are profound psychic dislocations at the root of modern society' (p.xii). Psychic disorders have evolved: 'over the centuries major institutions and metaphysics might finally celebrate attitudes and ideas originating in the normal context of immaturity [or] ... adolescence ...' (p.15). Having glided easily and invalidly to the idea of sick societies, in a mere three pages, Shepard proceeds to diagnose in more detail the nature of the alleged sickness.52 It supposedly arises, like other psychopathy with which it is immediately associated, in infancy, and is 51 52 For trickery through redefinition of sickness and madness, Wisdom has already prepared us. Observe that Shepard's redefinition of sickness to include sick (i.e. debasing and devaluing) practices with regard to natural habitats (and conjoined therewith, to, older people) does not leave no contrast classes. For there remain benign 'relic tribal' societies, such as the Manus, Crow and Comanche, Aranda and !Kung San (p.xii), 'people who feel themselves to be rather than (p.6 empasis added)—an elegant analogy. 'The idea of a sick society', which as Shepard confesses (on p.4) is hardly new, is reached on the third page of the main text. �29 manifest in life-long immaturity, with whole societies stuck in a kind of destructive adolescence. No doubt there is something to some of what Shepard describes in child and person development (not the 'private demons' and so on) or might well have described. There is evidently, conspicuously in "new world" societies, wide commitment to a shallow juvenile culture, adulation or imitation of immature media and sport models and flawed authority figures, marginalization of the elderly, and so on, coupled with hyper-activity, violence and vandalism. But, like political commitment to extensive economic activity, this is hardly satisfactorily accounted for through psychopathological reduction, concentrating the whole social problematic in the ontogeny of individuals.^^ A superior explanation to widespread individual psychic disorder proceeds through ideological commitment, that industrial humans are raised and educated in, inducted into and committed to, defective ideologies, without coming to know or properly experience alternatives. The 'portraits of maturity' alluded to likewise appear individualistic and culture-bound, resembling those of deep ecology, directed at embroidery of person and self, through personal growth and identity, wider identification and relatedness, self-realization.$4 They are not exactly those of older and ecologically wiser societies. They do not reveal ecologically mature mixed communities. Furthermore, comparisons with relic tribal societies, which are important, can be decoupled from psychopathological analysis and reduction. Different lifeways, commitments and ideologies, are what they are and do not all reduce to matters of mental health. Undoubtedly we can learn of and from these different societies. We can still witness 'smallgroup, leisured, foraging life-ways with[in] natural surroundings. ... there is the rub—... for us, now, that world no longer exists' (p.14 rearranged). Nor is it really true that such a world is no longer accessible to most of us; more leisured small-group ways can be retrieved, some natural surrounding can even now be restored. In a curious fashion, Shepard has managed to invert likely causal relations. While a certain interaction can no doubt be conceded, it is not so much human ill-health that is leading to environmental degradation, but rather environmental degradation, generally brought about for other reasons, that is increasingly leading to human ill-health, and in the longer term causing erosion of life-support systems. 53 54 A psychopathic reduction is in part made plausible by reexpression in medical or psychological terms of what would better be otherwise expressed. Consider, for instance the language of the following clever paragraph, which infiltrates much with no argument: 'The person himself is, of course, caught between his inner calendar and the surgeries of society. His momentum for further growth may be twisted or amputated according to the hostilities, fears, or fantasies required of him, as his retardation is silently engineered to domesticate his integrity or to allow him to share in the collective dream of mastery' (p.16). But the trapping of agents between inner directives and social conditions and demands, or between rival ideologies, can be retold in different, less medical and metaphorical terms. Cf pp.12-14. Likewise there is a conservative underlay, more oppressive than that of deep ecology: insistence on 'one particular mother' (p.7) even suggestion of unsatisfactoriness in 'taking mothers off to work' (p.15)! �30 REFERENCES J. Alton, L^z'Zzzzz'fz A EzogzYz/z/zy, Adam Hilger, Bristol, 1985. E. R. Attfield, 'Has the history of philosophy ruined the environment?' Ezzvz'rozzzzz^zz^Z Ef/zzcs 13(1991)127-137. R. Attfield, 77z^ ERzzc.y o/'Ezzvzzwzzzz^zztzzZ Cozzc^z *zz, Second edition, University of Georgia Press, Athens, 1991. A. Bellett, 'The evaluation of values compatible with ecological sustainability', FMzztEzzzz^zzfaZ QM^rzozz^ Pap^, No.2, CRES, Australian National University, 1990. J.B. Callicott and R.T. 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Hanson, Pat^zT?.? o/ * Jz^cov^zy; zzzz zzz^z/zry zzz/o cozzc^ptzz^zZ ybMzzJzzrzozz^ o/ ^cz^zzc^, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1958. E. C. Hargrove, FozzzzzEzhozz-y o/'Ezzvzzwzzzz^zzfaZ Et/zzc^, Prentice Hall, N.J., 1989. D Hillel, G%? o/T/z^ Ezzz *r/zr CzvzZz^hozz zzzzzZ /Zze Ez/^ o/r/z^ 5*ozZ., Free Press, Macmillan, 1991. M. Jacobs, 77ze Gzr^zz Ecozzozzzy, Pluto, London, 1991. K. Marx, zGz *MM^.' zzzZz FozzzzzZatzozz^ o/ t/z^ cz *ztz^zz^ o/ /zoZztzc^Z ^cozzozzzy, Harmondsworth, England 1973. F. Mathews, 77ze EcoZogzc^Z ^Z/^ Routledge, London, 1991. A. McLaughlin, R^gaz-<7zzzg M2fMz-^: 7zzzZzz^/z *z6zZz^zzz N. Y., 1993. P. Marshall, azz^Z EcoZogy , SUNY Press, Albany W^Z?, in two editions, Simon and Schuster, 1992 and 1993. A. Naess and D. Rothenberg, EcoZogy, cozzzz/zMzzzTy zzzzz/ Lz/^y/yZf, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1989. J. Passmore, Afazz\y R^pozz^zZ?z'Zz/y/br Azz^z/z *^, Duckworth, London, 1974. D. 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Bennett, 77z<? Gz-^azag a/Er/zz^, White Horse Press, Cambridge, 1994; referred to as GE. R. Sylvan with D. Bennett, O/ * Ufa/aa-y, Paa am/ Z)^p Eca/agy, Green Series #19, RSSS Australian National University, 1990; referred to as UTD. 77z^ WWZaa<py Pra/'^cZ, War/<7 EarZ/z, special issue, Canton NY, 1993. Y.F. Tuan, 'Discrepancies between environmental attitude and behaviour: examples from Europe and China', 77z^ Caaa<7zaa G^agz-ap/z^z * 12(1968) 176-91. S. Toulmin, 77ze ReZazvz Za Ca^aza/agy, University of California, Berkeley, 1982. L. White Jr., 'Historic roots of our ecologic crisis', 5czaaca 155(1967) 1203-7. J. Wisdom, P/zz/awp/zy am/ P^yc/zaaaa/y^z^, Blackwell, Oxford, 1953. M. Zimmerman and others (eds.), Eavzzwzza^aZa/ P/zz/a.yap/zy, Prentice Hall, N.J., 1993; referred to as EP3. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Draft Papers Description An account of the resource Sylvan's literary executor encountered an archive in which “all his projects were current", since manuscripts were undated and unattributed. Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document 3.7.95 PARADIGMATIC ROOTS OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS Abstract. Virtually all diagnoses of the roots, and sources, of environmental problems are defective. While defective diagnoses persist, problems will not be adequately addressed. Focal questions ask why human communities so frequently degrade, impoverish or even destroy their own environments, and more generally why the whole earth is now in jeopardy through human enterprise. More immediate answers, sometimes correct so far as they go (which is not deep enough), look to components of environmental impact equations. More thorough-going answers fall into two classes: first those that do not question entrenched paradigms, but seek (unsuccessfully) to explain widespread problems simply through defective practice, and secondly those that, rightly recognising that defective practice is no adequate answer, look to deeper paradigmatic sources of problems. A fatal flaw in most of the latter answers lies in their monistic concentration on a single paradigm, or single narrow band of paradigms. These flaws are exposed, whence a wider, more satisfactory answer can be broached. Background busywork includes firstly, explaining problems and relevant paradigms and how paradigms operate regarding environmental problems, and secondly, detailed disentangling of proposed and alleged sources of the problems. With this done, it is argued that none of these answers, fashionable or other, to the focal questions is satisfactory. Here lies the important hard, but very negative and decidedly incomplete, work of the present investigation. A different more complex investigation is accordingly instigated. An initial answer is located through broader classes of paradigms : environmentally friendly and unfriendly. Further effort is expended, profitably, in trying to characterize these classes. Among significant corollaries, one is striking: philosophy as portrayed through its standard history is dismal environmental news. 2 PARADIGMATIC ROOTS of ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS Broaching focai questions, and searching for deeper answers. Human activity is now degrading terrestrial eco-systems at an extraordinarily rapid rate (liquidation of natural forest systems affords just one striking example). In modern times humans have devised sophisticated and sophistical idea-systems which justify such system degradation. Often in the past they would not have seen such transformation as mattering; many remain so programmed, regarding transformation as increasing wealth (a presumption encouraged under mainstream economics). More recently dominant human cultures have developed social systems which induct most humans into degradation procedures (through need, tax impositions, pressure to engage in cash economies, and so on) and which weave entrapping justificatory webs (through agencies, councils, courts, educations, missions, and so on). Whence arises an increasingly broached question 1; Why is this happening? More explicitly, w/zy /zzzzzz^zzz cozzzzzzzzzzzyz^^ <27Z6^ zzzzpov^rz^/z ^zzvzwzzzzz^zzr^, their own habitats? Indeed why do they sometimes, persistently, perhaps over a long period, destroy their owzz habitats? More sweepingly, w/zy fy r/zf w/zo/e now perhaps in y^o/7or^y r/zrozzg/z /znnzon ^ni^rprfs^? For those eager to anticipate the main outcome, the unremarkable answer to be eventually found to these focal questions is in essence this, because too many humans, especially those in control of environmentally impacting enterprises, remain committed to or caught within environmentally unfriendly paradigms, diverse paradigms but all displaying quite insufficient regard for the health and well-being of relevant habitats and of the earth. Parts of any answers to such focal questions come immediately through environmental impact equations, conservation laws, and such like. For example, degradation is occurring through the impact of overpopulation, excessive pollution, damaging or faulty technologies, and so on. While such answers are important, and often correct as far as they go in combination, and while they may correctly indicate what has to be changed somehow, they are nonetheless somewhat superficial, and they leave much to be explained. For example, they do not explain why a community persisted upon a course that deliberately led to such problems, or why it is so resistant to changes that might reduce impacts and pull it out of its problem-holes. Less superficial answers look to ideologically entrenched attitudes and commitments, to 1 In sources as diverse as Shepard (first page) and Jacobs (p.23). Contrary to other sources, such as Marshall, humans are by no means the only biological species that proceed to degrade or impoverish their own environments. Introduced "pest" species, such as rabbits and mynahs in the Antipodes, also do so; perhaps some botanical species contrive to as well. 3 pervasive paradigms that underwrite anti-environmental practices, as for instance the wood production ideology does forestry practice, even so-called "new forestry", and market ideology does economic practice, even so-called "environmental economics"^ An illustrative example which reveals the power of paradigms in blocking or facilitating action will shortcut a more elaborate argument, through action theory, to the efficacy of idea­ systems. Consider an unwanted pregnancy, resulting despite due precautions or whatever. Observe that, more and more there are comparatively safe technologies available to effect termination and seemingly solve the immediate problem. Ask: why so many people are opposed to choice of abortion? A very common answer is: because they are operating under an elaborate paradigm, typically organised religion (bureaucratic Christianity in the West), themes of which, the creeds of which, prohibit such choicest Of course pro-choice considerations are also paradigmatically embedded, for instance in forms of liberalism. Picturesquely, a social paradigm imposes controls on action, a system of red and green lights on a captured agent s routing procedures. Or with a different picture, paradigms project a steeply impeding topography on action space. Paradigms not only guide, control and limit, they also correlatively give permission—as, for instance, space to play god, freedom to release a new species or variety which may or has proved a pest or noxious or has been biologically engineered, liberty to neglect or degrade or vandalize. But paradigms do even more; they facilitate explanation, above all they make understanding possible. In these regards, they may work for better as well as for worse. Thus it is not a matter of getting rid of them, were this even feasible, but of getting right paradigms. The settings in terms of which agents such as humans act and operate, even down-toearth everyday agents, invariably include, not far in the background, paradigms, cultures, creeds, ideologies, pervasive myths or the like, all idea-systems, all involving models (in a technical sense) of one sort or another. Even the most practical (and vociferously practical) of humans are governed by background ideosystems. It is in terms of these background ideosystems that a great deal concerning human practices with respect to natural environments can be explained, what would otherwise lack satisfactory explanation.^ That explanation comes not however through a single paradigm, as has too often been supposed in trying to answer focal questions, but through a bundle of somehow aligned paradigms. Compare how a person may be represented, in social science, not through a single 2 3 4 For more on this style of explanation, see further RP. It is not, going to be contended that religion—or a certain Abramic religion, such as Christianity—is the main villain of the environmental piece. It is now well enough appreciated that religions in general borrowed much in their damaging articles from ancient philosophies. What will however, be suggested is that dominant philosophies Jo have much to answer for in this regard. Further, as logical positivists observed, explanation and justification patterns tend to overlap. How people justify their practices offers an explanation, though perhaps a misleading or superficial explanation, of them. As well, positivistic theories show, though in an oversimplified way, how models, which paradigms are, serve in explanation, justification and understanding. See e.g. Hanson. 4 role or program, but by way of a set of interconnected roles. What has been regularly overlooked in seeking deeper paradigmatic sources of environmental problems is systematic plurality. In part this neglect of plurality can be explained through countervailing propensity to seek single answers, and to try to locate uniqueness, where however causes and sources are plural. So it is with paradigmatic sources and roots of environmental problems. They are plural. As to what is going on theoretically, there is a fairly complex story to be told, an easier working image for which is appropriately ecological. That image focusses upon the structure of a perhaps impenetrable thicket or tangle, such as a dense rainforest patch, or, itself simplified, a fig or bamboo thicket. Below an emergent top layer representing the problems concerned, those raised by the focal questions, there is the canopy layer, of interlinked proximate causes. Below that again stands a plurality of stems, plural supports, which can be construed as supporting sources, and below them again, ultimately sustaining the whole structure, a multiplicity of intertwined roots, representing paradigmatic basics. What is sought are ultimate sources, and roots, not immediate causes. The cause of local pollution may be a factory that an agent installed, to produce more flim-flam. That too may be the physical source of the immediate problem. But deeper questioning seeks the reasons for such production and such factories. While there may be problems with ideas and idea­ structures as causes, as causally efficacious, these problems do not transfer to reasons and sources. Nonetheless there are buried metaphors, and linkages, to be unscrambled: how are "A is source of B" and "A is a root of B" to be explicated? While there is much written on roots and sources of environmental problems or developments virtually none of it addresses the question of what is meant by the partially buried metaphors of rooA? and introductory text, 7%^ . One striking example is supplied by Pepper's useful Although this text presents itself specifically as concerning roots, there is in fact no explication offered of the crucial metaphor on which it turns. For that matter there is no direct account of what the roots of environmentalism—still less, though quite different, of environmental problems to which environmentalism answers—are supposed to be (granted there is much oblique material). It is apparent also that Pepper has become rather carried away with the roofs metaphor, throwing it into several chapter headings and applying it pretty indiscriminately to mean simply (from some earlier occurrence); thus for instance, 'the roots of the theme of reconciliation of freedom and authority' (p.193). Such usage is unsound. Because rudiments of some idea make an earlier appearance in some authority or work, later workers may not have arrived at such an idea by expanding on these rudiments; they may have arrived where they did quite independently or by a different route. The mistake is that of reading a source or (genetic) causal linkage into a mere temporal conjunction: Neither roots nor sources are mere beginnings or simply early occurrences; there have to be continuing connections, with directional relationships such as supply or sustenance. But for 5 roots and sources different connections and elaborations are to be expected. After all, the metaphors, and likewise what they give rise to, are evidently different; more literally, plants have roots, normally below them, springs and streams rise from sources, not roots, often above them, and so on. Both differ from another popular buried metaphor, that of foundations. Foundations bring in other features such as solidity, stability and comparative permanency, while severing critical transmission features (for foundations may merely passively support, not sustain supported superstructure). So foundations, for all their importance in epistemology and elsewhere f/Toundationalism is correct, can be set aside.$ So far dictionaries do better than popular and philosophical texts. For instance, a short listing for the/ig^ra/Mre use of 'root' runs: 'the basis, bottom, the fundamental part, or that which supplies origin, sustenance, means of development, etc.' (Concise English Dictionary). Such a two component account will serve nicely, for a start. However conjunctions should substantially displace disjunctions, else roots could collapse to foundations or could collapse to mere trace element supplements. Roots both give a basis and bottom binding into a substratum and supply sustenance and means of development. Roots connections are richer as well as more specific than sources, which may merely show from where an item comes or is obtained. Further that place of derivation that may not be a basis or bottom, but for instance a source­ book. With roots, like normal foundations, a basis or bottom is reached, whereas sources may have further sources (hence the search for "deeper", even ultimate, sources). Finally, root and source connections carry explanations, at least genetic explanations—concerning how items got to be what and the way they are—because roots and sources are characteristically that from which items develop. Sometimes even more information, including a whole control system, gets transmitted. As much happens where roots are paradigmatic, to return to that strange mix of buried metaphors. Reaching deeper roots is important. Without locating them, perhaps all the roots (should they resemble blackberry), problems may not get properly addressed. Should we wrongly locate roots, then proposed resolutions directed at these, cutting them off or replacing them, will also go astray, wrongly directed or whatever. Such is the fate of many proposals concerning environmental problems. There are several parts to the approach sketched, if it is to be properly elaborated— including a working classification of environmental problems and their proximate solutions, and an account of paradigms and their roles—before getting to paradigmatic answers to focal questions. But we can be brief on these necessary preliminaries, because main details are already in circulation and because they have been addressed elsewhere. 5 Despite a referee's suggestion that discussion of "roots" 'could be improved by a contrast of the "roots" metaphor with the "foundations" metaphor, the fact is that we are decidedly not concerned with foundations of environmental problems; to the contrary, we do not wish to see them supported (if shoddily), established and so on. On the growing complexity and varying interpretations ofan emergent bog, see for instance Chisholm. 6 Although these will be duly connected, with paradigms implicated in problems, they are different components, and admit and deserve separate explanation. la. ^nv/ronw^nZoZ pro/?Z^wis omZso/o^ows. Definitions of 'environmental problem', and classifications of such problems, have already been ventured? What problems emerge as environmental depends upon background value framework. What counts as a major problem on deeper environmental perceptions may be but a minor problem, or written off as not a problem at all, on shallower perspectives. Among such indicator problems, ones here taken as seri'oMS problems, are those of * sustaining biodiversity and * maintaining significant wilderness? Even if the broad impact of human enterprise were sufficiently reduced to guarantee comfortable survival of future humans, these desiderata may well not be guaranteed. There would be outstanding problems. In any event, it is not too difficult to say more or less what environmental problems are (at worst by furnishing familiar lists), and in many cases to indicate at least in principle how they might be resolved. Environmental impact equations, encountered in a more perceptive classification of problems, reveal how they can be resolved. Namely, by altering relevant impact parameters. Given this why are they proving so intractable? Why is so little done? Why is so very little despite all the talk? Proximate solutions, about as far as positive science conveys us, are not however satisfactory stopping points. How is it, given so much scientific information and expertise, that humans are continuing to sharply degrade, and risk substantially destroying, their habitats. To these, the focal questions of this exercise, there is an array of competing answers on offer or to be met in an extensive literative. As we will soon discover, most of these answers are too simple; and taken, as intended, as comprehensive, they are wrong. Correct answers to the questions are however tm/yorfoHf, because if we fail to get to the bottom of the issues, there is even less prospect of satisfactory action to turn around a difficult and deteriorating situation. That these issues do not matter, that casual human relationships, or how many devaluing dollars uncaring humans can briefly stuff in their pockets, matter more than whole islands of habitats—these sorts of value judgements (after all is a value term par excellence) derive from and are supported by particular ideologies. lb. Afo%ZeZ-ZZ%e oZyecZs. * poro^ZZgozs, Z^ZeoZogZes, CMZZMr^s ,a?MZ so on. A can be explicated, technically, as a model in precisely a generous logical sense? See for example GE, which duly details connections of the problems with impact equations and proximate solutions. As to the extent of the problem (even) in North America, and a proposed remedy, see See e.g. 77^ eHvhwwwgnta/po/icy m OECD Box 1.7, in Pearce et al, p.24. See RP, where many environmentally relevant illustrations are given and explained. 7 That is, a paradigm amounts to a structure supplied by an elaborate interpretation function on a general system, i.e. semantical and other evaluations defined on an integrated relational structure. Naturally it is required to be/hif/t/h/ to what it models, the social forms and norms, scientific research programs, or whatever. A jocz#/ in contrast to a scientific paradigm, is a paradigm where the propositional and action theory, the socio-political themes and value judgements, is that of a social group. A pure is but a comprehensive social paradigm, where by "comprehensive" is meant that it covers a sufficiently comprehensive part of the life-styles and life-forms of the community concerned. There are now many examples of formulations of the themes delivered under rival social paradigms and under different cultures, from these, mostly sketchy formulations we can work back towards the underlying models. The basic vehicle, a situations or worlds model, is a -ytwHmh'ca/ object, an item like a complex universal 10 similarly open to a range of construals and reduction attempts, e.g. metaphysical, conceptual, epistemic, linguistic and so on. Once this is realised, it can be seen that successive cohorts of philosophers and sociologists, historians and geographers have repeated one another in vaguely discerning essentially the same sorts of underlying structures under different categorisations: thus, for instance, forms of understanding (Kant), of consciousness (Marx), of life (Wittgenstein), conceptual schemes (Conant), presuppositions (Collingwood), discursive formations (Foucault), W^/to/tsc/zoMMtzgs, total views (Naess), traditions (MacIntyre), traditions of thought, cultures, perspectives, outlooks, ideologies, programs,.... An ideology, for instance, in the non-derogatory (non-Marxist) sense is an ideas - system, initially a propositional system or theory with a relevant domain of ideas operative, from which a paradigm can be discerned and elaborated. Such models are typically presented in extremely truncated form, for example through a tabulation of capsule themes. Here is a combination example: TABLE 1: Elements of Taoism as contrasted with Deep Ecology and with the dominant paradigm: an initial capsule formulation .n Taoism Deep Ecology Dominant (Western) Paradigm Harmony with nature, through Tao Harmony with nature Domination over nature Nature valuable in itself; "humanism" rejected Natural environment valued for itself Nature a resource; intrinsic value confined to humans 10 11 It resembles a universal; compare e.g. Plato's system of forms, Locke's of complex ideas. Naturally there are differences between, for instance, traditions (of thought) which are historically bound, cultures, which are geographically and otherewise connected, and conceptual schemes (where a conceptual reduction is insinuated), but all are, at logical bottom, models of paradigmatic sort. This tripartite example is adapted from UTD, where capsule elements of Taoism are duly expanded. 8 Levelling of differences; wide impartiality Biocentric egalitarianism Human supremacy Supplies ample Earth supplies limited Ample resources with substitutes Following Tao-te Spiritual goals, especially self-realisation Material economic growth a predominant goal Enlightenment Self-realisation Personal (material) enrichment Doing with enough (recycling inappropriate) Doing with enough; recycling Consumerism Non-competitive lifestyle; voluntary simplicity Cooperative lifestyle Competitive lifestyle Decentralised/neighbourhood and village focus Decentralised/bioregional /neighbourhood focus Centralised/urban centred/ national focus Hierarchy without power structure; anarchoid Non-hierarchical/ grassroots democracy Power structure hierarchical Limited technology Appropriate technology High technology Considerable caution Precautionary practice Risking taking (verging upon adventurism) Paradigms control action space by some equivalent of directives; under an earlier analogy, red and green lights duly interpreted. They may not supply direct commands, general obligations and prohibitions, but may operate more indirectly. For instance an enlightened person, a role model, a person following Tao, would act this way, not that. (Taoism, like certain modern ideologies, eschews deontic judgements.) Paradigms are absorbed and they guide practice. They commonly form part of actors' worlds; they are certainly part of actors' programs for practice and considered action in a world. In a then, they are things, programs actors carry round in their heads; so heads (or rather consciousnesses) have to be changed, nor rolled. 2. Proposed answers to focal questions: a preliminary classification of inadequate answers and suggested remedies. Most of the extraordinary range of answers proposed supply but a single source, and are accordingly defective for this reason, usually among other reasons. Indeed it is not much of an exaggeration to assert that virtually everything proposed, in a now extensive literature, is wrong. TABLE 2. Main tabulation of answers and remedies , in three stages. D. answer? 9 DI. Ignorance Relevant information Information now available D2. Unintended consequences Relevant information Information now available D2a Faulty technique, or technology Repairs Repairs already made D3 Deviation (from theory, etc.) Education (for failure to limit deviance) Adherence a. Deviation uneliminable, or b. Adherence no remedy D4. Systemic lock-in (through poverty, ensnarement in market forces, etc.) Trap removal a. Explains only certain cases, and b. Due to paradigmatic features D5. Insensitivity or insensibility Problem apprised Remedy tried; background ideological blockage D3a When pursued, objections like those noted either force defective practice out as unsatisfactory, or push it back to paradigmatic features. proposed (among others) single paradigm an.S3V^r.y Pl. Christianity (mainstream Catholicism) Pla. Protestantism and its ethic P2. P2a Cartesianism Dualism Scientific enlightenment, or alternative (Eastern) religion Monism Anti-dualism Modified holism P2b Mechanism Organicism P3. P3a P3aa Substance metaphysics Possessive individualism Personalism Process metaphysics Non-reductionism Transpersonalism P4. Capitalism Socialism P5. Industrialism Pre-industrialism (romanticism) Post-industrialism P5a Technocratic bureaucracy P5aa. Transnational business P6. Enlightenment Anti-enlightenment Anti-materialism 10 P6a Materialism Spiritualism P8. P9 Patriarchy, andocentrism Human domination of humans Feminism Anti-domination (anti-hierarchy) Observe that what some have proposed as remedies, others have seen as sources; remedies proposed tend to share defects of sources. of this paradigmatic sort (but with the paradigms often subject PS. Furfur specific or partial) include: Typical Platonism Leibnitzianism Kantianism Anglo-American philosophy^ Utilitarianism Economism (economic imperialism as suggested New metaphysics New metaphysics Consequentialism Continental philosophy Alternative ethics New social science; ethics contrasted with straight economic roots) -TO on. A very rough Contractarianism Consequentialism Domination transfer Human nature (esp. aggression) Domination removal Adolescencism Infantilism (from Freudian physchology) Maturation Maturation runs as follows: draw up a potted list of mayor movements and factors in dominant Western thought. Then many—perhaps it is not excessive to say mo^r—entries in that list will have been nominated, likely separately, by someone as the source of the problems. That list accordingly continues (even including, sometimes, entries like Taylorism, i.e. reorganisation of industry along lines popularized by Taylor), but what is included is representative of the important and more interesting answers to be encountered. There are other allegedly nonparadigmatic answers however, varying from interesting to crazy, that should also be taken into some account, for instance answers like Shepard's challenging answer. Although Shepard dismisses ideologies, what he offers is a further ideosystem, of similar dubious or false cast. Strange answers include pushing it all back to human (thus not only Shepard, but also Fox, and Ehrlich and other gurus with insistence upon 'mental maladaptation'). 12 The mainstream form, analytic philosophy, appears to comprise empiricism-cum-utilitarianism in Britain, tempered in America by pragmatism. 11 Basically, there is something wrong with a society that does that to its habitat. It is sick —in a popular sense, yes, it is sick. It is the slides that follow, however, along psychological routes, that are to be resisted. One slide begins invitingly: As it is not literally sick, well not physically usually, it must be sick; that is, sliding further and fast, insane or mad. But the sources of mental sickness lie in childhood (as Freudianism erroneously insists). The slide continues to: what we have are immature societies, frozen at an early stage of development. No doubt there is somef/nng to the theme that dominant societies, USA especially (which now influences so much in other cultures), are locked into youth culture, a sort of late consumptive adolescence. 13 No doubt, too, that maturity—but an environmental maturity—is desirable, even mandatory. Meanwhile, immaturity is fostered right through human life. Considerable effort is put into trying to induct older people, who are often marginalised, into active consumptive society, to spend their money through tourism, on new compact housing, in those most wasteful of modern institutions such as airliners and hotels, hospitals and old-age homes, and so forth. 3. Documentation as to some of the acclaimed purer sources. Like the lists of proposals and intricated paradigms, the documentation too is somewhat perfunctory, tending here and there towards notes. Of course there are excuses. While whole theses could be spun out on several of these topics, already beginning to elicit such treatment, a prime objective here is different from usual: neither to convict, nor to clear or excuse, but to partially implicate most items cited in the main tabulation above. Consider, in brief, some of the usually accredited sources: * region, above all Christianity. The theme that the source of ecological problems, The historical roots of our ecological crisis', are to be found in Western religion, and specifically in The Judaeo-Christian belief that mankind was created to have dominion over nature', was repeated in a particularly pointed and subsequently influential way by White. 14 One helpful summary of White's line of argument runs as follows: Allied with technological and scientific developments, orthodox Christianity has produced arrogant exploitation of nature, and a contemporary ecological crisis. White's thesis is that the West's successful science and technology developed between the 8th and 12th centuries — it is much older than the scientific revolution though it was not until about 1850 — following the democratic revolutions — that the science and technology were combined to produce truly immense powers to change nature. The early development, however, was paralleled by the development of exploitative attitudes to nature which seemed to be Tn harmony with larger intellectual patterns', namely the victory of Christianity over paganism. This destroyed the animistic beliefs whereby men thought twice before they plundered and destroyed natural objects. It substituted instead a faith in perpetual progress, 13 14 It interestingly matches the locking of primary production systems into pioneering stages such as preclimax formations. Shepard's dialectic is investigated in more detail in the Appendix . White's article has generated an enormous defensive literature, primarily from Christian apologists, but also from softer environmentalists and from testy historians of ideas. The whole area looks in danger of disappearing from intellectual view under a heavy blanketing snowfall, snowed. 12 a belief that God designed nature for man's benefit and rule, and that action, not contemplation, was the correct Christian behaviour. Science formed an extension of theology (for to know God you had to find out how his creation worked), and technology provided the active means to carry out God's will. Because today's attitudes are essentially inherited from Christianity, then it 'bears the burden of guilt" for contemporary ecological disruption.^ What has happened with the divisive charge, advanced by White, that Christianity was the prime source of environmental problems, is particularly instructive. In an attempt to diffuse the charge Christian apologists pointed to, what there undoubtedly were, recessive strands or isolated seeds in Christianity which were much more environmentally benign (though some such as stewardship, which has evolved toward total managerialism and sustainable development, have proved increasingly problematic). That does little or nothing to meet a more sensitive and telling criticism that mainstream (or dominant) Christianity has much to answer for as regards destruction and degradation of natural environments.^ Similar responses are apposite for attempts to exonerate their wider sources, such as Western philosophy. Against the sheeting of responsibility to religion, dominant forms of which should undoubtedly cop heavy criticism, it has been contended that philosophy ... is the primary source of most Western ideas [and] is ... for the ideas and attitudes that inhibit environmental protection today.... Religion ... though often criticized ... as the chief culprit, has played a much less fundamental role. Most of the environmentally offensive ideas in Western religion originated not in religion but in Western philosophy.^ * CZa-y-sica/ above all the peak philosophies of Plato and Aristotle. Greek philosophers approached natural phenomena in a way that (1) prevented the development of an ecological perspective, (2) discouraged the aesthetic appreciation of the natural world, and (3) promoted a conception of reality that made the idea of nature preservation conceptually difficult, if not impossible, is More sweepingly, they set Western philosophy on a ruinous environmental course, a course accentuated with the appearance of modem rationalist and empiricist philosophies. * /2/nZ(?.y6)/7/ry. The dominant modern environmental approach is sometimes Pepper pp.44-5. Pepper then embarks upon the murky story of alternative interpretations of Biblical data and the Christian tradition, dredged up by a series of White's critiques. The issue continues to be debated; for an older survey of traditions see Passmore, for a challenging recent contribution to the debate see Callicott. Each religion is multistranded. But we should look hardest at dominant operative forms: Ask, not merely what they say, but what they Jo, and woM/J do. For an outline of just such a telling criticism of mainstream Christianity, see Singer esp. pp.265-8. Hargrove p.15. Certainly the sort of message that Pentecostal missionaries even now try to preach to resistant Australian Aboriginals, that the earth is just filth, mere rubbish, can be traced back in direct line to Plato's attitude to the land, an attitude Hargrove and Plumwood help expose. Hargrove p.21. Hargrove's claims may appear to have been confuted by Attfield, but really, while they have been subject to minor qualification, they have been highlighted. There is a much fuller story still to be told about classical Greek philosophy reassessed environmentally, of the very different roles and impacts of Plato (with his unearthly philosophy), of Aristotle (with his earthier chauvinism), of Stoics and of Epicureans, and of neo-Platonists. For a modest beginning, see Plumwood on Plato, Toulmin on Stoics as contrasted with Epicureans, and Glacken on lesser or lost Greek strands. 13 denominated Cartesianism, or the Cartesian Technocratic paradigm, in honour of Descartes, upon whom (as a conveniently select individual from a swag of like-minded people) several of the leading themes and ideas can be pinned. 19 While Descartes was undoubtedly extraordinarily influential, so were others; Newton for one, Locke for another. The paradigm is accordingly better denominated the Atomist-Empiricist-Technocratic paradigm, or some such. Evidently it substantially overlaps other modern ideologies, such as that of the Enlightenment, widely implicated as major sources of environmental problems. * While some conglomeration of the preceding sources and others (some potted history of Western metaphysics, so to say) may be offered, more often what is presented is some selection of Western metaphysical elements. Here is one example, plainly exhibiting a heavy Heideggerean influence: The roots of our environmental problems lie in Western metaphysics. For metaphysics, Being is presencing; no allowance is made for any other mode (sheltering, declining, concealing). Once metaphysics has established the absolute dominion of the present over the not-present or no-longer-present, the way is paved for the scientific method, with its emphasis on replicability of results, predicability, quantification, and control. Nature becomes a "natural resource" —and people become "human resources". The sources of anthropocentricism, imperialism, colonialism, sexism and consumerism can all be traced back to metaphysics. Western metaphysics has more or less conquered the world, and there is no going back. Western metaphysics is more than simply a false consciousness overlaid on top of "authentic" experience. Being changes historically, and metaphysics is the index of that change... Metaphysics has a conquering, exclusive imperative, ... and different [former] modes now exist only as vestigial traces. They cannot be resurrected through ancient wisdom, native healing, goddess worship, or any other supposedly intact, dormant system. We cannot create a "new order". That would simply be another form of the Will to Power... We can—and must—turn away from the dominant rhythms of western metaphysics if we are to avoid the nihilism of a perpetually ensconced technocratic rationalism. 20 An alternative to turning entirely away from Western metaphysics, consists in combining rejection of standard Western metaphysics (or, less sweepingly, of dominant metaphysics, characteristically individualistic and atomistic) in favour of development of recessive traditions or mere Western seeds. Such a more sophisticated approach, also critical of Western metaphysics, with atomism a main villain, is pursued by those who promote instead process or plenum metaphysics.21 For encapsulation of the Cartesianism paradigm (a dominant dualistic form), summarising Drengson's exposition, see RP, table 5. Drengson, for one, has helped portray Descartes as the environmentally evil genius (or demiurge). That some orthodox philosophers, not merely maverick philosophers, are now rushing to the defence of Descartes should be seen as entirely in keeping with the character and roles of Western philosophy. Undisclosed source. Amusingly, I have seen myself accused of 'rejecting] in its entirety mainstream western philosophy and science, ... seen as the cause of the [environmental] problem' and instead basing my 'ecocentric values on Eastern philosophies' (thus Bellett). This charge was levelled on the strength of a peripheral exercise on classical Taoism and Deep Ecology (now included in UTD). For the first process option, see Gare; for the second, where the plenum is that of a holistic relativity theory (more exactly holistic relativistic geometrodynamics), see Mathews. 14 * The source of problems lies in The intellectual heritage of the Enlightenment' (e.g. Dobson). Of course the main doctrines of the Enlightenment substantially overlap those of modern mainstream philosophy and of Descartes' philosophy (but they shed dualistic and theistic scholastic hang-overs). * CapzfaZfym. The assumption that capitalism is responsible for environmental as well as social evils, widespread until recently in state-socialist countries (when their own records were revealed), can be traced back to Marx. According to Marx, with capZr^ZZym for the first time, nature becomes purely an object for humankind, purely a matter of utility; ceases to be recognised as a power for itself; and the theoretical discovery of its autonomous laws appears merely as a ruse so as to subject it under human needs, whether as an object of consumption or as a means of production.22 But, as observed, a main embedded theme had appeared in earlier philosophy; for instance, the idea of nature as purely an object for humankind, was advanced in Aristotle: 'Now if nature makes nothing incomplete and nothing in vain, the inference must be that she has made all animals for the sake of man'.23 Aristotle adopted a similar stance on nature as on other species. The theme was to be oft repeated in subsequent Aristotelianism, and reiterated apparently in shallower Stoicism. But the subjection of everything to MfZZZ/y, no doubt a relative of capitalism, appears to be a distinctively modem contribution. * Zn6?M.yfrZaZ jocZ^fy or Z/t^My/rZ^ZZym. Modern ZwJMyZrZ^ZZ^m ('the smooth­ superhighway of industrial progress') is the source, such is an extraordinarily popular theme: '... the root causes of the present crisis lie deep with the very foundations of the industrial paradigm'.24 Similarly 'roots [of] the environment crisis ... go deeper to the foundations of modern industrial society'.23 Again, 'the structural roots of the environmental crises [are found in] industrialism, in commoditization, in commercialism, and in competition and greed'26 The popular theme, that industrialism is the source, tends to confuse mere means— industrial technology can without any doubt at all vastly facilitate environmental degradation (as well as, It should not be overlooked that some of those who nominated meant thereby jpara^/gm or /yaraJt'gwM or an equivalent. But what they may gain thereby in verisimilitude, they tend to lose in confusion. p.409f. Aristotle, Po/Zf/cs, Book 1, ch.8. an inference, you might well exclaim. See further Hargrove p.25. M. Gabriel, 'How "attitudes and implements" have brought us to "the end of nature"', a paper presented at UNE Environment/ Poroe/igm^ Conference, April 1993. Gabriel proposes a managerial resolution: 'for us to learn to manage both our relationship to our environment, and more broadly the environment itself (quotes from abstract of paper). This amounts to the flip side of an old problematic record. For the "solution" derives from the same defective box as the evident problem. Gabriel Similarly industrialism is assumed as the source throughout McLaughlin (the theme pervades his book) and as the root of the modern problem in Marshall (p.5ff). While seriously astray as to roots and sources, those critical of industrialism have a significant case. For, as well as functioning as a major inflator of intact problems, industrialism has helped generate side problems of its own, as with new types of chemical and nuclear pollution. Editorial in 7%^ Eco/ogMt, Jan-Feb 1992, p.2. 15 less satisfactorily, subsequent clean-up and environmental repair)— with sources and causes, what directs and powers uses of industrial technique and practice. * Economic growf/t or economic JeveZopmenf. 'According to a common and currently influential diagnosis, the environmental crisis has essentially economic roots'.27 One widespread misconception is that economic growth is the source of environmental problems. The assumption is astray for several reasons. For one, growth is at best a proximate cause, itself in need of explanation. More importantly, growth may occur in sectors of an economy, such as information technology or religious or artistic services, which have little or no environmental impact. Also conversely, an economy which fails to grow, but is desperately trying to survive, may exact heavy environmental costs (e.g. the forests are clear-felled to pay for continuing employment). No doubt though, economic growth is intimately intricated with proximate causes of environmental problems (through environmental impact equations). Similar considerations tell against the familiar proposition that the source of the problems is economic development itself or, what is different, the entrenched model of economic development. While it is no doubt correct, and important to emphasize, that 'the Western model of economic development, far from being the solution to" environmental and social problems, is 'actually fuelling' them, it is not the sole or distinguished source of the problems. 28 * nafMre. '... the roots of our ecologic crisis reach beyond the variable topsoil of intellectual history, whether Eastern or Western, into the common substrata of human nature itself.'29 What such "nature" amounts to and how it functions as roots, both commonly left obscure, turns upon background hypotheses as to the nature of this nature. Different false 27 28 29 Goodin, p.573. While not contesting the theme, Goodin does continue: 'the problem is not just that there are too many people, or even that they are enjoying too high a standard of living. A// r/mf fy too, of course. More fundamentally, however, problems of environmental despoliation are said to derive from skewed incentives as they pursue their various goals' (p.573). That too will be seen to be seriously astray, though it contains large grains of truth; it presumes unchanged the prevailing economically-skewed dominant social paradigm. Both socialists and other opponents of capitalistic conspicuous consumption tend to select the living-standard component of the main environmental impact equation as the source of the crisis. Thus Cuban luminary, Castro, in a recent stunningly succinct speech: 'Less luxury, less wastage. Otherwise it will be too late'. Quoting claims of E. Goldsmith, advanced in an interview in For^f arx/ Fir;/ 273 (August 1994) pp.46-7. The need for emphasis will persist while locally prominent political figures like the present Prime Minister of Australia travel around the Earth with the hackneyed message that only economic growth will solve environmental problems. Seeing growth as the problem affords only a superficial analysis, like that of pointing to overconsumption with which growth is interconnected. As deeper inquiry reveals, underlying both issues of economic growth, employment and consumption, and alternatives taken, are models, paradigmatic models. Growth is but a means to objectives assumed in the dominant paradigm. A deeper analysis shows too why more growth will not ultimately solve relevant problems. Callicott and Ames, 'Epilogue: On the relation of idea and action' p.282 (see also p.281), in a desperate and apparently unsuccessful attempt to reconcile the claim (repeatedly advanced in their book) that Asian traditions of thought can make a significant contribution to much improved treatment for natural and built environments, with 'the deplorable environmental conditions prevailing in contemporary Asia' (p.280). 16 hypotheses, that humans are invariably driven by aggression, sexual or reproductive imperatives, economic needs, yield different defective accounts. In Catholic orthodoxy such a source, human nature, comes burdened with original sin; the source of a sweep of problems, including now environmental ones, is "man's fallen nature". That astonishing source also comes contaminated, as for instance gender biassed. * Parriarc/ty. The source is patriarchy, and androgyny; problems derive from mistreatment of women. 'Our troubles begin with the invention of male deities located off the planet'.30 'patriarchy is the source of the environmental crisis'.31 One sample linkage statement runs as follows: ... there is a huge denial ... of the violence perpetrated on women both historically and ... presently] and ... this is the same energy that, turned against the Earth, is destroying the very life-support systems and rapidly destroying the conditions that makes complex life possible. The fires that consume the Amazon are the very same fires that burned 9 million witches and I believe that there can be no solution of our ecological problems unless we simultaneously address our gender issues.32 Patriarchy, as source, is evidently a special case of long invoked themes: * 77MW6W JommarzoM q/ It is an extraordinarily widespread assumption that the impact of humans (or, until recently, of Man!) on the environment, or creatures or things in it, is a product of that of humans with each other, typically of groups or classes. In misleadingly brief form, the source is social: Man's inhumanity to Man; and the solution correspondingly is social. Unremarkably, this unlikely assumption comes in a variety of different formsrearly, concerning the mistreatment of animals as an (inevitable) spill-over from mistreatment of humans, recently concerning maltreatment of nature spilling over from, or being one with, that of women. The fashionable assumption runs, in one form or another, from Aquinas through Kant to a range of recent trend-setters, including Marcuse, Illich, Passmore, Bookchin ... and some leading feminists. In particular, it is part of the very meaning of wcz'a/ an ideology shaped and championed by Bookchin: 'ecological problems arise from deep-seated social problems'.33 On this theme among others, Bookchin simply follows a prominent trend in social anarchism set by Kropotkin and his contemporary Reclus: all see that the JornmoTzon anJ q/ man L? * q/ * man Z?y man. Thus, 'Both Kropotkin and q/ Reclus ... laid the foundations of a radical theory of human ecology. Ecological despoliation was seen to reflect imbalances in human relationships Quoted in Eckersley p.64, who develops and begins to assess patriarchical source themes. For a more critical assessment see the sequel to GE. See Seed, quoted in the sequel to GE; also Salleh (e.g. in EP3). Jo/zzr 7992, Rainforest Information Centre, Lismore, 12. 12.91. Seed's extravagant identity claims are but a dramatic extension of that popular tendency to transform comparison and similarity statements into identity claims. Indeed reductionism often reaches further, with attempted conversion of all relational statements into identity ones, along with unrelational property claims. Bookchin sometimes qualifies this central claim, with 'nearly all present', e.g. EP3 p.354. But he is not strictly entitled to any such qualification, given his invariant theme that the domination of nature always results from humans' domination of other humans (see e.g. Clark EP3, p.346). The text EP3 contains a sizeable section providing a useful introduction to social ecology. 17 —domination of nature thus following from human domination'. ... It follows that if domineering and exploitative human relationships can be avoided in small-scale decentralised societies then such societies are also best for a harmonious man-nature relationships Domination and exploitation of one division by another can in tum be seen as a case of dualism at work, between the one, the dominator or dominating class, and the other, the dominated. *A * o/ Environmental problems derive from operation of a set of connected ideologically-entrenched and defective dualismsS * of environmental problems lie in educational systems. Or if roots don't, do. However, roots of environmental or social problems do not lie in educational systems. ParAy of their solutions may however. For education is critical, for instance, in correcting to established satisfactory arrangements, such as, so it is claimed, Enlightenment ideals or traditional ethical systems.^ Therewith we are transported full circle back to defective practice answers. 4. A on, to, proposed answers A main part of this exercise consists in a detailed critical commentary on the entries in the main tabulation, and on proposals like them. Small beginnings are made on the exercise, in two stages reflecting a major division in the main tabulation. a J D. Defective practice answers tend to come from those who presume we are already in possession of adequate theories, or what approximates them or supplies main elements of them. (Such answers are also more liable to emanate from conservatives, opposed to new or radical theories, advanced on the basis of inadequacy of prevailing theories in practice.) Defective practice answers are especially popular in economic reaches. There was a time, perhaps not past yet, when all market failures in the shape of negative externalities were passed off as unintended consequences of economic activity. While "consequences" or outputs such things as pollution certainly are, unintended they mostly are not now, without 'unintended' of its normal sense. For example, industrialists, apprised of conservation laws and unsurprised by polluted wastes, who dump their waste where and when regulators and waste­ watchers are not looking, can hardly pretend that that output is an unintended consequence of their industry. That should now be a joke, itself with serious consequences. Accordingly new ecological economics insists that we dig deeper—without however exceeding economic settings or a shifting dominant paradigm—to discover why markets may Pepper p.192, with internal quotation from Breitbart. Unfortunately it is all too evident, given humans could so socially organise, that they could settle into harmonious small-scale communities which retained but little of pristine natural environments. Such a proposition obtains a much fuller elaboration within Plumwood. In an interesting way, such a proposal can hardly be wrong, given the conclusion reached below that a set of defective paradigms is at work. For evidently paradigms can be covered by dualisms, represented by a set of them in each case, somewhat as numbers can be represented in binary terms, generated from a basic two-oneness duality. Thus Passmore, Attfield, and others. For a critical assessment of education, see GE 18 foreseeably fail and why environmentally rectifying technology is not delivered.37 where they usually arrive, travelling within such unduly confined settings, is, like welfare economics before ecological, at better regulated markets, with business set as before within frameworks of plans and incentives, controls and penalties. Environmentally, however, such approaches do not reach very deep, or tap into underlying paradigmatic problem-sources. But these sorts of defective practice answers do not always derive from standard economic sources. A deviation-style answer is much favoured by Marxists to explain failure, environmental and other, of the former Soviet Union and other Eastern block countries; namely that true, or authentic, Marxism was not practiced. Unfortunately, even if it had been, environmental consequences would be little better, given the heavy industrial commitments and environmental shallowness, at best, of true Marxism.38 Differently, enlightenment liberals like Passmore try to ascribe failures in Western environmental practice, not to any deficiencies in mainstream theory, but to deviation from well established principles. Unfortunately adherence to these "well established principles" is just one way in which the Earth will lose what remains of its wilderness and remarkable diversity. Now there are no doubt cases, past especially but also present, some resulting (collectively) in extensive environmental degradation, where defective practice answers may be correct. For example, there is harrowing case after harrowing case (brought together in texts like CAz/z'Wzon and AgrzcM/fMra/ Orzgz/M <2n<7 DAp^r^/) of degradation of prime agricultural lands by imposed farming practices, where at least early on (before damage became visible) ignorance and unintended consequences could be legitimately claimed. In most historical cases we do not have enough information to be able to say with much assurance that agriculture proceeded until effective collapse because of continuing ignorance, or because practices were locked-in in one way or another, or because of sheer obduracy. But we do know more about present agricultural practices, for example in more arid parts of Australia, concerning both irrigated and dry-land agriculture. Many of these practices are undoubtedly sharply degrading lands, and the consequences of the practices, which cannot plead or pretend ignorance, are sufficiently appreciated. But the practices persist, and are encouraged by a sweep of subsidies or concessions. No doubt some of the practitioners can reasonably claim that they are locked into bad practices through circumstance, circumstances /tow beyond their control such as financial pressures, unfavourable terms-of-trade, and so on, coupled with the need to make a living. But some, such as companies controlling large tracts of land, can make no such claims or excuses, nor can claim such things as family precedence, attachment to place, and similar. Their obdurate practice has to be attributed to something else, most obviously not 37 38 Thus e.g. Jacobs, p.24. it is surprising how much of the practice of later Socialist states is prefigured in texts like Comm/mA? Thus "industrial armies" are to be set up; credit, communications and transport are to become state monopolies; "migrants and rebels" are to have their property confiscated; and so on. All this runs contrary to much Marxist apologetics (as A. Urquhart, who made those points, also observed). 19 deviation from theory, but commitment to an environmentally defective paradigm. <?(% P and PS. Dealing with defective paradigm answers is an even more complex, and vexed, business. Let us try to condense main matters to a few broad 1. Many of the (incomplete) paradigms listed are no? for environmental impasses. They may be seriously mistaken, they may have undesirable intellectual and perhaps social effects, but a society could persist sustainably with those drawbacks. Thus, for example, substance metaphysics (under modified Spinozism), dualisms, even patriarchy. The same might even hold for materialism and mechanism, (assuming these practices can be coherently made out, that depending on how differentiated ideologies and values are accommodated, and so forth). To illustrate: a metaphysics, of any sort, cannot be the whole story, because it does not, on its own, account for action, anti-environmental or other. Without special bridges, link principles, from metaphysics to value-intricating action theory, a sort of naturalistic fallacy Thus subverted, in essentially Hume's way, are all the vulgar sources of environmental problems which take them as derived from metaphysics of one sort or another. operates. Such a criticism does not however extend to more comprehensive paradigms which connect appropriately with practice. 2. While several—not just —of the paradigms listed are sufficient—in the rzg/tf (given long historical development, accumulation, and so on^9)—none are necessary. Similar impasses could arise, and locally have arisen, given significantly different paradigms; for example given, instead of main Western trouble-making paradigms, Confucianism or advanced Polynesianism. At this stage in dialectic, green history and the like—bio-history, eco-history, and related virtual histories (concerning what Ponting's have happened)—enter decisively. For instance, Hilary of f/te WorM begins with a graphic account of the rise and ecological fall of Easter Island under the impact of Polynesian projects. The work also conveniently documents many other examples, well-known to biohistorians, of ecological degradation or collapse,/hr from the influence of Western paradigms.^ An important example (much less speculative than some of the numerous other examples because of a comparative wealth of primary documentation) outlines the destruction of accessible Chinese ecosystems under Confucian dynasties. What several of these examples—Polynesian, Mayan, Sumerian and others—also reveal is that no very high level of technology is needed to inflict serious environmental damage; persistence in pursuit of an ideological project (with nothing directly to 39 40 While it is easy to imagine ineffectual or incompetent tribes which live benignly environmentally, by just muddling along, under even the worst of paradigms, that is not really to the point. A pertinent tribe needs to have developed the structure which leads to problems, to have the means, and so on. Ponting's valuable though rather simple book is but one of several bleak texts. Another is Hillel's, and there is a succession of earlier classic works by geographers: Lowdermilk, Dale, Mallory, Thorp and others. In general however, geographers and historians do not dig deep enough, to paradigmatic roots. 20 do with basic needs) will suffice. Other cultures did wreak, or would (given the technology and numbers, both of which some were gaining) have wreaked similar damage. For instance, deforestation, salination, megafaunal elimination, and so on, were well established, and expanding, before (or effectively outside) the rise of modern Western paradigms, or in extensive regions outside their influence. 3. The list of paradigms, as so far assembled, is substantially Western in orientation. Moreover environmental woes are regularly ascribed to Western sources — wrongly. For non­ Western paradigms have led, or would lead given the opportunities (including access to the technologies), to outcomes as undesirable as under dominant Western paradigm. Witness again Confucianism, for instance, and its role and influence in Asian regions. Confucianism incorporates human chauvinism par excellence (as well as, some might say, Chinese chauvinism).41 Or consider Islam, with its reach across the Middle East and beyond. The main tabulation (of table 2) should accordingly be extended to take due account of non-Westem paradigms, including for example: Other Abrahamic religions Islam Judaism Confucianism Shintoism Polynesianism, at least in advanced forms as on Easter Island. What is "Western" is tending to blur also. Is Judaism Western, how western, or Islam? There is also a tendency to suppose that more Western religions, Abrahamic religions, with their intense monotheism, are significantly ideologically worse than non-Western. But the contrasts are different and much more complex than that. A better divide is into monistic and pluralistic. Even so, many undesirable social and environmental features are incorporated in, or encouraged by, religious pluralisms from the Indian subcontinent. 4. All the single paradigm answers are inadequate, all are too simple. Even so some are less inadequate than others. It is the same, more or less, for the combined answers, often to be encountered. For generally they represent but one thin cross-section of Western paradigms. While all the single one-source one-shot paradigmatic answers, occur on their own, often they are combined. For instance, although Descartes is often cited as a villain, more often criticism of Cartesianism is combined with criticism of other concurrent ideological elements, such as Baconian empiricism (less incompatibly, Drengson, for one, regularly combines criticism of the technocratic paradigm with criticism of Cartesianism—though Descartes, for all his rich and appalling thought, contributed little to the rise of technocratic organisation.) Similarly Hargrove combines Greek philosophy, as original source, with modern rationalism and much else. 41 Its net of effects extends widely. Consider, e.g., the role of Chinese medicine in decline of large fauna worldwide. 21 5. A general method of showing the inadequacy of all the paradigmatic answers tabulated, and others, is familiar from logical theory: namely, the method of counter-models, of which the counter-examples (under head 2) provide special cases. A presently important illustration concerns /?<2frz<2rc/zy as a source of environmental woes. Counter-models reveal the substantial of mistreatment of women and mistreatment of environmental items such as animals or ecosystems. One the one hand, it is easy to envisage situations, not far from the actual in some regions, where the lot of women is significantly improved, but the lot of environmental items is not (e.g. men change their behaviour and attitudes relevantly as regards women, are forced to change, or whatever); just such an outcome would accord with persisting human chauvinism. More relevant, on the other, there are situations where the position of environmental items is much improved, for instance under much more careful husbandry, but that of women is not, for one reason or another (e.g. they remain other, different, second class, etc.). It follows from the elaboration of such counter-models that patriarchy is not the source of environmental problems, as there can be continuing patriarchy without the present range of environmental problems (problems can dry up while patriarchy continues to operate). There is no need to deny that patriarchy as (contingently) practised, with its sweeping supremacist attitudes which make no due distinctions between inferior items, may be a major contributing factor in present problems. Such slack contingent conjunctions do not convert to roots or sources. Similarly with other social roots of environmental problems, for instance with human domination of humans as the supposed source of all problems. 5. Towards a more satisfactory expianation. Not only are the paradigmatic roots seriously intertangled (because of connections of one paradigm with another, because for instance of heavy philosophical inputs into religious paradigms), but further there is not a single defective paradigm. Rather there is a/wm'/y or sheaf of paradigms, commitment to any of which, or any suitable combination of which, in requisite circumstances, appears to have yielded environmentally untoward outcomes (requisite circumstances including availability of technology, extent of social support, and so on). Within that plurality there are of course gradations—and not only gradations but major differences—in calibre, in environmental friendliness. For example, Cartesianism which regards animals as mere automata incapable of feeling genuine pain, is significantly worse as regards other life­ forms and their decent treatment than a utilitarianism which positively values animal sentience. The family is not exclusively Western, nor somewhat more plausibly Northern, even though as a result of forces like migration, colonialism and cultural imperialism, paradigms of these sorts now predominate. Paradigms and cultures of less "advanced" and of third world communities have also operated to enhance environmental vandalism and degradation locally and regionally. Nor are major infiators of environmental problems essentially Western. Industrialization and technological advance—neither intrinsically Western, both manifested in varying degrees in other cultures—are, without much doubt, what have environmental problems from 22 rather localised ones, damaging for instance islands and river catchments, to grander and even global ones. They are the engines, powerhouses, of major problems, generating thereby spin­ off problems as well. But, once again, they are not deeper sources, but only means. (For again push questioning deeper, and ask: why bother or persist with industry, the effort and dirt and mess involved?) Nor, however, did they run on their own, nor do they continue on their own. Such engines were not designed and built, fuelled and tended, independently.42 They evolved primarily in the specially favoured culture of capitalism, though parallel developments could have occurred, and later did, in other prepared and heavily controlled surroundings, such as state socialism or post-imperial Confucianism. Now however these engines have been rendered more reliable and less dependent on careful cultural support, and have been transformed to run in less favourable settings. Thus inflation can escalate from a multiplicity of prepared sources, thereby intensifying problems and spreading them to larger regions. The intensification and spread is much facilitated by the joint transfer of technology, industry and coupled problems from region to region. As a result of transfer, inflation can occur within settings of quite different paradigms. Even if the whole "West" went into a terminal decline, and its paradigms disappeared into history, serious environmental exploitation and degradation would continue, driven by other enthusiastic cultures. For instance, the West could in theory collapse through protracted war, through pollution and congestion, or climate change and agriculture failure (there are many unexcludible routes to catastrophic decline, outlined in "Limits to Growth" scenarios, that could differentially impact on the West). Degradation would now continue however; there would be only temporary respite from environmental crises. While most of the conspicuous problems, awfully aggregated in contemporary environmental crises, are accelerated by—what connects them—contemporary industrial society, not all environmental problems are or have been of this sort. However, too many of the other problems, such as destruction of rainforests by itinerant peasants, can be seen as by­ products or similar of the main generators. Thus, in the illustration, the peasants displaced by agribusiness or absentee wealth-holders, arrived there on industrially-made roads opening the forests, and often wrecked this damage using industrial machinery. An environmental friendly culture has to be much more critical concerning certain types of industrialization, and much more selective regarding technology than present dominant cultures, Western or non-Western. A friendly paradigm would not only ensure much more Lacking favourable ideological settings, earlier technological "break throughs" were not duly developed: thus early wheels, steam engines, dyes, gunpowder, etc. Western cultures did not enjoy a monopoly upon technology powerful enough, when massed, to induce global crises. The picture of development of large-scale environmental problems being sketched bears superficial resemblance to that now tendered for development of the early Universe, where, to achieve presumed size, a source event, the Big Bang, was followed by huge inflationary phenomena. Naturally the resemblance has limitations; for instance, universe inflation is not terrestrially replicable in the way industrialization now is (hired or delivered off the shelf, pollution problems and all, with a big price tag). 23 selectivity and care, but would sharply limit impacts of damaging technology and industrialization. While there are such paradigms, on the ideas market, they mostly lack sophisticated contemporary elaboration and they may be flawed in other respects. Examples of more friendly paradigms, that do not lead of themselves to massive environmental problems and crises conditions, include those now tabulated: TABLE 3: Examples, some flawed, of environmentally friendly paradigms. Oriental ideologies: Taoism (classical) recessive traditions, now with tiny followings and little political influence. Jainism Indigenous cultures: Australian Aboriginals (e.g. Aranda) Amazonian Indians. Western philosophies: under certain favourable interpretations old Stoicism new Deep-green theories, such as deep ecology. Given the remoteness of most of these examples from predominant contemporary life, and difficulties with their wide adaptability, it is a short step to a familiar conclusion that new paradigms need to be worked out soon. Much much more intellectual effort should be devoted to such enterprise. One upshot, then, is a rough classification of paradigms into two families, the second large: environmentally friendly, and unfriendly. No doubt there is a small fuzzy residue class^ lying between major unfriendly and friendly divisions. Environmental friendliness means more or less what it appears to mean, what a functional break-down into components would yield: friendliness in approaches, practices and attitudes, to environments, especially more natural environments, with friendliness including, as usual, goodwill and kindliness towards (and substantially displaceable by these). As indicated, such friendliness concerns not merely actual practices, but also attitudes held, as reflected in what would be done in certain other sorts of situations. Certainly a culture that manifests unfriendliness, as a sweep of Northern cultures do, is unfriendly. But, as well, various "primitive" cultures, whose practices are not hostile, for example because they lack means or resources, energy or health, may nonetheless be unfriendly; for instance all members of a culture hold thoroughly negative attiudes which they are in fact unable to put into practice. 43 In logical terms perhaps as well as another residue class, hot/!. 24 It is not too difficult to explain in outline which paradigms will, if duly, diligently or religiously practiced, lead to environmental problems and impasse. Certain /hmz/y c/zaracferMfi'c-y, of unfriendly paradigms are worth elaborating: * illustrated through Cartesianism and Confucianism. More generally, direct impact is illustrated by any idea-system which attributes little or no value to natural items, and typically much value to nature transforming or interfering human (or elite) projects, and whose themes are linked to practice. So it is with Confucianism, which is entirely human focussed. 'Centering his attention on man in his present life, Confucius had as his goal the achievement of a good society characterized by harmonious social relations.'44 The outside world, the natural environment, was of no moral significance. It mattered only instrumentally, to humans. Descartes went further. Human bodies too were automata, complex machinery. 'The exception is [mznJ, or specifically] and its external manifestation language: this alone cannot be explained mechanistically—a thesis which leads Descartes to assert a fundamental divide between human beings and "the beasts"'.4$ The remaining world, the natural environment—lacking humanity, thought, mind—was again of no moral significance. It possessed derivatively only what value and meaning humans, or minds, chose to confer or project upon it, typically little or none. Since, either way, any way, a natural environment devoid of humans has no thoughts, purposes or interests, no value or meaning of its own, it could hardly matter what happens to it. It could be regarded and treated, justifiably, as nothing but a reservoir of resources for humans. Cartesians drew just such conclusions; similar conclusions derive, by one route or another from Platonism and Pentecostalism, and are implicit at least in Confucianism. Descartes again went further than some others. His practices and methods, like those of Bacon, were 'aimed at making men the masters and possessors of nature'.46 Untowards effects result through linkage of ideological theory to heavy practice. Link principles, reminiscent of "correspondence rules" used in explaining applications of scientific theories and normally included in comprehensive paradigms, connect the theoretic level to practice, they also serve to activate otherwise inoperative or uncoupled paradigms. Such principles may take the form of directives; familiar examples include maximization directives, such as maximize personal fun, tribal utility, national interest, or state GNP. * com&z'nafzon illustrated through Leibnitzianism. Any which yield satisfaction of all or enough elements of the consumption impact equation, and so would generate excessive impacts. To illustrate, consider what might be called in honour of Leibnitz's fragmentary ideology. Leibnitz was substantially committed to all of human population 46 Reese p.102 For much more on the geographic impact of Confucianism, as also compared with other (Asian) paradigms, see Tuan's investigations. Cottingham p.15. The utter invalidity of Descartes' argument (reported in Cottingham) to this divide is now comparatively easy to expose, given almost 400 years of hindsight. There are no such status divides—just as flamboyant forms of deep ecology maintain. See Descartes, V7. 25 growth, unfettered technological advance, and human lifestyles of consumption,^ in short, to precisely those factors that combine in the impact recipe to produce excessive human impacts upon environments. However neutral Leibnitz's metaphysics, his monadology, may have been—by contrast with Plato's or Descartes', both of which explicitly devalued much or all of the natural world—Leibnitz's wider ideology is linked indirectly, through impact equations, to damaging effects. Some imagine that this oblique formalistic detailing, through direct and indirect classes, can be simply cut through, retaining plurality and so forth. Surely environmental friendliness is nothing but environmental depth? While the suggestion points in the right sort of direction (for the relevant sort of depth) it too is astray .48 Depth is neither necessary nor sufficient. Take the move plausible sufficiency half, plausible because depth helps, no end. Nonetheless depth can be achieved in macho ways (as ecofeminism has emphasized against deep ecology), ways which may not be altogether friendly to less favoured species, groups or habitats. For example, depth can be satisfied through due selection and support of some super species and magnificent habitats—requisite environmental impartiality (and reflected justice), critical for friendliness as intended, being neglected.49 Still less in depth necessary. For kindliness can, both in principle and in practice, extend far beyond humans, still ranked top, to much more of "creation". Such extensive kindliness, observed in some humanistic humans, appears to be exhibited in some sects and tribes not committed to depth, and it could well be considerably more widespread, under changed but not deepened ideological conditions. Naturally, however, deepening would afford an obvious, and excellent, reason for change. As friendliness is not tantamount to depth, nor similarly is a prime part of what explains depth, recognition of intrinsic value in nature outside humans. Some animal liberationists who display high regard for creatures with capacity to suffer, show little goodwill towards forests largely unpopulated by such creatures. Conversely, though shifting ground, an environmentally friendly society may hold that value is but an anthropocentric construct, merely projected onto a basically neutral world. All the same, aspects of depth are normally reliable indicators of environmental sensitivity and friendliness, and inversely, aspects of shallowness (as investigated in authentic deep ecology) marks of unfriendliness. Shallowness will work out satisfactorily environmentally only with what is now rare (given ideological dominance), a right mix of humans; and its any longer working widely is implausible. These reliable marks include such familiar features as For requisite details, see Aiton. The case against Leibnitzianism is developed in a sequel. As to the relevant sort of depth, see GE. Other accounts of depth are also proferred in deep ecology, some of which relate to the present exercise. In particular deep questioning should lead to paradigmatic roots, to Naess's "total views". Herein lies another reason why something like biospecies egalitarianism is essential in deep ecology; such a requirement needs, not dilution away (as has happened in American and transpersonal deep ecology), but rectification. 26 * short-term framework. * devaluation of natural items as against human elements or artefacts (typically exhibiting human chauvinism); and, as a corollary of heavy devaluation, * entitlement to domination, dominion over nature; * appropriation of nature, its conversion to property. * maximization assumptions concerning personal or societal aggrandizement, utility and size, coupled with grand projects. * technofix approach to environmental problems. Friendly paradigms will tend to mverf these features. An environmentally friendly paradigm can be expected to yield environmentally significant corollaries, such as the following samples: * an end to degrading primary production; instead ecological forestry and ecological agriculture will come to prevail. * a strong selectivity regarding industrialization, which weeds out damaging forms. * a calling off of grand ideologically-grounded projects, interfering with or damaging natural environments, such as major dams, river diversions, demolished islands (e.g. for airports), new mountains, terraforming, extensive rainmaking, climatic interference, and generally the sweep of "playing God" projects. A little of this sort of unfriendly technology can go a very long way. As unfriendly paradigms are decidedly plural, so likewise are answers to questions as to why agents adhere, or continue to adhere, to environmentally unfriendly paradigms. Some of the diverse answers match answers already encountered in the main tabulation. Reasons are psychological, social and cultural (with a familiar circularity here encountered), and include considerations of the following sorts and others: because that is how things are done, or have always been done; because needs can be met, perhaps only met, in that way, so it is believed; because there are no alternatives, or none seen, perhaps because none have been sought; because negative outcomes can be overcome, or do not really matter; and so on. A short answer can now be ventured to the focal questions: Because, in one way or another, most agents are bound to—locked into, committed to, captured by, or just passively go along with—environmentally unfriendly paradigms. As a result the (long-term) health of the rest of environments does not matter, or matter enough. 6. Glimpsing an entertaining corollary: an unfavourable report upon dominant philosophy. It will hardly have escaped notice that virtually all dominant philosophical roads lead to Rome, to environmentally unfriendly paradigms. Stripped of metaphor, there are environmental conditions of adequacy, which most philosophical systems fail to meet. In an environmentally friendly new world, most philosophy that is remembered, indeed most of the humanities, is destined for scrapping. Prevailing philosophy is a serious impediment to satisfactory environmental outcomes. Predominant philosophy, not just Western philosophy, has by and large been bad environmental news. 27 It may be insisted that philosophy can make no difference, for instance to environmental practice. It is not an expression of basic needs, or of any such practical matters. Exceptions to such practical bravado have however to be recognised almost immediately; philosophy soon enters for organizational, justificatory and explanatory ends. That concession still grossly under-estimates the extent to which ideas, and more generally paradigms, influence and even govern action and practice, especially reflective and rational action. The substantial point is not therefore removed through any alleged practical impotence of philosophy. Mainstream philosophy has supplied, or mightily assisted in supplying, dominant unfriendly paradigms under which environments labour. Of course not everything has to be trashed, as even defective enterprises or evil projects may include decent part or worthwhile features; much can be salvaged, arguments, subtheories and so on (and with intellectual tipping there need be little material waste). Nor therefore is it as if an entirely fresh start has to be made. As well as salvaged bits and pieces (which need to be carefully tested for soundness), there are brash new alternatives such as authentic deep ecology, and there are recessive paradigms and neglected traditions to peruse for suggestions, for inspiration, and perhaps to rehabilitate. Richard Sylvan * APPENDIX. On Shepard's approach to focal questions. A remarkably sustained investigation of the focal questions is found in Shepard s intriguing books. In his TVafi/re anJ he considers and quickly dismisses many of the stock responses to focal questions suggested by contemporary luminaries (or by himself in earlier work), such as lack of information, faulty technique, insensibility, greed, political inertia, change to agriculture and settlement,^... . He would (and should, for his eliminative argument) have also dismissed industrialization, state and corporate control, and so on. More disconcertingly, for present purposes, Shepard claims that 'a history of ideas' similarly no doubt a story of paradigms—will not serve; for it 'is not enough to explain human behaviour' (p.3), it 'seems too easy and academic' (p.3), itself an easy and superficial criticism. But if, for instance, the 'dictum that nature should serve man' and 'insistence that animals feel no pain' should become widely entrenched, then they may well impact heavily on practice, as accordingly appears to be the case. His slight further argument appears to miss the intended * ^0 An earlier, even rougher version of this article was presented at the Environmental Paradigms Conference, University of New England, Armidale, April 1993. It would not have been written without its solicitation for the Conference; also it might well not been thought through in fashionable but confining and perhaps misleading paradigmatic terms. A subsequent working draft has benefitted, slightly, from comments from very unimpressed reviewers. Thanks certainly to Holmes Rolston for helpful comments. No doubt a popular picture of human social changes with agriculture and settlement is simplistic: that before societies lived in harmony, afterwards they did not. But it is also too simple to go on to claim, as Shepard does, that 'the economic and material demands of growing villages and towns are ... not causes but results of this change' (p.3). Some demands appear to derive from factors, such as population pressures, which were among causes of the changes. 28 target: 'The meticulous analysis of these philosophies and the discovery that they articulate an ethos beg the question' (p.3). it can reasonably be inquired? What is offered is but the facile, false, 'ideas are impotent' consideration, fostered by thinking and operating in terms of (e.g. lower p.3), rather than reasons and (rational) explanation, and encouraged through an attempted move to (what is explanatorily inadequate) pure behaviour. For a simple example of the familiar explanatory roles of ideas and paradigms, consider an alternative explanation through them. The admittedly bizarre ("crazy") 'turning everything into something man-made and [or] man-used' (p.5) is readily explained through dominant paradigms: is the way it acquires value, otherwise it is worthless. There is no need at all for psychopathology here. Correspondingly Shepard briefly reviews and rejects several of the very partial, and often hopeless, solutions suggested under stock responses to focal questions such as making information, or better information, more widely available, bringing people from all walks of life together, encouraging conviviality, hitting problems with smart technology, practicing conservation, and so on. Shepard's own resolution is more readily reached from a further (meta-focal) question that he proceeds to ask: why do humans per-yfyf in degrading their habitats once sources and solutions are made He effectively argues by elimination: other sources (read as causes) do not succeed in providing an answer; but 'the idea of a sick society (which he leaps to, without argument, p.4) does. Wrong on both counts: On the first because a non-causal explanation in terms of ideological wiring can provide answers (listen to politicians, representative of the people, again, just a little time). On the second because some industrial societies are not sick in a normal sense (though .yome may be), rather sickness has to be yo redefined (such low redefinitions are among underlying subplots^) that having certain ideological commitments that are carried into practice counts as "sickness". So it is that Shepard arrives at his of 'general, culturally-ratified distortions of childhood, of massive disablement of ontogeny as the basis of irrational and self-destructive attitudes towards the natural environment' (p.ix). Succinctly, 'there are profound psychic dislocations at the root of modern society' (p.xii). Psychic disorders have evolved: 'over the centuries major institutions and metaphysics might finally celebrate attitudes and ideas originating in the normal context of immaturity [or] ... adolescence ...' (p.15). Having glided easily and invalidly to the idea of sick societies, in a mere three pages, Shepard proceeds to diagnose in more detail the nature of the alleged sickness.52 It supposedly arises, like other psychopathy with which it is immediately associated, in infancy, and is 51 52 For trickery through redefinition of sickness and madness, Wisdom has already prepared us. Observe that Shepard's redefinition of sickness to include sick (i.e. debasing and devaluing) practices with regard to natural habitats (and conjoined therewith, to, older people) does not leave no contrast classes. For there remain benign 'relic tribal' societies, such as the Manus, Crow and Comanche, Aranda and !Kung San (p.xii), 'people who feel themselves to be rather than (p.6 empasis added)—an elegant analogy. 'The idea of a sick society', which as Shepard confesses (on p.4) is hardly new, is reached on the third page of the main text. 29 manifest in life-long immaturity, with whole societies stuck in a kind of destructive adolescence. No doubt there is something to some of what Shepard describes in child and person development (not the 'private demons' and so on) or might well have described. There is evidently, conspicuously in "new world" societies, wide commitment to a shallow juvenile culture, adulation or imitation of immature media and sport models and flawed authority figures, marginalization of the elderly, and so on, coupled with hyper-activity, violence and vandalism. But, like political commitment to extensive economic activity, this is hardly satisfactorily accounted for through psychopathological reduction, concentrating the whole social problematic in the ontogeny of individuals.^^ A superior explanation to widespread individual psychic disorder proceeds through ideological commitment, that industrial humans are raised and educated in, inducted into and committed to, defective ideologies, without coming to know or properly experience alternatives. The 'portraits of maturity' alluded to likewise appear individualistic and culture-bound, resembling those of deep ecology, directed at embroidery of person and self, through personal growth and identity, wider identification and relatedness, self-realization.$4 They are not exactly those of older and ecologically wiser societies. They do not reveal ecologically mature mixed communities. Furthermore, comparisons with relic tribal societies, which are important, can be decoupled from psychopathological analysis and reduction. Different lifeways, commitments and ideologies, are what they are and do not all reduce to matters of mental health. Undoubtedly we can learn of and from these different societies. We can still witness 'smallgroup, leisured, foraging life-ways with[in] natural surroundings. ... there is the rub—... for us, now, that world no longer exists' (p.14 rearranged). Nor is it really true that such a world is no longer accessible to most of us; more leisured small-group ways can be retrieved, some natural surrounding can even now be restored. In a curious fashion, Shepard has managed to invert likely causal relations. While a certain interaction can no doubt be conceded, it is not so much human ill-health that is leading to environmental degradation, but rather environmental degradation, generally brought about for other reasons, that is increasingly leading to human ill-health, and in the longer term causing erosion of life-support systems. 53 54 A psychopathic reduction is in part made plausible by reexpression in medical or psychological terms of what would better be otherwise expressed. Consider, for instance the language of the following clever paragraph, which infiltrates much with no argument: 'The person himself is, of course, caught between his inner calendar and the surgeries of society. His momentum for further growth may be twisted or amputated according to the hostilities, fears, or fantasies required of him, as his retardation is silently engineered to domesticate his integrity or to allow him to share in the collective dream of mastery' (p.16). But the trapping of agents between inner directives and social conditions and demands, or between rival ideologies, can be retold in different, less medical and metaphorical terms. Cf pp.12-14. Likewise there is a conservative underlay, more oppressive than that of deep ecology: insistence on 'one particular mother' (p.7) even suggestion of unsatisfactoriness in 'taking mothers off to work' (p.15)! 30 REFERENCES J. Alton, L^z'Zzzzz'fz A EzogzYz/z/zy, Adam Hilger, Bristol, 1985. E. R. Attfield, 'Has the history of philosophy ruined the environment?' Ezzvz'rozzzzz^zz^Z Ef/zzcs 13(1991)127-137. R. Attfield, 77z^ ERzzc.y o/'Ezzvzzwzzzz^zztzzZ Cozzc^z *zz, Second edition, University of Georgia Press, Athens, 1991. A. Bellett, 'The evaluation of values compatible with ecological sustainability', FMzztEzzzz^zzfaZ QM^rzozz^ Pap^, No.2, CRES, Australian National University, 1990. J.B. Callicott and R.T. Ames (eds), Mzfz/z^ in A^zzzzz 7zYZ<7zfz<?zz.y o/ * P/zoz/g/zr, SUNY Press, Albany NY., 1989. J. Callicott, 'Genesis and John Muir' R^Vfyzozz 12(3) (1990) 31-41. R. Chisholm, 77z^ FozzzzzEzfzozM o/ *Rzzowzzzg, Harvester Press, Sussex, 1982. J. Cottingham, 77z<? Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1988. C. Dale, Po/zwzZ ^zzzzZ CzvzZzzzzhozz, Revised edition by V.G. Carter, University of Oklahama Press, Norman, 1974. A Dobson (ed.), Gz^zz R^zzzZ^r, Routledge, London, 1991? A. Drengson, 'Ecosophy', Po^z'tzw Vz'Zzz-zzhozzj, (1990?) 8-10. R. Eckersley, Ezzvzrozzzzz^zztaZz^zzz azzzZ PoZztzc^zZ 77z^ozy, UCL Press, London, 1992. W. Fox, 7bwnr^ a Przzzzjp^z'^ozzzzZ EcoZogy, Shambala, Boston, 1990. A. Gare, E^yozz^ Ez/rop^^zzz CzvzZz'znhozz, Eco-logical Press, Bungendore, 1993. C. J. Glacken, ozz r/z^ R/zoiE'azz 5/zoz *^, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1967. R. Goodin, 'Selling environmental indulgences', RyEZo^ 47(1994) 573-596. N. R. Hanson, Pat^zT?.? o/ * Jz^cov^zy; zzzz zzz^z/zry zzz/o cozzc^ptzz^zZ ybMzzJzzrzozz^ o/ ^cz^zzc^, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1958. E. C. Hargrove, FozzzzzEzhozz-y o/'Ezzvzzwzzzz^zzfaZ Et/zzc^, Prentice Hall, N.J., 1989. D Hillel, G%? o/T/z^ Ezzz *r/zr CzvzZz^hozz zzzzzZ /Zze Ez/^ o/r/z^ 5*ozZ., Free Press, Macmillan, 1991. M. Jacobs, 77ze Gzr^zz Ecozzozzzy, Pluto, London, 1991. K. Marx, zGz *MM^.' zzzZz FozzzzzZatzozz^ o/ t/z^ cz *ztz^zz^ o/ /zoZztzc^Z ^cozzozzzy, Harmondsworth, England 1973. F. Mathews, 77ze EcoZogzc^Z ^Z/^ Routledge, London, 1991. A. McLaughlin, R^gaz-<7zzzg M2fMz-^: 7zzzZzz^/z *z6zZz^zzz N. Y., 1993. P. Marshall, azz^Z EcoZogy , SUNY Press, Albany W^Z?, in two editions, Simon and Schuster, 1992 and 1993. A. Naess and D. Rothenberg, EcoZogy, cozzzz/zMzzzTy zzzzz/ Lz/^y/yZf, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1989. J. Passmore, Afazz\y R^pozz^zZ?z'Zz/y/br Azz^z/z *^, Duckworth, London, 1974. D. Pearce and others, EZz/^przzzf/br <x Gz-^^zz Ecozzozzzy, Earthscan Publications, London, 1989. D. Pepper, 77z^ R<?oAy o/MozZ^z-zz Ezzvzrozzzzz^zzr^Zz^z/z, Ed: Tom Colveson London; Dover N.H. Croom Helm 1984. 31 V. Plumwood, F^mz'az^m azz6? r/z<? Ma^r^zy a/Aaraz *^, Routledge, London, 1993. C. Ponting, A Gz-^zz Wzsfazy a/ *r/z^ Waz-M, Sinclair-Stevenson, London, 1991. R. Routley, 'Roles and limits of paradigms in environmental thought and action', Dz.ycM.y.yzazz *^/zap^z zzz ^zzvzz *azzz?z^zzra/ modified, in Ezzvzz *azzz?z^zzra/ p/zz/a^a/?/zy #1, RSSS, Australian National University, 1982, also, P/zz/a-yap/zy (ed. R. Elliot and A. Gare), University of Queensland Press, Brisbane, 1983; referred to as RP. C. O. Sauer, Agz-z'czJfaz-aZ Oz7gzzz.y azz;/ Dzs/z^a/, American Geographical Society, New York, 1952. P. Singer, Prachca/ Er/zzc-y, expanded edition, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1993. P. Shepard, Aamr^ am/ Ma^/af^, Sierra Club Books, San Francisco, 1982. R. Sylvan and D. Bennett, 77z<? Gz-^azag a/Er/zz^, White Horse Press, Cambridge, 1994; referred to as GE. R. Sylvan with D. Bennett, O/ * Ufa/aa-y, Paa am/ Z)^p Eca/agy, Green Series #19, RSSS Australian National University, 1990; referred to as UTD. 77z^ WWZaa<py Pra/'^cZ, War/<7 EarZ/z, special issue, Canton NY, 1993. Y.F. Tuan, 'Discrepancies between environmental attitude and behaviour: examples from Europe and China', 77z^ Caaa<7zaa G^agz-ap/z^z * 12(1968) 176-91. S. Toulmin, 77ze ReZazvz Za Ca^aza/agy, University of California, Berkeley, 1982. L. White Jr., 'Historic roots of our ecologic crisis', 5czaaca 155(1967) 1203-7. J. Wisdom, P/zz/awp/zy am/ P^yc/zaaaa/y^z^, Blackwell, Oxford, 1953. M. Zimmerman and others (eds.), Eavzzwzza^aZa/ P/zz/a.yap/zy, Prentice Hall, N.J., 1993; referred to as EP3.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Box 21, Item 705: Draft of Paradigmatic roots of environmental problems Subject The topic of the resource Printout of draft, dated 3 July 1995. Description An account of the resource One of ten papers digitised from item 705. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/browse?search=Richard+Sylvan&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bjoiner%5D=and&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=&amp;range=&amp;collection=&amp;type=&amp;user=&amp;tags=&amp;public=&amp;featured=&amp;exhibit=&amp;geolocation-mapped=&amp;geolocation-address=&amp;geolocation-latitude=&amp;geolocation-longitude=&amp;geolocation-radius=10&amp;submit_search=Search+for+items">Richard Sylvan</a> Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived <span class="MuiTypography-root-125 MuiTypography-body2-126">The University of Queensland's <a data-testid="rek-series" href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/records/search?page=1&amp;pageSize=20&amp;sortBy=score&amp;sortDirection=Desc&amp;searchQueryParams%5Brek_series%5D%5Bvalue%5D=Richard+Sylvan+Papers%2C+UQFL291&amp;searchMode=advanced">Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291</a></span>, Box 21, Item 705 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org">Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy</a> Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1995-07-03 Contributor An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, <a href="https://najtaylor.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Dr. N.A.J. Taylor</a>. Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library. Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource [31] leaves. 92.75 MB. Type The nature or genre of the resource Manuscript Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context <a href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:906b49d">https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:906b49d</a> Box 21: More Green Como House Como House > Shelves > Top > Pile 3 https://www.antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/4806440e025cfc5ea6631620bfddc532.pdf 3cd4e6697a512b5b75d9d97be3baa8de PDF Text Text 15 nght. 'Vital force without restraint', mtentionaily excessive force, is only part of what counts as which is more generally/^ w/tm/i i.e. transgresses, descrecrates, profanes, injures, outrages, etc. It is thus a negatively connoted force, an evil force in some specified intentional respect. There is a tendency for Taoist commentators, not Taoists, to regard Taoism as condemning all uses, or even occurrences, of force, but this is not so. Rather intentional ill-forcing is what is castigated, what is deviant. Thus Taoism does not exclude a range of defensive practices, which make satisfactory use of natural forces, like letting the machines of war industry stop. Those who would abolish war and its machinery, substituting for it nonwarlike and ideally nonviolent methods, technology, and strategies, have been confronted not merely with much sub-rational abuse but with plenty of criticism and even some paradoxes. Here is a recent paradox concerning war and nonviolence: War must be abolished. One reason is simply economic. We can no longer afford it, and the opportunity costs are enormous. Along with other extraordinarily wasteful activities, it is an anachronism. - Doing so cannot be accomplished without violence, i.e. in effect, given the types of violence involved, without what amounts to war. According to a fuller version of this premiss, the process of abolishing a war would only be achieved through a revolution so profound that it could not succeed without extensive and extreme violence, amounting to (civil) war. But then war cannot be abolished without war. Therefore, war which must be abolished cannot be abolished.^ This "paradox" has been compared with the Liar paradox, but the parallel does not persist far. For this paradox does not involve self-referential features, and is easily broken, as follows. Let the "last war" be not the last standard war but the revolution abolishing war. Then, given that the revolution is successful, war will be abolished therewith, i.e. with that last war. There need be no regress, given again a successful outcome. All the premisses stand intact, but the conclusion, following the 'therefore' is a nonsequitur. However, while the dissolution of the argument is accordingly logically fine, the route is repugnant. Standard pacifism challenges the Brian Medhn, who forcefully propounded this puzzle, set other analogous puzzles alongside it designed to reveal deep difficulties m contemporary political, and especially alternative, t oug t Another puzzle, concerning liberty and repression in the context of capitalism revolved around the following inconsistent triad: * capitalism must be removed, but liberty retained. * capitalism cannot be removed without repression. * repression is antithetical to liberty. The puzzle is resolved as with the analogous puzzle of abolishing. Let the "last capitalist" action be/bre the days of liberty be the repressive but liberating revolution overthrowing �17 Plainly the to warfare, like the sanctions and so on, cannot itself be military (using soldiers and other devices of war), on pain of some incoherence. But otherwise" ways of opposition can be many and various: they can certainly be ucrive, as with nonviolent demonstrations, resistance movements, and so forth, and they may also be devious (e . ummg th. forces of war upon themselves so they are neutralised). It quickly becomes evident hen, that some of th. dictionaries offer but loaded definitions which, by restating the negaZ components, reduce the initial appeal and plausibility of pacifism. Consider th. of . al on-c-operadon with any form of warfare'. Thereby excluded ar. forms of pacifism o er active an plausible alternatives to warfare such as social defence. The Concise often, with depreciatory implication, the advocacy of peace at any price', 'in any circumstance . Pacifism can easily resist being forced into thes. sorts of circumstances: it has y resources, as an extensive senes of texts on alternatives to war, such as negotiation non­ ent action and social defence, from Taoism to contemporary environmentalism attest. of rendennZ semantical strategy of som. dictmnan.s', Th f h ""nT Z" "" biassed definitions. y ave stretched the term from its restricted setting of warfare, confined to state and ve" Z of violence, from state and interstate to, what ,s noL oZZ^"""' "t^ ^'nce. Caii the resulting considerably stretched notion of pacifism, according to which it is morally wrong to us. violence, according to which stretched pacifism certainly includes standard pacifism 'h' inverse is very far from being (uniMs Znof hf c e f T diff^mml" f """"" different reasons for this, which will be picked up seriatim. n several, substantially Stretched pacifism, also misleadingly called "mra/ pacifism, has looked a very easy al arg.t to moral philosophers. Many th. effusive philosopher who, upon sighting such a "fana icaP- H "inconsistent", "insensitive", treZ ' Z"' " accommodating and reat ng moral dilemmas, it is no great feat to resist such attacks, in the fashion of previous stretched pacifism "-ent wZt oT 7 Zen Zs S 7 "Z Z" ways. So far from bemg stupid, it is viable. In future gentler times stretched pacifism In Al this notion was contrasted with standard pacifism might have been better. as pacifism: �19 accordingly do not hold that violence is always wrong. From such a commonsense angle, pacifism with its condemnation of conventional wars and the violence they involve remains a radical doctrine. As regards wars and other violence-incurring social authorities, contemporary pacificism is, as previous explained (e.g. Al p.3), a form of activism. Pacifism does not imply utter pacifity, but may actively involve social defence, resistance and so on. However a certain level of misrepresentation enters into the JWS challenge in the details of what forms of activism pacifism may include. That misrepresentation begins in the second clause concerning what is said to be sometimes justified. For the situational procedure where dilemmas arise will not generally be consequential applying a principle of lesser evil. In dilemmatic situations such principles are suspended, and such a principle is in any case unacceptable to moral pacifists. A small amount of violence may be less bad in its consequences than verbal offence, but a principled pacifist will choose the slightly greater evil where other obligations do not exclude it. A more serious distortion occurs in JWS's effort to force procedures in dilemma situations into purely consequentialist form. In fact consequential decision theory wa *s deployed as a only for how to proceed rationally in a situational setting where deontic procedures were suspended (see MD p.38). What was said, still misleadingly retrospective vision reveals, was this: 'what is done is a very consequentialist thing' (Al p.13), nor 'one acts in a consequentialist fashion to do the sufficiently good thing in the circumstances' (JWS p.152). Situationally or/zgr procedures than those resembling orthodox rational decision making (modified from maximizing to satisizing objectives) may be adopted (MD p.38). Further the orthodox consequentialist theory is inadequate because it leaves out, or tries to reduce to consequences, nonconsequential elements, notably motives. It is not difficult, in principle (in advance of attempted consequentialization of motives), to design situations where motives, such as integrity or maintaining faith, enter to yield outcomes upsetting consequential calculations. More elaborate decision making procedures than those of consequentialism, sometimes at variance with consequentialism, are thus presupposed. A further part of JWS's criticism accordingly goes by the board, the alleged appeal 'to second best' consequentialist considerations,... already explicitly condemned' (p.154). What was condemned was stock universal consequentialism, 'that <9t/y consequentialist considerations carry argumentative weight' (quoted on p.152), so undercutting other deontic principles, such as those of pacifism. It was not claimed, what is utterly different, that consequentialist considerations can nouVigrg enter into deliberation and decision making. The conclusion JWS arrives at is therefore substantially astray. After criticising modern moral philosophy for its reliance upon consequentialist modes of thought, it is surprising, and inconsistent, to find ... [reliance] upon such modes of thought to escape logical difficulties raised by moral dilemmas facing ... pacifis[m] (p.152) �21 routinely in violent activity. While it can no doubt be argued, as some vegetarians may do, that the natural order is an immoral order, and that remaining carnivores should be converted to vegetarianism as rapidly as proves possible (in the way domestic dogs are converted to dog biscuits), the difficulties with such proposals are immense. The task envisaged is gigantic, and beyond human capacities - even if it were desirable. For there are millions of species to be somehow converted to proper vegetarianism. Then there are millions of other species to be converted to proper and well regulated contraceptive practices, else their numbers will get out of hand (uncontrollably) with predation removed. Given humans lack of success in limiting their own excessive numbers, such regulation appears entirely remote. Aside however from the practical difficulties, is such a fully vegetarian order, with evolution further derailed, a desirable improvement on the natural order? Is it morally obligatory? It is certainly not obligatory, as alternative systems of morality in harmony with the prevailing natural order are feasible. Nor is it desirable, for (to appeal to such alternative value systems) the natural order is more or less in order as it is. Full vegetarianization would only reduce its value, vastly. More generally, a defensible ethical framework should not, it would be rightly contended, be right out of step with the natural order of other creatures, decently depicted. Decent depiction is important, for some features of the natural order, such as competition, combat and predation, so far from escaping attention, have been grossly exaggerated and exploited. Thus, for instance, the ludicrous picture of nature red in truth and claw, so beloved of descendents of orthodox Victorians and of orthodox economists. However, even under decent depiction, the "natural order" is often not benign. That appears to be enough to induce a supervenient moral dilemma for any stretched pacifism which is coupled to a deep ethic (e.g. which does not separate humans out from the natural order) and which eschews the desperate vegetarian route: The natural order is not an immoral order The natural order contains (regular) instances of violence. Therefore, instances of violence are not immoral - in apparent defiance of P2 Moreover, there are too many instances of violence, too regularly occurring, for them all to be plausibly shunted into the moral dilemma category (and predatory carnivores face no dilemmas). Raptors that practice violence every week are not immoral (neither are they clearly moral; the category of morality only significantly extends so far). The main trouble lies however with P2 (which needs some finer adjustment, as was alrady indicated in Al). While P2 is alright in context, within a particular, perfectly viable, ethical framework, designed for the usual human round, the conventional setting for ethical theories, it stands in need of modification outside that setting. It is time to suggest the sort of modification envisaged. Evidently P2 was addressed to moral agents. Which agents? Not to carnivores that supply their own livelihood, nor really to morally degenerate humans, but to �22 peace-sensitive agents. With that semi-technical form, yet to be characterised, a suitably modified P2 results: MP2. It is morally wrong, for a peace-sensitive agent, to use violence.^ To recover what amounts, in the previous discussive context, to P2, it suffices to add the proposition that every human agent ought to be peace-sensitive. Much as that proposition has to recommend it, it appears too ethically advanced for many modem humans; it sets too high a moral standard to be taken as a serious guide to practice. It seems wise to settle presently for something less demanding, such as that every advanced moral agent ought to be peace sensitive. To put essentially the same proposition alternatively: ^tr^rc/z^ /?<2cz/z.wz (as modified) is While it is perhaps too late to hope for much moral progress in humans, it is pleasant to contemplate alternative futures where what is supererogatory became obligatory, and widely practiced. Richard Sylvan* * I began drafting this essay at the time (January 17, midday Australian time) of the American attacks upon Iraq. The optly named Prime Minister Hawke of Australia had just made a statement to the nation-state, announcing (the) war. In this statement there was much talk of peace. There was even - in what was effectively a declaration of war - reiteration of the modem quest for 'a new world order of peace'. Peace through war; so it rings out again and again, through the centuries. 'War must be for the sake of peace' (Aristotle p.220). More than two thousand years later, we have fought those wars to end all wars. But it is no use, Hawke solemely pronounced, just taking aZzoMf and thinking about peace; we must work for peace,/zg/zt for it-through war. Impeccable logic? President Bush, supreme commander, convinced us with similar logic, speaking too with many tongues. Of how he 'preferred to think of peace, not war'. But now 'only force will prevail', as 'all reasonable efforts to reach a peaceful solution are exhausted'. 'What must be done' must be done, or will be anyway. With God on side with the US offensive (as well as on the other side), it will go well. As it was said to have, though it achieved comparatively little that other efforts may not have yielded more satisfactorily, and thought it may now have to 9 The generalization of P2, suggested in Al, to cover also the parallel situation of environmental vandalism, can be similarly modified. The anti-vandolence principle becomes MP2°. It is morally wrong, for a peace- and environmentally-sensitive agent, to use vandolence. * Thank to David Bennett for joint contributions (from UT) and to JWS for opposition (in JWS) � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Draft Papers Description An account of the resource Sylvan's literary executor encountered an archive in which “all his projects were current", since manuscripts were undated and unattributed. Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document 15 nght. 'Vital force without restraint', mtentionaily excessive force, is only part of what counts as which is more generally/^ w/tm/i i.e. transgresses, descrecrates, profanes, injures, outrages, etc. It is thus a negatively connoted force, an evil force in some specified intentional respect. There is a tendency for Taoist commentators, not Taoists, to regard Taoism as condemning all uses, or even occurrences, of force, but this is not so. Rather intentional ill-forcing is what is castigated, what is deviant. Thus Taoism does not exclude a range of defensive practices, which make satisfactory use of natural forces, like letting the machines of war industry stop. Those who would abolish war and its machinery, substituting for it nonwarlike and ideally nonviolent methods, technology, and strategies, have been confronted not merely with much sub-rational abuse but with plenty of criticism and even some paradoxes. Here is a recent paradox concerning war and nonviolence: War must be abolished. One reason is simply economic. We can no longer afford it, and the opportunity costs are enormous. Along with other extraordinarily wasteful activities, it is an anachronism. - Doing so cannot be accomplished without violence, i.e. in effect, given the types of violence involved, without what amounts to war. According to a fuller version of this premiss, the process of abolishing a war would only be achieved through a revolution so profound that it could not succeed without extensive and extreme violence, amounting to (civil) war. But then war cannot be abolished without war. Therefore, war which must be abolished cannot be abolished.^ This "paradox" has been compared with the Liar paradox, but the parallel does not persist far. For this paradox does not involve self-referential features, and is easily broken, as follows. Let the "last war" be not the last standard war but the revolution abolishing war. Then, given that the revolution is successful, war will be abolished therewith, i.e. with that last war. There need be no regress, given again a successful outcome. All the premisses stand intact, but the conclusion, following the 'therefore' is a nonsequitur. However, while the dissolution of the argument is accordingly logically fine, the route is repugnant. Standard pacifism challenges the Brian Medhn, who forcefully propounded this puzzle, set other analogous puzzles alongside it designed to reveal deep difficulties m contemporary political, and especially alternative, t oug t Another puzzle, concerning liberty and repression in the context of capitalism revolved around the following inconsistent triad: * capitalism must be removed, but liberty retained. * capitalism cannot be removed without repression. * repression is antithetical to liberty. The puzzle is resolved as with the analogous puzzle of abolishing. Let the "last capitalist" action be/bre the days of liberty be the repressive but liberating revolution overthrowing 17 Plainly the to warfare, like the sanctions and so on, cannot itself be military (using soldiers and other devices of war), on pain of some incoherence. But otherwise" ways of opposition can be many and various: they can certainly be ucrive, as with nonviolent demonstrations, resistance movements, and so forth, and they may also be devious (e . ummg th. forces of war upon themselves so they are neutralised). It quickly becomes evident hen, that some of th. dictionaries offer but loaded definitions which, by restating the negaZ components, reduce the initial appeal and plausibility of pacifism. Consider th. of . al on-c-operadon with any form of warfare'. Thereby excluded ar. forms of pacifism o er active an plausible alternatives to warfare such as social defence. The Concise often, with depreciatory implication, the advocacy of peace at any price', 'in any circumstance . Pacifism can easily resist being forced into thes. sorts of circumstances: it has y resources, as an extensive senes of texts on alternatives to war, such as negotiation non­ ent action and social defence, from Taoism to contemporary environmentalism attest. of rendennZ semantical strategy of som. dictmnan.s', Th f h ""nT Z" "" biassed definitions. y ave stretched the term from its restricted setting of warfare, confined to state and ve" Z of violence, from state and interstate to, what ,s noL oZZ^"""' "t^ ^'nce. Caii the resulting considerably stretched notion of pacifism, according to which it is morally wrong to us. violence, according to which stretched pacifism certainly includes standard pacifism 'h' inverse is very far from being (uniMs Znof hf c e f T diff^mml" f """"" different reasons for this, which will be picked up seriatim. n several, substantially Stretched pacifism, also misleadingly called "mra/ pacifism, has looked a very easy al arg.t to moral philosophers. Many th. effusive philosopher who, upon sighting such a "fana icaP- H "inconsistent", "insensitive", treZ ' Z"' " accommodating and reat ng moral dilemmas, it is no great feat to resist such attacks, in the fashion of previous stretched pacifism "-ent wZt oT 7 Zen Zs S 7 "Z Z" ways. So far from bemg stupid, it is viable. In future gentler times stretched pacifism In Al this notion was contrasted with standard pacifism might have been better. as pacifism: 19 accordingly do not hold that violence is always wrong. From such a commonsense angle, pacifism with its condemnation of conventional wars and the violence they involve remains a radical doctrine. As regards wars and other violence-incurring social authorities, contemporary pacificism is, as previous explained (e.g. Al p.3), a form of activism. Pacifism does not imply utter pacifity, but may actively involve social defence, resistance and so on. However a certain level of misrepresentation enters into the JWS challenge in the details of what forms of activism pacifism may include. That misrepresentation begins in the second clause concerning what is said to be sometimes justified. For the situational procedure where dilemmas arise will not generally be consequential applying a principle of lesser evil. In dilemmatic situations such principles are suspended, and such a principle is in any case unacceptable to moral pacifists. A small amount of violence may be less bad in its consequences than verbal offence, but a principled pacifist will choose the slightly greater evil where other obligations do not exclude it. A more serious distortion occurs in JWS's effort to force procedures in dilemma situations into purely consequentialist form. In fact consequential decision theory wa *s deployed as a only for how to proceed rationally in a situational setting where deontic procedures were suspended (see MD p.38). What was said, still misleadingly retrospective vision reveals, was this: 'what is done is a very consequentialist thing' (Al p.13), nor 'one acts in a consequentialist fashion to do the sufficiently good thing in the circumstances' (JWS p.152). Situationally or/zgr procedures than those resembling orthodox rational decision making (modified from maximizing to satisizing objectives) may be adopted (MD p.38). Further the orthodox consequentialist theory is inadequate because it leaves out, or tries to reduce to consequences, nonconsequential elements, notably motives. It is not difficult, in principle (in advance of attempted consequentialization of motives), to design situations where motives, such as integrity or maintaining faith, enter to yield outcomes upsetting consequential calculations. More elaborate decision making procedures than those of consequentialism, sometimes at variance with consequentialism, are thus presupposed. A further part of JWS's criticism accordingly goes by the board, the alleged appeal 'to second best' consequentialist considerations,... already explicitly condemned' (p.154). What was condemned was stock universal consequentialism, 'that <9t/y consequentialist considerations carry argumentative weight' (quoted on p.152), so undercutting other deontic principles, such as those of pacifism. It was not claimed, what is utterly different, that consequentialist considerations can nouVigrg enter into deliberation and decision making. The conclusion JWS arrives at is therefore substantially astray. After criticising modern moral philosophy for its reliance upon consequentialist modes of thought, it is surprising, and inconsistent, to find ... [reliance] upon such modes of thought to escape logical difficulties raised by moral dilemmas facing ... pacifis[m] (p.152) 21 routinely in violent activity. While it can no doubt be argued, as some vegetarians may do, that the natural order is an immoral order, and that remaining carnivores should be converted to vegetarianism as rapidly as proves possible (in the way domestic dogs are converted to dog biscuits), the difficulties with such proposals are immense. The task envisaged is gigantic, and beyond human capacities - even if it were desirable. For there are millions of species to be somehow converted to proper vegetarianism. Then there are millions of other species to be converted to proper and well regulated contraceptive practices, else their numbers will get out of hand (uncontrollably) with predation removed. Given humans lack of success in limiting their own excessive numbers, such regulation appears entirely remote. Aside however from the practical difficulties, is such a fully vegetarian order, with evolution further derailed, a desirable improvement on the natural order? Is it morally obligatory? It is certainly not obligatory, as alternative systems of morality in harmony with the prevailing natural order are feasible. Nor is it desirable, for (to appeal to such alternative value systems) the natural order is more or less in order as it is. Full vegetarianization would only reduce its value, vastly. More generally, a defensible ethical framework should not, it would be rightly contended, be right out of step with the natural order of other creatures, decently depicted. Decent depiction is important, for some features of the natural order, such as competition, combat and predation, so far from escaping attention, have been grossly exaggerated and exploited. Thus, for instance, the ludicrous picture of nature red in truth and claw, so beloved of descendents of orthodox Victorians and of orthodox economists. However, even under decent depiction, the "natural order" is often not benign. That appears to be enough to induce a supervenient moral dilemma for any stretched pacifism which is coupled to a deep ethic (e.g. which does not separate humans out from the natural order) and which eschews the desperate vegetarian route: The natural order is not an immoral order The natural order contains (regular) instances of violence. Therefore, instances of violence are not immoral - in apparent defiance of P2 Moreover, there are too many instances of violence, too regularly occurring, for them all to be plausibly shunted into the moral dilemma category (and predatory carnivores face no dilemmas). Raptors that practice violence every week are not immoral (neither are they clearly moral; the category of morality only significantly extends so far). The main trouble lies however with P2 (which needs some finer adjustment, as was alrady indicated in Al). While P2 is alright in context, within a particular, perfectly viable, ethical framework, designed for the usual human round, the conventional setting for ethical theories, it stands in need of modification outside that setting. It is time to suggest the sort of modification envisaged. Evidently P2 was addressed to moral agents. Which agents? Not to carnivores that supply their own livelihood, nor really to morally degenerate humans, but to 22 peace-sensitive agents. With that semi-technical form, yet to be characterised, a suitably modified P2 results: MP2. It is morally wrong, for a peace-sensitive agent, to use violence.^ To recover what amounts, in the previous discussive context, to P2, it suffices to add the proposition that every human agent ought to be peace-sensitive. Much as that proposition has to recommend it, it appears too ethically advanced for many modem humans; it sets too high a moral standard to be taken as a serious guide to practice. It seems wise to settle presently for something less demanding, such as that every advanced moral agent ought to be peace sensitive. To put essentially the same proposition alternatively: ^tr^rc/z^ /?<2cz/z.wz (as modified) is While it is perhaps too late to hope for much moral progress in humans, it is pleasant to contemplate alternative futures where what is supererogatory became obligatory, and widely practiced. Richard Sylvan* * I began drafting this essay at the time (January 17, midday Australian time) of the American attacks upon Iraq. The optly named Prime Minister Hawke of Australia had just made a statement to the nation-state, announcing (the) war. In this statement there was much talk of peace. There was even - in what was effectively a declaration of war - reiteration of the modem quest for 'a new world order of peace'. Peace through war; so it rings out again and again, through the centuries. 'War must be for the sake of peace' (Aristotle p.220). More than two thousand years later, we have fought those wars to end all wars. But it is no use, Hawke solemely pronounced, just taking aZzoMf and thinking about peace; we must work for peace,/zg/zt for it-through war. Impeccable logic? President Bush, supreme commander, convinced us with similar logic, speaking too with many tongues. Of how he 'preferred to think of peace, not war'. But now 'only force will prevail', as 'all reasonable efforts to reach a peaceful solution are exhausted'. 'What must be done' must be done, or will be anyway. With God on side with the US offensive (as well as on the other side), it will go well. As it was said to have, though it achieved comparatively little that other efforts may not have yielded more satisfactorily, and thought it may now have to 9 The generalization of P2, suggested in Al, to cover also the parallel situation of environmental vandalism, can be similarly modified. The anti-vandolence principle becomes MP2°. It is morally wrong, for a peace- and environmentally-sensitive agent, to use vandolence. * Thank to David Bennett for joint contributions (from UT) and to JWS for opposition (in JWS)  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Box 21, Item 708: Partial draft of War and peace IV: Tao and deep-green Subject The topic of the resource Printout (photocopy) of draft, undated. Pages also numbered 15, 17, 19, 21, 22. Later title of paper: On extirpating war: Tao and deep-green pacifism. Description An account of the resource One of eight papers digitised from item 708. Title in collection finding aid: RS: Partial xc on Taoism. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/browse?search=Richard+Sylvan&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bjoiner%5D=and&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=&amp;range=&amp;collection=&amp;type=&amp;user=&amp;tags=&amp;public=&amp;featured=&amp;exhibit=&amp;geolocation-mapped=&amp;geolocation-address=&amp;geolocation-latitude=&amp;geolocation-longitude=&amp;geolocation-radius=10&amp;submit_search=Search+for+items">Richard Sylvan</a> Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived <span class="MuiTypography-root-125 MuiTypography-body2-126">The University of Queensland's <a data-testid="rek-series" href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/records/search?page=1&amp;pageSize=20&amp;sortBy=score&amp;sortDirection=Desc&amp;searchQueryParams%5Brek_series%5D%5Bvalue%5D=Richard+Sylvan+Papers%2C+UQFL291&amp;searchMode=advanced">Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291</a></span>, Box 21, Item 708 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org">Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy</a> Contributor An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, <a href="https://najtaylor.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Dr. N.A.J. Taylor</a>. Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library. Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource [5] leaves. 12.89 MB. Type The nature or genre of the resource Manuscript Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context <a href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:f9e5f52">https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:f9e5f52</a> Box 21: More Green Como House Como House > Shelves > Top > Pile 3 https://www.antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/5cf3fa7566f03bef6d23380d6f744d0b.pdf 8d655745ec6e4e2226f9a9158360a8c5 PDF Text Text �The following has been redacted from access file (PDF) due to copyright restrictions. Letter, Arne Næss to Richard Sylvan, 19 Jul 1991 re feedback on Sylvan and David Bennett’s paper, Utopias, Tao, and deep ecology. Letter is signed by Kit Fai on behalf of Næss. (1 leaf) �/V / 7 7 . �TAOISM and DEEPER ENVIRONMENTAL CONCERNS Let concern spread to aH the myriad things^ Among accredited religions, Taoism appears exceptionally environmentally friendly. Whereas the main terrestial religions, particularly those that have gained significant political influence, are heavily anthropocentric (indeed human chauvinistic), Taoism, certainly as propounded in the classical texts, is not.2 It is genuinely ecocentric; in it nature has a preeminent and fundamental place. It is throughout decidedly ecologically oriented; a high level of ecological consciousness is built into it, a main recipe amounting to FoZZow TVamre as the basis of practice. Thus it can provide sources for, and inspiration for, genuine environmentalism in a way that no Western religion can (outside some deviant minority sects), and in a way that few other Eastern religions can. It can assume just such a source and inspirational role for contemporary deeper environmental positions, a place it has been assigned for the most prominent of these, Deep Ecology. Taoism was, and remains, a radical position. It represents a severe attack on mainstream materialist civilization, on themes of the dominant social paradigm (as the following table shows). Like Deep Ecology, it discards or upsets many mainstream values, and most mainstream ways of organising and doing things. It holds up instead examples of very different lifestyles as much preferable, and offers an environmental path, simple and modest, a middle way between insufficiency and excess. 1 The tenth thesis of Hui Shih, cited in CT. 2 Classical Taoism, or philosophical Taoism as it is sometimes distinguished, consists essentially of two primary texts, LT and CT, and early creative commentaries upon them. The primary texts were probably both assembled in the intellectually prolific period of the Warring States (from 403 to 221 BC), before the deadening cover of an empire descended. The classic works were only subsequently brought together as texts for a loosely associated religion, Daoism, that then proceeded to diverge from them, especially as regards natural world emphases and concerns. Very many details of the cultural and physical contexts in which the texts were written, and of those who wrote them, have vanished with passage of time. For an outline of what is known or reasonably conjectured, see e.g. Graham. Of course in such respects Taoism resembles other religions with shrouded origins. Daoism radically transformed philosophical Taoism, for the worse environmentally (and intellectually). %<? became the means to happiness, wealth, and long life, human life; and (neo-)Daoism became mired in human chauvinism. Coupled to it under Daoism were - what were no part of classical Taoism - belief in spirit survival, use of magical charms for the cure of illness, confession of sin and absolution on the basis of good work, a priestly caste, and the trappings of ritual, ceremonies, and so on. For an account of these features of Daoism, see Lagcrwey. The present essay considers only classical Taoism, and that under a certain straightforward interpretation. �3 1. Nature, cosmology, and the character of Tao. Taoism sketches a cosmology, which is interestingly at variance with Western cosmologies. For the universe arises out of nothing. Being arises in accordance with Tao, which precedes existence. Nonbeing precedes Being. Nonbeing is ultimate (according to Chang Tzu) and comes first. All things in the world come from being And being comes from nonbeing^ The universe had a primeval beginning, coming into existence from nothing? Diagram 1: Taoist cycie of return^ flourishing growth reversion cycle of generated entity NATURE (HEAVEN AND EARTH, or\ ACTUAL UNIVERSE): Existent, Named, Temporal (FORMING) SOURCE: Nonexistent, Nameless, Eternal 7 Every entity arises out of (material) nothingness and eventually falls back into nothingness; all that comes to pass, that is. All things flourish, but each one returns to its root'? The whole, the integrated natural system, is a process of becoming and decay. But the emphasis upon process, evolution and change, upon Nature as flux and transformation, is much enhanced in Chang Tzu, over the work of Lao Tzu, where more stress is put upon stability, constancy and equilibrium? Overall, it is correct to say, if not so far highly informative, that Taoism is a natural process philosophy, with a keen sense both of c/ta/ige and of Zz'mi'Ay. 4 LT 40. 5 SB p.202. 6 Cf. Chan, p.173, fn.2. 7 LT 16. For a detailed contemporary presentation of such a cosmological cycle, see Sylvan cs. In Neo­ Taoism, e.g. Kao Hsiang, such a cycle is disputed, on standard ontological grounds (see e.g. Chan SB, p.335). 8 Cf. Chan, p.20, also SB p.177. �4 Tao itself is a complex item, comprising both an initial source, or program, and a coupled direction; a planned course, with a natural (and ideal) path. (So it is appropriately symbolised O—*-) The great or overarching Tao is a comprehensive source of natural activity; it encapsulates, in its program, a framework of forms or principles, principles of natural order, both metaphysical and moral. It comprises both dynamic principles (or evolving "laws") of nature an<% axiological principles guiding conduct. In this representation it invites comparison with Plato's structure of Forms,9 or still better, though again neglecting the dynamism of Tao, comparison with the preSocratic Logos. But to see overarching Tao as an axiological ontology, after the pattern of Plato's Form theory, would be to import unwarranted Western assumptions. Though Tao is a "great form", and there is no doubt room in the generous object framework for other (unhypostatised) forms, main Platonic forms such as Beauty, Truth and Goodness, do not feature large in the CTi/ng. They are distinguished, and set rather to the side, in the final chapter. 10 Other less Platonically emphasised (or available) environmentally friendly forms are more important, such as Simplicity, Frugality and Non-competition, as well as Tao itself, the supreme form, also the One, which supplants the static Good of Plato's scheme and is coupled with a dynamic path component. Tao is intimately linked with, and concerned with, the natural, and indeed linked with and not above the everyday. It is certainly not supernatural, and it does not transcend natural things in the fashion of Western supernatural religions; rather Tao both orders and reflects nature. Tao supplies the physical laws that provide physical idealisations (i.e. ideal models) of processes. Tao in this is a process and the container and origin of process and the laws of process. Tao is the natural way of the universe (of Heaven and Earth), and super-Tao, also signified as Tao, is the way of the universe and the universe. (Under a computer analogy, Tao is the program of the whole system; it is also, as super-Tao, the program combined with the system, everything). As Great Tao it is certainly simple, all-embracing and one. Getting the hang of its components and their connections is not quite so simple. The overarching Tao - grand or capital Tao, the program or recipe of Form or whole genetic code - combines many individual ones - lesser or /ow^r-case taos within it. Such a lesser tao, of an individual, system or whatever, is what makes a thing what it is properly, a coursed or informed source, a program directed path, a processed output. A tao is a sourced directed object; it is thus a type of object, a dynamic item, which can be represented by a pair comprising a recipe, program or form and a direction or goal-orientation. Accordingly, an individual or local tao (or form) resembles one of 9 Though appropriately neutralised, in the object-theory fashion Reid urged: for details see JB. 10 LT 81. �5 Aristotle's individual forms as coupled with a which comprises a normative directive. For both Artistotle and Tao there is, in effect, an "invisible hand" at work. (How did this, such convenient namra/ order come about? That is Tao. But another, old, compatible, and more satisfactory answer is: It evolved.) When things are running properly, the lesser, individual, taos (most conveniently) fit together and operate in accord under the overarching program (cf. diagram 2). If each individual runs according to the program, then the overall program succeeds fully. However, it works even if each individual does not run according to the overarching program, but it has a Diagram 2: Super-Tao, or Great Tao, with components integrated SUPER-TAO O-> D-> unrealised Nature, with taos in world objectified natural forms system / E-> a-> —Deviation line— Defective (or fallen) taos from Natural Ways �6 less ideal result. If each person acts in a correct way a massive net good and great order result. Yet, any attempt to impose order does not bring it about, but is counterproductive. The invisible (natural) hand guides, but the hand cannot be forced. As to the status of principles (laws, rules), standard Western categorisations are again exceeded. These principles are not transcendent, governing things externally, but are, so to say, self-supplied, with things self-regulated. Undominated things are naturally self-governing. 'Everything has its own nature and each nature is its own ultimate ... then by whom are things produced? They produce themselves, that is all'.n But they proceed according to the Tao-te, the goal directed way of virtue, autonomously. Diagram 3: Tao-te paths, and going with the natura! fiow^ Te(los) Tao (source) EH----------- ?----------- + * Ideal Way: Way of Virtue 2. Natural order, and the extent of Tao as agency. Tao supplies a spontaneous natural order. Though the phrase "natural order" may seem strange, even perverse, it is not. The reason is, in part, that the Taoist perspective is the reverse of the modern perception of the world. In contrast to European political thought of the mainstream Hobbes-Locke strain, where the state-of-nature is one of chaos or extreme disorder, the Taoist state-of-nature is one of order. A main assumption of Western thought, that political order must be imposed by regulation on an unruly state-of-nature, is accordingly undercut. A separate imposed political order is not required; the idea that it is rests on mistaken assumptions. Politics can, and ideally should, follow nature. Science and politics can be blended, not sharply separated in the typical Western fashion, where nature is taken to exclude value. 11 Kao Hsiang, p.328. 12 Cf. LT 53. �7 According to Taoism then, by contrast with dominant Western thought which sees the world as extensional, mechanistic and value-neutral (except for its human cargo), nature is both intensional and value-infused. These features extend not merely to the whole, but to components which go into composing the greater whole. These have their programs, or ways, which are integrated into the greater way (somewhat as, but artificially, expert system programs may be organised into grander programs representing super-experts). Nature is already in order as it normally is, through a unity in diversity which involves a normative component - a principle or recipe for how things "should" be as well as how they are integrally. Values are build into the environment, an integral part of the way of things. By following the values of Tao one enters and comes into contact with the whole environment and into unity with the environment. Tao is a description of how things are and a prescription of how to act in accord with the way they are. Since it is normally regulated by Tao, natural order is decidedly benign, and definitely worth emulating. As a result, natural order is the way, the recommended way. Imposed order is counterproductive. There is reciprocal resistance to the imposition of deviant order. This would hold even if social organisers tried to impose Tao itself. To attempt to impose it would be to go astray. Such points help to explain why little satisfactory detail is offered as to social and political organisation. For the requisite organisation, such as it is, follows natural patterns and natural social structures (whichever they are). No doubt details would be (in the style of Aristotelian ethics) largely descriptive of what happens in cases where social affairs were functioning well. It is deviation from the natural state that represents the problem, quite in contrast again to European political thought, where the state-of-nature is one of extreme disorder (lives are nasty, brutish, short, etc.). Such a state-of-nature is not at all a Taoist natural state, which is one of satisfactory order. A strong sense of natural order, of self organisation, of anarchy (in a positive sense), flows from classical Taoism. Like Buddhism, Taoism assents to the maxim, "Do nothing and from unforced order greater order results". If each being is permitted to follow its tao, then the needs of all will be met without coercion. Following the way of Tao, nature emerges as a self-supplying organisation. Such convenient natural organisation stands (so far as it occurs!) in need of some further explanation, whether of an internal, evolutionary sort or of a supernatural sort, as in Neoplatonism where God or the One accomplishes the organisational task. Taoism undermines such latter alternatives, and points^ towards an evolutionary explanation. 13 In CT. �8 Order occurs naturally, spontaneously (as the inertial state), without agency. Super-agents do not feature, and would be otoise. God does not occur, and is not needed, in the cosmology, either as an agent, to make things in the universe happen, or as an authority, to regulate things or set moral or legal standards. If He did occur, He would, like other directors and rulers, not be needed, though He could serve as an example. 'But there is no indication of his existence'.^ As in the socio-political sphere, direction by a overseer or ruler is otoise, and only exemplary. In particular, God is not required to start or wind the universe up. 'Everything in the world creates itself without the direction of any creator. Since things create themselves they are unconditioned. This is the norm of the universe.'15 The Tao is not a supernatural personal agency; it is not supernatural, it is certainly not personal, and it is only in a stretched sense "agency". If the Tao includes all- encompassing natural order - a unity in diversity — in which the tao of each is ideally in harmony with the whole, then there is no need to posit a super-Being. Each being follows its course in the whole. Moreover, the appeal to a superpersonal authority, exalted example, or the like, on the one side, or to ethics, on the other, is needed only when people have moved away from the Tao. Everything will work well if a community lives according to the Tao. Thus deontic features are brought in only at disequilibrium - an interesting, if awkward, position. Then too, in formulating norms, appeal is back to framework from which people have diverged. There is a concealed moral purpose in Lao Tzu; a moral purpose that is central, alongside, and inseparable from, the evident metaphysical purpose. Since axiology is a crucial part of it - evaluations and commendations are freely and extensively offered in the texts - Taoism is not amoral. But the treatment of deontic principles, and of rules of conduct generally, is very different. Deontics enter only when there is a lapse or deviation from an ideal natural state (from a proper course). 'When the Great Tao declined, the doctrine of humanity and righteousness arose'. 16 Much depends then, on what counts as "moral" and "amoral". Certainly there are approved and implicitly recommended lifestyles, though there are few "oughts", and no (Confucian-Kantian) lists of duties. Moreover, unless preferred Taoist lifestyles merely recommended, not required, Taoism would fall down as insufficiently pluralistic. 3. On Taoist styles of life: an environmental lifestyle. As well as a set of regulative propositions about how things happen, and proceed ideally, Taoism supplies a parallel 14 CT 2. 15 Kao Hsiang, CTwwze/i/ary 16 LT 18. pp.330-331. �set of suggestions and prescriptions for how to live well. According to Lao Tzu, there are some basic elements to living well, for instance 'three treasures'.^ 1. Deep love — which can also be taken to involve compassion, pity, commiseration, care, concern, respect and regard, and which includes something close to empathy, deep-penetrating empathy. Sympathy, a main linkage of the European "Enlightenment", does not however capture what is involved: sympathy alone would be too egoistical and too circumscribed for Taoism, as it is for Deep Ecology. Deep love is part of the notion of genuine relatedness, not a one-sided "relatedness" or possessiveness (which Taoism rejects). It is certainly not confined to fellow humans, but reaches through, around and beyond them to the myriad things; 2. Frugality - a renunciation of excess. That implies a renunciation of consumerism. But frugality is not impoverishment. Needs are met adequately without deprivation or excess. As in Deep Ecology too, richness in ends is compatible with modesty of material means; 3. Modesty or humility - not to dare to be ahead of the world, not to take the lead. In Taoism there is no competitive requirement, but the opposite; such Western desiderata lapse. Rather, one gives up trying to be on top of the pile, or even being in a faster lane. In a Taoist society there are no conspicuous tall poppies. Much else connects with or follows in a loose way, so it is assumed, from these three virtues; for instance, courage from deep love, generosity from frugality, a kind of leadership from humility. The arguments for those surprising derivations go like this: 'deep love helps one to aim in the case of attack / And to be firm in the case of defence'. 18 Earlier^ it is taken that proper abandonment of humanistic ethics will mean a return to (what the ethics inadmissibly substitutes for) deep love, a basic valuational relation. But in place of frugality, goes a discarding of profit, and in place of humility an abandonment of conscious sageliness and discarding of immodest (or conventional) wisdom. These changes are, astonishingly, said to be rather superficial and inadequate; so further desiderata, commonly read out of the "treasures" are adduced: 'Manifest plainness / embrace simplicity / reduce selfishness / have few desires'. 20 Another element, beyond the three of relatedness, frugality, and not daring to be ahead, is 17 LT 67; but different overlapping lists are presented, e.g. LT 19. 18 LT 67. 19 LT 19. 20 LT 19. �10 adaptability or spontaneity. This "fourth treasure" (which can be read off natural order) complements the further desiderata. Evidently main ingredients for a simple environmentally sound lifestyle are highly commended. Lao Tzu might almost have been writing another introduction for Callenbach's environmental handbook, LM/ig Poor or even for Pausacker and Andrews' Lfwzg Po^r wft/z In Chang Tzu, the /?Mr^ person is a deep environmentalist:— She is a companion' of Nature and does not attempt to interfere with it by imposing the way of man upon it'. Her goal is 'spiritual emancipation and peace' and derivatively freedom; and her route is 'through knowing the capacity and limitations of one's own nature and adapting it to the universal process of transformation' and thus to the environmental In complementary fashion, opposite "virtues", common in anti-environmental lifestyles are condemned. The Western drives to power, fame, competition, possessions, excess commodities, useless (small) knowledge are rejected by Taoism (along with "Mans Affairs"). Thus entrepreneurial activity in business, and also in professional and academic affairs (as well as busyness itself), gets decidedly discouraged. The good life naturally reduces ambitions and desires and avoids competition. Competition is connected with self-assertion and aggressive action. Taoism, while not neglecting limited natural competition, passes aspersions on both. In place of the mainstream economic virtue of competition, inherited from the Enlightenment and reinforced by Darwinianism, appears the 'virtue of non­ competition'.^ Competition often requires forced or artificial action; thus it violates the doctrine of wM-wef (non-action). In competition external rival standards are imposed on Tao. Competition is deviant, evidencing deviation from tao, and from te, virtue. In any event, according to Taoism, there is no merit in trying to place onself above another. So there is no value in competition. Fortunately competition can be reduced. If a person does not compete then the world cannot compete with him. A broad way of life is depicted, based on love, respect and compassion for all things, attuned to what is essential, shedding what is unnecessary, where simplicity and frugality are sought, and excess and competition avoided. This involves, in a nutshell, voluntary simplicity of a deep sort. Simplicity is not however the impoverished life of one who seeks escape. Taoism goes much further in disparaging scarce material means. Do not exact the worth, so that people compete. Do not value rare treasure, so that people do not steal. Gross wealth and prestige are rejected; they are vanities and vexations. But not all is vanity: living well is not. 21 Chan SB p.177. 22 LT 68. �11 It is a very natural inference, then, from the account of living well to the suggestion that Tao offers a deep form of voluntary simplicity. Voluntary simplicity is a fuzzy notion.23 Voluntary simplicity can initially be explained through its two obvious components, simplicity and its voluntary adoption. Simplicity connects with, and is often equated with frugality, as elaborated in Taoism. But whether or not simplicity is obtained from frugality or other Taoist virtues, it plays a direct and important part in the theory, and is in fact modelled, like its metaphysical counterpart, the unconceptualised Whole, by the uncarved block, a central Gestalt of the theory. The block symbolises unity, simplicity and naturalness not spoiled by artifice, metaphysically the wholeness and unity of Tao before conceptual carving, and ethically the wholesome straightforward non-devious life under Te, the 'simple life that is free from cunning and cleverness, is not devoted to the pursuit of profit or marked by hypocritical humanity and righteousness, but is characterised by plainness, tranquility, and purity'.24 As to voluntariness, people have a c/iozce of selecting the way of Tao rather than one of the deviant ways. It is a choice of recipes - frugal vs. excess, relatedness vs. non- relatedness, tall poppies vs. not daring to be ahead. But one does not attempt to force one's way onto a correct path. To hyperactively seek the path is a deviation in itself. Within the broad way of life depicted fall a plurality of particular lifestyles, appropriate to various different social roles. Among more specialised lifeways on which Taoist attention is lavished are those of the sage and the ideal ruler. A sage is naturally one who follows Tao, who has acquired great knowledge, and so on (ideality is built into the notion of The sage understands the fundamentals of Tao, and practices accordingly. Likewise an ideal ruler is a non-interfering exemplar ruler, who observes voluntary Ideally the people become emulators of this ruler. Effectively Taoism redefines the notion of "ruler", equating ruler with supreme exemplar, such as the sage, whereupon the meaning attributed to "ruler" becomes that of following Tao. The ruler simplicity. is one who deviates little from the Tao; this is his "power". Someone who deviates little from the Tao is kingly, that is, to observe another subversion of terminology, he shows an all-embracing impartiality. The sage and the "ruler" are but two important examples of kinds of ideal lifes. Another kind is also sketched,2$ that of the best type of person (effectively an ideal Deep Ecologist), a person 'who in his dwelling loves the earth', but also loves humanity, and order, and competence, and profundity. 23 As its fullest elaboration, Elgin's very profuse account, reveals. 24 Chan, p.14. 25 Notably in LT 8. �12 4. Following Tao: non-action, cultivating Te and seeking Enlightenment. Part of the Taoist route to an environmental lifestyle and towards enlightenment consists in acquiring the practice of non-action, exemplified through non-assertion, non­ aggression, non-destruction, and the like. commonly translated as 'non-action', is thereby rendered a dialectic notion, for it does not exclude action and in a sense is action. To avoid such dialectical overtones, is sometimes rendered 'not acting wilfully' or 'not acting artificially' or 'acting naturally'; it is better transcribed as 'without forcing' or 'no forced (or coercive) action'. Construed in this fashion, is not an extraneous awkward addition to Taoism, but an integral part, which emerges from other features of the theory, namely those of following natural low-action ways. For non- action is the "activity" of letting one's tao drift or flow into line with the overall Tao (so arrows in Diagram 2 are aligned). What is commended is, in the correct circumstances, pacific action, of letting happen (e.g. letting die), as opposed to aggressive, extraverted action (e.g. killing), forced action upsetting natural ways. Similarly for other No-nos; the "no desires" directive, for instance, is a piquant shorhand for 'no impure desires',26 i.e. for no unsatisfactory or anti-te desires. Non-action accordingly does not require literally no action, but only actions in accord with ideal nature, so ruling out actions contrary to undisturbed Tao. It may appear that perennial problems, alleged to haunt Taoism (and intensified in Stoicism), are induced. For example, if all is Tao, and Tao is natural, how can there be unnatural activity? Or differently, if nothing can depart from Tao, how can there be unspontaneous actions, or any violation of Tao, however, is a source which only in an ideal, natural, direction. It does not all individual paths, which can deviate from ideal or natural paths. Thus deviant activity is not excluded, unspontaneous and ill-organised activity by individuals is in no way ruled out; and forced, coercive and nature-destroying activities are all too common. When 'all activities follow their specific principles, that is nature';27 deviation from Nature accordingly occurs, namely when some activities do not follow their principles. As for destruction, 'Do not let man destroy Nature'.28 Non-action as policy generally implies non-interference, when things have not been damagingly disturbed. It implies letting things take their own natural course; letting Being be, as Deep Ecology has it, with basically "hands off practice and management. Unforced action in practice is well illustrated by examples of going with the flow. One main example of going with the flow is cutting meat. The Chef does not encounter bones. He takes the meat apart effortlessly in the same way that an athlete 26 Chan, p.13. 27 SB p.202. 28 SB p.207. �13 does things effortlessly, with little waste action. Going with the flow can however involve a lot of activity, as with the man swimming easily in a raging torrent below the waterfall, or as in sailing and trimming to the wind. At a personal level, non-action lies in such things as not striving to put oneself above others, in foregoing competition, in simplicity, frugality, and adherence to the mean. Evidently this removes a range of normally accepted social activities. Flexibility, and suppleness, and even weakness, belong to the centre (or mean), to the valley way. Though the ancient transcultural doctrine of the mean, of a middle way, appears explicitly in La<9 TzM,29 that middle path is arrived at, and taken, differently. The Taoist route is an easy no-action route, a valley way, a non-maximising path of weakness and little resistance, in line with the broad account of living and faring well. Taoism, like other older non-maximising wisdoms enjoining adherence to the Mean, is incompatible with modem maximising ideologies. Taoism is thus incompatible with Deep Ecology, whose supreme directive is self-realisation (again capitalised for wider "selves"). Such Self-realisation is a European idea, a maximising prescription applied to the aggregated interests of a separate self, inflation of a typically egoistic concept not found in Taoism. But although such directives to Self-realisation would be rightly queried in Taoism, there are parallel non-maximising goals to be found in Taoism: namely, attaining enlightenment and tranquility, following Tao, and cultivation of and the contrast between self-realisation and Self-realisation parallels that between and %, great re. Since a 'main objective of the [Lao Tza] is the cultivation of virtue or fe',3O can be seen as displacing self-realisation on the Taoist scheme. As it works out then, Self-realisation is nicely displaced by Enlightenment. Complementary to Tao is Te, and to tao is te. Whereas tao is the directed source of a thing, te is the matching goaZ-bZfrc^Z or unfolding of a thing. It is a directed and standard translation of (in principle favourably) developing, value-adding; hence the as 'virtue'. Because of its potentiality to reach a (good) goal, a rival translation as 'power' has some currency; it is a directed force/br good (or evil). The program of tao supplies the direction of matching te. So a thing can follow its tao (and thereby follow Tao) by cultivating te, by practising positive virtue, by choosing a lifestyle of deep simplicity. The directives for a good individual life are accordingly commonly given in terms of individual te, and it is te (rather than Tao) that generally appears invididualised. Each being has its own tao, its own ideal naturally-programmed path of self­ development or unfolding. Correspondingly, there is an immanent telos, a te, a goal29 E.g. 77, also 29. 39 Chan, p.ll. �14 directed virtuous developing, for each thing. By each following its own nature, all follow nature. Our self-development does not then interfere damagingly with your self­ development. How does this happen? Through natural (again invisible) inter­ organisation, my proper self-development cannot impede your proper self-development. While Taoism is decidedly short on details of such mututal adjustment and harmonious integration, it is certain that it happens naturally — as it may, for instance, through the evolution of co-operation.3i So there is, or need be, no vacillation between following one's own path and taking care not to interfere with the paths of others, between individualistic and relational paths. The Taoist result is integration, a harmonious combination of plans, without domination, by contrast with the dominant pattern of Western relations, operating through hierarchical ordering and domination. 5. Environmental theory and practice; environmental problems and difficulties, such as quietism and security. As on deeper environmental theories, traditional Western models for human relations to the natural world are one and all rejected. The dominant view, of domination, of human dominion over the earth and its other inhabitants, is not merely roundly and soundly rejected; the metaphysical creationist base and the superiority myths upon which it is regularly founded are also removed. Therewith also the bases for the lesser, and rather more benign, Western models, such as stewardship and perfectionism, are also undercut. There is no superior or greater purpose for humans to serve, or lord to supplicate as steward. Besides stewardship, a kind of servant-master relationship, which is both hierarchical and implicitly patriarchical in cast, typically involves active interference in producing products. The idea of perfecting nature also implies active interference, when however nature is more or less in order as it is, and requires no "perfecting". Thus stewardship and perfectionist alternatives fall along with domination and dominion. Taoism offers instead a non-interference model for relations to nature, a letting-be approach, with "hands off" environmental management and associated lifestyles. A most striking feature of Taoism is its environmental depth, its strong opposition to then prevailing (and still prevailing) humanism and human chauvinism. 31 Ong resolution of this problem can now make a useful start with Axelrod's investigations of evolving cooperation. Cooperation can begin with small clusters. It can thrive with rules that are nice, provocable, and somewhat forgiving. And once established in a population, individuals using such discriminating strategies can protect themselves from invasion. The overall level of cooperation tends to go up and not down. In other words, the machinery for the evolution of cooperation contains a ratchet (Axelrod p.177). �15 Heaven and earth are not humane They regard all things as straw dogs [i.e. rather worthless strict ritual objects]. The sage is not humane [or human chauvinist]. He regards all people as straw dogs.32 Because of such tough pronouncements, reiterated and reinforced in Chang Tzu,33 Taoism is sometimes said to be predicated on anti-humanism. But it is not 'a dehumanizing philosophy', it does not deny compassion; what transpires is that concern and value are not confined to humans or their affairs, but include the natural and the metaphysical. The human is no longer the criterion of what is good or true. The traditonal idea that a supreme supernatural being ... is the ruler of the universe is replaced by the doctrine that the universe exists and operates by itself. When [Lao Tzu] says that "Heaven and Earth are not humane", he means in a narrow sense that they are but in a broader sense that Nature is no longer governed according to ... In one stroke he removes Heaven [or God] and man as the standards of things and replaces them with Nature.34 What is rejected with the rejection of humanism and humanistic ethics is human chauvinism. For being "humane" means accepting the chauvinistic assumptions of conventional society and remaining within the narrow sphere of interests of the human species. There is no unbridgeable gulf between humans and other creatures such as Western thought has tried to manufacture. 'Put a halter around the horse's head and put a string through the cow's nose, that is man'.35 In place of humanism, Taoism adopts a doctrine of impartiality. 'Embrace all things without inclining to this way or that way'. 36 He who is enlightened 'is impartial';37 'he has no partial love for anyone'38 he does not bestow undue or special favours upon humans; he aims to be one with Nature. Impartiality does not imply equality. Despite the received heading of chapter 2 of the TzM, 'the equality of all things' (the literal 'levelling all things' is nearer the mark), and the standard inference to some Taoist doctrine of parity, no simplistic and difficult theme of equal value of all things is ventured — nor any theme of parity for some favoured subclass thereof such as living things. (Though there is some accent on prime life, there is not the same stress on in Taoism that there is in Deep Ecology, nor the bizarre extension of "life" to include waterfalls, mountains and other striking What is offered, instead of much in the way elucidation of impartiality, is (again like Deeper Ecological theory) a doctrine of identification. Wide natural objects.) identification and wide solidarity does promote impartiality and counter chauvinism. 32 LT 5. 33 E.g. CT 2. 34 Chan, p.10, italics added; also p.107. 35 SB p.207. 36 SB p.206. 37 LT 6. 38 SB p.201. �16 Egoism, for instance, involves discounting all but oneself, humanism all but humans, and requires a species solidarity with human things. But wider identification puts a stop to such discounting (e.g. in favour of one's own or species's interests, as exhausting value) and to such class-restricted solidarity. For wider identification reveals that interests and desires, concerns and values and so forth, are not so individual or class restricted. Many exquisite examples of identification, and the processes by which it may be achieved, are developed, for example with a butterfly, by dream access,39 with rivers and seas, and wider again, by the proper meditative process, with the dusty world - 'Become one with the dusty world / This is called profound identification'40 - and perhaps wider yet, and ultimate, with ideal Nature, and thus in complete accord with Tao .41 No less striking than the criticism of humanism, Taoism makes similar sort of attack on traditional education and on the accumulation of knowledge. The case against traditional education, especially rote "learning", is straightforward; it reinforces entrenched practices and prejudices, e.g. those of humanism. The criticism does not of course imply that there would be no regular learning or habituation processes, in place of those excessively encouraged traditional indoctrination methods. More perplexing is the attack on knowledge acquisition, though in part it is of the same sort, against an entrenched knowledge in the hands of power and professional groups. But, in an organic society, knowledge is integrated into the community and not ratified into a commodity held or controlled by a priesthood or a class of intellectuals or literati. Insofar as knowledge is power, such power is removed from the control of a few by making it a community good. In these respects Taoism goes beyond Deep Ecology, for instance in questioning and rejecting experts. Indeed in its criticism of schooling, narrow expertise, and the like, Taoism resembles and anticipates the stance adopted by Illich rather than features of Deep Ecology. The superficially anti-intellectual trend of Taoism is really directed against other targets than pure knowledge: against power through knowledge and control of knowledge, against slickness and cleverness, against devious and crafty uses of knowledge ,42 against counter-productive acquiring of knowledge or cunning, and its teaching. The puzzling situation is tidied up somewhat in the C%<2Kg TzM, where an apposite distinction is made between knowledge, the castigated sorts, which is inquisitive, partial, discriminative or merely analytic, and greaf knowledge, which is 'leisurely and at ease', comprehensive, extensive, and 39 SB p.190. 40 LT 56, also 4. 41 E.g. LT 16. 4^ LT 3. �17 synthetic .43 Even so, classical Taoism hardly seems to cater for adequate access of information, and the removal of (perhaps debilitating) ignorance, concerning health and welfare, careful and damaging practices, choices and alternatives. What is environmentally significant is that the critique of small knowledge and narrow expertise extends to encompass a critique of technology. In Taoism, technology was assigned a very limited role at best. Certain forms of technology were, if not rejected outright, at least strongly discouraged. 'Even if there are ships and carriages, none will ride in them. Even if there are arrows and weapons, none will display them'.44 More generally, while high and dangerous technology is set aside, even more appropriate technology cannot be accepted uncritically. Lao Tzu recognised clearly that even low impact technology may destroy conventions and practices constitutive of a community. Nor was the connection of technology with population neglected. Given a small country and few inhabitants, if provided with a labour-saving device he would not use it. There are dominating and non-dominating forms of technology. What is enjoined is avoidance of artificial wants and desires, and therewith of unnecessary consumption, and correspondingly on the production side, shunning of a work void, of efficiently replacing labour with nothing at all. In these sorts of respects Taoism exhibits a firmer grasp of some of the problems of technology, even more appropriate labour-saving technology, than a spread of recent positions. Likewise a Taoist approach demolishes the so-called iron law of technology, that there is no stopping technology or its progress. Whatever the merits of the "law" (they are not so conspicuous), Taoism reveals that such social laws are culture and community dependent, and do not withstand transfer from the dominant social paradigm everywhere else. Many other elements of a sensitive and sophisticated ecological position feature in classical Taoism. There is an elaborate and sensitive account of Nature, from which it emerges plainly that Nature is not a mere instrument or means for other ends, and not merely a resource, but something of great value in itself. Nature is something to be cherished in its own right, allowed to take its own course, not to be interfered with or destroyed by humans. Indeed the dominant instrumental perspective is interestingly reversed; value for humans is achieved above all by identification with Nature, and by following natural ways. (Paradoxical reversal is a feature of Taoism; even castigated Western aims, such as leadership, fame and so on, are in fact achieved, when they are, not by direct aim, but by letting the reverse happen. So it is with what control of Nature is required; non-intervention and non-action is the approach. Sufficient control is gained, it is said, when assertive attempts to impose it are abandoned.) While such 43 CfChan, p.20. 44 LT 80. �18 recently fashionable ideas as bioregionalism are not encountered in explicit form in Taoism, their bases are, as are other associated environmental ideas: living in place is certainly present;^ doing things locally and remaining local, while being attuned to the universe, is certainly advocated, giving some sustenance to the maxim Deep Ecology happily borrowed, "think globally, act locally". While there is then very much in Taoism that fits easily and revealingly with deeper environmental theories, Taoism also induces puzzles or generates residual problems. While some of the problems are genuine enough, that of material scarcity for example, not all the supposed problems are genuine; and not all the puzzles are bequeathed to contemporary theory. Illustrating both is the problem of quietism, which is at bottom the issue of reconciling "non-action" with environmental and social improvement and action. How, for instance, would a Taoist resistance against depredation, a Taoist defence of environment proceed, and fare, given its apparent emphasis on not bothering, "don't bother"? In-built harmony and quietism do not allow sufficiently for conflict. In part there is only a problem because of misrepresentation of Taoism, which is not committed to a "don't bother" attitude to environmental destruction: quite to the contrary, humans should not be allowed to destroy nature.^ Furthermore, there are many Taoist tactics and techniques, using weakness to overcome strength, letting the flow of nature demolish the forces of environmental destruction, and the like, which can be applied in environmental resistance.^ Quietism is accordingly a misrepresentation of the practice, and something of a misnomer (an oppositional, not a Taoist tag). How can Tao work in a world where there is scarcity almost everywhere? Very simply, Taoism optimistically holds that there is no genuine problem concerning plentitude; things are not scarce, there is an abundant outpouring from nature. There is scarcity only because of violations of the requirements of Tao (with excessive desires, excessive consumer demand, excessive hoarding, political mismanagement, and so on). Tao will serve to restore plentitude/s Rather than a collection of scarce resources, Nature is represented as an virtually infinite storehouse of boundless wealth. Nor was there a looming problem of limits to growth, because growth (in key parameters, such as populations) would not proceed exponentially. Does Tao allow for the prospect and problems of too many people? Can the greater Tao keep pace with the requirements of many too many individual taos, even if 45 LT 80. 46 See CT. 47 Use of the power of water affords a prime example; cf LT 15. No-action adaptations of old Chinese martial arts and strategies presumably offer more direct methods of defence and resistance. 48 LT 77. �19 those individual requirements are in line with the greater Tao? No doubt in those times, and most historical times when epidemics and plagues were almost as regular as droughts, when evolution still operated overtly on human species, there was little more than a hypothetical or remote future problem concerning population. It seems plain however that Taoism did not face the environmental problems such as those of too many people and incremental resource and ecosystem degradation. While the texts do address, forcefully, two of the three main components of the standard environmental impact equation, namely consumption and technology, the important third, human population, is not considered at all, still less statisfactorily therefore. It is much the same for other significant environmental issues. The prime texts say little about soil degradation and deforestation, long major environmental problems in China, as in other centres of civilisation. Nor does Taoism have much to offer directly on main contemporary issues of animal liberation, species loss, urban disgustification, and so forth, though several of the problems are hardly new (and some are recognised in early commentaries). Historic Taoism too was a product of its times, adjusted to what were seen as problems. There is no reason at all, however, why classical Taoism should not be updated, more than two millenia, to take account of contemporary environmental problems. Because of its compatibility with deeper environmentalism, Taoism admits such an extension in a way that main modem religions do not.49 49 Such an extension of Taoism, entitled Neo-Daoism, is brashly sketched in UTD, from which much of the present exercise is adapted. Such Neo-Daoism diverges sharply from contemporary Daoism. But it is very congenial to contemporary deep environmental theory. �20 REFERENCES Ames, R.T. (1986), 'Taoism and the nature of nature', E/zvzronm^nfaZ P/zz7o^op/zy 8:317350. Axelrod, R. (1984), T/ze Evo/zmon of Cooperarzo/z, Basic Books, New York. Chan, W.T. (1963), A .Source BooZr zTz C/zzzz^ E/zzZosop/zy, Princeton University Press, Princeton [referred to as SB]. Chan, W.T. (1963), 77ze 1Toy of Loo Tza (Too-re c/zzzzg), Bobbs-Merill, New York [introduction referred to as Chan, translation referred to as LT]. Devall, B. and Sessions, G. (1985), Deep EcoZogy: Lzvzng os y zzomre Moffered, Gibbs M. Smith, Layton, Utah. Elgin, D. (1981), VoZa/zfary .SzmpZzczzy, Murrow, New York [for a better briefer account, see D. Elgin and A. Mitchell, 'Voluntary Simplicity', Co-EvoZafz'on gzzorrerZy 14 (Summer 1977)]. Elgin, D. and Mitchell, A. (1977), 'Voluntary Simplicity', Co-EvoZaaozz QaarferZy 14 (Summer 1977). Fox, W. (1990), Toward o TroHspersoKo/ EcoZogy, Shambhala, Boston. Graham, A.C. (1989), Dz'sporers ofr/ze Too, Open Court, La Salle, Illinois. Illicit, I. (1974), 7oo/sfor CozzvzvzaZzzy, Calder and Boyars, London. Lagerwey, J. (1987), 7oozsrEz'rooZ z'/z C/zz/zese ^ocze/y, Macmillan, New York. Naess, A. (with D. Rothenberg) (1989), EcoZogy, Co/w/za/zzZy ozzzZLz/esZy/e, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Routley, R. (1980), ExpZorzzzg Mez/zozzg's Jzz/zgZe a/z^Z BeyornZ, Research School of Social Sciences, The Australian National University, Canberra [referred to as JB]. Routley, V. and Routley, R. (1980), 'Social theories, self management and environmental problems', in D. Mannison cf aZ. (eds), Ezzvz'rozzmc/zro/ E^/zzc^, The Australian National University, Canberra [referred to as EE]. Sylvan, R. (1985-86), 'Towards an improved cosmological synthesis', Grazer P/zzZo^op/zz'jc/zg 57a<7z^/z 25/26:135-178 [referred to as CS]. Sylvan, R. and Bennett, D. (1990), Df Ufopza.?, Tao azzefDeep EcoZogy, Green Series No. 19, Research School of Social Sciences, The Australian National University, Canberra [referred to as UTD]. Wang Pi (1979), 'Commentary on the Lao Tzu', transl. A. Rump and W.J. Chan, University of Hawaii Press, Honolulu. Watson, B. (1964), T/zc Co/zzpZcrc WorE? of C/za/zg Tza, Columbia University Press, New York [referred to as CT]. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Draft Papers Description An account of the resource Sylvan's literary executor encountered an archive in which “all his projects were current", since manuscripts were undated and unattributed. Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document The following has been redacted from access file (PDF) due to copyright restrictions. Letter, Arne Næss to Richard Sylvan, 19 Jul 1991 re feedback on Sylvan and David Bennett’s paper, Utopias, Tao, and deep ecology. Letter is signed by Kit Fai on behalf of Næss. (1 leaf) /V / 7 7 . TAOISM and DEEPER ENVIRONMENTAL CONCERNS Let concern spread to aH the myriad things^ Among accredited religions, Taoism appears exceptionally environmentally friendly. Whereas the main terrestial religions, particularly those that have gained significant political influence, are heavily anthropocentric (indeed human chauvinistic), Taoism, certainly as propounded in the classical texts, is not.2 It is genuinely ecocentric; in it nature has a preeminent and fundamental place. It is throughout decidedly ecologically oriented; a high level of ecological consciousness is built into it, a main recipe amounting to FoZZow TVamre as the basis of practice. Thus it can provide sources for, and inspiration for, genuine environmentalism in a way that no Western religion can (outside some deviant minority sects), and in a way that few other Eastern religions can. It can assume just such a source and inspirational role for contemporary deeper environmental positions, a place it has been assigned for the most prominent of these, Deep Ecology. Taoism was, and remains, a radical position. It represents a severe attack on mainstream materialist civilization, on themes of the dominant social paradigm (as the following table shows). Like Deep Ecology, it discards or upsets many mainstream values, and most mainstream ways of organising and doing things. It holds up instead examples of very different lifestyles as much preferable, and offers an environmental path, simple and modest, a middle way between insufficiency and excess. 1 The tenth thesis of Hui Shih, cited in CT. 2 Classical Taoism, or philosophical Taoism as it is sometimes distinguished, consists essentially of two primary texts, LT and CT, and early creative commentaries upon them. The primary texts were probably both assembled in the intellectually prolific period of the Warring States (from 403 to 221 BC), before the deadening cover of an empire descended. The classic works were only subsequently brought together as texts for a loosely associated religion, Daoism, that then proceeded to diverge from them, especially as regards natural world emphases and concerns. Very many details of the cultural and physical contexts in which the texts were written, and of those who wrote them, have vanished with passage of time. For an outline of what is known or reasonably conjectured, see e.g. Graham. Of course in such respects Taoism resembles other religions with shrouded origins. Daoism radically transformed philosophical Taoism, for the worse environmentally (and intellectually). %<? became the means to happiness, wealth, and long life, human life; and (neo-)Daoism became mired in human chauvinism. Coupled to it under Daoism were - what were no part of classical Taoism - belief in spirit survival, use of magical charms for the cure of illness, confession of sin and absolution on the basis of good work, a priestly caste, and the trappings of ritual, ceremonies, and so on. For an account of these features of Daoism, see Lagcrwey. The present essay considers only classical Taoism, and that under a certain straightforward interpretation. 3 1. Nature, cosmology, and the character of Tao. Taoism sketches a cosmology, which is interestingly at variance with Western cosmologies. For the universe arises out of nothing. Being arises in accordance with Tao, which precedes existence. Nonbeing precedes Being. Nonbeing is ultimate (according to Chang Tzu) and comes first. All things in the world come from being And being comes from nonbeing^ The universe had a primeval beginning, coming into existence from nothing? Diagram 1: Taoist cycie of return^ flourishing growth reversion cycle of generated entity NATURE (HEAVEN AND EARTH, or\ ACTUAL UNIVERSE): Existent, Named, Temporal (FORMING) SOURCE: Nonexistent, Nameless, Eternal 7 Every entity arises out of (material) nothingness and eventually falls back into nothingness; all that comes to pass, that is. All things flourish, but each one returns to its root'? The whole, the integrated natural system, is a process of becoming and decay. But the emphasis upon process, evolution and change, upon Nature as flux and transformation, is much enhanced in Chang Tzu, over the work of Lao Tzu, where more stress is put upon stability, constancy and equilibrium? Overall, it is correct to say, if not so far highly informative, that Taoism is a natural process philosophy, with a keen sense both of c/ta/ige and of Zz'mi'Ay. 4 LT 40. 5 SB p.202. 6 Cf. Chan, p.173, fn.2. 7 LT 16. For a detailed contemporary presentation of such a cosmological cycle, see Sylvan cs. In Neo­ Taoism, e.g. Kao Hsiang, such a cycle is disputed, on standard ontological grounds (see e.g. Chan SB, p.335). 8 Cf. Chan, p.20, also SB p.177. 4 Tao itself is a complex item, comprising both an initial source, or program, and a coupled direction; a planned course, with a natural (and ideal) path. (So it is appropriately symbolised O—*-) The great or overarching Tao is a comprehensive source of natural activity; it encapsulates, in its program, a framework of forms or principles, principles of natural order, both metaphysical and moral. It comprises both dynamic principles (or evolving "laws") of nature an<% axiological principles guiding conduct. In this representation it invites comparison with Plato's structure of Forms,9 or still better, though again neglecting the dynamism of Tao, comparison with the preSocratic Logos. But to see overarching Tao as an axiological ontology, after the pattern of Plato's Form theory, would be to import unwarranted Western assumptions. Though Tao is a "great form", and there is no doubt room in the generous object framework for other (unhypostatised) forms, main Platonic forms such as Beauty, Truth and Goodness, do not feature large in the CTi/ng. They are distinguished, and set rather to the side, in the final chapter. 10 Other less Platonically emphasised (or available) environmentally friendly forms are more important, such as Simplicity, Frugality and Non-competition, as well as Tao itself, the supreme form, also the One, which supplants the static Good of Plato's scheme and is coupled with a dynamic path component. Tao is intimately linked with, and concerned with, the natural, and indeed linked with and not above the everyday. It is certainly not supernatural, and it does not transcend natural things in the fashion of Western supernatural religions; rather Tao both orders and reflects nature. Tao supplies the physical laws that provide physical idealisations (i.e. ideal models) of processes. Tao in this is a process and the container and origin of process and the laws of process. Tao is the natural way of the universe (of Heaven and Earth), and super-Tao, also signified as Tao, is the way of the universe and the universe. (Under a computer analogy, Tao is the program of the whole system; it is also, as super-Tao, the program combined with the system, everything). As Great Tao it is certainly simple, all-embracing and one. Getting the hang of its components and their connections is not quite so simple. The overarching Tao - grand or capital Tao, the program or recipe of Form or whole genetic code - combines many individual ones - lesser or /ow^r-case taos within it. Such a lesser tao, of an individual, system or whatever, is what makes a thing what it is properly, a coursed or informed source, a program directed path, a processed output. A tao is a sourced directed object; it is thus a type of object, a dynamic item, which can be represented by a pair comprising a recipe, program or form and a direction or goal-orientation. Accordingly, an individual or local tao (or form) resembles one of 9 Though appropriately neutralised, in the object-theory fashion Reid urged: for details see JB. 10 LT 81. 5 Aristotle's individual forms as coupled with a which comprises a normative directive. For both Artistotle and Tao there is, in effect, an "invisible hand" at work. (How did this, such convenient namra/ order come about? That is Tao. But another, old, compatible, and more satisfactory answer is: It evolved.) When things are running properly, the lesser, individual, taos (most conveniently) fit together and operate in accord under the overarching program (cf. diagram 2). If each individual runs according to the program, then the overall program succeeds fully. However, it works even if each individual does not run according to the overarching program, but it has a Diagram 2: Super-Tao, or Great Tao, with components integrated SUPER-TAO O-> D-> unrealised Nature, with taos in world objectified natural forms system / E-> a-> —Deviation line— Defective (or fallen) taos from Natural Ways 6 less ideal result. If each person acts in a correct way a massive net good and great order result. Yet, any attempt to impose order does not bring it about, but is counterproductive. The invisible (natural) hand guides, but the hand cannot be forced. As to the status of principles (laws, rules), standard Western categorisations are again exceeded. These principles are not transcendent, governing things externally, but are, so to say, self-supplied, with things self-regulated. Undominated things are naturally self-governing. 'Everything has its own nature and each nature is its own ultimate ... then by whom are things produced? They produce themselves, that is all'.n But they proceed according to the Tao-te, the goal directed way of virtue, autonomously. Diagram 3: Tao-te paths, and going with the natura! fiow^ Te(los) Tao (source) EH----------- ?----------- + * Ideal Way: Way of Virtue 2. Natural order, and the extent of Tao as agency. Tao supplies a spontaneous natural order. Though the phrase "natural order" may seem strange, even perverse, it is not. The reason is, in part, that the Taoist perspective is the reverse of the modern perception of the world. In contrast to European political thought of the mainstream Hobbes-Locke strain, where the state-of-nature is one of chaos or extreme disorder, the Taoist state-of-nature is one of order. A main assumption of Western thought, that political order must be imposed by regulation on an unruly state-of-nature, is accordingly undercut. A separate imposed political order is not required; the idea that it is rests on mistaken assumptions. Politics can, and ideally should, follow nature. Science and politics can be blended, not sharply separated in the typical Western fashion, where nature is taken to exclude value. 11 Kao Hsiang, p.328. 12 Cf. LT 53. 7 According to Taoism then, by contrast with dominant Western thought which sees the world as extensional, mechanistic and value-neutral (except for its human cargo), nature is both intensional and value-infused. These features extend not merely to the whole, but to components which go into composing the greater whole. These have their programs, or ways, which are integrated into the greater way (somewhat as, but artificially, expert system programs may be organised into grander programs representing super-experts). Nature is already in order as it normally is, through a unity in diversity which involves a normative component - a principle or recipe for how things "should" be as well as how they are integrally. Values are build into the environment, an integral part of the way of things. By following the values of Tao one enters and comes into contact with the whole environment and into unity with the environment. Tao is a description of how things are and a prescription of how to act in accord with the way they are. Since it is normally regulated by Tao, natural order is decidedly benign, and definitely worth emulating. As a result, natural order is the way, the recommended way. Imposed order is counterproductive. There is reciprocal resistance to the imposition of deviant order. This would hold even if social organisers tried to impose Tao itself. To attempt to impose it would be to go astray. Such points help to explain why little satisfactory detail is offered as to social and political organisation. For the requisite organisation, such as it is, follows natural patterns and natural social structures (whichever they are). No doubt details would be (in the style of Aristotelian ethics) largely descriptive of what happens in cases where social affairs were functioning well. It is deviation from the natural state that represents the problem, quite in contrast again to European political thought, where the state-of-nature is one of extreme disorder (lives are nasty, brutish, short, etc.). Such a state-of-nature is not at all a Taoist natural state, which is one of satisfactory order. A strong sense of natural order, of self organisation, of anarchy (in a positive sense), flows from classical Taoism. Like Buddhism, Taoism assents to the maxim, "Do nothing and from unforced order greater order results". If each being is permitted to follow its tao, then the needs of all will be met without coercion. Following the way of Tao, nature emerges as a self-supplying organisation. Such convenient natural organisation stands (so far as it occurs!) in need of some further explanation, whether of an internal, evolutionary sort or of a supernatural sort, as in Neoplatonism where God or the One accomplishes the organisational task. Taoism undermines such latter alternatives, and points^ towards an evolutionary explanation. 13 In CT. 8 Order occurs naturally, spontaneously (as the inertial state), without agency. Super-agents do not feature, and would be otoise. God does not occur, and is not needed, in the cosmology, either as an agent, to make things in the universe happen, or as an authority, to regulate things or set moral or legal standards. If He did occur, He would, like other directors and rulers, not be needed, though He could serve as an example. 'But there is no indication of his existence'.^ As in the socio-political sphere, direction by a overseer or ruler is otoise, and only exemplary. In particular, God is not required to start or wind the universe up. 'Everything in the world creates itself without the direction of any creator. Since things create themselves they are unconditioned. This is the norm of the universe.'15 The Tao is not a supernatural personal agency; it is not supernatural, it is certainly not personal, and it is only in a stretched sense "agency". If the Tao includes all- encompassing natural order - a unity in diversity — in which the tao of each is ideally in harmony with the whole, then there is no need to posit a super-Being. Each being follows its course in the whole. Moreover, the appeal to a superpersonal authority, exalted example, or the like, on the one side, or to ethics, on the other, is needed only when people have moved away from the Tao. Everything will work well if a community lives according to the Tao. Thus deontic features are brought in only at disequilibrium - an interesting, if awkward, position. Then too, in formulating norms, appeal is back to framework from which people have diverged. There is a concealed moral purpose in Lao Tzu; a moral purpose that is central, alongside, and inseparable from, the evident metaphysical purpose. Since axiology is a crucial part of it - evaluations and commendations are freely and extensively offered in the texts - Taoism is not amoral. But the treatment of deontic principles, and of rules of conduct generally, is very different. Deontics enter only when there is a lapse or deviation from an ideal natural state (from a proper course). 'When the Great Tao declined, the doctrine of humanity and righteousness arose'. 16 Much depends then, on what counts as "moral" and "amoral". Certainly there are approved and implicitly recommended lifestyles, though there are few "oughts", and no (Confucian-Kantian) lists of duties. Moreover, unless preferred Taoist lifestyles merely recommended, not required, Taoism would fall down as insufficiently pluralistic. 3. On Taoist styles of life: an environmental lifestyle. As well as a set of regulative propositions about how things happen, and proceed ideally, Taoism supplies a parallel 14 CT 2. 15 Kao Hsiang, CTwwze/i/ary 16 LT 18. pp.330-331. set of suggestions and prescriptions for how to live well. According to Lao Tzu, there are some basic elements to living well, for instance 'three treasures'.^ 1. Deep love — which can also be taken to involve compassion, pity, commiseration, care, concern, respect and regard, and which includes something close to empathy, deep-penetrating empathy. Sympathy, a main linkage of the European "Enlightenment", does not however capture what is involved: sympathy alone would be too egoistical and too circumscribed for Taoism, as it is for Deep Ecology. Deep love is part of the notion of genuine relatedness, not a one-sided "relatedness" or possessiveness (which Taoism rejects). It is certainly not confined to fellow humans, but reaches through, around and beyond them to the myriad things; 2. Frugality - a renunciation of excess. That implies a renunciation of consumerism. But frugality is not impoverishment. Needs are met adequately without deprivation or excess. As in Deep Ecology too, richness in ends is compatible with modesty of material means; 3. Modesty or humility - not to dare to be ahead of the world, not to take the lead. In Taoism there is no competitive requirement, but the opposite; such Western desiderata lapse. Rather, one gives up trying to be on top of the pile, or even being in a faster lane. In a Taoist society there are no conspicuous tall poppies. Much else connects with or follows in a loose way, so it is assumed, from these three virtues; for instance, courage from deep love, generosity from frugality, a kind of leadership from humility. The arguments for those surprising derivations go like this: 'deep love helps one to aim in the case of attack / And to be firm in the case of defence'. 18 Earlier^ it is taken that proper abandonment of humanistic ethics will mean a return to (what the ethics inadmissibly substitutes for) deep love, a basic valuational relation. But in place of frugality, goes a discarding of profit, and in place of humility an abandonment of conscious sageliness and discarding of immodest (or conventional) wisdom. These changes are, astonishingly, said to be rather superficial and inadequate; so further desiderata, commonly read out of the "treasures" are adduced: 'Manifest plainness / embrace simplicity / reduce selfishness / have few desires'. 20 Another element, beyond the three of relatedness, frugality, and not daring to be ahead, is 17 LT 67; but different overlapping lists are presented, e.g. LT 19. 18 LT 67. 19 LT 19. 20 LT 19. 10 adaptability or spontaneity. This "fourth treasure" (which can be read off natural order) complements the further desiderata. Evidently main ingredients for a simple environmentally sound lifestyle are highly commended. Lao Tzu might almost have been writing another introduction for Callenbach's environmental handbook, LM/ig Poor or even for Pausacker and Andrews' Lfwzg Po^r wft/z In Chang Tzu, the /?Mr^ person is a deep environmentalist:— She is a companion' of Nature and does not attempt to interfere with it by imposing the way of man upon it'. Her goal is 'spiritual emancipation and peace' and derivatively freedom; and her route is 'through knowing the capacity and limitations of one's own nature and adapting it to the universal process of transformation' and thus to the environmental In complementary fashion, opposite "virtues", common in anti-environmental lifestyles are condemned. The Western drives to power, fame, competition, possessions, excess commodities, useless (small) knowledge are rejected by Taoism (along with "Mans Affairs"). Thus entrepreneurial activity in business, and also in professional and academic affairs (as well as busyness itself), gets decidedly discouraged. The good life naturally reduces ambitions and desires and avoids competition. Competition is connected with self-assertion and aggressive action. Taoism, while not neglecting limited natural competition, passes aspersions on both. In place of the mainstream economic virtue of competition, inherited from the Enlightenment and reinforced by Darwinianism, appears the 'virtue of non­ competition'.^ Competition often requires forced or artificial action; thus it violates the doctrine of wM-wef (non-action). In competition external rival standards are imposed on Tao. Competition is deviant, evidencing deviation from tao, and from te, virtue. In any event, according to Taoism, there is no merit in trying to place onself above another. So there is no value in competition. Fortunately competition can be reduced. If a person does not compete then the world cannot compete with him. A broad way of life is depicted, based on love, respect and compassion for all things, attuned to what is essential, shedding what is unnecessary, where simplicity and frugality are sought, and excess and competition avoided. This involves, in a nutshell, voluntary simplicity of a deep sort. Simplicity is not however the impoverished life of one who seeks escape. Taoism goes much further in disparaging scarce material means. Do not exact the worth, so that people compete. Do not value rare treasure, so that people do not steal. Gross wealth and prestige are rejected; they are vanities and vexations. But not all is vanity: living well is not. 21 Chan SB p.177. 22 LT 68. 11 It is a very natural inference, then, from the account of living well to the suggestion that Tao offers a deep form of voluntary simplicity. Voluntary simplicity is a fuzzy notion.23 Voluntary simplicity can initially be explained through its two obvious components, simplicity and its voluntary adoption. Simplicity connects with, and is often equated with frugality, as elaborated in Taoism. But whether or not simplicity is obtained from frugality or other Taoist virtues, it plays a direct and important part in the theory, and is in fact modelled, like its metaphysical counterpart, the unconceptualised Whole, by the uncarved block, a central Gestalt of the theory. The block symbolises unity, simplicity and naturalness not spoiled by artifice, metaphysically the wholeness and unity of Tao before conceptual carving, and ethically the wholesome straightforward non-devious life under Te, the 'simple life that is free from cunning and cleverness, is not devoted to the pursuit of profit or marked by hypocritical humanity and righteousness, but is characterised by plainness, tranquility, and purity'.24 As to voluntariness, people have a c/iozce of selecting the way of Tao rather than one of the deviant ways. It is a choice of recipes - frugal vs. excess, relatedness vs. non- relatedness, tall poppies vs. not daring to be ahead. But one does not attempt to force one's way onto a correct path. To hyperactively seek the path is a deviation in itself. Within the broad way of life depicted fall a plurality of particular lifestyles, appropriate to various different social roles. Among more specialised lifeways on which Taoist attention is lavished are those of the sage and the ideal ruler. A sage is naturally one who follows Tao, who has acquired great knowledge, and so on (ideality is built into the notion of The sage understands the fundamentals of Tao, and practices accordingly. Likewise an ideal ruler is a non-interfering exemplar ruler, who observes voluntary Ideally the people become emulators of this ruler. Effectively Taoism redefines the notion of "ruler", equating ruler with supreme exemplar, such as the sage, whereupon the meaning attributed to "ruler" becomes that of following Tao. The ruler simplicity. is one who deviates little from the Tao; this is his "power". Someone who deviates little from the Tao is kingly, that is, to observe another subversion of terminology, he shows an all-embracing impartiality. The sage and the "ruler" are but two important examples of kinds of ideal lifes. Another kind is also sketched,2$ that of the best type of person (effectively an ideal Deep Ecologist), a person 'who in his dwelling loves the earth', but also loves humanity, and order, and competence, and profundity. 23 As its fullest elaboration, Elgin's very profuse account, reveals. 24 Chan, p.14. 25 Notably in LT 8. 12 4. Following Tao: non-action, cultivating Te and seeking Enlightenment. Part of the Taoist route to an environmental lifestyle and towards enlightenment consists in acquiring the practice of non-action, exemplified through non-assertion, non­ aggression, non-destruction, and the like. commonly translated as 'non-action', is thereby rendered a dialectic notion, for it does not exclude action and in a sense is action. To avoid such dialectical overtones, is sometimes rendered 'not acting wilfully' or 'not acting artificially' or 'acting naturally'; it is better transcribed as 'without forcing' or 'no forced (or coercive) action'. Construed in this fashion, is not an extraneous awkward addition to Taoism, but an integral part, which emerges from other features of the theory, namely those of following natural low-action ways. For non- action is the "activity" of letting one's tao drift or flow into line with the overall Tao (so arrows in Diagram 2 are aligned). What is commended is, in the correct circumstances, pacific action, of letting happen (e.g. letting die), as opposed to aggressive, extraverted action (e.g. killing), forced action upsetting natural ways. Similarly for other No-nos; the "no desires" directive, for instance, is a piquant shorhand for 'no impure desires',26 i.e. for no unsatisfactory or anti-te desires. Non-action accordingly does not require literally no action, but only actions in accord with ideal nature, so ruling out actions contrary to undisturbed Tao. It may appear that perennial problems, alleged to haunt Taoism (and intensified in Stoicism), are induced. For example, if all is Tao, and Tao is natural, how can there be unnatural activity? Or differently, if nothing can depart from Tao, how can there be unspontaneous actions, or any violation of Tao, however, is a source which only in an ideal, natural, direction. It does not all individual paths, which can deviate from ideal or natural paths. Thus deviant activity is not excluded, unspontaneous and ill-organised activity by individuals is in no way ruled out; and forced, coercive and nature-destroying activities are all too common. When 'all activities follow their specific principles, that is nature';27 deviation from Nature accordingly occurs, namely when some activities do not follow their principles. As for destruction, 'Do not let man destroy Nature'.28 Non-action as policy generally implies non-interference, when things have not been damagingly disturbed. It implies letting things take their own natural course; letting Being be, as Deep Ecology has it, with basically "hands off practice and management. Unforced action in practice is well illustrated by examples of going with the flow. One main example of going with the flow is cutting meat. The Chef does not encounter bones. He takes the meat apart effortlessly in the same way that an athlete 26 Chan, p.13. 27 SB p.202. 28 SB p.207. 13 does things effortlessly, with little waste action. Going with the flow can however involve a lot of activity, as with the man swimming easily in a raging torrent below the waterfall, or as in sailing and trimming to the wind. At a personal level, non-action lies in such things as not striving to put oneself above others, in foregoing competition, in simplicity, frugality, and adherence to the mean. Evidently this removes a range of normally accepted social activities. Flexibility, and suppleness, and even weakness, belong to the centre (or mean), to the valley way. Though the ancient transcultural doctrine of the mean, of a middle way, appears explicitly in La<9 TzM,29 that middle path is arrived at, and taken, differently. The Taoist route is an easy no-action route, a valley way, a non-maximising path of weakness and little resistance, in line with the broad account of living and faring well. Taoism, like other older non-maximising wisdoms enjoining adherence to the Mean, is incompatible with modem maximising ideologies. Taoism is thus incompatible with Deep Ecology, whose supreme directive is self-realisation (again capitalised for wider "selves"). Such Self-realisation is a European idea, a maximising prescription applied to the aggregated interests of a separate self, inflation of a typically egoistic concept not found in Taoism. But although such directives to Self-realisation would be rightly queried in Taoism, there are parallel non-maximising goals to be found in Taoism: namely, attaining enlightenment and tranquility, following Tao, and cultivation of and the contrast between self-realisation and Self-realisation parallels that between and %, great re. Since a 'main objective of the [Lao Tza] is the cultivation of virtue or fe',3O can be seen as displacing self-realisation on the Taoist scheme. As it works out then, Self-realisation is nicely displaced by Enlightenment. Complementary to Tao is Te, and to tao is te. Whereas tao is the directed source of a thing, te is the matching goaZ-bZfrc^Z or unfolding of a thing. It is a directed and standard translation of (in principle favourably) developing, value-adding; hence the as 'virtue'. Because of its potentiality to reach a (good) goal, a rival translation as 'power' has some currency; it is a directed force/br good (or evil). The program of tao supplies the direction of matching te. So a thing can follow its tao (and thereby follow Tao) by cultivating te, by practising positive virtue, by choosing a lifestyle of deep simplicity. The directives for a good individual life are accordingly commonly given in terms of individual te, and it is te (rather than Tao) that generally appears invididualised. Each being has its own tao, its own ideal naturally-programmed path of self­ development or unfolding. Correspondingly, there is an immanent telos, a te, a goal29 E.g. 77, also 29. 39 Chan, p.ll. 14 directed virtuous developing, for each thing. By each following its own nature, all follow nature. Our self-development does not then interfere damagingly with your self­ development. How does this happen? Through natural (again invisible) inter­ organisation, my proper self-development cannot impede your proper self-development. While Taoism is decidedly short on details of such mututal adjustment and harmonious integration, it is certain that it happens naturally — as it may, for instance, through the evolution of co-operation.3i So there is, or need be, no vacillation between following one's own path and taking care not to interfere with the paths of others, between individualistic and relational paths. The Taoist result is integration, a harmonious combination of plans, without domination, by contrast with the dominant pattern of Western relations, operating through hierarchical ordering and domination. 5. Environmental theory and practice; environmental problems and difficulties, such as quietism and security. As on deeper environmental theories, traditional Western models for human relations to the natural world are one and all rejected. The dominant view, of domination, of human dominion over the earth and its other inhabitants, is not merely roundly and soundly rejected; the metaphysical creationist base and the superiority myths upon which it is regularly founded are also removed. Therewith also the bases for the lesser, and rather more benign, Western models, such as stewardship and perfectionism, are also undercut. There is no superior or greater purpose for humans to serve, or lord to supplicate as steward. Besides stewardship, a kind of servant-master relationship, which is both hierarchical and implicitly patriarchical in cast, typically involves active interference in producing products. The idea of perfecting nature also implies active interference, when however nature is more or less in order as it is, and requires no "perfecting". Thus stewardship and perfectionist alternatives fall along with domination and dominion. Taoism offers instead a non-interference model for relations to nature, a letting-be approach, with "hands off" environmental management and associated lifestyles. A most striking feature of Taoism is its environmental depth, its strong opposition to then prevailing (and still prevailing) humanism and human chauvinism. 31 Ong resolution of this problem can now make a useful start with Axelrod's investigations of evolving cooperation. Cooperation can begin with small clusters. It can thrive with rules that are nice, provocable, and somewhat forgiving. And once established in a population, individuals using such discriminating strategies can protect themselves from invasion. The overall level of cooperation tends to go up and not down. In other words, the machinery for the evolution of cooperation contains a ratchet (Axelrod p.177). 15 Heaven and earth are not humane They regard all things as straw dogs [i.e. rather worthless strict ritual objects]. The sage is not humane [or human chauvinist]. He regards all people as straw dogs.32 Because of such tough pronouncements, reiterated and reinforced in Chang Tzu,33 Taoism is sometimes said to be predicated on anti-humanism. But it is not 'a dehumanizing philosophy', it does not deny compassion; what transpires is that concern and value are not confined to humans or their affairs, but include the natural and the metaphysical. The human is no longer the criterion of what is good or true. The traditonal idea that a supreme supernatural being ... is the ruler of the universe is replaced by the doctrine that the universe exists and operates by itself. When [Lao Tzu] says that "Heaven and Earth are not humane", he means in a narrow sense that they are but in a broader sense that Nature is no longer governed according to ... In one stroke he removes Heaven [or God] and man as the standards of things and replaces them with Nature.34 What is rejected with the rejection of humanism and humanistic ethics is human chauvinism. For being "humane" means accepting the chauvinistic assumptions of conventional society and remaining within the narrow sphere of interests of the human species. There is no unbridgeable gulf between humans and other creatures such as Western thought has tried to manufacture. 'Put a halter around the horse's head and put a string through the cow's nose, that is man'.35 In place of humanism, Taoism adopts a doctrine of impartiality. 'Embrace all things without inclining to this way or that way'. 36 He who is enlightened 'is impartial';37 'he has no partial love for anyone'38 he does not bestow undue or special favours upon humans; he aims to be one with Nature. Impartiality does not imply equality. Despite the received heading of chapter 2 of the TzM, 'the equality of all things' (the literal 'levelling all things' is nearer the mark), and the standard inference to some Taoist doctrine of parity, no simplistic and difficult theme of equal value of all things is ventured — nor any theme of parity for some favoured subclass thereof such as living things. (Though there is some accent on prime life, there is not the same stress on in Taoism that there is in Deep Ecology, nor the bizarre extension of "life" to include waterfalls, mountains and other striking What is offered, instead of much in the way elucidation of impartiality, is (again like Deeper Ecological theory) a doctrine of identification. Wide natural objects.) identification and wide solidarity does promote impartiality and counter chauvinism. 32 LT 5. 33 E.g. CT 2. 34 Chan, p.10, italics added; also p.107. 35 SB p.207. 36 SB p.206. 37 LT 6. 38 SB p.201. 16 Egoism, for instance, involves discounting all but oneself, humanism all but humans, and requires a species solidarity with human things. But wider identification puts a stop to such discounting (e.g. in favour of one's own or species's interests, as exhausting value) and to such class-restricted solidarity. For wider identification reveals that interests and desires, concerns and values and so forth, are not so individual or class restricted. Many exquisite examples of identification, and the processes by which it may be achieved, are developed, for example with a butterfly, by dream access,39 with rivers and seas, and wider again, by the proper meditative process, with the dusty world - 'Become one with the dusty world / This is called profound identification'40 - and perhaps wider yet, and ultimate, with ideal Nature, and thus in complete accord with Tao .41 No less striking than the criticism of humanism, Taoism makes similar sort of attack on traditional education and on the accumulation of knowledge. The case against traditional education, especially rote "learning", is straightforward; it reinforces entrenched practices and prejudices, e.g. those of humanism. The criticism does not of course imply that there would be no regular learning or habituation processes, in place of those excessively encouraged traditional indoctrination methods. More perplexing is the attack on knowledge acquisition, though in part it is of the same sort, against an entrenched knowledge in the hands of power and professional groups. But, in an organic society, knowledge is integrated into the community and not ratified into a commodity held or controlled by a priesthood or a class of intellectuals or literati. Insofar as knowledge is power, such power is removed from the control of a few by making it a community good. In these respects Taoism goes beyond Deep Ecology, for instance in questioning and rejecting experts. Indeed in its criticism of schooling, narrow expertise, and the like, Taoism resembles and anticipates the stance adopted by Illich rather than features of Deep Ecology. The superficially anti-intellectual trend of Taoism is really directed against other targets than pure knowledge: against power through knowledge and control of knowledge, against slickness and cleverness, against devious and crafty uses of knowledge ,42 against counter-productive acquiring of knowledge or cunning, and its teaching. The puzzling situation is tidied up somewhat in the C%<2Kg TzM, where an apposite distinction is made between knowledge, the castigated sorts, which is inquisitive, partial, discriminative or merely analytic, and greaf knowledge, which is 'leisurely and at ease', comprehensive, extensive, and 39 SB p.190. 40 LT 56, also 4. 41 E.g. LT 16. 4^ LT 3. 17 synthetic .43 Even so, classical Taoism hardly seems to cater for adequate access of information, and the removal of (perhaps debilitating) ignorance, concerning health and welfare, careful and damaging practices, choices and alternatives. What is environmentally significant is that the critique of small knowledge and narrow expertise extends to encompass a critique of technology. In Taoism, technology was assigned a very limited role at best. Certain forms of technology were, if not rejected outright, at least strongly discouraged. 'Even if there are ships and carriages, none will ride in them. Even if there are arrows and weapons, none will display them'.44 More generally, while high and dangerous technology is set aside, even more appropriate technology cannot be accepted uncritically. Lao Tzu recognised clearly that even low impact technology may destroy conventions and practices constitutive of a community. Nor was the connection of technology with population neglected. Given a small country and few inhabitants, if provided with a labour-saving device he would not use it. There are dominating and non-dominating forms of technology. What is enjoined is avoidance of artificial wants and desires, and therewith of unnecessary consumption, and correspondingly on the production side, shunning of a work void, of efficiently replacing labour with nothing at all. In these sorts of respects Taoism exhibits a firmer grasp of some of the problems of technology, even more appropriate labour-saving technology, than a spread of recent positions. Likewise a Taoist approach demolishes the so-called iron law of technology, that there is no stopping technology or its progress. Whatever the merits of the "law" (they are not so conspicuous), Taoism reveals that such social laws are culture and community dependent, and do not withstand transfer from the dominant social paradigm everywhere else. Many other elements of a sensitive and sophisticated ecological position feature in classical Taoism. There is an elaborate and sensitive account of Nature, from which it emerges plainly that Nature is not a mere instrument or means for other ends, and not merely a resource, but something of great value in itself. Nature is something to be cherished in its own right, allowed to take its own course, not to be interfered with or destroyed by humans. Indeed the dominant instrumental perspective is interestingly reversed; value for humans is achieved above all by identification with Nature, and by following natural ways. (Paradoxical reversal is a feature of Taoism; even castigated Western aims, such as leadership, fame and so on, are in fact achieved, when they are, not by direct aim, but by letting the reverse happen. So it is with what control of Nature is required; non-intervention and non-action is the approach. Sufficient control is gained, it is said, when assertive attempts to impose it are abandoned.) While such 43 CfChan, p.20. 44 LT 80. 18 recently fashionable ideas as bioregionalism are not encountered in explicit form in Taoism, their bases are, as are other associated environmental ideas: living in place is certainly present;^ doing things locally and remaining local, while being attuned to the universe, is certainly advocated, giving some sustenance to the maxim Deep Ecology happily borrowed, "think globally, act locally". While there is then very much in Taoism that fits easily and revealingly with deeper environmental theories, Taoism also induces puzzles or generates residual problems. While some of the problems are genuine enough, that of material scarcity for example, not all the supposed problems are genuine; and not all the puzzles are bequeathed to contemporary theory. Illustrating both is the problem of quietism, which is at bottom the issue of reconciling "non-action" with environmental and social improvement and action. How, for instance, would a Taoist resistance against depredation, a Taoist defence of environment proceed, and fare, given its apparent emphasis on not bothering, "don't bother"? In-built harmony and quietism do not allow sufficiently for conflict. In part there is only a problem because of misrepresentation of Taoism, which is not committed to a "don't bother" attitude to environmental destruction: quite to the contrary, humans should not be allowed to destroy nature.^ Furthermore, there are many Taoist tactics and techniques, using weakness to overcome strength, letting the flow of nature demolish the forces of environmental destruction, and the like, which can be applied in environmental resistance.^ Quietism is accordingly a misrepresentation of the practice, and something of a misnomer (an oppositional, not a Taoist tag). How can Tao work in a world where there is scarcity almost everywhere? Very simply, Taoism optimistically holds that there is no genuine problem concerning plentitude; things are not scarce, there is an abundant outpouring from nature. There is scarcity only because of violations of the requirements of Tao (with excessive desires, excessive consumer demand, excessive hoarding, political mismanagement, and so on). Tao will serve to restore plentitude/s Rather than a collection of scarce resources, Nature is represented as an virtually infinite storehouse of boundless wealth. Nor was there a looming problem of limits to growth, because growth (in key parameters, such as populations) would not proceed exponentially. Does Tao allow for the prospect and problems of too many people? Can the greater Tao keep pace with the requirements of many too many individual taos, even if 45 LT 80. 46 See CT. 47 Use of the power of water affords a prime example; cf LT 15. No-action adaptations of old Chinese martial arts and strategies presumably offer more direct methods of defence and resistance. 48 LT 77. 19 those individual requirements are in line with the greater Tao? No doubt in those times, and most historical times when epidemics and plagues were almost as regular as droughts, when evolution still operated overtly on human species, there was little more than a hypothetical or remote future problem concerning population. It seems plain however that Taoism did not face the environmental problems such as those of too many people and incremental resource and ecosystem degradation. While the texts do address, forcefully, two of the three main components of the standard environmental impact equation, namely consumption and technology, the important third, human population, is not considered at all, still less statisfactorily therefore. It is much the same for other significant environmental issues. The prime texts say little about soil degradation and deforestation, long major environmental problems in China, as in other centres of civilisation. Nor does Taoism have much to offer directly on main contemporary issues of animal liberation, species loss, urban disgustification, and so forth, though several of the problems are hardly new (and some are recognised in early commentaries). Historic Taoism too was a product of its times, adjusted to what were seen as problems. There is no reason at all, however, why classical Taoism should not be updated, more than two millenia, to take account of contemporary environmental problems. Because of its compatibility with deeper environmentalism, Taoism admits such an extension in a way that main modem religions do not.49 49 Such an extension of Taoism, entitled Neo-Daoism, is brashly sketched in UTD, from which much of the present exercise is adapted. Such Neo-Daoism diverges sharply from contemporary Daoism. But it is very congenial to contemporary deep environmental theory. 20 REFERENCES Ames, R.T. (1986), 'Taoism and the nature of nature', E/zvzronm^nfaZ P/zz7o^op/zy 8:317350. Axelrod, R. (1984), T/ze Evo/zmon of Cooperarzo/z, Basic Books, New York. Chan, W.T. (1963), A .Source BooZr zTz C/zzzz^ E/zzZosop/zy, Princeton University Press, Princeton [referred to as SB]. Chan, W.T. (1963), 77ze 1Toy of Loo Tza (Too-re c/zzzzg), Bobbs-Merill, New York [introduction referred to as Chan, translation referred to as LT]. Devall, B. and Sessions, G. (1985), Deep EcoZogy: Lzvzng os y zzomre Moffered, Gibbs M. Smith, Layton, Utah. Elgin, D. (1981), VoZa/zfary .SzmpZzczzy, Murrow, New York [for a better briefer account, see D. Elgin and A. Mitchell, 'Voluntary Simplicity', Co-EvoZafz'on gzzorrerZy 14 (Summer 1977)]. Elgin, D. and Mitchell, A. (1977), 'Voluntary Simplicity', Co-EvoZaaozz QaarferZy 14 (Summer 1977). Fox, W. (1990), Toward o TroHspersoKo/ EcoZogy, Shambhala, Boston. Graham, A.C. (1989), Dz'sporers ofr/ze Too, Open Court, La Salle, Illinois. Illicit, I. (1974), 7oo/sfor CozzvzvzaZzzy, Calder and Boyars, London. Lagerwey, J. (1987), 7oozsrEz'rooZ z'/z C/zz/zese ^ocze/y, Macmillan, New York. Naess, A. (with D. Rothenberg) (1989), EcoZogy, Co/w/za/zzZy ozzzZLz/esZy/e, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Routley, R. (1980), ExpZorzzzg Mez/zozzg's Jzz/zgZe a/z^Z BeyornZ, Research School of Social Sciences, The Australian National University, Canberra [referred to as JB]. Routley, V. and Routley, R. (1980), 'Social theories, self management and environmental problems', in D. Mannison cf aZ. (eds), Ezzvz'rozzmc/zro/ E^/zzc^, The Australian National University, Canberra [referred to as EE]. Sylvan, R. (1985-86), 'Towards an improved cosmological synthesis', Grazer P/zzZo^op/zz'jc/zg 57a<7z^/z 25/26:135-178 [referred to as CS]. Sylvan, R. and Bennett, D. (1990), Df Ufopza.?, Tao azzefDeep EcoZogy, Green Series No. 19, Research School of Social Sciences, The Australian National University, Canberra [referred to as UTD]. Wang Pi (1979), 'Commentary on the Lao Tzu', transl. A. Rump and W.J. Chan, University of Hawaii Press, Honolulu. Watson, B. (1964), T/zc Co/zzpZcrc WorE? of C/za/zg Tza, Columbia University Press, New York [referred to as CT].  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Box 21, Item 708: Letter, Arne Næss to Richard Sylvan, 19 Jul 1991 ; Draft of Taoism and deep environmental concerns: let concern spread to all the myriad things Subject The topic of the resource Typed letter, handwritten notes and printout of draft. Letter on University of Oslo Centre for Development and Environment letter head and addressed to Richard Sylvan from Arne Næss, signed by Kit Fai on behalf of Næss. Næss sends feedback on Sylvan and David Bennett's paper, Utopias, Tao, and deep ecology. Description An account of the resource Letter and paper original housed together with a paper clip. Letter redacted from access file (PDF) due to copyright restrictions. One of eight papers digitised from item 708. Title in collection finding aid: RS: Taoism & Deeper Env. Concers - uncorrected ts + Ms notes. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/browse?search=Richard+Sylvan&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bjoiner%5D=and&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=&amp;range=&amp;collection=&amp;type=&amp;user=&amp;tags=&amp;public=&amp;featured=&amp;exhibit=&amp;geolocation-mapped=&amp;geolocation-address=&amp;geolocation-latitude=&amp;geolocation-longitude=&amp;geolocation-radius=10&amp;submit_search=Search+for+items">Richard Sylvan</a> Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived <span class="MuiTypography-root-125 MuiTypography-body2-126">The University of Queensland's <a data-testid="rek-series" href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/records/search?page=1&amp;pageSize=20&amp;sortBy=score&amp;sortDirection=Desc&amp;searchQueryParams%5Brek_series%5D%5Bvalue%5D=Richard+Sylvan+Papers%2C+UQFL291&amp;searchMode=advanced">Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291</a></span>, Box 21, Item 708 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org">Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy</a> Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1991 Contributor An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, <a href="https://najtaylor.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Dr. N.A.J. Taylor</a>. Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library. Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource Letter, [1] leaf + [21] leaves. 44.08 MB. Box 21: More Green Como House Como House > Shelves > Top > Pile 3 https://www.antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/390ffa1bb15fead94d0f2ceb672bf51a.pdf 8ecd75d0f66607f59f52395a8fd68e7a PDF Text Text TAOISM AND DEEP (ECOLOGICAL) THEORY: a preliminary object-theoretic investigation. There is a remarkable, and remarked, convergence of themes of deeper ecological positions, such-as Deep Ecology, with those ot Taoism, i Given that Deep Theory has not received adequate elaboration in important directions, particularly metaphysical and political directions, the older wisdom of Tao can be profitably drawn upon to elaborate and enrich deeper positions. Where Taoism does diverge from Deep Ecology (our working example since it is presently the best known deep environmental theory) concerns some of the weakest and most controversial parts of the Deep Ecology platform, such as the theme of Biospheric Egalitarianism, the equality of all (living) beings.2 Thus Taoism can also provide a base for 1 The connections are remarked in some of the prime texts for Deep Ecology, for which see Devall and Sessions (and therein p.100), and also CD. Not all the connections assumed in Deep Ecology sources are correct however; in parucular Taoism does not deductively deliver the platform of Deep Ecology. At most it informs the platform, which it would, if taken seriously, after. 2 A critical exposition of Deep Ecology, which surveys the main themes, is ventured in Sylvan CD. In several significant respects, Taoism offers a (retrospective) improvement on Deep Ecology, being free of the excessive junk Deep Ecology has quickly accumulated. Fortunately for those averse to intellectual junk such as environmental thought tends to collect (though no doubt for later building or recycling), Deep Ecology is but one deep ecological position. Another, presently being worked out in some detail, is Deep Green Theory, the ecological part of a more comprehensive Deep Theory, which is intended to cover a much broader region of philosophical ideas. Deep Theory includes, for instance, what adds to the depth, depth relevant logic, intenzional object theory, and deep pluralism. As will begin to become evident, Taoism proves to be a very congenial position for Deep Theory, and for Deep Green Theory in particular. Thus it can most usefully be applied to illuminate Deep Theory, as well as adding to its historical depth. But in this preliminary investigation, we become ^o caught up in interpreting and explaining authentic Taoism, that we do not get to much explicit elaboration of Deep Green Theory. A corollary we want to draw from our investigations (preliminary though they are) bears upon, and when developed may help to eradicate, a commonplace Western complacency and smug superiority. A widespread, though usually subterranean, view in philosophy is that the East really has little or nothing to offer. This view even extends far into environmental philosophy (cf. Rolston's put-down). It is often part of cultural chauvinism; Western scientific industrial culture doesn't have much to learn from other, generally more backward or primitive or scientifically crude, cultures. The West is the cultural pace-setter, with the information, resources, etc. Observe however that a nothing-new-to-offer position need not reject old theories as worthless and not worth bothering with; in less brash form it can allow �51 correction and adjustment of Deep Ecology, and an impressionistic guide to a more satisfactory and richer deep theory. Taoism is throughout decidedly ecologically oriented; a high level of ecological consciousness is built into it, a main recipe amounting to FoZZow Mxmrg as the basis of practice. It is also, so it transpires, a very congenial philosophic way­ station for ecologically-concerned intellectual travellers weary of mainstream Anglo-American and Continental philosophies which inform and reinforce the dominant Western social paradigm. Both for background, and in order to arrive immediately in the thick of the comparison, we outline a main part of the Deep Ecology platform in (typical) slogan form and contrast it on the one side with predominant Western attitudes and platitudes and on the other side with Taoism. TABLE 1. DEEP ECOLOGY CONTRASTED WITH THE DOMINANT PARADIGM AND WITH TAOISM DOMINANT (WESTERN) PARADIGM DEEP ECOLOGY (DE) TAOISM Domination over nature Harmony with nature Elaboration of DE Nature a resource; intrinsic value confined to humans Natural environment valued for itself Much for DE; "humanism" rejected Humane supremacy Biocentric egalitarianism Differs from DE; wide impartiality Ample resources/substitutes Earth supplies limited Supplies ample Material economic growth a predominant goal Non-material goals, especially self-realization Following Tao-te that there is interest and merit in historical and reconstruction exercises. What it cannot allow is news, such as News from Tao. Thus it does clash with what we argue, that such deep theories as Deep Ecology can benefit and learn from Taoism. Taoism offers a striking timetested theory upon which Deep Theory can draw, an ongoing source of inspiration and wisdom. Taoism texts may lack the detail of prime Western (non-industrial) sources such as the texts of Aristotle or Plato; but they offer a much more congenial source for Deep Theory. �52 Consumerism Doing with enough/ recycling Doing with enough (recycling inappropriate) Competitive lifestyle Cooperative lifeway Much as for DE: voluntary simplicity Centralized/urban centred/ national focus Decentralized/bioregional /neighbourhood focus As for DE Power structure hierarchical Non-hierarchical/ grassroots democracy Hierarchy without power structure High technology Appropriate technology Limited technology The contrasts tabulated are of limited accuracy, because condensed to slogans, and also limited because much of importance is omitted, especially from Taoism (which as so far portrayed only reflects themes of Deep Ecology). In what follows several of the contrasts will be expanded, and main omissions rectified. The richness of Taoism, the philosophical topics traversed to which nothing corresponds in Deep Ecology, will mean that Deep Ecology is often left far behind? Deep Ecology offers however a different perspective on Taoism than has been arrived at before. Not only can Taoism further Deep Ecology, then, but the compliment can be returned. A comparison of Taoism with deep ecological theory can hardly be our only objective; as an essential preliminary, much effort is directed at systematising Taoism. In the course of this outside endeavour, we succumbed to a rather too familiar taunting challenge: to draw something philosophically solid, of contemporary relevance, from the ancient Taoist tests. A key element in our attempt to pull off something mind-expanding has been an object- theoretic interpretation of perhaps the most vexing part of elusive Taoist theory, the "metaphysics". Taoism lends itself to natural systematisation in terms of noneism (the brand 3 We have not attempted anything approaching a fuii coverage of features of Taoism of contemporary philosophical interest; but a coverage is an eventual eco-theoretic objective. The main works repay repeated fossicking. There is, for instance, a significant doctrine of opposites in Taoism, iikely /tot the same as that in the main Chinese tradition, which needs fathoming, and linking with common ancient themes of balance and dynamic equilibrium of healthy systems. Every sort of thing, every category has an opposite, which furthermore interacts with its dual. In theory, the opposition appears to be tied to a (questionable) contrast theory of meaning. In practice, the opposites tend to be reconciled or harmonized, but /tor in a Hegelian fashion by ascent, but through taking a middle way (natural compromise rather than dialectic confrontation). �53 of object-theory developed in JB). For not only is the theory woven around certain striking objects - Tao, Te, Tzu-jan, and others - not only does the theory cleverly exploit an objecttheoretic cosmology; but also important, the theory, though remarkedly free of the type of religious trappings and claptrap that ontologically weigh down most older or traditional ideologies, is opposed to and is highly resistant to reductionistic practices. That is, like noneism, Taoism takes a no-rubbish non-reductionist stance. It is in part for such reasons especially that most everything in what it is and neither some other (approved) item nor reducible to such other item - that Taoism avoids the common-sense implausibility and scientific naivety of many a position, old and new: that for instance everything reduces to water or air or fire or matter or energy or superstrings Evidently, in advancing such noneist claims and other claims about what Taoists say or imply, an interpretation is adopted, when often enough other rival interpretations of the central texts are supportable. Indeed such a small body of theoretical work as the basic Taoist tests comprise is far from categorical and is bound to admit of a plurality of non-isomorphic interpretations.^ The main arguments we should offer for the selection we make from the basket of admissible interpretations are these: the interpretation we offer is very straightforward and is mostly an "obvious reading"; for the most part such an interpretation has already been offered, in other connections, by others much better informed than we are about the Chinese texts; and that it is a relevant and important one for deep ecological purposes. Finally we should remark that we are essentially concerned with the systematisation of only the Erst two Taoist texts (LT and CT) and focus upon LT. In brasher moments we are inclined to think that the framework supplied (brushstrokes behind the old master's impressionistic brushstrokes) will enable us to take philosophical account of almost everything in the compact LT; we are not nearly so confident as regards CT. 1. Nature, cosmology, and the character of Tao. Taoism sketches a cosmology while Deep Ecology does not. The cosmology is interestingly at variance with dominant - Western cosmologies. For the universe arises out of nothing. Being arises in accordance with Tao, which precedes existence. Nonbeing precedes Being. Nonbeing is ultimate (according to Chang Tzu) and comes first. 4 There are significant pluralistic lessons for hermeneutics to be drawn from the logical investigations of categoricalness of postulate systems and the typical /a/Zare of categoricalness. �54 All things in the world come from being And being comes from nonbeing (LT 40). The universe had a primeval beginning, coming into existence from nothing (SB p.202). DIAGRAM 1. TAOIST CYCLE OF RETURN (cf. Chan p.173 fn 2). flourishing growth cycle of generated entity reversion NATURE (HEAVEN AND EARTH, or ACTUAL UNIVERSE): Existent, Named, Temporal (FORMING) SOURCE: Nonexistent, Nameless, Eternal Every entity arises out of (material) nothingness and eventually falls back into nothingness all that comes to pass, that is. "All things flourish, but each one returns to its root' (LT 16). The whole, the integrated natural system, is a process of becoming and decay. But the emphasis upon process, evolution and change, upon Nature as flux and transformation, is 5 For a detailed contemporary presentation of such a cosmological cycle, see Sylvan CS. In Neo-Taoism, e.g. Kao Hsiang, such a cycle is disputed, on standard ontological grounds (see e.g. Chan SB, p.335) A serious complication is induced in the Taoist cosmological story by variations on the traditional interpretation of the later verses of LT 1. (On the variations, see Chan p.99 note 5; the linkage of Nonbeing with "no desires" is not however so remote as Chan tries to make out; see LT 37.) The variations (which replace having desires and having no desires by Being and Nonbeing) lead to dialethic complications of a Hegelian cast. For they make Being and Nonbeing ultimately the no doubt because of the becoming and reversion of each generated being to nonbeing. (Becoming is seen by the modem translators Hegelian-style, as the product of Being and Nonbeing.) Of course there is bound to be some dialethic elaboration of Taoism in any case; e.g. Tao itself is both nameless (LT 1) and named (LT 14), though in a slack sense. Thus Tao is both nameless because nonexistent and not fully conceptualisable or describable; and also named, because called "Tao', "the Subtle', etc., and theorisable about. �55 much enhanced in Chang Tzu, over the work of Lao Tzu, where more stress is put upon stability, constancy and equilibrium (cf. Chan p.20, also SB p.177). Overall, it is correct to say, if not highly informative, that Tao is a natural process philosophy, with a keen sense both of and of The novel cosmology — the emergence of what exists from nothing — is made feasible through adoption of rudiments of a theory of objects (in the style much later elaborated by Reid, Meinong and others). Nonbeing, what does not exist, is not formless or empty, an indescribable nullity, as previous Chinese schools had apparently invariably thought (Chan, p.8). On the contrary, it is not devoid of characteristics, but has definite features. Perhaps wisely (if unfortunately from an analytic angle) authentic Taoism is largely silent on such questions as to exactly which features nonexistent items have. But enough is said to reveal how what does not exist — above all Tao — may yet have very distinctive features, while yet lacking other properties (such as existence). Main examples, some repeatedly alluded to, are those of gaps, lacunae, vacant spaces, as with a hollow bowl (LT 4), or empty utensil or window space or lightweight wheel (LT 11), or valley. The unoccupied space of a room for example has definite dimensions, location, and so forth; and its function and utility depends upon its not being occupied (LT 11). Rudiments of object-theory are however coupled with a curiously narrow doctrine of names, perhaps as a concession to rival Chinese schools and with a view to making its nonstandard position devastatingly clear. (This would parallel then the contemporary concession of to mainstream schools, in virtue of which nonexistent objects are not referents; there are no referring terms, "referential names", which signify them.) According to this doctrine of names, only what is a concrete individual and partly at least describable in quite particular ostensive terms is nameable (nor at least nameable). As Wang Pi, an early commentator, indicated, names have a restricted role, naming requiring circumscription, 'the name that can be named point[s] to a particular affair' (p.l). Thus, for example, the main - transcendental notions are not nameable, Tao in particular. Tao, though-a great form , though at least apparently "named" honorifically in several ways, is not named thereby, but is nameless, because not suitably circumscribed, because not a particular (affair). Similarly for the other central notions of Taoism, such as Te; though they can be described, in approximate fashion, they cannot be named. 'Tao', Te' and the like are not (ptimary) 77#/%?.?, but rather (like 'God' and 'Vulcan' on contemporary theories) condensed descriptions. They could be said to be 'Name' has been contracted, perhaps unduly, to 'primary name'. There is another very important reason for eschewing names, or at least treating them - �56 and descriptions - with due caution. Names come with classification, with conceptualisation, with carving the whole block, with imposition of a theoretical grid on the seamless Whole.6 Usual metaphysical theories presuppose one or another of standard, narrow and limiting, conceptualisations and classifications, some perspective already carving up the Whole. Names, basic to the linguistics of such carving operations, have a major role in the worldification, in breaking up the One, which is simple and undifferentated, and typically a major role in imposing a single impoverishing theoretical grid (e.g. recent empiricist perspectives eliminate intensional and evaluative richness from the presented stuff). Part of the point of the "uncarved block" image - which symbolises the One (among other things, it is also a symbol for simplicity, and naturalness, for things not spoiled by artifice), the One simple and undifferentiated, the unity behind all multiplicity - is to get at the purity and unity of Tao before conceptualisation, before naming, before the differentiating and perhaps distorting conferring of names. Though Tao is so nameless, that is, it is not an existent concrete thing (e.g. a particular), nonetheless a lot can be said a&oM? the Tao, by way of description (see the excellent summary of Taoist descriptions in Chan pp.6-7). Though Tao is a single item, One, unity behind multiplicity, under conceptualisations it is "complex', many things: source of everything, great form regulating both nature and conduct, Way of satisfactory conduct and proper lives, and derivatively it is "invisible', "inaudible', "vague and elusive'. Nothing important conceptualised in Taoism comes in neat single form. All the main features and notions of Taoism - principles, models, examples, etc. - appear in such multiple form: metaphysical, ethical, etc. The artificial boundaries between these areas are broken down. Tao itself exhibits this plural conceptual character: it combines both a complex of natural principles and methods and of guiding ethical forms, with no imposed separation of fact and value; but it is also an inexhaustible source, and so on. But the Tao is not beyond the reach of reason (necessarily), even though it is inexpressible (adequately). Other things, such as infinity, are also of this sort. (If Tao were Nothing, which in a sense it Ay, many of the puzzling descriptions would be entirely apt.) Tao is perhaps best explained by going going back to fundamentals. "The word fao 6 This appropriate image was popularised by James. Under deep pluralism, different determinations of the Whole, different grids, yield different worlds, a pZuraf/ry of worlds, with different domains of objects named or different classes of designated propositions (and so derivatively perhaps widi different logics). �57 consists of one element meaning a head and another meaning to run. It means that on which something or someone goes [that by which a thing becomes what it is], a path or road, later extended to mean "method", "principle"../ (Chan p.6, insert from p.7). DIAGRAM 2. FUNDAMENTALS OF TAO head running stvlised source course program path § source directed path To the apt Taoist images of Tao as "storehouse", "mother" and "ancestor", may be added others, such as that of a programmed or guided projectile. Each image helps peel off unwanted associations of others; thus Tao is a great mother without male input; an ancestor without predecessor, a missile without maker, an outputing program without input. Like a program projectile or delivering storehouse, it integrates a complex source, an initial operating program, with a planned course, a natural (and ideal) path. The great or overarching Tao is a comprehensive source of natural activity; it encapsulates a framework of forms or principles, principles of natural order, both metaphysical and moral. It comprises both dynamic principles (or evolving ""laws"") of nature <37%/ axiological principles guiding conduct. In this representation it invites comparison with Plato's structure of Forms, appropriately neutralised (in the object-theory fashion Reid urged: see JB), or still better, though again neglecting the dynamism of Tao, comparison with the pre-Socratic Logos. But to see overarching Tao as an axiological ontology, after the pattern of Plato's Form theory, would be to import unwarranted Western assumptions. Though Tao is a ""great form"", and there is no doubt room in the generous object framework for other t (unhypostatized) forms, main Platonic forms such as Beauty, Truth and Goodness, do not feature large in the CTn/ig. They are distinguished, and set rather to the side, in the final chapter (LT 81). Other less Platonically emphasized (or available) forms are more important, such as Simplicity, Frugality and Non-competition, as well as Tao itself, the supreme form, also the One, which supplants the static Good of Plato's scheme and is coupled with a dynamic path component. Tao as form is part of Tao as in/bT*???//?^ source, which comprehends the class of characterisations of objects e.g. subjectized and individualized forms, taos (these no doubt �58 relate to forms, ideals or principles, rather as particular essences relate to Platonic forms). Tao as informing source is summed up in such phrases as "The original of everything and out of which all arises." Tao as combined governing principle and source is summed up in such phrases as "the ancestor and mother of all things". The Mother-image provides both a source, and for the form of an object without being that object? Under the ancestral-image, Tao supplies both the material source and the form, the genetic coding, for existence. It is evident that Tao is intimately linked with, and concerned with, the natural, and indeed linked with and not above the everyday. But what is the relationship between nature and Tao? Is Tao supra- or super-natural? Tao is certainly not supernatural, and it does not transcend natural things in the fashion of Western supernatural religions; rather Tao both orders and reflects nature. Tao supplies the physical laws that provide physical idealisations (i.e. ideal models) of processes. Tao in this sense is a process and the container and origin of process and the laws of process. Tao is the natural way of the universe (of Heaven and Earth), and super-Tao, also signified as Tao, is the way of the universe and the universe. (Under a computer analogy, Tao is the program of the whole system; it is also, as super-Tao, the program combined with the system, everything). As Great Tao it is certainly simple, allembracing and one. Getting the hang of its components and their connections is not quite so simple. The persistent Mother image in Lao Tzu has suggested several tancifui interpretations, such as that of a mother-goddess, which are not textualiy supported. The latest in this fanciful line is a Gaia story. �59 DIAGRAM 3. SUPER-TAO, OR GREAT TAO, WITH COMPONENTS INTEGRATED SUPER-TAO Overarching forms, principles, Way of Nature '§ '§ Nature, with taos in world unrealised objectified forms natural system '§ '§ '§ '§ § '§ '§ Deviation line Defective (or fallen) fl' from Natural taos As to the status of principles (laws, rules), standard Western categorisations are again exceeded. These principles are not transcendent, governing things externally, but are, so to say, self-supplied, with things self-regulated. Undominated things are naturally self- governing. Nor is it quite accurate to say that "the Tao is immanent and expressed through the �60 fe = r^Zoj, ideal direction) of things'.s The transcendent/immanent dichotomy fails (as on object-theory), because it presupposes that principles and the Tao exist, either externally or internally; but they do not exist. What is nearer right is that "Everything has its own nature and each nature is its own ultimate ... then by whom are things produced? They produce themselves, that is all' (Kuo Hsiang, p.328). But ZJooZZy they proceed according to the Tao- te, the goal directed way of virtue, autonomously. DIAGRAM 4. TAO-TE PATHS, AND GOING WITH THE NATURAL FLOW (cf. LT 53). Tao (source) Te(los) Flow Ideal Way: Way of Virtue § Deviations from Flow Deviant Ways tao '§.....................>-Ote Laws persist, and perhaps evolve, under the guidance of overarching Tao, while the universe in its rich diversity comes into and goes out of being. Tao thus offers a kind of unity in, or above, diversity. In this regard too, Taoism can be applied to clarify the value scheme of Deep Ecology. For Deep Ecology also values diversity and organic unity in diversity, but lacks the cosmology from which the features derive. The unity lies in a unified tier of principle (matched in part at an upper level of the Deep Ecology pyramid) above the diversity of life processes. The Taoist metaphor of a single block, variously composed of many things, can likewise be applied to fill out Deep Ecology's picture of the ecosphere. However, 8 As Hall claims. a fundamental notion in Taoism, is often translated as wrfa%, sometimes power; but often reZo^y gets the intended item and objective better, as the subsequent text tries to explain. Te is not the same as Tao. And it is a mistake to t?Ze?uZ/y tao, or individualised Tao, with te (as sometimes suggested; e.g. Chan SB p.178), though they are evidendy closely connected, and to a restricted extent (as e.g. in a missile example) one can be derived from the other. While tao gives the source and route ' §, te supplies die virtuous direction and focus or goal (telos) §-O. �61 the block metaphor has some drawbacks; it tends to suggest a static picture, which is unwarranted. For both Tao and Deep Ecology, universes and ecospheres are, when appropriately stable, in dynamic equilibrium. Tao is a natural order. Though the phrase "natural order'* may seem strange, even contradictory, it is not. The reason is, in part, that the Taoist perception of the world is the reverse of the modern Hobbes-Locke perception of the world. In contrast to European political thought of the mainstream Hobbes-Locke strain, where the state-of-nature is one of chaos or extreme disorder, the Taoist state-of-nature is one of order. A main assumption of Western thought, that political order must be imposed by regulation on an unruly state-of- nature, is thus undercut. A separate imposed political order is not required; the idea that it is rests on mistaken assumptions. Politics can, and should, follow nature. Science and politics can be blended, not sharply separated in the typical Western fashion, where nature is taken to exclude value. Nature presumes value. Nature is already in order as it normally is, through a unity in diversity which involves a normative component - a principle or recipe for how things "should" be as well as how they are integrally. Values are build into the environment, an integral part of the way of things. By following the values of Tao one enters and comes into contact with the whole environment and into unity with the environment. Tao is a description of how things are and a prescription of how to act in accord with the way they are. According to Taoism then, by contrast with dominant Western thought which sees the world as extensional, mechanistic and value-neutral (except for its human cargo), the world is both intensional and value-infused. These features extend not merely to the whole, but to components which go into composing the greater whole. These have their programs, or ways, which are integrated into the greater way (somewhat as, but artificially, expert system programs may be organised into grander programs representing super-experts, computer substitutes for the lost "universal men**). The overarching Tao - grand or capital Tao, the program or recipe or Form or whole genetic code - combines many individual ones - lesser or /ow^r-case taos - within it. Such a lesser tao, of an individual, system or whatever, is what makes a thing what is properly, a coursed or informed source, a program directed path, a processed output. A tao is a sourced directed object; it is thus a type of object, a dynamic item, which can be represented by a pair comprising a recipe, program or form and a direction or goal-orientation. Accordingly, an individual or local tao (or form) resembles one of Aristotle's individual forms as coupled with a which comprises a normative directive. For both Aristotle and Tao there is, in effect, �62 an "invisible hand" at work. (How did this, such convenient namraZ order come about? That is Tao; another, old and compatible answer is: It evolved.) When things are running properly, the lesser, individual, taos (most conveniently) fit together and operate in accord under the overarching program (cf. diagram 3). If each individual runs according to the program, then the overall program succeeds fully. However, it works even if each individual does not run according to the overarching program, but it has a less ideal result. If each person acts in a correct way a massive net good and great order result. Yet, any attempt to impose order does not bring it about, but is counterproductive. The invisible (natural) hand guides, but the hand cannot be forced. This picture of order invites comparison with the modem market theory, which claims that maximum effect or benefit is obtained without regulation (other than extensive framework legislation!), and that once regulation is imposed the result is inferior. In principle, the market operates on a set of understood (partly conventional) rules. The rules are known and it is merely a matter of following them. But the market enables dominance by the rich and powerful, and thereby discrimination and the like. Tao, however, is opposed to such dominance; those who follow Tao attempt to refrain from dominating others. But like the market, the rules of conduct are built into the system and any attempt to impose them is counterproductive. As a result, spontaneity and order are not opposites, but result from the same thing. A strong sense of natural order, of self organisation, of anarchy (in the good sense) enters. Like Buddhism, Tao assents to the maxim, "Do nothing and from unforced order greater order results". If each being is permitted to follow its tao, then the needs of all will be met without coercion. Following the way of Tao, nature emerges as a self-supplying organization. Such convenient natural organisation stands (so far as it occurs!) in need of some further explanation, whether of an internal, evolutioning sort or of a supernatural sort, as in Neoplatonism where God or the One accomplishes the organisational task. Taoism undermines such latter alternates, and points (in CT) towards an evolutionary explanation. 2. The extend of Tao as agency: non-religion and (non-)moraiity. God does not occur, and is not needed, in the cosmology, either as an agent, to make things in the universe happen, or as an authority, to regulate things or set moral or legal standards. If He did occur, He would, like other directors and rulers, not be needed, though He could serve as an example. "But there is no indication of his existence" (CT 2). As in the socio-political sphere, direction by a overseer or ruler is otoise, and only examplary. In paiticular, God is not required to start or wind the universe up. "Everything in the world creates itself without the �63 direction of any creator. Since things create themselves they are unconditioned. This is the norm of the universe.'9 The Tao is not a supernatural personal agency; it is not supernatural, it is certainly not personal, and it is only in a stretched sense "agency". It the Tao includes all-encompassing natural order — a unity in diversity — in which the tao of each is ideally in harmony with the whole, then there is no need to posit a super-Being. Each being follows its course in the whole. Moreover, the appeal to a superpersonal authority, exalted example, or the like, on the one side, or to ethics, on the other, is needed only when people have moved away from the Tao. Everything will work well if a community lives according to the Tao. Thus deontic features are brought in only at disequilibrium — an interesting, but tricky, position. Then too, in formulating norms, appeal is back to framework from which people have diverged. In politics, as in morals, it is deviation from the natural state that represents the problem, quite in contrast again to European political thought of the Hobbes-Locke strain, where the state-of-nature is one of extreme disorder (nasty, brutish, short, etc.). Such a state of-nature is not at all a Taoist natural state; by contrast with mainstream thought, nineteenth century European anarchism adopts a position very similar to Taoism. 10 It is revealing to compare the Taoist picture of deviation from a natural state with Aristotelian model of deviation from the mean, which provides the norm (cf. diagram 4). On the Aristotelian model, the end of all things is seeking well-being, to be achieved by following the Mean. This involves adhering to the Mean in an active rational fashion. Rationality is tied to seeking, to the means. Tao does not require rationality. Tao is sought passively, by letting happen, not actively, by forced efficiency, whereas on the Aristotelian account, the search and aim for the good is active. 9 Kao Hsiang, on Tyu, 330-7. When Hall and others try to argue (like Neo-Taoists) that the Taoist totality is without a beginning - contrary to Hall's other material about Being coming from Nonbeing - what they actually present, and mean, is. without a creative beginning. And that is right: there is no Creano m/h/o as per Genesis. But it is false that there is no cosmogony. There is; and while there is no creation, a making by someone, there is a beginning; see e.g. SB, p.202. 10 In this respect, Hall is right off track (in the last sentence of his paragraph 1). The Taoist point is that naturalness is not such a prominent feature of human affairs, because of the imposition of excess laws, regulation, etc. Taoist sensibility is only bizarre from an erroneous dominant paradigm perspective. �64 DIAGRAM 5. TAOIST MIDDLE/CENTRAL/LITTLE-ACTION WAYS 1. 2. Aristotelian/Confucian/Taoist Taoist contrasting ways mean path, in fuzzy sufficiency cone hard or extreme mountain ways a middle way valley, ravine or river way; easy, natural way Though the ancient transcultural doctrine of the mean, of a middle way, appears explicitly in Lao 7h/ (e.g. 77, also 29), that middle path is arrived at, and taken, differently. The Taoist route is an easy no-action route, a valley way, a path of weakness and little resistance, in line with the general account of following Tao and living and faring well. Tao supplies a set of suggestions and prescriptions for how to live well, as well as a parallel (and controlling) set of propositions about how things happen and proceed ideally. Of course there is a moral purpose in Lao Tzu; the moral purpose is a central one alongside, and inseparable from, the metaphysical purpose, the acquiring of an account of ultimate reality". To what extent then is Taoism open to the accusation of amorality? Since axiology is a crucial part of the world view — evaluations and commendations are freely and extensively offered in the texts — it is not amoral in a generous sense. But the treatment of deontic principles, and of rules of conduct generally is very different. Deontics get into the picture only when there is a lapse or deviation from an ideal natural state (from a t course), 'When the Great Tao declined, the doctrine of humanity and righteousness arose' (LT 18). It depends then, on what counts as "moral" and "amoral". Certainly there are approved and implicitly recommended life-styles, though there are few "oughts' and no (ConfucianKantian) lists of duties. Moreover, unless the preferred Taoist lifestyle merely recommended, not required, Taoism would tall down as insufficiently pluralistic. 3. On the Taoist styie of iife; an environmental hfestyie. According to Lao Tzu, there are some basic elements to living well, for instance 'three treasures' (LT 67; but different overlapping lists are presented, e.g. LT 19). �65 1. Deep love - which can also be taken to involve compassion, pity, commiseration, care, respect and regard, and which includes something close to empathy, deep-penetrating empathy. Sympathy, a main linkage of the European "Enlightenment", does not however capture what is involved: sympathy alone would be too egoistical for Taoism, as it is for Deep Ecology. Deep love is part of the notion of genuine relatedness, not a one-sided "relatedness" or possessiveness (which Taoism rejects). 2. Frugality - a renunciation of excess. But frugality is not impoverishment. Needs are met adequately without deprivation or excess. 3. Modesty or humility - not to dare to be ahead of the world, not to take the lead. In Taoism there is no competitive requirement, but the opposite; such Western desiderata lapse. Rather, one gives up trying to be on top of the pile, or even being in a faster lane. In a Taoist society there are no conspicuous tall poppies. Much else connects with or follows in a loose way, it is assumed, from these three virtues; for instance, courage from deep love, generosity from frugality, a kind of leadership from humility. The arguments for those surprising derivations go like this: 'deep love helps one to aim in the case of attack/And to be firm in the case of defence" (LT 67). Earlier (LT 19) it is taken that proper abandonment of humanistic ethics will mean a return to (what the ethics inadmissibly substitutes for) deep love, a basic valuational relation. But in place of frugality, goes a discarding of profit, and in place of humility an abandonment of conscious sageliness and discarding of immodest (or conventional) wisdom. These changes are, astonishingly, said to be rather superficial and inadequate; so further desiderata, commonly read out of the "treasures"", are adduced: 'Manifest plainness/ embrace simplicity/ reduce selfishness/have few desires" (LT 19). Another element, beyond the three of relatedness, frugality, and not daring to be ahead, is adaptability or sponanteity. This complements the further desiderata. Evidently main ingredients for a simple environmentally sound life-style are highly commended. Lao Tzu might almost have been writing an introduction for Callenbach's environmental handbook, Living Poor wifL or even for Pausacker and Andrews' Living Rener wifL L^^. In Chang Tzu, the pure person is a deep environmentalist:- She is a 'companion' of Nature and 'does not attempt to interfere with it by imposing the way of man upon it". Her goal is 'spiritual emancipation and peace" and derivatively freedom; and her route is 'through knowing the capacity and limitations of one's own nature and adapting it to the universal process of transformation" and thus to the environment (Chan SB p.177). �66 In complementary fashion, opposite "virtues", common in anti-environmental life-styles are condemmed. The Western drives to power, fame, competition, possessions, excess commodities, useless (small) knowledge are rejected by Taoism (along with "Mans Affairs"). Thus entrepreneurial activity in business, and also in professional and academic affairs (as well as busyness itself), gets decidedly discouraged. The good life naturally reduces ambitions and desires and avoids competition. Competition is connected with self-assertion and aggressive action. Taoism, while not neglecting limited natural competition, passes aspersions on both, thus fitting neatly with Deep Ecology's prescription for environmental lifestyle and (supposedly derived) policy of non-violence . In place of the Enlightenment and mainstream economic virtue of competition appears the 'virtue of non-competition' (LT 68). Arguments against competition can be developed from other doctrines of Taoism. For example, competition often requires forced or artificial action; thus it violates the doctrine of (non-action), competition is deviant, evidencing deviation from one's tao. The penality for such deviation from the path is not spelled out in Deep Ecology, but it is in Taoism. Another way of putting it (suggested by Clark) is that in competition external rival standards are imposed on Tao, presumably with electrifying results. In any case, according to Taoism, there is no merit in trying to place oneself above another. So there is no value in competition. Fortunately competition can be reduced. If a person does not compete then the world cannot compete with him. A way of life is depicted, based on love, respect and compassion for all things, attuned to what is essential, shedding what is unnecessary, where simplicity and frugality are sought, and excess avoided. This includes, in a nutshell, voluntary simplicity of a deep sort. In Deep Ecology the same idea appears, partly sloganised as "simple in means; rich in ends". Simplicity is not the impoverished life of one who seeks escape. Taoism goes much further in disparaging scarce material means. Do not exact the worth, so that people compete. Do not value rare treasure, so that people do not steal. Gross wealth and prestige are rejected; they are vanities and vexations. But not all is vanity: living well is not. It is a very natural inference, then, from the account of living well to the suggestion that Tao offers a deep form of voluntary simplicity. Voluntary simplicity is a fuzzy notion.^ 11 As Elgin's very profuse account reveals. Strictly much further detail is called for here: namely, a set of conditions is needed, and also elaboration of the Taoist form of frugality, and then connection of the conditions with die three basic elements of Tao - frugality, deep relatedness, and not daring to be ahead in die world. �67 Voluntary simplicity can initially be explained through its two obvious components, simplicity and its voluntary adoption. Simplicity connects with, and is often equated with frugality, as elaborated in Taoism. But whether or not simplicity is obtained from frugality or other Taoist virtues, it plays a direct and important part in the theory, and is in fact modelled, like its metaphysical counterpart, the unconceptualised Whole, by the uncarved block, a central Gestalt of the theory. The block symbolises unity, simplicity and naturalness not spoiled by artifice, metaphysically the wholeness and unity of Tao before conceptual carving, and ethically the wholesome straightforward non-devious life under Te, the 'simple life that is free from cunning and cleverness, is not devoted to the pursuit of profit or marked by hypocritical humanity and righteousness, but is characterised by plainness, tranquility, and purity' (Chan p.14). As to voluntariness, people have a of selecting the way of Tao rather than one of the deviant ways. It is a choice of recipes - frugal vs. excess, relatedness vs. nonrelatedness, tall poppies vs. not daring to be ahead. But one does not attempt to force one's way onto the correct path. To hyperactively seek the path is a deviation in itself. It is deontic to speak of a to find the correct path. 4. Following Tao, non-action, Te and Self-realization. Part of the Taoist route to an environmental lifestyle and to "self-realization" consists in acquiring the practice of non­ action, in terms of non-assertion, non-aggression, non-destruction, etc. commonly translated as 'non-action', is thereby rendered a dialectic notion, for it does not exclude action and in a sense is action. To avoid such dialectical overtones, wzz-w^z is sometimes rendered 'not acting wilfully' or 'not acting artificially' or 'acting naturally'; it is better transcribed as 'without forcing' or 'no forced (or coercive) action'.^ Construed in this fashion, wM-wez is not an extraneous awkward addition to Taoism, but an integral part, which emerges from other features of the theory, namely those of following natural low-action ways. For non­ action is the "activity" of letting one's tao drift or flow into line with the overall Tao (so arrows in diagram 3 are aligned). What is commended is, in the correct circumstances, pacific action, of letting happen (e.g. letting die), as opposed to aggressive, extraverted action (e.g. killing), forced action upsetting natural ways. Similarly for other *No-nos; the "no 12 An illuminating philological comparison of activity with anarc/zz.wi is developed by Ames, pp.342-3. The sympathy between [them] lies in their common reference to activity performed in the absence of coercively determined constraints ...'. As Ames observes, the comparison operates not only at the political and ethical levels, but bears upon cosmology also, negating a coercive boss or planner in the beginning of things. For an integrated treatment of wzz-principles, which generally reject forms of imposition and control, see Hall pp.59-60. �68 desires" directive, for instance, is a piquant shorthand for 'no impure desires' (Chan p.13), i.e. for no unsatisfactory or anti-te desires. Non-action accordingly does not require literally no action, but only actions in accord with ideal nature, so ruling out actions contrary to undisturbed Tao. It may appear that perennial problems, alleged to haunt Taoism (and intensified in Stoicism), are induced. For example, if all is Tao, and Tao is natural, how can there be unnatural activity? Or differently, if nothing can depart from Tao, how can there be unspontaneous actions, or any violation of /yoznAy in an ideal, natural, direction. It does not Tao, however, is a source which only all individual paths, which can deviate from ideal or natural paths. Thus deviant activity is not excluded, unspontaneous and ill-organised activity by individuals is in no way ruled out; and forced, coercive and nature­ destroying activities are all too common.^ Non-action as policy generally implies non-interference, when things have not been damagingly disturbed. It implies letting things take their own natural course; letting Being be, as Deep Ecologists would say, with basically "hands off' practice and management. Unforced action in practice is well illustrated by examples of going with the flow (cf. diagram 4). One main example of going with the flow is cutting meat. The Chef does not encounter bones. He takes the meat apart effortlessly in the same way that an athlete does things effortlessly, with little waste action. Going with the flow can however involve a lot of activity, as with the man swimming easily in a raging torrent below the waterfall, or as in sailing and trimming to the wind. At a personal level, non-action lies in such things as not striving to put oneself above others, in foregoing competition, in simplicity, frugality, and adherence to the mean. Evidently this removes a range of normally accepted social activities. Flexibility, and suppleness, and even weakness, belong to the centre (or mean), to the valley way. In Tao these qualities are associated with life; the inflexible and the rigid are associated with the dead. This can be visualized as a range of activities associated with the process of coming into being and passing out of being, in which the pre-life and the post-life are dead. The central time, like the centre, is flexible and supple; not hard, stiff and inflexible. All this carries a social message as well as an individual one. After things reach their prime they grow old, which means they become contrary to Tao. What is contrary to Tao soon perishes. After prime a thing moves towards rigidity. 13 When 'all activities follow their specific principles, that is nature' (SB p.202); deviation from Nature accordingly occurs, namely when some activities do not follow their principles. As for destruction, 'Do not let man destroy Nature' (SB p.207). �69 But Taoism does not accept Western cultural notions of primeness. Primeness is not a matter of a certain juvenile physical or sporting prowess or peak. It takes a long time to reach a practice approximating Tao. Socrates died in his prime, although by Western standards he was an old man. An important, but retrograde, cultural shift has occurred in modern Western culture. The doyens of Deep Ecology are old(er) men by Western standards. A supreme goal in Deep Ecology, both for individuals and systems, societies and such like, is self-realisation (again capitalised in the overall case). Self-realisation is a modem European idea, not found in Taoism, and indeed incompatible with it and all older non­ maximizing wisdoms which incorporate theories of adhering to the Mean. For Self­ realisation, as understood and explained (of course the account could ahistorically be amended to a satisizing one), is a maximizing prescription applied to the aggregated interests of separate self, inflation of a typically egoistic concept not found in Taoism. But although Deep Ecology's ideal of Self-realisation would be rightly queried in Taoism, there is a group of associated goals to be found in Taoism: namely, attaining enlightenment and tranquility, following Tao, cultivation of parallels that between cultivation of virtue or and the contrast between self-realisation and Self-realisation and %, great Since The main objective of the (Chan p.ll), it is is the that displaces self-realisation on the Taoist scheme. Complementary to Tao is Te, and to tao is te. Whereas tao is the directed source of a thing, te is the matching or unfolding of a thing. It is a directed and (in principle favourably) developing, perfecting; hence the standard translation of as 'virtue'. Because of its potentiality to reach a (good) goal, a rival translation as 'power' has some currency; it is a directed force ybr good (or evil). The program of tao supplies the direction of matching te. So a thing can follow its tao (and thereby follow Tao) by cultivating te, by practising positive virtue, by choosing a lifestyle of deep simplicity. The directives for a good individual life are accordingly commonly given in terms of individual te, and it is te (rather than Tao) that generally appears individualised. As self-realisation in Deep Ecology is not restricted to individuals, so te and tao are not. The society as well as the individual has a tao and a matching te. Taoism is neither individualistic nor atomistic, but systemic and holistic. Thus groups or societies have their own taos and the collection is related to the overall Tao. Social insects perhaps provide a conspicuous example of the social tao. The example transfers to overly rigid social forms, such as bureaucracies, and also to military societies which are obsessed with security. (Taoism is fairly lateralist in its thinking, with much inferential movement by association.) �70 But security is not obtained by being secure as in military security, which is characteristically a fortified security. In peace people are open to danger but secure in another sense. The materialist world, excessively propped up by possessions, Taoism treats with disdain; it does not equate security with material security. Each being has its own tao, its own ideal naturally-programmed path of self­ development or unfolding. Correspondingly, there is an immanent telos, a te, a goal-directed virtuous developing, for each thing. By each following its own nature, all follow nature. Our self-development does not then interfere damagingly with your self-development. How does this happen? Through natural (again invisible) inter-organisation, my proper self­ development cannot impede your proper self-development. Taoism is decidedly short on details of such mutual adjustment and harmonious integration, but certain it happens naturally - as it may, for instance, through the evolution of co-operation.^ So there is, or need be, no vacillation between following one's own path and taking care not to interfere with the paths of others, between individualistic and relational paths. Perhaps in Taoism the modem problems are skirted rather than solved. But the Taoist result is integration, a harmonious combination of plans, without domination, whereas the pattern of Western relations operates (as in Hegel) through hierarchical ordering and domination. 5. Anti-patriarchal aspects: feminism, powerlessness, peace. Taoism advances other models, than those concerning age, which are strange by entrenched Western standards - such as demotion of strength and power, and the place and importance ascribed to characteristically feminine and child-like elements in living well and achieving Taoist self­ realisation, te. It was prepared for ecofeminism in a way that Deep Ecology was not. Taoism is highly critical of patriarchy, accepting in effect main anti-chauvinistic themes of ecofeminism. By contrast, there has been continuing conflict between Deep Ecology and ecofeminism. In its formative programmatic days Deep Ecology did not recognise legitimate feminine aspirations or sexual domination, and it took no due account of the organising theme 14 resolution of this problem can now make a good start with Axelrod's investigations of evolving cooperation. Cooperation can begin with small clusters. It can thrive with rules that are nice, provocable, and somewhat forgiving. And once established in a population, individuals using such discriminating strategies can protect themselves from invasion. The overall level of cooperation tends to go up and not down. In other words, the machinery for the evolution of cooperation contains a ratchet (Axelrod p.177). �71 of ecofeminism, the striking parallel between the domination of women and the domination of nature. But Taoism even incorporates an interesting early form of affirmative action. In Taoism, the traditional Chinese balance between ya/rg and ym swings, when in disequilibrium it does, towards the y/n. Quite in contrast with the Western paradigm, one properly aims at yzn (which represents the complex of supposedly feminine features) rather than at yang (symbolising, among other things, the masculine complex). There is an emphasis on female and child-like, features, and, as in ym-yang dovetailing, integration of gender features. There is, nonetheless, some stereotyping of male and female features in Tao (as there is generally in feminism itself), with males allegedly active and female weaker and more passive. It is in this way that the emphasis on yin is reached, from desiderata such as humility and weakness. Still, though historic Taoism hardly admits of degendering, rigidly defined sex roles are alien to Tao sensibilities. People develop according to their own tao. They can develop typically male, or female, features or features of both. One who rigidly accounts these masculine and feminine features, speaks from without the framework of Tao. Historically, where it began to be put into practice, Taoism worked for sexual freedom and liberation of women. The Child also serves as a model (LT 55), and there are certain components of Childhood liberation in Taoism: in the emphasis on freedom, in the attack on learning and schooling, and so on. The reason the child is a model is because it has spontaneity, it is direct and natural, and lacks power or strength. Tao rejects institutions and societies based on power. Infants are not ruled by a longing for power, instead all actions are spontaneous. Active force, like power, is in general castigated. To force growth is deviant, destroying harmony. To stop growth is deviant. "For the mind to employ the vital force without restraint means violence" (replacing "mind" with intentionality would give a better picture of what is meant). There is a significant difference between force and violence. To employ intentionally destructive force is to do violence. To so force things is condemned. To remain in harmony with things one does not so force things or practice violence. There is a non-interference principle at work, which also indicates types of non-interference that are excluded. Not only is the Taoist opposition to violence well-known, but there is a blistering attack on militarism and warfare in 7zM (e.g. LT 31, 30, 46); "war is a symptom of the decline of man' (Chan p.5). Given the hostility to war, it has been regarded as passing strange, not to say puzzling, that Lao Tzu sketches military tactics and other allegedly devious political strategies. The strategies are however but application of Taoist principles and techniques to �72 warfare, politics and elsewhere. Nothing excludes application of these techniques to what are accounted, in general, unnecessary evils (which must sometimes, on other Taoist grounds, be countered). Nor, to meet the main criticism, need any deceit or deviousness be involved; nor is it. The legalist tactic, Tn order to grasp, it is necessary first to give" (LT 36), is said to involve 'an element of deceit' 'undeniably', and 'worse' is 'morally questionable' (Chan p.17). But in order for me to grasp your hand in a normal handshake, it is necessary first for me to give my hand. There is no deceit here, nothing morally questionable. All the tactics permit of benign construals, of a Taoist kind. Consider, for instance, Tn order to contract, it is necessary first to expand' (LT 36). In order to bend a copper pipe to the intended angle, it is better to bend it first further than required. The transformation of water to ice (both favoured natural items for symbolic purposes) neatly illustrates the Taoist principle (which is however hardly necessary), and shows softness and weakness turned hardness and strength. 6. Environmental theory and practice, and environmental problems and difficulties, such as quietism and security. As on deeper ecological theories, traditional Western models for human relations to the natural world are one and all rejected. The dominant view, of domination, of human dominion over the earth and its other inhabitants, is not merely roundly and soundly rejected; the metaphysical creationist base and the superiority myths upon which it is regularly founded are also removed. Therewith also the bases for the lesser, and rather more benign, Western models are also undercut There is no greater boss or purpose for humans to serve or act as steward to; besides stewardship, which is both hierarchical and implicitly patriarchical in cast, typically involves active interference in producing products. The idea of perfecting nature also implies active interference, when however nature is more or less in order as it is, and requires no "perfecting". Thus stewardship and perfectionist views fall along with domination and dominion. Taoism offers instead a non-interference model for relations to nature, a letting-be approach, with "hands off' management and associated lifestyles, several features of which we have already glimpsed. A most stoking feature of Taoism is its environmental depth, its strong opposition to then prevailing (and still prevailing) humanism and human chauvinism. Heaven and earth are not humane They regard all things as straw dogs [i.e. rather worthless strict ritual objects]. The sage is not humane [or human chauvinist]. He regards all people as straw dogs (LT.5). Because of such tough pronouncements, reiterated and reinforced in Chang Tzu (e.g. CT. 2), Taoism is sometimes said to be predicated on anti-humanism. But it is not 'a dehumanizing �73 philosophy", it does not deny compassion; what transpires is that concern and value are not confined to humans or their affairs, but include the natural and the metaphysical. The human is no longer the criterion of what is good or true. The traditional idea that a supreme supernatural being ... is the ruler of the universe is replaced by the doctrine that the universe exists and operates by itself. When [Lao Tzu] says that "Heaven and Earth are not humane", he means in a narrow sense that they are imparm?/, but in a broader sense that Nature is no longer governed according to g&m&izTZy ... In one stroke he removes Heaven [or God] and man as the standards ot things and replaces them with Nature (Chan p.10, italics added; also p.107). What is rejected with the rejection of humanism and humanistic ethics is human chauvinism. For being "humane" means accepting the chauvinistic assumptions of conventional society and remaining within the narrow sphere of interests of the human species. There is no unbridgeable gulf between humans and other creatures such as Western thought has tried to manufacture. 'Put a halter around the horse's head and put a string through the cow's nose, that is man" (SB p.207). In place of humanism, Taoism adopts a doctrine of impartiality. 'Embrace all things without inclining to this way or that way" (SB p.206). He who is enlightened 'is impartial" (LT 6); 'he has no partial love for anyone" (SB p.201) he does not bestow undue or special favours upon humans; he aims to be one with Nature. Impartiality does not imply equality. Despite the received heading of chapter 2 of the CTxmg 'the equality of all things" (the literal 'levelling all things" is nearer the mark), and the standard inference to some Taoist doctrine of parity, no simplistic and difficult theme of equal value of all things is ventured - nor any theme of parity for some favoured subclass thereof such as living things. (Though there is some accent on prime life, there is not the same stress on /i/i? in Taoism that there is in Deep Ecology, nor the bizarre extension of "life" to include waterfalls, mountains and other striking natural objects.) What is offered, instead of much in the way elucidation of impartiality, is (again like deeper ecological theory) a doctrine of identification. Wide identification and wide solidarity does promote impartiality , and counter chauvinism. Egoism, for instance, involves discounting all but oneself, humanism all but humans, and requires a species solidarity with human things. But wider identification puts a stop to such discounting (e.g. in favour of one's own or species's interests, as exhausting value) and to such class-restricted solidarity. For wider identification reveals that interests, desires, values and so forth, are not so individual or class restricted. Many exquisite examples of identification, and the processes by which it may be achieved, are developed, e.g. with a butterfly, by dream access (SB p.190), with rivers and seas, and wider again, by the proper meditative process, with the dusty world - 'Become one with the dusty world/ This is called profound identification" (LT 56, also 4) - and perhaps wider yet, and �74 ultimate, with ideal Nature, and thus in complete accord with Tao (e.g. LT 16). No less striking than the criticism of humanism, Taoism makes similar sort of attack on traditional education and on the accumulation of knowledge. The case against traditional education, especially rote "learning", is straightforward; it reinforces entrenched practices and prejudices, e.g. those of humanism. The criticism does not of course imply that there would be no regular learning or habituation processor, such as those encouraged traditional indoctrination methods. More perplexing is the attack on knowledge acquisition, though in part it is of the same sort, against an entrenched knowledge in the hands of a power group. But, in an organic society, knowledge is integrated into the community and not rarified into a commodity held or controlled by a priesthood or a class of intellectuals or literati. Knowledge is power; such power is removed from the hands of a few by making it a community good. This goes beyond Deep Ecology, in that it questions and rejects experts. Indeed in its criticism of schooling, narrow expertise, and the like, Taoism resembles and anticipates the position taken by Illich rather than features of Deep Ecology. The move against informational power also points to the difference between wisdom (not unequivocally approved) and knowledge, a difference recorded in Taoism as in most older wisdom. However one of the indicated Taoist arguments against mere knowledge illustrates an a//-to-any fallacy. We can't reasonably (or possibly) aim for all knowledge - by the unlimited objective or limited beings argument (see CT 2) - so we can't reasonably aim for any, and shouldn't, so it appears to be suggested. Another line of argument looks more promising. Life has a limit, but knowledge is without limit. For the limited to pursue the unlimited is futile. However the argument only reveals limits to the accumulation of knowledge, not its pointlessness or undesirability. In any case, in the end the superficially anti-intellectual trend of Taoism shifts ground; it is directed against other targets than pure knowledge: against slickness and cleverness, against devious and crafty uses of knowledge (LT 3), against counter-productive acquiring of knowledge or cunning, and its teaching. The messy situation is tidied up a bit in the CTnxng where an apposite distinction is made between knowledge, the castigated sorts, which is inquisitive, partial, discriminative or merely analytic, and knowledge, which is "leisurely and at ease", comprehensive, extensive, and synthetic (cf. Chan p.20). Even so, original Taoism hardly seems to cater for adequate access of information, and the removal of (perhaps debilitating) igornance, concerning health and welfare, careful and damaging practices, choices and alternatives. The critique of small knowledge and narrow expertise extends to encompass a critique of technology. In Taoism, technology was assigned a very limited role at best. (Hence, png of the complex reasons for the delayed development of technology in China.) Certain forms �75 of technology were, if not rejected outright (as Clark contends), at least strongly discouraged. Thus, 'Even if there are ships and carriages, none will ride in them. Even if there are arrows and weapons, none will display them" (LT 80).15 More generally, while high and dangerous technology is set aside, even more appropriate technology cannot be accepted uncritically. Lao Tzu recognized clearly that even low impact technology may destroy human practices and conventions constructive to a community. Nor was the connection of technology with population neglected. Given a small country and few inhabitants, if provided with a laboursaving device he would not use it. There are dominating and non-dominating forms of technology. There is enjoined an avoidance of artificial wants and desires, and correspondingly a shunning of replacing labour with nothing at all. Taoism exhibits a firmer grasp of some of the problems of technology, even more appropriate labour-saving technology, than recent positions like Deep Ecology.^ The Taoist approach also demolishes the so-called iron law of technology, that there is no stopping technology or its progress, whatever the merits of the "Law" (they are not so conspicuous), Taoism reveals that such social laws are highly paradigm-dependent, and do not withstand transfer from the dominant Western paradigm everywhere else. Many other elements of a sensitive and sophisticated ecological position feature in Taoism. There is an elaborate and sensitive account of Nature, from which it emerges plainly that Nature is not a mere instrument or means for other ends and not a resource, but something of great value in and for itself. Nature is something to be cherished, allowed to take its own course, not to be interfered with or destroyed by humans. Indeed the dominant view is reversed; value for humans is achieved above all by identification with Nature, and by 15 Some verses of LT, of which this one example, support a rival, sinister, interpretation. According to this sinister interpretation (pointed out to us by David Garrett, a student at the University of Auckland), the LT represents not what it has been taken to be, but a work addressed, like Machiavelli's 77%? Prince, to a Prince, on how to pacify and control the people. Thus weapons, though held and sharpened, will not be displayed; wealth, though inequitably distributed, will not be shown; the people will be kept ignorant, through lack of information and education; and so on. Fortunately many other verses tell decisively enough against this interpretation. In particular, Taoism denies the need for a Ruler. While under satisfactory arrangements there will be those who are much better attuned to Tao, even sages, they are in position to rule as to impose upon others. Moreover should they endeavour to do so, thay would jeopardise or negate their own accord with Tao. Authoritarian rule Machiavelli-style is decidedly politically counterproductive. 16 The claim promoted recently that Taoism is an evident home for alternative technology, and prescribes as much, is rather naive in the light of Taoist texts. �76 following natural ways. (Paradoxical reversal is a feature of Taoism; even castigated Western aims, such as leadership, fame and so on, are in fact achieved, when they are, not by direct aim, but by letting the reverse happen. So it is with what control of Nature is required; non­ intervention and non-action is the approach. Sufficient control is gained, it is said, when assertive attempts to impose it are abandoned.) While such concepts as bioregionalism is not to be encountered in explicit forms in Taoism, their bases and many other recently fashionable environmental ideas are: living in place is certainly present (LT 80); doing things locally and remaining local, while being attuned to the universe and retaining global connections, is certainly advocated, underwriting the Deep Ecology maxim of "think globally, act locally . While there is then very much in Taoism that fits easily and revealingly with deeper environmental theories, Taoism also leaves puzzles or points to residual problems. Not all the supposed problems are however genuine; and not all the puzzles are bequeathed to contemporary theory. Illustrating both is the problem of quietism, which is at bottom the issue of reconciling "non-action" with environmental and social improvement and action. How would a Taoist resistance against depredation, a Taoist defence of environment go, and fare, given its strong (alleged) emphasis on "don't bother'? In-built harmony and quietism do not allow sufficiently for conflict. In part there is only a problem because of misrepresentation of Taoism, which is not committed to a don t bother attitude to environmental destruction: quite to the contrary, humans should not be allowed to destroy nature. Furthermore, there are many Taoist tactics and techniques, using weakness to overcome strength, letting the flow of nature demolish the forces of environmental destruction, and the like, which can be applied in environmental resistance.^ Quietism is accordingly a misrepresentation of the practice, and something of a misnomer. How can Tao work in a world where there is scarcity almost everywhere? Very simply, Taoism holds that there is no genuine problem of plentitude; things are not scarce, there is an abundant outpouring from nature. There is scarcity only because of violations of the t requirements of Tao (rather as some claim there is food scarcity even now, with present gigantic human populations, only because of politico-economic mismanagement). Tao will serve to restore plentitude (LT 77). Rather than a collection of scarce resources, Nature is represented as an virtually infinite storehouse of boundless wealth. 17 Use of the power of water affords a prime exampie; cf LT 15. No-action adaptations of old Chinese martiai arts and strategies presumably offer more direct methods of defence and resistance. �77 Does Tao allow for the prospect and problems of too many people? Can the greater Tao keep pace with the requirements of many too many individual taos, even if those individual requirements are in line with the greater Tao?is No doubt in those times, and most historical times when epidemics and plagues were almost as regular as droughts, when evolution still operated on human species, there wasn't more than a hypothetical or remote future problem. It seems plain however that Taoism did not face the environmental problems such as those of too many people and incremental resource degradation. The texts say little about soil degradation and deforestation, long major environmental problems in China. By contrast, in the West, Plato was properly concerned about deforestation of Greece. Nor does Taoism have much to offer directly on main contemporary issues of animal liberation, species loss, urban disgustification, and so forth, though some of the problems are hardly new. Historic Taoism too was a product of its times, adjusted to what were seen as problems. 7. The extent of political anarchism: hierarchy, domination, and rulers in Taoism. In looking to Taoism for political illumination, an early query is likely to be: To what (damaging) extent is Taoism, and the work of Lao Tzu in particular, anarchistic? It explicitly addresses a ruler, and takes for granted the existence of a state. But the format of the Lao 7zM may have been obligatory; for Taoism also hopes for "the absence of princes". Nonetheless, overtly, Taoism is not anarchistic. But although literally archist, almost everything in the work corresponds to anarchist sentiments, and it has struck responsive chords in anarchists. Not surprisingly then, some have argued that, despite appearances, the work is anarchistic, and disposes of the state and the ruler "when taken in a political sense (thus Clark). What has happened here is that anarchism is confused with an important Taoism sketches an early version of monarchically organised anakyrism; Clark (in his book) a late version of variant, meaning practice, policy and so on ecological anakyrism. If Taoism assumes a ruler then it is open to the charge of not being a suitably natural - way - unless there is a no-hands ruler. But a satisfactory ruler does not coerce, and in fact does no regulation. It seems clear that Lao Tzu assumes a monarchical style of society without coercion. The basic idea is that it is alright (if maybe costly) to have or inherit a perhaps superfluous ruler, so long as there is no coercion. The "ruler" is merely a planner, a 18 It is tempting to speculate that the greater Tao would serve to limit the number of actual individual taos, as certainly happened in most historic times. On a market model, supply and demand would be on a natural parity. �78 guide, an example. "Laws" are not backed up with coercion. Carving the block coercively is seen as counterproductively breaking up the community. Control or domination breaks the natural order of society, coercion removes the basic elements of voluntary simplicity; they are appropriately met with resistance. Government is said to be a sort of disorder. Government is indeed a main source of disorder, where government means coercive government. People are difficult to keep in order because those above interfere. Indeed this is the only reason they are difficult to keep in order (LT 57 and 58). The more laws there are, the more disorder is possible, the more disorder there is. The more ways order is attempted, and more ways there are to have disorder. Natural order is the way, the recommended way. Imposed order is counterproductive. There is reciprocal resistance to the imposition of deviant order. This would hold even if social organisers tried to impose Tao itself. To attempt to impose it would be to go astray. Such points help to explain why little satisfactory detail is given on social and political organisation. For the requisite organisation, such as it is, follows natural patterns and natural social structures (whichever they are). No doubt details would be (in the style of Aristotelian ethics) largely descriptive of what happens in cases where social affairs were functioning well. Even so, rather more needs to be said about how society accommodates "deviants" of various sorts, as to how unsocial and unenvironmental activities are curtailed, what support structures natural arrangements afford, and so on. Of course these things are attended to locally by society, not by a remote and mostly indifferent state. As in modem anarchism, an important distinction is taken for granted between (local) society and the state or empire. (By contrast, in contemporary texts, especially those of economic orientation, the state is often conflated with society, social roles are transferred to the state, and it is even claimed that what society wants is what the state does!) In Taoism, as in nineteenth century social anarchism, society functions along natural lines; the state is essentially otiose. Society is self-regulating. No doubt small markets that do not yield excess profits flourish, no doubt craftspeople - abound and live well but not extravagantly, no doubt local people make inputs to the arrangements of their social affairs. Most of these sorts of background details go largely unstated. But some significant features of social practice are revealed; for example (LT 3), the worthy are not exalted or rewarded, competition is not promoted, there is no unnecessary accumulation of possessions, consumerism and the manufacturing ot wants is discouraged. In short, all the main approved features of modern economic behaviour - the sources of greed, discrimination and strife according to Taoism (Chan p. 103) - are gently set aside, they do not represent natural, or satisfactory, ways. �79 Just as nature can operate by itself without a director or boss, so a confederation can run itself without an emperor or president. True, there may be one or more rulers. However a Taoist ruler/sage "exercises" non-dominating authority. But obviously, since he exercises no authority, some of the stuffing has been removed from notion of authority. The ruler/sage has no personal power. He imposes nothing on others. He transmits worthwhile tradition but does not impose it. He is said to transmit it through eternal edicts, but these are principles proferred or advice at best. He does not attempt to legislate or require the good. Society is like the individual, it cannot be coerced into doing right things. And it should not be! At work is a teleological model of "transcendent" good, a bit like a natural law theory, but even more like recent deep environmental theory. No more than co-operating individuals in a social matrix are required for the good. A ruler, or organiser, does not attempt to require it for society. He takes no action and the people are transformed by an exemplar ruler. He is a ruler on a rather more Gandhian model, but even so not a visible charismatic leader. Unlike contemporary models, the ruler is not a jet-setter or super-consumer; he is not usually seen on television, and perhaps not seen at all, but only known about, or his or her existence merely rumoured. As with "authority", but even more so, other social and political terms thus get drastically turned around, and even subverted. The "empire ceases to be coercive power, but turns into a natural super-regional order under general guidance of the Tao. Possessing the empire" even comes to mean something like attunement to Te. The "power" of a ruler is not coercive. It is exemplary. The best rulers are those whose existence is merely known by the people. Thus they are not rulers or leaders, but models for personal development. (For Deep Ecology the corresponding roles would be those oi eco-saints.) They are not apart from society, but central to society's ideals. Society could have a lot of "rulers" (kingly people) or could consist entirely of "kingly people". Like Christ, a taoist ruler leads from within or behind. The people seeing the life of the sage choose to do likewise. An ideal ruler is a non-interfering exemplar ruler. The people bec&me, if you like, ruler-groupies. The sage understands the fundamentals of Tao, and practices accordingly. So Taoism reinterprets the notion of "ruler", equating ruler with supreme exemplar, such as the sage. The meaning attributed to "ruler" becomes that of following Tao. The ruler is one who deviates little from the Tao. This is his "power"". Someone who deviates little from the Tao is kingly, that is, to observe another subversion of terminology, he shows an allembracing impartiality. The sage and the "ruler" are but two important examples of an ideal life. A more general model is also sketched (notably in LT 8) ot the best type of person — a person 'who in his dwelling loves the earth", but also loves humanity, and order, and �80 competence, and profundity. While Taoism is decidedly short on structural details for organising large human populations, which are no longer self-regulating (by contrast with large dense populations of modem penguins), it nonetheless transmits significant political messages, which deep theory needs to assimilate. Taoism has been attacked, like other similar alternative political forms (e.g. Morris's social anarchism and Illich's convivial society), as being conservative, as seeking anachronistically to turn the clock back to some ancient village communal life-style, better left far behind. Such attacks do not cohere. Such considerable changes, as Taoism envisages, from the status quo, can hardly be represented as conservative. To be sure, there are conservative elements in Taoism, as in the most radical environmental movements, for instance the desire to conserve elements of the natural environment that the "conservatives" wish to exploit or destroy. ('Conservative', like many a political terms in heavy popular use, breaks down under conceptual overload.) While backward-looking glances at an idealised past is a conservative tendency, anathema to forward-looking progressives who prefer to leave the past obscured in a heavy cloud of dust, nonetheless, the past, with its actual features, its blocked possibilities, and its paths not taken, remains important to all main political persuasions. Against anarchistic positions, progressives like to lodge the charges that the past never was ideal, that virtually everything that matters (not, surely, forests inhabited by wild creatures) was far worse than the enlightened present, #776? that anarchism has never really been achieved in the past. Again the charges do not cohere. (Proof is left as an exercise; but for hints, see EE). It should be evident that Taoism was, and remains, a radical position. It represents a severe attack on mainstream civilization, on themes of the dominant social paradigm. It discards or upsets many mainstream values, and most mainstream ways of organising and doing things. It holds up instead examples of very different lifestyles as much preferable, and offers a very mean path, simple and modest, between insufficiency and excess- APPENDIX. Doctrines of Four: the four great things and the fourfold way. Running in a striking way through the history of thought are certain related doctrines of four — of four great, important or valuable, things, whose basic interrelations are fundamental to the whole doctrine involved. Consider first three, plainly related, fourfolds, of much interest in deeper ecological thinking:- theWay/Tao I God(s) I Whole/Gaia � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Draft Papers Description An account of the resource Sylvan's literary executor encountered an archive in which “all his projects were current", since manuscripts were undated and unattributed. Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document TAOISM AND DEEP (ECOLOGICAL) THEORY: a preliminary object-theoretic investigation. There is a remarkable, and remarked, convergence of themes of deeper ecological positions, such-as Deep Ecology, with those ot Taoism, i Given that Deep Theory has not received adequate elaboration in important directions, particularly metaphysical and political directions, the older wisdom of Tao can be profitably drawn upon to elaborate and enrich deeper positions. Where Taoism does diverge from Deep Ecology (our working example since it is presently the best known deep environmental theory) concerns some of the weakest and most controversial parts of the Deep Ecology platform, such as the theme of Biospheric Egalitarianism, the equality of all (living) beings.2 Thus Taoism can also provide a base for 1 The connections are remarked in some of the prime texts for Deep Ecology, for which see Devall and Sessions (and therein p.100), and also CD. Not all the connections assumed in Deep Ecology sources are correct however; in parucular Taoism does not deductively deliver the platform of Deep Ecology. At most it informs the platform, which it would, if taken seriously, after. 2 A critical exposition of Deep Ecology, which surveys the main themes, is ventured in Sylvan CD. In several significant respects, Taoism offers a (retrospective) improvement on Deep Ecology, being free of the excessive junk Deep Ecology has quickly accumulated. Fortunately for those averse to intellectual junk such as environmental thought tends to collect (though no doubt for later building or recycling), Deep Ecology is but one deep ecological position. Another, presently being worked out in some detail, is Deep Green Theory, the ecological part of a more comprehensive Deep Theory, which is intended to cover a much broader region of philosophical ideas. Deep Theory includes, for instance, what adds to the depth, depth relevant logic, intenzional object theory, and deep pluralism. As will begin to become evident, Taoism proves to be a very congenial position for Deep Theory, and for Deep Green Theory in particular. Thus it can most usefully be applied to illuminate Deep Theory, as well as adding to its historical depth. But in this preliminary investigation, we become ^o caught up in interpreting and explaining authentic Taoism, that we do not get to much explicit elaboration of Deep Green Theory. A corollary we want to draw from our investigations (preliminary though they are) bears upon, and when developed may help to eradicate, a commonplace Western complacency and smug superiority. A widespread, though usually subterranean, view in philosophy is that the East really has little or nothing to offer. This view even extends far into environmental philosophy (cf. Rolston's put-down). It is often part of cultural chauvinism; Western scientific industrial culture doesn't have much to learn from other, generally more backward or primitive or scientifically crude, cultures. The West is the cultural pace-setter, with the information, resources, etc. Observe however that a nothing-new-to-offer position need not reject old theories as worthless and not worth bothering with; in less brash form it can allow 51 correction and adjustment of Deep Ecology, and an impressionistic guide to a more satisfactory and richer deep theory. Taoism is throughout decidedly ecologically oriented; a high level of ecological consciousness is built into it, a main recipe amounting to FoZZow Mxmrg as the basis of practice. It is also, so it transpires, a very congenial philosophic way­ station for ecologically-concerned intellectual travellers weary of mainstream Anglo-American and Continental philosophies which inform and reinforce the dominant Western social paradigm. Both for background, and in order to arrive immediately in the thick of the comparison, we outline a main part of the Deep Ecology platform in (typical) slogan form and contrast it on the one side with predominant Western attitudes and platitudes and on the other side with Taoism. TABLE 1. DEEP ECOLOGY CONTRASTED WITH THE DOMINANT PARADIGM AND WITH TAOISM DOMINANT (WESTERN) PARADIGM DEEP ECOLOGY (DE) TAOISM Domination over nature Harmony with nature Elaboration of DE Nature a resource; intrinsic value confined to humans Natural environment valued for itself Much for DE; "humanism" rejected Humane supremacy Biocentric egalitarianism Differs from DE; wide impartiality Ample resources/substitutes Earth supplies limited Supplies ample Material economic growth a predominant goal Non-material goals, especially self-realization Following Tao-te that there is interest and merit in historical and reconstruction exercises. What it cannot allow is news, such as News from Tao. Thus it does clash with what we argue, that such deep theories as Deep Ecology can benefit and learn from Taoism. Taoism offers a striking timetested theory upon which Deep Theory can draw, an ongoing source of inspiration and wisdom. Taoism texts may lack the detail of prime Western (non-industrial) sources such as the texts of Aristotle or Plato; but they offer a much more congenial source for Deep Theory. 52 Consumerism Doing with enough/ recycling Doing with enough (recycling inappropriate) Competitive lifestyle Cooperative lifeway Much as for DE: voluntary simplicity Centralized/urban centred/ national focus Decentralized/bioregional /neighbourhood focus As for DE Power structure hierarchical Non-hierarchical/ grassroots democracy Hierarchy without power structure High technology Appropriate technology Limited technology The contrasts tabulated are of limited accuracy, because condensed to slogans, and also limited because much of importance is omitted, especially from Taoism (which as so far portrayed only reflects themes of Deep Ecology). In what follows several of the contrasts will be expanded, and main omissions rectified. The richness of Taoism, the philosophical topics traversed to which nothing corresponds in Deep Ecology, will mean that Deep Ecology is often left far behind? Deep Ecology offers however a different perspective on Taoism than has been arrived at before. Not only can Taoism further Deep Ecology, then, but the compliment can be returned. A comparison of Taoism with deep ecological theory can hardly be our only objective; as an essential preliminary, much effort is directed at systematising Taoism. In the course of this outside endeavour, we succumbed to a rather too familiar taunting challenge: to draw something philosophically solid, of contemporary relevance, from the ancient Taoist tests. A key element in our attempt to pull off something mind-expanding has been an object- theoretic interpretation of perhaps the most vexing part of elusive Taoist theory, the "metaphysics". Taoism lends itself to natural systematisation in terms of noneism (the brand 3 We have not attempted anything approaching a fuii coverage of features of Taoism of contemporary philosophical interest; but a coverage is an eventual eco-theoretic objective. The main works repay repeated fossicking. There is, for instance, a significant doctrine of opposites in Taoism, iikely /tot the same as that in the main Chinese tradition, which needs fathoming, and linking with common ancient themes of balance and dynamic equilibrium of healthy systems. Every sort of thing, every category has an opposite, which furthermore interacts with its dual. In theory, the opposition appears to be tied to a (questionable) contrast theory of meaning. In practice, the opposites tend to be reconciled or harmonized, but /tor in a Hegelian fashion by ascent, but through taking a middle way (natural compromise rather than dialectic confrontation). 53 of object-theory developed in JB). For not only is the theory woven around certain striking objects - Tao, Te, Tzu-jan, and others - not only does the theory cleverly exploit an objecttheoretic cosmology; but also important, the theory, though remarkedly free of the type of religious trappings and claptrap that ontologically weigh down most older or traditional ideologies, is opposed to and is highly resistant to reductionistic practices. That is, like noneism, Taoism takes a no-rubbish non-reductionist stance. It is in part for such reasons especially that most everything in what it is and neither some other (approved) item nor reducible to such other item - that Taoism avoids the common-sense implausibility and scientific naivety of many a position, old and new: that for instance everything reduces to water or air or fire or matter or energy or superstrings Evidently, in advancing such noneist claims and other claims about what Taoists say or imply, an interpretation is adopted, when often enough other rival interpretations of the central texts are supportable. Indeed such a small body of theoretical work as the basic Taoist tests comprise is far from categorical and is bound to admit of a plurality of non-isomorphic interpretations.^ The main arguments we should offer for the selection we make from the basket of admissible interpretations are these: the interpretation we offer is very straightforward and is mostly an "obvious reading"; for the most part such an interpretation has already been offered, in other connections, by others much better informed than we are about the Chinese texts; and that it is a relevant and important one for deep ecological purposes. Finally we should remark that we are essentially concerned with the systematisation of only the Erst two Taoist texts (LT and CT) and focus upon LT. In brasher moments we are inclined to think that the framework supplied (brushstrokes behind the old master's impressionistic brushstrokes) will enable us to take philosophical account of almost everything in the compact LT; we are not nearly so confident as regards CT. 1. Nature, cosmology, and the character of Tao. Taoism sketches a cosmology while Deep Ecology does not. The cosmology is interestingly at variance with dominant - Western cosmologies. For the universe arises out of nothing. Being arises in accordance with Tao, which precedes existence. Nonbeing precedes Being. Nonbeing is ultimate (according to Chang Tzu) and comes first. 4 There are significant pluralistic lessons for hermeneutics to be drawn from the logical investigations of categoricalness of postulate systems and the typical /a/Zare of categoricalness. 54 All things in the world come from being And being comes from nonbeing (LT 40). The universe had a primeval beginning, coming into existence from nothing (SB p.202). DIAGRAM 1. TAOIST CYCLE OF RETURN (cf. Chan p.173 fn 2). flourishing growth cycle of generated entity reversion NATURE (HEAVEN AND EARTH, or ACTUAL UNIVERSE): Existent, Named, Temporal (FORMING) SOURCE: Nonexistent, Nameless, Eternal Every entity arises out of (material) nothingness and eventually falls back into nothingness all that comes to pass, that is. "All things flourish, but each one returns to its root' (LT 16). The whole, the integrated natural system, is a process of becoming and decay. But the emphasis upon process, evolution and change, upon Nature as flux and transformation, is 5 For a detailed contemporary presentation of such a cosmological cycle, see Sylvan CS. In Neo-Taoism, e.g. Kao Hsiang, such a cycle is disputed, on standard ontological grounds (see e.g. Chan SB, p.335) A serious complication is induced in the Taoist cosmological story by variations on the traditional interpretation of the later verses of LT 1. (On the variations, see Chan p.99 note 5; the linkage of Nonbeing with "no desires" is not however so remote as Chan tries to make out; see LT 37.) The variations (which replace having desires and having no desires by Being and Nonbeing) lead to dialethic complications of a Hegelian cast. For they make Being and Nonbeing ultimately the no doubt because of the becoming and reversion of each generated being to nonbeing. (Becoming is seen by the modem translators Hegelian-style, as the product of Being and Nonbeing.) Of course there is bound to be some dialethic elaboration of Taoism in any case; e.g. Tao itself is both nameless (LT 1) and named (LT 14), though in a slack sense. Thus Tao is both nameless because nonexistent and not fully conceptualisable or describable; and also named, because called "Tao', "the Subtle', etc., and theorisable about. 55 much enhanced in Chang Tzu, over the work of Lao Tzu, where more stress is put upon stability, constancy and equilibrium (cf. Chan p.20, also SB p.177). Overall, it is correct to say, if not highly informative, that Tao is a natural process philosophy, with a keen sense both of and of The novel cosmology — the emergence of what exists from nothing — is made feasible through adoption of rudiments of a theory of objects (in the style much later elaborated by Reid, Meinong and others). Nonbeing, what does not exist, is not formless or empty, an indescribable nullity, as previous Chinese schools had apparently invariably thought (Chan, p.8). On the contrary, it is not devoid of characteristics, but has definite features. Perhaps wisely (if unfortunately from an analytic angle) authentic Taoism is largely silent on such questions as to exactly which features nonexistent items have. But enough is said to reveal how what does not exist — above all Tao — may yet have very distinctive features, while yet lacking other properties (such as existence). Main examples, some repeatedly alluded to, are those of gaps, lacunae, vacant spaces, as with a hollow bowl (LT 4), or empty utensil or window space or lightweight wheel (LT 11), or valley. The unoccupied space of a room for example has definite dimensions, location, and so forth; and its function and utility depends upon its not being occupied (LT 11). Rudiments of object-theory are however coupled with a curiously narrow doctrine of names, perhaps as a concession to rival Chinese schools and with a view to making its nonstandard position devastatingly clear. (This would parallel then the contemporary concession of to mainstream schools, in virtue of which nonexistent objects are not referents; there are no referring terms, "referential names", which signify them.) According to this doctrine of names, only what is a concrete individual and partly at least describable in quite particular ostensive terms is nameable (nor at least nameable). As Wang Pi, an early commentator, indicated, names have a restricted role, naming requiring circumscription, 'the name that can be named point[s] to a particular affair' (p.l). Thus, for example, the main - transcendental notions are not nameable, Tao in particular. Tao, though-a great form , though at least apparently "named" honorifically in several ways, is not named thereby, but is nameless, because not suitably circumscribed, because not a particular (affair). Similarly for the other central notions of Taoism, such as Te; though they can be described, in approximate fashion, they cannot be named. 'Tao', Te' and the like are not (ptimary) 77#/%?.?, but rather (like 'God' and 'Vulcan' on contemporary theories) condensed descriptions. They could be said to be 'Name' has been contracted, perhaps unduly, to 'primary name'. There is another very important reason for eschewing names, or at least treating them - 56 and descriptions - with due caution. Names come with classification, with conceptualisation, with carving the whole block, with imposition of a theoretical grid on the seamless Whole.6 Usual metaphysical theories presuppose one or another of standard, narrow and limiting, conceptualisations and classifications, some perspective already carving up the Whole. Names, basic to the linguistics of such carving operations, have a major role in the worldification, in breaking up the One, which is simple and undifferentated, and typically a major role in imposing a single impoverishing theoretical grid (e.g. recent empiricist perspectives eliminate intensional and evaluative richness from the presented stuff). Part of the point of the "uncarved block" image - which symbolises the One (among other things, it is also a symbol for simplicity, and naturalness, for things not spoiled by artifice), the One simple and undifferentiated, the unity behind all multiplicity - is to get at the purity and unity of Tao before conceptualisation, before naming, before the differentiating and perhaps distorting conferring of names. Though Tao is so nameless, that is, it is not an existent concrete thing (e.g. a particular), nonetheless a lot can be said a&oM? the Tao, by way of description (see the excellent summary of Taoist descriptions in Chan pp.6-7). Though Tao is a single item, One, unity behind multiplicity, under conceptualisations it is "complex', many things: source of everything, great form regulating both nature and conduct, Way of satisfactory conduct and proper lives, and derivatively it is "invisible', "inaudible', "vague and elusive'. Nothing important conceptualised in Taoism comes in neat single form. All the main features and notions of Taoism - principles, models, examples, etc. - appear in such multiple form: metaphysical, ethical, etc. The artificial boundaries between these areas are broken down. Tao itself exhibits this plural conceptual character: it combines both a complex of natural principles and methods and of guiding ethical forms, with no imposed separation of fact and value; but it is also an inexhaustible source, and so on. But the Tao is not beyond the reach of reason (necessarily), even though it is inexpressible (adequately). Other things, such as infinity, are also of this sort. (If Tao were Nothing, which in a sense it Ay, many of the puzzling descriptions would be entirely apt.) Tao is perhaps best explained by going going back to fundamentals. "The word fao 6 This appropriate image was popularised by James. Under deep pluralism, different determinations of the Whole, different grids, yield different worlds, a pZuraf/ry of worlds, with different domains of objects named or different classes of designated propositions (and so derivatively perhaps widi different logics). 57 consists of one element meaning a head and another meaning to run. It means that on which something or someone goes [that by which a thing becomes what it is], a path or road, later extended to mean "method", "principle"../ (Chan p.6, insert from p.7). DIAGRAM 2. FUNDAMENTALS OF TAO head running stvlised source course program path § source directed path To the apt Taoist images of Tao as "storehouse", "mother" and "ancestor", may be added others, such as that of a programmed or guided projectile. Each image helps peel off unwanted associations of others; thus Tao is a great mother without male input; an ancestor without predecessor, a missile without maker, an outputing program without input. Like a program projectile or delivering storehouse, it integrates a complex source, an initial operating program, with a planned course, a natural (and ideal) path. The great or overarching Tao is a comprehensive source of natural activity; it encapsulates a framework of forms or principles, principles of natural order, both metaphysical and moral. It comprises both dynamic principles (or evolving ""laws"") of nature <37%/ axiological principles guiding conduct. In this representation it invites comparison with Plato's structure of Forms, appropriately neutralised (in the object-theory fashion Reid urged: see JB), or still better, though again neglecting the dynamism of Tao, comparison with the pre-Socratic Logos. But to see overarching Tao as an axiological ontology, after the pattern of Plato's Form theory, would be to import unwarranted Western assumptions. Though Tao is a ""great form"", and there is no doubt room in the generous object framework for other t (unhypostatized) forms, main Platonic forms such as Beauty, Truth and Goodness, do not feature large in the CTn/ig. They are distinguished, and set rather to the side, in the final chapter (LT 81). Other less Platonically emphasized (or available) forms are more important, such as Simplicity, Frugality and Non-competition, as well as Tao itself, the supreme form, also the One, which supplants the static Good of Plato's scheme and is coupled with a dynamic path component. Tao as form is part of Tao as in/bT*???//?^ source, which comprehends the class of characterisations of objects e.g. subjectized and individualized forms, taos (these no doubt 58 relate to forms, ideals or principles, rather as particular essences relate to Platonic forms). Tao as informing source is summed up in such phrases as "The original of everything and out of which all arises." Tao as combined governing principle and source is summed up in such phrases as "the ancestor and mother of all things". The Mother-image provides both a source, and for the form of an object without being that object? Under the ancestral-image, Tao supplies both the material source and the form, the genetic coding, for existence. It is evident that Tao is intimately linked with, and concerned with, the natural, and indeed linked with and not above the everyday. But what is the relationship between nature and Tao? Is Tao supra- or super-natural? Tao is certainly not supernatural, and it does not transcend natural things in the fashion of Western supernatural religions; rather Tao both orders and reflects nature. Tao supplies the physical laws that provide physical idealisations (i.e. ideal models) of processes. Tao in this sense is a process and the container and origin of process and the laws of process. Tao is the natural way of the universe (of Heaven and Earth), and super-Tao, also signified as Tao, is the way of the universe and the universe. (Under a computer analogy, Tao is the program of the whole system; it is also, as super-Tao, the program combined with the system, everything). As Great Tao it is certainly simple, allembracing and one. Getting the hang of its components and their connections is not quite so simple. The persistent Mother image in Lao Tzu has suggested several tancifui interpretations, such as that of a mother-goddess, which are not textualiy supported. The latest in this fanciful line is a Gaia story. 59 DIAGRAM 3. SUPER-TAO, OR GREAT TAO, WITH COMPONENTS INTEGRATED SUPER-TAO Overarching forms, principles, Way of Nature '§ '§ Nature, with taos in world unrealised objectified forms natural system '§ '§ '§ '§ § '§ '§ Deviation line Defective (or fallen) fl' from Natural taos As to the status of principles (laws, rules), standard Western categorisations are again exceeded. These principles are not transcendent, governing things externally, but are, so to say, self-supplied, with things self-regulated. Undominated things are naturally self- governing. Nor is it quite accurate to say that "the Tao is immanent and expressed through the 60 fe = r^Zoj, ideal direction) of things'.s The transcendent/immanent dichotomy fails (as on object-theory), because it presupposes that principles and the Tao exist, either externally or internally; but they do not exist. What is nearer right is that "Everything has its own nature and each nature is its own ultimate ... then by whom are things produced? They produce themselves, that is all' (Kuo Hsiang, p.328). But ZJooZZy they proceed according to the Tao- te, the goal directed way of virtue, autonomously. DIAGRAM 4. TAO-TE PATHS, AND GOING WITH THE NATURAL FLOW (cf. LT 53). Tao (source) Te(los) Flow Ideal Way: Way of Virtue § Deviations from Flow Deviant Ways tao '§.....................>-Ote Laws persist, and perhaps evolve, under the guidance of overarching Tao, while the universe in its rich diversity comes into and goes out of being. Tao thus offers a kind of unity in, or above, diversity. In this regard too, Taoism can be applied to clarify the value scheme of Deep Ecology. For Deep Ecology also values diversity and organic unity in diversity, but lacks the cosmology from which the features derive. The unity lies in a unified tier of principle (matched in part at an upper level of the Deep Ecology pyramid) above the diversity of life processes. The Taoist metaphor of a single block, variously composed of many things, can likewise be applied to fill out Deep Ecology's picture of the ecosphere. However, 8 As Hall claims. a fundamental notion in Taoism, is often translated as wrfa%, sometimes power; but often reZo^y gets the intended item and objective better, as the subsequent text tries to explain. Te is not the same as Tao. And it is a mistake to t?Ze?uZ/y tao, or individualised Tao, with te (as sometimes suggested; e.g. Chan SB p.178), though they are evidendy closely connected, and to a restricted extent (as e.g. in a missile example) one can be derived from the other. While tao gives the source and route ' §, te supplies die virtuous direction and focus or goal (telos) §-O. 61 the block metaphor has some drawbacks; it tends to suggest a static picture, which is unwarranted. For both Tao and Deep Ecology, universes and ecospheres are, when appropriately stable, in dynamic equilibrium. Tao is a natural order. Though the phrase "natural order'* may seem strange, even contradictory, it is not. The reason is, in part, that the Taoist perception of the world is the reverse of the modern Hobbes-Locke perception of the world. In contrast to European political thought of the mainstream Hobbes-Locke strain, where the state-of-nature is one of chaos or extreme disorder, the Taoist state-of-nature is one of order. A main assumption of Western thought, that political order must be imposed by regulation on an unruly state-of- nature, is thus undercut. A separate imposed political order is not required; the idea that it is rests on mistaken assumptions. Politics can, and should, follow nature. Science and politics can be blended, not sharply separated in the typical Western fashion, where nature is taken to exclude value. Nature presumes value. Nature is already in order as it normally is, through a unity in diversity which involves a normative component - a principle or recipe for how things "should" be as well as how they are integrally. Values are build into the environment, an integral part of the way of things. By following the values of Tao one enters and comes into contact with the whole environment and into unity with the environment. Tao is a description of how things are and a prescription of how to act in accord with the way they are. According to Taoism then, by contrast with dominant Western thought which sees the world as extensional, mechanistic and value-neutral (except for its human cargo), the world is both intensional and value-infused. These features extend not merely to the whole, but to components which go into composing the greater whole. These have their programs, or ways, which are integrated into the greater way (somewhat as, but artificially, expert system programs may be organised into grander programs representing super-experts, computer substitutes for the lost "universal men**). The overarching Tao - grand or capital Tao, the program or recipe or Form or whole genetic code - combines many individual ones - lesser or /ow^r-case taos - within it. Such a lesser tao, of an individual, system or whatever, is what makes a thing what is properly, a coursed or informed source, a program directed path, a processed output. A tao is a sourced directed object; it is thus a type of object, a dynamic item, which can be represented by a pair comprising a recipe, program or form and a direction or goal-orientation. Accordingly, an individual or local tao (or form) resembles one of Aristotle's individual forms as coupled with a which comprises a normative directive. For both Aristotle and Tao there is, in effect, 62 an "invisible hand" at work. (How did this, such convenient namraZ order come about? That is Tao; another, old and compatible answer is: It evolved.) When things are running properly, the lesser, individual, taos (most conveniently) fit together and operate in accord under the overarching program (cf. diagram 3). If each individual runs according to the program, then the overall program succeeds fully. However, it works even if each individual does not run according to the overarching program, but it has a less ideal result. If each person acts in a correct way a massive net good and great order result. Yet, any attempt to impose order does not bring it about, but is counterproductive. The invisible (natural) hand guides, but the hand cannot be forced. This picture of order invites comparison with the modem market theory, which claims that maximum effect or benefit is obtained without regulation (other than extensive framework legislation!), and that once regulation is imposed the result is inferior. In principle, the market operates on a set of understood (partly conventional) rules. The rules are known and it is merely a matter of following them. But the market enables dominance by the rich and powerful, and thereby discrimination and the like. Tao, however, is opposed to such dominance; those who follow Tao attempt to refrain from dominating others. But like the market, the rules of conduct are built into the system and any attempt to impose them is counterproductive. As a result, spontaneity and order are not opposites, but result from the same thing. A strong sense of natural order, of self organisation, of anarchy (in the good sense) enters. Like Buddhism, Tao assents to the maxim, "Do nothing and from unforced order greater order results". If each being is permitted to follow its tao, then the needs of all will be met without coercion. Following the way of Tao, nature emerges as a self-supplying organization. Such convenient natural organisation stands (so far as it occurs!) in need of some further explanation, whether of an internal, evolutioning sort or of a supernatural sort, as in Neoplatonism where God or the One accomplishes the organisational task. Taoism undermines such latter alternates, and points (in CT) towards an evolutionary explanation. 2. The extend of Tao as agency: non-religion and (non-)moraiity. God does not occur, and is not needed, in the cosmology, either as an agent, to make things in the universe happen, or as an authority, to regulate things or set moral or legal standards. If He did occur, He would, like other directors and rulers, not be needed, though He could serve as an example. "But there is no indication of his existence" (CT 2). As in the socio-political sphere, direction by a overseer or ruler is otoise, and only examplary. In paiticular, God is not required to start or wind the universe up. "Everything in the world creates itself without the 63 direction of any creator. Since things create themselves they are unconditioned. This is the norm of the universe.'9 The Tao is not a supernatural personal agency; it is not supernatural, it is certainly not personal, and it is only in a stretched sense "agency". It the Tao includes all-encompassing natural order — a unity in diversity — in which the tao of each is ideally in harmony with the whole, then there is no need to posit a super-Being. Each being follows its course in the whole. Moreover, the appeal to a superpersonal authority, exalted example, or the like, on the one side, or to ethics, on the other, is needed only when people have moved away from the Tao. Everything will work well if a community lives according to the Tao. Thus deontic features are brought in only at disequilibrium — an interesting, but tricky, position. Then too, in formulating norms, appeal is back to framework from which people have diverged. In politics, as in morals, it is deviation from the natural state that represents the problem, quite in contrast again to European political thought of the Hobbes-Locke strain, where the state-of-nature is one of extreme disorder (nasty, brutish, short, etc.). Such a state of-nature is not at all a Taoist natural state; by contrast with mainstream thought, nineteenth century European anarchism adopts a position very similar to Taoism. 10 It is revealing to compare the Taoist picture of deviation from a natural state with Aristotelian model of deviation from the mean, which provides the norm (cf. diagram 4). On the Aristotelian model, the end of all things is seeking well-being, to be achieved by following the Mean. This involves adhering to the Mean in an active rational fashion. Rationality is tied to seeking, to the means. Tao does not require rationality. Tao is sought passively, by letting happen, not actively, by forced efficiency, whereas on the Aristotelian account, the search and aim for the good is active. 9 Kao Hsiang, on Tyu, 330-7. When Hall and others try to argue (like Neo-Taoists) that the Taoist totality is without a beginning - contrary to Hall's other material about Being coming from Nonbeing - what they actually present, and mean, is. without a creative beginning. And that is right: there is no Creano m/h/o as per Genesis. But it is false that there is no cosmogony. There is; and while there is no creation, a making by someone, there is a beginning; see e.g. SB, p.202. 10 In this respect, Hall is right off track (in the last sentence of his paragraph 1). The Taoist point is that naturalness is not such a prominent feature of human affairs, because of the imposition of excess laws, regulation, etc. Taoist sensibility is only bizarre from an erroneous dominant paradigm perspective. 64 DIAGRAM 5. TAOIST MIDDLE/CENTRAL/LITTLE-ACTION WAYS 1. 2. Aristotelian/Confucian/Taoist Taoist contrasting ways mean path, in fuzzy sufficiency cone hard or extreme mountain ways a middle way valley, ravine or river way; easy, natural way Though the ancient transcultural doctrine of the mean, of a middle way, appears explicitly in Lao 7h/ (e.g. 77, also 29), that middle path is arrived at, and taken, differently. The Taoist route is an easy no-action route, a valley way, a path of weakness and little resistance, in line with the general account of following Tao and living and faring well. Tao supplies a set of suggestions and prescriptions for how to live well, as well as a parallel (and controlling) set of propositions about how things happen and proceed ideally. Of course there is a moral purpose in Lao Tzu; the moral purpose is a central one alongside, and inseparable from, the metaphysical purpose, the acquiring of an account of ultimate reality". To what extent then is Taoism open to the accusation of amorality? Since axiology is a crucial part of the world view — evaluations and commendations are freely and extensively offered in the texts — it is not amoral in a generous sense. But the treatment of deontic principles, and of rules of conduct generally is very different. Deontics get into the picture only when there is a lapse or deviation from an ideal natural state (from a t course), 'When the Great Tao declined, the doctrine of humanity and righteousness arose' (LT 18). It depends then, on what counts as "moral" and "amoral". Certainly there are approved and implicitly recommended life-styles, though there are few "oughts' and no (ConfucianKantian) lists of duties. Moreover, unless the preferred Taoist lifestyle merely recommended, not required, Taoism would tall down as insufficiently pluralistic. 3. On the Taoist styie of iife; an environmental hfestyie. According to Lao Tzu, there are some basic elements to living well, for instance 'three treasures' (LT 67; but different overlapping lists are presented, e.g. LT 19). 65 1. Deep love - which can also be taken to involve compassion, pity, commiseration, care, respect and regard, and which includes something close to empathy, deep-penetrating empathy. Sympathy, a main linkage of the European "Enlightenment", does not however capture what is involved: sympathy alone would be too egoistical for Taoism, as it is for Deep Ecology. Deep love is part of the notion of genuine relatedness, not a one-sided "relatedness" or possessiveness (which Taoism rejects). 2. Frugality - a renunciation of excess. But frugality is not impoverishment. Needs are met adequately without deprivation or excess. 3. Modesty or humility - not to dare to be ahead of the world, not to take the lead. In Taoism there is no competitive requirement, but the opposite; such Western desiderata lapse. Rather, one gives up trying to be on top of the pile, or even being in a faster lane. In a Taoist society there are no conspicuous tall poppies. Much else connects with or follows in a loose way, it is assumed, from these three virtues; for instance, courage from deep love, generosity from frugality, a kind of leadership from humility. The arguments for those surprising derivations go like this: 'deep love helps one to aim in the case of attack/And to be firm in the case of defence" (LT 67). Earlier (LT 19) it is taken that proper abandonment of humanistic ethics will mean a return to (what the ethics inadmissibly substitutes for) deep love, a basic valuational relation. But in place of frugality, goes a discarding of profit, and in place of humility an abandonment of conscious sageliness and discarding of immodest (or conventional) wisdom. These changes are, astonishingly, said to be rather superficial and inadequate; so further desiderata, commonly read out of the "treasures"", are adduced: 'Manifest plainness/ embrace simplicity/ reduce selfishness/have few desires" (LT 19). Another element, beyond the three of relatedness, frugality, and not daring to be ahead, is adaptability or sponanteity. This complements the further desiderata. Evidently main ingredients for a simple environmentally sound life-style are highly commended. Lao Tzu might almost have been writing an introduction for Callenbach's environmental handbook, Living Poor wifL or even for Pausacker and Andrews' Living Rener wifL L^^. In Chang Tzu, the pure person is a deep environmentalist:- She is a 'companion' of Nature and 'does not attempt to interfere with it by imposing the way of man upon it". Her goal is 'spiritual emancipation and peace" and derivatively freedom; and her route is 'through knowing the capacity and limitations of one's own nature and adapting it to the universal process of transformation" and thus to the environment (Chan SB p.177). 66 In complementary fashion, opposite "virtues", common in anti-environmental life-styles are condemmed. The Western drives to power, fame, competition, possessions, excess commodities, useless (small) knowledge are rejected by Taoism (along with "Mans Affairs"). Thus entrepreneurial activity in business, and also in professional and academic affairs (as well as busyness itself), gets decidedly discouraged. The good life naturally reduces ambitions and desires and avoids competition. Competition is connected with self-assertion and aggressive action. Taoism, while not neglecting limited natural competition, passes aspersions on both, thus fitting neatly with Deep Ecology's prescription for environmental lifestyle and (supposedly derived) policy of non-violence . In place of the Enlightenment and mainstream economic virtue of competition appears the 'virtue of non-competition' (LT 68). Arguments against competition can be developed from other doctrines of Taoism. For example, competition often requires forced or artificial action; thus it violates the doctrine of (non-action), competition is deviant, evidencing deviation from one's tao. The penality for such deviation from the path is not spelled out in Deep Ecology, but it is in Taoism. Another way of putting it (suggested by Clark) is that in competition external rival standards are imposed on Tao, presumably with electrifying results. In any case, according to Taoism, there is no merit in trying to place oneself above another. So there is no value in competition. Fortunately competition can be reduced. If a person does not compete then the world cannot compete with him. A way of life is depicted, based on love, respect and compassion for all things, attuned to what is essential, shedding what is unnecessary, where simplicity and frugality are sought, and excess avoided. This includes, in a nutshell, voluntary simplicity of a deep sort. In Deep Ecology the same idea appears, partly sloganised as "simple in means; rich in ends". Simplicity is not the impoverished life of one who seeks escape. Taoism goes much further in disparaging scarce material means. Do not exact the worth, so that people compete. Do not value rare treasure, so that people do not steal. Gross wealth and prestige are rejected; they are vanities and vexations. But not all is vanity: living well is not. It is a very natural inference, then, from the account of living well to the suggestion that Tao offers a deep form of voluntary simplicity. Voluntary simplicity is a fuzzy notion.^ 11 As Elgin's very profuse account reveals. Strictly much further detail is called for here: namely, a set of conditions is needed, and also elaboration of the Taoist form of frugality, and then connection of the conditions with die three basic elements of Tao - frugality, deep relatedness, and not daring to be ahead in die world. 67 Voluntary simplicity can initially be explained through its two obvious components, simplicity and its voluntary adoption. Simplicity connects with, and is often equated with frugality, as elaborated in Taoism. But whether or not simplicity is obtained from frugality or other Taoist virtues, it plays a direct and important part in the theory, and is in fact modelled, like its metaphysical counterpart, the unconceptualised Whole, by the uncarved block, a central Gestalt of the theory. The block symbolises unity, simplicity and naturalness not spoiled by artifice, metaphysically the wholeness and unity of Tao before conceptual carving, and ethically the wholesome straightforward non-devious life under Te, the 'simple life that is free from cunning and cleverness, is not devoted to the pursuit of profit or marked by hypocritical humanity and righteousness, but is characterised by plainness, tranquility, and purity' (Chan p.14). As to voluntariness, people have a of selecting the way of Tao rather than one of the deviant ways. It is a choice of recipes - frugal vs. excess, relatedness vs. nonrelatedness, tall poppies vs. not daring to be ahead. But one does not attempt to force one's way onto the correct path. To hyperactively seek the path is a deviation in itself. It is deontic to speak of a to find the correct path. 4. Following Tao, non-action, Te and Self-realization. Part of the Taoist route to an environmental lifestyle and to "self-realization" consists in acquiring the practice of non­ action, in terms of non-assertion, non-aggression, non-destruction, etc. commonly translated as 'non-action', is thereby rendered a dialectic notion, for it does not exclude action and in a sense is action. To avoid such dialectical overtones, wzz-w^z is sometimes rendered 'not acting wilfully' or 'not acting artificially' or 'acting naturally'; it is better transcribed as 'without forcing' or 'no forced (or coercive) action'.^ Construed in this fashion, wM-wez is not an extraneous awkward addition to Taoism, but an integral part, which emerges from other features of the theory, namely those of following natural low-action ways. For non­ action is the "activity" of letting one's tao drift or flow into line with the overall Tao (so arrows in diagram 3 are aligned). What is commended is, in the correct circumstances, pacific action, of letting happen (e.g. letting die), as opposed to aggressive, extraverted action (e.g. killing), forced action upsetting natural ways. Similarly for other *No-nos; the "no 12 An illuminating philological comparison of activity with anarc/zz.wi is developed by Ames, pp.342-3. The sympathy between [them] lies in their common reference to activity performed in the absence of coercively determined constraints ...'. As Ames observes, the comparison operates not only at the political and ethical levels, but bears upon cosmology also, negating a coercive boss or planner in the beginning of things. For an integrated treatment of wzz-principles, which generally reject forms of imposition and control, see Hall pp.59-60. 68 desires" directive, for instance, is a piquant shorthand for 'no impure desires' (Chan p.13), i.e. for no unsatisfactory or anti-te desires. Non-action accordingly does not require literally no action, but only actions in accord with ideal nature, so ruling out actions contrary to undisturbed Tao. It may appear that perennial problems, alleged to haunt Taoism (and intensified in Stoicism), are induced. For example, if all is Tao, and Tao is natural, how can there be unnatural activity? Or differently, if nothing can depart from Tao, how can there be unspontaneous actions, or any violation of /yoznAy in an ideal, natural, direction. It does not Tao, however, is a source which only all individual paths, which can deviate from ideal or natural paths. Thus deviant activity is not excluded, unspontaneous and ill-organised activity by individuals is in no way ruled out; and forced, coercive and nature­ destroying activities are all too common.^ Non-action as policy generally implies non-interference, when things have not been damagingly disturbed. It implies letting things take their own natural course; letting Being be, as Deep Ecologists would say, with basically "hands off' practice and management. Unforced action in practice is well illustrated by examples of going with the flow (cf. diagram 4). One main example of going with the flow is cutting meat. The Chef does not encounter bones. He takes the meat apart effortlessly in the same way that an athlete does things effortlessly, with little waste action. Going with the flow can however involve a lot of activity, as with the man swimming easily in a raging torrent below the waterfall, or as in sailing and trimming to the wind. At a personal level, non-action lies in such things as not striving to put oneself above others, in foregoing competition, in simplicity, frugality, and adherence to the mean. Evidently this removes a range of normally accepted social activities. Flexibility, and suppleness, and even weakness, belong to the centre (or mean), to the valley way. In Tao these qualities are associated with life; the inflexible and the rigid are associated with the dead. This can be visualized as a range of activities associated with the process of coming into being and passing out of being, in which the pre-life and the post-life are dead. The central time, like the centre, is flexible and supple; not hard, stiff and inflexible. All this carries a social message as well as an individual one. After things reach their prime they grow old, which means they become contrary to Tao. What is contrary to Tao soon perishes. After prime a thing moves towards rigidity. 13 When 'all activities follow their specific principles, that is nature' (SB p.202); deviation from Nature accordingly occurs, namely when some activities do not follow their principles. As for destruction, 'Do not let man destroy Nature' (SB p.207). 69 But Taoism does not accept Western cultural notions of primeness. Primeness is not a matter of a certain juvenile physical or sporting prowess or peak. It takes a long time to reach a practice approximating Tao. Socrates died in his prime, although by Western standards he was an old man. An important, but retrograde, cultural shift has occurred in modern Western culture. The doyens of Deep Ecology are old(er) men by Western standards. A supreme goal in Deep Ecology, both for individuals and systems, societies and such like, is self-realisation (again capitalised in the overall case). Self-realisation is a modem European idea, not found in Taoism, and indeed incompatible with it and all older non­ maximizing wisdoms which incorporate theories of adhering to the Mean. For Self­ realisation, as understood and explained (of course the account could ahistorically be amended to a satisizing one), is a maximizing prescription applied to the aggregated interests of separate self, inflation of a typically egoistic concept not found in Taoism. But although Deep Ecology's ideal of Self-realisation would be rightly queried in Taoism, there is a group of associated goals to be found in Taoism: namely, attaining enlightenment and tranquility, following Tao, cultivation of parallels that between cultivation of virtue or and the contrast between self-realisation and Self-realisation and %, great Since The main objective of the (Chan p.ll), it is is the that displaces self-realisation on the Taoist scheme. Complementary to Tao is Te, and to tao is te. Whereas tao is the directed source of a thing, te is the matching or unfolding of a thing. It is a directed and (in principle favourably) developing, perfecting; hence the standard translation of as 'virtue'. Because of its potentiality to reach a (good) goal, a rival translation as 'power' has some currency; it is a directed force ybr good (or evil). The program of tao supplies the direction of matching te. So a thing can follow its tao (and thereby follow Tao) by cultivating te, by practising positive virtue, by choosing a lifestyle of deep simplicity. The directives for a good individual life are accordingly commonly given in terms of individual te, and it is te (rather than Tao) that generally appears individualised. As self-realisation in Deep Ecology is not restricted to individuals, so te and tao are not. The society as well as the individual has a tao and a matching te. Taoism is neither individualistic nor atomistic, but systemic and holistic. Thus groups or societies have their own taos and the collection is related to the overall Tao. Social insects perhaps provide a conspicuous example of the social tao. The example transfers to overly rigid social forms, such as bureaucracies, and also to military societies which are obsessed with security. (Taoism is fairly lateralist in its thinking, with much inferential movement by association.) 70 But security is not obtained by being secure as in military security, which is characteristically a fortified security. In peace people are open to danger but secure in another sense. The materialist world, excessively propped up by possessions, Taoism treats with disdain; it does not equate security with material security. Each being has its own tao, its own ideal naturally-programmed path of self­ development or unfolding. Correspondingly, there is an immanent telos, a te, a goal-directed virtuous developing, for each thing. By each following its own nature, all follow nature. Our self-development does not then interfere damagingly with your self-development. How does this happen? Through natural (again invisible) inter-organisation, my proper self­ development cannot impede your proper self-development. Taoism is decidedly short on details of such mutual adjustment and harmonious integration, but certain it happens naturally - as it may, for instance, through the evolution of co-operation.^ So there is, or need be, no vacillation between following one's own path and taking care not to interfere with the paths of others, between individualistic and relational paths. Perhaps in Taoism the modem problems are skirted rather than solved. But the Taoist result is integration, a harmonious combination of plans, without domination, whereas the pattern of Western relations operates (as in Hegel) through hierarchical ordering and domination. 5. Anti-patriarchal aspects: feminism, powerlessness, peace. Taoism advances other models, than those concerning age, which are strange by entrenched Western standards - such as demotion of strength and power, and the place and importance ascribed to characteristically feminine and child-like elements in living well and achieving Taoist self­ realisation, te. It was prepared for ecofeminism in a way that Deep Ecology was not. Taoism is highly critical of patriarchy, accepting in effect main anti-chauvinistic themes of ecofeminism. By contrast, there has been continuing conflict between Deep Ecology and ecofeminism. In its formative programmatic days Deep Ecology did not recognise legitimate feminine aspirations or sexual domination, and it took no due account of the organising theme 14 resolution of this problem can now make a good start with Axelrod's investigations of evolving cooperation. Cooperation can begin with small clusters. It can thrive with rules that are nice, provocable, and somewhat forgiving. And once established in a population, individuals using such discriminating strategies can protect themselves from invasion. The overall level of cooperation tends to go up and not down. In other words, the machinery for the evolution of cooperation contains a ratchet (Axelrod p.177). 71 of ecofeminism, the striking parallel between the domination of women and the domination of nature. But Taoism even incorporates an interesting early form of affirmative action. In Taoism, the traditional Chinese balance between ya/rg and ym swings, when in disequilibrium it does, towards the y/n. Quite in contrast with the Western paradigm, one properly aims at yzn (which represents the complex of supposedly feminine features) rather than at yang (symbolising, among other things, the masculine complex). There is an emphasis on female and child-like, features, and, as in ym-yang dovetailing, integration of gender features. There is, nonetheless, some stereotyping of male and female features in Tao (as there is generally in feminism itself), with males allegedly active and female weaker and more passive. It is in this way that the emphasis on yin is reached, from desiderata such as humility and weakness. Still, though historic Taoism hardly admits of degendering, rigidly defined sex roles are alien to Tao sensibilities. People develop according to their own tao. They can develop typically male, or female, features or features of both. One who rigidly accounts these masculine and feminine features, speaks from without the framework of Tao. Historically, where it began to be put into practice, Taoism worked for sexual freedom and liberation of women. The Child also serves as a model (LT 55), and there are certain components of Childhood liberation in Taoism: in the emphasis on freedom, in the attack on learning and schooling, and so on. The reason the child is a model is because it has spontaneity, it is direct and natural, and lacks power or strength. Tao rejects institutions and societies based on power. Infants are not ruled by a longing for power, instead all actions are spontaneous. Active force, like power, is in general castigated. To force growth is deviant, destroying harmony. To stop growth is deviant. "For the mind to employ the vital force without restraint means violence" (replacing "mind" with intentionality would give a better picture of what is meant). There is a significant difference between force and violence. To employ intentionally destructive force is to do violence. To so force things is condemned. To remain in harmony with things one does not so force things or practice violence. There is a non-interference principle at work, which also indicates types of non-interference that are excluded. Not only is the Taoist opposition to violence well-known, but there is a blistering attack on militarism and warfare in 7zM (e.g. LT 31, 30, 46); "war is a symptom of the decline of man' (Chan p.5). Given the hostility to war, it has been regarded as passing strange, not to say puzzling, that Lao Tzu sketches military tactics and other allegedly devious political strategies. The strategies are however but application of Taoist principles and techniques to 72 warfare, politics and elsewhere. Nothing excludes application of these techniques to what are accounted, in general, unnecessary evils (which must sometimes, on other Taoist grounds, be countered). Nor, to meet the main criticism, need any deceit or deviousness be involved; nor is it. The legalist tactic, Tn order to grasp, it is necessary first to give" (LT 36), is said to involve 'an element of deceit' 'undeniably', and 'worse' is 'morally questionable' (Chan p.17). But in order for me to grasp your hand in a normal handshake, it is necessary first for me to give my hand. There is no deceit here, nothing morally questionable. All the tactics permit of benign construals, of a Taoist kind. Consider, for instance, Tn order to contract, it is necessary first to expand' (LT 36). In order to bend a copper pipe to the intended angle, it is better to bend it first further than required. The transformation of water to ice (both favoured natural items for symbolic purposes) neatly illustrates the Taoist principle (which is however hardly necessary), and shows softness and weakness turned hardness and strength. 6. Environmental theory and practice, and environmental problems and difficulties, such as quietism and security. As on deeper ecological theories, traditional Western models for human relations to the natural world are one and all rejected. The dominant view, of domination, of human dominion over the earth and its other inhabitants, is not merely roundly and soundly rejected; the metaphysical creationist base and the superiority myths upon which it is regularly founded are also removed. Therewith also the bases for the lesser, and rather more benign, Western models are also undercut There is no greater boss or purpose for humans to serve or act as steward to; besides stewardship, which is both hierarchical and implicitly patriarchical in cast, typically involves active interference in producing products. The idea of perfecting nature also implies active interference, when however nature is more or less in order as it is, and requires no "perfecting". Thus stewardship and perfectionist views fall along with domination and dominion. Taoism offers instead a non-interference model for relations to nature, a letting-be approach, with "hands off' management and associated lifestyles, several features of which we have already glimpsed. A most stoking feature of Taoism is its environmental depth, its strong opposition to then prevailing (and still prevailing) humanism and human chauvinism. Heaven and earth are not humane They regard all things as straw dogs [i.e. rather worthless strict ritual objects]. The sage is not humane [or human chauvinist]. He regards all people as straw dogs (LT.5). Because of such tough pronouncements, reiterated and reinforced in Chang Tzu (e.g. CT. 2), Taoism is sometimes said to be predicated on anti-humanism. But it is not 'a dehumanizing 73 philosophy", it does not deny compassion; what transpires is that concern and value are not confined to humans or their affairs, but include the natural and the metaphysical. The human is no longer the criterion of what is good or true. The traditional idea that a supreme supernatural being ... is the ruler of the universe is replaced by the doctrine that the universe exists and operates by itself. When [Lao Tzu] says that "Heaven and Earth are not humane", he means in a narrow sense that they are imparm?/, but in a broader sense that Nature is no longer governed according to g&m&izTZy ... In one stroke he removes Heaven [or God] and man as the standards ot things and replaces them with Nature (Chan p.10, italics added; also p.107). What is rejected with the rejection of humanism and humanistic ethics is human chauvinism. For being "humane" means accepting the chauvinistic assumptions of conventional society and remaining within the narrow sphere of interests of the human species. There is no unbridgeable gulf between humans and other creatures such as Western thought has tried to manufacture. 'Put a halter around the horse's head and put a string through the cow's nose, that is man" (SB p.207). In place of humanism, Taoism adopts a doctrine of impartiality. 'Embrace all things without inclining to this way or that way" (SB p.206). He who is enlightened 'is impartial" (LT 6); 'he has no partial love for anyone" (SB p.201) he does not bestow undue or special favours upon humans; he aims to be one with Nature. Impartiality does not imply equality. Despite the received heading of chapter 2 of the CTxmg 'the equality of all things" (the literal 'levelling all things" is nearer the mark), and the standard inference to some Taoist doctrine of parity, no simplistic and difficult theme of equal value of all things is ventured - nor any theme of parity for some favoured subclass thereof such as living things. (Though there is some accent on prime life, there is not the same stress on /i/i? in Taoism that there is in Deep Ecology, nor the bizarre extension of "life" to include waterfalls, mountains and other striking natural objects.) What is offered, instead of much in the way elucidation of impartiality, is (again like deeper ecological theory) a doctrine of identification. Wide identification and wide solidarity does promote impartiality , and counter chauvinism. Egoism, for instance, involves discounting all but oneself, humanism all but humans, and requires a species solidarity with human things. But wider identification puts a stop to such discounting (e.g. in favour of one's own or species's interests, as exhausting value) and to such class-restricted solidarity. For wider identification reveals that interests, desires, values and so forth, are not so individual or class restricted. Many exquisite examples of identification, and the processes by which it may be achieved, are developed, e.g. with a butterfly, by dream access (SB p.190), with rivers and seas, and wider again, by the proper meditative process, with the dusty world - 'Become one with the dusty world/ This is called profound identification" (LT 56, also 4) - and perhaps wider yet, and 74 ultimate, with ideal Nature, and thus in complete accord with Tao (e.g. LT 16). No less striking than the criticism of humanism, Taoism makes similar sort of attack on traditional education and on the accumulation of knowledge. The case against traditional education, especially rote "learning", is straightforward; it reinforces entrenched practices and prejudices, e.g. those of humanism. The criticism does not of course imply that there would be no regular learning or habituation processor, such as those encouraged traditional indoctrination methods. More perplexing is the attack on knowledge acquisition, though in part it is of the same sort, against an entrenched knowledge in the hands of a power group. But, in an organic society, knowledge is integrated into the community and not rarified into a commodity held or controlled by a priesthood or a class of intellectuals or literati. Knowledge is power; such power is removed from the hands of a few by making it a community good. This goes beyond Deep Ecology, in that it questions and rejects experts. Indeed in its criticism of schooling, narrow expertise, and the like, Taoism resembles and anticipates the position taken by Illich rather than features of Deep Ecology. The move against informational power also points to the difference between wisdom (not unequivocally approved) and knowledge, a difference recorded in Taoism as in most older wisdom. However one of the indicated Taoist arguments against mere knowledge illustrates an a//-to-any fallacy. We can't reasonably (or possibly) aim for all knowledge - by the unlimited objective or limited beings argument (see CT 2) - so we can't reasonably aim for any, and shouldn't, so it appears to be suggested. Another line of argument looks more promising. Life has a limit, but knowledge is without limit. For the limited to pursue the unlimited is futile. However the argument only reveals limits to the accumulation of knowledge, not its pointlessness or undesirability. In any case, in the end the superficially anti-intellectual trend of Taoism shifts ground; it is directed against other targets than pure knowledge: against slickness and cleverness, against devious and crafty uses of knowledge (LT 3), against counter-productive acquiring of knowledge or cunning, and its teaching. The messy situation is tidied up a bit in the CTnxng where an apposite distinction is made between knowledge, the castigated sorts, which is inquisitive, partial, discriminative or merely analytic, and knowledge, which is "leisurely and at ease", comprehensive, extensive, and synthetic (cf. Chan p.20). Even so, original Taoism hardly seems to cater for adequate access of information, and the removal of (perhaps debilitating) igornance, concerning health and welfare, careful and damaging practices, choices and alternatives. The critique of small knowledge and narrow expertise extends to encompass a critique of technology. In Taoism, technology was assigned a very limited role at best. (Hence, png of the complex reasons for the delayed development of technology in China.) Certain forms 75 of technology were, if not rejected outright (as Clark contends), at least strongly discouraged. Thus, 'Even if there are ships and carriages, none will ride in them. Even if there are arrows and weapons, none will display them" (LT 80).15 More generally, while high and dangerous technology is set aside, even more appropriate technology cannot be accepted uncritically. Lao Tzu recognized clearly that even low impact technology may destroy human practices and conventions constructive to a community. Nor was the connection of technology with population neglected. Given a small country and few inhabitants, if provided with a laboursaving device he would not use it. There are dominating and non-dominating forms of technology. There is enjoined an avoidance of artificial wants and desires, and correspondingly a shunning of replacing labour with nothing at all. Taoism exhibits a firmer grasp of some of the problems of technology, even more appropriate labour-saving technology, than recent positions like Deep Ecology.^ The Taoist approach also demolishes the so-called iron law of technology, that there is no stopping technology or its progress, whatever the merits of the "Law" (they are not so conspicuous), Taoism reveals that such social laws are highly paradigm-dependent, and do not withstand transfer from the dominant Western paradigm everywhere else. Many other elements of a sensitive and sophisticated ecological position feature in Taoism. There is an elaborate and sensitive account of Nature, from which it emerges plainly that Nature is not a mere instrument or means for other ends and not a resource, but something of great value in and for itself. Nature is something to be cherished, allowed to take its own course, not to be interfered with or destroyed by humans. Indeed the dominant view is reversed; value for humans is achieved above all by identification with Nature, and by 15 Some verses of LT, of which this one example, support a rival, sinister, interpretation. According to this sinister interpretation (pointed out to us by David Garrett, a student at the University of Auckland), the LT represents not what it has been taken to be, but a work addressed, like Machiavelli's 77%? Prince, to a Prince, on how to pacify and control the people. Thus weapons, though held and sharpened, will not be displayed; wealth, though inequitably distributed, will not be shown; the people will be kept ignorant, through lack of information and education; and so on. Fortunately many other verses tell decisively enough against this interpretation. In particular, Taoism denies the need for a Ruler. While under satisfactory arrangements there will be those who are much better attuned to Tao, even sages, they are in position to rule as to impose upon others. Moreover should they endeavour to do so, thay would jeopardise or negate their own accord with Tao. Authoritarian rule Machiavelli-style is decidedly politically counterproductive. 16 The claim promoted recently that Taoism is an evident home for alternative technology, and prescribes as much, is rather naive in the light of Taoist texts. 76 following natural ways. (Paradoxical reversal is a feature of Taoism; even castigated Western aims, such as leadership, fame and so on, are in fact achieved, when they are, not by direct aim, but by letting the reverse happen. So it is with what control of Nature is required; non­ intervention and non-action is the approach. Sufficient control is gained, it is said, when assertive attempts to impose it are abandoned.) While such concepts as bioregionalism is not to be encountered in explicit forms in Taoism, their bases and many other recently fashionable environmental ideas are: living in place is certainly present (LT 80); doing things locally and remaining local, while being attuned to the universe and retaining global connections, is certainly advocated, underwriting the Deep Ecology maxim of "think globally, act locally . While there is then very much in Taoism that fits easily and revealingly with deeper environmental theories, Taoism also leaves puzzles or points to residual problems. Not all the supposed problems are however genuine; and not all the puzzles are bequeathed to contemporary theory. Illustrating both is the problem of quietism, which is at bottom the issue of reconciling "non-action" with environmental and social improvement and action. How would a Taoist resistance against depredation, a Taoist defence of environment go, and fare, given its strong (alleged) emphasis on "don't bother'? In-built harmony and quietism do not allow sufficiently for conflict. In part there is only a problem because of misrepresentation of Taoism, which is not committed to a don t bother attitude to environmental destruction: quite to the contrary, humans should not be allowed to destroy nature. Furthermore, there are many Taoist tactics and techniques, using weakness to overcome strength, letting the flow of nature demolish the forces of environmental destruction, and the like, which can be applied in environmental resistance.^ Quietism is accordingly a misrepresentation of the practice, and something of a misnomer. How can Tao work in a world where there is scarcity almost everywhere? Very simply, Taoism holds that there is no genuine problem of plentitude; things are not scarce, there is an abundant outpouring from nature. There is scarcity only because of violations of the t requirements of Tao (rather as some claim there is food scarcity even now, with present gigantic human populations, only because of politico-economic mismanagement). Tao will serve to restore plentitude (LT 77). Rather than a collection of scarce resources, Nature is represented as an virtually infinite storehouse of boundless wealth. 17 Use of the power of water affords a prime exampie; cf LT 15. No-action adaptations of old Chinese martiai arts and strategies presumably offer more direct methods of defence and resistance. 77 Does Tao allow for the prospect and problems of too many people? Can the greater Tao keep pace with the requirements of many too many individual taos, even if those individual requirements are in line with the greater Tao?is No doubt in those times, and most historical times when epidemics and plagues were almost as regular as droughts, when evolution still operated on human species, there wasn't more than a hypothetical or remote future problem. It seems plain however that Taoism did not face the environmental problems such as those of too many people and incremental resource degradation. The texts say little about soil degradation and deforestation, long major environmental problems in China. By contrast, in the West, Plato was properly concerned about deforestation of Greece. Nor does Taoism have much to offer directly on main contemporary issues of animal liberation, species loss, urban disgustification, and so forth, though some of the problems are hardly new. Historic Taoism too was a product of its times, adjusted to what were seen as problems. 7. The extent of political anarchism: hierarchy, domination, and rulers in Taoism. In looking to Taoism for political illumination, an early query is likely to be: To what (damaging) extent is Taoism, and the work of Lao Tzu in particular, anarchistic? It explicitly addresses a ruler, and takes for granted the existence of a state. But the format of the Lao 7zM may have been obligatory; for Taoism also hopes for "the absence of princes". Nonetheless, overtly, Taoism is not anarchistic. But although literally archist, almost everything in the work corresponds to anarchist sentiments, and it has struck responsive chords in anarchists. Not surprisingly then, some have argued that, despite appearances, the work is anarchistic, and disposes of the state and the ruler "when taken in a political sense (thus Clark). What has happened here is that anarchism is confused with an important Taoism sketches an early version of monarchically organised anakyrism; Clark (in his book) a late version of variant, meaning practice, policy and so on ecological anakyrism. If Taoism assumes a ruler then it is open to the charge of not being a suitably natural - way - unless there is a no-hands ruler. But a satisfactory ruler does not coerce, and in fact does no regulation. It seems clear that Lao Tzu assumes a monarchical style of society without coercion. The basic idea is that it is alright (if maybe costly) to have or inherit a perhaps superfluous ruler, so long as there is no coercion. The "ruler" is merely a planner, a 18 It is tempting to speculate that the greater Tao would serve to limit the number of actual individual taos, as certainly happened in most historic times. On a market model, supply and demand would be on a natural parity. 78 guide, an example. "Laws" are not backed up with coercion. Carving the block coercively is seen as counterproductively breaking up the community. Control or domination breaks the natural order of society, coercion removes the basic elements of voluntary simplicity; they are appropriately met with resistance. Government is said to be a sort of disorder. Government is indeed a main source of disorder, where government means coercive government. People are difficult to keep in order because those above interfere. Indeed this is the only reason they are difficult to keep in order (LT 57 and 58). The more laws there are, the more disorder is possible, the more disorder there is. The more ways order is attempted, and more ways there are to have disorder. Natural order is the way, the recommended way. Imposed order is counterproductive. There is reciprocal resistance to the imposition of deviant order. This would hold even if social organisers tried to impose Tao itself. To attempt to impose it would be to go astray. Such points help to explain why little satisfactory detail is given on social and political organisation. For the requisite organisation, such as it is, follows natural patterns and natural social structures (whichever they are). No doubt details would be (in the style of Aristotelian ethics) largely descriptive of what happens in cases where social affairs were functioning well. Even so, rather more needs to be said about how society accommodates "deviants" of various sorts, as to how unsocial and unenvironmental activities are curtailed, what support structures natural arrangements afford, and so on. Of course these things are attended to locally by society, not by a remote and mostly indifferent state. As in modem anarchism, an important distinction is taken for granted between (local) society and the state or empire. (By contrast, in contemporary texts, especially those of economic orientation, the state is often conflated with society, social roles are transferred to the state, and it is even claimed that what society wants is what the state does!) In Taoism, as in nineteenth century social anarchism, society functions along natural lines; the state is essentially otiose. Society is self-regulating. No doubt small markets that do not yield excess profits flourish, no doubt craftspeople - abound and live well but not extravagantly, no doubt local people make inputs to the arrangements of their social affairs. Most of these sorts of background details go largely unstated. But some significant features of social practice are revealed; for example (LT 3), the worthy are not exalted or rewarded, competition is not promoted, there is no unnecessary accumulation of possessions, consumerism and the manufacturing ot wants is discouraged. In short, all the main approved features of modern economic behaviour - the sources of greed, discrimination and strife according to Taoism (Chan p. 103) - are gently set aside, they do not represent natural, or satisfactory, ways. 79 Just as nature can operate by itself without a director or boss, so a confederation can run itself without an emperor or president. True, there may be one or more rulers. However a Taoist ruler/sage "exercises" non-dominating authority. But obviously, since he exercises no authority, some of the stuffing has been removed from notion of authority. The ruler/sage has no personal power. He imposes nothing on others. He transmits worthwhile tradition but does not impose it. He is said to transmit it through eternal edicts, but these are principles proferred or advice at best. He does not attempt to legislate or require the good. Society is like the individual, it cannot be coerced into doing right things. And it should not be! At work is a teleological model of "transcendent" good, a bit like a natural law theory, but even more like recent deep environmental theory. No more than co-operating individuals in a social matrix are required for the good. A ruler, or organiser, does not attempt to require it for society. He takes no action and the people are transformed by an exemplar ruler. He is a ruler on a rather more Gandhian model, but even so not a visible charismatic leader. Unlike contemporary models, the ruler is not a jet-setter or super-consumer; he is not usually seen on television, and perhaps not seen at all, but only known about, or his or her existence merely rumoured. As with "authority", but even more so, other social and political terms thus get drastically turned around, and even subverted. The "empire ceases to be coercive power, but turns into a natural super-regional order under general guidance of the Tao. Possessing the empire" even comes to mean something like attunement to Te. The "power" of a ruler is not coercive. It is exemplary. The best rulers are those whose existence is merely known by the people. Thus they are not rulers or leaders, but models for personal development. (For Deep Ecology the corresponding roles would be those oi eco-saints.) They are not apart from society, but central to society's ideals. Society could have a lot of "rulers" (kingly people) or could consist entirely of "kingly people". Like Christ, a taoist ruler leads from within or behind. The people seeing the life of the sage choose to do likewise. An ideal ruler is a non-interfering exemplar ruler. The people bec&me, if you like, ruler-groupies. The sage understands the fundamentals of Tao, and practices accordingly. So Taoism reinterprets the notion of "ruler", equating ruler with supreme exemplar, such as the sage. The meaning attributed to "ruler" becomes that of following Tao. The ruler is one who deviates little from the Tao. This is his "power"". Someone who deviates little from the Tao is kingly, that is, to observe another subversion of terminology, he shows an allembracing impartiality. The sage and the "ruler" are but two important examples of an ideal life. A more general model is also sketched (notably in LT 8) ot the best type of person — a person 'who in his dwelling loves the earth", but also loves humanity, and order, and 80 competence, and profundity. While Taoism is decidedly short on structural details for organising large human populations, which are no longer self-regulating (by contrast with large dense populations of modem penguins), it nonetheless transmits significant political messages, which deep theory needs to assimilate. Taoism has been attacked, like other similar alternative political forms (e.g. Morris's social anarchism and Illich's convivial society), as being conservative, as seeking anachronistically to turn the clock back to some ancient village communal life-style, better left far behind. Such attacks do not cohere. Such considerable changes, as Taoism envisages, from the status quo, can hardly be represented as conservative. To be sure, there are conservative elements in Taoism, as in the most radical environmental movements, for instance the desire to conserve elements of the natural environment that the "conservatives" wish to exploit or destroy. ('Conservative', like many a political terms in heavy popular use, breaks down under conceptual overload.) While backward-looking glances at an idealised past is a conservative tendency, anathema to forward-looking progressives who prefer to leave the past obscured in a heavy cloud of dust, nonetheless, the past, with its actual features, its blocked possibilities, and its paths not taken, remains important to all main political persuasions. Against anarchistic positions, progressives like to lodge the charges that the past never was ideal, that virtually everything that matters (not, surely, forests inhabited by wild creatures) was far worse than the enlightened present, #776? that anarchism has never really been achieved in the past. Again the charges do not cohere. (Proof is left as an exercise; but for hints, see EE). It should be evident that Taoism was, and remains, a radical position. It represents a severe attack on mainstream civilization, on themes of the dominant social paradigm. It discards or upsets many mainstream values, and most mainstream ways of organising and doing things. It holds up instead examples of very different lifestyles as much preferable, and offers a very mean path, simple and modest, between insufficiency and excess- APPENDIX. Doctrines of Four: the four great things and the fourfold way. Running in a striking way through the history of thought are certain related doctrines of four — of four great, important or valuable, things, whose basic interrelations are fundamental to the whole doctrine involved. Consider first three, plainly related, fourfolds, of much interest in deeper ecological thinking:- theWay/Tao I God(s) I Whole/Gaia  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Box 21, Item 708: Draft of Taoism and deep (ecology) theory: a preliminary object-theoretic investigation Subject The topic of the resource Printout (photocopy) of draft, undated. Pages also numbered 50-80. Description An account of the resource One of eight papers digitised from item 708. Title in collection finding aid: RS: Taoism and Deep (Ecological) Theory Ts. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/browse?search=Richard+Sylvan&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bjoiner%5D=and&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=&amp;range=&amp;collection=&amp;type=&amp;user=&amp;tags=&amp;public=&amp;featured=&amp;exhibit=&amp;geolocation-mapped=&amp;geolocation-address=&amp;geolocation-latitude=&amp;geolocation-longitude=&amp;geolocation-radius=10&amp;submit_search=Search+for+items">Richard Sylvan</a> Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived <span class="MuiTypography-root-125 MuiTypography-body2-126">The University of Queensland's <a data-testid="rek-series" href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/records/search?page=1&amp;pageSize=20&amp;sortBy=score&amp;sortDirection=Desc&amp;searchQueryParams%5Brek_series%5D%5Bvalue%5D=Richard+Sylvan+Papers%2C+UQFL291&amp;searchMode=advanced">Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291</a></span>, Box 21, Item 708 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org">Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy</a> Contributor An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, <a href="https://najtaylor.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Dr. N.A.J. Taylor</a>. Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library. Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource [31] leaves. 67.21 MB. Type The nature or genre of the resource Manuscript Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context <a href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:49545e5">https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:49545e5</a> Box 21: More Green Como House Como House > Shelves > Top > Pile 3 https://www.antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/c2e6632d96cd9731bb185e500740e78e.pdf ba53f5b39bc28242d44e3586fc9c8987 PDF Text Text / / * WAR AND TAO AND DEE Taoism and deep-green environmental theory nanism, is not a pacific issues, diverge over war. For Taoism, by contrast foi doctrine, but is committed to skilful defensive militarism. While it does not espouse a fortress mentality, Taoism certainly condones limited defensive military operations for specific purposes, a sort of guerilla warfare. sBy contrast, deep-green theory, while acknowledging the role of organised social defence, stands opposed to professional militarism, and thereby to military defence, and is committed to a principled pacifism. Conveniently a route through Taoism, philosophically fascinating in its own right, will lead us to problems of pacifism and towards deep-green theory. 7. o/ a o/ war wnZz/arMw. War did not receive a favourable press in ancient Chinese philosophy. Generally aggression and war were to be avoided. Even Confucius imposed very demanding conditions: for example, 'when good men have instructed the people [in morals, agriculture, military tactics] for seven years, they way be allowed to bear arms/ Tf a ruler ... does not set himself right, even his commands will not be obeyed' (SB p.41, italics added). Mo Tzu went much further than Confucius, roundly condemning war - on utilitarian grounds, that war yields no net benefit at any level (SB p.227). What is more, he backed his heavy condemnation practically (unlike some conspicuous contemporary theoretical utilitarians); 'he did not hesitate to walk for ten days and ten nights in an effort to dissuade a ruler from making war' (SB p.212). But none, it is said, went as far, in a detailed and sophisticated criticism of war,,as Lao Tzu; 'none has condemned war more strongly than Lao Tzu'. '[T]he opposition of Taoism to the use of force is well-known, and the most bitter attack on militarism if found in the Zzzo (Chan, p.154, p.17.) But, after that splendid build-up, the text is slightly disappointing. Lao Tzu does not assert outright that war is an abomination, or even roundly condemn it. His critique of war, militarism, and military technology, is subtle and oblique, and, on the surface, far distanced from pacifism. For he does not recommend an end to war - in that genuine Taoists, those who possess Tao, will never participate in them - but expects wars to continue as ^vz'Ay. Worse, he even goes so far as to outline proper attitudes to war and conduct in war, and indeed to suggest military techniques and strategies, some of which look decidedly devious. Among the classical works of Taoism, we focus on the because, by contrast with other works, a remarkable component of that book is devoted to war and militarism. The apparent deviousness of the tactics Lao Tzu allocates serves to highlight what has been seen as 'the most troublesome element' in his philosophy (Chan p.17) - not so much however because they concern military operations, but because they are taken to apply much more widely, 'to life in general' (p.17). But why should military activity obtain some special �/ / 46""WAR AND PEACE )V: TAO AND DEEP-GREEN \ Taoism and deep-green environmental theory, although closely aligned on very many issues, diverge over war. For Taoism, by contrast for instance with Buddhism, is not a pacific doctrine, but is committed to skilful defensive militarism. While it does not espouse a fortress mentality, Taoism certainly condones limited defensive military operations for specific purposes, a sort of guerilla warfare. sBy contrast, deep-green theory, while acknowledging the role of organised social defence, stands opposed to professional militarism, and thereby to military defence, and is committed to a principled pacifism. Conveniently a route through Taoism, philosophically fascinating in its own right, will lead us to problems of pacifism and towards deep-green theory. J. of a Tao:s; of war anJ wn/%ar:syn. War did not receive a favourable press in ancient Chinese philosophy. Generally aggression and war were to be avoided. Even Confucius imposed very demanding conditions: for example, 'when good men have instructed the people [in morals, agriculture, military tactics] for seven years, they way be allowed to bear arms/ 'If a ruler ... does not set himself right, even his commands will not be obeyed" (SB p.41, italics added). Mo Tzu went much further than Confucius, roundly condemning war - on utilitarian grounds, that war yields no net benefit at any level (SB p.227). What is more, he backed his heavy condemnation practically (unlike some conspicuous contemporary theoretical utilitarians); 'he did not hesitate to walk for ten days and ten nights in an effort to dissuade a ruler from making war" (SB p.212). But none, it is said, went as far, in a detailed and sophisticated criticism of war,,as Lao Tzu; 'none has condemned war more strongly than Lao Tzu". '[T]he opposition of Taoism to the use of force is well-known, and the most bitter attack on militarism if found in the Lao 7za" (Chan, p.154, p.17.) But, after that splendid build-up, the text is slightly disappointing. Lao Tzu does not assert outright that war is an abomination, or even roundly condemn it. His critique of war, militarism, and military technology, is subtle and oblique, and, on the surface, far distanced from pacifism. For he does not recommend an end to war - in that genuine Taoists, those who possess Tao, will never participate in them - but expects wars to continue as tmavoMfa&Zt? evz'A. Worse, he even goes so far as to outline proper attitudes to war and conduct in war, and indeed to suggest military techniques and strategies, some of which look decidedly devious. Among the classical works of Taoism, we focus on the Lao 7za because, by contrast with other works, a remarkable component of that book is devoted to war and militarism. The apparent deviousness of the tactics Lao Tzu allocates serves to highlight what has been seen as 'the most troublesome element" in his philosophy (Chan p.17) — not so much however because they concern military operations, but because they are taken to apply much more widely, 'to life in general" (p.17). But why should military activity obtain some special ��2 dispensation? Why should what is no/ tolerated more generally be exonerated there? But given that Taoism has here the virtue of consistency (i.e. uniformity on principles) and of universalizability, that simply leaves more explaining to be done. * Pnzz^/br 7hofym, on J wary a.y nnavo^^/e evi/.y There are /wo puzzles here in Taoism rather than one. There is the miP/ary-prac/fce^ paradox, and, varying and generalising on that, there are /{/e-^racOce^ paradoxes. The special paradox is generated by the following incompatible elements: on the one side, The most bitter attack on militarism", the well-known opposition of Taoism to the use of force (p.17) and to the possession and use of smart military weapons and technology - implying that war is far from all right - and on the other, advocacy of certain (devious) military tactics, outlines of (deceitful) conduct in war, and so on - implying that war is all right after all. A straightforward generalisation of this paradox would look at other morally-sensitive parts of life, where some practice was strongly condemned yet engaged in (for many examples, see the dilemmas assembled in MD). But the variation of concern to Chan and the neo-Confucians concerns the conjunction of upright with devious practices in life, in particular in the life of the sage. For a Taoist sage is presumed to lead an upright straightforward life, yet appears to engage in devious and even deceitful practices incompatible with such a life-style. Call this the paradox. Evidently a good deal of explaining is required, as to how Taoism can coZ^r^n/Zy take the positions it appears to presume, both on war and peace, and on life more generally. A desirable preliminary would seem to be a little investigation of what position Ay taken, especially on war and militarism. One key pasage runs: Fine weapons are instruments of evil They are hated by creatures Therefore those who possess the Tao turn away from them.... Weapons are instruments of evil, not the instruments of a good ruler. When he uses them unavoidably, he regards calm restraint as the best principle Even when he is victorious, he does not regard it as praiseworthy, For to praise victory is to delight in the slaughter of men. He who delights in the slaughter of men will not succeed in the empire. ... For a victory, let us observe the occasion with funeral-ceremonies (LT p.154). Wars, which involve the use of weapons, instruments of evil, are accordingly themselves evil. They are also evil because they involve the slaughter of men. But they are also sometimes unavoidable (also p.152). Therefore such wars are unavoidable evils. Such discourse, obtained by almost immediate inference from the passage, is within the standard orbit of dilemma talk. But Taoism lacks, through deliberately eschewing deontic talk, the discourse which enables direct expression of such dilemmas, or even direct condemnation of wars or of clever weapons. Instead the points are made by circMw/ocM/Zon, what the possesser of Tao does, how the good ruler conducts himself, or by ana/ogy, of victory in war with death. �3 Unavoidable evils are the very stuff of deontic dilemmas (though many theories, underpinned by shonky logic, lack the resources for representing this stuff properly). Where something is unavoidably evil, it is because evil, J also no/ doing it is excusable, because it is unavoidable. So, given such an argument (which has its weaknesses), an unavoidable evil is a genuinely dilemmatic object with inconsistent features. Certain wars have looked, since ancient times, like such dilemmatic objects. Revealingly, Chan tries to explain that 'most troublesome element' in Taoism, the military-practice paradox, through the following exercise in lateral thinking: It can ... be argued that Lao Tzu uses warfare to illustrate his principles of taking no action and weakness because warfare is among the most dynamic and critical of human experiences, just as the Indian classic, the chooses fighting as the theme on which to discuss the terrible dilemma whether one should fulfil his duty, as in the case of a soldier, and kill, or should fail in his duty and refrain from killing (p.17). 'Just as'? The Indian classic prevents a classic moral dilemma, a dilemma represented in contemporary philosophy (following its rediscovery by Sartre), where there are incompatible duties: the duty to kill, because of one's role as a soldier, and the duty not to kill, because of one's human condition, and the supervenient dilemma of failing in and fulfilling one's duties. These dilemmas for an individual (male, as it then was) are replicated in dilemmas regarding war for group institutions: at bottom, the obligation to engage in war (for one set of compelling reasons) as contraposed with the obligation not to engage in war (for another, perhaps overlapping, set of reasons). A theory of moral dilemmas (as worked out for example in MD) is crucial for an adequate treatment of major issues in war and peace, especially (as will become evident) for a viable strong pacifism. But Taoism, eschewing deontic discourse, lacks the apparatus to state or develop moral dilemmas. Hence it is logically excluded from giving a full or adequate account of what is going on conceptually. One of the philosophically fascinating feature of Taoism is the fashion in which it manages to avoid deontic discourse, and to substitute for direct deontic discourse or improvise circumlocutions when deontic discourse would otherwise appear inevitable (cf. UT for examples). But there are costs. One is inability to display the mechanism of deontic dilemmas, or to show what reasons and argument lie behind Taoist prounouncements and conclusions (the shortage of Taoism on argument is another philosophically conspicious feature, also observed in UT). As conceptual apparatus for analysizing moral dilemmas is missing, most of the machinery involved has to be passed over. Only the outcomes, as Taoism sees them, are presented, as if from a black box. Taoism blacks out the story on deontic dilemmas that deep-green theory can tell, as the following diagram tries to show: DMgrawy . C/tar/ing �4 It is evident that Taoism can be information can be put into the Black Box rendering it less opaque. That extension can be made so as to conform to deep-green theory, i.e. so that the extended Taoist chart, a neo-Daoist chart, looks like the deep-green one. That is indeed essentially how neo-Daoism get characterised, in terms of conformity of the extension to deep ecological theory (see UT). We are now placed to explain how to dissolve, or at least neutralize, the paradoxes deriving from repudiation of militarism, an awkwardly qualified repudiation in the case of Taoism. In a significant sense there is no resolving of genuine deontic dilemmas. The principles delineating the fix may .yfonJ, incompatible, signalling the persisting suboptimality (or better, sublimenality) of the dilemmatic situation. Where there is a dilemma, involved parties should try to do well enough in the sublimenal circumstances (for a much fuller account, see MD). Thus where there is a war, itself a non-Taoist process, engaged or caught up Taoists will not abandon Taoism. Taoist methods will be applied, Taoist strategies pursued. So much for theoretical representation and (non-)resolution of life-practices and other dilemmas, details of which are readily elaborated in deep-green extensions of Taoism. A prior substantive issue is whether dilemmas always generated: not whether wars are evil (typically they are, an issue we shall come to), but whether wars are unavoidable. Analysis of wars does not bear that familiar claim out decisively. Many wars could have been avoided, through conciliation, negotiation, restraint, etc., and no worse results apparently obtained, through sanctions, exchange, trade, etc. Through a typology of wars (coming up) that conjecture can be given some substance. Consider, for instance, what would be walk-overs. Then there is little point in making a military response. So war can be avoided. Certainly an occupation, to be met in a different way, may still occur. And so on, perhaps, for various other types of war. But, more generally, try this:Every war involves an aggressor, who makes an aggressive move. Such an aggressor could always avoid that move, taking a different (or a do-nothing) course of action. Therefore, �5 every war can be avoided. No war is entirely unavoidable. Setting aside determinism (which renders %/Z actual wars along with all other events unavoidable), it could be argued that a war sometimes simply boils up, without an aggressor, an intensification of a conflagatory situation. There are grounds for scepticism regarding such examples; for such intensification can only occur if provocative military moves are made, for instance troops are stationed in provocative or risky positions. The presumption that certain wars are unavoidable typically derives from a one-sided perspective on war, a defender's perspective. A defender has no option, so it is routinely averred, but to respond to a determined aggressor. Even i/that should be so sometimes, when there is no running away or going underground, it does not establish that such a war is unavoidable; for it neglects the role of the aggressor. By a smarter formulation, relevant features of unavoidability can be captured. Although wars may not be unavoidable, defensive action in wars that have been initiated may be unavoidable. At least such action may be unavoidable z/ unacceptably high costs (death, enslavement, etc.) are not to be avoided. Thereupon another highly relevant feature emerges: the linkage of avoidability to costs. For whether an action is unavoidable then depends upon what costs a party is prepared to incur before and when insisting on action: but this appears entirely unacceptable. How can what is "unavoidable" cease to be so when some further costs are absorbed? However with basics like survival, a certain liberty, and so on, we do reach such bounds. An important fype of unavoidability. We also reach scenarios, unavailable to Lao Tzu but kindly brought within range by modem technology, which may appear to justify aggressive strikes. State Z, while not an aggressor, is carrying out practices which will impose unacceptably high costs upon peoples of other states and implacably refuses to desist. It could, for example, be poisoning air or water flowing to other states. But ,to make the case vivid, let us suppose that state Z is constructing, for reasons Zeders find convincing (they are committed to a faith which depicts all humans as incorrigible sinners and unworthy of life), an effective doomsday machine. Would an (aggressive) preemptory strike designed to disable or destroy the machine be unavoidable?* In a sense, No; in another Yes. For different modalities can operate. Physically outsiders need to do nothing, but watch Zeders go about their zealous work. But deontically they are under heavy moral pressure, because of the costs of standing by idly: if the human race is worth anything very substantial, then they are obliged to act, action is deontically unavoidable. Here is a situation where a proposed reduction of deontic logic proves illuminating. Obligation is explicated through not implying, or necessitating, the sanction, i.e. 1 Whether it would be justifiable, or just, are separate issues. But it is evident enought that such scenarios further damage the obsolescent idea of war. For, according to received doctrine, a just war is defensive. (How such a war can be fought at all is another matter; coherence requires relativization to Just war Jbr party d'.) �6 excessive ethical costs such as extermination. Let us explain deontic unavoidability analogously: an action is so unavoidable if not undertaking it would result in excessive ethical costs. Then /fit can be established that there is no other way than a military strike, an act of war, to ensure that the Zeders desist (and certainly we can envisage scenarios like that), then that is deontically unavoidable. It is also for those committed to, or inclined towards pacifism; and it is, for them at least, but paradoxically justifiable, as the negation is also justifiable, on pacific grounds. Scenarios like that sketched, that appear to render certain wars deontically unavoidable require but little or no elaboration to render them evil. Evil indeed is such a standard feature of standard wars that at least its great presence call for little supporting evidence. But it has taken to vast stretch of human history to reach this general point of recognition. The manifold evils of war Lao Tzu very early recognised and emphasized: Wherever armies are stationed, briars and thorns grow. Great wars are always followed by famines (p.152). And nowadays followed by great tides of refugees. This passage includes not only recognition of the widely-observed socio-environmental consequences of war, but, more striking, very early recognition of the severe environmental impact of military forces. That critique is not however developed in Taoism.^ Only recently has it been pushed substantially further. And only recently could a new, most significant twist occur, the merging of resource security, long a military objective, with environmental security. The appalling idea has recently been floated that the military, in need of new work and roles with the apparent warming of West-East relations and cooling of the Cold War, should exchange usual military idleness for meddling in environmental matters: regulation and policing of environmental resources, ensurance of environmental security of powerful states, and similar. This is a bit like reassigning those imprisoned for child abuse to managing kindergartens; for consider the impressive military record of environmental vandalism. What the military is alleged to offer is a structure appropriate and available for handling such matters. But, to the contrary, it is precisely the sort of hierarchical, authoritarian expensive structure that should be wound down and up as soon as the opportunity appears, as (briefly) now, rather than being retained and shockingly reoriented (as a state-serving "Greenwar"). 2. On q/ /row Having arrived, by better or worse arguments, at the conclusion that wars, though 2 But a bridge to deep-green theory can be made through neo-Daoism, an updating of Taoism in continuity with deep ecology (which however is somewhat thin and threadbare on war; for what there is so far, see Naess p.160). On neo-Daoism, see UT. �7 generally evil, may be sometimes unavoidable, it is evidently important to say something about how they - those of the theoretical residue - are to be conducted. By appropriate conduct the damage they do may be reduced; also the conduct should be appropriate to the funereal nature of wars (to exceed Taoist resources for stating this sort of point). It is at this stage that deep­ green theory begins to diverge from Taoism. In further explaining the Taoist and deep-green critiques of war, and diverting objections to them, a roMg/t and preliminary %?<?Zogy of wars is important. It is also of passing interest in its own philosophical right. War, according to English Dictionaries, is a "contest earned on by force of arms, typically between nations or states'. More exactly, war is a game - in the generous technical sense of game-theory, with players, rules, goals, strategies, and so on carried on in significant part by military means, normally between states or substates. Call the contestants, (warring) /?ar%&?. They typically represent of course larger populations. The set­ up between parties resembles the arrangements of players in game theory. There are several analogical extensions of the term war to cover games where one of the parties is an object, construed as hostile (an enemy of the state), such as Crime, Drugs, Poverty or Nature. These we can set aside as aaa/a^/ca/ wars. Of course wars form only a part of military activities. Military interests and objectives have always stretched significantly further than war, to include surveillence and security, easily extended to resource security, environmental security and life­ style security, and beyond that to political stability and other political matters. Evidently military ambitions have far over-extended themselves in bagging such democratic concerns. An anarchist solution to the whole problem of war, which some have seen Taoism as reaching towards, is immediate: eliminate the source of war, graf^. Unfortunately it is not quite that simple (and that's not simple). For wars can also occur between nations, cultures, races or tribes (which are not such artifices as states, and not always so readily or desirably abolished), between inhabited regions, and between factions within states (thus civil wars) or, perhaps by extension, between factions within other social structures (thus, for instance, gang wars). But undoubtedly eliminating states and aspiring states would abolish most wars and virtually all the worst wars. While ""nonviolent wars" are excluded by definition, by virtue of "force of arms', token wars, limited wars, and so on, are not: for instance, wars fought by small armed teams representing competing sides (cf. medieval and science fiction war games). As wars are hemmed in by conventions and agreed rules, there is no reason in principle why they should not be reduced to two person contests, fought under strict rules like boxing or gladiatorial contests. But in modem times wars have never taken such sensible forms, but have been much larger affairs, making heavy (though fortunately restricted) use of latest technology. Let us distinguish such wars as wars. They have, directly or indirectly (for the technology may be bought or bartered), a heavy research and development support structure (indeed the bulk of contemporary science is devoted - misdirected - in one way or another to �8 this effort). Among wars, an important distinction is that between and wars. An offensive war is one which ventures off a given party's territory or recognised pad, "invading" that of another party or parties; correlatively defensive parties, if they have not also invaded. Force projection typifies offensive practice. Plainly, offensiveness and defensiveness are not strictly features of a war, but of parties to a war. In a two-party war, while both parties can easily act offensively, the possibility of both parties proceeding defensively is excluded, unless they share territory. (Even then issues may arise as to which party, if any, was the aggressor, which started it, was responsible for starting it, and so on.) Thus mutually defensive wars between contemporary states are impossible (but would be possible if states shared territory, e.g. if Eire and Britain shared the territory of Northern Ireland). Tao-accredited wars were defensive wars, never wars aiming at domination: last-resort wars, in which no pride was taken (LT p.l52).3 The pretence that offensive wars are defensive is widespread, and reflected in the subterfuge that departments or ministries of war are those of defence, security or whatever. (If they really were what they purport to be, we should be well on the way to an end to war.) Offensive practices are rendered defensive ones by shabby redefinitional strategems, such as redefining 'defensive' to include defence of ideals like democracy or liberty, infringed (or allegedly infringed) on territories abroad, or to include "defence" of a third party or place (whence every offensive war is "defensive"). In the present war in which part of Arabia is engulfed (February 1991), one party claims to be defending what really was (or should be) part of its territory, namely Kuwait, another party to be defending (what Kuwait did not enjoy) democracy. It is a doubly offensive war presented in this guise as jointly defensive. Aggressive wars are waged for a variety of reasons, but usually for resources or access to resources or markets, a matter often disguised by appeal to ideology (thus a war for oil is represented as a war of liberation). But there are other reasons than narrowly economic ones, such as religion (as with crusades), power and aggrandisement (as in building an empire), and so on. Nor are those reasons necessarily far separated; ideologies like Marxism and market capitalism, for example, exhibit many of the features of religion. The economic reasons for war appear to have become much more complex with the 3 There is one line in LT that may suggest that attack was sometimes justifiable, namely Tor deep love helps one to win in the case of attack' (p.219). But how can compa^fo/i be appropriate unless this attack is a defensive setting, a larger context of unavoidability or such like. A passage shortly below confirms this interpretation: I dare not take the offensive but I take the defensive: 1 dare not advance an inch but I retreat a foot (p.222). These are advances and attacks within a defensive setting. �9 advent of an integrated world economy. At the same time many of the independent reasons for economic wars are now obsolete. For to powerful states accrue the advantages of war without war. At least most of the former economic advantages of war can be obtained without expensive wars, through trade, institution of economic dependence, etc. Small medieval wars were sometimes instituted for the collection of neighbouring riches and booty, a kind of piracy meeting conditions of war. "Small" contemporary wars can be waged for a remarkable mix of political-economy ends: to establish a regime favourable to economic penetration and profit repatriation, to subjugate markets and to remove competition, to boost a sagging weapons economy by using up old stocks and also testing new equipment, to restart a depressed economy, and so on. Such wars, along with the economic aims which motivate them, are in effect heavily castigated by Lao Tzu: When Tao prevails in the world, galloping horses are turned back to fertilize (the fields ...). When Tao does not prevail in the world, war horses thrive in the suburbs. There is no calamity greater than lavish desires. (LT p.181). But it does exceed evidential warrant to claim that Tao is not only sufficient, but for cessation of such practices. The practice of regularly stimulating complex military-saturated economies through war is reminiscent of older, much ridiculed practices in simpler societies. They now ridicule the Tsembaga, who proceeded to destroy much of their surplus product by going to war every 5-15 years (cf Rapaport). But they do not similarly ridicule the most powerful nation on the Earth, the USA, which proceeds to write off a colossal amount of surplus in war every 10-20 years (the Gulf war liquidated some $1.7 billion per day). Taoists would. For ridicule was a favoured method, an important rhetorical strategem, and war and its idiocy were favourite targets. Some classification of defensive wars is also important, for various reasons: reducing and abolishing wars, their costs and damage, restructuring societies away from war and military practices, and, not least, for appreciating Taoism. A main distinction is between * conventional defence, maintained by armies of armed soldiers, many of them professionals, and * social defence, where there are no such armies or but fragments of them, and defence is carried out through social networks of a significant part of society/ It is here that Taoism and deep-green theory part company. Under Taoism, the state wi// have a standing army, but a defensive army operating by strange, surprise tactics (p.201). No 4 Details of social defence are presented in Sharp and in Martin. �10 doubt defensive wars are to remain last resort action. Nonetheless the state will operate in secrecy, in a way incompatible with decentralised socia/ defence; people will be kept in the dark about smart weapons of the state; and they too will be surprised, along with presumed enemies of the state. By contrast, under deep-green theory, there should be no hidden smart weapons of state; information would flow more freely and not be hidden from the people (who should retain influence in informed decision making). Under deep-green, standing armies, and more generally military organisation, will be wound down altogether. Taoism should have pushed its searching criticism further. For military objectives, easily acquired by standing armies with time on their hands, are frequently incompatible with Taoism. For example, Taoism is opposed to domination (LT p.152), whereas military operations frequently seek or involve domination; and military structure is invariably hierarchical and authoritarian. Taoism aims for self-regulation, wherever feasible (cf. p.201); so does deep­ green theory, which is one reasons why it aims to dispose of standing armies, as an important preliminary to the withering away of states themselves (military forces being major props of state control and power, and often maintained primarily for internal state security). Taoism has no project for ending the era of wars; deep-green theory does. That project involves an elimination of standing armies, too often poised for fighting or political interference. A recommended route to war consists in progressive scaling down: reduction of the means and manpower. The initial stages are well-known, and include * elimination of nuclear, biological and chemical weaponry, and * force reduction. It can hardly be pretended that the Earth's states have managed to proceed very far on even this complex of stages. The next stage consists in * contraction to defensive capacities only, and the final stage consists in * elimination of remaining military defensive forces, and adoption, so far as required, of social defence practices. The complete route thus involves complete demilitarisation. Reasons why deep-green aims to proceed the /aZZ distance are readily grasped by considering the environmental shallowness of an otherwise cogent traditional case for the sharp curtailment of wars and militarism. The traditional Western case against wars has been primarily along two dimensions: social and moral. Wars are highly disruptive of the social fabric; wars may be unjust. From these joint features, it was argued that wars should be a matter of last resort, to be fought to ensure peace. It was argued further that only just wars should be fought. Just wars were rare objects. But as there was little evidence of the decline and fall of wars, much effort was expended, more practically and unsuccessfully, upon endeavouring to improve the calibre of wars, and more theoretically, upon trying to characterize war satisfactorily, or rather to bend the notion in an effort to approximate the gory unjust facts. Progress was long hindered, furthermore, because there was always a rival positive perspective on wars, which encouraged the exaltation of wars and military feats. It also �11 facilitated the transfer of the favourable image of war to other problem areas, whence the long and apparently successful war against Nature (but the short-term successes are turning into long-term problems), the short and unsuccessful war against Poverty, and so on. Behind all this is the complex idea of war as rejuvenating, even cleansing, like fire; of war as heroic, and glorious, of war as the supreme testing ground of men. These pictures of war — finally shattered by the first World War (where even the poets began to tell of horrors and atrocities) and subsequent technological wars — though no longer in ascendency, have by no means vanished. The notion of war as rejuvenating a flagging economy persists, along with the practice of keeping capitalism running smoothly by integrating substantial military components into the industrial engine. With the development of highly technological wars - the celebrated development of the dirty industrial age is substantially military - the traditional negative case has grown in strength. Wars have become much more damaging, with the potential for much more that is significantly worse, and the possibility of a just war has correspondingly contracted, virtually to zero. The opposition to war has likewise grown, but more than correspondingly with the rise of women in social and political influence. Wars have almost always and everywhere been Men's affairs; likewise conquest. Deep-green theory accepts much of the traditional negative case, but would further strengthen it. For example, the stricture against unjust wars, as out and out immoral, can be strengthened, through the following syllogism: All wars should be fully just wars. Modem wars cannot be fully just wars. Therefore, there should be no modem wars. A fully just war is not merely a just war, but a war those just character can be reliably forecast in advance. A modern war is of course a war that deploys modern technology, at least that available this century. The evidential basis for the second premiss derives from much information that collateral damage, damage to innocent bystanders and involved citizens is always likely and cannot be excluded. Such wars are always liable to violate uncontroversial requirements for a just war, even if they are purely "conventional" wars, not throwing radiation or chemical or biological weapons around. From a contemporary viewpoint the traditional doctrine of a just war, really of a just war, is seriously out of date. The reasons for this reach wider than the new features introduced by modem technological wars and the character of modem civilization, with its giant cities littered with dangerous and vulnerable military targets. They have also to do with the chauvinism of the justice proposed, which is shallow human justice, not natural or environmental justice. There is no consideration of justice to other creatures or to the Earth (cf Naess p.160). Two troubles are really intertwined here: conceptual difficulties with too narrow a notion of justice, and ideological difficulties with too narrow a vision of what is an object of �12 value, of what counts. The deep-green case against war adds to the traditional case a further dimension, neglected until very recently: the environmental dimension. It has suddenly been seen that wars are typically environmental atrocities. Earlier, of course, "environments" were simply backgrounds, backdrops in paintings and plays, to the real drama. Contemporary technological wars tend to be not merely social tragedies but environmental ones as well. There is a doctrine of just war, but it is a human chauvinistic affair. There is no similarly developed doctrine of an ^co/og/ca/Zy goMnJ war, a deep ecological war. Unless any such war were literally different from modem wars, that is from contemporary technological wars, it would overstep permitted bounds. For such wars are characteristically ecological disasters. Hardened military people, desensitized by a rigorous unethical training, feel even less compunction about degrading or destroying environments or members of other species than they do of maiming or killing civilians through "collateral" activity. Matching the no-just-war syllogism is a no-sound-war syllogism: All wars should be environmentally sound wars. Modem wars cannot be environmentally sound. Therefore, there should be no modem wars. The argument for the second premiss has of course to be different. It looks to the information accumulating on what wars do to natural and built environments. The Vietnam and Gulf wars both inflicted immense damage on natural environments or what was left of them. The environmental effects of war are not confined to direct and collateral damage. There are indirect effects also. Thus, for instance, war also supplied the mechanism of, and the technology for, modern environmental destruction: explosives, bulldozers from tanks, etc. As well, training for war and engagement in war have much fostered, along with attitudes that make for social callousness or ruthlessness, those that contribute to environmental insensitivity and cruelty. 3. Fuzzes Tao/s/ sZra/fgy of Z^cAnoZogy an<Z woZ^ncF Tt is surprising how much of the Loo 7zM is devoted to military strategy". Which strategies? Surprise, above all. But why such strategies? "Do they not contradict the Taoists strong opposition to the use of force" (Chan p.222), the implied commitment to quietism? Briefly, Taoism is not committed to quietism, and while certainly antagonistic to violence, does not oppose certain uses of force (only really ///-forcing, as will be explained). Even so, the emphasis on military strategy remains puzzling. The strategies, many of them relevant to social defence, include * -yenoMyn&M, not 'making light of the enemy" (p.222) * and nonvisibility (p.201). The defensive strategy involves guerilla tactics: marching without formation, holding weapons without seeming to have them, confronting �13 enemies without seeming to meet them (p.222). But even in times of peace, "smart weapons of the state should not be displayed to the people' (p.164). Such recommendations helped to fuel the charge of deviousness lodged against Lao Tzu. But look at part of the reason for concealing smart weapons: "The more smart weapons the people have, the more troubled the state will be' (p.201). Smart weapons are carried in corrupt states, where the rich engage in conspicuous consumption and the people are suppressed, not where Tao is practiced (LT p.194). * advance from flexibility but firmness. Weakness is the principle of life and will overcome strength (LT p.164, p.233). * coolness and (LT p.233, p.164). Like these, most of the general strategies are standard Taoist practices simply applied to military conduct. For these standard practices the charge of deviousness looks feeble. The response applies more generally to other allegedly devious political strategies. For the strategies are but application of Taoist principles and techniques to warfare, politics and elsewhere. Nothing excludes application of these techniques to what are accounted, in general, unnecessary evils (which must sometimes, on other Taoist grounds, be countered). Nor, to meet the main criticism, need any deceit or deviousness be involved; nor is it. In particular, the legalist tactic, "In order to grasp, it is necessary first to give' (LT p.164), is cited as involving "an element of deceit' "undeniably', and "worse' it is "morally questionable' (Chan p.17). But in order for me to grasp your hand in a normal handshake, it is necessary first for me to give my hand. There is no deceit here, nothing morally questionable. All the tactics permit of benign construals, of a Taoist kind. Consider, for instance, "In order to contract, it is necessary first to expand' (LT p.164). In order to bend a copper pipe to the intended angle, it is better to bend it first a little further than required. The transformation of water to ice (both favoured natural items for symbolic purposes: natural processes which may look devious!) neatly illustrates the Taoist principle (which is however hardly necessary), and shows softness and weakness turned hardness and strength. The Taoist critique of militarism is as much a critique of technology as of war. Sharp weapons, "smart weapons' as we might now say, come in for much critical attention, as we have already noticed. Only in corrupt and degenerate states are they displayed or flaunted (p.194, p.164); in deep-green regions smart weapons of state' would not be retained unexhibited. The people will not have them for they mean trouble (p.201); for similar reasons deep-green regions will be free of them. So, it seems, will ideal Taoist regions: "Even if there are arrows and weapons, none will display them' (LT p.238). Much technology, military and other, is excluded under the Taoist edict against violence (a further facet of the military-practices paradox).^ 5 Under contemporary technology and technological arrangements, such as the storage of quantities of oil and nuclear and chemical materials in great cities, wars have assumed new and �14 The powerful critique of militarism in the 7ho-^ CTnng is coupled with strong opposition to violence. Some of the linkage is evident enough. Militarism as practised represents an ultimate form of state (or party) violence. A basic theme is that violent practices will come to an unnatural end, and accordingly to a non-Taoist end (generalising LT p.176). While force may occur in spectacular, but satisfactory, natural forms, force is duly distinguished from violence. To force the growth of life means ill omen. For the mind to employ the vital force without restraint means violence (LT p.197). One who follows Tao does not apply dominating force, which usually has had results bringing requital (p.152). Dominating force, like power, is in general castigated, under doctrine of WMno forced actions, no violence. To force natural growth is deviant, destroying harmony. To stop natural growth is deviant. But there is a significant difference between force and violence. To intentionally employ destructive force is to do violence. To so force things is condemned. To remain in harmony with things one does not so force things or practice violence. There is a non-interference principle at work, which also indicates types of non­ interference that are excluded. However Taoism does not always get the distinction between force and violence quite right. 'Vital force without restraint", intentionally excessive force, is only part of what counts as vZoZence, which is more generally w/tZc/t vZo/aZ^^, i.e. transgresses, descrecrates, very destructive dimensions, to the point of being utterly irresponsible. A different approach to technology, as to war, is now mandatory. These are no longer things that can in principle be nicely confined and need not touch parties outside the fray. An important part of ending wars, "winning the war against wars", is removing the technology of war, above all from irresponsible state power. As for which technology to try to jettison and which to try to retain or improve, it is not so difficult to indicate, provided evaluative terminology is not outlawed. What is wanted is technology that is good in its place, what should be excluded is technology that is indifferent or bad or potentially so. Technology to be justified has to do something worthwhile, it has to address identifiable respectable needs. That is why merely indifferent technology is out; there is no virtue in technology for technology's sake, as it is a mere technique. It is because of the crucial evaluative component in choice of technology that approprZaf^n^&f, itself evaluative, comes closer to encapsulating the criterion than other recent efforts. Size, such as smallness, or intermediateness, are not what matter, though modest and not excessive technologies are likely to fare better in satisfying appropriateness. In simpler societies, small technology is of course more appropriate; for that is what is good there. From known criteria for what is good these other features for locally appropriate technology can be read off: reliability, esp. in maintenance, functioning well and safely under the expected range of operating conditions (which may be difficult), ease of repair, capital cheapness and repair inexpensiveness, environmental benignness, and meeting sound social needs. �15 profanes, injures, outrages, etc. It is thus a negatively connoted force, an evil force in some specified intentional respect. There is a tendency for Taoist commentators, not Taoists, to regard Taoism as condemning all uses, or even occurrences, of force, but this is not so. Rather intentional ill-forcing is what is castigated, what is deviant. Thus Taoism does not exclude a range of defensive practices, which make satisfactory use of natural forces, like letting the machines of war industry stop. Those who would abolish war and its machinery, substituting for it nonwarlike and ideally nonviolent methods, technology, and strategies, have been confronted not merely with much sub-rational abuse but with plenty of criticism and even some paradoxes. Here is a recent paradox concerning war and nonviolence: * War must be abolished. One reason is simply economic. We can no longer afford it, and the opportunity costs are enormous. Along with other extraordinarily wasteful activities, it is an anachronism. * Doing so cannot be accomplished without violence, i.e. in effect, given the types of violence involved, without what amounts to war. According to a fuller version of this premiss, the process of abolishing a war would only be achieved through a revolution so profound that it could not succeed without extensive and extreme violence, amounting to (civil) war. ° But then war cannot be abolished without war. Therefore, war which must be abolished cannot be abolished. 6 This "paradox" has been compared with the Liar paradox, but the parallel does not persist far. For this paradox does not involve self-referential features, and is easily broken, as follows. Let the "last war" be not the last standard war but the revolution abolishing war. Then, given that the revolution is successful, war will be abolished therewith, i.e. with that last war. There need be no regress, given again a successful outcome. All the premisses stand intact, but the conclusion, following the "therefore" is a nonsequitur. However, while the dissolution of the argument is accordingly logically fine, the route is repugnant. Standard pacifism challenges the second premiss. 4. 6 am/ Brian Medlin, who forcefully propounded this puzzle, set other analogous puzzles alongside it - designed to reveal deep difficulties in contemporary political, and especially alternative, thought. Another puzzle, concerning liberty and repression in the context of capitalism, revolved around the following inconsistent triad: * capitalism must be removed, but liberty retained. * capitalism cannot be removed without repression. * repression is antithetical to liberty. The puzzle is resolved as with the analogous puzzle of abolishing. Let the "last capitalist" action the days of liberty be the repressive but liberating revolution overthrowing capitalism. �16 Although Taoism is strongly opposed to war, and much in favour of peace - and accordingly by prevailing standards a substantially /xzcf/ic position — it is not (nowhere in the central texts) committed to pacifism in usual senses, for two different reasons:* It is not, by contrast with pacifism, opposed to all types of warfare, for example smart defensive wars. * It eschews deontology in terms of which moral pacifism is commonly stated, for instance through the watershed thesis P2. It is morally wrong to use violence. By contrast with Taoism, deep environmentalism does not avoid deontic claims, and is committed m to nonviolent technologies and ways and to pacifistic principles. Moreover, certain forms of deep environmentalism are completely committed to pacifism, notably European forms. Is deep green? There is heavy contemporary opposition to pacifism, as there also was to Taoism in the warring times when Taoism was first being promulgated. Many of the central institutions of contemporary life are intricated in coercion, violence and war. The most prominent contemporary institutions, states, are premissed on these elements of damaging force; they claim entitlement to use them widely, and even claim a certain territorial monopoly on their use. As a result they are having constantly to engage in them in attempt to maintain that monopoly. They are certainly the main perpetrators of wars, and of violence. They are indeed inured to wars, are in constant preparation for wars, yet propound dialectial (and normally dishonest and cynical) doctrines of peace through war (for a recent example see the appendix). Unremarkably then, the extensive propagandistic machinery of state has invested heavily in "justificatory" exercises in favour of controlled use, /A? own use, of destructive force, and continues to inveigh against pacifism. Because a routine trick in this sophistical repetoire consists in conflating pacifism with extreme, naive and inplausible, forms, an inevitable and important early task commits in unscrambling senses of pacifism". Semantical skulduggery can be thwarted in this way. Paci/Mwi, as explained by English dictionaries, invariably concerns wars and warfare, and contains two components, negative and, elaborating on that, positive:- The negative component is, in Amauld's word, a/ifi-War-M/M, opposition (in ways to be further specified) to all forms of warfare (see OED). The positive component supplies alternative ways of settling disputes (what it is supposed that wars with some semblance of justification involve), such as negotiation, arbitration,... - and, adding to too narrow dictionary accounts - sanctions, substitutions (e.g. of sporting events, operatic contests, cooperative ventures),... . In brief .yfa/iJarJ paci/Mwi is opposition to all warfare and resolution of potential wars by other nonmilitary means. Plainly the to warfare, like the sanctions and so on, cannot itself be military (using soldiers and other devices of war), on pain of some incoherence. But otherwise the ways of opposition can be many and various: they can certainly be as with nonviolent �17 demonstrations, resistance movements, and so forth, and they may also be devious (e.g. turning the forces of war upon themselves so they are neutralised). It quickly becomes evident, then, that some of the dictionaries offer but loaded definitions which, by restricting the negative components, reduce the initial appeal and plausibility of pacifism. Consider the Eng/fy/t definition of the negative component: 'the doctrine of non-resistance to hostilities and of total non-co-operation with any form of warfare". Thereby excluded are forms of pacifism which offer active and plausible alternatives to warfare such as social defence. The Eng/is/t tends to force pacifism into what the Ox/brd Dictionary lists as its final item: 'often, with depreciatory implication, the advocacy of peace at any price", 'in any circumstance". Pacifism can easily resist being forced into these sorts of circumstances: it has many resources, as an extensive series of texts on alternatives to war, such as negotiation, non­ violent action and social defence, from Taoism to contemporary environmentalism attest. Academic philosophers have much advanced the semantical strategy of some dictionaries, of rendering pacifism more difficult from the very outset by narrow and biassed definitions. They have stretched the term from its restricted setting of warfare, confined to state and organised gang violence, to cover all forms of violence, from state and interstate to, what is very different, personal and interpersonal violence. Call the resulting considerably stretched notion of pacifism, according to which it is morally wrong to use violence, according to which P2 holds, -yfrefcM While stretched pacifism certainly includes standard pacifism (unless the notions of war and warfare are tampered with), the converse is very far from being the case. A pacifist is in no way committed to stretched pacifism, which is a much more problematic and difficult position than standard pacifism. There are several, substantially different reasons for this, which will be picked up seriatim. Stretched pacifism, also misleadingly called wior#/ pacifism, has looked a very easy critical target to moral philosophers. Many the effusive philosopher who, upon sighting such a target, has charged, whooping such rhetoric as "incoherent ", "inconsistent"", "insensitive , "fanatical"". However, with improved logical technology now available for accommodating and treating moral dilemmas, it is no great feat to resist such attacks, in the fashion of previous investigations (see esp. Al, also MD). A main aim was to demonstrate that stretched pacifism was not so stupid as it was made out to be or appeared to be to these inured to present dominant violent ways. So far from being stupid, it is viable. In future gentler times stretched pacifism could even be realised for whole communities of creatures (as some genuinely Christian sects envisaged); whence it will finally be seen to be feasible not merely for sages and supermen, and many ordinary women, but much more extensively. 7 In Al this notion was contrasted with standard pacifism as <9v^rc<9m/?r^H.S7Vg might have been better. pacifism: �18 The method of philosophical accommodation was through moral dilemmas. The sort of moral dilemma that stretched pacifism can induce derives as follows. On the one side stands the theme P2, Wv, in convenient symbols, for Wrong V-ing, violencing. Now this implies to WB, where B presents a case of of violence. On the other side, particular circumstances develop which lead to W -B, because -B would produce in the circumstances considerable wrong, for instance extensive violence, mass murder, etc. One stock example from the literature concerns calling off the firing squad about to shoot several captives z/* the pacifist shoots one of them (it is elaborated in Al p.13). Interestingly, another stock example from the literature concerns standard pacifism (it can also be presented in terms of patriotism; for details of both see MD p.10). Resolution of intractable moral dilemmas is, where it is required, situational. The agent decides in the situation, wzf/zzzz the fix, what to do. There are many ways in which such decision making can proceed, less rational, such as those applying chance or involving bad faith, or more rational, such as those applying consequentialist decision theory (for details see MD, pp.32-9). A decision theory taking account of that should be included will not however be purely consequential. It would also take account of relevant motivation. This defence and rehabilitation of moral pacifism has been challenged, in particular by Smith (hereafter JWS). JWS claims the defence offered is a "failure because it trivializes pacifism" (p.153 twice). The rehabilitation trivializes pacifism because it entails that pacifism doesn't substantially differ from a form of acfzvLf/M which holds that while violence is a/wayj wrong one is justified on consequentialist grounds for preferring violent acts, if these acts are lesser evils than any other real alternatives. This is the commonsense position which most people hold - yet - pacifism after all was supposed to be radical moral doctrine - (p.153 rearranged).^ Par? of the criticism is, then, not so much that pacifism is trivialized - JWS ""activism"" is hardly trivial - as that pacifism is deflated from a radical position to the commonsense position most people hold (p.154 also). Yet not a shred of evidence is adduced that JWS activism is such a populist position. Available evidence, for example from peace movements and oppositional opinion polls, suggests the very opposite: that, for instance, most people support state-justified conventional wars with the military violence they incur, and accordingly do not hold that violence is always wrong. From such a commonsense angle, pacifism with its condemnation of conventional wars and the violence they involve remains a radical doctrine. As regards wars and other violence-incurring social authorities, contemporary pacificism 8 JWS now informs me that he has changed his position. Whether the move effects his criticism, I don't know. �19 is, as previous explained (e.g. Al p.3), a form of activism. Pacifism does not imply utter pacifity, but may actively involve social defence, resistance and so on. However a certain level of misrepresentation enters into the JWS challenge in the details of what forms of activism pacifism may include. That misrepresentation begins in the second clause concerning what is said to be sometimes justified. For the situational procedure where dilemmas arise will not generally be consequential applying a principle of lesser evil. In dilemmatic situations such principles are suspended, and such a principle is in any case unacceptable to moral pacifists. A small amount of violence may be less bad in its consequences than verbal offence, but a principled pacifist will choose the slightly greater evil where other obligations do not exclude it. A more serious distortion occurs in JWS's effort to force procedures in dilemma situations into purely consequentialist form. In fact consequential decision theory was deployed as % only for how to proceed rationally in a situational setting where deontic procedures were suspended (see MD p.38). What was said, still misleadingly retrospective vision reveals, was this: 'what is done is a very consequentialist thing" (Al p.13), nor 'one acts in a consequentialist fashion to do the sufficiently good thing in the circumstances" (JWS p.152). Situationally or%er procedures than those resembling orthodox rational decision making (modified from maximizing to satisizing objectives) may be adopted (MD p.38). Further the orthodox consequentialist theory is inadequate because it leaves out, or tries to reduce to consequences, nonconsequential elements, notably motives. It is not difficult, in principle (in advance of attempted consequentialization of motives), to design situations where motives, such as integrity or maintaining faith, enter to yield outcomes upsetting consequential calculations. More elaborate decision making procedures than those of consequentialism, sometimes at variance with consequentialism, are thus presupposed. A further part of JWS's criticism accordingly goes by the board, the alleged appeal 'to "second best"" consequentialist considerations,... already explicitly condemned" (p.154). What was condemned was stock universal consequentialism, 'that onZy consequentialist considerations carry argumentative weight" (quoted on p.152), so undercutting other deontic principles, such as those of pacifism. It was not claimed, what is utterly different, that consequentialist considerations can enter into deliberation and decision making. The conclusion JWS arrives at is therefore substantially astray. After criticising modern moral philosophy for its reliance upon consequentialist modes of thought, it is surprising, and inconsistent, to find ... [reliance] upon such modes of thought to escape logical difficulties raised by moral dilemmas facing ... pacifis[m] (p.152) There is no inconsistency. JWS has confused universal with particular. As well he has wrongly contracted all situational decision making to consequentialist modes. There is a third part to the criticism, that the defence is too easy; the 'strategy will allow ?<%) mMc/z violence to be (perpetrated and) justified to suit the tastes of any real pacifist" (p.153). This another part of the so-called trivialization, this time however J/ZMfzon rather than �20 populatization, weakening the moral stand against violence. This third contention is premissed on a mistake: that one can 'justify on consequentialist grounds any number of violent acts, providing that such acts are lesser evils than other real alternatives facing social agents' (p.153). Moral pacifism offers no such licence; allowing such consequentialism to take over was never part of the position. The slide to such consequentialism is made on the strength of a similarly erroneous example. The potential victim of an aspiring rapist 'is supposed to flee or wriggle free if possible. But it is easy to consequentially justify the use of violence by the woman to prevent herself from being raped' (p.153 italics added). In the example so far described there is no dilemma, and no such easy resort to consequentially 'justified' violence. What allows too much violence is the lesser evil JWS assumes is easily consequentially justified; for example that the woman is entitled to inflict, and escalate, violence so long as it remains 'a lesser evil than the violence of attempted rape' (p.153). Since she may thereby inflict quite unreasonable damage (esp. if she is a Kung Fu expert), the result is inconsistent with 'the basic principle of self-defence' which JWS earlier adduced according to which what is 'appropriate, in response is <?n/y that level of force necessary to defend oneself against the threat' (p.150). There is evidence in JWS's work of some enthusiasm for levels of violence which exceed his 'basic principle', his appeal to 'lesser evil' generates some instances. The 'basic principle', itself fraught with difficulties (cf. the contorted discussion of what weapons are appropriate in response to what attacks, p.150), still exceeds what stretched pacifism would enjoin; for instance, it may not be appropriate to respond with force. But in a technical sense stretched pacifism is compatible with the 'basic principle', since it only imposes the upper bound on level of force. As for easiness, moral pacifism is not an easy position to live by, or to justify. Removing objections to pacifism is one thing; solidifying a positive case for it is quite another, and so far hardly conclusive (as Al tried to explain, pp 29-31). Stretched pacifism was advanced, to put it more precisely, as a still viable option. It was not presented as a morally compulsory position, or, for that matter, as one that this defender adhered to or affirmed. To reiterate, while a cumulative case can be made for stetched pacifism as principled non­ violence, that case was not conclusive, and is hard to improve. For, further, some serious difficulties standing in the way of stretched pacifism were assembled, the most important of which derives from the extent of violence apparent in transactions within the natural world. Simply consider the practices of carnivores, essential to their natural way of life. In order to meet their life needs for sustenance, these creatures do, and are often obliged to, engage routinely in violent activity. While it can no doubt be argued, as some vegetarians may do, that the natural order is an immoral order, and that remaining carnivores should be converted to vegetarianism as rapidly as proves possible (in the way domestic dogs are converted to dog biscuits), the difficulties with such proposals are immense. The task envisaged is gigantic, and beyond human capacities - even if it were desirable. For there are millions of species to be �21 somehow converted to proper vegetarianism. Then there are millions of other species to be converted to proper and well regulated contraceptive practices, else their numbers will get out of hand (uncontrollably) with predation removed. Given humans lack of success in limiting their own excessive numbers, such regulation appears entirely remote. Aside however from the practical difficulties, is such a fully vegetarian order, with evolution further derailed, a desirable improvement on the natural order? Is it morally obligatory? It is certainly not obligatory, as alternative systems of morality in harmony with the prevailing natural order are feasible. Nor is it desirable, for (to appeal to such alternative value systems) the natural order is more or less in order as it is. Full vegetarianization would only reduce its value, vastly. More generally, a defensible ethical framework should not, it would be rightly contended, be right out of step with the natural order of other creatures, decently depicted. Decent depiction is important, for some features of the natural order, such as competition, combat and predation, so far from escaping attention, have been grossly exaggerated and exploited. Thus, for instance, the ludicrous picture of nature red in truth and claw, so beloved of descendents of orthodox Victorians and of orthodox economists. However, even under decent depiction, the "natural order" is often not benign. That appears to be enough to induce a supervenient moral dilemma for any stretched pacifism which is coupled to a deep ethic (e.g. which does not separate humans out from the natural order) and which eschews the desperate vegetarian route: The natural order is not an immoral order The natural order contains (regular) instances of violence. Therefore, instances of violence are not immoral - in apparent defiance of P2 Moreover, there are too many instances of violence, too regularly occurring, for them all to be plausibly shunted into the moral dilemma category (and predatory carnivores face no dilemmas). Raptors that practice violence every week are not immoral (neither are they clearly moral; the category of morality only significantly extends so far). The main trouble lies however with P2 (which needs some finer adjustment, as was alrady indicated in Al). While P2 is alright in context, within a particular, perfectly viable, ethical framework, designed for the usual human round, the conventional setting for ethical theories, it stands in need of modification outside that setting. It is time to suggest the sort of modification envisaged. Evidently P2 was addressed to moral agents. Which agents? Not to carnivores that supply their own livelihood, nor really to morally degenerate humans, but to peace-sensitive agents. With that semi-technical form, yet to be characterised, a suitably modified P2 results: MP2. It is morally wrong, for a peace-sensitive agent, to use violence.^ 9 The generalization of P2, suggested in Al, to cover also the parallel situation of environmental vandalism, can be similarly modified. The anti-vandolence principle becomes MP2°. It is morally wrong, for a peace- and environmentally-sensitive agent, to use � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Draft Papers Description An account of the resource Sylvan's literary executor encountered an archive in which “all his projects were current", since manuscripts were undated and unattributed. Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document / / * WAR AND TAO AND DEE Taoism and deep-green environmental theory nanism, is not a pacific issues, diverge over war. For Taoism, by contrast foi doctrine, but is committed to skilful defensive militarism. While it does not espouse a fortress mentality, Taoism certainly condones limited defensive military operations for specific purposes, a sort of guerilla warfare. sBy contrast, deep-green theory, while acknowledging the role of organised social defence, stands opposed to professional militarism, and thereby to military defence, and is committed to a principled pacifism. Conveniently a route through Taoism, philosophically fascinating in its own right, will lead us to problems of pacifism and towards deep-green theory. 7. o/ a o/ war wnZz/arMw. War did not receive a favourable press in ancient Chinese philosophy. Generally aggression and war were to be avoided. Even Confucius imposed very demanding conditions: for example, 'when good men have instructed the people [in morals, agriculture, military tactics] for seven years, they way be allowed to bear arms/ Tf a ruler ... does not set himself right, even his commands will not be obeyed' (SB p.41, italics added). Mo Tzu went much further than Confucius, roundly condemning war - on utilitarian grounds, that war yields no net benefit at any level (SB p.227). What is more, he backed his heavy condemnation practically (unlike some conspicuous contemporary theoretical utilitarians); 'he did not hesitate to walk for ten days and ten nights in an effort to dissuade a ruler from making war' (SB p.212). But none, it is said, went as far, in a detailed and sophisticated criticism of war,,as Lao Tzu; 'none has condemned war more strongly than Lao Tzu'. '[T]he opposition of Taoism to the use of force is well-known, and the most bitter attack on militarism if found in the Zzzo (Chan, p.154, p.17.) But, after that splendid build-up, the text is slightly disappointing. Lao Tzu does not assert outright that war is an abomination, or even roundly condemn it. His critique of war, militarism, and military technology, is subtle and oblique, and, on the surface, far distanced from pacifism. For he does not recommend an end to war - in that genuine Taoists, those who possess Tao, will never participate in them - but expects wars to continue as ^vz'Ay. Worse, he even goes so far as to outline proper attitudes to war and conduct in war, and indeed to suggest military techniques and strategies, some of which look decidedly devious. Among the classical works of Taoism, we focus on the because, by contrast with other works, a remarkable component of that book is devoted to war and militarism. The apparent deviousness of the tactics Lao Tzu allocates serves to highlight what has been seen as 'the most troublesome element' in his philosophy (Chan p.17) - not so much however because they concern military operations, but because they are taken to apply much more widely, 'to life in general' (p.17). But why should military activity obtain some special / / 46""WAR AND PEACE )V: TAO AND DEEP-GREEN \ Taoism and deep-green environmental theory, although closely aligned on very many issues, diverge over war. For Taoism, by contrast for instance with Buddhism, is not a pacific doctrine, but is committed to skilful defensive militarism. While it does not espouse a fortress mentality, Taoism certainly condones limited defensive military operations for specific purposes, a sort of guerilla warfare. sBy contrast, deep-green theory, while acknowledging the role of organised social defence, stands opposed to professional militarism, and thereby to military defence, and is committed to a principled pacifism. Conveniently a route through Taoism, philosophically fascinating in its own right, will lead us to problems of pacifism and towards deep-green theory. J. of a Tao:s; of war anJ wn/%ar:syn. War did not receive a favourable press in ancient Chinese philosophy. Generally aggression and war were to be avoided. Even Confucius imposed very demanding conditions: for example, 'when good men have instructed the people [in morals, agriculture, military tactics] for seven years, they way be allowed to bear arms/ 'If a ruler ... does not set himself right, even his commands will not be obeyed" (SB p.41, italics added). Mo Tzu went much further than Confucius, roundly condemning war - on utilitarian grounds, that war yields no net benefit at any level (SB p.227). What is more, he backed his heavy condemnation practically (unlike some conspicuous contemporary theoretical utilitarians); 'he did not hesitate to walk for ten days and ten nights in an effort to dissuade a ruler from making war" (SB p.212). But none, it is said, went as far, in a detailed and sophisticated criticism of war,,as Lao Tzu; 'none has condemned war more strongly than Lao Tzu". '[T]he opposition of Taoism to the use of force is well-known, and the most bitter attack on militarism if found in the Lao 7za" (Chan, p.154, p.17.) But, after that splendid build-up, the text is slightly disappointing. Lao Tzu does not assert outright that war is an abomination, or even roundly condemn it. His critique of war, militarism, and military technology, is subtle and oblique, and, on the surface, far distanced from pacifism. For he does not recommend an end to war - in that genuine Taoists, those who possess Tao, will never participate in them - but expects wars to continue as tmavoMfa&Zt? evz'A. Worse, he even goes so far as to outline proper attitudes to war and conduct in war, and indeed to suggest military techniques and strategies, some of which look decidedly devious. Among the classical works of Taoism, we focus on the Lao 7za because, by contrast with other works, a remarkable component of that book is devoted to war and militarism. The apparent deviousness of the tactics Lao Tzu allocates serves to highlight what has been seen as 'the most troublesome element" in his philosophy (Chan p.17) — not so much however because they concern military operations, but because they are taken to apply much more widely, 'to life in general" (p.17). But why should military activity obtain some special 2 dispensation? Why should what is no/ tolerated more generally be exonerated there? But given that Taoism has here the virtue of consistency (i.e. uniformity on principles) and of universalizability, that simply leaves more explaining to be done. * Pnzz^/br 7hofym, on J wary a.y nnavo^^/e evi/.y There are /wo puzzles here in Taoism rather than one. There is the miP/ary-prac/fce^ paradox, and, varying and generalising on that, there are /{/e-^racOce^ paradoxes. The special paradox is generated by the following incompatible elements: on the one side, The most bitter attack on militarism", the well-known opposition of Taoism to the use of force (p.17) and to the possession and use of smart military weapons and technology - implying that war is far from all right - and on the other, advocacy of certain (devious) military tactics, outlines of (deceitful) conduct in war, and so on - implying that war is all right after all. A straightforward generalisation of this paradox would look at other morally-sensitive parts of life, where some practice was strongly condemned yet engaged in (for many examples, see the dilemmas assembled in MD). But the variation of concern to Chan and the neo-Confucians concerns the conjunction of upright with devious practices in life, in particular in the life of the sage. For a Taoist sage is presumed to lead an upright straightforward life, yet appears to engage in devious and even deceitful practices incompatible with such a life-style. Call this the paradox. Evidently a good deal of explaining is required, as to how Taoism can coZ^r^n/Zy take the positions it appears to presume, both on war and peace, and on life more generally. A desirable preliminary would seem to be a little investigation of what position Ay taken, especially on war and militarism. One key pasage runs: Fine weapons are instruments of evil They are hated by creatures Therefore those who possess the Tao turn away from them.... Weapons are instruments of evil, not the instruments of a good ruler. When he uses them unavoidably, he regards calm restraint as the best principle Even when he is victorious, he does not regard it as praiseworthy, For to praise victory is to delight in the slaughter of men. He who delights in the slaughter of men will not succeed in the empire. ... For a victory, let us observe the occasion with funeral-ceremonies (LT p.154). Wars, which involve the use of weapons, instruments of evil, are accordingly themselves evil. They are also evil because they involve the slaughter of men. But they are also sometimes unavoidable (also p.152). Therefore such wars are unavoidable evils. Such discourse, obtained by almost immediate inference from the passage, is within the standard orbit of dilemma talk. But Taoism lacks, through deliberately eschewing deontic talk, the discourse which enables direct expression of such dilemmas, or even direct condemnation of wars or of clever weapons. Instead the points are made by circMw/ocM/Zon, what the possesser of Tao does, how the good ruler conducts himself, or by ana/ogy, of victory in war with death. 3 Unavoidable evils are the very stuff of deontic dilemmas (though many theories, underpinned by shonky logic, lack the resources for representing this stuff properly). Where something is unavoidably evil, it is because evil, J also no/ doing it is excusable, because it is unavoidable. So, given such an argument (which has its weaknesses), an unavoidable evil is a genuinely dilemmatic object with inconsistent features. Certain wars have looked, since ancient times, like such dilemmatic objects. Revealingly, Chan tries to explain that 'most troublesome element' in Taoism, the military-practice paradox, through the following exercise in lateral thinking: It can ... be argued that Lao Tzu uses warfare to illustrate his principles of taking no action and weakness because warfare is among the most dynamic and critical of human experiences, just as the Indian classic, the chooses fighting as the theme on which to discuss the terrible dilemma whether one should fulfil his duty, as in the case of a soldier, and kill, or should fail in his duty and refrain from killing (p.17). 'Just as'? The Indian classic prevents a classic moral dilemma, a dilemma represented in contemporary philosophy (following its rediscovery by Sartre), where there are incompatible duties: the duty to kill, because of one's role as a soldier, and the duty not to kill, because of one's human condition, and the supervenient dilemma of failing in and fulfilling one's duties. These dilemmas for an individual (male, as it then was) are replicated in dilemmas regarding war for group institutions: at bottom, the obligation to engage in war (for one set of compelling reasons) as contraposed with the obligation not to engage in war (for another, perhaps overlapping, set of reasons). A theory of moral dilemmas (as worked out for example in MD) is crucial for an adequate treatment of major issues in war and peace, especially (as will become evident) for a viable strong pacifism. But Taoism, eschewing deontic discourse, lacks the apparatus to state or develop moral dilemmas. Hence it is logically excluded from giving a full or adequate account of what is going on conceptually. One of the philosophically fascinating feature of Taoism is the fashion in which it manages to avoid deontic discourse, and to substitute for direct deontic discourse or improvise circumlocutions when deontic discourse would otherwise appear inevitable (cf. UT for examples). But there are costs. One is inability to display the mechanism of deontic dilemmas, or to show what reasons and argument lie behind Taoist prounouncements and conclusions (the shortage of Taoism on argument is another philosophically conspicious feature, also observed in UT). As conceptual apparatus for analysizing moral dilemmas is missing, most of the machinery involved has to be passed over. Only the outcomes, as Taoism sees them, are presented, as if from a black box. Taoism blacks out the story on deontic dilemmas that deep-green theory can tell, as the following diagram tries to show: DMgrawy . C/tar/ing 4 It is evident that Taoism can be information can be put into the Black Box rendering it less opaque. That extension can be made so as to conform to deep-green theory, i.e. so that the extended Taoist chart, a neo-Daoist chart, looks like the deep-green one. That is indeed essentially how neo-Daoism get characterised, in terms of conformity of the extension to deep ecological theory (see UT). We are now placed to explain how to dissolve, or at least neutralize, the paradoxes deriving from repudiation of militarism, an awkwardly qualified repudiation in the case of Taoism. In a significant sense there is no resolving of genuine deontic dilemmas. The principles delineating the fix may .yfonJ, incompatible, signalling the persisting suboptimality (or better, sublimenality) of the dilemmatic situation. Where there is a dilemma, involved parties should try to do well enough in the sublimenal circumstances (for a much fuller account, see MD). Thus where there is a war, itself a non-Taoist process, engaged or caught up Taoists will not abandon Taoism. Taoist methods will be applied, Taoist strategies pursued. So much for theoretical representation and (non-)resolution of life-practices and other dilemmas, details of which are readily elaborated in deep-green extensions of Taoism. A prior substantive issue is whether dilemmas always generated: not whether wars are evil (typically they are, an issue we shall come to), but whether wars are unavoidable. Analysis of wars does not bear that familiar claim out decisively. Many wars could have been avoided, through conciliation, negotiation, restraint, etc., and no worse results apparently obtained, through sanctions, exchange, trade, etc. Through a typology of wars (coming up) that conjecture can be given some substance. Consider, for instance, what would be walk-overs. Then there is little point in making a military response. So war can be avoided. Certainly an occupation, to be met in a different way, may still occur. And so on, perhaps, for various other types of war. But, more generally, try this:Every war involves an aggressor, who makes an aggressive move. Such an aggressor could always avoid that move, taking a different (or a do-nothing) course of action. Therefore, 5 every war can be avoided. No war is entirely unavoidable. Setting aside determinism (which renders %/Z actual wars along with all other events unavoidable), it could be argued that a war sometimes simply boils up, without an aggressor, an intensification of a conflagatory situation. There are grounds for scepticism regarding such examples; for such intensification can only occur if provocative military moves are made, for instance troops are stationed in provocative or risky positions. The presumption that certain wars are unavoidable typically derives from a one-sided perspective on war, a defender's perspective. A defender has no option, so it is routinely averred, but to respond to a determined aggressor. Even i/that should be so sometimes, when there is no running away or going underground, it does not establish that such a war is unavoidable; for it neglects the role of the aggressor. By a smarter formulation, relevant features of unavoidability can be captured. Although wars may not be unavoidable, defensive action in wars that have been initiated may be unavoidable. At least such action may be unavoidable z/ unacceptably high costs (death, enslavement, etc.) are not to be avoided. Thereupon another highly relevant feature emerges: the linkage of avoidability to costs. For whether an action is unavoidable then depends upon what costs a party is prepared to incur before and when insisting on action: but this appears entirely unacceptable. How can what is "unavoidable" cease to be so when some further costs are absorbed? However with basics like survival, a certain liberty, and so on, we do reach such bounds. An important fype of unavoidability. We also reach scenarios, unavailable to Lao Tzu but kindly brought within range by modem technology, which may appear to justify aggressive strikes. State Z, while not an aggressor, is carrying out practices which will impose unacceptably high costs upon peoples of other states and implacably refuses to desist. It could, for example, be poisoning air or water flowing to other states. But ,to make the case vivid, let us suppose that state Z is constructing, for reasons Zeders find convincing (they are committed to a faith which depicts all humans as incorrigible sinners and unworthy of life), an effective doomsday machine. Would an (aggressive) preemptory strike designed to disable or destroy the machine be unavoidable?* In a sense, No; in another Yes. For different modalities can operate. Physically outsiders need to do nothing, but watch Zeders go about their zealous work. But deontically they are under heavy moral pressure, because of the costs of standing by idly: if the human race is worth anything very substantial, then they are obliged to act, action is deontically unavoidable. Here is a situation where a proposed reduction of deontic logic proves illuminating. Obligation is explicated through not implying, or necessitating, the sanction, i.e. 1 Whether it would be justifiable, or just, are separate issues. But it is evident enought that such scenarios further damage the obsolescent idea of war. For, according to received doctrine, a just war is defensive. (How such a war can be fought at all is another matter; coherence requires relativization to Just war Jbr party d'.) 6 excessive ethical costs such as extermination. Let us explain deontic unavoidability analogously: an action is so unavoidable if not undertaking it would result in excessive ethical costs. Then /fit can be established that there is no other way than a military strike, an act of war, to ensure that the Zeders desist (and certainly we can envisage scenarios like that), then that is deontically unavoidable. It is also for those committed to, or inclined towards pacifism; and it is, for them at least, but paradoxically justifiable, as the negation is also justifiable, on pacific grounds. Scenarios like that sketched, that appear to render certain wars deontically unavoidable require but little or no elaboration to render them evil. Evil indeed is such a standard feature of standard wars that at least its great presence call for little supporting evidence. But it has taken to vast stretch of human history to reach this general point of recognition. The manifold evils of war Lao Tzu very early recognised and emphasized: Wherever armies are stationed, briars and thorns grow. Great wars are always followed by famines (p.152). And nowadays followed by great tides of refugees. This passage includes not only recognition of the widely-observed socio-environmental consequences of war, but, more striking, very early recognition of the severe environmental impact of military forces. That critique is not however developed in Taoism.^ Only recently has it been pushed substantially further. And only recently could a new, most significant twist occur, the merging of resource security, long a military objective, with environmental security. The appalling idea has recently been floated that the military, in need of new work and roles with the apparent warming of West-East relations and cooling of the Cold War, should exchange usual military idleness for meddling in environmental matters: regulation and policing of environmental resources, ensurance of environmental security of powerful states, and similar. This is a bit like reassigning those imprisoned for child abuse to managing kindergartens; for consider the impressive military record of environmental vandalism. What the military is alleged to offer is a structure appropriate and available for handling such matters. But, to the contrary, it is precisely the sort of hierarchical, authoritarian expensive structure that should be wound down and up as soon as the opportunity appears, as (briefly) now, rather than being retained and shockingly reoriented (as a state-serving "Greenwar"). 2. On q/ /row Having arrived, by better or worse arguments, at the conclusion that wars, though 2 But a bridge to deep-green theory can be made through neo-Daoism, an updating of Taoism in continuity with deep ecology (which however is somewhat thin and threadbare on war; for what there is so far, see Naess p.160). On neo-Daoism, see UT. 7 generally evil, may be sometimes unavoidable, it is evidently important to say something about how they - those of the theoretical residue - are to be conducted. By appropriate conduct the damage they do may be reduced; also the conduct should be appropriate to the funereal nature of wars (to exceed Taoist resources for stating this sort of point). It is at this stage that deep­ green theory begins to diverge from Taoism. In further explaining the Taoist and deep-green critiques of war, and diverting objections to them, a roMg/t and preliminary %?<?Zogy of wars is important. It is also of passing interest in its own philosophical right. War, according to English Dictionaries, is a "contest earned on by force of arms, typically between nations or states'. More exactly, war is a game - in the generous technical sense of game-theory, with players, rules, goals, strategies, and so on carried on in significant part by military means, normally between states or substates. Call the contestants, (warring) /?ar%&?. They typically represent of course larger populations. The set­ up between parties resembles the arrangements of players in game theory. There are several analogical extensions of the term war to cover games where one of the parties is an object, construed as hostile (an enemy of the state), such as Crime, Drugs, Poverty or Nature. These we can set aside as aaa/a^/ca/ wars. Of course wars form only a part of military activities. Military interests and objectives have always stretched significantly further than war, to include surveillence and security, easily extended to resource security, environmental security and life­ style security, and beyond that to political stability and other political matters. Evidently military ambitions have far over-extended themselves in bagging such democratic concerns. An anarchist solution to the whole problem of war, which some have seen Taoism as reaching towards, is immediate: eliminate the source of war, graf^. Unfortunately it is not quite that simple (and that's not simple). For wars can also occur between nations, cultures, races or tribes (which are not such artifices as states, and not always so readily or desirably abolished), between inhabited regions, and between factions within states (thus civil wars) or, perhaps by extension, between factions within other social structures (thus, for instance, gang wars). But undoubtedly eliminating states and aspiring states would abolish most wars and virtually all the worst wars. While ""nonviolent wars" are excluded by definition, by virtue of "force of arms', token wars, limited wars, and so on, are not: for instance, wars fought by small armed teams representing competing sides (cf. medieval and science fiction war games). As wars are hemmed in by conventions and agreed rules, there is no reason in principle why they should not be reduced to two person contests, fought under strict rules like boxing or gladiatorial contests. But in modem times wars have never taken such sensible forms, but have been much larger affairs, making heavy (though fortunately restricted) use of latest technology. Let us distinguish such wars as wars. They have, directly or indirectly (for the technology may be bought or bartered), a heavy research and development support structure (indeed the bulk of contemporary science is devoted - misdirected - in one way or another to 8 this effort). Among wars, an important distinction is that between and wars. An offensive war is one which ventures off a given party's territory or recognised pad, "invading" that of another party or parties; correlatively defensive parties, if they have not also invaded. Force projection typifies offensive practice. Plainly, offensiveness and defensiveness are not strictly features of a war, but of parties to a war. In a two-party war, while both parties can easily act offensively, the possibility of both parties proceeding defensively is excluded, unless they share territory. (Even then issues may arise as to which party, if any, was the aggressor, which started it, was responsible for starting it, and so on.) Thus mutually defensive wars between contemporary states are impossible (but would be possible if states shared territory, e.g. if Eire and Britain shared the territory of Northern Ireland). Tao-accredited wars were defensive wars, never wars aiming at domination: last-resort wars, in which no pride was taken (LT p.l52).3 The pretence that offensive wars are defensive is widespread, and reflected in the subterfuge that departments or ministries of war are those of defence, security or whatever. (If they really were what they purport to be, we should be well on the way to an end to war.) Offensive practices are rendered defensive ones by shabby redefinitional strategems, such as redefining 'defensive' to include defence of ideals like democracy or liberty, infringed (or allegedly infringed) on territories abroad, or to include "defence" of a third party or place (whence every offensive war is "defensive"). In the present war in which part of Arabia is engulfed (February 1991), one party claims to be defending what really was (or should be) part of its territory, namely Kuwait, another party to be defending (what Kuwait did not enjoy) democracy. It is a doubly offensive war presented in this guise as jointly defensive. Aggressive wars are waged for a variety of reasons, but usually for resources or access to resources or markets, a matter often disguised by appeal to ideology (thus a war for oil is represented as a war of liberation). But there are other reasons than narrowly economic ones, such as religion (as with crusades), power and aggrandisement (as in building an empire), and so on. Nor are those reasons necessarily far separated; ideologies like Marxism and market capitalism, for example, exhibit many of the features of religion. The economic reasons for war appear to have become much more complex with the 3 There is one line in LT that may suggest that attack was sometimes justifiable, namely Tor deep love helps one to win in the case of attack' (p.219). But how can compa^fo/i be appropriate unless this attack is a defensive setting, a larger context of unavoidability or such like. A passage shortly below confirms this interpretation: I dare not take the offensive but I take the defensive: 1 dare not advance an inch but I retreat a foot (p.222). These are advances and attacks within a defensive setting. 9 advent of an integrated world economy. At the same time many of the independent reasons for economic wars are now obsolete. For to powerful states accrue the advantages of war without war. At least most of the former economic advantages of war can be obtained without expensive wars, through trade, institution of economic dependence, etc. Small medieval wars were sometimes instituted for the collection of neighbouring riches and booty, a kind of piracy meeting conditions of war. "Small" contemporary wars can be waged for a remarkable mix of political-economy ends: to establish a regime favourable to economic penetration and profit repatriation, to subjugate markets and to remove competition, to boost a sagging weapons economy by using up old stocks and also testing new equipment, to restart a depressed economy, and so on. Such wars, along with the economic aims which motivate them, are in effect heavily castigated by Lao Tzu: When Tao prevails in the world, galloping horses are turned back to fertilize (the fields ...). When Tao does not prevail in the world, war horses thrive in the suburbs. There is no calamity greater than lavish desires. (LT p.181). But it does exceed evidential warrant to claim that Tao is not only sufficient, but for cessation of such practices. The practice of regularly stimulating complex military-saturated economies through war is reminiscent of older, much ridiculed practices in simpler societies. They now ridicule the Tsembaga, who proceeded to destroy much of their surplus product by going to war every 5-15 years (cf Rapaport). But they do not similarly ridicule the most powerful nation on the Earth, the USA, which proceeds to write off a colossal amount of surplus in war every 10-20 years (the Gulf war liquidated some $1.7 billion per day). Taoists would. For ridicule was a favoured method, an important rhetorical strategem, and war and its idiocy were favourite targets. Some classification of defensive wars is also important, for various reasons: reducing and abolishing wars, their costs and damage, restructuring societies away from war and military practices, and, not least, for appreciating Taoism. A main distinction is between * conventional defence, maintained by armies of armed soldiers, many of them professionals, and * social defence, where there are no such armies or but fragments of them, and defence is carried out through social networks of a significant part of society/ It is here that Taoism and deep-green theory part company. Under Taoism, the state wi// have a standing army, but a defensive army operating by strange, surprise tactics (p.201). No 4 Details of social defence are presented in Sharp and in Martin. 10 doubt defensive wars are to remain last resort action. Nonetheless the state will operate in secrecy, in a way incompatible with decentralised socia/ defence; people will be kept in the dark about smart weapons of the state; and they too will be surprised, along with presumed enemies of the state. By contrast, under deep-green theory, there should be no hidden smart weapons of state; information would flow more freely and not be hidden from the people (who should retain influence in informed decision making). Under deep-green, standing armies, and more generally military organisation, will be wound down altogether. Taoism should have pushed its searching criticism further. For military objectives, easily acquired by standing armies with time on their hands, are frequently incompatible with Taoism. For example, Taoism is opposed to domination (LT p.152), whereas military operations frequently seek or involve domination; and military structure is invariably hierarchical and authoritarian. Taoism aims for self-regulation, wherever feasible (cf. p.201); so does deep­ green theory, which is one reasons why it aims to dispose of standing armies, as an important preliminary to the withering away of states themselves (military forces being major props of state control and power, and often maintained primarily for internal state security). Taoism has no project for ending the era of wars; deep-green theory does. That project involves an elimination of standing armies, too often poised for fighting or political interference. A recommended route to war consists in progressive scaling down: reduction of the means and manpower. The initial stages are well-known, and include * elimination of nuclear, biological and chemical weaponry, and * force reduction. It can hardly be pretended that the Earth's states have managed to proceed very far on even this complex of stages. The next stage consists in * contraction to defensive capacities only, and the final stage consists in * elimination of remaining military defensive forces, and adoption, so far as required, of social defence practices. The complete route thus involves complete demilitarisation. Reasons why deep-green aims to proceed the /aZZ distance are readily grasped by considering the environmental shallowness of an otherwise cogent traditional case for the sharp curtailment of wars and militarism. The traditional Western case against wars has been primarily along two dimensions: social and moral. Wars are highly disruptive of the social fabric; wars may be unjust. From these joint features, it was argued that wars should be a matter of last resort, to be fought to ensure peace. It was argued further that only just wars should be fought. Just wars were rare objects. But as there was little evidence of the decline and fall of wars, much effort was expended, more practically and unsuccessfully, upon endeavouring to improve the calibre of wars, and more theoretically, upon trying to characterize war satisfactorily, or rather to bend the notion in an effort to approximate the gory unjust facts. Progress was long hindered, furthermore, because there was always a rival positive perspective on wars, which encouraged the exaltation of wars and military feats. It also 11 facilitated the transfer of the favourable image of war to other problem areas, whence the long and apparently successful war against Nature (but the short-term successes are turning into long-term problems), the short and unsuccessful war against Poverty, and so on. Behind all this is the complex idea of war as rejuvenating, even cleansing, like fire; of war as heroic, and glorious, of war as the supreme testing ground of men. These pictures of war — finally shattered by the first World War (where even the poets began to tell of horrors and atrocities) and subsequent technological wars — though no longer in ascendency, have by no means vanished. The notion of war as rejuvenating a flagging economy persists, along with the practice of keeping capitalism running smoothly by integrating substantial military components into the industrial engine. With the development of highly technological wars - the celebrated development of the dirty industrial age is substantially military - the traditional negative case has grown in strength. Wars have become much more damaging, with the potential for much more that is significantly worse, and the possibility of a just war has correspondingly contracted, virtually to zero. The opposition to war has likewise grown, but more than correspondingly with the rise of women in social and political influence. Wars have almost always and everywhere been Men's affairs; likewise conquest. Deep-green theory accepts much of the traditional negative case, but would further strengthen it. For example, the stricture against unjust wars, as out and out immoral, can be strengthened, through the following syllogism: All wars should be fully just wars. Modem wars cannot be fully just wars. Therefore, there should be no modem wars. A fully just war is not merely a just war, but a war those just character can be reliably forecast in advance. A modern war is of course a war that deploys modern technology, at least that available this century. The evidential basis for the second premiss derives from much information that collateral damage, damage to innocent bystanders and involved citizens is always likely and cannot be excluded. Such wars are always liable to violate uncontroversial requirements for a just war, even if they are purely "conventional" wars, not throwing radiation or chemical or biological weapons around. From a contemporary viewpoint the traditional doctrine of a just war, really of a just war, is seriously out of date. The reasons for this reach wider than the new features introduced by modem technological wars and the character of modem civilization, with its giant cities littered with dangerous and vulnerable military targets. They have also to do with the chauvinism of the justice proposed, which is shallow human justice, not natural or environmental justice. There is no consideration of justice to other creatures or to the Earth (cf Naess p.160). Two troubles are really intertwined here: conceptual difficulties with too narrow a notion of justice, and ideological difficulties with too narrow a vision of what is an object of 12 value, of what counts. The deep-green case against war adds to the traditional case a further dimension, neglected until very recently: the environmental dimension. It has suddenly been seen that wars are typically environmental atrocities. Earlier, of course, "environments" were simply backgrounds, backdrops in paintings and plays, to the real drama. Contemporary technological wars tend to be not merely social tragedies but environmental ones as well. There is a doctrine of just war, but it is a human chauvinistic affair. There is no similarly developed doctrine of an ^co/og/ca/Zy goMnJ war, a deep ecological war. Unless any such war were literally different from modem wars, that is from contemporary technological wars, it would overstep permitted bounds. For such wars are characteristically ecological disasters. Hardened military people, desensitized by a rigorous unethical training, feel even less compunction about degrading or destroying environments or members of other species than they do of maiming or killing civilians through "collateral" activity. Matching the no-just-war syllogism is a no-sound-war syllogism: All wars should be environmentally sound wars. Modem wars cannot be environmentally sound. Therefore, there should be no modem wars. The argument for the second premiss has of course to be different. It looks to the information accumulating on what wars do to natural and built environments. The Vietnam and Gulf wars both inflicted immense damage on natural environments or what was left of them. The environmental effects of war are not confined to direct and collateral damage. There are indirect effects also. Thus, for instance, war also supplied the mechanism of, and the technology for, modern environmental destruction: explosives, bulldozers from tanks, etc. As well, training for war and engagement in war have much fostered, along with attitudes that make for social callousness or ruthlessness, those that contribute to environmental insensitivity and cruelty. 3. Fuzzes Tao/s/ sZra/fgy of Z^cAnoZogy an<Z woZ^ncF Tt is surprising how much of the Loo 7zM is devoted to military strategy". Which strategies? Surprise, above all. But why such strategies? "Do they not contradict the Taoists strong opposition to the use of force" (Chan p.222), the implied commitment to quietism? Briefly, Taoism is not committed to quietism, and while certainly antagonistic to violence, does not oppose certain uses of force (only really ///-forcing, as will be explained). Even so, the emphasis on military strategy remains puzzling. The strategies, many of them relevant to social defence, include * -yenoMyn&M, not 'making light of the enemy" (p.222) * and nonvisibility (p.201). The defensive strategy involves guerilla tactics: marching without formation, holding weapons without seeming to have them, confronting 13 enemies without seeming to meet them (p.222). But even in times of peace, "smart weapons of the state should not be displayed to the people' (p.164). Such recommendations helped to fuel the charge of deviousness lodged against Lao Tzu. But look at part of the reason for concealing smart weapons: "The more smart weapons the people have, the more troubled the state will be' (p.201). Smart weapons are carried in corrupt states, where the rich engage in conspicuous consumption and the people are suppressed, not where Tao is practiced (LT p.194). * advance from flexibility but firmness. Weakness is the principle of life and will overcome strength (LT p.164, p.233). * coolness and (LT p.233, p.164). Like these, most of the general strategies are standard Taoist practices simply applied to military conduct. For these standard practices the charge of deviousness looks feeble. The response applies more generally to other allegedly devious political strategies. For the strategies are but application of Taoist principles and techniques to warfare, politics and elsewhere. Nothing excludes application of these techniques to what are accounted, in general, unnecessary evils (which must sometimes, on other Taoist grounds, be countered). Nor, to meet the main criticism, need any deceit or deviousness be involved; nor is it. In particular, the legalist tactic, "In order to grasp, it is necessary first to give' (LT p.164), is cited as involving "an element of deceit' "undeniably', and "worse' it is "morally questionable' (Chan p.17). But in order for me to grasp your hand in a normal handshake, it is necessary first for me to give my hand. There is no deceit here, nothing morally questionable. All the tactics permit of benign construals, of a Taoist kind. Consider, for instance, "In order to contract, it is necessary first to expand' (LT p.164). In order to bend a copper pipe to the intended angle, it is better to bend it first a little further than required. The transformation of water to ice (both favoured natural items for symbolic purposes: natural processes which may look devious!) neatly illustrates the Taoist principle (which is however hardly necessary), and shows softness and weakness turned hardness and strength. The Taoist critique of militarism is as much a critique of technology as of war. Sharp weapons, "smart weapons' as we might now say, come in for much critical attention, as we have already noticed. Only in corrupt and degenerate states are they displayed or flaunted (p.194, p.164); in deep-green regions smart weapons of state' would not be retained unexhibited. The people will not have them for they mean trouble (p.201); for similar reasons deep-green regions will be free of them. So, it seems, will ideal Taoist regions: "Even if there are arrows and weapons, none will display them' (LT p.238). Much technology, military and other, is excluded under the Taoist edict against violence (a further facet of the military-practices paradox).^ 5 Under contemporary technology and technological arrangements, such as the storage of quantities of oil and nuclear and chemical materials in great cities, wars have assumed new and 14 The powerful critique of militarism in the 7ho-^ CTnng is coupled with strong opposition to violence. Some of the linkage is evident enough. Militarism as practised represents an ultimate form of state (or party) violence. A basic theme is that violent practices will come to an unnatural end, and accordingly to a non-Taoist end (generalising LT p.176). While force may occur in spectacular, but satisfactory, natural forms, force is duly distinguished from violence. To force the growth of life means ill omen. For the mind to employ the vital force without restraint means violence (LT p.197). One who follows Tao does not apply dominating force, which usually has had results bringing requital (p.152). Dominating force, like power, is in general castigated, under doctrine of WMno forced actions, no violence. To force natural growth is deviant, destroying harmony. To stop natural growth is deviant. But there is a significant difference between force and violence. To intentionally employ destructive force is to do violence. To so force things is condemned. To remain in harmony with things one does not so force things or practice violence. There is a non-interference principle at work, which also indicates types of non­ interference that are excluded. However Taoism does not always get the distinction between force and violence quite right. 'Vital force without restraint", intentionally excessive force, is only part of what counts as vZoZence, which is more generally w/tZc/t vZo/aZ^^, i.e. transgresses, descrecrates, very destructive dimensions, to the point of being utterly irresponsible. A different approach to technology, as to war, is now mandatory. These are no longer things that can in principle be nicely confined and need not touch parties outside the fray. An important part of ending wars, "winning the war against wars", is removing the technology of war, above all from irresponsible state power. As for which technology to try to jettison and which to try to retain or improve, it is not so difficult to indicate, provided evaluative terminology is not outlawed. What is wanted is technology that is good in its place, what should be excluded is technology that is indifferent or bad or potentially so. Technology to be justified has to do something worthwhile, it has to address identifiable respectable needs. That is why merely indifferent technology is out; there is no virtue in technology for technology's sake, as it is a mere technique. It is because of the crucial evaluative component in choice of technology that approprZaf^n^&f, itself evaluative, comes closer to encapsulating the criterion than other recent efforts. Size, such as smallness, or intermediateness, are not what matter, though modest and not excessive technologies are likely to fare better in satisfying appropriateness. In simpler societies, small technology is of course more appropriate; for that is what is good there. From known criteria for what is good these other features for locally appropriate technology can be read off: reliability, esp. in maintenance, functioning well and safely under the expected range of operating conditions (which may be difficult), ease of repair, capital cheapness and repair inexpensiveness, environmental benignness, and meeting sound social needs. 15 profanes, injures, outrages, etc. It is thus a negatively connoted force, an evil force in some specified intentional respect. There is a tendency for Taoist commentators, not Taoists, to regard Taoism as condemning all uses, or even occurrences, of force, but this is not so. Rather intentional ill-forcing is what is castigated, what is deviant. Thus Taoism does not exclude a range of defensive practices, which make satisfactory use of natural forces, like letting the machines of war industry stop. Those who would abolish war and its machinery, substituting for it nonwarlike and ideally nonviolent methods, technology, and strategies, have been confronted not merely with much sub-rational abuse but with plenty of criticism and even some paradoxes. Here is a recent paradox concerning war and nonviolence: * War must be abolished. One reason is simply economic. We can no longer afford it, and the opportunity costs are enormous. Along with other extraordinarily wasteful activities, it is an anachronism. * Doing so cannot be accomplished without violence, i.e. in effect, given the types of violence involved, without what amounts to war. According to a fuller version of this premiss, the process of abolishing a war would only be achieved through a revolution so profound that it could not succeed without extensive and extreme violence, amounting to (civil) war. ° But then war cannot be abolished without war. Therefore, war which must be abolished cannot be abolished. 6 This "paradox" has been compared with the Liar paradox, but the parallel does not persist far. For this paradox does not involve self-referential features, and is easily broken, as follows. Let the "last war" be not the last standard war but the revolution abolishing war. Then, given that the revolution is successful, war will be abolished therewith, i.e. with that last war. There need be no regress, given again a successful outcome. All the premisses stand intact, but the conclusion, following the "therefore" is a nonsequitur. However, while the dissolution of the argument is accordingly logically fine, the route is repugnant. Standard pacifism challenges the second premiss. 4. 6 am/ Brian Medlin, who forcefully propounded this puzzle, set other analogous puzzles alongside it - designed to reveal deep difficulties in contemporary political, and especially alternative, thought. Another puzzle, concerning liberty and repression in the context of capitalism, revolved around the following inconsistent triad: * capitalism must be removed, but liberty retained. * capitalism cannot be removed without repression. * repression is antithetical to liberty. The puzzle is resolved as with the analogous puzzle of abolishing. Let the "last capitalist" action the days of liberty be the repressive but liberating revolution overthrowing capitalism. 16 Although Taoism is strongly opposed to war, and much in favour of peace - and accordingly by prevailing standards a substantially /xzcf/ic position — it is not (nowhere in the central texts) committed to pacifism in usual senses, for two different reasons:* It is not, by contrast with pacifism, opposed to all types of warfare, for example smart defensive wars. * It eschews deontology in terms of which moral pacifism is commonly stated, for instance through the watershed thesis P2. It is morally wrong to use violence. By contrast with Taoism, deep environmentalism does not avoid deontic claims, and is committed m to nonviolent technologies and ways and to pacifistic principles. Moreover, certain forms of deep environmentalism are completely committed to pacifism, notably European forms. Is deep green? There is heavy contemporary opposition to pacifism, as there also was to Taoism in the warring times when Taoism was first being promulgated. Many of the central institutions of contemporary life are intricated in coercion, violence and war. The most prominent contemporary institutions, states, are premissed on these elements of damaging force; they claim entitlement to use them widely, and even claim a certain territorial monopoly on their use. As a result they are having constantly to engage in them in attempt to maintain that monopoly. They are certainly the main perpetrators of wars, and of violence. They are indeed inured to wars, are in constant preparation for wars, yet propound dialectial (and normally dishonest and cynical) doctrines of peace through war (for a recent example see the appendix). Unremarkably then, the extensive propagandistic machinery of state has invested heavily in "justificatory" exercises in favour of controlled use, /A? own use, of destructive force, and continues to inveigh against pacifism. Because a routine trick in this sophistical repetoire consists in conflating pacifism with extreme, naive and inplausible, forms, an inevitable and important early task commits in unscrambling senses of pacifism". Semantical skulduggery can be thwarted in this way. Paci/Mwi, as explained by English dictionaries, invariably concerns wars and warfare, and contains two components, negative and, elaborating on that, positive:- The negative component is, in Amauld's word, a/ifi-War-M/M, opposition (in ways to be further specified) to all forms of warfare (see OED). The positive component supplies alternative ways of settling disputes (what it is supposed that wars with some semblance of justification involve), such as negotiation, arbitration,... - and, adding to too narrow dictionary accounts - sanctions, substitutions (e.g. of sporting events, operatic contests, cooperative ventures),... . In brief .yfa/iJarJ paci/Mwi is opposition to all warfare and resolution of potential wars by other nonmilitary means. Plainly the to warfare, like the sanctions and so on, cannot itself be military (using soldiers and other devices of war), on pain of some incoherence. But otherwise the ways of opposition can be many and various: they can certainly be as with nonviolent 17 demonstrations, resistance movements, and so forth, and they may also be devious (e.g. turning the forces of war upon themselves so they are neutralised). It quickly becomes evident, then, that some of the dictionaries offer but loaded definitions which, by restricting the negative components, reduce the initial appeal and plausibility of pacifism. Consider the Eng/fy/t definition of the negative component: 'the doctrine of non-resistance to hostilities and of total non-co-operation with any form of warfare". Thereby excluded are forms of pacifism which offer active and plausible alternatives to warfare such as social defence. The Eng/is/t tends to force pacifism into what the Ox/brd Dictionary lists as its final item: 'often, with depreciatory implication, the advocacy of peace at any price", 'in any circumstance". Pacifism can easily resist being forced into these sorts of circumstances: it has many resources, as an extensive series of texts on alternatives to war, such as negotiation, non­ violent action and social defence, from Taoism to contemporary environmentalism attest. Academic philosophers have much advanced the semantical strategy of some dictionaries, of rendering pacifism more difficult from the very outset by narrow and biassed definitions. They have stretched the term from its restricted setting of warfare, confined to state and organised gang violence, to cover all forms of violence, from state and interstate to, what is very different, personal and interpersonal violence. Call the resulting considerably stretched notion of pacifism, according to which it is morally wrong to use violence, according to which P2 holds, -yfrefcM While stretched pacifism certainly includes standard pacifism (unless the notions of war and warfare are tampered with), the converse is very far from being the case. A pacifist is in no way committed to stretched pacifism, which is a much more problematic and difficult position than standard pacifism. There are several, substantially different reasons for this, which will be picked up seriatim. Stretched pacifism, also misleadingly called wior#/ pacifism, has looked a very easy critical target to moral philosophers. Many the effusive philosopher who, upon sighting such a target, has charged, whooping such rhetoric as "incoherent ", "inconsistent"", "insensitive , "fanatical"". However, with improved logical technology now available for accommodating and treating moral dilemmas, it is no great feat to resist such attacks, in the fashion of previous investigations (see esp. Al, also MD). A main aim was to demonstrate that stretched pacifism was not so stupid as it was made out to be or appeared to be to these inured to present dominant violent ways. So far from being stupid, it is viable. In future gentler times stretched pacifism could even be realised for whole communities of creatures (as some genuinely Christian sects envisaged); whence it will finally be seen to be feasible not merely for sages and supermen, and many ordinary women, but much more extensively. 7 In Al this notion was contrasted with standard pacifism as <9v^rc<9m/?r^H.S7Vg might have been better. pacifism: 18 The method of philosophical accommodation was through moral dilemmas. The sort of moral dilemma that stretched pacifism can induce derives as follows. On the one side stands the theme P2, Wv, in convenient symbols, for Wrong V-ing, violencing. Now this implies to WB, where B presents a case of of violence. On the other side, particular circumstances develop which lead to W -B, because -B would produce in the circumstances considerable wrong, for instance extensive violence, mass murder, etc. One stock example from the literature concerns calling off the firing squad about to shoot several captives z/* the pacifist shoots one of them (it is elaborated in Al p.13). Interestingly, another stock example from the literature concerns standard pacifism (it can also be presented in terms of patriotism; for details of both see MD p.10). Resolution of intractable moral dilemmas is, where it is required, situational. The agent decides in the situation, wzf/zzzz the fix, what to do. There are many ways in which such decision making can proceed, less rational, such as those applying chance or involving bad faith, or more rational, such as those applying consequentialist decision theory (for details see MD, pp.32-9). A decision theory taking account of that should be included will not however be purely consequential. It would also take account of relevant motivation. This defence and rehabilitation of moral pacifism has been challenged, in particular by Smith (hereafter JWS). JWS claims the defence offered is a "failure because it trivializes pacifism" (p.153 twice). The rehabilitation trivializes pacifism because it entails that pacifism doesn't substantially differ from a form of acfzvLf/M which holds that while violence is a/wayj wrong one is justified on consequentialist grounds for preferring violent acts, if these acts are lesser evils than any other real alternatives. This is the commonsense position which most people hold - yet - pacifism after all was supposed to be radical moral doctrine - (p.153 rearranged).^ Par? of the criticism is, then, not so much that pacifism is trivialized - JWS ""activism"" is hardly trivial - as that pacifism is deflated from a radical position to the commonsense position most people hold (p.154 also). Yet not a shred of evidence is adduced that JWS activism is such a populist position. Available evidence, for example from peace movements and oppositional opinion polls, suggests the very opposite: that, for instance, most people support state-justified conventional wars with the military violence they incur, and accordingly do not hold that violence is always wrong. From such a commonsense angle, pacifism with its condemnation of conventional wars and the violence they involve remains a radical doctrine. As regards wars and other violence-incurring social authorities, contemporary pacificism 8 JWS now informs me that he has changed his position. Whether the move effects his criticism, I don't know. 19 is, as previous explained (e.g. Al p.3), a form of activism. Pacifism does not imply utter pacifity, but may actively involve social defence, resistance and so on. However a certain level of misrepresentation enters into the JWS challenge in the details of what forms of activism pacifism may include. That misrepresentation begins in the second clause concerning what is said to be sometimes justified. For the situational procedure where dilemmas arise will not generally be consequential applying a principle of lesser evil. In dilemmatic situations such principles are suspended, and such a principle is in any case unacceptable to moral pacifists. A small amount of violence may be less bad in its consequences than verbal offence, but a principled pacifist will choose the slightly greater evil where other obligations do not exclude it. A more serious distortion occurs in JWS's effort to force procedures in dilemma situations into purely consequentialist form. In fact consequential decision theory was deployed as % only for how to proceed rationally in a situational setting where deontic procedures were suspended (see MD p.38). What was said, still misleadingly retrospective vision reveals, was this: 'what is done is a very consequentialist thing" (Al p.13), nor 'one acts in a consequentialist fashion to do the sufficiently good thing in the circumstances" (JWS p.152). Situationally or%er procedures than those resembling orthodox rational decision making (modified from maximizing to satisizing objectives) may be adopted (MD p.38). Further the orthodox consequentialist theory is inadequate because it leaves out, or tries to reduce to consequences, nonconsequential elements, notably motives. It is not difficult, in principle (in advance of attempted consequentialization of motives), to design situations where motives, such as integrity or maintaining faith, enter to yield outcomes upsetting consequential calculations. More elaborate decision making procedures than those of consequentialism, sometimes at variance with consequentialism, are thus presupposed. A further part of JWS's criticism accordingly goes by the board, the alleged appeal 'to "second best"" consequentialist considerations,... already explicitly condemned" (p.154). What was condemned was stock universal consequentialism, 'that onZy consequentialist considerations carry argumentative weight" (quoted on p.152), so undercutting other deontic principles, such as those of pacifism. It was not claimed, what is utterly different, that consequentialist considerations can enter into deliberation and decision making. The conclusion JWS arrives at is therefore substantially astray. After criticising modern moral philosophy for its reliance upon consequentialist modes of thought, it is surprising, and inconsistent, to find ... [reliance] upon such modes of thought to escape logical difficulties raised by moral dilemmas facing ... pacifis[m] (p.152) There is no inconsistency. JWS has confused universal with particular. As well he has wrongly contracted all situational decision making to consequentialist modes. There is a third part to the criticism, that the defence is too easy; the 'strategy will allow ?<%) mMc/z violence to be (perpetrated and) justified to suit the tastes of any real pacifist" (p.153). This another part of the so-called trivialization, this time however J/ZMfzon rather than 20 populatization, weakening the moral stand against violence. This third contention is premissed on a mistake: that one can 'justify on consequentialist grounds any number of violent acts, providing that such acts are lesser evils than other real alternatives facing social agents' (p.153). Moral pacifism offers no such licence; allowing such consequentialism to take over was never part of the position. The slide to such consequentialism is made on the strength of a similarly erroneous example. The potential victim of an aspiring rapist 'is supposed to flee or wriggle free if possible. But it is easy to consequentially justify the use of violence by the woman to prevent herself from being raped' (p.153 italics added). In the example so far described there is no dilemma, and no such easy resort to consequentially 'justified' violence. What allows too much violence is the lesser evil JWS assumes is easily consequentially justified; for example that the woman is entitled to inflict, and escalate, violence so long as it remains 'a lesser evil than the violence of attempted rape' (p.153). Since she may thereby inflict quite unreasonable damage (esp. if she is a Kung Fu expert), the result is inconsistent with 'the basic principle of self-defence' which JWS earlier adduced according to which what is 'appropriate, in response is <?n/y that level of force necessary to defend oneself against the threat' (p.150). There is evidence in JWS's work of some enthusiasm for levels of violence which exceed his 'basic principle', his appeal to 'lesser evil' generates some instances. The 'basic principle', itself fraught with difficulties (cf. the contorted discussion of what weapons are appropriate in response to what attacks, p.150), still exceeds what stretched pacifism would enjoin; for instance, it may not be appropriate to respond with force. But in a technical sense stretched pacifism is compatible with the 'basic principle', since it only imposes the upper bound on level of force. As for easiness, moral pacifism is not an easy position to live by, or to justify. Removing objections to pacifism is one thing; solidifying a positive case for it is quite another, and so far hardly conclusive (as Al tried to explain, pp 29-31). Stretched pacifism was advanced, to put it more precisely, as a still viable option. It was not presented as a morally compulsory position, or, for that matter, as one that this defender adhered to or affirmed. To reiterate, while a cumulative case can be made for stetched pacifism as principled non­ violence, that case was not conclusive, and is hard to improve. For, further, some serious difficulties standing in the way of stretched pacifism were assembled, the most important of which derives from the extent of violence apparent in transactions within the natural world. Simply consider the practices of carnivores, essential to their natural way of life. In order to meet their life needs for sustenance, these creatures do, and are often obliged to, engage routinely in violent activity. While it can no doubt be argued, as some vegetarians may do, that the natural order is an immoral order, and that remaining carnivores should be converted to vegetarianism as rapidly as proves possible (in the way domestic dogs are converted to dog biscuits), the difficulties with such proposals are immense. The task envisaged is gigantic, and beyond human capacities - even if it were desirable. For there are millions of species to be 21 somehow converted to proper vegetarianism. Then there are millions of other species to be converted to proper and well regulated contraceptive practices, else their numbers will get out of hand (uncontrollably) with predation removed. Given humans lack of success in limiting their own excessive numbers, such regulation appears entirely remote. Aside however from the practical difficulties, is such a fully vegetarian order, with evolution further derailed, a desirable improvement on the natural order? Is it morally obligatory? It is certainly not obligatory, as alternative systems of morality in harmony with the prevailing natural order are feasible. Nor is it desirable, for (to appeal to such alternative value systems) the natural order is more or less in order as it is. Full vegetarianization would only reduce its value, vastly. More generally, a defensible ethical framework should not, it would be rightly contended, be right out of step with the natural order of other creatures, decently depicted. Decent depiction is important, for some features of the natural order, such as competition, combat and predation, so far from escaping attention, have been grossly exaggerated and exploited. Thus, for instance, the ludicrous picture of nature red in truth and claw, so beloved of descendents of orthodox Victorians and of orthodox economists. However, even under decent depiction, the "natural order" is often not benign. That appears to be enough to induce a supervenient moral dilemma for any stretched pacifism which is coupled to a deep ethic (e.g. which does not separate humans out from the natural order) and which eschews the desperate vegetarian route: The natural order is not an immoral order The natural order contains (regular) instances of violence. Therefore, instances of violence are not immoral - in apparent defiance of P2 Moreover, there are too many instances of violence, too regularly occurring, for them all to be plausibly shunted into the moral dilemma category (and predatory carnivores face no dilemmas). Raptors that practice violence every week are not immoral (neither are they clearly moral; the category of morality only significantly extends so far). The main trouble lies however with P2 (which needs some finer adjustment, as was alrady indicated in Al). While P2 is alright in context, within a particular, perfectly viable, ethical framework, designed for the usual human round, the conventional setting for ethical theories, it stands in need of modification outside that setting. It is time to suggest the sort of modification envisaged. Evidently P2 was addressed to moral agents. Which agents? Not to carnivores that supply their own livelihood, nor really to morally degenerate humans, but to peace-sensitive agents. With that semi-technical form, yet to be characterised, a suitably modified P2 results: MP2. It is morally wrong, for a peace-sensitive agent, to use violence.^ 9 The generalization of P2, suggested in Al, to cover also the parallel situation of environmental vandalism, can be similarly modified. The anti-vandolence principle becomes MP2°. It is morally wrong, for a peace- and environmentally-sensitive agent, to use  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Box 21, Item 708: Draft of War and peace IV: Tao and deep-green Subject The topic of the resource Printout of draft, undated, with correction notes (1 leaf). Later title: On extirpating war: Tao and deep-green pacifism. Description An account of the resource One of eight papers digitised from item 708. Title in collection finding aid: RS: War & Peace IV: Tao and Deep Green corrected ts. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/browse?search=Richard+Sylvan&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bjoiner%5D=and&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=&amp;range=&amp;collection=&amp;type=&amp;user=&amp;tags=&amp;public=&amp;featured=&amp;exhibit=&amp;geolocation-mapped=&amp;geolocation-address=&amp;geolocation-latitude=&amp;geolocation-longitude=&amp;geolocation-radius=10&amp;submit_search=Search+for+items">Richard Sylvan</a> Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived <span class="MuiTypography-root-125 MuiTypography-body2-126">The University of Queensland's <a data-testid="rek-series" href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/records/search?page=1&amp;pageSize=20&amp;sortBy=score&amp;sortDirection=Desc&amp;searchQueryParams%5Brek_series%5D%5Bvalue%5D=Richard+Sylvan+Papers%2C+UQFL291&amp;searchMode=advanced">Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291</a></span>, Box 21, Item 708 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org">Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy</a> Contributor An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, <a href="https://najtaylor.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Dr. N.A.J. Taylor</a>. Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library. Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource [21] leaves + [1] leaf. 53.46 MB. Type The nature or genre of the resource Manuscript Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context <a href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:f28769f">https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:f28769f</a> Box 21: More Green Como House Como House > Shelves > Top > Pile 3 https://www.antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/3044e76f70e17f7d2314623237b7068b.pdf c7a4c55216b6f35b0e87ed23b8e75926 PDF Text Text WAR AND PEACE IV: TAO AND DEEP-GREEN Taoism and deep-green environmental theory, although closely aligned on very many issues, diverge over war. For Taoism, by contrast for instance with Buddhism, is not a pacific doctrine, but is committed to skilful defensive militarism. While it does not espouse a fortress mentality, Taoism certainly condones limited defensive military operations for specific purposes, a sort of guerilla warfare. By contrast, deep-green theory, while acknowledging the role of organised social defence, stands opposed to professional militarism, and thereby to military defence, and is committed to a principled pacifism. Conveniently a route through Taoism, philosophically fascinating in its own right, will lead us to problems of pacifism and towards deep-green theory. 7. Fca/ar^y o/ % Tao/s/ q/ war an<? War did not receive a favourable press in ancient Chinese philosophy. Generally aggression and war were to be avoided. Even Confucius imposed very demanding conditions: for example, 'when good men have instructed the people [in morals, agriculture, military tactics] for seven years, they way be allowed to bear arms/ Tf a ruler ... does not set himself right, even his commands will not be obeyed' (SB p.41, italics added). Mo Tzu went much further than Confucius, roundly condemning war - on utilitarian grounds, that war yields no net benefit at any level (SB p.227). What is more, he backed his heavy condemnation practically (unlike some conspicuous contemporary theoretical utilitarians); 'he did not hesitate to walk for ten days and ten nights in an effort to dissuade a ruler from making war' (SB p.212). But none, it is said, went as far, in a detailed and sophisticated criticism of war, as Lao Tzu; 'none has condemned war more strongly than Lao Tzu'. '[T]he opposition of Taoism to the use of force is well-known, and the most bitter attack on militarism if found in the Lao 7za' (Chan, p.154, p.17.) But, after that splendid build-up, the text is slightly disappointing. Lao Tzu does not assert outright that war is an abomination, or even roundly condemn it. His critique of war, militarism, and military technology, is subtle and oblique, and, on the surface, far distanced from pacifism. For he does not recommend an end to war - in that genuine Taoists, those who possess Tao, will never participate in them - but expects wars to continue as tmavoi<7a&/e gvfAy. Worse, he even goes so far as to outline proper attitudes to war and conduct in war, and indeed to suggest military techniques and strategies, some of which look decidedly devious. Among the classical works of Taoism, we focus on the Lao 7za because, by contrast with other works, a remarkable component of that book is devoted to war and militarism. The apparent deviousness of the tactics Lao Tzu allocates serves to highlight what has been seen as 'the most troublesome element' in his philosophy (Chan p.17) - not so much however because they concern military operations, but because they are taken to apply much �2 more widely, 'to life in general' (p.17). But why should military activity obtain some special dispensation? Why should what is no? tolerated more generally be exonerated there? But given that Taoism has here the virtue of consistency (i.e. uniformity on principles) and of universalizability, that simply leaves * PMzz/ay/br explaining to be done. and wars as M/tavafda&Ze evf/s There are fwa puzzles here in Taoism rather than one. There is the zm/ffary-pracac^s paradox, and, varying and generalising on that, there are /Z/g-prac^c^s paradoxes. The special paradox is generated by the following incompatible elements: on the one side, 'the most bitter attack on militarism', the well-known opposition of Taoism to the use of force (p.17) and to the possession and use of smart military weapons and technology - implying that war is far from all tight - and on the other, advocacy of certain (devious) military tactics, outlines of (deceitful) conduct in war, and so on - implying that war is all right after all. A straightforward generalisation of this paradox would look at other morally-sensitive parts of life, where some practice was strongly condemned yet engaged in (for many examples, see the dilemmas assembled in MD). But the variation of concern to Chan and the neo-Confucians concerns the conjunction of upright with devious practices in life, in particular in the life of the sage. For a Taoist sage is presumed to lead an upright straightforward life, yet appears to engage in devious and even deceitful practices incompatible with such a life-style. Call this the 7%oLyf-ZZ/&y?y/e paradox. Evidently a good deal of explaining is required, as to how Taoism can coA^nfZy take the positions it appears to presume, both on war and peace, and on life more generally. A desirable preliminary would seem to be a little investigation of what position taken, especially on war and militarism. One key pasage runs: Fine weapons are instruments of evil Weapons are instruments of evil, not the instruments of a good ruler. When he uses them unavoidably, he regards calm restraint as the best principle Even when he is victorious, he does not regard it as praiseworthy, For to praise victory is to delight in the slaughter of men. He who delights in the slaughter of men will not succeed in the empire. ... For a victory, let us observe the occasion with funeral-ceremonies (LT p.154). Wars, which involve the use of weapons, instruments of evil, are accordingly themselves evil. They are also evil because they involve the slaughter of men. But they are also sometimes unavoidable (also p.152). Therefore such wars are unavoidable evils. Such discourse, obtained by almost immediate inference from the passage, is within the standard orbit of dilemma talk. But Taoism lacks, through deliberately eschewing deontic talk, the discourse which enables direct expression of such dilemmas, or even direct condemnation of wars or cleaver weapons. Instead the points are made by what the possesser of Tao �3 does, how the good ruler conducts himself, or by awa/ogy, of victory in war with death. Unavoidable evils are the very stuff of deontic dilemmas (though many theories, underpinned by shonky logic, lack the resources for representing this stuff properly). Where something is unavoidably evil, it is bof/i because evil, also no? doing it is excusable, because it is unavoidable. So, given such an argument (which has its weaknesses), an unavoidable evil is a genuinely dilemmatic object with inconsistent features. Certain wars have looked, since ancient times, like such dilemmatic objects. Revealingly, Chan tries to explain that "most troublesome element* in Taoism, the military-practice paradox, through the following exercise in lateral thinking: It can ... be argued that Lao Tzu uses warfare to illustrate his principles of taking no action and weakness because warfare is among the most dynamic and critical of human experiences, just as the Indian classic, the chooses fighting as the theme on which to discuss the terrible dilemma whether one should fulfil his duty, as in the case of a soldier, and kill, or should fail in his duty and refrain irom killing (p. 17). 'Just as*? The Indian classic prevents a classic moral dilemma, a dilemma represented in contemporary philosophy (following its rediscovery by Sartre), where there are incompatible duties: the duty to kill, because of one's role as a soldier, and the duty not to kill, because of one's human condition, and the supervenient dilemma of failing in and fulfilling one's duties. These dilemmas for an individual (male, as it then was) are replicated in dilemmas regarding war for group institutions: at bottom, the obligation to engage in war (for one set of compelling reasons) as contraposed with the obligation not to engage in war (for another, perhaps overlapping, set of reasons). A theory of moral dilemmas (as worked out for example in MD) is crucial for an adequate treatment of major issues in war and peace, especially (as will become evident) for a viable strong pacifism. But Taoism, eschewing deontic discourse, lacks the apparatus to state or develop moral dilemmas. Hence it is logically excluded from giving a full or adequate account of what is going on conceptually. One of the philosophically fascinating feature of Taoism is the fashion in which it manages to avoid deontic discourse, and to substitute for direct deontic discourse or improvise circumlocutions when deontic discourse would otherwise appear inevitable (cf. UT bn examples). But there are costs. One is inability to display the mechanism of deontic dilemmas, or to show what reasons and argument lie behind Taoist prounouncements and conclusions (the shortage of Taoism on argument is another philosophically conspicious feature, observed in UT). As conceptual apparatus for analysizing moral dilemmas is missing, most of the machinery involved has to be passed over. Only the outcomes, as Taoism sees them, are presented, as if from a black box. Taoism blacks out the story on deontic dilemmas that deep-green theory can tell, as the following diagram tries to show: �4 Diagrams . C/%zr%Kg "r&w/v^". procawmg Dggp-grgg/Y c/Mrr Arguments to incompatible prescriptions Processing of dilemma, directive situational procedures output CorrasppMJing 7%<9i\f c/M!rr: Black directive Box output input It is evident that Taoism can be information can be put into the Black Box rendering it less opaque. That extension can be made so as to conform to deep-green theory, i.e. so that the extended Taoist chart, a neo-Daoist chart, looks like the deep-green one. That is indeed essentially how neo-Daoism get characterised, in terms of conformity of the extension to deep ecological theory (see UT). We are now placed to explain how to dissolve, or at least neutralize, the paradoxes deriving from repudiation of militarism, an awkwardly qualified repudiation in the case of Taoism. In a significant sense there is no resolving of genuine deontic dilemmas. The principles delineating the fix may stand, incompatible, signalling the persisting suboptimality (or better, sublimenality) of the dilemmatic situation. Where there is a dilemma, involved parties should try to do well enough in the sublimenal circumstances (for a much fuller account, see MD). Thus where there is a war, itself a non-Taoist process, engaged or caught up Taoists will not abandon Taoism. Taoist methods will be applied, Taoist strategies pursued. So much for theoretical representation and (non-)resolution of life-practices and other dilemmas, details of which are readily elaborated in deep-green extensi^s of Taoism. A prior substantive issue is whether dilemmas always are generated: not whether wars are evil (typically they are, an issue we shall come to), but whether wars are unavoidable. Analysis of wars does not bear that familiar claim out decisively. Many wars could have been avoided, through conciliation, negotiation, restraint, etc., and no worse results apparently obtained, through sanctions, exchange, trade, etc. Through a typology of wars (coming up) that conjecture can be given some substance. Consider, for instance, what would be walk-overs. Then there is little point in making a military response. So war can be avoided. Certainly an occupation, to be met in a different way, may still occur. And so on, perhaps, for various other types of war. But, more generally, try this:- �5 Every war involves an aggressor, who makes an aggressive move. Such an aggressor could always avoid that move, taking a different (or a do-nothing) course of action. Therefore, every war can be avoided. No war is entirely unavoidable. Setting aside determinism (which renders aZZ actual wars along with all other events unavoidable), it could be argued that a war sometimes simply boils up, without an aggressor, an intensification of a conflagatory situation. There are grounds for scepticism regarding such examples; for such intensification can only occur if provocative military moves are made, for instance troops are stationed in provocative or risky positions. The presumption that certain wars are unavoidable typically derives from a one-sided perspective on war, a defender's perspective. A defender has no option, so it is routinely averred, but to respond to a determined aggressor. Even if that should be so sometimes, when there is no running away or going underground, it does not establish that such a war is unavoidable; for it neglects the role of the aggressor. By a smarter formulation, relevant features of unavoidability can be captured. Although wars may not be unavoidable, defensive action in wars that have been initiated may be unavoidable. At least such action may be unavoidable if unacceptably high costs (death, enslavement, etc.) are not to be avoided. Thereupon another highly relevant feature emerges: the linkage of avoidability to costs. For whether an action is unavoidable then depends upon what costs a party is prepared to incur before and when insisting on action: but this appears entirely unacceptable. How can what is "unavoidable" cease to be so when some further costs are absorbed? However with basics like survival, a certain liberty, and so on, we do reach such bounds. An important (ype of unavoidability. We also reach scenarios, unavailable to Lao Tzu but kindly brought within range by modem technology, which may appear to justify aggressive strikes. State Z, while not an aggressor, is carrying out practices which will impose unacceptably high costs upon peoples of other states and implacably refuses to desist. It could, for example, be poisoning air or water flowing to other states. But",to make the case vivid, let us suppose that state Z is constructing, for reasons Zeders find convincing (they are committed to a faith which depicts all humans as incorrigible sinners and unworthy of life), an effective doomsday machine. Would an (aggressive) preemptory strike designed to disable or destroy the machine be unavoidable?* In a sense, No; in another Yes. For different modalities can operate. Physically outsiders need to do nothing, but watch Zeders go about their zealous work. But deontically they are under heavy moral pressure, because of the costs of standing by idly: if the human race is worth anything very substantial, then they are obliged to act, action is deontically 1 Whether it would be justifiable, or just, are separate issues. But it is evident enought that such scenarios further damage the obsolescent idea of war. For, according to received doctrine, a just war is defensive. (How such a war can be fought at all is another matter; coherence requires relativization to 'just warybr party d'.) �6 unavoidable. Here is a situation where a proposed reduction of deontic logic proves illuminating. Obligation is explicated through not implying, or necessitating, the sanction, i.e. excessive ethical costs such as extermination. Let us explain deontic unavoidability analogously: an action is so unavoidable if not undertaking it would result in excessive ethical costs. Then i/* it can be established that there is no other way than a military strike, an act of war, to ensure that the Zeders desist (and certainly we can envisage scenarios like that), then that is deontically unavoidable. It is also for those committed to, or inclined towards pacifism; and it is, for them at least, but paradoxically justifiable, as the negation is also justifiable, on pacific grounds. Scenarios like that sketched, that appear to render certain wars deontically unavoidable require but little or no elaboration to render them evil. Evil indeed is such a standard feature of standard wars that at least its great presence call for little supporting evidence. But it has taken to vast stretch of human history to reach this general point of recognition. The manifold evils of war Lao Tzu very early recognised and emphasized: Wherever armies are stationed, briars and thorns grow. Great wars are always followed by famines (p.152). And nowadays followed by great tides of refugees. This passage includes not only recognition of the widely-observed socio-environmental consequences of war, but, more striking, very early recognition of the severe environmental impact of military forces. That critique is not however developed in Taoism.^ Only recently has it been pushed substantially further. And only recently could a new, most significant twist occur, the merging of resource security, long a military objective, with environmental security. The appalling idea has recently been floated that the military, in need of new work and roles with the apparent warming of Wept-East relations and cooling of the Cold War, should exchange usual military illness for meddling in environmental matters: regulation and policing - of environmental resources, ensurance of environmental security of powerful states, and similar. This is a bit like reassigning those imprisoned for child abuse to managing kindergartens; for consider the impressive military record of environmental vandalism. What the military is alleged to offer is a structure appropriate and available for handling such matters. But, to the contrary, it is precisely the sort of hierarchical, authoritarian expensive structure that should be wound down and up as soon as the opportunity appears, as (briefly) now, rather than being retained and shockingly reoriented (as a state-serving "Greenwar"). But a bridge to deep-green theory can be made through neo-Daoism, an updating of Taoism in confirmity with deep ecology (which however is somewhat thin and threadbare on war; for what there is so far, see Naess p.160). On neo-Daoism, see UT. ; �7 2. On divergence of deej?-green fron: Taoisn!. Having arrived, by better or worse arguments, at the conclusion that wars, though generally evil, may be sometimes unavoidable, it is evidently important to say something about how they - those of the theoretical residue - are to be conducted. By appropriate conduct the damage they do may be reduced; also the conduct should be appropriate to the funereal nature of wars (to exceed Taoist resources for stating this sort of point). It is at this stage that deep­ green theory begins to diverge from Taoism. In further explaining the Taoist and deep-green critiques of war, and diverting objections to them, a roMg/t and preliminary ryp<?/<9gy of wars is important. It is also of passing interest in its own philosophical right. War, according to English Dictionaries, is a 'contest carried on by force of arms, typically between nations or states'. More exactly, war is a gawc - in the generous technical sense of game-theory, with players, rules, goals, strategies, and so on carried on in significant part by military means, normally between states or substates. Call the contestants, (warring) parfzay. They typically represent of course larger populations. The set­ up between parties resembles the arrangements of players in game theory. There are several analogical extensions of the term war to cover games where one of the parties is an object, construed as hostile (an enemy of the state), such as Crime, Drugs, Poverty or Nature. These we can set aside as a/za/ogfca/ wars. Of course wars form only a part of military activities. Military interests and objectives have always stretched significantly further than war, to include surveillence and security, easily extended to resource security, environmental security and life­ style security, and beyond that to political stability and other political matters. Evidently military ambitions have far over-extended themselves in bagging such democratic concerns. An anarchist solution to the whole problem of war, which some have seen Taoism as reaching towards, is immediate: eliminate the source of war, -yfafe.y. Unfortunately it is not quite that simple (and that's not simple). For wars can also occur between nations, cultures, races or tribes (which are not such artifices as states, and not so readily or desirably abolished), between inhabited regions, and between factions within states (thus civil wars) or, perhaps by extension, between factions within other social structures (thus, for instance, gang wars). But undoubtedly eliminating states and aspiring states would abolish most wars and virtually all the worst wars. While "nonviolent wars" are excluded by definition, by virtue of 'force of arms', token wars, limited wars, and so on, are not: for instance, wars fought by small armed teams representing competing sides (cf. medieval and science fiction war games). As wars are hemmed in by conventions and agreed rules, there is no reason in principle why they should not be reduced to two person contests, fought under strict rules like boxing or gladiatorial contents. But in modern times wars have never taken such sensible forms, but have been much larger affairs, making heavy (though fortunately restricted) use of latest technology. Let us distinguish such wars as wars. They have, directly or indirectly (for the �8 technology may be bought or bartered), a heavy research and development support structure (indeed the bulk of contemporary science is devoted - misdirected - in one way or another to this effort). Among wars, an important distinction is that between and wars. An offensive war is one which ventures off a given party's territory or recognised pad, "invading" that of another party or parties; correlatively defensive parties, if they have not also invaded. Force projection typifies offensive practice. Plainly, offensiveness and defensiveness are not strictly features of a war, but of parties to a war. In a two-party war, while both parties can easily act offensively, the possibility of both parties proceeding defensively is excluded, unless they share territory. (Even then issues may arise as to which party, if any, was the aggray-yor, which started it, was responsible for starting it, and so on.) Thus mutually defensive wars between contemporary states are impossible (but would be possible if states shared territory, e.g. if Eire and Britain shared the territory of Northern Ireland). Tao-accredited wars were defensive wars, never wars aiming at domination: last-resort wars, in which no pride was taken (LT p. 152)3, The pretence that offensive wars are defensive is widespread, and reflected in the subterfuge that departments or ministries of war are those of defence, security or whatever. (If they really were what they purport to be, we should be well on the way to an end to war.) Offensive practices are rendered defensive ones by shabby redefinitional strategems, such as redefining "defensive* to include defence of ideals like democracy or liberty, infringed (or allegedly infringed) on territories abroad, or to include ""defence** of a third party or place (whence every offensive war is ""defensive**). In the present war in which part of Arabia is engulfed (February 1991), one party claims to be defending what really was (or should be) part of its territory, namely Kuwait, another party to be defending (what Kuwait did not enjoy) democracy. It is a doubly offensive war presented in this guise as jointly defensive. Aggressive wars are waged for a variety of reasons, but usually for resources or access to resources or markets, a matter often disguised by appeal to ideology (thus a war for oil is represented as a war of liberation). But there are other reasons than narrowly economic ones, such as religion (as with crusades), power and aggrandisement (as in building an empire), and so on. Nor are those reasons necessarily far separated; Marxist and market capitalism, for 3 There is one line in LT that way suggest that attack was sometimes justifiable, namely Tor deep love helps one to win in the case of attack' (p.219). But how can c<?wpa.y.Hon be appropriate unless this attack is wif/un a defensive setting, a larger context of unavoidability or such like. A passage shortly below confirms this interpretation: I dare not take the offensive but I take the defensive: I dare not advance an inch but I retreat a foot (p.222). These are advances and attacks within a defensive setting. �9 example, exhibit many of the features of religion. The economic reasons for war appear to have become much more complex with the advent of an integrated world economy. At the same time many of the independent reasons for economic wars are now obsolete. For to powerful states accrue the advantages of war without war. At least most of the former economic advantages of war can be obtained without expensive wars, through trade, institution of economic dependence, etc. Small medieval wars were sometimes instituted for the collection of neighbouring riches and booty, a kind of piracy meeting conditions of war. "Small" contemporary wars can be waged for a remarkable mix of political-economy ends: to establish a regime favourable to economic penetration and profit repatriation, to subjugate markets and to remove competition, to boost a sagging weapons economy by using up old stocks and also testing new equipment, to restart a depressed economy, and so on. Such wars, along with the economic aims which motivate them, are in effect heavily castigated by Lao Tzu: When Tao prevails in the world, galloping horses are turned back to fertilize (the fields ...). When Tao does not prevail in the world, war horses thrive in the suburbs. There is no calamity greater than lavish desires. (LT p.181). But it does exceed evidential warrant to claim that Tao is not only sufficient, but for cessation of such practices. The practice of regularly stimulating complex military-saturated economies through war is reminiscent of older, much ridiculed practices in simpler societies. They now ridicule the Tsembaga, who proceeded to destroy much of their surplus product by going to war every 5-15 years (cf Rapaport). But they do not similarly ridicule the most powerful nation on the Earth, the USA, which proceeds to write off a colossal amount of surplus in war every 10-20 years -the (pulf war liquidated some ^1.7 billion per day). Taoists would. For ridicule was a favoured method, an important rhetorical strategem, and war and its idiocy were favourite targets. Some classification of defensive wars is also important, for various reasons: reducing and abolishing wars, their costs and damage, restructuring societies away from war and military practices, and, not least, for appreciating Taoism. A main distinction is between * conventional defence, maintained by armies of armed soldiers, many of them professionals, and * social defence, where there are no such armies or but fragments of them, and defence is carried out through social networks of a significant part of society.4 It is here that Taoism and deep-green theory part company. Under Taoism, the state wz'Z/ 4 Details of social defence are presented in Sharp and in Martin. �10 have a standing army, but a defensive army operating by strange, surprise tactics (p.201). No doubt defensive wars are to remain last resort action. Nonetheless the state will operate in secrecy, in a way incompatible with decentralised defence; people will be kept in the dark about smart weapons of the state; and they too will be surprised, along with presumed enemies of the state. By contrast, under deep-green theory, there should be no hidden smart weapons of state; information would flow more freely and not be hidden from the people (who should retain influence in informed decision making). Under deep-green, standing armies, and more generally military organisation, will be wound down altogether. Taoism should have pushed its searching criticism further. For military objectives, easily acquired by standing armies with time on their hands, are frequently incompatible with Taoism. For example, Taoism is opposed to domination (LT p.152), whereas military operations frequently seek or involve domination; and military structure is invariably hierarchical and authoritarian. Taoism aims for self-regulation, wherever feasible (cf. p.201); so does deep­ green theory, which is one reasons why it aims to dispose of standing armies, as an important preliminary to the withering away of states themselves (military forces being major props of state control and power, and often maintained primarily for internal state security). Taoism has no project for ending the era of wars; deep-green theory does. That project involves an elimination of standing armies, too often poised for fighting or political interference. A recommended route to war consists in progressive scaling down: reduction of the means and manpower. The initial stages are well-known, and include * elimination of nuclear, biological and chemical weaponry, and * force reduction. It can hardly be pretended that the Earth's states have managed to proceed very far on even this complex of stages. The next stage consists in * contraction to defensive capacities only, and the Anal stage consists in * elimination of remaining military defensive forces, and adoption, so far as required, of social defence practices. The complete route thus involves complete demilitarisation. Reasons why deep-green aims to proceed the /%// distance are readily grasped by considering the environmental shallowness of an otherwise cogent traditional case for the sharp curtailment of wars and militarism. The traditional Western case against wars has been primarily along two dimensions: social and moral. Wars are highly disruptive of the social fabric; wars may be unjust. From these joint features, it was argued that wars should be a matter of last resort, to be fought to ensure peace. It was argued further that only just wars should be fought. Just wars were rare objects. But as there was little evidence of the decline and fall of wars, much effort was expended, more practically and unsuccessfully, upon endeavouring to improve the calibre of wars, and more theoretically, upon trying to characterize war satisfactorily, or rather to bend the nation in an effort to approximate the gory unjust facts. Progress was long hindered, furthermore, because there was always a rival positive �11 perspective on wars, which encouraged the exaltation of wars and military feats. It also facilitated the transfer of the favourable image of war to other problem areas, whence the long and apparently successful war against nature (but the short-term successes are turning into long-term problems), the short and unsuccessful war against poverty, and so on. Behind all this is the complex idea of war as rejuvenating, even cleansing, like fire; of war as heroic, and glorious, of war as the supreme testing ground of men. These pictures of war - finally shattered by the first World War (where even the poets began to tell of horrors and atrocities) and subsequent technological wars - though no longer in assendency, have by no means vanished. The notion of war as rejuvenating a flagging economy persists, along with the practice of keeping capitalism running smoothly by integrating substantial military components into the industrial engine. With the development of highly technological wars - the celebrated development of the dirty industrial age is substantially military - the traditional negative case has grown in strength. Wars have become much more damaging, with the potential for much more that is significantly worse, and the possibility of a just war has correspondingly contracted, virtually to zero. The opposition to war has likewise grown, but more than correspondingly with the rise of women in social and political influence. Wars have almost always and everywhere been Men's affairs; likewise conquest. Deep-green theory accepts much of the traditional negative case, but would further strengthen it. For example, the stricture against unjust wars, as out and out immoral, can be strengthened, through the following syllogism: All wars should be fully just wars. Modem wars cannot be fully just wars. Therefore, there should be no modern wars. A fully just war is not merely a just war, but a war those just character can be reliably forecast in advance. A modem war is of course a war that deploys modem technology, at least that available this century. The evidential basis for the second premiss derives from much information that collateral damage, damage to innocent bystanders and involved citizens is always likely and cannot be excluded. Such wars are always liable to violate uncontroversial requirements for a just war, even if they are purely "conventional" wars, not throwing radiation or chemical or biological weapons around. From a contemporary viewpoint the traditional doctrine of a just war, really of a just war, is seriously out of date. The reasons for this reach wider than the new features introduced by modem technological wars and the character of modem civilization, with its giant cities littered with dangerous and vulnerable military targets. They have also to do with the chauvinism of the justice proposed, which is shallow human justice, not natural or environmental justice. There is no consideration of justice to other creatures or to the Earth (cf thlaess p.160). Two troubles are really intertwined here: conceptual difficulties with too narrow �12 a notion of justice, and ideological difficulties with too narrow a vision of what is an object of value, of what counts. The deep-green case against war adds to the traditional case a further dimension, neglected until very recently: the environmental dimension. It has suddenly been seen that wars are typically environmental atrocities. Earlier, of course, environments were simply backgrounds, backdrops in paintings and plays, to the real drama. Contemporary technological wars tend to be not merely social tragedies but environmental ones as well. There is a doctrine of just war, but it is a human chauvinistic affair. There is no similarly developed doctrine of an eco/ogica/Zy son/M? war, a deep ecological war. Unless any such war were literally different from modern wars, that is from contemporary technological wars, it would overstep permitted bounds. For such wars are characteristically ecological disasters. Hardened military people, desensitized by a rigorous unethical training, feel even less compunction about degrading or destroying environments or members of other species than they do of maiming or killing civilians through "collateral" activity. Matching the no-just-war syllogism is a no-sound-war syllogism: All wars should be environmentally sound wars. Modem wars cannot be environmentally sound. Therefore, there should be no modern wars. The argument for the second premiss has of course to be different. It looks to the information accumulating on what wars do to natural and built environments. The Vietnam and Gulf wars both inflicted immense damage on natural environments or what was left of them. The environmental effects of war are not confined to direct and collateral damage. There are indirect effects also. Thus, for instance, war also supplied the mechanism of, and the technology for, modem environmental destruction: explosives, bulldozers from tanks, etc. As well, training for war and engagement in war have much fostered, along with attitudes that make for social callousness or ruthlessness, those that contribute to environmental insensitivity and cruelty. 3. PuzzZes Tao/sf s/ra/egy anJ f/s endues o/ fec/tnoZogy an*/ woZence Tt is surprising how much of the Lao Tza is devoted to military strategy'. Which strategies? Surprise, above all. But why such strategies? 'Do they not contradict the Taoists' strong opposition to the use of force' (Chan p.222), the implied commitment to quietism? Briefly, Taoism is not committed to quietism, and while certainly antagonistic to violence, does not oppose certain uses of force (only really ///-forcing, as will be explained). Even so, the emphasis on military strategy remains puzzling. The strategies, many of them relevant to social defence, include * * not 'making light of the enemy' (p.222) and nonvisibility (p.201). The defensive strategy involves guerilla tactics: �13 marching without formation, holding weapons without seeming to have them, confronting enemies without seeming to meet them (p.222). But even in times of peace, "smart weapons of the state should not be displayed to the people* (p.164). Such recommendations helped to fuel the charge of deviousness lodged against Lao Tzu. But look at part of the reason for concealing smart weapons: "The more smart weapons the people have, the more troubled the state will be* (p.201). Smart weapons are carried in corrupt states, where the rich engage in conspicuous consumption and the people are suppressed, not where Tao is practiced (LT p. 194). * advance from weaATt&M, flexibility but firmness. Weakness is the principle of life and will overcome strength (LT p.164, p.233). * coolness and noncompetition (LT p.233, p.164). Like these, most of the general strategies are standard Taoist practices simply applied to military conduct. For these standard practices the charge of deviousness looks feeble. The response applies more generally to other allegedly devious political strategies. For the strategies are but application of Taoist principles and techniques to warfare, politics and elsewhere. Nothing excludes application of these techniques to what are accounted, in general, unnecessary evils (which must sometimes, on other Taoist grounds, be countered). Nor, to meet the main criticism, need any deceit or deviousness be involved; nor is it. In particular, the legalist tactic, "In order to grasp, it is necessary first to give* (LT p.164), is cited as invoking "an element of deceit* "undeniably*, and "worse* it is "morally questionable* (Chan p.17). But in order for me to grasp your hand in a normal handshake, it is necessary first for me to give my hand. There is no deceit here, nothing morally questionable. All the tactics permit of benign construals, of a Taoist kind. Consider, for instance, "In order to contract, it is necessary first to expand* (LT p.164). In order to bend a copper pipe to the intended angle, it is better to bend it first a little further than required. The transformation of water to ice (both favoured natural items for symbolic purposes: natural processes which may look devious!) neatly illustrates the Taoist principle (which is however hardly necessary), and shows softness and weakness turned hardness and strength. The Taoist critique of militarism is as much a critique of technology as of war. Sharp weapons, "smart weapons* as we might now say, come in for much critical attention, as we have already noticed. Only in corrupt and degenerate states are they displayed or flaunted (p.194, p.164); in deep-green regions smart weapons of state* would not be retained unexhibited. The people will not have them for they mean trouble (p.201); for similar reasons deep-green regions will be free of them. So, it seems, will ideal Taoist regions: "Even if there are arrows and weapons, none will display them* (LT p.238). Much technology, military and other, is excluded under the Taoist edict against violence (a further facet of the military-practices �14 paradox)^ The powerful critique of militarism in the C/wng is coupled with strong opposition to violence. Some of the linkage is evident enough. Militarism as practised represents an ultimate form of state (or party) violence. A basic theme is that violent practices will come to an unnatural end, and accordingly to a non-Taoist end (generalising LT p.176). While force may occur in spectacular, but satisfactory, natural forms, force is duly distinguished from violence. To force the growth of life means ill omen. For the mind to employ the vital force without restraint means violence (LT p. 197). One who follows Tao does not apply dominating force, which usually has had results bringing requital (p.152). Dominating force, like power, is in general castigated, under doctrine of WMwef, no forced actions, no violence. To force natural growth is deviant, destroying harmony. To stop natural growth is deviant. But there is a significant difference between force and violence. To intentionally employ destructive force is to do violence. To so force things is condemned. To remain in harmony with things one does not so force things or practice violence. There is a non-interference principle at work, which also indicates types of non­ interference that are excluded. However Taoism does not always get the distinction between force and violence quite 5 Under contemporary technology and technological arrangements, such as the storage of quantities of oil and nuclear and chemical materials in great cities, wars have assumed new and very destructive dimensions, to the point of being utterly irresponsible. A different approach to technology, as to war, is now mandatory. These are no longer things that can in principle be nicely confined and need not touch parties outside the fray. An important part of ending wars, "winning the war against wars", is removing the technology of war, above all from irresponsible state power. As for which technology to try to jettison and which to try to retain or improve, it is not so difficult to indicate, provided evaluative terminology is not outlawed. What is wanted is technology that is good in its place, what should be excluded is technology that is indifferent or bad or potentially so. Technology to be justified has to do something worthwhile, it has to address identifiable respectable needs. That is why merely indifferent technology is out; there is no virtue in technology for technology's sake, as it is a mere technique. It is because of the crucial evaluative component in choice oLtechnology that appropr^/zg^, itself evaluative, comes closer to encapsulating the criterion^ 3ize, such as smallness, or intermediateness, are not what matter, though modest and not excessive technology are likely to fare better in satisfying appropriateness. In simpler societies, small technology is of course more appropriate; for that is what is good there. From known criteria for what is good these other features for locally appropriate technology can be read off: reliability, esp. in maintenance, functioning well and safely under the expected range of operating conditions (which may be difficult^ ease of repair, capital cgeapness and repair inexpensiveness, environmental^ benignness, and meeting sound social needs. /-C ^7^^7*// / �right. 'Vital force without restraint', intentionally excessive force, is only part of what counts as which is more generally /orcg w/zzc/z vzo/af&y, i.e. transgresses, descrecrates, profanes, injures, outrages, etc. It is thus a negatively connoted force, an evil force in some specified intentional respect. There is a tendency for Taoist commentators, not Taoists, to regard Taoism as condemning all uses, or even occurrences, of force, but this is not so. Rather intentional ill-forcing is what is castigated, what is deviant. Thus Taoism does not exclude a range of defensive practices, which make satisfactory use of natural forces, like letting the machines of war industry stop. Those who would abolish war and its machinery, substituting for it nonwarlike and ideally nonviolent methods, technology, and strategies, have been confronted not merely with much sub-rational abuse but with plenty of criticism and even some paradoxes. Here is a recent paradox concerning war and nonviolence: * War must be abolished. One reason is simply economic. We can no longer afford it, and the opportunity costs and enormous. Along with other extraordinarily wasteful activities, it is an anachronism. * Doing so cannot be accomplished without violence, i.e. in effect, given the types of violence involved, without what amounts to war. According to a fuller version of this premiss, the process of abolishing a war would only be achieved through a revolution so profound that it could not succeed without extensive and extreme violence, amounting to (civil) war. ° But then war cannot be abolished without war. Therefore, war which must be abolished cannot be abolished.^ This "paradox" has been compared with the Liar paradox, but the parallel does not persist far. For this paradox does not involve self-referential features, and is easily broken, as follows. Let the "last war" be not the last standard war but the revolution abolishing war. Then, given that the revolution is successful, war will be abolished therewith, i.e. with that last war. There need be no regress, given again a successful outcome. All the premisses stand intact, but the conclusion, following the 'therefore' is a nonsequitur. However, while the dissolution of the argument is accordingly logically fine, the route is repugnant. Standard pacifism challenges the 6 Brian Medlin, who forcefully propounded this puzzle, set other analogous puzzles alongside it - designed to reveal deep difficulties in contemporary political, and especially alternative, thought. Another puzzle, concerning liberty and repression in the context of capitalism, revolved around the following inconsistent triad: * capitalism must be removed, but liberty retained. * capitalism cannot be removed without repression. * repression is antithetical to liberty. The puzzle is resolved as with the analogous puzzle of abolishing. Let the "last capitalist" action the days of liberty be the repressive but liberating revolution overthrowing capitalism. ; /1 �16 second premiss. and worn/ /zacz/zszn. Although Taoism is strongly opposed to war, and much in favour of peace - and accordingly by prevailing standards a substantially pacz/zc position - it is not (nowhere in the central texts) committed to pacifism in usual senses, for two different reasons: * It is not, by contrast with pacifism, opposed to all types of warfare, for example smart defensive wars. * It eschews deontology in terms of which moral pacifism is commonly stated, for instance through the watershed thesis P2, It is morally wrong to use violence. By contrast with Taoism, deep environmentalism does not avoid deontic claims, and is committed zn prznczp/e to nonviolent technologies and ways and to pacifistic principles. Moreover, certain forms of deep environmentalism are completely committed to pacifism, notably European forms. Is deep green? There is heavy contemporary opposition to pacifism, as there also was to Taoism in the warring times when Taoism was first being promulgated. Many of the central institutions of contemporary life are intricated in coercion, violence and war. The most prominent contemporary institutions, states, are premissed on these elements of damaging force; they claim entitlement to use them widely, and even claim a certain territorial monopoly on their use. As a result they are having constantly to engage in them in attempt to maintain that monopoly. They are certainly the main perpetrators of wars, and of violence. They are indeed inured to wars, are in constant preparation for wars, yet propound dialectial (and normally dishonest and cynical) doctrines of peace through war (for a recent example see the appendix). Unremarkably then, the extensive propagandistic machinery of state has invested heavily in "justificatory" exercises in favour of controlled use, zr^ own use, of destructive force, and. inveighed against pacifism. Because a routine trick in this sophistical repetoire consists in conflating pacifism with extreme, naive and inplausible, forms, an inevitable and important early task commits in unscrambling senses of 'pacifism'. Semantical skulduggery can be thwarted in this way. Pacz/z^nz, as explained by English dictionaries, invariably concerns wars and warfare, and contains two components, negative and, elaborating on that, positive:- The negative component is, in Amauld's word, a/zzz-IVar-z^nz, opposition (in ways to be further specified) to all forms of warfare (see OED). The positive component supplies alternative ways of settling disputes (what it is supposed that wars with some semblance of justification involve), such as negotiation, arbitration,... - and, adding to too narrow dictionary accounts - sanctions, substitutions (e.g. of sporting events, operatic contests, cooperative ventures),.... In brief ^Zazzdard ^acz/z^nz is opposition to all warfare and resolution of potential wars by other nonmilitary means. /, �17 Plainly the oppojzfzon to warfare, like the sanctions and so on, cannot itself be military (using soldiers and other devices of war), on pain of some incoherence. But otherwise the ways of opposition can be many and various: they can certainly be acfzve, as with nonviolent demonstrations, resistance movements, and so forth, and they may also be devious (e.g. turning the forces of war upon themselves so they are neutralised). It quickly becomes evident, then, that some of the dictionaries offer but loaded definitions which, by restricting the negative components, reduce the initial appeal and plausibility of pacifism. Consider the Concz'-ye Ezzg/z^/z definition of the negative component: "the doctrine of non-resistance to hostilities and of total non-co-operation with any form of warfare'. Thereby excluded are forms of pacifism which offer active and plausible alternatives to warfare such as social defence. The Cozzcz^ E/zg/zj/z tends to force pacifism into what the Eng/zs/z Dzcfz'onafy lists as its final item: 'often, with depreciatory implication, the advocacy of peace at any price', 'in any circumstance'. Pacifism can easily resist being forced into these sorts of circumstances: it has many resources, as an extensive series of texts on alternatives to war, such as negotiation non­ violent action and social defence, from Taoism to contemporary environmentalism attest. Academic philosophers have much advanced the semantical strategy of some dictionaries, of rendering pacifism more difficult from the very outset by narrow and biassed definitions. They have stretched the term from its restricted setting of warfare, confined to state and organised gang violence, to cover all forms of violence, from state and interstate to, what is very different, personal and interpersonal violence. Call the resulting considerably stretched notion of pacifism, according to which it is morally wrong to use violence, according to which P2 holds, .yfrefc/z^ /?acz/z.M?z.7 While stretched pacifism certainly includes standard pacifism (unless the notions of war and warfare are tampered with), the converse is very far from being the case. A pacifist is in no way committed to stretched pacifism, which is a much more problematic and difficult position than standard pacifism. There are several, substantially different reasons for this, which will be picked up seriatim. Stretched pacifism, also misleadingly called mora/ pacifism, has looked a very easy critical target to moral philosophers. Many the effusive philosopher who, upon sighting such a target, has charged, whooping such rhetoric as "incoherent", "inconsistent", "insensitive", "fanatical". However, with improved logical technology now available for accommodating and treating moral dilemmas, it is no great feat to resist such attacks, in the fashion of previous investigations (see esp. Al, also MD). A main aim was to demonstrate that stretched pacifism was not so stupid as it was made out to be or appeared to be to these inured to present dominant violent ways. So far from being stupid, it is viable. In future gentler times sketched pacifism 7 In Al this notion was contrasted with standard pacifism as cowigrghgn.yzvg pacifism: ovcrcomprgAe/MAe might have been better. �18 could even be realised for whole communities of creatures (as some genuinely Christian sects envisaged); whence it will finally be seen to be feasible not merely for sages and supermen, and many ordinary women, but much more extensively. The method of philosophical accommodation was through moral dilemmas. The sort of moral dilemma that stretched pacifism can induce derives as follows. On the one side stands the theme P2, Wv, in convenient symbols, for Wrong V-ing, violencing. Now this implies to WB, where B presents a case of of violence. On the other side, particular circumstances develop which lead to W -B, because -B would produce in the circumstances considerable wrong, for instance extensive violence, mass murder, etc. One stock example from the literature concerns calling off the firing squad about to shoot several captives if the pacifist shoots one of them (it is elaborated in Al p.13). Interestingly, another stock example from the literature concerns standard pacifism (it can also be presented in terms of patriotism; for details of both see MD p. 10). Resolution of intractable moral dilemmas is, where it is required, situational. The agent decides in the situation, wif/nn the fix, what to do. There are many ways in which such decision making can proceed, less rational, such as those applying chance or involving bad faith, or more rational, such as those applying consequentialist decision theory (for details see MD, pp.32-9). A decision theory taking account of a// that should be included will not however be purely consequential. It would also take account of relevant motivation. This defence and rehabilitation of moral pacifism has been challenged, in particular by Smith (hereafter JWS). JWS claims the defence offered is a 'failure because it trivializes pacifism" (p. 153 twice). The rehabilitation trivializes pacifism because it entails that pacifism doesn't substantially differ from a form of acf/vw?! which holds that while violence is wrong one is -yowefwtay justified on consequentialist grounds for preferring violent acts, if these acts are lesser evils than any other real alternatives. This is the commonsense position which most people hold - yet - pacifism after all was supposed to be radical moral doctrine - (p.153 rearranged).^ Par? of the criticism is, then, not so much that pacifism is trivialized - JWS "activism"" is hardly trivial - as that pacifism is deflated from a radical position to the commonsense position most people hold (p.154 also). Yet not a shred of evidence is adduced that JWS activism is such a populist position. Available evidence, for example from peace movement:and oppositional opinion polls, suggests the very opposite: that, for instance, most people support state-justified conventional wars with the military violence they incur, and 8 JWS now informs me that he has changed his position. Whether the move effects his criticism, I don't know. �accordingly do not hold that violence is always wrong. From such a commonsense angle, pacifism with its condemnation of conventional wars and the violence they involve remains a radical doctrine. As regards wars and other violence-incurring social authorities, contemporary pacificism is, as previous explained (e.g. Al p.3), a form of activism. Pacifism does not imply utter pacifity, but may actively involve social defence, resistance and so on. However a certain level of misrepresentation enters into the JWS challenge in the details of what forms of activism pacifism may include. That misrepresentation begins in the second clause concerning what is said to be sometimes justified. For the situational procedure where dilemmas arise will not generally be consequential applying a principle of lesser evil. In dilemmatic situations such principles are suspended, and such a principle is in any case unacceptable to moral pacifists. A small amount of violence may be less bad in its consequences than verbal offence, but a principled pacifist will choose the slightly greater evil where other obligations do not exclude it. A more serious distortion occurs in JWS's effort to force procedures in dilemma situations into purely consequentialist form. In fact consequential decision theory was deployed as a only for how to proceed rationally in a situational setting where deontic procedures were suspended (see MD p.38). What was said, still misleadingly retrospective vision reveals, was this: 'what is done is a very consequentialist thing" (Al p.13), nof 'one acts in a consequentialist fashion to do the sufficiently good thing in the circumstances" (JWS p.152). Situationally procedures than those resembling orthodox rational decision making (modified from maximizing to satisizing objectives) may be adopted (MD p.38). Further the orthodox consequentialist theory is inadequate because it leaves out, or tries to reduce to consequences, nonconsequential elements, notably motives. It is not difficult, in principle (in advance of attempted consequentialization of motives), to design situations where motives, such as integrity or maintaining faith, enter to yield outcomes upsetting consequential calculations. More elaborate decision making procedures than those of consequentialism, sometimes at variance with consequentialism, are thus presupposed. A further part of JWS's criticism accordingly goes by the board, the alleged appeal 'to "second best"" consequentialist considerations,... already explicitly condemned" (p.154). What was condemned was stock universal consequentialism, 'that <?n/y consequentialist considerations carry argumentative weight" (quoted on p.152), so undercutting other deontic principles, such as those of pacifism. It was not claimed, what is utterly different, that consequentialist considerations can enter into deliberation and decision making. The conclusion JWS arrives at is therefore substantially astray. After criticising modern moral philosophy for its reliance upon consequentialist modes of thought, it is surprising, and inconsistent, to find ... [reliance] upon such modes of thought to escape logical difficulties raised by moral dilemmas facing ... pacifis[m] (p.152) �20 There is no inconsistency. JWS has confused universal with particular. As well he has wrongly contracted all situational decision making to consequentialist modes. There is a third part to the criticism, that the defence is too easy; the "strategy will allow foe violence to be (perpetrated and) justified to suit the tastes of any real pacifist' (p.153). This another part of the so-called trivialization, this time however rather than populatization, weakening the moral stand against violence. This third contention is premissed on a mistake: that one can "justify on consequentialist grounds any number of violent acts, providing that such acts are lesser evils than other real alternatives facing social agents' (p.153). Moral pacifism offers no such licence; allowing such consequentialism to take over was never part of the position. The slide to such consequentialism is made on the strength of a similarly erroneous example. The potential victim of an aspiring rapist "is supposed to flee or wriggle free if possible. But it is to consequentially justify the use of violence by the woman to prevent herself from being raped' (p.153 italics added). In the example so far described there is no dilemma, and no such easy resort to consequentially "justified' violence. What allows too much violence is the lesser evil JWS assumes is easily consequentially justified; for example that the woman is entitled to inflict, and escalate, violence so long as it remains "a lesser evil than the violence of attempted rape' (p.153). Since she may thereby inflict quite unreasonable damage (esp. if she is a Kung Fu expert), the result is inconsistent with "the basic principle of self-defence' which JWS earlier adduced according to which what is "appropriate, in response is on/y that level of force necessary to defend oneself against the threat' (p.150). There is evidence in JWS's work of some enthusiasm for levels of violence which exceed his "basic principle', his appeal to "lesser evil' generates some instances. The "basic principle', itself fraught with difficulties (cf. the contorted discussion of what weapons are appropriate in response to what attacks, p.150), still exceeds what stretched pacifism would enjoin; for instance, it may not be appropriate to respond with force. But in a technical sense stretched pacifism is compatible with the "basic principle', since it only imposes the upper bound on level of force. As for easiness, moral pacifism is not an easy position to live by, or to justify. Removing objections to pacifism is one thing; solidifying a positive case for it is quite another, and so far hardly conclusive (as Al tried to explain, pp 29-31). Stretched pacifism was advanced, to put it more precisely, as a still viable option. It was not presented as a morally compulsory position, or, for that matter, as one that this defender adhered to or affirmed. To reiterate, while a cumulative case can be made for stetched pacifism as principled non­ violence, that case was not conclusive, and is hard to improve. For, further, some serious difficulties standing in the way of stretched pacifism were assembled, the most important of which derives from the extent of violence apparent in transactions within the natural world. Simply consider the practices of carnivores, essential to their natural way of life. In order to meet their life needs for sustenance, these creatures do, and are often obliged to, engage �21 routinely in violent activity. While it can no doubt be argued, as some vegetarians may do, that the natural order is an immoral order, and that remaining carnivores should be converted to vegetarianism as rapidly as proves possible (in the way domestic dogs are converted to dog biscuits), the difficulties with such proposals are immense. The task envisaged is gigantic, and beyond human capacities - even if it were desirable. For there are millions of species to be somehow converted to proper vegetarianism. Then there are millions of other species to be converted to proper and well regulated contraceptive practices, else their numbers will get out of hand (uncontrollably) with predation removed. Given humans lack of success in limiting their own excessive numbers, such regulation appears entirely remote. Aside however from the practical difficulties, is such a fully vegetarian order, with evolution further derailed, a desirable improvement on the natural order? Is it morally obligatory? It is certainly not obligatory, as alternative systems of morality in harmony with the prevailing natural order are feasible. Nor is it desirable, for (to appeal to such alternative value systems) the natural order is more or less in order as it is. Full vegetarianization would only reduce its value, vastly. More generally, a defensible ethical framework should not, it would be rightly contended, be right out of step with the natural order of other creatures, decently depicted. Decent depiction is important, for some features of the natural order, such as competition, combat and predation, so far from escaping attention, have been grossly exaggerated and exploited. Thus, for instance, the ludicrous picture of nature red in truth and claw, so beloved of descendents of orthodox Victorians and of orthodox economists. However, even under decent ^depiction, the "natural order" is often not benign. That appears to be enough to induce a supervenient moral dilemma for any stretched pacifism which is coupled to a deep ethic (e.g. which does not separate humans out from the natural order) and which bschews the desperate vegetarian route: The natural order is not an immoral order The natural order contains (regular) instances of violence. Therefore, instances of violence are not immoral in apparent defiance of P2 Moreover, there are too many instances of violence, too regularly occurring, for them all to be plausibly shunted into the moral dilemma category (and predatory carnivores face no dilemmas). Raptors that practice violence every week are not immoral (neither are they clearly moral; the category of morality only significantly extends so far). The main trouble lies however with P2 (which needs some finer adjustment, as was alrady indicated in Al). While P2 is alright in context, within a particular, perfectly viable, ethical framework, designed for the usual human round, the convendonal setting for ethical theories, it stands in need of modification outside that setting. It is time to suggest the sort of modification envisaged. Evidently P2 was addressed to moral agents. Which agents? Not to carnivores that o supply their own livelihood, nor really to morally degenerate humans, but to peace-sensitive �22 agents. With that semi-technical form, yet to be characterised, a suitably modified P2 results: MP2. It is morally wrong, for a peace-sensitive agent, to use violence.^ To recover what amounts, in the prevous discussive context, to P2, it suffices to add the proposition that every human agent ought to be peace-sensitive. Much as that proposition has to recommend it, it appears too ethically advanced for many modem humans; it sets too high a moral standard to be taken as a serious cjuic^ to practice. It seems wise to settle presently for something less demanding, such as that every advanced moral agent ought to be peace sensitive. To put essentially the same proposition alternatively: Stretched pacifism (as modified) is supererogatory. While it is perhaps too late to hope for much moral progress in humans, it is pleasant to contemplate alternative futures where what is supererogatory became obligatory, and widely practiced. Richard Sylvan Append?* I began drafting this essay at the time (January 17, midday Australian time) of the American attacks upon Iraq. The optly named Prime Minister Hawke of Australia had just made a statement to the nation-state, announcing (the) war. In this statement there was much talk of peace. There was even - in what was effectively a declaration of war - reiteration of the modem quest for 'a new world order of peace". Peace through war; so it rings out again and again, through the centuries. 'War must be for the sake of peace" (Aristotle p.220). More than two thousand years later, we have fought those wars to end all wars. But it is no use, Hawke solemely pronounced, just fa/Amg aAoaf peace, and thinking about peace; we must work for peace,/ig Ar for it - through war. Impeccable logic? President Bush, supreme commander, convinced us with similar logic, speaking too with many tongues. Of how he 'preferred to think of peace, not war". But now 'only force will prevail", as 'all reasonable efforts to reach a peaceful solution are exhausted". 'What must be done" must be done, or will be anyway. With God on side with the US offensive (as well as on the other side), it will go well. As it was said to have, though it achieved comparatively little that other efforts may not have yielded more satisfactorily, and thought it may now have to followed with another invasion. Nor have we ever managed to glimpse much of what is now supposed, when we are no longer engaged, to come 'out of the horror of war": a 'new world order ... which governs the conflict of nations"; a 'rule of law", not war. How the one, enforcable law, is achieved, unless backed by the the other, is not explained (Medlin's paradox 9 The generalization^ P2, suggested in Al, to cover also the parallel situation of environmental vandalism, can be similarly modified. The anti-vandolence principle becomes^MP2°. It is morally wrong, for a peace- and environmentally-sensitive agent, to use vandolence. �23 hits back). Similarly what we now hear from many militarists, as they rush to war, is that "peace is a great good, war a great evil'. But, for the most part, only the rhetoric has shifted; practice has scarcely changed at all. REFERENCES W.-T. Chan, A 5*oarce 2?oo% on C/zz'ae^e P/zZZo^op/zy, Princeton University Press, 1963; referred to as ST. W.-T. Chan (ed.), T/ze Way a/* Lao Tza(Tao-re C/zZag), Bobbs-Merrill, New York, 1963; referred to as LT. B. Martin, UproorZag War, Freedom press, London, 1984. A. Naess, EcoZogy, coazazaaZry aa<% ZZ/e.yfy^, Cambridge University press, Cambridge UK, 1989. R.A. Rapaport, PZg.y /or r/ze Anc&yfory : rituaLin the ecology of a New Guinea People, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1967. R. Routley, "War and Peace II. On the alleged inconsistency, moral insensitivity and fanaticism of pacifism', DZjca^Zoa papery Za eavZroawzeafaZ p/zZZojop/zy #9, Research School of Social Science, Australian National University, 1983 (also in /apaZry); referred to as Al. R. Routley and V. Plumwood, "Moral dilemmas and the logic of deontic notions', DZ-yca&yZoa papery Za eavZroaazearaZ p/aZo-yopAy #6, Research School of Social Science, Australian National University, 1984 (also in Paracoa^z\yrearLogZc); referred to as MD. R. Routley, "War and Peace I. On the ethics of large-scale nuclear war and nuclear-deterrence and the political fall-out', DZ^ca^Zoa papery Za eavZroawzearaZ p/zZZo^op/zy, #5, Research School Of Social Science, Australian National University, 1984. G. Sharp, 6*acZaZ Power aad PoZZrZcaZ Free&wi, Porter Sargent, Boston, 1980. J.W. Smith, 77ze Woraz^ ar r/ze 7/earr o/T/zZag^ , Public Relations Unit, Flinders University, 1989. R. Sylvan, "War and Peace III, Australia's defence philosophy', 5*ocZaZ P/zZZo^op/zy, for Nuclear Conference, University of Queensland, 1985. R. Sylvan and D. Bennett, "Of Utopias, Tao and Deep Ecology', DZ^ca^Zoa papery Za eavZroaazearaZ p/zZZo^op/zy #19, Research School of Social Science, Australian National University, 1990; referred to as UT. �22 To recover what amounts, in the previous discussive context, to P2, it suffices to add the proposition that every human agent ought to be peace-sensitive. Much as that proposition has to recommend it, it appears too ethically advanced for many modern humans; it sets too high a moral standard to be taken as a serious guide to practice. It seems wise to settle presently for something less demanding, such as that every advanced moral agent ought to be peace sensitive. To put essentially the same proposition alternatively: paci/Ly/H (as modified) is While it is perhaps too late to hope for much moral progress in humans, it is pleasant to contemplate alternative futures where what is supererogatory became obligatory, and widely practiced. Richard Sylvan* I began drafting this essay at the time (January 17, midday Australian time) of the American attacks upon Iraq. The 3ptly named Prime Minister Hawke of Australia had just made a statement to the nation-state, announcing (the) war. In this statement there was much talk of peace. There was even — in what was effectively a declaration of war — reiteration of the modem quest for "a new world order of peace". Peace through war; so it rings out again and again, through the centuries. "War must be for the sake of peace" (Aristotle p.220). More than two thousand years later, we have fought those wars to end all wars. But it is no use, Hawke solemely pronounced, just peace, and thinking about peace; we must work for for it - through war. Impeccable logic? President Bush, supreme commander, convinced us with similar logic, speaking too with many tongues. Of how he 'preferred to think of peace, not war". But now 'only force will prevail", as 'all reasonable efforts to reach a peaceful solution are exhausted". 'What must be done" must be done, or will be anyway. With God on side with the US offensive (as well as on the other side), it will go well. As it was said to have, though it achieved comparatively little that other efforts may not have yielded more satisfactorily, and thought it may now have to followed with another invasion. Nor have we ever managed to glimpse much of what is now supposed, when we are no longer engaged, to come 'out of the horror of war": a 'new world order ... which governs the conflict of nations"; a 'rule of law", not war. How the one, enforcable law, is achieved, unless backed by the the other, is not explained (Medlin s paradox hits back). Similarly what we now hear from many militarists, as they rush to war, is that vandolence. Thank to David Bennett for joint contributions (from UT) and to JWS for opposition (in JWS) �23 'peace is a great good, war a great evil'. But, for the most part, only the rhetoric has shifted; practice has scarcely changed at all. REFERENCES W.-T. Chan, A on C%Zn^.y^ P/zZZo-yopZEy, Princeton University Press, 1963; referred to as ST. W.-T. Chan (ed.), 7%^ Way 0/L00 7za (7ao-z^ C/nng), Bobbs-Merrill, New York, 1963; referred to as LT. B. Martin, Uprooting War, Freedom Press, London, 1984. A. Naess, EcoZogy, co/wmonZy an%Z ZZ/f^ZyZ^, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge UK, 1989. R.A. Rapaport, PZg^ybr z/^^ Anc^^ror^ : rZzaaZ Zn Z/^^ ^coZogy o/ a ZV^w GnZn^a P^opZ^, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1967. R. Routley, 'War and Peace II. On the alleged inconsistency, moral insensitivity and fanaticism of pacifism', DZ^cn^Zon papery Zn ^nvZronm^nfaZ p/zZZo-yop/zy #9, Research School of Social Science, Australian National University, 1983 (also in /npaZry); referred to as Al. R. Routley and V. Plumwood, 'Moral dilemmas and the logic of deontic notions', DZ-yca-MZoK papery Zn ^nvZronw^HZaZ p/nZo-yopAy #6, Research School of Social Science, Australian National University, 1984 (also in Paraco/MZ-yZ^/iZ LfgZc); referred to as MD. R. Routley, 'War and Peace I. On the ethics of large-scale nuclear war and nuclear-deterrence and the political fall-out', DZ-ycas-yZon papers Zn ^nvZron/M^nZaZp/zZZo^op/zy, #5, Research School Of Social Science, Australian National University, 1984. G. Sharp, &?cZ%Z Potter aA!^Z PoZZzZcaZ Fr^fJow, Porter Sargent, Boston, 1980. J.W. Smith, 7%^ Wor^ty %Z z/z^ 7/^arZ p/77iZag^ , Public Relations Unit, Flinders University, 1989. R. Sylvan, 'War and Peace III, Australia's defence philosophy', 5*ocZ#Z P%ZZo.yopZ!y, for Nuclear Conference, University of Queensland, 1985. R. Sylvan and D. Bennett, 'Of Utopias, Tao and Deep Ecology', DZ^ca^-yZan papers Zn ^HvZronm^nZaZ p/uZo-yop^y #19, Research School of Social Science, Australian National University, 1990; referred to as UT. �23 'peace is a great good, war a great evil'. But, for the most part, only the rhetoric has shifted; practice has scarcely changed at all. REFERENCES W.-T. Chan, A 6*az/rce Z3aa& on C/zinese P/ziZasap/zy, Princeton University Press, 1963; referred to as ST. W.-T. Chan (ed.), 77ze Way a/Eaa 7za (7aa-te C/zing), Bobbs-Merrill, New York, 1963; referred to as LT. B. Martin, (/proofing War, Freedom Press, London, 1984. A. Naess, Eco/ogy, canznznnify aneZ Zi/esfyZe, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge UK, 1989. R.A. Rapaport, Pigs^ar r/ze Ancesfars : rifzzaZ in f/ze ecaZagy a/a Aew Gzzinea PeapZe, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1967. R. Routley, 'War and Peace II. On the alleged inconsistency, moral insensitivity and fanaticism of pacifism', Discassian papery in enviranznenfaZ p/ziZasap/zy #9, Research School of Social Science, Australian National University, 1983 (also in /n^aizy); referred to as Al. R. Routley and V. Plumwood, 'Moral dilemmas and the logic of deontic notions', Discassian papers in enviranzzzenfaZ p/tiZo.yop/ty #6, Research School of Social Science, Australian National University, 1984 (also in Paracon.yi.y^nf Lagic); referred to as MD. R. Routley, 'War and Peace I. On the ethics of large-scale nuclear war and nuclear-deterrence and the political fall-out', Discassian papers in enviranznenfaZp/ziZasap/zy, #5, Research School Of Social Science, Australian National University, 1984. G. Sharp, .SaciaZ Patter anJ PaZificaZ FreeJazn, Porter Sargent, Boston, 1980. J.W. Smith, 77ze Warzzzs af f/ze Pfearf a/77zings, Public Relations Unit, Flinders University, 1989, h 7^)5, R. Sylvan, War and Peace IIL Australian defence philosophy', P/ziZasap/zy 3 Zw) R. Sylvan and D. Bennett, 'Of Utopias, Tao and Deep Ecology', Discassian papers in enviranznenfaZ p/ziZasap/zy #19, Research School of Social Science, Australian National University, 1990; referred to as UT. /-//TirZcVf Z^9/ � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Draft Papers Description An account of the resource Sylvan's literary executor encountered an archive in which “all his projects were current", since manuscripts were undated and unattributed. Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document WAR AND PEACE IV: TAO AND DEEP-GREEN Taoism and deep-green environmental theory, although closely aligned on very many issues, diverge over war. For Taoism, by contrast for instance with Buddhism, is not a pacific doctrine, but is committed to skilful defensive militarism. While it does not espouse a fortress mentality, Taoism certainly condones limited defensive military operations for specific purposes, a sort of guerilla warfare. By contrast, deep-green theory, while acknowledging the role of organised social defence, stands opposed to professional militarism, and thereby to military defence, and is committed to a principled pacifism. Conveniently a route through Taoism, philosophically fascinating in its own right, will lead us to problems of pacifism and towards deep-green theory. 7. Fca/ar^y o/ % Tao/s/ q/ war an<? War did not receive a favourable press in ancient Chinese philosophy. Generally aggression and war were to be avoided. Even Confucius imposed very demanding conditions: for example, 'when good men have instructed the people [in morals, agriculture, military tactics] for seven years, they way be allowed to bear arms/ Tf a ruler ... does not set himself right, even his commands will not be obeyed' (SB p.41, italics added). Mo Tzu went much further than Confucius, roundly condemning war - on utilitarian grounds, that war yields no net benefit at any level (SB p.227). What is more, he backed his heavy condemnation practically (unlike some conspicuous contemporary theoretical utilitarians); 'he did not hesitate to walk for ten days and ten nights in an effort to dissuade a ruler from making war' (SB p.212). But none, it is said, went as far, in a detailed and sophisticated criticism of war, as Lao Tzu; 'none has condemned war more strongly than Lao Tzu'. '[T]he opposition of Taoism to the use of force is well-known, and the most bitter attack on militarism if found in the Lao 7za' (Chan, p.154, p.17.) But, after that splendid build-up, the text is slightly disappointing. Lao Tzu does not assert outright that war is an abomination, or even roundly condemn it. His critique of war, militarism, and military technology, is subtle and oblique, and, on the surface, far distanced from pacifism. For he does not recommend an end to war - in that genuine Taoists, those who possess Tao, will never participate in them - but expects wars to continue as tmavoi<7a&/e gvfAy. Worse, he even goes so far as to outline proper attitudes to war and conduct in war, and indeed to suggest military techniques and strategies, some of which look decidedly devious. Among the classical works of Taoism, we focus on the Lao 7za because, by contrast with other works, a remarkable component of that book is devoted to war and militarism. The apparent deviousness of the tactics Lao Tzu allocates serves to highlight what has been seen as 'the most troublesome element' in his philosophy (Chan p.17) - not so much however because they concern military operations, but because they are taken to apply much 2 more widely, 'to life in general' (p.17). But why should military activity obtain some special dispensation? Why should what is no? tolerated more generally be exonerated there? But given that Taoism has here the virtue of consistency (i.e. uniformity on principles) and of universalizability, that simply leaves * PMzz/ay/br explaining to be done. and wars as M/tavafda&Ze evf/s There are fwa puzzles here in Taoism rather than one. There is the zm/ffary-pracac^s paradox, and, varying and generalising on that, there are /Z/g-prac^c^s paradoxes. The special paradox is generated by the following incompatible elements: on the one side, 'the most bitter attack on militarism', the well-known opposition of Taoism to the use of force (p.17) and to the possession and use of smart military weapons and technology - implying that war is far from all tight - and on the other, advocacy of certain (devious) military tactics, outlines of (deceitful) conduct in war, and so on - implying that war is all right after all. A straightforward generalisation of this paradox would look at other morally-sensitive parts of life, where some practice was strongly condemned yet engaged in (for many examples, see the dilemmas assembled in MD). But the variation of concern to Chan and the neo-Confucians concerns the conjunction of upright with devious practices in life, in particular in the life of the sage. For a Taoist sage is presumed to lead an upright straightforward life, yet appears to engage in devious and even deceitful practices incompatible with such a life-style. Call this the 7%oLyf-ZZ/&y?y/e paradox. Evidently a good deal of explaining is required, as to how Taoism can coA^nfZy take the positions it appears to presume, both on war and peace, and on life more generally. A desirable preliminary would seem to be a little investigation of what position taken, especially on war and militarism. One key pasage runs: Fine weapons are instruments of evil Weapons are instruments of evil, not the instruments of a good ruler. When he uses them unavoidably, he regards calm restraint as the best principle Even when he is victorious, he does not regard it as praiseworthy, For to praise victory is to delight in the slaughter of men. He who delights in the slaughter of men will not succeed in the empire. ... For a victory, let us observe the occasion with funeral-ceremonies (LT p.154). Wars, which involve the use of weapons, instruments of evil, are accordingly themselves evil. They are also evil because they involve the slaughter of men. But they are also sometimes unavoidable (also p.152). Therefore such wars are unavoidable evils. Such discourse, obtained by almost immediate inference from the passage, is within the standard orbit of dilemma talk. But Taoism lacks, through deliberately eschewing deontic talk, the discourse which enables direct expression of such dilemmas, or even direct condemnation of wars or cleaver weapons. Instead the points are made by what the possesser of Tao 3 does, how the good ruler conducts himself, or by awa/ogy, of victory in war with death. Unavoidable evils are the very stuff of deontic dilemmas (though many theories, underpinned by shonky logic, lack the resources for representing this stuff properly). Where something is unavoidably evil, it is bof/i because evil, also no? doing it is excusable, because it is unavoidable. So, given such an argument (which has its weaknesses), an unavoidable evil is a genuinely dilemmatic object with inconsistent features. Certain wars have looked, since ancient times, like such dilemmatic objects. Revealingly, Chan tries to explain that "most troublesome element* in Taoism, the military-practice paradox, through the following exercise in lateral thinking: It can ... be argued that Lao Tzu uses warfare to illustrate his principles of taking no action and weakness because warfare is among the most dynamic and critical of human experiences, just as the Indian classic, the chooses fighting as the theme on which to discuss the terrible dilemma whether one should fulfil his duty, as in the case of a soldier, and kill, or should fail in his duty and refrain irom killing (p. 17). 'Just as*? The Indian classic prevents a classic moral dilemma, a dilemma represented in contemporary philosophy (following its rediscovery by Sartre), where there are incompatible duties: the duty to kill, because of one's role as a soldier, and the duty not to kill, because of one's human condition, and the supervenient dilemma of failing in and fulfilling one's duties. These dilemmas for an individual (male, as it then was) are replicated in dilemmas regarding war for group institutions: at bottom, the obligation to engage in war (for one set of compelling reasons) as contraposed with the obligation not to engage in war (for another, perhaps overlapping, set of reasons). A theory of moral dilemmas (as worked out for example in MD) is crucial for an adequate treatment of major issues in war and peace, especially (as will become evident) for a viable strong pacifism. But Taoism, eschewing deontic discourse, lacks the apparatus to state or develop moral dilemmas. Hence it is logically excluded from giving a full or adequate account of what is going on conceptually. One of the philosophically fascinating feature of Taoism is the fashion in which it manages to avoid deontic discourse, and to substitute for direct deontic discourse or improvise circumlocutions when deontic discourse would otherwise appear inevitable (cf. UT bn examples). But there are costs. One is inability to display the mechanism of deontic dilemmas, or to show what reasons and argument lie behind Taoist prounouncements and conclusions (the shortage of Taoism on argument is another philosophically conspicious feature, observed in UT). As conceptual apparatus for analysizing moral dilemmas is missing, most of the machinery involved has to be passed over. Only the outcomes, as Taoism sees them, are presented, as if from a black box. Taoism blacks out the story on deontic dilemmas that deep-green theory can tell, as the following diagram tries to show: 4 Diagrams . C/%zr%Kg "r&w/v^". procawmg Dggp-grgg/Y c/Mrr Arguments to incompatible prescriptions Processing of dilemma, directive situational procedures output CorrasppMJing 7%<9i\f c/M!rr: Black directive Box output input It is evident that Taoism can be information can be put into the Black Box rendering it less opaque. That extension can be made so as to conform to deep-green theory, i.e. so that the extended Taoist chart, a neo-Daoist chart, looks like the deep-green one. That is indeed essentially how neo-Daoism get characterised, in terms of conformity of the extension to deep ecological theory (see UT). We are now placed to explain how to dissolve, or at least neutralize, the paradoxes deriving from repudiation of militarism, an awkwardly qualified repudiation in the case of Taoism. In a significant sense there is no resolving of genuine deontic dilemmas. The principles delineating the fix may stand, incompatible, signalling the persisting suboptimality (or better, sublimenality) of the dilemmatic situation. Where there is a dilemma, involved parties should try to do well enough in the sublimenal circumstances (for a much fuller account, see MD). Thus where there is a war, itself a non-Taoist process, engaged or caught up Taoists will not abandon Taoism. Taoist methods will be applied, Taoist strategies pursued. So much for theoretical representation and (non-)resolution of life-practices and other dilemmas, details of which are readily elaborated in deep-green extensi^s of Taoism. A prior substantive issue is whether dilemmas always are generated: not whether wars are evil (typically they are, an issue we shall come to), but whether wars are unavoidable. Analysis of wars does not bear that familiar claim out decisively. Many wars could have been avoided, through conciliation, negotiation, restraint, etc., and no worse results apparently obtained, through sanctions, exchange, trade, etc. Through a typology of wars (coming up) that conjecture can be given some substance. Consider, for instance, what would be walk-overs. Then there is little point in making a military response. So war can be avoided. Certainly an occupation, to be met in a different way, may still occur. And so on, perhaps, for various other types of war. But, more generally, try this:- 5 Every war involves an aggressor, who makes an aggressive move. Such an aggressor could always avoid that move, taking a different (or a do-nothing) course of action. Therefore, every war can be avoided. No war is entirely unavoidable. Setting aside determinism (which renders aZZ actual wars along with all other events unavoidable), it could be argued that a war sometimes simply boils up, without an aggressor, an intensification of a conflagatory situation. There are grounds for scepticism regarding such examples; for such intensification can only occur if provocative military moves are made, for instance troops are stationed in provocative or risky positions. The presumption that certain wars are unavoidable typically derives from a one-sided perspective on war, a defender's perspective. A defender has no option, so it is routinely averred, but to respond to a determined aggressor. Even if that should be so sometimes, when there is no running away or going underground, it does not establish that such a war is unavoidable; for it neglects the role of the aggressor. By a smarter formulation, relevant features of unavoidability can be captured. Although wars may not be unavoidable, defensive action in wars that have been initiated may be unavoidable. At least such action may be unavoidable if unacceptably high costs (death, enslavement, etc.) are not to be avoided. Thereupon another highly relevant feature emerges: the linkage of avoidability to costs. For whether an action is unavoidable then depends upon what costs a party is prepared to incur before and when insisting on action: but this appears entirely unacceptable. How can what is "unavoidable" cease to be so when some further costs are absorbed? However with basics like survival, a certain liberty, and so on, we do reach such bounds. An important (ype of unavoidability. We also reach scenarios, unavailable to Lao Tzu but kindly brought within range by modem technology, which may appear to justify aggressive strikes. State Z, while not an aggressor, is carrying out practices which will impose unacceptably high costs upon peoples of other states and implacably refuses to desist. It could, for example, be poisoning air or water flowing to other states. But",to make the case vivid, let us suppose that state Z is constructing, for reasons Zeders find convincing (they are committed to a faith which depicts all humans as incorrigible sinners and unworthy of life), an effective doomsday machine. Would an (aggressive) preemptory strike designed to disable or destroy the machine be unavoidable?* In a sense, No; in another Yes. For different modalities can operate. Physically outsiders need to do nothing, but watch Zeders go about their zealous work. But deontically they are under heavy moral pressure, because of the costs of standing by idly: if the human race is worth anything very substantial, then they are obliged to act, action is deontically 1 Whether it would be justifiable, or just, are separate issues. But it is evident enought that such scenarios further damage the obsolescent idea of war. For, according to received doctrine, a just war is defensive. (How such a war can be fought at all is another matter; coherence requires relativization to 'just warybr party d'.) 6 unavoidable. Here is a situation where a proposed reduction of deontic logic proves illuminating. Obligation is explicated through not implying, or necessitating, the sanction, i.e. excessive ethical costs such as extermination. Let us explain deontic unavoidability analogously: an action is so unavoidable if not undertaking it would result in excessive ethical costs. Then i/* it can be established that there is no other way than a military strike, an act of war, to ensure that the Zeders desist (and certainly we can envisage scenarios like that), then that is deontically unavoidable. It is also for those committed to, or inclined towards pacifism; and it is, for them at least, but paradoxically justifiable, as the negation is also justifiable, on pacific grounds. Scenarios like that sketched, that appear to render certain wars deontically unavoidable require but little or no elaboration to render them evil. Evil indeed is such a standard feature of standard wars that at least its great presence call for little supporting evidence. But it has taken to vast stretch of human history to reach this general point of recognition. The manifold evils of war Lao Tzu very early recognised and emphasized: Wherever armies are stationed, briars and thorns grow. Great wars are always followed by famines (p.152). And nowadays followed by great tides of refugees. This passage includes not only recognition of the widely-observed socio-environmental consequences of war, but, more striking, very early recognition of the severe environmental impact of military forces. That critique is not however developed in Taoism.^ Only recently has it been pushed substantially further. And only recently could a new, most significant twist occur, the merging of resource security, long a military objective, with environmental security. The appalling idea has recently been floated that the military, in need of new work and roles with the apparent warming of Wept-East relations and cooling of the Cold War, should exchange usual military illness for meddling in environmental matters: regulation and policing - of environmental resources, ensurance of environmental security of powerful states, and similar. This is a bit like reassigning those imprisoned for child abuse to managing kindergartens; for consider the impressive military record of environmental vandalism. What the military is alleged to offer is a structure appropriate and available for handling such matters. But, to the contrary, it is precisely the sort of hierarchical, authoritarian expensive structure that should be wound down and up as soon as the opportunity appears, as (briefly) now, rather than being retained and shockingly reoriented (as a state-serving "Greenwar"). But a bridge to deep-green theory can be made through neo-Daoism, an updating of Taoism in confirmity with deep ecology (which however is somewhat thin and threadbare on war; for what there is so far, see Naess p.160). On neo-Daoism, see UT. ; 7 2. On divergence of deej?-green fron: Taoisn!. Having arrived, by better or worse arguments, at the conclusion that wars, though generally evil, may be sometimes unavoidable, it is evidently important to say something about how they - those of the theoretical residue - are to be conducted. By appropriate conduct the damage they do may be reduced; also the conduct should be appropriate to the funereal nature of wars (to exceed Taoist resources for stating this sort of point). It is at this stage that deep­ green theory begins to diverge from Taoism. In further explaining the Taoist and deep-green critiques of war, and diverting objections to them, a roMg/t and preliminary ryp<?/<9gy of wars is important. It is also of passing interest in its own philosophical right. War, according to English Dictionaries, is a 'contest carried on by force of arms, typically between nations or states'. More exactly, war is a gawc - in the generous technical sense of game-theory, with players, rules, goals, strategies, and so on carried on in significant part by military means, normally between states or substates. Call the contestants, (warring) parfzay. They typically represent of course larger populations. The set­ up between parties resembles the arrangements of players in game theory. There are several analogical extensions of the term war to cover games where one of the parties is an object, construed as hostile (an enemy of the state), such as Crime, Drugs, Poverty or Nature. These we can set aside as a/za/ogfca/ wars. Of course wars form only a part of military activities. Military interests and objectives have always stretched significantly further than war, to include surveillence and security, easily extended to resource security, environmental security and life­ style security, and beyond that to political stability and other political matters. Evidently military ambitions have far over-extended themselves in bagging such democratic concerns. An anarchist solution to the whole problem of war, which some have seen Taoism as reaching towards, is immediate: eliminate the source of war, -yfafe.y. Unfortunately it is not quite that simple (and that's not simple). For wars can also occur between nations, cultures, races or tribes (which are not such artifices as states, and not so readily or desirably abolished), between inhabited regions, and between factions within states (thus civil wars) or, perhaps by extension, between factions within other social structures (thus, for instance, gang wars). But undoubtedly eliminating states and aspiring states would abolish most wars and virtually all the worst wars. While "nonviolent wars" are excluded by definition, by virtue of 'force of arms', token wars, limited wars, and so on, are not: for instance, wars fought by small armed teams representing competing sides (cf. medieval and science fiction war games). As wars are hemmed in by conventions and agreed rules, there is no reason in principle why they should not be reduced to two person contests, fought under strict rules like boxing or gladiatorial contents. But in modern times wars have never taken such sensible forms, but have been much larger affairs, making heavy (though fortunately restricted) use of latest technology. Let us distinguish such wars as wars. They have, directly or indirectly (for the 8 technology may be bought or bartered), a heavy research and development support structure (indeed the bulk of contemporary science is devoted - misdirected - in one way or another to this effort). Among wars, an important distinction is that between and wars. An offensive war is one which ventures off a given party's territory or recognised pad, "invading" that of another party or parties; correlatively defensive parties, if they have not also invaded. Force projection typifies offensive practice. Plainly, offensiveness and defensiveness are not strictly features of a war, but of parties to a war. In a two-party war, while both parties can easily act offensively, the possibility of both parties proceeding defensively is excluded, unless they share territory. (Even then issues may arise as to which party, if any, was the aggray-yor, which started it, was responsible for starting it, and so on.) Thus mutually defensive wars between contemporary states are impossible (but would be possible if states shared territory, e.g. if Eire and Britain shared the territory of Northern Ireland). Tao-accredited wars were defensive wars, never wars aiming at domination: last-resort wars, in which no pride was taken (LT p. 152)3, The pretence that offensive wars are defensive is widespread, and reflected in the subterfuge that departments or ministries of war are those of defence, security or whatever. (If they really were what they purport to be, we should be well on the way to an end to war.) Offensive practices are rendered defensive ones by shabby redefinitional strategems, such as redefining "defensive* to include defence of ideals like democracy or liberty, infringed (or allegedly infringed) on territories abroad, or to include ""defence** of a third party or place (whence every offensive war is ""defensive**). In the present war in which part of Arabia is engulfed (February 1991), one party claims to be defending what really was (or should be) part of its territory, namely Kuwait, another party to be defending (what Kuwait did not enjoy) democracy. It is a doubly offensive war presented in this guise as jointly defensive. Aggressive wars are waged for a variety of reasons, but usually for resources or access to resources or markets, a matter often disguised by appeal to ideology (thus a war for oil is represented as a war of liberation). But there are other reasons than narrowly economic ones, such as religion (as with crusades), power and aggrandisement (as in building an empire), and so on. Nor are those reasons necessarily far separated; Marxist and market capitalism, for 3 There is one line in LT that way suggest that attack was sometimes justifiable, namely Tor deep love helps one to win in the case of attack' (p.219). But how can c<?wpa.y.Hon be appropriate unless this attack is wif/un a defensive setting, a larger context of unavoidability or such like. A passage shortly below confirms this interpretation: I dare not take the offensive but I take the defensive: I dare not advance an inch but I retreat a foot (p.222). These are advances and attacks within a defensive setting. 9 example, exhibit many of the features of religion. The economic reasons for war appear to have become much more complex with the advent of an integrated world economy. At the same time many of the independent reasons for economic wars are now obsolete. For to powerful states accrue the advantages of war without war. At least most of the former economic advantages of war can be obtained without expensive wars, through trade, institution of economic dependence, etc. Small medieval wars were sometimes instituted for the collection of neighbouring riches and booty, a kind of piracy meeting conditions of war. "Small" contemporary wars can be waged for a remarkable mix of political-economy ends: to establish a regime favourable to economic penetration and profit repatriation, to subjugate markets and to remove competition, to boost a sagging weapons economy by using up old stocks and also testing new equipment, to restart a depressed economy, and so on. Such wars, along with the economic aims which motivate them, are in effect heavily castigated by Lao Tzu: When Tao prevails in the world, galloping horses are turned back to fertilize (the fields ...). When Tao does not prevail in the world, war horses thrive in the suburbs. There is no calamity greater than lavish desires. (LT p.181). But it does exceed evidential warrant to claim that Tao is not only sufficient, but for cessation of such practices. The practice of regularly stimulating complex military-saturated economies through war is reminiscent of older, much ridiculed practices in simpler societies. They now ridicule the Tsembaga, who proceeded to destroy much of their surplus product by going to war every 5-15 years (cf Rapaport). But they do not similarly ridicule the most powerful nation on the Earth, the USA, which proceeds to write off a colossal amount of surplus in war every 10-20 years -the (pulf war liquidated some ^1.7 billion per day). Taoists would. For ridicule was a favoured method, an important rhetorical strategem, and war and its idiocy were favourite targets. Some classification of defensive wars is also important, for various reasons: reducing and abolishing wars, their costs and damage, restructuring societies away from war and military practices, and, not least, for appreciating Taoism. A main distinction is between * conventional defence, maintained by armies of armed soldiers, many of them professionals, and * social defence, where there are no such armies or but fragments of them, and defence is carried out through social networks of a significant part of society.4 It is here that Taoism and deep-green theory part company. Under Taoism, the state wz'Z/ 4 Details of social defence are presented in Sharp and in Martin. 10 have a standing army, but a defensive army operating by strange, surprise tactics (p.201). No doubt defensive wars are to remain last resort action. Nonetheless the state will operate in secrecy, in a way incompatible with decentralised defence; people will be kept in the dark about smart weapons of the state; and they too will be surprised, along with presumed enemies of the state. By contrast, under deep-green theory, there should be no hidden smart weapons of state; information would flow more freely and not be hidden from the people (who should retain influence in informed decision making). Under deep-green, standing armies, and more generally military organisation, will be wound down altogether. Taoism should have pushed its searching criticism further. For military objectives, easily acquired by standing armies with time on their hands, are frequently incompatible with Taoism. For example, Taoism is opposed to domination (LT p.152), whereas military operations frequently seek or involve domination; and military structure is invariably hierarchical and authoritarian. Taoism aims for self-regulation, wherever feasible (cf. p.201); so does deep­ green theory, which is one reasons why it aims to dispose of standing armies, as an important preliminary to the withering away of states themselves (military forces being major props of state control and power, and often maintained primarily for internal state security). Taoism has no project for ending the era of wars; deep-green theory does. That project involves an elimination of standing armies, too often poised for fighting or political interference. A recommended route to war consists in progressive scaling down: reduction of the means and manpower. The initial stages are well-known, and include * elimination of nuclear, biological and chemical weaponry, and * force reduction. It can hardly be pretended that the Earth's states have managed to proceed very far on even this complex of stages. The next stage consists in * contraction to defensive capacities only, and the Anal stage consists in * elimination of remaining military defensive forces, and adoption, so far as required, of social defence practices. The complete route thus involves complete demilitarisation. Reasons why deep-green aims to proceed the /%// distance are readily grasped by considering the environmental shallowness of an otherwise cogent traditional case for the sharp curtailment of wars and militarism. The traditional Western case against wars has been primarily along two dimensions: social and moral. Wars are highly disruptive of the social fabric; wars may be unjust. From these joint features, it was argued that wars should be a matter of last resort, to be fought to ensure peace. It was argued further that only just wars should be fought. Just wars were rare objects. But as there was little evidence of the decline and fall of wars, much effort was expended, more practically and unsuccessfully, upon endeavouring to improve the calibre of wars, and more theoretically, upon trying to characterize war satisfactorily, or rather to bend the nation in an effort to approximate the gory unjust facts. Progress was long hindered, furthermore, because there was always a rival positive 11 perspective on wars, which encouraged the exaltation of wars and military feats. It also facilitated the transfer of the favourable image of war to other problem areas, whence the long and apparently successful war against nature (but the short-term successes are turning into long-term problems), the short and unsuccessful war against poverty, and so on. Behind all this is the complex idea of war as rejuvenating, even cleansing, like fire; of war as heroic, and glorious, of war as the supreme testing ground of men. These pictures of war - finally shattered by the first World War (where even the poets began to tell of horrors and atrocities) and subsequent technological wars - though no longer in assendency, have by no means vanished. The notion of war as rejuvenating a flagging economy persists, along with the practice of keeping capitalism running smoothly by integrating substantial military components into the industrial engine. With the development of highly technological wars - the celebrated development of the dirty industrial age is substantially military - the traditional negative case has grown in strength. Wars have become much more damaging, with the potential for much more that is significantly worse, and the possibility of a just war has correspondingly contracted, virtually to zero. The opposition to war has likewise grown, but more than correspondingly with the rise of women in social and political influence. Wars have almost always and everywhere been Men's affairs; likewise conquest. Deep-green theory accepts much of the traditional negative case, but would further strengthen it. For example, the stricture against unjust wars, as out and out immoral, can be strengthened, through the following syllogism: All wars should be fully just wars. Modem wars cannot be fully just wars. Therefore, there should be no modern wars. A fully just war is not merely a just war, but a war those just character can be reliably forecast in advance. A modem war is of course a war that deploys modem technology, at least that available this century. The evidential basis for the second premiss derives from much information that collateral damage, damage to innocent bystanders and involved citizens is always likely and cannot be excluded. Such wars are always liable to violate uncontroversial requirements for a just war, even if they are purely "conventional" wars, not throwing radiation or chemical or biological weapons around. From a contemporary viewpoint the traditional doctrine of a just war, really of a just war, is seriously out of date. The reasons for this reach wider than the new features introduced by modem technological wars and the character of modem civilization, with its giant cities littered with dangerous and vulnerable military targets. They have also to do with the chauvinism of the justice proposed, which is shallow human justice, not natural or environmental justice. There is no consideration of justice to other creatures or to the Earth (cf thlaess p.160). Two troubles are really intertwined here: conceptual difficulties with too narrow 12 a notion of justice, and ideological difficulties with too narrow a vision of what is an object of value, of what counts. The deep-green case against war adds to the traditional case a further dimension, neglected until very recently: the environmental dimension. It has suddenly been seen that wars are typically environmental atrocities. Earlier, of course, environments were simply backgrounds, backdrops in paintings and plays, to the real drama. Contemporary technological wars tend to be not merely social tragedies but environmental ones as well. There is a doctrine of just war, but it is a human chauvinistic affair. There is no similarly developed doctrine of an eco/ogica/Zy son/M? war, a deep ecological war. Unless any such war were literally different from modern wars, that is from contemporary technological wars, it would overstep permitted bounds. For such wars are characteristically ecological disasters. Hardened military people, desensitized by a rigorous unethical training, feel even less compunction about degrading or destroying environments or members of other species than they do of maiming or killing civilians through "collateral" activity. Matching the no-just-war syllogism is a no-sound-war syllogism: All wars should be environmentally sound wars. Modem wars cannot be environmentally sound. Therefore, there should be no modern wars. The argument for the second premiss has of course to be different. It looks to the information accumulating on what wars do to natural and built environments. The Vietnam and Gulf wars both inflicted immense damage on natural environments or what was left of them. The environmental effects of war are not confined to direct and collateral damage. There are indirect effects also. Thus, for instance, war also supplied the mechanism of, and the technology for, modem environmental destruction: explosives, bulldozers from tanks, etc. As well, training for war and engagement in war have much fostered, along with attitudes that make for social callousness or ruthlessness, those that contribute to environmental insensitivity and cruelty. 3. PuzzZes Tao/sf s/ra/egy anJ f/s endues o/ fec/tnoZogy an*/ woZence Tt is surprising how much of the Lao Tza is devoted to military strategy'. Which strategies? Surprise, above all. But why such strategies? 'Do they not contradict the Taoists' strong opposition to the use of force' (Chan p.222), the implied commitment to quietism? Briefly, Taoism is not committed to quietism, and while certainly antagonistic to violence, does not oppose certain uses of force (only really ///-forcing, as will be explained). Even so, the emphasis on military strategy remains puzzling. The strategies, many of them relevant to social defence, include * * not 'making light of the enemy' (p.222) and nonvisibility (p.201). The defensive strategy involves guerilla tactics: 13 marching without formation, holding weapons without seeming to have them, confronting enemies without seeming to meet them (p.222). But even in times of peace, "smart weapons of the state should not be displayed to the people* (p.164). Such recommendations helped to fuel the charge of deviousness lodged against Lao Tzu. But look at part of the reason for concealing smart weapons: "The more smart weapons the people have, the more troubled the state will be* (p.201). Smart weapons are carried in corrupt states, where the rich engage in conspicuous consumption and the people are suppressed, not where Tao is practiced (LT p. 194). * advance from weaATt&M, flexibility but firmness. Weakness is the principle of life and will overcome strength (LT p.164, p.233). * coolness and noncompetition (LT p.233, p.164). Like these, most of the general strategies are standard Taoist practices simply applied to military conduct. For these standard practices the charge of deviousness looks feeble. The response applies more generally to other allegedly devious political strategies. For the strategies are but application of Taoist principles and techniques to warfare, politics and elsewhere. Nothing excludes application of these techniques to what are accounted, in general, unnecessary evils (which must sometimes, on other Taoist grounds, be countered). Nor, to meet the main criticism, need any deceit or deviousness be involved; nor is it. In particular, the legalist tactic, "In order to grasp, it is necessary first to give* (LT p.164), is cited as invoking "an element of deceit* "undeniably*, and "worse* it is "morally questionable* (Chan p.17). But in order for me to grasp your hand in a normal handshake, it is necessary first for me to give my hand. There is no deceit here, nothing morally questionable. All the tactics permit of benign construals, of a Taoist kind. Consider, for instance, "In order to contract, it is necessary first to expand* (LT p.164). In order to bend a copper pipe to the intended angle, it is better to bend it first a little further than required. The transformation of water to ice (both favoured natural items for symbolic purposes: natural processes which may look devious!) neatly illustrates the Taoist principle (which is however hardly necessary), and shows softness and weakness turned hardness and strength. The Taoist critique of militarism is as much a critique of technology as of war. Sharp weapons, "smart weapons* as we might now say, come in for much critical attention, as we have already noticed. Only in corrupt and degenerate states are they displayed or flaunted (p.194, p.164); in deep-green regions smart weapons of state* would not be retained unexhibited. The people will not have them for they mean trouble (p.201); for similar reasons deep-green regions will be free of them. So, it seems, will ideal Taoist regions: "Even if there are arrows and weapons, none will display them* (LT p.238). Much technology, military and other, is excluded under the Taoist edict against violence (a further facet of the military-practices 14 paradox)^ The powerful critique of militarism in the C/wng is coupled with strong opposition to violence. Some of the linkage is evident enough. Militarism as practised represents an ultimate form of state (or party) violence. A basic theme is that violent practices will come to an unnatural end, and accordingly to a non-Taoist end (generalising LT p.176). While force may occur in spectacular, but satisfactory, natural forms, force is duly distinguished from violence. To force the growth of life means ill omen. For the mind to employ the vital force without restraint means violence (LT p. 197). One who follows Tao does not apply dominating force, which usually has had results bringing requital (p.152). Dominating force, like power, is in general castigated, under doctrine of WMwef, no forced actions, no violence. To force natural growth is deviant, destroying harmony. To stop natural growth is deviant. But there is a significant difference between force and violence. To intentionally employ destructive force is to do violence. To so force things is condemned. To remain in harmony with things one does not so force things or practice violence. There is a non-interference principle at work, which also indicates types of non­ interference that are excluded. However Taoism does not always get the distinction between force and violence quite 5 Under contemporary technology and technological arrangements, such as the storage of quantities of oil and nuclear and chemical materials in great cities, wars have assumed new and very destructive dimensions, to the point of being utterly irresponsible. A different approach to technology, as to war, is now mandatory. These are no longer things that can in principle be nicely confined and need not touch parties outside the fray. An important part of ending wars, "winning the war against wars", is removing the technology of war, above all from irresponsible state power. As for which technology to try to jettison and which to try to retain or improve, it is not so difficult to indicate, provided evaluative terminology is not outlawed. What is wanted is technology that is good in its place, what should be excluded is technology that is indifferent or bad or potentially so. Technology to be justified has to do something worthwhile, it has to address identifiable respectable needs. That is why merely indifferent technology is out; there is no virtue in technology for technology's sake, as it is a mere technique. It is because of the crucial evaluative component in choice oLtechnology that appropr^/zg^, itself evaluative, comes closer to encapsulating the criterion^ 3ize, such as smallness, or intermediateness, are not what matter, though modest and not excessive technology are likely to fare better in satisfying appropriateness. In simpler societies, small technology is of course more appropriate; for that is what is good there. From known criteria for what is good these other features for locally appropriate technology can be read off: reliability, esp. in maintenance, functioning well and safely under the expected range of operating conditions (which may be difficult^ ease of repair, capital cgeapness and repair inexpensiveness, environmental^ benignness, and meeting sound social needs. /-C ^7^^7*// / right. 'Vital force without restraint', intentionally excessive force, is only part of what counts as which is more generally /orcg w/zzc/z vzo/af&y, i.e. transgresses, descrecrates, profanes, injures, outrages, etc. It is thus a negatively connoted force, an evil force in some specified intentional respect. There is a tendency for Taoist commentators, not Taoists, to regard Taoism as condemning all uses, or even occurrences, of force, but this is not so. Rather intentional ill-forcing is what is castigated, what is deviant. Thus Taoism does not exclude a range of defensive practices, which make satisfactory use of natural forces, like letting the machines of war industry stop. Those who would abolish war and its machinery, substituting for it nonwarlike and ideally nonviolent methods, technology, and strategies, have been confronted not merely with much sub-rational abuse but with plenty of criticism and even some paradoxes. Here is a recent paradox concerning war and nonviolence: * War must be abolished. One reason is simply economic. We can no longer afford it, and the opportunity costs and enormous. Along with other extraordinarily wasteful activities, it is an anachronism. * Doing so cannot be accomplished without violence, i.e. in effect, given the types of violence involved, without what amounts to war. According to a fuller version of this premiss, the process of abolishing a war would only be achieved through a revolution so profound that it could not succeed without extensive and extreme violence, amounting to (civil) war. ° But then war cannot be abolished without war. Therefore, war which must be abolished cannot be abolished.^ This "paradox" has been compared with the Liar paradox, but the parallel does not persist far. For this paradox does not involve self-referential features, and is easily broken, as follows. Let the "last war" be not the last standard war but the revolution abolishing war. Then, given that the revolution is successful, war will be abolished therewith, i.e. with that last war. There need be no regress, given again a successful outcome. All the premisses stand intact, but the conclusion, following the 'therefore' is a nonsequitur. However, while the dissolution of the argument is accordingly logically fine, the route is repugnant. Standard pacifism challenges the 6 Brian Medlin, who forcefully propounded this puzzle, set other analogous puzzles alongside it - designed to reveal deep difficulties in contemporary political, and especially alternative, thought. Another puzzle, concerning liberty and repression in the context of capitalism, revolved around the following inconsistent triad: * capitalism must be removed, but liberty retained. * capitalism cannot be removed without repression. * repression is antithetical to liberty. The puzzle is resolved as with the analogous puzzle of abolishing. Let the "last capitalist" action the days of liberty be the repressive but liberating revolution overthrowing capitalism. ; /1 16 second premiss. and worn/ /zacz/zszn. Although Taoism is strongly opposed to war, and much in favour of peace - and accordingly by prevailing standards a substantially pacz/zc position - it is not (nowhere in the central texts) committed to pacifism in usual senses, for two different reasons: * It is not, by contrast with pacifism, opposed to all types of warfare, for example smart defensive wars. * It eschews deontology in terms of which moral pacifism is commonly stated, for instance through the watershed thesis P2, It is morally wrong to use violence. By contrast with Taoism, deep environmentalism does not avoid deontic claims, and is committed zn prznczp/e to nonviolent technologies and ways and to pacifistic principles. Moreover, certain forms of deep environmentalism are completely committed to pacifism, notably European forms. Is deep green? There is heavy contemporary opposition to pacifism, as there also was to Taoism in the warring times when Taoism was first being promulgated. Many of the central institutions of contemporary life are intricated in coercion, violence and war. The most prominent contemporary institutions, states, are premissed on these elements of damaging force; they claim entitlement to use them widely, and even claim a certain territorial monopoly on their use. As a result they are having constantly to engage in them in attempt to maintain that monopoly. They are certainly the main perpetrators of wars, and of violence. They are indeed inured to wars, are in constant preparation for wars, yet propound dialectial (and normally dishonest and cynical) doctrines of peace through war (for a recent example see the appendix). Unremarkably then, the extensive propagandistic machinery of state has invested heavily in "justificatory" exercises in favour of controlled use, zr^ own use, of destructive force, and. inveighed against pacifism. Because a routine trick in this sophistical repetoire consists in conflating pacifism with extreme, naive and inplausible, forms, an inevitable and important early task commits in unscrambling senses of 'pacifism'. Semantical skulduggery can be thwarted in this way. Pacz/z^nz, as explained by English dictionaries, invariably concerns wars and warfare, and contains two components, negative and, elaborating on that, positive:- The negative component is, in Amauld's word, a/zzz-IVar-z^nz, opposition (in ways to be further specified) to all forms of warfare (see OED). The positive component supplies alternative ways of settling disputes (what it is supposed that wars with some semblance of justification involve), such as negotiation, arbitration,... - and, adding to too narrow dictionary accounts - sanctions, substitutions (e.g. of sporting events, operatic contests, cooperative ventures),.... In brief ^Zazzdard ^acz/z^nz is opposition to all warfare and resolution of potential wars by other nonmilitary means. /, 17 Plainly the oppojzfzon to warfare, like the sanctions and so on, cannot itself be military (using soldiers and other devices of war), on pain of some incoherence. But otherwise the ways of opposition can be many and various: they can certainly be acfzve, as with nonviolent demonstrations, resistance movements, and so forth, and they may also be devious (e.g. turning the forces of war upon themselves so they are neutralised). It quickly becomes evident, then, that some of the dictionaries offer but loaded definitions which, by restricting the negative components, reduce the initial appeal and plausibility of pacifism. Consider the Concz'-ye Ezzg/z^/z definition of the negative component: "the doctrine of non-resistance to hostilities and of total non-co-operation with any form of warfare'. Thereby excluded are forms of pacifism which offer active and plausible alternatives to warfare such as social defence. The Cozzcz^ E/zg/zj/z tends to force pacifism into what the Eng/zs/z Dzcfz'onafy lists as its final item: 'often, with depreciatory implication, the advocacy of peace at any price', 'in any circumstance'. Pacifism can easily resist being forced into these sorts of circumstances: it has many resources, as an extensive series of texts on alternatives to war, such as negotiation non­ violent action and social defence, from Taoism to contemporary environmentalism attest. Academic philosophers have much advanced the semantical strategy of some dictionaries, of rendering pacifism more difficult from the very outset by narrow and biassed definitions. They have stretched the term from its restricted setting of warfare, confined to state and organised gang violence, to cover all forms of violence, from state and interstate to, what is very different, personal and interpersonal violence. Call the resulting considerably stretched notion of pacifism, according to which it is morally wrong to use violence, according to which P2 holds, .yfrefc/z^ /?acz/z.M?z.7 While stretched pacifism certainly includes standard pacifism (unless the notions of war and warfare are tampered with), the converse is very far from being the case. A pacifist is in no way committed to stretched pacifism, which is a much more problematic and difficult position than standard pacifism. There are several, substantially different reasons for this, which will be picked up seriatim. Stretched pacifism, also misleadingly called mora/ pacifism, has looked a very easy critical target to moral philosophers. Many the effusive philosopher who, upon sighting such a target, has charged, whooping such rhetoric as "incoherent", "inconsistent", "insensitive", "fanatical". However, with improved logical technology now available for accommodating and treating moral dilemmas, it is no great feat to resist such attacks, in the fashion of previous investigations (see esp. Al, also MD). A main aim was to demonstrate that stretched pacifism was not so stupid as it was made out to be or appeared to be to these inured to present dominant violent ways. So far from being stupid, it is viable. In future gentler times sketched pacifism 7 In Al this notion was contrasted with standard pacifism as cowigrghgn.yzvg pacifism: ovcrcomprgAe/MAe might have been better. 18 could even be realised for whole communities of creatures (as some genuinely Christian sects envisaged); whence it will finally be seen to be feasible not merely for sages and supermen, and many ordinary women, but much more extensively. The method of philosophical accommodation was through moral dilemmas. The sort of moral dilemma that stretched pacifism can induce derives as follows. On the one side stands the theme P2, Wv, in convenient symbols, for Wrong V-ing, violencing. Now this implies to WB, where B presents a case of of violence. On the other side, particular circumstances develop which lead to W -B, because -B would produce in the circumstances considerable wrong, for instance extensive violence, mass murder, etc. One stock example from the literature concerns calling off the firing squad about to shoot several captives if the pacifist shoots one of them (it is elaborated in Al p.13). Interestingly, another stock example from the literature concerns standard pacifism (it can also be presented in terms of patriotism; for details of both see MD p. 10). Resolution of intractable moral dilemmas is, where it is required, situational. The agent decides in the situation, wif/nn the fix, what to do. There are many ways in which such decision making can proceed, less rational, such as those applying chance or involving bad faith, or more rational, such as those applying consequentialist decision theory (for details see MD, pp.32-9). A decision theory taking account of a// that should be included will not however be purely consequential. It would also take account of relevant motivation. This defence and rehabilitation of moral pacifism has been challenged, in particular by Smith (hereafter JWS). JWS claims the defence offered is a 'failure because it trivializes pacifism" (p. 153 twice). The rehabilitation trivializes pacifism because it entails that pacifism doesn't substantially differ from a form of acf/vw?! which holds that while violence is wrong one is -yowefwtay justified on consequentialist grounds for preferring violent acts, if these acts are lesser evils than any other real alternatives. This is the commonsense position which most people hold - yet - pacifism after all was supposed to be radical moral doctrine - (p.153 rearranged).^ Par? of the criticism is, then, not so much that pacifism is trivialized - JWS "activism"" is hardly trivial - as that pacifism is deflated from a radical position to the commonsense position most people hold (p.154 also). Yet not a shred of evidence is adduced that JWS activism is such a populist position. Available evidence, for example from peace movement:and oppositional opinion polls, suggests the very opposite: that, for instance, most people support state-justified conventional wars with the military violence they incur, and 8 JWS now informs me that he has changed his position. Whether the move effects his criticism, I don't know. accordingly do not hold that violence is always wrong. From such a commonsense angle, pacifism with its condemnation of conventional wars and the violence they involve remains a radical doctrine. As regards wars and other violence-incurring social authorities, contemporary pacificism is, as previous explained (e.g. Al p.3), a form of activism. Pacifism does not imply utter pacifity, but may actively involve social defence, resistance and so on. However a certain level of misrepresentation enters into the JWS challenge in the details of what forms of activism pacifism may include. That misrepresentation begins in the second clause concerning what is said to be sometimes justified. For the situational procedure where dilemmas arise will not generally be consequential applying a principle of lesser evil. In dilemmatic situations such principles are suspended, and such a principle is in any case unacceptable to moral pacifists. A small amount of violence may be less bad in its consequences than verbal offence, but a principled pacifist will choose the slightly greater evil where other obligations do not exclude it. A more serious distortion occurs in JWS's effort to force procedures in dilemma situations into purely consequentialist form. In fact consequential decision theory was deployed as a only for how to proceed rationally in a situational setting where deontic procedures were suspended (see MD p.38). What was said, still misleadingly retrospective vision reveals, was this: 'what is done is a very consequentialist thing" (Al p.13), nof 'one acts in a consequentialist fashion to do the sufficiently good thing in the circumstances" (JWS p.152). Situationally procedures than those resembling orthodox rational decision making (modified from maximizing to satisizing objectives) may be adopted (MD p.38). Further the orthodox consequentialist theory is inadequate because it leaves out, or tries to reduce to consequences, nonconsequential elements, notably motives. It is not difficult, in principle (in advance of attempted consequentialization of motives), to design situations where motives, such as integrity or maintaining faith, enter to yield outcomes upsetting consequential calculations. More elaborate decision making procedures than those of consequentialism, sometimes at variance with consequentialism, are thus presupposed. A further part of JWS's criticism accordingly goes by the board, the alleged appeal 'to "second best"" consequentialist considerations,... already explicitly condemned" (p.154). What was condemned was stock universal consequentialism, 'that <?n/y consequentialist considerations carry argumentative weight" (quoted on p.152), so undercutting other deontic principles, such as those of pacifism. It was not claimed, what is utterly different, that consequentialist considerations can enter into deliberation and decision making. The conclusion JWS arrives at is therefore substantially astray. After criticising modern moral philosophy for its reliance upon consequentialist modes of thought, it is surprising, and inconsistent, to find ... [reliance] upon such modes of thought to escape logical difficulties raised by moral dilemmas facing ... pacifis[m] (p.152) 20 There is no inconsistency. JWS has confused universal with particular. As well he has wrongly contracted all situational decision making to consequentialist modes. There is a third part to the criticism, that the defence is too easy; the "strategy will allow foe violence to be (perpetrated and) justified to suit the tastes of any real pacifist' (p.153). This another part of the so-called trivialization, this time however rather than populatization, weakening the moral stand against violence. This third contention is premissed on a mistake: that one can "justify on consequentialist grounds any number of violent acts, providing that such acts are lesser evils than other real alternatives facing social agents' (p.153). Moral pacifism offers no such licence; allowing such consequentialism to take over was never part of the position. The slide to such consequentialism is made on the strength of a similarly erroneous example. The potential victim of an aspiring rapist "is supposed to flee or wriggle free if possible. But it is to consequentially justify the use of violence by the woman to prevent herself from being raped' (p.153 italics added). In the example so far described there is no dilemma, and no such easy resort to consequentially "justified' violence. What allows too much violence is the lesser evil JWS assumes is easily consequentially justified; for example that the woman is entitled to inflict, and escalate, violence so long as it remains "a lesser evil than the violence of attempted rape' (p.153). Since she may thereby inflict quite unreasonable damage (esp. if she is a Kung Fu expert), the result is inconsistent with "the basic principle of self-defence' which JWS earlier adduced according to which what is "appropriate, in response is on/y that level of force necessary to defend oneself against the threat' (p.150). There is evidence in JWS's work of some enthusiasm for levels of violence which exceed his "basic principle', his appeal to "lesser evil' generates some instances. The "basic principle', itself fraught with difficulties (cf. the contorted discussion of what weapons are appropriate in response to what attacks, p.150), still exceeds what stretched pacifism would enjoin; for instance, it may not be appropriate to respond with force. But in a technical sense stretched pacifism is compatible with the "basic principle', since it only imposes the upper bound on level of force. As for easiness, moral pacifism is not an easy position to live by, or to justify. Removing objections to pacifism is one thing; solidifying a positive case for it is quite another, and so far hardly conclusive (as Al tried to explain, pp 29-31). Stretched pacifism was advanced, to put it more precisely, as a still viable option. It was not presented as a morally compulsory position, or, for that matter, as one that this defender adhered to or affirmed. To reiterate, while a cumulative case can be made for stetched pacifism as principled non­ violence, that case was not conclusive, and is hard to improve. For, further, some serious difficulties standing in the way of stretched pacifism were assembled, the most important of which derives from the extent of violence apparent in transactions within the natural world. Simply consider the practices of carnivores, essential to their natural way of life. In order to meet their life needs for sustenance, these creatures do, and are often obliged to, engage 21 routinely in violent activity. While it can no doubt be argued, as some vegetarians may do, that the natural order is an immoral order, and that remaining carnivores should be converted to vegetarianism as rapidly as proves possible (in the way domestic dogs are converted to dog biscuits), the difficulties with such proposals are immense. The task envisaged is gigantic, and beyond human capacities - even if it were desirable. For there are millions of species to be somehow converted to proper vegetarianism. Then there are millions of other species to be converted to proper and well regulated contraceptive practices, else their numbers will get out of hand (uncontrollably) with predation removed. Given humans lack of success in limiting their own excessive numbers, such regulation appears entirely remote. Aside however from the practical difficulties, is such a fully vegetarian order, with evolution further derailed, a desirable improvement on the natural order? Is it morally obligatory? It is certainly not obligatory, as alternative systems of morality in harmony with the prevailing natural order are feasible. Nor is it desirable, for (to appeal to such alternative value systems) the natural order is more or less in order as it is. Full vegetarianization would only reduce its value, vastly. More generally, a defensible ethical framework should not, it would be rightly contended, be right out of step with the natural order of other creatures, decently depicted. Decent depiction is important, for some features of the natural order, such as competition, combat and predation, so far from escaping attention, have been grossly exaggerated and exploited. Thus, for instance, the ludicrous picture of nature red in truth and claw, so beloved of descendents of orthodox Victorians and of orthodox economists. However, even under decent ^depiction, the "natural order" is often not benign. That appears to be enough to induce a supervenient moral dilemma for any stretched pacifism which is coupled to a deep ethic (e.g. which does not separate humans out from the natural order) and which bschews the desperate vegetarian route: The natural order is not an immoral order The natural order contains (regular) instances of violence. Therefore, instances of violence are not immoral in apparent defiance of P2 Moreover, there are too many instances of violence, too regularly occurring, for them all to be plausibly shunted into the moral dilemma category (and predatory carnivores face no dilemmas). Raptors that practice violence every week are not immoral (neither are they clearly moral; the category of morality only significantly extends so far). The main trouble lies however with P2 (which needs some finer adjustment, as was alrady indicated in Al). While P2 is alright in context, within a particular, perfectly viable, ethical framework, designed for the usual human round, the convendonal setting for ethical theories, it stands in need of modification outside that setting. It is time to suggest the sort of modification envisaged. Evidently P2 was addressed to moral agents. Which agents? Not to carnivores that o supply their own livelihood, nor really to morally degenerate humans, but to peace-sensitive 22 agents. With that semi-technical form, yet to be characterised, a suitably modified P2 results: MP2. It is morally wrong, for a peace-sensitive agent, to use violence.^ To recover what amounts, in the prevous discussive context, to P2, it suffices to add the proposition that every human agent ought to be peace-sensitive. Much as that proposition has to recommend it, it appears too ethically advanced for many modem humans; it sets too high a moral standard to be taken as a serious cjuic^ to practice. It seems wise to settle presently for something less demanding, such as that every advanced moral agent ought to be peace sensitive. To put essentially the same proposition alternatively: Stretched pacifism (as modified) is supererogatory. While it is perhaps too late to hope for much moral progress in humans, it is pleasant to contemplate alternative futures where what is supererogatory became obligatory, and widely practiced. Richard Sylvan Append?* I began drafting this essay at the time (January 17, midday Australian time) of the American attacks upon Iraq. The optly named Prime Minister Hawke of Australia had just made a statement to the nation-state, announcing (the) war. In this statement there was much talk of peace. There was even - in what was effectively a declaration of war - reiteration of the modem quest for 'a new world order of peace". Peace through war; so it rings out again and again, through the centuries. 'War must be for the sake of peace" (Aristotle p.220). More than two thousand years later, we have fought those wars to end all wars. But it is no use, Hawke solemely pronounced, just fa/Amg aAoaf peace, and thinking about peace; we must work for peace,/ig Ar for it - through war. Impeccable logic? President Bush, supreme commander, convinced us with similar logic, speaking too with many tongues. Of how he 'preferred to think of peace, not war". But now 'only force will prevail", as 'all reasonable efforts to reach a peaceful solution are exhausted". 'What must be done" must be done, or will be anyway. With God on side with the US offensive (as well as on the other side), it will go well. As it was said to have, though it achieved comparatively little that other efforts may not have yielded more satisfactorily, and thought it may now have to followed with another invasion. Nor have we ever managed to glimpse much of what is now supposed, when we are no longer engaged, to come 'out of the horror of war": a 'new world order ... which governs the conflict of nations"; a 'rule of law", not war. How the one, enforcable law, is achieved, unless backed by the the other, is not explained (Medlin's paradox 9 The generalization^ P2, suggested in Al, to cover also the parallel situation of environmental vandalism, can be similarly modified. The anti-vandolence principle becomes^MP2°. It is morally wrong, for a peace- and environmentally-sensitive agent, to use vandolence. 23 hits back). Similarly what we now hear from many militarists, as they rush to war, is that "peace is a great good, war a great evil'. But, for the most part, only the rhetoric has shifted; practice has scarcely changed at all. REFERENCES W.-T. Chan, A 5*oarce 2?oo% on C/zz'ae^e P/zZZo^op/zy, Princeton University Press, 1963; referred to as ST. W.-T. Chan (ed.), T/ze Way a/* Lao Tza(Tao-re C/zZag), Bobbs-Merrill, New York, 1963; referred to as LT. B. Martin, UproorZag War, Freedom press, London, 1984. A. Naess, EcoZogy, coazazaaZry aa<% ZZ/e.yfy^, Cambridge University press, Cambridge UK, 1989. R.A. Rapaport, PZg.y /or r/ze Anc&yfory : rituaLin the ecology of a New Guinea People, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1967. R. Routley, "War and Peace II. On the alleged inconsistency, moral insensitivity and fanaticism of pacifism', DZjca^Zoa papery Za eavZroawzeafaZ p/zZZojop/zy #9, Research School of Social Science, Australian National University, 1983 (also in /apaZry); referred to as Al. R. Routley and V. Plumwood, "Moral dilemmas and the logic of deontic notions', DZ-yca&yZoa papery Za eavZroaazearaZ p/aZo-yopAy #6, Research School of Social Science, Australian National University, 1984 (also in Paracoa^z\yrearLogZc); referred to as MD. R. Routley, "War and Peace I. On the ethics of large-scale nuclear war and nuclear-deterrence and the political fall-out', DZ^ca^Zoa papery Za eavZroawzearaZ p/zZZo^op/zy, #5, Research School Of Social Science, Australian National University, 1984. G. Sharp, 6*acZaZ Power aad PoZZrZcaZ Free&wi, Porter Sargent, Boston, 1980. J.W. Smith, 77ze Woraz^ ar r/ze 7/earr o/T/zZag^ , Public Relations Unit, Flinders University, 1989. R. Sylvan, "War and Peace III, Australia's defence philosophy', 5*ocZaZ P/zZZo^op/zy, for Nuclear Conference, University of Queensland, 1985. R. Sylvan and D. Bennett, "Of Utopias, Tao and Deep Ecology', DZ^ca^Zoa papery Za eavZroaazearaZ p/zZZo^op/zy #19, Research School of Social Science, Australian National University, 1990; referred to as UT. 22 To recover what amounts, in the previous discussive context, to P2, it suffices to add the proposition that every human agent ought to be peace-sensitive. Much as that proposition has to recommend it, it appears too ethically advanced for many modern humans; it sets too high a moral standard to be taken as a serious guide to practice. It seems wise to settle presently for something less demanding, such as that every advanced moral agent ought to be peace sensitive. To put essentially the same proposition alternatively: paci/Ly/H (as modified) is While it is perhaps too late to hope for much moral progress in humans, it is pleasant to contemplate alternative futures where what is supererogatory became obligatory, and widely practiced. Richard Sylvan* I began drafting this essay at the time (January 17, midday Australian time) of the American attacks upon Iraq. The 3ptly named Prime Minister Hawke of Australia had just made a statement to the nation-state, announcing (the) war. In this statement there was much talk of peace. There was even — in what was effectively a declaration of war — reiteration of the modem quest for "a new world order of peace". Peace through war; so it rings out again and again, through the centuries. "War must be for the sake of peace" (Aristotle p.220). More than two thousand years later, we have fought those wars to end all wars. But it is no use, Hawke solemely pronounced, just peace, and thinking about peace; we must work for for it - through war. Impeccable logic? President Bush, supreme commander, convinced us with similar logic, speaking too with many tongues. Of how he 'preferred to think of peace, not war". But now 'only force will prevail", as 'all reasonable efforts to reach a peaceful solution are exhausted". 'What must be done" must be done, or will be anyway. With God on side with the US offensive (as well as on the other side), it will go well. As it was said to have, though it achieved comparatively little that other efforts may not have yielded more satisfactorily, and thought it may now have to followed with another invasion. Nor have we ever managed to glimpse much of what is now supposed, when we are no longer engaged, to come 'out of the horror of war": a 'new world order ... which governs the conflict of nations"; a 'rule of law", not war. How the one, enforcable law, is achieved, unless backed by the the other, is not explained (Medlin s paradox hits back). Similarly what we now hear from many militarists, as they rush to war, is that vandolence. Thank to David Bennett for joint contributions (from UT) and to JWS for opposition (in JWS) 23 'peace is a great good, war a great evil'. But, for the most part, only the rhetoric has shifted; practice has scarcely changed at all. REFERENCES W.-T. Chan, A on C%Zn^.y^ P/zZZo-yopZEy, Princeton University Press, 1963; referred to as ST. W.-T. Chan (ed.), 7%^ Way 0/L00 7za (7ao-z^ C/nng), Bobbs-Merrill, New York, 1963; referred to as LT. B. Martin, Uprooting War, Freedom Press, London, 1984. A. Naess, EcoZogy, co/wmonZy an%Z ZZ/f^ZyZ^, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge UK, 1989. R.A. Rapaport, PZg^ybr z/^^ Anc^^ror^ : rZzaaZ Zn Z/^^ ^coZogy o/ a ZV^w GnZn^a P^opZ^, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1967. R. Routley, 'War and Peace II. On the alleged inconsistency, moral insensitivity and fanaticism of pacifism', DZ^cn^Zon papery Zn ^nvZronm^nfaZ p/zZZo-yop/zy #9, Research School of Social Science, Australian National University, 1983 (also in /npaZry); referred to as Al. R. Routley and V. Plumwood, 'Moral dilemmas and the logic of deontic notions', DZ-yca-MZoK papery Zn ^nvZronw^HZaZ p/nZo-yopAy #6, Research School of Social Science, Australian National University, 1984 (also in Paraco/MZ-yZ^/iZ LfgZc); referred to as MD. R. Routley, 'War and Peace I. On the ethics of large-scale nuclear war and nuclear-deterrence and the political fall-out', DZ-ycas-yZon papers Zn ^nvZron/M^nZaZp/zZZo^op/zy, #5, Research School Of Social Science, Australian National University, 1984. G. Sharp, &?cZ%Z Potter aA!^Z PoZZzZcaZ Fr^fJow, Porter Sargent, Boston, 1980. J.W. Smith, 7%^ Wor^ty %Z z/z^ 7/^arZ p/77iZag^ , Public Relations Unit, Flinders University, 1989. R. Sylvan, 'War and Peace III, Australia's defence philosophy', 5*ocZ#Z P%ZZo.yopZ!y, for Nuclear Conference, University of Queensland, 1985. R. Sylvan and D. Bennett, 'Of Utopias, Tao and Deep Ecology', DZ^ca^-yZan papers Zn ^HvZronm^nZaZ p/uZo-yop^y #19, Research School of Social Science, Australian National University, 1990; referred to as UT. 23 'peace is a great good, war a great evil'. But, for the most part, only the rhetoric has shifted; practice has scarcely changed at all. REFERENCES W.-T. Chan, A 6*az/rce Z3aa& on C/zinese P/ziZasap/zy, Princeton University Press, 1963; referred to as ST. W.-T. Chan (ed.), 77ze Way a/Eaa 7za (7aa-te C/zing), Bobbs-Merrill, New York, 1963; referred to as LT. B. Martin, (/proofing War, Freedom Press, London, 1984. A. Naess, Eco/ogy, canznznnify aneZ Zi/esfyZe, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge UK, 1989. R.A. Rapaport, Pigs^ar r/ze Ancesfars : rifzzaZ in f/ze ecaZagy a/a Aew Gzzinea PeapZe, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1967. R. Routley, 'War and Peace II. On the alleged inconsistency, moral insensitivity and fanaticism of pacifism', Discassian papery in enviranznenfaZ p/ziZasap/zy #9, Research School of Social Science, Australian National University, 1983 (also in /n^aizy); referred to as Al. R. Routley and V. Plumwood, 'Moral dilemmas and the logic of deontic notions', Discassian papers in enviranzzzenfaZ p/tiZo.yop/ty #6, Research School of Social Science, Australian National University, 1984 (also in Paracon.yi.y^nf Lagic); referred to as MD. R. Routley, 'War and Peace I. On the ethics of large-scale nuclear war and nuclear-deterrence and the political fall-out', Discassian papers in enviranznenfaZp/ziZasap/zy, #5, Research School Of Social Science, Australian National University, 1984. G. Sharp, .SaciaZ Patter anJ PaZificaZ FreeJazn, Porter Sargent, Boston, 1980. J.W. Smith, 77ze Warzzzs af f/ze Pfearf a/77zings, Public Relations Unit, Flinders University, 1989, h 7^)5, R. Sylvan, War and Peace IIL Australian defence philosophy', P/ziZasap/zy 3 Zw) R. Sylvan and D. Bennett, 'Of Utopias, Tao and Deep Ecology', Discassian papers in enviranznenfaZ p/ziZasap/zy #19, Research School of Social Science, Australian National University, 1990; referred to as UT. /-//TirZcVf Z^9/  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Box 21, Item 708: Draft of War and peace IV: Tao and deep-green Subject The topic of the resource Printout of draft, with emendations and annotation, dated 1992. Handwritten above title: Old. Diagrams. Draft includes multiple versions of page 22 (2 versions ) and 23 (3 versions). Later title: On extirpating war: Tao and deep-green pacifism. Description An account of the resource One of eight papers digitised from item 708. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/browse?search=Richard+Sylvan&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bjoiner%5D=and&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=&amp;range=&amp;collection=&amp;type=&amp;user=&amp;tags=&amp;public=&amp;featured=&amp;exhibit=&amp;geolocation-mapped=&amp;geolocation-address=&amp;geolocation-latitude=&amp;geolocation-longitude=&amp;geolocation-radius=10&amp;submit_search=Search+for+items">Richard Sylvan</a> Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived <span class="MuiTypography-root-125 MuiTypography-body2-126">The University of Queensland's <a data-testid="rek-series" href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/records/search?page=1&amp;pageSize=20&amp;sortBy=score&amp;sortDirection=Desc&amp;searchQueryParams%5Brek_series%5D%5Bvalue%5D=Richard+Sylvan+Papers%2C+UQFL291&amp;searchMode=advanced">Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291</a></span>, Box 21, Item 708 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org">Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy</a> Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1992 Contributor An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, <a href="https://najtaylor.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Dr. N.A.J. Taylor</a>. Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library. Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource [26] leaves. 61.54 MB. Type The nature or genre of the resource Manuscript Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context <a href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:0c7af66">https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:0c7af66</a> Box 21: More Green Como House Como House > Shelves > Top > Pile 3 https://www.antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/eda41b7e99ab429778e36fdfc2dc6228.pdf e09714a43059bcfdd5e1a4ce9841c246 PDF Text Text ON EXTIRPATING WAR: TAO AND DEEP-GREEN PACIFISM Taoism and deep-green environmental theory, although closely aligned on very many issues, diverge over war. For Taoism, by contrast for instance with Buddhism, is not a pacific doctrine, but is committed to skilful defensive militarism. While it does not espouse a fortress mentality, Taoism certainly condones limited defensive military operations for specific purposes, a sort of guerilla warfare. By contrast, deep-green theory, whilp acknowledging the role of organised social defence, stands opposed to professional militarism, and thereby to military defence, and is committed to a principled pacifism. Conveniently a route through Taoism, philosophically fascinating in its own right, will lead us to problems of pacifism and towards deep-green theory. FeaZi/res o/ a Tacts/ o/ war antZ wn#tarfs?n. War did not receive a favourable press in ancient Chinese philosophy. Generally aggression and war were to be avoided. Even Confucius itnposed very demanding conditions: for example, "when good men have instructed the people [in morals, agriculture, military tactics] for seven years, they may be allowed to bear arms,' Tf a ruler ... does not set himself right, even his commands will not be obeyed' (SB p.41, italics added). Mo Tzu went much further than Confucius, roundly condemning war — on utilitarian grounds, that war yields no net benefit at any level (SB p.227). What is more, he backed his heavy condemnation practically (unlike some conspicuous contemporary theoretical utilitarians); "he did not hesitate to walk for ten days and ten nights in an effort to dissuade a ruler from making war' (SB p.212). But none, it is said, went as far, in a detailed and sophisticated criticism of war, as Lao Tzu; "none has condemned war more strongly than Lao Tzu'. '[T]he opposition of Taoism to the use of force is well-known, and the most bitter attack on militarism if found in the L<3<9 TzM (Chan, p.154, p.17.) / But, after that splendid the text is slightly disappointing. Lao Tzu does not id build-up, bu assert outright that war is ann abomination, or even roundly condemn it. His critique of war, militarism, and military teclhhology, is subtle and oblique, and, on the surface, far distanced from pacifism. For he does/not s/n< recommend an end to war - in that genuine Taoists, those who possess Tao, will never participate in them - but expects wars to continue as Worse, he even goes so far as to outline proper attitudes to war and conduct in war, and indeed teqhi to suggest military techniques and strategies, some of which look decidedly devious. Among the classical works ^f Taoism, we focus on the Lao Tza because, by contrast with other works, a remarkable component of that book is devoted to war and militarism. The apparent deviousness of the tactics Lao Tzu allocates serves to highlight what has been seen as The most troublesome element' in his philosophy (Chan p.17) - not so much however because they concern military operations, but because they are taken to apply much more widely, To life in general' (p.17). But why should military activity obtain some special �WAR AND PEACE IV: TAO AND DEEP-GREEN Taoism and deep-green environmental theory, although closely aligned on very many issues, diverge over war. For Taoism, by contrast for instance with Buddhism, is not a pacific doctrine, but is committed to skilful defensive militarism. While it does not espouse a fortress mentality, Taoism certainly condones limited defensive military operations for specific purposes, a sort of guerilla warfare. By contrast, deep-green theory, while acknowledging the role of organised social defence, stands opposed to professional militarism, and thereby to military defence, and is committed to a principled pacifism. Conveniently a route through Taoism, philosophically fascinating in its own right, will lead us to problems of pacifism and towards deep-green theory. 7. o/ a Taofsf endive o/ War did not receive a favourable press in ancient Chinese philosophy. Generally aggression and war were to be avoided. Even Confucius imposed very demanding conditions: for example, 'when good men have instructed the people [in morals, agriculture, military tactics] for seven years, they may be allowed to bear arms/ Tf a ruler ... does not set himself right, even his commands will not be obeyed' (SB p.41, italics added). Mo Tzu went much further than Confucius, roundly condemning war - on utilitarian grounds, that war yields no net benefit at any level (SB p.227). What is more, he backed his heavy condemnation practically (unlike some conspicuous contemporary theoretical utilitarians); 'he did not hesitate to walk for ten days and ten nights in an effort to dissuade a ruler from making war' (SB p.212). But none, it is said, went as far, in a detailed and sophisticated criticism of war, as Lao Tzu; 'none has condemned war more strongly than Lao Tzu'. '[T]he opposition of Taoism to the use of force is well-known, and the most bitter attack on militarism if found in the Lao Tzz/ (Chan, p.154, p.17.) But, after that splendid build-up, the text is slightly disappointing. Lao Tzu does not assert outright that war is an abomination, or even roundly condemn it. His critique of war, militarism, and military technology, is subtle and oblique, and, on the surface, far distanced from pacifism. For he does not recommend an end to war - in that genuine Taoists, those who possess Tao, will never participate in them - but expects wars to continue as ewA. Worse, he even goes so far as to outline proper attitudes to war and conduct in war, and indeed to suggest military techniques and strategies, some of which look decidedly devious. Among the classical works of Taoism, we focus on the Lap Tztv because, by contrast with other works, a remarkable component of that book is devoted to war and militarism. The apparent deviousness of the tactics Lao Tzu allocates serves to highlight what has been seen as 'the most troublesome element' in his philosophy (Chan p.17) - not so much however because they concern military operations, but because they are taken to apply much �2 more widely, 'to life in general' (p.17). But why should military activity obtain some special dispensation? Why should what is tolerated more generally be exonerated there? But given that Taoism has here the virtue of consistency (i.e. uniformity on principles) and of universalizability, that simply leaves /nare explaining to be done. There are rwo puzzles here in Taoism rather than one. There is the paradox, and, varying and generalising on that, there are paradoxes. The special paradox is generated by the following incompatible elements: on the one side, 'the most bitter attack on militarism', the well-known opposition of Taoism to the use of force (p.17) and to the possession and use of smart military weapons and technology - implying that war is far from all right - and on the other, advocacy of certain (devious) military tactics, outlines of (deceitful) conduct in war, and so on - implying that war is all right after all. A straightforward generalisation of this paradox would look at other morally-sensitive parts of life, where some practice was strongly condemned yet engaged in (for many examples, see the dilemmas assembled in MD). But the variation of concern to Chan and the neo-Confucians concerns the conjunction of upright with devious practices in life, in particular in the life of the sage. For a Taoist sage is presumed to lead an upright straightforward life, yet appears to engage in devious and even deceitful practices incompatible with such a life-style. Call this the paradox. Evidently a good deal of explaining is required, as to how Taoism can take the positions it appears to presume, both on war and peace, and on life more generally. A desirable preliminary would seem to be a little investigation of what position A? taken, especially on war and militarism. One key pasage runs: Fine weapons are instruments of evil They are hated by creatures Therefore those who possess the Tao turn away from them. ... Weapons are instruments of evil, not the instruments of a good ruler. When he uses them unavoidably, he regards calm restraint as the best principle Even when he is victorious, he does not regard it as praiseworthy, For to praise victory is to delight in the slaughter of men. He who delights in the slaughter of men will not succeed in the empire. ... For a victory, let us observe the occasion with funeral-ceremonies (LT p.154). Wars, which involve the use of weapons, instruments of evil, are accordingly themselves evil. They are also evil because they involve the slaughter of men. But they are also sometimes unavoidable (also p. 152). Therefore such wars are unavoidable evils. Such discourse, obtained by almost immediate inference from the passage, is within the standard orbit of dilemma talk. But Taoism lacks, through deliberately eschewing deontic talk, the discourse which enables direct expression of such dilemmas, or even direct condemnation of wars or of clever weapons. Instead the points are made by what the possesser of Tao �3 does, how the good ruler conducts himself, or by a/M/ogy, of victory in war with death. Unavoidable evils are the very stuff of deontic dilemmas (though many theories, underpinned by shonky logic, lack the resources for representing this stuff properly). Where something is unavoidably evil, it is &<2<7, because evil, also doing it is excusable, because it is unavoidable. So, given such an argument (which has its weaknesses), an unavoidable evil is a genuinely dilemmatic object with inconsistent features. Certain wars have looked, since ancient times, like such dilemmatic objects. Revealingly, Chan tries to explain that "most troublesome element' in Taoism, the military-practice paradox, through the following exercise in lateral thinking: It can ... be argued that Lao Tzu uses warfare to illustrate his principles of taking no action and weakness because warfare is among the most dynamic and critical of human experiences, just as the Indian classic, the chooses fighting as the theme on which to discuss the terrible dilemma whether one should fulfil his duty, as in the case of a soldier, and kill, or should fail in his duty and refrain from killing (p.17). 'Just as'? The Indian classic prevents a classic moral dilemma, a dilemma represented in contemporary philosophy (following its rediscovery by Sartre), where there are incompatible duties: the duty to kill, because of one's role as a soldier, and the duty not to kill, because of one's human condition, and the supervenient dilemma of failing in and fulfilling one's duties. These dilemmas for an individual (male, as it then was) are replicated in dilemmas regarding war for group institutions: at bottom, the obligation to engage in war (for one set of compelling reasons) as contraposed with the obligation not to engage in war (for another, perhaps overlapping, set of reasons). A theory of moral dilemmas (as worked out for example in MD) is crucial for an adequate treatment of major issues in war and peace, especially (as will become evident) for a viable strong pacifism. But Taoism, eschewing deontic discourse, lacks the apparatus to state or develop moral dilemmas. Hence it is logically excluded from giving a full or adequate account of what is going on conceptually. One of the philosophically fascinating feature of Taoism is the fashion in which it manages to avoid deontic discourse, and to substitute for direct deontic discourse or improvise circumlocutions when deontic discourse would otherwise appear inevitable (cf. UT for examples). But there are costs. One is inability to display the mechanism of deontic dilemmas, or to show what reasons and argument lie behind Taoist prounouncements and conclusions (the shortage of Taoism on argument is another philosophically conspicious feature, also observed in UT). As conceptual apparatus for analysizing moral dilemmas is missing, most of the machinery involved has to be passed over. Only the outcomes, as Taoism sees them, are presented, as if from a black box. Taoism blacks out the story on deontic dilemmas that deep-green theory can tell, as the following diagram tries to show: �4 Digrams . r/zg q/^zzrzc 6Zz7gw/?z^ r/z^zr ^zrg "r&wZvg^". Z)gg/?-grggzz c/^rr; Arguments to dilemmii ' incompatible input/^^ prescriptions -* Processing of dilemma, situational procedures directive output C(?rrgjpgzz<7z7zg TzzcAr c/z^rr: Black directive Box output It is evident that Taoism can be gxfgn^M; information can be put into the Black BoR rendering it less opaque. That extension can be made so as to conform to deep-green theory, i.e. so that the extended Taoist chart, a neo-Daoist chart, looks like the deep-green one. That is indeed essentially how neo-Daoism get characterised, in terms of conformity of the extension to deep ecological theory (see UT). We are now placed to explain how to dissolve, or at least neutralize, the paradoxes deriving from repudiation of militarism, an awkwardly qualified repudiation in the case of Taoism. In a significant sense there is /i<9 resolving of genuine deontic dilemmas. The principles delineating the fix may incompatible, signalling the persisting suboptimality (or better, sublimenality) of the dilemmatic situation. Where there is a dilemma, involved parties should try to do well enough in the sublimenal circumstances (for a much fuller account, see MD). Thus where there is a war, itself a non-Taoist process, engaged or caught up Taoists will not abandon Taoism. Taoist methods will be applied, Taoist strategies pursued. So much for theoretical representation and (non-)resolution of life-practices and other dilemmas, details of which are readily elaborated in deep-green extensions of Taoism. A prior substantive issue is whether dilemmas always arg generated: not whether wars are evil (typically they are, an issue we shall come to), but whether wars are unavoidable. Analysis of wars does not bear that familiar claim out decisively. Many wars could have been avoided, through conciliation, negotiation, restraint, etc., and no worse results apparently obtained, through sanctions, exchange, trade, etc. Through a typology of wars (coming up) that conjecture can be given some substance. Consider, for instance, what would be walk-overs. Then there is little point in making a military response. So war can be avoided. Certainly an occupation, to be met in a different way, may still occur. And so on, perhaps, for various other types of war. But, more generally, try this:- �Every war involves an aggressor, who makes an aggressive move. Such an aggressor could always avoid that move, taking a different (or a do-nothing) course of action. Therefore, every war can be avoided. No war is entirely unavoidable. Setting aside determinism (which renders a// actual wars along with all other events unavoidable), it could be argued that a war sometimes simply boils up, without an aggressor, an intensification of a conflagatory situation. There are grounds for scepticism regarding such examples; for such intensification can only occur if provocative military moves are made, for instance troops are stationed in provocative or risky positions. The presumption that certain wars are unavoidable typically derives from a one-sided perspective on war, a defender's perspective. A defender has no option, so it is routinely averred, but to respond to a determined aggressor. Even (/"that should be so sometimes, when there is no running away or going underground, it does not establish that such a war is unavoidable; for it neglects the role of the aggressor. By a smarter formulation, relevant features of unavoidability can be captured. Although wars may not be unavoidable, defensive action in wars that have been initiated may be unavoidable. At least such action may b^ unavoidable if unacceptably high costs (death, enslavement, etc.) are not to be avoided. Thereupon another highly relevant feature emerges: the linkage of avoidability to costs. For whether an action is unavoidable then depends upon what costs a party is prepared to incur before and when insisting on action: but this appears entirely unacceptable. How can what is "unavoidable" cease to be so when some further costs are absorbed? However with basics like survival, a certain liberty, and so on, we do reach such bounds. An important of unavoidability. We also reach scenarios, unavailable to Lao Tzu but kindly brought within range by modem technology, which may appear to justify aggressive strikes. State Z, while not an aggressor, is carrying out practices which will impose unacceptably high costs upon peoples of other states and implacably refuses to desist. It could, for example, be poisoning air or water flowing to other states. But ,to make the case vivid, let us suppose that state Z is constructing, for reasons Zeders End convincing (they are committed to a faith which depicts all humans as incorrigible sinners and unworthy of life), an effective doomsday machine. Would an (aggressive) preemptory strike designed to disable or destroy the machine be unavoidable?! In a sense, No; in another Yes. For different modalities can operate. Physically outsiders need to do nothing, but watch Zeders go about their zealous work. But deontically they are under heavy moral pressure, because of the costs of standing by idly: if the human race is worth anything very substantial, then they are obliged to act, action is deontically 1 Whether it would be justifiable, or just, are separate issues. But it is evident enought that such scenarios further damage the obsolescent idea of war. For, according to received doctrine, a just war is defensive. (How such a war can be fought at all is another matter; coherence requires relativization to 'just war /hr party d'.) �6 unavoidable. Here is a situation where a proposed reduction of deontic logic proves illuminating. Obligation is explicated through not implying, or necessitating, the sanction, i.e. excessive ethical costs such as extermination. Let us explain deontic unavoidability analogously: an action is so unavoidable if not undertaking it would result in excessive ethical costs. Then i/*it can be established that there is no other way than a military strike, an act of war, to ensure that the Zeders desist (and certainly we can envisage scenarios like that), then that is deontically unavoidable. It is also for those committed to, or inclined towards pacifism; and it is, for them at least, but paradoxically justifiable, as the negation is also justifiable, on pacific grounds. Scenarios like that sketched, that appear to render certain wars deontically unavoidable require but little or no elaboration to render them evil. Evil indeed is such a standard feature of standard wars that at least its great presence call for little supporting evidence. But it has taken to vast stretch of human history to reach this general point of recognition. The manifold evils of war Lao Tzu very early recognised and emphasized: Wherever armies are stationed, briars and thorns grow. Great wars are always followed by famines (p.152). And nowadays followed by great tides of refugees. This passage includes not only recognition of the widely-observed socio-environmental consequences of war, but, more striking, very early recognition of the severe environmental impact of military forces. That critique is not however developed in Taoism.2 Only recently has it been pushed substantially further. And only recently could a new, most significant twist occur, the merging of resource security, long a military objective, with environmental security. The appalling idea has recently been floated that the military, in need of new work and roles with the apparent warming of West-East relations and cooling of the Cold War, should exchange usual military idleness for meddling in environmental matters: regulation and policing of environmental resources, ensurance of environmental security of powerful states, and similar. This is a bit like reassigning those imprisoned for child abuse to managing kindergartens; for consider the impressive military record of environmental vandalism. What the military is alleged to offer is a structure appropriate and available for handling such matters. But, to the contrary, it is precisely the sort of hierarchical, authoritarian expensive structure that should be wound down and up as soon as the opportunity appears, as (briefly) now, rather than being retained and shockingly reoriented (as a state-serving "Greenwar"). 2 But a bridge to deep-green theory can be made through neo-Daoism, an updating of Taoism in confirm ity with deep ecology (which however is somewhat thin and threadbare on war; for what there is so far, see Naess p.160). On neo-Daoism, see UT. �7 2. On //ze Jtrergence o/ yrow T^o/yw. Having arrived, by better or worse arguments, at the conclusion that wars, though generally evil, may be sometimes unavoidable, it is evidently important to say something about how they - those of the theoretical residue - are to be conducted. By appropriate conduct the damage they do may be reduced; also the conduct should be appropriate to the funereal nature of wars (to exceed Taoist resources for stating this sort of point). It is at this stage that deep­ green theory begins to diverge from Taoism. In further explaining the Taoist and deep-green critiques of war, and diverting objections to them, <2 roMgA and preliminary %?<9/<9gy is important. It is also of passing interest in its own philosophical right. War, according to English Dictionaries, is a 'contest carried on by force of arms, typically between nations or states'. More exactly, war is a - in the generous technical sense of game-theory, with players, rules, goals, strategies, and so on carried on in significant part by military means, normally between states or substates. Call the contestants, (warring) para&y. They typically represent of course larger populations. The set­ up between parties resembles the arrangements of players in game theory. There are several analogical extensions of the term war to cover games where one of the parties is an object, construed as hostile (an enemy of the state), such as Crime, Drugs, Poverty or Nature. These we can set aside as ana/agma/ wars. Of course wars form only a part of military activities. Military interests and objectives have always stretched significantly further than war, to include surveillence and security, easily extended to resource security, environmental security and life­ style security, and beyond that to political stability and other political matters. Evidently military ambitions have far over-extended themselves in bagging such democratic concerns. An anarchist solution to the whole problem of war, which some have seen Taoism as reaching towards, is immediate: eliminate the source of war, yfafgy. Unfortunately it is not quite that simple (and that's not simple). For wars can also occur between nations, cultures, races or tribes (which are not such artifices as states, and not always so readily or desirably abolished), between inhabited regions, and between factions within states (thus civil wars) or, perhaps by extension, between factions within other social structures (thus, for instance, gang wars). But undoubtedly eliminating states and aspiring states would abolish most wars and virtually all the worst wars. While "nonviolent wars" are excluded by definition, by virtue of 'force of arms', token wars, limited wars, and so on, are not: for instance, wars fought by small armed teams representing competing sides (cf. medieval and science fiction war games). As wars are hemmed in by conventions and agreed rules, there is no reason in principle why they should not be reduced to two person contests, fought under strict rules like boxing or gladiatorial contests. But in modem times wars have never taken such sensible forms, but have been much larger affairs, making heavy (though fortunately restricted) use of latest technology. Let us distinguish such wars as wars. They have, directly or indirectly (for the �20 There is no inconsistency. JWS has confused universal with particular. As well he has wTongly contracted all situational decision making to consequentialist modes. There is a third part to the criticism, that the defence is too easy; the 'strategy will allow rot? violence to be (perpetrated and) justified to suit the tastes of any real pacifist" (p.153). This another part of the so-called trivialization, this time however ^VHrion rather than populatization, weakening the moral stand against violence. This third contention is premissed on a mistake: that one can 'justify on consequentialist grounds any number of violent acts, providing that such acts are lesser evils than other real alternatives facing social agents" (p.153). Moral pacifism offers no such licence; allowing such consequentialism to take over was never part of the position. The slide to such consequentialism is made on the strength of a similarly erroneous example. The potential victim of an aspiring rapist 'is supposed to flee or wriggle free if possible. But it is to consequentially justify the use of violence by the woman to prevent herself from being raped" (p.153 italics added). In the example so far described there is no dilemma, and no such easy resort to consequentially 'justified" violence. What allows too much violence is the lesser evil JWS assumes is easily consequentially justified; for example that the woman is entitled to inflict, and escalate, violence so long as it remains 'a lesser evil than the violence of attempted rape" (p.153). Since she may thereby inflict quite unreasonable damage (esp. if she is a Kung Fu expert), the result is inconsistent with 'the basic principle of self-defence" which JWS earlier adduced according to which what is 'appropriate, in response is 0/7/y that level of force necessary to defend oneself against the threat" (p.150). There is evidence in JWS's work of some enthusiasm for levels of violence which exceed his 'basic principle", his appeal to 'lesser evil" generates some instances. The 'basic principle", itself fraught with difficulties (cf. the contorted discussion of what weapons are appropriate in response to what attacks, p.150), still exceeds what stretched pacifism would enjoin; for instance, it may not be appropriate to respond with force. But in a technical sense stretched pacifism is compatible with the 'basic principle", since it only imposes the upper bound on level of force. As for easiness, moral pacifism is not an easy position to live by, or to justify. Removing objections to pacifism is one thing; solidifying a positive case for it is quite another, and so far hardly conclusive (as Al tried to explain, pp 29-31). Stretched pacifism was advanced, to put it more precisely, as a still viable option. It was not presented as a morally compulsory position, or, for that matter, as one that this defender adhered to or affirmed. To reiterate, while a cumulative case can be made for stetched pacifism as principled non­ violence, that case was not conclusive, and is hard to improve. For, further, some serious difficulties standing in the way of stretched pacifism were assembled, the most important of which derives from the extent of violence apparent in transactions within the natural world. Simply consider the practices of carnivores, essential to their natural way of life. In order to meet their life needs for sustenance, these creatures do, and are often obliged to, engage �8 technology may be bought or bartered), a heavy research and development support structure (indeed the bulk of contemporary science is devoted - misdirected - in one way or another to this effort). and wars. An offensive war is one which ventures off a given party's territory or recognised pad, "invading" that of another party or parties; correlatively defensive parties, if they have not also invaded. Force projection typifies offensive practice. Plainly, offensiveness and defensiveness are not Among wars, an important distinction is that between strictly features of a war, but of parties to a war. In a two-party war, while both parties can easily act offensively, the possibility of both parties proceeding defensively is excluded, unless they share territory. (Even then issues may arise as to which party, if any, was the aggr&yxor, which started it, was responsible for starting it, and so on.) Thus mutually defensive wars between contemporary states are impossible (but would be possible if states shared territory, e.g. if Eire and Britain shared the territory of Northern Ireland). Tao-accredited wars were defensive wars, never wars aiming at domination: last-resort wars, in which no pride was taken (LTp.l52).3 The pretence that offensive wars are defensive is widespread, and reflected in the subterfuge that departments or ministries of war are those of defence, security or whatever. (If they really were what they purport to be, we should be well on the way to an end to war.) Offensive practices are rendered defensive ones by shabby redefinitional strategems, such as redefining 'defensive' to include defence of ideals like democracy or liberty, infringed (or allegedly infringed) on territories abroad, or to include "defence" of a third party or place (whence every offensive war is "defensive"). In the present war in which part of Arabia is engulfed (February 1991), one party claims to be defending what really was (or should be) part of its territory, namely Kuwait, another party to be defending (what Kuwait did not enjoy) democracy. It is a doubly offensive war presented in this guise as jointly defensive. Aggressive wars are waged for a variety of reasons, but usually for resources or access to resources or markets, a matter often disguised by appeal to ideology (thus a war for oil is represented as a war of liberation). But there are other reasons than narrowly economic ones, such as religion (as with crusades), power and aggrandisement (as in building an empire), and so on. Nor are those reasons necessarily far separated; ideologies like Marxism and market 3 There is one line in LT that way suggest that attack was sometimes justifiable, namely 'For deep love helps one to win in the case of attack' (p.219). But how can cow/?a.y.yz'<9/i be appropriate unless this attack is wn/u'/i a defensive setting, a larger context of unavoidability or such like. A passage shortly below confirms this interpretation: I dare not take the offensive but I take the defensive: I dare not advance an inch but I retreat a foot (p.222). These are advances and attacks within a defensive setting. �23 followed with another invasion. Nor have we ever managed to glimpse much of what is now supposed, when we are no longer engaged, to come 'out of the horror of war': a 'new world order ... which governs the conflict of nations'; a 'rule of law', not war. How the one, enforcable law, is achieved, unless backed by the the other, is not explained (Medlin's paradox hits back). Similarly what we now hear from many militarists, as they rush to war, is that 'peace is a great good, war a great evil'. But, for the most part, only the rhetoric has shifted; practice has scarcely changed at all. REFERENCES W.-T. Chan, A referred to as ST. Paa/: on C7zzm?yg P/zz7a.ya/?/zy, Princeton University Press, 1963; W.-T. Chan (ed.), 77za Way a/Lao 7za(Taa-m C/zzrzg), Bobbs-Merrill, New York, 1963; referred to as LT. B. Martin, U/zraarz'/zg War, Freedom Press, London, 1984. A. Naess, Eca/agy, cam/Mmzz'zy a/zb /z/byzy/g, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge UK, 1989. R.A. Rapaport, Pzgy/ar z7z^ Anc^yrary : rima/ zn r/zg eca/agy a/* a University Press, New Haven, 1967. Gamoa P^a/z/e, Yale R. Routley, 'War and Peace II. On the alleged inconsistency, moral insensitivity and fanaticism of pacifism', Dz'yczzyyzan /za/z^ry zzz g/zvzrazzm^zzra/ jz/zz/aya/z/zy #9, Research School of Social Science, Australian National University, 1983 (also in Ezz/zzzzy ); referred to as AL R. Routley and V. Plumwood, 'Moral dilemmas and the logic of deontic notions', Dzycayyza/z ^a/z^ry z/z oma'ronmoma/ p/zz/aya/z/zy #6, Research School of Social Science, Australian National University, 1984 (also in Paracazzyz'y^mLagz'c); referred to as AID. R. Routley, 'War and Peace I. On the ethics of large-scale nuclear war and nuclear-deterrence and the political fall-out', Dz'yczzyyz'a/z pa/z^ry z/z e/zvzra/z/?z^/zfa/ /z/zz/aya/z/zy, #5, Research School Of Social Science, Australian National University, 1984. G. Sharp, Sacz'a/ Pavt^r am/ Pa/z'aca/ Priborn, Porter Sargent, Boston, 1980. J.W. Smith, 77zg War/?zy af zTzg H^arf a/T/zz'/zgy , Public Relations Unit, Flinders University, 1989. R. Sylvan, 'War and Peace III, Australia's defence philosophy', Sacz'a/ P/zz7aya/z/zy, for Nuclear Conference, University of Queensland, 1985. R. Sylvan and D. Bennett, 'Of Utopias, Tao and Deep Ecology', Dz'yczzyyza/z /za/z^ry z/z a/zvz'ra/z/?z^/zra/ /z/zz/aya/z/zy #19, Research School of Social Science, Australian National University, 1990; referred to as UT. �9 capitalism, for example, exhibit many of the features of religion. The economic reasons for war appear to have become much more complex with the advent of an integrated world economy. At the same time many of the independent reasons for economic wars are now obsolete. For to powerful states accrue the advantages of war without war. At least most of the former economic advantages of war can be obtained without expensive wars, through trade, institution of economic dependence, etc. Small medieval wars were sometimes instituted for the collection of neighbouring riches and booty, a kind of piracy meeting conditions of war. "Small" contemporary wars can be waged for a remarkable mix of political-economy ends: to establish a regime favourable to economic penetration and profit repatriation, to subjugate markets and to remove competition, to boost a sagging weapons economy by using up old stocks and also testing new equipment, to restart a depressed economy, and so on. Such wars, along with the economic aims which motivate them, are in effect heavily castigated by Lao Tzu: When Tao prevails in the world, galloping horses are turned back to fertilize (the fields ...}. When Tao does not prevail in the world, war horses thrive in the suburbs. There is no calamity greater than lavish desires. (LT p.181). But it does exceed evidential warrant to claim that Tao is not only sufficient, but for cessation of such practices. The practice of regularly stimulating complex military-saturated economies through war is reminiscent of older, much ridiculed practices in simpler societies. They now ridicule the Tsembaga, who proceeded to destroy much of their surplus product by going to war every 5-15 years (cf Rapaport). But they do not similarly ridicule the most powerful nation on the Earth, the USA, which proceeds to write off a colossal amount of surplus in war every 10-20 years (the Gulf war liquidated some $1.7 billion per day). Taoists would. For ridicule was a favoured method, an important rhetorical strategem, and war and its idiocy were favourite targets. Some classification of defensive wars is also important, for various reasons: reducing and abolishing wars, their costs and damage, restructuring societies away from war and military practices, and, not least, for appreciating Taoism. A main distinction is between * conventional defence, maintained by armies of armed soldiers, many of them professionals, and * social defence, where there are no such armies or but fragments of them, and defence is carried out through social networks of a significant part of society A 4 Details of social defence are presented in Sharp and in Martin. �10 It is here that Taoism and deep-green theory part company. Under Taoism, the state w;7/ have a standing army, but a defensive army operating by strange, surprise tactics (p.201). No doubt defensive wars are to remain last resort action. Nonetheless the state will operate in secrecy, in a way incompatible with decentralised defence; people will be kept in the dark about smart weapons of the state; and they too will be surprised, along with presumed enemies of the state. By contrast, under deep-green theory, there should be no hidden smart weapons of state; information would flow more freely and not be hidden from the people (who should retain influence in informed decision making). Under deep-green, standing armies, and more generally military organisation, will be wound down altogether. Taoism should have pushed its searching criticism further. For military objectives, easily acquired by standing armies with time on their hands, are frequently incompatible with Taoism. For example, Taoism is opposed to domination (LT p.152), whereas military operations frequently seek or involve domination; and military structure is invariably hierarchical and authoritarian. Taoism aims for self-regulation, wherever feasible (cf. p.201); so does deep­ green theory, which is one reasons why it aims to dispose of standing armies, as an important preliminary to the withering away of states themselves (military forces being major props of state control and power, and often maintained primarily for internal state security). Taoism has no project for ending the era of wars; deep-green theory does. That project involves an elimination of standing armies, too often poised for fighting or political interference. A recommended route to ^<7 war consists in progressive scaling down: reduction of the means and manpower. The initial stages are well-known, and include * elimination of nuclear, biological and chemical weaponry, and * force reduction. It can hardly be pretended that the Earth's states have managed to proceed very far on even this complex of stages. The next stage consists in * contraction to defensive capacities only, and the final stage consists in * elimination of remaining military defensive forces, and adoption, so far as required, of social defence practices. The complete route thus involves complete demilitarisation. Reasons why deep-green aims to proceed the /a// distance are readily grasped by considering the environmental shallowness of an otherwise cogent traditional case for the sharp curtailment of wars and militarism. The traditional Western case against wars has been primarily along two dimensions: social and moral. Wars are highly disruptive of the social fabric; wars may be unjust. From these joint features, it was argued that wars should be a matter of last resort, to be fought to ensure peace. It was argued further that only just wars should be fought. Just wars were rare objects. But as there was little evidence of the decline and fall of wars, much effort was expended, more practically and unsuccessfully, upon endeavouring to improve the calibre of wars, and more theoretically, upon trying to characterize war satisfactorily, or rather to bend the notion in an effort to approximate the gory unjust facts. �11 Progress was long hindered, furthermore, because there was always a rival positive perspective on wars, which encouraged the exaltation of wars and military feats. It also facilitated the transfer of the favourable image of war to other problem areas, whence the long and apparently successful war against Nature (but the short-term successes are turning into long-term problems), the short and unsuccessful war against Poverty, and so on. Behind all this is the complex idea of war as rejuvenating, even cleansing, like fire; of war as heroic, and glorious, of war as the supreme testing ground of men. These pictures of war - finally shattered by the first World War (where even the poets began to tell of horrors and atrocities) and subsequent technological wars - though no longer in ascendency, have by no means vanished. The notion of war as rejuvenating a flagging economy persists, along with the practice of keeping capitalism running smoothly by integrating substantial military components into the industrial engine. With the development of highly technological wars - the celebrated development of the dirty industrial age is substantially military - the traditional negative case has grown in strength. Wars have become much more damaging, with the potential for much more that is significantly worse, and the possibility of a just war has correspondingly contracted, virtually to zero The opposition to war has likewise grown, but more than correspondingly with the rise of women in social and political influence. Wars have almost always and everywhere been Men's affairs; likewise conquest. Deep-green theory accepts much of the traditional negative case, but would further strengthen it. For example, the stricture against unjust wars, as out and out immoral, can be strengthened, through the following syllogism: All wars should be fully just wars. Modem wars cannot be fully just wars. Therefore, there should be no modern wars. A fully just war is not merely a just war, but a war those just character can be reliably forecast in advance. A modern war is of course a war that deploys modern technology, at least that available this century. The evidential basis for the second premiss derives from much information that collateral damage, damage to innocent bystanders and involved citizens is always likely and cannot be excluded. Such wars are always liable to violate uncontroversial requirements for a just war, even if they are purely "conventional" wars, not throwing radiation or chemical or biological weapons around. From a contemporary viewpoint the traditional doctrine of a just war, really of a just war, is seriously out of date. The reasons for this reach wider than the new features introduced by modem technological wars and the character of modem civilization, with its giant cities littered with dangerous and vulnerable military targets. They have also to do with the chauvinism of the justice proposed, which is shallow human justice, not natural or environmental justice. There is no consideration of justice to other creatures or to the Earth (cf �12 Naess p.160). Two troubles are really intertwined here: conceptual difficulties with too narrow a notion of justice, and ideological difficulties with too narrow a vision of what is an object of value, of what counts. The deep-green case against war adds to the traditional case a further dimension, neglected until very recently: the environmental dimension. It has suddenly been seen that wars are typically environmental atrocities. Earlier, of course, "environments" were simply backgrounds, backdrops in paintings and plays, to the real drama. Contemporary technological wars tend to be not merely social tragedies but environmental ones as well. There is a doctrine of just war, but it is a human chauvinistic affair. There is no similarly developed doctrine of an gco/og/c^Z/y war, a deep ecological war. Unless any such war were literally different from modern wars, that is from contemporary technological wars, it would overstep permitted bounds. For such wars are characteristically ecological disasters. Hardened military people, desensitized by a rigorous unethical training, feel even less compunction about degrading or destroying environments or members of other species than they do of maiming or killing civilians through "collateral" activity. Matching the no-just-war syllogism is a no-sound-war syllogism: All wars should be environmentally sound wars. Modern wars cannot be environmentally sound. Therefore, there should be no modern wars. The argument for the second premiss has of course to be different. It looks to the information accumulating on what wars do to natural and built environments. The Vietnam and Gulf wars both inflicted immense damage on natural environments or what was left of them. The environmental effects of war are not confined to direct and collateral damage. There are indirect effects also. Thus, for instance, war also supplied the mechanism of, and the technology for, modern environmental destruction: explosives, bulldozers from tanks, etc. As well, training for war and engagement in war have much fostered, along with attitudes that make for social callousness or ruthlessness, those that contribute to environmental insensitivity and cruelty. 3. PMzzZes sfrafegy and /Zs o/ fec/tno/ogy an;? woZence Tt is surprising how much of the E<2<? TzM is devoted to military strategy". Which strategies? Surprise, above all. But why such strategies? 'Do they not contradict the Taoists" strong opposition to the use of force" (Chan p.222), the implied commitment to quietism? Briefly, Taoism is not committed to quietism, and while certainly antagonistic to violence, does not oppose certain uses of force (only really ///-forcing, as will be explained). Even so, the emphasis on military strategy remains puzzling. * The strategies, many of them relevant to social defence, include not 'making light of the enemy" (p.222) �13 * and nonvisibility (p.201). The defensive strategy involves guerilla tactics: marching without formation, holding weapons without seeming to have them, confronting enemies without seeming to meet them (p.222). But even in times of peace, 'smart weapons of the state should not be displayed to the people" (p.164). Such recommendations helped to fpeT the charge of deviousness lodged against Lao Tzu. But look at part of the reason for concealing smart weapons: 'The more smart weapons the people have, the more troubled the state will be" (p.201). Smart weapons are carried in corrupt states, where the rich engage in conspicuous consumption and the people are suppressed, not where Tao is practiced (LT p. 194). * advance from flexibility but firmness. Weakness is the principle of life and will overcome strength (LT p.164, p.233). * coolness and (LT p.233, p.164). Like these, most of the general strategies are standard Taoist practices simply applied to military conduct. For these standard practices the charge of deviousness looks feeble. / The response applies more generally to other allegedly devious political strategies. For the strategies are but application of Taoist principles and techniques to warfare, politics and elsewhere. Nothing excludes application of these techniques to what are accounted, in general, unnecessary evils (which must sometimes, on other Taoist grounds, be countered). Nor, to meet the main criticism, need any deceit or deviousness be involved; nor is it. In particular, the legalist tactic, Tn order to grasp, it is necessary first to give" (LT p.164), is cited as involving 'an element of deceit" 'undeniably", and 'worse" it is 'morally questionable" (Chan p.17). But in order for me to grasp your hand in a normal handshake, it is necessary first for me to give my hand. There is no deceit here, nothing morally questionable. All the tactics permit of benign construals, of a Taoist kind. Consider, for instance, Tn order to contract, it is necessary first to expand" (LT p.164). In order to bend a copper pipe to the intended angle, it is better to bend it first a little further than required. The transformation of water to ice (both favoured natural items for symbolic purposes: natural processes which may look devious!) neatly illustrates the Taoist principle (which is however hardly necessary), and shows softness and weakness turned hardness and strength. The Taoist critique of militarism is as much a critique of technology as of war. Sharp weapons, 'smart weapons' as we might now say, come in for much critical attention, as we have already noticed. Only in corrupt and degenerate states are they displayed or flaunted (p.194, p.164); in deep-green regions smart weapons of state" would not be retained unexhibited. The people will not have them for they mean trouble (p.201); for similar reasons deep-green regions will be free of them. So, it seems, will ideal Taoist regions: 'Even if there are arrows and weapons, none will display them" (LT p.238). Much technology, military and other, is excluded under the Taoist edict against violence (a further facet of the military-practices �paradox).5 The powerful critique of militarism in the CA&ig is coupled with strong opposition to violence. Some of the linkage is evident enough. Militarism as practised represents an ultimate form of state (or party) violence. A basic theme is that violent practices will come to an unnatural end, and accordingly to a non-Taoist end (generalising LT p.176). While force may occur in spectacular, but satisfactory, natural forms, force is duly distinguished from violence. To force the growth of life means ill omen. For the mind to employ the vital force without restraint means violence (LT p. 197). One who follows Tao does not apply dominating force, which usually has had results bringing requital (p.152). Dominating force, like power, is in general castigated, under doctrine of wuno forced actions, no violence. To force natural growth is deviant, destroying harmony. To stop natural growth is deviant. But there is a significant difference between force and violence. To intentionally employ destructive force is to do violence. To so force things is condemned. To remain in harmony with things one does not so force things or practice violence. There is a non-interference principle at work, which also indicates types of non­ interference that are excluded. However Taoism does not always get the distinction between force and violence quite 5 Under contemporary technology and technological arrangements, such as the storage of quantities of oil and nuclear and chemical materials in great cities, wars have assumed new and very destructive dimensions, to the point of being utterly irresponsible. A different approach to technology, as to war, is now mandatory. These are no longer things that can in principle be nicely confined and need not touch parties outside the fray. An important part of ending wars, "winning the war against wars", is removing the technology of war, above all from irresponsible state power. As for which technology to try to jettison and which to try to retain or improve, it is not so difficult to indicate, provided evaluative terminology is not outlawed. What is wanted is technology that is good in its place, what should be excluded is technology that is indifferent or bad or potentially so. Technology to be justified has to do something worthwhile, it has to address identifiable respectable needs. That is why merely indifferent technology is out; there is no virtue in technology for technology's sake, as it is a mere technique. It is because of the crucial evaluative component in choice of technology that itself evaluative, comes closer to encapsulating the criterion than other recent efforts. Size, such as smallness, or intermediateness, are not what matter, though modest and not excessive technologies are likely to fare better in satisfying appropriateness. In simpler societies, small technology is of course more appropriate; for that is what is good there. From known criteria for what is good these other features for locally appropriate technology can be read off: reliability, esp. in maintenance, functioning well and safely under the expected range of operating conditions (which may be difficult), ease of repair, capital cheapness and repair inexpensiveness, environmental benignness, and meeting sound social needs. �15 right. 'Vital force without restraint', intentionally excessive force, is only part of what counts as vzo/^zzc^, which is more generally w/zz'c/z i.e. transgresses, descrecrates, profanes, injures, outrages, etc. It is thus a negatively connoted force, an evil force in some specified intentional respect. There is a tendency for Taoist commentators, not Taoists, to regard Taoism as condemning all uses, or even occurrences, of force, but this is not so. Rather intentional ill-forcing is what is castigated, what is deviant. Thus Taoism does not exclude a range of defensive practices, which make satisfactory use of natural forces, like letting the machines of war industry stop. Those who would abolish war and its machinery, substituting for it nonwarlike and ideally nonviolent methods, technology, and strategies, have been confronted not merely with much sub-rational abuse but with plenty of criticism and even some paradoxes. Here is a recent paradox concerning war and nonviolence: * War must be abolished. One reason is simply economic. We can no longer afford it, and the opportunity costs are enormous. Along with other extraordinarily wasteful activities, it is an anachronism. * Doing so cannot be accomplished without violence, i.e. in effect, given the types of violence involved, without what amounts to war. According to a fuller version of this premiss, the process of abolishing a war would only be achieved through a revolution so profound that it could not succeed without extensive and extreme violence, amounting to (civil) war. ° But then war cannot be abolished without war. Therefore, war which must be abolished cannot be abolished.^ This "paradox" has been compared with the Liar paradox, but the parallel does not persist far. For this paradox does not involve self-referential features, and is easily broken, as follows. Let the "last war" be not the last standard war but the revolution abolishing war. Then, given that the revolution is successful, war will be abolished therewith, i.e. with that last war. There need be no regress, given again a successful outcome. All the premisses stand intact, but the conclusion, following the 'therefore' is a nonsequitur. However, while the dissolution of the argument is accordingly logically fine, the route is repugnant. Standard pacifism challenges the 6 Brian Medlin, who forcefully propounded this puzzle, set other analogous puzzles alongside it - designed to reveal deep difficulties in contemporary political, and especially alternative, thought. Another puzzle, concerning liberty and repression in the context of capitalism, revolved around the following inconsistent triad: * capitalism must be removed, but liberty retained. * capitalism cannot be removed without repression. * repression is antithetical to liberty. The puzzle is resolved as with the analogous puzzle of abolishing. Let the "last capitalist" action the days of liberty be the repressive but liberating revolution overthrowing capitalism. �second premiss. 4. anJ nioraZ jz^cf/zy/T!. Although Taoism is strongly opposed to war, and much in favour of peace - and accordingly by prevailing standards a substantially pacz/zc position - it is not (nowhere in the central texts) committed to pacifism in usual senses, for two different reasons:* It is not, by contrast with pacifism, opposed to all types of warfare, for example smart defensive wars. * It eschews deontology in terms of which moral pacifism is commonly stated, for instance through the watershed thesis P2. It is morally wrong to use violence. By contrast with Taoism, deep environmentalism does not avoid deontic claims, and is committed zVz /?rzzzcz/?/g to nonviolent technologies and ways and to pacifistic principles. Moreover, certain forms of deep environmentalism are completely committed to pacifism, notably European forms. Is deep green? There is heavy contemporary opposition to pacifism, as there also was to Taoism in the warring times when Taoism was first being promulgated. Many of the central institutions of contemporary life are intricated in coercion, violence and war. The most prominent contemporary institutions, states, are premissed on these elements of damaging force; they claim entitlement to use them widely, and even claim a certain territorial monopoly on their use. As a result they are having constantly to engage in them in attempt to maintain that monopoly. They are certainly the main perpetrators of wars, and of violence. They are indeed inured to wars, are in constant preparation for wars, yet propound dialectial (and normally dishonest and cynical) doctrines of peace through war (for a recent example see the appendix). Unremarkably then, the extensive propagandistic machinery of state has invested heavily in "justificatory" exercises in favour of controlled use, z^ own use, of destructive force, and continues to inveigh against pacifism. Because a routine trick in this sophistical repetoire consists in conflating pacifism with extreme, naive and inplausible, forms, an inevitable and important early task commits in unscrambling senses of 'pacifism'. Semantical skulduggery can be thwarted in this way. /^cz/zym, as explained by English dictionaries, invariably concerns wars and warfare, and contains two components, negative and, elaborating on that, positive:- The negative component opposition (in ways to be further specified) to all forms of warfare (see OED). The positive component supplies alternative ways of settling disputes (what is, in Amauld's word, it is supposed that wars with some semblance of justification involve), such as negotiation, arbitration, ... - and, adding to too narrow dictionary accounts - sanctions, substitutions (e.g. of sporting events, operatic contests, cooperative ventures), .... In brief ^a/z^ar^ /zacz/Aw is opposition to all warfare and resolution of potential wars by other nonmilitary means. �17 to warfare, like the sanctions and so on, cannot itself be military (using soldiers and other devices of war), on pain of some incoherence. But otherwise the ways of opposition can be many and various! they can certainly be as with nonviolent demonstrations, resistance movements, and so forth, and they may also be devious (e.g. turning the forces of war upon themselves so they are neutralised). It quickly becomes evident, then, that some of the dictionaries offer but loaded definitions which, by restricting the negative Plainly the components, reduce the initial appeal and plausibility of pacifism. Consider the Eng/fy/? definition of the negative component: 'the doctrine of non-resistance to hostilities and of total non-co-operation with any form of warfare'. Thereby excluded are forms of pacifism which offer active and plausible alternatives to warfare such as social defence. The Eng/7y/z tends to force pacifism into what the Eng/fy/i Efcfforza/y lists as its final item: 'often, with depreciatory implication, the advocacy of peace at any price', 'in any circumstance'. Pacifism can easily resist being forced into these sorts of circumstances: it has many resources, as an extensive series of texts on alternatives to war, such as negotiation, non­ violent action and social defence, from Taoism to contemporary environmentalism attest. Academic philosophers have much advanced the semantical strategy of some dictionaries, of rendering pacifism more difficult from the very outset by narrow and biassed definitions. They have stretched the term from its restricted setting of warfare, confined to state and organised gang violence, to cover all forms of violence, from state and interstate to, what is very different, personal and interpersonal violence. Call the resulting considerably stretched notion of pacifism, according to which it is morally wrong to use violence, according to which P2 holds, p<2c(/Ts7??.7 While stretched pacifism certainly includes standard pacifism (unless the notions of war and warfare are tampered with), the converse is very far from being the case. A pacifist is in no way committed to stretched pacifism, which is a much more problematic and difficult position than standard pacifism. There are several, substantially different reasons for this, which will be picked up seriatim. Stretched pacifism, also misleadingly called wora/ pacifism, has looked a very easy critical target to moral philosophers. Many the effusive philosopher who, upon sighting such a target, has charged, whooping such rhetoric as "incoherent", "inconsistent", "insensitive", "fanatical". However, with improved logical technology now available for accommodating and treating moral dilemmas, it is no great feat to resist such attacks, in the fashion of previous investigations (see esp. Al, also MD). A main aim was to demonstrate that stretched pacifism was not so stupid as it was made out to be or appeared to be to these inured to present dominant violent ways. So far from being stupid, it is viable. In future gentler times stretched pacifism 7 In Al this notion was contrasted with standard pacifism as might have been better. pacifism: �18 could even be realised for whole communities of creatures (as some genuinely Christian sects envisaged); whence it will finally be seen to be feasible not merely for sages and supermen, and many ordinary women, but much more extensively. The method of philosophical accommodation was through moral dilemmas. The sort of moral dilemma that stretched pacifism can induce derives as follows. On the one side stands the theme P2, Wv, in convenient symbols, for Wrong V-ing, violencing. Now this implies to WB, where B presents a case of of violence. On the other side, particular circumstances develop which lead to W -B, because -B would produce in the circumstances considerable wrong, for instance extensive violence, mass murder, etc. One stock example from the literature concerns calling off the firing squad about to shoot several captives the pacifist shoots one of them (it is elaborated in Al p.13). Interestingly, another stock example from the literature concerns standard pacifism (it can also be presented in terms of patriotism; for details of both see MD p.10). Resolution of intractable moral dilemmas is, where it is required, situational. The agent decides in the situation, wifAi/r the fix, what to do. There are many ways in which such decision making can proceed, less rational, such as those applying chance or involving bad faith, or more rational, such as those applying consequentialist decision theory (for details see MD, pp.32-9). A decision theory taking account of <2// that should be included will not however be purely consequential. It would also take account of relevant motivation. This defence and rehabilitation of moral pacifism has been challenged, in particular by Smith (hereafter JWS). JWS claims the defence offered is a 'failure because it trivializes pacifism' (p. 153 twice). The rehabilitation trivializes pacifism because it entails that pacifism doesn't substantially differ from a form of acfzvz.S7?z which holds that while violence is a/wayy wrong one is justified on consequentialist grounds for preferring violent acts, if these acts are lesser evils than any other real alternatives. This is the commonsense position which most people hold - yet -- pacifism after all was supposed to be radical moral doctrine - (p.153 rearranged).^ of the criticism is, then, not so much that pacifism is trivialized - JWS "activism'' is hardly trivial - as that pacifism is /?r?/?zz/d:rz\y^(/, deflated from a radical position to the commonsense position most people hold (p.154 also). Yet not a shred of evidence is adduced that JWS activism is such a populist position. Available evidence, for example from peace movements and oppositional opinion polls, suggests the very opposite: that, for instance, most people support state-justified conventional wars with the military violence they incur, and 8 JWS now informs me that he has changed his position. Whether the move effects his criticism, I don't know. �19 accordingly do not hold that violence is always wrong. From such a commonsense angle, pacifism with its condemnation of conventional wars and the violence they involve remains a radical doctrine. As regards wars and other violence-incurring social authorities, contemporary pacificism is, as previous explained (e.g. Al p.3), a form of activism. Pacifism does not imply utter pacifity, but may actively involve social defence, resistance and so on. However a certain level of misrepresentation enters into the JWS challenge in the details of what forms of activism pacifism may include. That misrepresentation begins in the second clause concerning what is said to be sometimes justified. For the situational procedure where dilemmas arise will not generally be consequential applying a principle of lesser evil. In dilemmatic situations such principles are suspended, and such a principle is in any case unacceptable to moral pacifists. A small amount of violence may be less bad in its consequences than verbal offence, but a principled pacifist will choose the slightly greater evil where other obligations do not exclude it. A more serious distortion occurs in JWS's effort to force procedures in dilemma situations into purely consequentialist form. In fact consequential decision theory was deployed as a only for how to proceed rationally in a situational setting where deontic procedures were suspended (see MD p.38). What was said, still misleadingly retrospective vision reveals, was this: "what is done is a very consequentialist thing' (Al p.13), nor 'one acts in a consequentialist fashion to do the sufficiently good thing in the circumstances' (JWS p.152). Situationally or/zgr procedures than those resembling orthodox rational decision making (modified from maximizing to satisizing objectives) may be adopted (MD p.38). Further the orthodox consequentialist theory is inadequate because it leaves out, or tries to reduce to consequences, nonconsequential elements, notably motives. It is not difficult, in principle (in advance of attempted consequentialization of modves), to design situations where modves, such as integrity or maintaining faith, enter to yield outcomes upsetting consequential calculations. More elaborate decision making procedures than those of consequentialism, sometimes at variance with consequentialism, are thus presupposed. A further part of JWS's criticism accordingly goes by the board, the alleged appeal 'to "second best" consequentialist considerations,... already explicitly condemned' (p.154). What was condemned was stock universal consequentialism, 'that <?n/y consequentialist considerations carry argumentative weight' (quoted on p.152), so undercutting other deontic principles, such as those of pacifism. It was not claimed, what is utterly different, that consequentialist considerations can enter into deliberation and decision making. The conclusion JWS arrives at is therefore substantially astray. After criticising modern moral philosophy for its reliance upon consequentialist modes of thought, it is surprising, and inconsistent, to find ... [reliance] upon such modes of thought to escape logical difficulties raised by moral dilemmas facing ... pacifis[m] (p.152) �19 accordingly do not hold that violence is always wrong. From such a commonsense angle, pacifism with its condemnation of conventional wars and the violence they involve remains a radical doctrine. As regards wars and other violence-incurring social authorities, contemporary pacificism is, as previous explained (e.g. Al p.3), a form of activism. Pacifism does not imply utter pacifity, but may actively involve social defence, resistance and so on. However a certain level of misrepresentation enters into the JWS challenge in the details of what forms of activism pacifism may include. That misrepresentation begins in the second clause concerning what is said to be sometimes justified. For the situational procedure where dilemmas arise will not generally be consequential applying a principle of lesser evil. In dilemmatic situations such principles are suspended, and such a principle is in any case unacceptable to moral pacifists. A small amount of violence may be less bad in its consequences than verbal offence, but a principled pacifist will choose the slightly greater evil where other obligations do not exclude it. A more serious distortion occurs in JWS's effort to force procedures in dilemma situations into purely consequentialist form. In fact consequential decision theory wa3 deployed as a only for how to proceed rationally in a situational setting where deontic procedures were suspended (see MD p.38). What was said, still misleadingly retrospective vision reveals, was this: 'what is done is a very consequentialist thing' (Al p.13), /tor 'one acts in a consequentialist fashion to do the sufficiently good thing in the circumstances' (JWS p.152). Situationally ofAer procedures than those resembling orthodox rational decision making (modified from maximizing to satisizing objectives) may be adopted (MD p.38). Further the orthodox consequentialist theory is inadequate because it leaves out, or tries to reduce to consequences, nonconsequential elements, notably motives. It is not difficult, in principle (in advance of attempted consequentialization of motives), to design situations where motives, such as integrity or maintaining faith, enter to yield outcomes upsetting consequential calculations. More elaborate decision making procedures than those of consequentialism, sometimes at variance with consequentialism, are thus presupposed. A further part of JWS's criticism accordingly goes by the board, the alleged appeal 'to "second best" consequentialist considerations,... already explicitly condemned' (p.154). What was condemned was stock universal consequentialism, 'that on/y consequentialist considerations carry argumentative weight' (quoted on p.152), so undercutting other deontic principles, such as those of pacifism. It was not claimed, what is utterly different, that consequentialist considerations can enter into deliberation and decision making. The conclusion JWS arrives at is therefore substantially astray. After criticising modern moral philosophy for its reliance upon consequentialist modes of thought, it is surprising, and inconsistent, to find ... [reliance] upon such modes of thought to escape logical difficulties raised by moral dilemmas facing ... pacifis[m] (p.152) �20 There is no inconsistency. JWS has confused universal with particular. As well he has wrongly contracted all situational decision making to consequentialist modes. There is a third part to the criticism, that the defence is too easy; the 'strategy will allow r<9<9 mMc/z violence to be (perpetrated and) justified to suit the tastes of any real pacifist' (p.153). This another part of the so-called trivialization, this time however <7;7Mh<9H rather than populatization, weakening the moral stand against violence. This third contention is premissed on a mistake: that one can 'justify on consequentialist grounds any number of violent acts, providing that such acts are lesser evils than other real alternatives facing social agents' (p.153). Moral pacifism offers no such licence; allowing such consequentialism to take over was never part of the position. The slide to such consequentialism is made on the strength of a similarly erroneous example. The potential victim of an aspiring rapist 'is supposed to flee or wriggle free if possible. But it is easy to consequentially justify the use of violence by the woman to prevent herself from being raped' (p.153 italics added). In the example so far described there is no dilemma, and no such easy resort to consequentially 'justified' violence. What allows too much violence is the lesser evil JWS assumes is easily consequentially justified; for example that the woman is entitled to inflict, and escalate, violence so long as it remains 'a lesser evil than the violence of attempted rape' (p.153). Since she may thereby inflict quite unreasonable damage (esp. if she is a Kung Fu expert), the result is inconsistent with 'the basic principle of self-defence' which JWS earlier adduced according to which what is 'appropriate, in response is on/y that level of force necessary to defend oneself against the threat' (p.150). There is evidence in JWS's work of some enthusiasm for levels of violence which exceed his 'basic principle', his appeal to 'lesser evil' generates some instances. The 'basic principle', itself fraught with difficulties (cf. the contorted discussion of what weapons are appropriate in response to what attacks, p.150), still exceeds what stretched pacifism would enjoin; for instance, it may not be appropriate to respond with force. But in a technical sense stretched pacifism is compatible with the 'basic principle', since it only imposes the upper bound on level of force. As for easiness, moral pacifism is not an easy position to live by, or to justify. Removing objections to pacifism is one thing; solidifying a positive case for it is quite another, and so far hardly conclusive (as Al tried to explain, pp 29-31). Stretched pacifism was advanced, to put it more precisely, as a still viable option. It was not presented as a morally compulsory position, or, for that matter, as one that this defender adhered to or affirmed. To reiterate, while a cumulative case can be made for stetched pacifism as principled non­ violence, that case was not conclusive, and is hard to improve. For, further, some serious difficulties standing in the way of stretched pacifism were assembled, the most important of which derives from the extent of violence apparent in transactions within the natural world. Simply consider the practices of carnivores, essential to their natural way of life. In order to meet their life needs for sustenance, these creatures do, and are often obliged to, engage �21 routinely in violent activity. While it can no doubt be argued, as some vegetarians may do, that the natural order is an immoral order, and that remaining carnivores should be converted to vegetarianism as rapidly as proves possible (in the way domestic dogs are converted to dog biscuits), the difficulties with such proposals are immense. The task envisaged is gigantic, and beyond human capacities - even if it were desirable. For there are millions of species to be somehow converted to proper vegetarianism. Then there are millions of other species to be converted to proper and well regulated contraceptive practices, else their numbers will get out of hand (uncontrollably) with predation removed. Given humans lack of success in limiting their own excessive numbers, such regulation appears entirely remote. Aside however from the practical difficulties, is such a fully vegetarian order, with evolution further derailed, a desirable improvement on the natural order? Is it morally obligatory? It is certainly not obligatory, as alternative systems of morality in harmony with the prevailing natural order are feasible. Nor is it desirable, for (to appeal to such alternative value systems) the natural order is more or less in order as it is. Full vegetarianization would only reduce its value, vastly. More generally, a defensible ethical framework should not, it would be rightly contended, be right out of step with the natural order of other creatures, decently depicted. Decent depiction is important, for some features of the natural order, such as competition, combat and predation, so far from escaping attention, have been grossly exaggerated and exploited. Thus, for instance, the ludicrous picture of nature red in truth and claw, so beloved of descendents of orthodox Victorians and of orthodox economists. However, even under decent depiction, the "natural order" is often not benign. That appears to be enough to induce a supervenient moral dilemma for any stretched pacifism which is coupled to a deep ethic (e.g. which does not separate humans out from the natural order) and which eschews the desperate vegetarian route: The natural order is not an immoral order The natural order contains (regular) instances of violence. Therefore, instances of violence are not immoral in apparent defiance of P2 Moreover, there are too many instances of violence, too regularly occurring, for them all to be plausibly shunted into the moral dilemma category (and predatory carnivores face no dilemmas). Raptors that practice violence every week are not immoral (neither are they clearly moral; the category of morality only significantly extends so far). The main trouble lies however with P2 (which needs some finer adjustment, as was alrady indicated in Al). While P2 is alright in context, within a particular, perfectly viable, ethical framework, designed for the usual human round, the conventional setting for ethical theories, it stands in need of modification outside that setting. It is time to suggest the sort of modification envisaged. Evidently P2 was addressed to moral agents. Which agents? Not to carnivores that supply their own livelihood, nor really to morally degenerate humans, but to �22 peace-sensitive agents. With that semi-technical form, yet to be characterised, a suitably modified P2 results: MP2. It is morally wrong, for a peace-sensitive agent, to use violence.^ To recover what amounts, in the previous discussive context, to P2, it suffices to add the proposition that every human agent ought to be peace-sensitive. Much as that proposition has to recommend it, it appears too ethically advanced for many modem humans; it sets too high a moral standard to be taken as a serious guide to practice. It seems wise to settle presently for something less demanding, such as that every advanced moral agent ought to be peace sensitive. To put essentially the same proposition alternatively: (as modified) is While it is perhaps too late to hope for much moral progress in humans, it is pleasant to contemplate alternative futures where what is supererogatory became obligatory, and widely practiced. Richard Sylvan* I began drafting this essay at the time (January 17, midday Australian time) of the American attacks upon Iraq. The optly named Prime Minister Hawke of Australia had just made a statement to the nation-state, announcing (the) war. In this statement there was much talk of peace. There was even - in what was effectively a declaration of war - reiteration of the modem quest for 'a new world order of peace". Peace through war; so it rings out again and again, through the centuries. 'War must be for the sake of peace" (Aristotle p.220). More than two thousand years later, we have fought those wars to end all wars. But it is no use, Hawke solemely pronounced, just fa/Aing a&oMf and thinking about peace; we must work for peace,/tg Ar for it - through war. Impeccable logic? President Bush, supreme commander, convinced us with similar logic, speaking too with many tongues. Of how he 'preferred to think of peace, not war". But now 'only force will prevail", as 'all reasonable efforts to reach a peaceful solution are exhausted". 'What must be done" must be done, or will be anyway. With God on side with the US offensive (as well as on the other side), it will go well. As it was said to have, though it achieved comparatively little that other efforts may not have yielded more satisfactorily, and thought it may now have to 9 The generalization of P2, suggested in Al, to cover also the parallel situation of environmental vandalism, can be similarly modified. The anti-vandolence principle becomes MP2°. It is morally wrong, for a peace- and environmentally-sensitive agent, to use vandolence. Thank to David Bennett for joint contributions (from UT) and to JWS for opposition (in JWS) �followed with another invasion. Nor have we ever hanaged (o glimpse much of what is now supposed, when we are no longer engaged, to come^ 'out of ihe horror of war': a new world order ... which governs the conflict of nations'; a; 'rule law', not war. How the one, enforcable law, is achieved, unless backed by the the bther, & not explained (Medlin's paradox hits back). Similarly what we now hear from many militarists, as they rush to war, is that 'peace is a great good, war a great evil'. But, for the'mosLpart, only the rhetoric has shifted; practice has scarcely changed at all. REFERENCES W.-T. Chan, A -Source Poo/: on Chines P/zi/osop/zy, Princeton University Press, 1963; referred to as ST. W.-T. Chan (ed.), 77ze Way a/* Tao Tza(Tao-re C/zing), Bobbs-Merrill, New York, 1963; referred to as LT. B. Martin, (/proofing War, Freedom Press, London, 1984. A. Naess, Eco/ogy, commtziry and /i/esfy/e, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge UK, 1989. R.A. Rapaport, Pigs/or r/ze Anchors : rita/ in r/ze eco/ogy o/*a New Guinea Pcop/e, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1967. R. Routley, 'War and Peace II. On the alleged inconsistency, moral insensitivity and fanaticism of pacifism', Di-srn.y.s'ion papers in environment/ p/zi/osop/zy #9, Research School of Social Science, Australian National University, 1983 (also in /notary ); referred to as Al. R. Routley and V. Plumwood, 'Moral dilemmas and the logic of deontic notions', Discussion papers in environment/ p/zi/osop/zy #6, Research School of Social Science, Australian National University, 1984 (also in Paraconsz'srenr Logic); referred to as MD. R. Routley, 'War and Peace I. On the ethics of large-scale nuclear war and nuclear-deterrence and the political fall-out', Discussion papers in environment/ p/zi/osop/zy, #5, Research School Of Social Science, Australian National University, 1984. G. Sharp, Socia/ Power and Po/irica/ Freedom, Porter Sargent, Boston, 1980. J W. Smith, 77ze Worms ar r/ze /Vearr o/T/zings , Public Relations Unit, Flinders University, 1989. R. Sylvan, 'War and Peace III, Australia's defence philosophy', -Socia/ P/zi/osop/zy, for Nuclear Conference, University of Queensland, 1985. R. Sylvan and D. Bennett, 'Of Utopias, Tao and Deep Ecology', Discussion papers in environment/ p/zi/osop/zy #19, Research School of Social Science, Australian National University, 1990; referred to as UT. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Draft Papers Description An account of the resource Sylvan's literary executor encountered an archive in which “all his projects were current", since manuscripts were undated and unattributed. Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document ON EXTIRPATING WAR: TAO AND DEEP-GREEN PACIFISM Taoism and deep-green environmental theory, although closely aligned on very many issues, diverge over war. For Taoism, by contrast for instance with Buddhism, is not a pacific doctrine, but is committed to skilful defensive militarism. While it does not espouse a fortress mentality, Taoism certainly condones limited defensive military operations for specific purposes, a sort of guerilla warfare. By contrast, deep-green theory, whilp acknowledging the role of organised social defence, stands opposed to professional militarism, and thereby to military defence, and is committed to a principled pacifism. Conveniently a route through Taoism, philosophically fascinating in its own right, will lead us to problems of pacifism and towards deep-green theory. FeaZi/res o/ a Tacts/ o/ war antZ wn#tarfs?n. War did not receive a favourable press in ancient Chinese philosophy. Generally aggression and war were to be avoided. Even Confucius itnposed very demanding conditions: for example, "when good men have instructed the people [in morals, agriculture, military tactics] for seven years, they may be allowed to bear arms,' Tf a ruler ... does not set himself right, even his commands will not be obeyed' (SB p.41, italics added). Mo Tzu went much further than Confucius, roundly condemning war — on utilitarian grounds, that war yields no net benefit at any level (SB p.227). What is more, he backed his heavy condemnation practically (unlike some conspicuous contemporary theoretical utilitarians); "he did not hesitate to walk for ten days and ten nights in an effort to dissuade a ruler from making war' (SB p.212). But none, it is said, went as far, in a detailed and sophisticated criticism of war, as Lao Tzu; "none has condemned war more strongly than Lao Tzu'. '[T]he opposition of Taoism to the use of force is well-known, and the most bitter attack on militarism if found in the L<3<9 TzM (Chan, p.154, p.17.) / But, after that splendid the text is slightly disappointing. Lao Tzu does not id build-up, bu assert outright that war is ann abomination, or even roundly condemn it. His critique of war, militarism, and military teclhhology, is subtle and oblique, and, on the surface, far distanced from pacifism. For he does/not s/n< recommend an end to war - in that genuine Taoists, those who possess Tao, will never participate in them - but expects wars to continue as Worse, he even goes so far as to outline proper attitudes to war and conduct in war, and indeed teqhi to suggest military techniques and strategies, some of which look decidedly devious. Among the classical works ^f Taoism, we focus on the Lao Tza because, by contrast with other works, a remarkable component of that book is devoted to war and militarism. The apparent deviousness of the tactics Lao Tzu allocates serves to highlight what has been seen as The most troublesome element' in his philosophy (Chan p.17) - not so much however because they concern military operations, but because they are taken to apply much more widely, To life in general' (p.17). But why should military activity obtain some special WAR AND PEACE IV: TAO AND DEEP-GREEN Taoism and deep-green environmental theory, although closely aligned on very many issues, diverge over war. For Taoism, by contrast for instance with Buddhism, is not a pacific doctrine, but is committed to skilful defensive militarism. While it does not espouse a fortress mentality, Taoism certainly condones limited defensive military operations for specific purposes, a sort of guerilla warfare. By contrast, deep-green theory, while acknowledging the role of organised social defence, stands opposed to professional militarism, and thereby to military defence, and is committed to a principled pacifism. Conveniently a route through Taoism, philosophically fascinating in its own right, will lead us to problems of pacifism and towards deep-green theory. 7. o/ a Taofsf endive o/ War did not receive a favourable press in ancient Chinese philosophy. Generally aggression and war were to be avoided. Even Confucius imposed very demanding conditions: for example, 'when good men have instructed the people [in morals, agriculture, military tactics] for seven years, they may be allowed to bear arms/ Tf a ruler ... does not set himself right, even his commands will not be obeyed' (SB p.41, italics added). Mo Tzu went much further than Confucius, roundly condemning war - on utilitarian grounds, that war yields no net benefit at any level (SB p.227). What is more, he backed his heavy condemnation practically (unlike some conspicuous contemporary theoretical utilitarians); 'he did not hesitate to walk for ten days and ten nights in an effort to dissuade a ruler from making war' (SB p.212). But none, it is said, went as far, in a detailed and sophisticated criticism of war, as Lao Tzu; 'none has condemned war more strongly than Lao Tzu'. '[T]he opposition of Taoism to the use of force is well-known, and the most bitter attack on militarism if found in the Lao Tzz/ (Chan, p.154, p.17.) But, after that splendid build-up, the text is slightly disappointing. Lao Tzu does not assert outright that war is an abomination, or even roundly condemn it. His critique of war, militarism, and military technology, is subtle and oblique, and, on the surface, far distanced from pacifism. For he does not recommend an end to war - in that genuine Taoists, those who possess Tao, will never participate in them - but expects wars to continue as ewA. Worse, he even goes so far as to outline proper attitudes to war and conduct in war, and indeed to suggest military techniques and strategies, some of which look decidedly devious. Among the classical works of Taoism, we focus on the Lap Tztv because, by contrast with other works, a remarkable component of that book is devoted to war and militarism. The apparent deviousness of the tactics Lao Tzu allocates serves to highlight what has been seen as 'the most troublesome element' in his philosophy (Chan p.17) - not so much however because they concern military operations, but because they are taken to apply much 2 more widely, 'to life in general' (p.17). But why should military activity obtain some special dispensation? Why should what is tolerated more generally be exonerated there? But given that Taoism has here the virtue of consistency (i.e. uniformity on principles) and of universalizability, that simply leaves /nare explaining to be done. There are rwo puzzles here in Taoism rather than one. There is the paradox, and, varying and generalising on that, there are paradoxes. The special paradox is generated by the following incompatible elements: on the one side, 'the most bitter attack on militarism', the well-known opposition of Taoism to the use of force (p.17) and to the possession and use of smart military weapons and technology - implying that war is far from all right - and on the other, advocacy of certain (devious) military tactics, outlines of (deceitful) conduct in war, and so on - implying that war is all right after all. A straightforward generalisation of this paradox would look at other morally-sensitive parts of life, where some practice was strongly condemned yet engaged in (for many examples, see the dilemmas assembled in MD). But the variation of concern to Chan and the neo-Confucians concerns the conjunction of upright with devious practices in life, in particular in the life of the sage. For a Taoist sage is presumed to lead an upright straightforward life, yet appears to engage in devious and even deceitful practices incompatible with such a life-style. Call this the paradox. Evidently a good deal of explaining is required, as to how Taoism can take the positions it appears to presume, both on war and peace, and on life more generally. A desirable preliminary would seem to be a little investigation of what position A? taken, especially on war and militarism. One key pasage runs: Fine weapons are instruments of evil They are hated by creatures Therefore those who possess the Tao turn away from them. ... Weapons are instruments of evil, not the instruments of a good ruler. When he uses them unavoidably, he regards calm restraint as the best principle Even when he is victorious, he does not regard it as praiseworthy, For to praise victory is to delight in the slaughter of men. He who delights in the slaughter of men will not succeed in the empire. ... For a victory, let us observe the occasion with funeral-ceremonies (LT p.154). Wars, which involve the use of weapons, instruments of evil, are accordingly themselves evil. They are also evil because they involve the slaughter of men. But they are also sometimes unavoidable (also p. 152). Therefore such wars are unavoidable evils. Such discourse, obtained by almost immediate inference from the passage, is within the standard orbit of dilemma talk. But Taoism lacks, through deliberately eschewing deontic talk, the discourse which enables direct expression of such dilemmas, or even direct condemnation of wars or of clever weapons. Instead the points are made by what the possesser of Tao 3 does, how the good ruler conducts himself, or by a/M/ogy, of victory in war with death. Unavoidable evils are the very stuff of deontic dilemmas (though many theories, underpinned by shonky logic, lack the resources for representing this stuff properly). Where something is unavoidably evil, it is &<2<7, because evil, also doing it is excusable, because it is unavoidable. So, given such an argument (which has its weaknesses), an unavoidable evil is a genuinely dilemmatic object with inconsistent features. Certain wars have looked, since ancient times, like such dilemmatic objects. Revealingly, Chan tries to explain that "most troublesome element' in Taoism, the military-practice paradox, through the following exercise in lateral thinking: It can ... be argued that Lao Tzu uses warfare to illustrate his principles of taking no action and weakness because warfare is among the most dynamic and critical of human experiences, just as the Indian classic, the chooses fighting as the theme on which to discuss the terrible dilemma whether one should fulfil his duty, as in the case of a soldier, and kill, or should fail in his duty and refrain from killing (p.17). 'Just as'? The Indian classic prevents a classic moral dilemma, a dilemma represented in contemporary philosophy (following its rediscovery by Sartre), where there are incompatible duties: the duty to kill, because of one's role as a soldier, and the duty not to kill, because of one's human condition, and the supervenient dilemma of failing in and fulfilling one's duties. These dilemmas for an individual (male, as it then was) are replicated in dilemmas regarding war for group institutions: at bottom, the obligation to engage in war (for one set of compelling reasons) as contraposed with the obligation not to engage in war (for another, perhaps overlapping, set of reasons). A theory of moral dilemmas (as worked out for example in MD) is crucial for an adequate treatment of major issues in war and peace, especially (as will become evident) for a viable strong pacifism. But Taoism, eschewing deontic discourse, lacks the apparatus to state or develop moral dilemmas. Hence it is logically excluded from giving a full or adequate account of what is going on conceptually. One of the philosophically fascinating feature of Taoism is the fashion in which it manages to avoid deontic discourse, and to substitute for direct deontic discourse or improvise circumlocutions when deontic discourse would otherwise appear inevitable (cf. UT for examples). But there are costs. One is inability to display the mechanism of deontic dilemmas, or to show what reasons and argument lie behind Taoist prounouncements and conclusions (the shortage of Taoism on argument is another philosophically conspicious feature, also observed in UT). As conceptual apparatus for analysizing moral dilemmas is missing, most of the machinery involved has to be passed over. Only the outcomes, as Taoism sees them, are presented, as if from a black box. Taoism blacks out the story on deontic dilemmas that deep-green theory can tell, as the following diagram tries to show: 4 Digrams . r/zg q/^zzrzc 6Zz7gw/?z^ r/z^zr ^zrg "r&wZvg^". Z)gg/?-grggzz c/^rr; Arguments to dilemmii ' incompatible input/^^ prescriptions -* Processing of dilemma, situational procedures directive output C(?rrgjpgzz<7z7zg TzzcAr c/z^rr: Black directive Box output It is evident that Taoism can be gxfgn^M; information can be put into the Black BoR rendering it less opaque. That extension can be made so as to conform to deep-green theory, i.e. so that the extended Taoist chart, a neo-Daoist chart, looks like the deep-green one. That is indeed essentially how neo-Daoism get characterised, in terms of conformity of the extension to deep ecological theory (see UT). We are now placed to explain how to dissolve, or at least neutralize, the paradoxes deriving from repudiation of militarism, an awkwardly qualified repudiation in the case of Taoism. In a significant sense there is /i<9 resolving of genuine deontic dilemmas. The principles delineating the fix may incompatible, signalling the persisting suboptimality (or better, sublimenality) of the dilemmatic situation. Where there is a dilemma, involved parties should try to do well enough in the sublimenal circumstances (for a much fuller account, see MD). Thus where there is a war, itself a non-Taoist process, engaged or caught up Taoists will not abandon Taoism. Taoist methods will be applied, Taoist strategies pursued. So much for theoretical representation and (non-)resolution of life-practices and other dilemmas, details of which are readily elaborated in deep-green extensions of Taoism. A prior substantive issue is whether dilemmas always arg generated: not whether wars are evil (typically they are, an issue we shall come to), but whether wars are unavoidable. Analysis of wars does not bear that familiar claim out decisively. Many wars could have been avoided, through conciliation, negotiation, restraint, etc., and no worse results apparently obtained, through sanctions, exchange, trade, etc. Through a typology of wars (coming up) that conjecture can be given some substance. Consider, for instance, what would be walk-overs. Then there is little point in making a military response. So war can be avoided. Certainly an occupation, to be met in a different way, may still occur. And so on, perhaps, for various other types of war. But, more generally, try this:- Every war involves an aggressor, who makes an aggressive move. Such an aggressor could always avoid that move, taking a different (or a do-nothing) course of action. Therefore, every war can be avoided. No war is entirely unavoidable. Setting aside determinism (which renders a// actual wars along with all other events unavoidable), it could be argued that a war sometimes simply boils up, without an aggressor, an intensification of a conflagatory situation. There are grounds for scepticism regarding such examples; for such intensification can only occur if provocative military moves are made, for instance troops are stationed in provocative or risky positions. The presumption that certain wars are unavoidable typically derives from a one-sided perspective on war, a defender's perspective. A defender has no option, so it is routinely averred, but to respond to a determined aggressor. Even (/"that should be so sometimes, when there is no running away or going underground, it does not establish that such a war is unavoidable; for it neglects the role of the aggressor. By a smarter formulation, relevant features of unavoidability can be captured. Although wars may not be unavoidable, defensive action in wars that have been initiated may be unavoidable. At least such action may b^ unavoidable if unacceptably high costs (death, enslavement, etc.) are not to be avoided. Thereupon another highly relevant feature emerges: the linkage of avoidability to costs. For whether an action is unavoidable then depends upon what costs a party is prepared to incur before and when insisting on action: but this appears entirely unacceptable. How can what is "unavoidable" cease to be so when some further costs are absorbed? However with basics like survival, a certain liberty, and so on, we do reach such bounds. An important of unavoidability. We also reach scenarios, unavailable to Lao Tzu but kindly brought within range by modem technology, which may appear to justify aggressive strikes. State Z, while not an aggressor, is carrying out practices which will impose unacceptably high costs upon peoples of other states and implacably refuses to desist. It could, for example, be poisoning air or water flowing to other states. But ,to make the case vivid, let us suppose that state Z is constructing, for reasons Zeders End convincing (they are committed to a faith which depicts all humans as incorrigible sinners and unworthy of life), an effective doomsday machine. Would an (aggressive) preemptory strike designed to disable or destroy the machine be unavoidable?! In a sense, No; in another Yes. For different modalities can operate. Physically outsiders need to do nothing, but watch Zeders go about their zealous work. But deontically they are under heavy moral pressure, because of the costs of standing by idly: if the human race is worth anything very substantial, then they are obliged to act, action is deontically 1 Whether it would be justifiable, or just, are separate issues. But it is evident enought that such scenarios further damage the obsolescent idea of war. For, according to received doctrine, a just war is defensive. (How such a war can be fought at all is another matter; coherence requires relativization to 'just war /hr party d'.) 6 unavoidable. Here is a situation where a proposed reduction of deontic logic proves illuminating. Obligation is explicated through not implying, or necessitating, the sanction, i.e. excessive ethical costs such as extermination. Let us explain deontic unavoidability analogously: an action is so unavoidable if not undertaking it would result in excessive ethical costs. Then i/*it can be established that there is no other way than a military strike, an act of war, to ensure that the Zeders desist (and certainly we can envisage scenarios like that), then that is deontically unavoidable. It is also for those committed to, or inclined towards pacifism; and it is, for them at least, but paradoxically justifiable, as the negation is also justifiable, on pacific grounds. Scenarios like that sketched, that appear to render certain wars deontically unavoidable require but little or no elaboration to render them evil. Evil indeed is such a standard feature of standard wars that at least its great presence call for little supporting evidence. But it has taken to vast stretch of human history to reach this general point of recognition. The manifold evils of war Lao Tzu very early recognised and emphasized: Wherever armies are stationed, briars and thorns grow. Great wars are always followed by famines (p.152). And nowadays followed by great tides of refugees. This passage includes not only recognition of the widely-observed socio-environmental consequences of war, but, more striking, very early recognition of the severe environmental impact of military forces. That critique is not however developed in Taoism.2 Only recently has it been pushed substantially further. And only recently could a new, most significant twist occur, the merging of resource security, long a military objective, with environmental security. The appalling idea has recently been floated that the military, in need of new work and roles with the apparent warming of West-East relations and cooling of the Cold War, should exchange usual military idleness for meddling in environmental matters: regulation and policing of environmental resources, ensurance of environmental security of powerful states, and similar. This is a bit like reassigning those imprisoned for child abuse to managing kindergartens; for consider the impressive military record of environmental vandalism. What the military is alleged to offer is a structure appropriate and available for handling such matters. But, to the contrary, it is precisely the sort of hierarchical, authoritarian expensive structure that should be wound down and up as soon as the opportunity appears, as (briefly) now, rather than being retained and shockingly reoriented (as a state-serving "Greenwar"). 2 But a bridge to deep-green theory can be made through neo-Daoism, an updating of Taoism in confirm ity with deep ecology (which however is somewhat thin and threadbare on war; for what there is so far, see Naess p.160). On neo-Daoism, see UT. 7 2. On //ze Jtrergence o/ yrow T^o/yw. Having arrived, by better or worse arguments, at the conclusion that wars, though generally evil, may be sometimes unavoidable, it is evidently important to say something about how they - those of the theoretical residue - are to be conducted. By appropriate conduct the damage they do may be reduced; also the conduct should be appropriate to the funereal nature of wars (to exceed Taoist resources for stating this sort of point). It is at this stage that deep­ green theory begins to diverge from Taoism. In further explaining the Taoist and deep-green critiques of war, and diverting objections to them, <2 roMgA and preliminary %?<9/<9gy is important. It is also of passing interest in its own philosophical right. War, according to English Dictionaries, is a 'contest carried on by force of arms, typically between nations or states'. More exactly, war is a - in the generous technical sense of game-theory, with players, rules, goals, strategies, and so on carried on in significant part by military means, normally between states or substates. Call the contestants, (warring) para&y. They typically represent of course larger populations. The set­ up between parties resembles the arrangements of players in game theory. There are several analogical extensions of the term war to cover games where one of the parties is an object, construed as hostile (an enemy of the state), such as Crime, Drugs, Poverty or Nature. These we can set aside as ana/agma/ wars. Of course wars form only a part of military activities. Military interests and objectives have always stretched significantly further than war, to include surveillence and security, easily extended to resource security, environmental security and life­ style security, and beyond that to political stability and other political matters. Evidently military ambitions have far over-extended themselves in bagging such democratic concerns. An anarchist solution to the whole problem of war, which some have seen Taoism as reaching towards, is immediate: eliminate the source of war, yfafgy. Unfortunately it is not quite that simple (and that's not simple). For wars can also occur between nations, cultures, races or tribes (which are not such artifices as states, and not always so readily or desirably abolished), between inhabited regions, and between factions within states (thus civil wars) or, perhaps by extension, between factions within other social structures (thus, for instance, gang wars). But undoubtedly eliminating states and aspiring states would abolish most wars and virtually all the worst wars. While "nonviolent wars" are excluded by definition, by virtue of 'force of arms', token wars, limited wars, and so on, are not: for instance, wars fought by small armed teams representing competing sides (cf. medieval and science fiction war games). As wars are hemmed in by conventions and agreed rules, there is no reason in principle why they should not be reduced to two person contests, fought under strict rules like boxing or gladiatorial contests. But in modem times wars have never taken such sensible forms, but have been much larger affairs, making heavy (though fortunately restricted) use of latest technology. Let us distinguish such wars as wars. They have, directly or indirectly (for the 20 There is no inconsistency. JWS has confused universal with particular. As well he has wTongly contracted all situational decision making to consequentialist modes. There is a third part to the criticism, that the defence is too easy; the 'strategy will allow rot? violence to be (perpetrated and) justified to suit the tastes of any real pacifist" (p.153). This another part of the so-called trivialization, this time however ^VHrion rather than populatization, weakening the moral stand against violence. This third contention is premissed on a mistake: that one can 'justify on consequentialist grounds any number of violent acts, providing that such acts are lesser evils than other real alternatives facing social agents" (p.153). Moral pacifism offers no such licence; allowing such consequentialism to take over was never part of the position. The slide to such consequentialism is made on the strength of a similarly erroneous example. The potential victim of an aspiring rapist 'is supposed to flee or wriggle free if possible. But it is to consequentially justify the use of violence by the woman to prevent herself from being raped" (p.153 italics added). In the example so far described there is no dilemma, and no such easy resort to consequentially 'justified" violence. What allows too much violence is the lesser evil JWS assumes is easily consequentially justified; for example that the woman is entitled to inflict, and escalate, violence so long as it remains 'a lesser evil than the violence of attempted rape" (p.153). Since she may thereby inflict quite unreasonable damage (esp. if she is a Kung Fu expert), the result is inconsistent with 'the basic principle of self-defence" which JWS earlier adduced according to which what is 'appropriate, in response is 0/7/y that level of force necessary to defend oneself against the threat" (p.150). There is evidence in JWS's work of some enthusiasm for levels of violence which exceed his 'basic principle", his appeal to 'lesser evil" generates some instances. The 'basic principle", itself fraught with difficulties (cf. the contorted discussion of what weapons are appropriate in response to what attacks, p.150), still exceeds what stretched pacifism would enjoin; for instance, it may not be appropriate to respond with force. But in a technical sense stretched pacifism is compatible with the 'basic principle", since it only imposes the upper bound on level of force. As for easiness, moral pacifism is not an easy position to live by, or to justify. Removing objections to pacifism is one thing; solidifying a positive case for it is quite another, and so far hardly conclusive (as Al tried to explain, pp 29-31). Stretched pacifism was advanced, to put it more precisely, as a still viable option. It was not presented as a morally compulsory position, or, for that matter, as one that this defender adhered to or affirmed. To reiterate, while a cumulative case can be made for stetched pacifism as principled non­ violence, that case was not conclusive, and is hard to improve. For, further, some serious difficulties standing in the way of stretched pacifism were assembled, the most important of which derives from the extent of violence apparent in transactions within the natural world. Simply consider the practices of carnivores, essential to their natural way of life. In order to meet their life needs for sustenance, these creatures do, and are often obliged to, engage 8 technology may be bought or bartered), a heavy research and development support structure (indeed the bulk of contemporary science is devoted - misdirected - in one way or another to this effort). and wars. An offensive war is one which ventures off a given party's territory or recognised pad, "invading" that of another party or parties; correlatively defensive parties, if they have not also invaded. Force projection typifies offensive practice. Plainly, offensiveness and defensiveness are not Among wars, an important distinction is that between strictly features of a war, but of parties to a war. In a two-party war, while both parties can easily act offensively, the possibility of both parties proceeding defensively is excluded, unless they share territory. (Even then issues may arise as to which party, if any, was the aggr&yxor, which started it, was responsible for starting it, and so on.) Thus mutually defensive wars between contemporary states are impossible (but would be possible if states shared territory, e.g. if Eire and Britain shared the territory of Northern Ireland). Tao-accredited wars were defensive wars, never wars aiming at domination: last-resort wars, in which no pride was taken (LTp.l52).3 The pretence that offensive wars are defensive is widespread, and reflected in the subterfuge that departments or ministries of war are those of defence, security or whatever. (If they really were what they purport to be, we should be well on the way to an end to war.) Offensive practices are rendered defensive ones by shabby redefinitional strategems, such as redefining 'defensive' to include defence of ideals like democracy or liberty, infringed (or allegedly infringed) on territories abroad, or to include "defence" of a third party or place (whence every offensive war is "defensive"). In the present war in which part of Arabia is engulfed (February 1991), one party claims to be defending what really was (or should be) part of its territory, namely Kuwait, another party to be defending (what Kuwait did not enjoy) democracy. It is a doubly offensive war presented in this guise as jointly defensive. Aggressive wars are waged for a variety of reasons, but usually for resources or access to resources or markets, a matter often disguised by appeal to ideology (thus a war for oil is represented as a war of liberation). But there are other reasons than narrowly economic ones, such as religion (as with crusades), power and aggrandisement (as in building an empire), and so on. Nor are those reasons necessarily far separated; ideologies like Marxism and market 3 There is one line in LT that way suggest that attack was sometimes justifiable, namely 'For deep love helps one to win in the case of attack' (p.219). But how can cow/?a.y.yz'<9/i be appropriate unless this attack is wn/u'/i a defensive setting, a larger context of unavoidability or such like. A passage shortly below confirms this interpretation: I dare not take the offensive but I take the defensive: I dare not advance an inch but I retreat a foot (p.222). These are advances and attacks within a defensive setting. 23 followed with another invasion. Nor have we ever managed to glimpse much of what is now supposed, when we are no longer engaged, to come 'out of the horror of war': a 'new world order ... which governs the conflict of nations'; a 'rule of law', not war. How the one, enforcable law, is achieved, unless backed by the the other, is not explained (Medlin's paradox hits back). Similarly what we now hear from many militarists, as they rush to war, is that 'peace is a great good, war a great evil'. But, for the most part, only the rhetoric has shifted; practice has scarcely changed at all. REFERENCES W.-T. Chan, A referred to as ST. Paa/: on C7zzm?yg P/zz7a.ya/?/zy, Princeton University Press, 1963; W.-T. Chan (ed.), 77za Way a/Lao 7za(Taa-m C/zzrzg), Bobbs-Merrill, New York, 1963; referred to as LT. B. Martin, U/zraarz'/zg War, Freedom Press, London, 1984. A. Naess, Eca/agy, cam/Mmzz'zy a/zb /z/byzy/g, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge UK, 1989. R.A. Rapaport, Pzgy/ar z7z^ Anc^yrary : rima/ zn r/zg eca/agy a/* a University Press, New Haven, 1967. Gamoa P^a/z/e, Yale R. Routley, 'War and Peace II. On the alleged inconsistency, moral insensitivity and fanaticism of pacifism', Dz'yczzyyzan /za/z^ry zzz g/zvzrazzm^zzra/ jz/zz/aya/z/zy #9, Research School of Social Science, Australian National University, 1983 (also in Ezz/zzzzy ); referred to as AL R. Routley and V. Plumwood, 'Moral dilemmas and the logic of deontic notions', Dzycayyza/z ^a/z^ry z/z oma'ronmoma/ p/zz/aya/z/zy #6, Research School of Social Science, Australian National University, 1984 (also in Paracazzyz'y^mLagz'c); referred to as AID. R. Routley, 'War and Peace I. On the ethics of large-scale nuclear war and nuclear-deterrence and the political fall-out', Dz'yczzyyz'a/z pa/z^ry z/z e/zvzra/z/?z^/zfa/ /z/zz/aya/z/zy, #5, Research School Of Social Science, Australian National University, 1984. G. Sharp, Sacz'a/ Pavt^r am/ Pa/z'aca/ Priborn, Porter Sargent, Boston, 1980. J.W. Smith, 77zg War/?zy af zTzg H^arf a/T/zz'/zgy , Public Relations Unit, Flinders University, 1989. R. Sylvan, 'War and Peace III, Australia's defence philosophy', Sacz'a/ P/zz7aya/z/zy, for Nuclear Conference, University of Queensland, 1985. R. Sylvan and D. Bennett, 'Of Utopias, Tao and Deep Ecology', Dz'yczzyyza/z /za/z^ry z/z a/zvz'ra/z/?z^/zra/ /z/zz/aya/z/zy #19, Research School of Social Science, Australian National University, 1990; referred to as UT. 9 capitalism, for example, exhibit many of the features of religion. The economic reasons for war appear to have become much more complex with the advent of an integrated world economy. At the same time many of the independent reasons for economic wars are now obsolete. For to powerful states accrue the advantages of war without war. At least most of the former economic advantages of war can be obtained without expensive wars, through trade, institution of economic dependence, etc. Small medieval wars were sometimes instituted for the collection of neighbouring riches and booty, a kind of piracy meeting conditions of war. "Small" contemporary wars can be waged for a remarkable mix of political-economy ends: to establish a regime favourable to economic penetration and profit repatriation, to subjugate markets and to remove competition, to boost a sagging weapons economy by using up old stocks and also testing new equipment, to restart a depressed economy, and so on. Such wars, along with the economic aims which motivate them, are in effect heavily castigated by Lao Tzu: When Tao prevails in the world, galloping horses are turned back to fertilize (the fields ...}. When Tao does not prevail in the world, war horses thrive in the suburbs. There is no calamity greater than lavish desires. (LT p.181). But it does exceed evidential warrant to claim that Tao is not only sufficient, but for cessation of such practices. The practice of regularly stimulating complex military-saturated economies through war is reminiscent of older, much ridiculed practices in simpler societies. They now ridicule the Tsembaga, who proceeded to destroy much of their surplus product by going to war every 5-15 years (cf Rapaport). But they do not similarly ridicule the most powerful nation on the Earth, the USA, which proceeds to write off a colossal amount of surplus in war every 10-20 years (the Gulf war liquidated some $1.7 billion per day). Taoists would. For ridicule was a favoured method, an important rhetorical strategem, and war and its idiocy were favourite targets. Some classification of defensive wars is also important, for various reasons: reducing and abolishing wars, their costs and damage, restructuring societies away from war and military practices, and, not least, for appreciating Taoism. A main distinction is between * conventional defence, maintained by armies of armed soldiers, many of them professionals, and * social defence, where there are no such armies or but fragments of them, and defence is carried out through social networks of a significant part of society A 4 Details of social defence are presented in Sharp and in Martin. 10 It is here that Taoism and deep-green theory part company. Under Taoism, the state w;7/ have a standing army, but a defensive army operating by strange, surprise tactics (p.201). No doubt defensive wars are to remain last resort action. Nonetheless the state will operate in secrecy, in a way incompatible with decentralised defence; people will be kept in the dark about smart weapons of the state; and they too will be surprised, along with presumed enemies of the state. By contrast, under deep-green theory, there should be no hidden smart weapons of state; information would flow more freely and not be hidden from the people (who should retain influence in informed decision making). Under deep-green, standing armies, and more generally military organisation, will be wound down altogether. Taoism should have pushed its searching criticism further. For military objectives, easily acquired by standing armies with time on their hands, are frequently incompatible with Taoism. For example, Taoism is opposed to domination (LT p.152), whereas military operations frequently seek or involve domination; and military structure is invariably hierarchical and authoritarian. Taoism aims for self-regulation, wherever feasible (cf. p.201); so does deep­ green theory, which is one reasons why it aims to dispose of standing armies, as an important preliminary to the withering away of states themselves (military forces being major props of state control and power, and often maintained primarily for internal state security). Taoism has no project for ending the era of wars; deep-green theory does. That project involves an elimination of standing armies, too often poised for fighting or political interference. A recommended route to ^<7 war consists in progressive scaling down: reduction of the means and manpower. The initial stages are well-known, and include * elimination of nuclear, biological and chemical weaponry, and * force reduction. It can hardly be pretended that the Earth's states have managed to proceed very far on even this complex of stages. The next stage consists in * contraction to defensive capacities only, and the final stage consists in * elimination of remaining military defensive forces, and adoption, so far as required, of social defence practices. The complete route thus involves complete demilitarisation. Reasons why deep-green aims to proceed the /a// distance are readily grasped by considering the environmental shallowness of an otherwise cogent traditional case for the sharp curtailment of wars and militarism. The traditional Western case against wars has been primarily along two dimensions: social and moral. Wars are highly disruptive of the social fabric; wars may be unjust. From these joint features, it was argued that wars should be a matter of last resort, to be fought to ensure peace. It was argued further that only just wars should be fought. Just wars were rare objects. But as there was little evidence of the decline and fall of wars, much effort was expended, more practically and unsuccessfully, upon endeavouring to improve the calibre of wars, and more theoretically, upon trying to characterize war satisfactorily, or rather to bend the notion in an effort to approximate the gory unjust facts. 11 Progress was long hindered, furthermore, because there was always a rival positive perspective on wars, which encouraged the exaltation of wars and military feats. It also facilitated the transfer of the favourable image of war to other problem areas, whence the long and apparently successful war against Nature (but the short-term successes are turning into long-term problems), the short and unsuccessful war against Poverty, and so on. Behind all this is the complex idea of war as rejuvenating, even cleansing, like fire; of war as heroic, and glorious, of war as the supreme testing ground of men. These pictures of war - finally shattered by the first World War (where even the poets began to tell of horrors and atrocities) and subsequent technological wars - though no longer in ascendency, have by no means vanished. The notion of war as rejuvenating a flagging economy persists, along with the practice of keeping capitalism running smoothly by integrating substantial military components into the industrial engine. With the development of highly technological wars - the celebrated development of the dirty industrial age is substantially military - the traditional negative case has grown in strength. Wars have become much more damaging, with the potential for much more that is significantly worse, and the possibility of a just war has correspondingly contracted, virtually to zero The opposition to war has likewise grown, but more than correspondingly with the rise of women in social and political influence. Wars have almost always and everywhere been Men's affairs; likewise conquest. Deep-green theory accepts much of the traditional negative case, but would further strengthen it. For example, the stricture against unjust wars, as out and out immoral, can be strengthened, through the following syllogism: All wars should be fully just wars. Modem wars cannot be fully just wars. Therefore, there should be no modern wars. A fully just war is not merely a just war, but a war those just character can be reliably forecast in advance. A modern war is of course a war that deploys modern technology, at least that available this century. The evidential basis for the second premiss derives from much information that collateral damage, damage to innocent bystanders and involved citizens is always likely and cannot be excluded. Such wars are always liable to violate uncontroversial requirements for a just war, even if they are purely "conventional" wars, not throwing radiation or chemical or biological weapons around. From a contemporary viewpoint the traditional doctrine of a just war, really of a just war, is seriously out of date. The reasons for this reach wider than the new features introduced by modem technological wars and the character of modem civilization, with its giant cities littered with dangerous and vulnerable military targets. They have also to do with the chauvinism of the justice proposed, which is shallow human justice, not natural or environmental justice. There is no consideration of justice to other creatures or to the Earth (cf 12 Naess p.160). Two troubles are really intertwined here: conceptual difficulties with too narrow a notion of justice, and ideological difficulties with too narrow a vision of what is an object of value, of what counts. The deep-green case against war adds to the traditional case a further dimension, neglected until very recently: the environmental dimension. It has suddenly been seen that wars are typically environmental atrocities. Earlier, of course, "environments" were simply backgrounds, backdrops in paintings and plays, to the real drama. Contemporary technological wars tend to be not merely social tragedies but environmental ones as well. There is a doctrine of just war, but it is a human chauvinistic affair. There is no similarly developed doctrine of an gco/og/c^Z/y war, a deep ecological war. Unless any such war were literally different from modern wars, that is from contemporary technological wars, it would overstep permitted bounds. For such wars are characteristically ecological disasters. Hardened military people, desensitized by a rigorous unethical training, feel even less compunction about degrading or destroying environments or members of other species than they do of maiming or killing civilians through "collateral" activity. Matching the no-just-war syllogism is a no-sound-war syllogism: All wars should be environmentally sound wars. Modern wars cannot be environmentally sound. Therefore, there should be no modern wars. The argument for the second premiss has of course to be different. It looks to the information accumulating on what wars do to natural and built environments. The Vietnam and Gulf wars both inflicted immense damage on natural environments or what was left of them. The environmental effects of war are not confined to direct and collateral damage. There are indirect effects also. Thus, for instance, war also supplied the mechanism of, and the technology for, modern environmental destruction: explosives, bulldozers from tanks, etc. As well, training for war and engagement in war have much fostered, along with attitudes that make for social callousness or ruthlessness, those that contribute to environmental insensitivity and cruelty. 3. PMzzZes sfrafegy and /Zs o/ fec/tno/ogy an;? woZence Tt is surprising how much of the E<2<? TzM is devoted to military strategy". Which strategies? Surprise, above all. But why such strategies? 'Do they not contradict the Taoists" strong opposition to the use of force" (Chan p.222), the implied commitment to quietism? Briefly, Taoism is not committed to quietism, and while certainly antagonistic to violence, does not oppose certain uses of force (only really ///-forcing, as will be explained). Even so, the emphasis on military strategy remains puzzling. * The strategies, many of them relevant to social defence, include not 'making light of the enemy" (p.222) 13 * and nonvisibility (p.201). The defensive strategy involves guerilla tactics: marching without formation, holding weapons without seeming to have them, confronting enemies without seeming to meet them (p.222). But even in times of peace, 'smart weapons of the state should not be displayed to the people" (p.164). Such recommendations helped to fpeT the charge of deviousness lodged against Lao Tzu. But look at part of the reason for concealing smart weapons: 'The more smart weapons the people have, the more troubled the state will be" (p.201). Smart weapons are carried in corrupt states, where the rich engage in conspicuous consumption and the people are suppressed, not where Tao is practiced (LT p. 194). * advance from flexibility but firmness. Weakness is the principle of life and will overcome strength (LT p.164, p.233). * coolness and (LT p.233, p.164). Like these, most of the general strategies are standard Taoist practices simply applied to military conduct. For these standard practices the charge of deviousness looks feeble. / The response applies more generally to other allegedly devious political strategies. For the strategies are but application of Taoist principles and techniques to warfare, politics and elsewhere. Nothing excludes application of these techniques to what are accounted, in general, unnecessary evils (which must sometimes, on other Taoist grounds, be countered). Nor, to meet the main criticism, need any deceit or deviousness be involved; nor is it. In particular, the legalist tactic, Tn order to grasp, it is necessary first to give" (LT p.164), is cited as involving 'an element of deceit" 'undeniably", and 'worse" it is 'morally questionable" (Chan p.17). But in order for me to grasp your hand in a normal handshake, it is necessary first for me to give my hand. There is no deceit here, nothing morally questionable. All the tactics permit of benign construals, of a Taoist kind. Consider, for instance, Tn order to contract, it is necessary first to expand" (LT p.164). In order to bend a copper pipe to the intended angle, it is better to bend it first a little further than required. The transformation of water to ice (both favoured natural items for symbolic purposes: natural processes which may look devious!) neatly illustrates the Taoist principle (which is however hardly necessary), and shows softness and weakness turned hardness and strength. The Taoist critique of militarism is as much a critique of technology as of war. Sharp weapons, 'smart weapons' as we might now say, come in for much critical attention, as we have already noticed. Only in corrupt and degenerate states are they displayed or flaunted (p.194, p.164); in deep-green regions smart weapons of state" would not be retained unexhibited. The people will not have them for they mean trouble (p.201); for similar reasons deep-green regions will be free of them. So, it seems, will ideal Taoist regions: 'Even if there are arrows and weapons, none will display them" (LT p.238). Much technology, military and other, is excluded under the Taoist edict against violence (a further facet of the military-practices paradox).5 The powerful critique of militarism in the CA&ig is coupled with strong opposition to violence. Some of the linkage is evident enough. Militarism as practised represents an ultimate form of state (or party) violence. A basic theme is that violent practices will come to an unnatural end, and accordingly to a non-Taoist end (generalising LT p.176). While force may occur in spectacular, but satisfactory, natural forms, force is duly distinguished from violence. To force the growth of life means ill omen. For the mind to employ the vital force without restraint means violence (LT p. 197). One who follows Tao does not apply dominating force, which usually has had results bringing requital (p.152). Dominating force, like power, is in general castigated, under doctrine of wuno forced actions, no violence. To force natural growth is deviant, destroying harmony. To stop natural growth is deviant. But there is a significant difference between force and violence. To intentionally employ destructive force is to do violence. To so force things is condemned. To remain in harmony with things one does not so force things or practice violence. There is a non-interference principle at work, which also indicates types of non­ interference that are excluded. However Taoism does not always get the distinction between force and violence quite 5 Under contemporary technology and technological arrangements, such as the storage of quantities of oil and nuclear and chemical materials in great cities, wars have assumed new and very destructive dimensions, to the point of being utterly irresponsible. A different approach to technology, as to war, is now mandatory. These are no longer things that can in principle be nicely confined and need not touch parties outside the fray. An important part of ending wars, "winning the war against wars", is removing the technology of war, above all from irresponsible state power. As for which technology to try to jettison and which to try to retain or improve, it is not so difficult to indicate, provided evaluative terminology is not outlawed. What is wanted is technology that is good in its place, what should be excluded is technology that is indifferent or bad or potentially so. Technology to be justified has to do something worthwhile, it has to address identifiable respectable needs. That is why merely indifferent technology is out; there is no virtue in technology for technology's sake, as it is a mere technique. It is because of the crucial evaluative component in choice of technology that itself evaluative, comes closer to encapsulating the criterion than other recent efforts. Size, such as smallness, or intermediateness, are not what matter, though modest and not excessive technologies are likely to fare better in satisfying appropriateness. In simpler societies, small technology is of course more appropriate; for that is what is good there. From known criteria for what is good these other features for locally appropriate technology can be read off: reliability, esp. in maintenance, functioning well and safely under the expected range of operating conditions (which may be difficult), ease of repair, capital cheapness and repair inexpensiveness, environmental benignness, and meeting sound social needs. 15 right. 'Vital force without restraint', intentionally excessive force, is only part of what counts as vzo/^zzc^, which is more generally w/zz'c/z i.e. transgresses, descrecrates, profanes, injures, outrages, etc. It is thus a negatively connoted force, an evil force in some specified intentional respect. There is a tendency for Taoist commentators, not Taoists, to regard Taoism as condemning all uses, or even occurrences, of force, but this is not so. Rather intentional ill-forcing is what is castigated, what is deviant. Thus Taoism does not exclude a range of defensive practices, which make satisfactory use of natural forces, like letting the machines of war industry stop. Those who would abolish war and its machinery, substituting for it nonwarlike and ideally nonviolent methods, technology, and strategies, have been confronted not merely with much sub-rational abuse but with plenty of criticism and even some paradoxes. Here is a recent paradox concerning war and nonviolence: * War must be abolished. One reason is simply economic. We can no longer afford it, and the opportunity costs are enormous. Along with other extraordinarily wasteful activities, it is an anachronism. * Doing so cannot be accomplished without violence, i.e. in effect, given the types of violence involved, without what amounts to war. According to a fuller version of this premiss, the process of abolishing a war would only be achieved through a revolution so profound that it could not succeed without extensive and extreme violence, amounting to (civil) war. ° But then war cannot be abolished without war. Therefore, war which must be abolished cannot be abolished.^ This "paradox" has been compared with the Liar paradox, but the parallel does not persist far. For this paradox does not involve self-referential features, and is easily broken, as follows. Let the "last war" be not the last standard war but the revolution abolishing war. Then, given that the revolution is successful, war will be abolished therewith, i.e. with that last war. There need be no regress, given again a successful outcome. All the premisses stand intact, but the conclusion, following the 'therefore' is a nonsequitur. However, while the dissolution of the argument is accordingly logically fine, the route is repugnant. Standard pacifism challenges the 6 Brian Medlin, who forcefully propounded this puzzle, set other analogous puzzles alongside it - designed to reveal deep difficulties in contemporary political, and especially alternative, thought. Another puzzle, concerning liberty and repression in the context of capitalism, revolved around the following inconsistent triad: * capitalism must be removed, but liberty retained. * capitalism cannot be removed without repression. * repression is antithetical to liberty. The puzzle is resolved as with the analogous puzzle of abolishing. Let the "last capitalist" action the days of liberty be the repressive but liberating revolution overthrowing capitalism. second premiss. 4. anJ nioraZ jz^cf/zy/T!. Although Taoism is strongly opposed to war, and much in favour of peace - and accordingly by prevailing standards a substantially pacz/zc position - it is not (nowhere in the central texts) committed to pacifism in usual senses, for two different reasons:* It is not, by contrast with pacifism, opposed to all types of warfare, for example smart defensive wars. * It eschews deontology in terms of which moral pacifism is commonly stated, for instance through the watershed thesis P2. It is morally wrong to use violence. By contrast with Taoism, deep environmentalism does not avoid deontic claims, and is committed zVz /?rzzzcz/?/g to nonviolent technologies and ways and to pacifistic principles. Moreover, certain forms of deep environmentalism are completely committed to pacifism, notably European forms. Is deep green? There is heavy contemporary opposition to pacifism, as there also was to Taoism in the warring times when Taoism was first being promulgated. Many of the central institutions of contemporary life are intricated in coercion, violence and war. The most prominent contemporary institutions, states, are premissed on these elements of damaging force; they claim entitlement to use them widely, and even claim a certain territorial monopoly on their use. As a result they are having constantly to engage in them in attempt to maintain that monopoly. They are certainly the main perpetrators of wars, and of violence. They are indeed inured to wars, are in constant preparation for wars, yet propound dialectial (and normally dishonest and cynical) doctrines of peace through war (for a recent example see the appendix). Unremarkably then, the extensive propagandistic machinery of state has invested heavily in "justificatory" exercises in favour of controlled use, z^ own use, of destructive force, and continues to inveigh against pacifism. Because a routine trick in this sophistical repetoire consists in conflating pacifism with extreme, naive and inplausible, forms, an inevitable and important early task commits in unscrambling senses of 'pacifism'. Semantical skulduggery can be thwarted in this way. /^cz/zym, as explained by English dictionaries, invariably concerns wars and warfare, and contains two components, negative and, elaborating on that, positive:- The negative component opposition (in ways to be further specified) to all forms of warfare (see OED). The positive component supplies alternative ways of settling disputes (what is, in Amauld's word, it is supposed that wars with some semblance of justification involve), such as negotiation, arbitration, ... - and, adding to too narrow dictionary accounts - sanctions, substitutions (e.g. of sporting events, operatic contests, cooperative ventures), .... In brief ^a/z^ar^ /zacz/Aw is opposition to all warfare and resolution of potential wars by other nonmilitary means. 17 to warfare, like the sanctions and so on, cannot itself be military (using soldiers and other devices of war), on pain of some incoherence. But otherwise the ways of opposition can be many and various! they can certainly be as with nonviolent demonstrations, resistance movements, and so forth, and they may also be devious (e.g. turning the forces of war upon themselves so they are neutralised). It quickly becomes evident, then, that some of the dictionaries offer but loaded definitions which, by restricting the negative Plainly the components, reduce the initial appeal and plausibility of pacifism. Consider the Eng/fy/? definition of the negative component: 'the doctrine of non-resistance to hostilities and of total non-co-operation with any form of warfare'. Thereby excluded are forms of pacifism which offer active and plausible alternatives to warfare such as social defence. The Eng/7y/z tends to force pacifism into what the Eng/fy/i Efcfforza/y lists as its final item: 'often, with depreciatory implication, the advocacy of peace at any price', 'in any circumstance'. Pacifism can easily resist being forced into these sorts of circumstances: it has many resources, as an extensive series of texts on alternatives to war, such as negotiation, non­ violent action and social defence, from Taoism to contemporary environmentalism attest. Academic philosophers have much advanced the semantical strategy of some dictionaries, of rendering pacifism more difficult from the very outset by narrow and biassed definitions. They have stretched the term from its restricted setting of warfare, confined to state and organised gang violence, to cover all forms of violence, from state and interstate to, what is very different, personal and interpersonal violence. Call the resulting considerably stretched notion of pacifism, according to which it is morally wrong to use violence, according to which P2 holds, p<2c(/Ts7??.7 While stretched pacifism certainly includes standard pacifism (unless the notions of war and warfare are tampered with), the converse is very far from being the case. A pacifist is in no way committed to stretched pacifism, which is a much more problematic and difficult position than standard pacifism. There are several, substantially different reasons for this, which will be picked up seriatim. Stretched pacifism, also misleadingly called wora/ pacifism, has looked a very easy critical target to moral philosophers. Many the effusive philosopher who, upon sighting such a target, has charged, whooping such rhetoric as "incoherent", "inconsistent", "insensitive", "fanatical". However, with improved logical technology now available for accommodating and treating moral dilemmas, it is no great feat to resist such attacks, in the fashion of previous investigations (see esp. Al, also MD). A main aim was to demonstrate that stretched pacifism was not so stupid as it was made out to be or appeared to be to these inured to present dominant violent ways. So far from being stupid, it is viable. In future gentler times stretched pacifism 7 In Al this notion was contrasted with standard pacifism as might have been better. pacifism: 18 could even be realised for whole communities of creatures (as some genuinely Christian sects envisaged); whence it will finally be seen to be feasible not merely for sages and supermen, and many ordinary women, but much more extensively. The method of philosophical accommodation was through moral dilemmas. The sort of moral dilemma that stretched pacifism can induce derives as follows. On the one side stands the theme P2, Wv, in convenient symbols, for Wrong V-ing, violencing. Now this implies to WB, where B presents a case of of violence. On the other side, particular circumstances develop which lead to W -B, because -B would produce in the circumstances considerable wrong, for instance extensive violence, mass murder, etc. One stock example from the literature concerns calling off the firing squad about to shoot several captives the pacifist shoots one of them (it is elaborated in Al p.13). Interestingly, another stock example from the literature concerns standard pacifism (it can also be presented in terms of patriotism; for details of both see MD p.10). Resolution of intractable moral dilemmas is, where it is required, situational. The agent decides in the situation, wifAi/r the fix, what to do. There are many ways in which such decision making can proceed, less rational, such as those applying chance or involving bad faith, or more rational, such as those applying consequentialist decision theory (for details see MD, pp.32-9). A decision theory taking account of <2// that should be included will not however be purely consequential. It would also take account of relevant motivation. This defence and rehabilitation of moral pacifism has been challenged, in particular by Smith (hereafter JWS). JWS claims the defence offered is a 'failure because it trivializes pacifism' (p. 153 twice). The rehabilitation trivializes pacifism because it entails that pacifism doesn't substantially differ from a form of acfzvz.S7?z which holds that while violence is a/wayy wrong one is justified on consequentialist grounds for preferring violent acts, if these acts are lesser evils than any other real alternatives. This is the commonsense position which most people hold - yet -- pacifism after all was supposed to be radical moral doctrine - (p.153 rearranged).^ of the criticism is, then, not so much that pacifism is trivialized - JWS "activism'' is hardly trivial - as that pacifism is /?r?/?zz/d:rz\y^(/, deflated from a radical position to the commonsense position most people hold (p.154 also). Yet not a shred of evidence is adduced that JWS activism is such a populist position. Available evidence, for example from peace movements and oppositional opinion polls, suggests the very opposite: that, for instance, most people support state-justified conventional wars with the military violence they incur, and 8 JWS now informs me that he has changed his position. Whether the move effects his criticism, I don't know. 19 accordingly do not hold that violence is always wrong. From such a commonsense angle, pacifism with its condemnation of conventional wars and the violence they involve remains a radical doctrine. As regards wars and other violence-incurring social authorities, contemporary pacificism is, as previous explained (e.g. Al p.3), a form of activism. Pacifism does not imply utter pacifity, but may actively involve social defence, resistance and so on. However a certain level of misrepresentation enters into the JWS challenge in the details of what forms of activism pacifism may include. That misrepresentation begins in the second clause concerning what is said to be sometimes justified. For the situational procedure where dilemmas arise will not generally be consequential applying a principle of lesser evil. In dilemmatic situations such principles are suspended, and such a principle is in any case unacceptable to moral pacifists. A small amount of violence may be less bad in its consequences than verbal offence, but a principled pacifist will choose the slightly greater evil where other obligations do not exclude it. A more serious distortion occurs in JWS's effort to force procedures in dilemma situations into purely consequentialist form. In fact consequential decision theory was deployed as a only for how to proceed rationally in a situational setting where deontic procedures were suspended (see MD p.38). What was said, still misleadingly retrospective vision reveals, was this: "what is done is a very consequentialist thing' (Al p.13), nor 'one acts in a consequentialist fashion to do the sufficiently good thing in the circumstances' (JWS p.152). Situationally or/zgr procedures than those resembling orthodox rational decision making (modified from maximizing to satisizing objectives) may be adopted (MD p.38). Further the orthodox consequentialist theory is inadequate because it leaves out, or tries to reduce to consequences, nonconsequential elements, notably motives. It is not difficult, in principle (in advance of attempted consequentialization of modves), to design situations where modves, such as integrity or maintaining faith, enter to yield outcomes upsetting consequential calculations. More elaborate decision making procedures than those of consequentialism, sometimes at variance with consequentialism, are thus presupposed. A further part of JWS's criticism accordingly goes by the board, the alleged appeal 'to "second best" consequentialist considerations,... already explicitly condemned' (p.154). What was condemned was stock universal consequentialism, 'that <?n/y consequentialist considerations carry argumentative weight' (quoted on p.152), so undercutting other deontic principles, such as those of pacifism. It was not claimed, what is utterly different, that consequentialist considerations can enter into deliberation and decision making. The conclusion JWS arrives at is therefore substantially astray. After criticising modern moral philosophy for its reliance upon consequentialist modes of thought, it is surprising, and inconsistent, to find ... [reliance] upon such modes of thought to escape logical difficulties raised by moral dilemmas facing ... pacifis[m] (p.152) 19 accordingly do not hold that violence is always wrong. From such a commonsense angle, pacifism with its condemnation of conventional wars and the violence they involve remains a radical doctrine. As regards wars and other violence-incurring social authorities, contemporary pacificism is, as previous explained (e.g. Al p.3), a form of activism. Pacifism does not imply utter pacifity, but may actively involve social defence, resistance and so on. However a certain level of misrepresentation enters into the JWS challenge in the details of what forms of activism pacifism may include. That misrepresentation begins in the second clause concerning what is said to be sometimes justified. For the situational procedure where dilemmas arise will not generally be consequential applying a principle of lesser evil. In dilemmatic situations such principles are suspended, and such a principle is in any case unacceptable to moral pacifists. A small amount of violence may be less bad in its consequences than verbal offence, but a principled pacifist will choose the slightly greater evil where other obligations do not exclude it. A more serious distortion occurs in JWS's effort to force procedures in dilemma situations into purely consequentialist form. In fact consequential decision theory wa3 deployed as a only for how to proceed rationally in a situational setting where deontic procedures were suspended (see MD p.38). What was said, still misleadingly retrospective vision reveals, was this: 'what is done is a very consequentialist thing' (Al p.13), /tor 'one acts in a consequentialist fashion to do the sufficiently good thing in the circumstances' (JWS p.152). Situationally ofAer procedures than those resembling orthodox rational decision making (modified from maximizing to satisizing objectives) may be adopted (MD p.38). Further the orthodox consequentialist theory is inadequate because it leaves out, or tries to reduce to consequences, nonconsequential elements, notably motives. It is not difficult, in principle (in advance of attempted consequentialization of motives), to design situations where motives, such as integrity or maintaining faith, enter to yield outcomes upsetting consequential calculations. More elaborate decision making procedures than those of consequentialism, sometimes at variance with consequentialism, are thus presupposed. A further part of JWS's criticism accordingly goes by the board, the alleged appeal 'to "second best" consequentialist considerations,... already explicitly condemned' (p.154). What was condemned was stock universal consequentialism, 'that on/y consequentialist considerations carry argumentative weight' (quoted on p.152), so undercutting other deontic principles, such as those of pacifism. It was not claimed, what is utterly different, that consequentialist considerations can enter into deliberation and decision making. The conclusion JWS arrives at is therefore substantially astray. After criticising modern moral philosophy for its reliance upon consequentialist modes of thought, it is surprising, and inconsistent, to find ... [reliance] upon such modes of thought to escape logical difficulties raised by moral dilemmas facing ... pacifis[m] (p.152) 20 There is no inconsistency. JWS has confused universal with particular. As well he has wrongly contracted all situational decision making to consequentialist modes. There is a third part to the criticism, that the defence is too easy; the 'strategy will allow r<9<9 mMc/z violence to be (perpetrated and) justified to suit the tastes of any real pacifist' (p.153). This another part of the so-called trivialization, this time however <7;7Mh<9H rather than populatization, weakening the moral stand against violence. This third contention is premissed on a mistake: that one can 'justify on consequentialist grounds any number of violent acts, providing that such acts are lesser evils than other real alternatives facing social agents' (p.153). Moral pacifism offers no such licence; allowing such consequentialism to take over was never part of the position. The slide to such consequentialism is made on the strength of a similarly erroneous example. The potential victim of an aspiring rapist 'is supposed to flee or wriggle free if possible. But it is easy to consequentially justify the use of violence by the woman to prevent herself from being raped' (p.153 italics added). In the example so far described there is no dilemma, and no such easy resort to consequentially 'justified' violence. What allows too much violence is the lesser evil JWS assumes is easily consequentially justified; for example that the woman is entitled to inflict, and escalate, violence so long as it remains 'a lesser evil than the violence of attempted rape' (p.153). Since she may thereby inflict quite unreasonable damage (esp. if she is a Kung Fu expert), the result is inconsistent with 'the basic principle of self-defence' which JWS earlier adduced according to which what is 'appropriate, in response is on/y that level of force necessary to defend oneself against the threat' (p.150). There is evidence in JWS's work of some enthusiasm for levels of violence which exceed his 'basic principle', his appeal to 'lesser evil' generates some instances. The 'basic principle', itself fraught with difficulties (cf. the contorted discussion of what weapons are appropriate in response to what attacks, p.150), still exceeds what stretched pacifism would enjoin; for instance, it may not be appropriate to respond with force. But in a technical sense stretched pacifism is compatible with the 'basic principle', since it only imposes the upper bound on level of force. As for easiness, moral pacifism is not an easy position to live by, or to justify. Removing objections to pacifism is one thing; solidifying a positive case for it is quite another, and so far hardly conclusive (as Al tried to explain, pp 29-31). Stretched pacifism was advanced, to put it more precisely, as a still viable option. It was not presented as a morally compulsory position, or, for that matter, as one that this defender adhered to or affirmed. To reiterate, while a cumulative case can be made for stetched pacifism as principled non­ violence, that case was not conclusive, and is hard to improve. For, further, some serious difficulties standing in the way of stretched pacifism were assembled, the most important of which derives from the extent of violence apparent in transactions within the natural world. Simply consider the practices of carnivores, essential to their natural way of life. In order to meet their life needs for sustenance, these creatures do, and are often obliged to, engage 21 routinely in violent activity. While it can no doubt be argued, as some vegetarians may do, that the natural order is an immoral order, and that remaining carnivores should be converted to vegetarianism as rapidly as proves possible (in the way domestic dogs are converted to dog biscuits), the difficulties with such proposals are immense. The task envisaged is gigantic, and beyond human capacities - even if it were desirable. For there are millions of species to be somehow converted to proper vegetarianism. Then there are millions of other species to be converted to proper and well regulated contraceptive practices, else their numbers will get out of hand (uncontrollably) with predation removed. Given humans lack of success in limiting their own excessive numbers, such regulation appears entirely remote. Aside however from the practical difficulties, is such a fully vegetarian order, with evolution further derailed, a desirable improvement on the natural order? Is it morally obligatory? It is certainly not obligatory, as alternative systems of morality in harmony with the prevailing natural order are feasible. Nor is it desirable, for (to appeal to such alternative value systems) the natural order is more or less in order as it is. Full vegetarianization would only reduce its value, vastly. More generally, a defensible ethical framework should not, it would be rightly contended, be right out of step with the natural order of other creatures, decently depicted. Decent depiction is important, for some features of the natural order, such as competition, combat and predation, so far from escaping attention, have been grossly exaggerated and exploited. Thus, for instance, the ludicrous picture of nature red in truth and claw, so beloved of descendents of orthodox Victorians and of orthodox economists. However, even under decent depiction, the "natural order" is often not benign. That appears to be enough to induce a supervenient moral dilemma for any stretched pacifism which is coupled to a deep ethic (e.g. which does not separate humans out from the natural order) and which eschews the desperate vegetarian route: The natural order is not an immoral order The natural order contains (regular) instances of violence. Therefore, instances of violence are not immoral in apparent defiance of P2 Moreover, there are too many instances of violence, too regularly occurring, for them all to be plausibly shunted into the moral dilemma category (and predatory carnivores face no dilemmas). Raptors that practice violence every week are not immoral (neither are they clearly moral; the category of morality only significantly extends so far). The main trouble lies however with P2 (which needs some finer adjustment, as was alrady indicated in Al). While P2 is alright in context, within a particular, perfectly viable, ethical framework, designed for the usual human round, the conventional setting for ethical theories, it stands in need of modification outside that setting. It is time to suggest the sort of modification envisaged. Evidently P2 was addressed to moral agents. Which agents? Not to carnivores that supply their own livelihood, nor really to morally degenerate humans, but to 22 peace-sensitive agents. With that semi-technical form, yet to be characterised, a suitably modified P2 results: MP2. It is morally wrong, for a peace-sensitive agent, to use violence.^ To recover what amounts, in the previous discussive context, to P2, it suffices to add the proposition that every human agent ought to be peace-sensitive. Much as that proposition has to recommend it, it appears too ethically advanced for many modem humans; it sets too high a moral standard to be taken as a serious guide to practice. It seems wise to settle presently for something less demanding, such as that every advanced moral agent ought to be peace sensitive. To put essentially the same proposition alternatively: (as modified) is While it is perhaps too late to hope for much moral progress in humans, it is pleasant to contemplate alternative futures where what is supererogatory became obligatory, and widely practiced. Richard Sylvan* I began drafting this essay at the time (January 17, midday Australian time) of the American attacks upon Iraq. The optly named Prime Minister Hawke of Australia had just made a statement to the nation-state, announcing (the) war. In this statement there was much talk of peace. There was even - in what was effectively a declaration of war - reiteration of the modem quest for 'a new world order of peace". Peace through war; so it rings out again and again, through the centuries. 'War must be for the sake of peace" (Aristotle p.220). More than two thousand years later, we have fought those wars to end all wars. But it is no use, Hawke solemely pronounced, just fa/Aing a&oMf and thinking about peace; we must work for peace,/tg Ar for it - through war. Impeccable logic? President Bush, supreme commander, convinced us with similar logic, speaking too with many tongues. Of how he 'preferred to think of peace, not war". But now 'only force will prevail", as 'all reasonable efforts to reach a peaceful solution are exhausted". 'What must be done" must be done, or will be anyway. With God on side with the US offensive (as well as on the other side), it will go well. As it was said to have, though it achieved comparatively little that other efforts may not have yielded more satisfactorily, and thought it may now have to 9 The generalization of P2, suggested in Al, to cover also the parallel situation of environmental vandalism, can be similarly modified. The anti-vandolence principle becomes MP2°. It is morally wrong, for a peace- and environmentally-sensitive agent, to use vandolence. Thank to David Bennett for joint contributions (from UT) and to JWS for opposition (in JWS) followed with another invasion. Nor have we ever hanaged (o glimpse much of what is now supposed, when we are no longer engaged, to come^ 'out of ihe horror of war': a new world order ... which governs the conflict of nations'; a; 'rule law', not war. How the one, enforcable law, is achieved, unless backed by the the bther, & not explained (Medlin's paradox hits back). Similarly what we now hear from many militarists, as they rush to war, is that 'peace is a great good, war a great evil'. But, for the'mosLpart, only the rhetoric has shifted; practice has scarcely changed at all. REFERENCES W.-T. Chan, A -Source Poo/: on Chines P/zi/osop/zy, Princeton University Press, 1963; referred to as ST. W.-T. Chan (ed.), 77ze Way a/* Tao Tza(Tao-re C/zing), Bobbs-Merrill, New York, 1963; referred to as LT. B. Martin, (/proofing War, Freedom Press, London, 1984. A. Naess, Eco/ogy, commtziry and /i/esfy/e, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge UK, 1989. R.A. Rapaport, Pigs/or r/ze Anchors : rita/ in r/ze eco/ogy o/*a New Guinea Pcop/e, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1967. R. Routley, 'War and Peace II. On the alleged inconsistency, moral insensitivity and fanaticism of pacifism', Di-srn.y.s'ion papers in environment/ p/zi/osop/zy #9, Research School of Social Science, Australian National University, 1983 (also in /notary ); referred to as Al. R. Routley and V. Plumwood, 'Moral dilemmas and the logic of deontic notions', Discussion papers in environment/ p/zi/osop/zy #6, Research School of Social Science, Australian National University, 1984 (also in Paraconsz'srenr Logic); referred to as MD. R. Routley, 'War and Peace I. On the ethics of large-scale nuclear war and nuclear-deterrence and the political fall-out', Discussion papers in environment/ p/zi/osop/zy, #5, Research School Of Social Science, Australian National University, 1984. G. Sharp, Socia/ Power and Po/irica/ Freedom, Porter Sargent, Boston, 1980. J W. Smith, 77ze Worms ar r/ze /Vearr o/T/zings , Public Relations Unit, Flinders University, 1989. R. Sylvan, 'War and Peace III, Australia's defence philosophy', -Socia/ P/zi/osop/zy, for Nuclear Conference, University of Queensland, 1985. R. Sylvan and D. Bennett, 'Of Utopias, Tao and Deep Ecology', Discussion papers in environment/ p/zi/osop/zy #19, Research School of Social Science, Australian National University, 1990; referred to as UT.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Box 21, Item 708: Draft of War and peace IV: Tao and deep-green Subject The topic of the resource Printout of draft, undated. First page is page 1 of later title of paper, On extirpating war: Tao and deep-green pacifism. Some pages printed on verso of duplicate printouts of same paper. Description An account of the resource One of eight papers digitised from item 708. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/browse?search=Richard+Sylvan&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bjoiner%5D=and&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=&amp;range=&amp;collection=&amp;type=&amp;user=&amp;tags=&amp;public=&amp;featured=&amp;exhibit=&amp;geolocation-mapped=&amp;geolocation-address=&amp;geolocation-latitude=&amp;geolocation-longitude=&amp;geolocation-radius=10&amp;submit_search=Search+for+items">Richard Sylvan</a> Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived <span class="MuiTypography-root-125 MuiTypography-body2-126">The University of Queensland's <a data-testid="rek-series" href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/records/search?page=1&amp;pageSize=20&amp;sortBy=score&amp;sortDirection=Desc&amp;searchQueryParams%5Brek_series%5D%5Bvalue%5D=Richard+Sylvan+Papers%2C+UQFL291&amp;searchMode=advanced">Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291</a></span>, Box 21, Item 708 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org">Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy</a> Contributor An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, <a href="https://najtaylor.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Dr. N.A.J. 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